Tactical interaction and integration : a study in warfare in the Hellenistic period from Philip II to the Battle of Pydna

Abstract

In many ways the Hellenistic period has been the poor relation as far as military studies have been'concerned. Even quite comprehensive works on ancient warfare deal with this period in a relatively cursory manner, scholars concentrating on hoplite warfare or Roman military systems to the detriment of the Hellenistic period. To make matters worse, a historiographical tradition exists which places the generals and armies of the period firmly in the shadow of Alexander the Great. Hellenistic warfare has therefore been seen as unimaginative and stereotypical, dominated by armies which used cumbersome and outmoded tactics, and which were led by generals outstanding only in their mediocrity. This thesis is an attempt to redress the balance. I have sought to form a detailed picture of the Hellenistic military machine from the ancient sources and to test modem theories about its operation. The format of the thesis reflects these objectives. As my research progressed it soon became apparent that Hellenistic armies were not the cumbersome devices portrayed in many modem works and that they were composed of a series of interlocking tactical systems that could be viewed on a series of levels, the highest being the army itself.