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"The ideas of Pierre de la Ramée with
particular reference to poetic theory
in the sixteenth century in France".

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Ph.D. thesis.

September 1970.

CONTENTS

Introduction	:		p. 1
Chapter One	:	The Life and Works of Ramus and his contact with the Pléiade	
		(Part One)	: Ramus' life and works 1
		(Part Two)	: Ramus and the Pléiade 17
		Synoptical Table	32
Chapter Two	:	The poetic theories of the Pléiade	34
Chapter Three	:	Art and Nature	55
Chapter Four	:	Imitation	88
Chapter Five	:	Clarity and Light	113
Chapter Six	:	Truth and Falsity	135
Chapter Seven	:	Invention	161
Chapter Eight	:	Style	182
Chapter Nine	:	Plain and Figurative Writing	207
Chapter Ten	:	Logic, Rhetoric and Poetry	238
Conclusion	:		259
Bibliography	:		266

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is twofold: firstly, to describe the views of Ramus on communication, and, in particular, on the qualities of different kinds of discourse, and, secondly, to compare these views with those of the theorists of the Pléiade. In the first chapter we shall see something of the life and works of Ramus (briefly, because this has been more than adequately treated by Walter Ong who bases himself on the contemporary biographies, especially that of Nancel)¹, and then the points of contact between Ramus and the various members of the Pléiade and some other associated writers and critics. The information we have on the subject of the relations between Ramus and the Pléiade is not extensive, but this fact is significant in itself, and corrects the commonly accepted view that Ramus was a close friend and follower of the Pléiade. The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of the main outlines of what has come to be known, above all since the appearance of Grahame Castor's book which bears this title, as Pléiade Poetics.² The subsequent chapters deal with the same questions of literary and artistic theory as did the theorists of the Pléiade. They set out Ramus' views in great detail, and then make a brief comparison between them and those of the Pléiade. The topics to be considered are: the relation of art to nature, imitation, clarity and obscurity, truth and falsity, invention and disposition, some general questions of style, and, especially, plain and figurative writing, and finally the relation between

1. Walter J. Ong, S.J., Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1958 (here referred to as RMDD).

2. Grahame Castor, Pléiade Poetics, Cambridge, 1964.

logic, rhetoric and poetry.

The literature on Ramus and Ramism is vast. A glance at Walter Ong's other major book on Ramus¹ will show, in the first place, the very great number of editions of books by Ramus himself published in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries:

"There are over 750 separately published editions (including some adaptations) of single or collected works by Ramus or his collaborator Omer Talon (Audomarus Talaeus, ca. 1510-1562) - close to 250 editions of the important Dialectic alone. Counting separately each of the works in these 750-odd volumes, some of which include more than one item, one gets a total of around 1100 separate printings of individual works. All but a few of these fall in the century roughly between 1550 and 1650".²

In the second place, Ong's list will show the extent of the controversies surrounding Ramus and Ramism, and the scope of Ramist influence throughout Europe.

Interest in Ramus continues to grow. Some more recent research has not always either acknowledged, or sometimes even been aware of, the vital and indispensable contribution which Ong's two books made. Clearly, the twelve years which have elapsed since he published these works have added something to our knowledge of the subject, but it is remarkable how little there has been found to criticize in his major contentions. Two broad objections may be, and have been, made: that the rhetorical tradition is more important in Ramus' theories, and in the period after Ramus' death, than Ong allows, and that his stress on the 'spatialization' of knowledge is excessive, but neither of these objections could be adequately substantiated

1. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1958 (here referred to as RTI).

2. Ong, RMDD, p.5.

without an equally detailed documentation. There are, of course, many additional facts which have come to light concerning editions and copies of books which Ong had not come across.¹ In general, however, his theses remain unassailed.

There are two books directly concerned with parts of the subject of this thesis which have appeared since 1958. The first of these is Grahame Castor's book which I have already mentioned. I intend to treat this book more fully in chapter two. It will become obvious that I am indebted to it (though on most of the major points I had already formed basically the same opinions before the book was published); it is an excellent account of the linguistic and psychological problems connected with the critical terms of poetic theory, and of the philosophical bases of that theory. I must, however, at this stage, make one important reservation about it. One chapter (Invention and Reason, pp.126-136) is devoted almost entirely to Ramus, yet Castor does not seem to have made any use of Ong whose name appears neither in the text nor the bibliography. Nor does Castor seem to have been aware of another earlier, but major, piece of work directly on his subject, Rosemond Tuve's Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago, 1947). The effect of both omissions is that Castor misses some of the broader aspects of the problem. The second book suffers from the same defect, but in a way which deserves much stronger criticism. I refer to the edition of the Dialectique prepared by Michel Dassonville.² He is aware of Ong but seems able only to

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1. I have communicated some of these to him, and he hopes to incorporate them in a supplement to the RTI. There are also some details of fact about Ramus' biography which need to be modified in the light of new evidence, but these are not relevant to the present study.
 2. Pierre de La Ramée, La Dialectique, edited by Michel Dassonville, Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance, Geneva, 1964.

refer to him slightly or disparagingly. For example, on p.16, he claims in a footnote "Walter J. Ong néglige d'analyser les phases de la révolte intellectuelle qui a mené Ramus à s'opposer à l'enseignement sorbonnique", and refers us to RMDD. There is some truth in Dassonville's statement, but it gives a completely distorted picture, since Ong's weighty contributions to the understanding of other phases of Ramus' activity are not mentioned. There are scattered references to Ong in the footnotes, but not a single one in the chapter called 'Les Démarches de la Dialectique ramiste'. This is impossible to account for. Furthermore, in a note on p.158, Dassonville has some very harsh things to say about Ong:

"Nous sommes persuadé. que Walter J. Ong, RMDD, notamment p.183 ss. s'est mépris en refusant de reconnaître la nouveauté et l'importance de la relation dans l'énonciation ramiste. En négligeant d'y voir une tentative logistiqu, W.J. Ong a commis une grave injustice et a faussé la perspective propre à la dialectique de Ramus".

While there is certainly room for discussion on the point at issue, the criticism is tendentious and itself unjust.¹

There have been many recent articles and short notes on Ramus and Ramism. I should like to draw attention to three of these. Frances Yates, in The Art of Memory (1966) has a chapter on Ramus which does acknowledge its debt to Ong, and shows how Ramus fits into the tradition of arts of memory; and R. Leake has published two articles, one in 1968, entitled 'The Relationship of two Ramist Rhetorics: Omer Talon's Rhetorica and Antoine Fouquelin's Rhetorique Française', an excellent article, clear, detailed and

1. I do not wish to lapse into the same kind of carping criticism as Dassonville does; for an assessment of the value of this, I am afraid, uncritical edition, I must refer the reader to my review of it in The Modern Language Review, 1967, pp.13C-3.

well-expounded and which promises well for the forthcoming edition of the Rhetorique which the author announces,¹ and one in 1970 called 'Antoine Fouquelin and the Pléiade'.² Besides these works there have been some recent reprints of books by Ramus.

I should like to thank many people for their help, especially my supervisor, Mrs. Doris Delacourcelle, for her kind encouragement. Father Ong, too, has always been generous with advice whenever I have written to him; any acknowledgement of debt to Ong, particularly in connection with the bibliographical part of his work, is bound to be an understatement. I should like to thank also James P. Thorne for letting me see the manuscript of his forthcoming book on medieval and Renaissance theories of language, grammar and logic, which contains chapters on Ramus, and Aristotelian poetics in the Renaissance.

1. Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1968, pp.85-108.

2. Ibid., 1970, pp.379-94.

CHAPTER ONE

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF RAMUS AND HIS CONTACT WITH THE PLEIADE

Part One - Ramus' life and works.

Petrus Ramus (otherwise called Pierre de la Ramée) was born in 1515 into an impoverished noble family, in the village of Cuts in Picardy, a few miles from Noyon where Calvin had been born six years earlier. At about the age of twelve he went from Cuts to Paris, having already twice tried to establish himself there as a student. The third time he managed to secure a place in the Collège de Navarre as the servant of a rich student, the Sieur de la Brosse. Among his companions were Charles de Bourbon and Charles de Lorraine, who were both later to become cardinals and his protectors. He had little time for the study of which he was passionately fond, and so applied himself with feverish diligence. Although presumably he had studied some grammar and rhetoric in Cuts, these would also form part of his syllabus at the university.

"This arts course consisted of grammar, rhetoric, and 'philosophy', the last being chiefly logic and 'physics', with a certain amount of ethics, a tiny dash of metaphysics, and variable incidental items such as rudimentary geometry or other mathematics, or occasionally music." ¹

Physics, it should be noted, embraced most aspects of natural science studied at that time, and included some metaphysics and psychology; the scope and treatment of these subjects were much the same as they had been for centuries.

1. Ong, RMDD, p.20. Most of the biographical details in this section come, through Ong, from the three contemporary biographies, of Johann Freige (1575), Théophile de Banos (1576), and, especially, Nicolas de Nancel (1599). I have used all these biographies, and also the many speeches and prefaces in which Ramus talks about himself, but it is not my present purpose to discuss these questions at length.

"Rhetoric and dialectic or logic (the terms were, in practice, synonymous) had not remained the same. The humanists were replacing the practical medieval rhetoric with a more elaborate art designed to teach perfect Latin expression as a literary and stylistic instrument."¹

The change in the teaching of rhetoric was, however, largely one of stress. The change in the teaching of dialectic was more far-reaching; the formal (almost mathematical) logic of the Middle Ages was giving place to the topical logic² of Rudolph Agricola (1444-1485) introduced into Paris by Johann Sturm in 1529.

After obtaining his M.A. degree in 1536 Ramus began immediately, as was the custom, to teach, first in the Collège du Mans in Paris, and then in the Collège de l'Ave Maria, where one of his colleagues was Omer Talon. While he was engaged in teaching he was also busy preparing for publication his first works on logic. In 1543 there appeared together two books; the first of these, Dialecticae Partitiones (The Structure of Dialectic)³ was brought out again later in the same year in a second slightly amplified edition, under the title Dialecticae Institutiones (Training in Dialectic); the other work was called Aristotelicae Animadversiones (Remarks on Aristotle). Both books were intended as an introduction to the reconstruction of philosophy, starting with traditional logic; as such, they were calculated to undermine the authority of Aristotle and his followers and, in effect, of the whole university teaching body. Since Ramus must have realised what would be the reaction of those responsible for the curriculum he was presumably not unduly disturbed when two of the university staff took up the challenge. Antonio Gouvea, a Portuguese

1. Ong, op.cit., p.21.

2. The 'places' (loci, τόποι) will be discussed in chapter eight.

3. For details of all Ramus' works see Ong, RTI; the English translations of the titles are mainly from Ong.

lawyer and teacher of logic, and brother of the principal of the Collège de Guyenne in Montaigne's time, brought out in the same year, 1543, a defence of Aristotle and of his supporters: Pro Aristotele responsio adversus P. Rami calumnias (A Reply on behalf of Aristotle against the calumnies of Ramus). He was supported by a Benedictine theologian, Joachim de Périon, who published a book called Pro Aristotele in Petrum Ramum orationes II (Two discourses on behalf of Aristotle against Ramus). Gouvea saw to it that Francis I heard about the dispute and a commission was appointed to look into and judge the matter. Since the attack had been directed at the very foundations of the university system the men chosen as adjudicators were drawn from all five faculties. Two were to be chosen by each party to the quarrel and a fifth, a neutral arbitrator, was to be chosen by the King. Ramus was to be represented by Jean Bomont, a physician, who had twice been rector of the university, and Jean Quentin, who was Dean of the Faculty of Law.¹ Gouvea and the Aristotelian party were supported by Pierre Danès, the first professor of Greek at the Collège Royal, and Francesco Vicomercato, who had been chosen in 1542 to occupy the newly-established Chair of Philosophy at the same college; (he had studied and later taught at Padua and Pavia, joining the study of philosophy to that of medicine, and since 1530 he had been physician to Francis I, while at the same time he taught philosophy in the various Paris colleges; his aim was to restore the body of Aristotelian thought to its true state by ridding it of the inaccuracies introduced by the hordes of commentators on the text). The fifth member of the panel was to be the theologian Jean de Salignac.²

After two days of discussion the judges could not reach agreement;

1. Cf. Charles Waddington, Ramus, Sa Vie, Ses Ecrits et Ses Opinions, Paris, 1855, p.34.

2. Waddington, op.cit., pp.47-48; cf. Henri Busson, Le Rationalisme dans la littérature française de la Renaissance, Paris, 1957, pp.193-4.

Ramus' representatives withdrew and he had to admit defeat. A royal decree of March 1, 1544, banned the sale or republication of the books in question and forbade Ramus to teach or write philosophy. The reason given for the twofold ban was the ignorance, stupidity and lack of integrity of the author; this is different from the reason given in the arrêt de justice obtained by Pierre Galland, rector of the university, when the books first appeared: that they were a danger to young minds, and were hostile to Aristotle and so against nature and truth.¹ The king gave the necessary sanction to the decree, it was registered by parliament without difficulty, and was received eagerly by the university.

Ramus next turned his attention to the teaching of mathematics and eloquence (that is, rhetoric, through the medium of classical authors). His first publication after the decree was a defence of mathematics, the earliest known science: Petri Rami Oratio de studiis mathematicis (Address on the study of mathematics). He followed this up with an edition of a Latin translation of Euclid's Elements, (1545).²

In this year he was invited by Nicolas Lesage, principal of the Collège de Presles, to become a member of his teaching staff; Ramus was soon joined there by Omer Talon, who was to be his friend and literary partner for the next seventeen years. On December 1, 1545, Ramus was installed as rector of the college in place of Lesage.

The association with Talon was to prove particularly fortunate. It was not just that the two writers shared more or less the same interests; they complemented one another, since Ramus' main preoccupation was with the

1. Charles Desmaze, P. Ramus, Sa vie, ses écrits, sa mort, Paris, 1864, p.45.
 2. Cf. my article, "La Ramée's Early Mathematical Teaching", in Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1966, pp. 605-614.

study of logic and Talon's with that of rhetoric. Talon's Institutiones Oratoriae (Training in Oratory, 1545) was intended as a close parallel to one of Ramus' banned books, and we have it on the authority of Nancel (Ramus' secretary and biographer) that the work on rhetoric published under Talon's name was perhaps largely written by Ramus. Furthermore, after Talon's death in 1562 Ramus undertook to revise a book called the Rhetorica which had grown out of the Institutiones Oratoriae. Finally, in 1546, Ramus evaded the ban on writing a philosophical work by publishing, under Talon's name, a third edition of his own treatise on dialectic: Dialectici commentarii tres auctore Audomaro Talaeo editi (Three commentaries on dialectic by Omer Talon). I mention at some length this close literary collaboration between Ramus and Talon because it is essential to an understanding of my exposition of Ramus' views. It is often impossible to say whether a particular work is either by Ramus or by Talon or by both. On occasion I think we must assume joint authorship. There is no doubt that Ramus was the principal author of almost all the works we are going to look at, though I venture to suggest, for stylistic reasons, that the Institutiones Oratoriae of 1545 owes more to Talon himself than Nancel allows.¹

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1. Cf. Ong, RTI, pp.82-85, where this question is discussed at length. It seems to me, however, after a close examination of Nancel's own words (Nancel, Petri Rami vita, 1599, pp.40-41), that Nancel is not quite so sure about the exact responsibility for authorship which each of the two writers had. Ong's view is that 'Nancel was convinced that "from its beginning", the work on rhetoric was more Ramus' than Talon's, Ramus having done most of the work with the material and "reduced it to an art", and Talon having only given it his own style...' (p.82). It is true that Nancel says this, but he also says, 'Hoc igitur Talaeo vita functo, cum Ramus artium instaurationem moliretur Rhetoricen illam eandem sub Talaei nomine diuulgatam, haud scio quo iure, sibi arrogauit, et interpolatam in vulgus edidit, quasi a se primum inuentam descriptamque, et a Talaeo commentarijs illustratam: sicuti primum de Dialectica factum constat: cuius verus author Ramus est, Talaeus commentator...' He goes on to say that because of Talon's stylistic improvements, 'ideo illi gloriam solidam inuentionis viuo concessisse, quam a mortuo velut vsuram repoposcit: vt cuius operis dictator atque dux extiterat, eiusdem nunc vere primarius author haberetur. Haec mea coniectura si vera non est, nescio quid queas excogitare: cum certum sciam, P. Ramo satis solidae laudis proprio Marte quaesitum, nec vnquam plagio alterius inuentam sibi arrogasse aut vendicasse'. It is clear from this that Nancel wants to prove that the work was largely written by Ramus, but realises the weakness of his own argument. (I have italicised the passages which show Nancel's uncertainty).

One question which exercised Ramus very much at this time was the relation of the different arts and sciences to one another. He is insistent that each art has a clearly defined scope, absolutely distinct from that of any other art, and yet the method to be used in the explanation of each art is identical. Furthermore, because of the unity of all thought, all the arts have a common ultimate purpose, the furtherance of human knowledge. It was on this subject that Ramus gave his first address of the new school year, on October 12, 1546; this was published three years later as Oratio de studiis philosophiae et eloquentiae coniungendis (Address on combining philosophy and eloquence). The union which he proposed was the classical one of philosophy and rhetoric, and since, at this time, traditional philosophy was more or less just logic and physics, and since Ramus had as yet shown little interest in the latter, it seems fairly clear that he was equating philosophy and logic. The 1546 address appears to be a summary justification of the attitudes adopted in the various editions of Ramus' dialectic and Talon's rhetoric.

Ramus proposed, from now on, to revert to the Greek and Roman practice of teaching 'philosophy' in the morning (this was to be Talon's task) and rhetoric in the afternoon; the afternoon classes were to be directly related to those given earlier in the day, since Ramus' procedure was to explain classical authors by showing the usage and application of the rules of logic.

After the death of Francis I (31st March, 1547) the ban on the composition and publication of books by Ramus was lifted by Henry II, under the influence of Diane de Poitiers, and Charles de Lorraine, Cardinal de Guise. Although Ramus was free now to write and teach philosophy, the concession did not make any real difference to him. He had in fact been teaching it already to some extent, and he had been able to publish, as we have seen, under

Talon's name. He was, however, now allowed to republish the two condemned books. The lifting of the ban would have made more difference had Ramus not been so interested at the time in another subject, rhetoric. No doubt his enforced teaching of the subject had awakened his interest in it. In 1546 he had produced an explanation of the Dream of Scipio from Cicero's Republic, and the following year (before he was granted his freedom) he brought out a commentary on Cicero's Orator. The year 1548 saw the fifth edition of Talon's work on rhetoric under the title of Rhetorica; this book had clearly been adapted so that it fitted in with Ramus' views. In the course of the next year Ramus completed his commentary on Quintilian's Institutiones Oratoriae, which he later combined with his commentary on Cicero's Orator to form the Scholae Rhetoricae (Lectures on Rhetoric)¹ and in which the main contention against both Cicero and Quintilian is that they are illogical. These works were followed by other commentaries on Cicero.

At this time, too, Ramus engaged in controversy with Pierre Galland on the subject of university reform; he was interested in the subject both from the practical angle (his own dissatisfaction with the way he had been taught had made him adopt in his teaching at the Collège de Presles a more humane and simpler attitude, free from the aridities of scholasticism and from the tyranny of authority revered for its own sake), and from the theoretical angle, because for him the arts and sciences should be taught in a certain order and in a certain way. The discourse Pro Philosophica Parisiensis Academiae disciplina (Plea for philosophy at the university of Paris, 1551) suggests that the arts-course could profitably be shortened. Ramus is anxious to show that his current practice at the Collège de Presles is free from heretical ideas. On the contrary, his quarrel with Aristotle is based on the

1. Ong, RTI, p. 147.

observation that this doctrine is opposed to the truth of the Gospel. Galland replied in Contra novam academiam Petri Rami oratio (Address against the new academy of Ramus). Rabelais, in the prologue to Book IV of Pantagruel, alludes to the quarrel, but does not take sides.¹

In the same year (1551) Ramus was appointed to a chair at the Collège Royal. This was an invitation to give public lectures but not technically within the university. His full title was Professor of Eloquence and Philosophy.² He retained the headship of the Collège de Presles, which led to an altercation with Jacques Charpentier,³ who contended that his method of conducting the classes at Presles was unacceptable (that is, that he taught discursively, and not progressing by a strict word-for-word analysis of a given text). At Charpentier's insistence the matter was eventually brought before a tribunal; because of his friendship with Cardinal de Lorraine Ramus was allowed to carry on teaching in his own way, but only at certain prescribed hours and on 'extraordinary' or feast days; since, however, there were about two hundred of these the restriction was not particularly harsh.⁴

In 1555 there appeared Ramus' first major mathematical work, Arithmeticae libri tres (Three books on Arithmetic). In the same year Ramus also published what many would see as his most important work, the Dialectique.

1. Ong, RTI, pp. 496-8; cf., also, p. 156; for the Rabelais episode see below p. 20.
2. After his death, the chair of Eloquence and Philosophy was discontinued and in its place a new chair of mathematics was set up, according to provisions made in Ramus' will. Ramus' interest in mathematics is the result partly of his teaching the subject when he was under the interdict, partly of his doctrine of the interrelation of all the branches of learning and of his desire to embrace all knowledge, and partly of his inclination towards clarity and methodical procedure.
3. Jacques Charpentier (1524-74), who engaged in controversy with Ramus on method and on the teaching of mathematics, was a teacher in the arts faculty, and later became a professor of mathematics at the Collège Royal.
4. Waddington, op.cit., pp. 73-8; for Ramus' defence of himself cf. his manifesto on his installation as Regius professor (Ong, RTI, p. 158).

Apart from being the first work in French on the subject of logic (and among the earliest works in French dealing with any of the parts of philosophy) it is also important as the only exposition of Ramus' leading ideas to come from his pen in French.

The Dialectique is important for two other reasons. Firstly, it represents a major step in the development of the presentation of Ramus' thought. From the vast number of editions, revisions, and adaptations of the original form of his works on logic, the Dialecticae partitiones of 1543, we can pick out a few main stages. The first edition discusses three parts of dialectic: nature, art and exercise. The second main stage is reached with the 1546 edition which Talon sponsored; this book is better arranged than any of the earlier ones and contains the first real treatment of method. The third stage is this Dialectique: 'exercise' has been discarded and the work has become an art or manual of dialectic made up of two parts, 'invention' and 'judgement' (disposition). In the following year the French version is re-adapted into Latin and expanded to include explanations by Talon: Dialecticae libri duo, Audomari Talaei praelectionibus illustrati (Two books on dialectic illustrated with notes by Omer Talon). There are numerous other editions which need not concern us here. It is, however, interesting to note that the work was soon translated into various languages: there were three different English translations before 1600, in several separate issues, the first The Logike of P. Ramus translated by Rolland M'Kilwein (1574), and others by Dudley Fenner and Abraham Fraunce; the first Dutch translation came out in Leyden in 1585 and the first German one in Erfurt two years later.

Secondly, the Dialectique is of importance, not merely because it marks a stage in the progress of the French language as a vehicle for serious

technical discussion, but also because the author had asked several well-known men of letters to provide translations of the excerpts from the classical poets which he was including to illustrate his new technique of dialectic. (In brief, Ramus' idea was that small boys would better understand logical processes if they were given examples of their usage taken from recognised masterpieces of literature, rather than if they were subjected to the meaningless scholastic mnemonics and jingle of barbaric terms). It is worth noting, however, that Jean Dorat, who had taught Du Bellay, Ronsard and Belleau at the Collège de Coqueret, did not approve of his pupils' support of his rival Ramus, and with his doctrine that French was a suitable medium for the expression of profound ideas.¹

In the same year (1555) the Rhetorica was brought out in French as a counter-part to the Dialectique; the translation was not by Talon but by Antoine Foclin (or Fouquelin) who was a pupil, then later a fellow-teacher, of Ramus at the Collège de Presles. The work is not an exact translation, but rather an adaptation, and Talon's examples from Latin authors have given place to French examples, mainly from Ronsard and Baif. The book was published by André Wechel who also brought out, in the course of the same year, Ramus' Dialectique and Arithmetica. A revised edition of Fouquelin's Rhetorique came out in 1557, but this was the last time it appeared in French.² Dudley Fenner and Abraham Fraunce both translated Talon's Ramist Rhetoric into English, as they

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1. Cf. Alexandre Eckhardt, Rémy Belleau, sa vie - sa 'Bergerie', Budapest, 1917, pp. 19-30.
 2. Cf. R. Leake, 'The Relationship of two Ramist Rhetorics: Omer Talon's Rhetorica and Antoine Fouquelin's Rhetorique Française' in Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1968, pp. 85-108. I should, however, like to add here details of an apparently unnoticed reprint of the text of Fouquelin's Rhetorique, (though without the supporting quotations): Christofle de Savigny, Tableaux accomplis de tous les arts libéraux, Paris, 1587.

had translated Ramus' Dialectic, and their versions went through several printings before the end of the century. It is sufficient to look at Father Ong's list of the dozens of Latin editions of the Ramist Dialectic and Rhetoric, and then compare it with the handful of translations into French to realise why it was that Ramus preferred to stick to the international language. The sort of person in France who would be likely to read his works would read them just as readily in Latin, and in many cases more readily, since the technical terms of the Latin and Greek theorists had not yet filtered through into French. The number of editions which came from presses outside France is an indication of the public Ramus aimed at. I have treated at some length this French version of the Ramist Rhetoric, since I intend to make use of Fouquelin in the course of this present study. I do not wish to suggest that we can read Fouquelin as though we were reading Ramus, in the way that we can often be sure that a work which purports to be by Talon is in fact by Ramus; but it must be borne in mind that within the circle of Ramus' acquaintances authorship is never easy to determine - there seems to be a kind of collective authorship - in much the same way as Ramus' own works become identified with their subject-matter and Ramus' logic becomes anonymously listed as logic. Furthermore, the Rhetorique does follow the Rhetorica fairly closely, and we have seen that the exact responsibility for the authorship of this is not easy to determine, and we must assume that at least Ramus was anxious to ensure that the Rhetorique appeared in a form which closely imitated the Dialectique.

The theme running through all the writings of Ramus at this time was the idea that everything should be studied and taught methodically - witness the small but important Quod sit unica doctrinae instituendae methodus (The one and only method for setting forth all subjects) which was published se-

parately in 1557, but which was from Book IX of one of the revisions of the Remarks on Aristotle (1556). It is method which is at the basis of Ramus' plans for university reform, a subject which attracted his attention at this time. In 1557 Ramus was appointed by the Faculty of Arts to a commission for university reform,¹ and he was also on the commission which appealed against some severe disciplinary measures taken by Henry II against some students who had fought with a group of religious about the right to make use of the Pré-aux-Clercs.² His Oratio de legatione (Address concerning the deputation) was issued twice in a Latin version in 1557, and four times in French (Harangue de Pierre de la Ramée, touchant ce qu'ont faict les deputez de l'Université de Paris envers le Roy), all from the press of André Wechel. The French version was apparently not by Ramus himself, but seems to have had his sanction.

An indication that his thoughts were turning more and more to the value of writing in French is that his next book was translated into French within the year it appeared. (It is to be noted, however, that the translation is not done by Ramus himself). This Liber de Moribus Veterum Gallorum (1559) was translated by his friend Michel de Castelnau as Traicté des facons et coustumes des anciens Galloys; in spite of the wide appeal the subject might have been expected to have in France,³ there were twice as many Latin editions as French. (The scholarly Liber de Caesaris militia came out from the house of Wechel in the same year, but in this case the translation, by Pierre Poisson (Traicté de l'art militaire ou usance de guerre de Jules César), was not printed until 1583.)⁴

1. Waddington, op.cit., p.117.

2. Ibid., p.112.

3. This book is the nearest we have to the lost book on ethics which Ramus is supposed to have written (cf. the preface by Johann Freige written in 1574).

4. Ong, RTI, p.308.

The period at the end of the 1550's and the beginning of the 1560's was a fruitful time for Ramus. It was then that he directed his energies to the study of grammar, and it is his works on grammar that most people seem to have heard of; this is strange in a way, since there was little of original or lasting value in his various grammars, though they are currently receiving some attention from students of linguistics interested in attitudes to language in the years immediately prior to the appearance of Descartes' works. The Latin Grammar came out in 1559 and went through numerous editions, including several in English. The following year saw his first Greek Grammar, which met with a similar success. Both works were supported by separate books explaining the rudiments of each grammar. The French Gramere (which made use of Louis Meigret's revised spelling) came out in 1562 and, after appearing in several French editions, was translated into Latin.

It was in 1562 that Ramus seems to have made the final break with Catholicism; he had earlier been suspected of Lutheranism and his attacks on Aristotle could have been construed as undermining the authority of the Church, but it was not until about 1562 that he ceased to practise as a Catholic. A Protestant influence is evident in a work which he wrote during this year on the subject of university reform: the Prooemium reformandae Parisiensis academiae (Notes on the Reform of the University of Paris),¹ published anonymously, and addressed to Charles IX and Catherine de Medici. André Wechel immediately published a translation: Advertissements sur la réformation de l'Université de Paris. The main points of the suggested reform are that the great number of teachers should be lessened and that poor students should not be at any disadvantage; scholasticism is contrasted with true classical humanism; Ramus stresses that it is essential to have recourse to the Hebrew version

1. Ong, RTI, p. 350.

of the Old Testament and the Greek version of the New; there must be a free and sincere explanation of the pure truth of religion.¹ During the Wars of Religion, when Calvinists were banished from the city of Paris, Ramus, taking advantage of a safe-conduct granted by the Queen Mother, escaped to Fontainebleau, where he remained until the Peace of Amboise, March 19, 1563; he then resumed his duties at the Collège de Presles and the Collège Royal. In the early autumn he made a speech setting out once more his theory of education and the interrelation of the arts: Oratio de professione liberalium artium (Address on the teaching of the liberal arts). In the early 1560's he devoted himself to commentaries on Aristotle's physics and metaphysics, applying to them his new-found logical principles. He continued also to develop his interest in mathematics. When Charpentier obtained the chair of mathematics in the Collège Royal (February, 1566) Ramus protested to the Privy Council on the grounds of Charpentier's ignorance of the subject. In the following year he wrote in French a Préface sur le Proème des Mathématiques, asking Catherine de Medici to provide a suitable building for the professors of the Collège Royal; the Prooemium itself was written in Latin and was a history and defence of mathematics. Ramus' principal argument against Charpentier was that he was combining the function of professor of philosophy and professor of mathematics, and then was forgetting about the latter in order to concentrate on the former.

After a second period away from Paris (a few months in 1567-8) Ramus seems to have decided that it would be advisable to profit from these enforced spells of absence which he saw might well occur again and take the opportunity of travelling abroad. From 1568 he travelled extensively in Switzer-

1. Waddington, op.cit., p. 148.

land and Germany, paying visits to many foreign academies.¹ The result of these travels, if not the intention, was the spread of his ideas throughout the Rhineland. He met Johann Sturm in Strasbourg, Henry Bullinger in Zürich, and Théodore de Bèze in Geneva. He went as far as Nuremburg to inspect mathematical and optical instruments.² His journey was a fruitful one by reason of the contact he had with other scholars, his opportunity to examine the running of other educational institutions, and the experience it afforded him of living in strictly Protestant countries. When he returned to Paris in 1570 he was debarred from the Collège Royal and from the Collège de Presles on account of his now open allegiance to the Protestant faith. On the 22nd October, 1570, he wrote to Cardinal de Lorraine that his only wish was to be able to devote the rest of his life to the study of Scripture; he asked the Cardinal to organize a new translation of the whole Bible; he asked, too, for a methodical table of religion which would contain all the principles and examples (note the similarity of technique to that of the other arts Ramus had dealt with) of doctrine and discipline.³ Ramus did attempt something of the sort in his posthumous Commentariorum de religione Christiana Libri quatuor (Francofurti, A. Wechelus, 1576), (Four books of commentaries on the Christian religion). This book is generally considered to be uninspired theology (just a mild and superficial form of Zwinglianism) but its interest for us is that it shows Ramus applying his views on method to his latest enthusiasm, theology.

He never regained his professorship, though the title and the salary were restored to him. He did not seem to find full favour with his new associates of the Reformed Religion. When he wrote to Bèze about the possibility

1. Waddington, op.cit., p. 188.

2. Ibid., pp. 197-215.

3. Ibid., p. 226.

of retiring to Geneva he was told that this would not be advisable since the Academy was short of money and was committed to teaching pure Aristotelianism. After the Synod of Nîmes in 1572, Bèze claimed that Ramus' democratic attitude on the subject of Church government was subversive.¹

In his last few months he was engaged on a project for uniting all the liberal arts and for producing a work which would embrace all knowledge, in Latin and French. He aimed to bring out further revised editions of his works on all the sciences; he published a new edition of the French Grammar, republished the Rhetorica, corrected the Latin version of the Dialectic, and prepared a new French edition of it. Ten days before his death he wrote to one of his former pupils, Johann Freige, sending him books on the first three liberal arts, and promising to send books on the other four at a later date. On August 26, 1572, Ramus was brutally murdered in mysterious circumstances on the third day of the massacre of St. Bartholomew.

These, then, are the salient facts about the life and works of Ramus. In the second part of this chapter I shall discuss his relations with some of his contemporaries, and after that, in the main body of the thesis, I shall discuss the ideas contained in the works I have described here.

1. Ibid., pp.229-30, 246.

Part Two - Ramus and the Pléiade.

I must stress at the outset what exactly my purpose is in this section and remind the reader of my overall purpose. My general aim is to discuss certain ideas of Ramus and then to contrast them briefly with views on the same or similar subjects which were held by poets and literary theorists of, or connected with, the Pléiade who were writing in the same place (Paris) at exactly the same time (1543-72). The basic justification for such a study is the undoubted, but not always appreciated, importance of Ramus in the history of ideas and his far-reaching influence on European literary theory and practice.¹ The brief comparison with the Pléiade is attempted because of the actual contact which took place between Ramus and the Pléiade, and because Ramus represents, in spite of his passion for reform, the scholastic tradition against which the poets reacted. Furthermore, Ramus is at the centre of all the academic debates of the years between 1540 and 1570, many of which concerned the very problems which were the subject of the literary manifestoes. A study of Ramus will greatly elucidate the broader philosophical background and the rhetorico-logical tradition out of which the arts of poetry grew.

It is for these reasons that I have already dealt with the life and works of Ramus so that he can be seen in his literary and historical context.

1. Cf. Tuve, *op.cit.* No study has as yet been done on the actual influence which Ramus may have had on French literature (as he certainly had on English literature); in his Ronsard, Poet of Nature, p.90, D.B. Wilson suggests 'with considerable hesitation' that round about 1555 Ronsard may have been influenced by Ramus in the matter of order or disposition. Because this was the moment at which the contact took place I feel, too, that there may be some influence, but so far I have not found any significant difference after 1555 which can be ascribed entirely or even principally to contact with Ramus.

The important years for the formation of his theories are 1543 to 1555; the parallel with the Pléiade is obvious, and I append a table at the end of this chapter to show synoptically and chronologically the relation between Ramus' own publications and those of the Pléiade.

I have said that there was contact between Ramus and the Pléiade. From what follows it will emerge that this contact was limited and that in any case our knowledge of the facts is not extensive. I include the present section, not because my thesis rests on the assumption that there was direct influence either way (it will become clear that I think the opposite to be the case), but for two other reasons: in the first place I wish to examine the commonly accepted opinion that there was close contact, and secondly to suggest some possible future lines of research.

In his edition of the Dialectique which I have already talked about in the introduction, Michel Dassonville does not deal at all with the question of the Pléiade's contribution to this book by Ramus (except for a few brief and unequal notes), because he had already published an article on the subject.¹ This article is a good factual analysis of the snippets from classical authors which the poets had translated at the request of Ramus, but some of Dassonville's conclusions can be no more than tentative, and it seems to me that he assumes far closer contact between Ramus and the Pléiade than the evidence warrants. When he claims 'A priori peu d'humanistes de ce temps étaient mieux faits pour s'entendre' (because Ronsard and the other poets were aiming at a renewal of poetry and Ramus at a renewal of teaching, and especially of logic), I feel that he is quite wrong. In the first place

1. "La collaboration de la Pléiade à la Dialectique de Pierre de la Ramée (1555)", in Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1963, pp.337-348.

we can think of several humanists who were far more likely to get on well with Ronsard, and who in fact enjoyed his friendship for years (Dorat, Muret, Turnèbe and Lambin, for example). Then there was little in common between the two aims Dassonville mentions, and I am convinced that the Pléiade found that even Ramus' modernised teaching programme retained all the vices of traditional scholasticism; and when he adds..

'Il n'est pas jusqu'au moyen qu'ils préconisaient qui ne les rapprochât: tout comme les gens de la Brigade et à la même époque, La Ramée décida d'employer la langue vulgaire, de la défendre et de l'illustrer par son enseignement et par ses écrits',

it is clear that he wants to make Ramus into an apostle of the vernacular when he was no such thing. In both the article, and the edition of the Dialectique he claims that after 1555, 'ses publications en français se multiplièrent'. This assertion is surely unjustified. Apart from the Dialectique itself there were the Gramere (three editions before 1572), Advertissements sur la réformation de l'Université de Paris, Préface sur le Proème des mathématiques, and the Remonstrance au Conseil Privé (three editions). But during these same years there were no fewer than thirty different Latin works in over sixty-five editions. Nine Latin editions of the Dialectica were published between 1555 and 1572. If Ramus was as enthusiastic about French as Dassonville suggests why did he not write in it? The simple answer is that his public felt more at home in Latin.

Dassonville goes on to give three hypotheses to explain how these translations of the Latin quotations were prepared and appeared in the edition. The first is that they were taken from already published translations: this is so in the case of a few quotations, for example, some by Marot: the second, that they were school-exercises; the third, that they were directly

commissioned by Ramus. He comments, 'La seconde et la troisième hypothèses... révèlent une collaboration plus intime, une confiance et une admiration réciproque, peut-être même une amitié que nous ignorions'. This presents too rosy a picture altogether as we shall see in a moment. The third hypothesis is the one which the author favours, and it does seem to be the most obvious and probable one. The names of the contributors will tell us something about the possible contact between Ramus and the poets. Ronsard is the principal contributor (thirty-five quotations in all, 168 lines). The others are Du Bellay (78 lines), Pasquier (57 lines), Peletier (47 lines), Belleau (42 lines) Denisot (37 lines), De Bruès (15 lines), Des Masures (3 lines); there are also 52 lines from Marot. It is almost impossible to know how this book was prepared, but I do not see that we can be certain that the collaboration was very close. What seems most likely is that it was Ronsard who organised the details of who should translate which passages.

In spite of this edition of 1555 I do not think that we can really conclude that Ramus and the Pléiade were given to mutual admiration. In my view the relationship was an uneasy one to say the least; it is by no means certain that the relations were either happy or prolonged. Ramus' biographer Nancel suggests that they were neither:

'He rarely associated with the poets, as if they did not have common interests. He did, however, from time to time, invite to dinner all those who were famous in Paris, with Ronsard at their head, like Apollo. But never afterwards. One of these people, the learned Du Bellay, mocked Ramus with a biting taunt, imitating the sarcastic insults of Rabelais'.¹

1. Nancel, *op.cit.*, p.65; cf.. Nollac, *Ronsard et l'Humanisme*, Paris, 1921 (1966), pp.167-9; the attack by Rabelais appears in the Prologue to *Pantagruel* Book IV, and that by Du Bellay in the *Pétromachie* (ed. Chamard, vol.V, pp.236-51).

It is not certain, of course, to what extent Du Bellay's criticisms were serious and lasting. It is possible that he may not even have been asked permission for the inclusion of his pieces in the Dialectique. There is nothing from him of a date later than 1552 (the date of the Pétromachie), but since he was absent from Paris from 1553 we can not be sure what his attitude was. Of the other contributors Ronsard is the most likely to have kept contact with Ramus (though temperamentally Ramus was much nearer to Du Bellay than to Ronsard), but he does not seem to have done so. Nohac quotes a manuscript account of 1559 in which Ramus' name is linked with those of Dorat, Du Bellay, Belleau, Peletier, Le Roy and Baïf, but he points out that Ronsard never mentions Ramus in his printed works.¹ Du Bellay also mentions him in 1559 and never again.²

Estienne Pasquier, who was one of Ramus' first pupils at the Collège de Presles, does seem to have kept in touch with him. His presence in the 1555 Dialectique is explained by the fact that he was closely linked with Ronsard in 1555. Ramus, just before his death, received a letter from Pasquier commenting on the 1572 edition of the Gramere. The tone of this letter is a little distant and cold, in spite of the fact that it is signed 'celuy, lequel, combien qu'il ne condescende à vostre opinion, si vous respecte il et honore pour le vouloir qu'il voit que vous portez aux bonnes lettres'.³

The contact with Peletier, too, can, at least in part, be explained by Peletier's relationship with Ronsard at the time. In many ways Peletier

1. Nohac, op.cit., p.168 and p.265.

2. Allusiones, 1569, p.13; quoted in Nohac, op.cit., p.168.

3. Cf. Estienne Pasquier, Choix de Lettres sur la Littérature, la Langue et la Traduction, ed. D. Thickett, Geneva, 1956, p.109.

shared more of Ramus' interests than did any of the others in the group (see especially his Arithmeticae practicae (1545), L'Arithmetique (1549), Dialogue de l'Orthographe et Prononciation françoise (1550), l'Algebre (1554), In Euclidis Elementa (1557) and De usu Geometriae (1572). Peletier, however, seems to have been absent from Paris so often that it seems unlikely that his actual contact with Ramus amounted to very much.¹

There is one strange omission from the list of poets who contributed to the Dialectique, that of Baïf. We do know that Ramus had been in touch with the father, Lazare de Baïf,² and that Antoine was to remain his friend throughout his life. It is odd that he should not appear in 1555, especially since the Amours de Francine were published in the same year as the Dialectique and also by Wechel. Apart from some unimportant reason for the omission of his name, it is possible that he does not appear precisely because at this moment relations between Baïf and Ronsard were rather strained. This would support my suggestion that it was Ronsard rather than Ramus who organised the work. We know that Baïf and Ramus were friends, from the letter of Pasquier to Ramus which I have just quoted, where he talks of 'Jean Antoine de Baïf, amy commun de nous deux';³ we know also that Ramus was interested in Baïf's system of reformed spelling which was similar to his own, and that in the 1562 edition of the Gramere Ramus speaks favourably of 'measured verse', and in 1572 mentions Baïf's experiments.⁴

1. Cf. André Boulanger's introduction to the edition of the Art Poétique (1555), p.25.

2. Cf. Scipionis Somnium... Petri Rami praelectionibus explicatum (1546), also contained in In Ciceronis orationes... praelectiones (1582), p.519.

3. Pasquier, op.cit., p.98.

4. For the Ramus-Baïf relationship see especially Thickett's edition of Pasquier, pp.70-74; cf., also, Frances A. Yates, The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century, London, 1947, p.21 and p.52.

About Belleau, Alexandre Eckhardt wrote,

'Il est fort probable que Belleau suivit aussi les cours de Ramus que celui-ci faisait au Collège Royal. Les rapports du professeur et de l'élève se changèrent en une sorte de collaboration qui aboutit à un livre fait en commun. En 1555 Ramus fit paraître sa dialectique en français...'¹

I do not think that we should make too much of the probability (and it is no more than that, in any case,) that Belleau heard Ramus' lectures. Ramus was a very famous teacher and public speaker, and we know that his lectures were a great attraction, but it is doubtful what influence or effect they would have had on Belleau. Furthermore, it will have become clear by now that the 'livre fait en commun' is not an accurate description of Ramus' book.

Jodelle, who, like Baïf, was interested in 'measured verse', seems to have had close contact with Ramus. In the 1572 edition of the Gramere (but not in 1562) there appeared a laudatory poem by Jodelle. Balmas notes that the printer André Wechel was a good friend of Jodelle.² (I think we may safely assume that he was a good friend also of Ramus, since he published, between 1555 and 1572, over sixty editions of his books.) Balmas then goes on to make much of the connection between Ramus and Jodelle. He writes of Jodelle's contribution to the Gramere (1572):

'Non è tuttavia impossibile che Jodelle avesse già composto questi versi nel 1567, all'epoca del suo incontro con Meliss'.

This refers to a visit which Paul Melissus made to Paris, in the course of which, according to Balmas, he came into contact with Ramus:

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1. A. Eckhardt, Rémy Belleau, Sa Vie - Sa "Bergerie", Budapest, 1917, pp.26-7.
 2. E. Balmas, Un poeta del Rinascimento Francese, Etienne Jodelle, 1962, p.646; cf E. Jodelle, Oeuvres Complètes, I, ed. Balmas, Paris, 1966, pp.46-50.

'Giunta a Parigi nel 1567, in compagnia di un amico, Jean Lobbet, chi viene a proseguirvi i suoi studi di diritto, Meliss, che è munito di lettere di raccomandazione fornitegli dal suo maestro viennese Sambucus per Henri de Mesmes, Denys Lambin e Pierre de la Ramée, fa tosto la conoscenza dei poeti e degli studiosi parigini più noti. Ramus, con ogni probabilità, lo introduce presso Ronsard, e questo a sua volta lo presenta a Dorat: sempre a Ramus, invece, egli deve di aver conosciuto Jodelle, come tra poco diremo. Jean-Antoine de Baïf et Jean Passerat si aggiungeranno a queste prime amicizie'.¹

Much of this is speculative and, I am afraid, even rather doubtful. I suspect that either Henri de Mesmes or Lambin were far more likely to have introduced Melissus to Ronsard than was Ramus. We know that both of these two were in close contact with Ronsard and with mutual friends (e.g., Michel de l'Hôpital, Turnèbe, Léger du Chesne, Dorat, Muret, Passerat),² and we have no evidence that Ramus was in touch with Ronsard as late as this. He seems to have been forever on the edge of the circle, though, again, it is possible that Ramus was among the lecturers whom Melissus frequented at the Collège Royal.³ Balmas wonders why Melissus should single out for translation Jodelle's poem on Ramus, and concludes,

'Meliss...era di religione riformata (quanto meno si mostra intimamente legato a molti protestanti notori) e nella sua raccolta inserisce l'elogio di un'altra illustre vittima della notte di S. Bartolomeo, il musicista Goudimel. L'elogio di Ramus è anch'esso un elogio post-mortem, e prende il sapore di una riposta ai contemporanei attachi di Dorat, alla memoria del celebre filosofo vittima dell'odio di parte'.⁴

1. E. Balmas, Un poeta..., pp.643-4.

2. Cf. Edouard Frémy, Henri de Mesmes, Paris, 1881; for the Ronsard-Lambin contact it will be remembered that in this very year (1567) Lambin published his notes on the Ars Poetica together with the unpublished text of part of the Franciade.

3. Balmas, op.cit., p.644.

4. Ibid., p.646; cf., also, Nolhac, Un poète rhénan ami de la Pléiade: Paul Mélianus, Paris, 1935.

A further source of biographical information about Ramus and his associates is the succession of controversies which surrounded his books.¹ In an age given to all kinds of polemical writing Ramus stands out as someone who needed controversy in order to be able to formulate his own ideas. The relevance of this is that some of his many adversaries had connections with the Pléiade. I shall restrict myself here to those discussions and arguments which directly concern people who were in Paris in the period 1540-70. The first of these is the quarrel in 1543 between Ramus and the Portuguese jurist Antonio Gouvea (1507-1565), about the nature of dialectic and the correct interpretation of Aristotle. From 1544 Gouvea left Paris for the south and there does not seem to have been further contact.² Another important controversy, the one which took place in 1551 between Ramus and Pierre Galland (1510-59) was about the reform of the curriculum, and is discussed by Rabelais in the 1552 Prologue to the Fourth Book.³

Then there is a lengthy exchange of views during the years 1564-7 between Jacques Charpentier (1524-1574) and Arnaud d'Ossat (1536-1604), who undertook to defend Ramus on the question of method. Adrien Turnèbe (1512-1565), well-known for his close contact with Ronsard, enters into this discussion, mildly attacking Ramus in his De methodo libellus (first published

1. Ong, RTI, pp.492-511; RMDD, pp.214-224.

2. Cf. Martha Katherine Zeeb, The Latin letters of Antonio de Gouvea, (Edition, Introduction, Text, Commentary and Translation), Philadelphia, 1932.

3. N. Nacel, op.cit., p.60, gives a significant account of the part Galland played in alienating people from Ramus: 'P. Galland was the one who raised the standard of war, and made many people hostile to Ramus: in the first place his own associates and colleagues, Turnèbe, Charpentier, Du Chesne, Vicomercato, and others who conspired with him in order to destroy Ramus, with a hatred greater than that inspired by Vatinianus, such as Gouvea, Perion, Muret and many others, who had fiercely hit out at Ramus in various speeches, or, rather, diatribes, and had attacked him with bitter charges and taunts, more bitter than those of women or the comic writers.'

posthumously in 1600). Turnèbe himself had also been involved in an earlier minor dispute with Ramus in 1550-1554 concerning Ramus' reduction of fate and predestination to logic rather than to ethics. Ramus hides behind the name of Talon in some of the books in this exchange of views and Turnèbe sometimes hides behind the name of his friend Léger Du Chesne.¹ It seems that Ramus became friendly again with Turnèbe and Galland at a later date.² I feel that it would be most rewarding to make a further study of Turnèbe's relations both with Ramus and with the Pléiade. We know of Turnèbe's life-long friendship with Du Chesne, that he studied with him at Sainte-Barbe in 1538, and went to Toulouse with him and Lambin in 1545. They are still associated in 1561 when Turnèbe takes over Vicomercato's chair of Greek philosophy, Lambin takes over Greek literature and Du Chesne Latin literature.³ Lambin himself does not seem to have had very much contact with Ramus, but then it must be remembered that he was teaching in Toulouse in 1548 and from 1549-1560 he had two very long periods of absence in Italy. There is one further name we might add to this list of humanists, that of George Buchanan. I feel sure that there was some contact between Ramus and Buchanan, but at the moment all we can do is to point to a few scattered references. The only time that Ramus mentions Buchanan is in the Prooemium mathematicum (1567), p.60, asking him to encourage the study of mathematics at St. Andrews. Buchanan mentions Ramus in a letter to Daniel Rogers in

1. Cf. Ong, RTI, p.293.

2. Nancel, op.cit., pp.66-7.

3. Cf. L. Clément, De Adriani Turnebi regii professoris praefationibus et poematis, Paris, 1899, p.19.

1571.¹

A glance at the relevant pages in Nollac's Ronsard et l'Humanisme will show what was Ramus' position in the humanist milieu. Time after time, three of the four names, Muret, Dorat, Turnèbe and Lambin appear in the same context, but hardly at all is Ramus ever included in these contemporary lists. There are several reasons for this fact. Dorat seems to have disapproved of him almost entirely (perhaps because Dorat was the one of the four he most closely resembled); Turnèbe, as we have seen, disagreed with him in public controversy on at least two occasions, and both Muret and Lambin were so often absent from Paris that contact was almost impossible. All the evidence we have points to the fact that Ramus was a difficult person to get on with. It is clear that he shared almost none of the interests of the members of the Pléiade, except the more academic interests of Baïf and Jodelle. He was sober, ascetic and withdrawn, totally apart, therefore, from the joyful social activities and epicurean aspirations of the poets. He seems to have had little poetic sensibility.² On the other hand we might

1. I.D. McFarlane, "George Buchanan's Latin Poems from Script to Print: A Preliminary Survey", in The Library, December 1969, p.293. This long article (pp.277-332), and another article by the same author, ("George Buchanan and France", in Studies in French literature presented to M.W. Lawton, Manchester and New York, 1968, pp.223-45), are invaluable for an understanding of the humanist background in Paris at the time. I am grateful to Professor McFarlane for several important leads and references in this connection, which he has given me, both in these articles and in private discussion.
2. N. Nancel has several comments on this: op.cit., p.22, 'Porrò facto illo in oratoriis progressu, animi recreandi, et lectoris oblectandi gratiâ, voluit ad poeticam diuertere: (ad quam tamē minus natus aut propensus erat)'; p.32, 'poetas Graecos, quod sciam, non attigit'; 'Iam verò ut in eloquentia primas tenebat, sic in poesi mirè nouus erat, minimūque versatus: ut per annos totos viginti et plures, quibus ferè cū illo egi, ne totidē quidē carmina scriptitarit'; p.33, 'Scio tamen me vidisse versus complusculos ab eodem Ramo adhuc iuene scriptos, neque illos inuita Minerua. sed consequentium studiorum ratio diuersa, istum poetices igniculum facilè sopijt atque restinxit'; Nollac, op.cit., pp.81-82, talks of some French poetry by Ramus in Charles Toutain's La Tragédie d'Agamemnon, but I was unable to find this in the B.N. copy.

have expected that he would have shared the interests of people like Turnèbe. Ramus, however, had put all his faith in logic and methodology (and it was on precisely this point that Turnèbe attacked him), and this was of little interest to the pleasure-loving Pléiade. Ramus' philosophy was, in spite of his desire to rid it of the deficiencies of scholasticism, still the philosophy of books which Montaigne was later to attack. The fact that Ramus was a far better philosopher than any of the neo-platonists (he has often been hailed as an important precursor of Descartes) was of little concern to Ronsard. Even as a classical scholar the appeal of Ramus was limited. It is sufficient to look at a list of the authors he commented on to see the reason: Caesar, Cicero, Quintilian, Aristotle; his commentaries on Virgil are the only instance of his tackling a more acceptable text, and even there his comments show little awareness of the poetry. Had he turned his energies to Terence, Catullus, Anacreon, or even Plato, then he would have aroused Ronsard's interest. Nor was he concerned with textual criticism, or the establishing of the correct text, so much as with a logical analysis of it. In simple terms Ronsard was not interested in the kind of literary criticism which Ramus advocated. A further point of the greatest importance is that Ronsard was a far better Greek scholar than Ramus.¹

I should like finally to mention some friends and associates of Ramus in order to indicate possible lines of future research. The best starting-point is, as usual, Nancel's biography. Nancel himself (1539-1610)

1. Cf. Nollac, op.cit., pp.141-2, for Ronsard's knowledge of Greek; for Ramus, cf., Ong, W.J., 'A Ramist translation of Euripides' in Manuscripta, VIII, I. St. Louis, March, 1964, p.23.

was a pupil, secretary and life-long friend of Ramus; they had first met in 1548. He gives us two lists of names which are of interest for the information which they contain and also for the names which they omit.¹ The first list contains the names Jean Magny (Magnienus, a doctor and mathematician),² Frédéric Reisner (a German mathematician who was responsible for publishing Ramus' posthumous work on optics, and who was a contestant for the chair of mathematics after Ramus' death),³ Forcadel⁴ and Jean Péna (whom Nancel calls his own fellow-pupil).⁵ The second list includes the following names: Omer Talon (whose close collaboration with Ramus has already been described), Barthélemy Alexandre,⁶ Quintinus Heduus, Oronce Finé,⁷ Jean Magny, Simon Pietre (Petreius), Jacques Hollier (Hollerius), Nicholas Charton (Cartonius),⁸

1. Nancel, *op.cit.*, p.26 and p.65.

2. Cf. his edition of *Euclidis Elementorum libri xv Graece et Latine*, Paris, Guillaume Cavellat, 1558; the preface is by St. Gracilis and talks of 'vir doctissimus Jo. Magnienus Mathematicarū artium in hac Parrhisiorū Academia professor vere regius'.

3. Cf. *Ong, RTI*, nos. 648-50.

4. Pierre Forcadel, not Estienne Forcadel.

5. Both Forcadel and Péna were to become regius professors of mathematics.

6. Alexandre was associated with Ramus in 1544 in the book: *Tres orationes a tribus liberalium disciplinarum professoribus, Petro Ramo, Audomaro Talaeo, Bartholomaeo Alexandro, Lutetiae in Gymnasio Mariano habitae, et ab eorum discipulis exceptae*, Paris 1544.

7. Finé (1494-1555) is one of the most important of these associates of Ramus. He held a chair of mathematics at the Collège Royal from 1530, and was a prolific writer of mathematical works; for his relations with Ramus, cf. my article, 'La Ramée's Early Mathematical Teaching' in *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, 1966, pp.605-614.

8. These three are all doctors or medical writers; there is a work *Nicolai Chartonis Bellovacae Scholae Gymnasiarchi Oratio, Lutetiae in eodem gymnasio, principio praelectionum suarum habita, Anno 1551. Non. Octob.*, Paris. M. David, 1551.

D. Furnerius, Jean Sabellus,¹ Pasquier, Bergeron,² Amariton,³ Loisel,⁴
 Dahurus, Péna, Reisner, Ossat, Brietus, Martinus, Gualterius.⁵

Ramus' principal associates seem to have been his own teachers (like Oronce Finé) or his pupils (Pasquier, Bergeron, Amariton, Loisel), and especially pupils who were authors of mathematical treatises.

I hope that I have sufficiently demonstrated that contrary to the generally accepted opinion the case for close friendship and collaboration between Ramus and the Pléiade is at least 'non-proven'. My own conclusions have the disadvantage of being negative, but they are based on a reading of the entire corpus of printed work by Ramus, much relevant manuscript material and countless prefaces and liminary epistles. It remains possible, certain even, that more material will come to light.

1. These two are theologians; the preface of the Praelectiones in Porphyrium (1547) is addressed to Sabellus.
2. Nicholas Bergeron was one of the executors of Ramus, and in 1580 he published a Commendatio professionis mathematicae, a Petro Ramo institutae, in gratiam Academiae Parisiensis, cum interpretatione francica, Paris (Joannes Borellus), 1580. This key text, the only first hand account of the strange sequence of events surrounding the foundation of the chair of mathematics, has gone completely unnoticed by historians; I am preparing an article describing this book and the new light it throws on the question.
3. This is Jean Amariton de Nonette who published a commentary on Horace in 1553: Joannis Amaritonis Nonetani Commentariorum in epistolas Q. Horatii Flacci. Liber primus, Paris, 1553; (I have been unable to find out if any more than the first volume was published); cf. Pierre-François Fournier, Jean Amariton de Nonette, Sa Vie, Ses Ouvrages, Sa Famille, Clermont Ferrand, 1933.
4. Loisel (1536-1617), the other executor of Ramus' will, is quite well-known from the life which was written by his grandson: Divers opusculs tirez des memoires de M. Antoine Loisel advocat en Parlement....Le tout recueilly et mis nouvellement en lumière par M. Claude Joly.... Paris, 1652.
5. There are some names here for which I have been able to find next to nothing, and one or two which I have not yet been able to identify. For the rest, I have given some indication of who they were and am preparing a detailed article on all the friends and acquaintances of Ramus which will contain much supplementary material.

It seems to me that it is of the first importance if we are to understand the place of Ramus in the eyes of people like Ronsard to realise how different he was from the poets and theorists associated with the Pléiade. He was a logician and a teacher of philosophy above all and only incidentally someone who was interested in literature for its own sake. We shall see that he did not write an art of poetry although he wrote an art of almost everything else. The justification for the present study is that in many ways Ramus, in spite of his desire for novelty, and for a recasting of the whole body of knowledge, because of his encyclopedic approach, provides a very complete picture of the intellectual climate of the Paris of the years from 1540 to 1572 which was where and when the theories and doctrines were formulated which we have come to know as Pléiade poetics and which represented such a major step forward in literary theory as well as in poetic practice.

SYNOPTICAL TABLE.

1541		Peletier, L'Art Poétique d'Horace.
1542		
1543	Dialecticae partitiones. Dialecticae institutiones. Aristotelicae animadversiones.	
1544	Oratio de studiis mathematicis.	
1545	Euclides Oratio in Gymnasio Praelleorum habita. Institutiones oratoriae (Talon)	Peletier, L'Art Poétique d'Horace(2nd.ed.). Arithmeticae practicae methodus facilis.
1546	Ciceronis Somnium Scipionis explicatum	
1547	Oratio de studiis philosophiae et eloquentiae coniungendis. Brutinae quaestiones.	
1548	Rhetorica (Talon).	Sebillet, Art Poétique François.
1549	Rhetoricae distinctiones in Quintilianum.	Du Bellay, La Deffence et Illustration de la Langue Françoisse. Sebillet, L'Iphigène d'Euripide. Peletier, L'Arithmetique.
1550	Ciceronis De Fato liber explicatus.	Peletier, Dialogue de l'Orthographe et Prononciation françoise. Barthélemy Aneau, Quintil Horatian. Du Bellay, Preface to L'Olive. Ronsard, Preface to the Odes.
1551	Pro philosophica Parisiensis Academiae disciplina oratio. Oratio initio suae professionis habita.	
1552		Pontus de Tyard, Solitaire Premier.
1553		
1554		Peletier, L'Algebre.
1555	Arithmetica. Dialectique. Virgilii Bucolica exposita.	Pontus de Tyard, Solitaire Second. Peletier, L'Art Poétique. Fouquelin, La Rhétorique françoise.
1556	Virgilii Georgica illustrata. Admonitio ad Turnebum.	Pontus de Tyard, Discours du Temps. Le Caron, Dialogues.
1557	Ciceronis De optimo genere oratorum. Ciceronianus. Quod sit unica doctrinae instituendae methodus.	Peletier, In Euclidis Elementa geometrica. Pontus de Tyard, L'Univers.
1558		
1559	Liber de moribus veterum Gallorum. Liber de Caesaris militia. Grammatica Latina.	Pontus de Tyard, Mantice.

1560	Algebra Grammatica Graeca	Peletier, De occulta parte numerorum quam Algebram vocant. Ronsard, Preface to Meslanges.
1561		
1562	Gramere. Prooemium reformandae Parisi- ensis Academiae.	
1563	Oratio de sua professione.	
1564		
1565	Scholae physicae.	Ronsard, Abbregé de l'Art Poétique.
1566	Scholae metaphysicae.	
1567	Prooemium mathematicum.	Peletier, Disquisitiones geometricae.
1568	Remonstrance au Conseil privé.	
1569	Geometria.	
1570		
1571	Basilea.	
1572		Peletier, De usu Geometriae. Ronsard, Preface to La Franciade.
1573		Peletier, De l'usage de Geometrie.
1574		
1575		
1576		
1577		
1578		
1579		Peletier, Oratio ...in praelectiones mathematicas.
1580		Peletier, In Mauricium Bressium Apologia.
1581		
1582		
1583		
1584		
1585		
1586		
1587		Ronsard, Preface to La Franciade.

NOTES.

I have used extensively the material to be found in Ong, RTI, pp.37-40, and in Boulanger's edition of Peletier's Art Poétique, pp.1-3, in the compilation of this table. I have omitted many of the less important works of Ramus (such as some of the commentaries on Cicero), and I have referred only to the first edition of each work, by Ramus and the other writers, except in the case of Peletier's translation of Horace's Ars Poetica (because the second edition is the most important) and of Ronsard's prefaces to the Franciade (because they are significantly different from one another). In the case of the poets I have included only the theoretical writings (and not just on poetry - Peletier's mathematical studies form an interesting parallel to those of Ramus), and not the different editions of the poems, because this would have made the table too unwieldy.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POETIC THEORIES OF THE PLEIADE

The views which the various members of the Pléiade held about poetry have, of course, often been discussed. The most complete and factual account is to be found in a book by W.F. Patterson, Three Centuries of French Poetic Theory, Ann Arbor, 1935. Then there are two books which came out shortly afterwards, Henri Chamard's Histoire de la Pléiade, Paris, 1939-40, a rather more general description, but one which does attempt to relate the theory to the poets and their poems, and R.J. Clements' Critical Theory and Practice of the Pléiade, Cambridge, Massachussets, 1942, which treats the subject thematically. In 1956, in La Création Poétique au XVIe siècle en France, Henri Weber published a brilliant synthesis of the theories and related them to the actual poetry of the time. There have also been several editions of the different Arts Poétiques, the introductions of which add much to our knowledge of the field, especially in the matter of the sources in Italian writers like Speroni, and in classical rhetoricians like Cicero and Quintilian. I should mention particularly the edition of Du Bellay's Deffence et Illustration de la Langue Françoise by Chamard, (1904, 1948), that of Peletier's Art Poétique by André Boulanger, 1930), and that of Sebillet's Art Poétique François, by Félix Gaiffe, (1932).

Finally, in 1964 there appeared a book devoted entirely to the subject, Grahame Castor's Pléiade Poetics. I propose to use this book as my starting-point, and to give a detailed account of the ideas which it contains, since any treatment of Pléiade Poetics must now depend greatly on

Castor's work. My discussion of the book will do three things: firstly, it will review what exactly the author contributes to our knowledge of Renaissance critical theory, secondly, it will serve as an exposition of the poetic theory of the group, and, thirdly, it will show where Ramus fits into the scheme. I shall have some criticisms to make of the book. One general point must be made here. It is evident that I am accepting the basic assumption that there was such a thing as 'Pléiade Poetics'. What in fact seems to have been the case is that there was a group of people, who saw themselves as a group, who made, individually, many pronouncements about poets and poetry. We are not entitled to forget their individuality. Castor, I feel, gives them a unity and an identity which they did not possess. In so many ways the things which divided them were more important than the things which they had in common. I do, however, accept his term as a convenient label. I see it rather as covering a number of people who were very closely connected with each other and who were interested in the same artistic problems. I would, nevertheless, prefer to think in terms of chronology, of the people who wrote about writing poetry between the years 1541 and, say, 1572.

Castor's sub-title, A study in Sixteenth-Century Thought and Terminology sets out clearly how different his approach is from that of his predecessors. At the beginning of his introduction he writes,

"The most obvious problem confronting the commentator of the Pléiade's theory of poetry is that no one member of the group produced a full and coherent theory of poetry as such",

noting that Pontus de Tyard is a possible exception but that he was not

primarily interested in poetry.¹ Castor's criticism of Patterson, Chamard and Clements, that they list the items in the poets' programme but do not evaluate them critically, is justified.² He is much more appreciative of Weber's book, and in particular of its treatment of two contradictions, firstly the one between imitation and inspiration, both of which were favourite doctrines of the early humanists, and secondly, the one between truth and fiction. He disagrees with Weber's restriction of 'fiction' to the use in poetry of 'les fables antiques', and wishes to give the term a much broader reference.

One of the most important ideas in the book is that we must beware of using the terminology of twentieth-century literary criticism when referring to sixteenth-century theorizing. The two best examples of this are the words 'originality' and 'creativity' (usually used by commentators to describe sixteenth-century theories) which do not come in until the seventeenth and even eighteenth centuries.³ He himself wishes to look closely at the language used by the theorists of the time, in order to see how they themselves thought of the nature of poetry, and of the rôle of the poet. Two of the most important of the concepts to be studied will be 'invention' and 'imagination'. It is only a study of these and related words which will enable us not to fall into the trap of equating the sixteenth-century use of 'invention' with our use of 'creative imagination'.

I should like to make clear what I think is new in this approach,

1. Castor, op.cit., p.1.

2. While I feel sure that Castor is basically right here, he seems to minimize the value and importance of these works of synthesis, with the result that he does not integrate into his own work as well as he might have done certain of the items discussed, and even omits some of them.

3. Ibid., p.5.

and show that although his aim seems at first sight to be broader than that of all his predecessors, it nevertheless has important limitations to its scope. The greatest innovation and merit of the work is that it attempts to relate the poetic theories of the Pléiade to the broader philosophical context of the time, by means of a linguistic enquiry into their own critical vocabulary. In general this is excellently done. The limitations, as I see it, are partly the result of the obvious need to restrict one's scope, partly, however, they amount to (perhaps unavoidable) distortion. It would be interesting to know, for example, how the vocabulary of the Pléiade theorists compares with that of some of the earlier vernacular arts of poetry, and the relation between both of these and the neo-Latin critical writings of the Renaissance, and especially of the French Renaissance in the years we are studying. The philosophical background, too, might have been dealt with in greater depth and detail.¹ I shall, of course, have a good deal more to say about Castor's chapter (Invention and Reason) of which pp.128-132 are devoted to Ramus. I need simply say here that the reason for the inclusion of Ramus is not made at all clear, and that he is not dealt with adequately since the only work of his which is quoted is a late (1576) edition of one of the rare works he wrote in French, and then a few lines (quoted from somebody else) of another earlier work. I hope to show that Ramus is indeed relevant, far more so than Castor seems to allow. The best way to explain his relevance both to Pléiade poetic theory, and, especially, to a linguistic study of it, is that since he wrote so voluminously on most

1. Ficino, for example, gets scanty treatment, and the work of Henri Busson, Le Rationalisme dans la littérature française de la Renaissance, does not figure in the bibliography.

of the arts, and, above all, on rhetoric and dialectic, he cannot be ignored. He represents the old tradition of education and at the same time stands outside it because of his passion for reform. The reforms which he proposed were being implemented in exactly the same years as the Pléiade theories were being published, and in the same literary and educational milieu in Paris. His importance is that he can tell us much about how the vernacular grew out of the Latin and neo-Latin tradition, and how the theories of poetry grew out of rhetoric and dialectic. I hope to show that although the actual connections between Ramus and the Pléiade are, as we have seen, less great than is often supposed, it is still true that a better understanding of Ramus adds to our understanding of the Pléiade. Castor's sketchy account of Ramus contains another distortion: many of the other topics discussed (and not just 'invention and reason') were discussed also by Ramus, so that his presence would have been justified in most of the other chapters as well. (I shall have reservations to make about his relevance to the discussion of imagination).

Castor's second chapter Poetry as the Art of Second Rhetoric (pp.14-23) tells how the late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century arts of poetry were considered as parts of rhetoric, and were concerned with technique. There is an important footnote, (p.14), on the different meaning art has now from its early Renaissance meaning:

'Then the predominant meaning of the word "art" was not the essentially modern one of "skill displaying itself in perfection of workmanship", but rather "a body or system of rules serving to facilitate the carrying out of certain principles" (O.E.D., under art). A typical Renaissance definition of the word is given by Abraham Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike (1588), l, i, lb: "An art is a methodicall disposition of true and coherent precepts, for the more easie perceiving and better remembering of the same."¹

1. It is worth pointing out that Abraham Fraunce was an ardent follower of Ramus, cf. Ong, RTI, Nos. 309-11.

This is perfectly true, but, as I shall show when talking of art and nature in Ramus in my next chapter, the connotations of the word are very much wider.

Castor is concerned to show the technical nature of the early arts of poetry. He says of the Art Poétique François of Thomas Sebillet, (1548),

"even though it marks a real advance over previous treatises in that it comes so much closer than they had done to a serious consideration of what poetry is and what poets are doing (the title itself of the work is probably significant from this point of view), it still contains a very high proportion of narrowly technical material".¹

Castor shows clearly that Sebillet carries on that tradition which made the art of poetry a mere part of rhetoric, and was devoted to a discussion of figures and other ornaments:

"The verse form was simply one more rhetorical figure, or 'colour'. For poetry was considered to have exactly the same object as any other form of discourse, namely to persuade an audience either that something is so, or that it should act in a particular manner."²

Sebillet sees invention as the 'premiere partie de Poésie', and this was traditionally the first part of rhetoric. There is a great similarity between the poet and the orator, except that the poet 'est plus contrainct de nombres que l'autre'.³ Castor points out that Du Bellay also equates the poet and the orator: 'les vertuz de l'un sont pour la plus grand' part communes à l'autre'. Jacques Peletier du Mans, in his Art poétique (1555), in a chapter on the 'diferance du Poète e de l'Orateur' sees them as being essentially the same, except for the superficial difference that the orator

1. Castor, op.cit., p.16.

2. Ibid., p.18.

3. Ibid., p.19.

must persuade briefly and immediately, while the poet's appeal is eternal and universal. In this connection Castor stresses that the poet (like the orator) deals in argumants; he sees this as primarily the terminology of rhetoric. He might have added here that it was absolutely central to Ramus' own theories of logic. The chapter concludes with the statement that to see poetry as a branch of rhetoric was to give it an ethical purpose (its aim was to persuade or dissuade). Castor does not, however, go into the differences in the functions of the poet and the orator, or the precise meaning of didacticism. I hope to show in my account of Ramus that the question was a good deal subtler than is suggested in the statement that the Pléiade's view of poetry 'provides moral teaching by means of a pleasing form.'¹ The tension between teaching and pleasing was one which was often debated and carefully worked out; there is, further, the vital question of clarity and obscurity in discourse which Castor seems to ignore.

In the next four chapters the relations between inspiration, nature and art are examined. In this connection Castor studies the twofold imitation which the Renaissance propounded, that of nature and that of the classical authors. His main concern is to "show that the Pléiade poets were indeed trying to introduce a new kind of poetry, and to give the poet a function proper to himself."

"The Pléiade sought to free poetry from the obligation of conforming to extra-poetical scales of value; poetry did not have to masquerade as ethics, or as philosophy, or as history."²

The author brings out well here the delicate balance between poetry as

1. Ibid., p.22.

2. Ibid., p.24.

ethical teaching and poetry which could also moralize, but which was much more besides. He situates, too, the poet in the social and intellectual context, thus explaining the Pléiade's feeling that they were a chosen and privileged intellectual aristocracy, and must live up to this ideal of virtue.¹ This will be of great significance when we come to see how different Ramus' position was; Ramus was a popularizer with strong democratic feelings, and his aims were a far cry from the aristocratic aspirations of the poets.

Castor links this feeling of aristocratic superiority with the belief in the divine origin of poetry. The first poets (especially Orpheus) were considered by the Pléiade to have been priests and interpreters of the gods, and they had helped to civilize primitive man. This idea, which Horace did much to perpetuate, was widely held, and was extended by some writers (Sebillet, for example) to include Moses, David, Solomon and the Prophets.²

Poetry is, in this theory, the result of divine inspiration.

"Sebillet also stresses the origin of human knowledge in the divine perfection. All the arts, since they are 'conjoins avec ceste divine perfection que nous appelons Vertu', contain some spark of the divine fire, for our minds are of kindred substance with the divine fire, though of necessity incomparably less pure. Whenever a spark from the divine fire comes near to a human mind, light is generated in the latter and it is enabled to know the divine substance. This is especially true in the case of the poetic art..."³

Sebillet repeats the adage that poets are born not made, but then goes on to show the necessity and importance of the technical side of writing poetry.

1. I should like to add here that this 'virtue' was much more than moral superiority; it was a general excellence or perfection (ἀρετή).

2. Ibid., p.27.

3. Ibid., p.27.

The theory that poetry is a kind of divine fury is at the basis of this doctrine of poetic inspiration; it comes into French writing from Plato's Ion and Phaedrus particularly via the translation and commentaries of Ficino. It finds its fullest expression in the Solitaire Premier (1552) of Pontus de Tyard. Poetic fury is the first step on the ascending ladder of perfection, the ascent from the senses to the world of spirit. Both Peletier and Ronsard share Pontus de Tyard's "neoplatonic" enthusiasm. Ronsard stresses, especially in the Ode à Michel de l'Hospital, (1552), that divine inspiration can come only to a virtuous person.

"Poetry, in Ronsard's view, reaches up into the highest realms of man's intellectual and spiritual endeavour. It is the vehicle of all man's noblest aspirations, and to become a poet is to commit one's whole being to a most sacred purpose."¹

It is only by thus seeing the Pléiade against the neoplatonist background of the time that we can understand the force of their theories. I suggest that this neoplatonism itself must be further and more deeply studied if we are to appreciate how it itself fits into the broader intellectual background of the time.

The next part of Castor's treatment can be summarized fairly briefly because the subject of it has often been dealt with. The relation between 'art' and 'nature' in literature is a topic which has exercised critics from earliest times, and which still continues to do so. Castor relates how Du Bellay and Ronsard both described the history of poetry as a process of degeneration from divine to human, and that for them this was, at least in part, one of the results of the fall from original innocence.² The evaluation

1. Ibid., pp.35-6.

2. Ibid., p.39: This complicated question will be treated at length in chapter three, pp.55 ff.

of the relative importance of art and nature was first attempted in treatises on rhetoric. To them was almost always added a third term, 'exercitatio' or practice. In the sixteenth century in France, and especially in the years we are considering, the general feeling seems to have been that art and nature were almost equally important, except that nature without art was better than art without nature. Castor distinguishes "the naïveté which had been a characteristic of the 'divine' poets, and the naïveté which could be achieved by merely human poets".¹ For the latter, naïveté was the result of long and arduous labour. Naïveté means also what is proper to an individual, and consequently it is closely linked with our sense of 'originality'. "Indeed naïf was more or less equivalent to naturel, but with the added suggestions of genuineness and "rightness", in the sense of particular appropriateness."² It was essential, if real naturalness was to be attained, that a poet should write in his own language. This idea was repeated time and again by all the theorists of the period. 'It was not enough' writes Castor,

"simply to follow others, certainly not to follow earlier writers in one's own language, and it was not enough even to enrich one's language by following exactly (i.e. by translating) the best works written in other languages. Imitation had to be of such a kind that the poet could yet be naïf, true to his own natural language and true to his own natural self."³

The doctrine of imitation is certainly central to all Renaissance theories of literature. The word was used in two main ways, the imitation (representation) of nature, and the imitation of classical models. It seems

1. Ibid., p.77.

2. Ibid., p.79.

3. Ibid., p.82.

to me that Castor is exceptionally perceptive and original in his treatment of the former topic. He distinguishes carefully between the Platonic theory of imitation at two removes from reality, and the theory of Aristotle who started by taking over Plato's idea, and then evolved a new theory:

"Works of Art were still held to copy "things" in some way, but in the Aristotelian scheme this implied nothing about their relative status on the scale of being."¹

Aristotle saw poetic imitation as an instance of man's capacity for learning by imitation. He also saw imitation as the apprehension of what is universal in what is particular.

"The philosopher tries to achieve knowledge of the eternally enduring universals inherent in the particulars, which exist only at a certain moment in time. The artist, on the other hand, tries to represent particulars in such a way that the universals embodied in them are revealed more clearly than they are in 'real life'."²

Castor shows that this theory of the universals was often misunderstood, and that Aristotle was wrongly thought to have been saying that imitation meant merely vivid representation. It is a commonplace that Aristotle's De Poetica, in spite of having been published in a Latin version in Paris in 1538, was virtually unknown in France until the appearance of Scaliger's Poetices libri septem (1561), and of Ronsard's Abbrégé de l'Art Poétique (1565).³ Neither Sebillet nor Du Bellay saw art as an imitation of nature in the Aristotelian sense. Peletier seems to be feeling his

1. Ibid., p.53.

2. Ibid., p.54.

3. There are, however, several indications in the Latin writings of the time that the humanists were aware of the importance of Aristotle's theories on the subject. This still remains to be worked out in detail.

way towards such a view, but is still much nearer to Plato. So, too, is Pontus de Tyard with his view that the arts are concerned with deceitful images.

It is not until Ronsard's Abbrégé that we begin to find any awareness in French critics, writing in French, of the Aristotelian concept of vraisemblance.¹ Castor shows clearly the progression in Ronsard's thought, until 1572 when Ronsard contrasts la vérité (the material of history) and le vraisemblable (the material of poetry). It is essential that we realize that Ronsard is not here equating poetry with lying. He defends himself explicitly against this charge.

"Le vraisemblable", writes Castor, "conforms to the true nature of things and depicts, or makes actual in images, or represents, what things contain in potentiality. Thus le vraisemblable brings out the universals in particulars. It conforms to the actual truth of the particulars and through this truth it expresses at the same time the potential truth of universals."²

Castor is here making a very real contribution to our understanding of the Pléiade's views on the imitation of nature. I feel, however, that he does not do full justice to the theory of the vivid representation of nature (which he calls a 'trivialisation' of Aristotle's view)³ which was such a well-developed and frequently found attitude.

The second kind of imitation, that of model authors, is much more straightforward. The study and adaptation of classical models is not in-

1. Peletier, of course, writing in 1555, does discuss the question of 'la vérité historique', and says of something in Virgil that it is 'chose mal croyable', but he does not use Aristotle's terminology: Peletier, L'Art Poétique, ed. Boulanger, pp.100,102.
2. Castor, op.cit., p.59.
3. Ibid., p.55.

tended to be an alternative to writing directly in the vernacular, but an exercise which will both help the writer to be able to write in his own language, and ensure that his medium, the vernacular, will improve and become capable of admitting a greater variety of writing. Imitation must go beyond servile translation (though this was not ruled out completely at the beginning; and was certainly practised by many, Du Bellay himself, for example, in spite of all his strictures on it). Peletier seems to be the first to say that the poet should go beyond his model:

"Il n'è faut pas pourtant qu'è le Poet' qui doet exceler,
soet imitateur jure ni perpetuel. Eins s'è propose non
seul'mant de pouvoer ajouter du sien, mes ancor'és de
pouvoer fer' mieus an plusieurs poinz."¹

Castor goes on to give a further justification for the imitation of classical models. The ideal should clearly be the imitation of nature in some form or other (though this was an ideal, as we have seen, of which these theorists became aware only gradually), and since the classical poets had found such an excellent way to express or represent nature, later (and consequently slightly less divine) poets should accept their writing as natural, and so imitate it. Castor does not really tie this up with the previous chapter where Sebillet, Du Bellay and Peletier were shown not to have been interested in the imitation of nature itself. Perhaps the link is to be made in this way, that at the beginning of the French Renaissance writers were so enthusiastic about the newly-discovered classics that they did not have time or energy to realise the extent to which direct imitation of the earlier models was desirable, and only gradually saw that there was

1. Peletier, L'Art poétique, ed. Boulanger, Paris, 1930, p.60; quoted in Castor, op.cit., p.71.

no value in imitation for its own sake. Rather what was valuable was to do the same thing as the classical writers had done, that is, imitate nature in the vernacular.

The second half of Castor's book deals with two main topics, invention and imagination. Of these, invention has a good deal more to do with my own study than has imagination, since Ramus was interested in logic (and rhetoric) rather than psychology, but it is essential that I describe both of them, for the sake of completeness and to show how Ramus differed from the Pléiade theorists.

Castor's basic contention is that invention, a term we use now only in a very limited sense in critical discussion, was extensively used from Cicero to the Romantic period. He sees a vital difference between the traditional idea that invention is 'finding', and the post-Voltairean idea that invention is a kind of 'making'. Both of these meanings are closely connected to their respective psychological and epistemological contexts, and differ in the same way as the sixteenth- and eighteenth-century theories of the imagination differ.

In Chapter Nine (Invention, Rhetoric and Poetry) Castor describes briefly some of the points of contact between the arts of poetry and rhetoric. He traces the development of the word 'invention' from classical to modern times, explaining how it starts with a neutral sense (coming to, upon), becomes 'finding out' (which implies seeking to discover), and is then used particularly for the orator's faculty of invention.¹ As such it is the first and principal part of rhetoric. (The others were disposition, elocution,

1. Castor, op.cit., p.96.

memory and delivery).

"Invenire is no longer something passive, no longer the event of happening upon a thing by accident; now it is something active, something deliberate and intentional, not so much a simple finding as a finding by seeking." ¹

Castor brings out very clearly how invention assumes the figurative connotations (of fabrication) that it often has today.. Since oratory's purpose is to persuade, invention will often be used on what resembles the truth, le vraisemblable.

"As long as this view of invention is supported by an Aristotelian or pseudo Aristotelian theory of verisimilitude, no harm will be done. If it is not so supported, however, invention is in great danger of being accused of producing merely non-truth, that is to say lies." ²

The hidden objects of invention will be readily found by recourse to the system of 'places'. The rest of Castor's chapter discusses rather summarily how the arts of poetry took over these rhetorical divisions (and specially invention, disposition and elocution).

The next chapter is a more general linguistic enquiry into some of the meanings of invention in the sixteenth century. The principal source is Montaigne. (In spite of Castor's justification of this I suspect that to rely so heavily on Montaigne is to run the risk of falsifying the picture.) Castor sees a beginning of a 'movement towards the implications of untruth and deception'. ³ This forms the subject of the next chapter ('Invention and Poetry as Fiction'). Poetry has been traditionally associated with lying (making up, rather than making), though poets had often repudiated

1. Ibid., p.97.

2. Ibid. p.98.

3. Ibid., p.112.

the accusations. In the sixteenth century one of the most common words in critical writing was 'fiction', very often in a pejorative sense of dissimulation and mensonges.

"It did seem possible, however, to use the cognate verb feindre to describe the activity of the poet, without necessarily condemning him out of hand as a liar. Feigning had not yet gone the way of fiction, and was apparently still regarded as a fairly reputable activity."¹

'Feindre' is to be distinguished from 'contrefaire' which usually had a pejorative sense. (I feel that all this could be gone into still further; my own reading of sixteenth-century poems which deal, incidentally or otherwise, with the nature of poetry-writing has left me with the impression that it is the pejorative senses which predominate, and that many other clearly pejorative words are used in the same context and connection.)

The following chapter (Invention and Reason) is the one which touches most nearly the subject of my own study. The author's aim is to show that invention was a respectable word, which had nothing irrational about it, and so he turns to Ramus as an obvious support for his idea. Here is some one, an exact contemporary of the Pléiade, an acquaintance of theirs, who is a fervent believer in the order in the universe, who writes voluminously about invention, and especially about the 'places of invention'. I must repeat that Castor's treatment of Ramus is (necessarily) superficial, and that it even has very serious defects. In the first place to appeal to Ramus for support is highly dangerous. Castor writes;

"Invention was suspect only as far as reason itself was suspect; and providing always that it kept strictly to its own realm of secular knowledge and did not try to

1. Ibid., p.119.

"meddle too closely in matters of faith, reason was felt during a large part of the sixteenth century to be all-powerful and (potentially at least) all-knowing."¹

Unfortunately Ramus himself was suspected of all sorts of heterodoxical opinions (some of which he actually held), and above all his account of reason and invention was suspect. In the second place, since Castor takes as his source for the ideas of Ramus the posthumous 1576 edition of the 1555 Dialectique he does not make clear the very evident evolution of Ramus' thought from 1543 onwards. It would have been interesting to see how Ramus developed at the same time as the other writers, such as Ronsard, developed.

Castor goes on to point out that Ramus reorganized rhetoric and dialectic, shifting invention and disposition to dialectic, and restricting rhetoric to elocution. This much is true, but it is quite untrue to say that "Ramus' system of dialectics is based on a fully elaborated epistemology and metaphysics".² The very opposite is the case. One of the greatest merits of Ramus' system is its independence of anything non-logical.

Castor shows briefly that for Ramus

"the method of dialectics could and indeed should be derived simultaneously from observation of the natural order of the universe and from observation of the natural processes of the human mind. These two elements, the natural order of the universe and the natural processes of the mind, infallibly correspond, so he believed, which means that the dialectical method of reasoning is able to give immediate and true access to things as they actually are".³

I do not wish, at this stage, to go into the discussion of the 'arguments' in Ramus, which Castor touches on here, because I shall deal with it at length in its place. Suffice it to say that the logician invents

1. Ibid., p.128.

2. Ibid., p.130.

3. Ibid., p.130.

'arguments' which correspond to the name of the mental conception of the thing.

"The arguments, then, subsist in reality; the dialectician simply comes upon them. This is the key to Ramus' view of invention. Invention is carried out by following what, according to him, are the natural rules of thought, that is, by descending from universal genera to particular instances."¹

In this chapter the close connection between invention and reason is stressed, but the views of Ramus on this subject are not fully explained.

The greatest merit of this book on Pléiade poetics lies perhaps in the five short chapters it devotes to the analysis of sixteenth-century attitudes to imagination. These chapters are specially valuable in that they get to the very heart of the problem of mimesis, and thus bring together all the different ideas Castor has been talking about. They are also the most original part of his work. If I treat them rather more summarily than I have treated the earlier chapters, this is because they have less to do with my own subject: Ramus was not interested in psychology or metaphysics.

The basic distinction which Castor makes is between the Platonic and the Aristotelian accounts of imagination. For the Platonist all artists produced 'images', which were somehow less real than the things they represented. "Thus, in Plato's terms, the imagination dealt only with appearances, with the ever-moving, ever-changing flux of particulars."² There is for him a clear distinction between the reason which deals with the ideal (i.e. real) world, and the imagination which deals with appearances. There is also, for the Platonist, a strong ethical concern which associates reason

1. Ibid., p.131.

2. Ibid., p.139.

with what is good, and imagination with what is bad. For the Aristotelian, the theory of the imagination is descriptive (of how we come to know things) rather than prescriptive (of how we should come to possess true knowledge in contemplation).

"Aristotle made two basic assumptions which were directly opposed to Plato's doctrine. First, he accorded reality not to the supra-sensible world of Ideas, but to the here-and-now, to the world of material things. Secondly (and this is simply an extension of the metaphysical assumption into the field of epistemology), he placed the origin of whatever knowledge human beings possess not in the intellectual apprehension of the universal ideas, but in sensation, in the apprehension of particulars through the senses."¹

Castor adds that the sixteenth-century attitude to imagination was usually an amalgam of these two systems of thought.

I do not wish to discuss, because it is not relevant to my purpose, his account of the faculty psychologies, and the medical treatises on how the brain worked. Suffice it to say that he feels that from quite early in the sixteenth century people thought that the imagination dealt not just with images derived from sense-objects, but with abstract ideas and judgments:

"By and large for the sixteenth century the imagination was simply the image-making faculty, which pictures objects and events already experienced or perceived, but no longer present to the senses. But it could also picture things which had never actually formed part of one's experience."²

The imagination was midway between the sense-world and the world of reason.

Castor goes on (in Chapter Sixteen, Imagination linked with Invention) to demonstrate that imagination in the sixteenth century was often more or less synonymous with invention, or at the very least they worked together in such

1. Ibid., p.141.

2. Ibid., p.153.

close harmony, that they became almost indistinguishable. In the next chapter (Imagination, Invention and Poetry) he repeats that both prescriptive and descriptive elements were present in the sixteenth-century account of imagination, and that there was a close link between imagination (which often had unfavourable associations) and invention (which was usually considered favourably). Invention was useful because it was so closely associated with the rational process, but it needed imagination if it was to be able to form pictures or images. Poetry, then, owes something to both imagination and invention. By the time of Ronsard it was becoming clear that any autonomy it might have would be the result of its growing concern with the vraisemblable as its proper and peculiar scope. Castor stresses that even for Ronsard this view of poetry was not yet clearly formulated.

Castor concludes by attempting to explain why the poets of the Pléiade did not go further than they did in formulating their doctrine about the true nature of the poet and of poetry. He has brought out very well the development that did take place between 1545 and 1572, and repeats that we must not judge the sixteenth century by twentieth-century criteria. We must not expect too much of these poets - for example, in their understanding of all the finer points and the full importance of Aristotle's theory of imitation and vraisemblance. At the end of his book Castor seems to come round to the view that the true rôle of the poet is that he is divinely inspired, that poetry is much more than a mere first step on the way up to the contemplation of the godhead.

This book, then, is the best and most complete account of Pléiade poetic theory that has been written. It has some defects, some major lacunae, however, which must now be mentioned. There are some unaccountable

omissions in the treatment of the topics of poetic theory: there is almost no discussion of the central problem of clarity and obscurity in poetry (a theme which was of immediate concern to almost all the sixteenth-century theorists), very little treatment of the nature of 'ornament' and what in Renaissance terms is called 'copie', and not much about the function of the poet (that is, the relation between the poet and the philosopher, and the orator). In general, I feel that the rhetorical tradition in the theory of poetry has not been given sufficient importance, considering the part it plays in Sebillet, Du Bellay and especially in Peletier; (apart from invention, the first part of rhetoric, the traditional divisions of rhetoric receive little treatment). But this is not to minimize the real contribution that the author has made to our knowledge of the subject, by his careful analysis of many of the critical terms used by the theorists, and his placing of them in their semantic context. (There are, of course, many other terms which are frequently used, and perhaps equally important, but these would make necessary a further, complementary study.)

In these first two chapters I have treated Ramus' life and works, and mentioned the actual contact he had with the Pléiade; I have also analyzed the main elements of what is now called (with some justification) Pléiade Poetics. I now come to the main body of my work, which is to set out Ramus' views on the topics discussed by these theorists of the Pléiade.

CHAPTER THREE

ART AND NATURE

One of the basic features of literary criticism in the sixteenth century was, as we have seen, the discussion of the rôles of art and nature in the composition of a work. It is evident that both terms had a very wide currency outside this context, and that an analysis of some of the other ways in which they were used will help towards a fuller appreciation of their function in poetic theory. The writings of Ramus are particularly useful for this purpose because he wrote on almost all the branches of science then known, attempting to define the difference between these branches, and, in the course of his argument, often touching on the problem of the relation of art to nature.

Together with his contemporaries Ramus sometimes uses the word 'ars' almost synonymously with 'scientia', 'disciplina', 'methodus', 'professio' and even 'virtus'. Other words, such as 'doctrina' and 'μύθησις' are often associated with 'ars'; behind most of these terms is the idea that an art is a way of teaching.¹

In the Aristotelicae animadversiones(1556) he attempts a definition of an art. First of all he says that 'categoria' is the 'arrangement of homogeneous things by means of what is most general, subordinate, lowest' and then goes on to state:

1. Ong, EMDD, p.156.

"This definition of category is nothing else than a definition of an art and science arranged according to true principles of method - for art is the perception of homogeneous things by means of what is most general, subordinate, most particular".¹

In the Scholae Metaphysicae Ramus stresses that art proceeds from the general to the particular. The difference between experience (or practice) and art is that experience deals with particulars and art with universals; arts deal with constant eternal things, which are not subject to the ravages of time.² The definition which Ramus gives of 'genus' will tell us something further about this universality:

"Genus is a multitude of similar essences, or the similar essence of many things. Now this is undoubtedly the Platonic Idea, the discussion of which I have left until now so that once genus has been dealt with the Platonic Idea will be more easily understood. For the Platonic Idea is nothing other than genus as I have defined it".³

There is here a very close linking of the Aristotelian theory of forms and the Platonic theory of ideas. It is of the utmost significance that for Ramus here the basis of all arts is the Platonic Idea, and that they are all concerned with making known the universals. Ramus' view, not surprisingly, is far more strictly Aristotelian than is that of Sebillet, Du Bellay or Peletier.⁴

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1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1556), p.115; cf. La Dialectique, (1555), p.121. (In my quotations from La Dialectique I have used the original edition; the modern edition of it has the original page-numbers in brackets, so the reader will be able to refer to this also).
 2. Scholae metaphysicae, in Scholae in liberales artes, (referred to hereafter as SLA), Bâle, 1569, col.831; it is important to notice that this is the edition I refer to by SLA, and not the edition of 1578; it seems to me that the earlier edition is likely to be closer to Ramus' own revision of his works.
 3. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1556), p.94; cf. Brutinae quaestiones, Paris, M. David, 1549, p.22.
 4. Cf. Castor, op.cit., p.55.

Here we have a philosopher, at least vaguely associated with the Pléiade, preaching a doctrine which is more or less purely Aristotelian, long before any of the group got round to accepting such a doctrine.¹

It is not obvious from these definitions which Ramus gives that 'ars' and 'scientia' may be synonymous, nor, indeed, is it obvious from the fact that they are often found linked together. They are, however, equated on at least one occasion, in the Scholae metaphysicae, where a distinction between them is rejected:

"All these words have a common general meaning in true common usage, so that grammar may be called an art, a science, a skill or wisdom, although skill is more often used for actions and wisdom for plans and deliberation".²

'Ars' and 'scientia' are here not distinguished in any way. Elsewhere, too, 'ars' and 'disciplina' are often linked,³ and on one occasion it is made clear that they are synonymous:

"All rational teaching and learning stem from previous knowledge; this is obvious to anyone who takes a global view of the question. And indeed mathematics proceeds to its end in this way, as does each of the other arts".⁴

A little later, commenting further on the Posterior Analytics he claims that 'doctrina' and 'disciplina' refer to complete arts such as grammar, rhetoric and logic.⁵ Now, while these two words 'doctrina' and 'disciplina' are not usually synonymous but complementary, they can both be equivalents of the

1. Peletier is again perhaps something of an exception. In his phrase, 'Car lui qui parle a une eternite, doit seulement toucher le neu, le secret et le fons d'un argument...' (l'Art poétique, ed. Boulanger, p.84), we have more than a theory of the immortality of the poet, something, in fact, very close to the Aristotelian theory of the universals.

2. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.832.

3. Cf. La Dialectique, p.86.

4. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.315.

5. Ibid., col.317.

one word 'ars'. Ong has, of course, pointed out Ramus' error in restricting 'doctrina' and 'disciplina' to formal arts. The Latin words had as wide a range of meanings as the words $\delta\iota\delta\alpha\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$ and $\mu\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ which Ramus was commenting on.¹ Finally, it is interesting that Ramus should hold that all art is teaching, but not that all teaching is art. In the Dialectique (1555) he wrote, 'Or ceste methode n'est seulement appliquée en matiere des arts et doctrines, mais en toutes choses, que nous deliberons enseigner facilement et clerement: Et partant elle est commune aux orateurs, poetes et tous escriuantz'.²

One of Ramus' favourite ideas was that all the different arts or branches of learning are interrelated. There is one method common to them all, and while they each retain their special aims, their ultimate purpose is identical:

"The ends and teaching-procedures of all the arts are separate from one another; they are united, however, in their usefulness; we see the same thing in the possession of farms and fields - my field does not make inroads into yours nor yours into mine, but when we buy, sell or exchange produce, they have a common usefulness."³

Elsewhere, in a justification of his own teaching-practice, in the Pro philosophica disciplina, the metaphor of utility is enriched by one of fruitfulness:

"We teach the different arts at different times, but as their individual fruits gradually ripen, we adapt them to our purposes for rhetoric and for action"; he joins the 'use' of one art to that of another until "we make finally one

1. Ong, RMDD, p.163.

2. La Dialectique, p.123.

3. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.237; Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.16.

common general practice of rhetoric and philosophy out of many special and particular practices." He continues in an untypical departure from his normal philosophical style to illustrate his point with a metaphor from farming:

"In agriculture there are crops, trees, vines, herds and cattle which all demand a particular kind of treatment: we leave the stubble in the fields and carry home the grain: we leave the beasts in the pasture and take home the milk and the fleeces: we give all of them a common usefulness in feeding, nourishing and clothing the body. So it should be in the nourishment of the mind: its various parts should be catered for in different ways."¹

Because of his insistence that all the branches of learning were closely connected Ramus laid himself open to the criticism that he was confusing them. He repeatedly professes that both in theory and practice he really keeps them quite separate; he writes, for example,

"Have all my labours been useless and in vain? For so many years have I been publicly arguing about the distinction of the liberal arts, and have written and published so many books on the subject!"²

His further jibe that anyone who denied this (and many did) could not have read his books, was generally justified. He was clear in his own mind about two complementary aspects, that all the arts had separate ends and should be taught quite distinctly from one another, but that at the same time the process of teaching and learning was similarly exemplified in each, and that their ultimate aim was always 'the cultivation of minds'.

It now remains to examine a little more closely the special aims of some of the individual arts and to see how they fit into the total scheme. There are many instances where Ramus lists the aims of different arts - grammar is the art of writing well, rhetoric of speaking well, logic of reasoning

1. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1020.

2. Ibid., col.1024.

well, and so on, right up to theology which is the art of living well - "for the end of any art is not the knowledge of what is contained there, but use and practice";¹ in this context he shows how the practical aims of all other arts are only part of what is necessary, mere steps towards the acquisition of wisdom:

"So the human arts teach by means of their own precepts to speak, write, reason, count and measure well, and so on according to their aims. Theology, however, teaches how to live well, that is, fittingly and in harmony with God who is the source of all good."

Pagan ethic philosophy fell far short of this ideal in situating man's happiness in his own natural human faculties,

"as though man could find happiness of life within himself, and could acquire it naturally, by learning or by habit, so that either the habit or practice of human virtue, or pleasure or honour could make him happy."

Theology, for Ramus, was God's revelation of himself contained in the canonical books of the two testaments.² But this is Ramus writing at the end of his life - his only work of theology was published posthumously in 1576 - and after he had decided to devote all his energies to the study of Scripture. Earlier on he had indeed seen all arts as leading to God, but he had been more interested in God's direct action on the human mind than His influence through Scripture. The natural light of logic becomes suffused with the divine light, because logic is the image of God:

"How many and how genuine are the images of divine wisdom which learning portrays to the philosophical mind! By what way do we come nearer, in this illusive mortality, to the condition of immortal nature?"³

1. Commentariorum de religione Christiana libri quatuor, (1576), p.6.

2. Ibid., p.7.

3. Dialecticae partitiones, Paris, 1543, p.54.

The answer is, by learning: 'mathesis' (strictly, learning, science, and by extension mathematics) has a broadening, liberating, liberalizing influence:

"Learning frees man from his limitations, or rather it makes man greater than the whole universe, so that he who can scarcely be called a millionth part of it, contemplates the whole with far superior eyes. Are we to feel pity for man as one cast out from his heavenly possessions into the remotest parts of the world, and exiled from his own country? Learning reinstates him into the citizenship and inheritance of his heavenly country."¹

Ramus proposes to heal, by means of his teaching, the diseased body of philosophy, which has become so afflicted by the disastrous state of its health that it has forgotten what it felt like to be well and scarcely even wants to be cured.²

Learning has also a sedative effect on man when he is troubled by unruly desires, restoring harmony in his soul under the rule of reason: "How heavenly and divine it is, when you are wandering blind in the dark, to be able to assess everything in the fullest possible light!"³ The same therapeutic qualities are ascribed to 'iudicium' which is 'the greatest and noblest part of an art': by it men realize their natural nobility; 'For although it is circumscribed by the minute prison of the body, it looses its bonds and frees itself by evaluating and judging'.⁴ The Platonic imagery is made even clearer in the Dialecticae partitiones than in the Dialecticae institutiones, after a discussion of the allegory of the cave, when we are exhorted to "light the fire sent down from heavenly light, and free ourselves from our bonds".⁵

1. Ibid., loc.cit.

2. Ibid., p.3.

3. Ibid., p.55.

4. Dialecticae institutiones, 1543, p.19.

5. Dialecticae partitiones, p.45; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, p.42.

Dialectic will free the mind from its sensuality, and our thought-processes from shackling habits. Ramus goes even further. Learning becomes synonymous with wisdom, and shows us something, however shadowy, of God's own wisdom, and that our own minds are 'struck out from some particle of His own being'.¹ Moreover, logic (which here, as elsewhere, is equated with learning and wisdom)² also finds ready-made images within itself 'when it comes to counsels and precepts about life and manners.'

Some principles are clear 'à nostre premiere et naturelle raison sans observation ny experience de sens aucun, voyre sans doctrine aucune antecedente'.³

Precepts are, in fact, nothing other than formulated natural messages.⁴ It is even possible for Ramus to talk about principles as 'singular gifts of nature'.⁵ The most outstanding natural gifts which have been accorded to man are, of course, reason and speech⁶ but there are all sorts of other natural gifts. The first principles of arithmetic, for example, are inborn within us ('divinely inborn')⁷, and moral principles are 'written in our hearts (animis)',⁸ From earliest childhood a boy has 'a natural bent towards using his reason',⁹ so that the only true method of teaching is that which performs an appraisal of

1. Dialecticae partitiones, p.55v; the soul is also described as "descended from the region of heaven", Dialecticae partitiones, p.49v.
2. Cf. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.833.
3. La Dialectique, p.85.
4. Dialecticae partitiones, p.62.
5. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.235.
6. Ibid., col.238.
7. Dialecticae partitiones, p.51v.
8. Ibid., pp.81v-82; cf. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1543), p.65v; it seems to me that Ramus' view here is not unlike that of Pascal, who saw that first principles, even those of mathematics, were known by the heart and not by the reason alone, or even primarily (cf. Pensées, ed. Brunschvicg, no.282).
9. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), p.II; cf., (1554), p.5.

propositions by progressing from those which are most naturally evident to those which are less so. The whole process of dialectic is called 'that eternal reason which is inborn and divinely imprinted in individual men's minds'.¹ As always, Ramus is here aware of a hierarchy within the arts. All arts are, indeed, called 'mental gifts and virtues',² but they do not all have the same immediacy and importance. On one occasion Ramus asks, if, as Josephus asserts, mathematics were given to the Hebrew people, almost with God teaching them directly, is it likely that logic would not be divinely inspired?³ And to go even one grade higher, the doctrine of theology is given by God to men. Since the knowledge of God is innate, this may seem rather obvious, but Ramus' expression is very emphatic, "divinely offered by God to men", with the suggestion of religious sacrifice contained in the 'oblata'.⁴ Ramus explains that the reason for our veiled and imperfect knowledge of God is that we are suffering the effects of original sin.⁵

The ultimate aim of life is to live according to nature ('naturae congruenter conuenienterque'), that is, with fortitude, justice, freedom, moderation, prudence and religion.⁶ We realize that in order to do this we must obey the dictates of our conscience.⁷ We are aware that we are not merely sensual

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1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1543), p.4v.
 2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1025.
 3. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.3; Ramus often returns to the idea that the art of mathematics was given by God to the Chaldeans; see, for example, the preface to the Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.4, (also in SLA, (1569), p.233); and M.T. Ciceronis de Fato liber, in Praelectiones in Ciceronis orationes octo consulares, (1575), p.302.
 4. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.7.
 5. Ibid., pp.24-5.
 6. Dialecticae partitiones, pp.55v-56.
 7. Ibid., pp.81v-82; cf. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.65v.

beasts but have the gift of free will. Ramus insists that he has always (this is 1543, in his first published work) praised the freedom of man's will (he calls it elevated, loveable, glorious) and considered slavery detestable.¹ This may seem to be in contradiction to the Platonic theory, which he adopts, of man's imprisonment in the body, but the two notions are not incompatible. Man is, indeed, limited by his body and by the world, but this is the given situation in which he must work out his freedom. To deny the limitations of the body would mean that one was not living according to nature.

The rational man knows that his share of the virtues is a mere spark of God's total possession of them, and when he has mastered the explanations of all the different arts, he will perceive that philosophy is "the love of God, Who is supreme goodness, for He is all truth and wisdom, to which all the studies and thoughts of men are naturally referred".² The aim of all arts or teaching, looked at from this rather different point of view, is the love of God. This is well summed up in the Dialecticae partitiones:

"All arts and teaching have no other aim than the contemplative admiration of the immense variety of nature, which has been established by the ineffable wisdom of the supremely good God. For this reason, all labour, industriousness, emulation, fame and literary excellence, together with that of any other art, exhort us to embrace by our own praise, justice and piety, the majesty of this great good and eternal power."³

1. Dialecticae partitiones, p.83 cf. ibid., p.56v.

2. Ibid., pp.70-70v.

3. Ibid., pp.41v-2; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, p.41, which adds that the aim is the contemplation of the Pythagorean sphere, equally spread through all the parts of the world, whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere. In Dialecticae partitiones, (pp.47-47v) men's minds are called 'glittering sparks' of the rays of divine light, and we read also (p.56v) of 'sparks divinely planted in our minds'. These seem to me partially to cover the divine activity in the person which is usually ascribed to grace. Some of these sparks, for example, make us patient, some generous, some are directed at the preservation of peaceful human relations within society, and some are for mastering unruly passion. Only in the final place do we find those which are meant to help us in the study of all arts and sciences.

These are some of the most important of the various meanings of 'art' in Ramus. However, the term can rarely be properly understood on its own, since it was normally thought of as one pole, with nature as the other. The two primary meanings of nature in this context are inseparable - origin and inherence. Ramus was well aware of the multiple other meanings 'nature' may have.¹ He discusses, on more than one occasion, Aristotle's various partial definitions of nature, and finds them unsatisfactory. Nature, for example, according to Aristotle, is the principle and cause of movement and rest, in which it primarily inheres, 'per se' and not 'per accidens'. Ramus criticizes this definition on the grounds that the addition of the word 'rest' is unnecessary amplification; the definition could apply to a certain extent to artefacts, and above all, it does not apply to all nature, for example, matter and form. A second Aristotelian definition or description of nature which Ramus refers to is 'that which is primarily inherent in something, simple and 'per se'.' Although this is the sense Ramus himself usually attributes to nature, he finds Aristotle's statement of it tautologous. Two other descriptions are given, firstly, that nature is 'the form and species which we use in defining what a thing is', and secondly, that it is 'genesis' or 'generation'.² Elsewhere Ramus lists five modes of nature according to Aristotle: generation, matter, efficiency (the principle of movement), subject, and the essence of things which are 'constant by nature'.³ These are not to be taken as synonyms of nature, but rather as ways in which Aristotle (and Ramus, too, in spite of himself) looked on nature. The 'nature of an art' has a special meaning. In

1. Cf. D.B. Wilson, Ronsard, Poet of Nature.

2. Scholae physicae, SLA, col.663-7.

3. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.896-7.

all arts except that of dialectic it is differentiated from the subject-matter (materia) of the art. In medicine, for example, the nature of the art is the doctor's skill, the matter is health, medicine, and anything which is contained in the precepts. But in dialectic they are the same since it deals with skill in discourse.¹ The nature of anything is contained in its causes and we can see, here again, the idea that nature is synonymous with origin. The nature of man (that is to say, his substance) is contained in his body and soul since these (matter and form) are the principal causes in which his nature is contained.² In the same way, the nature of the soul lies in its three-fold make-up, or the three causes, vegetative, sensitive, rational, 'desquelles l'essence de nostre ame est composée'.³

Ramus repeats the dictum that art imitates nature. For him, art is an attempt to express (re-present) the natural, that is, what is inborn in man before he has recourse to labour, study, practical exercise or industry. The science of logic, for instance, is an imitation of natural logic. The teaching process is a copy of the natural process, a reflection of the order in nature; that which is natural to us has been given to us by God, and our innate ideas are proof of the natural origin of all arts; the practical aim of all the arts is that they should be either taught or studied in order to improve men, leading them back to God through an understanding of nature (the universe) and of man himself (in his nature). At times Ramus indulges in a neoplatonic lyricism about nature. In 1543 he wrote about the singular beauty of the universe, the symmetry of the world, its flowers, waters, and infinite

1. Dialecticae libri duo, (1556), p.7.

2. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.298.

3. La Dialectique, p.49.

variety of living beings, listing these beauties in some detail, and referring them all back to their source:

"Now do not these principal components of the world show forth in the shadows the goodness, prudence and wisdom of the most powerful God, their author and begetter, and endow them with all possible meaning?"¹

Natural logic is seen as an image of God, yet from man's point of view nature is the true exemplar, and art is the image:

"The difference between nature and art is the same as that between a true exemplar and an imitated image."²

At the same time as art reflects the variety of nature and divine goodness, from a different point of view art is imperfect, because the very diversity of nature is an imperfection. In its imitation of nature, art follows natural prudence:

"This is the true observation of nature, from which learning should never depart, but should follow religiously as if it were a god. It will be seen to have fulfilled its function with distinction if it is able to imitate the discretion of nature."³

This imitation has two stages: the teacher organizes his material by observing (and then copying) nature, and later proposes his view of nature for imitation by the disciple. It is important to understand what is meant here by nature: it is whatever is inborn in man, and especially as exemplified in particularly gifted men. Thus art learns from nature and then teaches nature in that the teacher works upon the natural gifts of the pupils. One's natural character benefits greatly by being presented with a true description of itself and so achieves self-knowledge. Ramus altered this text in the course of 1543;

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1. Dialecticae partitiones, pp.48v-49.
 2. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.8.
 3. Dialecticae partitiones, pp.4-4v.

when the revised Dialecticae institutiones came out in the autumn the phrase "the natural signs inborn in men of outstanding character" was changed to "the signs inborn and inherent in human spirits".¹ This refinement of the idea of what is innate was the result of an inclination to democracy. All men are naturally logicians and the aristocracy of the intellect was irrelevant.² This change of text is corroborated by another very similar one in the two editions. In the earlier text Ramus invites the reader to choose out from all living men those who were outstanding examples of natural shrewdness and discernment (but who had no knowledge of logic), such men as Homer's Nestor and Ulysses had been,³ and he will find that they are quite at ease in any discussion of great moment, giving evidence of their natural qualities. The later text modifies this, omitting the reference to Homer and to outstanding men; it asks the reader to look rather at peasant people

"and in order to form a proper idea of nature's liberality towards men, ask these unskilled, unlettered vine-growers, who have never even heard of the existence of an art of reasoning, about the prospects of the coming year's harvest, and what quantity of wine can be expected, then an image of nature will be reflected in their minds as in a mirror".⁴

This fits in with Ramus' general appeal to common sense⁵, and with his view that all dialectic is popular, natural and expressed primarily in popular and natural speech. The common people are the ultimate court of appeal for the correct use of language.⁶ Ramus does not seem to have been particularly

1. Dialecticae institutiones, p.6.

2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1025.

3. Cf. Institutiones oratoriae, (1545), (Talon), where the unlettered rhetoric of Ulysses and Menelaus is discussed; cf., also, Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1068, where rhetoric and philosophy are both called 'to a large extent natural'.

4. Dialecticae partitiones, p.2; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, p.6.

5. Dialecticae partitiones, p.12v; cf. Prooemium reformandae Parisiensis Academiae, SLA, col.1097.

6. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1543), p.10.

happy about this question, however, because in 1548 he reverts to his former position, and adds an explanation, namely that we should not be surprised if unlettered people seem to achieve the same results as the learned, because this is often indirectly the result of art in that they have followed the example and practice of others.¹ In the Prooemium mathematicum there is a curious departure from Ramus' normal theory that all men are born logicians. He seems to except the American savages.²

Art is also often referred to by Ramus as "the image and picture of nature". The art of dialectic imitates natural dialectic and indeed the truth (true content) of any art is to be found in nature before any principles are formulated.³ We cannot, however, grasp or appreciate what is natural without some sort of formulation of it. The creative originality of art is limited in so far as it must not contain anything which is not imitated from nature.⁴ Ramus stresses again and again that "the art of dialectic is an image of natural dialectic"⁵ and finds fault with Aristotle for ignoring this principle. When Ramus says that logic is natural to all men he means that it is innate, God-given. This is a strange equation of 'natural' and 'divine' which is not without parallel in other fields of Renaissance thought. Art is similarly contrasted by the theorists of poetry with both nature and divine inspiration, so that the distinctions between the two latter are often blurred. On numerous occasions Ramus uses the expression 'mother nature' or 'parent nature'.⁶ This accords well with the view of

1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.10.

2. Prooemium mathematicum, p.270.

3. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), p.6; cf. Ong, RMDD, pp.181-2.

4. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.3v.

5. Ibid., p.4v.

6. Cf., for example, Dialecticae partitiones, p.82.

nature as both origin and principle of generation. It is significant that in revising the 1543 Aristotelicae animadversiones in 1548 Ramus changed the phrase 'the dictates of our parent nature' into 'the dictates of almighty God.'¹ God is nature. So it is that we find almost identical references to God as the author and parent of the universe, 'God the parent of all things'.² Natural logic is described as 'the eternal reason which is inborn and impressed by God upon individual human minds'.³ In a final summing-up, in the Scholae dialecticae, of the differences between Aristotle and himself in the question of logic, the first contrast Ramus makes is this, that while he himself derives all logic from the imitation of nature, according to the practice of human prudence, Aristotle starts from an inadequate definition, and flounders in the idle sophistic wranglings of the Schools.⁴ The theory that all men are born logicians finds its clearest expression in the Dialectique of 1555. In his discussion of the syllogism Ramus writes of reason, "certainement ceste partie en l'homme est image de quelque divinité", precisely because it is natural to man and distinguishes him from animals.⁵ This gift of God is often spoken of as a light:

"Et partant (comme dict Socrate au lieu mesme) la lumiere de ceste methode est un don des Dieux, conferé aux hommes par un Promethée avecques un feu reluysant et resplendissant".⁶

After stressing that practical experience is more desirable than art, Ramus goes on to say, as a conclusion to his book,

1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.470.
2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.49v and p.55v.
3. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.4v.
4. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.556.
5. La Dialectique, p.119.
6. Ibid., p.127.

"ie priray (sic) le Dieu tout puissant, qui est le seul parfaict logicien, et qui seulement en tout et par tout use parfaitement de raison, qu'il vous continue le bon vouloir de maintenir et auancer ceste philosophie, et toutes honnestes et liberalles disciplines".

Just as there is a natural logic so grammar and rhetoric are natural to men; logic because men are rational animals, grammar and rhetoric because they are endowed (praeditos)² with a mother tongue

"by which they may express not only what is in their minds, but they can show various feelings in different ways by exclamation, by turning away, by communing, by imitating".³

Talon, in his Institutiones oratoriae (1545) published, as we have seen, in very close collaboration with Ramus, amplifies the point that rhetoric is natural:

"For God has implanted in us quick mental processes which are fruitful and abundant for expressing all thoughts and judgements, and when these have been strengthened by a knowledge of the subject, hard work and meditation, then the gift of eloquence becomes outstanding and excellent".⁴

Talon comments on the imitative use of language in the child before he has had contact with any written arts. Since any speech is an example of natural rhetoric, the art of rhetoric is concerned with all things, "it can exist in, and wander freely through the vast field of all things and all arts",

1. Ibid., pp.139-40; cf., ibid., p.ii: Prometheus took heavenly fire from the 'officine' of Minerva, 'pour esclaircir et enluminer l'esprit de l'homme'; it is interesting to note that in the preface to M.T. Ciceronis de Fato (contained in Praelectiones in Ciceronis orationes octo consulares, (1575), p.284), Ramus writes, 'At bone, imò etiam dialectice Deus, vtinam homines dialecticam artem aut veram nossent, aut omnino nullam nossent'.
2. Men can also be seen as 'endowed with a liberal erudition' even though this must have been laboriously acquired, Oratio de sua professione, SLA, col.1108.
3. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1025.
4. Institutiones oratoriae, p.6.

and whatever claim other arts may have to the "science and knowledge of things", rhetoric reserves to itself the task of 'embellishing and illuminating the praise of speech'.¹ In this activity the art of rhetoric imitates the natural processes: "The parts of the art of rhetoric correspond to the parts of nature, one of which deals with the praise of single words, the other with that of words joined together".²

Neither Ramus nor Talon composed an art of poetry, but they were both aware that their principles applied to poetry as well, though with the obvious difference that while poets are dependent on their natural inspiration, not all men are poets. In the Prooemium mathematicum (1567), Ramus quotes the adage, current at the time, that poets are born not made:

"Popular opinion thinks that poets are born such, and are driven on by a fury of the mind to pour forth outstanding poems";

Ramus immediately refers this to his own theory of the arts in general:

"But this natural vigour is common to all virtues and to all learning, in which nobody will reach perfection, unless he is impelled by his natural genius and goodness, or rather unless he is carried off by force".³

(This is a refinement on Ramus' earlier position; he seems uncertain whether perfection is attainable or not. God is the only perfect logician; men are imperfect logicians in varying degrees. The aim of all teaching is perfection, [teaching itself is a 'virtus'], and it is the perpetual search for

1. I shall deal with this question of the 'praise' of words when I come to talk about ornament. At this stage we may take it simply as synonymous with ornament.

2. Ibid., p.8.

3. Prooemium mathematicum, p.37; the phrase is very often found in the poetry and poetic theory of the time: cf., for example, Sebillet, Art Poétique François, ed.cit., p.25; Du Bellay, Deffence et Illustration, ed. Chamard (1948), p.105, and Peletier, L'Art Poétique, ed.cit., p.73.

perfection that ensures that successive generations continue to search for the truth. When Aristotle is styled the 'inventeur et perfecteur'¹ of a certain theory, we are not dealing with a final perfection but with a stage on the road. That perfection is relative (and means 'perfecting') is understood from a reference to Euclid's Elements, 'desquelz la methode est estimée tres parfaite').² The passage from the Prooemium mathematicum continues:

"Grass grows spontaneously in the fields, but different kinds grow more profusely and more richly in different places. In the same way we are to think that the seeds of the arts are naturally inborn in men's minds, but different kinds are more abundant in different people".³

Ramus concludes by saying that this explains how Hippocrates, a merchant, should have risen to be so great and original a mathematician. Talon makes it clear that rhetoricians, too, have differing gifts: 'those qualities of nature shine more brilliantly in some people than in others'.⁴

Poets are among those whose writing attempts to be natural, to follow the natural and spontaneous order of thought and speech. This is why the complete syllogism is so infrequently found. Ramus writes,

"Car souvent et presque tousiours es poetes, orateurs, philosophes, et tous auteurs suyuantz l'usage naturel, encore qu'ilz traictent questions syllogistiques, neantmoins quelque partie du syllogisme est delaissée".⁵

And in following the natural method which is common to all writers, they are imitating nature.

Ramus, after Quintilian, divided up each art into three sections: nature, art and practice.⁶ This is an important part of Ramus' teaching from his

1. La Dialectique, p.vii.

2. Ibid., p.127.

3. Prooemium mathematicum, p.37.

4. Institutiones oratoriae, p.6.

5. La Dialectique, p.114.

6. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.242; cf. Prooemium reformandae Parisiensis Academiae, SLA, col.1085.

earliest writings onwards. In 1543 he writes:

"For nature establishes in man the principle of reasoning, art instructs him with its suitable advice, and practice finishes the education of such a man."¹

Here the texts of the Dialecticae partitiones and the Dialecticae institutiones differ. The earlier one goes on to say that there is a prudence which is natural to men, and that

"as soon as men are born, one is siezed with a more obvious and more ardent personal zeal to make use of his reason, and another is duller and slower."²

Similarly, the sense of logic common to all men is possessed in greatly differing degrees. The whole art of rhetoric is based on the assumption that "the minds of the listeners have different capacities",³ and the same is observed in other sciences.⁴ The arts, indeed, are not discovered and elaborated for the sake of excellent or perfect minds, but in order to help the dull.⁵

The revised text of the Dialecticae institutiones was amplified as follows: the three parts of an art are referred to as three books which are essential, "for the fruitfulness and praise of every discipline". The first of the three,

"the great and good God has imprinted in our souls with eternal characters; the second, a diligent observer of nature has fashioned with little imitated signs according to the exemplar of those divine signs; the third is embraced by hand and tongue, as abundantly as is possible."

Nature and practical exercise are both from within, albeit in different ways; one is inborn, the other voluntary. Art alone relies on an extrinsic

1. Dialecticae partitiones, p.lv; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, p.5v.

2. Ibid., p.6.

3. Oratio de studiis mathematicis, (1544), p.9v.

4. Prooemium mathematicum, p.37.

5. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.4.

cause. Ramus speaks of "natural dialectic, that is, talent, reason, mind, the image of God the parent of all things."¹

Apart from differences in natural ability which are with us from birth, there are differences which are the result of differing degrees of application:

"Car combien qu'ilz soyent tous naturellement participans de la faculté syllogistique, neantmoins le nombre est bien petit de ceux qui s'estudient d'en bien user, et de ce petit nombre encor est beaucoup moindre la quantité de ceux qui sçauent disposer par bonne methode et cinger".²

The Dialecticae institutiones goes on to say that the light of logic which is 'emulous of that blessed and eternal light' is something proper to man. In spite of art's being the only one of the three which is not natural to us, it is sometimes seen as the simplest and most easily accessible. Ramus attacks the idea that art alone is sufficient.³ He was in agreement with those of his contemporaries who said that art and nature were equally indispensable to a writer. He asks whether anyone can be a perfect grammarian, logician and so on, without these three 'virtues' and claims that anyone who wants to describe the excellence(perfection) of the grammarian etc., must include these three qualities.⁴

1. Dialecticae institutiones, 1543, pp.5v-6: Since man is made in the image of God (cf. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.142 etc.), natural dialectic becomes synonymous with his nature or essence: cf. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA col.836: "of all the powers and faculties of the soul, none is more desirable than reason, to which corresponds the art of logic; the other arts make a man a grammarian, an arithmetician, a geometrician. Logic makes him a logical man, that is a man ..."cf.,also, Dialecticae institutiones, 1554, pp.273-4: "man's whole life should be nothing but meditation and the practice of reason".
2. La Dialectique, p.135.
3. Scholae dialecticae, SLA col.434.
4. Brutinae quaestiones, 1549, p.85.

The method of any art is centered on the practical exercising of it; this is the only possible way it can achieve its purpose and be of use to man in his pursuit of self-perfection. This is well expressed in the Aristotelicae animadversiones of 1548:

"No instrument, no art is used for its own sake: grammar is used for the explaining of poets and orators, and for speaking and writing properly. Geometry was not invented in order to measure itself or its precepts, but to measure everything long, broad and high".¹

This is partly, of course, an attack on the aridities of the Schools, but it is not simply destructive. It contains the basis of Ramus' pedagogical reform. In a later summing-up of this he says: 'The end of the arts is not subtlety, but real and solid utility'². Wisdom is essentially practical³ - here Ramus appeals to the example of Socrates. That usefulness is the aim is amply born out by the whole pattern of Ramus' work: his rearrangement of the curriculum and his pleas for university reform, as well as in his repeated statement of his theory. He says, for instance:

"I made the true natural usefulness of true natural examples the basis of my Scholae dialecticae, and the begetter not only of logic, but of all teaching."⁴

He delighted in his examples; it must, however, be admitted that he saw them as true only in so far as they were natural and in keeping with the subject. The force of the examples was twofold: the teacher showed the pupil practical everyday illustrations of the theories he was propounding, and so guaranteed the usefulness of the art, and at the same time he taught his

1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.249.

2. Ibid., p.348.

3. Scholae grammaticae, SLA, col.5.

4. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.420.

subject better, because it became less arid and more easily remembered. This is well brought out in the preface to the Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), where the author, while discussing how to teach philosophy to young people, suggests the twofold programme of usefulness and ease of learning, "to increase the fruits of the pupils' industry, and to diminish the irksomeness of the long time spent in it". The art of dialectic is to be described according to the use of natural human reason, that is in accordance with natural inborn logic, by means of examples taken from poets and orators, and by an examination of the saying of philosophers and even of other men. In this context, as often elsewhere, 'docere' and 'exercere' are inseparably linked. The humanist approach is in great evidence in this celebrated union of philosophy and eloquence.¹ Ramus appeals against a slavish and bookish following of Aristotle and advocates a return to the living methods of the true Aristotle. The logician is equated with man himself; "a man is not a logician simply because he teaches the rules of logic", and this for two reasons: firstly, because true logic is synonymous with wisdom, which is practical ('for wisdom is universal knowledge'), and secondly, because he needs also to have seen how logic is related to all other disciplines, how it is fundamental to everything else:

"That man is a logician who produces an art of logic by explaining and unravelling the writings of poets, orators and philosophers, using argument, enunciation, syllogism and method; who observes and cultivates their logical virtues by long and assiduous meditation, writing and speaking; who has given himself to long and repeated practice in all kinds of labour and study".²

1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.58.

2. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.68.

The contradiction between the wish to 'diminish the irksomeness' of study and the necessity for 'long and repeated practice' is not a serious one. Ramus' constant desire was to lighten the burden of the student, by improving his own teaching-methods in his classes and in his writings, but at the same time he was unwilling to state that the acquisition of truth was a simple and effortless quest. The very conception of the 'scientia in agendo' meant that, initially, hard work was unavoidable:

"this is the hard labour with which the immortal gods have surrounded virtue; this is the rough, difficult, arduous path, and when you have climbed to the top of it, everything will then become easy for you".¹

Everything is capable of improvement by the application of art:

"There is nothing which is beyond improvement either because it is too constant or too indifferent. Nothing which cannot be sharpened with the help of art".²

But this sharpening process always entails much work. The process of invention, for example, is fraught with difficulty ('difficile et rare à trouver').³ Ramus was a great believer in the corporate effort of scholarship: particular arts 'ont esté reiglees par grand labeur de plusieurs hommes'.⁴ he talks also of 'tant de manoeuvres, voire tant d'excellentz architectes et maistres d'oeuvres'.⁵ Dialectic itself will be advanced only by 'long (sic) estude et recherche du naturel usage et de la vraye pratique de raison'.⁶ Even if inborn precepts seem easy and natural, there is always hard work involved in applying them and in appreciating them.⁷ Study and

1. Ibid., col.69.

2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.5.

3. La Dialectique, p.52.

4. Ibid., p.ii.

5. Ibid., p.x.

6. Ibid., p.86.

7. Animadversiones aristotelicae, (1548), p.459.

hard work are necessary, even, if we are to profit from our powers of reminiscence. (Ramus does not, of course, accept Plato's doctrine of reminiscence absolutely, but some of his statements seem to assume it. On one occasion¹ he compares Plato with Aristotle on this point showing that for Plato men's immortal souls were "taken out of the fountain of the godhead" and so had some knowledge before they entered the body, whereas for Aristotle the soul was recently infused into the body and was like a clean tablet without any pre-knowledge; it had the potency of knowledge but that was all. Ramus' own view is a fusion of the two). Wisdom is exceedingly difficult to attain, according to Aristotle, because the most universal precepts (which are, as we have seen, the proper concern of art) are those which are furthest removed from the senses. Ramus accepts the statement about the difficulty of wisdom, but not the reason, because what is most removed from the senses enjoys the greatest natural clarity.² In the study of logic, as of any other art or science, we must always use our energies of labour, vigilance and study.³ This is summed up in the word 'industria'.⁴ Practice, or use, (exercise) is often seen as the most important of the three, nature, art and exercise. Art is perhaps, from many points of view, the least important:

"Et vouldroit beaucoup mieux avoir l'usage sans art que l'art sans usage car par l'usage de raison sans art nous voyons en toutes pars de la République maintz hommes sages et de bon jugement, c'est à dire grands logiciens et dialecticiens. Et par l'art de raison sans usage, nous cognoissons souvent en noz escholes, selon le dict d'Aristotle, je ne sçay quelz Mercure de Passon".⁵

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1. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.485-7.
 2. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.834.
 3. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1016.
 4. Prooemium reformandae Parisiensis Academiae, SLA, col.1106.
 5. La Dialectique, p.139.

You can often find practice in great minds without art being present.¹ The whole merit of any art will be found in its practical application. 'La pratique faict l'artisan' sums up an idea which Ramus repeated over and over again.² We read that the apprentice observes and considers 'les mandemens du maistre' and even more importantly, 'les exemples et oeuvres d'icelluy', and by imitation 'faict quelque chef d'oeuvre'.³ Philosophy itself is seen rather as action than as knowledge.⁴ Ramus attacks, too, the view which saw mathematics as a purely contemplative science, separated from the interest of the vulgar mob.⁵

Every true logician must be analytic, that is, he must make use of the examples to be found in all kinds of writing. Fouquelin, Talon's translator, makes a similar point concerning the orator:

"Pour le quel exercice de la vois [on] ne doit estre content de ces exemples, ains doit élire des poètes et orateurs les plus insignes exemples qu'il pourra, et exercer sa vois de toutes sortes."⁶

This was Ramus' own personal approach at exactly the same date. In the Dialectique he laments the difficulties entailed in the practical approach:

"Car experimenter par usage, observer par lecture des poètes, orateurs, philosophes, et bref de tous excellentz hommes, et non seulement approuver par leurs tesmoignages et exemples ce qui est conuenable: mais refuter le contraire contre l'opinion si long temps publiquement receue, outre ce que ie confesse estre chose laborieuse, hélas (mon MECENE) c'est mettre les ventz orageux sur la mer..."⁷

1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.73.

2. La Dialectique, p.136; cf. Prooemium mathematicum, p.223.

3. La Dialectique, p.137.

4. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.148-9.

5. Prooemium mathematicum, pp.224-8.

6. Antoine Fouquelin, La Rhetorique françoise, Paris, 1555, p.124; this is the 1557 reading: in 1555 the text was 'un enfant ne doit estre...'

7. La Dialectique, preface.

And indeed Ramus was accused of inconstancy because he tried by repeated revision to improve his own writings and those of others.

There is a lengthy treatment in the Scholae dialecticae of the topic of practical exercises. No art is to be self-centredly concerned with 'noise about precepts'; let the pupil exercise his art rather 'in serious matters and useful examples'. Those aspiring to the mastery of any art are required to pass a practical examination:

"they are not only questioned about the rules, but they are tried and tested in the most difficult kind of example, explanation and formation to see how competent they are in the subject; nor are they judged worthy of the name of craftsman unless they are capable not only of reciting the precept by heart, but also of putting spontaneously into practice the most difficult and important part of the art".¹

So must we deal with logic. When Aristotle was alive he taught logic by analyzing Homer. He will be our example.

Finally, the use Ramus makes of the word 'artifice' and some other related words needs clarification. 'Art' in Ramus is often associated with 'artifice', which is perhaps an aspect of an art. It is used neutrally without any suggestion of deceit or contrivance, except what is inevitable in our approximate knowledge of reality. (This is striving rather than contriving. The body of knowledge is so vast that no one has ever known, or will ever know all that could be known, not even the thousandth part of it).² 'Artificium' is synonymous with 'instrumentum' (Dialectic, for example, is the 'proper artifice and instrument for explaining all things'.³) 'Artificium' is used to refer to man's technical skill. It is used in the plural

1. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.111.
 2. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.833.
 3. Dialecticae partitiones, p.25.

to describe the activities of filing (limare) and shaping (fingere). Any artist or craftsman (such as the orator) is called 'artifex', and God Himself is seen as the 'universitatis artifex'.¹ (This sheds an interesting light on the idea of creative originality).² 'Artificial' for Ramus (apart from an importantly idiosyncratic technical usage which we shall see later)³ means 'made by man's skill' or 'referring to an artefact'.⁴ 'Instruments' are the tools of the trade (literally or figuratively). So the τόποι or places are the instruments of invention.⁵ Reason and speech are instruments for progress in the arts.⁶ Names, too, are seen as instruments of things, handy tools which help us to locate the things to which they correspond.⁷

The points of contact between Ramus' attitude to art and nature, and that of the Pléiade theorists are numerous. We must again make the proviso that Ramus is not talking about poetic theory, but about a general aesthetic theory and a theory of language and communication. But this perhaps is the most significant factor which comes out of his discussion of the problem: poetic theory is part of a much broader background. This fact gives deeper meaning to the questions raised in all the arts of poetry about the relation

1. ibid., p.57; cf. p.53; cf., also, Oratio de studiis philosophiae et eloquentiae jungendis, (1546), in Collectaneae Praefationes, (1577), p.306, where we read 'Deus ille parens ingeniorum et artifex'.
2. Cf. Castor, op.cit., p.198.
3. see below, p.173.
4. La Dialectique, pp.5 and 8; cf. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.327.
5. Animadversiones aristotelicae, (1548), p.253.
6. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.322.
7. La Dialectique, pp.4 and 7.

of inspiration to technique, and about the relative need for talent and for craftsmanship.

The divine origin of poetry, poetry as a kind of fury imparted by God or the gods, is something which fits very well into Ramus' view of the origin of all the arts. It ties in also with his occasional equation of the natural and the divine. There are clearly many neoplatonist elements in the work of all the theorists of the Pléiade and others who wrote about poetic theory at the same time. The two people who best illustrate this, Sebillet and Pontus de Tyard, did not belong to the group, and were not even associated with it particularly closely, but, of course, Du Bellay and Ronsard often wrote in the neoplatonist vein about the writing of poetry. Many critics have wondered how sincerely and profoundly the poets and theorists believed in their neoplatonism. This question is more important in the matter of the theory, because it is there of more immediate concern to the reader whether a particular explanation is meant to be metaphorical or literally true. It seems to me that in this instance at least it is quite obvious that both Ramus and the other theorists approached the matter with the utmost seriousness. The neoplatonism had become assimilated to Christian theology. This seriousness is in great evidence in the theological commentary which Ramus wrote, Commentariorum de religione Christiana, which takes over the general approach to theology of Ficino, and adds to it the more highly developed syncretist attitudes of the later French Renaissance and of Protestant writings.¹

1. In his article on Fouquelin's Rhetorique Françoise, R. Leake draws attention to the fact that the author does not mention the divine inspiration of poetry. I am not certain that this omission is significant. The book, in so far as it talks of poetry at all, is concerned with the mechanical techniques of the art and nothing more. What is clear is that since it is Ramist in conception and expression it fits into the whole Ramist doctrine of the origin of the arts; cf. 'The Relationship of Two Ramist Rhetorics: Omer Talon's Rhetorica and Antoine Fouquelin's Rhetorique Françoise' in Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1968, p.103.

Sebillet is perhaps of all the writers under discussion the nearest to Ramus. His book opens with a passage which is almost pure Ramus (not because it is in any way Ramist in the later sense of the word, but because it is within exactly the same neoplatonist tradition):

"Tous les ars sont tant conjoins avec ceste divine perfection que nous appellons Vertu, que outre ce qu'ilz ont assis leur fondement sus elle comme pierre quarrée et ferme, encor ont ilz emprunté d'elle leur vertueuse appellation. Et pourtant ceuz qui ont dit que la vertu et les ars sourdoient d'une mesme source, c'est a dire, de ce profond abyme celeste ou est la divinité, ont bien entendu que la felicité de cognoistre les choses, et la perfection de les bien faire, avoient tout un et mesme effét. Aussi est-ce que nous appellons science (mère a vray dire et nourrice de l'oeuvre vertueus) chose propre a la divinité; et de ceste science l'art est tant prochain, et de si pres frère, que les prenant un pour autre, on ne serait de guere abusé. Et certes comme en tous les ars ceste estincelle du feu divin a l'approcher de l'esprit son semblable, rend lumière, par laquelle ell'est évidemment congneue; aussi en l'art Poétique (me soit permis de nommer art ce que plus proprement j'appelleroie divine inspiration) reluyt elle en plus vive et plus apparente splendeur".¹

I have quoted this passage at great length because it comes at the beginning of the first of the poetic manifestoes of the time, and because it seems to me that it relates the poetic theory to the general theory of knowledge current at the time in a way that none of the other writings (except those of Ramus) manage to do. It will be seen that it contains many of the ideas I have been dealing with in this chapter. The main points of contact here are: the linking of all the arts in the divine virtue, and the linking of knowledge with perfection; the equation of art with science, and the

1. Sebillet, Art Poétique François, ed. Félix Gaiffe, pp.7-9; for another general discussion of the relation between art and nature, cf., especially, Peletier, L'Art Poétique, ed. André Boulanger, pp.72-79, chapter entitled 'De la Nature e de l'Exercice', and the accompanying notes.

account of the spark of divine inspiration. All the theorists of poetry share with Ramus the notion that this inspiration is a 'don divin', and they ascribe to the poet the power to heal and to restore harmony to the soul, which Ramus had ascribed to art in general, and above all to philosophy. Just as the poets had thought that poetry was a sacred science which brought man nearer to the godhead, so Ramus envisages a similar ascent which he describes in moving, lyrical language; for him, however, the medium is not poetry, but philosophy.

In any Renaissance account of literary theory we find a discussion of the academic questions whether you can have art without nature, and which of the two is the more important. The answer seems obvious enough, that you will achieve more when natural talent expresses itself in a disordered way, than when an ungifted person relies merely on precept and the tricks of the trade. But the Renaissance thought for the most part that the two were equally indispensable, though each of the writers seems at first sight to be laying emphasis on one or the other. Sebillet seems to be more interested in the divine inspiration of the poet, and yet his book is in large part a manual of verse-forms and metres. Du Bellay counteracts Sebillet's theory with a new one, summarized by the title of his chapter, 'Que le naturel n'est suffisant à celui qui en Poesie veult faire oeuvre digne de l'immortalité'. Peletier, for his part, seems to have a more balanced view;

"De toutes les opinions, celle de Peletier, qui s'inspire surtout d'Horace, est la plus conciliante. Toute en reconnaissant l'importance prédominante des dons naturels, il estime que la nature ne saurait se passer de l'art non plus que l'art de la nature".¹

1. Boulanger, ed. cit., p.72.

Peletier discusses two main meanings of nature: the first of these is nature as the creative force:

"Mes certés qui vouldroët prandreï ici Natureï ampleïment, pour cetë grand' ouurierië, qui agit uniuerseïement sus tout ce qui ët au mondeï, e sus tout ce qui tombeï an la cogitacion des hommës: e qui comprend mêmës les choses quë nous apëlons contrë natureï, e ancorës les supernatureïles: lors il n'i auroët quë la Natureï au Poëtë, quand il n'i auroiët quë la Natureï au Mondeï".¹

In this sense nature includes what is normally considered to be the province of art. The second sense of nature which Peletier considers is a narrower one:

"cë qui ët imposë an nous, sans notrë peinë et sans notrë premierë intancion: si nous mëtons pour cetë heurë cëlë opinion a part, quë cëla quë nous sauons n'ët qu'uneï remi-niscanceï".²

Peletier goes on to show that there is nonetheless need for art because these divine gifts are not present equally in everybody:

"Car nous voyons es uns prouënir tout dë gre les dons et les vertuz, quë les autrës në gagnët quë par grand labeur".³

Ramus' view is much the same as Peletier's. My own impression is that the side he would have stressed would be that of art. He does not minimize the importance of nature, but rather takes it for granted. All men, for him, are endowed with the natural gifts requisite for any art (though it must be admitted that the degree of endowment differs from person to person). Furthermore, Ramus was committed, from his earliest works onwards, to the value of art, art in the sense of teaching. His whole life-work was centered on re-organizing, representing in a more perfect

1. Ibid., p.73.

2. Ibid., loc. cit.

3. Ibid. pp.73-4.

way, correcting, the whole body of the arts, and in developing his own teaching skills. He was able to appreciate the balance between art and nature because in the end he saw them as being the same thing. In spite of his love of dichotomies and polarities what mattered for him in the last analysis was the unification of knowledge.

CHAPTER FOUR

IMITATION

The concept of imitation is perhaps the one which people associate most readily with Renaissance aesthetics, for two very good reasons: firstly, because the men of the Renaissance themselves, as they rediscovered classical antiquity, devoted themselves enthusiastically to the practice of imitation, far more than at any other time, and defended this practice in their critical works, and secondly, because the theoretical basis itself of imitation came from some of the classical writers the Renaissance admired most. Cicero was perhaps the most influential, though Quintilian is respected, too, as a continuator of Cicero. In the early stages at least there is little reference to the doctrine of Plato or Aristotle except in so far as this was known to the Middle Ages. It is through the rhetorical tradition, which had been less corrupted, rather than through works of philosophy, that the concept of imitation came to the Renaissance.

Ramus, too, was deeply concerned with the idea of imitation. For him, (as for many others of his time) there were two basic ways in which a writer imitates: he imitates other authors and he imitates nature. In following another author he is said to imitate his virtues and so become like him. Ramus, in his early dispute with the Aristotelians, reproaches his adversaries with not trying to understand fully their author, or indeed any other:

"They do not explain in their teaching the invention or disposition of any famous writer; and so they do not try to follow or imitate his virtues".¹

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), p.8.

It is only by actual imitation of someone, and not by a repetition of his principles, that we will be able to understand him and to write anything of value ourselves. The process is not something reserved to those with great literary aspirations: Ramus sees imitation as essential to all writing, and in fact claims that beginners will be able to write (Latin) only if they do imitate:

"My Brutinae quaestiones have followed the same principle, since in this book I both praised without pretence Cicero's virtues, intending them to be copied by my pupils, and at the same time pointed out, with disapproval¹ the faults I thought should be avoided".

At this level writing is not meant to be creative, and we are aware of our lack of originality: "Our grammar is based on an observation of Cicero and Virgil, and is directed towards understanding them, so that we may become like them."² Imitation is the easiest way of learning to write or to speak,³ and progress will depend on the prudent choice of models. It is better, as Quintilian said, to choose many models rather than just one.⁴ This will help us to avoid mere copying and give us greater scope for originality. We must be careful whom we choose and "whom we wish to become like".⁵ This idea is repeated again and again; for instance, "We make things which are like the examples"⁶ and "We become like those whose traces and examples we follow and imitate".⁷ Once we have appreciated an author's virtues by

1. Platonis Epistolae, p.3.

2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1027.

3. In the Institutiones oratoriae (p.6) we read that young boys imitate and represent the speeches they have heard, by gesture and voice.

4. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.390; cf. Ciceronianus, (1580), p.35.

5. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), p.177.

6. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.388.

7. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.494; cf. col.599; cf., also, Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1027.

an analytical examination of the way in which he writes, we are in a position to choose a similar subject, and develop it "as truthfully and as accurately as possible."¹

In this way we sharpen our own powers of invention and judgment, since we

"feel ourselves being coloured by other peoples' virtues, as men who walk in the sunshine are affected by the sun'.²

The idea is taken up again in the Scholae in liberales artes, which adds

"although they are thinking about, and doing, other things, yet they are coloured by the sun without wanting to be and without knowing it - the same applies to us, when we read eloquent and elegant authors, even though our aim is to analyze the logical artifice, yet unintentionally we assimilate the ornateness of the transitions".³

Once this stage has been reached, originality takes over; the writer discards imitation, and

"chooses an open subject, explains it by relying on its own devices, and stimulates all the arts of invention".⁴

From the sun simile imitation would seem to be fairly superficial, and it is clear from the rest that the analogy is not to be pressed. A similar point is made in the Institutiones oratoriae where it is said that 'suavitas' is achieved by observation of the style of the most eloquent men, not by learning principles.⁵ Ramus elsewhere makes it quite clear that it is possible to imitate and at the same time be original. His De Caesaris militia, for example, is not meant to be a mere theoretical treatise on the

1. Dialecticae partitiones, p.73.

2. Ibid.; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), pp.177-8.

3. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.603.

4. Dialecticae partitiones, p.73.

5. Institutiones oratoriae, p.24.

art of war, but one based on Caesar's own military practice. He admits that the question is one that has been brilliantly treated by Greeks and Latins, and also by modern Italian and French writers, but comments, (in the preface to Cardinal Charles de Lorraine),

'Nobody whose writings I have read has yet proposed to imitate Caesar as a model; I mention this in case you despise my work on the grounds that it is derivative'.¹

One important kind of imitation for the writers of the Renaissance was translation, and they usually discuss the two questions in the same context. Ramus does not seem to have had a very practical interest in translation. The only translations we have of his are his Latin version of Plato's letters (many of which are not, of course, by Plato, though commonly ascribed to him) and of Aristotle's Politics.² Ramus' knowledge of Greek seems to have been inadequate, at least until late in his life. He did, however, translate into French (and partly rewrite) his own major work on logic, and there are French translations, which may or may not be by him, of some of his less important works. It is a measure of his desire for originality that he does not want to restrict himself to translation. He makes this quite explicit in a work which has been directly attributed to his colleague Talon (from the evidence of the title-page) but which is in reality the work of Ramus himself.³ Here he comments

1. The word used is 'tralatitium': Estienne, in his Dictionarium Latinogallicum, (1538), translated this word as 'Emprunté et prins d'ailleurs, Qui n'est pas nouveau'.
2. Platonis epistolae a Petro Ramo latinae factae, et dialecticis rerum summis breviter expositae, (1549 and 1552); Aristotelis Politica... (1601).
3. The work is Audomari Talaei Dialecticae praelectiones in Porphyrium, (1547, 1550, and 1553). Ong discusses the question of authorship (RTI, pp.465-6) and suspects that the book may be by Ramus rather than Talon, but has no conclusive proof of this. I find the conclusive proof he was looking for in the Aristotelicae animadversiones (1556), p.327: 'I have compared in the Porphyry the industry of artisans with the inactivity of our philosophers'. Since the date is too early for the book to have been translated by Ramus (because of his inadequate Greek) we must conclude that the book was translated by Talon and that the commentary is by Ramus.

that a translator is faced with the danger that he will not merely make the matter and words correspond in both languages but will try to add something of his own. There would, he says, be a real danger of trying to improve on Porphyry.¹ It might seem at first that Ramus is here being very inconsistent, in desiring originality and not allowing it in the matter of translation; I suggest that he sees two different kinds of imitation, of which translation is the less interesting, precisely because originality can be present only to the extent that the translator leaves the text and adds something of his own.

In the Ciceronianus Ramus discusses at great length the question of imitation. He shows that imitation was often debated at the time in the context of Ciceronianism:

'We read today an almost infinite number of books written by Italians, Frenchmen and Germans on the subject of the imitation of Cicero'.²

He goes on to show that most of these writers are interested rather in the superficial aspect of Cicero's pure Latin style and hardly at all in his virtues. Ramus, for his part, proposes to describe Cicero's true qualities, and to give their causes rather than just their observable effects.³ On several occasions throughout this book Ramus points to the value even of the use of the vernacular as training for someone who will later become an orator using the vernacular. The criterion is that as a young child he should learn pure speech, and the language is of secondary importance. There is some confusion in Ramus here, because he wants his budding 'Ciceronian' to imitate

1. Dialecticae praelectiones in Porphyrium, p.5.

2. Ciceronianus, (1580), p.3.

3. Ibid., p.4.

the master in everything, but it is not always clear to him in what exactly this imitation should lie. Cicero, for example, learned Greek grammar first and then Latin:

'To Cicero Greek literature was foreign, whereas Latin literature was familiar and domestic; to French people both Greek and Latin literature are foreign, and French literature is popular and familiar. Therefore our Ciceronian should first be instructed in Greek and Latin literature'.¹

But Ramus then goes on to give further reasons why the French pupil should learn Greek and Latin: he should know Greek in order to be able to go back to the original sources of much religious writing, and Latin because it is the language of the schools and "the one common language of Christian Europe".² When immediately afterwards he goes on to propose that French should be used in the schools and the law-courts, it becomes difficult to see how all these statements are to be reconciled. Perhaps the truth is that Ramus is well aware that he is living in an age of transition, that he does really want the spread of the vernacular but sees the temporary need to train people in Latin. He raises the theoretical objection that there are no French texts for a young French student of oratory to become familiar with, and replies that there are, at least, many good translations into French from Spanish, Italian, Greek and Latin.³ He is confident that French writers will be able to 'enrich their country and make it illustrious';⁴

and 'Just as Cicero imitated the Attic writers in Latin, so we are able to imitate the Greeks and Latins in French...'⁵

1. Ibid., pp.13-14.

2. Ibid., p.14.

3. Ibid., p.17.

4. Ibid., p.16.

5. Ibid., p.63.

Many of the ideas which Ramus puts forward in this context remind us of Du Bellay's Deffence et Illustration. There is one passage in the Ciceronianus which might have come from Du Bellay's book, except that in Ramus the stress is still on the value of the classical languages:

'...there is no language so poor and barbarous that it can not, with diligence, be enriched and cultivated. So our Ciceronian, whether he be French, Italian, Spanish or belonging to some other nationality, will follow in Cicero's footsteps, and never despair about the richness and eloquence of his country; he will make his own country great and illustrious with the richer spoils of Greece and Italy; he will add new ornaments of his own. At the beginning he will speak more often in Latin and Greek, because these languages at the moment are richer, and provide more ornaments, which he will use for speaking in a similar way'.¹

It will have become clear that the Ciceronianus is not just about the imitation of Cicero but is also about the imitation of other authors and, indeed, about imitation in general. The same principles therefore apply to the imitation of Aristotle, and Ramus was engaged in controversy on this subject from his earliest writings onwards. He claims that the Aristotelian party which he is attacking are at fault in that not only do they not imitate their master's virtues, but imitate him where it is not lawful or desirable, and rely too much on his authority:

'They consider themselves wise enough if they are able not just to follow in judgment and in practice the inventions of the man, but to admire them superstitiously, and to interpret them to us (poor rustic layfolk) as the oracles of some great God'.²

The basis of this clerical philosophy is the Pythagorean "Ipse dixit, ergo uerum".³ Ramus, of course rejects this utterly, and claims that we should

1. Ibid., p.78.

2. Aristotelicae animadversiones, pp.76v-77.

3. Dialecticae partitiones, pp.12-3. Du Bellay and Tahureau both refer to Pythagoras as the source, quoted in Clements, Critical Theory and Practice of the Pléiade, pp.13-4.

always go beyond what we imitate, except when we are engaged on the work of translation. The first stage in imitation is copying. The second is that we should go on from there to excelling the people we have chosen to imitate. Imitation itself is a mere stage, part of the process of learning. It is perhaps as well to give a few examples of this idea, since there is always a great danger of minimizing the place of originality in Renaissance theory and practice. Ramus writes, for instance, 'We strive not only to follow but in some places to conquer and overcome'.¹ On another occasion he says that in order to give logic the place it deserves, we must follow poets and orators,

"en considérant et examinant leurs vertus et vices, en imitant premierement par escripture et par voix leur bonne invention et disposition, et puis en taschant les esgaller, voire surmonter en traictant et disputant de toutes choses par soy-mesme, et sans plus avoir esgard à leurs disputes".²

The measure of originality comes out adequately in the words 'surmonter' and 'par soy-mesme'. Ramus agrees with Quintilian that "we must attempt something more than did those whom we are imitating".³ He claims, however, that there is a great difference between Quintilian's view and his own, in that for Ramus not only could invention itself be imitated (which Quintilian denied) but it was the most easily imitable part of logic and rhetoric.

Ong shows how this aspect of Ramus' idea of imitation fits in rather badly with his belief in natural gifts:

1. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1016.

2. La Dialectique, p.138.

3. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.339; cf. Rhetoricae distinctiones in Quintilianum, (1549), pp.99-100.

'In his Ciceronianus, Ramus will treat imitation as though it were reproduction of classical models. He does this also in the Training in Dialectic when he discusses exercise, saying that the boy should learn by imitating all the good classical writers, especially Cicero. This notion does not entirely accord with his insistence that art is mere reproduction of 'natural' preschool speech habits. Ramus never fully resolves the conflict here, although he seems elsewhere to indicate that the speech of the uneducated can be used as a point of departure for 'deducing' the art of dialectic rather than for direct imitation'.¹

The second aspect of imitation, the imitation of nature, is rather more important to him. We have already seen something of how in his view art imitates nature, how the way of teaching anything must be based on the most natural expression of it. (It may happen that one's chosen subject has been so well treated already by some other writer, that by imitating what he wrote we are virtually imitating nature itself, at one remove, certainly, but still directly). The observation of nature is a god from whom we should never turn away; our observation imitates the prudence and economy of nature. The artist (teacher) will observe all the indications which seem to be inborn in outstanding people

"just as Apelles, intending to paint Alexander, examined him and all his characteristics in detail".²

Once these qualities have been noticed

"he will draw up an order and a way similar to nature, and he will describe them and propose that they should be copied by orators".³

In the later text of the same year this is changed to: "he will draw up an image and picture similar to nature". Because of the more graphic and concrete 'imago' and 'tabula' the later text makes it more explicit that we

1. Ong, RMDD, p.177.

2. Dialecticae institutiones, p.7v.

3. Dialecticae partitiones, p.4.

are here concerned with teaching-method. It is interesting that 'imitating nature' is described as 'making an image of nature'. All art is seen as a picture of nature and terms from painting abound in the works of Ramus.

'Tabula', too, may be seen not only as a synonym of 'via' or 'methodus' but in its other meaning of picture or painting.¹ The passage from the Dialecticae institutiones continues:

"so that in this artificial mirror, as it were, nature is able to contemplate the dignity of its own form, and to wipe out and wash away any roughness or blemish there may be".

Both texts go on to assert that art, which was once the pupil of nature, becomes its teacher in improving upon it by industry. The later passage adds that in our painting of nature, "in order to make more sure progress, we should always keep the living exemplar before our eyes". And just as Apelles painted Alexander's head in the likeness of his real head, and so on for the other parts of his body, so we describe the different parts and qualities of natural logic, and try to imitate them in our painting. The difference between the natural and the artificial is further explained: "on the one hand everything is living, on the other merely painted and imitated".² The same idea is expressed succinctly in the speech Pro philosophica disciplina "Art is practice".³ It has less reality, less immediacy or vividness than nature, it is at one remove from reality and from truth. The copy is doubly imperfect, because it is a mere attempt at representing something and also because of the basic imperfection of nature. In describing teaching in terms

1. Cf. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.4v: 'arts which are, as it were, the pictures and images of things'.
2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.4; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.8v, and (1554), p.6.
3. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1027.

of painting, Ramus does more than give evidence of the interrelations between different disciplines, and he is not simply using the first metaphor that comes to hand; he tells us a good deal about his own aesthetic theories. Painting re-presents reality as vividly as possible and with attention to realistic detail. The teaching process is similar in that it reproduces the vivid reality to be found in nature, and re-presents it in a less vivid but still living form. (The aim, of course, is to reproduce it as vividly as it is in reality, but it is not possible to achieve this). If it does not copy nature it will be fruitless. In this connection Ramus likens the acceptance of principles without practice to the dinner which Heliogabalus offered to his guests, where everything was painted and artificial; teachers of logic are like him if they lay before their students nothing but empty precepts:

'For art, I repeat, however true and correct, or imprinted and fixed in the intelligence and the memory by endless repetition, still remains a picture of nature and practice'.¹

There is no doubt, then, how far in Ramus' hierarchy of values nature was superior to art.

There are some other uses of the word 'imitation' in Ramus and some related words which help us to understand his theory. He often talks, for example, about the imitation of examples or of an exemplar. 'Exempla' is sometimes linked with 'instituta'; the difference is that the latter refers to the principles which are put into practice.² When Ramus talks of imitating an exemplar he is often thinking of the imitation of another author. It was a fault in Aristotle, he claims, often repeated, that he considered himself to be the inventor of dialectic, and refused to propose for himself ex-

1. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.190.

2. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.458.

emplars to be imitated.¹ Otherwise it is natural human reason itself which is the exemplar: 'Whoever composes an art of dialectic should keep before his eyes in order to imitate it the exemplar of natural human reason'.²

Ramus has yet another way of looking at this question of imitation and originality, seeing the process as a twofold one of analysis and genesis. Analysis of a work is the methodical examination of it, and genesis is the 'bringing into being of a new work';³ they are applicable to both speaking and writing, and to all the arts. Analysis is not pure contemplation of the work; it, too, contains essentially an element of practice. Nor is analysis itself new. It is not a new art, but the art itself repeated in the same steps in which the work was composed.

A teacher of grammar, writes Ramus, proposes to his raw pupils examples from Virgil or Cicero, "which he analyses or unravels (ἀναλύει, retexit), and resolves and weighs up according to the law of the art'.⁴ Grammatical analysis unravels, breaks down, a composition according to the rules of grammar. Rhetorical analysis examines the tropes and figures, and sees whether the pronunciation, gestures and elocution are fitting. Logical analysis is concerned with the origin of the argument or proof, and with the kinds of enunciation and so on.⁵ In commenting on logical analysis Ong remarks,

1. Ibid., p.33.

2. Ibid., loc.cit.

3. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), pp.175-7; cf. Ong, RMDD, pp.263-7. In the Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.304, 'Genesis' is used for 'the bringing into being similar or even better works, as Aristotle showed'.

4. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.191.

5. Ibid., loc.cit.

'in protracted discourse, the thread on which the arguments are strung gets tangled, and the syllogism serves the excellent purpose of enabling one to disentangle or 'unweave' (retexere) the thread. Rotexere...is Ramus' translation for ὑνελύειν, which is generally rendered resolvere in Latin and thus is equivalent to 'analyze'.¹ Properly unwound, any discourse is delightfully simple'.

This unravelling, therefore, represents the first stage in the interpretation of a work and in the writing of a new one: 'a commentator unravels the entire work from the beginning and thus comprehends it.'² Logical analysis is, in fact, called 'an unravelled art' or 'the unravelling of an art'.³ Ramus' corrections are always revealing. In 1543 the initial logical process is referred to as 'interpretation',⁴ and in 1549 this is corrected to 'analysis';⁵ the 1549 text, 'Disputations of all kinds in orators and poets should be examined methodically' becomes in 1554 '...should be unravelled methodically'.⁶ Ramus becomes very attached to the idea because he sees clarification and simplification as his life's work. He soon extends the notion of 'unravelling' to the later stages of the logical process. In the Scholae dialecticae we read that

"that man is a logician who produces an art of logic in explaining and unravelling the writings of poets, orators and philosophers, using argument, enunciation, syllogism and method".⁷

1. Ong, RMDD, p.191.

2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.81.

3. Dialecticae partitiones, p.44.

4. Ibid., p.44v.

5. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), p.146.

6. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), p.211.

7. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.68.

Ramus' contention was that this particular ideal of imitation was not achieved in his own day, precisely because the practical approach was inadequate. In the second step, or genesis, the pupil, having understood the model and what the experts make of the rules, imitates them by making something similar, and then, "by himself and without the assistance of others he exerts his mind, and produces something which is different, and his own".¹ The originality of the new work is still perhaps limited, but at least the writer has assimilated and appropriated the model. "We call this exercise 'genesis' because it begets and produces a new work of art".² The novelty of the result is stressed: There are two kinds of practical logical exercise, one of which consists in the exploration of an already existing disputation, the other in the bringing about and composition of a new one.

Γενέσις is sometimes called 'compositio' and sometimes equated with σύνθεσις, and ἀνάλυσις is called διαίρεσις³, and they are elsewhere styled 'ascensus' and 'descensus'.⁴ That we are here dealing with a general theory of imitation is abundantly clear. By analysis we know the merits and defects of a speech, and by genesis we imitate or shun them. Just as in the correct use of the grammatical process we transfer the purity

1. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1010. Ramus often reiterates that real learning can take place only by practice. Active participation was an essential part of his pedagogical approach, and this points at once to the necessity and to the limited usefulness of imitation. In the preface to his Euclides he sums this up: "I have greater praise for the pupil when he imitates on the counting-board or in the dust the figures demonstrated to him, than when he idly and uselessly gazes at other peoples' pictures" (p.4).
2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1010.
3. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), p.211.
4. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.431; in Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.192 analysis is called 'examen et probatio'.

of one speech to another, so in all other arts there is a twofold process: 'to recognize the art in the examples we look at, and to imitate what we have recognized'.¹ It is the art itself which we imitate; we should realize, however, that Ramus is here using 'art' in the sense of 'artifice' or 'craftsmanship'.² Analysis proceeds from the complex ("from what is most dense and most intricately composed")³ to the simple, and genesis proceeds in the opposite way.

This basically is Ramus' theory of the process of imitation. It will be appreciated that his primary concern was with teaching young boys to write Latin, but that the principles he enuntiates have a far more general application which he himself was well aware of.

This conception of 'genesis' is the nearest approach that Ramus (or indeed any of his immediate contemporaries) seems to have been able to make to the idea of originality. Each time he discusses the question he insists that 'genesis' is the 'producing of a new work'. The novelty or originality lies in the disposition or composition of what we have discovered by analysis.⁴

Ramus' theory of imitation is an illustration of his overall attitude to the Renaissance ideals of humanism and the ingestion of classical attitudes. Any study of his logic and his views on education will show that his aims were humanist in that he wanted to reinstate genuine classical learning, to teach in a more liberal and more accessible manner, to join poetry with

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), p.212.

2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1011-14.

3. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.431.

4. See, for example, the Defensio pro Aristotele adversus Jacobum Schecium, (1571), where 'inuentio' and 'iudicium' are given as equivalents of *εὕρεσις* and *ὑπόθεσις*; 'iudicium', as we shall see, is synonymous with 'dispositio'.

philosophy, and to link together all the different disciplines in one body of knowledge. He did not, however, manage to give his whole allegiance to the spirit of the Renaissance. For although it is true that he shared many of the ideals of the humanists, he was at the same time preeminently a scholastic, and in spite of his strictures on the scholastic distortion of Aristotle, his manner and temperament owed much to the scholastic tradition. It is worth noting that most of his remarks about the Renaissance as a movement come in his later works, particularly in the Prooemium mathematicum (1567).

Except for his personal approach to the teaching of logic, Ramus was not a trend-setter, and was sometimes even well behind the times. In the Préface sur le Proëme des mathématiques, he talks at some length about the flourishing of 'les arts et bonnes lettres' at Florence and at Paris. His century has seen a greater abundance of learned men and works than the previous fourteen:

"Aussi les charrues parees de laurier des sieurs Cosme et Laurent par l'Italie, les triomphants laboureurs, le grand Francoys, Henry, Charles par la France ont redoublé ceste plante d'esprits, ceste abondāce de doctrines, ceste foison de muses que lon a veue".

He evokes the richness and fertility which will be ensured "si l'esperance d'Italie et celle de la France sont une foys jointes ensemble"; (He cannot have been very widely read in the literature of the preceding fifty years). He is perhaps nearer the mark when he claims that his own mathematics brings "une nouvelle et non acoustumee clerté de leurs nombres et alignements".¹ In the course of the text of the Prooemium he praises an astronomer in these words:

1. Préface sur le Proëme des mathématiques, pp.30-2.

"You write, most learned Leovitius,¹ that you know from that great conjunction of the stars from which you prophesy the imminent return of the golden age of a purer religion, that many arts will emerge which have been hidden up to now, and that very soon some matters of great import will be brought to their final perfection; you say this because there exist in our times so many brilliant and enlightened minds".²

Had Ramus realized that his own "discoveries" in logic were merely better ways of teaching the subject, and that they had little direct heuristic value? Is his excitement about the future a partial disillusionment and a realization that he himself will not see the fruits of his methodology? The golden age is still in the future - the wars of religion were a sufficient indication that it had not yet come to pass in spite of Renaissance optimism that it would; we may note that its characteristics will be purity of religion, the discovery of new arts and the perfecting of all arts:

"May the great and good God bring it about that all this be offered to His own glory, and the safety of the church and the state".³

The same theme finds an obvious place in the posthumous Commentariorum de religione Christiana libri quatuor. The only solution to the dispute between Catholics and Protestants about many questions, about the value of the Eucharist, for example, will be a conscious return to the golden age of the Church:

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1. This person is Cyprian von Leowitz, astronomer and author of several works, including: Eclipsium...descriptio et pictura (1556); De Conjunctionibus magnis insignioribus superiorum planetarum (1564); and a work in which he gives evidence of an association with the English mathematician John Dee, who himself was a correspondent of Ramus: Brevis et perspicua ratio iudicandi genituras ex physicis causis...Adiectus est ...libellus de praestantioribus quibusdam naturae virtutibus, J. Dee...authore (1558).
 2. Prooemium mathematicum, pp.283-4.
 3. Ibid., loc.cit.

"If we returned to the age of the apostles the Eucharist would be celebrated as it was by them and there would remain no cause for dissension; that was indeed the golden age of religion, and we can scarcely even call our own age the age of iron".¹

A distinguishing feature of the golden age in the future will be the mark of religious unity (Ramus' attitude here resembles that of his contemporary Postel).² Another characteristic will be the presence of true learning as a civilizing force:

"Mathematical science is to be understood as the companion and handmaid of peace as well as of war".³

Although he has much to say about the fertility and fruitfulness of his own period, Ramus is more interested in the means by which these have been increased than in the richness of its literary or artistic productions.

He showed some interest himself in the matter of textual criticism, though it was not a subject to which he devoted his energies.⁴ He did, however, realize that it was the key-note of the new learning:

"And so it is that learned men have corrected and amended poets, historians, orators, writers on husbandry, lawyers, and even the sacred prophets".⁵

In this sphere he singles out for praise Rhenanus and Erasmus in Germany, Politianus and Victorius in Italy, and his colleagues Turnebus and Lambinus in France. Similar reforms have been made and new approaches dis-

1. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.344; cf. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.66.

2. Cf. Bouwsma, W.J., Concordia mundi; the career and thought of Guillaume Postel, 1510-1581; Cambridge, Mass., 1957, passim.

3. Prooemium mathematicum, p.297.

4. Ong lists (RTI passim) his commentaries on Cicero, Virgil, etc., but most of these are rhetorical or logical analyses of the text rather than critical editions.

5. Prooemium mathematicum, p.440.

covered in medicine and other disciplines.

The doctrine of imitation is closely linked with the idea of the Renaissance, in Ramus as in some of his contemporaries. It is certain that he thought his own age had much to learn in general from the way of writing of the ancients, and that all good writing in Latin or in French would imitate the old masters. We shall see later something of his theory of the springs or sources (*fontes*) of invention. His feeling was that by his own day these natural springs had dried up. He laments the fact that the Druids who, he claims, were possessed of a good logical sense, did not see fit to preserve their knowledge in writing. The spoken word is certainly more penetrating and persuasive than the written, but the written word guards against forgetfulness. Had the Druids realized this, we would not be dependent upon the merchandise of the Greeks, but would possess our own national goods in abundance. There would be no need to acquire knowledge by means of Greek and Latin, and at the cost of much personal labour, "but we would imbibe it with pleasurable sweetness almost with the milk of our nurse". (The translation which Michel de Castelnau made in 1559 has "mais avec un grand plaisir et contentement d'esprit nous les humerions quasi quant et le lait de la nourrice").¹ The image is a variation on that of drawing water from the springs of invention, and is very near to Du Bellay's "innutriton". Long years of study are necessary before we can hope to understand classical poetry, but our own national poets should be immediately accessible to us:

"since the understanding of the meaning and the pronunciation of the hymns and poems of our own bards is given to us by nature, so we would sing them joyfully and without labour".²

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1. De moribus veterum Gallorum, p.44v; Traicté des façons et coustumes des anciens Galloys, p.61; cf. Ciceronianus, (1558), p.11.
 2. De moribus veterum Gallorum, loc.cit.

As things were, because of the lack of enough models in French, he and his contemporaries were obliged to have recourse to Latin and Greek. The imitation which then takes place must not be slavish, since its purpose is to produce new and original works. According to the true principles of imitation a writer should always try to surpass his model. A philosopher, for example, should try to improve on Aristotle as Aristotle improved on Plato.¹

There is a lively account of imitation in the Institutiones oratoriae. The author compares novice writers to young birds who "look to their mothers as an example, then make a trial of their strength and wander freely on their own throughout the heavens". We progress from the contemplation and imitation of excellent men to writing or speaking "with our own genius and judgment".² In this book originality is stressed more than it is in other works by Ramus or Talon. Any writer, the author tells us, follows those who have devoted much time and energy to the practice of writing and then strives

"to comment on the subject and polish it according to his own judgment; he brings in a way of writing which is peculiarly his own; and he so represents the style of his author that although his own work is not entirely similar, yet it merits praise because it is different".³

We should not leave the discussion of Ramus' account of imitation without showing how it fits into his whole philosophical system. Although he does not himself explicitly draw out all the implications, it is quite evident that Ramus saw all imitation as part of the general process by which man must strive to make himself more like God, to realize more and more that he is already made in the image of God. Furthermore, imitation, for Ramus,

1. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.66; cf. col.189.

2. Institutiones oratoriae, p.81.

3. Ibid., p.83.

as for Aristotle, is above all the principal method by which man learns anything at all, from the niceties of Latin grammar to the most profound mathematical and metaphysical truths. Imitation is synonymous with the ascent to wisdom. It is impossible to disentangle all the different threads of Ramus' thought on this subject. He is neither purely Platonist, purely Aristotelian, nor purely Christian. Basically, however, he adopts the Christian synthesis of Neo-Platonism and the Gospel, and so he is able to ignore the very real differences between Plato's and Aristotle's doctrines of imitation. In fact, he manages to combine the idea that reality as we think we know it is at one remove from true reality, and art at two removes, with the idea that art and philosophy somehow bring out the universals in nature.¹ Then he superimposes on this amalgam the further idea of man in the image of God. The clearest expression of this last notion is to be found, of course, in the Commentariorum de religione Christiana. I shall dwell on this at some length because I feel that it was at least as important to Ramus as was the classical idea of imitation, because it underlines his whole doctrine of imitation and of learning, and because (although this has as yet to be worked out in detail) I feel that the religious or theological suppositions of the treatment of imitation and of imagery could not have been unimportant during this vital first generation of Calvin's reformation.

Ramus, following Zwingli, adopts an unoriginal Protestant attitude to

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1. In the Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.848, Ramus makes an interesting equation between the Pythagorean theory of imitation ('The Pythagoreans are even said to have explained the whole of philosophy by the imitation, μιμησις, of numbers') and the Platonic doctrine of participation: ('He borrowed μεθεξις from the Pythagoreans, but changed the name: they spoke about μιμησις in connection with numbers, and Plato used μεθεξις for the ideas').

images, but his insistence on the subject is significant. Frances Yates has shown the connection between Ramus' sympathy with the iconoclastic movements and Protestant propaganda against Catholic images, with his rejection of particular kinds of images as aids to memory.¹ Ramus himself contrasts false images with the true image of God which we can find within ourselves:

"God wants to be pleased by these gifts, propitiated by these sacrifices, served by this cult, adored by this kind of adoration, and in these we see the principal colour which can renew the image of the first man, made in the likeness of God."²

A little later in the same book he writes:

"For man (I keep repeating this) is created in the image of God, and he is ordered to restore it whenever he falls away from it by sin: 3. Coloss. You have put on the new nature, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator. To fall away from this image, therefore, is to sin, if we are right to accept $\epsilon\mu\lambda\theta\epsilon\tau\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma \tau\eta\varsigma \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ $\epsilon\mu\lambda\theta\epsilon\tau\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$: Tertullian says that those people are living in the image of God who have the same feelings and emotions as the lord: and some philosophers think that sin means not living in accordance and harmony with perfect nature. So as often as you go away from that perfect nature, you go away from the image of God, and so you sin."³

Imitation, for Ramus, almost always has moral overtones. However we imitate, whether it be the imitation of nature or of classical models, our aim is learning, wisdom and self-betterment. This ties in very well with the imitation of the virtues of our model.

Ramus' remarks on imitation should be seen in the broader context of his attitude to the natural links and correspondences which he saw existing in the universe. There are many suggestions throughout his works that one

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1. Frances Yates, The Art of Memory, pp.236-7.
 2. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.142.
 3. Ibid., p.188.

aspect of nature corresponds to, is the image of, or imitates another. Music, for example, by its imitation of changes and revolutions in the heavens "composes those human moods which are related to them".¹

Natural correspondence is at the basis of Ramus' view of the relation between art and nature. Art should imitate the 'forces of nature'.² So Dialectic has nothing to do with anything 'of which there is not some image imprinted in natural discourse'.³ 'Image' can refer either to the exemplar (as here) or to the imitation of it, so 'the image must tally with the exemplar', that is, reason is the exemplar of natural logic and art must conform to this.⁴ Natural usage is called 'the archetype of a true art'.⁵ The same idea is applied to rhetoric:

"The description of the art of rhetoric will be according to the idea and similitude of oratorical truth and beauty and will be a pattern (specimen) of nature".⁶

Ramus' theory of imitation is, in its broad outlines, very close to that of the Pléiade, except that he was less interested than they were in the vernacular. It is true that many of the French writers of the time were champions of French and yet managed to write a good deal of their work in Latin; Du Bellay and Peletier spring to mind as the two most obvious examples.

1. Dialecticae partitiones, p.53.
2. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.284.
3. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1543), p.61.
4. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.12.
5. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1556), p.53.
6. Institutiones oratoriae, p.7.

But their output in the vernacular was considerable too. Ramus, on the other hand, as we have seen, paid lip-service to the use of the vernacular but wrote very little in French. For this reason I am unable to accept without reserve the view of Gmelin, who claims that in the matter of writing in French and translating other languages into French,

"In diesen Punkten schliesst sich Ramus unmittelbar an das Programm der Plejade an, zu dem sein Rednerideal wie eine Ergänzung erscheint".¹

What is true is (as Gmelin goes on to show) that Ramus, on an important but isolated occasion in the Ciceronianus,² suggests that it is not incompatible for the budding Ciceronian to follow in the footsteps of the master, and at the same time write in the vernacular, thus enriching his own language. Gmelin concludes in the following words:

"Neu ist dieses Programm prinzipiell nicht, die Plejade hatte für die Dichtung schon einen Anfang gemacht, als Ramus seinen Traktat schrieb, aber neu ist die Allgemeinheit und der weite, freie Sinn, mit dem ein überzeugter Humanist hier das Französische den antiken Sprachen auch stiltheoretisch gleichstellt und die alte ciceronianische Tradition im Geiste des Erasmus hinüberführt in die moderne Prosaliteratur".³

The only qualification I would make is to repeat that even though Ramus' theory has a broader basis than that of the members of the Pléiade, he remains in the realm of theory. In this at least he is very different from the Pléiade.

Apart, then, from the use of the vernacular and translation, Ramus shares the obsession of the Pléiade with imitation. In the writings of Ramus

1. H. Gmelin, 'Das Prinzip der Imitatio in den romanischen Literaturen der Renaissance', in Romanische Forschungen, 1932, p.342.

2. Ciceronianus, (1580), p.18.

3. Gmelin, art.cit., p.343.

the concept takes on further connotations, and is seen to be at the heart of the entire process of learning and teaching. It is for this reason that, in distinction from most of the Pléiade, he attaches as much importance to the imitation of nature as he does to that of classical models. Furthermore, Ramus is closer to the Aristotelian doctrine of imitation than were most of his contemporaries. Grahame Castor has shown that the early theorists of the Pléiade rarely, if ever, discuss or give any importance to Aristotle's theory largely because Aristotle's Poetics were not treated adequately until Scaliger and Ronsard wrote about them, although the earlier writers do adopt the view which arose out of Aristotle's, namely that art is a vivid representation of particulars. Apart from this last point they do not talk about the imitation of nature. Ramus, because of his close reading of Aristotle, and his interest in imitation as learning, has much to say about the expression of the universals to be found in nature, and is also incidentally taken up with the idea of vivid representation. With regard to the other kind of imitation, that of classical models, Ramus goes further than the literary theorists, since his theory of 'genesis' allows for greater originality. In all this, however, we must remember that he is talking about artistic imitation in general, and not directly about poetic imitation.

CHAPTER FIVE

CLARITY AND LIGHT

As we read through the works of Ramus and attempt to define his views on the characteristics of the different kinds of communication (which are the result of art's imitation of nature) we are struck by his obsession with the ideas of clarity and light. They are to be found repeatedly in his writing on many different topics. His own teaching (in spite of the possible obscurity presented, ironically, by some of his schemata) was directed towards a more lucid exposition of philosophy and the arts than obtained generally in his day, and his primary contention was always that clarity and order should be the aim of each individual discipline.¹ Clarity of discourse was for him almost a synonym of logic,² and he felt that the orator, if he was to succeed, must inform his fictions and selective handling of his material with clarity, both of arrangement and of phraseology. The poet, too, must pay some attention to clarity, though in this matter Ramus shared the hesitation of the critics who were his contemporaries. Some held that the appeal of the poet should be, if not immediate, at least after a certain amount of rereading and meditation, others that he was entitled, if not obliged, to foster a mystique of impenetrability. Ramus was well aware of the difficulty of avoiding ambiguity in communication. He saw that obscurity was different from ambiguity in that the result of the former is that nothing is understood, and that of the latter something different from what we expect is understood:

1. Cf. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.359: 'The use of an art demands that the precepts be taught clearly and succinctly'.

2. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1543), p.35.

"I do not want it to be thought that all disputation is defective: there is hardly any word which is not ambiguous".¹

In accordance with his general theory that philosophy and eloquence should be closely associated he shows that Lucretius, Virgil, Ovid, Seneca and Pliny sometimes or always wrote works dealing with natural philosophy, and concludes:

"There is no place in the treatment of the principles of physics, to which a quotation from a poet or an orator might not be added in order to gain some fruit by a more gracious and more human illustration".²

This word 'illustratio' will be commented on later in this chapter. Here it is important as one of the ideals of the Renaissance (interestingly linked with another main aim of the Renaissance, humanitas). Poetry and rhetoric make philosophy more presentable and so more assimilable; they increase rather than diminish its clarity:

"Out of so great an abundance of distinguished authors we append those who are the clearest and who have the greatest affinity to the philosophy in question".³

Poetry, therefore, adds clarity to philosophical writing; if it is not always clear itself, this is because the ascent to truth, by whatever path we choose, is rather more difficult than people think, and entails assiduous and arduous labour.⁴

In spite of some minor indications that clarity is not always possible or even desirable, it is abundantly evident that Ramus was devoted to the task of making all kinds of communication as easy as he could. In so far as

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), pp.150-1.

2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1020.

3. Ibid., loc. cit.

4. Ibid., col.1014-5; cf. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.856.

it made use of rational discourse, poetry, for Ramus, must implicitly aim at clarity of presentation. A corollary of his distinction between the natural and the artificial is the further distinction between what is naturally clear and what has been (unintentionally) obscured by the distancing effect of the contrivance. All teaching should try to emulate the clarity of the natural light of reason. It is a characteristic of Ramus' writing that reason is often compared to light. God, as light, is the exemplar, guarantor and source of man's own reason, which is the light of his body. One of the several hymns to the God of light and to the power of reason is to be found at the end of the Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1543):

"O holy heavenly father, the prince and author of eternal and most blessed light, who have not only cast out from the universe chaos and its eternal darkness, but have also lit from perpetual fires that most clear lamp of the universe in the sun, the moon and the other stars (who have even illuminated in our minds the far clearer and more illustrious light of your face so that we may invent, judge and explain all things), we beg you not to allow any longer the minds of men to wander (in Aristotelian darkness) deprived of that divine light of yours."¹

Men participate in God's creative light by virtue of their gift of reason. The 1548 text puffs up the rhetorical impact of the passage, and makes more explicit the relation between God and reason, showing the manner in which God's illuminative influence works.² The light of reason is often described as an image of the divine light. At the beginning of the 1543 work just quoted Ramus had made another prayer for lucidity:

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1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.80v; the phrases in brackets are added in the 1548 text.
 2. Ibid., loc.cit.

"I beg for peace and pardon, and I pray that you will permit that the image of the divine and heavenly light (which you have inspired and kindled in our souls) may be freed and snatched away from misery and darkness".¹

One of Ramus' aims was, of course, to prescind from metaphysics and natural theology in his logic; he simply does not find it a fault in method to presuppose God's existence and influence, and a well-ordered universe. Clarity is often appreciated only through order, and so light and order are often mentioned in the same breath.² In another passage reference is made to Platonic or Augustinian 'characters': there are three 'books' of logic, the first of which

"the great and all-good God has imprinted by eternal characters in our souls; the second, a diligent observer of nature, by imitating these indications, will fashion according to the exemplar of those divine notes";

The third book is written or spoken practice. A little later Ramus adds;

"Natural dialectic, that is, temperament, reason, mind, the image of God the parent of all things, and finally the light which is emulous of that blessed eternal light, is proper to man and born with him".³

By the light of reason we strive to be more like the God of light. The emotive value of the metaphor is not neglected; the obscurantism of his opponents and of the established tradition is always under fire:

"O wretched dialectic, into the hands of what robbers have you fallen? You were granted to men in order to investigate what is occult, to make clear what is obscure, and behold you hide what is manifest, and you obscure what is clear".⁴

1. Ibid., p.3v.

2. Cf., for example, Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1026.

3. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), pp.5v-6.

4. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.35.

For Ramus this is not just vague general abuse; he shares the excitement of the men of the Renaissance in their idea of their own enlightenment. Sometimes it is logic itself which is described in terms of light: 'logicum lumen'; at other times the light of the mind is referred to: 'rationis lumen'.

"In vain would we have been endowed by God with the light of reason, in vain would we interpret the strength and power of his light in precepts, if we did not practise them ourselves".¹

That this light of the mind is inborn is well brought out in a passage from the 1556 revision of the Aristotelicae animadversiones, and its all-embracing scope is described:

"This universal, general, integral light knows no bounds, and all things which are capable of being known by men, are known and understood by the help of this light. This logical and dialectical light is innate and natural in man, and when I talk about natural logic I am talking about the natural, innate light of man".²

This light shines on rich and poor alike.³

Apart from finding the origin of man's reasoning in God, Ramus is anxious to show that God is the ultimate end and object of this reasoning. Logic is the chief tool of metaphysics which is itself entirely directed to the contemplation of God:

"so that when we shall have seen in these universal examples some shadow of the divine sun, and have contemplated in a logical manner, and with reference to mathematics, the works of God, and the order, symmetry and description of these divine works, then we shall be converted to a contemplation of that most brilliant sun, and to an imitation of it by the integrity of our lives"⁴

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1. Dialecticae institutiones, pp.50-50v; cf. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.447.
 2. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1556), p.50.
 3. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.968.
 4. Ibid., preface.

But theology had long been equated with metaphysics, particularly that of Aristotle, and Ramus contended that this union was far from happy. On several occasions he appeals for the separation of Christian theology from Aristotelianism, and a return to the truth and light of Scripture. He remarks that Aristotle's metaphysics was even more pagan than the physics, even further from the divine light: 'Turning to the light', 'seeing the light' have all the overtones of evangelical proselytism. It is revealing that Ramus with all his practicality should see contemplation of the divine sun as the goal of all mental and moral activity.

Sometimes the light of the sun stands for God, sometimes for the power of reasoning¹ which is the image of God; (man in his entirety is made in the image of God, but it is in his rationality that his humanity and his divinity² are best expressed). Sometimes it is the difference between the analogues which are brought out. Ramus is conscious of the inadequacy of his metaphor:

"The light of reason is far more brilliant and illustrious than the light of the sun. The light of the sun illuminates only this corporeal world; the light of reason roams also through the regions of supramundane infinity, and contemplates not only mortal bodies, but eternal and divine minds".³

He is clear in his own mind here, and aware of the danger of using such attractive metaphors as this one of light in as many different contexts as he does. In this present passage we are introduced to some of the Platonic elements in his thought and teaching. He is ready enough to welcome the Platonic

1. Dialectic is the sun of all disciplines and disputations: "not only do they shine and are illustrated by its light, but by its heat and movement they are excited, live, are increased and flourish, and in the end they bring to man most pleasing and honourable fruits", (Dialecticae partitiones, p.84v).
2. La Dialectique, p.135.
3. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.34.

theory of ideas and the hierarchy of being, though it must be admitted that this is not something which he develops at any great length. It was a handy alternative to the doctrine of Aristotle, and more congenial to someone who wanted to leave alone epistemology and psychology. It could be accepted as an easy parallel with one Christian way of looking at God, and one which appealed to the reformers more than did the theory of Aristotle. Its validity ended there. Had Ramus examined the notions a little more closely he might have been tempted to declare them less clear and less useful than Aristotle himself at his best. In spite of himself he was looking at Plato through the eyes of Aristotle.

Not unconnected with Ramus' distinction between natural and artificial, which we examined in chapter three, is his interpretation of Plato's contrast between the spiritual and the grossly material. This image, too, resolves itself for Ramus into one of light and dark:

"When therefore dialectic has, in this way, recalled the soul from these thick shadows of the senses, and has progressed through all the regions of philosophy, it will demonstrate in the things it describes, each in its own order, the most clear ideas of that sempiternal truth (which are scarcely able to be glimpsed since they are hidden in the obscurity of the shadows, and enveloped in wrappings)".¹

'Umbra' is closely linked with 'imago'. An image is by definition a mere shadow of the exemplar, and bears an analogous relationship to the real object. Once more the shadows and images of a lower existence lead us up to God:

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.42v; cf. Dialecticae partitiones, pp. 55-7.

"Hither all the arts are to be led and directed, so that they may contemplate with the greatest possible ardour of piety the very brightness of truth, whose shadows and images they had been following".¹

There is a fusion of light and heat in the intensity of the aspirant soul with God. To emphasize the insufficiency of his metaphor, Ramus shows that in spite of all this logical light and this semi-mystical participation in the mind of God, men are still shrouded in darkness:

"the minds of men are, in the knowledge of universal forms, like owls groping about in the splendour of the sunlight".²

The image is as much one of vision and blindness as of light and darkness. Ramus was throughout his life deeply attracted to optical questions, and was fascinated by problems of visual imagery, particularly with reference to colour.³

On one occasion Ramus' obsession for clarity, and the distaste he felt equally for the vague and the complicated leads him off into one of his rare excursions into picturesque language and the expression of lyrical feeling. He thoroughly enjoys the comparison he is making between a natural effect of light and shade and the processes of the mind. Autobiographical or personal comment of this kind is so rare in Ramus that we welcome it all the more when we come across it:

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1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), pp.42v-43; cf., (1554), pp.5-6, and Dialecticae partitiones, p.45.
 2. Dialecticae institutiones, p.43; but cf. La Dialectique, p.3, where 'owls' becomes 'bats', and Scholae physicae, SLA, 953, where the vision of bats is compared to that of 'mentes eruditae' which are called eagles.
 3. Ramus' Optics was not published during his lifetime, but first appeared in in 1606 as Opticae libri quatuor, ex voto Petri Rami novissimo, per Fridericum Risnerum, eiusdem in mathematicis adiutorem, olim conscripti, nunc demum...in usum et lucem publicam producti ; cf. Ong, RTI, Nos.648-50.

"I remember once seeing when I was a boy, a wonderful sight in the high mountains of Auvergne. The sun and the day were completely serene. From my elevated position I looked with great delight of soul on the fields spread out far below, on the green trees and the streams running between them. Suddenly a cloud appeared half way down the mountain, and obscured from view the fields, the trees and the streams, although the sun was still shining brilliantly on the summit. Then I turned to look at the top of the mountain, whose summit was above the clouds and the storms, and I was greatly pleased with the spectacle. Now, as in that field, so in the work proposed, I want the same thing to take place in our minds, so that all kinds of arguments, propositions, syllogisms and methods may be clear and visible by the sunlight of definitions, divisions, examples (which, we contend, exists in our logic as a result of the matter and form of Aristotle's philosophy). Then if there should intervene any cloud of obscurity, we would realize that the obscurity did not belong to logic, just as it did not belong to the trees and the fields but to the clouds in between; and when they were taken away and the original light of the sun returned, they were seen to be clear and illustrious. For the whole of logic, which is contained in the Analytics, is in itself most easy and clear, but is made difficult and obscure by various clouds. Let us therefore bring in the sunlight and remain in it; let us remain on the topmost peak of clarity".¹

The value of this image depends on the peculiar intensity of the light. The effect on Ramus of the peacefulness of the day was one of deep intellectual and sensual pleasure. Although the description of the countryside is generic enough it is made brighter by contrast with the drabness of the philosophical context, and the passage is not lacking in perceptiveness. The imagery is entirely visual, and, in this instance, does not depend on colour. Ramus sums it up in the word 'spectaculo', another word connected with vision. He evidently enjoys describing the incident for its own sake, although the main purpose of the passage is comparison. One gets the impression that he had stored up this experience intending to use it in some worthwhile context.

1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1556), p.208.

Once more we have returned to the notion that in itself logic, even the logic of Aristotle, is pure, simple and natural; it is all light, and is close to the divine mind.

The strands in Ramus' comments on clarity and light are not always easy to disentangle. There is the idea that God is light, that our minds are made in this image, but fall far short. Light is also a symbol of the order of the universe. By the light in our own minds we arrive at some comprehension of this ordered reality, and by a clear disposition of our material we are able to translate our natural awareness into an artificial scheme and present it in such a way that other men can share our experience. In so far as we are obscure we have either failed ourselves to appreciate our subject, or have been misled by some external factor. This idea is not without importance for literary theory in general. It is instructive to know why Ramus thought clarity was so necessary in communication and how he thought it could be achieved, while at the same time conceding that a poet's clarity was to be tempered with the fictitious.

For Ramus, the practical application of this idea of clarity lay largely in the proper disposition of the material. Our aim should always be to teach clearly and distinctly. Ramus tells us, in the preface to the Liber de Moribus veterum Gallorum, that he intends to follow the testimony of earlier writers on the subject,¹ and that

1. In general Ramus dissociates himself from philosophers who rely on authority, mystification and an esoteric cult of the master. He is against a priesthood of the intellect and wants philosophy to be understood by the people.

"after removing all obscurity, we shall teach the same things distinctly and openly".¹

Obviously all teaching entails clear arrangement of the material; Ramus' contention is that this applies to discourse or communication of any kind :

"in discourse and the use of reason there is nothing so involved that it may not be made clear, nothing so obscure that it may not be declared openly".²

We should note, once more, the images of light and vision ('illustretur' and 'declaretur'). This is not the place to re-examine Ramus' notion of method; Ong has already dealt with it at great length,³ and it is the one part of Ramus' thought which most commentators discuss. It is sufficient to note that method⁴ is, for Ramus, a way of arranging material for the purposes of teaching, that it is the basis of clarity,⁵ and that it is synonymous with 'via', which is quite literally 'a way', a way through a wood which is dark and densely entangled. Perhaps the most useful tool for clearing a way through the undergrowth is the syllogism, in spite of all the humanists' strictures upon it, because it reduces our statements to their most elemental, and expresses their simplest and yet most exact relationships one to another. In talking of the simply syllogism he says;

"These primary lights both of the natural and the artificial judgment are clear in themselves and evident, and, indeed, nature has not given anything to the human judgment more clear and open than the syllogism, by which they may themselves be tested".⁶

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1. In the French translation 'distincte et aperte' becomes 'tres distinctement et clairement'.
 2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.25v.
 3. Especially in RMDD, pp.225-69.
 4. 'Method, which is the same as practice, is the light of that universal order, and when matters are disposed according to it, they are taught more plainly, and more easily perceived', Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, 265.
 5. La Dialectique, p.120.
 6. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), pp.21-21v.

The idea of light is applied by Ramus to the syllogism, and it is more certain than sunlight.¹ Men make use of the syllogistic technique, whether consciously or not, to the extent that their errors of reasoning are ascribable to its misuse, and their constant and true judgments are the result of the constant truth of the syllogism.² It has the same natural and divinely inspired characters as men's reasoning powers in general:

"Let us love and cherish this golden heavenly gift of almighty God; this light is far clearer than all the stars which shine in the heavens, and more divine; by this light the conclusions of learned and unlearned alike, of old and young, of men and women, of all ages and natural capacities are given confirmation".³

Technically speaking, in the language of mystical theology, this is divine illumination, just as the activity of the Holy Spirit is inspiration; God enlightens the mind of all men. Ramus resolves, and incites his readers to resolve, that we should not squander this divine gift on sterile bickering, 'but use it in the cause of wisdom, humanity and life'.⁴ Enlightenment is for him a concomitant of the feeling of humanity.

We have already had one or two instances of Ramus' use of the word 'illustris' and its cognates. It was one of his favourite words. We are not able to decide whether in a particular context the literal sense of 'bright' or 'lit up' has given place or not to the figurative 'clear', 'distinct', 'plain', nor how often this in turn has become 'illustrious'. 'Illustris' is

1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), pp.423-4.

2. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.303; by the use of the syllogism 'a boy will most easily conceive phantasms in his mind, and by means of these he will so place in his mind images of abstract absent things that he will seem to see them, with his eyes, present before him'. (Dialecticae institutiones, p.56v).

3. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.303.

4. Ibid., loc.cit.

always used with approval. More often than not it is used in the set expression 'illustria argumenta', or linked with 'clarus':

"He ought to say that wisdom is by its nature the most clear and illustrious of all the arts"

is, for example, followed a few lines later by the words 'by a more illustrious argument'.¹ On one occasion it sums up his attitude to his own 'enlightened philosophy':

"there is almost no illustrious statement of philosophy which you will not find contradicted in some way in Aristotle".²

In his treatment of the Eucharist in the course of his commentary on religion Ramus writes:

"Christ uses these illustrious arguments to illuminate the blind senses of men".³

In this last instance, at least, it seems clear that the idea of light is the most prominent one.

Another principal concomitant of the process of enlightenment is the gradual certainty and self-assurance it engenders. The syllogism typifies this:

"The judgment thus obtained will be so solid, stable, fixed, so utterly immutable, that I could more easily believe that the light of the sun be taken away from man than his affirmation of assent in it".⁴

Elsewhere he speaks of the 'light and evidence of speech and gesture'.⁵

1. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.835.

2. Scholae physicae, preface.

3. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, pp.302-3.

4. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), pp.423-4.

5. Prooemium reformandae Parisiensis Academiae, SLA, 1082.

Since method is the keynote of all the writing of Ramus, I have treated at this great length his ideas on clarity and obscurity. Ramus stresses that clarity must be present in every discipline:

"There is a difference between the obscurity of a doctrine and that of its teacher. For the nature of the subject which is being taught may be so occult and obscure that it is difficult to make it easier. On the other hand it may be the fault of the teacher, either because he is not using a clear manner of speaking, or because he is not proceeding in a distinct and easy way. Some colours are darker or lighter than others, but in a certain situation and light they are equally visible".¹

The clarity inherent in all the arts is to be found especially in the fields of mathematics and theology. Mathematics, as the art or discipline par excellence, owes its whole existence to the quest for absolute clarity.² This clarity is carried over into the other arts so that, as Plato says, the man who is a natural mathematician is gifted in other arts.³ Mathematics brings light to subjects such as physics. This help is fundamental; it is not just that mathematics illustrates physics by examples. Again, mathematical clarity is an antidote to legalistic wrangling and confusion.⁴ The same can be said of theological clarity. Because of his great respect for sacred subjects Ramus wants the teaching of them to be

"a teaching which is as little as possible stony or thorny with scholastic questions; on the contrary it should be popular, resplendent and illustrious throughout the whole extent of the treatment and exposition".⁵

But clarity in theology is not achieved simply by the barrenness and

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1. Prooemium mathematicum, pp.326-7.
 2. Cf. Préface sur le Proème des mathématiques, pp.31-2.
 3. Prooemium mathematicum, p.198.
 4. Ibid., p.303.
 5. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.1.

precision of mathematics. Theology will make use of poetic and rhetorical colour.¹ In the course of a theological argument examples will be adduced first from the Old and New Testaments, and then from pagan authors in order to whet the appetites of the readers,

"not so that any authority or proof of religion should be sought in that quarter, but so that it may be plain that Christian theology is not so abstruse or removed from the senses of men that it may not shine forth to all peoples with a certain natural light, and that humanity itself will invite and entice men to undertake the study of divine things".²

Once again, 'humanitas' is coupled with enlightenment and with the excited joy of the reformer:

"And therefore I think that the new-found darkness should be cast far off and the ancient light should be summoned back again".

And once more clarity will be achieved by a right use of method:

"Therefore the first man to carry over this method into theological exposition, will light an outstanding lamp to illuminate clearly and brightly all parts of theology".³

Presumably Ramus thought that Calvin's systematizing had not gone far enough, if, indeed, he was at all familiar with the work of Calvin. What he wanted was an application of logical tables and schemata to the truths of scripture, but the danger of this was that it was likely to introduce aridity, and to fall into exactly the same error as did the medieval scholastic commentators.

Ramus' interest in optics seems to have been more than just a desire

1. Ibid, loc.cit.

2. Ibid., p.2.

3. Ibid, loc.cit.

to include an account of all the known sciences in his encyclopedia.¹ It seems likely that he came late to this subject as a result of his study of, and enthusiasm for, mathematics. Indeed he makes the connection between the two subjects quite clear:

"For optics is, in the question of vision, nothing but the application of geometry to light, shade and colour, to the nature and faculty of sight itself, its truth and hallucination, taking account of position, movement, number, quantity, figure, and the question whether sight is direct or by the reflection of mirrors, or by the density or rarity of different bodies, or by the refraction of bodies in between, so that the painters have at their disposal not only light and shade, but a brightness which is between these two and is called tone".²

All these images of light are a pointer to Ramus' theory of illumination and inspiration. At the same time many of them reveal his dogmatism, and the moral indignation he showed about what he thought was the culpable blindness of his adversaries, and of the establishment.

Nevertheless, much of his light imagery is vague, and some of it is tendentious and highly emotive. Even the most involved of the scholastic commentators on Aristotle paid at least lip-service to clarity, and the whole aim of their wrangling was ultimate clarification. Ramus' theological rhapsodies, too, managed to conceal the lack of original or even accurate thinking. The ideal of clarity, however, was worth establishing and pursuing. The reformer and humanist probably achieved more by falling short

1. We learn from the Prooemium mathematicum, p.182, that he taught optics (i.e., Euclid) for two years; we notice also that many of his references to sight, colour, and so on, are technical in character, cf. La Dialectique, pp.29-36.

2. Opticae libri quatuor, preface.

of the ideal than attainment would have brought.

Although Ramus was prepared to make an exception for the non-mathematical communication which was poetry, he could not dissociate himself from his addiction to clarity at all times. In any case he does not seem to have ever been whole-heartedly in favour of conscious obscurity in poetry. The lights of poetry were more like those of theology than of mathematics, or rather, the analogical language of theology borrows some of the techniques of poetry and yet retains some of the precision of mathematics.

As a logician Ramus was permanently engaged in the analysis of the 'vices of discourse' and in the attempt at eradicating them. He lists these on many occasions and there is no need here to go into them in detail. For the most part they are different kinds of logical sophisms and fallacies, and he illustrates these with examples. They are to be avoided by the correct application of true logical method. We shall see in the next chapter that there are certain qualifications which Ramus adds to the question of clarity. No writer ever has the right to be obscure, but it is sometimes possible that his meaning will be made more clear if he departs momentarily from what is strictly logically true. Sometimes, indeed, this process is very near to a conscious obscuring of the truth. Ramus calls the process 'Crypse' after the Greek word κρυψις which means 'hiding' or 'concealment'. The ultimate aim of this, however, is still clarity.

Ramus' basic opinion is that all discourse must be clear, but, since it must also be persuasive, he fears that the requisite embellishments will alter the plainness of the expression. There will be varying degrees of deviation from logical exactness; clarity itself, must, indeed, never be lost, but, in poetry especially, it ceases to be the only consideration.

The Pléiade theorists, too, and their associates were deeply concerned with the problems of clarity and obscurity, though they were divided about the relative rôles. Scève and Pontus de Tyard were the two principal advocates and practitioners of obscurity. Pontus de Tyard makes the matter quite clear in the Solitaire Premier: when Pasithée asks

"Mais que respondrez vous à ce qu'ils dient, que si par estranges façons de parler vous taschez d'obscurcir et ensevelir dans voz vers voz conceptions tellement, que les simples et les vulgaires, qui sont (jurent-ils) hommes de ce monde comme vous, n'y peuvent recognoistre leur langue, pource qu'elle est masquée et desguisée de certains accoustremens estrangers, vous eussiez encor mieux fait, pour atteindre à ce but de non estre entendus, de rien n'escire du tout?"¹

she receives the following answer:

"Je leur respondray que l'intention du bon Poëte n'est de non estre entendu, ny aussi de se baisser et accommoder à la vilté du vulgaire (duquel ils sont le chef) pour n'attendre autre jugement de ses oeuvres que celui, qui naistroit d'une tant lourde cognoissance".²

In other words, without trying consciously to be incomprehensible the poet is allowed to use language which will be obscure to the common people. There are many other instances in the poetry of the time of poets who followed Horace's adage, 'Odi profanum uulgas et arceo'.

Sebillet, Du Bellay and Peletier all thought that Scève was obscure. Sebillet shows his interest in the matter of clarity and obscurity, and his preference for clarity, especially in his chapter eleven of the second book, De l'Enigme ; he defines 'Enigme' as follows:

1. Solitaire Premier, ed.cit., p.67.

2. Ibid., loc.cit.

"Enten donc que l'Enigme est allégorie obscure, vice d'oraison appelé en Quintilian, a cause de son obscurité. Et a la vérité l'Enigme, soit escrit en prose ou vers, soit caché dessoubz peinture, semble inutile et superflu. Car si on n'y veut estre entendu, il demeure du tout inutile: et si on y veut estre entendu, n'est grand vice son obscurité?"¹

Peletier, however, is the writer who has the most to say in favour of clarity in poetry and in the other arts. He says, for example, at the beginning of the chapter entitled, Des Ornemens de Poésie (I,IX),

"Le première e plus digne vertu du Poème est la Clerte: e ainsi même que le parler commun nous temoigne, quand on dit par singularite de louange, ceste chose ou celà la auoët etè eclercie e illustre par un tel ou un tel, ou an tel tans ou an tel. Au contrere, par maniere d'accusacion e desestime, auoër etè obscurcie e auilie, E cete-ci est la beaute uniuersele, laquelle doët aparoeir par tout le cors du Poème; acompagnee d'une certaine majeste, qui ne rande point l'Eure intretable: e d'une grauite, qui ne le face point trouuer trop superbe. E a cete-ci, les particuliers Ornemens doënt obeir: léquez seront rares e antréluisans parmi le Poème, comme les fleurs an un pre, ou comme les anneaus es doëz."²

Peletier's following chapter, Des Vices de Poésie, treats especially of obscurity:

"Comme donq nous auons dit la clerte estre le plus insine ornemant du Poème: ainsi l'obscurite se contera pour le premier vice. Car il n'i a point de diferance antré ne parler point, e n'estre point antandù: Ancor panseroëje estre plus mal fet de parler obscurément, que de ne parler point du tout: Car on tient le tans d'un homme qui s'amusoëit ailleurs".³

In this chapter Peletier then goes on to describe the different kinds of obscurity, basing himself on Quintilian's treatment of the topic:

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1. Art Poétique François, ed. cit., p.175.
 2. Art Poétique, ed. cit., p.126.
 3. Ibid., p.139.

"Car si le Poète n'usé point de mox trop loin cherchez,
ni trop affectez, ni impropres: s'il n'est point trop brief:
s'il a suivi bon ordre (qui sont les poinz qui garantissent
d'obscurite): alors s'il n'est antandu, ce sera la faute du
Lecteur, e non pas de l'Auteur".¹

Peletier exhorts the poet:

"Et donq le Poète le premier soin de donner lumiere a
son ouvrage: e pense que le tans n'est plus de ceus
qui se delectent es choses obscures, pour prendre ocase-
on de se glorifier de les auoir comprises: ou pour s'an
rejouir, non pas comme de les auoir apprises, mes comme
de les auoir inuantees".²

The desire for clarity is in even greater evidence in the prefaces
which Peletier wrote for his mathematical works. In the preface to Théodore
de Bèze, in l'Arithmétique (Book Two) he debates the question at length:

"n'est encor' le different vidè, lequel des deux est le
plus profitable pour l'entretienement des ars et dis-
ciplines, que les professeurs d'icelles, quant ilz les
mettent par escrit, les traittent clairement et au long,
ou bien obscurément et brief".³

He gives the arguments for both sides: those who favour brevity say
that since the readers or hearers have to do the work for themselves they
understand and remember better. He makes the interesting comment here that
the invention of printing has made men dissipate their energies and made
them read many books on many different subjects quickly and badly:

"qui est cause qu'en se charg'ant l'esprit de tant de
choses, ilz sont contrains d'en laisser de chacune une
grand' partie par les chemins, et se trouuent en fin
frustrez de toutes".⁴

On the other hand those who favour clarity,

1. Ibid., loc.cit.

2. Ibid., p.141.

3. L'Arithmétique, (1552), p.27v.

4. Ibid., p.28.

"disent que la premiere vertu de l'oraison c'est la perspicuité, et qu'entre les ecriz clairs et les ecriz obscurs i a telle difference comme du iour a la nuit".

They go on to show that:

"a la verite nous voions qu'aujourd'hui on a trouvé moien d'abreger le temps aux disciplines par clairte et facile maniere d'enseigner. Comme on peut voir de la Grammaire, Retorique, Musique, et autres professions".¹

Peletier claims that he does not want to take sides in this debate,

"aincois ai pris opinion de suiure un chemin metoien: Car apres auoir bien examiné le merite des deux contraires, ie trouue qu'il n'est pas impossible d'estre facile et brief tout ensemble, pourueu qu'on tiegne tousiours son adresse a la metode, qui est celle qui donne maiesté aux ecriz et non l'obscurité: laquelle ne doit ni ne peut aucunement estre defendu contre la facilité".²

It is nonetheless evident that he has come down on the side of clarity, that his aim is to make his writing as clear as he possibly can:

"A ces causes me suis resolu de tenir en cette mienne Aritmetique, et en tous autres Traitez que pourrai faire desormais, un train le plus clair et le plus aisè que pourrai imaginer".³

Peletier is the closest to Ramus of the writers we have been examining, perhaps because he was better able than the others to see how poetry fitted into a broader scheme of the arts.

One final point in this connection is the matter of stylistic clarity. Although the writers of the Pléiade did not have much to say about this directly they did by implication. Ramus was deeply interested in Quintilian's

1. Ibid., p.28v.

2. Ibid., loc.cit.

3. Ibid., p.29.

ideal of clarity centering round 'proprietas', and in the same way the Pléiade sought 'naïveté' which was closely related to it. On this point Grahame Castor says,

"Indeed naïf was more or less equivalent to naturel, but with the added suggestions of genuineness and 'rightness' in the sense of particular appropriateness".¹

1. Castor, op.cit., p.79, quoted above p.43 .

CHAPTER SIX

TRUTH AND FALSITY

Since Ramus was not directly concerned with questions of epistemology and metaphysics,¹ it is not surprising that we do not find anywhere in his work a profound and detailed analysis of the idea of truth. This is not, however, to say that he was not interested; he shows throughout his work that his primary concern was furthering the cause of truth, with almost evangelical zeal. Truth is presupposed as the ultimate criterion. Everything in his system, as in the world of which this system was intended as a scheme and representation, has a clearly defined place. Truth was, for Ramus, as for most philosophers of the Renaissance, the unifying principle, the universal formula or equation which would solve all problems.

For Ramus, as for Descartes whom he foreshadowed in so many ways, God was the guarantor of truth in the world. God is truth, 'consummate truth'.² We are, as it were, sparks struck off from this truth.³ A further quality of this divine truth for Ramus is that it is certain. Ramus is not prepared to accept with Plato that the starting-point is doubt, for the reason that so many doubts are mere illusory sophisms. On the contrary, God is the beginning of wisdom as well as the end of it. Our final aim is the contemplation of the God whose shadows we have already glimpsed.⁴

Because of this centering of truth in God it is easy to see that Ramus

1. Cf. Ong, EMDD, pp.180-2.

2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.56, cf. p.70.

3. Ibid., p.47v.

4. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), pp.42v-43.

believed in the certainty and objectivity of truth. It is as well to bear this in mind since it is something which Ramus himself took for granted. There would otherwise be a very great risk of paying too much attention to the other aspect of his thought on the subject, the relativity and adaptability of truth.

Truth, then, for Ramus, is something certain and fixed, and the syllogism, which is our tool for deciding what is true and what is false, deals with 'what is doubtful, matter which is inconstant and, as it were, in flux'.¹ Truth itself can neither be disproved nor refuted.²

Ramus often talks about the 'solidity of truth'.³ He perceives it spatially, and in three, not two dimensions.⁴ But in spite of all this, by far the greater part of Ramus' remarks on truth show either that it is relative (that is, that our attempts to grasp it or express it are feeble approximations to the ideal - it is interesting to note in passing that Ramus followed Aristotle's suggestion that no thought is true unless it can be illustrated by a particular example), or that we must modify bare truth in some way if we wish to persuade our readers or listeners.

Whatever the arts teach must not only be true, according to Ramus, but must also bear the stamp of usefulness, and be in accordance with nature.

1. Dialecticae partitiones, p.7; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, p.27.

2. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.319.

3. Scholae physicae, SLA, col.827.

4. Ong makes repeated reference to 'logic in space', and insists on the important change that the ability to print schemata brought to our ways of thinking. The idea is stimulating, but I feel that the case is overstated; cf. F. Yates, The Art of Memory: 'Where I would differ from Ong is in his insistence that this spatial visualisation for memorisation was a new development introduced by the printed book. Rather, it would seem to me, the printed Ramist epitomes are a transfer to the printed book of the visually ordered and schematised lay-outs of manuscripts'. (pp.233-4).

Truthfulness is modified by expediency and by the need to communicate with a particular audience. The distortion, if distortion there be, must never, however, condone a direct falsehood.

Together with his contemporaries, Ramus seems to have been reasonably confident that man could arrive at a perfect knowledge of everything by knowing the causes, but he was enough of a realist to have seen that man is perpetually distracted by the senses. By the time he wrote his more mature work the first flush of the Renaissance had died down. He had begun to appreciate that the promise which the ideal of rebirth held out had not been fulfilled. This perhaps explains his insistence that the paeons of praise concerning reason in which he himself indulged are not sufficient without a laboriously accurate methodology. His contemporaries, and particularly the poets, were perpetually being disillusioned about the nature of truth and knowledge. This fact goes a long way towards accounting for the stress laid by the poets on lying, deceptive appearances and the unattainability of the ideals.

Ramus asks the question, to what extent should a writer depart from a rigid adherence to truth? He finds that it depends very much on the purpose of the writer, the genre of writing he is employing and, above all, on the character and aptitude of the recipient. Poets and orators often change the legitimate order of writing (that is, the more normal order) in the interests of pleasurability or usefulness. Readers are looking for more than a series of terse definitions; they want a fuller, more splendid discourse, which contains poetical or rhetorical colouring. Ramus insists that the rejection of excessive brevity is simply for the sake of greater clarity. Whatever amplification is necessary, it must not interfere with this aim.

According to Ramus there are two main kinds of method which are used in discourse.¹ There is what he calls the method of teaching and the method of prudence. The method of teaching (which, incidentally, is not completely divorced from the use of prudence) is based on the correct arrangement of the material, proceeding from the general to the particular. The method of prudence takes into account the nature of the audience, and all the attendant circumstances of time and place, and hardly depends on art, that is, teaching, at all. For greater persuasiveness logical clarity must sometimes be sacrificed. So a writer may place first truths or facts which are not necessarily better known than those which follow, but which are, on the other hand,

"plus conuenables à celui qu'il faut enseigner, et plus probables à l'induire et amener ou nous prétendons".²

The aim of all 'fiction' in literature is 'à enseigner le bon auditeur, qui de soy ayme et demande la verité'.³ A logician, for example, will not always be able to find the 'artificiel et vray chemin' of teaching, and in such a case he will look for another by the way of prudence, or 'coustume et usage'.⁴ The customary way of persuading people is by the use of figures of speech.

It is necessary, if we are to understand the precise nature of the idea of 'truthfulness' expressed in Ramist writings, to establish the relationship between figurative and 'truthful' writing. 'Hyperbole', for example, is 'traiectio veritatis', when we say more than the nature of truth allows either

1. Cf. Ong, RMDD, pp.245-7, and Dudley B. Wilson, Ronsard, Poet of Nature, Manchester, 1961, pp.90-1.

2. La Dialectique, p.128.

3. Ibid., p.131 (quoting "Ar. 3. Rhet").

4. La Dialectique, p.134.

by increasing or diminishing the subject-matter.¹ The Institutiones oratoriae adds that

"by amplification the thing itself exceeds the natural mode, but it does not want to deceive by a lie, and so we can excuse this speech".

In all cases the craftsmanship must be unobtrusive:

"Whenever in the matter of ornamentation, attention to the words destroys our faith in the emotions described, and whenever art is apparent, truth seems absent".²

The nearest Ramus gets to an epistemological discussion of truth is in his distinction between truth and opinion.³ Liberal-minded men, he says, lovers of truth, should realize at once this distinction. They differ from contentious men in that they are not concerned with retailing the opinions of others, precisely because they cannot all be equally true. Humanists contemplate simple unadorned truth and voluntarily embrace it.⁴ Ramus recalls the ancient debate whether knowledge alone was to be followed or whether there was not also a place for opinion. Plato had said that truth belonged to gods and to the children of gods, and 'le vray semblable aux hommes'.⁵ Yet Plato, too, exhorted us to follow truth wherever it might lead us. Ramus agreed with Plato that 'l'homme estoit capable de science' and that 'toute doctrine est invention de verité'.⁶ Most often men have to reconcile themselves to the fact that their knowledge is only probable, 'opinions which are so often deceptive'.⁷ Even more, their persuasive statements of their ideas

1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.54.

2. Ibid., p.80.

3. Cf. the long account in Pontus de Tyard's Solitaire Premier.

4. Dialecticae institutiones, p.32.

5. La Dialectique, p.3.

6. Ibid., p.4.

7. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.281.

will also be merely probable: 'Popular speech has all the splendour of discourse, and is satisfied with verisimilitude'.¹ It is in the 'places of invention', we are told, that we will find 'certain and firm signs and an infinite number of probable conjectures'.² There are three different approaches we may use, according to Ramus, when we are trying to persuade or prove anything, looking at reality on three different levels: firstly, there is the level of knowledge and truth, secondly, if the two former are lacking, probability and opinion, and thirdly, if even these are lacking, we may resort to 'some sophistic fallacy'.³ In logical terms, truth will be exhibited by the demonstrative syllogism, opinion by the dialectic syllogism, and captiousness by a sophistic syllogism.⁴ 'Jugement de science' deals with what is necessary, and 'jugement d'opinion' with what is contingent.⁵

Again we are shown that truth is not something of easy access. One feels that Ramus would like it to have been, to fit in with his views on man's natural inclination to logic, 'le vray et naturel usage de raison'.⁶ But he was faced with the awkward fact that, throughout the ages, men who were presumably well-meaning had obscured the philosophical heritage by making it more complex, and more difficult for their successors to arrive at the truth, and with the knowledge that all his own writing would have been superfluous if truth were easily attainable. He saw the need for eternal vigilance:

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1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.78v.
 2. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.356.
 3. Ibid., pp.431-2.
 4. Ibid.; cf., (1556), p.36.
 5. La Dialectique, p.73.
 6. Ibid., p.1.

"Est ordonné de Dieu et de nature comme une montée difficile et glissante, par les marches de laquelle nous est dressé et limité un seul chemin à la connaissance de science et de doctrine".¹

The tree which bears the golden apples is guarded by a dragon representing the ferocity of conflicting opinions.²

One further aspect of the question of truth in discourse is the problem of realism in writing. Ramus shared his contemporaries' preoccupation with the accurate representation of reality. This idea has yet to be adequately explored, but it is at least clear that most Renaissance theorists and writers were dedicated to what they called a portrayal 'ad vivum' or 'au vif'. Painters and sculptors, it went without saying, were, with a few exceptions, utterly devoted to this ideal, and so, too, were the poets. Basically the ideal was to describe something in such detail, and with such accuracy that the reader saw things as if he had been there or as if the things were present before his very eyes. The painter Apelles was the hero and ideal of Renaissance writers who spoke of his works as though they had seen them and of his books as though they had read them. His name was a sort of mythical token which immediately conjured up the idea of the perfect craftsman. Ramus is no exception to this idolisation of Apelles, and often refers to him in this way. On one occasion he mentions that Apelles strove to paint Alexander by a detailed representation of the different parts of his body. In the same way we should teach the parts of dialectic "according to the exemplar of that truth living in the man (not to go away from our

1. Ibid., p.x; for a close parallel, cf. Pontus de Tyard, Solitaire Premier, ed. Silvio Baridon, p.3.

2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1014-5.

Apelles)".¹ The most important feature of his theory seems to be that in nature 'everything is living, in art merely painted and imitated'.² The truth of everything, of all arts, 'flourishes in nature before any precepts are thought up'.³ The aim of an art is to make these things relive in a different way, by an admission of the fact that such life as they will have will be a mere reflection of their real life. Sometimes Ramus is carried away by his own enthusiasm and confuses the degrees of vividness; he says, for example, that the practice of an art might be compared to someone looking at paintings of animals and seeing them come to life.⁴ Since the paintings themselves are the result of practice in an art, we see at once that all Ramus is saying is that practice produces the vividness and originality of an art.

Whenever we intend to imitate any author, we must set before ourselves the criteria of truth, and attempt 'the expression of similitude'.⁵ This is not the same as representation, where we are trying to re-present, present in a different way the reality of nature. In rhetoric, for example, the presentation of the art should be 'according to the idea and similitude of rhetorical truth and beauty'.⁶

Representation almost always has a visual, spatial, pictorial basis in the writings of Ramus. The mind goes from the ideas of things 'to their living and archetypal exemplar', and so, by meditation on these shadows and images, catches sight of the infinite mind, which it then exhibits to those

1. Dialecticae institutiones, p.8.

2. Ibid., loc.cit.

3. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.4.

4. Dialecticae partitiones, p.58v.

5. Ibid., p.72v.

6. Institutiones oratoriae, p.7v.

who cannot see it.¹ The merit of good syllogisms is that they bring things before our eyes.² This is more than the fact that they set things out schematically. It expresses also the clarity of the reorganization and consequent artificial representation of natural ideas. In the same way, by the figure of speech called 'evidentia' the object is 'set up... before the eyes'.³ Fouquelin makes all this even more explicit. For him the best metaphors are those 'qui tombent dessous le sentiment, principalement des lieux, lequel est le plus vif de tous'. This explains 'la clarté de leur signification'.⁴ He even goes so far as to describe voice and gesture as the parts of rhetoric which correspond to hearing and sight, ('par lesquelz deux sens, toute conoissance vient en l'esprit'.⁵ It is possible that an adherence to this theory is an explanation of the preponderance of visual and auditive imagery in the poetry of the Pléiade. The Rhetorica gives examples of images from the other senses, but repeats that images of sight are more vivid "because they place as it were within sight of the soul things which we are not able to discern and see".⁶

Ramus uses the word 'representare' very frequently. We represent, for instance, the style of another writer by imitation, yet so as to retain our originality.⁷ Similarly, Fouquelin says that whenever we employ the figure called 'prosopopeia', by our own voice and gesture, 'nous contrefaisons et

1. Dialecticae institutiones, p.42v.

2. Ibid., p.56v.

3. Institutiones oratoriae, p.29.

4. La Rhétorique Françoisse, p.26; ('le plus vif' translates 'acerrimus' in a similar passage in the Rhetorica, p.36).

5. La Rhétorique Françoisse, p.113.

6. Rhetorica, (1572), pp.19-20.

7. Institutiones oratoriae, p.83.

representons la voix et personnage d'autrui'.¹ 'Representare' is often a synonym of 'imitare'; ('imitare mores', for example, used of drama, is equated with 'representare').² The two words are closely linked in the following sentence from the Rhetorica:

"Rhetoricians call it ἡθοποιΐαν (deliniation of character) and μίμησιν (imitation) when we represent someone else's words by imitating them".³

In the preface of the 1572 edition of the Rhetorica we read

"our Apelles wants to represent for you here a certain living image of eloquence, to enable you both to understand the excellence of men's rhetorical virtues by speaking about them, and when you have understood them, to make them your own by imitation and commentary".⁴

This almost pleonastic use of 'representare' is close to the use of 'exprimere', another related word, often found in the writings of Ramus:

"We ourselves imitate (fingimus) by our voice and gesture the examples of voice and gesture which appear in a dead form in written works, and as far as is possible we express them".⁵

This brings us back to the starting-point, which was the vividness and liveliness of representation. Pupils are encouraged to show forth their art, 'not only in painted precepts, but in living examples'.⁶

It seems that portrayal 'ad vivum' does not so much mean 'after' or 'according to the life' as 'as vividly as possible'. Otherwise we would never be able to see something painted as a vivid representation of reality,

1. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.86.

2. Rhetorica, (1572), p.30.

3. Ibid., (1562), p.112.

4. Ibid., (1572), pp.3-4.

5. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1012-3.

6. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.388; cf. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1027.

the vividness, truth and reality would be too dazzling. We must not lose sight of Ramus' belief in the degrees of reality. Art lives on a lower level from that of nature.¹ In the same way when it is suggested that ethics should not be described with lifeless precepts but illustrated with living and 'fully active'² (actuosus) examples, we remember that it is still an art, and so of necessity is a mere shadow of nature, and gives nothing more than a momentary stress to the living force of the principles.

We have now seen something of what Ramus had to say about truth and truthful representation. It remains to consider the opposite qualities, fiction and deception. If we examine some of the arts in turn we see that the logician, for his part, has no intention of deceiving, even though what he is dealing with is the probable, because his primary aim is to distinguish what is true from what is false. The orator, on the other hand, does deceive in that he more often plays on the emotions than on reason. A similar sort of deception is to be found in poetry and is inseparable from the poet's function of pleasing and moving his hearers or readers. It was taken for granted by Ramus, as it was by his contemporaries, that the truth with which the poet was concerned was not logical truth, except that incidentally he was obliged to make use of normal logical processes. When a critic said that a poet was lying this was not usually a moral appreciation of his sincerity, but was more concerned with his particular way of communicating to people or to his method of conceiving or imagining before communication.

1. Dialecticae institutiones, p.8v.

2. De moribus veterum Gallorum, (1574), preface by J.T. Freigius.

Ramus is quite adamant that the aim of poets is not truth but either pleasure (sweetness) or utility, "since they (i.e., poets and orators) set before themselves the task of writing pleasurable or usefully, and not that of unfolding the truth".¹ Since the primary object of logical 'exercitatio' is the separation of what is true from what is false,² we can assume that there is some objective and absolute truth from which poets and orators turn away.

The word most frequently used to describe the activity of the poet is 'fingere' or one of its compounds or derivatives: we read, for example,

"Choose out of so many thousands of living men those who have a natural excellence in wisdom and judgment - men such as Homer often feigned Nestor and Ulysses to be",

or again,

"Pluto, the god of riches, is feigned by the poets as reigning in Hell".³

The use of the word 'fingere' (which I have translated 'feign') corresponds generally to our 'imagine' or 'represent'. It is not easy to decide whether the word contains (as it seems to in these two instances) the idea of dissembling, or whether it has not progressed beyond the basic meaning of 'forming' or 'fashioning'. It would, however, be in order to suppose that because of the other words used to refer to the poet's activity, the idea of deception is often at least implicit. In another context, 'fingere' is branded by the bad company which it keeps: Ramus is speaking

1. Dialecticae partitiones, p.68.

2. Ibid., pp.63v-64; cf. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.920.

3. Dialecticae partitiones, p.2; cf. Prooemium mathematicum, p.266; cf., also, La Dialectique, p.122, 'ceste méthode artificielle me semble quelque longue chaîne d'or, telle que feint Homère.'

of the laudable procedure of setting up natural logic as the exemplar when writing a book on logic; in this way the correct order and distribution of the parts will be observed:

"he will express the small particles of all the sections which are derived from one and the same natural source; he will contrive nothing of his own, will feign nothing, will dream up no lies about it".¹

Good logical method is explicitly opposed to the allegedly spurious approach of Aristotle, and, indirectly to the very different technique of poetry. On another occasion, talking of the attempt to discover or describe the perfect orator, Ramus proposes the analogy of the painter who promises a picture painted with no common colours, and then, on being pressed, admits that it will be painted in green and blue. So, says Cicero, (according to Ramus)

"I shall imagine (fingam) and form (informabo) an idea of an orator, such as never existed"

and then goes on to claim that this orator's perfection (virtus) lies in his invention.² 'Effingere' is sometimes used in similar contexts, but means simply 'represent' or 'portray' with no suggestion of deceit:

"Jokes are spread broadly throughout a speech, so that when the ways of men are ridiculed, and are represented in this way, they may be understood as they really are".³

Poets are not reprimanded by Ramus as they had been by Plato, and as they were by Calvin and the reformers. Allowances are to be made for them and they are to be accorded a special licence of their own. In the Scholae

1. 'Nihil autem de suo comminiscatur, nihil fingat, nihil somniando mentiatur', Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.386.

2. Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.70; cf. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.275.

3. 'Atque ita effinguntur, ut quales sint, intelligantur', Institutiones oratoriae, p.56; 'effingere' is also used in a neutral sense in Dialecticae partitiones, p.58v.

physicae, for example, Ramus makes the following comparison between the philosophical approach to time and that of the poets:

"Time is imagined (*fingitur*) by the poets as a scyther, reaping all things with his scythe: this is to be condoned on the grounds of poetic metaphor, but it would not be permitted in a solid and serious public lecture."¹

'*Fingere*' here clearly contains the idea of 'imagine', 'represent' and 'deceive (but without malice)'. Poetry is therefore neither weighty nor serious. We shall return to the question of metaphor.

A further distinction between poetic and non-poetic style is made in the Scholae dialecticae, where 'poetic' is equated with 'popular'. (As we have already seen, Ramus shared his contemporaries' indecision about the clarity of poetic communication; here he gives evidence of his sympathy with those who felt that poetry should appeal immediately to the people, and that obscurity was a defect):

"Therefore orators and poets allow themselves in popular matters this licence to digress; moreover, since it is apt to reform the minds of their hearers or readers, they think it is praiseworthy or virtuous. And so, what would be blameworthy in an accurate style of teaching, would sometimes be praiseworthy in a popular style".²

But only sometimes, because although licence is allowed in the choice of subject, the actual treatment must make use of a plain and accurate mathematical style. The poets' licence is, in part, a result of their being hampered by their medium: 'since poets are more restricted by their metre, they freely and with licence make use of other ways of speaking'.³ We find the

1. Scholae physicae, SLA, col.735-6.

2. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.575; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), p.230.

3. Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.65.

same idea in the Rhetorique Françoise:

"D'autant plus que la loy du carme est seüere et rigoureuse, d'autant plus est donné aus poetes grande licence de changer et transferer les mots de leur propres significations".¹

The Institutiones oratoriae has much to say about poetic licence.

One kind of licence is the invention of neologisms, either by inventing composite words (e.g., perpetuus), by derivation (e.g., qualitas), or by 'translation' from other languages (e.g., philosophia):

"Our present day poets use far greater licence in this respect, so that not only when native words are lacking, do they use neologisms, but even when they exist already".²

After listing some figures of speech he says,

"Of these some are more freely found by poetic licence than in prose...some belong indifferently to either way of speaking".³

Poetic licence does not refer only to the fashioning of new words, but to the disposition of words within the sentence:

"A poem has many phrases which prose repudiates, so that poets use more daringly all ornaments of single words and of words joined together, in order to give themselves in their writing the greatest possible pleasure of song and harmony".⁴

Licence itself is regarded as a figure:

"Licence est une figure, laquelle montre quelque audace et hardiesse de dire ce qui sembloit estre dangereux à dire".⁵

Ramus repeats the dictum that poets are liars: 'poets, as the proverb says, tell lies about many things'.⁶ It is unlikely that he here sees this

1. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.10.

2. Institutiones oratoriae, p.10.

3. Ibid., p.20.

4. Ibid., pp.71-2.

5. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.111.

6. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.837; cf. Dialecticae partitiones, p.68.

as an ethical question, but rather as aesthetic or critical. In the commentary on the Christian religion he distinguishes different kinds of lying. The lie of David's wife, Michal, for example, was mental ('ad mentem') rather than moral ('ad mores'), and the sin was academic and against logic. There follows an account of the origin of lying, and of man's illogicality; the blunting of his natural powers of logic is ascribed to the lie contained in his fall from the state of grace by his original sin:

"Scripture does not say that every man is an atheist or an idolator, a blasphemer against the name of God, or a violator of the Sabbath, a despiser of his parents or a murderer, an adulterer or a thief, or covetous of his neighbour's goods, but it does say openly (Ps.116,II) that every man is a liar, and man's lie was the window first opened by the serpent on to every kind of iniquity. This enslavement of man is certainly natural, and we have seen that philosophers have had some perception of it. And so, although the first man was created a true logician by God, he has degenerated by his sin into a lying sophist, and has left to posterity a sophistic inheritance instead of a logical one."¹

The injunction against lying was particularly necessary because of these disastrous inherited effects. Ramus is ready to admit that there may often be extenuating circumstances; for example, as Plato says, in the case of leaders of the state, doctors and orators. The orator's eloquence is even equated with the gift of prophecy, and this is taken as an exoneration of any possible blame attachable to the idea of lying:

"It is not true that the orator is a mere craftsman of lying, because in sacred scripture eloquence has the same honourable place as prophecy."²

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1. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, pp.184-6.
 2. Ibid., loc.cit.

The poet's duplicity is linked with his intention of teaching:

"Il se propose d'enseigner le peuple, c'est a dire bostes de plusieurs testes: et partant deçoit par maintes manieres: Il commence au milieu et là souuent comprend le premier: finalement il conclud le dernier par quelque cas incertain et inopiné..."¹

A few pages later Ramus gives examples of 'feindre' in oratory.²

A word which is often discussed by critics writing about Ramus is related to this question of 'fiction'. The word is 'commentitius'. It appears in the title of the spurious M.A. thesis which Ramus is supposed to have presented in 1536: Quaecumque ab Aristotele dicta essent, commentitia esse. Ong rejects all the translations and interpretations of this title which suggests that the word means 'false':

"Comminiscor does not mean strictly to lie or to falsify ...so much as to invent irresponsibly, to let the imagination or storehouse of memory run riot".³

But the word, it seems to me, has very close links with words from the 'feindre' group. Interesting confirmation of this is to be found in Robert Estienne's Dictionary Latinogallicum (1538):

"Comminiscor...from 'con' and 'mente', since things which do not exist are feigned in the mind. Controuuer quelque chose en son esprit, Faindre quelque chose, Confingere et comminisci aliquid...Commentitius, adjective, as 'commentitia res', Chose controuuée et fainte. Commentitium, Ce qu'on a songé de nouveau, Nova et commentitia."

Perhaps Estienne is right that the word 'commentitius' has more to do with the root 'mens' than with memory, contrary to Ong's interpretation. Ong lists all the related meanings but finally decides that the best para-

1. La Dialectique, p.129.

2. Ibid., pp.132-3: in oratory, writes Ramus, often 'il ne fault pointot entrer par le vray chemin mais par quelque insinuation destournée'.

3. Ong, RMDD, p.46.

phrase of the title of the thesis would be:

"all things that Aristotle has said are inconsistent because they are poorly systematized and can be called to mind only by the use of arbitrary mnemonic devices".¹

Ramus was no doubt thinking of memory-recall, but the word does not necessarily refer to this. I would prefer to note simply that 'feindre' is almost an equivalent of 'comminisci'.

'Fingere' appears equally frequently in its other verb-forms and in some compounds and derivatives. In the preface to Cardinal Charles de Lorraine in the De Caesaris militia, Ramus links 'confictam' with what is fanciful and arbitrary:

"I am not professing an art of warfare which is arbitrarily and ingeniously fabricated, but I am relating, by definition and division, Caesar's art of warfare, extracted from his own exploits..."²

Part of the opprobrium attached to the word 'confictam' is that it means unrealistic as well as 'feigned' and 'contrived'. Elsewhere he talks of 'fables of New World fabrication', mentioning in the same context mythological monsters.³

The full force of 'fictus' is well brought out in a passage of the Pro philosophica disciplina. Ramus says that he disapproves of Aristotle's excessively mathematical style in his writings on logic, and his use of symbols (e.g., "omne a est b"). This, he contends, is bad teaching-method and

1. Ibid., pp.46-7.

2. De Caesaris militia, preface.

3. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1025; cf. Scholae rhetoricae, col.369. 'confingere partitiones', which is 'to fabricate divisions' (i.e., which are useless); cf., also, Aristotelicae animadversiones (1556), p.136: 'philosophers and orators who by the places and images have fabricated (confinxerunt) an art of memory'.

quite unnecessary, since there is an abundant supply of good natural examples:

"Therefore I shall rather use examples from Virgil and Cicero, that is, human and popular examples which serve exactly the same purpose, instead of those alphabetical figments. "Why?" asks my accuser. "Will not the practice of the art of logic, which was, indeed, originally demonstrated by fictitious literary examples, be better demonstrated in Aristotle's teaching on ethics and physics?"¹

The reasoning of the interlocutor is that the logic contained in Aristotle is subtler, more accurate, more perfected. Ramus points out that the pupil will not be in a position to understand the content of the physical and the ethical teaching and will therefore be less ready to grasp his subject. (We should not forget that, in spite of the fact that the examples from poetry which Ramus gives are more immediate, they are nonetheless artificial. The fiction in literature corresponds to the author's contribution to, and cooperation with, his inspiration or natural gifts). Ramus further amplifies the usage of 'fictus' when he makes a distinction between natural (physica) and artificial (artificiosa). A physical body is one which is endowed with physical qualities such as colour, density, weight. An artificial body is

"what is painted by Apelles, fashioned by Lysippus, built by Cyrus, or composed by any craftsman, such as paintings, sculptures, buildings, porticos, temples, arsenals".²

It must be noted that all these arts are non-literary, but the principle of composition is the same. 'Fictum' is used here for the fashioning of (bronze) statues. It has reference to that art which is perhaps the most representative and which seems to be the closest imitation of nature.

1. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1028.

2. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.327.

A further example of the contrast between 'fictus' and 'natural' or 'true' is to be found in the Prooemium mathematicum where Ramus says that the new astronomy is 'not based on feigned hypotheses, but on the very truth and nature of the stars'.¹ We are never far from the suggestion that fiction is more than fashioning; it is the contribution that man makes to reality, in the corruption of his nature, and so it can never be anything more than an approximate representation of reality.

The distancing from reality becomes all the greater and all the more striking when the reality in question is supernatural. At one stage in his life Ramus was interested in the different ways of representing God. As a good follower of Zwingli he is concerned to deny the value of idols or images of the deity. He adduces the support of Isaiah to show that when the fallible and earthly writer attempts to portray the invisible Godhead he achieves this only by 'an infamous and disgraceful fiction'.²

Another word which appears repeatedly in these contexts is 'fabula' and its cognates. It is sometimes used in its perhaps more frequent classical sense of dramatic poem or play (after its original meaning of 'talk' or 'conversation'). Thus in the commentary on Cicero's De optimo genere oratorum, we read that tragedy and comedy are both fabulae.³ But even here there is the sense that a play is a fictitious narrative and on dozens of other occasions it is this aspect of deception which is emphasized. Fictitious writing is distinguished also from historical accounts which must bear the stamp of veracity and objectivity. In the Liber de moribus veterum

1. Prooemium mathematicum, p.299.

2. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.113.

3. Ciceronis De optimo genere oratorum praefatio...illustrata, (1557), p.3.

Gallorum Ramus enunciates this principle, and a further illustration of his attitude is his statement that 'the law of history forbids that there should be in historical writing any suspicion of favouritism or animosity'¹, though it must be admitted that Ramus himself does not always write free from an excessively strong national pride.

Poetry and many other forms of writing are 'fictitious' and 'fabulous'. 'Rhetorical and poetic fables' says Ramus, 'will contain a greater fluency and delight'.² This is a clear suggestion that poetry is to be equated with myth or the making of fictions. Once this stage has been reached the way is open for a debasing of the word to a more pejorative use.

In the preface to La Rhetorique Françoise Fouquelin writes:

"Je desireroi fort (MADAME) qu'au lieu de si grand nombre d'histoires fabuleuses, nos deuanciers eussent employé une partie de leur loysir, à traiter en leur langue les sciences et disciplines".³

The word 'fabuleuses' is here used pejoratively, though the disapproval is not great. It is clear, however, that the author thinks the French romances are neither serious nor objectively accurate. Ramus is less critical of the poetic fable, when he shows what is the main purpose of poetry; wonder or admiration is at the basis of both philosophy and poetry: 'the poetic fable, like philosophy, consists in an admiration of reality'.⁴

A glance at some of the examples given above will show that 'fabula' is often used quite pejoratively; see, for instance, the phrase 'confictas fabulas'. Other examples can readily be found:

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1. De moribus veterum Gallorum, p.28.
 2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1029.
 3. La Rhetorique Françoise, preface.
 4. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.837.

"Hence this fantastic ἀφαιρέσις (abstraction) has been described in a fabulous way by certain degenerate Pythagoreans and Platonists",

and later on in the same context,

"You must understand that this is not the sophistical shadow of some fable or other, but the logical action of the mind, by which the demonstration of truth is shown in a more pure and more accurate way".¹

The force of the word is clarified between two editions of the Scholae dialecticae. In talking of a particular kind of syllogistic demonstration the later edition adds 'it is a poetic fable - no, not even poetic, since there is nothing probable about it!'² (The reference to Aristotle's poetic theory will be noticed). This demonstration, says Ramus, is the 'chimerical dreaming of a fevered mind, without matter, form or example'.³ There are degrees of aberration from the truth and even poetic narrative, with all its uncertainty, is nearer to it than the groundless gropings of an unbalanced logician. A few lines further on this logical defect of Aristotle is labelled 'that fanatical delirium'.⁴ This is not pointless invective; Ramus was quite convinced that poetry was a form of madness.

'Fabulator' and the cognate words did, however, soon become terms of abuse:

"How many false and impious things did Aristotle relate, he who told the story that man's happiness begins and ends in man himself, and many other wicked impieties?"⁵

1. Prooemium mathematicum, pp.195-6.
2. The two editions are those of 1560 (p.237), and 1569 (SLA, col.467); the Latin phrase is 'cum verisimile nihil habeat'; it is very interesting to note that this reflects the increasing familiarity which the idea of 'vraisemblance' gained in the 1560's.
3. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.467.
4. Ibid., loc.cit.
5. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.301.

Ramus notes that some ancient theologians had indulged in anthropomorphic (ἄνθρωποι θεοὶ) writing which is

"fabulous and invented to persuade the mob, for legal purposes and the expediency of everyday human life. This is the philosophy behind Aristotle's theology on the number of the gods".¹

He goes on to make the point that the Christian worship of images is even more impious. Later in this same book he comments on the Aristotelian criticism of Plato and Zeno, by styling it 'fabulous and childish',² and, in the preface to the Scholae physicae he castigates the attitude of some Aristotelians who ensure that "Moses is laughed at as an Egyptian story-teller".³

Ramus mentions Plato's 'fiction' of the reactions of a man risen from the dead, and adds the view of Coluthus the Epicurean who said, "a philosopher should not have imagined this fable (a philosopho fabulam non oportuisse confingi) because no kind of feigning is appropriate to those who profess the truth".⁴

We find, then, in Ramus the same sort of semantic confusion about the truthfulness or otherwise of poetry as we find in most sixteenth-century theorists of poetry. Renaissance theorists sometimes use 'fingere' simply to mean 'fashion' but it often has the pejorative sense of 'feign'. Grahame

1. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.965.

2. Ibid., col.969; cf. ibid., col.859.

3. Scholae physicae, preface in SLA after col.616; cf. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.26.

4. Ciceronis Somnium Scipionis explicatum, (1546), p.15.

Castor sums this up in this way:

"Such, then, was the status of feigning - an equivocal concept which was always in danger of being equated with lying and deceiving. The endeavour of sixteenth-century theorists of poetry was to stabilise the concept and firmly to set aside the disreputable aura of deceit, pretence and untruth which surrounded it".¹

Ramus seems to share the Pléiade's opinion that although poets are given to 'lying' this is not usually to be considered from an ethical point of view. Poets are not allowed to lie in the traditionally accepted moral sense of the term. Clements says of the Pléiade:

"It is within the poems themselves that one learns of the Pléiade's belief that deliberate falsehood and insincerity in literature are cardinal sins. One may feign - that is, conceal truth - but one may not lie. Feigning, as a matter of fact, was an important part of the primitive relationship existing between poetry and truth. The function of the poet was to interpret and embroider truth. In Pléiade theory, the process of feigning was entirely dissociated from the vice of lying".²

This could be taken as a summing up of Ramus' attitude also.

Ramus shares, too, the confusion between the two uses of "fingere (feindre)", that of making or creating, and that of falsifying. (Clements' translations 'creative imagination' and 'creative falsification' for the two areas of meaning are not very accurate, though the latter is better than the former). Castor has shown very clearly the way in which 'fiction' and 'feindre' change meaning in the sixteenth century:

"Fiction, then, was a dangerous word for sixteenth-century theorists of poetry to use, for it was in a way to concede the point at issue from the beginning, and to admit that poetry does indeed consist of mensonges. It did seem possible, however, to use the

1. Castor, op.cit., p.122.

2. Clements, op.cit., p.4.

cognate verb feindre to describe the activity of the poet, without necessarily condemning him out of hand as a liar. Feigning had not yet gone the way of fiction, and was apparently still regarded as a fairly reputable activity. Feindre still preserved its connection with the realm of material objects, which seems to have been the original home of its Latin parent, fingere".¹

This analysis is equally true of Ramus' use of these words. Castor shows also that fingere could still have the meaning of modelling in its sixteenth-century French form of feindre:

"In these cases, quite simply, feindre has the sense of 'to make a (material) copy of'. But, as Huguet points out, feindre was also applied to the literary arts, to signify representation 'par la parole ou les écrits'".²

The word acquires derogatory overtones in the course of the sixteenth century:

"Something of these derogatory implications was certainly present in the sixteenth-century French word feindre, though to a far lesser degree than in fiction".³

Castor lists and evaluates associated words, such as 'fantastique' and 'contrefaict', and shows that poetic fictions are not 'contrefaits'. He refers to Ronsard's 1572 preface to the Franciade and says,

"Ronsard is making a deliberate contrast, I think, between feindre and contrefaire; contrefaire is the legitimate kind, proper to poets and artists in general".⁴

For my part, I am sure that Castor is right here in his analysis

1. Castor, op.cit., p.119.

2. Ibid., p.120.

3. Ibid., p.121.

4. Ibid., p.123; (contrefaire, it should be pointed out, was not necessarily pejorative, and could mean simply 'imitate').

of the uses of these words in sixteenth-century Latin and French, and have found many illustrations to support his views in the writings of Ramus.

In more general terms the idea of 'vraisemblance' seems to have been one that was more familiar to Ramus than it was to most of the Pléiade writers, except perhaps to Peletier and to the later Ronsard.¹ This results from Ramus' greater familiarity with the ideas of Aristotle.

1. Pierre de Courcelles, in his Rhetorique (1557), already has a good deal to say about 'vraisemblance'.

CHAPTER SEVEN

INVENTION

'Invention', which starts off its life as an integral part of rhetoric, is at the heart of all Renaissance poetic theory, though not all its resonances are made clear in the arts of poetry. Grahame Castor has traced the relation between invention and imagination, and invention and reason, and shown how the concept degenerated from meaning 'finding' to meaning 'fabricating'. His overall contention is that the sixteenth century did not either have in its critical vocabulary the word originality, nor possess our post-Romantic concept of creative imagination, but that "invention" does become an activity in its own right. It is not to Castor's purpose to go very deeply into Ramus' concept of invention,¹ and so it is important here to develop it more fully, and to show the evolution of Ramus' thought.

It is worth examining the different uses of the term in some detail, especially in the case of Ramus, for whom it established the common link, and, at the same time, the differences between the disciplines. An understanding of invention is imperative if we are to understand Ramus' frequent and peculiar use of the term 'argument'. First of all, he uses 'invention' to refer to the whole of an individual art or to the various component parts of an art. So, for example, he debates whether Aristotle can be considered the inventor of logic or not; he agrees that Aristotle did not lay claim to the invention or perfection of ethics or physics:

1. Castor, op.cit., pp.128-35.

"but in his logical Organon he does not quote anybody as his teacher in logic, and even styles himself by name as the author of the whole art which has been invented or brought to perfection".¹

I should like to draw attention here to the connection between invention and authorship: it is of significance for an understanding of the problem of creativity.² In this case the inventor of an art seems to be the first person who wrote it down.

We read elsewhere:

"Plato wonderfully embraced those things which the ancients had invented, diligently practised them, and even taught them wisely and increased them copiously".³

The reference to the 'copia inventionis' will be noticed.

Dialectic, Ramus continues, owes more to Plato than to his predecessors because of Plato's own innovations. Up to the time of Plato it had been easy to observe nature and was obvious how this was to be done. It was Aristotle who gave himself to continuously arduous work, and who was really the master-inventor, but even he cannot lay claim to absolute originality:

"Aristotle followed Plato, and with unbelievable labour, daily study and wise observation he searched for (indagavit), drew out, and brought forth like precious veins of gold hidden in obscure caves, the arts of invention before they had been described and the arts of reasoning before they had been invented; but he merely produced the coin, he did not strike it".⁴

The process of invention, Ramus says elsewhere, is a cumulative and corporate effort: "Many things were invented by our ancestors for the use and

1. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.22-3.

2. Cf. also the dedication of the Scholae rhetoricae, in which patrons of the arts are called their 'inventors and authors', SLA, col.185.

3. Dialecticae partitiones, p.8.

4. Ibid., loc.cit.

dignity of human life and bequeathed to posterity...."¹

Ramus also uses the word 'invention' to refer to a particular part of an art, for example, a particular theory or technique. Contrary to what Hippocrates thought, writes Ramus, he himself did not, according to Philoponus, "invent the squaring of the circle, but when he had squared a lens he erroneously thought the circle was thereby squared". Proclus, however, admits that "there are many things in geometry discovered by Hippocrates".²

Ramus discusses at length what exactly Euclid could be said to have invented:

"What about Euclid? What did he invent in mathematics? Proclus says that he collected together the Elements, and in this book he arranged much of Eudoxus, perfected much of Theaetetus, and many things which had been negligently demonstrated by the ancients he himself affirmed in unshakeable, irrefutable demonstrations".³

Ramus calls this arrangement 'perfecting, strengthening', and sums it up as 'the exposition and decoration of a work'. Proclus, he claims, sees Euclid not as an inventor but as a compiler or demonstrator.⁴

Ramus' fullest treatment of invention comes in his logical works and not in his rhetorical works, since he had transplanted into logic the first two sections of traditional rhetoric, invention and disposition.⁵ For Ramus, invention, as a logical or rhetorical term, almost always refers to finding something one was looking for.⁶ There are, indeed, he says, (and we must note that he is firmly within the Rhetorical tradition), certain places (loci, τόποι) and certain sources of invention (fontes) in which one can expect to

1. Oratio de sua professione, SLA, col.1103.

2. Prooemium mathematicum, pp.32-3.

3. Ibid., p.95.

4. Ibid., loc.cit.

5. Cf. Ong, RMDD, p.275; cf., Tuve, op.cit., pp.339-42.

6. Cf. Castor, op.cit., pp.95-9.

find the answer to one's query. The working out of this process can be seen in Ramus' admission that his aim is "d'eslire de tant de livres, voyre beaucoup plus de rechercher par moy-mesme telz preceptes et reigles, que la matiere de l'art requiert".¹ Invention is always paralleled with disposition, so that the second stage of the process is always to dispose the precepts which have been invented, according to an artificial method. Invention is the "doctrine of finding the argument", and its counterpart, disposition, is the "doctrine of arranging the argument".²

In his attempt to find a universal formula, and to show the relatedness of all branches of knowledge, Ramus fastens on to the unifying factor that there is one common doctrine of invention, one method applicable to the resolution of all problems. Aristotle had contended that this was not so, and, even if it were, that it would be so difficult to discover it, and it would be so obscure and barbaric that it would not be worth paying attention to. For Ramus, this fact in itself is sufficient explanation of Aristotle's tautology and other errors in the matter of invention.³ The unifying doctrine of invention is compared to a river with its various uses:

"There is one river at Rome, the Tiber, which is suited to several purposes, for drinking, washing, irrigation, cleansing, putting out fires, and transport; nor are there individual streams set aside for all these advantages, but the whole river is of such a nature that it is useful for each and every one of them; similarly the doctrine of invention is universally applicable".⁴

For Ramus, the theory of the places of invention was far from being a mere logical or rhetorical exercise. All discourse was founded on it and con-

1. La Dialectique, p.viii.

2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.5v; Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.246-7.

3. Ibid., SLA, col.506.

4. Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.47; (elsewhere the Seine is used, instead of the Tiber, in the same illustration).

sequently all teaching. This in itself would justify our looking for the logical bases in the imagery of Renaissance writers, even if there were no other indications that sixteenth-century poets were alive to this sort of thing. In the Péroration de l'Invention of the Dialectique we find an explanation of why we should study the places of invention.¹ Because of its vital part in Ramus' philosophical system this passage is worth quoting at some length:

"or par telz lieux ainsi distinctz nous avons tous
les moyens d'inventer toutes choses".

Meno, says Ramus, had argued against Socrates that there was no point in invention:

"Mais, dit-il, ô Socrate, par quelle voye chercheras-tu
ce que tu ignores du tout? Quoy? Comment chercheras-tu?
Quelle marque te proposeras-tu de la chose que tu cognois?
Ou bien si tu tombes d'aventure, en icelle, comment
cognoistras-tu la chose ignorée estre celle que tu cherches?"

Socrates' answer is based on a pythagorean doctrine of reminiscence:

"Car puisque la nature de toutes choses s'entretient et
s'entresuyt, et que l'esprit l'auroit cogneu totalement
il ne seroit pas hors de propos qu'après qu'il se seroit
souvenu de quelqu'une de tant de choses, qu'il ne puisse
parvenir semblablement à la souvenance de toutes les
autres conjointes et connexées, moyennant qu'il fut
diligent à chercher et qu'il ne se fascha du labeur et
fatigue de l'invention".

Aristotle's solution is that 'celluy qui cherche scait généralement
ce qu'il cherche mais qu'il ne le scait pas spécialement'. Ramus objects
that this explanation is not applicable to the time when man did not even have
general knowledge. It is at this stage that he introduces his own belief in
the perfectibility of knowledge, and in man's capacity for knowledge (which

1. La Dialectique, pp.66-9.

both Socrates and Aristotle would admit). His conclusion is beautifully expressed:

"Et quand il aura devant ses yeux l'art d'inventer par ces genres universelz, comme quelque mirouer luy représentant les images universelles et généralles de toutes choses, il luy sera beaucoup plus facile par icelle recognoistre les espèces singulières, et par conséquence inventer ce qu'il cherchera. Mais il faut par plusieurs exemples, par grand exercice, par long usage forbir et polir ce mirouer, avant qu'il puisse reluire ny rendre ces images..... A ceste cause comme généralement toute doctrine, ains principalement Logique en ceste partie, ne baille point ses biens à crédit aux paresseux, ains les départit seulement aux diligens et laborieux, voire par juste portion; tant gagné, tant payé".¹

This describes very clearly the necessity of hard work in the perfecting of any art. The doctrine of the places may seem to us rather unrewarding because it is so artificial, but to Ramus and his contemporaries this particular mirror was worth polishing.

Ong's treatment of invention and of the places is carefully worked out and shows Ramus' dependence on the Dutchman, Rudolph Agricola (1444-1485). The question of the places, he notes, arises in connection with the need for discovering middle terms for syllogisms:

"By what regular technique can these middle terms be found or 'invented'? This will be the first part of dialectic. Like Agricola, Ramus now proposes a list of topics or places in which are stored all possible middle terms of 'arguments'. Here in the Training in Dialectic he proposes it as a list of arguments without enlarging on this term. But in the concurrent Remarks on Aristotle he makes clear that he wishes to do away with all discussion of categories and of predication in dialectic and all logic in favour of this topical orientation. By the time of his French Dialectique in 1555, he has elaborated a full explanation of his

1. Ibid., loc.cit.

rejection of the categories and of his own way of designating simply as 'arguments' the loci themselves, traditionally conceived rather as the 'seats' of the arguments. Ramus can designate the loci as arguments because he can think of them as arguments which are generic and of which the other items more commonly styled 'arguments' are species, or, in his way of putting it 'parts'.¹

We might add to this that Ramus does even equate argument and middle term: "the doctrine of inventing an argument or (vel) middle term".² His intention throughout is to substitute these places for the traditional categories. In the 1543 text there are fourteen arguments or places which, says Ong,

"will undergo an indefinite number of rearrangements as Ramus licks into shape further editions of his Training in Dialectic and of the Dialectic which succeeds this initial work".³

I shall say something about them in a moment, after a general analysis of Ramus' ideas on argument. Miss Tuve has attempted a definition of it:

" 'Argument' is a special, technical word in Ramist writings. The best I can do with it is to say that it seems to indicate the relatableness of a word or thing. It is that which has a fitness to argue something; every several 'respect' (relation, reference) is an argument - as man referred to God is an effect, referred to sickness, is a subject, referred to a place he dwells in, is an adjunct".⁴

The clearest account of the relation of argument to place comes in the Brutinae quaestiones. "Place", says Ramus, can be used loosely; you can, for example, talk about the places of etymology, meaning the parts of etymology. But, more technically, Aristotle, followed by Cicero, called the different kinds of arguments τόποι or places:

1. Ong, RMDD, pp.182-3.

2. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.246.

3. Ong, RMDD, p.183.

4. Tuve, op.cit., p.344; cf. Castor, op.cit., p.130.

"This is the origin of the wranglings of idle and lazy men about the difference between place and argument, as if place itself were not an argument, and as if the words of an art did not sometimes signify the art itself, and sometimes the things proposed in the arts; just as 'nomen' sometimes signifies 'noun', the part of speech, sometimes the thing itself which is proposed in that part of speech, as 'Cicero' or 'Cato': so argument indicates sometimes the art of the argument, sometimes the thing itself which argues or proves. But how much simpler it would be to define invention (if we may indeed so call the first part of logic) as the art of those things which may be said about a subject. And since they would all prove and argue a doubtful matter, they may be called arguments, and the kinds of argument could be described without the interposition of the proper name of any place".¹

Castor comments on a similar passage in the Dialectique:

"The 'argument' is that which proclaims the true nature of a thing, that is to say it is the name of the thing or the mental conception of the thing".²

The reason he gives for this statement is that

"since the order of the universe and the way in which the human mind operates correspond so exactly, there is no possibility that any epistemological slip might occur, no possibility that there might be any gap or discrepancy between things as they are and things as they are perceived or thought by human minds."³

Now whereas I am sure that Castor is right in showing how close is this correspondence he mentions, I feel that Ramus does not intend to say that the name (or sign or note) of a thing is the same as the thing itself.

Let us see what Ramus himself says about argument. First of all there are occasions in his writing when the word does seem to have the ordinary sense of 'dispute',⁴ but this has nothing to do with the more frequent

1. Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), pp.50-1; cf. p.59.

2. Castor, op.cit., p.130.

3. Ibid., pp.130-1.

4. Cf., for example, Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.847, where Ramus is talking about the controversy between nominalists and realists: 'they fought not only with words and arguments, but with blood, slaughter, and almost with civil riot and sedition'; cf., also, La Rhétorique Françoisse, p.83: 'en ditz et argumentz: quand nous concedons ce que celuy qui debat et dispute contre nous demande luy estre concedé'.

technical sense. In general, Ramus sees argument as the 'soul' of a doubtful question:

"Invention provides the argument, that is the soul of a question as of a dying body. The syllogism joins the argument with the question, that is, the soul with the body."¹

His first full treatment of argument comes as early as the Dialecticae Institutiones of 1543, where he describes it as follows:

"That by which a question is treated and expounded is called an argument, that which argues, or, in other words, proves and demonstrates something, as Virgil says, Fear lays bare (arguit) worthless souls. Now the same modes of invention must apply in art as in nature. Therefore, since in arguing the mind naturally happens upon the causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, disagreeings and other things arising from them, of the matters under discussion, this part of the art will stay in the same tracks, and will order us to look at both parts of the question, the major and the minor, in order to bring out the causes, effects, and all those natural counsels".²

This first classification does not appear in the Dialecticae partitiones of the same year, but Ramus does at this point in the book list the simple arguments:

"The main parts of a simple argument are causes, effects, concurrent and disagreeing circumstances. But there are four kinds of causes, final, efficient, formal, material; and disagreeing circumstances are divided into contraries, repugants and disparates, and contraries are divided into opposites, privatives, relatives. These are the principal forms of the simple argument, and from them arise genus, species, notation, conjugates, similars, dissimilars, antecedents, consequents, comparates, division, definition. For genus signifies the cause of the species, species the effect of the genus. The rest can be taken in turn from all the others. A composite argument is one contained in the testimonies of gods and men, and in the conflict of enunciations".³

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1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.187.
 2. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.8v.
 3. Dialecticae partitiones, p.5v.

In the Dialecticae institutiones this classification is clarified and appears as "kinds (species) of arguments..some of them primary, and others arising from the primary ones". In the first group are causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, disagreeings (dissentanea), and in the second, genus, species, names, notation, conjugates, witnesses, comparates, division, definition. Examples are given to illustrate and explain the different kinds of cause and other arguments. There is in particular a lengthy account of 'comparates':

" 'Comparates' are those things which are compared together, and are of two kinds: for the comparison (collatio) is either of quality or of quantity; quality is the habit of the things which are compared, the force and almost the power of quantity".¹

Quality itself is further subdivided into similitude and dissimilitude. The former is the comparison of different things but with respect to the same quality; for example, just as dogs are born hunters and horses are born runners, so men are born for discourse and reasoning. The similitude may sometimes be expressed in a shorter form; for example, "like the angels, men are created for the use of reason". Or it may be hinted at by a mere adverbial indication, for example, 'man, as if armed with dialectic'. Ramus goes on to contrast with this dissimilitude, which he calls an overthrowing of similitude. It is a comparison of things of different quality.

Comparison according to quantity may be of three kinds, greater, equal or lesser. An example of the first kind would be, according to Ramus, 'a man is some sort of a god, what wonder if he is a logician?'; of the second, 'a man is an orator, what wonder if he is a logician'; of the third, 'even animals

1. Dialecticae institutiones, p.8v; cf. Ong, RMDD, p.183. We might note also that the list of the arguments undergoes several revisions; there are some changes in terminology ('effecta' becomes 'facta', for instance), in 1548, and 'genus', 'species' and 'notatio' are absent, to reappear in 1556.

have some power of logical reasoning, how could it be lacking in man?' The use of comparison, says Ramus, is by far the most important and most frequent of all the arguments, and is the basis of all metaphor and simile. We notice once again the close links there are between the different disciplines.

In 1554 Ramus defines invention as "the thinking up of an argument, that is of a suitable way of explaining the question".¹ He calls it ^{τοπικὴ} (localis) because it points out certain precepts or places from which, or in which, arguments are to be sought. These places, he says, are sometimes called στοιχεῖα (elements). In Aristotle's logical works, argument is sometimes termed λόγος, πῶς (ratio, fides) but in the more familiar Rhetoric 'fides' is the most common name given to it.² Argument is also called 'probatio'. It is useful for us to notice all the different names given to the word 'argument' because they are all partial explanations of its meaning. It is particularly instructive to see how many of the words have to do with testimony or witnessing. The arguments are closely bound up with the appeal to the authority of the ancients and with the Renaissance conception of imitation.

Quintilian had defined argument as "a reason providing proof, by which one thing is inferred through another, and which confirms what is doubtful by what is not".³ So too, Ramus often equates argument and proof.⁴

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), pp.8-9.

2. Ibid; in Dialecticae partitiones, p.4, we read that the first motion of the mind is 'to find the confirmation of a doubtful thing' and we are told that this calls for a certain amount of subtlety and acuteness; and on p.33, 'the more simple, constant, holy discourse is, the more persuasion and confirmation it will have in teaching'.

3. Rhetoricae distinctiones in Quintilianum, (1549), p.80.

4. Cf. Dialecticae institutiones, p.2; Scholae physicae, SLA, col.827; 'probatio' was also a technical rhetorical term for the third part of a speech (also called 'confirmatio' or 'fides') in which the orator enumerated his arguments.

There are many additional points which might be made about the invention of arguments in the places, since it is a matter to which Ramus returns again and again. As a final note I should add that there is a very close link between the arguments and 'copia'. It is by the arguments that we appreciate the great variety that exists in nature:

"hence the great supply (copia) and furnishing of things. Therefore since there is so much good here we must devote great labour and study so that we may draw on the most ample abundance of things and the faculty most ready for all disputation".¹

Elsewhere we read that in the fifth year of a schoolboy's course, grammar, rhetoric and dialectic will be studied together; this will continue into the years of the philosophy course, and "the practice will be more copious and rich in proportion to the richness (ubertas) and wealth (copia) of the questions spoken about and discussed".² We often read about the 'copia inventionis': the scope of the four books of the Analytics, for example, is given as 'inventionis copia et abundantia'.³

By 1555, as Ong shows, Ramus has perfected his rejection of the categories and of predication in favour of the places: the treatment of the places has become very extensive and invention now deals with the separate parts of every sentence. In the Scholae dialecticae Ramus amplifies further his rejection of the Aristotelian categories, showing that there are far more than the traditional ten.⁴ In the Dialectique he gives various words for argument: 'principes, elemens, termes, moyens, raisons, preues',⁵ wrongly

1. Dialecticae partitiones, p.78v.

2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1017.

3. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.191.

4. Ibid., col.121.

5. La Dialectique, p.6; cf. pp.63-4.

claiming that they were all equivalent,¹ and announces, 'Nous usorons des vocables de raison, preuve, argument, comme estantz les plus receuz et usitez en cest art'.² He goes on to give two main kinds of argument, 'artificiel, qui faict foy de soy et de sa nature', and 'inartificiel...qui de soy et de sa force ne faict foy'. Natural reasons are contrasted with artificial reasons based on the authority of men. Ramus writes elsewhere

"I do not abuse the opinion or authority of Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, or any other man. I seek the ultimate and first causes of things in their deepest sources".³

For more than fifty pages in the Dialectique Ramus analyzes the different kinds of arguments and gives examples of them (and it is here that the Pléiade were most useful in translating his classical quotations). The first broad division is 'simple et non issu d'ailleurs'⁴ and has four species, 'Causes et Effectz, Subjectz, et Adjoinctz, Opposez, Comparez'. When he turns to the second main kind of argument Ramus lists 'loy, tesmoignage, paction, question, serment': and concludes 'si est-ce toutefois que tous ces argumentz sont appelez comunement autoritez et tesmoignages'.⁵

A metaphor basic to Ramus' discussion of the topics is that of the sources, springs or fountains (fontes) of invention from which arguments were to be drawn. The frequency of its occurrence suggests that it was being used rather tritely, and that the metaphor had lost most of its original force. Prometheus is seen as opening the fountains of wisdom:

1. Dasonville, edition of La Dialectique, p.103, comments, 'R. confond ici des termes dont chacun a un sens précis' (cf. Aristote, Mét., Δ): il est vrai qu'il prétend négliger leurs résonances métaphysiques'.
2. La Dialectique, p.5.
3. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.238.
4. La Dialectique, p.6.
5. Ibid., p.61.

"with a few brief precepts to have opened up the wonderful fountains of wisdom, from which he is said to have stolen from heaven, together with fire, the artificial wisdom of Vulcan".¹

In another example, after his treatment of the argument of causes, in 1555, Ramus concludes

"Voila donques la premiere fontaine de l'^unⁿction Logicienne: Fontaine (dict Aristote au premier de la Demonstration et au premier de la Philosophie) de toutes sciences: car lors nous sçauons parfaictement, quand nous sçauons les causes: fontaine par ce philosophe exposée en tant non seulement de passages et chapitres, mais de liures entiers, que ne pouuons doubter, qu'il n'ayt grandement estimé la doctrine de ceste partie, pour laquelle il a tant trauaillé".²

In the Dialecticae partitiones Ramus had declared that logic should contemplate itself and see within itself the image of God; it would see, too, that

"the fountains of all things which were to be investigated were noted and described in clear divisions, with the result that nothing could escape man's diligence, nor deceive his powers of judgment".³

In another example we read that Plato thought that men's immortal souls were plucked or gathered (delibatos) from the fountain of the godhead and so had some knowledge of things before they entered men's bodies.⁴

Another good illustration is to be found in the preface to the Institutiones oratoriae where we read that the author's aim will be "to draw forth the teaching of the arts from the pure natural fountains rather than from the

1. Dialecticae partitiones, p.8; cf. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1543), p.2; in the Préface sur le Proème des Mathématiques, pp.15-6, Francis I is described as establishing the library at Fontainebleau, in these words: 'il ouvrit les fontaines des louables disciplines'.
2. La Dialectique, pp.19-20.
3. Dialecticae partitiones, p.47.
4. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.486.

disturbed streams of opinions".¹ That nature (or sometimes God) is the ultimate source is often stressed:

"Theology teaches us to live well, that is, harmoniously, and in a befitting manner with God, the source of all good".²

Ramus also uses 'fontes' to refer to the Hebrew and Greek originals of the Bible, before they were sullied by mistranslations and disturbed commentaries,³ and 'fons' describes the unity of the Church in which there are many streams but only one source.⁴

One last important use of the word is worth mentioning. It appears especially in the writing on rhetoric, where reference is often made to the 'fountains of eloquence'. The author of the Institutiones oratoriae, talking of the three styles, comments that although there is a different style, adapted to different subjects, yet all styles have this in common,

"that they draw the same things from the open fountains of eloquence almost indiscriminately,"

though they make a different use of what they have drawn. Tropes, in general, are seen as being drawn from a fountain.⁵

Disposition, which is almost invariably for Ramus the counterpart of invention, traditionally the second part of rhetoric, is transferred by him to logic. It is inseparable from invention because it teaches the way in which the arguments which have been discovered are to be arranged. It is usually defined as 'the apt arrangement of things invented', and is synonymous with judgment and 'collocatio'.⁶

1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.3.

2. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.6.

3. Ibid., loc.cit.

4. Ibid., p.82.

5. Institutiones oratoriae, pp.69-70.

6. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), p.89.

In 1548 Ramus shows a preference for the rhetorical terms 'invention' and 'disposition' rather than 'invention' and 'judgment', because disposition is a broader term and can include method as well as judgment. He claims that method and judgment are very different from each other, but blurs the distinctions between them, especially in the later texts.¹ The second book of the Dialectique begins with a description of 'jugement' as 'la deuziesme partie de Logique qui monstre les voyes et moyens de bien juger par certaines reigles de disposition', which, says Ramus, Aristotle in the Analytica calls 'composition et resolution'.² There is great confusion about the terms here, because at one moment composition is given as synonymous with syllogism (which is only a species of disposition) and at another we find that "the whole of logical disposition could be called composition", and that composition is the same as judgment.³ In the Scholae dialecticae 'inventio' is called 'fides', and 'dispositio' is called 'ordo'.⁴ According to Ramus there are three kinds of judgment, that which proceeds syllogistically, that which proceeds by means of arguments linked together, and that which proceeds in the manner of the Platonic ascent to truth.⁵ All three are directed to "the same imitation of mother nature".⁶ The first kind is called syllogism, 'ratiocinatio' or "the firm and necessary collocation of the argument with the question".⁷ Ramus also calls it enunciation. (Ong comments on this:

1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.33.

2. La Dialectique, p.71.

3. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.54.

4. Ibid., col.55.

5. Cf. Ong, RMDD, pp.182-190.

6. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.19v.

7. Dialecticae partitiones, p.7.

"Undoubtedly the most telling and curious oversight in this threefold division - which is everything in discourse after the invention of individual terms - is Ramus' omission of the enunciation or proposition or 'judgment' itself".¹

Ramus does not, however, omit enunciation; in the Dialecticae partitiones there is a lengthy account of it on page 8v.)

Ramus points to the varying degrees of clarity and simplicity in the syllogism - some are more in accordance with common sense than others.²

The second kind of disposition has a more general application, giving "the order of many and varied arguments which stick together and are bound, as it were, by a perpetual chain". Since dialectic is the instrument for interpreting and explaining everything clearly, then the setting out and arranging of the arguments is of the utmost importance.

The third kind of disposition is an examination of the harmony of divine truth.⁴

It is the second kind which is of the greatest importance for an understanding of Ramus' thought, because it is out of this that grows, from 1546 onwards, the study of method which we have come to associate with his name. Ramus likens this artificial method to

"quelque longue chaîne d'or, telle que feint Homère, de laquelle les annelets soyent ces degrez ainsi dépendans l'un de l'autre, et tous enchaînez si justement ensemble que rien ne s'en puisse oster sans rompre l'ordre et continuation du tout".⁵

Method, then, is closely associated with order and correct disposition;

1. Ong, RMDD, p.184.

2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.12v.

3. Ibid., p.7.

4. Ibid., cf. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.224.

5. La Dialectique, p.122.

in so far as it is the best way (via (vove), μέθοδος) of teaching a subject, it becomes connected with the short cut or compendium. Estienne's definition is instructive:

"Methode, Methodus. C'est une breue façon d'enseigner ou apprendre quelque chose, au moyen de laquelle les hommes parviennent tost à leur desir".

In 1554 (Dialecticae institutiones) the short cut is given as the primary significance of method:

"Method is the disposition of many and various things proposed, but all tending to one end. We have called this disposition method, although method signifies all teaching and disputation, but properly signifies a short cut (compendium viae)."¹

In his commentary on the Christian religion Ramus says that he wants all the precepts of Scripture to be arranged methodically (not alphabetically) and according to their relation to the main heads of Christian doctrine:

"Although the wood (silva) of so many and such great matters is very broad and dense, yet they may be understood artificially by means of abbreviated signs of numbers".²

In the same way, Ramus expresses the hope in the Prooemium mathematicum that some doctor from his own college will come forward who will freely explore the medical opinions of all doctors by the fire of methodical judgment, and describe them more briefly and more accurately.³ Similarly, when Ptolemy said to Euclid 'Surely there is no better short cut (via magis compendiaria) to Geometry than [his] Elements'? Euclid replied, 'There is no royal path to Geometry', seeming to imply that

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), pp.193-4.

2. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.5; cf. Ong, RMDD, pp.118-120.

3. Prooemium mathematicum, p.443.

"the way of his own Elements was broad, open, simple, direct and almost military, and so was a royal way; but a shorter way would be slippery and steep and so not a royal way".¹

Ramus often returns to the idea that a way through the wood must be cleared. He refers repeatedly to the thorns of Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy which must be cleared from the path.² 'Way' is synonymous with reason and method:

"The best teacher ought in his teaching, to follow a short and easy way".³

Why then, asks Ramus, does Quintilian proceed with so many digressions and meanderings, and along such a thorny and twisted path?⁴ In order to diminish the irksomeness of long hours spent in study, Ramus proposes, 'compendiaria quaedam via'.⁵ He wants theology to be popular and clear instead of thorny; no matter how extensive or dense is the forest of theology, it can be penetrated by artificial short cuts.⁶

It might seem at first that Ramus' theory of invention fits easily into the theories propounded by the Pléiade. A closer examination of what Ramus says and what the members of the Pléiade and their associates said, however, shows that the points of comparison are not as many and as close as expected.

1. Ibid., p.98.

2. Cf. Dialecticae partitiones, p.13.

3. Ibid., pp.3v-4v; cf. La Dialectique, p.123.

4. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.335.

5. Aristotelicae animadversiones (1548), preface.

6. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.5.

Castor's exposition of the Pléiade's attitude shows that although they used the word 'invention' very frequently in writing about the art of poetry, nevertheless they were consciously transferring it from the art of rhetoric, and still gave to it most of the resonances it had had in that field. But they did not work out in any detail how exactly the rhetorical invention of places was to be used in poetry, presumably because training in rhetoric was traditional, and familiar to every schoolboy. In a more general sense, they used the word, as Castor shows, both with the meaning of 'finding what one was looking for', and, later, with the pejorative meaning of 'making something up', though without necessarily the admission that this was the equivalent of lying. Later still in the century, and especially in Montaigne, the word was often used to refer to what one had invented.

In Ramus' writings the word is very often used in the technical senses which have been described in this chapter. This time 'invention' has been transferred from rhetoric to logic, and here again it has retained all its rhetorical resonances. The main difference between Ramus' usage of the word and of the idea and that of the theorists of poetry, is that for Ramus, because of his interest in logic, it is more clearly connected with teaching rather than with persuading, (though a glance at some of the synonyms of 'argument', words like 'probatio' and 'fides', will show that the two are almost inextricably linked). In Ramus invention and fiction are not as directly linked as they come to be by the theorists of poetry, except in so far as these are both connected with art (both as artifice, and as teaching). Ramus makes disposition the equivalent of method; we today would see invention as being closer to method than was disposition, and this reflects how the word 'method' has changed its meaning radically since the sixteenth century. For

Ramus it was a way of arranging what had been found out, not a set of principles or a procedure for finding things out. For him invention and disposition meant, exactly as they did for Ronsard, tracing a way which was already in existence.

When Sebillet says that invention is the 'premiere partie de Poesie', (title of Bk.1,ch.3), he is, as Castor shows, thinking of that invention which is the first part of rhetoric. But what this means in poetry, how rhetorical invention works in poetry, is never made clear, neither by Sebillet, nor by Du Bellay nor Peletier who share Sebillet's opinion of its importance. It seems to me extremely unlikely that the Pléiade ever made any use at all of Ramus' division of the places of invention, or of his disposition of the arguments once they had been found. His mechanistic treatment is one which was entirely foreign to the Pléiade's approach to poetry. A priori one feels that images would not be sought with reference to the schoolboy rhetoric which the poets would all have studied. They would not, it is true, have written in a way which was completely uninfluenced by their study of rhetoric, but they surely did not carry over any accurate knowledge of methodical tables.

It now remains to say something more about the Ramist rhetoric, to see what he has to say about style in general, and metaphor in particular, before going on to examine the relationship between the poet, the orator and the logician.

CHAPTER EIGHT

STYLE

The question of style was one which interested Ramus throughout his life, and not just during the years he devoted to the study and teaching of rhetoric. Not only was so much of his work concerned with types of communication (which meant that he was also concerned with the form), but he himself wrote his many books in several differing styles.

A fairly basic initial distinction which Ramus made was the one between the written and the spoken word.¹ He was well aware of the different force each kind of communication had, and was also aware that the distinction did not always apply in practice. In some ways it was hypothetical, because a text (such as a speech or a lecture) was often written out beforehand, delivered and then finally printed and published. The impact on the hearer or the reader would clearly be different, firstly on the different occasions a person heard or read the same text, and secondly between someone who read it and someone who heard it. Ramus was fascinated by the relation between the written and the spoken word, particularly from the point of view of their relative persuasiveness.

In the Liber de Moribus he compares the Druids' theory that the written word was undesirable because it gave the people access to the mysteries contained in the different disciplines and because it encouraged people to memorize without understanding, with Socrates' view that in spite of its insufficiencies the written word was a useful antidote against for-

1. Cf. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.388; cf., also, the preface to the Euclides.

getfulness. To Ramus, the orator and voluminous writer, the whole question was rather unreal, but he does agree that the attitude of Socrates is more humane. The intransigence of the Druids, he says, has brought it about that we now have to approach the arts through the medium of a foreign language. He is not so much concerned with the occasional advantage of committing one's thoughts to paper instead of relying on oral communication, as with the fact that by vernacular composition a tradition of writing and speech would have been established.¹ This difference between the written and the spoken word is often mentioned, from his earliest works onwards:

"We now come to the practice of writing and speaking, which are treated together; but writing comes first both naturally and chronologically, and there is no other way of practising eloquence besides that which the rhetoricians have handed down".²

In my view it is hard to see how writing is more natural than speaking, except that it may be more natural and spontaneous to write than to read from what one has written. The revised text (the Dialecticae institutiones), adds;

"although the voice is much more powerful than writing for teaching purposes, and the tongue is more eloquent than the hand, as Socrates wisely argues at the end of the Phaedrus".³

It is more eloquent, says Ramus, because it can accommodate itself more easily to the ears of the listeners.⁴

Ramus has no illusions about the unsuitability of language to express

1. Liber de Moribus veterum Gallorum, p.44v.

2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.71v.

3. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.52v.

4. Cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), pp.269-70; cf. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.602.

thought, especially as he considered that our thoughts are mere sparks or reflections of God's thoughts:

"There is no power in speech which is so strong that it can outline even the slightest part of the divine mind".¹

Speech is further imperfect, he says, in that we rarely talk according to logical structures; we do not, for example, give all the stages in the syllogism when we are talking.²

We now come to Ramus' remarks on style as such. Ong has noted that Ramus progresses from an orthodox commentary on the traditional three styles (low, middle and high), to a theory of the plain style.³ It seems to me, however, that Ramus does always retain the three rhetorical divisions, because he never entirely convinces himself that the plain style is universally desirable. His addiction to the use of illustrative examples, even in his more technical writing, precludes a bare straightforward style. The mathematical style, he declares, may on occasion convince an attentive reader, but it rarely persuades anyone who approaches the subject with a vestige of prejudice. Ornamentation is essential for all but the strictest and most technical mathematical works, and, even there, diagrams may take the place of verbal illustrations. Figurative language may, and even should, be present in philosophy and theology, according to Ramus. So much for the plain mathematical style. We must emphasize that the allegiance Ramus professes to it is often theoretical. Ong comments on the Ramist plain style:

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.41.
2. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.554.
3. Ong, RIDD, pp.212-3.

"This style is certainly not the high or grand style, nor is it the low or middle style. It is the phoenix which rises from the holocaust of all three styles, the verbal counterpart of the coming visualist universe of 'objects', voiceless and by that very fact depersonalized, which would soon recommend to the Royal Society, as Thomas Sprat records in his history, 'a close, naked, natural way of speaking', as near the 'mathematical' as possible".¹

Now, while it is true to say that "with the appearance of the Ramist 'method'... decorum and the three styles will disappear from the corresponding Rhetoric for good",² I do not think that it is true that they disappear completely from Ramus' way of envisaging style in general. Ramus does not ever reject the embellishment of language, and the adaptation of the language of a particular piece to the capacity of the audience.

The classification of the three styles is not the only possible way in which different kinds of writing and speech can be described, though it is the most common one in classical and Renaissance theorists; style can be described according to other criteria. This is often seen in the writings of Ramus. He was particularly interested in the different styles which were adapted to different subjects. There is, for example, the historical style, which is characterized not perhaps so much by a different use of words, as by the author's approach to his subject, by his objective, uncoloured treatment of it. Ramus calls the ideal historical style 'pure eloquence'.³ Historical writing, he says, must be grave, equable and true.⁴ Then there is, for example, theological style, which possesses a

1. Ibid., p.213.

2. Ibid., p.212.

3. Liber de Moribus veterum Gallorum, p.28 (with reference to Livy).

4. Ibid.; cf. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.271.

different kind of truth. If it is to persuade, and religious writing, he says, is totally devoid of purpose if it does not incite the reader to piety, it must be popular, and it will achieve this end if the writer illustrates his text with rhetorical examples. What characterizes it, above all, is its variety, since it makes use of prophecy, history and poetry, which make it urbane and elegant without destroying its plainness. The good theological writer will take the bare truths of Christianity ('the rough outlines of Christian doctrine') and will file and polish them before expressing them 'in living colours'.¹

Apart from this, style embraces differences which do not belong necessarily to any particular kind of writing, but may be used by the same writer for different purposes within a particular context. Variety of style, for example, is usually advantageous in that it will make the text more persuasive. According to Ramus, the three traditional styles are themselves an example of this variety:

"to express humble matters in a modest way, middle matters in a temperate way, and important matters in a serious way: by every method possible to lead, conciliate, alienate, please, move, excite, relax, to take where you want and bring back from where you want the minds of your hearers".²

This fits in also with Ramus' idea that all arts reflect the variety of nature:

"What do all arts and teaching contemplate, admire and follow, but the immense variety of things (which have been founded and brought into being by the great all-powerful God in His incredible wisdom?)".³

1. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.4.

2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.46v.

3. Ibid., p.4lv.

Poets and historians often use a great variety of figures of speech, and, in general, Ramus thought that this variety was essential for sweetness.¹ A work will be all the more admirable if it reflects the variety of nature in the variety of its expression by using different tropes, figures and metres.²

As is to be expected it is in the Institutiones oratoriae that we find the clearest exposition of the Ramist rhetoric, and the fullest discussion of stylistic questions. Variety of style is one such topic to which this book devotes considerable attention, and the reason given is that rhetoric, by definition, must be capable of dealing with any subject:

"Because this teaching has no defined region inside the boundaries of which it may be restrained, but is able to wander and exist in the immense area of all fields and arts - whether it is dealing with divine matters or with human, with heaven or earth, with any kind of nature, with human manners and institutions, and whether it is talking to many or to a few - while it will concede to the rest of the arts knowledge and understanding of things, it will reserve to itself the praise of illuminating and ornamenting speech."³

A further good way of examining what Ramus had to say about stylistic questions is to see what he considered worthy of praise or blame in

1. Cf. Institutiones oratoriae, p.24; cf. p.41: 'By means of this happy and elegant variety poets and historians often soothe the minds of their readers'.
2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.46.
3. Institutiones oratoriae, p.8. In this and the following chapter I shall make extensive use of Talon and Fouquelin, and remind the reader that I am doing this because, in the case of Talon it is never clear exactly how much of the books published in his name is by him, and how much is in fact simply the work of Ramus, and that in any event here we have the Ramist rhetoric, and in the case of Fouquelin we have a pupil of Ramus, and someone who translated very closely this Ramist rhetoric.

different kinds of style; in all these writings about rhetoric it is apparent that some qualities are to be found in all good style and others are restricted to writing which has a particular purpose. We shall not be surprised to see Ramus or Talon extolling the virtues of a style which is natural, even though they thought that any writing must also be artificial in the sense that it is at one remove from reality. Communication was for Ramus, by definition, artificial, yet it could approximate more or less closely to the ideal and so be more or less natural. In this context the word 'natural' is usually coupled with 'proper' or 'apt'. The idea has an obvious philosophical basis in the category of the 'proprium', the four kinds of which are summarized in the Aristotelicae animadversiones (1556):

"That which belongs to one class and not another - that a man be a doctor; that which belongs to all, not one alone - that a man should have two feet; that which belongs to individuals and to all on occasion - that a man should have white hair in old age; that which belongs to individuals and to all at all times - that a man should be born with a capacity for laughter".¹

This description of what is 'proper' is the philosophical background to what is 'natural'. On one occasion Fouquelin uses it with reference to the meaning of words. In explaining that Enigma need not be metaphorical he quotes an example where 'tous les motz sont propres et naifz'.² They are proper and natural in the sense that they are not metaphorical. Not all writing is proper and natural. Proper style means either that the words are all used in their literal sense, so that the head must mean a part of the body, and if used metaphorically is used improperly, or simply that it is

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1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1556), p.100.
 2. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.14. (1557 text).

'apt'. Even though style will be only in certain very limited circumstances natural and proper in the first sense, it should always be clear (with the reservations already made about poetic licence) and apt or suitable to its purpose.

In discussing the Eucharist in his commentary on religion Ramus contrasts 'foreign (exoticis) words and words thought up by man', (he also refers to these latter as 'profane λογολιγία (disputations) and κινωγωνία (vain talking)), with the words of Sacred Scripture and of the Holy Ghost

"the most true teacher of wisdom the most clear speaker of eloquence, who uses words which are clear, significant and suitable for what is necessary for our understanding".¹

This is a good explanation of what Ramus considers to be the ideal style for any subject, especially a technical one, when we are anxious to appreciate the exact sense.

Perhaps for him this is the most desirable characteristic of good style, that it should be apt, suited to the subject-matter.² Usually in classical and Renaissance rhetoric a discussion of aptness in style has reference to the three styles already mentioned. Decorum will moderate the three styles.³ An excellent account of the whole question is to be

1. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, pp.340, 342-3.

2. Cf. Institutiones oratoriae, p.72; Style must be suitable for the particular speech, for the principal part of an art (according to Cicero) is aptness (decere): the one thing which can scarcely be handed on by an art. (Ibid.) Propriety is associated with brevity: a definition is a proper and brief declaration of what a thing is (Dialecticae Institutiones, (1543), p.17v; cf. La Dialectique, p.58).

3. Institutiones oratoriae, p.71; cf. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.233, and Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col. 1041.

found in the Institutiones oratoriae:

"That is apt which is a conjunction of words in a style accommodated to the subject in hand. When the orator's subject-matter is humble, grave or intermediate, then he must conform with the three-fold variety which is available for the explanation of things; and although there is a difference according to the importance and the nature of the matters, yet this is something which is common to all kinds of speech, that they draw almost promiscuously from the fountain of eloquence when they have been made available, but they make use of the ornaments I mentioned above sometimes in a more formal and splendid way and sometimes more loosely".¹

The author goes on to show that in matters which are not elevated the orator must proceed unobtrusively and with delicacy. The result of this procedure will be that he teaches all these matters "in a modest way and plainly". This humble style admits of an infinite number of levels of "aptness". The author also uses the didactic criterion with reference to the grave style. It is 'vehement, full, copious, and arranged for the purpose of instructing minds'.² The 'copia verborum' is in great evidence here as it had been in the discussion of invention.

The touchstone of the aptness of style is, for Ramus as it had been for Cicero, 'decorum'. In a passage of the Brutinae quaestiones Ramus claims rather tendentiously that 'decorum' is proper to logical invention and disposition rather than to rhetoric, but goes on to say that since logic is inherent in all the other disciplines, decorum is found everywhere too,

"in all that is said and done, in all the plans which are made about everyday things not included in any art but which are the result of human prudence. Decorum is contained in every precept of every art".³

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1. Institutiones oratoriae, pp.69-70.
 2. Ibid., loc.cit.
 3. Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.71.

In general the 'full' or high style was accorded more attention by the rhetoricians because of its elevated moral connotations; the hierarchy of styles implied a hierarchy of aesthetic and moral values. And the 'copia verborum' was of particular interest to the men of the Renaissance because of their desire to increase the purchasing-power of words in their own languages, and to savour to the full the resources of Latin and Greek. Ramus was dedicated to this theory because he wanted schoolboys to make use of the riches of Latin in their own compositions, and because he wanted Latin phrases and literary allusions to illustrate his plain and natural dialectic. 'Copia' reflects an increasingly more widespread use of language, with the purpose of persuading and convincing the reader more easily. It points to an attitude to imagery and ornamentation which is radically different from our own today.

In the Ramist view much is made of the idea of ornamentation. For Ramus "rhetoric is content with the possessions which are its own ornaments".¹ When we devote ourselves to the practice of an art, it is as though we went into "some rich (locupletem) and ornate house of eloquence" and laid bare "the magnificent hidden riches of its construction".² The idea of the "furniture of eloquence" is borrowed from Cicero and Quintilian: we read, for example, 'Hence (i.e., from practice) comes all abundance and store of things, all proof and guarantee, almost all movement and delight in the soul'.³ Ramus talks also about 'laying bare (explicandum) all the riches of rhetorical furniture'.⁴ Another image is used, in the Institutiones

1. Dialecticae institutiones (1543), p.58.

2. Institutiones oratoriae, p.74.

3. 'Hinc omnis copia rerum, et supellex...' (Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.53v)

4. Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.94.

oratoriae, with reference to 'copia', and that is the image of clothing.

There was clearly a very close parallel between ornamentation and adornment and the idea of clothing (since this is the basis of the metaphor), and it had the further advantage that it could be contrasted with the plain bare style.¹ We read about the 'covering of allegory'. Just as we wear clothes because we are cold, says Ramus, and later make these more attractive, so we use tropes because we need to, and then later ornament them.²

In the Institutuiones oratoriae 'copia' is used on one occasion as follows:

"Forensic oratory has not only sinews and stings, but also an accurate and ornate store of words".³

Ramus returns to the idea of 'copia' (which, it should be remembered, does not just refer to words, but also mirrors a flourishing of all arts and sciences), in the Préface sur le Proëme des Mathématiques, when, talking of himself and the men of his generation, he says,

"[Nous] avons plus veu d'affluence d'hommes et d'oeuvres doctes en un seul aage, que noz ancestres n'en auoient veu en tous les quatorze aages d'auparauant".⁴

He goes on to say that the Medicis, and the French kings, Francis, Henry and Charles,

"ont redoublé ceste plante d'esprits, cesteabondance de doctrines, ceste foison de muses que lon a veue..."⁵

1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.81.

2. Rhetorica, (1572), p.7.

3. Institutiones oratoriae, p.70; cf. Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.94.

4. Préface sur le Proëme des Mathématiques, pp.30-1.

5. Ibid., loc.cit.

(Ramus then makes another of his belated pleas, this time for a cultural union between France and Italy. There are many other instances of Ramus' being behind the times. His academic aloofness ensured that he supported causes long after they had ceased to be living issues. In this instance what he is hoping for, above all, is 'fertilité'. Philosophy and letters, he writes, have filled the minds of men with 'un fruit tresplantureux').

The 'copia' of orators is not, however, for Ramus, simply exuberance and fertility of imagination (though this is, indeed, a large part of it). He contrasts it in fact with the garrulousness and aridity of the scholastics.¹ He also compares Aristotle's sterility with the fecundity of natural logic.² What is more surprising is the way in which he contrasts the Attic style with Cicero's 'empty verbal glibness'.³

We have already seen that for Ramus 'copia' is cultivated by invention and disposition. Ramus felt that his plan to unite all the sciences could not but result in greater richness. In uniting rhetoric and philosophy, great labour is necessary in order to 'draw out the most ample abundance of things, and a faculty most prompt for every disputation'.⁴ He says elsewhere that he wants pupils to take from the feast of learning not just 'copiam et abundantiam' but wants these things to be cut up and prepared in such a way that they will be able to digest them.⁵

The opposite of 'copia' is 'inopia'. The ancients we are told, brought in words which were new both in form and meaning,

1. Aristotelicae animadversiones, p.7v.

2. Ibid., p.79v.

3. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.249.

4. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.605.

5. Dialecticae praelectiones in Porphyrium, pp.4-5.

"not only in order to do away with the want (inopia) and poverty of their own speech, but also to make it richer and more dignified".¹

Fouquelin is even more insistent about 'la pauvreté de notre langue' which is only just out of its infancy, and which needs the 'accoutrementz et (s'il faut ainsi parler) les plumes d'autrui pour se farder et acouter'.² He talks, too, of the 'indigence de noms et appellations propres'. It is this 'inopia' which begets the need of tropes.³ The 1562 Rhetorica goes even further than Fouquelin had done when it says

"We even use figurative words more frequently than proper words, and that partly because of a lack of proper words and partly because of the elegance and ornateness of the figurative words".⁴

Apart from aptness a further quality which Ramus was particularly interested in was that of familiarity. The familiar style held an obvious attraction for him because of his theories about man's natural logical abilities. He felt that the language of the common people was less likely to be corrupt and riddled with sophistry. All writers should strive to present their thoughts with the economy of language usually to be found in the speech of the common people, and which represented their natural approach to life. Ramus mentions this ideal in the Brutinae quaestiones and shows that it is also an ideal which can be achieved by extreme artifice such as that of Thucydides, who, according to Antonius,

"is so accurate and apt in his vocabulary that you do not know whether the matter is illustrated by the speech or the words by the meaning".⁵

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1. Institutiones oratoriae, pp.9-10.
 2. La Rhetorique Françoise, preface and p.20.
 3. Rhetorica, (1572), p.7.
 4. Rhetorica, (1562), pp.47-8.
 5. Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.34.

But Thucydides, thought Ramus, was an exception. Most writers do not manage to match exactly their thought and the way they express it. Nonetheless, because of its proximity to the ideal, Ramus thought very highly of the familiar style. On occasion he refers to the common everyday use of words in contrast to the technical use they have in philosophy.¹ Dialectic, he says, because it is popular and natural may above all be expressed in popular and natural speech. Ramus reprehends Aristotle for his use of a geometric style in the Analytics; this language, he claims, is not common, it is

"odious to young boys, not understood by the people, removed from common sense, and most alien to the use of rhetoric (which we want to preserve) and to the use of humanity (which we desire to strengthen by Dialectic)".²

This common usage is, for Ramus, that of all men, and is a constituent part of the ideal of humanity. One should note, however, that Ramus was not, in this matter, in entire sympathy with his contemporaries, because for him the familiar tongue was not necessarily nor even primarily the vernacular.³ It was possible, indeed, to be either clear or obscure, natural or sophisticated, in either language, and Ramus favoured the Latin with which he was so conversant. When the schoolboy has worked two or three times over a text in the pursuit of his studies in grammar and rhetoric, when he then comes to apply his logical principles to the examples which they provide, he will realize that "the language of those masters is already domestic and familiar to him".⁴ 'Sermo popularis' is the subject of grammar;⁵ we have already seen,

1. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.440.

2. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1028.

3. Ibid., col.1014; cf. De Moribus veterum Gallorum, p.44v.

4. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1029.

5. Scholae grammaticae, SLA, col.5.

too, that Ramus thought that theology must be expounded in a popular way.

Ramus, Talon and Fouquelin all see the disadvantage of the familiar language, or at least that it sometimes represents the barest form of communication which must be worked on and polished up until it becomes acceptable. Ramus' apparent confusion in this matter is a result of his attempt at oversimplification. On the one hand he wants us to believe that the language of the common people is to be imitated by all because it is natural and devoid of sophisms and other accretions. On the other hand he has the clear realization that speech remains artificial. The learning of a language takes place in a way similar to that in which the natural innate logic of man is perfected and clarified by good teachers. Man has a natural aptitude for clear speech and expression, and a child, if taught well and supplied with good examples, will learn to speak without apparent artifice. Yet no matter how well the lesson is learned, thought Ramus, speech remains artificial. Ramus is confused because he does not know how far he should commit himself to the ideal of unlettered speech. What he really means by popular, domestic, familiar and common is not so much the language of the uneducated, but rather the unpretentious speech of right-minded (that is Ramus-minded) anti-scholastics.

His attitude to the vernacular is curiously ambivalent. He did write two or three important books in French, and in theory he favoured writing in French, but his practice belies this almost completely. The Dialectique of 1555 is addressed to his compatriots; the exercise, he tells us, has been a salutary one which has helped him towards his own understanding of his thought. It has made his familiar way of expressing himself even more familiar and natural:

"Et voicy soubdainement quand ie retourne des escholes Grecques et Latines, et désire à l'exemple et imitation des bons escholiers rendre ma leçon à la patrie, en laquelle i'ay esté engendré et esleué, et luy déclairer en sa langue et intelligence vulgaire le fruit de mon estude, i'appercoy plusieurs choses répugnantes à ces principes, lesquelles ie n'auoye peu appercevoir en l'eschole par tant de disputes".¹

Ramus gives his support to the vernacular version of the Bible, though at the date of writing the cause could hardly be said to need his support.² The same is true of his proposal that the laws should be in French: 'Let the laws of France be inscribed in French on twelve tablets' - not a very original suggestion so many years after Villers-Cotterêts.³

The common language was important to him, but he did not think that it was self-sufficient; it was bound to have the disadvantage of being rough and inelegant. If it was to make communication easy (and 'sermonis facilitas' was always a desirable quality in his eyes) then it must be improved by illustration and ornamentation. 'Copia' is accordingly linked with 'suavitas' (douceur). What strikes Ramus so forcibly, and delights him so much about Cicero's eloquence is the bare suitability of his words and the elegance of the way they are joined together:

"There is such great propriety, purity, elegance in the words on their own, such great decoration, and so many brilliantly figurative passages when they are joined together, such great pleasantness in the voice, such great dignity of gesture..."⁴

'Suavitas' has particular reference to sound. It is the business of the rhetorician to examine the 'laus' (praise) or 'lumen' (light) of individual phrases and to assess 'what great evenness they have in their order,

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1. La Dialectique, p.ix.
 2. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.4.
 3. Prooemium mathematicum (1567), p.308.
 4. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.318.

what sweetness in their rhythm, what beauty in their figures'.¹ The relevance of the sound-element here is that

"things which sound well (like the other 'lights') should have greater 'praise' because, by the agreeableness of the sound, our ears let us know for whose judgment the speech must be aptly feigned".²

Ramus' search for elegance in style receives practical application in some of his own better passages. He has both the simpler phrases of familiar speech and the polished phrases of the orator. He is conscious that his own Latin style reflects a humanist's return to true Ciceronian excellence, from the ineptitudes of some medieval and Renaissance scholastics, who were inelegant almost by definition. In his preface to the Dialecticae institutiones of 1549 he defends his own practice against that of the Aristotelians, who refuse to illustrate their writing with examples from famous authors:

"For almost three years they keep clamouring about nothing else but the thorny points of their silly little principles; they despise the poets, do away with the orators, and reject all men of an elegant and ornate learning; they think their philosophy is being undermined by them".³

The whole tenor of Ramus' argument was that good writing and teaching must be elegant and humane. It is the job of rhetoric to adorn and illuminate speech.⁴ When he finds it necessary to defend himself against his calumniators in the Pro philosophica disciplina he invites inspection of his method of teaching philosophy:

"let there be an examination of our teaching, so that it will be agreed that the charge preferred against us is false, and if we have in any way offended against humanity, then we will make amends, not only not reluctantly, but gladly".⁵

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1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.8; 'laus' and 'lumen' were semi-technical terms for 'ornament'. For a full discussion see Ong RMDD, pp.278-9 and p.370.
 2. Institutiones oratoriae, p.9; cf. La Dialectique, p.139.
 3. Dialecticae partitiones, (1549), p.8.
 4. Institutiones oratoriae, p.8.
 5. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.999.

Ramus does, of course, realize that there is a danger that ornamentation can lead to abuse but does not feel that this is a sufficient reason for the horror in which it has been held by some of his contemporaries.¹

Any question of physics (natural philosophy), he says, may be provided with a parallel from a poet or orator, to make it more humane. Ramus' own aim was that this elegance should not be simply an addition from outside, but should become part of the philosopher's own style. "Humanitas" is not something superimposed; it is the result of men's communicating normally with one another, though it can be enhanced by training:

"And so the fact that men converse clearly with men, that they express in an ornate and splendid way the meaning in their minds ... that they achieve conformity of manners by laws and rules, and that they respect among themselves the sanctity of social life, is a beneficial result of noble and praiseworthy teaching".²

The idea of illustration is one we have already seen something of in the discussion of Ramus' preoccupation with light. Here we find its basis and why he was so interested in it. Furthermore, it is connected with some other words of similar meaning, but with a different metaphorical intention: enriching, illuminating, ornamenting and amplifying. Since all these words are used so frequently by Ramus and in different combinations it will not be possible to separate them completely, but, firstly, illustration itself - there are two main uses of the word, the illustration of the arts (by poetic examples, and so on) and of speech and style in general. In the preface to the Dialecticae institutiones, (1549) Ramus is at pains to show that he differs

1. Ibid., col.1013-4.

2. Oratio de sua professione, SLA, col.1102; cf. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1013-4.

radically from Aristotle in the 'description, illustration and use' of the art of dialectic. He goes on to explain himself:

"As to illustration, we for our part, posit no principle in teaching which we do not explain by the clear testimony and examples of famous men".

Even the Aristotelians, he says, admit the need of examples

"for teaching clearly; not obscure examples, such as we find in Chaerilus, but clear as they are in Homer".

He finds however that unfortunately the Aristotelians do not live up to this and do not even give examples from Chaerilus.¹ There is contained also in 'illustrare' the idea of 'bringing honour to'. The words are closely associated, for example, in the Liber de Moribus:

"I love my country as I ought, and I have a great desire to illustrate and celebrate its outstanding praises".²

'Ornare' and its cognates are frequently found in his writing in the company of 'illustrare':

"When we have laid out the definitions and divisions of all our passages we illustrate and ornament them with outstanding examples, and in this way our teaching becomes easier and the application of our teaching more straightforward".³

Furthermore, the connection of ornamentation with light is brought out in a long lyrical passage in the Pro philosophica disciplina:

"Almighty and eternal God, we give You the great thanks which we owe You, since instead of the leaden streams of the old grammarians, You have poured out upon us the golden rivers of Cicero, Virgil, Demosthenes and Homer and have lit in our times the singular light of Your grace. Our elders and ancestors were striving in their

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), pp.6-7.

2. Liber de Moribus veterum Gallorum, preface to Cardinal Charles de Lorraine.

3. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1548), p.347; cf. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col. 310-1.

laws for what You have given us; they showed us in a dark cloud what You have made manifest in the clearest light; they wanted to make the use and fruit of philosophy more pure by joining to it the elegance of the grammarians; You have made it most fruitful and complete by very weighty and ornate examples of poets and orators".¹

Ramus' imagery here is highly intricate and confused - weightiness, fruitfulness, ornamentation, clarity and light - but nonetheless all the images express his enthusiasm for his cause of enriching humanity by clarifying all problems of communication. It is here that Ramus' interest in the clarity of style is linked with his idea of ornamentation of style. We must notice that the two ideas are found together so frequently.

We find often, too, in the writings of Ramus the use of the word 'ornamenta', particularly in the works dealing with rhetorical subjects. The Institutiones oratoriae mentions, for example, "the reputation of countless men who talk seriously and ornately without any rhetorical precepts, and are remarkably excellent in the ornaments of speech".² Ramus gives as one of his reasons for managing to pack the large lecture-halls with students the fact that he pressed into his service poets, historians, orators and philosophers, who have supplied him with "wealth and riches, ornaments and lights of speech, discourse, and reasoning".³ These ornaments of speech are capable of imitation as well as of explanation.⁴ Poets make more adventurous use of them than do prose writers:

1. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1036.

2. Institutiones oratoriae, p.7; cf. Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.32.

3. Oratio de sua professione, SLA, col.1104: 'opes ac divitias, ornamenta ac lumina sermonis, orationis, ratiocinationis'.

4. Ibid., col.1106.

"They use more daringly all ornaments of single words and words linked together, to give themselves greater auditive pleasure in their writing".¹

Sometimes the word 'ornamenta' is coupled with 'pigmenta'.² This tallies with Ramus' frequent use of terminology which seems more appropriate to the art of painting. Man's mind is not a 'tabula rasa', "but naturally filled with certain colouring and outlines".³ In the same way Ramus associates poets with philosophers "in order to colour and strengthen eloquence".⁴ Ornament, like illustration, is connected with the idea of praise.⁵ He says explicitly, quoting Cicero,

"the greatest praise... of eloquence is to amplify a thing by ornament; this is valid not only for adding to something by speaking in a lofty way, but also for minimizing or degrading something".⁶

"Illuminare" is also linked with both "illustare" and "ornare". It is used especially in the phrase "illuminare mentes".⁷ "Amplificare", too, is used in similar contexts: for example, "in order to amplify and ornament the disputation".⁸ In his dedication to Madame (Mary, Queen of Scots), Fouquelin refers to her as

"une Princesse née, et selon la commune esperance diuinement predestinée, non seulement pour l'amplification et auancement de nôtre langue mais aussi pour l'illustration et honneur de toute science".

The idea that a language could be so enhanced was clearly current coin

1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.72.

2. Dialecticae partitiones, p.8v.

3. Prooemium mathematicum, p.353.

4. Pro philosophica disciplina, SLA, col.1019; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), p.213.

5. Institutiones oratoriae, p.20.

6. Ibid., p.7; cf. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.23; for this technical use of 'praise' cf. above p.198, n.1.

7. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.303 and p.348.

8. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.552.

at the time. Nevertheless, the word (amplification) is sometimes used pejoratively. In the preface of the Brutinae quaestiones, addressed to Henry, Ramus writes:

"When I say that my doctrines are not only free-born but royal, I am not exaggerating (amplificandi), but expressing their nobility in a true and simple manner".

There is here the suggestion that ornamentation is a departure from the bare truth, and that it shares the label of prevarication for persuasive purposes. The same idea lies behind the passage from Fouquelin which talks of the 'accoutrementz' with which the poor French language is obliged to 'se farder et acoutrer'.¹ Behind this we may perhaps perceive the Greek counterpart of 'ornata' (ἡ κοσμημένη)². Fouquelin returns to the idea a few pages further on, acknowledges his debt to Du Bellay, and makes the link with 'ornementz' explicit:

"Et par même moien nous ont laissé nôtre langue si pauvre et nue, qu'elle a besoing des ornementz, et (s'il faut ainsi parler) des plumes d'autrui".³

On the one hand we see poverty and nakedness, on the other riches and fine apparel. It was so easy for ornament and decoration to become excessive:

"When the lights of a speech (which the Greeks call ὀχρηματία) are too beautifully or too pleasantly expressed they are often repudiated as childish and unfitting.... And the repetitions of words which we have described... often go off into ταντολογία, (tautology) or ἡ κοζηλία (affectation), when they are sought immoderately or inopportunately, and they not only take away the seriousness of what is being said, but even rob the words of their ornateness and beauty: for, just as some women are said to be

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1. La Rhetorique Françoise, preface; (in the 1557 revision, p.3v., 'accoutrementz' becomes 'vestements').
 2. Cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), p.222.
 3. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.20.

unadorned, because their hair is too well groomed and curled, so in a speech which is too well polished and painted with figures, there arise somewhat vexatious and painted vices".¹

The theorists of poetry whom we have been looking at, were, of course, preeminently concerned with style, even making it synonymous with 'elocution' as Ramus does. Sebillet, for example, has a chapter entitled 'Du style du Poète: du choix et ordre des Vocables, appelé en Latin, Elocution',² and Ronsard begins his section 'De l'Elocution' in these words: 'Elocution n'est autre chose qu'une propriété et splendeur de paroles bien choisies et ornées de graves et courtes sentences...'³

In spite of the fact that all the theorists were concerned with style from a practical rather than a theoretical point of view, there emerges nonetheless from their treatises a clear attitude to style. In general terms, as we saw in chapter two, poetry during our period becomes an activity in its own right, self-authenticating, and distinct from rhetoric, history and ethics, with the result that it develops a style of its own.

Predictably enough, the plain, bare, mathematical style was far from being congenial to the poets. Du Bellay even talks of 'figures et ornemens, sans les quelz tout oraison et poeme sont nudz, manques et debiles'.⁴ Nakedness in a poem is quite inappropriate. Yet the poem must still be clear.

1. Institutiones oratoriae, pp.80-1.

2. Sebillet, Art Poétique françois, ed. cit., p.29.

3. Ronsard, Abbrege de l'Art Poétique françois, ed. Laumonier, XIV, p.15.

4. Du Bellay, Deffense, ed. Chamard, pp.35-6.

Peletier writes, (and this is at the beginning of a chapter entitled, 'Des Ornemens de Poésie'), 'La première e plus digne vertu du Poème est la Clarté',¹ and Ronsard, in the Abbrege shows his concern for clarity and meaningfulness in a poem: on three occasions in this short work he makes this point, that words must be 'significatifz'. He says, for instance, 'tes epithetes seront recherchez pour signifier et non pour remplir ton carme ou pour estre oysieux en ton vers'.²

On the other hand, what also comes out very clearly indeed from the arts of poetry is a particular theory of ornamentation which is similar to that of Ramus. We find there the same attitude to ornament as a garment, rather than as mere decoration. I feel, however, that both in Ramus and in the sixteenth-century writers in general, this theory of ornamentation is nearer to the modern idea of ornament as decoration than either Ong or Miss Tuve would allow.³ It does not take long for the garments which were necessary for the covering of nakedness to become finery and covered with pretty jewels. In the chapter from Peletier which I have just referred to he makes this quite clear:

"E a ceteci [i.e. la Clerte], les particuliers Ornemens
doeuēt obeir: léquez seront rars e antréluisans parmi
lé Poème, commé les fleurs an un pre, ou commé les
anneaus es doez"...⁴

Ronsard, too, in the passage from 'De l'Elocution' already quoted, says;

1. Peletier, L'Art Poétique, ed.cit., p.126.

2. Ronsard, op.cit., p.17.

3. Ong, RMDD, pp.277-9 and Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery, Chicago, 1947, pp.61ff, which Ong discusses here.

4. Peletier, loc.cit.

"... ornées de graves et courtes sentences, qui font reluyre les vers comme les pierres precieuses bien enchassées les doigts de quelque grand Seigneur".¹

This ideal will be achieved, according to all the theorists we have been looking at, if attention is paid to 'copie', which was such a commonplace in the Renaissance outlook, and the very basis of the 'illustration de la langue françoise'. Sebillet, for example, talks of 'l'illustration et augmentation de notre langue françoise' and of the 'copie du futur Poëte'.² The idea of 'copie' is perhaps the key-note of the Deffense. The chapter 'Pourquoy la Langue Françoysse n'est si riche que la Greque et Latine' begins in this way:

"Et si nostre Langue n'est si copieuse et riche que la Greque ou Latine, cela ne doit estre imputé au default d'icelle, comme si d'elle mesme elle ne pouvoit jamais estre si non pauvre et sterile: mais bien on le doit attribuer à l'ignorance de notz majeurs".³

In the following chapter I shall show how this 'copie' was to be achieved, by the use of the rhetorical 'colours' of figures.

1. Ronsard, op.cit. p.15.
 2. Sebillet, op.cit., pp.31-2.
 3. Du Bellay, op.cit., pp.22-3.

CHAPTER NINE

PLAIN AND FIGURATIVE WRITING

One of the principal tensions in Ramus' mind when he writes of the theory of style is the one between plain and figurative writing. As we have seen, for Ong there is a gradual progression in the writing of Ramus towards a doctrine of the bare mathematical style; it must not, however, be forgotten that for Ramus ornamentation was not incompatible with clarity. In spite of his interest in, and his reputation for, logical precision and brevity, it is his theory of disposing material according to the 'method of prudence', which takes into account all the circumstances of any situation, which eventually wins the day. To put the matter at its simplest, for Ramus, if writing is to have any purpose at all, one of its main characteristics must be that it is persuasive, and in order to persuade it must be enhanced by ornament.

Figurative language is usually artificial, removed from the natural speech of the uneducated. 'Figure', writes Fouquelin,

"est un'espece d'elocution, par laquelle le langage est changé de la simple et vulgaire manière de dire...."

He goes on to say that it is

"un peu changée de la vulgaire et acoutumee manière de dire, qui s'offre premierement, quand nous voulons deuiser et parler de quelque chose: non pas que le vulgaire n'use quelquefois de ces ornements de Rhetorique, mais pource que ces lumieres ne re-
luisent pas si souvent, au langage et parler des
indoctes".¹

The language of the unlettered is neither as varied nor as rich as that of the educated. Figurative language calls for a conscious use of the

1. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.34.

'ornements de Rhetorique', which are very carefully analyzed and listed both by Ramus, Talon and by Fouquelin. There is nothing haphazard about the Ramist theory and technique of ornamentation.

Renaissance arts of poetry usually relegate any serious and detailed study of ornamentation to rhetoric. I propose to set out in some detail the Ramist classification of ornaments because it is complementary to the theories of the Pléiade. In its main lines, and even in most of its details, Ramist rhetoric is traditional rhetoric. It is the rhetoric with which the members of the Pléiade would have been familiar, not because of any direct influence on them of the work of Ramus, Talon or Fouquelin, but because this was the rhetoric, (at least in so far as ornamentation was concerned) which they had studied at school and university.

In general terms, for Ramus style (*elocutio*) is 'the alteration of speech from the practice of common men to some more elegant manner' and it is to be divided into trope and figure, (trope being the alteration of single words, and figure that of words joined together).¹ There is some confusion in Ramus' mind whether or not trope is synonymous with metaphor. In the Brutinae quaestiones he complains that Cicero has wrongly equated trope with metaphor; he should rather have defined it as elocutio in single words in which the meaning is changed from its own place into another, and he should have divided it into metonymy, irony, metaphor and synecdoche.² In his commentary on Quintilian, Ramus gives Quintilian's definition of trope: "the artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another", and takes him to task for the reference to a phrase, since trope

1. Brutinae quaestiones, (1549), p.95.

2. Ibid., loc.cit.

should be restricted to single words.¹ He goes on to disagree with Quintilian's twelve-fold division of tropes (metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, antonomasia, onomatopoeia, catachresis, metalepsis, epitheton, allegoria, periphrasis, hyperbaton, hyperbole), and reverts to the four-fold division advocated above. Ramus is carping here; what he finds fault with above all is the logical invalidity, as he saw it, of Quintilian's divisions. The definition of metonymy, for example,² is one which is applicable to all tropes, and onomatopoeia, metalepsis and hyperbaton do not involve any change of meaning. Allegory is defined as an 'inversion which shows one thing in words and another in the meaning, sometimes even the opposite'. Ramus' comment is that the first part of this definition applies to all tropes and the second is a definition of irony, and is not a new trope, even if it is continuous. In the Institutiones oratoriae it is defined in this way: 'Allegory is the inversion of a speech when one thing is said and another understood'. According to this work there are two kinds, allegory proper, where by means of a comparison some related meaning is taken, and irony (dissimulatio). The first kind is often 'brought into being as a result of continued metaphors'. Proverbs contain the same sort of figure.³ When Fouquelin adapts this passage of the Institutiones oratoriae he considers allegory as 'metaphore multipliée et continuée'. The reason he gives why it should not be separated from metaphor is that 'l'ornement n'est point changé, ains seulement multiplié'.⁴

1. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.368; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, VIII,vi, I, translated by H.E. Butler, Loeb Classical Library, London, 1922.

2. 'Nominis pro nomine positio'.

3. Institutiones oratoriae, pp.42-4.

4. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.21.

To return to Ramus' commentary on Quintilian - Ramus adds that 'aenigma' which is not in Quintilian's list is, according to Quintilian, a kind of allegory, but for Ramus many aenigmata are not tropes. Fouquelin, too, was aware of this. He notes that the ancient writers on rhetoric called allegories which were obscure 'enigmes', but says that some of these are not really tropes because the words are used in a proper and natural sense. His conclusion is that 'Aenigme n'est point trope; mais si quelquefois l'Aenigme se fait de motz transferés, il le faudra referer à la Metaphore'.¹

Ramus aims to prove syllogistically that there can be only four kinds of tropes. Whenever there is an alteration of the proper meaning, he declares, it must be from causes to effects (metonymy), from subjects to adjuncts (also metonymy), from opposites to opposites (irony), from things compared to things compared (metaphor), from the whole to the part (synecdoche) or vice versa, then this must be either metonymy, irony, metaphor or synecdoche. But every trope, he continues, is an alteration of the proper meaning of a word from causes to effects... and so on.²

Perhaps the clearest discussion of trope comes in the Rhetorique Françoise; and the position adopted in this work is exactly that of Ramus in the commentary on Quintilian:

"Elocution n'est autre chose, que l'ornement et enrichissement de la parole et oraison: laquelle a deux espèces, l'une est appelée Trope, l'autre Figure. Trope est une

1. Ibid., p.23; for a lengthy discussion of Enigme, cf. Sebillet, op.cit., pp.175-7, where it is defined as 'allégorie obscure, vice d'oraison appelé en Quintilian, a cause de son obscurité'. (It seems to be better to mention the few figures treated by the theorists of poetry at the same time as they are described in the Ramist rhetoric so that a comparison can be made).
2. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.373; cf. Peletier, op.cit., p.135 (Ironia) and p.137 (Metonimia).

elocution par laquelle la propre et naturelle signification du mot est changée en une autre: ce que declare ce mot (Trope), qui signifie en françois, mutation".¹

The four kinds of trope he gives are identical with those mentioned by Ramus.

Fouquelin lists several examples from contemporary French poets to illustrate the different kinds and subdivisions of tropes. As Ramus had said, the first kind of trope is metonymy: (a) metonymy is present when the word which properly signifies the cause of something is used for the effect; (b) when the effect stands for the cause; (c) when the name which properly signifies the subject is used for the circumstances; (d) when the subject is understood in the circumstances. These four kinds of metonymy are distinct and separate from one another, but they may be found joined together in practice. The criterion to be followed in using these tropes is discrimination, and 'l'usage de ceus qui parlent bien et elegamment, lequel nous deuõs principalement suiure et imiter'. This will often be possible in verse where it would not be acceptable in prose.

Irony, the second kind of trope is explained by Fouquelin in these words:

"quand par le contraire le contraire est entendu: c'est à dire quand on usurpe quelque mot le contraire du quel nous voulons signifier. Les François la peuuent appeller simulation et dissimulation, laquelle se peut entendre, tant par la pronuntiation, que par la nature de la chose de la quelle on parle."

Fouquelin lists also 'Preterition' which is a kind of dissimulation 'quand nous faisons semblant de ne vouloir dire, ce que toutefois nous disons'.

The third kind of trope is metaphor. Because of the confused relation-

1. Ibid., p.1; cf. Institutiones oratoriae, p.14.

ship between trope and metaphor in Ramist writing I feel that this point demands closer attention. It is also important because of the frequent references to metaphor throughout Ramist writings, and because this raises the broader question of the nature of figurative language. To start with Fouquelin's description: he defines metaphor as

"quand par le semblable, le semblable est entendu;
c'est à dire quand un mot propre à signifier quelque
chose, est usurpé pour un' autre semblable à icelle:
comme (lumière) est proprement attribuée au soleil:
quand on dit la lumière de l'esprit, c'est une meta-
phore, que nous pouuons appeller en François, transla-
tion".¹

The first kind of metaphor is described by Fouquelin in these terms;

"ce qui est propre aus choses divines, souuentefois
aveq grace est acommodé aus choses humaines".

Metaphor is also often taken from the elements. Fouquelin illustrates this with a quotation from Du Bellay's translation of Aeneid IV:

"Elle qui ia de la mort est certaine,
D'orrible et grand ie ne sçay quoy demaine
En son courage, et son ire enflammee
Fait refloter sa poitrine allumee",

and comments

"Floter est propre en l'eaue, en un homme douteus et
incertain, il est transferé et metaphorique".²

Further, metaphor may also be derived from animals, plants and trees, and from 'arts et metiers'. There are some scattered remarks on different aspects of metaphor: the assertion for example that Catachrese ('tout trope un peu plus hardiment pris') is permissible, even though it is 'abusif'; if, however, it seems too hard on the ear it should be toned down by 'premunitions' such as 'par maniere de dire' or 's'il faut ainsi parler'.³ These

1. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.15.

2. Ibid., p.17.

3. Ibid., p.20.

qualifying phrases, of course, notes Fouquelin, are more frequent in prose than in poetry. Fouquelin is ready to admit hyperbole as part of metaphor, calling it 'un exces et superlati^{on}de signification', because he feels that the presence of similitude means that it should not be too rigorously separated from metaphor. It may be used either to amplify or to attenuate.

Fouquelin's conclusion to the section on metaphor is this:

"quelque diction ou mot que ce soit, lequel sera transféré de sa propre signification, en une autre, par quelque similitude, soit singulier et unique, ou continué ou excessif, ou diminutif, ou transféré par quelque autre maniere, sera appelé metaphorique".¹

The appeal of metaphor, he adds, is due to its great capacity for delighting the mind.²

At this stage it is necessary to say something about Ramus' attitude to metaphor in general. He quotes in Greek Aristotle's definition of it in the Art of Poetry:

"Metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion".³

Ramus turns 'Μεταφορα' by 'translatio', and points out that Cicero was right to draw attention to the fact that Aristotle includes all

1. La Rhétorique Françoise, p.25; for Hiperbolés, cf. Peletier, op.cit., p.135.
2. Cf. Rhetorica, (1562), p.25; (1572), p.19.
3. The Art of Poetry, 1457 b 4, translated by S.H. Butcher, 4th edition, London 1911; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), pp.219-20; Peletier has a good deal to say about metaphor and comparison (op.cit., pp.128-130): 'les Metaforés e Alegoriés: léquelés se peuvent toutes deus comprandre sous ce mot de Tranlacion....' He goes into a long description of the need for appropriate metaphors, and concludes, 'An somme, les Metaforés se font sus choses connues e generalés: Comme aussi les Comparsons: léquelés consistét an l'acommodacion des fez les uns aus autres'. He also talks of 'la Comparson, qui ét d'eclaircir, exprimer e représanter les choses comme si on les santoët'; cf. Ronsard, Abbrégé, ed. Laumonier, p.10.

kinds of trope under metaphor 'since in all of them another name is assumed'. But Aristotle's division, he claims, is inaccurate. Aristotle's first two classes are in fact synecdoche, and his fourth class is metaphor. The third can embrace irony and allegory. But, according to Ramus, this is not what Aristotle says, "nor does he give the special name of any trope, since the art of tropes does not seem to have been known in his day". Ramus adds that in five instances in the Organon Aristotle rejects metaphors, that is tropes, from logical disputation, for the reason that metaphors lack precision and are often ambiguous.¹ At the same time, says Ramus, Aristotle would admit that

"metaphor is often very necessary, when we lack the proper words, and any metaphor which is a true one in some way makes known by a comparison what is signified. Aristotle, in his Rhetoric celebrated metaphors especially which were pleasant, significant and taken from near at hand, and subjected to them the image, fullness of speech, witticisms, built-in answers, proverbs and hyperboles".¹

Yet, says Ramus, Aristotle is not consistent and has some harsh things to say about metaphor. According to Ramus this attack on metaphor is a result of Aristotle's dissatisfaction with Plato's style which he finds 'redundant, verbose, excessive and affected'.² Since clarity is his own criterion Ramus lets us know that 'metaphor is often clearer than the proper meaning'.³ In the Institutiones oratoriae we read that just as the author had been against excessive ornamentation in general, so he feels that metaphor must flow naturally and smoothly:

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), p.221; cf. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.568-9.

2. Ibid., SLA, col.570.

3. Ibid., col.543.

"I now come to the elegance of metaphor, when it is so aptly done that it does not seem to rush headlong into a different place, but to come into its own".¹

He agrees that for the purposes of teaching it is convenient to list all the remaining tropes under this head, and goes on to explain 'translatio' more fully:

"I call those things transferred which are changed from a place in which they were proper to one in which they are not".

He follows this with a comparison between the light of the sun and the light of the mind. On this point he says that the variety of such tropes is as great as the variety of nature itself, and there is nothing which has a certain and proper word corresponding to it which may not be transferred elsewhere for the sake of comparison.

In the Institutiones oratoriae the next division of metaphor is into simple and composite: simple is based on the four elements, and composite is a mixture of other things. Composite metaphors are partly inanimate,

"such as the clouds, things which the earth produces, things which are produced by the labour and artifice of men, and partly animate, such as plants, beasts, men; in both kinds we should look to the ornateness of the metaphor. For Cicero mocked Piso by talking of the dark cloud on his forehead. And countryfolk talk about vines putting forth gems or eyes".²

There follow examples from the five senses and the parts of the body, and then from artistic processes, "such as filing, fashioning, painting, shaping, dyeing, polishing, patching, unstitching. From these, we have the most agreeable and ornate metaphors, 'to file the truth of disputation', 'to fashion a crime', 'to paint with all the colours of one's art'...." and so on.

1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.14; for the following account of metaphor, cf. ibid., pp.14-20.

2. Ibid., p.19.

This type of metaphor is one to which Ramus took easily, as did his contemporaries. Many other examples are possible

"which are so ready to hand that they scarcely have need of art or principles; their excellence is such that they shed a most clear light on the speech. Therefore it is evident that there is nothing in the whole of nature the name of which may not be used to refer to other things...."¹

The second kind of metaphor is of those things "where the comparison does not indicate why they are put in the place of other things, such as sacrilege instead of a sacrilegious person, temerity instead of a rash person." There are five types: (i) when causes stand for their effects, such as (a) the efficient cause, e.g., Ceres for corn, (b) the part of the whole, e.g., the roof for the house, (c) the genus for the species, e.g., the poet for Homer, (d) the material for what is made out of it, e.g., the pine, for the ship. (ii) when effects stand for their causes, such as 'pale death' or Rome instead of the capitol (whole for the part); (iii) when subjects stand for their adjuncts, such as saying that a man is eaten up when you mean that his inheritance is; (iv) when adjuncts stand for subjects, such as a crime for a criminal; (v) when things stand for their opposites, such as calling a man good when you mean bad. Some of these cases are found only in poetry, others are found both in poetry and prose:

"Wherefore the honour of single words is due especially to four things: if there seems to be anything pleasant in the euphony; flowery in what is new; serious and venerable in what is old; if finally what is transferred, whether by reason of comparison or some other way in the speech, should be resplendent like sparkling gems".²

1. Ibid., p.19.

2. Ibid., p.21.

This last phrase is very like Ramus' 'gems of tropes';¹ both phrases point to the same kind of ornamentation-theory.

The last kind of trope in Fouquelin's classification is synecdoche,

"que nous pouuons dire en François, conception et intelligence, quand par le nom de la partie, le tout est entendu, ou au contraire, quand par le nom du tout il faut entendre la partie".²

After giving a list of examples Fouquelin notes that 'Antonomasie' is, in fact, synecdoche, giving the general for the special. He adds that tropes may be joined together, and gives the reason:

"Et n'y a rien simple en la nature des choses outre ce, en quoy se puisse changer la signification du mot. Toutes lesquelles sortes et manières de Tropes, sont bien souuent plus distinctes par raison que par la nature des choses, veu que souuent en un même mot, plusieurs Tropes de diverses sortes s'entrerencontrent".³

So, with reference to the example from Ronsard which he quotes,

"Gouttant le miel de mes chans,
Elle me guide par les chams",

he comments

"Le miel des chants, pour la suauité douce comme miel, c'est une Metaphore: le miel pour la douceur, c'est une Synecdoche de l'espece pour le genre."⁴

Fouquelin goes on to show that one trope may be 'engendré de l'autre'; so when Ronsard writes to Du Bellay,

"Je chanteray ta louange,
Et l'enuoiray de Loire à Gange,
Dessus les aisles de més vers",

Fouquelin's comment is

1. Oratio de sua professione, SLA, col.1106.

2. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.28.

3. Ibid., p.31.

4. Ibid., p.32.

"Loyre, pour le pais d'Aniou, et Gange, pour les Indes, c'est un Trope, mais la signification va plus outre, et par le pais d'Aniou et les Indes, sont entendus les manans et habitans en cez deus regions: comme s'il vouloit dire, qu'il feroit conoitre aus peuples qui habitent pres du fleuve de Gange (qui diuise les Indes) les vertus et louénges de Joachin Du Bellay, auquel il écrit".¹

The later versions of the Rhetorica which grew out of the Institutiones oratoriae do not seem to add anything important to this account of trope, though the wording of the definitions varies slightly. In 1572 Ramus comments that Aristotle thought trope was sometimes foreign to accurate teaching because of the possibility of ambiguity or obscurity, while admitting the necessity of its existence.²

We have seen the word 'analogy' used in the definition by Aristotle which Ramus quotes. In a more general way he uses it as a synonym of 'similitude' and this meaning is perhaps never far away. It is a method of understanding a matter according to a comparison - as bronze is to a statue, and wood to a litter, so matter is to form.³ On one occasion it seems to be used in a scholastic sense (cf. 'the analogy of faith'):

"If the exact form of the words be followed rather than the analogy of the meaning".⁴

More technically still it is found in religious contexts, especially throughout the commentary on the Christian religion. In the chapter entitled 'What is the Eucharist?' we read:

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1. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.33; for Antonomasie cf. Du Bellay, op.cit., p.161, and Peletier, op.cit., p.135.
 2. Rhetorica, (1672), p.7.
 3. Scholae physicae, SLA, (1578), col.801; for 'analogie' cf. Sebillet, op.cit., pp.67, 70, 112, 117, 140; Du Bellay, op.cit., p.140, and Ronsard, Abbrege, ed. Laumonier, p.33.
 4. Prooemium mathematicum, p.233; cf. Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.317.

"Who then is the author?... Christ alone... What is the matter¹ of the Eucharist? Obviously the bread and wine, by means of which the analogy of the sacred mystery is above all understood, for just as our bodies preserve their mortal life by eating the bread by bodily organs and drinking the wine and thus recovering their strength, so our souls attain eternal life when they are freed by a living faith from the hell of eternal death, because of the crucifying of the body and the shedding of the blood of Christ".²

Ramus makes the further point that bread and wine were chosen to symbolize the food of the soul, because "bread and wine are the nourishment most familiar to all mortal men, so that the similitude of the metaphor will be all the clearer". His contention here is simple enough, that the terms of the Eucharist are nothing more than metaphorical, and that the metaphor is a very ordinary one. The words are indeed being used in a sense which is not proper to them, yet they remain clear to all ordinary men. He adds that in the words of consecration "the trope is twofold, being both metaphor and metonymy". He then introduces another element, that of sign or symbol:

"Therefore by the signs of bread and wine there is impressed on the souls of those who approach the sacred table Christ's crucified body and the blood which he shed, for the remission of our sins and the liberation and eternal salvation of those who truly believe and repent".

Ramus was against multiplying signs where they do not exist. The breaking of bread does not signify the breaking of Christ's body, as Bede thought. He adduces in support of his objection some other obviously metaphorical statements which all men are agreed in taking, "not in a proper but a modified way", - member of Christ, the Church as the spouse of Christ and

1. This fits in with the traditional theological discussion about the matter and form of each of the sacraments.

2. Ibid., p.286.

so on.... "wherefore we realize that the entire mystery of the Eucharist is packed with tropes". To the Jews and early Christians these were "most clear tropes"; why then should modern Christians argue so violently about them?

"It is all the more remarkable that these tropes seem so excessive to the new theologians since if you were to gather together into one place all the poets and orators of all nations, they are not comparable to Moses and the prophets, to Christ and the Apostles, not just because of the divine majesty of the tropes they use, but by the frequency with which they use them. But it is true that many of the fathers were rather too zealous in adding further tropes to the tropes of the gospels, since they took the signs for what was being signified - saying that Christ in the Eucharist could be seen by the eyes of the body, could be handled and broken, could be eaten by the mouth and the teeth...."¹

The word Ramus uses in his definition of a sacrament is the technical theological word 'sign':

"A sacrament is a public act of faith by a sensible sign and a solemn rite of His Church instituted by God to commemorate the death of Christ and give participation in its fruit".

The sign is more than a mere memorial token; it is a testimony to authority. Sacrament and sign, however, both have a non-technical application for Ramus:

"The name sacrament is sometimes used to refer to all ceremonies and rites concerned with the exercise of piety, or any notes of something sacred and spiritual".

The illustration Ramus gives of this is Noah's rainbow. Ramus stresses that sacraments properly so called can only be instituted by God. He attempts another definition: 'the visible sign of a sacred thing', and says that it is essential that the sign should be a similitude:

1. Ibid., pp.286-8; cf. p.310 and pp.317-20.

"The matter itself is earthly and what is put before our eyes is divine and heavenly. If sacraments (says Augustine, taking sacrament for that earthly matter) did not bear some resemblance to those things of which they are sacraments, then they would not be sacraments. In them (he continues) one thing is seen and another is understood".¹

There is no need to go any further into Ramus' idea of sacrament. It is sufficient to say that he was very much alive to the different ways in which material signs could be used to express the spiritual. In this respect he is nearer to Plato's than to Aristotle's view of imitation.

I have included this long account of Ramus' idea of sacrament to show that his views on trope and metaphor form a part of his whole philosophical attitude. We have already seen that 'comparison' has its place in among the logical arguments. If comparison is expressed according to quality it is either 'similitudo' or 'dissimilitudo'. If it is expressed according to quantity, then it is threefold: it may be greater, equal or less. Comparison is the most frequently used of all the arguments: "in quality there is much more light for the purpose of illustration, in quantity there is more strength for the purpose of persuasion". We note the pairing of illustration and corroboration, which almost typify, sum up or stand for, dialectic and rhetoric:

"Comparisons have an important place for philosophers and all those who want to teach in a popular and familiar way."

Good examples of this are Aesop, Hippocrates (who thought 'similitudo' was sufficient for all explanation), Plato and above all Christ; "and so, I think I am right in saying that, as the eyes do in the body, so comparisons in a speech bring light to all the parts".² (It should be noted that 'similitudo' is not metaphor; it is a logical rather than a rhetorical device.)

1. *Ibid.*, pp.257-287.

2. *Dialecticae Institutiones*, (1543), pp.13-15; cf. *La Dialectique*, p.42.

Orators use especially comparisons of quantity because they find them most persuasive, and poets, too, it seems, make great use of comparison by lesser things:

"These are excellent amplifications, when we go by degrees from what is greater to what is lesser.... From this kind of comparison there are some exceptional amplifications in poets and orators".¹

We may add a few concluding remarks about metaphor. According to the Institutiones oratoriae it is imperative that metaphors be apt, since all writing must be apt. There must be some obvious point of similarity

"lest the comparison be drawn from afar, lest the metaphor appear to be out of shape... it must be neither too great nor too small... nor too narrowand if it seems rather too hard it must be softened by some preliminary warning."²

We have seen that for Aristotle metaphor did not have a place in logic because of its imprecision. So Ramus, in spite of his desire to adorn all writing with metaphor, realizes how far it can mislead in philosophy. When Aristotle, the natural philosopher, says that in the course of time all things decay, grow old and are obliterated, and nothing new or beautiful is brought into being, he is using a metaphor, says Ramus. In Ramus' eyes, Aristotle never had any intention of suggesting time as a principle of corruption and so he would have done better to leave such images to the poets. How pejorative this is may be judged from another passage where Aristotle is quoted as saying that to affirm exemplary ideas is tantamount to 'ξενολογεῖν καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικὰς', to talk trifles and to speak in poetic metaphors'³, and later, 'Exemplary ideas are but τερστίσματα

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1549), pp.53-4; cf. La Dialectique, p.55.

2. Institutiones oratoriae, p.77.

3. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.854.

(twittering)and fabrications of poetic metaphors'.¹

The second main division of 'elocutio' in the Ramist rhetoric, after trope, is that of figure. After taking Cicero to task for his faulty definition and division of trope, Ramus has similar things to say about figure. I propose to treat this important question by using as a basis the Institutiones oratoriae and the Rhetorique Françoise, reminding the reader once again that although these works are not published under Ramus' name, they are both to a large extent his responsibility, and the rhetoric which they set out is very much the rhetoric of Ramus.

The Institutiones oratoriae explain that the figures sometimes go under the name of 'schemata' of discourse; all discourse has them, (they are also called the 'habitus' or clothing of speech), but they are not so evident in vulgar speech.² There are two broad divisions of figures, figures of sentences and figures of words. These are then distinguished in the traditional way, in that each of the former is an ornament whose beauty is independent of whatever words you care to use, whereas the latter has 'concinnitas' (which is described in the Latin dictionary of Lewis and Short as 'beauty of style, produced by a skilful connection of words and clauses') and 'condecencia' (what is becoming, seemly) in the manner and kind of words, which often disappear if you change the words.

Fouquelin deals first with the figure of words and defines it as

1. Ibid., 985.

2. Institutiones oratoriae, p.28.

"une figure qui rend l'oraison douce et armonieuse, par une resonance de diction, apelle^d des anciens Nombre, la quelle s'apperçoit aveq plaisir et delectation. Parquoy si ie dis du nombre, ie diray de la figure de diction";¹

and goes on to define the other kind thus:

"la figure de sentence, est une figure mise et étendue en la continuation de toute la sentence de l'oraison, et pour-tant elle peut estre retenue en icelle, voyre mêmes les motz changez, ce qui ne se peut faire en la figure de diction: en laquelle si la diction est changée ou transportée, l'ornement est perdu".²

He makes a comparison between the two kinds of figures:

"Mais si les figures de la sentence sont conferées avecq celles de la diction, en celles là, vous direz estre ie ne sçay quelle grauité et dignité, en cêtes cy, une beauté et fart: Celles là ont plus de nerfz et de force: cêtes cy, plus de sang et de couleur. Lesquelles comme iointes à bonnes sentences aportent grand ornement à l'oraison, ainsi quand le suiet n'y convient, il n'y a rien plus laid que ses peintures fardées".³

The Latin text begins with the figures of sentence. The reason for this, as Leake shows in his article⁴ is that it follows Quintilian's suggestion that, since ideas come before the expression of them, then figures of thought should come first. For the sake of completeness I propose now to list the different figures, first of all according to the Institutiones oratoriae and then according to the Rhetorique Françoise. The first figure is "euidencia, ἐνδείξις", which is the figure by which things are vividly presented to the eyes of the mind:

1. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.35.

2. Ibid., p.72.

3. Ibid., pp.112-3.

4. R.E. Leake, "The Relationship of Two Ramist Rhetorics, Omer Talon's Rhetorica and Antoine Fouquelin's Rhetorique Françoise", in Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1968, p.92.

"It sets up the object before the eyes, and it often arises from an accumulation of effects or adjuncts, or from the comparison of things which are similar, equal, lesser or greater".¹

It is worth looking a little closer at this figure because it is one which was very familiar to the members of the Pléiade and because it is at the heart of the most common Renaissance attitude to realistic description. Castor² quotes Du Bellay's "j'estimeroy l'Art pouvoir exprimer la vive energie de la Nature" in the context of vivid representation. Du Bellay has another reference to 'energie' in the Deffense, this time as a figure of speech. There is a note in Person's edition of the Deffense which says:

l'v "Il s'agit ici de cette figure de style qu'Aristote (Rhet. III. xi) appelle ἐνέργεια, et qui consiste non seulement à animer les choses, mais à les montrer agissantes. On confond souvent cette figure avec celle de Quintilian (VIII, iii, 89) appelle (sic) ἐνδείξις, evidentia, repraesentatio, et qui consiste dans une vive representation des objets: res clare, atque ut cerni videantur, enuntiare".³

This distinction is made very clear in Puttenham's Arte of English Poesie, (1589) in which he says that there are two kinds of ornament Poeticall,

"one to satisfie and delight th'eare onely by a goodly outward shew set upon the matter with wordes, and speaches smothly and tunably running: another by certaine intendments or sense of such wordes and speaches inwardly working a stirre to the mynde: that first qualitie the Greeks called Enargia, of this word argos, because it geuth a glorious lustre and light. This latter they called Energia of ergon, because it wrought with a strong and vertuous operation".⁴

1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.28.

2. Castor, op.cit., p.55; Du Bellay Deffense, ed. Chamard, p.80; cf., also, Deffense, pp.35 and 40; Sebillet, op.cit., pp.33, 116, 190; and Peletier, op.cit., p.133.

3. Deffense, ed. Person, Paris, 1892, p.64.

4. George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie, English Reprints, London, 1869, p.155.

The *Institutiones oratoriae* goes on to list the following figures: addubitatio, ἀπορία or διαπόρῃσις, which is a sort of pretended doubt;¹ communicatio, ἀναγκασίωσις, a consulting or deliberating with other people; licentia, παρρησία, self-assurance and freedom of speech, freely expressing one's state of mind; Fouquelin defines this important figure as;

"une figure, laquelle montre quelque audace et hardiesse de dire ce qui sembloit estre dangereux à dire",

and adds

"Céte figure est fort rare et infrequente aus liures des autheurs François, si esse toutesfois qu'elle n'a moins de grace, que celles qui ont esté cy deuant expliquées".²

The next figure listed is praesumptio, πρόληψις, the anticipation of something; it is twofold, either of objection or of defence (that is, giving the opponent's argument and therefore weakening it); exclamatio is a vehement heightening of the speech, and includes acclamationes and epiphonemata: Fouquelin defines exclamation as 'un cri et eleuement de vois, inuenté pour augmenter et amplifier'. For him exclamation, sustētatō and Licēce are all kinds of amplification; deprecatō, supplicatio, inuocatio, δεήσις, means asking something of the gods, of men or of other things. The next figure listed in the *Institutiones oratoriae* is the very important one of prosopopeia; it is "the feigned introduction of persons by means of which anything at all may take on voice and speech", that is, it sometimes means personification and sometimes dramatising. It is further

1. *Institutiones oratoriae*, p.32.

2. *La Rhétorique Françoisse*, p.111; cf. Peletier, *op.cit.*, pp.212 sq.

subdivided into 'full' and 'mute', " 'full' when the whole fiction of the person and the speech is represented, 'mute' when indirect speeches are introduced". The first kind is itself divided into 'continuous' and 'interrupted':

"By means of this happy and elegant variety, poets and historians often soothe the minds of their readers; their work has the added dignity of places, times and all the attendant circumstances",¹

with the result that all who read it think that the matter is fact not fiction. Interrupted prosopopeia is called dialogismus, (which Fouquelin calls 'une feinte collocation de certains personnages ensemble').² Leake comments, concerning Talon's description of prosopopeia, that it has nothing to do with our modern idea of 'personification', but finds that Fouquelin, in 1557, has one example of fictio rei which we would consider 'personification'.³ Fouquelin himself defines prosopopeia in these terms:

"Prosopopeie ou sermocination, est une figure de sentence, par laquelle nous de nôtre voix et action, contrefaisons, et representons la voix et personnage d'autrui".⁴

For him the most important consideration about this figure is that it should be apt:

"Mais comme la Prosopopeie est un grand ornement d'eloquence, quand nous representons la personne par voix et parolle decente et conuenante: Ainsi est ce un grand vice; quand la parolle repugne à la nature de la personne feinte et representée".⁵

The next figure in the Institutiones oratoriae is allegory, which we

1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.41.

2. La Rhétorique Françoisse, p.90.

3. Leake, art.cit., pp.97-8.

4. La Rhétorique Françoisse, p.86.

5. Ibid., p.93; cf. Sebillet, op.cit., pp.157 and 160; Peletier, op.cit., p.135.

have already seen something of under trope. It is of two kinds, similitudo and irony.¹ There follows a discussion of 'concession' which has close connections with irony: it is distinguished from 'permission' in that, in Fouquelin's words, it deals with 'ditz et argumentz' whereas 'permission' deals with facts.² The next kinds of figures are incrementum and diminutio. Amplification, it will be seen from this, is not just for 'increasing something by speaking in a more elevated manner, but also for attenuating and degrading it'.³ Particular attention is accorded here to interrogatio,

"which not only looks for doubtful matter, but is turned to hatred, envy, mercy, joy, hope, annoyance and all the emotions: for there is nothing so flexible, nor which follows so easily, wherever you lead it, as interrogatio".⁴

Subjectio is the next figure given: it is a discussion of possible objections together with a reply to them; Praeteritio, παραληψις, is a pretended reluctance to mention something; correctio, ἐπιρροθωσις, can be either of a thought or of a word;⁵ Fouquelin describes this figure as

"une reprehension et amendement de nôtre dire, laquelle a grace comme les autres, quand ce qui auoit esté au parauant dit, est subtilement et ingenieusement repris";⁶

Significatio, ἑμψυσις, means something which it does not actually say;⁷ auersio, ἀποτροπή,⁸ is the turning away of the speech from its right and natural

1. Institutiones oratoriae, pp.43-4.

2. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.82.

3. Institutiones oratoriae, p.47.

4. Ibid., pp.48-9.

5. Ibid., p.52.

6. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.102.

7. This is one of Quintilian's meanings of emphasis; the other is that which 'means more than it says', cf. Sonnino, A Handbook to Sixteenth Century Rhetoric, p.200; cf. Peletier, op.cit., p.135.

8. Cf. Sebillet, op.cit., p.41; Peletier, op.cit., p.135.

course to something else, to men or to God: Fouquelin adds that it may be to an indefinite person or even to ourselves;¹ superlatio, ὑπερβολή, is an exaggeration of the truth, when we say more than the nature of the truth allows.

Before leaving this account of the figures of sentence, the Institutiones oratoriae has something to say about the matter of 'colouring truth':

"This is the justification for counterfeiting truth: a joke is pleasant and often useful, for making the speech both agreeable and beautiful, by means of which the ugliness of something is laughed at, but not basely or tastelessly. There are two kinds, witticisms and banter. Witticisms are more deeply embedded in the speech, as when men's manners are described, and so portrayed that they will be understood as they really are. Banter is shorter and more pointed".²

To turn now to the 'figures of words', the second main division of figures, which are introduced here as 'lumina verborum'. It should be said at the outset that Fouquelin treats this subject in a way which is basically different from that set out in the Institutiones oratoriae; the principal difference is centered on the attitude to 'number':

"Fouquelin's concept of Nombre is quite different from Talon's Numerus. If for the latter it was only one of the categories of the word figure, for the former it becomes such a broad and important concept as to be synonymous with them".³

So Fouquelin begins his account with the definition already quoted:

"La Figure de la diction est une figure qui rend l'oraison douce et armonieuse, par une resonance de dictions, appelee des anciens Nombre, la quelle s'apperçoit avec plaisir et delectation. Parquoy si ie dis du nombre, ie diray de la figure de diction".⁴

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1. La Rhétorique Françoisse, p.101.
 2. Institutiones oratoriae, p.56.
 3. Leake, art.cit., p.101.
 4. La Rhétorique Françoisse, p.35.

In the Institutiones oratoriae number is said to include both rhythm and metre, and to be 'a harmony invented for the sake of sweetness from the apt modulation of the feet'.¹ It has its place both in prose and verse. (Leake suggests that Talon differs from Fouquelin in this respect, but, in fact, the Institutiones makes it quite clear that number is also found in prose, though it is true that the examples are taken from poetry).² Fouquelin even says

"L'observation des syllabes en l'oraison, est toute poëtique, car en notre prose françoise nous auons bien peu d'egart au nombre des syllabes, ny par quelle diction, et de combien de syllabes est fermée la clause et periode".³

He notes that French verse is very much freer than Latin, but that it does need rhyme (similitude of sound). There is some rhymeless verse in French, but it sounds strange, just as it would to write in Greek or Latin disregarding the long and short syllables,

"C'est à dire sans la quantité des temps, qui soutient la modulation et musique du carme en ces deus langues".⁴

In French, he continues, there is an infinite number of possibilities, 'selon la difference du nombre et de la quantité des syllabes (comme dit un certain autheur de l'art poetique, lequel en cétte partie j'ay suivi)'.⁵ At this point Fouquelin does, indeed, follow closely Sebillet's chapter five on the nine principal sorts of French verse, even using Sebillet's examples.

1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.24.

2. Leake, loc.cit.

3. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.35.

4. Ibid., p.37.

5. Institutiones oratoriae, p.26, where the same point is made about Latin verse.

He then lists seven different kinds of number: Epizeuxe, Anaphore, Epistrophe, Epanalepse, Epanode, Anadiplose, Gradation.

He then goes on to define and illustrate these different 'numbers':

"Epizeuxe est un nombre, par lequel un même son est
subsequemment repeté",

and to illustrate this from Baïf's lines,

"Car hélas, hélas Meline,
Plus, plus ie ne suis à moy".

It is, he says, to be compared with the French 'ryme couronnée, quand le dernier mot du carme est une partie de la diction precedente'.¹ Epizeuxe can occur either in a single word or in several,

"car les motz de semblable son, delectent fort,
pour une armonieuse et melodieuse similitude
de son".²

'Anaphore' or 'relation' is when the same sound is repeated at the beginning of a section, for example Baïf's

"Mon oeillet, mon coeur, mon ame",

where the result is also 'une douce et melodieuse armonie'.³

'Epistrophe' occurs at the end of periods, for example, Tahureau's refrain to Jodelle, 'Iö, le Delien est né', which Fouquelin also calls an 'anagrammatisme' of Estienne Jodelle. Epistrophe is to be found as well in different words, but

"de semblable son et terminaison....et d'autant plus
grande est cétte armonie, que le nombre est plus plai-
sant et melodious aus clausules qu'aus commencementz
...A laquelle manière d'Epistrophe toute la ryme
françoise doit estre referée, c'est à dire, cétte melodie
de laquelle usent les poetes en la fin des vers françois,

1. La Rhétorique Françoisse, p.44.

2. Ibid., p.46.

3. Ibid., p.49.

par une similitude de son, tombant en la fin et liziere du vers: Laquelle ilz appellent ryme platte ou croisée. La Ryme platte est, quand les vers symbolisans et de même termination s'entresuyuent sans moyen".¹

An example is given from Ronsard:

"Le potier hait le potier
Le febure, le charpentier:
Le poète tout ainsi,
Hait celuy qui l'est aussi".

Fouquelin warns against rhyming the same word unless there are two different meanings, or two different parts of speech are being used.

Anaphore and Epistrophe may be joined together, and will then be

"pour cétte même cause plus gratieuses et plaisantes aus oreilles".²

'Epanalepse', says Fouquelin, 'est un nombre, par lequel le même son est repeté au commencement et à la fin de la clausule', and it may occur in one or in several words.³

'Epanode' is defined as, 'un nombre resonnant par semblables sons, repetez ou au commencement et meillieu, ou au meillieu, et à la fin de la clausule', and 'Anadiplose' as 'un nombre par lequel un même son est repeté à la fin du precedent vers, et au commencement du suivant'.⁴ Finally, 'Gradation' is defined as;

"un nombre, quand l'oraison marche de telle sorte, que l'antecedent est repeté deuant que ce qui s'ensuit prochainement soit proferé".⁵

Fouquelin sums up this discussion by saying that apart from 'la similitude de la vois et du son' there is also the question of order and disposi-

1. Ibid., p.58; cf. Sebillet, op.cit., p.155.

2. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.61.

3. Ibid., p.63.

4. Ibid., pp.63-4.

5. Ibid., p.66.

tion at the beginning and end of sections. He adds a comment on 'Paronomasie' in which 'le nombre est engendré par la seule consonance et accord des vois semblables'. It is also defined as 'allusion au mot, ou ressemblance d'un mot à l'autre'. If it is of the whole word it is called by the French poets, he says, 'aequivoque':

"laquelle il (sic) font espee de Ryme, quand le son du mot, mis en la fin du carme, est repeté à la fin du vers simbolissant en un ou plusieurs motz de diuerse signification".¹

It may also occur at the beginning and end of words, for example, Du Bellay's 'traditeurs/traducteurs' or in the first two syllables, for example, Du Bellay's 'Heroët aux vers heroïques'; if it occurs in the middle and last syllables it is called 'ryme riche' and is much used by the French poets. Another kind of this figure is 'Polyptote' which Fouquelin defines as 'Nombre par lequel souuentesfois le cas est changé, et ce neantmoins quelque similitude entre les diction est retenue' (Fouquelin is aware here that he is using the word 'cas' in a broader sense than that of the grammarians; he means by it any possible word-ending, including alteration of number, gender, tense, mood: his illustration is from Balf,

"Mais moy bien plus heureux,
Que cet heureux lien si heureusement lie,
Dans l'heureuse prison, des heureux amoureux")²

Of the French writers we have been looking at, Sebillet has the most to say about this last figure. For him it is not so much a rhetorical figure as one of the five kinds of rhyme:

1. Ibid., p.68.

2. Ibid., pp.69-71.

"La première s'appelle, Equivoque, et se fait quant les deus, les trois ou les quatres syllabes d'une seule diction assise en la fin d'un vers, sont répétées au carme symbolisant, mais en plusieurs mos répétées dy-je ou simplement de mesme son ou seulement de mesme orthographe, ou de mesme son et de mesme orthographe ensemble".¹

Sebillet considers that it is the most difficult kind of rhyme and therefore is the least frequent,

"et ne laisse pourtant a estre la plus élégante, comme celle qui fait cest unison estre semblance plus égale et de ce plus poignante l'ouye".²

Sebillet seems also to be Fouquelin's immediate source for his warning about rhyming a word with itself:

"Mais aussy regarde bien que tu ne tombes de là en une faute, qui es de mettre un mot rymant contre soy mesme: si d'aventure n'estoit diversifié par signification, ou partie d'oraison, comme si l'un fut nom, l'autre verbe ou adverbe, toutesfois sous une mesme vois".³

In his edition of the Art Poétique François, Gaiffe notes that Sebillet's admiration for this kind of rhyme is traditional in the Arts de 2e Rhetorique; he notes also that Du Bellay is not enthusiastic about it though the Le Quintil defends it. The Pléiade seems to follow Sebillet's and Du Bellay's advice to use rich rhyme.⁴

As we saw in the last chapter the Pléiade were obviously more interested in figurative than in plain writing. I have dwelt at some length

1. Sebillet, Art Poétique François, ed.cit., p.62.

2. Ibid., p.63.

3. Ibid., p.71.

4. Ibid., p.63; I reserve for the next chapter a fuller discussion of rhythm and number.

on the enumeration of the figures in the Ramist rhetoric, because, in spite of what I have said about the lack of actual contact and influence between Ramus and the Pléiade, it seems to me that, apart from the few unequal comments which they made about individual figures, there is no Pléiade rhetoric. The theorists of poetry were aware that they were breaking new ground in separating poetry from rhetoric; aware, too, that there were many points of similarity between the poet and the orator, and that some areas of their arts of poetry were very much influenced by rhetorical theory - the transference, for example, of the first three parts of rhetoric, invention, disposition and elocution into the art of poetry. Du Bellay, in fact, closes the first book of his Deffense with the statement:

"En quoy (Lecteur) ne t'ebahis, si je ne parle de l'orateur comme du poete. Car outre que les vertuz de l'un sont pour la plus grand' part communes à l'autre, je n'ignore point qu'Etienne Dolet, homme de bon jugement en notre vulgaire, a formé l'Orateur Francoys, que quelqu'un (peut estre) amy de la memoire de l'auteur et de la France, mettra de bref et fidelement en lumiere".¹

Dolet himself tells us that he did compose this work, but did not publish it.² In the absence of Dolet's treatise this Ramist rhetoric which we have been looking at is perhaps the nearest we can get to a Pléiade rhetoric. It is all too easy to forget the importance of the rhetorical background of the Pléiade; they make little mention of it, but this is because they took it so much for granted. Du Bellay says on this point:

"Quand aux vertuz et vices du poeme, si diligemment traités par les anciens, comme Aristote, Horace, et apres aux Hieronyme Vide: quand aux figures des sentences et des motz, et toutes les autres parties de l'eloquution, les lieux de

1. Deffense, ed.cit., pp.85-6.

2. In the address "au peuple Francoys" in his book on translation (1540), quoted in Deffense, ed.cit., p.86.

commiseration, de joye, de tristesse, d'ire, d'admiration, et toutes autres commotions de l'ame: je n'en parle point apres si grand nombre d'excellens phylosophes et orateurs qui en ont traité, que je veux avoir été bien leuz et releuz de nostre poete, premier qu'il entreprenne quelque hault et excellent ouvraige".¹

Sebillet, too, had insisted on this close similarity between the poet and the orator:

"Car la Rhétorique est autant bien espadue par tout le poème, comme par toute l'oraison".²

The principal manifestation of this is to be found in the use both the poet and the orator make of the ornaments we have been discussing. It seems to me to be highly improbable, however, that the poets should have made any greater use of the Ramist classification of figures than they had made of the Ramist classification of arguments. Works on rhetoric have two very different aims: on the one hand they are useful in the training of the orator, and incidentally as part of the general education of any pupil, and on the other they present a theoretical classification of the material in an academic fashion. The second of these aims (which was the one which often seems to have been the main interest of the compiler) was of no interest at all to the poets as poets, and of little interest to them, even, as theorists of poetry. The first was of greater interest to them, but it does not seem to have had much direct and immediate bearing on the actual writing of the poetry.

The poets' early rhetorical training was not without influence on their later writing of poetry. The best summing up of this is to be found

1. Ibid., pp. 159-60.

2. Sebillet, op.cit., p.21.

in the passage in which Peletier relates the whole question to the respective roles of art and nature in the composition of the poem:

"Mès qué dirè jé plus des Ornémans de Poësie? léquez sont si diuers, qu'il les mé faut par necessite remetre an la felicite du Poëte; pour n'exceder le deuoir d'anseignement, qui ét d'étre brief. Car certes il ne se peut dissimuler, que l'eureuse nésance du Poëte ne soët celé qui plus lui aide a gagner l'honneur: voëre an cas d'anrichicémans, léquez sambleroët être dùz a l'artifice. Telé felicité ét naturel: mès en partie aquisitiue. Nous ranuoyérons donq tousjours a la lecture des Poëtes Célui qui promet de soë la gloire e le pris, les decouurira an lisant: e an receura ocultémant les sémances, dont il fecondéra tout le champ de son Poëme. E féra par étude e eureus exercice, que toutes les richèces se presantéront a lui tout de gre, quand il an aura besoin".¹

1. Peletier, op.cit., p.137.

CHAPTER TEN

LOGIC, RHETORIC AND POETRY

It is surprising that Ramus had, in fact, as little to say directly about poetry as he did, considering how extensive were his writings on logic and rhetoric. This must strike us as curious given his obvious love of classical literature and especially of Virgil. His lectures on Virgil do not, however, seem to have been a great success:

"The great Latin orator wrote no poetry (in Latin), Nancel informs us, because he was not sure of syllabic count. His commentaries on poetry could hardly be called successful. His lectures on the Bucolics and Georgics of Virgil drew so much laughter that he seemed not to have the heart to continue with the Aeneid, as he had originally intended".¹

The annotated editions of the Bucolics appeared in 1555, and of the Georgics in 1556, at exactly the same time as his contact with the Pléiade was at its closest (though we have seen that this contact did not amount to very much). Ramus seems to have had next to no interest in contemporary literature.

We may wonder why he did not write an art of poetry. He did admit that poetry was an art:

"Art est genre. Poetique et Eloquence sont especes";²

but he never actually composed an art of poetry.³ His successors, those

1. Ong, RMDD, p.33.

2. La Dialectique, p.54; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1556), p.112.

3. Ronsard, at the beginning of the Abbrege, writes: 'Combien que l'art de poesie ne se puisse par preceptes comprendre ny enseigner, pour estre plus mental que traditif: toutesfois, d'autant que l'artifice humain, experience et labour le peuvent permettre, j'ai bien voulu t'en donner quelques reigles icy...' Perhaps Ramus is making a similar distinction between poetry and the other arts.

who amplified his encyclopedia of the arts, did see the need for the art of poetry in order to complete his system, but they restricted poetry to the art of versifying.¹ Ramus himself does not seem to have been aware of the lacuna. Poetics does not figure in his proposed scheme for revising and bringing to completion the encyclopedia which he proposed in 1572, just before his death.²

I do not think that the reason for his apparent lack of interest is that he despised poetry, or thought it subversive and immoral; nor is it that imagination and technical skill are lacking in him; some of his better writing evinces a perceptiveness not unrelated to that of the poet. Yet it seems that he did not find it a serious enough pursuit to fit into his life's work of the reorganization of all the arts and sciences. Ong does not find much to say about Ramus' attitude to poetry:

"The Ramist notion of poetry is highly quantitative and diagrammatic; it was built up in terms of 'number' or counting. Although Ramus elsewhere expresses the opinion that poetry is a separate art, like medicine, from the earliest editions of Talon's Rhetoric poetry, in the Ramist tradition, is really treated as a part of rhetoric. The reasons for this are obvious: like rhetorical speech, it is speech which is out of the ordinary in that, as sound, it attracts attention. Poetry is differentiated from the rest of rhetoric in terms of 'number' (numerus), which of course is the Latin term for rhythm or musical count".³

Now while Ong is certainly right in stressing the quantitative aspect here, it should be pointed out that Ramus is completely within the tradition

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1. Ong, RMDD, p.371, note 58: 'Quid est poetica? Est facultas bene scribendi versus', Freigius, Paedagogus (1582), p.131; 'Poetica est ars bene versificandi', Bilsten, Syntagma Philippo-Ramaeum, (1596, p.271.
 2. Cf. Waddington, Ramus: sa vie, ses écrits et ses opinions, Paris, 1855, p.233 and p.248.
 3. Ong, RMDD, p.282.

which runs from Cicero through Quintilian to the medieval and Renaissance arts of rhetoric and poetry. Ong continues;

"By the time of the later editions of the Rhetoric, poetry has migrated to a somewhat different position within the art, and is given an even more frankly quantitative treatment. It is now part of tonal 'dimension' (tonorum dimensio) for which numerus is only a second-best synonym. Tonal dimension has become dichotomized into poetic and oratorical dimension, and poetic dimension into rhythm (length of lines) and meter (kind of feet). This is the sum and substance of Ramist view on poetry, which echo the most mechanistic 'poetic' of the medieval dictamen".

It seems to me that Ramus and Talon have much more to say about poetry than this; and especially, much more to say about number. Nor do they understand it in a purely mechanistic way.¹ In the Rhetorica (1562) we read that number in discourse of any kind works partly by apt structure and disposition of the feet, partly by the sweet and measured similarity of words. What is important is not the number of syllables but their relative length.² This 'sweetness' is to be judged by "a certain inborn sense of hearing."³ In the same work we read that metre, which is one of the aspects of number in poetry, calls for a much more rigorous disposition of the feet.⁴ Prose must have some number, but not metre:

"So rhetorical prose steals from the poem a certain numbered voluptuousness".⁵

Prose manifests this 'voluptuousness' or 'pleasurability' by the

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1. In his comparison of Talon's and Fouquelin's books on rhetoric Leake discusses number at length and shows that both these writers were concerned with sounds as much as with spatial arrangement; 'The Relationship of Two Ramist Rhetorics: Omer Talon's Rhetorica and Antoine Fouquelin's Rhetorique Françoise', in Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1968, pp.99-102.
 2. Rhetorica (Talon), (1562), pp.49-50.
 3. Ibid., p.65.
 4. Ibid., p.56.
 5. Ibid., p.60.

variety and aptness of the sounds. The difference between rhythm and metre is that rhythm is poetic number containing a certain number of syllables and ending in a particular way, whereas metre is poetic number containing a fixed number of feet in a fixed order.¹ There are natural, spontaneous rhythms in every nation's popular speech, as in pre-Homeric poetry, without any measurement of long or short syllables. 'There is nothing', says the Rhetorica of 1572, 'more natural to our minds than number'.² It goes on to say that this is what poetry was like in its infancy; it readily gave way to a maturer type of poetry, which is based on feet, and is discernible even in popular speech and primitive poetry if you look carefully.³ Ramus contends, in the Scholae rhetoricae that the whole style or expression (alocutio) of prose is different from that of poetry, though he feels that both the trainee orator and poet have much to learn from a study of the other's discipline. In general, says Talon in the 1562 Rhetorica, prose imitates the beauties of poetry, though prose-writers should normally shun the techniques and effects of verse.⁴ It is quite clearly stated in the Institutiones oratoriae that the basic difference between poetry and prose is that poetry uses number and prose does not:

"Number (by which name we mean rhythms and metres) is the harmony which is achieved by the apt measure of the feet in the interests of sweetness. The foot is the division of number, and its length is defined by fixed intervals of time.... There are two forms of the rhythmical period, song and a freer speech which Quintilian called 'bound'...."⁵

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1. Rhetorica, (1572), p.32: the 1572 revision after Talon's death, is, of course, by Ramus.
 2. Ibid., p.29.
 3. Ibid., p.31.
 4. Rhetorica, (1562), p.87.
 5. Institutiones oratoriae, pp.25-6.

After quoting the opening words of the Aeneid, "Arma virumque cano...", the author comments that 'carmen' takes its name from singing because it is easier to set it to music than to set the freer kind of speech. He adds that there is an almost infinite variety of the kinds of verse.¹

So much for the more technical side of poetry, concerned with number, metre and rhythm. More basically and generally, we may remind ourselves that Ramus was quite familiar with the notion of poetic fury. He describes, for example, Cicero's quest for the perfect orator in these terms:

"That fury of yours is indeed poetic, Marcus Tullius, by which I see that you are rather thrown forward into that idea than led on by firm reasons".²

This indeed seems to stress rather the inherent irrationality than the divine origins of poetry. The same is true of a statement later in the same book (Brutinae quaestiones) with reference to the discovering of the perfect orator:

"Why then do you boast that you have got hold of something that he (Antonius) did not? What way do you lay open to us in praise of that perfect orator that he did not lay open? You are relapsing into that poetic fury of yours, for you object that there has never ever been such an orator as you describe".³

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1. Ibid., loc.cit; cf. Rhetorica, (1562), pp.49-50; cf. also, Ciceronis De optimo genere oratorum, where the different poetic genres are listed in detail. It is worth noting in parenthesis that the theorists had a good deal to say about the nature of rhythm, metre and number; cf. Sebillot, op.cit., pp.16-20, chapter entitled: 'Qu'est ce que le Francois doit appeller Ryme?'; Du Bellay, op.cit., two chapters: 'De la rythme et des vers sans rythme', and 'De ce mot rythme, de l'invention des vers rymez, et de quelques autres antiquitez usitées en notre Langue'; Peletier, op.cit., pp.147-150, 'De la Rime Poétique'; Ronsard, op.cit., p.18, section 'De la Ryme'; most of the discussion in these chapters centres round the relation between 'rythme' and 'rime'.
 2. Brutinae quaestiones, p.27; cf. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.245.
 3. Brutinae quaestiones, p.76.

Here it is the madness implied in the poetic fury which comes to the fore. Again, in the Prooemium mathematicum Ramus links the idea of poetic fury with the idea that poets are born not made. In the course of this long history of mathematics and in a section in praise of Hippocrates, he says;

"Logic was natural to this merchant, and of the kind which Proclus later noted in Cratistus, who artlessly and readily came to a judgment about any problem, relying uniquely on his natural powers. Popular opinion thinks that poets are born such, and are driven on by a fury of the mind to pour forth outstanding poems".¹

Ramus' main emphasis here is on the idea that fury in poets exemplifies ~~free~~ what happens in the other arts as well, and that we see here in the right proportions technique and natural ability:

"But this natural vigour is common to all virtues and to all learning, in which nobody will reach perfection, unless he is impelled by his natural genius and goodness, or rather unless he is carried off by force".²

On another occasion Ramus explains this word 'carried off', when he talks of Caesar as 'comme ravy et mis hors du sens'.³ This fury is something supernatural which drives a man out of his mind and makes him utterly unconcerned about the ordinary processes of truthful discourse. On the subject of Cicero's verbal juggling Ramus writes.

"Those poetic miracles of yours, I say, are full of childish wonder, but devoid of prudence and truth".⁴

The epithet 'poetic' is significant. In such circumstances the hearers do not realize the persuasive forces which are working on them:

1. Prooemium mathematicum, p.37.
2. Ibid., loc.cit.
3. La Dialectique, p.7.
4. Institutiones oratoriae, p.74.

"When unlearned people hear this, they are moved by great pleasure and joyfulness, but they do not know what it is, so singular and divine, which moves them".¹

Ramus applies this word 'fury' also to the abuse of philosophy which takes place when it departs from the pure use of reason; he talks of 'that philosophical fury'.² In the same sense he refers to Aristotle's madness (deliratio).³ He mentions also Cicero's reputation of 'being out of his mind and raving' (furere et bacchari) because his style was so elevated and glowing.⁴ His reputation was largely due to his opponent Brutus who thought that the aim of oratory should not be to move, but to teach and please the hearer.⁵ Ramus attacks this 'Asiaticism' of Cicero and contrasts it with the attitude of the Attic philosophers who

"prefer to teach their hearers truly and calmly, rather than to be driven on and disturbed by any powerfully inflamed speech."⁶

Furious possession, whether poetic or philosophical, has religious overtones, according to Ramus. Those same people, for example, who see Moses as an Egyptian story-teller consider Christians as 'wicked and frenzied backbiters' (τελχίνας).⁷

The idea that poets are born not made is expressed in a different form in the Dialecticae institutiones (1543):

"By their reason men know the gods themselves, and everything else, and by reason they excite their individual inborn talents for praying, numbering,

1. Institutiones oratoriae, p.74.

2. Scholae dialecticae, SLA, col.466.

3. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1543), p.79v.

4. Rhetorica, (1572), p.56.

5. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, preface.

6. Ibid., col.275.

7. Scholae physicae, SLA, preface; this passage is contained verbatim in Commentariorum de religione Christiana, p.27.

measuring, singing and extolling the virtues of the rest of the arts".¹

Now if singing is a particular inborn gift which some men have and others do not, then poetry must be the same since poetry was synonymous with song. Furthermore, poetry is also natural in that poets (and orators) attempt to follow the natural usage. This may sound strange to us, given the obvious artificiality of poetry, but the meaning is that their statements are not usually intentionally obscure, and that what they are expressing is simple and sincere.² Poets and orators, according to Ramus, teach 'facilement et clerement'.³ It is nature itself which is responsible for the introduction of the fury. Poets and orators are excited naturally, excite themselves in a sense, because

"the knowledge of causes is so natural to men that nature does not seem so much to be opening the way to knowledge of them, as to be providing a certain violent impulse".⁴

We now come to the vexing question of the relation between logic, rhetoric and poetry in Ramus. Nelson has shown clearly the difficulty there is in distinguishing with any accuracy the function which Ramus assigned to these three arts.⁵ It seems to me that Ramus is saying that they all use the same language more or less, and that logic is what is common to all of them; that they are all endowed with the same common prudence, that is, instinctive, spontaneous judgment; and, moreover, that they are all trying to persuade their readers in one way or another. Ramus did not, indeed, see them

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.10.

2. La Dialectique, p.114.

3. Ibid., p.123.

4. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.10.

5. N.E. Nelson, Peter Ramus and the Confusion of Logic, Rhetoric and Poetry, (Ann Arbor), 1947.

as essentially different; any distinctions he made were made for the purpose of teaching. He expected the practitioners of each art to be well-versed in the others, and in many more besides. If they were to participate in the handing on of any part of knowledge they must be men of sufficient breadth of vision to see the relevance of this part to the whole. A knowledge of music or mathematics, he thought, will not make a man a better grammarian, but it should make him a fuller man and consequently a better teacher of grammar.

There is considerable confusion among writers of the French Renaissance arising from the fact that they often use 'poet' and 'orator' almost interchangeably, as they were used in the Arts de Rhétorique. We are, however, able to see certain distinctions in the writings of Ramus. The main distinction for him between the poet and the orator on the one hand, and the logician on the other is that the latter's teaching is more formal and professional: 'For dialectic is artifice and a proper instrument for explaining all things'.¹ Yet, as we have seen, for Ramus, the logician will be wasting his time completely if he has not learnt to dress this explanation in attractive language. This is the reason for Ramus' repeated use of examples to alleviate an otherwise burdensome text.

We must remember (when we are looking at the difference between logic, rhetoric and poetry in Ramus) that for him logic is not restricted to manuals on the subject or to classes devoted to its study. It is to be found in every use of language:

1. Dialecticae partitiones, p.26.

"Although dialectic, that is the art of natural reason, is put into practice only briefly and for a few years in school, we meditate on it and practise it in everything throughout our lives".¹

Since then every writer has an interest in the correct use of logic, and since for Ramus one of its main purposes was distinguishing the true from the false, then, however pleasurable writing may be, it is usually also didactic. The poet's teaching function is put above that of the orator, and Ramus stresses that he uses natural prudence. It is significant that it is by logical method that the poet moves his audience.

Whenever poets and orators depart from strict logical method it is for the sake of providing pleasing entertainment. In discussing method in writing, Ramus says

"Anybody who wants to teach must follow this way. It is true that poets and orators turn aside from it, but they do so for the sake of pleasing, sometimes even for the sake of deceiving, and not in order to teach".²

In the later version of this same text, published later in 1543, the stress is shifted. Firstly, 'perspicue' is added to 'docere': this suggests that even when they are pleasing they are to a certain extent teaching, but without precision and clarity; also in the later text the use of definition and distribution is described in far greater detail. Secondly, their departure from logic is seen as poetic licence: 'they allow themselves many things for the sake of utility and pleasure'. It is clear at least that Ramus saw poets as teachers, and at the same time as people who were engaged in pleasurable communication.³

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1554), p.274.

2. Dialecticae partitiones, pp.34-34v; cf. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.30.

3. La Dialectique, p.129.

For Ramus it is clear that all discourse must teach:

"Logic is the art of discourse, and therefore also the art of teaching... For if a grammarian, a rhetorician, or a mathematician teaches anything, it is by means of logical artifice, and not by one belonging to his own art, that he does it".¹

The pleasurable nature of poetic discourse will be best achieved, he thought, by exploiting the connections poetry has with music. One kind of poetry, perhaps even all poetry, was very close to song - this was a commonly accepted view at the time of the Renaissance. So, in the Institutiones oratoriae, we read that poets

"have found verses, and harmonies of speech of delightful sweetness, almost infinite in number, varying in the disposition of the measures".²

Furthermore, just as the poet must pay attention to the sound of what he is writing so the good orator is distinguished from the bad by his ability to appeal to the ear: the bad orator has no sense of rhythmical sweetness whereas the good orator is capable of subtle and joyful harmonies.³ Fouquelin shows that the poetic element in all kinds of writing (because in the Ramist view poetry and rhetoric were present in all discourse too, in varying degrees) is characterised by its harmony and capacity to delight. The orator borrows techniques from the poet:

"L'orateur et celui qui parle en prose a usurpé et derobé cete suauité et modulation aus muses, comm'il a emprunté la mesure et le nombre des poetes: les marques et enseignementzen sont ótez, toutesfois la delectation même demeure".⁴

What unites the two functions (teaching and pleasing) is the third

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1. Scholae metaphysicae, SLA, col.836; cf., Institutiones oratoriae, p.70.
 2. Institutiones oratoriae, p.26.
 3. Ibid., pp.79-80.
 4. La Rhetorique Françoise, p.117.

function of oratory which Ramus also borrows from Cicero and Quintilian, the notion that one of the purposes of discourse is to persuade. Ramus quotes Cicero's statement about the three functions of the orator, to teach, to move and to please,¹ and comments that Brutus and others thought that the orator should not try to move people forcibly, and that those whose speech was elevated were given to raving. Ramus agrees with Cicero's definition that the true orator was he 'whose speech was such that he proved things, pleased and persuaded people' and who made a correct use of the traditional three styles.² A little later in this context Ramus quibbles on this point when he claims that persuasion is not "the end and highest and most perfect honour (laus) of the orator", because a successful result depends on circumstances which are fortuitous, and not dependent on the art. The aim should simply be "to speak well".³ (Besides, Ramus notes that the threefold Ciceronian definition 'to teach, to please, to move' is common to many arts and not proper to rhetoric). In a similar way it is made clear that the end of logic is not to demonstrate but to discourse (disserendi); success is not important.⁴

In a sense, for Ramus, it is impossible to separate the respective functions of teaching and persuading:

"Ce que nous appellons enseigner, n'est pas bailler la sapience, ains seulement tourner et diriger l'esprit à contempler ce que de soy mesme il eut peu apercevoir, s'il se fut là tourné et dirigé".⁵

1. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, preface.

2. Ibid., in SLA, col.273, probo is given as the equivalent of doceo.

3. Ibid., col.275.

4. Aristotelicae animadversiones, (1543), p.56.

5. La Dialectique, p.2.

This is most clearly exemplified in the case of the orator. In the Dialecticae institutiones (1543), Ramus writes that comparisons are most useful for those

"who wish to move and impel the minds of their listeners by the force of their speech. Just as nature impels us, so we impel others when we attempt to persuade them. Orators especially are given to this since they aim to capture and take away by force the minds of their listeners, if this does not seem possible by quiet and clear teaching".¹

The orator, Ramus writes elsewhere, tries to gain the 'grace at attention de l'auditeur'.² In the Rhetorica of 1572 he says of figures of sentence and figures of diction that the former are more useful for moving and convincing, and the latter for teaching and pleasing. Their common purpose lies in their use for teaching.³

One corollary of the widely-held Renaissance theory that the "universal" man was the only one who could be called truly educated was that anyone who wished to practise any art at all was expected to be well-versed in all the others, for the reason that this would make him a better man and therefore a better practitioner of the art in question. So Ramus insists that orators should be absolutely familiar with the encyclopedia of all the arts, but, he adds, (and here he is attacking Cicero) these should all be subservient to rhetoric.⁴ According to Cicero, he writes, the perfect orator 'shares in all the arts',⁵ but Ramus contends that what Cicero is describing is the perfect citizen, who, in the time of Cicero, had to be an accomplished

1. Dialecticae institutiones, (1543), p.16v.

2. La Dialectique, p.13.

3. Rhetorica, (1572), p.56.

4. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.236; cf. col.279.

5. Ibid., col.242-3.

public speaker if he was to play his proper role in the affairs of the state. What Cicero is talking about is "a politician who is absolutely accomplished", and, adds Ramus, there is all the difference in the world between defining the perfect citizen and defining the perfect orator.¹

One wonders why Ramus was so interested in oratory. His reputation as one of France's greatest orators may be justified but there is little evidence to prove it.² He was not himself concerned with intervening in public affairs, except in matters which concerned the university, and most of his own speeches must have been made within the university. He was, of course, anxious that his pupils should become all-round universal men and he was particularly convinced of the power of the spoken word. But above all he was interested in oratory because of his familiarity with Cicero and desired to reproduce classical education with its distinctly rhetorical bias.

He did, on the other hand, feel that the quest for the perfect orator was an impossible one:

"No man's nature can be perfect, no art, since it imitates nature, can be perfect: no practice can be so perfect that nothing could be added to it, since man's life is so short and uncertain".³

Ramus ridicules Cicero's quest for the perfect orator by saying that all he would have to do would be to attribute a knowledge of all disciplines to anyone - a poet, a doctor, a grammarian, a cook - in order to dream up a perfect poet, doctor, grammarian or cook.⁴ (Cicero is reported as having

1. Ibid., loc.cit.

2. In the Ciceronianus, more than in any other book, Ramus mentions French oratory in his own day, cf. pp.13, 17, and 61.

3. Scholae rhetoricae, SLA, col.244.

4. Ibid., col.246.

thought that it would be easier to find a perfect grammarian, logician, doctor and so on because their aims and functions were necessarily more restricted than those of the orator). It is not absolutely clear how far away from Cicero Ramus is here, since they are in agreement that the orator should possess all these accomplishments. When Quintilian adds that the orator must have the virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, and a knowledge of philosophy, law, history and so on, Ramus thinks that this is too far-reaching. What Ramus is saying is that the orator should have all these qualities, but that they should not be discussed in an art of rhetoric.¹ In fact, for Ramus, the perfect philosopher and perfect historian have more need of eloquence than the orator has need of a knowledge of philosophy or history.²

Ramus finds that Quintilian seems to have thought that the good orator must be virtuous, and he suggests that the virtue of rhetoric is not a moral virtue of such a kind that "a man who was endowed with it could not help being good".³ He sees it rather as a mental or intellectual virtue: it is possible to be a good orator and yet at the same time a wicked man. In all this the primary concern of Ramus is to keep the different arts separate. Quintilian should realize, he notes, that a man who in explaining the poets teaches other arts is not doing it as a grammarian but as an exponent of the other arts.⁴

1. Ibid., col.320.

2. Ibid., col.279.

3. Ibid., col.322.

4. Ibid., col.330.

If we turn to the Pléiade and the related theorists we see that they had a good deal to say about the relation between poetry and oratory, and not much to say about logic, though they do often imply that the poet has a teaching function.

We have already seen that they were aware of the relation between the rôle of the orator and that of the poet. Sebillet, for example, writes

"Et sont l'Orateur et le Poëte tant proches et conjoinz, que semblables et égaux en plusieurs choses, différent principalement en ce, que l'un est plus contraint de nombres que l'autre".¹

This is very like Du Bellay's statement that 'le poëte et l'orateur sont comme les deuz piliers qui soutiennent l'edifice de chacune Langue'.² Sebillet, for his part, is concerned with the interrelation of the two disciplines and with the help which they can give to each other:

"Et tout ainsy que le futur Orateur profite en la leçon du Poëte: aussy le futur Poëte peut enrichir son style, et faire son champ autrement stérile, fertile, de la leçon des Historiens et Orateurs françois".³

Sebillet is very near to the medieval idea of poetry as rhetoric. Du Bellay, too, in his "Art of Poetry" has much to say about the function of the orator:

"L'office donques de l'orateur est de chacune chose proposée elegamment et copieusement parler. Or ceste faculté de parler ainsi de toutes choses ne se peut acquerir que par l'intelligence parfaite des Sciences".⁴

In many ways this idea of the orator is like Du Bellay's own idea of the poet - the need for encyclopedic knowledge, for example, is common to

1. Sebillet, op.cit., pp.21-2.
2. Du Bellay, op.cit., pp.87-8.
3. Sebillet, op.cit., pp.30-1.
4. Du Bellay, op.cit., p.33.

both of them, as we shall see. In Du Bellay there is, in fact, no clear differentiation between the poet and the orator. When he insists that he is not attempting the definition of a non-existent poet he uses exactly the same terms that Cicero, and then Ramus, had used about the ideal orator:

"Or ne veux-je en ce faisant feindre comme une certaine figure de poète, qu'on ne puysses ny des yeux, ny des oreilles, ny d'aucun sens apercevoir, mais comprendre seulement de la cogitation et de la pensée: comme ces Idées que Platon constituoit en toutes choses, auxquelles, ainsi qu'à une certaine espece imaginative, se refere tout ce qu'on peut voir".¹

Du Bellay in the end gives very practical advice about what the poet should be like. In the celebrated passage in which he shows what the true function of the poet should be, once more he is using the words in which Cicero describes the function of the orator:

"Pour conclure ce propos, saiches, Lecteur, que celui sera veritablement le poète que je cherche en nostre Langue, qui me fera indigner, apayser, ejoyr, douloir, aymer, hayr, admirer, etonner, bref, qui tiendra la bride de mes affections, me tournant ça et la à son plaisir".²

It seems to me to be fairly clear that Sebillet and Du Bellay were very close to Ramus on this point and that they did not in fact distinguish to any appreciable extent between the poet and the orator. This emphasizes therefore the importance of the study of rhetoric for an understanding of Pléiade poetic theory.

Peletier, on the other hand, marks an important stage in the development of the idea of the poet, because, while he does show the similarities between the poet and the orator, he is careful to point out that there are

1. Ibid., p.89, and cf. Chamard's references there to Cicero's De Oratore.

2. Ibid., p.179.

also great differences. He devotes a whole chapter to this topic: 'Du Sugget de Poësie: E de la difference du Poëte e de l'Orateur'.¹ The main difference is explained as follows:

"Einsi voëla l'une des principales diferances qu'il i à entre l'Orateur e le Poëte, que cétuici peut s'ebatre an tous g'anrës d'argumans, cétuila èt astreint aus choses particulieres. Car l'Orateur ne pourra pas chercher l'ocasion de fere parler les Dieus, de treter l'Amour, les Ieus festiz, les Anfers, les Astrës, les regiõs, les chans, les prez, les fonteinës e teles beautez d'Ecriz: Mes se tiendra dedans les causes de ses clians: mouura les afez, deduira ses reõs, refutera celës de son auersere. E an ces deus derniers poinz, le Poëte i antre aussi: mes il les trete succinctement".¹

It is worth noting here that Peletier says that the poet shares with the orator the function of reasoning rather than that of persuading, but that he is less 'argumentative' than the orator. The passage goes on :

"Car lui qui parle a une eternite, doët seulëmant toucher le neu, le segrët et le fons d'un argument, e parler plus resolumant, lessant les menues narracions",²

showing the inappropriateness of historical detail in good poetry.

Peletier goes even further than Du Bellay had done in describing the true function of the poet:

"L'office d'un Poëte, èt de donner nouveaute aus choses vielhës, autorite aus nouvelës, beaute aus rudës, lumiere aus obscurës, foë aus douteusës, e a toutes leur naturel e a leur naturel toutes".³

This new conception of the poet is radically different from the idea which Sebillet had. It is also a long way away from anything Ramus had to say about the function of the poet. By the time Ronsard wrote the Abbrege

1. Ibid., pp.83-4.

2. Ibid., p.84.

3. Ibid., p.97.

the difference between the two views is taken for granted:

"Car tout ainsi que le but de l'orateur est de persuader, ainsi celui du Poëte est d'imiter, inventer, et représenter les choses qui sont, qui peuvent estre, ou que les anciens ont estimé comme veritables".¹

It is not easy to establish the extent to which sixteenth-century theorists thought that the poet should be didactic. One thing is certain, that they were all in favour of the Horatian injunction to mix what was useful with what was sweet.² The only difficulty for us is to decide the meaning of the word 'useful' in this context. In spite of the attempt to free poetry from all the moral implications which it had had through the Middle Ages, there was still a belief in the value of poetry as a means to betterment. Peletier, for example, writes,

"Ie vièn a l'excelance de la Poësie. Les Poëtes ont etè jadis les mètres e reformateurs de la vie.... La Poësie à congregè les hommes, qui estoit sauvages, brutaus e epäues: e d'une horreur de vie les à retirèz a la ciuillite, police e societe".³

Because of this civilizing mission it was important that the poet should himself be an accomplished man; here we come back to the question which exercised Ramus with reference to the orator and the logician. Du Bellay makes his own view clear in the chapter 'Du long poeme Francoys' (Bk.ii.ch.5):

1. Ronsard, Abbrege, ed. cit., p.13.

2. Cf., on this topic, R.J. Clements, Critical Theory and Practice of the Pléiade, Cambridge, Mass., 1942, especially chapter four, 'Poetic Sweetness and Utility', pp.122-186, in which he discusses among other things the use the French writers made of Horace's 'Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci, Lectorem delectando pariterque monendo', Ad Pisones, vv.343-4.

3. Peletier, op.cit., p.67.

"Donques, ô toy, qui doué d'une excellente felicité de nature, instruit de tous bons Ars et Sciences, principalement naturelles et mathematiques, versé en tous genres de bons aucteurs Grecz et Latins, non ignorant des parties et offices de la vie humaine, non de trop haulte condition, ou appellé au regime publiq'....ô toy (dy-je) orné de tant de graces et perfections....'1

Peletier makes even clearer the accomplishments which the poet must have:

"Je n'è donq pas ici grand bésain de diré, qu'a notrè Poète ęt necesseré la connoëssance d'Astrologié, Cosmografié, Geometrié, Phisiqué, brief de touté la Philosophie".2

Finally Ronsard (who in the preface to the Franciade will repeat this idea of the learning necessary to the poet) makes the point in the Abbrege that the poet himself must be virtuous:

"Or, pour ce que les Muses ne veulent loger en une ame, si elle n'est bonne, sainte, et vertueuse, tu seras de bonne nature, non meschant, renfrongné, ne chagrin: mais animé d'un gentil esprit, ne laisseras rien entrer en ton entendement qui ne soit sur-humain et divin".3

We have seen that Ramus was anxious to establish whether it was possible or not to decide on the characteristics of the perfect orator, and so on, and was careful to make the distinction between the perfect practitioner of any art and the perfect citizen or perfect man. This was clearly a commonplace in Renaissance writing because we find the theorists of poetry also debating the question with reference to poetry. Peletier makes the comment:

"Songé que le Ciel peút feré un Poète parfèt: mes qu'il n'an à point ancorés fèt".4

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1. Du Bellay, op.cit., pp.127-8.
 2. Peletier, op.cit., pp.216-7.
 3. Ronsard, op.cit., p.5.
 4. Peletier, op.cit., p.96.

He is more ready than were the others to describe an imaginary poet:

"l'équel, possible, nous faisons ici nō tel qu'il à ancor
etè: mēs tel qu'il s' peut imaginer".¹

Yet in spite of what Peletier says here one has the impression that he felt his ideal was realizable. By 'tel qu'il s' peut imaginer' he does not wish to suggest the hypothetical nature of such a poet but the possibility of his existence. The same could be said of Ramus. Many of his contemporaries considered him to be academic and theoretical in his outlook, but he did really believe that his aims were capable of realization.

1. Ibid., p.113.

CONCLUSION

Abraham Fraunce, in his Lawiers Logike (1588), gives a neat definition of Renaissance didacticism:

"Hee teacheth, whosoever maketh any other man know that, whereof he was ignorant".¹

Fraunce was writing a work of logic, and logic was certainly in his mind when he wrote these words, but he is using 'know' in a very general sense. His book was an adaptation of the Ramist Dialectic, and his statement can be taken as a summary of Ramus' own views on discourse and communication in general. It seems clear to me that 'teaching' (in its broad sense) can be taken as the key-note of Ramus' work, just as it can of Calvin's (we may remember the importance for Calvin of the idea of 'institutio' in its sense of 'teaching'). Furthermore, it seems to me that we must place the Renaissance idea of poetry in its educational context if we are to understand it fully, both because Renaissance writers were consciously didactic in everything that they wrote, and because French Renaissance poetics grew out of a clearly-defined educational milieu. They reflect the importance attached to educational problems by humanists, reformers, and reactionaries alike.

The subject of the relation between the ideas of Ramus and those of the French poetic theorists is a vast one, in particular from the point of view of Ramus because of the sheer volume of his works. I have attempted to show some of the similarities and differences between his views and those

1. Fraunce, Lawiers Logike (1588), fol. 3v, quoted in Rosemond Tuve's Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago, 1947), p.384; cf. Ong, RMDD, p.347, n.33.

of the Pléiade. We have seen that he did not write a specific art of poetry, but that nonetheless his attitudes to logic and rhetoric can help to elucidate the attitudes of the Pléiade to poetry, by placing them in their broader philosophical context. He touches on most of the problems in Renaissance critical theory (though not of course on the more technical questions of verse-forms and metres), and analyzes carefully and precisely many of the tensions which existed there. Ramus is famous for his dichotomies and this approach of his is evident in the way he treats the relation between art and nature, analysis and genesis and so on. We have seen that he manages to amalgamate successfully the Aristotelian theory of universals with the Platonic system of ideas, that the basis of all arts is for him in one sense the Platonic idea, and yet that all the arts are devoted to making known the universals in nature. He combines the Platonic outlook of Sebillet and Pontus de Tyard with the Aristotelianism of the later Ronsard.

For Ramus, art means teaching and conversely it often means learning (doctrina and disciplina); it is interesting that he should equate teaching and learning on so many occasions, interesting for what it tells us about his own pedagogic attitude. For him art is never entirely devoid of an ethical and even a religious significance, much more so than it was for the members of the Pléiade, though even they found it difficult to shake off the moral obligations of the poet. Just as Ramus had felt that mathesis had a broadening, liberalizing influence so the poets drew attention to the civilizing effects of their craft. Just as for Ramus all learning (and especially logic) frees man from sensuality and guides him on the path which ascends to God and wisdom, so for the poets and the theorists of poetry, poetry had a

similar purpose. Poetry helped man to appreciate the great variety of nature which Ramus had said all arts should contemplate. It is of course the poets who approach more nearly to the realization of the ideal; Ramus was far more interested in the day-to-day process of teaching and writing (because that was another way of teaching) than in the attempt to enjoy eternal ecstasy. He was neither mystic nor theologian: his one work of theology is, for the most part, very prosaic, and even his Platonic lyricism, though sometimes moving, is often not very convincing.

We have seen, too, that Ramus shares and amplifies the Pléiade's view of the way in which art imitates nature. He shows that all art is an attempt to express (re-present) the natural, that is, what is inborn in man before he has recourse to labour, study, practical exercise or industry. The teaching-process is for him a copy of a natural process, a reflection of the order which exists in nature. Yet it shares the imperfection which is inherent in nature. Logic and rhetoric are natural to all men even if not in the same degree. Ramus is not familiar enough with the work of poets to be able to say with any conviction that poetry is natural. He certainly could not have said that it was natural to all men. He was in agreement with those of his contemporaries who said that art and nature were equally indispensable to any writer, and insisted on a third point, that art is valueless unless it gives rise to practical exercise and activity. The divine origin of poetry, poetry as a kind of fury imparted by the gods or by God fits in very well into Ramus' view of the origin of all the arts.

In the matter of imitation Ramus provides a parallel to the views of the theorists of poetry, develops the idea much more profoundly and places

it in the total philosophical context. Like the Pléiade theorists he did not use the words 'creativity' and 'originality' in their modern senses, but he had a theory of originality which was even better developed than that of the Pléiade. He sees imitation as a mere stage, as part of the process of learning, and his theory of learning was based on the idea of the personal contribution and participation of the pupil. Ramus stresses, in fact, originality rather than imitation. His description of genesis is a very modern theory of originality.

Norman Nelson has written that "Ramus' logic is not a logic at all, but a rhetoric or technique of persuasion".¹ This is of course an oversimplification of what Ramus says about the persuasiveness of logic, and takes no account of the precise and technical content of the Ramist Dialectic, but it does contain a certain amount of truth. Nelson reminds us that for Ramus poets are natural born logicians who share with the orator a three-fold function,

"to teach, to move and to delight, and of these the
delight and the moving were means to the end of
poetry, which was to teach".²

It is quite true that Ramus was an advocate of the interrelation of all the different disciplines, because, while for him they each retained their special aims, there was one method common to them all and their ultimate purpose was identical. He sensed the perpetual tension which must exist between the clarity which all discourse has to have and the embellishment it takes on in order to please and persuade. The Pléiade poets were

1. Nelson, op.cit., p.14.

2. Ibid., p.22.

less interested in the clarity than in the embellishment: for them there was a definite distinction between the plain writing of history or of logic and the figured language with which they were more familiar. In this connection Ramus debates, in almost the same terms as did the other theorists, how far a writer may depart from a strict adherence to logical truth. His answer is that any writer (even, on occasion, the logician) may write in a way which is persuasive rather than truthful; in line with the distinction made by all critics at the time this is not to condone lying. One feels that Ramus wanted the logician to be exempt from the need to persuade by these means, and, indeed, some of his writing suggests that the logician is concerned only with distinguishing what is true from what is false and can therefore never depart from absolute truth. But he does allow it in his 'method of prudence' in discourse (even logical discourse) by means of which the character of the audience is allowed for in the disposition of the material, and truthfulness gives way to persuasiveness.

In the matter of invention, something which lies at the heart of Renaissance critical theory, Ramus echoes in broad outline what the theorists of poetry say, but for him 'invention' is part of logic, and related to a particular 'topical' theory which was originally part of rhetoric. The Pléiade, too, took over invention from rhetoric, but they were very vague indeed about how it was to be understood and how it was to be practised. Except in a very general sense I do not believe that they took any notice of the Ramist, or indeed any, topical theory of the invention of arguments in the places, or ever used it schematically. This was too far removed from the spontaneous, 'inspired' character of their poetry. Nor did Ramus' academic presentation of the rhetorical figures influence their poetry. On the

other hand they had benefited from a similar sort of rhetorical training, in the common school tradition, in their early years, and there are many points of contact. We should remember that for Ramus the doctrine of invention was not something peculiar to logic: it was universally applicable to all the arts and was based on a theory of the perfectibility of knowledge.

In the course of this study we have seen the points of contact between the philosophical and general aesthetic theories of Ramus and the poetic theories of the Pléiade. Although Ramus is rarely talking specifically about poetic theory, his works do show how poetic theory is part of the broader philosophical tradition. My first contention has been that the actual personal or literary contact between Ramus and the Pléiade was negligible and unsatisfactory (though this is contrary to the commonly and increasingly more widely accepted view)¹ and my second that a study of Ramus is nonetheless fruitful and illuminating if we wish to go more deeply into the issues behind Pléiade poetic theory. One other point emerges clearly. Ramus' Platonism, much talked about, is superficial. He is much less of a Platonist, for example, than Pontus de Tyard, Du Bellay or Ronsard; his Aristotelianism, in spite of his repeated rejection of it and his captious vituperation of Aristotle is profound and well-developed. It seems to me that in many ways Ramus shows as early as 1540 familiarity with the Aristotelian views which did not erupt into French poetic theory until the publication of Scaliger's Poetices libri septem in 1561, and Ronsard's Abbrégé in 1565.

Since Ramus, in the 1540's and 1550's, was preaching an Aristoteli-

1. cf. R.E. Leake, "Antoine Fouquelin and the Pléiade", in Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 1970, p.383.

anism which Ronsard was to accept in the 1560's, it might seem reasonable to suppose that Ronsard took over the ideas of Ramus, that there was, in fact, a literary contact. Except in a very general sense, however, I do not believe that this is what happened. My contention is that in the formative years of Pléiade theory (say, 1547-60) there is no evidence for any contact except for the superficial collaboration in the Dialectique. Nor is there any necessity to conclude that Ronsard's later Aristotelianism owes anything to Ramus. It seems to me far more likely that Ronsard was influenced by Italian Aristotelianism (through Scaliger's book), and, more importantly by Turnèbe and Lambin with whom we know he was in close and fruitful contact.

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Once again the problem of authorship arises. In general I follow Ong, pointing out the occasions when I think his attribution is doubtful or even wrong.

Unless otherwise stated the work is by Ramus, and the place of publication is Paris. An asterisk indicates that the work is also to be found in SLA (Scholae in liberales artes, Bâle, 1569).

Dialecticae partitiones, J. Bogard, 1543.

Dialecticae institutiones, J. Bogard, (Sept.) 1543; other editions by M. David, 1549, and L. Grandin, 1554.

* Aristotelicae animadversiones, J. Bogard, (Sept.) 1543; also M. David, 1548, and A. Wechel, 1556.

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Oratio de studiis rhetoricis (Talon), also in Tres orationes...

Euclides, L. Grandin, 1545; also by Thomas Richard, 1549 and 1558. The translation is not by Ramus, as Ong believed, though the preface, of course, is.

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Dialecticae praelectiones in Porphyrium, M. David, 1547. (Ong gives Talon more credit for this work than is his due. This work is, in fact, by Ramus, vide supra, p.91, note 3.)

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P. Virgilii Maronis Bucolica, 1555.

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Appendix

- 56.n.1. ' Sed tamen res intelligatur, sitque Categoria, homogeneorum descriptio per generalissima, subalterna, infima. Quae Categoriae definitio, nil aliud est, quam artis et scientiae vera methodo dispositae definitio: Ars enim, est rerum homogeneorum per generalissima, subalterna, specialissima, comprehensio et ordinatio'.
- n.3. ' Genus, est multitudo essentialium similium, aut essentia multorum similis: Et illa nimirum est idea Platonis, de qua disputationem huc reieceram: ut genere cognito, Platonis idea facilius cognosceretur. Etenim Platonis idea nil est aliud, quam genus hactenus a nobis definitum'.
- 57.n.2. 'At (inquam) vocabula haec omnia in vero et communi usu significationem communem et generalem habent, ut Grammatica possit et ars, et scientia, et prudentia, et sapientia nominari: quanquam prudentiae nomen in rebus agendis saepius usurpatur: sapientiae in consiliis et deliberationibus...'
- n.4. ' Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ratiocinativa, ex antecedente fit cognitione: manifestum vero id considerantibus in omnibus. Etenim mathematicae disciplinae hunc in modum concluduntur, et aliarum unaquaeque artium'.
- 58.n.3. ' artium omnium fines et institutiones separentur: usus tamen conjugatur: sicuti in hominum fundis et agris fieri videmus: ut meus ager in tuum non incurrat, nec tuus incidat in meum: rerum tamen nostrarum vendendo, emendo, permutando usus communicetur'.
- 59.n.1. ' Artium distinctis temporibus distincte docemus, fructus tamen omnium paulatim ut maturescunt, ad usum eloquentiae et prudentiae convertimus...unumque tandem eloquentiae et philosophiae generalem et communem usum ex multis specialibus et praecipuis efficimus. In agricultura sunt segetes, sunt arbores, sunt vites, sunt armenta, pecudes, quae suum quaeque cultum separatim requirunt: relictis in agro calamis frumenta domum comportamus: arboribus in horto relictis, poma domum comportamus: pecoribus et armentis in pascuo relictis, lactis copiam et vellera domum comportamus: eorum omnium simul usum ad corpus pascendum, alendum, vestiendum coniungimus: Ita sit in animorum cultura: variae sunt eius partes, variis modis exercendae'.
- n.2. ' O vani et inanes labores mei! Tot annos publice de artium liberalium distinctione disputavi, tot libros ea de re conscripsi et publicavi'.
- 60.n.1. ' Finis enim doctrinae non est notitia rerum ipsi subiectarum, sed usus et exercitatio'.

- 60.n.2. ' Sic humanae vitae artes docent suis praeceptis bene loqui, bene dicere, bene ratiocinari, bene numerare, bene metiri, et eiusmodi ex suo fine quidpiam. Theologia autem docet bene vivere, id est, Deo bonorum omnium fonti congruenter et accommodate. Ethica siquidem paganorum Philosophia beatam hominis vitam caducis et infirmis humanae facultatis viribus fere comprehendit et terminavit, tanquam homo seipso contentus esset ad beate vivendum, suaeque natura, doctrina, consuetudine beatitatem sibi per se posset acquirere, ideoque humanae virtutis vel habitus, vel actio, vel voluptas, vel honor beatos efficeret'.
- n.3. 'Quid ergo quantas divinae sapientiae, et quam synceras imagines mathesis philosophis animis ostendit? Qua via proprius in hac mortalitatis illusionem, ad immortalis naturae conditionem accedimus?'
- 61.n.1. ' Mathesis liberat, seu potius hominem hac mundi universitate maiorem reddit: ut eam, cuius vix millies millesimum punctum dici potuit, totam oculis ipsa multo grandioribus aspiciat. Hominem a coelesti possessione in ultimas mundi partes abiectum, et a patria extorrem, exulemque miseramur? Mathesis in civitatem, patriamque coeli haereditatem restituit'.
- n.3. ' Quam coeleste, quamque deorum proprium est, cum in tenebris caecus erres, in amplissimo lumine omnia numerare?'
- n.4. ' Iudicium sequitur, pars artis maxima, nobilissimaque: hac virtute mens hominum naturae suae celsitudinem praecipue agnoscit: quamvis enim perexiguo corporis ergastulo vineta teneatur: seipsam tamen aestimatione, iudicioque rerum solvit, liberatque'.
- n.5. ' Quare agite, ignem hunc ab illa coelesti lampade demissum accendamus, vinculis liberemur...'
- 62.n.1. ' animos nostros ex quadam eius particula decussatos'; and ' e caeli regione delapsus'.
- n.2. ' cum ad monita, praeceptaque de vita, et moribus dialectica pervenerit'.
- n.5. ' singulares ... a natura dotes'.
- n.7. ' divinitus insitis'.
- n.8. ' nostris animis inscripta'.
- n.9. ' naturaliter propensus est ad ratiocinandum'.
- 63.n.1. ' quae ratio aeterna in singularibus hominum mentibus divinitus insita est, atque impressa'.

- 63.n.2. ' artes, id est, mentis dotes et virtutes'.
- n.4. ' Theologia itaque est doctrina de Deo divinitus hominibus oblata'.
- 64.n.2. ' amor optimi, maximique Dei, ille enim veritas omnis sapientiaque est, ad quam studia hominum, et cogitationes omnes natura referuntur'.
- n.3. ' Artes vero, ac doctrinae omnes quid nisi immensam rerum varietatem (quae ab optimo, maximoque Deo incredibili sapientia conditae sunt, et effectae) intuendo, et admirando persequentur? Omnis igitur labor, industria, contentio, dignitas, honor literarum, doctrinarumque omnium ad summae illius bonitatis, et aeternae potentiae maiestatem laude, iustitia, pietate complectendam adhortatur!; 'radiorum illorum micantes igniculos' and 'animis nostris igniculos divinitus insitos'.
- 65.n.2. 'Sequitur altera Naturae significatio. Primum insitum unicuique incompositum per se ipsum'; ' Sequitur tertia significatio Naturae, forma et species, quam dicimus definiendo quid est'.
- n.3. ' essentia rerum natura constantium'.
- 67.n.1. 'Quid inquam haec mundi principia, nonne praepotentis Dei, id est authoris, et parentis sui bonitatem, prudentiam, sapientiam in his umbris ostentant, et quanta significatione possunt, praedicant?'
- n.2. ' nec aliud inter naturam et artem interest, quam inter exemplar verum, et imitatum imaginem'.
- n.3. ' Haec certa naturae observatio est: a qua nunquam discedere doctrina, sed tanquam deum sequi debet. Egrege enim munere suo perfuncta videbitur, si naturae prudentiam poterit imitari'.
- 68.n.1. ' monitiones illas naturae praestantibus ingeniis insitas' and ' monitiones illas humanis ingeniis insitas, atque ingenitas'.
- n.3. ' Rhetorica philosophiaque tota, magna ex parte naturalis est'.
- n.4. ' ut magis naturae liberalitatem erga homines admirare, agrestes, et imperitos vinitores, qui artem disserendi ne auditione quidem, eamque ullam esse noverint, eosque de consequentis anni fertilitate, atque ubertate interroga, quanta vini copia sit futura, tum ex eorum ingeniis veluti speculis imago naturae resultabit'.
- 69.n.3. ' Nec aliud hic ars est, quam naturae imago et pictura'.
- n.5. ' ars dialectica est imago naturalis dialecticae'.
- 70.n.1. ' parentis naturae consilia' (1543, p.65v) and 'Dei optimi maximi consilia' (1548, p.470).

- 70.n.2. ' Dei, id est authoris et parentis sui' and ' rerum omnium parentis Dei'.
- n.3. ' 'quae ratio aeterna in singularibus hominum mentibus divinitus insita est, atque impressa'.
- 71.n.2. ' animos liberali ingenuaque eruditione praeditos'.
- n.3. ' homines patrio quodam sermone esse praeditos, quo non solum sensa mentis exprimerent, sed exclamando, aversando, communicando, simulando, varios affectus varie promerent'.
- n.4. ' Deus enim celeres ingeniorum motus ingeneravit nobis, qui sunt ad omnem cogitationem mentis, prudentiamque rationis explicandam, et ornandam uberes, et copiosi: quos cum doctrinae cognitio, et assiduus meditationis labor confirmavit, praeclarum atque eximium eloquentiae munus existit'.
- 72.n.1. ' Quod haec professio nullam habeat definitam regionem, cuius terminis septa teneatur, sed in immenso rerum omnium, atque artium campo libere vagari, consistereque possit...cum reliquis artibus scientiam et cognitionem rerum concesserit, sibi ornandae atque illuminandae orationis laudem vendicabit.'
- n.2. ' Rhetoricae autem artis partes, naturae partibus respondent: quarum una versatur in laude verborum singulorum, altera coniunctorum'.
- n.3. ' Vulgus poëtas nasci arbitratur et mentis furore ad egregia carmina fundendum excitari. At impetus iste naturalis communis est omnium virtutum omniumque disciplinarum, in quibus excellet nemo, nisi qui naturae indole atque bonitate impellitur, vel potius rapietur'.
- 73.n.3. ' Nascuntur in pratis herbae sua sponte: sed in aliis aliae foecundiores et uberiores. Sic existimandum est artium semina hominum mentibus a natura ingerari, sed in aliis alia abundantius'.
- n.4. ' quanvis in aliis magis, in aliis minus naturales illae dotes eluceant'.
- 74.n.1. ' Natura nanque disserendi principium instituit, institutum doctrina propriis, et congruentibus consiliis instruit, instructum ab arte exercitatio in opus educit, atque absolvit'.
- n.2. ' ideoque simul atque natus homo est, ad rationis usum proprio quodam naturae studio praestantiore alius, atque ardentiore: alius tardiore, atque hebetiore rapitur'.
- n.3. ' cum varia sint nobis auditorum ingenia'.

- 75.n.1. ' Hi sunt tres libri ad omnis disciplinae fructum, laudemque necessarii: quorum primum aeternis characteribus in animis nostris Deus optimus, maximus imprimit. Secundum naturae diligens obseuator imitatis notulis ad aeternarum illarum notarum exemplar effingit: tertium manus, linguaque (quantum, quamque copiosum volunt) amplectuntur'; ' Naturalis autem dialectica, id est, ingenium, ratio, mens, imago parentis omnium rerum Dei'; and ' Omnium enim animae potentiarum et facultatum, nulla optabilior est ratione, cuius ars est logica: Caeterae artes faciunt animal grammaticum, arithmeticum, geometricum: at logica facit logicum, id est hominem'; ' Dialecticam, id est rationis naturalis artem, quamquam breviter et paucis annis in schola meditatam et exercitatem, tota vita tamen in rebus omnibus meditemur et exercemus'.
- 76.n.1. ' Nullum instrumentum, nulla ars in seipso exercetur: grammatica in poëtis, et oratoribus explicandis, in scribendo proprie, et loquendo exercetur. Geometria non est inventa, ut se vel suas praeceptiones, sed ut res omnes, longas, latas, altas, metiretur'.
- n.2. ' Finis artium non est subtilitas, sed vera solidaque utilitas'.
- n.4. ' scholarum dialecticarum fundamentum feci, omninoque parentem non solum Logicae, sed omnis disciplinae, verum naturalemque in veris et naturalibus exemplis usum statui'.
- 77.n.2. ' Nec enim logicus est, qui logica praecepta didicit'; ' illa enim est scientia universalis'; ' logicus est, qui logicam artem in explicandis et retexendis poetarum, oratorum, philosophorum, argumento, enuntiato, syllogismo, methodo adhibuit: qui logicas eorum virtutes multa et assidua meditatione, scriptione, dictione observavit, excoluit: qui seipsum omnibus laborum et studiorum generibus diu multumque in his exercuit'.
- 78.n.1. ' ille sudor est, quem immortales dii virtuti praeposuerunt, illa est aspera, difficilis, ardua via, ad cuius summum cum perveneris, faciles tibi res succedant'.
- n.2. ' Nulla enim natura tam firma, constansque est: quin cognitione sui et virium suarum descriptione firmior et constantior: nulla tam languida, et abiecta: quin adiumento artis acrior, et alacrior effici possit'.
- 79.n.1. ' animos hominum immortales e fonte divinitatis delibatos'.
- 81.n.1. ' non solum de praeceptis interrogantur, sed difficillimo genere exemplorum et explicandorum et formandorum, quid in arte valeant, tentantur et probantur: nec artificis nomine digni iudicantur, nisi difficillimum quodque et gravissimum artis, non dico praeceptum memoriter recitare, sed opus in promptu facere atque exhibere valeant'.

- 81.n.3. ' Doctrinae disserendi proprium est omnes res explicandi, atque interpretandi instrumentum'.
- 88.n.1. ' Nullius insignis authoris inventionem, dispositionemve suis praeceptis explicant: nec idcirco virtutes eius vel assequi, vel imitari curant'.
- 89.n.1. ' Eandem rationem Brutinae quaestiones deinde consecutae sunt: in quibus Ciceronis et virtutes, quae pueris essent imitandae, sine simulatione laudavi, et vitia quae declinanda viderentur, sine dissimulatione notavi et reprehendi'.
- n.2. ' Grammatica nobis ex observatione Ciceronis et Virgilii facta est, et ad eos intelligendos est referenda, ut eorum similes efficiamur'.
- n.5. ' providendum diligenter erit, quem imitemur: cuius similes esse velimus'.
- n.6. ' artis usum in propositis exemplis cernamus, deinde similia his effingamus'.
- n.7. ' eorum similes efficeremus, quorum vestigia et exempla sectaremur et imitaremur'.
- 90.n.1. ' quam maxime ad veritatem, et similitudinis expressionem accommodate'.
- n.2. ' cum ex alienis virtutibus (ut accidit in sole ambulantes) colorari nos sentiemus'.
- n.3. ' licet res alias meditentur et agant, tamen interea imprudentes et inscientes colorantur: ita nos in disertis et eloquentibus authoribus, licet artificium tantum logicum de industria consectantes, attamen coniunctus et alligatus orationis ornatus, vel imprudentes sequetur'.
- n.4. ' quaestionem liberam sumit, et industria propria explicabit, omnes inventionis artes excitabit'.
- 91.n.1. ' Attamen ideae huius Caesarianae exemplar adhuc nemo (cuius quidem scripta legerim) sibi ad imitandum proposuit, ne tu munus nostrum tanquam tralatitium despicias'.
- n.3. ' Opificum industriam in Porphyrio cum philosophorum nostrorum inertia comparavi'.
- 92.n.2. ' Itaque de Ciceronis imitatione, infinita fere volumina ab Italis, Gallis, Germanis conscripta quotidie legimus'.

- 93.n.1. ' Graecae, inquam, literae Tullio externae fuerunt, familiares autem et domesticae, Latinae: Francis Graecae pariter ac Latinae peregrinae sunt, Francicae vero populares et vernaculae: Graecis igitur et Latinis literis Ciceronianus noster prius erudiatur'.
- n.2. ' Europae Christianae sola communis est haec lingua'.
- n.4. ' ditare patriam, et illustrare'.
- n.5. ' Sic Atticos Latine imitatus est Cicero, sic Graecos et Latinos Francice imitari possumus'.
- 94.n.1. ' nullam esse linguam tam inopem tamque barbaram, quam diligentia ditari et excoli non possit. Itaque Ciceronianus noster, Francus, Italus, Hispanus, aut cuiusvis gentis alumnus, vestigia Ciceronis ingressus, de patria facundia nunquam desperabit: Graeciae et Italiae opimioribus illis spoliis patriam suam decorabit et amplificabit: ornamenta ipse nova pariet: Latine et Graece declamabit initio saepius: quia linguae illae modo sunt uberiores, pluraque afferunt ornamenta similiter dicendi'.
- n.2. ' satis se sapientes existimarunt, si hominis illius inventa non dico iudicio, et usu consequi, sed superstitiose admirari, et velut oracula dei cuiusdam maximis, et occultissimis ceremoniis nobis (agrestibus videlicet et prophanis) interpretari possent'.
- 95.n.1. ' nec assequi tantum, sed alicubi vincere ac superare contendimus'.
- n.3. ' conandum aliquid supra eos, quos imitamur'.
- 96.n.2. ' Quamobrem summa diligentia, ut Apelles Alexandrum picturus, omnes eius partes, partiumque proprietates intueretur'; ' in naturae simillimam viam, rationemque concludet: descriptaque disserentibus ad imitandum proponet'.
- 97.n.1. ' in naturae simillimam tabulam, imaginemque concludet'.
- n.2. ' ut hoc artificioso quasi speculo natura formae suae dignitatem perspicere, et si qua macula sit aspersa, delere, atque eluere possit'; ' in qua pingenda, ut certius progrediamur, exemplar ipsum vivum ante oculos semper habeamus'; ' at illic viva sunt omnia, hic picta duntaxat, et imitata'.
- n.3. ' artes, quarum rerum tanquam tabulae sint et imagines'.
- 98.n.1. ' Ars enim, ars inquam, vel rectissima, vel mille clamoribus intelligentiae ac memoriae impressa et infixata, tantum pictura est naturae et usus'.
- 99.n.2. ' Quis igitur artem dialecticam scribit, statuatur sibi ante oculos naturalis illius, et humanae rationis exemplar imitandum'.

- 99.n.3. ' genesis ad effectiorem similitudinem, vel etiam praestantiorum operum adhibenda est, ut docet Analyticus magister'.
- n.4. ' quae ἀναλύει , retextit, et ad artis legem resolvit et expendit'.
- 100.n.2. ' a capite retexit opus universum, quaestionem cernit'.
- n.3. ' retexta quaedam ars est'.
- n.5. ' interpretatio'; ' analysis'.
- n.6. ' perspicuendae'; ' retexendae'.
- n.7. ' logicus est, qui logicam artem in explicandis et retexendis poetarum, oratorum, philosophorum, argumento, enuntiato, syllogismo, methodo adhibuit'.
- 101.n.1. ' per seipsum et suo Marte nitendo conandoque, suum aliquid et proprium faciat'.
- n.2. ' Haec exercitatio, Genesis a nobis appellatur, quia novum gignat opus artis et efficiat'.
- 102.n.1. ' agnoscere in spectatis exemplis artem, et agnitam imitari'.
- n.3. ' Analysis denique a crassissimis maximeque compositis descendat ad simplicia'.
- 104.n.2. ' Scribis enim, doctissime Leoviti, e magna illa Syderum conjunctione, unde et purioris religionis aureum saeculum brevi reditum vaticinans, artes quoque plurimas, quae adhuc abditae latuerant, emersuras, resque maximas modico impendio perfectum absolutumque iri: adeo solertia et expedita ingenia his temporibus existent'.
- n.3. ' Faxit Deus optimus maximus ut haec omnia ad ipsius gloriam, ad Ecclesiae et Reipublicae salutem referantur'.
- 105.n.1. ' Redeatur ad Apostolorum saeculum, Coena sic administretur, ut ab illis administrata est, dissidii causa nulla supererit: tempora religionis illa vere aurea fuerunt, nostra autem vix ferrea dicere possumus'.
- n.3. ' Quae cum ita sint mathesis intelligitur esse non solum belli, sed pacis comes et administra'.
- n.5. ' sic a doctis hominibus castigati et emendati poetae, historici, oratores, georgici, iurisconsulti, sacri etiam Vates'.
- 106.n.1. ' sed magna suavitate animi ac voluptate, pene una cum lacte nutricis hauriremus'.

- 106.n.2. ' At Bardorum nostrorum hymnos et poëmata ut intelligentia mentis, ut vocis sonus a natura tribueretur, sic cum laetitia sine labore cantaremus'.
- 107.n.2. ' ut enim avium teneri foetus cum discunt egredi, et circumvolare nidos, matres suas in exemplum tuentur, deinde probatis viribus per se toto coelo liberius vagantur'; ' nostro ingenio, et iudicio'.
- n.3. ' ut cum omissa prioris imitationis consuetudine, studium adiunget ad aliquid suo iudicio commentandum, et limandum. genus inducat dicendi et singulare, et suum: ut ita sui authoris stylum representet, ut quamvis non sit omnino similis, tamen in dissimilitudine laudem mereatur'.
- 108.n.1. ' Dicuntur etiam Pythagorei numeroῦν μίμησι, imitatione, philosophiam totam explicasse'; ' μέθεξις vero sumpsit a Pythagoreis, sed mutavit nomen: quia illi μίμησιν dicebant de numeris, quod Plato μέθεξις de ideis dixit'.
- 109.n.2. ' His muneribus placari, his sacrificiis propitiari, hoc cultu coli, hac adoratione adorare Deus cupit: atque hi primarii sunt colores ad illam primi hominis Deo similis imaginem renovandam'.
- n.3. ' Homo enim (quod tam saepe repeto) creatus est ad imaginem Dei, a qua per peccatum prolapsus iubetur eam recuperare. 3.Coloss.10. Induistis novum hominem, qui revocatur ad agnitionem iuxta imaginem eius, qui condidit illum. Aberrare igitur ab hac imagine peccare est, si recte accipimus εἰμαρτίναν ἔπὶ τοῦ εἰμαρτίνεῖν . Et Tertullianus ait, ad imaginem Dei esse illos, qui habent eosdem sensus et motus, quos habet dominus. Et philosophis quibusdam peccare est perfectae naturae non congruenter et convenienter vivere. Itaque quoties ab illa perfecta natura disceditur, disceditur ab imagine Dei; ideoque peccatur'.
- 110.n.1. ' coelestium imitatione conversionum cognatas humanae mentis conversiones, vagas et errantes, componit'.
- n.2. ' naturae vires imitetur'.
- n.3. ' cuius in sermonibus naturalibus impressa quaedam non sit imago'.
- n.4. ' imago respondeat exemplari'.
- n.5. ' naturalis usu, verae artis archetypus'.
- n.6. ' ad oratoriae veritatis, et pulchritudinis Ideam, similitudinemque descriptio artis dirigenda est, et specimen ipsum naturae ex optima quaque natura capiendum'.
- 113.n.1. ' Usus artis exigit ut praecepta perspicue et succinte doceantur'.

- 114.n.1. ' Neque tamen existimari volo omnem disputationem vitiosam, quia nullum fere vocabulum sit non ambiguum'.
- n.2. ' nullus est in physicis decretis locus cui non possit ad aliquem gratioris et humanioris illustrationis fructum poeta vel orator adiungi'.
- n.3. ' ex tanta praestantium authorum copia clarissimos quosque et philosophiae huius affines et propinquos adiungimus'.
- 115.n.1. ' O coelestis sancte pater, sempiterni, beatissimique luminis princeps, atque author qui (non modo chaos ac sempiternas eius tenebras mundo depulisti sed etiam) perpetuis ignibus clarissimam illam mundi lampadem sole, luna, caeterisque syderibus accendisti; (imo vero, qui longe clariorem et illustriorem vultus tui lumen in animis nostris ad res omnes inveniendum, iudicandum, explanandum, illuminasti): ne patiare diutius hominum mentes lumine illo tuo divino privatas (Aristotelicis tenebris) errare'.
- 116.n.1. ' pacem, ac veniam peto, precorque ut imaginem divini, coelestisque luminis (quod in animis nostris inspirasti, atque accendisti) a miseris tenebris eripi, liberarique patiare'.
- n.3. ' aeternis characteribus in animis nostris Deus optimus, maximus imprimit. Secundum naturae diligens observator imitatis notulis ad aeternarum illarum notarum exemplar effingit: ' Naturalis autem dialectica, id est, ingenium, ratio, mens, imago parentis omnium rerum Dei, lux denique beatae illius, et aeternae lucis aemula, hominis propria est, cum eoque nascitur'.
- n.4. ' O miseram dialecticam, in quorum latronum manus incidisti? tu eras homini concessa, ut occulta investigares, illustrares obscura, at ecce prompta occultas, obscuras illustra'.
- 117.n.1. ' Frustra enim rationis lumine a Deo optimo donati, dotatique essemus, frustra luminis eius vim ac potestatem praeceptis interpretaremur nisi exerceamus'.
- n.2. ' Lumen hoc universum, generale, totum nullis finibus terminatur, omnia quae possunt ab hominibus intelligi, luminis huius auxilio cognoscuntur et intelliguntur. Hoc logicum et dialecticum lumen homini cognatum et naturale: et cum de Logica naturali moneo, de hominis naturali cognatoque lumine moneo'.
- n.4. ' ut tandem cum divini solis umbram quandam in his universalibus exemplis deprehenderimus: operaque Dei, divinarumque operum ordinem, symmetriam, descriptionem, e mathematicis, logica mente contemplati fuerimus, tum ad eum ipsum clarissimum solem contemplandum, vitaeque integritate imitandum convertamur'.

- 118.n.1. ' cuius non solum lumine colluceant, et illustrentur, sed calore, motuque excitentur, vivant, augeantur, florescant, tandemque gratissimos homini, et honestissimos fructus adferant'.
- n.3. ' Imo vero lux rationis luce solis longe clarior et illustrior. Lux solis mundum duntaxat istum corporeum illustrat: lux rationis etiam supra mundum per illas supra mundanae infinitatis regiones pervagatur: neque mortalia tantum corpora, sed mentes aeternas et divinas intuetur'.
- 119.n.1. ' Cum igitur hoc modo dialectica animum ab hisce crassis sensuum umbris avocaverit, omnesque philosophiae regiones peragraverit, in eis suo quibusque ordine descriptis ideas illius sempiternae veritatis (quas in obscuris umbris occultas, et reconditas vix per involucra conspiciendi potestas fuit) clarissimas demonstrabit'.
- 120.n.1. ' huc artes omnes traducendae sunt, et convertendae ut illum ipsum veritatis fulgorem cuius umbras, et imagines erant persecutae, summo pietatis ardore contemplantur'.
- n.2. ' sunt autem mentes hominum in formarum inversarum cognitione, tanquam noctuae caligantes in solis splendore'.
- 121.n.1. ' Memini me quondam puerum in altissimis Arvernorum montibus rem mirabilem vidisse: Solis et diei serenitas summa erat: e supero illo et sublimi loco inferne patentes campos, arbores virentes, interfluentes rivos, summa animi voluptate conspiciebam: repente nubes in medio monte coorta, camporum, arborum, rivorum conspectum illum obscuritate sustulit, cum superne tamen sol clarissimus illucesceret: Miratus vero sum montis altitudinem, cuius vertex, nubes et aeris tempestates superaret: et spectaculo illo valde delectatus sum. Simile quippiam iam nostris animis concipi cupio, ut sint nobis omnes argumentorum, propositionum, syllogismorum, methodorum modi, veluti in campo, sic in opere proposito sole definitionum, partitionum, exemplorum aspectabiles et clari: quod in Dialectica nostra ex Aristotelicae philosophiae et materia et forma efficere contendimus: tum si interveniat obscuritatis nubes aliqua, attamen intelligemus istam obscuritatem Dialecticae non esse, sicuti neque illic camporum et arborum, sed interpositarum nubium: quibus sublatis cum pristina lux solis, quae adempta fuerat, redierit, clari et illustres aspiciantur: Etenim tota Logica, quae Analyticis continetur, per se facillima est et clarissima, sed nubibus variis difficilis et obscura redditur. Solem igitur inducamus et perpetuo comparemus: in illo summo claritatis vertice consistamus'.
- 123.n.1. ' obscuritate dimota, eadem distincte docebimus et aperte'.
- n.2. ' disserendo enim, et ratione utendo nihil tam perturbatum, quod non illustretur: nihil tam obscurum quod non declaretur'.

- 123.n.4. ' Methodus, quod usus est, est lux universi illius ordinis, qua res ita dispositae docentur apertius, et facilius percipiuntur'.
- n.6. ' Haec prima sunt tum naturalis, tum artificiosi iudicii lumina ex sese clara, perspicuaque. Nihil enim quicquam natura dedit humano iudicio clarius, et apertius, quo probari possint'.
- 124.n.2. ' quinetiam hac ratione facillime phantasias animo concipiet: per quas imagines rerum absentium ita subiiciet animo: ut cernere oculis, ac praesentes habere videatur'.
- n.3. ' Hoc aureum et caeleste Dei omnipotentis donum amemus et colamus: hoc lumen est omnibus (quae toto caelo nitent) sideribus longe clarius, longe divinius: hoc lumine, peritorum, imperitorum, senum, virorum, mulierum, omnis denique aetatis et sexuum conclusiones confirmantur'.
- n.4. ' non ad nugatorias de praeceptiunculis sophisticis altercationes, sed ad usum prudentiae, ad humanitatis subsidium, ad vitae auxilium referamus'.
- 125.n.1. ' sapientiam dicere debuit suapte natura omnium artium clarissima et illustrissima esse'; ' illustriore argumento'.
- n.2. ' Nulla enim philosophiae sententia illustris fere est, cuius contradictionem aliquam in Aristotele non reperias'.
- n.3. ' His igitur illustribus argumentis Christus utitur ad caecos hominum sensus illuminandum.'
- n.4. ' tam enim fuerit illud solidum, tam stabile, tam fixum, tam prorsus immutabile iudicium, ut facilius esse credam, soli lumen, quam homini sic affirmatam assensionem eripere'.
- n.5. ' propter vocis et actionis lumen et evidentiam'.
- 126.n.1. ' Obscuritas alia doctrinae est, alia doctoris. Potest enim rerum natura, quae praeceptis traditur sic occulta esse ac recondita, ut facilis effici aegre possit: potest contra doctoris esse culpa, neque perspicuo sermonis genere loquentis, neque distincta et facili via procedentis: Colores aliis sunt obscuriores vel illustriores: sed tamen sunt omnes certo situ certaue luce visibiles'.
- n.5. ' sic earum singularem quamque institutionem minime omnium scrupulosam scholasticis quaestionibus aut spinosam, sed popularem toto expositionis tractationisque cursu splendidam, et illustrem esse cupio'.
- 127.n.2. ' non ut inde ulla religionis vel autoritas vel approbatio repetatur, sed ut planum sit, Christianam Theologiam non adeo abstrusam esse, vel ab hominum sensibus remotam, quin naturali quadam luce populis omnibus illucescat, hominesque ideo humanitas ipsa ad divina studia capessendum invitet, atque alliciat'.

- 127.n.3. ' Quapropter antiquam lucem novis eiusmodi tenebris longissime reiectis revocandam censeo'; ' Itaque qui primus hanc methodum ad Theologiae informationem attulerit, accendet lumen singulare ad omnes Theologiae partes clare et perspicue pervidendum'.
- 128.n.2. ' Optica enim in visu nil nisi geometria est in luce, umbra, colore, visus ipsius natura et facultate, veritate, hallucinatione, e situ, motu, numero, quantitate, figura, seu visus ipse rectus seu speculorum reflexione, seu diversorum densitate et raritate, mediorum refractione: unde pictoribus non solum lumen et umbra, sed medius inter utrumque splendor qui propterea tonus appellatur'.
- 135.n.2. ' consummatam veritatem'.
- 136.n.1. ' rem dubiam, quasi fluxam, et inconstantem materiam'.
- 139.n.1. ' augendo enim saepe res ipsa naturalem modum excedit: neque tamen mendacio fallere vult: ideoque ignoscitur orationi'.
- n.2. ' cum in his rebus cura verborum deroget affectibus fidem, et ubicumque ars ostentatur, veritas abesse videatur'.
- 140.n.1. ' concio populi capit omnem splendorem orationis, verisimilitudine contenta est'.
- n.2. ' certas et firmas notas, et verisimiles coniecturas infinitas'.
- n.3. ' captiunculam aliquam sophisticam'.
142. n.1. ' ad exemplar illud viventis in homine veritatis (ne ab Apelle nostro recedamus)'.
- n.2. ' at illic viva sunt omnia, hic picta duntaxat, et imitata'.
- n.3. ' omniumque artium veritas prius in natura vixit, quam ulla praecepta cogitarentur'.
- n.5. ' ad veritatem, et similitudinis expressionem accommodate'.
- n.6. ' ad oratoriae veritatis, et pulchritudinis Ideam, similitudinemque'.
143. n.1. ' earum vivum, et archetypum exemplar'.
- n.3. ' rem ante oculos constituat'.
- n.6. ' Illa vero oculorum multo acriora, quae ponunt pene in conspectu animi, quae cernere et videre non possumus'.

- 144.n.3. ' Rhetores ῥητοποιῶν et μίμησιν appellant, cum aliena dicta imitando repraesentamus'.
- n.4. ' denique vivam quandum eloquentiae imaginem Apelles hic noster tibi repraesentare voluit, quo facilius praestantiam in dicendo hominum rhetoricas virtutes et intelligeres et intellectas imitando et commentando tibi comparares'.
- n.5. ' vocis et gestus exempla (quae in scriptis libris mortua sunt) voce gestuque nos ipsi fingimus, et quantum licet, exprimimus'.
- n.6. ' ut non solum discipulis bene dicendi artem ex pictis praeceptis ostendant, sed multo magis usum vivis exemplis aperiant'.
- 146.n.1. ' quoniam illis voluptatis, aut utilitatis certae studium, non veritatis explicandae propositum erat'.
- n.3. ' selige de tot viventibus hominum millibus, qui naturae solertia, iudicioque praestent: quales Homerus Nestorem saepe atque Ulyssem fingit'; 'Pluto divitiarum deus fingitur a poetis apud inferos regnare'.
- 147.n.1. ' omnium etiam partium particulas ex eodem fonte naturae derivatas expresserit: nihil autem de suo comminiscatur nihil fingat, nihil somniando mentiatur'.
- n.2. ' talem oratorem fingam et informabo, qualis nunquam fuit'.
- n.3. ' Facetiae latius in oratione funduntur: ut cum ridicule describuntur hominum mores, atque ita effinguntur, ut quales sint, intelligantur'.
- 148.n.1. ' Atqui, inquam, tempus tanquam falcarius quidam, sua falce omnia demetens a poetis fingitur. Sed metaphoris poeticeis illud est condonandum: solidae et seriae acroasi non idem permittendum'.
- n.2. ' Quapropter oratores et poetae in rebus popularibus hanc digressionis licentiam sibi permittunt: imo cum apte ad reficiendos audientium vel legentium animos fiat, laudis et virtutis loco ducunt. Ergo quod in accurato genere docendi vitiosum fuerit, id aliquando fuerit in populari laudabile'.
- n.3. ' poetae numeris cum sint astrictiores, reliquis tamen generibus dicendi licenter utuntur et libere'.
- 149.n.2. ' Horum faciendorum apud nos in poetis licentia maior est, ut non solum cum patriae voces desint, verumetiam cum suppeditant, usurpentur'.
- n.3. ' Ex his autem omnibus quaedam sunt licentia carminis quam solutae orationis liberiora... quaedam ad utrumque dicendi genus promiscue pertinent'.

- 149.n.4. ' habent multas in poëmate phrases, quas oratio soluta repudiat: eoque audacius utuntur omnibus verborum singulorum, et coniunctorum ornamentis, quo maiorem sibi proponunt in scribendo cantus, et aurium voluptatem'.
- n.6. ' poëtae (ut in proverbio est) multa mentiuntur!.
- 150.n.1. ' Scriptura non dicit, Omnis homo atheus, vel idolatra, vel in Dei nomen blasphemus, vel homicida, vel adulter, vel appetens alieni: sed aperte dicit Psalm.116.11. Omnis homo mendax. Et mendacium homini prima a serpente ad omnem nequitiam fenestra fuit. Atque haec nimirum naturalis est hominum servitus, quam philosophis modo quodam perceptam diximus. Itaque cum primus homo verax logicus a Deo factus esset, peccato suo in mendacem sophistam degeneravit, et pro logica sophisticam posteritati haereditatem reliquit'.
- n.2 ' Neque verum est, oratorem mentiendi artificem esse, cum eloquentia tanquam prophetia in sacris literis honoretur'.
- 152.n.2. ' Nec enim confictam pro ingenio arbitrio aliquam militiae disciplinam profitero: sed militam Caesaris ex ipsius rebus gestis excerptam definite et partite commemoro'.
- n.3. ' Itaque cum de his rebus cogitur tandem per vos aliquid audire, ex terris novis confictas fabulas se putat audire: et cum dico artium, sicuti moralium virtutum, semina nostris animis a natura insita et ingenerata esse, hominesque natura esse Grammaticos, Oratores, Philosophos, perinde dici putat, ac si dicerem esse alatos, monopodas, hippocentauros'; and ' philosophis et oratoribus, qui locis et imaginibus artem quandam memoriae confinxerunt'.
- 153.n.1. ' Virgilianis igitur et Ciceronianis, id est, humanis et popularibus exemplis, idem facientibus potius, quam illis abecedariis figmentis utar. Quorsum, inquit accusator? Nonne logicae artis usus, qui primo in fictis literarum exemplis demonstratus est, melius in Ethica et Physica Arist. doctrina demonstrabitur?'
- n.2. ' Artificiosum, quod ab Apelle pictum, a Lysippo fictum, a Cyro aedificatum, aut ab aliquo artifice compositum sit, ut tabulae, statuae, aedificia, porticus, templa, armamentaria'.
- 154.n.1. ' astrolgiam iam a nobis exoptatam non e fictis hypothesisibus, sed ex ipsa astrorum veritate ac natura...'
- n.2. ' infami et probrosa fictione'.
- 155.n.1. ' Lex historiae vetat ne qua gratiae, ne qua simultatis in historia suspitio fit'.
- n.2. ' Facilitas et voluptas in iis oratoriis et poëticis fabulis longe maior erit'.

- 155.n.4. ' fabula siquidem poëtica, ut sapientia, constat e rebus admirandis'.
- 156.n.2. ' poëtica fabula est, imo ne poëtica quidem, cum verisimile nihil habeat'.
- n.3. ' chimericum agitatae mentis insomnium est sine materia, sine forma, sine exemplo'.
- n.4. ' fanatico isto..deliramento'.
- n.5. ' Quam enim multa falsa et impia tradit Aristoteles...qui hominis felicitatem et ab homine inchoari, et in homine terminari, sicut alia permulta tam nefarie, tanque impie fabulatur?'
- 157.n.1. ' fabulosa sunt, inventaque ad persuasionem vulgi, ad usum legum, ad humanae vitae utilitatem. Haec aristoteleae theologiae, de numero deorum philosophia est'.
- n.2. ' fabulosa et puerilia esse reliqua'.
- n.3. ' Mosem tanquam fabulatorem Aegyptium irrideri'.
- n.4. ' a philosopho fabulam non oportuisse confingi quoniam nullum fingendi genus, veri professoribus conveniret'.
- 162.n.1. ' At in logico Organo neminem logicae doctorem citavit, imo nominatim sese artis universae et inventae et perfectae authorem praedicavit'.
- n.2. ' inventores et authores'.
- n.3. ' Plato (cuius ore loquitur Socrates) veterum inventa mirifice amplexatus diligenter exercuit, docuit etiam sapienter, et copiose auxit'.
- n.4. ' Platonem secutus Aristoteles incredibili labore, et diuturno sagacis observationis studio non descriptas adhuc inventionis, nec inventas ratiocinationis artes, tanquam abditas in occultis antris pretioso aurivenas indagavit, eruit, protulit: sed protulit tantum, numum non percussit'.
- 163.n.1. ' Cum multa praeclare (auditores) a maioribus nostris ad humanae vitae usum atque dignitatem sint inventa ac posteritati relictas'.
- n.2. ' Circuli quidem quadraturam non invenit, sed cum quadraret lunulam, falso arbitratus est ex hac circulum quadrari'; ' multa(que) in Geometria reperta'.

- 163.n.3. ' Quid igitur Euclides? quid in mathematicis invenit? Elementa, inquit Proclus, collegit, in iisque pleraque Eudoxi composuit, pleraque Theaeteti perfecit, aliaque a veteribus negligentius demonstrata, demonstrationibus iis affirmavit, quae neque refelli, neque redargui possint'; and ' expositio operis et exornatio'.
- 164.n.4. ' Unus est Romae fluvius, Tyberis, ad varios usus accommodatus, ad potandum, lavandum, irrigandum, purgandum, restinguendum, vehendum: nec singuli rivuli ad singulas eiusmodi commoditates dirimuntur, sed universum flumen sua natura tale est, ut singulis usquequaque adhibeatur: ita est inventionis doctrina per se tota communis ad usus omnium quaestionum'.
- 167.n.2. ' doctrina inveniendi argumenti, vel medii'.
- 168.n.1. ' Hinc ortae sunt otiosorum et inertium hominum quaestiones, quomodo differant et locus et argumentum: quasi argumentum non esset ipse locus: et artis vocabula non significarent aliquando artem ipsam, aliquando res artibus propositas: ut nomen aliquando significet nomen, id est partem orationis: aliquando rem ipsam illi parti propositam: ut Cicero, Cato: sic argumentum indicat aliquando artem argumenti, aliquando rem ipsam, quae arguit et probat. At vero quanto simplicius erat inventionem (si hoc nomine priorem Dialecticae partem placet appellare) definire artem earum rerum, quae dici de quaestione possent? quae omnes quoniam probarent et arguerent rem dubiam, argumenta dicerentur: tum argumentorum genera describerentur: loci nullum nomen quasi proprium interponeretur'.
- n.4. ' et quidem contenderent, non verbis tantum et argumentis, sed sanguine, caede, civili prope discordia et seditione'.
- 169.n.1. ' Inventio praestat argumentum, id est animam quaestioni caduco tanquam corpori: syllogismus argumentum cum quaestione, id est animam cum corpore coniungit et connectit'.
- n.2. ' Est autem id quo quaestio tractatur, atque exponitur argumentum nominatum: quod arguat, id est probet rem, ac demonstret: sic Virgilius, Degeneres animos timor arguit. Cuius inveniendi modi qui naturae sunt, eosdem artis esse necesse est. Itaque cum animis disputando naturaliter incidat in earum rerum de quibus agitur, causas, effecta, subiecta, adiuncta, dissentanea, caeteraque ab illis orta, pars haec artis iisdem vestigiis insistet, et quaestionis utramque partem maiorem, et minorem sic intueri iubebit: ut causas, effecta, omniaque illa naturae consilia promantur'.
- n.3. ' Atque simplicis argumenti principes sunt partes: Causae, eventa, consentanea, dissentanea. Sed in causis finis, efficiens, forma materia: in dissentaneis quoque contraria, repugnantia, disparata: et in contrariis adversa, privantia, relata numerantur. Hae sunt itaque principes simplicis argumenti formae: unde consequentia, comparata, divisio, definitio. Genus enim speciei causam, species generis effectum significat. Caetera ex omnibus sigillatim sumi possunt. Coniunctum est in testimoniis deorum et hominum, atque in enunciationum pugna'.

- 170.n.1. ' principes aliae, aliae a principibus ortae'; ' Comparata sunt ea quae inter se conferentur, ideoque modo duplici: collatio enim aut est qualitatis, aut quantitatis: qualitas est habitus comparatarum rerum: quantitas vis, et quasi potestas quaedam'; 'ut angeli, ita homines ad rationis usum creati'; 'homo dialectica velut armatus'; ' homo deus quidam est, quid mirum si dialecticus?'; ' homo orator est, cur non et dialecticus?'; ' bestiis inest quaedam vis dialecticae rationis, hominibus non inest?'.
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- 171.n.2. ' ad inveniendam rei dubiae fidem'; ' sed et ipso orationis genere, quod quo simplicius, constantius, sanctius erit: tanto plus habebit in docendo persuasionis, ac fidei'.
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- n.3. ' Argumentum est ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliud per aliud, et quae quod est dubium, per id quod dubium non est confirmat'.
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- 172.n.1. ' Hinc omnis copia rerum, et supellex depromenda est. Quare quoniam in hac parte tantum boni est, magnus labor, magnum studium est adhibendum ut inde rerum abundantiam quam amplissimam, et ad omnem disputationem promptissimam facultatem hauriamus'.
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- n.2. ' Imo reliquis etiam philosophici temporis annis tanto copiosius et uberius exercetur, quanto rerum, quae loquendae, dicendae, disputandae sunt, maior est ubertas et copia'.
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- 173.n.3. ' non abutor Platonis, vel Aristotelis, vel Isocratis, vel hominis cuiusquam opinione, vel authoritate: causas rerum summas et primas ab imis fontibus repeto'.
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- 174.n.1. ' brevibusque monitis mirabiles sapientiae fontes aperuisse: unde Vulcani, Minervaeque artificiosam pariter cum igne sapientiam de coelo clepsisse dictus est'.
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- n.3. ' fontes omnium rerum investigandarum definitis spatiis notatos, ac descriptos ostendi: constantissimas iudicandi leges institui, ut hominum nec diligentiam effugere, nec iudicium fallere quicquam possit'.
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- 175.n.1. ' atque omnino artium institutionem potius ex puris naturae fontibus, quam ex turbidis opinionum rivulis haurire'.
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- n.2. ' Theologia autem docet bene vivere, id est, Deo bonorum omnium fonti congruenter et accommodate'.
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- n.5. ' ut ex patefactis eloquentiae fontibus eadem pene promiscue hauriant'.
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- n.6. ' apta rerum inventarum collocatio'.
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- 176.n.6. ' ad eandem naturae matris imitationem'.
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- n.7. ' argumenti nempe cum quaestione firma necessariaque collocatio'.
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- 177.n.2. ' ordinem multorum, et variorum argumentorum cohaerentium inter se, et perpetua velut catena vincitorum'.
- 178.n.1. ' methodus est multorum et variorum, sed ad unum finem tendentium propositorum dispositio: Nomen dispositionis huius fecimus methodum, licet methodus omnem doctrinam et disputationem significet, attamen proprie compendium viae significat'.
- n.2. ' sylvaque tot tantarumque rerum licet amplissima latissimaque, tamen brevibus compendiariisque numerorum notis artificiose comprehenderetur'.
- 179.n.1. ' Rex enim Euclidem aliquando interrogasse fertur, num qua ad Geometriam via magis compendiaria esset quam *Ξτοιχειώδην* ab eo compositae: cui Euclides, Semita, (inquit), o Rex, ad Geometriam regia nulla est. Quo responso videtur significasse viam elementorum a se compositorum esse latam, apertam, simplicem, directam et tanquam militarem, ideoque regiam esse: semitam autem breviorum esse lubricam et ancipitem, neque ideo regiam'.
- n.3. ' Optimus praeceptor viam facilem et brevem in docendo sequi debet'.
- 183.n.2. ' Scribendi, dicendique exercitatio superest: una et eadem monitione compræhensa: sed scriptio natura, et tempore prior est: cuius non alia via est quam rhetores exercendae eloquentiae tradiderunt'.
- n.3. ' quanvis vox ad docendum multo valentior sit scriptura, linguaque sit manu disertior, ut sapienter in Phaedro extremo Socrates disputat....'
- 184.n.1. ' nulla enim orationis tantavis est, ut vel minimam tam beatæ mentis partem possit adumbrare dicendo'.
- 186.n.1. ' hactenus placuit ad istam tractationis methodique speciem tibi rudia quaedam doctrinae Christianae lineamenta ducere, quae tu polito limatoque iudicio polires et limares, vivisque coloribus exprimeres'.
- n.2. ' humilia summis: mediocria temperate: summa graviter exprimere: audientium mentes omnibus modis tractare, conciliare, alienare, placare, commovere, excitare, remittere, quo velis impellere, unde velis deducere'.
- n.3. ' Artes vero, ac doctrinae omnes quid nisi immensam rerum varietatem (quae ab optimo, maximoque Deo incredibili sapientia conditae sunt et effectae) intuendo, et admirando persequuntur?'
- 187.n.1. 'Hac iucunda varietate, et elegantia poëtae saepe, et historici relaxant animos legentium'.

- 187.n.3. ' Quod haec professio nullam habeat definitam regionem, cuius terminis septa teneatur, sed in immenso rerum omnium, atque artium campo libere vagari, consistereque possit: et sive de rebus divinis, sive de humanis dicat, sive de caelo, sive de terra, sive de omni genere naturae, sive de moribus hominum et institutis, sive ad multos, sive ad paucos, cum reliquis artibus scientiam et cognitionem rerum concesserit, sibi ornandae atque illuminandae orationis laudem vendicabit'.
- 188.n.1. ' Quod soli speciei, non omni accidit, ut homini, medicum esse: Quod omni, non soli, ut homini bipedem esse: Et soli et omni et aliquando, ut homini in senectute canescere: Quod soli, omni, semper, ut homini, natum esse ad risum'.
- 189.n.1. ' Mittamus igitur profanas λογισμῶν, et κενόφωνίας, loquamur verba sacrae Scripturae, utamur sermone Spiritus sancti. Verissimus enim est doctor sapientiae, clarissimus rhetor est eloquentiae, verbisque utitur ad id, quod a nobis intelligi necesse sit, perspicuis, significantibus, idoneis'.
- 190.n.1. ' Aptum est verborum continuatio, quae stylum habet ad id quod agimus, accommodatum. Cum autem res oratori subiectae sint aut humiles, aut graves, aut intermediae: oratio quae rebus explicandis adhibetur hanc tripartitam varietatem sequatur necesse est: in qua et si differentia pro rerum momentis, et naturis accipitur, omnibus tamen dicendi generibus hoc commune est: ut ex patefactis eloquentiae fontibus eadem pene promiscue hauriant, sed alias contentius, et splendidius, alias remissius supradictis ornamentis utatur'.
- n.2. ' summis et dilucide'; ' vehemens, plena, copiosa et ad tractandos animos instructa'.
- n.3. ' in omnibus et dictis et factis, in omnibus rerum quotidianarum et nulla arte comprehensarum consiliis ex humana earum rerum prudentia'.
- 191.n.1. ' rhetorica possessionibus ornamentorum suorum contenta'.
- n.2. ' aliquam locupletem et ornatam eloquentiae domum ingressi magnificas eius opes constructas, ac reconditas interpretationis beneficio patefaciamus'.
- n.4. ' hic campus, haec palaestra concessu omnium dabatur ad omnes oratoriae supellectilis opes explicandum et propalam collocandum'.
- 192.n.3. ' Forensis oratio non solum nervos et aculeos habet, sed accuratam, et ornatam verborum supellectilem'.
- 193.n.3. ' inanem quandem verborum profluentiam in te despicimus'.

- 193.n.4. ' ut inde rerum abundantiam quam amplissimam, et ad omnem disputationem promptissimam facultatem hauriamus'.
- 194.n.1. ' non modo ad sublevandam inopiam et paupertatem sui sermonis, verumetiam ad locupletandam copiam, et augendam, dignitatem'.
- n.4. ' Modificatis etiam verbis frequentius utimur quam propriis, idque partim inopia priorum, partim elegantia et ornatu modifierum'.
- n.5. ' ita porro verbis aptus et pressus est, ut nescias utrum res oratione, an verba sententiis illustrentur'.
195. n.2. ' odiosa pueris, ignota populo, a communi sensu remota, a Rhetoricae usu (quem retinere tamen volumus) ab humanitatis usu (quem confirmare Dialectica cupimus) alienissima'.
- n.4. ' eorum magistrorum lingua illi iam domestica et familiaris est'.
- 197.n.3. ' Jura igitur et leges duodecim tabulis Francico sermone Francia describito'.
- n.4. ' tanta est in verbis singulis proprietas, puritas, elegantia: tantus in coniunctis ornatus, tam varia figurarum insignia, ac lumina, tanta in voce iucunditas, in actione dignitas'.
- 198.n.1. ' Singula per se, et separatim quam laudem quodve lumen adferant, coniuncta in perpetuitate, et continuatione orationis quantam in ordine aequabilitatem, in numeris suavitatem, in figuris venustatem habeant, diligentissime spectandasunt'.
- n.2. ' bene autem sonantia (ut caetera lumina) plus laudis habeant, quod sono et iucunditate deliniunt aures ad quarum iudicium accommodate fingenda est oratio'.
- n.3. ' de solis inanum praeceptiuncularum spinis in schola (quasi dialectica ad scholasticas de se duntaxat inventa sit) triennium fere totum clamitant: contemnunt poëtas, removent oratores, omnes elegantis et ornatae disciplinae homines respuunt: iisque philosophiam suam labefactari putant'.
- n.5. ' de nostra disciplina quaeratur, ut falso crimine nos accusates esse constaret, et si quid a nobis humanitus offensum esset, ut nobis non modo non repugnantibus, sed optantibus emendaretur'.
- 199.n.2. ' Itaque quod perspicue homines cum hominibus colloquuntur, quod ornate ac splendide sensa mentis exprimunt...quod iure ac legibus mores conformatos habent et in vita vitae societatem sanctam inter se tuentur, laudandae nobilisque disciplinae beneficium est'.

- 200.n.1. ' Nos enim huius artis et descriptionem et illustrationem, et usum faxit tandem Deus optimus maximus, ut homines intelligant quam differentem ab Aristoteleis ostendamus'; ' Nos (quod illustrationis est) nullum in arte praeceptum ponimus, quod perspicuis insignium hominum testimoniis, et exemplis non explicemus...'; ' Aristotelei praecipunt ad perspicue docendum, exemplis opus esse non obscuris, qualis sunt apud Chaerilum: sed illustribus, qualia sunt apud Homerum'.
- n.2. ' Amo patriam, sicuti debeo, eiusque praeclaras laudes illustrari celebrarique maxime cupio.
- n.3. ' Nos omnes locos definitionibus, partitionibus expositos, insignibus exemplis illustramus et ornamus: quibus et doctrina faciliior, et doctrinae usus promptior efficitur'.
- 201.n.1. ' At Deus Aeterne Maxime, maximas tibi gratias debemus et habemus, quod pro vix plumbeis illis veterum Grammaticorum rivulis, aurea Ciceronis, Virgilii, Demosthenis, Homeri flumina nobis effuderis, et singularem quandam gratiae tuae lucem nostris temporibus accenderis. Maiores et patres nostri, legibus suis id nobis optaverunt, quod tu donasti: nobis in obscura nube indicarunt, quod in clarissima luce collocasti: philosophiae usum et fructum coniuncta Grammaticorum elegantia nitidiorem facere voluerunt, tu poëtarum et oratorum gravissimis et ornatissimis exemplis uberrimum et absolutissimum dedisti'.
- n.2. ' declarat hodie innumerabilium hominum sine ullis praeceptis Rhetoricis graviter, et ornate loquentium fama: qui ornamentis orationis mirabiliter excellunt'.
- 202.n.1. ' eoque audacius utuntur omnibus verborum singulorum, et coniunctorum ornamentis quo maiorem sibi proponunt in scribendo cantus, et aurium voluptatem'.
- n.3. ' pigmentis etiam quibusdam et lineamentis naturaliter aspersa'.
- n.4. ' ad eloquentiam colorandam et roborandam'.
- n.6. ' Summa...laus eloquentiae est amplificare rem ornando: quod valet non solum ad augendum aliquid altius dicendo, verumetiam ad extenuandum atque abiciendum'.
- n.8. ' ad ornandam et amplificandam disputationem'.
- 203.n.1. ' Cum igitur doctrinas non solum ingenuas, sed regias dico, nihil amplificandi causa dico, sed earum nobilitatem vere ac simpliciter exprimo'.

- 204.n.1. ' Quinetiam lumina orationis (quae Graeci vocant $\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$) cum nimis belle, aut festive dicuntur nonnunquam ut puerilia, et inepta repudiantur...Et iterationes verborum, quas in varia genera descripsimus, nonnunquam abeunt in $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu$, aut, $\chi\alpha\chi\omicron\zeta\eta\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$, cum immodice aut non opportune petuntur, detrahuntque non solum sententiis pondus, sed etiam verbis ornatum, et decorem: ut enim quaedam mulieres inornatae dicuntur esse, quod nimium comptae, et calamistratae sunt, sic in oratione nimium polita, et picta figuris, infucata quaedam, et subodiosa vitia nascuntur'.
- 208.n.1. ' Elocutio definienda fuit orationis a vulgari consuetudine ad elegantio rem quendam modum mutatio'.
- 209.n.3. ' Allegoria est inversio sermonis: cum aliud dicitur, aliud intelligendum est'; ' superior nonnunquam ex continuis translationibus gignitur'.
- 214.n.1. ' At id Aristoteles non exprimit, neo tropi nomen ullum speciale ponit, ut eius aetate videatur ars troporum nondum extitisse';
 ' tametsi metaphora plerunque necessaria est, cum verbis propriis caremus, et metaphora, quae vera metaphora est, quodammodo quod significatur, notum facit per similitudinem: Et Aristoteles in Rhetoricis metaphoras inprimis celebravit, quae suaves, significantes, e propinquo sumptae essent eisque imaginem, amplitudinem orationis, facetias, subiectiones ante oculos, proverbia, superlationes subiicit'.
- n.2. ' redundantiam habere, et loquacitatem et insolentiam et affectationem'.
- n.3. ' metaphora clarior est plerunque significatione propria'.
- 215.n.1. ' Venio nunc ad elegantiam translationis, cum tam apte facta est, ut non irruisse in alienum locum, sed imigrasse in suum videatur'.
- n.2. ' Translata dico quae ex eo loco in quo propria erant, in eum in quo propria non sunt, commutantur'; ' ut nubes, ut ea quae gignuntur e terra, ut ea quae opera hominum, et artificio fiunt: partim animatae, ut plantae, pecudes, homines. In utroque genere translationis ornatus spectatur. Nam Cicero nubeculam frontis dixit illudens Pisonem: Et rusticorum sermo est gemmare vites, id est oculos emittere'.
- 216.n.1. ' Et quae spectantur in artificiis hominum: qualia sunt limare, fingere, pingere, formare, tingere, polire, sarcire, dissuere: unde summuntur ornatissimae, et suavissimae translationes, veritatem in disputatione limare, crimen fingere, omnibus artis coloribus pingere....'; ' quae ita sunt in promptu, ut vix arte, et praeceptis egeant: ita sunt excellentia, ut orationi clarissimum lumen adferant....Quare perspicuum est nihil esse in rerum natura, cuius non in aliis rebus possumus uti vocabulo...'.

- 216.n.2. ' cur pro aliis ponantur, similitudo non indicat: ut sacrilegium pro sacrilego, temeritas, pro temerario'; ' Quamobrem honos verborum singulorum, quatuor maxime existit ex rebus: si quod vocalitate iucundum, novitate floridum, vetustate grave et sanctum videatur: si denique translatus vel similitudinis ratione, vel alio quovis modo in oratione, tanquam luminosa gemma splendet'.
- 217.n.1. ' troporum gemmas'.
- 218.n.4. ' Si exactam verborum scripturam potius quam sententiae analogiam sequatur'.
- 219.n.2. ' Quis igitur author?...Christus solus...Quae materia? panis nempe et vinum, quibus analogia sacri mysterii praecipue comprehenditur. Ut enim corpora nostra confecto corporeis organis pane epotoque vino viribus recreata caducam vitam tuentur, sic animae nostrae Christi crucifixo corpore profusoque sanguine ab aeternae mortis gehenna per vivam fidem liberatae, aeternam vitam consequuntur'.
- 220.n.1. ' et quidem panis et vinum mortalibus omnibus notissima alimenta, ut inde metaphorae similitudo clarissima fieret'; ' tropus geminus est, Metaphora et Metonymia'; ' Signis igitur panis et vini obsignatur in animis ad sacram mensam accedentium Christi corpus crucifixum, et sanguinem effusum in remissionem peccatorum nostrorum, in liberationem aeternam salutemque vere credentium poenitentiumque'; ' non proprie sed modificate'; ' Quapropter videmus totum Coenae mysterium tropis refertum esse'; ' tropi clarissimi'; ' Et quidem eo mirabilius est, tropos novis theologis tam insolentes videri, cum Poetae atque oratores omnium gentium, si in locum unum conferantur, non sint cum Mose et Prophetis, cum Christo et Apostolis, troporum, non dico divina quadam maiestate, sed crebritate et frequentia conferendi. Veruntamen Evangelii tropis etiam tropos alios plerique Patres impensius aggregarunt, cum signa pro signatis rebus acciperent, Christum in Coena Domini videri corporis oculis, manibus attrectari, frangi, ore et dentibus manduciare...'.
- 221.n.1. ' Sacramentum est publica fidei actio, sensili signo solennique ritu Ecclesiae suae a Deo, ad Christi mortem commemorandum, eiusque fructum participandum instituta'; ' Sacramenti vero nomine interdum omnes exercendae pietatis caeremoniae, ritusque, vel rei sacrae spiritualisque notae nominantur'; ' rei sacrae visibile signum'; ' Materies igitur terrestris et nostris oculis subiecta est similitudo coelestis et divinae. Nam si Sacramenta (ait Augustinus, Sacramentum pro materia illa terrestri accipiens) quodum similitudinem earum rerum, quarum Sacramenta sunt, non haberent, utique Sacramenta non essent. In iis (ait idem) aliud videtur, aliud intelligitur'.
- n.2. ' in qualitate multo plus est luminis ad illustrandum: in quantitate plus roboris ad impellendum. Similitudines itaque apud philosophos, et omnes eos qui familiariter, populariterque docere volunt, principem locum obtinent'; ' itaque vere mihi dicturus videor, ut oculos in corpore: ita similitudines in oratione, partibus omnibus lumen afferre'.

- 222.n.1. ' Hinc etiam sunt amplificationes eximiae, cum gradatim a minoribus itur ad maiora; ' Ex hoc porro comparationis genere singulares quaedam sunt in poëtis et oratoribus amplificationes'.
- n.2. ' ne longe simile sit ductum...cavendum etiam, ne sit deformis translatio....ne nimio maior...neve minor...neve angustior...et si durior esse videbitur, mollienda est quadam praemunitioe'.
- n.3. ' ξενολογεῖν καὶ μεταφορᾶς λέγειν ποιητικὰς , nugari, et poëticas metaphoras loqui'.
- 223.n.1. ' Ideae exemplares, τερσιόματα tantum sunt, et poëticarum metaphorum commenta'.
- 225.n.1. ' illustris explanatio, qua res pene sub aspectum subiiciuntur. hoc schema cum rem ante oculos constituat, in maximis affectibus dominatur: sitque saepe ex conglobatis effectis, aut ex cumulatis adiunctis, aut ex comparatione similium, parium, minorum, maiorum...'
- 227.n.1. ' ficta personarum inductio, per quam res cuiuscunque generis sint, vocem et sermonem possunt accipere. Haec vel plena est, vel quodammodo muta. Plena cum tota fictio personae, et orationis repraesentatur: muta, cum obliquae allocutiones introducuntur....Hac iucunda varietate, et elegantia poëtae saepe, et historici relaxant animos legentium: tantamque habent in fingendis alienis sermonibus rationem et dignitatis, et locorum, et temporum, et momentorum omnium'.
- 228.n.3. ' quod valet non solum ad augendum aliquid altius dicendo, verumetiam ad extenuandum, atque abiiciendum'.
- n.4. ' Interrogatio figurata non solum quaerit rem dubiam, sed ad odium, invidiam, misericordiam, laetitiam, spem, molestiam, omnesque animorum commutationes convertitur: nihil enim est tam flexibile, neque quod tam facile sequatur quocunque ducas, quam interrogatio'.
- 229.n.2. ' Atque ita se habet ratio ementiendae veritatis: suavis autem est, et saepe utilis iocus, cum ad condiendum, tum ad venuste conformandum sermonem: quo rei alicuius deformitas irridetur non turpiter, nec insulse. Huius duo genera sunt facetiae, et dicacitas. Facetiae latius in oratione funduntur: ut cum ridicule describuntur hominum mores, atque ita effinguntur, ut quales sint, intelligantur. Dicacitas brevior est, et acutior'.
- 230.n.1. ' concentus ex apta pedum modulatione caussa suavitatis excogitatus'.
- 240.n.3. ' nativo quodam aurium sensu'.
- n.5. ' Rhetorica igitur prosa furatur a poëmate numerosam quandam voluptatem'.
- 241.n.2. ' numerus: quo uno nihil est cognatius nostris animis'.

- 241.n.5. ' Numerus (quo nomine et rythmos, et metra significari volumus) est concentus ex apta pedum modulatione caussa suavitatis excogitatus. Pars igitur numeri pes est, et eius dimensio certis spatiis temporum definita...Sunt autem duae formae numerosae continuationis, carmen, et oratio liberior, quam Fabius vinctam nominat'.
- 242.n.2. ' Poëticus est iste furor Marce Cicero, quo te potius in hanc cogitationem impulsus, quam firma ratione adductum sentio'.
- n.3. ' Quid igitur gloriaris te tenere, quod ille non tenuerit? quam viam nobis aperis ad illius oratoris perfecti laudem, quam ille non viderit? Tum relaberis ad illum furorem poëticum: Obiicis enim tibi neminem oratorem talem unquam fuisse, qualem definieris'.
- 243.n.1 ' Logica in hoc mercatore, videlicet, naturalis fuit, qualem Proclus in Cratisto postea commemorat fuisse, qui sine arte, solo naturae acumine prompte problema quodvis diiudicaret. Vulgus poëtas nasci arbitratur et mentis furore ad egregia carmina fundendum excitari'.
- n.2. ' At impetus iste naturalis communis est omnium virtutum omniumque disciplinarum, in quibus excellet nemo, nisi qui naturae indole atque bonitate impelletur, vel potius rapietur'.
- n.4. ' Poetica inquam, sunt ista miracula plena quidem puerilis admirationis, prudentiae vero ac veritatis inania'.
- 244.n.1. ' indocti cum hoc audiunt, magna delectatione, et iucunditate permoventur: at quid sit tam singulare, et divinum quod eos moveat, nesciunt'.
- n.2. ' furor ille philosophicus'.
- n.6. ' auditorem vere et constanter doceri malint, quam ulla cupiditate capi, aut vi inflammatae orationis impelli ac turbari'.
- n.7. ' τελχίνας tanquam scelestos, furiososque appellari'.
- 245.n.1. ' Itaque cum universam quandam, et hominum propriam virtutem rationem esse iudicarem, qua deos immortales, et seipsos, caeteraque omnia cognovissent, qua singulares sibi dotes ingenitas ad orandum, numerandum, metiendum, canendum et reliquas artium laudes persequendum excitassent...'
- 245.n.4. ' Sed de caussis satis, quarum cognitio tam naturalis est ut hominibus natura non viam ad earum cognitionem aperire: sed violentam quandam impulsionem afferre videatur'.
- 246.n.1. ' Est igitur dialecticae rerum omnium explicandarum artificium atque instrumentum proprium'.
- 247.n.1. ' 'Dialecticam, id est rationis naturalis artem, quanquam breviter et paucis annis in schola meditatam et exercitatem, tota vita tamen in rebus omnibus meditemur et exercemus'.

- 247.n.2. ' Hanc viam (qui docere volet) sequi debebit. quanquam poetae, et oratores ab ea saepe discedunt, sed delectandi, aliquando etiam fallendi gratia, non docendi'; and ' utilitatis, et voluptatis gratia multa sibi permittunt'.
- 248.n.1. ' Est enim logica, ars disserendi, ideoque etiam docendi...Nam siquid doceat grammaticus, rhetor, mathematicus, non suo, sed logici artificio docebit'.
- n.2. ' versus invenerunt, et concentus orationis suavitatem delectabiles, multitudine prope infinitos, varia dimensionum colloca-tione discrepantes'.
- 249.n.3. ' Persuadere non est finis et perfecta summaque laus oratoris. Quid ita? quia id in eventu fortuito situm est, quem ars sua vi praestare non potest: sed bene dicere'.
- 250.n.1. ' qui vero movere, et impellere vi orationis audientium animos cupiunt: quantitatis comparationibus magis utuntur: ita sunt oratores in maiorum, minorum, parium argumentis frequentius: quia sibi viribus auferendum, tellendumque auditoris animum proponunt: nisi quieta docendi perspicuitate adduci posse videatur'.
- n.5. ' omnium artium participem'.
- 251.n.4. ' Nulla hominis cuiusquam natura perfecta esse potest, nulla ars, quoniam naturam imitatur, perfecta esse potest: nulla exercitatio perfecta esse potest: sic ut addi nihil possit, cum vita hominis tam brevis sit et incerta'.
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