The Common Foreign and Security Policy and Weak States
The Case of Greece

Ph.D. Thesis

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to my mother and father
Preface

'Visions have always been the driving force behind effective pragmatism. Only intellectual forces can move the mountains that stand in the way of the union of Europeans. Only in this way can strength be increased and, through a type of superior will, difficulties overcome.'


'The foreign policy undertaking is the most delicate of political actions and the most fragile of political relationships.'

James Rosenau
Abstract

This thesis endeavours to present a systematic and rigorous examination of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to the Weak European Union member states, by analysing the role, contribution, and participation of Greece in the CFSP framework. Reference is also being made to other weak EU member states such as Ireland, Portugal and Belgium. Chronologically, the thesis is focused on the period from 1981 to 1994 and it is built upon thematic entities and does not intend to follow any chronological sequence.

It attempts to address the following key issues: The distinctive elements of EU's weak member states' attitudes towards EPC/CFSP; the ways in which Greece had responded to the institutional development of the CFSP; the way in which Greece had handled its role and participation in the EPC and CFSP frameworks; the impact of EPC/CFSP participation on the formulation and implementation of Greece's foreign policy; and Greece's contribution in EPC/CFSP.

The thesis addresses four important dimensions of European Union framework for political co-operation and co-ordination: first, its theoretical basis; second its impact upon the weak EU member states; third, its institutional development; and finally its implications in the formulation of Greek foreign and security policy.

Its main theoretical ambition is to assess the validity of the theory of Modified Structural Realism to the extent that it is applied as an explanatory theoretical framework for the institutional development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to its impact on the weak EU member states having Greece as a case study.

To measure CFSP's overall success and its impact upon Greek politics, the thesis will examine key structural and procedural developments and policy initiatives and assess whether the Greek objectives have been fulfilled based on the following key variables: the behavioural patterns of weak states in foreign policy issues; the domestic sources
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of weak states' foreign policy; the dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of weak states; and the resources and perspectives of the diplomatic and strategic regimes.
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Introduction
AIM - RATIONALE

This thesis endeavours to present a systematic and rigorous examination of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to the weak European Union member states, by analysing the role, contribution, and participation of Greece in the CFSP framework.

The analysis attempts, in relation to the weak EU member states, to explore the diplomatic and strategic regimes of Greek foreign policy and to identify determinant underlying patterns in the CFSP established as a result of developments in the European political arena, strategic relations, and regional politics. It offers a historical context, refers to fundamental aspects of the European Political Co-operation and foreign policy, touches upon geopolitical issues, and examines aspects of political and strategic attitudes of the Member States. Emphasis is also put on foreign policy strategy, the security attitude of Greece in a regional perspective, the role of the WEU, and generally speaking, foreign policy and strategic issues relevant to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Chronologically, the thesis is focused on the period from 1981 (when Greece became a member of the Community) to 1994 (when member states started preparing for the next IGC in order to reform CFSP), although it covers briefly the institutional development of EPC before 1981.

The thesis, through the case study, addresses the following key issues:

- The distinctive elements of EU’s weak member states’ attitudes towards EPC/CFSP;
- The ways in which Greece had responded to the institutional development of the CFSP;
- The way in which Greece had handled its role and participation in the EPC and CFSP frameworks;
- The impact of EPC/CFSP participation on the formulation and implementation of Greece’s foreign policy; and
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- Greece's contribution in EPC/CFSP.

This thesis presents an internal and external perspective emphasising the interface between external relation and internal developments in European integration. The major part of the thesis, however, is reserved for in-depth empirical analysis of the CFSP's impact on the EU's weak member states by examining Greece's foreign policy and the way it is set within this structure. Reference is also being made to other weak EU member states such as Ireland and Portugal.

To measure the CFSP's overall success and its impact upon the weak member states and upon Greek politics, the thesis will examine key structural and procedural developments and policy initiatives and assess whether the Greek objectives have been fulfilled.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In the 1990s, the European Union is an extended Community of fifteen countries, with a population of over 380 million people, introducing the use of a common currency, moving and working without any restriction within the borders of a new Union. The European Union is unique. Over four decades, its Member States have learned at first hand the advantages -and the constraints- of the process of European integration. Since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, European Community countries have gradually added a European dimension to their national structures in trade, economics and in politics.

With a combined GNP ahead of the US, with the largest single market in the world, as the most important player in international trade, and being the main source of development assistance and humanitarian aid to the third world, the European Union member states realised that they should start adopting a more active policy in world affairs, especially when common European interests were at stake.
Introduction

The **Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)** and its two regimes, the diplomatic and the strategic/security ones, is the mechanism to promote this increased responsibility. However, some Member States have established smaller groupings to deal with particular problems and the Union itself has so far failed to develop a strategic approach to major foreign and security policy issues since this policy area has been largely paralysed by the unanimity principle.

A preliminary observation is that throughout the post-war era most of the Western European governments were continuously confronted with three fundamental questions: first, how to establish a stable balance-of-power system on the continent in East-West terms; second, how to achieve a pattern of peaceful and co-operative relations among the states of Western Europe; third, given the excessive European reliance on the United States for security, how to achieve a pattern of Euro-American relationships which would preserve Europe’s basic security requirements, while at the same time reserving the governments of Western Europe sufficient autonomy in political and economic matters. The European Political Co-operation was the starting point, and the CFSP process was the Union’s response to the external difficulties and foreign policy challenges that were presented in the 1990s.

Recent dramatic events over the Gulf, the Uruguay Round and Yugoslavia proved that the EU is not an effective international actor, in terms both of its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events.

Apart from that, the European Union has reached a critical point in its history, with a ‘no coming back’ option especially with the realisation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and CFSP is considered by the majority of member states to be vitally important for the future of European integration itself. A number of changes within the European continent, brought consequences such as the dismantling of the iron curtain, the transformation of communist regimes, German unification, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, an end to the Cold War syndrome, and the arrival of a host of new states in Eastern Europe. The consequences of these changes affected all EU member states but they had a more significant impact upon the small and weak ones.
Introduction

In this context, Greek foreign policy was faced with an important transition. It was obliged to respond to major new pressures emanating from three spheres: the European Union, the Balkans and the international system. This study of how Greek foreign policy adapted and continue to adapt to these pressures helps to illuminate not only the particular case of Greece, but also to some extent the general nature of European Union membership and the wider character of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

One of the main objectives of the thesis is to examine CFSP in foreign policy interactions where the Union attempted a purposeful collective behaviour. However, such an attempt requires the building of a solid theoretical background upon which such an examination can be based. It is therefore necessary to measure the impact of EU’s theoretical debate upon the CFSP’s framework.

Few studies have addressed the Union’s complex network of external relations in relation to the EU’s weak member states, and those which have done so have either had a specific focus or been highly empirical. This according to Ole Norgaard¹, brings us to the most serious lacuna in political science writings on the external relations of the European Union: the scarcity of theory. Martin Holland, one of the analysts who has tried to elevate the theoretical debate in EPC studies, rightly points out that ‘... EPC has been poorly served by theory’. Apart from Holland’s work the EPC study by Ifestos, David Allen’s and Christopher Hill’s several writings the one major theoretically based examination of foreign policy co-operation in the EC/EU is Ginsberg’s book Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community (1989).

The thesis aims to partially fill this gap. Its main theoretical goals are: first to provide explanations for the creation, contribution, preservation and change of a regime such as the CFSP, by assessing the validity of the theory of Modified Structural Realism borrowing some elements from interdependence theory and second, to improvise an explanatory theoretical framework that could be applied to the institutional
development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to its impact on the weak EU member states. However, the thesis does not only assess and apply the Modified Structural Realism but also offers a general coherent theoretical study by commenting upon all the approaches that have attempted to provide explanations for political co-operation in the EU, arguing that a sole explanation does not exist and as a result an analysis of all theoretical attempts is necessary. In this context, the relevant dominant international relations theories and foreign policy approaches are tested and applied. The theoretical approach of the thesis also contributes to the explanation of the weak states' foreign policies by referring to the integration process, explaining foreign policy behaviour, and by testing theoretical models and explanations.

The hypothesis tested derives from the assumption that pure national interest is still behind any move towards further integration in the EU's political domain; nevertheless, whereas in the past it was based on a state's power in the last two decades it is based on the management of mutual dependency. Therefore, member states since they are not any more the autonomous units they were in the past had to create/form 'Regimes' (this is the domain where the Modified Structural Realism is applied) and set new common European interests in order to achieve their goals. In the analysis that follows CFSP is considered as a 'Regime' that operates within the European Union but with unique characteristics and particularities. Characteristics such as the formation of a variety of different coalitions between member states, the constant shifting of political behaviour in decision-making and the bargaining games related to benefits deriving from the first pillar. In addition, as we now shift our level of analysis to get into alternative explanations for the foreign policy outputs of states such as role, societal, governmental and decision-making factors, it is clear that apart from power and national interests there are also other important variables that have a contribution in the calculus of decisions. These variables are those that determine weak states' attitudes in the CFSP:

- Behavioural patterns in foreign policy issues;
- The domestic sources of the foreign policy of weak states;
- The dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of weak states; and
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- Certain and distinct political and security perspectives in the diplomatic and strategic regimes that vary among the weak EU member states.

The analysis of these variables perfectly fits in the case study of Greece since first, the country is the weakest EU member state and second, it has demonstrated in the past such behaviour to justify this exploration.

METHODOLOGY

Technique

This thesis is the result of a three-year project. It was carried out from 1995 to 1998. Research was conducted in the UK, where I was a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne; Belgium, at the headquarters of the European Commission (DG1a); and in Greece, since Greek foreign policy and its interrelationship with CFSP forms the case study. What is presented here is a coherent study that is based upon the extensive analysis of the relevant literature; documents; the interpretation of statistical data; the participation of the author in related seminars, congresses and conferences in Britain and abroad; and upon the gathering of information from various electronic sources and the World Wide Web.

During the time I spent for doing the literature review in the first year of my research I also send an ‘informal questionnaire’ to a number of policy-makers, politicians, practitioners, researchers, scholars and academics. Its main purpose though was to provide me with a more complete view of the issues addressed in the thesis and it was not aimed at forming the base for any quantitative, qualitative or statistical analysis. In other words, the ‘informal questionnaire’ was mainly used as a brainstorming exercise,
as an informal mean for concentration of ideas and arguments in order to comprehend the complexity and the peculiarities of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. For the format of the ‘informal questionnaire’ see Appendix I b.

During the three years of my research I also had the opportunity of meeting a variety of people, politicians, practitioners, EU officials, policy-makers, scholars, researchers and academics that were directly or indirectly involved in the issues that I examined in the thesis. (see detailed list in the Appendix I a)

However, from the three existing groups that usually describe interview technique:

1. structured questionnaire (maximum of 10 questions);
2. semi-structured interview (using heading and prompts); and
3. informal discussion,

the author chose the last one since the main aim was to use the material on a complementary basis to the main arguments of the thesis and not as parts of any quantitative, qualitative or statistical survey or review. In consequence, as was the case with the ‘informal questionnaires’, the gathered information does not constitute part of any analysis, but adds value to the thesis arguments and to the points that are emphasised.

As a result, interaction with the persons listed in the Appendix I a did not follow any prescribed or strict format, on the contrary it was informal and had the form of a series of ‘meetings’, ‘discussions’ or ‘informal interviews’ that took place in various conferences, seminars, congresses or casual meetings.

The purpose of these informal meetings, discussion and interviews, as mentioned above, was the concentration of material complementary to the basic arguments of the thesis. More particularly:

- The provision of information related to CFSP and Greece;
- The sharing of experiences in the field;
- The improvement and development of new insights into the CFSP area; and
- The provision of feedback.
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Structure

The thesis addresses four important dimensions of European Union framework for political co-operation and co-ordination and it is built upon thematic entities and does not intend to follow any chronological sequence: first, its theoretical basis; second its impact upon the weak EU member states; third, its institutional development; and finally its implications in the formulation of Greek foreign and security policy.

In conducting the research and by examining CFSP activities in relation to Greece, the author had also the chance to evaluate the degree of the Greek national attachment to foreign policy goals and objectives formulated at the European level. It is attempted in the thesis, for instance, to evaluate the Greek attachment to the objective of a collective external identity, the degree of priority Greek policy-makers grant to ‘European options’, and the existence of divergence or convergence of the domestic participants on key foreign policy issues.

The thesis is divided into six chapters that may be summarised as follows:

In Chapter One a theoretical approach towards the institutional development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is developed. The analysis is based upon the theory of the Modified Structural Realism; whereas, issues such as: integration and foreign policy; explanation of foreign policy behaviour; classical and modern approaches to the study of European foreign policy; the testing of theoretical models; and the application of interdependence and regime theories in the CFSP context are also addressed.

Chapter Two highlights the politics, security and foreign policy formulation of the small and weak European member states and also serves as a link between the CFSP institutional development and the case study. It stresses upon definitions and characteristics of weak and small states and provides the model for the case study analysis based on the following four variables (as mentioned previously): the behavioural patterns of weak states in foreign policy issues; the domestic sources of weak states’ foreign policy; the dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation
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of weak states; and the resources and perspectives of the diplomatic and strategic regimes of weak states.

Chapter Three covers the form of Greek participation in the EC/EU and the implications of membership for Greece. It evaluates the extent to which Greece is an exceptional EU member, taking into account the existence of various unique characteristics and features. It also highlights certain impacts of membership on Greek politics: national perceptions of European integration; the accession to the EC as a security guarantee; and the changing attitude of Greece towards the EC/EU.

Chapter Four is divided into two parts. The first part stresses the early steps towards political co-operation and co-ordination in the European Community and provides the necessary historical background. The dominant issue is the evolution of the European Political Co-operation and its impact on the weak EU member states; whereas, the second part focuses on Greece’s participation in EPC and its consequences.

Chapters Five and Six should be considered together since it is not easy to completely separate foreign and security policy. Chapter Five focuses upon the institutional development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its implications for Greek foreign policy. The chapter explores the diplomatic regime of Greece in relation to the CFSP by focusing upon: a brief analysis of CFSP’s institutional development; Greece’s aspirations of the Maastricht Treaty; expectations with regard to the TEU in the field of foreign policy; and Greek foreign policy in the nineties.

Turning to Greece’s security policy in the perspective of the CFSP, Chapter Six explores the security regime of Greece by focusing upon: the particularities of Greek security; alternative models for the Europeanisation of Greek security; the operation of multiple networks for regional stabilisation; and the Greek Strategic Doctrine. The chapter also considers the consequences of the developments in the international system, together with changes in the Balkans and the wider area, for contemporary Greek security policy. It focuses upon the relations of Greece with the Balkan countries; the problems with Turkey; and the Cyprus issue.
Introduction

The intention of all chapters, based upon the four variables\(^3\) that determine weak states' attitudes in the CFSP offered by the Modified Structural Realism theoretical model, as mentioned earlier, is to address the following key issues of the thesis:

- The distinctive elements of EU’s weak member states’ attitudes towards EPC/CFSP;
- The ways in which Greece had responded to the institutional development of the CFSP;
- The way in which Greece had handled its role and participation in the EPC and CFSP frameworks;
- The impact of EPC/CFSP participation on the formulation and implementation of Greece’s foreign policy; and
- Greece’s contribution in EPC/CFSP.

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\(^3\) Behavioural patterns in foreign policy issues;

The domestic sources of the foreign policy of weak states;

The dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of weak states; and

Certain and distinct political and security perspectives in the diplomatic and strategic regimes that vary among the weak EU member states.
Chapter One

A Survey into the Relevant Theoretical Approaches Applied in the Study of European Foreign Policy-Making Process
A great number of the major proposals and reforms on European Union stress the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of their vital and more important components. However, since an independent and common foreign policy is considered one of the principal elements of a state’s sovereignty, the concrete development of a CFSP has been a very sensitive and controversial issue in the history of European political integration. The failure of the EU to move decisively towards a recognisable form of political union, as it was the case with EPC, undermined confidence in the application of the term integration to the political processes of the Union.

The theoretical debate over the nature of European Common Foreign and Security Policy will, no doubt, continue to generate competing explanations of the character of the Union and diverse predictions as to its future. The intention of this chapter is to place the debate on the pattern of the CFSP development and its impact on the weak EU member states, on a more comprehensive basis by identifying a set of theoretical concepts that could provide an adequate explanation for the evolution of European foreign policy. More specifically, it will try to contribute to the understanding of the gradual transformation of the EU into a single foreign policy actor by referring to the integration process, explaining foreign policy behaviour, and by testing theoretical models and explanations. An analysis of the relevant dominant international relations theories and foreign policy approaches is attempted, whereas, the theoretical model of the Modified Structural Realism, borrowing some elements from interdependence theory, is applied as the most appropriate one to provide a basis for CFSP’s exploration. The aim is to examine the relative utility of these approaches in providing an explanation for the evolution of the CFSP’s diplomatic and strategic regimes and their impact on the weak EU member states having Greece as a case study. The hypothesis tested, as mentioned in the introduction, derives from the assumption that
pure national interest is still behind most of the moves towards further integration in the EU’s political domain. Nevertheless, whereas in the past its achievement was solely based on a state’s power in the last two decades it is also based on the management of mutual dependency. The powerful member states are not any more the autonomous powerful giants they were in the past and in order to achieve their national interests they had to depend to other states and establish common interests. Their weak partners, on the other hand, continued to be dependent and powerless. Therefore, both strong and weak member states had to create Regimes and set down new common European interests in order to achieve their goals. In the analysis that follows CFSP is considered as a Regime that operates within the European Union but with completely different dynamics and structure. Before we articulate the Modified Structural Realism and its explanations for the creation, contribution, preservation and change of Regimes and analyse its contribution and function, it will be fruitful to discuss some other theoretical approaches in order first, to borrow some theoretical tools and second, to acquire a more complete view of the theoretical debate in the area.

**INTEGRATION AND FOREIGN POLICY**

It is in principle relatively easy to describe the assumptions and mechanisms through which sovereign nation-states conduct foreign policy. The pursuit of common foreign and defence policy by entities or by federal states is more complex but can nevertheless be contained within the conventional concepts of international relations. However, according to Hill, the evolution of European Political Co-operation (EPC) presented a challenge of a ‘different order’. However, linking this assumption to the theoretical debate, is this ‘different order’ a new form of collective diplomacy which has left the sovereignty of the participating member states fundamentally unaffected, to be understood within the framework of realist theory? Has it led to the emergence of patterns of group behaviour, implicit and explicit rules, which are best understood within such framework as regime theory and liberal institutionalism? Or are we
witnessing a process of *engrenage*, in which habits of working together have gradually upgraded perceptions of common interest, to be understood better through the insights of neo-functionalist theory? Western Europe as a collective entity may well have established a ‘presence’ in the international arena; but is not at all clear that it has become an effective or authoritative international actor. We also have to note that the transformation of the European Community into a single foreign policy actor through the formation and implementation of a Common Foreign and Security policy has not been a continuous goal of the majority of the member states. Nevertheless, the challenges of the new Europe and the post Cold War era have offered the opportunity to boost the international performance of the EU as a unified actor. The process of transformation has been greatly accelerated by two significant events: first, the challenge of completing a Single European Market in 1992 and the prospect of a single European currency; and secondly, the unification of Germany, which some called the ‘fourth enlargement’.

As Soetendorp\(^3\) argues, the implementation of a single European market and the prospect of a future economic and monetary union had made the European Community a major international power in its own right. Consequently, it became essential to have an independent European identity and a more unified performance in the international arena. At the same time the unification of Germany triggered a process of negotiations among the member states on major institutional and political reforms leading to a form of political union. Responding to German unification, political union, led by France, had the undeclared aim of reinforcing the integration of Germany into the EU, thus constraining the freedom of Germany to act alone.

It is very important to realise that during the EU evolution two dimensions of politics appeared. On the one hand supranational integration and on the other the protection of national independence and sovereignty:
However, if these two dimensions are extended on the common foreign policy domain (i.e. the second pillar), it is extremely difficult to reach common agreement on the most ‘useful’ theoretical approach for comprehending their function. In other words, it is obvious that there is a ‘theoretical vacuum’. For this reason an attempt to provide a theoretical framework will be very fruitful since it will provide explanations not only for the CFSP’s institutional development and its impact on the weak EU member states but also for all the other key qualitative issues central to the integration of foreign policy that are on the Union agenda, such as decision-making, agreement on common policy areas, collective security and defence, majority voting, and the EU’s emerging role within the changing contexts of NATO and the WEU. Above all, a theoretical framework will lead our way through the case study providing the necessary basis to understand the peculiarities of Greek politics and foreign policy.

We will start by stressing the most significant classical and modern theoretical approaches and assess what they have to offer to the present study.

**CLASSICAL AND MODERN APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY**

Among the problems that face the analyst of the process of European integration is that of finding a way among the various theoretical approaches to the subject. The area has been proved problematic so far. First integration theories such as functionalism and
neo-functionalism, for instance, which flourished during the 1950s and early 1960s, provide some explanations but they do not offer a satisfactory theoretical model for further analysis. The inability to predict or explain the development of political integration adequately - either in practice or in theory - led according to Wallace to 'the collapse both of the political commitment to European integration and of the conceptual framework that had supported it'. This is especially the case in analysing CFSP. According to Whitman, although there is a lot of literature on how CFSP functions it does not come with the satisfactory theoretical framework. The range of theoretical approaches that have been used to understand the contemporary expression of CFSP is diverse. International relations (realist, political economy and world systems approaches); comparative politics; and public policy analysis have all been legitimately used with a degree of success. The key question to be addressed is whether the Union's foreign policy is *sui generis* and demands its own empirically inductive theory, or whether CFSP can adequately be understood by reference to the existing political science literature.

This thesis argues that the evolution and development of the CFSP so far have led to a conclusion that it is a *sui generis* activity and as a result, requires a distinct and unique theoretical model from those applied to offer explanations in the first pillar. Nevertheless, all theoretical approaches have tools to offer. It will be fruitful to examine and assess the existing theories and those used in the past in order to acquire a more complete and in depth analysis. In this framework, this chapter will reflect on the main schools of thought in European integration theories: realism and neo-realism; neofunctionalism and regional integration theory; interdependence theory and regime theory, focusing also on the question of what the most prominent scholars of each approach say about the phenomena under consideration in this chapter. Some of their assumptions about the nature of political activity amongst states neatly reflect the developments in the conceptual frameworks which have shaped the study of international politics.

Two broad frameworks: the *Realist* and *Pluralist* ones regarding the international regimes have been used, either directly or implicitly, as the basis for providing
explanations for the development of political co-operation in the European Community. International regimes such as the CFSP do not derive from a natural situation. A frame of related powers, ambitions, values and treats operates and functions before their creation. Any development is the result of choices made by the actors of the international system within the bounds of restrictions and opportunities. This thesis argues that for foreign policy issues, related not only to the CFSP context but also to weak states and Greece, the Modified Structural Realism forms the basis for satisfactory explanations, since it provides explanations for the creation, contribution, preservation and change of regimes such as CFSP.

In addition to Modified Structural Realism, in the sections that follow, we will also resort to a number of other paradigms where appropriate and refer to other international relation theories in order to present the most complete and appropriate method / model for the needs of the present study.

We will start by focusing upon the realist approaches, then we will shift the analysis towards the pluralist approaches and finally, we will concentrate on our main theoretical framework the Modified Structural Realism.
REALIST APPROACHES

Classical Realism

This particular school of thought used to be the most dominant theory in the field of international relations. The roots for contemplating the Classical Realism reach back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Clausewitz, though the most renowned realists of the 20th century are Carr, Spykman, Morgenthau, Aron, Kissinger, Brzezinski, Huntington and for a short period of time Gilpin, Krasner and Hoffmann. Realists stress that nation states are the most important actors within the anarchic international system. International relations and foreign policy formulation consist, according to the realist perspective, of the interaction between sovereign states in pursuit of their foreign policy goals. Realists view states as being unitary rational actors, which operate solely for their own interests. States calculate costs and benefits and seek to maximise their own power, which is in the realist view the ultimate goal of states.

An influential realist scholar Morgenthau argued that, because all politics is a struggle for power, securing national sovereignty has to be considered as an irreducible national interest, a fundamental value that shapes the basic foreign policy goals of each nation-state. But despite the basic assumption in his writings that national sovereignty will continue to be a central driving force in the international system, he does not rule out the willingness of states to transfer their national sovereignty to supranational organisations. However, he makes such a willingness conditional upon the mutual recognition of the national interests of the nations concerned, and an expectation of benefits that outweigh the loss of the nations' freedom of action.
A realist perspective according to Holland, demands that any discussion of collective foreign and security policy has to first confront the basic assumptions and concepts of the realist traditional school of international relations. Thus in this view, an appropriate framework for CFSP has to account for the anarchical structure of international society; the role of the state as an international actor; the pre-eminence of security; the concept of the balance of power; and the limited impact of domestic politics. Above all, it will help us to understand weak states’ behaviour and provide some explanations of the complexities of Greek politics and foreign policy.

Classical Realism consists of four axioms:

a. The states are the most important (significant) factors of the international system.
b. The states form rational units along with entities that function in a state of uncertainty, calculate the cost and the profit of their alternatives and therefore pursue the maximization of the profits without having sufficient information about the variety of alternatives or the ability to fully re-estimate them.
c. The states seek power (so as to influence the rest or to acquire means for the same cause), they evaluate their interests over power conditions and they intend to satisfy the ‘national interest’ through that evaluation.
d. International law does not have a significant role but serving the interests of the powerful. According to Thucydides: “in discussing the human issues the argument of the ‘right’ has value where there is equal power to impose it. . . the strong imposes whatever his power allows him to, and the weak concedes whatever his weakness forces him to”.

Classical realists believe that international organisations, and especially alliances, exist for as long as stable common interests exist and of course accordingly to the member states’ power. This power and the ability to influence foreign policy among the states is a result of specific meetings, treaties and agreements, and not of permanent inner-dynamic coalitions and alliances. In other words, for realists, international organisations
should not necessarily exist for ever since common interests and the distribution of power are dependent variables.

Classical realism is useful since it can lead us to examine the states’ role, to speculate on their interests and to observe their impermanent allies as they are creating the second pillar of the E.U and its related regulations. Greece, for instance, forms alliances in CFSP based on its own interests and not on the achievement of the common European ones. Realism cannot explain in depth where those interests resulted from, or the reasons that led states to form coalitions at a certain period of time and not for example earlier or later. It cannot examine the possible contribution of the international system or other governmental sectors in the creation of the CFSP. Realism also cannot examine the role of the already existent regulations in foreign policy, in the security policy of Europe, or the policy in the governmental structure of the states, which are participating in the creation of the second pillar.

Structural Realism or Neorealism

Structural Realism, also known as Neorealism, is the advanced form of Classical Realism, formed by Kenneth Waltz. Neorealism understands (as realism does) the states’ ‘behaviour’ in foreign and security policy matters, accepting beforehand the ‘personification’ of the ‘rational’ state and the general term ‘national interest’.

Neorealism adds the dimension of an anarchic international system that exists outside the framework of international law. Two conditions are considered to be necessary for the existence of the ‘international system’;

a. Connections between the units of the system, for the purpose of having the whole system changed, once changes are revealed in one of its parts;

b. The system’s behaviour has to be different from the expectations and the priorities of its secondary parts. 20
In this system, the situation resulted from the ultimate contest between the states is stable when it concerns the use of power to establish certain advantages for the maximization of security. The changes in states' behavior are due to the pressures imposed by the international system's allocation of power and not on their specific features or even the internal proceedings through which they specify their interests. In other words, according to the neorealists:

- Severe restrictions are imposed to the collaboration of the states within the bounds of the complex anarchic international system;
- International institutions reflect the division of power but their influence in the states' interests is limited;
- The changes in the domestic policies of the states don't change their interrelationships.

However, Neorealism is not in the position to examine the role of the pure national interests. For neorealists that such interests do not exist in the explicit form, introduced by the realists, but they are developed and modified under the pressure of the international system. Neorealism allows us to fully understand the role of the international system during the first years of European integration. It is a more dynamic model and provides a perspective to understand the formation of members' coalitions as well as to the formation of those financial institutions that represent and strengthen the powerful member states.

Neorealism "acknowledges international regimes, such as the CFSP, as external factors for descriptive reasons although for theoretical reasons it uses regimes as internal ones. The creation of the European Economic Community was not based on the changes which had occurred in the industrial society, or on external preferences, on the positive impact of public opinion or even on the international pressures, pushed by groups of interests. All those forces may exist and function but one fact is critical at this point; that they are depended on changes in the general distribution of power." The main reason for its formation was to offer to Europe's powerful states another area for action.
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Neorealism completely ignores the dynamic substance of organizations such as the EU and the impact they have on the international and European developments due to the legal, political and financial bonds they create.\textsuperscript{24}

In Europe, apart from the organizations relevant to the second pillar-- and these are the EU, WEU\textsuperscript{25} and NATO\textsuperscript{26}, there are also other institutions and regional organizations each one having its own characteristics.\textsuperscript{27} (OSCE, The Council of Europe, etc.) Their reason of existence is to strengthen the security in Europe by setting 'limitations' on the states' behavior. At the same time it is true and accurate that the more active these organisations are the stronger the states' relations become. For neorealists, these politico-strategic organisations have been developed in Europe in order to impose the stability, security and peace in the area. Nowadays, this search of stability continues to exist, to dominate and to preserve a conspicuous position in important European documents, though through a different philosophy free from any Cold-War syndrome.\textsuperscript{28}

If we persist in getting an answer from neorealists on the matter of providing an explanation for political change, we will get on return the axiom that the great changes will appear in the international system only with over-systematic wars. Minor changes will come into force when the foundations of power are altered. However, neorealists miscalculated on this matter since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent changes in the international system were not the result of a war nor the result of the American supremacy in weaponry over the USSR.\textsuperscript{29}

Changes in states' behavior and in the international organizations occur when the allocation of power is altered, however, this suggestion is not absolute and it can be put under testing. For Nye "the structural stability of the bipolar system tends to be a static theory and says little on how things can change".\textsuperscript{30} According to the neorealism view of Europe, the postwar bipolar status quo led to opposite economic groups offering stability at the same time.

So, after 1989 the new European status quo appearing as multipolar should have been unstable with the tendency to result to collision.\textsuperscript{31} What we should logically have observed in the post 1989 European system should have been a continuous contest between all factors, temporary coalitions and disintegration of all alliances and other
organizations. However, what we find is that NATO still exists and proliferates, the EU is developing, expanding and is acknowledged as politically equal with other great poles of the international system. Of course in addition to the crisis in Yugoslavia where the war had been limited in Bosnia, there were no conflicts in Europe. Any other conflicts are laid in the inner core of the Russian Federation of Independent States (Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Tsetsnia).

To sum up, the neorealist 'fetish' philosophy influenced the developments in the 'oldest continent'. It proposed the foundation of institutions in order to impose stability, security and peace in Europe and as a result, we can conclude that it played a role in setting up the institutional framework for the development of organisations such as the EU and regimes such as the CFSP.

**Intergovernmentalism**

Realist approaches, in general, regard the State as a unitary actor. They also tend to 'rationalise' the interests and the actions of actors. Other important realist approaches are intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism derives from its emphasis on the resilience of intergovernmental methods of co-operation. After the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise, the European Community adopted intergovernmental methods in its development, (something that was apparent in the creation of European Political Co-operation, the European Council, the COREPER, and in the growing importance of the Council). Intergovernmentalist theory seeks to analyse the EU as the result of strategies pursued by national governments acting on the basis of their preferences and power. The major agenda-setting decisions in the history of the EU, in which common policies are created or reformed, are negotiated intergovernmentally. In this framework, negotiation is the process of collective choice through which conflicting interests are reconciled.
The approach starts, like the realist school, from the assumption that national governments are the key players. Therefore, it rests with these governments to decide either to move towards the establishment of common European interests, or to advance their selfish national interests. In the context of EU, the member states set up parallel arrangements for promoting co-operation where the independent, supranational technocrats were either clearly subservient to the governments or excluded, as was initially the case in European Political Co-operation (EPC).

It is argued that, from its inception, the EU has been based on interstate bargains between its leading member states. Heads of government, backed by a small group of ministers and advisers, initiate and negotiate major initiatives in the Council of Ministers or the European Council. Each government views the EU through the lens of its own policy preferences; EU politics are the continuation of domestic policies by other means. Even when societal interests are transnational, the principal form of their political expression remains national.

As a result, Intergovernmentalism asserts that common foreign policy is determined by the perceived interests of the governments of the main member states and not by organised economic or political interests of groups. Moreover, whereas neo-functionalism regards the integration process as a ‘positive-sum-game’, intergovernmentalism views it as strictly a ‘zero-sum-game’.

Ernst Haas and other social / political scientists tried to explain and interpret the concept of European integration with reference to general theories of international relations such as neo-functionalism. However, as Andrew Moravcsik\textsuperscript{32} suggests, ‘the European Union can also be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination’. Actually, it was in the mid 70s, that neo-functionalists themselves argued that it would be better to see EC as an international regime designed to promote policy co-ordination.

If we see the EU as an international regime for policy co-ordination, then its substantive and institutional development can be explained through the sequential analysis of national preference formation and intergovernmental strategic interaction. At this point
we have to introduce the concept of **liberal intergovernmentalism**, which is the relevant theory that deals with the above political phenomena and stands as an alternative approach to the other realists for analysing the EU.

As Moravcsik\(^2\) argues, liberal intergovernmentalism builds on an earlier approach, **intergovernmental institutionalism**, by refining its theory of interstate bargaining and institutional compliance, and by adding an explicit theory of national preference formation grounded in liberal theories of international interdependence. At the core of liberal intergovernmentalism are three essential elements: the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation.

As we observe in the following structure the emphasis on liberal intergovernmentalism is put on domestic politics and the role of societal actors, on the formation of alternative coalitions, on issue linkages and on the achievement of national interests through negotiations.

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**The Liberal Intergovernmentalist Framework of Analysis**

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<th>Liberal Theories</th>
<th>Intergovernmental Theories</th>
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<td><strong>international demand for outcomes</strong></td>
<td><strong>international supply of outcomes</strong></td>
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<td>underlying societal factors:</td>
<td>underlying political factors:</td>
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<td>pressure from domestic societal actors</td>
<td>intensity of national preferences</td>
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<td>as represented in political institutions</td>
<td>alternative coalitions; available issue linkages</td>
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Institutional intergovernmentalism is a variation of modified realism. It emphasizes the role of international institutions and regimes such as CFSP. It differs from modified structural realism because it focuses on one element of realistic theory, the role of states. The states' role is not, however, defined by systematic factors. It also differs from realism, as the states' interests are not specified in relation to other factors but only according to internal processes. States are not 'black empty boxes' but are represented by governments accountable towards people they represent. Moravcsik argues that, states' interests change in time in a critical way for the integration process but they cannot be defined when changes in power relations between the states, are taking place.

The institutional intergovernmentalism paradigm was developed within the bounds of a study related to the Single European Act. This paradigm has been the result of three factors: intergovernmental co-operation of the ruling elites, compromises on the lowest common denominator, and protection of national sovereignty. As far as the Communities and their successes are concerned, these are due to hard intergovernmental negotiations and calculated compromises between the key players, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

To sum up, liberal intergovernmentalism theories, by bringing together theories of preferences, bargaining and regimes, provide plausible accounts for many aspects of decision-making in the history of the EU. They stress the predominance of state bargaining but also tries to analyse the way in which state preferences are formed. They
also emphasise the role of domestic coalition struggle, of relative power, and of the autonomy of national leaders.

Liberal intergovernmentalism’s usefulness lies on their provision of explanations on some of the key issues in the CFSP framework such as: on domestic politics and the role of societal actors, on the formation of alternative coalitions, on issue linkages and on the achievement of national interests through negotiations.
PLURALIST APPROACHES

The second group of theories that are examined in this chapter is Pluralist approaches, which include supranational, transgovernmental, liberal or idealistic theories and they are the result of a critique of Realism. They can provide an extra tool in order to interpret more effectively the institutional shape of CFSP and its relation with the politics of the weak EU member states. Pluralist approaches are also the result of converging conclusions from different fields of international relations. Pluralism’s first form is Idealism. Idealism is now pushed out of the limelight to the margins of theory, and Pluralism rejects the traditional form of the policy that expresses itself through the assertion of power, power balance and use of violence.

Pluralism suggests in return respect of International Law, the necessity of the international organizations, the abolition of any ‘nationalist’ organization of the international society, and the formation of supranational structures. It does not accept that states exist as simple units of the international system but it adds international governmental organizations, multinational companies, and forms of regional organizations to the general category. Through numerous studies of the role of international political developments, domestic politics developments, decision-making and bureaucratic politics, Pluralism rejects the united, orthological and always augmentative behavior of states and stands against ‘the abstract and axiomatic term: “national interest”.’

Pluralism also questions the existence of pure antagonistic relations in the context of the international system due to the parallel international (basically financial but political as well) co-operation which reduces the chances of conflicts by increasing the interdependence between states. According to pluralistic theories, the role of power is not excluded, nevertheless the international system is not anarchic and does not impose changes as was the case with the realist approaches, but is in a status of a relative order owed to international organizations and regimes that create various forms of co-
operation.\textsuperscript{35} It can specify the substance of the so-called "international interests" of nations and it can examine the influence the international system has on states, not on the basis of power distribution but on the basis of the existence of systematic bonds of co-operation and interdependence. Finally, it accepts the catalytic role of international organizations and international regimes in global developments. The states participating do not function on their own and are not controlled by the distribution of military power but are influenced by international organizations and regimes that create different power sources than those accepted and acknowledged by realists.

Pluralism is certainly not a 'mega block of theories'; it is not absolute and decisive like realism. It is not the powerful telescope that would offer an utter panoramic 'great image' of the system, putting aside many details. It is a relative theory inter-connected and complicated like the world it describes. It offers, however, a plethora of flexible theories and methods in order to explain various phenomena of the international system.

There are two groups of theories based on Pluralism, which can provide some explanation in the analysis of second pillar of the EU. The first group contains \textbf{Integration theories} (Unification, Federalism, Functionalism and Neofunctionalism) developed by the most typical representatives of the pluralistic theory whose object of study is the process of European integration (Amitai Etzioni, David Mitrany, Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg); whereas, the second group supports the \textbf{Interdependence theory} (R. O. Keohane, J. S. Nye, K. J. Holsti). Integration theories are useful for the interpretation of CFSP since they describe a process or an end; whereas Interdependence theory is also necessary since it analyses a pattern of relations between member states. As a result, the analysis of these two groups of Pluralist theories, and especially those from interdependence theory, will provide the necessary theoretical tools that combined with the assumptions from the Realist approaches will build a solid framework for the development of the Modified Structural Realism, which is a development from structural realism mixed with pluralistic / interdependent elements, and as previously noted forms the main theoretical approach of this study.
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**Integration Theories**

Within the many trends that appeared in Pluralist Integration theories four are the more prevailing: Unification, Federalism, Functionalism, and the dominating Neofunctionalism.

**Unification**

Unification represented as noted by Amitai Etzioni, sets integration as a precondition to creating a political community. 'Integration is estimated by the level to which the political community has effective control in the potential use of violence. A global political community has a decision-making centre where decisions are made. This centre distributes power, values and wealth sources and it is the reporting center opposite to which conscious citizens are politically recognized.' However, Unification does not explain the processes of integration and consequently does not offer a method, which would help on the present study. It offers though, the criteria to confirm what is structurally and institutionally known; the incapability to create a political community on the EU level due to lack of such a center that would have at its disposal the monopoly of power.

**Federalism**

The second Pluralist Integration theory is federalism. Federalism can be viewed either as providing a political solution, a way of managing different interests within a single political framework; or it can be viewed as an administrative convenience, a method of governing a homogeneous society within which there is a high degree of consensus. As Lodge argues, federalism comes closest to realising the spectre of the withering away and replacement of the nation state by a new, supranational organisation with
recognisable state features. Federal approaches to integration rest on the belief that links between states must be institutionalised to deter them from resorting to violence in order to settle disputes. Federalists associated with the idea of creating a United States of Europe draw inspiration from existing federations and advocate the establishment of a new constitution with central political institutions, based on a separation of powers among the executive, legislature and judiciary. Federalists argue that when a transfer of responsibility and competence for policy areas such as foreign affairs and external security occurs, a supranational organisation acquires sovereign powers at the expense of the nation state.

The federalist approach assumes that the political postulates concerning identity, action and loyalty are the same regardless of the level of institutional formation. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as progress towards political union in the European Communities was made, very different interpretations were put upon federalism and most member governments saw it as a system for allowing policy-making to take place at the national level wherever appropriate. It is obvious, that a Common Foreign and Security Policy constitutes an integral part of the European federal model, which emphasises the 'state-like' characteristic of the EU.

**Functionalism**

Classical Functionalism was one of the primary theories of pluralism after the 1st World War. David Mitrany claimed that the developing complexity of political systems had multiplied the artificial, non-political problems (i.e. financial issues) at the national level. As a result, the problems increased even on the national level. Politicians had to resort to technocrats' help for issues of domestic politics and to functional organizations for issues related international developments. 39

Organizations of functional co-operation could overbalance or make the traditional political institutions useless and abolish the national contests and conflicts, provided that faith in the national state can be diffused and redirected to the frames of
In order to explain the increase of the international organizations or the expansion of their sectors, Mitrany created the ‘dogma of ramifications.’ According to that, the development of co-operation in a technical sector leads to the expansion of co-operation in other technical sectors as well. Functional co-operation in a sector, is the result of an established need that produces a similar need for functional co-operation in another sector.

The creation of a Common Market, for instance, caused pressures for co-operation on market values, investments, insurance, taxation, transportation, wages, social security, bank system and currency policies. Mitrany suggested the beginning in cooperating on technical sectors where there are no conflicts, in order to achieve progress on the integration process. According to his views, in the long run, a procedure that includes financial unification would create the bases for a political agreement.

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**The Functional Model**

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<td>capacity</td>
<td>strengthening socio-psychological Community</td>
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To sum up, according to functionalism a peaceful world order could be constructed through the functional integration of economic sectors and political tasks and this new status quo should replace the existing structures of the nation-state, which had caused the two catastrophic world wars. More specifically, as Lodge argues, functionalism starts from the premise that by promoting functional co-operation among states it may be possible to deter them from settling disputes aggressively. The logic behind the approach is to prevent war not negatively - by keeping states apart - but positively by engaging them in co-operative ventures. The approach rests on sustaining international co-operation by collective action and the creation of cross-cutting ties, consensus and attitudinal changes at the popular level. It proposes the notion that form should follow function to establish functionally specific agencies - initially in what were then seen as non-contentious areas like welfare. These were to transcend national boundaries and be managed by rational technocrats owing allegiance to a functionally specific organisation not to a given nation state. Functionalism helps to explain the first stage of political co-operation and the creation of EPC.

Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism can also be used to provide some explanations regarding the first stages of political co-operation in the Community. It was first developed in Ernst Haas's major study of the ECSC and in Leon Lindberg's study of the early years of the EEC, it does not assume that a state is a single unified actor; nor does it assume that states are the only actors on the international stage. Its basic argument is that the process of integration takes shape not as a consequence of the various pressures that exist because of functional needs or technological progress, but basically from the interaction of political powers (pressure groups, political parties, governments), that exploit these pressures in order to achieve their own goals. In other words, pure self-interest is one of the main reasons for the transfer of power and sovereignty from national governments to a new centre of authority. All progress towards a unified
foreign policy, according to neo-functionalism has to be based on agreements between the political elites of the Member States, reached by a realisation of individual interests. At the core of the neo-functionalist approach is the concept of *spill-over*. ‘Spill-over’ was the process whereby successful integration in an area of lesser salience would lead to a series of further integrative measures in linked areas so that the process would become increasingly involved with issues of greater political importance. Two distinct aspects of this idea can be identified. The first will be referred as *functional spill-over*, and the second as *political spill-over*. According to the idea of ‘functional spill-over’, if states integrated one sector of their foreign policies, for instance, technical pressures would push them to integrate other sectors. Since modern political structures are made up of interconnected parts, it is not possible to isolate one sector from the rest. The integration of one sector will therefore only work if other sectors are also integrated. In this framework, the level of linkages would increase and as a result, ‘high political’ questions such as defence policy and foreign policy will also be involved in the process. *Political spill-over* involves the build-up of political pressures in favour of further integration within the states involved. Once one area of domestic foreign politics is integrated, the interest groups operating in that sector will have to exert pressure at the regional level, on the organisation charged with running their sector. These groups will soon understand the benefits and the barriers of integration. As soon as they realise that the main barrier will be that integration in one sector can not be effective without the integration of other sectors, they will become advocates of further integration. This process might eventually lead to the integration of the foreign policies of member states. Neofunctionalists were concerned with tracing progress toward a final stage called ‘political community’ - the evolution of a unique, potentially federal political structure in Europe that would prevent war and guarantee peaceful change. However, as Moravcsik argues, they limited their definition of integration almost exclusively to institutional characteristics of the EC with the result of discouraging attention to foreign policy conflicts in the EC over issues such as external threats, the enlargement problem, and policy harmonisation.
For neofunctionalists, integration towards a political union is an elite process that proceeds in a situation of permissive consensus where publics acquiesce passively to decisions reached, which is not the case especially in weak member states, where their nationals protest heavily on CFSP decisions when they feel that they are unfair and are imposed on them by their powerful EU partners.

Integration is described as a process for increasing the interdependence and interweave of international systems to a point where the limits between the system of international organizations will no longer be visible. For CFSP and member states this means, in theory, that closer co-operation and further co-ordination of national foreign policies will push political integration to the next stage which is the development of a common defence policy.

It was argued that the states were progressively 'resigning from the desire and the ability to practice foreign and internal policies on important issues.' In contrast, they were looking forward in making common decisions or debuting to new central authority actors the privilege to take decisions. They were developing new structures and functions "in a new systematic field, wider than the pervious one (geographically or functionally)". The new structures were expressing a wider approach between economic
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and political structures that could cover -but not necessarily replace- the older structures. 45

However, integration may also start as a process to deal with technical problems, as argued by functionalists. It goes further though, and also includes the developments made by those who are interested in the governmental and private sector, those who support integration for real benefits and altruistic reasons.

Integration goes forward also as a result of the changes it brings. In the first place, the idea of power is connected to prosperity, maximized by functional efforts. Therefore, international regimes and organizations promote the power and competence of their members, substituting the states in this duty, so that states re-orientate their interests solely to issues of prosperity. This is achieved through learning proceedings that lead these interests to apply the integration lessons in other functional frames. 46 Secondly, actors' action according to Haas (in contrast to Mitrany), would not remain in the technocratic level for ever, they are politicized as forced to come to an agreement, regarding the solving means to be used. 47

According to Nye, in neofunctional theory there are seven procedural mechanisms that promote integration; the functional association of competence or sense of diffusion (spill-over), the increase of exchanges, the bonds of advisability (intentional diffusion spill-over), the formation of blocks 48, the socialization of the elite, the creation of regional groups, the appeal of ideological similarity (community) and the entanglement of external factors in the process. 49 According to Haas and the neofunctionalists the sense of spill-over is in a dominant position when it comes to mechanisms of integration. Those who gain benefits from supranational institutions have good reasons to support the expansion of integration in other sectors as well. In other words, potential benefits in national foreign policies of certain states is a prerequisite for promoting integration in the CFSP regime. The decisions made by an organization such as the EU have consequences: "previous decisions are diffused in new functional bounds demanding even more contacts between the bureaucratic units in order to deal with the new problems, resulting from past settlements". 50
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Haas argues that the spill-over doesn’t function automatically. Spill-over will arise if “the factors are willing to adjust the integration lessons they had in a new sector”.\textsuperscript{51} In other words, adjust the spill-over effect of the EMU, for instance, to CFSP. He also acknowledges that integration is fragile if exclusively supported by ephemeral material interests instead of an ideological, political commitment conducted by major elites and government actors which is necessary to complete integration.\textsuperscript{52} However, the process that neofunctionalism describes does not always guarantee successful results and can be ineffectual. Non-politicization, no spill-over effect from technical sectors to the CFSP regime\textsuperscript{53}, or the creation, as Schmitter proposed, of different aspects from the classical form of spill-over\textsuperscript{54} can occur:

- ‘spill-around’, the functions of an organisation are increased in width but this doesn’t apply to power increase.
- ‘build-up’, decisions along with the authorities of CFSP are taken on a more independent way.
- ‘retrenchment’, common decisions by arbitration and power reduction of the relevant organisation.
- ‘spill-back’, declination of competence and authority of an organisation pursuing integration, to the state before integration.\textsuperscript{55}

Neofunctionalism offers a series of mechanisms, through which, integration could be accomplished. Some of them worked and contributed in creating the Diplomacy and Strategy of the EU’s second pillar. However, as a theory, neofunctionalism is more helpful to provide explanations for the early years of political integration in Europe where the spill-over effect for further political co-operation was more obvious, especially during the Cold War. However, it can not interpret phenomena such globalisation and the power vacuum that followed the end of the Cold War.
Interdependence theory forms the second part of Pluralist approaches. It will provide some elements that will form the basis upon which the theoretical model of this research is going to be built. Although interdependence as a theory, according to Featherstone, is not sufficient enough to explain the institutional development of the CFSP it can offer some very valuable explanations concerning relations between EU member states and the dynamics of decision-making.

What interdependence means is mutual dependence. In global politics, interdependence describes situations known as mutual effects between states or factors in several countries. These effects are often the result of relations developed by international trade, exchanges of capital, currency, and materials, and summits of interest groups beyond national limits. These inter-connections and contacts create a variety of linkages between individuals, groups or even states. The creation of interdependence depends on the level to which inter-connections cause mutual commitments, restrictions or costs. If commitments and trades reach their highest point along with the cost that can breach them, interdependence is as complex as it can be. Interdependence does not exclusively describe situations of mutual profit, whereas, it imposes a certain cost since it reduces autonomy.

Nobody can say a priori the profits from such a relation will overcome the costs. Two approaches can be adopted to calculate the cost of profits. The first put emphasis on common profits or common cost and the second on relative profits and profits’ distribution. In other words we go back to the old issue of politics, “who gets what”? The increase of interdependence and international co-operation does not include the deletion of conflicts. Even in situations where profitable co-operation is mutual, there will always be conflicts as to the distribution of profits.

Interdependence can be located on a spectrum between mutual dependency on the one hand and complete dependence on the other. It lies between the absolute situations described above; but it can also be extended to international relations and power contests. Interdependent relations offer or are offered as power sources. For example,
in a situation of non-symmetrical interdependence, the less dependent factors can use the interdependent relation as a power source (since any changes in a relationship will cost them less) in relation to a specific issue or just to influence another.\textsuperscript{62}

According to theorists, economic interdependence and progress in technology, transits and communications reduce the national states' role and diminishes the traditional financial functions. Within the bounds of global economy and the needs of a welfare state, the nation-state, concedes powers to other international organizations or institutions that better serve those financial expediencies.\textsuperscript{63} The national economies are trapped in a web of economic interdependence (commerce, foreign investments, and currency relations), making financial profits but not being able to easily escape from this network of linkages.\textsuperscript{64}

Any effort to reduce interdependence will have negative consequences on labour markets, regional development, welfare policy, something that politically will have enormously costs to any government, as citizens are not ready yet to accept any devaluation of their standards of living.\textsuperscript{65}

Interdependence brings changes to the function of the international system. Due to existence of linkages and the interaction of actors and interest groups around the continent and the globe, the importance of having a strict hierarchy on national interests issues is fading for individual countries; whereas, at the same time the Big Powers are experiencing more and more difficulty in achieving their goals. That leads them to use the 'power of persuasion' rather than a policy based on obligations and constraints towards the other states.\textsuperscript{66}

Furthermore, the role of non-governmental factors is enforced,\textsuperscript{67} there is no permanent hierarchy in problem-solving and decision-making; whereas, the sense of military power is diminished as a general mean, in order to achieve targets in the international field.\textsuperscript{68}

Finally, since no state can handle by itself a system characterised by numerous international inter-connections and while efforts to adjust national issues may lead to commercial wars, lack of confidence, unemployment etc., states resort to co-operation and co-ordination regimes.\textsuperscript{69} They create these international regimes in their effort to
influence or to control the conditions of interdependent relations, reducing indirectly the possibilities of international contests and conflicts.

The theory of interdependence describes a situation mostly resulting from economic relations. It may allow the understanding of perspectives as well as the understanding of the prerequisite conditions, necessary for their creation. Interdependence may also explain why something did not happen, especially the reasons why certain traditional means of behavior cannot bring the expected results in specific sectors; for example, the military power in GATT negotiations.

As far as Europe, the EU and the second pillar’s regimes are concerned, the validity of interdependence lies in providing a framework of explanations as to why co-operation regimes are created in a particular sector (agricultural products) and not in another (defense products). According to Clarke, ‘CFSP is the management of interdependence within the European Union’ since it provides explanations for ‘relationships among member states, package deals and national interests.’

Interdependence can describe an environment where various uniting processes for negotiations are taking place and it can also explain why disagreements don’t result in conflict and fragmentation of the processes, instead they lead to compromises almost every time and to delays in decision-making. It can also explain whether specific compromises will be preserved or altered, and the reason why even a weak state within the bounds of the EU could gain power.

In this framework what interdependence also includes is the direct and positive linkage of states’ particular interests in the sense that when the position of one state changes, the position of others is affected. Weak European member states are tied to this assumption, since in most cases they are strongly affected.

The dynamics and perspectives of interdependence

For some scholars, interdependence is preferred as the term better suited to describe the network of relations and collaboration represented in the European Union. In the
literature of international relations, interdependence refers to the close and persistent relationship between two or more states or international actors, based on mutual reliance and therefore carrying a cost to one side or the other, or both, if the relationship were to be ended. Interdependence has, in fact, been invoked to describe a wide range of relationships, from conflict-prone exploitable links involving a visible and one-sided dependency to more evenly balanced and harmonious links, sustained through mutual sensitivity of the kind said to bind together the member states of the EU.

According to Webb73, in its specific application to the European Union the concept of interdependence has been used variously to describe the conjuncture of economic conditions in Western Europe which gave rise to the EU initiatives; to the economic and political consequences of policy collaboration; to indicate the limits of regional cooperation; and as a justification for maintaining the EU in spite of disagreements amongst its member states about its ultimate political purpose.

It encourages the analyst to focus on the policy first and foremost rather than be diverted by the particular and frequently parochial institutional problems which actually complicate or even erode the ability of governments to shape the policy process in such a way as to protect national objectives.

What the interdependence school provide in the 1980s, as Webb argues74, is a perspective on the EU which focuses directly on its very incompleteness as an integrated regional system, and its incipient tensions as a policy-making forum, stemming from the combination of external pressures and internal divisions. Thus in a conscious back-tracking from the neo-functionalists' 'integrated political community', interdependence analysts have suggested that the modest formula of an 'international regime' may be a more appropriate label for describing the rules and commitments of the EU and of the CFSP. It has been suggested, for instance, that the EU can be adequately explained as a system of managed interdependence since it rests in mutual rewarding economic interdependence and the members adhere to a regime of rules and prescribed practices which is normally observed. Pentland has noted that: Community policy-making is unique in that it is made in an environment where the nature of the
political game itself is more than usually ambiguous and where different groups see it in different terms.

**Interdependence and CFSP: compatibility and expectations**

Although, we can argue that interdependence theory and regime theory, which is described in the next section, could be subsumed under the broader category of Pluralist approaches, they both constitute a distinctive entity especially in their application on foreign policy issues.

Interdependence theory and its offshoot, regime theory, dominate the current study of contemporary efforts to establish co-operative networks and build communities beyond the state. The interdependence approach, as previously noted, considers the implications of the emergence of transnational and other non-state actors on the global stage, as well as the increased international transaction among countries and between actors in different countries.

Interdependence theory contrasts the diminishing importance of national boundaries with the growing globalisation of economic, political, and security interests. It also argues, in contrast to the Realist school, that international organisations possess a certain dynamic of their own, independent of the interests of the states.

As Soetendorp argues, the interdependence or transnational view of international politics moved from the realist assumption that military security is the sole goal for all states, and that military statecraft is the dominant foreign policy instrument in international relations. Adherents of the interdependence framework argued that because of increased interdependence among states and the growth in international organisations, new issues such as the environment, health, and fraud were added to the foreign policy agenda. Economic statecraft became a major foreign policy instrument. The transnational perspective also contributed to the erosion of the separation between foreign and domestic policies and the distinction between high and low politics. According to Sullivan it also contributed to the recognition that foreign policy is not
made by unitary actors but is an outcome of bureaucratic politics and organisational outputs. It is also influenced directly and indirectly by domestic and transnational interest groups as well as by various international governmental and non-governmental organisations. If the above assumptions applied to the CFSP regime they would lead to the conclusion that the conduct of any common foreign policy in the European Union is the result of the co-operation of a variety of actors, bureaucrats and agents operating in a network of economic, social and political interests.

The interdependence and transnational literature highlights the importance of change in the decision-making structure of foreign policy. Because of the increased emphasis on interstate relations on trade problems, monetary politics and other economic issues, it is not only the foreign ministry which involves itself in foreign policy activities. Such a development creates what the two most outspoken interdependence theorists, Keohane and Nye\textsuperscript{77} have called a transgovernmental policy network, and Karl Kaiser described as multibureaucratic decision-making, features that pave the way towards an institutional approach. Under 'complex interdependence' (a term used by Keohane and Nye to contrast with the realist view of international politics), because of the existence of transgovernmental networks, the importance of the national interest as a guideline for national policy-makers diminishes. The two authors assume that national interests will be defined differently on different issues at different times and by different governmental units\textsuperscript{78}.

In other words, we can conclude from the views presented above, that interdependence offers a different model of foreign policy explanation that is far away from the concept that foreign policy is conducted only by the national governments and that the agenda is dominated by issues related to national interests.
The Interdependent Structure in the CFSP context

### STRONG STATES / WEAK STATES

[‘European hegemons’] / [partners]

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* *Areas where Interdependence is applied*

As we can see in the above table apart from the traditional elements that determine the power of a member state (military, economic and governmental strength) there are also other elements, that the interdependent structure adds, such as the role of governmental
and non governmental organisations, the existence of networks and of
transgovernmental coalitions, the effect from international transactions and the common
formation of diplomatic and strategic regimes.
Moreover, the contacts between national bureaucracies may change the officials' perspective and perception of their interests and lead to a different interpretation of the national interest or even to a 'new institutionalism.' Governmental bureaucracies charged with the same tasks may lead to transgovernmental coalitions on particular foreign policy issues. To improve their bargaining position officials may even bring actors from other governments or countries into their own national decision-making processes as allies.
Interdependence theory contrasts the diminishing importance of national boundaries with the growing globalization (or Europeanisation in the case of the EU) of economic, political, and security interests. Under this perception, international organisations possess a certain dynamic of their own, independent of the interests of the member states.
However, interdependence does not mean harmony. It is mutual dependence that is often unevenly balanced. The less-dependent or less vulnerable party in an interdependent relationship can often derive power from threats to manipulate that interdependence. This is exactly the case with Greece. Interdependence is often balanced differently in different issues, such as security trade, and finance. Thus, creating and resisting linkages between issues where a nation is either less or more vulnerable than the other becomes part of the power game. Political leaders use international institutions to discourage or promote such linkages; they choose the forum that best suits their interests in defining the scope of an issue.
The solutions to many current issues of transnational interdependence require collective action and co-operation among states. In this framework, higher levels of connection and integration between member states should lead governments towards a recognition of their common interests.
However, the willingness of member states to pool their national sovereignty has been made from the very beginning conditional upon such a recognition of mutual interests,
which is extremely difficult within the CFSP decision-making process and most times end to a series of bargaining games.

Governments of weak member states are said to counter the loss of autonomous control, either by exploiting the network of interdependent relationships to extract suitable political rewards for domestic consumption, or by identifying the collective policy network with significant national goals. It goes, of course, without saying that the smaller member states have gained in international status from the addition of a foreign policy dimension to economic co-operation, either from representing the EU as a whole when they occupy the EU presidency, which rotates among all members every six months, or simply from being members of the Union.

Interdependence theory provides us with the most important motive for understanding why member states, and especially the weak ones, co-operate in the joint making of foreign policy. Member states achieve national interests by turning their goals into common European ones. The whole effort is based on mutual dependency and on the Union’s solidarity when it exists. In the scholarly discourse of the interdependent school of thought about the incentives for integration and co-operation, the concept of egoistic self-interest still occupies a prominent place. According to Soetendorp, it is obvious that the benefits of the economies of scale were the most important reason for the member states to join the Community, to pool their resources and to establish a common commercial policy for their external trade. Compared with the United States and Japan, only the pooling of economic resources makes the Union a world economic power in its own right, improving the competitiveness of EU industries on the world market and expanding the Union’s powerbase. It has made the EU an economic power bloc that commands the largest share of world trade of any state or grouping. Hence, the cost to member states resulting from the loss of sovereignty with respect to foreign trade policy was compensated by the benefit of being a member of the trade bloc with the largest share in world trade. It serves the member’s interests by creating a large and exclusive internal market on the one hand, and protecting trade interests in the outside world and offering them opportunities to exploit economics and politics on a larger scale, on the other. However, the same framework is difficult to be applied to political
co-operation and the CFSP since, although the emergence of the EU as a coherent powerful trading bloc has given to the Union at least as much potential bargaining power in international trade negotiations as the United States, in foreign policy issues the situation is not yet the same since the full implementation of the CFSP still appears to be remote.

The politics of interdependence will not necessarily lead to co-operation. Reflecting upon their writings, Keohane and Nye\(^8\) argued that, from a foreign policy standpoint, the problem facing individual governments is how to benefit from international exchange while maintaining as much autonomy as possible. To regulate international behaviour under interdependence and control its effects, networks of rules, norms and decision-making procedures are created. Keohane and Nye called these ‘international regimes’, in our case it is the Second Pillar of the European Union. The analysis of regimes’ creation, contribution, preservation and changing forms a major part of the thesis main theoretical approach Modified Structural Realism.
MODIFIED STRUCTURAL REALISM

Our aim in this chapter, as mentioned in the introduction, is to find and form a complex method of researching and analyzing the regimes of the EU’s second pillar in relation to their impact on the weak member states.

Each one of the two groups of theories analyzed (realist and pluralist) showed powerful tools. Each one of the tools has a specified use, so consequently it is not always suitable for an extended scale of analysis. It maybe useful for a certain time period or for providing explanations that partially fill the theoretical vacuum. In other words, the validity of the approaches analyzed so far is on the one hand useful but on the other hand each is limited and not always adequate. Nevertheless, CFSP analysis is demanding. A coherent, solid, and flexible theoretical framework is required, not to provide all the explanations but to cover the areas where realist and pluralist approaches fail. The analysis in this section will be sustained on the application of the Modified Structural Realism theoretical approach to CFSP, which is an improvement of structural realism mixed with pluralistic /interdependent elements. In this section, we will examine how the Modified Structural Realism CFSP Regime version fits to the research.

In order to define some of the basic characteristics of the Modified Structural Realism, we will begin with R. O. Keohane’s suggestion concerning the modification of classical realism and Neorealism, as follows:

a. The axiom that the states are the main factors of the international still remains valid.
b. Major attention is given to the non-governmental factors, governing organizations; international institutions in general.
c. The axiom of rationalism is maintained, aiming the benefits maximization under the conditions accepted by classical realists.
d. The axiom that the states seek power is diminished while they are focusing on other interests.
The value of power depends on the targets pursued as, on the one hand, the power sources are not equally effective in all activities and on the other, factors are using different means or they link different sectors of activities (linkage).

The definition of interests is influenced from the international system's structure but also from other international (i.e., institutions) and internal factors (i.e., political realignments, historical experiences, public opinion etc.).

The perspective of Modified Structural Realism corrects some of the imperfections of the two groups of theories, analyzed in the previous section, in their original form. We can investigate the sense of international regimes on the basis of interdependence theory and the Modified Structural Realism. Besides, as J. S. Nye underlined, "the most interesting explanations usually involve the interdependence between the international system's restrictions, the nature of states' society and policies of greater states".

What Modified Structural Realism offers is a framework for regime analysis. At the core of the theory are the creation, contribution, preservation and changing of regimes. Since in this study CFSP is considered as a regime, this section will examine how these key denominators could be applied. This means extensive analysis of the following factors:

- **International regimes: conditions of creation and contribution:**
  - Creation of international regimes and game theory;
  - Creation of international regimes and hegemonic leadership;

- **Conditions for the preservation or changing of regimes:**
  - Perseverance of international regimes and game theory;
  - Preservation of international regimes and hegemonic power;
  - Regimes and Legitimacy.

**International regimes: conditions of creation and contribution**

As previously noted CFSP is considered in this thesis to have the form of a regime. The theoretical model through which this regime will be explored is the one that stems from
Modified Structural Realism. From this section and onwards any reference to regime will be under the principles and rules that Modified Structural Realism dictates together with some elements from interdependence theory.

The concept of regime, based on Modified Structural Realism, is extensively developed in Keohane’s writings. He used theories of rational choice to explain the creation, maintenance and evolution of international regimes. In a complex world, egoistic governments seek to form international regimes on the basis of shared interests. A hegemon (in our case, a powerful EU member state) may help, according to Keohane, to create shared interests by providing rewards for co-operation and punishments for defection. But co-operation can also develop among egoists without a hegemon, because international regimes perform the valuable function of reducing international transaction costs, reducing uncertainty and facilitating negotiations, leading to mutually beneficial agreements among governments.

The view that self-interest of states is the driving force behind the creation and existence of international regimes has also been suggested by other scholars of regime theory. According to Krasner, egoistic self-interest, that is the desire to maximise one’s own interests and power, is the most important incentive for states to co-operate. Stein argues that sovereign states have a national self-interested and calculated drive to abandon independent decision-making in favour of joint decision-making. Regimes arise, according to Stein, when states are confronted with the dilemmas of common interests and common aversions. In both cases, jointly reached outcomes are preferable to decisions made independently. This assumption is within CFSP’s perspective of decision-making.

Such a joint effort can be made through either collaboration or co-ordination. While regimes were created in order to solve the dilemmas of common interests which require collaboration, those established to deal with common aversions need only facilitate co-ordination. However, in both cases the creation of regimes has a most important effect on the criteria by which national decisions are made. The institutionalisation of co-ordination and collaboration may lead governments to recognise the importance of joint decision-making, thus making governments joint-maximisers rather than self-
maximisers\textsuperscript{86}. Such an understanding is crucial for the maintenance of regimes, which might change as a result of shifts in the international distribution of power, affecting in turn the pattern of interests of the actors involved.

The assumptions of regime theory are incorporated in the approach Keohane calls 'neo-liberal institutionalism'\textsuperscript{87}. This perspective on international politics keeps states at the centre of world politics, but stresses that state actions depend to a considerable degree on prevailing institutional arrangements. Keohane argues that institutions, defined as 'persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations'\textsuperscript{88}, both constrain states and make their actions intelligible to others. International institutions have three regulative and constitutive aspects. These affect the incentives facing states, make it possible for states to take actions that would otherwise be inconceivable, and affect the costs associated with alternatives that might have existed independently. International institutions may also affect the understandings that leaders of states have of the roles they should play and their assumptions about others' motivations and perceived self-interests\textsuperscript{89}.

In our case, the essential elements in the CFSP process are the changing attitudes of key actors with specific policy goals determined by their domestic political system and by the preferences of policy makers, technocrats, political parties, and interest groups. These actors are the so called 'European hegemons'. A 'European hegemon' is capable of providing universal incentives or threats to promote regime formation and to dominate decision-making in a particular policy, such as Germany and France in the EMU context.

The concept of an international regime may in fact be usefully applied also at a sectoral level within the EU to compare and contrast the rule-making environment in different policy areas. Member states have to accept the rules of the regime because it is only by doing this that they can obtain their separate interests.
A focus upon the creation of international regimes and game theory is required to assist us to a better interpretation of why the second pillar was created and how the ‘game’ is played. According to Stein, a classical realist, international regimes are the outcome of the interdependent relations between the states that are taking decisions independently, in relation to their interests and preferences. International regimes are created to deal with the corporate lack of best selections which result from “competitive behavior” from “the dilemma regarding the common interests” or from the attempt to create national or international “corporate commodities” like security. From this perspective, on the national level individuals created states and on the international level states created regimes.

The game theory is not used to explain but mostly to describe or schematically represent a situation of the international system. Thus Stein examined the issue of the regimes’ creation by powerful factors through games. There are two games-situations in which the perpetrators need a collaboration regime:

I. A dilemma of common interests (and limited collaboration) known as “the prisoners’ dilemma”. Although antagonistic and different, the actors’ interests coincide without any collaboration on the second best choice level. However, if the factors desire to accomplish the best possible result in their relationships (the best choice), they must abandon their basic interests’ aspiration, something that is in contrast to the previous one. Moreover, they should not fear the possibility of their competitor grabbing the opportunity once they have abandoned it, to use it according to his own interests. Therefore, their choice is to collaborate and it is at this point where they need a regime.

II. Two dilemmas of mutual deterrence: actors prefer to avoid the situation and simply co-ordinate. In the first of these two dilemmas, actors do not have specific interests or conflicting strategies. There are balance points (two if the actors are two) on which they concentrate their preferences (for example; they
want to drive safely - they don’t care if they are driving on the right or the left side of the road) and other points they are trying to avoid (for example; conflicts). In order not to take any chances, they need a regime to set one of the two points they agree on (right or left side of the road). On the second dilemma the situation is the same; in this case the preference of two actors is divided between the two balance points (for example; two drivers reach a crossroad at the same time. They want to avoid a crash but each one wants to cross the road first). A regime is necessary to clarify the situation (i.e. in a crossroad the car coming from the right has priority). 94

The most important conclusion coming from these two game situations, is that the spirit for making compromises and pursuing second and alternative choices must exist as a condition for the need to form a regime. Even though it is not categorically expressed we believe that Stein requires the balance or the existence of a tension for compromise on a specific field of international relations, in order to explain the creation of a regime. In the CFSP case the second game-situation better describes the situation and the relationships that exists among the member states. An example of the first dilemma of mutual deterrence could be applied to the case of the Franco-German axis, where EU/CFSP is used as a balance basis that also helps in avoiding potential conflicts; and the second dilemma is best applied to Greece when it finds itself having a different position than the rest of Union’s members. On the one hand, Greece desires to follow its partners line on foreign policy issues, but on the other, when this line conflicts with its national interests the situation becomes more confusing and complex than in any other member state. The regime that is supposed to provide the solution to this problem according to game II, in this case the CFSP, has proved inefficient so far.

Creation of international regimes and hegemonic leadership

The second key factor of regimes creation and contribution is hegemonic leadership and its impact on member states, especially on the weak ones. It is one of the basic
Chapter One

characteristics of international regimes such as the CFSP, since although in theory power is equally allocated among the member states, strong and weak, in practice, the powerful partners are the key players. Charles Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner developed a systematic theory regarding the preservation (and in consequence, the creation and the alterations) of international regimes, on the basis of unequal power distribution in the international system.

According to this part of the Modified Structural Realism theory—named “theory of hegemonic stability”—the existence of powerful regimes depends up to a certain extent, on the existence of a hegemonic power. The theory has a primary part which presupposes that the unequal distribution of power within the bounds of the international system (hegemony) leads to development and preservation of powerful international regimes. In other words, it verifies the obvious that for any reliable common foreign policy formulation in the European Union the contribution and the leadership of the Union's powerful member states is required. However, this is an indirect way for the big European powers to 'legitimise' and 'institutionalise' their dominance upon their weak partners. On this occasion, we are referring to a established regime, “elaborated in-between the limits set by powerful actors”. Power and dependence relations will specify regime's characteristics while actors' choices will be diminished to the primal preferences of the strong.

In CFSP, the existence of a hegemonic power in a sector of decision-making and the existence of a causal nexus between the regime's action and creation are two factors that were always unclear and complex. Change in hegemonic leadership occur within the CFSP when an initiative affects a powerful state's national interests.

In the next section, we will shift the analysis towards the second block of theoretical elements of the Modified Structural Realism, those focusing upon the conditions for the preservation or changing of regimes.
Chapter One

Conditions for the preservation or changing of regimes.

Perseverance of international regimes and game-theory

The theoretical elements of the Modified Structural Realism discussed in the previous sections provide satisfactory explanations as to how and why regimes such as the CFSP are created. However, they should also be used to describe the preservation or the changing of power relations within regimes. Starting from this rationale Stein resorted to a realistic interpretation, arguing that the factors explaining the creation of regimes are the same factors that explain their preservation as well as their disappearance. Regimes are preserved for as long as interests that preserve them exist. The moment these interests change, every regime’s character may change or the regime may disappear.97

On the other hand, Stein admits that regimes can be preserved in spite of the change of interests that led to their formation. Initially, states don’t estimate their interests they do that only periodically. Soon after the operative institutions have set a behavioral model, states are trying to avoid the cost of constant estimations and re-estimations. They also consider the interests and benefits that are invested on the regimes themselves: changes of interests do not mean changes of regimes due to uncertainty regarding how permanent the change of interests is. The fact that a regime is already in power, becomes a decisive factor that prevents temporary decisions becoming permanent.98

Preservation of international regimes and hegemonic power

In the main part of the Modified Structural Realism theory, power concentration leads to stability of international regimes. Power fragmentation between competitive factors, on the other hand, leads to the regimes’ fragmentation. The hegemonic powers (the powerful EU member states) have the ability to preserve the international regimes they
prefer (in this case CFSP) either by using power to impose rules or by offering advantages to the ones that are co-operative with them. In this way, the leading powers have the ability to dominate in the international system through the regimes, and they supply the small and medium powers with the benefit of contribution or of proposition of initiatives. This situation is damaging for CFSP’s principle of equality and solidarity.

For a change in regime’s decision-making, power relations or operation to occur, all depend upon the condition that the following theory’s aspects are realised:

- A change occurs when hegemons (the strong EU member states) are not using their power either for internal reasons (changing of political aims) or for external reasons (changing in the evaluation of the situation, connection of their power to another sector), but for extending their dominance upon their weaker partners or for protecting their vital national interests.
- The international regime usually does not change, because of a decline of hegemonic power, or because the medium and small powers are substituting the big powers in preserving the regime.
- A change occurs due to some very important facts in the international system that facilitate co-operation and co-ordination (i.e. the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, etc.). As a result, member states issue common positions or undertake joint actions.

The above aspects provide an explanation of how and why changes in CFSP’s decision-making may occur.

**Legitimacy**

Legitimacy provides a different explanation from the one that refers to the preservation of external factors and of the interests that were created around them. Max Weber, wrote that “tradition offers legitimacy” and it is also “a base to preserve the political order”. Expanding this argument to the international relations domain, regimes, such as
the CFSP, can be preserved and empowered by tradition and their institutionalisation. Even in an anarchic environment, international institutions may acquire legitimacy that preserves the model of international behavior since the "initial" base of those institutions has disappeared. Consequently, even if combinations of interests that held these regimes change, the regimes can be preserved. This could be explained by developing the argument according to which actors give great importance in their 'good reputation' and believe that it is negatively affected if they don't respect the rules.\textsuperscript{102}
CONCLUDING REMARKS

All of the above approaches have been used in an attempt to explain and interpret the dynamics of integration and of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU although originally and in their inception they focused on different areas. Some have performed this task more centrally than others. If we take as an example the foreign policy provisions in the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, we will conclude that pluralist approaches, for instance, see these developments as a product of competing non-state interests and the realist approaches as a product of national self-interest. So, it is obvious that different approaches generate different perspectives. However, one can not say in this case that only one approach is useful and all the others are discredited and without substance. Nearly all approaches have something different to offer to the explanation of European integration and of the Union's foreign policy. Some of them are combined with each other. Neo-functionalism, for instance, combines elements from functionalism and federalism. This approach is the adaptation of functional theory in the particular conditions of regional integration that have been created in Western Europe when European Community first established. Federalists offer the model of the last stage of integration, the 'supranational state'. Functionalists, on the other hand, offer the dynamic of change -the machinery of integration-, in other words, the idea of dynamic evolution, which based in socio-economic pressures. The final product of the process, as we saw, is the so-called 'political community'.

The object of this chapter, as mentioned in the introductory remarks, is to explain the creation, function and perspectives (maintenance or changing) of the Diplomatic and Strategic regimes, that are included in the second pillar of the EU.

In any case factors of creation and the function of the two regimes must be defined along with the characteristics of the European political system. An explanation also must be given for the creation of these regimes, why they were developed at a specific historical moment. The analysis of the terms of creation and prospect of EU's
Chapter One

Diplomacy (foreign policy and politico-economic security) and Strategy (strategic security and prospect of a common defense policy) are based on the theories outlined in this chapter.

Recognizing a priori, through a theoretical assessment, the positive explanations and restrictions of the theories, the approach to be followed is to examine each time the degree to which the interpretation offered by the theoretical tools, confirms the data a researcher may have. Here are some indicative questions; what are the specific sectors of international relations that settle the regimes? Is there a leading (hegemonic) power in that sector? If not, what are the catalytic factors, who are taking actions? Is it the states, governments or supranational factors and what's their relation within the bounds of a specific international relation sector set by the regime?

Has there been a need for general principals, rules and information? In other words, did the factors have a common interest related to the need the CFSP regime would fulfill? Were there activities in economic sectors that pushed towards the direction of undertaking new ones in political sectors or were there previous activities that forced their expansion?

What is the state of the national system and did it affect foreign policy behaviour or not? In which way did member states hold the negotiations and how did they end up to agreements?

To sum up, the theoretical approaches and models discussed so far have provided us with some insight into the obstacles to and opportunities for creating a single European foreign policy. For instance, realism, on the one hand, and interdependence and Modified Structural Realism theories on the other, differ with respect to the impact that the international system has on the willingness or unwillingness of member states to collaborate and co-operate. Realism considers the anarchic character of the system basically as a disincentive to integration, while for interdependence and regime theories this anarchic system favours the development of mutual dependencies and as result it creates a crucial incentive for co-operation. Both neo-functionalism and regime theory agree that self-interest is the basic driving force behind the willingness of the states to
co-operate, though such a motivation is made conditional on the expectation that the gains from co-operation far outweigh the costs of uncooperative behaviour. The concept of national interest is at the heart of the realist school. However, we have to use this concept in the modified and extended version of the Structural Realism theory in combination with some aspects from the interdependence theory. This means that internal structures and processes, put together with agent-structural linkages as well as the combined and interrelated external actors' behaviour, account for foreign policy decision-making. In other words, national interests, foreign policy goals, domestic politics and the external environment all are combined together in what we call the Diplomatic and the Strategic regimes of the second pillar. Past experiences, perceptions of the behaviour of other actors and that of new international constellations, country-specific situational facts and economic interests, are also relevant determinants.

Since the aim of the thesis is to analyze the impact on and the contribution of the EU's weak member states on the CFSP regime and vice versa, what follows is an analysis of weak members' politics and behaviour that aims to the creation of a theoretical framework, based on the assumptions drawn by Modified Structural Realism that outlined in this chapter, in order first, to present an alternative assessment of CFSP through a weak-state dimension and second, to consider the case of Greece.

In addition, as we now shift our level of analysis and get into alternative explanations for the foreign policy outputs of EU's weak member states such as role, societal, governmental and decision-making factors, it is clear that there are certain important variables initiated from the principles of Modified Structural Realism, that have a contribution in the calculus of decisions at the subnational level. These variables, based on regimes' creation, contribution, perseverance and changing, are outlined in the next chapter, and are those that determine weak states' attitudes in the CFSP:

- Behavioural patterns in foreign policy issues;
- The domestic sources of the foreign policy of weak states;
- The dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of weak states; and
- Certain and distinct political and security perspectives in the diplomatic and strategic regimes that vary among the weak EU member states.
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The first three variables are considered and assessed in chapters three and four, whereas the fourth one is extensively analysed in chapters five and six.

Without explicit theories of state interests, interstate bargaining and assessment of variables, it is impossible to determine when consequences are truly unintended, the common interest is truly being upgraded, or supranational officials are truly acting autonomously.

5 Informal interview with Dr. Richard G. Whitman, University of Westminster, [conducted in London 27/2/98].
15 In a sense, the difference between the 1970s and 1980s was merely the latest oscillation of a recurring argument between realists and liberals over international relations. Realism, with
its focus on states' use of military force to balance power in the international system of states, has been the dominant strand. The liberal tradition has been the secondary strand, associated with such thinkers as Grotius, Cobden, and Woodrow Wilson. It stresses the impact on states of societal contracts, economic interdependence, and international institutions. Realists tend to take national interests for granted, whereas liberals note how interdependence and international institutions influence states' definitions of their national interests. How states define their national interests and how those interests change, have always been weak areas in the realist approach. The latter approach also does not recognize how contacts among different societies can introduce new ideas about national interests.

18 Thucydides: Histories, translation according to E. Venizelos, Smimiotakis, Athens, Chapter B', pg. 64, Book E', 10-14.
22 J. A. Caporaso, "Has Europe changed? Neorealism, institutions, and domestic politics in the New Europe", at the R. J. Jackson (editor), Europe in transition, Praeger, N. York, 1992, pg 22. Regarding the 2nd see R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, N. J., 1984, p.7: “any cooperation that occurs would be derivative from overall patterns of conflict”.

Ibid.

See the critic in neorealist views referred to the E.U from J. A. Caporaso, ibid pg.24-30.

VWEU has 10 members, 5 observers, 3 connected members and 9 connected partners.

NATO consists of 14 European and 2 North American states.


See at the Treaty for EU, B’ Statement for Western European Union, 1st paragraph: “due to stability and security in Europe”.

For the issue regarding the specific weakness of neorealism, see. R. Koslovski, Fr. V. Kratochwil, “Understanding change in international politics: the Soviet empire’s demise and the international system”, International Organization, 48,2, Spring 1994, pp.215-47.


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37 P. Ifestos uses the integration criteria according to Amitai Etzioni and David Mitrany as criteria of political unification, as conditions to create the European defense. See Hephaistus, *European defense and European integration, Europe of multi-speed and categorical against the European idea*, Odysseas, Athens, 1994, p. 89-94.


48 "All problems are intentionally associated under a negotiation, not because of technological necessity but due to political-ideological promotion and realistic competency". See J. S. Nye, *Peace in parts: integration and conflict in regional organization*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1971, p. 68.


50 Ernst B. Haas; "International integration; The European and the Universal process", *International Organization*, XV, August 1961, p. 372.

51 See *op. cit. (42)*, p. 48

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53 This occurred with telecommunications and post Office sectors. See J. A. Caporaso, Functionalism, spill-over and international integration, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1968.

54 Concerning spill-out, Nye outlines that “lack of balance caused by functional interdependence or internal bonds of targets/competence, may form a power able to push political factors in redefining their targets/competence. This target redefinition may not lead to the increase of competence, but it may have negative consequences as well. See J. S. Nye, op.cit., p. 56-58 and 65.


56 Meeting with Prof. Kevin Featherstone, University of Bradford, [conducted in Bradford, 14/7/98.]


58 Ibid, p.9


60 Ibid., p.9.

61 Ibid., p.10

62 Ibid., p.10-11.

63 See Gilpin, op.cit., p.39

64 Ibid., p.40

65 Ibid.

66 See K. J. Holsti, “Change in the international system; interdependence, integration and fragmentation”, in O. R. Holsti, R. M. Siverson & George A. L. (editors), Change in the international system, Westview, Boulder, 1980, p.27.


68 Ibid., p.26-29.

69 See K. J. Holsti, op.cit., p.27.

70 See Keohane & Nye, Power, op.cit., p.5

71 National regimes are developing not only because of interdependence, but because they want to influence and control it. “National Regimes are the intermediate elements between the international system's structure (distribution of power sources between the states) and the political and financial relations (bargains- function of the system) that are taking place within the bounds of the system. The structure of the system influences regime's nature. The regime accordingly, influences at some point and rules the political relations (bargains) and the daily decision-making that results within the bounds of the system”. See Ibid., p.19 and 21.

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Informal interview with Professor Mike Clarke, Director of the Center of Defence Studies, [conducted at Newcastle upon Tyne, 19/11/97.]
Ibid., p. 36.
Keohane, R. O., and Nye, J. S., Power and Interdependence, Little Brown, Boston, 1977, p. 34.
Ibid., p. 35.
See Nye, op. cit. (31) p. 372.
Ibid., p.39.
Ibid., p. 51-53.
Ibid., p.3.
Ibid., pp. 5-6.
Ibid., p. 307.
Ibid., p. 300.
Ibid., p.305.
Ibid., p.309-10.
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97 See Stein, op.cit. No 64, p.321.

98 Ibid., p.322.


100 Ibid., p.135, 156.

101 Ibid., p.135.

102 See Stein, op.cit., p.323.
Chapter Two

Politics Security and Foreign Policy Formulation of the Weak European Union Member States
INTRODUCTION

"...right as the world goes, is only in question between equals in powers, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."

Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Book V, Chapter 17.

Most of the major studies of modern European history and theories of European integration have usually been based on the relations among the big European powers: the UK, France and Germany. The study of the smaller and weaker EU member states, on the other hand, has been sorely neglected. The main aim of this chapter is to attempt to explore the features, capabilities and expectations of the weak EU member states in order first, to link the theoretical assumptions of the first chapter with the CFSP institutional analysis that follows second, to offer an alternative approach to European foreign policy analysis and third to highlight the axons of analysis of the forthcoming case study. It is also an attempt to spell out some of the practical political implications of the material inequality of states within the European Union. It is a reality the last two decades that within the EU those member states with greater economic resources and a large population have more influence on events outside their frontiers and within the Union's borders, greater security from pressure and attack, more prestige, and a larger element of choice in respect of the national policy they pursue than their weaker partners. A weak state on the other hand, is more vulnerable to pressure, more likely to give way under stress, more limited in respect of the political and strategic options open to it, and subject to a tighter connection between domestic and external affairs as it will be explained later in this chapter. In other words, the weaker the human and material
resources of a state the greater are the difficulties it must surmount if it is to maintain any valid political options at all.

In the CFSP’s framework, the weaker the state the less viable it is as a genuinely independent member of the international community. However, in the foreign policy domain, human and material capability is not the only factor. There are also factors that may modify the ability of the state to perform as a resistant rather than vulnerable, and active rather than passive, member of the international community. Among these are:

- the level of economic and social development that has been attained;
- the chance effects of geographical proximity to areas of conflict and importance between and to the great powers (European and global ones);
- the nature of the environment in which the state is placed;
- the cohesion of the population and
- the degree of internal support given the government of the day.

Nevertheless, material size and resources constitute two very important factors that their significance can not be neglected. They set the limit to what can be attained and fixes the international role and status of the nation more securely than any other. The first task of this chapter is to distinguish between small and weak EU member states. This research will focus upon the weak and not the small EU member states since size is only one of the variables that are examined. Holland and Belgium are small states but not at all weak since they are economically, politically and strategically strong.

The capacity of the state to withstand stress, on the one hand, and its ability to pursue a policy of its own devising, on the other, that are the key criteria that weak EU member states will be judged in this chapter. It is vital for any relevant research to try to provide answers to the following four questions:

1. what are the practical consequences for the small European power of the material inequality of states?

2. what are the limits of the weak power’s strength and, in particular, its capacity to withstand great external stresses within membership of the EU?

3. given the limited resources and the case, with which overwhelming strength can be marshalled against it, what national policies are open to the small power to pursue?
4. What are the dynamics of the weak-powerful member states relationships within the EU/CFSP framework.

Of course, since some weak states can, and in very many cases do, seek to offset their weaknesses by association or alliance with other powers, great and small within the EU this issue is also going to be assessed. We should have in mind though that where the quest for protection and insurance is successful a price must normally be paid in terms of sacrifice of autonomy in the control of national resources and loss of freedom of political manoeuvre and choice. For such states the answers to the first and third questions posed above are largely predetermined.

CHARACTERISTICS AND FEATURES OF THE WEAK EU MEMBER STATES

A weak power is a state which recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the small power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other states involved in international politics.¹

In general, we can describe the weak state as a state which, because of its lack of power, is unable to achieve most of its political goals vis-à-vis most other states. We can also think of weak states as those whose leaders (more than those of the powerful states) recognise that their own state’s political weight is limited to a local arena rather than to the global one, that they are dependent upon outside political forces for much of their security, and that their particular state’s interests may be dispensable in the eyes of one or more great powers.²

Weak powers are almost by definition ‘local’ powers whose demands are restricted to their own and immediately adjacent areas. The power of the weak state is narrow in ‘domain’ however much or little may be its ‘weight.’
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In other words, the outlook of weak states and their leaders is provincial or parochial. The majority of scholars that tried to define weak states have reached the conclusion that: 'where the great affairs of the world impinge on them directly, the leaders of a weak power will therefore generally find themselves operating in the light of their own regional interests, conflicts and fears.'

The characteristics and features of the weak EU member states can be classified into two broad categories:

- the political / strategic domain that includes: military power; position in the international system; and the significance of geopolitics.
- the economic domain that includes: economic issues, disabilities and resources.

In the model below, a comparison between weak and strong European states is outlined:
### The political / strategic domain

**Military power / position in the international system**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAK</th>
<th>STRONG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military power</strong></td>
<td><strong>STRONG</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Cannot defend itself</td>
<td>1. Can defend itself by its own power against any state or combination of states; very little reliance on external support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>against external threats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by its own strength; high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or total dependence on external help</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Total (or very high) dependence on</td>
<td>2. Has full array of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weapon acquisition in foreign countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A high proportion of strength</td>
<td>3. Domestic production of all weapons systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>always mobilised or at its disposal</td>
<td>4. Large standing armies combined with very high war potential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>longer-range war potential very low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The international system</td>
<td>1. Limited scope of interests (usually regional and neighbouring areas).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Little or no influence on the balance of power (or the nature of the system).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Mainly passive and reactive in foreign policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Tends to minimise risks, especially vis-à-vis the powers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Can be ‘penetrated’ relatively easily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Strong support for international law and norms and international organisations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Worldwide (global) interests.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Weighs heavily in world balance of power, shapes the nature of the international system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pursues a dynamic and active foreign policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Tends to maximise gains (rather than minimise risks).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relatively difficult to ‘penetrate’ (depends on nature of the internal political system).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Low regard for international law and organisations; prefers power and summit policies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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The Significance of Geopolitics

The geographical position of weak states could have decisive implications upon the formulation of their foreign and security policies since an important and key location, poses them in the situation of receiving potential military threats.

In that case, support for international law is in many respects an obvious policy and one with which weak states in general have historically been closely associated. This position constitutes a defence against intervention, especially in the case of Greece.

The possible geographic advantages and disadvantages of the weak states can be summarised according to Handel as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible advantages</th>
<th>Possible disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Large territory: higher probability of including a larger and more balanced variety of natural resources; more room for strategic manoeuvre.</td>
<td>1. Small in size: lower probability of a large and balanced variety of natural resources; a serious strategic disadvantage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Combination of natural, easy-to-defend borders and difficult or impassable terrain.</td>
<td>2. Lack of easy-to-defend borders, and terrain conducive to fast advancement of troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Geographic isolation or a low number of adjacent and weaker neighbours preferably non-hostile ('low border pressure').</td>
<td>3. Large number of bordering countries, more powerful and with conflicting goals ('high border pressure').</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Located on the periphery of the relevant system or subsystem. Distant from the active center of the system. Nonstrategic location.</td>
<td>4. Central location in a system or subsystem (in conflict). Location of strategic importance to the powers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Geopolitical factors, including the geographical position of a country, are elements that definitely affect a state’s security. Weak states make ideal candidates for a regional or global power to use as means to project its influence, secure transport lanes, or prevent a hostile power from acquiring outposts.

The economic domain

Since interstate warfare is not frequent in this age of European integration and the effect of globalisation is growing, the actual and potential diplomatic strength of a state, stems not only from pure military power but also from the state’s economic capabilities. In other words, economic strength in contemporary EU affairs constitutes a very strong diplomatic and bargaining tool that in many cases becomes the most important factor for determining the rank in the European hierarchy. For some Commission’s officials such as At. Theodorakis, ‘the current trend that leads to the concentration of wealth in the powerful EU countries has to stop.’ Apart from that as Ben Soetendorp noted, weak states have to deal with special issues such as funding. As a result, they are tied to strong states’ attitudes and pressures.

A key aspect of security problems relates to the dependent nature of weak states’ economies. Economic dependence can be argued to be the root cause of most of these problems. Weak EU member states need external aid to develop their infrastructure; markets in which to sell their commodity production; and foreign investment to introduce a measure of industrialisation to their economy. Taking into account the effort for reaching the convergence criteria for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), in many cases financial assistance is required in order to balance the budgets. “It seems preferable to define a weak state as one which, while depending comparatively heavily upon EU foreign trade both for supplies and sales markets, makes only a modest contribution to the aggregate flow of international trade . . . a
state is weak from the point of view of foreign trade when its dependence on foreign markets is relatively great but its contribution to them small in absolute terms.\(^8\)"

"Most weak countries have a more specialised export industry than powerful countries. This follows from the distribution of natural resources over the world surface, from regional differences in climate and traditions, and from advantages in specialisation and large-scale production. It is easy to find examples where agricultural or forest products, fish, ore, oil or shipping dominate the exports of weak countries. Powerful countries are less likely to have all their export ‘eggs’ in one or a few baskets. There is, therefore, an \textit{a priori} likelihood that weak countries will more often find themselves for periods in a favourable or unfavourable situation as regards the trends and potentialities of their dominating exports.\(^9\)"

As Sullivan argues\(^{10}\), economic development and size appear to influence the formulation of their foreign policy as well as determining a state’s power.

The best summary of economic problems of weak states has been provided by Ward\(^{11}\), who set out the problem in traditional supply and demand terms.

Among the fundamental supply problems are:

- \textit{Land}. Not only is land restricted in area, but often the inherent physical properties of the land as well as its variety of resources are limited.

- \textit{Labour}. There is likely to be a narrower spread of labour skills in a weak state, as well as comparatively less effective manpower capability, even though the proportion of people in the labour force may be the same as in a stronger country. The country will probably also be more affected by imbalances in its demographic structure, as in the case of Greece.

- \textit{Capital}. In a weak state a large proportion of the available capital will probably be owned and controlled by foreign multinational corporations. The government also has to rely heavily on outside grants and loans of some sort or another, as Greece does on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), on the Cohesion Fund and on Structural Funds. In general, therefore, the borrower is small in relation to both actual and potential lenders and investors.
Chapter Two

- **Entrepreneurship.** Independent local businessmen in weak states tend to be few in numbers, to lack organisational skills and to face many obstacles in their local economic environment, such as the difficulty of securing freehold tenure for industrial activities.

Among the demand constraints mentioned by Ward, two are given prominence:

1. *The domestic market.* The basic problem of the limited size and narrowness of the domestic market is often further complicated by demographic characteristics, which increase the diversification of the pattern of demand and lead to even greater fragmentation of an already small market. The maximum, let alone optimum, technically efficient scale of plant that can be introduced in such weak economies thus renders some productive activities completely uneconomical unless a substantial export potential is also available.

2. *External markets.* As a result of these limitations the rate of growth of the economy in a weak state tends to be primarily a function of the rate of growth of exports of goods and services. In turn, exports are typically highly concentrated on one or two products, whereas imports are very diverse. The weak state's economy is thus dependent on foreign trade but lacks the capacity to exert any influence over the international market either in respect of price or quotas.

*****

The model below is an attempt to constructively blend all the conclusions and the assumptions made in the previous sections in order to have a first platform of analysis that will serve as an introduction to the more specific domain that we examine, that of CFSP and its impact on Greece.
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Elements determining the strength of a state

Internal Sources of Strength

External Sources of Strength

Formal alliances

Collective good with great powers mixed alliances with other weak states

1. Geographic conditions (location, terrain, border space, etc.)
2. Material conditions (natural resources, industrial development, capital, technology, etc.)
3. Human resources (population size, national character, ethnic and political homogeneity, etc.)
4. Organisational capabilities (political institutions, adaptability, military preparedness, etc.)

Formal

Informal

Patron-client relationship
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What can we conclude from the model described above? How may we understand the opportunities and willingness of weak states, in terms of their range of foreign policy choices and their ability to exercise influence in the European and in the international system? Probably the most important features are size and power. Size and power reduce or increase the diplomatic resources, which can be brought to bear on the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Apart from that, for the weak states there is also a general, limited capacity for influence and interaction with their partners. Weak states lack the capacity to act offensively and to exert a decisive influence on other nations. They are also generally limited in personnel, both in number and in skill and financial constraints provide for only a small-scale foreign policy apparatus.

Weak states also have difficulty in obtaining and interpreting information from the external environment, and this causes them to be slow to perceive various opportunities and constraints. These bureaucratic and personnel factors limit the ability of weak European member states to have a high degree of international interaction with a large number of states, causing most weak states to have a low level of international involvement. In addition, a weak domestic economy, a small military and limited wealth mean that weak states do not normally have a wide range of tools with which to implement their foreign policies. Greece, for instance, spends a great amount of its GDP (6 to 7 per cent) financing its defence forces in order to strengthen its military power but still does not acquire the power required to pursue foreign policy goals, since its weak economy and lack of resources constitute huge constraints towards this effort.

The instruments of foreign policy are few and it is vital for weak states to carefully manage their external relations in order to minimise risks and reduce the impact of policy failures. They have fewer margins for error than the more powerful states in the EU since the price that they will pay in potential losses is much higher. Apart from that, the small domestic economies of these states cause them to have a high degree of dependence on foreign trade, but with low levels of economic diversification and concentrated export markets. This condition leaves weak states vulnerable to fluctuations in the world economy and open to domination by their trading partners.
Michael Brecher\textsuperscript{12} differentiates between two components in the conduct of foreign policy of a given state: an \textit{initiating} element and a \textit{reactive} element. The policy of each individual state is a mixture of the two. Nevertheless, the more powerful a state is, the more the initiating element is evident in its foreign policy. However, Brecher does not completely exclude the possibility of initiative by weak states on a regional level, as it was the case with the Greek proposition to send troops to Albania in 1997.\textsuperscript{13}

The normal status for the weak European powers is more a matter of reacting to situations created by others over whom they have little or no control, than it is of taking the obvious and direct measures that would, on the face of it, seem the simplest way of getting what they want. A moment's reflection on recent international history will reveal at least that the "non-greats" main activities have been to respond to situations presented to them by those more powerful than themselves and that most of their decisions have been on how to deal with situations they had little or no part in creating,\textsuperscript{14} as it was with the situation that the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia created in the Balkans, after strong pressure from Germany. The powerful EU member states also use their veto power in a more confident way since there is no fear towards any potential losses as it was the case with the United Kingdom and the BSE crisis in 1996.\textsuperscript{15}

For Iñestos the important question is the direction that the EU's solidarity and \textit{acquis communautaire} take and what are their implications since among the EU's sovereign states democracy means unanimity.\textsuperscript{16} As far as the European Union goes, on matters requiring unanimity, even the weakest member state can – theoretically at least – rock the boat. All members, at least constitutionally, are equal partners. Although, in theory, this may hold especially true as regards EPC and CFSP, and their co-ordination mechanisms since they operate along the lines of traditional intergovernmentalism and diplomacy. Within the CFSP decision-making structure all member states can veto or block the reaching of any decision ("common position" or "joint action") since unanimity is required nearly in all cases. Something that is a strong bargaining tool for the weak states since sometimes they unofficially negotiate their positions with their powerful partners in order to maximise their benefits in other areas where they do not have the
luxury of being equal. Since, in reality and especially in the first pillar, some members may prove to be more equal than others, to paraphrase George Orwell. On matters not requiring unanimity, the EU treaties provide for inequality, taking into account the unequal importance of the members’ demographic, economic and geographical weight. The same applies to the distribution of seats in the elected European Parliament. Also on defence issues according to Willaert, almost any decision is dominated by the big European powers.

Nevertheless, despite their generally narrower focus, there are specific subjects on which even the weak EU member states can have worldwide interests, such as Greece having far-flung maritime interests. The Greek commercial fleet also represents the 48 per cent of the European Union fleet.

It is the peculiar and characteristic quality of the external affairs of the weak state that fundamentally, and in the long run, leads to a defensive role within the CFSP framework. Its major problems are how to avoid situations where its weaknesses will be exposed and exploited and how, on the other hand, to make the most of its limited resources.

As Vital argues, the weak state is not debarred from participating in political and commercial arrangements concluded between sovereign states on a basis of equality and joint interest. It has every reason to seek them. The difficulty is that it has little to offer. It is too small in size to offer security or military protection and too limited in resources to offer weighty commercial or financial advantages, let alone economic aid. Its ability to create or evoke an interest on the part of other member states in friendship and cooperation with it need not be negligible in all circumstances, but it cannot be very great. Whatever it receives in return for political, economic or technical assistance will be subject to great uncertainties. It can make no arrangements which offer security against ‘stressful situations’ in an organisation such as the EU. As a result, the weak EU member states have little or no impact upon policy formulation, decision-making and policy implementation. They focus their activities on various bargaining games, sometimes underlined by a “zero sum” attitude, and try to identify their interests with those of their powerful partners whenever this is feasible.
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THE DEFINITION OF THE WEAK EU MEMBER STATE

The particularities of the Greek case

The characteristics and features of the weak EU member states as analysed in the previous section were classified into two broad categories:

- the political / strategic domain that includes: military power; position in the international system; and the significance of geopolitics.
- the economic domain that includes: economic issues, disabilities and resources.

Taking into consideration these two broad areas together with the limitations and the constraints they present we can draw some assumptions regarding the definition of the weak EU member states. We can therefore define as a weak EU member state: the country or countries that their military, economic, and bargaining power together with their strategic value are situated in a low level of the relative power spectrum.

Following this definition, we can classify the member states of the EU into two broad categories: the one that includes France, Germany and the United Kingdom and the one that includes the remaining twelve members. Nevertheless, we also recognise that the second category is divided into certain, admittedly loose, groups. It is useful to distinguish between at least three more broad classes among the lesser states. The first group includes Italy, Spain, and Holland, which for Keohane and Nye could be classified as ‘soft powers’ and exist in the middle of the power spectrum; the second, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, and Luxembourg and the third, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. According to Tonra and Featherstone, it is on the third group that the CFSP institutional development had the biggest impact. However, this study will divide member states just in two broad categories, strong and weak, in order to assess more clearly its capabilities, differences and attitudes.

The measure of state power in the European Union’s Common Foreign Policy framework, is the capacity of a government to induce other member states, or governments, to follow lines of conduct or policy which they might otherwise not pursue; alternatively, it is the capacity to withstand the pressure of other member states which are intent on deflecting it from a course which the national interest would appear
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to require. For the big European power it is the first aspect of power that is of highest and most immediate importance; for the weak state it is the second.

Greece presents is a unique case study for analysing weak state behaviour. As a state it has the limitations and the constraints that all weak EU member states do but also embodies some peculiarities that are worth exploring both in economic and political terms. The peculiarities of the Greek case, that give the country a special place among the other weak EU member states are centred in the following three issues:

☐ The lack of persuasion power in the EU/CFSP decision-making structures;
☐ The situation where EU policies and politics are transformed into ‘position issues’ in Greek domestic politics; and
☐ The problematic orientation of Greece.

More particularly, Greece is a weak EU member state not only because of its limited military, economic, bargaining and strategic power but also because of the three additional parameters that listed above and never existed in the cases of the other two weak EU member states, Ireland and Portugal.

☐ The lack of persuasion power in the EU/CFSP decision-making structures.

Greece has failed in great number of occasions to persuade their EU/CFSP partners of issues directly related with its external security or with other important policy areas.

Not all of the weak states fully recognise the limitations on their abilities to take initiatives and see them through, as Greece did not when it imposed an embargo to the neighbouring state of FYROM, an action that was above its capabilities. The country lost both on economic and political terms after imposing an embargo to the neighbouring state FYROM after a bilateral dispute concerning the new state’s name. Its European partners failed to perceive the rationale behind that act either first, because of Greece’s lack of persuasion power, second, because of lack of information and third, because they considered the issue of no great importance. The result was that Greece found itself politically isolated within the EU, whereas there was also a financial price to pay since trade and commercial relations with the neighbouring state ceased to exist.
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- The situation where EU policies and politics are transformed into 'position issues' in Greek domestic politics.

For both major political parties, PASOK and New Democracy, most of the EU/CFSP issues are considered as 'position issues' in the domestic political arena. Consensus is reached only in issues related to Turkey since the neighbouring state is recognised as the major security problem of Greece.

The PASOK party, for instance, made Greece's EC membership as one of its main pre-electoral declarations in 1981 arguing that in the case they won the general elections Greece would leave the Community. The main rationale was simply to attack the New Democracy's European policy that put Greece into the EC. Apart from that, since in most cases Greek politicians were unable and unsuccessful to persuade their European partners for the Greek positions and for issues related to Greece's European policy they frequently resorted to accusations against the EC in order to justify their failure.

- The problematic orientation of Greece.

Greece is a country that suffered for years from an identity crisis stemmed from its international orientation and posture. It is located in an extremely precarious and volatile geographical area, and was subjected to blatant foreign intervention almost since inception as a modern state. As a result, the psychological and political significance of being an institutional participant in a wider collective body of policymaking like that of the EU/CFSP can hardly be overstated. However, some of the legacies of the past continue to torment Greek foreign policy and in certain cases they create problems of orientation and credibility. Clearly, the Greek governments will have much to do in order to address the 'credibility deficit' that has resulted from the country's prior European policies and attitudes.

In this thesis the notion of the 'weak state' will embody all the characteristics and the assumptions that were highlighted in this section. Our task is to use the definition of the 'weak EU member state' presented in this section, together with the peculiarities that
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characterise the Greek case study as a weak state, as a platform in order to comprehend certain foreign policy behavioural patterns and to assess the impact of EPC/CFSP upon Greek politics.

WEAK STATES, THEORETICAL QUESTIONS AND CFSP: THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERDEPENDENCE

Since the thesis’ theoretical approach borrows elements and features from interdependence and regime theories form the basis of the research, it will be fruitful to assess and evaluate their application on weak states’ foreign affairs. As Singer argues, interdependence in general, is the psychological relationship between states that feel themselves autonomous, and more or less equal, but recognise the advantages of reciprocal dependence. Each unit in the relationship feels that it has something to contribute to the other, and that the other has something to contribute to it. While each unit may feel that it could, if necessary, survive and perhaps prosper without the relationship, it believes it can prosper more in association with the other, and voluntarily enters into the relationship. Each unit perceives itself as in one way or another equal or nearly equal to the other, and treats the other as though it were in fact equal, whether it actually is or not. Thus, the actual power relationship that exists between the units may be less important than the perceived relationship of equality. In this circumstance, one unit is willing to become dependent upon some other unit for some issues in the expectation that for different issues, or at different times, the other will be dependent upon it. The perceived complementarity leads to the establishment of interdependence. In the case of the CFSP, the weaker the state the more willing it is to form and create interdependent relations (linkages) or alliances with its partners, preferably with the weak ones based on the principle of mutual understanding. As a result, the structure of the regime that is developed is extremely complex. This complex structure, which according to Keohane and Nye, is called complex interdependence, has structurally induced constraints on the range of choice of nation
states. The lack of serious global military threats, in addition to the presence of multiple global common goods, has dictated changes in the priorities nation-states establish as well as their means of influencing world politics. A wide variety of issues and their accompanying regimes are dominating the international arena, rather than the traditional military and security concerns, in a process of slow change. Nevertheless, because of the absolute limits of the weak state's economic and social resources, the political value of foreign policy co-operation can never be great.

Traditional power theory has a difficult time accounting for the impact of interdependence, issue regimes and transnational relations on international politics, especially in the sense of modifying our conceptions of the sources of power and influence. Keohane and Nye's conception of power as originating from asymmetric interdependent relationships is a major conceptual change from the realist notion of power as attributes and military might. Importantly, though, in this conceptualisation of power we obtain a new perspective of power as emanating from relationships between states (CFSP) instead of a comparison of their relatively fixed resources. With respect to issue regimes and global collective goods, the nature of the problems themselves and the anarchy of the international system imply that only the co-operative and voluntary agreements are fruitful. In practice, everything that has been achieved in the CFSP was based on mutual recognition of interests (when possible), voluntary and involuntary compromises and on inevitability.

The character of the contemporary international system seems to be one in which the concepts of 'influence' and 'interdependence' are appropriate alternatives to the concepts of 'power' and 'sovereignty'. The development of theories about interdependence, regimes, transnationalism, and so on, has simultaneously refined and expanded our understanding of international politics. In addition, as we now shift our level of analysis and move to the process of providing alternative explanations for the foreign policy outputs of states such as societal, governmental and decision-making factors, it is clear that apart from power, size and resources there are also other important variables that have a contribution in the calculus of decisions at the
subnational level. These variables are those that determine weak states’ attitudes in the CFSP:

- Behavioural patterns in foreign policy issues;
- The domestic sources of the foreign policy of weak states;
- The dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of weak states; and
- Certain and distinct political and security perspectives in the diplomatic and strategic regimes that vary among the weak EU member states.

FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR

After mentioning the weak states’ features, environment, and the opportunities and constraints which are presented by such an environment, it is possible to construct some understanding about the foreign policies of EU’s weak states. An understanding about foreign policy as decision making, output and behaviour within the CFSP structure. The behaviour of weak states in the CFSP framework is generally defined as relatively passive and reactive. This is due to the bargaining inability of the weak states, as a result of their lack of power, and the way they are frequently manipulated by great powers. Bargaining capability is essential within the CFSP since most of the decisions are compromises resulting from hard bargaining. Due also to the absence of bargaining power, sometimes countries such as Greece have to use their veto power in order to bloc a decision that they consider to be harmful for their national interests. Nevertheless according to Tsoukalis, it is negative for a weak state to exercise its veto power for a long period, nothing positive is happening and the weak state is becoming even more vulnerable.27 Weak states according to Clarke, use CFSP as a forum where their voices can be heard but also as a regime where they can stop things and this is the case especially with Greece.28

In this framework, weak states are generally expected to demonstrate the following kinds of foreign policy behaviour within CFSP:
• *Low levels of overall participation in CFSP affairs:* because weak states have limited human and material resources and their status in the pillar structure is lower than that of their powerful partners, they have fewer opportunities to influence the decision-making in the CFSP.

• *High levels of activity in international organisations and international fora:* because weak states have limited diplomatic resources they will use them in the most cost-efficient manner by strengthening their multilateral ties and create alternative routes and alliances other than the CFSP.

• *High levels of support for international legal norms:* since the present norm of sovereign equality, as far as state recognition is concerned, is to the benefit of weak states, since the system which grants them the same recognition as larger states they are highly supportive to it. Weak states survival generally depends upon respect for international law and the practice of international co-operation.

• *Avoidance of the use of force as a technique of statecraft:* because weak states do not have the capacity to maintain a large military, they will not attempt to use force in their international relations since there is a high chance of military defeat.

• *Avoidance of behaviour which tends to alienate the more powerful states in the system:* weak states are dependent upon the larger powers; consequently they would not wish to challenge them.

• *A narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities:* since the weak-state capacity for international interaction is limited, it is most likely that their interaction will be regionally located (Greece / Balkans), and that weak states will concentrate their resources on the few major substantive issues which involve them (as Greece did by sending troops to Albania in 1997 to assist to the restoration of law and order and to the provision of humanitarian aid).

We thus have a general picture of the EU weak state as an inactive submissive state in international affairs. In most cases, weak states do not challenge the status quo – are in fact supportive of it – and try to cultivate the goodwill of the larger powers whenever this is feasible. Weak states are dependent upon international law and normative
principles for this status, and naturally they attempt to encourage other states to abide by the same principles.

In the model below we can observe the degree of equality and the benefits that derived from the strong-weak state relationship within the CFSP. It is a kind of patron-client relationship in some cases and the weaker the member state the lower the benefits. As a result, in practice weak states are prone to unilateral exploitation.

Correlation between degree of equality and benefits derived in great power-weak state relationship within the CFSP framework

Weak states are assumed to have, almost exclusively, reactive foreign policies – they rarely take the foreign policy initiative in the CFSP decision-making process – and they are invariably reacting to pressure from their powerful EU partners. The ability of a weak state to exercise influence is thus usually understood as its ability to resist the
demands of a larger state (Greece finds very difficult to resist pressure from its EU partners considering Turkey's potential membership).

Weak states can exert influence and leverage on a larger state by appealing to mutual interest and future dangers. The power of persuasion may be substantial if a weak state can convince a larger power that a particular action is also the interest of the bigger state. This may especially be the case if the weak state has something to offer the larger state – such as a strategic location, a valuable commodity or a prestigious political association. In this sense, strength on the part of the weak state emanates more from its relationship with the other state.

Weak states in the EU usually carefully manage their foreign policies to avoid risky behaviour, they are careful not to aggravate other states, and they are generally unwilling to either exert influence on other states or to disrupt the balance of the international system, unless this is absolutely necessary. Frequent use of the veto power could only lead to further isolation, whereas unwillingness to co-operate causes more tension between the member states and as a result no progress is achieved.

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF WEAK STATES' FOREIGN POLICY

Moving to the governmental level of analysis, sometime small size can be an asset. Smallness can facilitate administrative co-ordination and integration and promote the responsiveness of public servants. The military and economic constraints of size may thus become a diplomatic strength. By developing and encouraging a small but efficient bureaucracy, a small state may concentrate its diplomatic efforts on key international 'pressure points'. There is flexibility, no delays in reaching decisions and clarity in the state's position. Luxembourg and Ireland are two good examples.

There are additional societal factors, discussed extensively in the case study, which may overcome primary size constraints and provide opportunities for the small size. Internal political stability may provide confidence and flexibility in policy making, and domestic intellectual and cultural resources may contribute to a prestigious international
reputation. Also, domestic economic constraints may be overcome by location, market access and historical ties.

Total power of a state

There is no doubt that up to a certain extent domestic politics influence the foreign policy of any state, weak or powerful. According to Tsoukalis, in the weak European states, governments are tied to public opinion otherwise their policy would have been bolder. Nevertheless, it seems that domestic politics in the weak states, especially during times of international crisis, have less impact on their foreign policies than would be the case with their great European partners. One of the characteristics of the weak states is that they play a much smaller part than the great powers in shaping the nature of the international and European system. Usually this system for them is a datum. As a result of their weakness there are fewer options for action open to them. So, because of
their limitations, the weak states must reach a greater consensus domestically with regard to the policy they should pursue. Even if opinions differ with regard to the foreign policy to be followed, there is still little room for choice. In Greece, for instance, although in the past traditionally the opposition party used to reject totally the foreign policy of the governing party, in the nineties and when the country started to participate more actively in the CFSP and put forward its national interests, it was realised that national consensus that will guarantee policy continuity was required. Weak states therefore, can not afford disagreements on the domestic level. The image that projects a weak and politically divided state is very negative to its powerful partners and its propositions and initiatives are not considered valid since they leave space for insecurity in the future.

On the other hand, the question of the influence of a weak state’s domestic institutional structure on its foreign policy is related to the argument that due to its smaller size it can make decisions faster and more efficiently than a great power. According to Vitafo, ... the policy-makers [in the weak state] can themselves become personally familiar with the detail of the topics they are most concerned with. The influence of the bureaucracy is therefore much reduced and decisions are more apt to be taken without or despite its advice and with far less inhibition than might be the case in great powers ... Perception of affairs is more direct, less influenced by, and less dependent on, advisers.

THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS

Since weak states lack up to an extent the traditional instruments of power and influence, they emphasise their sovereign equality with the larger powers as their main justification for being ‘heard’ in the European and in the international arena. However, the relationships between strong and weak member states in the European Union are constantly changing, and in many cases, weak states are on the spot, facing extreme difficulty in adjusting their foreign policies to the new status quo, since any false
movement could have ‘painful’ consequences. Therefore, in order to adjust, weak states have to adopt a kind of active strategy, which according to Vital, has the purpose of altering the possibly negative external environment in favour of the weak state up to an extent, by one or more of these three means: reducing an unfavourable discrepancy in strength, broadening the field of manoeuvre and choice, and increasing the total resources on which the state can count in time of stress. Accordingly, there are two classes of targets in the CFSP: those which pertain to relations with the powerful member states and those, which pertain to relations with the extra-regional powers, the great states of the world.

Because of their limited material resources, weak states are defined as having virtually little or no power, as being ‘system takers’, and as always being on the policy ‘defensive’. Naturally then, weak states can exercise influence only when they are able to exploit competing great-power interests, and in this context their foreign policies should reflect great-power manipulation. In addition, weak states are presumed to be overwhelmingly preoccupied with maintaining their territorial security.

As noted in earlier section in this chapter, the range of limited, contingent levers of influence are very important for weak states. These are chiefly functions of geographical and geopolitical circumstances such as location in, or proximity to, areas of conflict (Greece’s location in the Balkan Peninsula falls in this category) and strategic importance and possession of rare or valued natural resources. There may also be such political advantages as occur when the state enjoys the rotating Presidency of the European Union, for a six-month period. But such advantages, however real and useful, can rarely be deliberate creations of national policy and are only barely amenable to political manipulation. They are windfall profits and as such not to be relied on for more than a very limited period. Therefore, the exploitation of such advantages has to be based on strategic planning and political realism. Broadly speaking, where a weak state is in possession of a strategic or commercial or political facility, this facility can only be exploited to advantage in relation to relatively minor issues. In short, the use of geographical, commercial and political advantages is only a little less limited in scope than the employment of purely political and diplomatic instruments of state and the
consequences of too heavy a reliance upon them may be disastrous. For Greece, the country's participation in various peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and the safeguard of its borders due to the large number of illegal immigrants proved to be financially devastating.

Adaptation to changes in the European and regional environment is also a key issue. This process of adaptation can link together external and internal factors to an extent where considerations of compatibility — relating to external constraints and opportunities for foreign policy goals — and consensus — relating to the internal setting of foreign policy-making — may become overlapped and inseparably intertwined. The crucial question has been how the boundary interaction with the environment and the effects of this interaction upon the essential economic, social and political structures of the weak member states could most effectively be controlled.

In any case, it is vital for weak states not to alienate themselves from their European or global environment. Even great powers have traditionally displayed some reluctance to allow themselves to be isolated from the rest of the international community for long periods of time on almost any subject. For a non-great power, isolation is particularly dangerous and even countries that have adopted policies of non-alignment and neutrality are, as we have seen, careful to avoid an isolation that leaves them unable to find international support from any quarter for any of their policies. A government that has any substantial interest to protect in the international field knows the importance of having good relations with countries with similar interests or which may be willing to barter support in one area for support in another.

THE DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC REGIMES AND WEAK STATES: RESOURCES AND PERSPECTIVES

The capacity of the weak state to avoid, soften or resist potential conflicts depends upon the extent to which it can create a contradiction for its opponent between the advantages of pursuing the conflict to the end and the advantages of some alternative
course. In the political sphere this means, in effect, a capacity to create or encourage an interest that is common to both states, or to a number of states. In the military sphere this means the ability to deter.

The consideration of the resources on which security depends and the extent to which these are available to a weak EU state is an extremely important issue, especially for a country like Greece. Scarce human and economic resources, geographical position, and political structure are some of the factors, which affect the security of a weak state. From this internal perspective and according to Espindola, the security resources of a weak state can be grouped into those relating to diplomacy, and those concerning arms and the security forces.

**The power of diplomacy**

One of the most important instruments at the disposal of a small power, in carrying out its foreign policy within the European Union, is diplomacy. A country’s place in the world, a people’s conception of themselves – their identifiable existence – can depend on an effective diplomacy.

Diplomatic skills are considered essential for those countries trying to exercise influence beyond their borders, whether they are a regional power trying to capture new markets, advance their interests, or a world power competing on the global stage. In such cases, the size and professionalism of a country’s diplomatic service often provides a measure of the weight a state carries within the international system, indicating the level of human and economic resources it is able and willing to commit in search of international influence. For weak states diplomatic contacts are a matter of survival. Diplomatic missions abroad are essential to seek the support of larger countries and international organisations, as well as to prevent, through diplomatic contacts and negotiations, risks of conflict with other states. However, scarcity of skilled personnel is a problem affecting not only the diplomatic representation of a weak state but also its ability to gather, obtain, collate, and analyse information related to its interests.
According to Linton\textsuperscript{33}, weak states need to rely not only on sober, democratic, and humane domestic policies, which ensure internal tranquillity, but also on prudent foreign policy and effective diplomacy. The record of weak states shows that they are quite capable of conducting their diplomacy ably, and some of the most astute diplomatic operations in international fora have come from these states. Size is no limitation in respect of diplomatic ability, even if a small population and limited resources mean that the size of the diplomatic establishment and its geographical range are limited. A weak state instead of overextending valuable resources at a number of missions around the globe, typically concentrates its diplomatic staff and their energies in the capitals of the most key powerful states so as their efforts can be more productive. A reputation of diplomatic effectiveness can be a valuable bargaining strength, and selective placement of embassies and personnel may help overcome the information and communications constraints of size.

\textbf{The allocation of resources for national defence}

It is beyond any doubt that weak states usually have a clear appreciation of their vulnerabilities, a realistic assessment of the potential and actual threats to their security, and a renewed analysis of the question of capacity. Paradoxically, weak states, such as Greece, because of their military weakness and insecurity, apply maximum resources to analysing security problems, assessing interests, possibilities and capabilities, indeed taking security at a new level of seriousness and purposefulness. According to Linton\textsuperscript{34}, whatever the size of the security forces, it seems clear that they should be highly trained and motivated and be as multipurpose as possible. Weak states cannot afford the luxury of a conventional approach to military or police roles: their forces should be able to carry out a diversity of functions, from disaster control through maritime and / or border surveillance to regular military self-defence roles. Once again the key factor is the economic and human resources available. The size and composition
of security forces in small and weak countries varies enormously, reflecting not only the resources available but also the perception of particular needs and threats. The size of the Irish armed forces is relatively small since there are no external threats, whereas it is the exact opposite situation with Greece despite the fact that the required economic resources are limited in both countries. (see Appendix III)

As Vital argues, the magnitude of the defence effort in relation to total economic resources determines the extent of weaknesses of the defence establishment. But it can be affected by the extent to which the essential supplies are drawn from domestic, rather than foreign, sources. It is nearly impossible for almost any state to maintain an entirely autonomous defence industry. But in determining what it will attempt to produce at home and what it will seek abroad the defence authorities will be faced with a number of extremely difficult dilemmas to resolve. And once again, the smaller the resources of the state the harsher are the dilemmas.

Broadly speaking, there are two mutually exclusive sets of considerations to take into account:

- the presence of military threats and external enemies that dictates the maintenance of skilled armed forces, and
- the percentage of the weak state’s reliance on foreign defence industries in order to built a reliable defence system and be able to deter threats.

These considerations are to be weighed either as part of a coherent national defence policy, or else as particular cases arise.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The general question with which this chapter has been concerned, based on the variables that were outlined, is whether a weak European member state can be a
significant actor within the European Union generally, and within the CFSP decision-making structure specifically.

It is a widely held view that the national governments and parliaments determine the foreign policy of all states. This, however, is correct only in so far as the formal decisions, through which this policy is given expression, appear as decisions of these organs. It is concluded that in reality, foreign policy of weak states is determined by factors on which the relevant governments have little influence such as: bargaining capability, military power, economic prosperity, strategic location, relationship with the key players within the CFSP system and adaptability to political change. The main task of weak states therefore is to keep informed about these factors and their interplay and in this connection to form an opinion of the right moment to exploit the prevailing situation to further their interests. An important denominator, of course, is the power balance between the great European powers that actually determines certain foreign policies and power relations in the European Union and in consequence in the CFSP framework. Something that makes the situation even more difficult since for the majority of the weak member states, CFSP constitute the primary vehicle for their foreign policy. 36

The central issue that weak member states' European policies have faced over the past 10 years has been the problem first, of how to cope effectively with change in the external environment, and its effects upon internal economic and societal structures; second, of how to resist pressure from their powerful partners, and third of how to promote their national interests. Their contribution to the CFSP decision-making processes falls into this area.

The survival of the weak European member states as independent powers within CFSP is precarious, depending on a multitude of factors over many of which, as outlined in the chapter, they themselves have little influence. Long term considerations and strategic planning in all major fields - the economic, the military and the political - have to be based upon the assumption that in a sudden change of the status quo the weak states will be affected more. And yet, what has been said of the economic sphere is largely true of the political and military: in an imperfect world a great many short and
medium term tactics can be adopted to keep the machinery of state running and to keep a measure of autonomous control over the national destiny. Some states will be more successful in this than others, either because they are better placed in terms of resources or else because they are more fortunate in their opponents.

Therefore, the value of weak states in CFSP is not at all significant. Weak states such as Greece, in many cases, used CFSP rather to stop things than conduct foreign policy. Nevertheless, according to David Allen: 'CFSP provided a huge resource for weak states'. This will be the subject of the forthcoming chapters.

This chapter explored the features, capabilities and expectations of the weak EU member states and provided a model first, for the more detailed analysis of the institutional development of the CFSP and second, for the case study that follow. This model built upon the theoretical approach analysed in the first chapter considers CFSP as a regime with two domains: the political / diplomatic and the security / strategic ones. In these two domains weak states according to their:

- Military power,
- Economic prosperity,
- Strategic location,
- Bargaining capability,
- Adaptability to political change, and
- Relationships with the key CFSP players,

operate in CFSP. The analysis of the case study of Greece that follows attempts to highlight upon some key historical and political events that are closely associated with the regime of political co-operation in Europe, starting from the country's EC membership and its impact; its participation in the EPC/CFSP framework; and its contribution in the preparations for the latest revision of the CFSP. It is interesting to see the magnitude of the impact that the two CFSP regimes (the diplomatic and the strategic one) brought on EU's weak states' since it was impressively bigger on them than on their powerful partners. It is also interesting to focus on weak state's
contribution to political and defence co-operation in Europe as an alternative way to assess their status in the EU’s system and prove the validity of interdependence.

2 Ibid
6 Informal interview with At. Theodorakis, European Commission DGVIII, [conducted in Athens, 24/4/1998]
8 Meeting with Prof. Loukas Tsoukalis, London School of Economics, [conducted in Athens, 12/1/1998].
9 Ibid.
13 Greece participated actively in the 1997 Operation ALBA in Albania by sending approximately 1,500 soldiers for nine months plus humanitarian and financial aid.
15 Great Britain during the BSE crisis in 1996 and as a result of the beef export ban imposed by the European Commission adopted the policy of blocking, by using its veto power, all major decisions in the EU decision-making mechanisms for a considerable period of time.
16 Meeting with Prof. Panayiotis Ifestos, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, [conducted in Athens, 12/1/1998].
17 Informal interview with Mr. Phillippe Willaert, Advisor in DG1a, European Commission, [conducted in Brussels, 11/6/1998].
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18 Greece has the largest commercial fleet in the world (according to the 1995 Fearnleys periodical, approximately 45,000 commercial ships and 133,650,000 t.d.w.). In order to serve better its maritime interests Greece, despite its small size, has around 600 diplomatic delegations around the world.


21 As Pierre-Louis Lorenz argues, the way Luxembourg deals with and responds to CFSP and to EPC in the past certainly is a case of 'small state behaviour in a regional grouping' as Patrick Keatinge has put it in the case of Ireland. But that may already be the end of all similarities, as Luxembourg's historical and geographical situation is so different from that of Ireland, and indeed the other small EU member states, Greece and Portugal. The case of the grand Duchy might be more interesting, in fact as an example of the distinct role a mini-state can carve out for itself in the decision-making of an international intergovernmental organisation, as well as of its motives and goals in doing so.

22 Discussion with Dr. Ben Tonra, University of Wales – Aberystwyth, [conducted in Aberystwyth, 16/5/1998].

23 Meeting with Prof. Kevin Featherstone, University of Bradford, [conducted in Bradford, 14/7/1998].


25 In the CFSP framework this "feeling of equality" originates from the application of the unanimity principle in decision-making, since all states can use their veto power to block any decision.


27 Meeting with Professor Loukas Tsoukalis, London School of Economics, [conducted in Athens, 12/1/1998].

28 Informal interview with Professor Michael Clarke, Director of the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, [conducted in Newcastle upon Tyne, 19/11/1997].

29 Meeting with Professor Loukas Tsoukalis, London School of Economics, [conducted in Athens, 12/1/1998].


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34 Ibid., p. 217.
36 Meeting with Dr. Richard Whitman, University of Westminster, [conducted in London, 11/6/1998].
37 Informal interview with Dr. Othon Anastasakis, EU expert, Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs, [conducted in London, 3/3/98].
Chapter Three

The European Challenge: Greece's Accession to the EC and Its Consequences on Its Diplomatic and Strategic Domains
INTRODUCTION

This chapter is a portrait of the relationship between Greece and European integration. It assesses Greece's European policy, its shortfalls and achievements, priorities and dilemmas. Greece's membership in the EC/EU is based on the country's particularities and unique characteristics. An analysis is necessary in order to provide the background for the exploration of the diplomatic and the strategic regimes of Greece. The central thesis advanced is that the relationship between Greece and the EU is one of uneasy interdependence, sustained by an evolving system of consensus elite government at the larger level based on the common management of merged sovereignties. Its main aim is to assess and apply the parameters highlighted in the previous chapter: the behavioural patterns of Greece; the domestic sources of policy; the country's adaptation in the changing European environment; and the resources and perspectives of the Greek diplomatic and strategic regimes. In order to fulfil this aim and to provide the necessary background for the foreign and security policy analysis, that follows in the next three chapters, this chapter will stress the dynamics of the relationship between Greece and the EU; the Greek perceptions of integration; and the changing attitude of Greece towards the EU in the last three decades. In addition, a comparison between Greece and Portugal, two characteristic cases of weak member states, is attempted in the last section of the chapter in order to test the variables highlighted in the previous chapter.

The evolution of the Union, and its transformation from a policy-oriented enterprise to a state-like entity, has had a direct impact on the Greek polity. Although Greece has been accused of an internally-oriented perception of EU affairs, this is due to its intergovernmentalist attitude in the conduct of its European policy. Being a 'weak' state, Greece has often found itself in a delicate position between the dictates of strengthening the co-operative ethos of the regional arrangements and the quest for independent self-
rule on highly sensitive national issues concerning the transference of competences traditionally located in the 'hard core' of the Greek state.

Interestingly, the dynamics of integration have acted as a call for institutional adjustment to the imperatives of joint decision-making in a 'regional regime', whose modus operandi rests upon the common management of merged sovereignties. In the Greek case substantive attitudinal changes at both the elite and popular levels in favour of further integration, combined with the changing constellation of power between old and new political parties, portray a state striving to break away from the ill-effects of unchecked centralisation, executive dominance, parliamentary decline, inter-institutional inertia, hyperpoliticisation and economic stagnation.

Against the background of an ever-challenging milieu of interactions between the Union and its constituent parts, this chapter explores some of the constitutional, political and socio-economic aspects of modern Greece in relation to the basic properties of integration. It suggests that over the last fifteen years, successive Greek governments have pursued a policy of uneasy interdependence toward the EU so as to maintain a maximum possible degree of flexibility in the management of both internal and external affairs. As in any other similar undertaking, no single model, category or pattern of explanation is alone capable of adequately simplifying an inevitably complex reality. To that end, one has to acknowledge that Greek politics has hardly ever been about 'the art of the possible.' Rather, the ius bells of national political attitudes has been linked to the art of creating the possible. Apart from that and according to Couloumbis, Greece itself is a challenge for European integration since first, it offers a challenge to the notion of Western Europe and second, it is an example of a state's transition to supranational behaviour.¹

Seeking to assess the impact of membership in the European Union on Greece's foreign policy profile and prescribe its political profile, is a very difficult conceptual task. Despite its centrality in the field of international relations, the concept of 'influence' has been quite complex and ultimately it has gravitated mainly to a matter of identifying perceptions of the patron-client relationship. However, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the last decade has been one of drastic change in the
structure and functions of the international system and of the European Union, while in the case of Greece the period since 1974 has been one of virtual political metamorphosis. The magnitude of change that Greek politics, in general, and foreign policy, in particular, have faced in recent years is undeniable. As with other nations, conditions and assumptions which were accepted for several decades have been fundamentally revised. Policy has had to adapt to a new, and rapidly changing, environment. Greece represents an exceptional case, however. The conjunction of the pressures emanating from the international, European and Balkan environments have created a highly complex challenge to Greek foreign policy.

Nevertheless, adaptation has certainly proved difficult. Greece has been subject to mounting international criticism for its stance in relation to both the EU and the Balkans. The image and reputation of Greece has been tarnished, as the international press reports criticism of its policies throughout the world.

Therefore, in order to understand the peculiarities of Greek politics and foreign policy and in order to set the context for the three more detailed case study chapters that follow, a survey of how EC accession influenced Greek politics is required. In other words, what EC /EU membership meant and means for Greece. In this framework, it is the intention of this chapter to provide an evaluation of the extent to which Greece is an exceptional EU member state, taking into account the various criticisms made of it. It also highlights the impact of membership on Greek politics. Turning to the narrower environment of foreign policy change, it considers the consequences of the developments in the second EU pillar, together with changes in the European and in the international system, for contemporary Greek foreign policy. The intention is to portray the dimensions of change affecting Greek politics and to highlight the major themes raised. But let us now turn to the process of integration itself and describe the wider framework within which the Greek polity has evolved over the last few years.
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BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS OF GREECE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A CASE OF UNEASY INTERDEPENDENCE

Greece has the reputation in the comparative politics literature of being one of the most centralised countries in contemporary. It has also the reputation of being a country with a lot of identities. The history of the modern Greek state is almost exclusively one of irredentism and national liberation struggles, some leading to victories, others ending in tragedies. Since 1831, it grew up in a hostile neighbourhood whose continuous turbulence triggered a series of domestic crises. Institutional centralisation was the inevitable result of a series of developments leading towards a modern 'Leviathan' or 'Colossus', but with 'feet of clay' as has been colourfully suggested. Yet, the magnitude of the Greek state has never meant that it was a strong state after all. Rather, institutional and organisational fragility emerged as its generic properties: a political system whose endurance was always in doubt. Although this may sound as a contradiction in terms, modern Greek history reveals that institutional centralisation does not necessarily result in a corresponding increase of 'public authority' - defined as a situation in which the autonomy of political institutions springs primarily from a core-set of commonly agreed (by state and societal actors) principles of intrastate organisation. Traditional political parties with extensive networks of clientelistic relations offering, inter alia, public sector enrolment, became the chief stabilisation mechanism in support of established governmental practices concerning the management of public affairs (a similar situation is observed in post-war Italy). Bureaucratic clientelism in particular, as the dominant modus operandi of the Greek polity, has been under attack on several grounds by a number of scholars, such as Iifestos, Tsoukalis and Valinakis, over the years.

Although these scholars have used different definitions over the years given the various theoretical constraints to accommodate in a single hermeneutic pattern all possible expressions of the subject in question, it seems that all of typologies capture a significant part of a more complicated reality.
Greek attitudes to the EC have long been characterised by degrees of division, ambivalence and controversy which have been largely absent in the cases of Portugal and Ireland. These attitudes, which have been to a considerable extent both cause and effect of Greece's relatively poor political and economic performance since joining the EC in 1981, are direct products of the still potent cultural and psychological legacies of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and of the inherently vulnerable, dependent, embattled and irredentist nature of the Greek national state that emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These legacies, kept alive by perceived 'threats' and demagogic manipulation of nationalist issues, provide the key to understanding Greece's exceptionally fraught and ambivalent relationship with Western Europe.

According to Bideleux, Greece stood for centuries at the confluence of three cultures (Byzantine/Eastern Orthodoxy, Ottoman Islam and Catholic/Western Christendom). It has continued to be torn between its Byzantine/Eastern Orthodox cultural roots and its more recent westward maritime, mercantile and intellectual orientations. From 1946 to 1989 the artificial East-West division of Europe engendered by the Cold War induced the West to treat Greece as part of Western Europe, in blatant defiance of cultural and geographical facts. It also meant that Western Europe indulged Greece's strident nationalism, rule-flouting and special pleading. The termination of communist rule and the end of the Cold War terminated Greece's special status as a front-line NATO state. After 1990 Greece again began to look and behave less like a Western than an Eastern European state, as the break-up of Yugoslavia and the resurgence of old national and territorial disputes and alliances dragged Greece back into the 'Balkan situation'. Indeed, as elsewhere in the Balkans, the modern Greek state concept was built around an exclusive 'ethnic' conception of the nation. In Western Europe most of the existing monarchical states had defined their modern nationhood in ways that included all (or almost all) their subjects fostered inclusive 'civic' conceptions of the nation and facilitated the development of constitutional monarchies and liberal democracies. But in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe the emergence of nationalism within predominantly
supranational/imperial polities induced nationalist movements to engage in long and often bitter struggles to bring into existence new nations and national states conceived and defined in narrowly ethnic and cultural terms and in opposition to the existing territorial and state structures. This gave rise to chronic irredentist and 'national minority' problems, whose creation had to a large extent been avoided in Western Europe, mainly as a result of the cultivation of more inclusive 'civic' and territorial conceptions of the nation in that part of the world. As in the parallel cases of Serbia, Croatia, Albania, Bulgaria and Hungary, Greek nationalist mythology and the Greek 'state idea' have remained inherently 'ethnic', integral, irredentist and expansionist, hankering after the eventual inclusion of all the major ethnic Greek communities and most of the territories that had long been Hellenic and/or Byzantine (including northern Macedonia, northern Epirus' and Cyprus) in a united Greek polity. The Pan-Hellenic 'Megale Idea' (Great Idea) and the integral 'ethnic' conception of the Greek nation have long had profoundly unsettling effects on the Balkans and on Greece's relations with Turkey.

The year 1974 is the gate connecting two different eras in the history of twentieth century Greece. In the period 1909-1974 the small and strategically located country experienced considerable turbulence in its external and internal relations. Economically, it was classified in the category of poor, agrarian, raw material producing, trade dependent and externally indebted, in short, underdeveloped. Politically, it was polarised, functioning with personalist and pluralist political parties whose main purpose was to distribute the largesse controlled by a hypertrophic state sector. Deep schisms pitting royalists against republicans and communists against nationalists marked the years from 1915 to 1974, resulting in frequent military interventions in politics. Accordingly, a dictatorial rule was imposed in 1925-26, 1936-41 and 1967-74. A bloody, destructive and socially traumatic civil war, in 1946-49, scarred deeply the body politic and the society of the country. Given the instability and fragility of its democratic institutions - constantly challenged by competing models of monarchical authoritarianism and communist totalitarianism – Greece during this long period was
classified by political scientists as a Balkan state in the 'praetorian zone' together with states such as Spain, Portugal and Turkey, as well as countries in Central and South America.

In its external relations, in the caldron that was Europe of two world wars, totalitarian ideologies, competing nationalisms and the holocaust, Greece was also actively involved in international conflicts such as the Balkan Wars (1912-13), World War I, the Greek-Turkish War (1921-22) and World War II. All these adventures, that were very much a reflection of general turbulence in Europe, affected the delimitation of the boundaries of Greece which were formally defined in 1923 (the Treaty of Lausanne) and 1947 (the Treaty of Paris).

Given its strategic location in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, Greece throughout the twentieth century was subject to the competing bids for Great Power penetration. Its near total exposure by sea, placed the small state under the direct influence of whatever Great Power exercised naval control in the Mediterranean (Great Britain before 1947 and the United States after that time). In the area of Greek – Great power relations, political scientists, such as Ifestos, classified Greece among those states with penetrated (dependent) political systems.6

The collapse of the Colonel's dictatorship triggered by the Cyprus imbroglio in the summer of 1974 opened the gates of a new era. The infrastructure for change had already been put in position, with the high rates of economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, the rapid urbanisation of the population (a product of the civil war, immigration, emigration and economic development), and the consequent creation of a sizeable middle class.

Constantinos Karamanlis returning from political exile in late July 1974 and possessing strong political instincts and considerable foresight, presided over a remarkably smooth transition process that led to the establishment and consolidation of durable and, with the passage of time, adequately tested democratic institutions. The deep divisions of the past were gradually bridged leading to the effective reintegration of the Greek society: the question of the monarchy was resolved in a free and fair plebiscite in December 1974, removing a thorny symbol that had for decades polarised a revolutionary Left
against an authoritarian Right. More importantly, the vanquished in the Greek civil war were permitted to re-enter the political process through the legalisation of the Greek communist parties.

The Greek government’s decision in 1974-75 to redress the imbalance of forces between Turkey and Greece – an imbalance so dramatically manifested by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus – reflects the deep impact that the prospect of EC accession exercised on post-1974 Greek foreign policy. Following the Colonel’s coup in Cyprus, which offered Turkey an opportunity to invade and partition the island republic, the Karamanlis government had three options: the first was to go immediately to war with Turkey but Greece was militarily exposed, vulnerable and weak; moreover, the Aegean islands were undefended and at the mercy of a Turkish military operation. The second option was to seek a truce so as to gain time and, later, mount a massive rearmament programme so as to force the Turks at an opportune moment to withdraw their occupation army from Cyprus. Had this option been chosen, Greece and Turkey would have initiated a chain-reaction of revanchist wars of the Arab-Israeli variety. Needless to say, a climate of high tension and protracted conflict would not have permitted Greece to secure membership in the EC. The third option was to arm Greece for purposes of adequate deterrence of future Turkish revisionist contingencies in Cyprus, the Aegean and Thrace, and to apply in parallel a mixture of political, economic and diplomatic, but not military, pressures in order to secure a viable settlement in Cyprus and the Aegean.

Karamanlis opted for the third of the strategies outlined above. He had become firmly convinced that Greece’s destiny would have been bleak outside the greenhouse of democracies that had been carefully erected by the ‘masterbuilders’ of European integration. However, in order to qualify for entry into the Community, Greece had to abandon concepts and policies such as irredentism or other forms of territorial revisionism and to accept instead the challenges of functional integration and economic interdependence which were at the heart of the grand European experiment. To a large extent the modus operandi of the Greek polity was characterised by: centralisation, hyperpolitisisation, absence of rules of the game, virtual non-existence of civic
organisations, and a weak but paternalistic state. Diamandouros notes that parliamentary institutions were never fully embraced by the Greek soul due to the impact of the illiberal Ottoman rule, the dire experiences inflicted by the behaviour of Western powers, the weakness of the Greek bourgeoisie, the powers of traditionalist elites, the dominance of nationalist and irredentist ideologies and the absence of strong links with the European Enlightenment.

According to Ioakimidis, accession to the European Community was seen by the party of the New Democracy and by Karamanlis himself as a decisive step towards strengthening Greece’s external position, consolidating democratic institutions and modernising the socio-economic system. In other words, the paramount reasons which prompted Karamanlis to seek Community membership were political and strategic.

NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF INTEGRATION

Greece signed the first Association Agreement with the European Community (EC) in 1961, aiming at the acquisition of full membership status within 22 years. But at the Commission's initiative, the 'accession process' was partly frozen for seven years (1967-74), as a reaction to the military regime. Immediately after its collapse, however, the Karamanlis administration crowned its novel political project 'bourgeois modernisation' which included the country's entry into the Community.

In the early stages of the post-dictatorial era, parliamentary rule was fairly well-established in the collective consciousness of the people. The 'breakthrough' came with the legalisation of the Greek Communist Party after almost thirty years of near-continuous prosecution by what was widely known as 'too much of a police state'. With the early electoral success of Communist left after the junta, it seemed that the anti-Communist ideology, a pillar of the pre-coup state, was driven at an end. In this context of communist re-legalisation, the monarchy was brought to an end through the 1974 referendum, a development which aimed at the completion of 'the liquidation of the past image' policy pursued by the New Democracy government. Other changes
rapidly followed the restoration of democratic rule concerning the composition and structure of the political personnel. But these were more obvious at the middle and lower layers of party political personnel, than at the leadership level. The New Democracy party and Karamanlis, in particular, made Greece's accession to the EC a national target for political (stability) and strategic (security guarantee) reasons. His government's European Community policy had always revolved around the political dimension. However, while publicly stressing that accession would strengthen Greece's young democracy, ND's real concern was with external security.

The post-1974 situation in the neighbourhood of the country necessitated additional structures of support in its external affairs, all converging to the idea of a close European 'partnership' to counterweight successive military threats by Turkey. The EC was seen as an additional platform for the newly re-established parliamentary regime to consolidate its strength. It was also perceived as the most appropriate context to facilitate national economic development. Karamanlis' strategy of 'induced modernisation' implied that Greece should adjust to its more competitive European environment.

The genesis of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in 1974 played a catalytic role in Greece's foreign and European policy. From the outset, both the socialist and the Communist left adopted political profiles consistent not only with their broad ideological stance, but also with the treatment that had been afforded to them since the years of the Civil War. This 'right' vs. 'left' cleavage that frustrated Greece until 1974 had spilled over to the international relations of the country. Strong anti-American feelings grew on the fertile background of the role of foreign powers during Greece's recent history; only to be revitalised in 1974, due to the British and NATO inaction to prevent Turkey from invading Cyprus and, hence, the Greek army from landing on the island. Andreas Papandreou¹¹, the leader of PASOK, masterly played the card of 'national independence' in the space of seven years after his re-appearance in the Greek political scene. Since the Greek public was not very much attached to European ideals and Greece was a country which has been divided in its attitude towards the EC, geopolitical orientations could change rather rapidly: Atlanticism in the 1950s and
1960s, Europeanism in the 1970s, and a Third World orientation in the 1980s under Papandreou. It is evident that the latter had a strong rhetorical bent and eventually accepted EC membership. The rather quickly changing orientations showed that no consensus between parties existed concerning European affairs. Whereas in Portugal and Ireland the main parties had nearly identical views regarding the EC's importance, the Community became the object of political rivalries in Greece. Being for or against Europe was an instrument in the internal competition among Greek parties. The Conservatives had been pro-European since 1974, whereas the then rapidly growing Socialists (PASOK) presented themselves as anti-European. This had changed, however, some years after they had come to power. In terms of rhetoric, the Community was a welcome scapegoat for the leftists or populists among the Socialists for nearly the whole decade.

The antipathy of the major parties of the broad left to the question of EC membership was manifested during the discussion on the ratification of the Accession Treaty in 1979. But Karamanlis' consummate statesmanship was decisive and instrumental in the success of the Greek application in 1981.

Apart from that, the domestic political debate on integration has developed within a small circle of bureaucratic and party political elites without wider public participation. As soon as Greece became member of the EC, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) won the national elections. This irony of history brought into power a party that was elected on a ticket to withdraw from the EC. It did not take very long for Greece to become the 'odd man out' of the Community under the new political leadership or 'a limited ally'. As a result, the country entered a stage of 'diplomatic isolation' from its European partners.

PASOK's years in government (1981-1988) went through a number of phases. Initially, the leadership of the party was caught in a north-south paradigm that almost naturally resulted to the rejection of the 'Community solution' to national economic problems. The pillars of PASOK's electoral manifesto were three-fold: national independence, popular sovereignty and social engulfment. The EC was seen as conflicting with at least the first. Electoral considerations aside, the dogma of national independence has acted
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as a major obstacle to changing PASOK's European policy. Somehow, the national feeling of a people being eternally persecuted and patronised was translated into unconditional support for Papandreou, facilitating his re-election in 1985.

The second phase was marked with the memorandum of March 1982 on the special problems facing the Greek economy after the accession. This document was a clear sign that the Greek government was contemplating the idea of staying in the EC on the terms of the Accession Treaty, rather than seeking alternative routes of action. It also projected the framework of future Greek-EC relations by requesting temporary deviations from the rules of both the Rome Treaty and the Accession Treaty. Finally, it called for a redistribution of costs and benefits resulting from the Common Market.

The third phase came with the government's support of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985. The 'trade off' took the form of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes which were under consideration by the Commission at the time. What seemed to encapsulate the mood of this phase was that the central question asked by party members was no more whether Greece should stay in the EC, but how to improve the conditions of membership. The inclusion in the SEA of the social and economic cohesion provisions was regarded by many 'moderate socialists' as an important European social conquest - the first ever to be reported as such in the EC. Whether a 'breakthrough' or not, for those that were largely to bear the burden of this policy, these provisions became the 'carrot' for PASOK's acceptable European behaviour. Essentially, they had been in favour of the European Community just as much as the Conservatives since the middle of the 1980s. The 'stick', however, took the form of various threats on the part of the Commission about the management of European financial resources by Greek governmental authorities. The Greek attitude towards the EU, was characterised by a lack of confidence, whereas, the source of all problems seemed to be deeply rooted misconceptions and ignorance of the real character of the EU.\textsuperscript{13}

These inadequacies, in certain cases continued to shape the quality of Greek-EU relations. As Fatouros argues, the issue of the country's entry to the EC was entangled in the cleavage between 'westernisers' and 'traditionalists'\textsuperscript{14}. This assumption results
from the period before the independence of the Greek state in 1831. It refers to the age-old question of whether Greece belongs to the 'east' or to the 'west'. The 'westernisers' have been historically identified, *grosso modo*, with the rational inquiry and the political liberalism of the continent whereas the easterners' have adamantly advocated the defence of the *status quo*. These reflections suggest that the Greek case in the EC in the first years after accession was a problematic one, not least due to the fact that the country joined the Community on political, rather than economic grounds.

**ACCESSION TO THE EC AS A SECURITY GUARANTEE**

Accession to the EC undoubtedly constitutes the greatest post-war achievement in Greek international relations. At the beginning, it was a catalyst and engine for modernisation. Under the leadership of Karamanlis, Greece capitalised on a particularly favourable international climate and became, as mentioned above, the tenth member of the EC in January 1981. The accession was not only a net benefit in economic terms and an added assurance for the country's democratic institutions, but above all, it also enhanced Greece's feeling of security and independence. It has been referred to as *the greatest achievement of Greek foreign policy since independence, as important as independence itself*.

The lessening of Greek political and even defence ties with the US and the development of the new politico-military linkages (for example, with France between 1981-1985) were convincing signs of this independence. Even though no single country appeared willing or able to counterbalance American influence in the region, the EU as a whole represented a very promising ally. The estrangement from the US and NATO first developed when frictions with Turkey escalated in 1974 because of the Cyprus invasion and because of Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean. Greek disappointment with the security guarantees by NATO and the US led Greece along the path to Europe and EC-membership in 1981.

Making these points underlines two important aspects:
Firstly, the turn to Europe was not an expression of a belief in the necessity of an ever deeper process of integration in Europe, in the superiority of a European federation, but it was the result of calculation: the Atlanticist model had proved insufficient to guarantee security, therefore, the European model was to be tested as an alternative.

Secondly, the birth of the pro-European orientation in Greece centred on Turkey from the very beginning. In Greece, Europe was seen as an alternative model of security, which was threatened by the Turkish neighbour.

We may therefore speak of a turn to Europe which was not primarily based on federal principles, but appeared as a calculated Greek Europeanism centered on Turkey.

The EU provided Greece with a more agreeable political forum than NATO, as Turkey was not and continues not to be one of its member states. As Arthur den Hartog argues, all Greek governments, whatever their ideological orientation or their specific approach to foreign policy, have subscribed to a consensus over what they have regarded as the 'Turkish threat'. In order to strengthen Greece's security Prime Minister Karamanlis perceived EC membership as the ideal solution since he knew that it will give Greece a boost of security confidence. As Tsakaloyannis notes: accession to the EC became an urgent priority, a 'must' if Greece's independence from the discredited Americans was to be effective, and an insurance against Turkish bellicosity. In Greece's view the EC was bound to develop common defence policies in the near future.

In the climate created by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, serious Greek-Turkish tension in the Aegean, Greek withdrawal from the military wing of NATO and the more general damage to the country's relationship with NATO, Greece needed new sources of international support. The EC, which included neither Turkey nor the 'pro-Turkish' US, was particularly attractive.

It was felt that the EC offered, a system of political solidarity, which could employ diplomatic and economic levers to dissuade Turkey from adventuring in the Aegean. ND believed Greek accession would have a deterrent effect, which would encourage Turkey to 'think twice' before endangering the political integrity of a Greece that would no longer be isolated. Many Greek supporters of accession also believed the dynamics
of European integration would ultimately result in a common Community foreign and
defence policy, which would strengthen Athens in relation to Ankara. Another political
advantage of EC accession was that Greece would be more rapidly and fully informed
on international developments, and Greece’s negotiating strength would also be
enhanced in relation to third parties, who would be prepared to pay a price for the
support of an integral member of the world’s leading commercial power.
However, EC member states had no particular security problem. What was and is
perceived as a threat is shared by all Western partners. That is not the case with
Greece. There are diverging security perceptions between Athens and the rest of its
partners in Europe and elsewhere. For Greece, Turkey is a special problem of top
priority which relegates the interest in shaping the future of Europe to second place.
Whereas the West has lost its traditional enemy, the Communist bloc, since 1989-90,
this is not the case with respect to Greece. There the anti-Communist orientation was
always second to the anti-Turkish one. Moreover, even after the collapse of the
Communist world, the ‘threat from the east’, which is how Turkey is perceived in
Greece, still persists. This leads to divergent options: Western Europe's security
concerns are centred on the question of how to stabilise the post-Communist world,
whereas Greece continues to give priority to the Turkish question. As far as security
was concerned, Greece followed a maximalist strategy. The European Union should
not only have a dimension of security, but also of defence, as this seemed to be most
appropriate to secure Greek borders. For this goal, Greece dissociated itself from the
Atlanticist orientation and favoured a strong Europeanist approach. Rapidly changing
orientations are typical for Greece. Whether the European Community was ready to
take over such a long term oriented target of defence was no major concern of Greece.

The historical background, and the analysis of the reasons that Greece joined the EC in
1981 (political, economic, strategic) have provided us so far with a complete picture of
the peculiarities and unique features that accompany the Greek membership. These
peculiarities and unique features caused friction between EC and Greece on a constant
basis. The next section attempts to outline the changing attitude of Greece towards the
EU which according to Kevin Featherstone, is a mixture of dependency and hegemony.

THE CHANGING ATTITUDE OF GREECE TOWARDS THE EC/EU

As previously noted in this chapter, Greece's changing attitude towards the idea of European Union can best be explained by recalling four Greek memorandums: the first one of 1982, in which the Greek Government did not rule out withdrawal from the European Community unless several conditions were fulfilled. A second memorandum of 1987 accepted the Single European Act and the completion of the Internal Market, but asked for more financial transfers in favour of the less developed member states. A third memorandum in 1990 made Greece a champion of EC reform: The deepening of integration and the establishment of a European Union was supported emphatically. The last memorandum dates from 1991. The Greek government now was eager to promote the idea of a European defence identity within the Community and pleaded for Greek membership in the Western European Union (WEU). Greek reservations against the Community and the further development to the European Union belonged to the past.

Greece in the 1980s: opposing the idea of European Union

In the first half of the 1980s, the PASOK-government under Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou took a negative stand against all aspects which could be attributed to political Union. This could be seen with respect to European Political Co-operation as well as to institutional reform, decision-making, and the democratic legitimacy of the Community. In 1982, the Greek government published a memorandum which asked for
higher financial transfers from the Community. It must be remembered that the Greek balance of trade produced extensive deficits due to the import flows from the Community in the first years of EC membership. In addition, Greece insisted on a 'special status' in the Community which would allow it to deviate from Community obligations and rules in different cases (deviation from competition regulations, protection of infant industries, subsidies for Greek small and medium enterprises, etc.).

The Greek government showed absolutely no interest in strengthening and developing the process of European integration. The Community was simply seen as "donor" to satisfy Greek demands. When the Commission gave its opinion on the Greek memorandum, one idea was therefore emphasised very strongly: the Greek, government had to make sure that the country would remain in the Community before solutions could be developed for the Greek problems.\(^2^1\)

With regard to the Solemn Declaration of European Union which was adopted at the European Council of Stuttgart in June 1983, the Papandreou government entered two reservations to the final text of the Declaration: first of all, the Greek Government opposed a more stringent application of the majority vote. Secondly, Greece ruled out any further limitation of its national sovereignty.

Following the Solemn Declaration, the Dooge Committee (the ad hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs) presented its report, and the European Council of Milan of June 1985 decided to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to negotiate a reform of the EC. Together with Denmark and the United Kingdom, Greece much opposed to the conference, but the three were outvoted by the other member states. As far as the Report of the Dooge Committee was concerned, Greece entered 16 reservations which appeared as footnotes in the final text. Greece thus became prominent as a 'footnote country.' Concerning decision-making, Greece still favoured unanimous voting. According to the Greek positions, the Commission should be staffed with only one Commissioner per member state but unanimity should be required when the press to be appointed by the European Council. The European Parliament's power should also be expanded, but the Greek side opposed any form of joint decision-making.
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It is interesting to note that the issues of these reservations made by the Papandreou government against the target of European Union reappeared in the Greek Memorandum of 1990 - only this time with a different motivation, as arguments in favour of a European Union. The 1990 Memorandum made it clear that, compared to the early 1980s, Greece had completed a U-turn with regard to European integration.

In the second half of the 1980s, Greece's role in the Community changed. The Greek Government accepted the Single European Act. When the act was ratified in the Greek Parliament on 14 January 1987, the Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs Pangalos, legitimised it with the expectation of greater independence from the United States. However, this was done mainly for domestic consumption, for those PASOK parliamentarians who were still sceptical, if not hostile, towards the European Community and any effort to build up a European Union.22 Later on, in May 1987, Pangalos made it clear what the real Greek intentions were. The Single European Act was accepted as a step towards European Union and the advantages for Greece were seen in the target of 'social and economic cohesion' which was fixed in the act. To reach this target, the doubling of the structural funds was foreseen (Delors Package). Pangalos was also in favour of the inclusion of security and defence in European Political Co-operation.23 Interestingly enough, when the European Council of Luxembourg presented the Single European Act in December 1985, it was accepted by the Greek Prime Minister without any prior debate among politicians, administrators, or scientists.

The Delors Package was seen by the Greeks as a prerequisite to acceptance of the Internal Market. In 1987, the Greek Government released a memorandum entitled 'strengthening the Economic and Social Cohesion,' which accepted the duplication of the structural funds as a 'minimum.'24 Several reservations were made with respect to the Internal Market, e.g., less developed countries should be privileged in the field of public procurement as well as in the liberalisation of capital transfers. The modernisation of small and medium enterprises in these member states should be finally assisted by the Community.
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In the late 1980s, Greece became as 'normal' as other member states: most decisions were taken in accordance with the partners, and only when 'national interests' were at stake did Greece abstain from the mainstream. The Community was no longer the subject of ideological battles between government and opposition; the country accepted membership and tried to derive as many advantages from it as possible. The PASOK government had become largely pro-European because of the 'sweet sound of Brussels 'cash register', as it was described in the Financial Times (3 February 1986). More and more, the Community was seen as a source of virtually endless financial transfers: The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) were initiated in 1986 to support Greece together with certain regions of France and Italy. In 1988, the European Council of Ministers agreed to concentrate the resources of the Structural Funds and to double their volume in real terms in 1993, compared to 1987. Greece benefited to a great extent from this reform. In 1988, 2.3% of the country's GDP came from the structural funds of the Community. Despite respectable financial assistance from the Community, domestic economic development was poor. The feeling was widespread in Greece that the country would suffer economic losses without active assistance by the Community. Apart from that, there was the fear of dependency. According to Kevin Featherstone, weak states with weak economies at the periphery of the EU are dependent entirely to the powerful EU member states. 25 Nevertheless, the late 1980s brought the end of the Cold War, which presented new opportunities (i.e. for Greek investments in the Balkans), but also new risks. Old disputes were not settled when new ones arose, especially in the Balkan peninsula.

During the Intergovernmental Conferences and the discussions on the projects of European Union (EU) and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Greece was in a very critical situation and had to cope with many sensitive issues and problems. This can best be understood when recalling the coincidence of decisive historical events (see the annex of the next chapter). Greece was not the only country challenged by international developments at the end of the Cold War. Yet what made the situation in Greece so critical was the fact that internal problems increased at the same time. We may make a distinction between two phases: (a) the preparatory phase, when
discussions on EMU and Political Union began and preparations for the establishment of the Intergovernmental Conferences were made; and (b) the conference phase. Greece's capabilities to take part in the preparation of the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) were limited very much by the fact that the political leadership of the country was replaced by a new elite with little experience in international as well as EC matters. The decision to convene an IGC on EMU was taken in December 1989 one month after the national elections had resulted in an all-party government in Greece. From June to November, a Conservative-Communist government had replaced the former PASOK administration. It is quite obvious that Greece could have only played a minor role in the preparation of the IGCs. Political stability increased after the installation of the Conservative-Liberal government under Mitsotakis, following the elections of April 1990. The Greek memorandum of May characterised the situation under the new government: a new optimism, high expectations with regard to the European Community, but at the same time, limited experience, with the result that certain passages of the memorandum were somewhat idealistic. The unstable internal situation hampered Greece more than other countries in contributing to the IGCs in the preparatory phase. Like other countries, Greece had to cope with the end of the Cold War and its participation in the war against Iraq in summer 1990.

The 1990s: U-turn to 'Europhoria' in Greece

Greece, following Ireland and Luxembourg, was the third member state to ratify the Treaty on 31 July 1992. The Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, the media, and the public were euphoric concerning the results of the Maastricht Treaty. The Prime Minister stressed the fact that Greece was invited to join the WEU, which meant: 'Europe offers us security.' As Mitsotakis anticipated, Greek frontiers would be defended by United Europe: 'Our frontiers will henceforth be part of a vast defensive entity which will be the Union of Europe.' Therefore, the Mitsotakis government which was elected in April 1990, declared itself willing to support the creation of a
political union based on a federal structure. Not only foreign policy, but also security and defence policy should become a 'common European' arrangement. The WEU was to be an integral part of the European Union.

The media reacted as positively to the Maastricht Treaty as the Prime Minister. 'Maastricht satisfies Greece', announced the journal 'Athena' in December 1991. Among others, the following aspects were perceived as being beneficial to Greece:

- Progress was achieved towards European unification while safeguarding fundamental national rights;
- Greece would join the WEU;
- A new Cohesion Fund was established;
- An increase in the resources of the structural funds (second Delors package) and a more general co-financing were expected.
- The establishment of a two-tier monetary union, at least on the institutional level, was not concluded.

The reporting of the media reflected a general positive public reaction to the European Community. Compared with the beginning of the 1980s, Greek public support for the Community had grown steadily. According to 'Eurobarometer', the Commission's public opinion poll, in autumn 1981 - immediately after Greece's entry into the EC - 38% of all Greeks said that their country's Community membership was a good thing. Ten years later (autumn 1991), 73% expressed approval, the average in the EC at that time was 69%. By contrast, the number of Greeks who felt that membership in the EC was a bad thing declined from 21% in 1981 to 6% in 1991. It was acknowledged by a growing number of people that Greece benefited extensively from the Community: 44% accepted this view in 1983, but by the end of 1991 this had grown to 73%. If one compares the Greek result with the EC average, the value of the Community for the public is apparent: on the average, in the EC 56% see their country benefiting from Community membership, but in Greece, the rate of approval is 17 percentage points higher!

Eurobarometer presents other interesting opinions outlining the profile of Greek 'Europhoria' in the early 1990s:
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- It was the opinion of only 54% of the Greeks polled by Eurobarometer that Greece could benefit from the completion of the Single Market. The EC average amounted to 60%.
- It was widely felt in Greece that the social dimension of the Single Market could be helpful: 71% versus an EC average of 65%.
- 62% of the Greeks, but only 41% of the Europeans, were aware of the benefits of the EC's regional policy.
- A Common Foreign Policy toward non-EC countries was strongly supported by Greeks (61% versus 55% in the EC).
- Together with the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and France, Greece was in the group which was relatively more in favour of the inclusion of security and defence in the EC's common policy. 65% of the Greeks supported this option. Acceptance was low in the United Kingdom (50%), Ireland (47%), and Denmark (47%).
- The following results show that events in Yugoslavia were to become a factor dissociating Greece from the rest of the Community: Greeks, more than any other member of the EC, preferred that Yugoslavia should preserve its integrity (39% versus an EC average of 19%). On the other hand, the right of self-determination was relevant in that case for only 36% of Greeks, but for 68% on the average throughout the EC.\textsuperscript{32}
- Dissatisfaction with the capacity of Greek authorities to overcome the critical economic situation which had emerged at the end of the 1980s may have been the reason that 61% of the Greeks were in favour of a European government. The EC average was 56%.

During the debate on the Maastricht Treaty in Parliament in the summer of 1992, the generally positive reports in the media were supported by the government and the parties through an expensive campaign by the government and the parties in the mass media, where Greece's benefits from the Maastricht Treaty were underlined. However, the costs of convergence did not feature in this campaign. As a result, public
expectations that Maastricht would be beneficial without the necessity of a national effort for economic and social convergence with the rest of the Community were strengthened.\textsuperscript{33}

Finally, 286 out of 300 members of parliament voted in favour of the Treaty of Maastricht. These were the members of the Liberal-Conservative New Democracy as well as those of the Socialist PASOK. Only seven Communists, traditionally anti-European, and one Ecologist voted against the treaty. The fact that Greek politicians succeeded in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty without a great confrontation was astonishing if one remembers the condition set by the then Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras. On 20 December 1991, he had declared in the Hellenic Parliament: ‘We were not going to sign the entire Maastricht package unless we signed at the same time the WEU agreement in its entirety.’\textsuperscript{34} This statement made it clear that Greece was not only interested in becoming a member of the WEU, but that Article V of the WEU Treaty should remain unmodified, which would mean the obligation of automatic assistance to Greece in the case of a conflict with Turkey. As is known, the partners did not accept the interpretation that Article V could be used to the advantage of Greece and against Turkey. After the WEU Treaty was subsequently modified, the Greek Parliament nevertheless did not hesitate to ratify the Maastricht Treaty.

A second aspect is important: as already mentioned, Greece expected greater financial support from the Maastricht Treaty. However, this expectation was only partially fulfilled. A decision was taken to establish a new financial source, the ‘Cohesion Fund’ but it was left to future debate what would be the financial volume of the new fund as well as to which extent the Structural Funds were to increase. A final decision on this topic was reached by the European Council in Edinburgh in December 1992 - one year after the heads of government had signed the Maastricht Treaty and half a year after the Greek Parliament had ratified the treaty.

Nevertheless, both aspects - the failed aspirations in the WEU membership as well as the debatable advantages from the Structural Funds - stressed the enormous ‘Europhoria’ when the Greek Parliament voted for the Maastricht Treaty. An
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explanation of the Greek Europhoria and why the Treaty was also seen as 'a cornerstone for domestic reform'\textsuperscript{35} is based on different arguments:

- First of all, the economic, but also the political and social crisis in Greece at the end of the 1980s was felt to be so strong that only external assistance, especially from the EC, could help to improve the situation.

- Secondly, more involvement with Europe seemed to mean more financial assistance for Greek politicians as well as for the public.

- Thirdly, when the first eruptions of the post-Cold War era occurred in the Balkans, Greece felt a bitter need for security and hoped to find it in the framework of the emerging European Union.

What should not be neglected is the fact that the new administration of the New Democracy government, which was elected in April 1990 with a firm pro-European programme, was eager to improve Greece's image abroad. This seemed useful for at least two reasons: Firstly, ten years of the PASOK-Government were widely regarded as a decade of lost chances in Greece as well as in the rest of Europe. Secondly, more and more voices were posing the question of whether Greece was still a reliable and solid partner in the Community. Jacques Delors, President of the EC Commission, called Greece the 'sick man of Europe' in 1992.\textsuperscript{36} The German Minister of Defence, Volker Rühe, questioned if the EC was still doing the right thing by supporting the European South with valuable financial transfers. As the effects of these transfers were meagre, he suggested switching financial assistance from the South to the East, to the new emerging market economies of the former Socialist block.\textsuperscript{37} Both statements sounded the alarm in Greece.

\textbf{Membership in the EC: a 'privilege at the end of the Cold War'}

The positive attitude in Greece towards the European Community and the idea of strengthening the integration process was deeply influenced and strengthened by the historical changes at the end of the 1980s. The collapse of the Communist world
implied much insecurity, especially in the Balkans, for which the security mechanisms and guarantees of the Western Alliance seemed to be inappropriate. NATO was not made for challenges as they emerged in the form of minority conflicts, border disputes challenging territorial integrity, or ethnic wars and cleansing. Security guarantees provided by NATO were not at a premium, as the Greeks thought they proved to be largely ineffective in the case of Cyprus and as far as differences with Turkey were concerned. The new situation of the late 1980s led to a reassessment of security institutions.

The Greek Government felt privileged to be a member not only of NATO but also of the Community. To be in the EC did not only mean participation in a framework of intensive economic co-operation, but also one of security. Moreover, strengthening the integration process seemed to be a logical consequence of more security. Prime Minister Mitsotakis stressed this aspect when he declared in September 1991, only a few weeks after the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia:

"The sad events on our doorstep, in Yugoslavia and more generally in the Balkans, are a dramatic example of where nationalist fervour can lead. Faced with this prospect, the European countries outside the Community seek refuge in the Community either through special trade agreements or with full accession. The reason is simple: the Community today forms the best of Europe. It is a pole of stability and, at the same time, offers a framework for co-operation between member countries to promote growth and prosperity. The Community's course towards economic and monetary union makes it even more attractive to non-members, and while these countries are knocking on the door, asking to be let in, Greece has the privilege of belonging to it for a whole decade. A privilege we must safeguard... But besides these economic benefits [i.e., EC structural funds], the Community is the only stable framework in the rapidly changing political map of Europe. Thus, the great majority of the Greek people today, indeed, almost all of them, favour closer union."
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Pleading for more integration had, in the case of the Greek Prime Minister, a double function: first of all, it was meant to legitimise his party's pro-European profile vis-à-vis political competitors. New Democracy wanted to be 'the' European party. Secondly, this role in the political spectrum was the more attractive as public opinion swung in favour of Europe. As was shown above, this was case in Greece in the late 1980s. So, for Mitsotakis, it did not entail any political risks to praise the Community as the 'haven of security' and to offer his active support for the deepening of integration.

The feeling of insecurity at the end of the Cold War and the chance to profit from a pro-European profile made the Mitsotakis government an advocate of the Maastricht Treaty. Aspirations with respect to foreign and security policies, will be examined in detail in the following three chapters.

INTEGRATION AND NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST – A COMPARATIVE VIEW

As described previously in this chapter, Greece demonstrated a very pro-European attitude, when it attended to the IGC on European Union. This was in direct contrast to the 1980s, when the Greek governments gave the impression that the finalisation of European integration might be an ambition worth while for all European countries, but not for Greece. Athens, under Prime Minister Mitsotakis, presented itself as an active promoter of deepening the European Community. The media already classified Greece as belonging to the 'federalist camp.'

Nevertheless, a country's attitude towards the process of European integration cannot simply be derived from some memorandums or political statements. It needs further investigation and some 'historical recourse' to come to a deeper understanding. In this context, it seems useful to endeavour to employ a comparative approach. The hypothesis is that national peculiarities can best be analysed if compared with other countries and systems. As far as Greece is concerned, a comparative analysis may be best carried out if countries are taken into account which, on the one hand, have proved
to be federalist with a long-standing tradition and which, on the other hand, face some development problems, as Greece does.

In this framework, a comparison with Portugal, a country which is more or less on the same level of development as Greece and is also a latecomer to the Community, may clarify some essential peculiarities of Greece's attitude towards the European Union. The Portuguese profile in European Community affairs is characterised by the following determinants:\textsuperscript{40}

- weak federalist traditions;
- a low interest in Political Union and the finalisation of the integration process;
- a preference for intergovernmental approaches and national sovereignty in political co-operation (use of the veto when 'national interests' are at stake);
- satisfaction with the structural status quo of the Community;
- flexibility and readiness to compromise with federalists (more than, for example, the United Kingdom);
- public opinion and parties accepting the Community (with the exception of the Communists);
- a long lasting Atlanticist orientation in foreign policy; the United Kingdom and the United States as preferential allies;
- a strong and enduring interest in NATO, the WEU as European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (i.e., a symbiosis of Atlanticism and Europeanism);
- the non-existence of special foreign or security problems;\textsuperscript{41}
- a prior interest in the European Community, firstly, because of a stabilising democracy after 1974, and secondly, because of solidarity and cohesion.

Comparing Portugal with Greece will show a number of differences as well as similarities. The latter derive from a strong interest in cohesion - as a peripheral country, Portugal does not differ from Greece in that respect. A lack of federal traditions is significant for both countries. Differences are significant in the following cases: Portugal has a strong Atlanticist tradition, whereas in Greece this orientation was limited to certain periods. Whereas today Atlanticism and Europeanism merge in Portugal, they appear as alternative strategies in Greece. Whereas the United States
have been the favoured ally of Portugal for a long time, Greece prefers a more flexible attitude and changes allies if it seems to be appropriate. Portugal represents continuity, whereas, Greece an erratic tendency. This is confirmed by the attitude of both countries towards the Intergovernmental Conference on European Union.

As in the past, Portugal showed a low integrationist profile, whereas Greece, in contrast to the past, made itself a champion of EC reform. National sovereignty in political cooperation, most important for Portugal, played a prominent role in Greece during the 1980s, whereas contemporary Greek governments no longer oppose some limited restrictions of that principle. Upgrading the structures of the Community was a target which was followed more readily by the Mitsotakis than by the Portuguese government. Flexibility and compromise, which characterise the Portuguese, play a different role in Greece. Whereas the Portuguese, with a strong tradition as intergovernmentalists, are willing to compromise with federalists, the Greeks favour the 'allocation of roles', having been national oriented in the past and being Europeanists in the present. Portugal’s problems abroad are solved, the same cannot be said about Greece.

Having compared Greece with Portugal, some essential peculiarities of Greece's role and aspiration in the Community become apparent and can be summarised as follows:

- The federalist approach to Europe seems to be limited to some of the old members of the Community of Six. Such newcomers as Greece and Portugal do not merely have a different level of development. Above all, they have had a different historical experience after 1945, which has led them to understand and accept the Community in a more mercantile manner. The historical aspect includes security arrangements, preferential allies, bilateral balances and confidence building.

- The expectations of member states towards the Community may have been influenced by the level of their economy and welfare. When the Community was founded, the level was low and peoples' expectations were centered more on what may be called basic needs. This changed after the first (1973), and even more so after the second (1981) and third (1986) enlargement. To become a member of the Community was legitimised more with improved welfare. Thus the electorate understood the EC mainly as a lever to more income, more social benefits, and
greater personal well being. For less developed countries like Greece and Portugal, this could only be obtained when the Community engaged itself in economic and social cohesion. The peoples' expectations, especially on the periphery of the EC, are far from being 'post-materialistic.'

- As the Community failed to overcome the barrier of national sovereignty, and as compromises and package deals became more and more the functioning principle of the EC (with weak supranational and strong national actors), an additional factor had to be included in this procedure with the entry of poorly developed countries into the Community, which requires some form of internal development aid. From now on, progress in European affairs, however limited, could only be obtained when the requirement of cohesion was met.

- Idealistic approaches to European Union are totally anachronistic. Greece demonstrated this in the 1980s, when the Papandreou government was only willing to accept some progress in the integration process in return for financial compensation. The Community became the cow to be milked. When the Mitsotakis government tried to correct Greece's image abroad, it did so through extensive support for the Maastricht process. Two objections must be borne in mind. On the one hand, transfers and security had to be secured, on the other, the New Democracy government wanted to present a contrast to the initially hostile and later indifferent attitude of the Papandreou governments towards Europe.

- While Portugal's Europeanism is limited by its strong pro-Atlantic orientation and thus represents continuity, the pro-European tendency of the recent pat in Greece reflects discontinuity. This renders predictions of future developments in Greece so difficult.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS

As the foregoing analysis shows, EU membership has deeply affected the organisational structure and functional dynamics of the Greek political system. It is believed among Greek politicians that whatever happens to the EU today has an impact on Greek politics.\(^{42}\) As happened with Portugal, the Europeanisation process has given rise to a new set of problems, created new demands, changed deeply ingrained perceptions and altered the territorial, as well as the institutional balance of power. European logic has entered the policy-making process and shaped extensive interdependencies between Greece and the EU institutional framework. According to Stefanos Manos, huge financial flows from the EU budget have contributed to the reorientation of developmental objectives, while pressures for greater nominal convergence have led to the reassessment of macroeconomic policy.\(^{43}\)

In attempting to sketch some final lines of our understanding of the relationship between Greece and European integration, the following need to be set out. Greek-EC relations have evolved through a number of phases over the years. The 'Community experiment' was often doubted by national governing elites for the best part of the 1980s, not least because the issue was entangled in the 'right' vs. 'left' cleavage that has long tormented the country. Here, the 'pendulum-theory'\(^{44}\) which was used to describe the nature of the Greek-EC relations has some explanatory value. In the mid-1990s, the pendulum seems to have been stabilised since the major political parties share the view that the country must adapt to the post-Maastricht era. In July 1992, Parliament ratified the Maastricht Treaty with a huge majority but without prior public debate, adding to what Stavridis describes as a 'democratic disjunction' between the wishes and interests of national leaders and popular political sentiments.\(^{45}\) An indication that whichever the position of the pendulum, the policy style seems to be the same.

Greek governments have pursued over the last seventeen years a policy of uneasy interdependence toward the Union so as to maintain a maximum degree of freedom in the management of both internal and external affairs. Interestingly, such an attitude may have helped the creation of a Greek anti-communautaire image and, in the early 1980s,
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of an anti-federalist one. There was no continuity and coherence in Greece’s European policy as was the case with Portugal, which was characterised by flexibility and compromise. Whereas, the Portuguese, being intergovernmentalists in the past were willing to compromise with federalists, the Greeks demanded to have a distinct role in the Union’s political integration process, having been anti-European in the past and being pro-European in the present. New Democracy, the pro-European party that led Greece into the Community was succeeded by the anti-European Papandreou PASOK government, which also made a U-turn on its policy towards the Community after 1986 in order to enjoy more economic benefits.

In conclusion, the attitude of successive Greek governments toward the Union postulates a more or less refined, but still easily discernible, intergovernmental view of EU politics, although the official rhetoric often denies such inclinations: the state seemed to have found a way of consolidating its authority by participating in the regional arrangements, although the nature of its participation differed according to the stakes involved. By the mid-1990s, the key dynamic between interdependence and autonomy seemed to have produced a flexible equilibrium between the Union and the states. Nevertheless, in foreign policy issues this equilibrium was difficult to be found.

The absence of common European interests on the one hand, the issue of sovereignty and of national interests on the other have always been constraints to any development in political and security co-operation in the European Union. The following three chapters will examine how a weak member state such as Greece used to operate in the diplomatic and strategic regimes of the EPC/CFSP; what changes this operation brought to the state’s foreign and security policy; and which was Greece’s contribution in these regimes. This chapter provided the necessary framework and background upon which any further analysis shall be based.

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1 Meeting with Professor Couloumbis, Director of ELIAMEP, [conducted in London, 7/3/1998].

2 Discussion with Dr. Erik Goldstein, University of Birmingham, [conducted in Birmingham, 16/5/1997].

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4 'Megali Idea' (Great Idea) was a plan developed in the 19th century and its aim was the reconquest of all the Greek-Byzantine territories that were occupied by the former Ottoman Empire. The plan had a nearly 100% public consensus and ended ingloriously with the defeat of the Greek army in the Greek-Turkish Asia Minor War in 1922.

5 ibid., p. 130.

6 Meeting with Prof. P. Iifestos, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, [conducted in Athens, 12/1/1998].


9 The party of the New Democracy (the Greek conservative party) was founded in the 4th of October 1974 by Konstantine Karamanlis. The Conservatives won at the 1974 (54.37%) and at the 1977 (41.84%) general elections. K. Karamanlis was Prime Minister from 1974 to 1980 and he was succeeded by Georgios Rallis from 1980 to 1981 (when PASOK, the Greek Socialists, won at the general elections).


11 Andreas Papandreou, (son of Georgios Papandreou who was Greece's Prime Minister when the military coup took power in April 1967), founded PASOK on the 4th of September 1974. He won the national elections in 1981, 1985 and 1993.

12 Discussion with Dr. Ben Tonra, University of Wales – Aberystwyth, [conducted in Aberystwyth, 6/5/1998].

13 Discussion with Dr. Erik Goldstein, University of Birmingham, [conducted in Birmingham, 16/5/1997].


15 ibid., p. 24.

16 Meeting with Prof. Loukas Tsoukalis, London School of Economics, [conducted in London 5/3/98].


20 *Meeting* with Prof. Kevin Featherstone, University of Bradford, [conducted in Bradford, 14/7/1998].


23 See *Agence Europe*, 23 May 1987, p. 4.


25 *Meeting* with Prof. Kevin Featherstone, University of Bradford, [conducted in Birmingham, 16/5/1997].


27 See *Agence Europe*, 13 December 1991, p. 3.

28 For *The Economist* (1 December 1990), Greece became member of the federalist camp.


32 It is interesting to note that the Germans, who stressed the necessity to accept the republics’ right of self-determination, were not among those who were most favourable towards self-determination: 63% of the Germans were of that opinion, compared with 76% of the Portuguese, 74% of the Irish, 73% of the British, and 73% of the French.


35 *Meeting* with Prof. Kevin Featherstone, University of Bradford, [conducted in Birmingham, 16/5/1997].


40 Alvaro de Vasconcelos, *Portugal and European Political Co-operation*, in *The International Spectator*. 
41 In the past, the foreign policy problem of top priority was Africa. But this problem was solved after 1974 when Portugal abandoned its former colonies.

42 Discussion with Mr. M. Papayannakis, MEP, [conducted in London, 7/3/1998].

43 In the last ten years Greece received nearly 60.000.000.000 $. Discussion with Stefanos Manos, former Greek Finance Minister, [conducted in London, 7/3/1998].


Chapter Four

EPC, Weak States and Greece: The Historical Context
INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy was always the weak point of European integration. As the Member States of the European Union have different national interests, they were reluctant to yield sovereignty to supranational institutions in the field of foreign affairs, an area which is decisive for their survival as independent states, especially when they feel that there wasn’t a common European interest to protect. The establishment of the European Political Co-operation system represented a significant landmark in the continuing debate about the character of political integration and the formal or informal nature of European institutions. This thesis endeavours to present a systematic and rigorous examination of the political co-operation and co-ordination efforts in Europe in relation to the weak European Union member states, by analysing the role, contribution, and participation of Greece in the EPC/CFSP framework.

EPC formed the basis from which the European foreign policy developed through the years. Its study is increasingly significant both for the institutional development of the Community and for its impact on world events. Therefore, a survey into the origins and the institutional development of the EPC, with reference to Ireland and Portugal in certain cases, will provide the background for a better understanding of the EU’s weak member states politics and foreign policies that can be used as comparators for the case of Greece.

In this context, this chapter, apart from focusing on EPC’s institutional development, will also concentrate on Greece's foreign policy and its contribution to EPC, whereas, the following two chapters (five and six) will deal with Greece’s role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and will analyse its diplomatic and strategic regimes. As foreign and security policy cannot be totally separated, some overlapping is unavoidable. In the first section of this chapter, a brief historical background of the creation of EPC and its significance for the EU’s weak member states is outlined. Thereafter, we shall discuss the Greek participation in the EPC in order, first to
evaluate its impact on Greek foreign policy, and second to demonstrate Greece's attitudes and action within the EPC framework.

The analysis will be based upon the four variables highlighted in Chapter Two:

- the behavioural patterns of the weak EU member states on foreign policy issues;
- the domestic sources of weak states' foreign policy;
- the dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of weak states; and
- the resources and perspectives of the diplomatic and strategic domains of weak states.

THE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EPC AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WEAK EU MEMBER STATES

It was inevitable that participation in EC institutions and the EPC, had affected the foreign policy-making structures and processes of Member States in a profound way. As has been correctly observed, membership in the EC 'blurs the distinctions traditionally made between domestic and foreign policy'\(^1\). Indeed, ministries handling domestic policy areas such as economics, finance, agriculture, industry, and energy tend to get extensively and increasingly involved in Community policy-making, while the ministries of foreign affairs, for their part, are drawn into the process of domestic policy-making by means of either having to formulate positions to be presented in Brussels or by co-ordinating Community policy. In other words, they found a new role.

The weak EU member states are rarely at the centre of the stage in diplomatic coalitions, yet it would be a mistake to regard them merely as extras brought on from time to time to punctuate the script of the leading actors. Common Foreign and Security Policy is a performance where the lines are written by a committee of the entire cast, and the contribution of the 'bit-players' cannot be ignored. Ireland, Portugal and Greece are undeniably to be numbered among the 'bit-players'. They are the weakest in terms of economic development, resources, political influence, and bargaining power, in
addition being in the periphery of the EU causes further problems. However, according to David Allen, ‘EPC/CFSP provided them with huge resources’. Their contribution in the process can be summarised under three roles: as constructive participants; as regional experts; and as loyal allies.

The European Political Co-operation (EPC) process provided the machinery for foreign policy co-ordination within the European Community. Although increasingly connected with the EC, it was operating separately from the Communities, set up under the Treaties of Paris and Rome, until the ratification of the Single European Act in 1987. The trade relations of the EC with the rest of the world were covered by the Treaty of Rome (EEC) and came under the auspices of the European Commission, which negotiates both bilaterally and in international forums. However, the Member States developed the machinery for formulating common positions on matters of foreign policy as an intergovernmental arrangement article of the Treaties. EPC began in 1970 as a pragmatic way of achieving a foreign policy identity alongside the economic identity of the Communities and developed gradually based upon earlier attempts over a period of twenty years. It is the intention of the next section to explore this institutional development and its impact on the Union’s weak member states; the following one analyses the role, contribution and action of Greece in the EPC framework.

The Early Steps towards Political Co-operation

Many of the problems and confusions that surrounded political co-operation at its inception in 1970 can only be understood by an examination of previous attempts at co-operation in the area that has become known as ‘high politics’. The attempt in the early 1950s to leap from the economic to the political/security sphere had failed when in 1954 the French Assembly refused to ratify the plans for the European Defence Community.

The failure of the Defence Community, and with it the Political Community, meant that the high road to European unification was barred. In 1958, the Treaties of Rome setting
up the European Economic and Euratom Communities, came into force. These Treaties, as Nuttal argues, did indeed contain provisions in the field of external relations -the EEC Treaty provided for the gradual transfer of responsibility for trade policy to the Community institutions- but left to one side ‘high politics’ which were the traditional and glorious domain of Foreign Ministries. Nevertheless, after the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community the question of the development of political union in Europe was taken up again, primarily at the urging of Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe. By now, however, France was governed by General de Gaulle who was actively opposed to any further integration moves that implied an increased surrender of national sovereignty. He was also against the expansion of the ‘Community method’, whereby power was transferred to the supranational institutions of the EEC. In 1959, he suggested through his Prime Minister Michel Debré, that a ‘regular and continuing consultation of the Heads of Government’ should established in order to prepare the ground for the political union of Europe. As a result of this initiative, an agreement was reached, in November 1959, to hold quarterly meetings of the Foreign Ministers for consultation on foreign policy matters. At the first conference of the ‘Heads of State and Government and Foreign Ministers’ which followed the French initiatives ended up in failure because of the fear of the other EEC member states that de Gaulle sought to undermine the institutions of the Community and that his emphasis on ‘national’ policies would prove disruptive of harmonious relations with the United States within the NATO framework. Then a period of discussions followed primarily between France and the other EEC members about the shape of the proposed ‘Political Committee’, the status of its secretariat and its relationship with the existing institutions of the Communities. A Study Commission was set up under the French politician Christian Fouchet, and at a meeting in Bonn in July 1961, the six Heads of Government accepted its proposals for regular meetings to ‘compare their views, to harmonise their policies and to arrive at common positions in order to further the political union of Europe, thus strengthening the Atlantic Alliance’. The Bonn declaration was warmly welcomed and gave rise to hopes that the road to a political Europe had been found. However, there was so far nothing beyond a
declaration of principles. The Fouchet Committee presented a draft Treaty, which came to be known as Fouchet I, on October 1961. The objective was a common foreign policy and a common defence policy ‘in co-operation with other free nations’, as well as the development of co-operation in the fields of science and culture. A Council at the level of Heads of Government would meet every four months, and Foreign Ministers would continue to meet quarterly. The existing Assembly of the Communities could debate and make recommendations in any of the areas covered by the Union. A Political Committee made up of senior Foreign Ministry officials with its seat in Paris would prepare and implement the Council decisions. The Treaty would be revised after three years to strengthen the Union in the direction of a unified foreign policy and the centralisation of the Communities within the Union. Finally, new members of the Communities could be admitted to the Union by unanimous decision. In the negotiations which followed, France seemed keen to make concessions to her partners who had not abandoned the concerns they had before the Bonn Declaration, in order to accept the proposals but without success6. Despite de Gaulle’s efforts to make amendments to the text, known as Fouchet II, the result was also a deadlock, since all other member states were still concerned about France’s real motives. In consequence, when in April 1962 the Foreign Ministers met in Paris for further discussions all proposals were rejected. This according to Allen and Wallace7 led France to increase its hostility to the Community institutions, which in turn ensured that future proposals for foreign policy co-ordination would be inextricably intertwined with arguments about the eventual nature of any full European Union.
The Birth of European Political Co-operation

The Hague Conference

In 1965-1966 the European Community faced a crisis which ended in the so-called 'Luxembourg Compromise'. This crisis raised, among others, the issue of the future shape of political co-operation within the Community. Thus, when at the end of the 1960s the Heads of States or Government met at The Hague on 1-2 December 1969 to consider both the British application for membership and the next steps for integration, the climate was not at all promising for a new round of negotiations. Nevertheless, the subject was reopened and following a French initiative, intensive discussions took place in order to settle the conditions for the relaunching of the movement towards political unification -confined to foreign policy issues. The French President Georges Pompidou proposed regular meetings of Foreign Ministers to discuss foreign policy problems, Europe's relations with the rest of the world, and particularly the United States and the eastern European countries, 'in order to harmonise our foreign policies and in any event to inform ourselves better of our respective policies'. However, the Conference did not wish to commit itself to a new mechanism or institution on the spot. For this reason the German Chancellor, Brandt, suggested, and the delegates approved, to instruct the Ministers of foreign Affairs 'to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement'. The Ministers were to make proposals on this by the end of July 1970. Viewed in this perspective, therefore, EPC was not just a circumstantial creation of a new policy, but an intended profoundly important step towards political unity of all member states weak or strong. According to Ifestos, the results of the Hague summit were also very important for the future of the Community. The programme provided for policies which would have completed and strengthened the existing structures and policies, and enlarge the EC by including new Member States. With the entry of Great Britain now a possibility, the way was
open for a form of political co-operation which owed much to the precedent of the Ministerial meetings between 1960 and 1963 and to the work done in the Fouchet Committee.9

The Luxembourg Report

The directives given by the Summit at The Hague were carried out within the year. In order to prepare the study as instructed by the Heads of State, a committee was assembled composed of the political directors of the Member States’ Foreign Ministers, under the chairmanship of the Belgian political director Etienne Davignon, to produce a report (the ‘Davignon Report’). The Report was subsequently approved by the Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg on 27 October 1970, (known as the ‘Luxembourg report’). The Report fixed the ground rules for Political Co-operation and the first Ministerial Meeting at Munich a month later put the agreement into practice.

According to Nuttall10, the Luxembourg Report had been drafted in such a way as to avoid the reefs on which the Fouchet Committee had foundered. The European Community, in particular, was to be kept at arm’s length. European Political Co-operation was not to interfere with the EC, and the EC was not to interfere with EPC.

The Paris Summit

When the preparatory work had been completed,11 a summit organised by the President Pompidou was convened in October 1972. The results of the summit, according to Ifestos12, as regards political co-operation and political union in general, were certainly not impressive. In the first place, the European leaders, after outlining the situation in Europe and the world, expressed mere wishes that ‘the time has come for Europe to realise the unity behind her interests, the scope of her capabilities and the importance of her obligations’. Furthermore, they declared that ‘Europe must be capable of making
her voice heard in world affairs and making a creative contribution in proportion to her human, intellectual and material resources and affirming her own concepts in international relations in line with her role in initiating progress, peace and co-operation'. However, the procedure was scarcely binding, and in fact went less far than the provisions of the Luxembourg Report. The scope of co-operation was refined, the definition now reading: 'to deal with problems of current interest and, where possible, to formulate common medium and long-term positions. This was an apparent advance on the Luxembourg formulation, since for the first time the possibility of common positions was admitted. As regards political union, the declarations of the political leaders, before and during the Summit, were more pragmatic, the statements of intentions less ambitious and more cautious, and the language of the Communiqué more down to earth than in the past. For the European Political Co-operation, the Heads of States indicated their intention marginally to improve the Davignon machinery rather than to transform it into the nucleus of a future European political union, or the immediate instrument of common foreign policy. At the same time, Foreign Ministers were asked to produce, not later than 30 June 1973, a second report on methods of improving political co-operation in accordance with the Luxembourg Report.

The Copenhagen Report

The Foreign Ministers’ report was subsequently submitted to their leaders in the November 1973 summit in Copenhagen, hence it is hereafter called the ‘Copenhagen Report’. The Report basically both outlined what was previously agreed on political co-operation and attempted to draw plans for its future development. Moreover, it gave EPC its final character, it established its ‘working rules’ throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and forms an integral part of the accumulation of reports and practices which make up the EPC.

According to the Copenhagen Report, the main objectives of EPC were to:
ensure by means of regular consultations and exchanges of information, improved mutual understanding as regards the main problems of international relations ... [the strengthening of] solidarity between governments by promoting the harmonisation of their views and the alignment of their positions and, wherever it appears possible and desirable, joint action.

In the Report, the Member States, strong and weak, expressed their satisfaction that in several fields (they) have been able to consider matters jointly, so as to make common political action possible. A new group, the 'Correspondents', consisting of officials of the Foreign Ministers, was set up 'with the task of organisation and problems of general nature', and 'prepare the work of the Political Committee on the basis of instructions given by that Committee'. In addition, in order to deal with questions of a special nature, 'working parties' consisting of senior officials, would meet as the need arose. Furthermore, several other methods were envisaged, either by groups of experts, or research groups depending on the matter in hand.

Another important innovation was the establishment of a special communication network among the Members' Foreign Ministries, the COREU system of telegrams. Through this novel system, there is a continuous process of co-ordination and information on each others' positions on issues of interest to political co-operation. In order to engage further the foreign services in the EPC process, the report provided for regular contacts, consultations, and meetings among the staffs of the members' diplomatic missions in each others' capitals, in third countries, and in international organisations. For the weak member states, these innovations paved the way for the modernisation of their foreign policies and opened new areas for action as they were to receive information they never had before.

From the institutional point of view, it was in the Copenhagen Report that the EEC - EPC dichotomy was officialised for the first time and it was obvious that the fundamental objective of the EPC machinery was co-ordination rather than increased co-operation or even common foreign policy. By imposing institutional limitations on themselves, the member states undoubtedly opted for a procedure which, on the one hand, did not impose on them constraints and commitments in their foreign policy -
making, and, on the other hand, retained decision-making powers and initiatives firmly in the hands of national institutions.

Apart from that, much of what was considered as innovative in the Copenhagen Report was nothing more than the practical methods followed in course of the implementation of the Luxembourg Report and subsequently ‘institutionalised’ in Copenhagen. According to Ifestos\textsuperscript{20}, it could be argued that the changes brought about by the Copenhagen Report were only marginal, they formalised the intergovernmental practices developed during the preceding two years, and the defensive nature of the EPC system did not fundamentally change. Its principal characteristics, though somewhat reinforced and formalised, remained the same: a mechanism for common analysis, reciprocal exchange of information, and at best, common public statements when views did not diverge.

**The Copenhagen Conference and the first enlargement**

For the EC the year 1973 was marked by two major external challenges and an internal one: the Nixon - Kissinger ‘Year of Europe’; the oil crisis; and the first enlargement. By the end of the year, the combined pressure of those major challenges led to two important developments: first, a common public statement from EPC members on the situation in the Middle East (on 6 November); second, an inspired document on ‘European identity’ (on 14 December). The developments of 1973 in the international political arena caused a revival in ideas for furthering European co-operation and for the creation of conditions for ‘Europe to speak with one voice’ in world affairs. The Document on European Identity, therefore, adopted by the Copenhagen Conference of Heads of State and published as a Community declaration on 14 December 1973, was an expression of this revived European Union debate. Among other things, the Declaration directly linked the EPC with the European Community\textsuperscript{21}. Furthermore, the Heads of State, having in mind the international crises of the time, acknowledged that:
present international problems are difficult for any of the nine to solve alone. International developments and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers, mean that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with one voice, if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world.

As Ifestos argues, by making such a major common declaration, the Member States certainly reinforced the conviction both within Europe and in third world countries that EPC is the forum for the Community to play an active role in world affairs, in developing a common foreign policy, and in making it the mainstream instrument of the evolving ‘European identity’ and ‘European unity’ that included all member states, weak or strong.

Another important Copenhagen Summit announcement concerns the procedure for urgent action in case of crisis. This agreement of the Heads of State to establish a procedure for urgent action, could be seen as an important step for more effective political co-operation. During the March 1974 EPC conference, the Foreign Ministers decided on an ‘urgent consultation mechanism’ to provide for continuing consultations among the members either at the crisis location or in the capital of the member holding the Presidency, or in Brussels.

The case of Ireland: membership as a challenge for a weak state

Turning to the internal challenge, the enlargement, we can conclude that of the three new member states which composed the EC’s first enlargement in 1973, Ireland probably enjoyed the clearest gain from its overall terms of membership. In the case of Ireland the four variables highlighted in the second chapter: behavioural patterns; policy adaptation; domestic sources of foreign policy; and political and security perspectives, are applied and tested.

Becoming a member of the European Community therefore, is often seen as the major turning point in the seventy-six years of the Irish state’s existence. Before that date the
main concerns of Irish foreign policy were two-fold. On the one hand, loosening ties
with the UK and on the other, attempting to participate in the activities of international
organisations. Apart from that, accession to the Common Agricultural Policy was the
most obvious single advantage, after decades of dependence on a British market
classified by low price levels. More generally, Irish policies were now able to
benefit from the opportunities afforded by a multilateral policy process which reduced
the effects of political marginalisation. However, after joining the Community and
realising that in addition to economic benefits derived from the CAP there could also be
political gains. Irish foreign policy orientation shifted towards a more ‘European’
approach. According to Miles, ‘institutional adaptation was also a very important issue,
if Ireland wanted to be an effective member it had to abandon neutrality at some
point.’

Ireland’s first participation in the EPC was on the 26/27 of May 1972. Participation in
EPC was not without problems. This was not simply because ‘Political Co-operation’
was itself an unknown quantity in the transitional years of Irish membership. Ireland’s
difficulty lay rather in the distance it had to travel from the outer margins of
international life to involvement in a diplomatic network with pretensions to a central
role in world affairs. Apart from that, Ireland’s traditional neutrality meant that the
whole EPC issues agenda remained problematic in the late 1970s.

Nevertheless, EPC led to the enhancement of Ireland’s foreign policy capabilities. High
level access to the major governments of both partners and third parties became a
matter of routine, and the Presidency offered a unique opportunity for a weak state to
demonstrate its new status. The machinery of national diplomacy, with regard both to
its representation abroad and its operation at home, was transformed. However, this
successful adaptation was marked by modesty in its presentation and caution in its
execution. If any generalisation is possible about Ireland’s attitude, it is the rather
obvious one that Ireland was at the ‘moralist’ rather than the ‘realpolitik’ end of the
EPC spectrum. This approach is facilitated by the narrow range of direct national
interests at stake, by the diffuse images of Ireland as a ‘civilian’ and ‘anti-imperialist’
state, and by its neutrality and historical roots respectively.
One basic difference between Ireland's role as a weak state in EPC and its former emphasis on the United Nations is that whereas in the global organisation positions were formulated on a particular selection of issues, in EPC a much broader range of issues must be tackled, and the imperatives are regional rather than national. As one official remarked: 'we eat table d'hôte now, rather than à la carte'.

In meeting the increased demands imposed by EPC, Irish policy-makers had not generally been subjected to tight domestic constraints from the public. More obvious constraints arose in the administrative setting, in so far as EPC implied some attempt to respond to issues which arose on a potentially global basis. The main impact of this was seen in the growth of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Its headquarters almost doubled in size between 1967 and 1977, and much of this can be attributed to the need first, to cover EPC issues and second, to perform a co-ordinating role for EU policies. Also the information flow arising from the COREU network and the regular meetings of officials had enabled Irish diplomats to be much better informed than they were prior to their participation in EPC.

When it comes to policy co-ordination and the ability to reach a national position quickly the small size of the Irish policy-making elite provided some advantages. Senior officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs dealing with EPC had very direct access to their counterparts in the Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and indeed found it much easier to have access to the head of government in person than do officials in the larger foreign ministries. It is largely through this type of flexibility and intimacy that an administration of such limited resources can cope with the demands of the Presidency.

Irish politicians saw EPC as one component of Community membership and showed a certain realism about the political imperatives on which it was based. At the same time there is no doubt that EPC had its place in Dublin's scheme of things; indeed, it might be seen as one of the main pillars of Irish foreign policy.
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The Tindemans Report

During the Paris Summit of December 1974, Leo Tindemans, the Prime Minister of Belgium, was asked to submit a comprehensive report, before the end of 1975, covering all areas of current concern. Of the six components of European Union identified by Tindemans, the first concerned the Union’s external role:

*European Union implies that we present a united front to the outside world. We must tend to act in common in all the main fields of our external relations whether in foreign policy, security, economic relations or development aid. Our action is aimed at defending our interests but also at using our collective strength in support of law and justice in world discussions.*

This is important since for the first time a weak member state proposed and initiated policy formulation concerning political co-operation.

As Nuttall\(^3\) states, Tindemans proposed three decisions to be taken by the European Council. First, that the distinction between EPC and Community meetings at ministerial level should be abolished. Second, all problems relevant to European interests could be discussed, including security aspects and without the distinction between political and economic, industrial, financial, and commercial questions which made increasingly less sense in the modern world. These two decisions taken together would set up a single decision-making centre, so that different aspects of problems could be dealt together, at least at ministerial level, by the same people and in the same place. Given this single centre, Tindemans also proposed a third radical change in the nature of Political Co-operation. The political commitment was to be replaced by a legal obligation. However, the report was far too optimistic and ended up in failure. Belgium had always been at the pro-federalist end of the spectrum of integration and political development. Europe was not ready for major advances in reaching Political Union as it was conceived through the lens of a weak member state. Apart from that, in 1975 economic growth was suffering under the oil shock. There was no longer any confidence that the Community had the potential for solving national problems of the member states, and since the report involved a loss of sovereignty, it was not welcomed.
The failure to agree on the great leap forward proposed in the Tindemans Report did not prevent the Nine from continuing to make pragmatic improvements in the functioning of European Political Co-operation. As we already saw, in addition to setting up the European Council, the Paris 1974 Summit had taken two decisions strengthening the role of the Presidency and granting a limited role to the European Parliament. The Ministerial meeting in Dublin on 13 February 1975 approved the plan for the implementation of the decision on the European Parliament. It was decided that in the first instance the exercise would be limited to written questions. Questions were sent directly to the Council Presidency which forwarded them to EPC. Then a draft reply was prepared by the Presidency, whereas, the Correspondants acted as a co-ordinating body. The first Irish Presidency, in 1975, was deeply involved in the preparation of the Community's policy of political and financial support for Portugal, of which the personal diplomacy of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Garret FitzGerald, was the most public manifestation; this is a typical example of the way in which EPC mobilised the services of a weak state on issues where the latter had few direct interests.

Another significant development was the common recognition that EPC should improve its capability concerning crisis management, something that was also been stated in the Copenhagen Summit. As Nuttall states, a report examined in October 1974, based on the experience gained from the Cyprus crisis and the October War, proposed that if a Member State thought there was a crisis, the Ambassadors of its EPC partners should meet in the capital of the presidency, discussing whether an emergency meeting of the Nine was necessary. For the weak member states that was an extra diplomatic tool. The need for preparedness and a system of rapid and confidential communications were recognised as being necessary to make this procedure work. It was also recognised that potential crisis situations had to be detected in advance and it was proposed that the Political Committee should identify the relevant specific subjects and entrust them either to the existing Working Groups or to a special group of analysis and research. The
latest proposition failed with a declaration stated that the existing Working Groups were sufficient. It was again very early for the establishment of a planning group.

**The Years 1978 to 1981 / from Stagnation to the London Report**

EPC was now to go through a period of stagnation, since it is commonly held that, by the end of 1977, it had reached a plateau. The Nine could continue more or less with what they were already doing but, it was difficult to do much more on the basis of existing data and structures. Apart from that, they were shaken out of their complacency by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Member states’ embarrassing failure to deal collectively with the crisis, provoked them into rethinking their working methods, as well as taking a more active approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Venice Declaration which resulted from this activity did not bring any progress, and the policy on Afghanistan had no greater success. According to Nuttall, EPC had difficulty in maintaining even the level of activity it had previously attained. Member States turned to other, more effective, forums for their foreign policy initiatives - the Contact Group of Five for Namibia, NATO for the CSCE after the Belgrade meeting, even the Western Economic Summits- or preferred bilateral approaches to diplomacy, like the Anglo-US efforts on Rhodesia. It was obvious that the lack of any institutional basis had weakened EPC. Its successful functioning depended more than most on a climate of optimism among the officials who took part in it. This climate was certainly affected for the worse by the pessimism prevalent in the Community and by the suffering from the second oil shock. A reform and a change were desperately needed.

**Greece’s initial participation in the EPC**

Greece’s initial participation in the EC and European Political Co-operation (EPC) under a New Democracy (ND) government (from January to October 1981) was too
brief to allow for reliable conclusions to be drawn. In addition, this was a period of adjustment to and familiarisation with the realities of political co-operation. At the time, Greece was engaged in a bilateral dialogue with Turkey and did not attempt to raise Greek-Turkish issues within EPC. Its positions on East-West relations followed the line of its partners.

In contrast to ND, the Greek socialists (PASOK) saw the EC primarily as an economic community and only secondarily as a political entity. They maintained that economic cohesion should precede political co-operation. In opposition, PASOK had been hostile towards the EC, which it had seen as a mechanism for larger member states to impose their views and to restrict the smaller partners' possibilities of playing a political role. Once in power, PASOK's opposition changed into suspicion and wariness. There were three basic reasons for this: first, during PASOK's early years in government, the uncertainty about Greece's relationship with the EC prevented the adoption of a long-term strategy or even co-ordinated tactical manoeuvres.

Secondly, PASOK's insistence that Greece should play an autonomous international role, its refusal to accept decisions entailing any cost to Greece, produced continual differentiation within EPC, particularly during the early months of its administration in 1981. PASOK's justification was that other members also diverged from the Community line, for example, over Cyprus, and that Greece faced a problem of 'national independence that did not apply to its Community partners'. At the same time, it had begun to realise the practical possibilities of EPC as a forum, and to use it to attack Turkey at every opportunity. While some minor successes were scored, it often appeared as if its partners were simply allowing Greece to express its views, with no major practical results.

Thirdly, PASOK's lack of confidence in EPC mechanisms resulted in an almost automatic use of the veto. Greece initially saw this as an absolute right, which could be exercised towards Greek interests. Excessive use of the veto on issues, which were not vital to national security, gave the impression that the Greek government regarded the immobilisation of EPC as a diplomatic victory.
The London Report

The failure of EPC to react immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 gave the stimulus required to set discussion in motion again, this time reinforced by the awareness of the Ministers themselves that the shortcomings of their foreign-policy co-ordination had been embarrassingly exposed. In October 1981 the Foreign Ministers, in their meeting, agreed and signed the third European Political Co-operation report, which together with the Luxembourg and Copenhagen reports were the constituent papers of EPC until 1986 when the Single European Act was signed. The London Report was approved by the European Council which met in London on 26 and 27 of November 1981. The Report in certain instances was a step forward, and in others a simple formal acknowledgement of what was already an established practice.

The main features of the London Report differentiating it from its predecessors, could be located in four areas: institutional, crisis procedures, security, and the political commitment. The Foreign Ministers stated that it was their constant concern to strengthen their political co-operation which 'answers a real need felt by the Member States of the European Community for closer unity in this field'. They also declared that 'it is their conviction that the Ten (Greece was now an EC member) should seek increasingly to shape events and not merely to react to them'.

Another provision concerned the crisis procedure. In a very important new clause, the Political Committee, or, if necessary, a Ministerial meeting, could be convened within forty-eight hours at the request of three member states. The same applies to Heads of mission in third countries and working groups are encouraged to analyse areas of political crisis and to prepare a range of possible reactions.

Security was also mentioned for the first time as a legitimate concern of EPC.

The text clearly shows that the commitment was the minimum possible and it was up to the political will of the Member States to deal or not to deal with the 'political aspects' of security. The Community was still a long way from being effectively involved with substantive security issues of contemporary world affairs, but even the mentioning of
security for the first time, was an important step, especially for Greece that had security concerns and felt threatened by Turkey.

As regards institutional strengthening, as Ifestos argues, the Report both confirmed and strengthened the previously established structures and practices. It did not change EPC's fundamental institutional characteristics, but it did formalise pragmatic and effective arrangements. Institutionally, it formalised the Commission's participation, it reinforced the Presidency, and established crisis procedures. It also introduced the 'political aspects' of security, it reconfirmed, a decade after the launching of EPC, the members' political commitment to political co-operation and finally added an extra diplomatic tool to the weak member states' foreign policy resources.

**EPC during the Period 1982 - 1986**

A more ambitious plan for further progress towards European Union, than the London Report, launched at the same time by Foreign Ministers Genscher and Colombo, proved to have aimed too high. Genscher proposed the drafting of a new Treaty which would draw together the existing components of the Community: the *acquis communautaire*, the intergovernmental co-operation of EPC, and the European Council, which will also include provisions for cultural co-operation and a common security policy. Colombo, the Italian Foreign Minister, joined Genscher and together they made a common proposal on November 1981 after the adoption of the London Report. The proposal had two sections. The first was entitled 'Draft European Act' and included a declaration of principles that would enable 'Member States, through a common foreign policy, to act in concert in world affairs' together with 'the co-ordination of security policy and the adoption of common European positions in this sphere'. The second section included institutional provisions such as the formalisation of the European Council as the main EPC and Community guidance organ, the reinforcement of the European Parliament and the upgrading of the Council (of Foreign Ministers) to 'be responsible for European Political Co-operation' and for security matters. The reaction to the
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proposal was not at all enthusiastic. Integrationists were against it because they believed that any development should come through the existing Treaties framework, whereas, the non-integrationists were opposed to any intergovernmental or federal initiative in general. Nevertheless, an ad hoc working group was set up to examine and discuss the proposal. From January 1982 to June 1983 all efforts that were made to reach an agreement failed. Then, on 19 June 1983 in Stuttgart and under the German presidency the 'Draft European Act' was transmogrified into a 'Solemn Declaration'. The Declaration emphasised the need for greater coherence and close co-ordination between the existing Community structures and EPC but it did not leave any space for merging or future progress.

As regards political co-operation the 'Solemn Declaration' text resembled more the London Report than the 'Draft European Act'. The EPC's institutional setting remained unchanged. For foreign policy, joint action and security there were only declaratory statements. If we study both the 'Draft European Act' and the 'Solemn Declaration', we can make two important points: first, that the 'Solemn Declaration' eliminated any aspect of the 'Draft European Act' that could have altered the institutional and political status of the Community; and second, the fact that the Declaration confirmed existing practices rather than introduced any innovations.

From Stuttgart (June 1983) to Luxembourg (December 1985)

The 'Solemn Declaration' in Stuttgart was not conclusive to move integration forward. However, the European Parliament took the initiative to vote on 14 February 1984 on the proposed 'Draft Treaty Establishing the European Paper'. This Draft Treaty was the outcome of the work by a Committee set up under Altiero Spinelli. Its principle was the construction of an even closer union in Europe. The approach followed in the Draft Treaty was to outline the path towards European Union, but carefully so, in order to avoid making it appear a political union. In the Draft Treaty it was proposed to bring political co-operation under the auspices of the Union, whereas, there were also
provisions for further co-operation in security, peace and disarmament issues. However, the reaction of the governments was neither enthusiastic nor encouraging. The French President, Mitterrand, for domestic and political reasons, supported the spirit of the Draft Treaty. In a highly influential speech to the European Parliament on the 23 of May 1984 he said: ‘Let us give the Council of Ministers back its means of implementing the policies of which the European Council lays down the guidelines. Let us give the European Council a permanent secretariat for political co-operation’. The French President presented an initiative at the European Council at Fontainebleau on 25-26 June 1984. The Council decided to set up an ad hoc committee of personal representatives of Heads of State and Government ‘to make suggestions for the improvement of the operation of European co-operation in both the Community field and that of political, or any other, co-operation’. The Committee, which was chaired by Dooge, the former Irish Foreign Minister, presented an interim report to the European Council in Dublin in December 1984 and a final report in Brussels in March 1985. Although most of the report was concerned with the internal development of the Community, there was one part which was devoted to ‘the search for an external identity’. The distinction between EEC and EPC was to remain but the need for closer co-operation was stressed.44

As regards foreign policy the Report proposed a strengthening of the EPC by creating a permanent Secretariat, and regular EPC working meetings. The reaction to the final report by the Member States was full of comments and reservations. The climate was the same as after the Genscher-Colombo proposals. In its March 1985 meeting the European Council decided to postpone any discussions until the June meeting in Milan.

From the Milan European Council to the Single European Act

In the Milan Summit, the Member States were divided on a number of issues, ranging from disagreements about the desirability of calling an intergovernmental conference, to divergence about the voting practices and the role of the political secretariat.
Nevertheless, the strong member states took all the initiatives and the views of the weak ones were neglected since there was a feeling that the time for major institutional decisions was approaching. Just before the Milan Summit France, together with Germany, presented a new ‘draft Treaty on European Union’; at the same time the UK submitted its own draft which focused only on Political Co-operation emphasising the intergovernmental structure of any future Political Union. In Milan, after discussions the European Council decided, (based on the Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome, which allowed a future revision of the Treaty), by qualified majority and not by unanimity, to take the necessary steps in order to convene an intergovernmental conference with a view to submitting the results for a decision at the next European Council in Luxembourg in December 1985. The Conference was to work out ‘with a view to achieving concrete progress on European Union: (i) a Treaty on a common foreign and security policy on the basis of the Franco -German and United Kingdom drafts’ and (ii) amendments to the EEC Treaty mainly on decision -making and the extension to new spheres of activity. Then, at its meeting on 22 July 1985 the Council of Ministers put into legal form the Summit’s decision and it was agreed that the conference would submit its conclusions to the next European Council meeting in December. The Conference, would be convened at a Foreign Minister level, with the full participation of the Commission, whereas, Spain and Portugal would also be represented. Discussions and meetings continued and at a Ministerial session of the Conference on 19 November, France tabled a draft ‘Act of European Union’ based on Commission’s proposals. In the text there were provisions for the creation of a new ‘Council of the Union’ with its own secretariat, which would substitute the existing European Council and its jurisdiction would be in both the EEC and the EPC. The text was rejected, but on the Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels on 16-17 December 1985, agreement was reached on a proposal by the Presidency, similar to the French draft but without ambiguous points such as ‘the Council of the Union and its Secretariat’. The Foreign Ministers decided also on the form of the Treaty in the sphere of Foreign Policy and finalised into a ‘Single European Act’. It was called ‘Single’ because it covered both the Community and the European Political Co-operation.
The Single European Act and Its Impact

After the hesitant moves of the 1970s, the Member States finally incorporated foreign policy provisions in a treaty text for the first time with the passage of the Single European Act. According to Lord Geoffrey Howe\(^45\): 'it started as a document which we in Britain wanted to commend to our partners in a way that was politically useful. So, Margaret Thatcher invited Chancellor Kohl to Chequers in May 1986 on his own, and there handed him a draft text with a view to be used as a joint Anglo-German initiative in the context of the upcoming negotiations. There was silence from Bonn for the next couple of weeks. Then, suddenly about eleven days before the Milan Summit in June, a Franco-German text using the same material appeared in almost exactly the same words. It was that which became in due course incorporated as Title III of the Single European Act, the provisions on European Political Co-operation\(^46\).

Regarding Political Co-operation, the major innovation was that the Act gave EPC a legal framework therefore, ended its *ad hoc* character which had lasted for fifteen years. The principles which apply to Political Co-operation were: to protect more effectively Europe’s common interests and independence; to display democracy and compliance with the law of human rights; and to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security. In Title I, the Community and EPC are stated to have as their objective to contribute together in order to make further progress towards European unity.

The EPC provisions were refined and extended over the years and were finally codified in a legal text in Title III. Under this Title (Article 30.10), a Political Co-operation Secretariat was set up in Brussels to help the Foreign Ministry of the presidency country to co-ordinate foreign policy and also to assist in preparing and implementing the activities of European Political Co-operation and in administrative matters. The Foreign Minister of the presidency country could speak for the EC as a whole in the United Nations. In theory, at least, the member states could work out a joint approach to international issues at the UN and could vote together in the UN General Assembly; similarly the EC took a common line on human rights and related issues at the CSCE.
(now OSCE). EC summits and Foreign Councils made declarations on global issues, from Afghanistan to the Middle East, and EC Foreign Ministers hold regular meetings with their counterparts from regional groupings (the Gulf, Central America, ASEAN, etc.). The EC had also taken limited sanctions against various states in an attempt to use its political and economic power for agreed European aims: for example against Libya and Syria over terrorism; against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990; and against South Africa over apartheid. Such sanctions have had mixed results. For the weak member states it was a chance to make themselves heard in the world and to elevate their status in world politics.

The Single European Act formally committed the member states to "endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy" (Article 30). It also (Article 2) regularised the position of the European Council, or the regular series of summit meetings of Heads of Government, which had been meeting three times a year since 1973, and twice yearly since 1986. The European Council meetings had played a considerable role in promoting "political co-operation", and foreign policy issues invariably occupy a prominent, and sometimes the predominant, place on the agenda. to a significant extent, they have provided an opportunity for the European members of the Western alliance to co-ordinate their positions, and enable them to adopt a more equal posture vis-à-vis the USA, which dwarfs each of them on a one-to-one basis.

The degree of commitment to Political Co-operation was also emphasised in Article 30. The scope of EPC was now given as 'any foreign policy matters of general interest'. Consistency was also stressed. Article 30.5 stated that 'the external policies of the European Communities and the Policies agreed in European Political Co-operation must be consistent. The Presidency and the Commission, each within its own sphere of competence, shall have special responsibility for ensuring that such consistency is sought and maintained'.

The Single European Act was signed in February 1986. There was a delay in its implementation because the Irish believed that the provisions of Title III caused a constitutional difficulty, since they saw it as a threat to their neutrality. As a result, the SEA did not enter into force on 1 January 1987, but on 1 July 1987 after a Supreme
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Court judgement. However, the Member States considered the delay as non-existent, and acted as if the Act was into force. Even the Secretariat, who officially did not exist until July, was in full operation in Brussels from 1 January. Foreign ministers decided on 21 July 1986 to appoint Ambassador Jannuzzi, the Italian Deputy Political Director to this position.

The fact that European Political Co-operation acquired a legal personality through intergovernmental procedures was very significant especially for the weak member states for a number of reasons. Firstly, their participation in the EPC decision-making process was institutionalised and as a result their bargaining power was increased, secondly, they enjoyed more diplomatic benefits and thirdly, there was no loss of sovereignty. The establishment of the Secretariat was a major change since it brought more efficiency to EPC. The increased efficiency was indispensable, as EPC faced a rising tide of work caused by its increasing attraction to third countries. The growing weight of the EEC internationally, as the Single Market was consolidated, led to increased interest in the Community as a political entity, to which EPC had to respond. The weak member states saw in the institutionalisation of the EPC the opportunity to ‘Europeanise’ and modernise their foreign ministries and foreign policies as it was the case with Portugal.

Portugal had always a vital interest in Europe developing a common foreign policy. It was equally vital to Portugal that the idea of an open Europe was consolidated, meaning that the Union should not become, from an economic and human point of view, a closed trading bloc with a minimalist view of its own identity, and that it should increasingly seek a central role in world affairs; a position identical to the Greek one. During the 1991 intergovernmental conference Portugal affirmed that ‘the Community’s external relations should be geared to the prime objective of building a Europe that is open to the world’. Historical, cultural, and geographical factors have made Portugal a country with deep roots in Europe and strong links to other parts of the world, particularly to the other Portuguese-speaking nations.
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Portugal's action in the EPC aimed at proposing initiatives mainly concern the countries that had traditional ties with or interests to, namely: South Africa, East Timor, and the five Lusophone countries (Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome e Principe).

It became clear that Portugal tried through Europe and EPC to strengthen its ties with the Portuguese-speaking Africa and South Africa, while with regard to Latin America the objectives were to value or give a national foreign policy objective (the 'national' prevailed over the 'European') substance to national objectives through the Community factor. The Mediterranean and to a lesser extent Central and Eastern Europe had also became part of Portuguese foreign policy as a consequence of membership.

It goes without saying that Portugal and Greece, as it is demonstrated in the next section, simply by being members of the Community have gained in international status from the addition of a foreign policy dimension to the existing economic co-operation.

GREECE'S BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN EPC DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1980s

It is noteworthy that Greece did not fundamentally object to the goals of EPC during the first half of the 1980s. In the majority of all decisions, the Greek government went along with the other partners in EPC. It was only in specific cases, such as those outlined below, that Greece abstained from a common position. Therefore it can be argued that the cases of dissent were something like an alibi, or a compensation process of the PASOK government's conversion from anti-European to pro-European attitudes.

Greece dissociated itself from the rest of the Community when the following issues were on the agenda: defence of national interests versus Turkey and in favour of Cyprus, solidarity with Arab states, and support of international détente.

Whereas Greece was to present itself as a ‘champion of reform,’ willing to give support to any initiative strengthening the process of EC integration and political co-operation at the beginning 1990s, the early 1980s showed a quite different picture. Greece was
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the state that objected most emphatically to the deepening of integration and of co-operation in foreign policy. The following examples may serve to verify this statement:

- The Greek government rejected the Genscher-Colombo-Act of 1981, which proposed majority voting and planned for a Common Security Policy in collaboration with NATO. The Papandreou government did not want to see EPC being in any way connected with NATO and was a strong defender of 'national autonomy.' At the end of 1981 PASOK's rhetoric still proposed that Greece should leave NATO as well as the European Community.

- As mentioned above, the Greek government signed the Solemn Declaration on European Union (Stuttgart, 19 June 1983) but, along with the UK and Denmark, added a footnote to it, stating that no declaration would ever hinder the government to follow Greece's national interests. In signing this statement, Greece declares that nothing can restrict its right to determine its own foreign policy in accordance with its national interests.49 This was paradoxical, given that a declaration does not have the legal force of a treaty or limit the rights of its signatories.

- When the Dooge Committee presented its Final Report on institutional affairs in March 1985, Greece stressed that national autonomy as well as consensus was needed in foreign affairs. The necessity of reforming EPC was totally rejected by Greece at the European Council in Milan. One month later, however, Greek foreign policy made a U-turn and assumed a more positive position towards political co-operation. Within the Dooge Committee the Greek representative suggested weakening the declared aim of EPC from the proposed 'systematic formulation and implementation of a common foreign policy' to the 'systematic formulation of common positions on foreign policy questions'50. While not expressing reservations about the inclusion of political and economic aspects of security in EPC, Greece asked for 'the special security problems' of certain member states to be taken into account. Greek representatives, backed by the British and the Danes, also proposed and succeeded in having the following statement included in the final report:
When a member state considers that its very important interests are at stake, the discussion should continue until unanimous agreement is reached.\textsuperscript{51}

At the June 1985 European Council, when the Dooge report was being considered, prime Minister Papandreou confirmed the Greek position by claiming that for a whole series of reasons, his country could not give up the right to use the veto.\textsuperscript{52}

As was stated before, Greece stood aside when common decisions were to be taken on political co-operation. This was the case with other EC member states, too. For example, Great Britain did not follow its partners when decisions on South Africa were taken in the Full Assembly of United Nations. However, no other EC member state opposed 'common positions' in EPC as much as Greece did in the first half of the 1980s. The major conflicts between Greece and the rest of the Community can be seen in the following cases:

- Greece prevented the EPC from publicly criticising Libya because of its intervention in Chad (November 1981).
- Greece did not support Western sanctions against the Soviet Union after it introduced martial law in Poland (January 1982).
- Together with Romania, Greece favoured a nuclear-free Balkans irrespective of a negative Western position on this proposal (November 1982), Greece isolated itself from the partners when its foreign minister publicly proposed a moratorium on NATO re-armament (August 1983).
- Greece prevented its partners in the EC from issuing a unanimous condemnation of the Soviet Union after it shot down a Korean civilian airliner (September 1983).

From a more systematic point of view, the following differences separated Greece from its partners: Firstly, the Papandreou government preferred a policy of détente vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its allies when the rest of the West was already in favour of re-armament and a policy of military strength. For PASOK, détente was not one of
various alternatives, but it constituted something like an ethical principle in the early 1980s. It was useful for the PASOK government not to join the ranks of the West in various instances for 'domestic consumption'. An anti-Western image satisfied party members as well as voters. At least some radical rhetoric was needed, as the PASOK government did not follow a radical policy in substance. No steps were taken to end membership in NATO and in the European Community as was promised in election campaigns. At the same time, Greece did not support the sanctions against the Soviet Union, rejected a common condemnation of the Soviet Union after it shot down the Korean aeroplane, and it isolated itself when proposing the project of a nuclear-free Balkans. The last example made it clear that the Greek government’s intentions were largely domestically oriented. There was no realistic possibility of bringing the Western partners to a common position and of getting them to support the idea of a nuclear-free Balkans. The Greek government was aware of this. The fact that the idea was nevertheless promoted by Athens was intended to help to project the picture of an autonomous Greece and of a foreign policy which did not hesitate to conflict with Western partners.

Secondly, Turkey is perceived as the central problem of Greek foreign policy. Whoever may have expected intensive disputes between Greece and its EC partners on this matter was wrong. The reason for this is that, on the one hand, the EC had made it clear from the very beginning that it was not willing to become a party in the Greek-Turkish conflict. On the other hand, Turkey, as an associate member of the Community, was not in the EPC agenda. Thus, the Greek aspiration to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Turkey in the framework of EPC failed. This may explain the limited interest shown for political co-operation by Athens. As EPC did not meet Greek intentions with regard to Turkey, the PASOK government tried to put pressure on Ankara by blocking the Fourth Financial Protocol and, in general, the development of the association between Turkey and the Community. Greece’s EC partners saw this blocking with 'a negative eye.' Although for Antanasiotis, 'the Protocol was not going to have a significant impact on Turkey's economy due to its dramatic situation.' Some compensation for Greek ambitions was also found when the Association Council
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EC-Turkey met. In its opening statement, the EC declared that the open Cyprus question ‘affects’ the association.\(^5\) Greece was not opposed, in principle, to the strengthening of EU ties with Turkey. It was and still is in Greece’s interest to have a moderate, European-oriented neighbour to the east and a potentially important market for its goods and services. Greece does not expect from Turkey anything more than other EU members would expect, that is implementation of international law principles and, in the context of the Cyprus conflict, of basic human rights embodied in international and European covenants and treaties.\(^5\) What these measures amount to in practice is not, however, quite clear. True, neither the Cyprus problem, which according to George Papandreou is Europe’s Cuba,\(^6\) nor the Greek-Turkish conflict have come any closer to a solution as a result of the Union’s action of policy pronouncements. On the other hand, it would have been totally unrealistic to expect that EU action alone could have solved these immensely complicated problems, given the limited political means and resources at its disposal. What appeared to be exceedingly important for the Greek side is that, in the face of rising Turkish military and political might, Greece, as a member of the Union, had at its disposal a number of institutional instruments to, at least, contain Turkish ambitions. Greece had, for instance, been able to forestall the diplomatic recognition of the self-proclaimed Turkish federated state in occupied Cyprus by at least three countries by threatening to take action in the EU against their interests. As already noted, the discovery of the bargaining superiority specifically against Turkey that EU membership conferred upon Greece had been a powerful factor contributing to turning Greece into one of the most pro-integrationist, federalist countries in the Union. Nevertheless, according to Tsakaloyannis\(^6\), the prospects for Greek participation in EPC were not very promising in the 1970s, since Greece’s main security consideration had to do with Turkey. As a result, Greek foreign policy was limited by this preoccupation. That dispute actually created friction at certain times between Greece and some of its partners. That was natural since not every member state saw the dispute in the same light as the Greeks, some of them like Germany having long-standing historical ties with Turkey.
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Thirdly, Athens continuously tried to get support from the EC on Cyprus. It is regrettable, however, that, at a time when this support may have been needed badly, relations between Athens and the rest of the Community were extremely poor. When, on 15 November 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was proclaimed, the Greek government, presiding the EC in during second half of the year, had just recently rejected the condemnation of the Soviet Union because of the Korean airliner incident. Athens could not launch any ambitious initiative of the EC. 

The Community condemned the proclamation of the TRNC and later (27 March 1984) asked Turkey to withdraw its recognition of Northern Cyprus. However, the EPC did not try to play a leading role as mediator. It left this role, as it had done traditionally, to the United Nations and its Secretary General. It is hard to say whether the EPC would have been willing to take a firmer stand on this issue, yet, in any case, this was prevented because of the strained relations between Greece and the EC. It is ironical that this resulted to a great extent from the radical rhetoric in Athens.

Fourthly, Greece favoured a pro-Arab position. On the one hand, like France, all Greek governments traditionally supported the Arab side against Israel and its ‘allies.’ On the other hand, PASOK socialism ‘decorated’ itself with its support of national Liberation movements. The Palestinian struggle was perceived as one of the outstanding examples in this respect. When PASOK came to power in 1981, it presented itself as pro-Arab, tried to soften the EPC’s condemnation of Libya’s intervention in Chad (November 1981), and permanently opposed any effort to make the Camp David agreement a basis for peace in the Middle East. The PASOK leadership shared the Palestinians’ view that this agreement had neglected their interests. Whenever Western countries criticised Libya or Syria because of their alleged support for terrorist groups, it was Athens which tried to soften any measures taken. Greece also did not recognise Israel until April 1990 when the government of Constantine Mitsotakis, came to power.

In all four cases outlined above Greece disassociated itself from any ‘common position’ that had to be taken, although in all the other issues that had arisen, did not fundamentally objected the goals of EPC.
THE EUROPEANISATION OF A SELF-WILLED PARTNER
SINCE THE MID-1980s

The dynamics of changing relationships and Greece's adaptation

The late 1980s recorded a very different performance of Greece in EPC. In the first half of the decade, the Greek government was indeed the 'lonely wolf' whereas Greek politicians followed a more pro-European course in the second half of the 1980s. From 1981 to 1985, the political elite had to adapt itself to Europe after having adopted a declaratory platform which was anti-European and which helped the PASOK party to win the elections of 1981.

Greece's attitude towards EPC changed during the second half of the 1980s in the sense that its anti-European declaratory policy lost its force. It is important to stress that the declaratory or rhetorical element of the PASOK government did not really intend to withdraw Greece from the EC or NATO. The government had accepted EC membership at the latest in March 1982, when it addressed its memorandum to the Community. Greece demanded more financial transfers and some (limited) exemptions from competition rules. PASOK made it clear that it saw Greece's future within and not outside the Community. However, the government could not refrain from anti-European rhetoric since it had promised to withdraw from the EC and NATO during the election campaigns and as a result, it was difficult to follow a European orientation. Despite this constraint, Greece's substantial policy moved in the process of becoming Europe-oriented, and some years later its declaratory 'decoration' followed too.

This change can be clearly pinpointed. When the European Council met in Milan on 28/29 June 1985, Greece still opposed the idea of reforming and strengthening the EC and EPC. One month later, however, the Greek government joined the ranks of those who sought to convene an Intergovernmental Conference to constitute some legal basis for EPC. The Papandreou government even accepted the idea of deepening co-
operation in foreign policy with some security aspects. When the Intergovernmental
Conference formulated the Single European Act, this was also accepted by Greece.64
There are at least three major reasons for the adaptation of Greece's policy to the
European mainstream. Firstly, the pro-European approach in foreign policy followed
an orientation which has been dominant in Greek society since the beginning of the
1960s: modernisation strengthened the ties with Europe. Association, and later,
accession to the EC had been the consequence of this. Secondly, alternative options of
Greek foreign policy as proposed by PASOK since the early 1970s were no longer of
any consequence, at the latest in the mid-1980s. This was true with regard to
collaboration with Mediterranean or Arabian countries as well as with the Third World.
As an outsider, Greece would not have had any influence on EPC. Thirdly, if Greece
had totally blocked any reform of the EC and EPC, it would have lost an instrument for
receiving more financial transfers from Brussels. In a typical mercantile style, Greece
had accepted the Single European Act in order to benefit from the doubling of
structural funds.

Greece's role in EPC was not characterised with great enthusiasm in the second half of
the 1980s. Nevertheless, Greece abstained from anti-European rhetoric and accepted
the fact of political co-operation. Issues like the Sandinista Regime in Nicaragua, the
war between Iraq and Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the British intervention
in the Falkland islands, apartheid in South Africa, or diplomatic recognition of the
Palestinian state did not separate Greece from its partners in EPC. This is remarkable,
as Greece's foreign policy set different priorities vis-à-vis the rest of the EC in many of
these cases.

This underlines the fact that, first of all, a limited number of disputes satisfied the
PASOK government's need to dissent from its EC partners in the early 1980s.
Secondly, as soon as PASOK had made its peace with the Community, the necessity no
longer existed to remain apart from the EPC mainstream. Thirdly, as a small country,
Greece's foreign Policy was limited to some special interests. Among those, as noted,
were Turkey, Cyprus, and the Balkans. In nearly all other regions, Greece followed the
course set by the EC majority.
However, although after the mid 1980s, the PASOK government no longer followed an anti-European (declaratory) policy since the mid-1980s, the European partners felt relieved when PASOK's term in office ended in 1989. The hope was expressed that Greece would play the role of an more active supporter of political co-operation and that consensus between Greece and its partners would increase substantially. Nevertheless, if someone had examined Greek voting behaviour in the United Nations before and after 1981, he would have discovered that the Conservative governments which were in office before 1981 kept apart from the EC mainstream as soon as national interests were at stake. 65

When New Democracy won the elections of 8 April 1990, the new government of Constantine Mitsotakis showed a very promising pro-European attitude. The Mitsotakis government tried to make it clear to its EC partners that Greek solo performances belonged to the past. The government was aware of the fact that Greece's traditional efforts to find an ally in the EC against Turkey had failed. Nevertheless, the unstable economy and - after the end of the Cold War - ever increasing perceptions of an insecure political situation strengthened the European profile of the new government. The new Prime Minister not only visited Washington but all capitals of EC member states as soon as he had taken office. This was clearly intended as a demonstrative act to assure all the Western allies that Greece would be a partner which no longer intended to follow an isolationist course.

The pro-European profile of the Mitsotakis government coincided with a general support for the Community in the media as well as in public. Greece became one of the most pro-European member states. At a time when the whole geopolitical situation changed and was re-arranged, Greece felt secure belonging to the Community. For Mitsotakis, the EC had become 'the one and only haven of peace and security.' 66

Whoever anticipated that this pro-European profile would lead to total harmony between Greece and the Community was mistaken. As has already been stated, the early 1990s led to a convergence in foreign policy between Greece and the EC in general. The partners, however, remained apart as far as the Balkans and Turkey were concerned. From a Greek point of view, Athens did not receive any substantial
assistance from its partners on its foreign policy problems in return for its new and reformed pro-European attitude.

In the beginning of the 1990s, it became apparent that the 1980s had been a 'lost decade' for Greece. The country missed its chance to make its partners in EPC more familiar with peculiar Greek security and foreign policy problems and there were times that it alienated itself. This chance was sacrificed on an altar of rhetorical radicalism and domestic 'consumption' of foreign policy issues.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: AN EVALUATION OF GREECE'S EPC PARTICIPATION

It is beyond doubt that membership in EC / EU institutions and participation in the European Political Co-operation (EPC) process for co-ordinating the foreign policy of the member states on international issues considerably broadened weak members' foreign policy objectives and 'area concerns'. According to Featherstone, Portugal, Ireland and Greece are the three countries that the EPC/CFSP institutional development had the most significant impact upon since participation in its framework involved the articulation and presentation of well-defined, concrete positions, and perhaps taking sides in diplomatic conflicts. Ireland, Portugal and Greece were no longer able to confine their foreign policy and activities solely to issues of immediate national interest. They had to deal with all issues arising in the international system and formulate views and present positions on all of them.

As far as Greece is concerned it has extended the geographical and thematic substance of its foreign policy. Before EC membership and before participation in the EPC mechanisms, Greek 'foreign policy makers' used rhetoric as statements and nationalist declarations as their diplomatic tools in order to have success on 'national issues'. In consequence, there was no significant effect. What EPC did was to force Greece to 'acquire a foreign policy' of some kind and give up its past spasmodic actions.
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As a member of the EPC process, Greece had been called upon or had been forced to deal with a wide range of international issues far beyond its traditional, immediate, 'foreign policy concerns'. Included among those issues were major items on the international agenda such as East-West relations, the Middle East crisis, the Iran/Iraq conflict, trans-Atlantic relations, the OSCE, the Afghanistan crisis, the Falklands crisis, and combating terrorism; other issues were geographically remote from what was traditionally perceived to be of 'Greek interest', such as, for instance, the situation in Philippines and in Latin and Central America, the conflicts in Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, and the Sudan, to name but a few.

In addition to markedly extending the scope of foreign policy, participation in the EPC had the related effect of fundamentally changing the content of that policy. It was not only that the agenda of foreign policy became more extensive, it was also the nature and content of the subjects brought onto the agenda that added a new dimension to foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been vested with the overall responsibility for co-ordinating Community policy, formulating positions, forwarding them to Brussels, and communicating with Community institutions. This should not necessarily be interpreted as reflecting a perception that 'Community policy' is part of the foreign policy. It rather follows the pattern of other member states in organising their Community affairs. As a result of this process, the Greek foreign policy-making process changed in a number of respects:

- **Structures.** There had been a significant reordering of departments in the internal hierarchy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The department of European Community Affairs (YEK) and the European Political Co-operation Department (EPC) had acquired predominance in policy-making. In practice, the European Political Co-operation department exercised control over all other departments dealing with political affairs, either on a bilateral or multilateral level. The same, though in a rather informal way, happened with the department of European Community Affairs in relation to other economic departments of the Ministry.

- **Nature /Style.** Foreign policy-making had become more of a collective exercise involving a wider number of actors (diplomats, technocrats, experts, officials)
drawn either from inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or from other specialised ministries. It had also become more open and transparent merely by involving a larger number of actors. In short, as a result of EPC participation, the process of foreign policy-making became more institutionalised and less personally dominated. Apart from that, the common commercial policy and the external economic relations of the Community embodied in a vast network of agreements (trade, association, cooperation, etc.) all instilled a strong economic element into Greece’s foreign policy. Consequently, Greek foreign policy was forced, for the first time, to address economic policy issues and global economic questions. This marked a change in Greece’s foreign policy which had previously been centred on relations with Turkey and the Cyprus problem. EPC participation forced Greek leaders to change that attitude.

It was the aim of this historical section is to highlight upon the most significant stages of the institutional development of political co-operation in Europe; explore their dynamics; assess the role of the weak states, with reference to Ireland and Portugal and finally analyse Greece’s role and contribution in EPC. This could not be done without the necessary provision of the historical context. As noted in the previous chapter Greece is not just another weak EU Member State. It is also a country with peculiarities and distinct features that are obvious in its presence within EPC/CFSP and dictate its behaviour.

In the next two chapters an analysis of the impact of the diplomatic and the strategic regimes of the Common Foreign and Security Policy upon the Greek foreign policy is outlined based on the four variables explained in the ‘weak states’ chapters:

- The behavioural patterns of Greece on foreign policy issues;
- The domestic sources of Greece’s foreign policy;
- The dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of Greece; and
- The resources and perspectives of the Greek diplomatic and strategic domains.

The First Meetings:

The first European Political Co-operation meeting took place on 19 November 1970 in Munich. The two important subjects on the agenda were the European Security Conference, and the problem of the Middle East. Both the letter and the spirit of the Luxembourg report were respected during the first meeting: the process was confined to the 'consultation' and 'exchange of views' spheres, and the Commission was invited only when the Foreign Ministers considered that necessary.

The second meeting, held in Paris on 13-14 May 1971, centred on the situation in the Middle East and on matters connected with the possible holding of a conference on European Security.

The third EPC conference of November 1971, was principally concerned with the planned March 1972 summit. However, differences between the Member States over important issues, such as on the Community response to American attitudes towards Europe, led to the postponement of the summit from March to 19-20 October 1972.

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3 Discussion with Dr. Ben Tonra, University of Wales – Aberystwyth, [conducted in Aberystwyth, 6/5/1998]
7 Allen David and Wallace William, op.cit, p.23.
10 Ibid., p.51.
11 The First Meetings:

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12 lfeestos Panayiotis, op. cit., p. 158-159.
15 Ibid., p. 16.
16 Ibid., p. 16.
17 Ibid., p. 17.
18 See Copenhagen Report, pp. 16-17.
19 Blumenfeld report to the European Parliament, p. 16.
20 Ifestos Panayiotis, op. cit., p. 173.

21 On the basis of the Luxembourg and Copenhagen reports, the nine governments have established a system of political cooperation with a view to determining common attitudes and, where possible and desirable, common action. They propose to develop this further. In accordance with the decision taken at the Paris conference, the nine reaffirm their intention of transforming the whole complex of their relations into a European Union before the end of the present decade. Bulletin -EC, no. 12, 1973, p. 119.

22 Ibid., p. 120.

23 Ifestos Panayiotis, op. cit., p. 179.

24 In the words of the Communiqué, the participants agreed: that the Foreign Ministers of the Member States should, at their next meeting, decide on the means by which a common position should be worked out quickly in times of crisis. The development of political co-operation will also enable them to make joint assessments of crisis situations, with the aim of foreseeing them and of taking the measures needed to deal with them.


27 The first Irish Presidency was in 1975.


29 Ibid., p. 144-145.

30 Ibid., p. 145.

31 Ibid., p. 147-148.

32 Nuttall J. Simon, op. cit., p. 143-144.

33 Ibid., p. 142.

34 Nuttall J. Simon, op. cit., p. 147.

35 Nuttall J. Simon, op. cit., p. 149-150.

36 Kathimerini, 9 November 1983, reporting a speech by A. Papandreou.
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41 *Ibid.*, p. 2.: 'As regards the scope of European Political Co-operation, and having regard to the different situations of the member states, the foreign ministers agree to maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which has made it possible to discuss in Political Co-operation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security.'
43 *Ibid.*, p. 25. The text reads: 'The Heads of State or Government confirm their commitment to strengthen and develop European Political Co-operation through the elaboration and adoption of joint positions and joint action, on the basis of intensified consultations, in the area of foreign policy, including the co-ordination of the positions of Member States on the political and economic aspects of security, so as to promote and facilitate the progressive development of such positions and actions in a growing number of foreign policy fields.'
44 *Bulletin -EC*, no. 3, 1985, p.106-107. The text reads: 'Europe's external identity can be achieved only gradually within the Framework of common action and European Political Co-operation (EPC) in accordance with the rules applicable to each of these. It is increasingly evident that interaction between these two frameworks is both necessary and useful. They must therefore be more closely aligned. The objective of European Political Co-operation must remain the systematic formulation and implementation of a common external policy.'
45 Lord Geoffrey Howe was Britain's Foreign Secretary from 1983 to 1989, when he became Deputy Prime Minister.
47 In the 1956 Arab-Israeli war Ireland's attitudes acquired a sharper focus. It was against any intervention and preferred instead a peaceful conflict resolution based on international law and norms. This attitude which characterises weak states, caused trouble within the EPC and put Ireland in a minority grouping.

Disarmament was a further issue on which Ireland always had difficulty to subscribe to an EPC line, if for no better reason than the fact that an EPC line is often difficult to find among the differences between nuclear and non-nuclear EPC states and other divergent strategic interests. That a weak state outside the major military blocs should be an advocate of far-reaching measures of disarmament and arms control is predictable enough, the more so in view of the absence of a serious national armaments industry. (as cited in Keatinge, *op. cit.*, p. 144)
* General statistics for Portugal:
  - Area (km²): 91,906,
  - Population: 9,871,000,
  - GDP: $97bn in 1996,
  - GDP per capita (in ECU): 7,983,
  - Inflation: 1.5%


51 Ibid., p. 109.

52 Agence Europe, 29 June 1985.

53 Rozakis, *Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική* (in Greek), ELIAMEP, Athens, p. 92.

54 This was stated in the Commission’s opinion on Greece’s application for membership (*Bulletin of the EC*, 12 November 1979, L 291, p. 3) and by the Council on 24 June 1975 (*Bulletin of the EC*, 6/1975, paragraph 1209). The Greek public did not take any notice of these statements.

55 This was confirmed during the Aegean crisis in March 1987. Athens neither informed nor consulted the EC partners sufficiently.

56 Informal interview with Franz Cermak, DG1a-DG1b European Commission, [conducted in Brussels, 11/6/1998].

57 Informal interview with Antonis Antanasios, DG1 European Commission, [conducted in Brussels, 11/6/1998].

58 This was done by the Association Councils on 25 April 1988 and 30 September 1991. A similar statement was published by the European Council in June 1990 in Dublin.

59 Ibid., p. 226.

60 Meeting with Mr. George Papandreou, MP, Alternate Minister for Foreign Affairs, [conducted in London, 7/3/1998].


62 When the Greek deputy foreign minister tried to convince the partners in the EC to impose sanctions on Turkey, he did not get any encouragement from them.

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64 Papandreou's speech at the European Council of Milan announced the coming change of Greek policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece in the European Community, Speeches of the Prime Minister, Mr. A. Papandreou, Athens 1988, pp. 33-37.

65 For a detailed analysis of Greek voting behaviour in the UN, see Axt, Griechenlands Außenpolitik, pp. 227-238, 278-285.

66 See the opening speech of Prime Minister Mitsotakis at the international conference 'Greece in the European Community: The Challenge of Adjustment', at the Hellenic Center for European Studies (Ephem) on 25 September 1991 in Athens.

67 Greek participation in EPC also reduced Community cohesion in UN General Assembly votes, which fell from 48.1 per cent in 1980 to 31.8 per cent in 1984. Greece argued this was an inevitable consequence of enlargement. It should be noted that Community cohesion had already dropped from 61.7 per cent in 1978 to 48.1 per cent in 1980. However, Greece’s opposition to West European attempts to formulate common positions on vital issues, particularly in relation to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe annoyed its partners and reinforced their negative stance on Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations.

68 Meeting with Dr. A. Mitsos, Director, DGXII European Commission, [conducted in London, 7/3/1998].

69 Meeting with Prof. Kevin Featherstone, University of Bradford, [conducted in Bradford, 14/7/1998].

70 Ibid.
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Greece’s Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy
INTRODUCTION

Greece offers a good case study to analyze attempts to Europeanize a country's foreign policy, to resolve the post-Cold War foreign policy and security dilemmas, and to participate actively in all West European security organizations (NATO, WEU, EU/CFSP). Its proximity to three former Communist countries (Albania, former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria), that in the 1990s experienced a period of instability and economic restructuring, its uneasy relationship with fellow NATO member Turkey, its exposed geographic location in the Balkans as well as the fact that it is not connected by land to any of the other European Community countries make this case unique. Apart from that, the country's imbroglio on the issue of the recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the dilemmas this issue presented to Greece and its allies in the Community or NATO and the fact that it is a weak state that has historically been involved in great power games, but which has everything to lose from new instabilities and confrontations in its neighbourhood, constituted major challenges for the Greek foreign policy in the 1990s.

Greece tried to respond to these challenges by participating in the European Political Co-operation. However, its EPC participation, produced a double dilemma. Firstly, as already explained in the previous chapter, the New Democracy government which had paved Greece's way to the European Community lost the elections of October 1981 and was replaced by an administration of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which was 'anti-European' at that time. What followed was a critical process of adaptation and a 'Europeanisation' of the new political elite which led to considerable friction with the country's European partners.

Secondly, at the end of the 1980s, the very pro-European government of Constantine Mitsotakis got its chance to improve relations with the EC partners and the USA. Then, however, came the end of the Cold-War, bringing chances, but also dislocations and disputes which destabilised the Balkans and once again separated Greece from its
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European partners. As far as its vital interests in the Balkans, and vis-à-vis Turkey were concerned, Greece followed a policy which its partners found hard to understand and to accept.

The transformation of EPC to CFSP presented new challenges for the country and found Greece to be more involved in EU’s political co-operation process with a ‘pro-European’ attitude and coherence in its foreign policy formulation. However, in order to evaluate Greece’s participation in CFSP it is necessary to clarify first that for Greece there was never what we call ‘formulation of foreign policy’. There was what the Greeks called a bloc of ‘national issues’ that considered of the utmost importance: the Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus issue, and relations with the Balkan countries. Although circumstances and political parties in government were different, it seems that there were some common characteristics in both cases. All governments in Greece follow a rather unified policy when so-call ‘national interests’ are at stake. This holds true with respect to Turkey and Cyprus, but also to the Balkans.

So far in the thesis Greece’s foreign policy in relation to the CFSP regime’s creation, contribution, perseverance and change, as outlined by the theory of Modified Structural Realism, has been analysed by assessing the validity of the three first variables highlighted in the second chapter: behavioural patterns in foreign policy issues; the domestic sources of the foreign policy; and the dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of Greece.

This chapter will explore the diplomatic regime of Greece based upon the fourth variable initiated from the principles of Modified Structural Realism: the evaluation of certain and distinct political perspectives and characteristics in the diplomatic domain of Greece.

The analysis focuses upon:

- A brief analysis of CFSP’s institutional development;
- Greece’s aspirations for the Maastricht Treaty;
- Expectations with regard to the TEU in the field of foreign policy; and
- Greek foreign policy in the nineties.
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Single European Act did not fundamentally change European Political Co-operation. It innovated considerably by putting the 'Davignon machinery' in a Treaty form, but it left its growth and success up to the members states' relations, and their willingness to develop principles, objectives and working practices. However, the agreement reached in 1986 formed the basis for the Community's foreign policy and external relations for the years ahead and led to the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy under the Treaty that established the European Union at Maastricht on 7 February 1992.

The Single European Act in Article 30.12 provided for its own revision five years after its entry into force. That deadline was fixed to coincide with the completion of the Single Market in 1992. Steps towards a common foreign, defence and security policy were among the major items on the agenda of the intergovernmental conference on political union, which opened in December 1990 and reported to the Maastricht Summit in December 1991. The negotiations within the IGC, as noted in the previous chapter, were up to a great extent influenced by the events unfolding in Central and Eastern Europe and within the Community environment it was obvious that the Member States were institutionally ill equipped to meet any new major external challenge. According to Paroula Naskou-Perraki and as it is widely believed among political scientists, the Gulf War and the beginning of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia stressed the need for the creation of a common foreign and security policy and acted as catalysts to the Member States to do something about the limitations of EPC. For Salmon, the emerging new policy, CFSP, had to be based on genuine intentions, supranational structures and political ambitions otherwise it was doomed to fail. For Clarke political will was also a crucial factor for the policy's success.

The Maastricht Treaty, among others, provided the mechanism to promote the new increased responsibility of the Union: the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Title 5 provides for its creation (see Appendix II). Article J.1.4 of the Treaty reads that:
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The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

Article J.1.2 assigned five principal objectives to the CFSP: safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and interdependence of the Union; strengthening its security; preserving peace and strengthening international security; promoting international co-operation; and developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

According to the Treaty the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP were to be laid down by the Heads of State or Governments in the European Council. The Common Foreign and Security Policy was about to pursue its objectives through ‘Joint Actions’ and ‘Common Positions’. The ‘Common Positions’ corresponded to the current practices of European Political Co-operation -systematic co-operation on most and potentially any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest-, ‘Joint Actions’ would be implemented in areas in which the Member States have important interests in common.

The Maastricht Treaty pledged the Union and its Member States to put into effect the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This was to be pursued by establishing systematic co-operation between Member States, gradually implementing joint action. The Member States were required to inform and consult each other within the Council of Ministers on matters of foreign and security policy, and the Council would adopt common positions where necessary. Member States were to ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions, and were to co-ordinate their action within international organisations. The European Council was to define general guidelines for joint action and the Council would decide, by unanimity, whether an area or issue should be the subject of joint action. The detailed arrangements for the implementation of joint action would be decided by qualified majority (that is, 54 votes in favour out of 76, cast by at least eight Member States).
The Treaty did contain far-reaching provisions, although they did not go as far as Germany and most of the other Member States would have preferred. A more cautious approach, based substantially on the principle of unanimity rather than majority voting, prevailed, largely at the bidding of the UK government. It was, however, agreed that the whole question should be reviewed at a further conference in 1996, when Germany and its supporters hoped that a more thoroughgoing approach would be adopted.

The Treaty specifically gave authority to the country holding the rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers to act on the EU's behalf, which it had often done informally in the past. It effectively gave it the responsibility for organising the CFSP, assisted where appropriate by the preceding and successive presidencies (the so-called 'Troika') and by the Commission. It also laid down that the European Parliament must be kept regularly informed by the Presidency, be consulted on broad policy questions and be permitted to question the Council and make recommendations.

The Maastricht Treaty had also progressed, at least theoretically, towards common foreign and defence policy but in such a way as did not interfere with the sovereign rights of the Member States. The Treaty allowed for the creation of a common policy but only under the condition of unanimous consent and states that the Common Foreign and Security Policy should include all questions relating to the security of the European Union including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. This allowed and allows each Member State to maintain a different policy and exercise the power of veto if its national interests differed from those of the other Member States. Greece exercised this beneficial provision in the cases of FYROM and Turkey, where there was a feeling that the common EU position was against Greek national interests and sovereignty.

Decisions on security with defence implications would, in the meantime, be implemented on request by the Western European Union. Previously, although there had been a substantial overlapping of membership, relations with the WEU had been complicated by the fact that not all the EC Member States belonged to it. At Maastricht a parallel meeting of WEU ministers agreed to admit any EC Member States that applied. All except Ireland were expected to do so, and it was therefore envisaged that
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the WEU should henceforth assume the role of the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance. In order to facilitate future co-ordination between the EU and the WEU it was also agreed at Maastricht that the latter’s headquarters should be transferred to Brussels.

Under the same terms of the Treaty, the Member States agreed to work towards the integration of the WEU into the Union’s future decision-taking procedures in the security and defence area. The decision to add security issues to the common foreign policy mechanism came in the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty as a result of the shift in the balance of forces in Europe following the unification of Germany and the return to democracy of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The CFSP is also notable for a number of other items. Firstly, progressively, the Commission has been permitted to participate in the work of EPC and share rights of initiation under the CFSP. Secondly, the creation of common positions and joint actions provided for under the CFSP would appear to suggest that the Member States intend to go beyond the over reliance upon the declaratory instrument that was the hallmark of EPC. Thirdly, the CFSP represented the next step of political co-operation within the Union.

Furthermore, the articles of the Treaty which concern foreign policy have the distinct status of an intergovernmental agreement, and do not form a legal commitment to the European Union. In other words, the agreement of the Member States depends on voluntary decisions and cannot be imposed upon them by the European Court. However, apart from the substantial restrictions of unanimity and voluntary commitment in foreign policy, the European Union does not yet have the means to function as an effective mechanism for the security of the whole of Europe. As J. Delors noted in 1991, the European Union has just three means to influence developments in a crisis: public opinion, diplomatic recognition, and economic sanctions. But, all these means are proving to be insufficient in situations of escalation of nationalism or in explosions of peripheral violence.
The objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are:

- to safeguard common interests
- to reinforce the security of the European Union
- to maintain peace in conformity with the principles of the United Nations, NATO, and the OSCE
- to promote international co-operation
- to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

(see also Appendix II)

THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AND GREECE'S ASPIRATIONS

Greece's aspirations with respect to the Maastricht Treaty can best be described by outlining the essentials of the two consecutive Greek memorandums of 1990 and 1991. The first supported the idea of European Union and the need for cohesion, whereas the second concentrated on security aspects.

The 1990 memorandum, entitled 'Contribution to the Discussion on Progress towards Political Union', stressed seven major issues:

1. The need for reforms of the Community was derived from the changes in international relations and internal imbalances of the Community, such as the "democratic deficit." As the EC was seen as the 'sole force for stability,' the double problem of giving the Community a new legitimacy and of speeding up the process to Political Union had to be solved. To reach the 'final goal', it seemed necessary not only to achieve Economic and Monetary Union and the development of a common external and defence policy, but also - as was emphasised several times - to come to a greater degree of internal cohesion.

2. The democratic basis of the Community should be improved by strengthening the legislative role of the European Parliament (among other things, recognition of
the right of initiative, extension of the procedure for assent and of the cooperation procedure to all legislative acts, participation in the appointment of the President and the Members of the Commission).

3. The Mitsotakis Government pleaded for a restriction of the principle of unanimity and the extension of qualified majority voting, in order to increase the effectiveness of the Council of Ministers.

4. The Commission's power should be strengthened by giving it a more political character and broader executive powers. The President of the Commission should be elected by the European Parliament and there should be only one Commissioner for each member state.

5. The People's Europe should be strengthened by recognition of central rights in the Treaty and by enshrining the principle of Community solidarity in a special article.

6. The Community policies should be expanded to new sectors (culture, education, environment). Above all, the promotion of cohesion was a target of top priority. Cohesion was not seen as a flanking position to further integration, but as an autonomous target of integration to be established on the same level and with the same priority as Economic and Monetary Union.

7. External policy was perceived as an area where 'joint action is more effective than action by each individual member state.' Political co-operation should be incorporated in the Community process, What the Greeks proposed remained nevertheless mainly intergovernmental, characteristic of the Greek philosophy of the 1980s, which opposed the idea of majority voting. As a concrete measure, the merger of the EPC Secretariat with the Council Secretariat was proposed, Political co-operation should furthermore include security and defence. Two important issues were raised. The Community's role in the field of defence should be defined, 'with the concept and extent of Community frontiers being defined.' Community solidarity should become the guideline of the member states' external policy.
The Greek memorandum, however, was characterised by a paradox which is seen in the following two aspects: on the one hand, Greece presented itself as an unshakeable believer in European ideals. Integration should be deepened, the scope of community activities widened. European Union was seen more positively in Greek politics. The Greek government seemed to start moving towards the federalist camp, as was mentioned before. On the other hand the Mitsotakis government did not fail to clarify where its priorities lay: when it spoke of Community solidarity, this implied first cohesion and then security. All the other proposals were, without doubt, very pro-European, but were over-optimistic to some extent. Thus the political costs of many Greek proposals were as low as the chances to implement these ideas were limited. The memorandum's intention was a demonstrative one: after ten years of Euro-criticism and Euro-scepticism in Greece, the new government wanted to give prominence to its pro-European profile.

To make it clear: the Mitsotakis government no longer spoke of the veto right, but it was Mitsotakis who used that instrument when declaring that without cohesion and without Greece becoming a member of the WEU there would be no acceptance of Economic and Monetary Union by Greece. The memorandum did not leave out national ambitions and priorities of Greece. The Mitsotakis government was as much interested in cohesion and borderline guarantees as the Socialist government had been in the 1980s, but the difference was that the Mitsotakis government did not limit its demands and proposals towards the European integration to these two aspects. Mitsotakis declared himself an active supporter of European integration, whereas Papandreou had first of all been its opponent and later its 'tolerator.'

As the European Council of Rome had demonstrated in December 1990, the member states' aspirations and priorities in the field of security had been rather disparate, if not controversial. That was the situation when the Mitsotakis government presented a new memorandum. The main aspects were the following:

- Firstly, mutual obligations in the field of CFSP should lead to common solidarity and the inviolability of the frontiers of the European Union.
• Secondly, priority should be given to the Union's regional environment; common action should be developed.

• Thirdly, the Union's activities should include security. As there had been strong reservations among EC member states against any reduction of NATO's responsibilities, the memorandum no longer spoke of defence, but some of the former essentials were kept by Greece with respect to the WEU. The WEU should become the framework for the elaboration of a common security policy. This meant that EC member states should become members of the WEU, if they wished. This was equivalent to respecting NATO obligations as well as specific ambitions of each member state's national defence policy.

As can be easily seen, Greece's priority was the enlargement of the WEU, with Greece itself being the top candidate for accession. For the Mitsotakis government, it a \textit{conditio sine qua non} that any treaty on European Union was only to be accepted if it included Greece's accession to the WEU. As became evident later, Greece was ready to veto the whole outcome of the IGC on Political Union if these conditions were not met. 10

"Security first, economy second", that was the strategy of Karamanlis when he led Greece into the 1970s. That was also the primary option of the Mitsotakis Government when negotiations concentrated on Political Union, especially in 1991. 11 The difference was, however, that 'security' in the 1970s was not only external, such as the Turkish threat, but also internal and concerned the stabilisation of the democratic system revitalised in 1974. For Greece, internal security challenges ceased to exist in the late 1970s, whereas the external ones had two dimensions in the early 1990s: the traditional one concerning Turkey and a new one with respect to the northern neighbours.

Greece's aspirations did not remain unopposed by other EC member states. Two issues were critical: firstly, the role of NATO, and secondly, Turkey. The EC's "Atlanticists" were not willing to reduce functions and responsibilities of NATO for the benefit of the WEU. Moreover, among these countries, it was especially the United Kingdom which wanted to emphasise that Turkey, as a NATO alliance partner, would be isolated by
Greek accession to the WEU. An Anglo-Italian initiative, which stressed the transatlantic relationship, favoured the reinforcement of the Atlantic Alliance, and attributed to the WEU an essential bridging role in the creation of a European reaction force, seemed less favourable to Athens. \(^\text{12}\) Greece was at that time more ‘Europeanist’ and less ‘Atlanticist’ and therefore rejected these ideas. Greek officials had several meetings with their British counterparts to win over their partners to the idea of Greek membership in the WEU. In addition, as was mentioned before, Greece was prepared to veto the Maastricht Treaty if accession to the WEU was not secured. When Mitsotakis spoke to the WEU Assembly on 2 December 1991, he reaffirmed this threat. \(^\text{13}\)

In contrast to the Anglo-Italian proposal, the Franco-German Initiative on Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy of October 18, 1991 was welcomed by Greece. \(^\text{14}\) From a Greek point of view, the letter from President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, which was made public in Paris and Bonn simultaneously, had several positive aspects:

- The WEU was seen as an ‘integral part of the process of European Union.’
- The WEU was to become step by step, ‘a component of the Union's defence,’
- Members of the Community which also belong to the Alliance were invited to become part of the WEU.
- For members of the Alliance which were not members of Political Union (e.g. Turkey) only a restrictive role in the WEU was foreseen: they should become associates of the WEU with the possibility of consultations - but only in those cases ‘when the interests of these countries are affected.’

**EXPECTATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE TEU IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY**

With regard to security, Greek expectations were much less satisfied by the Maastricht Treaty than was the case concerning foreign policy. As mentioned before, the Greek government hoped to decrease its main traditional ‘security risk’ – as Turkey is perceived in Greek politics – by becoming a member of the WEU. Article V of the
Modified Brussels Treaty was to serve as a security guarantee against Turkey. Other risks, such as those which could emerge north of the Greek frontiers, were to be covered mainly by NATO guarantees.

Art. J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty declares that the Common Foreign and Security Policy will include the ‘eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might time lead to a common defence.’ The WEU was to become an ‘integral part’ of the development of the Union. However, there was no provision for the WEU to replace NATO in the future. The obligations of certain member states under the North Atlantic Treaty had to be compatible with those of the European Union. The strong pro-Atlanticist orientation was underlined in the Declaration on the role of the WEU, annexed to the Treaty. The WEU was understood as the ‘European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.’

An invitation to EC member states still outside the WEU was expressed in the following words: ‘States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU.’

Greece was an associate member of the WEU and this declaration was an open invitation for membership which was conceived as a great benefit. Accession to the WEU was for the New Democracy government a ‘victory for Greece’.

However, WEU Member States were not at all willing to let Greece use the WEU as a shield against Turkey in order to decrease its ‘security risk’. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Portugal had been in the forefront trying to prevent a bilateral Greek-Turkish conflict from becoming a matter for the WEU. Even Germany, which was in favour of the Greek entry to the WEU, was not willing to let the WEU become an instrument for dealing with bilateral regional problems. In addition, taking into account the Anglo-Italian Initiative on Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy of 5 October 1991, it was clear that Greek expectations of forming a WEU alliance for the benefit of
Greece against Turkey were totally unfounded. Greek government’s expectations that Maastricht would be a guarantee of Greek borders were frustrated.

What could be anticipated from the Maastricht Treaty was confirmed by the Petersberg Declaration on 19 June 1992. The nine partners were not willing to take sides in Greek-Turkish differences. As was anticipated, such a position could only weaken the Western Alliance in a strategically important region. Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty was interpreted and altered so as not to be applicable to any form of Greek-Turkish conflict. As Greek observers have noted, even an unprovoked attack by Turkey on Greece would not be a case for WEU assistance. The WEU Treaty was modified in the sense that obligations to assist a partner were seen as mutual and equal regardless of whether they originated from the NATO or the WEU Treaty.

The explanation for Greece’s reaction to the Petersberg Declaration can best be understood by the over-optimistic perception of the benefits of the TEU. The Greek side had interpreted the Maastricht Treaty and the attitudes of EC member states as a panacea in its security problems. The disappointment that followed the Petersberg Declaration was perceived in Greece as ‘a slap in its face’. When Greece signed the accession treaty to WEU in November 1992, the Greek authorities were obviously disappointed that Turkey had become an associated member of the WEU and that Article V had been modified. Nevertheless, despite its frustration regarding security, the Greek government, as mentioned before, did not realise its threat to veto ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

WEAK STATES AND CFSP: THE END OF ‘EUROPHORIA’

Positive feelings towards the EU led Greece to adopt a positive friendly towards the Maastricht Treaty. Before we move towards a more detailed analysis of Greece’s foreign policy in the nineties in relation to CFSP, it will be interesting to observe how the other weak EU member states reacted to the preparation and adaptation of the TEU. In this context, two aspects are of importance. Firstly, what was the Greek
position in comparison with other weak EU member states? Secondly, which was the future of Greek pro-Europeanism?

Ireland, in the 1991 Conference on Political Union which led to the Maastricht Treaty, teamed with Greece, Portugal and Spain and actually committed itself that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) should include ‘all questions related to the security of the Union’. The taboo on even discussing neutrality had been broken. The Department of Foreign Affairs had designated officials specialising in security both in Dublin and Brussels (where the ambassador to Belgium serves as permanent representative to the WEU) as well as a separate delegation to the OSCE in Vienna. Ireland’s decision for the new treaty’s ratification was 69.1 per cent to 30.9 per cent, with a reasonably high turnout by Irish standards of 57 per cent.

Portugal belongs to the group of countries that in the 1991 IGCs stood for the need to maintain the intergovernmental character of the foreign policy pillar of the Union. On the basis of its positive experience within EPC17, the Portuguese government felt that purely extending the mechanisms of Community decision-making to encompass foreign policy would not sufficiently safeguard the specifics of Portugal’s international experience and its traditional ties18. The idea of a voting strength ultimately based on the criteria of size enjoyed little sympathy in Portugal. The opposition of many to qualified majority voting was also explained by concerns relating to the need for CFSP to integrate fully the specific and varied contributions of member states in foreign policy.

The variables that determined states’ attitudes towards the TEU were the same for the three states, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, because of their ‘weak’ status:

- strengthening of Community’s foreign and security policies profile, expecting, by an indirect way, strengthening of their relative power,
- the safeguarding of the intergovernmental character of political co-operation in the Community, and
social and economic benefits (Portugal's and Greece's expectations with regard to social benefits from the Single Market have been significantly higher than the average of the Community\textsuperscript{19}).

In the Eurobarometer\textsuperscript{20} (table below) we observe that for all the three weak states EC membership is considered positive. For Cermak\textsuperscript{21}, Greece especially, benefited more than any other member state.

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| For the preservation on integrity of Yugoslavia | 39 | 13 | 20 | 19 |
| For self-determination in Yugoslavia         | 36 | 76 | 73 | 68 |

Public opinion in 1991 in selected member states (in percent)

All three countries favoured a European government more than the EC average. The main differences between them arise on sensitive issues like defence and security. The case of the former Yugoslavia, for instance, marks some significant differences between the selected countries. Greece favoured a common defence policy, imposed by its proximity to the conflict area and potential future dangers, whereas Portugal and Ireland were below the EC average in this respect. A lack of strategic doctrine and the absence of external threats for both countries may be the explanation for their unwillingness to favour a common defence policy. With regard to Yugoslavia, Greece disassociated itself from both other countries. Greece followed a status quo oriented policy, whereas the other Europeans accepted the right of self-determination for the former Yugoslav republics. They were these Balkan quarrels though that challenged Greece’s pro-European orientation as illustrated in the table above and led to a shift of attitude. Greece realised that its perceptions for foreign policy issues differed once again from those of its EU partners.

By 1992 Europhoria - the striking attribute of the early period of the Mitsotakis government – was a phenomenon of the past. Two aspects were primarily responsible for the change of behaviour in Greece.

Firstly, Greece had enormous aspirations as to what European Union could imply for the country. As negotiations proceeded, it became obvious that essential parts of these hopes were not fulfilled. What frustrated the Greeks most was the fact that the partners were not willing to develop Greek membership in the WEU into an automatic security
guarantee of Greek borders, especially against Turkey. Having realised that, Greece’s interest in the European Union decreased substantially.

Secondly, as the Inter-Governmental Conferences progressed, the Yugoslav crisis turned into war, and Greece was included in the conflict because of the ‘Macedonian question’. While discussing the target of a ‘common’ foreign security and defence policy, Greece’s expectations were extremely high that the partners would understand the obligation of ‘solidarity’ in the same way as the Greeks did: more or less as unilateral support for the Greek demands against the newly established state, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Although the Community showed itself extremely compliant to the Greek position, this was not enough for the Greek government. Greece expected too much of the Community, with the result that frustration spread within the country when hopes were not fulfilled. As a backlash, nationalism grew and Europeanism declined. Furthermore, during 1991-1996 the handling of the Macedonian question and continuing Greek support for the Serbs dissociated Greece from the rest of the Community.

The Greek Prime Minister declared that his government was of the opinion that the Maastricht Treaty ‘was more than incomplete’ and aimed at a ‘Europe simply concerned with the monetary system,’ and therefore the Greek government favoured the revision of the Maastricht Treaty planned for 1996. The fact that Papandreou stressed at the same time that ‘Europe needs to be strengthened in its weakest regions,’ accusing the European Union of being ‘responsible for the current tragedy in former Yugoslavia,’ and stating that Greece did not feel European solidarity or support in the case of Skopie, was an indication of two trends coming from the past and even determining the future. First, that the Greek government regarded the Community after the Maastricht Treaty primarily as a lever for the development of the backward regions and countries, and second, that Greek politicians believe that solidarity in the Community should favour their country.
LOSING THE BALKAN ‘PILLAR': GREECE’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NINETIES

General observations – old problems, new prospects

It is an irony of history that during the Cold War, Greece was separated geographically from the rest of the European Community by non-western States (Warsaw Pact countries and also Yugoslavia and Albania). After the end of East-West antagonism, Greece was isolated once again - this time by an arc of conflicts and crises which started in Albania, included the former Yugoslavia and reached to the former Soviet Union. Greece obviously has not yet found a way to deal with this difficult situation. In addition, Greece’s geo-strategic location, as NATO’s ‘shield’ in south-east Europe, lost its significance after the end of the Cold War, whereas Turkey’s was strengthened, since strategic interests moved to the Gulf area and Caucasus. 25

Summarising Greece's situation in the period from 1990 to 1996 with regard to foreign and security policy, the following aspects constitute the most important structures and developments.

Greece’s Policy centred on Turkey, whereas, the post-Communist era is perceived as an encirclement by the eastern neighbour.

As other countries and regions, Greece is reverting to history. Differences and disputes from the past which seemed to be settled somehow reappeared. What had not been an object of major concern during the Cold War had become so in the nineties. This is true with respect to the ‘Macedonian question’ and to ‘Northern Epirus’, as the Greeks call the southern part of contemporary Albania.

Greece's security seemed to have been challenged more than ever during the last forty years and on nearly all ‘fronts.’ Differences with Turkey relating to the complex conflict in the Aegean, the Cyprus question, and the minorities were still unsolved. The problem of refugees and the treatment of the Greek minority divided Greece and
Albania. Because of a disputed name and anticipated expansionist tendencies there was no détente with the FYROM. Relations with Bulgaria no longer had a privileged status, and it was feared in Greece that some day even territorial claims could arise, as happened in the past during the two Balkan Wars in the first two decades of the twentieth century.

The fact that the Balkans as well as Turkey were and still are areas of unsettled disputes overstrained the capacity of the multidimensional foreign policy traditionally followed by Greece. Greece had not been able to develop a clear strategy for managing disputes on nearly all fronts. After 1993 Greece tried to ‘Europeanise’ the Cyprus issue and at the same time in the Council of Ministers and at the European Councils also tried to convince its partners that the Greek-Turkish dispute is not a bilateral but a European one, based on the assumption that when a member state is under constant threat there is an effect on the Union itself.

Albania and the FYROM did not constitute significant security threats for Greece in the nineties. Furthermore, in contrast to all other northern Balkan neighbours, Greece was a member of NATO and WEU which created a favourable security status. Security guarantees provided by these organisations were valid against any threat from the north, but not, of course, against Turkey.

What Greece feared most was that the northern neighbours might form alliances with Turkey. Until 1996 such a constellation was not in sight. However, perceptions in Greece were different. Turkey was seen to be collecting allies all around Greece. The ‘worst case scenario’ seemed to exert an influence on domestic politics, too. To some extent, this explains harsh reactions in Greece towards the Balkan states and the feeling of being ‘threatened’ by neighbours. The result was a disparity of perception between Greece and the rest of the EU. Western partners did not regard the behaviour of Greece’s northern neighbours as threatening, as the Greeks did. In the language of International Relations, what others saw as ‘capability’ or ‘probability,’ the Greek government might regard as ‘intention.’

These differing perceptions had substantial consequences. Where Western partners favoured some form of ‘institutional’ arrangements and integration vis-à-vis Balkan
states, Greece did not see the usefulness and legitimacy of such steps and, instead, in many cases opposed such strategies. Thus economic and financial co-operation with Balkan states, which was understood as a core element of this strategy, was blocked by Greece as far as the FYROM or Albania were concerned. Apart from that, Greece's attitude was still national centred. In the nineties, issues such as: relations with Turkey, the Cyprus issue and the Macedonian question, monopolised the Greek press; whereas, at the same time the European press mainly referred to the situations in Iraq and Ireland. In other words, there was no interest in Greece for important European or global events but only for developments related to the Greek so-called 'national issues': Turkey, Cyprus and the Balkans.

In all modern democracies, foreign policy is determined to a great extent by domestic politics. Whenever nationalist tendencies grow, foreign policy may be the first victim. Where compromises could be found by an able diplomacy, this fails as soon as nationalism dominates. In the case of Greece, this was apparent not only in the Macedonian question, but also in the relationship with Albania. Where the acting foreign minister achieved détente and moderation in bilateral relations in the 1980s, this progress was later endangered when signs of xenophobia against Albanians appeared in the Greek public.

It is very important to show that the patterns which had been evident in Greece's attitudes to EPC in the 1980s were confirmed with regard to Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 1990s: Greece followed its partners in nearly every declaration and action. In this respect there was no difference between the Mitsotakis government which was in office from 1990 to 1993 and the PASOK administration which came to power again in 1993. This can be demonstrated by the following selection of statements:

- supporting US policy vis-à-vis Haiti;²⁹
- demanding the withdrawal of troops from the frontier with Kuwait addressed to Iraq;³⁰
- welcoming of the development in South Africa;³¹
- condemning all acts of violence in the Israel-Palestine area;³²
- assisting CFSP proposals on disarmament;\textsuperscript{33}
- demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries;\textsuperscript{34}
- expressing concern over the aggravation of the human rights situation in Turkey.\textsuperscript{35}

However, whenever its vital interests were concerned, Greece found it difficult, more than any other member state, to follow its partners in CFSP. Greece hampered the development of the EU's relations with Turkey. As in the past, Athens blocked the Fourth Financial Protocol.\textsuperscript{36} Greece was prepared to compromise when Turkish troops withdraw from Cyprus and a solution was found for the island. In September 1994, the Greek Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made it clear that tripartite talks within the EU/CFSP troika to study relations with Turkey could only take place if there was a reference to the problem of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{37} Another conflict concerned the project of the Customs Union to be finalised with Turkey in 1996. Greece opposed these plans\textsuperscript{38} and tried to convince its partners in the Council of Foreign Ministers to issue declarations on Turkey's unsuccessful application for membership in order to put pressure on the neighbouring state.

In contrast to the early 1980s, not even minimal criticism of US policy towards Third World countries was expressed, even over Haiti. Concerning Iraq, with which PASOK had had connections in the past, Greece took a firm stand on the Western camp. South Africa and even the Middle East also did not cause any friction. Greece had toned down its pro-Palestine position. Disarmament was no longer a matter of dispute. The same held true with regard to Russia. Having made progress in the 1980s, the adaptation of Greece's policy to the EU mainstream was speeded up after the end of the Cold War.

In 1992, there had been some improvements in Greek-Turkish relations. Together with ten other countries, Greece signed the Istanbul Declaration to found the Black Sea Co-operation Zone in June 1992 - a project supported by Turkey,\textsuperscript{39} and Prime Minister Mitsotakis declared that Turkey was not looking for adventures in the Balkans. But there had also been negative signals. The Greek Deputy Foreign Minister attacked Great Britain for having signed a co-operation agreement with Turkey,\textsuperscript{40} Greece was accused by Turkey of supporting Kurdish separatists belonging to the PKK (Kurdish Labour Party) and of permitting them to maintain offices and training camps in Greece,
Chapter Five

and finally, tensions grew in the Aegean. The Turkish Prime Minister, Tansut Ciller, threatened to occupy Greek islands if Greece extended its territorial waters to 12 sea miles. Some days later it was reported that the Turkish army was using live ammunition during its military exercises. As long as there was no substantive improvement of bilateral relations in sight, the CFSP's and the EU's relations with Turkey continued to be impaired.

Papandreou's return to power and the recognition, in December 1993, of FYROM by half the twelve EU member states, including the four most important states, marked a new phase in Greece's relations with the EU. Its three main features were a strengthening of relations with the US, which viewed in Athens as a stabilising element in the Balkans; a corresponding scaling down of expectations of the EU, particularly as regards foreign policy and security; and a re-examination of Greece's position towards FYROM where PASOK had tacitly accepted the diplomatic fait accompli.

Greece's foreign policy in the Balkans

The Balkans became the most critical region for Greece's foreign policy in the nineties. However, the question of how to handle the Yugoslav crisis, and especially Serbia, separated Greece from its partners in CFSP. Greece was the only EU member state that adopted an friendly attitude towards Serbia and refused on a number of occasions to agree with its partners in the Council of Foreign Ministers in issuing 'common positions' condemning Belgrade's policy. Apart from that, NATO's plans to impose an ultimatum on Serbia or to make air strikes against Serbian artillery emplacements, were met by firm Greek opposition, from 1992 and onwards. Greece also declared that its airports were not available to NATO aircraft intervening in the Yugoslav war against Serbia, as was agreed by the Alliance in February 1994. Furthermore, Greece threatened to end its logistical assistance and to withdraw Greek crews in AWACS observation planes in such a case. There were various reasons which made Greece a privileged partner for Serbia. What should be stressed here is the fact that Serbia was a
‘natural pillar’ in a balance-of-power strategy followed by Greece. As Serbia was a potential threat for the FYROM and thus weakens this state permanently, it was wooed by Greece. As Greece’s foreign policy was occupied by the Macedonian question, Athens was trying to improve relations with Serbia, even if this did not meet the expectations of its Western partners. As is the case with Turkey, the conflict involving the northern neighbour was perceived as a vital interest, where Greece did not hesitate to abstain from a common Western policy, if such a policy could be said existed at all.

It is important to note, however, that even without the problems created by Greece, the EU had massive difficulty finding a common approach to this question. If the Yugoslav war is understood as a test for the effectiveness of CFSP, the result is not flattering for the EU. Great Britain and France were the leading nations; Germany came to the forefront only when Slovenia and Croatia were recognised. What the EU and its member states need urgently in conflicts such as that in Yugoslavia is ‘to find a greater coherence and consistency if they were to be seen as any sort of credible international actor.’

Whereas countries like Germany were among the first to stress the principle of self-determination and no longer supported a united Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy (like the US) were in favour of maintaining a federation for a long time. Despite this substantial difference, Greece was in line with many of the CFSP declarations on the former Yugoslavia. Here are some examples from the period 1992-1994:

- the approval of armistice between Croats/Muslims and Serbs;
- the condemnation of Bosnian Serbs because of attacks on Gorazde;
- demands to end the bombardments of Sarajevo and the shooting of civilians;
- backing the Paris initiative aimed at obtaining a diplomatic relaunch and joint action by the EU, the US, Russia, and the UN;
- the support of Lord Owen’s and Thorwald Stoltenberg’s endeavours with respect to Bosnia.

Greece’s geopolitical intentions in the Balkans were highlighted by a project which was scheduled for 19 September 1991. Greece invited the governments of Bulgaria,
Rumania, and Serbia to Athens for a Four-Party-Conference. Greece's intentions were, among others, to support Serbia and thus to prevent the independence of Yugoslav Macedonia, and also to get some assurance that Bulgaria would not recognise a Macedonian state. When it became clear that Sofia was not willing to fulfil Greece's expectations, the conference was finally cancelled. Greece, however, was strongly criticised by its EU partners for its plans, which had not been subject to discussion with the CFSP framework.

In March 1994, Greece categorically opposed the sending of Turkish Blue Helmets to Bosnia. As the UN had problems mustering enough troops to enforce the peace agreement, it had been proposed to deploy some 1000 Turkish soldiers in the Croatian areas of Bosnia, thus reducing the possibilities for tensions with the Serbs. Greece, however, did not accept even this limited alternative and demanded that no troops be deployed by countries bordering, or having historic links with the parties involved. Good arguments can be found for this position. However, the real Greek intentions centred on the effort to prevent Turkey from involvement in Western efforts to pacify the Balkans. This plan had already become evident in April 1993 when the Greek government was opposed to any involvement of Turkey, even if no negative side-effects were foreseeable: Athens had also protested against Turkish participation in AWACS air space control. In this case, there had not been any danger that Greek and Turkish, or that Turkish and Serbian troops would confront each other directly.

Greece was the country which continuously sabotaged UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, as was reported by the media, and also by the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) in July 1993. The reactions of Western partners were harsh. The WEU Assembly criticised Greece for having obstructed the sanctions, and so did the German and French foreign ministers. European Commission's President Delors proposed to send an EU mission to the Greek border in order to supervise the functioning of the sanctions, and the Danish government proposed taking Greece to the European Court because of its repeated violation of the sanctions. Greece was the first country to support a proposal in 1994 to lift the
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in order to honour some Serbian concessions (ending military support for the Bosnian Serbs).

The 'Macedonian question': the thorn in EU-Greek relations

The Macedonian question and the relationship with Albania constituted the most important problems for Greece's foreign policy after 1992 and continuously divided Greece and its partners in the CFSP. Turning to the Macedonian case first, two major differences must be remembered which divide Athens and Skopje. Firstly, Greece did not accept that the new state was to be called ‘Macedonia,’ since, as the Greeks understand it, this name is monopolised by the Hellenic world. Therefore it was unacceptable to Greece that the FYROM's flag shows the ‘Star of Vergina’, which was found on the tomb of Philip of Macedonia. Furthermore, Greece criticised two articles in the FYROM's constitution, which, together with political propaganda, showed an expansionist tendency from the Greek point of view. Secondly, Athens categorically rejected the existence of a ‘Slavo-Macedonian’ minority in Greece which was claimed by Skopje. Putting bilateral differences aside, a long list of disputes had also separated Greece from its Western and CFSP partners in the period 1990-1996. Greece conducted its EU's policy vis-à-vis the former Yugoslav Macedonia, frequently making use of vetoes and of the requirement of consensus in CFSP. The result was that the EU could no longer play the role of mediator and that efforts failed to stabilise the situation in this part of the Balkans through intensified economic and political cooperation. It was Greece's pressure which led the EU to conclude that recognition of the former Yugoslav republic by Greece could only be achieved by giving up the name Macedonia, This was announced when the European Council met in Lisbon in 27 June 1992. From this time on, no compromise was any longer attainable which made use of the term ‘Macedonia’ in combination with different prefixes like ‘Slavo’ or ‘Novo’ to satisfy Skopje at least partially. Due to Greek pressure, the EU failed totally in crisis management. The WEU requested recognition of the FYROM by Greece in December
1993 - without success. This is remarkable as Greece - not yet being a member of WEU, but, intending to become one as soon as possible - took no action to remove any obstacles. Whoever might have expected a conciliatory or more flexible attitude of Greece thus discovered how vital interests were understood in Athens.

Apart from that, Greek supermarkets imposed a boycott on products from Italy and the Netherlands after reports that both countries would recognise the FYROM in February 1992. It would be unfair to make the Greek government responsible for an activity which entrepreneurs had initiated, yet this example showed to what extent Greek society harbours nationalist feelings with respect to the FYROM. In January 1993, there followed a boycott of Danish products, after the Danish Foreign Minister made some critical comments on Greece, declaring that it had made the EU a 'hostage' of the Greek policy against Skopje. Commissioner Martin Bangemann accused Greece of 'poisoning the spirit of the EU.'

Whenever negotiations between the EU and the FYROM were envisaged, Greece stressed the principle of 'Community solidarity' - but in a sense which was not shared by other member states. For the Greek government, the notion of solidarity implied a preference of the EU for the Greek position. The EU's options to come to an understanding with Skopje were thus very limited. EU member states which were aware of the fact that blocking any compromise would make the situation more critical were forced by Greek bargaining tactics to act outside the EU framework, (such as the seven member states which recognised the FYROM in 1993).

Greece did much to destabilise the situation in the FYROM, whereas CFSP partners tried to achieve the opposite, as stabilisation of the FYROM was understood as a precondition for pushing back the influence of nationalists in the country and thus improving the perspective for a compromise with Greece. Stabilisation of the FYROM was also understood as a contribution to the settlement of disputes and potential conflicts in the Balkans. However, the Greek government radically disagreed with these assumptions. It (mis-) used the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro to block the transport of oil and other products to the FYROM in August 1992, Greece closed frontiers for persons and for vehicles with licence plates of the FYROM in October.
1993, it vetoed inclusion of the FYROM in the Phare Programme which, for Skopje, totals 35 Mio ECU, mostly for pharmaceutical products and first aid goods, and finally, as was reported in the press, Greece concentrated its troops near the northern frontier and held military exercises there.66

Greece met mediation efforts of the EU with maximalist demands. When commissioner Hans van den Broek became personally involved in the 'Macedonian Question' in February 1994, he was confronted with a hard-line position by Greece which was not willing to compromise in any way on the differences relating to the name, the flag, the constitution, and the 'expansionist propaganda of the FYROM.67

When fifty member states of the OSCE agreed that the FYROM become a member, this was repeatedly vetoed by Greece. Greece was requested by EU partners several times to lift the veto, but it ignored these requests. The last effort to make the FYROM a member of the OSCE failed due to Greece's opposition in November 1994 when the summit of the OSCE in Budapest (5/6 December 1994) was prepared.68 The FYROM still had the status of an observer.

The most serious case may have been the trade blockade against the FYROM which Greece imposed on 16 February 1994 - at the time of Greece's EU presidency. The land-locked neighbour's access to the port of Salonica was denied without Greece having consulted the partners of the CFSP and without taking into account Article J.1.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, which imposes the duty on member states 'to refrain from an action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.' Greece tried to justify the measure as a response to a 'serious threat to the country's security' (Article 224, EC Treaty).69 Greece promised to stop the sanctions as soon as bilateral differences (the use of Greek symbols, some articles in the Macedonian constitution, territorial claims and anti-Greek propaganda) were solved to Greece's satisfaction.

This action was criticised not only by the EU Council,70 the member states,71 and the European Commission,72 but also by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which demanded the immediate lifting of the sanctions.73
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In order to suspend the Greek trade measures against the FYROM, the European Commission appealed to the European Court to decide on the matter. It was the first time that the Commission made use of Article 225 of the EC-Treaty because of a violation of free trade. The Court ruled that the matter was urgent and that the Greek measures would cause serious and irreparable injury to the EU.

An evaluation of the Greek foreign policy towards the ‘Macedonian question’ demonstrates once again how Greece tried to instrumentalise the EU/CFSP in order to pursue its national interests without regard to the Union’s principles and CFSP’s decision-making framework. The Greek government for a long period of time fought a battle that had no prospects of winning. In this issue Greece failed to adapt its foreign policy to a European oriented context. It was reasonable that its EU/CFSP partners found this policy hard to understand and to accept.

**Relations with Albania**

To turn to relations with Albania these have deteriorated significantly after 1990. There are two reasons for this: the treatment of the Greek minority in southern Albania on the one hand, and the increased number of refugees coming from Albania to Greece, on the other. There is no doubt that Albania’s democratic institutions, laws, and legal procedures were and still are underdeveloped due to the Stalinist history of the country. Members of the Greek community in ‘Northern Epirus’ were especially discriminated against when they were active in the minority's organisation ‘Omonia’. The sentencing of five members of Omonia to imprisonment was widely criticised by foreign observers, especially as they were condemned mainly for their convictions, and as the political motivation of the trial was obvious. It was assumed that the Albanian government was using Omonia to unblock the EU’s financial assistance to Albania. The Albanian government damaged bilateral relations when, without any prior announcement, it declared that Greek citizens needed a visa to visit Albania. There can be no doubt that
the Albanian constitution lacked European standards with regard to religious and minority affairs.\textsuperscript{76}

Greece, however, did not merely protest, but took revenge by closing its frontier to Albanian citizens, closing its consulate in Tirana, and expelling more than 30000 Muslims and non-Christian Albanians from Greece. The Albanians in Greece are estimated to number about 300000.\textsuperscript{77} Greece, in fact, prevented the EU from improving relations with Albania and thus from stabilising the region. With regard to the FYROM, Greece also blocked financial transfers from the EU to Albania. It was generally agreed by the EU in July 1994 to make 30 million ECU available to Albania and to provide an option for a further 40 million ECU. Greece, however, vetoed the payment. Athens tried to justified its policy with the argument that Albania had instituted legal proceedings against five members of the Greek minority (see above).\textsuperscript{78} Greece's Western partners although doubted that the allegations were true they did not accept the Greek negative reaction. There were three reasons: Firstly, relations between the EU and Albania were impaired; secondly, the EU was hampered in its attempts to help improve the internal situation in Albania through external financial aid; and thirdly, a chance was missed to stabilise the endangered region.

Greece was therefore requested by its EU partners to lift its veto against financial assistance to Albania. This was done by the EU Foreign Ministers during their informal meeting in Usedom / Germany in September 1994,\textsuperscript{79} by the German government in August 1994,\textsuperscript{80} by Foreign Ministers Kinkel and Juppe in September 1994,\textsuperscript{81} and by the German Minister of Development and Co-operation, Spanger, in October 1994.\textsuperscript{82} The Greek government, however, little impressed by its partners, continued its policy. Only in December 1994 was it reported that Greece had lifted the veto with respect to 15 million ECU.\textsuperscript{83}
Relations with Bulgaria

As far as Bulgaria is concerned, it seems justified to speak of the loss of the Balkan pillar. Two important aspects are the bilateral relationship and the role of Bulgaria as a supporter of Greece against Turkey. Bilateral relations worsened in the early 1990s. This is noteworthy, as the relationship with Bulgaria was relaxed even during the Cold War. Bulgaria could be seen as a cornerstone of Greece's multidimensional foreign policy. Disputes over frontiers had already been settled in 1953, and diplomatic relations were established in 1954. It became common to speak of an "Athens-Sofia-Axis." Visits of the Prime Ministers of both countries took place in a favourable climate, and economic co-operation was intensified. Thus Greece was all the more troubled when Sofia recognised the FYROM on 15 January 1992. The motive may have been to calm down nationalistic aspirations in Bulgaria and to improve relations with Turkey. For Greece, however, this was a traumatic event. Athens could no longer count on Sofia to stay in line when Greece's interests, especially regarding Skopje, were concerned. 84

From a Greek point of view, it was a negative development when the Bulgarian government - due to internal developments - improved relations with Turkey in recent years. The Greeks did not regard this as a contribution to the pacification of the region by reducing Bulgarian-Turkish animosities. On the contrary, it was felt to be a loss of a privileged ally who had been strengthening Greece's position against Turkey. The Balkan adage that my enemy's enemy is my friend seemed to have been borne out. Three times previously, Bulgaria had made claims on Greek territory in order to gain access to the Aegean. It cannot be ruled out entirely that such claims might reappear. In mid-90s, however, the Bulgarian government clearly preferred to play the role of a mediator between Greece and Turkey. This policy showed results when relations between Athens and Sofia improved after 1993. This could be observed when Prime Minister Mitsotakis visited Sofia in March 1993, and when the Bulgarian Foreign Minister came to Athens. Bulgaria seemed to have learned the lesson that Greece would be the country's gate to the European Union.
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CONCLUSION

All three weak EU member states, Ireland, Portugal and Greece had nearly the same aspirations from the Maastricht Treaty: protection of intergovernmentalism, strengthening of the political co-operation process and socio-economic benefits. Greece had also expectations in the field of security.

Even though the Maastricht Treaty did not go as far as to integrate the defence policies of the member states as the Greek government hoped, the Community framework and even more so the EPU process entailed a series of important assets for Greek security, above all the web of interdependence and solidarity among the fifteen partners. Participation in the CFSP decision-making structure also guaranteed an increased and timely flow of information critical for foreign policy decision-making. It contributed simultaneously to the modernisation of Greece’s foreign policy mechanism and bureaucratic structures (educational effects through intensive consultation, etc.).

As a member of the EU, Greece could have enjoyed, up to certain extent, the support of the other member states even though this support was not automatic and was subject to a certain code of conduct based on shared values. It is very important to emphasise that with regard to Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 1990s, what was said about EPC in the late 1980s had to be confirmed: Greece followed its partners in nearly every declaration and action.

However, although Greece had demonstrated such a ‘pro-European’ attitude after 1990, instead of Europeanising its foreign policy, it tried to Europeanise its foreign policy goals and as a result, suddenly found itself isolated from its EU/CFSP partners. This became obvious in two cases in Greece’s foreign policy in the Balkans. First, in the ‘Macedonian question’ where Athens for two years had gone through the agony of fighting a diplomatic battle against recognition which it had no realistic prospects of winning. The only thing in which it succeeded was to seriously impair its place in the Union. Second, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, Greece also disassociated itself from its partners by adopting a pro-Serbian attitude and continuously sabotaged UN sanctions purely for national interest reasons.
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Greece's policy in both cases was catastrophic. The Greek government conducted its EU's policy vis-à-vis FYROM and Serbia, frequently making use of vetoes and of the requirement of consensus in CFSP. The result was that the EU could no longer play the role of mediator and that efforts failed to stabilise the situation in this part of the Balkans through intensified economic and political co-operation. Apart from that, Greece hampered the development of the EU's relations with Turkey and as a result, it found it difficult to follow its partners in CFSP.

These cases led to a shift of attitude towards CFSP. According to Tsakaloyannis, from 1994 and onwards, the CFSP structures looked much less attractive than they did in 1992. This also applies to the WEU, which was seen as the ultimate prize for Greece during the 1992 IGC. After the TEU however, expectations from the WEU had been scaled down to a more realistic level. This stemmed from a dual realisation, first that the WEU was largely a defence organisation without a nervous system and, therefore, incapable of addressing problems like those in the Balkans. Second, even if the WEU did possess real muscle, it was far from certain whether it would have rushed to Greece's side.

We can conclude that mere participation in the EU/CFSP provided Greece with many opportunities for advancing, directly or indirectly, its political and security interests. However, as far as foreign policy is concerned Greece used the CFSP framework mainly for satisfying its national interests, or when that was not possible, for stopping unpleasant developments imposed by its partners. The chapter that follows aims at exploring and evaluating the opportunities that presented to Greece on security and strategic issues in the last two decades.
ANNEX

Historical events 1989-1992

1989

18 June  Greece: national elections, PASOK's defeat, Conservative-Communist government under Tzannis Tzannetakis.
5 November Greece: National elections, all-party government under Xenophon Zolotas.
9 November Fall of the Berlin Wall.
8-9 November EC: European Council in Strasbourg decides to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in December 1990.

1990

19 March EC: Belgian memorandum on Political Union.
28 April EC: European Council in Dublin discusses the Kohl-Mitterrand proposal to establish a Political Union.
May Greece: visit of Mitsotakis to all 11 EC member states and to the EC Commission.
16 May Greece: Greek memorandum on Political Union.
19 May Balkans: Yugoslav Macedonian merchants block Greek border, accusing Yugoslavs of buying cheaper goods in Greece.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 June</td>
<td>Greece: start of a 11-day working visit of Mitsotakis to the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-26 June</td>
<td>EC: European Council in Dublin decides to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Political Union (EPU).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>EC: first stage of the EMU.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 August</td>
<td>Annexation of Kuwait by Iraq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 August</td>
<td>Greece: Greece participates in the WEU discussions on the Kuwait crisis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 September</td>
<td>EC: Italian proposal to merge the WEU and the EC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 October</td>
<td>German unification.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 November</td>
<td>EC: Portuguese memorandum on Political Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15 December</td>
<td>EC: European Council in Rome; opening of IGCs on the EPU: and the EMU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Balkans: increasing number of refugees from Albania coming to Greece.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1991</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>EC: Irish proposal on Social and Economic Cohesion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 January</td>
<td>Greece: Prime Minister Mitsotakis visit Tirana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Greece: the country receives an extraordinary credit from the EC (2.2 billion ECU).</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Greece: Economic stabilisation ‘Programme of 22 points’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April</td>
<td>EC: Luxembourg non-paper (Draft Treaty on the Union).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June</td>
<td>Balkans: Foreign Ministers of the EC not willing to accept the unilateral declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>Balkans: Yugoslav People’s Army begins armed intervention in Slovenia.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
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5 June
Balkans: Second and Third Financial Protocol for Yugoslavia suspended by the EC.

7 September

8 September
Balkans: Yugoslav Macedonians hold referendum on independence.

19 September
Balkans: Four Party Conference (Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, Greece) invited by Greece to Athens, later cancelled.

30 September
EC: Treaty proposed by Dutch Presidency.

5 October
EC: Anglo-Italian declaration on European security.

11 October
EC: Franco-German initiative on Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy.

8 November
Balkans: sanctions announced against Yugoslavia by the EC.

11-12 November
EC: IGC on the EMU discusses 'Delors II Package'.

17 November

9-10 December
EC: the Brussels Conclave; the European Council of Maastricht adopts the Treaty on European Union.

16 December
Balkans: decision of the EC on principal guidelines for the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics.

23 December
Balkans: Germany recognises Slovenia and Croatia.

1 Meeting with Prof. P. Ioakimidis, University of Athens, [conducted in London, 6/3/1998].
2 Discussion with Dr. Paroula Naskou-Perraki, University of Macedonia, [conducted in Thessaloniki, 3/9/1997].
3 Discussion with Prof. Trevor Salmon, University of Aberdeen, [conducted in Aberdeen, 4/2/1998].
4 Informal interview with Dr. Michael Clarke, Centre for Defence Studies, [conducted in Newcastle upon Tyne; 19/11/1997].
5 Source: The Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J.1.
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7 Discussion with Mr. Stefanos Manos, MP, [conducted in London, 773/1998].


9 EC member states wishing to accede to the WEU 'before a common foreign and security policy is established' should automatically become members.

10 'Greece demands accession to the WEU as condition for its acceptance of Political Union' in Macedonia, 13 November 1991.


12 For the text, see Agence Europe Documents, 5 October 1991, pp. 1-2.


14 For the text of the Franco-German initiative see Agence Europe Documents, 18 October 1991, pp. 1-4.

15 Article V reads as follows: 'if any of the High Contrasting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charters of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'.

16 Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur on the enlargement of the WEU for the WEU's Parliamentary Assembly, had pleaded, for instance, in favour of the simultaneous membership of Greece and Turkey. See Agence Europe, 4 December 1991, p. 6.


19 Informal interview with Mr. Gunnar Klinga, DG1a European Commission, [conducted in Brussels, 11/6/1998].

20 For additional information see Integration 15 (1992) 4, pp. 206-215.

21 Informal interview with Mr. Franz Cermak, DG1a – DG1b European Commission, [conducted in Brussels, 11/6/1998].


23 Some Greek newspapers warned that the prevailing opinion in Greece is that the partners have to follow the path set by the Athens government. If this is not done, the Greeks are quick to accuse the Community of 'betraying' Greece. See anonymous author in Oikonomikos Tachydromos, 30 January 1991, p. 20.

24 See Agence Europe, 6/7 June 1994, p. 4.
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25 Meeting with Prof. N. Christodoulakis, Minister of Finance, [conducted in London, 7/3/1998].


27 Informal interview with Dr. Spyros Economides, London School of Economics, [conducted in London, 26/2/1998].

28 Meeting with Mr. O. Miles, former British Ambassador to Greece [conducted in London, 6/3/1998].


30 Ibid., 19 October 1994, p. 906.

31 Ibid., 16 June 1994, p. 556.

32 Agence Europe, 9 April 1994, p. 4.

33 Ibid., 26 August 1994, p. 4.


36 This was confirmed in July 1992. Reservations were dropped by Greece only with respect to some finances in the context of the Mediterranean policy. See Agence Europe, 27 July 1991, p. 3. The question was on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council whether Greece was willing to drop its veto. As is known Greece was not ready to do so.

37 Agence Europe, 28 September 1994, p. 3.

38 Agence Europe, 3 November 1994, p. 6.


40 The Independent, 3 December 1993, p. 15.


43 Die Welt, 13 August 1992, p. 5.

44 When on February 7, 1994 EU Foreign Ministers demanded to end the siege of Sarajevo by using NATO air force, this was strongly opposed by Greece.

45 Political objections against NATO air attacks were also raised by Great Britain and Russia – with different motives, however. Whereas, Great Britain had reservations against any intervention which might involve the West too much, Russia stressed the close relationship with Slavic Serbia.


Greece also opposed a military presence of the US in former Yugoslavia. See Agence Europe, 16 July 1993, p. 2.

The UN accepted the deployment of Turkish Blue Helmets.

This became obvious when the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic, immediately requested the deployment of Greek soldiers in Serbia and Montenegro.

Some Danish politicians even pleaded for an expulsion of Greece from the EC. See Le Monde, 14 July 1993, p. 2. Greece, however, participated in the monitoring of the sanctions with one vessel in the Adriatic Sea.

When Belgium, Great Britain, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, and Denmark recognised Skopje in December 1992, they did so by using the name FYROM (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) without accepting the name and the flag the republic had chosen.

The Foreign Relations Committee of the German Bundestag twice rejected Greece's membership in the WEU before it accepted the move in April 1994. See Le Monde, 2 December 1993, p. 7.

It was announced at the end of September 1992 that this blockade was lifted.

Prime Minister Mitsotakis, however, described these exercises as military 'routine' which met with scepticism because of the coincidence of events.

Greece closed the frontiers, although Prime Minister Papandreou had ruled out a closure in January 1994 when the Greek government met the EU Commission.

This was explained in a legal memorandum to the European Commission.


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73 Agence Europe, 1 July 1994, p. 4.
74 The EU Commission argued that Greece was misusing article 224 of the EC-Treaty, which allows a member state to take specific measures in the event of internal disturbances or international tension.
75 Human rights organisations declared that the condemnation did not meet lawful standards. Le Monde, 5 August 1994, p. 3.
76 This became evident when the new constitution was presented in Albania. Article 7, paragraph 4, ruled, for example, that heads of religious communities must be born in Albania, must possess an Albanian citizenship and must have lived in Albania for at least twenty years.
80 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 August 1994, p. 2.
81 See Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 22 September 1994, p. 2.
82 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 October 1994, p. 6.
83 This was reported to have taken place at the Foreign Ministers' Council in Brussels on 28 November 1994. Athener Zeitung, 1 December 1994, p. 1.
84 With respect to the FYROM, Bulgaria recognised the state, but not the nation.
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Greek Security Policy in the Perspective of the CFSP
INTRODUCTION

During the four decades of the Cold War the undisguised adversarial relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact provided a high degree of stability in the world under the threat of a general nuclear war. At the same time, the south remained unstable and conflict prone. Scores of internal, interstate and Great Power proxy conflicts cost the inhabitants of the Third World over 25 million deaths in the years 1950-90. In the mid-1990s, the post-Cold War global structures were still in a state of flux. Analysts and policy-makers in small countries sought to identify and to predict trends as well as to recommend policies of adjustment to emerging global patterns.

The task for Greece, a small, weak and strategically located country, was to safeguard its territorial integrity and to protect its democratic system and values. Greece could best be described as democratic, internationalist, Western, status quo, free-trade and free-enterprise oriented, and a sensitive strategic outpost of the European Union and NATO in the troubled regions of the Balkans and the central-eastern Mediterranean.

In the previous chapter Greece’s diplomatic regime was examined in the framework of the country’s role and participation in CFSP.

This chapter will explore the security regime of Greece in relation to the creation, contribution, preservation and change of the CFSP regime, as outlined from the theory of Modified Structural Realism, by focusing upon:

- The particularities of Greek security;
- The Greek Strategic Doctrine;
- The WEU and its role;
- Alternative models for the Europeanisation of Greek security, and
- The weighting of the ‘European’ security model against the ‘Atlantic’ one.

The analysis will explore, as in Chapter Five, the fourth variable, highlighted in Chapter Two, that determine weak states’ attitudes in the CFSP: certain and distinct security perspectives and characteristics in the strategic domain of Greece.
THE PARTICULARITIES OF GREEK SECURITY

1. An evolving internal setting

The paradox of Greece in the field of security is not between Greece's military performance and its military potential, but between its military performance and its diplomatic and economic potential. Aristotle wrote that the defenders of a walled city have a choice of strategies. Either they can defend the city as walled or as unwalled. The defenders of a city without walls, however, have no choice. A forward defence is their only feasible strategy.

This was roughly the strategic situation of Greece in the early nineties. Ancient Greece was protected by the hazardous winds and currents of the Aegean and the 'wooden walls' of the Greek fleet, as well as by the massive ashlar fortifications of its cities. Modern Greece enjoys no such advantages. Its natural defences have been drastically reduced by advances in military technology, but the size of the area that has to defend has not. Greece has to provide for the defence not only of the Greek mainland and the Peloponnesus but of fifteen hundred Greek islands scattered across the Ionian and Aegean seas from the coast of Albania to the coast of Turkey. Under the common defence policy to which Athens has committed itself with Nicosia, the Greek defensive perimeter now extends to the Republic of Cyprus, over five hundred miles to the southeast of the Greek mainland. Cyprus aside, the coastline of Greece, including its islands, is close to that of the contiguous coastal border of the United States. While Greek land frontiers extend only 725 miles, they are penetrated by north-south river valleys, like the Vardar and Struma, which have facilitated the passage of invading armies three times in the twentieth century. This is the sense in which modern Greece resembles Aristotle's 'unwalled city' and is the reason why the central question for Greece's defenders is not whether to adopt a forward defensive strategy but what kind of forward strategy will best provide for Greek security.
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The question cannot be answered in military terms alone. Greece has a population of 10.6 million and its armed forces number 159,300, clearly too few in themselves to patrol and defend the entire Greek perimeter. Since modern Greece declared its independence in 1821, astute diplomacy has been as important as military strength in securing Greek frontiers. The choice of allies and the structure of alliances were vital components of Greece's defence strategy. The imperatives driving the strategy arose from Greece's position as both a Balkan and a Mediterranean country. The strategic choice defined by geography for Greek political leaders has usually been narrow - whether to align Greece with the land power dominant on the Balkan peninsula or the sea power dominant in the Mediterranean.

However, Greece's ability to cope with the challenges and risks generated by a radically different security environment largely depends on its internal evolution, both in terms of political stability and of economic strength. For Greece, there had been an unprecedented degree of political instability in the late 1980s and early 1990s which affected the country's international behaviour as well as its capability to adapt quickly and effectively to the new European system. Even the New Democracy's electoral victory in April 1990 produced only a paper-thin majority (152 out of 300 seats) in Parliament. Faced with a serious economic malaise and a fragile majority, Prime Minister Mitsotakis came increasingly under fire from his own party. His open dispute with Foreign Minister Samaras drastically reduced his room to manoeuver in foreign affairs³. In particular, the issue of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) acted as a catalyst by creating an ideological split that runs across the political spectrum and may produce a more lasting restructuring of Greece's political system in the next decade. A more nationalistic current strongly came to the fore after having been on the increase for some years. On the other hand, seventeen years after accession to the Community, the wider European orientation appeared firmly embedded in Greek public opinion.⁴

The restructuring of the Balkan political landscape and the fears of regional instability affecting Greece's own security had been the main driving force feeding nationalistic tendencies in Greece. The disintegration of Yugoslavia gave birth to a new phase of the
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‘Macedonian issue’ in September 1991. By then, the referendum held in this southernmost Yugoslav republic had demonstrated a clear preference for independence under a name that was regarded in Greece as an indication of expansionist aims (Greece's northernmost province is also called Macedonia), as well as a provocation to its own history and culture. Foreign Minister Samaras' absolute opposition and his statement that Greece would never recognise any entity bearing this historical Greek name purposefully mined all bridges for possible retreat. This inflexibly formulated attitude provoked a (first) stark disagreement with the Greek Prime Minister who preferred a less absolute position. Fearing the political cost of a public disavowal, however, he opted for a wait-and-see attitude.5

By the spring of 1992, the nationalistic current (already cutting across the political spectrum) dominated the situation in a way that even the reference to a possible compromise on the name of the new entity looked politically suicidal. Following pressures from an awakened electorate, a group of MPs from northern Greece (Macedonia) indirectly warned Prime Minister Mitsotakis not to compromise on the issue.6 By April, the Prime Minister decided to remove Mr. Samaras from office fearful, however, of nationalistic attacks on his alleged proclivity for compromise, he continued for some time on a rather inflexible course. It was only when Skopje decided to press for UN entrance (fall 1992) that the Greek government decided to accept a last-minute French Proposal opening the way to a process of arbitration or mediation linked to UN membership under the provisional name of FYROM.7

Having stirred Greek emotions more than any other issue since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the row over the name Macedonia brought to the surface strong passions that had been thought to be defunct. These highly emotional developments aggravated relations with some EU member states which were proceeding to a recognition of the FYROM, thus deviating from a common EU attitude. This was considered as particularly painful in view of the Maastricht agreements envisaging a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the Twelve.

The perceived lack of clear EU support and Greece's eventual loss of face over this issue proved traumatic and entailed long-term implications regarding Greek perceptions.
of the Community Process, particularly in the crucial field of the CFSP. However, the October 1993 parliamentary elections which brought PASOK back to power, as well as the electoral campaign (run by both major parties on an economy-first platform), indicated that the nationalistic current was receding.

2 Turkey as a Threat in the 1990s

The perception of a potential military threat from Turkey has been dominating the public and expert debate as well as Greek security planning for the last two decades. According to Featherstone, this phenomenon is unique and rooted in the 1974 Cyprus crisis, which can be regarded as a turning point in Greek security orientation. The Turkish invasion and subsequent occupation of the northern part of Cyprus was a highly traumatic experience for Greece, but also a start for new thinking in terms of security. This change was based on several reasons.

Firstly, an ally within NATO had used open military force to promote its interests in an area largely (80%) inhabited by Greeks, thereby creating 200 000 Greek Cypriot refugees within their own country. As long as Turkish troops continued to occupy Cypriot territory, no Greek government could consider Turkey as a true and trustworthy ally. Moreover, the possibility of escalation to an all-out Greek-Turkish war could not totally be ruled out.

Secondly, the NATO alliance was increasingly seen as being of secondary importance to Greece's real security needs. The close relationship that the US and NATO had cultivated with the Greek colonels (1967-1974) had identified them with the dictatorship and oppression (a perception starkly contrasting with that of the EC which had frozen relations with Greece during the colonels' regime). Thus, already unpopular with public opinion, US diplomacy and the 'US-dominated NATO' were further charged with passivity and inaction in 1974 when Turkey as an 'ally' used force to settle the Cyprus dispute with another member of the NATO family. Greek opinion was even negative towards the US, which was considered 'an ally out of necessity'.

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The traumatic experience of the Turkish invasion meant that, in effect, Greek policymakers stopped treating Turkey as a trustworthy ally, except possibly in the context, perceived as rather unlikely, of an East-West war extending to the Balkans. The idea that Turkey could henceforth use military means against a NATO ally and Greek territory itself constituted a major turning point in Greek security planning.

Under Premier Ozal's effective leadership in late 1980s and early 1990s, Turkey embarked on a wide-ranging and in-depth modernisation programme of its armed forces\textsuperscript{12}. The scheme, although sounded overly ambitious, had benefited from (a) stout and continuous governmental support and (b) a propitious external environment. It involved not only a complete restructuring of the Turkish armed forces and the purchase of sophisticated assets off-the-shelf, but more importantly, the creation of a long-term military production capacity and an extensive support basis for military operations.\textsuperscript{13}

This multidimensional effort to create a fully-fledged defence industry allowed Turkey to obtain both a defensive and offensive weapons systems capability, including submarines, missile frigates, F-16 and transport aircraft, AFVs and electronic equipment. Further projected capability targets included helicopter, missile, and MBT production.\textsuperscript{14}

What made these efforts even more worrisome for the Greeks was that the extra cost which the programme entails came at a time of general cuts in defence expenditure, particularly in NATO countries. Furthermore, the decision to produce such sophisticated equipment domestically entailed great financial sacrifices which in turn unambiguously signifies Turkey's priorities and perhaps intentions. Until the Gulf War, Turkey's perceptions of a multi-azimuth threat to some extent justified this huge undertaking. In the post-Gulf War era, however, this industrial capability became 'a white elephant' for the Turkish nation, since it was interpreted in the context of a regional grand design (as was the case in the Soviet Union, where national resources proved inadequate in supporting and sustaining its defence industries).

This imminent take-off of Turkish military potential, particularly when seen in the light of regional developments, took on a significance of great magnitude for Greek security.
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...planners. Not only the actual balance of power was altered fundamentally in Turkey's favour, but on a psychological level all the sacrifices which, for years, had been deemed necessary by the Greeks through higher defence spending and lengthy military service suddenly appeared to have been in vain. Since political connections and appropriate manoeuvering were not used in order to offset the prospective Turkish military superiority, the only solution for Greece was to embark upon a costly and destabilising arms race, which the region could ill-afford.

The use of Turkey's new military potential against Greece was perceived that it could manifest itself in Cyprus (extension of the occupation zone southwards), in the Aegean Sea (attack Greece's easternmost islands), in Thrace (invasion to protect the Moslem minority or even simultaneously in all three theatres. Balkan instability, with the possibility of extending in a conflict in Kosovo, could create another front of Greek-Turkish opposition.

When documenting the existence of the Turkish threat, the Greeks traditionally referred to Turkey's positioning of the 'Aegean Army' and to the numerous landing craft that confronted the Greek islands. Both were seen in Greece as potential instruments of a Turkish design to seize the Greek islands in the eastern part of the Aegean. This move could follow a bilateral crisis or even a possible Greek extension of territorial waters from six to twelve miles. Turkey had explicitly threatened that such an act would be considered a cause of war. To deter a Turkish attack on the Greek islands, Athens took defensive measures in most of them.

Turkish Intentions as Viewed by Greece

Turkish official declarations, usually making headlines in Greek newspapers, had intensified Greek fears. For instance, the Turkish Prime Minister stated in 1975 that 'half the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world know that this is so ... we know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige, dignity and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked.' Turkish official references to a 'growing Turkey' all to the 21st
century as the 'era of Turkism' caused concern and anger in Greece. Moreover, direct questioning of Greek sovereignty, as in the case of the group of islands that are situated within 50 kilometres of the Turkish coast 'should belong to Turkey' as well as indirect challenging over the Aegean islands had been viewed with alarm. Greece, in the early 1990s proposed a plan of a bilateral non-use of force, which was rejected by Turkey thus reinforcing the perception of Turkish intentions to use military force against a member of the same alliance.

The East European revolution created a completely new situation for Greece with respect to its regional environment. Because of the instability that had been created in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia and of Ankara's willingness to become involved, Turkey had been seen to profit more from the new setting than Greece. Ankara's aspiration to become a regional power was seen in Athens with increasing concern and also as a factor of destabilisation in the Balkans which would further burden an already uneasy relationship. However, Turkish intentions to seek a 'more active' regional role were also considered in Athens as being out of proportion to Turkey's real capabilities to shape the course of Balkan, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern affairs decisively.

Both Greek and Turkish experts agreed that the collapse of Soviet power had drastically reduced the threat to Turkey and consequently the latter's traditional importance as a Western bastion in the area. In Greece, this was seen as a positive development, since Turkey might become more amenable to compromise, for example over the Cyprus issue. However, this loss in strategic value was seen to be partly compensated by new opportunities opened up for Turkey by the decrease of Soviet power in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as by the new Balkan situation. The outbreak of ethnic conflict in the Caucasus and Turkey's growing interest in extending its influence over Azerbaijan and its increasing pressure on Armenia initially provided many opportunities for Turkish diplomacy towards the East.

The breakup of the Soviet empire also opened up opportunities for Turkey in Central Asia. Russia's internal priorities and external reorientation westwards had further aggravated the situation in this vast area. Motivated by geography, culture, and history,
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Turkey tried to fill the vacuum created by the Soviet retreat by becoming a regional power. This role involved the projection of the Turkish model (pluralist democracy and market economy in a Moslem society), as opposed to Islamic fundamentalism or Iran-oriented options for the new states of this region. 24

Ankara mobilised all possible national resources to this end and had been seeking, international support that would go beyond rhetorical encouragement. Indeed, the US and some European governments viewed this orientation favourably and publicly supported it; their practical help to Ankara, however, had not been very substantial and generous. Their motivations usually stemmed from genuine consideration of future stability in this crisis-prone area as well as from a desire to have a political economic presence there. Some Europeans probably also felt some relief as a result of Turkish reorientation eastwards, which thus meant less Turkish pressure for accession to the EU. Greek views towards Turkey’s potential EU membership were always negative: However, Turkey had neither the capability to play the ‘Asian card’ based on its own resources nor the intention to abandon plans to join the EC. Its real intention, as portrayed in the Turkish press and in the speeches of Turkish politicians in the early nineties, were: a) to extract as much Western assistance to this Turkish-orchestrated project as it could, and b) to use this vast area of prospective influence as a political asset to become part of the EC family. Such a course would not only bring international prestige and possibly even internal political gains, but would also strengthen the Western-oriented Turkish elite, which felt the increasing pressures of ‘a return to Islam’ particularly in view of the spectacular increase of the Islamic and other extremist parties in the March 1994 local elections. 25 However, the progressive return of Russian influence and the overthrow of the pro-Turkish Azeri government represented a serious blow to Turkish visions in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s reintegration into the CIS, as well as Armenian military victories, further reduced Turkey’s chances to become the dominant force in the Caucasus. Moreover, Turkey’s own insensitivity vis-à-vis less powerful neighbours, and above all the short-term difficulties in mobilising the resources needed to stabilise Central Asia, created more problems than opportunities.
The Gulf War highlighted Turkey's role in Middle East scenarios, in conjunction with the perceived need to deter Sadam Hussein. These developments had rendered Turkey particularly useful to the West, but they had also brought to the front the embarrassing Kurdish issue, which initially took the form of Turkish territorial claims against Iraq. The allies had to set preconditions on their assistance to Turkey in order to restrain it from undertaking offensive action against Iraq. The outcome of the war brought to the surface Ankara's worst fear: that of a semi-independent Kurdish state in Iraq. Moreover, the Kurdish issue developed into a civil war in Turkey's south-eastern provinces and into an obstacle to the growth of a democratic system in Turkey. The continued refusal of Ankara to recognise the distinct Kurdish identity of more than 10 million of its citizens, as well as the overall human rights record of Turkey, hampered further Turkish aspirations to be treated as an ordinary European democracy. Thus, even though Turkey was in a position to be the central actor in the region, its proclivity to use violence internally against the Kurds and to project military power abroad had produced negative and unpredictable counter-effects, not only in the region, but also across the Atlantic.

The Greek-Turkish relationship, however, was particularly burdened by Turkish efforts to play an active role in the Balkans. Based on the existence of some Moslem communities and minorities (in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo) and of some populations of Turkish descent (in Bulgaria and the FYROM), Ankara begun to create a 'Turkish network' in the Balkans, aimed, inter alia, at isolating Greece in this area. This incremental process involved a strong private sector presence, backed by Ankara through substantial export credits, as well as a series of bilateral agreements in all fields. Accompanied by bombastic statements referring to a Turkish return to the Balkans following in the footsteps of the Ottoman Empire, this quest for a neo-Ottoman role rang 'alarm bells' in Greece. For this reason Greek foreign policy-makers preferred what Bakoyanni called: 'a European Turkey'. A Turkey with a European orientation which would be the antidote against any aspiration of fundamental movement in the future. According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 'Greece was ready even to support Turkey's application for EU membership if Turkey would put an end on its
terриториални претензии". 32. Но когато някои от членовете на ЕС показваха приятелиство към Турция, те получаваха негативни коментари от същите политици-създатели, които не се разбираха с драмата, с която се съизкушаваха страните-партньори на ЕС/СФСР връзка с Турция. 33. Това беше да приемат по-гъвкаво отношение към нея и да заемат по-възможно по-гъвкави позиции, за да се вгледат в нарушенията на правата на човека, демократичния дефицит и агресията на Турция, за да осигурят възможност за по-гъвкаво отношение към Турция. 33. Това беше да приемат по-гъвкаво отношение към нея и да заемат по-гъвкави позиции, за да се вгледат в нарушенията на правата на човека, демократичния дефицит и агресията на Турция, с оглед да спрат исламската примитивност и втора да се възползват от преимуществата, които Турция предлага, като геополитична и 'икономична' позиция.

Тъй като ситуацията в Балканите в началото на 1990-те години се видяла безнадежна. Въпреки, международния отбелязане за голямата роля на Балканите в българо-турския отношения. Позиционирането на несъществени (и несъществени) елементи от Балканското шахматно поле в обратна посока на несъществени изгърбнало гръцки грижата за 'македонската въпрос'. Турските усилия да проникнат в източна гръцка близост в политика и економика дадоха възможност за гръцка страх от исламска (или турска финансирана) 'арка' в края на Адриатическото море до Кипър. Този относително изцяло забелязано представя на екстремно, нестабилна област претърсвала голяма изменение донякъде гръцки възприемаха мулти-а̀зимутна защитна позиция в СФСР, което съществено ограничи гъвкавостта и дългосрочния ефект на гръцко балканската политика. Това било особено тревожно, по отношение на възможностите, които бяха направени на гръцко балканската политика.

3 Balkan Instability as a Security Risk

The Disintegration of Yugoslavia

Разпадът на бившия Югославия доведъл до възход на въпроса за териториалните граници на Федерация, които, благодарение на съседство, бяха превърнали в международни граници. В случай на Словения, етническите граници почти напълно се изпълнили с административни. В случай на Хърватия и особено на Босна, обаче, размиването на населението...
was quite significant. The transformation of administrative into inter-state borders thus created problems of a different magnitude resulting in the outbreak of hostilities.

In the Yugoslav South, the disintegration scenarios reflected qualitatively unique characteristics: the secession of former Yugoslav republics, and, potentially, of former autonomous provinces (such as Kosovo) that could drastically alter the essence of the Balkan problem, since states bordering on these regions most probably would feel threatened or seek to get involved; based on an interest in the fate of ethnically related populations. As a result, neighbouring Balkan states, could adopt a self-proclaimed right of protection through intervention, which might permit an internal issue to spill over and become an international one. With neighbouring states taking sides on the basis of broader criteria of balance of power and national interest, a general conflagration was possible to result.

The Greek authorities dealt with the issue of Yugoslav disintegration with many of these fears in mind. They saw a negative precedent in the process set in motion by the EU recognition of Slovenia and Croatia from the perspective of spill-over effects into the Yugoslav South. They felt that self-determination was given more attention than long-term survivability. Furthermore, Greek officials, much like some American analysts, tended to see self-determination movements as undermining the potential for democratic development in non-democratic countries and threatening the foundations of democracy in the democratic ones. In sum, faced with the choice between stable neighbours and destabilising forces of national self-determination, Greece clearly opted for the first. From the start its efforts were aimed at averting a hasty recognition of the FYROM before the creation of a mechanism that would contain or dissipate the challenge this fledgeling state represented to the regional status quo.

With an Albanian Population of 30 to 40% (mainly concentrated along the FYROM's western border with Albania) and a north-western border with (heavily Albanian-populated) Kosovo, a major destabilisation factor seemed to be totally ignored. Of equal concern was another third of the republic's population which had voted for the
VMRO party. The latter's ideology was heavily influenced by a nationalistic orientation and some factions were believed to develop pro-Bulgarian tendencies.

The PASOK administration's 1993-1996 Balkan policy appeared to emphasise an all Balkan co-operative approach instead of a preferential treatment of Serbia. Even though the New Democracy's tilt in favour of Belgrade was basically an instinctive preference for the central and uniting power versus the disintegration forces, the perception of a Greek-Serbian axis limited Greece's credibility and freedom of manoeuvre both in terms of its Balkan policy and its possibilities to influence the debates within the CFSP. PASOK's efforts at forming a new Balkan strategy so as to reflect a more balanced attitude towards its northern neighbours (including a de-emphasis on Greek-Serbian ties) resulted up to an extent in a more flexible position that allowed Athens to play a fully stabilising role in the region in the mid-1990s.

Furthermore, Greece's Balkan policy was traditionally conceived in close connection with its relations with Turkey. Some form of Greek-Turkish competition in the Balkans persisted even during the Cold War era. However, the collapse of Communism dramatically altered the essence and structure of regional politics by adding an altogether new factor: Greek-Turkish antagonism over influence in the Balkans.

Ankara recognised FYROM, for instance, by under the name of 'Macedonia' only a few hours after the February 1992 Davos meeting. This act considered in Athens as particularly 'provocative', especially since Prime Minister Mitsotakis had explicitly asked his Turkish counterpart to wait for an EC-wide decision on this sensitive issue. Ankara's move reinforced Greek fears of a Turkish encirclement. The Turkish government had in fact embarked on a systematic process of concluding various agreements (including on military co-operation) with Sofia, Skopje, and Tirana, thus reinforcing suspicions that the so-called 'Islamic arc', as noted in Chapter Five, was being formed along Greece's northern and eastern border. However, in view of the fact that Christian Orthodoxy is the dominant religion in Serbia, Montenegro, the FYROM, Bulgaria, and Romania, the Islamic element had not necessarily been dominant in the Turkish efforts to penetrate the Balkans. Political antagonisms and specific economic considerations created a climate that tended to limit Greece's horizon in the Balkans.
Nevertheless, the more balanced approach adopted by the new PASOK administration had also affected Ankara, since the Greek government recognised a ‘Turkish role’ in the Balkans. The multilateral scheme promoted by the Greek foreign minister in the mid-1990s served as an appropriate forum to diffuse Greek-Turkish antagonism in the Balkans.

**Balkan Instability and Immigration Pressures**

The failure of reforms to satisfy basic needs such as employment, access to food, shelter, education, and social security brought political instability which turned endemic in at least some of the former Communist countries. Popular discontent with the pains and delays of the modernisation process proved strong enough to generate acute political crises and protracted instability, it even redirected public preferences toward politicians that adopted nationalistic and possibly expansionist aims.

Economic malaise and social tension in south-eastern Europe also affected Greece primarily in the form of immigration pressures. Ethnic conflict and fear of chaos and anarchy across the board led to vast migrations southwards in the 1990s - a prospect that was widely perceived as a major risk. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina created millions of refugees, the highest number in Europe since World War II. The chaotic situation of Albania with its foundering economy, its political instability, and its explosive birth-rate also developed into a veritable powder keg for the Balkans and Greece in particular. The breakdown of Albania's food and health systems and virtual economic collapse created social problems. Government breakdown and economic privation also created a state almost incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community. The urge to leave the country for better pastures became so acute that it required the intervention of the armed forces of Greece and Italy to protect the borders. Moreover, the Greek frontier regions were often under assault by armed Albanian irregulars intent on looting. What also proved of major importance in Greek-
Albanian relations was the pressure which Tirana increasingly exerted on the Greek minority, thus forcing a massive exodus of ethnic Greeks. Like other EU governments, Athens faced domestic pressures to tighten controls. The reaction to asylum-seekers further intensified by fears of 'directed' immigration from neighbouring countries aiming to create ethnic minorities in border areas. This dimension was clearly present in a geographically not-contiguous EU country such as Greece: bordering on economically poor and politically unstable countries, the immigration pressures were mounting. The blunt responses to the influence of Albanian refugees in countries such as Greece and Italy were a refusal of Tirana's requests to 'legalise' large numbers of Albanian settlers. For example, as many as 400,000 Albanian immigrants had been seeking integration into the Greek society and economy. Similar situations arose along the rest of Greece's northern and eastern borders.

To sum up, the East European revolution led, paradoxically, to a darkening of Greece's security horizons at the start of the 1990s. The end of the Cold War and Yugoslavia's disintegration released a variety of explosive ethnic, political, social, and economic tensions with serious destabilising implications for Greece's northern neighbourhood. Civil strife, economic privation and government breakdown in south-eastern Europe pushed Greece's northern neighbourhood into violence and confusion. These changes clearly highlighted the magnitude of the stakes that the new regional environment brought to the fore. They also rendered imperative the need to define an appropriate strategy and adopt a new strategic doctrine in order to meet the new threats and risks that the new millennium would entail.
Chapter Six

THE GREEK STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

The security policies of weak states in strategic locations such as Greece, as analysed in the second chapter, are dependent on the following variables:

- their behavioural patterns in foreign/security policy issues;
- the domestic sources of their foreign/security policies;
- the dynamics of changing relationships and their adaptation; and
- on the resources and perspectives deriving from the diplomatic and strategic regimes.

These variables, if put together, they form the basis upon which, a weak state's strategic doctrine is built.

Strategic doctrine is viewed as a state's theory about how it can best 'produce' security for itself. A Strategic doctrine may be conceptualised as a means-end relationship, in which military means are connected to political objectives.

According to Platias, actual events test the validity of the state's national security 'theory' and serve to show whether the 'theory' helps the state to achieve its political goals. In this framework, the Greek optimal defence and security doctrine, triggered by the variables mentioned above and based upon the particularities of Greek security outlined in the previous section, could be visualised in the model below:

According to the model, the inner core of Greece's security, the state itself, has to be served by a healthy and competitive economy, functioning under conditions of free trade in an environment of strong and adequately tested democratic institutions backed
by well-trained and equipped armed forces sufficient to maintain Greece’s regional balances.

The next area represents the experiment of the European Union which solidifies and supplements Greece’s defensive / deterrent / status quo stance. Needless to say, that this constitute a strong deterrent asset since Greece’s potential adversaries will have second thoughts before attempting to challenge its territorial integrity, in the sense that they will be challenging, in addition to the country, the gradually integrating European Union.

WEU’s status on the other hand, as previously noted, is not yet clear. The question still to be answered is whether the WEU will evolve into the future defence component of the European Union or whether it will grow to house a greater number of member states thus serving as the European pillar of NATO. In either case, Greece will be counting on the WEU to provide a segment of the value of collective security.

Finally, in the next and most decisive field in terms of collective defence we find NATO and the Atlantic community. The maintenance of the institutions as well as the security and defence functions of NATO will remain the *sine qua non* for the creation of a post-Cold War order that can usher in decades of global peace. The above table also includes wider-in membership institutions, such as the OSCE and the UN that could further enhance Greece’s commitment to peaceful processes for the settlement of disputes.

Nevertheless, a doctrine also incorporates economic, moral, demographic and other factors upon which the security of a state is built in various ways. It should also identify treats and devise remedies for those threats. For the case of Greece it has the structure prescribed below:
# THE THREAT

### Threatening Statements

### Diplomatic initiatives
- At the continental shelf level
- At the territorial sea level
- At the airspace level
- At the territorial level

### Military preparations

### CONSTRAINTS
- Population geography
- Economic resources
- Great power interests

### REMEDIES
- Search of autonomy
- Search of deterrence
- National deterrence
- International deterrence
- Extended deterrence
- Active deterrence
As Platias argues, weak states trying to develop their own strategic doctrines have fewer options and less freedom than the great powers. Indeed, very few weak and 'soft' powers (namely Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and Israel) have actually managed to develop their own original doctrines. Weak states usually develop an original doctrine after realising that the doctrines of the bigger powers have only limited applicability to their problems. Apart from that, it is difficult for weak states to resist to pressures from their strong partners. This realisation plus the Turkish invasion in Cyprus forced Greece to completely reshape its strategic doctrine in the last two decades.

Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 showed Greece that its national security ‘theory’ was not valid: it was tested and it failed. Full reliance on NATO for its own strategic needs did not prove to be a guarantee of protection. Greece in 1974 realised that it was both insecure and dependent. The events demanded a new theory, one consistent with the new realities. Greece then revised new approaches to the mounting threat from the east. The new strategic doctrine attempted to ‘produce’ security by maximising autonomy while simultaneously strengthening deterrence.

However, just a new strategic doctrine is not enough. According to Pesmazoglou, political developments in the 1990s in many parts of the world have shown that possession of advanced military hardware does not constitute a guarantee against internal upheavals nor external threats, unless accompanied by the proper functioning of democratic rule. This is of particular significance for European political stability and defence. It would imply that no EU, WEU or NATO global strategy would ever be credible or effective without a clear and consistent orientation towards the preservation of peace and democracy, respect for international law and procedures with exclusion of all arbitrary and aggressive action against any member state.
THE WEU AND ITS ROLE

'WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance'. This statement appears in the Declaration by WEU member states on the role of Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, adopted at Maastricht in 1991, and was ritually intoned in every declaration by the Council of Ministers. It summarises, albeit not without ambiguity, the dilemma the Organisation was facing in relation to the reforms being made in the other two institutions. Although definite progress had been achieved in terms of relations with NATO, no consensus had emerged, with regard to the Union, as to the course WEU was to take in order to carry out the role of 'defence component'. Although Ifestos argued, if the WEU develops into an autonomous and independent defence institution abolishing its ties with NATO its political schizophrenia would be resolved, the issue was a sensitive one as it brought to the fore the policies of individual governments towards the European Union itself, and each one's views of the future in store for political co-operation in Europe and the Union's place in the world. For other scholars such as Whitman, if WEU was developed in the future as an independent defence mechanism, that would mean the end of NATO.

The legal basis of the European Union's remit for security and, indirectly, for defence is laid down in Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, the first two paragraphs of which state:

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence.

2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.
Chapter Six

Application of this text, cited in the Maastricht Declaration by the Member States of the WEU and effective from 1 January 1993, proved difficult, mainly on account of governments' differing views over the content of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Denmark's refusal to subscribe to the security and defence provisions of Article J.4 and the accession in 1995 of three countries whose policies in the regard had evolved outside the framework of NATO or WEU membership markedly complicated implementation of the CFSP as it was envisaged in 1991.

The Intergovernmental Conference in 1991 was meant to give the CFSP its second political wind, but there is no denying of the fact that progress to date has been minimal. Issues such as: lack of technical support, non-existence of troops, absence of political constituted also factors for WEU's inefficiency. In addition, as Clement argues, WEU was not ready to undertake missions due the lack of mandate, operational means, and decision-making structure. Although for Michael Smith, the external economic relations of the member states were the core and the motive for action in CFSP in the 1990s. To these factors might be added the differences that had traditionally existed between some states over the European Union's role in the world - a mere club for promoting the market economy or an integrated economic and political system. Relations with WEU, which, since the Maastricht Treaty was signed, was supposed to 'elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications', reflected the vicissitudes of the prevailing situation within the Union and were suffering as a result of the differing memberships of the two organisations. Apart from that, according to Clarke, member states had not distinguish between security and defence. As a result, in security issues all member states were willing to deal with (i.e. arms control, nuclear proliferation, internal security), whereas in defence, anything that was related to deployment of forces found member states against.

At the time of signature of the Maastricht Treaty, only three signatory states, Denmark, Greece and Ireland, were not WEU members. Denmark, a member of NATO, posed no problem as far as development of co-operation between WEU and the Union in security and defence matters was concerned; Greece, for its part, was shortly to become a
member of WEU, and Ireland, avowedly neutral with regard to the military alliances, signed and ratified the Treaty in its entirety. Deadlock over the application of Article J.4.2 set in with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, as none of these countries, all NATO non-members, openly expressed any desire to join WEU. There were one or two political declarations from Austria and Finland, which were not followed up by an official approach, the only one that in fact could carry any weight. Their observer status provided no solution to the dilemma over implementing the provisions of Article J.4, since in practical terms it would amount to non-members instructing an organisation in respect of which they had no legal rights or obligations. Moreover, difficulties arose over establishing military co-operation with NATO - already embodied in principle in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty and the very aspect that constituted a major stumbling block to convergence between WEU and the European Union.

ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF EUROPEANISATION AND GREECE

Although, the Maastricht Treaty did not manage to bridge over the basic intra-European divergencies on the future framework and course of security policy; it reduced, however, the overall complexity to a fundamental choice between an ‘Atlantic’ Europe and a fully ‘Europeanised’ one. For the EU member states this was conceptualised into two models. The first model was based on a continuation of NATO with a strengthening of the WEU, where the latter would serve as a reinforced European pillar of the Alliance and would remain independent of the EU.

The second model foresaw the creation of a purely European Defence Identity through a gradual incorporation of the WEU into the EU. The Union members would thus integrate not only their economic (EMU) and political (EPU) strategies, but their military policies as well. The dilemma was left largely unresolved, and both sides had to compromise in Maastricht. However, subsequent events and above all the worsened
international situation, as well as the long row over the treaty's ratification re-opened the issue sooner and more forcefully than anticipated. Furthermore, the increased complexities of the European system reinforced already mounting ethnocentric tendencies and, as demonstrated by the Yugoslav crisis, allowed each European country to engage in the institution within which its own national interests could best be pursued.53

In this context, while the institutional models for European security were in flux in the early 1990s, Greece hastened to make an unqualified choice for one of them. Convinced that a 'Europeanised' security system would better serve both European and Greek interests, Greece actively campaigned during the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) negotiations in favour of the EPU/WEU model. As subsequent developments demonstrated, however, this choice had been rather instinctive and less well thought out than one might presume.

1 The EPU/WEU Model and the Greek Choice

The EPU/WEU model was perceived almost naturally and from the very beginning of the post-Cold War debates as a real bonus for Greece. Building a security and defence shield to protect the twelve member countries was certainly a welcome idea for a country that felt geographically isolated from the rest of Western Europe. With only the orthodox Communists (KKE) opposing it, and with PASOK having progressively adopted a pro-European policy after the elections of 1985 during the 1980s Greek public opinion progressively reached a spectacular consensus in favour of European integration. Defence was considered an integral part of the European process.54

NATO, on the other hand, was considered as having been overtaken by events. It was certainly viewed as a successful institution in terms of responding to the Soviet threat and in bringing the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion; however, NATO's success in promoting these goals throughout the post-war person was matched with disregard of regional sensitivities in some quarters. No matter how successful it had been, it was
seen as a remnant of the old East-West divide; therefore, a number of Greek analysts doubted that the alliance was still an effective means to maintain stability in Europe. They felt that NATO had been created to deal with threats that no longer existed, and that with the disappearance of the Soviet threat the alliance had no reason to continue. Under the new post-Cold War circumstances, some analysts in Greece felt NATO had to adopt a more "political orientation" and to transform its military posture, focused predominantly on the Soviet/WTO threat, into a new more flexible approach. As far as the WEU is concerned, Greece addressed the issue of membership with increasing interest. The 1984 revitalisation of the WEU framework had been, inter alia, a response to the need felt during the INF crisis to co-ordinate a unitary West European attitude without the three EC 'dissidents' (Greece, Denmark, Ireland). A concern that a twelve-member EPC might not be a sufficiently effective or credible forum for security deliberations had indeed been growing among some EC member states since the early 1980s. Indirectly, Irish neutrality, Danish reluctance and Greece's anti-nuclear rhetoric accelerated and reinvigorated a trend toward finding more effective ways of organising a Western European approach to East-West relations and the Old Continent's security. Thus, whatever the real motivations behind the move to revive the Western European Union, those Greeks who favoured an increasingly 'Europeanised European defence' largely interpreted this shift away from the EPC framework as a way of excluding Greece (as well as the other non-WEU members) from European security consultations; furthermore, it was seen as an effort to achieve a more intimate and productive dialogue for some governments, which would not be hampered by the requirement of incorporating all minority interests.

In this framework, the progressive normalisation of Greece's EC policy, and particularly the signing of the Single European Act, accelerated Greek efforts to approach the WEU and declare Greece's readiness to engage in negotiations leading to WEU membership. Greece's willingness not to be absent from an increasingly important forum, however, was hampered by the Socialist government's still anti-nuclear rhetoric. Unable to display the flexibility of their Spanish counterparts on this issue, the Greek Socialists did not commit themselves when faced with a clearly pro-nuclear text, such as the Platform
of The Hague. Consequently, Portugal (which had already applied in 1984) and Spain were invited to start negotiations in April 1988. Another important obstacle was the state of Greek-Turkish relations. The disputes of the two prospective members were seen as likely to disturb the smooth functioning of the WEU. Most important for WEU members, the real issue was the automatism of Article V of the Treaty. Should a situation of armed conflict have arisen between Greece and Turkey, an embarrassing problem would be created: WEU members would then have to intervene directly in an armed conflict between two members.

Until the beginning of the EC IGC on Political Union in 1990, the Greek and Turkish candidacies were directly linked. Though not official, this link practically meant that WEU members preferred to treat the two countries as a package. By inviting Greece to join first, Athens would have acquired a serious leverage on the progression of eventual Turkish membership not only in the EC but in the WEU as well. Furthermore, the event of Greece alone becoming a member of the WEU would have amounted to a WEU guarantee of Greek borders. Finally, inviting only Turkey was also seen as highly premature and would have constituted a fundamental change in the EC's conceptual approach.

For Greece, the EPU model presented a series of important advantages. However, due to the overall consensus on European integration, this option was not discussed in depth. Two arguments in favour of the EPU model seemed overwhelmingly convincing: (i) the inclusion of the security/defence dimension into European integration was seen necessary as the most logical step towards European Union, and (ii) the membership composition of the EC rendered it politically more attractive to Greece in comparison with other security institutions. It was believed that an EC common security policy would guarantee Greece's territorial integrity.

(i) In Greek eyes, enlarging the scope of European integration to incorporate a security and/or defence dimension appeared to be an eminently rational development. The existence of a community of nations sharing the same values and interests and integrating their various policies into collective ones provided the best and most promising environment: the comprehensive net of interdependence created during years
of progressive integration was expected to culminate in the co-ordination and step-by-step orchestration of the security policies of the Twelve. 59

(ii) The foundation of Greece's EC strategy in relation to security affairs had traditionally rested on perceived advantages involving a European framework with regard to external challenges and most particularly in relation to the perceived Turkish threat. The prevailing argumentation in favour of a Europeanised security system went mostly along the following lines: if a common defence policy was created within the EPU, it would by definition protect all twelve members against external threats. Given that Turkey posed a serious threat to Greece, the latter would be able to count on the support of a collective deterrence mechanism that would discourage a potential Turkish incursion. Because of the slow progress of security consultations within the EC, even after the SEA, accession to the WEU was increasingly perceived as the true key to Greece's future security needs. PASOK's anti-nuclear policy during the 1980s had unfortunately excluded Greece from this increasingly important forum and was thus threatening to marginalise this country in the debate on the future of European security. The New Democracy administration, therefore, pursued the goal of WEU accession as a top priority. It adroitly put forward its credentials as an EC member (as a basis for a differentiated treatment vis-à-vis Turkey), and it demonstrated its eagerness to join the security component of EC integration.

During the IGC on the Political Union, it was made clear from the outset that Greece placed a special emphasis on defence; no real progress was thought possible in the IGCs on both the EMU and Political Union without parallel progress in defence. 60 To the Greek government, defence meant above all that the country's borders would be 'guaranteed' against air external attack. Greece expected its participation in a politically united Europe to act as a deterrent against expansionist neighbours; moreover, if deterrence failed, the EU 'would certainly help' through political and military support (provision of equipment, for example), economic sanctions against the aggressor, and perhaps even through the dispatch of a future EU/WEU Rapid Reaction Force.
Beyond some generalities, the Greek debate on the Treaty on Political Union, as outlined in Chapter Five, focused almost exclusively on the latter's relationship to the WEU and on Greece's prospective accession, as well as on the technicalities of the Greek as opposed to the Turkish treatment. However, the Maastricht compromise and the evolution of the European defence identity towards the one or the other European security model influenced Greece's security deeper than the WEU provisional arrangements.

At Maastricht, Greece's efforts to join the WEU finally met with success when the nine WEU member states officially invited Greece, along with the other two members of the European Union (Denmark and Ireland),

'...to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the Modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of the WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU. The Member States of WEU assume that treaties and agreements corresponding with the above proposals will be concluded before 31 December 1992. 61

Under this formulation, the WEU Nine agreed that negotiations on Greece's entry to the WEU could begin. However they balanced this move with proposals for parallel negotiations to begin with Turkey (as well as Norway and possibly Iceland). These would in fact aim at letting Ankara take full part in WEU activities, without being a member with full voting rights. Prime Minister Mitsotakis was quick to declare immediately after the Maastricht Declaration of the Nine in October 1992 that 'our frontiers will henceforth be defended by the united Europe.' 62

However, Greece's success in finally joining the WEU was only partial since the provisions of the agreement contained a number of delicate issues and the Declaration
in fact provided only a framework to be defined through negotiations. Two issues were considered to be of paramount importance:

(i) In view of the WEU's evolution and the expansion of its scope after Maastricht, the internal debate to redefine the Union's role took place while Greece remained excluded. 63

(ii) The Maastricht decision of the WEU Nine also affected Greek interests through the invitation addressed to European (but non-EC) NATO members (i.e. Turkey) to become WEU associate members in a way which would give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU.

However, the agreement presented some positive aspects for Greek security. A long-standing Greek claim was being fulfilled and the WEU membership certainly increased the Greek feeling of security. Greece was now part of all three major European organisations, the EC, NATO, and the WEU and could profit from their combined contribution to European stability. The longer-term perspective of the WEU becoming the defence arm of the Union as well as its potential with regard to out-of-area scenarios were also positive aspects of Greece's security horizon.

The Petersberg meeting of the WEU (June 1992), as noted in Chapter Five, came as a shock to Greek public opinion. The nine members agreed to interpret and thus practically to modify Article V of the Brussels Treaty in a way that left no doubt as to what its main aim was: to render Article V inapplicable to any form of Greek-Turkish conflict, including even a surprise and unprovoked attack by Turkey on Greece. 64 However unlikely this latter worst-case scenario sounded to most WEU members, it nevertheless constituted an arbitrary change of the rules of the game, and was perceived in Athens as extremely anti-Greek. The new interpretation did not leave the Greek government the slightest room for manoeuvre; it was now impossible to convey the internally very important message that Greece could feel secure from eventual aggressive actions by Turkey. It could not alleviate the feeling of insecurity created among Greek public opinion by the menacing presence of an uneasy eastern neighbour, who was seen as meddling increasingly in an already chaotic and unstable Balkan environment. Had Article V been kept intact, Greece certainly would have adopted a
more relaxed attitude with regard to regional problems and would feel less nervous about their spill-over potential. More importantly, the message sent from Petersberg to Ankara was not one of solidarity among WEU members but, instead, one of carte blanche.

Greece, however, despite the limitations outlined above, tried to pursue an active policy in the WEU, although there was a huge gap between planning and implementation. Greek proposals for the forthcoming Greek WEU Presidency in the second half of 1998 included: more contribution of the WEU member states to the organisation’s instruments; strengthening of institutional relations between EU-WEU; strengthening of relations with third countries and Russia; practical co-operation with NATO in the application of Petersberg tasks; and police co-operation with Albania. The Presidency offers the chance to a weak state to initiate and formulate policy but above all, despite its deficiencies, WEU offers important contributions to Greek security. Full membership rights guarantee full consultation and timely information capabilities in the defence field (regular meetings of defence ministers or chiefs of defence staffs, for example). The Union's operational potential may also prove of military importance, particularly for out-of-area action or in orchestrating selective military measures before NATO comes into play, its overall importance may grow if the United States becomes less dominant on European security issues.

COMBINING RATHER THAN CHOOSING: WEIGHTING THE EPU/WEU AGAINST THE ATLANTIC MODEL

The analysis in the previous section suggests that the EPU/WEU model had important drawbacks, at least in its Maastricht form although the potential for substantial improvement by the IGC scheduled to begin in 1996 should not of course be disregarded. However, by 1996 the political map of Eastern Europe might well look quite different from the present one. Consequently, ethnic conflict and small wars in the former Communist zone probably would have to be managed by the available...
institutions and procedures. In this perspective, it is important to weigh the possibilities offered by the EPU/WEU model against its alternative: a reformed NATO model.

The end of the Cold War spurred NATO planners to re-think the structure and concepts of the alliance in view of the dissipation of old threats and the rise of new risks. These new challenges to Western security were not seen as stemming from outright aggression, but rather from an unforeseen escalation of instabilities, complicated by too rapid structural changes. However, the diffuse and multidimensional character of future risks was perhaps too tall an order for NATO.

The evaluation of Greece's choices in relation to the two security models, the European and the Atlantic ones, depends on the answers each provided to this country's specific security needs based on the following criteria and considerations:

(i) the provision of a collective security system that (ii) is militarily efficient, (iii) links Europe to the United States, and (iv) is politically rational and coherent.

(i) A Collective Security System

Given the fluid and anarchy-prone Balkan neighbourhood, Greece needed the protective shield of a comprehensive and future-oriented collective security system. It realised it could not mobilise sufficient resources to meet the new and multidimensional challenges of an increasingly unstable regional environment. Therefore, it needed an updated version of NATO's security system that served its interests so well for over forty years. Was NATO capable of effectively deterring and resisting potential aggressor states and other challenges in the 1990s? Or was the EPU/WEU developed into a collective security system of its own?

NATO provided Greece with a comprehensive and effective collective defence system (Article V) covering the whole of Greece's territory and its armed forces north of the Tropic of Cancer (Article VI). Regarding the geographic source of the attack, Greece's northern borders had been explicitly covered during the Cold War years and specific measures and plans had been adopted to this effect (US bases, tactical nuclear weapons,
etc). However, the end of the Cold War brought some of Greece's northern neighbours, namely, formerly Communist Bulgaria and Albania, closer to NATO; both countries became members of NACC and even expressed their willingness to become full members of NATO. This reduced the likelihood of an attack on Greece; at the same time, was such an attack to take place in the foreseeable future, it would probably be realistic to expect a more or less unitary NATO assessment (the exact nature and circumstances of the attack, as well as Turkey's role, would be important parameters). However, the more substantial the relationship with NATO became for Greece's northern neighbours, the less likely an automatic NATO military response would be in case of a regional conflict. This incidentally, conceivably placed Greece among those preferring the deepening rather than the widening of the alliance. With time passing and demarcation lines becoming blurred, NATO solidarity with Greece progressively weakened. However, as long as the democratic system of its northern neighbours was extremely unstable, the return of totalitarian (and 'adventuristic') regimes of a new type was always a possible scenario. In any case, Greece continued to enjoy an important advantage over its regional environment in terms of democratic stability, social cohesion, Western tradition and values.

With respect to Greece's eastern border, a more complex case arose: During the PASOK years (1981-89), Prime Minister Papandreou tried in vain to convince his NATO counterparts that collective security had also to be applied among members of the same alliance, since, in his eyes, a Turkish attack on Greece was not just a theoretical scenario. When faced with clear reluctance, he had to abandon his plan. Yet the idea continued to be kept alive by some Greek analysts.\textsuperscript{66} Papandreou conceded, however, that the participation of both Greece and Turkey in the alliance was by itself an important safety net containing aggressive behaviour.\textsuperscript{67} The New Democracy governments had been traditionally closer to this position and the pro-American orientation of the new PASOK administration (1993-... ) seemed to indicate that the Socialist leadership would probably continue regard the participation of the two countries in the same alliance as an important contribution to regional stability. Thus, depending of course on the specific pros and cons of each candidacy, Greece's position
might well evolve favourably with regard to the eventual accession of former Communist countries to NATO. This trend was strengthened by the German proposals calling for accession to NATO of the Visegrad countries. Greece objected to the exclusion of former Communist Balkan states from such a NATO enlargement.

The EU, on the other hand, had not managed to go beyond a vague solidarity formula of the treaty preamble and some references to the objective of ‘strengthening the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways’ (Article J. 1.2). A collective security formula which basically satisfied Greek needs was included in the Commission's initial proposals. ‘Should a Member State be the subject of armed aggression in Europe, the others will lend, in compliance with the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military and other.’ However, this formula was quickly rejected, it was not even included in the Luxembourg Presidency's first draft because of the majority's clear preference for more cautious and conservative formulations. This was most unfortunate for the Greek side which had always perceived the Commission's proposal as the ideal formula for Greece. It had the advantage of a *tous azimuts* interpretation that would also implicitly cover the Turkish case. Greece's accession to the WEU was a step in the same direction, but, as already noted, the Petersberg interpretation left little or no room for further hopes in respect to a *tous azimuts* orientation.

**(ii) Military Efficiency**

For a geographically exposed country such as Greece, the military efficiency of any security model is obviously of great importance. Indeed, a fundamental deficiency of the EPU/WEU model was its lack of military efficiency as compared to NATO.

In fact, the EPU/WEU had no military infrastructure and was dependent on the alliance. No common threat assessment or military planning took place within the EPU/WEU model. Therefore, carrying out large military operations without NATO was extremely problematic. For example, the UN coalition against Iraq was completely dependent
upon US reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities, which no other state had or could easily duplicate. Furthermore, the WEU had been traditionally linked to NATO. Article IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty states that the WEU works ‘in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’ and that it should not duplicate the military staffs of NATO.

The Treaty on European Union also required the WEU to be developed as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. In terms of operational capabilities, this could be translated into ‘closer military co-operation complementary to the Alliance in particular in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance.’ Furthermore, ‘arrangements aimed at giving the WEU a stronger operational role had to be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all Allies’ (Declaration, point C.5). In fact, most of the WEU forces probably had to be drawn from forces that had been assigned to NATO's integrated military command and that had missions in the alliance. Their use would therefore require a close co-ordination between the WEU and NATO. The Maastricht Treaty made clear that NATO policies would take precedence over WEU actions; WEU decisions ‘should not affect the obligations of certain member-states under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.’ This provision reinforced the 1991 Rome Summit agreement that ‘the Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.’

Any effort to create ‘independent’ European forces would raise important questions of cost-efficiency. NATO members traditionally sought security co-operation within the alliance as a most valuable means to maintain defence cost-efficiency. Moreover, the end of the Cold War and rising defence costs forced most Europeans to narrow the personnel and technological bases of their conventional forces. The maximisation of effectiveness with reduced resources and forces, however, would be difficult to achieve if a new defence network was to be constructed.
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NATO is certainly a militarily efficient and credible institution and has instilled confidence in its members. It achieved military integration at an unprecedented level, both in terms of operational procedures and common infrastructure. As demonstrated by the Gulf War, NATO preserved unparalleled strength in conducting and implementing effective military planning. Reform might render NATO an even more credible institution, particularly if pitfalls such as premature widening could be avoided. At the same time, however, 'NATO's ability to organise a coalition for missions other than defending the members' territory was problematic.\textsuperscript{70} The cost of projecting military power beyond national borders and engaging in sustained combat had risen spectacularly.

Exceptionally high costs as well as experience in organising forces and orchestrating military planning explains why NATO prepared plans for and proceeded rapidly with the authorisation of a Rapid Reaction Force, thus outpacing similar efforts by the WEU or the EU. Those same forces would be required by the EU for future military actions. However, none of the members of the NATO integrated military command was willing to pay to commit new forces to an EU or WEU force, particularly at a time of slow economic growth and overall cuts in defence spending; most Europeans were even using the CFE Treaty to justify significant reductions of their armed forces. Thus, the creation of the NATO RRF pre-empted any non-NATO rapid deployment force, thereby diluting French (and Greek) hopes for the Europeanisation of a politically visible instrument for international action.

The creation of the RRF also revived interest in the traditional intra-alliance out-of-area debate (which had not attracted much attention in Greece). Under the new conditions, the Cold War basis of NATO was generally perceived as likely to inhibit NATO domination of the out-of-area operations. A more detailed analysis of the Charter reveals, however, that NATO's inhibitions stemmed from its historical evolution and practice, rather than from the Treaty text itself.\textsuperscript{71} Such analyses suggested the possibility for NATO to go beyond a strict interpretation, provided, of course, that the mainly 'political resistance' put forward by the 'minimalist school' was to be overcome.
Greek authorities avoided explicitly taking sides in this controversy, but their overall rational suggested an indirect preference for the minimalist position, given the overall attraction felt for the EPU/WEU model. The main argument had been the generally accepted advantage of the WEU in relation to out-of-area activities. The WEU deployed naval forces in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War to protect merchant shipping and did so again during the UN-sponsored action against Iraq. The WEU therefore became an effective body orchestrating European out-of-area actions. Plans followed for NATO to be used to carry out the highly technical tasks of co-ordinating the actions of the WEU states with those of the North Americans but with no success. The Atlantic framework seemed to be more effective than that of the EPU/WEU in terms of nuclear proliferation and arms control, two important issues on the future security agenda, particularly when seen from the perspective of resolutely non-nuclear smaller states. The prospect of CIS nuclear-equipped republics turning into or helping other countries becoming new strategic actors might become a particularly destabilising scenario. Indeed, powerful radical regimes of fundamentalist or other expansion-prone character were likely to emerge as strategic actors in the late 1990s. As a Mediterranean country and increasingly within the range of weapons of mass destruction, Greece had a definite interest in an institutional framework that ensured its security against that kind of out-of-area risks. At the same time, in a world of increased proliferation, NATO would probably diminish the incentives for its stronger non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. ‘Nuclear aspirations’ on the other hand, could increase in view of decreasing confidence in conventional forces as a result of deep cuts in defence expenditure.

In the mid-1990s, ‘Atlantic Europe’ appeared to be a militarily more efficient framework in terms of arms control, too. Being geographically close to Eastern Europe, Greece watched the re-emergence of old rivalries and the breaking apart of historic states. The conflict potential arising from ethnic and social instability in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe increasingly induced former Communist countries to challenge arms control commitments that reflected past realities and had been based on the ‘non obsolete concept of bloc-to-bloc parity.’ Without NATO’s experience and its
clear commitment to arms control, it would have been more difficult to agree to further substantial arms reductions in the post-Helsinki negotiations. Yet one should not underestimate the increasing complexity of arms control in the new European configuration of forces. With more states operating independently, each might identify its security threats in ways that others would not easily accept. However, if formal arms-control agreements would become increasingly unlikely and stability was undermined, the continued presence of NATO would serve to contain diverging interpretations and would develop new formulae for arms reductions, possibly at a sub-regional level. With its pluralistic decision-making, NATO could prove more effective than any other scheme in co-ordinating the positions of its member states in multilateral negotiations and, particularly, in conducting analyses of competing proposals - a task that is very difficult for individual European states and especially the weak ones.\textsuperscript{75}

Finally, and most important from the Greek perspective, a continuously invigorated NATO would provide a credible rationale for the continuation of bilateral basing agreements between the US and states that desire them. Even though this prospect would require some re-evaluation and adaptation, it would provide smaller NATO members such as Greece with tangible links to US power and resolve.

\textbf{(iii) Linking Europe to the United States}

An active EPU/WEU model was expected to increase the probability for a substantial reduction of the US military presence in Europe. The perception of Europeans embarking on a fully Europeanised defence system capable of ensuring stability and peace on the Old Continent strengthened the voice of neo-isolationist forces in the US administration, Congress, and public opinion to retreat from Europe. The Clinton administration had been elected on an 'economy-first' ticket and was tempted to use anti-NATO arguments as a justification to speed up reductions of US forces in Europe. This in turn reignited intra-European fears of a post-American vacuum that might lead
to conflicting views on future security architecture and thus turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 76

By continuing to link the Old Continent with the New World, a reformed NATO would also serve as an "insurance policy" against a possible reversal of present trends. In fact, developments in Russia in the mid-1990s suggested that the possibility of a re-emergence of challenges from a nationalistic Russia should not be discarded. Furthermore, instability in Eastern Europe might spill over not only into the former Communist zone, but might also revive old Western "nationalisms." If intra-European problems continue to grow as demonstrated by the Yugoslav crisis and the row over the Maastricht Treaty ratification, a US "mediating role" would be crucially necessary. For this mediating role to be effective and credible, it is required that the US retain its capability to bring significant forces to bear on the European continent.

This perspective was vividly present in Greece's strategy. Even though bilateral ties with the US had suffered under the PASOK governments in the 1980s and remained unpopular even among some of New Democracy voters, the Mitsotakis government displayed a strongly pro-American attitude. Within three months after coming to power, it signed a new eight-year agreement regulating the presence of US bases and installations in Greece. 77 Moreover, the initially marginal role played by the US in the Yugoslav crisis was not particularly welcomed in Greece. The US attitude was considered positive for Greece, as long as Europe opted for the status quo in former Yugoslavia. The US worried in fact that any encouragement of separatist trends in Slovenia and Croatia would have a domino effect elsewhere in Eastern Europe, encouraging the dismemberment of states through the rise of secessionist movements. 78 Even though Greek enthusiasm for the US was occasionally shaken, the Mitsotakis government continued to view the American factor as a useful mediator in its efforts to win EC support for Greek policy regarding the Yugoslav question. 79 More surprisingly (given the evolution of Greek-American relations in the 1980s), the new PASOK administration displayed a strongly pro-US attitude, and Prime Minister Papandreou praised the "wisdom" of American policy in the Balkans in contrast to the counter-productive attitude of some European countries. 80
In sum, in the mid-1990s a continued US military presence along with a US political influence in the Old Continent appeared to be necessary in view of the magnitude of the problems to be solved and the interests at stake. The Greek government regarded this as a moderating factor in European politics, despite its generally 'European behaviour.' The US military presence in Greece, through basing agreements or NATO, as well as Washington's moderating influence on the governments in Tirana and Skopje, continued to constitute a valuable and irreplaceable asset for Greek security. These links continued to exercise an important influence on Greek policy, even though Athens occasionally nurtured mixed feelings about the American presence and involvement in the Balkans. Firstly, because the US was seen as a factor containing, to some extent, Turkey's adventurism, but at the same time encouraging Ankara's grandiose visions in the Middle East, Central Asia, and in the Balkans; and secondly, because the US constituted a power that could play a major role in shaping the course of events in the Balkans (for example, by helping to contain the hostilities in the Yugoslav North), but with unpredictable implications for Greek interests. The rapid evolution of the US position from a status quo policy to one of favouring recognition (stronger and more rapid than the EC's) was perceived as a factor of uncertainty and unpredictability. Another source of concern to the Greek side was Washington's pressures for a more direct and possibly military involvement in the Balkans, whereas Athens (along with other European capitals) continued viewing such an intervention as a nightmare that might escalate into a Balkan war or, more menacingly, into West Europe's 'Vietnam.'

(iv) Political Rationale and Coherence

A major factor influencing the viability and effectiveness of any security model or doctrine is its political rationale. A collective security system based on an integrated force structure may be efficient on the whole, but it would lack a political rationale based on a coherent membership philosophy.
A generally perceived major advantage of a Europeanised security organisation is based on the belief, widely shared in Greece, that Europeans have more interests in common than with the other side of the Atlantic. This perception was strengthened after the collapse of Communism, which was seen as favouring the development of a European defence identity capable of exporting stability and which would constitute an integration model to the eastern part of the Old Continent. The 1987-1988 minesweeping operation in the Gulf by the WEU nations was seen as a practical example of common European interests. Even though the 1990-1991 Gulf War experience failed to support the validity of the argument, Greek analysts quickly espoused the view that this failure of a collective European response underlined the necessity to move more quickly to a common defence policy. However, the Yugoslav crisis demonstrated the current limits of a European role. Historic sympathies and preferences, narrowly nationalistic interests and choices, and above all a frequently quasi-anarchic and conflict-prone East and South-East European environment dominated the approach of the EU members. To all this one should add the spectacular increase of the anti-federalist movement in many European countries and the resulting psychological letdown.

Decision-making within NATO had not been very coherent and successful. While the EU was diplomatically active during the whole of the Yugoslav crisis, NATO and the WEU were patrolling the Adriatic (or helping to patrol the Danube) to enforce the UN-imposed embargo. However important these measures and involvements had been, particularly in terms of containing the conflict, the Yugoslav problem demanded much more diplomatic patience and a more comprehensive approach in order to avoid spill-over effects southwards. Political coherence was also a very important asset in terms of decision-making. Greece's assessment of each model's political coherence had been based mostly on the nature of each institution's membership. This affected Greece in a number of ways. The EU's present (Ireland, Denmark) and, more important, new (Austria, Sweden, Finland) membership directly affected its potential to develop in the direction of a genuine defence organisation. Even though most of these neutrality policies were based on Cold-War bipolarity, the inclusion of security into the Maastricht Treaty created
difficulties regarding the precise content of the *acquis politique*. Moreover, the CFSP was designed by some members to serve as a means to delay or even block enlargement. However, such a policy might backfire. Furthermore, the concessions made to Denmark at the Edinburgh summit in relation to its exclusion from the CFSP further reduced the chances of a future EU-wide consensus in favour of including defence into the Union's policy.

On the other hand, NATO's membership and long history of like-mindedness in defence affairs seemed to guarantee a more coherent position on future policy. Furthermore, the acceptance of NATO by the East Europeans as a politically credible and militarily efficient organisation increased the chances of a wider (mainly UN) legitimisation. It should be noted, however, that this might change in the future. Indeed NATO's force planning continues to be essentially focussed on collective defence in case of aggression against NATO territory. However, this military rationale is steadily retreating and thus the political goals and rationale are fading, too. Another complication that could affect co-operation between the EU and NATO might stem from the members of the Union which are not part of the Alliance (Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Finland). Such a European pillar reaching binding decisions within the EPU/CFSP framework would marginalise the US and other European allies, the fact that the latter group would include Turkey does not suffice to create an argument in favour of the EPU/WEU model.

A politically coherent and rational security model would have to deter or contain the 're-nationalisation' trend, which might threaten the defence policies of the EU members. As a result of diminished direct threats and of a perception that NATO might become somewhat 'irrelevant', in the early 1990s some European states gave 'disconnected' responses to the new challenges. An effective and coherent CFSP was supposed to serve as a framework for a parallel and concerted evolution of the national security policies at a time of increasingly 'disconnected ones. This could be applied in the case of Germany and might directly affect its future role since the EPU framework was also conceived as a means of binding Germany into the EU. However, this also worked in a negative way as well. Through the perceived role of Germany in the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, Greek analysts sensed (along with other Europeans) that Germany's choice and weight could be the decisive factor in tipping the balance in favour of specific policies which could conceivably disregard vital interests of the weaker EU partners. The perceived sweeping and hegemonic role of Bonn during the early phases of the Yugoslav conflict possibly explains the revitalisation of Greek-American ties and particularly the efforts by the new PASOK administration. NATO could also play an important role in averting the 're-nationalisation' of Germany. Having met with remarkably little domestic resistance within its member countries since the end of the Cold War, the alliance continues serving as an insurance policy with regard to increasingly autonomous decisions and practices by member states, including, of course, the United States. The NATO framework could also contribute more than the EU in containing fears about future German dominance. However, France's expectation of an imminent US retreat from Europe could turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Security has been Greece's second main motive to become a member of the European Community. This chapter explored the security regime of Greece in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy by focusing upon the particularities of Greek security, the Greek Strategic Doctrine, the WEU and its role, alternative models for the Europeanisation of Greek security, and the weighting of the 'European' security model against the 'Atlantic' one. The particularities of Greek security could be summarised in the following three areas: the evolving internal setting in the 1990s, the perception of Turkey as a threat and the instability in the Balkan Peninsula. In order to respond to these particularities Greece adopted a new strategic doctrine in the 1990s. Apart from that, Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 showed Greece that its national security 'theory' was not valid: it was tested and it failed.
However, the new Greek strategic doctrine was not sufficient by itself to meet the challenges that the end of the Cold War and Balkan instability presented to Greece in the nineties. There was also a paradox in the field of security, not between Greece's military performance and its military potential, but between its military performance and its diplomatic and economic potential. As a result, as outlined in the Chapter, Greece turned to alternative models of security such as the CFSP that was based on the operation and function of the WEU. Convinced that a 'Europeanised' security system would better serve both European and Greek interests, Greece actively campaigned during the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) negotiations in favour of the EPU/WEU model. As subsequent developments demonstrated, however, this choice had been rather instinctive and less well thought out than one might presume.

When Greece became a member, the existing members agreed to interpret and thus practically to modify Article V of the Brussels Treaty in a way that left no doubt as to what its main aim was: to render Article V inapplicable to any form of Greek-Turkish conflict, including even a surprise and unprovoked attack by Turkey on Greece. This perception of a potential military threat from Turkey has been dominating the public and expert debate as well as Greek security planning for the last two decades.

After the disappointment from WEU's inefficiency to provide solutions to Greece's security problems, the country's security policy was at a crossroad once again, divided between its 'European' and 'Atlantic' orientation.

However, as outlined in the Chapter, the evaluation of Greece's choices in relation to the two security models, the 'European' and the 'Atlantic' ones, depends on the answers each provided to this country's specific security needs based on the following criteria and considerations:

(i) the provision of a collective security system that (ii) is militarily efficient, (iii) links Europe to the United States, and (iv) is politically rational and coherent.

To sum up in weighting the two models, in terms of providing Greece with the protective umbrella of a collective security system, NATO's advantages over those of the EPU/WEU model are important. The alliance's system has certainly served Greek
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security interests vis-a-vis its Balkan neighbours (but also vis-a-vis Turkey) well and should remain in place at least until a better and workable alternative exists. However, this does not exclude nurturing a Europeanisation strategy. A medium-term policy could thus rely on NATO while expanding the scope and use of the WEU in implementing decisions and actions of the Union. If there are positive developments and European integration progresses, NATO will gradually cede increasing responsibility to the EPU/WEU mechanisms. Such an arrangement presents minimal risks to Greece, for if a more Europeanised security system fails to develop, the NATO command structure will continue to provide collective defence to its members. Of course the worst case scenario would involve a simultaneous loosening and/or disintegration of both NATO and EPU/WEU mechanisms.

To sum up, however, it will be an illusion to assume that the EU/CFSP would provide security for Greece against Turkey. Greece, as noted earlier, learnt the lesson at the latest in 1992, when the Petersberg agreement made it clear that membership in the Western European Union (WEU) does not imply any assistance for Greece in case of a military conflict with NATO member Turkey. Although the Maastricht Treaty defines defence policy as a long term responsibility of the EU, it seems not very likely that the EU will take over these responsibilities in 1996 or in 1998, when the Brussels Treaty expires, if it is not renewed before.

Taking into account the experiences with Greece, it should not be regarded as a deficit if the EU lacks the defence component for a longer time. Perceptions and interests of EU member states still differ too much to provide a solid foundation for a common defence policy. So far, Greece is only the most obvious case. Imagine what the reactions would have been worldwide if the EU already had a common defence policy but had not been able to make use of it in areas of vital interest (e.g. the Balkans), because Greece would have been permanently in opposition against the rest of the EU. As far as Greece's relations with Turkey are concerned, the rest of the EU has no other choice but to use every diplomatic and political channel to make it clear to Greek policy
makers that there is no alternative to looking for security with – and not against – Turkey.

1 Aristotle, *Politics*, Book VII.
2 The Greek coastline is 13,676 km and that of the United States is 19,924 km. Source: CIA World Factbook, 1995-96, pp.154,416.
4 For the appraisal of Greece’s ten year record of EC membership, see L. Tsoukalis (ed.) *Greece in the European Community: the challenge of adaptation* (in Greek), Athens, EKEM-Papazisis, 1992.
5 *Kathimerini*, 5 March 1993.
7 See memorandum of Greece concerning the application of FYROM for admission to the United Nations, ELIAMEP 1993.
8 Meeting with Prof. Kevin Featherstone, University of Bradford; [conducted in Bradford, 17/7/1998].
11 Discussion with Dr. Marios Euriviadis, Athens University of Economics and Business, [conducted in Athens, 23/3/1998].
13 Discussion with IISS defence economist N. Protonotarios, [conducted in London, 1 May 1992].
14 See *Turkish Defence and Aerospace Update*, March 1992.
16 In 1976, the Turkish commander had described the Fourth Army as a force of 123,000 men with striking capability; see McDonald, *op.cit.*, p. 57.
17 See the then Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel's declarations to *Le Monde*, 5 April and 20 May 1975 as well as the Turkish newspapers *Gunaydi*, 1 January 1975, and *Cumhuriyet*, 11 April 1975.
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18 On these issues, see C. Manolopoulos/C. Rozakis (eds.), The Demilitarisation of the Greek-Turkish Frontier, Athens, Panteios, 1977, (in Greek).
20 Statement by Turkey’s Foreign Minister in Cumhuriyet, 19 January 1975.
21 Statement by Turkey’s Deputy Premier in Devlet, 3 March 1976.
23 For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s new roles, see P. B. Henze, Turkey: toward the Twenty-First Century, a RAND Note N-3558-AF/A, 199, pp. 31-34; and on Turkey’s role in the Transcaucasus, see D. Bazoglu-Sezer, Turkey’s Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma, in The International Spectator, January-March 199, pp. 25-28.
27 On Turkey’s role in the Middle East, see P. Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, RIIA, 1991.
31 Meeting with Mrs. Dora Bakoyianni, Member of the Greek Parliament, [conducted in London, 6/3/1998].
32 Discussion with G. Kranidiotis, Greek Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, [conducted in London, 5/3/1998].
33 Informal interview with Mr. Antonis Ahtanasiotis, Security Advisor DG1 European Commission, [conducted in Brussels, 11/6/1998].
35 For a comprehensive analysis of similar concerns, see G.B. Helman / S.R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, in Foreign Policy, Winter 1993, pp. 3-20.
36 See A. Etzioni, The Evils of Self-Determination, in Foreign Policy, Winter 1993, pp. 21.
38 See Kathimerini, 26 November 1993.
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41 On various border incidents see To Vima, 8 March 1992; The Independent, 2 March 1992.
42 To Vima, 3 May 1992.
44 Ibid., p. 105-106.
45 Informal interview with Phillipe Willaert, Advisor DG1a, European Commission, [conducted in Brussels, 11/6/98].
47 Meeting with Prof. Ifestos, op. cit.
48 Informal interview with Richard Whitman, University of Westminster, [conducted in London, 27/2/1998].
49 Informal interview with Antonis Antanasiotis, DG1 European Commission, [conducted in Brussels, 11/6/98].
50 Discussion with Dr. S. Clement, WEU Institute of Security Studies, [conducted in London, 6/3/1998].
51 Discussion with Prof. Michael Smith, University of Loughborough, [conducted in Glasgow, 31/1-1/2/1997].
52 Informal interview with Prof. Michael Clarke, Centre for Defence Studies, [conducted in Newcastle upon Tyne, 19/11/1997].
54 See P. Kazakos, Greece between Integration and Marginalisation (in Greek), Athens, Diaton, 1991.
55 For a representative position see Kathimerini, To Vima, 15 April 1990.
57 Greece seeks to join WEU, in The Financial Times, 6 April 1987.
58 H. Ginos, Greece and the WEU; (unpublished paper) p. 33.
59 This position was very clear in the Commission's ideas. See Political Union, European Commission's Opinion about the IGC, in Europe Documents, 31 October 1990, 1659, p. 2.
60 See the Greek proposals in the Southeast European Yearbook 1990, in ELIAMEP 1991, pp. 345-352.
61 Treaty on European Union; Declaration on Western European Union II, AF/UP-UEM/ en 35.
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65 Meeting with Dr. Stellios Perrakis, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Secretary for EU issues, [conducted in Athens, 23/3/1998].
66 For a representative view see T. Malescanu, Security in Central Europe, in the NATO Review, October 1993, pp. 12-17.
69 See The International Herald Tribune, 8 October 1993.
72 These plans were in accordance with Articles V and VIII, 3 of the WEU Treaty and Article V of the NATO Charter.
74 See T. Dokos, Non-proliferation and the CIS Republics (in Greek), ELIAMEP Occasional Papers, 1992.
75 On Russia’s new attitude vis-à-vis the CFE Treaty, see The International Herald Tribune, 19 November 1993.
77 Kathimerini, 17 June 1990.
78 See, for example, The International Herald Tribune, 5 October 1991.
79 Kathimerini, 10 June 1992.
80 Ibid., 31 October 1993.
81 Kathimerini, 16 April 1992.
83 See W. Van Eekelen, The WEU's New Missions, in NATO Review, October 1993, pp. 19-23.
84 For representative articles see Eleftherotypia, 10 February 1992; Kathimerini, 10 November 1992.
Conclusions
This thesis presented a systematic and rigorous examination of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to the weak European Union member states, by analysing the role, contribution, and participation of Greece in the CFSP framework. The analysis attempted, in relation to the weak EU member states, to explore the diplomatic and strategic regimes of Greek foreign policy and to identify determinant underlying patterns in the CFSP established as a result of developments in the European political arena, strategic relations, and regional politics. The thesis, through the case study, addressed the following key issues:

- The distinctive elements of EU's weak member states' attitudes towards EPC/CFSP;
- The ways in which Greece had responded to the institutional development of the CFSP;
- The way in which Greece had handled its role and participation in the EPC and CFSP frameworks;
- The impact of EPC/CFSP participation on the formulation and implementation of Greece's foreign policy; and
- Greece's contribution in EPC/CFSP.

The main theoretical goals of the thesis were: first to provide explanations for the creation, contribution, preservation and change of a regime such as the CFSP, by assessing the validity of the theory of Modified Structural Realism borrowing some elements from interdependence theory and second, to improvise an explanatory
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theoretical framework that could be applied to the institutional development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to its impact on the weak EU member states. However, the thesis did not only assess and apply the Modified Structural Realism but also offered a general coherent theoretical study by commenting upon all the approaches that have attempted to provide explanations for political co-operation in the EU, arguing that a sole explanation did not exist and as a result an analysis of all theoretical attempts was necessary. In this context, the relevant dominant international relations theories and foreign policy approaches were tested and applied. All of the theoretical approaches have been used in an attempt to explain and interpret the dynamics of integration and of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU although originally and in their inception they focused on different areas. Nearly all theories have something different to offer to the explanation of European integration and of the Union’s foreign policy. To sum up, the theoretical approaches and models discussed have provided us with some insight into the obstacles to and opportunities for creating a single European foreign policy. Some of them are combined with each other. Neo-functionalism, for instance, combines elements from functionalism and federalism. This approach is the adaptation of functional theory in the particular conditions of regional integration that have been created in Western Europe when European Community first established. Federalists offer the model of the last stage of integration, the ‘supranational state’. Functionalists, on the other hand, offer the dynamic of change -the machinery of integration-, in other words, the idea of dynamic evolution, which based in socio-economic pressures. Realism, on the one hand, and interdependence and Modified Structural Realism theories on the other, differ with respect to the impact that the international system has on the willingness or unwillingness of member states to collaborate and co-operate. Realism considers the anarchic character of the system basically as a disincentive to integration, while for interdependence and Modified Structural Realism theories this anarchic system favours the development of mutual dependencies and as a result, it creates a crucial incentive for co-operation. Both neo-functionalism and Modified Structural Realism theory agree that self-interest is the basic driving force behind the
willingness of the states to co-operate, though such a motivation is made conditional on the expectation that the gains from co-operation far outweigh the costs of uncooperative behaviour. This means that internal structures and processes, put together with agent-structural linkages as well as the combined and interrelated external actors' behaviour, account for foreign policy decision-making. In other words, national interests, foreign policy goals, domestic politics and the external environment all are combined together in what we name the Diplomatic and the Strategic regimes of the second pillar. Past experiences, perceptions of the behaviour of other actors and that of new international constellations, country-specific situational facts and economic interests, are also relevant determinants.

The approach tested derived from the assumption that pure national interest is still behind any move towards further integration in the EU's political domain; nevertheless, whereas in the past it was based on a state's power in the last two decades it is based on the management of mutual dependency. Therefore, member states since they are not any more the autonomous units they were in the past had to create/form 'Regimes' and set new common European interests in order to achieve their goals. CFSP is considered as a 'regime' that operates within the European Union but with unique characteristics and particularities.

The theoretical approach of the thesis also contributes to the explanation of the weak states' foreign policies by referring to the integration process, explaining foreign policy behaviour, and by testing theoretical models and explanations. The thesis explored the features, capabilities and expectations of the weak EU member states and provided a framework first, for the more detailed analysis of the institutional development of the CFSP and second, for the case study of Greece. This framework built upon the theoretical approach analysed in the first chapter explores CFSP as a regime with two domains the political / diplomatic and the security / strategic ones. In these two domains weak member states according to their:

- military power,
- economic prosperity,
- strategic location,
Conclusions

- bargaining capability,
- adaptability to political change, and
- relationships with the key CFSP players,

operate in CFSP. In this framework, in order to provide explanations for the foreign policy outputs of EU's weak member states, the thesis explored certain and important variables initiated from the principles of Modified Structural Realism, that have a contribution in the calculus of decisions at the subnational level. These variables, based on regimes' creation, contribution, perseverance and changing, are those that determine weak states' attitudes in the CFSP:

- Behavioural patterns in foreign policy issues;
- The domestic sources of the foreign policy of weak states;
- The dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of weak states; and
- Certain and distinct political and security perspectives in the diplomatic and strategic regimes that vary among the weak EU member states.

It has been shown that the survival of the weak European member states as independent powers within CFSP is precarious, depending on a multitude of factors over many of which they themselves have little influence. Long term considerations and strategic planning in all major fields - the economic, the military and the political - have to be based upon the assumption that in a sudden change of the status quo the weak states will be affected more. And yet, what has been said of the economic sphere is largely true of the political and military: in an imperfect world a great many short and medium term tactics can be adopted to keep the machinery of state running and to keep a measure of autonomous control over the national destiny. Some states will be more successful in this than others, either because they are better placed in terms of resources or else because they are more fortunate in their opponents. Therefore, the value of weak states in CFSP is not at all significant. Weak states such as Greece, in many cases, used the CFSP framework rather to stop things than conduct foreign policy.

Being a 'weak' state, Greece has often found itself in a delicate position between the dictates of strengthening the co-operative ethos of the regional arrangements and the
quest for independent self-rule on highly sensitive national issues concerning the
transference of competences traditionally located to the 'hard core' of the Greek state.
Over the last fifteen years, successive Greek governments have pursued a policy of
uneasy interdependence toward the EU so as to maintain a maximum possible degree
of flexibility in the management of both internal and external affairs.
In assessing the four variables, outlined in chapter two, that determine a weak state's
foreign policy behaviour in the EU: behavioural patterns in foreign policy issues; the
domestic sources of the foreign policy of weak states; the dynamics of changing
relationships and the adaptation of weak states; and certain and distinct political and
security perspectives in the diplomatic and strategic regimes that vary among the weak
EU member states, the following conclusions can be drawn in the case of Greece.

**Behavioural patterns in foreign policy issues**

As the analysis demonstrated, EU membership has deeply affected the organisational
structure and functional dynamics of the Greek political system. As happened with
Portugal, the Europeanisation process has given rise to a new set of problems, created
new demands, changed deeply ingrained perceptions and altered the territorial, as well
as the institutional balance of power. European logic has entered the policy-making
process and shaped extensive interdependencies between Greece and the EU
institutional framework.
However, for Greece there was never what we call ‘formulation of foreign policy’.
There was what the Greeks named a bloc of ‘national issues’ that considered of the
utmost importance. Namely:
- The Greek-Turkish relations,
- The Cyprus issue, and
- Relations with the Balkan countries.
Greek-EC relations have evolved through a number of phases over the years. As already noted, Greek governments have pursued over the last seventeen years a policy of uneasy interdependence toward the Union so as to maintain a maximum degree of freedom in the management of both internal and external affairs. Interestingly, such an attitude may have helped the creation of a Greek anti-communautaire image and, in the early 1980s, of an anti-federalist one. For the best part of the 1980s the 'Community experiment' was often doubted by national governing elites. In the mid-1990s, the situation seemed to have been stabilised since the major political parties shared the view that the country had to adapt to the post-Maastricht era.

Not only Greece but also all EU member states regard vital interests as a sensitive matter. Decision-making in the EU and even more so in CFSP has to take this into account. France objects to any substantial reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the GATT Treaty, Great Britain 'opts out' of the Social and even the Monetary Union, Spain threatened to veto enlargement of the EU if its interests if fishery are neglected, and Germany demanded from its partners not to recognise the GDR in the past, and it was only willing to support financial aid for Northern Ireland if subsidies were accepted for the Eko steel industry. However, the question is, to what extent are interests perceived to be 'national' ones, and how promptly are member states willing to act unilaterally. In this respect, Greece gives the impression, of being a 'champion of a self-willed policy.' More than its partners, Greece made rise of a unilateral approach.

As was shown in the thesis, solo attempts and vetoes were used extensively by Greece. It thus ignored the interests of its partners. With respect to the Macedonian question, the veto was not used as a last resort, but this instrument was inflated. More than other states, Greece ignored the obligation to take into consideration the partners' interests as well, as political co-operation can only function if such an approach is used. The case of the Single European Act also may be recalled. Member states were obliged to consult on every question of common interest, to discuss before final positions were fixed, and to take note of common points of view. To recognise these obligations may have been necessary for every member state, but having in mind Greek foreign policy of the early 1980s, this was to be understood as a 'Lex Hellas.' As it turned out,
Conclusions

admonition was too weak an instrument to bring Greece's foreign policy more in line with that of its EU partners.

Although Greece had demonstrated such a 'pro-European' attitude after 1990, instead of Europeanising its foreign policy, it tried to Europeanise its foreign policy goals and as a result, suddenly found itself isolated from its EU/CFSP partners. Apart from that, Greece hampered the development of the EU's relations with Turkey and as a result, it found it difficult to follow its partners in CFSP.

Greece may already be following a path which, in the future, could be characteristic of the whole of Europe: The principle of the EU that the national interest is best preserved in common interests will be replaced more and more by a backward orientation of national egoism so that balance of power will again be the general guiding line.

The domestic sources of Greece's foreign policy

Foreign policy in modern European democratic societies is no longer a case for cabinets but rather has to look for legitimacy and public support in the domestic environment. Domestic expectations can no longer be ignored. This does not concern all aspects of external relations but at least all those cases which are perceived to be vital interests. As this is a European-wide phenomenon it must be taken into account by CFSP too. However, in the case of Greece, there seem to be some peculiar conditions. The rationality of Greek foreign policy depends on the following sequence of impulse and reaction: developments displeasing Greece's aspirations are perceived to be 'provocations' which allow exclusively a harsh and strict reaction - irrespective of whether other means of foreign policy are negatively influenced or not. Balancing and controlling elements like the national press or academics have little ability to counter the aspirations expressed by the masses.

The Greek press does little to contribute to a differentiated assessment of external problems. Even high quality newspapers often reproduce what was written in the foreign press. If it is perceived not to be in Greece's interests, it is unconditionally as
Conclusions

'provocation' or 'anti-Greek' which demands a massive reaction. The quality of analysis consequently suffers. What is described here on the basis of personal impression may be verified (or perhaps even refuted) by a thorough comparative analysis. The existence of a critical press may be understood as one of the main elements of a 'civil society'. In this respect, it is stressed once more that the modern Greek state lacks important elements of a civil society. It is not only the economy, but also society as such which is penetrated by 'etatism.'

Another aspect is the role of the elite. Greek academics are to a great extent out-ward oriented - probably more so than in other European countries. Study abroad and foreign language ability are widespread. In this respect, there is no difference from other Western elites. The peculiarity, however, is that this internationalised profile of the elite has only a limited influence on Greek politics. When we speak of traditional elements of the Greek political system, we should not only think of clientelism and patronage, but also of what is perceived to be Greek or not. Rationality, 'calculability', temperateness are not values and attitudes which seem to ease a Greek's political career. Candidates are frequently described as being 'Europeanist' which means that this person will have little chance of success. Only somebody who corresponds to traditional norms and attributes is qualified for a political career. The Greek political class is influenced by Western values as well as its counterpart in other European countries. However, Greek politicians have to respond to an electorate which does not honour Western values and attitudes generally, and obviously no politician can ignore what is expected by the public.

A last but most important element is the Greek perceptions of the 'external factor', the feeling of being dependent on foreign countries. External interventions are felt to have been so massive that they curtail Greece's self-determination and independence. Examples from the past are the Great Powers' behaviour in the 19th and the British and American interventions in the 20th century. Irrespective of whether this perception is well based or not, it has had an important impact on political culture. Only if the ambivalent and often critical attitude to foreign countries is taken into consideration can
Conclusions

it be understood why solo ventures in foreign policy and dissociation from EU partners are so easily accepted by people in Greece.

All governments in Greece follow a rather unified policy when so-call 'national interests' are at stake. This holds true with respect to Turkey and Cyprus, but also to the Balkans. Since the 1970s there has existed a national consensus in Greek foreign policy which rested on the following elements:

- The greatest threat is seen to come from Turkey.
- Therefore, a strong national defence component seemed indispensable.
- NATO and the US are seen as necessary but imperfect allies in securing Greek interests. They assisted the country against any threat from the Warsaw Pact states in the Cold War era, but they failed to strengthen the Greek position against Turkey. When Turkish troops intervened in Cyprus in 1974, NATO and the US partly lost their value for Greece as - contrary to Greek expectations - they did not react sufficiently.
- To compensate this deficit, in the mid-1970s, former Prime Minister Konstantine Karamanlis developed a 'multidimensional' foreign policy. This entailed strengthening Greece's position against the 'threat from the East'; membership in the EC, and good relations with the Balkan states, the Soviet Union and the Arabian world were favoured. Good neighbourhood with the Balkan countries had a double function in this context. Firstly, to prevent the development of conflicts on the northern 'front,' and secondly, to strengthen Greece's position vis-à-vis Turkey, the 'threat from the East.'

This policy was also followed in substance by the succeeding PASOK government. At the end of the 1980s, the national consensus in foreign policy was greater than ever before. The PASOK government had not only accepted the fundamental targets of operational policy (in force since 1982), but had also toned down its declaratory radicalism (since the second half of the decade). Rhetoric was no longer needed to compensate for the fact that no substantial change had taken place in foreign policy.
Conclusions

What Mitsotakis did at the beginning of the 1990s was to ‘clear’ foreign policy from some remaining declaratory nationalistic irritations.

Nationalism – exclusively a Greek phenomenon

If we compare EU member states, we get the impression that, in Greece, foreign policy is determined more by domestic and nationalist tendencies than in other states, Greece's current Balkan policy (concerning Turkey, the Macedonian question, and Northern Epirus) can only be understood if nationalist pressure is taken into consideration. Nationalist feelings made two million people demonstrate on the streets of Salonica to deny the inhabitants of the FYROM the right to name their state ‘Macedonia.’ Efforts to moderate tensions with Albania failed due to national ‘insurrection.’

In Greece, nationalism has a direct influence on the formation of foreign policy (at least with respect to vital issues), whereas, up to now, nationalism in other EU member states has been more of a problem of domestic, but not of foreign policy. For example, in Germany, some forms of xenophobia and racism also have an influence on foreign policy (migration and asylum policy), but they do not determine it, nor do they make Germany unable to compromise with EU partners. This, however, is the case in Greece.

The observations made so far may lead to the question whether there is either a specific form of nationalism in Greece or if it is more its intensity which makes the nationalist behaviour important. Both alternatives are inadequate to explain the situation. The answer offered from the analysis is the following: in Greece, nationalist tendencies are characterised by three elements.

Firstly, as Western orientation crumbled in 1974, Greece has tended to define its interests without taking into consideration its partners' perceptions and intentions. This is the ‘trauma of recent history.’

Secondly, Greece made solo ventures in foreign policy more than other countries. This is the ‘phenomenon of quantity.’
Conclusions

Thirdly, EU member states as well as analysts have problems accepting Greece's foreign policy and role in CFSP. This is true especially in cases when Greek intentions seemed to be justified. This leads to the notion that targets and means are judged to be effective or not in a different way.

The dynamics of changing relationships and the adaptation of Greece

It is beyond doubt that membership in EC / EU institutions and participation in EPC/CFSP process for co-ordinating the foreign policy of the member states on international issues considerably broadened weak members’ foreign policy objectives and 'area concerns'. Portugal, Ireland and Greece are the three countries that the EPC/CFSP institutional development had the most significant impact upon since participation in its framework involved the articulation and presentation of well-defined, concrete positions, and perhaps taking sides in diplomatic conflicts. Ireland, Portugal and Greece were no longer able to confine their foreign policy and activities solely to issues of immediate national interest. They had to deal with all issues arising in the international system and formulate views and present positions on all of them.

As far as Greece is concerned it has extended the geographical and thematic substance of its foreign policy. Before EC membership and before participation in the EPC mechanisms, Greek ‘foreign policy makers’ used rhetoric as statements and nationalist declarations as their diplomatic tools in order to have success on ‘national issues’. In consequence, there was no significant effect. What EPC did was to force Greece to ‘acquire a foreign policy’ of some kind and give up its past spasmodic actions.

In addition to markedly extending the scope of foreign policy, participation in the EPC had the related effect of fundamentally changing the content of that policy. It was not only that the agenda of foreign policy became more extensive, it was also the nature and content of the subjects brought onto the agenda that added a new dimension to foreign policy. The handling and the management of the EC rotating Presidency was also a positive asset. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been vested with the overall
Conclusions

Responsibility for co-ordinating EU policy, formulating positions, forwarding them to Brussels, and communicating with European Union institutions. This should not necessarily be interpreted as reflecting a perception that 'EU policy' is part of the foreign policy. It rather follows the pattern of other member states in organising their European affairs. As a result of this process, the Greek foreign policy-making process changed in a number of respects: structure, nature, and style.

The magnitude of change that Greek politics, in general, and foreign policy, in particular, have faced in recent years is undeniable. As with other nations, conditions and assumptions which were accepted for several decades have been fundamentally revised. Policy had to adapt to a new, and rapidly changing, environment. Greece represents an exceptional case, however. The conjunction of the pressures emanating from the international, European and Balkan environments have created a highly complex challenge to Greek foreign policy.

Adaptation has certainly proved difficult. Greece tried to respond to these challenges by participating in the European Political Co-operation. However, its EPC participation, produced a double dilemma. Firstly, as already noted, the New Democracy government which had paved Greece's way to the Community lost the elections of October 1981 and was replaced by an administration of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which was 'anti-European' at that time. What followed was a critical process of adaptation and a 'Europeanisation' of the new political elite which led to considerable friction with the country's European partners.

Secondly, at the end of the 1980s, the very pro-European government of Constantine Mitsotakis got its chance to improve relations with the EC partners and the USA. Then, however, came the end of the Cold War, bringing chances, but also dislocations and disputes which destabilised the Balkans and once again separated Greece from its European partners. As far as its vital interests in the Balkans, and vis-à-vis Turkey were concerned, Greece followed a policy which its partners found hard to understand and to accept.

The transformation of EPC to CFSP presented new challenges and found Greece to be more involved in EU's political co-operation process with a 'pro-European' attitude.
Conclusions

and coherence in its foreign policy formulation. However, again 'national issues': the Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus issue, and relations with the Balkan countries, played a crucial role and made adaptation to the new situation complex. Also the disillusionment regarding expectations from the TEU in the field of security made the CFSP structures, from 1994 and onwards, to look much less attractive than they did in 1992. This also applies to the WEU, which was seen as the ultimate prize for Greece during the 1992 IGC. After the TEU however, expectations from the WEU had been scaled down to a more realistic level.

Certain and distinct political and security perspectives in the diplomatic and security regimes

Modern forms of conflict prevention meet with little positive response in Greece. Whereas the problem of security is somewhat better understood in broad terms, including the role of democratic institutions and economic and social welfare, this has not been true with regard to Greece's foreign policy up to now. Greece's approach is more traditionally oriented. As analysed in the thesis, three corner stones constitute the country's profile on foreign policy: the accentuation of national interests, the trust in the balance of power and the permanent wooing of allies.

Security has been Greece's second main motive to become a member of the European Community since Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 showed that its national security 'theory' to rely on its Western allies and NATO, was not valid: it was tested and it failed. The Greek perception of a limited benefit of the Western linkage may explain why Greek politicians had an ambivalent opinion on security guarantees offered by the West. Indeed, the Atlantic Alliance offered little to Greece with respect to Turkey. However, the EC and EPC also proved incapable of providing the type of security that Greece was seeking.

Then, Greece, during the Cold War, pinned its hopes of withstanding the Turkish challenge on finding allies in the Balkans. This was the rationale of its multidimensional
Conclusions

foreign policy. After the end of the Cold War, it became difficult, if not impossible, to continue with this pattern with respect to Turkey. However, as the Balkans became unstable, Greece once again tried to win allies, namely, this time, Serbia. The main reason, however, for the 'Greco-Serbian Axis' must be seen in the fact that Serbia was a 'natural' ally for Greece, since both countries tried to prevent the independence and sovereignty of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Turkey was still seen as the main challenge to Greece. The more Turkey emerged as a 'regional power' in Central Asia and in the Balkans, the more Greece felt insecure and directed its foreign and security policy towards this 'threat.' As noted, Greece's multidimensional foreign policy rested on the fundamental assumption that the 'threat from the east,' from Turkey, had to be counterbalanced by privileged relations with Balkan neighbours.

With regard to the Balkans, the dilemma for Greece was that its foreign policy lost its multidimensional dimension, as only the US and the member states of the European Union were regarded as Greece's remaining partners. On the other hand, the policy followed by Greece in the early 1990s vis-à-vis the Balkan states was hard to be accepted by its EU partners.

The politico-strategic situation and the particularities of Greek security in the 1990s - the evolving internal setting, the perception of Turkey as a threat and the instability in the Balkan Peninsula - made policy-makers draft a new strategic doctrine in the 1990s. However, the new Greek strategic doctrine was not sufficient by itself to meet the challenges that the end of the Cold War and the increased Balkan instability presented to Greece. There was also a paradox in the field of security, not between Greece's military performance and its military potential, but between its military performance and its diplomatic and economic potential. As a result, as outlined in chapter six, Greece's foreign and security policy shifted towards the EU and turned to alternative models of security that CFSP seemed to offer and were based on the operation and function of the WEU. However, after the disappointment from WEU's inefficiency to provide solutions to Greece's security problems, the country's security policy was at a crossroad once again, divided between its 'European' and 'Atlantic' orientation.
Conclusions

To sum up, national interests play a role for every modern state, but in the case of Greece, they make the country less willing to compromise and to collaborate with its partners. This became true especially in the context of the CFSP. Greek politicians like to stress the principle of ‘EU solidarity,’ but they see it mainly as a one-way street - more in the favour of Greece than of the EU. This can be demonstrated by the fact that Greek politicians did not hesitate to veto a common policy of the EU when they thought Greece's national 'interests were at stake. It is true that other EU member states also do not refrain from unilateral actions when trying to safeguard their vital interests, but Greece has been exceptional in this respect. The EU partners find it difficult both to accept the legitimacy and to understand the effectiveness of Greek behaviour. This was the case at least with respect to the Macedonian question. Whenever vital interests were at stake, Greece tended to block offers of co-operation by the EU in order to put pressure on third states. So far, the impression is that Greece's foreign policy is more eager to prevent developments than to shape them. It will be an illusion to assume that the EU/CFSP would provide security for Greece. However, we can conclude that mere participation in the EU/CFSP provided Greece with many opportunities for advancing, directly or indirectly, its political and security interests. However, as far as foreign policy is concerned Greece used the CFSP framework mainly for satisfying its national interests, or when that was not possible, for stopping unpleasant developments imposed by its partners. Greece expected from the EU/CFSP something that the EU was not yet able to provide and that was security. The EPU process though entailed a series of important assets for Greek security, above all the web of interdependence and solidarity among the fifteen partners. Participation in the CFSP decision-making structure also guaranteed an increased and timely flow of information critical for foreign policy decision-making. It contributed simultaneously to the modernisation of Greece's foreign policy mechanism and bureaucratic structures (educational effects through intensive consultation, etc.).
Conclusions

Europe is no longer faced with threatened aggression from major expansionist powers. Its constituent parts may, however, become the object of regional efforts to attain changes of the status quo. It is within this destabilising perspective that the security needs of Greece have to be addressed. The Community’s evolution to a European Union presupposes the display of solidarity vis-à-vis external threats, as well as a more sensitive understanding of the fundamental security needs of all member states, particularly of the weakest and most exposed ones.

The European debate regarding the most promising institutional framework is still continuing and will probably continue in the foreseeable future, existing and proposed institutions are also likely to undergo substantial transformation in the coming years. Policy makers tend to deal with tangible models. Organisations such as the EU, NATO, and the WEU are in place, they seem to work and they are constantly undergoing evolution. The future development of the CFSP will hopefully contribute to a more coherent and effective European diplomacy. More preventive than reactive, armed with a richer variety of diplomatic tools the EU framework has certainly a lot to offer to Greece. Participation in the EU may also prove of invaluable importance to Greek security, in view of the EU’s overwhelming capacity to mobilise important economic and technical assistance aimed at political stabilisation. The availability of EU resources may, for example, constitute a major asset in encouraging regional stability in the Balkans. Being a member of the EU, Greece could enjoy, up to certain extent, the support of the other member states even though this support is not automatic and is subject to a certain code of conduct based on shared values.

1 Meeting with Prof. P. Ioakimidis, University of Athens, [conducted in London, 6/3/1998].
2 See Article 30 of the Single European Act.
Appendices
APPENDIX Ia ‘INFORMAL INTERVIEWS- MEETINGS-DISCUSSIONS’

During the three years of my research I had the opportunity of meeting a variety of people, politicians, practitioners, EU officials, policy-makers, scholars, researchers and academics that were directly or indirectly involved in the issues that I examined in the thesis. My interaction with them did not follow any prescribed or strict format, on the contrary it was informal and had the form of a series of ‘meetings’, ‘discussions’ or ‘informal interviews’.

As explained in the methodology section in the introduction of the thesis the material and the information that I gathered were not used as part of any quantitative, qualitative or statistical database or analysis but rather as additional components to my arguments and to the points that I wanted to emphasise.

GREEK POLITICIANS

- Ms. Dora Bakoyanni, MP, Former Minister of Culture.
- Dr. N. M. Christodoulakis, Minister of Finance.
- Mr. Giannos Kranidiotis, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- Mr. Stefanos Manos, MP, Former Minister of Finance.
- Mr. Mixalis Papagiannakis, MEP.
- Mr. George Papandreou, MP, Alternate Minister for Foreign Affairs.

PRACTITIONERS

- Dr. Othon Anastasakis, EU expert, Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- Dr. S. Clement, Fellow, WEU Institute of Security Studies, Paris.
Appendices

- Dr. T. Couloumbis, Secretary-General – Hellenic Foundation for European Foreign Policy.
- Mr. O. Miles, CMG, Former British Ambassador to Greece.
- Dr. N Protonotarios, IISS defence economist, London.

EU OFFICIALS / POLICY-MAKERS

- Mr. Antonis Antanasiotis, Advisor on security matters, DG1 European Commission, Brussels.
- Fraser Cameron, Advisor, DG1a European Commission, Central Planning – Department for external relations, Brussels.
- Mr. Franz Cermak, Political Advisor, DG1a – DG1b European Commission, Brussels.
- Mr. Gunnar Klinga, Political Advisor, DG1a European Commission, Brussels.
- Dr. A. Mitsos, Director, DGXII European Commission, Brussels.
- Dr. At. Theodorakis, DGVIII European Commission, Brussels.
- Mr. Phillippe Willaert, Advisor on institutional matters, DG1 European Commission, Brussels.

SCHOLARS, RESEARCHERS AND ACADEMICS

- Mr. Michael Clarke, Director of the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London.
- Dr. Spyros Economidis, Lecturer, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics.
- Dr. Marios Euriviadis, Associate Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business.
Appendices

- Professor Kevin Featherstone, Department of European Studies, University of Bradford.
- Dr. Erik Goldstein, Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies, University of Birmingham.
- Professor Panayiotis Ifestos, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens.
- Dr. P. Ioakimidis, Associate Professor in European Studies, University of Athens.
- Dr. Lee Miles, University of Hull.
- Professor Paroula Naskou-Perraki, Department of International, Economic and European Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki.
- Professor Stellios Perrakis, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens.
- Professor Trevor Salmon, University of Aberdeen.
- Professor Ben Soetendorp, Leiden University.
- Professor Michael Smith, University of Loughborough.
- Dr. Ben Tonra, Centre for European Studies, University of Wales, Aberystwyth.
- Dr. P. Tsakalogiannis, Associate Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business.
- Professor Loukas Tsoukalis, Eleftherios Venizelos Chair in Contemporary Greek Studies, London School of Economics.
- Lord Wallace of Saltaire, Reader, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics.
- Dr. Richard Whitman, Senior Lecturer, University of Westminster, London.
APPENDIX Ib ‘INFORMAL QUESTIONNAIRE’

The questionnaire that follows was mainly used as a brainstorming exercise (as explained in the methodology section in the introduction). It was sent to a number of policy-makers, politicians, practitioners and academics, during the first year of my research (1995-96). Those that were kind enough to reply helped me a lot to comprehend the complexity and the peculiarities of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and provided me with a more complete view of the issues addressed in the thesis. In other words the questionnaire was used as an informal mean for concentration of ideas and arguments and does not constitute the base for any quantitative, qualitative or statistical database.
RESEARCH AREA:

"The Impact of the Institutional Development of the CFSP on the Weak European Member States - the Case of Greece"

INFORMAL QUESTIONNAIRE

NAME: ..............................................................................................
POSITION: .........................................................................................
ORGANISATION: ................................................................................
PLACE: ............................................................................................
DATE: ...............................................................................................

1. How do you evaluate and assess the institutional development of political cooperation in the European Union so far?

2. Do you believe that Interdependence theory provides a satisfactory theoretical basis for explaining the CFSP institutional development?
Appendices

3. Does European Union need a Common Foreign and Security Policy to meet the new challenges of the 21st century?

4. Do you agree with the proposal that supranationalism should be extended apart from the first pillar to the CFSP also?

5. Is it possible to have an economic union without a political one (which presupposes the existence of a common defence) within the European Union?

6. How do assess the role of the national governments of the powerful European Member States in the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy?
Appendices

7. How do you evaluate the Common Foreign and Security Policy in operation so far? [How effective were the ‘Joint Actions’ and ‘Common Positions’ of the Union]

8. What do you think are the issues that had made the realisation of the CFSP problematic?

9. How can we improve CFSP and make it more effective in order to serve the interests not only of the strong states but also of the weak ones? Proposals and suggestions over the following key issues: Policy Planning, Decision-making, Finance, External Representation, the strengthening of the Community institutions

Appendices

11. How unrealistic are considered any plans for the creation of a common European defence and the development of a ‘European Army’?

12. Should the Western European Union (WEU) be developed into an autonomous and independent defence institution abolishing its ties with NATO?

13. How the future enlargement of both the EU and NATO can influence the institutional development of EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy?

14. Do you believe that the institutional development of the CFSP had an impact upon the politics, security and development of the small and weak European Member States?
15. How the small and weak European Member States such as Greece could contribute on EU's political and defence union?

16. Up to what extent the foreign policy goals and objectives formulated under the CFSP process serve Greek interests at the European and at the global scene?

17. Taking into account the Greek geopolitical situation, the country's lack of resources and need for dependency, how do you evaluate the Greek attitude towards the EU?

18. Is the behaviour of the EU Member States towards Greece fair and within the Union's principles and ideals?
19. How a small and weak EU member state as Greece could utilise the CFSP decision-making process and forum in order to serve its national interests? What are the prospects and perspectives for the future?

(additional comments:)

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APPENDIX II  TEU / TITLE V: PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Article J

A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed by the following provisions:

Article J.1

1. The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.

2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

3. The Union shall pursue these objectives: by establishing systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy, in accordance with Article J.2; by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common.

4. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.
Appendices

Article J.2

1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.

2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.

3. Member States shall co-ordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such forums. In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.

Article J.3

The procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by the foreign and security policy shall be the following: The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action. Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation. The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority. Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority pursuant to the preceding subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and for their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members. * Second subparagraph of point 2 as amended by Article 15 AA A/FIN/SWE in the version resulting from Article 3 of AD AA A/FIN/SWE. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the
necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.

Article J.4

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.

4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.
Appendices

5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer co-operation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then.

Article J.5

1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.

2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of common measures; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organisations and international conferences.

3. In the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Presidency shall be assisted if need be by the previous and next Member States to hold the Presidency. The Commission shall be fully associated in these tasks.

4. Without prejudice to Article J.2(3) and Article J.3(4), Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
Article J.6
The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organisations, shall co-operate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. They shall step up co-operation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Article J.7
The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

Article J.8
1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines adopted by the European Council. It shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in Article J.3(2).
3. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council.
4. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.

5. Without prejudice to Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.

Article J.9
The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.

Article J.10
On the occasion of any review of the security provisions under Article J.4, the Conference which is convened to that effect shall also examine whether any other amendments need to be made to provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy.

Article J.11
1. The provisions referred to in Articles 137, 138, 139 to 142, 146, 147, 150 to 153, 157 to 163 and 217 of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title.

Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities. The Council may also: either decide unanimously that operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise is to be charged to the budget of the European Communities; in that event, the budgetary procedure laid
down in the Treaty establishing the European Community shall be applicable; or determine that such expenditure shall be charged to the Member States, where appropriate in accordance with a scale to be decided.
APPENDIX III ORGANISATION AND OPERATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

DEFENCE POLICY AGENCIES

The responsibility for the defence of the country lies with the Government which determines the National Defence Policy and exercises the command of the Armed Forces.

1.1. Government Council on Foreign Affairs and National Defence (kysea)

The main decision making body on issues of National Defence is the Government Council on Foreign Affairs and National Defence.

The Prime Minister is the Chairman of the Council. Other members include the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, National Economy, Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, Public Order and the Chief, Hellenic National Defence General Staff.

The jurisdiction of the Government Council on Foreign Affairs and National Defence covers the following areas:

- Formulation of the National Defence Policy based on the evaluation of long term perspectives and approval of long and mid-term development programmes of the defence capabilities of the country as well as major programmes of defence procurement.
- Decision making on issues of National Defence and especially on issues requiring coordination of more than one Ministries.
- Decision making on declaration and cancellation measures and status of alert, as well as the partial or general mobilisation of the country.
- Proposal to the President of the Republic, after the recommendation of the Minister of National Defence, for the declaration or cancellation of the general or partial mobilisation as well as the declaration of war.
- Decision-making on assignments of the Hellenic Armed Forces within the framework of the country's international obligations.
- Selection of the Chief, Hellenic National Defence General Staff and the Chiefs of the General Staffs, after recommendation of the Minister of National Defence.
1.2. Ministry of National Defence (MOD)

The Ministry of National Defence and its subordinate national Armed Forces, that is the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, are responsible for the implementation of the National Defence Policy.

The main agencies of the Ministry of National Defence are:

- The Minister of National Defence
- The Deputy Minister(s) of National Defence
- The Defence Council
- The Joint Council of Chiefs of General Staffs
- Chief, Hellenic National Defence General Staff
- The Supreme Councils of the services of the Armed Forces (Supreme Army Council, Supreme Navy Council, Supreme Air-Force Council)
- The Chiefs of the General Staffs of the three services
- The Armed Forces of the country (Army, Navy, Air-Force)
- The Staff of the Minister of National Defence (MOD Staff)
- The General Armaments Directorate
- The Integrated Administrative Agency.
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