THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEW SYSTEM OF POWER RELATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY

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Abstract

The last decade has witnessed a dramatic resurgence in the United States capabilities of deploying her military forces around the world, particularly, in the Persian Gulf region. The region's security and stability, due to its extensive oil reserves, is crucial for the well being of the global economy.

This thesis is a study of the interaction between the United States' policies and Persian Gulf regional developments in the new system of power relations in the region. No bilateral interaction can be understood properly without a reference to the multilateral context in which it occurs. Therefore, in this study the Persian Gulf region is used as the unit of analysis and the interaction is studied in the context of regional security and stability as methods of assessing the effects of the two interacting factors. The study traces both regional developments and US policies towards the region in a period of approximately three decades since the British withdrawal in the early 70s and it attempts to construct an analytical framework for the study of the effect of regional developments upon US policies in the region.

The most salient features of the present work and its original contribution to the literature of the Persian Gulf studies are as follows:

1. Using a systemic approach, it defines the Persian Gulf as a geopolitical region and rejects the concept that it has sub-systemic relations to the Middle East.

2. It shows instead that the region is a subsystem of the international system. The interaction between US policies and regional developments is directly assessed without reference to intermediate levels.

3. Three systems of power relation have been proposed as the main framework for the study of the United States' role in the region from the time of the British withdrawal from the region.
4. A distinction has been made between “security of the Persian Gulf region” and “security of the foreign power interests in this region” in order to assess the interaction between US policies and the regional developments.

5. It presents for the first time the idea of “dual functional effects of regional developments” and shows that the role of the United States in this region is a function of two complementary variables of “threats” and “opportunities”.

This study applies different methods in dealing with its different procedures of analysis namely: “analysing historical background”; “conceptual clarifications”; “explaining the problematic”; “hypothetical illustrations”; “reasoning” and “theory building and prescription.” However, it mostly uses a normative analysis of rational (not actual) choices.
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Chapter I

Introduction

Patterns in international politics are not permanent. Many dynamic processes such as changing regimes, shifting alliances or cooling friendships are responsible for recurrent changes in political maps of the world. In most cases, these changes have evolved gradually. However, sometimes, as a result of wars, revolutions or coincident developments, they have proceeded with extraordinary speed and sizeable impact.\(^1\) According to Nierop\(^2\), the years around 1990 have presented an example of aggregating quickening change. A number of positions and relations that were basic to the post-war international system and seemingly went unchanged for decades were under stress or substantially changed in character.

The creation of a new pattern for the relation between the United States and the states littoral to the Persian Gulf was one of the eminent changes in this period. On the one hand, it was affected by the emergence of a new system of power relations in the region, due to the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and on the other, it was influenced by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

The new era for the United States involvement in the Persian Gulf started by her military intervention which practically reaffirmed the importance of the region for her overseas interests. This fact had been declared by the US officials on many occasions.\(^3\) Bell and Gaffney\(^4\) argue that "the Gulf war may be behind us but the questions it raised as well as its consequences are not." They refer to Edgard Pisani’s\(^5\) "questions about future" not only as important questions arise from the crises itself but also as a complex series of questions related to the wider international order. Pisani raises 25
questions regarding the future of US involvement in the region, the new international political and economic order, regional developments, the future of Arab nationalism, the role of the European Community, United Nations and Israel. Some of his questions are as follows:

Can Iraq ever find a way of playing a regional role that is acceptable to its neighbours? Has Iran abandoned its ambitions concerning the spread of a fundamentalism that knows no frontiers? Will Saudi Arabia continue to believe that with its strong religious authority and all its money, it has a decisive role to play as the partner of the United States and at the same time as the propagator of Islam? Will it see itself as a secular regional power in search of stability or as an international religious power? Are the two compatible?

Did the United States become massively engaged in the war against Iraq to guarantee and uphold the international order, to guarantee the world's oil production, to protect the state of Israel, or as a great power bent on controlling, for her own gain, a strategic region of the world (or perhaps all of them if they are compatible)? Will the United States be able to leave the Middle East after having dominated, pacified, and organised the whole situation?

Although Pisani uses a traditional method to introduce the problems and does not answer the questions, the questions themselves clearly point out the uncertainty as to the future events as well as the role of the United States in the region.

There are many other questions regarding the role of the United States in this region. However, they cannot be answered without having a comprehensive understanding of the Persian Gulf region and finding proper answers to the following fundamental questions:
I. Is there a balance of interaction between the US policies and the Persian Gulf regional developments?

II. What are the basic elements in such an interaction?

Understanding the Persian Gulf region involves a review of the history of the outside power presence in this area as well as defining the Persian Gulf region; locating its position in the international system; finding the criteria of its security and finally assessing the major determinants of its regional developments.

Examining the interaction between the US policies and the Persian Gulf regional developments, on the other hand, involves examining the role (affecting and being affected) of the United States in the region and finding basic elements in shaping US policies toward the region.

This thesis is a study of the underlying characteristics of the interaction between the United States policies and the Persian Gulf regional developments over a period of approximately three decades starting from the British withdrawal from the region in the early 1970's.

The interaction will be studied in the context of regional security and stability in order to formulate an analytical construct for assessing the role of the United States in the new system of power relations in this region as the main objective.

The literature on the subject mainly belongs to one of the two fields in international studies namely, the United States foreign policy analysis and the study of international regions. 7

The method normally used in the former field can be labelled an “external approach” to the subject of this research which is to study the region as an extension of the study of US foreign policy by assessing the three distinct, yet related, areas of analysis: the influences on US foreign policy, the making and the implementation of it. 8 Since the Persian Gulf states have traditionally been considered part of the regional grouping
variously known as the "Middle East"\textsuperscript{9}, "Mid-East", "Near East" or "Islamic world", in this method the relation between the United States and the Persian Gulf is studied as a sub-division of the study of the implementation of US foreign policy in one of the above groupings.

One of the good examples for this method is Eric Hooglund's\textsuperscript{10} article "US perspectives on Persian Gulf Security." According to him, in the wake of unprecedented international developments during 1991\textsuperscript{11}, the United States was compelled to re-evaluate its foreign policies, especially in the Persian Gulf. A major issue in the continuing debate among US foreign policy experts was whether the United States should disengage militarily from its global commitments or maintain a certain level of involvement. This gave rise to the two approaches of "globalist"\textsuperscript{12} and "regionalist"\textsuperscript{13} among them.\textsuperscript{14}

His remark clearly shows that researches using this method are more affected by participating elements in shaping US foreign policy and deal with the United States' relations with strategically important parts of the world, including the Persian Gulf, as a case study of its implementation rather than the study of the region itself.

There is a considerable literature on US foreign policy, and its foreign relations using this method. The works of Stephen Gilbert\textsuperscript{15} (1978), Thomas L. Brewer\textsuperscript{16} (1986), Thomas J. McCormick\textsuperscript{17} (1989), Robert A. Strong\textsuperscript{18} (1992), James M. McCormick\textsuperscript{19} (1992), Eric Hooglund\textsuperscript{20} (1994) and Walter Lafeber\textsuperscript{21} (1994) are a few examples for the first method.

The method used in the study of international regions can be labelled "regional approach" which is to study the US policies toward the region as an extension of the study of regional developments.\textsuperscript{22} In this method, unlike the first one, the main theme of study is the regional pattern of conflict and co-operation, therefore, US policy is
studied as a subdivision of the study of Persian Gulf states' foreign relations. Works of Byers and David Leyton-Brown\textsuperscript{23} (1982), Chubin\textsuperscript{24} (1982), Jeffery Record\textsuperscript{25} (1983), Bruce, R. Kuniholm\textsuperscript{26} (1984), Anthony Cordesman\textsuperscript{27} (1984, 1987, 1988, 1993), Hussein Sirriyeh\textsuperscript{28} (1984), Joshua Epstein\textsuperscript{29} (1987), James Bill\textsuperscript{30} (1988), Philip Robins\textsuperscript{31} (1989), Charles Davies\textsuperscript{32} (1990), Miron Rezun\textsuperscript{33} (1990) and Mehran Nakhjavani\textsuperscript{34} (1991) are a few examples using this approach.

Although both approaches are important, each of them belongs to a distinct field of study. Nevertheless, applying one does not necessarily mean an all-out departure from the other. It will be shown in the following chapters that there are many areas such as the study of certain aspects of regional developments, regional security and stability and the roots of regional conflicts and wars in which the two approaches overlap. Therefore, this study mainly uses a "regional approach" to enter the discussion and applies selected procedures\textsuperscript{35} of the first method to study the interaction (affecting and being affected) between US policies and the Persian Gulf regional developments.

Another general classification regarding the literature can be made based on the context in which both "external" and "regional" approaches have dealt with the subject. In this relation four related contexts can be identified: the Middle East\textsuperscript{36}, the Arab world or Arab nationalism\textsuperscript{37}, Islamic world\textsuperscript{38} and the Persian Gulf itself.\textsuperscript{39}

There are also some studies using two or more of the above contexts as their general frameworks.

This study deals with the role of the United States in the context of the Persian Gulf region for:
• It refuses to accept the Middle East as a region (chapter three).

• The context of Arab nationalism excludes Iran, which is one of the major regional powers.

• The context of Islamic world is a very broad area of study and involves many factors which are not entirely relevant to the study of the Persian Gulf regional developments.

It does not mean that the Persian Gulf states cannot belong to the other groupings or, perhaps, sub-regions. For instance Iraq might be considered as a part of the Arab countries or Iran as a member of ECO (Economic Co-operation Organisation)\textsuperscript{40} which links her to another grouping in central Asia. It means that other groupings cannot include all the Persian Gulf states at the same time. Therefore, for the purpose of this study the Persian Gulf region as the only system which includes all the states littoral the Persian Gulf will be used as the main context.

1.1- Main objectives of the thesis:

1.1.1. To evaluate the effectiveness of the current frameworks for the study of the relations between the Persian Gulf States and the United States.

Almost all of the Persian Gulf studies especially those which have been done since the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) have been focused on the following six related areas:

1- Security and stability of the Persian Gulf region.\textsuperscript{41}

2- The question of conflict among its states; causes and effects of the two Persian Gulf wars (mostly regional causes and international effects).\textsuperscript{42}

3- Oil and outside power interests and international or regional threats facing the Western powers.\textsuperscript{43}

4- Different interpretations of the Soviet threat\textsuperscript{44} and the question of super powers’ rivalry in the region.\textsuperscript{45}

5- Government and politics in each of the Persian Gulf states.\textsuperscript{46}

6- Foreign relations of the Persian Gulf states.\textsuperscript{47}
There are also some published works regarding the question of information and communication systems in the region\textsuperscript{48} and Persian Gulf States' relations with Japan and Western Europe\textsuperscript{49}. The general framework for almost all of the above studies can be summarised as follows:

1) The Persian Gulf is not only considered as a part of the Middle East but also as a sub-system of it.

2) The concepts of "security of the Persian Gulf region" and "the security of the outside powers in the region" have been used synonymously as if there are a single concept.

3) Although the term "region" has been widely used to refer to the Persian Gulf area, the general framework always goes further down to the state level or even sub-state level. Therefore, the term "the Persian Gulf region" has not been clearly defined.

4) Either external or internal factors in relation with the grounds for regional conflict and co-operation have been exaggerated.

5) Regional developments such as wars, conflicts, revolutions, etc. are assumed to be threats to external power interests in the region.

The first objective of this research is to examine the effectiveness of the above frameworks in studying the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf region especially in the following areas:

I. The Persian Gulf as a Subsystem:

The study of the international relations of regions is largely a post-World War II development. It may be traced in part to the emergence in the 1940s and 50s of the "area studies’ approach, inspired more by a particular interest in the affairs of a given locality than by a general interest in global affairs.\textsuperscript{50}

Western Europe achieved a regional identity during post-war rehabilitative efforts. The coming to independence in the 1950s and 60s of numbers of former colonies generated additional regional consciousness, with Southeast Asia and parts of Africa joining Latin America and the Middle East as areas of study by experts of regional studies.\textsuperscript{51}
Furthermore, according to Donald Hellmann, the "loosening of the bipolar world, moves toward autonomous policies by the middle range powers, and explicit efforts at fostering patterns of international collaboration in various areas of the world" have all served to direct scholarly attention toward "regional foci of interaction."

There is a modest, yet developing, body of literature on the international politics of regions which draws upon concepts of general systems theory and the research tradition of systems analysis. Working from the conception of the world as "the international system," a group of scholars has applied the systems perspective to the analysis of geographically distinct (and otherwise distinct) groupings of states, variously called "subordinate systems", "subsystems", or "regional subsystems" of the international or global system.

The Persian Gulf has been studied so far as a subsystem of the Middle East. Although, from a geographical point of view, this area is an important part of the Middle East, attempts will be made to test the systemic approach in the case of the Persian Gulf to show that, due to its international strategic and economic importance, the Persian Gulf is a subsystem of international system.

II. The Persian Gulf Region:

The term "Persian Gulf region" has widely been used by the researchers, reporters, and political scientists in their articles, reports, and books to specify an area with a high degree of international importance. The common trend in the study of the Persian Gulf is to deal with it as a "region". However, the advantages of studying the Persian Gulf as a "region" instead of studying each of the countries around it individually has not been so clarified. Before examining this important question, there is the question of whether the term "region" can be applied to the Persian Gulf area. This study is going to introduce "the Persian Gulf region" not only as a geographical term but also as an
extra-governmental and a supra-national concept by which the interaction between this region and the international political and economic system can be better examined.

There is a high degree of interdependence among the Persian Gulf states. They have some common interests and some common security problems which can easily affect their national securities. Therefore, none of the eight countries around the Persian Gulf can be studied without considering the effect of these important common issues.

Studying the Persian Gulf as a region, on the one hand, helps the researcher to focus on common political and economic issues among the eight member states and, on the other, highlights the common policies of the outside powers toward this area.

Therefore, the term “Persian Gulf region” will be used in this research not only as an important strategic area but also as a term to define the complexity of interaction among its member states. The interaction between internal and international factors in relation with the security and stability of this region, which itself has a great impact on the international security, has made this area the scene of the complex clashing interests. By using both theories of globalism and regionalism, it is possible to define different systems of power relations for this area in each of the different international orders since the beginning of the first World War. However, due to the significance of the role of the United States in this region after the British withdrawal, this research will trace the United States role in the region since 1972.

III. The System of Power Relations:

Except a few analysts most of the Persian Gulf researchers have considered the system of power relations in the Persian Gulf either a closed system with indigenous causes of developments or an open system with totally exogenous ones. For instance, in the case of the Iran-Iraq war (as one of the most important regional developments in this region) Shireen Hunter emphasises Iraqi ambitions as opposed to the fear of the
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contagious impact of the Islamic revolution on the survival of the Ba’athist regime, as the main cause of the war (it is important that both compared factors are indigenous). Antithetically, Hewedy\textsuperscript{61} puts an emphasis on the influence of outside powers as the major determinant of regional developments (exogenous factors).

In this research, using an interdependence approach, attempts will be made to combine these approaches to define different systems of power relations for this region.

1.1.2- To test approaches to evaluate the effects of the US policies upon the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.

Almost all studies of the Persian Gulf seem to be based on a preconceived notion of accepting or at least considering the legitimate right for the outside powers to play a stabilising role in this area. Consequently, the concepts of stability and security of the region are normally interpreted as the stability and security of the foreign power interests.\textsuperscript{62} The following brief discussion may help to explain this important problem.

If security means safety and freedom from danger or anxiety then the security of the Persian Gulf, as an area of different clashing interests, should be a situation in which the peace and tranquillity for both the states around it and the outside powers are guaranteed. However, in many cases the security and stability of regional powers are not the same as those of the outside powers’ interests in the region. A more secure Persian Gulf for the United States is not necessarily a secure region for the Islamic Republic of Iran or even for Iraq.\textsuperscript{63} The simple fact is that the “danger” means different things to different participants in a regional dispute. The United States military presence in the region is considered by Iran as a potential danger since:

1- It helps the Gulf Co-operation Council (G.C.C) member states to maintain the status quo and to demonstrate more serious reactions against the Islamic revolutionary activities inside their territories.
2- The United States has shown its willingness to intervene in the Persian Gulf regional affairs. Moreover, as there is no longer a potentially equal counterbalance in the International arena (as there used to be during the cold war), Israel, as the most important ally of the United States in the region, will have an opportunity to promote its objectives more easily which means another misfortune for the Islamic revolutionary activities in the Middle East.

3- The United States growing influence on regional affairs, according to the Iranian officials\textsuperscript{64}, will eventually provide the more chance for the Americanised Islam\textsuperscript{65} to grow thus the less chance for the revolutionary Islam to spread.

4- Iran cannot feel secure while almost all of its oil fields are under potential threat of a hostile superpower.

On the other hand, the Iranian Islamic revolutionary activities and the strong anti-American ideas behind it, are able to affect the stability of the region. Therefore, from various angles, they are considered as potential threats to the interests of outside powers, especially, the United States and its regional allies. Iraq's military strength has been considered a danger to the United State and other Persian Gulf states since the beginning of the second Gulf war, while the US military activities inside and outside Iraq is threatening the Iraqi Ba'hist regime. In other words, in the present trilateral system of power relations in the Persian Gulf region, namely that of Iran, Iraq, and the United States, what provides security for the interests of the dominant outside power threatens the security of the other two and what can possibly provide security for Iran or Iraq, because of their clashing interests, threatens the security of one another and the security of the United States and the G.C.C. member states. A secure Persian Gulf for Iran is one without any outside power presence\textsuperscript{66} while for the United States it is one without any obstacle for the free flow of oil and its access to regional markets.
Therefore, when the term "Security of the Persian Gulf" is applied it should be clear whether it is a regional, international, or merely a specific concept for the security of Western powers. This question has been one of the most important unsolved conceptual problems in the field of the security and stability of the Persian Gulf for the previous researchers.

According to Hewedy\textsuperscript{67}, it has been proved through bloody experience in the region that enforcing peace by using force and imbalance (by regional or outside powers) is merely an illusion because the result is always either bad agreements, or continuous encroachments. These kinds of agreements, he adds, are temporary because they are the result of the imbalance of the signatories. They do not remove the causes of the conflicts. He concludes that, the real peace cannot be established except after the removal of material and moral causes of the conflict. He suggests that a complete and "wise" agreement must be based upon a balance of interests, in which the individual state sacrifices some of its interests in favour of the collective interests and security of the region.

There has been no "wise agreement" among the belligerents in the Persian Gulf and it seems that the United States has to be blamed in not helping the removal of the causes of conflict in this region.

There is a contradiction between selling sophisticated weapons to the regional states and expecting regional security and stability. Some analysts believe that the US arms transfer policy is the key to a strategy aiming at controlling the region through double-faced actions: strengthening one side to be a big regional power, and weakening the other side to accept unfavourable agreements (bad agreements) and to enforce elusive peace.\textsuperscript{68} Such a policy is more likely to be a "conflict supervision" instead of "conflict
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solving." The Arab-Israel conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, and the second Gulf war are examples of the result of pursuing such a policy.

There is a further important question as to whether the intervention of an outside power, such as the United States, in a strategic part of the world, such as the Persian Gulf, helps to create a peaceful environment and to guarantee a secure and stable future for that region.

The most important pretext or justification of the United States to spend millions of dollars in strengthening its footholds in the Persian Gulf region has been "defending the security and stability" of this area which claims to have a great effect upon the international security. However, the recent history of the Persian Gulf, especially after 1979, shows that this region has been, both before and after the end of the Cold War, one of the main centres of instability and insecurity in South West Asia. This historical reality raises another important question that whether or not the role of the United States has been a stabilising one in this area. It also puts a question mark over its present role in this region.

There can be three approaches to the role of the United States in the new system of power relations in the region. The first one is that as long as the United States is the only dominant military force in the international arena and is able to use its military strength as a pressure lever whenever necessary, its military presence or absence does not have a significant effect upon the security and stability of the region. According to this approach the Persian Gulf states are obliged to accept and follow the new world order whether or not it provides security for the region. The second approach is that the presence of the United States in the Persian Gulf can ensure the security of the region, and its absence will create intrigue and war among the Persian Gulf states (the US approach).
The third one is that, since the outside powers’ attempt to protect their own interests without paying much attention to the right of the regional powers to determine their destiny has been one of the underlying factors in intensifying the grounds for conflict between the Persian Gulf states, the US military presence will create insecurity whereas its absence leaves the region to achieve a peaceful settlement (the Iranian approach).

In this research, attempts will be made to distinguish between “security of the Persian Gulf” and “security of US interests in this region”. Therefore, it will be argued that all of the above approaches can be useful if the right term is applied in the right context.

The central objective of this research, is to investigate whether there is a causal relationship between the US policies and the question of security and stability of this region in different regional systems of power relations.

Because of making a distinguish between “security of the Persian Gulf” and “security of US interests in this region” this research will use a “pan-regional model” as an alternative to the widely used “regional actor model” as its main approach to the question of regional security and will try to develop it.

1.1.3. To test new hypotheses regarding the relations between the United States policies and the security of the Persian Gulf and also new approaches to the security of the region.

In spite of their different views about the security of the region, the Persian Gulf states have some common security interests. The first method for identifying these common interests is to find the common national interests of the eight Persian Gulf states. The second is to determine the common parts of their national security approaches to the Persian Gulf region. The fact is that results are not so different. There are four main issues that are common between them:

1- Security of oil export.
2- Security of foreign trade.

3- Preventing the Persian Gulf from being affected by the regional conflicts.

4- The environment.

Since both export and foreign trade need foreign partners, there are also three main issues from the view point of the outside powers:

1- Security of the free flow of crude oil.

2- Security of trade with the Persian Gulf states.

3- Preventing the Persian Gulf states from causing any unexpected situation which can directly or indirectly affect the outside power interests.

However, the main question is why have the above similarities in internal and external perspectives regarding the necessity of security and stability of this strategic part of the world not been able to set the stage for co-operation among all participants in different systems of power relations in this region? Why this region has always been the scene of conflicts and upheavals. What has been the role of the United States in this regard?

Both conflict and co-operation in the Persian Gulf region cannot be examined without having a comprehensive approach to the question of the security of this strategic region. This also cannot be achieved without understanding the question of threats to both regional states and the United States overseas interests.

Taking into account the above questions and also the main objectives of the thesis, this study will examine the following hypotheses in order to assess the role of the United States in the new system of power relations in the Persian Gulf:

1. The Persian Gulf is a geopolitical region and also a subsystem of the international system.\(^{72}\)
2. Since the British withdrawal, there have been three systems of power relations in this region every one of which has represented a different pattern of conflict and co-operation. 73

3. The role of the United States has not been a stabilising one in these systems. 74

4. Security of the Persian Gulf in not only different from security of the outside power interests (in this case the United States) in the region but also, in many cases, they stand against each other. 75

5. The role of the United States in the new system of power relations in the Persian Gulf region can be studied only by considering “dual functional effect of regional developments” namely “threatening” and “providing opportunities” as two complementary functions. 76

6. The new system of power relations in the region has not provided security and stability for all of the regional states. 77

1.2. Methods and Theoretical Frameworks

There are different methods to study the role of the United States in this region among which two more commonly used methods seems to be more significant. The first method is the empirical analysis which, according to Brewer, 78 is to analyse facts based on factual observations so that one can reach conclusions about what has occurred or why it has occurred. This method can be named “descriptive” or “explanatory” method. 79 The second one is normative analysis. This method, which inevitably involves values as well as facts, is to predict and to prescribe rational choices for future policies. In a normative analysis five steps - Description, Explanation, Prediction, Evaluation, and Prescription - are needed in order to analyse the policies of a given state. 80
Although the history of the Persian Gulf can be described or explained by referring to the past experiences or observations as historical evidences, the future of this region cannot be predicted in the same certain way. There are many options, alternatives and, of course, uncertainties which need to be considered. Therefore, a single method cannot be used to deal with the subject of this study. The study of the interaction between US policies and the Persian Gulf regional developments implies six interrelated steps. These steps which form the present study's research procedure are as follows:

1. To study the historical background of the role of the outside powers in the Persian Gulf region which provides necessary information for understanding the general principals regarding the interaction between regional developments and outside power's interests in the region.

2. To make conceptual clarifications in order to evaluate previous studies to find possible misunderstandings or misconceptions in their approaches to the questions of both regional developments and US policies toward the region.

3. To introduce main gaps in the relevant literature on the relation between the United States and the Persian Gulf region and to present new questions based on them.

4. To introduce new hypotheses for the main questions arising from the previous step.

5. To develop the hypotheses and put forward necessary arguments to prove the validity of them by using both historical evidence and rational choices analysis.

6. To construct a theoretical framework for the study of the interaction between regional developments and US policies in order to introduce a practical method for assessing the role of the United States in the new system of power relations in this region.
These steps can be named “historical background”, “conceptual clarifications”, “explaining the problematic”, “hypothetical illustrations”; “reasoning” and “theory building and prescription” respectively. Each of these procedures needs a particular method or a combination of different methods to be applied. For instance, to make conceptual clarifications, it seems more appropriate, to apply a conceptual analysis and evaluation rather than an empirical analysis.

Therefore, in dealing with the historical background, this research follows the tradition of applying the descriptive method, normative analysis, as well as conceptual analysis and evaluation and also critical analysis. They will be used to trace the United States policies toward the Persian Gulf and their effects on security and stability of this region. Normative or prescriptive analysis used in this study concerns rational choices rather than actual choices. Rational choices are those which prescribe the course of action that should be selected in order to achieve a specified goal. Rational choice or normative analysis will be especially applied in the case of the regional security and stability.

Rational choice here is in the form of rational actor model not formal rational choice theory like K. Arrow etc.

Both empirical and normative analysis have their own advantages and can be used in their own places to give the researcher broader approaches (especially in multidisciplinary researches) and more effective tools to proceed his research. Therefore, this study will follow the above-mentioned procedure (six steps) as its research method which seems to be more appropriate for its purpose.

The hypotheses will be developed by utilising two levels of analysis; systemic and regional. These incorporate total interaction between the United States and the Persian Gulf states. On the international or system-wide level, the emphasis will be on the
importance of the Persian Gulf to the United States and US world-wide "responsibilities" to maintain the "world order". On the regional or subsystem level, the concern of this study will be the characteristics of the relations among the states littoral to the Persian Gulf and the evaluation of US actions to promote the stability and security of the region. At this level, discussions will also focus on the relationship of "threats" and "opportunities" to the regional conduct of both local states and the United States policies.

The study cumulatively points toward the traditional approach of interdependence. Seyom Brown asserts that the nation-state system is being transformed by the emergence of new political communities, in terms of economic coalitions (e.g., OPEC.) or political structures (e.g., the new international economic order). Oran Young views interdependence as "the extent to which events occurring in any given parts or within any given component unit of world system affect (either physically or perceptually) events taking place in each of the other parts or component units of the system. Keohane and Nye define interdependence as "situation characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries."

Interdependence in this research, simply refers to two levels (i.e., international, regional) of relations that involve mutual, two-way benefits and costs. This will be especially applied in identifying the effects of "threats" and "opportunities" in relations between the United States and the Persian Gulf states.

The research also includes analysis of official documents, newspapers, scholarly writings and other materials obtained from database services.

1.3. Organisation

In addition to the present chapter, the rest of the thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter two, presents a brief review of the outside powers presence in the Persian
Chapter I

Gulf. It also deals with different systems of power relations in the Persian Gulf since the British withdrawal in early 1970s. It also contains a discussion on the significance of the Persian Gulf for the post Cold War international system.

Chapter three contains a critical study of the prevailing applied frameworks and concepts for studying the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf. It also investigates the reasons for considering the Persian Gulf as a sub-system of the Middle East and offers a new framework for studying the region in relation to the new international political and economic order. The advantages of dealing with the Persian Gulf as a region will be also discussed in this chapter. Attempts will be made in this chapter to identify the main concern of the United States and also to evaluate approaches to the definition of US goals, policy objectives and policies.

In chapter four the whole issue of the security and stability of the region will be examined. The main objective of this chapter is to find the criteria of long term security of the Persian Gulf and to evaluate the US policies toward this region based on them. The first part of this chapter deals with the concept of security and tries to explain what the security of the Persian Gulf is.

In the second part, the Persian Gulf states national security issues will be examined and in the third section, the concept of regional security and the previous attempts of each state to participate in a common regional security plan in both forms of “regional actor model” and “pan-regional model” will be discussed.

Considering the characteristics of the question of regional security and stability Chapter five discusses the evolution of US involvement in the Persian Gulf and contains a brief review of US policies toward the Persian Gulf before 1970, as a historical framework, and will assess the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf regional developments from 1970 to 1979 (system one), the interaction between US
policies and regional developments from 1979 to 1991 (system two), and the new era for US involvement in the Persian Gulf since 1991 (system three).

The main objective of this chapter is to elucidate the determinants of the US involvement in the Persian Gulf and also the effect of her policies upon regional developments.

After a discussion of the United States demands, objectives, and policies toward the Persian Gulf and the examination of their effects upon the security and stability of the region, attempts will be made to find the best theoretical framework to assess the interaction between US policies and regional developments. This clearly shows the necessity of a discussion about regional and international threats to the security and stability of the region.

Chapter six, will examine this question by testing approaches to evaluate indigenous and exogenous threats to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.

The main objective of this chapter is to make a distinction between the real and imaginary threats and to formulate the new idea of “dual functional effects of regional developments”. It is important in view of the fact that the US policies toward this region are mostly formulated to deal with the imaginary form of threats.

Conclusions will be presented in chapter seven. The results will be divided into four related areas as follows:

1) The new framework for the study of the Persian Gulf region.

2) The Persian Gulf regional security and stability.

3) The role of the United States in the new system of power relations in the Persian Gulf.

4) Threats and opportunities as the two major influences on US policies toward the region.
CHAPTER II

Systems of Power Relations in The Persian Gulf Region

The year 1980 was the dawn of yet another era of conflict and disorder in the long history of the Persian Gulf. Alvin J. Cottrell in his book *The Persian Gulf* quoted the now famous remark by Sir Arnold Wilson that: "It is scarcely possible to imagine a quarter of the globe of similar physical configuration that has had so romantic and varying a past, that contains more diverse nationalities and clashing interests", as a useful explanation for the events then taking place in that area.

Today, after two devastating wars in this region, namely the Iran-Iraq war and the second Gulf war, and more than a decade of turbulence, it seems that Sir Arnold’s observation is still valid.

Ever since the strategic, mercantile and political importance of the Persian Gulf attracted the foreign powers, the clash of interests and confrontation between different local and external powers have become a distinctive feature of its history. Persians, Arabs, Portuguese, Dutch, Ottomans, British, Soviets and Americans have all played their parts in the shaping of events in the Persian Gulf.

The following is a brief historical review of the outside powers’ presence in this area prior to the British evacuation in early 70s as an introduction to the study of different systems of power relations in the Persian Gulf.

2.1. A brief review of the outside powers presence in the Persian Gulf

Historically, command of the sea has always been the prerequisite of political power in this area. In dealing with the history of the Persian Gulf, however, it is important to make the distinction between the political hegemony in the area and the control of its
trade. For the power that exercised political hegemony was not necessarily the principal beneficiary of the trade.\textsuperscript{3} Iran in the post-Islamic period is a good example. Since the rise of Islam in the seventh century AD until the sixteenth century, Muslims\textsuperscript{4} controlled the Middle East and monopolised trade with the East by land and sea. However, "there was no reassertion of Iranian political power in the Persian Gulf until Safavid times, until the early sixteenth century, yet for much of the intervening period Iranian ship's captains, sailors, and merchants had a large share of the trade between the Persian Gulf and the Indies, China, and Africa."\textsuperscript{5}

The arrival of Vasco da Gama\textsuperscript{6} in the Indian Ocean, in 1498, signalled the end of the Arab and Persian, or in other words, Muslim domination in the Persian Gulf area. The Portuguese were the first Europeans, since the time of Alexander, to come to the Persian Gulf. They came not just as traders, but as conquerors. Their plan was to establish a Portuguese imperium not only in the Persian Gulf, but throughout Asia.\textsuperscript{7} To achieve their goals, the Portuguese believed that there were some strategic areas in the world that they had to conquer. The Portuguese captain, General Afonso de Albuquerque, in his analysis of the strategic situation in the East India, had identified these key points as Aden, Hormuz (a channel linking the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman), and the strait of Malacca. This city of Hormuz, he said, "is, according to my idea, the most important of them all."\textsuperscript{8}

In 1515, the Portuguese captured the key trading city of Hormuz and concurrently extended their hold to Bahrain.\textsuperscript{9} For nearly a century thereafter, they maintained a virtual monopoly in European sea-borne commerce within the Persian Gulf. After the Portuguese, the Dutch and the Ottomans came to this area. The Ottomans occupied Basra in 1546 and tried to penetrate other strategic points of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, this area became the scene of conflict between the Portuguese and the
Turks. However, the former were unable to consolidate their position in the Basra region and the latter failed to win control over Hormuz. 10

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese fortunes were in decline and their control over the Gulf was challenged by the Persians. In 1616, "Shah Abbas I" granted the English-owned East India Company permission to trade in Persia, and English factories were later established at Shiraz, Isfahan and Jusk. At the suggestion of the Persian ruler, the East India company agreed to launch a joint attack on the Portuguese stronghold of Hormuz and, under the combined Persian land forces and English naval power, the fortress capitulated in 1622, thus ending a century of Portuguese domination in the Persian Gulf. 11

J.B. Kelly in his book *Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880* 12 states that: "Whereas the Portuguese came to the Gulf as soldiers and conquerors, to impose their will upon the Gulf states, the English came initially as merchant adventurers, seeking trade and fortune." Since that time, the local rulers were under the British influence until the nineteenth century, when the British power completely dominated the Persian Gulf. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Britain gradually increased its sphere of influence. The process of its dominating the region through a network of treaties, began with an agreement with Bahrain in 1861, renegotiated in 1880, to include a commitment by Bahrain that it would neither negotiate nor conclude a treaty with any other entity but Britain. Similar treaties were concluded with Qatar in 1869, the Trucial States (now known as the United Arab Emirates) in 1887, Oman in 1891 and Kuwait in 1899.

In 1892 the previous agreements with Bahrain and the Trucial States were renegotiated to intensify Britain's already considerable influence. 13
The discovery of oil at Masjid-e-Suleiman in southern Iran in 1903 added a new dimension to the foreign power interest in the Persian Gulf. Nothing could illustrate this new importance more clearly than the purchase by the British government in 1914 of a substantial share in the oil company operating the Iranian concession. Since this time, rival economic interests focused on petroleum. Table (2.1) shows oil concessions and production dates of the Persian Gulf countries.

Table 2.1: Oil Concessions and Production Dates of the Persian Gulf countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persian Gulf Countries</th>
<th>Concession Date</th>
<th>Initial Oil Discovery Date</th>
<th>Initial Commercial Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharjah</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the early years of the twentieth century, it became apparent that the Persian Gulf area offered a cheap and plentiful supply of oil products to the industrialised and industrialising nations of the world. Within the last half century, it has been established that this region held the largest crude oil reserves in the World (Table 2.2). The most important new agreements between Britain and the Persian Gulf states (signed by Kuwait in 1913, Bahrain in 1914, and the Sheikhdoms of the Trucial coast in 1922) were those that stipulated that no concessions for oil could be granted except to a person appointed by the British government.
Table 2.2: Persian Gulf Oil Reserves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Estimated Proved Reserves</th>
<th>(\text{Billions of Barrels} \times \text{Percent of World Total} \times \text{Years of Production} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Persian Gulf</td>
<td>396.18</td>
<td>56.70 \times 80^*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.02 \times \text{N/A}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Zone</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.80 \times 43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>48.50</td>
<td>6.90 \times 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>44.5 (65.0)</td>
<td>6.40 \times 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>92.70</td>
<td>13.30 \times 224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.50 \times 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>0.50 \times 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>32.49</td>
<td>4.60 \times 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia***</td>
<td>171.70</td>
<td>24.60 \times 99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Average year of production for total reserves.
** Most US officials now estimate Iraqi proved reserves at 65 billion or more.
*** Kuwait's reserves are probably in excess of 100 billion and Saudi Arabia's are near 200 billion.

With Britain's position of major influence in Persia and the creation of the British-controlled Mandate in Iraq in 1920, these relationships made the Persian Gulf virtually a British preserve. Since there were no clear boundaries between the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, internal conflicts in the period between Portuguese withdrawal and the end of British domination had been focused on territorial dispute among these countries. One of these disputes was between Iran and the Sheikdoms over the ownership of the Persian Gulf islands of Sirri, Hengam, Abu-Musa and Lesser and Upper Tunbs. There were also some other disputes between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Qatar, and the Trucial States.\(^{16}\)

The arrival of geologists in search of petroleum quickened the rulers' own interest in their Sheikdom's inland boundaries and made them re-examine their relationships with their inland tribal allies. This resulted in the fact that even now the external boundaries and internal divisions and subdivisions of some of the Persian Gulf states, such as the United Arab Emirates are still in question.\(^{17}\) The entire question of territorial claims in
this area according to Said Zahlan\textsuperscript{18} is linked with the various extensions of British policy during the inter war period.

The economic recession in Europe after the second World War caused significant changes in international political and economic orders. As a result, the British position in the Persian Gulf waned rapidly.

Soviet support for Nasserism and the Mossadeq movement in Iran exacerbated the traditional rulers’ fear of eventual Soviet support to similar movements in their countries. The rulers assumed that these movements were designed by the Soviets to take over the region. A common myth among western as well as Arab policy makers was that Arab nationalism or even Iranian nationalism was a “pretext for Soviet domination.”\textsuperscript{19}

Two types of nationalism pervaded the Persian Gulf at that time: moderate nationalism and radical nationalism. Moderate nationalism, status-quo oriented, was the instrument which the ruling families in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and even Kuwait utilised to show themselves to be progressive, to undermine British domination and to neutralise the radical nationalism.

Radical nationalism, on the other hand, was equated with drastic economic and political changes such as the take over of foreign oil companies, unity with other Arab countries, reduction in the power of ruling houses and opposition to foreign domination. Both radical and moderate nationalism were in the position of rejecting the British domination.

In the early 1950's Iran began to exert her independence from outside influence, the 1958 coup in Iraq ended Britain's security and political role there, and in 1961 Kuwait regained her complete independence from British protection. But in the nine Gulf
Sheikhdoms and Oman, the British military and political presence was still considered to be the major stabilising force.\textsuperscript{20}

The United States supported the moderate nationalism and benefited from it, even by undermining British domination.\textsuperscript{21} The British realised that to persist on remaining as a dominant external power in the Persian Gulf region was profitable neither economically nor politically. Therefore, in January 1968, Britain set a time limit of less than four years for her withdrawal from the Persian Gulf.

The British withdrawal not only left the Trucial states without any security and protection shield, but also provided a new opportunity for Soviet expansion and left Iran as the strongest local power in that area.\textsuperscript{22} Figure (2.1) shows a comparison between major regional powers in the Persian Gulf region between 1972 and 1973.\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.1.png}
\caption{(Figure 2.1)}
\end{figure}

Since the 1958 leftist coup of Abdulkarim Qasim in Iraq until the British withdrawal, Britain and to a lesser extent, the United States have regarded Iran (the shortest way between the former Soviet Union and the entire northern part of the Persian Gulf) as a major obstacle to Soviet expansion in the Persian Gulf. After the British withdrawal, it
was therefore quite natural that Iran would be the chosen military power to fill the
vacuum in the region.24

The announcement of British withdrawal in 1968 came as a shock to the area. Several
of the Gulf rulers, particularly those who were in fear of their more powerful
neighbours, pleaded with Whitehall to reconsider its decision.25 However, for Britain, it
was not a policy option for it was the inevitable consequence of her declining role as a
world power.

The British did their best to prepare their protected states for independence. They
succeeded in getting the Shah to agree that Iran's irredentist claim on Bahrain be
determined by a plebiscite of the Bahrainis, which eventually resulted in an
overwhelming vote for independent statehood. They also attempted to create a
federation of the nine Sheikhdoms of the central Gulf, but, in the end, managed a
grouping of only the seven Trucial coast Sheikhdoms26, with Qatar and Bahrain opting
for independence.

The reaction of the newly independent states to the regional developments was heavily
conditioned by the specific threats they believed they faced, as well as by their internal
make-up. Kuwait had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in the
early days of its independence in 1961 for two specific reasons. Firstly, to counter Iraqi
claims to her territory and, secondly, as many hard line Palestinian refugees who had
come to Kuwait, she saw her security being dependent upon her being on the side of
Arab radicals.27 The Soviet Union entered the area through her policy of assistance to
Iraq after 1958 and began to help the communist parties and opposition groups in the
Persian Gulf states.28

Hussein Sirriyeh29 argued that for the United States, the British withdrawal was an
unpleasant event (the validity of this view will be discussed in chapter 6). He went on
to state that the American anxiety about the implication of the relinquishment of British
defence responsibilities east of the Suez was reinforced by the anticipated conclusion
that the United State would be the alternative major power that had to defend Western
interests in that part of the World. It was particularly worrying for the Americans,
firstly, because it came at a time when the United States was intensely involved in the
Vietnam conflict and, secondly, because the major powers in the Persian Gulf area
(Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) publicly maintained that the British withdrawal from the
area would not leave a vacuum that had to be filled by outside powers.

There is a contradiction between Sirriyeh's argument and that of Kolko (see note 21).
It will be argued in following chapters that US twin-pillar policy was not a direct result
of the British withdrawal from the region, but a policy based on a new approach to the
international political and economic orders including a shift to local programmes and to
construct a regional balance of power. There was not any other option for such a
policy but to support moderate nationalism in the region (especially in the case of Iran
as a powerful regional ally) which itself opposed British domination. Therefore, what
Sirriyah mentioned as "worrying" for the United States was, in fact, a part of US new
approach to her role in the Persian Gulf. 30

According to Alvin Rubinstein 31, some of the smaller Gulf states looked to the United
States just after the British withdrawal to replace the British, but they soon realised
that Washington did not wish to replace the British, instead, the American policy was
to rely on the "twin pillars" of Iran and Saudi Arabia to protect Western interests in the
Persian Gulf.

From this stand point, the Persian Gulf faced a new regional order which was
characterised by the East-West rivalry and led to the formation of different systems of
power relations in this region.
2.2- The systems of power relations in the Persian Gulf

In the aftermath of the First World War the new social science of "International Relations" emerged as a discipline of studying the causes of war to pre-empt the spreading of international conflicts into wars.\(^{32}\) For a long period of time, especially from the beginning of the first World War to the end of the Second World War, Europe has been the scene of conflicts and wars. Since the end of the second World War the stage of war has moved to the non-western "Third World", to which the subject of this study namely the Persian Gulf belongs. The question of whether Europe moved the stage of war from its own centre to the third world or the underlying causes of war in Third World countries is unequivocally endogenous will be examined later; however, the transference of war from Europe to Third World countries did not change the main trend of International relations studies, namely, searching for international peace and security.

Both the globalization of the European states' system at the time of the Great Powers and international bipolar system at the time of the Super Powers had their effects upon regional and international conduct of the Third World countries. The Persian Gulf is among the most important strategic areas of the world which has been affected by different world orders since the arrival of Vasco da Gama in the Indian Ocean, in 1498. The interaction between internal and international factors in relation with the security and stability of this region, which itself has a great impact on the international security, has made this area the scene of confrontation between the complex clashing interests.

To find the relationship between the outside powers and the Persian Gulf regional developments, it is necessary to study the different systems of power relations in this area. However, the term "system of power relations" perhaps needs more clarification
than might at the first glance seem to be necessary. Therefore, before going any further, two questions need to be answered.

1) What is the system of power relation?
2) How can it help to better understanding the relation between internal and external powers in this region?

As G. P. Chapman\textsuperscript{33} in his book; \textit{Human and Environmental Systems} has quoted, probably the most widely used definition of a system is that of Hall and Fagen (1956): "A system is a set of objects with relationships between the objects and between their attributes". According to Davies and Lewis:

The concept of system is one borrowed from the natural sciences, and difficulties arise when it is adapted for the analysis of social and political phenomena. In the natural sciences the system concept is usually used to refer to fairly clearly defined sets of interactions, around which recognisable boundaries can be drawn. The sets of interactions which constitute the political system, however, cannot be so completely or clearly isolated, and the operation of the system is influenced very considerably not only by the interactions which are internal to itself, but also by interactions which fall outside its boundaries.\textsuperscript{34}

They also argue that "to account for what happens in a political system solely in terms of its internal activities, isolated from the influence of its environment, involves a superficial view of political life as a closed system. To be of use to the political scientists therefore the system concept must be capable of incorporating the part played by the non-political aspects of social life. Thus the political system must be seen as an open system that is, it is open to outside influence."\textsuperscript{35}

To answer to the question that: "what makes a group of states in a given geographical region a system?" Tibi\textsuperscript{36} introduces two criteria: (1) the structural interconnectedness between them (not only socio-economic, but also political, cultural and also ethnic), and (2) the density of interaction, that is the degree of intensity of co-operation or disorder between the countries of a geographical region on all levels (political, economic, cultural and military).
In the case of the Persian Gulf the degree of intensity of co-operation or disorder between its states is affected by the degree of influence of the outside powers (external factors).

A regional system cannot be an exception to the actuality of international interdependence and it cannot be seen as a closed system. For example, the system of power relations in the Persian Gulf cannot be studied without considering the great effects of the outside powers economic policies or the United States policies toward this region in particular.

In a system of power relation the objects are states and the attributes are their policies. Therefore, it is a group of political, economic, military, and cultural elements, of two or more sovereign states, working together in a regular relation. These elements can be defined as domestic or international policies of those states or their actions and reactions as to a specific regional or international issue. In other words, the system of power relations is a complex interaction between two or more sovereign states every one of which trying to promote its own objectives towards a specific regional or global development while functioning as a complex whole.

In a global system of power relations the objective can be control over international economic system or in the case of the Persian Gulf it can be defined as control over the Persian Gulf states decision making process. In a system of power relations there are always different levels of conflict, political considerations, participation, and aid (all forms of aid, chiefly in the economic and the military spheres). The role of elements (each state) in such a system can be described by using the Game Theory.

The theory of games might be called the mathematics of competition and co-operation. It analyses situations in terms of gains and losses of opposing players. It is applied
widely in economics, operations research, military science, political science, organisation theory, and the study of bargaining and negotiation.  

When there are more than two players in a game the best strategy of each player depends on the strategies adopted by the other players. In a system of power relations there are various degrees of competition and co-operation, actions and reactions which can be studied separately. However, without having a distinct framework, it would be very difficult to examine the interaction among various elements in a system especially when the subject, in this case the Persian Gulf, involves a considerable number of political, economic, ethnic, and religious factors. Therefore, to study the system of power relations in the Persian Gulf it is necessary to define a framework and to introduce the main elements.

There are two frameworks which can be applied in this case. The first is an external one, the same as what Fox (1944) put in his classic that: "the international order cannot be comprehended in a scholarly way without taking into account the differences between elephants and squirrels in international politics." In such a theory, according to Bassam Tibi, foreign policy of the small states can only be interpreted in terms of responses to steps taken by the "elephants". Therefore, the roots of regional developments including agreements, conflicts, or wars should be traced outside that region within the global political and economic system. The second framework can be an internal one which itself contains two different approaches. The first is to find "independent regional systems" without considering the effects of the external factors and the second, on the contrary, is to define regional systems as subsystems of international or global system with a regular interaction between them. The history of the Persian Gulf indicates that there has always been an interaction between international and regional developments. For instance, the discovery of oil in Iran in
1903, and in other Persian Gulf states a few years later, added a new dimension to international rivalry among the industrial states to gain an access to the energy resources of the region. Also the decline in the international role of Britain, which eventually led to her withdrawal from the region in the early 70's, changed the old patterns of power relations in the Persian Gulf which was based on British control over decision making process of the Gulf states.

The Islamic revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, the regional effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the second Gulf war, and the position of the Persian Gulf in international information and communication system are other examples of interaction between the international system and the Persian Gulf regional developments.

Therefore, it seems that using the second approach, which can be named “the regional subsystem theory” and deals with the Persian Gulf as a sub-system of the international system, is the more appropriate way of analysing the question of power relations in this area. The term “system of power relations in the Persian Gulf”, as a sub-system of international system, is useful in introducing the structural interconnectedness among the regional powers, and also the interaction between regional and international issues.

The central assertion of regional subsystem theory, according to Tibi, is that the regions of the international system have their own internal dynamic, while at the same time forming part of the overall systemic configuration of world politics. In this theory, the dimensions of regional dynamic and of global politics ought to be considered as two mutually related intrinsic levels of analysis, without deriving the one from the other.

Using this theory and taking into account the significance of regional events in the Persian Gulf since the British withdrawal in the early 70's and considering the
importance of the United States' role since then, it is possible to define different systems of power relations for each of the following important periods in the history of this region:

1) From the British withdrawal to the Islamic revolution in Iran (1970-1979).
2) From the Islamic revolution in Iran to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (1979-1991).
3) From the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait up to now.

Since 1970 there have been three different patterns of conflict and co-operation (hereafter, referred to as system one, system two, and system three) in the Persian Gulf. System one started just after the British withdrawal from the region in early 1970's and lasted until 1979 (the Islamic Revolution in Iran). In this system the effect of external factors was high, so that, the relations between the Persian Gulf states were based on their own position in the international arena and the bloc to which they belonged. In this bilateral system, there were two main sides (pro-Western Iran and pro-Soviet Iraq) on the stage and, of course, superpowers at the backstage. Perhaps the Fox's theory of elephants and squirrels has a proper application in explaining the different aspects of system one. The power relations among the Persian Gulf states in system one can be summarised by considering the following characteristics:

1. The United States "Twin-Pillar" policy.
2. The Persian Gulf states arms race.
3. The balance of fear due to the international fear of superpowers' confrontation.
4. Iran's utmost attempts to show off its military strengths as the only powerful defender of western interests in the Persian Gulf.
5. The reinforcement of the grounds of disputes between Iranian nationalism and the Arab nationalism.

The most important external effect upon this system was the US "twin-pillar" policy. By the time that President Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger arrived in Tehran in May 1972, the British forces had already left the Persian Gulf. Kissinger was worried about the changing balance of power and the role of the Soviet
Union in the region. Syria had invaded Jordan in 1970 and its relationship with the Soviet Union had been well established. Egypt had signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. The Soviets had concluded a similar treaty with Iraq in April 1972 which resulted in massive deliveries of advanced modern weapons to that country. The conclusion of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty, a treaty that was said to strengthen the front of the progressive forces opposing imperialism and to provide a long-term basis for political and possibly military co-operation between the two countries, seriously alarmed Iran. So did the Soviet support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf in the Omani province of Dhufar, as well as, the increased activity by Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean and the regular passage up the Persian Gulf of Soviet merchant ships that, the Iranian suspected, were carrying arms to Iraq. In Kissinger's view, Iraq would achieve hegemony in the Persian Gulf area unless local forces were strengthened or American power built up. However, neither congress nor the American public supported the deployment of American forces against Soviet-backed Iraq in those days. The problem was solved for the Americans by supporting the Shah against Iraq which in turn led to the Iranian military supremacy over the Persian Gulf from 1973 to 1979.

The United States "twin pillar" policy had the following four objectives.

I. To promote co-operation between Iran and Saudi Arabia as two bases for maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf.

II. To maintain the tiny US naval presence (the three ships of the Middle East command) without change.

III. To expand the US diplomatic representation in this oil-rich area and to promote US technical assistance.

IV. To encourage the lower Gulf States to look primarily to the United Kingdom for their security needs by restraining US sales of arms in that area.

However, the main reason for the American new policy toward the Persian Gulf was that the American public, especially after the Vietnam war, was increasingly opposed to
any expansion of US military commitments abroad. The "twin pillar" policy helped the United States to secure Western interests without being accused of intervening in the internal affairs of other countries. It was also both cheaper and safer. Therefore the previous system of power relations which was based on direct military intervention of Western powers to protect their interests in the region was replaced by a new system in which the local states had more important roles.

There were two main problems in such a new system that eventually caused a radical change in relations between the Gulf states. Firstly, Western interests became more dependent on internal developments in the Persian Gulf states particularly the internal situation of Iran which had become the main ally of the United States. As a result the Iranian Islamic revolution deeply affected the US interests in the Middle East. Secondly, this new system caused the Shah to promote his own national objectives by using the Western protection and intensified the confrontation between Iranian and Arab nationalism.

The Persian Gulf and the straits of Hormuz had become much more important to Iran for the oil, which was the basis of her rising prosperity and power, was shipped through that narrow strait. Therefore, Iran considered it essential that the Arab side of Hormuz should not fall under actually or potentially hostile control. Although the Shah acknowledged Bahrain independence in 1971, he took over three small but strategically located islands of Abu Musa (he agreed to share sovereignty over this island with Sharjah) and the Great and Little Tunbs, with minimal use of military force. This action was a blow to Arab pride. Libya broke off diplomatic relations with both Tehran and London and nationalised the assets of the British Petroleum Company. Iraq also denounced the Iranian move.
After the British withdrawal, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, became the major participants in regional affairs. Although both Iran and Saudi Arabia were supported by the United States, there was a great difference between them. From the Iranian outlook, Saudi Arabia was an Arab country which was capable of supporting the radical Arabs. After the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and the subsequent claims by radical Arab nationalism, including the contention that Khuzistan (south-west of Iran) was part of the Arab homeland, Iran, as the only non Arab state in the Persian Gulf area, did her best to become more powerful than her Arab neighbours.\textsuperscript{51}

In the later 1960s and throughout the 1970s, oil revenues had made Iran a second-rank power in international politics and the "gendarme" for the Gulf security. Iran sent troops to help Royalists in North Yemen while Egypt's Gamal Abd al-Nasser helped the Arab nationalists who were trying to set up a republic. Iran did her utmost to influence the Arab rulers of all the Gulf littoral states from Oman to Kuwait and became the strongest military power in the region.\textsuperscript{52}

One of the most important consequences of the impact of the external factor of "twin-pillar" policy upon the "system one" was to activate the spark of regional conflict in the Persian Gulf. The years between the British withdrawal and the Islamic revolution in Iran (1970-1979) have been one of the most important periods in the history of this region. During this period, many important events such as the Soviets build-up of Iraq, the domination of the Ba'th party in Iraq, the rise of the old Kurdish question in northern Iraq, the Algeria agreement between Iraq and Iran, the rise of Saddam Hussein, the emergence of Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeyni as a religious leader with a strong anti-American doctrine, and finally, the downfall of the Shah (the most powerful ally of the United States in the region), took place that set the stage for the future developments. No doubt the impact of the Islamic revolutionary movements led by Ayatollah Khomeyni was more important than all of them. Khomeyni's revolutionary
Islamic ideology and his extraordinary charisma caused Iran of 1979 to be viewed as a "special danger" by the United States. System One was affected by the international bipolar system of the 70s in which each superpower was supporting its client state. Figure (2-2) shows the structure of "System One."

System one was shattered by the Islamic revolution in Iran. The Iran of 1979 did not continue to be a strong ally of the west and began to challenge its secular values which were imposed upon her society during the reign of the Pahlavi dynasty. From the West's point of view, "the Islamic revolution in Iran ended any prospect of exclusive or primary reliance on regional states for assuring the security of the area. After 1979, the indirect and covert role of the outside powers especially the United States was jettisoned and followed by more intensified involvement." However, there were some international obstacles such as the possibility of superpowers confrontation which prevented the United States from direct military intervention in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the previous political and military deployments in this area were completely

* Kuwait, Qatar, U.A.E., Bahrain, Oman

(Figure 2.2)
changed and the same players made a new arrangement in which pro-Soviet Iraq and pro-Western Saudi Arabia along with the other Arab states of the Persian Gulf (as the Gulf Co-operation Council member states) stood against revolutionary Iran. As a result, the previous system of power relations based on Iranian military supremacy as an American gendarme in the region was changed and the "System One" was replaced by a new system in which all outside powers as well as previous Iranian regional allies were trying to prevent Iran from establishing an Islamic revolutionary base in the Persian Gulf.

The most important difference between systems one and two returns to the roots of their formations. In system one the impact of external factors was high. However, in system two the determinant of new changes was purely an internal phenomenon. Unlike system one, in which the Persian Gulf states followed the steps taken by the superpowers, in system two it was the superpowers which had to change their policies because of a challenging regional development. There were two stages in system two. First, the stage of formation in which the effect of the Islamic Revolution in Iran as an internal development was considerably high. Second, the stage of continuation in which the outside powers tried to change the regional balance of power in order to prevent the independent regional revolutionary activities from being spread in the Middle East.

In system two the relations between the Persian Gulf states were affected by the following issues:

1) The fear of spreading the Islamic revolutionary activities into the other Persian Gulf states.
2) The Iran-Iraq war.
3) The isolation of the Islamic republic of Iran both regionally and internationally.
4) The formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council.
5) The attempts of G.C.C. member states to help Iraq in its war against Iran
6) The outside powers' attempts to control the warfare, so that, neither Iraq nor Iran could be the winner of the Iran-Iraq war.
In this system the previous regional pattern of superpower-clients was changed. The new government in Iran and its Islamic revolutionary activities were directly supported by neither of the two superpowers. Figure (2-3) shows the changes in the position of the Persian Gulf states in system two.

"System Two" is a good example of the effect of the indigenous regional factors on the security and stability of a regional subsystem. However, the impact of the regional factors in this case has been negligible in comparison with the continuous effect of the external factors.

System two like system one did not last long. After the Iran-Iraq war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new international political and economic orders, Iraq changed its policies and turned against its previous allies and stood against the G.C.C. member states and finally invaded Kuwait in 1990. The United States, seeking a new sphere of influence, was involved in a war against Iraq to protect its oil rich allies in the Persian Gulf. Iran re-established its relations with the G.C.C. member
states and did not militarily react against the US presence in the region. The G.C.C. member states also cut their financial assistance to Iraq and tried to make a security agreement with Iran allowing "their previous enemy" into their camp. At a meeting on 5 May, 1991, the G.C.C. Ministerial Council recognised the importance of Iran's role in any future security arrangement in the Persian Gulf. These events caused complex changes in "System Two" and gave rise to a new system in which the United States for the first time, after the British withdrawal from the region, became formally involved. "System Three" came into being right after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1991 and it is still the dominant existing system of power relations in the Persian Gulf.

In both systems one and two, the United States supported one of the major regional powers (Iran in system one and Iraq in system two) to make a regional balance of power. However, in system three, she saw her interests in containing both Iran and Iraq. Figure (2-4) shows the present system of power relations in the Persian Gulf region.

(Figure 2-4)

Since the United States has become a direct participant in the Persian Gulf regional affairs, in order to study the question of "power relations" in this strategic area, it is
necessary to examine the role of the United States in the region from different aspects. The recent developments in the Persian Gulf which led to the settlement of the "System Three" have been one of the most significant political and military events of the twentieth century. These developments have caused profound changes in the balance of power in the Middle East⁵⁹, as well as changes in alliances, both within the region and between the countries of the Middle East and the United States.

Although there are pro and con approaches to the necessity of the US military involvement in the region⁶⁰, it is quite obvious that the Persian Gulf has such a significant international importance that any development within its member states attracts outside powers and makes problems to be solved in a more complex way. The eight year Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the second Persian Gulf war, and the continuation of the US military presence in this region are cases in point.

In the new system of power relations in this area there is a trilateral dispute in which the possibility of co-operation between all sides, according to the historical evidences, seems to be less likely than the probability of the rapprochement of one side and one of the other two. If Iraq sides with Iran, the US interests in this area will face a serious potential threat.⁶¹ If Iran sides with the Gulf Co-operation Council, Iraq will be isolated. A declining role for Iraq would mean a rise in the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran and this is not what the United States wants, at least as long as Iran is attempting to create an Islamic revolutionary base in this area.

If the United States leaves the region, the G.C.C. member states cannot remain a powerful side against any of the other two. Therefore, the situation will change from a trilateral competition to a bilateral rivalry in which the G.C.C. member states will side with either Iran or Iraq. Therefore, there is a very complicated situation in this area and there are many questions regarding the future of the region. Some of these questions are as follows."
1) Is the new system of power relations capable of remaining as a stabilising system for a decade ahead? (see Chapter VI)

2) How will the pax-Americana treat the Pax-Islamica and vice versa?

3) Are there any common objectives between foreign power interests (especially those of the United States) and what is known as Arab nationalism and what the West knows as Islamic Fundamentalism and those policies which the Islamic Republic of Iran believes in as the Islamic foreign policy. (see Chapter III)

4) Is the Islamic foreign policy of Iran flexible enough to consider any rights for the other participants in the Persian Gulf? (see Chapter VI)

5) Is the Iraqi Ba’thist regime a real threat to the future of the security and stability of the Persian Gulf? (see Chapter III & VI)

6) If the trilateral power relations which is the dominant system of power in this area remains, how will the role of the United States be defined? (see Chapter V)

7) Does the stability of the Persian Gulf depend on the US withdrawal from the region (as has been argued in the case of Iran and Iraq since the end of the second Gulf war). (see Chapter IV)

8) What will happen if the United States withdraws her troops from the Persian Gulf region? (see Chapter V)

9) What are the grounds for future conflicts in this area? (see Chapter IV)

10) What are the grounds for co-operation among the Persian Gulf states and the limitations of that co-operation? (see Chapter III)

According to what has been argued so far, there are three different approaches to deal with the above questions.

From an internationalist point of view, the history of the Persian Gulf shows the importance of the foreign power interests and their impact on relations among the Persian Gulf states. Therefore, peace and war, security and insecurity, stability and
instability of the Persian Gulf depends on the way the United States acts to move from the present system of power relations to a new one.

On the other hand, from a regionalist point of view, the steps taken by the outside powers have always been based on regional developments. Therefore, to find the grounds for the future incidents, one should look at the Persian Gulf states and their, so called, independent or nationally motivated policies. In other words, to find proper answers to the above questions, based on this approach, the Persian Gulf should be studied at a state or perhaps sub-state level, with more emphasis on indigenous determinants of conflict and co-operation among its states.

The third approach, used in this research, is to study the Persian Gulf as a regional sub-system (a sub-system of international system) without overestimating the effect of external powers or underestimating the effect of internal factors.

The term, "the system of power relations in the Persian Gulf", used as the title of this chapter, clearly indicates the interaction between internal and external elements of regional developments. However, in this respect two important points should be considered:

1) In a regional sub-system the effects of internal and external factors in relation with regional developments are not necessarily the same.

2) The effects of both factors are relative.

System three shows a different pattern of conflict and co-operation among the Persian Gulf states as well as between them and the United States. However, before examining the role of the United States in the new system of power relations in this region the following questions need to be addressed.

1) What has been basically changed for the United States in the Persian Gulf after the collapse of the Soviet Union?
2) Is there any difference between the main issues for the United states in its relations with the Persian Gulf states before and after the second Gulf war?

To answer the above questions it is necessary to glance through the significance of the Persian Gulf for the international system.

2.3. The significance of the Persian Gulf for the post Cold War international system.

The Persian Gulf has the richest known reserves of crude oil and natural gas in the entire world. This explains its significance for the international economic system. Therefore, as long as oil is the world's main energy resource the Persian Gulf will continue to be a principal focus of world attention. There are three main reasons for such an importance:

1) The geographical concentration of low-cost crude oil reserves has put the Persian Gulf countries in a dominant position vis-a'-vis the other oil exporting countries.

2) The Persian Gulf states are among the richest countries in Asia with a huge market for foreign products and services (especially, after two wars which left Iraq, Iran and Kuwait in need of extensive reconstruction).

3) The recurrent possibility of conflict in this region, which is the direct result of the unstable nature of the Persian Gulf power relations.

Furthermore, the Persian Gulf area occupies a strategic location among three continents which broadly explains its importance in the international communication system. The Persian Gulf is the centre of the Islamic world. Mecca, the holiest shrine and Muslim's Qeblah, is located in this area. This region is also the centre of both moderate and revolutionary Islam and is the most important base of Shii Islam. Therefore, if there is any Islamic active opposition against the West, it will be generated in or supported by states in this region.
According to Anthony H. Cordesman, all of the Gulf states even Iran are major trading partners with the West. The Southern Gulf states, however, are particularly heavy trading partners with the OECD states. They not only import substantial quantities of goods but also they generally have a large enough trade surplus which enables them to make substantial foreign investments almost entirely in the West. This trade has been of major importance for the United States in spite of the "oil glut".

In 1986, the Gulf nations and their immediate neighbours experienced a $9 billion trade deficit. Nevertheless, they had a total import/export flow of some $168 billion. The trade with the United States was worth over $16 billion, and the US had a $3.6 billion trade advantage.

Today, the geopolitics of communication has made the Persian Gulf region the fifth largest and most complex centre of telecommunications and digital networks in the world after the United States, the former Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the Pacific basin which includes Japan.

The underlying factors contributing to the importance of information and communication in the Persian Gulf, according to Hamid Mowlana, can be observed in three distinct areas:

1) The expansion of military and security alliances accompanied by the growing hardware and software of communication technologies.

2) The expansion of international trade and financial services and competition for the existing and potential markets.

3) The efforts of national governments to implement domestic development projects and to expand their infrastructure for national and regional integration.

These few accounts can illustrate the considerable interests of the external powers and multinational corporations in the Persian Gulf.

Since the United States is one of the world's largest oil importers and its need for Middle East oil is increasing rapidly, it has a vital interest in maintaining access to
Persian Gulf oil supplies at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantity to meet its own needs and those of its allies. Therefore, in relations between the United States and the Persian Gulf states four issues; demands, access, securing the access, and threats need to be considered.

First is the question of demand. According to the recent long term forecast prepared by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the annual growth rate for global energy demand will be 1.6 percent between 1990-2000 and 2.3 percent between 2000-2010. This will mean that the global demand for energy which was 160 m b/d (oil equivalent) in 1990 will be nearly 190 m b/d by the year 2000 and 238 m b/d by 2010.

Oil demand is predicted to grow at the rate of 1.5 percent annually between 1990-2000 and 1.8 percent between 2000-2010. This growth represents 10 m b/d more in 2000 compared to 1990, and a 15 m b/d increase in 2010 from the year 2000. Actual demand for oil will increase to 74 m b/d by the year 2000 compared to 64 m b/d in 1990 and will reach 89 m b/d by the year 2010 (see figure 2.5)

\textbf{Estimated Global Oil and Energy Demand}
\textit{m b/d (oil equivalent for the energy)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{estimated_global_oil_energy_demand.png}
\caption{Estimated Global Oil and Energy Demand}
\end{figure}

According to the OPEC’s estimates, the oil production capacity of the member countries may reach 39 m b/d by 2010, of which 28 m b/d (about 80%) will be located in the countries of the Persian Gulf.
The International Energy Agency in Paris estimates that world dependence on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf will go from the present 15 percent to 35 percent by the end of the century. Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia will be able to control 50 percent of the world oil market by the late 1990s. In 1989, the United States' domestic oil production fell by seven percent to 7.6 million barrels a day (the lowest figure since 1964) which meant an increasing dependency on Persian Gulf imports. By the year 2000, it is estimated that the United States will import two-thirds of its oil.\textsuperscript{73}

As long as the United States demand for low cost energy resources exists, there is the necessity of maintaining access to these resources. Therefore, the second issue would be access to the regional resources. The third issue is "safeguarding" or "securing" that access which itself involves the two questions of "barriers" and "threats" to the access and the process of securing the access. Figure (2.6) shows the relations among these issues.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2-6.png}
\caption{Figure 2.6}
\end{figure}

Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, some analysts, such as Valerie Yorke\textsuperscript{74}, believed that the realignment of the moderate and radical Arab states, coupled with the Islamic revolution in Iran, would provide increasing opportunities for Soviet penetration. Then the most probable range of military and political threats to oil supplies was estimated as follows:

1) Soviet military action to take over key fields or block oil routes.
2) The sabotage of oil-gathering stations, pipelines, refineries, loading and transit facilities by extremist and frustrated Arab nationalists.

3) Closure of the strait of Hormuz to tankers.

4) Tension or open conflict between oil-producing states around the Gulf.

5) The use of the oil price or an embargo as political weapons.

6) The adoption of hard-line pricing and production policies by either present leaders or others assuming power after a coup, rebellion or a revolution.

7) Regional and domestic upheavals such as the disruption of oil supplies through strike action by religious or nationalist movements.75

Although containing the Soviet penetration in this region has been an important issue for the United States and its regional allies, demand for low cost energy resources has existed both before and after the East-West rivalries. The United States would have vital interests in this area even if there was not any threat from the Soviet Union or the local radical states. In other words, regional threats do not have any direct relations with the demands of outside powers. Demands cannot be threatened or be the subject of attacks. However, access (in this case to oil and regional market) and the security of this access may be affected by regional or international barriers and/or threats.

Developing the same idea, Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz76 argue that:

At the end of World War II, Washington was committed to an active internationalist agenda and would have pursued it even if the Soviet Union had not emerged as a geopolitical and ideological rival. The essential point was acknowledged in NSC 68, the 1950 National Security Council document that articulated America's Cold War strategy as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. Motivated by their conviction that American security and prosperity depend on world order, NSC 68's authors argued that the policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community was a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat.
The main issue for the United States in its relations with the Persian Gulf states is the maintenance and security of access to the region's market and energy resources. The actual demand behind the above issue has not been affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union or by major regional developments such as the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Iran Iraq war, or even by the second Gulf war. However, the process of maintaining and securing the access has been affected by the end of the Cold War and the new regional pattern of conflict and co-operation.

Perhaps the most serious question regarding the future of the Persian Gulf is whether or not the United States will be able to pursue its objectives without intensifying the grounds for conflict in the region. The second question, of course, is whether or not the stability and security of the Persian Gulf are common objectives for all actors in this region. To find proper answers to the above questions and as an introduction to the study of regional security and stability and the effects of regional and international threats on the region's system of power relations, therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the prevailing applied frameworks for the study of the region in order to find their ability to answer these and other basic questions.
CHAPTER III


The "role" of a state normally means the task, duty, or function of that state in an undertaking or an enterprise or the part it plays in an international arena. Since the United States, unlike its inclination prior to the second Gulf war, has become directly involved in the Persian Gulf region, the term "role" which commonly applies to express the position of an actor in connection with the other actors, in both positions of affecting or being affected by the others, can better explain the interaction of different powers involved in the Persian Gulf affairs. The role of the United States in this area has been observed by both Western and the Persian Gulf states' media, especially after the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979), as the role of a protector, a supplier, a saviour, a partner, a controller, a plunderer, or an invader. However, away from these journalistic terms, this research in the first stage uses the term "role" to specify the part the United States is playing in the Persian Gulf affairs simply as a participant.

The concept of participation, referring to the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf region, is used in the same way as Fredric Pearson used in his definition of regional systems. In his view regional systems are systems of interaction. Participation, as a subdivision of interaction, includes negotiations between governments, the conclusion of states treaties, as well as all forms of exchange (e.g. trade). Nonetheless, there is an imbalance of political, military, and economic power between the United States and the Persian Gulf states which affects the interaction between
regional developments and US policies toward this region. Such an imbalance will be considered in all stages of this research.

To study the role of the United State in the new system of power relations in the Persian Gulf region a certain procedure needs to be followed in which the following main steps seem to be more significant.\(^2\)

1) Defining the Persian Gulf region and its position in the international system.
2) Identifying the main concerns of the United States in the region.
3) Finding US goals and policies toward the region.
4) Examining the interaction between US policies and the Persian Gulf regional developments.
5) Finding the effects of such an interaction on security and stability of the region.
6) Finding the effect of threats upon policies of both the United States and regional states.

Although there are a considerable number of contributions in the literature regarding the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf region, in many cases the above issues have been studied separately, and the quantity and quality of the literature in each case are considerably different. From a qualitative point of view, there are different frameworks, diverse or even opposite approaches to a certain question combined with overestimation or underestimation of the effect of external and internal factors regarding both the root causes of instability, conflicts and wars in this region and the question of US interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The number of research works is also different in each case. For instance, while the main concern of the United States in this region has been well documented, the Persian Gulf has not been much studied as a region, although the term “Persian Gulf region” or “Gulf region” is widely used in books and articles. Following the above six steps of studying the role of the United States in this region, this chapter uses a comparative method to
deal with the first three issues and tries to highlight the literature’s gap in each case, if there is any. This is done in order to construct a clear framework for the other three remaining issues which are, in fact, the main concerns of this study.

### 3.1. Defining the Persian Gulf region and its position in international system.

#### 3.1.1. The Persian Gulf and the Middle East.

Studying the regions outside the traditional framework of East-West rivalry has come much more to the fore in International Relations inquiry since the dissolution of the colonial empires in the 1950s and 1960s. After World War II and to the subsequent demise of colonialism, the association of Non-aligned Nations which had no formal commitment to either of the two power blocs in the world, led by the United States and the Soviet Union, was initiated by leaders of countries that had recently freed themselves from foreign domination and rejected renewed ties to any big power. In 1963, according to Tibi, the American political scientist Leonard Binder coined the term “uncommitted states” for these new states in the international system. This concept formed part of his attempt to achieve an adequate understanding of the policies of states outside the domain of the East-West conflict. His motivation stemmed from his critical position vis-à-vis Kaplan's thesis of bipolarity and developed into a theory of a “regional subsystem”. According to this theory, the world outside the superpower sphere is divided into geopolitical regions defined as “subordinate subsystems”. Leonard Binder laid this foundation stone in a work published in 1958. Following from Binder’s pioneering effort has been a number of works seeking to submit area data to subsystemic analysis. Prominent among them have been Michael Brecher, "The Subordinate State system of Southern Asia" (1963), William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations" (1967), Larry W. Bownan, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa" (1968), Donald G.
From that time until the early 1980s leading scholars in the field continued to develop this theory. In 1973, Saul Cohen offered a model of geostrategic and geopolitical regions. In his “Geography and Politics in a World Divided” Cohen (1973) propounded a hierarchical and regional world model. This model, according to Peter J. Taylor, was based on exposing the “unity myth” which he believed had misled previous geopoliticians. According to Cohen, there is not a strategic unity of space but rather there are separate arenas in a fundamentally divided world. He brings forward the traditional geographical concept of the region to describe this division. A hierarchy of two types of regions are identified depending on whether they are global or regional in scope. First, geostrategic regions which are functionally defined and express the interrelations of a large part of the world. Second, geopolitical regions which are subdivisions of the above and they tend to be relatively homogeneous in terms of one or more of culture, economics and politics.

He defined just two geostrategic regions, each dominated by one of the two major powers and termed “the Trade Dependent Maritime World” and “the Eurasian Continental World” each of them was divided into five and two geopolitical regions respectively. In Cohen’s model there were two distinctive geopolitical regions between the two existing geostrategic regions, which were termed “shatterbelts” - the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Pirouz Mojtahed Zadeh explaining Cohen’s “shatterbelt” argues that: what is termed the Middle East, is, in fact, a collection of distinct geopolitical regions such as the Persian Gulf, Levant, North Africa, and so on. These regions, because of their
concordant environmental phenomena, can be considered as independent and definite geopolitical regions. Therefore, he concludes, the Middle East which is characterised by a lack of political and economic unity, as a geopolitical region does not exist. However, he identifies the Persian Gulf region as the best example of a geopolitical region.\(^{16}\)

Although he does not go any further to define the Persian Gulf region and to identify characteristics of geopolitical regions, his challenge is a valuable starting point for reconsidering the relation between the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps the most important problems in defining the Persian Gulf region are its position in relation to the Middle East and the international political and economic system. It was argued in chapter two that the system of power relations in the Persian Gulf can be better examined by considering it as a subsystem of international system. Such a claim raises the following basic questions which form the main focus of studying the Persian Gulf as a region.

1. The Persian Gulf states are located in the Middle East. Why should the system of power relations in this area not be considered as a subsystem of the Middle East?

2. What are the advantages of such a study?

To answer the above questions and to explain their effects on studying the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf, it is necessary to review the previous studies in this field which inevitably involves an evaluation of concepts they have used to build up their main frameworks.

According to Russett, the notion of a region, either within a single country or a region of the world embracing a number of nations, has provide a venerable tool in the workshed of political and social research. Like most ancient implements, originally
designed for specific purposes by their inventors, it fairly soon was discovered to be an instrument useful for shaving, and smoothing diverse bodies of sociological data.\textsuperscript{17}

Examining some criteria by which a region can be distinguished, Russett introduces three approaches to the concept of a region. The first one is to identify an area divided from another by barriers, perhaps geographic ones, producing thus definition by isolation or separateness. This approach is going to find a natural region such as a river, valley, or plain. The second approach belongs to the social scientists that a region must be composed of units with common characteristics. In other words, regions should be areas of relative homogeneity (the difference between homogeneity and integration should be considered in this approach).\textsuperscript{18}

The third approach defines regions by interdependence, as areas within which a higher degree of mutual dependence exists than in relationships outside that area, nodes where people are bound together by mutual dependence arising from common interests. This easily leads to a definition of a region according to Loyalties or Patriotism, "an area of which the inhabitants instinctively feel themselves a part."\textsuperscript{19}

In addition to the above internal approaches, sometimes a region can be defined from an external approach as "a device for effecting control" or "a highlighted area as a target". Davidson in response to this question that: "where is the Middle East?" says: "the term Middle East seems to have been originated by the British in the late Nineteenth Century to refer to an area with common implications for Her Majesty's strategy."\textsuperscript{20}

Studying the strategic aspects of the relationship between the United States and the States belonging to a vast area in the southern part of Asia called "the Middle East" mainly started after the second World War, when the end of the war brought to the Arab states the sovereignty that they had demanded since their creation in the early
20th century. Since then the term “Middle East” has appeared in literature referring to different things such as, a region loosely defined by geography and culture, located in south-western Asia and north-eastern Africa, a vast geographical area containing Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen, and the states and emirates along the southern and eastern fringes of the Arabian Peninsula, namely, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, or a so-called culture area, the unity of which is based on Islamic law and custom, which usually embraces a much more extensive region, stretching from the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east through all of North Africa, including Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.⁴¹

According to W. B. Fisher, use of the term “Middle East” first arose in the early years of the present century particularly with reference to the area around the Persian Gulf: it was then a logical intermediate definition between the Mediterranean “Near East”, and a “Far East”.⁴²

Don Peretz in his book *The Middle East Today* argues that both the "Middle East" and the "Near East," the older form of the term, are used daily in the press and even in diplomatic exchanges; yet there exists no general agreement concerning the boundaries of the area so described. Not even scholars who have specialised in the study of this area wholly agree upon what territory or populations should be included in the term.⁴³

For the same reason Michael Curtis introduces the definition of the Middle East as an "elastic definition".⁴⁴

Ken Matthews, extending the definition to the cultural area believes that the Middle East is a construction of the European mind. He adds “In intellectual and cultural terms, as has already been observed in the idea of “orientalism”, the Middle East is a product of the European imperial and bourgeois imagination. What might be termed
the "politics of exotica" describes the whole ethos of nineteenth century European exploration, not only of the Middle East but of much of the globe."

Bassam Tibi, in his book *Conflict and War in the Middle East*, also deals with the term "Middle East" from a similar standpoint. He says: "The term "Middle East" is a modern political term, the often very loose geographical definition of a region that - as a geopolitical entity - came into being in the course of recent history, and that is hence expandable and contractible." He adds: "The terms "Middle East" or "Near East" used in European languages are only meaningful from the European perspective. If one is travelling from India or China to Cairo or Damascus, one is moving westwards, and yet one speaks incorrectly in geographical terms of a journey to the Middle East. This term came about in the narrow context of the imperial interests of European colonial powers. The present-day superpowers the USA and to a certain extent the former Soviet Union, have adopted it, despite the fact that it is inappropriate to their geographical location."

The above explanations and many other definitions of this area deal with the question from a geographical point of view. It is quite obvious, as Don Peterz points it out, that general acceptance of the term "Middle East" has been hampered by the tenacity of the previously established usage and by the lack of universally accepted geographical boundaries, however, in addition to geographical considerations there are political, economic, geopolitical, and strategic approaches which need to be examined before entering the main discussion regarding the Middle East and the Persian Gulf as a subsystem.

Among the above mentioned scholars, Tibi, goes further by defining the Middle East as a modern political term, and by trying to introduce the Middle East as a regional subsystem.
He argues that: “When other types of conflict potential in the region are added to that of inter-Arab discord, the picture becomes even more complicated. Regional conflicts in the Middle East can be seen to be of world-wide political importance - not in the globalist sense, however - when one bears in mind that both the USA and the former Soviet Union had crucial regional interests there. These interests, or the perception of them together with the linkage between regional developments and global world politics, and with the inability of the outside powers to exert full control over their regional allies, combine to make the Middle East the single most crucial regional subsystem in world politics today”.32

He identifies three main areas of conflict in the Middle East as a subsystem: The Arab-Israeli state conflict together with the Jewish-Palestinian conflict, Inter Arab conflicts, and Inter-superpower conflicts carried over into the region. He also introduces five geographical conflict zones; the Arab-Israeli Zone, the Arab-Iranian Zone (the Persian Gulf), Lebanon, the Red Sea zone, and the Western Sahara.33

What is important in the above classification is that Tibi identifies the Persian Gulf as a conflict zone within the Middle East regional subsystem. In other words he identifies a single problem area named the Middle East regional subsystem within which a number of conflict zones including the Persian Gulf are highlighted.

Opposite to Tibi’s approach is that of J. D. B. Miller. In a speech in the Seventh National Conference of Australian Institute of International Affair on “The Middle East in World Politics” held in Canberra in March 1979, and in answer to the question; “what does Middle East mean?”, he argued:

I want to draw together some threads in terms of the overall title of the conference and the volume, “the Middle East in world politics”. I emphasise the last two words, because much of the discussion has been, concerned with particular issues, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than with the general picture to which the Middle East contributes. In other words, I am going to say:
here is the Middle East; what have the papers shown about its significance within the international political system? If we look at it technically and clinically, simply in terms of the interaction of particular international relationships, the Middle East is not a single area—even if one stretches it as far as Professor Harris has done in a footnote, to include Algeria—but, as discussed at this conference, it comprises at least five distinct but related subsystems of world politics.

Miller’s argument is based on the concept of subsystem that in his view is a group of states which are notable for their connections and interactions with one another, but which are also parts of the general international system covering the world as a whole. He identifies five subsystems as follows:

1) What one might call the Arab-Israeli group, comprising Israel and its neighbours and traditional antagonists, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

2) The Persian Gulf states.

3) The Horn of Africa and neighbouring areas.

4) The area including Afghanistan as a geographical centre, Iran to the south and west, and Pakistan to the east.


According to him, although one can see how these relate to one another, often through particular states (e.g. Iraq and Saudi Arabia between the first and second groups, Iran between the second and fourth, and Egypt between the first and fifth) each sub-system has its own problems of interrelationship which are not shared to the same degree by the others. Thus, in his view, contrary to Tibi, the Middle East does not constitute a single problem area, but a number of problem areas, each of which is drawn into the international political system through its external connections. The difference between Tibi and Miller is that Miller identifies the Persian Gulf as a subsystem of international system while Tibi tries to keep the Persian Gulf within a group of areas which together form a regional subsystem.
A more recent contribution to the above argument is E. G. H. Joffe’s necessity of rethinking of the term Middle East. In his article “Relations between the Middle East and the West” he argues that the consequences of the second Gulf war in early 1991 provide an opportunity to reconsider the significance of the generally accepted concept of "the Middle East" and its future relationship “the West.” Joffe says:

The traditional vision of the Middle East has been one of a cohesive set of geographically contiguous states, embodying the Arab world at its core and a non-Arab periphery comprising Turkey and Iran, in which normatively common political objectives were seen to be the integrative factors. In large measure, too, the region's cohesion depended on the existence of the Soviet Union as an alternative patron to the United States and on the environment of the Cold War. Now both of these factors are gone, and the contemporary Middle East is characterised both by its atomisation into sub-regions and states with different perceptions of their regional and sub-regional roles, and by an expansion of its outer limits eastward into Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. 37

As a result, according to Joffe, it is no longer possible to talk of a region united by common interests and concerns. The Middle East has now fragmented into at least four components: North Africa, Northeast Africa, the Levant, and the Persian Gulf, each one governed by different imperatives, particularly as far as foreign policy is concerned. 38

The above approaches provide four examples of the main different frameworks to study the relation between the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. First is the traditional one which considers the Persian Gulf as an integral part of the Middle East which itself is viewed as a cohesive set of geographically contiguous states. 39 The Second approach is that of Tibi’s which deals with the Middle East as a regional sub-system and identifies the Persian Gulf as a conflict zone in it. The third one is Joffe’s that classified the Persian Gulf as a sub-region of the Middle East with a high degree of integration.
into the global economy. Finally the fourth one is Miller’s which connects the Persian Gulf region to the international system apart from the other states around it.

Although Miller’s approach was unique in its own kind, especially taking into account the time it was presented (1979), it did not appear to include enough evidence to prove that “the Persian Gulf has its own problems of interrelationship which are not shared to the same degree by the others.” Putting some exceptions aside, the prevailing approach to study the Persian Gulf region is to deal with this area as a part of the Middle East from geopolitical, strategic, and sometimes economic points of view. Such a trend may affect the way a researcher conducts his research regarding a particular subject such as examining the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf. Considering the Persian Gulf as a part of Asia, South Asia, Southwest Asia, Near East, or Middle East, as long as it is only a geographical demarcation, does not seem to have a great impact on the results of such a research. However, when it is examined as a subsystem of the Middle East the research should be capable of showing the interaction among four elements: the US policies, the Persian Gulf regional developments, the Middle East of which the Persian Gulf is a subsystem, and the world order. The following discussion shows that finding such an interaction is impractical both from geopolitical and economic viewpoints.

Examining the criteria which make a group of states in a given geographical region a system, Tibi, argues the following:

Obviously, in order to form a subsystem the members of a group of states must lie in geographical contiguity. Since, however, the concept of a regional subsystem is not merely geographic, but relates also to the idea of a system. This criterion alone is not sufficient to delineate a region. The question is, what makes a group of states in a given geographical region a system? On the basis of my own research, I would regard the following as key criteria: (i) the structural interconnectedness between them (not only socio-economic, but also political, cultural and also ethnic), and (ii) the density of interaction, that is the degree of intensity of
co-operation between the countries of a geographical region on all levels (political, economic, cultural, and military). The notion of “interaction” in this case equally covers co-operation and discord. In other words, he offers three criteria to delineate a region: (1) geographical contiguity; (2) regionally interconnecting structures; and (3) a certain density of interaction, involving both political, as well as ethnic and cultural dimensions.

Using the same criteria, if one considers that the Middle East is a regional sub-system and it comprises several conflict zones as sub-divisions, one can conclude that the Persian Gulf, which according to Tibi is a conflict zone within the Middle East, is in interaction with other conflict zones in the same region. Furthermore, one should not only consider the question of interaction but also the geographical contiguity and regionally interconnecting structures of these zones which together with a certain degree of interaction form the bases of Tibi’s regional subsystemic definition of the Middle East.

This itself raises various problems. For example, how can the regionally structural interconnectedness between the Persian Gulf and the West Sahara be defined? What about the geographical contiguity and interaction between these two conflict zones. What are political, cultural, or ethnic similarities between Iran (for instance) and Cyprus, which according to Tibi is an actor in Middle East subsystem?

It seems that Tibi’s criteria, which have been carefully configured, are a useful starting basis to distinguish a region. However, the Middle East, as it has been defined by him, does not meet the criteria and cannot be considered as a proper unit of analysis.

The Middle East subsystem according to Tibi includes all the countries of the Mashrek, the Maghreb, and the Gulf region. Such an area is too vast and embraces too many diversities, cultural and ethnic divisions, and delineating problems to be a proper model for regional subsystems. However, the question is whether the Persian
Gulf can be a better unit of analysis for Tibi's criteria. Therefore, to find which one of the above mentioned criteria fits the Persian Gulf region and whether or not there are other criteria which should be added to them, it is necessary to test them in the case of the Persian Gulf.

3.1.2. Testing Tibi's criteria in the case of the Persian Gulf region

3.1.2.1. Geographical Contiguity

The Persian Gulf is an arm of the Arabian Sea separating Iran from the Arabian Peninsula. Connected to the Gulf of Oman by the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian gulf is about 990 km (615 mi) long and 56-338 km (35-210 mi) wide; it has an area of approximately 240,000 sq km (92,500 sq mi). The Persian Gulf is bordered by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. The island sheikhdom of Bahrain is the largest of the many islands in the Persian Gulf. This region unlike the Middle East is a definite part of Southeast Asia and there is not any disagreement about the above mentioned states belonging to this region.

The Persian Gulf region is much smaller than the whole Middle East and each of the states around it has a common border with at least two of the others. Therefore Tibi's first criterion fits this region.

3.1.2.2. Regionally Interconnecting Structures

This criterion seems to be more complicated than the first one. There are two problems in the term "interconnecting structures". The first is which kind of connection one should consider among these structures and the second, what are these structures? It is not clear whether it deals with the political or social relations of sovereign states or whether it covers their economic connections also? Is it an economic structure or a political one? Is it cultural or social? Is it a governmental structure or does it go further
back to the social classes? Is it a connection among states or between sub-regions? Is it among all states or just some of them? If one chooses, for instance, the economic aspects, the economic structure of the states in the region should be defined. Then the question would be why should it be limited to a specific region? Perhaps interconnecting structure means the existence of a certain connection among different structures. Interconnectedness can be considered as either integration or interaction. In both cases the interconnecting structure among the states in a region is relative and it seems to be impossible for one to identify a single connecting structure, for example economic, political or even social, for all of the states in the region.

In such a sense the second criterion can be applied neither to the Middle East nor to the Persian Gulf. The only possible solution, if one considers the Middle East as a region, is to divide the Middle East into sub-regions with many similarities, the same as Tibi and Joffe have done, and to limit the number of states involved. In this case, the second criteria is, in fact, applied to the sub-regions not to the region itself. Also in this case the problem is how these sub-regions can have a structural interconnectedness among themselves.

According to some estimates, the Middle East (excluding North Africa) holds 667 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, around 67% of the total discovered in the world. Ninety-nine per cent of these reserves are located in the countries surrounding the Persian Gulf; the remaining 1% is in Egypt. This, on the one hand, shows the significance of the Persian Gulf region for the global market and, on the other hand, because of the similar economic infrastructure of the Persian Gulf states in which oil revenue based economy and oil industry are the most important factors, it represents a high degree of similarity in the geopolitical concerns of the Persian Gulf states. There are three such common geopolitical interests among them:
1- Security of oil export from the Persian Gulf region.
2- Security of foreign trade.
3- Preventing the Persian Gulf region from being affected by the regional or international conflicts.

It is possible for the states within a region to have distinct political, economic, or cultural structures but common geopolitical concerns. Although the existence of regionally interconnecting structures among states may explain a certain degree of common interests, it is not a prerequisite for having common interests. For instance Japan and Saudi Arabia have common interest on the continuation of the oil export from the region, while there is not any regional interconnectedness between them, in fact, they do not even belong to the same region. Saudi Arabia and Iran have their own governmental, social, national, cultural, ethnic, and even religious structures which are not shared between them, while they have common geopolitical concerns as to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region.

Although "geopolitical concern" is not the only factor for identifying a region, unlike interconnecting structures, it is prerequisite of that and cannot be ignored. The term "interconnecting structures" is rather vague and it is not clear whether or not it includes common interests. Therefore, it seems that the second criterion needs to be replaced by "the common geopolitical concerns." Unlike Tibi's second criterion; "regionally interconnecting structures" the "common geopolitical concerns" can better explain the interaction among the Persian Gulf states.47

3.1.2.3- A Certain Density of Interaction

According to Robert Keohane, interaction includes not only co-operation but also conflict and discord.48 The history of the Persian Gulf, especially in the two last decades, is the history of conflict in this area. In addition to the two devastating wars
in the Persian Gulf every one of the eight states around the Gulf has to some degree a
dispute or conflict with another state. Table (2.1) shows some of the territorial
disputes among them.

**Examples of territorial disputes among the Persian Gulf states**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Other Persian Gulf States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iran</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute with Iraq over Arvand Rood (river) and also eight years of war with Iraq, border demarcation problem with Kuwait, dispute with U.A.E. over the ownership of the three Islands of Abu-Musa, lesser Tunb and greater Tunb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute with Iran over Shatt-Al-Arab (river) and also eight years of war with Iran, border dispute with Kuwait, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, dispute with Saudi Arabia over Neutral Zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saudi Arabia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute with Iraq over Neutral Zone, dispute with Kuwait over the ownership of the two Islands of Qurva and Umm-Al-Maradim, territorial dispute with Oman and Qatar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kuwait</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute with Saudi Arabia over the ownership of the two Islands of Qurva and Umm-Al-Maradim, border dispute with Iraq, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, border demarcation problem with Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Arab Emirates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute with Qatar over Khour-Al-Addid, dispute with Iran over the ownership of the three Islands of Abu-Musa, lesser Tunb and greater Tunb, controversy with Oman over Buraimi area and some of the oil fields of Ras-Al-Khaymah, demarcation dispute among Emirates themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qatar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial dispute with Saudi Arabia, Dispute with United Arab Emirates over Khour-Al-Addid,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oman</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>controversy with United Arab Emirates over Buraimi area and some of the oil fields of Ras-Al-Khaymah, territorial dispute with Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from, Asghar J. Voldany and Nilofar H. Kashani, Border disputes among the Persian Gulf states and their effects on regional security, in The Third Seminar on the Persian Gulf (Tehran, Centre for Persian Gulf Studies, 1993), pp. 89-110.

Therefore, one can identify different levels of interaction among the Persian Gulf States which shows that the third criterion can easily be applied to this region. The above account indicates that Tibi's criteria for distinguishing a regional subsystem clearly applies to the Persian Gulf because; 1) the interaction among the Persian Gulf states is more than that of between the Persian Gulf states and the other states of the Middle East, at least as far as the question of conflict is concerned. 2) As far as the global economy is concerned, the Persian Gulf is the most important part of the Middle East
with its direct connection to the global market. 3) From a geographical point of view, external boundaries of the Persian Gulf region are clear while they are not so clear in the case of the Middle East. 4) It is possible to define certain geopolitical concerns for all of the Persian Gulf states while it is almost impossible to do so for the entire Middle East.

The Persian Gulf region is the littoral of the Persian Gulf shared between eight countries of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirate, Bahrain, and Oman. It is also the area where most of the natural economic resources of these eight countries are located. Because of this significance, and taking into consideration the importance of this area in connection with international economic system, none of the above states can be studied in relation with the international political and economic system without a comprehensive discussion about the Persian Gulf region itself. In contradistinction to the possibility of studying the Persian Gulf apart from the Middle East, it is not possible to study the relationship between the states around the Persian Gulf and outside powers solely in the state level apart from the effects of the other states in this region.

The very first criticism of studying the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf at a "regional level" instead of in relation to each state around it separately, is that it will give the researcher just an abstraction and thus, it is not a proper way to study the subject. To avoid such a misunderstanding, one should notice that examining the Persian Gulf as a "region" does not exclude the states. On the contrary, it means both looking at the states and their interaction with one another. The history of the Persian Gulf indicates that any developments in any one of the states around the Gulf has affected the others and has caused changes in the patterns of conflict and co-operation in this region. The Islamic revolution in Iran, the formation of the Gulf Co-operation
Chapter III

Council, the eight years of war between Iran and Iraq, the tanker war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the new deployment of the Persian Gulf states in response to Iraq’s ambitions, the Second Gulf war and its aftermath are good examples of such effects.

The Persian Gulf is not an artificial name created by someone to specify a portion of the globe. As was argued above, unlike the Middle East, it does not have a problem of delineation. There is not any disagreement regarding the geographical definition of the Persian Gulf nor the number of countries that share this area. Therefore, the term “Persian Gulf region” addresses a specific point and a definite area in West Asia which can be considered as a natural as well as a geopolitical region.

The total population of the countries around the Persian Gulf is about 93 million in which Persians, Iraqi Turks, Azarbaijanis, Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiaris, Baluchs, and Arabs are major ethnic Groups. More than 60% of the total population are Shi’i and 40% are Sunni which are divided into different sects. Therefore, from a socio-scientific approach, the Persian Gulf is not homogenous, however, despite diverse nationalities, ethnic groups and different religious beliefs, there is a high degree of interdependence among the Persian Gulf states. The interdependence among these states can be characterised by two factors: common interests and common security problems (these factors will be examined in chapter four).

As was argued in chapter one, there is a strong connection between the global economic system and the Persian Gulf region which does not pass through the, so called, Middle East subsystem.

It does not mean that there is no relation between the Persian Gulf sub-system and its neighbours. Countries can be members of different sub-regions at the same time. However, to be an intermediate level between the Persian Gulf sub-system and the international system, another defined system should have a certain degree of
interaction with both systems (Persian Gulf system and International system). Based on what has been argued earlier in this chapter, there is no such a system in this area. Neither an Arab system nor a Middle East system can be considered as an intermediate level in this regard.

The Middle East for the lack of political and economic unity, could not be considered as a geopolitical region and for the lack of geographical proximity among those states which are located in this area, the lack of common geopolitical concerns among them and the lack of a certain degree of interaction among so called Middle East countries cannot be defined as a system.

An Arab system based on Arab nationalism is also just an idea rather than a system (see the definition of systems in section) and also, taking into account the previously discussed criteria by which a region can be identified, Arab system does not represents a geopolitical region.

There is a big difference between the existence of an affecting factor and the existence of a subsystem or a system as an intermediate level.

For instance, Israel can be considered as a major influence on US decision making regarding the Persian Gulf, however, it does not mean that each and everyone of the Persian Gulf developments or its relations to the international system will find its path through Israel. With or without the effect of Israel upon US decision making, access to the region’s energy resources or its market is an objective for the United States. There are other neighbours or even remote countries or groupings which may affect or be affected by both regional developments and US policies in this region. However they cannot be defined as a subsystem or an intermediate system (for the affecting factors see chapter V, p.133 and 154).
3.2. Identifying the main concern of the United States in the Persian Gulf region.

The main concerns of the United States in the Persian Gulf region are well documented and not in dispute. According to almost all sources regarding the relations between the United States and the Persian Gulf, oil is the main concern of the United States in this region.54

Roger M. Savory's55 approach is among the few exceptions to this consensus of opinion. He argues that the "vital" US interests in the Gulf region were enunciated in the 1980 Carter Doctrine and were, even then, largely geopolitical, rather than economic in nature. By 1983 the United States could no longer pretend that Middle East oil was a "vital" interest, inasmuch as Middle East oil imports to the United States in that year, expressed as a percentage of total US oil imports, amounted to only 8 percent. In fact, in 1983 Great Britain exported more oil to the United States than did Saudi Arabia. It is true that Japan, an ally of the United States, obtains 56 percent of its oil from the Middle East, but the United States has not forced Japan to pay the military and economic costs of securing free passage of its oil tankers through the Gulf.

The principal US geopolitical interests in the Gulf continue to be the rendering of support to Israel; denying the Soviet Union (it was states before the disintegration of the Soviet Union) a dominant role in the Gulf region; bolstering the security of friendly Arab states in the region; and maintaining safe passage through the Gulf for the ships of the United States and its European and Middle Eastern allies. It is this last objective that has led to a greatly enhanced US naval presence in the area, according to Savory.56 The first question regarding Savory's approach is why bolstering the friendly Arab states in the region is important to the United States. The second question is why maintaining safe passage through the Gulf for the ships of the United States and its
European and Middle Eastern allies is so important. Are these “vital interests” or policies to meet the vital interests?

Feisal Al Mazidi, among others, argues that the single most important factor in determining United States-Gulf relations is the US interest in maintaining the continued supply of oil from the region at a reasonable price. According to him, OPEC, overall, holds 77 per cent of total world oil reserves, approximately two-thirds of which lie in the Persian Gulf. Rising US oil imports as well as European and Japanese dependency on Gulf oil, ensure a long-term US commitment in the area to protect energy resources. The United States also has an interest in preserving and expanding its share of Gulf markets. This is particularly important where arms sales are concerned due to the shrinking domestic US military market, increased international competition, and the post-Gulf War expansion of GCC armament programmes. (In 1991 Saudi Arabia was the single largest arms purchaser in the Third World, mostly from the USA.)

Valerie Yorke adopts the same approach and says: “since the United States’ need for Middle East oil is increasing rapidly, it has a vital interest in maintaining access to Persian Gulf oil supplies at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantity to meet its own needs and those of its allies.” Michael Tanzer, in his article “Oil and the Gulf Crisis”, also says: “historically, it has always been a US goal to have as much control as possible over non-renewable resources, especially oil.” Philip Robins identifies “maintaining the unimpeded flow of oil from the Gulf to the West” as vital concern of the United States in this region.

Because of the similarity of approaches regarding the above question there is no ambiguity as to the main concern of the United States in the literature. Nevertheless, there are sometimes misconceptions of the terms, concerns, goals, objectives, interests, and policies of the United States in the region which need to be examined.
3.3. Finding goals and policies of the United States toward the region.

The most interesting part of the literature concerning US-Persian Gulf relations is the considerable number of discussions regarding the United States' goals, objectives, interests and policies toward the region. Since there are various interpretations of the above terms and this research needs a clear conceptual framework for further discussion, it is necessary to examine the applications of the above terms in literature from a comparative standpoint.

As Gregory Treverton argues in his book *Crisis Management and the Superpowers in the Middle East* (1981), the complicated tangle of interests and relationships that run through international politics, including regional conflicts and wars and the continuing struggle for self-determination; the competition between the two super-powers; and an increasing awareness of the West of its dependence on imported resources, especially petroleum from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, has been the most important factor leading to the United States growing involvement in this area.

World War I had proven to the world that petroleum was a critical resource for any nation that aspired to greatness. Such a realisation called special attention to the countries of the Middle East in general and to the Persian Gulf in particular, because, although most of the world's nations produced at least minor amounts of oil, the primary concentrations were (and still are) in the Persian Gulf, North and West Africa, the North Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico. Out of about 90 oil-producing nations, five countries in the Persian Gulf contain two-thirds of current-known oil reserves. Historically, the United States has attempted to find the new sphere of influence in the oil rich area of the Persian Gulf since the early 40's. According to James A. Bill, In August 1943, after discussing the moral and humanitarian reasons for an American
presence in Iran to offset British and Soviet ambitions, Cordel Hall, then the US Secretary of State, stated: "Likewise, from a more directly selfish point of view, it is to our interest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American development in Saudi Arabia." Parallel to the American development in Saudi Arabia the United States began to send advisory teams and missions to Iran in 1942. The mission of these teams was to strengthen the organisation and forces of the badly weakened Iranian army. Another military mission was the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC), headed by Gen. Donald Connolly, consisting of nearly thirty thousand non-combatant American troops who aided the Allied cause by providing the USSR with badly needed wartime supplies over the Iranian land bridge. Although these events and many other similar US involvement indicate the United States activities in the Persian Gulf prior to the end of the second World War, perhaps two unrelated conflicts paved the way for the more intensified and complicated involvement of the United States in the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf in particular. Firstly, the dispute between the Soviet Union on the one hand and its Southern neighbours, Turkey and Iran, on the other; and secondly, the formation of Israel and the continuing conflict between Israel and the Arab states.

After the second World War, the position vacated by the old imperial powers were filled by the new superpowers. Historically, the first involvement of the United States in the region, after World War II, was to provide economic, diplomatic and military aid to Iran, Turkey (and also Greece in Europe) to withstand the communist expansion (Truman Doctrine). J.A.S. Genville and Bernard Wasserstein argue that the
replacement by the superpowers in the Middle East was particularly the case after the Suez adventure of 1956\textsuperscript{68}, when the United States felt compelled to assume primary responsibility for the defence of Western interests in the region. Such an explanation of the United States involvement in the region raises two questions. The first question is, what would happen to the role of the United States in the Middle East if the Soviet Union did not appear as a rival military superpower. In other words, was the US involvement in this region a reaction against the growing influence of communism or was it in the direction of the evolution of a hegemonic process which had been started soon after the end of the second World War?\textsuperscript{69}

The second question is why the United States should assume primary responsibility for defence of Western interests in the region?

Christopher Layne argues that the US involvement in strategic parts of the world was due to the nature of American Imperialism and its need to spread, regardless of the existence or none existence of a hostile superpower. He states that: "at the end of World War II, Washington was committed to an active internationalist agenda and would have pursued it even if the Soviet Union had not emerged as a geopolitical and ideological rival. That essential point was acknowledged in NSC 68, the 1950 National Security Council document that articulated America's Cold War strategy as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. Motivated by their conviction that American security and prosperity depend on world order, NSC 68's authors argue that the policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community [was] a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat."\textsuperscript{70}
The fact is that goals unlike the policies cannot be reactionary, they are defined by three elements of interests, security, and prosperity. At the national level, where foreign policies are defined, there are commonly stated to be three foreign policy goals: (1) Promotion of the national interests, (2) The protection of national security, and (3) The maximisation of national welfare. However, the meanings of these terms, according to Brewer, are normally vague. The avoidance of nuclear war or the achievement of an open international trade system are examples of the more clearly specified goals.

Sometimes stated goals are either propagandistic or ambitious rather than realistic. Defending the human rights, providing for international peace, or creating a new world order in the form that George Bush addressed to Congress on 11 September 1990 are good examples of this kind of goal.

There are four key terms which are used in almost all of the research works regarding the US foreign relations; interests, goals, policy objectives, and policies. Interests seem to be the permanent elements in the whole process which motivate policies through defining goals as general aims and policy objectives as specific (local) intents (see figure 3-1).

Although there are relations among these terms, sometimes they are applied instead of one another which makes confusion and affects the results of a research. For example, Gary Sick, in his article “The United States and the Persian Gulf”, argues that the interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf region have been very simple and consistent: first, to ensure access by the industrial world to the vast oil resources of the region; and secondly, to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political or military control over those resources. Other objectives, he believes, "have been expressed by
US leaders from time to time, such as preserving the stability and independence of the Gulf states or containing the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. But those are derivative concerns growing out of specific circumstances and are implicit in the two grand themes of oil and Soviet containment that have been the constant elements in US policy.\textsuperscript{76}

The first criticism of the above statement is that the two consistent interests of the United States namely: having access to the region's oil resources and preventing the Soviet Union from controlling these resources are not in the same category. The former is a goal while the latter is a policy. It is interesting that Sick has mentioned other US policies such as containing the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a derivative concern grown out of specific circumstances without considering that the policy of containing the Soviet threat has also been another adopted policy in another specific circumstances.

The second question is whether or not "preserving the stability and independence of the Gulf states" is an "objective" for the United States.

If one accepts the above course of action as an objective for the United States, one can conclude that the Americans should have used or should use all necessary means to achieve it. Then the question would be how much the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf has helped the security and stability of the region. On the other hand if one considers that preserving the stability and independence of the Gulf states is only a US policy, one can assume that it may change from time to time or in different circumstances. Therefore, it is important how a researcher distinguishes between goals and policies. In the case of Sick's argument of US foreign policy it seems that the two conceptions of "policy" and "objective" have been mixed up.
Another example is Eric Hooglund's explanation of the US policies in his article "US Policy toward the Persian Gulf in the 1990s." He states that from 1979 to the end of the Iran-Iraq war, US policy toward the Persian Gulf can be summarised as follows:

1) Containing the expansion and influence of the Soviet Union in this region.
2) Protecting US and Western economic interests in the Gulf, especially oil supplies.
3) Maintaining friendly relations with the local political allies.
4) Making sure that political developments in the area do not adversely affect the security of Israel.
5) Containing the expansion and influence of the Islamic revolution.
6) Keeping Iraq within the moderate camp.77

There is a contradiction in this explanation that "protecting US and Western economic interests in the Gulf", as a "goal", is not in the same category as the other "policies" are. In fact, all other above mentioned policies are derived from this goal.

Philip Robins uses the term "US interests" referring to the main concerns of the United States in the Persian Gulf. He identifies four such interests:

1) Maintaining the unimpeded flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the West.
2) Blocking Soviet expansion southwards.
3) Maintaining an active presence in a geostrategic part of the world.
4) Confining the Islamic revolutionary model of government to Iran.78

Here also two goals (1 and 3) are beside two policies (2 and 4). Due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, blocking Soviet expansion southwards is now a redundant policy while maintaining the unimpeded flow of oil from the Persian Gulf is still a valid policy.

In most cases, terms like interests, goals, and policies of the United States toward the Persian Gulf have not been used in a right place in literature. Therefore, for the purpose of this research defining a framework in this regard seems to be necessary.79
The United States has some political, economic, and social interests both at the national and transnational levels. Consider for instance US economic interests at the transnational level. The economic interests of the United States inspire different economic goals towards different geographical parts of the globe. For example, safeguarding the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the industrialised countries or preserving and expanding the United States' share of Gulf markets. The goals also motivate different policies in different circumstances. For example, helping Iraq in its war against Iran or protecting Kuwait against Iraq in second Gulf war. In other words, interests build goals and goals motivate policies.

Figure (3.1) shows how interests, goals, and policies can relate to each other in the case of economic interests for instance.

Using this framework helps to study the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf in a systemic way. It also helps to distinguish permanent interests and temporary policies.
of the United States in this region. Separating goals and policies also enables one to evaluate whether a right policy has been applied to meet a certain goal.

3.4. Summary and Conclusion

So far, existing problems in the literature regarding the first three steps of studying the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf region have been discussed. It has been argued that the Persian Gulf is a "region" interacting with international system as a sub-system. It was also argued that, because of this interaction, there is no need to study the role of the United States in the system of power relations in the Persian Gulf as mediated by the Middle East. It has been accepted that the main concern of the United States in this region is economic; access to the oil resources and gaining more profit by exchanging goods particularly military equipment with petro-dollars. The relation between interests, goals, and policies was defined and it became clear that misuse of these terms may affect the result of the research.

Putting all these points together, the scenario for further discussions would be as follows: There is a region with a high degree of importance for the international economic system for its huge accumulation of natural energy resources named the Persian Gulf. The United States has been militarily involved in this region to defend its interests and those of its allies. Such an involvement shows the existence of certain interests, inevitable dangers or threats, certain goals and a number of adopted policies toward the region. Whatever the interests or goals have been (are), it is possible to define two levels of interaction in this area: 1) Interaction between the United States' policies and the Persian Gulf regional developments. 2) Interaction between regional developments and the international system. To define these levels of interaction, it is necessary to follow the three remaining procedures of the six aforesaid steps namely:
• Examining the interaction between US policies and the Persian Gulf regional developments.

• Finding the effects of such an interaction on security and stability of the region.

• Finding the effect of threats upon policies of both the United States and regional states.

These issues form the main body of this research. Therefore, each will be discussed in a separate chapter.
CHAPTER IV

The United States and The Security of the Persian Gulf Region

4.1. Introduction:

To have a proper understanding of the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf’s new system of power relations which itself represents the new pattern of conflict and co-operation in this area, it is necessary to understand the concept of security in this region. Relations among states involve confrontation between different levels of national, regional, and global interests. These interests set the stage for the states to pursue different objectives and to apply different foreign policies to protect themselves against various forms of internal or external threats. Threats, in this sense, can be military, political, social, economic, or even cultural. Wherever there is a threat there is a security problem which needs to be dealt with.

Therefore, security is a major issue in studying the relations among different states. In the case of the United States and its relations with the Persian Gulf states there is a high degree of economic interests involved which along with the unstable nature of the regional developments makes a “security complex”. Therefore, the security of the Persian Gulf region needs to be studied by a framework capable of exploring interconnected complexities. The commonly used term in literature for explaining the situation in which security of a group of states is in mind is “regional security” which, the same as security itself, is an underdeveloped concept.

There are two approaches to the question of regional security in literature. The first approach, which can be labelled the isolationist one, assumes that many problems faced by the states (particularly in the third world) are of a regional nature and potentially can be solved by regional solutions. For instance, Ayoob, among others, states that
the idea of regional security makes three assumptions: that external states with interests in the region will refrain from interference; that regional states will have successfully dealt with their own domestic frictions; and that interstate tensions in the region are at a low level and/or can be dealt with easily by institutional mechanisms regionally accepted.4

Caroline Thomas, while accepting Ayoob’s criteria as a set that better fits Western Europe, which has had centuries of state-building and political legitimisation, than the third world states, adds a fourth criterion to his list that “a region can be defined”. With or without Thomas’s criterion, according to the first approach, “the idea of regional security stands in contrast to the notion of global or systemic security which sees the international system as indivisible, i.e. all developments in all parts of the system are interconnected.”5

In this sense, the concept of regional security can only be used to study the interaction among the Persian Gulf states, not the interaction between the United States policies and the Persian Gulf regional developments simply because it assumes that external states with interests in the region will refrain from interference. If the first approach is applied, the United States as an external power will remain outside of the circle of regional powers. Therefore, its role cannot be studied as a participant in the regional order.

The second approach which can be labelled “systemic approach” does not draw a line between global and regional security. In contrast, it sees the regional security as a level between national and international or global security with a certain degree of interaction between them. Barry Buzan, searching for such an intermediate level argues that: “Any attempt to study security has to face the problem of the seamless web.”6 He states that security is a relational phenomenon. It involves the capabilities, desires and
fears of individual states, as well as, the capabilities, desires and fears of the other states with which they interact. Because security is relational, the national security of any given state cannot be understood without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded.

Buzan’s “seamless web” is faced with a complicated issue that if the security of each is related to the security of all, then nothing can be sufficiently understood without understanding everything. Since the reality of security interdependence is unavoidable, he concludes: “the only hope of defining manageable subjects for study that neither lose, nor succumb to, the vital sense of the whole, is to find a hierarchy of levels within the holistic perspective.” Each of these levels must identify durable, significant, and substantially self-contained features of the security problem. But no one of them will, by itself, be adequate to understand the problem as a whole, and the full meaning of each will only become clear in relation to the others.

He offers three levels of study as his own framework: the top level, which is the global security or the security of the international system; the intermediate level and the bottom level which is the national security.

Buzan applies the term regional security for his intermediate level, however, regional security in his view, contrary to the first approach, is not a distinct level or an idea which stands in contrast to the notion of global or systemic security (i.e. it does not exclude external factors). His intermediate level is a subsystem of international security while at the same time is interacting with the lower level (national security).

In this sense, the term “regional security” can be applied to study the role of an outside power in a region. Such a framework seems to have a particular application to study the Persian Gulf region in which the regional security, according to Jo-Anne Hart, from a systemic point of view, cannot feasibly be seen or formulated around an
essentially autonomous regional approach. It involves outside actors, especially the United States, to a greater or lesser extent. Therefore, considering the second approach as a starting point and evaluating the other possible approaches, in this chapter attempts will be made to develop the concept of Persian Gulf security to be useful to evaluate the effect of the United States policies toward this region which will be examined in the following chapter.

Buzan’s subsystemic approach to the question of “region” and “regional security” is more or less similar to the one which was used in chapter III and will be compared and tested in the case of the Persian Gulf in this chapter. The main objective of the preceding chapter was to define the Persian Gulf both as a region and a subsystem of the international system. It was argued that common geopolitical concerns among the Persian Gulf states was among the criteria by which this region could be distinguished from the other parts of the Middle East.9

However, the question is whether or not the existence of common geopolitical concerns leads to a common security approach among all participants in the system of power relations in this region.

The three geopolitical concerns among the Persian Gulf states namely; oil, foreign trade, and preventing the region from being affected by the regional conflicts are all related to the question of security and stability of the region. However, how much they can set the stage for practically achieving security is another question.

There are two main groups which have certain interests in this region and have tried to use the issue of security and also the necessity of balance of power and stability of the region to justify their policies toward the Persian Gulf; outside powers, particularly the United States, and the Persian Gulf states.
Since the British withdrawal from the region in early 70's, there have been a considerable number of contributions in the literature dealing with the security and stability of the region in both forms of considering the Persian Gulf as a part of the Middle East, thus studying a more complicated issue of the Middle East security, and focusing on the Persian Gulf region itself. However, the concept of security of the Persian Gulf region has not been clearly defined.

The terms like "security in the Persian Gulf", "security of the Persian Gulf", "the Persian Gulf and its security", which are widely used in the literature do not employ a single conception. It is not clear whether, for instance, "security in the Persian Gulf" means security of regional powers or outside power interests or both. It is also not clear that whether it is defined against regional threats or external ones or both.

In addition to the underdevelopment of the concept of security itself, it seems that two more factors have been responsible for such a gap in literature. First, the unstable nature of events in this region which has kept the region in a position with a high risk of spreading conflicts and wars, especially in the period prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, the different clashing interests of the active internal and external participants in the system of power relations in this region every one of which has had a different approach to the security of the region based on different levels of threats which have faced each of them.

Uncertainty as to the concept of the security of the Persian Gulf region has affected the accuracy of evaluating the effect of the internal and external power's policies on the stability of the region. For instance, it is not clear whether the dual containment policy\textsuperscript{10} of the United States to prevent Iran and Iraq from dominating over the region is an stabilising policy aiming at securing and stabilising the region simply because it is not clear what the stability and security of the region mean.
According to Hart, identifying the key components of current security needs for the Persian Gulf is a matter of considerable differences in perspective. For the United States the list might include a credible and ready ability to secure its Arab allies in the Persian Gulf, the containment of Iran and Iraq, and regional non-proliferation goals relative to unconventional weaponries (i.e. weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons). The Iranian statement of security goals, on the other hand, would clearly be different. Other Persian Gulf actors would identify different priorities. (The viewpoints of Iran, the United States, Iraq and GCC member states will be discussed later in this chapter).

In other words security means different things to different participants in this region simply because each of them faces different kinds of threats. The most important point in this regard is that the existence of common geopolitical interests among participants in the Persian Gulf’s system of power relation does not necessarily mean the existence of a single common security approach among them. For instance, security of oil exports from this region is one of the common geopolitical concerns of both internal and external powers, however, for the United States it is Iran’s Islamic radicalism and Iraq’s Bathist expansionist policies which have to be considered as the main threats to the security of this common interest, while, Iran, and to some extent Iraq, are blaming the United States for its military presence in the region that threatens the stability of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, common security in the Persian Gulf is not merely based on common geopolitical concerns of the internal and external powers. As was mentioned above, the main objectives of this chapter are:

1) To define the concept of the security of the Persian Gulf region.

2) To investigate whether there are certain criteria for the region’s security.
Nonetheless, there are a few questions which need to be examined before discussing the main subject. These questions are as follows:

- What is security?
- What is regional security?
- Is it possible to apply the framework of "regional security" in the case of the Persian Gulf?
- Is the Persian Gulf security a common security issue for both regional states and the United States?
- What is the best framework for studying the Persian Gulf security?
- What is the difference between "security of the Persian Gulf" and "security of US interests in the region?"

4.2. What is Security?

The dictionary definition of security is the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger.\(^\text{14}\) It also means freedom from doubt, well-founded confidence, freedom from anxiety or apprehension. Security whether individual, national, or international, undoubtedly ranks among the problems facing humanity. It is widely used in literature referring to peace, freedom, confidence, safety, and many other conditions in which an individual or a group of people feels free from anxiety, fear, danger or threat rising both from within or outside. Although, as Barry Buzan argues\(^\text{15}\), the term itself is in general use in international relations and other disciplines, and appears to be accepted as a central organising concept by both practitioner and academics, the literature on it is very uneven. Buzan argues that a large and flourishing body of work exists on the empirical side dealing with contemporary national security problems and issues. Most of this comes out of the sub-field of Strategic Studies, for which security is a central normative focus. The foreign, military and economic policies of states, the intersections of these policies in areas of change or dispute and the general structure of relations which they create, are all analysed in terms of aspirations to achieve national and/or international security. However, until the rise of economic
and environmental concerns during the 1970s the concept of security was seldom addressed in terms other than the policy interests of particular actors, and right up to the end of the 1980s the discussion still had a heavy military emphasis.\textsuperscript{16}

In his comprehensive search for a conceptual framework for security, he identifies a few references before 1980 in which there is still no coherent school of thought. John Herz's idea of "security dilemma" in the early 1950's\textsuperscript{17} can be considered as a major breakthrough after the first World War. In his "International Politics in the Atomic Age", Herz explains that the "security dilemma", or "power and security dilemma" is a social constellation in which units of power (such as states or nations in international relations) find themselves whenever they exist side by side without higher authority that might impose standards of behaviour upon them and thus protect them from attacking each other.

In such a condition, a feeling of insecurity, deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear, compels these units to compete for ever more power in order to find more security, an effort which proves self-defeating because absolute security remains ultimately unobtainable. He believes that this dilemma, and not such (possibly additional) factors as "aggressiveness," or desire to acquire the wealth of others, or general depravity of human nature, constitutes the basic cause of what is commonly referred to as the "urge for power" and resulting "power politics."\textsuperscript{18}

Buzan introduces Herz's approach to the security dilemma as a starting point in this field. However, according to Baylis and Rengger, writing about the security dilemma in 1959, Herz indicated that he had been unaware of Butterfield's writings on the subject when he had first claimed "primary importance for the security dilemma."\textsuperscript{19}

Butterfield's understanding of the insecurity dynamic focused on the inadvertent but invariable consequences of "Hobbesian fear". Butterfield suggested that international
politics was shaped by a "condition of absolute predicament or irreducible dilemma" which lay "in the very geometry of human conflict". Running through his words is Butterfield's sense of the tragedy in international relations: "Behind the great conflicts of mankind", he wrote, "is a terrible human predicament which lies at the heart of the story."20

Baylis and Rengger argue that Herz indicated that he wished to distance himself from Butterfield's claim that the "dilemma" was the basis of all past and present conflict. Herz suggested that there was a difference between "security policies" and policies motivated by interests that go beyond security proper. By this he meant that all states pursue security, but some pursue security plus ambition. Here, Herz pointed as an example to Hitler's behaviour in the 1930s, arguing that it can hardly be maintained that it was a German security dilemma which lay at the heart of that conflict, but rather one man's, or one regime's ambition to master the world. Baylis and Rengger conclude that in spite of differences of emphasis between Herz and Butterfield, it is evident that both writers believed that the search for security through military power tends to provoke insecurity in others.21

The second step to define security was taken by Arnold Wolfers.22 In his article on national security he characterises security as an "ambiguous symbol" which may not have any precise meaning at all. He has suggested that security points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired. Quoting Walter Lippmann, Wolfer says: "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war. What this definition implies is that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it."23 According to Buzan, aside from the above core works, one finds only a few other conceptual
discussions of security that predate the relative boom starting in the early 1980s. Since this period, more dimensions (such as economic, environmental, etc.) have been added to the definition of security and the traditional assumptions have been modified. Characteristics of the traditional usage of the term have appeared in Mohammed Ayoob’s review article: “The Security Problematic of the Third World.” He says: “the term security as it has been traditionally used in literature is based on two major assumptions: one, that threats to a states’ security principally arise from outside its borders, and two, that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and usually need a military response.”

Although entering the question of interdependence in security studies by Buzan and others opened a new area of research, the traditional usage had not completely vanished in 1980’s.

Table (4.1) shows a few samples of different contributions to the definition of the term security.

Table 4.1. Some of the contributions to the definitions of the concept of security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DEFINITION OR CONTRIBUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert McNamara</td>
<td>Poverty leads to unrest, to internal upheaval, to violence and to the escalation of extremism. Security means development and not military hardware. Security is neither force nor military activity but it is development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedley Bull</td>
<td>Brief but useful contributions on the difficulties of applying security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh MacDonald</td>
<td>Attempted to tackle the ambiguity of the concept, but ended up defeated by his own categories and withdrew from the struggle by dismissing security as an 'inadequate' concept- a view also arrived at for quite different reasons by Hans Mouritzen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Jervis</td>
<td>Introducing the interesting idea of security regimes, which draws attention from the state to the system level of analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gert Krell</td>
<td>Attempting a broad critique of excessively military conceptions of security from a peace research perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>DEFINITION OR CONTRIBUTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jozsef Balázs</td>
<td>International security is determined basically by the internal and external security of the various social systems, by the extent, in general, to which system identity depends on external circumstances. Experts generally define social security as internal security. Its essential function is to ensure the political and economic power of a given ruling class, or the survival of the social system and an adequate degree of public security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Bellany</td>
<td>Security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penelope Hartland-Thunberg</td>
<td>National security is the ability of a nation to pursue successfully its national interests, as it sees them, anywhere in the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Lippmann</td>
<td>A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael H.H. Loud</td>
<td>National security includes traditional defence policy and also the non-military actions of a state to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal and international objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giacomo Luciani</td>
<td>National security may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John E. Mroz</td>
<td>Security is the relative freedom from harmful threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defence College (Canada):</td>
<td>National Security is the preservation of a way of life acceptable to the people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others.  It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values which are essential to the quality of life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank N. Trager and F. N. Simonie</td>
<td>National security is that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Ullman</td>
<td>A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table (4.1.) continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ole Wever</td>
<td>One can view 'security' as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying 'security' a state-representative moves the particular case into a specific area; claiming a special right to use the means necessary to block this development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold Wolfers</td>
<td>Security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard H. Ullman</td>
<td>Security may be defined not merely as a goal but as a consequence. This means that we may not realise what it is or how important it is until we are threatened with losing it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The core elements which appeared in almost all of the definitions of the term security were values and dangers or threats. Security is defined between these two elements as a function for protecting values against threats. Both common values and common threats may lead to a common security approach among sovereign states. Buzan who has a more comprehensive conceptual approach to the problem calls the term security an underdeveloped concept. Quoting W. B. Gallie, he accepts the essentially contested nature of social science concepts including security. He tries to make an intermediate level of analysis between the Realists power based approach and the Idealists peace based contributions to define the concept of security. According to him, traditionally, most of the literature that attempted analysis or prescription was, and to some extent still is, based on the concepts of power and peace each representing Realist and Idealist viewpoints respectively. Until the 1980s, these two approaches dominated thinking about the national security problem. They usually led to highly polarised and conflicting prescriptions within which the concept of security played a subsidiary role. Realists tended to consider security as a derivative of power: an actor with enough power to reach a dominating position would acquire security as a result. This view, he says, was easy to take when power was defined in the very broad terms.
sketched by Morgenthau. Although security was rightly placed as the goal, the understanding that power was the route to it was inherently self-defeating. Idealists tended to see security as a consequence of peace: a lasting peace would provide security for all.

Buzan argues that the concept of security is, in itself, a more versatile, penetrating and useful means of approach to the study of international relations than either power or peace. It points to a prime motive for behaviour which is different from, but no less significant than, that provided by power. It also leads to a comprehensive perspective which is likewise different from, but no less useful than, that provided by peace. In combination, these add up to an analytical framework which stands comparison with anything available from the more established concepts. Buzan's new approach begins with assuming that a more fully developed concept of security can be seen to lie between the extremes of power and peace, incorporating most of their insights, and adding more of its own. It provides many ideas which link the established conventions of the other two schools and help to bridge the political and intellectual gulf which, he believes, normally, and to their mutual detriment, separates them.

The most important difference in Buzan's work is that he does not see security as a part of the strategic studies but a major element of the international relations. Because of the ambiguity of the concept of the security, he does not try to define the term, however, he gives a framework by which security can be studied in different cases and different contexts.

In sum, there is not a generally agreed definition for the term since it is affected by factors in different sectors: military, political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental. Therefore the best way to study the security is to direct studies toward empirical cases where the particular factors in play can be identified. This method can
be named "security in context." Applying security in different contexts may lead to entirely different subjects of study.

For instance, while social security addresses a particular usage of the concept of security in social context, by itself, it represents a specific concept in national context. It means that social security in the United States may contain different elements as compared to that of Saudi Arabia or Japan, because, it addresses both different societies and different states. It is the case even if the general meaning of social security in both cases is to protect social values against internal and external threats.

Therefore, as far as the subject of this study is concerned, to identify the proper method to study the security of the Persian Gulf region it is necessary: 1) to examine common applied terms in studying states collectively, in this case, "regional security"; 2) to determine the context in which this concept should be defined.

Regional security according to Buzan is more important than mere situational name-tags, and more enduring than the passage of some particular war or confrontation. Regional security expresses the sense that distinct and significant subsystems of security relations exist among some sets of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other. However, like the concept of security itself, this concept also is an ambiguous one. While Caroline Thomas explaining regional security says: "many problems faced by the Third World are of a regional nature and potentially could be solved by regional solutions," Razavi sees it as the West against the others. Whether the determinants of insecurity be of a regional nature or imposed from outside the region, or, as was discussed earlier, be a combination of both, studying a region needs a clear framework in which elements and their interactions in mutual relations among them can be identified. Referring to the previous chapter, a region is a subsystem of an international system. Therefore security
of a region cannot be seen outside the scope of the interaction between the international system and regional developments. Considering the importance of such an interaction the traditional subsystem idea of balance of local powers, although is a significant feature of the security environment, according to Buzan, it has never proved very useful precisely because it is confined to the single dimension of power on which the great power dynamic most strongly overrode and obscured the local ones.53

The Persian Gulf regional security can be approached in one or a combination of social, political, economic, military, cultural, and environmental contexts. It can also be defined in an interstate (among the Persian Gulf states) or an international level (global level) (see Figure 4.1).

![Diagram of Level and Context]

(Figure 4.1)

At a regional level security of the region can be studied as common parts of member states' national security needs. At the international level it can be studied as a subsystem of the international security system. Based on what has been argued so far none of the above is able to give a comprehensive approach on its own. It seems that a combination of both, which is to study common parts of member states national
security needs in their relations to the international system, would be the best way to deal with the question of security in the Persian Gulf.

To avoid going far from the main subject of the research, which deals with the system of power relations in the Persian Gulf, and taking into account that a comprehensive study of Persian Gulf security may include all the above stages, this chapter will define the Persian Gulf regional security at the regional level and will investigate its position in the international system. This method seems to be useful to highlight the importance of the systemic relationship between regional security and both lower (state) and higher (international) levels.

There are at least three questions which need to be answered:

1) Basing it on the national security approaches of the Persian Gulf states, what is Persian Gulf regional security? (see sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7)

2) How does the security of this region link to the international security? (see section 4.9)

3) What is the position of the United States in this circle? (see sections 4.4, 4.8 and 4.9)

4.3. The Persian Gulf Regional Security

Security of the Persian Gulf can be studied by using three different frameworks:

1. A framework which includes the eight Persian Gulf states linking together in a triangle of power relations (Iran, Iraq, G.C.C. member states) and excludes the United States from the regional security circle while considering the effects of its policies as the most penetrating external factor. In such a framework the United States is considered to pursue its own national security objectives which are not necessarily the same as that of the Persian Gulf states, even if a common issue such as the oil be at stake. In this sense, the United States can be considered as threat to the security of region for the three main reasons:
I. Contrary to the regional states, providing for security and stability of the Persian Gulf is not an objective for the United States but an issue in context of its national security needs and, of course, its interests. Therefore, security of the region can be threatened by the United States in special circumstances when regional developments in any forms are assessed as threats to those interests. In this case, for the United States, what really matters is “the security in the Persian Gulf”, which is the security of its interests in this region, not “the security of the Persian Gulf.” Things get even more complicated when there is a mutual connection between the US interests and that of one or a group of states in the region. There have been three different situations in this case:

1) The situation in which the United States supports the strongest regional power, as occurred in system one between 1972 and 1979.54

2) The situation in which the strongest local power is turning against US interests in the region (system two).55

3) The situation in which the United States supports the weaker side in a regional conflict to create a balance of power (system three).

Therefore, for the United States, security of the Persian Gulf has had three different meanings in three different circumstances since the British withdrawal from this region in early 70’s. However, in all cases security of the US interests in this region has been its main objective.

II. There is an imbalance of fear from insecurity between regional powers and the United States. the US people, territories, natural resources, national source of manpower and military capabilities are far from the region. Therefore, the United States cannot be affected by regional insecurity as much as the local powers.

III. Security of the US interests in the Persian Gulf are considered or defined as a part of a broader area of US international interests. Therefore, security of the local powers
may be threatened by the United States when a more important objective in the international context is at stake.

Using the first framework inevitably leads to a closed definition of regional security, that is, collective security of all local powers; protecting regionally common values against external threats. Ayoob's criteria of regional security has a proper application in this framework.

2. A framework which includes the United States as well as the eight Persian Gulf states in a security web.

Defining local elements of regional security is much easier than even recognising elements from outside the region which are interacting with the regional ones. In addition to the United States there are other beneficiaries, such as, EC, Japan, NIC’s, Arabs, Israelis, India, Pakistan, etc. who may think of having a share in the Persian Gulf security or be affected by the regional developments. Every one of these states have their own approach to the question of security in this region. In this sense security of the region may be defined as “security of direct and indirect interests” instead of “security of common interests”.

Although defining “direct and indirect interests” is as difficult as defining the concept of security of this region itself, it may help to understand that Persian Gulf insecurity affects internal and external states in quite different ways. Insecurity in its extreme form, war, has occurred twice since 1979 in this region; the Iran-Iraq war and the second Gulf war. Taking into consideration the number of dead, casualties, destroyed industrial firms, hospitals, airports, railways, mines, refineries and the effect of war on regional agriculture and its psychological and environmental effects, one can easily conclude that the effect of insecurity upon regional states is much greater than that of
external powers. Therefore, in this framework there cannot be single perception of threat for both regional powers and the United States as an external power.

3. A framework which considers Persian Gulf security as a subsystem of international security. In such a framework it is not necessary to include external powers in the regional security system. Nevertheless, since it deals with the interaction between two units, the effect of external factors on regional security can be studied.

As was argued in chapter two, taking into account the major objective of the present study, which is to assess the interaction between regional developments and US policies, it seems that the third approach is more appropriate for the purpose of this study.

Using this framework, there are at least two models for regional security in the Persian Gulf region. The first model can be named “regional actor model” and the second one can be labelled “pan-regional model.”

Regional security in “regional actor model” is mostly defined based on threats posed by actors (in both forms of a single actor or a group of actors). Threats in this model, therefore, is considered to be mainly internal. One of the examples for this model is James Bill approach to regional security and domestic stability in the Persian Gulf. According to him, although there are many sources of the instability that plague the Persian Gulf region, the pre-eminent problem drives from the internal dynamics of the Persian Gulf states.

Interpreting the regional security as a balance of power, interstate alliance patterns or the existence of powerful client states which can be found in different systems of power relations in the Persian Gulf are other examples of focusing on inherent internal causes of instability and insecurity in this region. Hooglund’s explanation of “regionalist” and “globalist” approaches in US perspectives on Persian Gulf security is
another example for this model. According to him, globalists tend to perceive Iran as a potential threat to security in the Persian Gulf while regionalists tend to believe that co-operation between Iran and the Persian Gulf states is necessary for maintaining long term stability in this region.  

This model deals with the regional security based on the way actors play their roles in maintaining or threatening the security of the other regional states or outside powers. The regional actor model has been widely used by previous researchers and there can be found a considerable number of contributions in the study of different aspects of it in the literature.

The second model is a “pan-regional model.” This model is based on the assumption that regional security, in the case of the Persian Gulf, is a collective security of all states littoral to the Persian Gulf. The assumption, as was argued before, is mainly based on the difference between “security of the Persian Gulf” and “security of outside power interests in this region.”

Regional security in both models should be defined based on threats. Threats can be posed both from within and outside the region. Internal threats can be divided into two groups:

1) Threats posed by one or more regional states (state level).
2) Threats posed by pressure groups, parties, national fronts, etc., in one or more regional states (sub-state level).

External threats also can be divided into two groups:

1) Threats from states adjacent to the region (neighbours).
2) Threats from superpowers or those states which are not adjacent to the region (remote).

The major point in a pan-regional model is that in a function which shows the direct relationship between security and threats (See section 4.9., roots of regional insecurity) all the above threats are not independent variables (isolated from the effect of the
others). Some of them (internal threats at state level for instance) are dependent variables which means their effect cannot be considered in a situation of the absence of the others.

Both models have their own significance. However, to ascertain the proper way out of the contradictory literature on the question of security of this region, it is necessary to assess the viewpoint of both regional states and the United States regarding the question of Persian Gulf regional security to see: 1) which model is used by which actor; 2) if any common elements can be identified.

Every one of the internal and external states has its own approach to the question of security and stability of the region. Emami63, in his article “Perspectives on the Security of the Persian Gulf” says that in analysing and interpreting discussions regarding this region, several perspectives on regional security can be discerned. However, he attempts to review the plans and ideas put forth by political sectors or countries which somehow contribute to or show interest in the security of the Persian Gulf. He deals with these contributors in three different categories: countries beyond the Persian Gulf region, those which are adjacent to the region, and countries in the Persian Gulf region. Such a classification seems to be useful to highlight major approaches to the question of security of the region and perhaps identifying these views will help to construct a more comprehensive framework. However, it seems to be more relevant if the approach of the main actors (the United States, Iran, Iraq, and the GCC member states) be identified.

4.4. What does security of the Persian Gulf Region mean to the United States

The most important assumption behind the US approach to the question of security in this region is that security cannot be achieved by the regional states themselves. It should be planned and pursued from outside the region in the form of a security pack
reinforced by the support of the United Nations. The second assumption is that the United States is the representative of the international body to do the job. Amin Saikal in his article “the US approach to the security of the Persian Gulf” argues that it is not surprising that the security of the oil-rich Persian Gulf has been of great concern to the United States since the end of the second World War. American presidents, from Harry S. Truman to Bill Clinton, have had a significant interest in attempting to reshape the geopolitics of the region in order to stabilise it in alignment with the global interests of the United States. Whatever their differences in approach, they have all pursued a common goal: to establish and maintain American dominance in the region. They have all contributed incrementally towards achieving this goal, but perhaps none more than President George Bush. He believes that in the wake of the favourable regional and international situation created by the ending of the Cold War as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and also the demise of the second Gulf war of 1991, President Bush was unusually well placed to accelerate the development of what might be called a “unipolar security system” in the Persian Gulf. His aim was to construct a permanent security structure not just to safeguard US friends in the region, but to ensure the expansion of US control in the Middle East. Clinton’s four key interrelated objectives outlined by his senior policy adviser, Martin Indyk, are as follows:

1) To protect US allies and interests, most importantly the free-flow of oil at reasonable prices from the region.
2) To enforce a “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran.
3) To promote an Arab-Israeli peace, on the basis of a linkage between this and the second objective.
4) To stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction and promote a vision of a more democratic and prosperous region for all the peoples of the Middle East.

The United States efforts to establish a favourable security system in the Persian Gulf go back to the second World War when, according to Miller, in 1944, the US helped
to construct the Dhahran air base in Saudi Arabia as a means to expand its regional influence and facilitate Allied operations during the War, and a year later when President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave a secret commitment to King Ibn Saud that the US would defend Saudi Arabia in the event of an outside attack. Roosevelt’s initiative was pursued in various forms, no American effort, however, proved as effective as the United States desired until the early 1990s.

The most important breakthrough for the United States came with the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Seizing upon this and the concurrent decline of the Soviet Union as a superpower, the Bush Administration set out not only to reverse the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait but also to alter the regional status quo with the hope that the US would achieve an unchallenged military position and political dominance in the region. It moved rapidly, Saikal says, to capitalise on the success of Desert Storm to put firmly in place a security system in the Persian Gulf which would be low-key in its political disposition and economical in its implementation.69 A successful completion of the system was expected to provide the United States with a steady and long-term regional structure of control to influence geopolitical developments, oil politics, and military built up in the area and beyond, with an eye to US perception of what should constitute world order in a single superpower world.

Saikal, referring to Youssef Ebrahim’s analytical article70, tries to define the U. S. “unipolar security system”. He writes:

This type of system essentially rests on the notion of one major power taking responsibility for the security of a number of small and vulnerable allies within a vital but at the same time highly unpredictable region. In return, these allies are required to provide effective political, financial and infrastructure support for the major power, so as to enable it to act as the external guarantor of their security with the highest degree of impunity whenever a threat arises. The system is structured at three interlocked levels: an alliance among its regional constituents, bilateral security pacts between each regional member and the
major power, and an overall regionally-based command centre and defence network shared between the major power and the regional allies as a whole.71

In such a system, there is nothing about “all regional states” in general but “regional allies”. This clearly shows that the United States approach to the regional security in this region follows a “regional actor model.” United States approach to the security of the Persian Gulf divides the region into two factions of foes and friends or allies. Security of the Persian Gulf, therefore, is considered as the security of its friends in the region not security of the region as such.

The history of the Persian Gulf, especially after 1970, shows that the pattern of friends and foes has been changed by regional developments, however, there has always been rivalry between two or more sides.

For the United States there should be at least a threat before its unipolar security system can be meaningful. By the collapse of the Soviet Union US focus has been turned from the external source of threats to the internal ones. Therefore, a regional security plan which includes all the Persian Gulf States is not the best one and, of course, is not an objective for such a system. The positive response of the regional allies to this system is based on threats they feel from other actors, therefore, in the absence of external threats the existence of the internal source of threat is a prerequisite for a unipolar amity-enmity based security system. In this sense, security of the Persian Gulf for the United States is security of access to oil provided by the oil rich regional allies and protecting them against regional threats.

4.5. Iran and the Security of the Persian Gulf

According to Bruce Langen, after its relative tranquillity in the second Gulf war, greater attention was paid to the Islamic Republic of Iran as the country that could play an important role in establishing “true security” in the region. Iran’s effective role
in securing peace, stability and security in the region during the second Gulf war was acknowledged repeatedly and with varied expressions by the Western countries, Russia, China, Japan and even the Arabs. 72

Whether or not Iran is or can be a threat to its neighbours or to the US interests is a basic question which will be discussed in chapter VI. However, as the most populous and clamorous state in the Persian Gulf region its approach to the security of this region needs to be examined.

Iran's approach cannot be viewed apart from the Islamic Ideology behind it. Since the seventh century, Iranian history had witnessed three important events. The first was the spread of Islam to Iran in the middle of the 7th century AD followed by the collapse of the Sassanid empire which caused fundamental changes in the Iranian government and the living conditions of the people. The second was the recognition of Shi'ism by the Safavid dynasty in 1501 as the formal religion of Iran which helped to preserve the independence and national identity of Iran against the repeated and pounding blows of the Ottomans. The third was the Islamic revolution of 1978 which led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran on April 1st 1979.

Islam has had the major role in all of these three changes, therefore, to understand Iranian policies and their approach to the question of regional security after 1979, it is necessary to examine the Islamic view of international relations based on the revolutionary approaches of the Iranian post-revolution leaders. Both Safavid Shi'ism and the Islamic movements of 1978 in Iran were based on Ethna Ashari sect of Shi'i Islam. However, there are differences between the two. Safavid Shi'ism (Tashayoe Safavy) did not have any programme to unify the Muslims of the world. On the contrary, it was an action against foreign domination (Sunni Ottomans) and its aim was
to resurrect the Iranian nationalism. The Islamic revolution of Iran, however, had a clear aim to unify all Muslims, both Sunnis and Shi'is.

Ayatollah Khomeyni in one of his sermons to a group of Sunni Muslims in July 21, 1980 said:

"We are brothers and we are united. Nonetheless, your Ulama issued one legal ruling (Fatva), you followed that, then you became Hanafi. Another group followed the Shafei's ruling and yet another followed the exalted Imam Sadeq. The followers of the latter became Shi'i. These are not reason for disunity... We are Muslims, monotheist and followers of the Quran. We should work for God and the Quran."  

According to Khomeyni, the Iranian revolution is not exclusively that of Iran because Islam does not belong to any particular people. In his opinion, Islam was revealed for mankind and the Muslims, not for Iran. An Islamic movement, therefore, cannot limit itself to any particular country, not even to the Islamic countries. It is the continuation of the revolution started by the prophets.

Safavid Shi'ism was an implement of nationalism used to bring back the Iranian identity, whereas, revolutionary Shi'ism which came to power in Iran in 1979, used all means including Iranian nationalism to bring back the lost Iranian Islamic values. The Iranian revolution was both a struggle against the despotism and repression of the Pahlavi regime, and a rebellion against foreign domination in politics, economics and culture. Ayatollah Khomeyni, as a notable religious leader, was the only one who had a clear definition of the various political aspects of Islamic revolution. Therefore, the policies of the new Islamic government became based on his approaches to the concept of Islamic government, international relations and political unity.

According to him:

Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism. But the servants of imperialism have presented Islam
in a totally different light. They have created in men's minds a false notion of Islam. The defective version of Islam, which they have presented in the religious teaching institutions, is intended to deprive Islam of its vital revolutionary aspect and to prevent Muslims from arousing themselves in order to gain their freedom, fulfil the ordinances of Islam, and create a government that will assure their happiness and allow them to live lives worthy of human beings.

The struggle against imperialism to gain the freedom of the suppressed and the independence of the Muslim communities, which had been clearly declared in Ayatollah Khomeyni's explanation of Islam, became the first outline of the Iranian foreign policy. This significant change in the foreign policy of this country, which was previously the most important ally of the United States in the Persian Gulf region, captured world attention and caused some important changes in the outlook of the other Islamic movements and in Western understanding of Islam.

The new era of conflict in the Persian Gulf has started from this period. Before the Islamic revolution in Iran the religious disputes were always considered as an internal problem among Muslims themselves. However, the Islamic revolutionary approaches to this question were completely different. The religious disputes to the leaders of the Islamic revolution were totally an external phenomenon imposed by external oppressive powers.

Before 1979, Islam was considered only a religion without any political opposition to the West. From the Western point of view, Islam was divided into two sects, Shi'i and Sunni, which had fought and killed each other for a long period of time. Having the most populous Shi'i state of the world (Iran) and the most fanatical Sunni state (Saudi Arabia) on its side, there was no reason for the United States, as the leader of the Western world, to be worried about Islamic movements. However, after 1979 the
Islamic revolution brought some new concepts and showed new dimensions of Islamic ideology. According to these new concepts, the world was divided into two groups: oppressive powers and oppressed people. The oppressive powers themselves was divided into two major powers: West (Gharb) and East (Shargh). The second group (oppressed people) was also divided into two sections: Muslims and non-Muslims.

Contrary to the western view of Islam, the Islamic revolutionary ideology of Iran divided Islam not into Sunni and Shi'i but into Americanised Islam (Eslame Amrica'i) and the pure Islam of Mohammad (Eslame Nabe Mohammadi) or revolutionary Islam, regardless of membership in the Sunni or Shi'i sect.

In such a sense, the necessary pattern for distinguishing friends and foes, which is the first step to construct a security system is available. Iran sees the security of the Persian Gulf as protecting the region’s wealth and values against the oppressive powers, notably, the United States. Iran's approach to the security of the region has been declared by Ali Akbar Velayati (Iran's Minister of foreign affairs) in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1994. He says:

We firmly believe in the imperative of developing regional security arrangements that ensures the participation of all Persian Gulf countries. Such arrangements would diminish the arms race and guarantee the free flow of oil and economic development and prosperity in the area. The religious, cultural, historical, and commercial commonalities shared by the countries of the region make it incumbent upon us to effect and expand trust and cooperation through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. We propose here the creation of a forum with the participation of the Persian Gulf countries to review and develop confidence building measures compatible with the requirements of the region. Maintaining security in the Persian Gulf is the responsibility of the countries surrounding this strategic waterway. Foreign governments, which have often been the source of instability and insecurity in the region, should support collective regional initiatives for co-operation and refrain from sowing discord and tension and other divisive policies to which they have historically
resorted in order to preserve their interests and justify their presence.82

The most important point in such an approach is that maintaining security has been considered as a responsibility of regional states. In other words, from an ideological point of view, the "sameness" of Muslims against the "otherness" of the west which is entirely opposite to the US approach. One may argue that much of Iran's policy can equally be explained in typical anti-imperialist terms (like other nationalist post-colonial states) or in its tendency to maintain or obtain the status of the regional hegemon. However, it does not affect the interpretation of its officially stated policy that Iran believes in regional security without any outside power intervention. As was argued in chapter one, even before the Islamic revolution, as the only player with a hegemonic role in the region, Iran still was against any outside power intervention in the Persian Gulf.83

In the light of the above discussion it is apparent that Iran's approach to the question of Persian Gulf security represents a pan-regional model.

4.6. Iraq and the security of the Persian Gulf

As an Arab state84, theoretically, Iraq's view of security of this region is affected by the notion of Arab nationalism. The concept of nationalism is slightly different when it is applied in the case of the Arabs. According to Abd- Al- Rahman Azam, then the secretary General of the Arab League,: "Those who live in Arab lands, speak Arabic language, live an Arab way of life, and feel proud of being Arab, are Arabs."85 Three kinds of Arab nationalism can be identified in the Arab world:

1) Local nationalism inside the artificial borders of the present Arab states, such as: Iraq, Jordan, Syria, etc.

2) Regional nationalism, such as Hashemite which does not exist any more.
3) Pan-Arab nationalism or Pan-Arabism which includes all Arab countries. The Arab socialist Baath party regards all Arabs as being part of one nation both in the cultural and spiritual sense. The different countries in which they live make up a politically and economically united father land. Each of these states refer to as a "Qutr" which means country. However, in the Baath context, it should be read as province or region. The adjective "Qutri" (provincial, regional) is used when referring to an individual country. The adjective "Qawmi" (national), on the other hand is used when referring to all the countries which together make up the one fatherland. Therefore, the Baathist concepts of national interests and national security have a broader meaning as compared to the their usage in the West. It is more a supra-national concept. In such a sense, the Iraqi Baathist regime sees the security of the Persian Gulf which affects six other Arab states around it as a national security problem which needs to be solved within the fatherland (seeing the concept through the 'sameness' of the Arabs against the "otherness" of the non-Arabs). Iran is the only non-Arab state (other) in the Persian Gulf region. Therefore, according to what has been argued so far, theoretically, the best security system for the Baathists is one which can protect the Arab countries of this region against the non-Arab Iran. The outside powers are also considered as aggressors in such an approach. According to Chubin, after 1978, Iraqi and (former) Soviet policies in the Persian Gulf region increasingly diverged. The Iraqi government condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and voted against the Soviet Union in the UN and in Islamic fora in 1980. Yet the limits to these divergences were still evident. In their criticism of the Soviet invasion, Iraq's leadership appeared equally worried by the prospect of other states moving toward the United States for protection or allowing the West a military presence. Furthermore, Iraq's leaders explicitly confirmed that Iraq would not change
its relations with the former USSR as a result of the invasion. This was despite Saddoun Hammadi's acknowledgement that: "We think the Soviet Union is trying to expand its sphere of influence via the old game of power politics."

Iraq's expectations were thus realistic in which they accepted differences with Moscow might arise. Chubin quotes Naim Haddad's statement that: ". . . while the Soviet Union is Iraq's friend still we may differ with it politically . . . because our policy derives from National and Pan-Arab interests".90

Chubin highlights two objectives in Iraq's perception of regional security:

1) To limit the presence of both superpowers in the region.

2) To provide a regional alternative to that presence.91

After 1979, Saddam Hussein saw himself as the leader of the whole Arab world and believed that only he was capable of bringing back Arab glories which in his opinion, had been trampled by the Israelis and Iranians, particularly at the time of the Shah. He often made speeches like:

The glory of the Arabs stems from the glory of Iraq. Throughout history, whenever Iraq became mighty and flourished, so did the Arab nation. This is why we are striving to make Iraq mighty, formidable, able and developed, and why we shall spare nothing to improve welfare and to brighten the glory of Iraqis.92

Although theoretically Iraq's perception of security is affected by the Bathist Pan-Arab interests, practically, her invasion of Kuwait93 (a part of the fatherland) and her military offensives against Saudi Arabia, showed that neither Arab nationalism nor regional collective security can explain her approach to the security of this region.

The best explanation for Iraqi approach to the security of the Persian Gulf is that, since 1979, Iraq has pursued a security system based on her own interest and needs. Iraq's approach to the regional security is another version of "regional actor model."
Chapter IV

4.7. The Gulf Co-operation Council and security of the Persian Gulf

John Chistie, describing the Gulf Co-operation Council says:

Where practically all other alliances of separate countries must absorb different languages, cultures and political systems, the GCC can and does emphasise the close similarities its member states enjoy. There is the common language Arabic, a common religion Islam, closely comparable social structures, roughly the same standards of economic development, very similar systems of government, a collective culture and a shared geography. And, perhaps among the more important factors in the composition of the GCC, the people of the six nations recognise and understand their fraternity in the wider implications of Arab nationality. 94

In spite of the above similarities, these states did not arrange any political or economic organisation among themselves until 1980.

According to J. E. Peterson95, it was the case because as long as the British remained in the Persian Gulf region, the Arab monarchies seemed to have little reason to fear external threat. Under the British Security umbrella, even the Iraqi claim on Kuwait in the Sixties (Qassem’s invasion in 1963) was not considered a serious threat to all of these states. Peterson believes, even after the British withdrawal from the region in 1970 the situation did not seem to deteriorate significantly. The smaller Gulf states eased into independence, the radical Arab threat paled, and Iraq moved from confrontation to coexistence.96 The only serious internal threat, the rebellion in Dhofar, was put down by 1975. Therefore, only a few clouds intruded on the bright security horizons of the conservative peninsula states. This situation was shattered by the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

After the fall of the Shah the question of which country in the Persian Gulf possessed enough political stability and military power to act as an alternative came to the fore. In 1979, Iraq’s leadership saw itself in a position to become the predominant power in the Persian Gulf region. The consequence of this ambition was the destructive war
with Iran. According to almost all analysts\textsuperscript{97}, the war produced the conditions enabling the creation of the long-discussed Gulf Co-operation Council. For the six members of the GCC the question of security of the region which actually meant security of the monarchies was the most important issue.\textsuperscript{98} Because of the lack of the internal source of power strong enough to resist against the potential threat of either Iran or Iraq, or both, the role of outside powers, especially the United States, was considered as the most important factor in GCC’s perception of security of this region.

The formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council itself presents the approach of its six member states to the Persian Gulf regional security as a proper example of "regional actor model". Threats, for them, come from Iran or/and Iraq, therefore the same as the United States they see these two states as the main sources of regional instability. In this sense, the only similarity among the aforesaid approaches is the "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq which comes from the Clinton administration and is common between the United States and some of the GCC member states.

4.8. A summary of regional security approaches

The position of every one of the eight participants in the system of power relations in this area can be summarised as follow:

The United States view is a model of 1+6 (The United States plus the GCC) against 2 (Iran and Iraq). Iran sees the security of the region as a model of the 8 against the United States. Iraq, although it acts unpredictably, tries to follow the model of 1+6 against 2 in which the two are Iran and the United States. And GCC sees Persian Gulf regional security as a model of 6+1 against 2 which is another version of the US view.

As can be seen there is no common approach among all these participants. The result of reviewing the above approaches is that:
1) The GCC is not considered as a threat in any of the above models.

2) Only Iran's model of "the eight" represents a collective regional security approach in the form of a pan-regional model.

3) As different forms of "regional actor model" the other models divide the region into hostile groupings and do not represent a common security plan.

As was mentioned earlier in this section, both security models can be used to assess the interaction between US policies and the regional developments. However, since there is a considerable number of studies using the "regional actor model" without making a distinction between "security of the Persian Gulf" and "security of outside powers in this region", and taking into account that making the above distinction can be completed by examining a pan-regional approach to the "security of the Persian Gulf", for the purpose of this thesis regional security will be considered as "security of all."

If one considers regional security as a common need and a common geopolitical concern for all the Persian Gulf states, to be able to define a common security for all, one should define at least a common threat to those states.

The common threat, in this case, cannot be defined at a regional level (appointing one or more of the regional states as threats to the others) for a state cannot be considered as a threat to its own interests.

Therefore, based on the above assumption, threat should be defined outside the circle of regional states. In other words, pan-regional security model cannot be defined without the existence of an external threat. If one can prove that the interference of the external powers, in this case the United States, is a threat to the security of all regional states, then one will be able to build up a regional based security structure for the region. Otherwise, one should assume that regional security is not a common need for
all regional states. Such an assumption is in contrast with the definition of regional security which according to Buzan is the distinct and significant subsystem of security relations existing among some sets of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.99

Geographical proximity, the existence of a certain degree of interaction and common geopolitical concerns among regional states100 make a certain degree of interdependence among them. Therefore, insecurity of one or more regional states will affect the security of all. In this sense “security of all” can be defined as regional security.

Whatever the other components of regional security (defined in other ways) might be, this kind of regional security has not been achieved so far.

The reason can be traced in both national and international levels. Whether the determinants of regional insecurity and instability have been indigenous or they have been influenced by exogenous factors is an important question which needs to be examined.

4.9. Roots of regional insecurity

After the Iran-Iraq war for many analysts, in spite of the uncertainties which characterise the regional interrelations of the Persian Gulf states, the prospects for conflict and tension appeared to be low.101 However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the second Gulf war proved that, in order to analyse any developments in this area, one should consider all internal and external underlying factors, especially, those which affect the foreign power interests in this region.

Historically, there have been four dependent scenes of conflict regarding the internal and external relations of the Persian Gulf states and foreign powers in this area which
form the main framework for the study of insecurity in this strategic part of the world.

Figure 4.3 shows these relevant areas of conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts (or wars) among the Persian Gulf states</td>
<td>Rivalry between foreign powers themselves in order to secure their interests in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal conflicts (or wars) inside the countries of the region which have always affected the other regional states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts (or war) between foreign powers and one or more countries of the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figure 4.3)

In spite of their different effects, there are also some political, economic and religious factors, which have been used by most of the analysts to explain the main determinants of these rivalries, conflicts and wars. Figure (4.4) shows all of these factors which can either directly or indirectly be considered the determinants of regional insecurity and instability in different periods of the history of the Persian Gulf.

Some of these factors have temporarily and some have always affected the regional security and stability. For instance, while territorial disputes among the Persian Gulf states have been a continuous affecting factor, struggle between foreign powers for getting access to the region’s oil resources, which was one of the major factors of regional insecurity prior to the British domination\(^{102}\), cannot be considered as a major affecting factor (with the same degree) in system three.

Therefore, to show those factors which are more important in the period which is covered by this study, the effect of each factor is shown by using two degrees of low and high.
Table 4.2. The Determinants of insecurity and Instability in the Persian Gulf Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenes of Conflict</th>
<th>Determinants of Regional Insecurity and instability</th>
<th>Degree of Intensity in systems:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Powers Rivalry</td>
<td>Access to the Persian Gulf oil resources</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventing other rivals from dominating the region</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict among the Persian Gulf states</td>
<td>Nationalism (Territorial disputes)</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dictator’s ambitions</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different religious beliefs</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trying to dominate over regional economic resources</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting the opposition groups or parties of the other countries of the region and using them as pressure levers</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict between an outside power and a Persian Gulf state</td>
<td>Protecting foreign power interests and their assets in the region</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventing the Persian Gulf states from establishing an independent national or revolutionary state</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keeping the balance of power in the Middle East</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Securing access to the Persian Gulf oil resources</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal conflicts</td>
<td>Struggle for power among different political and ethnic groups</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different religious beliefs</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposing foreign power influence</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figure 4.4)

The history of the Persian Gulf indicates that the above root determinants of insecurity and instability of the region were removed neither by the end of the Iran-Iraq war nor by the collapse of the Soviet Union or the end of the second Persian Gulf war.103

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They can explain why conflicts or wars in this area are possible and what will possibly be the grounds for the future conflicts, but they cannot be used to predict a certain conflict in the future. The two Persian Gulf wars have indicated that war in this region (as the extreme edge of regional insecurity and instability) is not a regionally independent phenomenon which is merely influenced by the indigenous causes of conflict. On the contrary, it is the function of two factors: 1) the existence of the regionally potential grounds for conflict; 2) the effect of external powers' policies toward the region.

\[
\text{Insecurity of the Persian Gulf} = \text{The existence of internal grounds of insecurity and instability} \times \text{The effect of external power's policies toward the region}
\]

Therefore, to eliminate the rate of regional insecurity there are three possible ways:
1) To reduce or eliminate the internal grounds for conflict and mistrust.
2) To reduce the effect of external power policies.
3) Both (1&2).

As can be seen the internal causes of regional insecurity and instability are as necessary to the conflict as the external ones. However, the history of the Persian Gulf region, especially in the period with which this thesis is concerned, shows that internal factors have not been “free standing factors” and have always had the external ones as affecting factors in addition.

For instance, consider “the ruler’s ambitions” as an internal factor for both the first and the second Persian Gulf wars. It has been the interests of foreign powers which have determined when such ambitions (Iraq’s territorial claims for example) is a stabilising force for the security of their interests in the Persian Gulf (system two) and when the same factor is an unlawful and destructive element which should be demolished (system three). The difference between Saddam Hussein at the time of the Iran-Iraq
war and in the second Gulf war is nothing but his position regarding the question of foreign power interests in the region. In other words, any political, economic or social change in this area can be turned into an internal or international crisis, if it is against foreign power interests.

One may argue that it has been the selfish interests of the Persian Gulf rulers which has been responsible for both Gulf wars and conclude that if there had not been any dictators in this region wars would have never taken place. Although it is true that this factor has played a great role in both wars, it is also true that the third world dictators are not able to act independently. Both starting and continuing a war need sophisticated weapons and their related training and neither of the third world countries and in particular the Persian Gulf states are able to produce such weapons including fighter planes or other equipment. Therefore, they cannot fight each other without depending on a foreign military supporter.

In other words, “ruler’s ambitions”, as one of the above mentioned internal factors of conflict in this region, cannot be considered as a “free standing factor.” It may become intertwined with other factors, or may be reinforced by external factors.

It is also the same for the question of territorial disputes. According to Valdani\textsuperscript{104}, “apart from clashes between Iran and Iraq, which included eight years of war, there have been over 60 wars and border clashes in the region from the beginning of this century through 1992.” However, only two of them (Iran-Iraq war, and Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) seriously affected the security and stability of the region. The most important factor in both cases was the question of foreign power interests\textsuperscript{105}. In system one the United States helped Iran and supported the 1975 border treaty between Iran and Iraq. In system two she helped Iraq which was opposing the same agreement and in system three she is pursuing a dual containment\textsuperscript{106} of both Iran and Iraq. None of the
other 20 border clashes between Iraq and Kuwait from 1973 to 1993\textsuperscript{107} made the United States militarily involve in a regional dispute and none of them imposed insecurity and instability to the region. As was argued before it seems that beyond the scope of internal factors of conflict and insecurity in this region there is another powerful factor (foreign power influence) which can manage, use, aggravate, or even mitigate the other factors in different circumstances.

As far as the Persian Gulf regional security is concerned, if one considers the regional security as an intermediate level between national and international security (Buzan's hierarchy of levels), one should notice that the international security does not necessarily mean the security of the US interests in this region. European states or Japan, for instance, are among the other major players in the international arena. The same as regional security, at the international level, also it is possible to define a common need for all the industrialised and industrialising states. A common international need in the Persian Gulf region is energy resources and its market. Therefore, secure access to them can be an international interest. Threats to this interest are not necessarily posed from within the Persian Gulf region itself. Taking into account the above mentioned effect of external powers on regional developments, US interference in the Persian Gulf region can be considered as a threat to the security of all by setting the stage for a regional conflict. The main point here is to make a distinction between the US interests and the international interests.

One may argue how a state in the international arena can threaten a common international need while such a need is also its own need. In response, one should consider that in a region, insecurity affects all the states of a region with almost the same degree in comparison with its effects on the states outside the region. However,
in international arena insecurity of a region does not affect all external states to the same degree.

In the light of the preceding discussion, it can be concluded that the security of the Persian Gulf and security of US interests in this region are two different issues. The former should be studied in the context of regional security and the interests of the regional powers while the latter needs to be pointed out in the context of US overseas interests.

It means that US policies can be considered as threats to the Persian Gulf regional security if security of all Persian Gulf states is not equal to the security of US interests in the region or there is at least one state in the region against which US policies are conducted (it has been the case in all three systems).

Now the question is whether achieving regional security in this region based on a "pan-regional model" is possible at all. The following section, using a hypothetical analysis, deals with this question.

4.10. Criteria of “security of the Persian Gulf”

In this section attempts will be made to assess the criteria of the Persian Gulf regional security. These criteria, then, will be used to construct an analytical model in order to evaluate the policies of the actors involved. Such criteria can be regarded applicable to both internal and external actors. That is, the actions of all involved should be judged according to the degree to which they promote the following criteria: interdependence, development, political stability and consensus.

Amin Hewedy\textsuperscript{108} argues that criteria of security in the Middle East in general differs from that of in some of in the developed countries. He identifies some of these differences as follows:
1) Political boundaries are respected between developed countries however, they are not in the case in the Middle East.

2) Deterrence is the only element for confrontations between developed countries, thus leaving room for political interference and negotiations. Conflict between Middle East states are normally and usually solved by wars and battles.

3) If it is nearly impossible that nuclear weapons can be used in direct confrontations between big powers, regional powers may use such weapons in the regional conflicts.

4) Most conflicts in this area is not about boundaries but about survival.

5) The means applied by some developed countries for their national security means insecurity to regional states.

6) Regional changes and polarisation are drastic and inconstant.

Almost all of the above differences can be applied to describe the situation in the Persian Gulf region. However, the collective mistrust seems to be the major debilitating element in relation to the regional security in this area. Among all participants in the system of power relations in this region, according to Green109, "neither side will cede control of the Persian Gulf to the other. And each has adequate resources at its command to veto any scheme put forth by its opponent when it feels its interests are left either unattended or in jeopardy."

He concludes that the only true solution to the problem of regional insecurity lies in intensive diplomacy as well as honest and painstaking consideration of how important this security is for all states in the region.

Green’s recommendation seems to be quite optimistic, especially, taking into consideration the internal and external determinants of conflict and mistrust in this region. It also cannot be the basis for a scientific analysis regarding the future policies of both regional and external powers toward the Persian Gulf region.

The concept of regional security is a relative concepts. Therefore, it can be defined between two levels of maximum and minimum. From a pan-regional point of view the maximum level of regional security, which is the security of all states littoral to the
Chapter IV

Persian Gulf, has historically never been achieved. Therefore, a “pan-regional security model” should be based on a hypothetical illustration of a situation with maximum level of security.

The result of the present study indicates that at least four elements of interdependence, developments, political stability and consensus have been separately mentioned in the literature as the keystones of maximum regional security which can be used together to illustrate a pan-regional model for the long term security in this region.

It is necessary to make a distinction between a long term and a short term security model. Regional security in a short term can be the construction of a stable system of power which protects the natural and legitimate interests of the regional states while not threatening the rational interests of outside powers. However, taking into account the roots of instability and insecurity of Persian Gulf, such a system can only be achieved if there is no conflict between legitimate interests of the regional states and the rational interests of outside powers. Therefore, a short term security plan for this region might include a number of recommendations to both regional states and outside powers to ignore some of their interests for the interests of all. Even if it happens, it cannot guarantee a long term regional security due to the lack of an endurable security infra-structure in this region. Regional security in a long term, however, is the construction of a stable and endurable regional security infra-structure.

What follows are brief explanations of the above four elements as criteria for long term regional security and also the way they can be used to evaluate a certain policy of either internal or external actors.

1. Interdependence:

According to Hylke Tromp, there are three basic ways of dealing with the conflict among states. One is to fight it out in order to win it (which includes a temporary
freeze) which has been the predominant strategy in 1980's in this region or in the second Gulf war. The second is to solve it through finding a compromise or accepting a court settlement the same as the end of the Iran Iraq war. The third is to transcend it, by embedding it in co-operative and positive relations that the security of the Persian Gulf really needs. A “good plan” for the security of the Persian Gulf might include the ways for enhancing interdependence among the regional states.

The more economic, cultural, and environmental interdependence among the Persian Gulf states the more grounds for co-operation among them. ¹¹¹

2. Development:

Robert McNamara in his book *The Essence of Security* argues that: “Poverty leads to unrest, to internal upheaval, to violence and to the escalation of extremism. Security means development and not military hardware. Security is neither force nor military activity but it is development.”¹¹²

Although development is not a sufficient condition for achieving security and, because of its relative nature, security cannot be defined as “development and nothing more”, it is one of the prerequisites of achieving security especially in the third world. Translating McNamara's definition of security into a regional context, one can say, when the nations of a region have organised their own human and national resources to provide themselves with what they need and expect out of life, and have learned to compromise peacefully among competing demands in the larger common regional interests, then their resistance to disorder and violence will enormously increase. In this sense development can be a criterion of the Persian Gulf security.

3. Political stability:

James A. Bill in his article, “Regional Security and Domestic Stability in the Persian Gulf” says that the question of regional security in the Persian Gulf is intimately related
to the issues of stability and security within the various littoral states. It means that as long as a particular state in this region faces destabilising internal problems, the region itself will remain fundamentally unstable and unpredictable. 113

4. Consensus:

In addition to stability at state level Jerrold D. Green argues that only with the cooperation and support of all states littoral to the Persian Gulf can true regional security in this important and inflammatory area be achieved. 114 In other words, from a pan-regional point of view, any security plan which excludes particular regional states does not help the security of all. Therefore, consensus both in approaches and practices is another criterion for achieving security in this region.

This study uses the above criteria to show how an analytical model of levels for a long term regional security works. Consider development, interdependence, political stability and consensus among the Persian Gulf states at one side and underdevelopment, independence, political instability and disagreement among them at the other.

As can be seen in Figure (4.5) the former set represents conditions for maximum regional security and the latter indicates conditions for minimum security. If one put a line between the two levels, regardless of the existence or lack of regional security in a specific period or in general, one will be able to evaluate a given policy to find whether it contains a “positive” or a “negative” value in each context.

For instance, if a policy encourages the regional states to attend consensus regarding a regional issue, it can be evaluated as positive policy (which is in the direction of Maximum level of regional security). On the contrary, if a policy is trying to overthrow
the regime of a regional state, since it may cause political instability in that state, it can be evaluated as negative policy towards the regional security.

Those policies which encourage regional states to establish a common regional market, for instance, or a common regional bank, since they lead to strengthen interdependence among regional states are also positive policies in this relation. Figure (4.5) shows how a long term security model can be used to evaluate certain policies.

The more regional states attempt to change their policies to meet the above criteria, the greater the possibility of achieving long term regional security. It is also the same for the external actor.

Whether or not the role of the United States, as an external actor, can be considered positive in this regard is a basic question which needs to be examined.

So far the concept of security and other necessary concepts for the study of the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf region have been examined. In the two next chapters attempts will be made to apply the results to assess the interaction between US policies and Persian Gulf regional developments. Next chapter will discuss the
interaction between US policies and the regional developments from 1971 to 1991 to find the impact of those policies upon security and stability of the region and chapter six will examine the same question in the present system of power relations in this region.
Chapter V

The evolution of the United States involvement in the Persian Gulf region since the British withdrawal

In the three previous chapters necessary concepts and frameworks for a discussion on the interaction between US policies and Persian Gulf regional developments have been studied. The Persian Gulf was defined as a region with a certain degree of interaction with international system. After defining the Persian gulf as a region, it was used as a context for examining the question of regional security and stability. Two models: “regional actor model” and “pan-regional model” were discussed and it was decided that this study would apply a pan-regional model to assess the role of the United States in the region.

In the next two chapters a certain procedure will be applied to find whether there can be found a general pattern for the interaction between US policies and Persian Gulf regional developments. The procedure will include the following steps:

1) To find the main reasons for the US involvement in this region.

2) To find the effect of US policies on regional developments in different systems of power relations in this region (with regard to the question of regional security and stability).

3) To find the effect of regional developments on shaping US policies toward the region.

Although it is possible to examine all the above question for the other regional players such as Iran, Iraq or each of the GCC member states, the subject of this study confines the area of examination to the study of the US role. Therefore, the interaction will be focused on the United States at the one side and the Persian Gulf as a region at the other. It is also important to consider that this study deals with the effects of the US policies in the Persian Gulf region not the US foreign policy making process. Decision making processes, conflicts within the United States government, lobbies, electoral
considerations and many other domestic and institutional factors have an impact on the coherence of US policy toward the Persian Gulf Region. An adequate study of this multitude of factors would constitute a separate study.

There is a strong tradition of analysis in international relations which adopts the rational actor model as applied here to the policies of the United States in the region. Whatever the internal mechanisms and differences behind the formulation and implementation of US policy the analysis here is of the actual impact on the region.

During a period of about fifty years, US involvement in Persian Gulf has reached from a minimum level of sending advisory missions to a current maximum level of direct military intervention.

Such an increasing involvement indicates that the interaction (affecting and being affected) between US policies and the regional developments has become more complicated. It also shows the growing importance of the region for US policy makers.

In this chapter, attempts will be made to identify the root determinants of such an increasing involvement. Finding basic elements in the formation of US policies in both global and regional levels is the second aim of this chapter. The third purpose is to examine the effect of US policies upon security and stability of the Persian Gulf.

As was argued in chapter four, there is a difference between the security “of” this region and US security “in” the Persian Gulf. Whether the former is the prerequisite of the latter or they can be achieved independently, is another question for which this chapter attempts to find a proper answer.

The vast area in the southern hemisphere including Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf states which is called by some the Middle East has become a major concern in United States policy only since the end of World War II. Although the United States established diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire,
which at the time controlled much of the above area, as early as 1930, the Middle East was little known to Americans before 1945.2

By the end of the American policy of isolation and non-involvement in world affairs and by the emergence of an internationalist view regarding its relationship with the rest of the world, on 9 March 1957, the United States Congress approved a presidential resolution which came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. This resolution conferred upon the US government the remarkable and enviable right to intervene in other countries. The resolution stated that "the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East."3 Therefore the Middle East was added to Europe and the Western hemisphere as America’s field of action.

Roger Trask argues that until the twentieth century, steadily developing American contacts in this part of the world were seldom news worthy and rarely controversial. The emergence of the Middle East as one of the arenas of Cold War conflict, the critical importance of its energy resources, and the Arab-Israeli dispute have gradually forced the region into the news headlines, and to a certain degree into the nation’s historical consciousness.4

World attention to this strategic area increased by the fundamental changes in the Persian Gulf region as a result of the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran followed by the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which led to the US military involvement in this region.

Prior to the British evacuation of the region in 1971, United States relations with the Persian Gulf states were a sub-division of and marginal to US relations with the Middle East as a whole. However, since then, American decision-makers have paid greater attention to the Persian Gulf region itself.
Therefore, relations between the United States and the Persian Gulf states, especially in the second half of the twentieth century, can be divided into two periods: before and after the British withdrawal. The Persian Gulf as a "region" including the eight independent states, as it is known today and with the same characteristics which were examined in chapter three is a production of the effect of the changing international order of the early 70's upon the system of power relations in this region. Therefore, although it is not the starting point for the US involvement in this area, in this chapter, the evolution of the US role in the "region" will be examined since the British withdrawal.

5.1. Major participating elements in forming US policies toward the Persian Gulf region.

In considering the relationship of the United States to the Persian Gulf region, two levels of analysis or approach seem useful. First, and perhaps most importantly, is what can be termed the structural level. According to what has been argued in chapter three, the basic interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf are enduring, they evolve slowly over time but without any relationship to the regional developments or even to US elections or to swings in American public mood. For instance, whoever be the president of the United States or whatever be the Persian Gulf system of power relations, getting a secure access to the regional energy resources is a basic interest for the United States. It does not depend on the way access is defined or achieved but the availability of such vital resources.

The second level is what can be termed "circumstantial." The history of the Persian Gulf has been full of big surprises. In most cases, it seems that US experts have not displayed a convincing grasp of the complexities of the region, and seem unable to anticipate crucial developments. Looking back over recent times, the Iranian
Revolution, the hostage crisis, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait all have taken regional specialists by surprise. These recurrent surprises have challenged US foreign policy makers to fashion responses on an ad hoc basis.⁹

Studying US policies in a situational level is more precise than examining them in a structural level. If getting access to the region's energy resources be a structural interest, preventing other rivals from changing the status quo in a favourable situation, or preserving the security and stability of the favourite regional system of power relations which are policy objectives can be studied in a structural level. However, at the same time, relying on local powers such as Iran or Saudi Arabia or both in early 70's, for instance, is a subject for studying the region in a situational level.

Keeping the same basic interests in mind, in another circumstance, say after the Islamic revolution in Iran, when another policy was pursued by the United States, which at the time was exactly in the opposite direction when compared to the previous US policies toward the region (restraining the Islamic Republic of Iran), although from a structural point of view nothing was changed, there was a dramatic change in US policies as far as the study based on the situational level is concerned.

It shows that, in addition to its basic interests, US policies have been affected by other elements such as international considerations (the world order) or the regional developments.

The first question, therefore, is whether the US policies in the Persian Gulf have been solely motivated by its basic interests in the region or they have been derived from other changing elements such as the world order or the regional developments.

Analysing the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf region at a structural level gives the researcher only an abstraction without a comprehensive view of the impact of the other factors. On the other hand, analysing it in a circumstantial level, although it
will highlight the effect of regional developments or the feedbacks of the previously applied policies, normally results in the policies being viewed as responses or reactions to regional developments rather than primitive actions rooted in US basic interests.

The relation between these two levels may simply be explained by defining the circumstantial policies\(^{10}\) as the steps taken by the United States to adjust its actions so that they can respond to the regional developments in an appropriate way. In such a definition circumstantial policies are considered as extensions to the general principles and plans not parallel to them. Therefore, a useful approach seems to need both levels with a well defined relation between them which deals with the interaction among various factors and the US policies.

In the case of the Persian Gulf, a proper approach should be able to answer the following questions:

1) How much have US policies toward this region been affected by the world order?
2) How much have they been influenced by regional developments?
3) How much have they been independent of those?
4) How much have they shaped the regional developments?

In other words, to study the relationship between the United States and the Persian Gulf region, it is necessary to assess the interaction among four elements: the world order, the US policies, the US interests, and the regional developments.

A simple scenario to explain the relationship among these elements is that the United States “policies” based on its “interests”, considering the necessities of “the world order” should affect “the Persian Gulf regional developments” in a way that guarantees the stability of a favourable regional order. If one assumes that the US interests in the Persian Gulf is constant, there are three interdependent variables in the above scenario: US policies, the world order, and the regional developments. Therefore each of these three elements can be studied as a function of the other two as dependent variables.
For instance, the regional developments can be studied as a function of two variables of world order and US policies or US policies can be examined as a function of the world order and the regional developments.

The effect of each element varies from time to time. It depends on how threats or dangers\textsuperscript{11} to the US interests are defined. The greater the external threats to the US interests in the region the more influence of the US global strategies on her policies toward the region. The greater the regional threats, the more effect of the US regional concerns. Any threat from outside the region has an effect on the region itself, therefore, even in a case that US policies are influenced by the global concerns, the effect of regional developments cannot be ignored. In other words, none of the above elements can be studied merely based on one variable. Figure (5.1) shows the interaction among these elements.

5.2. A framework for analysis.

Walter LaFeber\textsuperscript{12} argues that recent United States foreign policy has been a search to find solutions for a series of problems that erupted between 1971 and 1974. These problems, he says, of course, did not suddenly appear during those years; they had
deep historical roots running back into the 1960s and beyond. By 1974, however, they were so obvious and dangerous that they shaped the political agenda for the next generation. According to him, the foreign policies of presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush can be interpreted as varied responses to these dangers. The dangers, however, were ultimately removed neither by these policies nor even by the collapse of the communist bloc in 1989-91.

LaFeber's argument has two key points. First, he sees the US economic decline in the late sixties as a major motivation for the US policies. Second, he believes that the decline has not been stopped since that time and because of the existence of the same situation, different US presidents were (or perhaps are) applying different policies to tackle the same problem.

The first critique to LaFeber's approach, when it is considered in the context of the Persian Gulf region, is that he ignores the effect of regional factors. It is obvious that US policies have been affected by her international economic concerns since the early 70's. However, the question is whether such decline has been the only factor in shaping her policies in the last two or three decades.

The question of US decline itself is a controversial issue. There are pro and con approaches regarding different aspects of it. Some like Thomas J. McCormick as LaFeber cites in his article, believes that US power in world affairs reached "high tide" in the 1960s, but between 1968 and 1976, the United States began to bear a striking resemblance to Great Britain a century earlier: while remaining the world's greatest power, "the United States nevertheless showed clear evidence of decline in its capacity to perform its functions as centre." Paul Kennedy also argues that the United States might be following Britain's example as a declining nation. Another opinion comes from Keohane and Nye that, the United States position in the World economy, and its dominance in policy making, both within the industrialised areas and within the Third
World, have clearly declined since 1944 or 1950. Yet during this period the United States has remained, militarily, the most powerful state in the world.\textsuperscript{15}

On the other hand, some like Susan Strange, emphasising on structural power as opposed to relational power, believe that the United States still overwhelmingly possesses the hegemonic power. According to her, although America has undeniably declined, but if one considers its residual structural power and cultural hegemony, and remembers that its decline has been relative not absolute, one must conclude that US decline is over-exaggerated.\textsuperscript{16}

Using the theory of hegemonic stability, one may argue that the main motivation for US policies toward the Persian Gulf has been her desire to expand her hegemonic role in the world order not her decline.

According to Keohane\textsuperscript{17}, "hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed". He argues that "the decline of hegemonic structures of power can be expected to presage a decline in the strength of corresponding international economic regimes".\textsuperscript{18} In his view, the theory of hegemonic stability, as applied to the World political economy, defines hegemony as preponderance of material resources.

He identifies four sets of resources by arguing that hegemonic power must have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods. He believes that the importance of controlling sources of raw materials has provided a traditional justification for territorial expansion and imperialism, as well as for the extension of informal influence.

For instance, Holland derived political and economic power from the quality of its capital markets in the seventeenth century; Britain did so in the eighteenth century; and the United States has similarly benefited during the last fifty years.\textsuperscript{19}
Whatever be the general framework for studying its policies, the United States in decline or in a hegemonic position needs a secure access to the Persian Gulf energy resources and its market.

Interpreting US policies as responses to a specific international incident and trying to build a general framework based on that, or defining a causal relationship between the US policies and a general desire, such as becoming a hegemonic power or regaining a lost hegemonic position, is not precise enough to explain the complexities of the interaction among different elements which together form the ground for applying a certain policy.

Among the four elements of the US interests, US policies, the world order, and the regional developments, only US interests are constant. The other three are dependent variables and are changing from time to time. Therefore, even a comprehensive analysis of the US policies can merely show different levels of the effect of these variables.

Table (5.1) shows a hypothetical framework for comparing the effect of international concerns and regional developments on US policies from 1971, which will be examined in the rest of this chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Policies toward the Persian Gulf</th>
<th>The effect of the US global Concerns</th>
<th>The effect of Regional Developments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-1979</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1988</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1991</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1991</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 5.1)


From an structural point of view, before the early 1970s, the United States had an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons and military strength and was able to pay
its own expenses. It had a dominant position in the international economy which seemed not to be seriously threatened by other economic rivals. Shifts in the relative strengths of the industrialised great powers began in the economic sphere primarily as a result of the Japanese economic miracle, and only secondarily through the economic recovery of Western Europe. 21

According to Sawhill and Stone from the fifties to the start of the nineties the United States relative loss of power has been one of the decisive factors in her international policies, although naturally in real terms the US is no weaker now than twenty or thirty years ago. Economically and militarily it is much stronger than it was then: it can produce more and better goods, and the military power of its armed forces is substantially greater. If one speaks of a relative weakening of the US one means the worsening of its position in relation to other countries, above all in economic vitality, in that. Sawhill and Stone 22 argue that in the early 1950s, the United States, with 6 percent of total world population, accounted for approximately 40 percent of the gross world product; by 1980, the American share had dropped by half to approximately 22 percent. Whereas the United States in the early post-war period produced 30 percent of world manufacturing exports, by 1986 its share had dropped to a mere 13 percent. American productivity growth, which had outpaced the rest of the world for decades, declined dramatically from a growth rate of 3 percent annually in the early post-war years to an incredible low of 0.8 percent in the 1970s. As American productivity lagged behind that of other advanced economies, particularly Japan, West Germany, and the NICs, the result was a less competitive economy and a substantial lowering of the American standard of living. 23

President Nixon in his speech in Kansas City in 1971, declared that a new era was emerging. Instead of one or two superpowers, world affairs were being shaped by “five
great economic superpowers”: the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Western Europe, and China four of whom challenge Americans “on every front.”

If they did not want to suffer the fateful decline of ancient Greece and Rome, Nixon warned, Americans had to understand that “economic power will be the key to other kinds of power” in the future, and that their power would depend on how well they disciplined themselves to win that economic race.

Nixon’s view was affected by the economic realities of the early 70’s, in particular, the fact that Americans were becoming less competitive in the vital international marketplace. In 1971, for the first time since 1894, the United States suffered an unfavourable balance of merchandise trade due to the costs of the Vietnam War and resulting inflation. Therefore, president Nixon, trying to tackle the growing problems, took four major steps.

1) Realising that the United States was no longer strong enough economically to back the dollar with gold, as it had since 1945, Nixon announced that the dollar would “float” which meant that it would be left to the whims of the marketplace where private business and other governments could directly influence its worth.

2) He began to pull troops out of Vietnam and by 1973 accepted a peace that was advantageous to the communists in North Vietnam.

3) As he withdrew US troops from Vietnam, Nixon pursued the policy of relying on allied local powers to protect US interests in worlds strategic areas. In the Pacific he asked more from Japan and in the Persian Gulf he designated the Shah of Iran.

4) Nixon set in place a détente policy that aimed at arms control and friendlier economic relations with China.
Chapter V

The impact of such a co-operative internationalist\textsuperscript{29} policy adjustment on the Persian Gulf system of power relations was so effective that it soon overshadowed the effects of the British withdrawal.

The new US policy, of which Kissinger was the chief architect, was based on his belief that the prime interests of the United States ought to be "stability", containment of Soviet "expansionism", and construction of a "regional balance of power."\textsuperscript{30}

In his speech before the Economic Club of Detroit on November 24, 1975, Kissinger declared that:

"Today's foreign policy and today's international environment pose for us a novel psychological challenge. We can no longer overwhelm our problems with resources; we must learn foresight, tactical skill, and constancy. We can no longer expect our moral preferences to hold sway simply because of our power; we must possess patience and understanding. We cannot shape a new world by ourselves, we must elicit from others - friends and foe alike - a contribution to the arduous process of building a stable international order. America's challenge today is to demonstrate a new kind of leadership guiding by our vision, our example, and our energy, not by our predominance."\textsuperscript{31}

According to Kissinger, the Sixties and the Seventies called for different devices. Therefore, the emphasis ought to be shifted to "local programmes." He believed, US policy should contribute to local defence co-operation, while upholding the traditional American emphasis on evolutionary political and economic changes.\textsuperscript{32}

The United States local programme needed powerful local states, what John Galtung named "go-between" powers\textsuperscript{33} or what Fred Halliday termed the "sub-imperialist" forces.\textsuperscript{34}

A go-between state, according to Galtung, is a US-made third power located between the centre and periphery in a feudal interaction structure.\textsuperscript{35} Halliday's sub-imperialist states, on the other hand, are intermediate capitalist states which are, in general, populous and strong enough to play a major regional role. The armies and ruling elites
of these states, are the apparatus of imperialism in the region "while imperialism itself maintains bases and provides covert aid."36 The difference between these two approaches is that in the first approach the function of the United States is to create the so-called "go-between" power, while in the second one it is to support and use an existing powerful local state.

In the case of the Persian Gulf, the second approach seems to be more valid. Iran and Saudi Arabia were adapted by the United States to play the role of the regional balancers because of their potentials and capabilities.37 Iran assumed the prime role of the guardian of the region and Saudi Arabia became the protector of the smaller Arab states. This policy came to be known as the twin-pillar policy.

The effect of international factors on United States decision to rely on local powers was high. However, policies are applied in different contexts and each context asks for a specific policy. Therefore, the answer to this question of why Iran and Saudi Arabia were chosen in this strategic region should be traced in the Persian Gulf regional circumstances in early 70's.

In the case of Iran, for instance, the following questions need to be examined. Was Iran's greater role because of the growing influence of the Soviet Union in this region and was Iran considered to be relatively capable of containing its expansion southward? Was Iran's greater role because of the increasing influence of the Arab Nationalism and Iran as a non-Arab state could be used against it? Was her greater role because of the growing influence of Iran and the United States wanted to take advantage of an emerging regional power?

To find proper answers to the above questions, one should notice that the US attention to Iran was neither a consequence of her Twin-Pillar policy nor the Nixon administration. The United States security interests in Iran began to increase in early
1950, when a new general strategy for containing Soviet expansionism called the "Perimeter Defense Strategy" was adapted by the Truman administration followed by a more activist foreign policy of Dwight Eisenhower. In his meeting with Roosevelt, in July 27, 1966, in Tehran, the Shah listed numerous reasons why he had been indispensable to the United States and his list included the following:

(1) Geostrategically, Iran, with its long border with the Soviet Union, served as a buffer against Soviet expansionism; (2) the Shah had faithfully supported the United States position on Vietnam; (3) Iran was willing to fill the vacuum left in the Persian Gulf when the British finally began to withdraw their forces; (4) Iran stood as a strong regional antidote to the radicalism of President Nasser of Egypt; and (5) the Shah's regime was one of the few Middle Eastern governments willing to support and assist the state of Israel.

The above points seemed to be good reasons for Iran to be considered as a prime candidate of US "surrogate policy". William P. Rogers then the US secretary of states in his annual report to the Congress in April 19, 1973, states that:

"The Persian Gulf is an area of spectacular economic growth and social change as well as rapid political evolution, spurred by the withdrawal in 1971 of Great Britain from defence responsibilities in the small Arab states of the Lower Gulf. In addition to its oil reserves, the Gulf is important to the American economy in other ways, offering expanding markets for American goods and services, a political climate generally receptive to American investments and expertise, and a growing surplus of capital for investment abroad and economic development throughout the region."

Based on the above accounts Rogers expressed US policy goals in the region as follows:
“The maintenance of close and beneficial relations with the states of this area, the
stability and orderly development of the region as a whole, and the enhancement of our
commercial and financial interests are policy goals that we are vigorously pursuing.”42

The kind of stability Rogers was referring to was contingent upon two conditions:

1) Prevention of the establishment of political hegemony by an outside power hostile to
the United States.

2) Safeguarding of the existing political structures against subversive activities aiming
at their overthrow.43

Iran and Saudi Arabia, in spite of their differences,44 did their utmost to act as US
proxies and helped to maintain the stability of the region. The pattern of conflict and
co-operation in the Persian Gulf in the period between 1971 and 1979 was in fact the
regional manifestation of the East-West rivalry and the Cold War and was shaped
under the supervision of the superpowers. Therefore, it can easily be concluded that
the effect of global economic, political, and military considerations upon US policies in
this period was greater than that of regional developments.

Under US twin-pillar policy, the ruling Shah became the central US military and
economic partner in the Middle East. Relying on local powers, especially exclusive
reliance on the Shah, according to Bruce Kuniholm, “fed Shah’s megalomania as well
as his obsession with security.”45 The effect of US policies in this period can be
examined in three levels of domestic, regional, and international.

From a domestic point of view, it deeply affected the internal situation of Iran since the
Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 was motivated in considerable part by opposition to
the monarchy, foreign control of Iran, and cultural domination by the West.46

Ayatollah Khomeyni’s most famous message was provoked by the Shah’s ostentatious
1971 celebrations of Persia’s twenty-five hundred years of continuous monarchy,
dating back to Cyrus the Great. At a cost of at least $200 million, the celebration was billed as the “greatest gathering of heads of state in history.”\textsuperscript{47} The Perspolis fete also, however, came at a time of serious famine in the provinces of Baluchistan and Sistan as well as Fars, where the commemoration was held. In response to such an ambitious celebration Khomeyni mentioning that: “Islam is fundamentally opposed to the whole notion of monarchy,” said:

Anyone who studies the manner in which the Prophet established the government of Islam will realise that Islam came in order to destroy these palaces of tyranny. Monarchy is one of the most shameful and disgraceful reactionary manifestations. Are millions of the people’s wealth to be spent on these absurd celebrations? Are the people of Iran to have a festival for those whose behaviour has been a scandal throughout history and who are a cause of crime and oppression, of abomination and corruption in the present age? . . . The crimes of the kings of Iran have blackened the pages of history.\textsuperscript{48}

From a regional point of view, according to Hunter\textsuperscript{49}, Iran has been a prime target of Arab irredentist ambition in the form of an Arab claim to Khusistan and Bahrain. In the Persian Gulf region, the Arab nationalist challenge to Iran has been manifested in the form of Arab efforts to change the name to Arabian Gulf and to challenge legitimacy of the Iranian presence. Under the United States supportive policies, the Shah, who was ruling the only non-Arab state in the region, promoted his ambitious national objectives to contest Arab nationalism in any form\textsuperscript{50} in the Persian Gulf region and beyond which gradually intensified the confrontation between Iranian and Arab nationalism.

One of the manifestations of such a clashing interests was during the Arab oil boycott of 1973. Israel did not want for oil because Iran was willing to meet its crude oil requirements. By the mid 1970s, Iran became Israel’s principal oil supplier and Israeli firms were involved in a variety of enterprises in Iran, particularly in agriculture, construction, and the import-export trade.\textsuperscript{51}
From an international viewpoint, focusing on local powers as protectors of US interests in the region gave rise to a new interdependence between the United States and the Persian Gulf states in which arms and oil formed its basis. The United States needed the Persian Gulf's oil and its recycled oil funds to help its stagnant balance of payments and its declining dollar. Also through its arms sales to the region, she expected to keep the Persian Gulf states within the capitalist political economy, and safe them from any Soviet influence or inroads. According to Chubin, for the arms supplier state, in general, the provision of arms holds several potential benefits: (1) it may serve as an entree into the recipient's society and provide a key channel for influence; (2) it may serve as a visible symbol of its commitment to the recipient, act as a deterrent, and substitute for its own military involvement by bolstering a regional balance of power; (3) it may serve as a quid pro quo in the bilateral relationship creating an entangling dependency for the recipient and binding it closely to the supplier; and (4) it may provide a means for conflict management by restraining the recipient from certain actions and making it dependent on the supplier for new stocks.  

It seems that the United States benefited from all of the above.

For the Persian Gulf States interdependence implied concern for the stability and security of their ruling regimes and facilitated access to the means necessary for stronger and more lasting control of their internal affairs.

Perhaps Oran Young's view of interdependence as "the extent to which events occurring in any given parts or within any given component unit of a world system affect (either physically or perceptually) events taking place in each of the other parts or component units of the system" has a proper application in this case.
As a result of the creation of such an interdependence, the United States became more sensitive to any regional developments which might change the status quo. Therefore, the collapse of the Shah's regime and the emergence of the new Islamic government in Tehran deeply affected the United States position in this region.


The relation between the United States and the Persian Gulf region from 1979 to 1988 can be divided into two periods: from 1979 to the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, and during the eight years of war between Iran and Iraq.

In the first period the effects of both "the world order" and "the regional developments" on US policies were high. In the international level, the United States fear of loosing Iran to the Soviet Union had an enormous influence upon US policy makers.

Moscow also was undoubtedly as uncertain as all the other states about how the Iranian revolution would evolve; presumably, the immediate Soviet objective was to make sure nothing happened that would have given the United States an opportunity to regain its former position in Iran.

At the regional level, the Islamic revolution was surprising for both superpowers as well as the Persian Gulf states. It not only brought about an upheaval in Iran's domestic politics and power structure but also it brought to power a coalition of forces that were inherently hostile to the United States and Israel and conservative Arab rulers. Thus it created a condition for potentially radical reversal of Iran's foreign policies. The new revolutionaries were in any case committed to undoing much of what the Shah had accomplished abroad as well as at home.

Therefore, in this period, as far as the US interest was concerned, there was a shift from a potential threat coming from outside the region, mainly from the communist
bloc, to an active regional threat. In other words, US policies were affected by the balance of fear in a global level as well as the Islamic revolution in a regional level.

During the Iran-Iraq war the effect of superpowers' rivalry on US policies decreased as compared to the first period. In this period, the Soviet Union's objectives in the region included support for national liberation movements attempting to end Western domination in their countries, defence of the national interests of pro-Soviet sovereign states, and protection of the southern borders of the Soviet states. During the Iran-Iraq war, the effect of superpowers' rivalry on US policies decreased as compared to the first period. In this period, the Soviet Union's objectives in the region included support for national liberation movements attempting to end Western domination in their countries, defence of the national interests of pro-Soviet sovereign states, and protection of the southern borders of the Soviet states. Pursuing the above objectives, the Soviet Union welcomed the revolution in Iran in 1979. However, this reaction was based more on relief at the downfall of a regime which was firmly oriented towards the United States, rather than any positive regard for the Islamic system of government that emerged soon after 1979. The Soviets described the religious leadership heading the Iranian revolution as "objectively progressive", meaning that even if they were "subjectively" reactionary, anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, "objectively" their activities served the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan affected Iran's relations with its northern neighbour. The Iran-Iraq war also was another subject of distrust between two countries. From an Iranian point of view, the Soviet Union was Iraq's major arms supplier for more than twenty years and it did not seem to be changed thereafter.

Unlike most of the previous conflicts in this region the Iran-Iraq war did not confront the two superpowers. On the contrary, the success of the Iranians in the war front made the United States and the Soviet Union come to a tacit agreement that Iraq could not be the looser in its war against Iran. The Soviets played a double-edged policy for most of the Iran-Iraq war, arming its ally (Iraq), while trying to court the revolutionary government in Iran. Although the Soviets attempts to improve its position in the Persian Gulf states was less effective than that of Americans, their ability to react
against any serious threat from the Western bloc had created a potential backup for anti-imperialist movements in the region which prevented the United States from taking any direct military adventure in the region.

After 1979 the two Superpowers realised that the basic threat to their security in the region came from local causes. Therefore, the Americans tried to cope in two ways. Firstly, they supported the Gulf Co-operation Council (G.C.C.) formed in February 1981 to help control regional unrest. Secondly, they formulated an alternative strategy, stressing their own military forces by developing a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to protect their vital interests whether from local threats or Superpower challenges.

Although it was suggested that the downfall of the Shah would end the US policy of relying on the local powers (Nixon doctrine), the United States for the second time found her interests dependent on supporting of a local power, this time to prevent Iran from establishing an Islamic revolutionary base in the region.

After the resignation of the Iranian moderate provisional-government of Bazargan in November 1979, it became apparent that the United States had accepted Iraq as the new protector of her interests in the Persian Gulf region. Although the Iraqi Ba'athist regime was not militarily supported by the United States at that time, its war against the Islamic Republic of Iran helped Americans to contain a revolutionary regime without being accused of direct intervention in regional affairs.

From this period even the name of the Persian Gulf in the western publications, newspapers, magazines, text books, and so on was changed to "the Gulf" or "the Arabian Gulf", what had been suggested by the Arab nationalists (especially Iraq) at the time of the Shah, then the United States' most important ally in the region, and had forcefully been rejected by him.
The most important suggestion for the US policy in this period recommended by western analysts, such as Fredrick W. Axelgard, was as follows:

To begin meeting the challenges and opportunities posed by the new Iraq, the United States should consider the following policy suggestions. For the near future—say, for the duration of the Iran-Iraq war, US policy must focus on helping Iraq avoid defeat in that conflict. A variety of proposals have been made to strengthen US ties to Iraq during this period. Some have been quiet extreme and open-ended, calling for everything short of the dispatch of US troops—advanced weaponry, US-crewed AWACS aircraft for maximum intelligence-gathering capability, and all the economic aid Iraq needs to stay politically and financially solvent. Other less ambitious, more politically realistic proposals are better suited to the twin goals of helping Iraq survive while not gratuitously or permanently alienating Iranian opinion.

According to Bulloch and Morris, "American policy towards the Iran-Iraq war was dictated by one simple aim: Iran would not be allowed to win." The Iran-Iraq war led, at the first stage, to the insecurity of the Persian Gulf region, while, at the same time, by restraining the Islamic revolutionary forces, it was helping the United States to secure its interests in the region.

In other words, security of the Persian Gulf was not the prerequisite of the security of US interests in the region and, in this particular case, it was against US interests. Iraq was receiving intelligence information from US satellites passing over the battlefronts and from Saudi Arabian AWACS soon after it became clear that Iraq had lost the initiative and that its very survival was now at risk. However, diplomatic relations between Iraq and the United States were established in 1984.

Therefore, Iraq was immediately removed from the list of countries accused of aiding and abetting terrorism and all US restrictions on exports to Iraq were lifted.

From early 1988, Iraq launched a series of offensives in order to regain all the territory occupied by Iran. "But this could not have been accomplished without careful military planning in logistics and intelligence-gathering," thus suggesting that Iraq could not
have brought off its startling victories if the United States had not provided the Iraqi army the necessary satellite intelligence that helped turn the tide against attacking Iranian forces.\textsuperscript{70}

At the end of the war, the US Navy was practically involved in the war against Iran.\textsuperscript{71}

This led to the Iranian acceptance of UN resolution 598 after the sad destruction of an Iranian airliner\textsuperscript{72} by the US cruiser \textit{Vincennes} in July 1988.\textsuperscript{73}

Bulloch and Morris argue that it was the United States which would do more than any other power to dictate the outcome of the conflict and to halt the tide of a revolution which had inflicted upon it so many humiliations. It was America which pushed Resolution 598 through the UN Security Council; it was America, not Iraq, which confronted the Iranian navy in the Persian Gulf; and it was America, having failed to find support for a one-sided arms embargo against Tehran, which put in train an unofficial but highly successful operation to starve Iran of weapons.\textsuperscript{74}

The United States turning to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war was not because of the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Iraq, since such an influence as a result of previous military agreements already existed. It also was not because of the growing influence of the Soviet Union in the other Arab states of the Persian Gulf. It was undoubtedly the effect of the Islamic revolution in Iran (as a regional development) which made the United States change its policies in this period. Threats to US interests now were generated from within the region not from outside. Even the possibility of turning Iran towards the Soviet Union as a permanent ally was extremely low.

The leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran based on the Iranian Islamic beliefs that true independence entailed a rejection of foreign values, a repudiation of standard procedures that ratified the domination of the weak by the strong, always rejected both superpowers.\textsuperscript{75} In 1984, he stated that:
Our revolution is a great one; it does not rely on any power, either East or West. Today, Iran is standing on its own feet. Therefore, it must put up with the difficulties and conspiracies. Certain individuals ... may say, well let us come to terms with the superpowers. However, they must bear in mind that any compromise today would be tantamount to eternal annihilation; that would be the end of Islam for ever.
Resist for your victory is a victory over the two superpowers. To triumph over one power through the support and backing of the other superpower is not important. You must stand up to both superpowers.  

Therefore, US policies toward the Persian Gulf from 1979 to the end of the Iran-Iraq war were much more affected by regional developments than the superpowers rivalry as a dominant feature of the then world order. However, by the end of the war, once again, the effect of these two elements was changed.

5.5. The United States and the Persian Gulf region from the end of the Iran-Iraq war to the end of the second Gulf war.

The Iran-Iraq war ended while both the Ba'athist regime in Iraq and the Islamic revolutionary forces in Iran were in power.
Before the Iran-Iraq war, the question of nationalism; the minor ethnic groups; the territorial claims; the religious factors, particularly the long-standing dispute between Shi'i and Sunni, revolutionary Islam and the question of Wahabism; the dictator ambitions; the regional manifestation of the East-West rivalry; and the position of each state regarding the question of Zionism and relation with Israel shaped the underlying patterns of conflict and co-operation in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East in general.

However, after the Iran-Iraq war, the United States realised that, among the Persian Gulf states, Iraq and the G.C.C. member states were unable, and Iran was not eager, to protect Western interests in this region. Therefore, contrary to her previous policies, namely the "twin pillar" policy and helping Iraq against Iran, the United States decided
to defend her interests through direct military intervention in the Persian Gulf. From this standpoint once again the effect of both world order and regional development upon US policies toward the region became high.

5.5.1. The effect of regional developments.

From a regional point of view, soon after the Iran-Iraq war, it became apparent that the Persian Gulf would not enjoy a peaceful settlement particularly because of the creation of an imbalance of power due to the relatively excessive military strength of Iraq. Table (5.1) shows military capabilities of the Persian Gulf countries in 1988.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Active Military Man Power (1000's)</th>
<th>Defence Budget ($ Millions)</th>
<th>Military Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>8690</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq*</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>13950</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1555</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>1385</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>13570</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1590</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The number of Iraqi Combat Air Crafts and Tanks (590 and 5500) are based on Atlas of the Middle East

(Figure 5.1)

The military and economic aid of the Western countries and the loans of the Persian Gulf Arab states, mostly spent for military purposes by Iraq, left a militarily powerful but economically bankrupt state which would do anything to survive. The Iraqi military power with more than 5500 tanks, 590 fighter planes and about one million soldiers which ranked among the world's five greatest military forces compared with the Israeli army with 3900 tanks, 676 fighter planes and about 650 thousand soldiers, was considered a real threat against the Israel's security. It was also a potential threat for
the security of the smaller Arab states in the Persian Gulf, thus, a considerable danger for the US interests in the Middle East.

In addition, Iranian military joint forces became more experienced during the eight years of war. Although both Iran and Iraq suffered major destruction during the war and their need for reconstruction made the two countries reconsider their relations with Western countries, particularly Iran which administered the war by using its own economic resources, it did not considerably change Iran’s anti-American policies. In addition, Iranian military joint forces became more experienced during the eight years of war. Although both Iran and Iraq suffered major destruction during the war and their need for reconstruction made the two countries reconsider their relations with Western countries, particularly Iran which administered the war by using its own economic resources, it did not considerably change Iran’s anti-American policies.80

Furthermore, there were reasons for Iraq to be convinced of taking steps to tackle its economic problems and adjust its position in the Persian Gulf by using its military strength. Some of the reasons are as follows:

The total economic cost of Iraq’s war against Iran was estimated at approximately $452.6 billion81 and it was obvious that Saddam Hussein was not able to reconstruct his country by using its revenue based on oil exports. The oil price crash, accompanied by a huge surplus in oil supplies, meant that Iraq could not expect an oil revenue higher than $10-12 billion, for many years to come.82 Therefore, an important question for the Iraqi Ba'athist regime was how the reconstruction was going to be financed. The Iraqi request for a new loan of $10 billion and for the writing off of its previous debt of $30 billion was rejected by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.83 Saddam Hussein realised that he could no longer use the economic resources of his temporary allies to rebuild his country. From the Iraqi point of view, this was not fair because:

- Iraq had suffered severely during the Iran-Iraq war and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers had been killed just to guarantee a more comfortable life for the Persian Gulf Arab states. “The war had not been Iraq’s private business”, Saddam told the Arab leaders, “but, rather, a defence of the eastern flank of the Arab world against fundamentalist Islam.”84
- While Iraq was being damaged during the war, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the other smaller states of the Persian Gulf were improving their economies by exporting more oil.

- The western countries took advantage of Iraq in order to prevent Iran from establishing a revolutionary base in the Middle East, not for Iraqi interests, but for their own economic benefits and in order to protect Israel (an action which actually went against the Arab nations including Iraq).

As a result, Iraq turned against its previous allies and declared a new anti-American policy.

In accordance with this new policy, Saddam Hussein declared that American interests in the region were not compatible with those of the Arabs during the Arab Co-operation Council summit in Amman on 24th February 1990. He called upon Arabs to withdraw part of their wealth from the United States and invest in Arab countries, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He warned that increasing economic pressure and western plots had weakened the Soviet Union to the extent that the United States would be the only remaining superpower in the Middle East. He added that the conclusion would be that Washington would advance the interests of Israel in the region and warned that the Israelis were likely to attack the Arabs within five years. He continued: "We can see the bright lights of Baytulmaqdas (Jerusalem) before our eyes as clear signs on the path of liberating Baytulmaqdas."

On July 25th, Saddam Hussein in his message to President Bush from his meeting with the American ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, declared that: "You are not the ones who protected your friends during the War with Iran, I assure you, had the Iranians overturned the region, the American troops would not have stopped them ... Yours is a society which cannot accept ten thousand dead in one battle in one week then another ten thousand the second week." Then he threatened the United States when he said: "We cannot come all the way to you, but individual Arabs may reach you."
The new Iraqi policies, which were based on Saddam Hussein’s ambition of leading the Arab world, along with its military attack against Kuwait affected the US policies and involved Iraq in a war with US-led coalition forces.

5.5.2. The effect of the world order.

In the Cold War era, US policies were affected by the presence of the Soviet threat, however, they were also influenced by the absence of such a threat thereafter. By the collapse of the Soviet Union the initial interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf were not changed, however, US policies because of the new international political and economic orders were upgraded. Table (5-2) shows the most important changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIODS</th>
<th>AGENDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COLD WAR ERA</td>
<td>- Containing the expansion and influence of the Soviet Union in the region especially in the Persian Gulf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Protecting U.S. and Western economic interests in the Persian Gulf, especially oil supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Maintaining friendly relations with the local political allies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Making sure that political developments in the area do not adversely affect the security of Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Containing the expansion and influence of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Keeping Iraq within the moderate camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST COLD WAR ERA</td>
<td>- All of the above policies with regard to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Preventing Iran and Iraq from having a dominant position in the Persian Gulf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Direct military intervention in the region in order to extend its influence and to protect the G.C.C. member states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Protecting Iraq from being swallowed by its revolutionary neighbour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Normalizing relations with Iran.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 5-2)

5.6. The United States and the Persian Gulf region after the second Gulf war.

A simple explanation for the U. S. policy toward the region after the second Gulf war is to prevent both Iran and Iraq from affecting the status quo while trying not to loose the chance of normalising relations with them.
Such a “double-edged” policy, which has been adopted by the White House towards events in the Persian Gulf, has created confusion and contradiction in its policies towards the region. There are also other examples of US double-edged policy against which critiques can be found in the viewpoints of both US friends and foes in the region.

The United States espouses support for democracy in the Arab countries while at the same time expresses concern that it may lead to the ouster of its autocratic friends and pave the way for an Islamic revolutionary government to come to power. On the other hand, the American decision to stop fighting before the Ba'athist regime had asked to surrender and to permit Saddam Hussein to use helicopters and armour against its own population has created uncertainty among Saudis and the other G.C.C. member states regarding the future of the Persian Gulf. For the Saudis and the other G.C.C. member states, the United States is only a protector to keep their autocratic forms of rulership. However, the United States, from their point of view, is playing a dangerous game by keeping the Ba'athist regime with its ambitious leader who even after his defeat in the war is still ruling his country.

As far as Arab nationalism is concerned, the war over Kuwait caused Arabs to forget Israel as a common danger to them. The rhetoric of the Arabs proved a failure and the Persian Gulf crisis united Arabs with the West to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait; Arabs never desired to go to war with a fellow Arab country and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait brought an end to the mythical period of pan-Arabism.

From the Islamic revolutionary point of view, US intervention in the region has more complicated consequences. The Islamic republic of Iran as the only base for the revolutionary Islam believes that the United States military intervention in the Persian Gulf was not merely responding to the actions of Saddam Hussein who, Americans
were told, had invaded his smaller neighbour without provocation or warning. 95

According to Iranian officials: 96

A careful look at American involvement in the region reveals that the US government bears prime responsibility for the war, which was planned in Washington long before the first Iraqi soldier entered Kuwait. The main reason for the US recent deployment in the region is to prevent Islamic revolutionary forces from affecting the western interests in the Persian Gulf, not to prevent Iraq from imposing its illegal demands on Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. The most important objection of the Islamic republic of Iran to the US policy in the region is that the presence of western forces, and especially the Americans, in the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa has created political groupings and an arms race, it has also violated the sovereignty of nations and is therefore a threat to the security of these strategic regions.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the second Gulf war and the formation of a new international political atmosphere set the stage for the then president of the United States to claim: "There is a new world of challenge and opportunities before us, and there is a need for leadership that only America can provide." 97

There are different interpretations of the term "New World Order" used by George Bush during the second Persian Gulf war. For some regional states such as Iran, the new world order is merely a new name for an old issue of stealing the Muslims wealth, particularly oil, in a more secure international atmosphere. 98

For some, on the other hand, it is a chance for all states including the Persian Gulf states to find their ways to prosperity and stability. According to Bush, "no one is more determined to seize from battle the real peace that can offer hope, that can create a new world order. When this is over, the United States, its credibility and its reliability restored will have a key leadership role in helping to bring peace to rest of the Middle East." 99

Whatever the major aim behind this new concept is, the new world order is used by the most western media to explain the world with only one dominant superpower; the
world of "white" aims and an era of reconstructing a new world without intervention of another major hostile military force. However, there is a criticism that, yet, despite President Bush's warning that only America could provide the kind of leadership necessary for this new world of challenges and opportunities, no US doctrine or grand design existed for meeting the collective security needs of a new world order.\textsuperscript{100} The second Gulf war and the continuation of United States military presence in the Persian Gulf region showed that the end of the Cold War era did not necessarily mean more peace for the region.


Security and stability of the Persian Gulf is the prerequisite of a peaceful settlement in this region. However, as John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey\textsuperscript{101} argue: "In the long term, US global intervention will almost certainly continue to be in support of its own interests, rather than in pursuit of peace or stability in the abstract."

There are different scenarios regarding the relation between the United States and the security of the Persian Gulf region. The first one can be named "the scenario of rescue." According to this scenario, the Persian Gulf is unstable due to the political, cultural, and ideological differences of its member states as well as the ambitions of the regional states and if the outside powers leave it on its own, the regional powers will try to dominate the region and will create an unpredictable situation which will eventually affect the security of foreign powers interests. Therefore, a strong external power, such as the United States, should come to the stage and defend the security of the regional states and keep the region calm and quiet. However, as was argued in chapter four, the question of conflict in the Persian Gulf is not merely an internal phenomenon and the situation is more complicated than what is presented by the above simple "scenario of rescue".
Furthermore, the history of the Persian Gulf shows that, in most cases, external powers have secured their interests through endangering the security of the region and there is no evidence to believe that the United States policies has shifted to oppose this prevailing trend.\textsuperscript{102}

According to the previous chapter\textsuperscript{103}, there are four criteria for the long term security of the Persian Gulf region: political stability of the Persian Gulf states, consensus among them, strengthening the economic and cultural interdependence among them, and the question of development in each states. A brief review of the role of the United States in the region clearly shows that none of the above criteria has been respected by the Americans since the British withdrawal.

Creating political groupings, selling arms and other destructive military equipments, and supporting opposition groups to create political instability in both Iran and Iraq, have been parts of the US record in the region which are also among major determinants of regional insecurity. The most important factors in this respect are polarisation and selling arms. The relationship among militarization, security and democracy, illustrated by Amin Hewedy\textsuperscript{104}, shows how militarization can affect the other two. He argues that using militarization and heavy arms transfer, as the means to achieve security, will eventually lead to insecurity for it creates more dependence on foreign aid and the increase of national debts thus inadequate budgets for development.

Therefore, an alternative scenario regarding the relation between the United States and security of the Persian Gulf is that there is no causal relationship between the United States policies and security of the Persian Gulf region.

The United States has been busy securing her access to the region's energy resources and its market. Therefore, there have been three elements in her relations with the
Persian Gulf region: her access, threats to that access, and her policies which have been applied to overcome the threats and secure the access. Figure 5-2 illustrates the relation among these elements.

In such a circle what is not really important is the security of the region which is the security of all regional states (a pan-regional model). Although in some cases threats to the regional security and US security in the region come from the same source, the existence of a common threat does not necessarily mean the existence of a common interest. For instance, in the second Gulf war, the Iraqi Ba’thists regime was a threat to US interests in the region while it was also a threat to the Islamic revolutionary forces in southern Iraq. However, since interests are defined in a wider context, there was no common interests between them. One may assume that eliminating the common threat is the common interest. However, the events after the second war showed that the United States not only did not try to remove the causes of the common threat namely the Iraqi Ba’thist regime but also, while securing its own interests, set the stage for the maximum insecurity of those revolutionary forces.

The role of the United States in two previous system of power relations from 1971 to 1991 has been argued so far. However, to find the implications of the US policies in the present system of power relations in the Persian Gulf, it is necessary to examine the
question of threats to both US interests in the region and security of the Persian Gulf which will be addressed in the next chapter.
Chapter VI

The United States and the question of threats in the new system of power relations in the Persian Gulf region

It was argued in the preceding chapter that, from an international point of view, four elements characterised the role of the United States in three systems of power relations in this area. Among these elements, namely US interests, world order, regional developments, and US policies, it does not seem to be possible to highlight one as the main factor in all systems. Everyone of them has its own effect for which there are a considerable number of analyses in previous studies. However, regional developments seem to have particular effects on the US role which have been neglected in the relevant literature.

Regional developments, such as, regional conflicts, wars, revolutions, etc., are normally introduced as threats to outside power interests in the region since they are believed to cause regional insecurity and instability. Then, the outside power's reaction is assumed to be only responses to the threats posed by them.

Although it is true that regional developments can impose different kinds of threats to both regional and outside powers, the scope of their external influence is not limited to threatening other states.

In this chapter attempts will be made to examine the interaction between US policies and the regional developments in the present system of power relations in the Persian Gulf region and also to develop the idea of dual-functional effects of regional developments.

Since there are certain political, economic, military, or even social incidents which are strong enough to change the status quo, each development is followed by a new
regional pattern of conflict and co-operation. Therefore, it represents a new pattern of threats and opportunities for both regional and external powers.

In other words, regional developments cannot be defined merely as threats to the interests of the external or regional powers. As much as they threaten the security of external power interests (in this case the United States), they provide opportunities for them to conclude new agreements and to strengthen their dominant position in the region. They also provide opportunities for other threatened regional powers to temporarily ignore their disputes and to reach new understandings.

According to Mojtahed-Zadeh⁴:

Iran's post-revolutionary behaviour or alleged behaviour towards Bahrain and other Arab states of the Persian Gulf added strong impetus to the gradual changes of political geography of the Persian Gulf in favour of Saudi Arabian geopolitical aspirations. These Saudi geopolitical aspirations for the eventual annexation of the smaller states of the southern coasts of the Persian Gulf date back to the "peninsular universality" of the Wahhabi movements of the nineteenth century. Bahrain is undoubtedly on its way to becoming a dependency of Saudi Arabia, and the use of scare tactics by exaggerating the threat of Iran's "territorial and revolutionary" ambitions, eases this geopolitical transition for the Saudis.

A clear example is the formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) coincident with the Islamic revolution in Iran and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war. According to Chubin⁵, "the marked acceleration of movement toward a partial regional security arrangement was directly attributable to the advent of a revolutionary regime in Iran which threatened, in different ways, the security of its Arab neighbours." Other examples are the rapprochement of the United States and Iraq coincident with the Iranian victories at the war front in the Iran-Iraq war, or the opportunity the United States gained to establish a permanent military base in Kuwait coincident with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Taking into account both threats and opportunities composed by regional developments, to study the role of the United States in the new system of power relations in the region, the following questions need to be examined:

1) How much have regional threats affected the US policies toward the Persian Gulf region?

2) Is it possible for the United States to promote her objectives in a secure region without defining at least one international or regional threat for her regional allies?

3) What is the relation between regional threats and US opportunities in the Persian Gulf region?

4) How much is the role of the United States in the new system of power relations in this region affected by the regional developments?

5) What is threatening the security of US interests in the Persian Gulf?

6) What is threatening the security of the Persian Gulf region?

7) Is it an objective for the United States to counter the Persian Gulf regional threats?

To find proper answers to the above questions it is necessary to assess the concept of threat and its application in the study of the Persian Gulf regional developments.

Two hypotheses will be examined for the above purpose. First is that the Persian Gulf regional developments have a dual functional effect on US policies. Second is that these two functions, namely "threatening" and "providing opportunities", are complementary.

In other words, it will be argued that threats and opportunities caused by the regional developments go hand in hand to affect US policies and the lack of one does not necessarily mean the existence or the intensification of the other. It means that security of the US interests in the Persian Gulf region does not mean the lack of regional threats.

The main objective of this chapter, therefore, is to indicate that, from a regional point of view, both "threats" and "opportunities" have shaped the US role in the region and
it is more likely to continue affecting her policies in the new system of power relations in this region.

6.1. The question of threats and the Persian Gulf regional developments

The dictionary definition of threat is a declaration of the intention to inflict harm, pain, or misery; an indication of imminent harm, danger, or pain; and an expression of the intent to hurt or punish another.6

"Threat" like "security" is an ambiguous concept. It can be used with different adjectives to address various social, economic, military, and environmental situations in which there are risks of impending dangers, such as, military threats, social or economic threat, strategic threat, etc. Perceptions of threat, according to Byers7, whether at the national or other levels, are shaped by a wide range of factors including historical experience, geostrategic position, military power, role and position in international affairs, diplomatic tradition, etc. Not surprisingly consensus on the scope and nature of specific threats, and on the manner and type of response, is often difficult to achieve.

In the international context, threats are defined by actors. They do not exist unless they are defined and considered as so by an actor.

For the individual, a threat is the "anticipation of approaching harm that triggers a characteristic response called 'stress'."8 Stress in turn produces behavioural reactions and effects referred to in the aggregate as "coping." McClelland9 distinguishes between issued threats (issued from one actor and directed toward another) and situational threats ("state of affairs" threats). Situational threat, according to him, has "two faces": the objective/state of affairs aspect and the subjective/image dimension. He labels the entire perceptual or psychological process "threat prevision," which he
defines as “patterning of perceptions that are oriented to foreseen future states of affairs that are, at once, undesirable, avoidable, and to be warned against.”

Distinguishing between these two kinds of threats, however, has been one of the most significant problems in relations between states. It creates a situation which, in the literature on international politics, has come to be labelled “security dilemma”.

A security dilemma exists when the military or other preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for “defensive” purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage).

Security dilemmas may arise from either inadvertent or deliberate threats. A dilemma is created in a government’s mind by the inadvertent actions of another when the latter fails to act carefully on security matters and behaves in ways which give unintended signals and when it shows insensitivity to security needs of others. Although it may be no intention of overthrowing the status quo, it may increase the sense of insecurity felt in another state.

In the second case a dilemma is created in a government’s mind as a result of the deliberate actions of another state. The target state may be placed in a dilemma as a result of the apparent contradiction between the others declared policy (reassuring) and their actual capabilities and behaviours (threatening). It may also be the result of the declared policies of a revisionist or a revolutionary state (wishing to change the status quo or completely overthrow the existing international political order).

If the threat posed by one state to another, be it inadvertent or deliberate, is accurately perceived by the potential or actual target state, then the situation cannot be classified as a security dilemma. It is simply a security problem, albeit perhaps a difficult one.
In the case of the Persian Gulf region it is important to distinguish between threats issued from one regional actor and directed towards both other regional actors and external powers and "state of affairs" or "inadvertent" threats. Whether an issued threat to a regional power is defined as the same by an external power is a question which needs to be addressed before examining the actual effect of regional threats on an external power's policies toward the region.

Threats posed by regional developments affect regional/local states as well as external powers. Therefore, two levels of stress can be distinguished; stress in regional level and in international level.

Most commonly, it is considered that the interaction between these two levels determines the level and the quality of external power reactions to the regional developments. For example, in the second Persian Gulf war, it was assumed that US reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (as a regional development) was a response to both regional stress which affected local states and international ones which endangered its own interests.

However, the question is whether prevailing over regional stress has the same value for the United states as coping with stress created by threats to her own interests. To make it clear, consider "system one" when the United States supported Iran whose growing military capabilities coupled with the Shah's ambitions to play a hegemonic role in the region had created "stress" among other Persian Gulf states and was considered as potential threat by them. It is apparent that US policy was motivated by its own interests not the interests of the other states unless there was a common interest between them.
On the other hand, the US protective role in the Persian Gulf region (systems two and three) can be considered essential by the smaller regional states only if there is a threat to the security and stability of those states. In other words, if there is no regional stress there will be no demand for protection.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, according to Dick Cheney\textsuperscript{16}, provided an opportunity for the United States to strengthen its foothold in the Persian Gulf. In his statement upon arrival home after his Persian Gulf tour in 1990, he said that: "The GCC members have agreed on consolidation of the US military presence in the Persian Gulf. Besides, it has been decided that the US will train GCC troops and hold joint military exercises". He also said: "Many Arab states were reluctant over the US presence in the region before the war but now the situation has changed."\textsuperscript{17}

Therefore, regional threats are not the only factors to affect US policies. The effect of opportunities provided by regional developments on both regional states and US policies is another important factor which needs to be considered.

As is shown in figure (6.1) regional developments provide threats as well as opportunities for both regional and external powers. Threats pose stress in two levels of regional and supra-regional. It means that they create stress both in regional states and external powers.

After defining an incident as a threat to their interests, regional states have three options to confront an "issued threat" or to plan to be less affected by a "state of affairs threat". If they are politically, economically, and militarily strong enough to defend themselves against that threat, they can react by relying on their own national means. If threat is greater than what can be dealt with at the national level, or if a state
Figure 6.1

Regional Developments

Threats

Regional Level

Stress in Regional States

Regional Level

Supra-regional Level

Stress in External Powers

Applying all necessary means to secure their interests

Opportunities

National level

Opportunities for states' rulers to justify any confrontation with opposition groups

Arms race

Regional level

Accelerating regional security co-operations

Supra-regional level

Opportunities for external powers to sell arms and conclude new security agreements
is not confident enough to face the threat on its own, it may join other regional states, which have been affected by that threat, to form a “temporary or permanent alliance”\textsuperscript{18} to cope with the problem.

The third option is to invite an external power to play a protective or a balancing role. Asking for help from other regional states or an external power provides opportunities for them to conclude new agreements which can be economic, military, or even environmental, dependent on the nature of the threat.

Opportunities, as the other derivatives of regional developments, also lead to new military and security agreements at every one of the national, regional and supra-regional levels.

In the case of the Persian Gulf region, the above scenario is slightly different because:

1) None of the present US allies in this region is able to counter an external threat on its own.

2) There is still a considerable imbalance of military power between the group of smaller states in the Persian Gulf known as GCC with either Iran or Iraq.\textsuperscript{19}

A brief review of the history of the region shows the continuous presence of the external powers in different systems of power relations to support one or a group of states against regional or supra-regional threats.

The United States, in particular, has supported Iran against the combined threat of the Soviet Union and Iraq in “system one”,\textsuperscript{20} Iraq and the smaller Persian Gulf states against the threat of Islamic revolution during the Iran-Iraq war (system two), and the GCC member states against the threat of both Iran and Iraq since the end of the second Gulf war (system three).

Feisal Al Mazidi\textsuperscript{21}, argues that, after the second Gulf war, the United States views both Iraq and Iran as threats to Persian Gulf security, and Iraqi-Iranian rivalry as endemic
and detrimental to regional stability as long as neither power is part of a United States-led alliance nor ready to participate in such an alliance on terms acceptable to the United States. He believes, in this context, from a US perspective, the ascendency of either power not only leads it to seek dominance over its main rival, but to extend its influence to the GCC as well. Given that the GCC states cannot rectify such an imbalance either on their own or by alignment with the weaker power (be it Iraq or Iran in comparison with the United States), the US believes that the presence of an outside power might be needed to maintain a stable balance of power in the region. By virtue of its vital interests in the area, and its long-standing ties to the GCC states, the United States, in conjunction with its Western allies, sees itself as best placed to play the required balancing role.

Although Al Mazidi does not make any distinction between security of the Persian Gulf and security of the US interests in his argument, he addresses the main point that the GCC states cannot confront any regional or international threat on their own. As long as Iran and Iraq are defined as threats to the other Persian Gulf states, for the foreseeable future, for both the US and the GCC, there appears to be no realistic alternative to an active United States’ deterrent role in the Gulf. In other words, as long as a regional or a supra-regional threat is defined there will be a demand from GCC member states to get help from the United States.

Such an interconnection between threats and their need for a protector raises two questions. The first question is whether or not they will need any external power to protect them if there is no threat. The second one is how much is their perception of threat influenced by the United States?
The first question was answered already; however, to answer the second question it is necessary to discuss both regional powers’ and the United States’ perception of threats.

6.2. External Threats To The United States

Every year the US Congress reviews in detail the annual appropriation requests of the Department of Defence for the next fiscal year and demands justifications for both the overall size and, sometimes, each item within the budget. The major public justifications for US defence spending are based on the threat analyses contained in the annual statements of the Secretary of Defence and his Chiefs of Armed Forces. Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, these analyses generally concerned two major types of threats:

1. Strategic threats to the continental United States from the Soviet Union and its allies; and

2. Non-strategic military threats to US overseas interests, such as US-flag shipping, US nationals abroad, US foreign investments, and trade with other countries.

Military threats to the United States are often distinguished by only the terms “strategic” and “theatre.” The latter refers to theatres of military operations such as the Central European theatre, the Southeast Asian theatre, or the Middle East theatre, whereas the former is used to identify intercontinental nuclear threats. However, there are many areas in which the two concepts overlap.

The term “strategic threats,” when narrowly defined, was often used to describe the potential threats of Soviet intercontinental nuclear weapons that were capable of reaching the United States. McGowan used the term strategic threat to indicate situations in which the US mainland was in imminent danger of conquest or widespread destruction by either nuclear or conventional forces. This definition is still
considerably narrower than when the term “strategy” is used to refer to “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the end of policy”\textsuperscript{27}

Strategic threats is a term normally used against “vital interests” which according to George F. Kennan\textsuperscript{28} does not have any application in studying US policy in the near East.\textsuperscript{29} He argued that “if the worst were to happen there, this would come as a tremendous shock to American and world opinion, but it would not bring mortal damage to our life in the physical sense.” He used the term “serious” instead of “vital” to refer to US interests in this area.\textsuperscript{30}

To find whether imposed threats to US interests in the Persian Gulf can be considered as strategic, a brief discussion seems to be necessary.

6.3. Strategic Threats to the United States

Abolfathi\textsuperscript{31} argues that during the one hundred years that followed the Civil War no foreign power ever seriously challenged the security of the US mainland. During the zenith of Axis power in World War II not a single German or Japanese bomber attacked the continental United States. America’s military security was greatly enhanced during the early post-war period by her possession of nuclear weapons and overwhelmingly powerful naval and air forces. The Communist threat as envisaged by alarmists in the 1940s ignored the fact that the US military could potentially take a war to the Soviet heartland while the Soviet Union had no such capability against the United States.\textsuperscript{32}

According to Menaul and Gunston\textsuperscript{33}, although the Soviet Union had developed a strategic air capability by the late 1950s, that force would have had great difficulty penetrating the North American air defences in large numbers. Indeed, for all practical purposes, the actual military balance greatly favoured the United States until the mid-1960s.\textsuperscript{34}
The first time since the Civil War that the US mainland became vulnerable to the threat of large scale destruction from a potential adversary was probably between the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. During this period the US-Soviet military strategic balance went through a transition from a state of approximate US first strike capability (with no major Soviet second strike response capability) to one of Soviet second strike capability. Since then, both sides have had enough nuclear forces to survive a first strike from the other and launch a retaliatory strike hopefully with enough destructive power to make the other side perceive nuclear war as unacceptable. Since the stability of such “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) required only the survival of a relatively small number of missiles out of the total missile forces of each side, theoretically the strategic security of the United States should remain unthreatened for many years to come.

By the collapse of the Soviet Union the above statement has become even more valid. According to Koehler and Pirie, by reasons of geography alone, the overseas interests of the United States have always been more vulnerable to military threats from potential adversaries than the US mainland. The security of these interests has dictated the large size of US general purpose forces since the end of World War II. In this sense, the Persian Gulf regional developments have not posed any strategic threat to the United States. What is normally referred to as an external threat to the United States, therefore, is a non-strategic threat in the form of challenging US overseas interests.

However, according to Abolfathi, the exact nature of the threats to the US overseas interests is the subject of intense controversy.
According to a survey carried on by US Department of State in 1989, more than 900 Americans were asked to rank potential threats to US security. Percentages identified the following as top-priority threats which is shown in Figure (6-2)


Although all of the above priorities cannot be considered as threats to US overseas interests, the result of the survey shows the variety of possible threats.

Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, some writers argued that the main threat to the US overseas interests was local nationalism while others argued that it was international communism. Now revolutionary Islam, international terrorism, and
many other themes, such as the economic threat of Japan, for instance, have been added to them.⁴⁰

Abolfathi does not mention any reason for such an intense controversy regarding the nature of threats to US overseas interests. The reason, as it was argued before, is that threats are defined by the actors, therefore, there cannot be a pre-defined constant threat which challenges US objectives in the region all the times and in any circumstances.⁴¹

The fact is that, in this regard, the function of a state is not merely to identify a threat but it is to define it. A state can identify an undesirable situation without defining it as a threat. For instance, the immigration of more than one million Afghans to Iran after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was an unpleasant event for the new Islamic regime in Iran⁴², however, it was not defined as a threat by the Iranian officials.

The military build up of Iran coincident with the British withdrawal, although it seemed to be an undesirable development for the Trucial States, was defined as a threat by the US policy makers neither to the smaller Gulf states nor to its own interests. However, the situation was changed after the Shah’s downfall in 1978.⁴³

Therefore, since defined threats are changing from time to time and in different circumstances, to determine the required response to a threat, searching for the nature of threats to the interests of a state (in this case the United States) is useless. What is really important is to determine what is endangered and to what degree.

In light of the preceding discussions, according to Abolfathi, it appears reasonable to argue that, with the possible exception of World War II, the major threats to the United States since the 1930s have been mainly those that involved overseas interests and required conventional and limited military responses. “Even the few major post-war US military challenges that required rapid increases in defence spending and
substantial mobilisation of manpower, such as Korea, Vietnam, and the second Persian
Gulf war, generally involved defence of territory or other interests far removed from
the continental United States. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there have been two types of conventional
and theatre-oriented threats involving US overseas interests:

1) Threats to US overseas interests, from both local and international actors, during
“peacetime” crises and periods of high regional or international tension.

2) Threats of potential military setbacks after the transition from crisis to war. At the
very least, such setbacks are likely to involve US prestige as a major power as well as
her economic and military stakes abroad. If, however, the conflict escalates to a world
wide nuclear war the very survival of the United States would be endangered.

Abolfathi concludes that the non-strategic threats to the United States can be viewed
as being a function of the level of international tensions involving US overseas interests
and the degree of US involvement in overseas conflicts. Therefore, it is feasible to
measure threats to US interests by the level of international tensions involving US
overseas interests and the degree of US war involvement.

It seems that two points need to be considered in Abolfathi’s argument. First is that, if
the degree of US involvement in overseas conflicts or wars is itself a function of the
level of threat to the US interests, it cannot, therefore, be a factor in measuring the
threats.

The second point is that, in the case of the Persian Gulf, although it is possible to
measure threats to US interests by the level of regional developments involving US
overseas interests, it is wrong to measure US response or behaviour to counter those
threats only by the level of the imposed threats.
For example, consider the degree of US involvement in regional conflict in the Persian Gulf in 1979 and in 1990. Although the imposed threat of the Islamic revolution to US interests was not less than that of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the US response or war involvement was considerably higher in 1990 than in response to the Islamic revolution.

The reason for such differences should be traced in the way threats are defined. Therefore, a brief discussion on US defined threats in the Persian Gulf region seems to be necessary.

### 6.4. Defined Threats

What is defined by the United States as a threat to its own interests does not necessarily threaten the interests of her regional allies and vice versa, therefore, there can always be a disagreement on a defined threat by either sides. For instance, there is always a chance of possible change in US policy towards Iran or Iraq (as it happened in “system one” and two). A US perception of “new openings” in relations with either Iran or Iraq may run contrary to the GCC’s own views and interests.

After the Islamic revolution in Iran, both Iraq and the United States tried to introduce the Iranian Islamic revolution as an issued threat to the smaller Gulf states. The following historical analysis evaluates the validity of such a claim and shows whether defined threats by Iraq and later the United States was really threatening the smaller Persian Gulf states.

For the Iraqi government, both Islamic internationalism and the Shah's Iranian nationalism were against the Ba'athist regime. However, there was a great difference between them. The Islamic revolution had a great appeal for the majority of the Iraqi Muslims, particularly the Shi'is. Consequently, the Iranian revolution was considered by the Ba'athists as an internal threat as well as a probable external offensive.
Sa'adun Hamadi, then the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his speech before the Security Council of the United Nations on October 15, 1980, declared that:

We are neighbours of Iran and have shared with the Iranian people cultural, religious, and humanitarian ties. We have for some time been convinced that policies and actions of successive regimes in Iran are clearly those of territorial expansionism ... I need only recall one fact of very recent history. All of us witnessed the visions of power and domination of the Shah, which were not confined to the Arab (Persian) Gulf area but extended also to the Indian Ocean and beyond. And today we all know that president Bani-Sadr of Iran has declared that between Muslim countries there are no borders. That is not meant to indicate a policy of free and open relations among Islamic states, because the Iranian government claims that many Islamic countries belong to the Iran (countries such as Bahrain, Yemen, Oman, and even the capital of my country).48

From Iraq's perspective, Khomeyni's Islamic revolution was merely Persian expansionism garbed in new symbols.49 This view was illustrated by Saddam Hussein in his speech in the National Assembly on November 4, 1980:

They took turns on Iraq; (Ottoman) Turkey goes, Iran comes, this is all done in the name of Islam. It is enough; no more Turkey, no more Iran, no more any human being in this universe ... We are Iraqis and we are a part of the Arab homeland and the Arab nation ... We will not accept anybody coming with a new path everyday which aims at dividing Iraq and dividing the Arab nation.50 Iraq no longer felt able to live with Iranian superiority which it had tacitly recognised in 1975, because of the simple fact that such superiority could eventually lead to the overthrow of the Ba'ath regime.51

The Islamic revolution was defined by the Iraqi regime as a threat to its own interests, however, the question is whether Iran was a threat to the other Persian Gulf states at that time.

The seizure of the US embassy in Tehran by the Khate-Imam students on November 4, 1979 followed by the laying of an embargo on Iran by a US-led movement, the downfall of the moderate and pro-western government of Bazargan in November 1979, and the proportional domination of the radical religious forces called Hezbollah,
convinced the Western powers that Iran would not remain in the West's fold any longer.

Mohammad Ali Rajai, then the prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his speech regarding the causes of the first Saddam's war, in October 1980, declared that:

The true aim of the Iraqi regime and its masters is not to gain a few kilometres of territory. What they are trying to do is to mutilate the revolutionary movement of the Islamic Iranian people. They wish to destroy the Islamic republic. They want to prevent the completion of the bond that mankind has begun to forge in Iran. They are trying to prevent us from building a free Iran on the foundation of Islamic and humanitarian values, for any victory for Iran spells the defeat of all the forces of evil throughout the world. 52

Before the war began Iraq's estimation of the distinctive features of the Iranian situation, declared by Tareq Aziz in May 1980, had been as follows:

- The disintegration of Iran's military capability.
- The existence of several different centres of influence and decision, the lack of any central power, and the sudden proliferation of disagreements and accusations amongst religious and political leaders.
- The eruption of conflicts between the Iranian people of non-Persian extraction and the ruling leadership, and a complete inability to solve the problems of the different nationalities within Iran.
- The spread of anarchy and unrest, and a lack of security.
- The break-down of production, the destruction of the economy, a horrendous increase in unemployment and the absence of the majority of food products.
- Chaos in relations with the countries of the region and in international relations. 53

To some analysts, such as Ralph King54, such an estimation, along with the fear of Islamic revolution, convinced the Iraqi government that, if no positive step were taken soon to meet the political challenge head on, the Ba'athist's authority - and by extension, the state - might collapse; and if no action were taken at the moment of Iran's greatest apparent weakness, an opportunity to adjust Iraq's border, and to pre-empt a possible future intervention by a militarily re-organised Iran, would be lost.
Iraq's reaction to the newly created situation in the region which led to the Iran-Iraq war (as a regional development with a new pattern of threats and opportunities) can be explained by using two key elements. Firstly, fear of Islamic revolutionary threat and the possibility of overthrowing the Ba'athist regime. Secondly, an exceptional opportunity had been given to Saddam Hussein as a result of Iran's weakness to adjust Iraq's borders.

Taking into account the estimation of the Iranian situation declared by Tareq Aziz in 1980, how could a country with a disintegrated army and with anarchy and unrest and a lack of security and chaos in relation with the countries of the region and in international relations possibly overthrow the strongest military state in the Persian Gulf at that time. According to Hunter: "Even if it is assumed that Iran had intended to impose its ideology on its neighbours by force of arms, in September 1980 it was in no position to do so."

Even the threat of the Iraqi Shiis also was not that serious. They could not overthrow the Ba'athists' regime when Iran was in a predominant position in the Iran-Iraq war, especially in 1984, or even in 1991 when Iraq was defeated by the US-led coalition forces and had lost its control over most of the southern part of the country. Therefore, the possibility of an Iranian military action against its neighbours was very slight. The only issue in this regard was (and perhaps is) the incompatibility of the Iranian (internationalist) Islamic objectives, termed by some as Pax-Islamica, with the monarchy for rulership, especially in the Islamic countries, which made revolutionary Islam be defined as a regional and, to some extent, an international "ideological threat" by both outside powers and the other Persian Gulf states. However, such a threat was more internal rather than external to the Persian Gulf states.
According to Mojtahed-Zadeh\(^57\), with the success of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979, Iran’s relations deteriorated initially with Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and other states of the Persian Gulf. This was mainly because of the perception of an acute threat to their security arising from either a direct undertaking by the revolutionary government of Iran in exporting the Islamic Revolution to these countries, or as a result of an Islamic uprising in their own societies inspired by the Iranian Revolution. The impact of this perceived threat was felt more strongly in the countries with a substantial Shi’a population, i.e., Iraq with 60%, Bahrain with 65%, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with Shi’a populations of 10% respectively.

The United States, Iraq, Iran, and the other Persian Gulf states have different approaches to the question of security and stability of the Persian Gulf region\(^58\), therefore, their definition of threats are different. They define threats based on their interests and the degree of the effect of regional developments upon them.

Both Iraq and the United States highlighted the Iranian Islamic ideological threat in their own favour. For Iraq it was an attempt to adjust its position in the region and for the United States it was aimed at establishing closer relationship with the region’s oil rich states.

From the Iranian point of view, however, the United States has tried to illustrate a false vision of Iran by introducing it as a threat to the Persian Gulf littoral states. In his interview with the Middle East Insight in July 1995, Hashemi Rafsanjani, remarked that:

> the United States know that if Iran and Saudi Arabia maintained good, friendly relations, then we could resolve many matters relating to oil, OPEC, and regional security problems and there would be no need for the US to have its military bases in the Persian Gulf. And perhaps they want to impose the peace plan on the Arab countries and present Iran as an enemy to be scared off - as a threat against them- so that they could receive extortion from them.\(^59\)
It was argued in chapter four that dividing the eight Persian Gulf states into hostile groupings had been the key feature of US policy toward the region. However, taking into account the preceding discussions, threats and opportunities go hand in hand in shaping the US role in the region. Therefore, the dynamics of the US growing influence in the Persian Gulf region can be explored only by considering both factors.

It is so apparent that once The Observer newspaper wrote: “there is nothing that America cherishes more than her enemies. Without foes, the land of the free feels purposeless.”

Three systems of power relations in the Persian Gulf are good examples of dual functional effects of regional developments. Starting with a surprising incident, everyone of them represented a new pattern of threats and opportunities for the United States(Figure 6-3).

### The United States and Threats and Opportunities in the Persian Gulf

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(Figure 6-3)
Dual functional effects of regional developments can explain why the United states has pursued status quo oriented policies toward the region. It can also explain why there are contradictions in the conduct of US policies in some cases particularly after the end of the Cold War. It explains how Iraq took advantage of the threats posed by the Islamic revolution in Iran to solve its regional and international problems in "system two" and how Iran did the same by using the Iraqi threat to the smaller Persian Gulf littoral state in "system three". It can easily explain the new US policy of "dual containment", however, whether or not the new US policy toward the Persian Gulf region can keep up the present pattern of threats and opportunities is another question which needs to be examined.

6.5. Dual Containment: the New US Policy toward the Persian Gulf

According to F. Gregory Gause, "if there is one part of the world where the Clinton administration cannot be accused of lacking a clear foreign policy, it is the Persian Gulf." The administration has identified both Iraq and Iran as significant threats to America's interests in the region. It has developed a policy known as "dual containment," to deal with those threats by isolating both countries regionally, cutting them off from the world economic and trading system, and encouraging a regime change in Iraq. It has strongly supported the continuation of UN sanctions against Iraq, made efforts to persuade Europe, Russia and Japan to deny Iran access to international capital and arms markets, and continued American military commitments to Saudi Arabia and the smaller monarchies that form the GCC.

US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Toni G. Verstandig, explaining principal elements of US policy in the Persian Gulf argues that while the Carter doctrine was aimed principally at blocking the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism, it was the reality of Iran's and Iraq's search for hegemony and regional
dominance which finally drew a US military response - first through protection of Kuwaiti oil shipments during the Iran-Iraq war and, then, significantly, the coalition effort to liberate Kuwait and defeat Iraqi aggression. Today, he continues, we recognise that the greatest potential danger to regional security lies in the threats which may come from either Iran or Iraq. These states pose different challenges. Their threats require different policies as have been detailed by National Security Advisor Lake in his recent Foreign Affairs article66, “Backlash States.”

Anthony Lake argues that the Clinton administration’s strategy toward these backlash states begins from the premise that today both regimes pursue policies hostile to our interests. Building up one to counter the other is therefore rejected in favour of a policy of “dual containment”. In adopting this approach, he continues, we are not oblivious to the need for a balance of power in this vital region. Rather, we seek with our regional allies to maintain a favourable balance without depending on either Iraq or Iran.67

He mentions four advantages (opportunities) for Clinton administrations which enables the United States to do so.

1) The end of the Cold War; the United States no longer has to fear Soviet efforts to gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf by taking advantage of US support for of these states to build relations with the other.

2) The establishment of a regional balance of power between Iran and Iraq at a much lower level of military capability. Iraq’s war against Iran substantially reduced Iran’s conventional offensive capabilities and Iraq’s defeat in Desert Storm significantly diminished its offensive capabilities and brought its weapons of mass destruction under tight control. Therefore, without the backing of an alternative superpower, they now confront serious difficulties in challenging US power.
3) As a result of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the GCC member states are less reluctant to enter into security arrangements with Washington.

4) Broader trends in the region are positive. Washington enjoys strong relations with the region’s other critical powers: Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Verstandig referring to Lake’s article declares that the basic strategic principle for the United States in the Persian Gulf, is to protect critical American interests in the security of her friends and in the free flow of oil at stable prices. In pursuing that balance, the US concentrates on two sets of key objectives: limiting the ability of both Iran and Iraq to threaten regional stability and bolstering the defensive capabilities of her friends in the region - individually, in tandem with their regional partners, and in concert with the US and other friendly outside powers.

The most important part of Lake’s explanation is that “dual containment” does not mean duplicate containment. The basic purpose, according to him, is to counter the hostility of both Baghdad and Tehran, but the challenges posed by the two regimes are distinct and therefore require tailored approaches. He says, although neighbours, the two states are quite different in culture and historical experiences. In Saddam Hussein’s regime, the United States faces an aggressive, modernist, secular avarice; in Iran, it is challenged by a theocratic regime with a sense of cultural and political destiny and an abiding antagonism toward the United States.

Both Verstandig and Martin Indyk (the special assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council) outlined the following as the principles of dual containment policy toward Iran and Iraq.

6.5.1. US Strategy towards Iraq

Iraq remains a regional power with a long-term potential to threaten regional and US interests, but it is subject to an extensive and highly rigorous set of international
restrictions on its freedom of action. US stance toward Iraq is clear: It must fully comply with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and with the measures taken by the international coalition to enforce and monitor them.

There is no convincing evidence that Saddam Hussein’s regime is prepared to meet this standard. Iraq is not in full compliance with any of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. It continues to reject elements of UN Security Council Resolution 687, which ended fighting in the Gulf war, such as recognising Kuwait’s borders. With such a record, Iraq’s calls for negotiations to end international sanctions are, at best, premature.

The United States strongly supports the continued territorial integrity and unity of Iraq. It also supports the Iraqi National Congress in its efforts to unify and strengthen the Iraqi opposition and to contribute to the process of bringing about a democratic, pluralistic government in Iraq, which can live in peace with its neighbours and its own people. In sum, it needs to be determined that the will of the international community, as expressed in UN Security Council resolutions, be enforced to ensure that Iraq can never again threaten its neighbours or pose a threat to peace. 72

6.5.2. US Strategy towards Iran

As for Iran, the United States has deep and serious concerns about its behaviour in five areas: 73

- Its quest for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery;
- The continued involvement of the Iranian Government in terrorism and assassination world-wide;
- Support for violent opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process;
- Threats and subversive activities against its neighbours; and
- Its dismal human rights record at home.
According to Verstandig:

US policy is not aimed at changing the Iranian Government but at inducing Iran to change its behaviour in these areas. The United States seeks increased international economic pressure to persuade Iran that it cannot expect to enjoy normal state-to-state relations as long as it violates basic standards of international behaviour. This means working with other countries to deny Iran access to technology and other means by which it can facilitate the pursuit of policies of destabilisation, terrorism, and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we have made it clear that we do not seek the overthrow of the Iranian regime. We have made it clear that we are prepared to enter into a dialogue with authorised representatives of the Iranian Government to discuss the differences between us.74

The above explanation of the principal elements of US “dual containment” policy only deals with the regional threats, however, according to the dual functional effects of regional developments, it should consist of another feature to meet the second complementary element (opportunities). In other words, according to the main hypothesis of this chapter, US policies toward the Persian Gulf are not merely responses to the regional threats, but they are mostly planned to take advantage of opportunities to adjust US position in the region. The validity of this assumption can be seen in US complementary policy of “security co-operation.”

US officials declare that one of the clear lessons of the past decade has been that containment of regional threats alone is not sufficient. “We also need to work with our friends in the region to develop a strong regional deterrent to those who would threaten its security or stability”75. Reviewing US approach to bolstering the security of her friends in the area, Verstandig says: the US is:

- Encouraging the members of the Gulf Co-operation Council to work more closely together on collective defence and security arrangements;
• Helping individual GCC countries meet their legitimate defence requirements, including arms sales that increase their capabilities to conduct co-ordinated operations in US and other GCC forces; and

• Working to strengthen its own ability to act quickly in the region by maintaining strong forces there, by prepositioning vital equipment and material, and by concluding defence access agreements with the GCC states.

Verstandig comes to the conclusion that “the recent reassessment of US defence strategy and resources carried out by the Clinton Administration reaffirmed the importance of the Gulf and committed major US defence assets to a continuing mission in the region. Our goal here is to complement, not replace, the Gulf states’ own collective security efforts. We do not intend to station troops permanently anywhere in the region. Our objective is to increase regional stability, deter threats, and raise the threshold at which direct US military action would be needed; that is, to reduce the likelihood that the US and its allies would have to fight to repel aggression.”

Verstandig is not the only US official who addresses the complementary effects of threats and opportunities upon US policies toward the region. Two years after the second Persian Gulf war, addressing the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington on January 7, Eagleburger (then the US Secretary of State) said: “our efforts to influence Saddam Hussein by diplomatic means were demonstrably unsuccessful, but those efforts, I believe, were the necessary predicate to our success. The fact is that there was simply no consensus for multilateral economic sanctions against Iraq prior to the August 2 invasion, nor was there a consensus to counter militarily. It was Saddam Hussein himself who created such a consensus by invading Kuwait.”

Eagleburger’s statement is a clear example of the complementary relationship between threats and opportunities in the context of the Persian Gulf region. In a broader sense,
the history of this strategic region shows that the resultant of the regional threats and opportunities has always been in the favour of the US interests, therefore, she will not try to demolish regional threats, on the contrary, her attempts will be focused on keeping the threats to her own interests at a containable level.

In this sense, US dual containment policy, as it is clearly understood from US official approaches, is a confining policy rather than an eliminating one. It means that the United States needs limited regional threats (in the absence of an external threat) to get the most benefit of the relevant opportunities.

Now the question is whether the dual containment is capable of making a reliable framework for the future role of the United States in the Persian Gulf region.

6.6. The Evaluation of US “Dual Containment” policy

From “twin pillar” policy to the “dual containment”, the United States has considered the followings as the key strategic elements of her policies:

1. Preventing any power (regional or external) from supplanting the United States as the dominant force in the Persian Gulf.78

2. Seeing Iran and Iraq as the key strategic players in the region.

3. Protecting Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian Gulf monarchies from outside threats.

Dual containment, on the one hand, incorporates a number of elements from previous American policies, such as preventing other rivals and protecting GCC member states, while, on the other hand, in its strategic logic the policy represents a significant departure in Washington’s approach to the Persian Gulf’s system of power relations.

According to Gregory F. Gause79: “dual containment explicitly disavows the need for any kind of political relationship with Iran or Iraq and rejects the idea that a rough military equivalence between them is an important element of Gulf stability. It assumes for the United States a much larger, unilateral role in managing Gulf affairs than any
previous administration has envisaged at a time that American influence over the two most important strategic actors in the gulf is practically nil.”

Critics of the United States’ new policy toward the region can be categorised in four areas: geopolitical, economic, political, and cultural.

Geopolitically, the major logical flaw in dual containment is the contention that Iran and Iraq can be contained simultaneously. Gause argues that containment of Iran requires a relatively strong and unified Iraq on its long western border. Otherwise, according to him, Iraq becomes an ideal area for Iran to try to break out of its regional isolation. Iran has close political ties to the Shiite majority in Iraq, a historical interest in the Shia holy cities in Iraq, and past relationships with Iraqi Kurdish groups. A weak Iraq is an inviting target for a “contained” and isolated Iran. 80

Conversely, the containment of Iraq is hard to imagine without some kind of Iranian co-operation. As long as Saddam Hussein is in power, Iran is an important element in keeping the pressure on his regime. If Iran were not a party to the economic sanctions on Iraq, they would lose some of their effectiveness. “Dual containment, however, pushes Saddam and Tehran closer together despite their history of hostility.”81

Containing Iran and Iraq without the presence of at least one powerful US regional ally, whose military capabilities and its size and population be comparable with Iran or Iraq, would mean a continuous and expanding military deployment of the United State in the region82 which is in contrast with Verstandig’s official declaration that “we do not intend to station troops permanently anywhere in the region.”83

On the other hand, according to Gause the higher the American military profile in Saudi Arabia and its GCC partners, the greater the risk that it would become a lightning rod for domestic discontent, as has happened many times in past decades in the Middle East. 84 The lack of enthusiasm for dual containment was summed up by the
Secretary General of the GCC, who said in a recent interview, "What interests us is that this policy does not reflect our situation, and that our states not be affected by it."  

Sir Anthony Parsons argues that "it would, of course, be better if a regional security system could be constructed so that the coalition could withdraw its ships and aircraft. Apart from the trouble and expense, they are bound to become the object of anti-imperialist clamour the longer they stay. A viable regional system can be based only on full co-operation between Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf states on the other."

Dual containment is accused of not considering the geopolitical reality of the Persian Gulf region. The reality is that US troops will leave the region sooner or later, therefore, without an established regional security system with the participation of all regional states, the GCC member states should payoff Iraq against Iran or stand with Iran to protect their assets against possible Iraqi aggression which is called by Julie Flint: "the law of political survival." Therefore, dual containment cannot be considered as an acceptable long term policy by the smaller Persian Gulf states whose long term security needs are blamed for forming the main idea of such a policy.

Economically, the United States is not the only trade partner of either Iraq or Iran. Therefore, her dual containment policy needs to be supported by the leading industrial states who have a great benefit in their relations with these countries especially Iran. According to Gause, Europe and Japan have been unwilling to isolate Iran economically, which would mean forgoing a market whose imports from Europe were over $10 billion and from Japan over $2.5 billion in 1992.
Kensaku Hogen, Japan’s Foreign Ministry Director General, in his meeting with Iranian officials in Tehran on July 10, 1995, declared that Tokyo believes in the need for exchange of views with Tehran on international issues and further explanation of ties between two countries. 89

Gause argues that: “commercial interests in the United States, also, want to do business with Iran. Boeing wants to sell aircraft to Iran’s national airline; American oil companies continue to buy Iranian oil. Even the GCC states, whose security is a major goal of the dual containment policy, regard isolating Iran as a mistaken approach. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, still threatened by Saddam’s regime in Baghdad, have reopened diplomatic channels to Iran.” 90

According to Hashemi Rafsanjani:

The trade embargo of the US president against Iran is doomed to fail, the United States cannot do much against us. What can possibly happen? They said they should not buy our oil, we can shift and sell to others. If they ban trade with us, it is the United States that is going to lose. The things that we are used to buy from the United States we’ll shift to other countries. We have been the target of such bans - even worse and more severe bans at a time when we had a war. These bans have had no impact on our economy and they will not affect this country. 91

Iran survived economic sanctions and international isolations at a much more serious level after the Islamic revolution and during the Iran Iraq war. Dual containment does not seem to add any new dimension to those economic sanctions. It does not mean that economic sanctions have not affected the Iranian economic situation. It means that parallel to those pressures, there has always been an opportunity for both Iran and other industrial states to improve their economic relations.

Politically, dual containment, as a situational policy with a short sighted approach to the future events in the Persian Gulf region, seems to be unable to answer a series of questions regarding the present system of power relation in this region. The two most important of these questions are as follows:
In the case of the collapse of Iraqi domestic situation into chaos, how would dual containment handle the situation to preserve regional security and stability without starting a dialogue with Iran on the future of Iraq. Fresh hostilities, according to Omani officials, "may turn the region into something like the conflict that went on in Indochina in the late 1960s" thus creating uncertainty among the smaller Gulf states regarding the future events.

As was argued before the most important aspect of the Iranian threat for the GCC member states is ideological which challenges their monarchies. According to Verstandig, US policy is not aimed at changing the Iranian Government but at inducing Iran to change its behaviour. Now the question is whether economic pressure and working with other countries to deny Iran access to technology would do the job or it is only possible through applying a cultural offensive to the Islamic revolution.

According to the Clinton administration "the American quarrel with Iran should not be misconstrued as a "clash of civilisation" or opposition to Iran as a theocratic state. Washington does not take issue with the "Islamic" dimension of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

The first critique to such a claim is that it was the Islamic revolution which made Iran be considered as a threat by the United States and their allies in the region. The Islamic Republic of Iran without its "Islamic" dimension does not exist. According to the founder of Islamic republic of Iran, if Muslims do nothing but engage in the canonical prayer, petition God, and invoke His name, the imperialists and oppressive governments allied with them will leave them alone. Once during the occupation of Iraq, a certain British officer asked: "Is the azan (calling for prayers) I hear being called now from the minaret harmful to British policy?" when he was told that it was harmless, he said "then let him call for prayer as much as he wants!"

If dividing Islam and Iran in Lake's approach means that the United States has come to a conclusion that Iran's so called new moderate international behaviour is a departure
from the major principles of the Islamic revolution and new Iran can be seen without
the influence of Islamic principles in its policies, then the question is what kind of
threat will pose by Iran which needs a “containment” response?
If the administration sees Iran with revolutionary Islam as the major part of it, how can
it separate them?
Whether Islam can be a threat to the West or the United States, in particular, is a
question which is beyond the scope of this study. However, whether today’s Iran can
be studied or dealt with without considering the profound effect of Islam upon every
aspect of its domestic and international policies is another question which needs to be
examined.
The fact is that there is a contradiction in the definition of the Clinton administration of
Iran as a threat. If it is possible to make a distinction between the Iranian behaviour
based on its nationalistic objectives and that of based on Islamic revolutionary aims,
perhaps, the latter will be more threatening for both the United States overseas
interests and regional monarchies than the former. Iranian nationalism was supported
by the United States in “system one”. However, it was the Islamic feature of the new
revolutionary government in Iran which was considered as a threat by the US policy
makers. From the beginning of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeyni had repeatedly
emphasised that:

There is no nationalism in Islam. It supersedes and abolishes all of
them. In a sense, nationalism is a pre-Islamic legacy. Islam came
to eliminate (national) fanaticism. The subject of Islam is
mankind, without distinction between one colour and another or
one race and another. There is no difference between an Arab and
a non-Arab, even though the prophet is Arab and the Quran was
revealed in Arabic. All Moslems are brothers, in the view of
Islam, and all Moslems must shed whatever divides them, be its
source nationalism, race or colour.
Therefore, separating "Islam" from "Islamic Republic" does not seem to contain any major point.

"Dual containment policy" seems to be the best example of "dual functional effects of regional developments." As was argued in chapter four, the United States needs foes as well as friends in this strategic region. Defining both Iran and Iraq as threats to the other regional states (GCC) and also to the US own interests in the region, on the one hand, can fill the vacuum of the generally defined previous external threat of the Soviet Union to the Persian Gulf smaller states and, on the other, it can provide opportunities for the United States to internationally justify the exchange of more regional petrodollars with her sophisticated weapons.

"Dual functional effects of regional developments" can also be used to foresee the future regional pattern of conflict and co-operation. If the United States cannot be able to define an external threat to the GCC, regionally defined threats will continue to be used by US policy makers to adjust US relations with the GCC member states.

There are two possible scenarios in this regard. The first one is the situation in which Iran changes its policies and improves its relations with the United States. In such a case, Iran will be placed beside the GCC member states. Therefore, Iraq will remain the only possible defined regional threat to the other Persian Gulf States. It means a return to the previous pattern of system one, this time without the threat of the Soviet Union.

The second scenario is that Iraq does the same. In that case, Iran should be defined as a threat to both Iraq and GCC member states. It also means a return to the previous pattern of system two (without the threat of the Soviet Union).

In other words, unless the United States interests in the region and those of the Persian Gulf states become so close and interrelated that the need for a unipolar "amity-
enmity" based security system reaches the minimum level or disappears (for instance consider an optimistic third scenario in which both Iran and Iraq improve their relations with the United States), the future of the Persian Gulf region cannot be based on a system other than one of the three previously discussed systems of power relations in this region.
Chapter VII:

Conclusion

7.1. Summary of the Research Procedure

This study examined the interaction between the United States’ policies and Persian Gulf regional developments as two parallel subjects during a period of approximately three decades since the British withdrawal from the region in early 70’s. It defined three systems of power relations in this region and showed that every one of them had its own patterns of conflict and co-operation and used them as general frameworks to examine the evolution of US policies toward the region. The same systems also used to examine the effect of US policies on the Persian Gulf regional security.

Since the interaction was studied in three different systems of power relations, it highlighted both constant and variable elements in shaping the relation between regional developments and US policies in this region. The interaction was studied in the context of “security and stability” as the most important common issue between regional and external powers. It is done by using a method containing the following six interrelated steps:

1) “The study of the historical background.” This provided necessary information to understand general principals regarding the role of the outside powers in the region as well as their main concerns in this strategic area.

2) “Conceptual clarifications.” This was necessary to evaluate previous studies and to find possible misunderstandings or misconceptions in their approaches to the questions of both regional developments and US policies toward the region.
3) “Explaining the problematic.” This was necessary to reveal the main gaps in the relevant literature and pose new questions regarding the way the research should evolve.

4) “Hypothetical illustrations.” This aimed at introducing new hypotheses for the main questions arose from the previous step.

5) “Reasoning.” This aimed at developing the hypothesis and putting forward necessary arguments to prove the validity of them by using both historical evidences and rational choices.

6) “Theory building.” This aimed at constructing a theoretical framework for the study of the interaction between regional developments and US policies in order to introduce a practical method for assessing the role of the United States in the new system of power relations in this region.

As the result of applying the first two steps of the above procedure a number of problems were identified in previous studies among which the following seemed to be more centric.

1. The Persian Gulf region was considered as a part of the Middle East and also as a sub-system of it.

2. The concepts of “security of the Persian Gulf region” and “the security of the outside powers in the region” were used instead of one another as if they were a single concept.

3. Although the term “region” was widely used to refer to the Persian Gulf area, the general framework always went further down to the state level or even sub-state level. Therefore, the term “the Persian Gulf region” was not clearly defined.

4. Either external or internal factors in relation with the grounds for regional conflict and co-operation were exaggerated.

5. Regional developments such as wars, conflicts, revolutions, etc. were assumed to be threats to external power interests in the region.

The above problems became the subject of a hypothetical analyses to find whether it would be possible to suggest a new hypothesis for every one of them. The result of this
step coupled with that of the study of the historical background of the outside powers’ presence in the region led to the creation of the following hypotheses:

1. The Persian Gulf is a geopolitical region and also a subsystem of the international system.

2. Since the British withdrawal, there have been three systems of power relations in this region every one of which has represented a different pattern of conflict and cooperation.

3. The role of the United States has not been a stabilising one in these systems.

4. Security of the Persian Gulf is not only different from security of the outside power interests (in this case the United States) in the region but also, in many cases, they stand against each other.

5. The role of the United States in the new system of power relations in the Persian Gulf region can be studied only by considering “dual functional effect of regional developments” namely “threatening” and “providing opportunities” as two complementary functions.

6. From a pan-regional point of view, the new system of power relations in the region has not provided security and stability for all of the regional states.

These hypotheses were examined throughout the thesis.

In this Chapter the results are categorised under the following four titles:

1. The new framework for the study of the Persian Gulf region.
2. The Persian Gulf regional security and stability.
3. The role of the United States in the new system of power relations in the Persian Gulf.
4. Threats and opportunities as the two major influences on US policies toward the region.

7.2. Results

7.2.1. The New Framework for the Study of the Persian Gulf Region

Traditionally, the Persian Gulf region is studied as a part of the Middle East which itself is considered to be a subsystem of the international system. As a result, based on such an assumption, to study the interaction between Persian Gulf regional developments and an external factor such as US policies, for instance, the researcher should examine the interaction among four elements: the US policies, the Persian Gulf
regional developments, the Middle East of which the Persian Gulf is a subsystem, and the world order.

The present study showed that the Middle East for the lack of political and economic unity, could not be considered as a geopolitical region. It was also shown that, even as a geographical region, the Middle East did not have a clear definition. Adding the lack of geographical proximity among those states which are located in this area, the lack of common geopolitical concerns among them and the lack of a certain degree of interaction among so called Middle East countries to the above issues, one can conclude that the Persian Gulf region cannot be studied as a subsystem of the Middle East for the Middle East itself cannot be defined as a system. However, the Persian Gulf region because of the existence of the above mentioned criteria among its countries can be defined as a geopolitical region. Therefore, it is possible to study the Persian Gulf region and its interaction with the international system without passing through the Middle East as an intermediate level. It showed a new framework for the study of the Persian Gulf region which was totally different from the prevailing frameworks applied by most of the researchers in this field.

7.2.2. The Persian Gulf Regional Security and Stability

The core elements which appeared in almost all of the definition of the term security in the literature were values and dangers or threats. Both common values and common threats seemed to lead to a common security approach among sovereign states. Security, therefore, was defined between these two elements as a function for protecting values against threats.

This study showed that there was not a generally agreed definition for the term since it was affected by factors in different sectors: military, political, economic, social,
cultural, and environmental. Therefore, it seemed that, the best way to study the
security was to direct studies toward empirical cases where the particular factors in
play could be identified. This method was named “security in context.” It was because
of the fact that applying security in different contexts might lead to entirely different
subjects of study.

As a result, as far as the subject of this study was concerned, to identify the proper
method to study the security of the Persian Gulf region, this study suggested that two
steps needed to be taken place:

1. To examine the commonly applied term in studying states collectively, in this case,
   “regional security.”
2. To determine the context in which this concept should be defined.

The Persian Gulf “region” was determined as the context. However to examine the
regional security three frameworks were compared as follows:

1. A framework which included the eight Persian Gulf states linking together in a
   triangle of power relations (Iran, Iraq, GCC member states) and excluded the
   United States from the regional security circle while considering the effects of its
   policies as the most penetrating external factor.
2. A framework which included the United States as well as the eight Persian Gulf
   states in a security web.
3. A framework which considers Persian Gulf security as a subsystem of international
   security. In such a framework it was not necessary to include external powers in
   regional security system. Nevertheless, since it dealt with the interaction between
   two units, the effect of external factors on regional security could be studied.

While applying the third framework, the Persian Gulf regional security was defined as
the security of all regional states (a pan-regional approach). Therefore, a clear
distinction was made between the security “of” the Persian Gulf and the Security “in” this region. The former referred to as the security of all regional states and termed “pan-regional model” and the latter identified as the security of outside power interests in this region.

This study showed that the regional security was not a prerequisite for the security of outside power interests in this region. It also showed a possible contradiction between the situation in which the interests of the outside powers (in this case the United States) were secured and the Persian Gulf regional security. Therefore it was suggested that the US policies, which were (and still are) providing for her own interest in the region, were basically in contrast to the regional security. This led to a hypothetical analysis to find certain criteria for the long term Persian Gulf regional security. First the viewpoints of the United States, Iran, Iraq and GCC member states regarding the question of security in this region were examined. Then, using a comparative method, attempts were made to highlight the common parts of their approaches.

The result of the comparison between these viewpoints and also the position of every one of the eight participants in the system of power relations in this region regarding the question of regional security were as follows:

The United States view is a model of 1+6 (The United States plus the GCC) against 2 (Iran and Iraq). Iran sees the security of the region as a model of the 8 against the United States. Iraq, although acts unpredictably, tries to follow the model of 1+6 against 2 in which the two are Iran and the United States. The GCC sees Persian Gulf regional security as a model of 6+1 against 2 (Iran and Iraq) which is another version of the US view.
There was no common approach among all these participants. The result of reviewing the above approaches was that:

1) The GCC is not considered as a threat in any of the above models.
2) Only Iran’s model of “the eight” represents a collective pan-regional security approach.
3) The other models divide the region into hostile groupings and do not represent a common security plan.

Since the study came to the conclusion that Persian Gulf regional security was the security of all regional states a method was needed by which it would become possible to test the effect of external powers’ policies toward the region upon regional security.

It was suggested that the solution was to define long term Persian Gulf regional security in two levels: minimum and maximum (based on some certain criteria). Then to determine the direction of each given policy in order to assess its main trend towards either security or insecurity of the region.

A long term model of a secure region (at maximum level) was suggested to be based on the following criteria:

1. Interdependence, based on the assumption that the more economic, cultural, and environmental interdependence among the Persian Gulf states the more grounds for co-operation among them.

2. Development: based on the assumption that when the nations of a region have organised their own human and national resources to provide themselves with what they need and expect out of life, and have learned to compromise peacefully among competing demands in the larger common regional interests, then their resistance to disorder and violence will enormously increase.
3. Political stability and consensus: based on the assumption that the question of regional security in the Persian Gulf is intimately related to the issues of stability and security within the various littoral states. As long as a particular state in this region faces destabilising internal problems, the region itself will remain fundamentally unstable and unpredictable. Also that only with the co-operation and support of all states littoral to the Persian Gulf can true regional security in this important and inflammatory area be achieved. In other words, any security plan which excludes particular regional states does not help the security of all.

This study used the above criteria to show how an analytical model of levels for regional security works. The results of the present study show that different US administrations have not made any distinction between the security of the Persian Gulf and security of the United States interests in this region. They have not aimed at including all Persian Gulf states in a regional security agreement. They have made regional groupings rather than consensus. They have aimed at preventing both Iran and Iraq from economic development (separately in system one and two, and together in system three). And finally, they have not helped to strengthen interdependence among the Persian Gulf states. Therefore, as long as the United States is not ready to meet the above mentioned criteria, there would be a contrast between US policies and the security of the Persian Gulf region.

7.2.3. The role of the United States in the new system of power relations in the Persian Gulf.

The most important feature of the role of the United States in the new system of power relations in the Persian Gulf is her "dual containment policy."

This policy, on the one hand, incorporates a number of elements from previous American policies, such as preventing other rivals and protecting GCC member states,
while, on the other hand, in its strategic logic the policy represents a significant
departure in Washington's approach to the Persian Gulf's system of power relations.
The study of the evolution of US involvement in the region shows that US policy has
passed the era of relying on local powers to protect her interests in the region.
However, the result of the present study shows that, even in the new era of "dual
containment," there is still a contrast between her policy and the security of the Persian
Gulf. Therefore, the role of the United States cannot be considered as a stabilising role
in the new system of power relations in this region.

7.2.4. Threats and opportunities as the two major influences on US policies
toward the region.

The records of US involvement in Persian Gulf regional affairs indicates that the
United States in its approach to the security of the Persian Gulf has divided the region
into two fractions of foes and friends or allies. Security of the Persian Gulf, therefore,
has been considered by the United States as "the security of friends" not a "regional
security."

The study of the history of the Persian Gulf region, especially after 1970, also shows
that the pattern of friends and foes has been changed by regional developments,
however, there has always been rivalry between two or more sides.

The result of the evaluation of the US involvement in this region shows that U. S.
unipolar security system needs foes as well as friends. It means that there should be a
threat before a security system can be meaningful. By the collapse of the Soviet Union
US focus has been turned from the external source of threats to the internal ones.
Therefore, for the US unipolar security system, a regional security plan which includes
all the Persian Gulf States is neither the best one nor, of course, an objective. The
positive response of the regional allies to such a system is based on threats they feel
from the foes, therefore, existence of the internal source of threat is a prerequisite for a unipolar amity-enmity based security system. This study showed that security of the Persian Gulf for the United States was security of access to oil provided by the oil rich regional allies and protecting them against "regional threats."

This means, that the system cannot allow any type of collective regional co-operation and order. Therefore, security of the Persian Gulf for the United States is, in fact, security of her own interest not a common or collective regional security. The necessity of the existence of friends and foes for the United States in this region led to the development of the theory of "dual functional effects of regional developments."

According to this theory, since regional developments are certain political, economic, military, or even social incidents which are strong enough to change the status quo, each development is followed by a new regional pattern of conflict and co-operation. Therefore, it represents a new pattern of threats and opportunities for both regional and external powers.

In other words, regional developments cannot be defined merely as threats to the interests of the external or regional powers. As much as they threaten the security of external power interests (in this case the United States), they provide opportunities for them to conclude new agreements and to strengthen their dominant position in the region. They also provide opportunities for other threatened regional powers to temporarily ignore their disputes and to reach new understandings.

This theory explained the relation between regional developments and US policies toward the region in different systems of power relations in this region. It was also the final achievement of the present study.

The major focus of this study was on the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf system of power relations, however, the same theory can be applied by the other
researchers to examine the role of each regional state in the new system of power relations in the Persian Gulf region.
NOTES:

Notes: Chapter I

1 See, Tom Nierop, Systems and Regions in Global Politics (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1994), p.1.

2 Ibid.

3 For example see, David Newsom, “United States Policy Toward the Gulf,” in R. G. Wolf, The United States, Arabia and Gulf (Washington: 1980), p.59, in which he said that if the world was a circle and one wanted to find its centre, it could be easily justified that the centre would be the Persian Gulf. Also see National Security Directive 26, “US Policy Toward the Persian Gulf”, 2 October 1989. Reprinted in Alan Friedman, Spiders Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq (New York: Bantam, 1993), pp. 320-22, in which US policy toward the Persian Gulf was summarised as follows: Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national security. The United States remains committed to defending its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate, through the use of US military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own.


5 Ibid. pp 7-13.

6 The term “traditional method” is used in this study to refer to those who consider the Persian Gulf as a sub-region and also a sub-system of the Middle East.

7 In this case Middle East studies (prevailing approach in the literature) or Persian Gulf studies (hypothetical approach in this study).


9 For a discussion on the term “Middle East” see chapter three.

11 Notably important incidents in this period are the successful prosecution of the US-led war against Iraq and the unexpected fragmentation of the Soviet Union into 15 separate countries.

12 Globalists advocate maintaining or even increasing US involvement. They argue that the Persian Gulf retains its vital importance for the United States despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat to US security interests. For this reason, they insist that the United States must remain prepared to defend its regional interests against any new threats. See Hooglund, op. cit.

13 Regionalists contend that it is appropriate, even necessary, for the United States to limit its role, not just in the Persian Gulf but even throughout the world. They argue that preoccupation with security issues risks entangling the United States with governments that are unrepresentative and use their alliance to help maintain repressive rule. In the long term, they believe that US identification with such regimes can be detrimental to the diverse non-strategic of the United States. See Ibid.


20 See note 5.


22 This method can be extended to study the subject in an “state level” or even in a “sub-state” level.


35 As a practice in the field of the Persian Gulf studies, this study does not deal with the US policy making process. However, the effect of regional developments on US policies toward the region will be examined.


39 See notes 41-49.

40 The ECO was set up in 1985 and was formally known as the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD), which was founded in 1964 with the purpose of providing economic, technical and cultural co-operation among the three Muslim states. By admitting Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as new members, ECO can take an important step towards the formation of an Islamic common market and a common bank. It can also be the initial step towards rapprochement of the regional nations and will provide the basis for a large-scale economic and political co-operation between Iran and her northern neighbours. Iran also signed a newly concluded economic agreement with four other countries around the Caspian sea including, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan in February 1992, which helps Iran to develop her relations with Russia.


44 This field is no longer the central focus of Persian Gulf studies.


53 For a discussion on systemic approach see chapter three.

54 See Chapter three notes 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.

55 The literature on this subject has been reviewed in chapter three.

56 Pirouz Mojtahed Zadeh, considers the Persian Gulf as a geopolitical region, however, he does not mention any particular reason. For a discussion on this subject see chapter III, note 15.

57 Concepts of regionalism and globalism in this case are different from those mentioned in notes 6 and 7. For a discussion on these terms see chapter three.

58 For an explanation of these systems see chapter two.

59 Basam Tibi considers the effect of both, however, he identifies the Persian Gulf as a subsystem of the Middle East. For a discussion on his view see chapter III, “The Persian Gulf and the Middle East.”


62 See note 40, especially Chubin.

63 See chapter IV, sections 5 and 6.
Notes

64 See "The Text of the Political and Religious Testament of Imam Khomeini" Published by Iranian Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture, 1990.

65 The Americanised Islam according to Ayatollah Khomeini is Islam without politics. See, Imam Khomeini's message to Mikhail Gorbachev, Kayhan Havai (February 19, 1992), p. 31.

66 According to the Iranian officials, the United States military presence in the region is not to prevent Iraq from imposing its illegal demands on Kuwait or Saudi Arabia but it has been designed to restrain Islamic revolutionary activities. The most important protest of the Islamic republic of Iran to the US policy in the region is that the presence of western forces, and especially the Americans, in the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa has created political groupings and an arm race. It has also violated the sovereignty of nations and is therefore a threat to the security of these strategic regions. See the speech of the Iranian first vice-president, Hassan Habibi, at a luncheon held in honour of visiting Ethiopian Prime Minister Tamirate Layne, Tehran, December 29, 1992, quoted by Kayhan Havai, December 30, 1992.

67 Hewedy, pp. 2-3.

68 Ibid. p.6.

69 See chapter V, notes 40 and 41.

70 This has been the case especially after the Islamic revolution in Iran.

71 Two variables are related if certain values of one variable tend to coincide with certain values of the other variable. If in addition, we consider that values of one variable produce the values of the other variable then the relationship is a causal relationship.

72 See chapter III, especially section 1.

73 See chapter II, section 2.

74 See chapter IV.

75 See chapters IV and VI.

76 See chapter VI.

77 This hypothesis has been examined as one of the major subjects of chapters IV, V and VI.


79 For example, see chapter II, section 1. Empirical analysis is widely used in the study of international relations and perhaps is the most commonly used method by researchers in this field.

80 Brewer, op cit.


NOTES: CHAPTER II


3 During this period, the Persian were also considered as Moslems. However, for some 400 years, from the seventh to the eleventh century, the Arabs were the centre of political power, commerce, and learning in the area. See, Michael Curtis, ed., *The Middle East Reader*, (New Jersey: Transaction Book, 1986) p. xiii.


5 Cottrell, p. 4.

6 Many years of Portuguese exploration down the West African coast had been rewarded when Bartolomeu Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1488. The Portuguese then planned to send a fleet to India for spices and to outflank the Muslims in Africa. The Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama led an expedition at the end of the 15th century that opened the sea route to India by way of the Cape of Good Hope. The trade goods and presents provided by the Portuguese king were suitable for Africa, not India, and the Arabs who dominated trade in the Indian Ocean region viewed the Portuguese as rivals. Adapted from, New Grolier Encyclopaedia, release 6, Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.

7 Cottrell, p. 20.

8 Cottrell, p. 21.

10 Cottrell, p.108.


14 Cottrell, p. 129.


17 Said Zahlan, p. 126.

18 Ibid.


20 Long, pp. 69-70.


23 For a comparison between Iran and the other Persian Gulf states see, J. M. Abdulghani, *Iran and Iraq: the Years of Crisis*, (Kent: Croom Helm Ltd, 1984), pp.82-83.

24 In the latter 1960s and throughout the 1970s, oil revenues had made Iran a second-rank power in international politics and the "gendarme" of the Gulf security. Iran sent troops to help Royalists in North Yemen while Egypt's Gamal Abd al-Nasser helped the Arab nationalists who were trying to set up a republic. Iran did her utmost to influence the Arab rulers of all the Gulf littoral states from Oman to Kuwait and became the strongest military power in the region. See, Miron Rezun, *Iran at the Cross-roads* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p.11.

26 These Emirates were: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ra's al-Khaymah, Ajman, Al-Fujayrah, Ummal-Qaywayn.


28 For example, the Soviet Union helped the Tudeh party in Iran and the Shoyuui Party in Iraq.


30 For more discussions on this subject, see, chapter V, section 3.


35 Ibid. p.15.


37 See, Bassam Tibi, pp. 48-49.


40 Bassam Tibi, Ibid., p.24.

42 Tibi., p.25.

43 See note 39.


50 Ibid.


56 The Gulf Co-operation Council was formally established on May 25, 1981, although the Arab unity, in different forms, has a long history back to the 1945 (the formation of the League of Arab States). The most important objective of the idea of the Arab unity has always been against the policies of Iran and Israel as the two powerful non-Arab states in the Middle East. In the case of the G.C.C. the main objective was also to protect the smaller Arab states from being affected by the revolutionary Islamic tide generated by the Ayatollah Khomeyni's revolution in Iran.

58 For United States dual containment policy see chapter VI.

59 The Middle East is used in this chapter only as a geographical term.

60 See chapter VI.

61 CNN reported on October 8, 1994, that: “US forces in the Gulf region are being bolstered to counter an Iraqi troop build-up as Saddam Hussein moved his elite Republican Guard toward Kuwait's border. Meanwhile, military chiefs from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the Gulf gathered in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, to discuss what action they should take in response to the Iraqi action.”

62 The following questions have been raised to show the complexity of the possible future events. Finding proper answers for all of these questions is beyond the scope of the present study. Therefore, only those parts which are directly relevant to the subject of this research (see chapter one introduction) will be discussed.

63 The direction toward which Muslims pray everyday.


65 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international organisation set up to attain the highest possible sustainable rate of growth among its member countries consistent with maintaining financial stability, to expand world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis, and to contribute via development to the expansion of employment and living standards everywhere. Originally set up as the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to co-ordinate MARSHALL PLAN aid in 1948, the OECD took on its present form in 1961, once the task of reconstruction was accomplished. Today the membership includes 24 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.


67 Hamid Mowlana, p.16.

68 Hamid Mowlana, p.2.


Narsi Ghorban and Mohammad Sarir, p.740.

OPEC Secretarial Report presented to the IPEC/OPEC Conference in Muscat Oman on 13 April 1993. Quoted by Narsi Ghorban and Mohammad Sarir, p.739.

Albert Legaut and John Sigler, p.96.


Ibid.

Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz, Foreign Policy, no:92, Fall 1993, p.5.

Also see questions in pp.24-25.

Notes: Chapter III


The first three questions will be discussed in this chapter. The remaining three are the main concerns of the following three chapters.

Bassam Tibi, p.24.


14 Taylor, p.60.

15 Taylor, p.61.


19 Russett, p.183.


21 The term Middle East was first used in 1902 by the US naval writer Alfred Mahan in a discussion of British imperial strategy. The term referred then to the western and


It seems that the term “Far East” does not refer to a certain geographical area. In Fisher’s definition it is not clear whether this term is East Asia, Central Asia or West Asia.


26 Bassam Tibi, p.43.

27 Tibi, p.43.

28 Don Peterz, p.3

29 See note 5.

30 See Tibi, pp. 6, 46, 64.

31 It was the American expert Rosenau who introduced the concept of “linkage”: “Hence we will use a linkage as our basic unit of analysis, defining it as any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another. In order to distinguish between the initial and the terminal stages, we shall refer to the former as an output and to the latter as an input. Each of these in turn will be classified in terms of whether they occur in a polity or its external environment (i.e., the intentional system).” See the new edition of James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics, 2nd edn, (London, F. Pinter, 1980), esp. the section on the linkage model, pp. 370 401, here p. 381. Quoted also by Tibi, p.194-195.

32 Tibi, p.57

33 See Tibi, pp.57-59.
Miller referred to Stuart Harris who had a speech on Economic Issues in the Middle East, identifying twenty or so states in the Middle East including Algeria. See Mohammed Ayoob, ed., *The Middle East in World Politics*, (London: Groom Helm, 1981), p.175.


Miller, p.203.


Joffe, p.251 and p.266.


Tibi, p.36.

Arab Near East.

North West Africa, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and sometimes, Libya.

He also mentions Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Cyprus as non-Arab state actors within the Middle East subsystem. See, Tibi, p.59.


See chapter IV.


Since 1972 the number of conflict among the Persian Gulf states has been greater than that of between one or a group of states in the Persian Gulf and a state or a group of states outside the region. For the question of co-operation in this regard see chapter 4 section 3.

See chapter four section four.
51 Since 1972, the period that this research covers, all of the smaller Gulf states have been accepted by the international community as independent states.


53 See, Michael Adams, pp.296-297.

54 In most cases oil is not only considered as the main concern of the United States in the Persian Gulf but also it is regarded as fundamental interest of the West in entire Middle East. For instance see, Michael Field, Inside the Arab World (London: John Murray Ltd., 1994), p.407.


56 Ibid.


64 James A. Bill, p.19.

65 Ibid. p.20.


67 When the second world war ended, the United States' relations with the USSR degenerated into the Cold War. The United States protested against Soviet behaviour
in Eastern Europe with no effect. The USSR also supported a Communist-led insurrection in Greece, pressured Turkey for control of the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, refused to withdraw wartime troops from north-western Iran, and rejected an American proposal for United Nations control of atomic energy.

Truman, who saw communist revolt in Greece as part of a general Soviet strategy to spread communist power under the direction of the Soviet Union, countered with a policy of containment. In March 1946, reacting in part to American demands, the USSR pulled out of Iran. In March 1947, Truman asked Congress to vote heavy military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey and proclaimed the policy that became known as the Truman Doctrine—a program of assistance to countries resisting outside domination. See note 55.

68 The Suez Crisis (1956) developed when Great Britain, France, and Israel retaliated against Egypt for nationalising the Suez Canal. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, angered by the withdrawal by the United States and Great Britain of an offer to finance the Aswan High Dam project, nationalised the canal on July 26. The British government, which held nearly half the shares in the Suez Canal Company, tried to block that move. Together with France, which resented Egyptian aid to Algerian rebels, and Israel, Britain planned to take over the canal. Israel launched a strike against the Sinai Peninsula on October 29. The next day Britain and France demanded that the combatants withdraw 16 km (10 mi) from the canal and then attacked Egypt from the air when it refused the demand. On November 5, Anglo-French troops landed near Port Said. Egypt's Arab neighbours did not come to its aid, but the USSR threatened to retaliate with nuclear weapons. The United States, working through the United Nations, demanded a cease-fire. One was put into effect on November 6, and a supervisory police force established by the United Nations took over on Mar. 7, 1957. See J.A.S. Genville and Bernard Wasserstein, p.127. Also see pp. 349-350.

69 Also see chapter V.

70 Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz, Foreign Policy, no:92, Fall 1993, p.5.


72 Ibid.

73 George Bush stated that: "We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of co-operation. Out of these trouble times a new world order can emerge: a new era freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nation of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony." See James Gow, ed., Iraq the Gulf Conflict and the World Community, (London: Brassey's Ltd, 1993), p.183.

74 According to K. J. Holsti, foreign policy is being defined as “the actions of a state toward the external environment and the conditions under which these actions are
formulated.” It is thus a process and it unfolds in three interrelated areas of analysis: the influences on foreign policy, the making of foreign policy and the implementation of foreign policy. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework For Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972), p.21.


75 The same definition will be used in this study.


78 Philip Robins, pp.84-85.

79 US policies toward the Persian Gulf will be identified in chapter V.


**NOTES: CHAPTER IV**

1 For a discussion on the question of threats and its relation to both regional development and US policies, see chapter VI.

2 For discussion about the underdevelopment of the concept of security, see Barry Buzan, *People States and Fear* (England: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p.3.


5 Thomas, p.100.


7 Buzan, Rizvi, p.5.

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9 The Middle East here after is referred to as merely a geographical name for an area in South West Asia.

10 See chapter VI.

11 Jo-Anne Hart, p.713.


13 For example, see Ali Akbar Velayati’s (Iranian Minister for foreign affairs) address to the UN General Assembly in Sept. 24, 1994, in page 89. For Iraq's view see, Adel Darwish and Gregory Alexander, Unholy Babylon (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1991), p.246.

14 Oxford Dictionary.

15 See Buzan, People States and Fear, p.3.

16 Ibid. p.4.


19 In the same book Herz declare that: “When I first claimed primary importance for the security dilemma, I was not aware that a similar thesis had been powerfully put forth by a British historian and student of power politics, Herbert Butterfield. What I have termed "security dilemma" is called "predicament of Hobbesian fear" by Mr. Butterfield.”, Ibid., p.234.


22 Arnold Wolfers, National security as an ambiguous symbol (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), Ch. 10.

24 Ibid.


26 Mohammed Ayoob, op cit.


36 Michael H. H. Loud, National Security (Pretoria: ISS-University of Pretoria, 1978), the quote is from the introductory note titled “The purpose of the symposium.”

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44 See note 39.

45 See note 1.


48 Buzan, op. cit.

49 Buzan, p.3.

50 Buzan, Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers, p.8.

51 Caroline Thomas, Third World Security, p.99


53 Buzan, Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers, p.7.

54 See system one in chapter II.

55 See system two in chapter II.

56 See note 3.
57 During the war, about one million people were killed on both sides. The total economic cost of war for both Iran and Iraq was estimated at about $1,097 billion ($644.3 billion for Iran and $452.6 billion for Iraq) which has absorbed 60 percent of Iran’s and 112 percent of Iraq’s GNP during the 1980-8 period. See, Kamran Mofid, “War, Destruction and Reconstruction”, in, Charles Davies, After the War (U.K.: Publishing Limited, 1990), p. 130.


62 See chapter I, note 41.


64 See “dual containment” in chapter VI.


66 Israel-PLO first comprehensive peace conference was held under the US supervision in October 1991 after the end of the second Gulf war which was followed by a peace agreement in September 1993.


69 See Saikal, op. cit.


71 See Saikal, op. cit.

He refers to the different schools of jurisprudence in Islam. The Sunni Muslims recognize the following four schools of jurisprudence: (1) the Hanafi, formed by Abu-Hanifa (d. 767) and his followers; (2) the Hanbali, formed by Ibn Hanbal (d. 855); (3) the Maleki, formed by Malik Ibn Anas (715-795); (4) the Shafe'i, formed by al-Shafe'i (d. 820). The Shi'i school follows the Imami school of jurisprudence founded by the sixth Shi'i Imam, Ja'far al-Sadeq (702-765). See, Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View (Boston: University Press of America, Inc., 1983), p. 126

74 See, Ibid., p. 86.
75 Ibid. p. 82.
79 It should be noticed that even a Muslim state can also be considered an oppressive power, for example, Iran under the Shah.
81 See, Ettela'at February 25, 1989. Also see “The Text of the Political and Religious Testament of Imam Khomeini”, Published by Iranian Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture, 1990.
82 Ettela'at, No: 97, September 27, 1994.
83 Address to vacuum
84 The pre-Islamic past of Iraq in not Arabic but Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian. The pre-Islamic past of Lebanon is Phoenician, of Palestine it is Hebrew, of Egypt it is Pharaonic, and of the Maghreb it is Berber. However, now they are Arab speaking states and we know them as Arabs.
85 Facts of the Arab nations, p. 32.
86 See "system two" in chapter two.

91 Chubin, pp.93-94.


93 Iraq always claimed that Kuwait was its 19th Province.


95 J. E. Peterson, "The GCC and Regional Security", in John A. Sandwick, p.168.

96 For a discussion on the relation between Iraq and the GCC see, Nonneman, Gerd. "Iraqi-G.C.C. Relations: Roots of Change and Future Prospects" in Davies Charles.


98 All of the six GCC member states are monarchies.

99 See note 52.

100 See chapter II, the criteria for defining a region.


102 See chapter II, section one.

103 As can be seen in figure (4.4) there are still many high value determinants of conflict in this region.

In the first case the Islamic revolution in Iran and in the second the growing military strength of Iraq and its invasion of Kuwait.

See chapter VI.

For wars and border clashes between the governments of the Persian Gulf see Valdani, p.546.


The question of water, for instance, can be considered as a good ground for economic co-operation or the question of pollution in the Gulf which is a common environmental issue for all the Persian Gulf states.


Jerrold D. Green, p.698.

NOTES: CHAPTER V

1 See chapter IV, section 4.


It was during this very period that CIA initiated its operation to over throw the government of Syria, see Curtis, Michael, ed. The Middle East Reader (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1986), p.xi.

4 See Roger R. Trask, p.294.


6 See chapter III, section one.
For a historical account regarding the relation between the United States and the Middle East prior to this period see, Roger R. Trask, Ibid., pp 293-309. To review the relations between the United States and Iran in the same period see, James A. Bill, *The Eagle and The Lion* (New York: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 15-154. For US relations with Saudi Arabia prior to this period see, Fouad Al-Farsy, *Saudi Arabia* (London: KPI Limited, 19820), pp.38-39.

Chapter III, section 3.


Although all policies are circumstantial, there are sometimes situations in which a policy is motivated by basic interests rather than by a changing factor such as regional developments or the necessities of the world order. For example, preventing the other rivals from changing a favourable situation in the Persian Gulf can be referred as structural policy as compared to twin-pillar policy as a situational one.

For a discussion on threats to the US interests see chapter VI.


Ibid.

22 Sawhill and Stone, 1984, p. 73.

23 Jochen Hippler, pp. 13-14.

24 Nixon’s views can be found in US Government Printing Office, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*. The 1971 volume (Washington, 1972), has the Kansas City speech. Cited by. LaFeber, p. 147

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Nixon called it “the most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world.”, *Times*, Jan. 3, 1972.

28 Nixon said “I seriously doubt if we will ever have another war”, *Times*, January 3, 1972.


32 Ibid. p. 47.


35 John Galtung, p. 104.

Iran’s rapid economic growth from the mid 1960s reduced the charge that the Shah’s survival depended entirely on US support. The American response to it was declared by Rusk (then the Secretary of States), in November 1967, when he said that “direct economic aid” to Iran would end. The reason, according to him, was “Iran’s rapid economic growth”: in ten years Iran’s industrial production had increased 88 percent, its exports by more than a third; its Gross National Product increased 11.8 percent in 1965 and 9.5 percent in 1966. Therefore, even before US twin-pillar policy, Iran was capable of standing on its own feet. For Rusk declaration see, U. S. Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1967, pp.825-827.

This strategy, embodied in the National Security Council study NSC-68, was a response to the growing tension between the two superpowers during this period. The study called for “a renewed initiative in the cold war,” beginning with a substantial US military build-up and increases in military and economic aid programs. Most of America’s foreign aid previously had gone to countries in Western Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, and East Asia. But in a strategy that came to be known as Perimeter Defence, much of the increased aid called for in NSC-68 was to be given to countries located on the borders of the emerging Sino-Soviet sphere of influence. For the National Security Council study NSC-68, see Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950, I, 273-292, reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Giddis, ed. Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp.385. Also see, Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski, ed., Neither East Nor West (New York: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 145-161.

The United States began to take a much greater interest in Iran after Dwight Eisenhower was inaugurated in January 1953. The new president and his advisers brought to the White House a more activist foreign policy than that pursued by the Truman administration. Once in power, they quickly set about strengthening US allies throughout the world and denouncing or actively undermining not only Soviet allies but also neutralist governments that appeared to sympathise with the Soviet Union. Although US policy makers did not regard Mosaddeq as a communist, the Eisenhower administration began planning to overthrow him within weeks of its inauguration. Mosaddeq was finally ousted in a CIA-instigated coup d’état in August 1953. Afterward, firm measures were taken to strengthen Mosaddeq’s successor and bring Iran firmly into the Western camp. By the late 1950s, Iran had become a major US ally, receiving large amounts of US economic and security assistance and joining a US-backed regional security organisation known as the Baghdad Pact. Despite important changes in the character of US-Iranian relations, Iran was to remain a key US ally until the 1978-79 revolution. See Ibid. p.147. Also see Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, No.19, August 1987, pp.266-69.


42 Ibid.


44 For a discussion on these differences, see chapter II, section 2.


46 Ibid.

47 See, James A. Bill, pp.183-185.


50 For a discussion on Arab nationalism see chapter IV, section 6.

51 See, Shaul Bakhash, Iran’s Relations with Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, in Miron Rezun, p.116. Also see Shireen T. Hunter, pp. 97-115.


54 For a discussion on this period see system two in Chapter II.


56 R. B. Byers and David Leyton-Brown, Superpower Intervention in the Persian Gulf (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 28.

57 Byers and Leyton-Brown, p. 90.


60 Prior to the Islamic Revolution, most analysts assumed that, if there were instability anywhere in the Middle East, the Soviet Union would be the principal beneficiary. In the long term, this may well still be true, but in the short term, the Soviet Union has run afoul of the traditional Islamic world-view described earlier. The Soviet Union had expected that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a revolutionary state, would at once recognise the U.S.S.R. as its natural ally. Instead it has found itself, much to its chagrin, placed in the same infidel category as the United States. See Roger Savory, "The Added Touch: Ithna 'Ashari Shi'ism as a Factor in the Foreign Policy of Iran," International Journal, Volume XLI, no. 2, Spring 1986, p. 416.


62 The major concern of the United States in this period was to prevent Islamic revolution from affecting US interest in the region and Iraq was the only regional power with enough military power to confront Iran.

63 This trend was changed after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 2, 1990.


68 See, Rezun, p. 25.

69 On December 14, 1986, the Washington post reported that: "The Central Intelligence Agency has been secretly supporting Iraq with detailed intelligence including data from sensitive US satellite reconnaissance photography, to assist Iraq bombing raids on Iran's oil terminals and power plants in the war between the two nations". Indeed it was revealed that, since 1984, information has been flowing to Iraq from the US satellite overseeing the Persian Gulf via Washington until the end of the Iran-Iraq war. "William Casey, then the director of the CIA, met twice in October and November of 1986 with top Iraqi officials to make sure the news channel was functioning and to encourage more attacks on Iranian installations". See, Bob Woodward, "CIA Aiding Iraq in Gulf War", Washington Post, December 15, 1986, p. 1.

70 See, Rezun, op. cit., p. 25.
71 Tanker War.

72 From an Iranian point of view, the tragedy of Iranian Airbus was not just a mistake as the US officials declared but a planned offensive against Iran. According to Hamid Molana, as information and communications systems are perceived as alternative security shields in the Persian Gulf, more than 47 billion dollars of telecommunications and data gathering equipment have been shipped and installed in such countries as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Yet with sophisticated radar tracking systems that supposed to be able to "see" the entire length of the Persian Gulf, providing for broader coverage than the air and sea surveillance systems previously, it is astonishing that the "Vincennes" crew was unable to distinguish between a civilian airline and a F14 jet fighter as the US claimed. See, Hamid Mowlana, Geopolitics of Communication and the Strategical Aspects of the Persian Gulf; paper prepared for presentation at the International Conference on the Persian Gulf, Tehran, November 20-23, 1989, p. 4.


74 Bulloch and Morris, p.123.

75 Chubin and Tipp, p.206.


77 See the determinants of insecurity and instability of the Persian Gulf region in chapter IV.


79 Ibid.

80 Western analysts believe that without a healthy Iraq, there is no regional counterbalance to the growing ambitions of Iran. Saddam's drawn-out confrontation with the United Nations has denied Iraq the recovery it needs to match Iran's new drive for dominance in the Persian Gulf. America, they believe, is now the only force standing in the way of Iran's long-sought goal of winning regional hegemony. Richard Murphy, then Reagan's top Middle East adviser says: "While we do not want to see one nation dominating the Gulf, for better or worse, there is one nation dominating the Gulf and it is us". See, News week, January 25, 1993.

81 Charles Davies, After the War (UK: Carden Publication Limited, 1990), p. 130.

82 Davies, p. 132.


In such a situation, the imitation of Sa'd bin Abi Waggass who led the Arab troops to victory over the Persian army in the Al-Ghadissiyah battle in AD 633 could not solve Iraq's new problems. A new model was required which could promote Saddam's ambitions for the future: the rebuilding of Iraq, the leadership of the Arab world and, above all else, the presentation of Iraq as a fortress guarding the eastern gate of the empire he wished to lead. Therefore, the policy of "Al-Ghadesseah" (or all Arabs against Iran) was changed to the policy of "Nebuchadnezzar II" (the king of Babylonia from 604 to 562 BC, who captured Jerusalem and took large number of Israelites into captivity). See, Mahmoud Toloui, *The Persian Gulf War and the Future of the Middle East* (Tehran: Tehran Publishing Co., 1991), p. 190.

See, Tareq Aziz's memorandum to the Secretary General of Arab Community, June 16, 1990, quoted in Toloui, P. 139.


Darwish and Alexander, p. 230.

See, Davies, p. 96. Also see, Eric Hooglund, *U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf in the 1990s*, in Davies, p. 396.


One may argue that if Saddam Hussein had been overthrown, it would have provided an opportunity for the pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiis to come to power. Therefore, US policy was in the favour of the GCC too. In response one should consider that there is no evidence in the history of the Persian Gulf to prove that the threat of the revolutionary Shii to the GCC member state has been/is greater than that of Iraqi Ba'thist regime

On August 22, 1995, CNN reported a new Iraqi attempt to attack Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.


For the effect of the second Gulf war upon the Arab Nationalism see, Anoushirvan Ehteshami, *The Arab States and the Middle East Balance of Power*, in James Gow, ed., *Iraq the Gulf Conflict and the World Community* (UK: Brassey’s Ltd, 1993), pp. 64-71.


Hashemi Rafsanjani in a televised press interview in Feb. 1992 declared that: “we do not believe that the United States will moderate its policies because this country’s enmity towards the Muslims of the world and region still persists.” See Etela’at February 29, 1992, p.2.

Berman and Jentleson, p.94.

Ibid.


Persian Gulf regional security was endangered by US policies to support Iraq in Iran-Iraq war, its military intervention in Iran-Iraq war (tanker war), its war against Iraq in 1992.

See, chapter IV, section 10.


For a discussion on threats and US policies see chapter VI.

NOTES: CHAPTER VI

1 See, for instance, chapter I, notes 41-46.

2 For some examples see chapter I, note 41.

Notes


10 Ibid., p. 9.


12 Robert Jervis has employed the term security dilemma as a result of both deliberate and inadvertent threats. Mostly, he talks about the security dilemma as a situation where one state’s gaining security often inadvertently threatens others. See Jervis, R. “Co-operation under the Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, 30/2, 1978, p. 170. Elsewhere in his writings, he also talks about the security dilemma not as the unintended consequence of policy but rather as its object where one state believes it can only be secure if others are insecure. See Jervis, “Security Regimes”, *International Organisation*, 36/2, 1982, p. 177.

13 See Jo-Anne Hart, p. 35.

14 See Jo-Anne Hart, p. 40.

15 In this particular case, US interests were parallel to those of Iran. However they were against Iraq’s interests in the region. The same situation can be seen in system two when US interests became parallel to those of Iraq against the Islamic revolution in Iran.

17 Ibid.

18 The same as the Gulf Co-operation Council.

19 See note 55.

20 See Chapter II.


22 The term “interest” needs to be replaced by the term “objective”. For problems in using the proper terminology in this regard see chapter III.

23 Faisal Al Mazidi, op. cit.


26 The term “strategic threat” will be used in this chapter with the same conception.


29 Kennan believed that the term Near East should apply to refer to the area from Libya to Iran.

30 Ibid.


34 Soviet historians, such as Sivachev and Yakovlev (1979), while sometimes admitting Soviet military inferiority during the early post-war years, downplay its significance by pointing out the complexity of the US-Soviet balance of power. However, Western
analysts generally agree that the strategic balance favoured the United States at least through the early 1960s. See for instance, Kistiakowsky, op. cit.


36 Farid Abolfathi, op. cit.


39 See chapter V, section 4.

40 See, Toni G. Verstandig speech (Transcript) in US Department of State Dispatch, v5, n14, April 4, 1994 p198.

41 The existence of a long standing threat, such as the Soviet Union, is possible. However, such a threat also can not be permanent.

42 At this time Iran was at war and the migration of hundreds of thousands of Kurds and Afghaniies had created economic and social problems especially in the Iranian bordering provinces of Khorasan and Kurdestan.


44 Abolfathi, p.89.

45 Ibid.

46 This example indicates that both incidents were identified as threats to US Interests, however, they were not defined in the same way.


49 Ibid., p. 22.

50 Ibid., p. 30.

52 See Ismael, _op. cit._, p. 214.
53 Ibid., p. 94.
56 See for example, David George, _Pax Islamica: an Alternative New World Order_, Newcastle Discussion Papers in Politics No. 5, September 1993.
57 Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, p. 47.
58 For different approaches to the question of security and stability of the Persian Gulf, see Chapter IV.
59 _Ettela’at_, No 289, July 12, 1995.
61 Relations between Iran and GCC member states has been improved dramatically since the end of the second Persian Gulf war. It shows that the threat of Iraq has given Iran an opportunity to adjust it position in the Persian Gulf region.
63 Although not clearly declared "dual containment" also see Iran and Iraq as threats to the interests of the smaller Persian Gulf states. See Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Verstandig, p. 198.
68 See, Toni G. Verstandig, _op. cit._
69 CIA Director Woolsey, in his speech before the Senate Selected Committee on Intelligence, also highlighted threats to US interests abroad. The following shows his approach to Iran and Iraq.
"On Iran, I wish I could tell this committee that 15 years after the triumph of the extremists, the voices of hate have given way to the policies of moderation. But there is no basis for such a view. Iran remains determined to maintain its implacable hostility, to eliminate any opposition to its rule, and to undermine our security interests and those of our friends and allies in the region. Terrorism remains a central tool for Iran’s leaders in seeking to accomplish these objectives, and Iranian support for Hizballah and other such groups from Algeria to Tajikistan has not abated.

We are especially concerned that Iran continues to develop its ambitious multibillion dollar military modernisation program and to pursue development of weapons of mass destruction. The intelligence community estimates that left to its own devices Iran will take at least 8-10 years to build its own nuclear weapons, but that it will try to shortcut this process by buying nuclear material and ballistic missiles.

Over the past year the intelligence community has been instrumental in the ongoing, intensive, dialogue with our European allies to outline for them the continued threats posed by Iran. The Administration intends to expand these consultations with our friends and allies in the Far East as well, and we will play a key role in these discussions.

Turning to Iraq, let us be clear: without UN sanctions and inspections Saddam Hussein would have been well on his way by now toward rebuilding his programs for weapons of mass destruction. The importance of sanctions and monitoring cannot be overstated. Because of the unprecedented information the intelligence community has given to the UN Special Commission since 1991 to track down and eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, we have destroyed a far larger share of Iraq’s capability in this area than was destroyed during the war itself.

Mr. Chairman, there are no easy or quick solutions to the threats posed by these two rogue regimes. For years to come, the intelligence community will continue to require the necessary resources to monitor their military programs, to uncover their attempts to establish clandestine procurement networks aimed at obtaining material and expertise for development of weapons of mass destruction, and to support terrorist activity. It was less than a year ago that Saddam attempted an audacious and outrageous crime; the assassination of a former American President. We cannot relax our guard against such governments.” For a full text, see, R. James Woolsey speech (Transcript), Threats to the US and its interests abroad: intelligence and security. Vital Speeches, March 1, 1994 v60 n10 p290-6.

70 See Anthony Lake, op. cit.


72 Toni G. Verstandig, op. cit.

73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.


78 See chapter V, note 80.

79 Gause, op. cit.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

According to Faisal Al Mazidi current United States plans foresee a substantial reduction in troop deployments overseas (particularly in Europe, the Middle East/Gulf forward deployment zone) and in (US) power projection capabilities over the next five years. To execute its part in 'Desert Storm', the United States deployed 10 army and Marine divisions, 11 air force wings and 6 carrier battle groups and still retained a large residual force to be used in a simultaneous contingency elsewhere. By the end of the decade, the United States will simply not have such a force available due to budgetary restrictions and cost-cutting plans now under consideration. See note 12.

83 See note 55.

84 Gregory F. Gause, Ibid.

85 Al-Hayat, October 17, 1993, p. 5.


88 Gregory F. Gause, op. cit.

89 Ettela'at, No 289, July 12, 1995.

90 Gregory F. Gause, op. cit.

91 Ettela'at, No 289, July 12, 1995.

92 Gause argues that a dialogue with Iran on the future of Iraq should aim at reassuring Tehran on a number of points: that the United States does not support the break-up of Iraq or Kurdish independence, that the United States does not seek to turn a post-
Saddam Iraq into an American asset aimed at increasing Iran’s isolation, that in a post-Saddam Iraq Shiites will be able to play a role commensurate with their historical and demographic weight in the country.

93 Julie Flint, op. cit.

94 See Anthony Lake, op. cit.


96 Ibid. p.39.

97 Some analysts, such as Leon T. Hadar, believe that Iran and its Islamic revolutionary ideology can not be considered as a threat to the United States. For a full discussion see, Leon T. Hadar, What Green Peril? Foreign Affairs, , p.28-42.

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