John Grote, Cambridge University and the Development of Victorian Ideas, 1830 - 1870.

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Volume I

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Grote

Synopsis

This thesis reconstructs and interprets the life and writings of the relatively unknown nineteenth century philosopher John Grote (1813-1866). It places his work in the intellectual contexts of the University of Cambridge of his day and discusses his place in the development of Victorian Thought. The thesis argues that John Grote, (brother of the historian George Grote) is a most original thinker in his own right and that historically he holds a crucial place in the debates that make up Victorian thought. Cambridge University between 1830 and 1870 is seen to have nurtured a dualistic intellectual movement called the Cambridge Network which rivalled intellectually, the centres of Edinburgh and London and the movements of positivism, utilitarianism and common sense philosophy. In developing the Cambridge philosophy of his day in response to developments elsewhere in British philosophy, John Grote (like James Frederick Ferrier in Scotland) is shown to have elaborated a nascent form of indigenous philosophical idealism in England prior to the 1870's and the emergence of Oxford Idealism.

The introduction argues that a modern understanding and appreciation of John Grote's philosophy is unlikely without the reconstruction of the cultural, intellectual and institutional world which he inhabited. The loss of detail about this world in the twentieth century, explains why past attempts to popularize Grote's work have failed. Conventional accounts of the history of Victorian philosophy are elaborated and attacked in the introduction, as are the methodological assumptions upon which they were written.

Chapter one provides details of Grote's life and writings but gives special prominence to his novel, and in retrospect revolutionary, work on language. Chapters two and three provide a

historical reconstruction of the intellectual context that attended the production of Grote's corpus. The middle chapters from four to nine reconstruct Grote's analytic philosophical work in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, ontology, ethics, and politics, revealing Grote's commitment to epistemological and ethical idealism and the production of a 'relational theory of obligation' and a 'jural theory of politics'.

My arguments are synthesised in chapter ten and the conclusions and some indications as to John Grote's influence are appended.

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Preface

The original idea for research into the writings of John Grote arose while I was studying for a Master of Arts degree in the Politics Department at Durham University between 1968 and 1969. I was then already acquainted with and interested in the Oxford Idealist movement and the work of those associated more recently with Michael Oakeshott. While browsing in the basement collection of books rarely read in the University Library I lighted upon John Grote's *Exploratio Philosophica* Part One. A passage in a page opened at random provoked a major puzzle. How could a Cambridge scholar in 1865 have produced what read to be a clear statement of epistemological idealism when such arguments were conventionaly held to have been produced in Britain only after 1870 and then in Oxford University? Further reading of Grote's *Exploratio* and the *Treatise on the Moral Ideals* confirmed my conviction that Grote was an idealist and a critic of positivism, empiricism and utilitarianism, and this deepened my sense of puzzlement.

Original relief came with the writing of a short M.A. dissertation with the guidance of Dr David Manning. Under his supervision and in discussion with him I gained confidence in my original hypothesis and started an analytic rebuilding exercise (Gibbins 1969). In addition I came to the conclusion that Grote was an early example of that tradition of philosophy and political theory made popular later by Michael Oakeshott, a philosophy of anti rationalism, of respect for tradition, for practices and their intimations. I concluded that 'Grote's work bears testimony to an original and penetrating mind, the study of which has been too long neglected', but then worried about the apparent lack of acredited admissions of influence and debt.

My reading of Lauchlin D. Macdonald's book on Grote provoked further worries for its publication in 1966 had not precipitated a major re-assessment of Grote's corpus(1). My first reaction was that this lack of response reflected the defects of Macdonald's book (e.g. lack of context; intellectual sloppiness). Hence my first declared PhD outline at the University of Newcastle in 1969 recommended a thesis based on a biographical and analytic textual analysis. The key theme in the thesis was to be John Grote's theory of practice and action, which I considered underpinned his moral and political philosophy. However further research and reading and especially the discovery of earlier accounts of Grote's work forced me to re-appraise this judgement.

In my revised proposal and outline of December 1980 I wrote that,

> 'The original outline for a doctoral thesis on John Grote was premised upon an assumption that the significance and originality of his work could be elucidated via the simple expediency of a biographical and textual analysis. Much has changed both in my research and in the methodology of social and political theory to challenge this premise and to require a reconsideration of approach. Firstly, the methodological debate of the last decade requires that any contemporary work recognises the importance and demands of contextual analysis. Secondly my research into John Grote has revealed only sketchy biographical materials and few of the listed but best manuscripts that I had hoped to locate to support the original project. Thirdly it is now apparent that an understanding and appraisal of the work of John Grote requires an appreciation of the intellectual context of mid-Victorian Britain and of the relatively closed world of Victorian Cambridge in particular. Finally, two recent scholarly works on the period have raised issues of concern which I feel call for reply and revision in light of my new knowledge of John Grote and of the wider Cambridge movement and hence my research project should be broadened to allow them to be brought into the ambit of my thesis.
>
> The primary aim of my revised Ph.D. thesis remains an elucidation of the ideas of John Grote, however the title, method of approach and scope of analysis will change. The new approach is to be historical as well as philosophical. A study of the debate between the empiricists, utilitarians and positivists who composed the non-university intellectual elite of the period 1830-1870 and the idealists, intuitionists and anti-positivists of the university elite will provide the social and intellectual context for the study. The scope of the thesis will be widened

to consider the development and interaction of scientific, mathematical, anthropological, theological and historical as well as philosophical and political ideas. Other Cambridge intellectuals of the period will also receive analysis including, F.D.Maurice, S.T.Coleridge, Julius Hare, William Whewell, Henry Maine and James Fitzjames Stephen'. Hence the revised title, *'John Grote, Cambridge University, and the Development of Victorian Ideas*, (1830-1870)'

The thesis as presented is the fulfilment of the plan presented and accepted in 1981. It gives prominence to a) reconstructing the intellectual context needed to correctly interpret and understand Grote's philosophical enterprise and b) to reconstructing and interpreting his writings. While some effort is made to critically appraise Grote's philosophy and to map out his influence, these two matters are of secondary concern to this thesis.

Acknowledgements

There are many individuals and institutions to whom acknowledgement and thanks must be given and these are presented in historical order of procedure. Firstly I must thank Dr David Manning not only for his encouragement and advice on the research for my M.A. dissertation but for philosophical conversations of the highest order over a period of years and for an introduction to an original form and style of argument only vaguely evidenced in any of his subsequent publications. In addition I would like to thank Henry Tudor at Durham for his companionship.

Thanks must next be given to the now much reformed Social Science Research Council for granting a two year studentship on what must have seemed a risky and somewhat esoteric venture in 1969. Next I must thank the staff in the Politics Department, at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne and especially Professor Hugh Berrington for providing me with an intellectual and institutional base for research. The staff there were a constant source of intellectual stimulation and amongst them I must specifically acknowledge the help of David George and Dr Tim Gray. To the latter I must extend the greatest thanks for his patient editing, encouragement and advice.

My last intellectual debt is to a series of teachers under whose guidance I have been fortunate to come over the last twenty two years, including Dr Noel O'Sullivan and Laurie Davidson, as well as David Manning and David George.

More practically I must acknowledge the financial assistance and study leave provided to me while teaching at Teesside Polytechnic and acknowledge a great debt to Marlene Melber and her dedicated staff in the Data Preparation Section for their inputting of this thesis on the Polytechnic's Prime Mainframe Computer. Thanks are also due to several colleagues, friends and relatives for proof reading. As is

usual the final word of thanks must go to my family and friends who have tolerated, supported and encouraged me through the seventeen years it has taken to research and write this thesis. To all these people I would like to apologize for the length of time it has taken to complete this work, I must excuse them from any responsibility for its defects and express my hope that its contents and reception will express my thanks to them.

John R Gibbins

29th October 1986

Brompton, Northallerton.

JOHN GROTE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF VICTORIAN IDEAS, 1830 - 1870

I

Introduction

If we were to judge from the rarity with which the name of John Grote (1813-1866) is mentioned in historical and philosophical writings, and the scantiness of such references as do occur, it would seem reasonable to conclude that his ideas were uninteresting and unimportant. It is the main aim of this thesis to controvert such a conclusion and to establish by an exercise in historical and philosophical analysis the significance of John Grote and of Cambridge University itself, to the development of Victorian thought in the mid nineteenth century.

The interest of John Grote to modern readers can be indicated under two headings. Firstly, he was an original thinker who tackled and suggested solutions to the major philosophical problems of his day. Secondly he filled a historical position which, when explained, makes more coherent the picture we have of Victorian intellectual development.

In the chapters on the *Exploratio Philosophica* I argue that John Grote provided one of the most perceptive and thorough critiques of positivism and empiricism written in the nineteenth century, and that in a similar vein *An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy* provides one of the most carefully argued and effective critiques of that equally dominant school of thought. The chapters on the epistemological and metaphysical prolegomena to ethics will show that John Grote carefully edges towards the creation of one of the earliest examples of idealist philosophy seen in Britain, apparently conceived

independently of any serious Hegelian influence. Grote's idealism emerges, I argue, from his efforts to adjudicate between and synthesise largely indigenous philosophies of the day, most especially those of intuitionism, empiricism and materialism in England and the common sense theory of the Scottish philosophers.

In later chapters I argue that Grote achieves a similar feat in the fields of moral and social philosophy by criticising and synthesising the indigenous schools of utilitarianism, intuitionism, romanticism and Scottish philosophy. With regard to political and social theory, Grote will be shown to have maintained the 'liberal outlook' associated at the time with Trinity College, Cambridge, on three novel grounds. Firstly, by supporting the Vichian 'Liberal Anglican Idea of History' (Forbes 1952) which stressed the unfolding of social ideas and purpose through historical stages, and then supporting this by reference to a 'relational social theory' most usually associated with his colleague Henry Maine, which stresses the factual anthropological basis for historical and social development. The final supports for the liberal outlook come from reason and religion. Grote, I show maintained that neither religion nor reason need fear the other, but that both if pursued freely and rigorously would reveal the same rationally ordered and benevolent world which the study of history and anthropology already indicated was coming into existence.

Finally, though I do not aim to examine in depth the later influence of Grote upon philosophy, I shall support the claim by John Passmore that his was

> 'perhaps the first, example of the Cambridge spirit - he was Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Cambridge - which was to reach its culmination in the work of G.E.Moore'(Passmore, 1966, 54).

I will argue, however, that similarities are also evident with the

work of Russell, Wittgenstein and Oakeshott.

When we turn to the historical and contextual story of Grote and his university in mid century the story is even more interesting and surprising. Biographically we shall find that John's life as a Cambridge don, a cleric, and a metaphysicain struggling towards idealism, makes his relationship to his brother George Grote, the whig historian of Greece, the atheist and philosophical radical, unique in Victorian intellectual history. Nowhere else can I discover two contemporaries from the same family so strategically ensconced in the camps of their greatest rivals.

Secondly the recognition of Grote's idealism must force us to re-appraise the conventional accounts of the emergence of that philosophy in Britain and of the fate of the crucial battle between the intuitional (a priori) and empirical (a posteriori) schools of thought evidenced at the time, as well as the reasons for his mistaken identification by some as an 'intuitionist', a 'realist', a 'rationalist' and a 'personalist'. Further historical interest arises from the location of John Grote's social theory within the new story of the development of the social sciences, particularly anthropology, history, comparative linguistics, sociology and politics, recently explored by John Burrow, Stefan Collini and Donald Winch (Burrow, Collini, Winch 1983).

Finally, there is the significance of Grote's work as a fulfilment of earlier and current Cambridge thought. My study will show that Cambridge thought in the period was not merely a case of 'arid rationalism'(Annan 1951, 130-131,151-152) but contained a romantic and in the end idealist current associated notably with the writings of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Frederick Denison Maurice and Julius Hare. This 'Germano Coleridgian' current as Morell called it (Morell 1847) was part of the wider Cambridge Intellectual Network

(Cannon 1964) which set out to challenge the other major philosophies and intellectual elites of the day.

II

When this research project was conceived in 1969 it seemed possible that the significance of John Grote's work could be elaborated through the straight forward provision of a biographical and philosophical reconstruction. The problems that appeared to be primary were, therefore, twofold.(1) Who was John Grote? How did he come to have the ideas he had? What was his relationship to his brother? Why was he so slow to publish? Why did so few contemporaries give a public reception to his work? (2) Such biographical questions were to run alongside research into other philosophical questions such as, What did Grote have to say? Was he right? Did he belong to a school of philosophy?

However, my research has revealed that this approach would not be effective and that an alternative strategy is needed. One reason for this is simple, the vein of biographical and primary source manuscript material listed by Joseph Bickersteth Mayor,(Grote's editor) soon ran out (Grote 1900, X-XI). The extensive range of subjects covered in over twenty one volumes of papers have not come to light despite extensive searches and it became apparent that a more creative approach using circumstantial evidence, unwitting testimony and extensive historical contextual support would be needed to supplement the analysis of primary source material. The second reason is more significant and reflected my worries as to why John Grote's work had been ignored for so long and whether my efforts at a reappraisal would be any more successful than those of my predecessors (Whitmore 1927, Macdonald 1966). My considered view was that the reader of this

thesis would be unlikely to gauge the significance of Grote's work if my project remained biographical and analytic, and failed to identify the contexts both intellectual and social, necessary to place Grote's writing in the history of thought. In particular, there was a lack of understanding at the time of the problems considered central by Victorian philosophers, the range of traditions and convention of discourse available to them and the paradigm conflicts they experienced (Quinton, 1958). As important was the failure to understand the social, cultural and institutional settings within which Grote and his adversaries worked. I shall return to these two points later in my introduction.

My predicament was mirrored somewhat in the experience of George Elder Davie recorded in the Forward to his classic work *The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and Her Universities in the Nineteenth Century.*

> 'This book originated almost accidentally, and, as it were, in the margin of regular academic 'researches'. I was preparing for the press a doctoral thesis on 'the Scottish school of common sense philosophy', and had been asked by interested publishers to add a chapter on the intellectual and social background of the Scottish philosophers. Suddenly, in gathering this introductory and general material, the whole topic deepened; unsuspecting drama's were revealed; and finally I became absorbed in 'the story behind the story' that, putting aside my thesis manuscript on the rise and fall of the Scottish philosophy, I launched out into a quite different book, of less specialised scope, but of not less serious temper, on the rise and fall of the Scottish Universities, or, to be precise, of that central sector of them, know as the Arts Faculty (Davie 1961, Forward).'

Davie did not, however, have the benefit of later debates which were to reveal that the change of his plans were not merely 'accidental' but the result of a 'logical' imperative, the nature of which was revealed during the methodological debates of the 1970's on the history of thought inspired by Quentin Skinner of the University of Cambridge (Skinner 1969, 1970, 1972, 1974).

These debates revealed the logical difficulties involved in trying to analyse, criticise or to converse with past writers and

supported the prescription that a precondition for an adequate philosophical analysis was the provision of an adequate contextual understanding of the writer or writers concerned. A brief discussion of the debate and of the methodological assumptions underpinning this thesis can be found in the second Appendix which the reader may now wish to consult, but I have concluded that for an adequate understanding and appraisal of the work of John Grote to be possible, we must have an appreciation of the intellectual and social context of the mid Victorian Britain he inhabited and of the world of Victorian Cambridge. We must in particular ask questions about the intentions shared by Grote and his colleagues, the conventions of discourse and traditions, and the social network they enjoyed. These questions will be answered in a provisional way in chapters three and four, but are returned to in chapters nine, ten and in the conclusion. This exercise of providing the context does, however, mean that throughout this thesis historical issues will predominate and that intellectual ideas generally, rather than philosophy as narrowly conceived, will take precedence. Even with the discussion of biographical details, I shall utilise the recently emerged literature on 'local intellectual elites' exemplified in the work of Christopher Harvie and Susan Faye (formerly Walter) Cannon (Harvie 1976, Cannon 1964, Collini 1979, Clarke 1978).

Before proceeding further I will defend my claims that the inadequate state of the history of Victorian philosophy and thought, and of the social, cultural and institutional structures of the Victorian intelligensia in the 1960's were hurdles to the understanding and location of Grote's work. In the preface to one of the best treatments of modern philosophy from a British perspective, John Passmore writes,

> 'I have tried to write a history of philosophical controversy rather than to compile an annotated catalogue. I do not profess to be speaking for eternity; it is a salutory reflection that, had I written the book in 1800 I should probably have dismissed Berkeley and Hume in a few lines, in order to concentrate my attention on Dugald Stewart - and that in 1850 the centre of my interest would have shifted to Sir William Hamilton' (Passmore 1966,8).

It is a mark of the author's perceptiveness not only that he recognises that intellectual history is a moving feast, but that he has also recognised the greater significance mid Victorian philosophers gave two Scotsmen Dugald Stewart and Sir William Hamilton when compared to David Hume and Bishop Berkeley. One crucial task, undertaken in chapter three, will be the reconstruction of the canonical picture of the history of philosophy as understood between 1830 and 1860, but here we must look briefly at the slightly different picture of our near contemporaries in the 1960's.

In philosophy, as with the related disciplines of political and social theory, when tastes change and new schools or styles emerge to prominence, there tends to be a re-writing of the history of the discipline. Past masters are re-graded in the hierarchy of excellence, new figures join in the ranks and others are relegated to obscurity. As Alasdair MacIntyre writes

> 'Each age, sometimes each generation has its own canon of the great philosophical writers and indeed of the great philosophical books' (MacIntyre 1984, 33).

'Canon-formation', as Rorty calls it, is vital in philosophy because philosophers are regularly called upon to adjudicate on what is a central 'philosophical question', who are 'the great dead philosophers' (Rorty 1984, 58-61). With the reincarnation of phenomenalism, positivism and analytic philosophy in the first four decades of this century, exemplified in the writings of Bertrand Russell, Alfred Ayer and George Moore, there was a rapid reassessment of the history of philosophy. Hume who had been thought sunk by the

broadsides from Thomas Hill Green and T H Grose (Green and Grose 1874-5) was rapidly refloated and in fact established as perhaps the greatest of all British philosophers. The work of other empiricists, especially Locke, Berkeley and John Stuart Mill were also re-assessed. In return the supposed originators of British idealism, especially Green, Bosanquet and Bradley were despatched to the breakers yard (Russell 1912 and 1945, Ayer 1936, 1956, Moore 1922, 1953). Opponents of the new currents such as the realists and ordinary language philosophers such as Strawson have sought to retrieve and refurbish Kant for the task of destroying Humean psychology (Strawson 1966, Rorty 1984). The history books soon began to ape contemporary taste as did publishers in their lists and choice of writers on and editors for past works. A shift against metaphysics and idealism and a particular shift against normative philosophy took place leading in political philosophy to the famous quip that it was now 'dead' (Laslett 1967, XIV).

It would not be hard to show that the rewriting of intellectual history from the standpoint of science and analytic philosophy which was growing in ascendancy between 1920 and 1950 had a deleterious effect on our understanding of intuitionism, idealism and other movements that stood in opposition. However, another major change in philosophical style and practice took place which not only revamped the history of philosophy in an anti metaphysical direction but which temporarily relegated the subject of the history of philosophy to a separate and lower sphere of analysis. This was the emergence of Ludwig Wittgenstein and of linguistic philosophy as a whole. The effect of Wittgenstein's contributions was to produce a swift philosophical 'revolution' or 'paradigm shift' in British philosophy (Kuhn 1962). Philosophy and political theory now moved their concerns away from the traditional quarries of epistemology, ontology,

metaphysics, political and moral theory towards linguistics and subsequently to semantics, semiology and ethnomethodology. The major contributions to the former discipline areas became treated with suspicion or were ignored.

In addition philosophers began to shift their concerns towards the everyday language of contemporary users and away from the rarified language of academic (scholastic) philosophers past or present. Now for an understanding of justice it became more essential to study how the concept is used in ordinary language situations via the playing of language games, and less essential to study the history of the concept, and the arguments about it by such figures as Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas and Hobbes. Implicit here was another preference, that philosophy is an 'activity', a living activity, and more importantly a 'living present activity', as opposed to the idea that philosophy is a doctrine, wisdom that is universal or ineffable, or an inheritance from the past (Gellner 1968, 63-65). The consequences were disastrous for intellectual history in the short term while this anti-historical spirit set in. For now the study of past thinkers or schools of thought became irrelevant, as well as being a likely source of confusion and error. As Professor J.O.Urmson states:

> 'It is notorious that many philosophers claim that they are adherents of no philosophical doctrines whatsoever, and even regard adherence to a philosophical doctrine as a sign of a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of philosophy... there seems nobody left under the age of eighty who is prepared to confess himself a rationalist, or empiricist, a neutral monist, a materialist, a logical atomist, a pragmatist, a realist, an idealist...' (Urmson 1957, 267).

This view, as Wolf Lepenies states, is profoundly mistaken (Lepenies 1984, 141-157). For one reason any present activity is premised upon rules, techniques, skills and language inherited from the past. In addition philosophy lives by dialogue, discourse and conversation between members of a public who have learnt to share the

same meanings which have been inculcated from the past. Finally, for the analytic and linguistic philosopher, philosophy and history became logically distant activities. The study of what was said or done is considered to be both different and inferior to the first order task of analysing what is said and done. This point is nicely made in the preface to one of the most popular contemporary histories of modern philosophy written by G.Warnock:

> 'The fact that I have said nothing about recent work in the history of philosophy is easily accounted for by the fact that the history of philosophy, though it is not just history, is not just philosophy either, and hence is for the most part only indirectly or incidentally relevant to the course of philosophy itself' (Warnock 1958, vii).

As a consequence of these and other shifts in taste and style within British philosophy and political theory between 1920 and 1960, there was a radical decline in historical writing and an anti-historical character given to references concerning past thinkers. There were some massive exceptions to this trend, but they can be explained by three considerations. Firstly, they tend to be written by philosophers from outside the dominant linguistic and analytic schools of the recent past. This accounts for the great works by Merz, Metz, Berlin, Muirhead, Passmore and Copleston (Merz 1914; Metz 1938, Berlin 1969, 1981; Muirhead 1931; Passmore 1957, MacIntyre 1967; Copleston 1963). Secondly, they tend to be non-nationals or British nationals resident overseas who have a wider philosophical perspective. This group includes apart from Merz, Passmore and Copleston; Bochenski, Mandelbaum and Ueberweg, (Bochenski 1961; Mandelbaum 1971; Ueberweg 1872, 1928,). Finally, and, most of all, the best accounts of Victorian thought came from outside the discipline of philosophy, being written by and for political theorists, sociological theorists, historians, theologians and historians of science. This group includes the works of

Mandelbaum, Barker, Laski, Plamenatz, Wolin, Sabine, Robson, Letwin, Nisbet, Giddens, Gooch, Young, Chadwick, Gillespie and many others. (Barker 1947; Laski 1920; Plamenatz 1958, 1963; Wolin 1961, Sabine 1937 and 1951; Robson 1968; Letwin 1965; Giddens 1971; Gooch 1920; Young 1960; 1953, Nisbet 1967; Chadwick 1966-1970; Gillespie 1951).

The picture of mid Victorian British philosophy that dominated the period from 1920 to 1960, with the notable exclusion of Passmore and Copleston, was so narrow as to exclude serious consideration of three major movements, intuitionism, the Scottish common sense philosophy and the early romantic and idealist reaction to positivism. However, before I draw out this picture we must look at my second argument, namely that another contemporary hurdle to the understanding of John Grote and the intellectual milieu of Cambridge University at the time involved the failure to appreciate the social, cultural and institutional structures of the Victorian intelligensia. This was not surprising since many professional philosophers distrusted social historians and especially sociologically inspired history, even more than they did the history of philosophy. Attempts by Marxist historians such as Hobsbawn, Habermas and Macpherson to write reductionist history were largely ignored. The noble attempts by writers such as John Roach, Noel Annan and Elie Halevy to write histories of local intellectual elites were generally treated as somewhat antiquarian, and the institutional history of the time tended to be written primarily for and by historians, preferably historians of education. These had no serious reference to the relationship between bureaucratic and social structure, culture and intellectual development. Until the recent writings of Susan Cannon, Sheldon Rothblatt and Martha Garland the institutional and cultural environment that spawned Grote's philosophy was unavailable.

Before the effects of revisionist historical writings began to be

felt in the 1960's the picture of mid Victorian philosophy and of Cambridge philosophy in particular, was very narrow. It presented a triumph of empiricism, positivism, and utilitarianism over a rump of rationalists, intuitionists and religiously minded metaphysicians. This triumph of the 'British Philosophy of Mind' is presented as marred only by arrival in Britain of the alien continental philosophies of Hegelia idealism, existentialism and phenomenology. Socially and institutionally the universities were portrayed in a very poor light, reactionary in terms of reform both structural and academic, religiously intolerant, upper class in social profile and generally unprofessional and uninspired in regard to philosophical teaching and research (Rothblatt 1968, Garland 1980). Ironically this picture is not far removed from that dominant in the minds of empiricists and positivists between 1830 and 1860 as we shall see in chapter three, but the level of attachment to the view and what it now entailed is very significant. Now there was even less interest in understanding, controverting, still less converting the non-empiricist philosophers of the age. They could happily and confidently be ignored.

The revival of interest in the history of thought in the 1960's has brought about a flowering of scholarship, and has made good many of the defects in the previous picture. The revival of interest can be timed to the founding of the journal of *Victorian Studies* in 1957 and in particular to the insightful article in the first volume entitled 'The Neglect of Victorian Philosophy' by Anthony Quinton (Quinton 1958). It's momentum was maintained primarily in university departments of history and politics but eventually had an impact in philosophical circles. The debates of the 1970's over Quentin Skinner's articles on method were crucial catalysts for what was to follow. Skinner's prescription that the historical exercise tries to

recover intentions, reconstruct conventions and restore contexts has borne fruit in many directions, and the industry in Victorian scholarship has become self-generating, even amongst those not directly influenced by him. For my purposes the products of this revival have come a great way, though not far enough, to remove the obstacles to the recovery of John Grote's philosophy.

Firstly, there has been a revived interest in intuitionist philosophy during the period, both by historians and those inspired by renewed interest in actively reviving intuitionist ethics. The key figure here has been Jerome B Schneewind in his scholarly work on the Cambridge Moralists and his reconstruction of the ethics of Henry Sidgwick. With more modern concerns in mind there has been the recovery of the whole 'confrontation' to the present in the work of W.D.Hudson (Schneewind 1968, 1974, 1977; Hudson 1980). However, as I shall show later Schneewind has managed to recover only the rationalist and intuitionist side of Cambridge philosophy, and has not only ignored but wrongly labelled the idealist or Germano-Coleridgeian kind of Cambridge philosophy evidenced by Coleridge, the Hares, Maurice and Grote and commented upon by J D Morell at the time and Susan Faye Cannon since.

Secondly there has been some excellent revisional writing on the social, cultural and institutional character of the mid Victorian intelligensia, some of the best being by John Gross on literary circles, Sheldon Rothblatt, Mary Garland and Susan Cannon on Cambridge University, Christopher Harvie on liberal political elite's, Stefan Collini and Peter Clarke on the new liberalism of the late nineteenth century, and numerous works on the Cambridge Apostles, the Oxford and other similar Movements (Gross 1969, Rothblatt 1968, Garland 1980, Cannon 1964, Harvie 1976, Collini 1979, Clarke 1978). Some of this has been outstanding, though the work done on Cambridge University

(apart from that of Cannon) is remarkable for its concentration on the revolution of the 1870's and its attendant underestimation of university reform, social networks and intellectual development before this period. I shall tackle these points in chapters 1 and 10.

The third major revision concerns the historical development and the philosophical re-assessment of idealist philosophy in Britain. While being kept alive through this period by idealists, such as G.R.G.Mure, J.N.Findlay, A.V.Miller, T.M.Knox and in particular those around the figure of Michael Oakeshott at the London School of Economics, the period since 1970 has seen the publication of some major research efforts on the subject (Collini 1976; Plant and Vincent 1984; Richter 1964; Milne 1962; Acton 1969). While coming a good way to re-establish the structure and effectiveness of Oxford idealism, these works have generally underestimated or ignored idealist developments outside Oxford University and before 1870, the date conventionally used to mark the beginning of the idealist reaction (Clarke 1978, Collini 1979, Freeden 1978, Morrow 1984).

My major objections to the current position cover three points. Firstly, the British origins of idealism have deep roots outside Oxford, which were known in the nineteenth century, but which have been forgotten since. The areas for exploration include the Scottish philosophers at Edinburgh, especially Stirling, Hamilton and Ferrier, and at Glasgow Caird and Wallace. Secondly, there is the early romantic reaction to the mechanical philosophy of James Mill and Bentham pioneered by Coleridge and Carlyle which led to the creation of what John Morell called the 'Germano-Coleridgian' movement. Finally, there is the issue of 'Cambridge Idealism' made popular recently by Stefan Collini and C.T. Dewey and by V.R. Mehta (Collini 1975; Dewey 1974; Mehta 1975). Mehta's article reaffirms the traditional story of idealism's Oxford origins, explaining its failure

to take root in Cambridge in terms of the latters continuous adherence to scientific rationalism and paradoxically empiricism and positivism (Mehta 1975, 180). One of my aims is to rebut this traditional thesis and to assert the case for the emergence of idealism in the Cambridge of Grote and Maurice, out of a culture and network conducive to romanticism and Germano-Coleridgian philosophy and history. C.J. Dewey for his part makes the claim for an affinity between Oxford and Cambridge Universities from 1870. He makes a case for 'Cambridge Idealism' out of the writings of Henry Sidgwick and Alfred Marshall. Stefan Collini has rejected this claim in a patient and well argued reply. However, it seems to me that both groups miss the central point, that if there is a case for a Victorian version of Cambridge idealism it is to be found in the period before 1870, and that the key figures are John Grote and Frederick Denison Maurice and not Henry Sidgwick, whose limited intention was to unite intuitionism, utilitarianism and common sense philosophy and to attack the neo-idealist outputs of Green and his Oxford colleagues.

Finally, on idealism there remains to be reconsidered the traditional assumption that idealism is merely a continental or rather German import, or to put it in the terms of one thesis on the subject, a product of 'The Reception of Idealism in England' (Robbins 1967,1982). What I will argue in this thesis is that a case can be made for the production of a largely indigenous philosophy of idealism during the first seven decades of the nineteenth century, which in fact set the scene and provided a context for the later triumphs of a more Hegelian idealism in Oxford in the 1870's. For origins I shall look more closely to both intuitional and empirical arguments and the debate between them, the romantic movement, the Germano-Coleridgeians and the Scottish philosophers - especially James Frederick Ferrier. In many ways the story I have to tell is a parallel to that given by

Davie of the emergence of Ferrier's idealism out of the debates about and within Scottish philosophy. For here I shall argue that John Grote developed an essentially idealist epistemology, ethics, political and social theory from debates within British philosophy and between British philosophers.

This thesis will suggest ways to modify the already revised picture of Cambridge and Victorian thought by, firstly, reconstructing the history of philosophy and its present conflicts and concerns as seen by John Grote's contemporaries. We must stress here (1) the perceived preoccupation with epistemology as the foundation of all other intellectual activity, (2) the conflict between supposedly scientific and anti-scientific schools of mental philosophy, (3) the conflict between the three major schools of empiricism, common sense and intuitionism; (4) the institutionalization of these three conflicting schools in the London quarters of the Philosophical Radicals, Edinburgh and Cambridge Universities. We must then concentrate on mid Victorian Cambridge and develop the insight of Susan Faye Cannon on the Cambridge Network as a supplement to the insights of Rothblatt and Schneewind. By further specialising on John Grote we shall find support for a modification of the history of idealism as contained in the 'Reception Theory'. Finally by comparing John with his brother George and putting them alongside the insights of Davie on Victorian Scotland, Milne, Mehta and others on Oxford, we can hint at the complex nature of nineteenth century intellectual movements and elites. We can then develop the existing picture to give a more significant place to John Grote, idealism and Cambridge University in Victorian intellectual life.

III

Three final demands will complete this introduction, a short note on my classification of periods, an acknowledgement of influential literature and a short synopsis of chapter headings. I shall leave the glossary of key concepts to the text, both because this will aid the development of my argument and because the essentialist assumptions underlying such glossaries are alien to the exercise undertaken here.

Periods

The practice of periodizing history is both anomalous and dangerous, as well as necessary.

The past is so vast, the subject matters of history so numerous, and the materials available as sources so immense, that both for the ease of author and reader the historian must divide the past into convenient parcels or periods. Two dangers predominate and produce anomalies and incoherences. Firstly, conventions of periodization based upon convenience, tend to become reified, and are treated as objective facts mirroring a supposed reality. Periods get treated as if they have a coherence and unity, a life cycle even, of their own, and more general history becomes seen as a succession of these discrete periods interspersed with 'revolutions', 'ages of transition' or 'paradigm shifts'. In fact in intellectual history, as in that of economics, politics, class and culture the boundaries traditionally set rarely mark clear or decisive breaks with the past. Secondly, periodization encourages not only academic but normative laziness, for the labels of periods are usually pejorative - the 'Dark Ages', the 'Renaissance', the 'Enlightenment', 'Modernity', and 'Post Modernity', all have emotive connotations and are a shorthand for numerous other unquestioned assumptions.

My periods are then not to be treated as having any significance other than that they help me to tell the story I intend. They are:

a) 1650 - 1830. This period establishes the character of modern British political, moral, religious scientific, and moral thought.

b) 1830 - 1870. This period covers the time of John Grote's philosophical education and writing. It also sees the contemporary fulfilment of the schools and styles of thought most evident in the former period, represented now by John Stuart Mill, Sir William Hamilton and William Whewell, and the synthesis of much of those in the figures of James Frederick Ferrier, and John Grote.

c) 1870 - 1920. This period saw the rise to ascendency of movements opposed to the claims of positivism recognized by contemporaries in the previous age.

d) 1920 - 1970. The period dominated in Britain by the three intellectual forces of phenomenalism, analytic and linguistic philosophies, and by Marxism and other pseudo scientific enterprises in the social sciences.

e) 1970 - present. A reconsideration and revision of the history of philosophy and of Victorian thought.

Literature on John Grote

As the literature on John Grote is so fragmentary the bibliography attached rather unusually provides a list of all secondary texts that make explicit reference to John Grote. It is as complete as I can make it and is given as a guide to students wishing to explore further the philosophy of Grote. These references can divided into four sections:-

a) short references, attributions, and eulogies

b) brief summaries and asides - up to three pages

c) articles and chapter length references to Grote

d) a book length study

There is only one book length study of Grote and only thirteen other references of over three pages in length. The quality and value of the shorter references (a) and (b) are generally as poor and brief as are their number, though a few, such as Bernard Bosanquet's belated admission to German readers in 1902 that,

> 'Mr Grote's position is peculiar. He does not treat by name any idealist philosophy later than Kant. But his highly original criticism lays down, in a characteristic terminology of his own, the fundamental doctrines of objective idealism'(Bosanquet 1902).

provide vital historical support to the argument provided below.

Section (c) and (d) contain literature that can helpfully be classified into five groups.

i) The first group contains substantial and appreciative continental surveys of Grote, the first three of which were written in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. They reveal that the novelty of Grote's position was not lost to continentals better versed in idealist thinking (Carrou 1877; Lasson 1878; Krohn 1878; Pucelle 1958). A last reference became available to me only recently but it confirms better than any other single source my assertion that the philosophy of John Grote, like that of James Frederick Ferrier, was produced as solutions to problems within British philosophy (Segerstedt 1934).

ii) The second group contains book reviews published in Britain of Grote's work between 1865 and 1902. Apart from the last, provided by Bosanquet, the others reveal a

general state of incomprehension in the minds of reviewers. The most usual response to his being difficult to place within existing typologies and developments being that his works are 'original', 'independently conceived', 'careful', 'candid' and 'truthloving'. The reviews by Henry Sidgwick are both insightful but very cool (Sidgwick 1871a, 1871b, 1877; Westminster Review 1871; Bosanquet 1902; Llewellyn Davies 1870).

iii) A third group includes a small but appreciative body of literature published between 1910 and 1933 to retrieve and assess Grote's work as an example of English idealism. Some of the work is British, though all from authors trained in Scottish Universities (Forsyth 1910; Seth 1912; Sorley 1921) while two impressive surveys come from sympathetic Americans (Whitmore 1927; Cunningham 1933).

iv) The only full length study of Grote that has been published is by Lauchlin D MacDonald. MacDonald's work started as a postgraduate thesis suggested and supervised by the personalist Edger S.Brightman (MacDonald 1966). MacDonald's book became available to me only after I had come across Grote's work and had nearly completed a Masters dissertation on him at Durham University. Unfortunately the book is so confused and confusing in structure, methods and argument that it acts more as a hindrance than as an aid in studying Grote's work. The book does a disservice to both the historical exercise of reconstructing Grote's life and times and that of critically assessing his work. Both in the failure to locate seven primary and numerous other important secondary sources and in the retrospective 're-educating'

of Grote as a 'personalist' MacDonald reveals a considerable lack of scholarly skill. These defects have had the consequence not of enlightening readers but of leading them into further confusion, and instead of inspiring a resurgence of interest the book has and will re-confine Grote to obscurity (Schneewind 1968; Werkmeister 1969).

v) Finally there are two recent scholarly references which do much to restore confidence in the possibility of further fruitful work on Grote. The first and most important, by J B Schneewind, are most sympathetic but mistakenly places him in the classes of 'moralist' and 'intuitionist' (Schneewind 1974, 1977). The second gives a short but fair summary of Grote's critique of utilitarianism (Quinton 1973).

For brief but informative introductions the reader may however dispense with the above and use the short references by Passmore, Copleston and Schneewind (Passmore 1966; Copleston 1966, Schneewind 1967, 1976) before passing onto the surveys by Charles Whitmore and G.Watts Cunningham. My own bibliography and biography of Grote are, as far as I know, the most extensive in existence.

Structure

The structure used below has been adopted for two reasons. Firstly it fulfils the methodological prerequisite of providing an historical reconstruction before providing an analytic or rational reconstruction. Secondly because it works at another level, it allows for a gradual elucidation and elaboration of key themes and ideas which can be drawn together in Chapter eleven and the conclusions.

Chapter one provides a biographical account of Grote's life and

introduces us to his thought through his minor essays, reviews and administrative papers covering religion, education, history and philology, literary criticism, reform and philosophy.

Chapter two develops the context for understanding Grote by outlining in detail the complex and pluralistic nature of early nineteenth century intellectual life. Sections are devoted to a) the utilitarians and empiricists, b) the positivists and materialists, c) German philosophy in Britain, d) romanticism, e) rationalism and intuitionism, f) Scottish common sense philosophy and g) French eclecticism.

Chapter three performs the final enclosing act by locating John Grote within the Cambridge of his day and especially what Susan Fay Cannon calls the Cambridge Network, and secondly by looking at the institutional structure of the mid-Victorian intellectual elite, in particular comparing John Grote's Cambridge with the world that his brother George inhabited in London.

Chapter four opens the effort to reconstruct and analyse the philosophy of John Grote by analyzing his ideas on the role and purpose of philosophy, his specific intentions and the methods he uses in his various works.

Chapter five deals exclusively with the metaphysical and epistemological arguments that John Grote produced, late in his life, to underpin and act as a prolegomena to his ethical writings. In so doing I argue that Grote's philosophy is essentially idealist in character, and within that category, that it is to be seen as a case of objective idealism with tendencies towards absolutism.

Chapter six provides an analysis of Grote's theory of human nature, a theory which along with his epistemology underpins his account of action, practice, morality and politics.

Chapter seven is fundamental for the thesis as it gets to the

heart of John Grote's enterprise, the ambition to prove that moral rules, principles and ideals can be known, that they can be known in the same way as we know the external world, and that though moral values are different in character to empirical statements of fact, they are analogous. In the idea of a scale of knowledge, intellectual and moral, ascending from immediate feelings (lower facts) through reflection and judgement, to complete knowledge (of the higher facts) we have the key to Grote's whole enterprise in moral philosophy, and in the analogy of the true and the right, the ideals of intellectual and moral knowledge respectively, we have the achievement indicated.

Chapter eight surveys the argument to date and provides one further element of importance, an outline of Grote's careful and effective critique of utilitarian philosophy. Like the next chapter this is long and detailed though justified because of the seriousness of the issues Grote raises and the complexity of his arguments.

Chapter nine deals with the social and political aspects of Grote's moral philosophy which are typified by his occasional reference to his own work as being an example of 'Jural Ethics'. This chapter explains how philosophy and politics were taught at the university in the 1860's, and then rebuilds Grote's social and political ideas, through his theory of man, society and practice. We discover that moral life is organized as if there was a moral law analogous to the positive law of a state, and to understand the operation of the former we need to understand the operation of the latter. Politics is understood as primarily the creation, enforcement and adjudication of the law, for and by free persons with conflicting interests and opinions, in a sovereign community called the State. Finally the chapter deals with John Grote's diagnostic and prescriptive social and political theory, his diagnosis of his age and society and his remedies for its ills.

Chapter ten draws together the historical and philosophical reconstructions of the past chapters into a synthesis of the three elements indicated in the title of this thesis, a) the philosophy of John Grote, b) John Grote and Cambridge University and c) John Grote and his place in the development of Victorian ideas.

Three appendices outline briefly the history of my search for the unfound Grote manuscripts, the methodological assumptions underpinning this research project, and the origins and influence of Grote's thought.

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PART I

CONTEXTS AND CONVENTIONS

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Section II: John Grote and Cambridge University: the place of John Grote in the wider Cambridge Network and especially the line from Coleridge, to Hare, Maurice, Whewell and Maine, loosly called the Cambridge Movement. John Grote can be understood in terms of the Cambridge response to the intellectual challenges of London (the Philosophical Radicals); Edinburgh (Common Sense); Oxford; and the Posititivism of the Provinces. Professionals versus amateurs in Victorian intellectual history and the professionalization process. John Grote and George Grote compared and contrasted. The revised picture of mid Victorian Cambridge intellectual life presented.

Section III: John Grote, Cambridge University and their place in Victorian thought: a summary.

CONCLUSIONS

Part I

Chapter One

The Life and Writings of John Grote

John Grote was born at the family estate of 'Shortlands' at Beckenham in Kent in 1813, the ninth of eleven children, all but one being sons. John Grote's father, George Grote senior (1760-1830) was an archetypal country gentleman, being the owner of a large estate, a Justice of the Peace, the local High Sheriff and the sitting patron of a London Merchant Bank; Prescott Grote and Co. (1)

The family descended from Andreas Grote (1710-1788) who moved from Holland to England in 1750. The family thereafter claimed that their Dutch origins related them to the famous philosopher Hugo Grotius (de Groot) though the connection has not been verified (Clarke 1962,1). The Dutch roots were, nurtured by membership of the Calvinist inspired Dutch Reform Church (Hessels 1892) the reaction to which is evident in the later life of John Grote. Andreas Grote was married twice, once to the daughter of a large landowner from whom he inherited a large mansion, Badgemore near Henley, and secondly to May Ann Culverdon, by whom he had nine children all the sons of which, excluding John's father, died young. The family lived variously at Henley and at Greenwich Hill; the father's business interests prospered and that social barometer Sir Joshua Reynolds measured the new prestige of the family in several paintings between 1760 and 1787 (Clarke 1962,2). Andreas Grote's eldest son Joseph became head of the family after his father's death in 1788.

John Grote's own father in spite of his preference for the life of a country gentleman was obliged to take over the estates and the running of the family bank on the death of his step brother Joseph in

1814. By this time he had married Miss Selina Mary Peckwell in 1793 and had already started a family the eldest child of which was George Grote junior, born in 1794 and destined to become the famous historian of Greece, radical M.P. and Philosophical Radical. From this point John Grote's father seems to have turned gradually from, 'a man of the world' into a stern and severe recluse, uninclined towards the education of his children and particularly determined to keep them from an academic and a church career. The process seems to have been brought about by the new found responsibilities and by the growing intolerance of Grote's mother, Selina Mary Grote (1774-1845) who seems to have turned after her marriage from being gay, sociable and intelligent to becoming excessively serious minded and very strict in her religious views (Clarke 1962, 2). As the daughter of an evangelical clergyman married into a family tied to the Dutch Reform Church this seems understandable. The family situation had changed even more by the time John was born in 1813. His mother had not only withdrawn from society outside of her home and church, but she even declined to receive visitors, including all her husband's friends, who did not share her religious beliefs (Grote H 1873,Ch.1). She assumed the role of head of the home and in all but the most serious matters ignored her husband.

The atmosphere created in the home according to Harriet Grote, wife of the historian George Grote, was

> `besides its dullness and vapidity so positively disheartening a quality - tending to quench every spark of mental activity and ambition - that it might perfectly well have dried up the springs of young Grote's genius and talent' (Grote,H.ibid).

Such an atmosphere pervades in the letters of Mrs Selina Joseph Grote (Grote S.J.,1877). In July 1817 she wrote `Oh that all my children might seek God in the days of their youth, might be convinced of their sinful state by nature of their condemnation in the sight of

God, and be led to seek refuge in a crucified Saviour;' and again later, `Well my dear Joseph, when I write to you, I cannot help reminding you of more serious subjects. Do not put the letter down and run away, but consider yourself (you have passed your sixteenth birthday) whether you are created only for amusing yourself and preparing yourself for the enjoyment of this short space of time. Whether, if you could for a moment look beyond that event which must sooner or later happen to us all, you would not see you were only thinking of trifles, and leaving an awful eternity unprovided for' (Grote S.J.1877,1-3). It was not surprising that Arthur had run off to sea and understandable that George and other sons should have left home so early.

John Grote seemed to have suffered less from this atmosphere and parental reversal of roles than his brother George, for whereas the latter was prevented by his father from going to university and was directly steered into the family business, young John was actually encouraged by his mother both towards university and the church. Whereas George had been sent to Charterhouse, John was privately educated at home and on the death of his father in 1830 he entered Trinity College, Cambridge. Only John's younger brother Francis followed into the universities, the rest of the sons typically dividing themselves between the Civil Service in India, commissions in the army and navy and entry into the family banking business. John and George remained close friends all their lives despite fundamental philosophical differences as both John and Alexander Bain confirm (Grote.J.1851,1;Bain 1904;253-6,258).

A student interested in history or philosophy had only three alternative areas of study in the Cambridge of the 1830's, classics, mathematics and physical sciences. Henry Sidgwick noted reasonably accurately that during the early part of the century`the educational

movement in Cambridge was entirely in developing and determining the mutual relations of Classics,Mathematics and Physics; and was content to leave Ethics and Metaphysics to the care of Scotland and Germany' (Sidgwick 1876, 236). Mathematics came more and more to be seen as the basis of education and Sidgwick humorously quotes the C19th Cambridge classicist Dr Jebb on the philosophic content of the Mathematics examinations, `the four branches of philosophy are questioned viz Mechanics, Hydrostatics, Apparent Astronomy and Optics ..., the Moderator, having closed the philosophical examination sometimes asks a few questions on Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, Butler's Analogy or Clarke's Attributes'. The first reform came with the establishment of a Classics Tripos in 1822 at which time the serious study of Greek Philosophy was accepted as necessary. However, it was not until 1839 that William Whewell, then a relatively young and liberal college and university reformer introduced a course of lectures on moral philosophy into the university by resurrecting the lapsed Chair of Casuistry. Philosophy was also introduced as a compulsory subject in the examinations for fellowships in the 1840's. Being intelligent and motivated by the success of his brother, John chose to take part in the two major tripos,(Mathematics and Classics), the aim being to take some prizes in what Leslie Stephen called 'The Derby', the analogy of the university educational system being that of horse racing (Stephen 1865,35-45). The race was run for high stakes, a fellowship, a chair, a living, a bishopric, a place at the Bar. The prize takers were marked for future social and economic success.(2)

The winner of the academic Derby was the senior wrangler: the racecourse, the examination; the stalls were the pupils rooms; the trainers were the private coaches, the owners were the colleges. The prize system, so highly valued later by Sidney Lowe, was the rationale

of the whole university system - the inducement being largely mercantile as Stephens saw it. For the men `who can secure a high place in either of the two great Tripos wins at least £5,000 in money, besides an amount of glory of which it is difficult to make an accurate valuation´ (Stephen 1865,38). A second senior optimate in mathematics and a sixth in classics in 1835 was enough to ensure Grote´s career and he consolidated his future with his election to a fellowship in 1837, which was confirmed in 1838 after his success in M.A. examinations (Anon 1866a, 549).

I

Essays on Religion and Religious Subjects

Between 1839 and 1841 we know little of Grote´s life. He seems to have resided in college and spent his summers travelling in Europe, but he also began, under the prompting of his mother, to consider the church as a profession. This course of action was not unusual for an aspiring academic, for the college system, as then instituted, gave special advantage to the ordained. The acceptance of the Tests - the thirty nine articles, was the minimum commitment needed before a candidate could become a fellow of a college and beyond this, ordination was essential for the achievement of a reasonable college ´living´. In addition clerical fellows had complete economic security not having to be appointed as a college tutor to secure tenure. One other factor made the ordination a necessity for anyone with aspirations to the Chair of Philosophy at Cambridge, for Mr Knightbridge, its founder, had insisted that ´Moral Philosophy was to be treated with regard to Theology´ and `he required the Professor to be B.D. or D.D. and introduced two Divinity Professors into the

Electoral Board'.(3) In such circumstances it is hardly surprising then that Rev. F.D.Maurice was preferred for the chair after the advances of the Hegelian J.H.Stirling in 1866 and that Rev. J.R. Birks was preferred to Henry Sidgwick who had revoked his acceptance of the thirty nine articles in 1869. The Vice Chancellor of the University invoked these rules in 1857 to prevent John Grote from changing the title of the Knightbridge Chair of Moral Theology to that of Moral Philosophy, arguing that, `If it were changed, more would be inferred than the Senate intended and the Professor might feel at liberty to lecture without regard to religion'. He added disapprovingly of Grote 'that the title of Moral Philosophy, which had been popularly used, rested upon no authority whatever',(ibid). These points and others concerning Grote's views of religion and the relationship of religion to philosophy, science and history will be taken up later, but some reference to Grote's religious writings is in place here.

These comprise a number of sermons, including a'Commemoration Sermon' (Grote 1849) preached at Trinity in 1849 and a selection of others preached between 1840 and 1865 collected and edited by Joseph Bickersteth Mayor as a book of *Sermons* published in 1872 (Grote 1872). Apart from occasional philosophic illustrations there seems little of importance for us here though it is interesting to note that several were written not for the edification of the Cambridge intelligensia but for local parishioners and friendly societies. Of far greater importance to Grote was his preparatory work on the history of the Authorized Version of the Bible since 1611. This task must have taken up a great deal of time, the fruits of which would have been lost if the manuscript had not been used by F.H.A Scrivener in his own book on the subject published in 1884 and containing an acknowledgement to his use of Grote's material (Scrivener 1884). The *Examination* is a work

in another vein, it refers to the judgement given by Dr Lushington in the courts of Arches in the cases against two authors of the book entitled *Essays and Reviews* published in 1860 (Grote 1861). Written by Broad Churchman in support of the radical contributors to the *Essay* the *Examination* contains a spirited defence of free speech and the separation of church and state, theology and law, theologian and churchman, and was called by the 'Church Guardian' `perhaps the ablest pamphlet which has been written on the question.'(4) This judgement was reinforced by A.P.Stanley in his review of the judgement on `Essays and Reviews' (Stanley,1864).

The posthumous essay 'On a Future State' fully identifies Grote with the liberal Broad Church Movement for here the notion and character of the future life are dealt with in a manner fully exclusive of references to judgement and retribution. The weight of the threats and fears associated with Calvanist teachings are exorcised and he produces a speculative and reassuring account that is fully in line with his philosophic and scientific views. In all of these essays Grote argues that Christianity is to be judged as an ethical and spiritual doctrine and not to be understood scientifically, or historically or logically, legally or even literally. He argues that the bible is to be seen neither as an historically nor a scientifically accurate document. Nor is it to be rejected as unmeaningful because irreducible to philosophically meaningful propositions. His approach is hermeneutical, the scriptures need interpretation and understanding from within the conventions of religious discourse alone, not from without.

Trinity College in the 1840's and 50's was renowned as the home of Liberal Anglicanism in Cambridge, a force that seemed to weld together many otherwise diverse strands that constituted the national intelligentsia into a Broad Church (Winstanley 1947;237; Forbes

1952;Sanders 1952). Grote's theological views fitted into that of the most liberal wing of this group. George Croom Robertson suggests that Grote's views suggested 'an independent religious bias from very early in his life', but regrettably we have none of his religious writings from which to judge, until after his ordination in 1844 (Croom Robertson 1885). What, however, is obvious in his writings is a rejection of religious paternalism and pessimism in all its forms, and a growing identification with the liberal Broad Church movement that was also developing in Oxford under the guiding hands of Arthur Stanley and Benjamin Jowett and by Julius Hare and F.J.A.Hort in Cambridge (Reardon 1971; Chadwick 1966-1970). The only trace of Calvinism or evangelicalism left in these writings is in their style which may be called either excessively 'high minded' or `serious'. Grote saw the spiritual aspect of man's life as its most unique aspect and entreated people to give it the attention which it deserved. However, while this argument was propounded with obvious conviction it was not evangelical in the form of a prescription based on faith or a command based on fear, but an entreaty based on reason and thought. This approach made Grote the model of the modern churchman for those scholars at Cambridge, who accepting the scientific and anthropological discoveries of modern researchers - especially the Darwinians - felt that the church could and had to accommodate them. Grote along with Charles Kingsley, Hort, Lightfoot, Westcott and later Maurice, is to be counted as one of those most responsible for accommodating Anglicanism to the modern scientific discoveries of the age.

II

Essays on Educational Subjects

Recurring bouts of ill health which continued throughout his life interrupted Grote's residence at College. In a letter of 1844 Selina Grote writes `Dear John makes the same complaint though he says he is pretty well. Those symptoms are often the last in recovery' (Grote S.J. 95). But she noted John's determination to get back into residence at Cambridge.

> `Dear John is getting better and what pleases me above all is, that he is going to Cambridge, this, I hope, is the prelude to a useful life in the discharge of duties of his profession' (Grote S.J. 1844).

But she adds a note of warning which suggests the reference to her son's intended profession might have been the church not the university.

> 'College habits do so much induce indolence and self indulgence, that I am sure they are neither good for mind or body, and, therefore I shall be glad of his entering on a charge for a time, though I suppose he will not be able to get a living just at present. He is still at Leamington, and talks of staying three weeks longer' (Grote S.J. 1844, 95).

With no secure financial base John had to spend time helping friends in various parishes until he was offered the perpetual curacy of Wareside in Ware near Hertford in 1847. But John finally made a permanent home in Cambridge when he obtained in 1847 a college living at the village of Trumpington a few miles from the city centre and hence became its vicar and a manager of the local school.

The diligence with which John exercised his duties in the former office go far to explain his inability to publish. However, it was his activities in this last capacity that led him to write his attack on Robert Lowe's `New Education Code' known as the `Revised Code', in 1862 (Grote 1862). The code was an attempt by the Government, faithful to the policy of the laissez faire state, to standardise and

economise on elementary education through the introduction of a scheme of 'payment by results'. The salaries of schoolmasters would depend on their ability to inculcate basic knowledge into the minds of their students in such a form that would allow a school Inspector to verify the results in a few minutes questioning (Sylvester 1974). However, Lowe's dual preoccupations with utilitarian efficiency and with the established university system of incentives by prizes, were not the sole sources of Grote's objections. Two other points troubled him. The first was that the rights of the new body of Certified Teachers created and trained under Parliamentary direction, were suddenly to be disregarded, for they were no longer to be permanent employees engaged under the terms of contract created by Parliamentary legislation, but were to become 'conditional pensioners' paid or not depending on the receptive and retentive powers of their students. Grote saw in the withdrawal of promised employment to teachers both an injustice and an encouragement to other groups in society to disregard the promises of the legal authority (Grote 1862, 8).

Secondly, Grote attacks the Code as an absurd reaction to past over estimated faults in the existing educational system. It was a panic measure,

> `Because in twenty years we have not been able to do for the lower classes that which two hundred years have scarcely done for the upper and educated them thoroughly' (Grote 1862, 40).

Yet in reality John Grote saw that the proposals were set `against the too high education of the lower orders'. In their `fear' the Government were prejudicing attempts to encourage wide intellectual education of the children of the working poor, in favour of the ideal of the mechanical learning of basic elements without ever proving `that the reason why elementary and more solid subjects have not been taught as well as one would wish, is because higher and perhaps less useful ones have been so' (Grote 1862, 40).

The thread of this latter argument which depreciates useful and mechanical learning as an inadequate substitute for the cultivation of individual thought and imagination, is given more solid foundation in Grote's later philosophic writings and appears again in his other writings on education, especially in a posthumously published essay entitled 'Thought versus Learning' sub-titled in true Victorian fashion 'An address to Self-Educated Men' (Grote 1871). This essay testifies to the concern Grote shared with many of his Cambridge colleagues for the education of non elite groups. Many Cambridge scholars of the time were, under the influence of Maurice, supporting educational missions in London, especially the East End. Grote seems to have confined his attention to local self help educational ventures for the working classes, and to providing intellectual support and guidance to the wider effort. Grote's argument is a reassurance to his readers, for his advice is that education does not consist in simply book learning, as if the passive mind learns by having a weight of knowledge impressed upon it. Education, Grote argues, is rather a primary product of `language'. and `conversation', the `habitual talk or communication between man and man' and both are social in origin and content (Grote 1871, 820). Language is the key to all education and it has made possible both thinking and writing. Thought derives from language and not language from thought as most philosophers until then believed. Of languages two daughter's 'thought' or 'imagination', the active constituent of thought, rather than the passive elements 'writing' or 'reading' are more important. Language and thought are the beginning and end of the living communication relationship while reading is only communication with thought that is `the absent and the dead' (Grote 1872, 821).

That part of education which is not already implicit in our stock of everyday language, argues Grote, we should see as novel or

revolutionary. It is the product of real, active thought by ourselves on what is presented for `knowledge grows from the bringing to fruition of what is in the mind already´ (Grote 1872, 822). Books are of use for education only when the reader puts himself in the position of the writer, and thinks out the problems for himself and responds. So to the unschooled he suggests that they forget any unwarranted reverence for the authority of books and learning,and, should rather model themselves on Socrates, Bacon and Hobbes, who forsook the thought of others in favour of their own judgement, enlightened by conversation with friends.

John Grote´s practice of preferring personal thought and philosophical conversations to reading and writing receives some intellectual justification in this short article, but its real import lies in the suggestion that thought is only `inward talk´ and the resulting argument that knowledge as a whole and philosophical knowledge in particular is derived from the clarification of linguistic usage, of language and conversation in particular. As the primary source is hard to acquire and the point being made here so important a long quotation is justified.

> `For it must be always remembered that language is talk; that literature is a growth or development of outward talk, just as thought, on the other hand is inward talk; that the real language of mankind, or of a nation, the stock upon which these two glorious prerogatives of man must be grafted, is the habitual talk or communication between man and man, which is always going on about us. They may spread and rise far away from their humble stock, but they cannot break their connection with it, or they lose at once their worth and vigour. When it degenerates or becomes unhealthy, they cease to be anything living in the present, and become things of past history only, if that. The daughters on the two sides may wonderfully help and improve their mother, but they cannot live without her; she is the essential and universal character of man, they, compared with her, are results and accidents; man, logically speaking, is social before he is individually reasonable; his communication with others (speaking generally, and of the race) is a pre-condition of the development of his own intelligence´ (Grote 1872, 820).

Philosophy we now learn is the clarification in thought and

conversation of our everyday language. Grote writes, that lack of understanding arises not from ignorance but `unobservance and inattention' in their `talk and listening to others' (ibid, 819). Care over our language and listening is more important than book learning. He writes later,

> `We should think of language then, not partly as a thing mean and of no account, and partly as a matter of display, refinement, and ornament, but throughout as one, as a thing of the most noble use, at once helping us to understand ourselves, and bringing us into intellectual fellowship with others. When we think so, we shall be worthy to read books: and a few books, if we can get only few, will stand for many, for they will overflow with meaning to us. And if we are anxious about having our own thoughts clear, it will not be very easy for language to deceive us. Philosophy is to good sense very much what literature is to talk or language. Many of the best results of both philosophy and literature are near at hand with us if our minds are active and in earnest, and if, in default of opportunity for the study of philosophy and literature, we try to do a little in the way of thinking and imagining for ourselves' (Ibid, 822).

Our duty as scholars is to think clearly for ourselves (using our stock of social language) and to then enter into conversations with others alive or, through their books, those dead to clarify our language. Clarification of our language and our thinking are one and the same thing. But there is an important warning to us, do not mistake the form for the meaning, the grammar for the content, the book for its message.

> 'Let us think what we think, and not merely say we do. Then our language will mean something, and it is its meaning something which is the specially important thing about it. For language is really misused when any of the accidents of it, its elegance, its classicalness, whatever it may be, is looked at by itself, and the attention is turned away from its real work, the carrying its message from one mind to another. This is not so very easy always, as the complaints of philosophers about language may have shown us. That it is not so, is the fault in the main of language in the mind, of the manner of thought' (Ibid, 822).

The final message is central to this Thesis. Grote wanted us to think for ourselves and converse with others using our stock of ordinary words. Our language is 'a great-book in our minds'.

> 'The best books were written when the fewest were read. Now that they are written, it would be foolish and ungrateful not to value them, but equally foolish to think that by them is the only way to the spirit which produced them. Take them as a great blessing and means of enjoyment; as what if you do not make the most of, so far as you are able, you are foolish; but do not take them as what they are not, necessary for intellectual development, for very little of them would suffice for this if only the mind is not suffered to sleep. And if we want something to think about, let us think about words. Our stock of language is a great book in our minds always ready for us to read, suggesting to us all kinds of images which a Milton could do no more than put together, and full of home-made philosophy of the kind which Socrates brought to bear against the book philosophy of the Sophists. We have all this in our mouths without giving it a thought, while we are murmuring that our minds are empty and stagnant, because what we want of other people's thought is perhaps denied us' (Grote 1872,822-823).

The last of Grote's general writing on education was prepared for an anthology of essays by leading Cambridge intellectuals and published in a companion volume to the *Oxford Essays* of 1855, *Cambridge Essays* of 1856 (Grote 1856). The contributions apart from Grote's included a suggestive essay on Coleridge's Philosophy by F.J.A. Hort, and an essay on Roman Law by another influence upon Grote, Henry Maine the Cambridge Professor of Jurisprudence. Grote chose to write on the topic of the role of `Old Studies and New` in the universities. As modern as it may seem, the argument between supporters of liberal and professional education, defenders of the arts subjects and those of the applied sciences, was a recurring element in university publications and debates in the C19th. Most historians of Victorian education are acquainted with the protracted battle in Scotland brought about by the failure of students in the Indian Civil Service exams, between those wishing to preserve a general education based on traditional national lines and those seeking a more specialised system of education on the model of Germany or of the reformed universities of Oxford and Cambridge. A key defender of the tradition of Scottish philosophy and culture, Sir William Hamilton took up the cudgel against Whewell and specialist

education in general and for the period to the 1850's he appeared to have won. However the pressures of industrialization were not to be defeated and after 1850 a new breed of national evangelical academics rose to ascendancy over the last serious defender of the 'high metropolitan philosophy' James Frederick Ferrier (Davie 1961, 288-290 , more generally see Wiener 1982, 22-24; Rothblatt 1968, 256-7).

A similar battle was fought at Oxford and Cambridge and while not being primarily nationalistic it still took place in the light of unfavourable comparisons of English education with that of Germany at both the elementary and university levels. The most famous polemic was between John Stuart Mill and Adam Sedgwick at Cambridge and was later taken up by William Whewell in his essay on Liberal Education (Whewell 1845). Whewell was also to take up arms against Sir William Hamilton and the Scottish reformers. Grote's essay must be read in this context. Many particular points of the argument will concern us later, but the general and somewhat Oakeshottian thesis of his essay can be stated fairly simply, as a defence of a humanistic education, of the classics, history and philosophy in particular, as against those who sought either their replacement by more professionally oriented subjects, or who sought to make them more practical or scientific in character.Grote rails at the English tendency,

> `to wish for professional preparation in several cases where previously practice was considered likely to be the best instruction', and questions 'whether, in fact, the learning of any business in the kind of shadowy outline, the sort of pantomime, which is the way in which it must enter into education is a help or a hindrance to the practical, serious exercise of it' (Grote 1856, 88-89).

Against the 'positivists' he argues that scientific method cannot without misapprehension subsume all aspects of human experience, a theme taken up later in the philosophical writings. He ends here with a characteristic phrase,that indicates his distrust of pseudo

scientific and practical subjects.

> `Even if we had a perfect system of sociology, we should still read the concrete history of England' (Grote 1856, 97).

The stated desire by some to improve the 'practicality' of traditional subjects is repelled by Grote by allusion to the fate of history when attempts were made to make it practical. `It increases our concern, while at the same time it blurs and distorts our view'. In fact, if our concern is for pure history (sui generis) then,

> `The real distinction, in his point of view, between one sort of history and another is, the consideration whether it is, or is not, any part of anything which is going on now, and in which we are likely to be concerned' (Grote 1856, 110-111).

Pure history demands the presence of the former as Michael Oakeshott was to reiterate when quoting Grote on this point (Oakeshott 1962, 162n).

These various contributions on education, religion and the classics tell us something about John Grote the philosopher. Firstly, they have some bearing on his social and political philosophy. They show him to be interested in the political affairs of his day, yet concerned to keep the practical demands of law, religion and politics distinct from those of the purely academic explanations with which he was concerned in the fields of history, philosophy and philology. His aim was not to make speculative knowledge a 'higher form' but rather to show it was simply a different form of knowledge. He was interested in keeping practical education practical, historical education purely historical, and so on. These writings suggest then a second recurring feature of Grote's thinking, the stated demand that the various `languages' or `manners of thinking' that go together to constitute a university education should be kept generally distinct.

This argument we shall see later recurs in the work of two later idealists R.G.Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott, but as prefigured in the nineteenth century by John Grote and the arguments of Hegel and

Bradley (Collingwood 1924; Oakeshott 1933, 1962; Hegel 1910, Bradley 1874.) However Grote was one of the first modern thinkers to recognise the confusions that arise when the rules, logic and language of one discipline or manner of thinking(or practice) run into that of another or others. He uses this argument to attack not only the advocates of philosophical and historical positivism, but those who wish to make the logic and language of education submit to that or practice; the language and logic of theology (which contains `much of poetry and allegory´), submit to those of science or the ´judicial manner of thinking´ (Grote 1862, 6-10); and the language and logic of morality submit to that of science or prudence (Grote 1870).

There is little data on John´s life and intellectual development between 1847 and his election to the Knightbridge Chair of Philosophy in 1855. Joseph B. Mayor´s list of manuscripts in the preface to *Exploratio Philosophica* Part II suggest scholarly concerns with history, literary criticism, philology and philosophy, and we can piece together a social life which involved in addition to parochial and tutorial responsibilities a concern with university and college politics and academic companionship, especially with Joseph B.Mayor and Robert Leslie Ellis, the mathematician and editor and biographer of Francis Bacon (Ellis 1863;1857-1872).

III

Historical and Philological Essays

The interest in history shared by John and George Grote had some common origin in the influence of their mother, though it was probably the model of his elder brother that inspired John in his early days (Clarke 1962, 3). Certainly we know that it was George Grote who

prompted his brother to apply for the Cambridge Chair of Modern History when it fell vacant in 1849 (DNB, 295). Apart from the benefit that might have been accorded to him through his relationship with his brother George, who was now becoming famous for his histories of Greece, and by himself being a fellow and senior optimate at Trinity and a brilliant personal reference from Robert Leslie Ellis as to Grote's range of historical knowledge, John appears to have had no real qualifications for the post (Ellis 1848, Ms.). It was therefore unsurprising to find that the Chair fell to Sir James Stephen (the father of Leslie and James Fitzjames Stephen) who was well known as a legal adviser and diplomat, and whose essays on ecclesiastical biography printed in the 'Edinburgh Review' were published in a book form in 1849 (Stephen J 1849).

Perhaps prompted to make good his deficiency in history with a view to re-application for a Chair at a later date John produced two historical publications between 1849 and 1855. Both of these were published in a new 'Journal of Philology' founded and edited by one of Grote's friends, Fenton J.A. Hort (himself a candidate for the Knightbridge Chair in 1866 and 1872) with the pronounced intention of pioneering classical and theological studies through the medium of philology - the science of language. The study of philology, as John Burrow notes, `was becoming fashionable in England in the eighteen-sixties'. Though it sprang originally from the works of an Englishman, Sir William Jones (1746-94), it had become largely the preserve of German scholarship and as such was later popularized in England in two series of lectures at the Royal institute, in 1861 and 1863, by F. Max Muller (Burrow 1966, 149). Equal status must be given earlier to another two Anglicanised Germans, Bastion George Niebuhr and Baron Christian Bunsen both friendly with Julius Hare the Cambridge tutor and founder of an earlier Cambridge venture in this

field the journal called the'Philological Museum'(Burrow 1967, 182, 194-7)(5)Mayor and Hort obviously considered that Grote's work on dating systems (how we name and catalogue time) and naming systems for people, was a part of the philological enterprise and of interest to these working in that field.

The first of these works `On the Dating of Ancient History' involved a history of historical schemes of dating, but it is of equal interest to philologers and sociologists interested in the factors effecting our conceptions of time (Grote, 1854). The general theme is that the styles of history and schemes of dating used by societies in the past have reflected deeper beliefs about time that are embedded in the concrete political and social institutions and practices of these societies. So the early Greek and Roman historians who used the 'epic' and 'pragmatic' styles of history writing, (eg Thucydides and Polybius) developed and used dating schemes based on a simple succession of 'great men' and 'great events'. This 'eponymous' style as Grote calls it, in turn reflected the dynamic social and political situations of Athens and Rome at the time of writing. In the Eastern world schemes of dating and styles of history writing reflected the unchanging ordered central despotisms that dominated social and political life. Dating systems then were 'epochal', ordered as a succession of equal numerical units, working from a zero base marked by some event (a war or a birth) that forged the pervading original unity or order. The common measuring rod in the Chinese case was the movement of planets.

The history of dating systems is that of the triumph of the epochal over the eponymous, the spread of eastern systems to the west, the triumph of order over disorder, of astronomy and mathematics over more humanistic and expressive concerns. The creation of the Roman Empire provided the base for uniting eastern and western, 'epochal'

and 'eponymous' dating schemes just as it 'finished the bringing of the East and the West together and made civilization one' (Grote 1854, 62). The key event was in the reign of Caeser Julian who imposed a system devised by Sosigenes, an astronomer of Alexandria, on the whole of the known world. The system was that for 365 day years plus an extra one every four years. As Grote writes;

> 'This reform, in which the imperial dominion of the West was used to give effect to the science of the East is one of the noblest and best results of the Roman Empire' (Grote 1854, 64).

The collapse of the Roman empire should, according to Grote's style of reasoning used so far, have produced a crisis, and so to a small extent it did. In the eastern empire dynastical epochs were maintained but conflicts within Christian belief was to exaggerate fragmenting tension within Western Christendom. Disputes existed not only on the dating of Christ's birth but on the significance of this compared with other major events in his life, eg death and resurrection. Other disputes surrounded prophesies for the Day of Judgement in both the old testament and those made by Christ himself. Order was restored as Christianity

> `began, as the Civitas Dei, in some measure to fill the place in mens thoughts which the greatness of Rome itself had filled, now that Rome was plainly coming to an end...' (Grote 1854, 67).

Now one epoch, the life of Christ, was to be used as the base for an otherwise entirely eponymous dating scheme, and though it took several generations to achieve consensus on the base epochal event and its date, this was finally produced in the sixteenth century when;

> 'began the plan of counting backwards from the year of the birth of Christ, and representing the earlier history so' (Grote 1854, 71).

Grote however had one other intention for this essay on dating systems, 'to find out whether, supposing them to be defective, any better way can be found' (Grote 1854, 52). Numerous defects of the existing system are noted, its tendency to encourage retrospective

historical writing is stressed. Rather bravely for a cleric he writes,

> `Such a way of reckoning, and our present reckoning B.C. is such, is only fit for history written backwards from effect to cause or occasion, as we may well conceive it written, like the house that Jack built. Retrograde dating will do very well for retrogressive history' (Grote 1854, 74).

Yet because the presence of a single universal system in the west like that at present used has such enormous academic advantages, Grote proposes only a moderate reform through changing "the unit of retrogression'. This unit he calls a chiliad and is a 1000 year epoch, to be marked in texts and calendars by capital Roman numerals up to the birth of Christ and by ordinary ones afterwards. So 500B.C. would now read I 500 or if the writer wished to be more specific A.C.I. 500 (A.C. standing for Ante Christum); 500 AD would now read 1.500. As the final scheme has still most of the defects associated with any epochal scheme it was not likely to achieve many converts.

The essay on Dating Systems does have obvious historical and sociological merits as well as providing a crucial biographical insight in the conclusion, for there Grote enters a debate with Niebuhr and writes `I have wished to make the paper entirely historical, nor in fact, am I capable of making it other' (Grote 1854, 78). This must have proved embarrassing consequently when in 1855 he appeared before the appointment board for the Chair in Philosophy.

The second essay, though historical in form is as much philological as historical in content, entitled, `On the Origin and Meaning of Roman Names' (Grote 1855). In it Grote seems to be trying to find, in the fashion of Bunsen, Muller et al, if there are any laws or underlying rules that cover the derivation of names in different countries. Similar enterprises in comparative philology were in vogue at the time and several famous contemporary Cambridge scholars were making names for themselves in the field, including three great

adversaries, Richard Chenevix Trench, John W. Donaldson, and Frederic W. Farrar (Burrow, 1967, 180-204). This essay like the last would have been seen by himself and his colleagues as a sign that his work was contemporary and up to date, revealing as it does knowledge not only of the rapidly emerging discipline of Comparative Philology but knowledge of several contemporary works of scholarship, by amongst others: Bastion Georg Niebuhr, John W. Donaldson and August Friedrich Pott. Grote finally makes two tentative answers to his question, firstly that a change,

> 'from individual to family naming, naturally takes place with the advance of civilization according to a general law of the language of names' (Grote 1855, 258).

Secondly Grote argues that this law covers the effect on names caused by the changes on the structure and `feelings as to the family' (Grote 1855, 260). We are to conclude that the derivation of names is a historical phenomenon, not a product of any natural law but of a historical (or rather sociological) rule. The study turns out to be on the effects on names of changing patterns of family relationships and of related social and political developments. The kind of project and analysis was popular at the time and puts Grote into that class of thinkers who benefited from and in return benefited Henry Maine, who was the Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge between 1847 and 1854. We shall see later that both men use 'patriarchal' and 'relational' anthropological theory to underpin their respective social, moral and legal theories. The `law' Grote details is very similar to those posited by other comparative historians, anthropologists and philologists of the day, bearing both elements of historical relativity and universality within a progressive model of 'civilization'. We get few glimpses of Grote's views on history in later works, and both his interests and publications in the field seem to have diminished once he was elected to the Knightbridge Chair of

Moral Causistry, (later Moral Philosophy and Causistry) in 1855.

Grote's research in philology however continued and broadened into a study of language. The bulk of the fruits of his labours in this direction are lost along with his other unpublished manuscripts, but the direction of his thoughts can be found both in the *Exploratio Philosophica* and in some introductory lectures on mental philosophy, posthumously published by Mayor in 1872 and 1874 under the title 'On Glossology' (Grote 1872 and 1874). Mayor had intended to publish more of these lectures (which amounted to 422 hand written pages) as instructed by Grote under the title 'Miscellaneous Philologica et Philosophica' but for some reason the project was never completed. We do not know the date when these papers were written and we can only speculate they were produced between 1855 and Grote's re-direction of attentions to the *Examination of Utilitarian Philosophy* in 1864 and the *Exploratio* in 1865. The full significance of the following survey of Grote's philosophy of language will only become apparent in chapters five and six below, and considerable space will have to be taken up explaining the context within which Grote's work can be understood before we can proceed further. However some points of great philosophical and historical significance must be made here that will set the context for the later analysis of Grote's extremely important contributions to the philosophy of language. The detail provided here is unfortunately necessary if the full significance of Grote's papers is to be recognized, and several technical terms will have to be used and explained.(6)

As already indicated the study of philology in England came into prominence in the 1860's. It had however taken on a new form and style, a new method and approach, and had gathered a new literature and set of academic notables before the popular approval of its role and significance (Burrow 1967,180-187). The old philology of Niebuhr,

Bunsen, the Grimm brothers and Von Humbolt had been related closely to the classics, and medieval literature, to the enterprise of rediscovering the 'original' or 'true' meaning of 'old' words, in the old dead languages of the past. The new philology was part of a wider intellectual re-think that went on in Germany and then Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century. This process was something of a romantic intellectual revolt against the eighteenth century and against the rationalism and positivism of the Enlightenment. But though it was not a uniform revolt it did have intellectual impacts of a positive kind which were to shape the intellectual debate of nineteenth century Europe.

The fields of dispute were various but can briefly be described in terms of some landmark pieces of German research. Firstly there was the radical re-appraisal of religion undertaken by the German critical scholars such as Strauss, Schleiermacher and Bunsen whose intentions seemed to be to save what was best in religion from rationalistic scepticism - through a new hermeneutic analysis of facts. Next there were the early pioneers of the German historical school who used an analogous technique - a kind of hermeneutic history, primarily of old legal systems, to engender an understanding of the past and its development.[7] Related was the German school of philosophical idealism from Schelling and Fichte to Hegel, which began to discover the identity of human history, of reason in the world, through a re-analysis of human thought and experience as revealed in the history of philosophy, art and religion. Other emanations of this re-analysis were evident in contemporary culture and politics, the resurgence of nationalism, the rediscovery of nation and even race, in Fichte, Beethoven and in the fairy stories of the brothers Grimm.

The new philology then started with these German scholars who looked to language as the carrier of meaning in history and who

believed that through a scientific analysis of its historical development a truer understanding of man, nation and civilization could be generated. Britain's contributions to this movement were laggardly and somewhat independently conceived, but they do not deserve the almost total obscurity given to them today. John Horne Tooke [1736-1812] almost single handedly applied his etymological skills to the task of re-discovering the essential and real meaning of words and he influenced not only later philologists but his contemporary Dr Samuel Johnson [Tooke 1786]. The etymological movement grew to a position of great prominence in the 1830's in Britain. The belief was that a historical study of the origins and the development of the meaning of words would reveal some 'true' or 'essential' or 'original meaning' which would free us from the prison of confusion in our contemporary language. But in the 1830's several British scholars began to react to Tooke and etymology under the influence of the Germans, and as indicated earlier, under the influence of Bunsen and Niebuhr.

In England the revision was inspired by several Cambridge men the most prominent being Julius Hare (and his brother Augustus), and two of the 'mystical' Apostles, John Kemble and Richard Chenevix Trench[8] The production by Hare and Connop Thirlwall of the new journal *Philological Museum* was a landmark in the development of philology in England. With it philology gained a new dimension as well as new theories - the comparative dimension was born. As we shall see later the 'Comparative Method' itself also came into prominence at the time in other areas, especially anthropology, law, history and literature. The key linking idea was that an understanding of both past and present could be gained through comparative analysis of not only our contemporary societies with those of the past but also with those of the present[9] In philology this

meant that we should also compare our own language with the contemporary languages of nations such as France, Germany, China and India as well as with the dead languages of Greek, Latin and Sanscrit which survived only in cannibalized forms in the present. The character of this comparative analysis was hotly disputed, as were the other key issues such as its value compared with the etymological, and earlier classical methods, the presence or not of key roots, essences and universal forms to all languages, the priority to be given to the written in regard to the spoken word, the 'revealed' as against the 'invented' nature of language, the naturalness or innateness of language as against its artificial or learnt character, and finally the issue of the relativity or absolute character of the relationship between languages and reality.

Two of John Grote's immediate colleagues at Trinity College had taken great interest in these questions and had published texts in the 1850's and 1860's to rival those of Trench, and even to challenge the widely regarded ascendancy of Bunsen, Niebuhr and the rising star of Oxford, Max Muller.[10] At the time Grote was writing, two key texts emerged from Cambridge scholars, John W Donaldson's *New Cratylus* (Donaldson 1839) and Frederich W. Farrar's *Origin of Languages* (Farrar 1860) but later called *Chapters on Language*. [11] John Grote does not refer directly to them in any of his philological writings but their presence and some of the themes of their work are echoed in them. Donaldson had been a lecturer in classics at Cambridge from 1835-1840 and again from 1858 to his death in 1861. He was one of the leading advocates of applying philology to the classics, a policy which he applied in various publications on the Hebrew, Greek and Latin languages. However he raised the possibility of a wider contemporary comparative philology and related this to ethnography in a companion essay to Grote's 'Old Studies and New' in *Cambridge Essays*

(Donaldson 1856).

The issue of the divine character of language was the peg upon which Farrar decided to hang his 1860 lectures (published incidentally one year before Max Muller's standard text on philology). The thesis is confirmed in the headings to the first three subsections of Chapter one, 'Nothing humanly discoverable has been made a subject of revelation'; 'Language was humanly discoverable', and thus there is 'Certainty of it non revelation'. Farrar's later position is summed up in this passage from Chapter XX1.

> `Language then is not a direct Revelation of the Almighty, nor was it an inevitable result of our physical organization, nor was it a purely mechanical invention, accepted by general agreement in consequence of a felt necessity:- but the *capacity* for language was a part of our human constitution, and in the development of this capacity, the Senses, the Memory, the Understanding, the Emotion, the Will, and the Imagination all played their part' (Farrar 1860, 219).

Working from an innate impulse to language reinforced by imitation, men discovered that, `sounds were capable of becoming signs not of sounds only but of things' (Farrar 1860, 220). Farrar proceeds to recognize the three elements of a word, 1) the sound, 2) its inner form, 3) its meaning (Farrar 1860, 256) and then proceeds to discuss the relationship of words to things asserting that `words can tell us nothing whatever about things' (257), nor can they `tell us something about notions ie about ourselves, and the modification of our own consciousness' (259), instead words `express the relations of things' (261). But they only express these relations and they do so imperfectly for the thought of a word is vastly more complex and extensive. `Words' Farrar concludes, `must be dethroned...'.

> `They are but the pyramidical point from which our conceptions broaden down. The world of ideas which seems in them to find its being, is created, not by *them* but by the Intelligence which uses them as the convenient notations by which its problems are worked out' (Farrar 1860, 263).

Farrar ends up as a kind of subjective idealist but from the

surprising origins of Fichte, a philosopher supposedly non influential at the time, and the still relatively unknown James Frederick Ferrier both of whom he quotes. He misreads Hobbes definition of words as `signs of our conceptions´ as a support for his subjective idealism (Farrar 1860, 263).

John Grote entered this debate in his usual style, carefully, thoughtfully, without critical malice and without immediate intention of publication. According to Mayor the papers `On Glossology´ were `pages from a digression in a course of lectures on Philosophy, and were intended to be preparatory to the analysis of different technical terms belonging to Moral Philosophy´ (Grote 1872, 55). They come from two separate packages of paper put together by Grote [I and V], suggesting different contexts of usage in the lectures. The essay on `Thought versus Learning´ comes from the second package and is hence closely related in Grote's mind at least (Grote 1900, X-X1). His ideas however closely relate to others found in `Old Studies and New´ and in *Exploratio Philosophica*.

Knowledge of most of the above philological sources is attested to in these various writings by Grote. He knew Farrar and Donaldson, and probably Trench through his Trinity connections, though he argues against only Trench. Grote refers in passing to Bunsen, Niebuhr, Grimm, Von Humbolt and Potts from Germany, and Hobbes, Dr Samuel Johnson, Horne Tooke, Bishop Wilkins, John Stuart Mill, Bentham, Carlyle, Liddell and Scott's *Greek English Lexicon* and Richardson's *Arabic and Persian Dictionary* in passing. Grote also unwittingly reveals some basic knowledge of German language here (Grote 1872, 55, 178-179). The lectures are divided equally between criticism, particularly of Tooke and Trench, and original interjection into the debates mapped out above. Grote felt that comparative philology was of vital importance, but that the importance popularly subscribed was

misconceived and that some of the directions of research being taken in the field were mistaken and dangerous. In 'Old Studies and New' Grote noted that

> 'Comparative philology is, in some respects a fresh and rising science, and the present state of classical philology may be a kind of approximation towards it; and connected with this is the feeling of those classical philologers who wish, while enlarging and liberalizing their own subject, to make it a kind of platform on which to build a general science of language'.

But he quickly adds

> `Classical education, then,is not the science of language or languages,and must neither arrogate to itself the merit,nor bear the blame of such a study' (Grote 1856, 95).

This last point set Grote in a different camp from Donaldson and the classicists. Freed from the grip of classics the subject seemed better treated as a branch of history or of philosophy. Grote's claim for it to be a part of the latter comes in his `Draft Scheme of Examination for the Board of MoralSciences' where he says

> `under Mental Philosophy are to be considered to be included (1) the Discussion of the Nature of Knowledge, (2) Psychology, and (3) the History of the Formation of Ideas; and under Logic, (1) the Theory of Definition and the Meaning of Words, (2) The Aristolelian or Aldrichian Logic and (3) the Inductive Logic and the Philosophy of Science'(Grote 1860, 6;LL.696.C.11727).

As a branch of history Grote sees some interesting potential for philosophy in telling us about the history of the changing meaning of words - *perinoematism* (Grote 1872, 57); the history of the changing sound of words (or phones) - *periphonalism* and the study of the origins of words from others - *dianoematism*. But the interest here is largely historical, and relying on his old distinction between 'manners of thought' and 'language', he insists it will have no philosophical or practical advantage. The belief that some philosophical or practical advantage can be gained from the historical study of languages is based on a set of fundamental misconceptions, which include the idea held by Tooke that by simple regressive

derivation (dianoematism) we can get to the 'original' 'real' or 'essential' meaning of a word, that escapes us today due to neglect, carelessness and other confusions of grammar (Grote 1874, 161-4). Grote denies words mean today what they 'originally' meant and that there is one essential or real meaning to be discovered by historical derivation. Words mean what they are used to mean in everyday language and nothing else.

> 'Now it is this notion of the meaning of words which I wish to combat. Neither Horne Tooke's interlocutor, nor 'every other person', nor 'those who had made the most use of the words', may have known well what they were saying, or had a clear idea of what was meant by right and wrong: but, in this difficulty, on what principle is the dianoematism given as the meaning?...Though there was no *clear* communication and mutual understanding amongst the different people using the words, there *was* such an understanding more or less: the one to a certain degree understood what the other meant to say: the real meaning of the word is this commonly understood significance cleared as much as possible, and weeded of individualities. If this varied at different times, then the meaning varied: the man who used the words did not *neglect* the historical meaning of them, but never in the least intended to convey it. Horne Tooke's notion of 'meaning' rests upon a false idea of language, likely to arise in an age when philology and history are cultivated more than philosophy and logic: viz. that language consists in the mass of dictionary words, not in the living intercommunication of thought. Whereas the former are but the furniture and instrument of the latter. For historical and poetical interest, we may dig and redig into them with endless profit: but as to living meaning it is not their structure which we are concerned with but their use' (Grote 1874, 165).

This immensely significant point surfaces again when Grote turns to his old Trinity colleague Trench and denies to him the role of philology as the discoverer through derivation of the real meaning of a word, but now he adds a crucial point about intentionality.

> 'I am unable to accept from Mr Trench, any more than from Horne Tooke, the notion of people implicitly meaning what they have no intention of *meaning*,and what the word which they use does not in the least convey to the person who hears it. It seems better, in all such cases, without overstating, to consider the present meaning of the word as independent of any derivation of this kind which in no respect suggests itself, and then to treat of the *history* of the word as of any kind of history, drawing conclusions from it as we may' (Grote 1874, 170).

A consequential mistake in logic Grote recognizes when the

historians and etymologists move on to 'reform' language so as to restore some single and clear meaning and to remove present `corruptions'. This error is not only one of those of Tooke and Trench but of most classical philologers, nominalists and empiricists such as Bentham and John Stuart Mill, and many others who wish to solve philosophical problems by inventing a new philosophical language.

> `However this may be, it seems to me an entire mistake to attempt to regulate our use of words now by consideration of what is, or is not, corruption or downwards movement. I am inclined to think that language has always prospered best when the attention has been most simply to its essential purpose, the clear expression of thought' (Grote 1874, 173-174).

The demand for a new grammar he equally rebuffs. On reform of our grammar and writing he asserts,

> `the desirableness or not of a *revolution* depends on the manner in which it is carried out, and the *a priori* probability being at any time strong against its being carried out well, it may be considered generally undesirable' (Grote 1872, 162).

Later Grote stresses that the logical impossibility of complete revolution arises from the very social and historical nature of language. Language involves shared usage, common and ordinary usage developed through time. It is not a fabrication of God, one man, or a category of men, be they philosophers or anyone else.

> `Revolutions, in this as in many other things, are wild chimeras in the mind of him who desires them, and would be coarse vandalisms in the execution. But time is the great innovator in language as in everything else: language, as to every part of it, meaning, pronunciation, and writing, is ever in gradual revolution...' (Grote 1874, 175).

In a criticism of another language reformer of the day, Bishop Wilkins, Grote produces his most decisive logical objection to the whole mistaken etymological and reformist line of argument. He argues, with Hobbes and Bentham in mind, that

> `We do not so much need to mend language as to learn from it, and this latter is one of the best roads open to philosophy now. Philosophers having exhausted their lungs for many generations in

> denouncing the hindrance which actual language has been to them in their researches, through its incompleteness and its mistakes, will probably now, in the revolution of human affairs, go upon the other tack, and accept the noematism of language as giving then, so far as it goes, a photograph of reality and existence...' (Grote 1872, 169-170).

Grote's prediction was correct though it took another seventy years to be realised.

When Grote turns to the constructive history of meaning ('noems') and sounds ('phones') his insights and prescriptions are of equally great value and historical interest. The historical laws and processes he enumerates; in meaning, the law of impejoration, the laws of evaporation or trivialisation, the process of inspecification and despecification or the laws of generalization and particularization, and the phonetic laws of periphonism, phonal impulse, and phonal correspondence, all show great concern for the style of historical research being made famous by Maine, Muller and the Comparative Methodologists (Grote 1872, 153, 63, 155, 175, 164, 174; 1874, 176-7). What the various laws reveal is that language necessarily is in a constant state of flux, but that this change though often exhibiting confusion and sometimes conflicts, is essentially rational. The history of languages reveals the struggle of people to understand the universe, their universe, which includes themselves within it. It is the struggle towards clarity of view, understanding, and in the end truth and reality. It is man's struggle to realize the Absolute. This we will return to later, but the idealist elements should be becoming clear.

When we come to the philosophy or logic of language Grote indicates several lines for research as well as answers to conventional questions. In so doing he somewhat paradoxically turns to a practice exhibited throughout his work, that of coining new words. [12] His justification for this is that it helps *him* think more

clearly, through the avoidance of words that are so complex or disputed as to be unhelpful in analysis. The first line for profitable research concerns the study of the meaning of words - the 'noem', 'concept' or 'idea'. Grote calls this study that of *noematism* (Grote 1872, 168). He considers the key areas for study to be (1) to determine the centres of the noems, (2) to fix their boundaries, and (3) to enumerate or classify them. The first two involve the patient analysis of the use of words to find distinctions in their meaning, the identity of each word and its difference from others that are similar. Classification is a tool to aid further study and not an end in itself. A second line of research is into how we use sounds (phones) to express meanings, or in Grotes terminology (now widely used) how *phones* express their *noem*. This study of *neomatoschematism* Grote recognises as the most difficult and is probably the truest form of logic (Grote 1872, 171). The difficulty arises primarily because we must use spoken words to study the meaning of words, we must use phonems to study noems. The third useful line of research is into *phonism*, the study of 'human significant sound' (172). He says little on this, only that the popular practice of searching for original `roots' is dangerous as we might

> `get into the error of supposing roots like the Sanscrit one (which I conclude are grammatical abstractions from actual phonism) to be the elements of phonal language in the sense that they are to be considered as actual language and significant in themselves:' (Grote 1872, 172).

The last general area for research Grote identifies as that of how one word or others can express the meaning of another. The practice of *dianoematism* the use of synonyms Grote considers as vital to human life, not a hindrance or source of confusion, as it allows insight into reality from an imaginative standpoint. In support of the romantic and idealist vision of art and imagination he writes

> 'By means of its dianoematism, language is itself the most perfect poetry, and the imaginative dwelling upon individual words will sometimes open out views and glimpses wider and brighter, we may say, than poetic literature has ever been able to express : with this feeling for us in addition, that the universal poetry of the human race embodied in language carries with it a necessary truth and reality above what can come from the authority of individual genius, be it what it may' (Grote 1872, 175).

We can now reconstruct John Grote's own contribution to a philosophy of language. We shall leave (1) discussion of its relationship to his philosophy as a whole (especially his epistemology and moral philosophy) and (2) our assessment of this theory, until later, but as I consider Grote's approach and substantive ideas to be so novel, and so central to his philosophy, it must be explored more deeply here. Grote's arguments were embedded in the debates discussed above and some of the arguments were not unique, but the novelty and suggestiveness of his views, his insightfulness and clarity of vision mark this research as important.

For Grote the study of languages of the past has only minor historical relevance, though if approached sociologically he could see some useful consequences for comparative research. What Grote insisted we direct our attention to, is the issue of what we are doing when we use language. In *Exploratio Philosophica* Part II Grote on successive paragraphs asks two distinctly modern questions, 'What do we *do* when we think?' and 'What is the meaning of meaning?' *On Glossology* implicitly tackles the same question for language and as Grote indicates it is similar to the above but now the question is 'what are we doing when we use a word?' 'This is the same as the question, What is a word, as meaning?' (Grote 1900, 217). Grote sets out to answer these questions of language by looking at the logical prerequisites for language in a very Kantian and Wittgensteinian manner. The key answer to the question of what we do when we use language is to *think*.

Language, according to Grote may have three uses 1) `to think with', 2) `to speak with' and 3) `to write in'. But the second and third uses are dependent upon the first, a theme we found in 'Thought versus Learning'

> 'But besides its great use to speak with, there is another use of language which I will call a higher one, because the sociability of speech is better than the solitude of thought., and because whatever a man thinks, his thoughts cannot help, I imagine, depending very much on others:- I mean its use to *think* in' (Grote 1872, 61).

We must remember that Grote goes further in `Thought versus hearing', he argues that both thought and writing are children of language, neither could operate without language, they are derivatives of it. `Thought' he there argues, is `inward talk', but

> `Of the two daughters of language, thought is far the more important, for this inward talk where the sympathy is imaginative only, is very often the most real society' (Grote 1871, 820).

But any attempt to found any part of the philosophy of language upon the logic and uses of the written word,as with Trench,must be doomed to failure. Grote insists on the priority of *use* in the spoken word,

> `The dependence of writing on speech is an essential features of *our* branch of general human language, and anything which tends consciously to loosen this dependence is a step China-wards' (Grote 1874, 176).

The development of this critique of the existing state of language philosophy proceeds and takes Grote into vital issues at the heart of any philosophy of language. He raises the issues,popularized by Peter Winch later, of (1) whether all languages provide discrete worlds of meaning, and whether, if all languages are discrete, whether we are forced to draw pessimistic conclusions about the possibility of true translation and the inevitability of radical relativism in regard to meaning and reality; (2) whether the capacity for language is innate or learnt, whether languages have any universal forms or presuppositions; (3) how, if thinking is only 'thought language',

thought words or noems can relate to spoken words or phonems; (4) how words and language relate to the 'things' to which they refer; and (5) to 'reality' as a whole? As the arguments Grote provides on the last two issues are complex and because they relate to the epistemological work I shall review in a separate chapter, the comments on the last two issues will be limited to stating Grote's important conclusions without much debate. However I shall examine briefly his handling of the first issues here because they will throw light on the whole approach John Grote has to philosophy and practical philosophy in particular.

(1) Briefly, John Grote's answer to the first question is yes, to the second question, no. From a close analysis of the phonetic and neomatic structures of various languages we find little or nothing in common between them.

> `In this respect every language is a perfectly new sphere of thought. For it is to be considered that the neomatism is not a matter simply of substantives and verbs: there is the neomatic syntax, or thought relation of the words together, which by means of the order of words, etc, gives significance to a thousand shades of meaning which the most delicate verbal distinctions would fail to express' (Grote 1872, 58).

Other differences are in `vocabulary and sentential schematism, in the grammar, syntax etc' all arising from differences in circumstances and the historical development of a society and its vocabulary. He concludes

> `There is no more foolish prejudice than that languages differ merely in sound, and all mean exactly the same and are mentally the same: the *chrestic* identity which enables people to translate from one to the other is by no means a full representation of that full noematic force which is the value of the language as *thought*; ...' (Grote 1872, 60).

Each language then is a separate 'universe' or 'world' of meaning which will not without 'positive logical error' allow true translation of meaning into another language (Grote 1900, 214-216; 1874, 177-8). But far from this being a calamity as Saint Augustine and the authors

of the Tower of Babel myth thought, it is a positive advantage to mankind. To begin with each unique language as thought, `makes the true soul and specific character of the literature' of each society. Reflecting the romantic and idealist influences of Grote's circle he notes that,

> 'National literature is the expression not only of the particular circumstances of a people but of the individuality of their language' (Grote 1872, 60).

In addition as each is unique,

> 'the becoming acquainted with the neomatism of a new language gives us a fresh view of nature and of man, and, as it were, opens our eyes to a new universe' (60).

And this opening up of a plurality of meaning systems increases the chances that a full or complete understanding may one day emerge. Grote here has in a mind both a historical version of the coherence theory of truth and some elementary idea of the Absolute, in which mankind through history, and the plurality of social minds revealed in each language, gradually homes in on a clear, comprehensive and shared understanding of our world. As with Hegel, even confusion and conflict are positive aspects of this development as each indicates an effort in the enterprise of human self understanding. And so the drift of meanings in time and the multiplication of synonyms within a language at a time, and the multiplication of insights in the universes gained from other languages, will be an aid (Grote 1874, 174, 1855, 92-3). Attempts to find rationalistic solutions to the multiplicity of the meanings of words in a language and between languages, he concludes, are roads to disaster.

Nor are we to conclude like Peter Winch later that men are trapped or are prisoners of language, in a relative world of meanings, from which there is no escape, (Grote 1874,170; Winch 1958; 1970, 78-111). One great advantage of the 'drift' of the meanings of words, is the possibility of change through time, and secondly, that `the

direction of the movement is more an index to us of truth than the original meaning was'. The various other laws of change of meaning, listed earlier above, all have the same progressive effect, and so relativism and the idea of a static world or Universe are destroyed, to be replaced by a picture of the Universe as a plurality of meaning systems at any one time reflected in the plurality of languages, all changing through time (or history) in a progressive direction. Here is Grote's helpful dictum with its modern sounding advice,

> `Be sure of your own meaning and find the words in which you can say it most distinctly and most unambiguously (this is the advice which I would give), and then you may leave language to take care of itself, secure (I think) that it will do so, and that you are *one* benefactor to it' (Grote 1874, 174).

This reflects a confidence in the historical mission of the philosopher, to guide thought and language in the direction of clarity and certainty, and hence truth and reality.

(2) One source of progress in research into the nature and origins of language might be developed if it was found that languages had some universal forms, of the kind later sought by Noam Chomsky, or if languages shared some fundamental logical prerequisites of the kind sought by Wittgenstein. On the question of universal form, Grote was as dismissive as he was with the search for common neomatic and phonetic structures. After some preliminary thoughts he recognizes that `language, as a great natural fact of humanity, has its laws, its regular course and flow' (Grote 1874, 175). But these are not laws of statics that refer to universal structures or forms underpinning each language, rather they are all dynamic historical laws, laws of flow. Grote did however argue, like Chomsky later, that language was not alternatively a pure product of historical and social circumstance. Language was rather an integral `part of man's constitution' and as `there is a primary impulse to vocal sound' (1872, 164), we must

conclude that to some extent, an extent Grote did not define, the capacity for it is innate. Society and history account for the *meaning* of words while the pre-ordered human constitution makes language possible, a simple and yet brilliant solution to a complex and difficult problem.

Like Wittgenstein and Winch later Grote does notice some basic logical postulates of all language which give us some purchase on the problem of meaning (Wittgenstein 1957; Winch 1958, 10-65). Firstly, all language is *social*, it is between speakers and hearers, a community of language users in communication with one another producing a community of thought (Grote 1865, 154; 1871, 820, 1874, 173; 1876, 253). Secondly, all languages are *organizations*, that is with many elements ordered together in a system, so that when one word is used it implies that all the other elements exist and that understanding the meaning of one word implies understanding the meaning of many others (Grote 1855, 93; 1876, 225). Thirdly, all the users within a language must share as well as some common phones and noems some common *assumptions*, certainties and beliefs about the world (Grote 1872, 64-65; 1874, 163, 165), and, fourthly some common *purposes* or intentions in the use of words and phrases. Grote is certain that a language, a common set of words, of sounds and meanings, implies a shared world of 'things' as well as 'thoughts', and a tacit agreement of purpose or 'intention' in the use of words (Grote 1855,81; 1874, 155, 163, 165, 170; 1876, 219-220; 1900, 214-5). Language then is not an accident of the world as it must appear to empiricists, but one of its fundamental parts. It carries its dynamic and reveals its dynamic and its meaning . In its essence language is `communication from mind to mind', and if each word and phrase reveals the intentions and purposes of the users, then language can be seen as both the creating of common purpose and the common

stock of purpose already achieved (Grote 1874, 172). Grote assumes that our hearers can and usually do understand us because they accept not only the same sound symbols and thoughts (noems and phonems) but the same rules and purposes in communication. We return then to the idea of language as the centre and basis of a shared world of meaning, a social world. We must now go on to see how words and language relate to the universe of things and to reality as a whole.

(3) To the question of the relationship within words of their meaning (noem) and their sound (phonem) Grote argues for an analogy. The details he regards as too complex for any current theory to explain, but he insists that,

> `The forming of an idea in our mind and the forming of a phonal sound are two things entirely different in themselves, but towards which nature has given us a single or united impulse, so that under normal circumstances language and sensation or observation go on in conjunction´
>
> `There is an exact analogy between noem and the expressing phone: each is highly complicated and compound, but to the mind, previous to scientific analysis,it is one and simple, its essence being oneness:... ´ (Grote 1872, 164).

(4) In answer to the question of the relationship between words and things he is decisive, and the answer is one of the key elements in his whole philosophy. While Grote rejects the arguments of those like Trench who draw sceptical and relativist conclusions from the admitted variety of languages and the tendency for 'drift' in the meaning of words (Grote 1874, 167-9), he consistently asserts that the meaning of words is the thing to which they refer, though perhaps with more 'general application'.

> 'I do not want to go here more into philosophy than is necessary, but it will be perceived that what I mean to express by the word *noem* is exactly what (according to the usually received dianoematism) must have once been the meaning of the word *thing*, i.e. a unit of the intelligible universe, the unity being given by the understanding´ (Grote 1874, 65).

This argument appears and re-appears in Grote's work, especially in

the *Exploratio*, and the argument is not only idealist but has later modern connotations when he writes

> 'No person can be more convinced than I am that the study of words is the study of things, if only we study the words rightly' (Grote 1874, 175).

(5) I shall return to the right methods shortly but now we record Grote's related assertion that there is also a perfect symmetry between language and reality. Here we have further evidence of Grote's commitment to monism, but now in the field of ontology. In an exceedingly perceptive passage he concludes that meaning is the mediation of language and reality, or, put negatively,

> 'as noematism is thus, logically, and as we are considering it now, an abstraction made by philosophers from actual language, so, on the other hand, historically, and as it arises in fact, it is an abstraction from the actual universe, made by man as a part of his nature for the purpose of translating reality into language (if we may speak of *purpose* where all is one impulse, and there is no distinction of *time*); it is the universe as, in its various parts, perceived and known preparatory to these being phonized and made matters of reasoning and communication between men. As a step, therefore, which must of necessity be *supposed* between reality and language, neomatism may be considered in different ways an abstraction from each' (Grote 1872, 65).

In idealist discourse the overcoming of abstraction is achieved in that which is concrete, by which is meant a universal or general category which contains, but unifies and overcomes, all the elements exhibited by the particular cases within the general class. John Grote differs from later English Idealists who make the Hegelian notion of the 'concrete universal' central to their philosophy, for that concept is rarely explicit in his work (Milne 1962, 15). But here it is implied. Thought is an abstraction from both language and reality. The unity lies in the triadic relationship of the three. We might return then to Grote's two metaphors of language quoted earlier, it is a 'picture' or a 'photograph' of reality (Grote 1872, 170; Grote 1900, 215). This imagery and the attendant argument are however based on an idealist ontological belief or premis that,

> `Reality and man's minds are made for each other, and man's systematic way of viewing things, setting aside the possible deceptions of the senses, is sure to be, to the depth to which it goes, a true representation of them: and language will show us this' (Grote 1872, 170).

The existence of these arguments in Grote's work will be one of the main pieces of evidence I will adduce later for calling Grote an idealist. But now we must finish this rather lengthy summary of Grote's work on philology with an account of his prescriptions on how to study words, for his answers tell us a great deal about his whole style of writing as well as about the substructive content of his philosophy of language. Because man is a language user, who attaches meaning to things and events in language, we can suppose that the correct study of words and sentences will provide some insight into thought and reality, and in particular will reveal the meaning that things and events have for human beings in the world. How then can the meaning of words and sentences (for to some extent `sentences are to be considered logically anterior to words') be elucidated? (Grote 1872, 66).

The answer cannot of course be given by any kind of historical study of derivation, nor by any etymology of contemporary language (1874, 155), nor by analysis of the structure or forms of language. The only answer that can be given is that we study how ordinary people use words in everyday language. This astonishing conclusion hinted at earlier and formulated sometime between 1855 and 1865, is first encountered on the third page of 'On Glossology'. This and subsequent quotations will be given verbatim both because the original sources are hard to obtain and because on such an important point the reader should be left in no doubt as to John Grote's intentions. In a passage advising readers on how to get accuracy of thought and of language by gaining a clear mental view of noems, Grote asks us to,

> 'remember carefully that a *noem* is a thought-word as it exists in use, as it is meant by the speaker and understood by the hearer, quite independent of its *dianoematism*, or the noems and phones *through* which, in fact and historically, it has come to be expressed' (Grote 1872, 57).

Later the idea reappears in a discussion of current research into the origins or dianoematism of words.

> `However, it is to be considered that, logically and straightforwardly, a word does not mean its dianoematism, but means its definition, a very different thing , and a thing too, in words of common use, continually shifting according to the laws of perinoematism, the definition not being any authoritative verbal one, but such a true account as can be given of the use of the word at any given time ... the determination of the *noem*, or accurate meaning, must be from the close examination of the word as it occurs in use' (Grote 1872, 176).

Apart from the somewhat strange usage of the words coined by Grote the message seems clear, but is elaborated later to show the role of both hearer and listener, the parties to a conversation.

> `When we use our own language for the purpose of speech, the important things to be in our minds in full force and vigour are, first, what we ourselves mean, or wish to express by the words; and next, what the person whom we address will understand by them; not what one person and another in the course of the world's history may have meant by them' (Grote 1874, 155).

Words, like coins changes their value, change their meaning through time and between users depending on many factors. They

> `mean not what is told by anything upon *themselves*, but what the giver and the taker agree they shall represent or be worth: these things may or may not be the same' (ibid, 155).

Conversationalists then, in the practice of conversing set the meaning, just as dealers operating within a money market set the value of money. Meanings, like markets never stand still, but as Grote shows there may be some historical generalizations that can be made to account for some of the most obvious features of change - his 'laws of drift'.

But the important point about the logical and practical inseparability of usage and meaning erupts during Grote's engagement with Horne Tooke on the issue of the value of etymology in general and

of the correct meaning of the words 'right' and 'wrong' in particular. Horne Tooke had aimed to discover not only the origin of words but their true meaning and Grote wants not only to separate the two enterprises but to condemn Tooke for having confused them. Tooke, he says, tried

> 'to provide a *method* by which the real meaning of words is to be ascertained. He will not accept as an account of the meaning, that it is the common and mutual understanding of men about them: ... ' (Grote 1874, 164).

In place of this Grote asserts of words, that

> 'as to living meaning, it is not their structure which we are concerned with, but their use' (Grote 1874, 165).

Similarly Grote attacks Richard Trench, for though he occasionally produces,

> 'the right view on the matter; viz. that while the present force, or meaning in usage, is the only proper meaning of the word' (169).

he often falls into the Tookian error. For instance a Tookian must suggest that a contemporary speaker who uses the word 'plague' intends to imply that the ailments 'were strokes or blows inflicted by God on a guilty or rebellious world'.

So everyday usage is the first key to the meaning of words, followed by a study of what the speaker intends and what the hearer understands as the meaning of the speaker. All this Grote puts into what he calls the *cardinal axiom* of unambiguity in language, that,

> 'words mean what they are simply used for, not what there may be in them of fossilized meaning, or what these elements or components may mean' (174).

For the philosopher, and indeed for any language user, the advice is simple, when you wish to speak, remember

> 'first, what we ourselves mean, or wish to express, by the words; and next what the person whom we might address will understand by them' (155)

Illustrations of how this theory of meaning could be applied to solve philosophical problems appear throughout the philosophical works

we will study below but one illustration from the *Treatise* refering to problems of the constituent characteristics of a promise or contact may be indicative.

> 'Words used as vehicles of a promise (or declaration) must have one meaning, in the same as they must in logic for an unfallacious conclusion. The words mean what the two parties agree in meaning by them: if they do not mean the same by them, no intelligent promise has been passed: if the promiser has two meanings, one his own, which he means to keep, and another, which he is aware is held by the person to whom the promise is made, there is *equivaletion*; and this is, which in logic is bad reasoning, is in morals bad faith' (Grote 1876,273-274).

Yet as we will appreciate the matter is complicated by the intrusion of a third source of usage and meaning, for

> 'words, like language in general, have meanings of their own in common use, distinct (in the notion of it) from the meaning which either party may attribute to them at a time' (ibid 274).

Where conflict over the meanings of words arises in law or moral life the most usual construction of them should be taken.

Grote is here taking sides in a contemporary debate, as is witnessed by his dialogue with Tooke,Trench and `the accomplished authoress' as yet unknown, who Grote allies with against them (171). These thoughts emerge in the context of a series of lectures on language, especially moral language, aimed for undergraduates about to study moral philosophy proper. It was not his intention to produce a systematic and coherent theory of language and this he does not do. Yet, he did intend, as he does with the rest of his philosophical work, to produce some ideas both on what will do as well as what will not do in argument, and in so doing he produces the outline of a positive theory which as we shall see he uses throughout his other writings. This theory bears similarities to what later came to be called, 'ordinary language philosophy', premised as it was on two ideas, (1) that meaning is to be discovered not through epistemology, but a study of living language, and (2) that the raw material for this study was the everyday language of the ordinary user (Grote 1865,73).

Grote also shared with many post Wittgensteinian's the view that science cannot resolve many problems in philosophy and in language, that words mean what they are used to mean in ordinary conversation within a language and a manner of thought', that language is social, that it implies shared intentions by the users, shared rules and organization, and a generally holistic and anthropocentric view of language and society. However John Grote had concerns much wider than those figures who later originate this school of thought. He mixes two fundamental idealist arguments in with this philosophy of language, the epistemological argument that the meaning or thought side of a word, its 'notion', 'idea' or 'concept' is what is meant by the 'thing'(see also Grote 1900, 27), and the monist ontological argument that language is an attempt to `photograph' or `picture' reality. However I expect that many twentieth century western philosophers will recognise the merits of the general theory, especially the 'use' theory of meaning, the insistence upon clarity in intention and use, the general method for solving philosophical problems, and the idea that philosophy is a conversation.

IV

Literary Criticism

Another recurrent theme and pre-occupation throughout Grote's writings, but especially in his earlier work, is with philosophical and literary criticism. This appears not only in the vast and laborious essays I shall analyse here but also in his critiques of the 'New Educational Code', entitled `An Examination of some portions of Dr.Lushington's Judgement in the cases of the Bishop of Salisbury v Williams, and Fendall v Wilson' (Grote 1862), the *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy* (Grote 1870) and two sets of philosophical

critiques published under the title of *Exploratio Philosophica* (Grote 1865, 1900). These later works are analysed elsewhere but it would help if the reader could grasp Grote's idea of the role, benefits and drawbacks of literary and philosophical criticism at this stage. The value of criticism to Grote lay in its ability to sharpen our own ideas and to prepare the way for the truth. In the two essays studied here, the `Remarks on a Pamphlett by Mr Shilleto entitled 'Thucydides or Grote' (Grote 1851) and `A Few Words of Criticism a propos of the Saturday Review' (Grote 1861), Grote however concentrates on the negative benefits of criticism. Taken together the two works amount to a criticism of criticism.

In line with his earlier stated preference for the self developed thought of the individual over learning from others, Grote argues that the popular art of literary criticism in books reviews, notices and general critiques was becoming a 'substitute for (reading) the books themselves', a substitute for real thought on the part of the reviewer and his reader (Grote 1861, 14). Worse than this it had the potential for destroying both the value of the works reviewed and the mind of the reader, literary criticism is

> `a parasitical appendage to that which makes effort to be real literature, which like the ivy strangles what it feeds on, offering *itself* only as the wretched substitute and really extinguishing in the readers everything that is intellectually valuable' (55).

Criticism by its very nature is negative, but it also tended to become destructive and was often written and read in personal rather than academic terms, so that 'the spirit into which reviewing has a tendency to degenerate' is one of 'mawkish, nauseous, canting, patronising ill nature' (5). Perhaps the most famous philosophical example of this form of literature, which exhibited these tendencies within criticism, were John Stuart Mill's two reviews of John Grote's two college peers, William Whewell and Adam Sedgwick, which Grote

later castigates for introducing into philosophy an 'odium ethicum' which was even more unreasonable than the 'odium theologicum' of the past (Grote 1870, 9). But Grote was first drawn to the criticism of criticism by a pernicious and patronizing review of an early edition of his own brother's *History of Greece* (Grote G. 1862). The critic was Richard Shilleto, `the most famous Victorian classic coach', and a well known figure around Trinity College.

Shilleto's stated aims according to John Grote, had been to `rescue Thucydides from unwarranted aspersions' and the `unwanted interpretations' of George Grote (Grote 1851,5). But John Grote felt that Shilleto's real aims were evident in an earlier statement in which the author claimed to write as, `one not ashamed to call himself a Tory against one not (I believe) ashamed to call himself a Republican', and `one proud of an Academic Education against one disregarding such a position' (ibid, 3-4). John argues that Shilleto's stated intentions were both political and institutional as well as being academic and historical. Anyway John Grote set out to ensure that `It was an evil hour for Mr Shilleto ... when he set down to write his pamphlet', for in reply to thirty pages of loose analysis, he received a crushing eighty seven pages of clear and pointed criticism of the criticisms. John's first academic aim was to reveal the wastefulness of this style of literary criticism through the careful elucidation of errors in this particular case study, but there is another aim, of much consequence to my thesis later (chapters three and ten)which appears at the end of the review. Here John turns to the point that Shilleto's exaggerated regard for the methods of the classicist, his petty jealousy, his snobbish defence of universities and his political prejudices, are the exception not the rule for the University as a whole. His fear is that if unchallenged `Mr Shilleto will go far to make it (the university) despised on every hand, and a

Cambridge pamphlet a byword for illiberality and folly' (ibid 70).

The aim of John's first major publication then was ultimately to defend the intellectual status of Cambridge University from the sort of attack that was then commonly made against it from outside, by reprimanding from within the university a figure who fulfilled the stereotype of the reactionary Cambridge Don painted later by Leslie Stephen, and at the time by John Stuart Mill (Mill 1835, and see Chapter three below). Grote recognised that a long duel had been going on between Cambridge and London, between the University don and the literary gentlemen,between the professionals and amateurs outside, but he wished to stop it getting out of hand to the detriment of the University. Shilleto for his part thought

> `that the University should be at war with everything of literature and science that is in any degree independent of it: and for this purpose he may try to convert a noble esprit de corps and feeling of brotherhood which University and College sympathies produce in others into a spiteful illiberality, ...' (ibid 69).

John called for a fair minded appraisal of all scholarship from any source, by the University.

> `For only so can it have or hold a place at the head of literature and science in England, and be looked up to both by those who write to instruct others, and those who want instruction themselves, as a place of wise criticism and real education. Who would care for the opinion of Cambridge if they took up this wretched pamphlet as a specimen of it, and saw in the first page, that the writer had to settle before he criticised whether his author was a Republican or a Tory, a member or not of his own University?' (ibid 69).

On substantive points John Grote shows Shilleto to have been more concerned with the minutia of the translation of classical texts than with the meaning of the authors concerned and of later commentators; to have been a classical textualist who was himself often mistaken on textual points; and an elitist scholar who was ignorant of philosophy and philology. But above all Shilleto is portrayed as an academic snob whose pompous and priggish intolerance of outsiders was damaging

the reputation of Cambridge. It is not surprising that Joseph Romilly records efforts to patch up the dispute between John and his adversary as late as 1855.(Romilly MS. 1853-1864, Cam 6804-6842).

The second article was published as a pamphlet with the aim of curbing the outrageously critical tenderness of the newly founded and extremely popular Cambridge based journal, the `Saturday Review'. The Review had been set up as a weekly in a market dominated by monthlies, and as a university journal to compete with the literary organs of the English universities' greatest opponents, the 'Westminster Review' of the Philosophical Radicals, and the 'Edinburgh Review' 'Frasers' and 'Blackwoods' of the Scottish intellectuals (Gross,1969). While liberal in origins and opposed to Disraeli in particular, the journal was soon to start that Liberal shift towards Toryism noted by Christopher Harvie in the *Lights of Liberalism* (Harvie 1979). Indeed in two of its key contributors, James Fitzjames Stephen and Henry Maine the 'Saturday Review' had two of the major figures in the political realignment towards the right of intellectuals in the second half of the nineteenth century (Stephen, J.F. 1892; Roach, 1957). John Grote picked up in 1855 a point later noted both by John Roach and M Bevington, that while the Review had set itself the task of improving

> `cultural opinion: its tone was destructive and it was highly critical of the vulgarity and sentimentality of the middle classes' (Roach 1957, 60-61; Bevington 1941).

Grote entered the controversy by choosing to reply to a review of Dr *Whewell's Platonic Dialogues for English Readers* which had accused Whewell of not only 'belittling' Plato but of 'being inferior' to him. Grote not only refutes the first aspersion but more interestingly calls into question the whole value of the exercise entered into by the 'Saturday Review' as indicated above. Their critical reviews he sees as 'the creation of the nineteenth century' and of a modern age.

They are usually anonymous which prevents direct dialogue with the author, secondly, they are often personally malevolent; thirdly, they are usually devoid of any helpful academic content; forthly, they do nothing to encourage the reader `to make himself acquainted' with the books reviewed and they proceed usually by casting aspersion, knowing well that `A sneer cannot be refuted'. For philosophers, he adds this reminder,

`It is an unhappy fact in regard of philosophy, though not the unhappiest: depreciation of opponents arising from motives of prejudice or philosophic party is not so bad as that depreciation of them which seems to arise from motives even less akin to love of truth than these, from jealousy, from private quarrel, from the pleasures of insulting great names, from the desire of securing attention to trivial thoughts by the attaching them to something that will be attended to' (Grote 1861, 36).

V

Friendship, Conversation and Philosophy.

Grote valued only constructuve criticism and the 'Saturday Review' for the universities suffered from the illness of negative criticism exhibited by its chief opponents amongst the Philosophical Radicals. From these brief reviews above of Grote's writings on education, history, philology and criticism we again learn something about his approach to philosophy.He saw philosophy as being an intellectual search for truth, a search that might well be made more difficult if we relied too much on books, the thought of others, on the adopting of the position of a 'school of philosophy', or merely contented oursleves with criticism. Philosophy progresses according to Grote by and through, the development and refinement of our own thoughts and language in conjunction with that of others; it cannot be thought or learnt,it is rather an intellectual skill or art that is acquired through the practice of thought, debate and conversation.

Ultimately satisfaction can only come in having thought out a

position for oneself, only then can ones thought and imagination rest content. In the introduction the *Exploratio* of 1865 Grote rightly described this method as 'egotistic' a term taken up and developed by F.D.Maurice (Maurice 1883, 6). By the term they both understood that knowledge presumes activity of the ego and that real thought always, 'calls forth the thought of another, to resist it, to conspire with it, or to complete it'(ibid,7). Philosophy works then when one mind puzzling over a problem and coming to conclusions enters into conversation with other such minds. The old idea of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle that philosophy is based upon friendship and conversation is revived. The adoption of these prescriptions by Grote and especially the 'dialectical subtlety he used when applying them 'gave him great influence over the minds of others', according to G.Croom Robertson, and reveal him to be a man of great academic independence and integrity, a point that has been noted by all of his biographers. These characteristics go a long way to explain how and why he could develop a philosophical theory of such originality and yet be so reluctant to publish what could be seen (with both the *Examination* and the *Exploratio*) as mere descriptions and criticisms of others.

Unfortunately we know very little of Grote's philosophical education prior to his appointment to the Knightbridge Chair in 1855. Apparently he showed an early preference for reflective subjects and probably, under the influence of his brother, he made acquaintance with the philosophical classics. However in the practice of philosophy Grote followed his own prescriptions, for his philosophical stimulus came neither from a wide acquaintance with philosophical literature nor from the teaching of others, but from intellectual companionship (Robertson,1885,274).(13) In regard to individuals the most important relationship that Grote refers to, is that between

himself and Robert Leslie Ellis (1817-1859) (Grote 1872). Ellis was primarily a mathematician who was attracted into the study of philosophy and logic by the need to answer several crucial questions within his discipline on mathematics (Ellis 1863). But he was also a competent historian of jurisprudence, especially of Roman law and was used by William Whewell as an advisor and editor of his various works on the history of moral and political philosophy. His original contributions in all areas seem to have been highly suggestive, but like Grote, he died before the publication of any completed original work. In mathematics his writings on such problems as the methods for calculating least squares seem to have become fully accepted, by the turn of the century and his work on logic, in particular the 'frequency theory of probability' is widely regarded as being the precursor of a later thesis pioneered by another of Grote's friends the logician John Venn (Keynes 1921, 209, 84-5). In the field of philosophy Ellis is remembered for his partnership with J. Stebbings in the classic 14 Vol Cambridge edition of *Bacons Works* (1857-74). In Ellis, Grote found the foil that he needed on which to sharpen his own ideas. Ellis, he says was not

> `one to think at large subjects (though he *was* to think out special points) independently for himself'... `He had more respect for books and literature and for what people have said than I should have expected from one who criticised them with such an independent judgement, and so constantly found them wrong' (Grote 1872, 68-69).

These qualities of respect for books and academic authority, and the preoccupation with literary criticism were alien to Grote, but being exceptionally widely read and having received an awesome mathematical and philosophical education in childhood, Ellis was able to prompt, challenge and advise Grote in the development of his own views. Fortunately Grote found that, 'criticism of the thought of others and the forming of his own opinion always went hand in hand

...', with Ellis. He found him a 'good listener' and a critic whose views were never `mean or trifling' (Grote 1872, 68). The two men apparently spent many years of friendship together both as undergraduates, fellows at Trinity and in particular in the long period of illness between 1852 and 1859 during which time Ellis resided close to Grote at Trumpington. Grote records long hours of discussion on a wide range of topics and in particular on politics, (Ellis had once tried to become the Whig candidate for Bath), and on the philosophy of jurisprudence, which was one of Ellis's specialities after a short flirtation with the legal profession. The full significance of this relationship is implied in a long passage from which I have abstracted the following,

> `My companionship with him (Ellis) I think was intellectually the most valuable portion of my life, for one reason, namely I learnt from *it* (I say from *it* rather than from *him*, for I think it was from the concurrence and conflict of our minds, which were very different) a something not easy to describe, but which has been the soul of all my notions about philosophy since: one might call it a belief in thought: a feeling that things were worth thinking about, that thought was worth effort, that half-thought or loose thought was something to be despised, that the getting to the bottom of anything was what would repay the trouble of it:' (Grote 1865, xxxv).

The lessons that Grote learnt from this relationship he tried to share with others by the establishment of a philosophical discussion group, which came to be known as the 'Grote Club' or 'Grote Society' and through which Grote's influence had spread to other persons and into other areas of thought. The Society started meeting sometime after Grote's election to the Knightbridge Chair and continued to meet as the Grote Society after his death under the Chairmanship of his successor F.D.Maurice. The group was the only viable alternative to the Cambridge Philosophical Society, which was concerned primarily with problems of science and mathematics, and the 'Apostles' which Henry Sidgwick for one found intellectually suffocating at the time due to the weight of elderly mathematicians and classicists. Meetings

were held at Grote's house in Trumpington, dinner being followed by the presentation of papers which were used as the starting point for discussion.

John Venn described Grote as an admirable `moderator' in these discussions,

> `Nothing escaped his keen and critical judgement, and he asserted himself just sufficiently to draw out the thoughts of those who were shy of expressing themselves, and to keep the conversation from struggling into side issues' (Sidgwick A.E.1906, 135).

Grote apparently directed the proceedings to `form a perfectly free discussion of fundamental principles', but no papers or notes are left of these meetings from which to judge further, though Rothblatt does try an imaginative reconstruction (Rothblatt 1968, 139). Though membership was open there was a hard core of regular members, who apart from John Grote included Henry Sidgwick, later to be Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge and author of several major works on philosophy and politics; John Venn (1834-1923) tutor of moral sciences at Caius College, cousin of the Stephen's and the Dicey brothers and author of a trilogy of books on logic; Aldis Wright (1831-1914) who became editor of the Cambridge *Shakespeare*, Bacon's *Essays*, and Milton's *Manuscripts and Poems*, and a well known agnostic, who after the relaxation of the Tests became the University Librarian, Bursar and Assistant Master at Trinity College; Joseph Bickersteth Mayor, moral sciences tutor of St. Johns, later Professor of Classics at University College London, the author of several books on classics, and editor of John Grote's manuscripts. Occasional members included John Mozely (1840-1913), later Professor of Pure Mathematics of Owens College, Manchester; and John Pearson the classical and medieval historian. Under F.D.Maurice the society gained the membership of Alfred Marshall the economist; W.K.Clifford the mathematician and philosopher and J.F.Moulton (Sidgwick 1876,

137-8; Keynes 1933, 158-168).

Two of these figures require further comment because of their effect on the understanding of Grote that appeared in later years. Joseph B.Mayor, though a St John's scholar had worked with John Grote as a tutor for the Moral Science Tropos from 1838. Their friendship rivalled that with Ellis and Mayor eventually married Grote's adopted niece, Alexandrina, who had come to live with him as housekeeper after the death of her own parents in 1835. One of their children christened Robin John Grote Mayor (1869-1947) was an Apostle later and a close friend of George E. Moore. He produced a book called *Reason and Common Sense* which refers to John Grote. His son Andreas became an Apostle in turn and his daughter Theresa married Lord Rothschild, himself an Apostle (Levy 1979, 120; Mayor 1951). Mayor was a lifelong ally and supporter of Grote without whom, few if any of his later writings would have reached us. Henry Sidgwick was very much their junior, but he has recently characterized up as the master of Victorian Cambridge philosophy by J.B.Schneewind and others (Schneewind 1977). In what follows I do not wish to suggest any diminution of this new found stature but I will suggest, 1) that he was in considerable debt to Grote for his philosophical education, 2) that he failed to propagate or to recognise his master's great originality and 3) that in turning away from ordinary language philosophy and idealism and back to the utilitarian versus intuitionist debate, he in one sense held up the development of philosophy in the university for several decades.

Another of John Grote's colleagues and discussants to whom we have already seen Grote paid his debts, was that still vastly underestimated philosopher and historian of science, William Whewell. We must turn back to him later for more insights into Grote's life and writings.

VI

Reform

In 1855 William Whewell the Knightbridge Professor of Moral Theology resigned, overburdened with his duties as author, editor, Master of Trinity College and periodically Vice-Chancellor of the University. John Grote was elected in his place and immediately began the dual task of preparing lectures and planning reforms for the Moral Science Tripos. Prior to the reform of the Tripos in 1860 the Moral Sciences had been in fairly serious disrepute both inside and outside the University. The rules allowed for only postgraduate students to take the course when they were seeking fellowships, M.A's or Doctorates. But the reasons for this disrepute were academic as well as administrative. Under Whewell's direction a Moral Sciences Tripos had been created in October 1848, but it had no homogeneity or identity, the subject matter including general examinations in Moral Philosophy, Political Economy, Modern History, General Jurisprudence and the Laws of England. However two other issues compounded the problem. Firstly a new Tripos in law was established and it also included the courses in Jurisprudence and Law. It had begun to attract those students who were considering the law as a profession. Moreover the Classics Tripos had begun to include courses in philosophy. Secondly the Moral Science Tripos did not lead to the awarding of a degree (Sidgwick 1876, 224). A student needed a B.A. before going on to Honours in the Moral Science Tripos and this ruled it out as a course of study for the bulk of young undergraduates. The Senate had been petitioned to remove this anomaly in 1854 but had refused on the grounds that the Moral Sciences did not offer a

suitable subject matter for the education of undergraduates, a popular prejudice that recurs in the succeeding arguments about academic reforms.

After considerable pressure, the Senate in 1859 approved a petition for the appointment of a syndicate `to consider whether any changes should be made in the regulations concerning the Moral Science Tripos'. The scheme recommended was that of Mayor and Grote. Its major suggestions were a) to allow an undergraduate with a pass in honours to obtain a B.A.degree, b) to set up a Board of Moral Sciences to agree on an examination, syllabus and booklists, and (c) to recommend the replacement of English Law by a study of mental philosophy (University Papers D.C. 5650). The two leading reformers, J.B.Mayor and John Grote feared that the Senate would be prejudiced against the recommendations, and submitted flysheets in their support to the Senate. (14) Mayor's appeal is the most comprehensive but Grote's paper, reflects his conviction of the value of philosophy in the universities. Grote firstly echoes the complaints of J.S.Mill and others that Cambridge is

> `surely almost the only school of higher instruction in the world which takes (may it be said so?) no account of logic or philosophy in any form, and makes no attempt to educate the reasoning powers by any other means than mathematics and grammar or ancient literature'

and recommends correction as soon as possible. He ends by pleading that

> `I would like to see the University taking a wide interest in the intellectual movement of the country, in order to be able to influence it for the good'.

The recommendations of the committee were fully accepted on 23rd February 1860 and the Board of Moral Science set to work to discuss the examination scheme and books for these Tripos. The booklists and schemes that were submitted tell us a great deal about the dominant areas of interest in philosophy at the time and Grote's

recommendations can be supposed to be indicative of his own preferences and throw considerable light on later problems discussed in this thesis.(15) The documents reveal firstly Grote's preference for the philosophers of England and Scotland at the expense of the Continentals, *Kants Critique of Pure Reason*, is the only book of modern German philosophy which I would have', (Grote 1860,10). H.J.R.Roby correctly identifies this as a weakness and in particular points out the ommission of any reference to Hegel (Roby 1860). Secondly the 'Draft Scheme' reveals Grote's reservations both about the confused metaphysical rambling of Coleridge, as well as the practical position of Comte, Bentham, Austin and Spencer (Grote 1860, 5-10). Finally it is apparent that Grote, along with others, wished the course in Modern History to include both `History and Political Philosophy' (ibid, 3). In recommending the works of Montesquieu, De Tocqueville and Mill, he hoped to pioneer the introduction of politics as a subject distinct from economics and history, a hope which was finally fulfilled in a reform of 1867. (See also Collini et.al. 1983,339-363).

The reform of the Moral Science Tripos was not the limit of Grote's reforming activities for he was a member of a select group at Trinity who achieved fairly radical reforms of the tuition system, the revision of rules governing the use of religious `Tests', and the award of scholarships and fellowships, and who managed to force through a scheme for limiting the authoritative powers of the Master of the college in all matters concerning college finance and access to college rooms. (16) John Grote's role in these vitally needed areas of reform is hardly mentioned in the recent literature on the reform of Victorian Cambridge, though at the time he was called a 'revolutionary' and a 'left-wing' reformer by his more conservative enemies (Winstanley 1940,347;1947,252). In reality Grote was a prime

mover in that 'Revolution of the Dons' which helped bring about the major academic and structural changes needed to bring the university into line with the new society of the times (Rothblatt 1968; Garland 1980; Winstanley 1940, 1947). As before Grote had been mindful of the challenges to Cambridge and the university world from competing groups and bodies from outside.. As before his response is one of careful but liberal reform not conservative reaction, he wished to preserve what was good in the old system.(17)

The academic and administrative reform of Cambridge however had not been entirely self induced but had rather been carried out under great pressure from avid critics in the press, in journals, books and finally in the report of the Royal Commissioners. The Commissioners had almost become a permanent fixture at Cambridge in the decade of the 1850s, but whereas Grote was consciously in sympathy with them on matters of internal collegiate reform he was a staunch defender of the University system from demands for it to depart from its purpose of providing an academic education.(18)

In addition he played his part in defending the Cambridge tradition of philosophy, (from the Cambridge Platonists onwards), against the political and intellectual attacks of outside opponents. As we shall see in the concluding chapter of this thesis, (Chapter Ten) John Grote is very much a member of one of the `Two worlds of the Victorian Intelligentsia', and a critic of its main opponents, the Philosophical Radicals and utilitarians. Despite his life long friendship with his brother, and despite his active defence as witnessed in the 'Remarks', John Grote remained a Cambridge philosopher engaged very much in the task of combating the positivism, empiricism and utilitarianism associated with his brother. Yet John's association with George Grote, Alexander Bain and other central members of the Mill circle makes him of unique interest as a critic

and his *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy* and his *Exploratio Philoscphica* are major primary sources in the history of Victorian Philosophy and its intelligentsia.

VII

Philosophical Writings

Before proceeding to an exposition of Grote's philosophical writings it is necessary to have some idea of the temporal order of their conception, and some idea of the priority the various works had in Grote's mind. The dates of publication after 1865 reflect the priorities of J.B.Mayor not John Grote and do not reflect the chronological order of conception. George Croom Robertson suggests that John began writing seriously only after his election to the Knightbridge Chair in 1855 but we can gather from J.B.Mayor's list of unpublished manuscripts, that he must have written profusely since this date, even if he had no immediate intention of publication (Grote 1900, X-X1: Robertson 1885). The first suggestion of an intention to publish came in 1861 when J.S.Mill's essays on *Utilitarianism* began to appear in 'Frasers Magazine'. Grote penned some fairly substantial criticisms of them but then decided against publication until Mill either extended the short essays or republished the essays as a definitive statement of his position. When Mill's book on *Utilitarianism* was published in full in 1863 Grote revised his earlier criticisms and sent the manuscripts to the printers. At this point pangs of conscience seem to have been experienced for Grote started to worry that perhaps his book would be everything he detested, being only negative and critical. This fear was largely ill founded for Grote had in fact succeeded in his aim of placing next to

> `each case where I have criticised what seemed to me the right view instead of the wrong' (Grote 1870,12).

But the worry decided Grote on the course of

> `putting together the intellectual views on which the moral view rested, which had something of the character of prolegomena to it, and had meant, if they should come within reasonable limits, to publish them in an Appendix' (Grote 1870, 12; Grote 1865, VII).

Grote later completed this task and the results can be found printed under the title of `Idealism and Positivism' in Part II of the *Exploratio Philosophica*, but whether pressed by time or doubt as to the fairness or value of his criticisms, Grote finally decided to abandon the whole project and ordered that the type should be broken up and the first seven chapters that had already been printed should be destroyed.

Grote next began the writing of his major work on ethics, which was to be later published and edited by Mayor as *A Treatise on the Moral Ideals*. He explains this plan in terms of a reaction to his decision not to publish the work on Mill.

> .`Being of a nature hesitating and irresolute, I altered my mind as to this: and although at first stimulated to controversy, which I do not think I should have shrunk from, I thought that what, in regard of the subject, was likely to be most useful was another course, and accordingly determined rather to put together, in an uncontroversial form, what seemed to me the truth, in opposition of what I thought error' (Grote 1865, VII-VIII).

The *Treatise* should in fact be read in this context, as an attempt by Grote to construct a coherent account of ethics which firstly, reflect the epistemological or intellectual pre-supposition on which it was founded, and in addition stood as the positive and constructive theory from which the criticisms of utilitarianism and other moral theories should be read.

This project seems to have carried Grote through to 1864 but in January of that year he suffered the first signs of the illness that was to cause his death. From spring of that year the illness

'prevented my doing as much in the way of my Professorship ... as I would have wished' and so he began to reconsider his publishing plans in favour of a project that was both more necessary and practical. Grote's statements certainly convey a sense of urgency and even annoyance with his own indecision,

> 'I have arrived at an age at which a man begins to feel, that if he thinks he has anything to say, he must say it, without being too particular how' (Grote 1865, xxxii).

Anyway when faced with decision of concentrating on just one project and that probably his last, he wrote,

> 'I have thought it might be as well to return upon the intellectual views with which the moral now connects itself, and to re-examine them and test them' (viii).

This project resulted in Part I of the *Exploratio Philosophica* published in the spring of 1865 and the preparation of a large section of Part II which as Grote had suggested included a discussion of the views of Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer, J.D.Morell, Sir William Hamilton and J.S.Mill with special reference to his newly published *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (Mill 1865). The Part II however had no clearly defined form or development and was certainly not ready for the presses when Grote died on 12th August 1866.

But why had Grote been so slow to publish when his listed manuscripts and posthumous volumes suggested that he had written down the central elements of his philosophy long before his death? Firstly, in the years from 1855, the date at which his specialist interest in philosophy grew, he seems to have been pre-occupied with his duties elsewhere, as a tutor, lecturer, college fellow, and priest. Secondly, Grote did not enjoy writing and he abhorred the task of preparing manuscripts for publication. This just compounded his natural reluctance and hesitancy to prefer ideas in any form that suggested they were final or authoritative. In addition John recognised that

his own style, his practice of writing as he thought and of returning rather repetitiously to key ideas, would put off many readers. Thirdly, Grote felt up to 1865 that he had the time to keep an open mind, to keep talking, rethinking and revising his ideas before presenting them to the world as final. Finally, there was a credibility problem. John had launched attacks both on the dangers of literary criticism and of overpersonalized and inbred academic controversy and yet his work was itself both highly critical of some of the major minds and schools of thought in mid-century Britain, and very much a product of the Cambridge mind and spirit which had been in bitter controversy with groups and schools outside for over a century (Grote 1865, XXX-XXXIV: 1870, 7-13).

The priorities that Grote attached to his work were however easy to grasp and were made plain in the instructions left to Mayor. In terms of logical and philosophical priority, epistemology was considered to be most important, but in terms of interest and practical importance attached to the various portions of his work, Grote claimed priority for his moral philosophy. As with T.H.Green the metaphysics of knowledge was treated as a 'Prolegomena to Ethics'. One other point is vital. Grote considered the arguments of the *Exploratio* formed the intellectual foundations for the rest of his works. After noting this it would be odd if epistemology had one character and his ethics another. It would be odd if his epistemology was idealist, his ontology phenomenalist and his ethics intuitionist. My aim is to show that Grote was a consistent idealist, and that it is only in the unfinished nature of his work and in his efforts to be fair to all sides in the debates that any hostages are given to those who wish to make him out to be woolly minded or profoundly inconsistent.

The instructions left concerning the publication of manuscripts

gave the literary executor wide discretion in terms of the form and the content of publication. A classification was suggested,

> 'that all, or the greater part of them, be published in three divisions, first *and most important*, Miscellania Ethica, next Miscellania Philologica and Philosophica' (Grote 1870, VII).

Mayor very quickly divested himself of this plan and after reading the manuscripts for Part II of the *Exploratio* he decided against publication on the grounds of their 'fragmentariness'. The same reaction followed his reading of the manuscripts for the 'uncontroversial statement' the *Treatise* and so he decided to publish the critique of Mills utilitarianism which had so nearly been released in 1863. Mayor was helped by H.J.A.Hort in this task and the book was published in the spring of 1870 entitled *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*.

The publishers were encouraged by the sales of the *Examination* and so Mayor proceeded in the far more laborious and difficult task of bringing the manuscripts together for the projected 'positive' statement of Grote's position. However I,along with Krohn, feel Mayor's editorship of Grote's writings was inadequate, and worse still, I suspect his surgery may have produced some confusion in Grote's meaning as well as a serious impairment of his style (Krohn 1878). Despite all his faults in *Exploratio Philosophica*, Grote's tortured but careful reflections can be apprehended by the careful reader and in the end his unique style appreciated. In the later edited works however the style is diminished and the thoughts more jumbled. I am not sure that Mayor's decisions to have 'continually changed relative into demonstrative clauses, and in general (to) have omitted qualifying clauses when they could be naturally supplied from the context' always aid the reader (Grote 1870, xii).

The editor's major problem was to alter Grote's difficult language so as to retain the essential meaning while making reading

easier. But a second problem was to find replacements for missing chapters in both the *Examination* and the *Treatise*. Mayor chose to introduce various alien manuscripts into the text taken from lecture notes, diaries and reviews and these certainly help to make the argument more complete. This was useful and in the case of the Appendix 'On Want' the addition contributes to one of the most important parts of the whole philosophical debate (Grote 1876, 26-33). Without the original manuscript materials at hand it is impossible to judge the extent to which Grote's own intentions and meanings were disrupted by the practices of Mayor but I suggest we should remain suspicious of his role and its import.

The next task took another six years but the *Treatise* was still published in the same year as Bradley's famous *Ethical Studies* in 1876. Sales of the *Treatise* as it was called, were not encouraging and Mayor therefore decided against pushing ahead with further publications. However in 1898 the editor received a letter from the Oxford philosopher H.W.B.Joseph,

> 'stating that it was felt by many in Oxford that the publication of the Second Part of the Exploratio would be of service to the cause of philosophy in England' (Grote 1900, VI-VII).

When pressed, Joseph furnished Mayor with a letter signed by twenty three graduates and fellows of colleges in Oxford requesting that the book be published, and so with the financial support of the Cambridge University Press, Mayor proceeded to edit and publish part II of the Exploratio in 1900 (Part I was republished at the same time). Henry Sidgwick at last rendered some service to popularizing the work of John Grote by helping Mayor with the difficult task of editing. The remaining philosophical writings were printed as articles without any apparent logic or purpose. They constitute: 'Materialism' (Macmillan's Magazine 1867 reprinted in part two of the Exploratio) and discussed later in the chapter on epistemology;

'Montaigne and Pascal' in the *Contemporary Review* of 1877 discussed alongside Grote's *Treatise* and an 'Imaginary conservation between George Grote and Socrates' by John Grote and Henry Sidgwick (Grote, 1889).

Of all of these, the papers published in the *Journal of Philology* are of by far the greater interest, for despite their incompleteness, they indicate not only Grote's ideas as to the nature and structure of language but they suggest the role of language in creating and discovering meaning in a social context. That Grote saw his writings on philology as being valuable can be deduced from his reference to a proposed book, the 'Miscellania Philologica', in the instructions to his literary executor. Of the unpublished manuscript listed by Mayor nothing is known though a thorough and prolonged search has been undertaken, an account of which can be found in Appendix I to this thesis.

VIII

Grote's Death

We can finish this account of Grote's life and writings with a tentative suggestion as to the causes and significance of John Grote's death aged 53 in 1866. This sad but not unexpected event was documented in several obituaries at the time, and in the D.N.B. article written by a later admirer of Grote, Professor George Croom Robertson who was the second Professor of Philosophy at London University (D.N.B 1885, 294-295). Medically Grote seems likely to have died 'partly from exhaustion and partly from imperfect respiration' following the rupture of a blood vessel in January 1864, though the obituaries were divided as to the diagnosis. The *Times* reported the illness to be caused by diphtheria but the *Guardian*

concentrated rather on the immediate symptoms noted above. From these recorded symptoms and from the reports of the gradual decline over eighteen months five possibilities seem viable. Tuberculosis was a popular killer of the time which conforms with the above symptoms though it seems unlikely to have been the culprit in this case due to the absence of a diagnosis of what was then widely called consumption. Secondly he could have died from cancer of the lungs with the possibility of additional cancer of the bronchial tracts. A third possibility is an attack of chronic bronchitis. However when we consider the earlier reports of John's delicate state of health and repeated bouts of illness we might look for an illness that would have eventually culminated in the symptoms mentioned. Here there are two possibilities, both involving illnesses contracted earlier in life, which produce recurrent bouts of illness, gradual debilitation and finally death. These are rheumatic fever with attendant heart disease and bronchiectasis - which involves dilation and congestion of the bronchial passages usually resulting from an earlier bout or bouts of chronic bronchitis.(19)

The prevalence of either of the last two diseases would explain further John's apparent inability to publish a major philosophical work. However John's death was a protracted affair and its outcome was long predicted, giving both his literary executor and himself time to plan and prepare for the posthumous publication of his work, and thus to minimize the intellectual significance of such an early demise. This makes even more extraordinary Joseph B.Mayor's failure to perform later the principal task of a literary executor and editor, that of the establishment in a secure public place of the manuscripts given into their trust for the sake of posterity. Their loss is a philosophical tragedy the magnitude of which is not yet widely appreciated.

The intellectual reactions to Grote's death were confined to a small circle around Cambridge, and the church network. *The Times* only non factual comment was that by the inhabitants of Trumpington 'he was deeply beloved, indeed his cordial and general nature, and open-hearted and open-handed benevolence endeared him to all ranks and circles'. The Church Guardian reported in more detail that in Professor Grote,

> `Cambridge has lost one of her ablest members, and the Church one of her most faithful sons. It would be hard to find any one whose mind was so richly stored with all kinds of knowledge; and with him it was knowledge, not information only. His intimate friends felt that there was no subject on which they could not learn from him. Every field of literature had charms for him, and his retentive memory seemed never to loose its hold on that which it had once embraced. A delicate state of health, forcing him into seclusion, joined with extreme modesty and absence of all ordinary ambition, kept even the members of his own college in comparative ignorance of his great powers. His writings, from a disregard of the graces of style very characteristic of him, will probably never become popular. The few there are do him very imperfect justice, but yet show a mind of great clearness, vigour, and originality. His 'Examination of some Portions of Dr. Lushington's Judgement' is perhaps the ablest pamphlet which has been written on the much vexed question of a final court of appeal. His unfinished work called 'Exploratio Philosophica', hard to read, chiefly from the intense closeness of the reasoning, is a masterly review of modern theories of philosophy, full of the soundest wisdom and opposed to the fallacies of popular metaphysicians. The few who were privileged to be his friends can testify that the heart was as full of all that is kind and true, all that is pure and lovely and of good report, as the mind was of all that is learned, thoughtful and wise. Warm and disinterested in his affections, unaffected but always courteous in his manners, honest and straightforward in his aims and actions, earnest and simple in his piety, he could not be well known without being much loved. A large and true sympathy with all deep religious feeling made him widely tolerant; whilst his own unwavering convictions made him a firm and zealous churchman. In his parish his genial kindness and constant benevolence endeared him to every one. In his few last hours, he had no longer strength to listen to reading or to join in conversation or prayer, he longed for and was cheered by music, and so sank to rest, as he may wake up again, in songs of praise. We are glad to hear that Professor Grote has left valuable papers, and it is hoped they are in a state for publication' (Quoted from Gentleman's Magazine, Oct.1866, 549-550).

The liberal theologian F.J.A. Hort and essayist on Coleridge who fought F.D.Maurice for the Knightbridge Chair in 1866 wrote to a friend,

> `The chair of Moral Philosophy of Cambridge has become vacant by the untimely death of Professor Grote, a far more serious public loss than is suspected outside a small circle of friends' (Hort 1896, VOL II,74).

Hort proceeded to help Mayor edit the *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*. Henry Sidgwick's retort was `It startled me very much, I shall miss him at Cambridge exceedingly' (Sidgwick A. and E. 1906, 130). The addition of 'exceedingly' does indicate the level of the debt Sidgwick owed to John Grote but never publicly paid except in the support he gave in the last years of his life to the task of editing the second part of the *Exploratio Philosophica*. Other comments were both belated, muted, and perhaps in the case of Maurice and Birks matters of academic etiquette (Maurice 1866 10; Birks 1973, 18-19, 30-31, 35-36, 70-71; 1874,2,9, 12-13, 200). Since then the usual ploy has been illustrated by Ueberweg in his account of Grote - to call his work `comprehensive, candid and truth loving' (Ueberweg 1872, vol2,438). One rare debt is paid by Asquith the Liberal Prime Minister who despite an education at the hands of the Oxford idealists wrote, that it was John Grote and James Frederick Ferrier who' did most to clear my own mind in the post-Kantian domain' (Asquith 1928 ,19).

The counter factual question of what Grote would have gone on to write if he had lived to the age of his brother (1890) is tantalizing. Personally I consider that Grote had emerged from the period of intellectual 'childhood' described by Sidgwick in 1866 into full maturity well before 1860 (Sidgwick A.E. 1906, 151-158). The lines of his thought and his priorities were clear and would have been both developed and made more coherent. He had sought to re-establish moral philosophy on a firm epistemological base, he had sought to reconcile antagonisms and to encourage critical and positive thought in all directions for the creation of truth. He was an advocate of

creative self knowledge and the search for truth as the preconditions for self and social realisation, and human development towards the Absolute. In short when projected into the future we can forsee Grote's thought meeting that of Sidgwick, Sorley, McTaggart, and Oakeshott at Cambridge, Green, Bradley and Bosanquet at Oxford. We then already have some substantial evidence to support John Passmore's note that

> `Grote's philosophy is in manner an early, perhaps the first, example of the `Cambridge spirit'

in British philosophy (Passmore 1966,54).

However we can end this chapter with the epitath that Grote probably choose for himself. On his gravestone in Trumpington cemetary are two biblical references that attest to his strongest religous and philosophical convictions.

> 'Now I know in part; but then shall I know even as I am known'. (I Corinthians 13,12)

> 'You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free' (St John VIII,32).

Chapter Two

Contexts and Conventions

The British Philosophical Traditions (1800-1860)

'Now, the difference between these two schools of philosophy, that of Intuition and that of Experience and Association, is not a mere matter of abstract speculation; it is full of practical consequences, and lies at the foundation of all the great differences of practical opinions in an age of progress' (Mill 1873 and 1963, 232).

In this passage and the larger section of Mill's *Autobiography* from which it is extracted we have the kernel of both the dominant Victorian and contemporary visions of nineteenth century intellectual development in Britain. In this chapter I shall elucidate this picture and subject it to some criticism before drawing out a more complete picture of intellectual and social development which took place between 1800 and 1860 and which were the immediate context for the production of John Grote's philosophy. This exercise could justify a thesis in itself as there are no texts available that do the job adequately. But because of the central concern of my thesis is on John Grote, my account must remain a sketch, the key sections of which will be (1) a critical review of the dominant picture based on a review of (2) primary sources for the period 1830-1866; (3) the new picture in detail including a) the utilitarians and positivists, b) the positivists and materialists, c) German thought and idealism, d) romanticism, e) rationalism and intuitionism f) the Scottish philosophy of common sense, g) French electicism; and (4) the situation as perceived by John Grote in the 1860's.

I

In my introduction I sketched the picture of nineteenth century British philosophy popular between 1920 and 1960 (ibid, 14-15). I noted that ironically this picture was not that far removed from that dominant in the minds of empiricists and utilitarians between 1830 and 1860. The picture was that of the gradual triumph of positivism, empiricism, materialism and utilitarianism over a collection of reactionary rationalists, intuitionists and assorted divines and metaphysicians up to 1870 and then a counter strike, the effects of which were to reverse the trend under the impact of Hegelian idealism up to the 1920's. The contemporary vision of Victorian intellectual historians is recognized and rather irreverently described by Anthony Quinton in the following passage,

> 'Under pressure they would describe the course of philosophers between Hume and Russell in roughly the following terms. First there is Mill carrying on in a more or less eighteenth century fashion, beside him sprang up a whole lot of amateur philosophers like Spencer, of materialistic tendency and intoxicated by the doctrine of evolution at which point the defenders of the religious and public order pull themselves together and import a quantity of surplus metaphysical material from Germany, whose rich obscurity soon puts an end to the complacency of secular rationalism' (Quinton 1982, 182).

In the twentieth century versions of this thesis can be found in the historical writings of J.H.Muirhead, E.Barker, B.Russell, J.B.Bury, P.R.Robbins, Maurice Mandelbaum, and W.D.Hudson and in the nineteenth century is found best elaborated by John Stuart Mill, William Lecky, George H. Lewes, Henry Sidgwick, and Leslie Stephen (Muirhead 1965, Part II; Barker 1947, 3-5; Russell 1945, Ch. XXVI; Robbins 1967; Mandelbaum 1971, 3-27; Lewes 1845-1846; Lecky 1865; Sidgwick 1967, 235, 259; Stephen 1900). One reputable modern scholar not only considers the thesis to be valid for the nineteenth but also for the twentieth century moral philosophy,

> 'At the beginning of our story we saw utilitarians and intuitionists in confrontation. At the end of it we once again see them so; (Hudson 1980, 170).

But it is to the most ardent nineteenth century advocate of the model, John Stuart Mill to whom we should turn, for it was he who set the historical agenda.

The story of John Stuart Mill's education is not only famous but infamous. From numerous primary and secondary sources we know that the full weight of the personalities and minds of James Mill and Jeremy Bentham, the inheritors of the empiricist and utilitarian mantle from Hobbes, Locke, Hartley and Hume, were brought to bear in a most authoritarian mannner on the young boy. What he learnt was more than how to think and argue, he learnt what was right and what was wrong, what was needed and what was not, who were friends and who were enemies in the battle for the 'reform of mankind' in an 'age of progress'. Allies were also found, first by James Mill and later by John himself, to forge an alliance, eventually a school of thought to espouse radicalism (Mill 1965, 85). James Mill found Jeremy Bentham and his brother Sir Samuel Bentham, who in turn introduced John to the economist David Ricardo, the historian George Grote, and the politician Hume (Mill 1965, 60-61). The next group of vetted allies were John Austin the philosopher of law and his brother Charles Austin, and John Roebuck. Before the massive influence of the 'German Coleridgians' in the figures of Coleridge, Maurice and Sterling in the period from 1829 to 1830, it was this school of thought, this social group and the Westminster Review which they published which set the pace and style of philosophical development and political debate.

The term debate is inadequate as a description of the style and tenor of argument. Mill, following on from his father and Bentham, visioned that not only philosophy but the whole economic, social, political and cultural development of Europe was in the balance. In a

key essay of 1831 Mill had defined the *Spirit of the Age* as one of progress. The chief peculiarity was that the nineteenth century was an age of transition,

> 'Society may be said to be in its *transitional* state, when it contains other persons fitter for worldly power and moral influence than those who have hitherto enjoyed them; when worldly power, and the greatest capacity for worldly affairs, are no longer united but severed; and when authority which sets the opinions and forms the feelings of those who are not accustomed to think for themselves, does not exist at all, or, existing, resides anywhere but in the most cultivated intellects, and the most exalted characters, of the age' (Schneewind 1965b, 47).

In this 'posture of affairs' there is no established doctrines but a 'mere chaos' which moves on inevitably until,

> 'a moral and social revolution (or it may be, a series of such) has replaced worldly power and moral influence in the hands of the most competent: when society is once more in its natural state, and resumes its onward progress, at the point where it was stopped before by the social system which it has shivered' (Schneewind 1965b,47).

These views encapsulate the *weltanschauung* of Mill and the Philosophical Radicals, in which the present situation is seen as an epic struggle between intellectual, social and political elites for ascendancy, with the whole of human progress as the prize at stake. Bentham had made this plain in his attack on the natural authorities of the eighteenth century, the upholders of natural law like Sir William Blackstone, the clergy, the landed aristocracy, the civil service, parliament, and the Lords, and the adherents to the doctrines of 'asceticism', 'sympathy' and the 'theological' principle (Manning 1968, 36-38). James Mill had set about the 'a priori' intellectuals in the book which gave his son the first taste of the job ahead, the *Analysis of the Phenomenon of the Human Mind* (Mill J.1829). He went on to attack the moral philosophy of the intuitionists and the political ideology of the aristocratic whigs in his *An Essay on Government* first published in 1820 and a rejoinder to the critics, Macauley and Mackintosh in *A Fragment on Mackintosh* of 1835 (Mill J

1955,1835). Bentham had flirted with the idea of the enlightened despots as being those revolutionaries able to forge a new order before James Mill convinced him that under universal suffrage power would be put into the hands of those best able to apply it - the middle classes like themselves.

> 'There can be no doubt that the middle rank, which gives to science and art, and to legislation itself their most distinguished ornamentations, and is the chief source of all that has exalted and refined human nature, is that portion of the community of which, if the basis of representation were ever so far extended, the opinion would ultimately decide. Of the people beneath them a vast majority would be sure to be guided by their advice and example' (Mill J 1955, 90).

The attack by the Philosophical Radicals on the 'sinister interest' spread out from the judiciary, the aristocracy and the whig party to the clergy in George Grote's notoriously atheistic tract the *Analysis of the Influences of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind* published under the pseudonym Philip Beauchamp (Grote G 1822). James Mill took on the task of destroying the aristocratic landed interests and their outmoded doctrine of political economy in his *Essay on Political Economy* of 1821. John Stuart Mill as well as championing the forces of progress was left the task of defeating the remnants of opposition, but he concentrated on the philosophical adversaries and their institutional base the universities. As we shall see the latter tasks were related in Mill's mind.

The enemies of progress, the opponents of empiricism and utilitarianism were lumped together in Mill's mind as the 'Intuitionists' the supporters of 'Innate Principles' or the 'A Priori School' (Mill 1867, I, 95 - 159). In his *Autobiography* Mill adopts the imagery of warfare to describe the philosophical controversy, and this image permeates the whole content and explains the character of much of his writing. Mill speaks of the 'natural hostility' between the 'rivals' of intuitionism and empiricism, even a 'bellum

internecinum', in the essay on Coleridge and he declares that each has 'powerful weapons of attack and defence'. It is the sins of conservatism, indolence and the support of 'false doctrines and bad institutions' which justify Mill in calling for 'hand to hand fighting' in an assault which should 'drive intuitionism from its stronghold' in the mathematics and sciences in the universities. In his essays on Adam Sedgwick, William Whewell and Sir William Hamilton later we have Mill fulfilling the demand that intuitionism be 'attacked at the very root', and he justifies a two volume critique on Hamilton because he was the 'great fortress of intuitional philosophy' (Mill 1965c, 170, 189-192, 230-235). There is then to Mill,

> 'a natural hostility between him and a philosophy which discourages the explanation of feelings and moral facts by circumstances and association, and prefers to treat them as ultimate elements of human nature; a philosophy which is addicted to holding up favourite doctrines as intuitive truths and deems intuition to be the voice of Nature and God, speaking with an authority higher than that of reason. In particular, I have long felt that the prevailing tendency to regard all the marked distinctions of human character as innate, and in the main indelible, and to ignore the irresistible proofs that by far the greater part of those differences, whether between individuals, races or sexes, are such as not only might but naturally would be produced by differences in circumstances, is one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of great social questions, and one of the greatest stumbling blocks to human improvement' (Mill 1965c, 232-233).

As the battle lines hardened, it became a usual philosophical and political tendency of Mill, to define all non adherents to empiricism, positivism and utilitarianism as adherents to the intuitional school. Even the doctrine of Coleridge which was judged to have some value was considered to be generally 'erroneous'. It had value because it 'denies less of what is true in the doctrine it was against' and was 'faithful to the general law of improvement' by which continued intellectual attrition between conflicting views leads to the narrowing and final elimination of difference (Mill 1965b, 298-303). Despite differences the ideas of Hamilton, Kant, Reid, and 'the later

German and French developments' were considered to be versions of a 'common doctrine' (Mill 1877,I, 9-10). As a result the differences between the otherwise distinct theories and schools of moral sense and sentiment, rationalism and intuitionism proper, the Scottish school of common sense, the romantics, Germano Coleridgians, the French eclectics and the German idealists and historical schools and various religious movements are lost, ignored or glossed over. The opprobrium following the supposed heresies of one school were frequently and illogically visited upon their hapless and otherwise unrelated neighbours.

The failure of most Victorian and our contemporary historians to recognize the unique developments and contributions of the above non empiricist thinkers and especially the failure to identify emergent idealism prior to 1870, and the attendant popularity of the 'Reception of Hegel in Britain' theory to account for the emergence of idealism in the late 1860's and 1870's, also reflects these misconceptions. It follows from Mill's views that if Britain only produced empiricists or intuitionists then any other kind of philosopher not an empiricist was either some kind of confused adherent of intuitionism, or else a writer imbibing the influence of some alien metaphysician. So it has become commonplace to lump Whewell, Sedgwick, Mansel, Grote, Maurice and debatably Hamilton into the first group and Coleridge, Carlyle, Ferrier, Stirling and sometimes Hamilton in the latter (Quinton 1982, 182). In fact as we shall see these classifications are either simplistic or simply wrong as I shall show with the case of John Grote and as George Elder Davie has convincingly demonstrated with Sir William Hamilton and Frederick Ferrier (Davie 1961). These classifications and the whole Millian thesis on Victorian intellectual life, are barriers to the recovery of its variety, its true nature, its excitement and above all its originality.

This picture of Victorian philosophy was modified only slightly as the century progressed. Still a final battle was perceived as in progress, but the protagonists were now empiricists, aligned with positivists against idealists, or else materialists against idealists as in the Marxist paradigm. The arguments associated with the former debate between intuitionists and empiricists were often relegated to the status of historical oddities after 1880, though in fact the old debate lived on in many later philosophical disputes. Today it is hard to get a coherent understanding of the twentieth century schools of Common Sense Philosophy and intuitionism associated with G.E.Moore, Carritt, Rashdall and Ross, and the New Realism of John Laird, Cook Wilson, Samuel Alexander and perhaps H.W.B.Joseph, who in my view were developing the indigenous philosophical schools of English intuitionism and the Scottish schools of Natural Realism and Common Sense, for they too have become ignored or forgotten (Passmore 1966, 259-260).

II

John Stuart Mill was neither the only philosopher to attempt a general classification and diagnosis of recent philosophy nor the only one to draw the picture of a battle between two totally opposed forces. George H.Lewes a positivist, the future husband of George Eliot,produced a modified version in his popular *A Biographical History of Philosophy* in 1846-7 and so did John D Morell (with two major modifications) in his *An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* in 1847 (Lewes 1846-7, Morell 1847). By turning to the study of these histories,(1) we can check whether the picture Mill held and publicized so effectively was shared by other popular historians at

the same time, (2) we can also learn independently of Mill what other pictures were available as sources to the student of and philosophers of the day, and (3) finally we may learn about the extent to which idealist and especially German idealist views were penetrating Britain between 1800 and 1860. The following histories are all largely unread today but while they were secondary sources on philosophy at the time of writing they are today important primary source material on British nineteenth century views of philosophy.

The introduction and conclusion of Lewes's history insist on the division of all western philosophy, including that of the present, into two camps or schools and he decries all efforts, such as those of the French eclectics, to bring them together. The two schools are mutually exclusive.

> 'Suppose the eclectic places in juxtaposition, the two great schools which have always divided the world, viz., that which declares experience to be the source of all knowledge; and that which declares we have a great deal of our knowledge antecedent to and independent of experience. Both of these systems he pronounces to be composed of truth and error.
>
> ' ... we then ask, what criteria has the eclectic whereby he is to distinguish error from truth? He has none; the doctors are silent on the point' (Lewes, 1847, 642).

In the end Lewes's vision is in line with Mill's and Comte's prescription that history will decide in favour of the positivist school, that of science, the new positivist sciences against the old philosophy of a priori metaphysics.

> 'Modern philosophy staked its pretensions on the one question: Have we any ideas independent of experience? This was asking in other words, Have we any organum of philosophy? The answer is always in the negative. If any one, therefore, remains unshaken by the accumulated proofs this history affords of the impossibility of philosophy, let him distinctly bear in mind that the first problem he must solve is, Have we ideas independent of experience? Let him solve that ere he begins to speculate. And now, reader, our task is done' (Lewes, 656)

The great merit of Lewes' book is that he does not label all the groups in the 'a priori' camp as intuitionists, but recognizes a wide

variety of allies and fellow travellers, identified only by their rejection of the pretentious claims of the positive sciences. The variety of different philosophies in the 'a priori' camp are said to include 'Scepticism, Common Sense and Idealism' in Hume, Reid and Berkeley in Britain and, Schelling, Fichte and Hegel in Germany, the French eclectics Cousin and Jouffroy, and the later British metaphysicians Sir William Hamilton, Thomas de Quincey, Sir John Herschel, F.Maurice and J Ferrier (Lewes, 1847, 634, 655). The general drift of anti-positivism however is towards 'idealism' and not to intuitionism, a view which becomes apparent in his introduction to the fourth epoch of history titled 'The Subjective Nature of Knowledge Being Established, Heads to Idealism' and in the long chapters on the eighth to the tenth epochs on Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel which were those penultimate to the final epoch of positivism. These chapters are well written and are both witting and unwitting testimony to both an interest in and knowledge of idealism in England at the time, and a primary source for the study of the thesis that German idealists were known about in Britain before the publication of Stirling's *Secrets of Hegel* in 1865.

Another book (and others by the same author in the same period) also support the last two points and provide a major source on the state of British philosophy in the first half of the nineteenth century. John Morell's initial philosophical education took place in London and then Scotland under the supervision of Thomas Brown, but his interest and reading took him to Germany and ranged over the whole terrain of European and American philosophy. His book reveals not only a knowledge of idealist, Scottish common sense, intuitionist and other schools opposed to positivism but a commitment to them and in particular to idealism. The point of analysis which brings Morell to our attention here is that he too divides nineteenth century

philosophy into two major forces in mortal combat, but like Lewes he too saw the battle lines drawn between 'idealism' and 'positivism' (here called 'sensationalism'). Two other forces are mentioned, those he calls 'mysticism' and 'scepticism' but these are seen to be in retreat during the nineteenth century battle. A final force, that which seeks peace, accommodation, negotiation and synthesis he recognized as present but not in the ascendent. He calls this force that of 'eclecticism' and we shall return to it later (Morell 1847, 63-72)

The similarity here with the most popular view of the age, that of Mill, then rests only on the idea of a battle between two current challengers for philosophical ascendancy. But the major challenger to positivist philosophy is considered to be idealism not intutionism, and there is a recognition that three other schools were in preliminary bouts to decide on an official challenger to the current champion. Yet the most significant difference is in the depth of knowledge Morell had of British philosophy and its sources, and in particular his knowledge of idealism as a whole and of its four schools, the German, French, English and Scottish (Morell 1847, II 1-3). This fact makes this text not only the best unexplored primary source on the British view of British philosophy in the period but is direct evidence of not only an interest in continental idealism in England of the time but of the presence of idealistic philosophical currents. Later I shall make use of Morell's insights into the Scottish and English idealist schools including the 'Scoto-English' and 'Germano-English' departments at Cambridge University, but now I would just like to make the point that Morell's knowledge of German idealism and mysticism was first hand and both analytically and historically astute. Part I ChapterIII, and Part II Chapters V and VII are an eye opener for any thinker prone to share the Millian

paradigm of Victorian intellectual history.

While opting for a modified version of the 'final battle' picture of nineteenth century philosophy Lewes and Morell have introduced contending forces into the picture. Philosophical propagandists and ideologists like Mill and Marx needed to simplify antagonisms for polemical reasons, but for our needs their work needs to be undone. We need to 'deconstruct' or 'unlearn' or 'unsee' their pictures if I may be allowed to steal a line from Foucault and recent French theory.(1) Other valuable primary sources, all popular at the time but largely unread today, tell us a more complex as well as a different story. We may briefly look at four other histories of philosophy of the period, William Whewell's various texts on ethics and the inductive sources; Frederick Denison Maurice's *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, both written from an English standpoint, and from Scotland, David Masson's *Recent British Philosophy* first published in 1865.(2)

The character of Whewell's philosophy and his influence on John Grote will be discussed later but for now I wish to spell out his picture of the modern philosophical scene in Britain. Like Maurice, Whewell was trained in philosophy at Cambridge, was deeply committed to Christianity and was generally opposed to the materialistic, positivist, empiricist and utilitarian currents of the day. Whewell gets closest of those discussed here to reflecting Mill's picture of a general conflict between the two dominant schools of reason and experience, the a priori and the a posteriori, but his story is more qualified, better argued and supported with historical evidence in his various encyclopedic writings (Whewell 1837, 1840, 1845, 1846, 1852, 1860 and 1862). Mill for his part saw William Whewell and his colleague Adam Sidgwick as the major representatives of the 'intuitionist' school before Hamilton, he was said to support 'a

priori' and 'necessary truths' in epistemology and the school of 'self evident morality' in ethics. But while Whewell's *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences* was, as we think erroneous philosophy ...' to Mill the

> 'Elements of Morality could be nothing better than a classification and systematizing of the opinions which he found prevailing among those who had been educated according to the approved methods of his country: ...'

Indeed to Mill it was worse for,

> 'the book is so mere a catalogue of received opinions, containing nothing to correct any of them, and little which can work with any potency even to confirm them, - that it can scarcely be counted as anything more than one of the thousand waves on the dead sea of commonplace, affording nothing to invite or to reward a separate examination' (Mill 1965b, 173).

In fact both books, and most others by Whewell, do invite and reward examination, and the author's work cleverly incorporates and utilizes inspiration from not only intuitional writers of the past, especially the Cambridge Platonists, More, Cudworth and Clarke, but also as Morell sees an ' influence from the Scottish Common Sense philosophy and the German idealism of Kant' (Morell 1848, 240-247; Thilly 1914, 70, 513-54; Segerstedt 1935, 103-113). Morell in the last analysis describes Whewell, as I will John Grote, as being an 'English Idealist'.

Historically the picture Whewell presents of the modern history of epistemology is complex and he recognizes not only a variety of positions under the heading of 'sensationalist' philosophy but the various schools of Scottish Common Sense (to whom he admits an obligation) (Whewell 1860, 216). Various French philosophers especially Laromiguiere and Cousin, Kant in Germany, as well as numerous English rationalists and intuitionists groups are seen as part of the 'Reaction to Sensationalists' (Whewell 1862, 212-224). Most important of all we once again find fairly detailed accounts of modern German philosophy and its effects in Britain in 'On The

Philosophy Of Discovery' of 1862, which runs for two long chapters (XXIV and XXVIII) and one appendix, and which recur in other works. The philosophical sources and challenge of idealism were known to Whewell and he was happy to place it on a par with common sense, intuitionist, rationalist and French eclectic philosophies as part of the challenge to the sensationalist, materialist and positivist alliance.

Whewell's works on the history of moral philosophy pass with little or no reference to a battle between two forces, but he does stress contributions from the intuitional and idealist schools from Cumberland and Cudworth to Butler, Berkely, Clarke and Coleridge before dispensing with Paley and Bentham. The booklist for the 'Board of Moral Science Tripos' he published reinforces the preferences mentioned above but ends with a surprise, for after 'Kant's Ethical System' we get added 'Fichte's Ethical System' (translated works, Vol I)' (Whewell 1862, 270). Finally we should note that if Whewell thought of a fundamental battle as ongoing in British intellectual circles it was between the German, British and Scottish Universities and their styles of education with regard to science, mathematics, the classics and philosophy. Whewell as we shall see later was engaged in a massive debate with Sir William Hamilton and others on this subject. The rivalry between Cambridge and its sons, the Germano-Coleridgians, and Edinburgh philosophy and science loomed larger in Whewell's mind, and that of many other nineteenth century philosophers than the conflicts between Britain and Germany, and between the 'a priori' and 'a posterori' schools (Hamilton 1852; Davie 1961, 41-45; 175-188, 259-266; Olson 1975; Mill 1877, 305-337).

The fame of Frederick Maurice's *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy* is regularly attested to in philosophical and intellectual works of the day, and had grown, following popular demands for such a book,

from an article on the history of philosophy of 1835 in the *Encyclopaedia Britanica* (Maurice 1861). Maurice had expended enormous energy on the project which distracted him from formulating his own original philosophical ideas, and his family and friends were later to complain that after all this effort, his, 'Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy' is plundered, without achnowledgement...' (Maurice F. 1885, I 185; II 302-4, 547'). The book is a remarkable testimony to the depth and breadth of ancient and modern philosophy and, in particular in Volume Two, to philosophy since the fourteenth century. Both Maurice's Christian beliefs and his Germano-Coleridgian symphathies are revealed in the text, but underneath it lies both a respect for a history and a philosophy independent of theology and the political needs of the immediate world of intellectual and practical politics (Maurice 1885, I, xxxiii, xli; II ixi: Muirhead 1965, 158-9). That this respect arose from a disputable belief that 'There has been a wisdom at work through all the Changes of human history', and that the study of 'different schools and various modes of thinking' will help reveal this wisdom does not detract from the observation that Maurice was very much a professional philosopher, and it will help us later to place him within the school of history dominant in mid-century Cambridge - the Liberal Anglicans (Maurice, I, xl-xli; Forbes 1952).

The general theme of the book is eclectic. Philosophy is pictured as a vast collection of philosphers' views and schools of thought, but developing in some definite though as yet unclear direction. The particular relevance to us lies in Maurice's clear recognition that while in the philosophy of Kant and later idealist thinkers we have the latest pointer to the eternal metaphysical truths, the popular philosophy of the day and spirit of the age, was that of positivism (associated with Bentham, Mill and Comte), which

was moving in a counter direction (Maurice 1885, II 617-676). Maurice in one place also goes to great length to save Kant from the label of being an intuitionist in the traditional anti-Lockian sense, and argues for his originalty in forging an idealist metaphysic (Maurice 1887, II 620-628). The idea of a positivist versus idealist conflict is evident but set in a more pluralistic and multifarious historical context. Maurice, as I shall argue later, has been wrongly identified as an intuitionalist himself. He is more correctly to be seen, like John Grote, as having forged a novel kind of English idealism out of the contemporary sources of European rationalism, intuitionism, idealism and religious thought (Lindsay 1968, 2-3, 9-13; McClain 1972,47,). His social and political stance, was opposed to the utilitarian, materialistic and individualistic currents of the day, and combined in a most original fashion a romantic conservative love of country and the past, with a Christian caring for brotherly love and a socialist demand that the state, church and other elites promote the well being of their citizens in a strident form of Christian Socialism (Flemming M 1973).

Pluralism, complexity and idealism are the essential features of David Masson's *Recent British Philosophy*. It is the last of the histories I shall study published in John Grote's lifetime. It reveals a picture of the range and depth of British philosophy even greater than that provided by Morell. The text ran into several editions, each extended in length while being brought up to date, but the central classification of philosophies remained throughout. Three philosophers dominate the period from 1830 to 1866 according to Masson, J.S.Mill, Sir W.Hamilton and T. Carlyle but they inhabit and represent only three places on a wider scale of contemporary philosophical positions. The three problem areas discussed are 'psychology' (epistemology), 'cosomology' and 'ontology' or the

'theory of knowledge', and the 'theory of reality' respectively (Masson 1877,II 191-261). Matters here get very complex, but as I only aim to illustrate the broader visions of philosophy available, not the accuracy of the classifications, we may simplify matters by extending Masson's scale into two tables (Masson 1866,175).

A POSTERIORI SYSTEMS

	Sensationalism and Empiricism Locke, Hume Buckle	Materialism (Bain and James Mill)
1. Pyschology		
2. Cosmology	Nihilism (Hume)	Materialism (Bentham)
3. Ontology	Nihilism (Hume)	Materialism (Bentham)

A PRIORI SYSTEMS

1. Psychology	Scottish Common Sense (Stewart Hamilton)	Constructive Idealism (J.S.Mill)	Transcendentalism (Carlyle, Kant, Coleridge and Whewell)	Absolute Idealism (Hegel, Ferrier)
2. Cosmology	Natural Realism (Stewart)	Constructive Idealism (Mill)	Pure Idealism (Kant)	Absolute Idealism (Hegel)
3. Ontology	The Unknowable (Hamilton	The Possibility of Sensation (Mill)	Noumena (Kant)	Ontological Idealism (Hegel)

Most of these categories Masson took from Sir William Hamilton and are confidently used by J.S.Mill in his review of his philosophy.

Four additional comments can be made on this rather confusing, but interesting set of categorizations. (1) Firstly, Masson does concede that British and indeed European philosophy since the sixteenth century had been marshalled under two great banners - the experiential, sensational, the a posteriori, and the rational, intuitional and transcendental, the a priori (Masson 1877, 24-27). However (2) he currently identifies several distinct forces under the two banners, each of which can and does conflict on some issues with its allies. (3) Thirdly, Mill is rather tentatively placed in the category of constructive idealist, because he believes that the sole cosmological certainty 'is a certain succession of ideas, or states of consciousness' (Masson, 77-83). (4) Fourthly, the classifications and the rest of the book are witting testimony to the use, and indeed the normal everyday use, of the term 'idealism' by Masson and the unwitting testimony that he, like Morell, Hamilton, Lewes, Maurice and Whewell, believed that the audiences of their books would have been familiar with the concept and have known how the concept was to be used in philosophical discourse. That different people would have meant by, and understood by, the concept 'idealism' different things, and that Masson's own categories and categorisations are contestable, does not detract from these two crucial points. Words, after all, mean what they are used to mean by their users, and are understood to mean by their hearers.

Finally, we can learn from this text that Masson, like Mill, Whewell, Hamilton and others, recognised that British philosophy was held in some disrepute in the period between 1800 and 1835, but that like Hamilton he saw the signs of rebirth from this date that were culminating in a genuine philosophical blooming in the middle of the century, represented by Carlyle, Mill and Hamilton (Masson, 1-8). Again Masson, like Hamilton, Whewell, Maurice, Morell and later John

Grote, rejected the notion that this revival arose solely under the influence of Kant and Hegelian idealism, with the attendant conclusion that the best in British philosophy in the 1860's amounted to 'continental crumbs'. He replies to Stirling's claim that there are only three 'reservoirs' or 'buckets' from which modern philosophers may usefully drink; - Hume, Kant and Hegel, as follows:-

> 'To all this what shall I reply? We may reply that we are, or at least may be, fully informed from Hume, and that this, on the critics own principle, is something, seeing that it limits the distance to which we go back. We may reply that surely some sufficient knowledge of Kant has been possessed by some of our thinkers and scholars since Kant lived, and has been digested in recent British speculation. We may reply that, if Hegel remains unknown, save in specimen-phrase or two, by reason of his terrible abstruseness, one or two of the intermediates and purveyors between Kant and Hegel - such as Fichte and Schelling - have not been without interpreters. We may reply that, as Hegel's date is the 1830's, it is about time, in the nature of things, that there should be a fourth European bucket somewhere, superseding Hegel; that, as Britain produced the first, it is not out of possibility that she may repeat her feat and produce the fourth; and that towards such an achievement a knowledge of Hegel may be essential, but not a knowledge of all Hegel, or even a worshipping or believing knowledge of Hegel' (Masson1877, 8-11).

In a later section on James Ferrier, the nearest philosopher at the time in Britain to John Grote, we find a eulogy which starts with the phrase that his *Institutes of Metaphysics*, is 'a remarkable book', about to 'shoot ahead' in the philosophical race. This confirms my view that James Ferrier and John Grote tried to produce the 'fourth bucket' out of essentially British 'saucers or puritains' and from secondary source knowledge of the idealist 'intermediates and purveyors between Kant and Hegel - such as Fichte and Schelling'. Unfortunately for British intellectual history since 1865, the pictures painted first by J.S Mill, of the great and simple intuitionist versus positivist clash, and the succeeding picture produced by Stirling of the revival of British philosophy through eating at the table of Hegel, have been accepted and believed by most. It is only if we modify these pictures that a better understanding of

Victorian philosophy and intellectual history can be obtained.

So far I think we can conclude that Mill's picture and classification of modern British philosophy was not mirrored by those intellectual contemporaries who shared both his world and the intention of mapping its intellectual development. Only at the most general level, did Lewes, Morell, Maurice and Masson, share the idea of two opposed forces in philosophy. Once below the surface they recognise a plurality of often divergent groups or schools within each camp, with varying degrees of distinction between them and their opponents. All of these historians recognised the depth, and the philosophical vitality, of the challenge offered by the forces of sensationalism, empiricism, scepticism, materialism, positivism and utilitarianism, but they disagreed with Mill as to the opponents. Rarely, if ever, do these commentators use the word 'intuitionism' to describe the creed of any one group, let alone the whole of the forces opposed to Mill. Secondly, they noticed, great divergence between French Eclecticism, German Idealism, Cambridge Platonism, Scottish Common Sense, English Rationalism and Transcendentalism, the German Coleridgians and the English Idealists in Britain between 1800 and 1866.

Finally, they were all happy to use the term idealism, even if there was no agreement between them on its meaning; they were all happy to analyse and even eulogise the German philosphers Kant, Schelling, Fichte and Hegel, and on occasions Jacobi, Lessing, Herbart, Herder, Schleiermacher and Strauss too. That Britain waited until 1865 to receive Hegel into its mind may still carry some truth, but not as its first experience of idealism. That Britain waited until 1865 for Stirling's 'Secrets of Hegel' for the first draught of idealism is a myth; the 'pannikins' were there before. We must now go on to analyse the major sources or schools of British philosophy up

to 1860, that could and did affect John Grote and his contemporaries. We must recognize especially the development of English idealist arguments from many of the schools listed above but especially from the Scottish philosophers, Hamilton, Mansel and Ferrier, and from Cambridge philosophy, William Whewell and Frederick Denison Maurice.

However, while inadequate, Mill's picture of the dualistic character of mid-Victorian philosophy became the most popular. Within the writings of Jerome Schneewind, W.D. Hudson and others it remains a powerful force today.

The new picture of Victorian philosophical development that I propose is to be faithful as far as possible to the understandings of the situation shared by actors and thinkers of the time. Primary source material must therefore take preference over subsequent secondary commentaries, though these will be used where they confirm, contest or throw light on the former, or where I am indebted for an idea or clue. Because the new picture is so pluralistic and because context is only one part of this thesis this collection of schools of thought must remain sketches, though I hope not caricatures, of a more subtle and complex and reality. Because no history of philosophy or political thought that I know of gets even close to producing a coherent and comprehensive account of the period in question, this sketch must be attempted here.

The intellectual traditions which continue into the nineteenth century defy strict periodization as well as strict categorization. The period I am now covering from the turn of the century to 1860 is part of a larger flow of history, just as the categories I shall use are neither water tight nor mutually exclusive. The thinkers and schools discussed shade off into each other, and often, as Masson found out with Mill, simply defy rigid classification, sharing as he and many others do, some views with some philosophers and other views

with others. With this in mind we must say something about the glossary of terms and concepts I will use here.

My general position is that the attempt to provide simple and concise definitions of such concepts as idealism and materialism is based on a paradox. For while a clear understanding of terms used in a work are a precondition for analysing and validating an argument, arguments of a historical kind which ignore Wittgenstein's warnings about the multifarious meanings of terms, and which rush into simplistic dictionary definitions are doomed to failure. Most of the terms appearing in the classification and categorizations below are cluster concepts, each containing under it a group of actual and possible meanings. Each usage may or may not share a common identity with its fellows, but as with a family the differences between the members may be greater than the similarities, and not all members may share the same essence, the same feature or features. Finally, even if these concepts are not 'essentially contestable' they are and will remain 'contestable', that is we can expect 'endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of the users' (Gallie 1955-6, 121-146). Such terms as idealism, intuitionism, empiricism and materialism have normative as well as descriptive properties, they often carry pejorative connotations, as when a Marxist defines an opponent as an 'idealist', or when that opponent calls his opposite number a 'Marxist'. For all these reasons, tight, simplistic dictionary definitions will be avoided where possible, and the accounts will proceed with Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblance' in mind (3).

III

The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed massive upheavals in the economic, political and social life, as well as the cultural and intellectual life of the British. The growing pace of industrialization with the attendant movements of labour from country to town, the growth of new class alignments and rivalries, the new pressures on government and parties, the collapse of old loyalties values and religions, was calling forth new explanations of who and what we were, what we were to value, and what we were to do. The philosophers of the period generally recognized that the century was the start of a new age and that new answers or modified versions of the old, would be needed to provide coherent intellectual, and eventually 'ideological', answers to these questions. Sometimes old answers were found to be satisfactory, especially when updated, and so varieties of religion and romanticism and conservatism taken from Rousseau and Burke served some Victorians well. On other occasions the old answers were found wanting and had to be radically overhauled, as were those of Paley and Bentham by Mill and Sidgwick. Sometimes new answers were forged and mixed from old or current materials. This was the case with English idealism working from its origins in intuitional, common sense, French eclectic, German idealistic and current romantic notions, but in Ferrier and Grote, producing an original and exciting development.

Almost always the schools of thought were associated with intellectual, social and cultural groups or literary elites, who shared some similar social and geographical as well as literary networks and channels. We shall see in the next chapter that, as John Roach, Susan Cannon, Christopher Harvie and Sheldon Rothblatt have argued, the mid-Victorian intelligentsia had its various centres in

London and the rising industrial centres of Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham for the new positivist schools and the old cities of Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh and St. Andrews for the more traditional idealist schools. Further the various schools had social networks which included families, friends and neighbours and were held together by numerous literary and debating societies (Roach 1937, 1959; Annan 1955; Cannon 1964). Finally the groups developed common and well organized channels of communication in the great reviews and journals of the day as well as often sharing common financial sources of dependency. John Gross, for instance, in his excellent analysis of *The Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters* has mapped out the still relatively ignored network of editors, journalists, reviewers, poets, historians, philosophers and scientists who contributed to such organs as the 'Edinburgh' and 'Quarterly' Reviews, 'Blackstone's', the 'Fortnightly', the 'London' and the 'Saturday' Reviews and the utilitarian 'London and Westminster Review', all of whom saw their job as moulding comtemporary opinion and culture. Indeed we could do worse than typify the conflict of the three major movements, before 1870, the positivist, intuitionists, and common sense philosophies, in terms of three centres, London, Cambridge and Edinburgh; three social networks, the Philosophical Radicals, the Cambridge Network and the Hamiltonians; and three journals the 'Westminster Review', the 'Saturday Review', the 'Edinburgh Review' before 1870 and afterwards 'Blackstone's' (Gross 1973; Fontana, 1985). Further elaboration would be needed to embrace idealism at Trinity College Cambridge and St Andrews, and sub sections of movements elsewhere but the general link of philosophical allegiance, social network and geographical centre was observable.

a) <u>Empiricists and Utilitarians</u>

Many terms, such as sensationalist, phenomenalist and sceptic could have been injected or alternated with ease into the title of

this section, but today the terms empiricists and utilitarians are most commonly used to describe the individuals, the network and the group of ideas I am referring to here. The forerunners of these two movements were Hobbes, Locke, and David Hume. Earlier in this chapter I outlined the range of attacks Mill and his colleagues made on the 'sinister interests' and their intellectual allies 'the intuitionists' in the early part of the century who opposed them. With the exception of the Cambridge theologian William Paley and Alexander Bain in Aberdeen the common geographical base for the movement was in London, at first based in Bentham's home, though later as Masson points out,

> 'It was the dingy old India House in Leadenhall Street, of whose many interesting legends it is now certainly not the least interesting that, many years ago, young John Mill, not so well known to the general public as he has since, had his official room, to which along intricate passages, friends and admirers of his, seeking his conversation, would find their way on late afternoons' (Masson 1877, 6-7).

The social network was soon to be labelled the Philosophical Radicals. The group were predominantly middle class, but representing more or less the aspiring and entrepreneurial middle classes, rather than their professional allies who had generally found their way to the universities. Their religious opinions were generally non conformist agnostics, or atheistic, as in the writings of George Grote. Most of the group earned their incomes either from labouring in private bodies such as banks or semi-public bodies like the East India Company, or from the sale of their published work. Only a few of them, James Mill, Bentham, the Villiers and John Austin had a university education and those mostly in Scotland, and apart from one permanent exile, Professor Alexander Bain at Aberdeen, only Austin taught in a university when one was finally founded in London (Thomas 1979, 450-2). Education was very much a matter of self help for the group, disciplined reading and writing sessions, early morning and late afternoon discussion groups. Only when John Mill set up his

shortlived but famous London Debating Society in 1823 was there a formal meeting place for the radicals to discuss topics of common concern and in the next year the group bought the London Review and turned it into the most radical British political and intellectual journal of the period, the Westminster Review, reborn in 1834 as the London and Westminster Review.

Almost all of the members of the Philosophical Radicals published in the Review, including John Stuart and James Mill, George Grote, John and Charles Austin, William Ellis, Eyton Tooke, John Roebuck, George Graham and Peregrine Bingham. Several members had associations with the radical wing of the Whig party such as Lord Brougham, Charles Buller and Sir William Molesworth, and George Grote, whilst John Stuart Mill eventually became a radical liberal Member of Parliament. Through Mill and the 'Review' the social network spread abroad, especially to France, where alliances with De Tocqucville, Auguste Comte and the Saint Simonians grew over the years.(4)

Philosophically it is difficult if not impossible to separate the group's commitments to empiricism in epistemology, utilitarianism in ethics, and laissez faire liberalism in politics and economics. The reasons for this are that each makes an appeal to the individual, to his own conception of what his senses tell him, and to a pragmatic commitment to following what experience and inductive generalizations from it tell them to do.

On the last point the group agreed on the debt they owed in methodological terms to Francis Bacon and his advocacy of inductive logic. The irony that the same claim was being made at the same time by the Scottish and Cambridge philosophers on behalf of their own systems seems to have passed them by, and Bacon's banner was regularly waved by opposing forces rallying to very different causes. But it was to Hobbes that Bentham at least, owed the greatest debt (Manning

1968, 80-85), and further indications of the Hobbesian foundations to the movement lie in the works of another member, Sir William Molesworth, who edited one of the best modern versions of Hobbes, *Collected Works* (Molesworth 1839-1845). Hobbes model of manas a sensing machine set in motion by the rubbing of the external world against his nervous system, and who organized data under the sovereign headings of pleasure and pain, and acting in response to the inevitable drive for pleasure and the absence of pain, is in fact the paradigm for the group. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) following a training in law turned to imbibe the recent contributions of Hutchinson, John Gay, Abraham Tucker, Priestly, David Hartley and Helvetius, which drove him on in his mission of reforming the known world by rational design, for the purpose of happiness (Hutchinson 1728; Gay 1731; Hartley 1749; Tucker 1763; Priestly 1768; Helvetius 1758,1773). With Paley, Bentham presented the first wave of utilitarians to impress nineteenth century audiences.

The major novelty of the nineteenth century utilitarians and empiricists lay in the practical ambitions and the applications they forsaw as resulting from their philosophical endeavours. John Stuart Mill's pretentious childhood ambition to 'reform the world' matched those of his chief advisor Bentham, the designer of model constitutions for all world government, panopticon prison and school systems, junction box bureaucracies, hedonistic calculi for individuals and governments. In the end the philosophical ground clearing was only a prelude to practical economic, political, social, moral and intellectual improvement and progress for mankind in the radical's weltanschauung.But philosophical novelties were introduced which intrigued contemporary audiences, in the areas of human nature, epistemology, psychology, ethics and political theory.

Bentham and Mill were divided on the nature of man as most modern

commentaries explain(5) Bentham had stated with total confidence that each man was a separate unit of matter and sense, a separate unit for political and moral calculation, each unit being self seeking. The young Mill found this desolate and depressing and modified his tutor's views in his essays on Bentham, Sedgwick, Whewell and Coleridge as well as in his *Utilitarianism* of 1861. The key modifications were firstly in the attempt to unite egoistic with altruistic motives and to place the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' above selfish desire for one's own pleasure, as the centre of human psychology. Secondly Mill, under the pressure of Germano-Coleridgian friends and public opinion, introduced qualitative dimensions as a superior comparison to quantitative in the calculation of pleasures. Thirdly, Mill allowed man to have certain traditionally moral attributes like virtue, a feeling of justice and obligation, making these consistent with utilitarianism proper by making the feelings that accompany the actions or virtues 'parts' of or 'means' to pleasure. Other modifications were made to the theory of 'sanctions'; Mill introduced a possible scheme of rule 'utilitarianism'; and added a 'best that could be provided in the circumstances' proof of utilitarianism. However despite these revisions the definite statement of the schools ethics and politics in *Utilitarianism* still maintained the traditional key ingredients of that moral philosophy, namely (1) that actions are to be judged right or wrong in terms of their consequences and these alone, that (2) the only consequences of importance to the calculations are those that refer to utility, that (3) utility is to be judged in terms of felicific (happiness) outcomes, and (4) that happiness is to be judged in terms of the two human sensory states of pleasure and pain (Schneewind 1965, 17-39). Some commentators, and R.J. Halliday in particular, consider that Mill has moved beyond moderate reform to an

eclectic ethical re-construction which incorporated romanticism, the Germano-Coleridgian ethic and even elements from intuitionism (Halliday 1976, 20-68). As we shall see in Chapter eight below Grote considered Mill's reformation to be a pragmatic patching of a leaking vessel that produced a doctrine heretical to traditional utilitarianism, and other commentators have questioned both Mills eclectic motives and achievements (Thomas 1979, 168-187).

In regard to human psychology the first major nineteenth century modification to Hume came with James Mill's adoption of the theory of association. This theory, adopted from Hume and Hartley, suggested that coherent trains of thought such as those contained in practical judgements and influences could be derived from and made compatible with the presence of discrete and transitory experiences of sense data, by association. Presuming the epistemological theory of empiricism or sensationalism as it was sometimes called, which claimed all knowledge to be derived from atomistic sense data, associationalism provided the psychological law which accounted for the everyday experience of thinking and judging, and gave extra credence to the utilitarian ethical and political doctrines derived from them. The only other modification that the readers meet in Mill's revision, is the new account of things and matter given in the *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* in which they are described as 'permanent possibilities of sensation' (Mill 1877, X1,I, 234-250). So the external world, which has been assured to be the source of sense data, becomes now a mere hypothesis drawn when

> 'Associations produced by contiguity became more certain and rapid by repetition'

leading to inseparable and indivisible association. This paradox is to be cruelly exploited in the *Exploratio* by John Grote later, as are the so-called 'modifications' to utilitarianism made by John Stuart

Mill, which he considered either changed its character completely, or collapsed back into traditional doctrine (below Chapter nine).

On political theory the nineteenth century utilitarians made a remarkable choice to advocate democracy, an extended suffrage, representative and accountable government, a meritocratic civil service, and liberty instead of the paternalism and enlightened despotism first explored by Bentham in the previous century. Yet Grote and other critics noticed more than a whiff of authoritarianism and elitism in their projects and writings, a distinct lack of liberality despite an advocacy of laisser faire liberalism (Cowling 1963; Halliday 1968; Burns 1968; Thomas 1979, 453). A preference for a meritocratic elite, for an educational system that would encourage the lower class electorate to recognize the benefits of such a system, for a system in which the state ensured that those failing to take advantage of self help paid the price, were authoritarian elements within the scheme. The New English Poor Law Reforms of 1834 and Robert Lowe's New Education Act of 1861 were the best evidences of it in practice.

b) Positivism and Materialism

Opponents of empiricism and utilitarianism regularly accused them of running to science, ignoring religion, everyday moral sense and conventional morality and being materialistic. To some extent the accusations were firmly based but between 1800 and 1860, and again after 1880, a new tide of opinion, confidently and unashamedly espousing positivism and materialism came into wider public prominence, independent of empiricism and utilitarianism.

Positivism was a name used to cover a multitude of related doctrines, from the narrow theories of the French Saint Simonians and Comteans, to anyone who believed that either the methods of science were alone valid for the study of man and society or who shared the

historical belief in the inevitable progress of history resulting from scientific advancement. Materialism was one example of a positivist doctrine but the term itself covered a range of beliefs from those of ancient Greeks like Democritus who considered the whole world to be made up of material atoms; to Hobbesians; eighteenth century French philosophers like Holbach, as considered everything, including mental events, are material in origin; to the psycho-physiologists of the nineteenth century such as Alexander Bain and George Lewes, and to historical materialists such as Marx and Engels who considered man's efforts to meet material needs determined both how he lived and thought, economically, politically and intellectually. Whatever was understood by these terms by audiences at the time, a certain amount of panic set in, made worse by the identification of these doctrines with alien Frenchmen and Germans. Most of the schools discussed in the sections below took it as one of their central missions to attack and destroy positivism, materialism or both. Here we must sketch briefly the range of allies who rallied to that banner.

By the time Saint Simon started to complain that his student friend and secretary Auguste Comte was plagiarizing his ideas in 1824, the self identified school of positivism was already firmly established in France and spreading to England by letter, book and disciple. St Simon (1760 - 1825) had picked up the scientific currents and excitement that had funnelled into the eighteenth century philosophies collectively called the 'Enlightenment'. As with most of his contemporaries, excepting Rousseau, he believed that with the growth and spread and correct application of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, the major problems of man and society could be solved. This faith was based on observations about the effects of the discoveries of Galileo, Bacon, Newton and other great scientists, and the positivists vied with each other for the titles of the 'Bacon',

the 'Newton' or the 'Kepler' of the social sciences. What the physical sciences offered as a model for the social sciences, they believed, was a method, a level of certainty in results never before thought possible, and a knowledge base of direct application to the world of practice. What the new positivists added was a historical weltanschauung which visioned history as progress, but in which the driving force was knowledge especially scientific knowledge. With advances in scientific knowledge came advances in economics, politics and society, as well as medicine, housing, and transport. All of the great positivists, St Simon, Comte and Mill believed in the coming of a new 'positive age', a final 'organic period', witnessing the triumphs of science and technology, which was to follow a present which they had recognised as a 'critical age', an 'age of transition'. (6)

It was these beliefs in science, the benefits of its application to man and the inevitability of a new age of certainty and universal human well being, that marked off the positivists, and which led some of them to create a new religion, a new scientific church with priests and apostles, and a new scientific clergy called the Clerisy (Markham 1964, xxxiv-vi). These beliefs also fired their political imaginations into attempts to reform cities, states, Europe and the world through their religion and through letters and appeals to the knowledgable elite to join into non party technocracies dedicated to progress. St Simon and later his six apostles led by Orlinde Rodrigues and Enfantin, set out with missionary zeal to convert Europe to the cause, starting with intellectuals and opinion leaders, who they expected in turn to influence the masses. Science and reason was for the elite, belief and religion for the masses, this discrimination being justified by the ultimate value of the end served. Lecture tours, personal visits to men such as Mill and Carlyle, Saturday

morning church meetings, journals, books and board meetings were the means of conversion and proselytising.

Comte, and his ally and financial patron in England, John Mill were suspicious of the religious connotations and the St Simonian means of persuasion, but they embraced the faith in science and history. Comte and Mill however concentrated upon the methodology of the social sciences only vaguely and naively sketched out by St Simon. In the three great positivist tracts Comte's *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830 - 1842), John Mill's *System of Logic* (1843, 8th edition 1872) and his *Auguste Comte* and Positivism (1865) modifications to the methods of Bacon are made which clearly attempt to reconcile, the demands of deductive and inductive logic, the belief in 'a priori' insights into universal truths and laws and faith in generalization from observation and testing, and a belief in determinism and a practice that demands a freedom to act for the improvement of mankind. Quite explicitly the positivists rejected any claims by theology and metaphysics to provide truths or valid argument. They rejected almost all past philosophy as worthless, except for that which performs the underlabourer role set out for it by Locke, namely that it clears the mind and language in preparation for the true tests of science. John Stuart Mill, approving Comte's historical theory that all knowledge, and hence all of social development, passes through three stages, the theological, the metaphysical and the positive, could confidently brand his opponents as outmoded and doomed carriers of the first two, and could bathe with his friends and colleagues in the light and certainty that history was on their side.

Before 1860 positivism was espoused in Britain in a limited number of places and groups and, with the exception of the 'Positivist Brotherhood' of Wadham College, Oxford and some isolated individuals such as Leslie Stephen of Cambridge , these were organized by literary

gentlemen outside the universities (Farmer 1967). John Stuart Mill had been the earliest advocate in England and he had brought several of the Philosophical Radicals into close intercourse with Comte and the St Simonians. Richard Congreve had been a lonely advocate of the religious variant of positivism in London until the 1860's when he was joined by old Wadham colleagues, Edward Beesley, J Bridges and Frederic Harrison. Another node developed around George Eliot who had become acquainted with positivism in 1851 and who met George Lewes, the editor of 'The Leader' when she came to help John Chapman edit the 'Westminister Review'. They spread the influence to include Harriet Martineau who translated Comtes' *Cours*, but another group built up around Herbert Spencer explicitly rejecting the religious option and any debt to Comte. Another group around the historian Henry Thomas Buckle (whose *History of Civilization in England* (1857 and 1861) charted the rise of positivism), had come into prominence by the time John Grote began to write, and it was to Mill and Spencer and Buckle that he directed his attacks on positivism (Simon 1963, Annan 1959,). The journal that popularized the movement , in addition to the 'Westminster' and the 'Leader' was the 'Fortnightly' which, under John Morley, elected as editor in 1866, was the nearest there was to a positivist periodical (Simon 1963, 203; Gross 1969, 114-117).

Materialism was a much older concept than positivism but it was looked on by both adherents and opponents of positivism as its most pure example. The earliest examples of the approach were recorded in ancient Greece, espoused by Heraclitus, Democritus and Epicurus who in a truly reductivist manner found the origins and basis of mental events, moral and political judgements and ideals, in matter, especially the interaction of physical atoms. The material philosophy was resurrected in the seventeenth century with Hobbes in Britain and Gassendi and Mersenne in France, and by the later compatriots La

Mettrie and Holbach in the eighteenth century. With the former, materialism amounted to the underpinning of empiricism, the sense data theory, with a crude account of human physiology, and it was this that attracted James Mill, Bentham and John Mill to them. With La Mettrie and Holbach the attraction of materialism

> 'lies in the simplification which it introduced into the confused realms of the ethics and natural philosophy and the discordant function of head and heart' (Vereker 1967, 173).

Through physiological and ethical reductivism, a short cut through philosophy to answers about knowledge and morality became possible for contemporaries exasperated with logic, metaphysics and ontology. Through a materialist scientific education we will have a short-cut to human happiness, for

> 'It is only by enlightening men, by showing them the evidence, by proclaiming the truth to them that it can be promised that they will be made better and happier' (Holbach 1770, II, 387-8).

None of this is anything to do with the popular use of materialism to refer to the personal or social motives and practices concerning consumerism, as used in the claim that La Mettrie died as the result of a 'materialistic' disposition and practice, to whit the eating of an entire eagle pate cooked in bad fat, at the court of Frederick the Great (Vereker 1967, 174). Nor is it much to do with 'materialism' as used to refer to the historical economic and dialectical writings of Marx, Engels and their followers. For whom materialism refers to a world historical outlook in which it is the way humans produce the means of their material sudsistence, through interacting with nature, which determines in the last instance their social, political and intellectual reality. Marx saw the Epicureans, Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, La Mettrie and Holbach as bourgeois predecessors, but he added to their mechanistic notions a materialistic anthropology that he claimed fulfilled the development of the philosophy into a practical tool of history. Finally, the use

of materialism covered by this section and opposed by Grote and many other contemporaries is not meant to be mistaken for its popular usage as a doctrine opposed to the more spiritual human values, associated with the emotions, the heart; reason, the mind; or spirit, the soul. The object of the religious objection to materialism was not the classical works of Epicurus, Hobbes, Holbach or Bentham, but any scientific or practical theory that was supposed to de-prioritize emotions, reason, spirit or the soul.

The special branch of philosophical materialism which was developing fast in the first decades of the nineteenth century was what John Grote calls the 'anatomy of psychology, psychical or psychological anatomy, physio psycholgy or psycho physiology' (Grote 1900, 231). The subject or set of subjects which underpinned much contemporary psychology and medical understanding of brain activity were developed in this period by Professor Alexander Bain (1855; 1859; 1868; 1873), George Henry Lewes (1817 - 1878), William K Clifford (1845-1879), John Tyndell (1820-1893) and Thomas Henry Huxley (1825 - 1895) and the contemporary record of achievements to date was produced by F Lange in his *History of Materialism* (Lange 1866). But by public imposition, rather than self identification, the arch materialist of the age, who was the immediate cause of the mid century controversies over idealism and materialism, was Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and his remarkable book *Origin of Species* (Darwin, 1859). As Metz notes the book represented

> 'a *naturalism* in that it made sub-human factors more emphatic than cultural ones, a *biologism* in that it construed philosophical questions through biological categories and theories, an *evolutionism* in that it viewed all things as part of a process of upward development, and a *mechanism* because it explained teleological phenomena in terms of mechanical causes and their laws'(Metz 1938, 97).

Darwin and other evolutionists in mid century, especially Herbert Spencer (1820 - 1903) were to be either the stated or unstated butts

of much of the anti-materialist movement.

c) German Idealism

Another philosophical current operating on and available to any philosopher of the period was German idealism. Its influence in Britain was however indirect and secondary not direct and primary. It was absorbed by a few, but not normally by direct contact with German philosophers or their primary texts, but through British and French scholars who had imbibed the Germanic spirit and ethos, or from histories and secondary texts written by Germans or Frenchmen and translated into English. Much but not all of the contact was almost of a hearsay kind which amounted to little more than claims to know of the German 'absolutists' or 'metaphysicians' but with little evidence of knowledge about them. Another source was the deep but partial knowledge about one element of German thought, usually of its philology or biblical criticisms, which was then used as a base upon which to generalize about the whole scope of ideas and disciplines involved covered. Finally, philosophical knowledge in Britain was primarily of and about Schelling and Fichte rather than Hegel. Altogether these disparate pieces of acquaintance amounted to a fairly coherent and comprehensive understanding of contemporary German thought, not the superficial and narrow view proposed by Muirhead , Robbins and most other modern commentators (Muirhead 1965; Robbins 1967).

Muirhead encapsulated the nineteenth century development of German idealism in the introduction to Chapter Two of his *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy* in a mannner which will set the scene for an account of the reception of these ideas in Britain.

> 'The stages of the post-Kantian development of thought in Germany are by this time familiar matter of history: first Fichte's Moralism with its emphasis on the Ego; next the reaction against it in the Natur-Philsophie of Schelling; with its emphasis on

> the Absolute as the neutral basis of both self and nature: the so-called Philosophy of Identity; lastly, Hegel's Absolute Idealism, which sought to establish Mind or Spirit as the principle that had been manifesting itself under the form of space and time in nature, of consciousness and the creation of science, art, morality, religion, that are the embodiments of its ideals in the life of man' (Muirhead 1965 , 147).

This introduction is followed by an account, not of the reception or non-reception of German idealism in Britain but an account of the slow and obstacled reception of Hegel's Philosophy in Britain. As with Robbins and many others, Muirhead seems to conflate the reception of German idealism with the reception of Hegel into Britain (Muirhead 1965, 148-164; Robbins 1967, 1982). As I shall argue later they also make the fatal historical mistake of presuming that British idealism had few other origins than in the reception of German idealism and in particular Hegelian idealism in this country. While a fuller account of the growth of idealism in Britain will be given later in this thesis, we can gain some insight into the level of knowledge of British idealism in Britain between 1800 and 1860 by looking at six sources (1) primary sources in translation, (2) German secondary sources in translation, (3) French primary and secondary sources in translation, (4) British histories of German philosophy, (5) British authorities indirectly acquainted with German philosophy through specialist knowledge of German philology, theology or history, (6) British philosophers who indirectly imbibed the spirit of German philosophy at the time, amongst whom I include, Coleridge, Carlyle, De Quincy, Hamilton, Julius and Charles Hare, Maurice and Ferrier, and who indirectly affected others.

(1) For those who read German, such as Morell, Hamilton, Ferrier, Lewes, the Hares and Maurice, the lack of availability of translations of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel was no barrier, but to the bulk of British philosophers first hand acquaintance depended upon the work of translators. Translations of Kant became available in the third

decade of the nineteenth century by John Richardson (1819), Thomas Wirgman (1824) with better editions later available for students by Max Muller and J M D Meiklejohn in the Bohn's library series. Almost all of the contributors to the debate about the booklists for the new moral sciences at Cambridge in 1860 agreed to include the *Critique of Pure Reason* and John Grote added that it 'is the only book of modern German philosophy which I would have' (Grote 1860, 10). But both from the weight of primary and secondary source material on Fichte and from the frequency with which one comes across debates on mental and moral philosophy conducted in terms of the contrasting of 'ego' and 'non-ego' we should conclude that it was through him rather than Hegel that British philosophers became acquainted with German idealism. One primary source was available, which received a wide circulation *The Popular Works of Johan Gottlieb Fichte* translated by William Smith of the University of Edinburgh and circulated in two volumes from 1844 and reissued in 1848 (Fichte 1848). A short translation of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* was also available in 1846 translated by Percy Sinnett. George Lewes reports translation in French of Schellings philosophy in 1845, but adds 'Nothing in English' a comment repeated in reference to Hegel later (Lewes 1880, 610, 633). The first translation into English of Hegel were two highly selective translations, *The Subjective Logic of Hegel* in 1853 by J Wallon and H Sloman, and *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* by J Sibree in 1857. All of the above translations must be suspect, but at least some compatriots read the Germans in the original including Julius and Charles Hare and William Whewell at Cambridge, De Quincy, Sir William Hamilton, Carlyle and Ferrier at Edinburgh, John D Morell, F D Maurice and George Lewes.

(2) For most Britons prior to 1860 acquaintance with German philosophy came via the translation of German secondary texts. In the

original German the most popular sources were Albert Schwegler's, *Handbook of the History of Philosophy*, of 1871, Tennemann's *A Manual of the History of Philosophy* of 1852, and H M Chalybaus *Historical Development of Speculative Philosophy from Kant to Hegel* of 1854. In English, Chalybaus, the best of the three, appeared in 1854 translated by Alfred Edershien from Aberdeen, with a prefaratory note by Sir William Hamilton; Tennemann was translated by A Johnson and revised by J R Morell in 1852, and Schwegler's history was translated by James Hutchinson Stirling and first published in 1867. All three books devoted at least half of their pages to German idealist philosophy and Chalybaus devotes his entire text to Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher Schelling and Hegel. The last text is not only comprehensive but is both analytically sound and well written, and it is not surprising that in the 1860 debate on the Moral Science Tripos booklist John Rigby the Trinity College philosophy tutor should recommend Chalybaus as 'indispensable', while admitting 'I do not speak of the subsequent German writers (to Kant), because I only know of them indirectly...' (Rigby 1860). Indeed I would claim that anyone wishing to research 'knowledge of German idealism in Britain before 1860', could hardly do better than start with reading Chalybaus.

(3) Many more French primary and secondary sources on the German idealists existed than in English but here we can note that the works of two major historians who refer to and know intimately of their neighbours' philosophical developments were made available in English prior to 1860. The best third hand sources are Victor Cousins, *Course of the History of Modern Philosophy* translated by O W Wright in 1852, and earlier by H L Linberg in 1832, and M Jouffroy's *Introduction to Ethics* translated by W H Canning and published originally in 1841. (Cousin 1832, 1852; Jouffroy 1860; Vera 1855, 1864).

(4) For most non German speakers their first acquaintance with

German thought would probably come through the perusal of histories written in English. As we saw earlier in this chapter the histories by John D Morell, William Whewell, George Lewes and Frederick Maurice all contained references to German philosophy since Kant and additional references could be found in the less detailed works of Sir William Hamilton, Frederick Ferrier, Dean Mansel and Robert Blakey (Hamilton 1866; Ferrier 1850; Mansel 1851, 1856, 1860; Blakey 1850).

(5) While knowledge of German philosophy was a specialist matter for an elite and only hearsay for the many, there was a much broader and deeper knowledge of German thought in the areas of philology, theology and history at the time, and this affected and inspired a knowledge of and fondness for German thought as a whole. Knowledge of the great philologists, the Grimms, von Humbolt, Bopp, Buttman, Schliecher and Pott was gained by Julius Hare and Connop Thirlwall at Trinity College Cambridge and they produced a journal *The Philological Museum* in 1831-3 to communicate their ideas to a wider audience. Julius and Charles Hare's, famous *Guesses at Truth* is a mine of information on wider German ideas and a history of contemporary philology could be found in Winnings *Manual of Comparative Philology* of 1838. The brief history of English philosophy influenced by the Germans has already been given in Chapter I but the works by Ferrier and Donaldson are of special mention here for their general reference to German ideas, as well as those of two German residents in England Max Muller and Baron Bunsen.

German Theology had gone through a remarkable stage of 'critical' analysis during our period, influenced mainly by the founder of the hermeneutic theological movement Freidrich Schleiermacher (1768 - 1834) and one of his most brilliant critics and developers David Strauss (1808 - 1874). Both had a remarkable grasp of German

philosophy, and though read in Britain primarily for their religious views, exposure to them had a more general effect, culminating in a massive debate over the validity of Strauss' *Life of Jesus* after its publication in 1835 (Strauss 1835, 1846). Schleiermacher was widely known to English audiences and was regularly quoted as an authority by members of the Cambridge Movement who held that it was he and Strauss who offered the raw materials for a rational defence of Christianity when the need arose with the publication of Darwin's *Origins* in 1859. He also had a nascent epistemology which in its attempt to overcome the empiricist rationalist gulf argues that thought is different from its objects, but is capable of reaching out and grasping it intellectually, since things and sense data are intelligible and capable of being ordered by thought. This shows a remarkable similarity to one of the key themes in John Grotes' own philosophy.

Finally, the German historical school were well known to several English historians, especially those interested in studying the ancient and medieval worlds with a view to learning about the anthropology of contemporary societies. As we shall see later the works of Herder, Erlich, Savigny and above all the Bastion Georg Niebuhr, a Danish national who became Professor of History at Berlin in 1810, were well known to George Grote, Connop Thirlwall, Stanley, Mitford and especially to that group of historians, influential at Cambridge called the Liberal Anglicans (Forbes 1952). Their knowledge was spread through lectures and publications to a much wider audience.

(6) Little will be said here about the group of Germanophiles regularly noted for their influence in the early decades of the century since they are better discussed under the heading of the movements to which they belong, Hamilton and Ferrier to Scottish philosophy, de Quincy and Carlyle to the romantic and Scottish movements, and the Hare brothers, Coleridge and Maurice to the

Germano-Coleridgians at Cambridge. However, a few notes may be useful. Firstly, this group while effectively popularizing German ideas rarely referred to primary sources; secondly, they rarely scratch below surface impressions to the details of argument, and thirdly they usually admit to being unable to understand the message of the master - Hegel. Dugald Stewart for instance wrote that he was totally ignorant of German thought; in his critique of idealism Sir William Hamilton admits no real understanding of Hegel; and Ferrier, often quoted as the first Briton to understand Hegel, wrote a long appendix to refute the allegation. His argument reflects the position of most Britons acquainted with Hegel as a primary source at the time (and perhaps even Stirling).

> 'Some of my critics assert that my philosophy is nothing but an echo of Hegel's; others have doubted whether I know anything at all about that philosopher. The exact truth of the matter is this: I have read most of Hegel's works again and again, but I cannot say that I am acquainted with his philosophy. I am able to understand only a few short passages here and there in his writings; and these I greatly admire for the depth of their insight, the breadth of their wisdom, and the loftiness of their tone. More than this I cannot say. If others understand him better and to a larger extent, they have the advantage of me, and I confess that I envy them the privilege. But, for myself, I must declare that I have not found one word - or one thought in Hegel which was available for my system, even if I had been disposed to use it.' (Ferrier 1875, I, 553).

Even so the prophet of German ideas in Britain, Thomas Carlyle, when pushed by a student for authorities on German philosophy in 1841 wrote

> 'Consult Sir William Hamilton, your neighbour, probably your former teacher: he is, of all men, British or foreign, the best acquainted with the biographies of Germans and other metaphysicians. A Mr Ferrier of your city I believe to be likewise worth inquiring of' (Davie 1961, 262).

At Cambridge John Rigby complained that 'both Dr Whewell and Prof. Grote (were) so disposed to confine the Examination to ancient and English Philosophy' and added 'the little I know of German philosophy makes me desirous to induce our better Students to read and think over it, whether they adopt it or not'. John Grote himself felt

that the 'Various books of Mr Morell would very likely be read by persons wishing without much German, to understand Kant or answer questions involving recent German speculations' (Rigby 1860, 2; Grote 1860, 10). Whewell for his part recommended Savigny and Fichte for Jurisprudence, (the latter agreed to by Grote), as well as the histories by Tenneman Chalybaus, Ritter and Willman.(7) Fichte found himself in fellowship examination papers of Trinity and St John's by 1840 and in reading lists after 1860 in Cambridge (Mayor 1862).

In short, German thought was known about in Britain between 1800 and 1860, though its philosophy was not so deeply known as its history, theology and philology. Knowledge of primary sources was thin, though Fichte seems better known than Schelling, Hegel, Jacobi or any other major German writer. Secondary source knowledge of a reasonably high quality was however available to the student of philosophy and there was a discernible current of excitement evident in the lectures and publications of professors and such popularizes as De Quincy, Carlyle and Coleridge. (See also Appendix III, 347-351).

d) Romanticism

Several dichotomies have been set up to characterize Victorian philosophy other than the empirical and intuitional divide, most of which exhibit the fallacy of the excluded middle. They include Marx's false dichotomy between idealism and materialism, the later idealist opposition of idealism to the empiricist utilitarian axis, and that common refuge of the faint hearted, the romantic and scientific divide. Even an inheritor of the scientific and empirical tendency, Bertrand Russell, was to adopt this device for his rather weak and cursory examination of Victorian philosophy in his *History of Western Philosophy*, (Russell 1963). His general thesis on British idealism

can be found in Book Three Chapter XXVI where he writes

> 'Throughout the period from Kant to Nietzsche, professional philosophers in Great Britain remained almost completely unaffected by their German contemporaries, with the sole exception of Sir William Hamilton, who had little influence. Coleridge and Carlyle, it is true, were profoundly affected by Kant, Fichte and the German Romantics, but they were not philosophers in a technical sense' (Russell 1963, 740).

If idealism was neither an indigenous growth nor a German import, the only explanation of a metaphysical opposition to positivism and utilitarianism could be the existence of a general, non-professional and non-academic current of popular cultural romanticism, which itself had some German origins. This is a regular theme in histories of Victorian thought.

A whole chapter is devoted to this current in Russell's *History*, which sets the start of the movement in the eighteenth century, and not

> 'with philosophy, thought it came before long to have connections with it. With politics, through Rousseau it was connected from the first' (651).

This explanation of origins is far too narrow to warrant much attention by itself, but Russell's general thesis and the elaboration he gives to it, of the forces in Britain of Coleridge, Southey, Wordsworth, Shelley, Byron, Keats, Tennyson, Bronte, De Quincy, John Stirling, and Carlyle, fighting an assorted bunch of 'money grubbing' materialists and laissez faire liberals as well as atheists, positivists philosophical materialists, evolutionists and utilitarians, is representative of this genre of history. Much better versions abound as in R.W. Harris's *Romanticism and the Social Order* 1780-1830; Alfred Cobban's *Edmund Burke and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century* and several readers by Frye, Halsted, Clayre and Keating and at least one vastly popular academic product, the Open University's Arts Foundation Course Units (Harris 1969, Cobban 1960, Frye 1963, Halsted (1965), Clayre (1977), Keating (1981) Open

For our purposes it is probably better to take the advice of Stuart Brown that definitions of 'romanticism' are as likely to obstruct our understanding of it as they are to be of help and to follow his suggestion that this word, as I suggest with the word 'idealism', has many uses which form a family, but that they may not share any set of characteristics in common to them all (Brown 1978, 21, 18-22). In short, romanticism had many origins, applications and expositions in literature, music, art, architecture, politics, religion and popular culture as well as in the academic disciplines of history, theology, philology, law and philosophy. Its exponents often took opposed positions on particular issues, such as tradition versus radicalism, reason versus the mysterious; the strong national state versus individualism; the idea of the organic society versus liberalism, socialism versus conservatism; optimism versus melancholic pessimism. As with families, the only uniting force was often opposition to outsiders, and so it was with the British romantics - they certainly knew their enemies and they rallied against them. All the opponents were associated with the industrial capitalist economy, the alienated and atomistic society and polity, and the mass of de-humanized cultures it had forged in its wake.

It was the indictments of the materialistic and capitalist worlds as much as their poetic, artistic and musical manifestations in the Lake poets, the pre Raphaelites, Turner and Constable, the music of Mendelssohn and Liszt; which caught the popular imagination. The scathing literary criticisms by Thomas Carlyle, De Quincy, William Hazlitt, William Coblett, Augustus Pugin, and John Sterling were matched in romantic novels by Charlotte Bronte, Charles Kingsley, Willian Goodwin and Charles Dickens. Together these authors had a massive audience and an enormous impact far in excess of the efforts

of their academic allies. Few university dons embraced the movement fully and those that did seem to have imbibed it either from specialist pursuits in history, law, theology, or through direct acquaintaince with popular polemicists. Hence the Scottish philosophers picked up currents of German thought, nationalism and rejection of empiricism, from De Quincy and Carlyle, and John Ruskin and William Morris made converts amongst a generation of students at Oxford. The Cambridge philosophers and scientists were deeply affected by Coleridge and Wordsworth, both students there between 1791 and 1795, and the next generation of romantics led by the Hare's, F.D. Maurice and John Sterling were all closely associated with the Cambridge 'Apostles' movement, a list of members which is almost a who's who of academic romanticism and proto-idealism in this part of the century (Allen 1978, 219-214; Brookfield 1906). The poets associated with the 'Apostles' including Wordsworth, Sterling, and Tennyson, and the artists came as an indirect association through F.D. Maurice's efforts to set up Working Men's Colleges. Through Maurice and Charles Kingsley members of the Universities organized education for the workers at various centres which in 1857 produced the following list of associates of Maurice in London.

> 'Messrs Ruskin, Alexander Moore, Woolner, Lowes Dickinson, and D.G.Rossetti, had given up evening after evening to teaching art to the students...'

The art teachers mentioned above were succeeded at later dates by

> 'Messrs Burne Jones, Valentine Prinsep, Cave Thomas, Arthur Hughes, Madox Brown and Stacey Marks, all of whom give in different degrees help in the studios' (Maurice 1887, II, 305).

Unfortunately, it is true that no leading romantic produced a coherent philosophical treatise, let alone a complete system or theory, but their indirect impact on the world of academia was immense, represented most obviously in the effect of Coleridge, Maurice and Sterling on Mill (Mill 1965c, 129-132). The level of

impact may well have been exaggerated in R.J. Halliday's *John Stuart Mill*, but from Mill's own testimony, the attacks on Coleridgians by the Scottish philosophers and the work on them by Cannon, Saunders and Muirhead, we can deduce a definite cultural influence which awaited philosophical idealism to have some systematic expression (Halliday 1976, 13-43; Cannon 1964; Saunders 1942; Muirhead 1930). John Grote rarely refers to either Carlyle or Coleridge but he reflected on romantic topics such as the countryside, architecture and on Ruskin, as Mayor's list of unpublished Manuscripts indicate. I suspect he would have been sympathetic to the romantic tendencies in Carlyle's work, but would have concurred with the judgement of his friend Leslie Ellis, who in a letter to Charles Brinsley Marley (1829-1912) of 1850, wrote

> 'But then there is the twisted unpractical view which right or wrong Carlyle takes everything...It is wonderful how much Carlyle's air of profundity resides in his bad English '[Ellis (Marley Papers) 1850].

Coleridge is mentioned only once by Grote but the reference is indicative of the indirect influence he had provided, for Grote writes

> 'The feeling against utilitarianism itself, as being at any rate an insufficient morality, and giving an insufficient account of human nature, was one that came later and was probably a good deal owing to Coleridge' (Grote 1870, 233).

But for the best testimony to the effect of romanticism and German culture at Cambridge we might turn to Adam Sedgwick the great enemy of idealism there. In his *Discourses* he returned several times to attack Schelling, Hegel and his 'zealous disciple' Strauss for their tendency to obscure thought and to direct young minds to Pantheism; but Sedgwick excuses Coleridge and tips his cap to the German intellectual movement noting that;

> 'The grand intellectual fermentation that has been going on in Germany, and the vast progress made by the Germans in the discovery of physical, philological, and historical truth, have

> been, no doubt, among the most remarkable phenomena of the civilised world during the greater part of a century' (Sedgwick 1850, CCLIX).

A further reading of Peter Allen's *The Cambridge Apostles* serves to show just how potent these 'remarkable phenomena' were between 1830 and 1860 (Allen 1978).

Writing, to Grote, was for philosophical and aesthetic ends and he rarely communicated in the romantic vein. However in his Introduction to the *Exploratio* of 1865 he expresses the romantics' feeling of unhappiness with the modern world.

> 'If a complaint is to be made at present of the absence of philosophical spirit in our country, it appears to me - perhaps mistakenly - that many men are in a sort of doubt as to what is before them: that they have a kind of fear that religion and the old ways are dying out, and yet are not satisfied with a prospect only of continual multiplication of fresh inventions and new markets, while they do not know what to look to instead. I have but to say this, let us believe in ourselves, which in this application is not the revolting against, but the believing in God, whose Providence has men to advance as he has. If we wish, as men, to be wiser, better, happier, let us believe that to some degree at least we can make ourselves so, and let us try. The following pages are a very humble attempt, or beginning of an attempt, towards advance in this intellectual direction' (Grote 1865, xl-xli).

e) <u>Rationalism and Intuitionism</u>

As a concept, rationalism in the nineteenth century had four regular philosophical uses only one of which is referred to here, its reference to a philosophical doctrine which includes amongst its tenets the idea that the world is knowable by reason, and that man's nature is essentially rationally ordered. The other wider or specialist uses in other disciplines such as history and sociology are to refer to 1) those theories that discourage reliance on belief, religion and metaphysics and which stress science - this is the use of rationalism shared by William Lecky, and later J M Robertson and A W Benn (Lecky 1865; Benn 1906; Robertson 1912); 2) the use to refer to a mode of thought that abridges the complexities of life or thought as popularised later by Michael Oakeshott (Oakeshott 1962) and 3) the

use by Weberians and others to refer to the modern stage in the historical process (rationalisation) in which rational authorities, calculations and modes of thinking, such as utilitarinism, oust their more traditional and belief based opponents (Weber 1968).

Intuitionism similarly has had several meanings but here it is used to refer to the ethical equivalents of metaphysical rationalism, which includes amongst its possible tenets, the idea that there is a human faculty which facilitates direct apprehension of moral ideals and virtues, that these are intuitively known without reference to experience or to the calculation of the consequences of any action, and that there is a plurality of distinct moral ideals (not just happiness) all of which are of ultimate value and which are known and prioritized by intuition. We shall ignore the use of the term to refer to hunches, and guesses, and we should already suspect Mill's blanket use of the term to refer to all non-utilitarian and non-empirical and materialist philosophies of his day, for this fails to distinguish intuitionism from idealism, common sense realism, and romanticism (Hudson 1970, 66-106; 1980, 1-23, 170-194; Schneewind 1977, 63-88; Raphael 1981, 43-54).

The historical inheritors of the rationalist and intuitionist mantle in Britain were rather a narrow and disparate group of individuals, if we accept as I recommend, a distinction between intuitionism, the common sense and idealist philosophers. In the recent and path finding research of Jerome B Schneewind the pure adherents have been recovered and they centre on a group Schneewind calls the 'Cambridge Moralists' led by William Whewell (1794-1866). Amongst the Cambridge Moralists Schneewind incudes Coleridge, Maurice and John Grote as well as William Whewell. I shall want to distinguish all four, but especially John Grote, Maurice and Coleridge from Whewell as idealist moral philosophers.

Schneewind also argues that common sense philosophy was a brand of intuitionism (Schneewind 1974, 371-404;1977, 63-88). There is indeed some truth in this, in that there was some influence of the Scottish philosophy on Whewell, and there was similarity on some points between Whewell and the later Common Sense philosophers such as Hamilton and even Ferrier. But as I will show in the next section, the influence was two way, and on some crucial points of argument the two schools diverge, representing the different stress that the Scottish philosophers give to Locke, experience, and ordinary practical judgements. We shall see elsewhere that Whewell and his Cambridge allies, Adam Sedgwick and Thomas Rawlinson Birks conceived themselves as in some way opponents of Scottish philosophy and culture, a position reflected back in an inflated manner by the Hamiltonians (Davie 1961, 8, 169-200, 258-271). At the very minimum then we should beware of oversimplification, and for reasons of clarity as well as historical and philosophical rigor we should separate the rationalist intuitional, the German-Coleridgian, and the Scottish Common Sense movements.(9)

Finally we must add one or two British philosophers who espoused intuitionism but get less attention, Frances Power Cobbe and James Martineau. Appearing in a male dominated world, Frances Cobbe (1822 - 1904) had to publish her early work anonymously. She was born in Ireland but moved after her father's death to Britain, where she agitated, especially in Bristol, on the behalf of women, for their enfranchisement, entrance to university, for the conferment of degrees for her sex, better treatment for prostitutes, female convicts and ex-convicts and for revisions to the law concerning marriage (Spender 1982, 310-317; Nightingale 1962). Philosophically Frances Cobbe based her radicalism on firm unitarian convictions and her theory of moral intuitionism. She felt her theory would free her from the

'authority of tottering Churches' while allowing her to embrace 'the Religious Sentiment', while opposing empiricism and utilitarianism she refused to,

> 'degrade the law of Eternal Right by announcing it as a mere contrivance for the production of human Happiness, or by tracing our knowledge of it to the experiences of the senses, or cajoling us into obeying it as a matter or Expediency' (Cobbe 1855, vii).

While tracing her theory to Kant she recognises that his system was not intuitive in the strict sense of the term. The second major object of her *An Essay on Intuitive Morals* she states is to

> 'place for the first time, as the foundation of ethics, the great but neglected truth that the End of Creation is not the Happiness, but the Virtue of Rational Souls' (Cobbe 1855, vii).

Frances Cobbe feared that some religious and some professional philosophical opinions may oppose her popular appeal to the truth, and she noted that her book

> 'will be condemned by others for going back to old metaphysics, which *must* be false because Fichte and Schelling and Hegel have lived since Kant' (ix).

Still the author had obviously read Mill and Hamilton as well as Cudworth, Mackintosh, Montesquieu, Whewell, Shaftesbury, Hutchinson, Morell, Victor Cousin, Leibnitz, Hume, Spencer, Stewart and many other contemporary authors. Her defence of moral laws as necessary truths, and practical deduction from them as the method for organizing moral life, is far from being naive and her impact on society through her political activites and the publication of over thirty volumes is vastly underestimated (Cobbe 1855, 1864, 1865, 1872, 1874, 1888, Merz 1938, 226). John Grote had a copy of the *Essay* in his private library.

According to Rudolf Merz, another influence on Cobbe was James Martineau who was a unitarian minister in Dublin and Liverpool before coming Professor of Philosophy and Political Economy at Manchester New College London (failing to obtain both Chairs at Cambridge and the new

University of London).Martineau suffers from the practice of many historians of Victorian philosophy, the placing of individuals not easily pigeon-holed into ramshackle philosophical categories such as 'Rational and Religious Philosophers' by Sorley and 'Groups interested in Religious Philosophy' by Merz (Sorley 1965, 264-266; Merz 1938 184-234). Into these boxes John Grote, Frederick Maurice, John Newman, Frances Cobbe, Max Muller, Alexander Fraser and Robert Flint are emptied as well as James Martineau. The irony is that as most Victorian philosophers were Christians of some kind they could all be placed in this category. The label 'religious' philosopher is selective, it usually carries a pejorative connotation to twentieth century audiences and worst of all it distracts readers away from the features of analytic interest in the works of those labelled.

In fact James Martineau is a most interesting thinker who followed in the footsteps of the Hares, Morell, and others to Germany, where he studied philosophy at Berlin from 1848-9. One element in his philosophy is subsequently idealist and as Merz argues he

> 'had in his own person anticipated the development of British philosophy by about twenty years, but he remained at first an isolated figure, able neither to liberate a movement of thought nor to find one to which to attach himself' (Merz 1938, 211).

Martineau was acquainted with T H Green and his colleagues at Oxford throughout the 1860's and 70's and was recognized as a kindred spirit, though Martineau soon found the Hegelian impetus amongst the group the source of disagreement. One other point of difference was his committment in moral philosophy to a 'direct insight into moral facts' not accepted by the Oxford Idealists.

> 'He thus proposes as original moral sense or special moral faculty which is fundamentally different from every other faculty (as that of reason or aesthetic susceptibility). In this basic assumption he is in essential agreement with Butler and his doctrine of the moral sense. We call this position ethical intuitionism' (Merz 1938, 217).

Later in the century, in a chapter by Alban Widgery added to *Outlines of the History of Ethics* by Henry Sidgwick, who had himself attempted to found utilitarianism upon intuitionist premises, Martineau is classified as an intuitionist. Martineau's valiant defence from the accusation that intuitionists 'do not agree amongst themselves' is unwitting testimony that he felt comfortable within that position (Sidgwick 1967, 302-4, Martineau 1891, II, 285-289).

But undoubtedly rationalism and intuitionism in ethics found their most coherent exposition in the works of Adam Sedgwick, William Whewell, Thomas Birks and with qualification Henry Sidgwick at Cambridge. An exposition of their ideas may however usefully be left to the next chapter where the philosophical life at Cambridge between 1800 and 1860 will recieve an extended analysis.

f) Scottish and Common Sense Philosophy

In contemporary histories of nineteenth century intellectual developments two major texts stand opposed to the view that Scottish philosophy is of purely antiquarian interest, George Elder Davies' brilliant book *'The Democratic Intellect'* and R. Olsen's *Scottish Philosophy and British Physics* (Davie 1961; Olsen 1975). Other philosophical accounts have been produced which give patient and sympathetic treatments of the works of individuals and of the whole movement but Davie and Olsen have recovered a world of individuals, ideas, social networks and disputes which had been lost since the 1870's and which pour life into an otherwise sterile and uninteresting vessel. What Davie and Olsen reveal is that the Scottish philosophical, scientific, cultural and educational movement of the period to 1860 was a unique and powerful force in both British and European intellectual life. Its power and position was nurtured and jealously defended by succeeding generations of scholars from the perceived threats from various pretenders to the sovereign

philosophical mantle they claimed as theirs.

The first claim made was from the Philosophical Radicals in London and primarily from John Stuart Mill. The elder radicals like Bentham and James Mill were fond of the Scottish tradition being partly products of it, but John Stuart Mill saw Sir William Hamilton as the 'fortress' at the centre of its empire and set it under seige in 1865 with his *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (Mill 1865). A second threat was from England and in particular from the University of Cambridge. The threat had two sources reflecting the two wings of Cambridge philosophy to be examined in the next chapter, the rationalist scientific and classicist wing represented by William Whewell and Adam Sedgwick, and the Germano-Coleridgians represented by Coleridge, the Hares and F D Maurice and Grote (Davie 1961, 258-266; Ingleby, 1870, 9-22). From 1826 to 1860 the dispute between Cambridge and Edinburgh raged in book reviews, college and university meetings and in Royal Commission enquiries, resulting in a division within Scottish philosophy in the 1850's between the nationalists like Sir David Brewster and the anglophiles including John Sharp and J D Forbes (Davie 1961, 44-45, 61-64, 69-192). The interchanges became heated and Forbes was obliged to mediate between Whewell and Hamilton after one polemical outburst by the Scotsman against the elitist, specialist, mathematical and scientific education preferred by Whewell and Cambridge.

> 'For a season Toby Philpot may be champion of England, but mathematics and dram drinking tell, especially in the long run - so much for Mathematical logic; so much for Cambridge philosophy' (Davie 1961, 170).

For his part Whewell reinforced the view that Scotland was a philosophical backwater in his *History of the Inductive Sciences of 1837*, a charge repelled by David Brewster who described his adversary as merely a 'clever bookmaker' referring to Whewell's championing of

the scientific imagination (Davie 1961, 175). Matters worsened for the Scots when a domestic group injected a claim by Professors Blackie and Lorimer that Scottish education and philosophy could benefit from models available in Germany. It was German idealism which offered the third serious challenge to Scottish philosophical hegemony (45-6).

So in our period the Scottish philosophy of realism and common sense morality felt itself distinct from and in competition with four groups, the Philosophical Radicals, the Germano-Coleridgians, the Whewellian rationalists and intuitionists and the German idealists. This was a fair appraisal of the situation excluding only the rising positivists and materialists. How did the Scottish philosophers distinguish themselves from the Coleridgians, Whewell and the German idealists? Against the Germano-Coleridgians, the earliest English idealists, the Scots rejected their claim to have found a metaphysics or a set of reasons why common sense notions were valid ethical imperatives. This claim made by both Coleridge and Maurice was in line with the German idealism known about at the time, and so Hamilton and Ferrier when attacking either one, felt they were inflicting wounds on the other (Davie 1961, 263-266).

Frederick Maurice and Coleridge had decried Scottish philosophy as purely academic, aloof from practical and political life and mundane (Maurice 1890, II, 582-586, 672-3; Davie 258-260). Reid, Maurice claims, differs from the deeply philosophical Hume in that

> 'he regards common sense as quite another thing from this fine Parisian sense. It is literally for him the sense which is common to men, to philosophers, so far as they care to take up the position of men. It is that which he finds in himself' (Maurice 1890, II 582).

That all human beings believe in the existence of what they experience, and that this is based on 'conviction, or, as I call it, consciousness', Maurice shares with Reid, but he decries Reid's failure to provide an account of the speculations that support the

claim, the placing of common sense as something which, 'you may put aside into the back corner of a scheme' (583). Without a metaphysics Reid's attempts to bridge a priori and a posteriori theory must be seen to fail, and in the common sense school we have 'A tribe of such philosophers' who constitute a 'plague' on mankind.

Hamilton is similarly attacked by Maurice, for despite his wide knowledge, his unwillingness to separate philosophy from human interest and his support for Kant he both 'denounced Schelling, Hegel and all the post-Kantian pursuers of the Absolute' and he claimed that 'The Infinite is that which prohibits all advances', both of which Maurice sees as evidence of philosophical ignorance (672-3). In reply Ferrier made two telling points against the Coleridgians in his attack on Coleridge in 'Blackwoods' magazine in June 1840. Firstly it is argued that the transcendental philosophy lays claim to several 'main and fundamental ideas' that underpin all thought, but what Coleridge does not do is to bring them 'intellectually, effectively and articulately out - in elaborating them into clear and intelligible shapes...' Secondly, there is a charge of hypocrisy. Coleridge and Maurice had demanded from the Scots the reasons, the metaphysical considerations, that support the claim that we know things, propositions and moral axioms. So Ferrier throws back the challenge and asserts that no English idealist could provide anything more than 'shadowy intimations', they failed by their own criteria of adequacy.

> 'When, therefore, Mr Coleridge tells us that, before Schelling's time, he was in possession "of all the main and fundamental ideas" of the transcendental philosophy, we reply - very likely - that, in one sense, is just what you or we or any weaver in the suburbs might be in possession of; but show us your honey, for that alone will convince us that you are the philosophical genius you wish us to believe you to be' (Ferrier 1840, quoted Davie 1961, 264)

In addition to the charges of unintelligibility and hypocrisy made by Ferrier against Hegel and the German idealists quoted above,

Hamilton was to add two central objections. The first arises from Hamilton's espousal of mind and body dualism. The idealists, he thought, stress only the 'a priori' or necessary truths, they stress only mind and ignore matter, and they always overstress the creative and constructive power of the consciousness giving no account of how we know (psychology) nor any account of the inductive process that goes into making and confirming judgements (Segerstedt 1935, 92-94). Secondly the idealists tended to posit an Absolute, a coherent whole which is all truth, and which is in principle knowable. Hamilton wished to deny the last point about knowability, for him all knowledge was relative and conditioned by experience and judgement, and no total grasp of the absolute, was therefore possible (Segerstedt, 99-100; Seth 1890, 189-194; Alexander 1922, 291; Grave 1960, 126-9). This last objection appeared in Hamilton's first publication of 1829 in which he attacked the Frenchman Victor Cousins for being influenced by Hegel into believing, 'the unconditioned is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness' (Hoeveler 1981, 154; Hamilton 1829). Ironically Hamilton was better acquainted with and nearer to the German idealists intellectually, than all of his colleagues except Ferrier. Hamilton considered himself to hold the middle ground on several disputes between idealists and intuitionists, between common sense theory (Reid) and empiricism (Hume), and between the nationalistic and democratic culture and education of Scotland and the specialist and elitist challenges of England and Germany. In fact

> 'among more direct defenders of the Scottish School, including McCosh, Hamilton was always suspect, specifically because of his connection to German Thought' (Hoeveler 1981, 122; Davie 1961, 266-271, 298).

McCosh and others claimed that Hamilton was deserting basic intuitions and with them a basic pillar to the evangelicalism that was rising to ascendancy in Edinburgh and Scotland between 1850 and 1870 (Hoeveler

1981, 116-125; Davie 1961, 289-299). With Ferrier, Hamilton was suspect for the opposite reasons, he relied too much on intuitions, common sense and faith that empirical inductions from experience would lend support to the former and to the evangelical political and academic axis, led by John Cairnes, which stood between Ferrier and the Edinburgh University Chair of Moral Philosophy in 1852, and which in the end stood in the way of the development of a unique form of Scottish idealism in Britain (Davie 298-9; Ferrier 1856).

Against the Cambridge philosophy of rationalism and intuitionism, characterized by William Whewell, Hamilton and his allies had taken up several lines of objection. Firstly, Whewell had too much faith in the methods of mathematics, believing them to be the methods appropriate for the whole of science. But secondly, this reflected his undue faith in the existence, coherence and extent of application of 'a priori' or 'necessary truths', to areas outside of mathematics and science, including politics and ethics. Thirdly, Whewell placed too much faith in the art of discovery, the place of imagination and reason in science and philosophy, he downplayed inductive research in favour of the methods of the 'bookmaker'. Fourthly, Hamilton considered Whewell to have been too Kantian in his thinking, in that he drew up a massive list of fundamental truths in epistemology, mathematics, science and ethics which were both indefensible and which gave too much power to reason. Finally, as with the Germano-Coleridgians and the German idealists, Whewell was castigated for being too transcendental in his thinking, though numerous commentators since have noted both that Whewell took most of his cues from the Scottish philosophers rather than Kant, and that in return, he

> 'struggles in an interesting way with the complex of problems inherited from the Common Sense school, and at the same time

> tries to reconcile them with a transcendental point of view' (Segerstedt 1935, 104).

Hamilton and Whewell were in fact closer on many philosophical points than the above divisions suggest and Segerstedt has correctly placed them both as early pioneers of British idealism, as those who demonstrated 'that there need not to be any jump from the philosophy of Reid and Stewart to the philosophy of Kant and Hegel' (Segerstedt 1935,113; Thilley 1914, 513-4; Morell II 1847, 3-81). David Masson in 1865 could even write that Hamilton's philosophy was 'Scoto-German' (Masson 1877, 69). When I develop my thesis later on John Grote and his role in founding British idealism with James Ferrier, I shall return to this argument, for as Segerstedt further argues, Ferrier's idealism reveals 'that there is no breach between the old Scottish tradition and the Scottish Hegelianism.... formulated as a reaction against Common Sense Philosophy, and consequently also influenced by it'. Again he writes 'we find there are more of the main ideas of the Scottish School achieving a solution in Grote's system' and more than this, for in his 'theory of the degrees of truth and reality' we 'have left the problem of knowledge as formulated in the Scottish philosophy' and moved into absolute idealism (Segerstedt 1935, 140, 149). In the Scottish philosophy of the day and its debates with German idealism and the Cambridge rationalists and Coleridgians, we have the indigenous ingredients for a genuinely British idealism.

Scottish philosophy in the first six decades of the century underwent several modifications from the inheritance of Reid and Stewart. On the empirical side Thomas Brown (1778 - 1820) had explored the physiological and sensory processes of the mind and body while maintaining both mind body dualism and a common sense belief in the existence of the world. This philosophy, contained in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* of 1820, became popular

with James Mill, Jeremy Bentham and John Mill and was developed in Scotland by Alexander Bain (Brown 1845). A second strand supported the common sense epistemology and the intuitional morality of the school of Reid and Stewart. The key adherents of this view were John Caird and James McCosh. The third school was that of Hamilton and Ferrier who gradually developed traditional common sense philosophy and intuitional ethics in a more idealistic direction. While this last interpretation is debateable the key elements in Hamilton's modifications of Scottish philosophy are agreed and can briefly and usefully be noted because they are part of the context to which John Grote responded.

As with Reid and Stewart, Sir William Hamilton defended the idea of a direct perception of reality - the thesis known as Realism (Masson 1877, 75-7). He used the phraseology of 'immediate knowledge' to explain this rather than intuition or direct perception though he sometimes runs the concepts together. He remained a mind body dualist and like his predecessors he considered that what was inductively known via the senses, experience and thought, would confirm what are known immediately in perception and consciousness. Necessary and a priori truths are defined and defended as the fundamental preconditions for knowledge, certainty and confidence, in the areas of knowledge and ethics, but equally he recognised that several laws, like those of free will, and the existence of external objects need confirmation from experience and are therefore 'contingent', while the laws of causality, identity, contradiction and the excluded middle are 'necessary'.

After balancing necessary and contingent truths, the a priori and the a posteriori, Hamilton moved back to the issue of the relativity of knowledge and reality. We know by intuition, by conviction as a fact of consciousness, that the world exists and that things are as

they appear, but we can never know the world and things completely - we cannot know the 'thing in itself' in Kantian terminology or the 'Absolute' in the Hegelian system. The reason is that all we know is the phenomenon of consciousness, sense data, thoughts and judgements which we are convinced portray reality. But in both sensing and judging our physiological, sensory and mental systems set the conditions for what they can do and know. The initial impetus here comes from Hamilton's reading of Kant and Hume, who had shown the preconditions for knowledge for the mind and the senses respectively. But just as Hume had correctly deduced from empiricism that we must be trapped within a world of sense data, so Kant had deduced from rationalism that we must be trapped in a world of conditioned or relative knowledge. Just as certain knowledge of external objects is denied to Hume, so according to Hamilton, knowledge of the essense of things, of reality as it is, of the 'thing in itself' or the absolute is denied to the logical follower of Kant. There can be no 'Philosophy of the Unconditioned' to Hamilton, no knowledge of the Infinite, the Absolute, the totality of truth, the concrete whole or of any other unconditioned object.

This uncompromising position separated Hamilton from Ferrier, Grote, Green and Bosanquet who went on to search for a knowable absolute, and from the more subjective psychologists of Common Sense like Brown. It also provided a basis for one of the biggest philosophical debates of the century in Britain the history of which is rarely studied - the debate about the Unconditioned. Two participants in the debate who support Hamilton may illustrate this development, Henry Mansel from Oxford and Herbert Spencer, while three opponents may illustrate the depth and nature of the objections, those of James Ferrier, Frederick Maurice and James McCosh.

Henry Mansel (1820-1871) was Oxford University's leading

philosophical figure before the flowering of Pattison, Caird, Jowett and Green in the late 1860's. He was a clergyman of evangelical persuasion who eventually became Dean of St Pauls Cathedral in 1869. Of Mansel's major philosophical works only the Bampton Lectures or *The Limits of Religious Thought* brought him any fame. The central theme of those lectures however can be found in three of his other philosophical publications, his *Metaphysics* of 1860, the *Philosophy of the Conditioned* of 1866 and his edition of Sir William Hamiton's *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic* produced with J Vietch between 1858 and 1860 (Mansel 1858, 1860, 1866; Hamilton 1858-1860). This theme is the defence and application of Hamilton's philosophy, especially the theory of the conditioned. In the Brampton Lectures this produced a novel defence of evangelical faith in the face of scientific and rationalist advances. For if it could be shown that God, like the absolute and the infinite is unknowable, but that common sense intuition gives us grounds for certainty, as it does with the external world of the object of our beliefs, then the Christian can rest his case on shared belief, faith or hoped for revelation. Mansel in fact played down intuition, faith and therefore dogmatism in favour of revelation. No amount of study will allow us to know God because mind is incapable of grasping the infinite in time and space, for the absolute as an undifferentiated totality (Matthews 1956, 10-15; Reardon 1966, 288-9; Freedman 1969).

Something similar emerges in the discussion of ethics, for if right and wrong are absolutes and yet all knowledge is relative, then moral knowledge is impossible (Mansel 1860, 298). As in religion Mansel concludes that moral rules are purely 'regulative' not 'descriptive', or 'speculative'. What is unknowable in its totality may still reveal itself to us in its parts via revelation or faith; and the products of these are still authoritative, symbols of the

truth and are to be taken as moral imperatives. On other occasions Mansel hopes that our fragmentary ethical insights will be developed from incompleteness to coherence in some 'more comprehensive formula', by analogy with the development of intuitions or immediate thought into knowledge itself (Mansel 1860, 46-48). This last line of development is however, one of the novelties of Mansel's thought which eventually leads him gradually away from common sense ethics and Hamiltonian metaphysics towards an idealism similar to that of Grote and Ferrier. There were several other modifications made to Hamilton's system by Mansel especially in his defence of Hamilton from John Mill's *Examination* but these are purely internal to the development of Scottish philosophy (Seth 1912, 303-305). But the next Scottish philosopher to take on the mantle of defender of the common sense intuitive tradition, James McCosh

> 'perceived some disturbing implications here and feared the German idealistic tendencies in philosophies as much as he feared Mill's sensationalism. Both confirmed in his mind the need to establish anti-materialistic intuitionism on a realistic basis'(Hoeveler 1981, 116).

In this second reply to Mill's critique of Hamilton, McCosh reiterated the realist, common sense and ethical intuitive position of Dugald Stewart and used it against both the utilitarian and sensationalists as well as the British idealists (Hoeveler 1981, 27, 115, 125 and 139).

McCosh found James Ferrier far more worrying than Hamilton, and so indeed he was for evangelicals in religion, whigs in politics, and rationalists and intuitionists in philosophy. After his defeats in the struggle for the Edinburgh Chair in 1852 and 1856 Ferrier retreated to St Andrews University. Here he produced such a novel reworking of the Scottish tradition that it produced an original idealist epistemology and ontology which has been defined by some authorities since as a version of German absolutist idealism.

Ferrier's own rejection of this claim has already been recorded as have been his interest, knowledge of, and writings of Schelling and Hegel in *The Imperial Dictionary of Universal Biography* (Ferrier 1850). But generally George Elder Davie's case that Ferrier's work is to be seen as the last great and original development of the Scottish tradition is the one we must take seriously, and is implicitly supported by the best sources close to Ferrier in Scotland following his death in 1864 (Davie 1961, 274-306; Seth 1912, 332-339; Forsyth 1910, 102-109; Masson 1877, 171-175; Sorley 1965, 284-285; Passmore 1966, 52-53).

Details of Ferrier's thoughts can be left until Grote's responses to them are discussed in the next chapter but within this chapter we can note his opposition to the idea of the unknowable and the role of crude common sense intuitions. To combat the unknowable Ferrier introduced a new subject called Agnoiology, or the theory of ignorance. It is impossible to know that which is inconceivable. We can only be ignorant of what is knowable in the first place. Within Hamilton's terms the absolute is rendered as beyond comprehension, but to call us ignorant of it is to produce undue confusion and worry - we might 'as well complain of the unknowableness of Nothing, or of Nonsense'. However Hamilton's reasoning is also portrayed as faulty in that he had maintained mind and body dualism while Ferrier insists on monism, underpinning his system with the demand for the inseparablity of subject and object, thinking and being. To support these claims Ferrier had produced the only comprehensive, demonstrative and logical philosophical system I know of in British philosophy, in which via numerous propositions and syllogisms built upon one another, all starting with a fundamental idealist premise, we reach an absolutist idealist conclusion:

Prop I 'Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have same cognisance of itself' (Ferrier 1185, I, 79)

Propostion XI 'All absolute existences are contingent except one; in other words, there is One, but only One, Absolute Existence which is strictly necessary; and that existence is a supreme, and infinite and everlasting Mind and synthesis with all things' (Ferrier 1885, I 522).

Frederick Maurice,and Grote, like many other idealists found Hamilton's and Mansel's notions of the unknowable and unconditional equally objectionable because of their anti-rationalistic and anti-religious implications. The notion of a God, a Divinity, a cosmological and ethical order that was beyond human comprehension and scrutiny seemed to pull the rug from under those Liberal Anglican historians and Broad Church theologians like Hort and Lightfoot who were busily trying to support Christianity on rational grounds from the encroachments of science and materialism. Maurice set about this claim in his famous book *What is Revelation* (1859) in a debate that rivalled that over *Essay and Reviews* (1861) and the Colenso Dispute of 1864. Maurice reaffirms that the absolute and the divinity are knowable by reason, he rejects dogmatism and evangelical faith and advocates a notion of the progressive discovery of God and his will.

The full epistemological and agnostic implications of the Unknowable were taken up by Herbert Spencer in various writings but most importantly it occurs at the very beginning of the Synthetic Philosophy in the first pages of the *First Principles* (Spencer 1910, 3-96). Spencer uses the arguement to separate religion from science and then to allow Christians and non Christians alike to embrace his otherwise positivistic system. Yet despite an avowed submission to the tenets of Humeian empiricism, a kind of transcendent metaphysics underpins the whole of his epistemology, with references to 'unknowable noumena' and 'things - in-themselves' as well as the 'Unknowable itself'. It is this element that John Grote is to take up

later, for he saw like Frederick Copleston later that 'the arguments are not well thought out' and 'are indeed somewhat confused' (Copleston 1966, 165). One finds a similarity between Hamilton, Scottish philosophy and Spencer in the belief that certain a priori conceptions or intuitions have to be assumed before we can speak about knowledge. As Copleston noted, Spencer also confuses matters by referring to 'unacknowledged postulates', 'tacit assumptions', 'unavowed data', 'certain organized and consolidated conceptions' as well as 'fundamental intuitions' but in each case the Scottish common sense position is clearly seen to be exhibited (Copleston 1966, 147).

Scottish philosophy then, between 1800 and 1860, went through several modifications and developments all of which were widely publicized and debated at the time. At one extreme, that of Stewart, Cairns and McCosh the claims by Mill and Sidgwick that the school was intuitionist was fair, but on the other wing the claim made against Hamilton was narrow minded, and altogether wrong when applied to James Ferrier. The claim by Mill that intuitionism dispenses 'with the obligation to justify itself by reason' was neither true of Hamilton,nor of Whewell as we shall see later (Mill 1963, 191). In addition there was a perceived conflict at the time between the Whewellian and Scottish variants of rationalism and intuitionism which was not reported by Mill and which runs deeper than personal and institutional rivalries. In a most general sense Whewell and Hamilton did share a belief in the a priori powers of the mind, a confidence in the findings of our sense and judgements, that were an anathema to empiricists, and they shared a faith in certain 'fundamental facts' or axioms in ethics, but they differed on much else, and much that was important.

g) The French Eclecticism

Anyone reading through early Victorian primary sources on British philosophers and philosophies will regularly find references to names of some Frenchmen which mean little or nothing to modern readers (Merz 1912, III, 79). Yet some of those thinkers are not only interesting in their own right but they had a certain vogue and influence upon British thinking at the time, an understanding of which is today lost. In particular they exerted considerable influence upon John Grote and Cambridge philosophy as a whole. The key figures belong to a school of philosophy that succeeded both the Napoleonic regime and the philosophy that dogged it, the philosophy of Ideology and of Destutt de Tracy. This school was self consciously eclectic, that is it considered that most philosophies contained some element of truth or wisdom and that by collecting these abstract elements together we could produce a complete and coherent picture.

The key advocates, Maine de Biran (1766-1824), Royer-Collard (1763-1845), Victor Cousin (1792-1867) and Theodore Jouffroy (1796-1842) acted like jackdaws taking unashamedly from Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel; from Locke, Hume and Price; and most significantly from the Scottish Common Sense philosophers. With the exclusion of de Biran, they considered themselves the natural inheritors of the Scottish tradition and set out to develop its potential in such a way that both its members and commentators have identified a unique 'Scotto-Gallican' philosophy (Sir William Hamilton 1858, I, 399; Alexander 1922, 540-544; Breheir 1932, 42-100; Morell 1847, II, 457-480).(10) In reading the French eclectics British philosophers were re-importing a domestic product, just as had earlier occurred with the re-importation of Locke into English radical thought by Thomas Paine in the *Rights of Man*.

The eclectics had a special position in encouraging both the

Scottish and Cambridge philosophers towards idealism, though they were also taken seriously by John Mill and the Philosophical Radicals. For an understanding of John Grote's philosophy we should start with Maine De Biran's psychology for in this we find an original contribution to thought that inspired his own *Treatise on the Moral Ideals* (Robinson, 1915). This is the assertion that the most basic human experience of life is the tension between our muscles and our will, against the resistance found in the world. Life is a basic struggle to survive and to achieve, against physical, mental and moral obstacles. At the heart of this is 'want', the want of food, warmth, the want to move, to get and to achieve what we want. What this tells us is that man's nature experiences an essential tension between feeling (want) and activity (the action of satisfying want), or as Brehier writes

> 'The active self and its effort against the body, which resists it, according to Maine de Biran, contains the germ of man's whole intellectual and moral life' (Brehier 1932, 59).

But if man starts with want, his active nature is set in motion by will and hence we get the claim by De Biran that the whole

> 'intellectual or cognitive system be grounded absolutely on the system of the will, so to speak, and to differ from it only by expression' (1920-1942 De Biran VII, 400).

Victor Cousin and Theodore Jouffroy were famous in England for their popular histories of modern philosophy which were rapidly translated into English and which appeared on the reading lists for the Cambridge Moral Science Trips by 1860. What is intriguing is both the tracing of a philosophical current opposed to empiricism (sensationalism) scepticism, and materialism and the ethics of selfishness, outside of Germany. However instead of accepting the thesis that idealism from Germany, produces the only opposition to positivism, they sought in French philosophy since Descartes, in the English Philosophy of Clarke, Cudworth and Price, and in the Scottish Philosophy of Reid and Stewart, a sister movement. In the Scottish

Philosophy they correctly perceive the intention as being to unite two truths, (1) that inductive observation of experience and consciousness provide us with valid psychological insights, which (2) support the convictions which our fundamental 'a priori' beliefs allow us. While not as systematic as Kant's presentation, the eclectics found this version less obstruse and closer to the human experience of certainty and common sense. There is an implication that there is another route to idealism which does not rely on the complex metaphysical systems of post-Kantian German metaphysics, an impression strengthened when we find Cousin later defending a notion of the knowable absolute.

The notion of man's nature as 'spontaneous' and 'active' recurs in Cousin's thought, but he adds that mental reflection is the bringing out to completeness what is already implicit in spontaneous action, feeling or judgement (Brehier 1932, 86-88). This idea he also imputes to history, which must be seen as an unfolding of truths and possibilities only dimly seen at any one time. As with Hegel and the Liberal Anglicans in England the process of history was one of the unfolding of human freedom with human beings being themselves the carriers of God's divine will (Copleston 1975, IX, 44-6). Like Hegel and the Coleridgians, Cousin and his colleagues were wrongly labelled as pantheists and as traditionalists, they were rejected as metaphysicians in an age of positivism and were later ignored as a pale shadow of the dominant German idealist movement.

In fact they were a part of the wider European Counter Enlightenment or Aufklarung popularized by Isaiah Berlin of much greater interest and value than has been indicated here (Berlin 1981).

IV

'At a time like the present, when, as many at least think, philosophy is rather dull and quiet, and those who care about it are not numerous, is not a bad opportunity, before some fresh school springs up with energetic apostles, for dropping sectarian names for a while, in order that we may be able the more quietly to study the exact nature of the things they represent. And in the absence of such names, and in the comparative (controversial) stillness of the air, I think people might more easily, if they would try, get an insight and view for themselves. There is less dust about, less to blind the eyes' (Grote 1870,11).

This diagnosis and statement of hope was made by John Grote in 1863. However he saw this strange calm in the context of the period of massive and often bitter controversy that had preceded it. The period from 1830 to 1860 he described as a 'time of mental stir and controversy', but a time revealing such an expenditure of misplaced energy, 'wild conceptions of what is said by opponents' and of 'false issues', that he considered it had been 'injurious to (the establishment) of permanent truth' (Grote 1870,10). Contemporary philosophers he saw as too ready to accept the most obviously simple or practical solution to their problems; they were too ready to join 'sectarian' schools of philosophy and to become 'disciples' instead of 'searchers' for the truth.

The 1860's was indeed a period of relative calm in philosophy. Before 1865 few major British works appeared and those that did such as Herbert Spencers *First Principles* caused little stir. In religion, geology, science and anthropology the bombs were exploding. Darwin had published his *Origins of the Species* in 1859 after introducing its main thesis to the Cambridge Philosophical Society. This was followed by Lyell's *Antiquity of Man* and Huxley's *Mans Place in Nature* in 1863 and Lubbock's *Pre-Historic Times* in 1865. In anthropolgy Henry Maine produced *Ancient Law* in 1861 and Mclennan his *Primitive Marriage* alongside Tyler's *Early History of Mankind* in 1865. In religion there

had been the publication of *Essays and Reviews* and the ensueing debate in 1860; followed by Newmans *Apologia* in 1864 and Seeley's *Ecce Homo* in 1865. In the same year three writers produced philosophical texts of major significance though only one was heralded as novel for the time, the attempt by James Stirling at Edinburgh to reveal the *Secret of* Hegel to British readers. John Grote's *Exploratio Philosophica* fell on ears unready for his message in 1865. The major events in philosophy during this period were the two thunderbolts launched by the mature and confident John Stuart Mill, but they did not arrive in a unexpecting audience for both the *Utilitarianism* of 1863 and *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* of 1865 were just another chapter in the saga of the traditional controversies between intuitionist and utilitarians with the former, and the utilitarians and empiricists with the Scottish School of Common Sense in the later case.

British philosophy had remained preoccupied with the same or similar problems, argued from within similar schools of thought for two hundred years since the publication of the major works of Bacon, Hobbes and Locke. With the bare exceptions of an Irish Bishop and a handful of Scottish metaphysicians no British philosophers had shown signs of moving the ground. Yet the familiarity of the combatants with the field did not detract from the fierceness of the fight, nor from the enthusiasm of the forces, and the length of the battle only served to deepen the conviction of many concerned that the war was unavoidable and that the issues at stake were fundamental. John Grote found the major features of this controversy a source of amazement and wonder and he wrote not primarily as a participate but as a spectator, suggesting from the wings that the conflict was a sad mistake, the product of some considerable confusion and offering to provide a new reconciliation and a new harmony.

The history of seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth century philosophical controversies is well enough documented for me not to have to discuss it at great length, however most of the schools discussed above were in existence or under development during the period from 1600 to 1800. Utilitarianism and empiricism developed through Hobbes, Locke, William Paley and Bentham; scientism and materialism with Bacon, Hobbes, and the French materialists; rationalism and intuitionism with Descartes, the Cambridge Platonists including Benjamin Whichcote, Henry More, Ralf Cudworth and Sarwel Clarke, and Richard Price; romanticism with Herder; Rousseau, Burke and Wordsworth, idealism with Bishop Berkeley and Immanueal Kant; Scottish common sense philosophy with Thomas Reid, Thomas Brown and Dugald Stewart, and moral sense and sentiments school with the Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutchinson, Adam Smith and Bishop Butler (11). The nineteenth century philosophers inherited these traditions and their conventions and amended them to suit their purposes.

We must now pass on to Cambridge University and its two philosophical schools, the rationalists and idealists to recover the immediate context which attended the conception of John Grote's philosophical systems. However the wider context must be constantly kept in mind. John Grote worked within the language conventions and philosophical tradition of contemporary British philosophy, he sought to overcome the problems of the psychology, knowledge, religion and ethics bequested by Mill, Hamilton, Mansel and Whewell amongst others. Above all he was committed, as was Maurice,to revealing the knowably right and true, the knowable absolute, in the face of the scepticism of Mill, Kant, Hamilton, Mansel and Spencer, and in the company of Ferrier, the Romantics, the French Eclectics, several of the German Idealists, and the English Rationalists and Intuitionists.

Chapter Three

Intellectual Elites, Universities and Philosophy at Cambridge (1800-1860)

In a passing comment quoted earlier, Anthony Quinton made reference to a phenomenon of great importance in understanding the development of Victorian ideas in general and the massive rivalry between the suppressed forces of 'intuitionism' and 'empiricism' in particular denoted by John Stuart Mill. The comment refers to the *amateur* status of philosophers aligned to the empiricist, utilitarian, positivist and materialist causes. Refering to contemporary historians he wrote,

> `Under pressure they would describe the course of philosophy between Hume and Russell in roughly the following terms: first of all there is Mill carrying on in a more or less eighteenth century fashion, besides him spring up a whole lot of amateur philosophers like Spencer, of materialistic tendencies and intoxicated by the doctrine of evolution, at which point.the defenders of religion and public order pull themselves together and input a quantity of surplus metaphysical material from Germany, whose rich obscurity soon puts an end to the complacency of secular rationalism' (Quinton 1982, 182).

Before closing the context on John Grote through a study of his immediate philosophical environment at Cambridge I would like to spell out an interesting intellectual ideological and sociological phenomenon of the age, the mirroring of this major philosophical division between intuitionism and empiricism in the battle between the universities and the amateur literary gentlemen of the age. Further elaboration of the dispute and of the development of the broad range of Cambridge thought of the period will be left for the conclusions but we can note here the outlines of the dispute.

I

John Grote was very much a product of Cambridge University, and of Trinity College in particular, and for this reason he stood the risk of being defined as a reactionary and an elitist. According to the received view of Mill, Lewes and others the British universities before the 1870's were typified by administrative and academic reaction accompanied by intellectual sterility. Intellectual leadership seemingly was taken into the hands of a new class of thinkers, educated outside the universities and who propagated, almost unopposed, radical theories and programmes whose intellectual character was essentially empiricist, positivist and utilitarian. Though all the universities have to some degree been so defined Cambridge has often been treated as the stereotype of reaction. Recently the nineteenth century Scottish universities have been redesignated by George Elder Davie as the home and centre of arguments about national education and culture and of the School of Common Sense Philosophy (Davie 1961). Oxford has at least been remembered for her great liberal university reformers, Pattison, Jowett, Arnold and Green and for the one major university based philosophical movement in the country, i.e. idealism (Richter 1964; Sparrow 1967: Mehta 1975). Cambridge however has continued to be treated, with a few notable exceptions, as the home of conservatism in reform and 'arid rationalism' in philosophy as symbolised and realised in the lives and writings of William Whewell and Adam Sedgwick (Annan 1951, 130-131, 151-2; Sidgwick 1876; Mehta 1975).

The exceptions to this interpretation have come a good way to modifying the above assumptions in so far as the administrative reform and social character of Cambridge is concerned, but apart from one

excellent article by Susan F. Cannon on the `Network' of scientists and Broad Churchmen who dominated Cambridge thought up until the 1850's, Martha Garland's recent study of *Cambridge before Darwin*, and various writings on particular thinkers and discipline areas, nothing has been written to modify the received view in terms of intellectual character (Cannon 1964; Garland 1980). Indeed what has been written recently on Victorian Cambridge by Noel Annan, John Roach and Sheldon Rothblatt largely goes to support the popular view, propagated so successfully by Leslie Stephen and Henry Sidgwick, that Cambridge thought like the universities role in society and state, was undeveloped and largely uninfluential until the 1870's, the period marked by the popular recognition of their own achievements (Roach 1959; Annan 1951; Rothblatt 1968).

That the Victorian universities were to some considerable extent reactionary bastions of social privilege and church dogma is undoubtedly true though Martha Garland has done well to correct former exaggeration. John Stuart Mill and other external critics of the universities however, added the more dubious rider that the universities were also intellectually sterile, a belief that probably explains James Mill's decision not to send John to Trinity College, Cambridge in 1823 (Bain 1882, 28). With his father and Jeremy Bentham, John Mill tied the universities with the churches as vehicles of the `sinister interests'. According to Mill, university statutes and endowments ensured not academic freedom as was claimed by their custodians but academic immobility.

> `All beyond this, is to make the dead, judges of the exigences of the living, to erect, not merely the ends, but the means, not merely the speculative opinions, but the practical expedients of a gone by age, into an irrevocable law for the present (Mill 1867,I,5).

In his critique of 'Professor Sedgwick's Discourses on the Studies of the University of Cambridge' Mill adds that because of the security given them by ancient status and aristocratic endowments the universities and colleges had become homes for complacent and self-perpetuating elites. Intellectual 'degeneracy" was the result of this complacency, and so

> 'while they are thus eulogizing their own, and the results of their efforts: philosophy not any particular school of philosophy but philosophy altogether - speculation of any comprehensive blend, and upon any deep or extensive subject - has been falling more and more into distastefulness and disrepute among the educated class of England' (Mill 1867,I,98-99; also see 175,192-200).

The consequences of the decline Mill saw as worrying for the patriot.

> `In the intellectual pursuits which form great minds, this country was formerly pre-eminent. England once stood at the head of European philosophy. Where stands she now? Consult the general opinion of Europe. The celebrity of England, in the present day, rests on her docks, her canals, her railroads. In intellect she is distinguished only for a kind of sober good sense, free from extravagance, but also void of lofty aspiration; and for doing all those things which are best done where man most resembles a machine with the precision of a machine' (Mill 1867,I,96).

Thomas Carlyle wrote from a more romantic but still a non university stance in 1829,

> `the Metaphysical and Moral sciences are falling into decay, while the Physical are engrossing, every day, more respect and attention. In most European nations there is now no such thing as a science of Mind; only more or less advancement in the general science, or the special sciences of Matter ... Among ourselves the Philosophy of Mind, after a rickety infancy, which never reached the vigour of manhood, fell suddenly into decay, languished, and finally died out with its last amiable cultivator, Professor Stewart. In no nation but Germany has any decisive effort been made in psychological science, not to speak of any decisive result' (Carlyle 1829).

Few people outside the universities took exception to these general indictments though John Morell's history tells a very

different story and David Masson was to write in 1866,

> `Even at the time when Mr Mill wrote these words I cannot but think they described matters as somewhat worse than they really were´ (Masson 1877,3).

The story of the development of Victorian ideas presented in histories past and present give credence both implicit and explicit to the important role allotted to university intellectuals by Mill and his contemporaries. The picture most frequently painted, as Quinton notes, is one dominated by non-university men or those who though educated in the universities like Leslie Stephen, Frederic Harrison, John Morley and Richard Congreve became alienated as a result of intellectual dissatisfaction. In all these cases the fundamental reason for this aversion to the universities was their supposed opposition to the scientism and materialism and historicism which were the hallmarks of the positivism of the non-university elite. Opposition to scientism and the theory of progress whether by individuals, groups or institutions was taken by positivists as a badge of reaction and irrelevance and as an open invitation for them to be insulted or ignored. An acceptance of this prejudice has become the norm in subsequent histories of ideas. Positivists and the amateurs were understood as representing the `Spirit of the Age´, metaphysicians and university dons were the forces of reaction.

The masters of Victorian social and political theory are conventionally the Benthamites and their liberal successors around Mill, Morley and Stephen; the socialists of various hue from Owen to Marx and the Webbs; the romantic conservatives, Southey, Cobbett, Carlyle and the evolutionists from Spencer and Huxley to Bagehot and Kidd. None were university based. The recognized founding fathers of British sociology in mid-century are all defined as positivists

including Comte, J.S. Mill, Spencer and Marx. Supposedly university thinkers offered no basis for the study of sociology. In philosophy the story is complementary, concentrating as it does on the empiricism of the Philosophical Radicals, the materialism of Leslie Stephen, Spencer, Huxley, Marx and Engels, and the positivism of the English Comteans including Frederic Harrison, Harriet Martineau, George Eliot and G.H. Lewes. Lewes in fact encapsulated the anti-university prejudice felt by so many positivists and non-university intellectuals in his widely read *Biographical History of Philosophy* published in 1846.

> `Our great thinkers have not been men who made Philosophy a profession by which to gain their livelihood. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkely, Hume, Hartley, were not professors' yet they found audiences composed of thinking men *not* rival professors' (Lewes 1880, 638).

Oxford and Cambridge philosophy was apparently dead, it had few heroes of positivism, empiricism, utilitarianism, socialism, evolutionism or sociology. University philosophy prior to 1870 was held only to live by courtesy of the Scottish schools where both James Mill and Bentham attended lectures. Even Henry Sidgwick, the most famous Cambridge philosopher of the century, could write of his own university that in the first half of the century.

> `the educational movement in Cambridge was entirely absorbed in developing and determining the mutual relations of Classics, Mathematics and Physics and was content to leave Ethics and Metaphysics to the care of Scotland and Germany' (Sidgwick 1876, 235).

So any student of ideas who stops to analyse the structure of the Victorian intelligensia as portrayed in the historical texts of the nineteenth and twentieth century must seem compelled to conclude with John Roach that from the evidence available

`High Victorian culture is the age of John Stuart Mill and

> Carlyle, of Tennyson and Browning - which was also the age of university reform - was non-academic and non-specialised' (Roach 1959, 147).

Indeed it is true that many major movements of the century were based outside of the university and that additionally there were social, geographic, economic as well as intellectual links between them which created a very real sense of identity. The mid-Victorian intelligensia had a common geographical centre in London and several branches in the rising industrial centres of Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham. Further it had a common and well organised set of channels of communication in the great reviews and journals of the day as well as a common financial dependence upon the publication of their ideas. John Gross in his excellent analysis of *The Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters*, maps out the relatively ignored network of editors, journalists, reviewers, poets, historians and philosophers who contributed to such organs as the *Edinburgh and the Quarterly Review*, *Blackstones*, the *Fortnightly*, the *London Review* and its successor, the utilitarian *London and Westminster Review*, all of whom saw their job as moulding contemporary opinion and culture (Gross 1973). Social links were also forged in numerous literary and debating societies and distinct social circles emerged. Around Jeremy Bentham a group developed which included George Grote, John Austin, Alexander Bain and David Ricardo; around G.H. Lewes a group included Herbert Spencer, George Elliott, T.H. Huxley, J. Tyndall; around Marx there was Frederick Engels, P. Lafaurgue, Charles Larguet and H.Hyndman, and a group around John Stuart Mill which included at various times Thomas Carlyle, Herbert Spencer, George Grote, Alexander Bain, Sir William Molesworth, John Romilly and several members of the Cambridge Union including John Sterling, Frederick Maurice, Connop

Thirlwall and Charles Buller. These various connecting links amongst the 'amateurs', including the Philosophical Radicals, Marxists, and Positivists have been documented (Thomas 1979, Kolakowski 1981, Simon 1963).

Complementary studies of intellectual movements in early and mid-Victorian English universities are rare. The first to receive attention was the Oxford Theological Movement around Manning, Newman, Pusey and Wilberforce. More recently there have been several studies of the aristocratic liberalism centred around Matthew Arnold. Serious consideration is however reserved, as Roach suggests, for the late 1860's and 1870's when the new liberalism and philosophy of Hegelian idealism was developed at Oxford and when, as Rothblatt suggests, a 'Revolution of the Dons' took place at Cambridge which led to what some called the golden age of 'Sidgwick's Cambridge'

What is completely missing from any of these studies with the exception of the works of Garland and Cannon is a serious consideration of the major intellectual development at Cambridge between 1800 and 1870. What little attention has been paid to these developments suffers from a rather slavish acceptance of the pictures painted by Mill and two of his Cambridge allies, Henry Sidgwick and Leslie Stephen in his *Sketches from Cambridge, By a Don* (Stephen 1832). Sheldon Rothblatt for instance views John Seeley as playing the fundamental role in originating historical studies of a comparative nature at Cambridge, while in the fields of university reform and wider intellectual stimulation 'the central figure in any account of the generation of the 1860's' is Henry Sidgwick (Rothblatt 1968, 133). As a result Henry Maine is given only a cursory mention as an influence upon Seeley while John Grote and F.D. Maurice are

treated only as transitional figures in the philosophical education of the young Henry Sidgwick. In Rothblatt's writings, then, the original picture of Cambridge thought and thinkers painted by Leslie Stephen and the young Henry Sidgwick is transmitted intact and another opportunity to have analysed the independence, originality and coherence of their views is missed.

Some of these defects are made good by Martha Garland in her *Cambridge Before Darwin* which reveals both the liberal nature and broad extent of the reforms and academic developments in the period, but the book tells us most about academic development in the fields of mathematics, the sciences and classics and relatively little about developments in history, law philology, anthropology, politics and philosophy (Garland 1980). John Burrow has done much to resurrect the significance of Henry Maine and along with Stefan Collini and Donald Winch have researched the development of political science at Cambridge and the work of Sidgwick and Alfred Marshall (Burrow, 1968; Collini, Winch and Burrow 1983). There is also new work being conducted on Whewell and Macauley to place alongside Forbes' work on the Liberal Anglicans and various tracts on the 'Cambridge Apostles' (Forbes, 1952; Allen, 1978;). What is needed now is to show that during the period from 1820 to 1870 there flourished at Cambridge University an intellectual movement that offered a sustained challenge to positivism, empiricism, materialism and utilitarianism from something other than an intuitional basis. While only sketching the outlines here we can set the scene for a detailed discussion of John Grote's philosophy, his social and political theory.

Luckily the outline of what we need can be found in a masterly piece of scholarship by Susan Faye Cannon, *Scientists and Broad*

Churchmen; an Early Victorian Intellectual Network (Cannon 1962,1964 1978). What I wish to show here is that one nub of the Cambridge Network defined by Cannon was essentially idealist in character, deriving its philosophical influence from Coleridge, Julius Hare and Frederick Maurice; its historical theory from the Liberal Anglicans, especially Thirlwall and Maine; its religious approach from the Broad Church movement, and its ethics, politics and economics from an updated and systematised version of Romanticism and the philosophical whig tradition of Burke, and Macauley. John Grote I shall argue was the natural inheritor of these currents of thought and through his conversations and debates with Whewell and the Cambridge rationalists and intuitionists as well as with the Scottish School, the French Eclectics, the Romantics and opposition to the Philosophical Radicals, Positivists and Materialists he forged a novel form of English idealism. From these currents of thought and from the general Cambridge Network he developed his unique idealist epistemology, ontology and anti-utilitarian ethic, a Vichian theory of history and progress, an altruistic and socialistic view of human nature, and a use of both the Comparative Method and the Relational Theory of Society which he shared with Maurice and Henry Maine.

II

Evidence of a general Cambridge opposition to the positivism and utilitarianism of the non-academic elite ironically comes from the writings of the positivists and utilitarians themselves, especially from the magazine articles of John Stuart Mill. The very fact that Mill engaged in repeated controversies with Cambridge University thinkers past and present but especially with Macauley, Sedgwick and Whewell indicates that the positivists recognized the university as

harbouring a challenge to their dominance. The range and scope of the challenge was immense. Cambridge, in fact, provided the historical book-ends to the nineteenth century controversy about utilitarianism, in the form of William Paley's *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785) and G.E. Moore's `*Principia Ethica*' (1903) and the utilitarians and positivists found amongst the members of the university some of their most vociferous critics throughout the century. In the field of ethics they were opposed by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Julius Hare, William Whewell, Adam Sedgwick, John Grote, Frederick Denison Maurice, John Sterling, Robert Birks and Henry Sidgwick.

In law and political science the utilitarians were opposed by Thomas Macaulay, Henry Maine, James Fitzjames Stephens and John Seeley. In the methodology of science, logic, philosophy and the social sciences the positivists were confronted at Cambridge by the substantial figures of Sir John Herschel, William Whewell, Augustus de Morgan, John Venn and John Grote. In psychology opposition to empiricism came from John Grote and later James Ward. Positivist history was contested by the Germano-Coleridgians, the Liberal Anglicans and Henry Maine, who, along with James Fitzjames Stephens also opposed the political platform of the Philosophical Radicals, their idea of representative government and laissez-faire liberalism. Further opposition to the Radicals views on history and politics came from Macauley and the Philosophical Whigs with whom he was associated at Cambridge and Edinburgh (Collini, Winch, Burrows, 1983, 91-126; Lively and Rees 1978, Fontana 1985). In fact only in the figures of Leslie Stephen, who left Cambridge in 1864, Henry Fawcett, the Professor of Political Economy, and Henry Sidgwick did the

utilitarians and positivists have any substantial base for influence within Cambridge during the nineteenth century.(1)

a) Samuel Taylor Coleridge

The foundation of the mid-Victorian Cambridge challenge was, as Susan Cannon has suggested, based on a group known as the Cambridge Network. This group, consisting predominantly of mathematicians and scientists, established its formal contacts through the foundation of the `British Association for the Advancement of Science', and `Cambridge Philosophical Society' (which met in the university) and in the `Statistical Society' (which met in London). The Network also had informal contacts with classicists, philologers, poets, historians and philosophers at Cambridge, these included Coleridge, Wordsworth, Tennyson, Sterling, Maurice and other members of the Apostles movement. At Oxford there were connections with Augustus Hare, Thomas Arnold and Edward Stanley. Before I go on to survey mid-century developments around John Grote, I think it is necessary to look at the philosophical centres that were contained within the wider Cambridge Network and from which the later movements were developed.

The wider Cambridge Network contained two distinct philosophical elements. One was rationalist in terms of scientific methodology and faith in human reason, and intuitionist in moral philosophy. It was inspired by William Whewell (1794-1866) and Adam Sedgwick (1785-1873). The second was idealist in terms of epistemology and conception of history, originating from the work of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) and Julius Hare (1795-1855). We will begin with the Second idealist element.

> `I was still under the influence of Coleridge's writings - himself I never saw' (Maurice F. 1855, I, 178).

So F.D. Maurice attests to the relationship that Coleridge had with that group of thinkers at Cambridge who chose to oppose the `prevalent faith' of Benthamism in the University. Coleridge of course had personal contacts as a student at the University long after his hasty exit in 1795, and it was by these that he came to make Cambridge aware of the importance of German speculative thought, in particular that of Kant and Schelling, as an alternative source to intuitionism for a critique of the empiricist, positivist and utilitarian orthodoxy. Such aphorisms and stories as the following pericope taken from *Table Talk* served to convince, instruct and encourage the few in the face of the dominant ethos (I guess that the reference is to John Stuart Mill).

> `Mr------ is, I suppose, one of the rising young men of the day; yet he went on talking, the other evening, and making remarks with great earnestness, some of which were palpably irreconcilable with each other. He told me that facts gave birth to, and were the absolute ground of, principles; to which I said, that unless he had a principle of selection he would not have taken notice of those facts upon which he grounded his principles. You must have a lantern in your hand to give light, otherwise all the materials in the world are useless, for you cannot find them, and if you could, you could not arrange them. "But then", said Mr------, "*that* principle of selection came from facts"!-"To be sure"! I replied; "but there must have been an antecedent light to see those antecedent facts. The relapse may be carried in imagination backwards for ever - but go back as you may, you cannot come to a man without a previous aim or principle' (Coleridge 1884, 110).

For Coleridge and his successors this illumination of a world, facilitated according to empiricists only by the passive association of ideas and inductive generalisation, was provided by Fancy and Understanding. The major faculties accordingly were Imagination and Reason, the first being the creative and modifying power of mind, the other its capacity for the penetration and conception of eternal truths. For the Coleridgians,senses without mind, experience without judgement, facts without concepts, prudence without principle are

abstractions, and more, if one party to the dichotomy is to be taken as logically prior then it was always to be the latter. `The path of my system is to make the senses out of the mind - not the mind out of the senses as Locke did' (Coleridge 1884, 165). For such reasoning Mill defined Coleridge as one of the two seminal minds in England in the present. The other was Bentham.

Along with the central role of active reason and the imagination in knowing, which Maurice, Hare and Grote inherited from Coleridge, they also adopted his philosophical style. Philosophy is not to help construct an edifice upon `fixed certain principles' but to `unite the insulated fragments of truth' in the mirror of imagination and reason. Hence Coleridge's tentative *Aids to Reflection*, *Confessions of an Enquiring Spirit*, his *Table Talk* and *Biographia Literaria* are complimented by Julius Hare's aphoristic *Guesses at Truth* and John Grote's *Exploratio Philosophica* subtitled *Rough Thought on Intellectual Science* (Hare J and Hare A 1827; Coleridge 1817, 1884). In characteristic fashion Grote believed that systems were too often perfected at the expense of truth. For this reason he elevated lack of system in philosophy into a virtue. Grote describes the faults of excessive systematisation and, in particular, the application of inappropriate scientific methodologies to human action and thought as follows:

> `I have a belief ..... that truth is a mistress who reigns by the affection of her subjects, our thoughts, not by arbitrary calls for their submission. Whenever I hear these latter, I feel a disposition to think that it is not truth that is calling, but either something else in her name, or else servants of hers who do not quite know the proper language of her servants' (Grote 1900, 234; Coleridge 1884, 135).

Romanticism in poetry, history and politics, and an element of mysticism in religion were the rather obvious companions of such views

of philosophy. Taken with the terminology and association with German metaphysics and the image of the poet-philosopher, the whole package provided an attractive alternative to both the rationalism of the eighteenth century and the dominant positivism of the nineteenth as John Stuart Mill attests in his complimenting review of Coleridge and the German-Coleridgian movement (Mill 1965b 298-305, 314-318). Indeed, as we have seen by the 1830's intellectual forces

> as disparate as those of John Stuart Mill and the Scottish school under Hamilton and Ferrier found it necessary to come to terms with what they regarded as a major challenge to their own supremacy, the Germano-Coleridgean Movement, by now firmly associated with Cambridge University (Morell 1847, II, 240-247).

b) Julius Hare

The personal presence of Julius Hare at Trinity College until 1832 however, explains the continuity and dissemination of German ideas and idealist philosophy and historiography during the first three decades of the century. Julius and his brother had been deposited in Germany by their father, himself an historian of Germany, from 1804-1805, ostensibly to learn the language, but actually to imbibe the spirit of German thought and literature, in particular from personal acquaintance with Goethe and Schiller. Julius arrived in Cambridge in 1812 with a knowledge and library of German literature (now returned to Trinity College) which was unrivalled in England until mid-century and he immediately attracted a wide circle of the interested, including Whewell, Sedgwick and Thirlwall and even began to influence his own tutors, Sedgwick in Philosophy and Professor March in Divinity. Maurice and Sterling later became Hare's favourite students

and though his primary interest was in the classics, he cultivated their ideas in theology, philology and metaphysics, introducing them especially to the works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, George Bastion Niebuhr and Baron Bunsen.(2) Augustus Hare went to Oxford and became acquainted with Thomas Arnold through whom German ideas were further cultivated and disseminated, but together the brothers put together a popular collection of notes and essays published under the title of *Guesses at Truth*, which served to indicate a new direction for philosophical, historical, classical and religious studies (Hare 1897).

Intellectually the Hares set out to suggest the defects in the popular philosophers and prejudices of the day and then to hint at the form and direction that adequate explanations of man, society and civilisation should take. Positivism, Materialism, Empiricism, Utilitarianism, Scholasticism, Eighteenth Century Rationalism and the Scottish Common Sense School all come in for severe criticism and German philosophy alone was seen as `on the road towards the truth´ because firstly, `it had been enabled to appreciate the philosophy of former ages ...´ and secondly, it alone could accommodate in one system, the `I´, `Self´ or `Ego´ of the Kantian and the `Not - I´ of the Scottish and Empirical philosophers (Hare 1897, 134-5 470-471). To Hare, as for Coleridge, philosophy was understood as a form of speculation closely associated with poetry and philology, but most crucial was its affinity with history. The historical development of nations, states and civilisations were analogous to the intellectual or mental development of individuals - and the appropriate method of study was the `historical, genetical method´ - the study of the `progressive development of human thought´. Philosophy and history

then show the same subject matter and methodology that is the study of 'the gradual unfolding of all the faculties of man's intellectual and moral being' (Hare 1897, 334; Forbes 1952). Hare attributes this approach not only to Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, Ritter, Cousin and Niebuhr, but more surprisingly

> 'to the history of Science by Dr. Whewell and to that of Philosophy in the History of Moral Philosophy published (sic) in the Encyclopedia Metropolitana'

by F. D. Maurice (Hare 1897, 470). In summary Hare was a romantic inspired by German thought and especially idealism, who in response developed a view of history and language appropriate to English surroundings. The whole brew is called by Duncan Forbes, *The Liberal Anglican Idea of History* (Forbes 1952; Dockhorn 1950).

c) William Whewell

We can now turn to the second of the elements that made up the Cambridge Network in mid-century. William Whewell, a working class boy from Lancashire, was an early acquaintance of Hare and their mutual friend, the historian, Connop Thirlwall, from whom he acquired a wide acquaintance with Wordsworth, Coleridge and German literature, and in particular the philosophy of Kant. This influence never left him completely and indeed several writers insist that his writing retained throughout a distinctly idealist character (Morrell 1847; Marcucci 1963; Butts 1967, 1968;). But philosophy was not his main preoccupation until after the 1840's and he was never entirely convinced by either German metaphysics or historiography. Whewell's early interests were generated through his friendship with Sir John Herschel and George Airy two famous contemporary scientists and his early teaching and writing was involved with mathematics, minerology and tideology, culminating in his mammoth project for applying 'the

plan of Bacon's Novium Organon to the present condition of Physical Science' (Whewell 1847). Whewell's metaphysical and ethical writings were widely known, but were not received so enthusiastically as his ideas on the science of discovery. The reasons were simple, Whewell was not a trained philosopher, nor was there provision for such a person at Cambridge before the 1840's. As a mathematician and cleric he came to philosophy through the activities of scientific, classical and theological speculation.

Despite this unpromising background Whewell went on to perform some philosophical tasks, the significance of which, we still only vaguely appreciate today. Firstly at Cambridge he resurrected the Chair of Moral Theology and Causistry financed by Dr Knightbridge in 1839, and agitated until successful to establish both the Natural Science and Moral Science Tripos in 1848 (Sidgwick 1976, 242). While not attracting vast numbers of students the Moral Science Tripos were a wedge placed to allow the development of history, law, politics, and sociology and pure philosophy later in the century. Whewell also influenced the training of fellows in philosophy, insisting that fellowship examinations contain questions on modern philosophy and he facilitated their further education during college dinners and by building up comprehensive philosophical libraries at Trinity College and in the University Library. The post of Master of Trinity College and the Chancellor of the University fell to Whewell during this period and despite his arrogance, authoritarianism and the reactionary conservative stand he took later in life in College reform, his support for philosophy and the new social sciences were immensley influential (Robson 195, 168-176; Clark 1900).

Mathematics and science were never ousted from Whewell's academic

character by philosophy but were incorporated into it in a way reflected by the whole of the Cambridge Network and by the Scottish scientists of the day who used the common sense philosophy to underpin and bind up their philosophy and practice of science (Cannon 1964, Olsen 1975). On this point we reach a great irony for the intellectual circles of both Edinburgh and Cambridge contained some of the best practicing scientists in Britain with a wide philosophical and literary education, while their opponents in London led by John Mill and later Spencer, who were attacking them for their anti-positivist and anti-scientific stances, were relatively unacquainted with both practicing scientists, and the content of recent scientific discoveries. Cannon in describing how Mill and Whewell argued at cross purposes over scientific method, Mill arguing from logic and Whewell from the practice of science, recounts that Whewell's colleague Herschel

> 'had to persuade Mill to cut out of the second edition (of the Logic) some of the more glaring scientific mistakes in the first' (Cannon, 85).

Cannon adds an insightful point on Whewell's whole enterprise in his work on the history and philosophy of science,

> 'Like his remarkable friend Hare, Whewell was interested in the activities around him and what made them happen. He was using, what is, a Kantian approach; science does exist, regardless of what logicians think, so let us try to understand how that is possible' (Cannon, 86).

Indeed this scientific pragmatism, traced by Whewell as an almost inevitable historical development and reality in the *History in the Inductive Sciences* of 1837, and *On the Philosophy of Discovery* of 1860, was accompanied by a fundamental confidence that the practice of scientific discovery, which utilized both inductive observation and imaginative leaps, was made possible because the mind was capable of

both observation (via experience) and judgement, and that both of these relied on the existence of a mind equipped with Kantian categories for understanding. Unlike the Scottish philosophers and like Kant, he elaborated their nature and effect as well as producing external epistemological arguments for their necessary existence in his philosophical treatise the *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences* published in two large volumes in 1860.

The exposition of the subtlety of Whewell's argument would demand a thesis in its own right, here we must rest on one argument and then refer the reader to both the primary sources and to some highly suggestive secondary sources which indicate the Kantian and German idealist element in Whewell's epistemology. One aim of this exposition, apart from preparing the way for an understanding of John Grote, is to suggest that John Mill badly misrepresented Whewell in the debate between them, rather in the fashion of Marx's treatment of Hegel at the same time. Marx needed to characterize the antithesis of his whole philosophy in one movement and one man, and largely rewrote the philosophies of Hegel and idealism to suit his purpose. Mill needed to characterize his opponents in the same way. John Passmore noted that `Whewell's existence saved Mill the trouble of inventing him' but in many ways the Whewell of Mill's *Logic* and of the book review on Whewell's ethics is an invention (Passmore 1966, 19; Mill 1965a, 170-213). Whewell's position on science and ethics is rarely as simplitic, illogical or reactionary as Mill suggests. In fact I concur with several others in considering that on many issues Whewell gets the better of Mill in their philosophical if not political exchanges.

There is underpinning John Mill's critiques of Whewell an

assumption that the methods of observation of induction, of correspondence as the test of truth are alone of ultimate value in intellectual science. Mill's views were generally one sided and he needed to characterize his opponents as similarly one sided - but on the wrong side. They were merely in favour of deductive logic as exhibited in mathematics and geometry, the method of a priori reasoning and of Cartesian 'clarity and distinctiveness' as the criteria of truth. Such single sided views are attributed not only to Whewell but to Sedgwick, Hamilton and all other opponents of philosophical radicalism that Mill collectively calls the 'intuitionists'. Needless to say few of those figures held the one sided views attributed to them by Mill. Whewell, especially, reveals a disposition to embrace both views, by arguing for a place in science, epistemology and ethics for both induction and deduction, observation and reasoning, the correspondence and the coherence theories of truth (Segerstedt 1935, 103-113). Indeed many philosophers at the time, including Mill, were trying to synthesise these opposing currents especially inductive and deductive methods (Halliday 1976, 77-89; Fletcher 1971, 26-29; Ryan 1974, 93-94).

That Whewell tends to stress the methods of reason and the understanding as fundamental, as underpinning all thought and as the providers of unity in thinking,is not being disputed here, only the point that a valuable, necessary and unavoidable role is also given to the methods of observation and induction. The necessity and unavoidability arises from what Whewell calls the `Fundamental Antithesis', that for all experience, thought and knowledge there must be both sensations and alternatively ideas

'The antithesis of *Senses* and *Ideas* is the foundation of the

> philosophy of Science. No knowledge can exist without the union, no philosophy without the separation of the two elements'.

Antithesis means to Whewell and Hamilton, that two elements are needed in all experience and all knowledge, but unlike Hegel (and Grote) they consider that they are irreconcilable in a synthesis, they are ever doomed to constructive competition, to an essential tension.

The simplest expression of this antithesis, Whewell suggests, lies in the opposition of things to thoughts, the former belong to the external world and the latter to ourselves. He immediately insists that for all human knowledge there must be some combination of `some *thing* about which I know, and an internal act of one who knows' (Whewell 1860, i, 17-18). In a neo-Kantian or even Hegelian fashion he makes the simple transcendental idealist assertion that

> `Without Thoughts, there could be no connection, without Things, there could be no reality... One single act of the mind involves them both; and their contrast disappear in their union' (Whewell 1860, 18).

But the fundamental antithesis goes right through epistemology, to ontology, to ethics, law, and politics. Sections in the *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences* are devoted to 'Necessary and Experimental Truths'; 'Deduction and Induction'; 'Theories and Facts'; Ideas and Sensations'; 'Reflection and Sensation'; 'Subjective and Objective'; 'Matter and Form'; 'Man the Interpretor of Nature'. In the introduction he suggests the implications for his ethics,

> `This doctrine is suited to throw light upon Moral and Political Philosophy, no less than upon Physical. In Morality in Legislation in National Policy we have still to do with the opposition and combination of two Elements; of Facts and Ideas; of History, and an Ideal Standard of Action; of actual character and position, and of the aims which are placed above the Actual. Each of these is in conflict with the other; each modifies and moulds the other. We can never escape the control of the first; we must never cease to strive to extend the sway of the second. In these cases, indeed, the Ideal Element assumes a new form. It includes the Idea of Duty. The opposition, the action and

> reaction, the harmony of which we must ever aim, and can never reach, are between what *is* and what ought to be; between the past or present fact, and the Supreme Idea' (Whewell 1860, X-X1).

Like Kant before him, and Coleridge and Hare his early friends, Whewell considered that because we are most intimately acquainted with mind that it is here we should start, and he considered it to be the lamp that Coleridge saw as throwing light upon our sensory data. Likewise in morals, politics, law and history, the study of the actual means nothing unless the ideas, and especially the normative ideas of the actors are considered alongside. Whewell practised what he preached in his histories of the scientific development and in his *Lectures on the History of the Moral Philosophy* of 1852 and the additional lectures added in 1862. He also directs us to the fact of progressive development in the social as well as scientific life, arising from successive generations learning from the experience and inventions of their predecessors. Each generation advances in practice and produces new theories to account for this, a theme taken from his Liberal Anglican friends and colleagues (Whewell 1845, 366-7).

Whewell considered that knowledge progressed as men successively grasped the fundamental first principles upon which the object of study worked. This struggle was from the most particular to the most general explanation in which a whole area may be covered by one principle or law, whether that be in science or morality. So first analyze the elements, then the system and finally the ultimate principles and laws. We must believe that in the end the truths, scientific or moral, will became clear. When they do become clear we say they are self evident, and are formulated as axioms. The role of moral philosophy is to draw out these axioms by interrogating existing

moral practice and rules, by systematizing it and reflecting on the results (Schneewind 1968b, 112-144, 119-120).

The history of ethical philosophy provides evidence of Whewell's method, his assumptions about progressive development and an illustration of the logical priority he gives to reason and the understanding in these areas. The two analytic texts the *Elements of Morality including Polity* of 1845 and the *Lectures on Systematic Morality* of 1846, do the job of the analytic texts on Inductive Science and Discovery, they spell out the fundamental elements, rules and axioms of morality, and then systematize the results into a theory (Whewell 1845, I, V-IX). It is here that a historical and philosophical dispute arises, which is crucial to an adequate understanding of Whewell. Did Whewell here collapse his arguments into rationalism and intuitionism, into a belief in moral axioms and/or into an argument about the human capacity to cognise self evident or necessary moral truths? Are scientific laws and moral truths like the self evident axioms of reason and intuition which we have in geometry and mathematics? Or was Whewell really a Kantian idealist, treating the moral man, like the mathematician and scientist as endowed with a mind, innately equipped with the necessary analytic categories and powers to reason for itself, but not given direct intuitive insight into or sense of the truth, (the content of mathematical, scientific moral or political judgements)?

This distinction is at the heart of the differentiation of rationalists and intuitionists on the one side and epistemological and ethical idealists on the other. It is the distinction that Mill and Marx ignored in the castigations of intuitionism and idealism respectively. My view is that on the second question recent

interpretations of Whewell's philosophy by Rothblatt and Schneewind have given too much support to the view of Sidgwick and Mill, that Whewell was a rationalist and intuitionist, and that not enough has been said about the Kantian and idealist elements in his thought (Rothblatt 1968, Schneewind 1977, 101-102). The seeds of such an idealist interpretation of Whewell were sown by Morell, by Hamilton, by Marcucci in his `L' *Idealismo Scientifico di William Whewell* and by numerous brief comments since, but a serious study which would allow a convincing answer to this point is still awaited.(3) My own tentative view is that Whewell rather confusingly moves between the two positions, unable quite to throw off the intuitionist and common sense desire for direct insight into self evident moral truth in favour of a Kantian ethics of universifiability, a Hegelian concrete ethics or the idealist relational social morality of `My Station and its Duties' as described later by F.H. Bradley and Grote (Bradley 1876 Walsh 1969).

Whewell in fact desired a kind of moral geometry backed by a philosophy able to give a rational account of the axioms contained in the former (Whewell 1945, V-VII). He was not content to explain the categories or concepts that made moral knowledge possible in a neo-kantian fashion because he felt confident that the moral axioms were readily available to us. His *Elements* reported these elementary moral rules and truths and his *Systematic Morality* attempted to organize them into a coherent fashion under a Supreme Moral Rule, `Be benevolent, be just, be true, be pure, be orderly' (Schneewind 1977, 111). This belief in the discoverability of moral axioms seem to identify Whewell as a moral intuitionist. Yet he was careful to distance himself from the school of Moral Sense, who believed in a special faculty for gaining moral insights, who were regularly

confused with the intuitionists (Williams 1985, 93-94; Schneewind 1967, 107). However his ethics also have some idealist connotations. Firstly, he argued that everyday moral rules and axioms were both knowable and generally known by observation of customary life. Everyday moral rules and positive laws are expressions of the moral law and observations of them are our first step in moral science. Secondly, Whewell accepted the Liberal Anglican idea that the history of moral practice and thought revealed a gradual progression towards the moral truth. Not all moral axioms were known, nor the rational principles or reasons for them, but the history of ideas was a gradual progress to clarity, to moral knowledge (Schneewind 1968, 113-120; 1977, 102-104). Thirdly, Whewell opposed utilitarianism and placed the idea of Right above that of Happiness.

Whewell's ethics then have, like his philosophy of science and logic, both intuitionist and idealist elements, they are in fact transitional, and they reach their idealist potential in John Grote. But while being more sophisticated in form and quality than Mill implies, Whewell's ethics do seem disappointing in content (Donogan 1974, 1977a, 1977b; Hudson 1980). Content is given to the moral axioms from conventional social morality, as Mill recognized. Such axioms are not principles as with Kant but substantive rules such as 'we must do what is right', and 'we should desire of the good of all men', 'that each person should have his own', and we should 'tell the truth', and 'control the appetites by the moral sentiments and the reason' (Schneewind 1977, 110-112, Mill 1965a 196-204). We can further proceed in morals and politics by using historical research to support and clarify these rules, but Whewell tried to deduce them all from his biblical Supreme Rule. By historical design it seems that

the laws of conventional morality around Cambridge matched those of the Law of England and the Ten Commandments, and all could be deduced from the five ethical rules of Benevolence, Justice, Truthfullness, Purity and Order. Moral philosophy tended to degenerate into conventional moral judgements known via observation, induction and intuition as necessary truths.

Despite these reservations Whewell's philosophy has a charm and power of its own the best useful surveys of which can be found in the several works by Jerome B.Schneewind (Schneewind 1968, 1974 and 1977; Donogan, 1977a, 1977b, 1974). Other central points in Whewells philosophy will be taken up in subsequent chapters, but we can here conclude that in his adoption and application of Kantian 'categories' and the comparative method and the idea of the progressive elaboration of truth through intellectual struggle, he encouraged the acceptance of German ideas and the study of modern philosophy generally at Cambridge. As was usual, John Grote displayed great reserve but stated the truth when he wrote

> `with Dr. Whewell, my predecessor in the chair which I occupy, and to whom all those interested in Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University must feel themselves much indebted, I have long had the advantage of friendly intercourse. He has set an example in the University (not followed, I am ashamed to say for myself at least, as diligently as it might have been) of energetic and large minded cultivation of the subjects to which these pages relate which I should be sorry not to acknowledge' (Grote 1865, xxx1).

d) Adam Sedgwick

However, a more accurate picture of the consequences of the rationalist and intuitionist attitudes to philosophy and science at Cambridge in the period is contained in Adam Sedgwick's infamous *Discourses on the Studies of the University of Cambridge* (Sedgwick 1833, 1850). In the preface to the fifth edition of 1850, which is

twice as long as the original Discourse of 1833, the original propagation of the `inductive method´ is defended not only against its traditional enemies, the `experimentalists´ and `utilitarians´, but by the more potent forces of `Materialism´ on the one side and `Idealism´ or `Ideal Pantheism´ as Sedgwick calls it, on the other. The former heresy was illustrated by a historically very interesting account of an emergent form of evolutionary theory that Sedgwick labels the `Transmutation of Species´. It wrongly

> `assumed that the humblest forms of organic life, having thus begun, had also a natural tendency to breed upwards, as to ascend (by a law of progressive development) on a natural scale of organic forms:- that a monad thus passed by natural means (and by natural means only) into the more complicated form of some zoophyte - the zoophyte into a mollusc - the mollusc, by a like succession of natural steps, into a fish, a reptile, a bird, and a mammal:- and lastly, that by a like natural progression (in which all idea of creative power is excluded) some inferior mammal passed into a monkey and a monkey into a man´ (Sedgwick 1850, XViii).

The second foe, from the spiritual wing, is idealism and is regarded as even more dangerous. Sedgwick describes the development of philosophy and history in Germany `as amongst the most remarkable phenomena of the civilised world during the greater part of a century...´ but he quickly notes with considerable reserve `I believe, that, some young men of this University have had their peace of mind destroyed and their faith blighted by the subtitles and refinements of Rationalism that end in ideal pantheism´. The major culprits are Strauss´ *Life of Jesus*, Schelling´s `Subjective Idealism´ and Hegel´s 'Absolute Idealism´ (Sedgwick 1850, cclix-cclxv). This is excellent unwitting testimony to the prevalence of idealist philosophy amongst some of Sedgwick´s contemporaries at Cambridge.

The warnings of the dire consequences that follow the reading of the works of idealists are obviously aimed at the group of thinkers at

Cambridge prior to and during the 1850's to whom idealist methods in history and philosophy appeared attractive. J.H. Rigg's attack on the dominant idealism inherent in contemporary Cambridge theology, referred to by Sedgwick, adds another dimension. Rigg identifies Coleridge, Hare, Maurice, Kingsley, LLewellyn Davies along with Benjamin Jowett as idealists, neo-platonists and pantheists, and he identifies the `alumni of Trinity College, Cambridge' as at the centre of the movement (Rigg 1857, 1-3, 271-273). Rigg clearly connects Coleridge to `Schelling, Kant and Jacobi', Hare and Jowett to `Fichte, Schelling and Hegel', and Maurice and Kingsley to `the German mystics' (Rigg 1857, 8-9, 146, 276). More interestingly, while conceding that `the proper English school of idealism, though originally impregnated from Germany and continually influenced from that country', Rigg adds that English idealism `has a character and a pedigree of it own' (Rigg 1857, 272).

The sophistries and heresies that result from idealism are, according to Rigg and Sedgwick able to be met largely in terms of the highly unoriginal and unappealing proposal that undergraduates turn back from Strauss, Hegel and their English defenders `to study the Evidence of Paley' (Sedgwick 1850, cclxxiv). However for a short critique of the subtleties in Strauss, Sedgwick himself suggests a paper by Dr.Mill entitled `Observations on the Applications of Pantheistic Principles'. Similarly for a summary and attack on Hegel `The reader has now no need to turn over Hegel's Encyklopadie, but may see all he wants on this subject, extracted and condensed by Dr. Whewell into the compass of eleven pages' (Sedgwick 1850, cclxvi). Such a feat was obviously not to be missed by any self-respecting Cambridge student. Sedgwick's philosophy was indeed far less subtle

and sophisticated than that of Whewell, and his dependence on rational insights, intuition and the revealed God is so obviously the core of his ethics, that he nearly fulfills the stereotyped intuitionist painted by Mill (Mill 1965, 79-104). Section III of the original *Discourse* attacks Locke's empiricist assumptions and defends an innate capacity for knowledge, including moral knowledge. Unlike Whewell, Sedgwick adds a defence of the faculty of moral sense to a belief in the existence of eternal moral truths, and their identification with the moral doctrine in the Bible (Sedgwick 1850, 45-89; Mill 1965a, 78-104). Like Whewell he assaults the bastions of empiricism, associational psychology and utilitarianism.

IV

Three points about Cambridge in the mid-century should now be clear. Firstly, by this time Cambridge University had developed two major schools of thought, namely intuitional rationalism and idealism, covering the areas of philosophy and theology and history, both of which were opposed to the dominant positivism, empiricism, materialism and utilitarianism of the non-university elite. Secondly, both schools of thought had developed an original response to the dominant ideas of the day and neither simply mirrored the arguments of eighteenth century rationalists, moral sense theorists, intuitionists or contemporary Scottish Common Sense philosophy. Finally, perhaps only the Sedgwickian strain of Cambridge philosophy can correctly be labelled intuitionist and deserves the label of 'arid rationalism' so successfully stuck to it by Leslie Stephen and his biographer Noel Annan despite the challenge of at least one widely read mid-Victorian historian, J.D. Morell. For Morell, Cambridge philosophy in the mid 1840's marks

> `the transitional point between the English philosophy that partakes of the Scottish and that which partakes of the German character´ (Morell 1847, II, 240).

In the attacks by Sedgwick and Whewell on Lockian empiricism and Benthamite utilitarianism from a Kantian position, in Whewell´s use of Kantian categories in epistemology and in his attack on Mill´s empiricist Logic, in the philosophy of Coleridge and the theology of Hare, Morell claims

> `evidence, which might be adduced, or a nascent idealistic school in the University of Cambridge´,

which he claims represents `the dawn of a new philosophical spirit´ (Morell, 1847, 241-2). John Grote was as near to the fulfillment of this expectation as Cambridge was to get prior to the emergence of John Ellis McTaggart at the end of the century.

The philosophical inheritors of the Cambridge philosophical movement during the later part of the century all relatively unknown to us today, though perhaps such a fate is only deserved by the long-suffering intuitionist Whewellite, Thomas Rawlinson Birks (1810-1883). The election of Birks to the Knightbridge Chair in 1872 explains both why the emerging idealism evident particularly in the writings of Julius Hare and John Grote failed to influence the next generation of Cambridge philosophers and why Henry Sidgwick, involved as was Birks in the ancient battle between intuitionists and utilitarians, could, without major opposition, come to direct the future of the modern Cambridge movement. Whewell´s two immediate successors in the Knightbridge Chair, John Grote from 1855 to 1866, and Frederick Maurice from 1866 to 1872, have remained largely ignored by contemporary historians and philosophers partly as a result of their apparent unconnectedness with the late nineteenth century

Cambridge developments and because the early idealist tradition of Cambridge philosophy, which was the context of their work, was itself not known or understood.

Having now drawn the context around John Grote, from the continental and indigenous philosophies of the day and the debates and movements in mid-century Cambridge, we can now go on to examine and interpret the philosophical corpus of John Grote.

PART II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN GROTE

Chapter Four

Philosophy and its Methods

Now that we have completed an account of the general intellectual, social and institutional context within which John Grote worked we are in a position to examine his thought in detail. Chapter five will examine Grote's epistemology and the metaphysics that underpins it, and chapter six will explore his theory of human nature and the existential assumptions that inform his ontology and moral philosophy. The succeeding chapters seven and eight will spell out John Grote's theory of the moral ideas and his critique of utilitarianism which will act as a prelude for the crucial chapter on Jural Ethics which elaborates his social and political philosophy.

This plan reveals one central assumption and assertion of the author, that John Grote considered that moral and political theory was premised upon metaphysical, epistemological and ontological assumptions that must be clarified and analyzed as a prelude to further moral studies. We must remind ourselves of the order in which Grote wrote and set his priorities out in chapter one.

After having written his critique of Mill, and then the positive moral theory from the standpoint of which the criticisms were made, Grote felt philosophically obliged to explain the metaphysical foundation of both works. The early attempt, the intended appendix to the *Examination* later entitled *Idealism and Positivism* he recognised

as being too brief, too incomplete and too controversial, so he decided to write the two volumes of 'Rough Notes' that he called *Exploratio Philosophica*. These works were intended to underpin all of his other writings. He held back from publication of his ethical works because he feared that without an understanding of his metaphysical assumptions the ethics and social theory would be misunderstood or unappreciated. In addition the *Exploratio* was the only book to satisfy Grote as ready for publication and it was on the second part of this that he was working when he died.

In fact there was nothing original in Grote adopting these priorities for they were shared by most European philosophers from Plato to Mill, Whewell, Kant ant Hegel and were maintained by the best of later English idealists including Thomas Hill Green, Frederick Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet and later Michael Oakeshott. What was original was John Grote's belief that a proper prolegomena to ethics must also include a study of language. The lecturers and notes from which the essays 'On Glossology' and 'Thought versus Learning' were taken were originally intended as an introduction to moral philosophy. Hence we shall draw heavily on the long section on philology contained in chapter one above in the whole of this part of the thesis.

However one last methodological assumption underpins the existence and argument of the present chapter, one that links the various schools of hermeneutics, the various idealist historical schools and interpretive sociology, the belief that an understanding of human actions, including speech acts, requires an appreciation of an actor or actors intentions, reasons and purposes. Through an account of Grote's intentions and his beliefs about the nature and purpose of philosophy I hope to facilitate both an understanding of

his major philosophical texts and bridge the gap between contextual analysis of traditions and conventions of discourse already provided and the more textual analysis of Grote given below.

In this chapter then, I shall begin an outline of the philosophical foundations to John Grote's ethical, social and political philosophy. The analysis will be descriptive and analytic rather than critical, though fundamental gaps or errors will be pointed out in passing. This chapter will have four elements, firstly, an account of John Grote's fundamental intentions in producing his 'Rough Notes', secondly, an account of the problems he saw facing philosophy arising from the philosophical and social contexts of his day, thirdly, an overview of the character of his solution to these problems, and fourthly, an account of his views on the nature of philosophy and the methods to realise its purposes. It is my contention that such a survey will repay the effort when we get on to Grote's epistemology, moral, social and political theory, with the bonus that in its own right the arguments he considered amount to a major contribution to modern philosophy in Britain.

I

Intentions

There are many hopes, aims, purposes and intentions that John Grote harboured and expressed in his writing for his philosophy. Here we shall comment only on those most prominent in his mind as revealed in his texts and those which do most to explain to us the course he took in his work. The first and the most general intention was to clarify his own thought on the central problems of man and the universe and to communicate his struggle and his feelings to his audience so that they too might think things out for themselves and

make a contribution to the eternal human effort towards self understanding and the understanding of the universe. Clearing his own mind therefore, was a preparatory exercise for entering into the conversation called philosophy. Such claims appear throughout the *Exploratio* but most prominently in the `Introduction' to Part I and the Epilogue to Part II. In the former he writes that

> `I care not the least to dispute what one says, except with a view to clearing my own thoughts and those of others' (Grote 1865, xxiii).

For this reason the `roughness' of his thoughts, their `incompleteness', the style which leaves evidence of the scaffolding upon which he built his arguments, are seen as an advantage not a disadvantage to those who follow and who may hope to improve upon them (xxxiii). Grote happily defines his method and his aims as that of 'egotism', the `personal production' of 'real thought' and a concern with *saying something* (xxii, xiv). The Epilogue in Part Two has at the beginning of paragraph two, the following phrase,

> `Had the purpose of what I had written had reference to the *intelligence* only, and been what could bear no fruit but that of clearer and juster thought, I should not think it had been at all in vain. In the midst of the difficulty in which one is placed as to what to believe in and to trust to in this world of hollownesses, I do believe in human intelligence: and I do this, I think, very mainly because I recognise in human imagination not a rival of it, but a servant or a helpful sister. I have a belief - of course such a belief can be no more than a sort of moral confidence, and can hardly have intellectual grounds - that the more we can find out in any way about ourselves, our human life and powers, and our real prospects, the better and the happier we shall be....' (Grote 1900,330).

Two interesting points arise here, firstly that intelligence and imagination are helpful sisters in the task of understanding the world, and secondly, that 'clearer and juster' thought about 'ourselves' will produce human happiness and not despair - a reference I suggest to the religious despair that many were feeling at the time

following the atheistic claims being made on the basis of Darwin's discoveries.

The second intention for writing the *Exploratio* had two dimensions. One noted above, to provide the metaphysical assumptions and foundations upon which the ethical work was based, and the other to provide the positive truth rather than the exposure of the negative error that was presented in the *Examination* of Mill's Utilitarianism. On the second point we should remember John Grote's strictures against philosophical criticism as a practice and accept his statement that it was this and his personal hesitancy and irresoluteness which determined him:-

> `to put together, in an uncontroversial form, what seemed to me the truth, in opposition to what I thought error' (Grote 1865,viii).
>
> The truth turns to be a defence of 'Idealism' as against 'Positivism'.

The third intention is also general and it refers to his belief that an antidote was needed to the positivist 'Spirit of the Age', that was rising to ascendancy in midVictorian Britain. This 'Spirit of the Age' had several tangible forms. Firstly, it was to be recognised in the Comtean belief that the value of religion and philosophy belonged to past ages and that only science and scientific knowledge today had any importance (Grote 1900,322; 1870,11,277). Secondly, it arose in the belief that various scientific enterprises, from the study of physiology to the study of sociology, could render the study of human mind, human morality and human action irrelevant (Grote 1870, 310-313). Thirdly, it was recognised in both the belief that history was determined and that a study of or `running to history' was the way to discover the laws of human life (Grote 1865

xviii, 196,201). Fourthly, it was recognised in the 'spirit of criticism' which was prevalent at the time (Grote 1870,306; 1861). Fifthly, it was recognised in the prevalence of attacks on conventional moral and social opinion as well as religious opinion, and the willingness to let outsiders, be they scientists or lawyers, pronounce on these matters - especially upon religion (Grote 1862,24;1867). Sixthly, it was evident in contemporary culture in which there was amongst people a

> `kind of fear that religion and the old ways are dying out, and yet are not satisfied with a prospect of continual multiplication of fresh inventions and new markets, where they do not know what to look to instead' (1865,xi).

But above all it was recognised in the whole materialist, positivist and scientific movement that threatened to stamp out human imagination and will for improvement, and which offered only a dull, depressing and desultory vision of the world in its stead. Grote expresses the sentiments of the cultural romanticism of the day with its rejection of the new mechanical and scientific age, but as we shall see, he offers a well worked out philosophical base for this response. The whole attack and its clear point and intention is represented in the following phrase.

> `For the best thing that I can hope, and the thing which I most wish, for anything which I may say, is that it may be improved upon: the present generation seem to have more than one bright field of speculation open before them and what I *want* more than anything is to prevent their enterprise being dampened by their being told, whether on the ground of notionalism or positivism, that to know about God, to form a notion of an ideal of what should be done or what they and the human race should aim at - that this and much more like it is visionary and beyond the reach of human faculties; nor do I wish to prevent the truth of their look at nature, and the sincerity of the investigation of it, being vitiated by the suspicion and fear that they will be brought to conclusions inconsistent with all this, and which will force them to renounce their best birthright'(Grote 1865, xxxii).

The 'Spirit of the Age' then lacked spirit or vision, it was

practical and materialistic, it was one of carping personal criticism not the careful analysis of language and the speculative pursuit of truth, it was narrowly scientific ignoring the truths of philosophy and religion, it was deterministic and hence ran to history for its answers rather than being free and creative. It undermined everyday moral, political and religious beliefs and threatened to hinder the new philosophical and scientific researches of the day and to dampen the spirit of young philosophers and scientists in their search for the truth. On this Carlyle in 'Signs of the Times' was at one with John Grote (Carlyle 1829).

The fourth intention was more specific for it relates to Grote's strategy for rebuffing the exaggerated claims of science. The provision for an intellectual response was not only requested but was demanded by the public and felt to be a duty by many academics (Carré 1949, Ch.IX;Passmore 1968,Ch2). The challenge was leading to the growth of agnosticism in society that was evident even amongst John Grote's friends, Henry Sidgwick, Leslie Stephen and Aldis Wright. During his lifetime the academic reaction to the discovery of science, the rise of positivism and materialism had been partly conservative and reactionary. Whewell and Sidgwick for instance felt that the correct response to the publication of Darwin's *Origins* was its religious and scientific denunciation and a refusal to place the book in Trinity College Library. The Scottish Scientists and many of the Cambridge intellectuals aligned to the Cambridge Network took a more open minded, liberal and rational view, the outline of which we will explore later. The *Exploratio* is a part of this more carefully thought out and balanced response. Religion does not get a lengthy; a detailed or a dogmatic defence, rather its defence hangs onto the

coat-tails of a defence of philosophical idealism.

New researches in religion, history, sociology, philology, and science are embraced and encouraged by Grote, as likely, if pursued correctly, to provide the truth and resulting happiness. However, and this is a point of the *Exploratio*, if science and its positivist allies are confused or confuse themselves with philosophy, history and theology, neither science nor history, nor philosophy nor any knowledge can progress, and the human mind and spirit will be blighted. The claims of science and positivism then must not be rejected but put in their correct place, science must not be made into a system of philosophy, history, philology, psychology and sociology, nor be allowed to become its master as Comte, Mill, Spencer and many others wished (Passmore 1968,53-4).

Most of the introduction to the *Exploratio* and much of the rest of its pages are devoted to this last task. Those who exaggerate the claims of philosophy are castigated for falling into the errors of 'notionalism', 'relativism' and 'regulativism'. Those who work from the side of science, he calls phenomenalists and physco-physiologists who in his view have a valid perspective but who usually either overstate their arguments or confuse them with metaphysical claims, these are the mis-psychologists and the mis-phenomenalists.

> `The purpose then of what I have written is to clear the grounds, or to do what I could to help clear thought, both in respect of philosophy and of physical views of nature: the one is quite as interesting to me as the other, and they seem to me, rightly pursued, to be mutually helpful, not antagonistic' (Grote 1865,xiv).

This task, performed via the methods discussed next, is Grote's main contribution to British philosophy and society's attempt to come to terms with the new scientific world of the nineteenth century. The key task of the *Exploratio* is exhibited in this claim about why

certain authors were chosen for criticism, in this case Sir William Hamilton'.

> `the purpose with which I am at present examining Sir William Hamilton's and other books is to see how far the phenomenalists view and that of pure philosophy of knowledge are confused: i.e. how far there is vacillation, in the primary assumption, between that of a thinking mind and that of a phenomenal universe' (Grote 1865,85).

That was the aim and that was the achievement, using a model of error similar to Gilbert Ryle's notion of `category mistake' (Ryle 1963, 17-20).

II

Numerous secondary intentions flourish in the pages of the *Exploratio* and in other texts but these four establish the mission that Grote had set himself and against which the success of his epistemological writings should be judged. We should now summarise from the last three chapters the problem he identified as at the heart of British philosophy. This was the problem of the 'Philosophy of the Human Mind' embracing the issues of what and how we know, and of the language in which these issues are to be tackled (Grote 1865, x-xii). The problematic was in reality dealt with by the whole array of schools and thinkers I have discussed, but Mill had established in the public mind and many of his opponents accepted the picture, that the ultimate battle of philosophy was between intuitionalism and empiricism, the schools of thought and experience, the a priori and the a posteriori, the transcendentalists and the sensationalists. The former side described mind as active and creative and the latter group saw it as passive and receptive in the creation of knowledge, the former considered reason to give independent powers of cognition, the later considered reason to be a 'slave' of the senses, thinking being almost reduced to acts of the association of ideas. The former groups

were presented as pioneering the causes of religion, tradition and political conservatism by Mill, while the later groups were the chieftains of positivism, radical change and radical liberalism.

John Grote's response to this problematic and this paradigm was novel. He sided with neither the intuitionists, rationalists, Scottish Common Sense philosophers and teachers on the one side, nor the empiricists, phenomenalists, positivists, materialists and utilitarians on the other. Firstly,he provided a careful adjudication of the claims of both sides. Secondly,and more importantly,he offered a synthesis, a philosophical system that both incorporated the truths implied in each side and yet transcended the dispute. The adjudication was performed using numerous techniques I shall discuss next including the nascent form of 'ordinary language' philosophy I discussed in Chapter One. The synthesis emerges in the construction of firstly a separate, unique and sui generis field for science, sociology and psychology on the one side, and on the other, the provision of a novel form of Absolute Idealism which claims to explain both the objective world of things and events outside the self and the subjective world of ideas, aims and purposes in terms of both human and divine mind. The synthesis, Grote realised, would in the nature of things, be itself seen as a thesis and challenged by a new antithesis. And so he actually maps out the philosophical dispute that is to transcend the intuitionalist and empiricist controversy in an essay on the dispute between `Idealism and Positivism `(Grote 1900, Book V, 291-324).

III

The character of John Grote's synthesis may be outlined before the substance is detailed. This has four philosophic strands to it,

the last and most important of which will need some conceptual attention.

a) Eclecticism provides the first key to the character of John Grote's philosophical system (though he disliked the notion of system himself). This approach, associated with the French philosophers between 1800 and 1860, sought to draw a picture of the answers to questions by a unity composed of elements from a variety of sources. Unlike Hegelian philosophy which sought in synthesis the annihilation of abstract views in a new systematic totality, eclecticism sought the overcoming of partiality and abstraction more modestly in producing a clearer picture and a more coherent argument, which did not itself claim the totality of truth, but claimed to be only another step in its realization.

Grote never refers to eclecticism though he does mention in passing Cousin, Jouffroy and Maine de Biran, but the spirit of his work is eclectic, in that he constantly identifies the partial and one sided truths of various philosophies and then tries to overcome their abstraction in a more coherent argument. The method of identifying and overcoming abstraction will be discussed in the next section but we may benefit from at least one example of the method as applied to phenomenalism at the beginning of the *Exploratio*. He claims

> 'That in the view of philosophy or the examination of the nature of knowledge, phenomenalism is an *abstraction* (so to call it) from something wider than itself, with the truth, real but partial, which belongs to the notion of an abstraction: that the progress, an undoubted historical fact, made by both the individual mind and the mind of the race in clearness of phenomenal view is not an absolute correction of what has gone before, not simply a substitution of something better for this, but a correction of it in one particular direction, leaving what purports to be corrected still important and of force in other directions' (Grote 1865,2).

In the field of ethics Grote is even more specific and determined

to polemicize against systems of thought which abstract partial truths and set them up as the principle of ethics, imposing artificial rigor and comprehensivity at the cost of abstraction, narrowness of view and confusion of thought. One of the greatest sources of failure in moral philosophy is

> 'to seize hold of some one point, possibly of some importance and truth, to exaggerate this, and make everything depend upon it, recommending attention to it as what will at once set everything right' (Grote 1870,343).

Henry Sidgwick in the first of his two reviews of the *Examination* sets himself against both Grote's opposition to system and criticized the unsystematic nature of his writing. There is direct evidence here that Sidgwick had noted the eclecticism in Grote's writing and did not like it. First he quotes Grote,

> 'My subject is not one which I should have written upon without having thought a good deal about it, and without considering that I had really something to say about it; but I have not sufficient respect, in a scientific point of view, for the moral systems which are past to have any ambition to add one to the number. My idea of moral philosophy is much more as a thing which we all think and talk about, but often exceedingly foolishly and badly, so that what we want is good sense, discrimination, and wideness of view, than as of a thing on which our minds are free and unoccupied, so that what we want is to have it set out before us in the best systematic form for our holding it. It is right manner of thought that we want about it, more than systematic knowledge' (Grote 1870,7).

In his commentary on the passage Sidgwick praises Grote,(Sidgwick 1870a,182), for providing 'good sense', 'discrimination', 'wideness of view', subtle criticism', 'exposure of prevalent fallacies', 'acute and effective criticism', and 'fresh and independent thought'. But this was not enough, for Grote only praises a 'systematic manner of thought' and presents or exhibits (1) no system of his own, no explicit principles (2) no systematic thought, no exactness of method and (3) no 'appreciation of systems'. Sidgwick added in his second review, that Mayor's editing had to save Grote's thought from the

'perplexing prolixity in which it has always tended to luxuriate' (Sidgwick 1870b,197).

In the first review he comments that while Grote desired an 'ultimate reconciliation of moral systems' his thought led us to 'a lax syncretism, a languid acquiescence in oscillation between different principles', in the hope that 'it will come to the same in the end' (Sidgwick 1870a,182-3). The idea of syncretism was a favourite metaphor of the eclectics to describe the bonding of elements into the whole, they recognized the need to reconcile but include partial truths, not to destroy them. 'Perplexing prolixity' sounds like the quality needed to fulfill this task and it also sounds like the criticism of ordinary language philosophy this century.

b) The second character evidenced in the quotation from Grote above is that of what is later called 'Ordinary Language' philosophy. Not however the approach that considers that 'ordinary language' provides a better vehicle for expression than technical terms, for Grote himself coined numerous technical terms to help overcome abstract problems in thought and language, but the approach that claims ordinary use of words to be the carrier of the real meaning of speakers in a conversation. That the use of words is their meaning, is the argument Grote uses in the analysis of *On Glossology*, given in chapter one above, but in the rest of his works the patient analysis of the use of words, the discrimination and separation of various and equally valid uses and meanings, the pin pointing of linguistic errors or category mistakes and his clarification and distinction of questions is evident (eg Grote 1865,72-3; Grote 1900 184,214-216).

c) the third and a less pronounced character is somewhat existential, if we mean by that term a theory which starts with

'Being' not 'Knowing', a theory which starts with the fact of individual freedom and aloneness in the world and a theory which describes and analyses human life and activity as an attempt to overcome certain universal existential handicaps, which are collectively described as the Human Condition.(1) As we shall see, Grote satisfies all three parts of this definition in his view of (1) the basal fact of knowledge being in the unity of being and knowing, (2) the claim for human freedom as a fact of mind,and (3) in the novel theory of 'want' and of human 'dissatisfaction' as the basis and the outcome of human existence (Grote 1865,xvi,xx,48; 1900,190-1901,321;1876 Ch II Appendix,26-33).

d) Finally there is the most important and pervasive idealistic character of John Grote's philosophical system, the elaboration of which will follow shortly. Two points can be covered here, firstly, Grote is correctly called an idealist for three good historical reasons. One, he was acquainted with the concept and the ideas of earlier and contemporary idealists; secondly, he identified himself as an idealist; and finally, he has been identified by later idealists to be a member of their school of thought. (2) Secondly, and more importantly, there is the analytic evidence of his arguments. To prove this second point we seem in need of some agreed definition of idealism.

Unfortunately, 'idealism', like romanticism and most other descriptive philosophical nouns, is a cluster concept, that is, it embraces a large number of different groups and systems of thought. As a result, idealism is best described rather than defined and each usage is best seen in relationship to the family of uses to which it belongs and not in regard to the proof of presence in it of some basic

essentials. Luckily much of the groundwork for this exercise has been conducted elsewhere.(3) The usage related to Grote's work is that of the late eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century and not of the Platonist philosophy of Ancient Greece or the rationalism of Cudworth, Balguy or others. Secondly, the usage is philosophical and not practical, that is it refers to a theory of knowledge, morals and politics and not to a visionary, unpractical or mythical doctrine. Thirdly, John Grote's use of and his category of idealism does not rely upon the denial of the existence of the so called 'external world', a view attributed perhaps mistakenly to Berkeley, Hume, John Stuart Mill and other sceptical empiricists. We should remember here Donald Masson's classification of Mill as a 'Constructive Idealist'.

By idealism I take that usage which refers to a collection of philosophical systems that claim variously that the human mind plays an active role in both the creation of knowledge and of the universe of things; that claims man to have an imaginative, active and creative element in his human nature; which sees the moral end of life to be the pursuit of several ideals unified around the notion of self-realization; which sees history and reality as having some order and purpose which reflects either human mind or the mind of Spirit or of God; and which claims knowledge to be the pursuit of truth as coherence whether or not that can be gained in the form of the Absolute. Not every idealist shares all of these beliefs, just as no family member shares all the facial and personal characteristics of all his or her relations, but some elements are shared with some and some with others as in the analogy of the 'chain' or 'rope' used used by Wittgenstein to explain these matters.

Traditionally idealist schools of philosophy are divided into

four groups. The Transcendental idealists,such as Kant and William Whewell, argue that the mind contributes some essential elements to the knowing process, that is it provides a grid of categories and unifying judgements that make experience and knowledge possible, without which we would and could have only an undifferentiated manifold (das Mannigfaltige) of sense data. Such a view remains and remained largely subjective and formal, describing how we could gain knowledge and moral ideas but not describing their objective realization or their substantive content. Grote is highly critical of this approach to philosophy which he finds evident in the work of Kant, Whewell, Sir William Hamilton, and Dean Henry Mansel and A.C. Fraser (Segerstedt 1935,141-143;Quinton 1971, 22-26). As we shall see his criticisms are levelled at 1) the narrow idea of the manifold of experience, 2) the subjective sphere of the argument with its attendant failure to see mind, spirit or reason in the objective world and in history, 3) the failure to define the content of the moral ideals, and 4) the tendency of the Kantians to posit an 'unknowable substratum ' or unknowable 'thing in itself' at the heart of reality. These last errors he calls those of 'notionalism', or the attempt to realise purely abstract notions, to prove that a Noumenal Reality exists but is unknowable, when its very existence is a purely logical notion; and 'relativism', the notion that as all sense based knowledge is relative to our corporeal frames and experiences, and all logical judgements are relative to the conceptual categories we use complete knowledge of the coherent wholes of the infinite, of reality or the absolute (variously called) is impossible (Grote 1865,xxviii,185-191, 229,xii 62-4; 1900, 181-183,300-311; Seth 1912, 176-180. (For further elaboration see chapter five section one).

Objective idealism was largely an attempt to remedy some of these defects within idealism mentioned above. But in actuality it was opposed not so much to transcendental idealism but to the subjectivism of what was sometimes called subjective idealism. In Subjective idealism subjective human mind is alone accredited with the power and capacity to know objects in the external world. Such a view could be assigned not only to Kant but also to David Hume and John Stuart Mill. Transcendental idealism then is one particular member of the more general branch of the family of subjective idealism. Objective idealism is the third general branch of which our fourth variant of Absolute idealism is a member. It argues that some or all of mind, meaning, purpose or reason are entailed in our experience, ideas and knowledge of objects. Ideas are facts and objects, which are and which help develop reality. Mind and meanings are therefore objectified, externalized or contained in objective things like houses, persons, actions, and laws, as well as in ideas, concepts or notions or in the process of a changing world. John Grote expresses it nicely when he writes that,

> `for a complete view of things, we in our most developed and instructed thought suppose as much mind in the objective universe as we did in our first and most uninstructed thought' (Grote 1865,57).

Objective idealists may give many accounts of how mind relates to reality, how mind gets into objects, and what or whose mind is there? Is it a product of reification as with Marx's and Hegel's account of money, in which humanly created products get treated as detached objective commodities? Is it simply a product of human beings extending their meanings over objects such as prized household goods? Is it a product of putting meaning or mind into things as when an artist conceives and creates a picture? Or is the meaning put there

by the spirit of history, a universal reason or by God? Is the mind in objects human and individual; human and social put there by groups or societies via shared language, or is it the product of God or some pantheistic thing called Nature?

Absolute idealism is a variant of objective idealism though a very senior member of both this branch of the family and of the whole family network. Its claims are numerous and the exact use in which 'absolute' is to be taken as relevant is not clear (Quinton 1971; Sprigge 1983). However the following are the available sources of reference. Absolute may be used to refer to a) the comprehensive and complete, as in fully finished argument; b) the fully coherent, or perfect, without contradiction or anomaly or partiality; c) the ultimate synthesis, the bringing together of all knowledge or parts of truth and reality into one system, d) the reference to the whole of reality, existence or the universe - an undifferentiated whole, or e) a reference to the ultimate reason or mind behind all these things, be it God, or some other divine cosmological or physical force. Even Absolute idealists are not agreed on the usage and other possibilities exist to complicate matters. Hegel in Germany, James Frederick Ferrier and John Grote in Britain however identified their idealism as in pursuit of the absolute. They used the term confidently, they engaged in debate on its character and its knowability; and they were identified at the time and later as absolutists.

English Idealism is a tradition to be distinguished to some extent from that of the rest of Europe, even amongst the Oxford Idealists. Noel O'Sullivan has noted that there are three theories that characterise the English tradition of idealism, and though I consider the list to be too exclusive it remains a useful checklist or

guide against which we may judge John Grote's theory in chapter ten. The three are, (1) that subject and object are identical, since both fall within one whole, and that within this whole various degrees of reality may be distinguished, (2) that within this whole there is a movement of an absolute self towards self recognition, and (3) that individual human personality is not absolutely real (O'Sullivan 1969, 47). We may add from Pucelle that both the mind of the individual and society is an expression and pursuit of freedom in idealism, the central thesis of Hegel (Pucelle 1955, 126).

It remains only to support these claims and to explain how John Grote used the term, how his version of idealism is portrayed and argued for, and to what effect.

Another point can be made before we progress. John Grote had great reservations about the production of both philosophical systems and of schools of philosophy (Grote 1987, 224). His student Henry Sidgwick noticed that he had neither the intention nor the personality to found or head a new school of philosophy (Sidgwick A 1906). In addition Grote was an original thinker who we have seen waited to think things out for himself. He follows nobody and no school completely and he neither sought nor obtained the after life of the philosopher in disciples. The idealism he constructs is then 'unique' and 'home grown' and 'independent', neither slavishly following German models nor making extravagant claims to superiority or sovereignty (Cunningham,1933, 65; Passmore 1968,53 ; Seth 1912,339; Merz 1938,245). In this, as in many ways, John Grote bears comparison with Michael Oakeshott today, and indeed his brand of idealism in style and in substance, both in his approach and his epistemology, show remarkable similarities.

Finally, Thomas Forsyth in 1900 was to note that John Grote's idealism

> `presents a view of the experiential basis of knowledge such as on the whole under the present-day discussion of philosophy..... as both an early and a typical expression of conceptions current in recent inquiry' (Forsyth 1910, 139).

I will want to show that in many ways the Oxford Idealists committed errors warned of by Grote and he provided answers that had to be re-learnt in the decades from 1910 to 1940 by R G Collingwood, Michael Oakeshott and A Smith, who survived the new idealists debates with the realists and phenomenalists of the day, and who re-equipped idealism for its contemporary tasks.

IV

This section aims to describe John Grote's use of the terms 'philosophy' and 'philosopher' and to explain the methods he uses in the course of constructing his own arguments. The outlines given are of course only sketches that will be filled out in the course of the remaining chapters but some ideas on these general matters will provide valuable insights throughout.

For a start, Grote puts to one side the everyday use of the term.

> `By philosophy, as the analysis of consciousness, I do not mean a report and record of the popular opinions of mankind' (Grote 1865, 143).

Secondly, he consistently and repeatedly distinguishes philosophy as a unique view or perspective, as a logic and conversation sui generis.(4), Throughout his work there are, as I have argued above, careful distinctions between not only the realms of science, history, psychology, religion, mathematics and practical discourses, but also the discourses of sociology and physiology. The consequences of lack of clarity in distinction is always confusion, details of which will

emerge as we proceed.

The artificial separation of philosophy itself into three schools or branches, logic (real and formal), metaphysics and ontology is however discouraged as a source of confusion and production of abstraction,

> `people constantly talk about different professedly philosophical subjects as if they were like branches of physical science, say geology and botany, in regard of which one man may know and value both, another may know one and honour another as a co-science, another may know one and think, or pretend to think, the other worthless, all this be of no consequence in respect of his knowledge of what he does know. But this is not the case with philosophical subjects. They are rival claimants more or less for the same ground. The thinking wrongly about their relation to each other may do damage in all sorts of ways´ (1865, 155-156).

A similar point is made about philosophy´s relation to ontology (the theory of being and reality) (1900, 174-5). Philosophy is the genus with its own species; ´logic´ with its sub species of real (inductive) and formal (deductive) logic; ´metaphysics´ with its sub species of ´epistemology´, and ´ontology´ sometimes called the higher philosophy. Philosophy and science, psychology and sociology, are however each sui generis.

Philosophy itself has both a general meaning to refer to this genus and a specialised meaning as a reference to the coherent and adequate account of experience, knowledge and reality given in the *Exploratio*. Philosophy in general is concerned with

> `the examination of what knowledge is, how we know, and what we mean by certainty and truth: the examination of what liberty or choice is, what is the meaning of a purpose or ideal of action, what purposes or ideals present themselves to us, what we are to think about them´ (Grote 1865, xvi-ii).

The areas of epistemology, ethics, politics, the philosophy of action and practice, and the social sciences seem covered in this list and elsewhere he included the philosophy of history, science, and

religion within its compass.

The general nature of philosophy is to be abstract and not practical, to ask questions about the questions, such as 'what do we mean by meaning? or 'what do we do when we think?, rather than `what do we mean or think?' and `to what practical effect?' Philosophy then is forced back from the practical to explore its preconditions just as it is forced back from history, science, religion, psychology and sociology in an effort to explore the logic, language, assumptions and practices within them. Time and again Grote tells us that the only major resource for the task is mind itself. It is in clear thinking about these topics that philosophy has its life and value, and

> `The progress of philosophy is a thinking, and a re-thinking, and a re-thinking still more clearly and better, about the same matters of everlasting interest, and the philosophical disposition is to value correct thought about these greater things, rather than small originality, if it be so, in detail' (Grote 1865, 130).

Earlier he writes that `philosophy is no more than good and methodical thought...'(1865, xxxix).

But throughout the *Exploratio* the term 'philosophy' is most regularly used in a restricted sense to refer to the best of three approaches in modern speculation on the mind. As we shall see later the other approaches are valuable in their own right but are partial and abstract, they are 'phenomenalism' and 'physio-psychology'. The statement at the end of the *Exploratio* that

> `The study of mind and intelligence from the point of view of consciousness is what I have called philosophy' (Grote 1900, 332).

mirrors that at the beginning, when he writes that real philosophy

> `is what all *begins* with for us, for all that we call existence is for us a *thought* of ours, which it belongs to that philosophy to discuss that the nature, meaning, validity of' (Grote 1865, xiv).

Philosophy is unique in its approach, methods, language, and assumptions and alone provides the chance of providing a coherent and complete account of mind, knowledge, experience and the universe. Just how and why we will soon explore in detail.

Now we know how Grote uses the word philosophy we can proceed to examine the methods or techniques of analysis he adopts for the tasks in hand. All reveal characteristics and dispositions of modern philosophy, a careful deliberate and unpretentious air, a disdain for laziness and of thought on one side and dogmatism and rash generalization on the other, all tied up in the admission that,

> `I would much rather that what I have said should be suggestively unsatisfactory than unfruitfully satisfactory´ (1870, 7).

John Grote proceeds with as many tools as he can, too numerous to discuss all in detail, but six methods stand out as both central and instructive.

1. First and most important is the method of distinguishing, then keeping distinct and pointing out the errors of confusing together, ´manners of thought´, ´modes of thought´, ´perspectives´ or ´viewpoints´ as he variously calls them. Almost all Grote´s commentators have noticed his desire to separate the worlds of science and those of philosophy, in knowledge the perspective of psychology and that of epistemological philosophy, but Forsyth alone seems to stress the major significance of this approach (Forsyth 1910, 139). Already we have seen in ´Old Studies and New´ that the approach of the classicist is different to that of the philologer, that history has to be distinguished from the practical manner of approach, (in a point quoted by Michael Oakeshott), and from the scientific or positivist approach. Philosophy is distinguished from practice in the same essay

where Grote rejects the demands that it, like the classics and history, become more useful and professionally orientated, a point that underpins his attack on utilitarianism in the *Examination* of the Utilitarian Philosophy.

Religion, Grote sees as coming to issues of philosophy, ethics, science and practice but from another standpoint and he is anxious to insist on the independence of each. Religion and its language should not be asked to submit to the language of and practice of the law, we are told in the critique of Dr Lushington's judgement of the 'Essays and Reviews' case. It should not bend its knee to the materialist discoveries of physiology and psycho-physiology, science or even, as proposed by Mansel, Spencer and Hamilton, to the claims of philosophy or logic. Philosophy in turn, should definitely not submit to any of these influences, whether religion, science, mathematics, psychology and sociology.(5) With religion we have an approach which works from the assumption of a God whose intelligence and reason is in the universe, while in philosophy we can only justifiably work with the assumption of our human intelligence, and with our human intelligence as objectively written into the universe. That the two distinct approaches are complementary and go `hand in hand' is a basic belief within Grote's entire system of thought, but that philosophers should work to explore this from their own independent position, with their own assumptions, methods and language is regularly repeated (Grote 1865, xxxviii, 57-59, 79-81; 1870, 214-220, 358; 1876 xiv, 374-5, 393, 462, 467-70; 1900, 232-233,322-323).

Details of his identification of God and the Absolute will be given at the end of this chapter but for now I will end with two quotations from the *Exploratio* Part II which clearly show that

philosophy and Natural Theology come from different routes to the same conclusions, but that the two routes, languages, methods and approaches should be held distinct. In the first, quotation concerned with perception and the mind body problem, he explains his refusal to discuss the term 'soul' and of the supposition of

> 'what we properly are in the view of an intelligence which could thoroughly know us, and what is the fundamental fact of our *life*... I hope after leaving off to come a little nearer to considerations of this kind, but at present *thought*, our manner of knowing, is all my business'(Grote 1900, 182).

In the second quotation Grote simply tells us that in the end he must desist from judging between the claims that the mind in the universe is our own or God's on the additional grounds that philosophically we cannot judge, because the so called evidence of God 'is previous to the consideration of either'.

> 'The reason why we think in this way may be in ourselves, if so we like to express ourselves (for I think that this comes only to a matter of expression); but if so, the reason of *all* our thought and knowledge is in ourselves, for there is no principle upon which we can go in dividing it. Or on the other hand the reason for all our thought (this amongst it) being what it is, may be in the object, if we use such language. I do not judge this matter either way, because I do not think we can go further than what I have called immediateness, viz, the existence of fact, which is the reason for *that* taking place which we find to take place. I do not think there is meaning in discussing whether this fact or reason is in ourselves or out of ourselves: it is previous to the consideration of either' (1900, 221).

The fact of 'immediateness' is however our basal 'consciousness' it is not a revelation, a belief implanted or any other such thing. In the end we must separate explorations based upon a logical analysis of human consciousness from these based on conviction, belief or revelation.

2. Clarification of language, and in particular the clarification of the use of words is a self consciously chosen and regularly used method of approach by John Grote. The case for this method and

details of how we should proceed to isolate the meaning of words was discussed in detail in Chapter One. So far no commentator, except John Passmore, has isolated this method in Grote, and then he has related it more to the common sense and analytic style of G.E.Moore than to the purely linguistic style of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Here I shall rest with pointing out that the reappearance of Grote's philosophy of language in the *Exploratio* and some references to its application in the various texts. After that details of application will emerge in consideration of the various texts that follow.

In Part I of the *Exploratio*, Ferrier is taken to task for condemning 'ordinary thinking' and claiming that philosophy's role and main method was `to correct the inadvertency of man's ordinary thinking. She has no other mission to fulfill... no other business to do' (1865,72). In reply John Grote writes:

> `Suppose we call 'ordinary thinking' that which is represented by common language. This, in the main, I believe in, and think it is right. It represents what may be described as the way we learn, or come to knowledge:..I am sorry to say, I have always had the feeling, that the language of ordinary intellectual communication among men is better than the language of philosophers. And *the thought* therefore cannot be very bad' (1865, 73).

In what follows, Ferrier's use of language is regularly criticized, so that on pages 74 and 76 we find him criticizing the "language of 'matter per se'", "the language of philosophical 'laws'", the talking as if `knowing of it (the thing in itself) is like talking of eating light or smelling sound: disparate, incongruous', and `Mr Ferrier's language as to the necessary and contingent'. Almost every page of Grote's work contains some reference to uses and confusions of language, hence the verb 'to be', 'is' or 'existence' are clarified on page 4 of the *Exploratio*, sensation on page 19, intuition on pages 21-22, consciousness on page 23, object on page 61, and relativity on

page 62-66, and, most impressive of all, clarification of uses of justice in the *Examination* and of the concept of want in the *Treatise* (1870, 152-154; 1876, 23-30). John Grote's application of the linguistic method is both crude, irregular and sometimes ill-disciplined, more seriously he doesn't distinguish between various things that might be meant by the 'use' of words (Hamlyn 1970, 64-66). But his conception was original, provocative and too radical to be understood by his readers at the time. It is also tremendously useful as an explanatory device.

3. Where clear thought is impossible and conceptual clarification impossible because of the plurality of meanings, and the presence of confused meanings surrounding a word or phrase, Grote introduces the method of neology (coining new words). Several commentators note the prevalence of this technique including Charles Whitmore, Leslie Stephen and Alexander Bain but none, except Grote's editor, try even a partial explanation (Whitmore 1927, 308; Stephen 1901, 5-6 , Bain 1904, 253-258). The likely reason is that not recognizing the above 'ordinary language' element, the need to transcend some confusion by 'coining' could not be appreciated. Mayor however does produce Grote's own explanation of this device from another source. Grote denies,

> `that I have intention of making new words for what lexicographers may call the English language; I merely give defined terms to express certain relations of thought,' (1870, xi).

He adds that through this device his readers may be persuaded `to take pains to find out the author's meaning in philosophy..' and hence avoid `unsatisfactoriness and confusion'. However neither Grote nor Mayor recognize the anomaly. Ordinary language philosophy and neology make unhappy bed fellows, the latter seems to contradict the former,

and the neologism would only have value if it became the conventional usage.

For once, Grote's influence, in this direction, is not only justifiably recognized but amplified many times in an unusual source, the pages of the complete *Oxford English Dictionary*, and for this we must thank its first editor and former colleague of Grote's, Leslie Stephen. My research became exhausted after about the first sixty accredited coinings and re-coinings by Grote, but many more, some not recorded in the Dictionary are unique. Some of his most famous neologisms are 'hedonics' used both in the *Treatise* (14) and *Examination* (181), 'hedonics' and 'hedonology' to describe the science of pleasure and 'hedonometer' a humorously coined phrase to refer to an apparatus for measuring pleasure much needed by crude utilitarians. 'Eudaemonic' refers to the quality of giving happiness, 'Eudaemomics' the science of the subject; 'Aretaics', is the science of moral action and virtue, the opposite of moral response and feeling. `Felicific' was first coined by Grote in 1865 to refer to the quality of happiness, along with `felicific calculus' the system for measuring happiness.

Lauchlin D MacDonald rests almost the entire thesis of his book on the fact that John Grote once called his own system of thought, `The idealism, personalism, or whatever it may be called, which lies at the root of all that I have said' (1865, 146). Poor Grote suddenly finds himself struggling with the later problems of a whole string of late nineteenth and early twentieth century 'personalists' as a result of coining this word. It is usually Americans, including Edgar Brightman, to whom MacDonald refers though British thinkers who call themselves `personalist realists', such as John McTaggart, H.C. Sturt

and Hastings Rashdall who are more interesting in regard to Grote, get no attention (Brightman 1925, 1940; McTaggart 1901, 1921-1927; Rashdell 1902 and 1907; Sturt 1902). The term 'phenomenalism' to describe the metaphysical doctrine that phenomena are the only objects of knowledge was first coined by Grote in 1865, along with its derivations, 'phenomenal' a 'phenomenalist' and 'phenomenalistic' properties.

Leslie Stephen's does not attribute 'phone', or 'noem' or any of their derivatives to John Grote, though we have seen he used them before the first date of usage recorded by the dictionary as 1890. Variations on 'unitary', 'unitariness' are attributed by Stephen's, as well as those on 'ideal', 'real', and 'qualified'. Other key words he coins are 'acturience', the desire to act, 'bewilled' or pre-chosen, 'egence' the desire or need to exist in animal and humans, 'wantingness' the call to action, 'actional' pertaining to actions, 'describability' the capacity for being described, 'ideality' the quality of being ideal, 'maleficence', the attempt to give pain, 'vindictivolence' the desire for revenge, 'percepience' the capacity to be perceived, and various adverbs 'outgoingness' 'wantingness', 'thoughtness', and 'thingness'.

One final word is not only illustrative but highly suggestive of another mode of thought and philosophic method of the contemporary world, the post structuralism of Michael Foucault and the method of 'archaelogy'. In his system and that of Deleuze the point is made that the way we see the world is conditioned by the 'discourses' and 'epistemes' the belief paradigms available to us. The correct philosophical and critical method is called one of 'de-construction', the 'unseeing' of what we generally perceive. The word 'unsee' and

the logical and epistemological difficulties of undoing or 'unseeing' a text or a visage are discussed in a short but very suggestive chapter entitled `The Interpretation of Nature' (1865, 242-245), in which Grote argues that

> `We cannot *unsee* the prospect before use. Dr Whewell has well described, in a passage which I lately quoted, how the draughtsman (as I will express it) unsees to a certain extent ie by effort divests himself of certain habitual ways of vision or inference from vision; but we have got to unsee or unknow much further back than this, if we are in any way to attempt imaginatively to reconstruct our knowledge' (Grote 1865, 243).

4. The fourth and fifth methods will receive little elaboration because they either have been or will receive elaboration elsewhere. The method most obviously used and which explains both Grote's hesitancy in publishing and the 'roughness' of his thought is the method of internal dialogue, of 'clearing his thought', of 'rethinking and rethinking again' the same subjects, the methods of 'reflection' and 'self correction'. That Grote saw thinking as internal dialogue or language was covered in the discussions of 'On Glossology', that this method rests on an epistemological principle of great importance, the coherence theory of truth, will be argued later.

5. If dialogue with the self is an old method, claimed by many as useful, including Hobbes, the method of conversation with others is even older going back to Socrates. In conversation two or more thinkers express their meanings, enter into each other's minds and in actuality or imagination, argument and dialogue bring out, rethink, and recreate the object of their discourse. When Grote writes we have at first hand his thought, his internal dialogue at the time, unrefined and unashamedly so. When he writes however he also enters into a dialogue with others whose own minds are apparent in their books, their texts. The chapters on John Stuart Mill, Sir William

Hamilton, James Frederick Ferrier, Herbert Spencer, William Whewell and others are then to be seen as dialogues, as conversations between Grote and them, in which their books are their only voices. The aim is that of

> `entering into the view, following the arguments (and watching them also) seeing the difficulties and seeing whether they are met - and much besides of this kind´ (1865, XXVI).

The method is crudely hermeneutic or the method of interpretation attempting to interpret the interpreter through his texts, in a manner attempted here in this thesis and by Richard Bernstein recently, `In the following essays, I have sought to enter into conversation with each of the thinkers discussed, to penetrate to to the heart of their projects, and to criticise their projects, and to criticize their differing understandings of modernity´ (Bernstein 1986, 17). But it is at the centre of Grote´s general philosophical view (Grote 1865, 98, 159).

> `Philosophy has been from the first...discussion, argument - even when *delivered* in a gnomic and authoritative, or in a poetic form, it must rest, in the mind of the philosopher, upon this imagined - and it never can be otherwise" (1865, xxi-xxii).
>
> `The text of what he says being not only words, but *something*, is first his inward sight: but this is something for himself done, and even he cannot entirely trust it: we cannot allow that an idea is, by mere virtue of its clearness, certain and true. Hence mind must be brought into contact with mind - no man can know even his own mind without this. And thus the conversational and discussional form of much early philosophy is not an artistic accident of it, but belongs to its being...´ (xxii).

The references to the friendships of Ellis and Mayor, the dialogues of the Grote Society of which Henry Sidgwick was a key member, the college social and intellectual life with such Fellows and colleagues as William Whewell, Adam Sedgwick, Julius Hare; the philologers, Frederick Farrar, John Donaldson; John Llewellyn Davies, Fenton Hort, and Joseph Lightfoot, three radical enlightened

theologians; James Clark Maxwell and William Thompson the scientists; Henry Maine and Leonard Seeley the historians, and the dialogues with his brother George, recorded by Alexander Bain, were the method in practice, that stimulated the production of the final form in the written texts. The lesson for us is to read Grote as if he is speaking out loud, thinking out loud, as conversing with his opponents and his friends, above all, to think of his work as an invitation to enter into a conversation with him. This idea of philosophy as conversation has very modern connotations as will be suggested later (below chapter 10, section three; Oakeshott 1962, 197-247; Rorty 1979; Dallmayr 1984, 192-223; Bernstein 1986, 21-57).

6. The final method is the most general. It is the attempt to draw all the partial truths, insights and philosophical voices into a new harmony, a new syncretism, a new and more complete picture, into coherence. Despite his eclecticism, despite his often divisive and confusing linguistic and conversational methods, despite his hatred of the `Euclidic' and the `method of demonstration' of Whewell and Ferrier, despite his hatred of the rigorous systems, John Grote aimed for coherence and he methodically sifts through the available sources to separate the wheat from the chaff, before bringing together the parts into a constructive, coherent and true philosophy. I shall call this the Method of Synchronism and it is a vital element in all of the works we are studying here.

Many other minor methods are used by John Grote, especially that of developed imagery, the production of metaphors and especially extended analogies to explain complex points, and examples of this and others will be highlighted in passing. But we may conclude this section on methods with a reference to Henry Sidgwick's oft quoted

description of his mentor's deficient philosophic style, disposition and writings, and add some mention of his place in producing the 'Unknown John Grote'. Sidgwick wrote as follows to his lifelong friend H.G.Daykin's on December 8th 1866 when Sidgwick was twenty two years of age.

> 'I have not progressed since I saw you except backwards. At my age it is a great thing even to progress backwards; it shows that I am not stagnating. I mean, in respect of thought I feel more like a young man (in all the points in which youth is inferior to age) than I did in June. In the first place I have less of a creed, philosophically speaking. I think I have more knowledge of what the thoughts of men have been, and a less conscious faculty of choosing the true and refusing the false among them.
>
> I wonder whether I shall remain a boy all my life in this respect. I do not say this paradoxically, but having John Grote in my mind who certainly retained, with the freshness, the indecisiveness of youth till the day of his death. I wonder whether we are coming to an age of general indecisiveness;...In the present age an educated man must either be prophet or persistent sceptic - there seems no media via. I have sold myself to metaphysics for a time and a half a time, I do not as yet regret the bargain. Take notice that I have finally parted from Mill and Comte - not without fears and wailings and cutting of the hair. I am at present an eclectic. I believe in the possibility of pursuing conflicting methods of mental philosophy side by side' (Sidgwick 1906, 157-158).

The general impression left with those who quote the short reference to Grote in this passage is that it is an indictment by the student of his former professor for failing to come to conclusions and to be decisive. Such an interpretation fits both Sidgwick's later condemnation of lack of a system in the *Examination* , his failure to treat Grote's writing seriously in the rest of his life and in his earlier reference to Grote's *Exploratio*, where he wrote

> 'John Grote is going to bring out a book. Rough Thoughts on something, he calls it; they are sure to be rough, and sure to be thoughts' (Sidgwick 1966, 130).

However we should now reappraise this judgement in light of the above arguments in this chapter, for Sidgwick seems to have been seriously affected by John Grote in 1866, to the extent that Sidgwick

felt himself to be an eclectic, to be retaining the philosophical freshness and indecisiveness of youth. Sidgwick is also announcing his independence from the popular systems of Mill and Comte, and he recognizes that Grote's work is full of real 'thoughts', and later they are 'astute', 'independent', 'effective' and full of 'good sense' wideness of view' 'eager' and 'friendly'. In the 1876 essay on 'Philosophy at Cambridge' Sidgwick says little about Grote but what he does say reinforces the conclusion that he held Grote in high regard and that he saw Grote's biggest failing was to have lacked the personality or drive to take university philosophy on the decisive route that he himself later tried to steer.

> `Perhaps the peculiar intellectual excellences of John Grote, subtle and balanced criticism, varied and versatile sympathy, were hardly such as qualified him - original as he was - to be the founder of a school' (Sidgwick 1876, 244).

Sidgwick in my view was distressed at this point in his life and felt that his friends at Oxford especially Thomas Hill Green who were busily building their own school of thought, had stolen a march on Cambridge. Yet his Cambridge training was preventing him from founding a school, because of the eclectic spirit and fear of rashness. His own ethical and epistemological works both retain the eclectic spirit as well as numerous other Grotian elements. But we might also gather that through Sidgwick's relationship with Green at Oxford, we have evidence, at least of a secondary kind, that John Grote's ideas would have reached the Oxford idealists in the crucial period from 1866 to 1876.

Chapter Five

Epistemology, Ontology and Language:

The Metaphysical Foundations of Philosophy.

For a philosopher who by self admission and reputation was rather hesitant, trepidatious, fearful of rash generalizations and aware of the many-sideness of man and truth, John Grote's whole philosophical corpus is amazingly coherent, well founded and structured. Behind the appearance of agonized argument, apparently large concessions to opponents and general self depreciation there is evidence of the production of a new and original synthesis in modern philosophy, well thought out and supported by argument. The form of presentation is haphazard, Grote's style is difficult and involved, his methods were unusual, but the patient reader can detect in the pages of his books a real philosophical spirit or soul that identifies him as very much a philosopher's philosopher. I am mindful in what follows to try and avoid the fallacy of coherence, of imposing coherence where there is none, and for this reason numerous quotations and references are produced so that readers can judge for themselves. But it is my contention that a developed system of philosophical idealism is prevalent in Grote's epistemological works and this permeates his ideas on morals, politics, history and religion. The statement by Robbins, supported by many others, that 'Grote is quite unsystematic' needs major qualifications (Robbins 1967, 71). This we must now explore and substantiate.

As we have seen Grote's style involved entering into dialogue with other conversationalists in philosophy, and this often makes it hard to extract his own views from those of others. Grote's own voice can be detected in these conversations which always rise above the

land of the polemical and negatively critical. However several chapters in the *Exploratio* are devoted to personal thoughts, personal reminiscences, assertions of truth rather than error, the production of analogies such as the 'scale of sensation', clarifications of concepts such as 'matter' and 'sensation' and so on. It is from these views that Grote launched his re-appraisal of contemporary philosophy and it is better to clarify his own views before assessing his critical analyses of other work.

I

Philosophy and its Errors

Almost all commentators have noted that at the heart of the *Exploratio* is the distinction between philosophy and science or rather various scientific subjects or those pretending to be science. The first sentence of chapter one states boldly that

> 'I am about to try to explain a manner of thought which, in various applications, or perhaps misapplications, of it, I have been in the habit of mentally characterizing and perhaps speaking of, as 'positivism' (Grote 1865, 1).

Philosophy, we shall see, alone can get to the basis of knowledge, reality and the meaning of things and actions, the universe. Its opponents take a partial view, starting from true but abstract or incomplete premises, and hence their final contributions are inadequate. But these abstract approaches continually make claims to the totality of truth and seek to remove philosophy from its fundamental place. In so doing they often exaggerate their claims, but worse still, they usually lose their logic and consistency in the attempt to become sovereign. Scientists, psychologists and positivist historians forget their own premises, inject alien metaphysical elements, confuse various uses of terms (such as cause) with one another, and in so doing threaten their own coherence and value.

Purged of these exaggerations, confusions and category mistakes, Grote felt that the new sciences were, and could be, carriers of truth, and he sought to advise their proponents on how to proceed to this goal. He did not seek to undermine, destroy or oppose science and its allies but to define them and keep them in their proper places.

The ground clearing appears in the introduction to the *Exploratio* Part One.

> `It perhaps may be said, that there are three main heads or kinds of philosophy in England at present, each of which it seems to me has appendant error: and it is against these errors that a great deal of what I say is directed´ (Grote, 1865, ix).

The first and the most popular branch of philosophy is empiricism, 'the Philosophy of the Human Mind' or as he often calls it 'psychology'. It is the subject of Locke, Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Hamilton, Spencer and Mill.In this approach we

> `attempt to analyze our consciousness while nevertheless we suppose ourselves, who have the consciousness, to be particular local beings in the midst of the universe of things...´ (ix).

To empiricists 'knowing' can be explained in terms of the history of sensory experience, it is a result of the `rubbing of ourselves´ against the matter of the universe, resulting in the experience of sense data, and inferences and judgements are made upon that basis. In a narrow sense this view is quite valuable and it works like many subjects despite its having to suspend doubt for its practice. But the 'philosophy of mind' in separating subject and object, in preserving the existence of the external world and in seeing mind as the product of its effects, is not logically founded. What is more it neither satisfies total materialists who deny that mental activity is in any way independent of physical processes, nor the philosopher who asserts that what we must start with is mental activity itself, experience, consciousness, or thought.

In attempting to satisfy the materialists or physio-psychologists as Grote calls them, the philosophers of mind make concessions that lead them to the fundamental error of 'mis-psychology' or 'wrong psychology' as he sometimes calls it (ix,74). This error amounts to a catagory mistake, the confusing of almost the entire epistemological vocabulary by running together different uses of the same sounding word as used in different descriptions of mind. Hence the physiologist may describe, 'see', 'perceive', 'judge', 'feel' or 'know' in one sense, as when he says 'when the sense data hits the retina I see the stone', while the empiricist adds that only when I think or judge or infer from the sense data on the retina do I 'see', and when the philosopher like Reid just asserts that in pure consciousness I 'see' the stone, it is in judgement without any reference to sense data or psychology (1865, 192-193, 236-7, 242; 1900, 46, 219-22). Hence Grote writes of Locke,

> 'This conversion of what is really one process into two by looking at it from two ends is what I have all along condemned as bad psychology. Locke would, I suppose, answer, that we have a sort of knowledge of the objects for the beginning, and then superadded to this, the gradual knowledge of growing experience or the reception of ideas from things, and of imagination, or formation of ideas about things, as can justify itself in any way to be right or truth' (Grote 1900, 46).

We shall see that Mill, Hamilton and Whewell, Stewart and Spencer all fall foul of this error. Grote seeks to rescue them from the error, to separate out legitimate psychology from its mis-psychological confusions and so to allow its healthy development. As it is he felt 'the old vein of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, or 'noo-psychology', is worked out...' and that 'this course will effectually ruin itself' (Grote 1865 x-xi). The real point now is to clarify matters further and separate out two legitimate areas for study, philosophy proper and a really scientific 'physio-psychology.'(1)

The second, but this time legitimate mode, of study is 'philosophy' proper or 'real philosophy', which must be 'disengaged' from the above. It starts from the ultimate or 'basal proposition' of our consciousness of being and describes knowledge, morality, politics, life and the universe from this.

> `Philosophy, by which I mean the study of thought and feeling not as we see them variously associated with corporeal organization, and producing various results in the universe, but as we understand, think, feel them of ourselves and from within, is something to me of an entirely different nature, and leads to entirely different fields of speculation from the physio-psychology which I have been speaking of' (Grote 1865, xi).

The basal fact or 'given' we shall soon see is 'consciousness of being', not the one sided thought of Descartes but the united thought and feeling of being, posited by Hegel in his early *Phenomenology of the Mind* (Hegel 1910). All knowledge and all action are seen as satisfactorily explicable only in terms of and from this consciousness 'within'.

But Grote sees the dangers of this view, for from Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, Whewell, Hamilton, Mansel, Fraser and even Ferrier we get the two errors or mistakes of true philosophy, its two bastard children, 'notionalism' and 'relativism', plus a third in the field of morality called 'regulativism'. Each has its own character, problems and solutions. Notionalism is the error of 'realising' or trying to posit in reality concepts or notions that are merely logical or abstract, even though necessary for philosophical explanation. It is mistaking logical or metaphysical catagories for 'real things', as for instance if we go hunting for empirical evidence of the good 'quality' of a car or a moral act, or if one tried to see 'being'. This is philosophy or metaphysics gone mad, it is the model of metaphysics and transcendentalism that Mill mocks, and of idealism which Marx was mocking at the time (Marx 1975, 80-81). Grote saw the point of many

of the general objections to metaphysics and sought to defend it by monitoring its claims, as well as its language, and by making it stay within its own fields, its own logic and language.

Some of the major errors of notionalism are conveniently listed in the introduction

> `The mixture of considerations *how we know* with the study of *what we know*, the supposition that we not only perhaps do not, but cannot, know reality, that we do not know existence, but only modes and modifications of it, that our knowledge makes, some sort of alteration in the thing that we know,- and other similar suppositions, which belong to the sort of philosophy which I have called 'notionalism' - all these sorts of things seem to me not only *to be* bad philosophy, but so far as they are attended to, to *make* bad physics' (Grote 1865, xxviii).

The taming of over zealous metaphysics and the tendency for its systems to make a mockery of 'ordinary thinking' and 'ordinary language' about the world of 'things' and 'beings' is pushed further in the isolation and critique of 'relativism'. Like notionalism it puts a `mask of theory over the face of nature' by deducing too much from the two claims that our experience (sensory) and our judging are both relative. The empirical relativist claims that we can only know that of which we have had sensory experience. The metaphysical relativist takes up different positions, one version is Hamilton's, that our knowledge depends on the 'constitution of our minds', reality therefore is relative to this, while another is Kant's and argues that in thought we only ever know predicates or adjectives of existence, the qualities of things and never existence, reality or things themselves (Grote 1865, 60-64, 236, 245; 1900, 303-312). The error arises, according to Grote, from a fatal misunderstanding of different uses of the word know, and confusion of the psychological and metaphysical accounts of the knowing process. In fact if we reason clearly we will see that knowledge is not relative in any of the senses noted above for we must

> 'consider the knowing power at bottom to be *one*, and these various manners of perception are simply the same kind of thing as if we looked at an object through different coloured glasses: there are different manners of seeing the thing, but one reality and one truth' (1900, 310)
>
> `It will be seen that the error arises from the supposition of the independent variation, so to speak, of manners of thinking on the one side, and qualities of the object on the other: on this supposition there is really *no* result' (1900,311).

Regulativism can be dealt with later in the context of the critique of

Hamilton, Spencer and Mansel.

Most of what follows in Grote's writings are a discussion from within what Grote calls philosophy, but he is anxious to isolate and explore the logic and defective forms of one further kind of modern mental philosophy, physio-psychology and its attendant errors of 'mis-phenomenalism' and 'ultra phenomenalism'. Physio-psychology is what today would include, neurology, zoology and ethnology, but Grote included within it the exciting new subject of 'mental anatomy', 'comparative anatomy, or the study of the varieties of animal intelligence' related to the human mind (Grote 1865, x). Alexander Bain, an acquaintance through his brother, is held up by Grote as the best recent exponent of this approach but he has in mind the whole explosion of zoological and anatomical research prompted by Darwin's *Origins*. Grote's point is that

> `The third kind of philosophy, though it is not properly philosophy, and is only good in its own place when it does not claim to be so, is that manner of looking at the universe to which belongs the physio-psychology... The error belonging to it consists of its claiming to be philosophy, or claiming to be all that need be considered. This error I have called ultra-phenomenalism or mis-phenomenalism, and I have given the reasons for my language: it is the same manner of thought as is very frequently called 'positivism' (Grote (1865, xiii).

Another error or potential danger for the physio-psychologist is of confusing his language with that of the philosopher as does Alexander Bain in his *Senses and the Intellect* of 1855, for

> `In the middle of a book of physiology, we come upon something, upon *thought* which, like an enchanters wand, makes everything vanish - makes all explode without ever remaining itself - we come upon a universal solvent - for it is not simply the external world, but *we* corporally, that vanish - and yet all this occurs in the middle of a system giving an account of *our* bodies, *our* organs, *our* senses etc´ (Grote 1865, xliv).

The point is to be repeated later and used to solve the traditional mind body puzzle. We can study ourselves, our bodies and brains either organically and scientifically, using `language most concretely physiological´ and the logic methods and tests appropriate, or we can study ourselves, our thoughts, and actions from within ordinary language refined by philosophical methods and logic. What we must not do is run the two together, for to do so will produce artificial puzzles and problems beyond any hope of solution. As I hinted before, John Grote outlined a solution to the mind body problem which was to reach full elucidation in Gilbert Ryle´s *Concept of Mind*, the theory of ´category mistake´.

In an insightful passage on the books to be discussed in the *Exploratio*, John Grote creates a scale, the polarities of which are the correct philosophy and pure physio-psychology, Ferrier being at the former end and Bain at the other. He notes that the books in between, those of Mill, Hamilton and Whewell are those that suffer

> ´that confusion of thought, as it seems to me, which one purpose of the following pages is to call attention to´

And Grote adds

> ´And also - what may excite some surprise, but I think it strongly - I think that the books at each extreme, so far as they touch any matter belonging to the opposite extreme, are likely, from their less confusion of view, to suggest truer thoughts than perhaps the others would´ (Grote 1865, xxvii).

Correctly posited in their own domains and language ´they are not hostile to each other´ but may complement and enlighten each other.

II

Positivism

One last contemporary development is elucidated that finishes the ground clearing exercise, the development of a literature on 'the past history of the human race, both intellectual and moral or civil'. This is the subject of Buckle, Comte, Whewell, Draper, Mill(in 'The Spirit of the Age') and of course Marx (though I imagine him to be unknown to Grote). John Grote recognized this literature to be novel and exciting, and legitimate in its own terms but he recognized immediately the error and confusion into which it was to run as it developed in the field of sociological theory especially. The trend he noticed was for all subjects to *run to history* and this 'historical tendency is a part of the character of mind which may be called 'positivism'.' For positivists the error is 'a blinking the great and real questions' which are those of the reasons why people think or do what they do, what we are by our thoughts and feelings and what we ought to do (Grote 1865, xviii-xx). Mandelbaum correctly quotes Grote's views of positivist historicism as a characterisation of that movement

> 'The study of the history of man is now put before us as that by means of which we are to understand man himself, and know what we ought to do' (Grote 1865, xviii; Mandelbaum 1971, 39).

In addition the positivist feels he can proceed as if history determines the way we act and think and can safely ignore that 'the great fact of the mind is human freedom, liberty and choice' (xvi). We may conclude with a long but vitally important quotation, for it contains the key to his whole rejection of positivism in philosophy, psychology, sociology and history, and it underpins his critique of utilitarianism and the determinist attack on human freedom in his *Treatise on the Moral Ideals*

'Already it is evident that the study of human progress, or human development, or civilization, is in a confusion most difficult to disentangle, on account of people's having failed to present to themselves as two different notions, the progressive improvement, on the one side, of beings with liberty, enterprize, aspiringness, and desire to do the best and the right and to elevate their nature, and, on the other, such a progressive development as we may conceive to take place in any kind of beings (or *zoocosm* as I have later called it i.e. system of kinds) a consequence of any natural tendencies in them or circumstances about them, independent of such free choice and aspiringness. In respect of the great important science of the philosophy of history, as we call it, it seems to me that the prospect is bad for the very reason which makes some think it good: namely, that we are looking to it for our morality: we want to find out from it what I am sure we cannot find out without perverting it, namely what we ought to do' (xvii-xviii).

To Grote 'Positivism' is a species of thought with many geni, including, the positivist logic of Mill and Comte, the positivist history of Comte, Mill and Buckle, and the positivist view of ethics, represented by Spencer, Mill and the utilitarians, the positivist view of mind that appears in phenomenalism, materialism and psychology and their confused offshoots such as mis-phenomenalism and mis-psychology, which Grote sometimes collectively calls positivism or phenomenalism. (2). Each area and each branch of positivism he carefully isolates and attacks, positivist ethics in the *Examination* and *Treatise*, positivist logic in his critique of Mill in Chapters eight and nine of *Exploratio Part One*, positivist history, in the introduction to the *Exploratio*, in the *Examination* and in the Essay on 'Old Studies and New', and the positivist account of mind in the long essays on 'Idealism and Positivism' and 'Materialism' published in Part Two, of the *Exploratio* underpinned by the whole direction of comments of the *Exploratio*. We must define the essential character of Positivism as expressed by Grote before proceeding to examine two of its branches, namely phenomenalism and materialism. Positivism is the attempt to account for everything in the world including human and social life in terms of science. That is firstly, it uses the scientific methods of

observation, induction and verification and deduction - from the scientific laws established (1865, 170 - 175; 1870, 2-4, 179;1876, 391). Secondly, positivism uses scientific assumptions which are legitimate for the science of nature but not for philosophy or human life, primarily the key assumption of an objective world existing logically prior to consciousness.

> 'The positivist scheme of thought is really the imagination of a state of things in which consciousness nowhere exists, underlying in thought, (and therefore with a natural suggestion of its preceding in time) a state of things in which it *does* exist. It makes particular and qualified existence an earlier idea, or an idea of a higher order, than knowledge or consciousness' (Grote 1900, 293).

This earlier existence the positivist just calls Nature, the Natural World, or merely Existence (Grote 1900, 297, 301; Grote 1865, 254-5). Other assumptions include as Humé pointed out, the belief in an order in the world, of a unity of thought, of causal connection and perpetual regularity, and of the persistence of objects. These assumptions are perfectly adequate for the physical sciences of astronomy, mechanics, physics, etc., but are utterly irrelevant when we turn to study human beings, mind, and action (1870, 179-182, 270, 285-286; 1900, 297-299, 313-318).

Thirdly, positivists use the whole language of science and apply it to the areas of man and society, to history, to law, religion, moral behaviour, mental behaviour and to rational processes, and they believe this to be a logically sound procedure. The language of cause, facts, laws, proofs, inductions, verification are shipped across with little thought as to their appropriateness and the dangers of confusion that may result (Grote 1865, 170-171). They also ignore, as James Ward is later to point out, that even words like 'atom' are creatures of the human scientific mind and are not concrete realities, they are part of a vocabulary, a coherent discourse about the world of nature, they are not nature itself (Passmore, 1968, 83). Fourthly,

positivism denies validity to any other discipline or explanatory system that either does not serve or conform to the tenets of science. Hence and

> 'Consequently positivism treats religion first, then philosophy, moral or speculative, or - as when thus thought of it is usually called -metaphysics, as two great dreams of human nature, the first in the main prevailing in the earlier, the second in the later stages of civilization...' (Grote 1900, 322).

A history that does not accept determinism, that rejects deterministic method, moral, economic, social and political assumptions, language and prescriptions, we have seen, is to be ignored and vilified. History for positivists is purely a succession of facts, though as Grote continually points out they inject or 'superadd' into it all sorts of metaphysical jargon about direction, evolution, progress, improvement, and ideals (1865, xv, 169-70; 1870, 171-179, 286, 279-302; 1876, 366-367; 376-7; 1877,286). The insights of poetry and art, along with those of religion, and all products of the 'imagination' are to be condemned as fantasy and discussed as irrelevant, as utopia, as a dream (Grote 1865 xv, xix-xx; 1900, 295, 295-298, 313-318, 323-324; 1876, 366-367).

Positivism as a whole, like all its children, is therefore a dangerous approach to the study of man and society, dangerous because while it is sucessful within science it attracts disciples anxious to repeat this success where its methods, language and assumptions are utterly inappropriate. The result is confusion disguised as prophetical insight, damage to other valuable explanatory system, and the production of disarray and doubt amongst the lovers of truth, of imagination, religion and humanity. Particular defects and illogicalities will be identified as they crop up in later arguments but the basis of opposition to positivism is now laid down and in broad terms I consider Grote's account to be perceptive and correct. What he considered was now needed was that science be put back into

its place as a partial provider of truths about man and the universe. In their places a good physio-psychology and phenomenal science should be encouraged, along with a positive science of morals called 'hedonics', and a 'history of all the advance of human thought and feeling'. But what was needed also was a proper philosophy of the human mind, proper history, moral philosophy, religion, and logic which would overcome partiality, get to the bottom of things and allow a new intellectual harmony to emerge. The significance of this 'taming of science' in Grote's work is recognized by Bernard Bosanquet, Thomas Forsyth, T. Segerstedt, and John Passmore (Bosanquet 1902, 128-130; Forsyth 1910, 140; Segerstedt 1935, 141-2; Passmore 1966; 53-54). It gets between little and no attention at all in MacDonald's generally poor review.

III

Consciousness, the Basal Fact of Experience

I shall now suspend the review and critique of positivism and phenomenalism and their adherents for a reconstruction of Grote's own philosophy, his theory of knowledge with its implicit ontology and theory of language. I say 'implicit' because Grote refuses to separate the often distinguished subjects of metaphysics, epistemology, logic and ontology, and because his philosophy of language is an integral part of his wider philosophy. Grote sought to unify philosophy at the same time as separating it collectively from its rivals, he clearly saw idealism to embrace and to be an epistemology, an ontology and a theory of language.

For a consistent, coherent and complete account of knowledge and reality we must start our analysis, as do all idealist theories, with

a rejection of that 'vast unauthorized assumption' that the external world exists independent of the knower , and start with consciousness and thinking.

> 'The basis upon which all rests - being not that things exist, but that we know them i.e. think of them as existing: the order of things in this view is not, existence first, and then knowledge with regard to this on to parts of it varying in whatever manner; but knowledge first, involving or implying the existence of what is known, but logically at least prior to it' (Grote 1865, 59)

But the danger here would be if Grote was setting subject against object in the process of acquiring knowledge and if he was siding with Descartes in placing mind, thought, and thinking against matter, objects and existence. How can Grote avoid either mind body dualism or else pure subjectivism or subjective idealism which makes subjective mind the only factor in knowledge? The answer is that the logical foundation of the thinking process is a unity of subject and object as it is with James Frederick Ferrier, a unity that remains throughout the conscious and knowing process. Thinking is the discrimination of subject and object from within the 'basal' manifold or seed that unites them in the first temporal instance and the metaphysical foundation point.

The starting point for all philosophical explanation of anything, the foundation point, the 'basal fact' as he often calls it, is self-awareness. From the first finding of themselves in the universe men are conscious, but not immediately conscious of self and things (the not self), not self conscious that is, not judging existence of things, but being simply aware. This idea of a something immediately 'given' is later to have an interesting and exciting history in an after life of Realism and the Continental Phenomenology of Nietzsche, Heidegger and their followers as well as in idealism and gestalt theory, but here our attention must be confined to John Grote (Ross 1970; Husserl 1970; Chisholm 1960; Spiegelberg 1960; Pivcevic 1970;

Megill 1985). The reader may however do well to acclimatise by reading J.J.Ross's *The Appeal of the Given*, for Grote seems to fit reasonably well into that version of the theory of the 'given' called by him 'Immediate-Experience Theory' (See also Taylor 1932, I, 58; Stout 1908, 20-46; Quinton 1973, 111).

Immediate awareness is one concrete whole to Grote that can be differentiated only in theory and philosophy. In our practiced everyday consciousness there is one continuous flow broken only on occasions of self reflection, the most extreme of which is the occasion of philosophizing. Grote repeatedly insists on the fundamental unity of awareness, apprehension or consciousness and on the unity of its context which is at one and the same time a unity of feeling and being, feeling and seeming, consciousness and existence. He argues

> 'that this first and original consciousness (to keep that word still for a moment) is double: that is, that we no more, and no sooner, feel ourselves to exist than we feel something to exist besides ourselves' (Grote 1865, 22).

This paradox must be explained, but he left the full explanation in note form to be included in Part Two of the *Exploriatio*, the most vital part of which is Book II on 'Immediateness and Reflection'. We find the account of immediate experience left vaguely outlined in Part One where he writes that,

> 'The important fact is that even our rudimentary consciousness, so far as it is intellectual, *i.e.* a seed of intellectual development, is a distinguishing ourselves from something' (Grote 1865, 23; 1876, 372).

The original seed is single and unitary, it is both a feeling and a feeling of being, it is the united basis for the whole of our later knowledge just as a seed is the single united piece of matter from which the whole of a plant with all its parts may grow, it is the potential, the implicit awaiting to become explicit. The seed is what he calls 'immediate thought' and sometimes 'intuition' and he is using

them in a manner very different to its uses by Reid and the Scottish philosophers, Descartes and all others except perhaps Kant and Hegel. The key idea is that immediate thought is a 'pre-distinctional' unity (Grote 1900, 154).

Firstly, in immediateness the differentiation between thought and being, self and not self is not apparent to us. Consciousness is a confused whole awaiting differentiation but not involving the attention, reflection and judgement to perform the task (Grote 1865, 109). 'Intuition', 'experience', 'thought', and immediateness in the vocabulary of Descartes, Hume, and Reid all carry the connotation of reflection and judgement but Grote wants this element reduced or even extinguished. The only other thinker and concept he quotes who gets near to his position is Kant with his concept of the 'manifold of experience' but even here he argues for clarification.

> 'Kant's 'experience' is liable to difficulties of a kind, which I have already touched on in speaking of Dr Whewell, who here is at one with him. Kant does not seem to give a clear account of what he means by 'experience'. But on the whole, when we speak of 'das mannigfaltige', the manifold of experience and intuition, which the conceptive understanding binds up into unity, it appears to me that what he ought to say is 'das verworrene', 'das unbestimmte' (the confused, the undistinguished) which then is digested, not by a special faculty adding to it ideas or applying to it categories, but by attention and notice intensifying and bringing out what is in the immediateness and intuition already' (Grote 1900, 157-158).

What Kant's picture of the immediate suggests, like Hume's, is a 'crowd' of sense data, impressions and sensations, waiting to be organized. What Grote puts in its place is the metaphor of a 'mist' being cleared, or a' picture' in whick the 'parts come out' on further study, or a 'film' which is gradually coming off our eyes. This is a radical modification of Kant and a major advance in idealist epistemology.

Secondly, the immediateness does not separate 'subject' and 'object' but unites them in a whole. This glue of the logical

foundations holds despite the stretching imposed by self consciousness, reflection and more experience. It allows Grote to speak of the knowable absolute, of the unity of subject and object, mind and matter and thought and its objects in the whole of experience including judgement. With others such as Kant and later Frederick Bradley the glue fails, and we are left with the problem of the unknowable (Bradley 1914, 166, 188). 'Subject' and 'object' to Grote are the 'duality' implicit in immediateness, they are the two sides or aspects but of a single united whole (Grote 1865, 61).

What Grote seeks to avoid is the idea that we have subjective knowing in the mind on one side; that we have an objective world first impressing itself on a passive mind, as Locke, Hume and Mill have it; or that we have subjective mind performing some tasks while the object is known to us through external objects impressing themselves on the mind, as Kant and Whewell seem to argue. We start rather with the unity of subject and object in immediate experience and carve out our consciousness of self and not-self from this, and then go on to carve out the particular knowledge of self and objects by further experience and reflection. Pure reflection Grote sees as an advanced 'manner' or 'mode' of thought which draws out that which is implicit in immediateness, and draws out the subject into self awareness and the object into full knowledge (Grote 1900, 167-171, 250 , 380). Subject and object are not separated in immediateness, but the separation is implicit there. This, as Forsyth argues, is the key originality of Grote's view which is an improvement on the first British effort in this direction found in Ferrier's philosophy (Forsyth 1910, 139-147).

Thirdly, the basal fact of immediateness does not involve a separation of thought and existence or reality, just as it does not separate subject and object. Grote recognizes ontology or the theory

of reality to be a 'higher' kind of philosophy but he is anxious to unite it with epistemology or the lower kind in immediate experience (Grote 1865, 84-85). In Part One, Grote puts the point briefly in contrast to the empiricist and phenomenalist viewpoint.

> 'The original fact to us, the one thing of which we are, before all others, certain, is not the existence of a universe of which we, as organized beings, form a part, but the feeling, thinking, knowing, that this is so, and the knowing that we do know it, or, in other words, that we who know it, are anterior, in our own view of ourselves, to it' (Grote 1865, 84).

This is the 'logical genesis' of all knowledge and all reality. There is no reality above experience but only in experience, the 'co-notions' of which are `thinking-existence,conciousness - thought-existence,phenomena' (Grote 1900, 88). The key point is the idea of thought and existence being 'co-notions', but he still insists that the 'co-notions' are in consciousness and thought, the basal notion. As he writes elsewhere,

> 'knowledge is first, involving or implying the existence of what is known, but logically at least, prior to it...', (Grote 1865, 59).

The positing of existence as distinct to consciousness, like the separation of subject and object are mere 'abstractions', as are the philosophies that operate from either side of the formula (Grote 1865, 59).

So the logical start is a unity of knowing and being, in which each confirms the other.

> 'Immediate thought does not *imply* being, but *is* being, *being* bare, uncharacterized, not knowing itself as being: that is, if there is immediate thought, *something* exists, but*what* it is that exists, is what we have no means of knowing' (Grote 1900, 148).

In immediate thought, subject and object are as yet 'undistinguished'

and so are thinking, knowing and being, or as he puts it

> 'Thinking and being the object or possible object of thought, are our two suggestions of *being*, and both grow from this',

and again

'the state of immediate thought or feeling (...) is a state of being, and it is what, as our thought distinctifies itself into reflection, is the germ of our notion of being, when we come to present ourselves as a notion. Thinking, and being the object or possible object of thought, are our two suggestives of *being*, and both grow from this' (Grote 1900, 149).

IV

From the Immediate to the Mediate

We can now allow the examination of the dualism of consciousness without the fear that this will be mistaken for a basic dualism. The first expression of this is in the second chapter of Part One of the *Exploratio*, in which he aims 'to follow back as well as we can the stream of our knowledge'. Grote writes there, that our first and original consciousness is double, we feel ourselves to be and to be in a world of things existing beyond ourselves. As he puts it 'in the notion"be"there is something quasi-generic, and it implies already a state of things, an universe' (Grote 1865, 23). Within immediateness we can (in philosophical terms but not in practice), distinguish 'feeling' and 'being' or 'seeming' to be and 'being' (Grote 1865, 22-3, 89; 1900, 241-243). This is the first step towards abstraction where judgement begins to impinge upon the otherwise united original consciousness, it is a logical, not a historical, process (though he suggests this can be traced in the development of a child's intelligence).

The clearest terminology in which he chooses to express the duality is the 'self-self' and the 'thought self'. The 'self self' is that immediateness and consciousness which is not self conscious, that is

> 'which cannot be made an object of thought, but which is *with-thought* (mitgedacht)' (Grote 1900, 145).

Grote recognises the contradiction here which arises when you get to the basis of thought and try to make what is not an object of knowledge into one, but asks his reader to use his imagination and to add appropriate corrections. The 'with thought' means merely conscious, the 'without thought' means not self conscious, an embryonic unity in which the separation of subject and object, awareness of self and others, is non existent.

The 'thought self' arises from this 'feeling of being' as soon as we conceive of ourselves as thinking, for we then make ourselves the object of thought in the same way that we are to distinguish trees and birds as objects of thought. In pure immediateness the mind is 'inactive and resultless'. But once self consciousness arises, a restlessness appears in our thoughts, a dissatisfaction with consciousness, which tempts and drives us into further reflection, distinction and judgement, both of distinct things and events, and of their qualities. The primitive unity in consciousness becomes partially fractured though in the pursuit of knowledge. But Grote believes that in the pursuit and achievement of knowledge and truth, the absolute, unity, coherence and satisfaction can be restored. In the meantime,

> 'The advance of thought, in my view, is the simultaneous development of the distinct conception of ourselves, or our personality, and the distinct conception of objects of thought as independent of us : and each conception brings out the other' (Grote 1900, 147, Hicks 1938, 124; Passmore 1966, 281-2).

Here is another key to Grote's whole philosophy, the growth of knowledge and of everything knowable, is by 'distinctification and characterization' on, of and from this united but confused consciousness, this feeling of being. But before proceeding we should take stock of what we have discovered here.

This extended analysis of Grote's conception of the foundations of all coherent philosophy, of his idealism, was necessary to support the point that the basal fact, be it called experience, consciousness, or intuition is a unity, of subject and object, knowledge and being, as yet undifferentiated in a confused, indistinct, mist-like manifold of experience, the experience of being in the world. This recognition, but without the detail, can be found in Segerstedt, Forsyth and Copleston, and is hinted at by others (Segerstedt 1935, 144-145; Forsyth 1910, 135-139; Copleston 1966, 187). It supports the claim that Grote's view is similar to Hegel's accounts of the original unity of subject and object, knowing and being in consciousness in his *Phenomenology of Mind* of 1807. The reader will need to explore the crucial section there but one or two quotations will reveal the similarities (Hegel 1910, 131-145; 1971, 153-176).

Hegel describes the origins of all knowledge in consciousness, and he separates this from self consciousness and knowledge proper which are the fulfilment of what is potential in knowledge. Hegel argues that in immediacy subject and object are not distinguished, and that in distinguishing, in self consciousness, mind expresses its own dissatisfaction with pure consciousness, a desire to know. And hence consciousness 'suffers this violence at its own hands, it destroys its own limited satisfaction' (Hegel 1974, 49). The basic consciousness to Hegel is a 'being for us', from which we posit ourselves (subject) and the 'other' (object). In consciousness being is merely ' in itself' while in reflection it is 'for itself'. Consciousness executes on itself this reflection, it interrogates itself in self consciousness, to find out what is in essence within itself (Hegel 1974, 51-52). Gaining knowledge is a process of 'transformation or conversion of consciousness itself:

This consciousness Hegel describes as 'immediate' in which

apprehension (Auffasen) is separated from comprehension (Begreifen). It is the 'bare' and the 'truest' and most 'authentic' basis to knowledge (1974, 54). Pure being and pure thought, the 'I' and the 'not I' or object, are posited and united in pure immediate consciousness, in discriminating the object we put meaning into it (1974, 57-58).

> 'This pure immediacy, then, has nothing to do with the fact of otherness, with Here in the form of a tree passing into a Here that is not a tree, with Now in the sense of day time, or with there being another I to which the something else is object. Its truth stands fast as a self-identical relation making no distinction of essential and non essential, between I and object, and into which, therefore, in general no distinction can find its way....I am directly conscious, I untuit and nothing more, I am pure intuition; I am - seeing, looking' (Hegel 1974, 58-59).

This account can be usefully compared with Grote's in the *Exploratio* (Grote 1900, 154-155,166). Similar references can be found in the 'Philosophy of Mind' of 1817, where Hegel describes the move into self consciousness as being into 'the naive land of truth, into that kingdom where it is at home' (64). Self consciousness and reflection destroy the unity of knowing and being, subject and object, it makes consciousness unhappy, it is the job of philosophy to steer it back to a unity of consciousness with self consciousness in pure knowledge - the absolute (Hegel 1907, 218-240; Hegel 1974, 64-85; 1971, 153-176).

Much of what I now describe of Grote's philosophy is premised on that kind of assumption and reasoning. What is at issue is not the similarity but its source, for either G.Watts Cunningham and Bernard Bosanquet are wrong and Grote was one of the earliest British philosophers to read, understand and operate upon Hegel's philosophy, or else they are right and Britain had its own indigenous Hegel writing coherently between 1860 and 1866. A decision will await further examination. We must suspend judgement at present for we have no evidence from Grote himself or from any other colleagues, friends or any later researchers that he was acquainted with the primary texts

of Hegel. Any case for the Hegelian origins of John Grote's philosophy will have to be built up on unwitting testimony and up on circumstantial evidence. (See below, II, 347-350)

We must now proceed further to give an account of Grote's view on the growth of knowledge from immediateness to reflection, the nature of things and their qualities, the two sides of the knowing process - acquaintance and judgement, the critique of phenomenalism and the wrong philosophies of notionalism and relativism, and finally an account of his theory of language and the absolute. But first we will elaborate in more detail the epistemological and existential dilemma of man as perceived by Grote.

V

Reflection and Judgement

Hegel described the effect of self consciousness as producing an 'unhappy consciousness' and Grote nearly follows suit, for he has introduced us to what Segerstedt correctly calls 'this epistemological fall of man', (Segerstedt 1935, 146). Grote's account is another key (lost in the current secondary sources,) to his whole philosophy of practice, of moral, political , economic and social life. Our predicament is not only that our consciousness gets divided against itself. The 'immediate-self' becomes separated from the 'thought-self' and both from the 'not-self'. But worse dissatisfaction with self and existence force us onwards to create ever more complex contradictions in our experience of the world. Grote writes,

> 'What I call 'immediateness' is the presentiment to us of a *state of things*, in which things *are* as they are, but in which, beyond this, things are also *not* as they ought to be - by which *ought* I

> do not mean any reference to morals (though this principle is very important in its application to them), but I mean simply that the state of things is to be looked at, not merely as it is in itself at the moment, but as it contains or implies what is coming or should come next' (Grote 1900, 190).

This vital point will be elaborated in the next chapter but here we can ask about the origins of our dissatisfaction and desire for self awareness, knowledge and improvement. The answer lies in Grote's theory of human nature and his psychology. As we shall see, in the first he posits two sides to human nature, sentience (feeling) and activity. Men are 'wanting' creatures both in terms of' sensal' satisfaction and in demanding 'something to do' (Grote 1865, 24, 35-52; 1876, 23-30). That we are at heart 'wanting' creatures explains why we interrogate primitive consciousness in the search for understanding and coherence. Here I believe he takes a psychological idea from Maine de Biran. The argument is that our whole physical and mental self, from its first experience, recognises 'resistance' to itself. As de Biran argued our muscles fight against the resistance of gravity and our minds fight the resistance of the objects of consciousness, objects are heavy or hard to move, they are equally inscrutable, they resist understanding. At roughly the same time Karl Marx argued that it was the physical desire to satisfy need that triggered the mental, verbal and physical exploration of the world. Grote and de Biran stressed rather the restless desire to satisfy intellectual, moral and physical want as the basis for social theory. Only Jean Pucelle has really found a satisfactory place for Chapter Three of the *Exploratio* Part One because only he understood the link, with de Biran or had a knowledge of the eclectics and their effect on British philosophy. But Pucelle, a french commentator on Grote, had the insight though not the interest or time to develop its potential (Pucelle 1955, 75-78).

What Grote argues is that consciousness in exploring itself in

reflection, introduces doubleness into the world, the self and not self, self and object, self and others, thought and things etc, but it does so as a result of the basic resistance the self-self experiences. In exploring the resistances felt, to remove the dissatisfactions consciousness brings to the youngest child and to the oldest person, the self explores both matter and mind, things and ideas, space and time, self and others, sensations and thoughts. Space for instance is explored primarily because objects in it resist our freedom of movement and touch, and secondarily because they resist our clear vision. Seeing to Grote is only 'a species of touch' which he calls 'betouchment' (Grote 1865, 122; 1900 135). Hence Grote's continual criticism of the priority given to 'perception' and 'eye' based theories of knowledge such as those of Berkeley, Hume and Mill (Grote 1865, 20-22, 40-47; 1900, 135-142).

As soon as we discover 'resistance' to self we experience 'want', 'desire', or 'irritability' and we discover the 'power' of the self to overcome resistance, in intelligence and will as well as in physical strength and activity. 'Wanting', 'willing' and 'acting' are as basic to our selves, to consciousness, to our human nature and psyche as are 'feeling' 'sensing' and 'experiencing'. The attention of reflection or judgement is brought to bear when something is brought to our 'notice' and this happens when the self is experiencing resistance, consciousness cannot understand or get satisfaction in any way. All perception and thought is a mixture of passivity and activity, of feeling and wanting, desiring and willing and a clear separation of the two is only possible in philosophy, impossible in practice.

We left Grote with the argument that self consciousness and reflection disrupt the naive unity of consciousness, the unity of thinking and being, subject and object. But this is a process of losing, as well as gaining.

> 'In all this process, thought is passing from immediateness to reflection, and as it passes, we lose, as well as gain: belief, conviction, certainty is the persistence, to such extent as it does persist, of that indistinction between ourselves and the object of our thought, which belongs to immediate thought; and our thought, as it becomes less immediate and more reflectional, loses some of its force of certainty; we become divided in ourselves and divided from the universe' (Grote 1900, 150).

The point is that in immediate thought willing and acting in everyday on practical thought and action, all is homogeneous and indistinguished. We just see, think, will, or act without self consciousness, self scrutiny and without need for rationalization of either in terms of aims or purpose. But once we start to be self-conscious and reflect, life gets more complex, there does become a difference between my thoughts and that of others, between me and objects, between what 'is' and what 'ought to be'. We then need to be able to describe, explain and justify ourselves, other things and events. In reflection we also begin not only to specify distinct 'things' or 'objects' but also their attributes or qualities, so we recognize trees, and leaves, and the solidity, greenness and size. We reflect on our behaviour and actions, we define them e.g. as being a murder, a lecture or a contract and we require and dispute their qualities as legal or illegal, useful or not, good or bad, right or wrong, as well as being political, moral or economic. This causes massive problems and the more we reflect the greater the problems seem to become, so great to Kant, Hamilton and later Bradley, that we lose the possibility of having the certainty, truth and satisfaction of ordinary consciousness. But for Grote this was just part of the price of being and knowing and a satisfactory outcome was possible.

The reason is that in reflection, in making judgements, the mind does not create fantasies, or add something new, it merely discovers something implicit in the immediate consciousness and reality and brings it out. Truth and knowledge are there to be discovered in

immediate consciousness. Reflection is its interrogation and scrutiny to bring out the truth and knowledge in the form of carefully worded propositions or judgements. Our everyday consciousness is in constant 'want of development of distinctiveness', and hence immediateness and reflection provide what each cannot offer by itself.

> 'Perhaps the best way in which we can describe knowledge is that it is an union of *indistinction* and *distinction* of thought, the indistinction giving the reality or trueness of knowledge, the distinction its point or particularity' (Grote 1900, 153).

But both originate in immediateness and it is this that binds up all thought, all knowledge and reality.

> 'The oneness of subject and object, thinker and thought, in immediate thought, is the germ of all after knowledge: it is this which constitutes the life, essence, special character of knowledge, *the trueness* in one word, though it cannot be called knowledge till it is developed' (Grote 1900, 154).

Reflection, reflective knowledge or 'mediate thought' as Grote sometimes calls it, and ultimately philosophy itself, only scrutinize immediate consciousness, to 'digest' it, to distinguish different portions of it and to bring them into relationship with one another. Reflection is not a special faculty, that gives intuitional insights or brings blinding 'a priori' insights and revelations as Reid, Hamilton, Descartes and Whewell thought (Grote 1900, 156-159). Nor does reflection act as the empiricists thought, merely associating impressions to form ideas, inducing or inferring from simple impressions and ideas, discovering nothing, but associating everything under laws and generalizations. Nor should we argue as Kant and Whewell do that experienced sense data is meaningless until judgement and the mind impose its unity, experience and judgement are not the 'matter and form of knowledge' (Grote 1865, 18, 174, 213-217; 1900, 158, 207-208). Reflection is rather the polar opposite end to immediateness on a scale of knowledge, with no breaks in between, no antithesis between them. It is the 'awakening','quickening' or

'germinating' of what was 'asleep', 'sluggish' or 'embryonic' in immediateness, intuition, experience or whatever one wishes to call the basal consciousness.

What reflection does is to bring 'notice' and 'attention' to play on our primitive consciousness, so we begin to distinguish in and from our first glance or view a tree, and then that it is tall or green and that it was planted in memory of a war hero. We first of all 'carve' the 'thing' out of consciousness and then give it meaning, attributes and qualities (Grote 1865, 45, 51). Similarly with action, we may in practice simply respond to situations, this being called an immediate response or a 'reflex action'. This in fact is not without any thought or reflection at all just as primitive consciousness is not without any thought or judgement at all (Grote 1900, 149-150). Hegel had produced a rising scale with consciousness of the bottom followed by self consciousness with knowledge at the top. Grote similarly refused any breaches or breaks on the ascent from both consciousness and reflex actions to knowledge and the freely willed action.

As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, rationalists had argued for the logical and historical priority of reflection, judgement, reason, the a priori with its capacity to know necessary truths, whilst the empiricists had argued for sensation, experience, association inference and the a posteriori leading to contingent truths. The Scottish Common Sense philosophers had incorporated elements of both but stressed the intuitive capacity of basic consciousness. Hamilton, Ferrier and Whewell, following Kant, had also argued for a place for both, but with priority to reflection and judgement. Grote sought to transcend these abstract views and the muddled attempts at synthesis given by Whewell and the Scottish philosophers. The Millian idea of the intuitive and empiricist antithesis and Whewell's 'fundamental antithesis' Grote saw as fundamental mistakes (Grote 1865, 213-216;

1900, 156-159; Bosanquet 1902, 128-129).

Grote as Segerstedt suggests has here ended the dispute by placing basic consciousness and immediate intuition at one end of a continuous scale that leads to reflection, judgement and pure knowledge at the other. But now in all experience, intuition and consciousness there is some element of judgement, and all judgement involves reflection on(and of) basic consciousness, experience or intuition, the immediate. In one of his most decisive phrases, reminiscent of the introduction to Oakeshott's *Experience and its Modes*,(Oakeshott 1933, 17-19, 26-27), Grote writes that judgement and experience cannot be totally separated,

> 'they are not two partsof knowledge, but two incomplete views: in judgement, for *it* to be knowledge, there must be something to judge or be judged; in experience for *it* to be knowledge, there must be *notice* or exercise of will' (Grote 1865, 30).

The point is that there is never consciousness, intuition or experience that has no element of judgement, and no judgement independent of primitive consciousness, intuition and experience. Experience to Grote is a single homogeneous whole.

Not only does this transcend the two partial views of the phenomenalist and the rationalist, who start and stress experience and judgement respectively, it transcends their fundamental antithesis because judgement needs experience and experience,(as mere sensation)is meaningless without judgement. In addition it transcends the conventional 'necessary' versus' contingent' truth argument.

> 'I hold therefore that there is no real difference between truth as necessarily known and truth as known by experience: all truth is found out: the question is what is it that is found out, and what the manner of the finding?' (Grote 1865, 30-31).

The only difference between the necessary and contingent or experimental truth is 'in our manner of arriving of the truth', not in the nature of truth itself (Grote 1865, 31-32, 217-219, 233-234; 1900, 200). The differences in manner are of degree and stress, not

kind. We only can say with any meaning that,

> 'that knowledge which we arrive at chiefly by the way of thought and reason has to us more of the character which we call necessity: that which is more of experience, acquaintance, testimony, is contingential: but we cannot draw a line: we cannot say one portion of knowledge is and must be known to us in the one way, another part in the other ...' (Grote 1865, 75).

As we shall soon see, knowledge and truth are of two sorts but they exist at either ends of the scale from immediateness to mediacy or reflection; there is no divide, no break, between them. Nor as we shall now see is there any break between 'feeling' or sensations and 'thought' or knowledge. We are here on the verge of the denial of differences in 'kind' in knowledge and truth, and the assertion of differences only in degree or place on the scale, an important element in many idealist theories of truth and knowledge (Grote 1865, 75-80).

An interesting point of comparison arises here with the work of F.H.Bradley. Like the majority of other philosophers in British Universities at the time, Bradley was interested in epistemology, and one of the problems he tackled was that concerning the immediacy of experience.. In an essay entitled 'On our Knowledge of Immediate Experience', Bradley states:

> 'We in short have experience in which there is no distinction between my awareness and that of which it is aware. There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and a being in one, with which knowledge begins; and though this in a manner is transcended, it nevertheless remains throughout as the present foundation of knowledge' (Bradley 1914, 159-160).

The problem here involved is that noticed by Grote and later by G. F. Stout another Cambridge philosopher namely, that in immediateness thought cannot be an object of thought, for to make it so, is to move to reflection and abstract thought (Stout 1908, 20-47). We cannot know what is pure immediateness or have immediate knowledge, for it is always transcended in the knowing process. Bradley, however, took Grote's argument about the truth and reality of immediate experience, and, without qualification, asserted it as being

satisfactory. Immediate experience, he explains, 'however much transcended, both remains and is active', (Bradley 1914, 161). It is the 'judge' and germ of all transcendence. We cannot possible know the content of immediateness, as this would be a contradiction, but, we do not conclude from this that immediate experience is defective, but rather that it is a partial experience of reality.

In Bradley's work as in Grote's, knowledge of the world that is mediate reveals 'unrest', and such 'experience is condemned as defective'. When we attempt to complete our object by'relational addition from without and by relational distinction from within', the result 'is failure and a sense of defeat' (Bradley 1914, 188). We find in reflectional thought only 'incompleteness and defectiveness'. Knowledge, Bradley adds, is only of appearance, and only in immediate experience, 'in this object do we find at last theoretical satisfaction and rest' (Bradley 1914, 166). Immediate experience contains implicit diversity, but it is not distinguished prior to its recognition as such. Bradley stresses that it is a unity and as soon as we pass beyond immediacy (as we do in reflective thought), we lose continuity, and distinction and contradictions emerge.

In*Appearance and Reality* this argument is the backbone of the separation of knowledge from reality (Bradley 1897). The 'relational way of thought must give appearance not truth', is the conclusion, immediate experience being of reality, of the Absolute. Bradley here sets the 'conditioned' (mediated) against the 'unconditioned' absolute and concludes with a position opposed to that of John Grote; that we have a 'reality that cannot be known', and 'knowledge that is not real'. Appearance and reality, judgement and experience are here made categorically distinct in a way that Grote, and later Oakeshott consider to be impossible. Both the similarity and difference between these arguments of Grote and Bradley are easily seen, and it must be

considered unlikely that Bradley received no inspiration and assistance from studying Grote's work. That Bradley actually read at least part of Grote's publications, can be established by a short reference to Grote in *Collected Essays*, Book I (Bradley 1935, I, 136-7).

Stout for his part sided with Grote on most of the points in his disagreement with Bradley. For a start he sees in immediacy that 'the implications are implied in the datum' and that both the knowledge of the datum, gained by acquaintance and the mediated knowledge are knowledge (Stout 1908, 26-27). Secondly, truth lies in neither immediacy nor in judgemental knowledge by themselves as Bradley asserted. For Stout, as for Grote,

> 'the test of truth is complex, involving both coherence and immediacy as its essentially correlated aspect, neither of them being workable apart from the other' (Stout 1908, 27).

Thirdly, Stout unlike Bradley and Joachim, argues that we can go back and scrutinize immediacy to 'verify' or 'confirm' our judgements, and calls this like Grote, an appeal 'to matter of fact' (Stout 1908, 40). Finally, Stout like Grote, recognizes that the facts of immediacy and of judgement affirm and reaffirm each other, the two kinds of knowledge do not contradict but support each other (Stout 1908, 45-46).

However Michael Oakeshott is the British philosopher closest to Grote's epistemology in his little read but vitally important *Experience and its Modes* of 1933 (Oakeshott 1933). A short summary of his second chapter will allow the reader to see the connections with Grote and for once we have primary source material of both an acquaintance and indebtedness by an author with Grote (Oakeshott MSS, 1970, 1985). Firstly, in immediate experience we have a concrete whole, not a composite of sensations, perceptions or whatever. We can only depart from this united 'given' in abstraction, as when in

reflection we differentiate 'subject' from 'object' within experience (Oakeshott 1933, 9-16). However we cannot and must not try to force a separation or contrast between immediate and mediate experience, we must see even in the barest sensation an element of thought because , almost in Grotian language,

> 'Sensation implies consciousness, consciousness implies judgement and judgement is thought' (Oakeshott 1933, 19).

The base is a 'One', that 'given' in thought is 'the complete situation in which we find ourselves in the first moments of consciousness', where there is only degrees of differentiation of self and objects. Later judgement 'is judgement supervening on less coherent judgement', experience progresses by modifying what is given (20-21). Oakeshott takes on both those intuitionists who trust only immediate intuitions to give us reality, and idealists such as Bradley and Joachim who see judgement as 'a defective, and incomplete formal experience', concluding with the view that

> 'There is in my view, no experiencing which is not thinking, nothing experienced which is not thought, and consequently no experience which is not a world of ideas' (Oakeshott 1933, 27)

Oakeshott goes on to describe truth as a world of ideas that is 'satisfactory to itself', and denies 'an unknowable absolute'. Unity is the beginning and end of experience, of thought and judgement, the goal is a satisfactory or coherent world of ideas.

> 'What is given in experience is, then, a world of ideas and, by pursuing the implications of what is given, a world of ideas, which is satisfactory because it is complete and can maintain itself, is achieved' (Oakeshott 1933, 37).

On reality Oakeshott starts by respecting the traditional and unbridgeable divide between experience (appearance) and reality, but posits the unified start in experience and sees reality as an outgrowth of experience (Oakeshott 1933, 49-50). Like Grote he denies an absolute division, between knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge of judgement, between judgements of predicates and of reality

(Oakeshott, 51-53). The real is what in the end we are obliged to think, what is meaningful and rational, as well as what we feel or sense to be. An object or thing is what we isolate in experience as a single, more or less self contained whole or unity, reality is a 'datum' and a 'result' of reflection (Oakeshott, 1933, 58-67).

From this point on, Oakeshott's arguments are more or less unique and original, not withstanding his debate with the Collingwood of *Speculum Mentis* (Collingwood 1924). But the former argument covers the terrain not only mapped by Bradley, Stout and Joachim but also John Grote, and the general tenor of argument as well as the conclusions show some remarkable similarities. That Oakeshott should then go on to separate 'modes of experience', history, science, philosophy and practice is interestingly similar to Grote's procedure as expressed in numerous places.

VI

The Growth of Knowledge

How then does knowledge develop from immediacy and the confusion of experience? Knowledge grows through the scrutiny of consciousness and its later products, self consciousness and mediate judgements. It is at one and the same time a scrutiny of our senses and our thoughts, it is an outgrowth both from experience and from judgement and reflection. Phenomenalism stressed only the acquiring of more sense data from the external world, then aggregation, association and inference. Rationalism stressed only more reasoning, reflection and judgement. Subjective idealism stressed the process of mind applying its categories to the jumble of sense data to induce order and knowledge. Grote stresses that the growth of knowledge is both a

matter of acquiring more information and thinking more clearly about what is in consciousness already. We both acquire facts by experience and scrutinise these at the same time. We imagine how things are and could be, we reflect, distinguish, discriminate, conclude, re-think and so on. The 'advance of knowledge' is then essentially a process of

> 'distinction, not aggregation. Each new particular of knowledge is not an addition to, but a newly observed part of a previously conceived whole' (Grote 1900, 299).

This novel account has attracted considerable attention in terms of quotation, but little subsequent analysis (e.g. Watson 1970, Preface). In fact this theory transcends and brings into harmony the so called 'bucket theory' of knowledge of empiricists which stresses aggregation; the 'intuitional' theory; and the 'reflective reason' theories from Descartes to Whewell. It first appears in Chapter Two of the *Exploratio* of 1865. Here knowledge is described as being 'contained seminally' in its first particular, with progress of knowledge being the 'gradual making acquaintance with that which is thus revealed' (Grote 1865, 24). The process is one of 'perpetual self correction' or 'auto correction' as he later calls it. It is almost dialectical because

> 'it proceeds as it were by hitches, and every step in it together with truth contains error, which the next step corrects' (Grote 1865, 24).

Imagination is vital in supplying 'a fresh crop of possibilities' for the mind to explore and determine 'among these possibilities which is the true'. It is thus the 'thinking and re-thinking' that he found to be at the heart of philosophy and one of its key methods, which was the key procedure for gaining all sorts of knowledge. This process when applied by Grote was often mistaken for repetition and indecision.

> 'The fact is, that every great step in knowledge, besides what it may have about it of addition to an aggregate, has the double character as well both of correction of wrong previous view and of understanding why the wrong previous view was taken, or in other words, of understanding what there is in it that is true and right: from the former of these processes, united with the aggregation of observation, results the phenomenal view:' (Grote 1865, 48).

Grote now injects imagination, a vital element in all post Coleridgian idealist epistemology in Britain and stressed heavily by Charles Whitmore (Grote 1865, 24,241; Whitmore 1927, 319, 321-322). The place of imagination in the growth of knowledge is allowing various possible answers to be considered, scrutinized and checked mentally before judgement selects that which is certain, true or right. In imagination we can see objects, situations, problems, actions and events in our 'inward eye', without the need for them to be present (Grote 1900, 59-65, 209-210, 296, 299, 306, 313; 1876 61, Chapter XV, 361-365). It allows philosophy to take place (1865, XXXIV), it permits all moral and practical conduct by allowing us to picture a different set of arrangements to those experienced, - the world of future and moral ideals and oughts (1900, 313; 1876, 103, 370-372). But above all imagination takes us half way to pure knowledge, in that it conditions immediateness and is an area for testing possibilities. True knowledge is in fact only a

> 'vast imagination which we take care to make self-consistent: and fresh imagination which possesses this consistency we call experience. *Insanimus* at the beginning, but we take care that all the progress of our dream shall be *cum ratione* (with reason)' (Grote 1900, 169).

Yet imagination takes us beyond - it is the vat of all knowledge for how else can we think but by imagination, the imagination of sounds, pictures and the 'using of imagination', which is what he calls 'thought'? (Grote 1900, 225).

The significance of this high estimation of the place of imagination in the creative knowing process is two fold. Firstly, it

locates Grote as close to the Romantics, especially the romantic poets for whom fancy and the imagination are the most human of all capacities that allows creative thought and penetrative understanding of the deeper meanings of life. It also locates Grote as an enemy of the phenomenalists and rationalists for whom imagination is respectively either something 'cold, sterile and hollow', a 'forward delusive faculty' that tempts the experimentalist from observation, induction and conclusion, or is reason fallen short of its goal, as something 'obtrusive and deceitful' (Grote 1900, 309; 1876, 61). Instead imagination is 'picturing the object with the feeling of its not being present' and as Aristotle had argued, without this faculty man could only know what is and be satisfied with that, the future and the world of ideals would be impossible (Grote 1900, 59, 309). Secondly, imagination is one of the ways in which mind expresses its active and creative powers, the way it puts meaning into the world and purpose into actions, a theme we will come to shortly. As Grote puts it, the imagination is

> 'the means by which the notion involved in the last step is familiarized to the mind: and the next or after step determines amongst these possibilities which is the truth' (Grote 1865, 24).

The paradigm then, is that immediate thought and practical thought are logically prior to abstract theoretical thought and knowledge. They are the subject matter of further thought and reflection, the reflection and thinking being what is called 'thought' or 'imagination'. Most thought and action is not self consciously premeditated but it does involve some element of judgement and will, some element of knowledge even if it appears only as a skill, as tradition or custom in which the mediated or reflected upon seems immediate (Grote 1870, 358; 1876, 438-443). Gaining knowledge is the scrutiny of all this, the clarification of the facts and history of purposes and meaning and this is true for logic and history. Put

clearly within the context of the intuitionist versus empiricist controversy.

> 'The description of knowledge as a course of experience and the description of it as a course of analytic and self correcting judgements ... are both what I call *abstractions*: that is, the historical advance of knowledge is the continued exercise of the mind in judgement in conjunction with the continued communication, by the senses, with phenomenal fact: ... it advances by the continual exercise of the will and judgement ... in conjunction with consciousness which we describe as such experience' (Grote 1865, 30 ; see also 1870, 269).

The process is creative however, not merely a discovery. The gaining of knowledge is best described as

> 'the coming more fully to ourselves in the universe, the becoming wider awake in it, the distinctifying object after object in it, at the same time that we more fully feel *ourselves*' Grote 1900, 150).

Later Grote unites all of the main points made in one phrase, it expresses the movement of knowledge as clarification, the denial of temporal priority to sense data or to a priori reason, and it hints at the absolute idealism to come. It shows also how all knowledge starts in a united flow of consciousness

> 'The intellectual order of things is not serial or linear, or successional. We are plunged into the middle of things, we are in the middle of them to begin with. Advancing knowledge is a pattern coming out: whether we consider this pattern to be in the mind or in objective nature does not in my view matter much, only we must not consider it partly in one and partly in the other' (Grote 1900, 205).

Knowledge of Acquaintance and Knowledge by Judgement

Before discussing some details of Grote's own theories of sensation, perception, space and time and truth as distinct from and as a critical basis of phenomenalism, and then tying these parts together in Grote's idealist assertion of mind putting meaning into the world,and his absolutist assertion of it discovering meaning

already there, we must look briefly at the most famous element in all his work, the distinction between 'knowledge of acquaintance' and 'knowledge of description'. The fame the distinction has acquired is due mainly to William James and Bertrand Russell. Through the latter's best selling *Problems of Philosophy* almost every philosophy student has become acquainted with the issue. The distinction has had a second revival in the last two decades as philosophers such as Ryle, Stawson and Hamlyn have struggled to define the various uses the term knowledge has in language. Today we are accustomed to speak of 'knowledge how' or practical knowledge; of 'knowledge that' or assertive factual knowledge; of 'convictional knowledge' or knowing as sincerely believing; of 'knowing why' or explanatory knowledge. These are added to and complement the two uses of 'knowing of'or knowledge of acquaintance, and 'knowing about' or knowledge of description (Hamlyn 1970, 103-111).

Secondary texts tell the story that Russell learnt the distinction from James, who admitted his indebtedness to Grote in a footnote in his first edition of the *Principles of Psychology* but withdrew this in subsequent issues (James 1890, I, 221; Russell 1901, 1910, 108-128). Intermediaries between Grote and James have been discovered including James Ward, (Ward 1919, 86). Lauchlin D MacDonald traces helpfully the accreditations given to Grote from Daniel Robinson, H.W.D Joseph, Alfred Whitehead, Roy Sellers, John Mackenzie and Edgar Brightman, and I can add to the list Sorley and Keynes (MacDonald 1966, 235-240; Robinson 1930, 109n; Joseph 1916, 55; Whitehead 1930, II, 2; Sellers 1920, 257-259; Mackenzie 1917, 130; Brightman 1925, 83n; Sorley 1921a, 193; To keep the record straight MacDonald also notes that Samuel Johnson hinted at the difference in outline without making it explicit, and we should add Hobbes and Hume to this list of early pioneers (MacDonald 1966, 237).

The concept is extensively discussed in numerous texts the most important being by Woolzey, Gellner and Hamlyn (Woolzey 1949, 23-25; Gellner 1968, 56-58; Hamlyn 1970 104-106).

An amusing point is made by John Passmore upon Bertrand Russell's attribution of this famed distinction to William James when he notes 'this distinction travelled from one Cambridge man to another, via Cambridge Mass' (Passmore 1966, 230). But the point is less amusing the more we begin to recognize both the range of Grote's ideas resulting in later Cambridge philosophizing. In his later years Russell claimed not to remember having read John Grote and we must accept this point with the qualification that at the time Russell was sitting for the Moral Science Tripos at Cambridge both Grote's *Examination* and the *Exploratio* were advised reading. Part Two of the *Exploratio* with a chapter on 'Knowledge of Acquaintance and Knowledge of Judgement' was published in Cambridge one year before Russell produced his discussion of the distinction in his *Problems*. In addition Russell continued to ignore the attribution and reference to Grote's theory well after the latters reputation in this area was widely known (Russell 1953, 197-218). Yet it is also clear that Grote and Russell deduced very different conclusions from the distinction, for while Grote the idealist used the distinction to beat both phenomenalists who stressed only knowledge of acquaintance, and rationalists and intuitionists who stressed only knowledge of judgement, Russell the phenomenalist used it to beat idealists, who he believed either denied knowledge by acquaintance with external objects or held that knowledge of description or propositional knowledge was reducible to acquaintance with things (Russell, 1967, 32).

Many aspects of the distinction are interesting, but apart from it further elaborating the immediacy and reflection spectrum the remaining important aspect is its illustration of Grote's 'ordinary

usage' theory of language.

> 'Language in general, following its true logical instinct, distinguishes between these two applications of the notion of knowledge, the one being Yvῶvai, noscere, kennen, connaitre, the other being eἰδévai, scire, wissen, savoir' (Grote 1865, 60).

When we claim to know 'things', rather than truths, beliefs, or connections, we can speak as if we are acquainted with the object, that it has presented itself to us via the senses or as if we can picture the thing, situation or event (vorstellung). Alternatively we can speak not 'of' the object but 'about' it, we can speak of its properties and qualities, we can express these in terms of propositions, judgements or concepts (begriffe) without the need for the present experience of the object or a picture. This latter form of expression refers to the reflectional end of the scale of knowledge where discrimination, evaluation, analysis and logical argument rule. The former refers to the immediateness in which we have low levels of judgement and discrimination, where we just claim to know of something, be it our body, a tree, a person or a murder. It is very similar to what Stuart Hampshire calls 'non propositional knowledge' (Hampshire 1959, Ch2; Anscombe 1957, 8-12, 28-32; Hamlyn 1970, 106-110).

As we move up the scale of knowledge, according to Grote, we clarify, develop and analyze our immediate knowledge (or as the old philosophers called it intuition or anschauung) and produce conjectural, theoretical and analytic judgements (Grote 1900, 201-204). What was simply a feeling that an action was wrong is analyzed to produce the reasons why, the character of the proposition, its moral and philosophical status. Again the immediate is always logically prior to the mediate, acquaintance before judgement; it is what Ward calls an 'existential proposition' but Grote hints that it is usually prior historically, judgement being about what we know

already in consciousness (Ward 1918, 86).

As used later by Russell knowledge of acquaintance reverts to being the phenomenalist base line which,

> 'brings the object itself before the mind. We have acquaintance with sense-data, with many universals, and possibly with ourselves, but not with physical objects or other minds' (Russell 1953, 216-217).

This kind of knowledge is that in which the mind is doubly aware of sense data but is not yet inferring anything, nor inducing or deducing truths of any kind (Russell 1911, 25-27). John Grote's account is very different, we are not acquainted with sense data but with basic consciousness, a feeling of being, or seeming to be, with immediacy as with Phenomenology later. Our immediate thought is largely an undifferentiated unity of subject and object, it is the self-self not yet self conscious of self or conscious of something distinctly not-self. Grote produced this argument to overcome two problems. The first was the phenomenalist tendency to reduce all knowledge to acquaintance with sense data. By reworking the concept Russell undid all Grote's efforts. Russell undid Grote's effort to transcend the problems of phenomenalism and returned Britain to a dispute that should have ended fifty years before.

Russell also argues that in knowledge of acquaintance we experience universals, such as 'wholeness, diversity, brotherhood'. Grote denies this, for what we are acquainted with in immediate thought, is a unified basic knowledge, that this is something that means something, that we do not separate particulars and universals, or know one before the other or anything similar (Russell 1911, 28). On one point however Grote and Russell agree, Russell reluctantly accepts that in knowledge of acquaintance we know the self as well as sense data and universals (Russell 1911, 27-28). To Grote immediacy is the base not sense data, universals or the self, but the self-self

and thought-self are the two sides of this.

The term knowledge of acquaintance was chosen by Grote to avoid several competing concepts used to refer to the logical bases of thought, but primarily 'intuitive' and 'immediate'. Time and again Grote argues that 'intuition' as used by rationalists and common sense theorists, and 'immediate' or 'direct' thought as used by empiricists from Locke to Spencer are both full of confusion in themselves and are regularly confused one with the other (Grote 1900, 201-204). In fact both intuition and immediacy suggest the absence of any judgement at all and Grote wished to reject this. The immediate is 'as immediate' as is compatible with being conscious and that is all (Grote 1900,200). Rationalists and Common Sense theorists quite wrongly treat the immediate and the intuitive as a 'direct sense' and a 'fundamental belief' just as phenomanalists quite wrongly treat it as merely sensory experience. Knowledge of acquaintance has both intuitive and sensory elements(as we shall see when we look at the famous 'Scale of Sensation and Knowledge') but both are elements within immediacy.

Knowledge of judgement to Grote, is knowing about something, so we know the car is new, green, or automatic, and that it has a low insurance rating, 'adjectively or predicatively', (Grote 1900,24). But Grote is anxious to insist that the logical object of knowledge is what we know by acquaintance, not so called' external things', nor' sense data', nor a supposed 'logical subject' of knowledge - the possessor of all these qualities, - the 'thing in itself', (Grote 1865,65-66, 122-124,). What is known via acquaintance is as much the 'thing' or 'event' as is what is known in judgements or propositions, but in the former we have the unity and certainty associated with immediateness while with the latter we have the duality and uncertainty associated with reflection and analysis. Now we can

correctly express our knowledge of things from either point of view 'provided only we do not confusedly express it, in the same proposition or piece of reasoning in both', as Ferrier and Hamilton do (Grote 1865,60). When we say the car is green and has a low insurance rating we are referring the object called the 'car' we know in immediacy by acquaintance or habit,

> 'just as from passing a tree every day we might know, entirely without intellectual exercise, every branch and leaf of it, or might know to little purpose every line on the face and every button on the coat of a man whom we meet every day, but to whom we have never spoken' (Grote 1865, 123-124).

In short these two types of knowledge are not 'generically' different,

they just come from two different directions, but

> 'in reality acquaintance with, intuition or apprehension or comprehension of, *it*, and judging correctly and exhausting this, that, and the other things, about *it*, are two ways of expressing the same thing, and *either* of them are definitions of knowledge', (Grote 1865,66).

Reflections, judgement and propositional knowledge then only partly untie the unity of knowledge, they do not destroy it.. Reflection caused difficulty because in reflecting it turns the subject (the self) into the 'object' of knowledge causing confusion as to what is subject and object (Grote 1865,61-62). Reflection draws to our attention the predicates of an object which may mistakenly get treated themselves as things eg. whiteness, goodness (Grote 1900, 26). Reflection provides new knowledge based on what is contained already in knowledge of acquaintance, but it is not a separate kind of knowledge or a new sort that prevents us from getting back to knowing the real object itself as Kant, Hamilton and Ferrier believed before Grote and Bradley after him. There is no need to posit 'things in themselves', 'unknowable substratums', the 'unknowable infinite or absolute'. As Grote correctly argues,

> 'the confusion which I have above alluded to as to 'things in themselves' arises from this, that after, with the meaning of

> knowledge which I am *now* supposing, we have knowledge (if it is so) *about* the thing all that there is to beknown, we still, mistakenly , think there is something wanting unless we know, with the first sort of knowledge or that of acquaintance, the thing which all the other knowledge is about. But *that* thing, supposing we use such language about it, was itself no *object* of knowledge, and never entered in thought as such. The *thing* in *this* view of knowledge, 'is all that can be known about it', and when we have come to this, we have come to an end, not only of our knowledge, but of all possible knowledge, in this direction' (Grote 1865, 62).

The absolute is all that there is to be known and that is all that knowledge of acquaintance and description can tell us of and about it. We can know nothing else and here, with Ferrier, Grote claims we cannot be ignorant of the absolute (Ferrier 1854; Grote 1865,62-67,147). The absolute or complete knowledge is a goal or ideal which 'we must *suppose*'

> 'to fasten our incomplete knowledge on: and the complete knowledge thus supposed includes of course a portion of ignorance, or unknown. But of the unknown there is no reason for us to suppose either that it is unknowable, or that it is (necessarily) more important to the thinghood of the thing about which the knowledge is than the qualities which we *do* know about it' (Grote 1865,147).

The errors here are those of 'notionalism' and 'relativism' described above. We must rather accept the immediate as the substance and mediacy as prediction, so

> 'For a complete *judgement* of the universe we have one initiatory *substantive*, and all our proceeding is by adjectives or predicates of it' (Grote 1900,25).

Two final points are worth noting before proceeding. Firstly, truth resides both in our primitive, common sense, or immediate knowledge and(in a different way) in our judgemental and propositional knowledge. Truth is not solely a property of judgements, but it is best stated in and by them. The germ of truth, of most of our certainty about the world and its basis is in immediate thought, in knowledge of acquaintance. As Grote puts it clearly, with truth we can call it either or both, 'thinking rightly', suggesting knowledge of acquaintance, or 'right thinking', stressing correct

judgement and reasoning (Grote 1865, 220; 1900, 59, 182, 216-220, 310-312). Secondly, Russell as a phenomenalist gets himself into all sorts of trouble with the distinction that Grote avoids, one last example of which is his assertion that, while some knowledge may be purely judgemental or descriptive, all knowledge of description is in principle reducible to knowledge of acquaintance, in particular to statements about sense data. Grote both denies pure knowledge of description (as we have seen in his rejection of purely necessary truths), and while he believes that all knowledge involves both acquaintance and judgement, refuses to reduce all to sense data. The fallacy of reductionism is avoided by John Grote, while it entraps Bertrand Russell.

VIII

Truth

Just as Grote has tried to bring into harmony the senses and reason, experience and thought, the contingent and the necessary, the immediate and the mediate, non-propositional knowledge of things and propositional knowledge about things, so he tries to synthesise competing concepts of truth. In his view, truth had been described correctly in a number of ways by previous philosophers, but each description is partial. Only the description of truth as coherence, as the bringing into propositional precision that which is implicit, but unclear and confused in primitive consciousness, is philosophically adequate. In this sense

> 'Trueness is the transference of fact into a different world or region, which we call thought', (Grote 1900,156, see also 202,182).

In addition the criteria or tests of truth may be several, but in the

end their satisfaction for mind or judgement, their coherence, is the only complete or 'entire' view.

The several partial views include those of Descartes and the phenomenalists who form the two extremes. Descartes, stressing reason, had the problem of distinguishing which of mind's internal productions was true and which were error. In the end, as Grote recognised, he chooses clarity and distinctness of thought as his definition, and his test of truth is 'inconceivability' of the contrary, (Grote 1865, 225;1900,267). This was the tradition of Cudworth, Balguy, Price and most other rationalists and intuitionists, before the nineteenth century, and of Whewell and Sedgwick. It argues that truth is merely a property of reflective thinking, it is 'right thinking'. The mistake is not merely that various competing propositions may appear to be equally 'clear or distinct', but that it does not show how such thought can be 'referred back' to its origins in consciousness (Grote 1900,202). The idea of purely a priori truths in which the contrary is 'inconceivable' suffers from the same defect, truth is cut off from experience in its own world of judgements and propositions (Grote 1865,217-218). In addition the test has only any value if we use 'reasonable' inconceivability not any possible inconceivability as the criteria (Grote 1865,219). Hume for one had warned correctly that he could conceive the opposite of many so called necessary truths and hence demanded that they be treated as error.

The second partial view is that of Bacon and the later phenomenalists from Locke to Mill for whom truth is 'conformity to fact' or 'closeness to fact' (Grote 1865,224-225). This view is both correct and compatible with the above if by fact we mean the experience or consciousness of nature and the self and the resulting imaginative reconstructions of what is there known (Grote 1865,220; 1900,84, 295-6).

But phenomenalists have a different usage and a different model. To them truth is conformity to external reality, truth means correspondence with a fact or facts by which is meant experienced sense data, and their test is agreement of propositions or judgements with these facts checked via evidence (Grote 1865, 59, 109-110,169; 1900,60, 85-86). As Grote clearly states it when contrasting 'positivism' and 'idealism',

> 'The point of the differences is that in the former we look upon what we can find out by physical research as ultimate fact, so far as we are concerned, and upon conformity with it as the test of truth: so that nothing is admitted as true except so far as it follows by some process of inference from this. In opposition to this, the contrasted view is to the effect, that for philosophy, for our *entire* judgement about things, we must go beyond this, or rather go further back than it, the ultimate fact *really*... for us - the basis upon which all rests - being not that things exist, but that we know them, i.e. think of them as existing: ...' (Grote 1865,59).

Not only is the assumption about reality then wrong, but so is the phenomenalist use of the term truth and its tests, for our judgements of truth refer to other judgements or to our immediate experience, not to independent facts or fact as sense data. Finally, the phenomenalists criteria of truth are partial. The first test they recommend is a kind of pragmatic test, it is 'applicability to practice and use' or 'its answering to our action'; the second is its 'harmonizing all our sensive powers and all the different experience of different men...' (Grote 1865, 12-13). Later he puts it even more neatly revealing the true harmony at the end, which must include the 'Common Sense' view that truth is agreement with our common sense.

> 'The idea of truth, in the positivist view, has to be aided by various other considerations, besides that which I have given. The *essence* of truth is its conformity with fact, but the *marks* of it are such as its consistency with other truth, its being the common thought of different minds, its being that which we can act upon to an expected result' (Grote 1900, 295).

Truth may mean 'conformity with fact', though fact used here does not refer to external objects, but it has a plurality of tests eg.

consistency stressed by rationalist, 'common thoughts' as stressed by common sense, pragmatism stressing 'what we can act upon'. All offer useful but abstract insights.

In a complete or philosophical view of truth, the ideas of clarity and distinctness, and conformity with fact are brought into relation along the scale of knowledge, there being more of the former at the reflection end and more of the latter at the end of immediacy. All truth arises from immediate consciousness but reflection clarifies this and divides it at the same time. Pure propositional truth is abstract or theoretical. Truth here means a complete account which involves the 'coherence' or 'consistency' with other true propositions or judgements. This coherence works both for the individual and for a whole social group because the language in which we think and reason is social. Language, thought experience and truth are social products, and truth is the consistency of propositions for a communion of intelligences (Grote 1865, 1876, 62-3; 1900, 214, 271-283). In the pursuit of truth we are out to make our vast imaginations, 'self-consistent' (Grote 1900, 169). We try to avoid relativity and to go for consistancy and absoluteness, and so it must be truth

> 'for all intelligences, not something private, or (if we form the notion of other genera of intelligent beings) generic to the human race' (Grote 1900 287).

Grote's view of truth is very interesting in that it intentionally harmonizes the phenomenalist and rationalist tests, the approaches of Bacon and Descartes. Secondly, truth grows and develops, it is not relative but is always a matter of degree in its approximation to absolute truth or pure completeness, and consistency. Thirdly, propositional and judgemental truth arise out of immediateness, so that our immediate judgement 'that this is a car' or 'this action is wrong' contain truths (or errors) that further speculation and reflection confirm or deny. This is vital for the

moral philosophy of Grote for he sees moral reasoning and moral philosophy to be the pursuit of rational truths already implicit in our everyday customary moral thought and practice. All that moral philosophy does is to bring out these truths, to state them simply, to find the reasons why they are truths, to justify ideals already accepted in practice. So that geometric, mathematical, philosophic and other abstract truths are not 'a priori', not of another 'kind' to practical, everyday, immediate and 'a posteriori truths, they are developments from them. Moral axioms, law, and principles are in this sense analogous to geometric, scientific and other practical axioms.

What he claims finally, is that no one sided definition or criteria of truth be allowed to blind us to the many sidedness of truth, of the plurality of correct but partial understandings and tests that occur within and from various intellectual perspectives. In addition no mistaken reasoning should deter us from believing in the ideal of truth, the complete view, 'an ideal (however derived) of what knowledge, as knowledge, is, or in other words, of what actual knowledge ought to be...' (Grote 1900, 63; Sorley 1922, 204). Truth, like the morally right, is an ideal we cannot avoid positing and searching after, for without it intellectual argument would be nonsensical, but its discovery is more difficult. John Grote believes in truths emerging from confusion towards clarity by a process of self correction, the tests being numerous. All other demands, especially of the positivists, are to be ignored, because

'I have a belief...that truth is a mistress who reigns by the affection of her subjects, our thoughts, not by arbitrary calls for their submission. Whenever I hear these latter, I feel a disposition to think that it is not truth that is calling, but either something else in her name, or else servants of hers who do not quite know the proper language of her servants' (Grote 1900, 234).

IX

Phenomenalism and the Scale of Knowledge and Sensation

So far I have quite intentionally concentrated upon John Grote's own constructive philosophy to counteract the traditional judgements that his work is only a commentary on, a response to and a critique of other philosophers and philosophies, and that his hatred of philosophical systems deterred him from the production of a coherent theory of his own. Past commentators have too quickly concluded that from the discussional form of his works, and the tentative, repetitious and 're-thinking' style, that he had no well formulated view. But now we must show how this view is used to criticize phenomenalism in the work of David Hume and John Stuart Mill leaving his critiques of Ferrier, Whewell, Hamilton, Spencer and others to the reader to explore. These critiques can be set against the 'right view' of philosophy by tracing them out on his 'scale of sensation and knowledge'.

The first chapter of the *Exploratio* is a critique of phenomenalism and it is followed up by a long critique of John Stuart Mill's *Logic*. These chapters amount to a most devastating critique of empiricism, which, despite John Mill's dismissive note and letter, were held by Mill's friend Alexander Bain to be perhaps the most effective critique of Mill's *Logic* written in the nineteenth century (Mill, 1972,III, 1095-1096; Mill 1961, 39-40; Bain 1904, 258, 253-256). On the critique of phenomenalism as a whole, the best critics, Seth, Forsyth, Sorley, Cunningham, Segerstedt and Whitmore and Pucelle are agreed on its success, in terms of rigour of analysis, and the constructive use to which the critique is put. Most of Grote's points are as effective against later phenomenalists such as Russell as against Grote's predecessors and contemporaries.

Phenomenalism, as we have seen is the scientific attempt to explain the knowing process. As with all positivist theories, it uses the methods of observation, induction and verification and it assumes as its first premise the existence of an external world known to us via the senses (Grote 1865, 2-4). The phenomenalist then wished to know how we, the subject, get knowledge of the 'things' the 'object' in the external world, a real problem as subject and object are considered from the start to be fundamentally distinct. To explain this the phenomenalist mixes together physiological and psychological propositions and thereby produces a heady confused brew. Phenomenally the body is the intermediary between mind and the external world. Sense data are etched onto the 'passive' and 'blank tablet' of the mind via physiological activity of the eyes, ears and other senses (Grote 1865, 35-36). By association of sensations we come to think, then think of things; things are 'matter' but to phenomenalists such as Mill, they can only be 'constant possibilities of sensation' (Grote 1865, XIX, 5, 164-170, 185, 210, 1900, 64-66). The 'facts' of experience are sensations and impressions and the communication of our organs, from which ideas, thoughts and conclusions result by a process of inference. All can be reduced to this 'corporal movement' (Grote 1865, 4-6).

The three principles or 'natural agents' of this theory are space, time and force; space is that which matter is confirmed in; time is that which things pass through; and force or motion is that which sets matter in motion, which precipitates change and contingency (Grote 1865, 10-11). The phenomenalist tests of truth we have already touched upon are 'correspondence' with reality, but 'reality' is only

> 'the resultant arising from the comparison together of the information...on our various senses, or ...our various means of communication with the external world' (Grote 1865, 13).

The gaining of knowledge is by aggregation of this information and communication, by inference, test and the production of causal laws (Grote 1865, 15-16). What we must assume is that the world exists independently of us and would remain what it is without us. The 'Spirit' of phenomenalism is that while universal laws and uniformities may emerge by observation and inference we 'cannot find in the universe',

> 'anything which we should describe as order, or form, or composition, it is not that kind of order, or anything like it, which we mean when we speak of putting together ourselves with a meaning and a reason' (Grote 1865, 14).

To the phenomenalist then knowledge is a kind of 'accident' for us arising from our physical constitution and that of the world. Everything to us is 'inexpressibly depressing and desolate' in this view, as if we were a 'stranger' thrown up on a deserted island which is inaccessible to our 'actual human experience', 'strange' and 'out of relation to us'. The 'great rule of phenomenalism then is the reverse of that of idealism,

> 'to be sure that we do not do that which, as we shall see, we always naturally *do* do, humanize the universe, recognize intelligence in it, have any preliminary faith, persuasion, suppositions about it, find ourselves, if I may so speak, at all at home in it, think it has any concern with us' (Grote 1865, 15).

Phenomenalism has value only in so far as it remains a scientific view, using the terminology of matter, motion, object, thing, communication, cause, law, etc. Once it goes beyond what it can legitimately do and tries to enter philosophy, or once it claims to provide the only account of knowledge, or once it pretends to give a 'logical' account of knowledge rather than a 'historical' one, then disaster in the form of confusion follows. Particular internal errors cannot detain us but Grote partially explores the misuse of and confusion of uses of several key phenomenalist concepts, picking out

the appropriate uses for the scientist and the relevant uses for the philosopher, including sensation, impression, object, thing, space, time, sight, sound, imagination, knowledge, and truth.

One important argument must delay us for its originality and the fact that is surfaces later in British philosophy (Hamlyn 1957; Ryle 1949). The argument is that the phenomenalists and materialists are wrong in arguing that the eyes see, the nose smells, the ears hear, the hands touch, the mouth tastes, for these apparatus only communicate corporally with the world. Philosophically we must rest with the assertion that 'we' see, smell, hear, touch and taste, or if we wish the 'mind' does so, as long as we do not mean by this that organ called the brain. Hence Grote's quotation from Crabbe,

> 'It is the mind that sees: the outward eyes Present the object, but the mind descries' (Grote 1865, 44).


The same argument is taken up later in rejection of the old 'mis-psychologist' errors of believing that accounts of our organs are giving us accounts of our minds. Grote argues that it is 'we' that see and the 'eye' is only an instrument, it is the 'mind' that thinks and the brain that facilitates this. Answering the physiologists and the 'dualists', such as Descartes, who add a soul to the machine, Grote concludes that,

> 'The fact is, that when we think for a moment, we recognize that what we call thinking, seeing, tasting, are what can only be done (or felt) by something which we call 'I' or 'we', the expression of consciousness: if there had not been in thought and in language such notions and expressions as 'I' and 'we', there would not have been such notions and expressions as 'see', 'feel'...'(Grote 1900, 184).

Elsewhere we find two other interesting arguments, that we definitely do not 'see' sense data, and that one of the root problems of the 'British Philosophy of the Mind' is its mistaken and slavish dependence on the sense of 'sight' which make's discussions of perception of 'objects' of 'things' a paradigm for the discussion of

all the other sense and of knowledge as a whole (Grote 1865, 21, 39, 41-45; 1900, 117-142). Overall Grote feels that the ear and mouth for speaking and hearing, and even the hands and touching are at least as important as the eyes and vision generally.

The attempt to harmonize phenomenalism with idealism, the correct philosophical view, comes in Chapter Six entitled 'Scale of Sensation or Knowledge'. A short survey will indicate the complex and somewhat confusing model given there. The model tries to unite discussions of the movement of knowledge from immediateness to reflection, of knowledge from acquaintance to description, of the development of our sensations and our thoughts, and <u>all</u> this while keeping the phenomenalist and philosophical views distinct, like two sides of a carpet hung on a line. A diagram may help here.



[Sources Grote 1876, 28-33; 1865, 107-124, 210-3, 217, 223, 241, 250; 1900, 30, 105-8, 181]

Fig.1 The Scale of Sensation or Knowledge.

On the vertical scale knowledge rises from immediacy to reflection, from knowledge of acquaintance to knowledge of Judgement: On the horizontal scale we move from feeling and will (activity) on the left to thought (mental activity) on the right. At the lower end we have primitive sensations (taste, touch, etc.) and basal consciousness. The lower sensations are connected with the intuitive capacities for conceiving space and time. Eventually under the impact of the Kantian categories of unity, genericity and causality we are

able to fully perceive objects as they are. On the other side thought has a corresponding development from consciousness, through self consciousness to pure knowledge or reflection. The only addition is that the higher up the scale we go the more there is a convergence of matter and mind, object and subject, capacities for knowledge and the conceptual ability for its production. John Grote considered that the phenomenalists and sensationalists engaged in philosophizing at the lower end on both sides of the scale, while Kant, Whewell and perhaps Hamilton concentrated upon the relationship of subject and object at the higher end of the scale.

On the scale of contemporary philosophy, Grote had placed Ferrier at the philosophical or idealist end and Alexander Bain, at the pure phenomenalist end (a position he seemed to accept with relish). Both positions Grote felt were justifiable so long as the former stuck to philosophy and the latter to physiology but Mill, Spencer, Hamilton, Stewart and Whewell unfortunately could not keep the two apart, they ran together their methods, assumptions, language and arguments. The critique of Hume, and of Mill's Logic will surface to give a flavour of the general critique of mis-psychology, and mis-phenomenalism, but the readers must go to Grote's texts to acquire the character and spirit as well of the detail of the critiques.

David Hume

The passage under review is sections 11-13 of the *Inquiries concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, the second book 'On the Origin of Ideas'. Grote asks his readers to 'watch for the beginning of the mixture of incongruous notions, or what I have called the bad psychology' (Grote 1900, 50). The first criticism of substance is that Hume's usages of 'impressions' and 'ideas' are confused and unclear (Grote 1900, 52-54,

65). In one sense the early impressions in consciousness are correctly taken as the foundation of all future thought, but in another sense of impression as isolated atomistic pieces of sense data, Hume must be wrong (Grote 1900, 55-56). It was Bosanquet's failure to see this equivocation as 'impressions' which led to his surprise that Grote could complement Hume while rejecting phenomenalism (Bosanquet 1902, 129-130). Secondly, Hume rushes to speak of 'things' existing before explaining how we come to know they exist, and at the same time he is forced to describe things not in material terms but as 'a number of customary conjunctions of particular impressions' (Grote 1900, 64-65). At the same time as he scientifically assumes the world to exist materially, and argues that we know the world via a material process, he is forced into pure subjectivism and scepticism.

Thirdly, Hume is accused of confusing a description of how the senses afford us materials for knowledge with having knowledge itself, explaining the jump in terms of the minds 'faculty of compounding' (Grote 1900, 55). A fourth criticism of Hume is the partiality, and 'fragmentary character' of his epistemology which makes it an abstraction. Hume fails to account for the unity of 'self', the unity of 'objects' and 'things' and falls into abject scepticism because he takes isolated impressions not consciousness, as the base of thought and stresses passive and responsive 'thought' and not creative 'thinking' (Grote 1900, 82-83)

John Stuart Mill

Mill's *Logic* is assessed in both parts of the *Exploratio* with equally devastating results. The *Logic* is defined as a 'Phenomenalist Logic' yet according to John Grote it confuses itself with philosophical or formal logic. Mill confuses a discussion of the

logic and methods of science for a whole formal study of the 'correctness of thought'. In addition Mill confuses the logical study of matter with the logical study of mind, a very different thing (Grote 1865, 161-162). Moreover, he seems to ignore the syllogism (Grote 1865, 157-159). The second major criticism concerns Mill's assumptions of an external world of 'natural facts' which get translated into knowledge because of our presence (or adstance) with them. This view is an 'abstraction' because it ignores all the 'imagination, speculation and action of mind' which goes into creating knowledge, it ignores consciousness at the base and the progressively creative powers of reflection (Grote 1865, 157-158). In another place Grote complains that to speak of knowledge as acquired from experience as adstance while ignoring ourselves in the world and the totality of immediatness, is a deficient as traditional Indian Cosmology. It

> 'is like taking the tortoise or elephant out of the world to support it, without thinking what it is to support him' (Grote 1900, 74).

Next, Mill conflates two uses of the word experience, the first to refer to the acquisition of sensory data and the second the process of imagining and judging. In so doing Mill becomes himself an intuitionist or 'imaginationist' at times (Grote 1900, 76). This is especially true when he gets down to analyzing the historical development of scientific thought via the 'Logic of Evidence'(Grote 1865, 158-159). A further two errors crop up in Mill's discussion of 'things'. Mill starts, like Aristotle, by categorizing things into those for minds, bodies, attributes of minds and attributes of bodies. Our knowledge of minds and bodies is pursued in terms of the presence of sense data but Mill then finds himself cut off from the world as becomes apparent in the *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* where 'things' get defined as 'an imagination of the possibility of sensations' (Grote 1900, 68). Next by treating

attributes of minds and bodies ie their perceptiveness or whiteness, as 'things' not merely predicates of things, and then trying to analyze them like phenomenal things, Mill ends up 'realizing notions' - the error of notionalism (Grote 1865, 164, 169,).

Logic to Mill was the fulfilment of Bacon's plan of an inductive science and method but Grote uses the superior knowledge of Bacon held by his friend Robert Leslie Ellis to note the odd misinterpretation by Mill (Grote 1865, 168). Mill is also castigated for his belief that a logic of physical science and of evidence can be made into a 'Real Logic for Social and Moral Science'. Grote's first objection is that Mill's book reads like a lawyer's manual on the methods for 'hunting down crime', with its three steps of (1) Induction - a preliminary induction to fix a strong suspicion of the culprit, (2) Ratiocination - a review of the suppositions that would follow, if the suspicion was correct and (3) Verification-'by actual facts' (Grote 1865, 173). Little originality is recognized in this and indeed Grote sees little difference between Mill's and Whewell's views despite all the polemical strife and despite Mill's technical and largely superfluous language (Grote 1865, 174-175).

The second chapter on Mill's *Logic* directs the reader to examples of mis-psychology, notionalism and relativism. Firstly, like Kant, Hamilton, and Spencer there is posited by Mill an 'unknowable substratum of things', for his knowledge cannot retrace its steps into the real universe as Grote's could (Grote 1865, 181-184). Grote recognizes in Mill's work, that 'wretched ghost of this higher philosophy which is furnished by the realizing of our logical notions' which is also evident in Hamilton (Grote 1865, 189). Next, Grote repeats an earlier point that Mill is inconsistent in reducing facts of mind to facts of body(matter) but then later reducing facts of matter to facts of mind. The result being a completely circular

argument (Grote 1865, 162, 176-7, 192). What follows from the reduction of facts of mind (consciousness) to facts of body is a collapse not only into reductionism but also determinism in which our own existential feeling of freedom is sacrificed at the altar of causality and science. Yet logically even causality and laws of nature are products of thought, 'and we only talk of a universe because we think and feel that there is one' (Grote 1865, 178).

The error of 'relativism' emerges where Mill argues that we can know nothing of the outward world 'except the sensations which we experience from it'. Mill loses here all chance of claiming that we see, hear or know what is in the world. Mill wishes to assert the ontological status of the universe and yet to deny it to us in knowledge because of our sensory constitution (Grote 1865, 180-189). This leads Mill into a contradictory and nonsensical position. 'In the circle, which makes sensational function of matter, and matter a possibility of sensation, where are we to find either premiss or conclusion, principle or result' (Grote 1900, 170). Grote blames Mill's 'dread of Schelling and Hegel' for making him fly to such a nonsense, which is incidentally the only reference to Hegel in Grote's existing corpus (Grote 1865, 190). Mis-phenomenalism is spotted in Mill's laborious attempt to run together physio-psychology and philosophy the details of which need not detain us here.

The final area of criticism is of Mill's attempt to provide a logical basis of positivism in the human and moral sciences. Grote's objectives are predictable, firstly, if Mill had wished to provide such a phenomenalist science he should have stuck to physiology, anthropology and ethology and not confused these with psychology and philosophy (Grote 1865, 194-195). His second and bigger point is that no science of society, however rigorous, could ever explain human activity with regard to laws. Why? Firstly, Grote correctly notes

that a precondition of action is 'want', or the desire or intention to act. The language of action involves some notion or 'what we want' and this asserts human choice and free will, and denies any notion of causal determinism. Secondly, what we call 'society' is a creation of man which he endeavors to improve, it is not a scientific or natural fact. Thirdly, in acting, people seek to close the gap between what 'is' and what 'ought to be', we must consult 'ideals' in practical life not just a past history of what men and societies have been (Grote 1865, 195-197). Mill like Comte is accused rightly of not being,

> 'exactly clear whether we are to be positivists...because we *ought* to be, or because it is certain we *shall* be, and is what we have come to' (Grote 1865, 196).

But the real point of significance is that for a philosophy of practical life and action 'art comes first, science afterwards, and therefore the phenomenal view will not be sufficient for us', and this goes both for 'ethology' and the new subject of 'sociology'. Sociology may tell us as Comte and Mill, in his 'Spirit of the Age' did that it is a law of human history that all societies pass through three stages, but

> 'on what principle are *we*, individual men, to infer from this that *we* are therefore to look upon it so? The *logic* of moral sciences is to guide us in sciences of the fact - what men *do* do - what are the laws by which they *do* act - what they *ought* to do, what we *ought* to think, belongs to the supposed *teleology*. By what right, and on what principles of logic, so to call it, does the sociology settle the *teleology*?' (Grote 1865, 201).

With this telling criticism, which underpins the whole of Grote's critique of Mill's *Utilitarianism* and of the whole of positivist moral and political philosophy, the chapter comes to an end, Grote relies on old Vichian reason why the human sciences need a distinct method to that of the physical, a view shared by idealism and hermeneutics,

> 'the moral world is man's creation: the phenomenal world is not' (Grote 1865, 201).

X

Language, Ontology and Idealism

So far four elements crucial to a fully formed idealist theory of knowledge have been discovered in Grote's *Exploratio Philosophica*. They are firstly, the assertion that subject and object are identical because both fall within one whole, and secondly, the claim that all knowledge arises from consciousness, immediacy or experience in the idealist sense of the word. Next, Grote has provided us with a theory of the growth of knowledge which recognizes the Hegelian climb from consciousness, through self consciousness to pure knowledge, and this by the exploration of consciousness by consciousness, by a self-examination. Fourthly, Grote has asserted the complete knowability of the universe, he has set up the key criteria of truth as 'completeness' of view or coherence, and asserted that the process of knowledge involves the creating of error along with truth, constant re-thinking, and a procedure of 'correctability'.

Now what I will argue is that Grote was an absolute idealist, that is, he believed that man puts mind into the world, into things and events; that the objective world has mind within it, it has meaning and purpose to man. Ultimately I wish to show that Grote held that in knowing the world man did not encounter 'dumb nature' but intelligence, that knowledge was in essence, mind meeting mind. Whether that mind being that of man, society or God being the crucial question remaining.

Grote's theory is not only surprising but probably more convincing than that given by any other Victorian British philosopher. Grote combines four arguments, one is epistemological and states that

the active creative mind, in exploring the universe in consciousness, puts order and meaning into the world. The second is metaphysical and states that in history (the record of practical activity, in will, choice and action), human beings creates their world, a world with human meaning and purpose. Thirdly, he turns to the philosophy of language explored earlier and asserts that through language, (an essentially social product), societies create collective meanings, and hence put collective mind into the worlds of thought, artifacts and nature. Finally,Grote, the Christian, claims that in its creative and exploratory activities, mind finds mind coming towards it from the opposite direction. We find in the universe the meaning and purpose, the reason and intelligence of the 'Planner and Maker'.

The object of our discussion is now what Grote calls 'Reality' and gradually more specifically, 'Being' 'Existence', the 'Universe' and 'things'. The subject set aside for this is 'Ontology' or the 'higher philosophy'. We have seen that Grote rejects the division of ontology from metaphysics, and epistemology, and he rejects the use of ontology as 'a stone to fling at a dog'. The study is to help us grasp the 'nature of being' or the 'reason for being', to analyse 'what the nature of our life is objectively,... and what is the fundamental fact of our life', what 'nature is objectively', and what is 'the real being of the thing' (Grote 1900, 29, 182).

What Grote is clear about is that the phenomenalist and Scottish Common Sense' views of existence, reality and things are incomplete, confused and wrong. The phenomenalist like Mill, always treats reality, existence, the universe and things as derivative from sensations, from either facts of the mind or facts of nature (our bodies). Illogically they posit existence first and derive thought, knowledge and consciousness from this, but epistemologically they are forced in the other direction to see external reality dependent on the

so called epistemological 'facts' (Grote 1865,26). For them reality and the universe, existence and things are beyond knowledge they are unknowable, dumb and meaningless, there is no order, purpose or meaning in the world (Grote 1900, 27-28). The maxim of the phenomenalist then is 'to put nothing (mentally) into the universe beyond which we find there' (Grote 1865, 14-15). The whole spirit of phenomenalism is then desolate and desultory, it makes us all strangers to the universe, to other people and things, it makes us feel homeless. Nor can phenomenalism explain law, order or even unity in the world if it sees 'the universe is composed of *things* or separate unities or individualities' (Grote 1865, 45).

The Common Sense philosophers have little more of value to offer. They take starts from both sides and come to confuse matters. Dugald Stewart, for instance, gives both a phenomenalist account of reality as a supposition of sensation, but then tries to explain it from the point of view of knowledge. In so doing he separates the 'substance' of 'reality' from its 'qualities'. The qualities we can know by reflection but not the 'substance' the 'thing in itself' or reality which is left as unknowable (Grote 1900, 26-32). Secondly, as Segerstedt points out there is relativism here as well as notionalism, because our senses and reason, our knowledge of and about things, cannot agree on reality. Grote held that this problem, central to Scottish philosophy, could be solved easily.

> 'In reality acquaintance with, intuition or apprehension or comprehension of, *it*, and judging correctly and exhaustively this, that, and the other thing, about *it*, are two ways of expressing the same thing, and *either* of them are definitions of knowledge: the difficulties as to relativeness seem to me to arise simply from a confusion between the two' (Grote 1865, 66; 1876, 383).

Idealism, or philosophy proper, can overcome these partial and confused views. Its basis is the unitary whole of consciousness or experience as Forsyth keeps calling it (Grote 1900, 167-168). The

basis of this is raw or primitive thought or knowledge,

> 'the basis upon which all rests - being not that things exist, but that we know them i.e., think of them as existing...' (Grote 1865, 59)

As he says in the introduction

> 'that we call existence is for us a thought of ours, which it belongs to that philosophy to discuss the nature, meaning, validity of' (Grote 1865, xiv).

But this basic consciousness involves both the feeling of ourselves and a feeling of being, of our existence. It also involves a recognition of the not self, the other, and of external existence, as well as the existence of the self and of consciousness. In immediateness we have bound up knowledge and being, self and not self, 'personality and individuality', subject and object, in a singular apprehension of reality, being, the universe (Grote 1865, 22-23, 168-170).

The progress of knowledge we have seen is not merely that of bodily communication with objects, norpurereasoning, it is a matter of 'noticing' or bringing to our notice, in an 'interested' fashion, or carving facts from our basic consciousness. We carve out the 'self' and the 'object' or 'things' from this based unity, we give meaning, reason and purpose. We humanize the universe and objects and make ourselves at home with them (Grote 1865, 14-15, 110; 124; 1900, 66 ; Forsyth 1910, 142-144). To Grote 'things' are interested and meaningful, they are products of mind, not of bodily communication. A 'thing' is the same thing as its 'idea', 'concept' or'notion', and the notion tells us not just the spatial size and temporal location of the matter but is meaning, reason and purpose (Grote 1900, 28, 112, 176-179; Rescher 1973, 105-110, 176-186). So an aborigine finding a plough in the middle of the outback immediately comprehends it and looks not just at substance and qualities, facts and qualities of the object, but looks for its reason, meaning and purpose.

'Supposing our knowledge *complete*, it might be considered as much a phenomenon or fact about the plough, that it turns up the ground, or is meant to turn up the ground, or however we describe it, as that is is wood and iron, its colour is red, and its shape whatever it might be. And it is its purpose, meaning, use, which makes it a plough. It is a plough i.e., which makes us call it a plough. It is a plough, ie.the thing which it is, in virtue of its doing this, or being meant or intended to do this, not in virtue of its being wood and iron and in colour red' (Grote 1900, 27-28).

In this sense Grote is anxious to see 'things' as dependent on ourselves, as 'our own creation', which can never stand independently...against us' (Grote 1900, 169). As we will remember 'a thing' is a unit of the intelligible universe, the unity being given by the understanding (Grote 1872, 65). Things are a conceptual construct whose meaning or reality lies in the notion, in constructing and in using these notions or concepts we 'construct' or 'make' the object (Grote 1865, 25, 27, 51). The world, the universe or existence is a collective name for both our immediate world of experience and for all the things and objects we put or find there. These objects may be pure notions, such as the supposition of God, man-made institutions such as society, the family, moral and legal codes, man-made things such as ploughs and houses. All of these are direct human constructs carved out of immediacy by reflection, judgement and conception and formed through activity (Grote 1900, 189-190). The world also contains natural objects, phenomenal things not made by man, but even here man imposes order, meaning and purpose on them, as with a tree which we decide to plant to commemorate a war, or to which we attribute historical or even aesthetic significance (Cunningham 1933, 77-78; Whitmore 1927, 311-313).

Later we shall see that Grote's analysis of human actions and practice involves the search for the mind in them, the intentions, reasons, and purposes, the wants, needs and desires that motivate them. In this, hermeneutics and idealism are to be unified (Whitmore

1927, 319). Man's nature to Grote has two sides sentience and activity, feeling and will, and neither takes priority (Grote 1900, 191). As we have seen the fundamental restlessness of man lies as much in his want and desire for action as it does in his want and desire for more pleasure and less pain. Will and self conscious action grow out of immediate reflex and customary action, as does knowledge out of consciousness (Grote 1900, 188-190). In the ontology for practice Grote bases all on the common parent of sensibility and activity 'want'. All of human activity can be understood by finding the want, physical or mental, that was its origin. Immediateness tells us how things are but it also reveals dissatisfaction and tells us what should or ought to be, and it calls forth human action to make good the shortage. Want and action are as basic a set of facts as are feeling, sensing and inferring. In wanting we identify a need in the world, and acting always has some purpose or intention, as well as some meaning. All this as the basis of Grote's *Treatise on the Moral Ideals* (Grote 1876, Grote 1900, 189-191).

So Grote argues that we put order and intelligence into the world or our minds, from the first awakening.

> 'Order or knowableness in the universe is then implied by us, or we may say, understood, so far as anything is understood, in the first act of knowledge. And the key to open this order, the clue to follow it by, the alphabet to read it by, is the recognition, continually corrected, of *ourselves* in it' (Grote 1900, 292).

But the ourselves is not just individual but is collective or social (Grote 1900, 212-213). Now this is not because we merely cooperate in making things and building up institutions or developing social practices, it is far more fundamental. The reason is that our imagining, thinking, our conceiving, judging even our acting, is only abstractly called individual. Because our language is social, because we think in language, as well as speak and write in it, because we share concepts, their meaning and their usages, we enter into the

minds of others in thinking, speaking and writing. This point has been almost totally ignored by commentators except for a hint by John Passmore and Charles Whitmore (Passmore 1966, 54; Whitmore 1927, 32).

The reader might refer to the section on 'Philological Writings' in Chapter I for refreshment here, but I shall concentrate now on the arguments in the *Exploratio*. Grote early on notes that the knowing and learning mind exists in the middle of a multitude of 'knowing ones' or 'fellow-knowers'. We share thoughts and knowledge, judgements, purposes and meanings not because we have been 'taught by others' or socialized, but 'because our intelligence is in its constitution social, and our mind is the mind of a social being' (Grote 1865, 154).

> 'We think of necessity socially: more socially perhaps in some solitude than in some society: we think with the minds of others as well as our own: thought is internal conversation and discussion'.

But how and why? For as phenomenalists we can never enter into the minds of others or think as they do. We are trapped in a private individual world. The reason is language

> 'Language, which is social, goes to the bottom of our mind: not but that we might, and perhaps do, abundantly imagine without language, but that we should not, without it, come to anything like the results to which we do come, and that in respect of some of the earliest and simplest things' (Grote 1865, 154).

We should now remember Grote's vital point in 'On Glossology', discussed in Chapter One, above, where he asserts that a 'thing' is its 'notion' or 'concept'. It is not an object separate to us but a construct of our mind, of consciousness and reflection upon it. In the *Exploratio* he makes the same point when he writes, the 'thought word' and the 'thought thing' are the same, and are what is called a 'concept' (Grote 1900, 226).

So, we are now at the bounds of what Rescher calls 'Conceptual Idealism' which stresses,

> 'not a doctrine as to the nature of reality itself, but one as to the nature of our thought about reality - and specifically about the framework of concepts by whose means our view of the world is (standardly) articulated' (Rescher 1973, 195).

And we have further evidence for this in Part Two of the *Exploratio* in a chapter otherwise on the traditional idealist terrain of 'Conception'. Grote wants to get beyond the phenomenalist preoccupation with concepts or notions as 'thought pictures' and the narrow idealist idea of them as pure 'thoughts'. His first assertion is that in language we build a

> 'man-made universe, or, rather these universes, of significant sound (for every separate language is a separate universe, to the extent which I shall in a moment describe' (Grote 1900, 214).

The capacity for 'making the universe' then is language, and there are a plurality of languages, hence a plurality of universes (as Peter Winch argues much later) (Winch 1958). Without social language we could not think to any 'purpose'.

The early Wittgensteinian idea is then produced for 'A language is a picture of the universe...which in fact *is* our universe' (Grote 1900, 215)

The picture is not of course, visual, the word is used as a metaphor, but Grote immediately shows how even a visual picture of it is shared by observers, they to some extent have a 'co-intelligence' once they 'are talking together'. The problem of two speakers using different language is tackled through the distinction between the sound word (phone) which differs and the thought word (noem) which may be shared. The meaning of a word is defined as its 'thought' and is judged to be akin to both a 'visual picture' and a 'sound picture'.

The central issue is then tackled 'What do we *do* when we think?' This Grote argues is the *same* question as 'What is a word, as 'meaning''? The link is language. We think in language, what we do when we think is have an inward conversation using social concepts

which have agreed social meanings. When we use words or propositions we mean what words and propositions are used to mean by a body of language users - usually a society. So when we scrutinize immediate consciousness to discriminate things in the universe, we are not just thinking and conceiving individually but socially, we do not just discover and put our own meaning into the universe but also those of fellow language users. Hence in discussing the world we are not just putting ourselves into the world and finding ourselves there in concepts but we are putting ourselves collectively into the universe and find 'us', 'we' or 'ourselves' collectively there (Grote 1900, 225-228). No wonder Grote could call the key to the discovery of intelligence in the universe, the 'alphabet' (Grote 1900; 292). No wonder he could describe the logical necessity of the absolute by reference to language,

> 'As one word of a language implies the whole system of it, so does one particular of knowledge involve thought of the, a yet unparticularized universe' (Grote 1900, 292).

So now we have three answers to the riddle of how intelligence or mind gets into the universe, and why we conceive things and objects to have meaning. Firstly, that the creative mind from the start humanizes the universe. Secondly, in activity we both create and endow meaning to things in the universe. And thirdly, in language, the use of words and propositions, we both carve out things and objects and endow them, or 'embody' in them, social meaning. But Grote had gone here nearly as far as he could with philosophy, he was on the verge of the absolute. The question of the absolute at the time resolved itself into two issues. Firstly, can a complete knowledge of everything be gained by human beings? And secondly, is there a reason, a purpose, a logic, mind or intelligence embodied in the objective world of reality, the universe? Grote tackles both questions and answers in the affirmative.

In counteracting Kant, Hamilton and Ferrier on the one side and Mill and Spencer on the other, who all denied the possibility of knowing the 'real substance' or 'unknowable substratum', Grote had claimed that with a combination of knowledge of and about things we could find out all there is to be known about reality. The growth of individual knowledge, and social knowledge as recorded in history, will and does reveal the absolute, even if each step is painful and partial. Reality and knowledge are inextricably linked, as Forsyth insists, and in the pursuit of knowledge and truth, by clarifying and making coherent our thinking, we are approximating to the absolute. In this sense the absolute is the ideal of knowledge, the re-unification of immediacy and mediacy (which Bradley felt was impossible).

> 'So long as our knowledge is imperfect, which in fact all knowledge of every being (One Being only excepted) must be, we must *suppose* complete knowledge, to fasten our incomplete knowledge on: and the complete knowledge thus supposed includes of course a portion of ignorance or unknown. But of the unknown there is no reason for us to suppose ...that it is unknowable' (Grote 1865, 147).

The point is most clearly expressed in the *Treatise* where the absolute is described 'as the knowledge of real truth, or that which our minds thirst after'. Grote then writes,

> 'This communication of subjective mind with mind objective, or mind in things, which, is the real knowledge, is something, in Aristotles phrase, rather EÚKTÓV, to be wished for or yearned after, than something which can be attained: but there is nothing in the nature of things to hinder its attainment: it is what we may conceive a continual approximation towards...' (Grote 1876, 387).

Next, human activity is the constant effort to close the gap between what is and what ought to be, it is want, action and pursuit of the ideal. The practical moral and political ideals are then the ideals or goals of practice just as the absolute is the goal of knowledge. Grote saw in human history a great endeavour for human social improvement or self realization, which often led to regress but

which overall witnessed man's ascent to the moral absolute, the Good and Right. The study of human history, like the study of human language and thought, will reveal a progressive development to social self realization and in the Liberal Anglican View of history, with its deeply Vichian assertions of historical development, he found along with his colleagues, the historical counterpart to his idealist metaphysics and philosophy (Grote 1900, 324).

On the last point of the identity of the intelligence and mind in the universe Grote gives us a choice. We can see it either as an 'embodiment' of human thought and will, or that of God, a wise 'Planner and Maker' (Grote 1865, 57). Advancing knowledge is 'a pattern coming out' but whose pattern? (Grote 1900, 205). Grote replies

> 'whether we consider this pattern to be in the mind or in objective nature does not in my view matter much, only we must not consider it partly in one and partly in the other' (Grote 1900, 205).

Later we get three choices, knowing can be seen as personally 'mirroring the universe', 'sympathy with other intelligence' in society, or 'awakening to God'. In one place at least Grote calls himself an 'egotist' and in another a 'personalist' idealist and he places responsibility for the knowableness and meaning of the universe with the self (Grote 1865, 14). In 'On Glossology' and in the passages above, the society of language users gets the responsibility (Grote 1874, 170, 175). But elsewhere God is considered to be the architect of the universe, and it is his mind and intelligence we meet when thinking or acting in the world (Grote 1865, 84). When we discover meaning we discover that 'thought, pre-contemplated by the Creator', before contemplation by ourselves.

Grote claims that 'objects', 'things' and 'reality' possess the quality of knowability or 'knowableness', that is they already possess

mind in them (Grote 1900, 292). Hence the knowing process, is our re-acquantaince with reality.

> 'Knowing is therefore mind meeting mind; mind analyzing, or dissecting, what mind must have compounded; mind sympathising with mind, as they proceed in their opposite directions' (Grote 1900, 292).

In several places he shifts from his fence sitting position and sides with the religious view as when he writes,

> 'For my own part, I seem to recognize a higher legitimacy in the transformed self-recognition, which shows us in the Universe a Planner or Maker with his ideas and his purposes...' (Grote 1900, 293 ; see also 1865, 79).

In religion, Grote had obviously found an ally for his idealist's philosophy, his eclectic methodology, his Hegelian ontology and his Liberal Anglican view of history. In this he was not alone but in the majority amongst Victorian idealists (Robbins 1967, 1982). But, as Ritchie writes, we must not see in idealist philosophy merely an apologist defence of old Christian beliefs for,

> .'So far as Christianity is a system of spiritual doctrines and beliefs about the relation between the soul of the individual and that Divine Spirit which is operating in the universe, it finds a philosophical counterpart and an intellectual interpretation in Idealism; but, so far as it is represented as *necessarily* including certain statements about alleged matters of fact, Idealism can lend no support to the apologist in his controversy with historical critics' (Ritchie 1893, 31).

For my own part the biggest fear is not that Grote used philosophy as a rationalization of Christianity, nor that he ran religious and philosophical language together,which he did not, but that he fallaciously conflated reasons and causes. Time and time again he urges their seperation, but then when he searches for the order and meaning of the universe of objects and things, he sometimes asserts they have reason and purpose, the reason and purpose given them by God. If Grote had not given himself a fall back position he could be correctly accused of anthropomorphism (Grote 1865, xl, xlv, xlvi,).

Personally, I feel Grote was attracted to this spiritual view but that he both recognised its dangers and generally held back from following 'this out into any conclusions of Natural Theology' (Grote 1865, 58-9). His final position is the one summed up in the *Exploratio* Part One,

> 'Knowledge from the philosophical point of view is a communication of mind with mind through an embodiment or result of the one, analyzed or traced back out of embodiment or result into thought again, by the other. The process or manner of this analysis, may be variously described: it is the mistaken,but continuously corrected, attribution to what we are conscious of as different from ourselves, of the mind which is *in* ourselves:... but the *entire* view, if we think rightly, never alters or should alter. The process of knowledge again, logically viewed, is a continued (logical) creation of an ordely universe out of what, but for knowledge, has no properties and cannot have anything thought or said about it: but this creation is always felt or understood by us not as a creation, but as a recognition' (Grote 1865, 57-58).

We may then conclude that Grote was an objective idealist, who tended towards absolutism. Within this he found several paths leading him to the same conclusion, not only epistemology, but linguistic philosophy, ontology, history, and religion. His system was indeed a modification of that of Whewell's and Ferrier's as Forsyth, Segestedt and Cunningham cleverly show. But it was also independently expressed and transcended many problems found in the work of Grote's predecessors (Forsyth 1910, 135-139; Segestedt 1935, 141-149; Cunningham 1933, 66-70).

Whether this, original and penetrating system was also uninfluenced by Hegel, as Cunningham suggests, is a matter of judgement which I shall leave until later. But what is clear is the profundity of John Grote's mind and writings, and the error in those who have ignored his work for so long. We can also reject the classification of his work as primarily 'intuitionist'as suggested by Rothblatt and Schneewind or 'religious', as suggested by Sorley for it was 'idealist' to its very heart. Finally, we can see that though

Grote's books were structured as critiques of other British philosophers, and that his own ideas were a modification and conversational response to their's, he had a philosophy, almost a system of philosophy of his own.

Chapter Six

Human Mind, Human Nature and Morality

A Prolegomena to Ethics

'And the notion of our own activity, which is the ground of morals, must be taken in relation to the complete or idealist view of knowledge, not to the other (phenomenalism)' (Grote 1900, 299).

Introduction

This chapter has several aims, but the one that takes precedence is the effort to explain how John Grote tried to found modern ethics upon an idealist epistemological and ontological basis. The epistemological base is explained in an introductory fashion in section four and then returned to in sections seven to nine after Grote's metaphysical assumptions about human nature have been explored in depth. Sections one and two will deal with the hopes Grote had for his ethical writings and their rather disappointing reception. Section five will outline Grote's major innovation of suggesting dualistic ethical system with both teleological and deontological elements in his sciences of Eudaemonics and Aretaics. Section ten will explain Grote's commitment to ethical objectivism and idealism.

Discussion of human nature alongside discussion of epistemology, ontology and metaphysics is not as odd as it sounds. For Grote the base for all our experience, knowledge and activity is reality. We

start with reality in our immediate experience and seek its re-establishment in a fully coherent ethical life, the absolute. But experience, knowledge and activity themselves disrupt reality and create an existential human predicament that intellectual, moral and political activity seek to overcome. Experience is disrupted by new sensation, movement and self awareness; immediate knowledge is disrupted by judgement, an orderly world by our want and physical and practical exertions. Our world is thus revealed as incoherent, not as what it ought to be. Our restlesness or want forces us to explore solutions to its defects to create the right and the true, the coherent, the absolute. Human nature, we shall see is as divided as mind and reality.

Mind and body, thought and sensations, satisfaction and want, the complete and the incomplete are matched in human nature by sensitivity and activity, the passive feeling self and the active doing self. Just as restlesness in our bodies and minds forces us onwards so want in our natures stimulates our activity. Moral and political activity we shall see are to be explained in the terms and their institutions, practices, rules and principles are seen as embodiments and survivals of past experience, thought, judgement and activity to satisfy want.

Production of such a grand scheme was not novel in the nineteenth century, indeed it was the norm amongst philosophers to seek epistemological and psychological bases for their ethics and politics. Hence the Philosophical Radicals founded their ethics and politics on the basis of phenomenalism and associational psychology. Herbert Spencer founded his synthetic system in his *First Principles* on ontological discussion of the Unconditioned and an empiricist psychology, while Green, Bosanquet and Bradley sought the same sort of prolegomena to ethics that the young Hegel gave in his *Phenomenology of Mind*. Grote's scheme may usefully be compared to Green's in his *Prolegomena*

to Ethics (Green 1884).

Most commentators on Thomas Hill Greens *Prolegomena to Ethics* note the almost total reliance and dependence of his ethics on his metaphysics, including his epistemology (Hudson 1980, 48-52; Richter 1964, 191; Copleston 1966, 194). But most have also noted the utter inadequacy of the metaphysical base provided by Green, premised as it was on several 'a priori' propositions that are subject to little scrutiny and which, in the final result, are either indefensible or actually false (Hudson, 1980, 48; Richter 1964; Copleston 1966, 198; Walsh, 1969, 71; Schneewind 1977, 402; Sidgwick, 1967, 284-285). The basic premis was a simplistic belief in

> 'a self-conditioning self determining mind or spiritual principle which realises itself in man and his institutions. As is our knowledge so is our moral activity explicable only on the supposition of this divine mind' (Richter 1964, 199).

John Grote, writing two decades before Green's *Prolegomena* was published in 1883, insisted on the same relationship of reliance or dependence of his ethics upon his epistemology. However, as I've pointed out in the last chapter, the metaphysics of the *Exploratio* was in fact coherent, systematic and profound. In addition while the notion of divine mind is compatible with purely epistemological (non religious) arguments, Grote does not ask us to rest everything upon the former as does Green (Grote 1900, 293-296, 299; 1876, 54). Grote's prolegomena to ethics is, in these two senses, superior to that of Green, and it may follow that the ethical superstructure is also more coherent.

The position is different with Bradley. Bradley wrote his major contribution to moral philosophy *Ethical Studies* in 1876 and he produced his metaphysics, best illustrated in *Appearance and Reality* in 1893. The ethical work is very self contained and while a Hegelian metaphysics seems to be required for its underpinning it is not worked

out there, as both Schneewind and Walsh note (Schneewind 1977, 392; Walsh 1969, 74). Copleston even argues that Bradley's *Ethical Studies* is not a metaphysical work at all (Copleston 1966, 217-218). It can in fact be argued that Bradley was preoccupied in *Ethical Studies* with contemporary ethical debates and not with restructuring ethical philosophy from scratch, and that even later, when the metaphysics was written the connections with ethics was not spelled out. We may conclude, as does Wollheim that,

> 'once again, we have the sense that the position in which he finally rests, is not to be regarded as the outpost of a bold and speculative intelligence, making the most forward point won in his advance upon the unknown, but is rather the last refuge of a sceptical and critical mind in retreat from a series of positions, successively found untenable. It is because of the hollowness and inadequacy and the ultimate inconsistency of ordinary ethical views - or at any rate of the ordinary interpretations of ordinary views - that Bradley finds himself forced into unfamiliar and forbidding terrain' (Wollheim 1969, 229).

The position was different with Bosanquet who was closer to Green and Grote.

> 'Metaphysics is at the beginning and end of Bosanquet's thought and also all that lies in between' (Merz 1938, 353).

But Bosanquet wrote no systematic treatise on ethics that illustrated the dependence of ethical philosophy upon metaphysics, though the 'Philosophical Theory of the State' does do this for political theory (Bosanquet 1899). Bosanquet's ethical works were generally collections of short essays, and the one book that sounds as if it may do the job *Psychology of the Moral Self* turns out not to refer to the ethical superstructure.

For a variety of reasons, including the inadequately explained link between metaphysics and ethics in the philosophy of the Oxford Idealists, and the confused or even inadequate metaphysics that it produced as a foundation, some writers such as Milne and Richter have suggested that the ethical, social and political work of the English

Idealists could easily be detached from the metaphysics. Milne argues that,

> 'The British Idealists themselves certainly thought that their work in social philosophy could, at any rate for the most part, stand on its own feet independently of metaphysics or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they believed their work in social philosophy pointed to the need for fundamental work in metaphysics but did not itself depend upon that work being done' (Milne, 1967, 319).

Ewing on the other hand has gone so far as to suggest that the idealist school in England did not even develop a distinctive ethical and political theory to found on their metaphysics. The strength and unity of the English Idealists lay in their epistemology and metaphysics. Their ethical and political works he saw as an independent appendage and of less significance (Ewing 1957, Introduction). For his part John Grote both saw and stated the need to found his ethics on his metaphysics, and as I hope to have shown he produced a coherent foundation. I shall now show that he built his ethics upon the metaphysical base constructed on the *Exploratio* in a most interesting and suggestive fashion. Grote may not only be an idealist supposedly before its time, but he may be one of the most coherent and comprehensive idealists as well. We may now move to review Grote's intentions in writing his major ethical works.

I

Aims and Intentions

There are numerous tasks Grote set himself in his ethical writing. Here we shall concentrate on only those most central to the understanding of his work.

The first two, and the most general, were to expose the one

sided, partial and abstract nature of the major schools of moral philosophy of the day and to provide a new and coherent theory that would unite the partial truths and overcome the abstractions of otherwise competing systems. The theory he offers is a synthesis of contemporary arguments but as he rarely uses the language of dialectics and prefers that of eclecticism we must take his intention to be the creation of a new 'harmony' in ethical argument, a new 'syncretism' in explanation.

The exposure of the partiality of sectarian schools of thought recurs regularly in both the *Examination* and the *Treatise*. The *Examination* is devoted to the exposure of the one sided truth of Utilitarianism or more correctly the plurality of schools that travel together under that general label. Both *Examination* and the *Treatise* contain critiques of the schools of Moral Sense and Moral Sentiments usually associated with the Scottish School of the eighteenth century (Grote 1870, 195, 203-4, 261-4, 289-90; 1876, 334-335.); the 'a priori' moral doctrines of the intuitionists and Scottish Common Sense philosophers, who Grote calls the intuitivists (Grote 1870 56 ,ChXI; 1876, 47-8, 53-56 chapterXI); and some comments on the ethics of Kant, with its 'rule of generality' and its principle of the 'categorical imperative' (Grote 1870, 275-6). Ancient ethical systems such as Stoicism and Epicurianism as well as Christianity are also analyzed, all with the intention of elucidating the truth that they contain alongside errors, confusions and partiality.

Grote's point is that the sectarian battles between the various schools was unnecessary and non productive. He constantly repeats that utilitarianism and intuitionism can happily synchronise, each holding a part of the truth the other needs (Grote 1870, 79; 1876, 57, 79). He regularly argues that scientific or 'positivist' observational morality and 'idealist ethics' imply and need each other

for the whole truth to be available, and he goes on to defuse and then reconcile the disputes between 'dependent' and 'independent' morality, highlighted by Whewell, between inductive and deductive (intuitionist) ethics set out by John Stuart Mill; and between utilitarianism, moral sense and sentimental ethics highlighted by amongst others Bentham.

That the disputes were unfortunate as well as unnecessary recurs in both the introduction and the final chapter on 'What are the Requisites of a 'Moral Philosohpy at the Present Time' in the *Examination*. Grote reports that in historical periods of 'mental stir', sectarian groups develop around ideas and individuals who form a 'Mental brotherhood which 'communes inimicitiae' produce''. Thomas Kuhn is later to argue that conflicts between such communities of learning and paradigms of knowledge are productive of intellectual advancement but Grote felt that such groups and the controversies between them were

> 'injurious to permanent truth on account of the wild misconception of what is said by opponents, the false issues, and the little real *meeting*, consequently, of argument' (Grote, 1870, 10).

One counterproductive by product is the waste of effort taken up by those disputes, the trench warfare of philosophy. Another is the uncongenial atmosphere it produces. Grote complains that Mill's earlier reviews of Professor Sedgwick and Dr Whewell were written in a destructive mood, adding that

> 'The 'odium ethicum' is even more unreasonable than the 'odium theologicum'. The cessation of it would be, I think, an advantage, not only to our tempers, but to the interests of truth and the progress of moral science'(Grote 1870, 9).

Grote argues later that in fact both the adherents of the moralities of utility and self command worked from within what they felt to be mutually exclusive systems. Each claims either 'to occupy the whole field' or to have some ground independent of the other.

> 'This is a disadvantage as causing a waste of words in argument, for there is no common standard or principle on which the argument is to go, and each brings charges against its opponents which are of importance only from its own point of view, and from any other are no charges at all. It is further a disadvantage in respect of the whole consideration of morality, as causing a divorce of things which ought to be considered together, and in regard of which the argument ought to arise, not from a claim of one or the other to the dominion, but from the effort to show how it is that, each having its own truth, they yet exist in harmony together, as observation of life shows us that in the main they do'(Grote 1870, 123).

Unfortunately, as Grote notices elsewhere, what is true of moral philosophers is also true for practical 'moralists' who,

> 'determined to shut their eyes to one of these sources or to the other, have in general gone on with a weary battle'(Grote 1876, 125).

In its place Grote calls, not for a new school or the triumph of one of those of the past or present, nor even for,

> 'a definiteness of system, but largeness of view'(Grote 1870, 344).

This 'largeness of view' is to embrace both the form and content of moral philosophy, we are to both bring partial systems into a relation with one another and we are to bring the partial truths they contain, on say, issues of human nature or justice, into a balance or harmony with one another. At present moral philosophers and schools of thought either rely on meaningless 'generalities' or are

> 'very likely to seize hold of some one point, possibly of some importance and truth, to exaggerate this, and make everything depend upon it, recommending attention to it as what will at once set everything right, in a manner which those who see the variety and complication of actual life, are at once aware is not reasonable'(Grote 1870, 343).

Grote now injects a superb medical analogy to show how unreasonable and illogical it is to expect that the whole of human nature, knowledge or moral value can be reduced to, or subsumed under some single proposition, rule or principle.

> 'It is not likely *a priori* that one medicine or one manner of treatment will cure all diseases; and in the same way it seems to me that any simplicity in morals which is, not painfully and

> in time distilled from most complicated observation (like the grand simplicity of Newtonian discoveries), but summarily assumed as what must be true and what must account for the facts (as has been the case in the larger number of moral theories), is not at all likely to be what we want'(Grote 1870, 343).

Contemporary moral philosophies are therefore to be criticised and exposed for this 'partiality and one sidedness', but then their partial truths are to be detached from the sectarian belief systems in which they are embedded and brought into a harmonious relationship with other truths, creating as a result a 'largeminded' and 'coherent' philosophical system. The production of a coherent system is the final philosophical aim, just as the final aim in practical moral conduct is a life of coherent meaning and action. Despite his reservations about scientific narrow mindedness, partial and one sided systems, Grote embraced the idea of system as a coherent body of ideas. His idea of moral philosophy is stated in a neat passage from the *Examination*

> 'Ethical philosophy is neither more nor less than the thought here mentioned, thought of man about his life, his character, and his work. This is a thing which there always has been, and always must be. Moral philosophy has been the effort to methodise and to systematise it. And if there is one error more than another to which moral philosophy has been liable from the first, it is that it has not been sufficiently true to itself, and has not sufficiently acknowledged the necessity and importance of *much* thought of this kind. The *partial* systematisation, the exhibition, time after time, of a portion, or of one feature, of human nature as the whole of it, has resulted from a sort of feeling within moral philosophy similar to that which outside of it has condemned philosophy altogether, a feeling that there should be as little call for thought as possible, that everything should be ready, simple, and immediate'(Grote 1870, 244-245).

The *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy* is not a negative critique of a totally wrong doctrine, but a patient elaboration of a difficult concept and a pluralistic school of thought, followed by a careful detachment of its truth and its value from what are untrue, confused, partial and exaggerated elements. The *Treatise* starts similarly with a discussion of the two distinct but syncretically

related moral sciences of Eudaemonics, the utilitarians science of happiness, and the more intuitionist science of Aretaics, the science of virtue, followed almost immediately by a discussion of the two distinct but syncretically related sides of human nature, the sentient and active. Neither book leaves utilitarianism or intuitionism or any other moral doctrine devastated and ruined but leaves them looking rather embarrassed and sheepish, but with at least some pride left in that some cardinal axiom of theirs is left intact. But the *Treatise* unites and synthesises where the *Examination* leaves issues unresolved.

We may now pass to the third intention of Grote's in his moral writings, to provide a critique of positivism, in particular its claim to answer or transcend the traditional issues of moral philosophy, and then, as with the distinct ethical schools discussed above, to bring it into harmony with idealist philosophy. Grote aimed to provide an original critique and a unique reconciliation which gave a legitimate place for both 'sociology', 'physiology' and even an observational science of pleasure, which he dubbed 'hedonics' or 'hedonology', while reserving pride of place and logical priority for the metaphysical discussion of the moral ideals, the world of values, the imperative, the normative world of 'what ought to be' rather than 'what is in existence' or 'has been'. That Grote utterly rejected the pretentious claims of positivism in both epistemology and moral philosophy, and that he saw how moral positivism 'degenerates into a sort of quackery' are indisputable (Grote 1876, 391). Like his colleagues at Cambridge, therefore, Grote launched critiques of utilitarianism, empiricism, positivism and materialism, but unlike them he embraced his opponents and called them to join in a new reconciliation. It is in his uniting of the scientific study of the 'lower facts' by observation and induction, in history, sociology, physiology and psychology, with the epistemological study of 'imagination' and

'ideals', and the ontological study of the 'higher facts' - the reasons for our ideals, and by bringing together the moral sciences with moral philosophy - or the 'Art of Life'.... that he made a unique and meritorious contribution to Victorian thought.

Grote's fourth intention was to create a new philosophy of man's active moral nature and man's moral action, the philosophy of Aretaics. This as already indicated was to complement the study of eudaemonics and hedonics but its creation was a separate and unique task. In part it arose from the need to transcend the limits of the intuitionist, common sense, moral sense and sentiments schools arguments against utilitarianism. In part it arose from the general need to systematise and synthesise an alternative to the utilitarian and positivist currents that were rising to flood heights at the time. It certainly sharpens up and directs attention to the better aspects of the intuitionist, the common sense and moral sense schools, Kantian and Coleridgian idealistic ethics.

But the real impulses were I think adjacent to these. The first was the need to bring to the attention of British audiences the novel psychologies of the the French eclectics, and in particular Maine de Biran, as a balance to the materialist and associationalist psychologies of Alexander Bain and James Mill. The science of Aretaics we shall see is premised upon several novel psychological (even existential) ideas, the idea that the motor nerves complement and even dominate the sensory nerves, the idea that life is a struggle against the resistance encountered by every part of ourselves in the world, from the muscles to our thoughts; and that at the heart of life and of human nature is not feeling but wanting ('Want' being the desire for the non-existent, the not yet, the ideal which is always absent, with its resultant ennui).

But secondly, I believe Grote also aimed to give philosophical

form and credence to the Romantic intellectual and cultural current that was challenging the mechanistic, materialistic and positivistic tide of the day. Aretaics, I argue, is an attempt to give a philsophical form to what Carlyle, Coleridge, De Quincy, Shelley, Wordsworth, Tennyson and Ruskin had left as poetic inspiration, the belief that at heart human nature was active not passive, creative not created, thirsty for expression not sensuous gratification. In a way, Grote's whole philosophy tries to harmonize the tension between the mechanistic and romantic impulses. In the exposition of the two sciences Eudaemonics and Aretaics the two sides of human nature, the two philosophies of phenomenalism and idealism, the two logics of induction and deduction and the politics of democracy and individual freedom, stability and change, are all respectively reconciled. But as ever the harmonization is via symmetry and in syncrety. The direction, logic and need of each is distinct but they complement each other and each side is needed to create a balanced and coherent view.

We may now discuss two specifically stated intentions of the *Treatise* and the *Examination* introducing areas to be covered in depth in this chapter. The first is the intention to show that the true source of moral value is not the weight we attach to beneficial consequences of actions, and to argue for another source of moral value, the worthiness of an act itself. Kant had tried to prove that moral value lay only in the motive for an action while Mill had stressed that consequences alone gave moral value to acts. Grote argues for two sources of moral value, consequences and worthiness, but he modifies the notion of moral worthiness to embrace not only motive but self sacrifice, self development and self realization. This first argument appears in one form in the first paragraph of the *Examination*

> 'The purpose of the following pages is to show that, though virtue or right action is the great source of human happiness, still the fact that it is so does not of itself constitute its virtue, or explain what we mean when we use that term' (Grote 1870, 1).

John Grote is aiming to describe the deficiencies and confusions of past thinkers who have sought to establish consequentialist (utilitarians) and deontological (intuitionist) bases for moral conduct, and to provide an account that adjudicates between them and balances the arguments using a method later made famous by Henry Sidgwick in the *Methods of Ethics*. Here utilitarianism was shown to be able to handle most problems of the application of ideals to actions but it could not account for the ideal or ideals itself, an intuition was needed - that happiness ought to be desired. This Sidgwickian solution of 'ideal utilitarianism' is very similar to that of John Grote, though Grote gives less prominence to utilitarianism a guide to action and he, like the other intuitionists and idealists of the day, wishes to assert the independent value of a plurality of moral ideals, dethroning sovereign happiness in the process.

The second specific intention of the moral philosophy was to show that the nature and content of the moral ideals was in principle knowable, and to show how and why, through the elaboration of a complex analogy of epistemology and moral philosophy on one side, and ontology and moral philosophy on the other. An analogy is the literary device whereby the explication of something unknown is made possible by a comparison with something already known where the relationship, qualities and character of the former are elaborated by reference to the latter. Grote had held back from publishing his moral works partly because he knew the analogy could not work unless one side, the something known about by everybody - in this case the epistemology - was available, to throw light on the not known.

The *Treatise* however contains the fundamental argument, that

firstly moral knowledge, like ordinary knowledge of things, grows by a process of distinction from the immediate through the process of reflection; that moral and political positivism and moral idealism relate as do phenomenalism and idealism in epistemology; that there is an imaginative and ideal element both in epistemology and moral philosophy; and that the absolute in both is knowable through the ordinary processes of experience, thought and judgment. In its fullest form Grote provides us with a chapter on the 'Analogy Between the Intellectual and the Moral Ideals' in the *Treatise*, which rounds off with an analogy of 'Truth and Right'(Grote 1876, 54-67). The production of the analogy is the main evidence I produce for my assertions about Grote's standing, compared with Green, Bradley and Bosanquet made at the opening of this chapter.

The last intention of Grote's is to apply the methods and views on philosophy that he held and which I elaborated in Chapter four above. A reference back to these may assist the reader to understand Grote's style, approach and the progress to agreement of both the *Treatise* and the *Examination*. But for now I will just comment that Grote is very careful to elaborate the possible range of meanings and uses of the key moral concepts and to expose possible and actual confusions of usage. He again distinguishes various manners and modes of thought and in particular, while admitting the great value of religion for morality, he insists on the independent role of moral philosophy. Grote coins new words e.g. intuitivism, hedonics, aretaics, where he thinks it would be useful in avoiding confusion; he leaves much of the mental scaffolding for his constructions intact for the reader to see, and he finally uses the method of syncretism, the search for harmony by exposing abstractions and bringing them into a symmetry.

II

The Moral Writings and their Reception

It will be remembered that in 1863, John Grote had decided against the publication of his first full length book, the *Examination* and had decided instead to,

> 'put together in an uncontroversial form what seemed to me the truth, in opposition to what I thought the error' (Grote 1870, vi).

But this project was shelved before publication as the idea grew in Grote's mind that even this venture, the provision of a positive moral philosophy, was going to prove unsatisfactory. The reason was that he came to recognise that if he was to produce a coherent moral philosophy to complement those of John Stuart Mill, Sir William Hamilton, William Whewell and others, he had to work out and publish the 'intellectual foundations' upon which the moral superstructure was based. Moral philosophy he considered to be superior in the value of its subject matter to man and society, but metaphysics and especially epistemology and ontology were prior logically, preparing the ground, clarifying concepts, establishing what could be known and how. Grote had recognised the logic and the need, and in the *Exploratio* performed the preparatory metaphysical tasks.

The *Exploratio* was a prolegomena to his ethics, and the *Treatise* was the basis from which the *Examination's* attack on utilitarian philosophy was to be launched. We should then follow Grote's advice and his intention and priorities here and treat the constructive moral theory before the critique of utilitarianism and we should reverse Mayor's actual practice and priorities.

We can gather that the text of the *Treatise* was written between 1863 and 1865, between the decision not to publish the *Examination* and

the publication of the *Exploratio*. The key year was probably 1864 and the dates of several of the additions, such as the chapter on 'Want' are dated in that year. Mayor added several lectures, diary extracts, and elements from notebooks to the original manuscript, some written at such evocatively named places as 'Byron's Pool' and the 'Great Meadow' on inspired outings. The opening chapters of the *Treatise* have a definite and systematic form uncharacteristic of much else in Grote's writing and it appears that he was looking to provide a tight and rigorous argument form. However the more laborious, careful and looser style soon returns. The impression is of reading someone thinking aloud and this style is to be explained by both the inclusion of extraneous elements by Mayor and the fact that this was a first draft to which the author never returned.

When the *Treatise* was finally published in 1876 the first flush of Oxford idealism had been experienced, Green and Grose had published the new edition of Hume, and Bradley had produced his *Ethical Studies*. By this time philosophy had been more definitely professionalized and instead of Grote's work being ignored completely in the journals, as was the *Exploratio* in 1865, it received attention in 'Mind', the French 'Revue Philosophique' and two German journals 'Philos Manotash' and 'Zeifsh fur Philos v fur Zeitchriften'.

The only English review was by Sidgwick and it contained an update of the highly critical reviews I recorded of the *Examination* above. Grote's thought is praised as subtle, impartial, fresh and independent, full of just criticism, fine psychological observation, elevated moral sentiment and sagacious practical counsels. But equally it suffered, according to Sidgwick, from not being exact, having no system, being in no way exhaustive, truly original or penetrating (Sidgwick 1876, 239). Sidgwick notes the defence given to Grote by Mayor in the introduction to the *Treatise*, but holds little

store by the claim that Grote respected 'clearness and consistency'. Sidgwick adds that Grote is masterly when,

> 'engaged in describing the relations of different points of view, or, distinguishing the different meanings of common terms'(Sidgwick 1876, 240).

but his evident haste and use of his own 'cardinal notions' is to be weighed heavily against this. Most important of all, Sidgwick felt that Grote had not done what he set out to do, and what Sidgwick was trying to do with his own *Method of Ethics*,

> 'to succeed in his main purpose of combining into a harmonious whole the chief competing systems of moral philosophy; though his impartial study of their mutual relations has led him to several valuable suggestions for such a combination'

none of which are mentioned. Such a repudiation makes Sidgwick's comment that Grote's work was

> 'hardly likely to have a marked influence on Contemporary thought'

into something of a self fulfilling prophecy. Once again Sidgwick had missed the existence of the epistemological and metaphysical heart of Grote's philosophy, witnessed by his apology for leaving out comments on what are the most important chapters in the *Treatise*, those on 'the relation of the ideals to higher and lower fact', 'actual and ideal, human nature' the 'goodness of custom' and 'the relation of the individual to custom' (Sidgwick 1876, 244)

The continental reviews are of a completely different character, penetrating and appreciative, with that by George Lasson, the famous editor of Hegel's collected works being the most impressive. Lasson finds the same key contributions in the book but most importantly spots the absolutist idealist undercurrents obviously missed by Sidgwick and later by Schneewind. Lasson sees in Grote,

> 'The belief in one all-embracing order for the whole of being, (and that) reason and purpose in the universe, is just as important for the practical life as it is for the intellectual life'

and later

> 'Real knowledge is a union between reason or pure intelligence and the reason embodied in things, their purpose, basis and definition. Indeed, this union between the subjective and the objective reason;, the reason in things, is more a wish, or aim than a real actuality. But there is no obstacle in the nature of things to the achievment of this aim, to which a constant approximation is hence coming about' (Lasson, 1876, 48-49)

This review is accurate and Lasson spots in Grote the theme made famous by Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, - that the content, rather than the form or idea of morality is embodied in particular duties and rights, in customs, traditions and the general climate of opinion in the present (ibid 53). In addition he spots the key idealist themes in Grote that the moral ought is 'unconditional', that imperatives are as factually grounded as any other claim to knowledge, and that morality involves self sacrifice for the good of others (ibid 52).

Grote is however criticised for spinning webs and then letting them go, of being aphoristic and, more substantially of lack of rigour in the development of the key arguments. The answer to the last point lies in the *Exploratio* which Lasson seems not to have read. But four other points are central, 1) that Grote ignored the Kantian arguments for autonomy of the will, 2) that he too readily accepts custom as the embodiment of Right, a criticism later used against Oakeshott, 3) that he does not deal with freedom of the will, and 4) that he inadequately deals with the relationship between ethics and religion.

The review by Krohn is less comprehensive but is remarkable for several reasons. One is that Krohn recognises some defects in Mayor's editing of the text and of his understanding of Grote's own ideas. He accuses Mayor of being out of tune with the 'logic' of Grote's work and of not seeing its power and originality, its creative potential, and of seeing in it only 'an eclectic joining together of different systems' (Krohn 1878, 153). This is generally an accurate

observation. Secondly, Grote is estimated to be

> 'one of the few of those for whom it could be claimed that he ruled over the course of English moral philosophy since Hobbes...'(Krohn 1878, 149-150).

This is an unsubstantiated claim - but a claim it was, and a large one that we must take seriously.

Thirdly, Krohn sees rightly that to understand Grote one should not take the *Treatise* 'away from the ground in which it has grown', a point I insisted upon in the introduction to this thesis. The two forms of rational thinking, natural to Britain are said to 'meet in him'. Utilitarianism and intuitionism are seen to be harmonized or transcended in the idealism to which he subscribed and because he finds a place both for empiricist observation and Coleridgian imagination in his scheme. Most important of all Krohn recognises that Grote merges the idea of the unconditional ideals in morality with their conditional embodiments in everyday custom, opinion, and law; and he recognises Grote's analogy of the 'Right' with the 'True'.

But finally, he concluded that despite great flights of insight and the idealistic principles he assembles,

> 'because of his expressed lack of speculative thought, the 'disjecta membra' of an impossible system lie so close together and in a train of thought difficult to disentangle, that hardly anyone will cast light into the labyrinth' (Krohn 1878, 182).

My task is to disentangle the remains, rebuild the system, restore Grote's intentions and bring his achievements to light, but we must first look at Carrou's response (Carrou 1877, 530-537). This review is a patient and sympathetic description of the *Treatise* which alots significance to several crucial elements in Grote's thought with some insight. However the review is trepidatious, uncritical and lacks any reference to the overall character of the work concerned. Concentration is given to the two sciences of morals, the two sides of

human nature and to Grote's theory of want, but Carrou does not penetrate to the heart of the matter, namely the analogy of epistemology and moral philosophy, truth and right (which would have been difficult without a prior reading of the *Exploratio*). In short a helpful introductory summary but lacking philosophical rigour and insight into the nature and significance of the author's work.

Later commentaries on John Grote's ethical writings diverge greatly on their intrinsic merits and character. The utilitarian 'Westminster Review' wrote of the author of the *Examination*

> 'Though careful to say that he writes from an independent point of view, as the disciple of no school, his mode of speculation bears strong resemblances to that of the Intuitive Moralists'(Westminster 1872, 42).

This view is later reaffirmed by Sheldon Rothblatt and Jerome B Schneewind (Rothblatt 1968 , Schneewind 1974, 1977). Another group of commentators see Grote's work as primarily eclectic, lacking system but embracing many viewpoints, and exhibiting largeness of view. Such a view, that reaffirms Grote's claim to be not founding or espousing the cause of any school of thought, can be found in the introductions by Mayor, the commentaries by Sidgwick and Llewelyn Davies (Mayor 1870, 1876; Sidgwick 1871a, 1871b, 1876; Llewelyn Davies 1870). Davies says that "Mr Grote is hardly an 'intuitive' moralist", but we are not told what character his work does have.

In a superficial survey of Grote's moral philosophy, in the only book-length commentary, Lauchlin D MacDonald concludes that Grote is a personalist idealist in his ethics as in his epistemology. More accurately MacDonald notes the Platonic and Aristotelian bases to Grote's idealism that I will explore afresh in Chapter ten. But the truly idealist character of Grote's ethics is asserted most forcefully by Jean Pucelle, and repeated by Jacques Chevalier (Pucelle 1955, 83-86; Chevalier, 1966, IV,9b). The biggest group of critics

comments only on the anti-utilitarian character of Grote's thought, a group that includes Anthony Quinton, Henry Calderwood, Thomas Birks, Alexander Bain, Leslie Stephen and W.F.Y.Edgworth (Quinton 1873, 83-87; Calderwood 1895, 109,114; Birks, 1872, 1873, 1874, 1876; Bain, 1880, 1882, 1904; Stephen 1900, 1901; Edgworth 1877). Other commentators refer either to the vague intellectual qualities of the author or his books, or refer to some narrow aspect of his writings without comment on their philosophical character. This is most sadly true of the brief comments by F.H.Bradley, Charles Whitmore, W.G.De Burgh, E.F.Carritt, E Westermark, S Alexander, F.D.Maurice and A.MacIntyre (Bradley 1935; Whitmore, 1927; De Burgh 1937, 1938; Carritt 1928; Westermark 1906, 1933; Alexander 1906; Maurice 1866, 1868; MacIntyre 1967).

Now the context is set we can proceed to examine the contents of John Grote's moral philosophy.

III

The Defects of Moral Positivism and Naturalism

To Grote issues of the objective or subjective, independent or dependent, intuitional or utilitarian basis of ethics were secondary. Of even less significance were issues of practical problem solving and issues of applied ethics such as the production of operative criteria for freedom, rights or authority. Nor was Grote heavily involved in the task of defining the character of moral statements, in a manner later made popular by emotivists, intuitionists, prescriptivists and others this century. His primary task was to go to the foundations of all ethical and moral activity, thought and language, to redescribe in

metaphysical terms their presuppositions. Metaphysical assumptions underpin all higher level theory on ethics, but the task of exposing and assessing them he thought had regularly been avoided. Surface perfection of system, applicability of prescriptions and principles, appeal to common sense, religious and social need, had (and have) more appeal than Grote's tortured metaphysical engagement.

The first, and the fundamental, point about the distinct nature of moral philosophy and moral conduct, can be found in the introduction and the first chapter of Grote's *Exploratio* of 1865. In the introduction he claims to have

> 'carefully avoided in the following pages all reference to Morals or Ethics...' (Grote 1865, viii).

But in an admitted prolegomena to ethics this was bound to prove difficult and there are references to the distinctive character of 'is' and 'ought' statements, and the relationship between them. First Grote notes that the positivist's practice of 'running to history' rather than philosophy in regard to morality, as a

> 'means of which we are to understand man himself, and know what we ought to do is inadequate and indeed illogical' (Grote 1865, xviii).

In the chapter on Mill's *Logic* the reasons are given.

> 'But before we can act, which is the important thing as to society, as Aristotle told us long ago, we must know *what we want*. In social and moral matters, art comes first, science afterwards, and therefore the phenomenal view will not be sufficient for us...' (Grote 1865, 196).

The point is basically that to act, knowledge is required of 'what has been', 'what is', 'what we want' and 'what ought to be', and the last two of these brings us into contact with 'the region of ideals'. Mill and Comte while professing to give a purely historical and scientific logic of what is the case, in fact move quite illogically into the terrain of ideals, even to suggest how things ought to be and how we can derive this from the phenomenal facts. Grote presents us with the

dual problem of teleology, how can we derive what 'will' or 'ought to be' from a knowledge of history and contemporary society.

> 'The *logic* of the moral sciences is to guide us in sciences of the fact - what men do do - what are the laws by which they *do* act - what they *ought* to do, what we *ought* to think, belongs to the supposed *teleology*. By what right, and on what principle of logic, so to call it, does the sociology settle the teleology?'(Grote 1865, 201).

A true positivist would not speak of ideals, of how the world ought to be, and any such language would have to be treated as 'an aberration or delusion' which we should endeavour to get 'rid of' (Grote 1900, 318). But as Grote stated in his essay on 'Idealism and Positivism', the positivists consistently smuggle value judgements into their arguments while insisting throughout that there is a fact and value split that should be maintained at the expense of values. Such an approach is both illogical and impossible for just as it is a basis to our nature and to our life and action that we are and we want things that we do not have, so it is natural we desire what 'ought to be', the morally desirable or ideal,

> 'Speaking generally, the understanding shows us what *is* or what we suppose to be: when we conclude to fact from our desires or promptings, it is not something which *is*, but something which *is not*, something which we wish to be, or think ought to be, that is first in view. But then this suggests further and higher fact as giving the reason why we thus wish, and giving meaning to the thought that a thing *ought to be*: the consideration of this higher fact, varying from simple imagination of it to belief of it, is what I have called idealism' (Grote 1900, 321).

An adequate understanding of ethical and political behaviour then involves a positivist account of what 'has been' and 'is' and a philosophical account of what 'has been', 'is' and 'ought to be', of the values as well as the facts. Positivism can never give an adequate account of ideals, of the 'higher facts' and philosophy struggles in this area too, but it must endeavour to make up the deficiencies of positivism. Idealism must complement, make good and even realise the potential of positivism. Little else is said by

Grote about ethics in the *Exploratio* except to further berate the naive Comtean view of the history of three stages and to hint at the metaphysical account of 'want' to be further elaborated in the *Treatise*.

But the logical difference between the concepts of 'is' and 'ought', and the studies of them is indicated and becomes a main plank of the *Examinations* and the *Treatise* (Grote 1900, 190-192, 321-324). In the *Examination* the theme is taken up in the introduction and Grote states that the second achievement of his books was to have

> 'controverted... a way of thinking about morals, which may be roughly called by the name *Positivism*, by which I mean the line of thought which endeavours to construct a system of morals, or something to supply the place of one, from observation and experience of fact alone, without any previous assumption or idea' (Grote 1870 2).

We must if we wish to study moral ideas and activity deal with the imperative, and

> 'begin by assuming that there is something imperative upon us to do, or desirable for us to do; must begin, that is, with an ideal: if it does not make this assumption, its real course is the exceedingly unphilosophical one of beginning with describing what man *does* do, and then, by degrees and unauthorizedly, altering its language, and speaking of this as what he *should* or *ought to do*' (Grote 1870, 3-4).

Grote claims that the study in sociology psychology and anthropology of what we do think and do, is most useful as a preliminary for a moral science, but what is also needed is a philosophical study of what we 'ought to do' and a study of the 'higher facts' or reasons why we should do what we ought to do. What we need then is not just a 'science of morals' but an art, the 'ars artium', the 'art of life' a claim that takes pride of place at the beginning of the *Treatise* and the *Examination* (Grote 1870, 3; 1976, 12).

The real logical point however is the assertion of a difference in character between a statement of what 'is' the case and a statement of what 'ought to be' the case that we can and must study. Statements

about what 'has been' and 'is' the case are descriptive statements of empirical fact about the past or present, while statements about 'ought' or 'ideals' are statements imperative about values and with a reference to the future (Grote 1870, 179, 269-70). Grote notes that scientific statements about the world are descriptive and explanatory, while moral statements explain and prescribe conduct for men, they imply a prescription that the act or ideal described ought to be done or sought after. Because of these three differences Grote is convinced that any attempt to deduce one sort of statement from the other, to reduce ideals to statements of empirical fact, or to try to prove things 'ought to be' on the grounds that they 'are' or 'were', is illogical. He writes

> 'There is no moral logic that will teach us to conclude what should be, in the great features of it, from what has been and what is: if we do so conclude, it is in the manner which I have mentioned, which destroys all our moral being' (Grote 1870, 308).

In the *Exploratio* he writes, attacking both materialist physiology and positivist history,

> 'All that man *has* done, whatever aid it may give, can never teach us what man *should* do or what it is best for him to do, any more than the facts of the universe can' (Grote 1865, 180).

This general ruling he applies to the whole of positivist ethics, including theorising evolutionary and materialist ethics of Spencer and the neo-Darwinians, who smuggle values into arguments that are supposedly value free. While saving Grote's critique of utilitarianism until later it should already be obvious that its main thrust is that utilitarianism tries unsuccessfully to be positivistic and inductive while at the same time it pretends to be a moral philosophy proposing an ideal of action i.e. that we ought to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Grote's view is that no amount of observation and inductive reasoning can adequately prove that ideal to be alone imperative and the utilitarians positing of an

'a priori' ideal removes the system from the terrain of science and sociology. Mill's *Utilitarianism* therefore,

> 'stands in a position, I have endeavoured to show, between positivism and idealism, in which it has the merits, if merits they are to be called, of neither: it is not true on the one side to its scientific profession, and on the other it fails altogether to give us an ideal of human action which meets our expectations and our reason, and a view of human life which we can recognize as a sufficient one' (Grote 1870, 4).

In conclusion, the social sciences are all badly grounded, over optimistic and incompatible.

> 'Sciences of this kind are *not* truly analogous to phenomenal and physical science... they are a bad mixture of history and speculation, the former rendered inaccurate by the latter, the latter not recognizing its proper position, (and) trammelled by the former, instead of hand-in-hand with it' (Grote 1865, 202).

Moral philosophy, like all other philosophy, and even religion and history, must reject the claims of science to sovereignty. It must resist science's assumptions, logic, methods and conclusions. We should learn what we can from all these subjects, we must study the physical, anatomical, mental, historical and social facts, and relate them to philosophy as we relate phenomenalism to idealism; as two sides of a coin. But we must also study philosophy and the world of ideals in moral philosophy independently, and we must even examine the realms of what he calls the 'higher facts', the ontological conditions of our moral existence and action. Only then can a coherent picture be produced by synchronizing the two views - the positivist and the idealist (Grote 1876, 366-368). Just how sociology, psychology and physiology may help philosophy we shall see later, but generally we can conclude, that like Green, Bradley and Bosanquet at Oxford later, like Ward, Sidwick, and McTaggart at Cambridge, Grote was opposed to the ethics of naturalism and positivism in all its forms, not just to the ethics of hedonism or utilitarianism. But he does not despair in the face of the rising flood of positivist thought in Europe, for

'In one form after another philosophy tries to gain credit with the advancing scientific spirit by denying itself, and ever tries in vain. I have no fear that philosophy will really die, because, however, in obedience to the supposed exigencies of scientific method, people try to make themselves altogether mentally positivist, they cannot do so: our nature in some respects is better to us than our will, and preserves the imagination, ideal, aspiring, tendency within us against all our effort to supersede it. But in the meantime there is caused much waste of thought and language' (Grote 1870, 277-8).

IV

Moral Philosophy and Epistemology - an outline

So, without too much fear, Grote allows a limited but useful role to the observational social sciences in grounding ethics, a role similar to that of phenomenalism in the whole field of epistemology. But does he build his moral philosophy upon his metaphysics? The answer is yes, but the arguments and proceedings are complicated and detailed.

Because the argument is so complex and so novel I shall risk boring the reader by producing an outline first and then duplicating the picture in greater detail in what follows. Fortunately we can use Grote's own imagery to help simplify matters. He considers the valid moral philosophy to be analagous to a valid epistemology, the account of one should be analagous to the account of the other, the procedures of one analagous to the procedures of another. The key to Grote's ethics is 'the analogy between the intellectual and the moral ideals', and even more specifically of the intellectual ideal of 'truth' and the moral ideal of 'right'. This ambitious piece of imagery may look unpromising but in its elaboration it turns out to be a powerful argument and the key to the whole system. Building on the earlier and failed attempts of intuitionists and reformists to establish an

analogy between ethical ideals and mathematical and geometrical axioms, ethical ideals and scientific laws, ethical ideals and rational self evident truths, Grote tries again comparing epistemological truth and the ethically right. To understand the analogy; to understand the ethical implications, we must first however remind ourselves of the epistemological truth - we must be clear about the familiar before we can use it to enlighten us about the unfamiliar.

We may study thought from two sides, the phenomenalist and idealist, (or philosophical) with great benefits as long as the two approaches are kept distinct, in that their languages, methods and arguments are not confused with those of their opposite number. Neither side conveys all the truth but idealism can transcend the partial and abstract nature of phenomenalism and proceed towards the Absolute. Similarly the practical and ethical world may be studied from the side of positivism (science) or idealism (philosophy) with valuable benefits and without competition or recrimination, so long as one side does not seek to conquer the territory of the other- and we do not confuse the language, methods and arguments of each side. Moral science and moral philosophy, like phenomenalism and idealism must synchronize and live separate but harmonious existences.

Secondly, just as phenomenalism and idealism posit and stress different sides to mind, different aspects of the thinking and knowing process, the passive and sentient side for phenomenalists and creative and active side for idealism, so in moral philosophy there are two sciences or approaches, one that stresses man's moral nature as sentient and the other that stresses creativity and activity. Grote wishes to argue that want of action and the will to act are as basic to our being as the desire for satisfaction and physical response. Just as it is impossible to build knowledge on observation about sense

experience alone without reference to creative imagination and will, so it is impossible to build knowledge of moral behaviour with references only to the sentient side of the self and without reference to creative imagination, free choice and will, and activity. Grote invents two sciences, that reflect the two sides of man's nature and existence and he christens them 'Eudaemonics' and 'Aretaics', the ethical equivalents of 'Phenomenalism' and 'Idealism'.

Thirdly, Grote had described the growth of intellectual knowledge as on the one side,

> 'perpetual aggregation and acquisition, or as a perpetual analysis and distinction' (Grote 1900, 303).

Knowledge is the movement from the confusion of immediacy to the clarity of mediacy via reflection and judgement. In our 'first look at anything we see the universe' as a whole and we gain knowledge by more acquaintance, reflection and 'separation and distinction'.

> 'Advance of knowledge is essentially distinction, not aggregation. Each new particular of knowledge is not an addition to, but a newly observed part, of a previously conceived whole' (Grote, 1900, 291).

This growth of knowledge is analogous to a 'puzzle' or a 'picture' coming out, but a picture or solution as yet known only partially. The source of this 'picture' or 'puzzle' coming out we saw as either self discovery, social self discovery of minds which have become embodied in words, things, institutions or activities, or the discovery of the absolute mind of the Divine Planner. Either way Grote has an ontology (the realm of higher facts) to complement and complete his epistemology. All knowledge is of reality, a complete world of ideas knowledge of which is possible. But as yet knowledge and reality are incomplete. That we do not grasp the absolute, the complete truth, is no indication that it is unknowable. Rather moral and intellectual life is the struggle towards the absolute true and right, which are then the key intellectual and moral ideals. However

each struggle to understand, and the achievement of each element of knowledge does imply or postulate the absolute, for,

> 'As the knowledge of a single word of a language, as a word, implies the idea of language, or as the knowledge of a single organ, as an organ, implies the idea of an organization, so the first particulars of knowledge implies the idea of a whole or universe of things, which is given us in fact, in every effort of consciousness' (Grote 1900, 299).

Now we can gain real moral knowledge analogous to intellectual knowledge by a similar process of observation and experience, reflection and analysis. Activity like sentience starts in immediacy - in habit, custom, re-enactment and reflex response. But under the impact of reflection, activity becomes gradually more self conscious, more freely willed, endowed with reason and given purposes or aims. Will realizes itself in action, in the same way as does mind in the process of thinking. Moral philosophy is the understanding of this process, it is the analytic struggle to grasp the meaning of individual pieces of moral life, the overall purpose and nature of the moral ideals and even the content of right, good, happiness, justice, duty and virtue. It is the struggle to grasp the meaning, character, nature and implications of the right and the good, in the way that intellectual endeavour tries to grasp and struggle after the ever elusive 'truth' and the 'certainty' through a reflective scrutiny and analysis of experience and consciousness. Each part of moral knowledge implies the existence of the ideal and the possibility of the Absolute, of the higher moral facts, just as in intellectual thought every statement of truth or certainty implies an absolute bench-mark of real truths against which to judge the particular truths or certainties.

The ethical equivalent of the intellectually true - the absolutely true, is to Grote the absolutely right, it is the primary ideal of moral activity and life against which all other ideals,

actions, laws, and rules are to be judged,(though we shall see that the ontological form it takes working from 'being' rather than 'knowing' is the summum bonum- the Good). Grote like Hegel treats the 'Right' as the ultimate ideal, he sees both life and history as the search for the right, and moral and political philosophy as the philosophy of right. The nature of moral ideals and their content he sets out to show are in the end as objective and knowable as is the world generally.

Moral ideals embody the mind of selves, a society of selves and possibly the mind of God as well. In a truly expressivist fashion, Grote sees all moral practices, institutions, rules and principles as embodying human reason, human choice and will, human purpose and want. Such things as laws, moral customs and public opinions lie between the higher facts and self consciously stated ideals above them, and the immediate feelings and reflexes of conformity to education and training on the other. Using Whewell's language Grote provides an independent not a dependent ethical system, he supports objective not subjective and relativist ethics. But his idealist epistemology, ontology and as we shall see, his idealist social theory, history and politics, allow a gradual approximation towards the absolute, the objective and independent and absolute through a hard struggle from confusion to knowledge, incoherence to coherence from the subjective to the objective from immediacy to mediacy, from a moral knowledge of acquaintance to knowledge of reflection. At each level human purpose and reason become more apparent, more distinct and more concrete as the self scrutinises and analyzes its world of experience.

All this now needs to be explained and elaborated in detail. We may then proceed by reference to Grote's idea in the *Treatise* of the two sciences of ethics; to analyse his theory of human nature, stressing its two sides, the sentient and active and showing how he

underpins the whole with an ontology based on 'want'. After this preliminary we will be able to show how the moral ideals reflect and realise these actual facts of human nature, and how Grote argues that the ideals and their source, the imagination, are not merely delusions but higher facts, real and true. Finally, we will show how Grote's ethical system throws light upon, undermines and transcends the traditional and modern moral philosophies of his day, and relates to religion.

V

Aretaics and Eudaemonics

The original and intended title for the *Treatise*, seems to have been *Aretaics and Eudaemonics: A Treatise on the Moral Ideals*, but Mayor, under the influence of friends opted for the qualifying phrase. This decision I feel better represents the contents of the book and, in fact the term 'aretaics' rarely appears after the first chapter of the *Treatise* but we must not underestimate the novelty of the thought behind the original title. This originality is expressed in this opening claim,

> 'The following treatise is constructed upon this principle: that in what is commonly known by the name of Moral Philosophy, there are two sciences: one the science of virtue, Aretaics; the other the science of happiness, Eudaemonics. The two sciences need each other, and affect each other, but they start from different points' (Grote 1876, 1).

The later science is most obviously covered by utilitarianism, the moral equivalent of phenomenalism, and like phenomenalism eudaemonics is an abstraction, with only the partial truth belonging to an abstraction. For,

> 'however we expand and manipulate the science of eudaemonics, it cannot, while it continues anything which that term can at all represent, fill nearly the whole ground which moral philosophy is required to fill, or give a reasonable account of all that is to be accounted for'(Grote 1876, 1).

The new science of Aretaics, which Grote proposes to be the idealist equivalent in ethics, would provide the syncretic element needed to complete moral philosophy. It is built on the remains of Aristotelian 'teleology', Platonic 'ideas', rationalist faith in 'reason' as the key to moral knowledge, the intutionists and common sense theorist's beliefs in the objective and independent ethical value of moral statements, as well as the creativity and idealism of Coleridge and the romantics, and the ontology and psychology of the French eclectics. The word aretaics is a Grotian coinage based on the Greek term 'arete which according to Liddell and Scott means goodness or excellence of any kind, but goodness or virtue when used in a moral context. The term aretaics is used to refer to the science of virtue, and while the novelty of this coinage and the proposal of a new study is recognised in the Oxford English Dictionary, it is interesting to note below the reference the similar term 'Aretology'. This was coined by Bailey in 1731 as, 'that part of moral philosophy that treats of virtue'. The science of sentience or happiness then is to be supplemented by a science of moral activity or virtue. It aims to study the independent value of ethical activity and ethical ideals, of virtuous and just action, and of ideals such as the good, the right, the dutiful, the just, and the benevolent.

Eudaemonics as proposed, is the science of what we actually feel. It has a physiological base in the study of the sensory nervous system; a psychological base in the study of how pleasure and painful sensations affect human behaviour; a historical base in the study of anthropology where the changes in human desire, felt want and need

relate to changing behaviour; a sociological base in the study of how social circumstances affect the experience of pleasure and pain, and it has a practical base in that aspect of utilitarianism devoted to the measurement and calculation of the actual sensory consequences of actions. Bentham, it may be remembered, proposed such a science in his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*(Bentham 1948, 151-189). As David Manning notes,

> 'Should we try to do without it, Bentham believed that we will be doomed to irrational behaviour. The calculus, 'is a postulatum without the allowance of which all political reasoning is at a stand', and it is with reformed conduct that Bentham was concerned' (Manning 1968, 35: Bentham MSS. UCL, Box 14, 3).

Grote labels this science 'hedonics or hedonology, the science of human pleasure', and describes how it may be developed and to what advantage. However a satirical flavour emerges when he notes how unfortunate it is that nobody has yet aided the utilitarians by inventing a 'hedonometer' for performing the tasks assigned (Grote 1870 181, 345: 1876 7, 14).

Yet Grote denies that Eudaemonics can remain positivist or unideal even in its own domain, for if it aims to study human action in general and moral activity in particular it must also discuss the end, purpose or aim of the action stimulated by feeling. The object of action, the fact aimed at the 'not yet' that action seeks to make actual, is the ideal of eudaemonics - happiness. Studied from a purely sentient basis a science of sentience cannot avoid the ideal, the 'beyond itself' the ideal state in which sentience would be satisfied and could take rest.

> 'Eudaemonics however has generally been, and is likely to be, exceedingly ideal. Man is an imaginative being, and is both inclined to look forward to the future and inclined to set himself an end to work for... We in vain try to make ourselves recognize (what reason, misapplied, tells us) that for enjoyment we ought to have no ideal: that to set ourselves a happiness to work for is after all to enslave ourselves, and to leave the notion of enjoyment; that life, on this view of it, is not

> happiness but toil after happiness, and toil after one thing is no better than toil after another'(Grote 1876, 13).

Eudaemonics, and utilitarianism in particular, usually end up deserting positivism for a limited idealism, by positing as an ideal, as an imperative, as that which ought to be, rather than has been, is or might be, the production of happiness. The differences are that some eudaemonicists like Aristotle recognise the need and admit the move, others like Bentham make the move but don't recognise or admit that they've made it, while others seem to make the move in reality but play it down, like Mill (Grote 1870, 347-348; 1876, 18-20, 141, 296, 387-389). Sidgwick's major contribution to utilitarianism later was to admit the move, to insist that its moral philosophy can only work if we admit and accept the a priori intuition that 'we ought to pursue happiness'.

There are five reasons given by Grote for establishing Eudaemonics and Aretaics as two different sciences: 1) to leave no part of moral philosophy unexplored, 2) to give voice to each side in the 'moral controversy of ages', 3) to suggest the value in each method and system, 4) to show how the intuitive and inductive schools of ethics relate, and 5) because 'I think they are so' (Grote 1876, 8-10). Why are they so? What is the basic premis?

> 'There being so seems to me to depend in the main upon this fact, - and I think that the bringing out of the full force of this fact is the most important business of moral philosophy of the present day - that man is an active being in the same manner which he is a sentient (or pain - feeling and pleasure - feeling) being: that his activity and his sentience are two independent portions or features of his nature, each as early, as native, and as important, as the other' (Grote 1876, 10-11).

Grote goes further for he sees these two sides to man's nature as mirrors of two sides of nature itself, the universe, the physical 'want' of all biological entities on one side and the complementary 'power' to attain the end on the other.

> 'Man's nature, in fact the whole universe in general has two portions or characters counter-fitting (if I may use the word) the one to the other, want and power in the universe, or, as I have called them in man sentience and activity' (Grote 1876, 11).

This fact is then the real basis for his distinction between aretaics and eudaemonics. As he writes

> 'that inquiry which proceeds from the assumption of activity is that which I call aretaics, that which proceeds from the assumption of sentience is eudaemonics,... in many particulars they treat, from opposite directions the same subjects';

The principle upon which Grote works is

> 'that man as early and naturally asks for an employment of his activity as for a relief from his pain'

hence

> 'we should be as badly off without work to do as without a world to live in'(Grote 1876, 49).

This distinctive theory of human nature and the existential theory of want, the real bases of Grote's moral theory, will be elaborated later, but first we must deal with an alternative account of the two sciences given by Grote in chapter one of the *Treatise*. This second account, I argue, arises from an aside made during an illustration of the differences between aretaics and eudaemonics and is not to be taken as standing by itself as the logical basis for the rest of the *Treatise*. This second account is important for two reasons. Firstly Sidgwick in his review of the *Treatise* notes a defect in the argument, and secondly he used this to attack the whole argument of the *Treatise*.

The disputed argument goes as follows. The science of aretaics deals with the epithets 'right' and 'wrong' not as mere descriptions of our sentient circumstances but as references to other facts of moral situations, namely cases where we are bound to perform acts. Aretaic moral value is independent of the consequences of actions and arises from the selfless performance of imperative moral action. As with Kant and Whewell, Grote aims to argue that moral acts do have an

independent value, independent of their sentient consequences (Grote 1876, 80-81). To illustrate this Grote produces the following argument about the application of the term wrong to pain. In eudeamonist terms a wrong act is one that causes someone pain, pain is considered unpleasant, undesirable and hence wrong (the ideal of which is 'we ought to promote pleasure or happiness'). In aretaic terms the term wrong is seen to refer to the other facts of the same case, namely that pain is an evil and hence ought not to be inflicted on people (the ideal being, 'we ought to do what is right').

> 'We may put the fact in this way, that pain has two characters, according to the side from which we look at it: that it is not only something unpleasant to, and dreaded by the sufferer, but also that it is something which another ought not carelessly to inflict upon him. This second fact about pain is one entirely different from the former... (it follows) not from anything involved in the experience, not from anything involved in the nature of pain as *we feel it*: the conclusion is essentially necessary and intutitive; and it is just the drawing this conclusion thus which constitutes us moral beings'(Grote 1876, 3).

The point is that wrong in eudaemonist terms is just a label we associate with and attach to acts we know to cause pain, the usage reflects our experience and our education, while in aretaic terms the label refers to an equally real fact, as real as the experience and the association, the actual feeling that the infliction of pain is evil, the fact that 'no man wants to give pain any more than suffer it' and the ideal fact that it ought not to be inflicted. The fundamental axiom of eudaemonics then is that 'pain is a thing undesirable or to be avoided', that of aretaics is that

> 'the inflicting of causeless pain is a misdeed, an evil in the universe... a something in the universe which we think ought not to be, which is a defect in it, a something undesirable' (Grote 1876, 7).

All that Grote is doing here, as Lasson notes, is pointing out that when we refer to the issue of pain, it seems as natural to conclude that we ought not to inflict it - an unconditional

imperative, as it is to conclude that the suffering of pain is to be avoided because unpleasant (Lasson 1878, 45-47). Grote is only working on pain as an example, and he hopes that by showing how different facts about and responses to pain may arise, that he will illustrate the differences between eudaemonics and aretaics. He is not providing an alternative grounding on argument for the distinction independent of the references to the two sides of human nature, and he noted the danger of confusion that Sidgwick falls into, when he says

> 'what I have hitherto said has been said for the sake of illustration, rather more simply than the case will properly bear...' (Grote 1876, 5).

Krohn, recognizing the relative unimportance of the argument about pain leaves its consideration out of his otherwise rigorous review, and Carrou and Pucelle give it little prominence (Krohn 1878, 150-151; Carrou 1878, 150-151, Pucelle 1955, 83-84). All of the above see Grote's distinction as arising from the two sides of human nature and the need to erect two moral systems, one that refers to feelings and the other to moral want. Sidgwick alone makes a meal of the argument about pain, and as a result finds grounds for almost totally dismissing Grote's ethical philosophy.

Sidgwick makes four points, (1) that the account of eudaemonics given by Grote is not coherent for the axiom that pain is to be avoided 'deals with man as an active being', ie. we have to be active to avoid pain, (2) that if purely prudentially 'wrong' or 'undesirable' means no one is to suffer, 'it must obviously be something which (to an equal extent) no one is to inflict', the axiom of eudaemonics entails that of aretaics, (3) that eudaemonics can account for all the value of an action and (4) that Grote fails to draw a consistent line between the Sciences (Sidgwick 1877, 240-241). There is some truth in some of these points and it would have been better if Grote (or Mayor, as it could have been he who made

the editorial decision) had used as a first chapter the alternative introduction printed in Mayor's preface which relies solely on the sentient versus active self dichotomy (Grote 1876, x-xiii). But it seems unlikely that even if valid, Sidgwick's criticisms undermine the rest of Grote's moral system.

We can answer Sidgwick briefly as follows, (1) The first argument only appears to be plausible because Sidgwick conflates two ideas of activity, one the general category covering of all human action, and the other, Grote's special usage, as creative and willed action as distinct from passive response and reflex action. The fact that a man or a jelly fish shrinks from a pain (acts in the first sense) is not to be confused with the action of a person refusing to torture a victim or cause unnecessary harm to a child. (2) The second argument misses the key difference between a prudential and a moral conclusion, for Grote argues that for eudaemonics pain is a thing that 'is undesirable, or to be avoided', with undesirable having no moral connotation. This statement is not compatible with 'pain is something which no one is to inflict', meaning 'ought not to inflict'. Sidgwick's argument only appears to work if either 'undesirable' and 'no one is to inflict' both have moral, or both have non-moral connotations. (3) That eudaemonics can explain and take account of the independent moral value of ideals such as virtue and generosity, by showing they promote general happiness is at best a contested assertion. Sidgwick indeed admits that this gives moral ideals 'only a secondary or derivative value' and his argument seems to rest largely on the example of 'self sacrifice' where he writes rather unconvincingly

> 'it may still be urged on Prof. Grote's side that our common moral conscience recognizes the *independent* value in self-sacrifice: to which Utilitarians may reply that common sense condemns *some* self-sacrifice as extravagant and that no

> satisfactory criterion of right and wrong self-sacrifice can be suggested except the Utilitarian' (Sidgwick 1877, 241).

We must await Grote's arguments against utilitarianism as a whole and his own defense of the independent value of ethical ideals before we can judge the adequacy of the utilitarian retort. (4) Finally a judgement as to the clarity and consistency of the line between aretaics and eudaemonics must wait until after the following argument, but I will argue that the line is both clearer and more consistent than Sidgwick gives credit even if there is considerable scope for misunderstanding and dispute.

VI

Human Nature and Want

That human nature involves an essential tension between its sentient and active aspects is not new to John Grote nor is the trend to prioritize the active entirely novel.

Neither was a discovery of John Grote, but goes back to early rationalist writings, and to the idea of active mind in the writings of two common sense philosophers, Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart (Reid 1846-1863; Stewart 1828). But more important the tension was the battle ground between the romantic and positivistic currents of thought in the mid-nineteenth century. Carlyle, Ruskin, Maurice, Coleridge and Wordsworth had berated Bentham, Mill and the Classical Economists for their 'mechanistic' theories of human nature and the mind and especially for their absurd production of 'economic man' (pleasure seeking and selfish). Carlyle proposed a 'dymamics' as opposed to a 'mechanics' of human nature, which stressed mans'

creativity, he posited free will and not necessity, he produced a 'gospel of work' to oppose the idea that man preferred passivity, and treated work as a 'necessary evil'.

> 'There is a perennial nobleness, and even sacredness, in Work. Were he never so benighted, forgetful of his high calling, there is always hope in a man that actually and earnestly works: in Idleness alone is there perpetual despair. Work, never so Mammonish, mean, isin communication with Nature: the real desire to get Work done will itself lead one more and more to truth, to Natures appointments and regulations which are truth... It has been written, 'an endless significance lies in work'; a man perfects himself by working' (Carlyle 1843, III XI).

More generally romantic artists like Maddox Brown in his famous picture 'Work' and poets and writers like De Quincy, John Ruskin and William Morris urged human beings to develop their creative and active rather than their sentient natures. John Grote is then to be seen to be systematising a major stream that already existed in the romantic current, but in a way that no other philosopher, including Coleridge, had been able to do. Grote provides the 'honey' that Ferrier had taunted the Cambridge philosophers to produce.

Nor was the contrast of sensitivity and activity new to the *Treatise*. This basic proposition of human nature had already been elaborated in the *Exploratio* in great detail. Grote had noted there how phenomenalists worked with a model of man as the sentient and passive receptor of sense data. To them, man is only a sensing machine,

> 'it is feeling that makes our being and not feeling and acting (or willing) as well' (Grote 1865,36).

R.G. Collingwood notes later that 'so judicious a critic as John Grote found himself obliged to treat the philosophy of human mind 'as a blind alley', and like Grote, the reason he gives for following suit is that the 'science of human nature' had become dominated by this 'analogy' with the natural sciences implied in empiricism (Collingwood 1966, 208). Grote was to change the analogy, we are to understand

mind, human nature and ethics from both sides, but with special reference to philosophy not science, and from idealism, the thinking and acting side, not the feeling and responding side. In the new analogy we understand the universe as we do the mind not vice versa. He balances this with the assertion that the body and mind are fit for and capable of creative activity and will, and that both are integral to our being in the world. Mind and body, men and nature are active.

Grote approves of Bain's physiological separation of the nerves into sentient and motor (activity) nerves. Epistemologically he has asserted the active role of mind in comprehension of reality, and of will in initiating action. But now he hints at an existential base for the assertion of an active self - in our awareness of 'want'. This argument is elaborated clearly in the chapter on 'Sensibility and Activity', to which I will shortly return (Grote 1900, chV). But now we must look at human nature more generally to explore its other facets, and to ask what make activity and moral activity possible.

(a) <u>Imagination</u>

The science of aretaics, stemming from our active natures involves the study of the nature and status of our ideals, especially our moral ideals. This is made possible by our imagination which allows us, as Aristotle had shown, to escape the world of 'is' and 'has been', and lets us into the world of the future - the 'may be', the 'could be' and the moral world of 'should' or 'ought to be'. As Grote puts it

> 'Man is an imaginative being, and is both inclined to look forward to the future and indeed to set himself an end to work for' (Grote 1876, 13).

Imagination, one of the keystones of Coleridge's philosophy and of the early romantic and idealist currents in Britain is given a detailed treatment, as Grote saw it as a central factor in the being, knowing

and acting processes.

> 'I have used the term 'imagination' as a starting word, or a starting point, to express all that action of mind which is not perception of what we ordinarily call fact, or what is not *experience*, as the word is often used... The word imagination goes not unfitly with the word 'idealism', and 'ideal' and 'idealism' I use always, it will be seen, in reference to action'(Grote 1900, 324).

We saw in chapter six that imagination helps knowledge grow by allowing us to check and scrutinize options before final decision.

> 'Imagination is what we may call the atmosphere of judgement, on that out of which judgement crystalizes, while exactly in the same way judgements are *centres* of expansive inward sight or contemplation' (1900, 308).

With moral action it allows us to posit goals and rules of action, or 'ideals', to scrutinize and check them for truth, to check if they are coherent and to fit them with our feelings, society and our other ideals (ibid pp43-45). Imagination makes both knowledge and action possible, by providing an area for free choice and scrutiny. The question, we shall see soon, is whether the imagination allows us access to the 'higher facts', the ontological facts of existence, the absolute moral ideals. Grote is to defend the hypothesis that 'imaginations' and the things they refer to, especially the 'ideals' are either

> 'indications of real fact of some kind: whether that fact be the existence of something independent of us: or whether it be that thinking in this way, imagining thus, is our nature' (Grote 1876, 103-104).

As Krohn elegantly states, for Grote

> 'imagination is the most fruitful source of thought, the organ of reality, and its products, the ideals, are as it were, the shadows of a realm of truth which we wish to draw to us'(Krohn, 1877, 151).

Imagination is not the 'forward delusive faculty' described by Bishop Butler, nor is it a trap for woolly minded transcendentalists and poets, as posited by the positivists, rather it is the world of thought and ideas half way between immediate and mediate thought,

between sensation and reason (1900, 307-308). The imagination provides knowledge in its germ, which after careful scrutinising can be brought out to provide us with facts about or in reality (Grote 1900, 169, 250: 1876, 360-370). Of course imagination may lead us to delusion, to error and mistake, but so can all thought and reasoning, and the dangers can be reduced if we think clearly, if we apply the appropriate tests of truth such as consistency and coherence (Grote 1876; 1900, 59-65, 169).

(b) Freedom

Imagination we see is a precondition both of thought and action and hence can be said to be in our nature, but so too is freedom or free will. To Grote this is a fact of our nature as basic as the fact that we are sensory and feeling beings.

> 'Our free will is at least an assumption which we must always make, as we do that of the reality of being and of the external world' (Grote 1870, 180 284-285).

Of course to positivists on action and phenomenalists on knowledge, freedom is impossible, it is incompatible with the laws of nature and of necessity (Grote 1900, 111, 295-296). But free will is something which, as Oakeshott later argues, we must postulate or posit if we wish to explain human conduct (Oakeshott 1975, 36-41). In the positivist and phenomenalist frameworks of the universe, all mental and physical activity, is determined but Grote utterly rejects the application of this model to thinking and acting. In so far as man is an animal, or his body appears to be a machine, he is governed by scientific necessity, but in so far as man has a mind and imagination, and in so far as he inhabits the world of practice, he is free. Practical life requires choice or a regular basis and choice presupposes freedom. As Grote puts it there are three strata or levels of our nature, the basic, original and natural; the educated,

mans 'second nature', that based on habit which is made by society; and the free, or human nature in the making (Grote 1876, 464-466). Hence he writes referring to the habit of virtuous conduct,

> 'It is not our nature to be virtuous, it is our nature to learn virtue' (Grote 1876, 460).

Through imagination we posit the ideals to strive for, and through choice and will decide which to act for. We can add freedom to man's nature to round off and modify the basic, natural or animal basis, and man's 'second nature', the habits, dispositions and character he has learnt from social intercourse (Grote 1876, 434-437). This is nicely explained by an analogy of the relationship of a horse and its rider with a man and his free will. A horse has a physical (basic or original) nature, but he can acquire dispositions, habits of behaviour through education and training. Ultimately however it takes a rider to direct the horse towards its work and towards its excellence or ideals; and this is made possible by both imagination and free will.

> 'But when we act reflectively and criticize our actions then comes in the doubleness which I have spoken of. We are in the position in regard to our own generic nature, both of the horse and the horse's master at once. We want something, and we use the horse for it. We do not ride and drive the horse in the first instance because it is his nature to gallop and draw, but because we want something, and we mix our thought of this want with a knowledge of his nature, and proceed to the satisfaction of our want by the way of his nature and his powers' (Grote 1876, 389-390).

Grote's philosophical works are littered with protestations about free will as a postulate of human activity and as a basic fact of human nature (Grote 1865, xvii, 9, 177-178; 1870, 283-285; 1876, 175-180, 353-354; 1900 2,96). Without it being postulated, he feels that no coherent account of morality as a whole, or virtuous conduct on ideals of right, or dutiful activity, are possible (1870, 165, 212, 287; 1876, 453, 459-460,). Every struggle for understanding and knowledge, truth and certainty, are proofs of our freedom.

> 'Action is a triumph of our will, and it is in the triumph, and in the amount of success against what is triumphed over, that we are conscious of ourselves, of our liberty and of our power' (Grote 1876, 488).

These fundamental postulates and suppositions, which include free will, a reflective and imaginative consciousness and the presence of power to do something, are the basis to the active side of man's nature which counteract the sentient side, described and posited as basic by phenomenalists, materialists and positivists. Because of their existential connotations, they lead him close to a denial of man having any nature at all. That man can posit ideals, can see the world differently to what it is and has been, and can choose, will and then act, renders his basic animal, and even his socially constructed nature almost irrelevent. He hence writes in true existentialist fashion

> 'In one point of view it might be said, that the nature of man is to have no nature; the same might be variously expressed in other words, less pointedly or rudely, by saying, that man makes his own nature, or makes himself what he pleases, or that his nature is to be educable or trainable, and in other ways' (Grote 1876, 388).

Like Sartre also he goes on to ruminate as to the consequences of this, is it a

> 'prerogative or misfortune to be able to be self-impelled to think and choose what he will be and do' (Grote 1876, 389).

(c) <u>Self realization</u>

The phrase above appears in an aptly named chapter on the 'Actual and Ideal Human Nature' but the basic thesis had been spelt out in the *Exploratio* and the *Examination*. There Grote argues that the ideal nature of man transcends or can transcend the actual. The ideal is both implied and implicit in our actual nature (hence the sentient and active basis) and the actual is an aspect of our ideal nature (Grote 1870, 284-288). The practice of life and the moral ideals oblige man to transcend their actual state in a continued effort to realise their

potential. Grote therefore, like Green, Bradley and most of the English Idealists after him, considered the nature of man and of moral and political life to be one of a search for improvement, self and social development, the striving for perfection in the self and the 'right' in social life (1870, ch XVII-XX; 1876 chII, XVII,). Human nature itself both ought to be developed and requires development, for

> 'Human nature exists not simply in order to have its wants supplied; it is to be brought out in its variety and its fulness, and it is upon this that its happiness depends' (Grote 1870, 258).

Indeed a case can be made that Grote sees man's primary duty to himself, society and the universe to be one of 'personal self-development' (Walsh 1985, 382).

Before proceeding a long quotation from the *'Examination'* is justified as it completes the point about the relationship between freedom, activity and self development, and between them all and the ideals of morality, and because it ends by hinting at Grote's moral ontology.

> 'This notion of an ideal, and the feeling of liberty as it is understood by many moral writers, may be considered to be the same thing: man has not only will, but has full and deliberate consciousness of himself as a free agent: he is conscious at once of there being the power in him, and the necessity upon him, of choice: he may not only do, but in a great measure be, what he pleases, in some respects at once, in some respects by slow degrees. This liberty is, in the very notion of it, a looking by man beyond anything which is merely a condition of his nature. So far as such liberty exists, it is his *nature* to *make* his own nature, his own self, his own course of action. And such liberty must involve an ideal, something for the liberty to look to: for it is not caprice, it is choice; it supposes reason why one thing should be done, and not another'.

And again,

> 'The feeling of our being free; the feeling of there being meaning and reason in things, to which our action may correspond; the feeling that thought or knowledge rules actuality or reality, and is not merely a sort of accidental awareness or result of it...'

are preconditions for our improvement. They are phenomenological and

epistemological facts to Grote (Grote 1870, 284-286).

This freedom, alongside the creative powers of the mind to know the truth (the absolute), and the possession of physical power, to realize our will in action, and improve ourselves, make us participants in the creation and discovery of the moral ideals. Customs, habits, conventions, laws, the 'general level of civilisation', and the 'mean' of human nature, embody the results of generations of individuals and societies efforts to realize their ideals in the actual.

This moral epistemology and phenomenology takes us to the verge of the moral absolute (the realization of which was only formal in Kant's ethics of the categorical imperative). Grote wants to discover the 'unconditionally moral', that which should be 'freely chosen' by all 'rational beings'. Grote's freely conceived, freely willed and acted upon ideals, both social and individual, are the absolutes Kant had sought and Hegel had mapped out in German idealism. In following the ideals we transcend not only what 'has been' 'is', but what 'will be', we enter into the world that 'should be' (Grote 1870, 287). To Grote, once formulated, the ideals act as the goals of our actions, they direct and give meaning and purpose to activity, they are prescriptive, descriptive and expressive at the same time.

> 'The words 'ought', 'should', and the other similar ones, are what may be called terms of art in this sense, that they express something to be done, a line of conduct to be pursued, ordinarily in view of the attainment of a particular purpose... they express a condition (at least a probable condition) of the attainment of this: if you would attain this or that end, if you want this thing or that, you must, you ought to, you should, do this other thing, whatever it is: 'must', 'ought', should', are only different degrees of intensity of the expression of the same thing; and it may be expressed still otherwise by saying, this thing is *to be done*, if you wish to gain that: the Latin expresses this simply in the form 'faciendum''(Grote 1876, 15).

Moral terms refer then to some 'absolute', and the absolute faciendum, is equal to the absolute truth in intellectual ontology.

It is that which is the ultimate purpose of action, the truly unconditional ought, with value independent of all motives, sensations, and consequences, 'a thing which for reasons contained in themselves, we ought to do'. Moral life is then the pursuit and realization of our actual selves in our moral ideals.

Three important points must be kept in mind before we proceed. Human nature has several levels, from the basic and determined to the freely chosen; secondly,the interaction of the ideal and the actual suggests that human nature is really a set of potentials awaiting realization; and finally,human nature has two sides the active and the sentient. Grote notes that much moral philosophy, and utilitarianism in particular, has

> 'taken views of human nature manifestly partial and incomplete even in the eyes of those who are no philosophers'

and has used them to produce supposedly coherent systems of philosophy (Grote 1870, 37). The result is and must be abstraction and catastrophe.

> 'But in us reflective creatures, being and thinking, fact (or *giveness*) and self-formation (or self-improvement), impulse (or disposition) and principle (or self-criticism) are mingled together in a complicated doubleness making it easy for the unthinking to say of human nature anything that they please, and making it difficult, with any amount of thought, to say anything about it satisfactorily(Grote 1876, 390)

Grote notes that several contemporary philosophers were seeking for the 'key' to simplify matters, analogous to Newton's Theory of Gravity. Marx, and Darwin, as well as the Utilitarians had proposed such keys. But Grote rejected the argument for simplicity by quoting developments in natural botany where the idea of balance and harmony is a more useful heuristic device than simplicity.

> 'superior to simplicity, as a presumption in favour of any theory, is its application, without straining, to all the facts, and the absence of any tendency in it to restrict the view, or to cause the eyes to be shut to any of them' (Grote 1876, 391)

An eclectic approach, an idealist paradigm of the relationship of difference within a single whole, and a rejection of 'artificial simplification, a shutting the eyes to all considerations except one', are preconditions to Grote for an adequate description of human nature. John Burrow notes how Grote's view that contemporary thought should 'fully recognize the largeness and variety of human nature' touched a sensitive nerve at the time, and his attack on the 'science of the human mind' reached the ears of the Anthropological Society in 1867 (Burrow 1970, 96-98, 134n; Grote 1870, 342; Hunt 1867, ccxvi - ccxix)

(d) Sociability and Sociality

Another defect of the rising social sciences noted by Grote was the belief that only statements capable of observational or inductive proofs could yield the truth. So the new sociologists and anthropologists were busily trying to prove man was an 'individual' or 'social being' by comparative scientific analysis, such as that of Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, and many others recorded in Burrow's *Evolution and Society*. Grote believed as deeply as anyone could that man was a social being, and that his sociality penetrated to his whole nature, was exhibited in his history, his relationships, his institutions and practices. But he uses metaphysical arguments as well as anthrolopogical arguments to ground this belief.

The existence of society is a precondition for being an individual, our individual human nature is premised upon social constructs. In 'Thought versus Learning' Grote made the statement that

> 'Man logically speaking, is social before he is individually reasonable, his communication with others is a precondition of the development of his own intelligence'(Grote 1871, 820)

The point was that a precondition of being a human being, is that we have a language (to think in, speak in and write in) and that language

is an essentially public institution. In a fashion reminiscent of later Cambridge philosophy, this assertion of the public nature of language and hence thought, is used to ground a whole theory of man and society. Grote's idealism, both intellectual and moral, is to work on the premise that when we speak and think we are engaged in a public not a private engagement.

Moral decision making and moral activity are also social to their roots. Grote in true existentialist fashion notes that in the end we do have to think and choose for ourselves, as we have to live our lives for ourselves.

> 'Do what we will, we act, as we die, alone, and must do so... The moral ideal is in the union of full and free individual choice with public or social motive...' (1870, 354).

But we must still reject the particular supposition of being a 'solitary' creature in the universe and recognise that we share an 'intelligent sociality'.

> 'That each one of us is a social being means a great deal more than that he is an individual of the genus man, living with other individuals of the same genus, talking with then, and pursuing common purposes with them. He is social to the bottom of his mind, and each one of his faculties is different from that which it would be, if it was not part of his nature to associate himself. He *thinks* socially, and cannot think otherwise: and so far as, by a solitude inappropriate to his nature, he is thrown out of actual companionship, he is like a man deprived of his legs or anything which *ought* to be his...' (Grote 1876, 62).

The moral ideals we formulate are then social, so is our imagining and so on back down to our feelings ie. (the recognition whether for instance, childbirth is painful is a socially defined matter). Hence this most general conclusion,

> 'In man's nature, as I have described, sociality is not a quasi-accident, but of the essence of it, each feeling bears its imprint. Thus the living, feeling, thinking, as man should, has reference not to the man's self alone, but to his place with others, and his relation to them; and into his purposes they, as well as himself, must enter' (Grote 1876, 296-297; See also 332-338).

Human nature to Grote is social, not only in the simple biological,

anthropological and sociological senses, but on account of common language, and the shared thought and action that follows. Sociality enters all our feelings, thoughts and activities,

> 'The truth about this is that all our feelings, and our reason and thought also in an eminent degree, are social; ... Man is social *in mind*, as well as condition; sociality is involved in the very idea of intelligence,...' (Grote 1870, 169-170.

(e) Want

We may now pass on to a deeper analysis of who and what we are as human beings, of what we are capable, and to what purpose we think and act. Here we enter into a phenomenology of action and an ontology of human existence, an account of 'being' which defines, underpins and in the end determines the human condition. It appears in all of Grote's major books and has a fundamental, even a foundation role to play.The two aspects of human nature which are the foundation stones of Eudaemonics and Aretaics have a common starting point in want, or as Grote imaginatively put it,

> 'Activity, like sensibility, has its root in immediateness: that is, in order to understand activity, we must begin with the supposition of a *state of things*, which (though that is not a matter of our knowledge, more than implicitly, or involvedly) contains a reason for the activity (when it comes to be recognized by us) being what it is and no other. The common parent of both sensibility and of activity may be said to be *want* - *want* as a fact, which must carefully be distinguished from want as a feeling' (Grote 1900, 190).

Grote is making several points here but first I shall concentrate on the relationship to activity and sensibility. Want is a fact at the bottom of our being. On the sentient side we feel the want, we feel the need for food, or sexual satisfaction, or happiness, to end our suffering or unhappiness. On the active side we have the want that impels action, we want to do something, to act, to use our powers and energies for something. To live means not just to satisfy our sensory wants, but to use all our powers and all our abilities, as

Carrou puts it, 'to some purpose'.

Both sentient and active want suggest some purpose to be realized, something absent or not yet, which we feel and know ought to be, if our lives are to be complete. Not only is the basis of want in our physical nature, our want of food for instance, a fact, and not only is a desire to do something, a fact, but their references to the object of want, the thing wanted are factual, thought the facts are 'higher', more 'ideal' or elevated'. The distinction between the feeling of want and the fact of want is crucial if this argument is not to collapse into naive materialism ('a la Marx) or into naive utilitarianism ('a la Bentham). Grote writes in 1865 or 1866

> 'Want in what I have called immediateness, exists as a fact, and when this immediateness passes into reflection, this *fact* of want passes into *felt* want or uneasiness, and *concurrently* with this (*not* as a result of it) the fact of want impels action' (ibid 190).

The point is similar to the distinction between a real need and a felt need, the first being more objective and the second subjective. A doctor may say we need some medication when we do not feel the need subjectively, or we may feel we need treatment when the doctor may judge the symptoms we feel to not warrant such treatment. So our body may want food though a suppressing drug may prevent us feeling the want, or we may feel we want something when the want is only a 'craving' or a 'mis-wish'. Grote's point is that we may be mistaken in recognizing want but that want is a fact of life that we must strive to recognize and satisfy as best we can. Want, however has far wider references to Grote.




Fig. 1 The Scheme of Want

Want, to Grote, is the dynamic force in man and nature. This fact of want is witnessed in the whole world of movement, change, force and energy. Whether we look at force and energy in physics, need or the struggle to grow in the biological world, whether we study the physiology of muscles or animal bodies, we see the ontological urge to move, to grow, to achieve that which is not yet

> 'We are thus something besides active and sentient beings, we are active and wanting beings: and extending our view beyond ourselves, the universe is an active and wanting universe. Not, indeed, exactly in the sense in which we are active and wanting, but in this sense, that there is a great deal of power in the universe, and also a great deal of want. I use the word universe with intentional vagueness: what I say will apply equally whether we make the widest possible supposition of the universe, taking in God as the Creator of it, or whether we consider it to be merely a physical *compages* of matter and force' (Grote 1876, 23-24).

An illustration of physical want in the universe is given by reference to the leaf or root of a plant which wants to imbibe water or air,

> 'there is egence in the plant, and there are movements in the parts of it by which the water or air is imbibed; the egence leads to the activity...' (Grote 1876, 27).

Felt want is the sensation of want, of say water or air, for a human being (not a plant). The fact is that the human body wants air and water to survive, the feeling is that of suffocation or thirst.

Grote notes that the 'facts which we feel, and our feeling of them, are in language constantly confused...', but he insists that the facts are logically independent of the feelings. So the fact that a starving person wants food is separable from his feeling that he wants food; when drugged with amphetamine a starving person does not feel the want for food, but we can quite correctly say that his body wants or needs food. Alternatively we may feel we want something not in proportion to how much we want it, this he calls 'craving' or 'false want' (similar to the difference between true and false needs in Marx) and even 'mis-craving' and 'mis-wish' (Grote 1876, 23, 27, 29-31).

Grote notes that

> 'A great deal of moral puzzle, intended or involuntary, arises from this doubleness. People say, 'That is not the thing you really wish for': meaning, when it is present, it will not satisfy you; you will not find what you expected' (Grote 1876, 31; Gibbins, 1983, 175-177).

Grote in fact produces a typology of want analogous to the recent typologies of need produced by Forder and Bradshaw (Forder 1974; Bradshaw 1977).

The relationship between want and activity is however the point of central interest here because it produces the basis for a philosophy of action, or a philosophy of practice, of a type later explored by William James, Michael Oakeshott and others (James 1907, Oakeshott 1933). We can remember the point quoted in chapter five,

> 'What I call 'immediateness' is the presentiment to us of *a state of things*, in which things *are* as they are, but in which, beyond this things are also *not* as they *ought* to be - by which *ought* I do not mean any reference to morals (though this principle is very important in its application to them), but I mean simply that the state of things is to be looked at, not merely as it is in itself at the moment, but as it contains or implies what is coming or should come next'

And later,

> 'the change in a universe thus made up is a continuous course of want, (as I have described the fact of want) and the supply of it' (Grote 1900, 191).

This suggests an ontology, an over-arching theory of being. All life, and all human life in particular, is rendered incomplete by the division between 'what has been' and 'is' and what 'should' or 'ought to be'. What this means is that in the world of practice we can never be at rest, we can never experience a coherent world of experience. We must either act to satisfy 'want' to try and close the gap between what 'is' and what 'ought to be', what 'is now' and 'what ought to be now' or in the future or else accept dissatisfaction. At the heart of being therefore there is something absent, (absentation) the 'not yet' or the 'not as it should be'. Want, or egence as he calls it, is the recognition of this fact. A feeling of uneasiness or 'ennui' accompanies this state. Action is the attempt to overcome it, to make coherent the world of experience (Grote 1876, 48-49). Attempts to satisfy wants in life seem ultimately to fail, as new wants occur, as our powers to know what we want and need are limited, and as our powers to achieve them are so limited. But just as in thinking we search for truth, and each part of truth implies the whole, so in life each effort to satisfy want implies the 'complete unity', the absolute of life or activity - the summum bonum, the ideal good or 'how we want to live' (Grote 1876, 29-30).

Activity is conditioned by the facts of our existence, 'the human condition', as Grote calls it on occasions. Want, power to satisfy it, action, and change are some of its features, as are free will and dissatisfaction. But so too are time and space, which help account for why we must want, act, (and it seems fail) to satisfy our want.

> 'The past and the future both *are*: the past is the experienced and already *bewilled*, which has had will expended upon it: the future is the unexperienced and *unbewilled*, but (independent of the manner in which will,which has to be spent on it, may affect it) it is continuous like the past, real and certain like it, and only not knowable by us because there is no experience to connect our intelligence and it'.

Again,

> 'The future, looked upon as real with a quasi-reality modifiable by will, is real in a higher view, inasmuch as even all that this *will* will do is contained in the ' existing egence, most widely taken' (Grote 1876, 32).

So as real to us as what is, is our knowledge that something 'has been', 'may be', 'could be' or 'ought to be'. When we act we act for some purpose, to do or achieve something, to close the gap between present and future, between the is and ought to be, between actual and ideal in both the practical and the moral senses of the later term.

To Grote our conceptions of what will, could, should or ought to be, are as much facts as the experience at what is. In fact they are more important or 'higher' as they are those things that motivate us to action. Without ideals and this gap, without uneasiness about the absent, we would never act or think. These facts are then 'higher' and deserve our most serious considerations and take priority over the positivists lower level studies of the actual, the felt want, the what is or has been.

> 'Besides the immediate and palpable wants of man, there is what may be described as a vast mass of want in respect of man's mind, imagination and feelings, and there is also the great want of moral elevation and improvement. These wants are all the more real for the ideal element they involve; for their being rather want in the sense of *absence* of what should be, than want in the sense of *desiredness*' (Grote 1870, 327).

The real moral facts turn out to be our ideals, the right, good, happiness, duty, benevolence, justice, virtue etc. Being social, general and normative they bear serious resemblance to Durkheim's 'social facts', like them they are to be treated as things (Thompson 1982, 59-60). They are not to be treated as surplus baggage, as most positivists including Marxists assume, but the purpose and aims of the journey. They can be studied usefully by observation of actual feelings, beliefs, hopes and wants, as in psychology and physiology; they can be studied as they change through time, as in anthropology,

sociology and history; their practical dynamics cam be studied in economics, jurisprudence and politics.

But the study of the actual is only a prelude to the study of the ideal and has little explanatory value unless it leads to and helps us explain the ideals, the purpose of all this feeling, acting, and struggling. These ideals can be studied metaphysically, epistemologically or ontologically, and the *Treatise* explains both how and to what effect. But the conclusion is clear already. Human beings are wanting beings physically, intellectually and morally, we want food, the truth, the right and the good. Human activity is premised upon want and the desire for its satisfaction. Our physical, intellectual and moral ideals are the visions we have of what would satisfy our want and allow us to be at rest with our being.

Grote's long term debt and inspiration here was to Aristotle, and especially to his idea of teleology. If all life was for some purpose, then equally (syncretically) it must involve some absence or incompleteness for the dynamic of purpose to arise. He wrote in a notebook on the 20th August, 1864

> 'Instead of taking the *epitelic* view of action, what we might do would be to take the *aparchic*. With Aristotle (is it not so?) the *archē* (starting point) of action is really only another word for the telos, purpose, or aim; but we might consider in regard of action its origin, or that which it starts from, as well as its telos, or that which it tends to' (Grote 1876, 26)

The idea that the basic fact of want is realized in the good (the summum bonum) is also taken from Aristotle.

But there are other sources of inspiration as well. Grote was looking for a dynamic of human life to rival the simplicity and persuasiveness of the utilitarian and other positivist and materialist theories ie. the search for happiness and the struggle for survival. One possible source of inspiration came from the psychology of the French Eclectics and Maine de Biran in particular, a view I share with

Jean Pucelle (Pucelle 1955, 67-69). Grote, we saw in chapter six, presents life, both physical and material, as a struggle to exert power against resistance in the world, whether that be weight against our muscles or a puzzle against our mind, or a moral conflict in our practical life. Grote even attempted, following Bain, to relate the physical events with feelings, and these with our mental events and thoughts (Grote 1865, 34-53; 1900, 191-193).

Grote regularly refers to the psychological (existential) experiences of 'restlessness' and 'uneasiness' as the concomitants of this physical experience of pressure. He writes (attacking Adam Smith, Bentham, Mill and the other utilitarians),

> 'Whatever may be natural to man, contentment is not. *Acturience* or desire of action, in one form or another, whether as restlessness, ennui, dissatisfaction, or the imagination of something desirable, is quite as much a fact of human nature as any kind of want or need. Were all appetites and desires satisfied, this would remain. Man wants an object for his activity quite as much as he wants his activity for the support of life'
>
> 'It is dissatisfaction and not satisfaction, which is the parent of all idealism, energy and progress' (Grote 1876, 301).

In addition we have in de Biran and in Cousin , the basic premise that man was an active being - whose will, not his senses, directed his nature. This understanding was popularized by Masson in the penultimate chapter to his history of nineteenth century philosophy, but I imagine that Grote had gone to original sources (Masson 1867, Ch viii, 471-513).

But Grote was also a great observer of human nature in the mould of La Rochefoucauld, Montaigne and Pascal, all of whom he regularly quotes. His dismal Calvinist upbringing and his priestly profession heightened his awareness of the desperate, as well as the idealist side of human nature, which want, and failure in its satisfaction, brought. His views in the *Treatise* on want, the human condition and human nature, were predated by a beautiful and perceptive essay on

'Montaigne and Pascal' finally published in 1877 (Grote 1877, 285-296). These two figures had some influence. Grote states that

> 'I have endeavoured, in all that I have written about human nature, to avoid the cynic indifference of Montaigne, and what we must call the complaint and repining of Pascal' (Grote 1877, 288)

He notes the contradictions in man's nature, the 'ennui', or restlessness for action and yet the desire for satisfaction that is present in them both. In La Rochefoucauld's maxims' mankind

> 'is always seeking rest, and yet engaging himself in action, wishing to enjoy himself, and yet directing his thoughts away from himself...' (ibid 293)

Grote, balancing optimism and pessimism, concludes,

> 'That man cannot rest in satisfaction, but is always setting before himself one purpose after another to strive after, is no more proof of the pitiableness of his condition, than of its nobleness; in fact we can conclude nothing from it except that it is in his nature' (ibid, 294).

One last source was an American philosopher of the day, R.G. Hazard, whose book, *Freedom of the Mind* was in Grote's private library, part of which can now be found in the College Library at Trinity College Cambridge. While written after, or at the same time as Grote formulated his views, it does contain a most interesting short seventh chapter entitled 'Of Want', written from a religious standpoint. There is, however, little other similarity of view other than the common concern to analyze this key concept (Hazard 1864).

We now have a nearly complete picture of John Grote's account of human mind, human nature and of the human condition. In brief we can identify his theory as essentially expressivist, to use the terminology of Charles Taylor (Taylor 1979, 1-14; 1985, 77-96). In this view man's nature is an unfolding from some central core. The unfolding is at one and the same time an unfolding of mind, personality, society and history. We saw in chapter five that mind's growth is an unfolding from an undifferentiated, incoherent whole, through a differentiated and even more incoherent stage of reflective

thinking, into a final absolute and coherent knowledge. In this process active and creative mind functions. Its imagination and reason are dominant over the purely passive and sensory elements.

In addition we saw that because language lies at the basis of thought, the creative and active unfolding of reality in self knowledge is a social not an individual enterprise. In the end knowledge and reality are social. As Taylor points out, an 'expressivist theory' is part of a long historical trail that ends by putting language at the heart of human nature. Grote's view is also in tune with what Berlin calls the 'counter enlightenment',it is a modification of Herder's linguistic theory, and it is a typically nineteenth century romantic and idealist development (Taylor 1985, 215-247). With human activity we have discovered man the creative actor, unfolding in his actions a world of meaning to himself and others in his society. Man acts as he thinks, socially, and activity is essential for his social self realization. His need to act - his want - is the core of his active self, as the immediate consciousness of self is the core of his mental self. In acting to satisfy felt want, but more importantly in acting to realize the purposes of his activly wanting self, in action itself, he both unfolds and discovers himself, his nature, his want, his purpose and that of his society.

Just as the theory of human nature is 'expressivist', so the theory of action, fits into the 'qualitative' category later defined by Taylor, in which self conscious human activity gradually emerges out of 'unreflecting' bodily practice in the same way that knowledge grows out of unreflective immediacy. As we have seen, just as in epistemology 'things' are to be seen as 'embodying' mind, so with Grote (as with other subscribers to the qualitative theory few of whom existed in Britain prior to 1870), customs, habits, practices, institutions, moral codes and laws 'embody' human meaning. To Grote

man's nature is active, he acts as a free, conscious, imaginative and self-directed social being to both discover and to put direction, purpose and meaning into the world.

But Grote has gone on beyond this to outline the existential human predicament. Man is a wanting creature, but his want can never be completely satisfied. Man's life on earth is always riven with contradiction, mirrored in the impossibility of closing the gap between past, present and future, but experienced in practical life in the gap between what the world at any time is and what it ought to be. Not succumbing to pessimism, cynicism, romanticism, or religious optimism, Grote looks `being' in the face, and unflinchingly accepts the unavoidability of the quest for the absolute in knowledge and action, in a world of apparently unremitting frustration, contradiction and incoherence. Both in the *Sermons* and the essay on 'The Future State', Grote advises his religious audiences to bother less about 'the after life' and to concentrate upon the future in this life. In the *Examination* Grote regularly explains the unavoidability of unhappiness, want, and dissatisfaction in the world, while urging positive, idealistic and creative effort at self improvement to realize a better life (Grote 1870, 174-182). Likewise in the *Treatise* the full implications of the human condition are spelled out, for while we have power, the companion of want, to help us realize our ideals, we never have enough of it. Nor do we ever have a clear enough view of what we do or ought to want, and hence a life, regularly exhibiting unhappiness, seems unavoidable (Grote 1876, 72, 327-331). Yet acting, like speaking and thinking are 'doings', they are activities in which we unfold, discover and create at the same time. We should now turn to the implications of this theory of human nature and of the human condition, which nearly amount to an account of human agency, for morality and later for politics.

VII

Moral Knowledge and the Status of Moral Ideals

So far I have studiously avoided reference to the connection between human nature, want and the moral ideals. These must now be elaborated before I turn back to the analogy of morality and epistemology, the right and the true, and before I relate Grote's moral to his mental philosophy.

In brief, Grote considers that both sides of our nature, and the fundamental fact of want that underpins them both, find satisfaction and realization in a moral ideal. The moral ideals are the objects, the purposes, the aims of our want, our desires (or felt want), and our active impulse (fact of want). The uneasiness and restlessness of life indicate to us that they are absent, or present only in part. Our want tells us we need happiness, justice, our rights and so on. The content of our ideals may be,

> 'a rule to go by, an end to be gained, or a character to be attained to which is in the man's mind'

but the analysis remains the same as do the facts (Grote 1870, 275).

Such a view was contained in the early appendix on 'Idealism and Positivism' written in 1863 to accompany the *Examination*.

> 'The word imagination goes not unfitly with the word 'idealism', and 'ideal' and 'idealism' I use always, it will be seen in reference to action. I mean by 'ideal' anything which we mentally set before ourselves as the purpose or rule of our action, and (as will have been seen from all that I have said) I do not regard anything as a *proper* ideal for our conduct, a true ideal, except as being fact or part of fact, representing or expressing fact. But then it is not the fact of ordinary understanding (which can only furnish us *means* for action, not purposes): it is the fact of our imagination intuition, belief, inward vision, however we like to describe it' (Grote 1900, 324).

We will concentrate here on the first two sentences, leaving the ontological reference until later. Under the category of ideals,

those things we mentally set before ourselves as purposes, Grote in the *Exploratio* explored *the ideals of truth* and knowledge. Truth and knowledge are implicit in all thought, but mind never rests in the undifferentiated and irrational, it turns reflection, imagination and thought on itself and struggles for coherence and absolute knowledge amongst its distinct and differentiated products. Yet the search is still for truth and knowledge at a higher level, for the unconditional or the absolute. Statements about truth or certainty assume some absolute standards the benchmarks used for judgement, but they are usually implicit and not explicit.

> 'Non-relative, full, simple, absolute truth or knowledge is what we mean by truth or knowledge, and we cannot make ourselves mean anything else: but they are ideals, they are what we think of, hope for, struggle after, while what we gain in the effort is relative knowledge, from which as in the case of individuality, we may more and more disentangle the exclusively relative element, and come towards our ideal' (Grote 1900, 287-288).

The same message appears in Grote's essay on 'Materialism', especially in chapter two on the 'Intellectual and Moral Difficulties of Materialism' (Grote 1867, 370-381; 1900, 241-250). The intellectual difficulty of materialism is that it is a partial and necessarily incomplete account of both 'being' and 'seeming to be' (consciousness), in that its premises are limited as well as its potential for truth and knowledge. Philosophy and common sense should be able to posit knowledge and truth as something more than 'a world of chimera and illusion', an epiphenomena of material events.

> 'The way of taking it *rightly* seems to me to be the consideration of our thought itself as a great fact: we think as we do (by which thinking the universe is suggested as given to us) in virtue of fact going beyond ourselves, or if we like to call it so, antecedent to ourselves - fact of which all our knowledge is an imperfect and gradual revelation to us' (Grote 1900, 247).

The moral difficulty of materialism is similar, for the materialist can only explain antecedent events, all thought of the future, all judgement about it is something delusive, abnormal and

unmeaning. But in fact we posit moral facts, like the right and the good, as we do truth and knowledge, in knowledge and thought. Moral knowledge grows from immediate thought towards the assertion of fact, from a confidence about right and wrong gained early in life.

> 'Knowledge is a mode of thought and is formed from imagination, and in this thought and imagination I see, perhaps not knowledge itself, but its germ and material...' (Grote 1900, 250).

Moral and political life is the struggle to gain knowledge of our moral aims and purposes, our moral ideals, and then to act to make our lives coherent, by realizing them in practice. As early as 1865, Grote had published his claim that our ideals belong to the realms of a 'higher objectiveness or higher idea of existence', and he claims the *Exploratio* to be a study of the value of the claim that the ideal is the 'true existence' (Grote 1865, 3).

But two other themes are given repeated consideration. One, that ideals are not mere dreams or illusions - they refer to and are part of reality, and secondly, that ideals are a fundamental part to the activities of life. Hence we can study morality by both speculation on the ideal and observation of what actually happened in the past (history) and what happens in the present (sociology).

That our ideals refer to reality is argued at three levels. Firstly, that the ideals refer to ontologically 'higher facts'; secondly, that they refer to the ordinarily knowable 'lower facts'. Finally, all knowledge begins with immediate consciousness of reality, involves imagination and a self correcting struggle to produce and discover the truth about reality. Grote wanted us to consider human ideals as intimations of some higher facts or reality, that could be known through the ordinary knowing process described above, in which observation of the actual and the immediate coexist in a complex interaction with the imagination and reason. Just as the mediated reflectional knowledge of things and events completes the immediate

consciousness of being, so our complex moral knowledge completes what is immediately felt and experienced, to be pleasurable, right or wrong.

The first stage in the moral argument appears in Chapter IV of the *Treatise* 'The Ideals Are Not Mere Imaginations' (Grote 1876, 42-53). Here Grote defends ethical idealism by denying to its enemies the claim that imagination is merely a 'forward delusive faculty', that moral ideals are like aesthetic sentiments, and that moral philosophy is analogous to a poetic engagement.(1) Grote's starting point is a denial of the separation of reason and imagination into two separate faculties, as had been suggested by Coleridge, by the assertion that they are intimately connected. Next, he asserts that while poetry is content to rest in partial views and visions which possess insights but do not provide knowledge, in practical life and philosophy, imagination spawns and crystallizes into actual knowledge.

In practical life we imagine making a fortune or sailing an ocean; then we plan and execute the task. In moral life we may imagine the nature, and character or content of moral ideals and imperatives. Moral reasoning is the effort to grasp and clarify ideals and principles through thought and argument. We consider what is ideal for ourselves and also for others, and we also criticise alternative ideals. In so doing we engage in debates, and when challenged we give reasons for our rejections or assertions. To complete the process we act in practice upon those ideals which have crystallized from our imaginations, which have survived social and intellectual scrutiny and for which reasons have now been provided. Actual moral conflicts and disputes, over such issues as slavery, are further means for distilling the truth.

The actual ideals, rules and principles we end up prescribing and living by are like the everyday facts we accept about the world, for

they are the conclusions that are spawned by experience and imagination. They are the crystals that have survived the processes of thought, reasoning, conversation and practice. As Grote puts it, we advance in knowledge by *fixing* our ideals, we convert the ideal into a kind of fact, and vice versa (Grote 1876, 38). As in science,where the researcher gropes in the dark for the absolute truth, but only grasps the partial, which is built on knowledge from the past and a prolific scientific imagination, so the moral philosopher and citizen gropes in the dark for the morally right. At any time they only grasp partial and relative truths, often embrace error and are often confused, with only custom, experience, imagination and judgement to help. Yet the aim and hope is to discover the objective truth.

Moral ideals next are dreams or imaginations, which are prompted by our dissatisfaction with what exists, by 'absence of fact', of truth or right. They take form as we try to identify what is missing, what is wanted and needed in our lives. The disposition to form ideals is as basic as our disposition to identify objects to satisfy our wants. The ideals are to active want, as food is to the feeling of hunger, it is the thing, the fact sought after. The moral ideals however lie between mere imagination and absolute knowledge, they are attempts to identify what is absent, and as yet beyond our immediate experience (Grote 1876, 48). As he writes

> 'Moral philosophy is thus concerned with that which is *not* as well as that which *is*, and more immediately. How to observe the actual so as to learn from it what is that complement of the actual which our action may produce, and which will be something gained to the actual and make it better, *this* is the main problem of ethics' (ibid 49).

After reiterating that a study of what is will never provide us with knowledge of what ought to be, Grote states three grounds for considering moral idealism to be the superior theory of morality, (1)

the degree to which that philosophy is fruitful, (2) the degree to which it is self-consistent (coherent), and (3) 'the degree to which the manner the mind proceeds in it bears an analogy to the way in which it proceeds intellectually' (ibid 51).(2) On the first Grote is content to point out that no account of practical action can work without the supposition of an ideal, and he adds that all moral speculation is concerned with separating the practical from the impractical ideals. On the second Grote avows no other proof than 'greater clearness of view', but he insists that the subsidiary sciences of 'hedonics' and 'observational aretaics' (the study of actually expressed ideals) and sociology, anthropology and comparative history may provide materials for further analysis and reflection which may enter into our view and help it become more complete, coherent and clearer (ibid 52-53). We shall come to the analogy of truth and right later.

VIII

The Ideal and Actual

The relationship between the ideal and the actual may now be discussed with special reference to the chapter devoted to this topic in the *Treatise* (ibid XVI, 388-402).(3) This relationship is explored at several levels; (1) human nature - the relationship between our animal and our human nature; (2) the relationship between our phenomenal nature (bodily) and our ideal (spiritual) nature; (3) the relationship between what we are made into by society via socialization or education and what we aspire to and can be; and intellectually we may (4) study the relationship between what 'is' and

what 'we feel ought to be'. On the last (4) I have spoken already but we may add some notes on (4) with special reference to Sociology. Grote considered this to be a valuable new discipline when studied correctly, but pretentious, mistaken and dangerous when constructed in a positivist fashion. The latter occurs when instead of being a descriptive historical study of social change, the subject pretends to discover laws of human development (Comte), to develop a 'Teleology' of human progress, or provide any kind of moral or political advice or prescription. Frequently sociology ends up being

> 'a bad mixture of history and speculation, the former rendered inaccurate by the latter, the latter not recognizing its proper position, and trammelled by the former' (Grote 1865, 202).

Room for observational study is present however and Grote goes out of his way to provide guidance in the study of sociology, which he calls 'the study of the real man', which in turn is 'the study of social man' (Grote 1870, 179-182, 281-288, 310-315, 323-326; 1876 415-416). Sociology should stick to the tracing of human custom and opinion, the way men organize themselves, and to relate these to the study of legal systems, the history of literature and science, the history of civilization, economic and other provisions.

(2) The second dimension, the relationship between our corporal frame and our mental and ideal lives, was examined in Chapter five. Grote returned to it on numerous occasions, to prove that no positive science of the body or brain can provide us with direction as to what we ought to do, as distinct from we must do. The first question (1) was raised in the discussion of human nature, where Grote insists that we differ from animals in being self conscious, self directed, freely capable of imagination and knowledge. In the *Treatise* there is also stress on the points that human beings can know the difference between right and wrong, and are hence capable of self improvement. However in so far as we have an animal shell, from which our social and

individual selves emerge, the observatory study of human behaviour may be instructive and tell us something about what we are.

However on (3), the issue of our self created nature, Grote makes two interesting points that take several chapters to explain. The first is the claim that the 'art of life' is to balance the ideal and the actual so that we do not engage in mere 'castle building', of a dangerous kind. The second is that existing customs and ideals are products of trial and error in thought and practice, so that what exists in the present, in terms of beliefs, customs, habits, laws and institutions, may be treated as 'embodiments' of the ideals (Grote 1876, 393-395). On the first, Grote provides a four point method to ensure a beneficial coexistence involving, a) philosophical clarification of the ideal; b) a study of the human condition to help see if and how the ideal could be applied; c) the historical study of the past to see the consequences of such an ideal being applied in a society, and d) its effects on specific institutions (the family) and feelings (family bonds) (Grote 1876, 393).

On the second part, to which I shall return, Grote produces another Hegelian sounding phrase,

> 'what man *has* become represents what it is best he should become and what it was in his ideal nature to become'.

Put even more clearly,

> 'In looking back thus on the development of man we see that the ideally good does, to a certain extent, produce itself in the actual or existing' (Grote 1876, 395).

To this extent Grote defends a hypothesis that 'the real is the rational, and the rational is the real'. Grote's relational social and moral theory, which argues that moral imperativeness and value, is embodied in actual social relationships and codified in law, moral law, roles, customs and habits is vital in this context, and will be discussed in the separate chapter on social and political theory.

IX

The Analogy Between the Intellectual and Moral Ideals

We can now study in detail the third reason why Grote considers idealism to be the most superior philosophy for analyzing ethics, the 'Analogy between the Intellectual and Moral Ideals'. Next, we can study with Grote's moral ontology, his analysis of moral reality, the higher as against the lower moral facts. These will pave the way to the account of the various moral ideals and his critique of utilitarianism in the next chapters, and to Grote's social and political theory in the one that follows.

In the last chapter of the *Examination*, originally written before the *Treatise* Grote had called for the fulfilment of the task of relating epistemology and ethics, a task that was to be realized in chapter five of the latter work. This was the key mission of ethics, the founding of an 'ars artium', a great art of living, which would lay down

> 'the *imperative* character of morals, as contra distinguished from the *indicative* mood of science' (1870,348).

Grote stated that

> 'We want something in the world of action analogous to what truth is in the world of intellect - something universal and the same for all. There must be right action as well as true thought: and no doubt this right action, *amongst other characters of it*, must be productive of happiness' (ibid 349).

This recognition provoked the line of thought that led onwards to the *Treatise* of 1864 and the epistemological base in the *Exploratio* of 1865 to 1866. Having discussed the epistemological base in chapter five the analogy as worked out in the *Treatise* can now be analyzed.

In chapter five above the epistemological character of Grote's *Exploratio* was identified as idealist, with the stress on its objective and even absolutist idealist currents. In chapter five of the *Treatise* we find the analogy between moral knowledge and intellectual knowledge argued for.

There are four elements that make up the argument of chapter five of the *Treatise*.(1) First is an early version of the argument later elaborated in the *Exploratio* that there are two distinct views of knowledge, the philosophical and the phenomenal , confusions between which have led to confusions both in epistemology and moral philosophy.(2) The second element attempts an idealist synthesis by transcending the problem that arose from the separation of subject and object and by the production of a scale of moral knowledge analogous to the scale of intellectual knowledge and sensation elaborated in chapter five.(3) The third element is the argument that the ideals which inhabit the upper end of the moral and intellectual scales are not only as real, but are more real, than the psychological sensations and the sociologically and historically observable phenomena that inhabit the lower and middle element of the moral scale. Indeed, Grote further argues that the ideals themselves reflect ontologically higher facts which are presumed in and are necessary for any kind of knowledge and action whether it relates to the physical or the moral world.(4) The final element is the worked out version of the analogy of moral ideals and intellectual ideals and especially the analogy of truth and right. This suggests that moral knowledge is possible, that it grows and develops logically in the same way as intellectual knowledge; that as the goal of intellectual knowledge is the totality of truth, so the goal of moral philosophy is knowledge of the right. Moral and political practice is the realization of the right, moral philosophy is its elaboration.

(1) As in the *Exploratio* later, the dualist dichotomy between phenomenalist theories of knowledge and intuitionist and rationalist theories is elaborated in detail. In the former we consider ourselves as gazing on an objective external world trying to recognize its qualities while in the latter the universe has no effect upon us but is rather a product of our gazing and thinking. Both views are credited with some value if kept untainted by the logic and language of the other, but both are ultimately rejected as 'abstractions'. Mediation between them is a 'surd' or is insoluble (1876, 55-57). Only idealism, which disallows the absolute separation of subject and object, mind and matter, into different worlds can alone transcend the intuitionist and phenomenalist conflict (Grote 1876, 57-59).

(2) Grote's attempted synthesis arises from the analogy of the 'scale of sensation' with a moral equivalent,

> 'And the moral ideals, in my view, stand to the sensations of pleasure and pain, considered simply and in itself in the same relation in which perceptions belonging to the higher part of the perceptional scale, or what I have just called ideas, stand to perceptions of the lower part, or what I have called mere sensations ...' (Grote 1876, 59).

The point is that intuitionism and phenomenalism are abstractions, inhabiting the upper and lower part of the scale of sensation respectively. The truth is that knowledge is a development from immediacy upwards on the scale to mediacy, where sensations under the gaze and direction of reflection and judgement are converted into knowledge about the world. In the moral world knowledge arises neither from private sensations of pleasure and pain, nor intuitive insights. Moral ideals, principles and rules are carved out of the immediacy of sensations (such as pleasure and pain, guilt and sympathy), in the same way that knowledge about things is carved out of knowledge of acquaintance (1876, 29-30, 58-59).

Moral knowledge, to Grote, grows according to a process of

distinction not aggregation, by reflection on what is undifferentiated in immediate thought and sensation. Reflection, using imagination, leads us to grasp and fix moral judgements that are more distinct, qualified and yet certain. Moral ideals, principles and rules grow out of experience and reflection as do intellectual truths.

In addition the 'fixing' of content, as Grote calls the process of moral speculation, is not purely individual but is rather social. Because we think in a shared language, because we experience and reason and argue together in a common discourse, the ideals, principles and rules we come to are also joint, shared or general products. Just as truth is truth for a social group, so is right a shared product of a community of individuals. Grote denies that a solitary individual could create a notion of truth and by analogy a notion of right, for the human 'thinks socially, and cannot think otherwise' (1876, 61-62). Conversation and arguments about the truth or rightness of propositions are valid tests of truth and right. Conversational coherence and consensus are more appropriate criteria than appeals to correspondence with external facts or practical consequences in the first instance.

The moral scale like the scale of sensation and knowledge rises from mere sensation to abstract judgements. This can be represented diagramatically.




Fig. 2. The Moral Scale of Sensation and Knowledge

(3) Moral phenomenalists such as the utilitarians treat as facts and reality, only sensations at the bottom end of the scale. Such moral phenomena are feelings of pleasure and pain, sympathy or disgust, guilt or honour. Intuitionists concentrate on moral ideals as the ultimate facts, the axioms of morality, with little or no reference to the lower facts and to the sociologically observable facts of social agreement, moral conventions, public opinion and established relationships and institutions. As with the arguments over mediacy and immediacy, knowledge of acquaintance and description Grote denies that we can have sensations without moral implications and moral ideals without any grounding or echo in our feelings and in social reality. Our feelings usually indicate what is genuinely right or wrong; and what is right or wrong will have its effect on giving us pleasure or pain in everyday life. One doesn't determine the other, they are aspects of one another.

The illustration given by Grote refers in fact to the two axioms of Aretaics and Eudaemonics referred to earlier. In everyday life humans experience sensations of pleasure and pain. By themselves

their immediate experiences are of no moral significance but once subjected to reflective judgement in social discourse, a number of possible moral principles may emerge, to be argued over and fixed for a society. The eudaemonic ideal that we ought not to suffer pain and ought to experience pleasure is an ideal fixed after reflective judgement on our immediate experiences. The ideal is a reasoned extrapolation from personal experience, observation of others, discussion and examination of historical and social phenomena.

But from the same immediate experiences, active creative and social beings may equally well conclude that pain 'is what should not be inflicted on others'. This is the aretaic first principle which arises from a different thinking process but based the same immediate sensations and experiences. These principles may be seen as complementary or, if in conflict, they must be treated as competitors for our rational allegiance. Later we shall see that Grote analyzes both duty and justice in the above fashion showing how the ideals emerge from low level feelings and sensations, higher level social relations, behaviour and practices, and general social rules, as well as by appealing to the higher facts above to which all the lower elements relate (ibid Ch 10).

Moral feelings,imperatives, ideals, rules and prescriptive principles are as natural to us as ordinary sensations and knowledge according to Grote. The tendency of humans to make ethical judgements and form ideals is as native to human beings as the tendency to pursue knowledge and truths about what is in the world. In addition the ideals are as real, if not more real than the sensations from which they are elaborated (1876, 59-60). The idea that ideals belong to mind and sensations to the body, one to the subjective and the other to the objective, Grote rejects emphatically.

> 'The moral ideals, as formed or grasped by the mind, are not less real, or more subjective, than the bare sensations of pain or of pleasure' (1876, 59).

Nor are these ideals or imaginations 'delusive' or 'dreams' as positivists liked to insist. Rather they are refined intellectual judgements of a kind similar to scientific statements of truth, and as we shall see later, they also reflect and indicate at the same time the higher facts, the universal moral order of which as yet we have only glimpses, hopes and beliefs.

The issue now is the status of these higher beliefs in the higher facts. All science and all positivism is grounded on one fundamental belief, unprovable in principle, but without which science would be logically incoherent and practically impossible. This is the belief

> 'in the universe: it is the belief that there is something to be known, which must accompany, more or less, every act of knowledge, or else I do not see how we could *try* to know anything ...' (1876, 64).

Later the fundamental postulate is described as

> 'The belief that law and order, as opposed to chaos and randomness, must apply not only to the particulars of things, as we see it does, but to the entire of being, in which case it becomes meaning and reason, as distinguished from insignificance and purposelessness, - this belief seems to me to play the same part in the fragmentary and incohesive mass of circumstance and occasion for action, which we call *life* or the moral universe, as it does in the intellectual universe' (1876, 373).

Without this belief Grote rightly sees that we could not speak of truth, we could not say we knew or even try to know anything. Without the supposition that truth was possible there would, he asserts, be no impulse to knowledge at all

> 'no notion of there being a truth of things, attainable (apparently) and worth attaining' (1876, 64).

Truth is the key intellectual and scientific ideal, it is the goal and the criteria of most academic disciplines. Truth standards are the pegs upon which intellectual and scientific standards are hung, and without them they could not proceed. As Roger Trigg states,

even upholders of the relativity theory of truth have to hold onto and believe in the absolute non relative truth status of their own major premise (Trigg 1973). As Grote puts it

> 'If the notion that there is such a thing as truth is a delusion, it is a delusion to which one of the most important parts of our nature owes its importance' (1876, 64).

Grote concludes that, if we take away this belief then 'knowledge would disappear', an exercise attempted later by Nietzche, Deluze, Derrida, Foucault and other contemporary thinkers (Megill 1985).

This Kantian and Oakeshottian line of reasoning, which explores the postulates of a practice or discourse which is already in existence, is brief but persuasive and provides a foundation stone for the next element in the argument. (4) For just as scientific and intellectual knowledge cannot proceed without some assumptions about the universe and the possibility of truth, so moral life, language and practice is premised upon the beliefs that there are moral standards to live by. Without the confidence that moral statements have an objective point of reference, that they indicate correct lines of conduct, that some actions are indeed better than others, the practices of moral argument and life would be ludicrous and impossible. Truth and right are the postulates of intellectual and moral practice respectively, as are beliefs in a physical and moral order in the world.

(4) We can now draw out the analogy of moral with intellectual knowledge, and within that the essential analogy of right and truth. The argument, at this stage, is left general, to be elaborated under the section on Right in the next chapter. Belief in objective right is as fundamental to the practice and theory of morality as belief in objective truth is to the practice and theory of science. The moral ideals, with right at their head, are analogous to the scientific ideals of truth, certainty, testability etc. But truth, Grote argues,

has been viewed from two different perspectives and indeed by analogy so has the morally right. From the phenomenalist side truth has been defined as 'seeing things as they are' while from the rationalist side it has been viewed as 'rightness of thought, thinking as we should about what we think of ...' (1876, 60). The analogous moral equivalents are of right as 'right thinking' about what is, and the right as 'thinking rightly', the former being 'objectivist' and the latter 'subjectivist' in character.

The adherents of moral objectivism are not utilitarians to Grote but the ancient idealists like Plato, and religious thinkers who consider moral thought to be a reflection or mirror of an independent moral reality. The equivalents of the epistemological subjectivists and rationalists are the 'Intellectual Moralists' who Grote correctly sees as equating the morally right with the clear thinking of the thinkers (1876, 65-66). The key sub ideal and tests of the objectivists both for truth and right he argues is 'that which is practicable'. The key ideals and test for the moral subjectivists and rationalists, for both truth and right, is that which is the consensus, the 'generally accepted'. In fact both are useful tests, criteria and indicators of truth and right, but not guarantees.(5)

Grote wished to transcend this false dichotomy on truth and on right by imposing his idealist epistemology, his eclectic theory of human nature, his theory of want and his unique ontology of man and the universe. His aim is clear when he states,

> 'Not to dwell too long on this, which, as it is to me a matter of prime importance, will at various times present itself, the ideal of truth appears to us, as I have said, in a double form: as thinking rightly or as we should: and as seeing things as they are. And one part of our belief in truth consists in this, in the belief that these two aspects of the ideal represent one thing: though most philosophers have looked chiefly at the one or the other of them' (1876, 64 65).

The idealist synthesis is accompanied by an eclectical bringing

together of the various ideals, the primary ideals of happiness, the good and the right, and the secondary ideals of the useful, the natural, the worthy, the just and the obligatory, into a harmonious whole, explained in the next chapter. But we might end this section with a major point. Grote sees correctly that moral objectivists like Plato usually stress the good as the ultimate ideal, while the intuitionists stress the right. Grote suggests that these moral ideals reflect the intellectual ideals of 'right thinking' and 'thinking rightly' respectively, though he has called them two aspects or ideals of the right previously. However his point is to stress that of the moral and intellectual ideals generally,

> 'The relation however is more and closer than that of analogy: the moral ideal in each case is the higher, and, more or less includes the intellectual' (1876, 65).

The arguments that are produced are that rightness is more 'genuine' for

> 'In the doing as we should, or living as we should, thinking as we should comes in, of course, as a part'.

Similarly as the moral ideal suggests the intellectual ideal so the intellectual suggests the moral,

> 'the rightness which governs action is an extension or wider application of the truth which governs thought' (1876, 65-66).

For once at least Grote is very close to the rationalist tradition so long ensconsed in Cambridge and espoused by Cudworth, Clarke, Balguy and later William Whewell. The apparent similarity of conclusion however masks the massive differences in argument witnessed above, and the elaboration that follows.

We conclude this section with a diagrammatic representation of this last argument, with a point about Grote's intention in producing this analogy.

Moral Ideal	The Right	The Good
Truth Ideal	Thinking Rightly (Cogitandum)	Right Thinking (Real Being)
Epistemological Base	Rationalism and Intuitionism (Cudworth)	Phenomenolism and Platonic Idealism (Plato)

Fig.3 The Analogy of Intellectual and Moral Ideals.

What were Grote's intentions and aims in producing this complicated analogy? The simple answer is that the analogy allowed him to accept, as in all analogies, that the two parties to the argument, in this case empirical statements and value judgements, are different in some crucial ways, while still insisting on some other similarities in form and development at least. Grote did not wish to go as far as Descartes, Clarke, Cudworth and later intuitionists to insist on the same status for the methods and findings (axioms) of mathematics, geometry, science, logic and moral philosophy. Yet he did not wish to deny the possibility of moral knowledge, and the value of moral argument as urged by Mansel on the one side and positivists on the other. Nor did Grote wish to rest his case on common sense, upon one blindingly obvious intuition as did the utilitarians, or upon a number of self evident beliefs as did several other intuitionists including William Whewell. The Analogy gave Grote the best available compromise, that linked together the truths of as many positions as were popular while maintaining a coherent philosophical position between his epistemology and his moral theory. But while simple in imagery the analogy is complicated and confusing in execution and application and attracted few imitations later.

X

Moral Facts and Moral Ontology

The transition to Grote's moral ontology appears in Chapter XV but is hinted at through the earlier portions of the *Treatise* and earlier in this chapter. Building upon his theory of the growth of knowledge from immediacy to certainty via reflection; his theory of the imagination which allows the mind to sift out the true and the right from a morass of possible delusions, dreams and errors; and building on the analogy of intellectual and moral ideals which insists that the ultimate ideals of truth and right are both necessary to intellectual and moral thought, we are brought to the realm of Grote's 'higher facts' (or his 'higher beliefs') and the relationshp between them and the lower facts and beliefs. (See also Grote 1865, 226-241; 1900, 317-321).

In ethical, political and practical discourse and life, we posit and at the same time search for, the higher facts that will make our thought and life coherent and complete. When we act we presume that something will be brought into existence that is not yet, we posit an ideal, a fact. When we reason morally and politically we consider the right, good, just, and fair that we need to complete our thought and life. When we make assertions of rightness and wrongness, justice and injustice, we are positing as facts that which is in fact only a tentative moral claim, which we feel reflects reality, a higher fact. The moral and political ideals are our conceptions of, our claims to knowledge of these higher facts or beliefs, which are presumed in any claim that something 'ought to be' or is 'right'. The idea that truth has no reference to any higher facts but is merely subjective Grote calls 'relativism',and it is rejected firmly.

The analogous idea to relativism in ethics is the claim by Mansel and others, later the functionalists and the prescriptivists, that the use and meaning of ethical concepts is merely to prescribe and regulate conduct, not to advocate 'right' or the 'ought to be', as facts or truths. Grote calls this view 'regulativism' (Grote 1900, 315-324)

'Regulativism is, if I may so say, belief in the supposition of a right and good, *without* belief in any fact corresponding to this supposition' (Grote 1900, 315).

Both relativism and regulativism accept that there is a

> 'right way of thinking on our part, to which there is nothing in *fact* to correspond: when we look at thought from the two sides, of the object and the subject, of reality and truth, the lines of view miss meeting: as in a tunnel begun from the opposite ends and badly engineered all comes to perplexity and mystification. The error seems to me to consist in the supposition, that rightness of thought can be anything other than conformity of thought to fact, or, taking the other course, that *fact* can mean anything else than what right thought suggests to us' (ibid 316).

Pure moral positivism likewise considers our ideals to be regulative and without any higher objective or factual reference, but posits some reference to the lower facts, to experience, usually sensory experience as regulated and controlled by teaching and habit or by some middle level 'facts of history' (1876, 83; 1900, 318). That such positivism is intellectually and practically incoherent has already been argued above. All moral thought and all moral action does necessarily posit ideals, it presumes a conflict between what 'has been' 'is' and what 'will be', and between them and what 'ought to be'. The ought to be governs our moral thought and practice as much as what has been and is. Our conceptions of what 'ought to be', our ideals, are not determined by what 'is' and 'ought to be', but rather are the product of free reflection upon and choice from alternatives arrived at by reflections upon both what is and what our imagination tells us could or ought to be. Our ideals are attempts to frame and grasp a moral reality that is in principle knowable but

rarely known coherently or completely, but a reality we do and must posit if our moral statements and actions are to have any real meaning and value.

As elsewhere in his theory where we find lower sensations indicating things, and where lower wants identify wanted things that would satisfy them, so in moral and political life such lower facts of experience, (such as the presence of a desire for something, that it gives happiness, that my conscience troubles me, or that others show approbation or disapprobation towards my choices or acts), indicate a set of higher facts. The moral ideals are our partial formulations of those facts. In addition the higher facts give the 'reasons' why we experience what we do, they are the reasons why we wish as we do, feel the happiness we do after a moral action, why we feel unsettled doing something against our better judgement. The feelings reflect the facts that the action or choice was wrong or right in so far as we can speak of knowing absolutely anything from an idealist standpoint (ibid 321-4). We feel hunger usually when the body is inadequately nourished, similarly we feel unhappy or troubled when our choices, actions or life are morally incoherent.

A scale of moral facts can be produced and in fact can be appended to the scales of sensations and knowledge given in Fig. 2 above. The scale is his scheme or methodology for the study of the social world, for we can work up and down the scale to examine and explain social reality. At the bottom are our sensations and our wants, the lower facts studied by physiologists and psychologists. As we rise up the scale we come to the social and historical facts beloved of historians, anthropologists, sociologists and other social scientists. These include such facts as social structures and relationships, social roles and the duties attached to them (eg. parental obligation within the institution of the family). Above these

are the relatively unreflected upon social norms governing these facts, (e.g. social customs such as bringing flowers and courting; conventions such as marriage ceremonies). Higher up the scale appear practical formulations of these rules, norms and conventions, legal, political, and religious.

Higher still up the scale are the ideals contained in moral, religious, political and economic principles, such as the moral principle of utilitarianism, the religious doctrine of benevolence, the political principle of equity or the economic principle of fair exchange. These ideals are the rationale of the laws and customs, the principles that explain why they exist and are both right and necessary. These are studied by philosophers. Above these finally are the higher facts (or beliefs as Grote sometimes calls them). They are ontologically superior, they are the 'reason for being' of all that is below them. Each rising level in the scale encapsulated, explains and gives meaning to the levels below. These levels can for convenience be divided into three, the lower facts, the ideals (or faciendum) in the middle, and the higher facts (1876, 378).

The ideals are the highest level in the hierarchy readily available for discussion in everyday language, readily applicable to moral or political practice. The higher facts, just like 'being' as a whole or 'the absolute' can only be grasped or glimpsed through some other media or via another sort of discourse. So the higher facts can be known via moral philosophy, ontology or religion (1876, 374-375; 1900, 319-321). Again the higher facts can be glimpsed via metaphor, analogy or in the activity of imaginative language, that is in poetry (Grote 1876, 360-380). At these higher levels progress is possible only with

> 'greater clearness of view, firmer hold in the mind of the principles it deals with, and happier expression of them' (1876, 51).

What is crucial is that the facts at all levels can be known. Grote argues powerfully for the value of and possibility of knowledge of the lower facts, advocating the use of empirical and psychological as well as inductive, historical and comparative methods. But he also argues for the possibility of knowledge of the ideals and the higher facts. Arguments about unknowable absolutes in morality are as illogical as the unknowable things in themselves (ibid 380-387).

The question is not only how the facts can be known at each level, but how they relate to one another. Both are tackled in chapter fifteen of the *Treatise*, but we need now to concentrate on the second issue, as the first has already received considerable attention.

> 'The formation then of moral ideals, is the putting together observed lower fact with supposed higher fact in some kind of way' (1876, 365).

The easiest approach is to study one ideal, that of duty, and show how appeals to low and higher fact can provide knowledge helpful to the making of moral decisions. Detail will be left until a later chapter but an outline will serve the purpose.

As an ideal, duty means to be bound or tied to do something for some person or body. The imperativeness of duty derives from the higher fact of right, duty being a sub-ideal of 'that which we should do' or right as a whole. The ideal of duty reflects the fact that there are some things that are absolutely right, that there are some things we must do, that are unconditionally imperative (1878, 365).Grote considers the idea of something absolutely right to be as fundamental, and as implicit in moral life as the notion of a universal order in nature and of absolute truths is to a scientist. Right, Duty, Truth and Order are postulates of our thought and

existence, not inventions or accidents (1876, 373).

Like the assumed order of nature, right and duty cannot be empirically proved to exist, they are merely preconditions of thought and postulates of action, 'beliefs' without which no intelligent life could continue. Duty is however more easily observable and more easily delineated as it is more specific. Right is general and duty is specific; Right is a general imperative, duty is something one owes to specific others. Duty can be formulated into one or more ideals, rules and principles (1876, 337). Below this duty is often embodied in moral law, or more concretely in positive law e.g.law of contract (1870, 147, 152-153, 1876, 85-102). Below the actual moral and legal law lies informed norms and conventions, roles and offices. These social facts, a list of our offices, are really a table of our duties (1870, 146; 1876 364). Yet even these lists of duties tied to offices and roles only codify the lower facts, our actual social relationships. Our duties are codifications of what is implicit in our actual social relationships (1870, 145; 1876, 97-98, 219-221,364).

Under these are the lower moral facts, our feelings of moral disgust or of a troubled conscience; our sensations of happiness, pleasure and pain, that may come through suffering moral condemnation. Just above them are their social manifestations of feeling in patriotism, social condemnation and other forms of social consensus. With duty, this amounts to personal pain following, say, the non fulfillment of duty and the social discomfort of our relatives, friends and neighbours at our failing to do our duty (1870, 97). As Grote puts it,

> 'the feeling of obligation, like the feelings which make us aware of the external world, is a feeling which we understand as representing facts independent of us. (But) It is not the feeling which binds or obliges us, but it is the state of facts

> of which we are thus made aware through the feeling' (1870, 144-145).

These 'moral feelings' are in fact 'quasi-sensations of the absent', in this case the as yet unfulfilled duty needed to make our reality coherent.

Now want, we have seen, is the ontological base fact that indicates the highest ontological reality. Underpinning all of the lower facts is want itself, ennui, dissatisfaction with the world. This existential fact, as against an epistemological or psychological fact, is the most basic - it originates the psychological and ultimately indicates that which could satisfy want as a whole. The ultimate higher fact, that which can alone satisfy want and make coherent our moral world, is the Good and its sisters, Right and Happiness (1876, 22-25, 26-33, 301). Other intellectual higher facts were found in the introduction to the *Exploratio*. The intellectual higher facts, the postulates of all thought and action, that must be taken as given are the orderliness of the universe, its existence, and human freedom, choice and liberty (1865, xvxxuii).

If the higher facts are these ontological postulates, the ideals are, as Krohn puts it, 'the shadows of a realm of truth which we wish to draw down to us' (Krohn 1877, 151). The higher facts and ideals are known ontologically, usually by being absent yet longed for. This experience produces reflection on that which we feel is absent in being, that which we feel ought to be in existence. We posit the ought to be, we imagine it, we toy with it in the imagination, in utopias, dreams and visions. We apply reason and practical judgement to these speculations and distil more concrete judgements about the ideals and reality. In the process we 'fix' our ideals. But this fixing arises initially from the incompleteness of our experience of being, from the experience of absence,

> 'our active nature is turned towards the non-existent, to bring it (if we may say *it*, that is, *something*) into existence; and these ideals are, as it were, the shadows of various existences in the non-existent' (1876, 46).

As we gradually fix our ideals through experience, education, thought and argument, we approximate to the higher facts and indeed to the absolute. Moral philosophy deals with 'that which is not' as well as 'that which is', it deals with the higher facts as well as the lower facts, with imagination and its products as well as sensations and their objects. Moral ideals are 'eminently practical' in that they direct actual conduct, but moral philosophy must seek to make sure that the guidance given is 'fruitful' and 'self-consistent' (Grote 1876, 49-51).

Various historical variants of moral idealism, from Plato, Stoicism and Christianity to Rousseau are analyzed by Grote. Contemporary anthropologists and historians, who conceive the progress of civilization to be the result of moral elevation and the growth of knowledge, are discussed. Both groups are conceived as moral explorers, groping for the 'higher facts', the 'absolute' in an age of scepticism and radical positivism (1876, 367-369). Grote tries at one stage to chart the various states of the imaginative mind in its climb to the absolute, starting from dreams, then imagining, going through the discovery of compelling ideas or 'beliefs', through 'inward sight' or intuitions, to moral 'knowledge' which 'is all expressible in propositions" (1876, 360, 368-372). However the categories and their relation are not clearly worked out in detail.

We now come to the central point of this analysis. Grote's moral idealism involves a kind of 'moral objectivism'. Mackie means by that term a moral theory which asserts that our everyday common sense presumption that prescriptive moral statements refer to moral truths which 'are a very central structural element in the fabric of the

world' and not a simple matter of subjective preferece (Mackie 1977, 23). Like Plato, Aristotle, Clarke, the Cambridge Platonists and Kant, John Grote believed there to be a moral order appropriate to the human world. This order, he supposed, was 'a good and complete whole' (Grote 1870, 349). The content of this objective moral order he felt to be as yet unknown but not in principle unknowable. Of 'right' and the 'good',

> 'we cannot hope to know either of the two things more than, most vaguely and generally ...'(1876, xii).

But we have the evidence of our feelings of being, our wants, our desires, our conventional wisdom ; our refined and rationalized principles and rules of conduct and the guesses and insight of the few great philosophers of the past and present. Along with our philosophical imagination and the eclectic practice of collecting truths from the great philosophers, these other sources of insight provide us with the grounds for gaining true moral knowledge.

For his part Grote offered two contributions to moral philosophy, the scale of moral knowledge and a scheme for the moral ideals, that we shall examine in the next chapter. The belief in an objective moral order Grote knew to be ultimately unprovable, but he felt it was presumed in everyday moral, political, legal and religious language and conduct. It was a foundational 'belief', but supported by a method used by Kant and Raymond Plant which Albert Weale is later to call 'reflexive theory'. This

> 'requires the user of a particular intellectual technique or mode of discourse to think through the preconditions of his or her being able to use that technique or speak that way' (Weale 1983, 18).

Grote's claim for moral objectivity is premised on the belief that ordinary users of moral discourse assume an objective point of reference for their judgement. The claim that stealing is wrong is meant to be taken as an objective judgement. In his argument our minds proceed morally as they do intellectually to set before

themselves ideal standards. These ideals are indispensable guides, as well as fundamental pressuppositions of thought and action (1876, 508-519). Faith in them, and of our potential for knowledge of them is an intuitive or natural faith which we need to have to act rationally. It is the concern of the final chapter of the *Treatise*.

> 'What we want, in order to be able to act morally in a manner analogous to that in which we act physically, or to put forth our nature in the most important choices and determinations with the same energy with which we constantly put it forth in the less important; and what, in fact, we instinctively and intuitively *have*, or really could not live - is a faith in the goodness and orderliness of the *moral* world; of there being, if we so choose to express it, moral as well as physical laws,...' (1876, 517).

Grote then shared with the phenomenalists a common sense belief in an external world, he differed however in his account of its ontological status and how it was known. Grote did not want to leave the belief in the hands of empiricists because they did not know how it could be cared for, locking it away behind the barrier of our senses as they did. Idealism allowed Grote to transcend the barrier of the senses and to allow active mind and the imagination to construct a meaningful physical and moral universe. This construction was both a creation and also a recognition of the mind or order in the objective universe. The creative mind of man meets the created mind embodied in the physical and moral universe. We might remind ourselves of the essential argument of Grote's *Exploratio* of 1863

> 'knowledge from the philosophical point of view is a communication of mind with mind through an embodiment or result of the one, analyzed and traced back out of embodiment or result into thought again, by the other ... The process of knowledge again, logically viewed, is a continued (logical) creation of an ordered universe out of what, but for knowledge, has no properties and cannot have anything thought or said about it: but this creation is always felt or understood by us as a creation, but as a recognition: ... The great problem of the higher philosophy as distinguished from simple epistemology or philosophy of knowledge, is to examine the validity of this feeling, understanding, thought, that we do not, in knowing or perceiving, make things, but find them out' (1865, 57-58).

Grote in the *Treatise* is doing his best to solve this conundrum, to explain the ontological base of all knowledge and all action, which he had said in the introduction to the *Exploratio* grew out of a comparison of phenomenalism and philosophy (1865, 3). Knowledge of real being, the higher existence, or of the higher facts, is possible through the normal knowing process without need for revelation or untutored intuition. Knowledge and truth are conditional by coherence and,

> 'we have amount of knowledge according to the amount of completeness of our view ; mistake, of which I hope soon to speak, is want of knowledge ...' (1900, 177).

Both Mill and Hamilton, like Mansel and Kant, had placed reality behind the veil, they had created

> 'the wretched ghost of this higher philosophy which is furnished by the realising our logical notions' (1865, 289).

Grote aims to relieve us from this logical muddle and to provide us with a new confidence along the way. In one long passage he concisely expresses his position on the knowability of the higher facts, the absolute, which will sum up the final section of this chapter.

> 'Using the word imagination for all these latter states, we may have the following views about the facts imagined: that they indicate a reality, but that this reality is either unseizable, or is very limited, or has mingled with it an element of deceptiveness and misleadingness. And of this higher fact in relation to the lower fact we may have the following views; that it is less true to us than knowledge of experience; that it is more true to us; that it is equally and similarly true to us; that is equally and similarly untrue. Of the three views in the former paragraph I consider the correct one to be a mixture of the first and the second: of the four views in the latter paragraph, a mixture (if we can suppose such a mixture) of the second and third' (1876, 379-380).