Community Participation
in South Korean Heritage-led Regeneration

Byung Choon Hwang

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape,
Newcastle University
United Kingdom
February 2024

Abstract

Community Participation in South Korean Heritage-led Regeneration

This research addresses the conflicts around the implementation of community participation in heritage-led regeneration in South Korea by: 1) examining the evolution of the heritage concept from the Japanese colonial period to the present; 2) mapping out the development of a heritage-led regeneration plan with community participation for four key cities designated as 'Ancient Cities'; 3) a focus on the local specificities and challenges to the implementation of heritage-led regeneration and community participation in Gongju, one of the four Ancient Cities. As such, the thesis provides a unique and novel insight into and an overview of the evolution of the heritage concept in South Korea, followed by a focus on more recent policy development towards heritage-led regeneration and community participation, and in particular how such processes are shaped by conflict between state power and local community needs.

Although political democracy and systems of local autonomy have been established in South Korea since the 1990s, heritage policy has not been democratised in the same way. Heritage policy, as developed by the state in an authoritarian political environment, was instead maintained and extended. By researching community responses to this process, the thesis highlights that power imbalance is a critical point of debate, revealing a gap in perspectives on community engagement between policy planners and local communities. South Korean policymakers have argued that a heritage-led regeneration strategy supports regional development while effectively preserving heritage. Whilst introducing community engagement may have been considered ancillary to achieving these policy goals, local communities have successfully used it to demand significant changes to policy and power structures. The study shows that local communities have struggled for rights and power within authoritarian heritage policy and local power structures, and argues that community participation should be viewed not as a policy tool but as a change process.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the individuals who have provided support and assistance throughout the completion of this thesis. Their support and assistance have been invaluable throughout my research journey.

First and foremost, I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to my supervisors, Professor John Pendlebury and Dr Loes Veldpaus. Without their dedication from the beginning of the research to the present, this thesis would never have been completed. Thanks to their insightful guidance and invaluable advice, I was able to continue my research despite my lack of ability. They have also encouraged me, particularly during the difficult times brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. I express my sincere respect to both of them, academically and personally.

I also thank everyone who participated in this study. This thesis is nothing more than a work observing the results of their passion and gathering their languages. I cannot name them individually, but I thank each of them from the bottom of my heart.

I extend my thanks to Dr Seong-Nam Park. He was the biggest motivator in my decision to research at Newcastle University, and he provided me with great financial and mental support throughout the research process. I will always cherish his warm heart.

Lastly, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my family. Without my wife's devotion, this thesis would have been an impossible challenge. This thesis is completed with her unwavering support. I express my sincere love and gratitude to her. Moreover, I thank my parents. Everything I have achieved is because of their dedication. I am also grateful to my parents-in-law. Their support and love gave my family the strength to live in the UK. Furthermore, I want to express my love for my two sons, Jinyu and Jinho, whose presence brings immeasurable joy to my life.

Table of contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Abbreviations used in this thesis

Abbreviation	Full name
AHD*	Authorised Heritage Discourse
ACPPP*	Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion Project
CBA	Council for British Archaeology
CDC*	Central Deliberative Committee (ACPPP)
CHA	The Cultural Heritage Administration
CPS	Common Preservation Society
EIRFP	Eastern India Rainfed Farming Project
HCEPA*	Historical and Cultural Environment Preservation Area
HUL	Historic Urban Landscape
ICDP	Integrated Conservation and Development Projects
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KRIHS*	Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
MOU	Memorandum Of Understanding
PPD*	Preservation and Promotion District
RDC*	Regional Deliberative Committee (ACPPP)
SAPAC*	Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities
SAPPAC*	Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities
SAPSUR	Special Act on Promotion of and Support for Urban Regeneration
SPAB	Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings
SPD*	Special Preservation District
UNESCO*	The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organization

* Frequently used

Glossary

This thesis contains several terms that readers may not be familiar with. The terms below are explained as follows:

Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD)

The idea of Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD) was introduced by Laurajane Smith in 2006. Smith (2006, p.13) argues that "there is no such thing as heritage; but rather a discursive construction of it that does cultural and political" practice. She called a professional discourse "that privileges expert values and knowledge about the past, and its material manifestations, and dominates and regulates professional heritage practices" Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD). AHD is a term critically defining traditional heritage practices and is often used in heritage studies to advocate an inclusive and participatory approach to heritage.

Ancient City Districts

Ancient City Districts are designated by the SAPPAC. The ACPPPs are implemented in these districts. There are two kinds of districts: SPDs and PPDs. An SPD is defined as "a core area for the preservation of the historical and cultural environments" in the SAPPAC. On the other hand, a PPD is defined as "an area where an additional survey is necessary to preserve the original form of an ancient city or an area where the preservation and promotion of the historical and cultural environments of an ancient city is necessary" in the SAPPAC. Practically, SPDs are areas including designated heritage that is strongly preserved by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. PPDs are areas adjoining SPDs, such as a buffer zone.

Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion Project (ACPPP)

The ACPPP is a project implemented to preserve and promote the historical and cultural environment of Ancient Cities in accordance with the master plan to preserve and promote ancient cities. The ACPPP can be seen as a kind of heritage-led regeneration. The ACPPP plans are not for specific assets but for Ancient City Districts, so they also include aspects of urban management.

Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA)

An external agency of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism established to manage affairs such as management, protection, designation and restoration of cultural heritage.

Cultural Heritage Committee

The Cultural Heritage Committee is a non-governmental organisation established to investigate and deliberate matters concerning preserving, managing and utilising cultural heritages. It determines practically the designation and cancellation of state-designated heritages, approves the plans related to state-designated heritages, and deliberates activities that may impact changes and use of state-designated heritages and assets in HCEPAs.

Gongju people and strangers

The terms "Gongju people" and "strangers", mentioned in Chapter 6 of this thesis, are used by the Gongju community to distinguish residents. They call people born and bred in Gongju "Gongju people" (공주사람) and new residents "strangers" (외부인). The term "strangers" includes visitors. People born and bred in Gongju also call new residents who use the urban space of Gongju for the ACPPP or personal gain "strangers".

Heritage-led regeneration

Heritage-led regeneration is a constructive method to bring about conservation. It encourages the economic and social roles of conservation. Heritage-led regeneration can be seen as an urban regeneration policy that addresses the extrinsic heritage value beyond the physical protection of heritage.

Historical and Cultural Environment Preservation Area (HCEPA)

In the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, the "historic and cultural environment" means the natural landscape or any place of outstanding historic and cultural value near cultural heritage that must be protected with the relevant cultural heritage. The Historical and Cultural Environment Preservation Areas (HCEPAs) are the designated areas under the control of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. The CHA supervises them practically as a part of the historic and cultural environments through the Cultural Heritage Committee's deliberation.

SAPAC and SAPPAC

The SAPPAC (Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities 2011) is an amendment to the SAPAC (Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities 2004). The SAPAC aimed to preserve the four historic cities (Gyeongju, Gongju, Buyeo and Iksan) through an integrated plan. However, this did not work due to opposition from local communities because it did not include the rights and support of residents, which was the original purpose of the law. As the SAPPAC included heritage-led regeneration schemes, Ancient City Districts could be designated, and ACPPPs could be implemented in practice.

Chapter 1. Introduction

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Background of research

This study focuses on community participation in the heritage-led regeneration processes in South Korea[1]. It originates in the researcher's experience in a unique policy process. I participated in the Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion Project (ACPPP) planning and policymaking process as a researcher at the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) between 2009 and 2017. "Preservation and Promotion" here means heritage-led regeneration. The ACPPP was a noteworthy policy due to the involvement of local communities in national heritage policy. In the early 2010s, the ACPPP was implemented as a national policy in four historic cities in South Korea. It was in 2004 that the Special Act on Preservation of Ancient Cities (SAPAC), the legal basis of the ACPPP, was enacted.

The ACPPP is South Korea's first national urban regeneration policy. Urban regeneration (as a general or comprehensive term), as a national policy, was implemented in 2014 after the Special Act on Promotion of and Support for Urban Regeneration (SAPSUR) was enacted in 2013. Why was regeneration policy first discussed in the field of heritage in South Korea? Based on the researcher's experience, this study began with the assumption that local communities greatly influenced heritage-led regeneration policies in South Korea.

The Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA) explains the introduction of the ACPPP as a means of establishing historical identity, improving the residential environment, and creating a unique historical landscape (CHA, 2012, pp.3–8). The CHA anticipated that the ACPPP would achieve two objectives: first, to develop a heritage policy that extends beyond the protection of individual heritage sites to include the preservation of more comprehensive historic environments, and second, to reduce conflicts with local communities (CHA, 2012, p.178).

---

[1] In this study, the terms "Korea" and "South Korea" are both used. The reason is to prevent reader confusion. In the thesis, "South Korea" refers to the Republic of Korea after its independence in 1945, and "Korea" refers to before that. Also, when referring to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the term "North Korea" is used. However, in South Korea, the term "South Korea" is not officially used because the terms South Korea or North Korea do not exist in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Therefore, the official names of institutions and organisations include "Korea", and even when the term "Korea" is used as an exception, it does not mean "North Korea".

When I was working at KRIHS, the challenging issues in both my work and heritage policy were often related to local communities. South Korea's heritage policy has imposed public regulations and obligations regardless of ownership (Jeon In-Seok & Park Seok-Hee, 2022, p.86). The SAPAC implied broader additional regulation in the early years, before the 2010s. Therefore, the SAPAC and the preservation planning faced a significant challenge due to the intense resistance of local communities in the early stage. The ACPPP was established during the revision process of the SAPAC into the 2011 Special Act on Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities (SAPPAC).

Due to the resistance of the local community and changes in the policy environment, the CHA urged the KRIHS to devise ways to involve the local community in the project. Thus, at KRIHS, I had the opportunity to engage with various stakeholders who emphasised the significance of community engagement in heritage policy. Based on that experience, the study explores local communities in the process of designing and implementing heritage-led regeneration in South Korea.

1.2. Knowledge gap

Many studies refer to heritage-led regeneration as a global trend (see De Cesari & Dimova, 2019; Dogruyol, Aziz & Arayici, 2018; Fouseki & Nicolau, 2018; Pendlebury, 2002). Moreover, conservation and regeneration tend to be represented as largely complementary processes, although areas of conflict exist (Pendlebury, 2002, p.145). A similar trend exists in South Korea as well. In the 2010s, heritage-led regeneration became one of the popular agendas in the heritage discipline in South Korea (see Kang Ho-Won, Hong Kyu-Seon & Yi Sung-Jea, 2016; Park Cheol-Hee, 2013; Shim Seung-Koo, 2012).

Nevertheless, South Korea's heritage or planning discipline lacks diverse and in-depth studies on community participation (Ryu Young-Ah & Chae Kyung-Jin, 2017, p.17). Most of the studies on the ACPPP in South Korea are concerned with the preservation and utilisation of heritage (Lee Su-Jeong, 2019; Moon I-Hwa, 2015; Kang Tae-Ho, 2010; Choi Wan-Kyu, 2013), laws (Namgung Seung-Tae, 2000; Jeong Jong-Seop, 2003; Oh Chang-Seop, 2001), projects and policy (Lee Soon-Ja, 2021; Shim Kyeong-Mi, 2021; Ohn Hyung-Keun, 2020; Chae Mi-ok, 2010), and urban landscape and design (Lee Kyung-Ah, 2018; Yang Wol-Soo, 2013).

There are also several studies on conflicts between the government and local communities in heritage preservation policies in South Korea beyond the ACPPP (see Lee Woo-Hyung, Jung Jae-Hee & Jung Jae-Woong, 2014; Ryu Young-Ah & Chae Kyung-Jin, 2017). However, they discuss funding for compensation according to regulations and point out legal flaws rather than study local communities and their participation.

My experience at KRIHS made me realise that the massive funding cannot resolve the conflicts and that a deeper understanding of community participation is needed. The study describes the narratives revealed in the process, shifting the gaze from South Korean heritage, heritage policy and heritage-led regeneration to community participation.

1.3. Research aim and questions

This study aims to look at how and why community participation occurred even before the heritage-led regeneration policy was planned and explores the nature of community participation. It explores the local community where the values of modern society, such as democracy and pluralism, confront the heritage idea, highlighting the universal value and common responsibility of protection. Rather than examining local communities' particular roles or activities, the study focuses on the power structure struggle and the desire to change governance that participation implies, exploring the internal and external conflicts communities face. "No town or city is immune from either the external forces that dictate the need to adapt or the internal pressures that are present within urban areas and which can precipitate growth or decline" (Roberts, 2016, p.9). The study examines the conflicting concepts, changing relationships, opportunities and challenges in heritage-led regeneration, focusing on local communities.

In order to understand the complex interactions of institutions and stakeholders involved in the implementation of heritage-led regeneration policy, the study closely explores the process of forming the heritage concept, the evolution of heritage policies, and the involvement of local communities. By providing a detailed examination of South Korea's heritage idea and its mechanisms, which have received limited attention at the global level, it can contribute significantly to the academic discourse surrounding international heritage on multiple fronts.

First, the study aims to comprehensively address various heritage issues, by doing so with a focus on South Korea, and as such is expected to add new perspectives to global literature on the selective use of heritage, as present for example in the literature on heritage use for nation-building (see Sengupta, 2018; Swenson, 2013a; Smith, 2006), symbolisation and destruction of heritage buildings (see Fibiger, 2015; Silverman, 2010; Billig, 1995), and colonial heritage (see Wei & Wang, 2022; Mawere & Mubaya, 2016; Harvey, 2001). South Korea's rapid transformation from a traditional monarchy to a colonial territory and subsequently to a modern and democratic nation within a relatively short span of 100 years, is likely to present many cases for understanding and exploring the use of heritage and interconnected issues further. As such, this research aims to provide an original comprehensive exploration of representation and use of heritage in times of political and social instability, associated with political shifts and their ideologies, building on some initial literature from South Korean authors on this (e.g. Lee Na-Yeon, 2020; Oh Chun-Young, 2020; Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-Dal & Lee Na-Yeon, 2019). Within the context of South Korea's nation-building and nation-reforming phases, spanning four distinctive periods, the study scrutinises the selective mobilisation of heritage for the propagation of prevailing political ideologies and objectives. The study also aims to challenge the universal heritage concept that has expanded around the world by showing these international heritage debates and heritage practices in a country in Far East Asia, which was distant from Western civilisation until the mid-20th century. This work positions South Korea in this discourse, offering new perspectives and understandings of the Korean context as well as relevance for global heritage studies.

Secondly, this study aims to identify external and internal relationships of stakeholders and policy intentions in heritage-led regeneration through various conflicts, exploring the cases of historical cities in South Korea. It will describe how the evolution of heritage policy has caused conflicts with local communities and how they have responded and participated in heritage decision-making. Questions about the legitimacy of heritage policy decisions by a particular group have long persisted (see Tunbridge, 1984; Lowenthal, 1985; Smith, 2006; Robertson, 2008; Veitch, 2015; Kiddey, 2018). In order to understand the relationship between exclusive national heritage policy and community participation, this study will examine the emergence and development process of Korea's modern heritage policy. Furthermore, it will investigate how their participation has come into conflict with different forces and power structures by describing the conflicts local communities face. As such, this study can provide a unique

example of the dynamics of participation in heritage policy to the international literature (see Seitsonen, 2017; Waterton & Watson, 2010; Robertson, 2008).

The study establishes three research questions with these research aims. First, the study raises questions about how South Korean heritage is conceptualised and how heritage policies have developed in which social and political contexts. Understanding South Korean heritage ideas and policies can help explain the emergence of heritage-led regeneration and community participation. The second research question is how community participation has occurred and influenced the development of heritage-led regeneration policy. This study examines how the state and local communities interacted in the confrontation between authoritative heritage policy and localism. Finally, the study seeks how to understand community participation within heritage-led regeneration. It discusses how participation has developed and how we can understand it by looking at the Gongju case. Gongju is a city where community participation has been actively developed in promoting its heritage-led regeneration project. Gongju is also where I observed for a long time before starting this study. Therefore, I was able to secure more information and understanding, and a mature relationship with the participants, than in other cities.

The three research questions and detailed research questions are as follows.

1) How has South Korea's heritage policy caused conflicts related to local communities?
   - What are the characteristics of the concept of heritage in South Korea?
   - How has the heritage concept in South Korea been settled within historical, social and political contexts?
   - How have heritage policies developed to cause conflicts related to local communities?

2) How did community participation occur and influence the development of heritage-led regeneration policy?
   - Why did the state establish a heritage-led regeneration policy?
   - How have the state and local communities confronted each other in policy establishment and transition processes?
   - How can we understand community participation amid national and regional conflicts?

3) How do we understand community participation in heritage-led regeneration in the case of Gongju?

- Why has community participation become significant in Gongju?
- How has community participation developed?
- What issues does community participation face and why?

1.4. Research method

This section briefly outlines the research methodology. The study conducts qualitative research. It is conducted through a mix of generic qualitative research and case studies. First, the study critically reviews various documents to understand the development process of heritage concepts and policies. It explores heritage concepts and policies diachronically and derives their characteristics.

The study then adopts case studies to understand heritage-led regeneration and community participation. Case studies in this study have two spatial and temporal scopes. The first case study describes establishing a heritage-led regeneration plan and community participation in four South Korean cities designated as "Ancient Cities" – Gyeongju, Gongju, Buyeo and Iksan – from the 2000s to the early 2010s. Through policy review and interview analysis, the study examines the conflict between state power and local communities, how community participation is connected to heritage-led regeneration, and its significance in heritage policies. The second case study focuses on community participation in Gongju city, where the ACPPP is being implemented. Through in-depth interviews with stakeholders of the Gongju ACPPP, the study reveals conflicting views and hidden intentions on community engagement.

As the research shifts from heritage concept to heritage policy, heritage-led regeneration planning and community participation, the temporal and spatial scope of the study is divided mainly into three stages (see figure below). The scope of research shifts from the early 1900s to 2000, the 2000s and the 2010s in terms of time and gradually narrows in terms of space. The analysis part of this study is thus divided into three, each employing different temporal and spatial scopes and data collection and analysis methods.

FIGURE 1-1. THE THREE TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL STAGES OF THE STUDY.

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

First, the study explores heritage concepts and policies from the Japanese colonial period in Korea to the present in South Korea. This step looks at changes in terminology to refer to heritage, the use of heritage to mobilise ideologies and the evolution of heritage policies and institutions. The study examines literature sources such as academic studies, government announcements and policy reports, and interprets relevant laws and regulations. It also reviews history books and news, and utilises a news database platform to understand the contexts of South Korean society in the past.

The second stage looks at the ACPPP and community involvement in the four historic cities. It examines the background, institutional framework, plans and programmes of the ACPPP and how local communities have been involved in them. At this stage, the study analyses policy changes and community activities in the 2000s. Similar to the previous step, the study reviews a wide range of literature. However, it also uses data from the experiences of researchers and interviews with stakeholders to explore how community engagement occurred and how it influenced policy.

In the final stage, the study describes how the local community participates in heritage-led regeneration and what conflicts the local community faces in Gongju city. Based on interviews with community members and other stakeholders in 2019 and 2020, this step demonstrates that the public sector and local communities are pointing in different directions in the participation debate.

7

1.5. Structure of the study

This study consists of eight chapters as follows:

Chapter 1 explains the background and purpose of the study. This chapter provides an overall understanding of what the research is about. It briefly outlines the research background, questions, method and contents of each chapter.

Chapter 2 reviews related literature and theories. This chapter examines the literature on heritage concepts, heritage policy, community and participation. As documents from South Korea will mainly be reviewed later, in the analysis chapters, this chapter focuses on Western theories. Heritage studies in South Korea have only recently begun to develop and still tend to borrow from the heritage concept based on the Venice Charter. Borrowing from the idea of critical heritage, this study examines recent progressive studies in the West. It does not compare Western and South Korean literature. This literature review is to explain how the researcher approaches essential concepts and realises the gap in research.

Chapter 3 describes the methodological approach of this study. This chapter provides an interpretive framework for the study and discusses how the study collects and analyses data. The chapter explains how to approach the research question as qualitative research and how the study design was developed. It describes how to acquire and analyse the data and what the research focuses on in each process. This description includes the methodology adopted in the research, data collection and analysis strategies, and the process of changing the research scope from South Korea to the four ancient cities to Gongju city. The chapter also explains ethical research issues and the challenges the study faced.

Chapter 4 explores heritage concepts and policies in Korea. Via critical reading of documents and academic writings, the study emphasises the political aspects of heritage in this chapter. The chapter begins with an explanation of how heritage is used terminologically in South Korea, analysing newspaper records. It describes how heritage has a stratified concept in South Korea. Then, the chapter explores why the heritage idea has been stratified, highlighting the national use of heritage in historical and ideological contexts. Furthermore, by tracing the development of heritage policy in Korea, the first research question – the fundamental reason why heritage policy caused conflict with the local community – is discussed. In this chapter, the study illustrates the state's heritage mobilisation and the oppressive and discriminatory aspects of heritage policy.

Chapter 5 describes the development of heritage-led regeneration policy and community resistance. The chapter examines conflicts before adopting the "resident support" scheme in the ACPPP. It describes how the state has maintained control through increasingly sophisticated heritage policies and deliberation systems and reacted to local communities demanding guarantees of individual rights and compensation from the state. Also, explaining the process of establishing South Korea's heritage-led regeneration policy, the ACPPP, and its institutional basis, the SAPPAC, it looks at how local communities resisted in historic cities. Analysing the documents published or announced by the public sector and interviews with government officials and planning experts, this chapter shows why community participation occurred in the heritage policy system and what local communities, governments and heritage experts learned in the process of reconciliation.

Chapter 6 then discusses community participation in the implementation of the Gongju ACPPP since the mid-2010s. This chapter seeks to understand the implications of community participation in heritage-led regeneration through the current roles and conflicts of local communities and the diverse perspectives of stakeholders. It begins with why heritage-led regeneration and community participation are becoming increasingly crucial in Gongju. Then, the study analyses local conflicts through interviews. In doing so, the study understands the political desires of various stakeholders to make achievements through heritage-led regeneration and community engagement. Furthermore, it examines the nature of community participation and asserts that communities are demanding new roles and power structures.

Chapter 7 summarises the study's findings and describes the connections between South Korea's uniquely developed heritage, policy, community and engagement. Discussing findings and their relationships in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Chapter 7 explains how the researcher interprets this long conflict. This study argues that heritage-led regeneration policy is not a destination for local communities and that participation can lead to broader discussions about the powers and values given to heritage.

Chapter 8 describes the experimental and theoretical contributions and limitations of the study and puts it in the context of wider literature. Research provides a broader academic and policy discussion of heritage and community engagement. In particular, it presents issues that South Korean society should consider through criticism of heritage decisions and participation. In addition, this chapter suggests further research by identifying the limitations of the study.

Chapter 2. Literature review

Chapter 2. Literature review

2.1. Introduction

This chapter reviews the relevant literature to draw the theoretical framework of the research. The study will comprehensively discuss the heritage idea, heritage policy, heritage-led regeneration and community engagement in South Korea to understand community participation in heritage-led regeneration. As with many sociological terms, those concepts and policies are complicated. The theoretical framework approaches key concepts and policies by examining the multidisciplinary literature can support the stance of this study.

The chapter consists of two main parts: 1) the development of heritage ideas and heritage-led regeneration and 2) community participation. The first part delineates the shift in the heritage concept and heritage policies. It demonstrates the modern features embedded in heritage. Moreover, the section illustrates how heritage policies and activities have evolved and expanded. It examines how conservation, a representative heritage measure, has taken centre stage in urban policy by combining with planning and has evolved into an economic impetus and a core urban regeneration agenda. It will provide a clue to understanding the heritage concept and relevant measures that have been transplanted, imitated and further transformed in South Korea, which will be elaborated in Chapter 4. In the second part, the study reviews the concept of community and its participation. It will suggest how to deploy these ambiguous concepts in this study and support the significance of community participation in the heritage process, especially in heritage-led regeneration.

2.2. Idea of heritage

This section takes a brief overview of the evolutionary process of the heritage concept. Since the purpose of the study is to understand heritage policy and community participation, here we first examine the modernity of the traditional heritage concept and then consider how recent heritage discourses relate to communities.

The modernity of the traditional heritage idea provides a theoretical basis for a critical understanding of South Korea's heritage concept and policy. Legally, South Korea's heritage

protection policy emphasises the fixed concept of the "original state (form)" (see the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, Article 3). Besides, when emphasising preservation in traditional ways, the heritage-led regeneration scheme in South Korea borrows from earlier British legislation and Ruskin's traditional concept of heritage (Chae Mi-ok et al., 2011, p.14). However, recent studies are critical of the traditional heritage idea. Though the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act of 1882 and the publication of John Ruskin's *Seven Lamps of Architecture* (1849) were undoubtedly essential narratives in the heritage concept development, Harvey (2008, p.19) claims that it is "arbitrary" to consider them as the beginning of the heritage idea or as the chronological definition.[2] As a "part of the cultural and social processes" (Smith, 2006, p.13), the heritage concept was not established at any one moment of the past. It emerged within the context of a series of distinctive philosophies and social and political movements that we would recognise as belonging to a modern sensibility (Harrison, 2013, p.23). Researchers understand heritage as a contemporary use of the past, a narrative process or discourse through criticisms of the traditional heritage concept's modernity (Harvey, 2001; Graham, 2002; Smith, 2006).

Moreover, this section reviews heritage discourses and difficult heritage. Recent trends in heritage research support diverse interpretations of heritage and community involvement in the heritage process. Recent researchers believe heritage is an ambiguous concept and that the heritage process is not exclusive. The 1972 Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage defined heritage (cultural heritage) as monuments, buildings and sites created by works of man (UNESCO, 1972, p.2). Until that time, heritage was considered valuable physical objects to be saved from the threat of destruction (Wiktor-Mach, 2019, p.1595). Since the late 20th century, however, the plural and complex heritage idea raised in heritage studies implies that heritage can be defined differently depending on various views: time (Harvey, 2001), power dynamics (Lowenthal, 1985), cultural process (Smith, 2006), social policy (Pendlebury, 2015), hegemony (Robertson, 2008) or cultural and economic practice (Graham, 2002). These researchers believe heritage is conceptualised by interacting with external political, cultural and social contexts. This literature review on heritage discourses and difficult heritage can provide an academic foundation for understanding South Korea's heritage ideas and policy, which will be analysed in Chapter 4.

---

[2] Chapter 4 explains that Korea defines heritage in this way.

2.2.1. Heritage and its modernity

Harrison (2012, p.39) connotatively defined heritage as "both a product and producer of Western modernity". There would be a question of whether the heritage was entirely modern. However, his definition may be acceptable when we discuss at least "official heritage", which refers to "a set of professional practices that are authorised by the state and motivated by some form of legislation or written charter" (Harrison, 2012, pp.14–15).

In general, modernism is defined as the tendency of Western literature and art in the 20th century to radically break away from the traditional foundations of art, architecture, literature, religious faith, philosophy, social organisation, everyday life and science. It is difficult to explain only in terms of breaks or reforms, however, since modernity widely "refers to modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence" (Giddens, 1990, p.1). Therefore, this section will focus on the following three characteristics that stand out in the nature of heritage ideas related to modernity: discontinuity, combination with ideology and operation as a discipline.

First, (official) heritage was conceptualised through the process of segmenting time (history) and selecting representative narratives among its implied meanings. This "discontinuity" is a fundamental nature of modernity emphasised by Giddens (1990, p.3). Harrison (2013, p.2) also pointed out that the heritage idea was created as a prominent factor that distinguished the past and the modern in the process of conceptualising modern societies. Heritages are often assigned their values within a specific past by describing them by arbitrarily divided periods and years, regardless of time continuity.

Preservation emphasises historic buildings' historical and aesthetic value, like antiques, not functional continuity. The arguments of John Ruskin and William Morris, who strongly criticised the restoration works of Viollet-le-Duc in France and Gilbert Scott in England as unforgivable sabotage, can be considered modern. Swenson (2013b, p.128) emphasised the modern approach of preservationists to heritage preservation, depicting the impact of several private societies on heritage preservation and national heritage movements, such as the Common Preservation Society (CPS), the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) and the National Trust. Restoration can be a process of providing functional sustainability to living monuments (Pendlebury, 2008, p.17).

For all, preservationist activism was only one part of a larger reform agenda. Some were mostly in search of artistic reform and used the rejection of restoration to overcome historicism and refine art through the Arts and Crafts, Art Nouveau and modernism. Others saw the preservation of the past primarily as a way to engender social reform movements offering an alternative to rampant industrialisation and capitalism.

(Swenson, 2013b, p.128)

Examining the process of heritage preservation in France, Hong Yong-Jin (2016, p.27) pointed out some attitudes based on rationalism and the Enlightenment, which degraded medieval "old" cities with modifiers such as disorder, unbalance and discomfort. Voltaire, a renowned Enlightenment thinker, even said that there should also be something in Paris like the Great Fire of London in 1666 to clean out medieval Paris at once and to make it more pleasant and modest, to befit the capital city (Voltaire, 1892, cited in Hong Yong-Jin, 2016, p.29). Moreover, heritage sites such as the cathedral of Notre Dame and the Palais des Tuileries were damaged during the French Revolution. Emphasising that Paris's dark and unpleasant image in the 1830s–40s amplified the nostalgia for the old appearance of the past with the rise of romanticism, Hong Yong-Jin (2016, p.23) argued that the concept and preservation of heritage emerged as a reaction to rationalism and the Enlightenment.

The French policy response and the restoration works of the architect Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, which were based on policies and institutions, evoke those of the Renaissance. Romanticism is also a very European modern concept (Pfau & Mitchell, 2010, p.267), and restoration is a creative process that transforms or causes the original form or structure to disappear by the architect's choice (Pendlebury, 2008, p.17). In other words, restoration implies discontinuity by selectively reconstructing the art and philosophy of the past that are contained in a historical building. Moreover, it is worth recalling that Johann Gottfried Herder, the representative thinker of romanticism who first used the term "nationalism", contributed considerably to nationalist thought (Patten, 2010, p.657).

The argument that the preservation and restoration of heritage demonstrate the modernity of heritage may sound contradictory. However, both are different practices performed on tangible objects. When considering heritage as a physical object, discontinuity is emphasised. Both heritage activities are intimately associated with modernity, because both are processes of arbitrarily setting and limiting the time of heritage within a specific space. Moderns define modernity by emphasising the difference from the past (Harrison, 2011, p.169), and heritage is

a measure of it by simultaneously embedding the past in the present to produce the "contemporary past" (Harrison, 2013, p.1). Modernism's methods of segmenting and constraining time are often used to justify heritage value (Harrison, 2011, p.170).

Second, heritage has been associated with ideologies such as nationalism, solidifying the state's identity. The term "ideology" can be defined as 1) a system of beliefs shared by group members seeking to achieve valuable group integration by interpreting the empirical nature of the group and the situation it is facing; 2) the process by which the situation has progressed; and 3) the relationship between the goal and the process (Parsons, 1951, cited in Yi Hwang-Jik, 2010, p.89). The process of Enlightenment has enabled us to recognise ideology (Hawkes, 2004, p.135), and heritage seems well suited to visualise that belief system materially. A series of "invented traditions" associated with the rise of new nation states drew new interests in the study of past and material evidence through archaeology (Harrison, 2012, p.43). Archaeology has created a sense of crisis that preserving and managing heritage is necessary by emphasising that heritage can be irreversibly destroyed as evidence of the past (Harrison, 2013, p.2). Moreover, in the nation-building processes, states carefully expropriated heritage as material evidence of the glorious past of the people they define (Winter, 2015, p.331). Citing Nazi Germany, India, Cambodia and Egypt as examples, Winter (2015) pointed out that archaeology was a practice uncovered in European nationalism, colonialism and imperialism and that heritage and "ancient" legitimacy was used to create nation states.

Schramm (2015, p.442) pointed out that the act of proclaiming something as heritage or related to heritage with a reductive characteristic of the "past" by those with political authority is ideological. "Heritage itself is not a thing and does not exist by itself" (Harvey, 2008, p.19). However, being programmed through the "subjugated standpoints" by certain groups is an ideological process in which political groups justify current interests and future aspirations via heritage (Schramm, 2015). Hypostatising ambiguous concepts requires certain criteria. Specific groups may secure exclusive powers in the process of setting standards for heritage (Jokilehto, 1999, cited in Silberman, 2014, p.434), although Ruskin argued that heritage belongs to the past and the future and that we do not have any authorities and rights in the present (Ruskin, 1849, cited in Swenson, 2013b, p.80). By acquiring, giving and controlling such divine powers and rights concerning heritage, states may appeal for their legitimacy. This heritage concept reflecting the state's grand narratives (Smith, 2006) shows one aspect of modernity.

Finally, a homogenised concept based on universalised values and discipline is imposed on heritage. With the growing view that heritage might have universal value, heritage developed into things integral to providing national identity and legitimacy (Pendlebury, 2008, p.20). Michel Foucault (1975) argued in his book *Discipline and Punish* (*Surveiller et punir*) that the "Enlightenment Age", when human freedom was invented, was also the age of the invention of discipline. For Foucault, power is linked to the creation of a powerful tool, objectification, which has the power to convince the public. Moreover, the objectification of an authorised organisation leads to disciplinary actions such as laws, institutions and policies. Foucault, in particular, saw that the operation of discipline is possible through "surveillance", and the traditional approach to heritage in national and international organisations encompasses all of these processes. Giddens (1990, p.55) also emphasised the institutional dimension of modernity. For the effective operation of ideologies, the elite group should provide plausible guidance for its society to interpret the situation it faces (Yi Hwang-Jik, 2010, p.89). Heritage has been increasingly focused on developing art-historical canons of objects and buildings (Harrison, 2012, p.95). The "time" of modernity has a double nature, creating the "past" recognised as being "immanent" and "imminent" in the present (Harrison, 2013, p.2). The traditional approach has highlighted the morality that heritage should be preserved in its entirety, and it has been standardised in the forms of charters, laws and policies (Pendlebury, 2008, p.18).

The process of assigning universal value to heritage and applying structured norms has been "universal" at both national and international levels. Moreover, "heritage became increasingly controlled and defined by legislation and the state as part of the process of nation-building" during the 20th century (Harrison, 2012, p.95). For example, in Britain, the nature of cultural resource management is inextricably linked to the role of government and political philosophies from 1882 when the first heritage legislation was adopted (Cooper, 2010, p.143). At the international level, specific heritages have also been listed by the international organisation UNESCO. This has implied that their agendas or approaches are proper for every nation under the name of "universal value". UNESCO's 1964 Venice Charter is a representative example of Ruskin's debate standardised and extended to the international level (Pendlebury, 2008, p.18), and several international organisations have suggested the notion that certain (natural and cultural) places are of universal value (Harrison, 2012, p.95). UNESCO still states that the value for being World Heritage, a common heritage of humankind, is "Outstanding Universal Value". Although the recent UNESCO policy objectives have shifted to conserving

the diversity of regional cultural traditions, the "resulting heritage regime" per se embodies a paradox of homogenisation that objectifies and typifies unique cultural forms "as heritage and others not" (Schramm, 2015, p.445).

2.2.2. Heritage discourse and community

Heritage is not a material thing (Smith, 2006, p.11), and the ambiguity of heritage has produced new ideas about it. Heritage discourse, which has emerged as a contested issue since the last quarter of the 20th century, deals with opposing views on the shift of the heritage concept (Robertson, 2008, p.144). The "postmodern", which considers "multivocality", contributed to the recognition of "divergent and multiple" conceptualisations of history and heritage (Smith, 2006, p.37). Roughly, the critiques on traditional heritage discourse raise the question of whether the modernity of heritage is suitable for the era of pluralism. The term "discourse" was highlighted by Smith (ibid) as a concept that contrasts with the material "thing". Researchers emphasising the shift of the heritage concept have criticised the premise regarded as common sense that heritage refers to monumental and grand material assets (ibid, p.37) such as luxury fashions (Lowenthal, 1985, p.42). They also share the perception that "heritage is subjective and filtered with reference to the present" (Harvey, 2008, p.20).

Borrowing the view of Lowenthal (1985), heritage is a process created by social consensus since most of the traces of the past eventually disappear, and all the remains are changed. Thus, it becomes significant "who" creates heritage "for what". Heritage is created and managed for the purposes defined by needs because the heritage is part of the past, chosen in the present for modern purposes (Graham, 2002, pp.1004–1006). Harrison (2012, p.14) pointed out that it is natural that the term "heritage" becomes a problem, as the past exists everywhere, and the concept of heritage can be applied to anything. He also emphasised that the ambiguity of the heritage concept was conveniently accepted and applied to various social and political purposes. Heritage has increasingly been embodied within the policy concept as a tool to achieve not only heritage policy, but also other social and economic goals; hence there has been a tendency to deploy state power by elite groups (Pendlebury, 2015, p.426).

Therefore, creating national identity and the privileges granted to certain groups, which have been applied in the process of heritage practice, have been the main issues of critique (see Smith, 2006; Robertson, 2008; Pendlebury, 2015). The birth of national heritage supporting the

concept of a nation state has led to the nationalisation of the past and the officialisation of national culture and heritage (Ashworth, Graham & Tunbridge, 2007, p.54). Smith (2006, p.4) criticises the concept of traditional heritage being a facilitator of history "by state-sanctioned cultural institutions and elites to regulate current cultural and social tensions in the present". She argues that heritage is a discourse, a form of social practice that includes and reproduces social meanings, knowledge and expertise, power relations, and ideology through language. Then, she names a professional discourse "that privileges expert values and knowledge about the past, and its material manifestations, and dominates and regulates professional heritage practices" as Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD).

Smith (2006, p.36) claims that the idea of heritage defined by AHD can undermine the historical legitimacy of community experiences and ignore or undervalue its social, cultural or political role by simply conveying nationalising stories. She also points out that in the archaeological literature, community participation issues have often been regarded as indigenous issues. At the national level, at least in the UK, expert groups have tried to make professional archaeological knowledge popular and disseminate it to the public. For example, the Council for British Archaeology (CBA), founded in 1944, has focused on public archaeological education from the beginning, and the popularisation of archaeology began with the slogan "archaeology for all" from the 1970s (Henson, 2011, pp.220–223). Smith (2006, p.11) insisted that AHD undermines alternative experiences and perspectives in a local by constructing the heritage idea with famous and professional narratives, as heritage binds everything of the past and reminds us of the good old days that have been generalised (Lowenthal, 1998, p.137).

Political activities in constructing the traditional heritage concept composed of representative narratives (Lowenthal, 1998, p.130) lead to the fundamental question of "whose heritage" in plural societies (Tunbridge, 1984, p.174). This question about "who" emphasises the need to develop research on marginalised groups and individuals. The studies associated with the local community occupy a large part in these critical discourses on heritage. The local community-based approach is one of the highlighted debates in the 21st century (Greer, 2010, p.45), and the idea of the community was included as one of the five C's – the strategic objectives of World Heritage: Credibility, Conservation, Capacity-building, Communication and Communities – at the 31st session of the World Heritage Committee (UNESCO, 2007). Studies on communities who are excluded from or still marginalised in the heritage process,

such as non-white people, women, colonial societies, LGBT societies (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender), or homeless people, have also increased during at least the last two decades (for example, see Goudie, Khan & Kilian, 1999; Smith, 2008; Bigenho & Stobart, 2016; Veitch, 2015; Kiddey, 2018).

Researchers critical of AHD argue that community participation is a legitimate process with a broad definition of heritage. They imply that everyone has the right to participate in heritage works and can interpret heritage through its ambiguous and multiple concepts. Schofield (2014, p.2) argued that heritage existing everywhere should be for everyone and that everyone is a heritage expert. He highlighted that 1) heritage "is changing as heritage has always changed"; 2) everyone has fundamental human rights to participate in the process of heritage that exists everywhere, like a landscape; and 3) local people have the most direct experience and knowledge in their terms since people and places are strongly connected. Robertson (2008, p.156) also suggested the possibility of the "heritage concept from below", emphasising the polysemantic nature of heritage. He argues that "heritage from below" can resist AHD as an expression of local identity, since heritage can be a resource to define and challenge the values and identities assigned to a group (Smith, 2006, p.4). The inclusive character of recent heritage discourse demonstrates that heritage is not for a few experts or interest groups but for everyone (Howard, 2003, p.33). Furthermore, the emphasis on polycentrism is also prominent in global governance (Wiktor-Mach, 2019, p.1600). In particular, the 2005 Faro Convention made it clear that all members of society have the right to participate in the heritage process (Schofield, 2014, p.5). Hence, from the end of the 20th century in international society, public participation and local community engagement have been key agendas in the heritage process (Chitty, 2017, p.1).

In conclusion, the definition of heritage varies depending on the value society places on it, since heritage is a cultural practice that ultimately constitutes and regulates diverse values and interests (Smith, 2006, p.11). During the 20th century, the values of a nation or a specific group were emphasised in heritage. However, recent studies and views show that the concept of heritage has moved away from metanarratives and that heritage practices have tried to take an inclusive attitude.

2.2.3. Difficult Heritage

Heritage is "often used as a form of collective memory", and "the contents, interpretations and representations of the heritage resource are selected according to the demands of the present" (Graham & Howard, 2008, p.2). Thus, many national governments symbolise heritage to consolidate national identity and legitimise their power (Mcdowell, 2008, p.46). However, instead of symbolising heritage, governments or people occasionally can want to shun or destroy it. In collective memory, there are not only 'positive and beautiful' memories but also 'negative and painful' memories, and there are also heritages in which those memories are stored. Over the last three decades, many researchers have studied heritage sites related to histories that are painful and wish to be forgotten, such as massacre (see Zhu, 2022; Curaming, 2017), Nazism or fascism (see Carter, 2020; Macdonald, 2009), imperialism or colonial rule (see Van Beurden, 2022; Fortenberry, 2016). They have emphasised that there is diverse controversy on those heritages as different groups experience and interpret different memories of heritage.

Researchers refer to those heritages by various terms depending on the phenomena related to them. Tunbridge & Ashworth (1996) argues that "dissonant heritage", a place symbolising negative history, conveys negative memories and causes more complex dissonance between stakeholders. Ashworth & Ashworth (1998) describes Limerick's "unwelcome and shunned heritage" in Ireland, deeply entangled with memories of poverty and suffering. Logan & Reeves (2009) refer to places representing painful and shameful historical events as "difficult heritage". Rather than focusing on events of the past, as they link the past and present situations to explain why these places are "difficult" to accept and "unsuitable" to commemorate in the current situation, they approached heritagisation as a multidimensional process. Wei & Wang (2022) criticise the selective interpretation of 'dissonant heritage' from a postcolonial perspective, exploring the interaction between AHD and tourists' lay discourses on colonial heritage in China. Moreover, MacDonald (2009) examines the heritagisation process of "difficult heritage" and the conflict that occurs in forming national identity. Exploring the process of a specific heritage being memorialised while being rejected by society, MacDonald (2010) explains that that kind of heritage contains multidimensional "difficulties" causing continuous conflict depending on changes in interpretation.

In this study, the term "difficult heritage" will be used to refer to heritage linked to negative and painful memories. South Korean heritage researcher Lee Hyun-Kyung (2018, pp.172-173)

champions the term "difficult heritage" as an inclusive and international term since it is difficult for current communities to accept and interpret painful memories encompassed in those heritages. She believes that "difficult heritage" includes complexities of "memory disputes". Thus, she argues that the term "difficult heritage" highlights not only the phenomenon of heritage being avoided as it symbolises negative memories but also controversy by experiencing and interpreting different memories of heritage by each group.

She also proposed that "uncomfortable heritage" would be more apposite in South Korea, considering the situation of heritage related to the history of pain and suffering and uncomfortable gazes to colonial heritages. However, difficult heritage will be used as a more appropriate term since this study focuses on the interaction between such heritages and the heritage system of South Korea. Rather than depicting an "uncomfortable" situation, this study is interested in how "memory disputes" have made South Korea's heritage system more complicated. The state's decision to dismantle a heritage built in Korea's Japanese colonial period, which is a repository of memories to be avoided while a space that evokes different nostalgia, has had a significant impact in expanding and subdividing the heritage system (discussed in Chapter. 4). Moreover, in South Korea, there has been 'difficulty' in recognising and interpreting the heritage beyond the "uncomfortable" view from experience in the process of transition from "remnants of the colonial era" to "modern heritage" (*Ibid.*).

2.3. Heritage policy

As there has been a change in the concept of heritage, so has there been a change in heritage policy. Reviewing heritage policy is fundamental to understanding a complex heritage process. As noted in Section 2.2, heritage needs to be understood in various social and political contexts. This section provides a theoretical approach to interpreting South Korea's heritage policy by examining heritage policies related to research, such as heritage conservation and heritage-led regeneration.

Since the adoption of the first Heritage Act in England in 1882, the state has played a key role in the development of cultural resource management and will also have a significant impact in the future (Cooper, 2010, p.144). During the 20th century, the state's influence on our daily lives grew, and the state developed policies and institutions about heritage (Pendlebury, 2015, p.426). Diverse approaches to heritage policy have been considered and developed according

to the frame defined by a specific era and social environment. At least in the UK, conservation has evolved "from the marginal preoccupation of an artistic elite to being an important consideration in the management of the environment" (Pendlebury, 2008, p.222). Policymakers and international organisations have also advocated heritage-led regeneration (De Cesari & Dimova, 2018, p.864). This section demonstrates heritage conservation and heritage-led regeneration in terms of the policy.

Regarding heritage conservation policy, this study briefly reviews heritage policy in the UK. South Korea's heritage policy is excluded here as it will be discussed in depth in Chapter 4. In the heritage policy debate in South Korea, the most cited Asian case is Japan, while the Western case is the UK. Traditionally, South Korean heritage policy literature frequently refers to the case of British heritage policy (see Jang Min-Young, Park Seong-Hyeon. & Lee Myung-Hun, 2015; CHA, 2014; Kim Bong-Geon; 1989). There are three reasons why this section focuses on British rather than Japanese heritage policy. The first reason is that this study is based on theoretical knowledge in the UK. The second is that the British case, which demonstrates more differences than Japan, is appropriate for the study to examine South Korea's heritage policy critically. The first heritage policy in Korea was established during the Japanese colonial era, and the current heritage system was established by imitating the Japanese system in the early days (Oh Se-Tak, 1997b, p.36). The last reason is simply the linguistic accessibility of the researcher.

2.3.1. Heritage conservation

If heritage is vague, complex and challenging to define, the first question will be why we should conserve it. Pendlebury (2008) explained in his book *Conservation in the Age of Consensus* that the establishment of values is a crucial element in heritage conservation, and the reason for conservation is as follows.

> *... societies only attempt to conserve the things they value. In addition, the very act of conservation gives a building, object or environment cultural, economic, political and social value. ... thus value is not an intrinsic quality but rather the fabric, object or environment is the bearer of an externally imposed, culturally and historically specific*

meaning that attracts a value status depending on the dominant frameworks of value of the time and place.

(Pendlebury, 2008, p.7)

In other words, conserving something means that something has enough "values" connected to external meanings imposed depending on time and space. Many values can be placed on heritage. Alsalloum (2011) analysed 117 international heritage documents dating from 1877 to 2010 and extracted 23 types of heritage values. However, in seeking the reason for conservation, issues at the time and society's demands will be more important than the number of values. Heritage conservation is not a fixed methodology created at one moment, but has evolved and transformed according to the demands of the times or the transition of the heritage concept (Pendlebury, 2008; Cooper, 2010; Pendlebury & Strange, 2011; Sully, 2013).

Conservation has become increasingly complex and dynamic, encompassing norms, economic goals and heritage discourses. The organisations in authority have strengthened their control and power to achieve their social and economic aims, as they have considerably expanded the scope of heritage and combined heritage with planning and legislation (see Pendlebury, 2008; Cooper, 2010; Pendlebury & Strange, 2011; Harrison, 2012). Until the end of World War II, the early days of heritage conservation in the UK introduced institutions and developed conservation systems (Pendlebury, 2008; Sully, 2013). During this period, heritage was still material, but the range of heritage to be protected had been expanded. Ruskin's idea, which is that the heritage does not belong to us in the present and that we have no right to change it, considerably impacted conservation (Kamel-Ahmed, 2015, p.67). Moreover, he expanded objects of protection from artworks to open spaces, such as his battles against the coming of the railways in the Lake District (Swenson, 2013b, p.89). Describing the process of gradually expanding the category of heritage from art and craft to architecture and open space via social movements in the UK, Swenson (2013b) pointed out that professional bodies and government agencies expanded their influences, while the specialisation of historical science and monument management gradually limited private associations' influence. Sully (2013, p.294) argued that creating heritage as a material past also provided a universal definition and basis for establishing heritage institutions. As the loss of physical structure was equated with the loss of information and knowledge, the role of experts was emphasised to allow the objects and collections named as heritage to survive (ibid).

As the Enlightenment concept of preserving nature and historical artefacts combined with state-led practices responded to widespread changes in the industrial era (Harrison, 2012, p.95), the need for conservation and the justification of state intervention was acquired through state legislation (see Pendlebury, 2008). However, while early heritage protection gained momentum through local laws specific to ancient monuments and places, the impact of building preservation in urban areas was still weak (Pendlebury & Strange, 2011, p.362).

After the war, the reconstruction plan, a significant issue in many regions, caused many conflicts with conservation. However, at the same time, it became an opportunity for conservation to be systematically applied to urban planning (Pendlebury, 2008). As conservation was increasingly recognised as necessary, the state's control and power over heritage gradually increased. The state announced more conservation areas and secured authority over listed buildings in the conservation area (ibid, p.81). The state's control had strengthened as urban and state planning had shifted to a comprehensive plan, and the concept of listed buildings was introduced as a part of that planning system (Pendlebury & Strange, 2011, p.363). As the types of heritage that were legally protected increased significantly, additional historic environment laws or policies were also developed to conserve diverse heritage types (Cooper, 2010, p.144). The accumulated legislation and policies have made heritage conservation a fundamental factor of town planning by expanding the designated categories, the tremendous increase in the number of heritage assets in each category, and the repetitive reinforcement of institutional legislation and policies (Pendlebury & Strange, 2011, p.381). Even after the 1980s, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's neoliberal agenda strengthened conservation policy to an unprecedented level based on an almost unanimous consensus, giving the market greater freedom to develop and centralising control and power (Pendlebury, 2008, pp.81–82).

Moreover, regulatory heritage management and economic value can be perceived as adversarial, but conservation has been carefully related to heritage's economic value and commercialisation (Pendlebury, 2015, p.431). Since the 1980s, Britain has emphasised both heritage conservation policies and the use of heritage as economic capital. While conservation almost avoided the rhetoric of liberalisation, the political importance of conservation was developed and highlighted in the neoliberal economy as it has simultaneously been negotiated through innumerable plans (Pendlebury, 2008, p.102). Though the commercialisation and regeneration-led conservation of heritage already existed in the 1970s, the economic function

of conservation became more significant as the neoliberal planning agenda to ease deterrence of development emerged (Strange & Whitney, 2003, p.220). Though there were differences in degree and acceleration of the shift in heritage discourse, Pendlebury et al. (2020) pointed out that institutional organisations, norms and AHD surrounding heritage have assembled within more comprehensive policy frameworks and economic goals, examining conservation planning in the period of austerity after the 2008 economic crisis in the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland.

Focus	Paradigm		
	Preservation	Conservation	Heritage
Goal	Object	Ensemble	Message
Justification	Keep	Adaptive reuse	Use
Time	Value	Value/Reuse	Utility
Criteria	Past	Past/Present	Present/Future
Past	Intrinsic	Preserve	Extrinsic
Focus	Real	Given	Imagined
Authenticity	Object	Compromise	Experience
Change	Immutable	Adaptable	Flexible
Actors	Experts	Policy maker	Users

TABLE 2-1. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PARADIGMS
SOURCE: ASHWORTH. (2011, P.13, TABLE 1).

A recent heritage debate raises the question of "who" will choose "which values" and emphasises the inclusion of more actors in conservation activity. Sully (2013, p.295) demonstrated the shift from an "object-focused approach" to one that concerns the different perspectives and responses of diverse social and cultural groups as the decision-making power of heritage experts on heritage conservation has been challenged over the past 30 years. He divided the stages of the change into three categories: "materials-based, values-based and people-based". In the first stage, the protection of material values of heritage is emphasised. Then, the selection of cultural values in the second stage and the maximisation of the accessibility of the values in the last stage are highlighted. Ashworth (2011) also argued that the heritage paradigm has shifted from protecting the intrinsic values of objects as evidence of the past to the processes and outcomes that contribute to various social, political and economic needs in the present. In his view, conservation embraces a holistic and broad approach and goals such as diverse contemporary uses. He also insisted that the paradigm shifted from conservation to a flexible and user-centred heritage (heritage planning or heritage process). Moreover, public and local community participation has become a new norm and principle of planning and policy

in the heritage process (Chitty, 2017, p.1). Nevertheless, Ashworth (2011, p.4) argued that the paradigm shift in heritage study and practice was partial and incomplete, as professionals still authenticate and make decisions about heritage.

In conclusion, conservation has been accepted as one of the essential goals of public policy based on political and social consensus (Pendlebury, 2008, p.1), and it has widely and variously been applied to achieve diverse social and political purposes. Ashworth (2011) argued that conservation provides a complex and holistic frame between protection and utilisation, emphasising that it is an act of protecting heritage with policy intent. However, local and national identities do not exist at both extremes in all cases because both identities cannot be understood without excluding complex interactive relationships between them (Purnell, 2002, p.229). Pendlebury (2013, p.710) demonstrated conservation as an "assemblage" that 1) combines complex relationships involving planning, law and institutions, heritage discourses including AHD, official institutions and other actors, 2) which have evolved to have a broad influence and strategic position based on value and heritage discourse.

2.3.2. Heritage-led regeneration

According to Roberts (2016, p.18), urban regeneration is a "comprehensive and integrated vision and action which seeks to resolve urban problems and bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change or offers opportunities for improvement". Heritage conservation is intimately linked to regeneration and economic development within political and economic frames (Pendlebury, 2013, p.710). Urban areas are centres of political power reflecting processes of physical, social, environmental and economic transition (Roberts, 2016, p.9). Therefore, heritage-led regeneration can be seen as an urban regeneration policy by its use of heritage.

Early urban regeneration also entailed large-scale demolition, often destroying disused industrial heritage (Rodopoulou, 2016, p.76). However, urban regeneration is recently regarded as a "new planning mode, inspired by the principles of strategic vision, public and private partnership, sustainability and urban heritage enhancement" (Preite, 2012, p.101). As the economic and social roles of conservation have been taken up in the heritage sector, heritage-led regeneration has become one of the main strategies for urban regeneration (Pendlebury, 2002, p.145). Using heritage as a tool for urban regeneration is now a global phenomenon, and

it involves developing cultural industries and place-making strategy to make urban space attractive (Pendlebury & Porfyriou, 2017, p.429).

Heritage-led regeneration goes beyond the physical protection of heritage to address the extrinsic heritage value that has been argued by Ashworth (2011). Heritage value includes spatial, economic and social values. Conservation, as an inclusive term, or heritage has played an essential role in providing direct economic benefits and development options, since it suggests a way to reuse existing resources in urban environments (Shipley & Snyder, 2013, p.307). Heritage has an economic value based on the knowledge that is embedded in the time, place, and multiple cultures occupied by regions and cities (Graham, 2002, p.1016), and utilising this economic value was also vital to the survival of the heritage (Shipley & Snyder, 2013, p.307). Thus, heritage is an economic resource that can be visualised multiple times to promote tourism, economic development and regional regeneration (Graham, 2002, p.1006). Moreover, heritage conservation provides a good reason to invest public money. Already, 60 years ago, the Local Authorities (Historic Buildings) Act 1962 made public funding theoretically possible for historic building conservation in England regardless of ownership (Tarn, 1985, p.252). The European Association of Historic Towns and Regions (2007, p.17) also defined heritage-led regeneration as the "investment in a city's historic fabric, its buildings and spaces, in order to help secure physical, cultural and economic regeneration in that city for the benefit of all those living, working and visiting there".

In addition, an inclusive process is also emphasised in recent heritage-led regeneration. Rodopoulou (2016, p.76) describes "interactive planning" and a "pluralistic decision-making process" as fundamental features of heritage-led regeneration. Fouseki and Nicolau (2018, p.230) also argue that participatory planning and environmental considerations for the sustainable life of communities are essential in heritage-led regeneration. Hence, community initiatives such as adaptive reuse of daily life heritages have become representative approaches as heritage-led regeneration catalysts and have considerable potential (Plevoets & Sowińska-Heim, 2018). Differences in concepts and viewpoints exist among conservationists, urban regenerators and place marketers, and this can lead to conflicts (Pendlebury, 2002).

2.4. Community participation in heritage

Community participation has become vital in the current policy environment (Savini, 2011). In the heritage and planning sectors, the term "community participation" has been used interchangeably with "community involvement" or "community engagement" (see Waterton & Watson, 2010; Park Joo-Hyung, 2012; Prangnell, Ross & Coghill, 2010). One of the classic definitions of community participation in social science is a "process in which individuals take part in decision-making in the institutions, programs, and environments that affect them" (Reinharz & Heller, 1984, p.339). Community participation is also defined as being involved in governance in a narrow view, or as engaging in diverse resource activities in a broad view (Russell, 2008, p.11). Regarding community participation, researchers often place weight on interaction as an act of mature respect for partnerships based on trust (Drucker, 2008, p.55).

However, the definition of community participation can vary in different academic disciplines (Talò, Mannarini & Rochira, 2014, p.3), though fundamentally, community participation can be understood as interactively exercising a direct or indirect influence within the partnership structure in a series of policy processes. In the heritage sector, community participation is often referred to as an expression of social or cultural inclusion within the process of management, interpretation and conservation (Smith, 2006, p.35). Moreover, with the fluid and ambiguous heritage and community concepts, community participation can also be interpreted differently according to social, cultural and political contexts (Crooke, 2010, p.24; Cole, 2019, p.96).

The significance of community participation has been well established in many studies. Community participation is often viewed as an efficient (Chamala, 1995) or effective (Kelly & Van Vlaenderen, 1995) alternative in the policy process. It is also linked to local people's human rights and the characteristics and functions of heritage as a sustainable place in the heritage discipline (Disko, 2012, pp.16–17). However, there are also critical views on community participation. Some experts such as Chapin (2004) have criticised community participation or pointed out that it is applied inappropriately.

2.4.1. Idea of community

There is also ambiguity in defining the term "community", as with other sociological terms. Community is a fluid concept that is paradoxical and has many possibilities (Day, 2006, p.24), and its implications can vary depending on the place and time (Cnaan, Milofsky & Hunter, 2008, p.5). A group of people who share cultural, ethnic, national, sexual, environmental, professional or political backgrounds can all be communities.

Early community studies regarded a community as a group of people who lived in a particular geographic area and shared their living environment by regionalism or kinship. Social solidarity, economic interests and social relationships have also been emphasised by classical social theorists such as Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx and Max Weber (Day, 2006, pp.2–5). Currently, a community often refers to people's various settings to achieve something in a fluid and chaotic reality (ibid, p.25). Furthermore, the term "community" has also been linked with sociological terms such as social empowerment in the 1970s, alleviating social erosion in globalisation and neoliberalism and creating social capital (Weber-Newth, 2019, p.146).

"Community" becomes problematic to define when we think about what common bonds are and how communities are maintained, although it fundamentally refers to a group of people who have a sense of belonging by something in common, whether physical or non-physical (Day, 2006, p.1). The power of governments, companies, individuals or even natural disasters also influences the community's nature (Cnaan, Milofsky, & Hunter, 2008, p.1). In addition, there can be an involuntarily formed community for "government through the community". Park Joo-Hyung (2012) argued that community had been planned as a structural and extensive neoliberal political project similar to that organised under the slogan "Saemaul (New Village) Movement" in the era of the dictatorship in the 1970s, criticising the government's community-building project in South Korea from the 2010s.

In urban studies, the idea of community tends to be conjunct with a place. Though Urry's (1995) view that communities belong to a specific geographic location and define a particular social system as an ideology is considered an outdated concept (see Day, 2006, p.25), many urban studies use the term "local community" so that the concept implies the geographic characteristics of a place (see Taylor, 2004; Walker, 2011; Weber-Newth, 2019). Weber-Newth (2019, p.66) emphasised the sharing of the geographic place while defining community as a set

of diverse people connected by social interaction, although they might differ in their characteristics, interests or inspiration.

Culture and regional identity related to urban regeneration are also considered criteria for setting the category of community. Atkinson (2003) regarded culture as a factor that defines the boundary of a community between inclusion and exclusion, as communities are classified by or problematic due to their culture. Russell (2008) categorised communities as "communities of place" of people who share geographic space, "communities of interest" for people with common concerns, and "communities of identity" that share a common belief or ethnicity.

The various approaches to the concept of community have aroused controversy (Day, 2006, p.24). From comprehensive discourse to heritage or urban regeneration, the concept of community is still metaphorical and fluid. However, the term "community" is used selectively as a specific given perspective. Although expert groups or a comprehensive set of stakeholders can also be referred to as a type of community, a community tends to be associated with resistance to regulation, a grassroots movement or a sense of place in the heritage or urban regeneration sectors (see Graham, 2002; Atkinson, 2003; Waterton & Smith, 2010). In other words, conceptualising the community includes the perceptions of others, criteria of inclusion, knowledge backgrounds and boundaries (Murphy, 2014), and it forms ambiguous boundaries according to the point of view of the studies.

2.4.3. Community in this study

Community as postulated in this study will not deviate from the concept generally recognised and defined by South Korean society. However, even in South Korean society, the community is not a concept that can be easily defined. In South Korean academia, community, insofar as the term relates to regional or heritage policy, is generally replaced by the term local residents, distinguished from experts, governments and public institutions. The term "community" in the South Korean institutional system varies with the purpose of the actors, such as local communities, residents in local or local organisations.

Despite the complexity and fluidity of the community concept, in terms of examining the heritage-based regeneration process, this study will define a community through the culture and vision shared and the boundaries of groups perceived within partnerships. Those boundaries are

blurred (Mason, 2000, p.26), but certain boundaries within a partnership cause people to recognise each other as members of the same group. Crooke (2010, p.27) notes that since communities are often associated with the community's behaviour, the conditions perceived as "other" in the decision-making structure can be critical in defining the community by culture, places or common interests.

In addition, the study includes the boundaries established in Korea's traditional heritage policy. While criticising South Korea's authoritarian heritage policy, the study regards groups excluded from existing heritage decisions and regulated by heritage policy as local communities. Silverman and Ruggles (2007, p.3) argue that it is contentious to determine who defines heritage and controls its management and benefits, as it can also be a tool of oppression. The study excludes local private groups that previously had power over heritage definition and control.

Therefore, this study defines the community as a group based on three conditions. First, in heritage-led regeneration, a local community is a group that various stakeholders regard as the target of a policy rather than a formal entity that carries out the policy according to a public system. Second, a local community is a group that shares a heritage or space that is recognised as one region. Finally, it is a group that participates in decision-making in the South Korean policy structure with a vision and method different from those of the government and experts.

2.4.4. Typology of community participation

Typification can provide a valuable basis for understanding community participation because a community is multidimensional (Cole, 2019, p.96). However, the types and standards of communities vary enormously according to social policy and demands (Cornwall, 2008). Therefore, we will look at a traditional typology of community participation. Sherry Arnstein's (1969) and Jules Pretty's (1995) works are well-known studies on types of participation, categorising them according to the degree of participation.

FIGURE 2-2. EIGHT RUNGS ON THE LADDER OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

SOURCE: ARNSTEIN. (1969, P.217, FIGURE 2).

The most classical study by Arnstein (1969) divided participation into eight levels of empowerment, examining whether citizen power works and whether it represents formal participation by case. The eight-step ladder is the metaphor for the participation level. She focused on participation to share the interests of society, setting those in power and ordinary citizens in opposition. The higher up the ladder, the more citizens have a greater level of influence over decision-making and share more benefits. Non-participation, located at the lowest step, is the stage in which those in power try to enforce and maintain their agendas. At the stages of participation representing tokenism, citizens have a voice but do not affect any changes. Only at a higher level of participation may the public's voices be accepted and influence the outcome. The study presented the steps through examples of federal social programmes in the United States. However, as the study emphasised control power in a confrontational structure rather than community activities at different points up or down the ladder, the boundaries of participation activities are unclear. Arnstein (1969) abstractly simplified the situation because there was a significant difference in perception between those with power and those without it. She said that in reality (in her case study), the powerless people accept the "powerful" as a "system". She also argued that those in power view the "have-nots" as distant objects that do not understand class differences.

However, since substantive planning requires community participation to respond to a specific context (Smith, 1973), it is necessary to take a closer look at the community as a user. Pretty (1995) divided the levels of participation based on how people participate. He also explained participation in the power transition process from authorised organisations to people but emphasised participatory methods. While Arnstein's (1969) study focused on confrontation in a power structure, Pretty (1995) demonstrated the boundaries between stages, focusing on the motives of the participants and the way they interacted with the outside. For example, in the seventh and last step, "self-mobilisation", he emphasised that "such self-initiated mobilisation may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power".

Typology	Characteristics of each type
1. Manipulative participation	Participation is simply a pretence, with "people's" representatives on official boards, but who are unelected and have no power.
2. Passive participation	People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. This involves unilateral announcements by an administration or project management without any listening to people's responses. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals.

3. Participation by consultation	People participate by being consulted or by answering questions. External agents define problems and information-gathering processes, and so control analysis. Such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision-making, and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people's views.
4. Participation for material incentives	People participate by contributing resources, for example, labour, in return for food, cash or other material incentives. Farmers may provide the fields and labour, but are involved in neither experimentation nor the process of learning. It is very common to see this "called" participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging technologies or practices when the incentives end.
5. Functional participation	Participation is seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. People may participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement may be interactive and involve shared decision-making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have already been made by external agents. At worst, local people may still only be co-opted to serve external goals.
6. Interactive participation	People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just the means to achieve project goals. The process involves interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systemic and structured learning processes. As groups take control over local decisions and determine how available resources are used, so they have a stake in maintaining structures or practices.
7. Self-mobilisation	People participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resources and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Self-mobilisation can spread if government and NGOs provide an enabling framework of support. Such self-initiated mobilisation may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power.

TABLE 2-2. A TYPOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION: HOW PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS
SOURCE: PRETTY (1995, P.1252, TABLE 3).

2.4.2. Community in heritage

In heritage studies, a community has been extended to a group of people who share values or beliefs, away from the perspective of "macro-level" at the local level (Waterton & Watson, 2010, pp.4–5). Waterton and Smith (2010, p.16) agreed that community is a very debatable concept because each community has different motivations and driving forces to organise and operate. A community, an expansive and fluid concept, can also interact with the heritage concept. Waterton and Watson (2010, pp.4–5) argued that 1) communities formed in a developed Internet environment defined the heritage concept with their own terms that

challenged the existing heritage concept and that 2) they developed the values latent within lower-ranking heritages excluded by experts.

Although the idea of community expanded fluidly according to social changes in heritage studies, it has paradoxically created a dominant concept about community with the changing approach to heritage (Waterton & Smith, 2010, p.17). As heritage is embedded in the justification of existing power structures, a complex process of identity conflicts tends to ensue (Graham, 2002). A community is often referred to as a stakeholder that stands in opposition to existing decision-making groups, such as government representatives or experts. In particular, studies emphasising community involvement (see Li et al., 2020; Waterton & Watson, 2010; Landorf, 2009; Smith, 2006) described the community as a cooperative or confrontational group having a relationship with governments or expert groups.

The community is often perceived as an entity distinct from the existing heritage management system. UNESCO has emphasised that responsibility for protecting and conserving World Heritage sites is shifting from conservation experts and national and local government representatives to new stakeholders such as community groups, private entrepreneurs, developers, owners and non-profit organisations (Millar, 2006, p.39). The range of stakeholders involved in heritage-related activities has expanded, and the broader involvement of community groups, individuals and value-driven planners requests the deployment of a wide range of public and professional expertise in the decision-making process about heritage regarding as a place or resource (Avrami, 2009, pp.178–179).

As administrative groups and conservation experts' monopoly status has been under threat by increased interests from other stakeholders, a community is often portrayed separately from groups with authority. Waterton and Smith (2010, pp.17–19) were concerned that this particular community concept dominated the heritage discipline by separating experts and non-professionals or by making distinctions between ethnicities or economic levels.

2.4.5. Criticism of community participation and counterarguments

Community-based projects have evolved over the past decades as alternatives to traditional conservation, but criticism has also expanded from biodiversity conservation to the social sciences (Horwich & Lyon, 2007, p.376). This section describes the criticisms raised in nature

conservation, urban regeneration and heritage. Moreover, it examines the counterarguments to these criticisms in relation to this study.

The following pages review into three categories, including two criticisms raised in general and criticisms raised in heritage practices. The first criticism of community participation raised in nature conservation is that community participation is not suitable for conservation. Chapin (2004, p.20) assessed most community-based projects as a series of failures. Criticising the three largest bio-conservation organisations and their Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), Chapin (ibid) devalued community participation following two reasons: 1) communities are generally paternalistic and lacking in expertise, and 2) agendas are unilaterally created by conservationists. Five other criticisms from some conservationists, summarised by Wilshusen et al. (2002, pp.20–21), are as follows: 1) protected areas require strict regulation; 2) biodiversity protection is morally imperative; 3) conservation linked to development does not protect biodiversity; 4) harmonious, eco-friendly local communities are a myth; 5) emergency situations require extreme measures. In other words, traditional conservationists argue that strong regulations are needed, and moral grounds should take precedence over the value of use to prevent damage to nature caused by population growth and economic growth. Thus, they believe that the participation of communities that do not certainly guarantee conservation should be suppressed, as the government needs to limit individual freedoms, considering the urgency of protection.

Second, some researchers question the effectiveness of participation. Kumar and Corbridge (2001, p.76) show that community participation can fail to change the modes of stratification even though the project achieves policy goals exceptionally well, examining a joint venture of the governments of India and the UK, the Eastern India Rainfed Farming Project (EIRFP). Looking back on the history of community organising in the United States, Fisher, De Filippis, and Shragge (2018, p.290) argue that communities take on political forms that are not inherently progressive. They show that community initiatives are political activities and that politically conservative forms are more frequent, with many communities ostracising blacks, gays or new residents. Park Joo-Hyung (2012, p.8) also points out that participation may be a part of neoliberal political planning or works to govern through community rather than liberal politics that resist neoliberal urbanisation, reviewing the project to create a "village community" in Seoul.

Furthermore, some studies focus on power relations within a community and criticise the strengthening of existing power or the reproduction of new inequalities. Inequality of power within the community is reported in some cases, such as participation in festival organisation and operation (Póvoa, 2023) and public health programs (Wallerstein. et al., 2019). Thomas (2010) also shows that community strategies that emphasise a specific religious class (young Muslims) rather cause division and conflict in the local community. Jones (2003) argues that community participation may produce or reproduce inequalities in urban regeneration. He believes community participation in Merseyside's Pathway is "evidently a minority activity". Community participation can be considered both in terms of social exclusion and the bureaucratic nature of planning, though policymakers expect participation to be "good" for the community (Jones, 2003, p. 598). He further points out that members who are "recruited" for politicised goals may sometimes take a "tyrannical" advantage. These studies emphasise that community participation is a political activity that inevitably involves conflict, which can expand or reproduce not only macro-level confrontations but also micro- or internal power relations.

Finally, we look specifically at criticism of community participation in heritage practices. There is a concern that the community concept can be used and accepted uncritically in the heritage process. Several scholars have pointed out that policymakers selectively use the community concept's ambiguity (see Waterton & Smith, 2010; Park Kyung-Seop, 2018; Park Joo-Hyung, 2012). In South Korea, various groups, including voluntary resident groups, social enterprises and cooperatives, private companies, and local groups, also participate in public community projects. However, people have uncritically accepted the notion of community as reciprocal relationships between neighbours and tend not to doubt community as an intended purpose (Park Kyung Seop, 2018, p.9).

Therefore, some researchers point out that national or local governments leading heritage practices do not want to involve local communities or are misusing community participation. In heritage projects, the goals of governments and local communities can differ (Nitzky, 2013, p.208). As mentioned in Section. 2.2.1, when heritage is viewed as an object of protection in danger, it has been emphasised as a norm by policy. Therefore, those who are not considered important in conserving heritage with strong national meaning are often excluded (Gardner, 2004, p.88). Moreover, Waterton and Smith (2010, pp.7–9) argue that the concept of community has been "obsessively" accepted as an "indulgence" by experts and policymakers

as rhetoric against exclusion, discomfort and injustice, notwithstanding that the community concept was theoretically less developed in heritage studies. They are concerned that within the dynamics established by public policy on community participation and support programmes, real-life communities go unrecognised, and inappropriate identities are institutionalised in the heritage process by the well-framed heritage practices and abstract community concepts.

There are also concerns and criticisms about community participation in the heritage field. In heritage practices, expertise is important in explaining the justification for community participation. Some scholars criticise heritage practices for their reliance on experts (e.g. Schofield, 2014; Harrison, 2013; Smith, 2006). As non-expert groups, local communities are often excluded from heritage projects since they are regarded as lacking resources such as knowledge and economic means, a particular vision, or an understanding of the heritage and its accepted values (Waterton & Smith, 2010, p.10). Thus, as people do not feel they can influence the outcome, they do not want practically to participate in practice planning and are willing to defer to expert opinion (Dian & Abdullah, 2013, p.254).

In this respect, Schofield's (2014, p.2) argument is interesting. He encourages community participation, arguing that "we are all heritage experts" because those people who have strong ties to a place are experts. However, Hølleland and Skrede (2019) directly counterargue his claim. Technical skills and scientific knowledge are required to conserve materials, the archaeological sites and the built environment (Hølleland & Skrede, 2019, p.826). Hølleland & Skrede (2019) criticise the attempt in heritage practice to avoid distinguishing two kinds of expertise between being able to contribute to a professional field and having sufficient competence to understand what experts are saying. They also argue that experts can internally identify errors and biases through peer review, which should not be overlooked.

However, the criticisms mentioned above can be challenged in that they discuss community participation within a limited scope. Wilshusen et al. (2002, pp.20–21) counter that the argument that communities should be excluded overlooks social and political landscape changes and complex variables among stakeholders. They question whether the common good established by a specific mainstream group can guarantee a moral basis. Fundamentally, this counterargument is no different from the questions: what is the "value" of the object to be conserved, and "who" conserves heritage and "how"? If we focus on heritage values as cultural properties, heritage becomes an object to be "protected" based on expertise. However, since heritage is a creation by social consensus, and the value of heritage is interpreted in the

"present", it has various interpretations and overlapping values according to present needs (Lowenthal, 1998). Therefore, as the representation of cultural heritage is established by the state (Harrison, 2013), viewed from a critical perspective, various stakeholders may produce diverse heritage values in social, cultural and economic contexts.

Moreover, doubts about the common good set by the state and professional groups can expand community participation. The state and experts have authorised "official heritage" through legislation or charter mechanisms (Harrison, 2013, p.14). The heritage representation and conservation strategies based on such policy approaches from particular groups may secure less moral ground. Instead, as diverse groups reflect identities in their heritage and project their memories and cultural symbols (McDowell, 2008), community participation in the heritage process seems to provide a more appropriate moral basis.

Furthermore, this criticism does not raise the question about the implication of community participation but rather presents the need to examine the community concept more thoroughly to strengthen democracy, equality and pluralism in the involvement process. Waterton and Watson (2010) were concerned with the unequal deployment of "other" communities and professional communities in the process, pointing out that the community concept of a particular dominant mainstream can lead to "misrecognition, discrimination, lowered self-esteem and lack of parity in any engagement with heritage". Jones (2003) also emphasises the need for research and policies that consider a higher level of honesty and maturity while criticising participation planned as a politicised structure rather than denying community participation.

2.4.6. Values of community participation in heritage

Community participation values have become a prominent part of the conservation process (Avrami, 2009) and urban policy (Weber-Newth, 2019, p.146). In the process of urban regeneration, the community rhetoric conveys a sense of "the local" to share the responsibilities of the state and residents (ibid). Also, community participation in heritage-led regeneration programmes is one of the most critical factors in achieving social and economic resilience (Fouseki & Nicolau, 2018). In addition, community participation is understood as the interaction between community and place attachments (Manzo & Perkins, 2006, pp.347–348),

re-figuring of the territory of government (Rose, 1996, pp.332–333), and changes in dynamics within a specific project (see Greer, 2010, p.63).

Moreover, community participation has become one of the most significant discussions in heritage studies at the international level. As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, community was added as one of the 5Cs by the World Heritage Committee at its 31st session (New Zealand, 23rd June–2nd July 2007) to the 4C strategic objectives of the World Heritage Convention, namely: credibility, conservation, capacity-building and communication, which were adopted at the 26th session in Budapest in 2002. The recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape (HUL), adopted on 10th November 2011 by UNESCO's General Conference, strongly encourages community participation in all processes related to World Heritage (Veldpaus & Bokhove, 2019, p.116).

At the national level, in South Korea, community participation and its role in the heritage process have also been significant in recent decades, which is due to the awareness of problems but partly also to UNESCO's influence (Cho Hyo-Sang, 2012, p.265). Kim Sook-Jin (2017, p.52) argued that the change in UNESCO's approach laid the foundation for community participation in the heritage process and provided the motive for the community to intervene in the interpretation of heritage and its value. The value of heritage in South Korea is still selectively determined by a government agency, the Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA) (Cho Hyo-Sang, 2012, p.265). However, the registration process of "Historic Villages in Korea – Hahoe and Yangdong", registered as a World Heritage site in 2010, and many conflicts before and after the registration, confirmed the necessity of severe concerns about the role and function of communities (ibid).

Moreover, community participation can be an expression of social or cultural inclusion within the heritage management, interpretation and conservation process (Smith, 2006, p.35). However, the term "inclusion" can have diverse connotations, depending on whether participation is understood as an alternative for policy implementation or as a means to counter the threats of human rights imposed by the mainstream culture in the name of universal values.

In terms of policy implementation, Chamala (1995, p.7) argued that community participation at all levels presents a more practical approach to solving the problem of sustainable resource management. Community participation has become mainstream in routine policy implementation, and governments expect community groups to provide detailed

information about the programmes and explain how they can meet various standards of practice and their goals (Day, 2006, p.240). Furthermore, community participation is suggested as an effective approach to heritage management that reduces conflict and resistance through communication (Chirikure et al., 2010, p.32). Those perspectives focus on the effectiveness of community participation for policy goals rather than its intrinsic meanings. Existing heritage laws, conventions and charters are the results of efforts to establish mechanisms for the conservation of heritages judged to be of "universal" importance (Blake, 2000, p.85). Thus, states or authorised agencies are still the key actors or trustees of the heritage process. In this respect, conservationists and private interests are traditionally unacceptable foes (Van Oers, 2009), and community participation can be regarded as a reconciliation process.

On the other hand, as an extension of the heritage discourse, participation can also be understood as a heritage value acceptance process (Lee Na-Yeon, 2020, p.54). Heritage can be made more meaningful through the relationship, local identities and a bottom-up approach (Robertson, 2008). We consistently try to conserve something to retain and improve the value of the object to "that society" (Caple, 2009). However, since "heritage is about creating, not about preserving anything" (Lowenthal, 1985), the right to create has become controversial. Ashworth (2011, pp.14–45) argued that heritage might have been created for political or social goals deliberately chosen by official institutions, such as the government's political legitimacy or social cohesion. Cole (2019, p.89) stressed that participation empowers community members in cultural tourism.

Furthermore, Del Mármol, Siniscalchi & Estrada (2016, p.350) asserted that heritage discourse and practice are a hegemony that strengthens and expands the control and power of the state and other authorities. They viewed community participation as a process of resistance to defend their position and secure decision-making power. Robertson (2008, p.156) also recognised heritage as a social and cultural outcome and believed that "heritage from below" as an expression of local identity was an expression of resistance to the dominant heritage discourse. Hence, participation can provide opportunities for various communities to re-establish the value and identity of their heritage, and through this, it can be a process of restoring the rights of communities excluded from the heritage process.

Accepting those arguments, community participation in the heritage process leads to a political debate about power and resistance, and recently more academic works have analysed that heritage has very subjective and political characteristics (Avrami, 2009, p.180). As

participation enables communities to share decision-making authority and take the lead in society's development process to exert the influence that can benefit from the project (Kelly & Van Vlaenderen, 1995, p.372), the implication of participation expands to the value of the local society. Community involvement becomes more significant as "communicative and advocacy planning" theories instruct and encourage participation in applying a more value-seeking and deliberative process (Avrami, 2009, p.180).

In conclusion, community participation embeds multiple values in the heritage discourse (Del Mármol, Siniscalchi, & Estrada, 2016; Robertson, 2008; Smith, 2006), such as political (Weber-Newth, 2019; Chirikure et al., 2010; Waterton & Watson, 2010; Horwich & Lyon, 2007; Chamala, 1995), social (Kelly & Van Vlaenderen, 1995; Day, 2006) and economic (Viñals & Morant, 2012; Fouseki & Nicolau, 2018) values.

2.4.7. Community participation research in South Korea

In South Korea, community participation tends to emphasise reconciliation with the community as a means to reduce conflict in the policy implementation process or as an alternative for better political outcomes. Lee Woo-Hyung, Chung Jae-Hee and Jung Jae-Woong (2014, p.36) viewed community participation as a means of negotiation in the policymaking process, and Min Hyun-Suk and Oh Ji-Yeon (2019, p.9) presented participation as a tool to restore the trust of public institutions with local communities. Jang Min-Young, Park Seong-Hyun and Lee Myung-Hoon (2015, p.109) insisted that various local groups should share roles and cooperate for sustainable conservation and management of heritage because a number of tasks must be solved, such as funding, human resources and institutional systems.

Though the Korean government has highlighted community in the policy process since the early 2010s, it has strengthened the institutionally conservative heritage preservation principle (Lee Su-Jeong, 2016). Kim Sook-Jin (2017, p.51) insisted that the Korean government still seeks national identity through the heritage process and that the local governments consider heritage a means for regional economic development. Furthermore, Park Kyung Seop (2018, p.9) believed community participation in South Korea was often designed as an intervention with an intended purpose for actualities without reflection on its concept.

Recently, such limited participation criticisms have been raised, mainly focusing on the conflict between public institutions and the private sector during the heritage process. They pointed out that the state still maintains overwhelming authority over the conservation, management, utilisation and valuation of heritage and that participation in the process is forced. Lee Nan-Kyeong (2018, p.18) insisted that heritage conservation policy should be more amicable vis-à-vis residents' lives to create fewer conflicts. Kim Nam-Hee (2020) pointed out that residents' interests disappeared at the management stage as the government-led designed policy structure restricted community participation in practice to the planning stage. In particular, Lee Su-Jeong (2018, p.36) pointed out a lack of understanding of the elements that form the community's characteristics and identity in the heritage-based regeneration process and that community participation has limitations in achieving effectiveness.

Recent research in South Korea also describes the interaction between the value of heritage and local communities. The works of Lee Su-Jeong (2016), Lee Nan-Kyeong (2018), Kim Nam-Hee (2020) and Lee Na-Yeon (2020) include concerns about how to interpret heritage value. Furthermore, Kim Sook-Jin (2017) argued that "protection" that excludes the community makes heritage an object to view. She is also concerned that the heritage's intrinsic nature may be altered or disappear due to the "museum effect" that isolates it from complex connections and associations with the community. Emphasising that heritage is a piece of the past shared by the region and a source of community identity, she argued that the vitality between a particular culture and heritage reveals the heritage's unique originality. In contrast, Lee Woo-Hyung, Chung Jae-Hee and Jung Jae-Woong (2014), Min Hyun-Suk and Oh Ji-Yeon (2019), and Jang Min-Young, Park Seong-Hyun & Lee Myung-Hoon (2015) drew the concept of heritage based on the institutional definition or universal value and considered participation to educate the public and help them to understand heritage based on its conservative interpretation.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter reviewed a range of literature related to heritage and community participation. Recent heritage studies have provided a critical perspective on the traditional concept of heritage. The study noted that these criticisms pointed out the following three modern characteristics of heritage: presenting a fixed concept of heritage by segmenting time, the state's use of heritage related to ideologies such as nationalism, and the definition and use of heritage

based on universalised values and disciplines. In addition, criticism of the definition of the traditional concept of heritage, referred to as AHD, supports the broad definition of heritage. Recent studies have provided the bases for advocating the inclusive concept of heritage and community participation as a legitimate process.

Heritage has diverse values, such as spatial, economic and social values. Heritage discourse has evolved into a discussion about how to use the past in the present and future to deliver those values. The change in the heritage paradigm from preservation to conservation to heritage means that the key actors of heritage policy change from experts to policymakers to users. In the heritage discipline, therefore, recent studies on community participation are increasing.

In South Korea, there are also discussions that emphasise the involvement of local communities in the preservation of historic cities (Choi Wan-Kyu, 2016; Sohn Jin-Sang, 2010) and heritage excavation and investigation processes (Ryu Ho-Cheol, 2014) or critique the excessive regulatory system of heritage (Lee Jae-Sam, 2015; Park Jeong-Hee, 2008). As will be discussed in Chapter 4, South Korea has maintained a strict heritage regulatory system for a long time. However, it is only recently that conflicts with local communities that have arisen from the implementation of heritage policies have begun to be studied. Lee Woo-Hyung, Chung Jae-Hee and Jung Jae-Woong (2014) suggested countermeasures through an analysis of the bargaining power of stakeholders in a heritage preservation policy. Ryu Young-Ah and Chae Kyung-Jin (2017) analysed conflicts related to heritage policies between the government and residents and presented a "measure to secure financial resources" for an agreement.

This study differs from previous ones in the following aspects. First, it explores the formation process of heritage concepts and policies in a country, examining the context in which conflicts have arisen in relation to heritage policies and how local communities have begun to participate. Many researchers have studied community engagement at a specific time, while diachronic studies often focus on heritage concepts or heritage policies without deeply addressing community engagement.

Second, this study seeks to understand where community participation is ultimately headed in heritage policy rather than as a policy tool. Despite the optimism of many scholars about community participation (see Section 2.4.6), it is questionable whether community participation can be a panacea. Not all community participation is expected to bring positive outcomes. Pretty (1995, p.1251) also argues that participation can be used "to justify the extension of control of

the state" and to drag people "into partaking in operations of no interest to them". Some examples show that some communities may not be interested in goals such as conservation (see the Grainger Town case, Pendlebury, 2002), and no one can be sure of the consequences of participation (see Jones, 2003). Nonetheless, participation in South Korea tends to be seen as a means of resolving conflicts with local communities (see CHA, 2012). This study focuses on the social and political implications of community participation. It examines how power has been given over heritage in South Korean society and how the imbalance of that power affects community participation. It also observes how community participation develops contrary to the expectations of the state leading the policy.

Chapter 3. Research methodology

Chapter 3. Research Methodology

3.1. Introduction

This chapter describes how the research methodology was developed to address the research questions. The study aims to understand community participation in the heritage-led regeneration process in Korea, as already suggested in the introduction. This chapter demonstrates an analytical framework and methodological approach used in the study to interpret heritage-led regeneration and community participation in that process. It provides the research design selected and its basis by developing the research methodology, including the theoretical framework, research questions, process, and data collection and analysis strategies.

Research designs are planning and procedures that encompass decisions ranging from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2009, p.3). This chapter will explain how subjects, means, structures and strategies have been selected and established in the research process for logical reasoning. It describes the researcher's perspective on community participation in the heritage-led regeneration process, identifies research questions, and designs research plans and procedures. The conceptual framework defines the researcher's viewpoint and interest, and the research questions and design provide direction for the research's structure and method. Then, the methodology selected provides a framework for the research target, data collection strategy and analysis method.

This study adopts a qualitative methodology based on interpretive epistemology. Urban regeneration is a highly complex process (Boyle, Kathy & François, 2018, p.3). Conservation is also about "very subjective relationships between people and places", not objective management (Avrami, 2009, p.179). Qualitative research is conducted for a complex, detailed understanding of the issues (Creswell & Poth, 2017, p.45). Moreover, this study intends to understand deeply community participation in the heritage-led regeneration policy process implemented in limited regions of South Korea. Accordingly, this study adopts the case study method for an intensive and in-depth analysis of policies and social activities in a specific region. This chapter describes the process of choosing such an approach and developing specific research strategies.

3.2. Conceptual framework of the study

This section demonstrates the philosophical perspective and theoretical framework to establish the conceptual framework. Research is based on particular beliefs and philosophical assumptions, whether or not the researcher is aware of it (Creswell & Poth, 2017, p.15). Whether we call it "worldview" or "paradigm", it provides the basis of research methods (Creswell, 2009, p.5). Therefore, explaining what philosophical assumptions this study is built on may be the first step in establishing how to develop the research. In addition, Creswell & Poth (2017, p.19), citing Huff (2009), stated that philosophical assumption helps a researcher to set the direction of research goals and results and readers to understand the researcher's stance on epistemological issues. This section will explain those philosophical stances that help to develop the research design, from the research questions to the research method and strategy.

3.2.1. Epistemological assumption

Knowledge is created for complex reasons and is mediated by the reflective process (Niekerk & Savin-Baden, 2010, p.28). Thus, epistemological foundations focus research on specific realities in the social sciences (Pascale, 2011, p.22). In other words, the research built on epistemological foundations can be understood as the process of grasping subjective meanings to interpret a particular reality. Bryman (2012, p.28) described interpretivism as a "term given to a contrasting epistemology to positivism". In terms of epistemology, interpretivism heavily influences qualitative research (ibid, p.399).

Why was South Korea's heritage-led regeneration policy planned in the 2000s? How has it developed? This study began with these two questions. I was more deeply interested in the conflict between heritage policy and local community participation in Korea. I have developed the research questions with that process. Moreover, as already explained in Chapter 2 (literature review), heritage, community and participation are all vague concepts rather than existential objects. Policy and participation can be seen as social activities of the state and local communities, respectively. They cannot be equally described anywhere in the world, although common characteristics can be inferred.

Moreover, subjective evidence needs to be collected in the "field" to understand a social problem in a particular area. This means that this study is designed within a broad philosophical

epistemology, not conducted with only subjective data. Some statistical data or quantitative data are used in this study. However, they are used to explain the shift in the "epistemological" paradigm in Korea's heritage concepts and policies. In his famous book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Khun (1996) explained that the paradigm is a holistic way of thinking about how the world is ordered, what knowledge is and how it can be obtained if possible. The study is the process of interpreting contexts related to the research topic and inferring answers to the research questions.

3.2.2. Postmodernism and research method

Postmodernism, which started with German philosophers such as Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, has been embodied into present-day postmodernism by French philosophers like Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard and Jacques Derrida (Fischer & Graham, 2014, p.29). Postmodern or post-structural ideas have been adopted by many researchers to study the core philosophical issues of social studies (Pascale, 2011, p.22). Grbich (2004, p.18) defines postmodernism as "the identifiable ideological position that developed from modernism, including further development of the ideas, stylistic communications and the perceptions and beliefs which began to dominate this era". Borrowing Grbich's view, postmodernism does not mean the opposite of modernism and has contradictory characteristics.

However, it also can challenge existing social discourses because it respects diverse viewpoints. In contrast to modernism, postmodern researchers approach knowledge and power as "dispersed, unstable and plural" (Tracy, 2013, p.42). The concept of postmodernism is that an assertion of knowledge should reflect circumstances of a "real" world and multiple views of class, race, gender or different groups (Creswell & Poth, 2017, p.26). The postmodern research process looks at social structures and established social discourses (such as morals and laws maintaining the power base of a specific group) as study subjects (Grbich, 2004, p.18). Furthermore, postmodern researchers seek to produce polyvocal research reports that express not only the researcher's voice but also the diverse voices of others in reporting or recording research results (Glesne, 1999). Therefore, no person or group is privileged over others (Grbich, 2004, p.25). Consequently, postmodernists may present a critical view of the modernity of heritage, as mentioned in Chapter 2.

Moreover, postmodernism is not opposed to science but emphasises the need for science to reflectively consider its limitations (Harding, 2004, p.27). It posits that truth and reality are understood as subjective perceptions through our own life experiences (Grbich, 2004, p.24). In research based on postmodernism, the inquiry into reality is "qualified" by recognising that the researcher's interpretation and discovery behaviour process is socially and culturally constructed and that further investigation is necessary (ibid, p.18). Therefore, postmodernists champion micro- and local truths that are from particular views and linked to the ability of actions (Brinkman, 2017, p.129). Postmodern thinkers see decentralisation and micro-politics as the dominant paradigm and understand interest groups, minority groups and social movements in local and situational contexts (Grbich, 2004, p.1).

In conclusion, these philosophical assumptions and perspectives provide research questions and may advocate research methods in this study. This study attempts to interpret the "public good" presented by laws and policies and the "reality" claimed by various groups, including authoritative experts, in a multifaceted context. Its implications are understood within a particular culture and social context. Moreover, within the framework of power formed in heritage practice, the study will trace the process of local community intervention.

3.3. Research questions

Research questions related to issues and theory are fundamental in the early stage of research (Tracy, 2013, p.22–23). The aims of the study are embodied in the research questions. Therefore, the research questions defined and refined through the conceptual framework suggest the beginning of the research design, including the research strategy and methods. Moreover, research questions "can and should be influenced by the field and are usually modified over time" in qualitative research (ibid, p.22).

Initially, this study also attempted to explore how local community participation occurred after implementing the heritage-led regeneration policy. However, in the process of understanding this policy, it was necessary to explore more deeply how the concept of heritage in South Korea and the activities of local communities have affected heritage policy in general. In other words, evidence was found that the government did not devise a heritage-led regeneration scheme and community participation for democratic or equitable reasons, but that local communities influenced the establishment of a heritage-led regeneration policy and their

participation. In order to understand this interaction, it was necessary to explore in depth the social and political contexts related to the study theme.

Therefore, this study examines community participation from institutions and policies to the current interactions and conflicts with other actors. It includes understanding various related contexts (mainly social and political), structures and actions. This approach reflects a connection of questions that go back in time. Why are stakeholders at odds? (Chapter 6). How did the community become a vital actor in the policy? Why was such a policy developed? (Chapter 5). Why did communities challenge heritage policy? How and why did heritage policy develop to be challenged in this way? (Chapter 4). The question of community participation led to a question about the heritage-led regeneration policy, South Korea's heritage policy and the concept of heritage in South Korea.

The research questions consist of three main questions and associated sub-questions. The first main research question is: "How has South Korea's heritage policy caused conflicts related to local communities?" This is a primary research question to understand the transformation of heritage policy and community participation in South Korea. In detail, the study will explore: 1) what the characteristics of the concept of heritage in South Korea are; 2) how the heritage concept in South Korea has been settled within historical, social and political contexts; and 3) how heritage policies based on that heritage concept have been developed.

The second main research question is: "How did community participation occur and influence the development of heritage-led regeneration policy?" This question concerns the role of local communities in transforming national policies and the state's response. Sub-questions are: 1) why the state established a heritage-led regeneration policy; 2) how the state and local communities have confronted each other in policy establishment and transition processes; and 3) how we can understand community participation amid national and regional conflicts.

The last key question is: "How do we understand community participation in heritage-led regeneration in the case of Gongju?" By discussing the following sub-questions, this study will examine the development process and current status of community participation in Gongju, which has set up heritage-led regeneration policy as its core planning measure: 1) why has community participation become significant in Gongju? 2) how has community participation developed? and 3) what issues does community participation face and why?

Research questions		Objectives	Chapter
Q1	How has South Korea's heritage policy caused conflicts related to local communities?	O1-1 What are the characteristics of the concept of heritage in South Korea?	Chapter 4
		O1-2 How has the heritage concept in South Korea been settled within historical, social and political contexts?	
		O1-3 How have heritage policies developed to cause conflicts related to local communities?	
Q2	How did community participation occur and influence the development of heritage-led regeneration policy?	O2-1 Why did the state establish a heritage-led regeneration policy?	Chapter 5
		O2-2 How have the state and local communities confronted each other in policy establishment and transition processes?	
		O2-3 How can we understand community participation amid national and regional conflicts?	
Q3	How do we understand community participation in heritage-led regeneration in the case of Gongju?	O3-1 Why has community participation become significant in Gongju?	Chapter 6
		O3-2 How has community participation developed?	
		O3-3 What issues does community participation face and why?	

TABLE 3-1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND TASKS

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

This study seeks answers to these research questions by carrying out the following research tasks. Here, the general research tasks are presented, while task execution strategies will be suggested later in the data collection and analysis strategies.

– Reviewing literature about heritage and heritage policy

– Examining the political, social and institutional contexts at a national level

– Illustrating motivation for community participation in the heritage policy

– Reviewing policy reports related to heritage-led regeneration

– Exploring the implications of the heritage-led policy and social contexts at the local level

– Tracing the political intention of the heritage-led regeneration strategy and the position of the community in the dynamics

– Demonstrating community participation and its impacts on policies

– Describing community involvement in heritage-led regeneration projects

3.4. Research development process

This section explains how the study is designed and what research method is adopted. The section consists of two parts: the research design and the research method. The research design will illustrate the research procedure and flow in a logical sequence. The research method section will demonstrate what method will be used as a logic of the research design. It will also describe the temporal and spatial scope of the study and who the subject of the field investigation is.

3.4.1. Research design

A research design is a plan and procedure that describes the various levels of decisions throughout the study, from assumptions to detailed strategies (Creswell, 2009, p.3). It is a framework for the research process, including the research aim, broad assumptions, research questions, selection of research methods, data collection, and analysis strategies and conclusions. It also can be understood as a structure to derive a result logically. Thus, the research design illustrates the flow of the study, outlines the main contents in each stage of the research procedure and structures logical relationships.

Although there is no settled structure on how to design a qualitative study (Creswell & Poth, 2017, p.49), all researchers start with a specific issue or problem, review the literature, raise research questions, collect and analyse data, and then write (ibid, p.50). This study does not deviate from these general principles as a process of the scientific method. The research aims and questions derived from my background and interest have been developed through a literature review. This process developed the research methodology, including data collection and analysis approaches, by expanding my interpretive framework.

This study's research aim, questions and methodologies have developed while influencing each other. Research topics and questions were re-established as they developed and revised according to the expansion of knowledge, changes in perspective and limitations in data collection. In particular, after conducting the first field survey, the research questions became more focused on the role of the community and governance rather than the types of community activities. The revision of research questions led to the revision of many processes, such as the research aim, literature review and research methodology. The process of data collection and

analysis also influenced the research method. In the beginning, the research method was a comparative analysis of British and South Korean cases. However, it switched to multiple case studies in South Korea for a deeper understanding of South Korea's heritage and policies. This was also a shared recommendation of the research progress review panels. Moreover, in this study, multiple case studies and single case studies are mixed. The policy analysis discusses four regions, but a single case study of Gongju for current community participation patterns and related conflicts is conducted. The reason for this mixed case study will be explained in detail in the next section, and Section 3.4.3 will explain the reason for selecting Gongju as a single case study. However, the research method shifted from a comparative study of many cases to an in-depth study of a specific case, and it is clear that field surveys and advice from peers considerably impacted this.

FIGURE 3-1. RESEARCH PROCESS.

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

3.4.2. Research method: policy analysis and case study

This research selects policy analysis and case studies to achieve its research aims. As described in the previous section, this study examines the interaction of community participation, a heritage-led regeneration scheme, heritage policies and the concept of heritage. For the reader's understanding, the order in this thesis will be the reverse of this. Therefore, the first research method to be explained is policy analysis.

The political analysis in this study is based on 'historical institutionalism'. Historical institutionalism, with sociological institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism, is a sub-theory of new institutionalism and is frequently adopted in political science studies (Bannerman & Haggart, 2015). Steinmo (2008, p.126) believes that historical institutionalists, sociological institutionalists and rational choice institutionalists all view institutions as rules that structure behaviour, but have different understandings of "the nature of the beings whose actions or behaviour is being structured." He argues that rational choice institutionalists believe that people follow the rules because they are strategic actors seeking to maximise their own personal or private interests, while sociological institutionalists believe that humans are fundamentally social beings, not selfish or rational, as rational choice institutionalists claim and habitually follow the rules. According to him, historical institutionalists, on the other hand, do not believe that humans are merely rule followers or strategic actors. Thus, historical institutionalism often emphasises the unintended consequences and inefficiencies of existing institutions, criticising the existing functionalist view (Kim Seon-Hee, 2020, p.18). Moreover, historical institutionalists define institutions as "the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy" and the range can be wider "the rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behaviour or bank-firm relations" (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.938).

From these historical institutionalists' views on institutions and human nature, they believe that political and economic crises can be historical junctures that form new institutions (Ikenberry, 1988) and explain social phenomena through institutions focusing on the interrelationship between actors and institutions (Kim Seon-Hee, 2020, p.17). In other words, due to unclear definitions of human nature and the range of institutions, historical institutionalists are interested in "why a certain choice was made and/or why a certain outcome occurred" in the historical contexts (Steinmo, 2008, p.126).

Bannerman & Haggart (2015, pp.5-6) argue that historical institutionalism specifically highlights three features of institutions: First, considerable attention is paid to the historical development of the system. In particular, institutional development is "path dependent" because future institutional change is constrained by the current institutional context. Second, institutions embody social power relations. Examining institutions and the dynamics of institutional change can yield valuable insights into power distribution within a given region and the marginalisation of specific interests. Third, ideas play a fundamental role in shaping actors' preferences and outcomes. The historical institutionalist framework presents an alternative perspective to conventional notions of ideology and class, positioning institutions as mediators of varied identities, encompassing ideology and class. This approach enables a comprehensive and nuanced exploration of these multifaceted dimensions.

Therefore, 'path dependency' is used as an essential concept in historical institutionalism to explain the institutional limitations and constraints and the structure of interactions (see Kay & Baker, 2015; Kim Seon-Hee, 2020; Bannerman & Haggart, 2015; Pierson, 2000). We often give meaning to previous empirical events and assume them as causes in order to understand how current policies were established and developed. Under the premise that policy systems are institutional "complexes" of numerous interconnected elements, gradual and moderate change can lead to fundamental change (Thelen, 2000). Since a certain theoretical framework is needed to identify and interpret causal relationships both between empirical events and between them and policy changes, path dependency provides a key framework for interpreting 'choice' and 'outcome' from the perspective of historical institutionalism.

Stark (1992) defined the path as the "process where memory (i.e. knowledge, experience, accumulated wisdom) can be passed from generation to generation or from actor to actor." And path dependency is directed and limited by 'possible corridors (range)' (Wilson, 2014, p.8). How something evolves or how a dynamic process is governed by its history is path dependent (David, 2007, p.92). Also, the institutional contexts that emerge within political actions structure those activities (Bannerman & Haggart, 2015, p.2). Recently, many studies have presented more detailed theoretical alternatives to complement the basic path dependence model by examining not only path dependence but also path creation, layering, conversion, and termination (creating new paths) (see Thelen, 2003; Alexander, 2001; Meyer & Schubert, 2007).

This study examines the concept of heritage and analyses the heritage policy following the path dependence model. It includes heritage policy generation (creation of a path), continuation

(dependence), revision (layering and conversion) and the creation of a new alternative path (or dissolution) in South Korea. It also encompasses an analysis of causal relationships between notable empirical events and changes in heritage policy over the past 100 years. This study analyses numerous policy reports, government announcements, laws, research literature, historical materials, news, statistical data, and images to understand 1) how heritage policy has been created and evolved based on what heritage concept within South Korea's historical (political and social) contexts and 2) why such institutional 'choices' and 'outcomes' have occurred by examining the interrelationships between institutions and actors in social contexts.

FIGURE 3-2. PHASES OF PATH CONSTITUTION.
SOURCE: MEYER & SCHUBERT, 2007, P.31.

On the other hand, the case study methodology of this study also requires clarification. A case study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 2009, p.18). The case study is often used for research focusing on "how" and "why" questions related to contemporary phenomena without manipulating the relevant behaviours (ibid, p.11). Moreover, the case study is beneficial to investigate community participation procedures, associated factors and the logic of relationships. According to George and Bennett (2005, p.19), the case study has four strengths: 1) potential for "achieving high conceptual validity" on variables hardly measured; 2) powerful procedures to support "new hypotheses" that are not considered by the researcher; 3) valuable methods for examination of the "hypothesised role of casual mechanisms (that operate only under certain conditions) in the context of individual cases"; and 4) capability to address "casual complexity" such as equifinality (the concept of multiple paths to a common end state) and path dependency.

Thus, this method can provide benefits to understanding community involvement, finding hidden obstacles, considering a unique social situation and accepting complicated relationships.

This study adopts both a multiple case study and a single case study. Case study methods can also be primarily distinguished as single and multiple case designs (Yin, 2009, p.47). The multiple case study could be considered more robust than the single case study by providing evidence from multiple cases (ibid, p.53). However, Creswell & Poth (2017, p.102) point out that the inclusion of many cases reduces the in-depth analysis of individual cases and that studying more than one case weakens the overall analysis. They (ibid, p.98) identified the characteristics of a good case study as providing a thorough understanding of the case and including a detailed description of it. Although the expectation of generalisability leads to the consideration of many cases, it is less meaningful for qualitative research (ibid, p.102).

Using both case study methods is related to the research questions. As shown in Figure 1-1 in Chapter 1, the questions of this study gradually narrow the spatial scope over time, from the Korean peninsula to South Korea to the four heritage-led policy implementation regions and Gongju city. This is due to the different dimensions of "complexes" found in Korea's heritage policy, heritage-led regeneration strategy and current community engagement. Except to explain the large category of Korea as a case, the heritage-led regeneration strategy implemented as a national policy is, in fact, only applicable to four regions.

This study investigates the four regions where heritage-led regeneration planning is applied to analyse the second research question; the interaction between the development of heritage-led regeneration policy and local communities will be discussed in Chapter 5. Though a multiple case study is often used for comparative analysis, it is not in this study. This is simply because, institutionally, the heritage-led regeneration policy only targets those four regions (see Figure 5-1). The study aims to explore the events that have occurred in association with the communities of the four regions, how communities have interacted with governments and professional groups, and how their collective actions have impacted institutional, policy and planning changes. Thus, there are few comparative descriptions of the four regions, and they would be a long way from the core point of the study of answering the research questions. Some might point out that this approach is not a multiple case study. However, similar conditions, such as the capitals of ancient kingdoms, the concentrated distribution of heritage in urban centres and the high level of heritage regulation compared with other regions lead to similar conflicts and patterns found in interactions between local communities and other groups. This

may be supported by the replication logic of the multiple case study highlighted by Yin (2009, p.54).

Moreover, the single case study is used to understand community participation; the third research question will be answered in Chapter 6. This study examines the implications of heritage-led regeneration policies in Gongju and how they relate to heritage policies and community participation. It also observes how local communities in Gongju have developed ways of participating and how conflicts with other groups have been formed. The reason for choosing Gongju as the subject of a single case study will be explained in detail in the next section.

3.4.3. Case study selection: Gongju

As mentioned above, this study conducted a single case study, Gongju, to understand the current community participation patterns and conflicts. At the beginning of the methodology design, a comparative analysis of community participation in two regions, Gyeongju and Gongju, was considered. The reason why the two regions were selected was that the Gyeongju community was prominent in the process of establishing a heritage-led regeneration policy (see Chapter 5), and the Gongju community showed the first and best performance in the policy implementation phase (see Section 6.2.1). Since this study also had to conduct policy analysis, the investigation of all four regions was never considered.

However, as a result, a single case study was adopted for Gongju for current community participation, though field surveys and interviews were conducted in both areas. The first reason is that comparative case studies may be beneficial, but the research questions focus more on path dependency to understand multidimensional interrelationships in the case. Since this research is also not concerned with generalisability, the study of many cases would be less meaningful, as Creswell and Poth (2017) noted above.

The second reason Is the ease of accessing Information and the quality of the Information obtained. A case that researchers may know is often selected because they can utilise their "special arrangement or access" (Yin, 2009, p.91). I had already built mature relationships with some stakeholders in Gongju before starting this study. From 2009 to 2017, I participated in the planning of the Gongju heritage-led regeneration plan at the Korea Research Institute for

Human Settlements (KRIHS). Therefore, despite the Covid-19 sanctions, I could contact various stakeholders related to the Gongju heritage-led regeneration scheme. It is a significant issue in data collection and analysis strategies 1) to use a better knowledge of the case from personal experience; 2) to conduct repeated interviews with six respondents (second interviews were not possible for four people due to COVID-19 regulations and personal circumstances); and 3) to obtain several documents that are generally difficult to acquire.

3.4.4. Time and scale of the research

The study examines meanings related to the community by looking back at the concept and policy of heritage from the past to the present. In detail, it takes an approach that narrows the scope of the study subject from the heritage concept that is shared nationally with the vision of communities in some historic cities and current community participation in a particular area.

FIGURE 3-3. SCALE AND TIME OF THE RESEARCH.

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

The narrowest spatial target of this study is Gongju city, South Korea. However, the study spans heritage policy at the national level, the heritage-led policy (Ancient City Preservation and Promotion policy) targeting four cities and the conservation areas of Gongju. Therefore,

the analysis process is gradually narrowed down from the macro to the micro level. Moreover, this study seeks to understand diachronically why and how the local community participated in South Korea's conservative heritage policy. Its focus moves from the heritage concepts, national policies and systems in the 20th century (Chapter 4) to policies for specific areas where community participation began around 2000 (Chapter 5) and current community participation (Chapter 6).

3.5. Data collection strategy

As a single case study, a data collection strategy is crucial to increase the credibility of the analysis. This section describes the materials the researcher selected and when and how the researcher accessed and obtained them. It includes a detailed explanation of the fieldwork and interviews conducted. Research ethics and limitations in the data collection process are also illustrated.

This study attempted to collect various data to triangulate data and build the chain of evidence despite the Covid-19 sanctions. First, the researcher tried to contact as many respondents as possible in a short period due to limited opportunities for field visits. As shown in Figure 3-2 above, the off-site interviews were additionally conducted due to a judgement that the evidence for specific research questions and the chain of evidence were weak. Moreover, since interview opportunities were limited, collecting various documents, records and drawings was also significant. There were also additional phone calls with some experts, with their agreement.

3.5.1. Sources of information

"There is no particular moment when data gathering begins" (Stake, 1995, p.49). Before this study began, I had been observing the target area for a long time in South Korea. I also secured certain documents and friendly gatekeepers. However, more data about the research questions were required in the research process. Therefore, interviews and the collection of other data were essential to the study. Data collection after the start of the study was mainly conducted at the time of the two field surveys, but additional data collection continued until the

end of the study. Collecting more data, replicating or triangulating provides higher objectivity (ibid, p.53), as data and evidence are always lacking.

Creswell and Poth (2017, p.160) classify basic data form into interviews, observations, documents and audio-visual data. However, for convenience, this study classifies data into ten types: interviews, books, academic materials, government reports, announcements of governments, newspapers, law-related documents, statistical data and pictures.

Research questions	Subject of investigation	Types of data (in order of importance)
How has South Korea's heritage policy caused conflicts related to local communities?	• Political and social contexts • The idea of heritage and heritage policies in South Korea	• Books • Academic materials • Government reports • Announcements of governments • Newspapers • Law-related documents • Statistical data • Law-related documents • Pictures
How did community participation occur and influence the development of heritage-led regeneration policy?	• Heritage conflicts • Heritage-led regeneration policy • Activities of local communities	• Interviews • Books • Academic materials • Government reports • Announcements of governments • Newspapers • Law-related documents • Statistical data • Pictures
How do we understand community participation in heritage-led regeneration in the case of Gongju?	• Local contexts • Activities of the local community • Implications of community participation	• Interviews • Books • Academic materials • Government reports • Announcements of governments • Newspapers • Law-related documents • Statistical data • Pictures

TABLE 3-2. INVESTIGATION SUBJECTS AND COLLECTED DATA
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

Interviews are one of the most critical resources in the later parts of this study. Various interviewees were contacted to understand the process of community engagement and secure the diversity of interview material, including former and present community association members, heritage authority officials, local government officials, former and present project planners, and regeneration project experts. Interviews were conducted nine times in the first field survey in August 2019, 11 times in the second field survey in September 2020, once online

in April 2022, and twice via phone calls in March and June 2022. A total of 16 interviews were conducted; 12 people participated in interviews, and six of them were interviewed twice. Seven interviews were conducted in the Gyeongju field survey in 2020, but they were excluded from the analysis (although mentioned only once in Chapter 5, they are considered to be excluded). All interviews were conducted with open-ended questions. In addition, interview data played an essential role in designing research methods and structures more than the subject of analysis. Analysing the interview data helped to develop the research methodology and to consider collecting more varied data.

Participants	Role/position	Date	Collecting method
Community members	President of Alleyway Revival Association	2019 2020	Field survey
	Manager of Gongju Ancient City Promotion and World Heritage Management Resident Committee	2019 2020	Field survey
	Secretary-general of Gongju Ancient City Promotion and World Heritage Management Resident Committee	2019	Field survey
	Former president of Gongju Ancient City Promotion and World Heritage Management Resident Committee	2019	Field survey
Government officials	Cultural Heritage Administration Management of the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Project	2019	Field survey
	Head of Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Team	2019 2020	Field survey
	Planning and management of Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Project	2019 2020	Field survey
Experts	Head of the Regeneration Centre of the Architecture & Urban Research Institute	2019 2020	Field survey
	Master planner of Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master Plan	2019	Field survey
	Former planner of Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master plan	2020 2022	Field survey Phone call
	Planner of Iksan Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master Plan	2022	Phone call
	Former master planner of Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master Plan	2022	Online meeting

TABLE 3-3. INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

Types of data	Source of data	Collection method
Interview	• Former and present community association members (4) • Cultural Heritage Administration official (1) • Local government officials (2) • Former and present project planners (4) • Regeneration project experts (1)	• Field survey (2019, 2020) • Online (2022) • Phone call (2021, 2022)
Documentation	• Books • Academic materials • Government reports • Announcements of governments • Newspapers • Law-related documents	• Previously possessed • Internet • Purchase • Acquisition from previous co-workers
Other data	• Statistical data • Pictures	• Internet • Acquisition from persons

TABLE 3-4. DATA COLLECTION METHODS
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

Documentation, such as newspapers, academic materials, policy reports, books, announcements of governments and law-related documents, also account for a large proportion of the research dataset. Except for pre-secured materials, policy reports were obtained through former colleagues, and books were purchased or obtained through library or Internet journals, like other academic materials. Newspapers, announcements of governments and law-related documents were mainly accessed through the Internet. For law-related documents, the Korean Law Information Centre web service provided by the Ministry of Government Legislation was used. Statistical data were mainly obtained from official government data such as Statistics Korea, Korea Press Foundation, the Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA) and Gongju City. However, statistics related to old newspapers were exceptionally extracted through the Naver News Archive, provided by the most popular Internet search engine in Korea. In the case of photos, they were obtained mainly through Internet websites and were also provided by interviewees who were former colleagues.

3.5.2. Research ethics in the data collection process

Silverman (2006, p.315) emphasised that the researcher is not a mere technician but a subject who must consider human issues such as values and ethics. He proposed four safeguards

for ethical research: voluntary participation, the confidentiality of speech and actions, protection from disadvantages, and mature trust with researchers (ibid, p.323). Concerning research ethics, this study considered the following matters regarding data collection, storage and use. 1) Before the interview, the researcher provided the research information sheet to the participants and confirmed their intention to participate voluntarily. 2) The researcher explained who they were and provided information about the study and the purpose of the interview to the participant. 3) The participant was promised that all data were to be kept anonymous. 4) Consent was obtained for the use and storage of data. 5) The participants were informed that they could request the deletion of words and actions that could cause actual or potential disadvantages after the interview. 6) The participant was also promised that personal information relating to roles and positions within the organisation would be anonymised when the study was published in Korean. 7) Other unofficial documents collection complied with the rules and conditions of the relevant institution.

3.5.3. Limitations and obstacles

Unexpected problems may arise during the data collection process. For this study, Covid-19 was the biggest obstacle. At the time of the on-site investigation, South Korea was sanctioning outside activities at a high level. In particular, Gongju, the study site, is an ageing city, and the death rate of the elderly due to Covid-19 at that time was high, making it practically impossible to interview people without going through the gatekeepers. Even when approached by the gatekeeper, some people refused face-to-face contact or even refused online interviews because they were older and not used to the Internet.

In addition, one community member refused to "sign" the consent form and voice recording because he was afraid it would be disadvantageous to them. Although he was a person who could provide important information in this study, he replied that the act of "signing" itself was "absolutely impossible", even though it was a consent form guaranteeing his anonymity or promising the ethical use of data by the researcher.

Apart from interviews, there were other obstacles to collecting documentation. Since the research case was in South Korea, many documents had to be collected online. However, the recently strengthened online security system often did not allow access from outside South Korea. For example, the latest GIS (Geographic Information System) data or documents

published by some public institutions were not accessible from outside South Korea. Fortunately, the data were obtained through acquaintances in South Korea, but this took a lot of time and effort.

3.6. Data analysis strategy

Analysing data is not a simple process; it is a complex process that includes organising data, a preliminary review of databases, organising coding and topics, presenting data, and structuring the interpretation of the data (Creswell & Poth, 2017, p.181). The collected and classified data could be direct evidence, but they were often interpreted as implying other meanings and intentions. It was necessary to collect different data again, and the analysis outputs were occasionally sent to another process to increase the interpretation's reliability. The collection of documents, other data and interview data was not sequential, and the collection and analysis of information were repeated in each dataset according to the analysis results.

Logic and Interpretation Development Direction

FIGURE 3-4. THE FRAMEWORK OF DATA ANALYSIS STRATEGY FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 1.
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

All research questions are linked to policy analysis. However, as shown in Table 3-2, Research Question 1 and Research Questions 2 and 3 use different data types. Research Question 1 does not include interviews and observations. In addition, Research Question 1 should explore the causal process within the long historical context of the 20th century. Therefore, the analysis strategy for Research Question 1 is important for the process of connecting not only current phenomena, but also past historical events and political and social

contexts with heritage concepts and policies. The first task was to look at how the terms related to heritage are used, and draw out issues. Next, the process of development of heritage ideas and related policies was examined in political and social contexts. Regarding heritage policy, Korea's modern and contemporary history is divided into four periods, as follows: 1) Japanese colonial rule (to 1945), 2) the dictatorship after independence (1945–1961), 3) the military dictatorships (1961–1993), and 4) democratic society (1993–).

FIGURE 3-5. THE FRAMEWORK OF DATA ANALYSIS STRATEGY FOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 2 AND 3.

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

The analysis strategy for Research Questions 2 and 3 has a more complex structure than that for Research Question 1. The analysis strategy finally implemented during the research process is as follows. 1) Based on the collected data, search for and collect valid data for the research questions, gradually narrowing the interview questions and the scope of the investigation. 2) Categorise the collected data (coding). 3) Determine hidden meanings and newly needed data by iteratively reviewing. 4) Describe cases and contexts based on organised

data. 5) Derive meanings by classifying and combining the described contents according to the research questions. 6) Consider whether the found meanings can be interpreted as evidence for the research question. 7) Derive more reliable evidence by going back and forth between data collection and analysis.

3.6.1. Data coding

All researchers have the privilege of paying attention to what they deem worthy of attention and an obligation to draw conclusions from meaningful choices (Stake, 1995, p.49). Although researchers cannot use only the data they want, they also cannot spend much time collecting and analysing data they do not need. Creswell & Poth (2017, p.190) describe coding as "winnowing the data" because not all information is used in qualitative research. They suggest reducing the coding category to five or six topics (ibid, p.190).

In this study, data coding can be either simple or multi-step. For example, in *The Ancient City Preservation White Book* (CHA, 2012), which is often mentioned in Chapter 5, events and issues related to the local community were selected as materials for research sub-questions. In the interview data, on the other hand, the study searched keywords within individual statements and categorised data using the keywords. However, it was noticed that each individual could approach selected keywords differently. Some answers were conflicting, depending on the respondent's situation, or might unexpectedly have a different meaning. Occasionally, various expressions and rhetoric of a respondent explained a single claim or issue. In those cases, the categories were changed, or collected data were moved to other categories.

Moreover, in the analysis process, all interviews had a data coding process two or three times after writing a transcript. For example, the obstacles to participation (the community members responded) were coded into 17 categories, which were then reduced to four categories. However, some initial categories required more detailed explanations or data, such as conflicts or heritage-led policy processes, or could be combined with responses from experts and governments.

Primary coding	Secondary coding	Revise and add
• Personal connection • Low level of consciousness • Lack of partnership • Lack of altruistic participation • Exclusive attitudes of some members • Lack of activity capacity • Age	Quality of community	Reorganised with 2nd field survey data added
• Selfishness • Ignored by the governments • Born and bred vs newcomer	Conflicts	Reorganised with 2nd field survey data added
• Subordinate relationship • Customary structure • Budget governance • Limited role and lack of opportunity • Exclusion tendency	Dynamics of governance	Additional investigation of hidden policy intentions
• Political bias • Outflows of capital • Mobilised as an administrative procedure	Administrative deficiency	Additional investigation of the structure of the policy

TABLE 3-5. EXAMPLE: THE CODING PROCESS OF THE FIRST FIELD SURVEY DATA

(COMMUNITY MEMBERS, OBSTACLES TO PARTICIPATION)

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

3.6.2. Reflexivity

The method of self-reflection on subjectivity in this study may be explained in the following three ways: reduction of reactivity, formation of rapport for honest answers and efforts for self-objectification. First, this study tried to reduce reactivity by not telling the participants the specific purpose or intent behind the interview questions. Ang (2009, p.457) argues that the interpretive act of the researcher begins even at the moment of data collection. Relationships and interactions between interviewers and interviewees during the interview process can also influence statements. Interference was minimised by presenting open-ended questions, and interviews were conducted so that respondents had sufficient time to answer questions in their own language. I tried to minimise the intervention so that the interviewee could continue to tell the story that he/she wanted to, even if the interviewee made a statement or asked a question that was beyond the scope expected by me, such as a private talk. Interviewees may highlight words and evidence that benefit them. This may contradict the

researcher's knowledge or be considered a fable. However, during the interview, I did not point this out and tried to obtain more information by asking interviewees to explain more.

Second, I tried to form a mature relationship to hear the interviewees' honest answers. Prior to the interview, the researcher's affiliation and the purpose of the study were explained via e-mail, and consent was sought again via phone call. I promised the interviewees that their names would be displayed anonymously and that I would not specify their job titles when publishing in Korean. Also, before asking questions in the interview, I tried to build a rapport by introducing myself and starting with a casual chat. Therefore, most of the interviews took more than two hours. Furthermore, I tried to obtain more candid statements by conducting a second interview with the same respondents one year later.

Lastly, I tried to objectify myself. This started by recognising that I could influence interviewees and readers in some way. This does not mean excluding the researcher's subjectivity but recognising my experience and the values that I pursue. The way statements are understood and interpreted is most decisive, and the ultimate political responsibility rests with the researcher (Ang, 2009, p.458). Thus, writing is "not only a technical problem, but also an issue of reflexivity" (Flick, 2018). I reviewed whether I was applying a biased perspective by coding the data and re-listened to the recorded interviews two or three times. Nevertheless, since an entirely neutral and objective interpretation is impossible, I tried to accept all of my supervisors' advice on the results of the analysis.

3.6.3. Validity

Triangulation, the validity strategy of this study, has probably already been emphasised several times. Triangulation is the combination of multiple theories, methods, observers and empirical materials for a more accurate, comprehensive and objective presentation (Silverman, 2006, p.291). When a qualitative researcher extracts evidence to support codes and subjects from multiple sources, they diversify the information and provide validity to the results (Creswell & Poth, 2017, p.260). As shown in Figure 3-4, this study established a chain of evidence extracted from various sources to connect it to the three major research questions. This is a process that shows that results produced through analysis may be used as consistent evidence for research questions.

	Key interview questions	Follow-up
1st field survey (2019)	• Current community role • Methods of community involvement and evaluation of them • Obstacles to community participation • Ideas to encourage participation	• Coding and interpretation • Revision of research questions • Collection and analysis of documents and other data (Chapter 4)
2nd field survey (2020)	• Background of heritage-led regeneration and its meaning within the region • Role of each respondent • Partnerships and conflicts • Background, assessment and change of community engagement • Obstacles to community participation • Reasons for each stakeholder agreeing to participate in the community	• Coding and interpretation • Collection and analysis of documents and other data (Chapter 5) • Check for insufficient evidence
Phone calls (2021, 2022)	• Complementary to the 2nd field survey • Current attitudes of governments and planning agencies towards heritage-led regeneration policy	• Gathering evidence of community activities • Heritage-led regeneration policy (Chapter 5) update
Online (2022)	• Public goals before and after establishment of heritage-led regeneration policy • Policy intervention of local governments and local civic groups • Conflict (law, policy, administration, groups) • Changing attitudes of local society • Evaluation of building traditional houses	• Overall review of the analysis • Additional data collection

TABLE 3-6. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND FOLLOW-UP

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

The data collection, organisation and analysis processes in this study do not proceed in one direction. The draft results of the analysis produced affect the following collection of data. Through an iterative process, the materials are re-coded and combined. For example, the analysis of the first field survey developed research questions affecting the interview questions of the second field survey. The materials described are subdivided and combined with additional materials, or they form other categories. This pattern was repeated in the third interview, the collection of documents and other materials.

This pattern may cause more tasks to be necessary, but it also validates the analytical procedure. Understanding the features of each piece of data and deciding which data to interpret well enable an effective analytical procedure. Table 3-6 shows the differences in interview questions and subsequent processes that led to repeated analysis and collection. Interview questions were repeated or added based on the results of data collection. Moreover, in the final online interview (3 hours) with a participant with the greatest experience and outstanding

reputation in heritage-led regeneration in South Korea, 13 multidimensional questions were presented on broad topics and specific issues.

3.7. Conclusion

This chapter describes the theoretical framework of the study. In order to understand community participation in the heritage-led regeneration programme of the Gongju region having a unique context, this study examines the implications of community participation, from the concept and policy of heritage in South Korea to social contexts, local features and the power structure in the heritage-led regeneration project. It adopts a qualitative research methodology within the philosophical framework of postmodernism and uses policy analysis based on the path dependency model and a case study method. Through research objectives, literature review, methodology, data collection and analysis, the study finds the implications of community participation in the heritage-led regeneration process. The study also sought to find objective evidence from various sources.

At the same time, this chapter also explains how the research was conducted. Although the philosophical assumptions and fundamental goals were maintained, the research methodology was revised several times. Research hypotheses have also changed, including reversing the causes and consequences of heritage-led regeneration policies and community engagement. Subsequently, the research questions and data collection and analysis methods were changed. Of course, regarding data collection methods, Covid-19 had a tremendous impact, but paradoxically, the development of these research methodologies may explain it well. The research objectives, the literature review, the methodology, and the data collection and analysis processes are all intertwined in both directions, and none of them was fixed until the conclusions were drawn.

Chapter 4. Heritage and policy in Korea

Chapter 4. Heritage and policy in Korea

4.1. Introduction

This chapter examines how Korean society has perceived heritage and how the state has mobilised it. The concept and policy of heritage developed in Korea after being introduced in the colonial era. By analysing the heritage terminology, heritage use and policies, the study argues that the state has chosen a "divisive heritage" strategy to maintain authority over heritage. This chapter explains historical, political and social contexts affecting the subsequent heritage-led regeneration and community participation. Moreover, it examines, in chronological order, the process by which state powers have defined and mobilised the concept of heritage.

This chapter is divided into three main parts. First, in terms of terminology, it examines how the word "heritage" has been used in newspaper articles, old books and statutes. By analysing the time series data, it describes how heritage, which had various meanings in the early 20th century, is now used as two separate concepts: cultural assets and cultural heritage. The second part presents examples in which the state powers that ruled Korea mobilised heritage as historical evidence to support their ideology amid changes in the political environment. Based on the examples presented, it explains that a series of political contexts stimulated the state power's desire to possess particular heritages exclusively. The third section describes how the state powers obtained formal authority over heritage practice. It explains how the state gradually strengthened its power over heritage through institutional devices and policies and how it developed the heritage power structure even after the end of imperialism and the Cold War ideology. In the last part, the conclusion, the research argues that the state's power over heritage has been maintained through the strategy of "divisive heritage" in the 21st century.

4.2. Cultural property or cultural heritage?

The terminology on heritage in South Korea varies depending on the context. However, the most commonly used terms are 문화재 (*munhwajae*: cultural property) and 문화유산

(*munhwayusan*: cultural heritage). Although the term "cultural property" is fundamentally a legal concept (Blake, 2000, p.65), it is used universally in South Korea's media and everyday conversation. Prott and O'Keefe (1992, p.319) argued that using the term "cultural property" is inappropriate even within the legal context. In South Korea, scholars such as Park Jeong-Hee (2008) and Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-Dal and Lee Na-Yeon (2019) also insist that "cultural heritage" is the preferred term, pointing out the semantic limitations of the term "cultural property". However, when referring to heritage in South Korea, the term "cultural property" is the most used, either formally or informally.

The number of articles from 1920 to 1999 provided by the Naver News Archive demonstrates an overwhelming difference, with 113,165 articles with the term "cultural property" and 11,116 articles with "cultural heritage".[3] Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-Dal & Lee Na-Yeon (2019, p.23) argue that South Korea's heritage idea is now, in the 21st century, on the path from cultural property to cultural heritage. From 2001 to 2020, Bigkinds shows a total of 72,369 news articles using the term "cultural property" in 11 main media. On the other hand, the number of articles using the term "cultural heritage" was 41,697, showing still a significant difference.[4] Looking at the number of articles by year, the gap is narrowing. However, it is difficult to say that "cultural heritage" is replacing "cultural property". South Korean heritage authorities still generally use the term "cultural property". In addition, among the 16 interviews conducted in South Korea, only one local activist used the term "heritage".

When the Cultural Property Protection Act was enacted in 1962, which excessively imitated Japan's Cultural Property Protection Act (Park Jeong-Hee, 2008, pp.79–80), the legal term "cultural property" was formalised. Although it was a term that has existed since the early 20th century, it was not a universal term and showed a semantic difference compared to the current terminology. For example, on 11th May 1925, in the *Chosun Daily* article titled 'Defects and Remedies in Modern Education' (Park Choi-Go, 1925), the term "cultural property" was used to mean traditional knowledge. And on 18th September 1928, in the article 'Dangun (the first founding father) and the eight emperors (삼황오제)' in the *Dong-A Daily*, "cultural property" was used as the meaning of old stories or tales.

---

[3] Naver is the most popular search engine in South Korea.
[4] Bigkinds is a big data news service website provided by Korea Press Foundation (https://www.bigkinds.or.kr/)

Instead, in the pre-modern and medieval eras in Korea, the terms used similarly to heritage were 고적 (*gojeok*: historic remains) and 형승 (*hyeongseung*: great scenery). Two historical geography records, *Survey of the Geography of Joseon* (동국여지승람) (Rho Sa-Shin et al., 1486) and *Revised and Expanded Edition of Survey of the Geography of Joseon* (신증동국여지승람) (Lee Heng et al., 1530) demonstrated "great scenery" and "historic remains" as important regional features along with the local history, administration and geography. In both documents, "great scenery" and "historic remains" were used similarly to natural heritage and cultural heritage, respectively. For instance, in the *Revised and Expanded Edition of Survey of the Geography of Joseon*, Vol. 17, Gongju city, Chungcheong-do, the famous beautiful mountains and rivers were illustrated as "great scenery" cited with a verse from Lee Ik-Bak's poem. Also, 28 historical places and buildings were described as "historic remains" in detail, along with related stories. Moreover, there were some cases where monuments were built on "historical remains" to commemorate historical events or persons, such as the current signs of heritage. The terms "great scenery" and "historic remains" were used until the early 20th century. The term "historic remains" was used in many survey reports and statutes during the Japanese colonial period, such as *Joseon Remains Pictures* (1915–1935), *Joseon Historic Remains Investigation Report* (1926–1938) and *Joseon Treasures, Historic Remains, Scenic Spots, and Natural Monuments Conservation Ordinance* (1933) (see Oh Chun-Young, 2018; Kim Ji-Seon, 2008; Jeong Jae-Hoon, 1985).

The enactment of the Cultural Property Protection Act in 1962 was the impetus for using the term "cultural property". In 1947, The Korean government proposed the National Treasures of Scenic Spots and Natural Monuments Conservation Act to substitute the heritage statutes used to extort heritage in the colonial era. However, the U.S. military government rejected the proposal (Kim Yong-Cheol, 2020, p.208).[5] In the end, with the enactment of laws imitating Japan's Cultural Property Protection Act, the term "cultural property" also began to be used as a generic term for various types of heritage. There were several reasons why the government at the time had to imitate Japan's laws and terminology. Koreans who were not in the pro-

---

[5] On 15th August 1945, the last day of World War II, the independence of Korea was confirmed with the surrender of the Japanese Empire to the Allied forces. However, the Korean peninsula was clearly divided along the 38th parallel in the same way as Germany. The Soviet army took over the northern part until 9th September 1948 and the U.S. army ruled the southern part until 15th August 1948.

Japanese group were excluded from colonial administration and lacked administrative experience during the whole colonial period. Accordingly, the existing elite bureaucrats succeeded the organisations of the colonial period (Jung Soo-Jin, 2007, p.348). Thus, the administrative system could not break from the colonial era after independence.

On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that Korea and Japan both have the linguistic custom of using the Chinese alphabet for professional terms. Most Japanese words are based on Chinese characters, and the term "cultural property", which was imported from Japan, is also one of them. The term "문화재 (*munhwajae*: cultural property)" is a compound word formed of 문화 (文化, *munhwa*) and 재(財, *jae*). The term "문화 (文化, *munhwa*)" can be briefly translated as "culture" in English. However, the term "재(財, *jae*)" has more complicated meanings because it is derived from the Chinese alphabet 才 (*jae*). Since it includes the sense of intangible talent or ability, it can be used in a more complex context in Korean. Although "property" is a word that can be used independently in English, in Korean it is usually not used alone but combined with other words. For example, the term "재(財, *jae*)" can mean money, goods, asset, capital, finance, wealth or treasure when combined with other words. 재 (property) is also often used as an uncountable noun in Korean. For example, South Koreans say "five cultural property", not "five cultural properties". When someone defines a word combining 재 (property), it can mean that he or she gives any form of value to the word in South Korea.

It was also possible for the state power to give particular value to heritage by defining the term "문화재 (*munhwajae*: cultural property)" in law. "Cultural property" was an appropriate term to confer on the state's immense power. In particular, 1962, when the Cultural Property Protection Act was enacted, was the year following the 16th May 1961 military coup, when the military dictatorship took power. The regime gave a broad and abstract meaning encompassing tangible and intangible heritage and natural objects to the term "cultural property". Cultural property could be related to anything that might be symbolised and utilised according to the needs of the state (specific cases of this will be presented in the next section). In this sense, the Korean term "cultural property" might be the most appropriate term for the state to intervene

extensively in heritage. Many heritage researchers in South Korea point out that the coercive legal system of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act may easily infringe on private property (Kim Min-Seop, 2019; Hong Wan-Sik, 2009; Jang Gwang-Gil, 2008).[6]

In the unstable situation after the Korean War, "cultural property" became an official term without social consensus. Heritage was focused on development rather than inheritance due to the needs of the state. The dictatorship desired a fragmentary symbol for the new "ethnic or national" image proposed by itself or its achievement rather than the narratives or multiple implications of heritage (see Choi Yeon-Sik, 2007; Choi Kwang-Seung, 2012). Lee Hyun-Kyung (2018) pointed out that the Korean government classified heritages according to fixed timelines rather than historical events. The state needed to cut off historical evidence for painful pasts, such as the decline of the late Joseon dynasty and the colonial era, and a basis to warrant strong state power (see Section 4.3.3). Moreover, one of the purposes of the Act was to prohibit the export of heritage overseas and to return cultural assets stolen by Japan and Western nations. The term "cultural property" was an appropriate new term as an object to be regulated and re-owned.

Therefore, around the enactment of the Cultural Property Protection Act in 1962, the legal terms for heritage began to be substituted by "cultural property". In the Japanese colonial period, the *Preservation Ordinance of the Preservation of Treasures, Historic Sites, Scenic Spots and Natural Monuments* (1933) stipulated heritages to be protected under various names such as treasures, historic sites, scenic sites and natural monuments. However, since 1962, those terms have been integrated into the term "cultural property".

Later, in terms of terminology, heritage was imported once again. The political changes in the 1990s significantly impacted use of the term "heritage". The military regime that had lasted since the 1960s ended in 1993. The new Kim Young-Sam regime emphasised "democracy" and "internationalisation" as a national vision. Since the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the Korean government has actively mobilised heritage to advertise South Korea to international society. In this process, the use of "cultural heritage" began to rapidly increase as "world heritage" began to be translated into Korean. The craze for World Heritage listing in South Korea in the 1990s shows how the state used heritage as evidence of the nation's

---

[6] The English title of the Cultural Property Protection Act has been changed to the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. This will be explained later in this section.

achievements, entering the world stage proudly with the achievement of democratisation. The Korean government has succeeded in listing 15 heritages as World Heritage sites: three cases in 1995, two cases in 1997, two cases in 2000 and one each in 2007, 2009, 2010, 2014, 2015, 2018, 2019 and 2021. Before 1995, no Korean heritage was on the World Heritage sites list.

The number of uses of "cultural heritage" in the newspapers, only 292 in 1990, surged to 1,331 in 1997 (Naver Corp, n. d), when the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism proclaimed the Year of Cultural Heritage. After that, whenever a Korean heritage was listed as a World Heritage site, the number of uses of the term "cultural heritage" in newspapers went up.

FIGURE 4-1. TRENDS IN THE NUMBER OF ARTICLES USING THE TERM "CULTURAL HERITAGE".
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR BASED ON NAVER NEWS ARCHIVE DATA (2021).

With many World Heritage sites listed in the 1990s, the term "cultural property" has been substituted by "cultural heritage" in national institutions and laws "when they are written in English" since the beginning of the 21st century. The Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA) is the central administrative agency in overall charge of public affairs concerning Korean heritage conservation and management. In 2004, the CHA changed its official English name from the Cultural Property Administration to the Cultural Heritage Administration. Since then, the names of many institutions, societies, and laws have all used the term "cultural heritage" in English.

However, this was not the manifesto of the change to the heritage concept in South Korea. The heritage acts, the national and public research institutes of heritage, most departments of local governments, and the majority of heritage-related societies still adhere to the term

"문화재 (cultural property)" in Korean. The National Research Institute of Cultural Heritage, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, the Buried Cultural Heritage Protection Act, the Korean Cultural Heritage Conservation Society and the Korean Cultural Heritage Policy Association are examples of this. The Korea Cultural Heritage Association, which changed its name from the Cultural Property Investigation and Research Institute Association in 2019, is the only exception. Recently, many heritage researchers have started to use the term "cultural heritage" (e.g. Lee Na-Yeon, 2020; Lee Hyun-Kyung, 2018; Kim Byoung-Sub, 2018; Kim Sook-Jin, 2017; Jang Min-Young, Park Seong-Hyeon & Lee Myung-Hoon, 2015). Oh Chun-Young (2018, p.101) criticised the term "cultural property" as an inheritance from the colonial heritage system. Nevertheless, the term "cultural heritage" is occasionally used interchangeably with "cultural property" but still, both formally and informally, has not replaced it.

Familiarity can be a large part of the terminological use. However, when we look at the patterns in which the state selects certain words for use in heritage policies and laws, it may be inferred that the term means more than mere familiarity. In several respects, it seems that the use of a word can be linked to the exercise and expansion of power by a particular group. The CHA tends to use different terms depending on where it has power and where it wants to extend its power.

The CHA became independent from the Ministry of Culture, Transport and Tourism in 1999 and was promoted to an administration from a department.[7] Since then, the CHA has enacted 11 additional Acts above and beyond the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. The number of national laws related to heritage has increased to a total of 12. The most pivotal Acts, such as the Cultural Property Protection Act 1962, the Act on the Protection and Investigation of Buried Cultural Heritage 2011 and the Act on Cultural Heritage Maintenance, Etc. 2011 still use the term "cultural property" in Korean. However, the choice of terminology varies in the other laws related to planning, such as the Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of the Ancient City 2005, the Special Act on the Restoration and Maintenance of Core Relics of the Silla Kingdom 2020, the Special Act on the Maintenance of Historic and Cultural Areas, Etc. 2021, and the Special Act on the Pungnap Earthen Fortress Conservation and Management 2021. These laws deal with clustered areas of heritages rather than individual heritages.

---

[7] In South Korea, a department is a part of a Ministry. This promotion means that the CHA has its own decision-making power and authority to use an independent budget account.

Although they deal with heritage, they include spatial regulation and planning previously dealt with in urban planning.

In addition, the terminological difference between the Cultural Heritage Preservation Fund Act 2009 and the Act on the National Trust of Cultural Heritage and Natural Environment Assets 2007, related to finances, implies how the CHA approaches differ. The Cultural Heritage Preservation Fund Act 2009 is directly related to the national budget for heritage activities under CHA control. It adheres to the words "cultural property" in Korean in the title. However, the Act on the National Trust of Cultural Heritage and Natural Environment Assets 2007 is an Act supporting private heritage activities. It uses the term "cultural heritage" in Korean. As an exception, in the case of UNESCO World Heritage sites, such as the Special Act on the Conservation, Management and Utilisation of World Heritage (2021), the independent name "World Heritage" is used. However, "World Heritage" belongs to "cultural property" under the domestic legal system.

This trend can also be seen in the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. The scope of heritage has expanded dramatically compared with previously. Heritage, first defined in 1962 by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, has now been revised to include more objects and concepts. It means expansion not only of a concept but also in the scope of policy influence. The CHA has expanded its influence by adding terms such as "registered cultural heritage" and "historical and cultural environment" to conceptualise extended objects such as undesignated heritage or surrounding areas. The CHA introduced the registered cultural heritage programme in 2001 to conserve non-designated heritage. Instead of enacting a new law, the CHA added the heritage registration process to the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. "Modern cultural heritage" was frequently mentioned to emphasise the necessity of the introduction of the new protection system. In *Registered Cultural Heritage System for the Preservation of Modern Cultural Heritage* (CHA, 2005), the CHA advertised that the targets of registration were being expanded from buildings or facilities to historical relics, living and cultural assets, and movable cultural assets. This programme aimed to conserve modern heritage previously considered difficult or negative heritage (e.g. colonial heritage) that was not in the heritage category. However, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act places modern heritage in a different category. Registered modern heritage is distinguished from a designated cultural property, and it is called "modern cultural heritage" or "modern cultural property". Although the term "historical and cultural

environment" will be explained in detail later in <u>Section 4.4.4,</u> this means that the Cultural Heritage Act also applies to buildings and structures surrounding individual heritages.

The change in the definition of heritage in the Cultural Heritage Protection Act also supports this argument. The Cultural Property Protection Act 1962 defines a wide range of objects as cultural property as follows (Article 2, translated by the author):

Article 2 (Definitions) In this Act, the term "cultural property" means the following:

1. Tangible cultural property: buildings, classical books, calligraphy works, ancient documents, pictures, sculpture, craft, etc. and other tangible cultural products of high historical or artistic value and other archaeological specimens corresponding to it;

2. Intangible cultural property: drama, music, dance, crafts technique, etc. and other intangible cultural expressions of high historical or artistic value;

3. Monuments: shell-mounds, ancient tombs, castle sites, palace sites, pottery remains, strata containing remains, etc., of high historical or scientific value, other sites of high historical or scientifically valuable remains, scenic places of high artistic or ornamental value, animals (including their habitat, breeding or migration places), plants (including their habitat), minerals and caves of high scientific value; and

4. Folklore material: public morals and customs relating to food, clothing, housing, occupation, religion or an annual event, etc. and clothes, tools or houses used therefore that are indispensable to the understanding of changes and progress in the national life.

Sixty years later, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act defines heritage in a broader and more complex way. Furthermore, it includes the facilities and activities associated with heritage and the spaces surrounding heritage ("protection zone" and "historic and cultural environment" distinguished by control levels) as policy objects. The current definitions of heritage terms in the Cultural Heritage Protection Act are as follows.

Article 2 (Definitions) (1) The term "cultural heritage" in this Act means artificially or naturally formed national, racial, or world heritage of outstanding historic, artistic, academic, or scenic value, which is classified into the following categories:
1. Tangible cultural heritage: Tangible cultural works of outstanding historic, artistic, or academic value, such as buildings, records, books, ancient documents, paintings, sculptures, and artefacts, and other archaeological resources similar thereto;
2. Intangible cultural heritage: Among intangible cultural heritage that have been passed on throughout many generations, referring to those falling under any of the following items:
    (a) Traditional performing arts and arts;
    (b) Traditional skills concerning crafts, art, etc.;
    (c) Traditional knowledge concerning Korean medicine, agriculture, fishery, etc.;
    (d) Oral traditions and expressions;
    (e) Traditional ways of life concerning food, clothes, shelter, etc.;
    (f) Social rituals such as folk religion;
    (g) Traditional games, festivals, and practical and martial arts;

---

3. Monuments: Those classified into the following categories:
   (a) Historic sites and particularly commemorable facilities that are of outstanding historic or academic value, such as temple sites, ancient tombs, shell mounds, fortress ruins, old palace ruins, kiln sites, and relic-containing strata;
   (b) Scenic sites of outstanding artistic value with excellent scenic views;
   (c) Animals (including their habitats, breeding grounds, and migratory places), plants (including their habitats), topography, geology, minerals, caves, biological produce, and extraordinary natural phenomena of outstanding historic, scenic, or academic value;
4. Folklore resources (Korean: "folklore cultural property"): Clothing, implements, houses, etc. used for customs or traditions related to food, clothing, housing, trades, religion, annual observances, etc. that are essential for understanding changes to the life of nationals.
(2) The term "cultural heritage education" in this Act means education that helps to cultivate an awareness of the people's love of cultural heritage and establish the identity of people through the learning of the historical, artistic, scientific, and scenic values of cultural heritage; and the specific scope and types of education on cultural heritage shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.
(3) The term "designated cultural heritage" in this Act means the following items:
  1. State-designated cultural heritage: Cultural heritage designated by the Administrator of the Cultural Heritage Administration pursuant to Articles 23 through 26;
  2. City/Do-designated cultural heritage: Cultural heritage designated by the Special Metropolitan City Mayor, Metropolitan City Mayor, Special Self-Governing City Mayor, Do Governor, or Special Self-Governing Province Governor (hereinafter referred to as "Mayor/Do Governor") pursuant to Article 70(1);
  3. Cultural heritage resources: Cultural heritage designated by a Mayor/Do Governor pursuant to Article 70(2) among those not designated pursuant to subparagraph 1 or 2.
(4) The term "registered cultural heritage" in this Act means the following cultural heritage, other than designated cultural heritage:
  1. State-registered cultural heritage: Cultural heritage registered by the Administrator of the Cultural Heritage Administration pursuant to Article 53;
  2. City/Do registered cultural heritage: Cultural heritage registered by a Mayor/Do Governor pursuant to Article 70(3).
(5) The term "protection zone" in this Act means an area designated to protect any designated cultural heritage, excluding an area that the designated cultural heritage occupies if a tangible object fixed on the ground or a certain area is designated as cultural heritage.
(6) The term "protective facility" in this Act means any building or facility designated to protect cultural heritage.
(7) The term "historic and cultural environment" in this Act means the natural landscape or any place of outstanding historic and cultural value near cultural heritage that needs to be protected together with the relevant cultural heritage.
(8) The term "construction work" in this Act means a civil work, construction work, landscaping work, or other construction works prescribed by Presidential Decree that involve a change to the original form of land or seabed.
(9) The term "Korean cultural heritage overseas" means any cultural heritage located within the territory of a foreign country (excluding any cultural heritage removed from the territory of the Republic of Korea pursuant to the proviso to Article 39(1) or the proviso to Article 60(1)) that has direct historical and cultural relations with the Republic of Korea.

Rather than abolishing the term "cultural property", by redefining it as an object in which state power can directly operate, the state legally set cultural heritage as a sub-concept with a lower conservation value than cultural property. Comparing laws at a national level and ordinances at a local level, this intent becomes clear. While "cultural property" refers to heritage designated by the state, "local cultural heritage" refers to non-designated heritage. The state formalises this hierarchy in the vertical administrative system. There are a few cases where the

term "local cultural property" is used, such as Geoje city and Goyang city. However, in most heritage-related ordinances enacted by most local governments, cultural heritage that has not been designated or registered as cultural property is classified as "cultural heritage". For example, non-designated or non-registered heritages are defined as "cultural heritages (Mokpo City Cultural Heritage Protection Ordinance)", "local cultural heritages (Gochang-gun Local Cultural Heritage Protection Ordinance)" or "protected cultural heritages (Mungyeong City Protected Cultural Heritage Ordinance)". Therefore, these official heritage terms have formalised the distinction between "cultural property" as heritage requiring national-level regulation and "cultural heritage" as that needing lower-level intervention. The state also delegates power over the expanded heritage category (cultural heritage) to local governments under the state's control. Kim Byung-Sup (2018, p.52) pointed out that cultural heritage has a looser standard for judging its value than cultural property. The state has chosen a strategy of segregation and differentiation rather than inclusive conceptualisation. This strategy maintains the state's power over selective heritage by transforming the two-dimensional concept into a three-dimensional one. The heritage terms selected by the state seem goals-oriented, although South Korean society could confuse those terms.

FIGURE 4-2. DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF HERITAGE TERMS.
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

Through the stratification strategy, the state authority over heritage is also validated. The term "cultural property" presents how the state classifies and formalises heritage as a policy object. "Cultural property" as a term from a state-centred perspective reflects state power as something that can exist above all heritages. Although there is no further use of the term "cultural property" in English, it still exists in Korean, both formally and informally. The potent combination of heritage and ideologies, the modernity of Korea's heritage policy, and the

centralised heritage power structure, which will be described in the following sections, will support this argument.

4.3. Heritage and ideology

Ideology can be useful in explaining heritage over the past 100 years in Korea, where multiple historical contexts have been jumbled. Borrowing Parsons' (1951, p.349) point of view, ideology is a system of beliefs shared by a social group to achieve group cohesion by interpreting the relationship between goals and processes. Heritage is a process of using the past (Harvey, 2008, p.19). Since the past, as shared memory, plays a vital role in maintaining group identity and strengthening cohesion (Halbwachs, 1980, p.84), there was no reason why power groups should not actively use heritage as a representation of the past. During the 20th century, new political powers such as the Japanese Empire, the U.S. military government, dictatorial regimes and democratic governments constantly appeared and disappeared in Korea. As a result, the entire system of society has changed rapidly in a short period. Korea has experienced colonisation, civil war, two coups, two presidential removals, democratisation, globalisation, rapid economic growth, a national bankruptcy crisis and decentralisation. All these happened during just one century.

If heritage is a discourse or process (Smith, 2006, pp.11–13), it is vital to understand these complex political and social contexts. Ideology can briefly demonstrate how they have affected the concept of heritage. In particular, when a new power that lacked legitimacy appeared, the conjunction of heritage and ideology was clearly and dramatically revealed in Korean history. Since pivotal heritage policies were established by state powers such as the Japanese Empire and the Park Chung-Hee dictatorial regime, understanding ideologies is significant. Thus, this section examines how various ideologies have been related to and accumulated the heritage concept in Korea.

4.3.1. Assimilationism, liberalism and totalitarianism: Japanese colonial period (1897–1945)

Many Korean historians define the ideology of Japanese imperialism in the Korean peninsula as "assimilationism", which was a form of governing the colony based on the "unity

of Japan and Korea theory" and the "mobilisation ideology" (Lee Na-Mi, 2003, p.62).[8] In the

Japanese colonial era, heritage was mobilised to enforce 황국사관 (*hwangkuksagwan)*, which

is a Japanese imperialist historical view. Understanding the historical relationship between

Korea and Japan is necessary to know why Japan emphasised *hwangkuksagwan* and

assimilationism in Korea.

Korea, located at the far end of the East Asian continent, has existed independently for

most of its history between the massive empire of China and the eastern island nation of Japan,

and had established nationalism and a centralised political system during the Joseon dynasty

(1392–1897). East Asian nations had formed an international order centred on China until the

Western powers actively advanced in the early 19th century. Since Korea is a long-time ally of

China and was trying to achieve a status similar to that of China, it called another neighbouring

country, Japan, "barbarians" and perceived it as a less civilised region, and was pursuing a

diplomatic policy different from that of China (Park Chan-Seung, 2010). In this East Asian

political environment, the Imjin War or Japanese invasions of Korea from 1592 to 1598 gave

birth to the concept of nationalism (Haboush, 2016). Westad (2021) also argued in his book

Empire and Righteous Nation: 600 Years of China-Korea Relations that the "nation" discourse

that is not identical to, but quite similar to, the modern European concept of "nation", has

existed in Korea since at least the 16th century. Since it was a strictly class-based society, it

seems closer to an ethnic nationalism that emphasised pedigree homogeneity rather than liberal

nationalism. At the end of the 16th century, Japan invaded Korea based on its enormous military

superiority. But the Japanese army suffered constant setbacks from the Korean volunteer troops

and was ultimately defeated with Chinese intervention.

In particular, the Korean volunteer army is a case that explains Korea's concept of "nation"

well (Haboush, 2016). In this historical context, Japan, colonising Korea, needed to instil a

Japanese imperialist historical view to reduce nationwide protests and armed struggles

throughout the colonial period. Since there were generally considerable gaps in civilisation

levels and cultural differences between the Western imperialist countries and their colonies, it

---

[8] The "unity of Japan and Korea theory" is the logic that "Japan and Joseon (Korea) are one or must become one". Policies such as a change of name, prohibition of the use of the Korean language, and forced worship of the Japanese emperor are representative of the theory. The Japanese Government-General of Korea used those policies to create a group that obeyed Japan while tolerating or even reinforcing discrimination and violence against Koreans. "Mobilisation ideology" generally refers to a type of propaganda that was used based on "nationalism" to mobilise sources and manpower for war at a time when Japanese imperialism turned into full-scale territorial expansion after the 1930s.

was relatively easy to subdue them by military force or economic power (Lee Na-Mi, 2003). However, Japan needed to emphasise a more persuasive logic than the Western approaches to colonise Korea, which had a more advanced civilisation in the past. In Joseon (Korea), where traditional Confucian philosophy is strong, Japan was seen as a less civilised nation that had received Korean Confucianism.

Lee Na-Mi (2003) insists that Japan demanded to develop a persuasive ideology to dominate Koreans who constantly protested and resisted, even though Japan mobilised force and economic incentives, compared with French and British colonial policies. The Japanese Government-General of Korea criticised nationalism and emphasised the liberal ideology that citizens could choose a new civilisation and power based on the social contract theory in the early colonial era. The Japanese Empire shifted this to nationalism, such as an anti-Western stance, establishing the new Asian order to mobilise resources for Japan's territorial expansion from the 1930s (Lee Na-Mi, 2003). This series of processes developed the logic of "we are originally one and must devote ourselves to building the new Asian order as one nation and one community".

Of course, Japan-centred integration was essential, and heritage was used as evidence to prove Japan's imperialistic view of history. At that time, Japan's heritage activities were focused on changing Korea's national identity. A logic similar to how Britain treated Newgrange, an Irish heritage (Harvey, 2001, p.335), was developed by Japan, which adopted Western civilisation. This represented the transmission of superior civilisation. The logic that Japan assigned to heritage in the early colonial era can be summarised as the claim that "it is reasonable that Japan, which was modernised based on Western liberalism, integrates Korea, which is in the same cultural sphere". Therefore, behind the liberal ideology emphasised by Japan, there is a discriminatory logic of Japan's civilisational superiority: the abolition of "oriental vices" and cultural reformation. By analysing the colonial view revealed in *Joseon*, the first Japanese magazine published in Korea, Jeong Byeong-Ho (2008) pointed out that the binary code of "civilised and enlightened Japan" and "uncivilised and barbaric Korea" had been continuously emphasised even before colonisation. He argued that this cultural code was the basis of propaganda as Korean management for "development" in Japan's colonisation process.

We use civilisation to decorate Korea, guide Koreans, and at the same time promote the proliferation, expansion and development of the Yamato nation in Korea. We create a

Korean peninsula like a dog or a pig as an ideal peninsula with a beautiful new Japanese style. It is the principle.

(*Joseon* (朝鮮), 1908, cited in Jeong Byeong-Ho, 2008, p.414)

Koreans do not call impurity unclean and do not call unscrupulousness evil. And they are very blunt about beauty and goodness. They are good at false statements and pretence and do not tell the truth even in trivial matters. The evil customs are deeply infiltrated, and the class notion is firmly established and cannot be eradicated. They are negligent and neglectful, dislike industriousness and strenuous efforts, lack the notions of order and discipline, and are very cold-hearted and lack sympathy. If you try to enlighten Koreans by insisting on having a good spirit, you should do your best to eliminate their evil and bad habits. It is because old customs bind them. It is because they are jealous and suspicious and lack a cheerful spirit. Today's Korean education is more urgent than ordinary education, which promotes the smooth development of human nature's functions. Above all, it is the most urgent task to break down the characteristics and habits unique to Koreans and arouse them to reflect and be aware.

(*Joseon* (朝鮮), 1908, cited in Jeong Byeong-Ho, 2008, p.415)

However, as mentioned before, it was not easy for Koreans to accept Japan's claim of the reversed "civilisation and barbarism" because Koreans believed they brought civilisation to Japan. Japan tried to emphasise the legitimacy of the "colonial" discourse through two opposing heritage policies. One was to gather evidence that Korea and Japan shared the same culture and that Japanese rule over Korea was historically justified. From 1916 to 1924, the Japanese Government-General of Korea issued the *Report on Historic Sites* or the *Special Report* every year (Jeong Jae-Hoon, 1985, p.2), but Koreans were excluded entirely from the processes of heritage research and management (Kim Ji-Sun, 2008, p.26). The investigation focused on the excavation and exploration of heritage sites that could suggest a close relationship with Japan and the Nakrang Kingdom region, which was controlled by China in ancient times (ibid).

The other approach was to arbitrarily reset the value of heritage to emphasise that the Confucian political order of the past should be abolished and that imperialism, represented by Western liberalism at the time, was a new civilisation to be accepted. Gyeongbokgung, the

Joseon dynasty's main palace and the symbol of Korean Confucianism, was the core of the capital city Hanyang (the old name for Seoul), designed based on the Confucian order.

FIGURE 4-3. THE BUILDINGS OF GYEONGBOKGUNG PALACE, WHICH DISAPPEARED DURING THE JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD (TOP: VIEW IN 1876; BOTTOM: VIEW IN 1951).

SOURCE: LEE GYEONG-HEE (2010).

FIGURE 4-4. ZOO AND MUSEUM IN CHANGGYEONGGUNG IN THE COLONIAL ERA.

SOURCE: KANG MIN-JIN (2017).

The Japanese Government-General of Korea dismantled about 400 palace buildings and distributed them to the Japanese people while constructing the massive building of the Japanese Government-General that covered Gyeongbokgung (see Figure 4-3). The Japanese Government-General also destroyed many buildings in the palace to build new facilities, including the Governor-General's residence. In addition, Changgyeonggung, another palace of the Joseon dynasty, was converted into an amusement park, including zoos, botanical gardens and art museums. Japanese cherry trees, the symbol of Japan, were also planted in those palaces (see Figure 4-4).

However, heritages as evidence of colonialism were few. Japan concentrated on destroying monuments and other relics that were evidence of the Koreans' victory over Japanese aggression and excavated tombs on a large scale to carry off the ancient relics to Japan (Oh Se-Tak, 1997a). To Koreans at that time, Japanese archaeological investigations were often understood as destroying and looting the tombs of their ancestors, which were valued in Confucianism (Kim Ji-Seon, 2008, p.33). [9] In addition, the liberal frame that criticised nationalism based on the social contract theory lost its power in the new modern nationalist movement, which represented the establishment of an independent state chosen by the people. After the death of King Gojong, the last emperor of Joseon, in 1919, non-violent protests (the March 1st Movement) took place across the Korean peninsula for three months. The Declaration of Independence (기미독립선언서) proclaimed in this independence movement emphasised the "differences" between Joseon and Japan. It also criticised that the Japanese imperialistic discourse was based on old-fashioned violence. This event became an opportunity to spread the modern nationalist ideology that independence had new moral values, breaking away from previous dynasty-centred nationalism.

Moreover, due to the overseas territorial expansion of the Japanese Empire, which began in 1930, Japan had to transform the colonies it had secured into war supply bases. Therefore, Japan, which had attained the status of a stable ruler, needed a new ideology to strengthen control and facilitate exploitation of resources. Ironically, Japan rejected liberalism as

---

[9] In Korea, on traditional holidays, many people still go to the tombs of their ancestors for ancestral rites based on Confucianism. People also hold a memorial service for ancestors on every anniversary of parents' and grandparents' deaths, and they go to their parents' tombs when they are in critical situations. My own parents, for example, go to the family cemetery at least twice a year and hold at least three ancestral rites at home. As the number of Christians has increased, these customs have declined, but Korea is a society that retains more Confucian characteristics than China, which is where they originated.

selfishness and began to put nationalism at the forefront of maintaining a totalitarian system. In this period, it was necessary to mobilise many materials for war within Japan. The Japanese government wanted to share the nationalism centred on the Japanese emperor in the Japanese islands and its colonies. The policy of *hwangguksinminwha* (converting colonial people into Imperial Japanese people), which enforced loyalty as the people of the emperor of Japan, was basically an education policy. It instilled the idea that the exploited colonial subjects could be equal to the Japanese through sacrifice. At the same time, it had the characteristics of a cultural policy that forced people to change national and cultural products, including language and personal names, into Japanese style.

During this period, Japan enacted the Conservation Order in 1933, which specified heritage preservation for the first time, instead of the Conservation Ordinance centred on research and collection, and officially designated and managed heritage in 1934 (Kim Ji-Sun, 2008, pp.42–45). Korean and Japanese researchers had markedly different views regarding this modern heritage policy. For the Japanese, this heritage policy was described as a contribution of Japanese imperialism that transplanted modern civilisation.

Before Joseon's annexation, no one loved ancient cultural assets and [there were] no national protection measures, so the underground was the only place to preserve them.

(Fujita Ryosaku, 1963, cited in Kim Ji-Seon, 2008, p.20)

In Japan, all-important objects are designated as national treasures to protect them from damage or destruction, whereas in Joseon, adequate protection methods have not been made. This Preservation Order made a sufficient way to preserve important objects by designation, which is extraordinary progress in Korea. It is fortunate [to be able] to study Joseon culture's history and preserve relics.

(Tadashi Sekino, 1933, cited in Kim Ji-Seon, 2008, p.22)

Conversely, many heritage scholars in Korea pointed out that the Japanese government used heritage to create the ideology for war mobilisation when Japan began to expand into overseas territories (see Oh Se-Tak, 1997a; Choi Seok-Young, 1997; Kim Ji-Seon, 2008; Kim Soon-Seok, 2014; Oh Chun-Young, 2018; Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-Dal & Lee Na-Yeon, 2019). The previous policy frame presented heritage as a relic that should be discarded and used up along with the Korean ruling power. In practice, it focused on making a list of items to loot

and mobilise rather than discovering evidence of Japan's and Korea's homogeneity through their heritage. In contrast, the new policy defined and converted heritage into evidence of the homogeneity between Japan and Korea and the representation of a united nationalism. The Japanese government emphasised that Korea was a part of Japan by giving the selected heritages a particular value to be protected. As a presentation of homogeneity, heritage was transformed from a symbol of reform to unity.

However, the Japanese Government-General of Korea excluded certain heritages from the designation, such as those related to Hangeul (the Korean alphabet) and the ancient history books of Korea that symbolised Korea's traditional culture. Also, the Government-General occasionally destroyed heritages designated by itself to expand war supplies or to build architecture with Japanese political and cultural symbolism (Kim Ji-Seon, 2008). Many South Korean researchers believe that the Government-General mobilised a heritage protection policy to support the Japanese totalitarian ideology.

4.3.2. Nationalism and Cold War ideology: Rhee Syngman dictatorship (1945–1961)

The Rhee Syngman regime in the 1950s, the Park Chung-Hee regime in the 1960s and 1970s and the military regimes that followed in the 1980s are regarded as dictatorships. There were varying assessments of the performances of the heritage policy, comparable to the regimes' economic achievements. However, projecting nationalism and Cold War ideology on to heritage, these regimes shared the political characteristic of symbolising heritage as their political legitimacy. A distinctive feature of nationalism revealed in South Korea's heritage activities during these periods was that it concentrated on "anti-communist ideology" rather than the "postcolonial". On the Korean peninsula, where liberalism and communism conflicted sharply during the Korean War, the Rhee Syngman regime enthusiastically combined "anti-communist ideology" with nationalism and reflected it in its heritage policy. In the 1990s, even over 40 years after independence, South Korea's heritage practices emphasised "postcolonial" nationalism.

Nationalism was an inevitable ideology required to establish a modern nation after Japanese colonial rule. After experiencing the threat of national extinction, the restoration of national identity became politically significant (Oh Chun-Young, 2020, p.69). However, the result of Japan's defeat in World War II did not mean complete independence for Korea but

division and rule by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. After that, South Korea and North Korea established their respective governments based on different ideologies under the force of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, respectively. Both governments still define each other as puppet governments in their constitutions.

During the three years of U.S. military government rule, the "national culture" to be newly defined and created in a new country was discussed by various social groups such as the existing knowledge elite, progressive intellectuals, resistance writers and artists (Jung Soo-Jin, 2007). However, amid the Cold War ideology and the Korean War, the U.S. military government and the new South Korean regime rejected progressive and diverse discourses about "national culture" and heritage.

> *... In this respect, the period of liberation [independence] for the three years before establishing the Korean government has a significant meaning. This liberation period was when various arguments and challenges were expressed in direct and visible speeches unprecedentedly around the cause of building a "national culture", which will be the basis for the realisation of the independent state that will soon come. ... [However,] after establishing the new government under the protection of the U.S. military government, the conflict to define "national culture" could not regain its former vitality, because the state monopolised the national culture to directly link to a tangible symbol of "cultural property"...*
>
> (Jung Soo-Jin, 2007, p.347 & p.357)

At that time, South Korea's economic system depended entirely on aid from the U.S. This was military aid to construct an anti-communist state and a means of controlling the South Korean economy (Park Chan-Seung, 2010, p.365). Under the strong influence of the U.S., anti-communist ideology became the basis of government. The Rhee Syngman regime formally emphasised the "anti-Japanese" ethnic doctrine. However, it maintained political power with the pro-Japanese police and military organisations that survived even after the colonial era (Park Chan-Seung, 2010). The Rhee Syngman regime wanted to emphasise a nation that was noble but endangered and had to be protected. Heritage was the perfect thing to be equated with that nation; and, to the state, the substantive enemy was communism, not colonialism.

Heritage needed to be more authoritative to project anti-communist ideology on to heritage efficiently. The "sacred" heritage was designated and protected by the state as the kernel and symbol of national culture. Meanwhile, it was associated with the "sacredness" of state power. At that time, the National Treasure, Historical Remains, Scenic Sites and Natural Monuments Conservation Association, newly established in South Korea, designated 592 heritage sites, including 436 heritage sites previously designated during the colonial period. This was also propagandised as a national event to realise nationalism as it proceeded simultaneously with the destruction of some colonial heritage (Jung Soo-Jin, 2007, pp.364–365).

The term "nationalism" was mobilised to equate heritage with the power holder and the nation (ibid). However, the ways used to manage heritage destroyed during the Korean War show that South and North Korea prioritised capitalism and socialism, respectively, rather than postcolonialism or nationalism (Oh Chun-Young, 2020). Oh Chun-Young (ibid, p.71) argues that they administratively inherited the colonial heritage system, although both Korean governments criticised the destruction of Japanese heritage in public. Moreover, he points out that both Rhee Syngman and Kim Il-Sung of North Korea (the first presidents of South and North Korea, respectively) tried to idolise themselves through heritage.

Amid the Korean War and extreme ideological conflict, there were various attempts to identify the "liberal state" with the heritage, a symbol of national culture. The Rhee Syngman regime in South Korea highlighted heritage as a nationalistic symbol and defined communists as ethnic enemies (Jung Soo-Jin, 2007). The regime made a distinction between the communists in the north and ethnic Koreans. The approach that criticised the communists as a problematic group and disconnected them from the people was similar to the early heritage policy under Japanese colonial rule. The government equated protecting heritage with saving the nation from communism and emphasised individuals' moral duty during the Korean War (Jung Soo-Jin, 2007, p.359). Newspaper articles of the time show this stance of the government. One editorial of the *Chosun Daily* in 1952 insisted that the North Korean Communist Party was the apparent culprit destroying heritage. It also insisted that the responsibility to protect heritage and fight against them also belonged to the people.

> *Then the Korean War broke out, and even before that, the communist "guerrilla" appeared, and its brutal military actions caused a lot of heritage destruction in the backwoods … The zeal of the relevant authorities is also 100% required for this responsibility. However, all of us should pay serious attention to the preciousness of*

cultural heritage, and each of us should protect it. In the future, we should not leave a reputation for losing cultural assets in vain because of ignorance and insincerity.

("Let's protect", 1952)

4.3.3. Nationalism and Cold War ideology: Military dictatorship (1962–1993)

The Rhee Syngman regime could maintain its power through constitutional amendments, repeated amendments to the election law and media suppression. However, when the fourth presidential election in 1960 turned into a fraudulent one that ignored even formal procedures, the pro-democracy protests intensified out of control (Park Chan-Seung, 2010, p.377). These nationwide protests, called the 4.19 Revolution, brought about the collapse of the Rhee Syngman regime. After that, the Yun Bo-Seon regime, which was in power for about a year, did not achieve any results, and a new dictatorship came to power through a military coup in May of the following year. In 1961, General Park Chung-Hee launched a coup d'état under the pretext of eradicating the political evils of the past and establishing a new nation, and formed the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction and the Military Revolutionary Cabinet. After that, he became president through an election.

At that time, modernisation logic dominated South Korean society (Jeong Gap-Young, 1993, p.93). Such logic, like "economic modernisation" and "modernisation of the armed forces", was the political basis of the Park Chung-Hee administration. The Cold War ideology was helpful for modernisation at both domestic and international levels. One of the propaganda items most readily available to the military regime that acquired power through a coup was the risk to national security. This was when less than ten years had passed since the end of the Korean War. The military regime enacted the Anti-Communist Act and established the Central Intelligence Agency as soon as power was handed over to it. Combining history, nationalism and anti-communism, the regime intended to conclude that loyalty to the state is a citizen's natural duty and aim. The National Education Charter, enacted in 1968, is a representative example of the military regime forcing people's loyalty to the state power by mixing nationalism and anti-communism. Until it was abolished in 2003, schools forced students to memorise the charter, and a ceremony was held on 5th December, the promulgation day.

We were born into this land with the historical mission of national revival ... Putting the public interest and order first ... Realising that national prosperity is the basis of my

development, I fulfil the responsibilities and obligations that come with freedom and rights and raise the spirit of the people to participate in and serve the nation by myself … The thorough patriotism with a spirit of anti-communist democracy is our way of life and the basis for realising the ideal of a free world. Let's create a new history through relentless efforts by gathering ethnic wisdom as hardworking citizens with faith and pride, looking forward to the future of a glorious and reunified nation that the road will pass down to future generations.

National Education Charter (Government of the Republic of Korea, 1968)

Diplomatically, the Cold War ideology was also the main agenda shared with the U.S., its most important ally. In the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. wanted to take the high ground in the confrontation between liberalism and communism that formed on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. quickly approved and supported the coup d'état in South Korea for building an anti-communist bloc, uniting Asian countries such as Korea, Japan and Taiwan (Park Chan-Seung, 2010, p.393). This was similar to the Marshall Plan, the post-war U.S. strategy in Europe in the 1950s. Moreover, anti-communism and the Vietnam War were used as diplomatic tools by both the U.S., which was in military difficulty, and the South Korean military regime, which wanted economic and military modernisation. When the Park Chung-Hee regime first proposed sending South Korean troops to Vietnam to President Kennedy, the U.S. promised to support the modernisation of the South Korean military and South Korea's export of munitions and goods (Park Chan-Seung, 2010). In the process, South Korea enjoyed special procurement demands, based on the sacrifice of 5,000 young men, and laid the foundation for economic growth from the 1960s, known as the miracle on the Han River.

In contrast to the 1950s economy that was devastated by the Korean War and that suffered from extreme inflation, the military regime mobilised heritage to represent its military and economic achievements while trying to break with its negative past. The Park Chung-Hee regime, which grasped power through a coup, showed similarities with the colonial-era Japanese rule in its approach to combining heritage and ideology. Although there was a clear difference between modernisation for exploitation and substantive modernisation, mobilising heritage approaches to present their pretext of modernisation and national development was similar. They criticised or denied history and heritage as intangible traditions and customs and then selected and idolised specific heritages that met their political goals. Considering that South Korea was substantially a one-person dictatorship until Park Chung-Hee's assassination

99

in 1979, his perception of history and the political situation he faced are beneficial to explain the ideology that the nation set in its heritage. As a former Japanese military officer, Park Chung-Hee's historical consciousness in the 1960s was generally evaluated as close to a "colonial view" (Choi Yeon-Sik, 2007; Choi Kwang-Seung, 2012; Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-Dal & Lee Na-Yeon, 2019).

Our history, like a storehouse of all evil, should rather be burned down. We cannot boast only of the vague regrets of the past or the age of weak history; unless there is a bold new start, our progress will eventually be hindered.

(Park Chung-Hee, 1963, pp.249–250, cited in Choi Kwang-Seung, 2012, p.187)

However, there has never been a time like those days during the Park Chung-Hee regime when the nation and features of ethnic nationalism were emphasised, such as ethnic democracy, ethnic revitalisation, national modernisation, Korean ethnic nationalism or ethnic independence (Jeon Jae-Ho, 1999, p.89). Scholars such as Jeon Jae-Ho (1999), Choi Yeon-Sik (2007) and Choi Kwang-Seung (2012), who studied the nationalism of the Park Chung-Hee regime, points out that the regime itself – and furthermore, Park Chung-Hee as an individual – was South Korea's largest producer of the nationalism discourse. Resistance via ethnic nationalism, which was the basis of independence for the ruled class during the colonial era, became a tool of the group in power in the 1960s to distinguish between us and other groups, the future and the past. To accomplish the revolution he had planned, Park Chung-Hee had to once again appeal to the nation's communal destiny and mobilise the nation and the people, although he had defined and rejected Korean history as regressive and dishonest to justify the coup d'état (Choi Yeon-Sik, 2007, p.50).

Therefore, the Park Chung-Hee regime put forward its legitimacy and goals on heritage. One of the most straightforward approaches was to reproduce the stories of heroes of the past that could present a new "ethnic image" they had set. By emphasising Yi Sun-Sin (the hero of the Imjin War) and Sejong (the creator of Hangeul, the Korean alphabet), Park Chung-Hee tried to project his legitimacy from their greatness as leaders. Admiral Yi Sun-Sin was the commander-in-chief of the navy during the Imjin War in the 16th century. He was a legendary general who led Korea to victory in dozens of naval battles despite internal political conspiracies. King Sejong was the enlightened monarch who invented the easy-to-learn Korean alphabet to replace the more difficult Chinese script. He also created Hangeul alone and led the

golden age of Joseon in the face of opposition from China and his subjects. Choi Yeon-Sik (2007) argued that Park Chung-Hee mobilised Lee Sun-Sin to criticise vested political groups who were incompetent and possessed a sense of inferiority, and symbolised Sejong as a great leader who could educate the people to achieve national prosperity.

> *For Park Chung-Hee, there was a clear distinction between heritage that should be discarded and ethnic heritage that should be inherited. Yi Sun-Sin and Sejong were recognised as ethnic heroes by Park Chung-Hee because they could be used as symbols of modernisation. In other words, Park Chung-Hee's perception of the nation was dichotomous and biased.*
>
> (Choi Yeon-Sik, 2007, p.60)

The heritage of the heroes that Park Chung-Hee chose was expanded and created. Those heroes' national achievements were projected into the regime's feats as better military or society-building accomplishments than North Korea, according to the Cold War ideology. Yi Sun-Sin is by far the most respected soldier in Korea. For Park Chung-Hee, he was more than a hero simply respected as a former soldier. A statue of Admiral Yi Sun-Sin was erected in front of the Gwanghwamun gate, in the heart of Seoul, and the Hyeonchungsa, a shrine to him, was designated as national heritage in 1966. This shrine was built in the early 18th century and reconstructed in 1932. The regime relocated the original shrine to construct a new, grander one built with modern methods in the original place. Both new and old shrines were designated as national heritage.

Moreover, Park Chung-Hee himself wrote the building's signboard. In traditional Korean architecture, a signboard was hung on buildings like a name tag. Park Chung-Hee also hung signboards in his handwriting at the Gwanghwamun and Samilmun gates, which he ordered to be restored. The Gwanghwamun is the main gate of Gyeongbokgung, the main palace of the Joseon dynasty, and it symbolises national legitimacy; while the Samilmun is the main gate of Tapgol Park, where the March 1st movement, the most significant national resistance movement during the Japanese colonial era, began. The Korean Constitution specifies the March 1st movement as the beginning of the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, the predecessor of the current Korean government.[10] In other words, he

---

[10] The preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea begins as follows: "We, the people of Korea, proud of a resplendent history and traditions dating from time immemorial, upholding the cause of the Provisional Republic

attached a name tag in his handwriting while restoring the heritage, representing the nation and ethnic Koreans. Since then, in the 21st century, all three signboards have been engulfed in controversy. In addition, heritage restoration projects were often referred to as cultural property "sanctuary" projects in this period. The Park Chung-Hee regime also defined heritage as a sacred thing. After newspapers first used the term "sanctuary" in 1966, the term "cultural property sanctuary project" continued to appear until 1995.[11]

> *On the 13th, President Park Chung-Hee designated the Hyeonchungsa Temple in Asan,*
> *Chungnam, as a national treasure and instructed officials to make it a sanctuary where*
> *the whole people could admire and respect the military service of Yi Sun-Sin.*
>
> ("Ordered the", 1966)

In the 1970s, Park Chung-Hee's view of history, which looked at Korea's history as an "object of refusal" to rationalise the legitimacy of the coup d'état, started to change. Based on confidence in rapid growth, willingness to win the competition with North Korea during the Cold War and the unstable political situation of a long-term dictatorship,[12] the regime attempted to emphasise the nation's glorious history (Choi Kwang-Seung, 2012).

> *By interpreting the history of the nation as a subjective perspective and by revealing*
> *how patiently the Korean people have maintained life amidst the suffering and history, we*
> *tried to autonomously find the source of the power that will unite our present and*
> *tomorrow with the past to accomplish the tasks that we face responsibly. Thus, we found*
> *the basis to view our history positively with hopes and expectations.*
>
> (Park Chung-Hee, 1971, p.270, cited in Choi Kwang-Seung, 2012, p.187)

The heritage practices of the Park Chung-Hee regime also remind us of those of the Japanese imperialists, in that they wanted to instil the ideology they desired through heritage. Both power groups created a new symbol of power in the heart of Seoul that replaced the

---

of Korea Government born of the March First Independence Movement of 1919 and the democratic ideals of the April Nineteenth Uprising of 1960 against injustice, having assumed the mission of democratic reform and peaceful unification of our homeland and having determined to consolidate national unity with justice, humanitarianism and brotherly love …"

[11] Naver News Library (Naver Corp, n.d).

[12] The constitutional amendment that made it possible for the president to be reappointed in 1969 and the announcement of the "October Reformation" in 1972, which allowed the president to rule for life with all administrative, legislative and judicial powers, accelerated public backlash and resistance. In particular, the "October Reformation" was an unconstitutional measure that practically removed the political freedom of citizens, including indirect presidential election, the president's right to appoint one-third of the National Assembly and all the judiciary, and the right to take emergency measures and dissolve the National Assembly.

previous one. During the colonial period, Japan intended to replace the Gyeongbokgung Palace of Joseon with the Government-General of Korea building. The military regime, which rejected the colonial and Joseon eras, restored the Gwanghwamun gate in front of the Government-General building, and Park Chung-Hee engraved his name on the newly created history of "reconstruction of the nation".

FIGURE 4-5. THE BUILDING OF A NEW POLITICAL SYMBOL, WITH THE RELOCATION OF THE GWANGHWAMUN GATE DURING THE JAPANESE COLONIAL ERA (LEFT) AND THE RESTORATION OF THE GWANGHWAMUN GATE IN 1969 (RIGHT).

SOURCE: "THE END" (2016).

Moreover, amid the ideological confrontation with North Korea that had reached extremes, South Korea's rapid economic growth had heightened the North's sense of crisis. With North Korea's rapid increase in military actions around 1967 and the backlash resulting from the constitutional amendment for a long-term dictatorship around 1970, the military dictatorship sought an object to symbolise its anti-communist ideology and the necessity of a military regime. In that respect, Gyeongju was the most appropriate place. Gyeongju was the capital city of Silla, the last nation to develop during the ancient Three Kingdoms era but which unified the three kingdoms. Silla was an ancient kingdom in South Korea, and Gyeongju is in Gyeongsangbuk-do province, the hometown of Park Chung-Hee.

> *In the 1970s, the national project for repairing and restoring cultural properties was carried out grandly. Cultural property repairers call that period the "golden age". In addition to maintaining cultural properties, extensive excavations of important relics were implemented. Relics such as the famous Gyeongju Hwangnamdae-Chong and Hwangnyongsa Temple were excavated during this period.*
>
> (Oh Chun-Young, 2020, p.72)

Choi Kwang-Seung (2012) describes that the South Korean government derided North Korea as a puppet force that destroyed national traditions, and the North Korean government

disparaged South Korea as a servant of American imperialism. The Park Chung-Hee regime intended to show that it was the only government with national legitimacy to unify a divided country by emphasising the Silla-led unification history (Choi Kwang-Seung, 2012). Through the testimony of refugees from North Korea, he also found out that North Korea only teaches the history of the countries founded in the North Korean region. Thus, in contrast, the centre of ancient history in North Korea is Goguryeo, militarily more powerful than any other southern kingdom.

Kim Won (2013), a political historian, also criticised the construction in 1976 of a large-scale shrine, Unification Hall (통일전), to honour the heroes and their Hwarang spirit who contributed to the unification of the three kingdoms by Silla for the very political purpose of "let's achieve unification with the spirit of Hwarang". Hwarang was a warrior organisation made up of young people in the Silla era, and the "spirit of Hwarangdo" was to serve the nation by training individuals physically and mentally. The story of Hwarang Gwanchang represents self-sacrificing loyalty for a unified nation.[13]

The Park Chung-Hee regime tried to emphasise the necessity of unification by grafting the ideology of the Hwarang in the Silla period to its anti-communist ideology. The regime attempted to retell Silla's history as evidence of its competitive advantage over North Korea. In 1971, Park Chung-Hee strongly pushed for the Gyeongju Ancient City Development Project. By borrowing a $25 million loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now the World Bank), the government set the project budget equivalent at about 5.5% of the national budget in 1971 (Kang Hee-Jeong, 2021, p.391), and Park Chung-Hee delivered guidelines for the development plan drawn up by himself to the agency.

At that time, South Korea was still an economically poor country. Investing that amount of money shows how much the regime emphasised heritage. The Park Chung-Hee regime is still blamed for giving up national pride and rights to give indemnity to Japan for Japanese economic aid and loans. The 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between South Korea and Japan was an agreement that was beneficial to the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. wanted to establish an

---

[13] In the battle against Baekje, Gwanchang, a young boy who fought bravely at the front, was captured, but Baekje's famous General Gyebaek praised him for his bravery and released him. Young Gwanchang, who was ashamed of this, continued to charge into the enemy camp. General Gyebaek, who released him several times, finally killed Gwanchang. The Silla army, seeing the young Gwanchang returned as a corpse on his horse, fought desperately. As a result, the Silla army, which had been defeated in a series of battles, achieved victory and destroyed the Baekje kingdom.

anti-communist bloc in Asia with the alliance of South Korea and Japan. This allowed Japan to resolve the question of compensation for its aggression at a low cost. On the other hand, in South Korea, it caused the declaration of martial law due to fierce opposition from every part of society. Although there was a corruption scandal in which Japanese companies provided political funds to the regime, the Korean government needed the money despite the humiliation. Even though the country was impoverished, the Park Chung-Hee regime, criticised for being pro-Japanese and immoral, tried to display the nationalism he had established, based on anti-communist ideology, through the Gyeongju Advanced Development Project.

FIGURE 4-6. PARK CHUNG-HEE'S HANDWRITTEN GUIDELINES FOR THE GYEONGJU DEVELOPMENT PLAN. SOURCE: SONG JONG-WOOK (2021).

He attempted to represent two things through the project: the history of Silla, symbolising the unification of Korea, on which the South Korean government was focusing, and the figure of a heroic leader achieving modernisation at the forefront of ideological confrontation in the Cold War era. Representing this anti-communist ideology through heritage was carried out to justify the military dictatorship's coup d'état and long-term rule. The regime often used the term "purification" for its heritage projects. Heritage, the state and the dictator needed to share

the same concept of "sacredness and essence". In the "restoration and purification of cultural property projects", Park Chung-Hee selected only the history and figures necessary for nationalism and anti-communism that he defined, and the cultural policy and heritage sanctuary work were highlighted more as the long-term dictatorship progressed (Choi Gwang-Seung, 2012).

In the 1960s and 1970s, there were 1,100 state-designated tangible heritage sites, including national treasures, treasures and historic sites. Among them, there are 140 heritage sites located in Gyeongju (about 12.7%) and 348 heritages relating to Silla (about 31.6%).[14] The number of national tangible heritage sites tripled to 3,139 in 2021. However, the proportions dropped to about 6.6% (208 heritages in Gyeongju) and about 15.0% (470 heritages in Silla), respectively. The difference is even more significant when compared with the tangible heritage designated by the state after Park Chung-Hee's death. The proportion of heritage in Gyeongju accounts for about 4.4%, and that relating to Silla accounts for about 8.2%, about one-third of the level of the period of the Park Chung-Hee regime. Also, after excavating many tombs in Gyeongju and restoring many heritages, Park Chung-Hee erected monuments emphasising his achievements. In particular, Choi Gwang-Seung (2012) claimed that the Gyeongju Ancient City Development Project was completely the product of Park Chung-Hee's individual thoughts and will and that damage to heritage was inevitable because many relics were excavated and uniformly restored in a short period according to his preferences.

Even after Park Chung-Hee was assassinated in 1979, a new military force led by Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo emerged and took control of the government. In 1980, the new military regime arrived by tank, seizing Seoul by force, and succeeded in taking power by imprisoning key democratic politicians. Afterwards, Chun Doo-Hwan took office as president by indirect election. While Roh Tae-Woo became president in 1988, the military regimes held power until 1993.

The new military regimes, lacking legitimacy, also actively used anti-communist ideology to maintain power. The Chun Doo-Hwan regime suppressed the democratisation movement in Gwangju by force on 18th May 1980. At that time, the justification for the massacre of protesters (ordinary people) was the sweeping up of violent groups led by a "rebellious element" and "resident spies" (referring to the martial law statement by commander Lee Hee-Seong in

---

[14] Data from CHA (2000). National Cultural Heritage Portal. https://www.heritage.go.kr.

1980). The Roh Tae-woo regime also emphasised the North Korean threat, even though it established diplomatic ties with communist countries such as Hungary, the Soviet Union and China (Park Chan-Seung, 2010). The ideological goals of cultural policy and the contents of cultural projects during this period were also substantively inherited from the previous dictatorial government (Jeong Gap-Young, 1993, p.104). "Creating a new history in a new era", the representative slogan of cultural policy at the time, reveals the paradox of the new military regime. Like the Park Chung-Hee regime, they tried to emphasise the legitimacy of rule by recreating a new "past" and regulations to protect the nation and its people from the North Korean threat. In this period, the government started strengthening its power over heritage and expanding heritage policy even more than before, as will be described in Section 4.4.3. Nationalism that was covered in anti-communism began to be converted into nationalism that emphasised the "ethnic nation" rather than national security only after the end of the military regime.

4.3.4. Anti-Japanese nationalism: democratic government (1993–)

Although almost all Koreans are furious at Japanese imperialism, the pro-Japanese faction has not been eliminated from Korean history, mainly due to the American political stance following the Cold War. Park Chan-Seung (2010) viewed that the U.S. response was the decisive cause of the collapse of the Rhee Syngman regime in 1960 and the success of the Park Chung-Hee regime's coup. The U.S. ignored the collapse of the Rhee Syngman regime, which emphasised an anti-Japanese stance even though it was just a formal gesture, and recognised the seizure of power by Park Chung-Hee, a former Japanese soldier. Indeed, anti-communism was a more attractive ideology for the U.S. than nationalism against Japan to maintain the U.S.'s influence on the Korean peninsula. In the 1950s, the surplus resources of the U.S. military base were almost the only means of accumulating wealth. Since the U.S. has exerted enormous military and economic influence on South Korea (Park Chan-Seung, 2010), anti-communism was an ideal position even for the military regime in both domestic and international circumstances.

However, the Cold War competition reached its end internationally in the 1990s due to the collapse of the communist system. This was also when democratic power succeeded the 30 years of military regimes, which emphasised the threat of war in Korea. Economically, as South

Korea gained a firm advantage over North Korea, the competition with communism was practically over. As part of these changes in the social environment, the new Kim Young-Sam government emphasised the eradication of corruption of the previous military regimes and extensive reform of society. The reforms also included historical ideology.

The ideology chosen by Kim Young-Sam, the most prominent politician and the leader of the struggle for democracy during the 30-year military regime, was also exclusive nationalism. However, the target of exclusion was no longer North Korea but Japan and the surviving power group in the military. The Rectifying History Movement (역사 바로세우기 운동), which began as soon as the Kim Young-Sam regime came to power, was a political act to clear up the history that Japan and the military regime had manipulated. To the Kim Young-Sam regime, both the Japanese Empire and the military regimes were oppressors who violated national autonomy.

The regime wanted to liquidate the "new history" created by oppressors while denying the past. The "new history" was "distorted history" to Kim Young-Sam. The specific method used by the regime was punishment. First and foremost, it removed political groups in the military and arrested two former presidents, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, who suppressed the democratisation movement. However, since there was no way to punish Japan after 40 years of independence, the colonial heritage, representing an unfortunate history, became the subject of punishment.

The Kim Young-Sam regime also advocated nationalism emphasising the nation, and actively mobilised heritage in its politics. However, the nationalism of the new regime was different from previous ideologies. The military dictatorships used nationalism based on anti-communism. In contrast, the new democratic regime saw the punishment of the perpetrators in history as the beginning of correct nationalism. In particular, President Kim Young-Sam wanted to emphasise that he was the one who restored the history distorted by Japan and the military regimes. The demolition of the Japanese Government-General of Korea building was an obvious example of how the new elected power dealt with a heritage that was evidence of distorted history. In 1995, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of independence, this building, the symbol of Japanese rule, was demolished, and the restoration of the Gyeongbokgung Palace, a symbol of the history of the Joseon dynasty, was underway.

When the Japanese government heard of the demolition plan, it offered to relocate the building to Japan. But President Kim Young-Sam dynamited the building, saying, "I will teach Japan manners" ("The Japanese", 1995). Although the building was indeed built in front of the palace to tarnish the meaning of the Joseon dynasty, it was the most significant modern building remaining in South Korea at the time. It had a high architectural and historical value at the centre of colonial and modern history, and in any case also represented heritage. After the Korean War, due to economic difficulties, the building was used as the central office of the government in the 1960s and 1970s. After repairs in the 1980s, it was used again as the National Museum of Korea (Lee Hyun-Kyung, 2018, p.178). However, just as communist East Germany demolished the royal Prussian palace in Berlin in 1950, the Japanese Government-General of Korea building was blown up in the name of "cleaning the distorted past".

President Kim Young-Sam insisted that it was wrong to preserve the cultural properties, the essence of the nation, in the Japanese Government-General of Korea building (museum), which was a symbolic place of national oppression. The dismantled spire and remnants of the building were intentionally relocated to the lower shaded area of the Independence Hall (Oh Chun-Young, 2020, p.73); and the remaining 17,500 tonnes of debris were classified as building materials and garbage, and disappeared (CHA, 2011, pp.412–413).

The Kim Young-Sam regime, which ended the military regime, tried to criticise Japan and the military regime for distorting the legitimacy of Korea's ruling power rather than projecting democracy into heritage. The Rectifying History Movement intended to punish those who distorted history and emphasise the "ethnic nation" based on historical legitimacy. The ethnic nation was a people who resisted Japan, and this heritage action reflected the Kim Young-Sam regime, who fought against the military regimes through the democratic process and ended them by democratic election, the modern political legitimacy.

However, the process was paradoxical in that the regime also destroyed heritage and mobilised it for political propaganda, as targets of its criticism did. The regime started the destruction of the building on Liberation Day with a show of dynamite. It exhibited the remains of the building in the backyard of the Independence Hall, built with donations from the public against the distortion of Japanese history textbooks.[15] This series of processes was also quite

---

[15] This is a controversy about the modern history that the Japanese government describes in the school history curriculum. From neighbouring nations' viewpoint, Japan's history textbooks tend to omit or cover up Japanese colonial rule and war

political. In 1996, as a result of a reassessment of properties designated during the Japanese colonial period, the CHA elevated the grades of names and heritages downgraded by the Japanese occupation, while the Japanese-style castles were now downgraded (CHA, 2011, p.411–412).

FIGURE 4-7. THE DEMOLITION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF KOREA BUILDING.

SOURCE: E VIDEO HISTORY MUSEUM (2021).

Moreover, Gwanghwamun, in front of the now demolished Japanese Government-General of Korea building, was an aggregation of heritage acts that tried to erase the distorted past and project a new independent nationalism. Gwanghwamun was built in 1395 and restored three times. It was burned down by the Japanese invasion in the 15th century and restored along with Gyeongbokgung Palace to establish the royal family's authority at the end of the 19th century.

---

crimes and describe detailed and emotional damage inflicted on it in the war such as the air raids on Tokyo and the atomic bombings. Korea and China believe that this interpretation of the history of Japan is overly arbitrary. In Korea, this controversy has intensified as it has been strongly linked to diplomatic issues since the 1980s: the Japanese government has not officially apologised to Korea for its colonial rule and war crimes, and territorial disputes related to Dokdo have continued.

Gwanghwamun was relocated in the Japanese colonial era and destroyed during the Korean War. In the 1960s, it was restored again by the Park Chung-Hee regime. The gate was built with concrete and modern construction methods at a new location. The traditional architectural technique was not attractive to Park Chung-Hee, who wanted to create a new history. The Gwanghwamun, now made of concrete, was dismantled again.

The restoration of the gate using traditional materials and architectural techniques took three years and eight months to complete. In 2010, the signboard written by Park Chung-Hee was also replaced. While the military regime restored the Gwanghwamun gate on a date unrelated to the history of Japanese colonial rule, the Kim Young-Sam and later governments destroyed the Japanese Government-General of Korea building on 15th August 1995 and completed the Gwanghwamun gate restoration on 15th August 2010. As a part of the Independence Day celebrations, they intended to cut out the humiliating past of the colonial era to recover legitimacy and project the "ethnic nation" as a political subject into heritage. The Gyeongbokgung Palace restoration project, which started at that time, also demonstrates heritage activity that destroys or highlights heritage according to the choice of the state power.

FIGURE 4-8. BEFORE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNOR-GENERAL BUILDING (LEFT) AND THE RESTORED GYEONGBOKGUNG PALACE (RIGHT).

SOURCE: AMUGEONA (2018).

In 1993, the Kim Young-Sam regime's decision to demolish the Japanese Government-General of Korea building caused a tremendous social debate. The regime tried to mobilise heritage as a symbol of the reform policies supported by citizens, such as the removal of the vested military group, the real-name financial system and the disclosure of office-holder assets. Although the Kim Young-Sam government emphasised nationalism and forced the demolition of the Government-General building, the opinion polls also showed sharp differences for and

against its destruction (Lee Hyun-Kyung, 2018, p.179). Many buildings built during the Japanese colonial period were outside the category of designated cultural property. In addition to representative modern heritages such as the old Seoul City Hall and the Bank of Korea, many other modern buildings were used for various purposes, were transformed or disappeared altogether.

The destruction of most representative heritage, which reminds Koreans of the "uncomfortable memory" of colonial rule, impacted the heritage discourse. The question of what can be defined as heritage in what range became a starting point for people to think about the concept of heritage from various perspectives away from ethnic nationalism or nationalism framed by the state. Until then, most of the official heritage was pre-modern, except that related to the independence movement or national leaders in the colonial era. In other words, modern buildings that did not conform to nationalist values were not seen as heritage. Lee Hyun-Kyung (2018, p.180) evaluated the 1990s as a period when South Korean society was faced with a modern heritage as a "difficult heritage". She believes that this was when South Koreans began to consider whether to remove the modern heritage of painful memory or leave it for educational purposes. Her evaluations focus on the functional aspects of heritage and diverse historical perspectives. Both removing negative memories and preserving them as educational evidence emphasised different ideologies by the actions inflicted on the heritage.

Proponents of demolition saw the building of the Japanese Government-General of Korea as a symbol of Japanese occupation that disconnects the context of Gyeongbokgung, a symbol of the Joseon dynasty. They insisted that it was an object that must be removed to remedy the national identity and the legitimacy of Korean history. On the other hand, opponents of demolition believed that Gyeongbokgung Palace was not an object of restoration because it was just a product of the declining feudal dynasty, mentioning the cost of destruction due to the overwhelming scale of the Japanese Government-General of Korea. Meanwhile, they discussed the value of its modern architecture. They also noticed that it was used for a long time in Korean history after independence. There was a widespread discussion that the Japanese colonial period should also be embraced as a painful history, and the building of the Joseon Government-General should be used as a site to learn from history.

(Lee Hyun-Kyung, 2018, p.179)

The public opinion she described looked at the event from a pluralistic perspective, such as nationalism, anti-feudalism, architectural and economic values, and an inclusive perspective on its negative past. The building of the Japanese Government-General of Korea, which was like a symbol of the "uncomfortable memory" that Koreans wanted to forget about, may have caused more controversy because it was also a place that shared the history of South Korea's dramatic development after independence. The generation who had the painful colonial memories of 50 years ago was increasingly disappearing, and new generations with the memories of the building as a museum gradually increased. Moreover, South Korea's economic boom, which continued before the IMF financial crisis in 1997, contrasted with Japan, which was plunged into a swamp of long-term depression due to the collapse of its bubble in the 1990s. South Korea was no longer the country engaged in humiliating diplomacy for Japan's economic aid in the 1960s. As a symbol of oppression left behind after the Japanese colonial period, and the National Museum, a repository of various memories that Koreans had used, it seems appropriate to view that controversy as starting to recognise that heritage can connote multiple meanings and values.

It may be inferred that Koreans have begun to recognise their heritage as not only evidence of nationalism, but also as a repository of various memories. In the 21st century, heritage activities cannot be explained by ideologies deliberately defined by external forces, such as imperialism, anti-communism and anti-Japanese nationalism. Since then, the governments, heritage academia and public opinion all tended to reach a consensus on conserving various modern and contemporary heritages, including "difficult heritages". The Korean government upgraded the status of the Cultural Property Agency in 1999 and introduced the Registered Cultural Heritage Protection System in 2000. This system was established through the revision of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. It was a policy that shifted the social perspectives on objects that should be conserved by being included in the category of cultural property and modern heritages from the Japanese colonial period to the Cold War era, the period of the democratisation movement and the industrial era (Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-dal & Lee Na-Yeon, 2019, p.19).

Some scholars argue that the Kim Young-Sam regime itself was the most affected by the destruction of heritage. Oh Chun-Young (2020, p.73) argued that the heritage idea itself became an ideology, going beyond a symbol of nationalism, through the Year of Cultural Heritage project and the enactment of the Cultural Heritage Charter in 1997, in the later years of the Kim

Young-Sam government. He believes the ideology imposed on the society by the state was "preserving heritage", and heritage had its ideological character during this period. Although it may be excessive to define heritage as an ideology, the heritage authorities have gradually mobilised heritage to expand their power. This will be discussed in-depth in the next section.

4.4. Heritage policy

In brief, a policy can be referred to as a course of action determined by the state. However, policy entails a complex process in which the state recognises social problems and arranges means and systems to solve them. By considering ideologies in Korea, the previous section described how the state recognised social issues related to heritage and what it has aimed for through its heritage activities. Here, this section will examine the systematic framework that the state has established to formalise heritage practices in Korea.

Since modern times, the state has been given the authority to exercise legal power through legislation and official procedures. Through policy, the state has exercised its power as a series of formal actions to solve immediate problems and achieve a social ideal drawn up by the state. As discussed in the previous section, power groups also attempted to represent their ideologies through heritage. Also, heritage activities have been mobilised as a part of the justified exercise of state power within the institutional framework.

Heritage policy is significant in understanding how the state has induced Korean society to perceive or conceptualise heritage in a complex social context. This section will explore how heritage policy began and how it was partially fixed or transformed in Korea's modern and contemporary history, which is divided into the same periods as in the previous section to make it easier to understand the historical context of Korea and the significant changes in heritage policy: 1) the introduction of modern cultural heritage policy under Japanese colonial rule (1897–1945); 2) preparing a heritage law before the military dictatorship after independence (1945–1961); 3) establishing heritage policy during the military dictatorships (1962–1993); and 4) heritage policy expansion (1993–). In addition, the study would like to critically examine the current Cultural Heritage Act and the operation of the Cultural Heritage Committee, which are the core of heritage policy in South Korea.

4.4.1. The introduction of modern heritage policy (1897–1945)

Like other modern policies, the heritage policy was introduced around 1900 in Korea. In the general view, Korea's modernisation began from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, one to two centuries later than in Europe. Early Korea's modernisation process was deployed by Japan, which actively accepted Western culture and institutions in all areas, such as politics, the economy, the military and education (Park Chan-Seung, 2010). Korea's early cultural heritage policy also came from Japan, which belonged to a similar cultural sphere, and greatly influenced the establishment of the heritage policy in the colonial era and after that.

After colonising Korea, rather than simply plundering heritage items, Japan formally emphasised that it established a policy framework to preserve the Korean peninsula as part of the same territory as Japan. The Japanese Government-General of Korea enforced policies based on heritage laws. At that time, the heritage laws mainly aimed at controlling crimes such as tomb robbery and usurpation. However, heritage activities by the state, such as the destruction, excavation and shipping out of heritage, were official procedures. To mobilise heritage into the ideology Japan set and effectively execute heritage activities, the Japanese Government-General of Korea also concentrated on the investigation, selection and control of heritage. The heritage policy at that time, which tried to classify heritage and monopolise authority over it, became the basis of the current heritage policy and has continued.

Of course, at that time, Japanese rule was based on military force. But the heritage policy was embodied in a more complex and sophisticated form due to the assimilationism that emphasised the idea of one nation. Oh Se-Tak (1997a) strongly criticised the heritage policy under Japanese rule as "a total expropriation policy based on a formal constitutionalism", and many South Korean researchers agree with this opinion (see Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-Dal & Lee Na-Yeon, 2019; Kim Soon-Seok, 2014; Oh Chun-Young, 2018; Kim Ji-Seon, 2008; Lee Na-Mi, 2003; Jeong Jae-Hoon, 1985). Unlike in Taiwan, which was the first colony of Japan, the Japanese government conducted a large-scale heritage survey several times, and the heritage laws in Korea were also more independent (Oh Chun-Young, 2018). In addition, although there are many cases where empires plundered heritage during colonisation, only the Japanese government graded and numbered heritages. The Japanese government attempted to strengthen the assimilationism ideology by prohibiting private destruction of heritage.

Although the Japanese government had strengthened heritage policy as a pretext to protect heritage, the reason for such protection in practice was more the use of state authority. In the Korean peninsula, heritage protection was assigned to the police, and the powerful smuggled a large amount of heritage to Japan, including buildings (see Oh Se-Tak, 1997a; Choi Seok-Young, 1997; Kim Soon-Seok, 2014). Though the Japanese government conducted extensive heritage surveys and cataloguing in Korea to systematically implement heritage policies (Oh Se-Tak, 1997a), numerous reports were missing in the excavation process (Jeong Jae-Hoon, 1985, p.3). Thus, a tremendous number of heritage items remain in Japan.

From its victory of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 to the period before the colonisation of Korea in 1910, Japanese imperialism investigated and graded heritages in Korea as one of the preparatory works for its colonial rule, such as the Korean Architecture Investigation in 1902 and the National Remains Investigation in 1905 (Oh Se-Tak, 1997a). Following that, in the early days of Japanese colonial rule, modern laws regulating heritage were established as a policy object, such as the Hyanggyo[16] Property Management Regulations (1910), the Temple Ordinance (1911), and the Ruins and Relics Conservation Rules (1916). The first list, compiled by Sekino Tadashi between 1909 and 1916, graded the heritages of Korea (Oh Chun-Young, 2018). The second list, compiled by Katsumi Kuroi between 1917 and 1933, was a report on researching and collecting heritages for the designation system (Kim Ji-Seon, 2008, p.20).

In the early stages of its occupation, Japan used various means to its colonies to consolidate its dominance in the controlled regions. Examples include "land survey", "custom survey", and "heritage survey". These surveys became the basis for obtaining results consistent with the policy goals of the Japanese Government-General of Korea. It cultivated large Japanese landowners through land surveys and established the basis for colonialist views through heritage surveys.

(Oh Chun-Young, 2020, pp.67–68)

Just as the Japanese Empire secured ownership and the right to use most of the land on the Korean peninsula after the land survey, all rights to Korean heritage after the heritage survey were legally transferred to the Government-General of Korea. The Government-General did not designate heritage sites that directly symbolised Japanese imperialism, unlike in Taiwan,

---

[16] Hyanggyo is a Confucian shrine and school to teach local students from the Joseon dynasty period.

where places of victory of the Japanese army were designated as heritage (Oh Chun-Young, 2020).[17] However, it had utilised heritage in Korea more deviously. The Hyanggyo Property Management Regulations (1910) and the Temple Ordinance (1911) were laws to prevent the relics officially belonging to the Hyanggyo and Buddhist temples from being exported to Japan. However, a new ruling power colonising Korea, the Japanese government itself, expanded control over the Korean communities by securing monopolistic heritage authority (Kim Ji-Sun, 2008; Oh Se-Tak, 1997a). Hyanggyo, where the opinion of the intellectual group was formed, and Buddhist temples, where the cultural and religious communities in local were shaped, were the central spaces of local communities.

The Rules for Preservation of Historic Sites and Relics (1916) was a manifesto that the entire heritage in the Korean peninsula belonged to the Government-General of Korea. The way the Japanese government implemented the heritage practices implies that it focused on securing ownership and control over heritage rather than on its academic and cultural value. After the promulgation of the Rules for Preservation of Historic Sites and Relics in 1916, power over heritage affairs previously entrusted to the provinces was transferred to and exclusively exercised by the Government-General of Korea.

The 3.1 Movement in 1919 and Japan's territorial expansion wars in the 1930s also had an impact on heritage policy. Japanese imperialism began to emphasise a new ideology in Korea (see Section 4.3.1). In 1934, the Japanese Government-General of Korea officially introduced the heritage designation system. The last list, compiled between 1934 and 1945, was the designated heritage list, which formed the basis of the Korean heritage system (Oh Chun-Young, 2018). From that point, Korean heritage officially became the property of the Japanese government. The Rules for Preservation of Historic Sites and Relics (1916) and the heritage designation in 1934 were the processes of formalising the state's authority over heritage. Oh Chun-Young (2018) believes these two policies are the starting point of modern Korea's heritage policy.

Jeong Jae-Hoon (1985) strongly argues that Japan's cultural policy showed the consistency of colonial policy to eradicate Korean national culture, such as the expropriation of Korean

---

[17] In Taiwan, which Japan colonised 15 years earlier than Korea, an extensive heritage survey was not carried out as in Korea. However, Oh Chun-Young (2020) emphasised that heritage was used as evidence of colonialist views in Taiwan, designating 15 of the 31 historical sites for very political reasons, such as the battlefields where the Japanese army won the war.

heritage, the prohibition of the use of the Korean language and alphabets and the distortion of history. Heritage investigations were conducted by constantly changing departments in charge, such as from the General Affairs Division in 1916 to the Documents Division in 1920, the Historical Site Investigation Division in 1921, the Religion Division in 1924, the Social Studies Division in 1932 and the Social Education Division in 1936. By the 1930s, they were transferred to the Department of Social Studies and Social Education, known as "organisations in charge of human remodelling projects suitable for colonial rule" (Kim Ji-Seon, 2008). However, the police were responsible for heritage preservation throughout the Japanese colonial period without any transfer of their authority (Oh Se-Tak, 1997a).

On the other hand, the heritage designation in 1934 formalised the implementation of selective heritage practices. The Japanese government introduced the heritage designation numbers system; Japanese heritages and Korean heritages were distinctively designated as "national treasures" and "treasures", respectively. Unlike the slogan "Japan and Korea are one" promoted by Japan, there was discrimination between Japanese and Korean heritage. The Korean heritage designation number also seems to be related to the justification of colonial rule. On 27th August 1934, the Government-General of Korea announced that it was designating Sungnyemun Gate as Treasure No. 1, Heunginjimun Gate as Treasure No. 2, and Poseokjeong Pavilion as Historic Site No. 1.

The two gates were the gates through which Japanese troops entered Seoul during the Imjin War at the end of the 16th century. Instead of their original names with Confucian meanings, the Japanese government designated them Namdaemun (South Gate, Sungnyemun) and Dongdaemun (East Gate, Heunginjimun). A Japanese historian, Ohta Hideharu (2003), points out that "the Japanese logic to preserve Namdaemun was because it was closely related to Gato [the Japanese general at the time of the Japanese invasion during the Imjin War], not because of cultural, architectural, artistic or historical value". He also explains that was the reason why Namdaemun and Dongdaemun, representing Japanese victory, were preserved, and Seodaemun, which was not linked to Japan at all, was destroyed. In addition, though the Japanese government designated them as treasures to be preserved, it tore down the walls of the two gates and isolated them using roads for the convenience of the Japanese prince, who was visiting Seoul.

FIGURE 4-10. SUNGNYEMUN GATE (SOUTH GATE).
SOURCE: RHO HYEONG-SEOK (2021).

FIGURE 4-9. ANNOUNCEMENT OF HERITAGE DESIGNATION IN THE
GAZETTE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF
KOREA (1934).
SOURCE: LEE KI-HWAN (2012).

FIGURE 4-11. POSEOKJEONG.
SOURCE: JANG, HYEON-KYEONG (N. D).

The designation of Poseokjeong as Historic Site No. 1, an auxiliary facility of a building called Poseoksa Temple in the Silla period before the 10th century, is also related to the colonial viewpoint. In this temple, which was a political space in the ancient era, the remaining Poseokjeong Pavilion is a representative entertainment facility of the Silla era, where banquets were held with glasses floating on a flowing waterway. It was also the place where the enemy captured the last king of Silla. It is well known as a piece of symbolic heritage for emphasising the weakness of the ruling class in Korea and the need for a new power, which was Japan. Another example was the designation of Japanese fortresses built during the Japanese invasion in the 16th century as national heritage (Jung Jae-Hoon, 1985, p.2). In the colonisation of Joseon, the Japanese government emphasised the historical background of the 16th century conquest of Joseon (during the Imjin War) to justify the overseas expansion policy in Korea and even in Japan (Ohta, 2003, p.185).

Heritage items in Korea are still ranked, although the CHA announced at a policy briefing in February 2021 that it would abolish the heritage designation number system that can rate

heritage value and use it only as an internal management number. In particular, the distinction between national treasures, treasures and historical sites, tangible heritages designated by the state, is ambiguous and is defined differently depending on the values of the state and expert groups. Even in 1997, the heritage ratings were raised or lowered according to the anti-Japanese ideology pursued by the state power. In other words, the heritage policy of the Japanese imperialists to classify and monopolise heritage has continued for over 100 years.

4.4.2. Preparation period for a heritage law (1945–1961)

After independence, South Korea, which established a modern state through U.S. military rule, needed to set out a new modern concept of state and people. In particular, the confrontation between extreme liberalism and communism played an essential role in shaping heritage as a material object representing a new national identity. Before and after the Korean War, state-led conservation activities were almost impossible within the Korean economy. Nevertheless, in the 1950s, Jung Soo-Jin (2007) argued that heritage was mobilised to symbolise "ethnic culture" rather than a subordinate history. It was used as evidence to transform the nation's concept from a colony of the Japanese Empire to that of a modern nation and institutionalised as a "typical control method" of punishment and commendation (ibid). Although illegal possession of antiques was punished, sometimes heritage owners were revered as "guardians of ethnic culture" through the media.[18] She (ibid, p.360) claimed that the state's arbitrary judgement and exclusive interpretation of heritage was the process of concentrating power over heritage in the state.

Moreover, this approach of the Rhee Syngman regime at that time only emphasised the political value of heritage and the citizens' obligations. Comparing the heritage systems of Taiwan and South Korea, Oh Chun-Young (2020) pointed out that the Korean government did not deviate from the colonial-era policy, unlike Taiwan's postcolonial heritage system development. He criticised the fact that both the South and the North Korean governments de facto followed the colonial institutional system, the heritage list and heritage-related facilities, even though both governments strongly criticised the destruction of Korean heritage by Japan. The state focused still on mobilising heritage rather than conserving it like the Japanese Empire.

---

[18] *Chosun Daily* (1957) articles such as 'Commendation of 53 Contributors to Cultural Heritage Conservation' show that the government at that time gave commendations and announced the list of names of heritage protectors.

The following article by Jeong Jae-Hoon (1985) reflects the features of the heritage policy at that time.

> *At the 2nd General Assembly of the Conservation Committee held in the Ministry of Education conference room on November 4, 1955, the first period for the "protection of cultural property in Korea" was set. Moreover, as the Director-General of the Ministry of Interior and Safety requested, the monument of Samjeondo King Taejong Gongdeok, which was designated as national treasure No. 164, was cancelled and buried in the ground because it was a historical artefact of disgrace.*
>
> (Minutes of the Conservation Committee of 4th November 1955, cited in Jeong Jae-Hoon, 1985, p.3)

The heritage policy maintained the Japanese colonial method in the chaotic and unstable social environment before and after the Korean War. Furthermore, the state actively mobilised heritage as political propaganda by emphasising protecting heritage identified with the nation and the state from communism. This was another version of what the Japanese Empire had tried to emphasise: the claim of protecting the nation and heritage by specifying the Western powers as enemies in the late period of Japanese colonial rule. The only difference was that the enemy had changed from the Western powers to North Korea. The social demand for the liquidation of the sleaze of the colonial era after liberation (Park Chan-Seung, 2010) was reflected politically only in the 1990s, almost 50 years later. It was also a chaotic and devastating period in all social aspects, including politics and the economy, so it was difficult to expect the development of a practical heritage policy.

4.4.3. Heritage policy establishment period (1962–1993)

The 1960s was a period when South Korea established its modern heritage system. Even though there were laws and administrative authorities during the Japanese colonial period, the primary purpose of the institutional system was for official plunder and control of public opinion. Therefore, establishing the Cultural Management Department in 1961 and enacting the Cultural Heritage Protection Act in 1962 provided the basis for a practical modern heritage policy that clarified the definition of heritage and the purpose of heritage conservation. The Cultural Heritage Protection Act has been amended 68 times, including three complete revisions, 19 other law revisions and 46 partial revisions since its enactment up until 2021.

Nevertheless, it cannot be called a completely new legal system. The Cultural Heritage Protection Act, enacted on 10th January 1962, was established just before the old statutes related to heritage were automatically abolished on 20th January 1962, by the Act on Special Measures for the Arrangement of Old Laws (1961). This was rough and ready legislation, excessively imitating the new Japanese heritage law in 1950 (Oh Se-Tak, 1997b, p.36). In addition, the Hyanggyo Property Management Act (1962) was enacted on the same date as the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. With the enactment of the Traditional Temple Preservation Act (1987), the institutional heritage management structure before the 21st century became very similar to that of the Japanese colonial period. Although it was a new statute, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act borrowed from a large part of the cultural heritage management system from that period (Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-Dal & Lee Na-Yeon, 2019). Kim Yong-Cheol (2020, p.218) pointed out that the Conservation Order (1933) and the Cultural Heritage Protection Act (1962) have the following four similarities: 1) the heritage designation criteria of "historical evidence" and "example of art"; 2) the classification approach of tangible heritage; 3) the establishment of an advisory body; and 4) similar designations and sequences of designation numbers.

The similarity of these legal systems led to repeated policy approaches emphasising the hierarchy of heritage. In particular, the heritage designation and national heritage activity laid the legal foundations to assign value and discriminate according to the national ideology. National heritage was divided into national treasures, treasures, important intangible cultural heritage, historic sites, scenic spots, natural monuments and folk resources. In particular, tangible heritage was classified into hierarchical categories such as national treasures, treasures, historic sites and important folk materials after consultation with the Cultural Heritage Committee. They were designated based on vague criteria such as "treasures" as important among tangible cultural assets, "national treasures" as treasures of great value and unprecedented in terms of human culture, and "historical sites" as important among monuments. To make value judgements, the state established a private advisory body called the Cultural Heritage Committee with substantial decision-making power. However, this was also another imitation of Japanese heritage policy operation. During the colonial era, the Joseon Treasures, Historic Sites, Scenic Spots, and Natural Monuments Conservation Association composed of Japanese and pro-Japanese officials de facto provided an official approval process to the state power (Kim Yong-Cheol, 2020, pp.213–217). The reconstruction of Hyeonchungsa, the

wooden shrine established in 1707 and rebuilt with national donations in 1932, is a good example. In 1967, the Park Chung-Hee regime relocated Hyeonchungsa, constructed a new massive shrine on the original site with concrete and modern techniques, and designated the entire area as a "historic site". In Gyeongju, the regime also mobilised heritage based on Park Chung-Hee's arbitrary judgement, as mentioned in Section 4.3.3. These cases reveal that the role of the Cultural Heritage Committee as a brake or supervisor was subservient to state power.

Division	Classification	Number of classes
National designated cultural heritage	National treasures, treasures, important intangible cultural heritage, historic sites, scenic sites, natural monuments and folk resources	7
Province/city-designated cultural heritage	Tangible cultural heritage, intangible cultural heritage, monuments and folk resources	4
Local cultural heritage	Local cultural heritage (resources, relics, monuments, etc.)	1
Cultural heritage resources	Cultural heritage resources (heritage not designated by local governments)	1
Registered cultural heritage	State-registered cultural heritage and province/city-registered cultural heritage	2
Other designated cultural heritage	General movable cultural heritage and buried cultural heritage	2

TABLE 4-1. CLASSIFICATION OF HERITAGE UNDER THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM IN SOUTH KOREA
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

In this period, the state arbitrarily defined heritage and laid the foundation of policy to expand its power. Within the process, national heritage activities were further expanded, and simultaneously the categories of heritage were highly stratified. The heritage authority completed a hierarchical heritage designation system by dividing the "treasures" designated during the Japanese colonial period into "national treasures" and "treasures". It subdivided less-valued other heritages into historic sites, scenic sites, natural monuments and important folk materials. The 1982 Cultural Heritage Protection Act amendment established a more subdivided hierarchical system. It further expanded the regulatory range of heritage, defining the categories mentioned above as nationally designated cultural heritage and adding new sub-level categories such as province/city-designated cultural heritage and cultural heritage resources. Currently, South Korea's heritage designation system has 17 subdivided classes, which can be increased, depending on the local ordinances. In the designation system, the state selects heritage by arbitrarily determining its value according to the national ideology and

subordinate heritage activities to the regulatory-oriented domain of the state (Park Jeong-Hee, 2008, p.83). The revisions of heritage law have increasingly formalised heritage as a subject that the state power can arbitrarily define, discriminately value and regulate.

4.4.4. Heritage policy expansion period (1993–)

In order to discuss the heritage policy of this period, it is necessary to understand the social contexts and the characteristics of national policy in general. First of all, politically, the 1990s were a time when the dictatorship ended and a democratic system was established, but at the same time, it was a time of social chaos. South Korean society experienced rapid development and growth and severe after-effects over a short period. The 1990s were called the golden age of South Korea's economic growth. However, South Korea's economy plunged from its peak to a national bankruptcy crisis in 1997 and was managed under the IMF programme. Many people lost their jobs due to the massive restructuring at the time, but at the same time, there was a positive aspect in that insolvent companies were quickly removed. Then, South Korea ended the IMF management arrangement in 2001, four years later. For the first time, more than half of all households owned private cars (Kang Chang-Gwang, 1997), and this was a time when large-scale new satellite cities around Seoul were constructed in earnest. As a result, the after-effects of large-scale urban development began to appear in large cities in South Korea, and the conservation movement became active.

Although South Korean society achieved the democratisation of politics, it has demanded diverse and complex policies in an unstable social environment. During the last three decades, South Korea has been the only nation in East Asia where progressive and conservative governments have repeatedly taken power alternately. After the Kim Young-Sam administration, the successive progressive governments (the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun regimes) had to adopt neoliberal policies. In South Korean society, diverse opinions were presented and confronted. Rapid globalisation progressed, and progressive slogans such as digitalisation, pluralism and internationalisation were abundant (Kang Jun-Man, 2006). In 1989, overseas travel for tourism was allowed for the first time. South Korea also participated in the Uruguay Round (the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations) in 1994 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. At the same time, conservative nationalist slogans such as "*Shintobuli* (land and human body are one, using domestic foods against the Uruguay Round)"

and "The most Korean is the most global" became popular (Kwon Sook-In, 1998). Although this period was when genuine democracy first began, positive evaluations of the dictator Park Chung-Hee and related books were pouring in (Kang Jun-Man, 2006). The 1990s was a period of transition in which openness and conservativism, reflection and nostalgia, and freedom and control were mixed together in the social, political and economic fields.

The Korean government needed to overcome several economic crises and control the increasingly diverse conflicts. South Korea, in this period, formally imitated the democratic and decentralised form of Western society but in practice expanded its centralised policy structure. After political democratisation, successive policies were implemented to diffuse centralised control. The implementation of local autonomy in 1995, the balanced national development policy in the 2000s and the relocation of central government agencies to the special self-governing city of Sejong in 2012 were typical. Nevertheless, South Korea still has a centralised power structure. The Local Autonomy Act had lost its validity during the military dictatorship since its enactment in 1949, but it was amended entirely in 1988 and is still in force today. However, rather than inducing local autonomy, this law has the characteristic of maintaining the central government's power as much as possible to reduce the side effects of local autonomy. [19] Therefore, the central government can interfere with and control local governments excessively (Jung Yun-Ju, 2020, p.300).

Heritage policy since the 1990s reflects these characteristics of South Korean society and the overall policy stance. In the 1990s, the Rectifying History Movement was not a civil movement but a government-led reform policy based on nationalism. President Kim Young-Sam was more popular than other celebrities in a survey in the early days of his administration ("President Kim", 1993). However, the heritage policy, closely related to history, led to fierce debate (see Section 4.3.4). Even if the item of heritage in question contained anti-national values, such as the Japanese Government-General of Korea building, many people believed that the result of the state's judgement on the heritage was an act of destruction. Based on this public opinion, the CHA has 1) broadened the range of heritage; 2) introduced a planning system; 3)

---

[19] The central government has the right to order the head of a local government to carry out corrections or cancel them (Article 169 of the Local Autonomy Act), the right to order the head of a local government to perform duties and execute them (Article 170), the right to audit autonomous affairs of the local government (Article 171), the right to request reconsideration and the right to file a direct complaint (Article 172).

established the principle of heritage protection; and 4) expanded private sector participation
(see CHA, 2011).

Paradoxically, the state's control power may be maintained through those measures. First,
the expanded heritage administration by the introduction of broader categories has increased
the size of the CHA. Scholars in the 1990s viewed the failure of heritage conservation policies
as a lack of expertise and deficiencies in the powers of heritage authorities (see Kim Jong-
Hyeok, 1997; Oh Se-Tak, 1997b). Kim Jong-Hyeok (1997) argued that the heritage authority's
organisational size, scope, budget and professional human resources should be increased. As
these kinds of arguments were reflected in policy, heritage practice was defined as a specialised
work, and the fostering of heritage experts and technical institutions was emphasised (Jang
Kwang-Gil, 2008; Kim Chang-Gyu, 2010). As a result, the CHA has continued to grow. No
organisation has grown so consistently in modern Korean history. In the *50 Year History of the
Cultural Heritage Administration* published by the CHA in 2011, the Cultural Management
Department celebrated its promotion to the CHA (independent of the Ministry of Culture and
Tourism) and its expansion, even despite the government's policy to reduce the organisation in
1999 by the IMF crisis.

	The early 1990s	Current
Cultural Heritage Administration	Cultural Heritage Management department under the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism	Promoted to Cultural Heritage Administration, established a number of agencies affiliated with it
Heritage charter		Establishment of the principles of preservation of the heritage's original state
Number of laws	1 law	12 laws
Enactment of special Acts		Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of the Ancient Cities, Special Act on Restoration and Maintenance of Core Ruins of the Silla Kingdom, Special Act on the Conservation and Management of Pungnaptoseong Fortress

TABLE 4-2. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AFTER THE EARLY 1990S

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

After that, the CHA significantly expanded the institutional basis for conserving and
managing heritage: modern heritages by introducing the Registered Cultural Heritage
Protection System in 2000 and buried heritage by enacting the Act on Protection and Inspection
of Buried Cultural Heritage in 2011. These were officially included in the Cultural Heritage
Protection Act. During the last two decades, the number of statutes under the jurisdiction of the
CHA increased dramatically from one to 12. The budget has also increased yearly from 2000

to 2021 and has not been reduced (Statistics Korea, n. d). Around 2000, various professional heritage organisations and educational institutions began to be established (CHA, 2011). The specialisation of administration and the quantitative and qualitative growth of the CHA became the backdrop to emphasise conservation in a more systematic form than before.

Second, the state has expanded heritage policy by including it in the national spatial management strategy. In the 1990s, state-led development projects were pointed out as one of the biggest causes of damage to heritage (Oh Se-Tak, 1997b, p.37). The expanded heritage policy provided the CHA with more power within urban spaces. A spatial heritage management system was developed from the 1980s to the early 1990s in South Korea. Since 1972, the Korean government has adhered to the government-led regional development policy by announcing the ten-year Comprehensive National Land Development Plan. The Third Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (1992–2001) included a spatial plan of heritage management to develop leisure spaces. The government announced a set of five broad cultural zones and maintenance plans according to the distribution of heritages of ancient countries such as Baekje, Silla and Gaya. Since then, heritage has become one of the broad policy objects.

At the micro level, from 1983, through the National Land Planning and Utilisation Act, local governments designated "aesthetic districts" and applied land-use restrictions in these, such as the number of floors, height and distance between buildings. The Traditional Buildings Conservation Act in 1984 allowed the designation of "traditional buildings to be conserved" and "traditional buildings conservation districts" to conserve traditional buildings except for designated cultural properties. As this law had many overlapping elements with "folk materials management" under the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, the utility of the law disappeared due to the lack of additional designations (Kim Jong-Hyeok, 1997, p.60).

In the 21st century, the CHA, which was indirectly involved in spatial planning, has direct control over the spaces around heritage. The 1990s was the golden age of South Korea's economic growth. Local autonomy, which began at this time, impacted national heritage policy. Local governments were enabled to consider various approaches to undesignated heritage and areas around heritage sites. This meant that the control of the state was weakened. In the local development process, many buildings with historical value were demolished, or some areas around heritage were recklessly developed without considering the city's historical context (Kim Ji-Min, 2020, p.287). In 2000, the CHA had the authority to review the implementation

of construction works around heritage with a revision of the Building Act. Also, in 2010, the CHA acquired official regulatory authority in areas around heritage through revisions to both the National Land Planning and Utilisation Act and the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. The latter stipulated the area around heritage that needs to be protected together with the heritage itself as natural landscapes or spaces with outstanding historical and cultural values as Historical and Cultural Environment Preservation Areas (HCEPAs). These were set around all designated heritages.

In South Korea, heritage impact assessment is not about heritage but the HCEPAs, which are areas within 50m–500m of heritage. Each HCEPA is generally divided into two to five districts (some even have ten districts), and allowable activities are set for each district. In HCEPAs, activities that exceed the criteria are subject to deliberation by the Cultural Heritage Committee. Accordingly, the CHA even obtained official control over the areas surrounding heritage sites: the buildings and land that are not heritage.

FIGURE 4-12. BUILDING ACTIVITY ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IN GYEONGJU CITY.
SOURCE: CHA (2010). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

FIGURE 4-13. BUILDING ACTIVITY ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IN GYEONGJU CITY.
SOURCE: CHA (2020). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

This measure gave great control to the CHA over urban areas in some cities, such as Gyeongju and Gongju (see figures above). As the 2010 Act amendment included the HCEPAs in the scope of heritage management, local governments' power in this field was transferred to the CHA in historic cities. Among the planning powers granted to local governments through the local autonomy policy, control over the areas around heritage returned to the state in less than ten years. In particular, this allowed the CHA to expand its influence from individual heritage to urban planning.

Third, establishing the Cultural Heritage Protection Principle was not a mere manifesto but strengthened the regulatory authority of a particular group. The principle of "preservation of the original state" was declared in the Charter of Cultural Heritage 1997. Then, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act accepted the concept of the "original state" in 1999. Although the idea of cultural heritage's "original state" – which is the core of the heritage protection principle – is ambiguous and has no logical basis, the principle became the foundation of judgement on heritage (Lee Su-Jeong, 2016, p.101). The CHA escaped criticism of the state's decision by delegating the judgement to the Cultural Heritage Committee, composed of private experts.

This committee has gained strong authority based on the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, one of the most powerful laws in South Korea.

It may be problematic that the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, with an extra-legal nature, supports this principle. There can be disagreement about value judgements. However, if the judgement of a particular group is combined with supreme regulatory authority, this is a matter of another dimension. In the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, the "basic principle for the preservation, management, and utilisation of cultural heritage is to preserve them in their original state" (Article 3). In other words, the Cultural Heritage Committee has officially obtained the right to insist on "do not touch anything" on all heritage-related issues. This authoritarian preservation principle closely resembles the laws established in the era of the dictatorship.

Control through legislation is an effective way for states to protect specific heritages. Many South Korean researchers point out that the Cultural Heritage Protection Act is the backbone of a robust government-led heritage preservation system (see Park Jeong-Hee, 2017; Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-Dal & Lee Na-Yeon, 2019; Kim Yong-Cheol, 2020). The Act has a legal structure that grants decision-making powers exclusively to the state or the Cultural Heritage Committee. Many criticise this, stating that "the Cultural Heritage Protection Act is an evil law" (Park Jeong-Hee, 2008, p.91). The Act strictly limits the rights of designated heritage owners to use and change their properties, including non-heritage items. It may be interpreted as a part of the public sanctions necessary to preserve heritage. However, the problem is that the state power even monopolises all the rights to designate, sell or dispose of heritage. Although governments can expropriate lands or properties as needed, whether designated or not (Article 83 of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act), individuals have no right to demand that the state must purchase them. In other words, the power goes one way: the individual cannot sell even if he wants to do so, and the government may buy, paying the amount it designates, when it wants to. Park Jeong-Hee (2008, pp.91–92) points out that this "extra-legal attribute of arbitrary and unilateral control over individual property rights" of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act is outside legal equity.

The extra-legal nature of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act is also clearly revealed in its relation to other laws. Almost all heritage-related laws, such as the National Land Planning and Utilisation Act and the Building Act, require that all related activities on designated heritage comply with the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. In South Korea, there are general laws and

special laws. General law applies to all general things, and special law specifically applies to a particular area, person, thing or matter. Since special laws deal with special matters, they take precedence over general laws. For example, the crime of theft follows the general criminal law, whereas theft by children and adolescents is subject to a special law. Nevertheless, technically, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act takes precedence over all other laws, whether special law or not, except for the Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act. Furthermore, although five special laws about heritage have been enacted in the last 20 years, the CHA has set up the same legal relationship to maintain the transcendental authority of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, which was enacted nearly 60 years ago.

To say that something tangible or intangible is heritage, it must have some "value" to be "preserved" (see Harrison, 2010; Pendlebury, 2008). In other words, judgements about the values and the necessity of preservation are among the most critical decisions about heritage. While recent studies on the heritage concept describe a prerequisite that heritage does not have a fixed and enduring value (Pendlebury, 2008, p.7), the CHA premises a principle preserving the "original state of heritage". The CHA suggested the principle. However, this has been criticised, as "there is no principle" in heritage decisions in South Korea because the judgements of certain groups do not logically convince others of the validity of the regulation (Lee Su-Jeong, 2016, p.101).

Fourth, the CHA expanded the participation of the private sector, but here, "private sector" meant experts. Political power groups had mobilised heritage throughout the 20th century, as demonstrated in Section 4.3. They selected certain symbolic heritages and destroyed those opposing their ideologies. At that time, civil society did not have much opportunity to intervene in heritage policy. In terms of jurisprudence, the Cultural Heritage Committee, composed of private experts, is an advisory body representing civil society.

The Cultural Heritage Committee is now closer to a decision-making group than an advisory body. Simply put, the state's decision-making power is exercised through deliberation by the Cultural Heritage Committee and the permission of the CHA. Although the committee has no official decision-making authority, its advice has been recognised as a national-level decision (Oh Se-Tak, 1997b, p.38). The committee intervenes as a proxy for civil society as an advisory body. Although the CHA is one of the smaller government agencies in terms of budget and administrative organisation size, it has a considerable voice in the government because its decision-making power can affect most regional projects. As mentioned above, the CHA

controls designated heritage and surrounding areas within a radius of 50m to 500m. In addition, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act allows the scope to be expanded without limitation when the CHA considers that construction activities more than 500m distant greatly impact heritages (Article 13). Therefore, concerning this excessive authority, the question "who can judge?" is significant for the legitimacy of the decision. The Korean government obtains legitimacy for heritage determination through deliberation by the Cultural Heritage Committee.

In many aspects, the Cultural Heritage Committee seems to be an agent of state power, not a representative group of civil society. The role of the Cultural Heritage Committee is "to investigate and deliberate on the matters concerning the preservation, management, and utilisation of cultural heritage" (Cultural Heritage Protection Act, Article 8). However, in the Cultural Heritage Committee Operation Guidelines 2020, which explicitly stipulates the role and duties of the committee, there are only matters related to decision-making, and nothing related to investigations. This guideline emphasises fairness, transparency and efficiency in the operation of the Committee (Article 1 objectives). Investigation of heritage is conducted by the CHA and local governments (Cultural Heritage Protection Act, Article 10). Also, investigations on HCEPAs are a responsibility of local governments (Guidelines for Preparation of Permit Standards for Building Activities in HCEPAs, Article 6). Article 2 of the Cultural Heritage Committee Operation Guidelines, which stipulates the duties of the committee, describes only its virtues as a decision-making body, such as "prompt and accurate deliberation of agendas for the convenience of the people" and "preparation of resolutions and minutes".

Moreover, Article 2 of the guidelines stipulates that the committee "actively reflects the standards of the Guidelines for Establishing Acceptance Criteria for Building Activities in HCEPAs, Etc., ordered by the CHA" when deliberating on activities in HCEPAs. This implies that decisions on heritage are made within the framework set by the CHA. The CHA also appoints 200 technical expert members for material collection, investigations and research related to deliberation (Cultural Heritage Protection Act, Article 8). According to the Cultural Heritage Committee list of members in 2022 (CHA, 2022b), 45 members work in public institutions, of which ten belong to the CHA among the current 200 expert members. Furthermore, the number of members who have previously worked in the CHA and affiliated organisations is estimated to be about ten. About 20% of the committee members are directly related to the CHA, considering only their primary job. The CHA publishes minutes of

deliberations of the Cultural Heritage Committee almost every month, but 300 committee members have never published a report.

In addition, most committee resolutions are focused on limiting users' activities. For example, according to the tenth meeting of the Historical Sites Subcommittee deliberation record in September 2021, there was no agenda about heritage alteration out of the 40 cases. All were related to collateral activities, such as holding festivals within the historical site, installing convenience facilities, roads and sewer pipes, and constructing small buildings in the vicinity of heritages. Seventeen cases were concluded with the grant of conditional permits. These resolutions can be understood as concerning the heritage landscape and historical context. However, they may also demonstrate a vertical power structure between the state and the heritage users and the excessive regulation power under the "preservation of original form" principle. All decisions from such deliberations were within the framework set by the CHA, and there is little chance of a compromise with regulatory advice. Through this authorised process, the state has defined heritage as the exclusive property of the state and regulated even minor activities close to heritage; users need permission from the state even if it the area is private property. In addition, since the CHA appoints all committee members, the independence of the committee is not guaranteed.

Subcommittees	Number of commissioners	Number of technical commissioners (assistant)
Architectural Heritages	11	21
Movable heritages	13 (1)	29
Historical Sites	14 (1)	19
Natural Heritages	14 (1)	25
Buried Heritages	11 (1)	21
Modern Heritages	12 (1)	26
Folklore Heritages	10	19
World Heritages	10 (1)	20
Royal Palaces and Tombs	16 (1)	20
Total	100	200

TABLE 4-3. THE ORGANISATION OF THE CULTURAL HERITAGE COMMITTEE
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR BASED ON CHA (2022B).

The committee has grown into a sizeable deliberative body, composed of nine subcommittees with 100 members and 200 technical experts (see the table above). The first

Cultural Heritage Committee, created by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act in 1962, comprised only three subcommittees with 17 members (Jeong Jae-Hoon, 1985, p.6). Why do we need a large non-governmental organisation of 300 people? The committee does not submit any reports or policy proposals to the government. As will be explained in Section 5.4, the 300 commissioners control annually about 2,000 actions of people related to heritage on behalf of the state (see Table 5-4). This number 300 is not the sum of all cultural heritage commissioners. There are also local cultural heritage committees at each regional/local level.

Cases from around 2010 also show that the Cultural Heritage Committee, an expert group, is difficult to operate as a mechanism to check state power. The Lee Myung-Bak regime strongly promoted the Four Rivers Project, which raised the water level of South Korea's major rivers. The regime drastically changed the composition of the Cultural Heritage Committee, which strongly opposed the project. The number of heritage experts was reduced, and the committee was filled with many experts in various fields. The official reason was that diverse opinions should be included in heritage decisions.

One of the government officials, who frequently attended the Cultural Heritage Committee for deliberations, argued that it was a very political measure (interview, 2019). After the change in the composition of the committee, the majority of members who were not heritage experts followed the opinions of a few heritage experts. Thus, a decision-making structure has been formed in which the views of specific experts appointed by the state can exert overwhelming influence. As a result, as the water level of the Geum River crossing Gongju city rose due to the implementation of the Four Rivers Project, the groundwater level of the Gongsanseong fortress located on the Geumgang river bank rose, making the ground of the fortress vulnerable in the rainy season. This was pointed out as the leading cause of the collapse of the Gongsanseong fortress wall in 2013 (Yeon Jae-Min, 2013). In addition, the Gomanaru sand field, a historical landscape, disappeared; it had also been a heritage site designated as a scenic site in 2006 by the CHA as the place where the combined forces of China and Silla were stationed for the last battle of the Baekje kingdom. After the progressive government came to power in 2017, the water level of the Geum River was lowered again as the floodgates of the weirs blocked by the Four Rivers Project were fully opened.

Another example is the result of the committee's deliberation on the project to install a cable car on Mount Seorak, a natural heritage site. This project, proposed in 1982, became controversial in 2014 when President Park Geun-Hye accepted the Federation of Korean

Industries' request. The Cultural Heritage Committee rejected the project in 2015 but allowed it, with conditions, 13 months later. Nevertheless, the project has not been carried out due to fierce opposition from non-government environmental organisations.

These cases show that the Cultural Heritage Committee is something close to a decision-making agency of the state rather than a representative of civil society. To the state, the logic of the decision of the Cultural Heritage Committee, an organisation of private experts, is useful to exert regulatory power over heritage users, local communities and local authorities. Thus, the CHA and the Cultural Heritage Committee have formed an interdependent relationship. However, this relationship may not be considered equal. State power may control the committee by exerting administrative pressure or replacing members in contentious situations. The right to organise the Cultural Heritage Committee, emphasised as being an independent private organisation, is strictly vested in the state. Jeon Yeong-Woo (2021), the chairman of the Cultural Heritage Committee, described it as "the last bastion of cultural heritage protection" in his greetings. But it looks as if that bastion could be removed by political decisions.

4.5. Conclusion: divisive heritage

This chapter examined developing heritage concepts and policies in Korea. The research attempted to interpret national policies and the idea of heritage, exploring the ways of using heritage in Korean society from the early 20th century, when the modern heritage concept was created, to the present. First, the study looked at how South Korean society uses heritage terminology. In Korea, heritage tended to be defined by the state through legislation. Heritage, referred to by various terms until the early 20th century, was integrated into the term "cultural property" (문화재) after the enactment of the Cultural Property Protection Act in 1962. Various terms used previously have been partially modified and defined as sub-concepts by law. Since then, when the social discourse on inclusive heritage emerged, the state has added sub-categories one by one to the existing heritage concept. In the globalisation boom of the 1990s, the term "cultural heritage" (문화유산) was gradually used more often in public due to the influence of world heritage. However, this refers to "less regulated" local assets rather than being an umbrella term for or replacing the term "cultural property". The discourse on colonial heritage also led to legal acts that created a category of modern registered heritage voluntarily

managed in the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. In this way, the state has fixed cultural property that must be protected as an unchanging concept, and it has added sub-concepts that are assigned less value in its view.

Secondly, the study explores ideologies by era and how the state has mobilised heritage to represent its ideology. Over the past 100 years, rapid changes in the political landscape and emerging ideologies have created pivotal heritage policies. The modern heritage system was first introduced during the Japanese colonial era and established during the dictatorship era. Even at the end of the 20th century, when democratisation first began, there were also significant changes in heritage administration and legal systems. In modern Korean history, new power groups have tended to emphasise the new belief system that they wanted Korean society to share to secure their political foundation; and heritage, as a historical symbol, represented the ideology they needed. State powers selected and sanctified certain heritages while degrading or destroying those with opposing values. This process of differential heritage was prominent during periods of rapid political change, such as colonial rule, civil war, Cold War, dictatorship and democratisation. As in the case of Gwanghwamun (see Section 4.3.4), occasionally, a single heritage site has been destroyed and restored several times to represent ideologies.

In addition, the study found that different ideologies were depicted as nationalism in national heritage use and policies. Many ideologies, including Japanese imperialism, totalitarianism, anti-communism, modernisation, authoritarianism, anti-Japanese and globalism were mobilised for political purposes. The state powers have transformed them into nationalism when they combine ideologies with heritage. Gwanghwamun (the main gate of Gyeongbok Palace) was left derelict in front of the huge building of the Japanese Government-General of Korea during the colonial era, and it was destroyed during the Korean War. It was restored with modern building materials and construction methods as a symbol of modernisation during the dictatorship era. However, it was destroyed again by the democratic government and restored with traditional building materials and construction methods. Each time when the state powers physically transformed that gate, they repeatedly emphasised nationalist rhetoric, such as one nation, national revival and restoration of national history.

Thirdly, this chapter examined the institutions and policies that state powers have put in place to formalise heritagisation and heritage activities as part of a legitimate exercise of state power. The study focused on two main characteristics of Korea's heritage policy. The first is

that heritage has been subdivided and stratified as objects of policy. The ranked selection of heritage began in the colonial era when the heritage concept was first introduced. It was political from the start, and now the state has set a more complicated classification system. In addition to the seven state-designated classification systems, heritage is also designated at the provincial and local levels. "Registered modern heritage" and "heritage materials" are other heritage categories. Officially, there are 17 kinds of heritage types. Five among them are called "non-designated heritages", but they are official heritages in their institutional aspects. In practice, the Cultural Heritage Committee judges the activities related to most of them.

Many heritage experts say there is no longer any valuable or important heritage, but it is defined in state policy. The state defines "cultural property (official heritage)" as objects by which they can monopolise the exercise of power, and it has secured more standardised control for "cultural heritage (other sub-categorised heritage)". The state establishes different levels of heritage ranks and manages them. This hierarchical heritage designation and protection system are convenient for the government responsible for managing heritage because priorities for heritage management have already been determined. This approach is also suitable for representing particular heritages, emphasising specific contexts.

On the other hand, South Korea's heritage policy has developed into a very normative form. As a means of control and plunder during the Japanese colonial era, heritage policy developed into an authoritarian norm during the dictatorship era. During the dictatorship rule, the Cultural Property Protection Act was established as a rule that de facto exists above all laws with the Protection of Military Bases and Installations Act. As an exception, the mutual relationship between these two Acts and other laws is established in the legal system so that these two Acts take precedence over the others. Both Acts are entrusted with regulatory provisions in all planning-related laws. For example, as exceptional cases for applying other laws, the National Land Planning and Utilization Act and the Special Act on Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities stipulate that all matters related to heritage follow the regulation and deliberation of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. In other words, when relevant, the regulation of heritage takes precedence over the provisions of all other laws. In general, special laws take precedence over general laws in South Korea. However, as seen in the example above, the heritage norm is a sanctuary that cannot be violated even by special laws.

Moreover, in the 1990s, the "difficult heritage" controversy, concern about the urban development boom following economic growth, and the heritage protection principles

established amid the fever for World Heritage registration made the normative characteristics of heritage policies more robust. In particular, in a situation where the heritage idea has not been discussed enough, the concept of the "original state", which has been used in heritage restoration work since the 1970s (Lee Su-Jeong, 2016, pp.111–113), became a core concept of the Heritage Protection Principles in 1999. This concept, which has a weak logical basis, has strengthened normative characteristics of heritage policy, combined with judgements from the Cultural Heritage Committee. In addition, the expanded heritage category has stimulated the growth of the administrative agency, the CHA and the Cultural Heritage Committee. Inclusive heritage discourse helped broaden heritage norms, not accessibility to heritage. The CHA extended its scope of regulation from individual heritage sites of objects to the land and buildings around them as a "historical and cultural environment".

In conclusion, heritage is divisive in South Korea. Heritage was defined and symbolised as linked to policy and ideology. State powers selected and graded heritages to effectively deliver their political purposes and policy intentions to Korean society. Such a hierarchical structure was also applied to the extension of the heritage concept. The number and range of heritage sites have increased, but the heritage concept has been developed in multiple layers. The scope of heritage has been expanded as separated and layered forms in three dimensions. The Korean government added local heritage, modern heritage and areas around heritage sites to the state-designated heritage in a stratified manner, just as the Japanese Empire added Korean heritage under Japanese heritage. Heritage has come to have more diverse values, but they are all separate.

FIGURE 4-14. EXPANDING CATEGORIES OF HERITAGE CONCEPTS AND POLICIES.

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

Moreover, the state established a centralised power structure by developing the heritage administration system and strengthening the normative characteristics of heritage policy. While the heritage category has expanded to three dimensions, the CHA and the Cultural Heritage Committee extended their influence to two dimensions. The imbalance of such expansion methods has led to significant conflicts with particular communities. In South Korea, heritage is separate and contested.

As such, this overview of the conceptual development of the meaning and use of heritage in South Korea shows diverse aspects of heritage discussed internationally. It contributes to this discussion not only by showing that some of those claims are also true in the South Korean discourse but also by providing a unique and comprehensive overview to be used by others to develop such overviews for other Nations or comparative purposes. As shown in this chapter, it is clear that the South Korean understanding of the concept of heritage developed in close relation to national ideologies (see Kisler, 2023; Schramm, 2015; Rampley et al., 2012). It has been used for nation-building and symbolised and destructed for such ideologies (see Sengupta, 2018; Swenson, 2013a; Smith, 2006; Fibiger, 2015; Silverman, 2010; Billig, 1995).

Discourse on colonial heritage can develop in various ways depending on the political and social environment of a society, such as shown in the cases of China, Africa, and Ireland (see Wei & Wang, 2022; Mawere & Mubaya, 2016; Ashworth & Ashworth, 1998). Section 4.3.4. showed that the colonial heritage debate in South Korea also controversially developed. By presenting a double practice of keeping the colonial legal structures whilst removing some of the visible markers in the landscape, this study focused more on the close relationship between heritage and the production of a society's identity and power through the examples of colonial heritage. It raises vital questions about whether it is legitimate for a particular group to monopolise heritage decision-making authority. The findings provide another basis for the critics of AHD (See Smith, 2006; Schofield, 2014; Harrison, 2012; Harvey, 2008; Robertson, 2008) and the more sophisticated authoritarian heritage practice case to the international society.

In the next chapter, this study will describe how these contradictory heritage ideas and policies have ignited local communities' sense of resistance. The conflicts and the community participation process in heritage policy will also be discussed in detail.

Chapter 5. Heritage-led regeneration and community involvement

Chapter 5. Heritage-led regeneration and community involvement

5.1. Introduction

This chapter will explore the Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion Project (ACPPP) as a heritage-led regeneration scheme in South Korea. The process of its establishment and development can explain what conflicts were caused by the divisive heritage policy, why the state considered a heritage-led regeneration scheme, and how community involvement has occurred.

The previous chapter looked at the transition of Korea's heritage policy from the practice of mobilising and destroying heritage as an ideological symbol in an authoritarian era to a policy of protecting heritage fixed in its "original state" in the 1990s. On the other hand, the Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA) defined three-dimensionally separated and stratified heritage categories in response to the inclusive heritage discourse. These measures were based on the authoritarian heritage system introduced in the colonial era and established in the dictatorship era, and they expanded the scope of heritage protection policies. This study argues that heritage is divisive because these separate heritage concepts and the state's influence on heritage, which is continuously being strengthened, have expanded disproportionately in different dimensions. In other words, Chapter 4 discussed the inequality of power over heritage in Korea. This chapter will examine how the state and local communities have reacted in resolving conflicts between the state, regions and individuals caused by that inequality. Also, studying the development process of the ACPPP will demonstrate the process and outcome of an agreement between the state and local communities on heritage conflicts.

As a representative case, the ACPPP may explain how local community involvement has occurred within the national heritage policy in South Korea. There are several cases in which heritage-led regeneration policies have been proposed as a process of resolving heritage conflicts, such as the cases of Jeonju and Bukchon, Seoul, which are famous in South Korea. However, they are separate from the national heritage policy. They were also designed to conserve undesignated heritages from the local redevelopments. While those examples illustrate another limitation of divisive heritage policy, the study concerns community engagement in areas where divisive heritage policies are applied in authoritarian ways. The

ACPPP was designed under national Acts and policies. The cases of Jeonju and Bukchon could not change national policy, but community involvement in the ACPPP did transform national law and policy. This chapter will describe how the participation of local communities has played a pivotal role in changing national heritage policy.

5.2. Interview data information

In this chapter, in addition to documentation and other data, interview data are used for analysis (see Section 3.5.1). The interview data used in this chapter are those with experts and public officials, including planners, who participated in establishing policies from the beginning. The participant names were replaced to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees, as shown in the table below.

Participants	Role/position	Date
F	Management of the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Project	2019
G	Head of the Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Team	2019 2020
H	Planning and management of the Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Project	2019 2020
J	Head of the Regeneration Centre of the Architecture & Urban Research Institute	2019 2020
K	Master planner of the Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Masterplan	2019
L	Former planner of the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Masterplan (Buyeo, Gongju and Gyeongju)	2020
M	Former master planner of the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Masterplan (Buyeo, Gongju and Gyeongju)	2022
P	Planner of the Iksan Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Masterplan	2022

TABLE 5-1. INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

5.3. ACPPP as a heritage-led regeneration scheme

The Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion Project (ACPPP) (or Ancient Cities Preservation Project) is the heritage-led regeneration scheme created by the Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities (SAPPAC). The ACPPP is "a project

implemented to preserve and promote the historical and cultural environment of ancient cities in accordance with the master plan to preserve and promote ancient cities" (SAPPAC, Article 2). The ACPPP covers four cities: Gyeongju, Gongju, Buyeo and Iksan, the capital cities of ancient kingdoms. Those cities have been regulated due to designated heritages and buried cultural heritages (archaeological artefacts). [20] Thus, the construction of modern buildings that require groundwork in those historical cities is greatly restricted.

FIGURE 5-1. FOUR ANCIENT CITIES.
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

Designated cultural heritage	Designated cultural heritage is divided into state-designated heritage, city/province-designated heritage, and heritage materials.
	State-designated heritage is designated by the head of the Cultural Heritage Administration after deliberation by the Cultural Heritage Committee.
	City/province-heritage is designated by the governors of a Special City, Metropolitan City, Special Self-Governing City, Province or Special Self-Governing Province among cultural properties.
	Heritage materials are designated by governors of cities/provinces among heritages that are not included in the above-designated heritages.
Buried cultural heritage	Buried cultural heritage is 1) tangible cultural heritage buried or distributed underground or underwater, 2) tangible cultural heritage contained in the structures, or 3) natural caves and fossils formed and deposited on the ground surface, underground or underwater (including seas, lakes and rivers), etc. and other objects deemed to have outstanding geological values under Presidential Decree.

TABLE 5-2. DEFINITION OF DESIGNATED HERITAGE AND BURIED HERITAGE IN VARIOUS ACTS
SOURCE: THE CULTURAL HERITAGE PROTECTION ACT 2022 AND THE ACT ON PROTECTION AND INSPECTION OF BURIED CULTURAL HERITAGE 2022.

The Act stipulates that the ACPPPs and resident support projects may be implemented by establishing a master plan (SAPPAC, Article 8). The resident support projects refer to "a project carried out to improve the living environment and promote the welfare of the residents of the

---

[20] Construction activities of owners and developers are regulated by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act and the Act on Protection and Inspection of Buried Cultural Heritage.

districts designated" (SAPPAC, Article 2). The master plan takes precedence over all spatial plans except for the Comprehensive Plans for Construction in the National Territory and military-related plans (SAPPAC, Article 4). The districts of the ACPPP are divided into Special Preservation Districts (SPDs) and Preservation and Promotion Districts (PPDs) (SAPPAC, Article 10). An SPD is an area where designated heritages are concentrated and practically corresponds with the Heritage Protection Area in the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. On the other hand, the PPD is a fringe area of the Heritage Protection Area previously regulated by urban planning (see Table 5-3 below). PPDs in the four ancient cities mostly overlap with the Historical and Cultural Environment Preservation Areas (HCEPAs) specified in the Cultural Heritage Protection Act.

The projects in SPDs and PPDs are subject to deliberation by the Central Deliberative Committee (CDC) commissioned by the CHA (SAPPAC, Article 5) and the Regional Deliberative Committee (RDC) commissioned by local governments (SAPPAC, Article 5-2), respectively. Currently, the CDC consists of nine government members (public officials), ten members from the private sector (five heritage experts, two planning experts, three tourism and landscape experts) and ten expert members (CHA, 2021a). On the other hand, the RDC consists of two city council members, four residents recommended by the city council and three experts, according to the local ordinances of Gyeongju, Gongju, Buyeo and Iksan.

District	Target area
Historical and cultural environment special preservation district (Special Preservation District, SPD)	A core area for the preservation of the historical and cultural environments of an ancient city, where it is necessary to preserve or reinstate such environment
Historical and cultural environment preservation and promotion district (Preservation and Promotion District, PPD)	An area where an additional survey is necessary to preserve the original form of an ancient city or an area where the preservation and promotion of the historical and cultural environments of an ancient city is necessary, such as an area adjoining an SPD

TABLE 5-3. DESIGNATED DISTRICTS OF THE PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION OF ANCIENT CITIES SCHEME SOURCE: SPECIAL ACT ON THE PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION OF ANCIENT CITIES 2020

5.4. Background to the introduction of heritage-led regeneration

This section explains that the divisive heritage, which was useful as a means of control and mobilisation (see Chapter 4), caused conflict with the democracy and decentralisation paradigm and that heritage-led regeneration policy emerged as a new alternative. South Korea's social

and political changes in the 1990s weakened the state's centralised control. However, this period was also when heritage protection was emphasised. The state strengthened and expanded its control over local residents through heritage protection policies based on authoritarian laws. In the gap between the social paradigm shift and authoritarian policies, communities in specific regions, such as Gyeongju, actively responded and demanded a new policy approach. The result of the agreement between the state and the Gyeongju community is the heritage-led regeneration policy. The section describes this complex process.

The study first examines the relationship between social change and heritage policy in the 1990s. Korea's heritage was frequently mobilised to be part of a nationalist ideology and support the regime's legitimacy of power during the colonial and dictatorship periods (Jung Soo-Jin, 2007; Oh Chun-Young, 2020; Choi Kwang-Seung, 2012; Kim Won, 2013). However, the 1990s in South Korea was when the "age of ideology ended, and the age of consumption began" (Kang Jun-Man, 2006). Externally, as the Cold War virtually ended with the collapse of communism in Russia and Europe, and the economic and military gap between South and North Korea widened significantly, the influence of the anti-communism ideology rapidly declined. Internally, the ideological debate, which had been a key agenda in the long-standing struggle to achieve democracy, reached the end of its validity as the democratic forces conspired with the military regime to secure a direct presidential election and consolidation of political power (Kang Jun-Man, 2006).

As heritage's symbolic values of these ideologies were weakened, the state focused on heritage protection. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the 1990s was when heritage protection policy was strengthened due to the controversy over colonial heritage, reflection on the political use of heritage by dictatorships, the value of heritage as a propaganda tool in the globalisation era and rapid urban development. The region most affected by these heritage policy changes was Gyeongju, where many large-scale heritages are concentrated in the city centre. The end of ideology caused an economic crisis in Gyeongju. As the Gyeongju development plan (see Section 4.3.3) was suspended due to the death of President Park Chung-Hee, heritage in Gyeongju became a symbol of regulation rather than of the impetus of development. Whereas property prices nationally skyrocketed due to economic growth, this did not happen in Gyeongju due to the regulations in force. In the 1970s, the price of a house in the neighbouring city, Pohang, where steel mills were built, was only 10% of that in Gyeongju city centre, but in the 2000s, 30 years later, it was ten times more expensive (former master planner of the ACPPP

master plan, interview). Kim Moo-Hyeong (2002) also points out that in 2000, land prices in non-conserved areas in Gyeongju were generally two to three times higher than those in conservation areas, and the benefits compared to social and economic costs due to conservation were only 0.18 to 0.36.

On the other hand, a new political environment empowered local communities. Until the 1990s, Korea's local communities and politics were either unilaterally dominated by the central government or formed a patron–client relationship subordinate to the central power (Kim Man-Heum, 1999). However, the formation of local councils in 1991 and direct elections for local governors in 1995 were political changes to transfer the decision-making rights from the state to the local level. The local governments acquired the authority to manage urban spaces in the local autonomy system. Moreover, the 1997 IMF crisis was an intense experience of facing the limits of the Korean government. The decentralisation system and government failure provided a rationale for more active local community participation.

Nevertheless, Korean governments have maintained the authoritarian system of the past (Kim In-Young, 2008). Ji Joo-Hyoung (2009, p.197) pointed out that the state relied on authoritarian and neoliberal policy tools due to the IMF crisis, despite achieving a democratised political system. Thus, inconsistencies emerged after the end of the IMF crisis between authoritarian policy strategies and democratised political systems (ibid).

Such inconsistencies also appeared in the heritage field. Heritage was still useful to the Kim Young-Sam regime's globalisation policy (see Sections 4.3.4 and 4.4.4). Although he emphasised globalisation in political aspects, ironically, South Korea passively experienced globalisation through IMF management due to the national bankruptcy crisis (Kim Min-Hyun, 2004). In the wave of globalisation, heritage has become a propaganda tool to inform the international community about Korean culture (Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-Dal & Lee Na-Yeon, 2019, p.19). Nine out of 15 World Heritage sites were listed in the 1990s and 2000s in South Korea. Also, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act is one of the most authoritarian laws in South Korea (Park Jeong-Hee, 2008, p.92). At a time of paradigm shift toward localism, the state continued to expand the influence of this law. The regulatory power on the non-designated buildings and lands around heritages was again returned to the central government by the revision of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act in 2000 (see Section 4.4.4). Legally, the basis for the areas surrounding heritage (Historic and Cultural Environment Preservation Areas,

HCEPAs) was merely transferred, from the National Land Planning and Utilization Act to the Cultural Heritage Protection Act.

However, many of the conflicts on heritage are due to construction activities in HCEPAs, not the heritage itself. The number of cases deliberated by the Cultural Heritage Committee increased from 287 in 1962 to 1,866 in 2015 (Chae Kyeong-Jin et al., 2016, p.15). HCEPAs were designated in 2000. As shown in the table below, since 2000, the number of heritage cases deliberated has exploded. The reasons for the HCEPA designation were that the CHA practically supervised them as a part of the historic environment, and the heritage experts argued for an intensive conservation system led by the central government in historical areas (CHA, 2012, p.13). The deregulation policy following the economic golden age and the IMF crisis in the 1990s promoted development activities within urban space, leading to the establishment of the HCEPAs, which restrict construction activities within a maximum of 500m from the designated heritage (Chae Kyeong-Jin et al., 2016, p.169). The Cultural Heritage Protection Act (Article 13) stipulates that administrative agencies set the standards for each HCEPA and hear experts' opinions on activities exceeding the standards. According to Chae Kyeong-Jin et al. (ibid, p.27), from 2013 to 2015, among the reviews and deliberations of the Cultural Heritage Committee, "permissions for actions affecting the HCEPA" accounted for 45.2% of cases, followed by heritage designation and revocation (20.2%) and alteration of the current situation of any state-designated heritage (17.1%). Moreover, HCEPAs took up 80.4% of the Architecture Subcommittee deliberations and 53.7% of the Heritage Site Subcommittee deliberations, respectively. More than half of the heritage deliberations were to do with private property, not heritage itself.

Year	1962	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	2015
Number of deliberation cases	287	342	507	497	2,067	1,659	1,866

TABLE 5-4. CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF DELIBERATION CASES BY THE CULTURAL HERITAGE COMMITTEE
SOURCE: CHAE KYEONG-JIN ET AL. (2016, P.15). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

This regulation, which restricts users' rights in the HCEPAs, is decided through consultation between the provincial governors and the CHA (Cultural Heritage Protection Act, Article 13). They need to hear the opinions of three experts, including one from the Cultural Heritage Committee (Enforcement Decree of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, Article 7-2).

The state handed over the decision and responsibility for this regulation to the Cultural Heritage Committee. According to *Cultural Heritage 2021 through Statistics* (CHA, 2022c, p.64), the total number of heritage alteration deliberations in 2021 was 2,747, of which 1,112 (40.1%) were related to HCEPAs. By law, properties in HCEPAs are managed through consultation with the local governors and the CHA. However, since decisions are made through deliberation by the Cultural Heritage Committee, they are regulated by the same procedures as designated heritage. Therefore, the legal decision-making authority of the local governments became nominal. Users, residents or executors therefore need to persuade the Cultural Heritage Committee of their case, not their local governments.

Local governments were able to attribute the responsibility for regulation to the CHA, and the CHA was able to retain its regulatory authority based on the decision of the Cultural Heritage Committee. This was a convenient system for administrative agencies, because they did not have to take responsibility. The authority of experts whom citizens could not elect was effective in the administrative enforcement process. This was because, ostensibly, decisions were made by the private sector. For local communities, delivering their complaints and opinions became more complicated.

The conflict between the state and the local community was replaced by a conflict between an individual and a non-governmental professional group representing South Korean civil society. This could be described as a conflict between the individual and public interests. Collectivism is strong in South Korean society.[21] South Koreans tend to value the public good more than private interests. A representative example is the controversy over apartment construction around the royal tombs of the Joseon dynasty in Incheon in 2019. The construction activity, 200 metres away from the royal tomb, was not within an HCEPA. However, the CHA issued an order to suspend construction based on the provision that deliberation could be allowed by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act even if the distance from the heritage was over 500 metres, but the court rejected the administrative order (Kim Nam-Seok, 2022).

---

[21] For example, the word "we" shows the collectivist characteristics of Korean society. In Korea, my motherland is our motherland, my home is our home, my children are our children, and Koreans even call my wife our wife. During the 1997 IMF crisis, Koreans collected 227 tons of gold ($1.8 billion) for three months to save "our nation" (Nam Ae-Ri, n.d).

Nevertheless, the public was of the opinion that the apartments under construction should be demolished (Kim Jong-Gook, 2022).

FIGURE 5-2. YOUTH HOSTEL COMPLEX AROUND BULGUKSA TEMPLE (LEFT) AND BOMUN TOURIST COMPLEX (RIGHT)
SOURCE: KANG SU-KYEONG (2010) (LEFT); KOREA TOURISM ORGANIZATION (2022) (RIGHT).

FIGURE 5-3. HERITAGE REGULATION AREA (HCEPA) IN GYEONGJU CITY CENTRE.
SOURCE: CHA (2010). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

In Gyeongju, South Korea's number one historical city, the gap between the new social paradigm and the authoritarian heritage policy was wider than anywhere else. Gyeongju was the capital of the ancient kingdom of Silla (57 BC–935 AD). Gyeongju city centre has been a representative city for historical tourism and has been heavily regulated since the 1960s. The Park Chung-Hee regime took strong conservation measures and established the Bomun tourist complex away from the city centre. It also promoted extensive excavation and restoration of the heritages. School trip businesses became active, centred on the youth hostel complex around Bulguksa Temple, and other tourism industry facilities were constructed in the Bomun tourist complex. Until the ban on overseas travel was lifted in 1993, Gyeongju was a characteristic school trip destination. However, in the city centre, the residents' property rights were restricted for a long time due to heritage preservation. Even repairing houses was impossible due to relics

(buried cultural heritage) that might exist underground. This occurred because there was a high probability that such relics did exist underneath the city that was the capital for a thousand years.

Even in the local autonomy era, Gyeongju city de facto lost its urban planning authority in the city centre due to widely drawn HCEPAs. The formation of local councils in 1991 and the direct election of the local governor in 1995 were significant changes in the local community in which the collective demands of the residents could form political power. The Gyeongju local communities had demanded alternatives to the central government since the 1980s (see next section about the enactment of SAPPAC). In the local autonomy system, heritage has gradually been transformed into cultural products revitalising the local economy in South Korea (Lee Hyun-Kyung, Son Oh-Dal & Lee Na-Yeon, 2019, p.19). Local autonomy was also a significant opportunity for the Gyeongju economy. However, heritage regulations that were strengthened further through HCEPAs in 2000 forced the local communities to urge the state to enact a new law on historical cities. As shown in the map above, there are almost no areas in Gyeongju city centre that are not subject to heritage regulations.

In 2001, the Gyeongju Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice led the establishment of the Citizens' Coalition for Enactment of the Special Act on the Preservation and Maintenance of Ancient City Area, which consisted of representatives of 120 civic groups in Gyeongju (CHA, 2012, p.13). Though the city government, city council and members of parliament also have played important roles, the enactment of SAPPAC and the implementation of ACPPP started from that civil movement (M, interview).

Despite political democratisation and introduction of local autonomy, the state has enlarged its power over heritage, utilising a deliberation system and the authoritarian nature of the Cultural Property Protection Act. In contrast, communities in certain regions attempted to become involved in heritage policy. However, they did not challenge the firmly established heritage concept or demand that their decision-making participation be empowered, but focused on compensation for economic loss by enacting a new law. This process did not lead directly to the heritage-led regeneration policy. It took another ten years after that for such regeneration to emerge. However, the need for a heritage-led regeneration strategy became convincing during that decade, as the demand of local communities for institutional change led to the enactment of new legislation. The following section will explore that process.

5.5. Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities

This section will describe the enactment of the SAPPAC and its revision process. The series of processes, from enacting to revising the SAPPAC, shows how heritage-led regeneration emerged as an alternative to the conflict resolution between the local communities and the state.

The SAPPAC is a law that is the basis of all procedures, plans, project implementation and local ordinances to preserve and regenerate the four historic cities designated by Presidential Decree. The Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities (SAPAC) was enacted in 2004 and changed to SAPPAC in 2011. The purpose of the SAPPAC is "to contribute to promoting ancient cities as vibrant historical and cultural cities by recovering the identity of ancient cities and improving residents' living conditions through the efficient preservation and promotion of the historical and cultural environment of ancient cities which are cultural assets of our nation" (SAPPAC, Article 1).

The enactment of the new Act, which started from the local community's demand for urban development and guarantees of property rights, was distorted into a regulatory law by the state. The collective protest of the residents made practical administrative actions impossible until the law was amended seven years after its enactment. The active intervention of local communities also influenced planning agencies, local governments, politicians and even the CHA. As a result, local communities' struggle has led to the development of the SAPPAC from the traditional heritage law to a form that has urban planning characteristics added. Above all, the guarantee of resident property rights and the urban regeneration project through the resident support project may be obtained legally.

5.5.1. Enactment of SAPAC 2004

The process of enactment of the SAPAC demonstrates the power struggle between local communities and the state in heritage conflicts. With the enactment of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act in 1962, large-scale historic sites were designated in Gyeongju city centre. As heavy heritage regulation led to the decline of the city centre and the housing environment worsened, residents demanded compensation frequently (Kim Nam-Hee, 2020, p.75). L and M argue that the SAPAC started from the local communities (interview). They believe that

Gyeongju communities wanted a new Act to offset the regulation by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act.

The SAPAC was enacted after several attempts (see Table 5-5). In the 1990s, the National Assembly members from Gyeongju proposed bills that were focused on support and compensation. However, they failed to pass. The SAPAC was enacted after the bill included a policy of strengthening regulations by heritage experts and authorities. The CHA argues that the Act was enacted by the need to manage old residential areas, as the Gyeongju historic site was registered as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2000 (CHA Ancient City Preservation Team, 2009). However, the initial bills emphasised support and compensation for residents and projects to improve living environments, because the demands of Gyeongju citizens as voters significantly influenced political society (L, interview).

The first attempt was a political pledge to appease the public. President Roh Tae-Woo's presidential campaign pledges in 1987 included enacting a Special Measures Act to improve urban planning in Gyeongju and alleviate inconveniences in citizens' lives (CHA, 2012). However, the bill failed due to the difficulty of securing finances and effectiveness. Subsequent bills for the 1997 Old City Conservation Act and the 1999 Special Act on the Preservation and Renovation Promotion of Historic Ancient City proposed by the Gyeongju National Assembly members were also not enacted due to opposition from the relevant ministries (Lee Sun-Ja, 2021, p.8). Those bills focused on support and compensation (CHA, 2012).

On the other hand, heritage experts warned that local government, which had gained independent urban planning authority with the local self-government system in the 1990s, would be unable to control heritages in historic cities (CHA, 2012, p.13). They argued that central government should take the initiative to preserve ancient cities even after implementing the local autonomy system (CHA, 2012, p.13). Emergency heritage excavations rapidly increased due to the development boom in the 1990s, and the Gyeongju city government suggested to the Ministry of Culture that the government should purchase the heritage area and enact a special law as soon as possible before the first mayoral election in 1995 (CHA, 2012). Until then, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act had no provisions for historical landscapes other than heritage. As governments and heritage experts worried, the new Gyeongju mayor, elected by Gyeongju citizens, executed a large-scale development project without a prior investigation of cultural heritage in 1998 (CHA, 2012, p.4). In the same year, the CHA proposed

a bill based on the 1997 Old City Conservation Act, but it also failed due to opposition from other ministries (CHA, 2012, p.14).

Year	Sponsor	Name of bill	Result
1987	Presidential campaign pledges	Special Measures Act	Suspension
1997	National Assembly	Old City Conservation Act	Draft prepared
1998	CHA	Old City Conservation Act	Suspension
1999	National Assembly (Lim Jin-Chool, Kim Il-Yoon)	Special Act on the Preservation and Renovation Promotion of Historic Ancient Cities	Automatically lost upon expiration of the term of the 15th National Assembly
2001	National Assembly (Kim Il-Yoon and 143 others)	Special Act on the Preservation and Renovation of Historic Ancient Cities	Passed by the National Assembly in 2003
2004	Government (revised)	Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities	Enacted

TABLE 5-5. PROGRESS OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE SPECIAL ACT ON THE PRESERVATION OF ANCIENT CITIES

SOURCE: CHA ANCIENT CITIES PRESERVATION TEAM (2009). UNDERSTANDING OF ANCIENT CITIES PROMOTION POLICIES.

EDITED BY THE AUTHOR.

The purpose of the legislation was different, but the governments and the Gyeongju community agreed that a new law was needed. The CHA and the Gyeongju National Assembly members sought an alliance with other historical cities such as Gongju, Buyeo and Iksan. Of the two hurdles, "legislation for one specific city" and "funding" (CHA, 2012, p.14), the first hurdle was overcome by a coalition of "Ancient Cities". In addition, the new bill (Kim Il-Yoon and 143 others, 2001) proposed spatial regulations for support programme funding. This bill included provisions regarding the designation of new conservation districts. The bill for the Special Act on the Preservation and Renovation of Historic Ancient Cities was submitted by 144 members of the National Assembly in 2001, and it was passed two years later.

In 2004, the SAPAC was established. However, the government and the legislature had agreed to remove matters from the bill that required additional funding. The title of the Act was changed from the Special Act on the Preservation and Renovation of Historic Ancient Cities (bill) to the Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities. It included nothing about support and compensation, the original purposes of local communities. The initial Act, the SAPAC, excluded matters such as local renovation and support for residents. It focused on forming a deliberation committee, the designation of preservation districts and the establishment of a

preservation plan. Before enactment, the bill suggested that 1) the state would compensate residents for the loss due to restrictions; 2) the state would establish and implement migration measures for excavation; 3) the state would guarantee residents' right to demand purchase by the state; 4) the state would accommodate requests for excavation from landowners; and 5) there would be reductions in or exemptions from land transfer tax and other business income tax. However, those measures were deleted just before enactment to achieve equity with other laws and regions (CHA, 2012, p.15).

The review comments on the bill recorded in the Ancient Cities Preservation White Paper (CHA, 2012) show that the central government and heritage experts shared views conflicting with those of local communities. The CHA argued that "renovation" and "compensation" should be deleted from the name and purpose of the law, noting that those words can stimulate expectations for urban development. It also demanded the deletion of rights to request compensation and excavation paid for the government. Moreover, by submitting its written opinion, the CHA indicated that it wanted to focus only on its existing task: heritage protection and deliberation. In its submission, the CHA argued that 1) the relevant local governments should establish a plan and implement it with approval from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, not the CHA; 2) the preservation areas should be designated by urban planning; and 3) the responsibility to secure human resources, organisations and tasks should lie with the local governments.

The Korean Archaeological Society also submitted a written opinion that 1) a realistic conservation measure should be based on the Cultural Heritage Protection Act rather than a new conservation system led by local governments; and 2) the name and contents of the Act relating to "renovation" should be deleted. In addition, M said in an interview, "They [governments] did not know how much money they would have to pay [showing concern for the expense of supporting residents], so the Ministry of Strategy and Finance intervened and removed all the things about support for residents from the legislative process". She recalled that the antipathy of the residents was considerable.

The state also refused to bear all of the project's costs (CHA, 2012, p.15). The creation of a special account was also not allowed by the central government's review. The state modified the bill to comply with the regulations of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act and the made the process to obtain permission the same as in that Act. The local communities accepted "preservation", expecting alternatives, such as compensation and support. However, the state

and expert groups took it as an opportunity to change the heritage policy from individual heritage protection to spatially planned preservation, leaving "preservation" without "renovation" and "resident support". As a result, regulations were strengthened by the HCEPAs and broadened by the SAPAC in four Ancient Cities.

The community of Gyeongju did not demand deregulation. They believed that the state's exercise of power was excessive but also that the regulation of the area where they lived was necessary. Since local communities and expert groups commonly agreed on the importance of heritage protection, the critical issue in the enactment process of the SAPAC was not the deregulation of conservation areas in Gyeongju but alternatives that the state could provide. According to the Ancient City Preservation white book (CHA, 2012), some heritage experts also argued that the state should establish a support strategy to strengthen heritage regulation.

Local communities wanted the state to be responsible for dealing with the decline of the city, whether or not legislation was enacted, and they react accordingly. The residents, who had consistently demanded the enactment of the law, began to oppose it as they heard the bill would be modified before enactment. The Pan-Civil Association for Enactment of the Special Act on the Preservation and Renovation of Historic Ancient Cities argued that the purpose of the legislation had been greatly undermined (CHA, 2012, p.35). The association claimed that the Act's name emphasised preservation rather than renovation and individual property rights, and the state was avoiding its responsibility for compensation due to economic loss and budget preparation.

Other civil organisations in Gyeongju also blamed the state, pointing out that "the state still evades its responsibility for the excavation cost" (CHA, 2012, p.35). Even after the enactment of the law, local communities protested that the new law would act as another "fetter" following the Cultural Property Protection Act and opposed the enforcement of the law (CHA, 2012, p.37). Gyeongju city government also demanded that the state should organise a significantly increased budget to quell the citizens' rage, emphasising the "special sacrifices" of Gyeongju (CHA, 2012, p.24). It appealed that 1) citizens' complaints were beyond what they could resolve on their own as the land price difference between the developed surrounding area and the regulated area was increasing; and 2) the state needed to invest in the city centre with an unprecedented budget increase, regardless of enactment.

To sum up, the state and local communities chose legislation to compromise on their conflicts rather than improve the existing heritage preservation system. Heritage experts and administrative authorities wanted to manage the broader area surrounding heritage, and local communities wanted measures to improve their living environment. Accordingly, the legislation was a political tool to resolve conflicts between them. However, the bill was shifted in a conservative direction by the state. The local communities' requirements in the 2004 Act were all deleted. This Act defined its purpose as "transmitting traditional cultural heritage by determining the matters necessary to efficiently preserve the historical and cultural environment of the ancient capital, which is the cultural asset of the nation". Moreover, Gongju, Buyeo and Iksan were added to the legislation, as the issue of equity with other regions was raised at the time. This result did not satisfy citizens in these four cities.

5.5.2. Revision of SAPPAC 2011

After the enactment of the law, the communities of Gongju, Buyeo, Iksan and Gyeongju all protested. Not only had all of the residents' requests been deleted from the Act, but the law stipulating a procedure to designate a district before establishing a plan was one of the reasons that aggravated the backlash. According to the law in 2005, districts were designated according to the results of the Basic Survey. Then, the Master Plan could be established. The Act applied the same method as the existing administrative procedures for the heritage governed by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. At that time, it was not compulsory to collect residents' opinions except in relation to the Master Plan. The law only stipulated that "the opinions of residents can be collected" by a judgement of administrative agencies in Article 12 of the Enforcement Decree of the Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities 2005.[22] It was mandatory to collect the opinions of residents only when the local governors requested designation, cancellation or changes to districts. In practice, the procedure for collecting residents' opinions only took place just before implementation of the project. Local community participation in the process was minimal. Since there was no legal guarantee for the improvement of living conditions and no information on what plans would be established, it was unacceptable for the residents to designate a district. This aggravated discord between the

---

[22] In Korea, enforcement decrees are made and published by central administrative agencies to enforce laws.

state, which aimed to preserve the heritage and surrounding landscape with a regulatory approach, and local communities, who desired a better living environment.

Local communities did not want rational zoning, plans or blueprints filled with rhetoric. They wanted the Act to be amended, as the state had promised to fulfil their desires. At the public hearing to devise supplementary measures for the Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities held in December 2006, just before the 2007 Basic Survey Report was submitted, the residents demanded the repeal of the Act. The opinions of experts were also divided (CHA, 2012, p.59). Law professor Jeong Jong-Seop argued that a new law should be prepared after the current law was repealed. Urban planning expert Chae Dr Mi-Ok and heritage Professor Kim Chang-Gyu emphasised the need for amendment, including compensation and a programme for resident support, while maintaining the law.

Despite the Basic Survey report submission in 2007, until the Master Plans were submitted and the Act was amended in March 2011, the CHA could not even designate districts (see Section 5.6.1). Before the revision of the Act, the CHA faced intense opposition from local citizens and could not take any administrative measures. The designation of districts was skipped. Administrative agencies, which had to follow laws, violated the legal procedure and established the Master Plans without district designation. The CHA and local governments entrusted the establishment of Master Plans to the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) in 2008. The district designation proposals of the Master Plans, not the Basic Survey, were approved in 2012.

The CHA began to look for ways to improve relationships with local citizens. The CHA established the Ancient City Preservation Council in 2008 and held regular conferences to secure communication channels between the CHA, experts and local governments (CHA, 2012). Then, a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) was signed with the city of Gyeongju in 2010 with the name "Ancient City Promotion Agreement". The following year, 2011, similar MOUs were signed with the other cities. Around this time, the CHA also began to improve relationships with local communities. The CHA held a meeting with residents' representatives of the four cities in 2009 and the Four Ancient Cities Preservation Resident Discussion Meeting. In 2010, the CHA supported the establishment of Ancient Cities Preservation resident associations by the cities. Local governments also started to operate educational programmes, such as the Ancient City Promotion Forums and the Ancient City Preservation Academies, with financial support from the CHA. After the CHA started financial support for local communities,

such as educational programmes and office operations, publication of booklets and support for activity expenses, the scope of communities' activities began to expand. They could meet various experts and public officials, expanding their network (this will be discussed in Chapter 6).

Although the CHA and the local communities improved their relationships, the state did not have to comply with the demands of the local communities. In response, the local communities in the four cities recognised that the CHA and the municipal governments had little influence over the amendment to the law and began to seek other political means. A typical example is that in November 2009, five National Assembly members and 200 resident representatives held a "legislative hearing to revise the Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities" at the National Assembly in Seoul. This was more like public lobbying and demonstrations against the National Assembly and the state, although there were some expert presentations (M, interview). In front of 200 residents, National Assembly members from the four cities invited and introduced other colleagues from the National Assembly, demonstrating their political efforts (L, interview). The representatives of the residents made a statement in front of the many lawmakers. In front of 200 residents from the four cities, none of the lawmakers, experts or public officials could say that amendment of the Act was impossible.

The 2011 revision of the Act included provisions about support for residents and easing of the level of regulations on property rights. The title of the Act also changed to the Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities (SAPPAC). The current Act stipulates designation, planning, related projects and support for residents in the four cities. Local communities and the state reached a compromise. The government secured the authority to establish and plan more comprehensive conservation areas, and communities could establish a legal basis for support and compensation programmes. The SAPPAC is a regulatory and supportive law. The Ancient City Preservation White Paper published by the CHA in 2012 after the Act's revision explains the purpose of the enactment of the SAPPAC as follows:

> The SAPPAC has institutionalised the debate on the necessity of broader preserving heritage and the demand for resident compensation, which have been raised for decades. It was enacted to protect the property rights of residents who were excluded from the cultural heritage preservation policy and to preserve and create a historic and cultural environment that was overlooked in the protection of a single cultural heritage system. Whereas the Cultural Property Protection Act focuses on the preservation of cultural

properties themselves, the SAPPAC is a law that manages and recreates the area surrounding cultural properties. The SAPPAC was enacted to enhance the practical effect of historical and cultural environment preservation in Ancient Cities, as preserving historical and cultural environments in Ancient Cities in a wide area to overcome the limitations of the pointing method (individual regulation) of preserving cultural properties.

(CHA, 2012, p.12)

FIGURE 5-4. COMPARISON OF FIRST AND CURRENT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE SAPPAC.
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

The SAPPAC began with local communities and developed with them (L and M, interview). Though not all of the residents' demands were accepted, local communities played a pivotal role in the process of the revision of the Act and achieved their purposes. The revised Act guarantees national support for conservation areas in four cities: Gyeongju, Gongju, Buyeo and Iksan. The designation of "Ancient City districts" of the four cities was also approved in March 2012, following the Act's revision in 2011. The districts were designated after the Master Plans were presented to communities. Furthermore, as shown in the figure above, local communities were guaranteed more opportunities to participate in formal processes. Several organisations and residents' committees, which will be discussed in Chapter 6, were also established during this process.

5.6. Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Plan

The process of establishing the ACPPP also shows that the local communities struggled to reflect their arguments in the plans despite the limited opportunities for participation. In the late 2000s, due to resistance from local communities, the Basic Survey was practically nullified, and the approval of the Ancient City Preservation Plan was postponed until the law was revised (see Section 5.5). This section emphasises that communities' efforts led the planning agency to reflect their opinions in planning beyond the scope set by the law.

FIGURE 5-5. MASTER PLAN ESTABLISHMENT PROCEDURE.

SOURCE: CHA (2022A), ANCIENT CITIES PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION MASTER PLAN STATUS REPORT 2022. TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

The SAPPAC stipulates that administrative agencies must "hear opinions from residents in the relevant ancient city and appropriate experts, and reflect such opinions if he/she finds the opinions reasonable" when 1) the designation of "Ancient City" is requested; 2) establishing or changing a Master Plan or an Implementation Plan; 3) designating, cancelling or changing a district (SAPPAC, Article 9). The administrator or governors shall publicly announce the plans through at least two daily newspapers, bulletin boards and the website of the CHA or governments to make it available to the general public for inspection for at least 30 days (Enforcement Decree of SAPPAC, Article 16-4-2). The administrator or governors also shall reply to the person who has submitted an opinion within 60 days from the end date of the inspection period (Enforcement Decree of SAPPAC, Article 16-4-3).

However, there is a possibility that residents' participation in the decision-making process may become formal by having the administrative agency judge the validity of the opinion. In addition, considering realistic planning periods, there is not much possibility for public opinion to be reflected in plans. The regeneration expert J pointed out that the administrative custom that the administrative agency that placed the order for the plan to the planning institution requires quick results is problematic (interview).

Since the planning period is very short and we are trying to achieve results quickly … We induce participation but the time to induce and reflect opinions is short. In Korea, the planning period is required to be within one year or as short as six months. There is not enough physical time for the local community to participate in the planning process. Since there is no time given [after the planners conduct on-site analysis], we have to listen to experts [during planning] and [finally] meet the procedure for collecting residents' opinions through formal events such as public hearings. Because that time is usually just before the plan submission, it [collecting opinions from the local community] is not easy.

(J, interview)

With such limited opportunities for participation, communities protested strongly about the initial planning process. In this section, the Basic Survey and the Master Plan establishment process will describe how the local community struggled to acquire political power and convince planning agencies and the CHA of their case.

5.6.1. Basic Survey (plan) establishment and its characteristics

According to the 2004 Act, Ancient City districts are designated through the Basic Survey, and then the Master Plan should be designed based on these districts. The CHA followed the legal process in the early stage. In interview, M said that the CHA, which had no experience in spatial planning, needed an expert to determine the boundaries of the districts to be designated by classifying conservation and non-conservation areas. Consequently, the CHA commissioned the KRIHS, where M worked, to conduct the Basic Survey for district designation.

> *The first thing that the CHA started after the legislation [was passed] was to request the KRIHS to conduct Basic Surveys on Ancient City Preservations. The reason was that there were too many heritages in those cities. And the first request was to create a standard to distinguish where to preserve and where to develop. I devised the Land Suitability Assessment System to prevent reckless development in metropolitan areas, called Measures to Prevent Reckless Development in Semi-Agricultural Areas. I developed a methodology and criteria to distinguish between areas for development and preservation. Based on that [methodology], standards for classifying management areas were established. ... The CHA conducts a Basic Survey before designating heritage. It is the opposite of urban planning, making plans first and designing target areas. In the process, I believed that this was not a problem only for heritage but an issue of urban planning, and it would be difficult to succeed if it was not combined with urban planning means or land policy means.*
>
> (M, interview)

The Basic Survey report, prepared by a planning organisation, not a heritage institution, directly emphasises the need to proceed with heritage-led regeneration on the premise of the amendment of the Act. The report is subtle. Despite using rhetoric attractive to heritage experts, the report suggests an urban planning approach. For example, using the term "the historical frame of the ancient capital city", the report presents the "range of the ancient capital city" based on archaeological data, topography and ancient literature. It also sets the six "components of the ancient capital cities" such as palaces, royal tombs, temples and towers, streets and building sites, mountains and rivers, and historical sites. This rhetoric signifies that district designation is to be based on a traditional heritage perspective.

However, the report devotes much more to urban spatial structure analysis than heritage analysis, and district designation reflects urban planning and zoning regulations considerably. It presents the map of the "ancient city environmental influence zone" by calculating the "historical and cultural environment index" through the gravity model. This sounds like a heritage analysis map, but the map actually looks like one for a regeneration scheme. The figures above show the Gongju Ancient City environmental influence zone suggested by the Basic Survey and the HCEPA set up by the CHA. Whereas the CHA drawing shows regulations within a certain distance centred on the state-designated heritage sites, the Gongju ancient city environmental influence zone emphasises the connection between the heritages and the long-standing urban spaces from north to south. In 2012, very similarly shaped Ancient City districts within the gravity map were designated. In particular, the report highlights regional regeneration through conservation and "improvement of the living environment", which did not exist in the SAPAC, setting its goal as the "activation of cultural potential" in the Ancient City.

FIGURE 5-6. ANCIENT CITY ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCE ZONE (LEFT) AND HCEPA IN GONGJU (RIGHT).
SOURCE: CHAE MI-OK ET AL. (2007B, P.37), THE ANCIENT CITY BASIC SURVEY, GONGJU (LEFT); CHA (2020) (RIGHT).

Nevertheless, the district designation proposal by the Basic Survey was not approved. M recalled that the opposition from the residents was very fierce, and it was difficult to even hold a briefing session for residents (interview). She and her team tried to persuade the residents by holding an informal "resident information session". In interview, she said that when she and her team went to the meeting room after receiving a call from the residents that they would attend, they did show up but quickly disappeared, shouting "absolutely impossible" to her team and government officials. Although the Basic Survey report satisfied the legal process by

submitting four regional reports and a comprehensive report to the CHA, the original purpose of district designation was practically eliminated.

I prepared two district designation proposals, but the residents strongly opposed them. The reason is that [they said] I do not know what kind of projects [there] would be without all the resident support matters. They bitterly opposed it because the designation of the district like this would only increase the new regulations ... Without completing this task, we moved on to the Ancient City Preservation Plan [Master Plan]. There was strong opposition from the residents. I had already framed the Ancient City Preservation Plan concept at that time, but the residents did not believe it. They couldn't believe it because there was no legal provision for resident support, and only heritages have been regulated for a long time [by the CHA].

(M, interview)

FIGURE 5-7. "WE WILL NEVER NEGLECT THE DESIGNATION OF ANCIENT CITY DISTRICTS THAT IGNORES THE OPINIONS OF THE CITIZENS", WRITTEN ON THE BANNER (LEFT) AND THE EMPTY PRESENTATION ROOM FOR THE BASIC SURVEY (RIGHT). SOURCE: INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT M.

5.6.2. Master Plan establishment process

In 2007, when the Basic Survey was completed, according to the legal procedure, the Master Plan would be established after the district designation based on the results of the Basic Survey. However, this designation was not approved due to the residents' resistance. The CHA and local governments prepared the Master Plan in 2008, ignoring the legal procedure. In 2009, the KRIHS completed the Ancient City Preservation Master Plans for Buyeo, Gongju and Iksan and submitted them to each local government. The Gyeongju Ancient City Preservation Master Plan was submitted in 2011.

The first local government to undertake the Master Plan was that of Buyeo. The most declining rural area among the Ancient Cities, Buyeo responded the most quickly because it was more interested in the archaeological excavation projects and the construction and relocation of the residential complex that would follow than in the project to support residents (M, Interview). As the Buyeo Development Committee met and persuaded the residents in person, Buyeo was friendly from the time of conducting the Basic Survey and was the first to establish a plan (CHA, 2012, p.122). However, other local governments, which had to place an order for planning services, postponed their planning. While Buyeo started work in March 2008, Gongju only started planning in October 2008, and Gyeongju and Iksan did so in December 2008.

[The other cities] started planning as soon as Buyeo took full action ... Gyeongju continued to delay the completion of the planning due to the residents' opposition, so the report could not be completed until 2011.

(M, interview)

FIGURE 5-8. COMPARISON OF THE ESTABLISHED SYSTEM OF URBAN PLANNING AND THE ANCIENT CITY PRESERVATION PLAN. SOURCE: CHAE MI-OK ET AL. (2011, P.22). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

In addition, Gongju and Gyeongju requested an extension for the planning submission, which was in contrast to the general South Korean planning pattern that set the planning period at one year and demanded quick results (L, interview). In South Korea's highly centralised

administrative structure, local governments had to be conscious of the central government. But they also did not like to expand the control of the central government in their areas. When the Ancient City Preservation Master Plan – which comes before the urban master plan – is established, the designated districts must follow that plan, not the urban plans established by the local government. Unlike Buyeo and Iksan, which were positive about the plan, because the target areas of the designated districts were outside urban areas, Gongju and Gyeongju, where the designated districts swallowed up the entire city centre, tried to delay the establishment of the plan. While the planning for Buyeo and Iksan took 12 months, it took 14 months for Gongju and 26 months for Gyeongju. The timings of the requests for approval of the plan was also different. Gongju and Iksan requested plan approval in June 2010 and Gyeongju in April 2011, while Buyeo requested it in July 2009.

During the planning period, the KRIHS, a planning agency, tried to persuade communities through a small "resident briefing session" (M, interview). The residents complained more about the law than the plan (CHA, 2012). In particular, there was much backlash in Gyeongju. The Citizens' Debate for Gyeongju Ancient City Promotion, scheduled for November 2010, was cancelled due to opposition from civic groups ("Do you", 2010). The Gyeongju City Merchants Association occupied the public hearing room to block the announcement of the Master Plan by the KRIHS. Some members even brawled with public officials who interrupted (L, interview). At a press conference five days before the public hearing, the Gyeongju Ancient City Development Association argued that "a plan without kernels is invalid" (Kim Seong-Woong, 2010). The Gyeongju community allowed the Master Plan in 2012 after the revision of the Act confirming the project to support residents. All four master plans were approved by the CHA in March 2012, just before the amended Act came into force.

FIGURE 5-9. A STRUGGLE BETWEEN RESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS AT THE 2010 GYEONGJU ACPPP PUBLIC HEARING.
SOURCE: KIM SEONG-WOONG (2010).

FIGURE 5-10. PROTEST AGAINST THE PLAN BY CIVIC GROUPS AT A PUBLIC HEARING ON THE GYEONGJU ANCIENT CITY PRESERVATION MASTER PLAN IN 2010.
SOURCE: KIM NAM-HEE (2020, P.113).

As the programmes to support residents according to the ACPPP became possible in 2012, local governments began actively intervening in planning. Although the Master Plan is established every ten years, it can be reviewed every five years (SAPPAC Enforcement Decree, Article 14). The local governments of all four cities applied to the CHA to change the Master Plan based on this provision. In 2012, the area of the designated districts was reduced in consideration of the opposition of residents who perceived the designation as another regulation. Recently, however, the area of designated districts has been gradually increasing (Lee Sun-Ja, 2021, pp.8–9). In 2014, Gongju changed its Ancient City Preservation Plan to the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master Plan. Gongju also announced a change (expansion) to its Ancient City district in 2017 and a second plan change in 2020. Iksan changed its plan in 2016. Gyeongju and Buyeo completed the notification of Ancient City districts with changed plans in 2017.

	Area of Ancient City Districts (ha)		Amount of Increase (%)
	2012	2017	
Buyeo	292	280	-4.11
Gongju	204	424	107.84
Gyeongju	277	361	30.32
Iksan	121	308	154.55

TABLE 5-6. CHANGES IN THE AREA OF DESIGNATED DISTRICTS

SOURCE: EDITED BY THE AUTHOR FROM THE MASTER PLANS AND THE DECISION NOTICES OF BUYEO, GONGJU, GYEONGJU AND IKSAN.

5.6.3. Features of the Master Plan

The KRIHS drew up all four Master Plans, but there is a slight difference in the basic framework because two teams in the KRIHS participated. M's team, who conducted the Basic Survey, was in charge of Buyeo, Gongju and Gyeongju, and another team was in charge of Iksan. Although the two teams presented different planning frameworks, the main concept, structure and method are very similar. The former team described that Ancient Cities would be managed and developed via "conservation, display and vitalising" by reading and interpreting the "historical frame" and "urban context" (Chae Mi-Ok et al., 2009, 2010, 2011). The latter team suggested "planned preservation", "historical restoration and regeneration", "historical tourism infrastructure construction" and "preparation of (resident) support measures" as the basic directions of the plan (Lee Wang-gun et al., 2016, pp.88–89). However, both teams dealt

with heritage preservation, improvement of the living environment, infrastructure creation, measures to support residents and the proposal for governance to include residents' participation in common. Specifically, they presented projects relating to the preservation and excavation of heritage sites, infrastructure creation in the SPDs and heritage-led regeneration projects such as infrastructure creation, projects to improve living environments, and support for the repair and new construction of traditional houses in the PPDs.

One of the characteristics of the first master plans, just as with the district designation process, was outside the scope stipulated by the law at the time. Planners accommodated residents' requests expecting a subsequent revision of the law. Before the revision of the law in 2011, the SAPPAC was in danger of abolition. At the public hearing on the revision of the Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities in 2006, not only residents, but also Professor Jeong Jong-Seop, a law expert, argued that the law should be repealed (CHA, 2012, p.59).

FIGURE 5-11. THE FRAMEWORK OF ANCIENT CITY MANAGEMENT.
SOURCE: CHAE MI-OK ET AL. (2011, P.14). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

In these circumstances, it was unlikely that the plan prepared as stipulated in the initial statute would be implemented. While the plans put preservation strategies at the top of the list, those drafted by urban planning experts placed considerable emphasis on urban regeneration and support for residents. The Buyeo Ancient City Preservation Master Plan in 2009, the first completed plan, included "improving living environment" and "compensation and support on [economic] loss" as Ancient City management goals (Chae Mi-Ok et al., 2009, p.118). The Gongju Ancient City Preservation Master Plan included an "urban regeneration strategy" as

one of its main approaches (Chae Mi-Ok et al., 2010, p.127). The Iksan Ancient City Preservation Master Plan included "resident support" as the goal of the plan (Lee Wang-Gun et al., 2016, p.92). In the Gyeongju Ancient City Preservation Master Plan, "improving the living environment of residents" and "revitalising the local economy" were set as the plan goals along with enhancing historical authenticity (Chae Mi-Ok et al., 2011, p.109). Strictly speaking, these goals were not accepted by the law at the time and were only possible after the revision of the law in 2011.

FIGURE 5-12. THE PLANNING STRATEGY OF IKSAN.
SOURCE: LEE WANG-GUN ET AL. (2016, P.89). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

In addition, as designation of districts was not approved due to communities' resistance, the Master Plans suggested dramatically reduced target areas. Using the term "pilot project district" instead of "Ancient City districts", the Master Plans adopted the strategy of implementing the plan in a smaller area than set out by the Basic Survey. The Basic Survey in 2007 suggested two types of designation, a broad zoning proposal ("future-oriented") and a reduced zoning proposal ("reality-compromised"). The table below compares the area of the "reality-compromised district designation" proposed in the Basic Survey and the pilot project

district of the Master Plan. The pilot project districts were approved as officially designated districts (Ancient City districts) later. In particular, in the case of Gyeongju, more than 20,000 hectares in the Basic Survey of 2007 dwindled to only 1.37% of the area, which was finally approved in 2012. Even in Gongju, which had the smallest reduction, the Master Plan reduced about 90% of the area.

	Districts	Basic Survey (Reality-compromised, ha)	Master Plan (approved in 2012, ha)	Area ratio (Master Plan / Basic Survey, %)
Buyeo	SPD	1,038	143	13.78
	PPD	1,525	100	6.56
	Total	2,562	243	9.48
Gongju	SPD	1,440	116	8.06
	PPD	580	88	15.17
	Total	2,030	204	10.05
Gyeongju	SPD	15,586	217	1.39
	PPD	4,586	60	1.31
	Total	20,172	277	1.37
Iksan	SPD	3,970	29	0.73
	PPD	1,440	92	6.39
	Total	5,410	121	2.24

TABLE 5-7. COMPARING AREAS SUGGESTED BY THE BASIC SURVEY AND THE MASTER PLAN

SOURCE: EDITED BY THE AUTHOR FROM THE BASIC SURVEY, MASTER PLANS AND THE DECISION NOTICES OF BUYEO, GONGJU, GYEONGJU AND IKSAN.

According to the law, the Master Plan has priority over all laws and regulations within the designated districts, except for the laws relating to the protection of military and cultural heritage and the comprehensive national land development plan. It was like two sides of the same coin, in that the Ancient City Preservation Plan replaced the urban master plan and the urban management plan in the designated districts. In areas where the influence of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act was weak, the Ancient City Preservation Plan could be a more restrictive measure. On the other hand, in areas where the Cultural Heritage Protection Act had a strong influence, the Ancient City Preservation Plan could operate as a relaxed measure as the law was amended. Therefore, in the Master Plan, pilot project districts were proposed in the old city centres, which the Cultural Heritage Protection Act strongly regulated. With the revision of the law in 2011, the pilot project districts were officially designated as Ancient City districts. The term "pilot project district" has not been used in the changes to the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion plans since the revision of the law in 2011.

5.7. Resident support projects

This section will describe resident support initiatives implemented after the revision of the law in 2011. The resident support schemes were vital in the Master Plan changes, and the local governments changed the Master Plans between 2014 and 2017. The local governments proposed additional designated areas in the 2017 Master Plans to expand coverage of the resident support projects (G, interview). This was just five years after the 2012 approval, which made the change legally possible. The Ancient City Preservation and Promotion projects in the Master Plan show different characteristics in the SPDs and the PPDs. As the landlord's right to demand purchase by the state was guaranteed in the SPDs, the state's land purchases have taken up a larger proportion than before. On the other hand, in the PPDs, the Ancient City Image Recovery Project, a financial support project for landlords to repair or build new buildings in the form of traditional buildings, emerged as a core project for urban regeneration. Specifically, this section will examine 1) the resident education programmes and Ancient City Preservation and Promotion community supporting schemes implemented before the amendment of the Act; 2) the resident compensation measures in the SPDs; and 3) the resident support schemes in the PPDs.

5.7.1. Resident education and community support programmes

Between the establishment of Master Plans and prior to the revision of the law in 2011, at a time when programmes to support residents were impossible, experts and administrative agencies had made it an important agenda for residents to understand the law and the Master Plans. They wanted to improve the perception of residents who advocated the repeal of the law on conservation (M and G, interview). Administrative officials, urban planning experts and even some community representatives recognised that the resident-led projects were not easy.

For example, to go to the international level, it is necessary first to understand the concept of the Ancient City scheme. [People do] not clearly understand the concept, and in Buyeo, there are many people who cannot distinguish between the SPDs and the PPDs. Consequently, there are many cases where only the developers know what kind of actions are possible in each district, but the people who live there have no idea. In the case of the Iksan Geumma area, the illiteracy rate is quite high, so handing out leaflets is not very effective. It is too risky to have them participate in decision-making in such a

situation. Not ignoring them, but they're not ready for that yet. Then, in this situation, I think it is right to educate people about the Ancient City and its benefits that there are ...

<div align="right">(F, interview)</div>

The problem is residents' capabilities, people's minds, etc. Maybe it would be ignoring them, but no people do it. And what they're suggesting is childish, I'm sorry. Some people aren't like that, but most of them are. And their suggestion, because they are proposing things related to their interests ...

<div align="right">(G, interview)</div>

To be honest, I still think experts or public institutions should lead the way. For example, the Ancient City Forum almost disappeared when government support was cut. When I interviewed them, they seemed unmotivated and uninterested. In a very small range, there could be things that residents can do actively, but beyond that, only a few people who can speak well take the lead. So if it goes beyond a certain range, I think experts, leaders, coordinators or public sector [bodies] should take the lead.

When I went to a suburb in Gongju for an interview, an older resident representative asked back, "most of the residents here are old, so even walking is difficult, so what can we think?" How likely is it that older people, who make up most of the population, can participate in the old town? It is questionable whether their level of activity and knowledge is sufficient and whether they have the concept of sharing is unclear. It is not a negligible issue.

<div align="right">(K, interview)</div>

Therefore, the Ancient City Promotion Academy, an educational programme for nurturing residents' awareness of participation and related community groups, was opened in the four cities. This programme aims to educate people on laws and plans related to the ACPPP with lectures and field trips to domestic and foreign advanced cases and to lay the foundation for gradual community participation (CHA, 2012). Since then, the Ancient City Promotion Academy has played a role as the training centre of the Ancient City Promotion Resident Committee that participates in the Ancient City Promotion project.

<div align="center">*174*</div>

All the Ancient City Promotion Resident Committee members are from the Ancient City Promotion Academy.

<div align="right">(G, interview)</div>

There was also criticism that the Ancient City Promotion Academy was only a means of publicity for national policy. A local newspaper, the *Gyeongju News* (2010), raised suspicion that while the Gyeongju Ancient City Preservation Plan was being developed, the Ancient City Promotion Academy induced the formation of unilateral public opinion and attempted division among merchant groups. Although a local university operates the Ancient City Promotion Academy, the government fully supports the operating costs. The timing of the opening of the Ancient City Promotion Academies, in a period of severe regulation in the city centres, may support this argument (Gyeongju from 2009, Gongju from 2010, and Buyeo and Iksan from 2011). In particular, in the early 2010s, there was also a debate about whether the overseas advanced case studies for Ancient City Promotion Academy students was an effective educational method (Lee Jong-Tae, 2011) and whether it was an inducement for residents (Go Jae-Hong, 2013).

However, the scope of local community participation has gradually expanded from the target of policy persuasion to various other activities. Despite the controversy, the Ancient City Promotion Academy has remained to this day, and its recent education range is expanding. Various curricula such as the training programmes on the interpretation of history or discussions on local culture and urban regeneration have been suggested (Gongju Ancient City Promotion Academy, 2022; Gyeongju Ancient City Promotion Academy, 2022). In particular, the Ancient City Promotion resident committees, composed mainly of the Ancient City Promotion Academy graduates, represent the local community and their opinions. These committees, established in each region, are receiving financial support of 20 to 30 million won (£126,600 to £189,900: July 2022 exchange rate) per year in the name of operating expenses and magazine publication costs and offices (G, interview).

The committees have an advantage in providing an obvious subject for consultation with the CHA, local governments and planning agencies. Given South Korea's short planning period, a clear consultation target helps promote mutual communication. In the case of Gyeongju and Gongju, members of the Ancient City Promotion resident committees could participate in the decision-making process as supervisors. Some members also became members of the regional

deliberation committee or consultants (H, interview). In particular, some residents were deeply involved in policies and projects related to urban regeneration in Gongju in the official process (G, interview). G argued that the previously vertical relationship between local government and residents has become virtually horizontal (interview).

5.7.2. Resident support in Special Preservation Districts

The SPD is an area where nationally designated heritages are concentrated. It is not subject to the resident support project as a heritage protection area. The Master Plan proposes the restoration and excavation of heritage sites and land purchases for heritage protection as projects for "restoring the historical frame" within the SPDs. This may be understood as rhetoric for the broad preservation of the urban area. As the name of the Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities (SAPPAC) suggests, the focus is on the ancient heritages of the four cities.

Local governments insist on active utilisation through restoration, but it is common to re-cover them with soil after excavation due to criticism (H, interview). Most of Korea's ancient heritage is not only buried underground, but traditionally, Korean buildings have wooden structures, so most of the ruins through excavation are the foundation stones of wooden pillars, roof tiles and embankments. Consequently, heritage restoration entails much debate because it is hard to secure data on the shape of the time available. In addition, since most of the SPDs are listed as World Heritage sites, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act and the Special Act on the Conservation, Management and Utilisation of World Heritage Sites regulate them. Therefore, the projects in SPDs focus on the state ownership and management of land and designated heritage, regardless of resident participation.

Nevertheless, one of the most fundamental national supports for residents in Ancient Cities is that the law guarantees residents' rights in SPDs. As mentioned in Section 4.4.4, South Korea's Cultural Heritage Protection Act stipulates that the state has the right to expropriate an individual's property but does not specify the right of an individual to demand that the state purchase the asset. Accordingly, the state can purchase or strongly regulate private lands and heritage within the cultural heritage protection zone. Under the principle of "preserving the original state", individuals had to obtain the state's approval to modify or repair their assets. Therefore, resistance to this intensified in Ancient Cities, where heritages were concentrated,

especially in Gyeongju. The revision of the SAPPAC guarantees the right to demand the state purchase of land and buildings not guaranteed by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act (SAPPAC, Article 19) and residents' property rights (SAPPAC, Article 17-3). This resolved one of the most severe conflicts in Ancient Cities. Since, in the Ancient Cities, the Cultural Heritage Protection Areas defined by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act in urban areas are mostly included in the SPDs, this can represent significant support for landlords compared with other areas. L argues that this is the result of struggles by the community in the Gyeongju area (interview).

5.7.3. Resident support in the Preservation and Promotion Districts

The PPDs are the areas where practical resident support projects are possible. In the PPDs, financial and administrative support, the supply of residential relocation complexes due to excavation, or resident support projects as stipulated by law are suggested by the Master Plans. They may propose an improvement of non-designated modern heritage, historical landscapes and infrastructure for tourism within such areas. According to the SAPPAC, resident support projects include projects 1) to increase residents' income; 2) to promote welfare; 3) to improve dwelling conditions, such as repairing housing; 4) to improve infrastructure, such as roads, parking lots, water and sewage systems; and 5) for residents' living convenience, education and local culture (SAPPAC, Article 17-2). In the Master Plan, these projects are presented to conform with the formation and improvement of the historical landscape. Resident support projects in the PPDs show that cooperation between local governments and communities can lead to many projects and is also greatly possible in the future.

FIGURE 5-13. CHANGES IN GONJU JEONGJISAN VILLAGE
SOURCE: INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT H.

FIGURE 5-14. RESTORING MODERN
HERITAGE IN GONJU.
SOURCE: AUTHOR.

The Ancient City Image Recovery Project is a representative resident support project. Though it was temporarily implemented for four years from 2015, a regular national budget for

the project has been organised since 2020. Initially, it was a programme that provided financial support for repairing and installing *han-ok*: traditional houses, fences, shop signs, etc. In the early days, it focused on simply building modernised *han-ok* but gradually expanded to restoring colonial-era buildings and various modern architecture. As the project target range has gradually been expanded, the budget can also be used to improve old roads and historical assets in the PPDs. When a resident applied to repair and install *han-ok*, a maximum of 100 million won (£63,337; July 2022 exchange rate) was provided by governments up to two-thirds of the total cost in the late 2010s. In 2022, the government raised the support fund to 150 million won (£95,006; July 2022 exchange rate) up to half of the total cost. Although its purpose is to create a streetscape that meets the title of "Ancient City", there is also the aspect of compensation for building height restrictions (under two stories) and land use restrictions according to the Enforcement Decree of the SAPPAC (Appendix 1). The Ancient City Image Recovery Project became a symbolic project of the ACPPPs and the core of heritage-based urban regeneration.

Participant F argued that the efforts of public officials in Gongju, who persuaded residents to proceed with the Ancient City Image Recovery Project like door-to-door salespeople, led to success (interview). Other interviewees also agreed with her argument (interviews with H, K and L). However, another success factor is that the I Lucia's Garden, an old and shabby *han-ok*, was voluntarily remodelled before the project began (H, interview). H believed that the I directly showed the new direction for development of the region as a model for success (interview). M also points out that the success of Lucia's Garden led to a higher level of resident participation (interview). She also emphasised the importance of individual residents caring for their living space during the lecture and the field trips of the Ancient City Promotion Academy in 2011.

However, there are also problems with the resident support projects in the PPDs. Though the Ancient City Image Recovery Project is being evaluated as a success (Park Sang-Hyun, 2020), most other projects have been stopped because the national budget has not been secured. Looking at the projects, types and budgets implemented from 2016 to 2019, most of them consist of excavation, preservation, maintenance and restoration of designated heritages rather than projects related to resident support. These projects, based on the designated heritage maintenance budget previously secured, are less relevant to the PPDs. Except for those projects, the national budget for the ACPPP is only 0.51% of the total budget of the CHA (Lee Soon-Ja,

2021, p.12). In practice, only two billion won for the Ancient City Image Recovery Project and 100 million won for the community activity support programme (£1,266,737 and £63,337, respectively; July 2022 exchange rate) for each Ancient City come from the state (F, interview). Gongju city, which is mentioned as a successful model of the Ancient City Image Recovery Project, is implementing the rest of the projects with local funds (H, interview). Meanwhile, Gyeongju city is implementing only the Ancient City Image Recovery Project (Sim Kyeong-Mi, 2021, p.16).

(*SPR: Sub-project number ratio, BR: Budget ratio, %)

	Gyeongju		Gongju		Buyeo		Iksan	
	SPR	BR	SPR	BR	SPR	BR	SPR	BR
Preservation and repairing of heritage	6.2	2.6	0	0	5	0.3	6	0
Survey and research	7.7	0.3	6	15	11	2.8	14	1
Land purchase	13.8	20.1	17	35	11	53.4	6	4
Excavation	15.4	48.1	17	27	9	10.1	17	13
Restoration	24.6	18.4	6	6	0	0	3	2
Maintenance	20	3.5	18	12	38	7.7	37	46
Ancient City Image Recovery Project	9.2	4.2	18	2	11	11	11	33
Community participation	3.1	0.3	18	3	4	0.3	6	1
Relocation residential complex construction	0	0	0	0	11	14.4	0	0

Table 5-8. The ratio of the number for each sub-project implemented and the budget for each sub-project (2016-2019)

Source: Sim Kyeong-Mi (2021, p.15). Translated by the author.

Regulations are adopted immediately, but as this fails to formulate the budget, we face various civil complaints from residents, and our reliability declines. They [the CHA and the state] approve many plans but are irresponsible. Nothing is implemented via the central government budget for regeneration except for the initiative supporting han-ok. *Nevertheless, we should follow the central government's decision, which has the right to organise the budget and therefore [there is] no choice in many cases. ... To convince our council leaders, the central government's interest and securing the budget are important. Things are going on under the premise that the central government will invest in related budgets according to the law in the future. However, if the money does not come in, we have to take full responsibility for projects that have already begun, which will lead to conflicts even within the city council. Budget is related to our [government officials'] individual trustworthiness. Without money, we government officials cannot work on anything. Central governments have no endeavour and ability to secure the*

budget. Agents in the Cultural Heritage Administration tend to avoid working in that
[Ancient City Preservation and Promotion] team.

(G, interview)

With the institutional system and plan complete, securing a budget becomes one of the essential tasks of the CHA. In particular, securing funding for resident support projects seems to be a major cause of conflicts with local governments. The CHA is not active in securing the budget due to the vertical structure of the South Korean administrative system (G and M, interview). Most South Korean administrative agencies' budgets come from the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. Even if the budget is estimated in the statutory plan, it must go through this ministry. Since the ministry also judged that the resident support project budget requested by the CHA is not related to heritage protection, it may not be easy to approve the budget. "We need to remember that the Ministry of Strategy and Finance removed the resident support clause in enacting the SAPPAC" (M, interview). The CHA, which had secured a budget for heritage protection and exercised administrative power through budget allocation to local governments, experienced the opposite for the first time. Some of the civil servants of the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Team of the CHA, who were in charge of their work, were undervalued within the CHA, and their workability regarding the budget was also poor (L, interview). I also had a shocking experience related to this. In 2012, I was asked by an official of the CHA to visit the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. Surprisingly, he did not want to meet with the ministry official, so did not make an appointment, and when the person in charge was not there, he quickly put the reports and materials on the desk and returned.

Moreover, at that time, the will of the administrative agency, the CHA, did not seem to be strong. In April 2013, two years after the law was amended in 2011, the CHA abruptly disbanded the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Team. The local communities and governments strongly opposed this, and the CHA reorganised and promoted it to a department ten days after disbanding it (Kim Jin-Man, 2013). Since then, the achievements of the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Department, reorganised with new officials, secured the Ancient City Image Recovery Project budget unrelated to designated heritage for the first time, although this was temporary and not very large. However, after that, the CHA's significant achievements in terms of budget have been unremarkable. The CHA changed the budget strategy so that local governments may use the Ancient City Image Recovery Project budget for other projects suggested in the Master Plan without an increase from 2020 onwards. Local

government officials of Gongju city interviewed complained that the CHA only made plans, even though it had to provide them with a budget.

Conversely, the CHA official pointed out the local officials' role and local governments' administrative characteristics. In an interview, F compared Buyeo and Gongju and emphasised that the ability and will of local officials have the greatest influence on the project's success. She argued that the will of Gongju city to implement the historic street environment creation projects using the local government's budget, rather than relying on the central government's budget, led to its success. But she also spent much of her interviews criticising other cities.

> *Over the past three years, in Gongju, the number of complaints saying, "I'm going to die because of heritage" has greatly decreased ... The perceptions of the city government and the people meet each other while purchasing land and building and repairing a house. Buyeo city is still repeating the story of not being able to do anything due to heritage. As a result, the administration is increasingly acting like listening to the civil complaints and neighbours' requests. So, there is a limit that is entangled with the delay of blood ties and academic ties.*

> *On the other hand, officials in Gongju city, since they are people from Seoul, houses are built according to the official land price and the administrative and legal procedures, according to the principle, and the house is built according to the building law. The administration is carried out humanely within the scope of not exceeding the public line ... Gongju city is also willing to put in its budget if the central government subsidises it a little. Other regions are showing a slightly different appearance, expecting only national funding. Since the [Gongju] mayor was also an expert on heritage, he was very interested in related projects and plans.*

> (F, interview)

An urban planner currently participating in the plan (P, interview) said that the CHA would directly commission the plans that each local government has previously commissioned to a planning agency in the future. In response, M pointed out that this is an unsuitable choice at the current stage, where the local governments are taking a leading role, and the local communities will gradually do so (interview). Nevertheless, this decision of the CHA proves that there is not much trust in local governments. In 2019, the CHA began organising regular events to directly

communicate with local communities (F, interview). The director of the Ancient City Promotion Resident Committee said that through these events, they could directly communicate their opinions to the CHA and understand each other better (interview).

However, it is difficult to say that this is a severe conflict between the CHA and local governments. The officials mentioned difficulties in their work through interviews and never expressed their intentions directly or publicly. Even though I did not mention the interviewees' names, they only complimented each other at the individual level, rather than complaining. Rather, J argued that the problem lies in South Korea's rigid administrative structure and method.

> *Rigidity is also closely related to planning and budgeting. This is because the plan is not easy to change in the middle, and if the budget execution fails, [officials] are subject to disciplinary action.*
>
> (J, interview)

The CHA has little experience dealing with resident support projects, and securing funds without a regular budget is difficult. Although local governments have no choice but to depend on the central government's budget, it is not simple to achieve a breakthrough without a decision from the greatest power (the president). In this regard, F sees the local community as an alternative to address administratively impossible areas (interview).

> *You see, when government officials start [new] work, the consequences are too huge. But nevertheless, even if we take such risks, there will be a significant effect in trying to nurture the local communities. Of course, it may change again if the person in charge changes. I don't know about other individual cultural heritage, but I think that's very important in Ancient Cities. Why? There are so many grey areas the government cannot intervene in, so if the residents can fill that area, whether it's investing private money, gathering people's opinions, or serving as a watchdog, I think that residents will sufficiently do the role that can fill the empty spaces.*
>
> (F, interview)

5.8. Conclusion

This chapter examined why and how local communities have been involved in national heritage policy processes by reviewing the establishment and development process of the ACPPP. By stratifying heritage, the state has extended the scope of heritage regulation to include urban spaces (see Chapter 4). In some historic cities, this has become a significant threat to local governments' urban planning authority and residents' property rights. Gyeongju, Gongju, Buyeo and Iksan were the capitals of ancient kingdoms in the past. Since wooden structures have traditionally been predominant in South Korea, few structures from 1,000 years ago remain on the ground. However, because ancient relics and ruins are buried underground in the area around the designated heritage (Chae Mi-Ok et al., 2007a, b, c, d), the state has maintained strict regulations on construction activities that could damage buried heritage. For this reason, despite the implementation of the local autonomy system, the state has maintained strong regulation at the national level through the revision of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act 2000. Accordingly, most construction activities have not been permitted in the city centres of historic cities. This was one of the biggest reasons for local decline (L, interview). L, who surveyed the Gyeongju city centre in 2010, argued that it was one of the poorest areas in South Korea, pointing out that it was impossible to even install a toilet inside a building at the time (interview). The ACPPP was devised to convert such a regulatory-oriented heritage policy to a different stage.

The ACPPP Is the process through which stakeholders have shared visions in the national heritage policy. Local communities accepted the existing regulations but demanded compensation and resident support (urban regeneration). Therefore, the Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities (SAPAC) 2004 was proposed through the consensus of diverse stakeholders with different purposes. However, in enacting the law, the central government deleted all the requirements of local communities. These communities reacted via representative group organisations, demonstrations, boycotts and political actions. Amid conflict between the state and local communities, the Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities was amended as the Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities (SAPPAC) in 2011, securing a legal basis for heritage-led regeneration. The right of citizens to demand purchase of their land by the state and the projects to support residents, which the Cultural Heritage Protection Act does not recognise, became officially possible in these cities. The persistent resistance of the residents also changed the scope and procedure of district

designation and affected the Master Plans. Local communities delayed district designation, which should have been implemented following the Basic Survey in 2007, to 2012, after the law was amended. They also reduced the designation range from 11.4% to 1.37% of the area suggested in the Basic Survey. To persuade the residents, the CHA and planning agencies used a strategy outside the scope of the law. The CHA disregarded the procedure stipulated by the law and promoted the Master Plans before district designation. The KRIHS, a planning agency, presented the Master Plans, including resident support strategies and projects not specified in the law at the time.

Moreover, the Ancient City Image Recovery project's success shows how important the local community's role was in the ACPPP. Local communities became not only whom the state regulates or convinces, but also those who participate in practice. Eventually, the policy shifted due to local communities. The planning agency held many briefing sessions, local governments opened educational programmes, and the CHA supported the establishment and operation of civic organisations. People may criticise the fact that all of these efforts aimed to convert the local community to be in favour of these organisations. However, the Ancient City Image Recovery project is a financial support programme that local communities demanded even before the enactment of the 2004 Act. It is hard to judge who wins in this situation. Instead, the project demonstrates that local communities, which were marginalised within a national policy, elicited changes from other stakeholders and gradually improved relationships with them.

On the other hand, the state and experts have also achieved their desired results through the ACPPP. From the 1990s, the state and heritage experts had expressed concern that the local governments elected by the citizens would threaten local heritage. They had mooted the need for plans and institutional means to manage historic cities systematically (CHA, 2012), and a new system was developed to preserve the historic city centres. National heritages are still under their control with a stronger regulatory basis. Moreover, the CHA succeeded in listing all four regions as World Heritage sites during this period. The field of expert activity has also expanded. The ACPPP includes many excavations and research projects. It provides new jobs for deliberation committees and academic courses.

To conclude, the ACPPP is a series of consensuses in nationally significant historic urban spaces. Though the ACPPP system was designed by governments, agencies, experts and institutions, it came from the process by which the local community has resisted other stakeholders. The ACPPP, as a national heritage policy, guaranteed individual property rights

and participation for the first time. The results in this chapter are unique and internationally meaningful in that they reveal that the local community has challenged the extended heritage norms and distorted policy decisions and, by doing so, further changed the framework of national policy. There are several international cases where local communities have challenged dominant heritage discourse or have gained more power, such as cases in Sweden (see Hammami & Uzer, 2018), Italy and Palestine (see De Cesari, 2020). However, at least so far, it is difficult to find cases in international literature where relatively small local groups have clearly influenced the establishment and change of new national heritage policies. Findings in this section criticise the role of policy in sustaining power relations and emphasise that local resistance can have a meaningful impact on national heritage policies armed with the grand discourse. As such, it demonstrates the potential for local or subordinate discourses on heritage to influence practical policy change.

This chapter explored how the local communities have risen and influenced the establishment of the ACPPP. The next chapter will describe how the local community participates in the ACPPP in Gongju.

Chapter 6. Community participation in Gongju

Chapter 6. Community participation in Gongju

6.1. Introduction

To understand the implications of community participation, this chapter will examine how it has developed and what conflicts local communities face in the heritage-led regeneration process. The previous chapter demonstrated that heritage-led regeneration had become an essential strategy for the Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion Project (ACPPP) due to active resistance from local communities. The study described that local communities were key players in the process to amend the Special Act on Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities (SAPPAC) and the establishment of the ACPPP. Though the broad protection of heritages is still the top priority purpose of the SAPPAC, the establishment of the ACPPP saw a shift to include regeneration projects on the outskirts of heritages, with resistance from local communities. In this chapter, the study examines the narratives of a local community following those events.

The chapter explores what conflicts between governments and local communities remain and why the strife never ends. This chapter consists of three parts. After a brief introduction to the case, the study will explain the importance and achievements of the heritage-led regeneration policy in Gongju. This part also provides general information and the policy environment in Gongju. Then, the study will describe the development of community participation in the Gongju heritage-led regeneration. In the second part, it will explore the different perspectives of stakeholders and changing patterns of community engagement. The last part will examine the nature of community participation beyond policy effectiveness. The study contemplates how we understand community participation through various conflicts that local communities face.

As described in the previous chapter, the Gyeongju community played the most crucial role in the process of establishing the ACPPP and enacting and revising the SAPPAC, but Gongju was considered to be the most appropriate case to understand the community in the current project implementation process. This is because Gongju is referred to as the most successful case of the policy implementation stage (Shim Kyeong-Mi, 2021, p.16), even though it was the city that was most neglected in the ACPPP development process (M, interview). Also,

the Gongju community was evaluated as the most active among the four "Ancient Cities" by experts in the interviews (Chapter 5). The spatial scope of this chapter, therefore, is Gongju. The case is also that for which I had ample and diverse information and reliable gatekeepers through my past participation in planning as an assistant researcher between 2009 and 2017. It was a significant issue under COVID-19 constraints (see Section 3.5.3). In part, there is mention of the Gyeongju area, but this is only to explain the participation of the Gongju community. The study explores the Gongju community as the best case to understand community engagement.

This chapter understands community participation mainly through interviews with stakeholders who have been or are involved in the Gongju heritage-led regeneration scheme. A total of 11 participants were interviewed (one Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA) official, two Gongju city officials, four residents and four interviewees with expertise in planning). The four resident participants consist of a former president of the Gongju Ancient City Promotion and World Heritage Management Resident Committee (GPWRC), two committee members and one non-member. Lastly, the four expert interviewees all have experience carrying out ACPPP-related research or planning at national research institutes.

Participants	Role/position	Survey year
A	President of Alleyway Revival Association	2019, 2020
B	Manager of Gongju Ancient City Promotion and World Heritage Management Resident Committee	2019, 2020
C	Secretary-general of Gongju Ancient City Promotion and World Heritage Management Resident Committee	2019
D	Former president of Gongju Ancient City Promotion and World Heritage Management Resident Committee	2019
F	Management of the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Project (CHA)	2019
G	Head of the Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Team	2019, 2020
H	Planning and management of the Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Project	2019, 2020
J	Head of the Regeneration Centre of the Architecture & Urban Research Institute	2019, 2020
K	Master planner of the Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master Plan	2019
L	Former planner of the Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master Plan	2020
M	Former master planner of the Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master Plan	2022

TABLE 6-1. GONGJU CASE STUDY PARTICIPANTS

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

6.2. Heritage-led regeneration in Gongju

The following pages portray brief information about Gongju and the Gongju ACPPP. Firstly, the history, heritage and the Gongju ACPPP will be outlined. Then, the study will explain why the heritage-led regeneration scheme has become significant in Gongju from geographic and policy perspectives.

6.2.1. Overview of Gongju

Gongju is a city in Chungcheong province, the central-western part of South Korea. It was the capital city of the Baekje kingdom from AD 475 to 538 and was called Ungjin in that period. Baekje, the ancient kingdom, thrived in the southwestern part of the Korean peninsula from 18 BC to 668 AD. In 475, Goguryeo, the ancient kingdom of the north, occupied the previous capital of Hanseong (modern-day Seoul) and Gongju became the new capital city of Baekje. In 538, King Seong moved the capital city again to Sabi, now named Buyeo. However, Gongju remained a significant political and military area until the kingdom's defeat by Silla in 660. The Gongsanseong fortress was the last battlefield of international war involving China and Japan. Even after that, Gongju was a centre of administration, politics and the military until modern times. In the subsequent kingdom of the Silla, Goryeo and Joseon dynasties, Gongju was the administrative centre of the southwestern part of Korea. King Injo of the Joseon dynasty stayed at the Gongsanseong fortress to escape Igwal's rebellion in 1624. Before the Japanese colonial era (the 20th century), the city had also been a transportation hub of land routes and waterways and was the administrative centre of Chungcheong province. As of December 2021, the population of Gongju city is 105,094 and about 57.9% of the total population lives in the city centres (old and new), occupying 10.6% of the total area (Gongju City, 2022, pp.17–18).

FIGURE 6-1. BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF GONGJU CITY CENTRE.
SOURCE: YEONHAPNEWS (2018).

FIGURE 6-2. LOCATION OF GONGJU.
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

The heritages relating to the latter period of the Baekje kingdom are designated as World Heritage sites by UNESCO (see UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 1992–2023). The World Heritage site of the Baekje Historic Areas includes Gongsanseong fortress and heritages related to the Woongjin capital in the centre part of Gongju. The earthen fortress of Gongsanseong was rebuilt in the 15th century into a stone fortress. Royal tombs in Songsan-Ri in the Baekje kingdom during the Woongjin period have seven ancient tombs. Tombs 1 to 5 have stone chamber tombs made of piling stones, while the tomb of King Muryeong and Tomb 6 have brick chamber tombs made of tunnel-shaped bricks. In particular, the tomb of King Muryeong provides essential pieces of evidence, such as its date of establishment (525), and connections with China and Japan can be confirmed.

Due to the above historical background of Gongju, most of Gongju city centre has been designated as a conservation area, and it is linked to the heritage-led regeneration policy on which this study focuses (see next section). After the establishment of the Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities (SAPAC) in 2004, a total area of 2,035,930m^2 – 1,158,127 m^2 of preservation areas (SPDs) and 877,803 m^2 of promotion areas (PPDs) – was nationally designated in 2012. Most designated heritages concentrated in the SPDs are regulated by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, while the regeneration programmes are implemented in the PPDs. With the success of the Ancient Image Recovery Project (a traditional house repairing and building project, with subsidies to residents) and some heritage restoration projects, Gongju is often mentioned as one of the successful examples of heritage-led regeneration in Korea (J & M, interviews; Park Sang-Hyeon, 2020).

FIGURE 6-3. HERITAGES IN GONGJU (GONGSANSEONG FORTRESS, ROYAL TOMBS, TOMB OF KING MURYEONG)
SOURCE: GONGJU CITY (N. D).

6.2.2. Significance of heritage-led regeneration in Gongju

This section will explain why Gongju has been in decline due to urban topographical characteristics and heritage regulations, and why the heritage-led regeneration scheme is significant for competition with neighbouring cities.

First, Gongju city has been excluded from the rapid growth process of modern Korea for geographical and institutional reasons (Chae Mi-Ok et al., 2007b). The city centre of Gongju has the shape of a long and narrow basin surrounded by the Geumgang River and mountains, and there are plains outside the basin. In Figure 6-4 below, the area inside the yellow outline is the plain of the Gongju city centre. Mountains surround the area except on the north side, which faces the Geumgang River. There are also buildings in the greyish-blue area outside the yellow outline, but the slopes are very steep. Beyond the Geumgang River, a wide plain is suitable for farming in the north. In ancient times it would have been a beneficial terrain for defence and food security. However, this topography is considered disadvantageous to Gongju as it grows into a modern metropolitan city.

In addition, several building regulations overlap in this long and narrow city centre. In Figure 6-4 below, the greyish-blue coloured area is where the height of the building is limited by urban planning. Also, the light green areas are Historic and Cultural Environment Preservation Areas (HCEPAs), which include practically all land available for construction in the city centre (see Table 6-2 below).

	Permission Standards	
	Flat roof	Sloped Roof (gradient over 10:3)[23]
District 1	· Deliberation	
District 2	· Deliberation · Installation of facilities for the public interest is permitted with a maximum height of 4m or less.	

District 3	· Building height: 5m or less
	  (Deliberation when standards are exceeded)
		· Building height: 7.5m or less
		  (Deliberation when standards are exceeded)

District 4	· Building height: 11m or less	· Building height: 7.5m or less
District 5	· In accordance with Gongju City Urban Planning Ordinance and related laws	
District 6	· In accordance with the SAPPAC as the PPDs (see Table 5-3)	
District 7	· In accordance with the SAPPAC as the SPDs (see Table 5-3)	
Common requirement (District 1– District 5)	· Repairing and rebuilding allowed · The height of a building shall be the height including rooftop rooms, stair towers, lift towers, watchtowers, decorative towers and other similar things. · Sloped roofs are limited to cases where the slope ratio is 10:3 or more, both slopes, and the non-sloping area is less than 1/8 of the total area. · Hazardous material storage and treatment facilities, resource circulation related facilities, animal and plant related facilities (barns, slaughterhouses), etc., and similar facilities should be deliberated · Excavation more than 50m underground should be deliberated · In the case of cutting or embankment with a height of 3m or more, or a slope, masonry or retaining wall with a height of 3m or more, it should be	

---

[23] Generally, since the roof shape is regarded as one of the most important architectural elements in traditional Korean architecture, there is a tendency to ease the regulation of building height due to the installation of sloped roofs.

deliberated (cutting the ground for the basement floor is excluded, the height calculation standard for the ground line is in accordance with the Building Act)

· New construction and expansion of similar facilities such as roads and bridges should be deliberated

· Buildings with a height of 32m or higher should be deliberated

· Areas with buried cultural heritage are handled according to the Act on the Protection and Inspection of Buried Cultural Heritage

· After the announcement of the Permission Standards, prior consultation with the Administrator of the Cultural Heritage Administration in case of changes to the urban planning within the Historical and Cultural Environment Preservation Areas (HCEPAs)

Regulation map

TABLE 6-2. HCEPAS REGULATION IN THE GONGJU CITY CENTRE AREA
SOURCE: CHA (2020). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

Although not all construction activities around designated heritage in Korea are forbidden, constructing high-rise buildings capable of accommodating a large population and many functions is impossible in Gongju. It is rarely possible to construct a high-rise building in even the new town over the river because there is no limitation on the scope of the HCEPA (see Section 4.4.4).[24] For instance, in 2017, a high-rise building plan was cancelled in the non-

---

[24] "The scope of a historic and cultural environment preservation area shall be within 500 meters from an outer boundary, in consideration of the cultural, artistic, academic, and scenic value of the relevant designated cultural heritage, its surrounding environment, and other necessary matters for the protection of cultural heritage: Provided, That where construction works implemented in an area 500 meters away from an outer boundary of designated cultural heritage are clearly deemed to affect the cultural heritage due to its characteristics, locational conditions, etc., the scope thereof may be set in excess of 500 meters" (Cultural Heritage Protection Act, Article 13-3).

HCEPA urban area over the river (G, interview). Furthermore, most areas inside the yellow outline are permitted only for buildings with two stories or fewer due to the SAPPAC (Enforcement Decree of the SAPPAC, Addendum 1). Currently, only buildings with two stories or fewer are allowed in most of the city centre, since the SAPPAC takes precedence as a Special Act.

FIGURE 6-4. REGULATIONS RELATED TO HERITAGE IN THE CITY CENTRE OF GONGJU.
SOURCE : CHAE MI-OK ET AL. (2007B, P.20). EDITED BY THE AUTHOR.

Considering the geographical characteristics and heritage regulations of Gongju city centre, Korea's general high-rise development method in the modern era is impossible to carry out there. As of 2020, Korea has the highest population density among OECD countries at 531 people per km^2 of land area, which is more than 13 times higher than the OECD average of 39 per km^2 (World Bank Open Data, n. d). As shown in Figure 6-5 below, many cities in Korea have developed with the economic agglomeration effect through high-rise construction.

FIGURE 6-5. AERIAL VIEW OF A LARGE APARTMENT COMPLEX IN SEJONG (LEFT) AND SEOUL (RIGHT)

SOURCE: (LEFT) HONG KUK-GI (2022); (RIGHT) YU YOUNG-GYU (2020).

FIGURE 6-6. DEPOSIT INTEREST RATE OF SEOUL TRUST BANK IN DECEMBER 1980.

SOURCE: ONEULUI (2020). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

The reason why development regulations on high-rise buildings are regarded as a factor preventing urban capital accumulation in historic cities such as Gongju lies in Korea's unique experience and housing preference. In Korea, high-density development has symbolised a method of rapid capital accumulation. After the Korean War, cities that were less regulated experienced explosive growth as new industrial infrastructure was built and the population was concentrated in the cities in a short period of time. In Korea, which has developed from one of the poorest countries to a developed country at an unprecedented speed, the concentration of the population has raised the value of urban capital, including real estate, at a rapid pace. For example, interest rates on bank deposits in the 1980s were usually in the 20% range, and in some cases, more than 40% were guaranteed (see Figure 6-6 above). One of the reasons this was possible was that the growth rate of real estate value before the 1990s had risen above bank interest rates (see Figure 6-7 below).

FIGURE 6-7. PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN LAND PRICE.

SOURCE: KIM EUN-WOO ET AL. (2015, P.17). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

In Korea, apartments are the most common type of housing and are real estate investment targets, rather than social housing or affordable housing. High-rise apartments are the most popular housing type, offering the most advanced technologies and amenity facilities. According to Statistics Korea (n. d), the proportion of apartments in housing in 2021 was 63.5%,

FIGURE 6-8. THE RATIO OF APARTMENTS AMONG HOUSING TYPES.

SOURCE: STATISTICS KOREA (N.D). PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

accounting for more than half. This percentage has been steadily rising (see Figure 6-8).

The reason heritage-led regeneration has become significant in Gongju is not only because high-density development is impossible. Gongju is one of the 89 "depopulation areas" designated by the state that are a concern about regional extinction due to population decline (Ministry of the Interior and Safety, 2023). As the speed of natural population decline and concentration in the Seoul metropolitan area continues to accelerate, "local extinction" has become a keyword for regional planning in the 2020s and beyond. Even in Korea's second-largest city, Busan, there are news reports that mention "local extinction" (Lee Hee-Chul, 2023). Currently, population decline among the locals is even mentioned as an important urban survival problem, such as reducing urban vitality or weakening competitiveness. As the population concentration in the Seoul metropolitan area becomes increasingly prominent, "local

extinction" has recently become a key policy term. In July 2021, the Korean government established a new fund to respond to the problems of local and underdeveloped regions facing demographic extinction due to low birth rates and an ageing population (Woo Young-Tak, 2021). In August 2022, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety distributed the "local extinction fund" to the 89 depopulation areas and 18 "caution areas" (Ministry of the Interior and Safety, 2023). Approximately £624 million per year will be allocated to local governments for the next ten years.

The Korean government considers this a serious problem due to the low birth rate. According to the OECD (n. d), among the 53 OECD countries, Korea had the lowest birth rate in 2020 of 0.84 people. The OECD average was around 1.66, and the birth rate of the 52nd-ranked nation, Italy, was 1.24. In Korea, the fertility rate has also changed very dramatically in a short period of time. Having experienced economic growth along with explosive population growth over the past 70 years, Korea has responded sensitively to rapid demographic changes. According to the Ministry of Education's (2015) population policy data, Korea completely shifted its population policy in 2000. In the baby boom era of the 1960s, the state began emphasising birth control policies, with a slogan, "population growth eats up economic growth". In the 1970s, slogans such as "Let's not discriminate between daughters and sons, let's have just two children and raise them well" appeared, and in the 1980s, "Two children are too many". In the 1990s, with the fertility rate dropping to 1.5 per household, gender imbalance became a social issue. Since the 2000s, as the country experienced a severely low birth rate, concerns about a future decline in the economically active population emerged. From this time on, the government began to advocate for childbirth encouragement with the slogan "Mom! Dad! I hate being alone ..." However, Korea's total fertility rate is still declining. The rate in 2021 was provisionally calculated at 0.78 (Korean Government, 2023). The population growth rates of Gongju, one of the 89 depopulation areas, were recorded at −1.93% in 2020 and −1.35% in 2021, while the national average population growth rates were −0.28% in 2020 and −0.46% in 2021 (Statistics Korea, n. d).

As the population is concentrated in metropolitan areas, the population numbers "falling off a cliff" in non-metropolitan areas is becoming a more severe problem (Park Gwan-Kyu & Joo Yun-Chang, 2022). As of 2021, the average population of eight major cities in Korea was 2,825,000, but the population of Gongju city was only 102,000, about 1/30 of the average (Statistics Korea, n. d). As seen from the map below, Gongju has a larger area than major cities in Korea, but its population is small – too small to be illustrated in the cartogram (right). Gongju

city's high ageing rate also highlights "local extinction" concerns. In 2019, the proportion of the elderly population aged 65 and over in Gongju city was 27.1%, which is nearly 10% higher than the national average of 17.9% (Gongju City, 2022, p.75).

FIGURE 6-9. COMPARISON OF CITY AREAS AND POPULATION CARTOGRAM AREAS.
SOURCE: (LEFT) PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR; (RIGHT, CARTOGRAM) WORLDMAPPER (2021).

Chungnam Development Institute (CDI) (Kim Jeong-Yeon, Lim, Hyeong-Bin & Oh Myeong-Taek, 2014, p.25) also warned that Gongju city's competitiveness would gradually weaken due to external factors. The administrative centre of Chungcheong-do (the province at the centre of Korea) was moved from Chungju, Cheongju and Gongju to the modern city of Taejeon during the Japanese colonial period. In the 21st century, another rival neighbour emerged. The construction of Sejong city in 2012, one of the balanced national development policies, also emerged as another threat to Gongju city (ibid). Sejong city, the administrative capital,[25] was built on the east side of Gongju city. A total of 1.2% of the population that was previously part of Gongju city was incorporated into Sejong city in 2012, and 2.1% and 1.8% of the population moved to other areas in 2014 and 2015, respectively, when Sejong city was constructed (Statistics Korea, n. d). Gongju is now adjacent to Taejeon on the southeast and Sejong city on the northeast. The Act on Special Measures for the Construction of the New Administrative Capital was enacted in 2004, and the Sejong City Self-Governing Government was launched in 2012. This coincides with the times when the SAPPAC was enacted and the Ancient City districts were designated. Although it is difficult to determine the correlation

---

[25] Although it was changed from an administrative capital to a multifunctional administrative city for political reasons, almost all central government agencies have completed the relocation to Sejong city. The official name is Sejong Special Self-Governing City.

between the two policies, there is at least a possibility that this sense of crisis stimulated Gongju city government.

Gongju city has rapidly shrunk from a hub city in the central region of South Korea into a small town in just two or three demographical generations. Gongju was the administrative centre for nearly 1,400 years, with the Chungcheong province government office during that period, until the modern era. The population of the city had been continuously increasing until 1966, but it experienced a gradual decrease in population starting from the era when the Korean economy began to grow rapidly, and now shares a sense of crisis called "local extinction". Perhaps, for Gongju city, heritage-led regeneration may not be the most desirable strategy but one that it has been forced to choose.

Surrounded by new modern administrative cities and without other modern industry infrastructure, the history-based cultural sector of Gongju became strategically important. Gongju city official H believes that heritage "is the strength of Gongju city, and there is no other way" to stop the urban decline (interview). The 2040 Gongju City Long-term Comprehensive Development Plan also suggests the development of cultural industries linked to historical and cultural resources as a vision for the city centre (Park Dong-Wan et al., 2022, p.178). The CDI (Kim Jeong-Yeon, Lim, Hyeong-Bin & Oh Myeong-Taek, 2014) highlighted the tourism industry in Gongju, based on agriculture and heritage, for development in its 2014 report. These sources indicate that heritage-led regeneration schemes are significant to Gongju, situated as it is between huge neighbouring cities.

Throughout the 20th century, Gongju city had been excluded from the national large-scale development investment areas. In the 2010s, the state budget for the ACPPP and urban regeneration projects would have been an attractive proposal for Gongju city. According to Statistics Korea (n. d), Gongju city's financial independence rate in 2021 is only 12.7%. In other words, more than 87% of financial resources come from central government. This rate is far below the national average of 43.6% and the Seoul Metropolitan Government's 75.6%. Therefore, in addition to the national budget that is incorporated as a fixed amount into the general accounts of Gongju city, national public offering projects take up a large portion of the city's administration (G, interview). H argued that the title "historic city" was advantageous when bidding for various national projects (interview). Many urban projects in Gongju city centre are currently being implemented with two keywords: heritage and regeneration (H, interview).

When I bid on national projects or things like this, I feel that Gongju won due to its culture and history compared to the size and capacity of the city ... Basically, the administration is the same for all cities. In public contests of the national programme, they [history and heritage] give Gongju city an advantage when the assessment committees evaluate cities.

(H, interview)

Gongju city, which has been the military, trade, industrial and administrative centre of the central region of Korea for 1,400 years, is now prioritising its value as a historical city. Until the SAPPAC became operative in 2012, it encouraged development with buildings of two or more floors in most city centre areas through urban planning. In other words, it encouraged high-density development despite the heritage regulations. However, the city is currently implementing the ACPPP, and according to the SAPPAC, all construction activities in the old city centre are restricted to buildings of one or two stories. Preservation of the national-designated heritages and surrounding areas provides a justification for Gongju city to request a "local extinction fund" or "ACPPP fund" from the state. In other words, Gongju's ancient heritages are now being mobilised to help Gongju city secure more funds from the state. Participant A criticised Gongju city for being excessively obsessed with ancient heritages underground rather than modern heritages (in which she is interested and of which she has high utilisation).

6.3. Development of community participation

In this section, the study explores the development of community participation in the Gongju heritage-led regeneration case. Chapter 5 examined community participation as resistance to authoritarian heritage regulation in establishing the ACPPP. However, the goals of national and local governments may be shared or different, and community participation may demonstrate different patterns in the project implementation phase after resistance. As mentioned in the previous section, the Gongju city government has been using heritage and community participation as a basis for policy establishment and securing funds from central government. However, this study approaches that question under the assumption that residents, who are the parties actually participating, and experts and public officials, who are the policy designers, want people to participate for different purposes.

First, interview participants were asked why community participation is necessary. Their answers may explain why each stakeholder maintains and develops community participation after the establishment of the ACPPP. Then, stakeholders' answers are supported by reviewing the community participation process and examining the budget flow of Gongju city related to regeneration. Further, by exploring the changes in community participation in Gongju, the section implies that empowerment is a vital issue of community participation, which will be discussed in the next section.

6.3.1. Two perspectives on community participation

The following pages show that Gongju communities participate to acquire "some" rights, not just to support the implementation of heritage-led regeneration policy. The study found that there are different perspectives on community participation and that the reasons for participation are divided mainly into rights and policy needs. Interestingly, in interviews, all resident respondents answered that community participation was essential in the heritage-led regeneration process because they were the masters of Gongju. They believed participation was about their rights as masters of the city. Here, a "master" connotes diverse meanings. In Korean, a "master" (주인) can be translated as owner, proprietor, landlord or host in English. Here, resident respondents used the word "master" to emphasise that Gongju city belongs to them. Looking at the interview transcripts, this word implies that they have authority and responsibility over the city.

In contrast, all government officials and experts also agreed that participation was necessary, but the reasons were different. The CHA official F said that it was required because the community could contribute to the policy. Public officials in Gongju city, who have direct contact with residents, answered that participation is necessary since the community is the object of their administrative affairs. J and K responded empirically that resident participation has become more critical in national policy. The former master planner M answered that it was significant, as the local community's resistance initiated the ACPPP in Gyeongju. While agreeing with M, the former planner L only emphasised that residents' rights should take precedence over policy or administrative purposes.

Respondent	Necessity of participation		Reasons	Value judgements
Residents	A, B, C, D	O	Residents are the masters of Gongju, a trend of the time (B)	Right
Officials	F	O	Can help with administration	Policy need
	G, H	O	Residents are subject to administration	Policy need
Experts	J	O	Required for regeneration and utilisation of local assets	Policy need
	K	O	Public recognised the necessity of the regeneration process empirically	Policy need
	L	O	Residents' rights, the cause of policy establishment	Right
	M	O	Cause of policy establishment	Policy need

TABLE 6-3. ANSWERS ON THE NECESSITY OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

In particular, L and F showed completely opposite views on community participation. L's answer, as follows, explains the residents' point of view well.

When I started the historical and cultural environment preservation plan, I got a view of the public stance. However, as I continued to participate, I turned to the position of a resident. I thought I would be really cross if I were them. Why should my life behind [present daily life] be affected just because cultural properties are discovered in front of my house? What is the value of our lives of 100 years or 60 years? In many cases, the value of our lives was underestimated than the value of some aristocrats hundreds or thousands of years ago. I honestly don't know which of the two is more valuable ... The ideas of the residents must be reflected, of course, and if the plan is not convincing to the residents, the government and planners must change their thinking.

(L, interview)

After participating in the ACPPP planning at the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS), L wrote a doctoral thesis on the Gyeongju ACPPP policy network in 2020. She said there were a lot of changes to her thinking while interviewing residents. She believed that the heritage policy to protect heritage was ignoring the residents' right to live and that the decision-making rights of the residents needed to be respected more. Most resident respondents emphasised that participation was their natural right but said they could accept the disadvantages of heritage protection to some extent (A, B & D, interviews). The reasons for preservation that they mentioned were different: maintaining urban beauty, securing national competitiveness and driving urban growth. Only C criticised people's lives not improving due

to heritage and the ACPPP (interview). When asked why participation was a natural right, the resident respondents only answered that they were the owners of Gongju city but could not explain the specific reasons. However, B believed that the changing era (to a democratic society) gave their community the right to participate.

On the other hand, F, a CHA official, understood participation as a policy necessity. She believed that community participation helps to formulate the right policy and can also be an auxiliary means to reduce the state's administrative burden (interview). She argued that the community should expand participation because it could support the role of budgeting and monitoring in areas not controlled by the state. She expected that the state and community could share the vision of heritage conservation and develop a cooperative relationship.

First of all, it requires the participation of residents personally. Their opinions are also needed, and when implementing policies on properties not owned by the state, their correct opinions can be good advice and sometimes give strength to policy implementation. It can be regulatory administration for a specific group. However, if residents can express their opinions in implementing policies for the entire region, it can be rather helpful to implement appropriate policies. For example, the CHA suggested strong regulations on non-permitted livestock facilities and solar panels around cultural properties. Those are carried out as national policies. So, it was not easy for the CHA [to be against the regime]. Rather, it was possible to reduce the administrative burden by allowing the residents to favour such regulations ... when a good case is developed, people will follow it. In that regard, it is possible that residents directly or indirectly play a role in areas beyond the state's jurisdiction in managing the whole ... I don't know about other individual cultural properties, but I think it is very important in the Ancient City. Why? There are so many grey areas that the government cannot control. If the local communities can fill that area, whether it's investing private money, gathering people's opinions or serving as a watchdog, I think that they can fill the ambiguous space. Otherwise, unless we back up commercial activities or residents, I think it will be very difficult for the CHA to manage heritages for a hundred or thousand days [every day]. In that sense, we need to raise residents [enhance community participation] more.

(F, interview)

F supported community participation in the view that heritage preservation is a shared responsibility. She believes that most people's views on heritage preservation will coincide

with those of the CHA, except for those who are regulated. Whether this refers to her utilitarian thinking or the utilitarian nature of regulation is unknown. She also cannot fully represent the CHA. However, as a member of the CHA, it seems clear that she limits the purpose of community participation to the value of participation desired by the CHA. She cites, for example, the experience of strengthened community voices in democratic societies to support the regulation of the CHA against the policies of other central government agencies. She uses the example to emphasise that the public agrees to heritage regulation, and that residents can be a good assistant to heritage policy implementation if the government supports their activities.

Moreover, this coincides with the circumstance that the responsibility of the CHA has increased, commensurate with the growing number of official heritages and heritage policies. As described in Section 4.4.4, the CHA has grown in size and has gained regulatory authority over more heritages and surrounding spaces. In addition, the number of laws and policies under the CHA's jurisdiction has increased dramatically. However, this also means that more responsibilities have been placed on the CHA. For example, the Sungnyemun (which was National Treasure No.1, the most valuable piece of heritage) arson incident that occurred in February 2008 led to the replacement of the administrator of the CHA, holding the CHA accountable for negligent management. Also, the partial demolition of the old Seoul City Hall (built in the colonial era, a modern registered heritage) by the Seoul Metropolitan Government in August of the same year increased public criticism of the CHA. F therefore believes that the majority of people will agree with the CHA's heritage preservation policy, and furthermore, hopes that local residents share in the responsibility of implementing the heritage policy, which is becoming increasingly out of reach for the CHA.

However, local officials G and H were negative about community participation, although such participation is natural as the community is an administrative subject. G criticised the fact that some residents raise their voices on issues related to their interests or to secure their political position. H also said that local communities make claims regardless of their vision, and local governments only follow the state's guidelines regardless of their intentions.

The reason we really do something resident [community participation] is that we have to do it. It is included in national policies nowadays, governance and so on.

(H, interview)

In summary, policy planners and adopters tend to understand community participation from their respective perspectives. Although L and the residents regard participation as their natural right, most experts and civil officials understand it as a policy necessity. Among public officials and experts, six respondents believe community participation is necessary for policy needs. Although their rationale differs, they emphasise that the current and future policy environment requires participation. However, it is hard to say the two views entirely oppose each other. Among the respondents who emphasise the need for policy, K and M have in mind a policy environment in which residents' rights are gradually more significant than in the past. They passively express that participation as a citizen's right should be accepted as a policy through expressions such as "change of the time", "cannot be ignored" or "essential in a democratic society". Therefore, this does not mean that all experts and government officials ignore the other implications of community participation. It is likely that F, G, H and K, who were directly involved in the ACPPP at the time, emphasised community participation as a policy tool more than other experts because of their roles and positions. However, even so, these results mean that the need for community participation is understood differently in the field of policy implementation.

6.3.2. The administrative need for community participation

The reasons why community participation in Gongju was considered may be divided into two main aspects. On the one hand, as the Gongju community was a part of the four Ancient Cities coalition that was resisting the state, it was able to form an organisation that was officially recognised and supported by the government. On the other hand, community participation became important for Gongju city to be selected for a government programme on regeneration.

In more detail, the first reason is that, as discussed in Chapter 5, systems and plans related to the ACPPP have been developed through local communities' struggles and the consensus of stakeholders, including Gongju. Here, we need to look back at the contents described in Chapter 5. As the Gyeongju community demanded deregulation and support, several attempts were made to enact new laws, but they failed. Afterwards, the law was successfully introduced through an alliance with the other three cities (Gongju, Buyeo and Iksan). However, after review by the government and experts, the law (the SAPAC) stipulated only the reinforced regulations and not the requirements put forward by the local communities. In response, these communities began to protest more violently (see Chapter 5). They called for the repeal of the

law and the enactment of a new Act. In particular, some communities in the Gyeongju area, which led to the local community association, then demanded that the state purchase the entire city centre of Gyeongju and build a new city to relocate to. The ACPPP was established in the process of revising the SAPAC to the SAPPAC, including the contents of support for residents. Thus, heritage-led regeneration and community involvement have become key strategies for the ACPPP. As a result, the basis for the local community to officially participate has been set out, and the Gongju community is the one that makes the best use of that opportunity (F, interview).

> *In the early stages of planning, the residents were very tough, insisting that the government purchase the entire city of Gyeongju, so it can be said that the government strengthened the resident participation process as a tool of persuasion ... at least in those cities [including Gongju], I believe their [local communities'] voices are right.*
>
> (L, interview)

As described in Section 5.7.1, all active participants in the Gongju ACPPP have completed the government-provided education programme. This can still be depicted as limited engagement. However, officially, anyone can participate in the regeneration. Opportunities for local community participation also increased in planning and decision-making. Officials of the CHA and Gongju city agreed that the influence of the local community had increased considerably and that the authoritarian administration of the past had gradually disappeared (F, G & H, interviews).

However, the plans were also drawn up by experts and governments. In other words, they also planned community participation in Gongju from the beginning of the ACPPP. The first Gongju ACPPP Master Plan (Chae Mi-Ok et al., 2009b, p.262; also see Figure 6-11 in the next section) proposed how to organise and develop the representative community organisation in Gongju. In the interview, expert L further argues that participation in the ACPPP was devised to persuade the community.

The other is that, paradoxically, it was intended by policy necessity. In addition to the ACPPP, Gongju city has been selected as a national policy project for the Urban Regeneration Project. As shown in the flow chart below, funds prepared by the Ministry of Finance based on laws go to local governments through different ministries. Within the process, central government ministries select cities to support the budget, and in the case of the 2017 Urban Regeneration New Deal pilot project, the competition rate exceeded 3:1 (Yoon Jong-Seok,

2017). The target area for urban regeneration is selected based on a decrease in population, a reduction in the number of businesses and a deterioration of the living environment (Enforcement Decree of the Special Act on Promotion of and Support for Urban Regeneration, 2022, Article 17). However, the central government emphasises local community participation amid fierce competition (J, interview). Seoul City also set three criteria for the selection of Urban Regeneration Activation Districts: the degree of decline, governance capacity, and potential and feasibility (Seoul Metropolitan Government, n. d). Since the city centre of Gongju is planned and implemented based on these two national project budgets, the ACPPP and the Urban Regeneration Project (G, interview), local community participation has become significant in terms of the policy. In other words, as mentioned in the previous section, community participation is directly related to the budget in Gongju, which lacks its own financial resources. Gongju City was able to carry out two other regeneration initiatives simultaneously because it was highly evaluated in the community participation categories (H, interview).

FIGURE 6-10. BUDGET FLOW IN THE GONGJU REGENERATION PROJECTS.
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

6.3.3. Planned community participation

As local community participation has become significant in policy, experts and governments planned programmes and organisations for community participation. Although

the individual motives of the four residents are somewhat different, there are commonalities in the motives of people's participation in the local community. One is that they all completed an education programme called the Ancient City Promotion Academy. The academy is a three-month educational programme aimed at strengthening the capacity of residents' autonomy for citizens who have lived in Gongju for more than one year (Gongju Ancient City Promotion Academy, 2022). Thirty citizens are accepted on a first-come, first-served basis. Usually, attendance alone is required to complete the course, but this programme also includes student presentations and discussion sessions.

This education programme has been criticised as an instrument of publicity for national policy (see Section 5.7.1), but it is also the first step for community members to participate in the ACPPP. G said that only Ancient City Promotion Academy graduates could join the GPWRC, the organisation most deeply involved in the project (interview). In other words, while the programme provides opportunities for participation, it is also a civic education process. Three resident respondents said they became interested in participation through the Ancient City Promotion Academy. The CHA official F and planning expert M believe that the academy played an important role in encouraging citizens' interest in and participation in heritage-led regeneration (interview). In 2012, Gongju City and the CHA supported the establishment of the GPWRC, which consisted of the Ancient City Promotion Academy graduates.

In the interviews, Gongju city official G equated the community with the GPWRC and some civic organisations. He pointed out that only particular people in those organisations are willing to participate in the policy process, and most people are not interested. Resident interviewee B also responded that most citizens who are busy with making a living or young people are not interested in the ACPPP.

G explained that the GPWRC was established by experts and the CHA, not the voluntary intention of the community, using the term "governmental organisation". Residents' responses were no different from those of the officials. Interviewee A critiqued the fact that there are many organisations mobilised for policy purposes. Most laws in South Korea, including those related to regeneration schemes, include a "citizen consent" procedure. In most cases, public hearings or individual hearings after public announcements are the "consent" process, but few people check the information given on the government website (B & C, interviews). It is, therefore, common for governments to provide relevant information to specific private organisations to meet the formal consent process (G & H, interviews). This statutory

engagement process allows government agencies to implement policies by replacing specific groups as representatives of the population concerned with the policy. According to B, most organisations receive budget support from Gongju city, except for a few, and are not free from Gongju city's influence. The GPWRC, the representative organisation, still recruits through public education programmes and receives government support.

FIGURE 6-11. STRATEGY FOR THE FORMATION OF THE ANCIENT PRESERVATION RESIDENT COMMITTEE. SOURCE: CHAE MI-OK (2009A, P.39). EDITED BY THE AUTHOR.

The representative organisation, the GPWRC, was organised under the leadership of experts and governments. The establishment of the resident committees (the GPWRC in Gongju) was discussed in 2009 at the Ancient City Preservation Committee, organised in 2008 by the CHA, local government officials and experts (CHA, 2012, p.161). At the time, the government was under pressure from local communities to repeal the Act. In 2009, the KRIHS submitted a report titled *Ancient City Promotion Plan for the Cultural Homeland* (Chae Mi-Ok, 2009a) to the CHA. The report proposed alternatives to institutional improvements, the management system, tax support, financial security measures and local community participation. It suggested gradually expanding the private sector's participation, as shown in the figure above. Moreover, after the establishment of the Master Plan in 2009, various education and publicity programmes were promoted as part of resident support (CHA, 2012, p.253).

As mentioned earlier, to join the GPWRC, residents need to complete the Ancient City Promotion Academy. The education programme provided by governments and professional

groups has become the first step in participation. It can make communities look like puppets of experts or governments. However, before that, as explained in Chapter 5, we need to remember that both the Ancient City Promotion Academy and the GPWRC were mediation alternatives put forward by the government and expert groups in response to resistance from local communities. In the late 2000s, the Ancient City Preservation Committee, which consisted of senior government officials and experts to gather opinions on the ACPPP, had already disappeared (see CHA, 2012). Some residents are influential in shaping the curriculum of educational programmes, including the Ancient City Promotion Academy (A, interview), and the GPWRC is involved in ACPPP policy decisions more deeply than before (C, interview). The Gongju government is experiencing the growing influence of local communities (G & H, interviews). The following pages will show that some community members are beginning to wield the same influence as the experts.

6.3.4. Changes in community participation patterns

The community engagement process in Gongju is designed passively. As described in the previous section, establishing and operating the GPWRC is planned as a policy. Also, the community has been trained to understand the government's policy intent. B, the manager of the GPWRC, replied that his primary role is to promote the ACPPP to other residents. He said that one of his main tasks is to inform the citizens of the information obtained through seminars and conferences, as most citizens do not even know the names of policies or projects.

However, the educational programmes and the establishment of the GPWRC provided knowledge about policy and a framework to progressively expand the participation of local communities. Two resident respondents said that the Ancient City Promotion Academy helped the local community to think about common topics and form a network (A & B, interviews). The existence of the GPWRC and other civil organisations gives governments clarity on what to negotiate. All residents interviewed had experience meeting with the mayor of Gongju and various government officials, planners and heritage experts. Respondents A, B and C said they learned more about the ACPPP through those experiences and their activities. In particular, A and C emphasised that they could identify policy problems as they continued participating.

The policy critiques of A and C, described in Section 6.4.3, show that they are not very different from those of experts, though the language of A and C is not couched in professional

terms. The knowledge of heritage professionals has been officially validated within their institutional arrangements (Hølleland & Skrede, 2019, p.830). By adopting certified scientific knowledge, the policy decision-making processes secure reliability, at least in South Korea. However, as the knowledge of experts was delivered to the community through participation in official meetings and human networks, the community was able to intervene more deeply in the decision-making process, which was done within the academic frame of existing experts. Until the mid-2010s, community participation was limited to legally guaranteed opinions and participation in educational programmes (H, interview). Nevertheless, from the late 2010s, campaigns and events led by civic organisations began to diversify (A, interview), and opportunities to directly intervene in the decision-making process gradually increased (B & C, interviews).

	Participation methods	Examples of activities
1	Participation in the legal process	Attending briefing sessions and public hearings, presenting opinions on public notice
2	Attending public education programmes	Ancient City Forum, Ancient City Promotion Academy, other lectures
3	Participation as a civic organisation member	Alleyway revival campaign, holding exhibitions and concerts, flower bed gardening, alleyway commentary, communal gardening, clean-up campaign, seminars with Gongju City
4	Participation in decision-making	Advising stakeholders, attending official meetings, being a deliberation committee member
5	Participation in projects	Ancient City Image Recovery Project, cooperative organisation

TABLE 6-4. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION METHODS IN GONGJU
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

Table 6-4 above shows the current ways of participating as a member of the community in the heritage-led regeneration process in Gongju. Community participation in Gongju can be divided into five categories. The first is participation through one of the legal procedures, which is traditional in South Korea. The SAPPAC specifies a procedure for collecting the opinions of local communities on significant matters in the regeneration process. The Act requires that residents' opinions be heard on planning and district designation, cancellation and change (Article 9). The community can attend public hearings and present opinions on public notice. Gongju City and the CHA generally also hold a briefing session before the public hearing (H, interview). The second method is public education programmes provided by governments. Since the early 2010s, the CHA and Gongju City Hall have been encouraging the participation

of the local community through the Ancient City Forum, the Ancient City Promotion Academy and other lectures (G, interview). Resident respondents A, B and C agreed that these played a vital role in forming a group where residents shared a vision. The third way is through the activities of civic organisations. Such organisations are leading many campaigns in Gongju, such as the Alleyway Revival movement and clean-up campaign, and other activities such as holding exhibitions and concerts, flower bed gardening, alleyway commentary, communal gardening, and seminars with Gongju City (A, B & C, interviews). The fourth way is direct involvement in the decision-making process. Representatives of the community advise other stakeholders and attend official meetings. Moreover, some are elected regional deliberation members and have the right to make decisions.

The last method is participation in the projects. The Ancient City Image Recovery Project is a project that induces individuals to restore or repair undesignated heritage with government financial support. Gongju had the most achievements among the four Ancient Cities up to 2021 (CHA, 2021b). In the interview, F insisted that successful community participation in Gongju moved the Ancient City Image Recovery Project from a temporary project to a regular project of the ACPPP. As shown in Table 6-5 below, the amount of budget execution of this project in Gongju is about twice that of other regions. Furthermore, Gongju City recently encouraged the local community to establish cooperatives to utilise the infrastructure built through regeneration measures (G, interview). Although no legal body directly related to heritage has yet been organised, interviewee A replied in an interview that she and several other residents were considering cooperatives.

	Buyeo	Gongju	Gyeongju	Iksan
Number of cases	145	211	112	128
Amount of budget execution	£2.5M	£6.0M	£3.8M	£3.8M

TABLE 6-5. NUMBER OF CASES AND BUDGET EXECUTION OF THE ANCIENT CITY IMAGE RECOVERY PROJECT BY 2021. SOURCE: CHA (2021B, P.1).

In Gongju, community participation was planned and developed within the intersection of stakeholders' objectives. However, as the scope of participation gradually expanded, residents could communicate with Gongju City more frequently and be involved in policies through various channels than before. B, who is in charge of public relations at the GPWRC, replied that he currently gives consultation on national heritage management and the ACPPP. A is

participating in consultation and deliberation related to regeneration and modern heritage management, and C is attending a meeting related to the particular projects of the ACPPP. It shows that the boundaries between the roles of local communities and professionals are blurring. Some Gongju community members are involved in deliberations, consultations and decision-making processes that have traditionally been the domain of experts. Heritage (see Graham, 2002; Pendlebury & Porfyriou, 2017) and local communities (see Taylor, 2004; Walker, 2011; Weber-Newth, 2019) imply the concept of "place". Moreover, specific relationships with specific places provide a rationale for "democratising heritage" beyond the traditional domain of experts (Hølleland & Skrede, 2019, p.830). As Waterton and Smith (2010, p.7) argue, current community participation in Gongju shows that the relationship between professionals and communities is changing.

However, this does not mean that there will be a happy ending. The next section will describe more diverse and complex conflicts. Although serious conflicts, such as the resistance that occurred around 2010, were not uncovered by the study, resident respondents expressed various complaints in the two field surveys. Additionally, the targets of complaints were diverse. In the next section, the study will focus on the nature of community participation, exploring complex conflicts.

6.4. Community participation, conflicts and empowerment

In the following pages, the study describes the phenomena that emerged from community participation in the ACPPP by examining the conflicts that local communities face. In Section 6.4.1, the study explores where the conflict between local communities and governments comes from. It also ponders why residents believe that the final decision rests with the state while claiming the legitimacy of their participation. The following section looks at the relationship between participation and empowerment by exploring conflict within the GPWRC, a representative body of the Gongju heritage-led regeneration community. Section 6.4.3 observes a new conflict emerging within Gongju society. This shows that participation is not an alternative to resolving conflicts, but could be the beginning of more complex conflicts.

Acquiring the decision-making authority for urban space behind the rhetoric of heritage preservation is a crucial purpose for community participation, whether it is for individual interests or not. Conflicts between local communities and the public sector, and within local

communities, look like confrontational interactions between groups that want to maintain power to decide and those that want to gain power. Proksch (2016, p.2) argues against the common notion that conflict arises from differing interests between people or groups as they "interact and pursue common goals". He argues that the definition of such a conflict is, at best, that of a "strained situation" resolved by negotiation or decision and that conflict arises when the factual issues at hand become more complex with relational problems. This section will show that 1) the relational problem would be the power to decide and 2) it is complex and multidimensional.

Individual property rights and deregulation also were the most controversial issues in establishing and revising the SAPAC (see Chapter 5). After conflict and resistance in the 2000s, heritage-led regeneration was suggested as an alternative (see Chapter 5). So far, the research has demonstrated that state power has hegemony over heritage and its surrounding areas. In the conflict between the state and the local community, resistance to authoritarian policy decisions still seems to be one of the purposes of participation in the process of heritage-led regeneration. In interviews, some experts and officials regarded the community as a nuisance to the efficient implementation of the projects, and residents saw the participation process as only a formal procedure.

Moreover, power and resistance are dynamic and co-dependent, considering their relationship (Fleming & Spicer, 2008, p.304). Conflicts within the community that will be discussed in this section make it challenging to understand community participation as mere resistance to governments. As C argues, conflict can be a process of reaching an agreement to arrive at a better conclusion. Furthermore, as will be described in this section, conflicts occur not only in the process of resistance but also in the process of intervening in initiatives. As mentioned in the previous section, although policymakers set the community participation system for policy needs, the Gongju community understood participation as a right to intervene in the policy. Even in heritage activities, participation empowers the local community and builds a dynamic (Greer, 2010, p.55). Nonetheless, respondents did not directly associate participation with power, while sensing that the conflicts that they face arise from various dynamics. The section discusses this reason and the misunderstandings of community participation in Korean society, as also discussed in Section 2.4.7.

6.4.1. Conflicts between local communities and governments

In Chapter 5, this study explored community participation as resistance to divisive heritage policies. Similarly, divisive heritage policies affect current conflicts between local communities and governments. Resident respondents highlight their still small impact within the current policy structure as the biggest challenge to current community participation. On the other hand, officials and experts argue that community participation is limited due to policy structures and a lack of local community capacity. Although there are differences of opinion, all respondents cited institutional and policy deficiencies as the reason for the community's low influence. The following pages show that initiatives over policy are one of the main causes of conflict, and criticism of the policy structure stems from the divisive heritage idea and policy described in Chapter 4, which does not allow local communities to take the initiative.

Although community participation in Gongju has gradually expanded its influence (see [Section 6.3.4](#)), resident respondents argue there is still a strong tendency to use community participation as a formality for policy purposes established by governments and experts. All the resident respondents strongly criticised the current resident participation as not escaping bureaucratic practices. A argued that participation was nothing more than a formality included in the government's policy process, although she participated in decision-making and projects. The GPWRC executives B and C also insisted that they had little decision-making authority. In particular, C argued that the administrative agencies viewed local community groups as formal tools to provide trivial ideas in the finished plan. She insisted that the community has to participate in the project implementation process, not attend meetings to agree to meet administrative procedures.

As shown in Table 6-6 below, respondents' arguments can be summarised into four categories: less influence in decision-making, tokenism, limited role and exclusion. Again, these categories can be summarised as "less power". Power means securing the conditions that make effective action possible (Parietti, 2022, p.56). Resident respondents blamed governments for not listening to them (tokenism), not doing as they wished (less influence in decision-making), not allowing the actions they wanted (limited role) or ignoring them (exclusion). These categories are about the community authority restricted by the policy. Residents told of various experiences in policy processes set up to achieve the goals and outcomes of governments, not of themselves. Respondents' criticism of the policy frame indicates the conditions limiting their possibilities.

		Criticism of Participation	Interviewee
Less power	Less influence in decision-making	Limited powers in various committees	A
		No decision-making power	B
		Even small comments are not considered	C
		Solid top-down policy structure	D
	Tokenism	A public hearing that is nothing more than a formality	A
		Communities are mobilised for public events and policy processes	D
	Limited role	Participation is part of the process set by the government	A
		The community can only contribute trivial ideas	C
		The role of residents is minimal	D
	Exclusion	Exclusion of local communities from project implementation	C
		Exclusion of local communities from operating budgets	D

TABLE 6-6. CRITICISM OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN GONGJU.

SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

On the other hand, Gongju government officials G and H pointed out that local community participation at a level that residents desire was practically impossible. G conceded that community participation is a democratic process and should be more active but expressed doubts about whether it was appropriate as a procedure. Because a few community members do not represent the whole local community, he said, whoever's opinions were accepted, there was always criticism of the results from others. He argued that the mayor and city council members are the democratically elected representatives of the Gongju community and that if the arbitrarily chosen representatives of a particular community conflict with them, officials should follow the opinions of the official representatives. His claim that a "vocal" minority can replace the silent majority is consistent with common criticisms of participation (Hall, 1999; Tosun, 2000; Kumar & Corbridge, 2001; Jones, 2003).

> *Most of the people participating are obvious [only certain people participate], and their opinions are highly likely to be distorted because they do not reflect the opinions of the entire community. And the administration proceeds with the project thinking that those opinions are everything, but residents often object to the project as unnecessary later.*
>
> (G, interview)

His argument deserves to be accepted. Concern that participation could instead produce a power imbalance and undermine democratic legitimacy may threaten the development of collaboration (Aas, Ladkin & Fletcher, 2005, pp.31–32). However, his argument also shows that the participatory process proposed by the governments does not take very much account of democratic values. As discussed in Chapter 5, community participation in the ACPPP has resulted from resistance. As noted in Section 6.3.1, few experts or public officials associate the

purpose of community participation with rights or decision-making powers. Even L, who argued that participation was necessary for residents' rights, said that at the time of participating in the plan, she thought it was required for policy, like other experts. From the point of view of government and experts, there is only the premise that community participation is necessary, and there is no specific discussion about setting boundaries and procedures among stakeholders about decision-making rights. G and H, who are in charge of the practical works of the Gongju ACPPP, argued that the current system does not consider community participation.

To be honest, the idea of creating a resident committee [GPWRC] is also because the CHA asked to establish it. Thus, the start was not that [the state] accepts specific requirements from the community ... The regeneration method [idea] is also from some scholars' ideas ... The planning process indeed lacks a process to judge whether residents want it. The projects included in the plan involve residents' participation as a mere formality.

(G, interview)

Although you can take it as an administrative convenience, the administrative structure or laws [de facto] do not allow for the project's implementation after obtaining all residents' consent. If you do not implement the plan and only argue with the residents about right and wrong, people say that the public officials are playing [not working]. We need to work within a set period and term, and the law does not force us to collect opinions from residents.

(H, interview)

Therefore, community participation strategies that do not discuss empowerment tend to remain debating policy only. As the interview progressed, all respondents linked the problem of community participation to an institutional or policy-structural problem. The most cited reason was the resident participation process, which was merely a formality. Residents criticised the bureaucratic system that prevented active community participation. A and C were frustrated that they could do many things with a small budget, but they did not have a chance to do so, while the national and local governments were wasting much money. In contrast, D, who served as a city council member and the president of the GPWRC, pessimistically replied that budgets come from the state and budget execution must be strictly supervised, but civic groups are not reliable enough to plan and execute the budget.

Experts and officials believed that it was too early for the community to participate in decisions. All of them highlighted policy implementation systems that make it difficult to "reflect" the community's opinions in their decisions. They insisted that the state-led policy structure, not the decision-making structure, hinders the participation of local communities. In interview, G argued that community participation at a high level is time-impossible both in the planning and project processes, though "understanding communities' views and opinions" is fundamental to facilitating participation. Experts (J, K & L) pointed out the short planning period of less than one year, and public officials (F, G & H) noted the short-term budget execution. This implies that the policy system and "policymakers" do not allow local communities time to claim or participate in decision-making.

Expecting efficient outcomes in a short period of time may make it difficult for communities to engage at a high level. Participation in legal procedures and educational programmes, which are the first and second participation methods in Table 6-4, are led by experts in a fixed manner according to the schedule set by the governments. On the other hand, higher levels of engagement require more flexible times and procedures that allow the community to coordinate internally and negotiate with governments and experts. Parfitt (2004, p.549) is concerned that requiring specific outcomes at specific times may cause reversion to a top-down approach, a non-participatory one. Institutional flexibility is vital to facilitate participation (Lowndes, Pratchett & Stoker, 2006, p.559). An approach that emphasises efficiency based on top-down policy delivery may reduce opportunities for communities to participate in core policy discussions. Furthermore, fewer opportunities and lower levels of participation may hinder the empowerment of communities and keep them on the fringes of policy.

The question of power is at the centre of discussions of conflict and participation (Barnes, Newman & Sullivan, 2007, p.184), as described in Chapters 4 and 5. However, while criticising the top-down policy structure, residents were not aware of the premise that experts and government officials had decision-making power. They also did not perceive their participation as a process of gaining power. A and B expressed participation as "help" and "advice" for local development. C described participation as an effort to gain an "opportunity".

When asked why the top-down policy structure is still maintained, participants pointed out the other side's problems and blamed each other. Resident respondents cited intentions to exclude themselves for reasons such as "bureaucratic practices", "behaviour of some indifferent

or incompetent public servants", and "government and experts are in sync". In contrast, K and the public officials (F, G & H) involved in establishing or implementing policies pointed out a "lack of competence" or "indifference" of residents as the reason it was not easy to participate in the community. Unlike other respondents, they are the ones who currently have the practical policymaking power in the ACPPP.

K believed that local communities still could not lead the projects. She was the master planner of the Gongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master Plan at the time of the interview. However, K was the most sceptical about community participation. Pointing out the age of the population and participation focused on individual interests, K argued that communities were indifferent to the policy. She also questioned their level of knowledge.

How possible is the participation of the elderly, who make up the majority of the population, in the old city centre? It is questionable whether their level of activity and knowledge is sufficient, and whether the concept of shared assets is sufficient for resident participation is unclear. It is not a minor issue.

(K, interview)

However, other experts (J, L & M) disagreed with her. They did not see the capacity of the local community as insufficient. In an interview, J asserted that no one knows their area as well as the residents. Involved in the Urban Regeneration New Deal plan, he emphasised the lack of experience, such as a lack of problem-solving ability, networking and confidence to act as an operating body.

I think they do not lack ability but experience ... It has not been long since 2014 that urban regeneration has actually been implemented [in Korea].

(J, interview)

Is the competence of communities an essential question for participation? Some officials and experts spent much time in their interviews providing evidence of the community's lack of capacity. This criticism is also often mentioned in academia (see Chapin, 2004; Reed, 1997). However, experts' evaluations of community competency showed significant differences depending on their goals. The assessment of M, who was a former master planner and led the SAPAC revision and heritage-led regeneration scheme, was generous. M argued that the capacity of the local community has developed to a level where it can lead to setting policies with local governments. In contrast, G and H said most residents' suggestions were childish.

The level of participation they expected was very high, with the community proposing policies, securing budgets and operating the project. However, B mentioned earlier that residents are busy making a living and do not have enough time to participate. It may not be appropriate to criticise them for lack of interest or pursuit of personal gain while expecting professional performance from those who volunteer for free.

F's assessment of community capacity also supports this. She argued that local capacity determines the level of participation. However, her expectation of community capacity was markedly different from that of Gongju officials. F plans policies and manages local governments as the CHA official. While public officials in Gongju city set the community's ability to implement and operate projects as a criterion for community competency, understanding national policy was her criterion. She argued that community participation in Gongju had reached a higher level than in other regions, as residents of Gongju, called an "education city", are more educated. She believed that the Gongju community's level of understanding of policies and the influence of the local community in the policy process was much higher than that of others.

Their responses show that they interpret community participation as they wish. In particular, F insisted that the capabilities and characteristics of local government officials determined local community participation, comparing Gongju with Buyeo and Gyeongju. She pointed out that Gongju officials are less affected by the dynamics within Gongju society because the officials are from other regions. She argued that local community participation in Gongju could be relatively active because Gongju officials had better experience, knowledge and skills. She claimed that G and H's long period of higher education in Seoul allowed them to exercise their abilities without being bound by the interests of other senior civil servants or residents.

F insisted that the capacity of G and H had a significant impact on performance and community participation for the following reasons: 1) G and H continue to lead the project while officials in charge are constantly being replaced in other cities; 2) some projects have been carried out using the city budget but without the state budget; 3) unlike other officials, they have continued to make efforts to communicate with residents to succeed in support projects; and 4) Gongju City has also supported not only building traditional-style houses, but also the restoration of modern heritages. Strictly speaking, of the reasons she listed, only the third seems to be related to community participation. Perhaps even that reason is also the answer

why the Gongju ACPPP, rather than community participation, has been successfully implemented compared with other regions.

Moreover, whether they are directly involved in the ACPPP seemed to be related to their point of view. L and M were the most experienced but had not conducted work or research related to the ACPPP for at least two years before the interview. J also started other studies around the same time. None of them claimed that the capacity of the local community was lacking. On the other hand, at the time of the interview, K and Gongju officials who were developing a new master plan were stakeholders who had to consult directly with the Gongju community. At the end of the interview, K said experts should lead the ACPPP. G and H also agreed with her view.

There are also institutional problems … In this nation, plans are established entirely by experts, and all systems are in place so that they work efficiently. I have argued that community participation is essential when writing research reports or articles, but honestly, I still think experts or public institutions should lead.

(K, interview)

K and J also looked at institutional and planning problems from different perspectives. K pointed out that the appropriateness of community participation was problematic even in the planning process. On the other hand, J pointed out that the governments do not hand over the initiative and do not provide opportunities to local communities. He criticised the fact that the structure makes it difficult for local communities to develop their capacity because the goals and perspectives of each government did not correspond with those of the local community. J argues that participation can be divided into several levels but that the state only wants participation at a low level. "Actually, participation is a headache for the public sector," he said. In addition, he argued that the issue of community capacity was raised due to the government wanting rapid policy outcomes.

Although it depends on what heritage is, designated heritages and regional assets are different. It is a difficult problem to utilise designated heritages for urban regeneration directly. I think it is possible to utilise low-level cultural properties such as modern and contemporary heritages.

(K, interview)

In other words, if we look at cultural properties by expanding them to include local assets with low-level traces, this is a different story. Urban regeneration deals with local assets, so we have no choice but to deal with that part ... In terms of urban regeneration, historical and cultural assets are moving away from past management. Rather than a historical background, it [heritage] is included as an inherent material object with the value of life, which is a collection of local experiences ... Fake heritage is also heritage. There is a saying that community participation is also a fake consultation, but only the level and perspective they want [the government and the local community] are different. And what is important is whether or not the local community see them [heritages] as things locally specialised.

(J, interview)

	K		J
Lack of community capacity	Community feature	• Low motivation due to ageing • Desire to increase wealth • Low level of knowledge • Indifference on policy	Lack of experience	• Lack of problem-solving skills • Lack of network • Difficulty in becoming an operating body
Systemic limitations	Institutional system	• Formalism • Deliberation committee and decision-makers-centred process	Administrative structure	• Vertical policy delivery system • Budget execution within a short period • Budget not transferred to community
	Planning	• Short planning period • Broad scope of the plan that the local community cannot afford • Participation does not represent the opinion of the entire community	Planning	• Short planning period • Resident participation process for governments' goals (concentrating 95% of the budget on construction projects) • Only participation in ideas or suggestions

TABLE 6-7. COMPARISON OF VIEWS ON REASONS FOR LIMITATIONS OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION.
SOURCE: PRODUCED BY THE AUTHOR.

I asked J and K, who differ markedly from other respondents, additional questions about heritage decisions. As expected, they had different views on heritage, as shown in Table 6-7. K argued that designated heritage decisions must belong to experts and decision-makers and that the local community cannot lead the planning. On the other hand, J cautiously responded that there are different views on heritage and how the local community perceives it as significant. K emphasised the inherent problems of the community, such as low motivation, participation

for personal gain, low levels of knowledge and indifference to policy. She felt it was challenging to allow community participation where low performance is expected in implementing a policy process designed to pursue efficiency. On the other hand, J argued that policy implementation structures are designed to provide fewer opportunities for communities. He pointed out that there were few opportunities for the community to build a network and learn by intervening in the decision-making process, and the area in which communities can participate was structurally limited. He criticised the lack of consideration for community capacity development rather than criticism of community capacity.

Community competence, which some experts and officials mentioned in the interviews, includes the capacity to judge heritage decisions. The low level of knowledge they were concerned about often referred to their professional knowledge of heritage and their level of knowledge as implementers of policy. Moreover, respondents who were critical of engagement expressed doubts about the morality of the community. They criticised residents for focusing on personal interests rather than the public good (D, G, H & K, interviews). On the other hand, as J argues in the quote below, individual needs are essential to the urban regeneration process. He explains this phenomenon as a process by which policies become localised.

> *On the positive side, the needs of the community are increasing. This means that interest has increased, and the demand for localisation in the policy implementation process has increased. The point is that the number of individuals concerned about local benefits and the connection with the Urban Regeneration Project and themselves has increased.*
>
> (J, interview)

Only J, who was not involved in the ACPPP, understood participation as a process of empowerment of the local community. Here, we can see that the divisive heritage concept (see Chapter 4) also emerges in community participation in the ACPPP. Except for J, respondents believed that the state had the final decision-making power even in regeneration projects. In the interviews, residents resented being excluded from decision-making but hoped that the governments would improve these problems and provide more satisfactory alternatives. A and C regarded themselves as watchers and B as an adviser. Institutions and implementation procedures also show that the government holds the hegemony of heritage-led regeneration even after the SAPPAC revision (see Figure 5-4).

224

This trend is more prominent in the state-designated heritage preservation process than in the ACPPP. While criticising the current heritage policy stance that emphasises protection only, the officials tend to view the areas where residents may participate in state-designated heritage very narrowly. F regarded herself as a senior planner, framing preservation policies and managing several Ancient Cities. G and H considered themselves responsible for all phases of conservation, such as planning, implementing, operating and managing projects. They believed that the community's possible roles in preserving state-designated heritages were fewer, such as providing inconsequential opinions and volunteering for heritage management. Even by law, residents are excluded from planning and decision-making processes for state-designated heritages (see the Cultural Heritage Protection Act). According to that Act, only the CHA and cultural heritage experts can intervene in those processes.

J argued that how residents perceive the state-designated heritages in their region is essential in determining participation. However, like government officials, local community members tend to separate designated heritage sites from informal historical spaces where they can engage. Throughout the interviews, residents said little about their rights to the designated heritage. Respondents confined community involvement within PPDs. Throughout the interviews, they only enthusiastically commented on activities in the PPDs. None of the resident respondents objected to the state's protection of designated heritage sites and its exercise of massive regulatory powers in the SPDs. B has provided advice on state-designated heritage, but this was not an official procedure. His advice was also about what should be protected more.

In the conflict between the community and the governments, residents took issue with their limited influence and role in the decision-making process, as shown in Table 6-6. Officials and experts in charge of the ACPPP were reluctant to involve communities in the projects they led, raising doubts about the communities' capacity and motivations to participate. In addition, the institutional structure and the policy delivery system emphasise efficient decision-making and policy implementation led by public sector practitioners with high levels of knowledge and competence. Parfitt (2004, p.549) argues that the expectation of community capacity is the contradictory demand of development agencies for "rules, regularity and efficient delivery of outputs" implied by the top-down hierarchy. Borrowing Arnstein's (1969) perspective, participation is a challenge to transform these hierarchies. Thus, initiative in decision-making is a key conflict factor.

Nevertheless, why do residents not challenge the hegemony in heritage-related decision-making? This phenomenon may explain why the authoritarian heritage concept deeply rooted in Korean society has an impact on limiting participation. In interviews, all resident interviewees claimed that they were being mobilised as helpers despite being the masters of the city. However, they seemed not to see themselves as the masters of heritage. They believed that the rigid regulation by the state should be maintained in the SPD. Experts and government officials who were directly involved in the project said that community involvement did not affect the protection of state-designated heritages, while it could hamper the effectiveness of the projects (G, H & K, interviews). The heritage concept symbolised as a national sanctuary during the dictatorship era (see Section 4.3.3) still seems to be intact.

6.4.2. Conflicts within the GPWRC

Conflicts did not just exist between communities and governments but also within the GPWRC itself, the representative group for residents of the Gongju ACPPP. Although the conflict was not routine and continuous, there were also confrontations that could be described as severe. Government officials noted that there was a severe conflict within the GPWRC, arguing that civic groups were, after all, interest groups. Other communities related to the ACPPP also experienced serious levels of internal conflict. F said there were more severe conflicts than the GPWRC in other cities, such as Buyeo and Iksan. The manager of the GPWRC, B, replied that this conflict was the most challenging aspect. Resident respondents avoided giving details of the conflict, but G informed me that a new GPWRC president had recently been elected.

Interviewee B expressed this as a battle for vested interests and answered that such conflicts often occur during the process of electing representatives. He also stated that some people wanted to be elected president for personal greed, such as the title of "president" or increased opportunities to influence the market. Another interviewee, C, agreed that the heads of various civic organisations tended to use the title of president to improve their social status. She pointed out that leaders wanted to emphasise their group's pride, campaigns and superiority rather than partnering, sharing or interacting with other groups. As such, the GPWRC also had characteristics related to the local society's politics. Some former presidents of the GPWRC are former city councillors or have run for that office. In addition, many of the members were people who had previously been active in various organisations. Moreover, there seemed to be

other conflicts besides the election, although B avoided giving detailed explanations. He insisted that the internal conflicts of the GPWRC had been resolved.

Our capabilities have grown, and as a result, internal conflicts have arisen, and we are now in the stabilisation phase. The radicals [the development advocates] also disappeared from the inside, and the conflict disappeared.

(B, interview)

However, an interview with Respondent D shows that the conflicts had not been resolved so straightforwardly. He argued there were many conflicts within the group, though conflicts between groups are few. D, the former president of the GPWRC and a former Gongju City Council member, was pessimistic about community participation and its possibility throughout the interview. He severely criticised people hostile to other stakeholders and organisations that failed to make rational judgements due to a victim mentality and mob psychology. He argued that the cause was the low level of awareness of the crowd. In Section 6.4.1, we saw that respondents with decision-making power tended to underestimate the capacity of local communities. As they did, D, who lost power in the organisation, claimed that the community was immoral and had very low competence.

Conflicts within a community exist all the time. The lower the level of awareness, the more unnecessary conflicts. There are people who are always confronting the administration. There is no place for rational judgement. The organisation is constantly shaken by victim mentality and mob psychology. Although there are many ways to cooperate, the further you go into the countryside [local small cities like Gongju], the more conflicts spread ... Some believe that the national budget is for a subsidy to make money, and the government is trying to bind us ... I believe the reason is a low level of awareness. The idea of contributing to the local community by utilising local assets is not easy [a few try to contribute to the local community]. How many current members have that level of awareness? It seems that the main idea is to get together and go on field trips with little thought of volunteering.

(D, interview)

Moreover, the unique age-oriented culture of Korea may form an irrational power structure within the group. Relatively young people within the group tended to have a limited voice even though they held key positions such as secretary-general or manager. In a field survey in 2019,

I originally made an appointment and visited the office to interview the president of the GPWRC and C. However, the president abruptly declined the interview when I requested him to sign a consent form and allow voice recording if possible. C, who was next to him, also declined to be interviewed, but once the president left, C agreed to the interview.

I can express my opinion to elders, not like in the past, but it seems to be a different matter whether or not they accept it. There are a lot of people who are in their 60s and 70s. And no matter what we say, they think they are right and are often stubborn. But if we keep talking about it, they'll think about it only then. We talk about expressing our opinions secretly, but it's still a bit difficult to do it actively.

(C, interview)

Conflicts within the GPWRC show the existence of power struggles and dynamics. What is interesting about these conflicts is that the individual views of those involved and those excluded from the GPWRC's activities differ significantly. B and C believed that conflicts within the organisation were natural in the local community and that they could gather opinions and create better results through compromise. They argued that their participation was to prevent external organisations or governments making arbitrary decisions about their area and to provide residents with opportunities within the policy process. B and C agreed about the tendency that young members unilaterally follow the elders' decisions. Both also criticised leaders for their desire for honour and their political appetites. However, they emphasised the positive changes within the organisation, claiming these issues were being "improved".

It Is not necessarily bad that resident' have different opinions, and conflicts arise. Opinions cannot be united as one, but one thing can be saved at the end of the fight. Even if you compromise, one will come out … I wonder if the conflict with other perspectives would rather produce a better result.

(C, interview)

On the other hand, D, excluded from the organisation's activities, was very sceptical about these conflict issues. In interview, he argued that "right" community participation was impossible because of the individual desires of some people in the organisation. He emphasised the community's lack of quality or competence several times. He also criticised community organisations for being exclusive and with many members seeking personal gain. His view of the community was very similar to that of the public officials described in the previous section.

Gongju officials are sceptical of the aforementioned hierarchical and authoritative nature of the GPWRC. Moreover, H argued that this explains why young people do not participate and why opinions coming from the community can be personal arguments. In this way, those who possess power within the organisation and those who are excluded demonstrate conflicting worldviews regarding the GPWRC's participation activities.

6.4.3. Conflicts between people born and bred in Gongju and new residents

Sanoff (1999, p.31) argues that participation and conflict resolution can be cohesive and allow the general public to obtain information and become involved and develop a consensus. However, conflicts and participation took on a different aspect in Gongju. Gongju city official H complained that as resident participation increased, so did more complex and unsolved tasks (interview). Residents also faced another conflict.

The interviews with respondents A and C show that the conflict between people born and bred in Gongju and new residents provides evidence that community participation can cause diverse conflicts, rather than resolving them. They argued that the ACPPP were not aligned with their visions. This sounds like a problem between them and the government. However, interviewee A teared up when she explained in her 2020 interview that the characteristics of Gongju society excluded new residents, while C spent more than half of the interview time emphasising that the ACPPP was a project only for new residents. If they had been interviewed together, a dispute might have occurred. Nevertheless, this may be misunderstood as a conflict with governments, because the target of their direct criticism was the governments, not each other.

Interviewees A and C have very different backgrounds. They call people born and bred "Gongju people" (공주사람) and new residents "strangers" (외부인). A is a stranger, and C is a Gongju person. Interviewee A lectured on art-related topics at the university, and her husband was retired but had been a professor. After retirement, the couple came to Gongju, restored an abandoned old house in the city centre, and opened a cafe, now one of the most famous places in Gongju. Official H assessed that the cafe's success was a great help to the Ancient City Image Recovery Project (interview). Planner L also rated A highly, as she restored a traditional house, and said her work catalysed the improvement of the urban landscape. F and G also praised the cafe's success for creating an opportunity for young and creative people to flow through

(interview). Interviewee A organised the Alleyway Revival Association, started the Alleyway Revival campaign, and has been working as a commentator on modern heritage and alleyways in the city centre. She is also very interested in art and has held exhibitions and concerts related to the modern Gongju culture. She is currently engaged in various activities related to urban regeneration projects, such as attending the Gongju city meeting. Therefore, she is one of the activists best suited to the policy goal of governments. She is a celebrity known both to experts and to public officials.

On the other hand, C, born and bred in Gongju, is a housewife but has been active in major civic groups such as the Gongju City Development Council (GCDC) and the GPWRC for a long time. Unlike the GPWRC, the GCDC is a civic group that does not receive direct support from the government. According to C, the GCDC is the most politically influential civic group in Gongju. She is the one who can best understand the policies of Gongju City, but none of the experts who participated in the interviews knew her.

*FIGURE 6-12. THE DIRECTION FOR RESIDENT SUPPORT INITIATIVES.*

SOURCE: CHAE MI-OK ET AL. (2009B, P.254). TRANSLATED BY THE AUTHOR.

They also have different affiliations and interests. A is the president of the Alleyway Revival Association, while B is the secretary-general of the GPWRC. A is very interested in modern heritage and culture-led regeneration policies. On the other hand, B is interested in the

ACPPP, the rights and interests of residents, and improving their quality of life. The views of experts of their activities is also different. Experts K, L and M gave positive reviews of A's activities. They praised A for setting a precedent for the Ancient City Image Recovery Project to succeed. However, those experts do not even know C's name.

The difference in reputation between the two respondents may be one of the reasons that A is more in line with the community participation method pursued by the ACPPP. Of course, we cannot overlook that her cafe was introduced in a magazine and became a local landmark. However, activities like restoring an old house and running a cafe were in line with the ACPPP strategy. As described in Chapter 5, the Act has experienced many crises from enactment to revision, and the central government and the CHA did not welcome the ACPPP. It was a political choice. The first Gongju Master Plan suggested a method to increase the value of buildings and increase housing demand, which was undervalued due to heritage regulations, through "tax support to promote the influx of residents" (Chae Mi-Ok et al., 2009b, p.280). The figure above shows that the ACPPP emphasised the revitalisation of the city centre's economy and the provision of new growth engines by the influx of new residents from an early stage. Gongju's heritage-led regeneration process focused on early policy successes, and experts predicted the conflict with new residents and gentrification as side effects (J, K & L, interviews).

Moreover, A's critique of the Ancient City Image Recovery Project was similar to that of the experts. Since 2000, as economical *han-oks* (traditional-style houses) with modern construction methods and materials have become popular, traditional architecture experts have criticised them as "fake *han-oks*" (Song Bo-Mi, 2015; Lim Jong-Up, 2013; Byun Jin-Kyung, 2009). In an interview, she criticised the Ancient City Image Recovery Project, pointing out that cheaply built artificial *han-oks* harmed the aesthetics of the city. She claimed that the beautiful scenery of Gongju city centre was being destroyed by public financial support. A argued that the administrative agencies needed to encourage community participation in a different way, not by people giving money. She believed people with artistic abilities should gather and voluntarily cultivate a high-quality urban space.

I am pessimistic about the han-ok *support project. I think that artificially fake* han-oks *are detrimental to the aesthetics of the city. The modern scenery of Gongju is beautiful, but the* han-oks *that are not in harmony here and there obstruct the overall landscape*

context of the city … Low-quality han-oks *that are dependent on public financial support are spreading.*

(A, interview)

Conversely, C stated that state subsidies only provided economic opportunities for new residents rather than improving the lives of existing residents. She also criticised the Ancient City Image Recovery Project, but her reason was different from that of A. It was not because the project harmed the city's historical landscape but because it caused gentrification. She saw the problem not in the provision of the subsidy but that it was used for the "strangers", not the "Gongju people".

Urban regeneration does not seem to be a business for the residents at all… Urban regeneration drives out my family members [people born and bred in Gongju]. And people from other regions do not stay for a long time. The city's population is declining. Strangers come here and turn their homes into cafes, and they live in Sejong city [a large city] and come here to work … everyone sells their house and land and leaves for Sejong city.

(C, interview)

There was a hidden "unpleasant gaze" towards each other, as different as their criticisms of the administrative agencies were. A criticised the Gongju people for being indifferent to history and culture and participating for individual economic purposes. She felt sorry if the Gongju people, familiar with the urban landscape, were unaware of its historical value (interview).

I am a stranger. But the Gongju people, who have been born and bred [here] for a long time, think they know it too well but don't know how historically valuable Gongju is. Rather, they were surprised and delighted when I explained … I believe it is important for the owners of each space in Gongju to show their capabilities in order for Gongju's urban regeneration to take place well. Residents, who are the owners, must manage the region to revive it. However, I was very surprised to see that the residents [Gongju people], who were not interested, misunderstood the public funds suddenly injected after the selection [as a target area of regeneration] as their money and focused on business interests such as the right to operate. Currently, I am concerned that this situation will cause conflict.

(A, interview)

In contrast, C criticised the ACPPP resident support project – which did not consider the Gongju people – and the strangers who jumped on the bandwagon. She argued that gentrification was unavoidable because older city centre residents were economically less affluent. She critiqued the policy as unfair since the financial support is useful to new residents, not the weak. The Ancient City Image Recovery Project supports about £95,000 per house within half of the total construction cost (see Section 5.7.3). C argued that most older people in the city centre did not have £95,000. Moreover, she believed that wealthy strangers had an advantage over the Gongju people, who needed another place to live during construction. C strongly criticised the project for instigating gentrification and relative deprivation. She believed policymakers did not consider the economic situation of the Gongju people or ignored them.

When you look at the construction of han-ok *... [it is not for Gongju people] due to the policy of subsidising up to 100 million won, up to 50% of the total construction cost. In practice, many older people in Bonghwang-dong and Junghak-dong don't have 100 million won on their hands. I am [have] a house that is collapsing, and the next-door neighbour has money, so I feel uncomfortable when a neighbour gets a better house. And then they sell it and move out. The original people [people born and bred in Gongju] leave ... I don't know why they do this. What is the Ancient City? Is it the Ancient City to build a new* han-ok*? I have no idea what the Ancient City is ... It would be nice for all residents to benefit too, but there are more people who can't.*

(C, interview)

C argued that urban regeneration should be a way to provide more opportunities and stable daily life to the Gongju people. Unlike A, she also expressed disapproval of history and culture. She was more interested in the lives of the Gongju people than in the rediscovery or fame of the Gongju city centre. She insisted that the policy emphasising history and art was also for the new residents, not the people of Gongju.

It would be nice for the residents to work together to make money, but they [officials] only do something like creative or cultural spaces. Older people ask me, "Were there so many artists in Gongju? Has Gongju now turned into a good place for artists?" It is a serious problem. Are those spaces for strangers [new residents], not spaces for Gongju people to enjoy? Gongju city centre is almost dead. After 8 o'clock, all the lights turn off. All the markets are dead. Urban regeneration must allow the old town residents to live

without leaving and earn something here. But we are not happy to see cultural things not related to us. We are not interested in doing something because we have a business for a living. What kind of culture can I enjoy? I think it should be a space where we [Gongju people] can live together whether strangers come.

(C, interview)

The study argues that "a sense of alienation" is one of the crucial causes of this confrontation. C emphasised that the Gongju people felt a considerable sense of relative deprivation while participating in the heritage-led regeneration. She believed that the ACPPP was excluding her and other Gongju people and selecting a group with cultural competence. Also, her interview implied that she recognised that economic benefits in the scheme were produced based on the local assets they had preserved, but that this policy approach ensured that the economic benefits went to strangers, the new residents. She expressed that the Gongju people were deprived of it all.

The city economy grows, but there is no way for me to make any money. It is becoming a situation where we have just to watch other people and newcomers make money. Artists in Gongju are few, but artists, professors and nature artists from other regions are coming and starting to reside [here]. In doing so, those people make money on the opportunities created by public projects. Gongju people [those born and bred in Gongju] just look at it and are deprived of it all. In the name of preservation, things always go that way.

(C, interview)

A felt similar to C. She felt that she was alienated from Gongju city and Gongju people. A's activities were highly praised by CHA officials and experts (F, K & M, interviews), the external groups, but it seemed to be different inside Gongju. She took great pride in her role. However, she said that the single fact that she was not born and bred in Gongju had caused disparagement of her efforts and hurt her. She attributed the jealousy and discriminatory evaluation of her achievements to her birthplace elsewhere.

The hard part is that I wasn't born and bred here … People are a bit jealous of people from outside … Of course, people born and bred in Gongju are Gongju people, but people who live here now should also be considered Gongju people … They get jealous when other people do it, but they do nothing … They do not give recognition for my achievements because I am from other regions. And even a Gongju city official contacted

someone else because I was not a Gongju person [a news reporter came to cover]. Finally, he [the news reporter] filmed me again. Things go like that. They put me through a lot of work, so it [this discrimination] really hurts me ... A professor said that even if you live for 50 or 100 years, there are many cases where the Gongju Cultural centre does not recommend it. The professor said that I should be grateful because I was recognised as a Gongju person for the first time in 25 years. It was really hard because of things like regionalism or school relations ... One advised me not to compete with the people here because they would be jealous. Even recently, I realised again that they chose the Gongju people at the decisive moment [the public offering]. So, I cried a lot. It is the worst chronic disease in the community. [Gongju] people do not recognise the efforts of people from outside.

(A, interview)

However, until the time of the on-site investigation, this conflict had yet to be publicly discussed. Neither of the two public officials of Gongju City considered this serious, and other experts viewed it as a possible conflict (G, H, J & K, interviews). As each interview lasted over an hour and a half, complaints that had not yet been expressed were revealed. C argued that considering the existing residents was necessary because one of the purposes of the ACPPP is compensation for the heritage regulations. Nevertheless, some public officials and experts believed the influx of creative human resources was essential for community-led regeneration (F, G, K & M, interviews). J also pointed out that this phenomenon is a conflict factor that often arises in urban regeneration projects, as development through re-creation goes against the social benefits of the existing community (interview). This kind of conflict is not unique to Gongju. L, who had studied Gyeongju for over ten years, warned that governments need to be fully considered in the future, pointing out that a similar conflict combined with a generational issue is worsening in Gyeongju.

A and C expressed great disappointment that their participation was ignored in the policymaking process. C was deeply disappointed that although the Gongju people felt deprived, they could not influence policy decisions significantly. A was disappointed that a group of communities she saw as inappropriate were often selected to operate detailed heritage-led regeneration programmes. They expressed dissatisfaction with policy decisions that each could not understand.

235

Community participation continued, but it was very passive. Even a small part did not reflect the opinions of residents. There was something wrong with the road expansion project in the past, so I explained it while showing pictures at a meal with the mayor, but [nothing changed] … Even at this urban regeneration meeting, the members were angry because they [the governments] asked us to think about what kind of programmes to put in the big frame already set by them. The opinion that it would be nice to remodel and use buildings in the neighbourhood where residents participate from the early planning stage was ignored. It was like, "you will blame me if I do not ask these things", while involving us in a small part of the almost completed plan. It is just the level allowed to us.

<div align="right">(C, interview)</div>

Currently, the mayor is trying to create various committees of residents and participate in the plan, but the authority given to us is small … Even in the case of public announcement projects with resident participation, the focus is on one team. Why do these people keep getting selected? Citizens talk a lot, and group leaders have doubts. How did those people win again? The programme became messed up again. We talk to the city councillor or the mayor about the problem. But it still doesn't work out as much as we want.

<div align="right">(A, interview)</div>

In conclusion, community involvement is unlikely to resolve conflict. Instead, this conflict confirms that many more groups may want to be involved in policymaking. The two claims that were precisely the same in their interviews were that "nothing changes even if I attend a meeting and talk to the mayor" and that community participation is necessary to check the governmental decisions. What they resist is not an institution or policy framework but a decision-making structure that excludes them. The study argues that the state misunderstands that participatory strategies are a way to earn the trust of the community. Such as the state mobilised heritage to spread its ideology (see Section 4.3), it also mobilised participation in persuading communities, as insisted by L in interview.

6.5. Conclusion

The CHA expected that community participation would effectively mediate conflicts with residents and play a significant role in building trust between the state and local communities

(CHA, 2012, p.309). This expectation has been seen as a common approach in South Korean academia, as mentioned in Section 2.4.7. Many Korean scholars refer to community participation as an alternative to "collaborative" planning or mitigating "conflicts" (see Lee Woo-Hyung, Chung Jae-Hee & Jung Jae-Woong, 2014; Min Hyun-Suk & Oh Ji-Yeon, 2019; Jang Min-Young, Park Seong-Hyeon & Lee Myung-Hoon, 2015). However, discussing community participation only in the dimension of results seems problematic. In the process dimension, collaboration and conflict imply "relationship" and "interaction". If positive interaction is called collaboration and negative interaction is called a conflict in the relationship between groups, we need to look at how the community interacts with other groups. All planning activities are related to governance processes and interactive relationships (Healey, 1997).

Although the Korean government saw these conflicts as something to be eliminated, this study emphasises the need to understand that the conflicts as interactions are strongly linked to complex social and policy contexts. A heritage policy, embodied in principles and norms, has identified and sorted the objects of preservation (see Chapter 4) and the space (see Chapter 5) in the way policymakers imagined. The community participation programme in the ACPPP was one of the plans to control the community backlash that arose during the policy development process (see Chapter 5). Section 6.3 showed that even after the SAPPAC was revised, community participation had been encouraged to develop in a way that was in accordance with government policy goals. The policymakers most of all emphasised an education programme as a participation method (see Section 6.3.3). Governments established a civic organisation representing communities for people to participate, and only those who completed educational programmes provided by the state could join this organisation.

As Crooke (2010) showed in two examples of museum community engagement in Northern Ireland, the motivations and purposes of engagement, interactions with other groups, and ways of responding to power structures can emerge differently. However, the case of this study seems closer to Arnstein's (1969) assertion that community participation is also related to challenges to structures designed by those in power. This is because the local communities, who were excluded from the heritage discourse from the beginning, had the motivation and purpose of their response to transform the existing normative system (see Chapter 5). Local communities also influenced two changes in spatial planning related to the designation of the ACPPP areas, over which the expert group has planning authority (see Section 5.6). Furthermore, Sections 6.3.4 and 6.4 in this chapter showed that the Gongju community still

envisions more empowerment and community-led interactions. In Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3, we saw that members wanted to exert more significant influence and guide policies towards their own set goals even within the Gongju community.

Section 6.4.1 demonstrated conflicts between groups seeking to change or maintain power structures. Although residents demanded more authority in the decision-making process, administrative agencies pointed out the inefficiency of participation and raised many questions about its representativeness. Policymakers emphasised limitations based on the current policy system or the lack of capacity of local communities, although increasing the level of community participation would be ideal. However, criticism of the capacity of local communities can sound like an excuse for other stakeholders to defend their desire to exclude nuisance communities. As capacity development means that the community will improve its ability to engage and negotiate in collaborative processes (Aas, Ladkin & Fletcher, 2005, p.44), this will benefit the community in interactions with other stakeholder groups. Moreover, the question of the quality and intention of local communities, raised several times in Section 6.4, comes from different perspectives depending on the position of the person raising the issue and the situation he/she faces. As described in Section 6.4.2, the perspective of the person excluded from the community organisation power structure was the opposite to those who led the activities of the organisations, but was rather similar to the perspective of public officials. Parietti (2022, p.58) argues that power means the conditions that make capacity possible. When communities have more power, this can make some significant changes possible, though experts may not want them or they would be against the good of society.

However, this study does not argue that we should build a power structure inclined to the community. As discussed in Chapter 5 and Section 6.3.2 of the study, power, the condition that makes something possible, has shifted several times in the development of the ACPPP: local autonomy, heritage regulation, legislative initiative, regulatory legislation, law revision, educating citizens and changing participation patterns. Relations with stakeholders in the local community also alternated between cooperation and confrontation (see Section 5.6). It may be meaningless to fix this unstable power relationship in one particular form.

Above all, this study found that interactions between stakeholders and between individuals are more complex and multidimensional than expected. As seen in the confrontation between A and C, community members' perspectives and goals may differ in the group but coincide with those of some experts. Resident respondents were also critical of the Gongju government

but had pretty friendly relations with some government officials. This interrelationship implies the possibility that the current power structure can gradually develop in multidimensional interactions and flexibly reflect more diverse values in policies. Additionally, a rapid power shift could lead to another struggle, in which case the government might again intervene strongly. Conflicts depicted in Section 6.4 showed the desire of stakeholders to have more influence in policymaking and to be recognised as essential actors. When boundaries are drawn by someone other than "me", this can be difficult to tolerate, especially for governments.

In a multidimensional interrelation where each wants to gain the upper hand in its dynamics, we need someone who flexibly coordinates their authority and roles. This would also be important for building relationships and policy flexibility, where cooperation outweighs confrontation. Gongju officials said they were mediators in conflicts between the CHA, Gongju City and local communities (see Figure 6-10), but all residents responded that there was no mediator. A mediator can understand each group's language and help to build amicable stakeholder relationships. The capacity previously mentioned by Parietti (2022) may be the same as that which the community has in mind, but it will differ from those who criticise participation. The community capacity that policymakers define will be for their purposes, not for the community. This study found that the boundaries drawn in existing governance systems influence how community and participation are understood (see Section 6.4.1). We need to find a way to cross the boundaries easily rather than redraw them.

To conclude, the study argues that what communities demand is much related to power distribution, analysing the conflicts that local communities face. This study's findings show that stakeholders' roles and power structures can be redefined; they need to be more flexible. Exploring diverse conflicts, this chapter described community participation that was symbolically designed in heritage-led regeneration without specific discussion of setting boundaries and procedures between stakeholders to achieve decision-making power. The respondents claimed that the top-down approach made it challenging to participate in the community. They believed that was because the policy structure was designed to be driven by the state and experts. However, as described in Chapter 5, local communities have already significantly influenced changes in institutions and planning. Community members are dissatisfied, but as discussed in Section 6.3.4, engagement patterns have changed, and some community members share roles that have traditionally been the domain of experts, such as decision-making, advising and presenting ideas.

Through the case of Gongju, this chapter argues that community participation in heritage practice, which is discussed internationally, must be understood from multiple dimensions. As argued by Hølleland and Skrede (2019), it showed the collapse of the barriers between stakeholders' roles are collapsing in Gongju, agreeing with the legitimacy of community participation in heritage practice (see Seitsonen, 2017; Dian & Abdullah, 2013). On the other hand, while presenting the internal and external conflicts that arise from community participation, it highlights that we must be wary of vaguely viewing community participation as a panacea (see Cornwall, 2008; Jones, 2003) and that participation can cause further discrimination internally (see Waterton and Watson, 2010).

Stakeholders need to think deeply about their roles. This is because the local communities have already started to get deeply involved in the policy and do not seem to give up. Furthermore, they seem to have already started to share knowledge through their conflicts. Rifkin and Pridmore (2001) argue that sharing knowledge through participation is empowerment because the information is knowledge, knowledge is power, and sharing knowledge is empowerment. They have already crossed the river. As seen in the Gongju case, the conflicts are not over but have only entered the next stage.

Nevertheless, I do not give up hope. We must keep participating and talking so that we can hear things we haven't heard before. If we keep watching and talking about it, I think it will work someday. As I keep doing it, I learn more things I haven't seen before and how to deal with them.

(C, interview)

Chapter 7. Conclusion

Chapter 7. Conclusion

7.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the conclusions of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The purpose of this study is to understand community participation in heritage-led regeneration. Recent studies in South Korea argue that community participation is necessary to negotiate conflict in heritage policy or as an alternative means of heritage conservation (see Section 2.4.7). However, this study focuses on participation as a process rather than as an outcome or means. It traced the "path" to know where the conflicts that the community has faced because of the heritage-led regeneration policy came from. It asked many questions to understand the complexity of that causal process. Why have communities conflicted with governments, how did community participation occur, why were heritage-led regeneration policies planned, how was heritage policy authoritarian, and what is heritage in South Korea? These are all questions whose answers influence the main aim of the study. This series of questions developed the following three research questions and nine sub-research questions:

1) How has South Korea's heritage policy caused conflicts with local communities?
    - What are the characteristics of the concept of heritage in South Korea?
    - How has the heritage concept in South Korea been settled within historical, social and political contexts?
    - How have heritage policies been developed?

2) How did community participation occur and influence the development of heritage-led regeneration policy?
    - Why did the state establish a heritage-led regeneration policy?
    - How have the state and local communities confronted each other in policy establishment and transition processes?
    - How can we understand community participation amid national and regional conflicts?

3) How do we understand community participation in heritage-led regeneration in the case of Gongju?
    - Why has community participation become significant in Gongju?
    - How has community participation developed?
    - What issues does community participation face and why?

In this chapter, the study first discusses the findings and main themes. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 reached conclusions to the above research questions in order. It sequentially explored heritage concepts, heritage policies and heritage-led regeneration policies from the past to the present and inferred the implications of community participation in the process. Then, based on the discussion, this chapter presents the key points of the overall conclusions, contributions, limitations and future research agenda. It describes the findings and understandings of research on heritage concepts, policies and community participation, with a focus on the South Korean context, while also aiming to outline contributions to the international literature, with a focus on heritage studies discourse. It will thus discuss what academic and policy contributions the study provides. The last part of this chapter depicts the study's limitations and suggests a future research agenda.

7.2. Findings and main themes

This section provides a description of the main findings of the study in relation to the three research questions. The following pages show the key findings of the study in the three themes: heritage and conflict, conflict and community participation, and community participation and empowerment.

7.2.1 Heritage and conflict

Chapter 4 discusses the Korean heritage concept and how policy causes conflicts. Heritage systems that were established in authoritarian eras selected and used heritage to put forward specific ideologies. Heritage, which used to be described as "historic remains" or "great scenery" as people's favourite local places, was newly defined when the Japanese Government-General of Korea established a heritage policy (see Section 4.2). As discussed in Section 4.3, the value judgement of heritage has increasingly focused on the symbolism of ideology rather than a place, and heritage was defined by law as an object of state control to protect its ideological value. The practice of selecting heritage as a policy target by the state power during the colonial era was also followed in the era of military dictatorships. In authoritarian times, the state powers emphasised the value of heritage as a national symbol, not that of a local place. They constructed a legal system in which the state's control overrode individual rights. When South Korean society expressed doubts about the state's narrow definition of heritage and its use or

destruction, the state expanded the scope of legal heritage and maintained its authoritarian concept of heritage (see Section 4.3.4). Furthermore, to efficiently manage the increased number of heritages, the heritage rating system of the colonial era was also developed to be more complex and stratified (see Section 4.4.4). The study argues that the heritage elaborated by the state is divisive and that the state has built policy systems that lead to conflict with local communities.

Heritage is divisive in South Korea. The expression "divisive" here has multiple meanings. The first refers to layered heritage concepts and policies. While expanding the heritage category, the Korean government has maintained and developed its traditional heritage strategy by stratifying heritage rather than transforming the authoritarian heritage concept into an inclusive one. Representative terms that refer to heritage in Korean are "cultural property" (문화재) and "cultural heritage" (문화유산). Cultural property is heritage recognised by the state, while cultural heritage refers to historical assets in a broader sense (see Section 4.2). Institutionally, cultural properties are assets managed by national laws, and cultural heritages are assets managed by local ordinances.

The state has defined cultural property as heritage under its direct control and cultural heritage as a sub-concept that is less useful to the state and has a lower preservation value. Moreover, the state has selected pieces of heritage and rated each one. There is a total of 17 classes of South Korean heritage, each with six categories (see Table 4-1). Even as late as 2021, a number was given to the heritages within that category. Although many researchers argue that heritage is an abstract concept (see Harrison, 2013; Harvey, 2008; Smith, 2006; Graham, 2002), the Korean government continues to expand the types of heritage while maintaining its traditional concept (see Section 4.4.4).

The second meaning is the fomentation of conflict. In South Korea, the heritage category has broadened downwards, but the value of heritage has moved upwards (see Section 4.4.4). In other words, more and more places are designated or registered as heritage, although the law does not allow local communities to evaluate the value of heritage on their terms.

Heritage does not only embody official national memory. We can refer to one physical space as an asset, place or heritage. The difference may depend on what value we find in that space. It may be an ideological value, but it may also be an economic, social, historical or aesthetic one. Because the relationship between community and place is reciprocal (Ashworth,

Graham & Tunbridge, 2007, p.54), heritage can be as special to a local community as it is to a national community.

It is not surprising that conflicts arise when the heritage concept and policies that exclude the memories and values of the local community extend to its everyday space. The regulation of Historical and Cultural Environment Preservation Areas (HCEPAs), institutionalised in 2000 and formalised in 2010, has caused resistance in historic cities. HCEPA regulations are for spaces up to 500m from designated cultural properties. These are regulations for everyday spaces, not designated heritages (see Section 4.4.4). This regulation covers the whole area of a city centre in some cities (see Figures 4-12 and 4-13).

The reason such unequal heritage practice is possible is that inequality is legal (see Section 4.4.4). South Korea's Cultural Heritage Protection Act grants the state complete authority over the definition, value judgement, use and control of heritage. That Act, established and developed during the military dictatorship, emphasises the state's rights to heritage. The state has various options to purchase, use or regulate heritage, but owners or users cannot claim corresponding rights against the state. The state formalised this imbalance of power and rights.

Finally, heritage policy has formed a divisive decision structure. As the state delegated the decision-making authority on heritage to the Cultural Heritage Committee, an advisory body, the conflict between the state and the local community was replaced by an internal conflict between the citizen and their representative organisation. In 1997, the CHA established rigorous heritage protection standards, taking "protection of the original state (or original form)" as the principle of heritage policy. At the same time, the Cultural Heritage Committee, a private advisory body, has fixed its role as a decision-making agent for the CHA. In 1962, the first Cultural Heritage Committee consisted of 17 members but has now grown to an enormous decision-making group of 300 members (see Table 4-3). Although the logical basis for the original state principle is weak (Lee Su-Jeong, 2016), that strict principle has granted regulatory authority to a particular expert group appointed by the state. The Cultural Heritage Committee has powerful authority to determine the "original state" of heritage that no one else can be sure of.

The Cultural Heritage Committee is a civil representative organisation. However, technically, it represents the state. The state controls it based on laws. Its original purpose is to advise on the decisions of the CHA, but its duty, prescribed by Presidential Decree, is the review of heritage activities. Most national heritage decisions are based on the results of deliberation

246

by the Cultural Heritage Committee. However, the authority to appoint the committee members rests with the administrator of the CHA, and its resistance to state power, which was attempted once, was unsuccessful (see Section 4.4.4). Moreover, their deliberation is stipulated by law to follow the review standards provided by the CHA.

The differential valuation of heritage is also a strategy to transfer the state's responsibility for heritage management to regions and individuals in a hierarchical manner. A hierarchical heritage designation and protection system provides a list of priorities for the state to manage. Moreover, this list has been useful for highlighting specific contexts in South Korean society. However, even if the person in charge of management is different, this does not mean that the authority for determining and using heritage is transferred to regions and individuals. The state delegated the decision-making authority to the Cultural Heritage Committee while strengthening the deliberation system. With the delegation of authority, the state and civil society share power and duties outwardly. However, as the state controls the Cultural Heritage Committee, the state and civil society maintain an unequal relationship. Responsibility is decentralised, but control of heritage remains centralised.

Civil society has to face the agent of the state while disguised as its representative. At the local level, communities are forced to accept control of their everyday space and regard the committee's decisions as representing the public interest. The state has created a divisive form of heritage in South Korea.

7.2.2. Conflict and community participation

The conflict between the state and local communities emerged significantly in historic cities as the public perspective on power changed. The study argues that the anachronistic "divisive" heritage policy caused that conflict. Ironically, the transition to democracy and local autonomy and the national heritage policy system's development occurred in the same period (see Section 4.4.4). The national heritage policy was built on nationalism, and the local autonomy policy was based on localism. The two policies, which implied opposing notions of power, provoked conflict. Local communities and the state responded in familiar ways, with resistance and regulation, respectively (see Section 5.4).

The period in which the current complex heritage policy system was completed was when political democracy in South Korean society was developing. At this time, criticism was raised

of the transcendent power of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act (Park Jung-Hee, 2008). It was contradictory for the government to regard individual rights against authoritarian laws as selfish greed while establishing policies of decentralisation and local autonomy (see Section 5.4). This contradiction has manifested in conflicts over areas where heritage is concentrated in city centres. Even in the era of local autonomy, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act exceptionally restricted the local government's urban planning authority and residents' property rights in historic cities.

The first action of local communities to the conflict was the legislation of a new law through local political power (see Section 5.5.1). In Gyeongju, local communities sought to regain their rights through legal action and to be compensated for past restrictions. In 1997, when the principle of "preservation of the original state" was established, Gyeongju city lawmakers introduced a bill to the National Assembly for the first time to guarantee the rights of residents in Gyeongju city centre, where heritages are concentrated. The bill was passed in the National Assembly in 2004 after three further attempts. However, the SAPAC was enacted after all rights and supports of residents were removed from the bill due to the government's objections (see Section 5.5.1).

The Gyeongju community had to unite with other local communities to ensure the Act was passed, and it took seven years to enact the law. However, revising the law to guarantee rights and resident support took another seven years. Although it took 14 years for the law to recognise residents' demands, legislation strengthening state control over the area around the designated heritages was passed quickly. After establishing the heritage "original state" protection principle (see Section 4.4.4), it took three years for the government to revise the HCEPA-related Cultural Heritage Protection Act. The SAPAC, the first law, passed in 2004, was also transformed into a regulatory law due to government intervention. It took only one year to change the Act on residents' rights into regulatory law. The SAPAC was amended as the SAPPAC in 2011 when the state and local communities reached an agreement after fierce resistance from local communities (see Section 5.5.2).

Community participation at this time can be expressed as resistance to the regulation of private property rights. The local communities did not claim the right to decide on designated heritage, but the right to personal property in the HCEPAs. They organised civic groups, rallied local forces, demonstrated in their areas and parliaments, and complained to local governments and politicians. Plans and legal processes were modified by collective action by local

communities, such as boycotts and demonstrations (see Sections 5.5.2 and 5.6). Governments and planning agencies changed plans, improved procedures and developed community participation programmes, assuming that the law would be amended. The procedure was changed to designate districts after the establishment of the plan, the initial district designation areas were drastically reduced to around 10% of the original area and a heritage-led regeneration plan was presented as a pivotal strategy for the master plan.

The local communities resisted fiercely from the early 2000s until the SAPAC was amended in 2011. As the state refused their requests, they even called for a repeal of the SAPAC. The SAPAC, which took legal effect only after district designation following residents' consent, had not functioned for seven years. Recognising that the CHA's status was not very high in the state power structure, local communities took the CHA officials and planners to the National Assembly building to protest against members of the National Assembly. The CHA and the planning agency watched as lawmakers promised to amend the law in front of 200 residents (see Section 5.5.2).

The outcome of the resistance by communities did not mean their complete victory. In their urban space, a new procedure for the Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion deliberations was established (see Section 5.3). Heritage experts and authorities have also succeeded in establishing a conservation plan that overrides the urban master plan. Since the SAPPAC is a Special Act, the plans of the SAPPAC take precedence over all other plans. The state and heritage experts who were concerned that local autonomy would lead to loss of control over designated heritages and surrounding areas have maintained control as a result. In addition, the state has developed a new planning system to preserve historic cities and has successfully listed World Heritage sites in these areas. Experts still take a leading role in heritage decisions, and the scope of their activity has expanded by including many excavations and education and research projects within the ACPPP. Moreover, as mentioned in Section 6.4.1, local communities still pose problems to governments regarding ACPPP implementation methods.

However, local communities in four historic cities were also guaranteed community participation programmes, regeneration support projects and the right of landlords to demand that the state buy their properties in the Heritage Protection Areas (see Section 5.7.2). These are exceptional in South Korea's heritage regulation system. Above all, this is a significant change related to heritage policy in that the government invests in the regions, and does not only regulate.

The local community is also guaranteed benefits from direct financial support, such as the Ancient City Image Recovery project. The ACPPP impacts two designated districts: Special Preservation Districts (SPDs) with designated heritage sites and Preservation and Promotion Districts (PPDs) around SPDs. In PPDs, the ACPPP provides community participation and resident support programmes, but buildings higher than two stories are not allowed. The Cultural Heritage Protection Act regulations are strictly applied in SPDs, and community participation is practically impossible. However, the property owner is guaranteed the right to demand its purchase by the state. Although the intensity of regulation has been somewhat strengthened, local communities have been guaranteed more rights than before.

7.2.3. Community participation and empowerment

This section argues that community engagement ultimately means empowerment and that establishing a new dynamic is required for heritage-led regeneration. As explained in the previous section, the ACPPP has focused on economic support and the "right to sell". However, there was still no consensus about the distribution of power. Community participation in heritage-led regeneration has become crucial for different purposes of governments and local communities: securing budgets, policy formulation, stable policy implementation and residents' rights (see Sections 6.3 and 6.4). Different orientations can lead to conflict. However, that alone is not enough to explain the increasingly complex conflicts. The study observed a desire in the local community for redistribution of authority and a reset of roles beyond the orientation problem in the Gongju case study. Community participation may mean the beginning of other struggles, not necessarily the resolution of conflicts. Community members demand more interventions that may threaten the traditional roles of experts and governments (see Section 6.4.1). They also want to have more influence on the ACPPP and within their organisation than others (see Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3).

Despite revisions to the SAPPAC, implementation of heritage-led regeneration and increased participation opportunities, conflicts have remained (see Section 6.4). Section 6.3.2 explained that after collective community resistance was over, local governments actively embraced heritage-led regeneration projects and community involvement out of policy necessity. After the implementation of the ACPPP, the local community in Gongju secured more channels of communication and engagement with the government. In addition to attending public hearings, they were engaging in higher-level participation activities such as participating

in educational programmes, joining civil organisations, attending meetings and conducting government collaboration programmes (see Table 6-4). Despite this, the Gongju community still strongly criticises the government for its ways of implementing the ACPPP, uses of the budget and the governance structure (see Section 6.4.1).

Governments, experts and local communities differed in their understanding of the political act of participation. The community participation process was planned by experts at the end of the 2000s when participation was active as resistance (see Section 6.3.3). Policymakers, government and experts wanted the local community to understand their national policy and help to implement it. The educational programmes and the establishment and support of the Gongju Ancient City Promotion and World Heritage Management Resident Committee (GPWRC) were their main strategies to facilitate community participation. However, the focal concern of the local community was the distribution of authority or power over the spaces of their daily lives (see Section 6.4). Residents believed "real participation" required greater decision-making power and practical opportunities to be involved in practical projects.

The controversy on community capacity that emerged during the investigation demonstrates this (see Section 6.4.1). Residents criticised the fact that governments did not reflect their opinions in policymaking and used participation as a formality. Public officials and experts agreed on the formality issue, with experts highlighting deficiencies in policies and institutions. However, public officials and a planner in charge of the ACPPP questioned the effectiveness and representation of participation. Five out of seven officials and experts cited a lack of community capacity as the top reason for the participation problem. They gave specific reasons such as age, level of knowledge, willingness and pursuit of personal profits.

Except for one expert, most government officials and experts believed that community participation was encouraged for policy needs, although the specific reasons differed (see Table 6-3). However, for policymakers, community participation is a process that is included in policy realisation, and they expect the role of the community to be an assistant, monitor or free labour in areas beyond the control of the state (see Section 6.4.1). They pointed out top-down planning and project implementation as obstacles to community participation, but took policymaking and decision-making in their roles for granted.

On the other hand, all resident respondents believed that participation was their natural right because they were the "masters" (주인) of Gongju city (see Table 6-3). Contrary to

policymakers' claims, some residents pointed out the policy's limitations beyond understanding the policy (see Section 6.4.1). A common criticism of the government by residents was that they were "not giving us a chance".

The ACPPP provides some means of community participation but does not provide specific guidelines for decision-making authority. However, participation has already stimulated the local community's desire for decision-making and redistribution of power. The intense confrontation between the state and the communities wound down, but conflicts are emerging in more diverse forms. Conflicts within communities reveal that different individuals and groups demand more power and new dynamics (see Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3).

The boundaries between stakeholders keep moving and seem to be crumbling. Government officials and some experts have argued that participation is limited because residents do not have the ability to make policy decisions or plans. However, as described in Section 6.3.4, community members are already involved in policymaking, planning and even deliberations. One resident respondent is also considering setting up a corporation for community-led small business operations. Barriers to entry for roles that traditionally excluded local communities, such as expert planning, value judgement and execution of government projects, appear to be lower than before. Above all, the local community is recognising its potential.

Community participation is still limited to PPDs. Communities are still not allowed to participate in the decision-making process about designated heritages. However, the investigation in Gongju suggests that community participation can pose a significant challenge even to the authoritarian heritage system in South Korea. Governments and experts know that participation guarantees the rights of local communities, but they need to be made aware that those rights can refer to power.

7.3. Key points of the overall conclusion

This section describes the key points of the overall conclusions of this study based on the above discussion. It merges the findings of all previous chapters: literature review, policy analysis, case study and discussion of research questions. The following four key points of the overall conclusions show how the findings in the process of answering the research questions connect.

(1) Heritage policy as a heritage of colonial rule: The state power's monopoly on heritage

(2) Distorted inclusive heritage concept: Divisive heritage

(3) Expansion of heritage regulation: Resistance by local communities

(4) Gap in perspectives on community participation: Community empowerment

Through these, the study explains how the heritage policy, which was introduced and developed by the state in an authoritarian political environment, was changed by the state and civil society in the democratic era. Sections (1) and (2) describe how heritage authorities and heritage expert groups have elaborated heritage policies to maintain a centralised authority. Section (3) describes the community's response to the state officially extending the authoritarian heritage norms to urban spaces. Finally, section (4) highlights that a power imbalance is the critical point of the debate, describing the gap in perspectives on community engagement between policy planners and local communities.

7.3.1. Heritage policy as a heritage of colonial rule: The state power's monopoly on heritage

Adopting Ashworth's (2011, p.13) argument, the South Korean heritage paradigm remains at the first stage, "preservation". In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this study, two terms, "protection" and "preservation", were used as terms relating to South Korea's heritage policy. This is both because of their formal use in laws and policy reports and because the heritage policies focus practically on keeping the values of the past (see Section 4.4.4). However, until at least 20 years ago, it would be correct to say that Korea's heritage paradigm was a "national heritage monopoly". In South Korea, among the 5,097 nationally designated heritages in 2021, 1,375 are legally owned by the state (CHA, 2022c, p.9). However, if ownership is a concept that includes usage rights, this number may increase considerably. The practice of the state monopolising heritage activities during the Japanese colonial period (Jung Soo-Jin, 2007) continues to this day (Park Jeong-Hee, 2008).

As discussed in Chapter 4, Korean society has a memory of modern history that it wants to erase: Japanese colonial rule. Most modern heritages were created in the colonial era and were not included in nationally designated heritage until 2000. After the "difficult heritage debate" (see Section 4.3.4), colonial heritages have been defined as a sub-concept of designated heritage in the Cultural Heritage Protection Act (March 2001). Although colonial buildings were

excluded from being termed as Korean heritage, South Korea has inherited and developed the method of approaching heritage from the Japanese colonial era. State powers mobilised heritage to symbolise ideologies and structured it in its authoritarian and oppressive form in the name of nationalism, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Since the 1960s, South Korea has experienced surprisingly rapid growth as a modern nation. However, until the mid-1990s, South Korea could not escape the shadow of military dictatorships. The military regimes imitated the heritage strategies and institutions of Japanese colonial rule. Despite significant changes (democracy and globalisation) in the country since the 1990s, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act framework adopted under the authoritarian regime and the fixed definition of heritage are still maintained today, 60 years later.

As discussed in Section 4.3, state powers have represented in heritage the ideologies they wished to instil in South Korean society. State powers mobilised heritage through protection, destruction, restoration and reconstruction to define the identity of South Korean society (see Section 4.4). The monopoly on the use of national heritage, which was taken for granted under colonial rule and the military dictatorships throughout the 20th century, faced resistance from civil society as South Korea transformed into a democratic society in the 1990s. Arbitrary destruction of heritage by the state has shaped critical public opinion and led to the difficult heritage debate (see Section 4.4.4).

After the controversy over destroying the Japanese Government-General of Korea building (Figure 4-7) in 1995, the state power faced a crisis in heritage policy. The decision to dismantle the building, which was the first National Assembly building in Korea and the National Museum of Korea, as well as a symbol of Japanese colonial rule, caused great social controversy (see Section 4.3.4). The first de facto democratic government calling for "historical punishment" faced resistance from many citizens, including those involved in archaeology and architecture.

Although there was criticism of the arbitrary use of heritage by the state power, from the late 1990s the state emphasised protection and strictly restricted the physical transformation of heritage. The Cultural Heritage Protection Act gained greater control by establishing the principle of the "preservation of the original state" declared in the Charter of Cultural Heritage 1997 (as discussed in Section 4.4.4). The "original state", which is ambiguous and has no logical basis (Lee Su-Jeong, 2016, p.101), provided the legal basis for the Cultural Heritage Committee to decide to prohibit the use of heritage by anyone other than the state.

Since it is practically impossible to return heritage to its past form at a particular time, this principle may be a declaration that users must keep the current physical form of heritage intact. However, the Cultural Heritage Committee reserves the right to set the time and form. Thus, the "original state principle" may not apply equally to the state and civil society. The state's exclusive heritage practice, the colonial political heritage, has continued for over 100 years.

7.3.2. Distorted inclusive heritage concept: Divisive heritage

As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the "discontinuity", segmenting time (history), is used to select narratives from heritage. The selection of heritage and the principle of the "original state" of heritage, which emphasise a specific period (see Chapter 4), show that Korean heritage has been similarly conceptualised. However, there is something more to Korean heritage policy. The study criticises the South Korean government for developing this "discontinuity" into "discrimination". Despite the principle of the "preservation of the original state", unlike individuals, who are strictly regulated by the state, the state has restored heritages that symbolise the glory of the Joseon dynasty, such as Gyeongbokgung Palace, and heritage that has a particular symbolism as National Treasure No. 1, such as Sungnyemun Gate (Chapter 4).

Moreover, the state has evolved selective heritage methods into a heritage pyramid. Heritage in South Korea is divided into several grades according to the value given to it by the state, which has become more complex in the 21st century (see Table 4-1). The more things are defined as heritage, the more complex the heritage hierarchy becomes. This includes the areas surrounding heritage, Historical and Cultural Environment Preservation Areas (HCEPAs), which were also included as a sub-concept of heritage. Although heritages are classified differently (see Figure 4-14), the regulatory powers of the heritage authority influence all heritages (see Section 5.8). Only the subject responsible for managing the heritage varies. A lower-level administrative agency is responsible for the protection of lower-grade heritage.

The study highlighted in Chapter 4 that the state not only chooses heritage and the specific narratives of that heritage, but also chooses the people who will exercise authority over heritage. Also, in that choice, the state's intention to retain power is disguised (see Section 4.4.4). Why does the Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA), one of the smallest government agencies, need a large-scale advisory body consisting of 300 members, as shown in Table 4-3? The Cultural Heritage Committee, a non-governmental advisory body of heritage experts, is a de

facto proxy for the CHA. This study argues that the committee is an organisation pretending to be a citizen advisory group. The CHA needs the group to maintain the authoritarian heritage protection principle in the expanded heritage regulations and to impute responsibility for heritage decisions. The committee does not provide reports or policy recommendations. As mentioned in Sections 4.4.4 and 5.4, its main task is deliberation that targets the people (users). The Cultural Heritage Protection Act, which stipulates these controls, formalises the unequal power structure of the state and individuals. Criticising the stratified heritage idea that results in conflicts with the local community, and considering it hypocritical and unfair, this study called it "divisive heritage".

7.3.3. Expansion of *heritage* regulation: Resistance of local communities

In the 1990s, South Korea faced significant political changes. Democracy and the local autonomy system gave citizens the right to select a city mayor and members of a city council. The CHA and heritage experts were concerned that local governments' acquisition of urban planning authority would promote urban development and thus damage the historical landscape (CHA, 2012). In 2000, seven years after local autonomy was implemented, heritage authorities and experts designated the areas surrounding designated heritages as HCEPAs and applied heritage regulations to them (see Section 5.4). The strong veto of the CHA was useful in controlling urban spaces around designated heritages (see Chapter 4).

Accordingly, in the early 21st century, demands for compensation for the infringement of property rights in accordance with regulations and implementation of resident support projects were strongly raised in some historic cities (Section 5.4). Chapter 5 emphasised that the heritage-led regeneration of the Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion Project (ACPPP), which the CHA argued was a new heritage policy paradigm, resulted from local communities' resistance. The establishment and revision process of the Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities (SAPPAC), which is the basis of the ACPPP, supported this (see Section 5.5). The establishment and development of the ACPPP can be summarised as a confrontation between heritage authorities and heritage professional groups who wished to maintain central control over the urban spaces of the historic cities by use of the HCEPA regulations, and local communities (see Section 5.4). As a result, local communities and individuals acquired a right to demand that the state should purchase their regulated assets, a

national subsidy to repair or build their homes when considering the traditional landscape, and a right to participate in the ACPPP policy (discussed in Chapter 5).

On the other hand, the heritage authority, through a new law (the SAPPAC), also achieved its original purpose to expand heritage regulation in urban spaces. The SAPPAC ensures that the ACPPP plans will take precedence over the city Master Plan. Also, all the Special Preservation Districts (SPDs), which are densely concentrated close to the state-designated heritages, are governed by the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. The CHA and heritage experts were able to secure decision-making power over urban space and a wider area controlled by this Act.

However, it is significant that local communities' resistance has not only changed laws, procedures and content of plans (see Section 5.6.2), but also has placed constraints on the unilateral decision-making process of heritage policy. As mentioned in Section 6.3.4, local communities are no longer playing the role of a rubber stamp to agree to the government's plan, but are intervening in policy in various ways, such as forming private organisations, participating in the decision-making process and directly implementing projects.

7.3.4. Gap in perspectives on community participation: Community empowerment

As reviewed in Section 2.3.1, the value of heritage imposed by society can change over time and space, and methods of conservation have evolved accordingly. In South Korea, the ACPPP is a conservation method that has evolved in rapid changes in political contexts (see Chapter 5). While the ACPPP stakeholders did not demonstrate vast differences in their views on heritage and preservation, defining their relationship as fully cooperative may be difficult. In the field survey, residents answered that "of course" heritage should be preserved (A, B, C & D, interviews). Government officials also criticised the aforementioned "preservation of the original state" (F, G & H, interviews). Nonetheless, the study found that various conflicts still exist in the ongoing ACPPP process, with residents and officials strongly criticising each other (see Chapter 6).

As seen in Section 2.4.4, community participation is related to the transfer of power. The ACPPP was planned after the democratisation and decentralisation of South Korean society in the 1990s. The process of establishing the ACPPP, which began with community resistance and eventually led to systemic change (see Chapter 5), can be seen as an example of power structure

conflict, emphasised by Arnstein (1969), and community-led systemic change, asserted by Pretty (1995). The study also argues that these power struggles and political desires lie behind much of the rhetoric given to community participation in heritage-led regeneration.

The "responsibility to preserve national or global heritage" blurs the power embedded in heritage. As noted in Chapter 6, governments and professional groups tend to view community engagement as a means to achieve their policy goals. In the early days of the ACPPP, their goal was to alleviate severe conflicts with local communities (CHA, 2012, p.309). The community participation process in heritage-led regeneration, proposed by policymakers to resolve conflicts, was able to alleviate aggressive collective actions of communities for a time (see Chapter 5).

Therefore, subsequent community participation may not have been an important issue to governments and professional groups. In particular, officials (G & H) and experts (K) who led the Gongju ACPPP at the time of the field survey were critical of community participation. Given the policy environment where planning objectives must be met quickly, they viewed community engagement as an inefficient and mandatory process (see Section 6.4.1). In the interviews, they pointed to a lack of capacity in the local community as a limit to community participation. The problems of local communities that they raised most often included a lack of understanding of policies, pursuit of personal interests, lack of representation and old age.

Interestingly, community members also regarded officials and professionals as incompetents who failed to represent their interests (see Section 6.4.1). Residents believed participation was one of their rights as masters of their city. They critiqued the lack of knowledge of some officials due to frequent job changes, and experts participating to pursue their personal agendas rather than on behalf of the community. The Gongju community was dissatisfied with the government and experts, who were supposed to work for them, monopolising budget and decision-making power and ignoring their opinions.

Even the CHA, the higher-level body in the policy enforcement structure, views local governments similarly. In the interview, a CHA official argued that the capacity of local governments had a great influence on the performance of the ACPPP, criticising a particular local government.

Some scholars argue that the right to participate does not equal the ability to participate and question the capacity of the community to participate effectively (Aas, Ladkin & Fletcher,

2005; Jamal & Getz, 1999). The study does not deny that community capacity is important for policy outcomes. Community capacity is seen as important for "collaboration" in heritage conservation (Mu & Aimar, 2022) as well as tourism (Idris, Purnomo & Rahmawati, 2021) and sustainable development (Franco & Tracey, 2019). However, the study suggests that all stakeholders tend to underestimate the other parties for their own purposes. Stakeholders commonly regarded themselves as the ones who should take the lead and that other stakeholders were "helpers". The study argues that "power", strongly embedded in heritage concepts and policies (see Chapter 4), has led to a confrontation between local communities and expert groups in the transition to a democratic era (see Chapter 5) and is still at the heart of the debate at the local level (see Chapter 6).

In the case of heritage-led regeneration in Gongju, community engagement demonstrates confrontation and the interaction of power structures related to spaces, including heritage and its surrounding assets. In the face of the national rhetoric of heritage and preservation, community participation has been used as a positive expression for cooperation and the relief of tension (CHA, 2012), but as discussed in Chapter 2, we should acknowledge that community engagement is a process of struggle for empowerment.

The various conflicts that the Gongju community faces demonstrate the desire of community members to have more decision-making authority and to steer the ACPPP in the direction they want (see Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3). The study found that communities that had achieved establishment of heritage-led regeneration policy are now demanding new policy governance structures.

As community participation develops, the current policy framework for heritage-led regeneration will be further challenged, and professionals and governments may be asked to assume new roles. Local community members strongly criticise the top-down policy structure that the governments and heritage experts designed (all resident respondents, interviews) and believe professionals and officials are less expert than themselves (A & C, interviews). Officials and planners in charge of the ACPPP are interested in how community involvement affects project outcomes (G, H & K, interviews). However, residents are more concerned with hegemony and conflict between the officials, experts, other organisations and other resident groups (see Section 6.4). Resident interviewees A and C strongly critiqued the Ancient City Image Recovery Project, which experts and officials regard as the most outstanding achievement of the ACPPP. Though the governments were the main subjects of their criticism,

the residents also argued that the project was geared towards other residents' interests (see Section 6.4.3). Moreover, residents A, B and C claimed that they needed someone to listen to them and mediate their conflicts. All residents were very dissatisfied with the government's unilateral notification of policy decisions to them and felt it was unfair to be assigned a marginal role in a bureaucratic system (see Section 6.4.1).

7.4. Academic contributions of the study

This section further highlights the findings that the research contributes academically. By presenting in-depth research on Korean heritage concepts and institutions, including policies and mechanisms that have received less attention in the international literature, this study contributes to academic discussions related to heritage discourse, heritage policy, heritage-based regeneration strategies, and community participation in heritage policy at both domestic and global levels.

7.4.1. Contribution to heritage discourse

This study aimed to comprehensively understand heritage ideas and policies and conflicts between local communities and the state in heritage-led regeneration policy. It helps expand wider international heritage debates by adding another less well-known case to international literature. It comprehensively describes the process of conceptualising heritage through policy and interprets South Korean heritage from a critical point of view, significantly developing a critical understanding of heritage management in South Korea in the process. The results of the study provide new understanding of the Korean context and empirical data related to various global heritage discourses.

This study supports claims that heritage is created as a political or social process (see Swenson, 2013a; Mcdowell, 2008; Smith, 2006; Lowenthal, 1985) and selectively used and represented (see Harrison, 2012; Harvey, 2008; Graham, 2002; Lowenthal, 1998), providing specific examples of how heritage has been selectively used to build nations or change political systems. In Korea, which experienced a great deal of change throughout the 20th century, the development of heritage concepts and policies dramatically revealed the features of heritage ideas. Amid colonial rule, civil war, Cold War, dictatorship, democratisation and unprecedented rapid growth, heritage represented Korea's long history in various ways and was mobilised in

support of the ideologies of state power (see Chapter 4). In particular, the study focused on how changes in the state's political ideologies affect heritage policies and heritage practices. Presenting various examples, it showed how the state power groups have selected heritages and sorted out values from them. It explained why specific national values, such as assimilationism, anti-communism and anti-Japanese nationalism, have been emphasised in heritage and why other values, such as Korean traditional values during the colonial era and pre-modern or colonial values after liberation, have been neglected (see Section 4.3.). This study illustrated how these complex political and social contexts are tied to heritage and how the heritage concept has been used and evolved, especially in an era of political instability. Furthermore, it also described how South Korea's heritage policies and systems have reflected this heritage idea.

On the other hand, this study presents a new perspective on the recently increasing discourse on difficult heritage. Recently, research related to difficult heritage or colonial heritage has been increasing. Many of them discuss the avoidance of difficult heritage and its use in the postcolonial era (see Wei & Wang, 2022; Lee Hyun-Kyung, 2018; Mawere & Mubaya, 2016; Logan & Reeves, 2009; Graham & Howard, 2008; Mcdowell, 2008). By examining the case of difficult heritage (colonial heritage) as well as the development of heritage policy based on colonial-era laws, this study provides specific discussions on the purpose and process by which state power symbolises, destroys, or reproduces heritage in a specific political context. Symbolisation and destruction of heritage buildings have often been observed around the world (see Fibiger, 2015; Silverman, 2010; Billig, 1995). However, the study highlights that the symbolisation and destruction of heritage can be attributable to both the social context of a specific period and the heritage institutions. The study showed that the state's heritage practices, which have repeatedly destroyed and restored heritages over nearly 100 years, such as the cases of Gyeongbokgung Palace and the Japanese Government-General of Korea, are due to the heritage system combined with specific social contexts. In South Korean academia, criticism of the use of heritage tends to be limited mainly to the period of Japanese colonial rule and the military dictatorships, and criticism of the current heritage system is limited to legal contradictions and inefficient policy achievements of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act (see Kim Won, 2013; Choi Kwang-Seung, 2012; Park Jeong-Hee, 2008; Jeong Jae-Hoon, 2008; Kim Ji-sun, 2008; Oh Se-Tak, 1997a). Lee Hyun-Kyung's work (2019) on South Korea's difficult heritage and nation-building shows a perspective that is similar this study. Unlike her research, this study dealt with difficult heritage within a more comprehensive

concept of heritage, and focused on how it influenced the development of heritage policy by examining the use and destruction of the Joseon Government-General building as one part of Gyeongbokgung Palace heritage practice. The study revealed that heritage policy from the Japanese colonial period has been exquisitely developed to the present day, giving the state power to symbolise or destroy heritage.

Finally, this study proposes what we should consider further in the heritage discourse that may be discussed differently in other parts of the world. As seen in Section 2.2.2, recent heritage studies emphasise heritage as an inclusive concept rather than seeing it as something material and fixed. Nevertheless, the case of South Korea presented in this study shows that these discussions may be distorted or modified at the policy establishment and implementation stages (see Section 4.4.4 and Chapter 5.). This study focused more on the political value of heritage than its economic and social values. It raises the question: whose interests should be considered for the purpose of conserving heritage?

7.4.2. Embedded power structures and community participation in heritage

This study supports global academic efforts to understand the relevance, nuance and impact of community engagement in heritage through case studies. As reviewed in, many scholars criticise the ways of defining heritage, heritage as a norm emphasising a universal value, and specific groups' mobilising heritage (see Smith, 2006; Harrison, 2011; Robertson, 2008; Pendlebury, 2008; Schramm, 2015; Silberman, 2014; Lowenthal, 1985). This study champions their arguments by showing how a power structure has been embedded in heritage practice.

In Chapter 4, several cases show that the powers of the state were unilaterally exercised through heritage during the 20th century. In South Korea, the transition to a democratic system at the end of the century required a broader heritage concept (see Section 4.4.4). However, as more types of heritage have been officially incorporated in stratified and separate forms, this has led to a far-reaching extension of the influence of the CHA and the Cultural Heritage Committee. Chapter 5 of this study presents the conflict between local communities and the heritage expert group, both of which have grown since 2000.

Furthermore, this study goes beyond discussing the benefits and problems of community participation and proposes a new way of thinking about how governance should change on heritage policy in the future. Views on community engagement in academia vary. ICOMOS

encourages community engagement as a complementary approach to heritage preservation (Rosetti et al., 2022). Participation is also often viewed as a process to reduce the cost of conflict (Yuksel, Bramwell & Yuksel, 1999) and to provide a more equitable relationship (Hall, 1999). On the other hand, Pretty (1995, p.1251) argues that participation can be used "to justify the extension of control of the state" and to drag people "into partaking in operations of no interest to them". Cornwall (2008, p.281) also argues that community participation has often been used for political purposes, demonstrating that "participation is in itself no panacea". Waterton and Watson (2010) are concerned that participation in heritage practice can lead to other inequalities. Moreover, some examples show that some communities are not interested in conservation goals (see the Grainger Town case, Pendlebury, 2002), and no one can be sure of the consequences of participation (see Jones, 2003). However, this study does not judge whether the outcome of participation is good or bad. In a democratic society, community participation should be unavoidable. However, the study seeks to emphasise how community participation in heritage policy is a right acquired through a difficult process and what issues need to be considered in the future.

This study tried to see what such various discussions in the global academia point to through the case of South Korea. Community participation in heritage-led regeneration was planned as a means of meditating the problems caused by preservation regulations and resolving conflicts with local communities (CHA, 2012). However, the policy was initiated by the political actions of local communities (see Section 5.5.1), and such communities think differently about participation (Section 6.3.1) and projects (Section 6.4). While policymakers designed community participation processes, participation was a result of long-term community resistance (see Chapter 5). While heritage concepts and policies are still authoritarian to some extent (see Chapter 4), power over heritage has increasingly moved to the local communities (see Chapter 6). While the intense conflict between local communities and policymakers has blown over (see Chapter 5), local communities are facing more diverse conflicts (see Chapter 6).

Chapter 6 of this study showed that local communities are demanding changes in policy governance, rather than simply giving opinions or taking charge of sub-scale project operations as policymakers expected. In addition, communities are already encroaching on areas previously considered to be exclusively for experts, such as deliberation (see Section 6.3.4). In interviews, government officials noted the gradual decline of public authority after implementing the ACPPP. Some experts and officials have expressed increasing difficulty in

obtaining community consent for planning. Residents were very dissatisfied with their lack of influence on policy. Governments and experts tend to retain the division of current roles, but local communities want a new power structure. Hølleland and Skrede (2019) argue that the barriers between stakeholders' roles seem to be gradually breaking down in heritage practice. This study supports their argument by showing how stakeholders sense the change in the power structure (see Chapter 6).

7.5. Contributions to policy

This section discusses how the research may contribute to heritage policy. The study points out the problems of the heritage system and policy and questions the logic of heritage policy as it is currently formulated. It discussed issues to be considered in community participation strategies from cases of the Korean heritage system.

7.5.1. Reflection on heritage policy

The results of the study criticise that the authoritarian nature of heritage norms has not disappeared in even a democratic era but rather has been legislated and made policy through more sophisticated and complex processes. It explains how the expansion of the field of heritage norms, the hierarchisation of heritage, and the strengthening of heritage decision-making powers have been reinforced in heritage institutions and policies. In addition, the study describes how the strengthening of heritage norms and the development of heritage policies based on them during the transition to a democratic society caused conflicts and interactions between the central government and the local community. By highlighting the process and the conflicts with the community in the 21st century, it can be observed that the paradigm shift from protection to conservation and heritage suggested by Ashworth (2011) is progressing at the macro level, but in an irregular direction at the micro level. Although local participation is increasing, it is observed that 'heritage' and 'participation' are still separated in heritage practices in South Korea cases.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the Cultural Heritage Protection Act has graded heritage and created an unequal structure, mainly guaranteeing the state's right to use heritage. Over the past 60 years, heritage preservation policy has steadily developed, but it has not changed much in its core concepts and philosophies. In the 21st century, the Act has refined these structures even

more: 1) heritage has become more broadly stratified, and 2) the deliberation of the Cultural Heritage Committee, a huge non-governmental organisation, transforms all heritage decisions from the state into a social agreement (see Chapter 4). These approaches are also adopted in the ACPPP. There is a line between state-designated heritage areas and local heritage areas, with different deliberative bodies responsible for each (see [Section 5.3](#)). The decision-making powers of these bodies are noticeably stratified. A state-formed deliberation committee may address all issues of the ACPPP and overturn any decision of the other deliberation committees, including the local community (SAPPAC, Article 5).

Moreover, as various power imbalances and conflicts are gradually expanding, this research emphasises the need for discussion on the heritage policy-making process and the roles of stakeholders. The results of the study criticise that the authoritarian nature of heritage norms has not disappeared, but rather has been legislated and made policy through more sophisticated and complex processes. It explains how the expansion of the field of heritage norms, the hierarchisation of heritage, and the strengthening of heritage decision-making powers have been reinforced in heritage institutions and policies. In addition, the study describes how the strengthening of heritage norms and the development of heritage policies based on them during the transition to a democratic society caused conflicts and interactions between the central government and the local community. By highlighting the process and the conflicts with the community in the 21st century, it can be observed that the paradigm shift from protection to conservation and heritage suggested by Ashworth (2011) is progressing at the macro level, but in an irregular direction at the micro level. Although local participation is increasing, it is observed that 'heritage' and 'participation' are still separated in heritage practices. Moreover, as various power imbalances and conflicts are gradually expanding, this research emphasises the need for discussion on the heritage policy-making process and the roles of stakeholders.

7.5.2. Policy suggestions for South Korea's heritage policy

This study emphasises the need for a continued discussion of South Korea's heritage policy. South Korea's heritage system is based on the regulatory norms of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act, an authoritarian law. The study discussed the logical justification of this heritage system, criticising the normative protection principle, the biased power structure and the distorted deliberation process. Chapters 5 and 6 show that conflicts and injustices are caused by this authoritarian heritage system. Even in democratic times, the state has increasingly

intervened in heritage. In the 21st century, the number of heritage-related laws has rapidly increased from one (the Cultural Property Protection Act) to 12. Among them, there are a total of six laws that contain regulations, including the Cultural Heritage Protection Act and the SAPPAC. All those regulations are based on the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. Arithmetically, over the past 20 years, a new law has been enacted every two years to respond to emerging heritage issues. This can also be a considerable burden on heritage administration. Each law contains various plans, and it is doubtful whether the continued growth of the CHA will solve the problems. The time is approaching when a fundamental discussion on the heritage system is needed in South Korea. Various criticisms of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act have recently emerged in South Korean academia, such as insufficient legal grounds and conceptual definition for the designation of cultural heritage (Kim Min-Seop, 2018), excessive infringement of individual property rights (Park Jeong-Hee, 2008; Woo Sung-Kee, 2011), and the limitations of control and discipline-centred management of areas surrounding heritage (Kim Ji-Min, 2020). The study may provide a basis for discussion on the amendment of the heritage laws while comprehensively dealing with the problems of the heritage system.

Moreover, this study suggests the following policy issues that the ACPPP and community engagement strategies should consider. First, community participation needs to be developed as a formal process in the ACPPP. The SAPPAC still stipulates only the consent of residents for policy decisions and matters related to resident support to be provided by the governments, but does not provide an institutional basis for community participation. It makes community engagement an informal activity and bottom-up plan development difficult. This may also be a critical issue for government. As shown in Chapter 6, in the ACPPP, heritage-led regeneration and community participation are expected to become increasingly important. Formalising community involvement that can be evaluated and monitored may also give local communities more accountability. Policies are formal procedures and require a legal basis and accountability. As noted in Chapter 5, since the ACPPP was developed as one of the formal heritage practices, participation as a formal process may facilitate community participation and encourage policy intervention responsibly.

Second, it is necessary to establish a policy system to mediate various conflicts. Currently, the policy of the ACPPP is determined by three committees: The Central ACPPP Deliberation Committee, the Local ACPPP Deliberation Committee and the Cultural Heritage Committee. Officially, their decisions are recognised as social consensus. However, these committees, which are mainly composed of experts, represent the government's decision-making process,

and do not deal with conflicts within the ACPPP (see Chapters 5 and 6). Gongju City officials claim they are the mediators of the conflicts (G & H, interviews), but according to the results of the interviews, residents disagree. Due to severe conflicts, the ACPPP was stalled for ten years after the enactment of the Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities (SAPAC) (see Section 5.5.2). Conflict management also has a significant impact on policy performance. The types and categories of conflict that residents perceive are more complex and varied (see Chapter 6). Building a new governance structure may be possible, but it will not be easy. A body could be formed to mediate conflicts related to the ACPPP, or conflict resolution might be included in the role of existing committees.

7.6. Limitations of the study

This study has the following limitations. First, the study conducted a single case study on "current" community participation. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with most of the narratives related to the ACPPP, but the discussion of community participation in Chapter 6 is limited to Gongju city. Moreover, the study focuses on two of the four cities covered by the ACPPP. Gyeongju and Gongju were cities where this researcher had experience participating in planning. The Gyeongju community was the most influential group in the early stages of the ACPPP, and the Gongju community was considered successful by experts and the press (J & M, interviews; Park Sang-Hyun, 2020).

Moreover, unlike Gongju, where I secured my gatekeepers at the beginning of the field investigation, I had to find gatekeepers in Gyeongju. In the meantime, the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic made a field survey in Gyeongju very difficult. In Gongju, I was able to conduct two field surveys in 2019 and 2020, but only one in Gyeongju in 2020 due to Covid-19 restrictions. In addition, interviewees in Gongju, where I had built trustworthy relationships before, told specific and candid stories, but the interviews in Gyeongju could not reach that level. Two of the three public officials related to the Gyeongju ACPPP had only one month of experience, so their answers were one-dimensional and merely repeated official defences, and the interviews with the three Gyeongju residents did not last long (about 30 minutes). In addition, as the study focused more on exploring the concept and policy of heritage in Korea after the 2019 Gongju field survey, it could not compare the four cities or consider other environmental factors. This also led me to shift the focus of the research, as explained in Chapter 3.

Second, reviewing academic discussions in South Korea related to the study was challenging. Archaeology and art history have been developed in Korea since the Japanese colonial era, but heritage studies only started after 2000. In particular, attempts to interpret heritage in a social, political and cultural context in South Korea are rare, and academic papers related to the ACPPP, which has been implemented since the mid-2010s, are even rarer. Therefore, reflection on the researcher's interpretation by other academic references may be somewhat lacking.

7.7. Future research agenda

The study examines heritage policy and community participation within Korea's unique heritage systems and regions. Therefore, future research may be considered in two aspects. The first would be to enhance the study's validity by expanding its spatial and temporal scale. As mentioned in the previous section, the study may be deepened through longer-term observations. In particular, by observing local communities in the longer term, research might describe stakeholder goals and conflicts in more detail. As explained in Chapter 2, heritage and participation are vague and complex concepts. Other social issues generated by community participation in heritage policy that the study may have overlooked by its approach, and its geographical and temporal limits, might be better unpacked. In addition, examining cities such as Buyeo and Iksan, where the ACPPP has had less impact, would supplement the research in various aspects. For example, analysing community participation in those two regions, where ageing is a significant issue, might extend the debate on the rights and capacity of local communities.

The second area of future research might be the comparative research of community participation with different forms of regeneration policy. This study critiques heritage policy and community participation systems, implying that policy reform is required. Acts and administrative agencies promoting general urban regeneration policies differ from the ACPPP. Community empowerment may also proceed differently, and the potential for and nature of conflicts differ. Other urban regeneration policies cover areas similar or different to the subject of this study. Such a comparative study may raise new questions about the impact of the heritage concept or heritage system by identifying the differences and similarities of community participation in the same social context of South Korea.

END

Appendix

1. Policy documents reviewed in this study

Title	Year	Publisher
Registered Cultural Heritage System for the Preservation of Modern Cultural Heritage	2005	Cultural Heritage Administration
Ancient City Preservation Basic Survey, Buyeo	2007	Cultural Heritage Administration & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement
Ancient City Preservation Basic Survey, Gongju	2007	Cultural Heritage Administration & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement
Ancient City Preservation Basic Survey, Gyeongju	2007	Cultural Heritage Administration & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement
Ancient City Preservation Basic Survey, Iksan	2007	Cultural Heritage Administration & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement
Buyeo Ancient City Preservation Master Plan	2009	Buyeo-gun & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement
Understanding Ancient City Promotion Policy	2009	Cultural Heritage Administration
Gongju Ancient City Preservation Master Plan	2010	Gongju City & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement
Historic Site No. 311 Notification of Permissible Criteria for Changes to Namsan Area in Gyeongju	2010	Cultural Heritage Administration
Gyeongju Ancient City Preservation Master Plan	2011	Gyeongju City & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement
50year History of the Cultural Heritage Administration	2011	Cultural Heritage Administration
The Ancient City Preservation White Book	2012	Cultural Heritage Administration
A study on the current status and content of cultural heritage preservation and management norms in advanced countries	2014	Cultural Heritage Administration
Iksan Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master Plan	2016	Iksan-gun & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement
Historic Site No.12 Notification of Permissible Criteria for Changes to Gongsanseong Fortress in Gongju	2020	Cultural Heritage Administration
Operational Status of the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Central Deliberation Committee	2021	Cultural Heritage Administration
Status of Ancient City Image Recovery Project	2021	Cultural Heritage Administration
Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion Master Plan status report 2022	2022	Cultural Heritage Administration

2. Legislative materials in this study

Title	Year	Statutory category
Special Act on Promotion of and Support for Urban Regeneration	2022	Special Act
Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities	2020	Special Act
Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities	2004	Special Act
Act on Protection and Inspection of Buried Cultural Heritage	2022	Act
Cultural Heritage Protection Act	2022	Act
Cultural Property Protection Act	1962	Act
Enforcement Decree of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act	2022	Presidential Decree
Enforcement Decree of the Special Act on Promotion of and Support for Urban Regeneration	2022	Presidential Decree
Cultural Heritage Committee Operating Guidelines	2020	Regulation
Gochang-gun Local Cultural Heritage Protection Ordinance	2015	Local Ordinance
Mokpo City Cultural Heritage Protection Ordinance	2019	Local Ordinance
Mungyeong City Protected Cultural Heritage Ordinance	2014	Local Ordinance

Bibliography

Act on Protection and Inspection of Buried Cultural Heritage. Act No. 18765. (2022).
Available at:
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=239475&chrClsCd=010203&urlMode=engL
sInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000

Cultural Heritage Protection Act, Act No.18770 (2022). Available at:
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=239481&chrClsCd=010203&urlMode=engL
sInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000

Cultural Heritage Committee Operating Guidelines. Regulation No. 216. (2020). Available
at: https://www.law.go.kr/행정규칙/문화재위원회운영지침

Cultural Property Protection Act. Act No.961. (1962). Available at:
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=5076&ancYd=19620110&ancNo=00961&ef
Yd=19620110&nwJoYnInfo=N&efGubun=Y&chrClsCd=010202&ancYnChk=0#0000

Enforcement Decree of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act. Presidential Decree No.33004.
(2022). Available at:
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=245565&ancYd=20221129&ancNo=33004&
efYd=20221201&nwJoYnInfo=N&efGubun=Y&chrClsCd=010202&ancYnChk=0#0000

Enforcement Decree of the Special Act on Promotion of and Support for Urban Regeneration.
Presidential Decree No.33033. (2022). Available at:
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=245747&chrClsCd=010203&urlMode=engL
sInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000

Gochang-gun Local Cultural Heritage Protection Ordinance. Gochang-gun Ordinance
No.2088. (2015). Available at: https://www.elis.go.kr/allalr/selectAlrBdtOne

Mokpo City Cultural Heritage Protection Ordinance. Mokpo City Ordinance No.3271.
(2019). Available at: https://www.elis.go.kr/allalr/selectAlrBdtOne

Mungyeong City Protected Cultural Heritage Ordinance. Mungyeong City Ordinance No.957. (2014). Available at: https://www.elis.go.kr/allalr/selectAlrBdtOne

Special Act on Promotion of and Support for Urban Regeneration. Act No.18942. (2022). Available at:
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=243095&chrClsCd=010203&urlMode=engLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000

Special Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Ancient Cities. Act No. 17171. (2020). Available at:
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=246655&ancYd=20221227&ancNo=19117&efYd=20230628&nwJoYnInfo=N&efGubun=Y&chrClsCd=010202&ancYnChk=0#0000

Special Act on the Preservation of Ancient Cities. Act No.7178. (2004). Available at:
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=61472&ancYd=20040305&ancNo=07178&efYd=20050306&nwJoYnInfo=N&efGubun=Y&chrClsCd=010202&ancYnChk=0#0000

Aas, C., Ladkin, A., & Fletcher, J. (2005). Stakeholder collaboration and heritage management. *Annals of Tourism Research,* 32(1), 28–48.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2004.04.005

Alsalloum, A. (2011). *Heritage-led Sustainable Urban Regeneration: the development of an assessment model for World Heritage Sites cities.* Doctoral thesis. The University of Liverpool.

Amugeona. (2018). *Before and after the demolition of the Japanese Government-General of Korea.* Retrieved 2020, April 4, from https://blog.naver.com/dndb018/221338287940

Ang, I. (2009). Wanted: Audience. On the Politics of Empirical Audience Studies. In: Thornham, S., Bassett, C., & Marris, P. (eds). *Media Studies: A Reader*, 451–461. Edinburgh University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctvxcrv1h.53

Ashworth, G. (2011). Preservation, Conservation and Heritage: Approaches to the Past in the Present through the Built Environment, *Asian Anthropology*, *10:1*, 1-18

Ashworth, G., Graham, B., & Tunbridge, J. (2007). *Pluralising pasts: Heritage, identity and place in multicultural societies*. London: Pluto Press.

Arnstein, S. (1969). A Ladder Of Citizen Participation. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners,* 35(4), 216-224.

Atkinson, R. (2003). Addressing urban social exclusion through community involvement in urban regeneration. In: Raco, M., & Imrie, R (eds). *Urban renaissance? New Labour, community and urban policy*, 101-120. Bristol: Policy Press.

Avrami, E. (2009). Heritage, Values, and Sustainability. In: Alison, R, Alison, B (eds). *Conservation: principles, dilemmas and uncomfortable truths*, 177-183. Burlington: Elsevier.

Bannerman, S. & Haggart, B. (2015). Historical Institutionalism in Communication Studies. *Communication Theory, 25(1),* 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12051

Barnes, M., Newman, J., & Sullivan, H. (2007). *Power, Participation and Political Renewal: Case Studies in Public Participation.* Bristol University Press.

Bigenho, M., & Stobart, H. (2016). The Devil in Nationalism: Indigenous Heritage and the Challenges of Decolonization. *International Journal of Cultural Property, 23(2),* 141-166.

Billig, M. (1995) *Banal nationalism*. London: SAGE.

Blake, J. (2000). On defining the cultural heritage. *International & Comparative Law Quarterly,* 49(1), 61-85.

Boyle, L., Kathy, M., & François, V. (2018). A Critique of the Application of Neighborhood Sustainability Assessment Tools in Urban Regeneration, *Sustainability,* 10, no. 4: 1005. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10041005

Bryman, A. (2012). *Social research methods* (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Byun, Jin-Kyung. (2009, August 17). The beauty of 'modesty' hidden in a hanok. *Sisa IN*. Retrieved April 26, 2022, from https://www.sisain.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=5087

Caple, C. (2009). The aim of conservation. In: Richmond, A., & Bracker, A. (eds). *Conservation: principles, dilemmas and uncomfortable truths*. 1st ed. Amsterdam; Boston :

London: Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann ; In Association with the Victoria & Albert Museum.

Carter, N. (2020). "What Shall We Do With It Now?": The Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana and the Difficult Heritage of Fascism. *The Australian Journal of Politics and History,* 66(3), pp.377–395. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12696

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2000). *National Cultural Heritage Portal.* Retrieved 2020, May 15, from, https://www.heritage.go.kr/main/?v=1683815906591

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2005). *Registered Cultural Heritage System for the Preservation of Modern Cultural Heritage.* Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2010). *Historic Site No. 311 Notification of Permissible Criteria for Changes to Namsan Area in Gyeongju.* Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2011). *50 year History of the Cultural Heritage Administration.* Cultural Heritage Administration. Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2012). *The Ancient City Preservation White Book.* Deajeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2014). *A study on the current status and content of cultural heritage preservation and management norms in advanced countries.* Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2020). *Historic Site No.12 Notification of Permissible Criteria for Changes to Gongsanseong Fortress in Gongju.* Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2021a). *Operational Status of the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Central Deliberation Committee.* Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2021b). Status of Ancient City Image Recovery Project. Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2022a). *Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion Master Plan status report 2022.* Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2022b). *Cultural Heritage Committee member list.* Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA (Cultural Heritage Administration). (2022c). *Cultural Heritage 2021 through Statistics.* Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

CHA Ancient City Preservation Team. (2009). *Understanding Ancient City Promotion Policy.* Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

Chae, Kyeong-jin., et al. (2016). *A study on the systematic operation of the Cultural Heritage Committee.* Daejeon: Cultural Heritage Administration.

Chae, Mi-Ok. (2010). Conservation of altitude and direction of cultivation of altitude. *Mahan Baekje Culture*, 18, pp.23–42.

Chae, Mi-ok., et al. (2007a). *Ancient City Preservation Basic Survey, Buyeo*. Anyang: Cultural Heritage Administration & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement.

Chae, Mi-ok., et al. (2007b). *Ancient City Preservation Basic Survey, Gongju.* Anyang: Cultural Heritage Administration & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement.

Chae, Mi-ok., et al. (2007c). *Ancient City Preservation Basic Survey, Gyeongju.* Anyang: Cultural Heritage Administration & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement.

Chae, Mi-ok., et al. (2007d). *Ancient City Preservation Basic Survey, Iksan.* Anyang: Cultural Heritage Administration & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement.

Chae, Mi-ok., et al. (2009). *Buyeo Ancient City Preservation Master Plan.* Anyang: Buyeo-gun & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement.

Chae, Mi-ok., et al. (2010). *Gongju Ancient City Preservation Master Plan.* Anyang: Gongju City & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement.

Chae, Mi-ok., et al. (2011). *Gyeongju Ancient City Preservation Master Plan.* Anyang: Gyeongju City & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement.

Chamala, S. (1995). Overview of participative action approaches in Australian land and water management. In: S. Chamala and K. Keith (eds.), Participative Approaches For Landcare, Perspectives, Policies, Programs, Australian Academic Press, Brisbane, Australia, 5-42.

Chapin, M. (2004). A challenge to conservationists. *World Watch (Washington, D.C.)*, 17(6), 17-31.

Chitty, G. (2017). *Heritage, conservation and communities: Engagement, participation and capacity building (Heritage, culture, and identity).* London: Routledge.

Chirikure, S., et al. (2010). Unfulfilled promises? Heritage management and community participation at some of Africa's cultural heritage sites. *International Journal of Heritage Studies,* 16(1-2), 30-44.

Cho, Hyo-Sang. (2012). Preservation of cultural heritage by who for whom? *The Journal of Korean Historical-forklife,* 40, 261-282.

Choi, Kwang-Seung. (2012). Park, Chung hee's Project on Developing the Ancient City of Gyeongju. *Korean Studies Quarterly,* 35(1), 183-214.

Choi, Seok-Young. (1997). *Creation of the Japanese assimilation ideology.* Seoul: Seogyeong Culture.

Choi, Wan-Kyu. (2013). Preservation of Baekje ancient cities (Gongju, Buyeo & Iksan) and listing of World Cultural Heritage. *Ancient Culture*, 81, pp.23–60.

Choi, Wan-Kyu. (2016). Inscription in the World Heritage List and Role of Local Communities. *Mahan Baekje Cultures,* 27, pp.59-84.

Choi, Yeon-Sik. (2007). Park Chung-hee's Invention of Nation and the Mobilized National Integration. *Journal of Korean Political And Diplomatic History,* 28(2), 43-73.

Clarke, J., Bainton, D., Lendvai, N. & Stubbs, P. (2015). *Making policy move: towards a politics of translation and assemblage.* Bristol: Policy Press.

Cnaan, R., Milofsky, C., & Hunter, A. (2008). Introduction. In: Cnaan, R.A. & Milofsky, C. (eds). *Handbook of community movements and local organizations.* New York; London: Springer.

Cole, S. (2019). Cultural Tourism, Community Participation and Empowerment. In: Robinson, M., & Smith, M. (eds). *Cultural Tourism in a Changing World: Politics, Participation and (Re)presentation*, 89-103. Bristol, Blue Ridge Summit: Multilingual Matters.

Cooper, M. (2010). Protecting our Past: Political Philosophy, Regulation, and Heritage Management in England and Scotland. *The Historic Environment* (London), 1(2), 143-159.

Cornwall, A. (2008). Unpacking 'Participation': Models, meanings and practices. *Community Development Journal,* 43(3), 269-283.

Creswell, J. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE.

Creswell, J., & Poth, C. (2017). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (Fourth edition. International Student ed.). Los Angeles: Sage.

Crooke, E. (2010). The politics of community heritage: motivations, authority and control. In: Waterton, E., & Watson, S. (eds). *Heritage and community engagement: Collaboration or contestation?,* 16-29. London: Routledge.

Curaming, R. (2017). From Bitter Memories to Heritage-Making? The Jabidah Massacre and the Mindanao Garden of Peace. *Sojourn (Singapore),* 32(1), 78–106. https://doi.org/10.1355/sj32-1c

David, P. (2007). Path Dependence - A Foundational Concept for Historical Social Science. *Cliometrica,* 1(2), 91–114. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-006-0005-x

Day, G. (2006*). Community and everyday life* (New sociology series). London: Routledge.

De Cesari, C., & Dimova, R. (2019). Heritage, gentrification, participation: Remaking urban landscapes in the name of culture and historic preservation. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 25(9), pp.863–869.

De Cesari, C. (2020) 'Heritage beyond the nation-state? Nongovernmental organizations, changing cultural policies, and the discourse of heritage as development', *Current anthropology,* 61(1), pp.30–56.

Del Mármol, C., Siniscalchi, V., & Estrada, F. (2016). Reflecting on heritage and power: dynamics, strategies and appropriations in the Catalan Pyrenees and the French Alps. *International Journal of Heritage Studies,* 22(5), 341-354.

De Cesari, C., & Dimova, R. (2019). Heritage, gentrification, participation: remaking urban landscapes in the name of culture and historic preservation, *International journal of heritage studies: IJHS,* 25(9), 863–869.

Dian, A.M., & Abdullah, N.C. (2013). Public Participation in Heritage Sites Conservation in Malaysia: Issues and Challenges. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences,* 101, pp.248-255.

Disko, S. (2012). World Heritage sites and indigenous communities: the importance of adopting a human rights-based approach. In: Albert M., Richen M., Jose Vinals M., Witcomb A. (eds). *Community Development through World Heritage*,16-25. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Paris.

Dogruyol, K., Aziz, Z. U. H., & Arayici, Y. (2018). Eye of Sustainable Planning: A Conceptual Heritage-Led Urban Regeneration Planning Framework. *Sustainability (Basel, Switzerland),* 10(5), https://doi.org/10.3390/su10051343

Do you know Gyeongju Ancient City Preservation and Promotion? (2010, November 15). *Gyeongju News.* Retrieved October 4, 2022, from http://m.gjnews.com/view.php?idx=23984

Drucker, D. (2008). Ask a Silly Question, Get a Silly Answer: Community Participation, Entry Points and the Demystification of Planning, *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 77:4, 53-72, DOI: 10.1300/J497v77n04_04

European Association of Historic Towns and Regions. (2007). *Investing in Heritage – A Guide to Successful Urban Regeneration.* Norwich: European Association of HistoricTowns and Regions

e Video History Museum. (2021). *Complete demolition of former Japanese Government-General of Korea building.* Retrieved August 23, 2021 from https://www.ehistory.go.kr/page/view/photo.jsp?photo_PhotoSrcGBN=PT&photo_PhotoID=24817&detl_photodtl=194701

Expansion of search target for Gongju Ancient Image Recovery project. (2018, January 9). *Yeonhapnews.* Retrieved August 16, 2022, from https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20180109070000063.

Fibiger, T. (2015). Heritage erasure and heritage transformation: how heritage is created by destruction in Bahrain, *International journal of heritage studies: IJHS*, 21(4), pp.390–404.

Fisher, R., DeFilippis, J., & Shragge, E. (2018). Contested Community: A Selected and Critical History of Community Organizing. In: Cnaan, R., Milofsky, C. (eds). *Handbook of Community Movements and Local Organizations in the 21st Century.* Springer, Cham. https://doi-org.libproxy.ncl.ac.uk/10.1007/978-3-319-77416-9_17

Fischer, R., & Graham, A. (2014). Postmodernism. *Reference and User Services Quarterly,* 54(1), pp.29-33.

Fleming, P., & Spicer, A. (2008). Beyond power and resistance: New approaches to organizational politics. *Management Communication Quarterly*, *21*(3), 301-309.

Flick, U. (2018). *Managing quality in qualitative research* (2nd edition). London: SAGE.

Fortenberry. (2016). Life Among Ruins, Bermuda and Britain's Colonial Heritage. *International Journal of Historical Archaeology,* 20(3), 601–613. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10761-016-0365-2

Foucault, M. (1975). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison* (2nd Vintage Books ed). (1995). New York: Vintage Books.

Fouseki, K., & Nicolau, M. (2018). Urban heritage dynamics in 'heritage-led regeneration': Towards a sustainable lifestyles approach. *The Historic Environment: Policy & Practice*, 9(3–4), 229–248.

Franco, I. B., & Tracey, J. (2019). Community capacity-building for sustainable development. *International journal of sustainability in higher education*, 20(4), 691–725.

Gardner, J. (2004). Heritage Protection and Social Inclusion: A Case Study from the Bangladeshi Community of East London, *International Journal of Heritage Studies,* 10:1, pp.75-92, DOI: 10.1080/1352725032000194259

George, A., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*

(BCSIA studies in international security). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Giaccardi, E., & Palen, L. (2008). The social production of heritage through cross-media interaction: Making place for place-making. *International Journal of Heritage Studies: IJHS*, 14(3), 281–297. https://doi.org/10.1080/13527250801953827

Giddens, A. (1990). *The consequences of modernity*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell, Oxford: UK.

Given, L. M. (2008). *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*. SAGE Publications, Inc. eBooks. Retrieved December 23, 2019, from https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412963909

Glesne, C. (1999). *Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction*. New York: Longman.

Go, Jae-Hong. (2013, September 6). How are going the promotion of the National Museum and the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion project? *Sisajeonbook.com.* Retrieved November 11, 2022, from http://www.sisajb.com/default/index_view_page.php?part_idx=463&idx=20343

Gongju Ancient City Promotion Academy. (2022). *Curriculum in 2022*. Gongju City.

Gongju City. (2022). *2022 Gongju City Statistical Yearbook.* Gongju City

Gongju City. (n.d). Stong Gongju, happy citizen, Culture and tour: Photo Exhibition. Retrieved August 15, 2020, from https://www.gongju.go.kr/prog/tursmCn/tour/sub02_01_02/view.do?cntno=11

Goudie, S. C., Khan, F., & Kilian, D. (1999). Transforming tourism: Black empowerment, heritage and identity beyond apartheid. *South African Geographical Journal,* 81(1), 22-31.

Government of the Republic of Korea. (1968). *National Education Charter*. Government of the Republic of Korea.

Graham, B. (2002). Heritage as Knowledge: Capital or Culture? *Urban Studies,* 39, 5– 6, 1003-1017.

Bibliography

Grbich, C. (2004). *New approaches in social research*. London: SAGE.

Greer, S. (2010). Heritage and empowerment: Community-based Indigenous cultural heritage in northern Australia. *International Journal of Heritage Studies: IJHS,* 16(1-2)*,* 45-58.

Gyeongju Ancient City Promotion Academy. (2022). *Curriculum in 2022.* Gyeongju City.

Haboush, J. (2016). *The Great East Asian War and the Birth of the Korean Nation*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Halbwachs, M. (1980). *The Collective Memory.* Harper & Row.

Hall, C. (1999). Rethinking Collaboration and Partnership: A Public Policy Perspective. *Journal of Sustainable Tourism,* 7(3-4), 274–289. https://doi.org/10.1080/09669589908667340

Hammami, F. & Uzer, E. (2018). 'Heritage and resistance: irregularities, temporalities and cumulative impact', *International journal of heritage studies: IJHS,* 24(5), pp.445–464.

Harding, S. (2004). A Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science? Resources from Standpoint Theory's Controversiality. *Hypatia,* 19(1), 25-47.

Harrison, R. (2010). *Understanding the politics of heritage*, Manchester University Press in association with the Open University.

Harrison, R. (2011). Surface assemblages. Towards an archaeology in and of the present. *Archaeological Dialogues,* 18(2), 141-161.

Harrison, R. (2012). *Heritage: Critical approaches*. London: Routledge.

Harrison, R. (2013). Heritage. In: Graves-Brown, P., Harrison, R., & Piccini, A. (eds). *The Oxford handbook of the archaeology of the contemporary world*. Online ed, Oxford Academic, https://doi-org.libproxy.ncl.ac.uk/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199602001.001.0001

Harvey, D. (2001). Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: temporality, meaning and the scope of heritage studies, *International Journal of Heritage Studies,* 7:4, 319-338.

Harvey, D. (2008). Introduction: Heritage and Identity. In: Graham, B., & Howard, P. (eds). *The Ashgate research companion to heritage and identity,* 1-16. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Hawkes, D. (2004). *Ideology* (2nd ed., New critical idiom). Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.

Healey, P. (1997). *Collaborative planning : shaping places in fragmented societies.* Houndsmills, England: Macmillan.

Henson, D. (2011). The Educational Purpose of Archaeology: A Personal View from the United Kingdom. In: Okamura, K., & Matsuda, A. (eds). *New Perspectives in Global Public Archaeology,* 217-226. New York: Springer.

Hong, Kuk-Gi. (2022, September 18). Sejong City apartment sales-Jeonse, 1st place in increase rate in 2 years → 1st place in decrease rate reversed. *Yonhapnews.* Retrieved December 18, 2022, from https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220918010500003.

Hong, Wan-Sik. (2009). A Study on the Cultural Assets Acts of Korea. *Public Land Law Review,* 44, 235-258.

Hong, Yong-Jin. (2016). Production of Historico-cultural Space in the 19th Century: Its Evolution and Meaning. *Korean Journal of Urban History,* 15, 25-53.

Horwich, R., & Lyon, J. (2007). Community conservation: Practitioners' answer to critics. *Oryx,* 41(3), 376-385.

Howard, P. (2003). *Heritage: Management, interpretation, identity*. London: Continuum.

Huff, A.S. (2009). *Designing research for publication.* Los Angeles, Calif. ; London: SAGE.

Hølleland, H & Skrede, J. (2019). What's wrong with heritage experts? An interdisciplinary discussion of experts and expertise in heritage studies. *International Journal of Heritage Studies : IJHS*, 25(8), 825–836. https://doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2018.1552613

Idris, Purnomo, A. & Rahmawati, M. (2021). Community-based tourism: Capability and community participation in tourism development. In: Sayono, J., et al. (eds). *Community Empowerment Through Research, Innovation and Open Access.* 1st edition [Online]. United Kingdom: CRC Press. pp. 139–144. https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003189206.

Jamal, T. & Getz, D. (1995). Collaboration theory and community tourism planning. *Annals of Tourism Research, 22(1),* 186–204. https://doi.org/10.1016/0160-7383(94)00067-3

Jang, Gwang-Gil. (2008). *A Study on the Remedy of Cultural Properties Protection Law.* Master's thesis. Chosun University.

Jang, Hyeon-Kyeong. (n.d). *Floating a glass on the flowing water and composing a poem, Poseokjeong site.* The Federation of Korea Culture Center. Retrieved October 21, 2021, from https://ncms.nculture.org/stonecraft/story/5715

Jang, Min-Young., Park, Seong-Hyeon., & Lee, Myung-Hun. (2015). Conservation Management of Private-owned Historical Cultural Heritage by Community Involvement. *Conference of the Society of Korean Urban Administration,* 93-112.

Japanese Government-General of Korea. (1915-1935). *Joseon Remains Pictures.* Seoul: Japanese Government-General of Korea.

Japanese Government-General of Korea. (1926–1938). *Joseon Historic Remains Investigation Report.* Seoul: Japanese Government-General of Korea.

Japanese Government-General of Korea. (1933). *Joseon Treasures, Historic Remains, Scenic Spots, and Natural Monuments Conservation Ordinance.* Seoul: Japanese Government-General of Korea.

Jeon, In-Seok., & Park, Seok-Hee. (2022). An analysis on types of the decentralization of cultural heritage policy: Based on the grounded-theory analysis. *The Journal of Cultural Policy*, 36(1), 83–112.

Jeong, Jong-Seop. (2003). State's obligation to protect cultural heritage and its high level of preservation. *The Journal of Seoul National University Law*, 44(3), 28–66.

Jeon, Yeong-Woo. (2021). *The greeting of the chairman of the Cultural Heritage Committee.* Cultural Heritage Administration. Retrieved November 11, 2021, from https://www.cha.go.kr/html/HtmlPage.do?pg=/seek/commit1.jsp&mn=NS_03_03_01

Jeon, Jae-Ho. (1999). Nationalism in the Park Chung-Hee Regime (1961-1979): The Change of Discourse and its Cause. *Korean Political Science Review,* 32(4), 89-109.

Jeong, Byeong-Ho. (2008). A study on Japanese imperialism in the early 20th century and the formation of <Japanese literature> in Korea-focused on the [Literature] section of the magazine [Joseon] (Joseon (朝鮮), 1908-11). *Japanese Literature, 37,* 409-425.

Jeong, Gab-Young. (1993). A study on the ideology of Korean cultural policy. *The Journal of Cultural Policy,* 5, 82-132.

Jeong, Jae-Hoon. (1985). A brief history of the Cultural Heritage Committe. *Korean Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies,* 18, 1-24.

Ji, Joo-Hyoung. (2009). The Shift in the State Form and Mode of Power Exercise in South Korea: From the Authoritarian Developmental State to Neoliberal State Power. *Korean Political Science Review,* 43(4), 175-203.

Jones, P. (2003). Urban regeneration's poisoned chalice: Is there and impasse in (community) participation-based policy? *Urban Studies,* 40(3), 581-601.

Jung, Soo-Jin. (2007). Modern Nation-State and the Creation of Cultural Asset. *The Korean Folklore,* 46, 343-373.

Jung, Yun-Ju (2020). Problems and Reform Proposals of current Local Autonomy System. *Constitutional Law,* 26(3), 297-325.

Kamel-Ahmed, E. (2015). What to conserve? Heritage, Memory, and Management of Meanings. *ArchNet-IJAR*, 9(1), 67.

Kang, Chang-Gwang. (1997, July 14). Number of registered 10 million units, now is the 'automobile world'. *The Hankyoreh.* Retrieved July 18, 2021, from https://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.naver?articleId=1997071400289109001&editNo=6&printCount=1&publishDate=1997-07-14&officeId=00028&pageNo=9&printNo=2930&publishType=00010

Kang, Hee-Jeong. (2021). From Dot to Area: The Third Republic and Cultural Heritage of Namsan, Gyeongju. *Korea Culture, 93*, 385-409.

Kang, Ho-Won., Hong, Kyuseon., & Yi, Sung-Jae. (2016). A study on policies in Korea and Japan for preservation and regeneration of architecture in modern era. *Journal of the Korean Institute of Culture Architecture,* 53, 197–205.

Kang, Jun-Man. (2006). *A walk in Korean modern history 1990's part 1: From coalition government to Starbucks.* Seoul: Personage and Idea.

Kang, Min-Jin. (2017, November 1). 108 years ago today, Changgyeonggung became a zoo. *The Hankyoreh.* Retrieved July 19, 2021, from https://m.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/culture_general/817011.html

Kang, Su-Kyeong. (2010, April 29). [Cultural Heritage Tour-Gyeongju ①] Worldwide Korean cultural heritage 'Bulguksa Temple and Seokguram Hermitage'. *Cheonji Daily.* Retrieved October 16, 2022, from https://www.newscj.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=42263

Kang, Tae-Ho. (2010). The preservation policy and historical landscape characteristics of ancient city Gyeongju. *Journal of Korean Traditional Landscape Architecture*, 28(4), 64–75.

Kay, A. & Baker, P. (2015). What Can Causal Process Tracing Offer to Policy Studies? A Review of the Literature. *Policy Studies Journal,* 43(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12092

Kelly, K., & Van Vlaenderen, H. (1995). Evaluating participation processes in community development. *Evaluation and Program Planning,* 18(4), 371-383.

Kiddey, R. (2018). From the ground up: Cultural heritage practices as tools for empowerment in the Homeless Heritage project. *International Journal of Heritage Studies: IJHS,* 24(7), 694-708.

Kim, Bong-Geon. (1989). Cultural Heritage Preservation Policy in England: Focused on Regional Preservation Policy. *Korean Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies*, 22, 404–418. https://doi.org/10.22755/KJCHS.1989.22.404

Kim, Byoung-Sub (2018). An Analysis of Tendencies and Characters of the Concept Expansion of Cultural Heritage in Korea: Focused on Enactments and Reforms of the Laws Related to Cultural Heritage. *Journal of Region & Culture,* 5(3), 49-70.

Kim, Chang-Gyu. (2010). The Improvement of Legal System and Policy for Cultural Properties Conservation and Promotion. *Law and Policy Research,* 10(2), 631-655.

Kim, Eun-Woo., et al. (2015). Long-term time series estimation of land assets in Korea. *Bank of Korea Economic Review*, June 2015.

Kim Il-Yoon and 143 others. (2001). *The bill of Special Act on the Preservation and Renovation of Historic Ancient Cities.* Gyeongju City.

Kim, In-Young. (2008). Rethinking the Capitalist Developmental State (CDS): The Transformation and Features of the CDS After 1997 Economic Crisis in South Korea. *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies,* 47, 183-204.

Kim, Ji-Min. (2020). A study on the direction of reestablishment of the historical and cultural environment protection system, focusing on the historical and cultural environment protection system under the Cultural Properties Protection Act. *Korean Law,* 96, 295-337.

Kim, Jin-Man. (2013, March 22). The Cultural Heritage Administration Ancient City Preservation Team should not be disbanded. *Jeonbuk Daily.* Retrieved October 5, 2022, from http://www.jjan.kr/465655

Kim, Ji-Seon. (2008). *Changes and Characteristics of the Cultural Heritage Policy of the Japanese Government-General of Korea.* Master's thesis. Korea University.

Kim, Jeong-Yeon., Lim, Hyeong-Bin. & Oh, Myeong-Taek. (2014). *Gongju City's Impact and Countermeasures Following the Construction of Sejong City.* Gongju: Chungnam Development Institute.

Kim, Jong-Gook. (2022, July 10). 'Damage of royal tomb view' Geomdan apartment construction as scheduled, 'Cultural Heritage Protection Act' that cannot protect cultural properties. *Korea News.* Retrieved October 4, 2022, from http://www.24news.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=206122

Kim, Jong-Hyeok. (1997). Development direction of cultural heritage administration. *Korean Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies,* (30), 55-74.

Kim, Man-Heum. (1999). Nation-State and Local Politics. *Korean Political Science Review,* 32(4), 167-186.

Kim, Min-Hyun. (2004). *Globalization and how Korea has Overcome Economic Crisis Since IMF Period*. Master's thesis. Dong-A University.

Kim, Min-Seop. (2018). Study of regulating the status of cultural heritage in Cultural Heritage Protection Act. *Kookimn Law Review,* 30(3), 87-115.

Kim, Min-Seop. (2019). The problem of legislation in management of cultural heritage. *European Constitutional Studies,* 30, 173-205.

Kim, Nam-Hee. (2020). *A Study on the Planning Process for Preservation and Promotion of Historical and Cultural Environment.* Doctoral thesis, University of Seoul.

Kim, Nam-Seok. (2022, August 23). Court "Royal tombs View Apartment is not illegal," Cultural Heritage Administration dismissal. *The Digitaltimes.* Retrieved September 8, 2022, from https://www.dt.co.kr/contents.html?article_no=2022082302109963046007

Kim, Seon-Hee. (2020). *New Institutionalism and Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice*. Seoul: Yoonseongsa.

Kim, Seong-Woong. (2010, December 20). 'Gyeongju Ancient City Preservation plan' is invalid before the public hearing. *Gyeongju News.* Retrieved September 8, 2022, http://www.gjnews.com/default/index_view_page.php?part_idx=4&idx=24279

Kim, Sook-Jin. (2017). The Reality of Community through Social Network Analysis: the Case of 7 Sansa, Buddhist Mountain Monasteries in Korea. *Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea,* 20(1)*,* 49–69. https://doi.org/10.23841/EGSK.2017.20.1.49

Kim, Soon-Seok. (2014). A study on the Hyanggo property management rule in the period of Japanese colonial rule. *Prenatal Classics Study, 3*3, 35-59.

Kim, Won. (2013). The Time of Cold War and Distorted Subjects in 1960s: Time of Citizen and Time of Nation. *Humanities Journal, 38,* 119-157.

Kim, Yong-Cheol. (2020). Law for Protection of Cultural Property of Korea enacted in 1962 and Japanese Acts for Protection of Cultural Property. *Korean Journal of Art History,* vol.308, 207-231.

Kisler, R. (2023). The political ideology underlying Israel's national cultural heritage policy. *International Journal of Cultural Policy:* CP, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp.1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2023.2221268

Korean Government. (2023, February 22). *'Statistics of births and deaths in 2022' briefing*. Retrieved February 26, 2023, from https://ebrief.korea.kr/briefing/61595.

Korea Press Foundation. (n.d). *Bigkinds.* Retrieved August 15, 2021, from https://www.bigkinds.or.kr/

Korea Tourism Organization. (2022). Gyeongju Bomun Tourist Complex. Retrieved September 8, 2022, from https://access.visitkorea.or.kr/ms/detail.do?cotId=363f7a56-874d-4789-a128-016ad1c67436

Kumar, S., & Corbridge, S. (2001). Programmed to fail? Development projects and the politics of participation. *Paper for the Nordic Conference of Geographers*, University of Oslo.

Kuhn, T.S. (1996). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. 3rd ed.. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kwon, Sook-In. (1998). Theory of Korean culture in the consumer society and the expansion of the world system. *Comparative Cultural Studies,* Vol.4, pp. 181-214. Seoul National University.

Landorf, C. (2009). Managing for sustainable tourism: A review of six cultural World Heritage Sites. *Journal of Sustainable Tourism,* 17(1), 53-70.

Lee, Jae-Sam. (2015). Development of Cultural Heritage Administration Systems under the Current Cultural Heritage Protection Act. *Legal Theory & Practice Review,* 3(1), 7-39.

Lee, Gyeong-Hee. (2010, August 13). Special project - 65 years of independence / 65 years of division / Gwanghwamun, the main gate of Gyeongbokgung Palace, open to the public on Liberation Day. *The Joong Ang.* Retrieved July 19, 2021, from https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/4380430#home

Lee, Hee-Chul. (2023, March 1). The second city 'Busan' is also on the verge of extinction accelerating...Young people are leaving the metropolitan area. *Naewoeilbo.* Retrieved March 26, 2023, from http://www.naewoeilbo.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=676511

Lee, Heng. et al. (1530). *Revised and Expanded Edition of Survey of the Geography of Joseon.* Retrieved March 25, 2021, from https://www.krpia.co.kr/knowledge/itkc/detail?artClass=MK&artId=kc_mk_g012

Lee, Hyun-Kyung. (2018). The concept and the roles of Difficult Heritage. *Korean Journal of Urban History,* 20, 163-192.

Lee, Hyun-Kyung. (2019). *'Difficult Heritage' in Nation Building.* 1st edition. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Lee, Hyun-Kyung., Son, Oh-Dal., & Lee, Na-Yeon. (2019). From Cultural Property to Cultural Heritage: A Historical Review and Critical Reflection of Korea's Cultural Property. *The Journal of Cultural Policy* 33(3), 5-29.

Lee, Jong-Tae. (2011, June 1). Gongju Ancient City Promotion Academy Overseas Exploration-3. *Kknews.* Retrieved July 18, 2022, from https://www.kknews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=14676

Lee, Ki-Hwan. (2012, April 25). There is an 'inconvenient truth' in National Treasure/Treasure/Historic Site No.1. *Kyunghyang Shinmun.* Retrieved July 19, 2021, from https://m.khan.co.kr/culture/scholarship-heritage/article/201204251157031#c2b

Lee, Kyung-Ah. (2018). Changes in general commercial area of Buyeo since the establishment of the master plan to preserve and promote ancient city. *Journal of the Architecture Institute of Korea Planning & Design*, 34(6), 17–126.

Lee, Na-Mi. (2003). Ideologies of Japanese Imperialism to Colonise Korea: Liberalism and Nationalism. *The Korean Review of Political Thought,* 9, 61-92.

Lee, Nan-Kyeong. (2018). *The Morphological Interpretation on the Changing Process around Pungnaptoseong Fortress in Seoul as a Historic and Cultural Environment.* Doctoral thesis, University of Seoul.

Lee, Na-Yeon. (2020). Diachronic Research History and the Concept of Heritage Interpretation. *Korean Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies,* 53(3), 42~61.

Lee, Soon-Ja. (2021). Development of the Ancient City Preservation and Promotion policy and enhancement of national dignity. *Planning and Policy*, 481, 6–12.

Lee Su-Jeong. (2016). The Introduction of the Concept of "Original Form" to the Heritage Conservation and Management and the Establishment and Development of the Principle of "Maintaining the Original Form". *Korean Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies,* 49(1), 100-119.

Lee Su-Jeong. (2018). Basic Principles of Ancient City Preservation and Promotion policy and Major Issues in Policy Changes. *2018 Korean Society of Architectural History Conference*.

Lee, Su-Jeong. (2019). Rationale and principle of reconstruction of Gonju old town hall in the philosophical context of heritage conservation. *Journal of Local History and Culture*, 22(2), 323–349.

Lee, Wang-gun., et al. (2016). *Iksan Ancient City Preservation and Promotion Master Plan*. Anyang: Iksan-gun & Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement.

Lee, Woo-Hyung, Jung, Jae-Hee., & Jung, Jae-Woong. (2014). A study on the introduction of negotiation theory to resolve conflicts of interest between public institutions and local residents in cultural heritage protection areas: Analysis of negotiation power by Habeeb's theory in Pungnaptoseong conflict case. *Journal of the Korean Urban Design Society: Urban Design*, 15(1), 33–50.

Let's protect cultural assets, in the wake of the Haeinsa attack. (1952, July 21). *Chosun Daily.* Retrieved August 3, 2021, from https://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.naver?articleId=1952072100239101004&editNo=1&printCount=1&publishDate=1952-07-21&officeId=00023&pageNo=1&print No=9027&publishType=00010

Li, J., et al. (2020). Community participation in cultural heritage management: A systematic literature review comparing Chinese and international practices. *Cities,* 96, 102476, 1-9.

Lim, Jong-Up. (2013, August 22). The real traditional Korean plastering that is harmless to the human body and breathes. *The Hankyoreh*. Retrieved December 11, 2021, from https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/culture_general/600546.html

Lowenthal, D. (1985). *The Past is a Foreign Country*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lowenthal, D. (1998). *The heritage crusade and the spoils of history*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lowndes, V., Pratchett, L., & Stoker, G. (2006). Local Political Participation: The Impact Of Rules-in-use. *Public Administration (London),* 84(3), 539–561. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2006.00601.x

Macdonald, S. (2009). *Difficult heritage: negotiating the Nazi past in Nuremberg and beyond.* Routledge.

Mason, A. (2000). *Community, solidarity and belonging.* Cambridge University Press.

Manzo, L. C., & Perkins, D. D. (2006). Finding Common Ground: The Importance of Place Attachment to Community Participation and Planning. *Journal of Planning Literature,* 20(4), 335-350.

Mawere, M., & Mubaya, R. (2016). *Colonial heritage, memory and sustainability in Africa: challenges, opportunities and prospects.* Langaa Research & Publishing CIG.

McDowell, S. (2008). Selling conflict heritage through tourism in peacetime Northern Ireland: transforming conflict or exacerbating difference?. *International Journal of Heritage Studies,* 14(5), 405-421.

Millar, S. (2006). Stakeholders and community participation. In: Leask, A., & Fyall, A. (eds). *Managing world heritage sites,* 37-54. New York: Routledge.

Min, Hyun-Suk., & Oh, Ji-Yeon. (2019). Performance and improvement direction of historical and cultural urban regeneration in Seoul. *The policy report*, 1-20.

Ministry of Construction and Transportation. (1992). *The 3rd Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (1992~2001).* Seoul: Ministry of Construction and Transportation.

Ministry of Education. (2015, September 22). *Korea's population policy.* Retrieved July 19, 2022, from https://if-blog.tistory.com/5599.

Ministry of the Interior and Safety. (2023). Announce of 'local extinction fund'. Retrieved March 21, 2023, from https://www.mois.go.kr/frt/sub/a06/b06/localextinctionFund/screen.do.

Moon, I-Hwa. (2015). A study on the utilization of Baekje cultural heritage in Iksan. *Mahan Baekje Culture*, 26, 95–128.

Murphy, J. (2014). *Community-based interventions: Philosophy and action (International perspectives on social policy, administration, and practice).* New York: Springer New York

Mu, Q. & Aimar, F. (2022). How Are Historical Villages Changed? A Systematic Literature Review on European and Chinese Cultural Heritage Preservation Practices in Rural Areas. *Land (Basel),* 11(7), 982. https://doi.org/10.3390/land11070982

Nam, Ae-Ri. (n.d). Overcoming the IMF crisis. *National Archives.* Retrieved 2022, June 5, from https://theme.archives.go.kr

Namgung, Seung-Tae. (2000). Historical cultural environment rights and the problem of advanced preservation: The present and future of the Cultural Heritage Act. *Law and Society*, 19, 9–45.

Naver Corp. (n.d). *Naver News Library*. Retrieved August 15, 2021, from https://newslibrary.naver.com/

Nitzky, W. (2013). Community Empowerment at the Periphery? Participatory Approaches to Heritage Protection in Guizhou, China. In: Blumenfield, T. & Silverman, H. (eds). *Cultural Heritage Politics in China.* Springer New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6874-5_11

OECD. (n.d). *Fertility rates*, 1970-2021. Retrieved March 22, 2023, from https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertility-rates.htm#indicator-chart

Oh, Chang-Seop. (2001). The direction of conservation of ancient city and coordination of residents' interests in Gyeongju. *Journal of Local Government Studies*, 13(3), 205–225.

Oh, Chun-young. (2018). Process of Institutionalisation of Cultural Property in Taiwan and Comparison of Joseon. *Korean Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies,* 51(1), 100-125.

Oh, Chun-young. (2020). Ideological Impacts and Change in the Recognition of Korean Cultural Heritage during the 20th century. *Korean Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies,* 53(4), 60~77.

Ohn, Hyung-Keun. (2020). Case study of wall renewal in ancient city Gongju, a historic-cultural city. *Korean Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies*, 53(2), 254–269.

Oh, Se-Tak. (1997a). Cultural Heritage Policy of the Japanese Empire: Focusing on the Institutional Aspect. *Japanese cultural property policy evaluation seminar.* Cultural Property Administration.

Oh, Se-Tak. (1997b). Cultural Heritage Protection Act and its Problems. *Korean Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies,* (30), 37-54.

Ohta, H. (2003). Recognition of Castles in Modern Korea and Japan and Japan's Colonial Policy of Joseon. *Korean History Theory,* 49, 185-230.

Oneului. (2020, August 21). *Bank Interest Levels in the 80s.* Retrieved March 2, 2022, from https://www.enuri.com/knowcom/detail.jsp?kbno=1452539.

Ordered the designation of the Hyeonchungsa Shrine of the Admiral Chungmu as a national treasure. (1966, April 14). *Chosun Daily.* Retrieved July 18, 2021, from https://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.naver?articleId=1966041400239107014&editNo=1&printCount=1&publishDate=1966-04-14&officeId=00023&pageNo=7&printNo=13836&publishType=00010

Parfitt, T. (2004). The ambiguity of participation: a qualified defence of participatory development. *Third World Quarterly*, 25(3), 537–555. https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000191429

Parietti, G. (2022). *On the concept of power : possibility, necessity, politics.* New York, online edn, Oxford Academic, https://doi-org.libproxy.ncl.ac.uk/10.1093/oso/9780197607480.003.0003

Park, Chan-Seung. (2010). *Reading Korean Modern History*. Seoul: Kyeongin Culture.

Park, Cheol-Hee. (2013). A street regeneration plan for small and medium-sized cities, utilizing historic and cultural heritage: Focused on the modern buildings of Chung-Ang Street in Ganggyeong, Nonsan. *Journal of The Urban Design Institute of Korea*, 14(6), 49–66.

Park, Choi-Go. (1925, May 11). Defects and Remedies in Modern Education. *Chosun Daily.* Retrieved July 19, 2021, from https://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.naver?articleId=1925051100239203010&editNo=0&printCount=1&publishDate=1925-05-11&officeId=00023&pageNo=3&printNo=1705&publishType=00020

Park, Dong-Wan., et al. (2022). *2040 Gongju City Long-term Comprehensive Development Plan.* Gongju City.

Park, Gwan-Kyu. & Joo, Yun-Chang. (2022). Critical Analysis of the Local Disappearance Response Fund System: Possible Problems and Solutions. *Decentralization Letter*, 91. Governors Association of the Republic of Korea.

Park, Joo-Hyung. (2012). Instrumentalizing 'Community': A Critical Analysis on 'Community-building Program' of Seoul Metropolitan Government. *Space and Environment,* 23-1, 4-43.

Park, Jeong-Hee. (2008). A Study on the Legal Theory of Protecting Cultural Property. *Law Review,* 31, 77-96.

Park, Kyung-Seop. (2018). The politics of building community: ideas, discourses, and practices, *Humanities Study (Chosun University),* 55, 7-34.

Park, Sang-Hyun. (2020, February 16). Hanok in the old city centre, adding traditional colours to historical ancient cities. *Yonhapnews*. Retrieved July 18, 2022, from https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200214132100005?input=1195m

Parsons, T. (1951). *The Social System*. Glencoe: Free Press.

Pascale, C. (2011). *Cartographies of knowledge exploring qualitative epistemologies*. Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London: SAGE.

Patten, A. (2010). The most natural state: Herder and nationalism. *History of Political Thought*, 31(4), 657-689.

Pendlebury, J. (2002). Conservation and Regeneration: Complementary or Conflicting Processes? The Case of Grainger Town, Newcastle upon Tyne. *Planning, Practice & Research,* 17(2), 145-158.

Pendlebury, J. (2008). *Conservation in the Age of Consensus*. London: Routledge.

Pendlebury, J. (2013) 'Conservation values, the authorised heritage discourse and the conservation-planning assemblage', *International journal of heritage studies: IJHS*, 19(7), 709–727.

Pendlebury, J. (2015) Heritage and Policy. Waterton, E, & Watson, S. Eds. *The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Heritage Research*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Pendlebury, J., et al (2020). After the Crash: The conservation-planning assemblage in an era of austerity. *European Planning Studies,* 28(4), 672-690

Pendlebury, J., & Porfyriou, H. (2017) 'Heritage, urban regeneration and place-making', *Journal of urban design,* 22(4), 429–432.

Pendlebury, J., & Strange, I. (2011). Centenary paper: Urban conservation and the shaping of the English city. *Town Planning Review,* 82(4), 361-392.

Pfau, T., & Mitchell, R. (2010). Romanticism and Modernity. *European Romantic Review,* 21(3), 267-273.

Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. *The American Political Science Review, 94(2),* 251–267. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586011

Plevoets, B., & Sowińska-Heim, J. (2018). Community initiatives as a catalyst for regeneration of heritage sites: Vernacular transformation and its influence on the formal adaptive reuse practice. *Cities,* 78, 128-139.

Póvoa, D. (2023). 'The festival is ours': Power dynamics of community participation in the Alter do Chão Film Festival. *International Journal of Cultural Studies,* 26(2), pp.200-215. https://doi-org.libproxy.ncl.ac.uk/10.1177/13678779231154288

Prangnell, J., Ross, A., & Coghill, B. (2010). Power relations and community involvement in landscape-based cultural heritage management practice: An Australian case study. International Journal of Heritage Studies : IJHS, 16(1-2), 140-155.

Preite, M. (2012). Urban regeneration and planning. In: Douet, J. (ed). *Industrial heritage re-tooled: The TICCIH guide to industrial heritage conservation,* 101-109. New York: Routledge

President Kim, 1st place in the popularity survey. (1993, April 8). *Maeil Business News Korea.* Retrieved July 18, 2021, from https://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.naver?articleId=1993041800099102013&editNo=15&printCount=1&publishDate=1993-04-18&officeId=00009&pageNo=2&printNo=8390&publishType=00010

Pretty, J. (1995). Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture. *World Development*, 23(8), 1247–1263.

Proksch, S. (2016). *Conflict management.* Vienna: Springer. Retrieved December 12, 2022, from https://www.springer.com/series/10101

Prott, L., & O'Keefe, P. (1992). 'Cultural Heritage' or 'Cultural Property'? *International Journal of Cultural Property,* 1(2), 307-320.

Purnell, J. (2002). Citizens and sons of the pueblo: National and local identities in the making of the Mexican nation. *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 25(2), 213-237.

Rampley, M., et al. (2012). *Heritage, Ideology, and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe. 1st edition.* Vol. 6. United Kingdom: Boydell & Brewer.

Reed, M. (1997). Power Relationships and Community Based Tourism Planning. *Annals of Tourism Research,* 21, 566–591.

Reinharz, S., & Heller, K. (1984). *Psychology and community change: challenges of the future.* Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks.

Rho, Hyeong-Seok. (2021, February 8). National Treasure No. 1 Sungnyemun?... Cultural heritage designation number disappears. *The Hankyoreh.* Retrieved June 18, 2021, from https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/culture_general/982394.html

Rho, Sa-Shin. et al. (1486). Survey of the Geography of Joseon. Retrieved September 3, 2020, from
https://db.itkc.or.kr/dir/item?itemId=KP#/dir/node?dataId=ITKC_KP_B002A_0010_000_0010

Rifkin, S. B., & Pridmore, P. (2001). *Partners in planning: information, participation and empowerment*. London: Macmillan.

Robertson, I. (2008). Heritage from Below: Class, Social Protest and Resistance. In: Graham, B. & Howard, P. (Eds). *The Ashgate research companion to heritage and identity*, 143-158. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Roberts, P. (2016). The evolution, definition and purpose of urban regeneration. In: Roberts, P., Sykes, H., & Granger, (eds). *Urban Regeneration,* 2nd edition*,* 9-43. London: SAGE.

Rodopoulou, T. C. (2016). Heritage-led regeneration in the UK — preserving historic values or masking commodification? A reflection on the case of King's Cross, London. In: Hein, C. (ed). *International Planning History Society Proceedings, 17th IPHS Conference, History-Urbanism- Resilience*, *TUDelft 17-21*, 4. 75-87.

Rosetti, I., et al. (2022). Heritage and sustainability: Regulating participation. *Sustainability,* 14(3), 1674. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14031674

Rose, N. (1996). The death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government, *International Journal of Human Resource Management,* 25(3), 327-356.

Ruskin, J. (1849). *The Seven Lamps of Architecture.* Project Gutenberg.

Russell, H. (2008) *Community engagement: Some lessons from the New Deal for Communities*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government.

Ryu, Ho-Cheol. (2014). The Need and the Direction to Improve the System of Measures for the Preservation of Buried Cultural Heritage. *Korean Journal of Cultural Heritage Studies,* 47(3), pp.146-159.

Ryu, Young-ah. & Chae, Kyung-jin. (2017). Analysis of conflicts between the government and local residents according to cultural heritage preservation policies. *The Journal of Korean Policy Studies,*17(1),1-19.

Sanoff, H. (1999). *Community participation methods in design and planning*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Savini, F. (2011). The Endowment of Community Participation: Institutional Settings in Two Urban Regeneration Projects, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,* 35(5), 949-968.

Seitsonen, O. (2017). Crowdsourcing cultural heritage: public participation and conflict legacy in Finland. *Journal of Community Archaeology & Heritage,* 4(2), pp.115–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/20518196.2016.1252129

Seoul Metropolitan Government. (n.d). *Criteria for Urban Regeneration Activation Districts selection.* Retrieved November 15, 2022, from https://uri.seoul.go.kr/web/main/contents/M010-02-02.

Schofield, J. (2014). *Who Needs Experts? Counter-mapping Cultural Heritage (Heritage, Culture and Identity).* Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.

Schramm, K. (2015). Heritage, Power and Ideology. Waterton, E, & Watson, S. Eds. *The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Heritage Research.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Sengupta, I. (2018). Preservation between empire, nation and nationalisms: the problem of history and heritage in India. *Nations and Nationalism,* 24(1), pp.110–130. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12376

Shim, Kyeong-Mi. (2021). Performance and development direction of the Ancient Cities Preservation and Promotion Project. *Planing and policy,* vol.481, 6-12. Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements.

Shim, Seung-Koo. (2012). The Meaning of Urban Regeneration Through the Restoration and the Representation of Historical Spaces: Focusing on the Hwaseong Fortress. *Humanities Contents,* 25, 39–67.

Shipley, R., & Snyder, M. (2013). The role of heritage conservation districts in achieving community economic development goals, *International Journal of Heritage Studies,* 19:3, 304-321.

Silberman, N. (2014). Changing Visions of Heritage Value: What Role Should the Experts Play? *Ethnologies (Québec),* 36(1-2), 433-445.

Silverman, D. (2006). *Interpreting qualitative data* (Third ed.). London: Sage.

Silverman, H., & Ruggles, D. (2007). *Cultural heritage and human rights (Cultural heritage in a globalised world).* New York: Springer.

Smith, L. (2006). *Uses of Heritage*. Florence: Routledge.

Smith, L. (2008). Heritage, Gender and Identity. In: Graham, B. & Howard, P. (eds). *The Ashgate research companion to heritage and identity*, 159-178. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Smith, R. W. (1973). A theoretical basis for participatory planning. *Policy sciences,* 4(3), 275-295.

Sohn Jin-Sang. (2010). A Study of Legal System concerning the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Cities. *Public Law Journal,* 11(1), pp.295-323.

Song, Bo-Mi. (2015, March 30). Hanok, from a 'house to see' to a 'house to live'. *Economic Review.* Retrieved July 2, 2022, from https://www.econovill.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=239778

Song, Jong-Wook. (2013, January, 23). Guidelines for the Gyeongju Development Plan written in the handwriting of former President Park Chung-hee. *Yeongnam News.* Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.yeongnam.com/web/view.php?key=20130123.010020754450001

Stake, R. (1995). *The art of case study research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Statistics Korea. (n.d). National Statistics Portal. Retrieved February 11, 2023, from https://kosis.kr/

Strange, I., & Whitney, D. (2003). The changing roles and purposes of heritage conservation in the UK, *Planning, Practice & Research,* 18(2-3), 219-229.

Sully, D. (2013). Conservation Theory and Practice: Materials, Values, and People in Heritage Conservation, In: Macdonald, S., et al. (eds). *The International Handbooks of Museum Studies*, 293-314. NewYork: Wiley-Blackwell.

Swenson, A. (2013a). The heritage of empire. In: Swenson, A. & Mandler, P. (eds). *Plunder to Preservation: Britain and the Heritage of Empire*, c. 1800–1940. Oxford: OUP/British Academy.

Swenson, A. (2013b). *The rise of heritage: Preserving the past in France, Germany and England, 1789-1914 (New studies in European history).* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Talò, C., Mannarini, T., & Rochira, A. (2014). Sense of Community and Community Participation: A Meta-Analytic Review. *Social Indicators Research*, 117(1), 1-28.

Tarn, J. N. (1985). Urban Regeneration: The Conservation Dimension, *Town planning review*, 56(2), 245–268.

Taylor, K. (2004) Cultural heritage management: a possible role for charters and principles in Asia, *International Journal of Heritage Studies,* 10:5, 417-433, DOI: 10.1080/1352725042000299045

Thelen, K. (2000). Timing and Temporality in the Analysis of Institutional Evolution and Change. *Studies in American Political Development,* 14(1), 101–108. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X00213035

The end of the building of the Japanese Government-General of Korea. (2016, September 28). *Chosun Daily.* Retrived December 12, 2021, from https://bemil.chosun.com/nbrd/gallery/view.html?b_bbs_id=10044&num=206436.

The Japanese government was also furious with teaching manners. (1995, November, 17). *Chosun Daily.* https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/1995/11/17/1995111770024.html

Thomas, P. (2010). Failed and Friendless: The UK's 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Programme. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 12*(3), pp.442-458. https://doi-org.libproxy.ncl.ac.uk/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2010.00422.x

Tosun, C. (2000). Limits to Community Participation in the Tourism Development Process in Developing Countries. *Tourism Management*, 21, 613–633.

Tracy, S. (2013). *Qualitative research methods collecting evidence, crafting analysis, communicating impact.* Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Tunbridge, J. (1984). Whose heritage to conserve? Cross-Cultural reflections upon political dominance and urban heritage conservation. *The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe Canadien,* 28, 171–180.

UNESCO World Heritage Centre. (1992–2023). Baekje Historic Areas. Retrieved May 16, 2023, from https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1477

UNESCO. (1972). *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*. Retrieved July 22, 2021, from https://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/

UNESCO. (2007). *31st session of World Heritage Committee*. Retrieved September 16, 2021, from https://whc.unesco.org/en/sessions/31COM/documents/

Van Beurden, J. (2022). *Inconvenient Heritage: Colonial Collections and Restitution in the Netherlands and Belgium.* Amsterdam University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2pnjvmx

Van Niekerk, L., & Savin-Baden, M. (2010). Relocating truths in the qualitative research paradigm. In: Savin-Baden, M., & Major, C. H. (eds). *New Approaches to Qualitative Research: Wisdom and Uncertainty*. 28-36. London: Routledge.

Van Oers, R. (2009). Sleeping with the enemy? Private sector involvement in world heritage preservation. *In Proceedings of the Xth World Congress of the Organization of World Heritage Cities*, Quito, Ecuador, 8-11.

Veitch, M. (2015). Proud Heritage: People, Issues, and Documents of the LGBT Experience, *Reference and User Services Quarterly*, 55(1), 77.

Veldpaus, L., & Bokhove, H. (2019). Integrating Policy: The Historic Urban Landscape Approach in Amsterdam. In: Roders, A. P., & Bandarin, F. (eds). *Reshaping urban conservation: the historic urban landscape approach in action*, 2, 111-122. Singapore: Springer.

Viñals, M. J., & Morant, M. (2012). Heritage, tourism and local community interactions within the framework of site management. *Community development through world heritage*, 40-48.

Urry, J. (1995). *Consuming places (International library of sociology)*. London; New York: Routledge.

Wallerstein, N. et al. (2019). Power Dynamics in Community-Based Participatory Research: A Multiple–Case Study Analysis of Partnering Contexts, Histories, and Practices. *Health Education & Behavior,* 46, pp.19-32. doi:10.1177/1090198119852998

Walker, D. (2011). Towards a Beneficial World Heritage: Community Involvement in the Blaenavon Industrial Landscape, *Museum International,* 63:1-2, 25-33, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0033.2012.01760.x

Waterton, E., & Watson, S. (2010). *Heritage and community engagement: Collaboration or contestation?* London: Routledge.

Waterton, E., & Smith, L. (2010). The recognition and misrecognition of community heritage. *International Journal of Heritage Studies,* 16:1-2, pp.4-15, DOI: 10.1080/13527250903441671

Weber-Newth, F. (2019). *The Game of Urban Regeneration*. Bielefeld: transcript. doi: https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839444863-007

Westad, O. (2021). *Empire and Righteous Nation.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wiktor-Mach, D. (2019). Cultural heritage and development: UNESCO's new paradigm in a changing geopolitical context. *Third World Quarterly*. 40-9. 1593-1612.

Wilshusen, P. R., et al. (2002). Reinventing a square wheel: Critique of a resurgent "protection paradigm" in international biodiversity conservation. *Society & natural resources,* 15(1), 17-40.

Winter, T. (2015) Heritage and Nationalism: An Unbreachable Couple? In: Waterton, E., & Watson, S. (eds). *The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Heritage Research,* 331-345. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

World Bank Open Data. (n.d.). *Population density (people per sq. km of land area) - OECD members*. Retrieved March 13, 2023, from, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST?locations=OE

Worldmapper. (2021). *Republic of Korea (South Korea) Gridded Population*. Retrieved September 24, 2021, from https://worldmapper.org/maps/gridded-population-kor/

Woo, Sung-Kee. (2011). A Study on Legislation for Sustainable Protection of Cultural Properties. *Administrative Law Jounal,* 31, 1-22.

Woo, Young-Tak. (2021, August 3). 1 trillion won every year for 10 years 'Local Extinction fund' issued to the locals. *Sedaily.* Retrieved February 18, 2023, from https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/22Q1M7V3MH

Yang, Wol-Soo. (2013). Public design direction research for the activation of the centre of the Ancient Cities. *Design Convergence Research*, 12(6), 177–193.

Yeon, Jae-Min. (2013, September 15). Historic site 'Gongsanseong Fortress' collapse... Suspicion of influence of the 4 Major Rivers Project. *News 1 Korea.* Retrieved July 18, 2021, from https://www.news1.kr/articles/?1324345

Yi, Hwang-Jik. (2010). A Cultural Study on the Structure and Narratives of Modern Korean Nationalism. *Culture & Society,* 8, 83-127.

Yin, R. (2009). *Case study research: Design and methods* (4th ed., Applied social research methods v. 5). Los Angeles, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Yoon Jong-Seok. (2017, October 26). Urban Regeneration New Deal pilot project competition rate 3 to 1… 212 applications out of 70. *Yunhapnews.* Retrieved February 4, 2022, from https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20171026133900003

Yuksel, F., Bramwell, B., & Yuksel, A. (1999). Stakeholder Interviews and Tourism Planning at Pamukkale. *Turkey Tourism Management,* 20, 351-360.

Yu, Young-Gyu. (2020, June 1). December 16 measures, 5 months... Gangnam apartments were caught at 2%, but Seongbuk-gu increased by 10%. *SBS News.* Retrieved July 16, 2022, from

Bibliography

https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1005813542&plink=COPYPASTE&cooper=SBSNEWSEND

Zhu, Y. (2022). Hot interpretations of difficult heritage: The Memorial Hall of the Nanjing Massacre in China. *Journal of Cultural Heritage Management and Sustainable Development,* 12(1), pp.32–44. https://doi.org/10.1108/JCHMSD-05-2021-0085