WHEN SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES FAIL: EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF OPPORTUNISM AND THE ROLE OF RELATIONAL NORMS

by

Tran Nguyen Thu Phuong

A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Newcastle University
Newcastle University Business School

Supervisors:

Professor Fred Lemke

Professor Matthew Gorton

DECLARATION

This thesis and the work to which it refers are the results of my own efforts. Any ideas, data, images, or text resulting from the work of others (whether published or unpublished) are fully identified as such within the work and attributed to their originator in the text, bibliography or in footnotes. This thesis has not been submitted in whole or in part for any other academic degree or professional qualification.

Study 1 of this thesis has been published in the *Journal of Business Research* in April 2021. Therefore, a part of the content of the thesis is identical with the refereed paper:

Tran, P. N. T., et al. (2021). "When supplier development initiatives fail: Identifying the causes of opportunism and unexpected outcomes." Journal of Business Research 127: 277-289.

Phuong Tran

ABSTRACT

Supplier development initiatives refer to actions by buyers to improve a supplier's performance and/or capabilities, and are often described as a 'win-win' for both buyers and their suppliers. However, supplier development initiatives can be ineffective and stimulate opportunistic behaviour by suppliers, so that the investments made by buyers are counterproductive. The thesis investigates this 'dark-side' of supplier-buyer relationships. Specifically, it studies (a) the relationships between supplier development initiatives, relational norms, and supplier opportunism, and (b)seeks to understand the factors that increase the likelihood of a positive outcome (improvements in the buyer's performance) and decrease supplier opportunism.

Informed by transaction cost and social exchange theories, and drawing on the case of fresh fruit and vegetable supply chains in Vietnam, the thesis comprises of two studies. The first study utilises thematic analysis and qualitative comparative analysis to analyse the relationships between specific supplier development initiatives and forms of opportunism, considering the role of relational norms. While often regarded as reducing the likelihood of opportunism, the study identifies a specific relational norm, norms of opportunism in supply chain relationships, which sanction a degree of opportunistic behaviour. The second study introduces and validates a model of supplier development, considering both negative and positive outcomes simultaneously. The analysis based on structural equation modelling indicates that supplier development not only can help improve a buyer's performance, but also simultaneously increases supplier opportunism. However, the degree to which supplier development initiatives lead to positive or negative outcomes depend on goal congruence and long-term orientation.

The research contributes to supply chain management theory and aids practitioners by investigating how buyers can address opportunism, so that supplier development initiatives curb supplier opportunism rather than trigger it. Supplier development initiatives should be designed to fostering suppliers' long-term orientation and goal congruence between parties.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Five years ago, when I was about to accept a PhD offer from another institution, I received an invitation to a PhD interview at Newcastle University. This great conversation with my prospective supervisors changed my mind and I never looked back. This has been a long PhD journey with lots of up and down, but it has been an incredible journey for me.

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Fred Lemke and Professor Matthew Gorton, for their valuable guidance and support during my PhD journey. I can never thank them enough for their endless patience, encouragement, and care that has helped me overcome the most challenging moments in the past five years. I would never have imagined me accomplishing my PhD or having internationally recognised publications without them. Prof. Lemke has always given me great challenges along with constructive feedback and thoughtful guidance for me to go beyond my comfort zone. My admiration extends to his long-term vision and excellent skills toward collaborations within the academic networks, as well as his attention-to-detail attitude. Prof. Gorton has always been very patient and takes good care of me in every situation I have been through even before I arrived in the UK. He always has time for me in between his busy schedule and has given me helpful advice, not only on my academic journey but also on other life matters. I see my supervisors as role models in supervising and mentoring students, and what I have learned from them influences how I will treat my students and shapes my do-able attitude toward my career path. I feel deeply grateful to be their PhD student.

I would like to acknowledge the Ministry of Education and Training in Vietnam, whose funding in four years has allowed me to pursue the highest degree in education. I would also like to thank the University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City (UEH) for supporting me in securing the grant and partly funding me for my data collection. My thanks are extended to Newcastle University, who gave me funding for attending training workshops and conferences and provided me with a laptop and equipment for a comfortable working environment at home during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Data collection was a difficult task that I could not have accomplished without support from various people. I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tran Tien Khai, Dr. Ngo Thi Ngoc Huyen, Dr. Nguyen Thi Doan Tran, Lecturer Le Thanh Nhan, Lecturer Luong Vinh Quoc Duy, Lecturer Tran Hong Hai from UEH, Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Hoa from Ho Chi Minh City Department of Industry and Trade; Mr. Pham Quoc Liem from Unifarm; Dr. Doan Huu Tien from the

Southern Horticultural Research Institute; Mr. Dang Phuc Nguyen from Vietnam Fruit and Vegetables Association; Ms. Phan Thi Xuan Dieu from Ho Chi Minh City Institute for Development Studies and my friends - Tong Hong Anh, Vo Nguyen Giang Tu, Do Bich Van, Tran Sy Quy, Le Thi Nguyet Giang, Huy Phan and Nguyen Lam Phuong for supporting me in getting contacts with organisations of interest. My thanks go to all the managers who spent their time being interviewed. Special thanks to my support team, including my students Thao Linh, Thuy Linh, Tan Loc, and Milestones company, for assisting me in doing fieldwork. I also appreciate the work of my inter-coders, Dr. Linh Pham, Dr. Anh Nghiem, Lecturer Duong Nguyen, Ha Sherry and Vi Tran who helped validate my interview data.

I very much appreciate Ms Carolyn Watkin - Education Administrator PGR, the admin team, the finance team, and the IT service at Newcastle University Business School for their efficient services. I benefited from working in the PhD office with the facilities and services I need to fulfil my tasks. I will not forget to mention HASS faculty, the University lecturers and NARTI for their helpful training workshops which has equipped me with essential skills to accomplish my research. Thanks also go to Ms Hoang Thi Kim Oanh - Principal Official of International Education Division at MOET, the Personnel department and Finance and Accounting department at UEH for their support with paperwork and my funding.

I am grateful to have many good friends in the UK and Europe who have given me great peer supports whenever I need it. Many thanks to Ade, Kamran, Martin, Rosie, Rainy, and Ahmed - my PhD colleagues, for sharing memorable times together in Newcastle and helping me in house moving. Thanks to Andrea Lane for your helpful information, kind sharing, passion in connecting people, and the writing group initiative with Adrienne and Katie, which makes me feel included and motivates me to get the writing done. Special thanks to Irene, Stefan, and Schaedel's family in Germany, who always welcomed me and treated me like a family member. Not to forget Palma, Eva, Alex, and Ankit, my friends from Leeds time for the solid connections and memorable events over the years despite the physical distance. I would also like to thank Margi Patterson from Newcastle whose kindness and caring make me feel like having my mom around.

I would like to extend my gratitude to my Vietnamese friends in the UK and in Vietnam. I cannot thank Linh Pham, Anh Nghiem, and Khanh Hoang enough for accompanying me throughout the PhD journey. They have always encouraged me, helped me believe in myself, given me advice on various matters and choices, and spent time with me through joy and sorrow. I would like to acknowledge other 911 friends, including Hang Nguyen, Bao Vi, Tra Hoang, Linh Kate, Trang Vu and Ninh Hoang for sharing experiences and hosting me on my short trips. Thanks, Diem My Do, Phuong Duong, and Trang Quynh To, my long-time childhood friends, for including me on special occasions and making me feel home. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Nghi Vo for the thoughtful talks between us. Thank you Nghi and his family for welcoming me to their home in London on my first days in the UK and for the bicycle which has been of use for the last three years. I would also like to thank Dory, Ha, Vi, Thao, Hoa, Hien, Nhat, Trang, and other Vietnamese friends in Newcastle, for our fun gathering times and delicious Vietnamese foods, which helped me overcome homesickness. Thanks should also go to my travel buddies and best friends in Vietnam, Hannah Huyen Tran, Giang Duong, and Thanh Le, who have shared many memorable trips with me, helped me to take care of my parents in Vietnam and talked with me every day. I am grateful to have Hoang Anh, Ngoc Mai as my best lifetime friends who are always beside me and listen to me whenever I need them the most. Thanks, Quynh Thu, my close friend and colleague at UEH, who has matched milestones with me since our undergraduate journeys, which let us have a lot in common to share during our PhD journey. I gratefully acknowledge other colleagues at UEH and other friends in Vietnam who occasionally help me in various matters.

This thesis is completed in remembrance of my late grandparents, whom I hope will be proud of me in heaven. Not being with you in the last moment of your lives was one of the most significant trade-offs for my PhD, but I know you both will be happy to see me grow. Special thanks to my extended family, my aunties, uncles, and cousins for their love, support, and encouragement in every milestone of my life.

Last but certainly not least, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my parents, who love me unconditionally, sacrifice for me, believe in me, and take good care of themselves to let me freely follow my dream. I love you to the moon and back.

Newcastle, 22 September 2021

Phuong Tran

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS	FULL VERSION/EXLAINATION
AVE	Average Variance Extracted
B2B	Business to Business
CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI	Comparative Fit Index
CMV	Common Method Variance
CR	Composite Reliability
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
EUBio	European Organic
EFA	Explanatory Factor Analysis
fsQCA	Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
GlobalG.A.P	Global Good Agricultural Practice
HTMT ratio	heterotrait-monotrait ratio
KMO	Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
ML	Maximum Likelihood
NASAA	North American Securities Administrators Association
Pclose	probability of close fit
PGS	Participatory Guarantee System
PLS-SEM	Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modelling
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RBV	Resource Based View
RMSEA	Root Mean Square Error
SD	Supplier Development
SET	Social Exchange Theory
SEM	Structural Equation Modelling
SRMR	Standardized Root Mean Residual
TCT	Transaction Cost Theory
TLI	Tucker-Lewis Index
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
VietGAP	Vietnamese Good Agricultural Practice

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction and Rationale

In supply chains, improving the quality and quantity of suppliers' outputs is a major concern. Buyers increasingly seek to create sustainable supply chains in co-operation with their suppliers, recognising that suppliers' capabilities affect, either directly or indirectly, their costs, quality, delivery, and level of technological competence (Krause and Scannell, 2002). Consequently, firms often seek to enhance the capabilities of their suppliers through supplier development initiatives, which are "any effort by a buying firm to improve a supplier's performance and/or capabilities to meet the manufacturing firm's short- and/or long-term supply needs" (Krause et al., 1999, p.206). Both suppliers and buyers can benefit from the implementation of supplier development initiatives (e.g.,Wagner, 2010; Li et al., 2012). They can lead to positive outcomes such as improved product and delivery performance (Wagner, 2010), as well as the enhancement of suppliers' operational potential (Krause et al., 1998). Therefore, the outcomes of supplier development initiatives are often characterised as a 'win-win' for suppliers and buyers alike (Pilar et al., 2012).

Nevertheless, even when both suppliers and buyers recognise the importance of supplier development, these initiatives are not always successful and may have unintended consequences. Informed by transaction cost economics, it has long been argued that investments in suppliers by buyers may suffer from opportunism (Liu et al., 2014; Li et al., 2017b). For buyers that invest much time and resources in trying to improve their suppliers' performance, if they fall victim to supplier opportunism their investments can be counterproductive (Proch et al., 2017). At first sight, the supplier development initiative let to a positive outcome of order fulfilment. However, in practice it created an unintended form of opportunism. Consequently, realising 'win-win' benefits is not a default outcome, rather supplier development initiatives may create a 'win-lose' situation.

Emerging economies such as Vietnam often lack strong, formal institutions for contract enforcement (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002), negatively affecting both suppliers' and buyers' performance (Saenger et al., 2014). Under these conditions, exploring opportunistic behaviour in supply chains is necessary. It is common in agri-food supply chains for processors to provide credit and physical inputs to farmers as part of a contract (e.g., seeds, fertilisers). Yet, difficulties in monitoring and contract enforcement may allow farmers to misuse the investment (Bellemare, 2010). This can lead to buyers withdrawing support, with negative impacts on output quality, safety, and quantity of production (Gow and Swinnen, 2001). There is some evidence that such problems beset the Vietnamese agri-food sector (Cadilhon et al., 2006). For example, a cooperative funded an initiative to help their farmers to comply with national good agricultural practices (VietGap), to improve the quality of sourced products. Farmers accepted the agreements on following good practices, because they believed it advantageous financially to be certified. However, the farmers continued to deliberately use chemicals on their farms which were not permitted under VietGap certification (Nam, 2014a). Thus, this research aims to understand the relationships between supplier development initiatives, opportunism and performance improvement in the context of Vietnam.

The extant literature notes that business-to-business relationships may suffer from a ‘dark-side’ (Abosag et al., 2016). Specifically, previous research considers relationship damage (Samaha et al., 2011), the potential disadvantages of being involved in close relationships (Mitręga and Zolkiewski, 2012), and how value co-creation activities (Chowdhury et al., 2016) may become ‘dark’. However, to date, very few studies consider the potential downsides of supplier development initiatives in business relationships and the circumstances under which they stimulate, rather than curb, opportunistic behaviours by suppliers. Exceptions include Huo et al. (2016b), who discern that buyer-specific investments increase the likelihood of suppliers engaging in opportunistic behaviour, arguing that the former is a risky, non-transferable investment. Moreover, when participating in supplier development initiatives, suppliers may behave opportunistically if they perceive a missing control mechanism (Li et al., 2017b). Others also note that one-sided investments in relationship-specific assets are sensitive to opportunistic behaviour, especially in an unpredictable business environment (Hawkins et al., 2008; Proch et al., 2017). According to Abosag et al. (2016) and Samaha et al. (2011), opportunism represents a natural dark-side of business relationships. Hence, within the scope of this research, opportunism is considered as a ‘dark-side’ of supplier development.

The opportunism literature draws on transaction cost theory, recognising how different governance mechanisms may affect the likelihood of opportunism (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Much of this work considers differences between internal (within a single firm) and external (market relations between two or more independent actors) relationships. However, it is increasingly acknowledged that intermediate or hybrid governance structures such as vertical interorganisational relationships may be preferable (Heide, 1994). This is because hybrid governance structures combine formal mechanisms (e.g., contractual provision, equity arrangements) and informal mechanisms (e.g., information sharing, joint planning) to achieve internal like organisational features while reaping the rewards of exchange between actors with different core competencies and assets (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Supplier development can be considered as a hybrid governance structure, in that a buyer remains independent from the seller but through formal and informal relationship support measures seeks to improve product and delivery performance (Wagner, 2010). This increases suppliers' satisfaction and their commitment to a particular buyer (Ghijsen et al., 2010). In the literature, hybrid governance structures that incorporate supplier development initiatives are often characterised as a 'win-win' for suppliers and buyers (Pilar et al., 2012). This is especially the case where the latter gains greater control over the quality of production and the supplier receives appropriate incentives for learning new skills and production techniques (Ghijsen et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017b; Zhang et al., 2017). It is apparent that the literature pays less attention to the circumstances under which hybrid governance mechanisms fail and induce opportunism. In other words, it is still unclear what supplier development initiatives, under specific conditions, are more likely to stimulate opportunism rather than advance the buyer's performance.

Supplier development research has been conducted within the framework of transaction cost theory (Humphreys et al., 2004; Li et al., 2017b), the resource-based view (Krause et al., 2000), and resource dependence theory (Carr et al., 2008). Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) proposes that investments in a supplier can make buyers more dependent on that business relationship, therefore, endangering them to greater risk and uncertainty (Humphreys et al., 2004). The Resource-Based View (RBV) assumes that firms possess various resources (i.e., assets, capabilities, and input resources) and should focus on using them in a manner that is difficult to imitate (Barney, 2001). These should form the basis of the firm's competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1995). Other less important resources, activities, or non-core capabilities can be allocated to external parties but require incentives and processes to ensure that suppliers act in a manner that protects and enhances the resources of the buyer. Resource dependence theory seeks to explain why suppliers are willing to engage with supplier development activities (Krause et al., 2000). Specifically, selling substantial amounts to a particular buyer increases dependency on this relationship, making the supplier more willing to cooperate with the buyer's supplier development initiatives, such as participating in a buyer's training (Modi and Mabert, 2007) and product development activities (Takeishi, 2001). All three of these theoretical frameworks focus on structural or strategic perspectives, which abound in B2B research. In contrast, the social aspects of relationships, which are more commonly studied in B2C and C2C research, have received much less attention in the supplier development literature (Shahzad et al., 2018). Specifically, while the notion that economic exchanges are influenced by social norms is central to economic sociology (Granovetter, 1985; Gibbons, 1999; Bercovitz et al., 2006), how social aspects affect the likelihood of supplier development initiatives leading to either positive (performance improvement) or negative (supplier opportunism) outcomes remains under-researched.

As a means to curtail opportunism in supply chain relationships (Liu et al., 2009; Huo et al., 2016a), previous studies highlight the role of relational norms (e.g., Brown et al., 2000; Tangpong et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2015; Huo et al., 2016a; Paswan et al., 2017). Relational norms are an informal governance mechanism, potentially mitigating opportunistic behaviours in exchange relationships. Previous research largely regards relational norms as positively affecting supply chain outcomes (Brown et al., 2000; Tangpong et al., 2010). However, it is argued that the literature overlooks relational norms that define commonly acceptable, dark-side behaviours. For instance, business partners may expect and tolerate to some extent wrongdoing from each other, on the basis that these are widespread within a particular context. Such norms of opportunism reinforce related behaviour.

1.2 Research Aims and Objectives.

Since the effects of supplier development initiatives on opportunism and the circumstances under which investments in supplier development trigger or suppress opportunistic behaviour by suppliers is uncertain, this research aims to explore those effects. Moreover, drawing on Social Exchange Theory (SET), as introduced by Emerson (1976), this research seeks to uncover the social exchange factors that mediate the relationships between supplier development initiatives, performance improvement and supplier opportunism. Hence, this thesis investigates three research questions:

(1) to what extent, and under what circumstances, do supplier development initiatives curb and/or stimulate supplier opportunism?

(2) how do relational norms affect the relationship between supplier development and opportunism in supply chains?

(3) how do relational norms facilitate positive outcomes (i.e., performance improvement) and negative outcomes (i.e., opportunism) of supplier development initiatives?

1.3 Research Methodology

To answer the three research questions, this research employs a mixed-methods research approach, consisting of two studies. Study 1 is designed to answer research questions (1) and (2). Study 2's focus is to answer research question (3), but also gives further insights in addressing research questions (1) and (2). *Table 1.1* provides a summary of the research gaps, research questions and corresponding research method for each study.

As the literature acknowledges that theoretical and empirical work to date underplays opportunistic behaviour stemming from supplier development initiatives (Proch et al., 2017) and the potential role played by negative relational norms, Study 1 suits a qualitative, theory building design. The goal of study 1 is to uncover how supplier development activities curtail or stimulate opportunistic behaviour and to conceptualise norms of opportunism. To generate insight, in-depth interviews with both buyers and suppliers in fruit and vegetable supply chains in Vietnam were conducted. In-depth interviews provided access to key buyers and suppliers, who were willing to discuss issues confidentially, including their motivations, experiences and behaviour when dealing with their business partners. To analyse further the qualitative data, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was employed in Study 1 to examine the causal conditions that lead to opportunistic behaviour. QCA uses a case-oriented 'set theory' approach to understand the combinations of conditions that jointly contribute to outcomes of interest. This entails identifying the mutual conditions of cases that feature the same outcome (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 2000; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). This study employs fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), which provides a more fine-grained analysis than the crisp-set variant, by classifying social phenomena to sets using partial membership rather than instances only of full (1) or non-membership (0) of sets (Ragin, 2008).

Study 2 develops and validates a research model using covariance-based Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), considering supplier development as an independent variable, buyer performance improvement and supplier opportunism. Three social factors (i.e., goal congruence, long-term orientations, and role integrity) are justified as mediators for the relationship between supplier development and buyer performance as well as supplier developments. The study tests eight hypotheses in addressing the thesis' research question 3. Empirical work was conducted in Vietnam, focusing on the agri-food sector.

Table 1.1 - Summary of the research gaps, research questions and methodology

The overall research gap: The literature overlooks the 'win-lose' potential of supplier development, regarding supplier development as a 'win-win' scenario for both buyers and suppliers in the supply chain.	
Study 1	
Research gap	The effects of supplier development initiatives on opportunism and the circumstances under which investments in supplier development trigger or suppress opportunistic behaviour by suppliers is unclear.
Research question(s)	*(1) to what extent, and under what circumstances, do supplier development initiatives curb and/or stimulate supplier opportunism?* *(2) how do relational norms affect the relationship between supplier development and opportunism in supply chains?*
Research method	Qualitative approach, utilising thematic analysis and fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.
Study 2	
Research gap	Lack of research considering social factors that facilitate supplier development outcomes.
Research question(s)	*(3) How do relational norms facilitate the positive outcomes (i.e., performance improvement) and negative outcomes (i.e., opportunism) of supplier development initiatives?*
Research method	Quantitative approach, utilising covariance-based Structural Equation Modelling.

1.4 The Vietnam Context

The country has two main types of domestic food supply chains for fresh fruit and vegetables: wet markets and supermarkets. Market based, rather than hybrid or internal governance arrangements, predominate. Within wet markets, regulations are poorly enforced (Cadilhon et al., 2006; Maruyama and Trung, 2007; Shepherd and Tam, 2008), with widespread concerns regarding food safety. In this situation, supplier performance is difficult to verify, and buyers require alternative governance structures in order to ensure food safety. In contrast, the supermarket sector is growing and more likely to insist on the certification of suppliers, to verify the quality of their produce (e.g., VietGap and GLOBALG.A.P – see section 4.4 for more information on these certifications). While hierarchical governance structures – where agri-food businesses bring production in-house (i.e., processors and retailers invest in their own farms) – provide greater control over product quality (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), they require considerable investment financially. This may stretch managerial time and competences. To avoid the problems of hierarchical structures, some supermarkets and their suppliers embraced hybrid governance structures. Specifically, they support farmers through credit and/or training, although these have not always delivered intended outcomes (Nam, 2014a; Nam, 2014b). Opportunistic behaviour remains widespread. Vietnam, thus, represents an appropriate context to investigate the phenomena of interest. To date the supply chain literature has mainly focused on North America and European Countries (Zhao et al., 2008;

Cannon et al., 2010) and there is very limited research on supply chain management in Vietnam (Geng et al., 2017a).

1.5 Summary of the Contribution of the Thesis

This thesis is the first to study the opportunistic behaviours of suppliers in the context of Vietnam's agri-food supply chains. Given the anecdotal evidence of opportunism in Vietnam, the thesis contributes to understanding how supplier opportunism may arise from supplier development initiatives in a specific context where legal enforcement is weak.

This research provides empirical evidence that supplier development initiatives, as an intermediate governance structure in business relationships, indeed have a 'dark side'. Specifically, study 1 documents the negative outcomes of different supplier development initiatives in Vietnam, which lead to specific forms of opportunistic behaviour such as cheating on product quality and quantity, inappropriate use of cash advances, failure to use physical inputs as intended, and breaking contracts to sell to competitors. Drawing on fuzzy set Qualitative Content Analysis (fsQCA), five configurations of supplier development initiatives and relational norms, which result in opportunistic behaviour were identified. The research also contributes to the literature on relational norm by identifying norms of opportunism in supplier-buyer relationships, which to date have been overlooked. The study explains how the existence of norms of opportunism is a critical factor in destroying supplier development efforts.

Study 2 makes three contributions. Firstly, the study confirms that supplier development has both a positive effect on the buyer's performance but also increases supplier opportunism. Second, the study extends the use of Social Exchange Theory in the supply chain context by examining the mediating role of social elements (i.e., goal congruence, supplier long-term orientation, and role integrity) in the relationships between supplier development initiatives and outcomes. Finally, while previous studies have often either emphasised the 'bright-side' of supplier development or have only considered the 'dark-side', the study captures both aspects and the factors increasing or decreasing the strength of negative and positive outcomes. The research, therefore, contributes to a nuanced assessment of supplier development, providing managerial recommendations for practitioners.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into seven chapters and structured as follows. This chapter (chapter 1) outlines the research gaps and gives an overview of the research. It is followed by chapter 2, which presents the relevant literature and the theoretical frameworks that inform the research, including Transaction Cost Theory and Social Exchange Theory. The conceptual framework and the development of hypotheses for testing in study 2 are discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 first discusses the philosophical worldview which informs the thesis and the rationale for a mixed-methods approach, which is followed by an overview of the Vietnam context. It then describes the research design for each study, including sampling technique, data collection, and data analysis procedures. The subsequent chapter (Chapter 5) presents the analysis and findings from Studies 1 and 2. Chapter 6 discusses the analysis and findings from the two studies. The thesis concludes with chapter 7, detailing the theoretical contributions and managerial contributions of the research. Chapter 7 also reflects on the limitations of the research and presents suggestions for future research. *Table 1.2* summaries the structure of the thesis.

Table 1.2 - Structure of the thesis

	Chapter title	**Chapter content**
Chapter 1	Introduction	Rational of the thesis Research aims, objectives and research questions Research methodology The Vietnam context Significant and contribution of the thesis Structure of the thesis
Chapter 2	Literature review	Literature review on supplier development, opportunism, and relational norms Theoretical framework: Transaction Cost Theory and Social Exchange Theory
Chapter 3	Conceptual framework	Hypothesis development The conceptual framework
Chapter 4	Methodology	Pragmatism in research philosophy The mixed-methods approach The Vietnam context and supply chain structure Research designs of Study 1 and Study 2
Chapter 5	Analysis and Findings	Study 1 findings from thematic analysis and fsQCA. SEM results for Study 2
Chapter 6	Discussion	Study 1 and Study 2 discussion
Chapter 7	Conclusion	Summaries of the thesis Theoretical and managerial contributions of the thesis Limitations and future research directions.

Chapter 2. **LITERATURE REVIEW**

2.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter reviews the extant literature as well as the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the thesis. Firstly, a thorough discussion of supplier development literature is presented, highlighting the 'win-win' scenario of supplier development in the supply chain. Section 2.3 reviews the relevant literature of opportunism, including its antecedents and control mechanism, whereas the next section (2.4 focuses on relational norms. Two theories (i.e., TCT and SET) which informed the research are considered in Section 2.5 followed by a discussion of the linkage between supplier development, opportunism, and relational norms.

2.2 Supplier Development

2.2.1 Definition and Classification

Supplier development (SD) can be defined as 'any effort by a buying firm to improve a supplier's performance and/or capabilities to meet the manufacturing firm's short- and/or long-term supply needs' (Krause et al., 1999, p. 206). Buying firms undertake supplier development as a result of suppliers' weak performance (reactive approach) or in order to increase supplier performance without any specific problem with the supplier (strategic approach) (Krause et al., 1998; Friedl and Wagner, 2016). Previous research in supplier development has studied a broad range of initiatives, including both low-risk and high-risk activities such as rewards to suppliers contingent on performance and supplier-specific investment, respectively (Krause and Scannell, 2002).

Prior research on supplier development indicates that buying firms employ various activities to improve suppliers' performance and/or capabilities (e.g., Wagner and Krause, 2009; Zhang et al., 2017). Such supplier development activities are highly dependent on specific situations. They are also subject to change as a result of aspects of the supplier development activity, parties (i.e., buyer, supplier) that will adopt the supplier development activity, and the environment in which the supplier-buyer relationships occur (Hahn et al., 1990). Considerable research classifies supplier development activities by the level of commitment from buyers to a specific supplier (e.g., Wagner, 2006; Ghijsen et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2011; Proch et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017). Consequently, supplier development activities include direct and indirect supplier development *(Table 2.1).*

Indirect supplier development occurs in the case of there being limited resources (or none) committed by buying firms (Proch et al., 2017). Rather, indirect supplier development activities include evaluating suppliers' operations, setting performance goals, and providing performance feedback. It also involves instilling competitive pressure and promising future business based on goal attainment or recognising suppliers' progress by designating them as preferred suppliers (Krause et al., 2000; Wagner, 2010). In order to satisfy buyers' requirements with these supplier development activities, suppliers could be encouraged to make an extra effort which could result in the unilateral deployment of relationship-specific investments (Proch et al., 2017). Indirect supplier development can improve suppliers' product and delivery performance as well as their capabilities (Wagner, 2010).

Table 2.1 - Supplier development practices

Supplier development Strategies	**Supplier Development Activities**	**Definition**	**How SD may affect to supplier and buyer performance**	**Source**
Indirect Supplier Development or Supplier Governance	Competitive pressure	When buyers are willing and able to switch suppliers, they apply competitive pressure. Consequently, current suppliers' performances become more competitive.	These activities promote vital information exchanges which should ultimately assist buyers and suppliers in enhancing their own performance.	(Krause and Ellram, 1997; Krause et al., 2000; Krause et al., 2007) (Blonska et al., 2013)
	Supplier incentives	Buyers reward the top suppliers with or increase the purchasing volume. This may inspire and stimulate competition among them.		
	Supplier assessment: evaluation and feedback	Buyers offer feedback to suppliers by assessing their quality, delivery, pricing, technical and management capabilities. Feedback assists suppliers in determining the areas that need improvement.		
Direct supplier Development Or Capability Development	Human-specific investment or Knowledge and qualifications transfer	Buyers give training and instruction to suppliers' workers or send a temporary workforce to work on-site at suppliers' facilities.	These actions improve supplier operations' efficiency, which has a direct impact on performance-related advantages such as lower costs, higher quality and flexibility, more dependable delivery, and shorter product development cycle times.	(Krause and Ellram, 1997; Krause et al., 2000; Krause et al., 2007; Wagner, 2010; Blonska et al., 2013)
	Capital-specific investment	Supplier received financial assistance in order to invest in equipment and tools.		
	Technologies	Buyers provide technical and quality expertise and advice.		

Contrastingly, buying firms play a more active role in direct supplier development. Such initiatives include the following: human-specific supplier development (e.g., training provided for suppliers' personnel, technical assistant, site visits, furnishing temporary on-site support to enhance further interaction) and capital-specific supplier development (e.g., providing equipment and tools, or even dedicating capital resources to suppliers) (Wagner and Krause, 2009; Ghijsen et al., 2010; Friedl and Wagner, 2016). Therefore, direct supplier development leads to bilateral deployment of relationship-specific investment because it presents a more collaborative approach based on frequent buyer-supplier exchanges (Proch et al., 2017). Supplier development activities can often support suppliers' improvement efforts. Moreover, direct supplier development results in a considerable enhancement in supplier capabilities (Wagner, 2010). It also encourages supplier commitment and satisfaction (Ghijsen et al., 2010), as well as stimulates improvements in quality, delivery, and flexibility (Krause et al., 2007). Furthermore, Krause et al. (2000) concluded that direct involvement activities, where the buying company internalises a significant amount of the supplier development effort, play a critical part in supplier performance improvement.

Furthermore, the most common classification of supplier development as indirect and direct activities, Sánchez-Rodríguez et al. (2005) classified supplier development initiatives. This was based on the extent to which buyers were committed to developing their suppliers, namely basic supplier, as well as moderate and advanced supplier development. These three levels of sophistication are based on buyers' involvement and investment regarding personnel, time, and capital that buyers who are devoted to their supplier development activities. For example, buyers limit their engagement and expenditure in order to improve supplier performance and/or capabilities to the lowest level in basic supplier development. This includes evaluating supplier performance and feedback, and standardising parts, providing qualifications for suppliers and limiting the number of suppliers on each sourcing item. In moderate supplier development, the level of buyer involvement and the complexity of development implementation are limited to activities such as on-site visits in order to evaluate supplier's facilities, giving rewards and identifying supplier's performance improvements, thereby enhancing materials by cooperating with suppliers and providing certifications for suppliers. Consequently, this requires a comparatively greater number of buyers' resources than basic supplier development practices (Sánchez-Rodríguez et al., 2005). Advanced supplier development requires the highest level of complexity in implementation and engagement of buyers with suppliers. This means providing credit and other resources for suppliers, involving them in the new product development process, and requiring them to share accounting information, cost and quality information. Thus, a greater use of buyers' resources than of moderate and basic supplier development initiatives is required (Sánchez-Rodríguez et al., 2005). By this classification, the authors identified the important interrelationships between basic, moderate and advanced supplier development practices. The results suggest that implementing one level of supplier development has no negative effect on another level of the practice, thus providing direction for designing improvement programmes as well as a significant incentive for the management to consider the strategies simultaneously. However, this result differs from the findings of Wagner (2010) who found that all types of supplier development activities should not be applied concurrently because this would be less effective.

2.2.2 The Implementation of Supplier Development

Extant research provides some insight into the factors that drive supplier development adoption and processes. Chen et al. (2016) uses the expectancy theory to provide a framework that posits the fundamental elements of motivation which drive buyers' supplier development adoption decisions such as expectancy, valence, and their interaction. Furthermore, Khan and Nicholson (2014) indicated a three-stage supplier development process, including the qualifying, evaluation and interactive stages. In each of these, a difference was apparent between the type of knowledge transfer, and the quality and level of interaction, direction and richness of communications and orientation. However, Matook et al. (2009) suggested that supplier development should be incorporated into a five-stage framwork in order to manage risk in the supply chain in which supplier development is seen as a component of supplier risk management responses. Nevertheless, in the socially sustainable supply chain, supplier development should commence with the purchasing process before any financial transactions occur (Cole and Aitken, 2019). Suppliers are required to demonstrate their commitment to sustainability by implementing improvement prior to transactions because this helps to align sustainability goals and to reduce risk. Similarly, Narasimhan et al. (2008) demonstrated the necessity to perform other activities prior to implementing supplier development. Therefore, it is essential for companies to focus on relationship and trust in building initiatives, and to conduct regular audits of the supplier perceptions on the level of trust and relational norms. Rezaei et al. (2015) proposed a novel and effective approach for developing suppliers by using supplier segmentation, the basis of which includes supplier willingness and capabilities. These important dimensions should be considered for application to suitable supplier development activities. According to (Modi and Mabert, 2007), evaluation and certification efforts are the most important supplier development activities that should be performed before implementing more intensive operational knowledge transfer activities such as site visits and supplier training.

Supplier development research has been conducted empirically in different settings and contexts including various industries (Krause et al., 1998; Krause and Scannell, 2002). These involved stages of the relationship life cycle (Wagner, 2011), competitive environments (Mahapatra et al., 2012), and the willingness and capabilities of suppliers (Rezaei et al., 2015). It is reported that product-based firms are more proactive than service-based ones in implementing supplier development initiatives (Krause and Scannell, 2002). The product-based companies purchased less standardised items and used more dependent suppliers, compared with service-based firms. Therefore, the purchase transactions of the former may involve comparatively high levels of transaction-specific assets, leading to difficulties in switching suppliers regarding cost and availability of the item (Krause and Scannell, 2002). Considering supplier-buyer relationship lifecycle, Wagner (2011) indicates that supplier development activities applied at a mature stage are more effective in that regular communication and information connects and initiates relationship-specific assets. However, the effect of organisational size and culture on supplier development design and internal quality dimensions (design quality and conformance quality) has been investigated (Salimian et al., 2017). This indicates that larger organisations have a significantly higher supplier development and internal quality performance integration than do small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Furthermore, buying organisations are more prepared to be involved in supplier development if they have a higher level of supply chain organisation culture (Salimian et al., 2017).

2.2.3 The ‘win-win’ scenario of supplier development

Research has revealed that suppliers and buyers can benefit from the implementation of supplier development (e.g., Krause et al., 2000; Wagner, 2010; Li et al., 2012). Suppliers gain benefits such as product and delivery performance improvement, or capabilities enhancement by participating in supplier development programmes (Krause et al., 2000; Wagner, 2010). Similarly, previous research indicated that companies proactively employ supplier development initiatives with key suppliers in order to maintain their suppliers’ operational performance such as quality, delivery and technological standards (Krause et al., 1998).

Supplier development can strengthen the relationship between buyers and suppliers (Blonska et al., 2013). Therefore, such improvements in supplier performance and supplier-buyer relationship can lead to enhancement in the performance or competitive advantage of buying companies (Krause et al., 2000; Li et al., 2012). During the new product development process, supplier development efforts of companies can be vital in provoking creativity and innovativeness in main suppliers, and can eventually reinforce the new product development (Lawson et al., 2015). Moreover, five supplier development factors such as effective communication, direct supplier involvement, trust, supplier evaluation and supplier strategic objectives were shown to be significantly associated with supplier-buyer performance (Humphreys et al., 2011). Supplier development has a strong direct positive impact on outsourcing performance by reducing outsourcing opportunism risk and improving outsourcing flexibility (Li et al., 2017b). Furthermore, supplier development can also result in the enhancement of supplier performance through the mediation role of different factors such as knowledge transfer and social capital. According to Modi and Mabert (2007), supplier evaluation and certification effort are the most crucial supplier development requirements before attempting operational knowledge and transfer initiatives such as site visits and supplier training. Moreover, transforming a company's efforts to promote supplier involvement requires collaborative inter-organisational communication as a critical supporting element. Furthermore, Carr et al. (2008) demonstrates that suppliers' operational performance improvement is a consequence of multiple practices of supplier development such as supplier training or involvement in product development.

The benefits of supplier development are not only limited to dyadic settings between one buyer and one supplier but can also occur in triadic settings among a focal supplier and a first and second buying company (Friedl and Wagner, 2016). However, it is worthy of mention that recent research on supplier development principally focuses on supplier-buyer dyads Friedl and Wagner (2016) by only considering a triadic setting with analytical modelling. Thus, empirical evidence on supplier development activities and its benefits in triadic structure remains underdeveloped.

2.2.4 Summary of Past Research

Table 2.2 below summarises past and current research on supplier development problems, detailing supplier development activities, motivations and performance outcomes of supplier development. The table includes six columns, namely *'Study', 'Supplier Development*

Area', 'Focal constructs', 'Theory', 'Findings' and 'Future Research'. The *Study* column presents the name of the first author and the year of publication of the research. In total, 42 empirical research projects, which were published in journals and ranked ABS 3 or above from 2000 to 2021, are included. The *Supplier Development Area* column covers the area on which the cited research focused, including corporate social responsibility, performance, supplier development adoption, and green supply chain supplier development practices. The next column depicts the primary constructs of each research project. The main theoretical frameworks of the published papers are shown in the column '*Theory*'. The main findings of each piece of research are summarised in the next column of the table. Finally, limitations and suggestions for future investigation are presented in the last column.

The benefits of taking supplier development and how companies should implement its initiatives are the two main themes shown in *Table 2.2*. These themes have been discussed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. Briefly, supplier development research often focuses on different positive outcomes of supplier development. These include buyer and supplier performance improvement, supplier satisfaction, buyer-supplier relationship improvement, purchasing performance, and buyer market responsiveness. However, the negative outcome of supplier development is overlooked. Supplier development should be taken after building trust in the supplier-buyer relationship and in seeing some indication demonstration of commitment from suppliers. Supplier development initiatives are classified into different levels which form the basis of supplier development such as supplier evaluation and certification, which should be employed before introducing more advanced supplier development initiatives with the suppliers, such as training and specific investment. Different types of supplier development also bring different kinds of benefits. It is recommended that future research conducts a detailed assessment of diverse supplier activities in order to explore the antecedents and consequences of different levels of supplier development practice (Nagati and Rebolledo, 2013).

Previous research remains limited in its design, in that it often collects data from a either supplier or buyer by using cross-sectional data. Future researchers are encouraged to apply longitudinal study in order to capture changes in the supplier and buyer's performance before and after the implementation of supplier development. Multiple theories have been considered as the theoretical framework for research in the supplier development domain, such as the Transaction Cost Theory, Resource-based View Theory and the Dynamic Capability Theory.

However, research investigating supplier development under the two perspectives of Transaction Cost Theory and Social Exchange Theory is lacking.

2.3 Opportunism

2.3.1 Definition

Opportunism, seen as a dishonestly oriented breaching of business obligations, is defined as "self-interest seeking with guile," (Williamson, 1985, p. 47). This can take numerous forms, including deliberately withholding information in the early stages of the relationship and giving fake information on the procedure of transactions (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Cavusgil et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2016a). This often occurs in inter-company relationships which offends tacit and/or specific arrangements between the cooperating partners and comprises some misleading aspects to the detriment of the exposed party (Lui et al., 2009; Leonidou et al., 2017). Opportunistic activities include the following: cheating, stealing, breaking of contracts, fake threats and commitments, dishonesty, deliberately misinterpreting data, cutting corners, blurring issues, complicating transactions, cover-ups, misrepresenting aspects and preferences, withholding information, and deception (Williamson, 1975; Wathne and Heide, 2000; Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2008; Hawkins et al., 2008). In order to boost its own unilateral interest, a partner may act opportunistically without considering the potential long-term effects of the relationship (Brown et al., 2000). Such bypassing and deceiving behaviour induces considerable transaction costs and weakens efficiency in economic exchanges (McCarter and Northcraft, 2007; Morgan et al., 2007; Tangpong et al., 2010).

Numerous types of behaviour could be regarded as opportunistic (Tangpong et al., 2010), potentially having different norms and consequences (Hawkins et al., 2013). For example, bluffing and stealing conform to the definitions of opportunism, but only bluffing (making false threats) is the norm, while stealing (fraudulently overbilling) may not do (Hawkins et al., 2013). Similarly, the same act of opportunism, such as stealing, can have various consequences (Hawkins et al., 2013). However, Hawkins et al. (2009) recognised that the measurement of opportunism in literature often combines such types of behaviour. Prior to this, scholars advocated examining the different types of opportunism (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Luo, 2006).

Table 2.2 - Summary of the research relating to supplier development

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Saghiri and Wilding (2021)	Performance	Supplier development Supplier performance Supplier size Supply share Product complexity Buyer-supplier integration Supplier's management system	RBV DCT	United Kingdom	Assessment/certification programs and direct buyer involvement impact positively on supplier performance improvement. Supplier size, buyer-supplier integration and the supplier's management systems positively moderate the effect of buyer direct involvement in SD to supplier performance improvement, while product complexity negatively moderate the relationship. Buyer-supplier integration moderates positively the effect of the evaluation/certification initiatives in SD to supplier performance improvement.	Explore a wider range of constructs and measure for supplier development in other supply chains. Investigate different time window (i.e., more than 3 years) for the improvement of supplier, and in different industries. Consider the factors of management of technological innovation in supplier development research
Gu et al. (2021)	Performance	Supplier development Firm performance Big data analytics (BDA)capability	RBV CT	China	BDA capability positively impact on supplier development and firm performance, respectively. BDA also plays positive mediating and moderation roles on the relationship between SD and firm performance improvement.	Develop a longitudinal study to capture the same effects. Include different respondents instead of a single respondent in data collection to reduce bias. Extend the research to other settings than China. Using meta-analysis method or bibliographic literature review to examine the relationship between SD and firm performance.
Cole and Aitken (2019)	SD adoption	Supplier development Supplier selection Commitment	AT	Not provided (3 focal firms who are exemplary in social responsible purchasing)	For socially sustainable supply chain, supplier development activities are now moved to the beginning of the purchasing process. It is performed at the pre-selection stage while previously positioned post-selection. Suppliers must demonstrate their commitment to sustainability through implementing improvements before any financial transactions occur. The change in the process helps to align sustainability goals and reduce risk.	Investigate the change in the process in the traditional buyer-supplier relationship and through the supplier view of the exchanges. Using larger sample, longitudinal design for investigation. Test the supplier selection process developments with environmental criteria.

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Maestrini et al. (2018)	Performance	Monitoring Incentives Supplier performance Goal congruence Supplier opportunism	AT	Finland Germany Italy Ireland	Monitoring and incentives positively impact the suppliers' operational performance. Goal congruence does not mediate the relationships between monitor and performance as well as incentives and performance, while supplier opportunism is a significant mediator. Offering incentives to suppliers increase opportunism from supplier, in turn decrease supplier performance.	Taking other theoretical perspectives that guide the collaborative view on supplier-buyer relationship. Explore if the effects change between different purchasing categories (i.e., raw material, IT, office supplies), and across countries. Consider collecting data from supplier's perspective or from supplier-buyer dyad.
Li et al. (2017b)	Performance	SD Outsourcing performance Supplier opportunism Outsourcing flexibility		China Manufacturing sector	Supplier development has a strong direct positive effect on outsourcing performance. Supplier development also improves outsourcing performance through reducing outsourcing opportunism risk and improving outsourcing flexibility.	Using multi-dimensional outsourcing performance measures. Investigate other contingency factors (e.g., task complexity, power, strategic importance, availability of alternative suppliers) that can impact the relationship between supplier development and outsourcing performance. Extend to other contexts (e.g., other countries or service sector) and observe from supplier perspective.
Zhang et al. (2017)	Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)	Supplier development CSR	IT RBV	Global	To promote supply chain social responsibility, manufacturers might use strategies such as standard operating procedures (SOPs), audits, collaboration, and training. Indirect supplier development practices (e.g., SOPs and audits) are established in response to institutional demands. Direct supplier development practices (e.g., collaboration and training) provide resources for overcoming suppliers' CSR skill gaps. The indirect and direct supplier development practices are complementary and positively influence each other in enhancing supply chain social responsibility.	Examine the impact of social capital on the linkages between supplier development and social responsibility in the supply chain. Link supplier development to other management strategies in the supply chain (e.g., postponement and integration) and examine their joint influence on social responsibility for the supply chain

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Salimian et al. (2017)	Performance	Organisation size Supply chain orientation culture Internal quality performance Supplier Development	N/A	United Kingdom	Larger organisations with more resources and a strong supply chain orientation culture tend to put the greatest emphasis on supplier development programmes. As a result, internal quality performance is improved.	Examine the influence of additional contingency factors on the examined association (e.g., local, national, and worldwide scope of operations). What sort of business climate is favourable to supplier development programmes - highly regulated, as in the UK, or less regulated, as in most emerging economies? Does the level of economic stability influence organisations' decisions to invest in/pursue supplier development programmes?
Mizgier et al. (2017)	SD adoption	Capital allocation SD	N/A	US Japan	The results from stock markets may be utilised for the performance of suppliers. Considering the specific characteristics of the suppliers to introduce a model which optimally allocates the capital for supplier development. Risk aversion of manufacturer plays a crucial role in allocate the capital for supplier development. Higher risk averse manufactures will allocate capital to more diversified supply base. Supplier base-driven is the most effective strategy for SD if the main goal of the manufacturer is to minimise the overall risk.	Consider an extended supply chain, including multi-tier suppliers. Add more objectives to the optimisation problems. Using other optimisation methods. Consider the risk aversion of suppliers.

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Friedl and Wagner (2016)	SD adotion	SD investment Triadic setting	N/A	N/A	Cooperation between two purchasing businesses results in lower overall development investments than non-cooperation. As a result, deciding to collaborate with other purchasers in development activities lowers overall development investments.	To develop the optimal contract to achieve profit maximum, explore different contractual agreements between suppliers and buyers. Consider supplier development investments and benefits across many levels of the supply chain, where suppliers in each tier have the option of cooperating or not cooperating with other suppliers in the same tier. Establish more sharing schemes (e.g., share in proportion to contributions)
Chen et al. (2016)	SD adoption	SD expectancy SD valence SD adoption	ET	N/A	The study developed a two-stage multilevel conceptual framework that offers the SD adoption process from a behavioural standpoint. The influences of activity-, firm-, interfirm- and environmental-level factors on the adoption of SD activities are mediated by two behavioural constructs, SD expectation and valence.	Empirical testing the propositions that are underlined the logical development of the framework
Bai and Sarkis (2016)	SD adoption	SD Cooperation SD Bargaining SD Investment	GT	N/A	Increasing in supply volume leads to motivation for SD investment activities in the 'increasing returns to scale' situation, while increasing the organisation and suppliers' marginal profit results in motivation for SD activities in the 'decreasing returns to scale' situation. Comparing to non-cooperative relationship, the cooperative relationship between focal organisation and suppliers benefits the supply chain more economically, but it also demands greater capital and knowledge expenditures.	Examine the situation in which suppliers compete directly with one another. Include other competing organisations that benefit from SD in the model because they may also invest in SD. Consider SD that not only boosts profits but also lowers risk or liabilities (e.g., environmental project implementation) and how this could affect cooperative and non-cooperative game scenarios.

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Agan et al. (2016)	CSR Performance	CSR Environmental SD (ESD)	N/A	Various industries	CSR relates positively with ESD. ESD impacts positively on the financial performance and competitive advantage of participating companies. Larger companies are slightly more concerned with CSR. In heavy industries, the link between CSR and ESD was not significant when compared to consumer products, textiles, and chemicals sectors	Examine the link between additional motivators (e.g., legal requirements, consumer pressure) and ESD. Research the nature and particular of the balancing act that exists between the three elements of sustainability (i.e., societal, economic, and environmental). Consider whether and how large retailers enhance their suppliers' environmental skills.
Saeedpoor and Vafadarnikjoo (2016)	SD adoption	Green SD program (GSDP)	N/A	China	Identify GSDP components in practice and the relationships between the GSDP components using grey-based DEMATE method. The focus of on the GSDP was relatively adversarial and less collaborative with its suppliers.	Using other method (e.g., analytical hierarchy process or rough set theory) to address the limitation of the importance value using in the research. Investigate of grey scale/linguistic assignment and dispersion of the grey scale. Conduct comparative analysis across multiple companies.
Sancha et al. (2015)	Performance	Social SD Supplier performance Buyer performance	N/A	Spain	Supplier development practices improves the suppliers' social performance and the buyers; operational performance. Supplier development practices do not pay-off in terms of economic performance.	Examine the effect of SD in the context of developing countries. Examine the difference between manufacturer and service firms on the same links.
Rezaei et al. (2015)	SD adoption	Supplier evaluation Supplier segmentation	N/A	China High-tech sector	Capabilities and willingness are two new dimensions for supplier evaluation and segmentation. The two dimensions are the crucial basis for supplier development strategies.	Examine the criteria that companies use for supplier selection and segmentation. Apply other decision-making methods for segmentation.

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Lawson et al. (2015)	Performance	Supplier Development New Product Development (NPD)	N/A	UK	Companies' supplier development efforts during NPD can play an important role in fostering creativity and innovativeness in key suppliers, and ultimately enhance the performance of NPD projects. Suppliers responsibility is an antecedent for NPD activities while skill-similarity between manufacturer and suppliers, and single-sourcing strategy do not lead to NPD activities.	Investigate the value of various relationship-specific assets (e.g., location, physical asset, or human asset) to NPD. Using buyer-supplier dyad or market spillover to explore the extent to which product and project performance improvements are achieved by supplier development. Investigate whether governance structures support supplier development in NPD, as well as how companies may successfully grow their suppliers' creativity and technology contributions.
Vanpoucke et al. (2014)	Performance	Supplier integration competitive advantages	N/A	Global Industrial sector	Supplier integrative capability (i.e., sensing, seizing and transforming) helps buyers to sense changes in the supply environment, seize opportunities presented by sharing information with suppliers, establishing procedures to analyse this information and make long-term changes to existing processes. SIC fosters both process flexibility and cost efficiency and enables firms to avoid the traditional cost-flexibility trade-off. The impact of SIC on operational performance is enhanced by market and technological dynamics; supply base complexity weakens this relationship.	Examine other integration practices (e.g., mapping out processes together or joint R&D projects) that could contribute to improving buying firms. Using dyadic data. Verify that firms with SIC can maintain their performance in variety of settings.
Khan and Nicholson (2014)	SD adoption	SD Communication Knowledge transfer Relational factors	TPT	Pakistan Automotive industry	Indicate three-stage supplier development process: the qualifying stage, evaluation stage, and interactive stage. In each stage, the type of knowledge transfer, quality and level of interaction, direction and richness of communications and the orientation differ.	Explores the different tensions and dilemmas that exist between emerging-emerging, developed-emerging, and developed-developed supplier development programs. Consider the research context of emerging market at different period of time. Include strategic practices into processual research.

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Nagati and Rebolledo (2013)	SD adoption	Supplier development Supplier perspective	N/A	Canada	Supplier engagement in SD activities is influenced by trust and preferred customer status. Supplier participation in SD impact positively on suppliers' operational performance. A dynamic environment also encourages suppliers to engage in SD initiatives.	A detailed assessment of diverse SD activities to explore the antecedents and consequences of different levels of supplier development practice. Explore the effect of SD activities on suppliers' financial and/or marketing performance.
Blonska et al. (2013)	Performance	Relational capital	N/A	Belgium France Italy	SD does not directly result in benefits for suppliers or buyers. Instead, relational capital connect SD and relationship benefits. Relational capital is crutial to accumulate benefits from capability development, and without it supplier governance regime can have negative impact to the relationship. Where high relational capital present, lower perceived buyer benefits are yielded from capability development.	Examine the alignment of two sides' perception on social capital and the effects of misalignment on relationship performance. Consider if matching, relationship-specific investments are required for effective SD. Determine the sequences of capability development and supplier governance system.
Akamp and Muller (2013)	Performance	Supplier selection and evaluation Supplier monitoring Supplier development Supplier integration Supplier performance Buyer satisfaction	N/A	Germany	Supplier selection and evaluation, supplier development, and supplier integration are suitable to improve supplier performance in developing countries. Supplier monitoring does not seem to have a positive impact on supplier performance.	Consider supplier perspective as mutual activities play an important role in improving performance.
Li et al. (2012)	SD antecedents	Supplier Development Competitive advantage	TCE	Hongkong Electronics industry	Top management, supplier evaluation, and supplier strategic objectives significant link to transaction-specific supplier development. Closer buyer-supplier collaborative relationships may strengthen buyers' competitive advantage.	Examine more factors (e.g., the purchase amounts, the number of suppliers, and the type of manufacturing firms) as determinants for supplier development. Consider suppliers' perspective to improve data reliability. Examine the nature of supplier development activities in other industrial contexts.

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Friedl and Wagner (2012)	SD adoption	Supplier switching SD	N/A	N/A	The development of a current supplier becomes more attractive when the uncertainty about the price the buyer can realise on the market and the curent supplier's cost is the higher Changing to an alternative supplier is desirable when the expected value of and the uncertainty regarding the buyer's market price is higher Changing suppliers is less advised when the present cost variance is significant and the unknown maximum demand is adversely associated with the existing supplier's cost.	Consider alternative optimise variables, instead of buyer's purchasing volume. Extend the decision criteria developed in the study to a multi-period setting. Examine the impact of different contractual agreements with the current supplier on the sourcing choice.
Wagner (2011)	Performance	Supplier development Relationship life cycle	SCT	Germany Switzerland Austria	Supplier development is more effective in mature life-cyclers phase, and less effective in initial and declining life-cycles phases.	Use objective measures of the main constructs for the dynamic nature of the buyer–supplier relationship. Examine life-cycle of buyer–supplier relationships in production and operations management.
Humphreys et al. (2011)	Performance	Communication Direct supplier involvement Trust Supplier evaluation Supplier strategic objectives	N/A	Hong Kong Electronics industry	Effective communication, direct supplier involvement and trust directly impacts buyer-supplier performance improvement. Supplier involvement mediates the positive relationship between supplier evaluation and supplier strategic objectives supplier performance improvement.	Consider effects of other constructs (e.g., power dependence relationship, trust, the technical complexity of the purchased item and the level in the supply tier) and their interrelationships to supplier performance improvement.
Wynstra et al. (2010)	SD adoption	Supplier product development Supplier position Supplier innovation strategy Customer development commitment		Sweden Automotive industry	Supplier product development activities is significantly affected by supplier position in the supply chain and supplier innovation strategy. The effect of strategic focus on innovation of supplier on supplier product development are contingent on the supplier position in the supply chain. Supplier innovation fully mediated the relationship between customer development commitment and supplier product development.	Use longitudinal design to capture the same effects in different settings. Examine the antecedents of supplier innovation strategy. Investigate the financial benefits of supplier product development. Examine the effectiveness of supplier commitment toward supplier product development.

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Wagner (2010)	Performance	Indirect SD Direct SD	TCT KBV	Germany Switzerland Austria	Only indirect SD increase supplier's product and delivery performance. Both indirect and direct SD improve supplier capabilities, with the latter has a stronger effect. When apply direct and indirect SD simultaneously, supplier development efforts are less effective.	Examine factors (i.e., time lag or opportunism) that explain no-relationship between direct SD and supplier's product and delivery performance. Examine moderators in the model, such as service versus product offerings, uncertainty, relational norms, trust, commitment, or communication, life cycle. Investigate the impact of direct and indirect SD to buyer's performance improvement.
Talluri et al. (2010)	SD adoption	SD investment Risk SD return	N/A	N/A	Suggestions for optimum investments in various suppliers based on effective risk and return analysis in the case of single-manufacturer and multiple suppliers. In the two-manufacturer and multiple suppliers case, manufacturers with different skills may benefit from partnering in supplier development to reduce risk. In collaboration between manufacturers in SD, The highest benefit/risk ratio for both manufacturers will be achieved if the inferior manufacturer bears 80% of the total investment expenditures.	It is necessary to address the issue of competitive manufacturers investing in SD in the same suppliers without coordinating or participating in partial collaboration.
Ghijsen et al. (2010)	SD outcome	Supplier commitment Supplier development Specific SD Indirect SD Direct SD	N/A	Germany Automotive industry	Promises and both human- and capital-specific supplier development affect supplier commitment positively. Indirect influence strategies and capital-specific supplier development increase supplier satisfaction, while other direct influence strategies decrease supplier satisfaction.	Investigate the usefulness or appropriateness of supplier development activities in supplier's perception. Examine other factors (e.g., power difference, level of collaboration) in buyer-supplier relationship and its affect to supplier development efforts and influence strategies.

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Wagner and Krause (2009)	SD adoption	Buyer-supplier relationship Human resource issue Supplier development Communication	N/A	Europe	Human interactions moderate the relationship between supplier's capabilities improvement goals and knowledge transfer. Training and co-location of buyer and supplier employees to leverage the knowledge transfer are crucial for improve supplier capabilities.	Collect dyadic data from both sides. Investigate communication in SD in both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Examine the role of human resources in supplier development and buyer-supplier relationships.
Matook et al. (2009)	SD adoption	Risk management SD	N/A	United Kingdom Chemical industry	Five-stages framework to manage risk: supplier risk identification, assessment of supplier risk, reporting and decision of supplier risk, supplier risk management responses, and supplier risk performance outcomes. At stage four of the framework, suppliers are developed through knowledge transfer, using benchmarking approach at stage four.	Apply the framework to a larger sample size. Develop measurements for risk types. Integrate supplier satisfaction and supplier benefits in the process of assessment.
Narasimhan et al. (2008)	Performance	SD Relational norms Trust	N/A	Denmark United States	Before engaging in a supplier development effort, companies must prioritise relationship and trust building initiatives. The level of trust and relational norms must determined through regular audits of the supplier perception.	Conduct a study with a larger sample size. Develop more comprehensive measures for the instruments.
Modi and Mabert (2007)	Performance	Supplier performance Knowledge transfer Communication	N/A	United States	Before implementing operational knowledge transfer activities (i.e., site visits, supplier training), evaluation and certification efforts are the most important supplier development activities should be taken. The positive relationship between supplier development and supplier performance improvements are mediated by collaborative communication.	Validate and examine the bilateral top management involvement role in the supplier-buyer relationship.

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Li et al. (2007)	Performance	Joint action Trust Asset specificity Buyer performance	N/A	Hong Kong Electronics industry	Joint actions and trust are the two most important components to improve a buyer's operational performance. Asset specificity slightly enhances buyer's market responsiveness. Other SD efforts (e.g., increasing supplier performance goals, recognising supplier progress) do not link to buyer performance improvement.	Investigate SD in other industries, using multiple research method approaches (e.g., surveys, experiments and qualitative)
Krause et al. (2007)	Performance	SD Commitment Social capital Buying firm performance	SCT	US Automotive and Electronics industries	Buyer commitment and social capital accumulation with key suppliers increase buyer performance. Depends on the type of performance improvement goals (i.e., cost and total cost, or quality, delivery and flexibility), the effects of structural capital (i.e., information sharing, supplier evaluation, supplier development) and relational capital (i.e., length of the relationship, buyer dependency, supplier dependency) on performance improvement vary.	Investigate the existing measures of the three dimensions of social capital, and additional measures of buying firm performance such as innovation. Examine the social dimensions of these relationships.
Wagner (2006)	SD practices	Buyer-Supplier Relations	N/A	Germany Switzerland Austria	Firms are hesitant to develop suppliers. Observed two dimensions of direct supplier development (i.e., human and capital support) and four dimensions of indirect supplier development (i.e., *ad hoc* manner supplier evaluation, formal supplier evaluation, structure and process of supplier evaluation, and communication) Direct SD is strongly related to formal supplier evaluation, process and structure of supplier evaluation and communication.	Include small and medium sized enterprises in future research. Investigate the influence of goal congruence or inter-organisational trust on supplier development practices. Examine the causal relationships between supplier development and different types of improvement (e.g., cost, delivery performance, product quality, product innovation) as well as profit. Investigate how SD benefits are shared in various supply chain settings (i.e., among several firms).

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Sánchez-Rodríguez et al. (2005)	Performance SD adoption	SD initiatives purchasing performance	N/A	Spain	Identify three SD practices: basic SD, moderate SD and advanced SD. The SD practices are inter-related in a positive manner. Basic and advance SD positively link with improving purchasing performance.	Collect data from supplier side. Using longitudinal study, or experimental study to investigate the model. Include supplier development antecedents into the model.
Sako (2004)	SD adoption	Company capability Continuous improvement	OC	Japan	Sharing practice of tacit knowledge is used to overcome difficulties in SD. Buyers have broadened the scope of supplier development over time because of dependency on the hierarchy of routines that make up buyer capabilities. Corporate governance is required to overcome the challenge of the broaden of SD as buyers needs to intervene to supplier's internal decisions.	N/A
Humphreys et al. (2004)	Performance	SD Supplier-buyer relationship	N/A	Hong Kong Electronic industry	Identify two SD groups: transaction-specific SD, and infrastructure factors of SD (i.e., effective communications, long-term commitment, top management support, supplier evaluation, supplier strategic objectives, and buyer trust in the supplier.) SD has positively related to supplier-buyer performance outcome. Buyer–supplier performance is significantly improved through transaction-specific supplier development, trust, supplier strategic objectives and effective communications.	Conduct research with a larger sample size, and from supplier's views. Consider cultural and historical factors in SD models.

Author	SD domains	Focal constructs	Theory	Context	Findings	Future research suggestions
Li et al. (2003)	Performance	SD Purchasing performance	N/A	Hong Kong Electronic industry	Identity seven SD initiatives: long-term strategic goals, effective communications, partnership strategy, top management support, supplier evaluation, direct supplier development and perception of supplier's strategic objective. SD has positively related to purchasing performance. Direct supplier development and supplier's strategic objectives improves purchasing performance.	N/A
Krause and Scannell (2002)	SD adoption	SD Product-based firms Service-based firms	N/A	United States	Product-based firms and service-based firms invest in SD differently. Supplier evaluation and feedback, supplier incentives, and direct involvement activities are employed more in product firms. Competitive pressure is preferable for service firms.	Consider context-specific effects or other moderating effects to explain the differences between product firms and service firms. Consider other independent variables such as manager support, communication, technical complexity. Investigate SD in supplier management strategies for different level of service firm, based on a classification scheme. Link specific SD activities with specific performance improvement. Examine the order of SD activities to achieve the optimal outcomes.
Krause et al. (2000)	Performance SD adoption	SD Supplier performance	RBV IT	United States	Direct involvement activities play an important role in improve supplier performance. Supplier assessment and supplier incentives are key enablers of supplier development efforts for the manufacturing firms.	Consider competitive environment, management support, power, dependance as context-specific factors and/or moderating factors in SD. Collect data from both suppliers' and buyers' perspectives.

Note: IT: Institutional Theory; RBV: Resouce-based View Theory; KBV: Knowlegde-based View Theory; OC: Organisational Capabilities; ET: Expectancy Theory; GT: Game Theory; GoT: Goal Theory; TCE: Transaction Cost Economics; SCT: Social Capital Theory; DCT: Dynamic capability theory; CT: Contingency theory; AT: Agency theory; TPT: teleological process theory

Supplier opportunism is an important risk for buyers from which they should safeguard themselves while they provide supplier development initiatives. If a buyer is unable to introduce effective safeguards, they may reduce the provision of supplier development initiatives, but this results in underinvestment and possibly would impair the buyer's long-term competitiveness (Rokkan et al., 2003).

Opportunism can be classified into different types, such as strong, weak, (Liu et al., 2014), proactive, and shirking (Handley and Benton, 2012). According to (Luo, 2006), the strong form of opportunism refers to actions such as failing to share information, investing insufficient resources or cheating on using joint assets. These actions seek to maximise self-interest by breaching the contractual terms and conditions as stated in the written agreements between suppliers and buyers.

Weak-form opportunism is defined as seeking self-interest by offending relational norms, or acting to damage another partner's benefits. An example of this is deterring a full attempt and partnership during relationship progression, not honouring verbal promises, or not complying with fair exchange and adaptable principles (Luo, 2006). These relational norms are not officially written in any of the contracts, but are usually understandable to all parties in a specific relationship. Hawkins et al. (2013) argues that the distinction between the strong and weak forms of opportunism depends on the perceptions of opportunistic partners regarding the opportunistic types of behaviour. Therefore, strong-form opportunism incurs formal costs for the victim to fix the disruption. Contrastingly, weak-form opportunism does not create a formal cost, but may still have other consequences. These can be worse than those related to strong form of opportunism because of its impact on trust (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), commitment (Gundlach et al., 1995), and cooperation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). However, consequences of the weak form of opportunism are concealed and do not appear to be an immediate threat (Luo, 2006). Moreover, the responsibility of the opportunistic actor may be less because the weak form of opportunism may not be easily detected (Hawkins et al., 2013). Therefore, Hawkins et al. (2013) provided empirical evidence that the strong and weak forms of opportunism are different with regard to their significant predictors. Specifically, environmental surroundings factors (leader opportunism) and individual difference factors (honestly) affect a buyer's weak form of opportunism but not the strong form. Buyer-supplier relationship factors, such as buyer power, tend to affect the strong form, but not the weak form (Hawkins et al., 2013). The classification of different forms of opportunism is an interesting area of research which is applied in domains where the existence of opportunism is established, and mechanisms are defined. The objective of this research is to explore whether opportunism is triggered by supplier development activities and, if so, what role relational norms may play in the process. Therefore, classifications of the degree of opportunism are outside the scope of this research investigation.

2.3.2 Antecedents

Extensive research considers the antecedents of opportunism (Joshi and Arnold, 1997; Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2008; Hawkins et al., 2008) because of the common occurrence and negative associations of it (Hawkins et al., 2008). Some key antecedents of opportunism include: dependence (Joshi and Arnold, 1997; Achrol and Gundlach, 1999), bureaucratisation, formalisation, centralisation, control, and participation (John, 1984; Achrol and Gundlach, 1999), relational norms (Heide and John, 1992; Achrol and Gundlach, 1999; Joshi and Stump, 1999; Lado et al., 2008), and uncertainty (Joshi and Stump, 1999; Dahlstrom et al., 2009).

2.3.3 Control Mechanisms

Opportunism is a significant threat to channel performance; therefore, it is important to manage it properly. In order to monitor opportunism, firms may employ various governance structures based on bureaucratic and/or relational norms (Paswan et al., 2017). From a factual perspective, opportunism can occur in any situation and, concurrently, companies often follow various forms of governance to control partners' opportunistic behaviour (Wathne and Heide, 2000). Different control mechanisms have their roles in reducing the opportunistic behaviour of supply chain partners which have been examined in empirical research (Liu et al., 2010a). The most frequently control mechanisms are power (Hernandez-Espallardo and Arcas-Lario, 2003; Caniels and Gelderman, 2010; Handley and Benton, 2012), contract, relational norms (Cavusgil et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2009), justice (Luo et al., 2015), information sharing (Eckerd and Hill, 2012; Wang et al., 2014), specific investment (Yu et al., 2006; Handley and Benton, 2012; Liu et al., 2014), and other factors (Kang and Jindal, 2015).

Current research focuses on the particular dimensions of these governance structures and their impact on opportunism (Paswan et al., 2017). For instance, literature has widely considered whether formal governance structure (contractual safeguard) or informal governance norms (trust) affect opportunism (Leiblein, 2003; Lui et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2015). Contractual safeguards, acting as a formal governance structure, increase the cost of opportunism by adjusting the pay-off structure (Lui and Ngo, 2004). Furthermore, informal governance norms that focus on relationship quality between partners principally depend on trust in order to reduce the tendency of partners to act opportunistically (Albertus et al., 2011). Recently, other factors that interplay with opportunism have been examined, such as transaction-specific assets and embeddedness (Liu et al., 2014), perceptions of justice (Luo et al., 2015), goal congruity, economic factors and unfairness (Kang and Jindal, 2015), and national culture (Handley and Angst, 2015).

2.3.4 Summary of Current Research

Table 2.3 below summarises recent research on opportunism. The first column of the table shows the first author's name and year of the research. Twenty-five summarised papers were published between the years 2010 and 2020. Opportunism is the topic of different research areas; therefore, the subject areas of the studies are presented in the second column. The main subject areas of the studies are project management and are as follows: supplier development, governance, business relationship, new product development, supply chain management, logistics, marketing, outsourcing, business management, and business strategy. The main variables of each study, namely focal constructs, are depicted in the third column. Business relationships are formed between supplier-buyer, owner-contractor, joint-venture partners, importer-exporter, logistic provider-user, and business partners. Hence, Column 4 cites the types of business relationship that were investigated in each study. The principal theories that provide theoretical framework for the studies are presented in the next column. The last two columns summarise the main findings and suggestions for future research.

In summary, antecedents and control mechanism are two important themes in opportunism research. Most research projects examine factors which lead to opportunism of partners in business-to-business relationship. For example, extorting rent costs have a significant impact on partners' opportunism, whereas another factor that increases buyer's opportunism is a supplier's calculative commitment. Environmental uncertainty and legal unprotected ability enhance supplier opportunism directly. With regard to control mechanisms, research that considers the topic of opportunism often emphasises the role of contractual governance and contract. Informal mechanisms such as trust and relational norms were also examined in the opportunism literature, which considers it to have a direct role in reducing opportunism. Moreover, the effect of specific investment in a B2B relationship on supplier development remains ununified. For instance, (Xue et al., 2018) concluded that specific asset investment has no significant impact on a partner's opportunism, but Huo et al. (2016b) suggested that buyer's specific investment does not curb supplier opportunism, but rather increases it.

2.4 Relational Norms

2.4.1 Social Norms and Individual Behaviours.

Social norms are unwritten rules and informal agreements which determine what is expected by and from us (Young, 2015). Similarly, Coleman (1990, p. 242) defines social norms as codes of conduct which 'specify what actions are regarded by a set of persons as proper or correct, or improper and incorrect'. Norms do not always have formal bases, and may even conflict with laws (Coleman, 1990). The feelings of shame, guilt, embarrassment and anxiety by people who violate social norms lead to their endurance. Some multiple mechanisms sustain social norms, such as the need to accommodate, the anxiety of being punished, signalling membership of a society, or simply following the guidance of others Young (2015). Furthermore, the emotions of those who comply with a norm can be driven positively (Elster, 1989). Social norms can trigger strong feelings within people that take hold of the mind (Elster, 1989); therefore, they govern our cooperation with others.

The principle of conformity and the distinction between informational and normative social motivations create a framework for the development of the Theory of Normative Conduct (Cialdini et al., 1991; Reno et al., 1993; Kallgren et al., 2000). This theory explains that the effectiveness of norms in influencing behaviour exists only when individuals focus their attention on the norms (Krupka and Weber, 2009).

Cialdini et al. (1991) distinguishes between two types of social norms, namely descriptive (popular) which generate a standard of what most people do, and injunctive (prescriptive) which refers to norms that define the perception of what most people accept or reject. Descriptive norms include what is commonly done and what motivates people, and in this way, they provide evidence of what is likely to be an effective and adaptive action. In conformity with informational conformity, descriptive norms provide information on how to behave appropriately in a given situation of uncertainty. For example, they might supply information on the average percentage of people who save energy (Nolan et al., 2008). Injunctive norms motivate behaviour through promises of social rewards and punishments (Cialdini et al., 2006). By providing information on what is approved by others, injunctive norms conceptually rest upon normative conformity (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004).

Both descriptive and injunctive norms have a powerful and systematic impact on human behaviour (Cialdini et al., 1991). Social norms have a direct influence on behaviour, such as littering, only when they are focal (Kallgren et al., 2000). Moreover, activating descriptive or injunctive norms can lead to significantly different behavioural responses (Reno et al., 1993). For instance, Cialdini et al. (1990) contended that the action of picking up litter (injunctive norm) could reduce littering behaviour in both clean and littered environments. Contrastingly, a tendency of littering behaviour (descriptive norm) increased littering only in a littered environment.

The role of norms in predicting behaviour is well established in the literature, showing that social norms not only stimulate but also lead actions in explicit and meaningful ways (Cialdini et al., 1991; Terry and Hogg, 2001; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2003; Goldstein et al., 2008). Social norms can be used to change behaviour from undesirable to desirable (or inverse direction) in relation to the following: energy consumption, pro-social behaviour, attitudes towards a product, purchase intention, pro-environmental behaviour, littering behaviour, food consumption, tax compliance, smoking behaviour, and other types of personal behaviours (Cialdini et al., 1991; Schultz et al., 2007; Goldstein et al., 2008; Allcott, 2011; Martin, 2012; Anik et al., 2014; Noguti and Russell, 2014; Warren and Campbell, 2014; Aldrovandi et al., 2015). Various empirical studies indicate that a successful behavioural change depends on users' awareness of the different effects of descriptive and injunctive norms, and on their ability to direct the target audience exclusively to norms that are congruent with the intended behaviour (Cialdini et al., 1990; Cialdini et al., 2006). Scholars such as (e.g., Warren and Campbell, 2014; Aldrovandi et al., 2015) have utilised these individual mechanisms which manifest themselves in the focus theory of normative conduct in several different areas to provoke behavioural change, predominantly to induce pro-environment and pro-social behaviour. However, business practitioners largely ignored the potency of social norms because of limited understanding of their psychological mechanism (Griskevicius et al., 2008). Businesses are now beginning to experiment with social norms as a tool to drive profits, and they need insightful guidance in implementation (Martin, 2012).

Table 2.3 - Summary of opportunism research in various disciplines

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Skowronski et al. (2020)	Outsourcing	Perceived supplier opportunism	Supplier - manufacturer	TCE	Perceived opportunism and opportunism are distinct constructs. More observable form of opportunism impact perceived opportunism more than less observable form off opportunism. For example, shirking affects perceived opportunism than poaching. In advanced economies, manufacturers perceive that poaching is more strongly related to the level of economic development where a supplier operates than shirking A cost focus can help to reduce perceptions of poaching, whereas an innovation focus provokes them	Use a longitudinal design to capture how perceptions change as media narratives emerge. Examine how innovation-focused suppliers in emerging economies could mitigate perceptions of perceived poaching.
Huo et al. (2019)	Business Relationship	Structural power	Buyer-supplier	SET RDT	In a buyer-supplier relationship, a partner dependence is positively related to the other partner's use of coercive and non-coercive power. The use of coercive power of a partner positively influences their opportunistic behaviours. The use of buyer's non-coercive power is negatively related to their opportunism and supplier's opportunism, whereas supplier's use of non-coercive power is not significantly linked to either partner's opportunism.	Collect data from other geographic regions. Use dyadic data from both suppliers and buyers. Use panel data to investigate the causal relationships among partner's dependence, use of power, and opportunism
Yang et al. (2018)	Supply chain relationship	Transaction specific assets Performance ambiguity Legal enforceability Guanxi important	Buyer-supplier	IT	Legal enforceability and guanxi importance reduce supply chain opportunism, but their interaction does not help to curb opportunism Legal enforceability reduces the positive effect of transaction-specific assets on opportunism. Guanxi importance decreases the positive effect of performance ambiguity on opportunism.	Examine the roles of alternative governance modes in offsetting potential exchange hazards and opportunism. Testing the framework in another emerging contexts. Explore the impacts of exchange duration, interdependence, and relationship commitment on supply chain opportunism

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Xue et al. (2018)	Joint venture relationship	Partner selection cost Specific asset investment Extorting rent cost Opportunistic behaviour	Joint venture partners	TCE	Extorting rent cost, specific asset investment and partner selection cost are positively related to a joint venture partner's cooperative behaviour. Specific asset investment has the most significant influence on partner's cooperative behaviour. Specific asset investment does not impact partner's opportunistic behaviour but extorting rent cost negatively affects partner's opportunistic behaviour. Partner selection cost and extorting rent cost positively affect specific asset investment.	Collect dyadic data from both sides Test the proposed framework in varying business contexts. Consider adding other factors to the model, such as uncertainty, enforcement costs, reciprocity, communication, and commitment.
Maestrini et al. (2018)	Supply chain management	Monitoring Incentives Performance Supplier opportunism	Supplier-buyer	AT	Suppliers' operational performance are affected positively by monitoring and incentives Goal congruence does not mediate the relationship between monitoring, incentives and performance, but opportunism does. Providing incentives rise the chances of opportunistic behaviours. In turns, supplier opportunism reduces suppliers' operational performance	Examine if and how the relationships between agency factors, such as culture or other nation characteristics, vary across countries. Consider the supplier side and/or the buyer-supplier dyad as units of analysis
(Kelly et al., 2018)	Supply chain management	Opportunism	Buyer-supplier	TCE	Opportunism with guile between buyers and suppliers appear to be unusual in practice.	Re-establish the relevance of 'guile' to opportunism.
Zhang and Qian (2017)	Project Management	Opportunism Risk perceptions Mediated power	Owner-Contractor	N/A	Contractors' relational risk perceptions and performance risk perceptions positively impact their tendency to act opportunistically. Owners' mediated power increases the contractor's negative perceptions of relational risks but not performance risks	Examine other factors (e.g., manager characteristics, external environment) and its link to opportunism. Investigate the influence of contractor power to opportunism. Consider various forms opportunism. Use social network approaches, or a triangle level approach that incorporate other stakeholders in to the relationship between owner-contractor.

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Li et al. (2017b)	Supplier Development	Supplier development Outsourcing performance, Opportunism	Supplier-Buyer	N/A	Supplier development impact outsourcing performance directly and indirectly. Directly, supplier development strongly and positively affects outsourcing performance. By reducing opportunism risk and improving flexibility, supplier development increases outsourcing performance.	Examine relationship between supplier development and multidimensional outsourcing performance Consider contingency factors such as task complexity, power, strategic important, alternative supplier, that can influence the relationship between supplier development and outsourcing performance. Conduct comparative research in different cultural contexts to examine the role of buying firms' investments in supplier development.
Wang et al. (2017)	Governance	Opportunism, contract specificity, shared vision	International Joint Venture	N/A	Government resource dependence and policy uncertainty enhance foreign partner opportunism. Contract specificity moderates the relationship between government resource dependence and opportunism. Shared vision moderates the relationship between policy uncertainty and opportunism.	Examine other salient aspects of institutional environments (e.g., the legal system, culture, and social norms) to foreign partner opportunism. Develop a better knowledge of how multiple institutions interact. Examine the effectiveness of other governance mechanisms, such as trust and relational embeddedness and their interplays with the institutional factors in reducing partner opportunism. Study the complex, dynamic, and multifaceted nature of inter-partner moral hazards and misconducts. From that, consider how to mitigate them effectively. Investigate the extent opportunism impacts performance and how.

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Villena and Craighead (2017)	Business Relationship	Size asymmetry, Relational capital asymmetry, Opportunism	Buyer-Supplier	N/A	A business partner that perceives a higher level of relational capital than its counterpart is more likely to be perceived as more (rather than less) opportunist. Buyers perceive size and relational capital asymmetries as a performance liability rather than an asset.	Examine other asymmetries in buyer-supplier relationship (e.g., technical capabilities) Investigate the interrelations among asymmetries. For example, could size asymmetry relate to trust asymmetry? Explore specific mechanisms for managing asymmetric buyer-supplier relationship and/or their negative consequences. Investigate if asymmetries have an impact on financial performance.
Paswan et al. (2017)	Governance	bureaucratic structure, relational norms,	Inter-firm partnership	CtrT	The interaction between formalisation and solidarity and increase opportunism The interaction between formalisation and role integrity and between participation and solidarity curbs opportunism. Participation's interaction with role integrity and mutuality likely to increase opportunism.	Examine the changes of governance structures in a channel relationship. Investigate the interactions between governance structures and environment and their effect on opportunism. Investigate the link between bureaucratic structure and relational norm Examine key cultural dimensions of business-to-business relationships.

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Leonidou et al. (2017)	Business Relationship	Betrayal, relational uncertainty, opportunism, inter-partner incompatibility, relational distance, conflict	Importer-Exporter	SET	Relational uncertainty, inter-partner incompatibility conflict, opportunism, and relational distance significantly and positively affect betrayal in exporter relationships with foreign buyers.	Examine differences in the antecedents and consequences of betrayal incidences in the setting of domestic versus international market settings. Improve the model by adding other constructs, such as the role of cultural differences, institutional distance, and internationalisation stages. Explore betrayal from the dyadic perspectives, and from the perspective of boundary spanners such as salespeople and purchasing employees. Study the moderating role of governance mechanisms (e.g., markets versus hierarchies), temporal factors (e.g., new versus old relationships) and cultural differences (e.g., high versus low uncertainty avoidance).
Wang et al. (2016a)	Supply Chain Governance	Supplier Opportunism, Contract, Trust	Buyer-Supplier	IT	When regulatory uncertainty is high, contracts deter supplier opportunism more effectively. In domestic supplier-buyer relationships, contracts help curtail opportunism more effectively than the effect in international ones. Trust is more effective in reducing supplier opportunism in international relationships than in domestic ones.	Investigate other formal and informal institutional factors (e.g., property rights protection, legal efficiency, or guanxi importance) on their interactions with alternative governance mechanisms. Define how institutional factors amend the joint use of contractual and relational governance. Examine the effectiveness of formal and informal governance mechanism in various institutional settings for managing supply chain relationships.

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Huo et al. (2016b)	Supply Chain Management	Justice Communication Specific investment Opportunism	Buyer-Supplier	SET	Buyer's specific investment is increased by supplier distributive and procedural justice. The communication between buyers and suppliers is improved by supplier interactional justice. Buyer communication restrains supplier opportunism but buyer's specific investment increase supplier opportunism. Both buyer communication and supplier procedural justice reduce buyer opportunism.	Design a longitudinal study to captures stages and/or multiple transactions occurs in the relationships. Include other forms of collaborative behaviour (e.g., relationship orientation, relationship commitment, and relationship integration) in the module. Collect data from other countries. Examine the effects of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on other outcomes
Huo et al. (2016a)	Logistics Outsourcing	Relational norms Contract Opportunism	User-provider		Detailed contracts and solidarity reduce 3PL providers' opportunistic behaviour. Contract application process leads to opportunistic behaviours, Flexibility positively impacts detailed contacted, in turn negatively affects 3PL providers' opportunism. Contract applications process is positively affected by flexibility, in turn positively impact 3PL providers' opportunism	Examine what kinds of information and how the exchange of information can curb opportunism. Using multiple methodologies to examine the degree of flexibility that helps 3PL users to curb providers' opportunism. Explore the relationships between, contracts, relational norms, and trust in the logistics outsourcing industry.
Yan and Kull (2015)	New Product Development	Opportunism, Joint Task Context, Relational Context, Project Performance	Buyer-Supplier	TCT	The task and relational contexts in new product development projects significantly affect supplier opportunism. Supplier opportunism damages two aspects of project performance (i.e., design quality and efficiency)	Examine buying firm opportunism from suppliers' perspectives. Investigate the reciprocal causal relationship between supplier opportunism and buyer opportunism. Examine how supplier opportunism affects other collaboration outcomes such as satisfaction, capability improvement. Collect data from a broader set of countries with distinct cultural and institutional settings.

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Yam and Chan (2015)	New Product Development	Commitment, Opportunism, Knowledge Sharing	Business Partners	N/A	Knowledge sharing among committed business partners curb, rather than trigger, opportunism. The result contrasts to most studies in the literature.	Investigate the interactive effects of other transactional and relational inter-firm governance mechanisms such as contract, commitment and trust on knowledge sharing and opportunism in inter-firm joint new product development projects. Examine other relational mechanisms such as trust in inter-firm joint new product development
Wang et al. (2015)	Supply Chain	External uncertainties, Power, Opportunism	Buyer-Supplier	TCE, RDT	Environmental uncertainty increases supplier opportunism directly and indirectly through the buyer's use of coercive power over the supplier. Legal unprotect ability increases supplier opportunism directly but suppresses it indirectly through the buyer's use of non-coercive power. Buyer coercive power enhances supplier opportunism, buyer non-coercive power reduces it.	Examine other relational governance mechanisms (e.g., control and relational norms) in the model. Investigate buyer opportunism to identify or control the specific influence. Study the effect of uncertainties and power on various types of opportunism
Huo et al. (2015)	Logistics	Trust, Contract, Opportunism, Demand uncertainty	third-party logistics (3PL) providers - users	TCE, SET, CT	Trust and detailed contracts directly reduce opportunism. Contract application increases the hazards of opportunism. The relationship between contract application and opportunism is moderated by demand uncertainty.	Develop a more comprehensive framework of governance mechanisms in 3PL relationships by adding other governance mechanism constructs (e.g., specific assets and norms). Examine and compare the opportunistic behaviour and the governance mechanisms of both providers and users. Investigate how various forms of trust affect opportunism.

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Handley and Angst (2015)	Outsourcing	Opportunism, contractual governance, relational governance, culture	Supplier-Buyer	N/A	Individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance cultures benefit more from contractual governance Collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance societies benefit more from relational governance. The individualism-collectivism dimension moderates the joint effect of contractual and relational governance. Contractual and relational governance mechanisms are generally complementary in mitigating opportunism. If apply separately, contractual governance is effective to reduce opportunism in high individualism cultures while relational is effective high collectivism cultures.	Add other hazards such as site specificity and temporal specificity to explore alternative explanations for the complex relationships between culture, governance, and opportunism. Examine the effect of other factors, such as supply market dynamics, operational disruption risk, to the effects of relative interfirm dependency and vulnerability to opportunism. Examine opportunistic behaviour from the perspective of the buying firm.
Kang and Jindal (2015)	Business Marketing	Conflict, opportunism, alternative attractiveness, goal incongruity, unfairness, transaction-specific investment, termination cost	Supplier-Buyer	TCE	Conflict in a business relationship significantly enhances franchisee opportunism. Conflict mediates the effects of other antecedents such as alternative attractiveness, goal incongruity, unfairness, transaction-specific investments, and termination cost to opportunism.	Examine the antecedents of opportunism in various markets, thus identify and compare differences in their impact across context. Investigate the relationship between other contextual factors (e.g., the level of competition and other environmental factors) and opportunism
Wang et al. (2014)	Supply Chain Management	Managerial Ties, Trust, Information sharing Opportunism	Supplier-Buyer	N/A	Managerial ties can significantly impact the extent of information sharing and the quality of the information shared through trust. The main leverage in suppress supplier opportunism appear to be the quality of the information shared – rather than the extent of information sharing.	Examine potential contingency for different types of information sharing such as environmental uncertainty. Investigate inter-organisational factors (e.g., commitment and power) in the model.

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Liu et al. (2014)	Supply Chain	Network embeddedness, opportunism, transactional specific investment	Supplier-Buyer	TCT	A firm's transactional specific investments are positively linked to partner's opportunism when network embeddedness and the partner's transitional specific investment are relatively low. A firm's transactional specific investments are negatively linked to partner's opportunism when network embeddedness and the partner's transactional specific investments are relatively high. Network embeddedness is more effective in constraining partner's weak-form opportunism than in constraining strong-form opportunism resulting from the firm's transactional specific investments. The negative moderating effect of network embeddedness is greater than the negative moderating effect of partner's transactional specific investments in the relationship between transactional specific investments and weak-form opportunism.	Examine the relationship between behavioural norms such as partner's information-sharing, participation relationship with weak-form opportunism. Examiner other relationships such as imperfect law system and "guanxi" culture, inter-firm relationship quality and various control mechanisms.
Zhou and Xu (2012)	Governance	Contract, centralise control, relational governance, Opportunism	Supplier-Buyer	TCE, RET	Detailed contracts are ineffective in restraining partner opportunism in contractually specified areas where legal institutions are weak. Where legal institutions are weak, relational governance provides an alternative for legal institutions to ensure contract execution. Relational governance complements detailed contracts but substitutes for centralised control in reducing opportunism.	Use dyadic data from both foreign buyers and local suppliers to examine possible mutual influences. Develop more precise opportunism measures. Investigate how various economic and social mechanisms suppress various types of opportunism.
Lai et al. (2012)	Logistics Governance	Trust, Relational Norms, Opportunism	3PLs provider-logistics user	SET, TCT	In highly uncertain environments, trust and norms are effective safeguards in reducing the opportunistic behaviour of logistics service providers.	Collect dyadic data from both 3PL providers and users. Investigate *ex ante* opportunism. Identify other factors that may have mediating, moderating, or direct/indirect effects on opportunistic behaviour in 3PL outsourcing relationships.

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
von Werder (2011)	Corporate Governance	Opportunism	Stakeholders	ST	Develop a conceptual framework for analysing the drivers and dynamics of different stakeholders' opportunism options and risks, as well as real opportunistic behaviour.	Identify and describe more thoroughly specific stakeholders' opportunism options, risks, and behaviours. Explain the variables and mechanisms that influence the opportunism options, risks and behaviours of the individual stakeholders. Develop a typology of opportunism options and risks that allows the classification of concrete options and risks of stakeholders. Examine the elements that influence stakeholders' legal and power positions, as well as their evolutions, changes over time, and interactions, as they shape opportunism possibilities. Investigate the antecedents and patterns of various stakeholders' opportunistic behaviours. Examine the likelihood of an opportunism event.
Villena et al. (2011)	Supply Chain Management	Social capital, Performance,	Supplier-Buyer	SCT	Social capital in a collaborative buyer-supplier relationship positively impacts buyer performance. However, if taken social capital to an extreme, it can impair the buyer's ability to make objective and effective judgments as well as enhance the supplier's opportunistic behaviour.	Build specific measurement scales that capture the negative side of buyer-supplier relationship. Consider other variables (e.g., loss of objectivity, the ineffectiveness of decision making) and the development of opportunism in collaborative buyer-supplier relationship Investigate the mediation effects of other factors in the social capital-performance relationship. Examine the life cycle of social relations in supplier-buyer relationships.

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Malhotra and Gino (2011)	Strategic Management	Power, outside options, sunk cost, opportunism	Exchange relationships	N/A	The extent to which individuals have invested in creating outside options enlarge the likelihood that they will exploit their exchange partners.	Explore the degree of non-reciprocity in costly option conditions. Examine conditions in which costly outside options might affect trust development. Investigate the relationships in more embedded, long-term relationship contexts. Examine other methods for attaining and retaining power, as well as their implications.
Das and Kumar (2011)	Strategic Alliance	Regulatory focus, motivational orientations, Opportunism	Alliance firms	N/A	The alliance firms' motivational orientations play vital roles in shaping tolerance for opportunism. Alliance firms with a prevention regulatory focus will be less tolerant of their partners' opportunistic behaviour than alliance firms with a promotion regulatory focus.	Empirically test the specific propositions that have been suggested in the research.
Al-Khatib et al. (2011)	Management	Deceitful tendencies, relativism, opportunism	N/A	N/A	Deceitful tendencies and relativism significantly impact opportunism. Opportunism predicts receptiveness to unethical negotiating tactics.	Examine how other constructs (e.g., idealism) interact with relativism to moderate opportunism.
Tangpong et al. (2010)	Management	Relational norms, agent cooperativeness, Opportunism	Supplier-buyer	TCE, PTT, CT	The interaction between relational norms and agent cooperativeness reduces opportunism. The interactionist perspective, a multi-level theoretical lens that encompasses the dynamic interplay between organisation-level and individual-level elements, is a more comprehensive model in explaining opportunism than either the organisationalist or individualist perspectives.	Investigate the framework in a more complex setting, focusing on multi-agent dynamics in buyer-supplier opportunism. Incorporate other factors such as regulatory, cultural, and institutional forces into the conceptual model and address their roles in reducing buyer-supplier opportunism. Examine the role of other agent personal characteristics that may potentially impact opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships.

Author	Subject area	Focal constructs	Relationship	Theory	Main findings	Future research suggestions
Rindfleisch et al. (2010)	Governance	Transaction cost, Opportunism	N/A	TCT	Identify six important contextual considerations of TCT, including partner characteristics, mode of communication, type of transaction, level of exchange, capabilities and resource, mixed mechanism for future research.	Examine how well TCT can define and explain the characteristics of emerging economic institutions. Examine social forms of production such as open-source software, peer-to-peer file sharing.
Liu et al. (2010b)	Marketing Management	Calculative commitment, loyalty commitment, Opportunism	Supplier-Buyer	N/A	A supplier's calculative commitment enhances a buyer's opportunism. A supplier's loyalty commitment leads to a reduction of a buyer's opportunism. A supplier's loyalty commitment reduces the positive impact of calculative commitment on opportunism.	Investigate the effect of the interrelation between calculative commitment and loyalty commitment on other channel variables (e.g., channel satisfaction, performance). Examine firm commitment during a relationship's dissolution or declining phase.

Note: CtrT = Control Theory TCT= Transaction Cost Theory CT = Contingency
SET = Social Exchange Theory TCE = Transaction Cost Economic RET = Relational exchange Theory AT = Agency Theory
IT = Institutional Theory RDT= Resource Dependence Theory SCT = Social Capital Theory PTT = Personal Trait Theory

2.4.2 Relational Norms

The idea that social norms influence economic exchange is central to considerable literature (Granovetter, 1985; Gibbons, 1999; Bercovitz et al., 2006). Numerous researchers believe that social norms are critical in creating economic behaviour and market performance, which occasionally prevail over the profit impulse (Hong and Snell, 2015). From one perspective, the relational governance approach assumes that transactions are typically embedded in social relationships. Thus, non-legal sanctions exist in the form of relational norms which encourage commitment in the exchange relationship between buyers and suppliers (Heide and John, 1992). From another perspective, a social norm is a complicated phenomenon. Moreover, many firms have begun to rely on building relational norms into their exchange relationships which help to govern the behaviour of exchange partners (e.g., Heide and John, 1992; Cannon et al., 2000; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).

Heide and John (1992) defined relational norms as the relational exchange's common expectation of behaviour which all applicable decision-makers in both companies accept. This creates a social environment in which mutual interests are encouraging as well as restraining, and self-interested seeking behaviour is the essence of these norms (Lai et al., 2012). As part of social norms, relational norms are also intangible and flexible because they have no specific elements and terms. However, all parties of a relationship share a set of bilateral oriented activities and hidden rules, values and norms (Lai et al., 2012).

Research on antecedents of relational norms has been conducted over the last two decades *(Table 2.4).* Some factors investigated included: environmental dynamism (Joshi and Campbell, 2003), relationship structure (Gençtürk and Aulakh, 2007), trust (Paulssen et al., 2016), exchange hazards (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sheng et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2016), legitimacy pressure and market ambiguity (Yang et al., 2012), communication (Sheng et al., 2006), transaction-specific investment (Sheng et al., 2006), and decision-making uncertainty (Sheng et al., 2006). Yang et al. (2016) suggested that exchange hazards, such as supplier volatility, affect relational norms in an inverse U-shape. The research findings, in particular, indicate an opposite direction of the effect between measuring partner performance difficulty from Poppo and Zenger (2002). Whereas the former research has revealed a negative effect, the latter has demonstrated a tendency to rely on relational norms where there is difficulty in measuring partner performance.

Table 2.4 - Empirical research on antecedents of relational norms

Study	Research area	Independent variable	Dependent variable	Relational norms dimensions	Research design	Key findings	Future research direction
Cai and Yang (2008)	Supplier - buyer relationship	Dependence Exchange hazards Norm facilitators	Cooperative norms Performance Buyer Satisfaction	Cooperative Norms	Structured Interview 344 organisations	Identify the determinants (i.e., dependence, exchange hazards, norms facilitators) of cooperative norms. The length of relationship does not impact cooperative norms. The relationship between cooperative norms and buyer satisfaction is mediated fully by supplier performance.	Explore cooperative norms from both supplier and buyer sides Investigate the relationships under other theoretical perspectives (e.g., resource-based view) to provide more comprehensive explanations of the development of cooperative norms Involve both guanxi at individual level and cooperative norms at organisational level in a cross-level analysis to better explore the model.
Joshi and Campbell (2003)	Supplier-manufacturer	Environmental dynamism Collaborative belief Supplier knowledge	Relational Governance	5-items scale	Survey 221 manufactures	Environmental dynamism positively related to relational governance when manufacturer collaborative or supplier knowledge is high. Environmental dynamism negatively related to relational governance when manufacturer collaborative or supplier knowledge is low.	Measure supplier learning explicitly directly test the inferences of manufacturer collaborative belief and supplier knowledge foster supplier learning. Examine the motivation and ability for interplay learning of both partners. Consider the network affiliation of the supplier as a moderator.

Study	Research area	Independent variable	Dependent variable	Relational norms dimensions	Research design	Key findings	Future research direction
Gençtürk and Aulakh (2007)	International distribution channel	Relationship structure: + Dependence + Formalisation + Socialisation	Relational norms Relationship e ffectiveness	A second-order construct: Trust Commitment Flexibility	Survey 129 industrial firms	Relationship structures (i.e., dependence, formalisation, and socialisation) between partner firms positively impact norms-based governance (i.e., relational norm) and control-based governance (i.e., control). The moderating effects of relational norms and control on the relationship between relationship structure and relationship effectiveness indicators are mixed. The nature of the influence of relational norms and control on the effectiveness of the relationship varies by the environmental uncertainty in the foreign markets.	Investigate other constructs as determinants and antecedents of relationship effectiveness. Test additional direct, in-direct, non-recursive linkages between variables.
Paulssen et al. (2016)	Customer-company relationship	Relationship quantity Relationship quality Trust	Relational norms	3 dimensions: Solidarity Flexibility Reciprocity	Survey 198 customers of a financial company.	Only trust has a significant and positive impact on relational norms. Identify five configurations of relationship factors consistently that reliably create high relational norms.	Authors did not discuss.

Study	Research area	Independent variable	Dependent variable	Relational norms dimensions	Research design	Key findings	Future research direction
Sheng et al. (2006)		Power asymmetry Exchange hazards Communication	Relational governance	Trust Loyalty Shared Value	Survey 459 firms	Instrumental or social communication has a strong positive impact on the advancement of relational norms. Where power asymmetry exists, transaction specific assets investment and decision-making uncertainty do not link with increased relational governance. The use of social communication reduces the negative impacts of transaction specific investment and decision-making uncertainty on relational governance.	Collect more diverse samples to investigate the relationship between dependency and power symmetry. Examine the change of task-related, goal-related, and social communication over the relationship life cycle.
Yang et al. (2012)	International marketing channel performance	Institutional distance: + Regulatory + Normative +Cultural cognitive Legitimacy pressure Market ambiguity	Contract customisations Relational governance Performance channel	A 3-dimentional construct: + Flexibility + Solidarity + Information exchange	Interview 436 managers from 218 firms	Regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive differences (i.e., institutional distances) lead to firms' perceptions of legitimacy pressure and market ambiguity. In turn, the perceptions enforce firm governance choices to safeguard performance. Legitimacy pressure and market ambiguity positively impact relational governance. Relational governance has a positive and significant impact on channel performance	Collect data from both sides of the relationships. Consider various channel members' perspectives to explore the influence of institutional distances on channel governance strategies in different stages of the relationship cycle.

Study	Research area	Independent variable	Dependent variable	Relational norms dimensions	Research design	Key findings	Future research direction
Yang et al. (2016)	Inter-firm relationship management	Contracts Relational Norms Transaction constraints: +Demand volatility +Supply volatility +Technology uncertainty +Vendor contribution	Outsourcing performance	A single construct: +Solidarity +Flexibility +Information exchange	Survey 264 Chinese firms	Supply volatility affects relational norms in an inverse U-shape Both contract and relational norms are increasingly used by client firms in the environments where technology uncertainty is common Client firms reduce the use of both contracts and relational norms when the contribution of vendor is highly unpredictable Contracts and relational norms have similar effects to operation performance, but contracts enhance satisfaction less effectively relational norms.	Examine other transaction uncertainty indicators (i.e., economic system, culture, legal framework, religion, resource availability, natural conditions). Collect dyadic data Consider transaction indicators as both antecedents and moderators in one model that investigate the relationship between transaction factors and control mechanisms.

Multiple studies on inter-firm relationship management (*Table 2.5*) have investigated the effectiveness of relational norms for enhancing exchange performance (Heide and John, 1992; Ferguson et al., 2005; Arranz and Arroyabe, 2012), commitment (Goo et al., 2009), and opportunism (Brown et al., 2000; Lui et al., 2009). Cannon et al. (2000) studied the benefits of relational norms in enhancing exchange performance, stating that relational norms increase performance when the environment uncertainty is high. Contrastingly, Poppo et al. (2008) believes exchange hazards and exchange tenure moderate the positive relationship between relational norms and exchange performance.

Other benefits of relational norms include the mediating roles in the relationship between service level agreements and relational outcome such as commitment (Goo et al., 2009), service provider-customer closeness, and performance (Ferguson et al., 2005). Additionally, relational norms moderate the relationship between goal congruence and performance or opportunism and transaction-specific investment, as well as influence strategies and opportunism (Brown et al., 2009a; Brown et al., 2009b) in addition to detailed contracts, centralised control, and opportunism (Zhou and Xu, 2012).

2.4.3 Relational Norms as an Overarching Term in the Literature.

Research on governance mechanisms with which to manage exchange relationships has measured relational norms differently. *Generally,* there are two common ways of measuring relational norms that are employed in the literature: (1) first-order reflective model and (2) second-order model (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). Typically, these studies select some dimensions of relational norms and develop statements that are considered applicable to each dimension. Subsequently, they ask respondents to indicate their evaluation by deciding the point on a Likert-type of a specific exchange, relative to that statement (Blois and Ivens, 2006). Since most of the research on relational norms is quantitative, it is unsurprising that almost all researchers employ some of the relational norms' dimensions suggested by Heide and John (1992) and Cannon et al. (2000) who are informed by Macneil (1980). Furthermore, Cao and Lumineau (2015) suggests that a possible source of the inconsistent results in the literature on relational norms is the type of measurement, and recommends that future research should exercise caution in choosing measurement scales, avoiding single-item measurement. Furthermore, scholars lack attention to some fundamental issues related to the norms which they study (Ott and Ivens, 2009) such as discussions on the way in which norms are, or should be, defined in business-to-business exchange research (Blois and Ivens, 2006; Ott and Ivens, 2009).

Table 2.6 summarises the measurement of relational norms. However, some scholars consider relational norms to be a unique construct (e.g., Tangpong et al., 2010; Lai et al., 2012), whereas others incorporate various dimensions into relational norm measurements (e.g., Brown et al., 2000; Huo et al., 2016a; Paswan et al., 2017). Specifically, some studies (Rokkan et al., 2003; Heide et al., 2014) exclusively consider the solidarity norm as a representative of relational norms. Furthermore, the norm attracts scholar's examinations in their measurements of relational norms (Huo et al., 2016a; Paswan et al., 2017), stating consistent findings of solidarity norms curtail opportunism in exchange relationships, and that norms change the effect of specific investments on opportunism (Rokkan et al., 2003). In addition to the solidarity norm that is often referred to as a sub-dimension of relational norms, other dimensions were employed, as presented in *Table 2.6.* It is worthy of mention that trust and commitment were examined inconsistently in the literature on governance mechanisms with which to control opportunism. Some scholars regard it as a dimension of relational norms (Carson et al., 2006; Zhou et al., 2015), while others view it as a single construct that directly interacts with relational norms to impact partner behaviour in exchange relationships, particularly opportunistic behaviour (Lai et al., 2012; Huo et al., 2015).

Table 2.5 - Empirical research on the impact of relational norms on exchange relationships

Study	Research Area	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Relational Norms Dimensions	Research Design	Key findings	Limitation/ Future research direction
Arranz and Arroyabe (2012)	Research and development project	Formal Contracts Relational Norms Trust	Performance	A 3-dimensional construct - Information exchange - Solidarity - Participant norms	Survey 371 European biotechnology companies	Transactional and relational mechanisms are mutually beneficial. Relational mechanisms are less statistically powerful than transactional mechanisms on the joint exploitation projects the performance. Relational mechanisms have a more positive impact than transactional mechanisms on the performance of joint exploration projects.	Extend similar inquiries in other contexts, examining the conditions under which the interaction between formal contracts, and relational norms and trust may result in superior performance.
Brown et al. (2009a)	Marketing relationship	Physical Transactional-specific Investment (TSI) Knowledge-based TSI Relational norms	Customer relationship performance Operational Performance Supplier Opportunism	A second-order construct + Solidarity + Role integrity +Conflict harmonisation	Survey 358 hotel general managers	The impacts of a firm's investment in TSIs can protect against opportunism while also promoting supplier performance, but they are dependent on the sort of TSIs used (i.e., knowledge based or physical) and how effectively relational norms characterise the exchange relationship. Increasing knowledge based TSIs lead to increasing firms' performance, especially in situations where relational norms are high. Firm invests more in physical transaction-specific assets lead to lowering its performance in situations when relational norms are strong.	Examine other constructs such as commitment, trust, relationship satisfaction, and relationship quality in the model.

Study	Research Area	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Relational Norms Dimensions	Research Design	Key findings	Limitation/ Future research direction
Brown et al. (2009b)	Marketing relationship	Influence strategies: +non-coercive influence +coercive influence Relational norms	Opportunism	Second-order construct: Relationship preservation Conflict Harmonisation Role Specification	Survey 367 hotel managers	Relational norms affect asymmetrically effect to coercive and non-coercive influence strategies. If relationships have high relational norms in the relationship, the use of non-coercive influence strongly suppress partner opportunism whereas the use of coercive influence increases partner opportunism. If relationships have low relational norms, non-coercive influence increases and coercive influence decreases partner opportunism.	Explore how relational norms are developed through communication, reward, and sanction. Investigate if the extent of opportunism within the exchange relationship could impact the use of influence strategies to manage that behaviour.
Brown et al. (2016)	Franchise monitoring	Monitoring Goal congruence Relational norms	Opportunism Performance	Second order construct: +Flexibility norms +Solidarity norms Information sharing	Survey 230 franchisees	Higher congruence between franchisors' and franchisees' goals directly affect franchisees on boosting their performance when exchange norms are weak in relationships. Goal congruence limits opportunism rather than enhance performance in situations where relational norms are strong.	The authors did not discuss.
Cannon et al. (2000)	Buyer-Supplier Relationship	Legal Bonds Relational Norms	Performance	Flexibility Solidarity Mutuality Harmonisation of conflict Restraint in the use of power	Survey 396 supplier-buyer relationship	Contract and social norms are effective in increasing supplier performance with individual effect as well as combination effect. When transactional uncertainty is low, an increasing in contractual specificity and details does not lead to enhancing supplier performance, but elaborate contracts is an effective governance that leads to increasing supplier performance. Cooperative norms positively affect to performance, regardless the level of transactional uncertainty.	Explore the role of other governance factors such as authority, ethics, trust, incentives, reputation, monitoring, reciprocity, markets, dependence, power, commitment. Explore various combinations of governance mechanism that affect learning and innovation.

Study	Research Area	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Relational Norms Dimensions	Research Design	Key findings	Limitation/ Future research direction
Ferguson et al. (2005)	Service companies' relationship exchange	Relational norms Contractual governance Boundary-spanner closeness	Exchange performance	11-item scale Harmonisation of conflict Solidarity Flexibility Information sharing	Survey 160 business clients and their account managers at the US, Canada, and Mexico	Demonstrate the strong link between relational governance and positive customer-based performance evaluations. The closeness of boundary spanners to the client company positively associates with performance of midmarket commercial banking exchanges. Both relational and contractual governance mediate the relationship.	Measure contractual governance with enhanced psychometric properties. Conduct the research in a broader context (e.g., more symmetrical partnerships and strategy alliances) using plural governance mechanisms.
Goo et al. (2009)	Outsourcing relationship	Service level agreement (SLA) Foundation characteristics Change characteristics Governance characteristics Relational norms	Relational norms Harmonious conflict resolution Mutual dependence Trust Commitment	A single first order construct, 5 items: +Flexibility +Information exchange +Solidarity	Survey 92 organisations	Support the basic premise that formal contracts and relational governance are complementary. The effect of SLA characteristics on relational outcomes (i.e., trust and commitment) is mediated by relational norms, harmonious conflict resolution. Relational norms positively impact commitment.	Consider adding other independent variables into the model Collect dyadic data from both partners.
Heide and John (1992)	Marketing relationship	Transaction-specific investment Relational norms	Buyer control over supplier decisions	A single second-order construct: +Flexibility +Information exchange +Solidarity	159 buying firms	Norms play a crucial role in establishing economically efficient relationships between independent businesses. Vertical control investment is positively influenced by specific assets and the relationship is contingent on the presence of relational norms.	Explore the factors that can be antecedents of relational norms.

Study	Research Area	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Relational Norms Dimensions	Research Design	Key findings	Limitation/ Future research direction
Liu et al. (2009)	Buyer-supplier relationship	Transactional mechanism Relational mechanism: +Relational norms + Trust	Opportunism Relational performance	A single construct: +information exchange + solidarity + participant norms	Survey 251 dyads	Transactional mechanisms are relatively more effective in suppressing opportunism. Relational mechanisms are more effective in increasing relationship performance. The joint effect of combining transactional mechanism and relational mechanism significantly restrains opportunism and enhances cooperation.	Examine other mechanisms (e.g., influence strategies, communication effectiveness, goal congruence and ownership arrangement) Rigorously investigate any potential asymmetry in the dyadic relationship between buyers and suppliers Explore the processes that establish and maintain transactional and relational mechanisms.
Poppo et al. (2008)		Relational Governance Exchange hazards Exchange tenure	Performance	Information exchange Collaboration	Survey 181 firm.	Exchange hazards and exchange tenure reduce the positive relationship between relational governance and exchange performance.	Explore if different governance choices can mitigate the conditional limits of relational governance. Examine the kind of administrative practices that are most crucial for creating value in relational governance.
Zhou and Xu (2012)	Supplier-buyer relationship	Detailed contracts Centralised control Relational governance (relational norms)	Opportunism	- A single construct +Flexibility +Solidarity +Information exchange	Survey 168 foreign firms in China	When relational governance is high (low), detailed contracts impact negatively (positively) to opportunism. When relational governance is low (high), centralised control is negatively (positively) related to opportunism.	Develop more refined measures of opportunism. Explore how various economic and social mechanisms suppress different types of opportunism arising in different areas. Conduct research in multi-country setting to better investigate the effects of alternative governance mechanisms.

Generally, there are two common ways of measuring relational norms that are employed in the literature: (1) first-order reflective model and (2) second-order model (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). Typically, these studies select some dimensions of relational norms and develop statements that are considered applicable to each dimension. Subsequently, they ask respondents to indicate their evaluation by deciding the point on a Likert-type of a specific exchange, relative to that statement (Blois and Ivens, 2006). Since most of the research on relational norms is quantitative, it is unsurprising that almost all researchers employ some of the relational norms' dimensions suggested by Heide and John (1992) and Cannon et al. (2000) who are informed by Macneil (1980). Furthermore, Cao and Lumineau (2015) suggests that a possible source of the inconsistent results in the literature on relational norms is the type of measurement, and recommends that future research should exercise caution in choosing measurement scales, avoiding single-item measurement. Furthermore, scholars lack attention to some fundamental issues related to the norms which they study (Ott and Ivens, 2009) such as discussions on the way in which norms are, or should be, defined in business-to-business exchange research (Blois and Ivens, 2006; Ott and Ivens, 2009).

Table 2.6 - Relational norms dimensions

Dimensions	Definition	Studies
Relationship preservation	The degree that channel members view their relationship as distinct from a series of discrete transactions, and consider the relationship important in and of itself, and wish to preserve that relationship	(Brown et al., 2000)
Role integrity	The complicated responsibilities and expectations that exchange participants have in a relationship	(Brown et al., 2000; Paswan et al., 2017)
Harmonisation of conflict	The extent to which channel participants are able to resolve their disagreements in a way that is mutually satisfactory.	(Brown et al., 2000)
Reputation	A perceptual representation of a corporation that conveys the organisation's overall attractiveness.	(Carson et al., 2006)
Continuity	The likelihood that the partners in a relationship will collaborate on future initiatives	(Carson et al., 2006)
Trust	An individual's general expectation that they may rely on another's word (Rotter, 1967)	(Carson et al., 2006; Zhou et al., 2015)
History of exchange	Exchange relationship in the past	(Carson et al., 2006)
Solidarity	A mutual anticipation that the connection would be valued highly together (Heide and John, 1992)	(Rokkan et al., 2003; Lai et al., 2012; Heide et al., 2014; Huo et al., 2016a; Paswan et al., 2017)
Mutuality	The significance of long-term payoffs in comparison with the value of single transactions	(Paswan et al., 2017)
Cooperative	The parties' shared relationship characteristics of anticipated attitudes and behaviour	(Zhou et al., 2015)
Commitment	The notion that a continuous connection with another party is essential and deserving of effort to guarantee its longevity (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).	(Zhou et al., 2015)
Information exchange	Bilateral expectation that both sides will give helpful information to the other (Heide and John, 1992)	(Lai et al., 2012; Huo et al., 2016a)
Flexibility	A mutual expectation of adaptability as circumstances change (Heide and John, 1992)	(Lai et al., 2012; Huo et al., 2016a)

From a relational capital theoretical viewpoint, when a partner in a supplier-buyer relationship perceives a risk of opportunism, they can seek to invest and cultivate non-economic features of their business exchange (Wang et al., 2013). Supplier development with two different dimensions – capability development and supplier governance – is an antecedent of relational capital (Blonska et al., 2013). However, the effects of the two dimensions on relationship outcome are contrasting (Blonska et al., 2013). Furthermore, Wagner (2011) stated that supplier development is particularly effective in well-established relationships with high levels of trust and commitment, but also commented on how supplier development affects the relationship outcome in different levels of relational norms remains unclear.

2.5 Theoretical Frameworks

Lambe et al. (2001) suggested that TCT and SET could be used together to explain exchange governance more comprehensively. Indeed, several studies integrated SET and TCT as their underlying theoretical framework. For instance, Shahzad et al. (2018) based on TCT and SET, investigated the effects of varying governance mechanisms (i.e., economic and sociological governance mechanisms) on ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment. They found that contractual completeness and symmetric dependence have a more effective role in minimising ex-post transaction costs, whereas trust and communication are more powerful in enhancing relationship commitment. Thus, assuming that an exchange relationship precisely follows TCT or SET principles is naïve because strategy, personnel, management, and goals change over time, and the way relationships are managed may shift from transactional to relational, and vice versa (Hawkins et al., 2008). Moreover, with time, an organisation's perception of the value produced by a more relational or transactional connection may shift (Hawkins et al., 2008). Thus, Lambe et al. (2001) recommend whenever possible, future research on B2B relationships should use both SET and TCT. TCT and SET are also the two dominant theoretical frameworks for research that consider opportunism (Hawkins et al., 2008). Accordingly, the next part discusses these two theories as the main theorical frameworks which underpin this thesis.

2.5.1 Transaction Cost Theory (TCT)

Transaction cost analysis is a very prominent theory, widely regarded as a foundation for understanding economic organisations (Williamson, 1985; Hill, 1990). This approach views firms as governance structures, and “under certain conditions, the costs of conducting economic exchange in a market may exceed the cost of organising the exchange within a firm" (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997, p. 31). TCT examines transactions as the unit of analysis to explain an organisation's boundaries. Accordingly, the firm will outsource if the cost of its own production or services is higher than external alternatives (Hawkins et al., 2008).

TCT is based on two critical assumptions, that of bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Bounded rationality means that a person does not always act logically due to the limitations in people's cognitive ability, and humans cannot be aware of all relevant information (Hawkins et al., 2008). Hence, due to a lack of knowledge or cognitive capability, a contract can never be perfect, and managers do not always serve the firm's best interests. Accordingly, a business must be cautious when investing their resources in an unpredictable and uncertain environment because it may create high transaction costs (Teece, 2006).

Opportunism is another key assumption of TCT. It means when opportunities present, people will behave opportunistically if it is profitable (John, 1984). According to TCT, humans are self-centred, calculative, and only "weakly moral" (Wang et al., 2017), so parties act opportunistically to better their own interests, once possible benefits exceed the expected costs (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Das and Rahman, 2010). Thus, TCT pays attention to the selection of governance mechanisms to reduce the transaction costs incurred by parties' opportunism (Walker and Poppo, 1991; Kim and Mahoney, 2005).

TCT views a business as a governance structure and failing to choose an appropriate governance mechanism to regulate an exchange might lead to opportunism in the relationship (Hawkins et al., 2008). TCT assumes that selecting a hierarchy-based governance (i.e., vertical integration) to control opportunism is more efficient than market-based governance (i.e., arm's length) in more uncertain transactions (Yan and Kull, 2015). Hybrid governance structures include supplier development efforts in which a buyer stays autonomous of its suppliers while attempting to enhance product and delivery performance through formal and informal relationship support methods (Wagner, 2010). This enhances supplier satisfaction and commitment to a certain buyer (Ghijsen et al., 2010). In the literature, hybrid governance systems are frequently described as a "win-win" situation for both buyers and suppliers (Pilar et al., 2012). This is especially true if the former gains greater control over production quality and the supplier obtains adequate incentives for acquiring new skills and production processes (Ghijsen et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017b; Zhang et al., 2017). However, under environmental uncertainty, the efficiency of hybrid governance structures is lower than in the case of hierarchical governance structures in terms of protecting transactional-specific assets, assessing partner performance, and responding to changing circumstances (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Yan and Kull, 2015).

However, TCT has received widespread criticism, from those who (Blois, 1990; Hawkins et al., 2008)Suggest that business relationships are not merely transactional but also have a relational element. The latter is often theorised using SET.

2.5.2 Social Exchange Theory (SET)

Developed by sociologists to explain social behaviour, SET has been used increasingly in B2B research, because of the limitations of transaction cost and resource-based perspectives, to explain relationship-based governance (Lambe et al., 2001; Geng et al., 2017b; Shahzad et al., 2018; Oyedijo et al., 2021). SET postulates that actors commence and maintain relationships due to expected rewards. These include not only financial benefits but also social rewards like friendship and emotional satisfaction, with positive exchange interactions fostering relational norms that govern actors' interactions (Emerson, 1976; Lambe et al., 2001). Overtime, relational exchange relationships create positive outcomes such as trust, commitment, and relational norms that govern the relationship (Lambe et al., 2001). Thus, SET suggests that the socially connected relationship is an alternate form of governance mechanism (Hawkins et al., 2008). As a result, business parties do not strictly rely on written contracts, but on trust, commitment, and relational norms (Heide and John, 1992).

SET acknowledges the potential existence of opportunism but work in this field largely focues on the "upside" of relationships (Hawkins et al., 2008). In a social exchange, one party's action evokes a reaction from another (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). More specifically, one partner voluntarily provides a benefit to another, establishing an obligation for the latter to reciprocate (Whitener et al., 1998). Provided that the relational parties are willing to invest resources sought by their partners, resource reciprocation strengthens the partnership over time (Aselage and Eisenberger, 2003). During the evolution of an exchange relationship into one marked by trust and loyalty, certain rules and conventions that comprise the parameters of social exchange are established (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). However, because the behaviour is volitional, the advantages offered to the partner may not be returned (Whitener et al., 1998). Based on SET, opportunism is regarded as a violation of implicit or explicit decency and fairness rules believed to govern the interaction, which eventually undermines the integrity of the interacting parties' roles and leads to negative emotional and behavioural responses (Leonidou et al., 2017).

SET seeks to understand social exchange systems, assuming that the more frequently an activity is rewarded, the more likely a participant of an exchange is to repeat that action (Griffith et al., 2006). Through successive social exchange episodes, the two parties not only perceive less uncertainty, but also interconnections are enabled (Glavee-Geo, 2019). In the context of supply chains, relationships include not just economic components covered in a contract, but also social interchange features (Griffith et al., 2006). The social aspects of exchange differ from the economic aspects in that the exchange partners' obligations are frequently undefined, and the standards for judging each partner's contributions are ambiguous (Masterson et al., 2000). Thus, from a social exchange perspective, exchange factors considered include justice (Huo et al., 2016b), trust and commitment (Shahzad et al., 2018; Patrucco et al., 2020), and relational norms (Huo et al., 2016a).

2.6 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter reviews the relevant literature relating to supplier development, opportunism, and relational norms. In each part, a summary of current research has been presented, showing the current understanding of each topic, and the remaining gaps in the literature. TCT and SET are suggested to be employed together to examine supplier-buyer relationships. This chapter discuss the relevance of TCT and SET which are the theoretical frameworks underpinning the research. Drawing on the two theories, the next chapter will discuss the conceptual framework of the research.

Chapter 3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Chapter Introduction

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on supplier development, opportunism, and relational norms. The chapter also discusses TCT and SET, the two theoretical framework that inform this research. This chapter will bring up the conceptual framework for the two sub studies. Section 3.2 discuss the linkage between supplier development, relational norms and opportunism as the foundation for study 1 (qualitative study). Section 3.3 proposes the hypotheses to be tested in study 2 (quantitative study).

3.2 The Linkage Between Supplier Development, Relational Norms, and Opportunism

Supplier development initiatives involve a collaborative relationship between suppliers and buyers. From a SET perspective, partners in supplier-buyer relationships prioritise long-term benefits, which curb opportunism as the latter may lead to the termination of the relationship (Li et al., 2017b). In contrast, according to TCT Williamson (2008), relationship-specific investments suffer from asset specificity, so that beyond the specific relationship the value of the investment is less, or even worthless (Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2008; Wang et al., 2013). Accordingly, dependence on a supplier increases when a buyer makes specific investments in a relationship, and the supplier becomes more powerful in dealing with the buyer, exposing the buyer to greater supply risk and business uncertainty (Humphreys et al., 2004; Huo et al., 2016b). Hence, specific-investment creates a 'locked-in' environment that induces supplier opportunism (Brown et al., 2000; Rokkan et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2009).

TCT predicts that suppliers will breach contracts that include supplier development measures – if the benefits of violating them exceed the cost (Williamson, 2008). However, in the long run, transactions become embedded in the social structure of buyer-supplier relationships (Granovetter, 1985). Within such a social context, relational norms mould and govern exchange relationships (e.g., Kaufmann and Stern, 1988; Noordewier et al., 1990; Dahlstrom et al., 2009). From a relational capital standpoint, when business partners perceive a risk of opportunism, they tend to invest and cultivate non-economic aspects of their business exchange (Wang et al., 2013). However, the effects of this are poorly understood (Blonska et al., 2013).

Relational norms have a significant impact on opportunism (e.g., Brown et al., 2000; Tangpong et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2015; Huo et al., 2016a; Paswan et al., 2017). *Table 3.1* summarises studies of the relationship between relational norms and opportunism. In general, relational norms can be regarded as an informal governance mechanism, potentially mitigating opportunistic behaviours in exchange relationships (Brown et al., 2000; Tangpong et al., 2010). The impact of that relational norms on opportunism will be robust to volatility situation but not to ambiguity situations (Carson et al., 2006). Moreover, Heide et al. (2014) suggested that the level of a negative effect of relational norms on opportunism is contingent on the context employed.

Relational norms can also interact with other elements such as bureaucratic structure (Paswan et al., 2017), contract (Lai et al., 2012), trust (Huo et al., 2016a), agent cooperativeness (Tangpong et al., 2010) to affect partner opportunism. Nevertheless, these interactions do not always lead to positive outcomes. For example, formalised structures interact with solidarity norms enhancing opportunistic behaviour because it causes confusion between exchange partners, and creates exchange hazards, while its interactions with role integrity address achievement of distinct aspects of the same goal, is to curb opportunism (Paswan et al., 2017). Zhou et al. (2015) integrated attitudinal elements (i.e., relational norms) and behavioural elements of relationship exchange in their research model, concluding that relational norms play a mediating role between collaborative activities and opportunism of firms. Opportunistic behaviours are fostered in joint planning activities while there is a high level of relational norms, but inhibited opportunism when there is a low level of relational norms (Zhou et al., 2015). The results are reverse with joint problem-solving activities. Similarly, detailed contracted and centralised control foster or curtail opportunism, depending on the extent of relational norms present in the relationship (Zhou and Xu, 2012).

Recognising the contrary views from different theoretical perspectives, as well as calls for studying the relationships between *specific* supplier development initiatives and forms of opportunism (Yan and Kull, 2015), and mechanisms to curtail opportunism (Luo et al., 2015), Study 1 takes into account the influence of supplier development initiatives and relational norms to opportunism. Specifically, it considers how combinations of supplier development initiatives and relational norms affect the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour occurring.

Table 3.1 - Empirical studies on the role of relational norms on opportunism.

Study	Context	Independent variables *	Relational norms dimensions	Research design	Key findings	Future research directions
Brown et al. (2000)	Exchange relationship	Relational Norms Ownership Transaction-specific assets	A single second-order construct: Relationship preservation Role integrity Harmonisation of conflict	Questionnaire survey 395 managers in two large hotel chains in North America	In exchange relationships, relational norms can effectively reduce opportunism	Examine other constructs (e.g.,) fairness, conflict, exchange partner replace ability, partner investment), adding it to the model Explore if motivations for making investment of a firm and their timing affect the firm's opportunism.
Carson et al. (2006)	Outsource research and development relationship	Volatility Ambiguity	Reputation Continuity Trust History of exchange	Email questionnaire to 125 managers	Relational norm is an effective governance mechanism for suppressing opportunistic behaviours. The effectiveness depends on the conditions of ambiguity and volatility.	Explore a new schema which incorporate ambiguity, volatility (i.e., environment uncertainty) and hierarchy.
Heide et al. (2014)	Concurrent sourcing	Buyer monitoring	Solidarity norms	2 studies in US apparel industry, 497 key informants Study 1: apparel manufacturers and their upstream suppliers. Study 2: apparel manufacturers and their downstream retailers.	The impact of monitoring and norms on relationship outcomes (supplier opportunism, performance) was dependent on the sourcing context in which they were used.	Examine how monitoring and norms interact. Examine the dynamics of governance choices of firms.
Huo et al. (2016a)	Outsourcing relationships	Relational norms Contract	3 items: Information exchanges Flexibility Solidarity	Questionnaire survey 246 companies in China	Solidarity directly decreases opportunism. Flexibility indirectly affects opportunism through the mediation of contracts Information exchange is not significantly linked to opportunism.	Update three relational norms dimensions with more details Relationship between relational norms, trust, and contract.

Study	Context	Independent variables *	Relational norms dimensions	Research design	Key findings	Future research directions
Lai et al. (2012)	Outsourcing relationships	Relational norms Trust Environment uncertainty	Single second-order construct Flexibility Information exchange Solidarity	Questionnaire survey 119 manufacturing and service firms in China	In situation where environment uncertainty is high, trust and norms significantly reduce the opportunistic behaviour of logistics service providers.	Investigate *ex ante* opportunism. Examine the mediating, moderating, direct, indirect impact of other factors opportunism.
Paswan et al. (2017)	Inter-firm partnership	Relational norms Bureaucratic structure (formalisation, participation)	3 items Solidarity norms Role integrity norms Mutuality norms	Survey 136 managers in pharmaceutical industry	The interaction between formalisation and solidarity and increase opportunism The interaction between formalisation and role integrity and between participation and solidarity curbs opportunism. Participation's interaction with role integrity and mutuality likely to increase opportunism.	Examine the changes of governance structures in a channel relationship. Investigate the interactions between governance structures and environment and their effect on opportunism. Investigate the link between bureaucratic structure and relational norm
Tangpong et al. (2010)	Supplier-buyer relationship	Relational norms Agent cooperatives	Relational norms as a single item	Two Experimental Studies: 1. 103 businesses professional in MBA courses 2. 83 purchasing professionals Post-experimental interviews: 8 experienced purchasing professionals.	The interaction between relational norms and agent cooperativeness reduces opportunism. The interactionist perspective, a multi-level theoretical lens that encompasses the dynamic interplay between organisation-level and individual-level elements, is a more comprehensive model in explaining opportunism than either the organisationalist or individualist perspectives.	Investigate the framework in a more complex setting, focusing on multi-agent dynamics in buyer-supplier opportunism. Incorporate other factors such as regulatory, cultural, and institutional forces into the conceptual model and address their roles in reducing buyer-supplier opportunism. Examine the role of other agent personal characteristics that may potentially impact opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships.
Rokkan et al. (2003)	Marketing Relationships	Relational norms Specific investment	Solidarity norm	Questionnaire survey 198 matched buyer-supplier dyads	The effect of special investments shifted from expropriation to bonding as a result of a strong solidarity norm.	Examine the influence of various norm types, as well as their interrelationships.

Study	Context	Independent variables *	Relational norms dimensions	Research design	Key findings	Future research directions
Zhou et al. (2015)	Exchange relationship in marketing channels	Relational norms Collaborative activities (i.e., joint planning, joint problem solving)	A single second-order construct Cooperative norms Trust Commitment	149 manufacturers in China	Relational norms impact negatively on opportunism. Effect of collaborative activities on opportunism is dependent on the level of consistency between the relational norms and collaborative activities.	Explore the interaction between business contracts, cultural and institutional forces, and industry contexts (e.g., complex industry value chains) with opportunism and the influence patterns. Examine collaborative activities in a more comprehensive manifestation.

Note: *Dependent variable: Opportunism

3.3 Hypothesis Development for Study 2

3.3.1 Supplier development and buyer performance improvement

Supplier development can improve a buyer's performance in purchasing as well as the organisation's overall effectiveness (Li et al., 2012), through the improvement of supplier performance (Krause et al., 2000). Several theories support the prediction that supplier development will enhance buyer performance (Li et al., 2007), including the RBV (Wernerfelt, 1995). From a RBV perspective (Wernerfelt, 1995), competitive advantage can be achieved by firms that have abilities to gain valuable, non-substitutable, and hard-to-emulate assets and capabilities (Barney, 1991). To strengthen the capability of their suppliers, buyers can implement supplier development initiatives. In an optimistic scenario, improvements in suppliers' capabilities will become the resources and capabilities of the buyer (Chen et al., 2006). Sequentially, the benefits from the buyer's development efforts will return to the buyer (Li et al., 2007). Empirically, several studies indicate that supplier development initiatives offered by a buyer enhance their competitive capabilities. For example, Li et al. (2012) develop a path analytic model to explore transaction-specific supplier development, indicating how it can strengthen the buyer's competitive advantage. Similarly, Humphreys et al. (2004) and Li et al. (2007) found a positive relationship between supplier development and improvement in a buyer's competitive advantage, using regression analysis and SEM respectively. Other work documents how supplier development can cut a buyer's costs and improve the quality of its products, allowing it to capture greater market share (Stuart, 1993). Following the above discussion, it is proposed that:

Hypothesis 1: Supplier development positively affects buyer performance.

3.3.2 Supplier development and opportunism

In a dynamic and uncertain business environment, Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) suggests that supplier development initiatives can be risky investments (Williamson, 2008). TCT views humans as self-centred, calculative, and only 'weakly moral' (Wang et al., 2017). Therefore, if perceived benefits exceed relevant costs once opportunities emerge, parties will act opportunistically to pursue their self-interest (Das and Rahman, 2010). In the case of supplier development, when confronted with incentive schemes with specific targets, it encourages suppliers to bypass or subvert performance measures for their own benefit, or misappropriate investments, consequently reducing favorable outcomes from the buyer's perspective (Maestrini et al., 2018).

Supplier development initiatives involve specific investments (i.e., human-specific or asset-specific), whereby the value of the investment is less, or even worthless beyond the supplier-buyer relationship (Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2008; Wang et al., 2013). Accordingly, specific investments from a buyer in a supplier-buyer relationship increase their dependence on a supplier, and the supplier becomes more powerful in dealing with the buyer, exposing the buyer to greater risk and uncertainty (Humphreys et al., 2004; Huo et al., 2016b). Hence, supplier development initiatives build a locked-in environment that increases the likelihood of supplier opportunism (Rokkan et al., 2003), so that:

Hypothesis 2: Supplier development increases the likelihood of supplier opportunism.

3.3.3 The mediating role of goal congruence

Goal congruence refers to the extent to which two actors perceive the possibility of achieving consistent, if not matching, objectives (Eliashberg and Michie, 1984). According to Bergen et al. (1992), conflicts in goals between parties promote shirking and moral hazard. Goal congruence plays a role in business relationships because if actors have mutual goals, uncertainty is reduced and problems encountered are more likely to be solved satisfactorily for both parties (Cuevas et al., 2015).

Generally, in a traditional buyer-supplier relationship, the two parties have contrasting objectives to each other: buyers want to procure at a lower price for better quality, or require more (i.e., innovation, sustainability, risk avoidance) for less (i.e., cost). Suppliers, on the other hand, wish to fulfil requirements with the highest achievable profit margins or potential value for them (Jap and Anderson, 2003). Simultaneously, both suppliers and buyers have a mutual aim for a successful agreement. Dealing with such conflicts in goals, supplier development might play an important role, offering a solution to reduce information asymmetry (e.g., through training activities and quality assessment) and facilitate the recognition of congruent goals (e.g., through monitoring and incentives) (Maestrini et al., 2018).

According to Yan and Dooley (2014), goal congruence assists the process of collaboration, diminishes irritation and instructs behaviours; so it facilitates the exchange of information and resources as well as increases effort to resolve common issues. When goal congruence exists, both parties are more likely to pursue cooperative behaviours, such as acting on constructive feedback and mutual problem solving, maintaining a high commitment to the relationship (Jap and Anderson, 2003). Once perceived that accomplishing the partner's requirements will not harm their own objectives, each party is more likely to be quicker in their response and offer support (Lakemond et al., 2006). Accordingly, Maestrini et al. (2018) suggest that goal congruence makes a 'win-win' situation more likely and triggers the search for resolutions that benefit both parties. So, it is expected that:

Hypothesis 3a: Goal congruence mediates the effect of supplier development on buyer performance improvement, so that supplier development increases goal congruence which in turn increases improvement in buyer performance.

Hypothesis 3b: Goal congruence mediates the effect of supplier development on supplier opportunism, so that supplier development increases goal congruence which in turn decreases opportunism.

3.3.4 The mediating role of role integrity

Brown et al. (2000, p. 54) define role integrity as "a clear understanding of mutual expectations that often go beyond the buying and selling of products". Role integrity involves partners' mutual expectations in proactive information sharing, bilateral coordination, with a willingness to be diligent and honest with each other (Brown et al., 2000). According to relational exchange theory (Macneil, 1980), the parties engaged in exchange processes fulfil roles that reflect mutual promises made to each other during the formation of their relationship. The promises guide each partner in the development of expectations concerning the other's behaviour (Kaufmann and Stern, 1988).

When a buyer tries to improve a supplier through their development efforts, it executes roles that reflect their promises and expectations. Unlike when buyers and suppliers buy and sell products in an arms-length relationship, supplier development efforts lead to closer collaboration between them (Li et al., 2012). Consequently, both parties enact roles that not only govern the individual transactions but cover a multitude of issues not directly related to any particular transaction (Kaufmann and Stern, 1988). When the buyer invests in supplier development programs, the roles enacted by the parties become more complex (i.e., role integrity). When role integrity is present in buyer-supplier relationships, this expectancy affects suppliers' behaviour. Once expectations to the partner are positive, suppliers become more compliant (Manolis et al., 1998), so that they are less likely to act opportunistically and the buyer is able to reap rewards from the relationship. Consequently, it is proposed:

Hypothesis 4a: Role integrity mediates the impact of supplier development on buyer performance improvement, so that supplier development increases role integrity which in turn increases buyer performance improvement.

Hypothesis 4b: Role integrity mediates the impact of supplier development on supplier opportunism, so that supplier development increases role integrity which in turn decreases opportunism.

3.3.5 The mediating role of long-term relationship orientation

Long-term orientation is "the anticipation of the mutual benefits of the outcomes in the long run" (Chung, 2012, p. 392). In a relationship, it represents a 'commitment' with independent partners cooperating to generate increased benefits for each other (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). According to Ganesan (1994), a long-term orientation implies that a partner prioritises future goal achievements, so that a long-term oriented partner is more likely to make sacrifices in the short-term in anticipation of long run returns (Chung, 2012).

A long-term orientation may emerge from supplier development programs in different ways (Krause, 1997). Firstly, supplier development investments may reduce a supplier's perceptions of the likelihood of the buyer acting opportunistically, so that suppliers see the relationship as having mutual benefits over the long run. Investments in suppliers, such as through training or pre-financing, rarely have an instantaneous benefit to the buyer, but rather rewards accrue over time. Secondly, by improving the resources of the supplier, supplier development can increase suppliers' satisfaction (Glavee-Geo, 2019). A satisfying relationship creates feelings of mutual trust and warmth between parties, thus increasing switching costs (Barnes et al., 2010) with a focus on mutual benefits (Polo Redondo and Cambra Fierro Jesús, 2005). Empirically, Lusch and Brown (1996) find that long-term orientation is associated with channel contracting and relational behaviour, which in turn impacts positively on wholesale-distributor performance.

Long-term orientation in supply chain relationships has long been studied. For example, Sheu et al. (2006) indicate that supply chain management activities, such as information sharing quality, inventory system development, and coordination structure is impacted positively by long-term orientation. According to that, the commitment of top managers to the relationship affects the quantity and quality of information sharing, the advancement of improved inventory system, and the utilisation of IT capability. In addition, relationship outcomes (i.e., conflict decreasing and satisfaction increasing) also are associated with partners' long-term orientation (Griffith et al., 2006). Empirically, Lusch and Brown (1996) find that long-term orientation is associated with channel contracting and relational behaviour, which in turn impacts positively on wholesale-distributor performance. Thus, it is expected that long-term orientation helps enhance the performance outcomes in buyer-seller relationships (Hofer et al., 2014).

Cooperation in supplier development initiatives can be seen as a 'game' that may bring benefits (Krause et al., 2007; Wagner, 2010). However, from the perspective of prisoner's dilemma theory, the general tendency to gain more considerable benefit or fears of being tricked by buyers leads suppliers to act opportunistically in order to protect their own benefits. For example, the fear of an unsuccessful production process that follow the buyer's guidance will result in suppliers' loss. It can also explain the temptation of gaining a better deal with other buyers from an improved product. Thus, suppliers prioritise their earnings, rather than the benefits of the supplier-buyer cooperation. However, taking a long-term orientation approach, where the 'game' is repeated, the motivation to cheat at a particular time is mitigated by the potential loss of future benefits (Jarillo and Ricart, 1987). Hence, long-term orientation might be a critical factor that decreases the chance of partner opportunism.

The above discussion suggests when buyers make an effort to develop their suppliers, it will exhibit long-term orientation of suppliers toward the supplier-buyer relationship. It inhibits opportunistic supplier behaviours and improves buyer performance. Thus, it is expected that long-term orientation helps enhance the performance outcomes in buyer-seller relationships (Hofer et al., 2014), so that:

H5a: Supplier long-term orientation mediates the impact of supplier development on buyer performance improvement, so that supplier development increases long-term orientation which in turn increases improvement of buyer performance.

H5b: Supplier long-term orientation mediates the impact of supplier development on supplier opportunism, so that supplier development increases long-term orientation which in turn decreases opportunism.

Following the discussion of the theoretical background and hypotheses development, *Figure 3.1* summarises the conceptual model underpinning the study.



Figure 3.1 - Conceptual framework for study 2

Chapter 4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 Chapter Introduction

Following the discussion of the extant literature and theoretical framework of the research presented in Chapters 2 and 3, this chapter examines the paradigm that guides the research design. Firstly, the research philosophy section presents the author's philosophical worldview which frames the overall research methodology. A mixed-methods approach, including qualitative and quantitative research methods, is introduced in the next section. Section 4.4 provides information on the Vietnam context where data were collected for both sub-studies. The last two sections describe the research design for each study, including sample selection, data collection, and analysis procedure.

4.2 Research Philosophy

4.2.1 Ontology, epistemology, and research paradigm

Philosophy refers to a set of beliefs and assumptions regarding how knowledge is generated and accepted (Saunders et al., 2019). Research philosophy shapes the form of any research according to its content.

Ontology and epistemology are two fundamental concepts in research philosophy which inform researchers' theoretical perspectives and approaches. Ontology "is about the nature of reality and existence" (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015, p. 134). Essentially, it is "what is out there to know about" (Grix, 2002, p. 175) or the objects themselves. All studies begin with ontology, from which researchers' epistemological and methodological perspectives flow logically (Morgan, 2007). A realist ontologist believes that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it and comprises structures and objects which have cause-and-effect relationships with one another. However, a researcher can be a relativist if he/she believes in multiple realities and multiple ways of interpreting them(Gray, 2013; Willig, 2013). On the other hand, epistemology is "what and how can we know about it" (Grix, 2002, p. 175). Researchers can take either a realist or relativist epistemological position, where the former believes that the collected information will facilitate understanding of the world and its reality. According to a relativist epistemological position, researchers are interested in how culture, history and language may be utilised to create numerous versions of an experience in different situations (Willig, 2013). When these assumptions have been understood, researchers can identify differences between various philosophies.

Every philosophical approach or paradigm in research has its underpinning ontology and epistemology which influence the research process, but these generally remain hidden (Slife and Williams, 1995). The philosophical approach represents the author’s critical viewpoints which are essential to a study’s strategy because this will establish the methodology used by the researcher. Hence, researchers should make their philosophical approach explicit in order to help to explain why they chose qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-methodology approaches for their research (Creswell, 2014). Grix (2002) suggests that the researcher’s ontological and epistemological positions and methodological approach should be presented clearly in order to discern how our ontological stance influences what and how we research.

To conduct research in a well-structured manner, researchers must first define their philosophy assumptions (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). Most social research is positioned in two contrasting paradigms: positivism and interpretivism (Guba, 1985). These two models have been debated regarding their assumptions relating to the nature of the reality, the connection between the researcher and the subject being studied, the context, the method being used, and the value of the research (Silverman, 2017; Bryman, 2019). The main difference between positivism and interpretivism is that the former is more concerned with identifying causal relationships, often statistically, whereas the latter is more focused on investigating and understanding the inner meaning and insights of people (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). More recently, pragmatism is posited as the third paradigm, within which researchers’ primary focus is understanding the research problem and having little commitment to any philosophical system or research methodology. Thus, pragmatists have the flexibility to select the approaches, methods, and processes which best fit the requirements and goals of their research (Creswell, 2014).

According to Della Porta and Keating (2008), positivists and post-positivists share ontological beliefs in objective and external reality, as well as epistemological assumptions regarding knowledge as a collection of rules and regulations. Positivists believe that it is not possible to find a single, absolute truth because knowledge is speculative, and understanding is shaped by data, facts, and reasoning (Creswell, 2014). Creating hypotheses and revising or rejecting them is part of the research process, starting from the test of a theory (Della Porta and Keating, 2008; Creswell, 2014). In order to preserve objective, external and bias-free information, the techniques and findings must be validated and reliable, being a general requirement in quantitative research (Creswell, 2014). A positivist approach to quantitative research typically involves collecting a large amount of information and analysing it mathematically and statistically, seeking to achieve generalisability and predictability (Della Porta and Keating, 2008).

On the other hand, the interpretivist paradigm has the general ontological belief that reality comprises complex and diverse interpretations (Creswell, 2014). With regard to epistemology, interpretivists assume that knowledge is socially produced and cannot be acquired without the researcher’s ideas and values being involved (Della Porta and Keating, 2008). Typically, the qualitative research approach is adopted under interpretivism (also combined with constructivism), using open-ended questions to obtain participants’ opinions (Creswell, 2014). The qualitative research approach is primarily inductive, and the interpretation of the data from an interpretivist perspective involves numerous aspects such as understanding of human nature, language and culture of people, contexts, and the relationship between the researcher and the object under investigation (Gray, 2013; Creswell, 2014). Researchers should utilise empathy and creativity in order to make sense of the topic and the respondents’ identities.

Pragmatism opposes the prevalent divide between positivism and interpretivism because pragmatism concerns solving practical issues in the actual world. It is regarded as a collection of philosophical perspectives for addressing problems, rather than as a philosophical position (Biesta, 2010). From the philosophical lens of pragmatism, the empirical method is favoured over idealistic or rationalistic approaches (Frega, 2011). Furthermore, instead of focusing on a particular technique, researchers highlight the problems and employ all possible ways of resolving them (Creswell and Miller, 2000). Pragmatists recognise numerous ways of understanding the world and conducting research, that no single opinion can ever provide the complete picture, and that multiple realities may exist (Saunders et al., 2019).

Pragmatism bridges the two opposing extremes (positivism and interpretivism) of research paradigms, and provides a useful framework for conducting social research (Morgan, 2014). This thesis takes pragmatism as the philosophical approach, thus allowing a mixed-method approach to explore both external reality and people’s internal sense-making processes around it (Morgan, 2007). The next part discusses how this research fits the pragmatism philosophical approach.

4.2.2 Pragmatism as the philosophical approach of this research

Pragmatism employs an objective ontology and a subjective epistemology (Morgan, 2007). A fundamental aspect of pragmatist epistemology is that knowledge always depends on experiences. Our social experiences shape our perspectives of the world, and personal knowledge created from experiences is socially shared (Kaushik and Walsh, 2019). Thus, pragmatism views knowledge as being social because it is built with the intention of managing one's existence in a better way and participating in the world rather views knowledge than reality (Morgan, 2014; Kaushik and Walsh, 2019). According to pragmatist philosophy, human behaviour can never be separated from past experiences and the ideas that arose from them. Therefore, human thoughts are inextricably tied to action so that people's actions are based on considering their probable outcomes, and that they use the results of such actions to anticipate the future outcomes of similar choices (Kaushik and Walsh, 2019).

According to Creswell and Clark (2011), pragmatism accepts that empirical inquiry can be conducted in line with the existence of single or multiple realities. Supplier development initiatives have been documented positively in the literature as those which could bring benefits to both buyers and suppliers. Research on this topic was mostly undertaken under the positivist paradigm, utilising empirical evidence and hypothesis testing within the quantitative method. However, this research argues that supplier development initiatives may also lead to negative relationship outcomes. Thus, multiple realities may exist as consequences of supplier development, which fits with the pragmatist philosophy. Moreover, the three research questions consider the complexity of the supplier-buyer relationship involving the direct positive or negative consequences of supplier development initiatives and relational norms. The first two questions are more exploratory, based on gaps in the literature regarding opportunism as an outcome of supplier development. The third research question is explanatory because it aims to confirm the results of the first two research questions as well as to testing empirically theories (i.e., TCT and SET). Therefore, the research design requires a flexible approach. Under the pragmatist paradigm, the methodology follows the research questions and problems (Saunders et al., 2019) and the ideal method produces the intended results of the investigation in the most effective way, irrespective of whether it is a single-method, mixed-method or multiple-method approach (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2008).

4.3 Research Methodology

4.3.1 Mixed-methods research approach

Pragmatists typically examine the different distinctions that designing and conducting a research project create while it is being developed (Creswell and Clark, 2011; Morgan, 2014). Various choices on how to design and conduct research are considered together with their consequences, and decisions are made according to researchers' personal beliefs and previous experiences. The original research questions and the project's objectives determine the choice of method (Morgan, 2014). The most crucial consideration for pragmatists is the usefulness of philosophical assumptions, the methodology, the information generated, and whether the anticipated results or desires can be obtained by the instrument that is used (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000).

From the above discussion, pragmatist researchers can conduct either a quantitative, qualitative method, or mixed-method study, in addressing their research questions, exploring a phenomenon, or testing a theory by the most appropriate method (Feilzer, 2010). However, the mixed-method approach is often associated with the pragmatic stance (Kaushik and Walsh, 2019). The mixed-method approach is a combination sequentially of both quantitative and qualitative research. This is beneficial when either a quantitative or qualitative technique alone is insufficient to comprehend a research topic in the best way, and to understand that combining both quantitative and qualitative research (and their data) may provide greater understanding (Creswell, 2014).

As discussed in Chapter 1, this research aims to explore the effects of supplier development initiatives on opportunism and the circumstances under which investments in supplier development trigger or suppress opportunistic behaviour by suppliers. Secondly, it focuses on uncovering the social exchange factors that mediate the relationship between supplier development initiative. Therefore, it adopted an exploratory sequential mixed-method design (Saunders et al., 2019) with two sub-studies.

The literature acknowledges that theoretical and empirical work currently underplays opportunistic behaviour stemming from supplier development initiatives (Proch et al., 2017) and also the potential role played by negative relational norms; therefore, Study 1 is appropriate for a qualitative, theory-building design. Its goal is to uncover how supplier development activities curtail or stimulate opportunistic behaviour and conceptualise norms of opportunism. Hence, this study answers two research questions: *(1) To what extent, and under what circumstances, do supplier development initiatives curb and/or stimulate supplier opportunism?; (2) How do relational norms affect the relationship between supplier development and opportunism in supply chains?*

Previous research has suggested that positive relationships exist between supplier development and performance outcomes. Study 1 is expected to uncover the negative consequences of supplier development. However, Study 2 attempts to answer the following research question: *(3) How do relational norms facilitate the positive outcomes (performance improvement) and negative outcomes (opportunism) of supplier development initiatives?* A research model has been built which contains hypotheses that propose relationships between supplier development initiatives and opportunism, as well as buyer performance improvements and the mediating roles of relational norms. The quantitative research design for testing hypotheses is therefore appropriate for Study 2.

4.3.2 Study 1 - Qualitative Research

Qualitative research is a methodological approach which incorporates techniques such as participant observation, ethnographic fieldwork, interviews and focus groups (Della Porta and Keating, 2008). Interviews are the most popular technique by which to collect data because it is economical and capable of gaining access to real-life events, and provides detailed descriptions of individuals' experiences, beliefs, attitudes, and the causes of their behaviour (Creswell, 2007; Silverman, 2017). Interviews in qualitative research are usually semi-structured since they typically follow a type of agenda chosen by the researcher which the participants can challenge (Parker, 2005). Therefore, according to common practice in conducting qualitative research, Study 1 employed semi-structured interviews with both buyers and suppliers in fruit and vegetable supply chains in Vietnam. The interview guide is provided in *Appendix B*. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the interview data. Furthermore, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was employed in Study 1 to examine causal conditions that lead to opportunistic behaviour. This entails identifying the mutual conditions of cases that feature the same outcome (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 2000; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006)

4.3.2.1 Thematic Analysis

Thematic analysis is a flexible way of examining multiple elements of the subject of interest (Willig, 2013). Braun and Clarke (2006) suggested that this should be the basic analysis method for qualitative research because the approach is diverse, complex, and nuanced. It is appropriate for the analysis of Study 1 due to the lack of research for structuring the negative outcomes of supplier development initiatives. The identified themes can also be used as the basic dataset for fsQCA in the next step of the analysis.

4.3.2.2 Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis

Qualitative researchers frequently look for commonalities among a group of cases, generally focusing on a small number of them (Ragin, 2000) which are demonstrated in thematic analysis. However, Ragin (2000) argued that these commonalities suggest meaningful empirical connections, but qualitative researchers rarely see their work in terms of sets. QCA is a case-oriented, comprehensive, set-theoretic approach that assumes outcomes are created by a collection of conditions acting together (Ragin, 2000). It compares cases that have the same outcomes in order to ascertain if they share the same conditions and vice versa (Ragin, 2008). The primary goal of QCA is to discover the set of variables or conditions that are shared by all cases with the same outcomes in order to gain a better understanding of how they generate the outcomes (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). QCA focuses on finding the combinations of conditions to produce the outcome, rather than the impact that a single independent variable has on a dependent one. Thus, QCA helps to understand if there are consistent patterns that may or may not occur when outcomes are present or absent.

Two approaches to QCA are crisp-set QCA (csQCA) and fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), where the former requires conditions and outcomes for each case to be dichotomised to full membership or non-membership (i.e., represented by 0 and 1 only) to the set values (Ragin, 2000). Fuzzy-set QCA is a variant of QCA which allows various degrees of membership (i.e., four- or six-level membership values) (Ragin, 2008). This research employs fsQCA which provides a finer-grained analysis. Moreover, since the causal conditions (suppler development initiatives, relational norms) and the outcomes (opportunism) are utilised at different levels for different observed cases in the supply chain, fsQCA permits greater flexibility and accuracy in data calibration, compared with csQCA.

QCA is based on set theory and Boolean algebra, in that it tests for relationships between sets and subsets (Ragin, 2000). The following four steps are involved in fsQCA analysis: 1) calibration of the data, 2) analysis of necessary conditions, 3) construction and analysis of a truth table, and 4) analysis of sufficient conditions (Parker, 2017). Moreover, fsQCA 3.1 software was employed to analyse the supplier development conditions that lead to opportunistic behaviour by suppliers.

4.3.3 Study 2 - Quantitative Research

Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is a powerful statistical analysis technique which enables researchers to conduct a comprehensive analysis of multiple variables – both the measurement of and relationship between them – simultaneously (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Chin, 1998). It uses factor and regression analysis to examine complex models, decompose correlation, and test theoretical relationships (Hair et al., 2010; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). One advantage of using SEM is that the technique considers the measurement errors; therefore, it can achieve a more accurate estimation (Bagozzi, 1977; Chin et al., 2003). Furthermore, SEM permits estimation of unobserved variables and testing of theoretical and measurement assumptions against empirical data (Chin, 1998).

Two approaches to SEM are covariance-based (CB-SEM) (Jöreskog, 1978; Bollen, 1989; Diamantopoulos, 2000) and variance-based partial least squares (PLS-SEM) (Lohmöller, 1989; Hair, 2017). These are unique in their fundamental statistical conceptions and in their methods of construct measurement, although they share the same objectives of estimating the relationship between latent constructs and indicators (Sarstedt et al., 2016). While the use of PLS-SEM is under ongoing debate in the literature (e.g., Rönkkö, 2014; Guide and Ketokivi, 2015; Rönkkö et al., 2016; Sarstedt et al., 2016), CB-SEM is the original and commonly applied approach in business and management research (Sarstedt et al., 2016). Furthermore, numerous researchers, when mentioning SEM, simply mean CB-SEM, which uses a common factor approach model and follows the maximum potential estimation procedure in order to reproduce covariance matrix (Hair et al., 2011). This study follows the dominant, widely agreed approach to SEM (CB-SEM) for the purpose of examining how well the conceptual model fits the data.

4.4 The Vietnam Context

4.4.1 The country overviews

Vietnam is currently one of the most actively growing economies in East Asia, whose population in 2020 reached 97 million, and which has a total national Gross Domestic Production (GDP) of 271.6 billion US dollars (WorldBank, 2021). The agricultural, forestry, and fishing industries accounted for 15% of the total GDP (WorldBank, 2021). Within agriculture, the fruit and vegetables sector is of strategic importance (Statista, 2020; Euromonitor, 2021). In 2018, 1,099,600 hectares of farmland were being used for vegetable production, and 9,894 hectares for fruit growing (GSO, 2019). *Table 4.1* shows the acreage of farmland for fruit and vegetable production in Vietnam from 2016 to 2018 and shows the growing importance of the sector when considering farmland devoted to it.

Table 4.1 - The acreage of farmland for fruit and vegetable production in Vietnam in 2016-2018

	2016	**2017**	**2018**
	Thousand hectares		
Fruit	711.5	742.9	775.7
Vegetables	1067.3	1087.7	1099.6

Source: GSO (2019)

The Mekong Delta is the largest area for horticultural crops, which accounts for 25.9% of the entire farmland. The Red River Delta is the largest region for vegetable production (24.9% farmland area) (Tran, 2015a; Tran, 2015b). *Table 4.2* presents the data of the area, yields, and production of vegetables in 2013-2014.

Table 4.2 - The acreage, yield and production of vegetables in 2013-2014 by regions

No	**Production areas**	**Acreage (1.000ha)**		**Yield (quintals/ha)**		**production (1000tons)**	
		2013	2014	2013	2014	2013	2014
1	Red River Delta	172.4	183.9	200.5	206.4	3,456,4	3,795.1
2	Northern Midlands & Mountainous	121.4	127.4	125.3	124.6	1,521,5	1,587.6
3	North Central Coast	88.6	89.2	112.1	115.7	993,4	1,032.4
4	South Central Coast	62.5	64.5	150.8	158.4	942,3	1,021.6
5	Centre Highlands	94.8	99.7	241.6	241.3	2,290.6	2,405.3
6	Southeast	57.8	59.8	168.1	170.8	971.7	1,021.3
7	Mekong Delta	249.7	256.7	178.3	177.5	4,451.2	4,555.0
The Vietnam Country		847.2	881.2	172.7	175.0	14,627.1	15,418

Source: MARD (2015)

The main products include fresh fruit (dragon fruit, grapefruit, mango), fresh vegetables (cabbage, tomato, cucumber, beans, herbs), processed fruit (pineapple, lychee, carrot, onion), and dry fruit (jackfruit, sweet potato, banana) (Tran, 2015b).

In early 2007, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development imposed restrictions on the production and certification of clean vegetables branded SAFE (in Vietnamese - *Rau An Toàn* RAT), recognising that contaminated vegetables may have been the source of illness and disease outbreaks in the past. SAFE vegetables are typically sold at 5-10% higher than the market prices (Simmons and Scott, 2007). The Ministry of Agriculture's Plant Protection Department is in charge of SAFE vegetable certification and random sampling to check pesticide residue levels (Simmons and Martin, 2010). Following the SAFE certification initiative, Vietnamese agriculture generally has shifted to more sustainable agricultural practices based around Good Agricultural Practices (GAP), specifically VietGAP certification.

VietGAP (Vietnamese Good Agricultural Practices) includes standards and codes of conduct in agricultural practices for farm products in Vietnam, such as crop, fishery, and livestock. The certification programme covers rules, procedures for harvesting, producing, and processing agricultural products in order to satisfy safety standards, improve product quality, ensure farmers' health, safety and welfare, protecting the environment, and trace product origins. VietGAP standards and codes of conduct are governed by Vietnam's Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development based on domestic laws and the guidelines of FAO (The Food and Agricultural Organisation), with references to other qualifications such as GlobalG.A.P (VietGap, 2021). In order to be VietGAP-certified, farms must register with a VietGAP certification body and satisfy the National Standard TCVN 11892-1:2017, including 11 critical criteria in general requirements and five criteria in production requirements. VietGAP-certified products are regarded as being of a higher quality than products labelled SAFE in Vietnam.

GlobalG.A.P is the internationally accepted agricultural production standard. The certification programme aims to benefit farmers, retailers and consumers through safe and sustainable agriculture production. GlobalG.A.P certification includes the following: (1) food safety and traceability, (2) environment (including biodiversity), (3) workers' health, safety and welfare, (4) animal welfare, and (5) Integrated Crop Management (ICM), Integrated Pest Control (IPC), Quality Management System (QMS) and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) (GlobalGap, 2021). In Vietnam, agricultural practices that follow GlobalG.A.P are unpopular because it is costly to follow the criterial to meet the requirements and gain the certification. The government and agricultural bodies focus on promoting VietGAP certification because it is adapted to the domestic market and suits national farming practices.

4.4.2 Vietnam's fruit and vegetable supply chain structures

The country has two main types of food supply chains: fresh fruit and vegetables for domestic consumers (a traditional supply chain through wet markets) and a modern supply chain through small shops and supermarkets as well as exports. The former comprises numerous small-scale operators which dominate total sales and maintain arm's length transactions. An established set of processors procure fruit and vegetables through cooperative arrangements (Yang et al., 2021) and, in some cases, through direct relationships with producers. The figure below illustrates the structure of the fresh fruit and vegetables supply chain in Vietnam.



Figure 4.1 - The fruit and vegetable supply chain structure in Vietnam

Actors in the fruit and vegetable supply chain include farmers, local collectors, cooperatives, wholesalers, vendors in wet markets, small shops, restaurants, supermarkets, and agricultural and export companies. Farmers are the producers who directly grow fruit and vegetable products. Most of them operate on a small scale, applying conventional production practices. In Ho Chi Minh City, the largest city in the country, only about 12.8% of land farms satisfy the safety and production standards required for VietGAP certification (UBND, 2016). Approximately 90% of fresh fruit and vegetables are sold on the domestic market (Tran, 2015b).

In the traditional supply chain (SC1), local collectors consolidate produce from farmers and arrange for cash-on-delivery to wholesalers at one of 107 wholesale markets (30 of which exclusively sell for fruit and vegetables). Wholesale markets supply to small vendors in wet markets before the vendors sell to consumers. Wet markets are fresh-food marketplaces which are popular in Asian countries, with the term “wet” referring to the wet floors that result from the extensive usage of water (Wertheim-Heck et al., 2014). The supplier-buyer relationship in the traditional supply chain is often vulnerable due to there being no official contracts. Regulations are poorly enforced in wet markets (Cadilhon et al., 2006; Maruyama and Trung, 2007; Shepherd and Tam, 2008), with widespread concerns regarding food safety; therefore, government officials seek to restrain wet market retailing (Wertheim-Heck et al., 2014). However, this traditional supply chain remains the favourite within the country. Although customer needs for fruit and vegetables are evolving more quickly, wet markets are seen as delivering fresher products at a lower cost and in more accessible places.

The modern supply chain includes supermarkets, which are dominant regarding total sourcing quantities. Supermarket chains often source fruit and vegetable products from suppliers through advance contracts. Suppliers in this chain are often large farmers (farm companies) or cooperatives which source products from small-scale farmers. Wholesalers or collectors, which play a major part in the traditional supply chain, have a considerably smaller part in the modern chain (Moustier et al., 2010). The supermarket sector is growing and more likely to insist on the certification of suppliers to verify the quality of their produce. The products supplied to supermarkets have to meet at least one certification standard regarding quality and quantities (e.g., VietGAP). The buyers require higher standards in growing crops, resulting in product prices in this channel being higher than in traditional markets. The higher production standards require more investment and typically technologies and procedures which small-scale farmers may find difficult to follow. Hence, the supermarkets and intermediate supply chain actors such as cooperatives support farmers through credit and/or training, although these have not always delivered intended outcomes. The relationship between suppliers and buyers in this supply chain is shifting to vertical coordination (hybrid structure) in order to encourage farmers to join this chain. This study focuses on investigating this modern supply chain since it includes supplier development initiatives.

Similar to the modern chain, the export supply chain requires a certain degree of quality certification, which varies depending on the export market. In this chain, agricultural and/or export companies source fruit and vegetable products through intermediate actors such as large farmers and cooperatives, whereas collectors are the main intermediate actors. However, exports account for only a small proportion of production (circa 10%) (Tran, 2015b).

4.5 Research Design for Study 1

4.5.1 Sample selection

Since supplier development activities require the involvement of both suppliers and buyers in the supply chain, the study investigated the perspectives of both parties. The study draws on 37 face-to-face, in-depth interviews with key informants *(Table 4.3).* This sample was of sufficient size to achieve data saturation (Guest et al., 2006) and falls within the ranges for qualitative interview-based research, suggested by de Ruyter and Scholl (1998) and Carson et al. (2001). The sample is cross-sectional, including nine organisations that act as buyers, nineteen organisations that are both buyers and suppliers, and seven companies that solely act as suppliers of fresh fruit and vegetables.

The Ho Chi Minh City Department of Industry and Trade, the Business Studies and Assistance Centre, Southern Horticultural Research Institute (SFORI) Vietnam, and Lam Dong Province Agricultural Extension Centre helped with the recruitment of interviewees. Potential interviewees received a participant information sheet, outlining the purpose of the research and guarantees of anonymity and data confidentiality. They signed informed consent forms, before the commencement of interviews. Some interviewees recommended other potential participants that we included in the data collection (snowball sampling).

4.5.2 Data collection

Data collection occurred during summer 2018 and autumn 2019. All interviewees were directly involved in supplier and/or buyer relationships and all interviewees held managerial positions (e.g., CEO, chairperson or owner, assistant chair, purchasing department head). I conducted semi-structured interviews in Vietnamese. Interviews occurred either face-to-face or via a video conference internet application, depending on the preference, technical feasibility, and availability of interviewees. Interviews lasted between 24 minutes and three hours, with an average time of approximately 75 minutes per interview.

Table 4.3 - Profile of Interviewees for study 1

Code	Interviewee's Title/Position	Role in the Supply Chain		Organisation Type	Size*	Organisation's Location
		Buyer	Supplier			
01	Assistant Chairman	x		Company	Medium	Binh Thuan
02	Manager	x		Company	Medium	Binh Thuan
03	CEO	x	x	Company	Medium	Binh Duong
04	Owner	x	x	Company	Small	Da Lat
05	Chairman	x	x	Cooperative	Medium	Da Lat
06	Director	x	x	Company	Medium	Ho Chi Minh
07	Department Head	x		Supermarket	Large	Ho Chi Minh
08	Department Leader	x		Supermarket	Large	Ho Chi Minh
09	Manager	x	x	Cooperative	Small	Da Lat
10	General Manager	x	x	Company	Small	Tien Giang
11	Chairman	x	x	Cooperative	Micro	Ben Tre
12	Director	x		Company	Small	Ben Tre
13	Owner	x	x	Company	Small	Ho Chi Minh
14	Senior Purchasing Executive	x		Supermarket	Large	Ho Chi Minh
15	Supplier Development Manager	x		Company	Medium	Ho Chi Minh
16	Quality Assurance Manager	x	x	Company	Small	Ho Chi Minh
17	Director	x	x	Cooperative	Small	Lam Dong
18	Director	x	x	Company	Small	Ho Chi Minh
19	Owner	x		Company	Micro	Ho Chi Minh
20	Former Owner	x		Company	Micro	Ho Chi Minh
21	Director	x	x	Cooperative	Small	Lam Dong
22	Director	x	x	Cooperative	Small	Lam Dong
23	Director	x	x	Cooperative	Small	Lam Dong
24	Director	x	x	Cooperative	Small	Lam Dong
25	Sales Manager		x	Company	Micro	Ho Chi Minh
26	Chairman and Director	x	x	Cooperative	Small	Ho Chi Minh
27	Chairman	x	x	Cooperative	Small	Ho Chi Minh
28	Former Chairman	x	x	Cooperative	Small	Hanoi
29	Deputy Sales Manager	x		Company	Large	Long An
30	Manager	x		Supermarket	Large	Ho Chi Minh
31	Manager	x		Company	Medium	Can Tho
32	Owner		x	Household Farm	N/A	Binh Thuan
33	Owner		x	Household Farm	N/A	Dong Nai
34	Owner		x	Household Farm	N/A	Ben Tre
35	Owner		x	Company	N/A	Da Lat
36	Owner		x	Household Farm	N/A	Daklak
37	Owner		x	Household Farm	N/A	Ho Chi Minh

*Note: According to the Vietnamese Law on Provision of assistance for Small and Medium-sized enterprises (2017) the company size thresholds are:

- Micro: Less than 10 employees, 2 billion (VND) revenue, 3 billion (VND) total capital.
- Small: Less than 100 employees, 50 billion (VND) revenue, 20 billion (VND) total capital.
- Medium: Less than 200 employees, 200 billion (VND) revenue, 100 billion (VND) total capital.
- Large: None of the above.

All interviewees detailed the nature of their supply chain and relationships with other actors (i.e., whom they supply to and/or from whom they source, their organisation's size, production methods, how long they have been working with their suppliers/buyers). Next, interviews addressed supplier development activities and evaluated the effectiveness of supplier development initiatives. To understand opportunistic behaviours that arose from supplier development initiatives, interviewees were asked to describe the behaviours that they observed. If buyers or suppliers initially reported no opportunistic actions from other supply chain partners, the author used the critical incident technique (Butterfield et al., 2005; Bott and Tourish, 2016) to explore successful and unsuccessful cases of supplier development. A stack of cards with supplier behaviours were also provided, asking interviewees to sort them into two groups. One group was for those behaviours they considered non-opportunistic and the other for those they regarded as opportunistic practices. Once groups were formed, interviewees explained their selection process and if they ever observed such behaviours from their suppliers and/or buyers.

Since self-reported opportunistic behaviour is sensitive and interviewees may not wish to discuss their own actions with the interviewer, the author also used two projective techniques: word association and completion tasks. Projective techniques elicit responses to ambiguous stimuli (Donoghue, 2000; Eldesouky et al., 2015). For the word association task, the interviewer provided six words that describe the most common supplier development initiatives in fruit and vegetable supply chains, namely: training farmers, supplier assessment, guarantees of sale, providing seeds and fertiliser, financial incentives on sale, and credit, and asked interviewees to think of opportunistic behaviour(s) associated with these words. Subsequently, interviewees were asked to finish incomplete stories as part of this projective task. The stories contained information on supplier development efforts and participants completed the narratives in terms of the consequences of supplier development initiatives. In follow-up questions, interviewees discussed whether they regarded the consequences as opportunistic behaviour.

4.5.3 Data analysis procedure

4.5.3.1 Coding

All interviews were audio-recorded apart from two where interviewees did not consent, and the author took written notes instead. Where audio recording was permitted, all interviews were transcribed. Data were coded utilising NVivo12 software and subsequently inter-coder reliability assessed.

The coding strategy followed an accounting-scheme approach, which combines creating a provisional list of codes from the conceptual framework and associated research questions, whilst also generating categories or labels during the process of reviewing the transcripts (Miles et al., 2019). Thus, the first stage was to create an initial coding framework from the literature and research questions covering the concepts of supplier development, opportunism and relational norms. Then, 'open coding' of transcripts occurred for half of the transcripts, selected in chronological order, focusing on how participants described their supplier development initiatives, the way that opportunistic behaviours arose from the initiatives, as well as the existence of norms between buyers and suppliers. Based on the open coding, the initial coding framework was revised. The author then coded all of the transcripts, based on the revised list of codes.

The next stage assessed inter-code reliability (Miles et al., 2019). This reassures that the coding would be reproducible across coders (Campbell et al., 2013). To achieve this goal, three experts coded 19 randomly selected transcripts based on the coding framework. After independently coding the transcripts, they separately discussed their decisions with the author, and they subsequently updated the coding scheme. After the third round of coding, the inter-coder reliability index was calculated by dividing the total number of all agreements for all codes by the total number of agreements and disagreements for all codes combined (Campbell et al., 2013). The inter-coder reliability index was 89.37%, exceeding the 80% threshold recommended by (Miles et al., 2019), which is commonly adopted in other studies (e.g., Lemke et al., 2011). By this threshold, the level of agreement indicates that the coding system is reliable and robust.

4.5.3.2 Calibration of the data for QCA

The first step of fsQCA is to calibrate the interviews into set membership. After coding the interviews in NVivo, the author assigned the coded items to sets regarding supplier development initiatives, relational norms (i.e., condition) and supplier opportunism (i.e., outcome). Ragin (2008) notes the possibility of varying set values in fsQCA (e.g., three-, four, six-value or continuous fuzzy sets). Researchers often consider using four-level or six-level value sets and the decision between them depends on initial qualitative analysis and/or theoretical knowledge (Crilly, 2011; Tóth et al., 2017). The set value chosen should be the best representation of the empirical evidence. Accordingly, this research uses a four-level set of values (0, 0.33, 0.67 and 1) where 1 means 'fully in', 0 is 'fully out', 0.33 stands for 'more out than in' and 0.67 means 'more in than out'. Data calibration was undertook, and two additional independent coders (native speakers) randomly calibrated two thirds of the cases based on a classification scheme inspired by the Generic Membership Evaluation Template (GMET) (Tóth et al., 2017). *Table 4.4* presents the data calibration scheme, and *Table 4.5* provides an example of data calibration form, based on the GMET of Tóth et al. (2017).

Regarding relational norms, Study 1 includes norms of opportunism (NormOPP) which emerged from the analysis of in-depth interviews as an important predictor of opportunism. Similar to other conditions, norms of opportunism was calibrated into a 4-value set, as shown in *Table 4.4*. Buyer trustworthiness, as a type of relational norm, is also included in the data calibration for fsQCA analysis for two reasons. First, trust is a critical factor in the completion of market transactions, and increases the value of exchange relationship partners, so that buyer trustworthiness is expected to reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour (Hoffmann et al., 2010). Second, in the context of this research, buyer trustworthiness is the only factor that the buyer can fully control and demonstrate in a supplier-buyer relationship. In *Table 4.4* buyer trustworthiness (TRUST) is also classified into a 4-value set.

The outcome of interest is supplier opportunistic behaviour, which is labelled 'OPP' in the fuzzy set. The outcome was also assigned into a 4-value set *(Table 4.4)*

4.5.3.3 Truth table

Truth table assesses sufficient conditions by considering the logically possible combinations of causal conditions and the outcome linked to each combination. Ragin (2008) outlines the procedures for constructing a fuzzy-set truth table. A truth table consists of 2^k logically possible combinations of the causal condition, with each combination displayed in a row. Hence, with five causal conditions, the truth table has 32 (2^5) rows. Only combinations of conditions with empirical evidence were retained for further analysis, so I deleted 16 logically possible combinations of conditions that lacked empirical evidence. The remaining 16 rows cover 100% of the cases *(Appendix F).* To refine the truth table, I employed a cut-off consistency threshold of 0.8, which lies within the range of 0.75 to 0.95 recommended by Crilly (2011). In addition, a frequency threshold of 1 was set to refine the truth table, as suggested by Ragin (2018) when the total number of cases is small.

Table 4.4 - Data calibration scheme

Condition/Outcome	Set membership score	Reason for set membership score
Upfront Resources (UPFRONT)	0	Buyer provides neither cash support nor physical support for their suppliers
	0.33	Buyer provides only one type of support (either cash or physical support) and of a modest nature
	0.67	Buyer provides only one type of support (either cash or physical support) but of a more substantial nature
	1	Buyer provides both cash support and physical support at a level critical for supplier performance
	Cases can also move up or down one level depending on the level and extent of support offered.	
Training and Assessment (TRAINING)	0	Buyer provides no training or supplier assessment and feedback
	0.33	Buyer provides only occasionally either training or assessment
	0.67	Buyer provides both training and assessment but only occasionally and of a modest manner
	1	Buyer provides both training for their suppliers and supplier assessments frequently and regularly
	Can also move up or down one level considering the variety of activities as well as their frequency and regularity.	
On-payment incentives (ONPAYMENT)	0	No use of incentives and no guarantee of sale
	0.33	The buyer offers only incentives to their supplier
	0.67	Buyer offers only a guarantee of sale for product that meets certain quality standards
	1	Offer a guarantee of sale for every product that suppliers can produce and also provides financial incentives
Norm of opportunism (NormOPP)	0	No norms of opportunism reported / identified
	0.33	Only minor and unimportant identification of norms of opportunism
	0.67	Norms of opportunism identified but seen as short-term and not permanent.
	1	Norms of opportunism regarded as endemic, substantial and unavoidable
Buyer Trustworthiness (TRUST)	0	Buyer trustworthiness absent
	0.33	Modest notion of buyer trustworthiness, lacking evidence
	0.67	Buyer trustworthiness identified but intermittent
	1	Buyer trustworthiness established and enduring, with evidence to substantiate the existence of the norms
Opportunism (OPP)	0	No reported opportunistic behaviour
	0.33	Witnessed opportunistic behaviour by suppliers, but of a modest and temporary nature
	0.67	Experienced a mixture of significant and modest opportunistic behaviour from suppliers
	1	Severe, multiple and enduring opportunistic behaviour from suppliers
	Membership was graded one level up and down, depending on the quantity and the frequency of opportunistic behaviour.	

Table 4.5 - Sample data calibration form

Data calibration form: Case number 1*				
Membership in the set of "Supplier Opportunism" outcome				
Dimensions #1	**Context-specific description #2**	**Direction/effect on membership #3**	**Intensive/relative importance #4**	**Illustrative quote (s) #5**
Cheating on product quality	Use products from a different source which does not meet the quality specified	Positive	High	"Their farm does not harvest enough fruit, so they take product from other farms to supply to us, but the quality of other farms' product does not meet our quality requirements."
Sell product to others	Break a contract with a fixed price to sell products to others when able to achieve a higher market price.	Positive	High	"First, at the beginning, he is the only one who does the business in the market…At the end, farmers stop selling product to him, but to others. The farmers sell to people who offer a higher price. That is the first thing, they break the contract."
Cheating on supply quantity	Do not deliver the agreed amount (quantity)	Positive	Medium	"Now the market price is increasing…they make up a reason to refuse supply to us. For example, the product is not good enough. Or on the delivery date, the product is not ripe enough to harvest…In general, they make up reasons…"
Opportunism Outcome	Buyer lost competitiveness in the market	Positive	High	"…they ruin everything. After that, he is the same with others in the market, there is no one thing specific. Instead of producing only 50 products for him [exclusively],…now it is messy."
Set membership score			1	
Reason for fuzzy-set attribution score	The buyer experiences a wide range of opportunistic behaviour by its suppliers that cause serious consequences to their business operations.			

**Note: This calibration form is inspired by the Generic Membership Evaluation Template (Tóth et al., 2017)*

4.6 Research Design for Study 2

4.6.1 The Survey Design

The self-administrated questionnaire used to collect data begins with a screening question "Are you a manager/senior manager or equivalent who works with your organisation's suppliers of fruit and vegetable products?" The main questions ask managers to give their opinions of their one major supplier regarding their development initiatives, opportunistic behaviours, improvement in the performance of the organisation. The questions also ask about role integrity and goal congruence between the organisation and the supplier, and the perceived supplier long-term orientation. The last part of the questionnaire asks demographic questions about the respondent's organisation, whereas details are optional.

The survey was initially developed in English, translated into Vietnamese, and then back-translated into English following the established procedures (Brislin, 1970). After reviewing and comparing the two English versions, minor changes relating to word choice for some questions resulted in the final Vietnamese version being refined. Subsequently, a discussion with appropriate Vietnamese academic staff confirmed the understanding of the questionnaire, including the appropriateness of its format, before a pilot test was conducted. This study followed the suggestions of Hair et al. (2006) and Kent (2007) when undertaking a survey pilot with experts and potential respondents. The survey pilot was conducted with five practitioners in the agri-food industry and also with five academic staff from a well-established university in Vietnam. Respondents received a copy of the questionnaire together with explanations of the purpose of the pilot study. They reviewed the questionnaire and gave their opinions on the format, degree of comprehension, and the overall content. The feedback from the pilot study respondents resulted in some changes of the wording of the questionnaire, including the Vietnamese pronoun used in the questionnaire. It was suggested to change the current wording of Vietnamese pronoun; "I/You" should be changed to a less formal because it causes the respondents to perceive a sense of distance. Hence, instead of using "*Ông/Bà*", the final version uses "*Anh/Chị*" to refer the respondent to her/himself. Based on their experience, the respondents suggested adding a question on the certification of supplier X as it is increasingly becoming a criterion of product quality in the fruit and vegetable market. Therefore, one question relating to the supplier certification was added to the questionnaire. It was then controlled in the analysis as discussed in Section 4.6.3.1 Regarding the order of the questions, recommendations were made to move those on the topic of "mood" towards the beginning of the questionnaire. The three questions were then placed after demographic questions while they were previously in the middle of the main variable items. A summary of other changes after back-translation and pilot study is provided in *Table 4.6*

Table 4.6 - Revisions of measurement translation

Original English version	Vietnamese version before revision	Vietnamese version after revision
The exchange relationship with supplier X creates a complex web of expectations between us over all kinds of issues.	Mối quan hệ trao đổi với nhà cung cấp X tạo ra một tổ hợp các kỳ vọng phức tạp *giữa chúng tôi trong tất cả các loại mối quan hệ.*	Mối quan hệ trao đổi với nhà cung cấp X tạo ra một tổ hợp các kỳ vọng phức tạp *trong tất cả các loại mối quan hệ giữa chúng tôi*
My company and supplier X in this category have compatible goals.	Công ty/HTX của tôi và nhà cung cấp X có những mục tiêu **tương thích** với nhau.	Công ty/HTX của tôi và nhà cung cấp X có những mục tiêu **tương đồng** với nhau
My company and supplier X in this category have compatible views on how to achieve our goals.	Công ty/HTX của tôi và nhà cung cấp X có quan điểm **tương thích** với nhau trong việc làm sao để đạt được mục tiêu chung của chúng tôi.	Công ty/HTX của tôi và nhà cung cấp X có quan điểm **tương đồng** với nhau trong việc làm sao đạt được mục tiêu chung của chúng tôi.

4.6.2 Data Collection

4.6.2.1 Sample size

Sample size can have a considerable impact on statistical significance (Hair et al., 2010), and researchers need to determine the desired sample size in order to infer research findings to a population (Barlett et al., 2001). Sample size can be estimated by either considering the absolute number of cases or the subject-to-variable ratio (Kline, 2010; Hair, 2013). Hair et al. (2010) suggested a preferable sample size of 100 or more for research based on factor analysis, and at least 200 observations for confirmatory factor analysis. Similarly, according to Kline (2010), a typical critical sample size of 200 is required for covariance-based structural equation modelling (SEM). A general rule for calculating sample size-to-parameters ratio is to make the number of observations equal to at least five times the number of estimated parameters (Bollen, 1989; Kline, 2010) when using the maximum potential estimation method. The ratio could increase to 10 or 20:1 observations-per-estimated parameter. Hair et al. (2010) proposed the same minimum ratio at 5:1, or more acceptably at 10:1 or 20:1 for the number of observations per variable to be analysed with the aim of maximising this. Calculation of the sample size according to the rule of observations-per-estimated parameter with a high number of free parameters to be estimated can lead to over- or underestimated sample size constraints (Wolf et al., 2013), and a large sample size can make statistical tests overly sensitive (Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, this research follows the rule of thumb of a 5 to 20: 1 ratio of sample size-to-variable. With six variables involved in analysing their relationships, the required sample size would be from 30 to 120 observations. The study employs covariance-based SEM, as discussed in Section 4.3.3, subsequently requiring a sample size of at least 200.

4.6.2.2 Survey administration

Data collection occurred between July and October 2019. The author approached potential respondents in different ways for data collection, using a professional research agency as well as directly contacting members of the Vinafruit Association (Hiệp Hội Rau Củ Việt Nam) which is the largest fruit and vegetable association in Vietnam. The professional research agency identified potential organisations that satisfied the research criteria based on their internal database and institutional networks. Research assistants were trained by the author to ensure they fully understood the purpose of the research, data collection process, questionnaire structure and reporting mechanism. Depending on the contact information available, the assistants contacted target respondents by telephone, email or directly face-to-face. Based on the respondents' preferred method of participation, research assistants employed the drop and collect survey technique to distribute the paper questionnaire or sent a direct link to the online survey. One supervisor of the agency undertook quality control by telephone with all respondents. This check confirmed that the collected questionnaires were genuine and appropriate for data analysis. The calls were recorded with the consent of respondents.

In total, 233 questionnaires were collected, of which 83 were completed online and 150 were paper-based. From this, 17 were classified as incomplete (i.e., less than 80% progression), 10 as unengaged (i.e., respondents gave vague responses or the same rating for all questions) and 2 as high missing values (i.e., have more than 10% missing values). Consequently there were 204 completed questionnaires suitable for data analysis (87.6% usable response rate) which exceeds the recommended threshold for covariance-based SEM (Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010).

Table 4.7 below presents an overview of respondents' organisations including the age of organisations, organisational type, number of employees and total revenue. As respondents were asked to complete the survey with respect to a specific supplier with which they have a current working relationship, the sample characteristics provide information on the supplier, including relationship length, the certificates which the supplier possesses, and if the supplier is a member of a cooperative (one form of farmer-farmer collaboration in Vietnam).

Approximately half of the organisations have operated between three and seven years (42.1%) with only a small percentage established less than one year ago (4.9%). Domestic agricultural companies and cooperatives account for 22.5% and 22.1% responses respectively. Other organisation types included supermarkets (18.1%), export companies (13.2%), and non-supermarket retailers (12.3%).

Regarding the size of organisations, nearly half of the sample had between 10 and 100 employees, with 43.1% possessing fewer than 10 employees. In terms of the organisation's revenue, more than half had a total revenue ranging from 130,000 to 208,000 USD per year. Buyers have been working with suppliers for between 1 and more than 10 years. More than half of suppliers were members of a cooperative, and most suppliers possess VietGap and/or GlobalG.A.P. certification, which are the two most common quality certificates in Vietnam. About 7% of suppliers possessed other certifications (e.g., USDA, EU Organic Bio, Participatory Guarantee System-PGS), and about 12% of suppliers were not certified.

4.6.3 Construct Measurement

4.6.3.1 Main variables

Study 2 adopts the measurement items for *supplier development* initiatives from Wagner (2011) and Salimian et al. (2017), with adaption to the supplier development measures commonly available in Vietnam. The items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale. For measuring buying firm *performance improvement*, the study adopted the scale developed by Wagner (2011) to which I added two items to capture the importance of the quantity available for buyers and the variety of products, which are important in the fruit and vegetable chain context.

Supplier opportunism measurement items were adapted from Yang et al. (2018). Respondents were asked to report the opportunistic behaviour of their designated supplier. Thus, we did not investigate their own opportunism as social desirability could lead to bias in their responses. *Goal congruence* was measured using the scale by Maestrini et al. (2018). The research follows Paswan et al. (2017), to measure *role integrity*, while the scale of Cannon et al. (2010) was adapted to measure the supplier's *long-term orientation*. A 7-point Likert scale was applied to all constructs and *Table 4.8* reports the items.

Table 4.7 - Descriptive statistics for survey respondents

	Category	Frequency	Percent (%)
Organisation Age	<1 year	10	4.9
	1 year – less than 3 years	42	20.6
	3 years – less than 5 years	46	22.5
	5 years – less than 7 years	40	19.6
	7 years – less than 10 years	22	10.8
	10 years or more	37	18.1
	Missing	*7*	*3.4*
	Total	**204**	**100%**
Organisation Type	Cooperative	45	22.1
	Retailer (non-supermarket)	25	12.3
	Supermarket	37	18.1
	Export Company	28	13.2
	Domestic Agricultural Company	47	22.5
	Others	21	10.3
	Missing	*1*	*0.5*
	Total	**204**	**100%**
Number of Employees	<10 employees	88	43.1
	10 – 100 employees	93	45.6
	101 – 200 employees	8	3.9
	>200 employees	12	5.9
	Missing	*3*	*1.5*
	Total	**204**	**100%**
Total Revenue	< 130,000 USD	59	28.9
	130,000 – 218,000 USD	106	52.0
	>218,000 – 8,710,000 USD	19	9.3
	>8,710,000	16	7.8
	Missing	*4*	*2.0*
	Total	**204**	**100%**
Supplier Type	Household farmers	76	37.3
	Agri Company	55	26.5
	Cooperative	52	25.5
	Trader	17	8.3
	Others	5	2.5
	Total	**204**	**100%**
Relationship Length with the Supplier	<1 year	8	3.9
	1 year – less than 3 years	78	38.2
	3 years – less than 5 years	54	26.5
	5 years – less than 7 years	30	14.7
	7 years – less than 10 years	16	7.8
	10 years or more	18	8.8
	Total	**204**	**100%**
Supplier Cooperative Membership	Yes	111	54.4
	No	52	25.5
	Not sure	41	20.1
	Total	**204**	**100%**
Supplier's certification	VietGap	108	52.9
	GlobalGap	7	3.4
	VietGap and GlobalGap	42	20.6
	Other certificates	13	6.4
	No certificate	25	12.3
	Do not know	9	4.4
	Total	**204**	**100%**

Table 4.8 - Measurement items for study 2

Item code	Item wording	Source
Supplier Development		
SupDev1	Giving production related advice to supplier X (e.g., processes, machining process, machine set up).	Adapted from Wagner (2011) and Salimian, Rashidirad, & Soltani, (2017)
SupDev2	Training farmers from supplier X.	
SupDev3	Giving product development related advice (e.g., processes, project management).	
SupDev4	The transfer of employees to supplier X.	
SupDev5	Giving technological advice (e.g., materials, software).	
SupDev6	Recognizing supplier's X achievements/performance in the form of awards.	
SupDev7	Site visits by our organisation's personnel to supplier X premises to help them improve performance.	
SupDev8	Site visits by our organisation's personnel to supplier X premises to assess their production process.	
SupDev9	Providing supplier X with equipment or tools for process improvement	
SupDev10	Providing supplier X with credit (e.g., in the form of prepayment and interest free loan)	
SupDev11	Evaluating supplier X's price, quality and delivery performance regularly.	
SupDev12	Offering guaranteed sales.	
Buyer Performance Improvement		
BPerImp1	Improve our delivery reliability.	Adapted from Wagner (2011)
BPerImp2	Reduce time to market	
BPerImp3	Reduce operation downtimes	
BPerImp4	Increase the satisfaction of our customers.	
BPerImp5	Improve the reliability of our product.	
BPerImp6	Improve the quality of our product.	
BPerImp7	Improve the quantities of our product.	
BPerImp8	Improve the number of our product lines.	
BPerImp9	Offer safer product to our customer.	
Supplier Opportunism		
Opp1	On occasion, this supplier/buyer lies about certain things to protect their interests.	Yang et al. (2018)
Opp2	This supplier/buyer sometimes promises to do things without actually doing them later.	
Opp3	This supplier/buyer does not always act in accordance with our contract (s).	
Opp4	This supplier/buyer sometimes tries to breach informal agreements between our companies to maximise their own benefit.	
Opp5	This supplier/buyer will attempt to take advantage of "holes" in our contract to further their own interests.	
Opp6	This supplier/buyer sometimes uses unexpected events to extract concessions from our firm.	
Goal Congruence		
GoalCon1	My organisation and supplier X in this category share the same goals in our relationships.	Maestrini et al. (2018)
GoalCon2	My company and supplier X in this category have compatible goals.	
GoalCon3	My company and the major suppliers in this category support each other's goals.	
GoalCon4	My company and supplier X in this category have compatible views on how to achieve our goals.	
Role Integrity		
RoIn1	The exchange relationship with supplier X creates a complex web of expectations between us over all kinds of issues.	Paswan et al. (2017)
RoIn2	The exchange relationship with supplier X is extremely complicated.	
RoIn3	The exchange relationship with supplier X is complicated.	
RoIn4	The exchange relationship with supplier X comprises of many diverse expectations about each other's behaviour.	
Long-term Orientation		
Lgterm1	Maintaining a long-term relationship with us is important to supplier X.	Cannon et al. (2010)
Lgterm2	Supplier X believes that over the long run our relationship will be profitable.	
Lgterm3	Supplier X focuses on long-term goals in this relationship.	
Lgterm4	Supplier X expects us to be working with them for a long time.	

4.6.3.2 Control variables

The inclusion of control variables in data collection and data analysis is vital for eliminating the risks that may invalidate the research finding (Becker, 2005; Spector and Brannick, 2011). Three variables, including type of suppliers (e.g., cooperative, or non-cooperative), the length of time that the buyer and supplier had cooperated, and the type of certificate that suppliers may possess (e.g., VietGAP or not), are used as control variables to study for their potential confounding effects on the dependent variables.

The literature suggests that organisation type may influence the supply chain network's effect (Li et al., 2017a). The current research studies supplier-buyer relationships at different tiers in the upstream of the fruit and vegetable supply chain, and supplier development activities can occur at any tier. From the very beginning of the chain, household farmers, who are directly involved in the process of growing fruit and vegetables, are suppliers. Moving downstream the supply chain, suppliers can be a cooperative, a trader, an agricultural company who will supply their products through the supply chain until they can be found on the retailers' shelves. Different types of suppliers have different roles in the supply chain, and there are variations in their operation management as well. This influences the ways in which they participate in supplier development initiatives. Hence, the type of suppliers may have some effect on their behaviour regarding opportunism and the performance of buyers. This study control of the supplier is a cooperative or not.

The length of the relationship between suppliers and buyers is often identified as a possible characteristic of the exchange relationship that may affect relationship outcomes (Li et al., 2017a). This study controls the length of the relationship by the number of years that the buyer and the supplier have been working with each other.

Finally, suppliers in the food and vegetable supply chain may or may not carry a type of certificate. This may create differences in agricultural practices when receiving support from buyers to improve their performances. A supplier who has not followed any qualification standards in production might feel it is more challenging to implement supplier development initiatives. Therefore, not possessing certificates will be likely to affect their behaviour. Also, certificates may indicate the quality of suppliers in some respects. Consequently, this is also likely to affect the performance improvement of buyers. The two popular quality certifications in agri-food in Vietnam are VietGAP (Vietnamese Good Agricultural Practices) and GlobalG.A.P (Global Good

Agricultural Practices). Other certificate types include USDA, PGS, EUBio, NASAA. The most popular type of certificate in Vietnam is VietGAP. Hence, this study controls certifications a dummy variable, indicating if suppliers possess VietGAP certificates or not.

4.6.3.3 Marker variable

Employing a marker variable is a popular technique for detecting Common Method Variance (CMV) (Simmering et al., 2015). In order to control for CMV, the Confirmatory Factor Analysis marker technique (Williams et al., 2010) requires the marker variable to be theoretically unrelated to all other substantive variables (Lindell and Whitney, 2001). In addition, an ideal marker variable should be perceptual and subjective, and should be chosen *a priori*. Also, it should be similar in format to at least one of the substantive variables. Prior to data collection, 'Mood' was selected as an ideal marker variable. The variable is measured by three 7-point Likert scale items, which is consistent with the scales of other variables. Three items adopted from Mayer and Stevens (1994) for mood were 'I know exactly how I am feeling', 'I know why I feel this mood', and 'My mood is clear'.

4.6.4 Remedies for common method bias

Measurement errors in social research are dangerous because they can harm the validity of research conclusions (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Such errors can be random or systematic with the latter being more serious (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Method variance, defined as variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the construct of interest, is one of the main sources of systematic measurement errors (Bagozzi and Yi, 1991). Common method variance (CMV) presented in the data can inflate the relationships among variables (Lindell and Whitney, 2001; Richardson et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2010; Simmering et al., 2015). Potential sources of CMV include (1) collecting data from a single respondent for both independent and dependent variables, (2) characteristics of measurement items, (3) the context of the items within the measurement instrument, and (4) the context of collecting the data (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Firstly, if the predictor and criterion variables are measured by the same person, this can create artefactual covariance between the variables due to his/her rationale, social desirability, and mood. Secondly, the item characteristics such as their complexity and/or ambiguity, scale format and anchors as well as wordings could lead to bias. Thirdly, the item context can influence the rating of other items. For example, a block of neutral items placed among blocks of positive/negative items could be evaluated in the same manner as the positive items, or some items could raise the mood of the respondent which would influence their answers to following questions. Finally, the surrounding contexts of giving measurement such as time and location or the method of collecting data (i.e., face-to-face or telephone) could also lead to a biased result. Details of discussion related to common sources of method bias can be found in Podsakoff et al. (2003).

Since common method bias is problematic, it is necessary to resolve it by both procedural (priori) and post-hoc statistical approaches (Podsakoff et al., 2003). With regard to procedural remedy, the research uses some techniques such as (1) separating the measurement of the predictor and the criterion variables by dividing them into separate parts (Podsakoff et al., 2003), (2) improving measurement scale by keeping the question simple, specific and concise, thereby avoiding complex wording, and providing verbal explanation (Tourangeau et al., 2000). Furthermore, the questionnaire does not request disclosure of the organisation's name and their suppliers, and the respondent had the option to remain anonymous. Moreover, at the beginning of the questionnaire, respondents are encouraged to provide honest responses by an instruction that clearly states that there are no right or wrong answers.

Post-hoc statistical solutions to account for common method bias were also applied. Harman's single-factor test which examines how much common variance might exist in a single factor, is a common technique widely used in research. However, it has been criticised because of its inability to control method effects, and is therefore insufficiently sensitive to detect common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Nevertheless, this test can assess the extent to which common method variance may be a major problem because if one factor is extracted, it accounts for all the variance in the items of the substantive constructs (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Furthermore, Fuller et al. (2016) suggested that a relatively high level (approximately 70%) of CMV must exist if there is to be a common method bias; hence, Harman's single-factor test can be used to detect the CMV bias level under common research conditions. The second approach to resolve CMV is the application of the marker variable technique (Lindell and Whitney, 2001). While Lindell and Whitney (2001) used a partial correlation technique for controlling method variance which is theoretically unrelated to the main variables in a study, Williams et al. (2010) proposed a more comprehensive confirmatory factor marker technique analysis plan. This study follows the common approach to report Harman's single-factor test results and conducts confirmatory factor marker technique analysis. The choice of the marker variable was discussed in Section 4.6.3.3

4.6.5 Data Analysis and Hypothesis Testing Procedures

Hair et al. (2010) suggested six steps for SEM, including (1) defining individual constructs, (2) developing the overall measurement model; (3) designing a study to produce empirical results, (4) assessing the validity of the measurement model, (5) specifying the structural model, and (6) assessing the validity of the structural model. Steps 1 and 2 establish the items to be used in the observed variables, and make the observed variables with the constructs, which were discussed in Section 4.6.3 . Step 3 considers the preliminary analysis with the adequacy of the sample size and missing data treatment. Step 4 of the process accesses the measurement models, while Step 6 accesses the structural model. Step 5 includes the conversion from the measurement model to the structural one. These six stages resemble the two-stage approach to assess the models in SEM as suggested by (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988) where stages 1 to 4 cover the measurement model evaluation, and stages 5 and 6 test the structural model. The measurement model assessment procedure is presented in Section 4.6.5.1.2 followed by the structural model assessment process which is explained in Section 4.6.5.2

4.6.5.1 Evaluation of the measurement model

Factor analysis is an interdependence technique whose "primary purpose is to define the underlying structure among the variables in the analysis" (Hair et al., 2010, p. 92). Hair et al. (2010) noted that the multivariate analysis technique defines sets of highly interrelated variables (factors) to analyse the underlying structure of the interrelationships among the variables. These factors are assumed to represent dimensions within the data. Moreover, factor analysis includes assessment of construct reliability and validity (Hair et al., 2010) which are central to the measurement model examination (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Therefore, factor analysis is employed in order to evaluate the measurement model of the research.

Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) are two statistical approaches to factor analysis. EFA determines the smallest number of interpretable factors required to explain the correlations among the factor items, but requires no *a priori* underlying theory (Thompson, 2004). CFA, as a part of SEM, requires a strong empirical or conceptual foundation to guide the specification and evaluation of the factor model (Brown, 2006). These two practices can be regarded as an ordered progression (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988) because numerous studies are, to some extent, both exploratory and confirmatory since they can involve known and unknown variables (Jöreskog, 1974). EFA is typically utilised before CFA in the measurement evaluation process. EFA explores the factor structure, whereas CFA confirms the underlying structure has been established *priori* on empirical (EFA) and theoretical grounds (Brown, 2006).

Study 2's construct measurements adopt measures from different sources and also add other measures to fit the context of the fruit and vegetable supply chain in Vietnam. Therefore, the measurement model will be firstly assessed by EFA, followed by CFA before converting to structural models for analysis and testing hypothesis.

4.6.5.1.1 Evaluation of the measurement model using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)

4.6.5.1.1.1 Adequacy and Communality

The dataset should initially be checked in order to satisfy several statistical presuppositions for factor analysis. The data will be firstly examined to determine if EFA was appropriate. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy determines if the data is suitable for factor analysis (Brown and Greene, 2006). The test examines the adequacy for each variable in the model, and for the complete measurement model. Moreover, the Bartlett test of sphericity was used to determine the appropriateness of factor analysis. This test examines the entire correlation matrix for the presence of correlations among the variables (Hair et al., 2010). SPSS 26.0 software will be utilised to support the analysis process.

Next, variables' communalities should be assessed in order to understand the amount of a variable's variance is shared with other variables (Hair et al., 2010). Higher communalities are better because of the extent to which an item correlates with all other items. Common magnitudes in the social sciences research are often from low to moderate communalities (from 0.40 to 0.70) (Costello and Osborne, 2005). Costello and Osborne (2005) claims that if an item has a communality of less than 0.40, it may not be related to the other items. Hence, low values indicate items to be considered for removal after examining the factor structure.

4.6.5.1.1.2 Rotation and estimation method

Following Hair et al. (2010) steps for EFA, a series of decisions should be made, including the number of factors to be extracted and the method of extraction. To assist the interpretation, researchers often rotate the extracted factors (Ruscio and Roche, 2012); thus, rotation method should also be considered. The conceptual model includes one independent variable, two dependent variables and three mediation variables, whereas it is expected that the final result of EFA will extract six factors. This means that there will be six factors with eigen values greater than 1.0 (Hair et al., 2010) in the final measurement model. Furthermore, another approach to decide the number of factors to be extracted is the percentage of variance. With regard to this, the extracted factors should account for at least 60% of the total variance explained (Hair et al., 2010). In terms of the extraction method, Maximum-Likelihood is chosen to be identical with the estimation method of the AMOS package, which will be used for CFA at a later stage. Although orthogonal is the most widely used rotation method (Hair et al., 2010), oblique rotation is recommended because it is more accurate and represents best practice in EFA (Costello and Osborne, 2005; Reio and Shuck, 2015). Oblique rotation allows factors to be correlated, while orthogonal rotations produce uncorrelated factors (Costello and Osborne, 2005; Reio and Shuck, 2015). In this study, Promax is chosen as an oblique rotation.

4.6.5.1.1.3 Validity and Reliability

The main purpose of factor analysis in this study is to evaluate the measurement model. Therefore, the expected outcome of the analysis will be data summarisation which identifies the underlying dimensions or factors, thereby providing estimations of the factors and the contributions of each variable to them in order to analyse the measurement model (Hair et al., 2010). The next step is to examine the factor matrix of loading which shows the loading of each variable on each factor and factor structure (Hair et al., 2010). Factor loading measures how observed items are related to their corresponding latent variables (Hair et al., 2010). Factor structure indicates the intercorrelations among the variables being tested in the EFA and is examined together with convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity reflects the degree of correlation of the variables within a single factor. A factor with strong loading items (0.5 or better) indicates a solid factor (Costello and Osborne, 2005). The extent to which factors are distinct from other constructs and uncorrelated is discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2010), the general rule for which is that the correlations between factors should not exceed 0.7, and variables should load significantly only on one factor (Hair et al., 2010; Pallant, 2020). Cross-loading is identified when a variable is found to have more than one significant loading (Hair et al., 2010).

The next criterion for measurement model evaluation using EFA is to examine the reliability of the factors extracted. The consistency of the item-level errors within a single factor represents construct reliability. Cronbach's Alpha indicates the level of internal consistency of the scales. The higher this is, the more consistent the scale. In the literature, the Cronbach's Alpha threshold applied is often more than 0.7 (Bollen, 1989).

Table 4.9 below provides a summary of all criteria used in EFA as discussed above. The result of these statistical tests and assessments will be presented in the next chapter.

Table 4.9 - Exploratory factor analysis assessment criteria

Assessment	Criteria	Cut-off value
Adequacy	KMO measure of sampling adequacy	0.5 or higher (Hair et al., 2010)
	Bartlett test of sphericity	Significant level (sig.) <0.05 (Hair et al., 2010)
	Communality	Communality value higher than 0.4 (Costello and Osborne, 2005)
Number of factors to extract	Eigenvalues	>1 (Hair et al., 2010)
	Percentage of total variance explained	>60% of total variance (Hair et al., 2010)
Convergent validity	Factor loading	Strong factor loading is 0.5 or higher (Costello and Osborne, 2005) Minimum loading is 0.32 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013) >0.4 is considered significant with a sample size of 200 (Hair et al., 2010)
Discriminant validity	Factor Correlation	Lower than 0.7 (Hair et al., 2010)
	Cross-loading	Variables should load significantly only on one factor (Pallant, 2020)
Reliability	Cronbach's alpha	0.7 or higher (Bollen, 1989)

4.6.5.1.2 Evaluation of the measurement model using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)

After factors have been developed using EFA, a movement to confirmatory factor analysis is suggested because researchers are recommended not to make substantive conclusions exclusively based on exploratory analysis (Costello and Osborne, 2005). CFA is employed to provide a confirmatory test of the measurement model (Hair et al., 2010). *Table 4.10* summarises the criteria that need to be considered in CFA.

Table 4.10 - Confirmatory factor analysis assessment criteria

Assessment	Criteria	Cut-off value
Convergent Validity	Factor loading	High loading >0.7 (Hair et al., 2010) Low loading <0.5
	Average variance extracted (AVE)	>0.5 (Hair et al., 2010)
Discriminant Validity	Fornell-Larcker criteria	The square root of the AVE score of each construct is greater than correlations among constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981)
	HTMT ratio	<0.85 (Kline, 2010; Henseler et al., 2015)
Unidimensional	Model fit indices	Good fit as defined in *Table 4.11*

Firstly, a path diagram for the measurement model will be developed from the revised construct measurements, which had been "explored" from EFA. This diagram is used to perform CFA for all scales of measurement models. This means that the path from the factors extracted (latent variables) to their remained items (observed variables) will be drawn by using AMOS 27.0

software. It is noted that, by default, most software support SEM (i.e., AMOS, LISREL) employed Maximum-Likelihood (ML) estimation technique, hence the estimation method of this study relies on the technique that integrated with AMOS software. Nevertheless, the study does not overlook the importance of the estimation method, as ML has properties of being unbiased, efficient, consistent, and scale-free (Bollen, 1989). The next step will assess the reliability, validity, and dimensionality of the measurements (Shook et al., 2004). These assessments are similar to those in EFA but are represented by different indicators.

4.6.5.1.2.1 Reliability and Validity

Construct reliability refers to the internal consistency of the observed variables portraying a latent construct (Hair et al., 2010). In EFA, reliability is assessed by Cronbach's Alpha, as discussed in Section 4.6.5.1.1.3 while CFA uses a composite reliability (Werts et al., 1974) indicator to evaluate the reliability of the constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2010). Hair et al. (2010) suggests the threshold of at least 0.7 for to indicate internal consistency of the constructs.

Convergent and discriminant validity will be assessed with regard to construct validity. The definition of these two assessments can be found in Section 4.6.5.1.1.3. Indicators for determining convergent validity are the factor loadings and the AVE. These show the amount of variance of observed variables captured by the latent variable relative to the total amount of variance, including that caused by measurement error (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Convergent validity is achieved if the constructs are estimated with high factor loading (>0.7) and AVE>0.5 (Hair et al., 2010).

In EFA, discriminant validity is assessed at the item and construct levels when it examines cross-loading of items and the correlation matrix. Discriminant validity will be achieved in CFA at the construct level when it satisfies the Fornell-Larcker criteria. Fornell and Larcker (1981)'s suggestion for examining discriminant validity is to compare the square root of the AVE score of each construct with the correlations among constructs. Discriminant validity is also examined at both item levels by checking the cross-loading of indicators with the other constructs (the heterotrait-monotrait ratio). The threshold for establishing discriminant validity is below 0.85 (Kline, 2010; Henseler et al., 2015).

4.6.5.1.2.2 Goodness-of-fit test and unidimensionality.

In SEM, once a specified model is estimated, goodness-of-fit (model fit) indicates "how well the specified model reproduces the observed covariance matrix among the indicator items" (Hair et al., 2010, p. 576). Since the specified model in CFA is the measurement model, it checks how well the measurement paradigm accounts for the correlations between variables in the dataset. The model is said to fit if the mathematical comparison values of the estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance matrix are close to each other (Hair et al., 2010). The paradigm fit indices are varied in the SEM literature (Kline, 2010). Measures commonly referred to in the covariance-based SEM literature are chi-square (χ^2), normed chi-square (χ^2/df), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximations (RMSEA), Standardised Root Mean Residual (SRMR), and pclose (probability of close fit) (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010). The measures' threshold from Hair et al. (2010) and Hu and Bentler (1999) is summarised in *Table 4.11,* each of which will be discussed below.

Table 4.11 - Model fit indices

Measure	**Threshold**		
	Cut-off value	Good	Excellent
χ^2			
χ^2/df	<5	>3	>1
CFI	>0.90	<0.95	>0.95
TLI	>0.90	<0.95	>0.95
SRMR	<0.10	>0.08	<0.08
RMSEA	<0.08	>0.06	<0.06
Pclose	>0.01	<0.05	>0.05

Chi-square (χ^2) is the only fundamental statistical test to compare the observed and estimated covariance matrices among various model fit measures (Hair et al., 2010). However, χ^2 alone has less meaning in accessing the model fit due to its mathematical problematic sample size and the number of observed variables (Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, the mathematical equation of χ^2 includes the sample size as a part of the multiple functions. Large sample sizes are often desired in CB-SEM, but an increase will result in a higher χ^2 value, which means that the model fails to pass the statistical insignificance test, even if the difference between the two matrices are identical (Hair et al., 2010). Moreover, the χ^2 statistic will probably be greater when the number of observed variables increases (Hair et al., 2010) which will also produce the same result as increasing the sample size does. Thus, Hair et al. (2010) suggested that other goodness-of-fit indices should always be assessed together with χ^2. In order to reduce the sensitivity of χ^2, normed chi-square (χ^2/df) is introduced and widely used as a model fit measure (Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010). This is a simple ratio of $\chi2$ to the degree of freedom. A better fit model will achieve χ^2/df value from 1 to 3 (Hair et al., 2010).

To supplement χ^2, fit indices are another popular way of evaluating model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). Two groups of fit indices are absolute and incremental (Bollen, 1989; Gerbing and Anderson, 1992). An absolute fit index (GFI - Goodness of Fit Index, SRMR - Standardised Root Mean Residual, RMSEA - Root Mean Square Error of Approximations) assesses how well a specified model reproduces the sample data (Hu and Bentler, 1999); therefore, it is the basic assessment on how well a researcher's theory fits the sample data (Hair et al., 2010). RMSEA complements χ^2 goodness-of-fit statistical test by correcting the tendency of rejecting models with a large sample size or a large number of observed variables based on χ^2 value (Hair et al., 2010). A low value of RMSEA (i.e., <0.06) shows an excellent fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999), whereas a value of <0.08 represents an acceptable fit (Hair et al., 2010). Standardised Root Mean Residual (SRMR) absolute fit index is a measure of the mean absolute correlation residual which is the overall difference between the observed and predicted correlations (Kline, 2010). It is useful to compare fit across models (Hair et al., 2010). Hu and Bentler (1999) suggested a threshold of SRMR <0.08 for excellent fit and a cut-off value of <0.1. Absolute fit indices of SRMR, RSMEA are recommended by various authors to assess model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010). Furthermore, Kline (2010) suggested reporting p-value of the close-fit hypothesis test (pclose). The models pass the close-fit test when pclose >0.05, indicating that the null hypothesis of H0: $\varepsilon_0 \leq 0.05$ (ε = the population parameter estimated by the RSMEA) has failed to be rejected. That is, passing this close-fit test favours the researcher's model (Kline, 2010).

Incremental model fit, on the other hand, assesses how well the estimated model fits with respect to some alternative baseline models (Hair et al., 2010). Examples of incremental fit include CFI Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker Lewis Index (TLI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), RNI (Relative Non-centrality Index), while the most widely used indices are CFI and TLI (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010). The TLI compares a proposed model normed $\chi 2$ with a nested baseline or null model, which considers model complexity (Garver and Mentzer, 1999; Hair et al., 2010). A value of TLI>0.95 indicates and excellent fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999), and good fit models have a value of TLI>0.90 (Garver and Mentzer, 1999; Hair et al., 2010). The CFI measures the relative improvement in the fit of the study model over that of a baseline model (Kline, 2010). Similar to TLI, a value of CFI> 0.90 means the model fits well (Hair et al., 2010) and CFI>0.95 is an excellent fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999).

Model fit is also applied to assess the unidimensionality of the measurement model. All constructs are assessed together in confirmatory factor analysis; therefore, it is important that each construct is unidimensional (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). This means that a set of observed variables or indicators can be explained by only one underlying construct (Hair et al., 2010). Observed variables have been pre-determined to link with their only latent variables, whereas if unidimensionality exists, the measurement model achieves a good fit (Garver and Mentzer, 1999; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 2000).

4.6.5.2 Evaluation of the structural model and hypotheses testing

4.6.5.2.1 Evaluation of the structural model

When the measurement model has been established and validated in CFA analysis, the next step is to transform the measurement model to structural models for evaluation (Hair et al., 2010). The evaluation of the structural relationship includes examining the model fit and estimating structural parameters in order to draw a conclusion about the proposed model (Hair et al., 2000).

Model fit indices and cut-off values for structural paths model applied to measurement model (Hair et al., 2010) that was discussed in Section 4.6.5.1.2.2. The structural model is valid when it satisfies two criteria: achieving a good model fit, and is statistically significant in the predicted directions (>0 for a positive relationship, and <0 for a negative relationship) (Hair et al., 2010).

4.6.5.2.2 Testing mediating effects

The literature has, for some time, been investigating how to establish a mediation effect between an independent and a dependent variable through a mediator. Three approaches to examine mediation effects that have been highlighted are the causal-steps approach (Baron and Kenny, 1986), the difference in the coefficients approach, the product of coefficients approach, and the evaluation of differences R square (MacKinnon et al., 2002; Wood et al., 2008).

Figure 4.2 below illustrates a simple model for mediation in which X is the focal predictor, Y is the dependent variable and M is the mediator. Four causal paths are included in the figure. Path c is the direct effect from the predictor to the dependent variable (X->Y); path a is the direct effect from X to the mediator M (X->M); path b is the direct effect from the mediator M to the dependent variable Y (M->Y) with controlling for X; and path c’ is the direct effect from X to Y after adding M (controlling for M).



Figure 4.2 - Illustration for mediation model: (a) direct effect (b) mediation effect

The causal steps approach (Baron and Kenny, 1986) tests for significances of different paths to examine whether a mediation exists. This approach follows a three-step method of constructing conditions for potential mediation effects. Step 1 requires the significance for path c, the direct effect between the focal variables, before adding the mediator. In path a, the effect of the focal predictor to the mediator is tested for its significance. The final step is the regression test which examines path b (effect between M to X with X to be controlled) and path c' (the direct effect between the two main variables with the mediator M added). Full mediation is established only when paths a, b and c are significant, and path c' is insignificant. If paths a, b, and c are significant but path c' is relatively reduced in size compared to path c, it suggests a partial mediation. Baron and Kenny (1986) suggested that Sobel (1982)'s test should be used to examine the change the coefficient of path c due to the occurrence of the mediator (path c') to conclude full or partial mediation. However, applying Sobel's test in the causal approach is problematic because the conclusion is made without a real test of the mediation effect on its statistical significance (MacKinnon et al., 2002).

The difference in coefficients approach (Clogg et al., 1992; Olkin and Finn, 1995) examines the difference of regression coefficients before and after controlling for the mediator. The standard error of the difference is then estimated and used for testing its significance against the t-distribution (Freedman and Schatzkin, 1992). If the coefficients difference significantly differ from zero, then a mediation exists.

The product of coefficients approach (Wood et al., 2008) tests the significance of the product in terms of path a and path b in *Figure 4.2* (Zhao et al., 2010). A comparison is made between the interaction of ab divided by its standard error and a t distribution tests for its significance (Wood et al., 2008). It is recommended that the second and third approaches employ Sobel's test in order to estimate the standard error when assuming a normal distribution.

Although it is suggested that Sobel's test is used for mediation, it has some limitations due to the fact that it requires a large sample size and multivariate normality assumption, which is often not satisfied (MacKinnon et al., 2002). Therefore, in order to overcome this problem, resampling methods performed by bootstrapping techniques is recommended as a more robust test for the confidence intervals, particularly when testing the significance of indirect estimations (Efron, 1993; Shrout and Bolger, 2002). In bootstrapping methods, the resampling technique generates thousands of resamples from the original sample size and also calculates the statistic of interest for each resample size (Hayes, 2018). Bootstrap resamples create empirical evidence for providing estimates of the confidence intervals of the parameters of interest, and by drawing statistical inferences on the underlying logic, the parameters are distributed normally with the large sample size (Hayes, 2018). (MacKinnon et al., 2002) claims that the bias-corrected bootstrap method gives the most accurate confidence interval. Moreover, the method performs the parametric approach and should only be used as the major technique in testing mediation effects (Zhao et al., 2010).

After reviewing the common approaches for established mediation effects and the two methods (Sobel's test and bootstrapping) used for the statistical significance test, this study follows the three-step causal approach using the bias-corrected bootstrap method for testing the indirect effect. It should be noted that in a more recent argument, the significant test of path c is not necessary for establishing mediation (i.e., Zhao et al., 2010; Hayes, 2018).

4.7 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter initially discussed the pragmatism paradigm that guides the mixed-methods approach and the research design of the current research. Following the mixed-method approach, Study 1 employs the qualitative method, and Study 2 is a quantitative study. Vietnam was chosen as the research context, and the overview and the structure of that country's fruit and vegetable supply chain were introduced. The next sections showed the research designs for studies 1 and 2. In Study 1, 35 face-to-face interviews were conducted, utilising the snowball sampling method. Thematic analysis and fsQCA were the main methods used for analysing the interview data. The interviews were coded independently, and the inter-code reliabilities were checked before calibrating for fsQCA. Study 2 employs SEM, analysing the data from 204 questionnaires. Techniques and methods for data analysis in studies 1 and 2 were also discussed.

Chapter 5. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

5.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter presents the analyses of the data that were collected for each study. The thematic analysis of comprehensive interviews is presented in Study 1. It reveals the relationship between supplier development and opportunism, and indicates that the relational norms have an impact on the potential of supplier opportunism (Section 5.2.1). Furthermore, fsQCA was employed to analyse the combinations of supplier development initiatives and relational norms which lead to supplier opportunism. The results are provided in Section 5.2.2. Section 5.3 documents the SEM assessments of the measurement models (Section 5.3.2) and structural models (Section 5.3.3), following the presentation of the data cleaning process and preliminary analysis (Section 5.3.1). The hypotheses are also tested, and their results are displayed in Section 5.3.3.3.

5.2 Study 1

5.2.1 Thematic Analysis

5.2.1.1 The relationships between supplier development initiatives and opportunism

Most buyers provide feedback on quality and training to suppliers. To a lesser extent, buyers offer cash support in the form of advanced payments or zero-interest loans, as well as providing physical inputs such as tools or equipment. Buyers may offer suppliers a guaranteed sale, implying that they will purchase the entire output of a supplier for a given good, at a pre-specified price over an agreed time period. Supplier incentives refer to financial inducements to the supplier (e.g., bonuses) to meet pre-specified quantity and quality thresholds.

Buyers often employ bundles of supplier development initiatives rather than just a single support measure. For example, a buyer may provide physical inputs as well as training and guaranteed prices to farmers. Although many buyers provide a specific form of supplier development support, implementation in practice may vary considerably. Quality assessment activities is one example, where one buyer may only assess product appearance visually (i.e., good size, skin without blemishes, weight as agreed). Another may test quickly for pesticide residues, but another assesses the product's microbiological index, which requires an independent third party to perform the assessment. This is far more expensive and not commonly applied practice.

Analysis of the data reveals that supplier development measures can induce supplier opportunism. Specifically, the six supplier development initiatives, represented by six rounded rectangles in the centre of *Figure 5.1* lead to six types of opportunistic behaviour. These are displayed in the six ellipses.

The provision of training to suppliers may fail to meet its objectives. Farmers may not follow the processes introduced in the training in order to sell products to other buyers who offer a higher price. For example, as a manager stated: *"When they are aware of a higher market price, they stop following our process. They do it their own way* [use prohibited chemicals, exceed fertiliser limits, etc…], *in order to keep the vegetables away from diseases. So, they can sell to the market at a higher price"* (Interviewee 9, Manager, Vegetable Cooperative).



Figure 5.1 - Supplier Development Initiatives and Links to Opportunism

Supplier assessment and feedback may be susceptible to two forms of opportunistic behaviour. Firstly, a supplier can bypass the assessment criteria, as Interviewee 14, a manager at a supermarket, reported: *"Suppliers do not deliver quality products. They put the freshest vegetables on the surface, […], in the middle they put lower quality ones; we can only test 1 or 2 samples; so sometimes it happens",* or *"…the fruit look beautiful on the outside, but only the farmer knows the real quality of it. For example, the fruit needs to be green in colour, which is standard for a Class I product. But there are fruits that look green on the outside but have some spots, a sign of ripeness, but it does not appear clearly. Only the farmer knows that, but they still classify those fruits as*

Class I" (Interviewee 32, Owner Household Farm). Secondly, suppliers may mix products from different sources to supply their buyers, as mentioned by another interviewee: "*They buy from wholesale markets, then process the product and mix it together. These are uncontrolled-quality products from the wet market. They process it, pack it under their name and then sell to the supermarket"* (Interviewee 13, Director, Fruit and Vegetable Company).

Buyers can offer suppliers a guaranteed sale. This initiative stimulates two different types of supplier opportunism. For example, a director states: *"When the market price is low, they mix products from their relative's farm to sell to us"* (Interviewee 17, Director, Vegetable Cooperative). With the guaranteed price offered, farmers cheat on product quantity by including output not produced by them and which may be of inferior quality. The second form of opportunism involves the supplier breaking the contract to sell to another buyer who offers a higher price. For instance: *"We sign a contract with suppliers with a fixed price for 3-6 months.... At the time, we fix the price, for example, 10.000đ per kg. We agreed on the price for three months… But one month later, the market has changed, and the price has increased. When the price increases, the farmer will break the contract with us to sell to other buyers, to traders"* (Interviewee 1, Assistant Chairman, Fruit Export Company).

Cash support may also provoke supplier opportunism. Firstly, when receiving money, a supplier can use it for purposes other than those agreed with the buyer: *"The fact is, there are businesses that use the money for the wrong purpose…that means… they take that money to do something else…*" (Interviewee 13, Owner and Director, Company). Secondly, the supplier may use the cash support to improve the quality and quantity of production, but then, they do not supply the superior products to the buyer who provided the support. For example, a supplier mentioned *"after four years I use your money, I produce as I usually do, don't follow any technical requirements, then I deliver it to you. If I can sell it at a high price, then I sell it to you, if not I will sell to others. Done. At that time, ok fine, I will refund your money; you let me borrow without interest. Thank you!"* (Interviewee 34, Supplier, Farmer).

When buyers provide physical inputs, the suppliers may not use them for the intended purposes. Instead, resources may be diverted to other uses as one manager identified: *"they use 100 trays per day… we lost some of those, they don't return enough… They use the trays to make a henhouse or use them as a bin. In general, they use the trays for everything…"* (Interviewee 22, Director, Cooperative). As with cash support, a supplier may utilise the inputs for production as intended but then fails to sell the superior products to the investing buyer.

Buyers often provide financial incentives to deliver specific volumes of a pre-specified quality. To gain these inducements, farmers may mix products from different sources in order to meet quantity thresholds, or cheat quality control processes. For instance: *"We need 100kg, but they only have 70kg… if they supply 70, they won't meet the quantity required. If they don't meet that, it affects the reward we offer. So, they think: I will take that quantity from another farm. Those products can be safe, can be unsafe"* (Interviewee 16, Manager, Vegetable Company).

To counter the problems of supplier opportunism, buyers seek to increase *monitoring*. Monitoring, via the stationing of some of the buyer's employees at the supplier's farm, can help ensure that cash and other physical inputs provided are used in accordance with the buyer's intentions. As Interviewee 28 remarked: *"The farms that have contracts with us have to follow us, because we monitor very carefully".* However, monitoring is inevitably incomplete – the buyer's employees cannot always oversee every action on a farm and monitoring costs can be substantial.

5.2.1.2 Relational norms affect the likelihood of supplier opportunism arising from supplier development initiatives

Norms of opportunism are the expectations of buyers and suppliers that each party will pursue their own interest and deviate from contractual terms within a supplier-buyer relationship. Interviewees expect some opportunism when offering supplier development initiatives, which reinforces its ubiquity. As Interviewee 1, a manager from a fruit export company, explained: *"That happens so much. We meet that situation so often… We call them in advance, saying that we need this number of tons. They said yes, they can harvest on that day… we have to pre-order, so they can harvest. Just a couple of days in advance; it should not be too long. They said they have sufficient quantity, we fixed on this price, Ok, we place the order, and we pay the deposit for the order. But closer to the harvest day, the price increases very much. Then they say, now the price is so high, I don't want to sell at 10.000, I want 12.000…. Either you accept the increase, or they refund your deposit, and they sell to others"*. Similarly, Interviewee 8, a supermarket manager, emphasised: *"It happens much; every day we have cases when we have to return… for example, low-quality products. It often happens, every day."* Both buyers and suppliers tolerate some degree of opportunism as *"a way of life"* (Interviewee 1, Assistant Chairman, Fruit Export Company).

However, other more positive forms of relational norms, identified in the literature, are also evident. Relational norms have been widely used in the literature as an overarching term that incorporates different behavioural expectations such as trust and reputation (Carson et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2016). From interview data, the author identified *a good reputation* as an important relational norm. It is a perceptual representation of a company that describes the firm's overall good standing (Fombrun, 1996). A buyer possessing a positive reputation reduces the likelihood of supplier development initiatives triggering opportunism. Interviewees described this as follows: *"The most important ... is reputation. You have a reputation, you have everything. The business who has a reputation, there will be no opportunism. There are so many traders, when products are in shortage and the market prices are high. But because of their reputation and long-time business, they accept the loss to supply to us [to not damage their reputation and keep our relationship going]"* (Interviewee 10, Manager, Fruit Company). Similarly, *"If you have a good reputation, they would not do things like…we give them money and they use it for other purposes… they would do this to other people who do not have a good reputation"* (Interviewee 16, Manager, Vegetable Company).

A particularly important relational norm is the *buyer's perceived trustworthiness*. Higher buyer trustworthiness reduces opportunism arising from the provision of supplier development measures. For instance, *"When we work with farmers, we have to keep our trustworthiness, and we have to communicate with them in the way that they can understand easily…. if we could not keep what we promised, they would not listen to us anymore"* (Interviewee 28, Director, Cooperative).

5.2.2 Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

From the thematic analysis, supplier development initiatives employed by buyers to improve suppliers' performance were identified, namely guaranteed sales, cash support, supplier incentives, supplier assessment and feedback, provide physical inputs, and train farmers. For the purposes of the fsQCA analysis, the author assigns the six initiatives into three categories, named *up-front resources (UPFRONT), training and assessment* (TRAINING) and *on-payment* (ONPAYMENT) incentives. *Up-front resources* includes support provided prior to the sale of the final good such as cash support to pay for inputs or directly providing physical inputs. The author defines *training and assessment* as buyers' efforts to train farmers and undertake supplier assessment and feedback. *On-payment incentives* relates to those offered at the time of sale, such as bonus payments and a guarantee of sale, which buyers offer as a motivation for suppliers to increase their performance. The three categories represent three sets of supplier development causal conditions.

The symbol '~' denotes the absence of the outcome or the condition.

5.2.2.1 Analysis of necessary conditions

As part of the QCA analysis, the author assessed whether any of the five causal conditions can be considered as necessary to the outcome (Carsten and Claudius, 2010), where the outcome is opportunistic behaviour by suppliers (OPP). The threshold to conclude a necessary condition is a consistency score of a condition or a combination of conditions greater than 0.90 (Ragin, 2006). *Table 5.1* details the results regarding necessary conditions with the outcome (OPP).

Table 5.1 - Analysis of Necessary Conditions for Opportunism

Condition	OUTCOME: OPP	
	Consistency	**Coverage**
ONPAYMENT	0.442330	0.442330
~ONPAYMENT	0.690888	0.6096690
UPFRONT	0.500000	0.666923
~UPFRONT	0.633218	0.610000
TRAINING	0.748558	0.670801
~TRAINING	0.498847	0.742489
NormOPP	0.384660	0.799760
~NormOPP	0.672434	0.514563
TRUST	0.269320	0.583750
~TRUST	0.730681	0.550870

Note:
ONPAYMENT = On-payment incentives
UPFRONT = Upfront resources
ADVICE = Buyer offers guaranteed sales
NormOPP = Norm of opportunism
TRUST = Buyer trustworthiness
~ = negate of condition

Table 5.1 reveals that no condition is 'almost always necessary' for opportunistic behaviour to occur. In other words, it is not evident that any particular causal condition must be present for opportunistic behaviour to materialise.

5.2.2.2 Analysis of sufficient conditions

Truth tables assess sufficient conditions by considering the logically possible combinations of causal conditions and the outcome linked to each combination. Ragin (2008) outlines the procedures for constructing a fuzzy-set truth table. A truth table consists of 2k logically possible combinations of the causal condition, with each combination displayed in a row. Hence, with five causal conditions, our truth table has 32 (25) rows. Only combinations of conditions with empirical evidence were retained for further analysis, so the author deleted 16 logically possible combinations of conditions that lacked empirical evidence. The remaining 16 rows cover 100% of the cases. To refine the truth table, a cut-off consistency threshold of 0.8 was employed, which lies within the range of 0.75 to 0.95 recommended by Crilly (2011). In addition, the author set a frequency threshold of 1 to refine the truth table, as suggested by Ragin (2018) when the total number of cases is small.

This study analyses sufficient conditions for supplier opportunism and non-opportunistic behaviours through consideration of the truth table described above. The analysis suggests five configurations of conditions that lead to opportunism and one configuration that leads to non-opportunistic behaviour. The author follows the approach of Tóth et al. (2017) in presenting the results in *Table 5.2.*

Table 5.2 - Conditions for Supplier Opportunism

	Opportunism (OPP)					
	Present					*Absent*
Condition	1a	1b	1c	1d	1e	2B
Training	⨂	•	●	⊗	•	●
Upfront support		⊗	⨂	●	•	⊗
On-payment incentives	⊗	⊗	●	⊗	●	⨂
Norms of Opportunism	●	●		●	●	⨂
Buyer Trustworthiness	⊗	●	⊗			⨂
Consistency	1	1	0.845	1	1	0.883
Raw coverage	0.134	0.038	0.210	0.096	0.115	0.365
Unique coverage	0.057	0.019	0.15	0.039	0.058	0.365
	Solution consistency: 0.920 Solution coverage: 0.442					Solution consistency: 0.883 Solution coverage: 0.365

Note: ●: Core causal condition (present) •: peripheral condition (present)

⨂: Core causal condition (absent) ⊗: peripheral condition (absent)

Table 5.2 shows that the solutions for OPP are robust because both the consistency (0.920) and coverage (0.442) values meet the threshold for an informative solution (Ragin, 2008; Woodside, 2013). The five combinations of causal conditions included in the solutions have all the consistency value of 1, with exception of solution 1c which has a consistency value of 0.845 which exceeds the minimum threshold value of 0.8. There are four solutions which include norms of opportunism (1a, 1b, 1d, 1e) and one solution (1c) which does not. Moreover, norms of opportunism is the core condition for most of the solutions (4 out of 5 solutions), and the absence of upfront support, the presence of training, and on-payment incentives are the core conditions when the presence of norms of opportunism does not matter. Only one solution includes buyer trustworthiness, two solutions in which buyer trustworthiness is absent, and two solutions for which buyer trustworthiness does not matter. In terms of non-opportunistic behaviour, the only solution offered involves the presence of training (supplier development initiative) and the absence of other conditions, including upfront resources, on-payment incentives, norms of opportunism, and buyer trustworthiness.

As *Table 5.2* indicates, together with the presence of norms of opportunism, there are various combinations of supplier development initiatives and buyer trustworthiness that lead to supplier opportunism. Specifically, opportunism emerges where buyers provide suppliers with training and undertake supplier assessment and feedback, in the presence of buyer trustworthiness, but do not provide any upfront resources and on-payment incentives. The other combination that leads to opportunism involves not providing training and assessment and on-payment incentives, but handing out upfront resources. In the presence of norms of opportunism, one combination that is associated with opportunistic behaviour is to provide all three supplier development initiatives to suppliers. The last route that results in opportunism is for the buyer to offer on-payment incentives and training and assessment. However, they are not regarded as trustworthy, and they do not provide upfront support.

Table 5.2 also presents the solution for the absence of opportunism. The consistency of the solution for non-opportunistic behaviour is 0.883 and the frequency is 1, which also meets the minimum thresholds for consistency and frequency, described above. It shows that when a buyer only provides training and supplier assessment in a setting where norms of opportunism and trust are absent, opportunistic supplier behaviour fails to occur.

5.3 Study 2

5.3.1 Data Cleaning and Preliminary Analysis

5.3.1.1 Missing data

Missing data can have a practical impact on data analysis because it reduces the available sample size, or can have a more substantive effect of bias for the generalisability of findings if the missing data are non-random (Hair et al., 2010). Thus, it is important to analyse the missing values in order to ascertain whether they occur randomly or follow a particular pattern. Hair et al. (2010) suggested a four-step approach to identifying missing data which this research followed, and the first step is to examine the type of missing data. The current research experiences some common types of ignorable missing data encountered in almost every survey (Hair et al., 2010). The research only draws on a sample of the population, rather than data from the entire population. Moreover, the survey was intentionally designed for the participation of managers in organisations which operate in the fruit and vegetable supply chain; therefore, missing data was created by the respondents who are not managers. Those types of missing data are under the researcher's control, and it is not concerned; thus, it is not calculated in the final total sample size. The research is with non-ignorable missing data, including known and unknown missing data processes. For the known missing data processes, in which respondents failed to finish the entire questionnaire (exiting during the survey process, without returning to it), the cases are deleted from the total sample size. There are cases of some unknown missing data processes among the 206 respondents who progressed until the end of the survey and returned it. Unknown missing data processes relate directly to respondents and are out of the researcher's control (Hair et al., 2010). The missing data are then examined in order to find the amount of (1) missing value for each case and (2) missing cases for each item for the purpose of ascertaining if it is sufficiently low not to affect the result. *Table 5.3* presents a summary of missing data in the total sample size of 206 cases after removing unusable questionnaires (incomplete and unengaged cases), and *Table 5.4* provides a summary of the missing value of a total of 52 items.

Table 5.3 - Summary of missing data of cases

Number of missing items	% missing item (per total 52 items)	Number of cases	Percent of sample
0	0	189	91.7
1	1.9	12	5.8
3	5.8	1	0.5
4	7.7	1	0.5
5	9.6	1	0.5
7	13.5	1	0.5
8	15.4	1	0.5
Total		**206**	**100%**

Missing data can have a practical impact on data analysis because it reduces the available sample size, or can have a more substantive effect of bias for the generalisability of findings if the missing data are non-random (Hair et al., 2010). Thus, it is important to analyse the missing values in order to ascertain whether they occur randomly or follow a particular pattern. Hair et al. (2010) suggested a four-step approach to identifying missing data which this research followed, and the first step is to examine the type of missing data. The current research experiences some common types of ignorable missing data encountered in almost every survey (Hair et al., 2010). The research only draws on a sample of the population, rather than data from the entire population. Moreover, the survey was intentionally designed for the participation of managers in organisations which operate in the fruit and vegetable supply chain; therefore, missing data was created by the

respondents who are not managers. Those types of missing data are under the researcher's control, and it is not concerned; thus, it is not calculated in the final total sample size. The research is with non-ignorable missing data, including known and unknown missing data processes. For the known missing data processes, in which respondents failed to finish the entire questionnaire (exiting during the survey process, without returning to it), the cases are deleted from the total sample size. There are cases of some unknown missing data processes among the 206 respondents who progressed until the end of the survey and returned it. Unknown missing data processes relate directly to respondents and are out of the researcher's control (Hair et al., 2010). The missing data are then examined in order to find the amount of (1) missing value for each case and (2) missing cases for each item for the purpose of ascertaining if it is sufficiently low not to affect the result. *Table 5.3* presents a summary of missing data in the total sample size of 206 cases after removing unusable questionnaires (incomplete and unengaged cases), and *Table 5.4* provides a summary of the missing value of a total of 52 items.

Table 5.3 shows that over 90% of the cases have no missing values. Only two of the remaining cases have more than 10% of these (seven and eight missing items per total 52 items in the survey). In terms of missing data of variables *(Table 5.4),* over three-quarters of variables have no missing value. Generally, cases and variables with less than 10% missing value can be ignored for treatment (Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, only two cases with over 10% are considered for remedial action. The simplest remedy recommended is to delete the cases so that the reduction in the sample size remains sufficient for analysis. Hence, the two cases were deleted, leaving a sample size of 204. The highest percentage of missing cases for each item is only 3.4 which can be ignored as stated above. However, for the purpose of Structural Equation Modelling, the items related to causal relationships, which are to be analysed, are imputed by a simple mean substitution technique. This simple remedy is considered appropriate for missing data treatment because the level is low (Hair et al., 2010).

Table 5.4 - Summary of missing data of variables

Number of missing values	% missing value (per total 206 cases)	Number of items	Percent of items
0	0	33	63.4%
1	0.5%	12	23.1%
2	1.0%	1	1.9%
3	1.5%	3	1.9%
4	2.0%	2	3.8%
7	3.4%	1	1.9%

One method of testing non-response bias is to compare the answers of early and late answering respondents. The author follows Alsawafi et al. (2021) to conduct an independent *t*-test, comparing two groups of respondents: the first 30% of respondents and 30% of later respondents (Table 5.5). Propensity scores were calculated for the first 30% of respondents and the remainder of the sample. Then, the author matched the 60 pairs of early and later respondents based on the scores (Guo and Fraser, 2010). Subsequently, independent samples *t*-tests indicate no statistically significant differences between the early and later groups of respondents (see Table 5.5). Hence, no evidence of non-respondent bias exists.

5.3.1.1 Normality

Normality indicates the distribution of the data for a particular variable or item, assessed by the variable/item’s means, median, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis (Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010). The descriptive statistics *(Appendix H.1)* indicate that the skewness values at item levels range from -2.138 to +1.256, and that the kurtosis values range from -1.492 to +5.596.

No official rules exist regarding skewness and kurtosis absolute values for checking normal distribution assumptions. For example, numerous authors refer to a normal distribution of data when the absolute value of skewness is less than 1, and kurtosis is less than 2 (Pallant, 2010; George and Mallery, 2011). Furthermore, Byrne (2001) argued that normal distribution assumptions are satisfied when the skewness and kurtosis value is between -2 and + 2 and -7 to +7, respectively. According to Kline (2010), a serious contravention of normal distribution assumptions occurs when the absolute value of skewness is above 3, and that of kurtosis is above 10.

Table 5.5 - Independent t-test results for non-response bias

	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	99% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
								Lower	Upper
SupDev1	.219	.641	-1.218	118	.226	-.400	.328	-1.260	.460
SupDev2	.643	.424	.424	118	.672	.150	.354	-.777	1.077
SupDev3	3.428	.067	.466	118	.642	.133	.286	-.616	.882
SupDev4	1.259	.264	.412	118	.681	.133	.324	-.715	.981
SupDev5	.118	.732	.000	118	1.000	.000	.338	-.884	.884
SupDev6	.685	.409	.256	118	.798	.083	.325	-.769	.935
SupDev7	4.155	.044	.475	118	.636	.133	.281	-.602	.869
SupDev8	.700	.405	.464	118	.644	.117	.252	-.542	.775
SupDev9	1.086	.300	1.369	118	.173	.450	.329	-.410	1.310
SupDev10	3.142	.079	-.091	118	.927	-.033	.365	-.988	.922
SupDev11	2.335	.129	.689	118	.492	.167	.242	-.466	.800
SupDev12	.297	.587	-.727	118	.468	-.233	.321	-1.073	.607
Opp1	6.383	.013	-.046	118	.964	-.017	.366	-.976	.942
Opp2	8.022	.005	.000	118	1.000	.000	.352	-.922	.922
Opp3	.995	.320	-2.097	118	.038	-.783	.374	-1.761	.195
Opp4	1.625	.205	-1.018	118	.311	-.367	.360	-1.310	.576
Opp5	4.560	.035	-.435	118	.665	-.150	.345	-1.054	.754
Opp6	2.023	.158	-.408	118	.684	-.150	.368	-1.113	.813
BPerImp1	4.621	.034	-.628	118	.531	-.100	.159	-.517	.317
BPerImp2	9.116	.003	.764	118	.447	.167	.218	-.405	.738
BPerImp3	.893	.347	-.226	118	.821	-.050	.221	-.628	.528
BPerImp4	1.936	.167	-.511	118	.610	-.083	.163	-.510	.344
BPerImp5	4.661	.033	.544	118	.588	.083	.153	-.318	.485
BPerImp6	2.124	.148	-.540	118	.590	-.083	.154	-.488	.321
BPerImp7	.037	.847	-1.104	118	.272	-.233	.211	-.787	.320
BPerImp8	.670	.415	-.690	118	.491	-.133	.193	-.639	.372
BPerImp9	3.059	.083	-1.139	118	.257	-.200	.176	-.660	.260
GoalCon1	.008	.930	-.147	118	.883	-.033	.227	-.628	.561
GoalCon2	.218	.641	.077	118	.939	.017	.217	-.550	.584
GoalCon3	.130	.719	-.323	118	.747	-.067	.207	-.608	.474
GoalCon4	.032	.859	-.612	118	.542	-.133	.218	-.704	.437
RoIn1	2.312	.131	-.792	118	.430	-.250	.316	-1.077	.577
RoIn2	.402	.527	-1.075	118	.285	-.300	.279	-1.031	.431
RoIn3	2.796	.097	-.942	118	.348	-.267	.283	-1.008	.475
RoIn4	1.781	.185	.114	118	.910	.033	.293	-.733	.800
Lgterm1	.008	.929	-2.072	118	.040	-.383	.185	-.868	.101
Lgterm2	.247	.620	-.815	118	.417	-.150	.184	-.632	.332
Lgterm3	.154	.695	-2.015	118	.046	-.400	.199	-.920	.120
Lgterm4	1.873	.174	-1.848	118	.067	-.300	.162	-.725	.125

Note: F = F value   Sig. = Significant value   t = t-value   df = degree of freedom   Std. Error = standard errors

The current study follows the suggestions of Kline (2010) in order to apply the cut-off value of skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, all the items are within the acceptable range of -3 to +3 and -10 to +10. Furthermore, even applying the strictest value of -1 to + 1 for skewness and -2 to + 2 for kurtosis leads to the conclusion that some items of contravene the normality assumption (Hair et al., 2010). Hayes (2018) contended that the assumption of normality is often not satisfied in social research areas, and modern statistical analysis techniques can robustly manage non-normality (Reinartz et al., 2009). Moreover, with a sample size exceeding 200, a serious effect of normality by examining skewness and kurtosis often makes no substantive difference (Hair et al., 2010; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). Hence, with the absolute value of skewness and kurtosis of the current research, it can be concluded that the study has no excessively non-normal data to influence the data analysis results.

5.3.1.2 Outliers and influential observations

An outlier is an observation whose distinct characteristic differs from those of other observations. Outliers can cause bias to statistical analysis (Hair et al., 2010); therefore, researchers should attempt to identify those influential observations (Bollen, 1989). However, the Likert scale contains no outliers because answering extremely at 1 or 7 does not necessarily represent outlier behaviour. All of the main indicators of this study used the Likert scale; thus, it is not necessary to consider outlier problems. Furthermore, items were measured on a predefined scale; hence, there are no univariate outliers of concern.

5.3.2 Measurement Model

5.3.2.1 Assessment of the measurement model using EFA

5.3.2.1.1 Adequacy

The data were first examined in order to ascertain if EFA was appropriate. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy determines whether the data are appropriate for factor analysis (Brown and Greene, 2006). The test examines the adequacy for each variable in the model, and for the complete measurement model. Using SPSS 26.0 software, the KMO test result *(Table 5.6)* was 0.880, indicating good inter-correlations between each pair of items (Treiblmaier and Filzmoser, 2010), thereby supporting a factor analysis.

Furthermore, the Bartlett test of sphericity was used to determine the appropriateness of factor analysis. This test examines the entire correlation matrix for the presence of correlations among the variables (Hair et al., 2010). *Table 5.6* shows a statistically significant Bartlett Test of Sphericity at 0.001 level, indicating that sufficient correlation exists among the variables.

Table 5.6 - Result of KMO and Bartlett's Test

KMO and Bartlett's Test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy		.880
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	4719.933
	Df	528
	Sig.	.000

5.3.2.1.2 Communalities

Table 5.7 provides details of communalities for all retained items. Higher communalities are better because, at this extent, an item correlates with all of the others. Common magnitudes in the social sciences research are often from low to moderate communalities (from 0.40 to 0.70) (Costello and Osborne, 2005). According to Costello and Osborne (2005), if an item has a communality of below 0.40, it may not be related to the others. Hence, low values indicate items to be considered for removal after examining the factor structure. Using the SPSS 26.0 package, the first assessment of the measurement model using EFA resulted in the extraction of eight factors, two of which contain only two items. Moreover, two items, *BperImp2* and *RoIn4*, have communalities below the 0.4 threshold, indicating their candidature of removal after examining convergent validity and discriminant validity. In total, four rounds of EFA assessment were performed with some items eliminated after each round until the measurement model was evident of communities, a clear structure, convergent validity and discriminant validity. The results of communities after the first three rounds are presented in *Appendix H.2*, and the result for item communalities of the final measurement model after EFA is presented in *Table 5.7*, The decision of item deletions after each round will be presented in the next session.

5.3.2.1.3 Convergent validity and discriminant validity

Factor structure refers to the intercorrelations among the variables being tested in the EFA and is examined together with convergent and discriminant validity. The former reflects the degree of correlation of the variables within a single factor which has strong loading items (0.5 or better) and indicates a solid factor (Costello and Osborne, 2005). The extent to which factors are distinct from other constructs and uncorrelated indicates discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2010). The general rule for discriminant validity is that the correlations between factors should not exceed 0.7, and that variables should load significantly on only one factor (Hair et al., 2010; Pallant, 2020).

As stated in section 5.3.2.1.2 , the first round of EFA assessment which has two factors contains only two items each *(Appendix H.*3). Specifically, *SupDev9* and *SupDev10* were loaded into one factor, and *BPerImp2* and *BPerImp3* were loaded into another. *SupDev10* and *BPerImp3* were subsequently deleted for the second round of assessment due to their lower communality values between both items of the same factor. The result of the second round of assessment indicates that *SupDev9* communalities have changed to only 0.255, and seven factors were extracted. The pattern matrix reveals that BPerImp7 and BPerImp8 were still the only items loaded onto one factor, with

BPerImp7 cross-loading with another. Thus, *SupDev9* and *BPerImp7* were removed for the third round of assessment in order to improve discriminant validity.

In the next round, a clear pattern structure with six factors was achieved. The extraction sum of square loadings was 61.47% for the six factors of interest which passed the 60% threshold. However, four items (i.e., SupDev4, SupDev6, BPerImp3, and RoIn4) have communalities below 0.4, meaning that the items may struggle to load significantly onto their factors. Furthermore, analysis of convergent and discriminant validity which ensures that solid factors were extracted shows that BPerImp3 and RoIn4 have loading factors of 0.470 and 0.458 respectively, being very close to the threshold of a strong loading factor (0.5 or greater). The minimum threshold for item loading is 0.32 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013) or a higher threshold at 0.4 (Reio and Shuck, 2015). After examining the content of the item, BperImp3 was deleted for the final round of assessment while RoIn4 was retained.

Convergent validity of the final measurement model is achieved because all factor loading values exceed 0.5 *(Appendix H.4),* but RoIn4. Discriminant validity is also evident when there are no strong cross-loadings between items, and the factor correlation matrix has no value greater than 0.7 (see *Appendix H.5).*

5.3.2.1.4 Reliability

The consistency of the item-level errors within a single factor represents construct reliability. Cronbach's Alpha coefficient indicates the level of internal consistency of the scales, and the higher this is, the more consistent the scale. In the literature, Cronbach's Alpha threshold often exceeds 0.7 (Bollen, 1989). From the result presented in *Table 5.7*, all of the factors have Cronbach's Alpha above 0.7 which indicates the overall reliability of the constructs.

Table 5.7 - Full measurement model for CFA before modification

Construct	**Code**	**Indicator**	Com	λ	S.E	*t-value*
Supplier Development (**SupDev**) α - .896	SupDev1	Giving production related advice to supplier X	.593	.753	n/a	n/a
	SupDev2	Training farmers from supplier X.	.572	.734	.105	10.550***
	SupDev3	Giving product development related advice	.430	.640	.086	9.085***
	SupDev4	*The transfer of employees to supplier X.*	*.394*	*.604*	*.108*	*8.533****
	SupDev5	Giving technological advice	.681	.801	.100	11.638***
	SupDev6	*Recognising supplier's X achievements/performance in the form of awards.*	*.357*	*.582*	*.104*	*8.207****
	SupDev7	Site visits by our organisation's personnel to supplier X premises to help them improve performance.	.608	.775	.077	11.221***
	SupDev8	Site visits by our organisation's personnel to supplier X premises to assess their production process.	.543	.708	.067	10.138***
	SupDev11	Evaluating supplier X's price, quality, and delivery performance regularly.	.479	.659	.065	9.377***
	SupDev12	Offering guaranteed sales.	.426	.653	.095	9.290***
Opportunism **(Opp)** α - .931	Opp1	On occasion, supplier X lies about certain things to protect their interests.	.725	.845	n/a	n/a
	Opp2	Supplier X sometimes promises to do things without actually doing them later.	.676	.815	.065	14.290***
	Opp3	Supplier X does not always act in accordance with our contract(s).	.668	.814	.070	14.245***
	Opp4	Supplier X sometimes tries to breach informal agreements between our companies to maximise their own benefit.	.790	.885	.064	16.379***
	Opp5	Supplier X will attempt to take advantage of "holes" in our contract to further their own interests.	.688	.824	.062	14.543***
	Opp6	Supplier X sometimes uses unexpected events to extract concessions from our firm.	.672	.817	.065	14.351***
Buyer Performance Improvement (**BPerImp**) α - .891	BPerImp1	Improve our delivery reliability	.513	.699	n/a	n/a
	BPerImp4	Increase the satisfaction of our customers	.567	.742	.121	9.858***
	BPerImp5	Improve the reliability of our product	.716	.832	.102	10.964***
	BPerImp6	Improve the quality of our product.	.711	.831	.106	10.958***
	BPerImp8	Improve the number of product lines.	.551	.731	.133	9.720***
	BPerImp9	Offer safer product to our customer	.604	.773	.114	10.250***
Goal Congruence **(GoalCon)** α - .907	GoalCon1	My organisation and supplier X in this category share the same goals in our relationships.	.666	.779	n/a	n/a
	GoalCon2	My company and supplier X in this category have compatible goals.	.742	.850	.084	13.208***
	GoalCon3	My company and the major suppliers in this category support each other's goals.	.745	.869	.072	13.564***
	GoalCon4	My company and supplier X in this category have compatible views on how to achieve our goals.	.762	.884	.076	13.861***
Role Integrity **(RoIn)** α - .846	RoIn1	The exchange relationship with supplier X creates a complex web of expectations between us over all kinds of issues.	.556	.744		
	RoIn2	The exchange relationship with supplier X is extremely complicated.	.817	.908	.069	13.392***
	RoIn3	The exchange relationship with supplier X is complicated	.908	.938	.071	13.711***
	RoIn4	The exchange relationship with supplier X comprises of many diverse expectations about each other's behaviour.	.381	.589	.088	8.369***
Long-term Orientation **(Lgterm)** α - .869	Lgterm1	Maintaining a long-term relationship with us is important to supplier X.	.534	.706	n/a	n/a
	Lgterm2	Supplier X believes that over the long run our relationship will be profitable.	.625	.782	.102	10.376***
	Lgterm3	Supplier X focuses on long-term goals in this relationship.	.855	.901	.112	11.619***
	Lgterm4	Supplier X expects us to be working with them for a long time.	.599	.776	.098	10.295***

α - Cronbach's alpha Com - communality λ - factor loading S.E - standard error *t-value* - unstandardised t-value *** significant level at $p < 0.001$
Indicators in *italic* will be eliminated for the final measurement model

5.3.2.2 Assessment of the measurement model using CFA

Confirmatory Factor Analysis was further employed to assess the measurement model, following common practice in structural equation modelling. However, not all of the items were included in the assessment, and CFA examines only those that were retained after performing EFA (excluded *SupDev9*, *SupDev10*, *BPerImp2*, *BPerImp3*, *BPerImp7*). CFA was performed using AMOS 27.0 software.

5.3.2.2.1 Reliability

Composite reliability (CR), a measure of internal consistency, is applied in order to assess construct reliability in CFA. The threshold which indicates the reliability of a construct is CR >0.7 (Hair et al., 2010). *Table 5.8* reveals high values of CR for all latent constructs (>.80); therefore, they are reliable.

Table 5.8 - Reliability, Validity results and Fornell-Larcker criteria for discriminant validity

	CR	AVE	SupDev	Opp	BPerImp	GoalCon	Lgterm	RoIn
SupDev	0.891	0.509	**0.714**					
Opp	0.927	0.681	0.095	**0.825**				
BPerImp	0.894	0.587	0.379***	-0.138†	**0.766**			
GoalCon	0.910	0.716	0.479***	-0.185*	0.703***	**0.846**		
Lgterm	0.863	0.614	0.417***	-0.135†	0.646***	0.586***	**0.784**	
RoIn	0.879	0.651	0.055	0.602***	-0.237**	-0.199*	-0.179*	**0.807**

Note: Significance of Correlations: † p < 0.100 * p < 0.050 ** p < 0.010 *** p < 0.001
Numbers along the diagonal indicate square roots of the variance extracted of each construct.

5.3.2.2.2 Convergent validity and discriminant validity

In CFA, convergent validity is assessed by high factor loading (>0.70), and the average variance extract (AVE) is greater than 0.50 (Hair et al., 2010). The assessment of construct indicated that the convergent validity was contravened because the AVE of *SupDev* latent variable was less than 0.5, and four factor loadings of items *SupDev3, SupDev4, SupDev11, SupDev12* were above 0.6, and two items *SupDev6*, *RoIn4* had factor loadings above 0.5 (*Table 5.7)*. The factor loading, *SupDev4* and *SupDev6* were deleted in order to improve AVE. *SupDev11*, *SupDev12*, and *RoIn4* were retained in the measurement model for their contributions to the construct's conceptualisation. *Table 5.8* shows the result of the final constructs CR, AVE for the final measurement model which is evident for construct convergent validity. *Table 5.10* displays the factor loadings of all retained items.

In EFA, discriminant validity, which is achieved in CFA at the construct level when it meets the Fornell-Larcker criteria, was evident at the item level. Fornell and Larcker (1981)'s suggestion for examining discriminant validity is to compare the square root of the AVE score of each construct with correlations among constructs. The results in *Table 5.8* indicate that discriminant validity is achieved for the final measurement construct because the variance explained by the indicators of each construct is greater than the shared variance between the construct and other latent variables.

Furthermore, discriminant validity is examined by checking the cross-loading of indicators to the other constructs (the heterotrait-monotrait ratio), while the threshold for establishing discriminant validity by heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratio is below 0.85 (Kline, 2010; Henseler et al., 2015). *Table 5.9* shows evidence for discriminant validity using HTMT ratio when all the values are less than 0.85.

Table 5.9 - Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) ratio

	SupDev	**Opp**	**BPerImp**	**GoalCon**	**Lgterm**	**RoIn**
SupDev						
Opp	0.100					
BPerImp	0.425	0.145				
GoalCon	0.510	0.168	0.720			
Lgterm	0.488	0.096	0.646	0.589		
RoIn	0.034	0.663	0.251	0.189	0.191	

5.3.2.2.3 Model fit

After the removal of *SupDev4* and *SupDev6* from the supplier development construct, according to widely accepted criteria (Hu and Bentler, 1999), the results revealed a good fitting model: χ^2*=707.927*, χ^2*/df=1.605*, *CFI=0.939*, *TLI=0.932*, *SRMR=0.057*, *RMSEA=0.055*, *pclose=0.153* (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010).

After the measurement model was assessed by using EFA and CFA, the final model comprised six latent factors representing supplier development initiatives, opportunistic behaviour of supplier, buyer performance improvement, goal congruence, role integrity and supplier long-term orientation. *Table 5.10* depicts the retained indicators for the final measurement model with each indicator factor loading, standard deviation, t-value and significance level. In total, seven items were removed from the original 39 of the measurement model which accounted for 17.9% of the total. This percentage is below the 20% maximum number of items recommended for the deletion of items from a measurement model (Hair et al., 2010).

Initially, the predictor, *Supplier Development (SupDev)* construct includes 12 indicators, and after the EFA and CFA assessments, four items were deleted. The deleted items are “SupDev4 - the transfer of employees to supplier X”; “SupDev6 - recognising supplier X’s achievements/performance in the form of awards”; “SupDev9 - providing supplier X with equipment or tools for process improvement.”; and “SupDev10 - providing supplier X with credit in the form of prepayment and interest fee loan”.

Considering the dependent variables, the *Opportunism (Opp)* construct comprises six items with high reliability and strong loading factors, whereas all constructs from the initial model were retained. For the second dependent variable, six out of nine indicators of Buyer Performance Improvement were retained for the final measurement models. The three removed items were “BPerImp2 - Reduce time to market”; “BPerImp3 - Reduce operation downtimes”; and “BPerImp7 - Improve the quantities of our product”. When the meaning of BPerImp2 and BPerImp3 are considered, these two items are less relevant in the context of agri-food.

With regard to mediators, all the original indicators were retained. The three mediators are Goal Congruence (GoalCon), Role Integrity (RoIn) and Long-term orientation (Lgterm), and each construct comprises four indicators.

5.3.2.3 Common method variance

In addition to procedural remedies for Common Method Bias (CMB), Study 2 employs two post-hoc statistical tests to assess common method variance (CMV) as discussed in Section 4.6.4

Harman’s single-factor test is conducted by including all items from the measurement model into an EFA in order to extract a single factor (e.g., Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000). An alternative method is to use CFA to test the hypothesis that a common latent factor can account for every variance in the dataset (Iverson and Maguire, 2000). The result of Harman’s single-factor test in EFA (*Appendix H.7*) reveals six factors with an eigen value above 1, and the first simply accounts for 26.193% of the total variance. The CFA test for the common latent factor model does not achieve a good fit (c2=2561.138, c2/df=5.604, CFI=0.522, TLI=0.481, SRMR=0.188, RMSEA=0.151, pclose=0.000). The EFA and CFA results indicate that the study did not experience a CMV issue.

Table 5.10 - Retained indicators for final measurement model

Construct	Code	Λ	S.E	*t-value*	*Sig.*
Supplier Development (**SupDev**) α - .879	SupDev1	.714			
	SupDev2	.684	.099	11.058	***
	SupDev3	.580	.084	8.904	***
	SupDev5	.819	.117	10.806	***
	SupDev7	.795	.087	10.813	***
	SupDev8	.773	.077	10.185	***
	SupDev11	.656	.072	8.939	***
	SupDev12	.656	.105	8.941	***
Opportunism **(Opp)** α - .931	Opp1	.829			
	Opp2	.789	.057	16.093	***
	Opp3	.825	.074	13.951	***
	Opp4	.900	.068	15.850	***
	Opp5	.803	.067	13.347	***
	Opp6	.800	.070	13.275	***
Buyer Performance Improvement (**BPerImp**) α - .891	BPerImp1	.674			
	BPerImp4	.721	.112	10.736	***
	BPerImp5	.835	.112	10.417	***
	BPerImp6	.839	.116	10.454	***
	BPerImp8	.736	.144	9.371	***
	BPerImp9	.777	.125	9.813	***
Goal Congruence **(GoalCon)** α - .907	GoalCon1	.780			
	GoalCon2	.849	.083	13.242	***
	GoalCon3	.870	.072	13.638	***
	GoalCon4	.882	.076	13.876	***
Role Integrity **(RoIn)** α - .846	RoIn1	.744			
	RoIn2	.908	.069	13.391	***
	RoIn3	.938	.071	13.709	***
	RoIn4	.589	.088	8.364	***
Long-term Orientation **(Lgterm)** α - .869	Lgterm1	.659			
	Lgterm2	.749	.096	11.424	***
	Lgterm3	.919	.137	10.376	***
	Lgterm4	.786	.115	9.586	***

Additionally, the CFA marker technique test was performed following the procedure of Williams et al. (2010), using *Mood* as the marker. Different models were built, including the CFA model, the Baseline model, and the Method-C, Method-U and the Method-R models. The CFA model includes a complete set of correlations between substantive latent variables (SupDev, Opp, BPerImp, GoalCon, RoIn, Lgterm) and marker variables (Mood). In the Baseline model, the six substantive latent variables are correlated with each other and with the statistically independent marker variable with its indicator having fixed factor loadings and error variances to the estimation of the marker variable in the CFA model. Method-C is the Baseline model with an additional constraint factor loading (forced to be equal) from the marker latent variable to all indicators of the substantive variables. Method-U is identical to Method-C, except that the factor loading from the marker latent variable is set to be free. Finally, the Method-R resembles the model of that name with additional fixed substantive latent variable correlations obtained from the Baseline model. All models achieved a good fit *(Table 5.11).*

The next step is to compare models in order to test the CMV hypotheses. Firstly, the presence of method variance associated with the marker variable is tested by comparing the Baseline model with the Method-C model. Secondly, a model comparison of chi-square difference between the Method-C and Method-U models determines if the impact of the method marker variable was equal for all 32 items loading on the substantive indicators. Finally, the comparison of Method-U and Method-R provides a statistical test to ascertain whether the 15 correlations between substantive variables were significantly biased by the marker variable method effects. The chi-square comparison results in *Table 5.11* indicate no bias in substantive variable relationships due to common method variance.

Table 5.11 - Model Fit indices and model comparison for CFA model with marker variable

Model	χ^2	df	CFI	RMSEA	Comparison	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	χ^2 critical value, 0.05
CFA	805.084	531	0.943	0.05				
Baseline	845.365	543	0.937	0.052				
Method-C	831.606	542	0.939	0.051	vs. Baseline	13.759***	1	3.840
Method-U	783.801	511	0.943	0.051	vs. Method-C	47.805*	31	44.985
Method-R	785.515	526	0.946	0.049	vs. Method-U	1.714	15	24.996
*****p<0.001**	***p<0.05**							

Specifically, the first comparison between the Baseline model and the Method-C yields a chi-square difference of 13.759 with one degree of freedom. This exceeds the 0.05 chi-square critical value for one degree of freedom of 3.84, thereby supporting the presence of common method variance associated with the marker variable. The chi-square difference in the Method-C model and the Method-U model is 47.805 with 31 degrees of freedom which exceeds the 0.05 critical value of 44.985, indicating that the presence of the CMV is not equal for all indicators. Lastly, the Method-R model does not statistically differ from Method-U because of the insignificant chi-square difference of 1.714 at 15 degrees of freedom. This result concluded that the effects of the marker variable did not cause any significant bias factor to correlation estimates.

The results of Harman's single-factor test and marker variable test for CMV demonstrated that Common Method Bias is unlikely to be detrimental to this study.

5.3.3 The Structural Model

5.3.3.1 Overview of the structural model

The conceptual model for testing includes two direct effects between the independent variable supplier development initiatives and two dependent variables (buyer performance improvement and supplier opportunism). There are three mediation effects of goal congruence, role integrity, and long-term orientation on the relationships between supplier development initiatives and buyer performance improvement and supplier opportunism. Therefore, a baseline path structure model and three path structure mediation effect models were built for examination and are represented in *figure 5.2 to 5.5. Figure 5.2* shows the baseline model with the result of direct effect standardised regression weights and the significance of the structural paths. *Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5* illustrate path structural mediation effects for goal congruence (model 1), role integrity (model 2), and long-term orientation (model 3) respectively, also with the direct effect and indirect effect standardised regression weights, and the significance of the structural paths.



Figure 5.2 - Path structure direct effects (baseline model)

Model 1



Figure 5.3 - Path structure model for the mediation effect of Goal Congruence (Model 1)

Model 2



Figure 5.4 - Path structure model for the mediation effect of Role Integrity (Model 2)



Figure 5.5 - Path structure model for the mediation effect of Long-term Orientation (Model 3)

The evaluation of the structural models includes an examination of the significance of the structural paths and model fit. *Table 5.12* presents the model fit for the four path structure models, which achieved a good fit. While the type of supplier (i.e., cooperative) does not have any significant effect on either buyer performance improvement or supplier opportunism, the duration of the supplier-buyer relationship and the type of certificate that the supplier possesses significantly effect supplier opportunism and buyer performance improvement respectively. Specifically, longer relationships between the supplier and buyer reduce supplier opportunism and VietGAP certification affects negatively buyer performance improvement.

Table 5.12 - Model fit indices for path structure models

Model	Path structure	χ^2	Df	χ^2/df	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA	PClose
Baseline	**SupDev->Opp** **SupDev->BPerImp**	310.495	212	1.465	0.961	0.059	0.048	0.612
1	**SupDev -> GoalCon->Opp** **SupDev->GoalCon->BPerImp**	490.873	303	1.620	0.942	0.060	0.055	0.164
2	**SupDev->RoIn->Opp** **SupDev->RoIn->BPerImp**	506.370	303	1.671	0.936	0.070	0.058	0.081
3	**SupDev->Lgterm->Opp** **SupDev->Lgterm->BPerImp**	434.390	302	1.438	0.957	0.056	0.046	0.720

Cut-off value: χ^2/df - between 1 and 3, CFI >0.90, SRMR<0.08, RMSEA<0.06, PClose>0.05
Baseline model includes one independent variable, two dependent variables and three control variables.
Model 1 adds GoalCon as a mediator to the baseline model.
Model 2 adds RoIn as a mediator to the baseline model.
Model 3 adds Lgterm as a mediator to the baseline model.

5.3.3.2 Hypothesis testing

Table 5.13 presents the results relating to the direct effects. Hypothesis 1 proposed that supplier development *positively affects* buyer performance, and this is supported (β=0.328, p<0.001). Hypothesis 2 proposed that supplier development *increases* supplier opportunism, and this is also supported (β=0.152, p<0.05). Taken together, the results thus confirm that supplier development both simultaneously creates positive and negative outcomes.

Table 5.13 - Results of direct effect testing

			B	β	S.E.	t	P
BPerImp	<---	**SupDev**	.144	.328	.036	4.029	***
Opp	<---	**SupDev**	.210	.152	.106	1.975	.048
BPerImp	<---	SupTyp	.046	.035	.090	.510	.610
Opp	<---	SupTyp	-.277	-.067	.293	-.944	.345
BPerImp	<---	Certificate	-.231	-.162	.100	-2.321	.020
Opp	<---	Certificate	.516	.115	.320	1.615	.106
BPerImp	<---	SupDur	.048	.112	.030	1.595	.111
Opp	<---	SupDur	-.285	-.213	.098	-2.914	.004

B= unstandardised regression weight, β = standardised regression weigh, S.E.= standard error, t = t value, p= p value

The conceptual model proposes that three factors (goal congruence, role integrity, and long-term orientation) mediate the relationships between supplier development and two outcomes, namely buyer performance improvement and supplier opportunism. As discussed above, the effect for each mediator was examined separately and mediation effects were tested with the bias-corrected bootstrap technique of 2,000 resamples. *Table 5.14* presents the mediation results.

Table 5.14 - Results of mediation effects

Path structure	Direct β w/o mediation	Direct β with mediation^	Indirect β	Mediation type observed
SupDev->GoalCon->BPerImp	.144***	.053ns	.322***	Full
SupDev -> GoalCon->Opp	.210*	.262**	-.118**	Partial
SupDev->RoIn->BPerImp	.144***	.360**	-.011ns	No mediation
SupDev->RoIn->Opp	.210*	.082ns	.030ns	No mediation
SupDev->Lgterm->BPerImp	.144***	.109ns	.245***	Full
SupDev->Lgterm->Opp	.210*	.229**	-.077**	Partial

*** p<0.001   ** p<0.01   *p<0.05   ns - not significant   ^ - bias-corrected bootstrap estimated

Hypothesis 3a proposes that goal congruence mediates the impact of supplier development on buyer performance improvement, so that supplier development increases goal congruence which in turn increases buyer performance. There is a significant positive relationship between supplier development and goal congruence (β=0.484, p<0.001) and a significant positive relationship between goal congruence and buyer performance improvement (β=0.666, p<0.001), as detailed in *Figure 5.3*. The indirect effect of supplier development on buyer performance improvement through the mediator goal congruence was positive (*β*=0.322, *p*<0.001). The standardised direct effect of supplier development on buyer performance changed from significant (*β*=0.328, p<0.001) to non-significant when goal congruence was added as a mediator. This indicates that goal congruence fully mediates the relationship between supplier development and buyer performance. These findings support Hypothesis 3a.

Hypothesis 3b suggests that goal congruence mediates the impact of supplier development on supplier opportunism, so that supplier development increases goal congruence which in turn decreases opportunism. The direct path from goal congruence to supplier opportunism is negative (*β*=-0.245, *p*<0.01), indicating that goal congruence decreases supplier opportunism. The result of bias-corrected bootstrap estimation shows that the indirect effect of supplier development on opportunism through the mediation of goal congruence was also significantly negative (β=-.118, *p*<0.01). The standardised regression of the direct effect of supplier development on supplier opportunism remains significant but changes in its weight when goal congruence is included as a mediator, indicates partial mediation. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is partially supported. Specifically, supplier development increases goal congruence between supplier and buyer, which in turn reduces supplier opportunism.

Hypothesis 4a advances that role integrity mediates the impact of supplier development on buyer performance improvement, so that supplier development increases role integrity which in turn increases buyer performance. The results indicate no significant indirect effect of supplier development on buyer performance improvement through the presence of role integrity. There is also no significant effect of supplier development on role integrity *(Figure 5.4)*. Thus, Hypothesis 4a is rejected.

Hypothesis 4b argues that role integrity mediates the impact of supplier development on supplier opportunism, so that supplier development increases role integrity which in turn decreases opportunism. However, like Hypothesis 4a, Hypothesis 4b is rejected. There is no significant indirect effect; thus, no mediation occurs.

Hypothesis 5a proposes that a supplier’s long-term orientation mediates the impact of supplier development on buyer performance, so that supplier development increases long-term orientation which in turn improves buyer performance. The direct effect of supplier development on long-term orientation is significant (*β*=0.423, *p*<0.001), and the direct effect of long-term orientation on buyer performance improvement is also significant (*β*=0.580, *p*<0.001), as *Figure 5.5* indicates.

Supplier development also has a significant indirect effect (β=0.245, p<0.001) on buyer performance improvement through the mediation of long-term orientation. The direct effect of supplier development on buyer performance was significant (β=0.328, p<0.001) but becomes non-significant when adding long-term orientation as a mediator, indicating full mediation. The findings, thus, support Hypothesis 5a.

Finally, Hypothesis 5b suggests that a supplier's long-term orientation mediates the impact of supplier development on supplier opportunism, so that supplier development increases long-term orientation which in turn decreases opportunism. Long-term orientation has a statistically significant direct effect on opportunism (β=-0.182, p<0.05) and the indirect effect of supplier development on supplier opportunism is negative (β=-0.077, p<0.05). With long-term orientation as a mediator, the direct effect of supplier development on supplier development changes significantly (β=0.229, p<0.01). The results indicate that long-term orientation partly mediates the relationship between supplier development and opportunism. Thus, Hypothesis 5b is supported. When buyers engage their suppliers in supplier development initiatives, the supplier's long-term orientation increases, and this in turn reduces the likelihood of supplier opportunism.

5.3.3.3 Summarise of hypotheses testing results

Table 5.15 summarises the hypotheses testing results for the study. Of the eight proposed hypotheses, four hypotheses (H1, H2, H3a, H5a) are fully supported. Two hypotheses (H3b and H5b) are partially supported for the mediating role of goal congruence and long-term orientation to the effect of supplier development on opportunism. The analysis results rejected two hypotheses (H4a, H4b) regarding mediating role of Role integrity.

Table 5.15 - Summary of the hypothesis testing results

	Hypothesis	Result
H1	Supplier development *positively affects* buyer performance.	Supported
H2	Supplier development *increases* the likelihood of supplier opportunism	Supported
H3a	Goal congruence mediates the impact of supplier development on buyer performance improvement	Supported
H3b	Goal congruence mediates the impact of supplier development on supplier opportunism	Partly supported
H4a	Role integrity mediates the impact of supplier development on buyer performance improvement	Rejected
H4b	Role integrity mediates the impact of supplier development on supplier opportunism	Rejected
H5a	Supplier long term orientation mediates the impact of supplier development on buyer performance improvement	Supported
H5b	Supplier long term orientation mediates the impact of supplier development on supplier opportunism	Partly supported

Chapter 6. DISCUSSION

6.1 Chapter Introduction

Following the data analysis for both studies in the previous chapter, this chapter discusses the studies' findings and results. Section 6.1 discusses the thematic analysis and fsQCA results from study 1, while section 6.2 discusses the hypothesis testing results from study 2.

Table 6.1 below summaries the main discussion points of the thesis's findings in relation to the existing body of knowledge. The first column shows the names of authors. The next column presents the discussion and findings of the published research. Finally, how the present research relates to the published studies is shown in the last column.

Table 6.1- Summary of main discussion

Study	Past research's findings and discussion	This research's findings in relation with past research
Glavee-Geo (2019) **Ghijsen et al. (2010)** **Agan et al. (2016)** **Mahapatra et al. (2012)** **Nagati and Rebolledo (2013)**	Supplier development activities contribute significantly to supplier performance and supplier satisfaction.	Supplier development measures may be required to improve supplier performance, but there is the risk of increasing the likelihood of opportunism.
Handfield et al. (2000); **Krause et al. (2007)**; **Sánchez-Rodríguez (2009)**; **Wagner (2011)**	Supplier development is broadly defined, including different types of supplier activities such as supplier assessment and feedback, the use of supplier incentives, competitive pressure, and supplier training and investment.	Unlike past research that consider supplier development broadly, this research identified six forms of supplier development initiatives that are often employed by buyers in the fruit and vegetable supply chain in Vietnam.
Wagner (2010)	Supplier development is divided into direct and indirect activities.	
Sánchez-Rodríguez et al. (2005)	Supplier development is examined under three clusters: basic, moderate, and advanced supplier development.	
Jap and Anderson (2003)	Use the concept of low-stakes opportunism when rapport is high. This concept challenged the general assumption of TCT that opportunism is motivated by the anticipation of obtaining a large payoff.	This research identified six specific forms of opportunistic behaviours that could happen in the fruit and vegetable supply chain in Vietnam instead of treating opportunism as a general term.
Liu et al. (2014)	Consider opportunism in strong and weak forms in the examination of a firm's transaction specific investment.	
Skowronski et al. (2020)	Examine two forms of perceived opportunism (perceived poaching and shirking).	

Li et al. (2017b)	Supplier development promotes long-term collaboration relationships, thus, reduces outsourcing opportunism risk. Suppliers have less desire to act opportunistically in the case of receiving supplier development from buyers.	The result contrasts with the findings of Li et al. (2017b), showing that supplier development could foster opportunistic behaviour amongst suppliers. However, it helps promote the long-term orientation of suppliers, thus, it reduces the likelihood of suppliers acting opportunistically.
Hawkins et al. (2008)	Attempting to eliminate opportunistic behaviour entirely may be less advantageous than setting tolerance limits for it.	The research is in-line with those arguments, supporting that norms of opportunism exist while buyers employ supplier development initiatives.
	Norms of opportunism may be more common in buyer-supplier relationships involving non-critical indirect spending that can leverage purchase.	Study 1 shows that more strategic purchases require supplier development. Both suppliers and buyers use a decision logic that considers long-term, total cost trade-offs caused by the opportunism to expect some sort of opportunistic behaviours.
Gu et al. (2021) **Luzzini and Ronchi (2016)**	The positive direct association between supplier development and firm performance is not always evident.	This research finding is consistent with the findings that supplier development improves the buyer's performance. It also shows relational norms such as goal congruence and long-term orientation positively mediate this relationship.
Humphreys et al. (2004) **Carr and Kaynak (2007)** **Cousins and Lawson (2007)** **Li et al. (2017b)**	Identify a positive direct relationship between supplier development and firm performance.	
Chowdhury et al. (2016)	Discusses that not only short-term but long-term business partners may also engage in opportunism. Relational norms do not always reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour.	FSqCA evidence indicates that the combinations of supplier development measures and relational norms that lead to opportunism are varied. Ensuring the complete absence of opportunism from supplier development is very difficult to achieve.
Hawkins et al. (2010)	Relational norms may determine relationship outcomes.	Evidence contributes to the literature that the impact of relational norms can be either positive or negative, depending on the nature of the norms.

The next sections extend the table, and critically reflects on how study 1 and study 2 of this research link with the current literature.

6.2 Discussion of Findings from Study 1

Study 1 identified six forms of supplier development initiatives that are often employed by buyers in the fruit and vegetable supply chain in Vietnam, namely: providing physical inputs, training farmers, assessment and feedback, providing supplier with incentives, cash support, and supplier guaranteed sales. This research is the first to identify specific types of supplier development that are employed by buyers in agri-food supply chain. Past research intensively investigated antecedents of opportunism in supply chain and how to mitigate it (Yang et al., 2018), but the previous research often based on the definition of opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1985, p. 47) without considering the actual forms of opportunism that may arise. Jap et al. (2013) identified the concept of low-stakes opportunism when rapport is high, which challenged the general assumption of TCT that opportunism is motivated by the anticipation of obtaining a large payoff. Strong and weak form of opportunism was also considered as the consequences of a firm's transaction specific investment (Liu et al., 2014). This study established six particular forms of opportunism arising from specific supplier development initiatives. They are 'do not use inputs provided', 'sell product to others', 'cheating on product quality', 'cheating on product quantity', 'mix product', and 'money wrongly used'. Moreover, relational norms, including norms of opportunism, buyer's trust worthiness, buyer's good reputation, contribute to the likelihood of supplier opportunism.

Opportunism is the central argument of TCT in which Williamson (1985) admitted that allowing some degree of opportunism could be less costly than sacrificing benefit. Thus, attempting to eliminate opportunistic behaviour entirely may be less advantageous than setting tolerance limit for it (Hawkins et al., 2008). As suggested by Hawkins et al. (2008), some organisations are willing to act opportunistically under specific circumstances, while others will opt to tolerate opportunism in order to keep the trade relationship going. Study 1 is in-line with those argument, supporting that norms of opportunism exist while buyers employ supplier development initiatives. This offers a foundation for the exchange partners to plan in advanced to negotiate in a manner that is suited to their unique circumstances (Blois, 2006). Although Hawkins et al. (2008) suggested that norms of opportunism may be more common in buyer-supplier relationship involving non-critical indirect spent can leverage purchase, study 1 found that even with more strategic purchases that needs to involve supplier development, both suppliers and buyers use a decision logic that takes into account long-term, total cost trade-offs caused by the opportunism (Hawkins et al., 2008) to expect some sort of opportunistic behaviours.

fsQCA based analysis indicates that the combinations of supplier development measures and relational norms that lead to opportunism are varied. The presence of norms of opportunism increases the likelihood of opportunism, regardless of whether the buyer provides a range of supplier development measures. This suggests that the prevalence of opportunism will vary across markets and countries, depending on the incidence of such norms of opportunism. Consequently, the implementation of supplier development initiatives may have very different outcomes when applied in different contexts. As recognised by Chowdhury et al. (2016), even long-term business partners may engage in opportunism. Moreover, not all relational norms have the effect of reducing the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour. While, as noted by Hawkins et al. (2010), relational norms may determine relationship outcomes, their impact can be either positive or negative depending on the nature of the norms.

The data for Vietnam suggests that ensuring the complete absence of opportunism from supplier development initiatives is very difficult to achieve. In this case, it only emerges in the absence of norms of opportunism when buyers provide merely advice. While the latter conditions may ensure the absence of opportunism, advice to suppliers alone may be insufficient to improve substantially the quality and quantity of their output. More direct supplier development measures may be required to achieve this (Krause et al., 2007), but they involve the downside of increasing the likelihood for opportunism (e.g., for using credit or physical inputs for ulterior uses).

The complexity of the knowledge transferred to suppliers through training leads to multiple forms of opportunism. Firstly, training may increase compliance costs that suppliers need to pay in order to apply what they had been trained. Hence, suppliers may disregard what they have learnt, especially in a market that is characterised by variable standards like the fresh fruit and vegetable supply chain in Vietnam. Secondly, the impossibility of buyers evaluating fully what they procure leads to suppliers subverting the buyer's assessment criteria in ways that are less costly for them. Thirdly, the offer of guaranteed sale prices provides certainty for suppliers operating in markets characterised by high price volatility (Romsdal et al., 2011). However, guaranteed prices for a later date will not always be in the favour of suppliers, when it actually comes to the sale. Hence, they often only keep to the contracted terms when the agreed price is favourable at a given time compared against market or spot rates. Hence, the study finds that:

Proposition 1: *Supplier development initiatives can lead to supplier opportunism, but such an outcome is not certain.*

Proposition 2: *Depending on their constituent parts, particular bundles of supplier development measures increase and decrease the likelihood of supplier opportunism.*

Previous research, informed by social exchange theory, establishes that relational norms can reduce opportunism directly or indirectly (Paswan et al., 2017). Many studies consider relational norms as common, positive values, priorities, and rules shared by suppliers and buyers (Elommal et al., 2019). By contrast, study 1 analysis finds that norms of opportunism permit opportunistic behaviour by suppliers and buyers arising from supplier development efforts. Specifically, there is a shared expectation of relationship partners that suppliers act to a degree opportunistically and a 'zone of tolerance' exists. If buyers had a zero-tolerance policy of opportunism, they would refuse to deal with suppliers that did not abide fully by all the terms and conditions of every contract. In the context of Vietnam, however, this would limit substantially their ability to source raw material, thus, imperilling their overall business. A pragmatic outlook prevails, that tolerates a degree of opportunistic behaviour buttressing the survival of norms of opportunism. Not all relational norms are, therefore, positive in terms of supporting contractual compliance. They may lead to supplier development initiatives having disappointing outcomes. Consequently:

Proposition 3: *Norms of opportunism, if present, override supplier development initiatives and other positive relational norm(s), and increase the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour.*

6.3 Discussion of Study's 2 Analysis

The quantitative study tests eight hypotheses, relating to the relationship between supplier development and its outcomes. The first two hypotheses suggest that supplier development can have direct effects on both buyer performance improvement and supplier opportunism. Both are supported. The mediation hypotheses consider the role of goal congruence, role integrity, and long-term orientation in the relationship between supplier development and buyer performance, on the one hand, and supplier development, on the other. The results show that supplier development leads to goal congruence and long-term orientation. In turn, these two relational norms increase buyer performance and decrease the likelihood of supplier opportunism. Role integrity is not affected by supplier development. The hypotheses that mediate the relationship between supplier development and buyer performance improvement as well as supplier opportunism are rejected.

H1 proposes that supplier development directly leads to buyer performance improvement. Although some researchers indicated that the positive direct association between supplier development and firm performance is not always evident (Luzzini and Ronchi, 2016; Gu et al., 2021), this study's result is in line with previous research in the literature that showed a positive direct relationship between supplier development and firm performance (e.g., Humphreys et al., 2004; Carr and Kaynak, 2007; Cousins and Lawson, 2007; Li et al., 2017b). For example, Humphreys et al. (2004) found that supplier development affects positively and significantly performance in their study of 142 manufacturing firms in Hong Kong. Supplier development practices significantly contribute to the prediction of purchasing performance (Sánchez-Rodríguez et al., 2005), and outsourcing performance (Li et al., 2017b). Similarly, Carr and Kaynak (2007) found that supplier development improves a buyer's performance although the impacts may vary depending on the measure of performance (i.e., financial performance, product quality improvement). The mixed results in the literature might reflect the inconsistent ways of bundling supplier development initiatives (Carr et al., 2008) and the various performance types investigated.

H2 is supported, showing that supplier development enhances the likelihood of supplier opportunism. This result is consistent with the empirical findings from Tran et al. (2021). It also supports Huo et al. (2016b), who identified that supplier-buyer collaborative activities could potentially stimulate supplier opportunism. However, the result is different from the findings of Li et al. (2017b), who suggested supplier development reduce opportunistic behaviour of suppliers, hence, improve the buyer outsourcing performance. Interestingly, the authors discussed that supplier development contributes to long-term collaboration between supplier and buyer, hence this collaborative help reduce suppliers' desire to act opportunistically which is evidence by this study. Hence, this study indicates that supplier development makes buyers more vulnerable to opportunism.

A key question for buyers is how they can reap supplier development benefits to improve their performance and reduce the likelihood that supplier development leads to supplier opportunism. In response to this, the study investigates three potential mediators of the relationship: goal congruence, long term orientation and role integrity. H3a, b and H5a, b consider the mediating role of goal congruence and long-term orientation in the relationship between supplier development and its outcomes, and all are supported. The results are similar to those of Blonska et al. (2013) who suggested that supplier development does not automatically bring benefits to suppliers and buyers, rather relational capitals 'bridge' supplier development and supplier-buyer benefits. Supplier development helps to shape mutual goals between buyers and suppliers, thus, increasing buyer performance and decreasing the likelihood of supplier opportunism. When supplier development initiatives such as monitoring or supplier incentives are employed separately, goal congruence may not facilitate the linkage between the initiatives and exchange outcomes (Maestrini et al., 2018). By contrast, goal congruence acts as a bridge between bundling supplier development and performance outcomes and suppliers' negative behaviours. Moreover, supplier development initiatives encourage suppliers to sacrifice short-term benefits to pursue long-term advantages of the relationship. Therefore, it reduces the chance of the supplier acting opportunistically, and helps buyers achieve better performance. Previous research consider the role of buyer's long-term commitment on a buyer's performance within buyer-supplier relationships (Krause et al., 2007) and the mediating role of long-term orientation in the relationship between satisfaction of exchange history and supplier opportunism (Lui and Ngo, 2012). This study extends the body of knowledge in term of the role of long-term orientation in supplier-buyer relationship by considering those from perceived supplier side.

Hypotheses related to role integrity (H4a,b) are not supported. The empirical evidence does not support that supplier development leads to mutual expectations beyond the simplicity of buying and selling products such as expectations of proactive information sharing, interactions between partners at multilevel, bilateral coordination, and that partners are diligent and honest with each other (Brown et al., 2000). An interpretation of this could be supplier development initiatives, while helping clarify the mutual goals between suppliers and buyers, do not necessarily lead to other expectations beyond exchange transaction. A consideration of the items that comprise the role integrity construct of Paswan et al. (2017), indicates that they largely relate to complexity (e.g., 'The exchange relationship with supplier X creates a complex web of expectations between us over all kinds of issues' and 'The exchange relationship with supplier X is extremely complicated'). Supplier development may not always create greater complexity – training, advice, and guaranteed sales can be relatively straightforward. Moreover, complexity *per se* may not make positive or negative outcomes more or less likely. Sometimes complex relationships regarding product development can be in the best interests of both parties but will not always be merited. Rather than seeing role complexity as always good or bad, the evidence suggests that goal congruence and long-term orientation are more important in understanding supplier development outcomes.

Chapter 7. **CONCLUSION**

7.1 Summary of the Thesis

This thesis investigates the impacts of supplier development efforts on supplier opportunism and the effect of relational norms on the relationship between supplier development and supplier opportunism. Using a mixed-method approach, the research investigates three research questions: (1) *to what extent, and under what circumstances, do supplier development initiatives curb and/or stimulate supplier opportunism?, (2) how do relational norms affect the relationship between supplier development and opportunism in supply chains?* and (3) *how do relational norms facilitate the positive outcomes (i.e., performance improvement) and negative outcomes (i.e., opportunism) of supplier development initiatives?*

Supplier development has a potential dark-side, which study 1 addresses through two questions. The first question considers the extent to which, and in what forms, supplier development initiatives may trigger opportunism. The second research question concerns how relational norms affect the relationship between supplier development initiatives and supplier opportunism. The study documents six types of opportunism that potentially arise from different supplier development initiatives. The findings also highlight five combinations of the presence and absence of supplier development measures and relational norms that are likely to lead to opportunistic behaviour. Norms of opportunism provides a new dimension to the concept of relational norms. This recognises that relational norms may also have a dark-side and, in some contexts, supply chain participants expect and tolerate a degree of opportunistic behaviour. Consequently, norms of opportunism may coexist alongside and override more positive aspects of relational norms that reduce the likelihood of supplier development initiatives, triggering supplier opportunism.

Study 2 integrates relational factors into the relationship between supplier development and its outcome, recognise both ‘win-win’ and ‘win-lose’ situation of supplier development to answer the third research question. The study supports the generalisation of study 1 findings that supplier development can lead to supplier opportunism and reconfirms the possible outcome of supplier development which is to increase buyer performance. SEM based analysis indicate that goal congruence and supplier long-term orientation mediate the relationships between supplier development and buyer performance improvement, on one hand, and supplier opportunism on the other hand.

7.2 Theoretical Contribution

In the context of Vietnam's agri-food supply chains, anecdotal evidence shows that supplier opportunism exists (Nam, 2014a; Nam, 2014b). This thesis is the first to study opportunistic behaviours in this context, employing the lens of Transaction Cost Theory and Social Exchange Theory. The thesis contributes to the knowledge of supplier opportunism and supplier development initiatives in a specific context where legal enforcement is weak.

Firstly, this study provides evidence on a context of weak legal enforcement that validates TCT assumptions (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Specifically, the research considers the 'dark-side' of supplier development initiatives in business relationships. This research recognises supplier development initiatives as a potential source of supplier opportunism. According to TCT, the potential for supplier opportunism is endemic where buyers make relationship-specific investments (Williamson, 1998). This approach informs much of the B2B literature on the topic, with a search for structural solutions in contracting which increase the costs of acting opportunistically to incentivise compliance (Gow et al., 2000). Abosag et al. (2016) identifies that business-to-business relationships may suffer from a dark-side, stemming from asymmetric information (moral hazard, adverse selection of partners) as well as from imprecise contractual agreements. Therefore, opportunism can be a ubiquitous and damaging consequence of business relationships, as Samaha et al. (2011) identified. This is the first study in the literature to identify the supplier development activities employed by buyers, and the specific forms of opportunism that may arise from each, responding to calls to identify the linkages between specific types of supplier development and forms of opportunism (Li et al., 2017b; Salimian et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017).

Secondly, according to TCT, choosing an inappropriate governance mechanism to control business exchanges might lead to opportunism, and TCT assumes hybrid governance structures that integrate include formal mechanisms (e.g., contractual provision, equity arrangements) and informal mechanisms (e.g., information sharing, joint planning) (Heide, 1994) are more efficient in term of minimising transaction costs than market exchange and internal organisation (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). However, this research provides evidence that hybrid governance structures alone do not 'solve' the dark-side of business-to-business relationships. While hybrid structures can offer advantages over market and internal hierarchical arrangements (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), they are not immune to opportunism, especially in the presence of norms of opportunism. The analysis, thus, offers a counterpoint to perspectives which merely focus on the 'win-win' outcomes of hybrid arrangements and the upside of supplier development initiatives.

TCT and other transactional/structural approaches, ignore the importance of social norms in shaping exchange outcomes. The research extends the use of SET in a B2B context by examining the role of relational norms in the relationship between supplier development initiatives and outcomes. The research goes beyond this by using fsQCA to identify the combinations of supplier development initiatives and relational norms that lead to opportunistic behaviour by suppliers and the combinations which avoid such an outcome. Drawing on SET, and its initial focus on inter-personal relationships, the research investigates whether goal congruence, role integrity, and long-term orientation mediate the relationships between supplier development and both positive (improved performance) and negative (supplier opportunism) outcomes. Study 2 finds support for the applicability of SET to the B2B context, in that the extent to which supplier development initiatives are associated with positive or negative consequences depends on the degree of goal congruence and long-term orientation. This insight closes a gap in the literature which mainly focuses on the economic aspects of supplier development under the theoretical lens of TCT and the RBV.

While relational norms are often regarded as positive mechanisms under the theoretical lens of SET, this research is the first to confirm the existence of norms of opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships, which have been overlooked in the literature. Not all relational norms help reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour. Regardless of the supplier development initiatives employed, the presence of norms of opportunism between buyers and suppliers suggests some degree of tolerance to opportunism. The presence of opportunistic norms reinforces the likelihood of opportunistic outcomes. Moreover, not all aspects of relational norms mediate the effect of supplier development initiatives on relationship outcomes. Specifically, this research finds no support for the importance of role integrity as a mediating factor between supplier development and its outcomes. Thus, while relational norms can influence relationship outcomes, depending on the nature of the norms, their impact might be positive or negative (Hawkins et al., 2010).

Buyers make substantial investments in their suppliers through supplier development initiatives, but these do not always pay off. Consequently, there is an interest in supplier opportunism and the factors that decrease its severity (Li et al., 2017b; Skowronski et al., 2020). To date, much of the literature considers either the potential upsides of supplier development initiatives (Gu et al., 2021), and Study 1 addresses this, through a consideration of the downsides of supplier development. Study 2 recognises both the bright- and dark-sides of supplier development initiatives and confirms that supplier development initiatives can help buyers improve their performance but simultaneously also trigger opportunism. This assessment contributes to a more realistic picture of supplier development.

TCT and SET are often employed separately to predict relationship success (Ambrose et al., 2010). The research demonstrates how TCT and SET can be used as complementary theories to explain the dark and bright sides of supplier development initiatives. For instance, buyers may invest in training suppliers to help improve their capabilities and skills. However, this can change the relative dependence between the two parties, as suppliers become more competent (Wang and Yang, 2013). This creates a spill-over effect of supplier development to other buyers, which now regard the trained supplier as a more desirable supply chain partner. Hence, suppliers may receive competitive offers to break commitments with their existing buyer(s). In the presence of norms of opportunism, suppliers may feel that it is acceptable to switch buyers in order to realise greater benefits.

7.3 Managerial Contribution

The empirical findings generate specific recommendations for managers regarding the deployment of supplier development initiatives. Overall, the research provides managers in the fruit and vegetable supply chain with a comprehensive understanding of common practices in supplier development and likely potential consequences.

Managers should be aware that supplier development initiatives can prove counterproductive. Rather than strengthening their supply base, they may exacerbate problems. Managers should evaluate carefully what forms of opportunism could arise from particular supplier development initiatives. In doing so, managers should consider both short and long-run implications. For instance, improving the quality and quantity of a supplier’s output, via supplier development initiatives, may be beneficial to the buyer in the short-term. Yet, they should be cognisant of the fact that this may make the supplier more attractive to other buyers, in the long-run. Consequently, the likelihood of opportunism may increase, and, in this case, managers should strategize how to minimise these medium to long-term threats to their business. For instance, by understanding a supplier’s goals and their costs and benefits from the relationship, the buyer improves their ability to offer supplier support packages that outweigh the supplier’s benefits of opportunistic behaviour.

New local and international buyers should become aware of the norms of opportunism that exist in particular supply chain contexts. Such norms may mean that supplier development measures, which have worked well in one market for the buyer, may not be so successful in other contexts. This is important, particularly considering global supply chains that cut across geographical and cultural boundaries. Since businesses cannot avoid opportunism in all settings when offering supplier development, in a context where norms of opportunism exist, firms should contemplate whether to set some tolerance thresholds for opportunism. In this way, they recognise the existence of the dark-side, but it may be more beneficial to accept some level of opportunism and reap the benefits of supplier development initiatives. This may benefit their business more than trying to combat opportunism completely (Barnes et al., 2010). Alternatively, if firms wish to have zero opportunism from partners, they should consider moving toward vertical integration. Here, firms have greater power to prevent the occurrence of opportunistic behaviours. However, this may be very costly and could represent an unwise opportunism-resources trade-off, taking the use of managerial and financial resources into account. Moreover, vertical integration may not completely mitigate the dark-side of supplier development if employees of the buyer engage in activities that misuse company resources.

Managers should be cognisant of the fact that supplier development initiatives can simultaneously have both positive and negative outcomes, so that they look beyond either solely ‘win-win’ and ‘win-lose’ perspectives which infuse some of the guidance for managers (Bowen and Vitasek, 2018), and rather embrace a more nuanced understanding. Besides recognising the potential upside of supplier development initiatives, buyers should be aware of the linkage with supplier opportunism and consider how they can minimise the likelihood and damage of this outcome.

The research identifies factors that can encourage performance improvements and inhibit supplier opportunism. Given that goal congruence and a supplier’s long-term orientation mediate the relationships between supplier development and outcomes, buyers should focus on supplier development activities that foster these social exchange norms. When deploying supplier development activities, goals should be communicated clearly with specific efforts to identify and resolve any goal conflicts. When launching supplier development initiatives, buyers should explicitly communicate the long-term benefits to suppliers, rather than only focusing on solving a short-term problem that arises from the buyer-supplier relationship. In addition, in an environment that includes many market uncertainties, like the agricultural sector, buyers are advised to select suppliers with matching goals and who are interested in building long-term strategic relationships. Against this background, buyers should screen and then differentiate between suppliers that follow short and long-term perspectives. Buyers often implement screening processes for potential suppliers (Choi and Kim, 2008), and these can benefit from incorporating an assessment of the degree to which goals are mutual and the long-term orientation of suppliers. While these may be more difficult to assess than some aspects like whether a supplier has a particular quality certification, venture capitalists have developed tools to assess relationship fit with potential partners (Faber et al., 2016), which have wider relevance in a B2B context.

7.4 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

While this research contributes to the supplier developed literature, several limitations can guide future research. First, this research explored and verified the existence of opportunistic behaviour in settings, where buyers offer supplier development initiatives and norms of opportunistic behaviour are present. However, governed by an interest in improving supplier development outcomes, this research focuses on social exchange factors that weaken the likelihood of supplier opportunism. Future research could develop a scale to measure norms of opportunism, to better capture this 'dark side' of social exchange and its effect on the outcomes of supplier development.

Second, future researchers are strongly encouraged to explore the finer nuances of opportunism and differentiating strong from weak forms. According to Luo (2006), strong-form opportunism includes actions such as failing to share information, cheating on using joint assets, etc. Weak-form opportunism is defined as self-interest seeking by violating relational norms that are not officially written in any contract, yet are normally understood by all relationship parties, e.g., not honouring verbal promises (Hawkins et al., 2013). This is a fruitful research alley to pursue by future scholars.

The research focuses on fresh fruit and vegetable supply chains within an emerging economy, where there is a culture of tolerating some degree of opportunistic behaviour. Cultural differences between countries may lead to supplier development initiatives having very different effects across markets, meriting further cross-cultural research.

The author was unable to access financial data to precisely discern the effects of supplier development initiatives on either supplier or buyer profitability. Future research consider firm performance would best to have access to financial reports which can provide more subjective evaluation of performance.

This research only captures buyers' assessments regarding their suppliers' behaviours and perceptions. A dyadic investigation, incorporating both buyers and suppliers (Skowronski et al., 2020), could validate the robustness of the conceptual model from the perspective of suppliers. Also, this research exclusively investigated opportunistic behaviour of suppliers, associated with supplier development initiatives. On the basis of relational norms, it would be interesting to explore whether buyers display opportunistic behaviour in this context.

Finally, this research is cross-sectional in nature and may not fully capture the relationship life-cycle (Wagner, 2011) and the dynamics of social exchange. A longitudinal study would capture precisely how changes in the bargaining power of buyers and suppliers affect the level of opportunism and the degree of which norms of opportunism are stable over time. This would also allow for testing propositions regarding how adjustments in buyer power affect commitments to long-term collaboration and relational norms (Wang et al., 2016b). Future research is invited to continue this research’s line of inquiry to shed more light on the dark-side of supplier development.

REFERENCES

Aarts, H. and Dijksterhuis, A. (2003) 'The silence of the library: environment, situational norm, and social behavior', *J Pers Soc Psychol*, 84(1), pp. 18-28.

Abosag, I., Yen, D.A. and Barnes, B.R. (2016) 'What is dark about the dark-side of business relationships?', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 55, pp. 5-9.

Achrol, R.S. and Gundlach, G.T. (1999) 'Legal and social safeguards against opportunism in exchange', *Journal of Retailing*, 75(1), pp. 107-124.

Agan, Y., Kuzey, C., Acar, M.F. and Acikgoz, A. (2016) 'The relationships between corporate social responsibility, environmental supplier development, and firm performance', *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 112, pp. 1872-1881.

Akamp, M. and Muller, M. (2013) 'Supplier management in developing countries', *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 56, pp. 54-62.

Al-Khatib, J.A., Malshe, A., Sailors, J.J. and Clark, I. (2011) 'The impact of deceitful tendencies, relativism and opportunism on negotiation tactics: a comparative study of US and Belgian managers', *European Journal of Marketing*, 45(1-2), pp. 133-152.

Albertus, L., Hans, V. and Geert, D. (2011) 'Reducing opportunistic behaviour through a project alliance', *International Journal of Managing Projects in Business*, 4(4), pp. 660-679.

Aldrovandi, S., Brown, G.D.A. and Wood, A.M. (2015) 'Social norms and rank-based nudging: Changing willingness to pay for healthy food', *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied*, 21(3), pp. 242-254.

Allcott, H. (2011) 'Social norms and energy conservation', *Journal of Public Economics*, 95(9), pp. 1082-1095.

Alsawafi, A., Lemke, F. and Yang, Y. (2021) 'The impacts of internal quality management relations on the triple bottom line: A dynamic capability perspective', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 232, p. 107927.

Ambrose, E., Marshall, D. and Lynch, D. (2010) 'Buyer supplier perspectives on supply chain relationships', *International Journal of Operations & Production Management*, 30(12), pp. 1269-1290.

Anderson, E. and Weitz, B. (1992) 'The Use of Pledges to Build and Sustain Commitment in Distribution Channels', *Journal of Marketing Research*, 29(1), pp. 18-34.

Anderson, J. and Gerbing, D.W. (1988) 'Structural Equation Modeling in practice: a review and recommended two-step approach', *Psychological Bulletin*, 103, pp. 411-423.

Anik, L., Norton, M.I. and Ariely, D. (2014) 'Contingent Match Incentives Increase Donations', *Journal of Marketing Research*, 51(6), pp. 790-801.

Arranz, N. and Arroyabe, J.C.F. (2012) 'Effect of Formal Contracts, Relational Norms and Trust on Performance of Joint Research and Development Projects', *British Journal of Management*, 23(4), pp. 575-588.

Aselage, J. and Eisenberger, R. (2003) 'Perceived organizational support and psychological contracts: a theoretical integration', *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 24(5), pp. 491-509.

Aulakh, P.S. and Gencturk, E.F. (2000) 'International Principal–Agent Relationships: Control, Governance and Performance', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 29(6), pp. 521-538.

Bagozzi, R.P. (1977) 'Structural Equation Models in Experimental Research', *Journal of Marketing Research*, 14(2), pp. 209-226.

Bagozzi, R.P. and Yi, Y. (1991) 'Multitrait-Multimethod Matrices in Consumer Research', *Journal of Consumer Research*, 17(4), pp. 426-439.

Bai, C.G. and Sarkis, J. (2016) 'Supplier development investment strategies: a game theoretic evaluation', *Annals of Operations Research*, 240(2), pp. 583-615.

Barlett, J.E., Kotrlik, J.W. and Higgins, C.C. (2001) 'Organizational research: Determining appropriate sample size in survey research', *Information technology, learning, and performance journal*, 19(1), p. 43.

Barnes, B.R., Leonidou, L.C., Siu, N.Y.M. and Leonidou, C.N. (2010) 'Opportunism as the Inhibiting Trigger for Developing Long-Term-Oriented Western Exporter-Hong Kong Importer Relationships', *Journal of International Marketing*, 18(2), pp. 35-63.

Barney, J. (1991) 'Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage', *Journal of Management*, 17(1), pp. 99-120.

Barney, J.B. (2001) 'Resource-based theories of competitive advantage: A ten-year retrospective on the resource-based view', *Journal of Management*, 27(6), pp. 643-650.

Baron, R.M. and Kenny, D.A. (1986) 'The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations.', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51(6), pp. 1173-1182.

Becker, T.E. (2005) 'Potential Problems in the Statistical Control of Variables in Organizational Research: A Qualitative Analysis With Recommendations', *Organizational Research Methods*, 8(3), pp. 274-289.

Bellemare, M.F. (2010) 'Agricultural extension and imperfect supervision in contract farming: evidence from Madagascar', *Agricultural Economics*, 41(6), pp. 507-517.

Bercovitz, J., Jap, S.D. and Nickerson, J.A. (2006) 'The antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms', *Organization Science*, 17(6), pp. 724-740.

Bergen, M., Dutta, S. and Walker, O.C. (1992) 'Agency Relationships in Marketing - a Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related Theories', *Journal of Marketing*, 56(3), pp. 1-24.

Biesta, G. (2010) '‘This is My Truth, Tell Me Yours’. Deconstructive pragmatism as a philosophy for education', *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 42(7), pp. 710-727.

Blois, K. (2006) 'The Boundaries of the Firm—A Question of Interpretation?', *Industry and Innovation*, 13(2), pp. 135-150.

Blois, K.J. (1990) 'Transaction costs and networks', *Strategic Management Journal*, 11(6), pp. 493-496.

Blois, K.J. and Ivens, B.S. (2006) 'Measuring relational norms: some methodological issues', *European Journal of Marketing*, 40(3/4), pp. 352-365.

Blonska, A., Storey, C., Rozemeijer, F., Wetzels, M. and de Ruyter, K. (2013) 'Decomposing the effect of supplier development on relationship benefits: The role of relational capital', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 42(8), pp. 1295-1306.

Bollen, K.A. (1989) *Structural equations with latent variables*. Oxford, England: John Wiley & Sons.

Bott, G. and Tourish, D. (2016) 'The critical incident technique reappraised: Using critical incidents to illuminate organizational practices and build theory', *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal*, 11(4), pp. 276-300.

Bowen, S. and Vitasek, K. (2018) 'Optimizing value with a win-win supply chain', *Supply Chain Management Review*.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) 'Using thematic analysis in psychology', *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3(2), pp. 77-101.

Brislin, R.W. (1970) 'Back-Translation for Cross-Cultural Research', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 1(3), pp. 185-216.

Brown, J.R., Cobb, A.T. and Lusch, R.F. (2006) 'The roles played by interorganizational contracts and justice in marketing channel relationships', *Journal of Business Research*, 59(2), pp. 166-175.

Brown, J.R., Crosno, J.L. and Dev, C.S. (2009a) 'The Effects of Transaction-Specific Investments in Marketing Channels: The Moderating Role of Relational Norms', *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice*, 17(4), pp. 317-334.

Brown, J.R., Dev, C.S. and Lee, D.J. (2000) 'Managing marketing channel opportunism: The efficacy of alternative governance mechanisms', *Journal of Marketing*, 64(2), pp. 51-65.

Brown, J.R., Grzeskowiak, S. and Dev, C.S. (2009b) 'Using influence strategies to reduce marketing channel opportunism: The moderating effect of relational norms', *Marketing Letters*, 20(2), pp. 139-154.

Brown, J.R., Weaven, S.K., Dant, R.P. and Crosno, J.L. (2016) 'Boosting the effectiveness of channel governance options: The moderationing role of relational norms', *European Journal of Marketing*, 50(1-2), pp. 29-57.

Brown, S.C. and Greene, J.A. (2006) 'The Wisdom Development Scale: Translating the Conceptual to the Concrete', *Journal of College Student Development*, 47(1), pp. 1-19.

Brown, T.A. (2006) *Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research*. New York: New York : Guilford Publications, Inc.

Bryman, A. (2019) *Business research methods*. Fifth edition.. edn. Oxford, United Kingdom

New York, NY : Oxford University Press.

Butterfield, L.D., Borgen, W.A., Amundson, N.E. and Maglio, A.-S.T. (2005) 'Fifty years of the critical incident technique: 1954-2004 and beyond', *Qualitative Research*, 5(4), pp. 475-497.

Byrne, B.M. (2001) *Structural equation modeling with AMOS: basic concepts, applications, and programming*. Mahwah, N.J., London: Mahwah, N.J., London : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Cadilhon, J.-J., Moustier, P., Poole, N.D., Tam, P.T.G. and Fearne, A.P. (2006) 'Traditional vs. Modern Food Systems? Insights from Vegetable Supply Chains to Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam)', *Development Policy Review*, 24(1), pp. 31-49.

Cai, S. and Yang, Z. (2008) 'Development of Cooperative Norms in the Buyer-Supplier Relationship: the Chinese Experience', *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 44(1), pp. 55-70.

Campbell, J.L., Quincy, C., Osserman, J. and Pedersen, O.K. (2013) 'Coding in-depth semistructured interviews: problems of unitization and intercoder reliability and agreement', *Sociological Methods & Research*, 42(3), pp. 294-320.

Caniels, M.C.J. and Gelderman, C.J. (2010) 'The safeguarding effect of governance mechanisms in inter-firm exchange: the decisive role of mutual opportunism', *British Journal of Management*, 21(1), pp. 239-254.

Cannon, J.P., Achrol, R.S. and Gundlach, G.T. (2000) 'Contracts, Norms, and Plural Form Governance', *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 28(2), pp. 180-194.

Cannon, J.P., Doney, P.M., Mullen, M.R. and Petersen, K.J. (2010) 'Building long-term orientation in buyer-supplier relationships: The moderating role of culture', *Journal of Operations Management*, 28(6), pp. 506-521.

Cao, Z. and Lumineau, F. (2015) 'Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation', *Journal of Operations Management*, 33-34, pp. 15-42.

Carr, A.S. and Kaynak, H. (2007) 'Communication methods, information sharing, supplier development and performance', *International Journal of Operations & Production Management*, 27(4), pp. 346-370.

Carr, A.S., Kaynak, H., Hartley, J.L. and Ross, A. (2008) 'Supplier dependence: impact on supplier's participation and performance', *International Journal of Operations & Production Management*, 28(9), pp. 899-916.

Carson, D.J., Gilmore, A., Perry, C. and Gronhaug, K. (2001) *Qualitative marketing research*. London: SAGE.

Carson, S.J., Madhok, A. and Wu, T. (2006) 'Uncertainty, opportunism, and governance: The effects of volatility and ambiguity on formal and relational contracting', *Academy of Management Journal*, 49(5), pp. 1058-1077.

Carsten, Q.S. and Claudius, W. (2010) 'Standards of Good Practice in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-Sets', *Comparative Sociology*, 9(3), pp. 397-418.

Cavusgil, S.T., Deligonul, S. and Zhang, C. (2004) 'Curbing foreign distributor opportunism: An examination of trust, contracts, and the legal environment in international channel relationships', *Journal of International Marketing*, 12(2), pp. 7-27.

Chen, C.-T., Lin, C.-T. and Huang, S.-F. (2006) 'A fuzzy approach for supplier evaluation and selection in supply chain management', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 102(2), pp. 289-301.

Chen, L., Ellis, S.C. and Suresh, N. (2016) 'A supplier development adoption framework using expectancy theory', *International Journal of Operations & Production Management*, 36(5), pp. 592-615.

Chin, W.W. (1998) 'The Partial Least Squares Approach to Structural Equation Modeling', *Modern Methods for Business Research*, 295(2), pp. 295-336.

Chin, W.W., Marcolin, B.L. and Newsted, P.R. (2003) 'A Partial Least Squares Latent Variable Modeling Approach for Measuring Interaction Effects: Results from a Monte Carlo Simulation Study and an Electronic-Mail Emotion/Adoption Study', *Information Systems Research*, 14(2), pp. 189-217.

Choi, T.Y. and Kim, Y. (2008) 'Structural Embeddedness and supplier management: A network perspective', *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 44(4), pp. 5-13 [Online]. Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-493X.2008.00069.x/abstract (Accessed: 01).

Chowdhury, I.N., Gruber, T. and Zolkiewski, J. (2016) 'Every cloud has a silver lining — Exploring the dark side of value co-creation in B2B service networks', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 55, pp. 97-109.

Chung, J.E. (2012) 'When and How Does Supplier Opportunism Matter for Small Retailers' Channel Relationships with the Suppliers?', *Journal of Small Business Management*, 50(3), pp. 389-407.

Cialdini, R.B., Demaine, L.J., Sagarin, B.J., Barrett, D.W., Rhoads, K. and Winter, P.L. (2006) 'Managing social norms for persuasive impact', *Social Influence*, 1(1), pp. 3-15.

Cialdini, R.B. and Goldstein, N.J. (2004) 'Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 55(1), pp. 591-621.

Cialdini, R.B., Kallgren, C.A. and Reno, R.R. (1991) 'A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior', in Zanna, M.P. (ed.) *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. Academic Press, pp. 201-234.

Cialdini, R.B., Reno, R.R. and Kallgren, C.A. (1990) 'A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places.', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56(6), pp. 1015-1026.

Clogg, C.C., Petkova, E. and Shihadeh, E.S. (1992) 'Statistical Methods for Analyzing Collapsibility in Regression Models', *Journal of Educational Statistics*, 17(1), pp. 51-74.

Cole, R. and Aitken, J. (2019) 'Selecting suppliers for socially sustainable supply chain management:post-exchange supplier development activities as pre-selection requirements', *Production Planning & Control*, 30(14), pp. 1184-1202.

Coleman, J.S. (1990) *Foundations of Social Theory*.

Costello, A.B. and Osborne, J. (2005) 'Best practices in exploratory factor analysis: four recommendations for getting the most from your analysis', *Practical assessment, research & evaluation*, 10(7), pp. 1-9.

Cousins, P.D. and Lawson, B. (2007) 'The effect of socialization mechanisms and performance measurement on supplier integration in new product development', *British Journal of Management*, 18(3), pp. 311-326.

Creswell, J.W. (2007) *Qualitative inquiry & research design : choosing among five approaches*. London: Sage.

Creswell, J.W. (2014) *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* 4th edn. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications.

Creswell, J.W. and Clark, V.L.P. (2011) *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Creswell, J.W. and Miller, D.L. (2000) 'Determining Validity in Qualitative Inquiry', *Theory Into Practice*, 39(3), pp. 124-130.

Crilly, D. (2011) 'Predicting stakeholder orientation in the multinational enterprise: A mid-range theory', *Journal of International Business Studies*, 42(5), pp. 694-717.

Cropanzano, R. and Mitchell, M.S. (2005) 'Social Exchange Theory: An Interdisciplinary Review', *Journal of Management*, 31(6), pp. 874-900.

Crosno, J.L. and Dahlstrom, R. (2008) 'A meta-analytic review of opportunism in exchange relationships', *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 36(2), pp. 191-201.

Cuevas, J.M., Julkunen, S. and Gabrielsson, M. (2015) 'Power symmetry and the development of trust in interdependent relationships: The mediating role of goal congruence', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 48, pp. 149-159.

Dahlstrom, R., Haugland, S.A., Nygaard, A. and Rokkan, A.I. (2009) 'Governance structures in the hotel industry', *Journal of Business Research*, 62(8), pp. 841-847.

Das, T.K. and Kumar, R. (2011) 'Regulatory Focus and Opportunism in the Alliance Development Process', *Journal of Management*, 37(3), pp. 682-708.

Das, T.K. and Rahman, N. (2010) 'Determinants of partner opportunism in atrategic alliances: a conceptual framework', *Journal of Business and Psychology*, 25(1), pp. 55-74.

de Ruyter, K. and Scholl, N. (1998) 'Positioning qualitative market research: reflections from theory and practice', *Qualitative market research.*, 1(1), pp. 7-14.

Della Porta, D. and Keating, M. (2008) *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective.* Cambridge: University Press.

Diamantopoulos, A. (2000) *Introducing LISREL: a guide for the uninitiated*. London: London : SAGE.

Donoghue, S. (2000) 'Projective techniques in consumer research', *Journal of Family Ecology and Consumer Sciences*, 20, pp. 47-53.

Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. and Jackson, P. (2015) *Management and Business Research*. 4th edn. London: Sage.

Eckerd, S. and Hill, J.A. (2012) 'The buyer-supplier social contract: information sharing as a deterrent to unethical behaviors', *International Journal of Operations & Production Management*, 32(1-2), pp. 238-255.

Efron, B., & Tibshirani, R. J. (1993) *An Introduction to the Bootstrap*. New York, NY: Chapman & Hall, CRC.

Eldesouky, A., Pulido, A.F. and Mesias, F.J. (2015) 'The Role of Packaging and Presentation Format in Consumers' Preferences for Food: An Application of Projective Techniques', *Journal of Sensory Studies*, 30(5), pp. 360-369.

Eliashberg, J. and Michie, D.A. (1984) 'Multiple Business Goals Sets as Determinants of Marketing Channel Conflict: An Empirical Study', *Journal of Marketing Research*, 21(1), pp. 75-88.

Elommal, N., Manita, R. and Chaney, D. (2019) 'Measuring exchange norms and its impact on satisfaction in a B2C context', *International Journal of Market Research*, 61(3), pp. 302-319.

Elster, J. (1989) 'Social Norms and Economic Theory', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 3(4), pp. 99-117.

Emerson, R.M. (1976) 'Social Exchange Theory', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 2(1), pp. 335-362.

Euromonitor (2021) *Vegetables in Vietnam - Analysis*. Euromonitor.

Faber, J., Castaldi, C. and Muskens, R.W.M. (2016) 'Venture capitalist-induced relational fit and new venture performance: a Dutch biotech comparative case analysis', *Venture Capital*, 18(3), pp. 237-256.

Feilzer, M.Y. (2010) 'Doing Mixed Methods Research Pragmatically: Implications for the Rediscovery of Pragmatism as a Research Paradigm', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 4(1), pp. 6-16.

Ferguson, R.J., Paulin, M. and Bergeron, J. (2005) 'Contractual Governance, Relational Governance, and the Performance of Interfirm Service Exchanges: The Influence of Boundary-Spanner Closeness', *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 33(2), pp. 217-234.

Fombrun, C. (1996) *Reputation: realizing value from the corporate image*. Boston: MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Fornell, C. and Larcker, D.F. (1981) 'Evaluating Structural Equation Models with Unobservable Variables and Measurement Error', *Journal of Marketing Research*, 18(1), pp. 39-50.

Freedman, L.S. and Schatzkin, A. (1992) 'Sample Size for Studying Intermediate Endpoints within Intervention Trials or Observational Studies', *American Journal of Epidemiology*, 136(9), pp. 1148-1159.

Frega, R. (2011) *Introduction*. Washington: Lexington Books.

Friedl, G. and Wagner, S.M. (2012) 'Supplier development or supplier switching?', *International Journal of Production Research*, 50(11), pp. 3066-3079.

Friedl, G. and Wagner, S.M. (2016) 'Supplier development investments in a triadic setting', *Ieee Transactions on Engineering Management*, 63(2), pp. 136-150.

Fuller, C.M., Simmering, M.J., Atinc, G., Atinc, Y. and Babin, B.J. (2016) 'Common methods variance detection in business research', *Journal of Business Research*, 69(8), pp. 3192-3198.

Ganesan, S. (1994) 'Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships', *Journal of Marketing*, 58(2), pp. 1-19.

Garver, M.S. and Mentzer, J.T. (1999) 'Logistics eesearch methods: employing Structural Equation Modeling to test for construct validity', *Journal of Business Logistics*, 20(1), pp. 33-57.

Gençtürk, E.F. and Aulakh, P.S. (2007) 'Norms- and control-based governance of international manufacturer - distributor relational exchanges', *Journal of International Marketing*, 15(1), pp. 92-126.

Geng, R.Q., Mansouri, A. and Aktas, E. (2017a) 'The relationship between green supply chain management and performance: A meta-analysis of empirical evidences in Asian emerging economies', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 183, pp. 245-258.

Geng, R.Q., Mansouri, S.A., Aktas, E. and Yen, D.A. (2017b) 'The role of Guanxi in green supply chain management in Asia's emerging economies: A conceptual framework', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 63, pp. 1-17.

George, D. and Mallery, P. (2011) *SPSS for Windows step by step: a simple guide and reference 18.0 update*. 11th ed.. edn. Boston, MA: Boston, MA : Allyn & Bacon/Pearson.

Gerbing, D.W. and Anderson, J.C. (1992) 'Monte Carlo Evaluations of Goodness of Fit Indices for Structural Equation Models', *Sociological Methods & Research*, 21(2), pp. 132-160.

Ghijsen, P.W.T., Semeijn, J. and Ernstson, S. (2010) 'Supplier satisfaction and commitment: The role of influence strategies and supplier development', *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management*, 16(1), pp. 17-26.

Ghoshal, S. and Moran, P. (1996) 'Bad for practice: a critique of the transaction cost theory', *Academy of Management Review*, 21(1), pp. 13-47.

Gibbons, R. (1999) 'Taking Coase Seriously', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 44(1), pp. 145-157.

Glavee-Geo, R. (2019) 'Does supplier development lead to supplier satisfaction and relationship continuation?', *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management*, 25(3), p. 100537.

GlobalGap (2021) *Cultivating the Future of the Planet*. Available at: https://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/what-we-do/globalg.a.p.-certification/globalg.a.p./.

Goldstein, N.J., Cialdini, R.B. and Griskevicius, V. (2008) 'A room with a viewpoint: Using social norms to motivate environmental conservation in hotels', *Journal of Consumer Research*, 35(3), pp. 472-482.

Goles, T. and Hirschheim, R. (2000) 'The paradigm is dead, the paradigm is dead…long live the paradigm: the legacy of Burrell and Morgan', *Omega*, 28(3), pp. 249-268.

Goo, J., Kishore, R., Rao, H. and Nam, K. (2009) 'The Role of Service Level Agreements in Relational Management of Information Technology Outsourcing: An empirical Study.', *MIS Q.*, 33(1), pp. 119-145.

Gow, H.R., Streeter, D.H. and Swinnen, J.F.M. (2000) 'How private contract enforcement mechanisms can succeed where public institutions fail: the case of Juhocukor a.s', *Agricultural Economics*, 23(3), pp. 253-265.

Gow, H.R. and Swinnen, J.F.M. (2001) 'Private enforcement capital and contract enforcement in transition economies', *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 83(3), pp. 686-690.

Granovetter, M. (1985) 'Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness', *American Journal of Sociology*, 91(November), pp. 481-510.

Gray, D.E. (2013) *Doing research in the real world*. Sage.

Griffith, D.A., Harvey, M.G. and Lusch, R.F. (2006) 'Social exchange in supply chain relationships: The resulting benefits of procedural and distributive justice', *Journal of Operations Management*, 24(2), pp. 85-98.

Griskevicius, V., Cialdini, R.B. and Goldstein, N.J. (2008) 'Applying (and Resisting) Peer Influence', *MIT Sloan Management Review*, 49(2), pp. 84-88.

Grix, J. (2002) 'Introducing Students to the Generic Terminology of Social Research', *Politics*, 22(3), pp. 175-186.

GSO (2019) *Động thái và thực trạng kinh tế - xã hội Việt Nam 2016-2018*.Thống Kê

Gu, V.C., Zhou, B., Cao, Q. and Adams, J. (2021) 'Exploring the relationship between supplier development, big data analytics capability, and firm performance', *Annals of Operations Research*.

Guba, E.G. (1985) 'The Context of Emergent Paradigm Research', in Lincoln, Y.S. (ed.) *Organization Theory and Inquiry: The Paradigm Revolution*. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage.

Guest, G., Bunce, A. and Johnson, L. (2006) 'How Many Interviews Are Enough?:An Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability', *Field Methods*, 18(1), pp. 59-82.

Guide, V.D.R. and Ketokivi, M. (2015) 'Notes from the Editors: Redefining some methodological criteria for the journal', *Journal of Operations Management*, 37, pp. v-viii.

Gundlach, G.T., Achrol, R.S. and Mentzer, J.T. (1995) 'The Structure of Commitment in Exchange', *Journal of Marketing*, 59(1), pp. 78-92.

Guo, S. and Fraser, M.W. (2010) *Prospensity Score Analysis*. London: Sage.

Hahn, C.K., Watts, C.A. and Kim, K.Y. (1990) 'The Supplier Development Program A Conceptual Model, Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management Volume 26, Issue 2', *Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management*, 26(2), pp. 2-7 [Online]. Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-493X.1990.tb00498.x/abstract (Accessed: 01).

Hair, J.F. (2013) *Multivariate data analysis*. Pearson Education.

Hair, J.F. (2017) *A primer on partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM)*. Second edition.. edn. Los Angeles : Sage.

Hair, J.F., Black, W.C., Babin, B.J. and Anderson, R.E. (2010) *Multivariate data analysis: a global perspective*. 7th ed. / Joseph F. Hair ... [et al.].. edn. Essex: Essex : Pearson Education.

Hair, J.F., Ringle, C.M. and Sarstedt, M. (2011) 'PLS-SEM: Indeed a Silver Bullet', *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice*, 19(2), pp. 139-152.

Hair, J.F., Robert, P.B. and David, J.O. (2000) *Marketing Research: A Practical Approach for the New Millenium*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Hair, J.F., William, C.B., Barry, J.B., Rolph, E.A. and Ronald, L.T. (2006) *Multivariate Data Analysis*. 6th edn. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education.

Handfield, R.B., Krause, D.R., Scannell, T.V. and Monczka, R.M. (2000) 'Avoid the pitfalls in supplier development', *Sloan Management Review*, 41(2), pp. 37-+.

Handley, S.M. and Angst, C.M. (2015) 'The impact of culture on the relationship between governance and opportunism in outsourcing relationships', *Strategic Management Journal*, 36(9), pp. 1412-1434.

Handley, S.M. and Benton, W.C. (2012) 'The influence of exchange hazards and power on opportunism in outsourcing relationships', *Journal of Operations Management*, 30(1-2), pp. 55-68.

Hawkins, T., Knipper, M.G. and Strutton, D. (2009) 'Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier Relations: New Insights from Quantitative Synthesis', *Journal of Marketing Channels*, 16(1), pp. 43-75.

Hawkins, T.G., Pohlen, T.L. and Prybutok, V.R. (2013) 'Buyer opportunism in business-to-business exchange', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 42(8), pp. 1266-1278.

Hawkins, T.G., Wittmann, C.M. and Beyerlein, M.M. (2008) 'Antecedents and consequences of opportunism in buyer-supplier relations: research synthesis and new frontiers', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 37(8), pp. 895-909.

Hawkins, T.G., Wittmann, C.M. and Beyerlein, M.M. (2010) 'Antecedents and consequences of opportunism in buyer-supplier relations: Research synthesis and new frontiers', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 39(5), pp. 874-874.

Hayes, A.F. (2018) *Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: a regression-based approach*. Second edition.. edn. New York, N.Y.: New York, N.Y. : Guilford Press.

Heide, J.B. (1994) 'Interorganizational Governance in Marketing Channels', *Journal of Marketing*, 58(1), pp. 71-85.

Heide, J.B. and John, G. (1992) 'Do norms matter in marketing relationships?', *Journal of Marketing*, 56(2), pp. 32-44.

Heide, J.B., Kumar, A. and Wathne, K.H. (2014) 'Concurrent sourcing, governance mechanisms, and performance outcomes in industrial value chains', *Strategic Management Journal*, 35(8), pp. 1164-1185.

Henseler, J., Ringle, C.M. and Sarstedt, M. (2015) 'A new criterion for assessing discriminant validity in variance-based structural equation modeling', *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 43(1), pp. 115-135.

Hernandez-Espallardo, M. and Arcas-Lario, N. (2003) 'The effects of authoritative mechanisms of coordination on market orientation in asymmetrical channel partnerships', *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 20(2), pp. 133-152.

Hill, C.W. (1990) 'Cooperation, opportunism, and the invisible hand: Implications for transaction cost theory', *The Academy of Management Review*, 15(3), pp. 500-513.

Hofer, A.R., Smith, R.J. and Murphy, P.R. (2014) 'Spillover effects of a firm's relationship marketing orientation in the logistics triad', *International Journal of Logistics Management*, 25(2), pp. 270-288.

Hoffmann, W.H., Neumann, K. and Speckbacher, G. (2010) 'The effect of interorganizational trust on make-or-cooperate decisions: Disentangling opportunism-dependent and opportunism-independent effects of trust', *European Management Review*, 7(2), pp. 101-115.

Hong, J.F.L. and Snell, R.S. (2015) 'Knowledge development through co-opetition: A case study of a Japanese foreign subsidiary and its local suppliers', *Journal of World Business*, 50(4), pp. 769-780.

Hu, L.t. and Bentler, P.M. (1999) 'Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives', *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, 6(1), pp. 1-55.

Humphreys, P.K., Cadden, T., Wen-Li, L. and McHugh, M. (2011) 'An investigation into supplier development activities and their influence on performance in the Chinese electronics industry', *Production Planning & Control*, 22(2), pp. 137-156.

Humphreys, P.K., Li, W.L. and Chan, L.Y. (2004) 'The impact of supplier development on buyer-supplier performance', *Omega-International Journal of Management Science*, 32(2), pp. 131-143.

Huo, B., Tian, M., Tian, Y. and Zhang, Q. (2019) 'The dilemma of inter-organizational relationships: Dependence, use of power and their impacts on opportunism', *International Journal of Operations & Production Management*, 39(1), pp. 2-23.

Huo, B.F., Fu, D.J., Zhao, X.D. and Zhu, J.W. (2016a) 'Curbing opportunism in logistics outsourcing relationships: The role of relational norms and contract', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 182, pp. 293-303.

Huo, B.F., Wang, Z.Q. and Tian, Y. (2016b) 'The impact of justice on collaborative and opportunistic behaviors in supply chain relationships', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 177, pp. 12-23.

Huo, B.F., Ye, Y.X. and Zhao, X.D. (2015) 'The impacts of trust and contracts on opportunism in the 3PL industry: The moderating role of demand uncertainty', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 170, pp. 160-170.

Iverson, R.D. and Maguire, C. (2000) 'The Relationship between Job and Life Satisfaction: Evidence from a Remote Mining Community', *Human Relations*, 53(6), pp. 807-839.

Jap, S.D. and Anderson, E. (2003) 'Safeguarding interorganizational performance and continuity under ex post opportunism', *Management Science*, 49(12), pp. 1684-1701.

Jap, S.D., Robertson, D.C., Rindfleisch, A. and Hamilton, R. (2013) 'Low-Stakes Opportunism', *Journal of Marketing Research*, 50(2), pp. 216-227.

Jarillo, J.C. and Ricart, J.E. (1987) 'Sustaining Networks', *Interfaces*, 17(5), pp. 82-91.

John, G. (1984) 'An Empirical Investigation of Some Antecedents of Opportunism in a Marketing Channel', *Journal of Marketing Research*, 21(3), pp. 278-289.

Jöreskog, K.G. (1974) 'Analyzing psychological data by structural analysis of covariance matrices', in *Contemporary Developments in Mathematical Psychology - Volume II*. W.H. Freeman Co., San Fransisco.

Jöreskog, K.G. (1978) 'Structural analysis of covariance and correlation matrices', *Psychometrika*, 43(4), pp. 443-477.

Joshi, A.W. and Arnold, S.J. (1997) 'The impact of buyer dependence on buyer opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships: The moderating role of relational norms', *Psychology & Marketing*, 14(8), pp. 823-845.

Joshi, A.W. and Campbell, A.J. (2003) 'Effect of environmental dynamism on relational governance in manufacturer-supplier relationships: a contingency framework and an empirical test', *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 31(2), pp. 176-188.

Joshi, A.W. and Stump, R.L. (1999) 'Determinants of commitment and opportunism: integrating and extending insights from transaction cost analysis and relational exchange theory', *Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l'Administration*, 16(4), pp. 334-352.

Kallgren, C.A., Reno, R.R. and Cialdini, R.B. (2000) 'A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: When Norms Do and Do not Affect Behavior', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26(8), pp. 1002-1012.

Kang, B. and Jindal, R.P. (2015) 'Opportunism in buyer-seller relationships: Some unexplored antecedents', *Journal of Business Research*, 68(3), pp. 735-742.

Kaufmann, P.J. and Stern, L.W. (1988) 'Relational Exchange Norms, Perceptions of Unfairness, and Retained Hostility in Commercial Litigation', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 32(3), pp. 534-552.

Kaushik, V. and Walsh, C.A. (2019) 'Pragmatism as a Research Paradigm and Its Implications for Social Work Research', *Social Sciences*, 8(9), p. 255.

Kelly, S., Wagner, B. and Ramsay, J. (2018) 'Opportunism in buyer–supplier exchange: a critical examination of the concept and its implications for theory and practice', *Production Planning & Control*, 29(12), pp. 992-1009.

Kent, R. (2007) *Marketing Research: Approaches, Methods, and Applications in Europe*. London: Thomson Learning.

Khan, Z. and Nicholson, J.D. (2014) 'An investigation of the cross-border supplier development process: Problems and implications in an emerging economy', *International Business Review*, 23(6), pp. 1212-1222.

Kim, J. and Mahoney, J.T. (2005) 'Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory an organizational economics approach to strategic management, Managerial and Decision Economics Volume 26, Issue 4', *Managerial and Decision Economics*, 26(4), pp. 223-242 [Online]. Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.1218/abstract (Accessed: 01).

Kirsten, J. and Sartorius, K. (2002) 'Linking agribusiness and small-scale farmers in developing countries: Is there a new role for contract farming?', *Development Southern Africa*, 19(4), pp. 503-529.

Kline, R.B. (2010) *Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, Third Edition*. New York: New York: Guilford Publications.

Krause, D.R. (1997) 'Supplier Development: Current Practices and Outcomes', *International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management*, 33(1), pp. 12-19.

Krause, D.R. and Ellram, L.M. (1997) 'Critical elements of supplier development The buying-firm perspective', *European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management*, 3(1), pp. 21-31.

Krause, D.R., Handfield, R.B. and Scannell, T.V. (1998) 'An empirical investigation of supplier development: reactive and strategic processes', *Journal of Operations Management*, 17(1), pp. 39-58.

Krause, D.R., Handfield, R.B. and Tyler, B.B. (2007) 'The relationships between supplier development, commitment, social capital accumulation and performance improvement', *Journal of Operations Management*, 25(2), pp. 528-545.

Krause, D.R., Ragatz, G.L. and Hughley, S. (1999) 'Supplier development from the minority supplier's perspective', *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 35(3), pp. 33-41.

Krause, D.R. and Scannell, T.V. (2002) 'Supplier development practices: product- and service-based industry comparisons', *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 38(1), pp. 13-21.

Krause, D.R., Scannell, T.V. and Calantone, R.J. (2000) 'A structural analysis of the effectiveness of buying firms' strategies to improve supplier performance', *Decision Sciences*, 31(1), pp. 33-55.

Krupka, E. and Weber, R.A. (2009) 'The focusing and informational effects of norms on pro-social behavior', *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 30(3), pp. 307-320.

Lado, A.A., Dant, R.R. and Tekleab, A.G. (2008) 'Trust-opportunism paradox, relationalism, and performance in interfirm relationships: Evidence from the retail industry', *Strategic Management Journal*, 29(4), pp. 401-423.

Lai, F.J., Tian, Y. and Huo, B.F. (2012) 'Relational governance and opportunism in logistics outsourcing relationships: empirical evidence from China', *International Journal of Production Research*, 50(9), pp. 2501-2514.

Lakemond, N., Berggren, C. and van Weele, A. (2006) 'Coordinating supplier involvement in product development projects: a differentiated coordination typology', *R&D Management*, 36(1), pp. 55-66.

Lambe, C.J., Wittmann, C.M. and Spekman, R.E. (2001) 'Social Exchange Theory and Research on Business-to-Business Relational Exchange', *Journal of Business-to-Business Marketing*, 8(3), pp. 1-36.

Lawson, B., Krause, D. and Potter, A. (2015) 'Improving supplier new product development performance: the role of supplier development', *Journal of Product Innovation Management*, 32(5), pp. 777-792.

Leiblein, M.J. (2003) 'The choice of organizational governance form and performance: Predictions from transaction cost, resource-based, and real options theories', *Journal of Management*, 29(6), pp. 937-961.

Lemke, F., Clark, M. and Wilson, H. (2011) 'Customer experience quality: an exploration in business and consumer contexts using repertory grid technique', *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 39(6), pp. 846-869.

Leonidou, L.C., Aykol, B., Fotiadis, T.A., Christodoulides, P. and Zeriti, A. (2017) 'Betrayal in international buyer-seller relationships: Its drivers and performance implications', *Journal of World Business*, 52(1), pp. 28-44.

Li, M., Zheng, X. and Zhuang, G. (2017a) 'Information technology-enabled interactions, mutual monitoring, and supplier-buyer cooperation: A network perspective', *Journal of Business Research*, 78, pp. 268-276.

Li, S.T., Kang, M. and Haney, M.H. (2017b) 'The effect of supplier development on outsourcing performance: the mediating roles of opportunism and flexibility', *Production Planning & Control*, 28(6-8), pp. 599-609.

Li, W., Humphreys, P.K., Yeung, A.C.L. and Cheng, T.C.E. (2012) 'The impact of supplier development on buyer competitive advantage: A path analytic model', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 135(1), pp. 353-366.

Li, W.L., Humphreys, P., Chan, L.Y. and Kumaraswamy, M. (2003) 'Predicting purchasing performance: the role of supplier development programs', *Journal of Materials Processing Technology*, 138(1-3), pp. 243-249.

Li, W.L., Humphreys, P.K., Yeung, A.C.L. and Cheng, T.C.E. (2007) 'The impact of specific supplier development efforts on buyer competitive advantage: an empirical model', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 106(1), pp. 230-247.

Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G. (1985) *Naturalistic Inquiry*. London: Sage.

Lindell, M.K. and Whitney, D.J. (2001) 'Accounting for Common Method Variance in Cross-Sectional Research Designs', *Journal of applied psychology*, 86(1), pp. 114-121.

Liu, Y., Li, Y. and Zhang, L.N. (2010a) 'Control mechanisms across a buyer-supplier relationship quality matrix', *Journal of Business Research*, 63(1), pp. 3-12.

Liu, Y., Liu, T. and Li, Y. (2014) 'How to inhibit a partner's strong and weak forms of opportunism: Impacts of network embeddedness and bilateral TSIs', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 43(2), pp. 280-292.

Liu, Y., Luo, Y. and Liu, T. (2009) 'Governing buyer–supplier relationships through transactional and relational mechanisms: evidence from China', *Journal of Operations Management*, 27(4), pp. 294-309.

Liu, Y., Su, C.T., Li, Y.A. and Liu, T. (2010b) 'Managing opportunism in a developing interfirm relationship: The interrelationship of calculative and loyalty commitment', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 39(5), pp. 844-852.

Lohmöller, J.-B. (1989) *Latent variable path modeling with partial least squares*. Physica, Heidelberg

Lu, P., Guo, S.P., Qian, L.M., He, P. and Xu, X.Y. (2015) 'The effectiveness of contractual and relational governances in construction projects in China', *International Journal of Project Management*, 33(1), pp. 212-222.

Lui, S.S. and Ngo, H.-Y. (2004) 'The role of trust and contractual safeguards on cooperation in non-equity alliances', *Journal of Management*, 30(4), pp. 471-485.

Lui, S.S. and Ngo, H.-y. (2012) 'Drivers and Outcomes of Long-term Orientation in Cooperative Relationships', *British Journal of Management*, 23(1), pp. 80-95.

Lui, S.S., Wong, Y.-y. and Liu, W. (2009) 'Asset specificity roles in interfirm cooperation: Reducing opportunistic behavior or increasing cooperative behavior?', *Journal of Business Research*, 62(11), pp. 1214-1219.

Luo, Y. (2006) 'Opportunism in Inter-firm Exchanges in Emerging Markets', *Management and Organization Review*, 2(1), pp. 121-147.

Luo, Y.D., Liu, Y., Yang, Q., Maksimov, V. and Hou, J.G. (2015) 'Improving performance and reducing cost in buyer-supplier relationships: The role of justice in curtailing opportunism', *Journal of Business Research*, 68(3), pp. 607-615.

Lusch, R.F. and Brown, J.R. (1996) 'Interdependency, Contracting, and Relational Behavior in Marketing Channels', *Journal of Marketing*, 60(4), pp. 19-38.

Luzzini, D. and Ronchi, S. (2016) 'Cinderella purchasing transformation: linking purchasing status to purchasing practices and business performance', *Production Planning & Control*, 27(10), pp. 787-796.

MacKinnon, D.P., Lockwood, C.M., Hoffman, J.M., West, S.G. and Sheets, V. (2002) 'A comparison of methods to test mediation and other intervening variable effects', *Psychological Methods*, 7(1), pp. 83-104.

Macneil, I. (1980) *The new social contract: An inquiry into modern contractual relations*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Maestrini, V., Luzzini, D., Caniato, F. and Ronchi, S. (2018) 'Effects of monitoring and incentives on supplier performance: an agency theory perspective', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 203, pp. 322-332.

Mahapatra, S.K., Das, A. and Narasimhan, R. (2012) 'A contingent theory of supplier management initiatives: Effects of competitive intensity and product life cycle', *Journal of Operations Management*, 30(5), pp. 406-422.

Mahoney, J. and Goertz, G. (2006) 'A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research', *Political Analysis*, 14(3), pp. 227-249.

Malhotra, D. and Gino, F. (2011) 'The Pursuit of Power Corrupts: How Investing in Outside Options Motivates Opportunism in Relationships', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 56(4), pp. 559-592.

Manolis, C., Harris, M.J. and Whittler, T.E. (1998) 'Expectancy Effects Between Exchange Partners', *Journal of Consumer Psychology (Taylor & Francis Ltd)*, 7(1), p. 49.

MARD (2015) *Report*.

Martin, S. (2012) '98% of HBR Readers Love This Article', *Harvard Business Review*, 90(10), pp. 23-25.

Maruyama, M. and Trung, L.V. (2007) 'Supermarkets in Vietnam: opportunities and obstacles', *Asian Economic Journal*, 21(1), pp. 19-46.

Masterson, S.S., Lewis, K., Goldman, B.M. and Taylor, M.S. (2000) 'Integrating Justice and Social Exchange: The Differing Effects of Fair Procedures and Treatment on Work Relationships', *Academy of Management Journal*, 43(4), pp. 738-748.

Matook, S., Lasch, R. and Tamaschke, R. (2009) 'Supplier development with benchmarking as part of a comprehensive supplier risk management framework', *International Journal of Operations & Production Management*, 29(3-4), pp. 241-267.

Mayer, J.D. and Stevens, A.A. (1994) 'An Emerging Understanding of the Reflective (Meta-) Experience of Mood', *Journal of Research in Personality*, 28(3), pp. 351-373.

McCarter, M.W. and Northcraft, G.B. (2007) 'Happy together? Insights and implications of viewing managed supply chains as a social dilemma', *Journal of Operations Management*, 25(2), pp. 498-511.

Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M. and Saldaña, J. (2019) *Qualitative data analysis: a methods sourcebook*. Fourth edition.. edn. Los Angeles : SAGE.

Mitręga, M. and Zolkiewski, J. (2012) 'Negative consequences of deep relationships with suppliers: An exploratory study in Poland', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 41(5), pp. 886-894.

Mizgier, K.J., Pasia, J.M. and Talluri, S. (2017) 'Multiobjective capital allocation for supplier development under risk', *International Journal of Production Research*, 55(18), pp. 5243-5258.

Modi, S.B. and Mabert, V.A. (2007) 'Supplier development: Improving supplier performance through knowledge transfer', *Journal of Operations Management*, 25(1), pp. 42-64.

Morgan, D.L. (2007) 'Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained:Methodological Implications of Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 1(1), pp. 48-76.

Morgan, D.L. (2014) 'Pragmatism as a Paradigm for Social Research', *Qualitative Inquiry*, 20(8), pp. 1045-1053.

Morgan, N.A., Kaleka, A. and Gooner, R.A. (2007) 'Focal supplier opportunism in supermarket retailer category management', *Journal of Operations Management*, 25(2), pp. 512-527.

Morgan, R.M. and Hunt, S.D. (1994) 'The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing', *Journal of Marketing*, 58(3), pp. 20-38.

Moustier, P., Tam, P.T.G., Anh, D.T., Binh, V.T. and Loc, N.T.T. (2010) 'The role of farmer organizations in supplying supermarkets with quality food in Vietnam', *Food Policy*, 35(1), pp. 69-78.

Nagati, H. and Rebolledo, C. (2013) 'Supplier development efforts: The suppliers' point of view', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 42(2), pp. 180-188.

Nam, H. (2014a) 'Rau ruộng trộn VietGAP', *Thanh Nien*edn). [Online] Available at: https://thanhnien.vn/thoi-su/rau-ruong-tron-vietgap-513283.html (Accessed: 22 Sep 2020).

Nam, H. (2014b) 'Rau ruộng trộn VietGAP - Kỳ 2: Người tiêu dùng bị lừa', *Thanh Nien*edn). [Online] Available at: https://thanhnien.vn/thoi-su/rau-ruong-tron-vietgap-ky-2-nguoi-tieu-dung-bi-lua-513480.html (Accessed: 22 Sep 2020).

Narasimhan, R., Talluri, S. and Mahapatra, S. (2008) 'Effective response to RFQs and supplier development: A supplier's perspective', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 115(2), pp. 461-470.

Noguti, V. and Russell, C.A. (2014) 'Normative Influences on Product Placement Effects: Alcohol Brands in Television Series and the Influence of Presumed Influence', *Journal of Advertising*, 43(1), pp. 46-62.

Nolan, J.M., Schultz, P.W., Cialdini, R.B., Goldstein, N.J. and Griskevicius, V. (2008) 'Normative Social Influence is Underdetected', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 34(7), pp. 913-923.

Noordewier, T.G., John, G. and Nevin, J.R. (1990) 'Performance outcomes of purchasing arrangements in industrial buyer-vendor relationships', *Journal of Marketing*, 54(4), pp. 80-93.

Olkin, I. and Finn, J.D. (1995) ' Correlations redux. ', *Psychological Bulletin*, 118(1), pp. 155–164.

Ott, C.M. and Ivens, B.S. (2009) 'Revisiting the norm concept in relational governance', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 38(6), pp. 577-583.

Oyedijo, A., Yang, Y., Koukpaki, A.S.F. and Mishra, N. (2021) 'The role of fairness in multi-tier sustainable supply chains', *International Journal of Production Research*, pp. 1-25.

Pallant, J. (2010) *SPSS survival manual a step by step guide to data analysis using SPSS*. 4th ed.. edn. Maidenhead: Maidenhead : McGraw-Hill Education.

Pallant, J. (2020) *SPSS survival manual: a step by step guide to data analysis using IBM SPSS*. 7th edition.. edn. Maidenhead : Open University Press : McGraw-Hill.

Parker, B. (2017) 'Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) and Criminology'.

Parker, I. (2005) *Qualitative psychology introducing radical research,* . New York Open University Press.

Paswan, A.K., Hirunyawipada, T. and Iyer, P. (2017) 'Opportunism, governance structure and relational norms: An interactive perspective', *Journal of Business Research*, 77, pp. 131-139.

Patrucco, A.S., Moretto, A., Luzzini, D. and Glas, A.H. (2020) 'Obtaining supplier commitment: antecedents and performance outcomes', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 220, p. 107449.

Paulssen, M., Leischnig, A., Ivens, B.S. and Birk, M.M. (2016) 'Relational norms in customer–company relationships: Net and configurational effects', *Journal of Business Research*, 69(12), pp. 5866-5874.

Pilar, A.L., Elsebeth, H. and Luitzen, d.B. (2012) 'How do supplier development programs affect suppliers?: Insights for suppliers, buyers and governments from an empirical study in Mexico', *Business Process Management Journal*, 18(4), pp. 680-707.

Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B., Lee, J.-Y. and Podsakoff, N.P. (2003) 'Common Method Biases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and Recommended Remedies', *Journal of applied psychology*, 88(5), pp. 879-903.

Polo Redondo, Y. and Cambra Fierro Jesús, J. (2005) 'Moderating effect of type of product exchanged in long-term orientation of firm-supplier relationships: an empirical study', *Journal of Product & Brand Management*, 14(7), pp. 424-437.

Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. (2002) 'Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?', *Strategic Management Journal*, 23(8), pp. 707-725.

Poppo, L., Zhou, K.Z. and Zenger, T.R. (2008) 'Examining the Conditional Limits of Relational Governance: Specialized Assets, Performance Ambiguity, and Long-Standing Ties', *Journal of Management Studies*, 45(7), pp. 1195-1216.

Proch, M., Worthmann, K. and Schluchtermann, J. (2017) 'A negotiation-based algorithm to coordinate supplier development in decentralized supply chains', *European Journal of Operational Research*, 256(2), pp. 412-429.

Ragin, C.C. (1987) *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantiative Strategies*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Ragin, C.C. (2000) *Fuzzy-Set social science.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Ragin, C.C. (2006) 'Set relations in social research: Evaluating their consistency and coverage', *Political Analysis*, 14(3), pp. 291-310.

Ragin, C.C. (2008) *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. London: University of Chicago Press.

Ragin, C.C. (2018) *User's Guide to Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 3.0.* Department of Sociology, University of California.

Reinartz, W., Haenlein, M. and Henseler, J. (2009) 'An empirical comparison of the efficacy of covariance-based and variance-based SEM', *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 26(4), pp. 332-344.

Reio, T.G. and Shuck, B. (2015) 'Exploratory Factor Analysis:Implications for Theory, Research, and Practice', *Advances in Developing Human Resources*, 17(1), pp. 12-25.

Reno, R.R., Cialdini, R.B. and Kallgren, C.A. (1993) 'The transsituational influence of social norms', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 64(1), pp. 104-112.

Rezaei, J., Wang, J. and Tavasszy, L. (2015) 'Linking supplier development to supplier segmentation using Best Worst Method', *Expert Systems with Applications*, 42(23), pp. 9152-9164.

Richardson, H.A., Simmering, M.J. and Sturman, M.C. (2009) 'A Tale of Three Perspectives:Examining Post Hoc Statistical Techniques for Detection and Correction of Common Method Variance', *Organizational Research Methods*, 12(4), pp. 762-800.

Rindfleisch, A., Antia, K., Bercovitz, J., Brown, J.R., Cannon, J., Carson, S.J., Ghosh, M., Helper, S., Robertson, D.C. and Wathne, K.H. (2010) 'Transaction costs, opportunism, and governance: Contextual considerations and future research opportunities', *Marketing Letters*, 21(3), pp. 211-222.

Rindfleisch, A. and Heide, J.B. (1997) 'Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future Applications', *Journal of Marketing*, 61(4), pp. 30-54.

Rokkan, A.I., Heide, J.B. and Wathne, K.H. (2003) 'Specific investments in marketing relationships: expropriation and bonding effects', *Journal of Marketing Research*, 40(2), pp. 210-224.

Romsdal, A., Kollberg Thomassen, M., Carin Dreyer, H. and Strandhagen, J.O. (2011) 'Fresh food supply chains; characteristics and supply chain requirements', *18th international annual EurOMA conference*. Cambridge.

Rönkkö, M. (2014) 'The Effects of Chance Correlations on Partial Least Squares Path Modeling', *Organizational Research Methods*, 17(2), pp. 164-181.

Rönkkö, M., McIntosh, C.N., Antonakis, J. and Edwards, J.R. (2016) 'Partial least squares path modeling: Time for some serious second thoughts', *Journal of Operations Management*, 47-48, pp. 9-27.

Rotter, J.B. (1967) 'A new scale for the measurement of interpersonal trust1', *Journal of Personality*, 35(4), pp. 651-665.

Ruscio, J. and Roche, B. (2012) 'Determining the number of factors to retain in an exploratory factor analysis using comparison data of known factorial structure', *Psychological Assessment*, 24(2), pp. 282-292.

Saeedpoor, M. and Vafadarnikjoo, A. (2016) 'Evaluating green supplier development programs at a telecommunications systems provider', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 178, pp. 189-189.

Saenger, C., Torero, M. and Qaim, M. (2014) 'Impact of third-party contract enforcement in agricultural markets - a field experiment in Vietnam', *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 96(4), pp. 1220-1238.

Saghiri, S. and Wilding, R. (2021) 'On the effectiveness of supplier development programs: The role of supply-side moderators', *Technovation*, 103, p. 102234.

Sako, M. (2004) 'Supplier development at Honda, Nissan and Toyota: comparative case studies of organizational capability enhancement', *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 13(2), pp. 281-308.

Salimian, H., Rashidirad, M. and Soltani, E. (2017) 'A contingency view on the impact of supplier development on design and conformance quality performance', *Production Planning & Control*, 28(4), pp. 310-320.

Samaha, S.A., Palmatier, R.W. and Dant, R.P. (2011) 'Poisoning Relationships: Perceived Unfairness in Channels of Distribution', *Journal of Marketing*, 75(3), pp. 99-117.

Sancha, C., Gimenez, C., Sierra, V. and Kazeminia, A. (2015) 'Does implementing social supplier development practices pay off?', *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, 20(4), pp. 389-403.

Sánchez-Rodríguez, C. (2009) 'Effect of strategic purchasing on supplier development and performance: a structural model', *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 24(3/4), pp. 161-172.

Sánchez-Rodríguez, C., Hemsworth, D. and Martínez-Lorente, Á.R. (2005) 'The effect of supplier development initiatives on purchasing performance: a structural model', *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, 10(4), pp. 289-301.

Sarstedt, M., Hair, J.F., Ringle, C.M., Thiele, K.O. and Gudergan, S.P. (2016) 'Estimation issues with PLS and CBSEM: Where the bias lies!', *Journal of Business Research*, 69(10), pp. 3998-4010.

Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2019) *Research Methods for Business Students Ebook*. Harlow, UNITED KINGDOM: Pearson Education, Limited.

Schultz, P.W., Nolan, J.M., Cialdini, R.B., Goldstein, N.J. and Griskevicius, V. (2007) 'The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms', *Psychological Science*, 18(5), pp. 429-434.

Shahzad, K., Ali, T., Takala, J., Helo, P. and Zaefarian, G. (2018) 'The varying roles of governance mechanisms on ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment in buyer-supplier relationships', *Industrial Marketing Management*.

Sheng, S., Brown, J.R., Nicholson, C.Y. and Poppo, L. (2006) 'Do exchange hazards always foster relational governance? an empirical test of the role of communication', *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 23(1), pp. 63-77.

Shepherd, A.W. and Tam, P.T.G. (2008) *Acta Hortic. 794*. International Society for Horticultural Science (ISHS), Leuven, Belgium. Available at: https://doi.org/10.17660/ActaHortic.2008.794.37.

Sheu, C., Rebecca Yen, H. and Chae, B. (2006) 'Determinants of supplier-retailer collaboration: evidence from an international study', *International Journal of Operations & Production Management*, 26(1), pp. 24-49.

Shook, C.L., Ketchen, D.J., Hult, G.T.M. and Kacmar, K.M. (2004) 'An Assessment of the Use of Structural Equation Modeling in Strategic Management Research', *Strategic Management Journal*, 25(4), pp. 397-404.

Shrout, P.E. and Bolger, N. (2002) 'Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: New procedures and recommendations', *Psychological Methods*, 7(4), pp. 422–445.

Silverman, D. (2017) *Doing qualitative research*. Fifth edition.. edn. Los Angeles : SAGE.

Simmering, M.J., Fuller, C.M., Richardson, H.A., Ocal, Y. and Atinc, G.M. (2015) 'Marker Variable Choice, Reporting, and Interpretation in the Detection of Common Method Variance:A Review and Demonstration', *Organizational Research Methods*, 18(3), pp. 473-511.

Simmons, D. and Martin, J. (2010) *Use of the Critical Incident Technique for Qualitative Research in Engineering Education: An Example from a Grounded Theory Study*.

Simmons, L. and Scott, S. (2007) 'Health concerns drive safe vegetable production in Vietnam', *LEISA Magazine (Low External Input Sustainable Agriculture, Netherlands)*, 23, pp. 22-23.

Skowronski, K., Benton Jr., W.C. and Hill, J.A. (2020) 'Perceived supplier opportunism in outsourcing relationships in emerging economies', *Journal of Operations Management*, 66(7-8), pp. 989-1023.

Slife, B.D. and Williams, R.N. (1995) *What's Behind the Research? Discovering Hidden Assumptions in the Behavioral Sciences*. Available at: https://sk.sagepub.com/books/whats-behind-the-research (Accessed: 2021/08/23).

Sobel, M.E. (1982) 'Asymptotic Confidence Intervals for Indirect Effects in Structural Equation Models', *Sociological Methodology*, 13, pp. 290-312.

Spector, P.E. and Brannick, M.T. (2011) 'Methodological Urban Legends: The Misuse of Statistical Control Variables', *Organizational Research Methods*, 14(2), pp. 287-305.

Statista (2020) *Agriculture in Vietnam*. Statista.

Steenkamp, J.-B.E.M. and Baumgartner, H. (2000) 'On the use of structural equation models for marketing modeling', *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 17(2), pp. 195-202.

Stuart, F.I. (1993) 'Supplier Partnerships: Influencing Factors and Strategic Benefits', *International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management*, 29(3), pp. 21-29.

Tabachnick, B.G. and Fidell, L.S. (2013) *Using multivariate statistics*. 6th edn. Boston: Pearson Education.

Takeishi, A. (2001) 'Bridging inter- and intra-firm boundaries: management of supplier involvement in automobile product development', *Strategic Management Journal*, 22(5), pp. 403-433.

Talluri, S., Narasimhan, R. and Chung, W.M. (2010) 'Manufacturer cooperation in supplier development under risk', *European Journal of Operational Research*, 207(1), pp. 165-173.

Tangpong, C., Hung, K.T. and Ro, Y.K. (2010) 'The interaction effect of relational norms and agent cooperativeness on opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships', *Journal of Operations Management*, 28(5), pp. 398-414.

Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. (2008) *Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Teece, D.J. (2006) 'Reflections on "Profiting from Innovation"', *Research Policy*, 35(8), pp. 1131-1146.

Terry, D.J. and Hogg, M.A. (2001) 'Attitudes, behavior, and social context: The role of norms and group membership in social influence processes', in Forgas, J.P. and (Eds.), K.D.W. (eds.) *Social influence: Direct and indirect processes*. Philadelphia: Psychology Press, pp. 253-270.

Thompson, B. (2004) *Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Tóth, Z., Henneberg, S.C. and Naudé, P. (2017) 'Addressing the 'Qualitative' in fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis: The Generic Membership Evaluation Template', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 63, pp. 192-204.

Tourangeau, R., Rips, L.J. and Rasinski, K. (2000) *The psychology of survey response*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Tran, P.N.T., Gorton, M. and Lemke, F. (2021) 'When supplier development initiatives fail: Identifying the causes of opportunism and unexpected outcomes', *Journal of Business Research*, 127, pp. 277-289.

Tran, T.K. (2015a) *Overview the current status of vegetable production in Vietnam*.

Tran, T.T.H. (2015b) *Phát triển chuỗi cung ứng hiệu quả*. Available at: http://www.vlr.vn/vn/news/img/chuoi-cung-ung/2284/phat-trien-chuoi-cung-ung-rau-qua.vlr.

Treiblmaier, H. and Filzmoser, P. (2010) 'Exploratory factor analysis revisited: How robust methods support the detection of hidden multivariate data structures in IS research', *Information & Management*, 47(4), pp. 197-207.

UBND (2016) *Chương trình mục tiêu phát triển rau an toàn trên địa bàn thành phố giai đoạn 2016-2020*.Công Báo.

Vanpoucke, E., Vereecke, A. and Wetzels, M. (2014) 'Developing supplier integration capabilities for sustainable competitive advantage: A dynamic capabilities approach', *Journal of Operations Management*, 32(7-8), pp. 446-461.

VietGap (2021) *VietGap là gì?* Available at: http://www.vietgap.com/1552/cm/vietgap-la-gi.html (Accessed: 23/08/2021).

Villena, V.H. and Craighead, C.W. (2017) 'On the Same Page? How Asymmetric Buyer-Supplier Relationships Affect Opportunism and Performance', *Production and Operations Management*, 26(3), pp. 491-508.

Villena, V.H., Revilla, E. and Choi, T.Y. (2011) 'The dark side of buyer–supplier relationships: A social capital perspective', *Journal of Operations Management*, 29(6), pp. 561-576.

von Werder, A. (2011) 'Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Opportunism', *Organization Science*, 22(5), pp. 1345-1358.

Wagner, S.M. (2006) 'Supplier development practices: an exploratory study', *European Journal of Marketing*, 40(5-6), pp. 554-571.

Wagner, S.M. (2010) 'Indirect and direct supplier development: performance implications of individual and combined effects', *Ieee Transactions on Engineering Management*, 57(4), pp. 536-546.

Wagner, S.M. (2011) 'Supplier development and the relationship life-cycle', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 129(2), pp. 277-283.

Wagner, S.M. and Krause, D.R. (2009) 'Supplier development: communication approaches, activities and goals', *International Journal of Production Research*, 47(12), pp. 3161-3177.

Walker, G. and Poppo, L. (1991) 'Profit Centers, Single-Source Suppliers, and Transaction Costs', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36(1), pp. 66-87.

Wang, L.W., Sheng, S.B., Wu, S.L. and Zhou, K.Z. (2017) 'Government role, governance mechanisms, and foreign partner opportunism in IJVs', *Journal of Business Research*, 76, pp. 98-107.

Wang, M.Y., Zhang, Q.Y., Wang, Y.G. and Sheng, S.B. (2016a) 'Governing local supplier opportunism in China: Moderating role of institutional forces', *Journal of Operations Management*, 46, pp. 84-94.

Wang, Q., Li, J.J., Ross, W.T. and Craighead, C.W. (2013) 'The interplay of drivers and deterrents of opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships', *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 41(1), pp. 111-131.

Wang, X.H. and Yang, Z.L. (2013) 'Inter-firm opportunism: a meta-analytic review and assessment of its antecedents and effect on performance', *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 28(1-2), pp. 137-146.

Wang, Y., Wang, N., Jiang, L., Yang, Z. and Cui, V. (2016b) 'Managing relationships with power advantage buyers: the role of supplier initiated bonding tactics in long-term buyer-supplier collaborations', *Journal of Business Research*, 69(12), pp. 5587-5596.

Wang, Z.Q., Huo, B.F., Tian, Y. and Hua, Z.S. (2015) 'Effects of external uncertainties and power on opportunism in supply chains: evidence from China', *International Journal of Production Research*, 53(20), pp. 6294-6307.

Wang, Z.Q., Ye, F. and Tan, K.H. (2014) 'Effects of managerial ties and trust on supply chain information sharing and supplier opportunism', *International Journal of Production Research*, 52(23), pp. 7046-7061.

Warren, C. and Campbell, M.C. (2014) 'What Makes Things Cool? How Autonomy Influences Perceived Coolness', *Journal of Consumer Research*, 41(2), pp. 543-563.

Wathne, K.H. and Heide, J.B. (2000) 'Opportunism in interfirm relationships: Forms, outcomes, and solutions', *Journal of Marketing*, 64(4), pp. 36-51.

Wernerfelt, B. (1995) 'The resource-based view of the firm: Ten years after', *Strategic Management Journal*, 16(3), pp. 171-174.

Wertheim-Heck, S.C.O., Spaargaren, G. and Vellema, S. (2014) 'Food safety in everyday life: Shopping for vegetables in a rural city in Vietnam', *Journal of Rural Studies*, 35, pp. 37-48.

Werts, C.E., Linn, R.L. and Jöreskog, K.G. (1974) 'Intraclass Reliability Estimates: Testing Structural Assumptions', *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 34(1), pp. 25-33.

Whitener, E.M., Brodt, S.E., Korsgaard, M.A. and Werner, J.M. (1998) 'Managers as initiators of trust: An exchange relationship framework for understanding managerial trustworthy behavior', *Academy of Management Review*, 23(3), pp. 513-530.

Williams, L.J., Hartman, N. and Cavazotte, F. (2010) 'Method Variance and Marker Variables: A Review and Comprehensive CFA Marker Technique', *Organizational Research Methods*, 13(3), pp. 477-514.

Williamson, O.E. (1975) *Markets and hierarchies*. New York: Free Press.

Williamson, O.E. (1985) *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism*. Free Press, New York.

Williamson, O.E. (1998) 'Transaction cost economics: how it works; where it is headed', *De Economist*, 146(1), pp. 23-58.

Williamson, O.E. (2008) 'Outsourcing: transaction cost economics and supply chain management', *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 44(2), pp. 5-16.

Willig, C. (2013) *Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology*. 3rd edn. Open University Press.

Wolf, E.J., Harrington, K.M., Clark, S.L. and Miller, M.W. (2013) 'Sample Size Requirements for Structural Equation Models:An Evaluation of Power, Bias, and Solution Propriety', *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 73(6), pp. 913-934.

Wood, R.E., Goodman, J.S., Beckmann, N. and Cook, A. (2008) 'Mediation Testing in Management Research:A Review and Proposals', *Organizational Research Methods*, 11(2), pp. 270-295.

Woodside, A.G. (2013) 'Moving beyond multiple regression analysis to algorithms: Calling for adoption of a paradigm shift from symmetric to asymmetric thinking in data analysis and crafting theory', *Journal of Business Research*, 66(4), pp. 463-472.

WorldBank (2021) 'Country profile - Vietnam'. 23/08/2021. World Bank. Available at: https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=VNM.

Wynstra, F., von Corswant, F. and Wetzels, M. (2010) 'In Chains? An Empirical Study of Antecedents of Supplier Product Development Activity in the Automotive Industry', *Journal of Product Innovation Management*, 27(5), pp. 625-639.

Xue, J., Yuan, H. and Geng, Z. (2018) 'Impacts of classic transaction cost-related factors on partner’s cooperative and opportunistic behaviour in joint ventures', *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 33(7), pp. 883-895.

Yam, R.C.M. and Chan, C. (2015) 'Knowledge sharing, commitment and opportunism in new product development', *International Journal of Operations & Production Management*, 35(7), pp. 1056-1074.

Yan, T.T. and Dooley, K. (2014) 'Buyer-Supplier Collaboration Quality in New Product Development Projects', *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 50(2), pp. 59-83.

Yan, T.T. and Kull, T.J. (2015) 'Supplier opportunism in buyer-supplier new product development: a China-Us study of antecedents, consequences, and cultural/institutional contexts', *Decision Sciences*, 46(2), pp. 403-445.

Yang, D., Sheng, S., Wu, S. and Zhou, K.Z. (2018) 'Suppressing partner opportunism in emerging markets: Contextualizing institutional forces in supply chain management', *Journal of Business Research*, 90, pp. 1-13.

Yang, Q., Zhao, X., Yeung, H.Y.J. and Liu, Y. (2016) 'Improving logistics outsourcing performance through transactional and relational mechanisms under transaction uncertainties: Evidence from China', *International Journal of Production Economics*, 175, pp. 12-23.

Yang, Y., Pham, M.H., Yang, B., Sun, J.W. and Tran, P.N.T. (2021) 'Improving vegetable supply chain collaboration: a case study in Vietnam', *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print).

Yang, Z., Su, C. and Fam, K.-S. (2012) 'Dealing with institutional distances in international marketing channels: governance strategies that engender legitimacy and efficiency', *Journal of Marketing*, 76(3), pp. 41-55.

Young, H.P. (2015) 'The Evolution of Social Norms', *Annual Review of Economics*, 7(1), pp. 359-387.

Yu, C.M.J., Liao, T.J. and Lin, Z.D. (2006) 'Formal governance mechanisms, relational governance mechanisms, and transaction-specific investments in supplier-manufacturer relationships', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 35(2), pp. 128-139.

Zhang, L.Y. and Qian, Q.Z. (2017) 'How mediated power affects opportunism in owner-contractor relationships: The role of risk perceptions', *International Journal of Project Management*, 35(3), pp. 516-529.

Zhang, M., Pawar, K.S. and Bhardwaj, S. (2017) 'Improving supply chain social responsibility through supplier development', *Production Planning & Control*, 28(6-8), pp. 500-511.

Zhao, X., Lynch, J.G., Jr. and Chen, Q. (2010) 'Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths and Truths about Mediation Analysis', *Journal of Consumer Research*, 37(2), pp. 197-206.

Zhao, X.D., Huo, B.F., Flynn, B.B. and Yeung, J.H.Y. (2008) 'The impact of power and relationship commitment on the integration between manufacturers and customers in a supply chain', *Journal of Operations Management*, 26(3), pp. 368-388.

Zhou, K.Z. and Xu, D. (2012) 'How foreign firms curtail local supplier opportunism in China: detailed contracts, centralized control, and relational governance', *Journal of International Business Studies*, 43(7), pp. 677-692.

Zhou, Y., Zhang, X., Zhuang, G. and Zhou, N. (2015) 'Relational norms and collaborative activities: roles in reducing opportunism in marketing channels', *Industrial Marketing Management*, 46, pp. 147-159.

APPENDICES

Appendix A - Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form

Appendix A.1 - Participant Information Sheet (English)

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Research Project: Supplier Development, Opportunism and Relational Norms: A study in Vietnam

You are being invited to participate in this research project. Before you decide whether to take part it is important you understand why the research is being conducted and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with your colleagues if you wish. Please ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Please take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

Introduction

My name is **Tran Nguyen Thu Phuong**. I am a PhD candidate at Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University, United Kingdom. I am also a lecturer at the University of Economics, Ho Chi Minh city, Vietnam. My supervisors are **Professor Fred Lemke**, Vlerick Business School, Belgium and **Professor Matthew Gorton**, Newcastle University Business School, United Kingdom.

We are conducting research to understand the supplier development efforts of industrial buyers and how they may go right and wrong. The research project has started from 2017 and is expected to finish by the end of 2020.

Why I have been invited

You have been chosen because as a manager working in the agri-food industry, you will have experience and expertise in dealing with suppliers in the field. Sharing your knowledge, experience and perception could provide valuable information to the project.

Taking part in the study

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be asked to sign a consent form. You will be given this information sheet and a copy of your consent form to keep.

If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at a later stage, without giving a reason. You can request for your data to be withdrawn until official submission of the project to Newcastle University (expected in June 2020).

What do I have to do if I take part?

You will be asked to attend a face-to-face interview during a period time from July 2018 to September 2018. The exact time and place to be interviewed will be at your choice. The interview should take around 1 hour depending on the information you would like to provide.

Please answer the questions in the interview to the best of your knowledge. However, please note that you are free to decline to answer any questions if you prefer.

What are the possible disadvantages and risk to taking part?

There are no right or wrong, good or bad answers. The will be no judgement on you and your company because of the answers provided. Participating in the research is not anticipated to cause you any disadvantages or discomfort. **What are the possible benefits of taking part?**

Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is hoped that this work will have a beneficial impact on how companies deal with opportunistic behaviours of their partner, especially in Vietnam. If requested, results will be shared with participants.

What if there is a problem?

Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during the course of the study will be addressed; please contact myself or my supervisors in the first instance. You can find the contact details at the end of this information sheet.

Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?

Yes. Your details will be held in strict confidence and we will follow ethical and legal practice in relation to all study procedures. You will not be able to be identified or identifiable in any reports or publications. Your company will also not be identified or identifiable. Personal data, including name, contact details, audio/video recordings, will be handled in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998 so that unauthorised individuals will not have access to them.

Data collected may be shared in an anonymised form to allow reuse by the research team for research purposes only. These anonymised data will not allow any individuals or their institutions to be identified or identifiable. With your consent, to make the most of your participation and support efficient advancements in social science, any anonymised data collected may be used in other relevant academic research.

Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media used?

Yes, you will be audio recorded using a recorder. The recorded media will be transcribed, translated into English and analysed to fulfil the research aims.

Who is organising and funding the research?

This research is organised by Newcastle University Business School. It is mainly funded by Ministry of Education and Training, and partly funded by Professor Matthew Gorton. The funders have no conflict of interest.

Who has reviewed the project?

This research has been looked at by an independent group of people, called an Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed by and received a favourable ethical opinion from Newcastle University Business School Ethics Committee.

Full contact details of the researcher and supervisors:

Tran Nguyen Thu Phuong

PhD Researcher

Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University, United Kingdom

Room 6.09 - 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 4SE

n.t.p.tran2@newcastle.ac.uk

Professor Fred Lemke

Professor of Marketing & Sustainability

Vlerick Business School, Belgium

Avenue du Boulevard - Bolwerklaan 21- 1210 Brussel - Belgium

fred.lemke@vlerick.com

Professor Matthew Gorton

Professor in Marketing

Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University, United Kingdom

Room 8.03 - 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 4SE

matthew.gorton@newcastle.ac.uk

Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet.

CONSENT FORM

Title of Project: Supplier Development, Opportunism and Relational Norms: A study in Vietnam

Name of Researcher: Tran Nguyen Thu Phuong

	√
1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.	
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time within the time frame stated in the Participant Information Sheet without giving any reason, and will not be penalised for withdrawing. Withdrawal will not affect my legal rights.	
3. I understand that the data collected will be held strictly confidential as stated in the Participant Information Sheet.	
4. I understand that information collected about me and my company will be used to support other research in the future, and may be shared anonymously with other researchers.	
5. I agree to be audio recorded in my interview	
6. I agree to take part in the above study	

I would like to receive a brief report of the research results: Yes ☐ No ☐

Participant: ______________________ Date __________ Signature _____________

Researcher: Tran Nguyen Thu Phuong Date __________ Signature _____________

Appendix A.2 - Participant Information Sheet (Vietnamese)

THÔNG TIN DÀNH CHO NGƯỜI THAM GIA PHỎNG VẤN

Đề tài nghiên cứu: **Phát triển nhà cung ứng, Chủ nghĩa Cơ hội và các Quy tắc trong mối quan hệ: Nghiên cứu tại Việt Nam.**

Chúng tôi xin được mời Ông/Bà tham gia vào dự án nghiên cứu này. Trước khi Ông/Bà quyết định có tham gia hay không, Ông/Bà sẽ cần được biết thông tin về dự án, tại sao nghiên cứu này lại được thực hiện và nghiên cứu này có những gì. Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng dành một ít thời gian để đọc thật cẩn thận những thông tin dưới đây, và nếu muốn, Ông/Bà có thể thảo luận với các đồng nghiệp của mình. Vui lòng cho tôi biết nếu như có vấn đề gì Ông/Bà thấy chưa được rõ ràng hay cần biết thêm thông tin. Xin vui lòng dành thời gian để quyết định là có tham gia vào nghiên cứu hay không. Xin cảm ơn Ông/Bà đã dành thời gian đọc tờ thông tin này.

Giới thiệu

Tôi là **Trần Nguyễn Thu Phương**. Tôi là Nghiên cứu sinh tại trường Kinh doanh đại học Newcastle, Đại học Newcastle, Vương Quốc Anh. Tôi cũng là một giảng viên tại Đại học Kinh tế Tp.HCM, Việt Nam. Các giáo sư hướng dẫn của tôi là **Giáo sư Fred Lemke**, Trường Kinh doanh Vlerick, Bỉ, và **Giáo sư Matthew Gorton**, trường Kinh doanh Đại học Newcastle, Đại học Newcastle, Vương Quốc Anh.

Chúng tôi đang thực hiện nghiên cứu để hiểu về các nỗ lực phát triển nhà cung ứng của các doanh nghiệp và xem xét khả năng những nỗ lực này có thể dẫn đến các kết quả như mong muốn và không mong muốn như thế nào. Dự án nghiên cứu này bắt đầu từ năm 2017 và dự kiến sẽ hoàn thành vào cuối năm 2020.

Tại sao tôi được mời tham gia?

Ông/Bà được mời tham gia bởi vì Ông/Bà là một nhà quản lý/ chuyên gia làm việc trong lĩnh vực nông sản, Ông/Bà sẽ có những chuyên môn và kinh nghiệm làm việc với các nhà cung ứng trong ngành. Việc chia sẻ lại các kiến thức, kinh nghiệm và quan điểm của Ông/Bà có thể cung cấp những thông tin rất có giá trị cho dự án.

Tham gia vào nghiên cứu

Việc quyết định có tham gia vào nghiên cứu hay không là hoàn toàn tùy thuộc vào Ông/Bà. Nếu Ông/Bà quyết định tham gia, Ông/Bà sẽ được mời ký tên vào một bản xác nhận đồng ý tham gia nghiên cứu. Ông/Bà sẽ được gởi lại bản thông tin nghiên cứu này, và một bản sao của bản xác nhận đồng ý tham gia nghiên cứu để Ông/Bà giữ lại.

Nếu như Ông/Bà quyết định tham gia, sau này Ông/Bà vẫn hoàn toàn có quyền tự do rút lui khỏi nghiên cứu mà không cần phải đưa ra bất cứ lý do nào. Ông/Bà có thể yêu cầu thông tin của mình được rút ra khỏi nghiên cứu cho tới trước khi nghiên cứu được chính thức nộp cho Đại học Newcastle (dự kiến vào tháng 06/2020)

Tôi phải làm gì nếu tôi tham gia vào nghiên cứu

Ông bà sẽ được mời tham gia một buổi phỏng vấn trực tiếp trong khoảng thời gian từ tháng 07/2018 cho đến tháng 09/2018. Thời gian và địa điểm cụ thể sẽ do Ông/Bà lựa chọn. Buổi phỏng vấn sẽ kéo dài trong khoảng 1 giờ đồng hồ, tùy thuộc vào những thông tin mà Ông/Bà muốn cung cấp.

Vui lòng trả lời những câu hỏi trong buổi phỏng vấn với tất cả hiểu biết của Ông/Bà. Tuy nhiên, xin vui lòng lưu ý rằng ông bà hoàn toàn tự do từ chối trả lời bất cứ câu hỏi nào nếu như Ông/Bà muốn.

Những rủi ro hay bất lợi nếu như tham gia vào nghiên cứu này là gì?

Không có câu trả lời phỏng vấn nào là đúng hay sai, tốt hay xấu. Sẽ không có bất cứ một phán xét nào về Ông/Bà hay công ty của Ông/Bà dựa trên những câu trả lời mà Ông/Bà trả lời trong phỏng vấn. Tham gia vào nghiên cứu này được dự đoán là sẽ không gây ra bất cứ bất lợi hay sự bất tiện nào cho Ông/Bà

Những lợi ích khi tham gia vào nghiên cứu là gì?

Mặc dù không có lợi ích trực tiếp nào cho những người tham gia vào nghiên cứu, hy vọng rằng nghiên cứu này sẽ có tác động có ích vào việc các doanh nghiệp ứng phó với các hành vi cơ hội của các đối tác, đặc biệt là ở Việt Nam. Nếu như được yêu cầu, kết quả nghiên cứu sẽ được chia sẻ với những người tham gia.

Nếu như có vấn đề gì xảy ra thì phải làm thế nào?

Bất cứ phàn nàn hay quan ngại về bất cứ khía cạnh nào liên quan tới cách làm việc với Ông/Bà trong suốt quá trình thực hiện nghiên cứu sẽ được giải quyết. Nếu có bất cứ vấn đề gì, xin Ông/Bà vui lòng liên hệ với tôi hoặc các giáo sư hướng dẫn. Ông/Bà có thể tìm thấy thông tin liên lạc cụ thể ở phần cuối của tờ thông tin này.

Việc tham gia của Tôi có được giữ bảo mật hay không?

Có. Tất cả những thông tin chi tiết của Ông/Bà sẽ được giữ bảo mật tuyệt đối và chúng tôi sẽ tuân thủ theo các quy định về đạo đức và pháp lý liên quan tới tất cả các quy trình nghiên cứu. Ông/Bà sẽ không bị nhận diện hay có khả năng bị nhận diện trong bất cứ báo cáo hay ấn phẩm xuất bản nào. Công ty của Ông/bà cũng sẽ không bị nhận diện hay có khả năng bị nhận diện. Các thông tin cá nhân, bao gồm tên, thông tin liên lạc, các bản ghi âm hình/ tiếng, sẽ được xử lý theo Đạo luật Bảo vệ Thông tin của Vương Quốc Anh 1998 (UK Data Protection Act 1998), theo đó những cá nhân nào không được phép sẽ không được quyền tiếp cận với chúng.

Những thông tin được thu thập có thể sẽ được chia sẻ dưới dạng ẩn danh để nhóm nghiên cứu có thể tái sử dụng với mục đích nghiên cứu. Những thông tin dưới dạng ẩn danh này sẽ không cho phép những cá nhân hay các tổ chức của họ bị nhận diện hay có khả năng bị nhận diện. Với sự đồng ý của Ông/Bà, để khai thác tốt nhất những dữ liệu đã thu thập nhằm phát triển các nghiên cứu trong lĩnh khoa học xã hội, những thông tin ẩn danh đã được thu thập có thể được sử dụng trong những nghiên cứu học thuật có liên quan.

Tôi có bị ghi âm hay không, và những thông tin ghi âm này được sử dụng như thế nào?

Có, cuộc phỏng vấn với Ông/Bà sẽ được ghi âm bằng một máy ghi âm. File ghi âm sẽ được chuyển thành dạng văn bản, dịch ra tiếng Anh và phân tích để đáp ứng các mục tiêu nghiên cứu.

Ai là người tổ chức thực hiện và tài trợ cho nghiên cứu?

Nghiên cứu này được trường Kinh doanh Đại học Newcastle tổ chức thực hiện. Nghiên cứu được tài trợ chính bởi Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo Việt nam, và một phần được tài trợ bởi Giáo sự Matthew Gorton. Những nhà tài trợ không có mâu thuẫn nào về lợi ích.

Ai là người xem xét dự án này?

Nghiên cứu này đã được xem xét bởi một nhóm độc lập, gọi là Hội đồng Đạo đức, để đảm bảo quyền lợi của Ông/Bà. Nghiên cứu nay đã được đánh giá và nhận được sự ủng hộ về mặt đạo đức từ Hội đồng Đạo Đức của trường Kinh Doanh Đại học Newcastle.

Thông tin liên hệ của nghiên cứu viên và các giáo sư hướng dẫn

Trần Nguyễn Thu Phương

Nghiên cứu sinh

Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University, United Kingdom

Room 6.09 - 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 4SE

n.t.p.tran2@newcastle.ac.uk hoặc thuphuong@ueh.edu.vn

Giáo sư Fred Lemke

Giáo sư ngành Marketing & Bền vững

Vlerick Business School, Belgium

Avenue du Boulevard - Bolwerklaan 21- 1210 Brussel - Belgium

fred.lemke@vlerick.com

Giáo sư Matthew Gorton

Giáo sư ngành Marketing

Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University, United Kingdom

Room 8.03 - 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 4SE

matthew.gorton@newcastle.ac.uk

Xin cảm ơn Ông/Bà đã dành thời gian đọc tờ thông tin này.

XÁC NHẬN ĐỒNG Ý THAM GIA NGHIÊN CỨU

Đề tài nghiên cứu: Phát triển nhà cung ứng, Chủ nghĩa Cơ hội và các quy tắc trong mối quan hệ: Nghiên cứu tại Việt Nam.

Nghiên cứu sinh: Trần Nguyễn Thu Phương

	√
1. Tôi xác nhận rằng tôi đã đọc tờ thông tin cho đề tài nghiên cứu trên. Tôi đã có cơ hội để xem xét các thông tin, hỏi các câu hỏi và đã được giải thích thỏa đáng.	
2. Tôi hiểu rằng việc tham gia của tôi là hoàn toàn tự nguyện và tôi được tự do rút lui vào bất cứ lúc nào trong khoảng thời gian đã được nêu trong Tờ Thông tin dành cho người tham gia, mà không cần phải đưa ra bất cứ lý do nào, và sẽ không bị phạt gì cả. Việc rút lui khỏi nghiên cứu không ảnh hưởng gì tới các quyền pháp lý của tôi.	
3. Tôi hiểu rằng những thông tin được thu thập sẽ được lưu giữ hoàn toàn bảo mật như đã được nêu trong Tờ Thông tin dành cho Người tham gia.	
4. Tôi hiểu rằng những thông tin được thu thập về cá nhân tôi và công ty của tôi có thể được sử dụng để hỗ trợ cho các nghiên cứu trong tương lai, và có thể được chia sẻ dưới dạng ẩn danh cho những nhà nghiên cứu khác.	
5. Tôi đồng ý được ghi âm trong buổi phỏng vấn.	
6. Tôi đồng ý tham gia vào nghiên cứu nêu trên.	

Tôi muốn nhận một bản tóm tắt về kết quả nghiên cứu: Có ☐ Không ☐

Địa chỉ (email/địa chỉ thư tín) để nhận bản tóm tắt kết quả nghiên cứu:

Người tham gia ________________________________ Date ____________ Signature ___________

Nghiên cứu viên: Trần Nguyễn Thu Phương ______ Date ____________ Signature ___________

Appendix B - Interview Guide

Appendix B.1 - Interview guide for interviewing buyer (English)

INTERVIEW GUIDE (BUYER)

Interviewer: Phuong Tran - Newcastle University

Q1. To start with, please introduce yourself. [How long have you been working in this company? Have you worked in the same position since then? How long have you been working in the industry?]
Q2. Could you give some information about your company? [big/small company? How big/small? Position in the market? When did it establish?]

Q3. Could you describe your company supply chain?

Q4. How do you select suppliers? [Do you have specific criteria to select supplier?]

Q5. Is the performance of these suppliers stable?

Q6. Is your purchasing activity stable?

Q7. What actions do you take to manage your suppliers' performance?

Q8. What kind of support do you provide them to increase their performance?

Q9. Do the above managements and supports work? [How does it work? Does it always work? What's problems?]

Please think of the suppliers who you have the most supplier development activities

Q10. Do the above activities for managing your supplier work?

Q11. Do the activities for developing your supplier work?

Q12. While applying the supplier development activities, do you feel they have opportunistic behaviour?

Q.13 Do you apply the monitoring and controlling activities to other suppliers? Why?

Q14. Do you apply the supplier development activities to other suppliers? Why?

Q15. Do the suppliers whom you just do supplier assessment and monitor have opportunistic behaviour?

Q16. To what extent the above behaviour (Q.15) differs to the opportunistic behaviour in Q.12?

Q17. What do you think about those opportunistic behaviours? Why do they act opportunistically?

Q18. Do you have any way to prevent those opportunistic behaviours?

Q19. How those opportunistic behaviour affect to your company?

Q20. To what extent do you accept those opportunistic behaviours?

Q21. Do you think if your supplier development activities relate to their opportunistic behaviour?

Q22. Is there any opportunistic behaviour that you know it will definitely occur but you have no way to control or have to accept it as a normal practice?

Q23. Is there any opportunistic behaviour that become popular, normal in the fruit and vegetable supply chain?

Q24. Could you tell me a situation when your supplier behaves greater than your expectations?

Q25. Does the behaviour (in Q24) happen before or after you apply supplier development activities?

Q26. How do you and your supplier relationship look like, before and after you be aware of supplier opportunistic behaviours?

Q27. What are norms in supplier-buyer relationship in fruit and vegetable industry?

Q28. When apply supplier development activities, is there any norms in supplier-buyer relationship?

Q29. Which behaviour and attitude should supplier have when receiving your support from your supplier development activities?

Q30. Does your supplier have those expected behaviour and attitude (in Q29)? [Could you give details on their behaviour?]

Q31. From your side, what are relationship norms do you often have?

Q32. Do you have any other things that you want to share? Is there anything you would like to add?

Q33. Do you have any questions?

Q34. Could you please refer me to your suppliers?

Appendix B.2 - Interview guide for interviewing buyer (Vietnamese)

HƯỚNG DẪN PHỎNG VẤN DÀNH CHO NGƯỜI MUA

Q1. Để bắt đầu, xin anh/chị vui lòng giới thiệu một chút thông tin về bản thân [Tên, tuổi, Anh/Chị đã làm cho công ty này bao lâu? Anh/Chị có làm cùng một vị trí từ khi bắt đầu làm ở công ty này hay không? Anh/Chị làm trong ngành này được bao lâu? Trước đó có làm nghề gì khác hay không?]

Q2. Vui lòng giới thiệu về quy mô, thời gian thành lập công ty và vị trí của công ty trên thị trường? [Farmer: giới thiệu về vườn của anh/chị]

Q3. Vui lòng mô tả chuỗi cung ứng của công ty, đối với mặt hàng rau củ quả? [Số lượng nhà cung cấp hiện tại? Người làm việc lâu nhất là bao lâu?]

Q4. Anh/chị hãy cho biết cách mà công ty anh chị lựa chọn nhà cung cấp cho mình? [Có bộ tiêu chuẩn hay không? Tiêu chí lựa chọn là gì?]

Q5. Việc cung ứng của những nhà cung cấp này này có ổn định hay không?

Q6. Việc mua hàng của doanh nghiệp anh/chị có ổn định hay không?

Q7. Công ty anh/chị đã có những hoạt động gì để quản lý nhà cung cấp của mình?

Q8. Công ty anh/chị có những hoạt động nào để hỗ trợ nhà cung cấp của mình hoạt động tốt hơn?

Q9. Những hoạt động để quản lý và hỗ trợ trên có đạt hiệu quả hay không?

Anh/Chị hãy nghĩ đến người mua hàng mà công ty anh/chị nhận được nhiều hoạt động hỗ trợ phát triển nhất.

Q10. Các cách thức quản lý của người mua đối với việc cung ứng cho doanh nghiệp anh/chị có hiệu quả hay không? [Sự hiệu quả, có tác dụng hay không]

Q11. Các hoạt động phát triển nhà cung ứng mà công ty anh/chị áp dụng có hiệu quả hay không?

Q12. Khi công ty anh/chị áp dụng các hoạt động hỗ trợ cho các anh/chị hoạt động tốt hơn, anh/chị có nhận thấy họ có các hành vi cơ hội nào đối với mình hay không?

Q13. Công ty anh/chị có áp dụng các hoạt động quản lý nhà cung cấp như vậy đối với các nhà cung cấp khác? Tại sao?

Q14. Công ty anh/chị có áp dụng các hoạt động phát triển nhà cung cấp với các nhà cung cấp khác? Tại sao?

Q15. Đối với các nhà cung cấp mà các anh chị chỉ áp dụng các biện pháp quản lý và không có hoạt động hỗ trợ phát triển, những người mua này có hành vi cơ hội hay không?

Q16. Các hành vi cơ hội của các nhà cung cấp ở trên (Q15) khác với các hành vi cơ hội ở câu 12 như thế nào?

Q17. Anh/Chị có suy nghĩ gì về những hành vi cơ hội mà anh/chị đã liệt kê ở trên. Theo anh/chị, vì lý do gì mà nhà cung cấp làm như vậy?

Q18. Anh/Chị có áp dụng biện pháp gì để ngăn chặn các hành vi cơ hội trên xảy ra?

Q19. Các hành vi cơ hội đã được nêu ảnh hưởng đến doanh nghiệp anh/chị như thế nào?

Q20. Mức độ chấp nhận của anh/chị đối với các hành vi cơ hội kể trên?

Q21. Theo anh/chị có sự liên quan nào giữa các hành vi cơ hội với các hoạt động phát triển nhà cung mà anh/chị nhận được từ người mua của mình?

Q22. Có hành vi cơ hội nào mà anh/chị biết chắc chắn rằng sẽ xảy ra nhưng anh/chị không có cách nào ngăn chặn mà chấp nhận đó như là một điều bình thường

Q23. Có hành vi cơ hội nào trong các hành vi cơ hội mà anh chị kể trên đã trở nên phổ biến, trở thành điều bình thường trong ngành kinh doanh rau củ quả?

Q24. Anh/chị hãy kể lại một tình huống, trong đó nhà nhà cung cấp thể hiện vượt mức mong đợi của công ty anh/chị khi họ được nhận các hỗ trợ phát triển nhà cung cấp?

Q25. Các hành vi này diễn ra trước hay sau khi áp dụng các hoạt động phát triển nhà cung?

Q26. Mối quan hệ của doanh nghiệp của anh/chị và nhà cung cấp của công ty anh/chị, trước và sau khi phát hiện ra các hành vi cơ hội là như thế nào?

Q27. Trong ngành cung ứng rau củ quả, có quy tắc quan hệ nào là phổ biến giữa người cung ứng và bên mua hàng?

Q28. Đối với việc áp dụng các hoạt động hỗ trợ nhà cung ứng phát triển thì có quy tắc nào trong quan hệ giữa người mua và người cung ứng hay không?

Q29. Anh/chị nghĩ rằng nhà cung cấp nên có thái độ/ hành vi đối với doanh nghiệp anh/chị như thế nào khi quyết định thực hiện các hoạt động phát triển nhà cung?

Q30. Họ có đáp ứng được những điều đó [Q29] hay không? [Probes: Cụ thể như thế nào?]

Q31. Vậy về phía anh/chị, những quy tắc trong mối quan hệ giữa hai bên mà công ty anh/chị thường thực hiện là gì?

Q32. Còn điều gì anh/chị muốn chia sẻ thêm hay không?

Q33. Anh/chị có câu hỏi gì hay khônng?

Q34. Anh/chị có thể giới thiệu tôi đến các nhà cung cấp khác của anh/chị để tôi thực hiện phỏng vấn được hay không?

Appendix B.3 - Interview guide for interviewing supplier (English)

INTERVIEW GUIDE (SUPPLIER)

Interviewer: Phuong Tran - Newcastle University

Q1. To start with, please introduce yourself. [How long have you been working in this company? Have you worked in the same position since then? How long have you been working in the industry?]

Q2. Could you give some information about your company? [big/small company? How big/small? Position in the market? When did it establish?]

Q3. Could you describe your company supply chain? [Number of buyers? How long do oldest buyers buy from you?]

Q4. How do you become their supplier? How do you find your buyers? [Do they have specific criteria to select supplier?]

Q5. Is the performance of these buyers stable?

Q6. Is your supplying activity stable?

Q7. What actions do your buyers take to manage your performance?

Q8. What kind of support do your buyers provide you to increase your performance?

Q9. Do the above managements and supports work? [How does it work? Does it always work? What's problems?]

Please think of the buyer who you receive the most supplier development activities.

Q10. Do you have any comments about the activities for managing your performances of your buyer?

Q11. Do you have any comments about the activities for developing your performance from your buyer?

Q12. While applying the supplier development activities, do you feel your buyer have opportunistic behaviour?

Q13. Do your other buyers apply the monitoring and controlling activities? Why?

Q14. Do your other buyers have supplier development activities? Why?

Q15. Do the buyers, who do not provide supplier development activities to you, have opportunistic behaviour?

Q16. To what extent the above behaviour (Q.15) differs to the opportunistic behaviour in Q.12?

Q17. What do you think about those opportunistic behaviours? Why do they act opportunistically?

Q18. Do you have any way to prevent those opportunistic behaviours?

Q19. How those opportunistic behaviour affect to your company?

Q20. To what extent do you accept those opportunistic behaviours?

Q21. Do you think if their supplier developing activities relates to their opportunistic behaviour?

Q22. Is there any opportunistic behaviour that you know it will definitely occur, but you have no way to control or have to accept it as a normal practice?

Q23. Is there any opportunistic behaviour that become popular, normal in the fruit and vegetable supply chain?

Q24. Could you tell me a situation when your buyer behaves greater than your expectations?

Q25. Does the behaviour (in Q24) happen before or after your buyer apply supplier development activities?

Q26. How do you and your supplier relationship look like, before and after you be aware of supplier opportunistic behaviours?

Q27. What are norms in supplier-buyer relationship in fruit and vegetable industry?

Q28. When apply supplier development activities, is there any norms in supplier-buyer relationship?

Q29. Which behaviour and attitude should buyers have when providing supplier development activities?

Q30. Does your buyer have those expected behaviour and attitude (in Q29)? [Could you give details on their behaviour?]

Q31. From your side, what are relationship norms do you often have?

Q32. Do you have any other things that you want to share? Is there anything you would like to add?

Q33. Do you have any questions?

Q34. Could you please refer me to your buyers to do interview?

Appendix B.4 - Interview guide for interviewing supplier (Vietnamese)

HƯỚNG DẪN PHỎNG VẤN DÀNH CHO NHÀ CUNG CẤP

Q1. Để bắt đầu, xin anh/chị vui lòng giới thiệu một chút thông tin về bản thân [Tên, tuổi, anh/chị bắt đầu làm nghề này từ khi nào? Trước đó có àm nghề gì khác hay không?

Q2. Vui lòng giới thiệu về quy mô, thời gian thành lập công ty và vị trí của công ty trên thị trường? [Farmer: giới thiệu về vườn của anh/chị]

Q3. Vui lòng mô tả chuỗi cung ứng của công ty, đối với mặt hàng rau củ quả? [Số lượng nhà người mua hiện tại? Người làm việc lâu nhất là bao lâu?]

Q4. Anh/chị hãy cho biết cách mà công ty anh chị trở thành nhà cung cấp củ quả cho đối tác? Cách tìm kiếm đối tác [Có bộ tiêu chuẩn hay không? Tiêu chí lựa chọn là gì?]

Q5. Việc mua hàng của những người mua này có ổn định hay không?

Q7. Công ty bên mua có những hình thức nào quản lý việc thu mua từ các anh chị đạt được như yêu cầu của họ?

Q8. Công ty bên mua có các hoạt động hay có làm gì để cho việc cung ứng của công ty anh/chị được tốt hơn hay không?

Q9. Những hình thức đảm bảo việc thu mua và các hoạt động hỗ trợ cho các các anh chị của họ có hiệu quả không? [Hiệu quả như thế nào? Có phải lúc nào cũng đạt kết quả? Có vấn đề gì không?

Anh/Chị hãy nghĩ đến người mua hàng mà công ty anh/chị nhận được nhiều hoạt động hỗ trợ phát triển nhất.

Q10. Anh/chị nhận xét như thế nào về các cách thức quản lý của người mua đối với việc cung ứng của anh, chị cho họ? [Sự hiệu quả, có tác dụng hay không]

Q11. Anh/chị nhận xét như thế nào về các hoạt động phát triển nhà cung ứng mà bên mua thực hiện? [anh chị có làm theo hoàn toàn hay không?]

Q12. Khi bên mua áp dụng các hoạt động hỗ trợ cho các anh/chị hoạt động tốt hơn, anh/chị có nhận thấy họ có các hành vi cơ hội nào đối với mình hay không?

Q13. Các bên mua khác có thực hiện việc quản lý anh/chị như nhà cung ứng trên hay không

Q14. Các bên mua khác có thực hiện việc hỗ trợ cho doanh nghiệp của anh/chị như nhà cung ứng trên hay không?

Q15. Đối với các người mua khác không có hoạt động hỗ trợ cho anh/chị phát triển, những người mua này có hành vi cơ hội hay không?

Q16. Anh/Chị hãy suy nghĩ về những hành vi cơ hội mà anh/chị đã liệt kê ở trên. Theo anh/chị, vì lý do gì mà bên mua làm như vậy?

Q17. Anh/Chị có áp dụng biện pháp gì để ngăn chặn các hành vi cơ hội trên xảy ra?

Q18. Các hành vi cơ hội đã được nêu ảnh hưởng đến anh/chị như thế nào?

Q19. Mức độ chấp nhận của anh/chị đối với các hành vi cơ hội kể trên?

Q20. Theo anh/chị có sự liên quan nào giữa các hành vi cơ hội với các hoạt động phát triển nhà cung mà anh/chị nhận được từ người mua của mình?

Q21. Có hành vi cơ hội nào mà anh/chị biết chắc chắn rằng sẽ xảy ra nhưng anh/chị không có cách nào ngăn chặn mà chấp nhận đó như là một điều bình thường

Q22. Có hành vi cơ hội nào trong các hành vi cơ hội mà anh chị kể trên đã trở nên phổ biến, trở thành điều bình thường trong ngành kinh doanh rau củ quả?

Q23. Anh/chị hãy kể lại một tình huống, trong đó nhà người mua thể hiện vượt mức mong đợi của công ty anh/chị?

Q24. Các hành vi này diễn ra trước hay sau khi áp dụng các hoạt động phát triển nhà cung?

Q25. Anh/chị có thể kể lại một tình huống mà anh/chị (DN) đạt được kết quả tốt ngoài mong đợi từ những các hoạt động hỗ trợ của người mua.

Q26. Mối quan hệ của doanh nghiệp của anh/chị và người mua của anh/chị , trước và sau khi phát hiện ra các hành vi cơ hội là như thế nào?

Q27. Trong ngành cung ứng rau củ quả, có quy tắc quan hệ nào là phổ biến giữa người cung ứng và bên mua hàng?

Q28. Đối với việc áp dụng các hoạt động hỗ trợ nhà cung ứng phát triển thì có quy tắc nào trong quan hệ giữa người mua và người cung ứng hay không?

Q29. Anh/chị nghĩ rằng người mua nên có thái độ/ hành vi đối với anh/chị như thế nào khi quyết định thực hiện các hoạt động phát triển nhà cung?

Q30. Họ có đáp ứng được những điều đó [Q30] hay không? [Probes: Cụ thể như thế nào?]

Q31. Vậy về phía anh/chị, những quy tắc trong mối quan hệ giữa hai bên mà công ty anh/chị thường thực hiện là gì?

Q32. Còn điều gì anh/chị muốn chia sẻ thêm hay không?

Q33. Anh/chị có câu hỏi gì hay khônng?

Q34. Anh/chị có thể giới thiệu tôi đến các người mua khác của anh/chị để tôi thực hiện phỏng vấn được hay không?

Appendix B.5 – Extended Interview guide for interviewing buyer/supplier (English)

1. Using Critical Incident Technique

Objective: Investigate suppliers' behaviours in two situations:

(1) suppliers receiving supplier development initiatives from buyers

(2) Suppliers not receiving supplier development initiatives from buyers.

Q1. Please think of a situation when, after your organisation implement supplier development initiatives with the supplier, a supplier behaves in a manner that you think should not be encouraged. It is because, from your viewpoint, the behaviour is an exemplar of opportunistic behaviours.

Q2. Please think of a situation when, after your organisation implement supplier development initiatives with the supplier, a supplier behaves in a manner that you think is positive and the suppliers' performance improves.

2. Using Projective technique

Two tasks are used: Word Associate Task and Completion Task.

Word associate task

1. Please give the possible opportunistic behaviours of suppliers that are likely to happen when a buyer:
    a. Give training and technical support to suppliers
    b. Monitor and assess the product quality
    c. Offer guaranteed sale for suppliers
    d. Offer award programmes
    e. Provide seedlings, facilities, and machines for production
    f. Give loan and/or making pre-payment for price stabilisation.

Completion task

Story number 1:

A fruit and vegetable company (company A) supplies their products to supermarkets and high-end retailers/stores selling fresh fruit and vegetable. The company recognises that the farmers who supply products for these places may experience many obstacles in their production. Their experience-based practices and the lack of standardised production procedures often lead to inconsistent quality and productivities, with unqualified products and thus unmarketable. Company A decides that they should take actions to support the farmers for better practices.

At first, Company A recognises/notices that one of the obstacles that farmer is facing is the lack of capital to invest in seedlings or fertilisers. Thus, they offer cash support in the form of 0% interest loan. The loan will be deducted from the payment that Company A makes for purchasing orders after each harvest. In order to benefit from the loan, the farmers are contracted to supply to Company A the produces that are up to an agreed standard, with an agreed quantity and for a price negotiable at the point of placing the order. As a result, company A sees that […]

Story number 2:

After giving cash support for a while, company A decides that, due to the enhanced requirements from the end-users for higher quality products (e.g., fresher, safer), it is necessary to improve the production procedures which involve the overuse of fertilisers, unapproved and unsafe chemistry in production due to the short-term benefits that they bring. Company A starts to transfer technical programmes and production techniques to the farmers by organising workshops on cultivating skills, the proper use of fertilisers, standardised production procedures, with a list of permitted fertilisers and chemical products that can be used in (the soil?) farmlands. The requirements for participation in this scheme are the commitment to follow and apply what have been trained and sell the products to company A for a fixed price. The result is […]

Story number 3:

Company A conducts a market survey and learns that there is an increased market demand for a particular type of fruit/ vegetables. The price and the value of the product are also higher than the market average. Company A invests a lot of money to buy these exclusive seedlings and the production techniques and transfers them to their suppliers to apply in their farms. Company A wants to hold a monopoly position in the market with the new product and does not permit their suppliers to share with any other farmers. The suppliers are contracted to sell the end produces back to company A. The result is […]

Story number 4:

Demands for products from company A is stable. Therefore, to avoid the possibility of price fluctuations due to natural conditions, and changes in the market demand, apart from giving training and technical supports, company A offers guaranteed sale for their farmers. The price is fixed for the whole year, regardless the fluctuations of the market price. When the market price decreases, company A buys at the fixed price higher than the market price. When the market price increases, company A still buys at the fixed price obviously lower than market price. The result is […]

Story number 5:

Company A offers an incentive and reward scheme for their suppliers. With this scheme, suppliers who always fulfil orders with the quantities and quality standards met will receive the title 'The best supplier'. Company A always gives priorities in placing orders to suppliers with the title. In addition, Company A also gives cash rewards or overseas training trips to the suppliers. The result is […]

Appendix B.6 – Extended Interview guide for interviewing buyer/supplier (Vietnamese)

Critical Incident Technique

Set out an objective: - Tìm hiểu về hành vi của nhà cung ứng khi nhận được hỗ trợ phát triển và không nhận được hỗ trợ phát triển.

Q1. Anh/chị hãy nghĩ về một tình huống mà khi đó người mua thực hiện một việc gì đó sau khi họ hỗ trợ phát triển từ công ty của anh/chị mà anh/chị cảm thấy rằng hành động đó không nên khuyến khích, bởi vì theo quan điểm của anh/chị thì đó là một điển hình của hành vi cơ hội?

Q2. Anh/chị hãy nghĩ về một tình huống mà khi đó người mua thực hiện một việc gì đó sau khi nhận được hỗ trợ phát triển từ công ty của anh/chị mà khi đó nhà cung cấp thể hiện hành vi/ kết quả làm việc vô cùng tích cực?

Projective Technique

Sử dụng Word Associate task và Completion Task

Word Associate task:

Anh/Chị vui lòng cho biết những hành vi cơ hội của người sản xuất có khả năng xảy ra khi người mua:

+ Hướng dẫn kỹ thuật, tập huấn cho người sản xuất.
+ Kiểm tra và đánh giá chất lượng sản phẩm của người sản xuất
+ Bao tiêu sản phẩm cho nhà sản xuất
+ Đưa ra các chương trình khen thưởng
+ Cung cấp giống, công cụ dụng cụ sản xuất.
+ Cho vay vốn, ứng tiền bình ổn giá.

Completion Task:

<u>Story number 1:</u>

Một doanh nghiệp kinh doanh trái cây và rau củ (doanh nghiệp A) chuyên cung cấp sản phẩm vào các chuỗi siêu thị và cửa hàng thực phẩm chất lượng cao nhận thấy rằng các nông hộ cung cấp sản phẩm cho mình thường gặp rất nhiều khó khăn, sản xuất theo thói quen, thiếu quy trình chặt chẽ dẫn đến chất lượng sản phẩm và sản lượng không đồng đều, thường xuyên có các sản phẩm không đạt yêu cầu để đưa ra thị trường. Doanh nghiệp này quyết định cần phải thực hiện một số biện pháp để giúp cho các nông hộ thực hiện sản xuất tốt hơn.

Đầu tiên, doanh nghiệp A nhận thấy rằng một trong các vấn đề mà các nông hộ gặp phải là không đủ tiền vốn để đầu tư mua cây giống, phân bón, do vậy họ quyết định cung cấp tiền mặt dưới dạng cho vay không tính lãi, tiền vốn cho vay được trừ vào tiền bán hàng sau khi đã thu hoạch cho doanh nghiệp A. Yêu cầu của doanh nghiệp A đối với các nông hộ nhận vốn vay là cần phải cung cấp lại các sản phẩm thu hoạch được theo đơn đặt hàng cho doanh nghiệp A theo số lượng, chất lượng theo tiêu chuẩn của doanh nghiệp A đưa ra và mức giá thỏa thuận theo từng thời điểm. Kết quả, doanh nghiệp A nhận thấy rằng […]

<u>Story number 2:</u>

Sau một thời gian thực hiện việc cung cấp vốn, doanh nghiệp A quyết định cần phải giải quyết các vấn đề về quy trình sản xuất và với nhu cầu ngày càng cao của người mua, họ phải cung cấp các sản phẩm ra thị trường với các tiêu chuẩn chất lượng chặt chẽ hơn trong tình trạng các loại hóa chất, thuốc bảo vệ thực vật không được phép đang được các nông hộ sử dụng tràn lan do hiệu quả ngắn hạn mà các sản phẩm này đem lại. Do vậy, họ tiến hành việc chuyển giao kỹ thuật, huấn luyện cho các nông hộ cung cấp sản phẩm cho mình, bằng cách tổ chức các lớp tập huấn về kỹ thuật trồng trọt, cách sử dụng phân thuốc, đưa ra quy trình sản xuất quy chuẩn và các quy định về các sản phẩm được sử dụng trong sản xuất. Yêu cầu của doanh nghiệp A là các nông hộ phải thực hiện tuân theo quy trình sản xuất và cam kết bán lại sản phẩm với giá bán thỏa thuận trước. Kết quả là, […]

Story number 3:

Doanh nghiệp A khảo sát nhu cầu thị trường và biết được nhu cầu về một loại rau củ giống mới đang tăng cao, với giá trị sản phẩm cũng cao hơn so với các sản phẩm khác trên thị trường. Họ đầu tư mua giống cùng với thuê tư vấn kỹ thuật trồng trọt sản phẩm mới này, phân chia lại cho các nhà cung cấp của mình để triển khai. Vì đây là sản phẩm mới và doanh nghiệp A muốn độc quyền khai thác trên thị trường, các nhà cung cấp phải cam kết không được chi sẻ giống này cho các nông hộ khác, cũng như chỉ được phép bán lại toàn bộ các sản phẩm thu hoạch được cho A. Kết quả là, […]

Story number 4:

Vì nhu cầu khách hàng của A luôn ổn định, để tránh việc giá cả biến động do mùa màng và nhu cầu thay đổi, ngoài các biện pháp tư vấn hỗ trợ về kỹ thuật, A bao tiêu toàn bộ sản phẩm của các nông hộ của mình sản xuất ra, với giá mua thỏa thuận ổn định quanh năm không phụ thuộc vào biến động giá cả trên thị trường. Khi thị trường giá xuống thấp, A vẫn sẽ mua với giá cam kết, và ngược lại khi giá sản phẩm trên thị trường tăng cao, A cũng chỉ mua với giá đã cam kết và thấp hơn giá của thị trường. Kết quả là, […].

Story number 5:

Doanh nghiệp A thực hiện thêm một chương trình khen thưởng cho các nhà cung cấp. Đối với các nhà cung cấp luôn cung cấp đủ sản lượng đặt hàng và chất lượng ổn định, đáp ứng theo các tiêu chí kỹ thuật mà doanh nghiệp A đưa ra, các nhà cung cấp sẽ đạt các danh hiệu nhà cung cấp ưu tú, và sẽ được ưu tiên hơn so với các nhà cung cấp khác khi A đặt hàng cho các đợt hàng tới. Đồng thời, A cũng sẽ thưởng bằng tiền mặt hoặc dưới các hình thức tham quan học hỏi ở nước ngoài cho các nhà cung cấp thực hiện tốt việc cung cấp sản phẩm của mình. Kết quả là, […]

Appendix C - Interview Transcript

Appendix C.1 - Selected Interview Transcript (Original in Vietnamese)

Mã số phỏng vấn B12Aug30Do

[00.00] Interviewer
Anh có thể mô tả cho em cái quy trình cung ứng của KXQ đầu vào và đầu ra như thế nào và nó liên hệ với chuỗi của SGC như thế nào?
[00.15] B12Aug30Do
Hiện nay thì mình cái đầu vào của mình thì là một là do trang trại KXQ tự sản xuất, thứ hai là mình bao tiêu sản phẩm theo cái tiêu chuẩn của KXQ của các cái hộ nông dân lân cận, đó thì nó có hai cái nguồn đó và … sau khi mà thu hoạch từ từ vườn, vô thì mình đem về cái xưởng chế biến của KXQ và sơ chế đóng gói rồi cung cấp thẳng đến kho của SGC
[01.00] Interviewer:
Ngoài SGC thì mình có…?
[01.02] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)
Mình cũng có cung cấp cho bên M, M bây giờ nó thành ra cái gì tự nhiên quên tên mất tiêu rồi **[Interviewer: MM]** à MM, rồi BC, hồi xưa cũng cung cấp cho BC rất là nhiều nhưng mà thời gian sau này thì do cái chính sách mua hàng của bên BC nó không được ấy cho nên là mình cũng cắt hàng mình không có cung cấp. Rồi về trái cây thì mình cũng có cung cấp cho một số cái [ngập ngừng 2s] cửa hàng trái cây lớn ở Sài Gòn
[01.41] Interviewer:
Mình trồng cả rau cả trái cây luôn hả anh?
[01.43] B12Aug30Do
Trái cây thì chủ yếu mình trồng các loại dưa lưới và dưa hoàng kim
[01:51] Interviewer:
Vậy nếu như mà mình chia ra trong những cái đơn vị này thì khoảng bao nhiêu % là mình sẽ cung cấp cho SGC bao nhiêu % mình sẽ cung cấp…?
[02:02] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)
SGC chiếm khoảng 70%
[02:07] Interviewer
Còn BC giờ là bớt rồi?
[02:09] B12Aug30Do
Ờ BC mình bớt rồi, BC không đáng kể, còn lại là M còn lại cái cửa hàng trái cây ngoài thì cũng ít thôi
[02:14] Interviewer:
Chắc là M cũng khoảng 20, 25
[02:19] B12Aug30Do
Khoảng 25 đó
[02:24] Interviewer:
Dạ dậy còn cái mô hình của cái SGC phát triển cái dự án rau sạch thì anh có thể mô tả cho em được cái…?
[02:32] B12Aug30Do
Thì hiện nay mình có hợp tác với lại một cái trang trại làm Organic ở Cà Mau, ờm thì ở trang trại đó quy mô cũng khá lớn cỡ khoảng 320ha thì nó sản xuất chủ yếu là gạo, lúa gạo và đang phát triển thêm cái mảng là rau củ qủa rồi các loại cá nước ngọt ở đó
[03:07] Interviewer:
Rồi mình chỉ hợp tác với lại bên đó thôi, với KXQ nữa chứ hả anh hay chỉ có một cái
[03:15] B12Aug30Do

Cái cái đó là cái riêng của SGC còn KXQ là cái riêng của anh (cười)
[03:20] Interviewer:
Cái của SGC là ngoài hợp tác với trang trại này thì có, tức là sẽ đầu tư trực tiếp hay cái hình thức hợp tác như thế nào?
[03:28] B12Aug30Do
Cái trang trại này thì là SGC đầu tư trực tiếp, mua lại hơn 50% của cái trang trại này
[03:43] Interviewer
Rồi vậy thì trong cái dự án này thì ngoài cái hàng từ trang trại thì còn có mua từ nguồn nào khác?
[03:53] B12Aug30Do
Không
[03:54] Interviewer
Duy nhất là trang trại
[03:54] B12Aug30Do
Ừm tại vì cái Organic thì nó khó
[04:01] Interviewer
50% này là tức là mua lại cái công ty ở bên đó rồi mình sẽ can thiệp vào?
[04:08] B12Aug30Do
Ấy mình cử người qua điều hành quản lý thì anh là một trong những người điều hành trong đó
[04:17] Interviewer
Vậy coi như cái này là của SGC tự trồng luôn?
[04:22] B12Aug30Do
Đúng
[04:22] Interviewer
Còn cái nguồn mua hàng của SGC bây giờ là sẽ, cái chuỗi cung ứng hiện tại của SGC là như thế nào, anh có theo cái sản phẩm rau củ nói chung á chứ không nói về cái dự án rau sạch á thì anh có thể chia sẻ với em được không?
[04:43] B12Aug30Do
Thì cái SGC thì bây giờ nó có khoảng kể cả rau và trái cây này kia thì nó có khoảng vài chục nhà cung cấp, vài chục nhà cung cấp thì các nhà cung cấp có thể là các công ty, có thể là các hợp tác xã nhưng mà do là cái cái cái mô hình SGC là hợp tác xã cho nên là cái sự liên kết với lại các hợp tác xã ở các cái tỉnh thành này kia nó cũng tương đối là chặt chẽ cho nên là cái nguồn hàng của các hợp tác xã nông nghiệp của các địa phương thì cung cấp về cho SGC, ngoài ra là các công ty cũng có thể là các doanh nghiệp tư nhân, hộ tư nhân nhưng mà cái hộ tư nhân thì ít ớ chớ cũng không nhiều chủ yếu là các công ty và các hợp tác xã thôi
[05:37] Interviewer
Nhưng mà tại sao khi mà qua các công ty hay là qua các hợp tác xã như vậy thì chắc là cũng phải có cái tiêu chuẩn nhất định đúng không anh?
[05:48] B12Aug30Do
Đúng rồi. Thì cái, hiện nay thì cái tiêu chuẩn hầu hết của các hệ thống siêu thị đang tuân theo là cái tiêu chuẩn VietGAP, ừm thì là mỗi cái [ngập ngừng 1s] tiêu chuẩn đó tiêu chuẩn chung của nhà nước rồi cho nên là tất cả các cái doanh nghiệp đều phải tuân theo cái đó, tại vì nhà nước đi kiểm thì cũng kiểm theo cái tiêu chuẩn đó, thì [ngập ngừng 2s] như SGC cũng vậy, M cũng vậy thì cũng có những cái đội ngũ để mà thường xuyên kiểm tra những cái cái đó, có thể là kiểm tra

sản phẩm khi mà cung cấp tới kho, rồi có thể là kiểm tra sản phẩm đang trưng bày bán ở siêu thị và định kỳ định kỳ hoặc là không thường xuyên, bất ngờ thì đi kiểm tra tại nơi trồng trọt

[06:48] Interviewer

Vậy thì cái dự án mà làm rau sạch này nó sẽ khác với lại hàng mà đang mua từ những cái nơi khác như thế nào?

[06:56] B12Aug30Do

Cái dự án làm rau sạch này thì hiện nay SGC đang muốn hướng tới tiêu chuẩn organic

[07:01] Interviewer

Còn cái VietGAP thì nó chưa chưa phải là đó, thì em quay lại KXQ, tại vì KXQ thì có hợp tác lại với các nông hộ để sản xuất ngoài cái việc mình tự sản xuất thì anh có thể chia sẻ với em là cách mình chọn cái nông hộ này như thế nào hay là làm sao để mình chọn cái…?

[07:25] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Thứ nhất là cái khu vực ở Củ Chi cũng là cái khu vực mà sản xuất nông nghiệp hồi nào tới giờ cho nên là mình cũng chọn những cái nông hộ mà có diện tích đất cũng tương đối lớn và nó gần với lại kế cận ngay ở cái khu khu công nghệ cao của mình để thứ nhất là để mình dễ quản lý nghĩa là nó gần đó thì cái đội ngũ quản lý của mình có thể là về mặt di chuyển để mà quản lý cái này nó thuận lợi. Và những cái nông hộ đó cũng phải có tiêu chuẩn là VietGAP, làm theo tiêu chuẩn sản xuất theo tiêu chuẩn VietGAP có giấy chứng nhận VietGAP này kia theo đúng cái tiêu chuẩn mà mình cam kết với lại hệ thống siêu thị

[08:18] Interviewer

Hiện giờ là mình đang làm với khoảng bao nhiêu nông hộ như vậy hả anh?

[08:22] B12Aug30Do

Mình làm khoảng đâu bốn năm hộ như vậy

[08:30] Interviewer

Vậy cái ví dụ cái diện tích anh nói là phải lớn một chút thì khoảng bao nhiêu thì gọi là lớn?

[08:41] B12Aug30Do

Thì nó khoảng từ 1 đến 2ha

[08:51] Interviewer

Các cái nông hộ này thì anh làm với họ lâu chưa anh?

[08:57] B12Aug30Do

Cũng lâu rồi

[08:58] Interviewer

Cái người lâu nhất thì khoảng bao lâu?

[09:00] B12Aug30Do

Người lâu nhất thì cũng khoảng sáu bảy năm

[09:04] Interviewer

Còn người mà ngắn nhất thì sao?

[09:04] B12Aug30Do

Hầu như là cũng cũng 4, 5 năm rồi

[09:14] Interviewer

Tức là đều là những người, vậy những cái người này là cung cấp cung ứng cho mình có ổn định không anh?

[09:19] B12Aug30Do

Đúng rồi những cái người mà làm với mình thì tương đối ổn định đó, hầu như là cũng không có ai rút ra (cười)

[09:30] Interviewer

Vậy cái việc mình mình bao tiêu cho họ là hình thức như thế nào anh?

[09:43] B12Aug30Do

Thì họ sản xuất xong rồi ừm hằng ngày như vậy họ thu hoạch được bao nhiêu thì họ đem vô trong trong trại của mình họ ấy thì mình hầu như là mình lấy hết cho họ

[09:59] Interviewer

Hầu như là 100% của họ luôn cho họ?

[10:00] B12Aug30Do

Hầu như là 100%

[10:02] Interviewer

Họ không bán cho ai bên ngoài?

[10:04] B12Aug30Do

Ờ họ không bán cho ai bên ngoài, tại vì cái giá của mình mua thì theo cái tiêu chuẩn này nó nó tương đối là nhỉnh hơn giá thị trường cho nên là họ bán ở ngoài thì họ sẽ tất nhiên là cũng có những cái thời điểm mà Việt Nam thì nó có những cái lúc mà dịp tết rồi này kia đồ vậy đó thì những cái mặt hàng ví dụ như dưa leo này kia đồ nó lên giá rất là cao thì thời điểm đó thì thực tế họ cũng có đem ra bán ở ngoài có chứ không phải không có

[10:33] Interviewer

Nhưng mà mình có cam kết có ký hợp đồng với họ không hay là cái?

[10:39] B12Aug30Do (trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Có ký hợp đồng

[10:45] Interviewer

Mình có cái hình thức nào để mình đảm bảo là mình thu mua từ các nhà cung ứng này đáp ứng được cái yêu cầu của mình không?

[10.56] B12Aug30Do

Mình có một cái đội ngũ [ngập ngừng 2s] đi kiểm tra họ đi thăm vườn họ hàng ngày kiểm tra họ và cái mình cũng lấy những cái mẫu hàng của họ mình đi mình kiểm tra định kỳ, test thường xuyên theo cái tiêu chuẩn của của của VietGAP

[11.21] Interviewer

Mình còn hình thức nào khác để kiểm tra họ nữa không, ngoài cái chuyện mình kiểm tra họ hàng ngày như vậy mình còn áp dụng thêm cái biện pháp nào nữa không kiểu để quản lý họ?

[11.34] B12Aug30Do

[Ngập ngừng 2s] Hầu như là không

[11.38] **Interviewer**

Vậy mình có cái hình thức nào để mình làm cho họ cung ứng tốt hơn cho mình không anh?

[11.46] B12Aug30Do

Hiện nay thì những cái hộ dân mà làm với mình hồi nào tới giờ thì họ gắn bó cũng tương đối lâu. Thì mình nghĩ là cái mà để mà họ làm tốt với mình, và họ gắn bó lâu như vậy thì nghĩa là mình… đảm bảo được cái …ổn định sản xuất của họ, ờ nó không… nghĩa là cái sản phẩm của họ làm ra hằng ngày thì… mình cũng không có khuyến khích họ làm nhiều lắm, họ làm đúng và họ làm cái sản lượng nó ổn định vừa đủ cho mình, rồi… họ… khi họ làm ra họ không có sợ bị ế, và cái giá cả này kia thì mình cũng mua và tương đối ổn định và thực tế là họ làm đúng theo tiêu chuẩn đó, thì là cái họ sống được theo cái thị trường, đó, thì cái đó mình nghĩ là cái đó là cái để mà họ gắn bó lâu dài với mình từ hồi nào tới giờ

[12.45] Interviewer

Vậy mình có hoạt động để gọi là hỗ trợ cho họ phát triển không anh?

[12.53] B12Aug30Do

Hầu như là không, tại vì [im lặng 2s] thực tế thì doanh nghiệp của mình thì nó cũng là doanh nghiệp nhỏ thôi, nó cũng không có lớn… doanh thu hai mấy ba chục tỉ hằng năm thì nó cũng không có gì là lớn. Và hồi nào tới giờ thì mình cũng phát triển từ nhỏ phát triển lên… đi từ từ từ từ phát triển lên thì hầu như mình cũng không có nhận được cái sự hỗ trợ gì của nhà nước, rồi kể cả cái sự mà tiếp cận những cái nguồn vốn từ ngân hàng này kia… hồi giờ hầu như là không không tiếp cận được, cho nên là cái cái nguồn lực để mà mình có thể đi hỗ trợ những cái người nông dân này kia đồ như vậy mình cũng không không có được ừm

[13.45] Interviewer

Vậy là về mặt ví dụ như về mặt kỹ thuật thì tất cả các nông hộ của mình họ sẽ tự lo hết chứ mình có cho có// tập huấn cho họ hay là…?

[12.55] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Có mình có tập huấn cho họ chứ, và mình [ngập ngừng 2s], họ vô trong chỗ trong nông trại của mình. Họ thấy mình làm như vậy như vậy như vậy. Và họ đầu tiên luôn thì họ có ý muốn tham gia trước cái đã. Ờ thì họ sẽ, mình sẽ hỗ trợ cho họ, ừ làm như vậy làm như vậy thì những cái kỹ thuật nó như vậy như vậy đó. Rồi kể cả về mặt máy móc thiết bị và kể cả là kỹ thuật chăm bón phân bón rồi này kia luôn thì mình sẽ hỗ trợ cho họ cái đó, và họ làm theo cái của mình và họ bán lại cho mình

[14.36] Interviewer

Nhưng mà mình có hỗ trợ cho họ nhiều ấy chứ, tức là những cái hoạt động như vậy thì anh sẽ có là anh… họ đến nông trại của mình để họ coi cái cách mình làm, rồi anh có đến vườn của họ để tập huấn cho họ chỉ họ làm không?

[14.52] B12Aug30Do

Có chứ, thì nghĩa là trong cái lúc mình đi kiểm tra rồi này kia đồ vậy đó, thì là mình sẽ hỗ trợ cho họ… những cái gì mà họ đang họ đang làm chưa có chuẩn thì mình sẽ chuẩn hóa những cái của họ theo cái đấy, rồi mình cũng cho họ đi học những cái lớp VietGAP rồi này kia đồ, gì đó, những cái lớp tập huấn này kia của nhà nước tổ chức thì mà mình được tham gia thì nghĩa là mình đối xử với họ giống như một cái nhân viên của cái công ty của mình làm bình thường và họ cũng được tham gia những cái đó.

[15.33] Interviewer

Anh có thể nhớ thêm là những cái hoạt động đó theo dạng hỗ trợ như vậy là mình làm cho họ là gồm những hoạt động gì, có thể chia sẻ với em, tức là càng nhiều càng tốt cái hành động hoạt động mà anh nghĩ ra là mình giúp cho họ làm có cái chất lượng tốt hơn hoặc là làm cho cái việc kinh doanh của họ dễ dàng hơn?

[15.55] B12Aug30Do

Thực tế ở đây thì cũng cái này thì cũng không thể mà gọi là giúp họ được, theo cái mình nghĩ thì cái này là mình đang làm cho mình, họ tất nhiên thì mình hướng dẫn họ làm những cái đó để mà cái hàng hóa của mình khi mà mình thu mua lại thì nó chuẩn ấy, khi mà mình đưa lên thị trường thì nó đúng theo cái chuẩn của mình ấy. Vậy thì cái đó thì cũng có thể có lợi cho họ nhưng mà thực tế cũng có lợi cho mình nữa… chứ cũng không thể gọi là giúp họ, theo theo cái ý anh nghĩ là như thế (cười)

[16.37] Interviewer

Vậy thì những cái hoạt động nào mà mình nghĩ là tốt cho mình nhưng mà mình phải làm với họ để đảm bảo là họ có thể cung ứng tốt cho mình á anh thì đối với…?

[16.46] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Vậy thì ví dụ như những cái hoạt động như là phổ biến cho họ những cái tiêu chuẩn về VietGAP là nó như thế nào, cho họ đi tập huấn, cho họ đi học những cái lớp về tiêu chuẩn VietGAP này kia. Rồi áp dụng những cái tiêu chuẩn đó vô trong đồng ruộng và rồi hỗ trợ họ về những cái kỹ thuật, ngoài cái kỹ thuật VietGAP đó ra, thì những cái kỹ thuật về kêu bằng là nông nghiệp công nghệ cao áp dụng máy móc khoa học đồ này kia đồ vô trong sản xuất, thì để mà họ làm ra những cái sản phẩm nó sạch hơn, nó ít sâu bệnh hơn, nó không có bị dư lượng thuốc trừ sâu, không có dư lượng phân bón này kia để mà cái sản phẩm của mình nó ra nó nó đạt chuẩn. Ừ thì cái đó là mình cũng… thực tế cái đó là mình đang theo, mình thấy thì có thể là cũng có lợi ích cho họ. Cái kinh nghiệm sản xuất đồ này kia của họ nó cũng sẽ được tăng lên nhưng mà cái lợi ích mình thu lại là cái sản phẩm của mình nó đồng nhất… nó đều và nó nó nó càng ngày càng chất lượng theo cái tiêu chuẩn của mình.

[18.00] Interviewer

Nói chung là đôi bên cũng cùng có lợi. Vậy cho em hỏi kỹ một chút cái chỗ mà anh hỗ trợ máy móc cho họ là cái hình thức như thế nào ạ?

[18.12] B12Aug30Do

Thì ví dụ như là mình sẽ… họ bỏ tiền ra họ đầu tư những cái đó thì mình có thể là hướng dẫn cho họ là sẽ mua những cái máy móc nào dùng cái màng này kia với cái quy mô như thế nào rồi mình setup cái hệ thống đó cho họ

[18.32] Interviewer

À mình làm cho họ luộn?

[18.33] B12Aug30Do

Ờ cái mình hướng dẫn mình làm cho họ này kia đồ dậy

[18.37] Interviewer

Nhưng mà vốn là họ phải đầu tư?

[18.39] B12Aug30Do

Vốn thì họ phải đầu tư chứ thực tế thì công ty không có vốn (cười) để mà

[18.44] Interviewer

Mình có hình thức mà ví dụ như cho họ mượn máy hay là cho họ thuê hay là tất cả những cái đó là họ đều tự phải mua?

[18.52] B12Aug30Do

Không

[18.54] Interviewer

Còn về phân bón thì như thế nào anh, cái hình thức mà mình hỗ trợ là phân bón?

[19.02] B12Aug30Do

Mình cũng có những cái hướng dẫn cho họ về những cái phân bón nó này kia nhưng mà thỉnh thoảng thì đôi khi thì có những cái nguồn phân bón mà mình họ mua ở ngoài không có hoặc là họ mua ở ngoài giá cao thì mình có thể mua dùm, ừ mình có thể mua dùm cho họ đấy dậy.

[19.25] Interviewer

Nhưng mà mình không có cấp phân cho họ để họ// để họ sản xuất nghĩa là...?
[19.28] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khia chưa hết câu hỏi)
Không, không tất cả mọi thứ đều hầu như họ tự tự đầu tư và họ bán lại cho mình
[19.38] Interviewer
Vậy nếu như mà những cái hoạt động của mình nãy giờ mình liệt kê á là hỗ trợ cho họ về kỹ thuật, cho họ đi tập huấn, rồi máy móc hỗ trợ cho họ, setup các máy móc, rồi mình còn có hỗ trợ cho họ…nếu tìm cái nguồn phân bón… để nếu như mà họ không tìm được thì mình sẽ giúp cho họ có cái giá thấp hơn là giảm giá thành sản xuất của họ thì nếu như anh xếp trên thang điểm từ 1 2 3 với cái 3 là cái mức hỗ trợ như vậy, tức là hỗ trợ cho họ như vậy là nhiều, 1 là ít nhất thì các hoạt động đó anh có thể đánh giá cái nào thì nó sẽ nằm ở mức cơ bản đơn giản không có gì phức tạp, cái nào là cái nó tương đối phức tạp hơn mình phải đòi hỏi mình phải giúp cho họ nhiều hơn, thì anh có thể đánh giá được không anh? Còn 2 là ở mức trung bình?
[20.41] B12Aug30Do
Thì theo ý mình á, là cái mà… cái mà mà… nó khó đó…để mà… là về mặt cái kỹ thuật trồng trọt. Thì cái đó là cái mà có thể gọi là… mình chia sẻ bí quyết công nghệ… ừm thì cái đó là cái mà mình… mình cho nó là chia sẻ với họ nhiều nhất. Còn về mặt mà hạ tầng cơ sở kỹ thuật rồi này kia á, thì bây giờ cái đó ở ngoài người ta làm đầy, ai ai cũng có thể làm được chứ không phải riêng gì một mình mình. Có thể là mình làm có những cái cải tiến rồi này kia gì đó mà nó…đại khái là rẻ hơn người ta tí xíu, chứ nhưng mà thực tế không phải cái gì lớn
[21.29] Interviewer
Anh có áp dụng cái đó cho tất cả các cái hộ mà làm việc với mình không, hay là mình chỉ áp dụng với một vài hộ, cái hình thức như thế nào, tức là mình có bốn đến năm hộ thì có phải hộ nào anh cũng?
[21.43] B12Aug30Do
ừm hộ nào mình cũng làm cũng y như vậy
[21.47] Interviewer
Có sự chênh lệch nào giữa các hộ không?
[21.50] B12Aug30Do
Hầu như là mình cũng không có phân biệt đối xử với lại (cười) bất cứ một cái hộ nào, nhưng mà có một cái điều… tất nhiên là điều kiện kinh tế của mỗi hộ nó mỗi khác, cho nên là cái, cái mà đầu tư về hạ tầng kỹ thuật á… thì ở mỗi nơi nó mỗi mỗi khác, chứ nó thực sự nó không có đồng đều
[22.16] Interviewer
Bây giờ anh nghĩ dùm em, trong số những người đó, em tập trung vô hỏi một người thôi để cho dễ, cái người mà anh cảm thấy là anh gắn bó, anh có nhiều hoạt động hỗ trợ cho họ nhất. Thì cái dạng nãy giờ mình nói, các hoạt động đó mình tạm gọi là mình hỗ trợ cho họ. Thì một cái hộ mà gắn với mình nhất là… đó, mình có nhiều cái gắn kết với họ trong những cái hoạt động như vậy nhiều nhất… thì… anh thấy là cái việc mà mình quản lý họ, rồi mình có cái hoạt động hỗ trợ họ như vậy thì có hiệu quả không anh?
[22.53] B12Aug30Do
Có chứ
[22.56] Interviewer
Tức là nếu mà đánh giá cái mức hiệu quả của nó thì anh nghĩ là nó đạt được bao nhiêu % so với mình mong muốn về cái đầu ra?

[23.11] B12Aug30Do

ừm thực sự thì cái này đánh giá nó cũng nó cũng khó tại vì hồi nào tới giờ anh cũng không có cái cái cái định (cười) hướng về cái chuyện đánh giá đó, nhưng mà chỉ thấy nhìn chung lại thì thấy họ cũng có gắn bó với mình và họ sản xuất nó ổn định và họ gắn bó với mình được lâu dài như vậy thì mình nghĩ rằng là cái cái cái sự mà cộng tác của mình đối với họ thì nó nó có hiệu quả, thì họ mới gắn bó với mình

[23.54] Interviewer

Vậy có khi nào mà anh cảm thấy là cái họ có các hành vi họ biểu hiện với mình là cơ hội không?

[24.11] B12Aug30Do

Ừm cũng cũng không

[24.15] Interviewer

Tức là mình không có. Vậy có khi nào mà giữa anh với họ có xảy ra trục trặc gì trong cái quá trình hợp tác với nhau hai bên không ạ?

[24.30] B12Aug30Do

Cũng không có gì lớn lắm. Thì ví dụ như là cũng có những cái thời điểm mà cái giá cả thị trường nó biến động á, thì họ cũng có yêu cầu mình là nâng cái giá lên cho nó bằng với thị trường này kia đồ vậy. Nhưng mà đó cũng là một vài thời điểm mà nó cao điểm ở trong năm thôi, hầu như thì cái chuyện đó không không lớn lắm… tại vì mình thì mình cũng mấy thời điểm đó thực tế mình cũng phải tăng giá lên để mà đảm bảo cái quyền lợi của họ chứ cũng không phải là

[25.14] Interviewer

Có trường hợp nào mà mình hổng có thể tăng giá được mà họ cuối cùng thì họ sẽ không bán cho mình nữa?

[25.23] B12Aug30Do

Nghĩa là không bán cho mình nữa thì không có, nhưng mà họ có thể là bớt cái sản lượng lại ví dụ như họ bán bên trong hay bên ngoài thì cái chuyện đó cũng có

[25.34] Interviewer

Mình có biết chuyện đó không anh?

[25.35] B12Aug30Do

Mình biết, mình biết hoàn toàn mình biết hết, nhưng mà cái cái sản lượng đó thì… mình tất nhiên là mình cũng có hụt, mình có hụt ở trong cái cung cấp cho bên cái hệ thống siêu thị. Nhưng mà mấy hệ thống siêu thị thì nó cũng có cái như thế này nữa… thì cái thời điểm đó thì cái giá hàng ở ngoài nó cũng rất là cao, và họ mua hàng á… tại vì mình á là mình bây giờ thì mình không áp dụng… thời gian gần đây thì mình không áp dụng cái đó nữa… chứ hồi xưa á là mình áp dụng giá là giá cố định trong cả năm luôn, mình không có lên xuống theo từng thời điểm. Ví dụ như là dưa leo mình bán vô trong đó là 12000/1kg, rồi trong đó bán ra 14-15000 gì đó, thì là cái hàng của mình lúc nào nó cũng vậy nó không có lên xuống gì hết tại vì mình sản xuất theo cái quy trình này á thì á là cái sản lương nó tương đối là ổn định. Nó không có bị thời tiết rồi này kia rồi ảnh hưởng nhiều. Và cái do cái quy trình của mình nó như vậy nên là cái giá thành nó cũng ổn định rồi. nớ thì mình muốn là làm một cái giá của mình nó ổn định từ rồi, giá thành rồi cộng với tỷ suất lợi nhuận rồi coi như là mình đưa ra cái giá nó ổn định như vậy, nhưng mà có một cái là ví dụ như tới cái thời điểm mà cái giá… và tất nhiên là cái giá của mình nó nhỉnh hơn cái giá hàng bình thường ở ngoài chứ nó không không có bằng. Ví dụ như giá bình thường ở ngoài bán 8000, 9000 rồi thì mình bán 12000, 12000 mấy, đó ví dụ như vậy nhưng mà có những cái thời điểm thì cái giá ở ngoài nó lên rất là cao nó lên tới hai mấy ngàn mười mấy hai mấy ngàn, thì bắt đầu bên mấy hệ thống siêu thị…thì lấy của những công ty lấy của những cái đầu mối này kia thì người ta sẽ tăng theo giá thị trường… và nếu như mà không tăng giá cho người ta thì người ta sẽ không giao hàng, thì các cái hệ thống siêu thị đổ dồn qua bên này đặt hàng ở bên này… nhưng mà thực tế thì sản lượng ở bên này cũng không đáp ứng đủ, tại vì mình sản xuất quy mô bao nhiêu đó là mình chỉ có ra được bao nhiêu đó thôi… chứ có bói cũng không bói ra thêm được (cười) có hái trái non đi nữa cũng không ra được cái sản lượng lớn hơn á…thì nó cũng cũng có cái đó thì vào những thời điểm đó thì hầu như là bên mình cũng đứt hàng bên mình cũng không có hàng nhiều để mà cung cấp cho họ

[28.03] Interviewer

Nhưng mà trong cái thời điểm đó mình vẫn phải cam kết giữ giá với lại bên siêu thị, chứ không có được quyền tăng giá?

[28.11] B12Aug30Do

Không có tăng nhưng mà từ năm ngoái… nghĩa là tới lúc ký kết hợp đồng mới á thì mình thấy cái tình trạng đó, siêu thị lớn thì cái bộ phận mua ở bên siêu thị cũng không phải là, nói thẳng luôn, là cũng không phải cái người làm nông và cũng không phải là cái… đại khái là cái cách làm việc á nó cũng không được gọi là fair play lắm (cười) cho nên là mình bỏ cái điều khoản đó và mình bán lên xuống theo giá thị trường. Theo giá thị trường luôn chứ mình không có không có cái đó nữa tại vì mình cam kết như vậy bao nhiêu năm trời. Mình cũng chẳng có được hỗ trợ cái gì, ưu tiên cái gì… cho cái chuyện mà mình làm, theo mình nghĩ là cái việc mình làm tốt đó. Thì chỉ có được một cái là tới chừng thời điểm hàng lên thì đem dồn hàng hỏi bên này đặt nhiều thế thôi (cười), thì cái lợi ích không có được…đấy cho nên là mình năm gần đây thì mình bỏ cái điều khoản đó

[29.30] Interviewer

Vậy với cái chuyện là những năm trước đó cam kết giá vậy thì mình vẫn phải mua lại cho các cái người mua của mình với mức giá thấp như vậy luôn hay là anh phải…?

[29.41] B12Aug30Do (trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Những cái thời điểm đó thì mình vẫn phải mua giá cao đó

[29.47] Interviewer

Nhưng mà mình bán lại?

[29.47] B12Aug30Do

Mình bán lại mình bán lỗ

[29.49] Interviewer

Vẫn phải chấp nhận?

[29.49] B12Aug30Do

ừ

[29.52] Interviewer

Nhưng mà có trường hợp nào anh hổng có thể nào mua giá cao được như vậy rồi họ bỏ mình, họ hổng cung cấp hàng cho mình không?

[30.03] B12Aug30Do

Làm ăn lâu dài mà, cho nên là mình cũng phải hỗ trợ… và kể cả mình cũng không thể nào nói rằng là… mình không cung cấp hàng cho siêu thị. Cho nên là mình vẫn phải mua để mà mình cung cấp hàng cho siêu thị, chứ không thể nào mà người ta đặt hàng mà mình không giao được. Tại vì chuyện làm ăn lâu dài thì có lúc này lúc kia

[30.27] Interviewer

Có khi nào mà bị gặp vấn đề gì về chất lượng sản phẩm không anh?

[30.36] B12Aug30Do

Cái hàng của bên mình á thì hầu như là ít. Nó không có bị cái đó… tại vì cái quy trình sản xuất của mình là mình kiểm soát cái đó hết toàn bộ… giống như là không phải mình đi mua hàng trôi nổi ở ngoài để mà mình không có thể kiểm soát được cái chất lượng. Cho nên là cái của bên mình là hầu như là không có

[31.00] Interviewer

Có trường hợp như là họ trộn hàng khác giá trị thấp hơn vô. Tại vì mình mua giá cao hơn giá thị trường, có khi nào họ đưa sản phẩm kém chất lượng vô cho mình?... Tại mình bao tiêu cho người ta?

[31.18] B12Aug30Do

Theo mình nghĩ thì cái đó nó có nhưng mà một cái tỷ lệ nào đó nó cũng không có. Họ làm như vậy thì họ cũng cảm thấy chẳng có lợi lộc gì hết á. Vì cái thứ nhất là cái quy mô cái vườn của họ là bao nhiêu đó, và mình… có thể là mình không tới hằng ngày nhưng mà một tuần mình vẫn tới một hai lần, thì mình biết được là với cái quy mô họ đang trồng như vậy thì cái thời điểm nào, đầu vụ nó như thế nào, rộ vụ nó như thế nào và cuối vụ nó như thế nào. Cái sản lượng đó mình nắm được, ừ cái sản lượng đó mình có thể ước lượng được. Cho nên là họ… mình thấy là ừ cái vườn đó cái thời điểm đó mà tự nhiên cái số lượng nó như vậy thì mình cũng sẽ nghi ngờ liền à. Rồi cái [ngập ngừng 2s] cái hàng kiểm nghiệm này kia rồi mình lấy mẫu của họ mình đi mình kiểm nghiệm này kia, thì mình cũng sẽ có thể phát hiện ra những cái hàng mà không phải làm đúng theo quy trình của mình. Ví dụ như có thể là cái hàm lượng dư lượng thuốc trừ sâu của ở bên mình là nó... nếu làm trồng theo cái quy trình này thì nó… nó rất là thấp… hầu như là không có, ví dụ như vậy. Mà cái hàng họ độn ở ngoài thì chắc chắn là cái dư lượng nó sẽ cao hơn. Có thể là vẫn nằm ở trong cái tiêu chuẩn nhưng mà nó sẽ cao hơn hẳn gấp hai ba lần cái cái hàng của mình, thì mình cũng biết liền. Tất nhiên là không vượt ra ngoài tiêu chuẩn Việt Nam (cười) không vượt ra ngoài tiêu chuẩn VietGAP, nhưng mà cái dư lượng của họ là có… thì mình sẽ làm việc với họ thì

[33.05] Interviewer

Nhưng mà có xảy ra trường hợp như vậy bao giờ không anh?

[33.08] B12Aug30Do

Trước kia thì cũng có nhưng mà sau đó thì hầu như là thời gian hồi gần gần đây thì không có

[33.15] Interviewer

Thế thì như em nghĩ có cái trường hợp vầy, tại vì họ cũng muốn mình làm ăn lâu dài với họ. Họ cũng muốn giữ cái mối quan hệ với mình. Trong cái thời điểm mà giá thị trường người ta đang mua cao và mình thì cũng cam kết với họ là mình mua một cái giá vừa phải thôi không thể cao được như thị trường, thì họ sẽ đem cái hàng của họ ra ngoài thị trường bán sau họ sẽ tìm cái nguồn khác để họ đắp vô cho mình. Thì có bao giờ anh phát hiện ra cái trường hợp như vậy không? Tức là về mặt sản lượng mình nói là cung cấp ba tấn, thì họ cũng chỉ cung cấp ba tấn thôi đó, nhưng mà thực ra ba tấn không phải hàng từ cái vườn của họ, vườn của họ chỉ đang trưng lên cho mình coi vậy thôi?

[33.57] B12Aug30Do

Thực tế thì em nói như vậy nó cũng nó cũng có lý đó, nhưng mà nó bất hợp lý một cái là… bản thân cái lúc đó cái giá hàng ngoài ở ngoài thị trường cũng cao lắm, và họ bán cái hàng này ra thì họ cũng chỉ bán được ngang giá thị trường thôi…chứ người ta cũng thị trường ở ngoài người ta đâu có cần mua hàng cao cấp để làm cái gì, đối với người ta cái hàng cao cấp cái hàng ở ngoài chợ đầu mối nói chung là cái hàng cao cấp đối với người ta không có ý nghĩa cho nên họ cũng chỉ là như dưa leo thì họ cũng chỉ mua là cái dưa leo thôi (cười) …chứ họ không mua cái dưa leo mà chất lượng cao này. Cho nên là cái giá khi mà họ bán ra, thì nó cũng chỉ là cao bằng với cái giá ở ngoài thị trường thôi, chứ không thể nào mà cao hơn được. Cho nên là cái chuyện đó hông hông có thể nào xảy ra đâu, họ không thể lấy cái hàng này hàng chất lượng cao rồi họ độn chất lượng thấp, tráo bằng chất lượng thấp tại vì thời điểm đấy thì giá cả nó như nhau (cười)

[34.51] Interviewer

Tức là không có lúc nào mà giá hàng thị trường giá sẽ thấp hơn cái hàng chất lượng cao của mình tại vì thường là chất lượng// rất là khác nhau?

[35.01] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Có chứ. Bình thường á… bình thường á là cái hàng cái hàng của mình á là mình mua cái giá có nhỉnh hơn, nhỉnh hơn khoảng một ngàn, ngàn rưỡi gì đó một ký so với cái hàng đấy ở ngoài

[35.14] Interviewer

Thì sẽ có cái trường hợp là mình mặc dù giá của mình cao rồi nhưng mà bởi vì… có những người khác người ta biết là cái vườn đó là vườn sản xuất sạch, cái họ vô họ trả cái giá cao hơn, thì vườn của mình sẽ mua hàng trôi nổi đỡ cho mình, rồi lấy cái hàng bán cho cái thằng lấy giá cao hơn. Tức là vì cạnh tranh về cái sản phẩm sạch bây giờ em thấy cũng nhiều, rất là nhiều nơi người ra giành để mua được cái sản phẩm mà có cái gọi là sạch đó. Thì mình mua cao hơn một hai ngàn nhưng mà có cái thằng nó bán cao hơn nữa thì họ sẽ mua?

[35.55] B12Aug30Do

Thì ở đây để mà làm ăn với nhau lâu dài tới giờ ấy thì… chủ yếu làm ăn cũng dựa trên cái uy tín với nhau thôi đó. Thì nếu như mà cũng có những cái [ngập ngừng 3s] thời điểm mà họ có thể nói với mình là, ừ có người đó mua với giá như vậy như vậy đó, thì họ cũng yêu cầu mình cái giá như thế này thế kia. Thì cũng có thể xem xét… thì mình có thể điều chỉnh giá của mạng lưới các siêu thị này kia vậy, để mà mình nâng. Nhưng mà thực sự mà nói thì cái sản lượng của những cái người đó mua không nhiều. Tất cả các cái hệ thống rau sạch khác bây giờ thì mua không nhiều, cho nên là họ cũng mua không hết cái sản lượng của cái vườn của mình đâu. Và bù lại một cái nữa là mình…mình lại có cái lợi thế là mình có cái trại riêng của mình. Mình có trại riêng của mình cho nên là ok… họ… nếu như mà họ cảm thấy là làm ăn không được, thì… không phải là năm bảy nhà vườn đó đều cắt của mình hết, mà có thể là một hai nhà vườn. Thì đối với mình… cái sản lượng đó, mình có thể hụt chỗ đó có thể hụt tí xíu nhưng mà mình vẫn chủ động được cái nguồn hàng của mình tự sản xuất trong trang trại. Rồi từ từ mình tìm cách mình bù lại bằng những cách khác. Chứ mình không phải là…Họ không có nắm cái quyền chi phối trong cái sản lượng cung cấp cho mình cho nên là mình có thể đàm phán được, mình sẵn sàng từ bỏ những cái đòi hỏi mà nó mình không đáp ứng được

[37.42] Interviewer

Nhưng mà vậy là có bao giờ đã xảy ra cái tình trạng như em nói không?

[37.45] B12Aug30Do

Cũng có một số người, người ta theo cái thời điểm giá này kia đồ đó, thì… và tất nhiên cũng có… Hồi nào giờ thì cũng đảo qua đảo lại bốn năm người ấy, và cũng có những người không trung thực chứ không phải là không có.

[38.05] Interviewer

Anh có thể kể cho em một cái trường hợp mà anh đã phát hiện được cái đó trong quá khứ. Họ làm như thế nào không ạ?

[38.13] B12Aug30Do

Thì chủ yếu thì họ… họ có thể là họ độn hàng như em nói là có. Họ lấy luôn cái hàng của vườn kế bên ví dụ như là vườn của anh em này kia gì đó. Nghĩa là không có tham gia trong cái chỗ của mình nhưng mà họ cũng trồng những sản phẩm đó giống như họ. Và họ kêu anh em mà ờ mày đưa qua đây tao bán luôn cho ờ đó. Ví dụ như vậy là một cái, rồi cái thứ hai nữa thì họ… canh tác không có đúng theo cái tiêu chuẩn của mình. Họ có thể là ví dụ như là ở trên đó chỉ bón một cái lượng phân bón là như vậy thôi thì họ bón nhiều hơn lên để mà cái trái đồ này kia đồ nhìn cho nó đẹp, nó ấy. Vậy rồi có những cái thời điểm mà sâu bệnh và sử dụng những cái thuốc trong cái danh mục của mình, thì họ không có… thực sự là không… có những cái thời điểm mà phải bỏ nguyên cả vườn. Và họ lại sử dụng những cái thuốc ở trong cái danh mục cấm này kia gì đó, để mà họ cứu cái vườn của họ. Thì mình phát hiện ra những cái trường hợp như vậy thì, sau khi làm việc với họ, nếu như họ không có sự mà thay đổi sự cải thiện thì mình cũng không có mua hàng của họ tiếp nữa

[39.43] Interviewer

Anh có nghĩ những hành vi như vậy là hành vi cơ hội không?

[39.53] B12Aug30Do

Thì cũng cũng có… tại vì cái thực tế thì cái tư duy của cái người nông dân của mình á hồi nào tới giờ nó…nó… nó như vậy. Nó hầu như là nó chưa có được cải thiện nhiều. Như hồi xưa á lúc đó mình làm còn làm… lúc mới ra á, mình còn làm với lại nông dân ở trên Đà Lạt nữa. Thì cũng lên trên đó, cũng đầu tư này kia cho họ, cam kết bao tiêu đồ này kia dậy đó, nhưng mà tới chừng thì… nghĩa là cái… cái hàng cái thời điểm mà hàng mà giá thấp á, thì họ có bao nhiêu thì họ dồn hết cho mình, tới chừng thời điểm mà giá cao á thì họ kêu vườn họ bị hư hết rồi, họ để cho mình được có tí xíu à (cười). Nhưng mà rồi cái khoảng cách nó quá xa đi, mình cũng không đi lên đi xuống rồi này kia được dậy đó nên mình cũng không kiểm soát hết được những cái vấn đề đó. Cho nên là sau khi làm được vài vụ thì thua không làm được nữa thế là mình rút về mình làm ở dưới này không thôi không có làm với cái thị trường hàng Đà Lạt nữa

[41.03] Interviewer

Rồi cái đó ảnh hưởng đến mình nhiều không anh, hồi cái lúc mình làm cái đó thì nó ảnh hưởng?

[41.07] B12Aug30Do

Nhiều chứ, mất tiền mất bạc rồi này kia rồi rất là nhiều

[41.11] Interviewer

Nhưng mà mấy cái hộ trên Đà Lạt đó anh cũng kiểu làm gắn với họ về tiêu chuẩn kỹ thuật y chang như vậy luôn?

[41.18] B12Aug30Do

Không hồi xưa thì làm không có đấy như vầy đâu. Chỉ có là họ làm ờ thì tiêu chuẩn kỹ thuật thì có nhưng mà không có gắt gao như là thời điểm này ớ. Và nghĩa là mình chỉ muốn là mình ứng tiền cho họ để họ làm ấy, để mà mình có một cái sản lượng ổn định để mà mình cung cấp để mà mình thu mua thôi. Nhưng mà cũng không không được

[41.46] Interviewer

Đây là mình đưa tiền trước cho họ luôn?

[41.47] B12Aug30Do

Ờ có có ứng tiền trước, tiền phân tiền giống này kia đồ gì gì đó ờ ứng trước. Nhưng mà tới chừng ớ thì hàng hàng mà lúc mà rẻ thì họ dồn hết cho mình (cười) tới chừng lúc hàng mắc thì… thì ở trên đó mình ở dưới này mà… ở trên đó thương lái họ đi tới tận vườn họ thu thu thu thu họ bán mất tiêu chứ họ đâu có chuyển hàng xuống cho mình đâu

[42.12] Interviewer

Nhưng mà ở trên đó là anh sẽ không hỗ trợ cho họ về kỹ thuật anh không có cho họ đi tập huấn gì này nọ anh chỉ đưa…?

[42.20] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Không lúc, lúc đó thì thị trường cách đây khoảng mười mấy năm rồi, lúc đó thị trường nó còn sơ khai lắm. Nó chưa có… hầu như lúc đó còn chưa có tiêu chuẩn VietGAP

[42.32] Interviewer

Vậy anh có thể so sánh cho em được hai cái khác nhau giữa cái việc ngày xưa anh làm với ở trên Đà Lạt á với cái hiện giờ mình đang làm, thì tại sao ở trên nông dân ở Đà Lạt họ, họ có nhìn có vẻ như họ cơ hội nhiều hơn là với những cái hộ anh đang làm bây giờ đúng không, anh có nghĩ lý do tại sao mà nó có cái khác biệt vậy không, từ chủ quan của họ hay là?

[43.02] B12Aug30Do

Mình nghĩ là mỗi thời điểm nó mỗi khác và cái cách làm của mình bây giờ nó cũng khác với lại cái hồi xưa thì cái mà … cái khác nhất bây giờ á là mình làm gần chỗ của mình mình có thể kiểm soát được này kia đồ được cái đó cũng là một cái. Cái thứ hai nữa là cái… có cái sản phẩm á hiện nay thì mình làm những cái sản phẩm nhiệt đới. Như bây giờ ví dụ như chủ yếu bây giờ sản phẩm của mình đang ở thị trường đó là trái bầu, cái trái bầu, trái bí đao với lại dưa leo này kia đồ gì đó…với cái thị trường của nó nó cũng tương đối là bình ổn. Nó không có những thời điểm mà sốt gay gắt như là cái hàng nông sản ở trên Đà Lạt đó thì cái đó cũng là một trong những cái yếu tố mà [ngập ngừng 2s] để mà cái nguồn cung của mình nó nó ổn định hơn… nó không đẩy chứ… ví dụ như là cái hàng nông sản trên Đà Lạt á thì nó phụ thuộc vô cái thời tiết này kia đồ rất là nhiều. Có những lúc coi như là bị sương muối đồ này kia gì đó thì hầu như là không có một cái bắp cải nào để mà đạt cái tiêu chuẩn để mà đưa vô siêu thị hết. Rồi có những cái mà đại khái là giống như là nó thiệt hại rất là nhiều cho nên là nó tạo thành những cái sốt về cái mặt hàng đó. Thì bây giờ những cái mặt hàng mình làm nó không có cái yếu tố đó nhiều, cho nên là đó cũng là một cái yếu tố mà mình có thể làm nó bền vững được

[45.13] Interviewer

Anh nghĩ là những cái việc mà mình gắn kết chặt chẽ hơn với các cái nông hộ ấy như là cái chuyện anh cho người ta anh đối xử giống như nãy anh nói anh coi người ta như nhân viên của mình cho người ta đi học luôn rồi hướng dẫn cho họ lại những cái đó, thì cái đó nó có ảnh hưởng đến cái việc là họ làm việc với anh lâu dài hay là kể cả cái việc đảm bảo là họ cung ứng cho mình không?

[45.37] B12Aug30Do

Mình nghĩ là cũng có. tại vì dù gì thì cái thứ nhất là cái người nông dân người Việt Nam mình nói chung cái người nông dân của mình và người miền Nam nói chung nữa á thì cái tình cảm á đó là một cái yếu tố mà nó quan trọng

[46.07] Interviewer

Trong những cái hành vi lúc nãy mà anh liệt kê á như là có thay đổi về giá cả, anh biết là họ bán ra ngoài như vậy thì…cái mức độ mà anh chấp nhận cái hành vi như vậy có cao không? anh có chấp nhận cái hành vi đó không?

[46.28] B12Aug30Do

Nếu mà nói về mà chấp nhận thì [ngập ngừng 3s] thì cũng cũng biết…nhưng mà mình cũng mắt nhắm mắt mở tại vì mình không có [ngập ngừng 2s] can thiệp được nhiều vô cái đó với cái với cái nguồn lực của mình, nhưng mà [im lặng 3s] thực tế thì họ cũng không phải là họ bán hết ra ngoài. Họ cũng có cái… họ vẫn giữ lại được một cái… họ vẫn muốn làm ăn với mình lâu dài mà. Họ chỉ muốn ở trong cái thời điểm đó họ kiếm thêm được một ít vậy thôi, nhưng mà họ vẫn muốn là sau thời điểm đó thì họ vẫn làm ăn với mình lâu dài, cho nên họ vẫn giữ lại cho mình một cái sản lượng nó cũng tương đối, để mà họ duy trì với mình thế này thế kia thì [ngập ngừng 2s]. Thôi thì mắt nhắm mắt mở, chứ cũng để mà làm ăn với nhau chớ làm gắt với nhau quá thì nó cũng không có ấy ừm

[47.33] Interviewer

Vậy anh có nghĩ đó là bình thường không?

[47.40] B12Aug30Do

Đối với cái điều kiện của mình như hiện nay thì không chấp nhận cũng không được nhưng mà dù gì không có thì vẫn tốt hơn (cười)

[47.56] Interviewer

Nhưng mà nó trở thành phổ biến rồi đúng không anh?

[47.59] B12Aug30Do

Đúng rồi nó trở thành phổ biến rồi, nó nhìn chung thì ai cũng vậy chứ không phải gì là cá biệt

[48.12] Interviewer

Vậy thì trước khi mà anh làm với họ với những cái người như vậy thì mối quan hệ hai bên như thế nào, và sau khi mà nó có những cái chuyện như vậy xảy ra thì anh có thấy là mình có thay đổi gì trong cái mối quan hệ với họ không khi mà anh phát hiện ra là đó họ không có còn ưu tiên cho mình như là cam kết như vậy?

[48.43] B12Aug30Do

Hầu như thì anh thấy là anh cũng không thay đổi gì nhiều, tại vì có lẽ là do cái tính anh nó như vậy. Hoặc là rồi thì anh nghĩ thì trong năm bảy hộ nông dân đó thì tất nhiên là có những hộ mình thân hơn, có những hộ mình ít thân hơn chứ không phải. Thân ở đây là trên cái khía cạnh gọi là tình cảm đơn thuần chứ không phải là cái khía cạnh làm ăn, mà gọi là thân hơn thì ưu tiên người này hơn người kia hơn. Nhưng mà cái chuyện thân với người này hơn rồi ít chơi với người kia hơn là có chứ không phải không có. Nhưng mà về mặt làm ăn thì mình vẫn đối xử nó công bằng thôi, nó bình đẳng nhưng mà thực sự mà nói đối với những người mà mình thân hơn á mấy người kia vậy đó thì mình cũng cảm thấy rằng là á họ họ làm ăn với mình nó đàng hoàng hơn, ừ. Những cái chuyện này kia rồi gì đó nó cũng ít xảy ra hơn. Và đó, rồi thì cũng có thể là do họ đàng hoàng hơn cho nên là mình thân hơn hoặc là do mình thân hơn cho nên họ đối xử với mình đàng hoàng hơn thì hai cái đó (cười) không biết là cái nào nó tác động đến cái nào nhiều hơn đó

[50.05] Interviewer

Vậy khi mà làm ăn với những cái người, những cái nông hộ như vậy á, thì giữa hai bên có cái quy tắc nào trong cái mối quan hệ này không? hay là những chuẩn mực nào chuẩn mực cho mối quan hệ mà đặc thù làm ăn thì trong cái ngành này thì phải tuân thủ?

[50.23] B12Aug30Do

Thì nghĩa là cái… thực tế thì họ… chủ yếu những người nông dân đó… thì hầu như là họ chủ yếu họ tự tìm đến mình. Ừm tại vì cái thị trường bên ngoài á nó cũng đang rất là bấp bênh và họ muốn có một cái sự ổn định trong sản xuất của họ. Họ muốn ừ… và mình cũng nói luôn, bây giờ cái sản lượng của tui đủ rồi nếu như mà anh muốn tham gia, ấy, thì anh phải trồng cái này thôi, chớ không trồng cái kia. Trồng cái kia tôi mua không có hết đó. Thì họ cũng muốn là ổn định cái cái chuyện sản xuất của họ, thì họ mới tự tìm tới mình. Chứ hầu như là mình không có tự tìm tới họ, cho nên là trước khi mà họ chấp nhận, họ thấy mình làm như vậy và họ kêu là có cần nguồn hàng đó thì họ sẽ sản xuất cho mình á, thì họ cũng đã chấp nhận những cái tiêu chuẩn này kia đồ của mình đưa ra. à ừ hàng của em nếu như mà anh làm hoặc chị làm thì nó phải như vầy như vầy vầy, và cái đó là cái tiêu chuẩn cái quy định mà khi mà họ bắt đầu tham gia với mình.

[51.31] Interviewer

Rồi sau đó trong quá trình hai bên hợp tác thì họ có cái quy tắc gì trong mối quan hệ giữa hai bên không anh?

[51.41] B12Aug30Do

Thì mình chỉ có cái quy tắc đó thôi là thì đúng theo cái tiêu chuẩn của mình đưa ra với cái sản lượng của mình đưa ra thôi, chứ còn ngoài ra cũng không có quy tắc gì hết

[51.56] Interviewer

Rồi anh có mong đợi gì đối với họ về những cái hành vi của họ hông?

[52.04] B12Aug30Do

Tất nhiên thì…mình luôn luôn mong đợi… rằng cái những cái đối tác của mình nói riêng và kể cả những người nông dân nói chung luôn thì.. họ càng ngày họ càng chuyên nghiệp hơn, chuyên nghiệp ở đây kể cả trong cái…chuyên nghiệp kể cả về trong cái sản xuất và chuyên nghiệp luôn về cả thị trường, chuyên nghiệp luôn cả về trong cái mối quan hệ làm ăn này kia gì đó. Thì càng chuyên nghiệp thì nó sẽ càng càng dễ. Chớ còn hiện nay thì thành thực mà nói luôn thì người nông dân của mình nói là làm bao nhiêu đời làm nông dân nhưng mà thực sự là không chuyên nghiệp. Không chuyên nghiệp cả về cái lựa chọn cây gì, con gì. Rồi không chuyên nghiệp kể cả về cách làm ăn buôn bán này kia

[53.08] Interviewer

Thì nếu như mà nói là chuyên nghiệp trong mối quan hệ làm ăn nghĩa là sao anh ha?

[53.16] B12Aug30Do

Thì họ phải làm đúng theo những cái cam kết họ đừng đứng núi này trông núi nọ (cười), họ đó như vậy đó

[53.28] Interviewer

Còn những ví dụ trong trường hợp có sự cố xảy ra thì như thế nào?

[53.38] B12Aug30Do

Theo em là những sự cố như thế nào?

[53.43] Interviewer

Em không biết là ở trong khi mà giữa hai bên anh với các đối tác thì nó sẽ thỉnh thoảng có khi nào nó xảy ra một cái trục trặc gì đó hay không, có cái vấn đề gì đó xảy ra thì?

[53.58] B12Aug30Do

Đó thì những cái sự cố ví dụ như là về mặt tiêu chuẩn chất lượng, về mặt đấy này kia thì hồi nãy anh cũng trao đổi với em đó thì mình sẽ nói với họ rằng ừ mình phát hiện ra những cái chuyện như dậy như vậy như vậy. Thì nếu như mà họ không có đáp ứng được những cái tiêu chuẩn của mình ấy đưa ra thì mình sẽ không có tiêu thụ hàng của họ nữa

[54.27] Interviewer

Vậy là…em dùng lại cái từ chuyên nghiệp trong cái mối quan hệ của anh á thì có sự cố xảy ra như vậy thì thế nào? Anh sẽ anh sẽ định nghĩa thế nào là chuyên nghiệp?

[54.43] B12Aug30Do

Thì cái bản thân trong cái cách của họ làm, nếu như mà họ là cái người chuyên nghiệp thì khi mà đã cam kết là làm theo đúng cái đó cái đó như vậy, thì họ phải làm theo đúng cái mà đã cam kết. Thì đối với mình nghĩ đó là sự chuyên nghiệp.

[55.18] Interviewer

Có hành vi nào của họ mà nó theo dạng là cơ hội hoặc là họ tiêu cực á khi mà anh làm việc với họ anh biết chắc chắn là nó sẽ xảy ra nhưng mà anh không có cách nào anh ngăn chặn nó trước?

[55.44] B12Aug30Do

Có những cái mà mình làm thị trường cũng nhiều năm rồi thì mình cũng biết được những cái… ví dụ như là làm hàng không đúng tiêu chuẩn, độn hàng rồi thế này thế kia rồi thời điểm bán hàng cho mình tùy theo thời điểm giá này kia thì kia đó. Thì cái này trước khi mà mình cộng tác với họ thì mình cũng trao đổi thẳng thắn thôi. và khi mà họ không đáp ứng được thì mình…nghĩa là mình có phát hiện… mình… mình có phát hiện… và mình không… mình cũng phát hiện thì mình cũng trao đổi này kia nếu mà họ không đẩy được thì mình cũng chấm dứt hợp tác với họ thôi

[56.28] Interviewer

Vậy mình có cách nào để ngăn chặn nó trước không anh?

[56.34] B12Aug30Do

Không tới bây giờ anh cũng chưa biết cách nào để ngăn chặn hết (cười). Chỉ chỉ là chỉ là bằng cái cam kết với nhau đấy vậy thôi chứ còn ngăn chặn họ cũng không biết ngăn chặn bằng cái cách nào

[56.52] Interviewer

Tại sao khi mà anh làm việc với bên SGC á thì mình sẽ phải bắt buộc bán vói họ bán cho SGC với giá cam kết trong những năm trước, khi mà hàng thị trường lên như vậy anh vẫn phải bán cho họ cho SGC với cái giá đó. Trong khi đó thì mình lại phải không bắt lại được cái người nông dân họ bán cho mình cái giá vậy…phải chấp nhận tăng cái giá mua lên, tại sao lại có cái sự khác biệt? Tại vì ví dụ anh đối với nhà nông anh cũng là nhà mua thì anh đối với SGC đối với anh cũng là nhà mua thì tại sao mình lại không deal giá lại với lại bên SGC để thay đổi

[57.38] B12Aug30Do

ừm ở đây mình nói về là cái quyền lực (cười) của của người mua, ừm ở đây mình nói về cái quyền lực của người mua thì đối với một cái hệ thống mà… nhà bán lẻ lớn nhất Việt Nam hiện nay thì cái quyền lực người mua của bên SGC là tương đối lớn, ừm họ có thể áp đặt những cái…điều khoản những cái điều kiện này kia rồi gì cho nhà cung cấp rất là lớn.

[58.10] Interviewer

Nên là mình buộc phải?

[58.12] B12Aug30Do

Mình buộc phải tuân theo cái đó.

[58.19] Interviewer

Giờ em lại hỏi qua với vai trò ở bên SGC với lại các doanh nghiệp. Thì hồi nãy anh có chia sẻ là khi SGC thì họ sẽ mua lại từ các công ty các hợp tác xã theo cái tiêu chuẩn VietGAP, thì em không biết là bên SGC có hỗ trợ gì có cái hoạt động gì hỗ trợ cho những cái đơn vị mà họ mua hàng để họ cung ứng tốt hơn?

[58.54] B12Aug30Do

Theo như mình biết á thì thì hầu như cũng không có cái hoạt động gì nhiều, cách đây mấy năm trước thì với cái thời điểm mà tết á, thì cái thời điểm hàng tết là cái thời điểm mà thứ nhất là nó hút hang, và cái giá của nó tăng lên rất là cao, thì SGC có cái sử dụng cái nguồn quỹ bình ổn giá của ở bên nhà nước cung cấp cho SGC trong vòng ba tháng gì đó. thì SGC mới dùng cái nguồn quỹ đó ứng trước tiền cho những cái đầu mối cung cấp hàng cho các cái công ty, ứng trước tiền để mà giữ được cái giá mà nó thấp ở trong cái thời điểm đó, ừm giống như là mua trước vậy đó, rồi ứng trước tiền rồi nhưng mà thực sự thì cái đó nó cũng làm mấy năm liên tục á, năm sáu năm liên tục nhưng mà tính ra thì nó cũng không không không đem lại hiệu quả nhiều, có chứ không phải là không có nhưng mà cũng không đem lại hiệu quả nhiều [im lặng 2s]. Đó thì cái hoạt động chủ yếu của SGC để mà hỗ trợ hỗ trợ supplier thì đó chỉ được ở dừng lại ở cái mức đó thôi, chứ còn về mặt mà kỹ thuật rồi về mặt chính sách đồ này kia đồ gì đó thì hầu như là không có. Nếu mà nói về kỹ thuật thì kỹ thuật của SGC của SGC thì cũng không có hơn được (cười), cũng không có đi hỗ trợ ai được về mặt kỹ thuật hết rồi. Còn về mà mặt chính sách rồi này kia gì đó thì nó cũng hầu như cũng không có một cái chính sách nào mà nó cụ thể và có hiệu quả để mà phát triển cái nguồn cung ổn định cho SGC hết.

[01.01.08] Interviewer

Anh nói là nó không có hiệu quả trong cái chuyện là ứng trước nguồn vốn tiền trong cái quỹ bình ổn giá là nó không hiệu quả như thế nào anh?

[01.01.19] B12Aug30Do

ừm [im lặng 3s] thứ nhất là nó nó không bình ổn được nhiều…nó vẫn lên giá. Và nó cũng bên kia… bên những cái nhà cung cấp ấy, thì cũng phụ thuộc vô thị trường. Thì nếu như mà cái nguồn tiền mà cung cấp mà đủ á, thì người nông dân…mấy người kia thì cũng đi mua lại của nông dân thôi, thì nếu mà thời điểm mà nó sốt nó sốt quá lên thì mấy thương lái ở ngoài họ sẵn sàng họ đẩy giá lên cao nữa thì bên này cũng thua, cũng không có nấy rồi. Thứ hai nữa là thực tế thì có những cái doanh nghiệp sử dụng những nguồn tiền đó sai mục đích, uhm nghĩa là… là lấy cái tiền đó để đi làm cái chuyện gì gì đó chứ không phải là lo cái chuyện bình ổn giá… rồi là cái đó là có chứ hổng phải không có… và nó cũng thực sự mà nói thì nó cũng có… có những cái… những cái sự ưu tiên cho những cái hợp tác, doanh nghiệp lớn, những cái hợp tác xã… thường là ưu tiên cho hợp tác xã trước rồi mới tới những cái doanh nghiệp đấy rồi thế này thế kia, thì cái sự bình đẳng ở trong cái nguồn tiền hỗ trợ đó nó cũng hổng có. Ờ cho nên là nó dẫn tới những cái chuyện là nó bất bình đẳng nó không có hiệu quả trong cái chuyện sử dụng cái nguồn tiền bình ổn giá.

[01.02.56] Interviewer

Nhưng mà em cũng chưa hiểu lắm là tiền bình ổn giá tức là mình có cái quỹ tiền xong rồi mình cấp cho lại cho những cái nhà cung ứng của mình để đổi lại là họ sẽ làm cái gì anh?

[01.03.09] B12Aug30Do

Đổi lại là đổi lại là họ sẽ giữ mức giá ổn định cho cho mình. Thì ví dụ như là trong cái thời điểm mà cận tết á tháng 12 âm lịch là bắt đầu là hàng nó lên bắt đầu từ rằm là hàng nó lên lên lên lên có thể là tăng lên gấp đôi gấp ba lần, thì cái lúc mà tháng 10 tháng 11 âm lịch là bắt đầu là nhà nước chi ra một cái quỹ bình ổn. Thì SGC nhận được cái cục nhiêu đây… các doanh nghiệp lớn lãnh cái nhiệm vụ là làm bình ổn giá đó… là sẽ chia ra mỗi ông một cục cục vậy nè thì ví dụ như SGC, SGC sẽ lãnh cục nhiêu đây thì ông SGC sẽ chia ngược lại cho ông này ông này ông này ông này cho những mặt hàng mà SGC cảm thấy là phải cần bình ổn thì bắt đầu mới đưa tiền cho ông này kêu chứ giờ tôi đưa cho ông nhiêu đây nha ông phải giữ cho tôi cái giá giống như là tôi mua hàng của ông ở thời điểm này và tôi chưa lấy hàng tới thời điểm đó tôi mới lấy, tới thời điểm đó ông không được lên giá tôi vì tôi mua của ông rồi, đó đó cái mục đích của bình ổn giá là nó như vậy

[01.04.25] Interviewer

Tức là coi như mình hình thức mình trả tiền trước?
[01.04.29] B12Aug30Do
Ừm trả tiền trước để mà mình giữ cái nguồn hàng để mà tới thời điểm đó thì mình lấy được cái nguồn hàng giá rẻ
[01.04.38] Interviewer
Nhưng mà tới thời điểm đó mình có phải tiếp tục lại trả tiền mua nữa hay không hay mình trả tiền trừ cái tiền đó ra?
[01.04.44] B12Aug30Do
Không, mình trừ cái tiền đó ra
[01.04.46] Interviewer
Rồi còn họ dùng sai mục đích là dùng sai mục đích như thế nào anh? Tức là thì cái người nông dân họ sẽ dùng cái tiền đó để đem đi trồng lại?
[01.04.56] B12Aug30Do
Không…chủ yếu là chủ yếu tại vì cái nguồn tiền nó không xuống trực tiếp tới người nông dân mà nó chỉ qua các cái doanh nghiệp thôi. Đó…qua các cái doanh nghiệp thôi qua các cái đầu mối ấy lại. Chứ thực sự thì SGC cũng không thể nào mà đi mua trực tiếp của nông dân được không thể nào đi mua nhỏ lẻ vậy được phải có một cái người gom lại một cục vậy rồi rồi mới mua lại một cục đó chứ không thể đi mua từng miếng từng miếng được (cười) á thì có những cái doanh nghiệp thì họ ứng cái nguồn tiền đó ra rồi nhưng mà họ không có làm được cái chuyện bình ổn đó [im lặng 3s] rồi [im lặng 2s] và thực tế thì năm nào cũng vậy cái cái hàng ở trong ấy nó cũng nó cũng lên giá chứ không phải là không lên ừm
[01.05.50] Interviewer
Nhưng mà họ nhận tiền của mình rồi sao họ tới lúc sao họ nói tăng giá được?
[01.05.57] B12Aug30Do
Họ nói là không tăng gía nhưng mà họ cung cấp cái sản lượng rất là thấp (cười)
[01.06.09] Interviewer
Anh có nghĩ cái đó họ cơ hội không?
[01.06.10] B12Aug30Do
Cái đó là cơ hội đấy, cái đó là một dạng cơ hội
[01.06.14] Interviewer
Thì trong cái hợp tác giữa các doanh nghiệp với SGC anh thấy có những hành vi cơ hội nào khác nữa không?
[01.06.27] B12Aug30Do
Ừ có chứ không phải là không có… và cái chuyện mà cơ hội ớ thì…để mà họ cơ hội được thì cũng do cái nghiệp vụ nghiệp vụ và năng lực của cái hệ thống, của cái bộ phận mua hàng của ở bên các hệ thống siêu thị. Thì ví dụ như là… họ có thể là đưa… ví dụ như một cái nhà vườn, họ có thể là đưa cái hàng đẹp ra ngoài họ bán hết với giá cao… ví dụ như là trái cây đi… họ có thể là cái hàng loại 1 là họ đưa ra mấy cái shop trái cây lớn này kia… họ bán với giá rất là cao trong khi đó họ đưa cái hàng loại 2, loại 3 và họ cung cấp cho bên siêu thị thì với cái giá cũng không hề rẻ… đó thì… cái đó thì do là cái cái … cái kỹ thuật đàm phán và cái cách đánh giá tiêu chuẩn của hàng hóa của bên này nó cũng chưa có được chuyên nghiệp đi… đó thì nó dẫn đến tình trạng như vậy và… thực tế luôn thì cái tiêu cực là có, á cho nên là nó nó có những cái … theo anh làm trong ngành thì anh đánh giá là nó là như vậy…cho nên với cái hàng, cái hàng rau quả thì không nói, nó ít lắm nhưng mà tới cái hàng trái cây á… ở trong các hệ thống siêu thị á thì anh đánh giá không

có cao, hoặc là do là cái cái hàng mà để mà bán vô trong… do là phải cạnh tranh về giá các hệ thống siêu thị phải cạnh tranh về giá với nhau rất là khốc liệt, cho nên là họ muốn tìm đến một cái nguồn hàng về giá nó cạnh tranh… thì cái đó nó dẫn tới một cái hệ lụy là… ở trong siêu thị không hề có hàng đẹp nhất là hàng trái cây, chuyện đó là chuyện tất nhiên luôn nếu mà em đi siêu thị á em vô em đánh giá hàng trái cây trong siêu thị là hàng không hề ngon, không phải hàng tốt, không phải hàng chất lượng.

[01.08.57] Interviewer

Nhưng mà như vậy là do cái tức là siêu thị chấp nhận mua cái sản phẩm như vậy hay là cái mong đợi của cái sản phẩm nó khác để là mình thấy đó là cái chuyện người ta cơ hội đối với mình?

[01.09.11] B12Aug30Do

Thực sự thì siêu thị… cái lúc họ chào hàng á là họ chào hàng cái sản phẩm nó ok nhưng mà tới chừng họ cung cấp thì nó nó không có được như là mình mong đợi nhưng mà mình lại không có một cái động thái nào cũng không có một cái biện pháp nào để mà hạn chế được cái cái cái chuyện đó

[01.09.37] Interviewer

Không không làm gì được người ta hết hả anh?

[01.09.41] B12Aug30Do

Hầu như là…hầu như là không làm gì…thì đó nó có những cái gọi là tiêu chuẩn …hệ thống của mình nó cũng không có được minh bạch để mà rõ rang, để mà ví dụ như là… ừ anh chị phải giao cho cái hàng nó như dậy như dầy dầy dầy dầy, kể cả về mặt cảm quan kể cả về mặt ấy…rồi và ngoài ra nó còn có cái như anh nói hồi nãy á còn có cái tiêu cực nữa

[01.10.12] Interviewer

Tiêu cực là sao anh có ngại chia sẻ cái chuyện đó không?

[01.10.15] B12Aug30Do

Thì tới thì cái chuyện mà under table… thì cái đó là cái cái có

[01.10.24] Interviewer

Nhưng mà nó phổ biến cái chuyện đó không?

[01.10.32] B12Aug30Do

Phổ biến và hầu như không phải riêng một hệ thống nào cả hệ thống SGC cũng có

[01.10.38] Interviewer

Nhưng mà chỉ có hệ thống siêu thị mới bị cái đó thôi còn những cái hệ thống bên ngoài tại vì rau củ quả thì nó sẽ qua nhiều kênh để nó đến thị trường chỉ có trong siêu thị mới bị cái chuyện như vậy thôi?

[01.10.52] B12Aug30Do

Đúng rồi

[01.10.55] Interviewer

Tại sao nó lại khác như vậy?

[01.11.00] B12Aug30Do

Tại vì nếu bán ra ngoài anh bán cho em, em là chủ SGC thì cái sản phẩm đó anh nói thẳng là trên giá luôn, à (cười) còn cái này anh bán cho siêu thị thì em là cái người trung gian người mua, em là cái người trung gian chứ em không phải là chủ ừm thì nó khác (cười)

[01.11.24] Interviewer

Còn trường hợp nào mà siêu thị họ sẽ gặp cái hành vi cơ hội của từ cái những cái công ty mà họ cung ứng cho mình nữa hông, ngoài cái chuyện là chất lượng không có được như cam kết ban đầu?

[01.11.52] B12Aug30Do

[im lặng 6s] Theo anh nghĩ là không. Tại vì về mặt mà giá cả đó, thì hiện nay thì nó cũng cạnh tranh với nhau rất là nhiều. Cũng không thể nào mà bán mắc cho siêu thị được, cho nên là bán mắc là bán mắc theo cái hình thức lúc đó thôi nghĩa là bán hàng loại 2, loại 3 mà nói là hàng loại 1. Và đó ví dụ như vậy thôi chứ còn ngoài ra thì cũng không có không có làm gì khác được

[01.12.25] Interviewer

Nhưng mà nãy anh nói là siêu thị giờ họ cũng có cái power cái người mua á nhưng mà tại vì họ không có hạn chế được cái chuyện đó… không có dùng được cái power đó cho cái việc mà bắt cái nhà cung ứng phải cung cấp cho tôi cái hàng đúng như anh nói

[01.12.45] B12Aug30Do

Ví dụ như là cái hàng mà… cái cái power của người mua thì nó lớn, nó lớn nhưng mà…hầu như nó lớn với những cái doanh nghiệp nhỏ (cười), còn đối với những cái doanh nghiệp mà lớn á thì cái…cũng khó nói lắm. Ví dụ như là bên M ok anh cung cấp cho họ là ừ nói là bữa nay anh cung cấp cho họ trái dưa là từ tám lạng chín lạng một trái, đó cái size của nó là khoảng như vậy… rồi lúc khác anh nói dưa nặng một ký, ký hai thì nói… dậy họ có thể xuống họ khui đại một thùng nào đó ra họ lấy ba trái ra họ để lên cân, ví dụ em nói là bảy đến tám lạng thì ba trái là ít nhất khoảng hai ký mốt, hai ký mốt trở lên. Đó nếu như mà họ lấy ra ba trái mà họ không không đúng hai ký mốt là họ sẵn sàng họ trả hết nguyên lô hàng đó về cho anh, ờ họ nói là không nhận không đúng theo ấy và họ không kiểm thêm một trái nào nữa hết họ trả hết nguyên lô hàng về á…và họ chấp nhận là họ trống quầy ở trên

[01.14.09] Interviewer

Họ chấp nhận?

[01.14.09] B12Aug30Do

Chấp nhận luôn, ngày đó họ sẽ không có cái mặt hàng họ bán họ chấp nhận luôn. Nhưng mà còn cái văn hóa bên này thì nó khác, cái áp lực của ở dưới các cái điểm bán các cái store khi mà họ không có hàng họ bán là rất lớn đối với cái bộ phận nhận hàng và cái bộ phận phòng kinh doanh, đó cho nên là khi mà họ không có hàng họ bán thì họ la lối rồi ấy thế này thế kia, coi như là phòng kinh doanh phải làm cách nào đó để mà có hàng cho họ bán…thì tại vì họ cũng phải có những chỉ tiêu về doanh số đó này kia họ không có hàng bán lấy gì họ có doanh số (cười). Đó thì phòng kinh doanh đôi khi vì cái áp lực đó ừ cũng phải là ừ mắt nhắm mắt mở đưa qua… đó là một cái, cái thứ hai nữa là những cái doanh nghiệp đó là những cái doanh nghiệp thân hữu…chuyện là gửi gắm này kia là có chứ hổng phải là không có…doanh nghiệp sân sau là có chứ không phải là không có, đó rồi cái chuyện thì cái chuyện đó nó cũng tính tương đương với cái chuyện under-table thôi đó nghĩa là đã làm ăn với nhau thì mắt nhắm mắt mở luôn đi cho qua. Đó thì đó đó là những cái chuyện mà các doanh nghiệp có thể đưa cái hàng mà không đúng cam kết vô trong hệ thống

[01.15.50] Interviewer

Anh có biết là cái thằng lớn nhất bây giờ mà cung cấp cho SGC trong các mặt hàng không?

[01.15.56] B12Aug30Do

Bây giờ cái hệ thống mà cung cấp lớn nhất cho thằng SGC với cái sản lượng mỗi ngày vài chục tấn của bên SGC thì đó là hợp tác xã AĐ, rồi công ty ST cũng của Đà Lạt luôn…. Tại vì mấy cái người đó hồi xưa… anh cũng không nhớ tên công ty nữa mà tại vì mấy người đó cũng hồi xưa làm ăn chung với anh cho nên là anh biết rằng ST này kia vậy thôi chứ còn bây giờ họ thành lập công ty họ lấy cái tên gì anh cũng anh cũng không nhớ chỉ biết ông ST đó thôi, đôi khi là anh nhớ cái tên nó không có chuẩn… Đó cái hợp tác xã AĐ rất là lớn ở trên Đà Lạt. Bữa vừa rồi thì… nhưng mà AĐ vừa rồi cũng bán lại cho công ty U&I 70% rồi nó cũng không hoàn toàn là hợp tác xã nữa, nó giờ nó cũng là một dạng cổ phần

[01.17.00] Interviewer

Anh Đào có khi nào có cái hành vi cơ hội không anh?

[01.17.06] B12Aug30Do

Thực sự thì kể cả AĐ kể cả ST đồ này kia đồ luôn nó cũng có những cái vụ scandal cách đây một vài năm này kia đồ gì đó nếu bây giờ tìm lại trên báo chí này kia cũng cũng còn

[01.17.20] Interviewer

Anh kể cho em cái đó được không?

[01.17.22] B12Aug30Do

Đó là người ta tố cáo nhau là thay vì là hàng thu mua của nông dân thì là đi ra chợ đầu mối mua về rồi sơ chế biến này kia trộn lại nghĩa là cái hàng trôi nổi trên thị trường để mà về sơ chế lại rồi đóng gói bao bì này kia rồi đem cung cấp lại cho SGC đó thì chuyện đó cái dạng mà em nói là độn hàng là đây đó.

[01.17.48] Interviewer

Là có xảy ra

[01.17.49] B12Aug30Do

Là có xảy ra…có trên báo chí đồ này kia đấy

[01.17.55] Interviewer

Em lại không biết mấy cái vụ đó, như AD thì trước giờ nghe tên thì cũng lớn rồi

[01.18.03] B12Aug30Do

Chỗ anh T thì ảnh to đùng ấy mà (cười)

[01.18.08] Interviewer

Nhưng mà vậy rồi thì sau cái vụ đó thì SGC vẫn tiếp tục làm với lại họ?

[01.18.15] B12Aug30Do

Ừm vẫn tiếp tục làm, thì cũng có ngưng hàng ngưng nhập hàng một thời gian rồi phạt phiếc đồ này kia đồ, rồi làm việc đàm phán này kia rồi lại, rồi cũng lấy hàng lại,

[01.18.31] Interviewer

Nhưng mà AD nó bự dậy mà nó cũng chơi cái trò đó hả ta?

[01.18.37] B12Aug30Do

(Cười) hầu như ai cũng chơi, hầu như ai cũng chơi. Đối với cái thị trường nông sản của Việt Nam bây giờ cái thiếu lớn nhất là thiếu sự minh bạch… Thiếu sự minh bạch… và cũng không có cái… cái cơ chế nào để mà kiểm soát cái sự minh bạch đó cho nó hiệu quả hết.

[01.19.07] Interviewer

Thiếu minh bạch là minh bạch trong cái gì anh?

[01.19.09] B12Aug30Do

Minh bạch trong chất lượng, minh bạch trong chất lượng… kể cả ví dụ như bây giờ á, cho nên cái cái thị trường nông sản bây giờ á, là em thấy là cái thị trường online á, nó đang rất là phát triển… Nó phát triển ghê lắm, và tại sao cái thị trường online nó phát triển được? là do là họ thiếu tin tưởng vào những cái… cái.. cái.. sự công bố của những cái doanh nghiệp, kể cả của bên siêu thị đồ này kia đồ luôn. Họ thì người tiêu dùng vẫn nói thẳng với anh luôn là siêu thị thì nói như vậy nhưng mà siêu thị không có làm không làm trực tiếp, và cái người cung cấp hàng cho siêu thị người ta làm, tất nhiên là họ biết các siêu thị không làm, nhưng mà cái người cung cấp hàng trong siêu thị người ta làm thì siêu thị là có biết hay không? Cho nên là họ tìm đến những cái mặt hàng online bán cao gấp hai gấp ba lần giá bình thường tại vì họ mua cái sự tin tưởng. à, ví dụ như là giờ em biết anh đi, kêu cái ừ thằng này quen nè làm ấy làm được nè, tin là nó nói thiệt cho nên là cho nên là em mua hàng của anh chẳng có cái giấy chứng nhận nào hết, chẳng ấy mua là do là mua của ông C thế thôi chớ. Còn ngoài ra cái thấy cái giấy VietGAP mua rất là dễ. nó Giấy VietGAP bây giờ chẳng qua là một cái tiêu chuẩn để cho có vậy thôi chứ thực sự cái đó nó không có là cái gì hết. nó… nó không còn cái giá trị về mặt sàng lọc nữa, hầu như bây giờ chẳng có ai tin vô cái chuyện mà cái giấy VietGAP đó nữa. Chẳng qua đó là một trong những cái quy định của nhà nước thành thử bây giờ là anh làm anh phải tuân theo cái đó thôi chứ bây giờ anh làm còn quá cha VietGAP còn hơn VietGAP rất là nhiều.

[01.21.14] Interviewer

Tức bây giờ VietGAP là họ bán giấy thôi chứ họ có kiểm tra họ có thực tế họ có đi xuống hay là mình//?

[01.21.21] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Có kiểm tra thực tế có đi xuống đồng ruộng quy trình này kia đủ hết nhưng mà nhìn chung là.. gần như là làm cho có. Và họ đi xuống kiểm tra một năm thì tới thời hạn thì họ đi xuống họ kiểm tra một lần, trong khi đó ba trăm sáu mươi mấy ngày còn lại thì người nông dân làm cái gì thì họ cũng chẳng ai kiểm tra. Đó, cho nên là thực tế để mà làm nông nghiệp, thì [im lặng 2s] làm sản phẩm sạch, làm sản phẩm ra ra đúng cái gì mà mình nói thì chủ yếu là bây giờ cái người nào làm chủ yếu làm bằng cái tâm. Chứ còn thực sự thì rất là khó kiểm soát, không kiểm soát được

[01.22.10] Interviewer

Không có cái cơ chế nào để có thể là coi như là… nếu mà mình không có trực tiếp làm không biết được

[01.22.21] B12Aug30Do

Không biết được. Kể cả tiêu chuẩn organic luôn vẫn có thể làm, vẫn có thể làm dối được

[01.22.31] Interviewer

Organic thì họ sẽ dối kiểu như thế nào anh?

[01.22.33] B12Aug30Do

Thì thay vì họ làm organic thì họ có thể sử dụng những cái phân bón hóa học những cái thuốc trừ sâu hóa học này kia đồ dô… thì về mặt nguyên tắc thì organic thì không được sài cái gì gọi là hóa học, nhưng mà nếu như mà họ làm với một cái mức độ mà vừa phải, với một cái thời gian cách ly mà nó.. nó… nó.. đủ, và với một cái hàm lượng nó vừa phải thì thực tế kiểm cũng khó ra lắm, kiểm hổng ra đâu.

[01.23.04] Interviewer

Dạ cũng có nhiều cái.

[01.23.14] B12Aug30Do

Đó cho nên là anh nói đó cái thị trường nó đang nó đang rất cần cái sự minh bạch

[01.23.21] Interviewer

Anh có nghĩ là cái sự minh bạch đó, cái vai trò của cái người mua nó quan trọng. Người mua là người mua như dạng siêu thị hay là những cái công ty giống công ty của anh mua lại với nông dân thì cái vai trò có?

[01.23.45] B12Aug30Do

Anh nghĩ là cái để mà đạt được cái sự minh bạch đó, thì cái quyền lực của người tiêu dùng là rất là là cao, và thứ hai nữa nó còn cái sự mà chế tài của nhà nước. Ví dụ như là, anh không biết nước ngoài thì người ta làm như thế nào, nhưng mà theo anh nghĩ thì ví dụ như là một cái công ty đã sản xuất thực phẩm ấy này kia dậy dậy, thực phẩm là cái mình ăn hằng ngày nó ảnh hưởng rất lớn đến sức khỏe của người tiêu dùng, nếu như mà anh làm sai cái… những gì anh nói anh làm không đúng thì cái cơ chế chế tài của nó nó phải ví dụ như phạt thật nặng hoặc là bắt đóng cửa công ty ấy rồi này kia rồi gì đó như vậy thì anh nghĩ là nó mới nó mới… đủ cái sự răn đe. Và kể cả người tiêu dùng cũng phải có cái sự hiểu biết về cái sản phẩm nông nghiệp, đó thì, ví dụ như là bây giờ họ cứ họ cứ không tin tưởng và họ đánh đồng, họ đánh đồng hết tất cả những cái sản phẩm ấy, và họ có thể là do cái đời sống nữa, cái điều kiện kinh tế của cái người tiêu dùng đại bộ phận người tiêu dùng ở Việt Nam mình. Họ cũng không chấp nhận trả một cái mức giá để mà cho những người làm đúng. Ờ, và họ cứ nói cứ biểu là ờ nói vậy đó chắc gì làm như vậy thôi mua cái hàng kia ăn cho nó chắc. Thì họ lại vô tình họ giết chết cái người làm đúng (cười)

[01.25.36] Interviewer

Nghĩa là cuối cùng hết thì nó lại quay về người tiêu dùng muốn cái gì và//?

[01.25.43] B12Aug30Do (trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Đúng rồi người tiêu dùng muốn cái gì, và ở đây nó thứ nhất là người tiêu dùng biết mình muốn cái gì và hiểu biết về cái cái sản phẩm đó, và cái thứ ba nữa là chấp nhận trả cho cái đó. Chớ nếu như mà họ không chấp nhận trả cho cái đó thì… người ta phải làm mọi cách để mà người ta cạnh tranh để mà người ta sống được. Thì cái chuyện mà người ta gian dối về mặt chất lượng thì để mà họ cạnh tranh về giá thì cái chuyện đó là chắc chắn sẽ xảy ra.

[01.26.19] Interviewer

Em quay lại một chút về cái chỗ em vẫn hơi lăn tăn cái vụ của AD á. Tức là họ, AD là sẽ sản xuất hết tất cả tức là trên trên//?

[01.26.34] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Theo về mặt lý thuyết thì AD có một cái khu đất của hợp tác xã và của các cái hộ nông dân trong hợp tác xã đó. Rộng cũng mấy chục hecta đó, bốn năm… hình như anh nhớ là bốn mươi mấy hecta, ở cái khu bữa đó anh có đi lên trên đó cái khu gì mà Đà Lạt đi về cái hướng cái hướng mà cái đường đi về về về Nha Trang á cái đường tắt mà đi từ Đà lạt về Nha Trang **[Interviewer: đường nối biển và Hoa]** Bà Hoa gì đó ờ đó đó cái đường cái đường Đa Hoa gì đó ờ đó thì AD cam kết là những cái sản phẩm của AD cung cấp là từ những cái hợp tác xã từ những cái hộ nông dân ở trong cái khu vực đó, và từ cái trang trại của AD. Nhưng mà đợt đó thì cũng có người đi chụp hình đồ này kia rồi gì gì đó, những cái xe của Anh Đào đang mua hàng ở ngoài chợ đầu mối của Đà Lạt đem về, rồi đưa lên báo chí rồi này kia rồi. Thứ nhất là tố cáo với SGC rồi hôm đó thì có báo chí này kia đồ nhảy vô thì có cái đó. Rồi ST cũng bị là đó cũng bị cái tình trạng đó đó thì có hai cái vụ đó thôi

[01.28.08] Interviewer

Nhưng mà tại sao họ lại phải mua cái hàng trôi nổi ở bên ngoài?

[01.28.18] B12Aug30Do

Theo anh nghĩ là do cái thời điểm đó cái trang trại của họ cung cấp không đủ cái nguồn hàng của bên siêu thị đặt. Cho nên là họ huy động thêm nguồn hàng (cười) bên ngoài

[01.28.28] Interviewer

Họ có bị cái vụ nào khác trước đó hay sau đó không?

[01.28.31] B12Aug30Do

Hồi nào tới giờ chỉ có cái vụ lùm xùm đó là lớn nhất thôi. Rồi chứ còn mấy cái vụ mà thỉnh thoảng thì rau củ quả đồ bị dư lượng vượt quá tiêu chuẩn đồ này kia gì gì đó, thì vụ đó thì bị hoài. Mà mấy cái vụ đó là vụ nhỏ **[Interviewer: từ cái trang trại của họ]** ở từ cái trang trại của họ?

[01.28.59] Interviewer

Thì mấy cái đó bên siêu thị có cách nào để ngăn chăn nó không?

[01.29.06] B12Aug30Do

Thì mỗi lần phát hiện đó như vậy á thì cũng cắt hang, rồi cũng phạt rồi này kia, rồi việc đó với một cái lỗi như vậy thì phạt bao nhiêu tiền này kia đồ vậy đó.

[01.29.15] Interviewer

Nhưng mà sau đó thì vẫn// làm với họ?

[01.29.18] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Ờ sau đó thì mình bắt đầu kiểm nghiệm lại những cái sản phẩm đó, đến chừng nào mà đạt tiêu chuẩn rồi mới đưa mới cho đưa vô bán lại

[01.29.28] Interviewer

Xong rồi tiếp theo nữa nó có lặp lại không?

[01.29.30] B12Aug30Do

Có (cười)

[01.29.36] Interviewer

Tức là chuyện đó nó thành phổ biến

[01.29.39] B12Aug30Do

Chuyện đó nó thành phổ biến và cái chuyện đó thường xuyên bị, hằng ngày siêu thị tốn rất là nhiều tiền, để mà test trực tiếp ở trên cái kho, ở trên đầu vào để mà trước khi đưa ra siêu thị thì ở trên cái kho lúc mà nhập hàng tổng vô đó. Thì siêu thị tốn rất là nhiều tiền hằng ngày để mà test cái đó trước khi mà để nhập hàng vô.

[01.30.04] Interviewer

Vậy nếu mà ngoài hai cái tên nhà cung ứng lớn này, các cái nhỏ lẻ khác thì có bị vậy không anh?

[01.30.11] B12Aug30Do

Cũng bị, hầu như thằng nào cũng bị

[01.30.16] Interviewer

Nghĩa là các hình thức chế tài hay, là các hình thức kiểm soát các mối quan hệ trước và sau như vậy, có bị gì không anh, có khác với lại hai cái thằng lớn không anh?

[01.30. 30] B12Aug30Do

Có những nhà cung cấp nhỏ nhỏ nhỏ nhỏ thì tới cuối cùng thì họ làm không nổi nữa thì họ tự bỏ. ừ

[01.30. 39] Interviewer

Có khi nào mình phải bỏ mình coi như là mình phạt bằng cách mình không có làm với nhà cung ứng đó luôn không?

[01.30. 50] B12Aug30Do

Thực tế thì mình không có ở cái phòng trực tiếp ở cái phòng kinh doanh á. Cho nên là mình cũng không có nắm kỹ được những cái thông tin đó, mà mình cũng chỉ là biết về những cái chuyện như vậy thôi chớ tại vì hồi mình làm quản lý bán lẻ á. Thì nghĩa là thằng này thì phòng quản lý chất lượng có gởi những cái thông tin về chất lượng sản phẩm mặt hàng này đang bị như thế này không nhập hàng vô, rồi những cái mặt hàng kia đang bị như vậy cho nên là phải thu hồi hàng về kho không bán cho người tiêu dùng nữa. Rồi ví dụ như vậy á thì mình nắm được cái thông tin đó chứ còn cái cái cách xử lý đối với nhà cung cấp như thế nào thì mình cũng không có nắm sâu.

[01.31. 36] Interviewer

Nhà cung cấp là phòng kinh doanh sẽ làm với nhà cung cấp?

[01.31. 39] B12Aug30Do

Đúng rồi phòng kinh doanh làm trực tiếp với nhà cung cấp

[01.31. 40] Interviewer

Bên SGC không có cái chuyện cái phòng gọi là phòng thu mua?

[01.31. 45] B12Aug30Do

Đó phòng thu mua đó

[01.31. 45] Interviewer

Thì gọi là phòng kinh doanh, thì ra cái tên nó khác. Còn anh quản lý bán lẻ là quản lý hết tất cả các mặt hàng//của SGC?

[01.31. 51] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Không anh anh hồi xưa anh quản lý bán lẻ thì mình quản lý một cái chuỗi SGC Food

[01.31. 58] Interviewer

Là anh quản lý toàn bộ cái//?

[01.32. 02] B12Aug30Do (Trả lời khi chưa hết câu hỏi)

Anh quản lý một số cửa hàng thôi

[01.32. 04] Interviewer

Anh với lại bên cái phòng kinh doanh là cái mà trong tức là trong cái hệ thống thì bên anh với bên phòng kinh doanh đó như thế nào? ngang hàng hay?

[01.32. 16] B12Aug30Do

Thực tế thì cũng hông hông có… hông có xếp được tại vì… [ngập ngừng 5s] nếu mà nói về phân cấp theo phân cấp hàng ngang á thì thì nó cũng hổng có đúng phân cấp theo hàng dọc cũng hổng có nói về cấp trên cấp dưới nó như thế nào được, mỗi bộ phận nó có một chức năng nhiệm vụ khác nhau (cười)

[01.32. 48] Interviewer

Tại em cũng hơi thắc mắc về cái cơ cấu của cái như SGC. Tại nó lớn á, thành ra là em thấy có mỗi siêu thị sẽ có một giám đốc riêng, rồi trong mỗi siêu thị sẽ có người quản lý mỗi cái mặt hàng riêng, rồi nó quá lớn nên thành ra em cảm thấy là không biết là cách tổ chức nó như thế nào cái đó có. Nhưng mà thôi cái này cũng không liên quan.

Vậy với những cái người lớn cái thằng lớn ví dụ như người bán lẻ như SGC với lại các cái nhà cung ứng của họ thì cái quy tắc trong cái mối quan hệ giữa hai bên nó như thế nào anh? Hay là có những cái gọi là cái chuẩn mực gì trong mối quan hệ hai bên giữa SGC và các nhà cung ứng của họ?

[01.33. 43] B12Aug30Do

Thì về mặt cái hợp đồng khung (cười), thì tất cả các nhà cung ứng đều như nhau. Nhưng mà có thể tùy theo mặt hang, có thể là tùy theo cái khả năng đàm phán, cái… [ngập ngừng 2s] cái trọng lượng của từng nhà cung cấp nó khác nhau. Thì cái trading term của nó nó cũng khác nhau, về mặt chiết khấu về mặt giá cả, về mặt các cái sự hỗ trợ rồi này kia, rồi gì đó thì nó cũng khác nhau. ừ hầu như là không không ai giống ai

[01.34. 19] Interviewer

Tức là các cái quy tắc ngoài hợp đồng á, tức là nếu mà bỏ qua cái yếu tố về cái việc hợp đồng thì giữa hai bên khi mà làm ăn với nhau, thì mình sẽ có những cái yêu cầu gì, mình có mong đợi gì với họ?

[01.34. 40] B12Aug30Do

Uhm…Như đối với SGC thì… ví dụ như là có những cái nhà, nhà cung cấp chiến lược, thì... họ sẽ giống như là… ví dụ như trong một cái mặt hàng đó đi, thì… có nhiều nhà cung cấp, cùng cung cấp một cái mặt hàng đó. Thì đối với nhà cung cấp chiến lược thì họ sẽ được ưu tiên, cái mặt hàng đó là thống lĩnh trong cái ví dụ như là… cùng một cái sản lượng đó, thì nhà cung cấp chiến lược sẽ chiếm 40%-50% trong cái sản lượng đó. Rồi còn lại những cái 50-60% còn lại rồi sẽ chia cho sáu bảy người khác, mỗi người khoảng 10% rồi trong cái sản lượng đó như vậy thôi

[01.35. 30] Interviewer

Ví dụ như là em nói tới là cái norms em không biết là dịch trong tiếng Việt như thế nào cho mọi người hiểu được nhưng nếu mà ví dụ như cái norm trong cái mối quan hệ giữa hai bên đó thì anh nghĩ là nó phải là cái gì. Chữ "norm" dịch ra trong tiếng việt nó là chuẩn mực, hay nó là cái nguyên tắc trong cái mối quan hệ của hai bên, nếu mà em nói là cái nguyên tắc trong mối quan hệ giữa SGC và những cái supplier của họ. Thì nó sẽ có những cái norm gì cái nguyên tắc gì trong cái mối quan hệ đó?

[01.36. 19] B12Aug30Do

[Im lặng 3s] Uhm…cái này thì cũng khó nói lắm, tại vì cái… trong cái… môi trường kinh doanh của Việt Nam, và nhất là cái trong cái điều kiện bên SGC cũng là một cái doanh nghiệp mà nó mang cái yếu tố nhà nước rất là nhiều, ừm thì những cái quy chuẩn đồ này kia dậy đó, thì nó cũng thực sự thì nó cũng không có rõ ràng. Tất nhiên thì về mặt quy tắc thì.. nhà cung cấp sẽ phải biết cung cấp cho SGC những cái sản phẩm chất lượng tốt nhất với cái mức giá là tốt nhất, thế này thế kia. Rồi về quy tắc đạo đức thì không được thế này không được thế kia đối với nhân viên phòng mua với nhân viên phòng mua đồ dậy. Thì đó nó có những cái quy chuẩn này kia đồ như vậy thì cũng chung chung vậy thôi

[01.37. 45] Interviewer

Còn nếu như mà em nói giữa KXQ với lại các cái hộ của mình á, thì ngoài cái hợp đồng ra hồi nãy anh có nói mong muốn họ làm đúng như cái hợp đồng như vậy. Thì ngoài cái hợp đồng đó ra thì anh có dạng mong muốn họ như thế nào nữa không trong cái mối quan hệ làm ăn giữa hai bên. Nó cũng là những cái norm trong mối quan hệ.

[01.38. 14] B12Aug30Do

Thì mình cũng chỉ mong muốn là họ làm đúng như cái cam kết thôi và họ… họ càng ngày càng…mình càng ngày càng phát triển lên thì họ cũng đồng hành cùng với mình để mà cùng làm ăn với nhau vậy thôi. Chứ ngoài ra mình cũng chưa có suy nghĩ được cái gì nó lớn lao hơn.

[01.38. 41] Interviewer

Dạ em cám ơn anh nhiều, em hết câu hỏi rồi em không biết là anh có gì muốn chia sẻ thêm liên quan đến những chuyện nãy giờ mình trao đổi, là các cái hành vi cơ hội trong ngành nói chung. Cũng không nhất thiết là phải một cái đơn vị nào, có thể chia sẻ thêm cái gì mà anh biết hoặc là cái thực trạng các cái vấn đề tồn tại ở trong ngành?

[01.39. 08] B12Aug30Do

Như hồi nãy anh nói đó, là cái thị trường để mà cung cấp ra một cái sản phẩm ra ngoài thì nó.. bây giờ nó.. nó.. nó.. thiếu cái sự minh bạch á, mình thiếu cái sự minh bạch mà nó còn có cái sự hiểu biết của người tiêu dùng, và cái sự chế tài của nhà nước. Thứ hai nữa là những cái mà sự hỗ trợ của nhà nước về bên cái lĩnh vực nông nghiệp nói chung, và nông nghiệp sạch nói riêng, thì… hầu như ví dụ làm mười mấy năm nay y vậy đó, cũng có tiếng có tăm ở trên thị trường rồi, nếu mà nói về mà học hành đồ này kia thì ủy ban nhân dân thành phố cũng mời đi họp, họp về kia đồ hoài. Đại khái là cũng nhà nước cũng biết tới chứ không phải là không biết. Nhưng mà để mà tiếp cận được những cái nguồn vốn ưu đãi đồ này kia đồ gì đó, thì hầu như là kể cả vay ngân hàng luôn thôi chứ chưa nói tới nguồn vốn ưu đãi thì hầu như là không có được hỗ trợ này kia đồ dậy đó, để mà phát triển cái cái cái cái vụ mà nông nghiệp này lên á, thì nó có những cái như vậy. Ví dụ như là cái vừa rồi cái nguồn vốn 5000 tỷ để mà ưu đãi cho ưu đãi cho bên bên bên bên phát triển nông nghiệp công nghệ cao nói chung ấy thì cũng doanh nghiệp nào lên lấy hết chứ. Còn bên này bên mình hầu như là không được tiếp cận với cái vấn đề đó. Rồi cái... đó nó có những cái tồn tại như vậy. Nhưng mà anh nghĩ cái quyền lực của người tiêu dùng, cái sự hiểu biết về cái sản phẩm nông nghiệp của người tiêu dùng đang là… thấp và có thể là… kêu bằng cái gì ta… hiểu chưa hết á (cười). Ví dụ như mới hiểu tới hai phần của vấn đề thôi và nghĩ rằng mình hiểu hết, nhưng mà thực tế thì nó nó không phải là như vậy nó chưa hết.

[01.41. 36] Cái đó nó cũng làm cho cái thị trường nó bị, ví dụ như là sản phẩm nông nghiệp sạch thì nó có nhiều cái cấp độ của sạch. Không biết sao là sạch như ừ sạch như thế này thì giá nó khác, sạch kiểu VietGAP thì giá nó khác, sạch kiểu Global thì giá nó khác, sạch kiểu organic thì cái giá nó còn phải khác hơn nữa. Nhưng mà họ cũng không hiểu được là ví dụ như là trồng kiểu Global nhưng mà trồng theo tiêu chuẩn theo cái công nghệ này nó khác, trồng theo công nghệ kia nó khác á. Thì nó nó lại ra những cái sản phẩm cái cấp độ sạch ở trỏng. Ví dụ như ở trong VietGAP có nhiều cái VietGAP, trong cái Global nó có nhiều cái Global, trong cái kể cả organic cũng có nhiều dạng organic (cười). Đó thì cái cái đó thì người tiêu dùng hầu như là không có nắm được. Họ làm cho họ đánh đồng tất cả các cái sản phẩm vô với nhau , từ đó nó cũng làm cho thị trường nó bị lệch lạc

[01.42. 46] Interviewer

Vậy ví dụ nếu như mình chia sẻ dưới góc độ người tiêu dùng đi nếu như mình hiểu không hết thì bản thân mình cũng thiệt hại thì đưa ra mình vẫn phải trả cao. Trả nhiều tiền hơn cho cùng một cái sản phẩm mà lẽ ra mình có thể mua đâu đó với cái giá rẻ hơn. Đó thì cái đó mình cũng thiệt hại. Uả nhưng mà tại sao anh như vậy, thì cũng có nhiều cái cũng nơi này nơi kia biết rồi thành phố, cũng biết này nọ nhưng mà sao mình không tiếp cận được cái vốn đó anh?

[01.43. 18] B12Aug30Do

Tại vì ví dụ như là cái ngân hàng bây giờ thì tất cả mọi thứ nó đều đòi là… đều có tài sản thế chấp hết. Nhưng mà tài sản cá nhân riêng ở ngoài á thì… nhỏ, và không đáp ứng được. Còn cái tài sản mà gắn liền ở trên cái những cái mà tài sản mà nó đầu tư ở trên miếng đất đó thì miếng đất đó, thì thực tế thì nhà nước chỉ giao cho mình hai mươi năm thôi, chứ không phải là đất của mình. Cho nên là ngân hàng người ta cũng không có chấp nhận cái đó là tài sản thế chấp, mặc dù mình đầu tư vô đó rất là nhiều cái tài sản cố định ở trên miếng đất đó. Đó cũng là một trong những cái mà mình không có đem cái đó đi để mà thế chấp, để mà làm vốn để mà kinh doanh được. Rồi còn cái chuyện để mà tiếp cận được nguồn vốn ưu đãi thì chuyện đó chuyện dài nhiều tập rồi chuyện đó hổng nói nữa (cười)

[01.44. 30] Interviewer

Dạ anh có câu hỏi gì cho em, anh có muốn hỏi gì không?

[01.44. 36] B12Aug30Do

Nhưng mà cái nghiên cứu này của em, là anh thấy là chỉ xoáy vô là cái chuỗi cung ứng, nghĩa là cái giai đoạn giữa, giữa người sản xuất và người tiêu dùng. Chớ hầu như là nó cũng không có đi sâu luôn về cái mà, cái cái sản xuất đúng không?

[01.45. 08] Interviewer

Em, thực ra là em không nghiên cứu về chuỗi cung ứng mà em nghiên cứu về quản trị chuỗi cung ứng. Tức là các vấn đề liên quan đến vận hành như thế nào, quản trị nó làm sao để cho nó, cái việc vận hành của nó được tốt hơn thôi. Trong phạm vi cái đề tài của em nó không xem xét đến cái chuyện là người ta kỹ thuật sản xuất như thế nào. Thì em chỉ tập trung duy nhất vô cái chuyện là mối quan hệ giữa hai bên thì khi mà hai bên làm ăn với nhau như vậy thì nó sẽ có các cái hoạt độn. Tại vì giống như anh chia sẻ hồi nãy á tức là anh không có anh nghĩ là cái chuyện là anh hỗ trợ kỹ thuật cho người ta, anh giúp cho người ta cái này cái kia chia sẻ bí quyết công nghệ đó là tốt cho anh thì bởi vì mình cảm thấy là cái nguồn cung ứng cho mình chưa có đầy đủ , mình muốn làm cho cái hoạt động kinh doanh tốt hơn lên, thì mình phải hợp tác với cái người cung ứng cho mình để hai bên cùng phát triển thì cái vấn đề xảy ra á là khổng biết là thực sự anh làm như vậy thì họ có thấy được cái lợi ích đó hay không để họ quay ngược trở lại họ cung cấp cho mình. Trong trường hợp nào thì các hoạt động đó nó sẽ chạy đi theo hướng khác, chẳng hạn anh đầu tư rất là nhiều, với mong muốn là họ quay trở lại họ làm tốt cho anh, nhưng mà họ lại không làm như vậy. Thì em chỉ giải quyết cái chuyện là anh đầu tư ở mức nào thì ra cái kết quả là họ sẽ gắn bó với mình, họ làm lâu dài, rồi anh đầu tư ở mức nào thì họ sẽ chỉ một phía là họ nhận hỗ trợ của mình rồi không có trả lại cho mình gì hết. Thì nó giải quyết một vấn đề rất là nhỏ trong cái việc mối quan hệ giữa cái người cung ứng với cái nhà.. với cái người mua của họ thôi. Thì thì trong cái phạm vi của một cái đề tài nghiên cứu nó không thể nào làm hết toàn bộ được, mà em chỉ làm sâu vô cái đó thô.i

[01.47. 07] B12Aug30Do

Thì cái đó thì cái của anh thì nó nhỏ, nhưng mà cái chuỗi cung ứng… nghĩa là đối của bên các cái hệ thống siêu thị. Hiện nay thì cái cái nhưng mà thực sự thì cái thị trường rau quả á.. do anh chuyên về hồi nào tới giờ anh làm với siêu thị thôi. Chứ còn thực sự cái kia thì thị trường rau quả nó ở ngoài mới là lớn. Cái siêu thị hiện nay chiếm khoảng chưa tới 10% so với cái ở bên ngoài. Thì tất nhiên là nó cũng chiếm cái vai trò tương đối là quan trọng đối với cái cái thị trường rau củ quả.

[01.47. 49] Interviewer

Tại vì cái hành vi bây giờ nó sẽ… do người tiêu dùng càng ngày người ta sẽ càng đòi hỏi cái sản phẩm chất lượng hơn. Mặc dù bây giờ là mình biết là cái thị trường bên ngoài nó chiếm cái tỷ trọng rất là lớn, nhưng cái ở bên ngoài hoàn toàn không kiểm soát được gì hết và tất cả mọi thứ là nó chỉ quyết định dựa trên yếu tố giá thôi. Thành ra là cái đó nó sẽ không nảy sinh ra cái vấn đề là họ phải phát triển họ phải làm sao cho cái nguồn cung của họ tốt hơn. Chỉ có cái nhóm ở bên là tiêu thụ cái mặt hàng chất lượng cao, hay là cái hàng xuất khẩu á thì người ta đòi hỏi cái chất lượng nhiều, và quay ngược trở lại thì họ bắt buộc là phải làm chặt với nguồn cung của mình thôi. Thì cái mong muốn của em á, là cái kết quả đề tài của em á là các cái doanh nghiệp người ta có thể sử dụng cái kết quả đó để người ta cân nhắc lại cái mức độ mà hỗ trợ cho, hay là mức độ hỗ trợ cho cái nhà cung ứng của mình đến cái mức nào thì sẽ đem lại hiệu quả, cho họ và đến mức độ nào họ phải cảnh giác với các cái hành vi cơ hội có thể xảy ra từ các cái nhà cung ứng của mình.

[01.48. 54] B12Aug30Do

Thì ví dụ như là cái ở bên một cái lớn hơn đó, là cái lớn hơn cái chuyện của anh cái chuyện KXQ của anh, thì là cái chuyện cái chuỗi cung ứng cho bên SGC. Thì nói là có các vấn đề như anh trao đổi á… nghĩa là cái sự hỗ trợ ngược lại đối với những cái nhà.. nhà cung ứng cho SGC, thì nó cũng thứ nhất là nó đang hạn chế, thứ hai nữa là … cái sự đánh giá của cái SGC đối với những cái nhóm, những cái ông mà đang cung cấp đó.. thì cũng không có cái sự đánh giá mà nó chuẩn mực, và nó công bằng. Đối với những cái nhà cung cấp đó, thí dụ như ờ thấy ông này ổng đang làm tốt nè ổng làm hàng hồi nào tới giờ thì cung cấp đều đặn rồi chất lượng, rồi giá cả như thế này thế kia, thì cũng không có cái bộ phận nào để mà ngồi lại mà đánh giá cái chuyện đó, hoặc là nếu mà có đánh giá rồi thì cũng không có một cái động thái nào, mà ừ thấy ông này ổng làm được đó, mình hỗ trợ thêm cho ổng cái này cái kia để mà ổng.. càng ngày càng làm tốt hơn với mình. á thì cái đó thì.. không biết là những cái nhà cung cấp khác nó nhận được những cái gì khác hay không, nhưng mà đối với KXQ thì là hầu như không có nhận được cái gì hết. Nhưng mà bản thân cũng làm với SGC. Thì với cái mức… ờ nếu mà nói về doanh số trong cái ngành rau củ quả thì KXQ cũng nằm trong top 5 của SGC, cũng là lớn chứ không phải là nhỏ, nhưng mà… cái sự hỗ trợ này kia thì hầu như là không có gì.

[01.50. 53] Interviewer

Thì đó em muốn, ví dụ cái kết quả đề tài của em á sẽ là. như SGC họ sẽ thấy là muốn làm cho giảm các cái hành vi cơ hội của những cái nơi cung cấp ví dụ AD chẳng hạn, thì họ phải hỗ trợ họ phải có các hoạt động supplier development, tức là phát triển nhà cung ứng để cái hoạt động đó nó sẽ làm ngăn cản cái cái hành vi cơ hội như AD, tức là ngăn cản cái cái chuyện họ trộn hàng lại hay không hay là ok giờ tôi không cần làm những chuyện đó, những cái đó không có cách nào giải quyết được. Thì em có thể so sánh là như một cái doanh nghiệp như anh làm lại với lại cái nơi cái nguồn cung của mình, thì cái hình thức như vậy, nó xảy ra cái trường hợp đó nó xảy ra những cái chuyện A B C D như vậy có cái thì thấy rất là tốt là nó hoàn toàn không có diễn ra bởi vì mình mua giá tốt, hơn mình hỗ trợ như vậy, nó không diễn ra. Thì em chưa có biết là sau khi em vẽ thành cái bức tranh em gặp nhiều người trong cái chuỗi và em nói nó đang như thế nào mà em hi vọng là cái kết quả đó người ta có thể sử dụng được.

[01.52. 01] B12Aug30Do

Với lại có một cái nữa á thì đối với những nhà cung cấp để mà chào hàng vô bán được cho SGC, là một cái một cái mong muốn rất là lớn. Cho nên là hàng ngày hàng giờ đều có những cái nhà cung cấp mới, chào những cái mặt hàng vô bán cho SGC. Và nó dẫn tới cái tình trạng là… muốn vô được mà… chào cái giá rất là cạnh tranh. Chào giá thấp, họ có thể họ sẽ nghĩ rằng họ chấp nhận lỗ trong một cái thời điểm nào đó.. thời gian nào đó, ví dụ ba tháng năm tháng… và họ có chỗ đứng được ở trong cái cái.. cái.. siêu thị rồi, thì lúc đó họ lại kiếm lời sau. Họ nghĩ rằng họ có vốn thì họ sẽ làm những điều đó, và phòng mua thì cứ căn cứ theo những cái giá mà họ đưa ra đó, để mà ép ngược lại các cái nhà cung cấp cũ. Nhà cung cấp cũ, thì nghĩa là bị bị phá giá thị trường rất là thường xuyên, bởi những cái nhà cung cấp mới đó. Nhưng mà thực tiễn cái đó cái đó là nó làm méo mó thị trường chứ cái đó nó không có đúng (cười) đó. Thực tế không có cái mặt hàng trong thời điểm đó cái giá của mặt hàng nó không bao giờ có cái giá đó, nhưng mà người ta, phòng kinh doanh lại… cứ coi như là ok cứ có giá tốt là lấy thôi, không cần biết mày lấy từ cái nguồn nào, không cần biết mày có thể cung cấp được bao nhiêu lâu. Đó thì nói chung là không sợ thằng lớn, ra ngoài làm không sợ thằng lớn, vì mấy thằng lớn làm rất đàng hoàng, chỉ sợ mấy thằng mới (cười) đó cái đó cũng là một trong những cái cái cái vấn đề trong cái nguồn cung.

[01.54. 05] Interviewer

Nhưng mà bên kể cả bên SGC họ sẵn sàng bỏ mình khi mà họ kiếm được cái nguồn tốt hơn giá tốt hơn chưa biết là sản phẩm tốt hơn hay không?

[01.54. 17] B12Aug30Do
Sẵn sàng
[01.54. 17] Interviewer
Sẵn sàng bỏ luôn?
[01.54. 18] B12Aug30Do
Sẵn sàng bỏ luôn
[01.54. 22] Interviewer
Vậy thì cũng… bên mình có vẻ như cái lợi thế của mình…mình cũng một phần phụ thuộc vào họ?
[01.54. 31] B12Aug30Do
Nhìn chung là không có một cái gì chắc chắn hết, nghĩa là không có một cái cam kết gì của ở bên SGC đối với nhà cung cấp là sẽ làm lâu dài đồ cái này cái kia, ví dụ như là không có một cái ví dụ như bây giờ tôi cam kết là tôi sẽ lấy cho anh cái nguồn hàng đó trong thời gian lâu dài như thế nào đó, nếu như mà anh đầu tư vô những cái chuyện này chuyện này anh làm. Ví dụ bây giờ anh sẽ làm một cái đầu tư máy móc thiết bị nhà màng này kia đồ gì đó, để mà anh cung cấp anh sản xuất ra được cái sản lượng đó với các công nghệ đó với cái chất lượng như vậy, với cái mức giá như vậy tôi sẽ cam kết và tôi sẽ mua của anh với cái đó, không hoàn toàn không có, chỉ dựa trên giá thôi.
[01.55. 23] Interviewer
Nhưng mà nó có khác với lại cái M mà anh bán không?
[01.55. 28] B12Aug30Do
M hiện nay thì nó cũng không có cũng không có hỗ trợ gì nhiều
[01.55. 35] Interviewer
Anh có nghĩ là tìm tới những thằng khác… kiểu như nó có nhiều cái hoạt động hơn một chút. Trong siêu thị thì em thấy cái cách mà làm chắc là nó cũng khác nhau, không phải là giống nhau?
[01.55. 53] B12Aug30Do
Nhưng mà thấy hầu như thằng nào cũng vậy. Hiện nay cũng chưa có anh làm cũng với hệ thống A này kia thì nó cũng không cũng chưa có cái gì để mà bảo vệ cái nguồn cung của mình hết?
[01.56. 11] Interviewer
BC hay là thằng VE chẳng hạn
[01.56. 16] B12Aug30Do
VE thì hiện nay thị trường của nó cũng đang rất là nhỏ, anh cũng chưa có vô VE
[01.56. 26] Interviewer
VE thì chắc không có bằng được SGC về cái sản lượng?
[01.56. 27] B12Aug30Do
Không không bằng được, với lại cái điều kiện để mà giao nhận hàng này kia điều kiện logistics á nó cũng khó khăn.
[01.56. 36] Interviewer
Nó khác như thế nào với SGC hả anh?
[01.56. 39] B12Aug30Do
SGC đang có một cái lợi thế là có cái trung tâm phân phối, nghĩa là mình giao hàng tập trung về đó, rồi SGC có đội ngũ logistics để mà đi giao hàng về cho các cái store, còn mấy hệ thống kia hầu như không có, hoặc là hoặc là giao hàng nó với cái sản lượng nó nhỏ, rồi để mà cộng cái đó vô trong chi phí vận chuyển vô trong cái giá thì nó rất là lớn. Đó nó có những cái khó khăn như vậy và thực trạng của nó hiện nay là nó như vậy.

Appendix C.2 - Interview guide for interviewing supplier (Translated to English)

Transcript code B12Aug30Do

[Interviewer]
Can you describe KXQ's supply chain, both upstream and downstream, and how it relates to the SGC supply chain?

[00.15] B12Aug30Do
At present, my supply side is… one that is produced by the KXQ farm, secondly, we do guaranteed buy the products that meet the KXQ standard of the neighbouring farmers, then it has that two sources and ... After harvesting from the farms, we transfer the products to KXQ's processing factory and pre-pack and then deliver directly to SGC's warehouse.

[01.00] Interviewer:
Besides SGC, do you have other buyers?

[01.02] B12Aug30Do
I also sell to M, M now it becomes something… I suddenly forget the name. [Interviewer: MM] ah MM, and BC. In the past we supplied so many to BC, but later on, because of the BC purchase policy it is not so… then I stop supply to them. And I also supply to some large fruit shops in Saigon

[01.41] Interviewer:
You plant both the fruit and vegetables?

[01.43] B12Aug30Do
In term of fruit, we mainly grow muskmelon and cantaloupe.

Interviewer:
So if we divide it up between buyers, about how many % do you supply SGC, how many % do you supply to other buyers?

[02:02] B12Aug30Do
SGC accounts for about 70%

Interviewer
BC is reduced now?

[02:09] B12Aug30Do
BC is reduced, BC is not significant. The rest is for M, supply to the fruit shops are also only for a little amount.

Interviewer
Probably M is about 20, 25%

[02:19] B12Aug30Do
About 25%

Interviewer
What about the new project of the SGC, develop clean fresh vegetables? Can you describe me?

[02:32] B12Aug30Do
Currently we cooperate with an organic farm in Ca Mau. At that farm, the size is quite big, about 320ha. It mainly grows rice, rice.… it is developing fruit and vegetables and freshwater fishes.

[03:07] Interviewer:
Then the firm only cooperate with that farm, and also with KXQ or they just only cooperate with one supplier?

[03:15] B12Aug30Do
That one is SGC's own and KXQ is mine (laughs)
[Interviewee]:
The new project of SGC, apart from cooperate with this farm, do they have direct investment or how do they cooperation?
[03:28] B12Aug30Do
SGC invest directly to the farm, acquiring more than 50% of the farm.
Interviewer
Then in this project, in addition to the goods from the farm, there are also purchased from other sources?
[03:53] B12Aug30Do
No
Interviewer
The only source is from the farm?
03:54] B12Aug30Do
Hm, because it's hard to do organic products.
[04:01] Interviewer
This 50% is the acquisition of that company and then you will interfere?
[04:08] B12Aug30Do
They sent people through to manage the farm. I am one of the operation managers in the project.
[04:17] Interviewer
So this is considered to be SGC self-cultivation?
[04:22] B12Aug30Do
It's correct
Interviewer
What is the current supply chain of SGC? The supply chain of the general vegetable products and not about the organic vegetable project. Could you share with me?
[04:43] B12Aug30Do
So currently, the SGC has about a few dozen suppliers of the vegetables and fruits. These few dozen suppliers may be companies, maybe the co-operatives. However, due to the fact that the SGC model is co-operative, the link with co-operatives in other provinces is relatively tight, so the source of the Agricultural cooperatives of other provinces are provided to SGC, besides, the companies may also be private enterprises and private households, but the private ones are few. Mainly supplier are companies and cooperatives only
Interviewer
But why, when it comes to companies or cooperatives, is there a certain standard?
[05:48] B12Aug30Do
Right. So now, the most common standard for supermarkets is following the VietGAP standard, well, every one… those criteria…is the standard of the state, and so all businesses have to follow that, because when the state do assessment, they also refer to the standard, then SGC also does the same. M does so, they have some teams that regularly check those, may be they check on the products when it is delivered to the store, or it can be a check on the product being sold at the supermarket, and periodically or irregularly, they go to check the place of cultivation without notification.

[Interviewer]
So the project that makes green veggie is different from the current product being bought from other places?
[06:56] B12Aug30Do
The project to produce clean vegetables. Now SGC is looking towards organic standards
[Interviewer]
And the VietGAP is not that? I would like to go back to KXQ. Because KXQ is cooperating with the farmers to produce, apart from production itself, could you please share with me how to choose this farmers to cooperate?
[07:25] B12Aug30Do (Answer without finishing question)
Firstly, the area in Cu Chi is the area where has traditional of agricultural production since long time ago, so I choose households that has that has a relatively large farm, and it is close and the immediate vicinity to my high-tech zone. Because… firstly, it is easy to manage. It means that it is nearby, then the management team can be, in term of transport, this is more convenient to monitor and the And the farmer must also follow VietGAP standard, they produce according to the VietGAP standard, and have VietGAP certificate in accordance with standards that I committed to the supermarket system.
[Interviewer]
How many farms are you working with currently?
[08:22] B12Aug30Do
I work with about four to five farms.
[08:30] Interviewer
You said the size of the household farm is relative large. How big is that?
[08:41] B12Aug30Do
It is about 1 to 2 hectares
Interviewer
How long do you work with these farms?
[08:57] B12Aug30Do
Long time ago
[Interviewer]
The longest is how long?
[09:00] B12Aug30Do
The longest is about six or seven years
[09:04] Interviewer
What about the shortest?
[09:04] B12Aug30Do
Almost four or five years ago
Interviewer
Do these suppliers supplying stable?
[09:19] B12Aug30Do
Yes, the people that I work with are relatively stable, almost no one withdraws (laughs)
[09:30] Interviewer
So what do you do guaranteed buy for them. How does it work?
[09:43] B12Aug30Do

They produce, then how much they harvested every day, they deliver it into our site, and I buy all of it, almost all of the products for them.

[09:59] Interviewer

Almost 100% of them?

[10:00] B12Aug30Do

Almost 100%

[10:02] Interviewer

They do not sell to anyone outside?

[10:04] B12Aug30Do

Yes, they do not sell to anyone outside, because of the price we buy the product with this standard, it is relatively better than the wet market price, so if they sell outside, they will… of course there are also sometimes, at the point that… Vietnam has the Lunar New Year and other occasions, then there are some products such as cucumber that the price increases very high, then at that time they in fact sell outside. That really happened.

Interviewer

But do you have any commitment or sign any contract with them or not?

[10:39] B12Aug30Do (answered without question)

Have signed contracts.

[10:45] Interviewer

What kind of actions do you have to make sure your purchase from these suppliers meet your requirements?

[10.56] B12Aug30Do

I have a team who check them, they visit the farms every day. They assess and regularly they also take product samples to analyse their quality, test regularly using VietGap standard.

[11.21] Interviewer

Is there any other way to monitor them? Besides the fact that you check their production daily, do you apply any other way to manage them?

[11.34] B12Aug30Do

[Hesitating 2s] Almost is not

[11.38] Interviewer

So do you have any ways to make them supply better?

[11.46] B12Aug30Do

Until now, the farmers have been with us for so long, they have strong attachment with us to a relatively long time. I think is the reasons that make them working well with us and close to us because we ensure the stability of their production, yes, it is not…it mean that their everyday production... we do not encourage them to produce to much, they do it right and they product just enough quantity in order to supply for us... so, they don’t fear of stock when they produce. As for price… we buy at a relative stable that price. And in fact, if that they do exactly what the standard require, so they can survive in the market. That’s it that is what I think that make them tied to us for a long time

[12.45] Interviewer

Do you have activities to support to their development?

[12.53] B12Aug30Do

Almost no, because in fact, my business is a small business, it is not big company… the revenue per year of twenty something to thirty billion VND is not anything big. From the beginning, from the we grow up from small company, and grows slowly and gradually develops, we almost do not get any support of the state and even the access to the loans from banks, we did not have approach to bank loans, so we don't have the resources that we can use support to farmers .

[13.45] Interviewer

So, for example, in term of technical, all of the farmers will in charge themselves? Do you provide training to them?

[12.55] B12Aug30Do (Answer without question)

I have training for them, and I… they visit our farm. They see we do this and we do that. And first and foremost, they need to be interested in joining us. Well, they will… I will support them. Yes, if you want to do this, to do that you will need to use these techniques… like that. And, in terms of machinery and equipment and even fertilizer and planning technique, we support for them, and they follow us and they sell it to us.

[14.36] Interviewer

So that you have a lot of support for them, so you have… they visit to your farm to learn from you, then you visit their farm for training, to show them how to plant

[14.52] B12Aug30Do

Yes, It means… that when we visit their farm to evaluate, we support them… the things that they have not do correctly yet, then we will correct it according to standard, and we send them to VietGap Educative training and others, the training courses from the state which we are allowed to participate in… It mean we treat them as a member of our company… and they can be involved in those. [15.33] Interviewer

[15.33] Interviewer

Can also remember those kind of activities that you support for them include what activities? Could you share with me as many as you can, the activities that you think they will make your supplier produce better quality or make their business easier?

[15.55] B12Aug30Do

Actually, we could not call it helps them, as I think this is what I'm doing is for us, they… of course we instruct them to do those things, so that the goods we buy meet the standards, so when we put on the market, it has our standards. That can also benefit them but that actually that also benefits us... Cannot say that we help them. that is my opinion. (laugh)

[16.37] Interviewer

Then, what activities do you think are good for you, but you have to do with them to make sure they can supply you well?

[16.46] B12Aug30Do

Then, for example, activities such as disseminating to them the VietGAP standards are what it is, send them to training course, sending them attend classes on the VietGAP standards and then apply those standard to their farm. Then support them in terms of techniques beyond the VietGAP technology, there is something called high-tech agriculture applying the science, machines in the production. So they make cleaner product, less pestilent, has no residue of pesticides, no residue of fertilizer, so that our products meet the output standard requirement. Yes, that is what…, actually that is what we are doing that may be beneficial to them as well. Their experience of producing will also be increased but the benefit that we get is that my product more standardize and it is increasingly quality according to our standard. .

[18.00] Interviewer

Generally speaking, both sides are mutually beneficial. Let me ask you a little bit more about your support in term of machine. How does it work?

[18.12] B12Aug30Do

For example, we would... they invest their money to buy those things, then we could advise them on which machine they should buy, which membrane they should use in which scale and we setup that system for them.

[18.32] Interviewer

You did it for them?

[18.33] B12Aug30Do

Yes, we instructed them…we make that for them.

[18.37] Interviewer

But are they supposed to invest?

[18.39] B12Aug30Do

They have to invest, because the company does not have capital (laughs)

[18.44] Interviewer

We have any kind of… for example let them to borrow machines or rent them the machines… they have to buy all themselves?

[18.52] B12Aug30Do

No we don't

[18.54] Interviewer

As for fertilizer, what kind of support do you have with fertilizer?

[19.02] B12Aug30Do

I also have instructions for them about fertilizers. But sometimes there are sources of fertilizer that they could not buy outside or they have to buy at high prices then we can help them to buy it. Yes, we can help them to buy it.

[19.25] Interviewer

Don't you provide the fertilizers for them to use in production?

[19.28] B12Aug30Do (Reply not finished yet)

No, almost everything they invest themselves and they sell it for us

[19.38] Interviewer

So, if you have listed some activities that supporting them, such as technical support, giving them training, support them to setting up the machines and then supporting them if they could not find a source of fertilizer in order to help them to buy at a lower price to lower their production costs. So, on a scale of 1 2 3 with 3 is the level of support is high, 1 is the lowest level. Could you rate what activities will be at the simplest level, or nothing complicated, which one is more complicated that require you to provide more support, and 2 is an average?

[20.41] B12Aug30Do

In my opinion, the thing is…is…difficult to… is about the cultivation technique. That is the thing we can call… we share the technological secrets…uhm that is the thing we… we share with them the most. In terms of technical, or infrastructure…nowadays there are a lot of people do that, everybody can do that, not only us. Maybe we have some improvements somewhat roughly cheaper than others, but in fact it is not something big.

[21.29] Interviewer

Do you apply it to all farmers that work with, or do you apply only to a few households? How do you do that? To be clear, you have four to five farmer do you do the same to all of them?

[21.43] B12Aug30Do

Yes, we do the same thing for every of them.

[21.47] Interviewer

Is there a difference between the farmers?

[21.50] B12Aug30Do

Mostly I do not discriminate against any farmer (laughs), but there is one thing…of course the financial condition of each farmer is different, so that… the investment on technical infrastructure in each place is different, in fact it is not equal.

[22.16] Interviewer

Now please think about one of those farmers. I just want to focus on one farmer whom you feels you have strong attachment, you provide the most supportive activities for him. The supportive activities means the actions that we have already mentioned. Do you think the way you manage them, and the way you support them is effective.

[22.53] B12Aug30Do

Yes. It does.

[22.56] Interviewer

So, if you evaluates the level of its effectiveness, how much do you think it achieves compared to your desire for the output?

[23.11] B12Aug30Do

Actually, this is very difficult to evaluate because I have never have any intention to do that assessment, but in general I can see they have strong attachments with us, and their production is stable, and they keep continues to stick with us in long-term, then I think the collaboration between us is effective, so that they stick with me.

[23.54] Interviewer

Do you feel that they behave opportunistically anytime?

[24.11] B12Aug30Do

Well, no

[24.15] Interviewer

So you don't see that. So is there any problem between your company and them when cooperate with each other?

[24.30] B12Aug30Do

There is nothing big. For example, there are times when the market price fluctuates, they also ask us to increase the price, then it is equal to the wet. There are just few occasions when it peak time in the year. That is almost not a very big deal for me, because I also see at that point realistically I have to increase the price to guarantee their interests.

[25.14] Interviewer

Is there any case that you can not afford to increase the buying prices so they will eventually not sell to you?

[25.23] B12Aug30Do

There is no case that they stop selling to me, but on that situation they can reduce the quantity. For example, there are cases that they both sell for us and to other people.

[25.34] Interviewer

Do you know that?

[25.35] B12Aug30Do

I know, I completely know about that, but the that quantity is… of course we also have shortages…we have shortages in the supply to the supermarket system… but the supermarket system is also like this… at that time the price in the wet market is very high, and they buy goods… because we are… we are not doing anymore… but in the past we applied a fixed price throughout the year, we do not change the price up and down from time to time. For example, we sell cucumber to supermarkets at the price of 12,000vnd/1kg, and they sell out at about 14-15,000vnd something, our products are always the same, not going up and down at all because I produce according to the process, so the productivity is relatively stable. It is not affected too much by the weather and other factors. And because of our production process, so the price is stable, we calculate cost of productions and a margin then we can offer a stable price. However, at the time when the price… of course our price is higher than normal products in the wet market, it is not the same. For example, the price in the wet market is 8,000 – 9,000 VND and our price is 12,000 – 12 thousand something. That is an example. But there is also the time when the price in the wet market is increased dramatically to 20,000 vnd or 20 thousand something, so the supermarket… if they buy from other company or other wholesaler, they will increase the price to reflect the market price…if the supermarket do not accept the prices increased, they will not sell to them, so the supermarkets will converge to buy from us… but in fact our quantity is not enough to provide for them, because with our production scale, we could only produce a certain amount… we could not make anything more, even we pick young fruit, we could not make that big quantities. So there are cases like that. At that time, we almost could not provide enough to their demand.

Interviewer

But at that point you still have to commit to keep the same price with the supermarket, you could not increase the price?

[28.11] B12Aug30Do

There is no increase in the price. However from last year… it means when it came to signing of a new contract, we see that situation… The big supermarket, the purchasing department of the supermarket is not, to be straight forward, is not the farmer and also not… roughly said the way they work is not “fair play” (laughs) so we dropped that clause in the contract and now I sell up and down at market prices. We sell at the market price… we don’t offer fixed price anymore because we committed to that so many years, but we do not have any support, or get any priority for what I did which I think that the thing that I do well. Only when the price is raised, then they convergence buying from us (laughs), because there is no benefits to do that so in recent years, we dropped that term.

[29.30] Interviewer

So in the past years when you committed to a fixed price, do you buy at such low prices or always have to ...?

[29.41] B12Aug30Do (answered without finishing question)

At those times, we still have to buy that high price

[29.47] Interviewer

But then you sell it?
[29.47] B12Aug30Do
When we sell it we have to sell it with the lost
[29.49] Interviewer
Still have to accept?
[29.49] B12Aug30Do
Yeah
[29.52] Interviewer
That is the case you cannot afford to buy at a higher price, then they leave you, they do not provide goods for you?
[30.03] B12Aug30Do
It is a long-term business, so we have to support them and we also could not say that we won't sell for the supermarket. So we still have to buy in order to supply to the supermarkets. If they order, we could not refuse to supply. Because it is a long-term business, it is normal that it is up and down.
[30.27] Interviewer
Is there any problem with the quality of the product?
[30.36] B12Aug30Do
Our product has almost very little problem. We do not have that because of our production process is we control it all…as if we don't buy unlabelled product from wet market, the we cannot control the quality. So our product is almost no problem.
[31.00] Interviewer
Are there any cases where they mix other lower quality goods to supply to you? Because you buy at a higher price than the market price, so will they bring poor quality products for you?
[31.18] B12Aug30Do
I think it happens, but somehow for a certain percentage it does not have. If they do that, they do not feel any benefit at all. Because the first thing is the size of their farm, and we may not coming to visit them every day but we do visit one or twice a week, so we know that at that scale they are growing, how is it the beginning of the season, how is it at the peak time of the season, how is it the end of the season. We know about the output, yes we can estimate that the output. So if they… we see that from the farm at that time the quantity of product is changed, so we are in doubt about it. ah. And also the tested product…we take their sample to do quality testing, so we will also be able to discover the goods without having to follow the process of us. For example, that the amount of pesticide residue of our product is ... if you grow it according to our process it is very low…almost doesn't have, take that as an example. If the product is mixed from other sources, it is definitely that the residue will be higher. Maybe it is still within the standard but it will be two or three times higher than our standard, then we know immediately. Of course that they are not out of VietGAP standards, but there is still residue is there, they will work with them.
Interviewer
But does that ever happen to you?
[33.08] B12Aug30Do
In the past it happened…but then recently it almost does not happen.
[33.15] Interviewer

Then, I think, because they also want to make long term business with you. They also want to keep the relationship with you. At a time when market prices are high and you committed to buying a reasonable price that is not as high as the market, they will sell their goods out to the market and they will find another source to cover for you. Have you ever discovered such a case? That is, in terms of quantity, they say that they will supply three tons, and they provide three tons, but actually that three tons are not from their farm, their farm are just showing up?

[33.57] B12Aug30Do

Actually, It makes sense what you say, but it is also unreasonable that… at that time the price at the wet the market is very high, and if they sell the product in the wet market, they can only sell it at the market price as the maximum, in the wet market they don't need to buy high-end products, for wholesalers in the wet market, the high-end products don't have any meaning to them at all, so they treat a cucumber is a cucumber, they just buy cucumber. They do not buy high quality cucumber. So if they sell it outside, it's just as high as the market price, cannot be anything higher. Hence it is unlikely to happen. They cannot get this high quality goods to exchange with low quality, cannot swap with low quality products because at that time the price is the same (laughs)

[34.51] Interviewer

Isn't there any point that the price of the market will be lower than the price of the high quality products, because usually the quality is very different?

[35.01] B12Aug30Do

Yes, It is. Because normally…normally… our products… we buy at a price is slightly better… higher about a thousand, a thousand and a half something compared to the products in the wet market.

[35.14] Interviewer

Then there is the case that although your price is high but because ... there are others company who know that the farms is a clean production farm, then they offer them a higher price. Then your farmers will buy unlabelled products for you, and then take their own products for the guy who offer them higher prices. That is because the competition for clean product is too much competition, many business try to win the product that has so called "clean". The price of you is one - two thousand higher, but the guy that sells higher then they will buy?

[35.55] B12Aug30Do

In order to do business together in a long-term… it is mainly based on the prestige of each other. There were the time… when they could say to me that someone will buy with that price, then they can also ask for the appropriate same price. So we can consider… we can adjust the price of the supermarkets, so we will able to increase the price. However, to be honest, they don't buy a large quantity of product. All other clean vegetable business currently don't purchase too much. So they cannot buy all the output of our farmers. Besides, we have our advantage that we have our own farm. We have our own farm, so ok… if they feel they don't want to do business with us, it is… it's not all five to seven of farmers who stop supply to us, but maybe a one or two farms. For us… that quantity, we may be in shortage that little amount but still we can be proactive in the source of our own production in our farm. Then we find a solution to fulfil the order in other ways. We do not... They do not have the right to dominate the quantity which they supply for us, so that we can negotiate. We are willing to give up on their demand that we could not meet.

[37.42] Interviewer

But is there ever a situation that I mentioned?

[37.45] B12Aug30Do

There are some people who focus on price at different points, and…of course there are. From the past until now there are four to five farmers, and there are people who are not honest. It is not does not happen.

Interviewer

Can you tell me a case where you have discovered that in the past? How did they do?

[38.13] B12Aug30Do

It is mostly… they may be mix up the product as you said. They take the product of the farm next door, such as their brother's farms. Those farms are not doing business with us, but they also grow the same products. And they said to their brother that bring your product here I will help you to sell them out. Such example is one, and the second one is they cultivation does not conform to our standards. They may be, for example, they only need to put a certain amount of fertilizer on the plants, but they add more to make the product looks better. Then there are times when there were pests and using pesticides in our pesticide list… they do not have, not really ... there will be times when they have to destroy the whole farm. And they use pesticides in the forbidden list, to save their farm. If we found out that such cases, after working with them, if they do not have the change, they do not improve, we will not buy their product for the next times.

[39.43] Interviewer

Do you think such behaviour is opportunistic behaviour?

[39.53] B12Aug30Do

Yes it is… because of the fact that the mind-set of our farmer is like that from so long time. It almost does not have much improvement. As I in the past, I did my first job with farmer in Da Lat. We went up there, do investment for them, pledge to guaranteed buy their product, but to some points when the product price was low, they sold all the products to us, to the points where the price is high, they said their farms corrupted, then they just sold a little bit to us (laughs). The distance was too far away for us to go up and down to visit them, so we could not control all those problems. So after a few seasons, we lost and could not do anything more, then I withdrew to do business here, we don’t do business in Dalat market anymore.

Interviewer

Did it affect you too much when you did that?

[41.07] B12Aug30Do

Too many…lose money and other things and it was a lot.

Interviewer

For those farmer in Dalat, you also do the same way such as has strong attachments and had same technical standard ?

[41.18] B12Aug30Do

No, not in the past, there was not such as this. Only that they…the technical standards were there but was not as strict as this time. That means we just want to give them money in advance for them to do so, so that we have a stable source to buy and to supply. But it did not work.

41.46] Interviewer

Did you give them money in advance?

[41.47] B12Aug30Do

Yes, advance payment, the money for fertilizer and seeds was given in advance. But when it comes to the point that product price were cheap they sell them all for us (laughs), and when the product price are high… they were up there and we were here… The traders went straight to the farm to buy, so they sold it, they did not ship it to me.

[42.12] Interviewer

You did not provide them technical support, you do not have them trained whatsoever, you just give them money?

[42.20] B12Aug30Do

No, at that time, dozen or so years ago, at that time its market was so primitive. It did not have…at that time there was not the VietGAP standards

[42.32] Interviewer

So you can compare the differences between what you did with Dalat farmers and what you are doing now, why the farmer in Dalat…It seems like they have more opportunistic behaviours than with the ones you are doing now, right? Could you think the reason why it has something the differences? It is subjective?

[43.02] B12Aug30Do

I think every time is different and my way of doing it now is different from the old one... the difference now is that I do business near my area, so we can control it. That is one. The second thing is… about the product. Currently we do tropical products. As for now, for example, the main product now in the market is the gourd, the gourd, the winter melon with the cucumber…and the demand is relatively stable. It does not have the times when there is harsh "fever" of agricultural product as the same to Dalat's product…it is also one of the factors that…make our supply source more stable… It's not that… For example the agricultural products of Dalat depends so much on the weather. There are times when there was frost or others, there were almost no single cabbage that meet the standard to supply the supermarket. And there are things that are… roughly the same as there were a lot of damages… so it make the fever of thr products. Now, my current products do not have that factors much, so it is also a factor that we can make it sustainable.

[45.13] Interviewer

Do think the activities that you do, you associate more closely with the farmer such as you treats them like your employees as you said, you send them to training, and instruct them to do thing. Do they affect to their the long-term business with you or ensure their supplying to you?

[45.37] B12Aug30Do

I think it also is. Because, however, firstly, for the Vietnamese farmers in general…our farmer and the Southern people in general, the sentiment is an important factor.

[46.07] Interviewer

In the behaviours that you listed earlier, as if there were a change in the price, and you knew they were selling out, the extent to which you accepted such behaviour? Do you accept that behaviour?

[46.28] B12Aug30Do

If you talk about accepting, then… We knew… but we turn a blind for that because I could not…interfere that with our resources, but actually… they are not actually selling all product out there. They also have… they still keep… they still want to do business with us long-term. They just want at that moment they earn a little more but they still want to do long-term business with us after that, so they still keep an appropriate certain quantity to supply us, so that they maintain with us. Well, so we turn a blind eye for that, in order to do business together, if we are too harsh with each other, then it is not that.

[47.33] Interviewer

So do you think that's normal?

[47.40] B12Aug30Do

For our current condition, we have to accept that because there is no other way but without it is still better (laughs)

[47.56] Interviewer

It became popular right?

[47.59] B12Aug30Do

Yes it is popular, in general everyone are the same, it is not something special

[48.12] Interviewer

Then before you do business with them, with such people, how was the relationship between you two, and after those such things happened, do you have any change in your relationship with them when you find out that they no longer priority you as their commitment?

[48.43] B12Aug30Do

I think I almost didn't change much, maybe it was because of my characteristic. Or I eventually thought, among those five to seven farmers, of course, some of them are closer, some of them are not that close. The close relationship here is on the pure personal sentimental aspect rather than the aspect of doing business, so it is not like we are closer to these people then we preferred them than other. But It can be denied that I am closer with this person than others is the fact. But in terms of doing business, I still treat them fairly, it is equal…but indeed to those who are closer to me, I also feel that they are doing business with us more decently. These things are going to happen less. Maybe it's because they are more decent so I am closer to them, or because they are closer so they treat us better (laughs) I do not know between that two which one affect which one?

[50.05] Interviewer

So when doing business with those farmers, is there any norms in this relationship? Or is there any norms in the business relationship in this particular industry that people must adhere to?

[50.23] B12Aug30Do

This is… in fact they… they are farmers… mostly they proactively approach us. Uhm, because wet the market is very uncertain and they want a stability in their production. They want to… and I told them that we have enough of these products, if you want to join with us, then you have to plant this one, not the other. If you grow the other I could not buy that. They want to stabilize their production, so they come to us. We almost don't need to find them, so before they accept it, they see how we are doing and they ask if we need that product, they will produce for us. So they accept our standard, if you want to sell to us, your product has to meet this, and this, and this. And that is the norms, the standards when they start to do business with us.

[51.31] Interviewer

And then during the cooperation, what norms do you have in the relationship between the two?

[51.41] B12Aug30Do

I only have that rule. It is to follow our product standard and the required quantities. Other than that, there is no other rules.

[51.56] Interviewer

Do you have any expectation of their behaviours?

[52.04] B12Aug30Do

Of course, I always expect that my business partners in particular and even the farmers in general, they are more and more professional. Professional here is…the professional both in the production and the professional in the market, professional in the business relationship. The more professional the more easy. To be honest, at the moment our farmer … says even they have been farmers through many generations, but in fact they are not professional. They are not professional on the choice of which plant to grow, which animals to feed. And they are not professional about the way of doing business.

Interviewer

What do you mean by being professional in business relationship?

[53.16] B12Aug30Do

They must keep their commitments. Do not perceive the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence (laugh)

[53.28] Interviewer

How about in case of an problem?

[53.38] B12Aug30Do

What are the problems?

[53.43] Interviewer

I do not know… between you and your partners if when something goes wrong, if there is something wrong?

[53.58] B12Aug30Do

Then the incident, for example, is in terms of quality standards, in this aspect, that I already told you then I will tell them that we detected those things. If they do not meet our standards, we will not buy from them anymore.

[54.27] Interviewer

So I use the word professional in business relationship that you mentioned, then when the incident happened so what would you define be professional?

[54.43] B12Aug30Do

Well, in their own way, if they are professional, when they commit to doing the right thing then they have to do what they have committed. I think it is professional.

[55.18] Interviewer

Is there any behaviour that they take in the form of opportunistic or do they happen negatively when you work with them that you know for sure that it will happen but you have no way of preventing it?

[55.44] B12Aug30Do

There are things that I do business for many years then I know. For example making the product does not meet the standard, mixing up products, and supply us depends on the market price. Well, before we cooperate with them, we frankly discuss with them, and when they do not meet then we… I mean that we detected and we did not... we still discuss with them on the problem if they do not sort it then we stop to cooperate with them.

[56.28] Interviewer

Do you have any way to prevent it to be happened?

[56.34] B12Aug30Do

Not yet… Until know I don’t know how to stop it yet (laughs). It's just only a commitment to each other. In term of prevent it, I do not know how .

[56.52] Interviewer

Why in the previous years, when you work with SGC, you had to supply to SGC for a fixed and then when the market price increase, you still have to supply them that fixed price. In the meantime, you had not been able to ask the farmers supply to you with a fixed price, instead you had to accept the increased price from them, why there is a difference? To the farmers, you are a buyer, to SGC, they are also a buyer, why didn't you deal with the SGC again to change the price.

[57.38] B12Aug30Do

Uhm, here I am talking about is the (laughs) power of the buyer. Uhm, here I talk about the power of the buyer… for a chain that is … the largest retailer in Vietnam, at present, the buyer power of the SGC is relatively large, so that they can impose the terms, the conditions to theirs suppliers.

Interviewer

You are forced to do that?

[58.12] B12Aug30Do

I have to follow that.

[58.19] Interviewer

Now I would like ask about role of SGC with other cooperation. You said that SGC buys from cooperative, and companies according to the VietGAP standard. I don't know if SGC has any supports for those organization to make them supply better?

[58.54] B12Aug30Do

As far as I know, there is almost no activity. Since many years ago, when on Tet holiday occasion, the occasion of Tet is the time when…firstly the time of high demand, and its price has risen sharply, so SGC has used the government's price stabilization fund that they provide for the SGC within three months. Then SGC used the money to pay in advance to the companies, to the supply sources…pay in advance in order to keep the low price during peak time, just like purchasing in advance. They actually do that a few consecutive years, five or six consecutive years but in fact it is not effective much. It has some, but not much effect. And then the main activity of the SGC to support supplier is just to stop at that level. There are almost no other support in terms of technology and other policies. In terms of technical… the technical of SGC is…no better than… (laughs), they could not support anyone in term of technical. As for policy, there is almost no policy that is specific and effective to develop a stable supply for the SGC.

Interviewer

You say it does not work in the case of advancing money from the price stabilization fund. How does it not effective?

[01.01.19] B12Aug30Do

Well…the first one is it's not keep the price stable enough, the price still increased. And from the other side of suppliers, they depends on the market. If the source of money that provided enough, the farmer, the other people also buy form farmers, so if there is the time when it's "fever" it's too hot, some traders outside are willing to increase the price sharply, so from this side we lose. Second, the fact is, there are businesses that use the money for the wrong purpose…that means… they take that money to do something else rather than taking care about the price stabilization. That happens. And also in fact they have priorities for co-operatives, large businesses, cooperatives… they usually prioritize for co-operative before businesses. In this way, the equality in approaching the source of money is not available. So it leads to the fact that it is unequal, it does not work in the use of the money form the price stabilization fund.

[01.02.56] Interviewer

I do not understand what is the money for price stabilization. It means we have money and then we give it to our suppliers, what do they do in return?

[01.03.09] B12Aug30Do

In return, they will keep the price stable for us. For example, in the time when the it come to lunar new year in December lunar calendar, the price begins to increase … starting from the full moon of the month, the price is up, may be doubled to three times. So from October November the state provides a stabilization fund. SGC will get an amount of money… the big companies take part in the programme will take the job of stabilizing the price. So for example SGC, SGC will divide the money to this company this company this company… to the products that SGC feels that they have to keep the price stable. Then they give the money to the company, and say okay now we pay you this money, you will have to commit that you will keep the price as I currently buy from you, but I am not pick up the product now, I will pick it later on. At that time you are not allowed to increase the price because I already bought. That is the purpose of the price stabilization.

[01.04.25] Interviewer

That means that is a form of advanced payment?

[01.04.29] B12Aug30Do

I paid the money in advance so that I can secure the supply source, so that at that point I get a cheap supply source.

Interviewer

When it comes to the point of picking up products, do you still have to pay in full for the order or you subtract the money you paid in advance?

[01.04.44] B12Aug30Do

No, I subtract that money

Interviewer

How do they misuse the money or use the money in wrong purpose?

[01.04.56] B12Aug30Do

It mainly because that funding does not reach to the farmers. It goes to the organizations, through the organizations and consolidators. Actually, SGC cannot buy direct from farmers… can not buy a little from a farmer, so they must have somebody to consolidate, and then they will buy in a large order…they cannot buy separately in small orders (laughs). So there were some company that they received the fund but they could not do the price stabilization job… in fact, every year the price still increases in the occasions, it happened.

[01.05.50] Interviewer

But they already get the funding, how could they increase the price?

[01.05.57] B12Aug30Do

They do not increase the price but they only supply very little (laughs).

[01.06.09] Interviewer

Do you think that is opportunistic behaviours?

[01.06.10] B12Aug30Do

That is the opportunistic behaviour , that is a form of opportunities.

[01.06.14] Interviewer

In the cooperation between the businesses and SGC do you see any other opportunistic behaviours?

[01.06.27] B12Aug30Do

Oh yes, It has… and the chance that the opportunistic behaviours happened is due to the professional and the capacity of the system, the purchase department of the supermarkets. For example, they might be giving… for example, a farm… they are able to sell good quality products to the market at a high price…take fruit as an example…they sell all the good class I products to large fruit shops for a very high price, while they take the class II and class II to supply to supermarkets at not-a-cheap price that is…that is because of the negotiation skills and the fruit standard assessment of the supermarket is not…say professional… so it leads to such situation and the fact is negative behaviours happen. So it has… I work in this industry, so that is my opinions. For some products, not mention to the vegetables products because it does not happen a lot, but for the fruit, I don't appreciate it. Or… because it is a type of commodity that, in order to be sold in the market, must compete for the price of the supermarket system. Price competition with each other is very fierce, so they want to have a supply source with competitive price… the consequence is… there is no beautiful commodity in the supermarket, especially the fruit. It is obvious…if you go to supermarkets, you can see the fruit in the supermarkets is not good, not delicious… it is not quality products.

Interviewer

Is that because the supermarket accepts the purchase of such a product or the expectation of the product is different so you conclude that they act opportunistically?

[09.09.11] B12Aug30Do

Actually, the supermarket… when they quote, they quoted for good products, but when they supply… it was not as expected but we could not have any solutions. There is no way to limit that.

[01.09.37] Interviewer

You cannot do anything?

[01.09.41] B12Aug30Do

Almost no…almost do nothing… it has so called a standard…the system is also not transparent enough to make everything clear... for example you have to supply the products which is this, and this, and this…both in its physical look and other factors…and also I mentioned earlier there are negative behaviours.

[01.10.12] Interviewer

What do you mean by negative behaviours, could you share about that?

[01.10.15] B12Aug30Do

That is the so called "under-table" – that happens.

[01.10.24] Interviewer

Is it popular?

[01.10.32] B12Aug30Do

It is popular and it happen in every supermarket as well as SGC.

[01.10.38] Interviewer

Does it only occur in supermarket system? How about the other channels? Because of vegetables and fruits will reach the market through many channels. Does only supermarket experience that?

[01.10.52] B12Aug30Do

Right

[01.10.55] Interviewer

Why is it so different?

[01.11.00] B12Aug30Do

Because if I sell it to you as the owner of the SGC, you I will quote the exact (laughs) here I sells to the supermarket, so you are the middleman who buys it, you are the middleman not the owner, so the price is different.

[01.11.24] Interviewer

Is there any other cases that the supermarket find the opportunistic behaviour of the supplying companies, besides the fact that quality is not as promised?

[01.11.52] B12Aug30Do

[silence 6s] I think there is not. Because in term of price, it is now very competitive. It is not possible to sell the supermarkets at a too high price. So the sellers only have a way to sell a high price to supermarkets… it means that they provide class II, class III products but charged as class I. There is no other ways.

[01.12.25] Interviewer

But you said supermarkets have the power of buyers, they could not limit that behaviours? They could not use that power to force the suppliers to supply the right product?

[01.12.45] B12Aug30Do

For example, the product, the product… the buyer's power is strong…but it is just strong to small businesses (laughs), but for large businesses… it's hard to say…Well, for example, M, ok I supply to them, I say I will supply melon which weighted from eight to nine grams per fruit, that is an approximate size… or another time I say the size is from 1 to 1.2 kg...they can open a random box and take three fruit to weight... For example, if you say it is 7 to 800 grams, so three fruit is at least 2.1 kilograms or above. If they take out three random fruit but they are not weighted exactly 2.1 kilograms, so that they are willing return full order to me. They won't test any further fruit, just return them all… They accept that their shelves will be empty.

[01.14.09] Interviewer

They accept?

[01.14.09] B12Aug30Do

They accept that. They accept that they will not have the item to sell. However the culture here is different, the pressure that the selling points, the stores put on the pickup function and sale department are huge if they have no product for sell. When they do not have the goods for sale, they blame, they shout, etc.… thus the sale department by any means to have products for them to sell…because they have revenue target if they don't have products so where they can meet the target (laughs). So because of that pressure, the sale department has to turn a blind eye to that. That is the first thing, the second is those businesses are close businesses, there is also "backyard business"…then that is the same with "under-table" things…that means turn a blind eye to do business together. That is the story how that businesses can supply the products which is not the same with their commitment to the supermarket.

[01.15.50] Interviewer

Do you know the biggest supplier who currently supply to SGC?

[01.15.56] B12Aug30Do

The biggest supplier of SGC now with a couple of tons per day, it is the AD co-operative, then ST company, both in Da Lat.... Because in the past they…I don't remember the name of the company… because they were doing business with me in the past, so I know they are ST, but now they have founded a company with a different name I don't know. I don't remember, I only remember his name is ST, maybe I don't remember it right. AD cooperative is very large in Da

Lat. Recently they sell 70% to U&I so it is not purely cooperative anymore… it is now kind of a joint stock company.

[01.17.00] Interviewer

Has AD ever act opportunistically?

[01.17.06] B12Aug30Do

Actually, both AD and ST, they had some scandals a few years ago. If you search now you still can find it in newspapers

[01.17.20] Interviewer

Can you tell me that?

[01.17.22] B12Aug30Do

They blame each other that instead of buying directly from farmer, they go to the wholesale market to buy product, and then pre-processing and mixing it up…that is get unlabelled products, then pre-processing and packaging and supply to SGC. That is the one you mentioned about mixing products.

[01.17.48] Interviewer

So it really happens?

[01.17.49] B12Aug30Do

Yes it does… it is still there in newspapers.

[01.17.55] Interviewer

I do not know about those cases, but I know AD is a big name.

[01.18.03] B12Aug30Do

Mr T is… a big guy (laughs)

[01.18.08] Interviewer

After that incident, did SGC continue to do business with them?

[01.18.15] B12Aug30Do

Yes, continue to do so… we stopped to buy from them for a while, and had penalties…then re-negotiate and then buy again.

[01.18.31] Interviewer

AD is big, do they really play that game?

[01.18.37] B12Aug30Do

(Laughs) Almost everyone plays, almost everyone plays. For Vietnam's agricultural market now, the biggest gap is lack of transparency ... Lack of transparency ... and there is no mechanism to control effectively that transparency.

[01.19.07] Interviewer

What do you mean by lack of transparency? Lack of transparency in what?

[01.19.09] B12Aug30Do

Transparency in quality, transparency in quality ... for example…the agricultural products market now… you can see the online market is growing... It's growing sharply, and why does the online market grow? It is because they lack of trust in the ... the .. the .. public announcement of businesses, including the supermarkets. They… consumers directly told me that… supermarkets say so… but the supermarket does not directly produce it, and the suppliers of supermarket do. Of course, they know the supermarket does not do, but their suppliers do, if the supermarket know or not? So they find online items that is sold twice as high as the normal price because… they buy the trustworthy. Well, for example, you know me, ok I know this guy, he is ok, believe that he tell the truth, so you buy from me even there is no quality certificate… just buy because it is C' product. Also, see it is very easy to buy VietGAP certificate. VietGAP certificate is a showing-up-standard, it does not have anything. It's no longer have any value for product screening. Now almost no one believes that VietGAP certificate. Just because it is one of the regulations of the state, so if you want to do business, you have to comply. I am now doing better than VietGAP, much better than VietGAP.

[01.21.14] Interviewer

You mean they sell VietGAP certificate, do they come to do assessments in reality?

[01.21.21] B12Aug30Do

Yes, they do test in reality… they go to farm… they have full process of doing it, but actually…they almost not do it properly. They do test once in a year, when it due they go to farm to test one time, they do not check on what farmer do during the rest over three hundred and sixty days. That is, in fact, for doing agricultural businesses, to make clean products clean, make products as you promised…who does that depends mainly on his heart. In fact, it is very difficult to control, not be able control.

[01.22.10] Interviewer

There is no mechanism to be considered as control? If you do not produce directly, so you do not know?

[01.22.21] B12Aug30Do

Cannot know. Even you still can do wrongly organic standards

[01.22.31] Interviewer

How would they do wrongly?

[01.22.33] B12Aug30Do

Instead of organic, they can use chemical fertilizers. Fundamentally, organic products standard does not allow any chemicals, but if they use at certain acceptable level is just right, with a enough quarantine time, and with a moderate level of it, it is very difficult to detect, could not detect it.

Interviewer

There are many.

[01.23.14] B12Aug30Do

That's why I says that the market needs transparency.

[01.23.21] Interviewer

Do you think the role of the buyer in that transparency is important. Buyers here are supermarkets or companies like yours who buy from farmers. What role do they have?

[01.23.45] B12Aug30Do

I think that in order to achieve that transparency, the power of the consumer is very high, and secondly it is the state's sanction. For example, I don't know how other countries are doing, but I think, for example, a company produces food… food is what we eat, it affect to consumers' health, so if you do it wrongly… you do not do what you said…the sanction mechanism must… for example fine a heavy penalty or shut the company, and something like that… I think it has to be that to have…have… enough deterrence. For the consumer, they must have an understanding of the agricultural product, for example, now they do not trust and they equalize, equalize all the products. And may be due to their life standard, the financial condition of the consumer, the majority of consumers in Vietnam. They do not willing to pay a price for the people who do things right. Oh, they keep telling me that…well, they said that but I am not sure they do that, so I just buy other product to be safe. They accidentally "kill" the person who do things right (laughs)

[01.25.36] Interviewer

That is, at the end of the day, it goes back to what consumers want?

[01.25.43] B12Aug30Do (reply without question)

Yes, what consumers do want… and here firstly consumers need to know what they want and know about that product, and thirdly is willing to pay for that. If they do not willing to pay for it… people have do everything to be competitive, so that they can survive. The story that people cheat on quality in order to compete on price, that thing is definitely going to happen.

[01.26.19] Interviewer

I would like to come back with the story of AD, I am still wondering if they produce everything themselves?

[01.26.34] B12Aug30Do

Literally, AD has their land land owned by cooperatives and farmers are members in that cooperative. The size is dozen hectares there, forty to fifty hectares... I remember it is forty something hectares. The location is on the highway…the shortcut from Dalat to Nha Trang. AD committed that the products of ADs are from cooperatives, from their farmers in that area, and from the farm of AD. But then people took photograph of AD vans…they are buying products from Dalat Wholesale Market, then they jump into that. The situation of ST is also the same. There were only two cases.

[01.28.08] Interviewer

But why do they have to buy unlabelled products outside?

[01.28.18] B12Aug30Do

I think, at that time, their farm did not have enough to fulfil the orders from the supermarket. So they go for outside sources (laughs)

[01.28.28] Interviewer

Did they have any other cases before or after?

[01.28.31] B12Aug30Do

So far, That scandal is the biggest one. There are cases that sometimes the vegetables and fruits have excess residue beyond the standard and so on, that happens quite frequent. Those are small incidents from their farms?

[01.28.59] Interviewer

Do supermarkets have any way to stop it?

[01.29.06] B12Aug30Do

Every time they detect such thing, they stop buying, and fine… with a failure they will have an appropriate penalty of a certain amount of money.

[01.29.15] Interviewer

But then they still do business with them?

[01.29.18] B12Aug30Do

Yes, then we start to retest the product, as long as they meet the standard, then we buy from them again.

[01.29.28] Interviewer

Then, do it reoccurrence?

[01.29.30] B12Aug30Do

Yes (laughs)
[01.29.36] Interviewer
It means it become popular?
[01.29.39] B12Aug30Do
Yes it is common and that often happens. Every day the supermarket spend a lot of money, to test at the warehouse, at the input source that before bringing the product to shelves…at the warehouse where they deliver the products. Supermarkets spend a lot of money every day to test that before they pick up the product.
[01.30.04] Interviewer
Besides the two big supplier names, do it happen at the other small suppliers?
[01.30.11] B12Aug30Do
Well, almost everyone,
[01.30.16] Interviewer
The sanctions, the control mechanism before and after, are they different from the two big ones?
[01.30. 30] B12Aug30Do
Yes. There are small suppliers who eventually cannot afford to do it, then they actively quit.
[01.30. 39] Interviewer
Have you ever considered to stop doing business with a supplier as a form of penalties?
[01.30. 50] B12Aug30Do
Actually, I was not work in the sale department. So I don't know about that information. I just know about such things only because I was a retail manager. This means, the quality management department has sent information about the quality problems of this product so they do not pick up, and the other product has these problems that need to recall to warehouse, stop selling to consumers. Take that as an example where got the information, but the way to deal with the supplier, I do not have a deep understanding.
[01.31.36] Interviewer
Is the sales department deal with the suppliers?
[01.31.39] B12Aug30Do
Yes, the business department deals directly with the supplier
[01.31. 40] Interviewer
The SGC does not have what a department called the purchasing department?
[01.31. 45] B12Aug30Do
That's the purchasing department
[01.31. 45] Interviewer
Ah, sale department is just a different name. You are a retail manager so you manage all the retail items ofSGC?
[01.31]. 51] B12Aug30Do (Answer without question)
No, when I was the retail manager, I managed a SGC Food chain
[01.31. 58] Interviewer
Did you manage the whole chain?
[01.32. 02] B12Aug30Do
I managed some of the stores
[01.32] Interviewer

For big retailers such as SGC and their suppliers, what's the norms in the relationship between them? Or what is the standard in the relationship between SGC and its suppliers?

[01.33.43] B12Aug30Do

It is the contract framework (laughs), all suppliers are the same. But depending on the item, it may be depending on the negotiation skills, the...the weight of each supplier varies. Its trading term is also different, on the discount, the price, in terms of the support and other thing are different. Almost nobody is the same.

[01.34. 19] Interviewer

Apart from contract, that is, if you just ignore the contract between the two parties when doing business together, do you have any requirements or expectations to them?

[01.34. 40] B12Aug30Do

Uhm... as for SGC ... for example, there are strategic suppliers, then... they would be like ... for example a product, there are ... many suppliers can supply the same product. As for strategic suppliers, they will be given priority, their product dominates the … for example with the same output, then the strategic supplier will account for 40% -50% in that output. Then the remaining 50-60% will be divided by six to seven, each about 10%.

[01.35. 30] Interviewer

If I mention the word “norms” I do not know does is translated to Vietnamese for but … what do you think is the norm in the relationship between the two partners? The word "norm" translated to Vietnamese is “chuan muc”, or it is “nguyen tac” in the relationship of the two. What are norms in the relationship?

[01.36. 19] B12Aug30Do

Uhm... this is hard to say, because of ... the ... business environment of Vietnam, and especially in the context of the SGC…it is also a business that has a lot character of a state company, well these norms are really is not clear. Of course, in terms of principle, the supplier will have to know to supply SGC with the best quality products at the best price. Then the code of ethics is not “do this do that” purchasing staff. It just has that general norms.

[01.37. 45] Interviewer

If you talk about e KXQ and your farmers, you said that that you want them to do exactly to the contract. Apart from that do you expecting anything more from them in the relationship between you two. That is also the norm in relationships.

[01.38. 14] B12Aug30Do

I just wish they were doing their commitment... day by day… we grow up then accompany to us to do the business together. Besides, I do not have any bigger idea.

[01.38. 41] Interviewer

I thank you so much. I finished the questions. I do not know if what you want to share more what we discussed, the opportunistic behaviours in the industry in general. Is not necessarily to be specific for one company, you can share whatever you know in the reality, or problems exist in the industry?

[01.39] 08] B12Aug30Do

As I said earlier, the market is lack of transparency. Lack of transparency and lack of consumer knowledge, and state sanctions. Secondly, the support of the state in the field of agriculture in general and of clean agriculture in particular is almost the same for the last several decades. We are known in the market, the city council invited us to meetings. The government knows us, not ignorant. However, in order to access these sources of funding, there is… almost we cannot access loans from the bank, not to mention to the funding. It is almost no support. In order to develop agricultural business, there are problems. For example, recently there is the funding of 5000 billion VND to preferential organizations who develop high-tech agricultural in general, other businesses got that. Our business almost did not have access to that. That has such problems. But I think the power of consumers, the understanding of the consumer about agricultural product is...low and may be...we can call it…not understanding fully (laughs). For example, they just only understand two parts of the problem and think that they understand them all, but in fact they are not.

[01.41.36] It also affect the market…for example clean agricultural products, it has many levels of clean. How do it clean… it is clean like this so the price is this, the price is different, clean as VietGAP standard is different, clean as GlobalGAP is a different price, clean as organic is another different price. But they do not understand that, for example, they do GobalGAP, but different technical are different. Then it's back to the level of clean products. For example, for VietGAP standard there are many VietGAPs, for the GlobalGAP there are many GlobalGAP, including organic ones. The consumers almost do not know about that. They equalize all the products, from which it also makes the market it deviated.

[01.42] Interviewer

Why you are known by the government but you don’t have access to their funding?

[01.43. 18] B12Aug30Do

Because, for example, the bank require mortgage. But personal estate is...small, and not meet. And the property that attaches to… the assets that is invested on land is… in fact, the state give it to us only twenty years, our own land. So the bank does not accept that as mortgage, even though we invest so much… there are many fixed assets on the land. That is also one of the things that I could not take it to mortgage, to make capital to business. And the story of accessing the funding is a long story that I don’t want to talk anymore.

[01.47. 07] B12Aug30Do

Our business is small. We only work with supermarkets. However, in fact, the real big market is the wet market. The supermarkets system occupy less than 10% market share compared to the wet market. Of course, it is important to the fruit and vegetable market. The problems are as I said…the support to SGC suppliers is very limit. The evaluation of SGC does not have any standards, and fair. For example, that supplier they perform well, they supply often and good quality, and good price…but there is no one to sit down to evaluate that, or if they evaluate that aspects and they take no further actions. If we know that supplier perform well…so we should support them this, support them that… to make them work with us more better… I don’t know if other supplier receive those things or not, but KXQ did not receive anything even we work with SGC. In term of position in fruit and vegetable, KXQ is in top 5 big suppliers to SGC, not just a small supplier…but there is no support.

[01.52. 01] B12Aug30Do

There is another factor…that is there are many supplier wish to supply to SGC. So every day, there are new suppliers giving quotes to SGC. Consequently... because they want to supply to the supermarket...they offer very competitive price. At low prices, they may think they accept losses at some point... for example, in three to five months and five months...and when they have a place in the supermarket, they earn money later. They think that they have the capital to do that, and the purchasing department is based on the price they quote, in order to create pressure for current suppliers. Current suppliers are dumped on the market very often, because of those new suppliers. But in fact it distorts the market, it is not right. In fact, no product could be offered that price at that time, but the purchasing is… just see that is a good price, so they buy. They do not need to know the sources of the products, don't care how long will they can keep supplying. Generally, when doing business, we do not afraid of the big guys, because the big guys do business properly, we are just fear the new guy (laughs). That is also one of the problems in the supply source.

[01.54. 05] Interviewer

SGC are willing to give up on you when they get a better source of better price even they don't whether the product is better or not?

[01.54. 17] B12Aug30Do

They are willing

[01.54]. 17 Interviewer

willing to leave?

[01.54]. 18] B12Aug30Do

Willing to leave

[01.54]. Interviewer

It seems like you depend on them?

[01.54]. 31] B12Aug30Do

In general, there is no certainty, that is, there is no commitment by the SGC to the supplier that will keep cooperate for a long time. For example, now I commit that I will buy your product for a long time, if you invest in these things. For example, now I am going to make an investment in this machines and green houses in order to supply them with that quantity, that technologies with such quality, so I will commit to buy from you… There is no such thing like that.

[01.55. 23] Interviewer

But is it different from the M that you sell?

[01.55. 28] B12Aug30Do

M does not have much support nowadays

[01.55. 35] Interviewer

Do you think of looking to other guys ... like they have bit more support activities. In the supermarket, I know the way they operate are different, are not the same?

[01.55. 53] B12Aug30Do

But it almost the same. They currently don't have… I am working with A… but they also don't have anything to protect their supply sources.

[01.56.11] Interviewer

For example BC or VE?

[01.56.16] B12Aug30Do

The market share of VE is currently very small, I have not work with VE yet.

[01.56.26] Interviewer

The order quantity form VE would be much less than SGC?

[01.56. 27] B12Aug30Do

No, could not be equal to…and the trading conditions, the delivery terms and logistics conditions are also difficult.

[01.56.36] Interviewer

How is it different with SGC?

[01.56.39] B12Aug30Do

SGC has the advantage of having a distribution centre, meaning that we delivery there, then SGC has a logistics team to deliver to the store, but the other supermarket almost don't have that. Or they order a small quantity, with the shipping cost put on top, it is very high cost. Those are such difficult things and it is the current situation.

[01.57.10] Interviewer

Thank you.

Appendix D - Screenshot of Study 1 codes in NVivo

Supplier Development	30	427	26/09/2021	PT	25/03/2019 2	PT
Assessment and feedback	28	104	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 1	PT
Cash support	19	35	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 1	PT
Competitive pressure	4	5	26/09/2021	PT	25/03/2019 2	PT
Guarantee sales for supplier	11	19	26/09/2021	PT	25/03/2019 2	PT
Provide physical input	15	60	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 1	PT
Sharing important information	15	28	26/09/2021	PT	21/10/2019 2	PT
Supplier Incentives	0	0	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 1	PT
Training farmers	25	156	26/09/2021	PT	21/10/2019 2	PT
Supplier Development (Trigger) Supplier Opportunism	22	76	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 1	PT
Train farmer	14	31	26/09/2021	PT	16/04/2019 1	PT
Supplier Incentives	1	1	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 2	PT
Sharing information	0	0	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 1	PT
Cash support	5	9	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 2	PT
guarantee sale	11	19	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 2	PT
provide physical input	2	2	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 2	PT
Assessment and feedback	9	14	26/09/2021	PT	15/04/2019 2	PT

OPP-SUP	29	347	26/09/2021	PT	18/03/2019 1	PT
OPP-SUP.BLISSUE	1	1	26/09/2021	PT	23/03/2019 0	PT
OPP-SUP.Brandname	1	2	26/09/2021	PT	15/03/2019 2	LP
OPP-SUP.BREAK	21	75	26/09/2021	PT	24/03/2019 0	PT
OPP-SUP.BREAK.mouth contract	4	5	26/09/2021	PT	19/03/2019 1	PT
OPP-SUP.BREAK.NO	1	2	26/09/2021	PT	18/03/2019 2	PT
OPP-SUP.CHEAT	24	112	26/09/2021	PT	16/04/2019 1	PT
OPP-SUP.Competitive pressure	1	2	26/09/2021	PT	24/03/2019 0	PT
OPP-SUP.Cover-up	3	4	26/09/2021	PT	24/03/2019 0	PT
OPP-SUP.Cutting Corner	7	12	26/09/2021	PT	24/03/2019 0	PT
OPP-SUP.DISHONEST	12	30	26/09/2021	PT	24/03/2019 0	PT
OPP-SUP.FKCOM	7	12	26/09/2021	PT	24/03/2019 0	PT
OPP-SUP.INCREASE PRICE	3	4	26/09/2021	PT	15/03/2019 2	LP
OPP-SUP.Irresponsible	2	4	26/09/2021	PT	24/03/2019 0	PT
OPP-SUP.MISASP	3	4	26/09/2021	PT	24/03/2019 0	PT
OPP-SUP.MIX PRODUCT	9	15	26/09/2021	PT	18/03/2019 1	LP
OPP-SUP.MIX PRODUCT.NO	1	1	26/09/2021	PT	15/03/2019 2	LP
OPP-SUP.NO	6	11	26/09/2021	PT	17/03/2019 2	PT
OPP-SUP.OTHR	4	8	26/09/2021	PT	15/03/2019 2	LP

Appendix E - Inter-coder Reliability – Result in Nvivo

Code	File	File Folder	File Size	Kappa	Agreement (%)	A and B (%)	Not A and Not B (%)	Disagreement (%)	A and Not B (%)	B and Not A (%)
CONTROL	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.47	0	99.47	0.53	0.53	0
CONTROL\CTRL-CONTRACT	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.47	0	99.47	0.53	0.53	0
CORR.BUYER	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	95.94	0	95.94	4.06	4.06	0
GUARSELL	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.48	0	99.48	0.52	0.52	0
GUARSELL\GUARSELL-3-6months	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.87	0	99.87	0.13	0.13	0
NORMS	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0.2658	92.1	1.66	90.44	7.9	6.91	0.99
NORMS\NORM-COMMITMENT	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	98.34	0	98.34	1.66	0	1.66
NORMS\NORM-Contract no work	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	97.27	0	97.27	2.73	2.73	0
NORMS\NORM-HACON	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.68	0	99.68	0.32	0.32	0
NORMS\NORM-HISTORY	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.91	0	99.91	0.09	0.09	0
NORMS\NORM-NONCONTRACT	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.7	0	99.7	0.3	0.3	0
NORMS\NORM-OPP	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	96.58	0	96.58	3.42	3.42	0
NORMS\NORM-OPP\NORM OPP - Change price	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	98.55	0	98.55	1.45	1.45	0
NORMS\NORM-REPUT	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0.8059	99.22	1.66	97.56	0.78	0.44	0.34
NORMS\NORMS-Strength	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.35	0	99.35	0.65	0	0.65
OPPORTUNISM	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0.3351	84.4	5.72	78.68	15.6	5.88	9.72
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-BUYER	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	91.97	0	91.97	8.03	0	8.03
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-BUYER\OPP-BUYER.BIRBERY	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	97.96	0	97.96	2.04	0	2.04
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-BUYER\OPP-BUYER.DECPT	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	98.62	0	98.62	1.38	0	1.38
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-BUYER\OPP-BUYER.DISHONEST	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	95.39	0	95.39	4.61	0	4.61
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-SUP	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0.312	89.71	2.99	86.71	10.29	5.88	4.42
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-SUP\OPP-SUP.BREAK	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0.2954	93.45	1.61	91.84	6.55	2.9	3.64
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-SUP\OPP-SUP.CHEAT	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0.1618	96.36	0.37	95.99	3.64	3.63	0.01
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-SUP\OPP-SUP.DISHONEST	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.12	0	99.12	0.88	0.88	0
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-SUP\OPP-SUP.INCREASE PRICE	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.64	0	99.64	0.36	0.36	0
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-SUP\OPP-SUP.MIX PRODUCT	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	99.64	0	99.64	0.36	0.36	0
OPPORTUNISM\OPP-SUP\OPP-SUP.PLAYGAME	B01Jan18Ex	Files	37651 chars	0	98.22	0	98.22	1.78	0	1.78

Appendix F - Truth table

UPFRONT	ONPAYMENT	ADVICE	NormOPP	TRUST	number	OPP	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0.889632	0.673267	1
0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.875472	0.834171	0.834171
0	0	1	1	1	2	1	0.854077	0.796407	0.796407
0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0.767981	0.62406	0.62406
1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0.75188	0.507463	0.507463
0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.744361	0.492537	0.492537
0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0.744361	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	2	0	0.732394	0.5	0.570816
1	1	1	0	1	6	0	0.685393	0.544715	0.598214
0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0.663317	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.596386	0	0
0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0.570815	0.455041	0.455041

Appendix G - Questionnaire

Appendix G.1 – Questionnaire (English)

QUESTIONAIRE

Thank you very much for considering participating in our survey. We very much appreciate your time to complete the survey. Your answer is much value for our research.

Please be assured that your confidentiality will be protected and only used for academic purposes.

By answering the below question, you consent to participating in our research.

<u>Part 1</u> – SCREEING

Are you a manager/senior manager or equivalent who works with your organisation's suppliers of fruit and vegetable products?

☐ Yes *(**continue** to Part2)* ☐ No *(**Stop**)*

<u>Part 2</u> – MAIN QUESTION

2.1 In order to answer the following questions, please think of ONE major supplier of your organisation. Let's call them supplier X.

Please answer the following questions.

1. What type of certification(s) does Supplier X have? (có thể đánh dấu nhiều lựa chọn)
   ☐ VietGAP ☐ GlobalGAP ☐ PGS ☐ USDA ☐ EU
   ☐ Organic
   ☐ Other (please specify) ....
   ☐ No certificate ☐ I don't know
2. Supplier X is… [Choose 1 answer]
   ☐ A household farmer. ☐ A Cooperative
   ☐ An Agri company. ☐ Trader.
   ☐ Other (please specify): ....
3. How long has supplier X supplied to your organisation? .... year.....................month
4. How long have you been involved in working with supplier X? ....year ....month.
5. In total, how many percentages of your total quantity/revenue of the fruit and vegetable is supplied by supply X?
   a/......................% quantity b/...................... % revenue
6. Is supplier X a member of a cooperative group?
   ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure

2.2 Please review your current mood and describe your thoughts and feelings about your present mood and its influence on you right now. Please choose ONE number from 1 to 7 (1= definitely does not describe my mood, 4= neither describes nor does not describe my mood, 7= definitely describes my mood)

7. I know exactly how I am feeling.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. I know why I feel this mood.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. It is clear.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2.3 Please indicates the extent you agree with each of the following statements

(1= strongly disagree, 4= neither agree or disagree, 7= strongly agree)

Our firm has undertaken supplier development with supplier X through:							
10. Giving production related advice to supplier X (e.g., processes, type of fertilizers, pesticides).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Training farmers from supplier X.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Giving product development related advice (e.g., processes, project management).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. The transfer of employees to supplier X.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Giving technological advice (e.g., materials, software)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Recognizing supplier's X achievements/performance in the form of awards.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Site visits by our organization's personnel to supplier X premises to help them improve performance.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Site visits by our organization's personnel to supplier X premises to assess their production process.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. Providing supplier X with equipment or tools for process improvement.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. Providing supplier X with credit (e.g., in the form of prepayment and interest free loan).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. Evaluating supplier X's price, quality and delivery performance regularly.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. Offering guaranteed sales.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2.4 Please indicates the extent you agree with each of the following statements

(1= strongly disagree, 4= neither agree or disagree, 7= strongly agree)

22. On occasion, supplier X lies about certain things to protect their interests.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23. Supplier X sometimes promises to do things without actually doing them later.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24. Supplier X does not always act in accordance with our contract (s).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25. Supplier X sometimes tries to breach informal agreements between our companies to maximize their own benefit.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26. Supplier X will attempt to take advantage of "holes" in our contract to further their own interests.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27. Supplier X sometimes uses unexpected events to extract concessions from our firm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2.5 Please indicates the extent you agree with each of the following statements

(1= strongly disagree, 4= neither agree or disagree, 7= strongly agree)

28. The exchange relationship with supplier X creates a complex web of expectations between us over all kinds of issues.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

29. The exchange relationship between our company and supplier X is extremely complicated.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30. The exchange relationship between our company and supplier X is complicated	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
31. The exchange relationship between our company and supplier X comprises of many diverse expectations about each other's behaviour.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
32. My organization and supplier X in this category share the same goals in our relationships.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
33. My company and supplier X in this category have compatible goals.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34. My company and the major suppliers in this category support each other's goals.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
35. My company and supplier X in this category have compatible views on how to achieve our goals.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2.6 Please indicates the extent you agree with each of the following statements

(1= strongly disagree, 4= neither agree or disagree, 7= strongly agree)

Through the development of supplier X, our firm was able to…							
36. Improve our delivery reliability	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37. Reduce time to market	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38. Reduce operation downtimes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
39. Increase the satisfaction of our customers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
40. Improve the reliability of our product	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
41. Improve the quality of our product.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
42. Improve the quantities of our product.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
43. Improve the number of our product lines	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
44. Offer safer product to our customer	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2.7 Please indicates the extent you agree with each of the following statements

(1= strongly disagree, 4= neither agree or disagree, 7= strongly agree)

45. Maintaining a long-term relationship with us is important to supplier X.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
46. Supplier X believes that over the long run our relationship will be profitable.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
47. Supplier X focuses on long-term goals in this relationship.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
48. Supplier X expects us to be working with them for a long time.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

<u>Part 3:</u> DEMOGRAPHIC

1. In total, how many suppliers currently supply fruit and/or vegetables to your organisation?
.... supplier

2. In which agri-food sector are your company currently operating? (Choose all applicable).
   - ☐ Fruit
   - ☐

Vegetable

☐ Other (please specify):...

3. Your organisation is … [tick **ONE** box only]
   - ☐ A cooperative
   - ☐ An Agri-food retailer (Not a supermarket) Nhà bán lẻ (không phải siêu thị)
   - ☐ A supermarket Siêu thị
   - ☐ An Agricultural Products Export company Công ty nông sản xuất khẩu
   - ☐ An Agricultural Products Domestic company Công ty nông sản nội địa
   - ☐ A catering services company Công ty dịch vụ ăn uống (E.g., restaurant, industrial catering)
   - ☐ A Food processing company Công ty chế biến thực phẩm
   - ☐ Other (Please specify)

4. How long has your organisation been in business?.......................years.............months
5. What is the number of full time (and full-time equivalent) employees are working in your organisation?
   - ☐ <10 employees ☐ 10-100 employees
   - ☐ 101 – 200 employees ☐ >200 employees
6. What is your organisation total revenue per year?
   - ☐ < 3 billions VND ☐ 3 billions – 50 billions VND
   - ☐ >50 - 200 billions VND ☐ > 200 tỷ đồng billions VND
7. Do you wish to receive a summary of the research result? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Appendix G.2 – Questionnaire (Vietnamese)

BẢNG CÂU HỎI

Xin cảm ơn Anh/Chị đã cân nhắc tham gia trả lời khảo sát. Những câu trả lời nghiêm túc, thẳng thắn và trung thực của Anh/Chị cho bảng câu hỏi này có ý nghĩa vô cùng quan trọng với nghiên cứu.

Xin lưu ý, không có câu trả lời nào đúng hay sai, mọi ý kiến trả lời của Anh/Chị đều có giá trị cho nghiên cứu của chúng tôi. Chúng tôi xin cam đoan mọi thông tin thu thập được đều sẽ được bảo mật và chỉ dùng cho mục đích nghiên cứu khoa học.

Bằng cách trả lời vào bảng câu hỏi bên dưới, Anh/Chị xác nhận đồng ý tham gia thực hiện khảo sát cho đề tài nghiên cứu của chúng tôi.

Phần 1 – CÂU HỎI GẠN LỌC

Anh/Chị có đang giữ chức vụ quản lý cấp cao/ quản lý (hoặc tương đương) và có làm việc với nhà cung cấp sản phẩm rau củ quả của công ty/hợp tác xã (HTX) của Anh/Chị?

☐ Có (***tiếp tục*** *trả lời)* ☐ Không (***ngưng*** *trả lời)*

Phần 2 – CÂU HỎI CHÍNH

2.1 Để trả lời những câu hỏi sau đây, vui lòng nghĩ đến MỘT trong những nhà cung cấp rau củ quả chính của công ty/HTX của Anh/Chị. Gọi nhà cung cấp này là nhà cung cấp X.

Vui lòng chọn trả lời cho những câu hỏi dưới đây.

1. Liệt kê các loại chứng nhận mà nhà cung cấp X đạt được? (có thể đánh dấu nhiều lựa chọn)
   ☐ VietGAP ☐ GlobalGAP ☐ PGS ☐ USDA ☐ EU
   ☐ Organic
   ☐ Chứng nhận khác (ghi rõ)...
   ☐ Không có chứng nhận: ☐ Không rõ
2. Nhà cung cấp X là…. [chọn **MỘT** câu trả lời]
   ☐ Hộ nông dân. ☐ Hợp tác xã.
   ☐ Công ty nông nghiệp. ☐ Thương lái/ Vựa.
   ☐ Loại hình khác (vui lòng ghi rõ): ....
3. Nhà cung cấp X đã cung cấp sản phẩm cho công ty/HTX của Anh/Chị bao lâu? ......năm tháng
4. Bản thân Anh/Chị đã làm việc với nhà cung cấp X bao lâu? năm tháng
5. Nhà cung cấp X cung cấp bao nhiêu phần trăm trong tổng sản lượng/doanh thu rau củ quả của công ty/HTX Anh/Chị?
   a/......................% sản lượng b/...................% doanh thu
6. Nhà cung cấp X có là thành viên của một hiệp hội hợp tác xã hoặc hiệp hội chuyên ngành hay không?
   ☐ Có ☐ Không ☐ Không chắc

2.2 Vui lòng đánh giá tâm trạng hiện tại của Anh/Chị và mô tả suy nghĩ và cảm giác về tâm trạng hiện tại của mình. *(1= hoàn toàn không mô tả tâm trạng của tôi, 4= trung lập, 7= hoàn toàn mô tả tâm trạng của tôi)*

7. Tôi biết chính xác hiện tại tôi đang cảm giác ra sao.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Tôi biết tại sao tôi có tâm trạng này.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Cảm giác của tôi hoàn toàn rõ ràng.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2.3 Anh/Chị vui lòng cho biết mức độ đồng ý của mình đối với những phát biểu dưới đây

(1 = hoàn toàn không đồng ý, 4 = trung lập, 7 = hoàn toàn đồng ý)

Công ty/HTX của chúng tôi thực hiện phát triển nhà cung cấp thông qua việc:							
10. Đưa ra các lời tư vấn liên quan đến việc sản xuất cho nhà cung cấp X (vd: sơ chế, loại phân bón, thuốc trừ sâu)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Huấn luyện nông dân của nhà cung cấp X	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Đưa ra các lời tư vấn liên quan đến phát triển sản phẩm (vd: sơ chế, quản lý dư án)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Đưa nhân viên đến làm việc tại nhà cung cấp X	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Đưa ra các lời tư vấn về kỹ thuật (vd: cách bón phân, sử dụng máy móc)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Ghi nhận các thành tích đạt được/thành quả bằng phần thưởng.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Thực hiện các chuyến đến thăm và làm việc với nhà cung cấp X tại cơ sở của họ để giúp họ cải thiện thành tích công việc.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Thực hiện các chuyến đến thăm và làm việc với nhà cung cấp X tại cơ sở của họ để đánh giá việc sản xuất của họ.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. Cung cấp các công cụ dụng cụ cho nhà cung cấp X để họ cải thiện quy trình sản xuất của họ.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. Cung cấp tín dụng cho nhà cung cấp X (vd: dưới dạng trả trước tiền hàng, hoặc cho vay không lãi suất).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. Thường xuyên đánh giá nhà cung cấp X về giá cả, việc vận chuyển, và chất lượng sản phẩm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. Bao tiêu sản phẩm của nhà cung cấp X	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2.4 Anh/Chị vui lòng cho biết mức độ đồng ý của mình đối với những phát biểu dưới đây

(*1 = hoàn toàn không đồng ý, 4 = trung lập, 7 = hoàn toàn đồng ý)*

22. Có những lúc, nhà cung cấp X nói dối về một số thứ để bảo vệ quyền lợi của họ.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23. Nhà cung cấp X thỉnh thoảng có hứa làm những việc nhưng thực tế sau đó họ không thực hiện.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24. Nhà cung cấp X không phải lúc nào cũng làm theo hợp đồng giữa hai bên.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25. Thỉnh thoảng nhà cung cấp X vi phạm các thỏa thuận chính thức giữa hai bên để tối đa hóa lợi ích của họ.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26. Nhà cung cấp X sẽ cố gắng để lợi dụng những "lỗ hổng" trong hợp đồng giữa hai bên để phục vụ cho lợi ích của họ.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27. Thỉnh thoảng nhà cung cấp X sẽ đưa ra những tình huống không lường trước để công ty chúng tôi phải nhượng bộ.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2.5 Anh/Chị vui lòng cho biết mức độ đồng ý của mình đối với những phát biểu dưới đây

(*1 = hoàn toàn không đồng ý, 4 = trung lập, 7 = hoàn toàn đồng ý)*

28. Mối quan hệ với nhà cung cấp X tạo ra một tổ hợp các kỳ vọng phức tạp trong tất cả các loại mối quan hệ giữa chúng tôi.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29. Mối quan hệ giữa công ty/HTX của chúng tôi và nhà cung cấp X là cực kỳ phức tạp.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30. Mối quan hệ giữa công ty/HTX của chúng tôi và nhà cung cấp X là phức tạp.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
31. Mối quan hệ giữa công ty/HTX của chúng tôi và nhà cung cấp X bao gồm nhiều kỳ vọng khác nhau về hành vi của mỗi bên.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
32. Công ty/HTX của tôi và nhà cung cấp X chia sẻ cùng mục tiêu trong mối quan hệ giữa hai bên.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
33. Công ty/HTX của tôi và nhà cung cấp X có những mục tiêu tương đồng với nhau.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34. Công ty/HTX của tôi và nhà cung cấp X hỗ trợ nhau thực hiện mục tiêu của mỗi bên.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
35. Công ty/HTX của tôi và nhà cung cấp X có quan điểm tương đồng với nhau trong việc làm sao để đạt được mục tiêu chung của chúng tôi.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2.6 Anh/Chị vui lòng cho biết mức độ đồng ý của mình đối với những phát biểu dưới đây

(*1 = hoàn toàn không đồng ý, 4 = trung lập, 7 = hoàn toàn đồng ý)*

Thông qua các hoạt động phát triển nhà cung cấp X, chúng tôi đã có khả năng…							
36. Cải thiện độ tin cậy trong việc giao hàng.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37. Rút ngắn thời gian đưa sản phẩm ra thị trường.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38. Giảm thời gian chết trong quá trình vận hành.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
39. Tăng sự hài lòng của khách hàng.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
40. Cải thiện độ tin cậy của sản phẩm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
41. Cải thiện chất lượng sản phẩm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
42. Cải thiện sản lượng.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
43. Cải thiện số lượng sản phẩm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
44. Cung cấp nhiều sản phẩm an toàn hơn cho khách hàng.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2.7 Anh/Chị vui lòng cho biết mức độ đồng ý của mình đối với những phát biểu dưới đây

(*1 = hoàn toàn không đồng ý, 4 = trung lập, 7 = hoàn toàn đồng ý)*

45. Duy trì mối quan hệ trong dài hạn với chúng tôi là quan trọng với X.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
46. Nhà cung cấp X tin tưởng rằng trong dài hạn mối quan hệ của chúng tôi sẽ có lợi.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
47. Nhà cung cấp X tập trung vào các mục tiêu dài hạn trong mối quan hệ này.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
48. Nhà cung cấp X kỳ vọng chúng tôi sẽ làm việc với họ lâu dài.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Phần 3: THÔNG TIN

7. Tổng cộng có bao nhiêu nhà cung cấp đang cung cấp trái cây và/hoặc rau củ cho doanh nghiệp/HTX của Anh/Chị? .... nhà cung cấp
8. Doanh nghiệp/HTX của Anh/Chị đang kinh doanh trong mảng nào của ngành nông sản? [chọn tất cả các phương án thích hợp]
   - ☐ Trái cây
   - ☐ Rau củ.
   - ☐ Khác (vui lòng ghi rõ): ....
9. Tổ chức của Anh/Chị là… [Chỉ chọn **MỘT**]
   - ☐ Hợp tác xã
   - ☐ Nhà bán lẻ (không phải siêu thị)
   - ☐ Siêu thị
   - ☐ Công ty nông sản xuất khẩu
   - ☐ Công ty nông sản nội địa
   - ☐ Công ty dịch vụ ăn uống (vd: nhà hàng, cung cấp suất ăn công nghiệp)
   - ☐ Công ty chế biến thực phẩm
   - ☐ Khác (vui lòng ghi rõ): ....
10. Tổ chức của anh/chị đã hoạt động được bao lâu? ....năm .... tháng
11. Số lượng nhân viên toàn thời gian (và tương đương toàn thời gian) đang làm việc tại tổ chức của anh/chị là bao nhiêu?
    - ☐ <10 nhân viên ☐ 10-100 nhân viên
    - ☐ 101 – 200 nhân viên ☐ >200 nhân viên
12. Tổng doanh thu hằng năm của tổ chức của anh/chị là bao nhiêu?
    - ☐ < 3 tỷ đồng ☐ 3 tỷ đồng – 50 tỷ đồng
    - ☐ >50 tỷ - 200 tỷ đồng ☐ > 200 tỷ đồng

Appendix H - Study 2 results

Appendix H.1 - Descriptive analysis of indicators

Indicator	Missing	Mean	Median	Std. Dev	Min	Max	Skewness		Kurtosis	
							Stat.	Std.Error	Stat.	Std.Error
SupDev1	1	5.64	6.00	1.841	1	7	-1.381	.170	.855	.338
SupDev2	1	5.00	6.00	2.114	1	7	-.745	.170	-.762	.338
SupDev3	0	5.75	6.00	1.689	1	7	-1.590	.169	1.704	.337
SupDev4	1	4.61	5.00	2.124	1	7	-.443	.170	-1.047	.338
SupDev5	1	5.24	6.00	2.023	1	7	-.904	.170	-.453	.338
SupDev6	2	4.99	6.00	2.043	1	7	-.786	.170	-.562	.339
SupDev7	1	5.99	7.00	1.553	1	7	-1.855	.170	2.897	.338
SupDev8	0	6.10	7.00	1.330	1	7	-1.908	.169	4.045	.337
SupDev9	0	4.15	4.00	2.151	1	7	-.200	.169	-1.270	.337
SupDev10	1	4.08	4.00	2.267	1	7	-.123	.170	-1.440	.338
SupDev11	0	6.15	7.00	1.280	1	7	-2.138	.169	5.071	.337
SupDev12	1	5.32	6.00	1.872	1	7	-.956	.170	-.073	.338
Opp1	0	3.63	4.00	2.196	1	7	.066	.169	-1.459	.337
Opp2	0	3.61	4.00	2.122	1	7	.121	.169	-1.334	.337
Opp3	0	3.58	4.00	2.255	1	7	.169	.169	-1.492	.337
Opp4	0	3.45	4.00	2.187	1	7	.207	.169	-1.409	.337
Opp5	0	2.86	2.00	1.986	1	7	.719	.169	-.718	.337
Opp6	0	3.24	3.00	2.106	1	7	.419	.169	-1.167	.337
BPerImp1	0	6.28	6.50	.866	3	7	-1.126	.169	.806	.337
BPerImp2	0	5.90	6.00	1.376	1	7	-1.685	.169	3.076	.337
BPerImp3	0	6.01	6.00	1.226	1	7	-1.576	.169	2.846	.337
BPerImp4	0	6.30	7.00	.976	1	7	-1.970	.169	5.596	.337
BPerImp5	0	6.42	7.00	.815	2	7	-1.629	.169	3.769	.337
BPerImp6	**0**	6.37	7.00	.845	4	7	-1.241	.169	.740	.337
BPerImp7	1	6.13	7.00	1.158	1	7	-1.715	.170	3.574	.338
BPerImp8	0	6.12	6.00	1.086	1	7	-1.488	.169	2.680	.337
BPerImp9	1	6.41	7.00	.918	2	7	-2.033	.170	5.059	.338
GoalCon1	0	5.99	6.00	1.238	1	7	-1.182	.169	1.007	.337
GoalCon2	0	5.89	6.00	1.262	1	7	-1.229	.169	1.680	.337
GoalCon3	0	6.12	6.00	1.086	1	7	-1.419	.169	2.518	.337
GoalCon4	0	6.08	6.00	1.155	1	7	-1.370	.169	1.855	.337
RoIn1	1	3.25	4.00	2.035	1	7	.268	.170	-1.248	.338
RoIn2	1	2.27	2.00	1.551	1	7	1.072	.170	.235	.338
RoIn3	0	2.37	2.00	1.568	1	7	.866	.169	-.338	.337
RoIn4	1	4.04	4.00	1.931	1	7	-.240	.170	-1.019	.338
Lgterm1	0	5.94	6.00	1.120	3	7	-.641	.169	-.844	.337
Lgterm2	0	6.03	6.00	1.061	2	7	-.885	.169	.026	.337
Lgterm3	0	6.04	6.00	1.140	2	7	-1.122	.169	.766	.337
Lgterm4	0	6.23	7.00	1.028	1	7	-1.785	.169	4.267	.337
Mood1	3	5.88	7.00	1.509	1	7	-1.517	.171	2.082	.340
Mood2	3	5.98	7.00	1.431	1	7	-1.673	.171	2.886	.340
Mood3	3	6.06	7.00	1.428	1	7	-1.874	.171	3.450	.340
OrgAge	7	3.68	4.00	1.527	1	6	.169	.172	-1.093	.343
OrgType	1	3.49	3.00	1.949	1	8	.407	.170	-.602	.338
Employee	3	1.72	2.00	.799	1	4	1.256	.171	1.590	.340
Revenue	4	1.97	2.00	.843	1	4	.872	.171	.495	.341
SupDur	0	3.12	3.00	1.349	1	6	.797	.169	-.291	.337
CoopMem	0	1.66	1.00	.797	1	3	.689	.169	-1.086	.337
Certificate	0	1.70	1.00	1.352	0	5	.887	.169	-.195	.337

Appendix H.1 - Assessment of communalities in EFA

Communalities						
	Round 1		Round 2		Round 3	
	Initial	Extraction			Initial	Extraction
SupDev1	.662	.605	.654	.589	.649	.591
SupDev2	.663	.611	.663	.615	.654	.569
SupDev3	.596	.455	.591	.434	.586	.437
SupDev4	**.499**	**.421**	**.487**	**.406**	**.439**	**.394**
SupDev5	.699	.671	.694	.674	.693	.679
SupDev6	**.548**	**.415**	**.536**	**.385**	**.503**	**.359**
SupDev7	.652	.611	.644	.604	.640	.609
SupDev8	.630	.578	.623	.560	.617	.543
SupDev9	**.557**	**.999**	**.451**	**.255**		
SupDev10	**.534**	**.417**				
SupDev11	.606	.500	.601	.488	.593	.479
SupDev12	.515	.435	.487	.432	.477	.426
Opp1	.779	.724	.775	.723	.768	.725
Opp2	.731	.686	.730	.677	.728	.676
Opp3	.721	.698	.714	.691	.711	.668
Opp4	.781	.796	.773	.794	.768	.790
Opp5	.758	.694	.756	.690	.744	.689
Opp6	.739	.675	.735	.671	.724	.672
BPerImp1	.588	.545	.581	.532	.575	.514
BPerImp2	**.509**	**.314**				
BPerImp3	**.571**	**.424**	**.495**	**.378**	**.490**	**.359**
BPerImp4	.666	.637	.659	.622	.655	.568
BPerImp5	.711	.654	.708	.693	.704	.710
BPerImp6	.735	.696	.734	.711	.712	.720
BPerImp7	**.824**	**.938**	**.824**	**.934**		
BPerImp8	.812	.794	.811	.798	.624	.551
BPerImp9	.632	.557	.627	.577	.627	.596
GoalCon1	.728	.730	.728	.723	.718	.670
GoalCon2	.745	.751	.742	.744	.740	.743
GoalCon3	.758	.749	.756	.746	.739	.744
GoalCon4	.772	.755	.772	.755	.768	.762
RoIn1	.633	.574	.622	.567	.612	.556
RoIn2	.813	.815	.812	.821	.811	.818
RoIn3	.833	.911	.831	.903	.830	.908
RoIn4	.516	.392	.512	.387	.502	.379
Lgterm1	.622	.525	.618	.545	.605	.529
Lgterm2	.679	.627	.675	.654	.664	.622
Lgterm3	.751	.873	.750	.837	.743	.862
Lgterm4	.641	.610	.634	.597	.614	.598
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.						

Note: items in **bold** were candidates for removals in the next round of assessment due to low communality value and/or cross-loading with another factors.

Appendix H.1 - Assessments of factor structure in EFA

Pattern Matrix[a]

	Factor							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
SupDev1	.791							
SupDev2	.715							
SupDev3	.652							
SupDev4	.598							
SupDev5	.868							
SupDev6	.497							
SupDev7	.766							
SupDev8	.691							
SupDev9							.983	
SupDev10							.400	
SupDev11	.632							
SupDev12	.578							
Opp1			.855					
Opp2			.827					
Opp3			.820					
Opp4			.907					
Opp5			.739					
Opp6			.819					
BPerImp1		.602						
BPerImp2		.594						
BPerImp3		.581						
BPerImp4		.835						
BPerImp5		.712						
BPerImp6		.737						
BPerImp7								.827
BPerImp8								.639
BPerImp9		.597						
GoalCon1				.812				
GoalCon2				.804				
GoalCon3				.783				
GoalCon4				.789				
RoIn1						.565		
RoIn2						.891		
RoIn3						.941		
RoIn4						.482		
Lgterm1					.622			
Lgterm2					.819			
Lgterm3					.904			
Lgterm4					.598			

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

Round 1

Pattern Matrix[a]

	Factor						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
SupDev1	.730						
SupDev2	.753						
SupDev3	.608						
SupDev4	.668						
SupDev5	.846						
SupDev6	.624						
SupDev7	.746						
SupDev8	.617						
SupDev9	.502						
SupDev11	.575						
SupDev12	.599						
Opp1		.853					
Opp2		.816					
Opp3		.814					
Opp4		.909					
Opp5		.739					
Opp6		.814					
BPerImp1			.585				
BPerImp3			.504				
BPerImp4			.818				
BPerImp5			.780				
BPerImp6			.781				
BPerImp7			.302				.802
BPerImp8							.634
BPerImp9			.647				
GoalCon1				.809			
GoalCon2				.802			
GoalCon3				.802			
GoalCon4				.800			
RoIn1						.589	
RoIn2						.892	
RoIn3						.934	
RoIn4						.472	
Lgterm1					.674		
Lgterm2					.863		
Lgterm3					.882		
Lgterm4					.614		

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

Round 2

Pattern Matrix[a]

	Factor					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
SupDev1	.750					
SupDev2	.749					
SupDev3	.618					
SupDev4	.658					
SupDev5	.858					
SupDev6	.600					
SupDev7	.758					
SupDev8	.630					
SupDev11	.590					
SupDev12	.597					
Opp1		.858				
Opp2		.826				
Opp3		.791				
Opp4		.902				
Opp5		.747				
Opp6		.816				
BPerImp1			.568			
BPerImp3			.470			
BPerImp4			.747			
BPerImp5			.838			
BPerImp6			.892			
BPerImp8			.539			
BPerImp9			.784			
GoalCon1				.738		
GoalCon2				.817		
GoalCon3				.782		
GoalCon4				.800		
RoIn1						.573
RoIn2						.889
RoIn3						.937
RoIn4						.458
Lgterm1					.651	
Lgterm2					.816	
Lgterm3					.909	
Lgterm4					.593	

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

Round 3

Appendix H.1 - Final factor structure in Exploratory Factor Analysis for retained items

Pattern Matrix	Factor					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
SupDev1	.751					
SupDev2	.753					
SupDev3	.615					
SupDev4	.660					
SupDev5	.860					
SupDev6	.600					
SupDev7	.755					
SupDev8	.627					
SupDev11	.586					
SupDev12	.598					
Opp1		.858				
Opp2		.827				
Opp3		.790				
Opp4		.902				
Opp5		.747				
Opp6		.815				
BPerImp1			.558			
BPerImp4			.736			
BPerImp5			.833			
BPerImp6			.871			
BPerImp8			.533			
BPerImp9			.785			
GoalCon1				.731		
GoalCon2				.817		
GoalCon3				.788		
GoalCon4				.801		
RoIn1						.574
RoIn2						.891
RoIn3						.938
RoIn4						.458
Lgterm1					.661	
Lgterm2					.825	
Lgterm3					.909	
Lgterm4					.599	
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.						
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalisation.						
Rotation converged in 6 iterations.						

Appendix H.1 - Factor Correlation Matrix

Factor	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
1	1.000	.123	.362	.441	.432	.018
2	.123	1.000	-.135	-.164	-.096	.545
3	.362	-.135	1.000	.618	.561	-.247
4	.441	-.164	.618	1.000	.500	-.204
5	.432	-.096	.561	.500	1.000	-.194
6	.018	.545	-.247	-.204	-.194	1.000

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalisation.

Appendix H.1 - Final Measurement Model (AMOS result)



Appendix H.1 - Results for Harman's single-factor test

Total Variance Explained						
Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	9.612	28.269	28.269	8.906	26.193	26.193
2	6.335	18.632	46.901			
3	2.845	8.368	55.269			
4	1.678	4.934	60.203			
5	1.481	4.357	64.560			
6	1.306	3.843	68.403			

Appendix H.1 - AMOS graphic for Baseline model - Direct Effect



Appendix H.1 - AMOS graphic for Mediation Effect of Goal Congruence



Appendix H.1 - AMOS graphic for Mediation Effect of Role Integrity



Appendix H.1- AMOS graphic for Mediation Effect of Long-term orientation