

**Newcastle**  
University

**THE DISCURSIVE MYTHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION  
OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THEIR FOES:**

**THE CASE OF THE ARABIC AND ENGLISH NEWS ARTICLES  
OF AL-JAZEERA**

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## Dedication

إن الكرام إذا ما أيسروا ذكروا      من كان يألفهم في المنزل الخشن

*This thesis is dedicated to the KING and QUEEN reigning over my heart and soul:*

*My mother,*

*Zaynah bint Aḥmad ibn Kuraydim al-Zubaydī*

*زينة بنت أحمد بن كريمة الزبيدي*

*My father,*

*Major General and Sheikh, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Marzūq al-Zubaydī*

*اللواء والشيخ عبدالله بن محمد بن علي بن مرزوق الزبيدي*

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*This thesis is also dedicated to:*


*My rare gem of a brother, Mish‘al, and my extremely wonderful sisters, Asmā’, Nūrah, Hājar, Ru‘ā and Sārah*

*My amazing nephew, Firās, and my lovely nieces, Razān, Jullanār, Diyālā Lārīn, and Tālā*

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*There is what I would call the hero journey, the night sea journey, the hero quest, where the individual is going to bring forth in his life something that was never beheld before.*

Joseph Campbell

*من فخاص فببات البحر فجاب درأ  
ويهمه ومصابيح الفسري كل فساري*

الإمام تركي بن عبدالله آل سعود

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## Abstract

Drawing on Kelsey's discourse-mythological approach (2015c) to critical discourse studies, the project at hand aims to examine the extent to which the discursive construction of mythology appears to impact the online portrayals of the Muslim Brotherhood Party and their opponents between the Arabic and English websites of Al-Jazeera. In conducting this research, a corpus of straight news reports and opinion articles covering the period between the ousting of President Muḥammad Mursī (Mohammed Morsi) on 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013, until the end of 2014, was collected, downsized, and analysed. The analysis included the usage of two supplementary approaches, one of which is thematic analysis, and the other is a manual analysis technique that was, specifically, improvised for the purpose of the study. Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA) is argued to have always been broadcasting to the support and sympathy of Islamist parties, including the MB (Sakr, 1999; Cherribi, 2006; Dabbous-Sensenig, 2006; Al-Najjar, 2009, p. 3; Al-Qassemi, 2012; Kessler, 2012; Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016; Seib, 2016; Obaid, 2020). Following the transfer of power in 2013, the majority of AJA journalists are said to have viewed the MB as victims and that it is "the moral duty" of Al-Jazeera to stand up for them (Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016, p. 276).

It has been the long argument of critical discourse analysts that different news outlets construct different social realities (Fowler, 1991; Trew, 1991). Putting the MB into the equation, the study seeks to understand whether or not such an argument still holds true between the two sites of the same news provider, Al-Jazeera. More importantly, the study pays specific attention to the practice of mythological storytelling, the extent to which it impacts the narratives on both sites in a similar and different manner. Although the Arabic and English articles across the two sites seem to agree on defending MB and attacking their opponents, each site, however, appears to construct the choice of mythical narratives in line with the social and cultural values of the target audience, resonating more with their collective psyche. Moreover, Al-Jazeera appears to be more inclined towards attacking the anti-MB social actors than defending the MB. Interestingly, such a case appears to be more evident in Arabic data as opposed to the English ones, and even more so with opinion articles than it is the case with straight news stories.

Indeed, approaching the study of news through the lens of mythology, storytelling, and narratives has been witnessing a mounting interest by scholars over the past three decades (Bird and Dardenne, 2009; Wahl-Jorgensen and Schmidt, 2020). Nonetheless, its application seems to have been mostly restricted to the analysis of monolingual news discourse. Moreover, Arabic languages, among others, still did not receive enough attention (if anything at all). Therefore,

this examination is hoped to provide some insights as to the potential implication of mythological analysis in the context of bilingual news discourse, which includes Arabic, among other languages. Moreover, the application of mythological analysis in news may help in gaining more insights as to the manipulative nature of mythological storytelling and how it is used aesthetically in news discourse, the likes of which Al-Jazeera is known for stirring and mobilising emotions.

**Keywords:** Critical discourse analysis; mythology; archetypes; narratives; storytelling; media discourse; online news; media representation; identity construction; cross-linguistic CDA; religious discourse; aesthetics; journalism; Islamism; politics

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>ABIM</b>	Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement
<b>AJA</b>	Al-Jazeera Arabic
<b>AJE</b>	Al-Jazeera English
<b>AKP</b>	Justice and Development Party
<b>Anti-MB</b>	People, coalitions, entities, or governments opposing the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood
<b>CAIR</b>	Council on American–Islamic Relations
<b>CDA</b>	Critical discourse analysis
<b>CDS</b>	Critical discourse studies
<b>DHA</b>	Discourse-historical approach
<b>DMA</b>	Discourse-mythological approach
<b>DRA</b>	Dialectical-relational approach
<b>FJB</b>	Freedom and Justice Party
<b>GCC</b>	Gulf Cooperation Council
<b>-H</b>	Articles belonging to the Hero archetype
<b>HRW</b>	Human Rights Watch
<b>IUM</b>	Civilisation at the International Islamic University Malaysia
<b>IRGC</b>	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
<b>ISIL</b>	The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
<b>MB</b>	The Muslim Brotherhood
<b>OP</b>	Opinion articles
<b>OPA</b>	Arabic opinion articles
<b>OPA-A</b>	First Arabic opinion article belonging to the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King archetype
<b>OPA-B</b>	Second Arabic opinion article belonging to the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King archetype
<b>OPA-C</b>	Third Arabic opinion article belonging to the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King archetype
<b>OPE</b>	English opinion articles
<b>Pro-MB</b>	People, coalitions, entities, or governments supporting the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood
<b>QDAS</b>	Qualitative data analysis software package
<b>RP</b>	Revolutionary Punishment
<b>RSF</b>	Reporters Without Borders
<b>SCA</b>	Socio-cognitive approach
<b>ST</b>	Straight news stories
<b>STA</b>	Arabic straight news stories
<b>STE</b>	English straight news stories
<b>-T</b>	Articles belonging to the Trickster archetype
<b>-V</b>	Articles belonging to the Victim archetype

# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Context of the study

The Muslim Brotherhood Party (MB), with its long and controversial history, emerged yet again as a dominant political force following President Hosni Mubarak's decision to step down from office amid rallies in 2011. Mohammed Morsi, the Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, won the presidential election and took on the presidency in June 2012. Following accusations of monopolising power, Islamising the state, and failing to deliver on economic reforms, Morsi was given a 48-hour ultimatum by the military to meet the demands of the protesters through surrendering power. Defiant and refusing to resign, he was later removed by the military on 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013 under the command of Egypt's army chief at the time, General Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi, ('Abd al-Fattah al-Sisī), who later became the 6<sup>th</sup> President of Egypt in 2014 (Fayed and Saleh, 2013; Wedeman *et al.*, 2013; Kingsley and Abdo, 2014; Zachary, 2014; Obaid, 2020).

Following the ousting of Morsi, different broadcasters with varying ideological inclinations have attempted to control the narratives on the ground, resulting in social events being portrayed differently (Fowler, 1991; Trew, 1991). At the lead of those news networks has been the Qatari-state funded broadcaster, Al-Jazeera. The Arab media giant seems to have tried every trick of the trade to brand and construct the removal of the MB from power as a form of "coup", "scandal", "betrayal", and "moral bankruptcy". Whilst turning a blind eye to the majority of their political failures and worrisome records, even though appearing to acknowledge some of them every once in a while, Al-Jazeera's narrative, overall, appears to be chiefly constructed to the service, sympathy, and support of the MB and their allies (Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016; Obaid, 2020). Meanwhile, a greater bulk of its straight news reports and opinion articles appear to be dedicated to scolding, demonising, and mocking their opponents in and outside Egypt, as found in this research. To archive this, much of Al-Jazeera's news articles used in this project have proven to be written along the lines of mythological storytelling: a universally cultural practice and a marked phenomenon in the study of news (Smith, 1979; Knight and Dean, 1982; Bird and Dardenne, 1997; Hartley, 2013) which seems to have been largely absent, if not completely, in the discursive studies of Arab news.

In exploring such phenomenon, the study, therefore, resorts to the employment of none other than Daren Kelsey's (Kelsey, 2015c) one and only framework to critical discourse studies, discourse-mythological approach (DMA). By adopting Kelsey's DMA, which offers a systematic procedure to the specific study and deconstruction of mythology in news, I not only extend its application, for the first time, in the monolingual context of Arabic news discourse but also in a bilingual context, given the cross-linguistic nature of this study. Moreover, despite the growing interest in Al-Jazeera by critical discourse analysts, comparing its Arabic versus English online reporting has been astonishingly under-researched. The only two CDA projects so far that sought to identify the similarities and differences between the two different language sites in relation to what they cover were those of Abdulmajid and Herring (2008) and that of Eid (2017). Neither of the two focused on the topic of Islamists, as the former study did not maintain any topical focus while the latter looked at the particular case of "immigration". Hence, the research at hand takes yet another novel point of departure by not only considering the specific case of the MB and their opponents but also how the discussion of each group is mythologically and discursively constructed, specifically, between the Arabic and English websites of Al-Jazeera.

## **1.2 Rationale of the study**

According to Bird and Dardenne (1997; 2009), one of the most fruitful ways of studying news is to do so through the analysis of mythology. 'News is not merely objective reporting of facts but also a form of storytelling that functions in a mythological way' (Bird and Dardenne, 2009, p. 205). As far as journalism studies are concerned, such practice was never uncommon (Lule, 2001; O'Donnell, 2003; Bird and Dardenne, 2009; Kelsey, 2018a). According to Lule (2001, p. 3), mythical archetypes can be identified 'in every type of news articles', never mind the genre. That is because journalists are, in a way, 'traditional storytellers' (Bird and Dardenne, 2009, p. 205) who draw on a rich treasure trove of 'conventional structures' (Bird and Dardenne, 2009, p. 205) and 'tales from a deep but nonetheless limited body of story forms and types that long ago proved their ability to hold audience' (Lule, 2001, p. 3). It is through all of these archetypes that the journalist makes sense of the world and succeeds in capturing the audiences' attention by reflecting and reinforcing their notions of reality (Lule, 2001). Audiences, in return, rely on similar archetypal conventions and familiar cultural mythologies in their attempt to make sense of the stories narrated to them (Kelsey, 2015c; Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey, 2018a).

The reasons as to why the present research pays specific attention to the case of Al-Jazeera can be explained as follows. Obviously, the aforementioned news provider is contended by scholars to be one of the most widely watched networks in the Arab world and one of the most powerful in the world today (Powers and Gilboa, 2007; Wintour, 2017). Attracting an increasingly high level of scholarship until presently (Ajaoud and Elmasry, 2020), the Qatari-based state-funded media giant is argued to have been exercising a level of independence that is arguably “higher” than other news networks, something that has even made researchers go as far as declaring Al-Jazeera as the “*The CNN of the Arab World*” (Abunimah and Ibish, 2001). Moreover, what makes the case of Al-Jazeera rather interesting has to do in part with the diametrically different coverage its two sister channels (Al-Jazeera Arabic vs Al-Jazeera English) have. Being directed to two different types audience, both channels have different codes of practice and different editorial policies (Abdulmajid and Herring, 2008; Kraidy, 2008; Satti, 2020; Barkho, 2021; Maziad, 2021). Whilst acknowledging the fact that Al-Jazeera represents a breakthrough in the evolution of Arab media, as stated by Sakr (1999), controversy has continuously been shrouding its reputation. For example, there have been questions around the broadcaster being a stalking horse, serving certain Islamist agendas (Seib, 2008). In another example, the Arabic version of Jazeera (AJA) is also argued to be broadcasting to the support of Islamist parties more generally, including MB (Al-Qassemi, 2012; Kessler, 2012). It has been accused, for instance, by a number of American officials for being representative of terrorist and jihadist groups and that it propagandises terrorism (Al-Najjar, 2009). This, in turn, has created a great deal of challenge for its English sister (AJE) to maintain its image in the West, given the controversial reputation of the former.

As for the news provider’s support of Islamist parties, Al-Qassemi (2012) suggests that both Al-Jazeera and Islamists have been long caught up in such an obvious love affair that dates back to the channel’s early beginnings. This can be seen, for instance, in the news network’s unwavering support for Islamist parties, particularly the MB and its offshoot group, Hamas. Following the removal of Muhammad Morsi, as 5<sup>th</sup> President of Egypt from office, Al-Jazeera has been leaving no stones unturned in defending the MB against what the broadcaster has always regarded as “injustice and oppression” being exercised against them at the hands of the military. The MB, along with Hamas, have even been given easy access to Al-Jazeera for globally promoting their cause (Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016; Moubayed, 2019; Obaid, 2020).

Additionally, the interest in the case of MB is also to do with them having the longest and most controversial political history, as well as being one of the major and most influential Islamist groups in the Arab world and internationally (Rubin, 2010; Gause, 2011). Because of reasons

such as their presence in and outside Egypt, their influence on other Islamist movements such as the MB offshoot Hamas, as well as the Al-Sahwa movement, their alliances with other religious regional powers, and their troubling transnational aspirations in establishing a caliphate, the MB are argued to have been posing one of the most important and complex set of challenges, not only to Arab nations but also Western countries such as the United States and its European allies (Asseburg and Brumberg, 2007; Monier and Ranko, 2013; Obaid, 2020).

Generally speaking, the success of the MB, according to Rubin (2010, pp. 1 - 3), is seen in them being arguably, the largest and ‘the first modern Islamist group’ to have been established in and outside Egypt.

‘Like no other indigenous popular movement has ever done in Egypt's history’, the MB are known for resorting to ‘peaceful or violent means; and often, a mixture of both’ (Ibrahim, 1988, p. 640). Furthermore, the MB’s adoption of clever tactics and strategies in fulfilling their own goals and aspirations, which are appropriate to any given circumstances they are faced with, is yet another point that counts to their success. For instance, as stated earlier, they are known for recognising the times when violence is deemed reckless or else necessary, and whether or not resorting to peaceful measures is seen as a better option.

Even though the rule of the MB is expected to bring tragedy and ruin to the community they aspire to govern, Rubin (2010) suggests that what makes MB the one group with the brightest future, as opposed to other Islamist groups, is that they are known for displaying more stamina and better organisational skills, which makes them a tough political actor. This is all seen in their manoeuvring skills, the successful employment of both electoral and violent strategies, their ability to patiently build bases of support, and continuing to pose as a moderate party.

### **1.3 Overview of the theoretical framework**

As far as this project is concerned, all of the archetypal theories of mythology adopted and to be will be discussed in this section are the reiterations of the same ones that form an integral part of the DMA framework (Kelsey, 2015c) with the exception of the Qur’anic master narrative of the Pharaoh (Halverson *et al.*, 2011b). The latter I inductively uncovered as a new archetypal category. As for the other archetypes and theories, the novelty and originality of each still stand in their exclusive application into a new context and dataset, and hence, provide new insights which add to the studies of news as myths and narratives, as briefly discussed in



section 1.4.2 and extensively in sections 2.7.1.1 (Chapter 2), 4.2.2.1 (Chapter 4), and 6.2.1 (Chapter 6).

Adopting the DMA as the main approach of analysis, the present research by default draws primarily on the seven master mythical narratives or archetypes as demarcated by professor and former journalist Jack Lule (Lule, 2001), and the ways in which they are believed to play out in journalistic writing of the news. In detailing his master narratives, Lule (2001) has drawn heavily on prominent theories of archetypes developed by renowned psychoanalyst Carl G. Jung (Jung, 1959). In addition, he incorporates the Jungian-influenced body of work of the distinguished mythologist Joseph Campbell (1959; 1964; 1969; 1988a; 1990; 1990; 2008). In simple words, the mythical archetypes can be defined as universal patterns that are deep-rooted in humans' collective unconscious. These can be manifested as symbolic and mythical content in various forms of narratives. Such narratives are believed to exhibit an intrinsic tendency of how the human mind conceptualises the physical world and makes sense of what happens around it. Nowadays, the theory of archetypes is utilised by scholars for the analysis of modern discourses such as news media.

As for the term myth, there are a number of descriptions that can be provided. For instance, as posited by Lule (2001, cited in Kelsey, 2016, p. 972), myth is 'a societal story that expresses prevailing ideals, ideologies, values and beliefs. More broadly, myth is an essential social narrative ... and forms to offer exemplary models for social life'.

In this project, I also adopt the key concepts and descriptions of myth that are outlined by Kelsey (2015c) in informing his DMA approach, who also bases his understanding of such ideas on a number of key scholars such as the linguist, semiotician, and anthropologist, Roland Barthes. As stated by Kelsey, whilst calling on Barthes (1972) and (Lule, 2001), myth is not about the construction of lies or truths. Myth is about distorting reality and promoting one way of seeing the world whilst blurring and suppressing other narratives and complexities.

Finally, my approach to mythology, which is that of the DMA, is also informed by other scholars. For instance, I refer to the work of Moore and Gillette (1992) and Hyde (1998) when discussing the myth of the Trickster. When it comes to deconstructing the traits of the Tyrant King, I resort to the work of Read *et al.* (1983), Moore and Gillette (1992), and Garry and El-Shamy (2017). Furthermore, I discuss the traits of the Hero and Victim in relation to works of the following scholars: Eliade and Trask (1958), Henderson (1964), Read *et al.* (1983), Faber and Mayer (2009), McCormick and White (2011), Barlow (2012; 2017), and Coman (2018). I

also draw on a new archetypal image, which has never been explored before in the context of news (to my best knowledge), known as the Pharaoh narrative. In discussing the Pharaoh figure, I refer to the archetypal descriptions outlined by none other than Halverson *et al.* (2011a), in which the scholars discovered as a frequent pattern manifesting in emotional religious discourse.

#### **1.4 Significance of the study**

As a Saudi researcher and being from the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the MB is perceived by the government of my own country and others in the region to be of as much a great threat to national security as they are in Egypt. By default, the Qatari-MB alliance, and the constant backing of such Islamist groups by the Qatari media giant, Al-Jazeera, have always been a subject of great and growing concern to the countries of the region (Ajbaili, 2014; Cage, 2014; Farhi, 2014; Wintour, 2017; Abdul Ghaffar, 2018; Seibert, 2019; Amour, 2020; Obaid, 2020)

As far as this study is concerned, the importance of examining the discursive mythological storytelling practices of Al-Jazeera not only stems from their editorial lines being arguably committed to the support of political Islam (Zelizer, 2004; Fandy, 2007; Al-Qassem, 2012; Kessler, 2012; Abunajela, 2015; Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016; Rizk, 2016; Al-Rawi, 2020; Obaid, 2020) nor from the latter posing one of the major and complex set of challenges confronting the world, including the Arab nations today (Vidino, 2010; Friedrichs, 2013; Ajbaili, 2014; Al Arabiya, 2014; Cage, 2014; Jenkins, 2017; 'The Muslim Brotherhood's global threat,' 2018; Abdul Ghaffar, 2018; Perry, 2019; Obaid, 2020) but also from all of the above being a major constituent of one of the most topical subjects in world politics today: the diplomatic crisis of Qatar (Al Arabiya, 2014; BBC World News, 2017; Jenkins, 2017; Wintour, 2017; Moubayed, 2019; Amour, 2020; Obaid, 2020). Here lies the significance of the study from personal and political perspectives, which I will endeavour to address in this section. However, in sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2, I will also be highlighting the importance of the study by briefly addressing its originality (research gap) and contribution.

I am not Egyptian, nor have I been fortunate enough to have lived or visited the ancient country. I am a Saudi Arabian and a native of my homeland. However, my interest in what is transpiring in Egypt generally stems from the extremely strong Arab and Islamic ties between the two highly influential key players in the region that are only separated by the Red Sea. Egypt is situated at the crossroads between Asia and Africa and between several key geopolitical

regions. Being at the heart of the Arab world, its long-term stability is not only of key importance to Saudi Arabia but also to the GCC countries, the Middle East, and entire Arab world (Abdul Ghaffar, 2018). In that regard, the Islamist movement of the MB, with its controversial and complex historical record (Wittes, 2008; Ayyash, 2020; Obaid, 2020), is known to have been founded in Egypt before becoming able to establish branches in various Arab countries, inspiring and supporting other Islamist organisations elsewhere such as Hamas (an offshoot of the MB) and the Al-Sahwa movement<sup>1</sup> in Saudi Arabia (Hegghammer and Lacroix, 2011; Lacroix and Holoch, 2011; Obaid, 2020). With the passage of time, the MB has become one of the major and most influential Islamist groups in the Arab world. (Ayoob, 2004; Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005; Rubin, 2010; Gause, 2011; Kull, 2011; Cage, 2014; Osman, 2016; Obaid, 2020).

As far as Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries (with the exception of Qatar and Oman) are concerned, the MB is believed to represent a great threat, not only in undermining the stability in Egypt but by extension, to the security and stability of Arab and Muslim nations. This led to Saudi Arabia in 2014, for strategic reasons, to designate the group as a terrorist organisation, a move that was welcomed and supported by other Arab countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Recently, and due to the gravity of threats posed by the MB, Saudi Arabia, joined and supported by the United Arab Emirates and some other countries, has taken a major regional lead in undertaking extra decisive measures in suppressing the MB, ensuring that no presence of them, whatsoever, is to be found on its soil (Ajbailli, 2014; Al Arabiya, 2014; Cage, 2014; Farhi, 2014; BBC World News, 2017; Jenkins, 2017; Wintour, 2017; Abdul Ghaffar, 2018; Seibert, 2019; Amour, 2020; Obaid, 2020; Turak, 2020).

The threats of the MB, as seen by the Saudis and other GCC countries, have not only just emerged in recent years but have a history behind them (Jenkins, 2017). Apart from what is seen as worrying behaviour of the MB during the presidency of Muhammad Morsi, as seen, for instance, in their suspicious alliances with radically religious actors who seek to change the character of the region and the group's alarming transnational aspirations (Frantzman, 2019; Seibert, 2019; The Levant News, 2019), the souring relationship between the Saudis and the MB goes as far as the 1990s. For instance, the MB is known to have clearly supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Saudi's fellow GCC neighbour, Kuwait. They also openly criticised the presence of the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. Moreover, the MB were found involved in supporting the Islamist movement, Al-Sahwa Al-Islamiyyah (the Islamic

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<sup>1</sup> Al-Sahwah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Awakening: الصحوّة الإسلاميّة).

Awakening), within Saudi Arabia. The latter group is believed to have taken a great shine to and inspiration from the MB. This was during the time when many of the MB members fled Egypt and sought shelter in Saudi Arabia in the 1950s, running from persecution at the time (Hegghammer and Lacroix, 2011; Lacroix and Holoch, 2011; Jenkins, 2017; Obaid, 2020).

The influence of the MB and their behaviour back then was becoming so intolerable that the Saudi Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud (Nāyif ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Āl Su‘ūd), once openly warned against them (Monier and Ranko, 2013; Ajbaili, 2014; Al Arabiya, 2014; Cage, 2014; Obaid, 2020), calling them the ‘source of all evils in the Kingdom’ in 2002 (Amour, 2020, p. 201). In recent years, the MB, along with other regional actors, were yet again found to be plotting against Saudi Arabia. For example, in 2014, as reported by the Intercept news organisation and New York Times (Frantzman, 2019; Seibert, 2019; The Levant News, 2019), some intelligence documents were leaked, revealing an alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) being discussed during a meeting in Turkey to counter Saudi Arabia.

The Qatari support of the MB is no secret matter but rather an obvious one (Amour, 2020; Obaid, 2020). The marriage between the two is said to have been going on for many years, and long enough to end up with prominent MB members getting privileged access to the ruling class, enjoying long residence in the country, and being able to dominate schools and the media. The Qatari leadership, meanwhile, is to benefit from such an alliance. By espousing the MB, the Qataris aspire to confront what they deem as the Saudi ideological domination in the region, and hence, boost their lack of agency and status (Amour, 2020; Obaid, 2020). Notably, much of the Qatari support for the MB has constantly been coming through the state-funded network, the most influential media giant in the Arab world, and one of the powerful ones internationally, none other than Al-Jazeera. The Doha-based network has long provided a global platform for the MB leaders (Zelizer, 2004; Fandy, 2007; Al-Qassem, 2012; Kessler, 2012; Abunajela, 2015; Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016; Rizk, 2016; Al-Rawi, 2020; Obaid, 2020).

Following the ousting of former President Morsi in Egypt, Al-Jazeera has taken upon itself to broadcast to the sympathy and support of the MB, declaring them as “victims” and “oppressed”, whilst at the same time attacking the military and post-MB establishment (Zelizer, 2004; Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016). The Qatari support of the MB, through Al-Jazeera and otherwise, was condemned as foreign interference in Egypt’s internal affairs, leading to ties between the two countries being ceased in 2017 (Jenkins, 2017; Sakka and Akyar, 2021). As viewed by each of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain, the continuing interference of the Qataris, the extensive

support for uprisings, the backing of the MB, and the pro-Islamist editorial lines of Al-Jazeera have been equally and constantly condemned by the aforementioned countries. Provoked and incensed by the conduct of Qatar, it was later the decision by each of those countries, including Egypt, to recall its ambassador in a shared protest back in 2014. With the Qataris continuing not to pay heed to the growing resentment, the Saudis assembled their allies to draw the final lines (Jenkins, 2017; Amour, 2020; Obaid, 2020; Sakka and Akyar, 2021).

In 2017, the Saudi-led coalition, formed by several Arab and Muslim countries, has taken the decision to sever diplomatic relations with Qatar on the grounds of supporting terrorism, undermining the security of its neighbours, and supporting the MB. A list of 13 demands was presented to Qatar in exchange for ending the restrictions. Among the list of demands is the immediate shutdown of Al-Jazeera and its affiliates, being considered a propaganda tool in the hands of the Islamists and one that undermines the support for governments, as seen by the countries partaking in the coalition. The demands asserted that Al-Jazeera is not a matter of negotiation or discussion. In response, the Qataris acknowledged that they have actually aided the MB and other Islamist groups but denied any links with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant<sup>2</sup> (Monier and Ranko, 2013; Farhi, 2014; Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016, p. 276; BBC World News, 2017; Wintour, 2017; Ajaoud and Elmasry, 2020; Obaid, 2020). Al-Jazeera condemned the call of its closure, dismissing it as ‘nothing but an attempt to end freedom of expression in the region, and suppress the right to information’ (Wintour, 2017, para. 22)

Two years later, still there is no end in sight. According to Moubayed (2019), calling on Kuwaiti journalist Fouad Hashem, the Qatari leadership is still hijacked by Islamists whose aim is to ‘tear the Gulf apart’ (Moubayed, 2019, para. 2). The MB is still enjoying the hospitality of the Emir of Qatar, Tamim Bin Hamad, acting like the country’s ‘cat’s claws’ (Moubayed, 2019, para. 32). Hamas’s offices in Doha are still operating, with its leaders enjoying limitless access to the studios of Al-Jazeera. According to Moubayed (2019, para. 13), ‘the unwavering support’ for the MB and the editorial policy of Al-Jazeera have still not changed nor softened. Until around late November 2020, the rift with Qatar had been showing no sign of relenting, in spite of the growing international pressure to end the dispute.

However, under mediation efforts by Kuwait and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who visited both Saudi Arabia and Qatar in early December 2020, significant progress in negotiations to end the crisis was announced (AFP, 2020; Wintour, 2020).

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<sup>2</sup> Abbreviated as “ISIL”.

Nonetheless, as seen by Turak (2020, para. 14), ‘a real end to the crisis is still a fair way away, not least because it would need all the involved states involved to be on board’. Meanwhile, Eurasia Group’s Bremmer stated that ‘Riyadh still wants a Qatar agreement around Al-Jazeera and a few other demands. Can’t have a breakthrough without that.’ (Turak, 2020, para. 13).

#### **1.4.1 Research gap**

According to scholars, studying the news through the lens of mythology, storytelling, and narratives has been gaining more and more attention over the past 30 years (Bird and Dardenne, 2009; Wahl-Jorgensen and Schmidt, 2020). However, the employment of such an approach appears to have been confined to monolingual discourse only. Even with it being restricted to monolingual discourse, the Arabic language was among the languages that have not been fortunate enough to receive enough attention (if anything at all).

Moreover, bearing in mind that the analysis of mythology’s aesthetic role in journalism may be considered as somewhat obscure by some (Postema and Deuze, 2020), I would argue that drawing on such aspect is more obscure, if not completely absent, in the context of deconstructing the discursive mechanism of mythology, as it occurs in Arabic news discourse and cross-linguistics research in general.

What needs to be stressed as well, after having reviewed sufficient literature, is that there does not seem to be any empirical work, so far to the best of my knowledge, that attempted to look at the particular representation of MB and their opponents between the Arabic and English straight news reports and opinion articles of Al-Jazeera, and certainly, not during the time period under investigation (starting as of 30<sup>th</sup> June 2013 until end 2014).

#### **1.4.2 Contribution**

The contribution of the study will be discussed, in detail, in Chapter 2, section 2.7.1.1, and Chapter 7, section 7.4. In short, the contribution is accomplished on a number of levels. First off, the study is hoped to be one of the extremely fewest, thus far (to the author’s best knowledge), to have considered the case of mythology (and to a lesser degree, aesthetics), not only in the context of bilingual news discourse but also in the Arabic language. Moreover, the study is believed to be the third one of its kind after those of Abdulmajid and Herring (2008) and Eid (2017), in which CDA is employed to compare the two sites of Al-Jazeera against each other. In doing so, the study takes another novel point of departure, not only in the sense of approaching the two sites through the lens of mythology but also in compiling a new dataset

and addressing a topic that is new and unexplored (e.g., representation of MB versus opponents between the years 2013 and 2014). Moreover, the contribution can also be found in improvising a new manual analysis technique to supplement the subsequent critical discourse analysis in detecting potential places of mythological archetypes (see Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.2). Such a tool led to the emergence of three new archetypes, and hence, offering yet another layer of contribution (see Chapter 4, section 4.2.2.1 and Chapter 6, section 6.2.1). Finally, I have also incorporated new strategies into the DMA toolkit for this particular project. Such tools may be drawn on by future researchers who may wish to explore Arabic news discourse (see Chapter 4, section 4.3).

## **1.5 Objectives of the study**

- It has been the extensive argument of critical discourse researchers that diverse news outlets, accordingly, create diverse social realities (Fowler, 1991; Trew, 1991). It would be interesting to find out whether this happens to be the case between the Arabic news site (AJA) versus the English news site (AJE) of Al-Jazeera, especially when it comes to reporting the case of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).
- More importantly, however, the study seeks to understand the extent to which the practice of mythological storytelling impacts the narratives on both sites, in a similar or different manner, in the positive versus negative portrayals of social actors and events.
- The study seeks to understand how the discursive construction of mythological expressions appears to function ideologically in advancing Al-Jazeera's agenda in both cases of positive and negative evaluations across the two sites mentioned.
- The study aspires to discover the types of mythical narratives or conventions being drawn upon across the two sister sites of Al-Jazeera in the positive versus negative portrayals of social actors and events.
- Finally, the study demands to uncover the sorts of themes and topics being evoked between the Arabic and English articles in fulfilling the positive versus negative depiction of social actors and events.

## **1.6 Design of the study**

The present research adopts a qualitative research design in which there are three approaches being employed for analysis. These are thematic analysis, manual analysis, and Discourse-Mythological Approach (DMA). More details about each approach can be referred to in Chapter 3, section 3.4.2. The research questions can also be found in section 3.4.1. Of course, the first

two approaches are meant to supplement the critical discourse investigation, which is the third and main approach.

### **1.6.1 Thematic analysis (supplementary)**

- 1) What sorts of themes are raised concerning the positive evaluation of the MB, their allies, and pro-MB arguments?
- 2) What sorts of themes are raised concerning the negative evaluation of the anti-MB establishment, their allies, and anti-MB arguments?

In answering the first and second research questions, the supplementary qualitative technique of thematic analysis will initially be applied with the sole aim of categorising and exploring themes of interest pertaining to the positive and negative evaluations of social actors and events. I will seek to apply the use of thematic analysis following the widely cited approach that is developed by psychologists Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke mainly (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

### **1.6.2 Manual analysis (supplementary)**

- 3) What are the archetypal conventions of the Arabic and English news stories of Al-Jazeera?

Of course, thematic analysis is not enough on its own to identify potential places of mythological narratives and hence, unable to answer the third research question. Therefore, there was a need for improvising another supplementary tool that builds up on the findings of the previous analysis and adds more meanings to them, mythology-wise. Conducting manual analysis is believed to be quite useful in helping me pinpoint mythological narrative cases across the articles that could be worthy of critical discourse investigation.

### **1.6.3 Discourse-mythological analysis (DMA)**

- 4) If mythological archetypal storytelling exists, how is mythology discursively constructed as it functions ideologically to deliver both positive and/or negative evaluations between the Arabic and English news stories of Al-Jazeera?

Of course, much about the approach is discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.5.4 and Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.3. However, in very brief terms, DMA traces the beginnings of its development by Dr Darren Kelsey in the year 2013, particularly in his body of work (Kelsey, 2013a; Kelsey,



2014; Kelsey, 2015c; Kelsey, 2016), and it is still being further-developed until recently (Kelsey, 2017a; Kelsey, 2020). Integrating the tools of critical discourse studies and other aspects of critical and cultural theory, DMA is specifically designed as a systematic framework for investigating mythology as a discursive practice of journalistic storytelling. According to Kelsey (2016, p. 973), whilst calling on Flood (2002), the ‘systematic frameworks for analysing the detailed discursive constructions of myth have been largely absent in myth theory’. DMA is therefore proposed, not only for the purpose of filling the above gap but also to propose a unique synergy, bridging the gap between journalism studies on the one hand and discourse studies on the other (Kelsey, 2016).

After having attained the findings of the thematic analysis, and most importantly, the manual analysis, the task is finally handed over to the Discourse-Mythological Approach (DMA). Beginning with the DMA’s micro-discursive strategies, the linguistic expressions of mythology and the conventions of archetypal storytelling revealed during the manual analysis stage will then be unpacked and deconstructed, and hence, answering the “what” and “how” of discourse. Afterwards, the focus of the inspection will shift to the subsequent macro-discourse analysis whereby the contextual social, political, or cultural aspects surrounding their production, distribution, and consumption of the text will be scrutinised. Indeed, the second stage is particularly important in revealing how the latter elements could potentially be reproduced in language in the forms of power hierarchies, cultural meanings, belief systems, etc. Indeed, finding out more about the who, how, and why of discourse will ultimately help in gaining more insights into the ideological role of mythology.

## **1.7 Thesis synopsis**

The thesis comprises seven chapters and is structured in the following order:

### **1.7.1 Chapter 1. Introduction**

The introduction chapter summarises the study in relation to its context, rationale, theoretical framework, significance, objectives, and design. It also provides the structure of the project at the end.

### **1.7.2 Chapter 2. Literature review**

The chapter begins by discussing the theories of mythology and their emerging importance in the study of news. The discussion will include subsections, each of which touches on the

concepts of myths, theories of archetypes, their aesthetical impact, and the ways they could be approached for analysis as part of the study of language and semiotics.

Next, the reasons for choosing the particular case of Al-Jazeera, its websites, and the MB will be presented, not without contextual information, as the relationship between the media giant and the Islamist group in question is significant. Afterwards, the chapter will briefly go through the traditional approaches available to critical discourse studies, along with the recently introduced framework to the study of storytelling, DMA. However, the DMA will not be discussed in greater detail as this is something to be kept for Chapter 2. Towards the end of the chapter, an appraisal of related empirical research will be provided, coupled with subsections on the identified research gaps in such studies, as they will be addressed in the project.

### **1.7.3 Chapter 3. Methodology**

The chapter starts by detailing the reasons for conducting the project at hand, following the qualitative approach to social science, as opposed to doing so quantitatively. Similarly, the rationale for choosing to conduct a critical discourse investigation of all other discourse-related approaches will be explained. Afterwards, the research questions will be presented, succeeded by another section about the research methods adopted in this project. In addition to the DMA framework being the main approach of analysis, there will be two other supplementary approaches. These are thematic analysis and manual analysis. The former approach is to be conducted in order to capture the thematic landscape of the data overall, in relation to the positive and negative portrayals of social actors and events. The second approach, meanwhile, is particularly carried out so as to assist the discourse analysis in identifying traces of mythical archetypes much more quickly. The data collection and sampling processes will subsequently be addressed and outlined. Then, the chapter will move on to detail and explain the steps undertaken in conducting the supplementary approaches of thematic analysis and manual analysis. Finally, it will finish by addressing the undertaken measures of validity and reliability.

### **1.7.4 Chapter 4. Results and micro-discursive analysis**

The first two sections of this chapter will be mainly allocated to presenting the findings of both thematic analysis and manual analysis as two introductory approaches supplementing the subsequent critical discourse investigation. The greater bulk of this chapter will be dedicated, afterwards, to presenting the micro-discursive analysis of news articles, being the first important step in the critical discourse investigation. First off, DMA's macro-discursive strategies will be

defined and rationalised as the main toolkit to be drawn on in this chapter. Thereafter, the actual discursive analysis of articles will be conducted.

At this stage, the analysis will pay specific attention to the linguistic constructions of mythical archetypes such as “the Victim”, “the Hero”, “the Trickster”, and “the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King”; all of which are identified with the help of manual analysis. The sub-archetypal category of the Martyr, meanwhile, will not be included as part of Chapters 4 or 5 for obvious reasons to be discussed later on.

To this end, the analysis will employ a number of micro-discursive devices, such as “lexical choice”, “predication”, “metaphors”, “hyperbole”, and “modality”, all of which are already found in the DMA toolkit. Nonetheless, their analysis will also make use of other tools which I have personally incorporated, such as “perspectivisation” and “speech acts”, with a bit of an expansion on predicational strategies. After this point, the chapter will hand it over to the subsequent macro-analysis stage, which will be conducted in Chapter 5.

### **1.7.5 Chapter 5. Macro-discursive analysis**

This chapter seeks to follow up on the previous linguistic analysis by extending the analysis beyond the level of words, phrases, and sentences. With the help of DMA’s macro-discursive strategies, the chapter at hand will attempt to examine the ways in which what is linguistically expressed in terms of mythological and archetypal conventions could relate to and reflect the contextual plus macro-level aspects, shaping and informing the production, distribution, and consumption of the text. These could feature in the forms of power dynamics, social, political, or cultural meanings, or belief systems (values, attitudes, etc.). Examining these processes is important if we are to fully make sense of the overall dynamics of mythology as they function ideologically in discourse. In doing so, a number of non-linguistic macro-discursive strategies will be used. These include each of “intertextuality”, “interdiscursivity”, “narration of the nation”, and “re-contextualisation”.

### **1.7.6 Chapter 6. Discussion**

The chapter discusses how the archetypal narratives used by Al-Jazeera appear to resonate with the existing theories and how each of these mythical categories is utilised by the media giant for delivering its ideological biases. The chapter also demonstrates how the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King and the Martyr archetypes emerged as new mythical categories, which have never been considered for mythological analysis in Arabic news discourse before. Drawing on such myths

is believed to warrant the project with an important layer of contribution. What will also be discussed in this chapter are counter-narratives and complexities which are believed to have been suppressed due to the manipulative nature of mythological storytelling. In addition to discussing Al-Jazeera's archetypes, the chapter will also present the bigger picture pertaining to the overall discursive landscape between the two sites as a means of revealing other important aspects of mythology. Whilst doing so, specific attention is given to the aesthetic role of mythology, which is arguably, another under-researched concept that is of key implication to the present project.

### **1.7.7 *Chapter 7. Conclusion***

This chapter concludes the project by presenting a summary of the study along with its main findings. Moreover, it addresses the study's contribution, limitations, implications, and recommendations for further research. It concludes with closing remarks.

## **Chapter 2. Literature review**

### **2.1 Introduction**

In endeavouring to offer an appraisal of the literature and related studies, this chapter will firstly begin with reviewing and rationalising the need for approaching news as a universally ancient cultural practice and a form of mythological storytelling (all of which will be discussed in section 2.2). This will also include a discussion on the concepts of myth and mythical archetypes and the ways these are seen as part of the study of language and semiotics. In addition, the section will also address the role of aesthetics as an important but perhaps under-researched concept that is closely associated with mythology. Next, in section 2.3, I will be discussing the reasons for choosing the case of Al-Jazeera's reporting, including subsections on Al-Jazeera's controversial relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the importance of analysing news sites, and how websites are being seen as fertile ground for critical discourse analysis (CDA). Following this, background information about the MB will be presented in section 2.4, touching on the group's inclinations towards violent activities and showing how they have evolved into a major political power until the day they ended up being removed from the political scene in 2013.

Afterwards, the chapter will shed some light on the traditional approaches to critical discourse studies (in section 2.5). This will be coupled with a subsection discussing the employed framework and singled out from the rest of the other major approaches. Subsequently, in section 2.6, I will be presenting a review of most of the empirical research conducted on cases of news storytelling, Al-Jazeera, and the MB. This will be combined with subsections dedicated to identifying the research gaps, showing the ways in which the present research appears to stand out from the other body of work, assuming elements of originality. Finally, this chapter will conclude by presenting a summary of points discussed in section 2.7.

### **2.2 Myths in the news**

This section sheds light on the emerging importance of studying the news as a form of cultural and universal mythological narrative. In addressing that, it will be touching briefly on the definitions of myths, the use of mythical archetypes, and how mythology is expressed and

communicated in language. The section will also discuss the aesthetics of mythology as an important concept to the study of news discourse.

## **2.3 What is unique?**

### **2.3.1 News as myths and narratives**

Generally, it can be argued that there are indications pointing to news being somehow thought of as part of a universally ancient cultural practice and a form of narrative and storytelling. Just like any narrative, news is naturally orienting and gives emphasis to standpoints. Being also a narrative, it is a practice that is ritualistic and communal (Dewey, 1927; Park, 1940; Rayfield, 1972; Turner, 1980; Scholes, 1982; Bird and Dardenne, 1997; Carey, 2002; Dewey and Rogers, 2012). News plays a central cultural role that can be argued to be equivalent to that of a myth. This role can be seen in its habitual use of familiarly repeated narrative patterns, or ‘mythical archetypes’ (Lule, 2001) in its endeavour to shape events into stories, something that can perhaps explain the reason as to why news stories appear to be novel, but at the same time, ‘soothingly predictable’ (Bird and Dardenne, 2009, p. 206).

In a similar alignment between news and myth, news, just like myth, does not aspire to describe a given event as it is but rather describe it in relation to what it signifies (Bird and Dardenne, 1997). It is for that reason that news can be considered as a particular type of mythological narrative which has its own representative codes that can be acknowledged and recognised by its own audience; when reading or hearing a news story, the audience may realise that they are in a given “narrative situation” (Barthes, 1982), of which, understanding can only be made possible through adopting a certain stance (Barthes, 1972). Indeed, the mythical attributes that are found in the news have always been regarded by researchers as marked phenomena (Smith, 1979; Knight and Dean, 1982; Hartley, 2013). This can be exemplified in the attempt by news to generate an order out of the disorder and its attempt to turn the process of knowing into something that can be told.

Furthermore, news warrants more than just facts: news provides a sense of reassurance and ‘familiarity in shared community experience’. Offered as well by news, are what could be thought of as reliable answers to questions that are believed to be inexplicable; news provides prepared explanations relating to many complex phenomena. Perhaps this also explains why the consumption of news has been something to be equated to religions, ritual practices, celebrations, and plays (Mead, 1926; Stephenson, 1964; Gerbner, 1977; Jensen, 1977; Glasser,

1982; Capo, 1985; Carey, 2002). It is through such a ritualistic process of narrating tales (which includes news) that myths can be expressed, transformed, and recreated. They may manifest as a symbolic system, having the possible function to act as a model of and a model for culture (Geertz, 1973; Turner *et al.*, 2017).

Bird and Dardenne (1997; 2009) believe that one of the most productive ways to examine news is through the lens of mythology. They state that ‘news is not merely objective reporting of facts but also a form of storytelling that functions in a mythological way’ (Bird and Dardenne, 2009, p. 205). Notably, approaching the study of news as a form of mythological storytelling was not a rare practice in journalism studies (Lule, 2001; O’Donnell, 2003; Bird and Dardenne, 2009; Kelsey, 2018a). Moreover, the use of mythical archetypes can be found in many contexts and within almost every type of news article: national reports, international correspondence, sports columns, human interest features, editorials, and obituaries’ (Lule, 2001, p. 3). Journalists, in a way, act like ‘traditional storytellers’ (Bird and Dardenne, 2009, p. 205) or ‘mythmakers’ of this day and age (Kelsey, 2018a, p. 663), where they draw on a ‘rich treasure trove of archetypical stories’ (Lule, 2001, p. 18), ‘conventional structures’ (Bird and Dardenne, 2009, p. 205), or ‘tales from a deep but nonetheless limited body of story forms and types that long ago proved their ability to hold audience’ (Lule, 2001, p. 3).

It is through all of these archetypes that journalists make sense of the world and succeed in capturing the audiences’ attention by reflecting and reinforcing their notions of reality (Lule, 2001). The audience, in return, depends on similar archetypal conventions and familiar cultural mythologies in their attempt to make sense of the stories being told to them (Kelsey, 2015c; Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey, 2018a).

*Myth legitimises and justifies positions. Myth celebrates dominant beliefs and values. Myth degrades and demeans other beliefs that do not align with those of the storyteller*

(Lule, 2001, p. 184)

In specifying the main purpose of myth, Drummond (2008, p. 27) explains that it ‘is primarily a metaphorical device for telling people about themselves, about other people, and about the complex world of natural and mechanical objects they inhabit’. Furthermore, myth is there for the provision of reassurance through telling the tales that explain baffling or frightening events or experiences and offers answers which are acceptable (Frye, 1957).

### 2.3.2 What is myth?

Myths and mythologies, in simple terms, are stories within an ability to animate individuals and societies alike (Mosco, 2004). As maintained by Mosco (2004, p. 3), myths can provide ‘paths to transcendence’, ‘lift people out of the banality of everyday life’, and ‘offer an entrance to another reality’. More importantly, myths can define heroes and villains (Farrant, 2016) and can validate and maintain ‘the established social order’ (Campbell, 1991, p. 621).

When conjuring up any given archetypes, as explained by Farrant (2016, p. 33) whilst drawing on (Warner, 1994; Warner, 2003), myths come into play:

*to say something about who we are and what we want by imposing structure and order. Mythology helps us make sense of the world, as these stories and legends are interwoven into social systems and can reveal their inner workings. They encourage us to engage with questions about transgression, order, politics and human relationships, and inspire and influence us more than we give them credit. Myths tell us about the reality of power and about our understandings of ‘truth’.*

(Farrant, 2016, p. 33)

Moreover, as asserted by Segal (1987, p. 136), ‘myth is both true and indispensable. Only when taken literally is myth false’. In helping us interpret the world, mythology may come in handy in exposing ‘the operation of power in terms of what constitutes truth at any one temporal and spatial moment’ (Warner, 2003, cited in Farrant, 2016, p. 33).

That said, Kelsey (2015c, p. 5) states that myth also ‘promotes one way of seeing or discussing something’ whilst simultaneously ‘restricts and denies other interpretations or understandings’. According to Kelsey (2015c) and Lule (2001), myth has a habit of providing clarity to those who believe in the social ideals they represent. It upholds blissful and social ideals it represents at the expense of those it does not, and in doing so, complexities and opposing narratives are often suppressed. This pretty much echoes what was mentioned earlier by Lule (2001, p. 119) that myths hold tendencies to maintain some beliefs whilst degrade others; myth ‘celebrates but also excoriates. It affirms but it also denies’.

Myths have a habit of not necessarily mirroring the objective reality as it is, but alternatively, building a world of their own (Frye, 1957). More on myths’ objectivity, equating it with that of the news, Barthes (1972, p. 11) explains that the ‘naturalness with which newspapers, art and



common sense constantly dress up a reality which, even though it is one we live in, is undoubtedly determined by history’.

Myths are also known for their creations of distorted meanings; such meanings are formed through associating them with other concepts and ideas, which can make them all seem to be connected and related in some ways whilst ‘justifying and naturalising the ways in which something is defined’ (Kelsey, 2015c, pp. 5 - 6).

Now, news as a storytelling device, according to Lule (2001, p. 119), justifies its ideological positions. As maintained by Kelsey (2018a, p. 663), such a selective process can be described as an extremely politicised negotiation of discursive practices. Moreover, the ‘diachronic and synchronic formations of mythology might articulate simple messages, but they are complex processes that often provide sophisticated manipulations of popular stories, memories and identities’ (Kelsey, 2015c, p. 187).

Bird and Dardenne (2009, p. 205) add that although journalism is considered to act (to a higher degree than myth) as ‘part of rational discourse that facilitates informed citizenship’, it is imperative that the narrative construction and mythological function of news be understood if the audience is ‘to fully comprehend the ideological way in which it operates in any culture’.

In stating all of the above, it is worth pointing out that myth must not be equated to falsehood, which is a point emphasised by Kelsey (2015c) and adopted as well in the study at hand. In fact, during the process of mythological storytelling, meanings become constructed in such a way that can be extremely distorting, thanks to the preferences that function through such process as well as other forms of distortions, such as exaggerations, suppressions, or simplifications (Kelsey, 2015c). Flood (2002) was known to have highlighted the distinction between the common use of myth as a term referring to lie, as opposed to that which is of scholarly use: using myth as a term that emphasises its unchallenged legitimacy within the belief systems of those who value them. Other scholars’ views of myth also align with Flood (2002). One perspective is from Barthes (1972), who argues that myth depends ‘on what is immediately visible, it organises a world which is ... without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity’. Bell (2003, p. 75) additionally stresses another similar perception with regards to this process of simplification that is practised by myth, suggesting that myth is known for flattening ‘the complexities, the nuance, the performative contradictions of human history’ and instead, it aims at representing ‘a simplistic and often uni-vocal story’.

Another important aspect of mythology accounts for the affective role it plays within our lives. According to Kelsey, (Kelsey, 2017b):

*The ideological and communicative practices of society and mythology are so deeply entwined with psychological structures and archetypal mechanisms of the human psyche. These affective qualities form the mythologies that we live by—they are powerful and they influence the best and worst traits of humanity. Affective mythologies have a significant impact on social relations including issues of race, religion, class, gender, power, and culture in personal, public, and private spaces, all of which are political. Therefore, it is essential to understand the psycho-discursive mechanics of mythology in its affective form and its inescapable ideological influence.*

(Kelsey, 2017b, pp. 4 - 5)

It is for this reason the scholar argues the need for thinking more responsibly and consciously about the ways in which mythology operates through the lives of individuals and societies. Kelsey (2017b) also stresses the importance of ensuring a reflective and critical disposition when considering our own storytelling (i.e., what it means to ourselves and others) ‘as much as we are willing to critique the stories of those we dislike or disagree with’ (Kelsey, 2017b, p. 5).

Viewing myth as an all-inclusive phenomenon that is part and parcel of people’s ‘experiential, psychological, physical, and social aspects’ of their lives (Kelsey, 2017b, p. 5), Kelsey brings attention to the important work of renowned mythologist and anthropologist, Joseph Campbell (Campbell, 1949; Campbell, 1988a; Campbell *et al.*, 1990), particularly his famous outline of “the four functions of mythology” (Campbell, 2008). According to Campbell (2008, pp. 6 - 10), mythology serves four common purposes in our lives, which explain the psychological and social levels through which an individual draws on myths to make sense of the world. These can be summarised as follows:

**1. *The metaphysical (or mystic) function:***

Myth, in this sense, is expected to ‘evoke in the individual a sense of grateful, affirmative awe before the monstrous mystery that is existence’ (Campbell, 2008, cited in Kelsey, 2017b, p. 6). In other words, myth expresses what it feels like for a person to live in awe of the universe and what it means to be human in the midst of many of the unknowns. Therefore, myth, in this sense, ‘tells stories that connect us to the notion of something else, rather than nothing, which cannot be explained’ (Campbell, 2008, cited in Kelsey, 2017b, p. 6).

## **2. *Cosmological (or cosmic) function:***

According to Campbell (2008), this is where myth:

*represents an image of the cosmos, an image of the universe round about, that will maintain and elicit this experience of awe. [or] ...to present an image of the cosmos that will maintain your sense of mystical awe and explain everything that you come into contact within the universe around you.*

(Campbell, 2008, p. 7)

Hence, myth serves the purpose of explaining how the universe has first begun and existed through the cosmos. As added by Kelsey (2017b, p. 7), for many people, such a mythical function works ‘through science’ since humans resort to ‘the laws of physics’ as the answer to explain the creation and existence of the universe.

## **3. *Sociological function:***

The third function concerns itself with validating and maintaining ‘a certain sociological system: a shared set of rights and wrongs, proprieties or improprieties, on which your particular social unit depends for its existence’ (Campbell, 2008, cited in Kelsey, 2017b, p. 7). As remarked by Kelsey (2017b, p. 7), this particular function is important to this day and age politics and can provide ‘an explicit point of where we can see how ideology breaks through in mythology’.

## **4. *Pedagogical function:***

As remarked by Kelsey (2017b), this function concerns itself with the psychological aspects of myth that are responsible for guiding us through the key stages of our lives’ journeys. Accordingly, myth helps us develop meaning to our lives by determining what life is about, why we are here, and what we are to do about it. In keeping with Campbell (2008, cited in Kelsey, 2017b, p. 8), ‘myth must carry the individual through the stages of his life, from birth through maturity through senility to death. The mythology must do so in accord with the social order of his group, and the monstrous mystery’.

### **2.3.3 Mythical archetypes**

In defining myths, as far as the scope of this study is concerned, I place emphasis on what is known as “mythical archetypes”, which was briefly touched on above, particularly the use of

archetypal figures and exemplary models (Lule, 2001). Before meandering to discussing these categories and describing each one of them, it might be beneficial to briefly look into the concept of narratives.

A narrative can be described as ‘a cross-cultural phenomenon’ (Meuter, 1995, p. 173), a ‘life form which contributes to creating the foundation of our lives as it helps us to interpret the world, through stories, in which we must be able to act’ (Schachtner, 2020, p. 28 - 29). According to the linguist, semiotician, and anthropologist, Roland Barthes, a narrative ‘is present at all times, in all places, in all societies; indeed, the narrative starts with the very history of mankind; there is not, there has never been anywhere, any people without narrative’ (Barthes, 1975, p. 237). Indeed, telling stories has always been part and parcel of life’s fundamental activities. As maintained by Wittgenstein (1953, p. 12), ‘recounting is as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing’. Moreover, as suggested by Schutz and Luckmann (1974, cited in Schachtner, 2020, p. 29), ‘we are born into a world of narrations which make up the unexamined ground of everything given in [our] experience’.

Within the field of text linguistics, a narrative is also defined as ‘text type which arranges actions and events in a specific sequential order (Beaugrand and Dressler, 1981, cited in Forchtner, 2021, p. 306). In other descriptions given by scholars within the field of critical discourse studies, a narrative is addressed in relation to groups’ identities, and hence, defined as ‘a story in a social and cultural context, a story which is also motivated by political interests, and points to two mega-narratives which normalise or estrange social objects, such as social groups, social phenomena or social events’ (Gavriely-Nuri, 2017, cited in Forchtner, 2021, p. 307). Narratives and stories are also addressed from an ecologically grounded perspective. As such, they are said to ‘take eight forms (ideology, framing, metaphor, identity, evaluation, conviction, erasure and salience), which exist as models in our minds and manifest linguistically as, e.g., discourses’ (Stibbe, 2017, cited in Forchtner, 2021, p. 307).

As stated above, we resort to narrativity as part of our quest to understand and make sense of the social world. We equally do so to construct the social identities of one another. On this note, (Somers, 1994). One of the most important characteristics of narratives lies in their ability to ‘configure (emplot) what happens in time into an ‘intelligible whole’ (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 21). As such, a narrative is ‘a perceived sequence of non-randomly connected events’ (Toolan, 2013, p. 7); ‘a sequence with a beginning, a middle and an end’ (Forchtner, 2021, p. 305). As noted by Forchtner (2021), whilst calling on White (1980), Chatman (1980), and Labov and Waletzky (1967), the sequence of narratives not only follows a chronological order but rather relies on

causality and consequences. Therefore, ‘the selections of events obtain the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imagined. Hence, they become meaningful; and indeed, every well-crafted story has a point, will make a moralizing judgment[s]’ (Forchtner, 2021, pp. 305 - 306).

As for what concerns the mythical archetypes, Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell, two of the most prominent explorers of the psychoanalytical and mythological origins for human and social behaviour, sees an archetype as ‘a recurring pattern of images, situations, or symbols found in the mythology, religion, art, and dreams of cultures around the world’ (Lane, 1954, p. 232). Lule (2001) describes them as motifs, patterns, characters, and images that are drawn from the shared experiences of human life and shaped by them. In a rather more inclusive description, which also points at the affective power of the archetypes, Kelsey (2017a) states the following:

*Archetypes are developed from neurological stimuli, recurring psycho-discursive complexes and behavioural patterns that we all share. They take on powerful forms in how we tell stories to construct meaning. From the collective unconscious through to the social and cultural salience of consciousness, we can analyse the affective trajectory of archetypes as they become personally and collectively fused within popular narratives and stories of our times.*

(Kelsey, 2017a, p. 19)

According to Lule (2001), archetypes are used for the sake of structuring and shaping stories across cultures and areas. He illustrates examples of such archetypes, ‘heroes, floods, floods, villains, plagues, patriarchs, pariahs, great mother and tricksters’, stressing that they are crucial forces and figures to the creation of ‘stories that are the heart of human storytelling’ (Lule, 2001, p. 15).

The way he sees it, myths enter the picture on occasions whereby these stories are drawn on so as to represent major social issues or ideals. It is through archetypes that myths and news are seen as an important way through which dominant ideals, ideologies, beliefs and values are expressed by societies (Lule, 2001). Lule (2001) further explains that archetypal stories tend to offer humans what is believed to be exemplary models, showing them what counts as good/right and what counts as evil/wrong. Myths draw on such archetypes to provide exemplary models of which their job is ‘to represent shared values, confirm core beliefs, deny other beliefs, and help people engage with, appreciate and understand the complex joys and sorrows of human life’ (Lule, 2001, p. 15).

As postulated by Lule, journalists, in their pursuit to make sense of the world, would cautiously or incautiously draw on mythical archetypes and by doing so assume their positions amongst ‘generations of storytellers who tell and retell the myths of humankind (Lule, 2001, p. 19)’. Following on that, Phillip (2011, p. 12), as referred to by Kelsey (2016, p. 973), explains that journalists use the same ‘basic characters archetypes or myths that are used by filmmakers and novelists’.

Importantly, Lule (2001, pp. 22 - 25) offers a set of frequently recurring mythical archetypes or, rather, seven master myths in news, which are derived from many years of his rigorous reading, writing, editing, and studying (in which the present research takes interest). Such narratives are based on previously existing archetypal theories such as those by the psychoanalyst Carl G. Jung (Jung, 1959) and the mythologist Joseph Campbell (1959; 1964; 1969; 1988a; 1990; 1990; 2008). These set of structures or mythical archetypes, as recognised by Lule (2001), are primordial stories that long guided the practice of storytelling for ages. Such stories include the Victim, the Hero, the Trickster, the Scapegoat, Good Mother, the Other World, and the Flood. In the interest of this project, the examples to be discussed in this section will only be restricted to the first three categories (i.e., Victim, the Hero, and the Trickster), being some of the major ones identified along with some other new archetypes. Moreover, I will be discussing three more categories, marking major contribution to this project due to them not having been uncovered before in the context of bilingual news discourse at all.

Finally, my approach to mythology is also informed by other key scholars. For instance, I refer to the work of Moore and Gillette (1992) and Hyde (1998) when discussing the myth of the Trickster. When it comes to deconstructing the analysing traits of the Tyrant King, I resort to the work of Read *et al.* (1983), Moore and Gillette (1992), and Garry and El-Shamy (2017). Furthermore, I draw on a new archetypal image, which has never been explored before in any previous research; it is known as the Pharaoh narrative. In discussing the Pharaoh figure, I refer to the archetypal descriptions outlined by none other than Halverson *et al.* (2011ab). Ultimately, I discuss the traits of the Hero and Victim in relation to the work of the following scholars: Eliade and Trask (1958), Henderson (1964), Read *et al.* (1983), Faber and Mayer (2009), McCormick and White (2011), Barlow (2012; 2017), and Coman (2018). The below segment will endeavour to provide brief definitions and descriptions of each above-mentioned archetypes.

### **2.3.3.1 Relevant categories**

#### **2.3.3.1.1 The archetypal Victim**

The mythical narrative of the Victim is exclusively used to the sympathy and support of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and their supporters, who are said to have been allegedly massacred and persecuted at the hands of the anti-MB establishment. Generally speaking, the purpose of this myth is to ‘reconcile people to the tragic and seeming randomness of human existence’ (Lule, 2001, p. 22).

The Victim is known to be as one of the oldest and most salient mythical archetypes, holding a substantial role in societies all around the world (Henderson, 1964; Jung, 1976; Jung, 1981; Eliade, 1996; Lule, 2001). As explained by Eliade (1996), the importance of such a narrative lies in its ability to become the consoler in times of conflict and tragedy, plus the fact that it is ‘better than any empirical or rational means of revealing human destiny’ (1996, p. 426).

As posited by Barlow (2017, para. 1), ‘everyone can relate to the Victim and we love to root for the underdog, the downtrodden and the disadvantaged’. She also adds that the reason for such fascination emerges from ‘the desire for transformation and personal empowerment that comes from the Victim becoming the Victor’ (Barlow, 2017, para. 1). In further justifying the reason for such strong cultural attachment, Lule (2001, p. 282) clarifies that ‘the victim symbolizes society. We must see ourselves, and cast ourselves too, in the part of the victim’. Feeling that way, according to Lule (2001), provides a set of qualities to emulate and allows the audience to imagine how they themselves might have acted or might have been remembered had they been in the shoes of the Victims afflicted with harm and calamity. After all, ‘logic will not explain the sudden death of a victim. Rationality will not comfort those left behind’ as added by Lule (2001, p. 58). Of course, the existence of the archetypal Victim is entwined with that of the Villain for both are inseparable, as stressed by Barlow (2017). Finally, it is worth pointing out that Victims are often assigned heroic qualities since their demise are mostly seen as a form of sacrifice made for a greater good of some kind (Lule 2001, p. 282). Henderson (1964), who blends the narrative of Victim with that of the Hero, explains that one of the most common archetypal tales that is being constantly repeated tends to involve a hero of some kind, battling with evil, and then dying following a heroic sacrifice. More on this will be discussed below in the section addressing the Martyr archetype.

### 2.3.3.1.2 The archetypal Martyr

As far as the project is concerned, the Martyr archetype<sup>3</sup> emerges as a secondary category since it is the archetypal child of the Victim and the Hero. As its name suggests, the Martyr is centred on the idea of sacrificial heroism, which in this case is the Islamic martyrdom or what is known as “dying in the cause of Allah” الشهادة في سبيل الله *al-shahādah fī sabīl Illāh* (Torok, 2012; Lawson, no date).

As maintained by Barlow (2012):

*The core of the Martyr archetype is about doing the right thing. They realize that part of their life’s journey involves sacrificing for others and doing so brings them a sense of purpose and joy [...] The Martyr knows that their sacrifice matters and that they can be a source of redemption for others as well as for themselves.*

(Barlow, 2012, para(s). 6 - 8)

Putting it within an Islamic perceptive, Halverson *et al.* (2011a, pp. 92-93) explain that ‘the conflict between good and evil mediated by a hero accepting his destiny as an archetypal martyr for God’s cause is therefore only satisfied by standing against an oppressor and accepting death in defiance of tyranny’ (92-93). Moreover, Islam accords a special status to those who sacrifice their lives in the service of their religion. According to the Islamic teachings, martyrs proceed directly to the highest abode in Paradise as their eternal reward in the hereafter (Torok, 2012; Lawson, no date). An important note, however, to be made about the Martyr, and the Victim for that matter is that the bearer of such archetypal traits does not necessarily need to have died “heroically”. Normal casualties can still be represented as Martyrs since ‘the portrayals of victims as heroes seem appropriate and somehow comforting’ (Lule, 2001, p. 54).

### 2.3.3.1.3 The archetypal Hero

As far as this project is concerned, the archetypal qualities of the Hero are mostly associated with each of the MB and their allies and supporters. This also includes the ousted president, Mohammed Morsi, Hamas, the Egyptian protesters, and pro-MB Turkey. The Hero is known for being one of the most enduring and prevalent archetypes in world societies and one of the most popular in media and popular culture (1949; 1969; Jung, 1981; 1990; Lule, 2001). Essentially, as explained by Henderson (2013, p. 101) the Hero myth bespeaks of ‘the

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<sup>3</sup> Further definitions and descriptions relating the archetypal Martyr can be found Chapter 2 (section, 2.3.3.1.2).



development of the individual's ego-consciousness and his awareness of his own strengths and weaknesses in a manner that will equip him for the arduous tasks with which life confronts him'. As stated by İşleyen (2019) whilst calling on (Campbell, 1949; Jung, 1981):

*Archetypal heroes display important psychological aspects of human life such as strength, achievement, and glory. The hero archetype has much of the same life pattern such as encountering unexpected obstacles yet finally managing to overcome them with his determination and wisdom.*

(İşleyen, 2019, p. 61)

According to İşleyen (2019), the archetypal traits of the Hero can take the forms of extraordinary bravery and courage. The bearers of such attributes are always ready to take action, never mind the dangers, turns, and twists thrown their ways. They are ready to go out of their ways or even sacrifice themselves for the sake of their ideals (İşleyen, 2019).

Now, the Hero is frequently produced and reproduced in the world of news in the forms of representations revolving around ideas such as 'the humble birth, the early mark of greatness, the quest, the triumph, and the return' (Lule, 2001, p. 23). That said, it is crucial to remember that the archetypal representations of the Hero do not necessarily follow one single pattern. As stressed by Kelsey (2016, p. 975), whilst calling on (Campbell, 1949; Lule, 2001) there are various forms of Heroism functioning 'through different contexts and dimensions of moral storytelling. Hero figures do not carry a monolithic form or set of characteristics and values'. They rather are 'dramatized and personified to reflect the core values and ideals of the societies in which their stories feature' (Lule, 2001, cited in Kelsey, p. 975).

Now, the reasons as to why the archetypal Hero myth is believed to be one of the most familiar narratives playing out frequently in both fictional and non-fictional stories alike, as maintained by Kelsey (2017b), lies in its moral ability to make people often reflect upon their own sort of life challenges, experiences, and journeys. Kelsey (2017b, p. 41) adds that the cultural prominence of the Hero's journey 'makes it particularly significant if we do not stop to question the ideological constructions and discursive substance of stories that feature this archetypal pattern'.

#### 2.3.3.1.4 The archetypal Trickster

In this project, the archetypal Trickster is mostly associated with the negative portrayals of the post-MB establishment and its advocates. As will be seen in the analysis, the discursive representations of the Trickster are not only communicated through the aforementioned social actors coming across as cunning, deceptive, or unpredictable but also as crude and numbskull figures who are enslaved to their animalistic desires, and hence, shunned and scorned as a laughing stock by Al-Jazeera (Jung, 1981; Hynes, 1993; Hyde, 1998; Lule, 2001; Garry and El-Shamy, 2017). As put by Lule (2001):

*News too often tells stories of crude, contemptible people, governed by seemingly animal instincts, who bring ridicule and destruction on themselves. In some stories, stupid criminals, dumb and dangerous athletes, hapless hit men, classless and crude rich people are offered up in the news as objects for mockery and contempt.*

(Lule, 2001, p. 24)

Radin (1956) provides yet another complex, albeit inclusive description of the mythic archetype of the Trickster possessing a number of traits:

*Manifestly we are here in the presence of a figure and a theme or themes which have had a special and permanent appeal and an unusual attraction for mankind from the very beginnings of civilization [...] Trickster is at one and the same time creator and destroyer, giver and negator, he who dupes others and who is always duped himself. He wills nothing consciously. At all times he is constrained to behave as he does from impulses over which he has no control. He knows neither good nor evil yet he is responsible for both. He possesses no values, moral or social, is at the mercy of his passions and appetites, yet through his actions all values come into being.*

(Radin, 1956, p. xxiii)

Hyde (1998, p. 7) defines the Trickster as ‘the mythic embodiment of ambiguity and ambivalence, doubleness and duplicity, contradiction, and paradox’. Moreover, he is described as a ‘summation of all the inferior traits of character in individuals’ (Jung 1981, p. 484), which are believed to have hardly deserted the animal level (Jung, 1981).

With all of the above in mind, and for the purpose of this research, the archetypal Trickster is to be explored with respect to its negative and mischievous traits as these appear to be the ones

in line with the narrative of Al-Jazeera. Therefore, the Trickster, as stated by Hathaway (2001, pp. 42-43), is a ‘slippery, selfish, and occasionally evil’ figure. He is a liar, deceiver, cheater, and troublemaker (Hynes, 1993; Hathaway, 2001). In keeping with Hynes (1993, p. 34), the Trickster is also a ‘consummate and continuous trick-player’ who is ‘the prima cause of disruptions and disorders, misfortunes, and improprieties’.

#### **2.3.3.1.5 The archetypal Tyrant (Pharaoh) King**

The Tyrant (Pharaoh) King archetype<sup>4</sup> constitutes a new contribution to the research at hand due to such an image being inductively uncovered thanks to the application of manual analysis. Merged with the Tyrant King (to be also discussed in this section), the incarnations of the evil Pharaoh of the Exodus<sup>5</sup> (in Islamic and Judeo-Christian theologies) are expressed through the image of President Al-Sisi, as intended by Al-Jazeera.

As maintained by Sherif (1985) and Firestone (2004), the Pharaoh archetype is constantly evoked in Islamic discourse as an archetype for autocracy and a symbol of arrogance and evil. Declaring himself as ‘the Lord, Most High’ (Heft *et al.*, 2011, pp. 179-180), the Pharaoh in the Qur’ān represents the archetypal traits of ‘arrogance’, ‘tyranny’, and’, ‘oppression’. As explained by Halverson *et al.* (2011a):

*Calling some leader a "Pharaoh" is enough to establish (or at least imply) that he is a tyrant who deserves the wrath of God, and as we have shown, extremists do just that. It is not necessary to recount the actual details of the Pharaoh and Moses story to make the implication clear to someone who is part of the culture where the master narrative circulates [...] The Pharaoh master narrative presents tyrannical rulers of the community as deserving targets of God's wrath and shows that the actions of vigilant believers can and should help bring about their downfall.*

(Halverson *et al.*, 2011a, pp. 182-185)

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<sup>4</sup> Further definitions and descriptions relating the archetypal Tyrant (Pharaoh) King can be found Chapter 2 (section, 2.3.3.1.5).

<sup>5</sup> More on the Qur’anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses), peace be upon him, and Fir‘awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) can be referred to in the following sources:

- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā' Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).

The scholars also explain that the archetypal Pharaoh:

*is used by Islamist extremists to reflect their struggles against corrupt regimes (internal enemies) and foreign nations (external enemies) they deem to be irreligious. It creates desire to rid the religion of corrupting influences, meaning that it primarily serves the Rebuke goal. By strategically applying this narrative, an analogy is drawn between the Pharaoh and the despised rulers (or foreign enemies) on the one hand, and the Prophet Moses (God's agent) and the extremists on the other. This analogy casts the extremists and their supporters as God's agents who seek to smite the rulers/enemies on God's behalf. Invoking the Pharaoh master narrative argues that the audience should see their own stories as part of the same narrative.*

(Halverson *et al.*, 2011a, p. 192)

As for the archetypal traits of the Tyrant, they are equally attributed to President Al-Sisi. According to Moore and Gillette (1992), the narrative of the Tyrant is centred on the propensity for destruction and tearing down. The authors explain that the Tyrant figures hold themselves as the centre of the universe, around whom everyone and everything must revolve to their will and praise. The Tyrant is also of the strong conviction that he is superior to others. Feeling so gives him an air of over-confidence, self-righteousness, and insolent pride. It also enables the figure to assume godlike omnipotence with which he can demand worship and exercise repression (Moore and Gillette, 1992).

Furthermore, the Tyrant figure manifests in characters who are deluded, narcissist, insecure, ruthless, merciless, self-serving, and devoid of feelings (Moore and Gillette, 1992). In fulfilling his own aspirations, the Tyrant will gladly eradicate any threat to his power and destroy anything and everything standing in the way of achieving his own ends, even if it jeopardises the lives of others (Garry and El-Shamy, 2017; Moore and Gillette, 1992).

Finally, Read *et al.* (1983) also offer another view of the Tyrant, describing such a figure through his insolent pride and his inclinations to the use of terror over wisdom or understanding, something which will eventually guarantee his downfall, as argued by the scholars.

#### **2.3.4 Myth and language: 'Myth is a type of speech' (Barthes, 1972, p. 110)**

Demonstrating the connection between myth and language can be explained by firstly understanding that myth is part of language and semiotics, and secondly, it can be primarily

uncovered through the study of language (and, for that matter, the language of the news). It must be understood that myth, first and foremost, is a type of speech (Barthes, 1972, p. 110), a system of communication that is evoked to convey a message or meaning, be it a spoken or written text, an image, a design, etc. As far as Barthes is concerned, every cultural product is bound to have a meaning, and such meaning is conditioned by ideology or myth. Therefore, any cultural product is liable to mythological analysis and review (Barthes, 1972). However, Barthes stresses that myth (which is to him a form of signification) is of a different form than ordinary speech and language:

*We shall therefore take language, discourse, speech, etc., to mean any significant unit or synthesis, whether verbal or visual: a photograph will be a kind of speech for us in the same way as a newspaper article; even objects will become speech, if they mean something. This generic way of conceiving language is in fact justified by the very history of writing: long before the invention of our alphabet, objects like the Inca quipu, or drawings, as in pictographs, have been accepted as speech. This does not mean that one must treat mythical speech like language; myth in fact belongs to the province of a general science, coextensive with linguistics, which is semiology*

(Barthes, 1972, p. 133).

Barthes endorses De-Saussure's discussion with regards to the nature of the linguistic sign. Therefore, he classifies myth as a second class of signification. As maintained by De-Saussure 'who worked on a particular but methodologically exemplary semiological system - the language or langue - the signified is the concept, the signifier is the acoustic image (which is mental), and the relation between concept and image is the sign (the word, for instance), which is a concrete entity' (Barthes, 1972, p. 112). In other words, myth, as Barthes understands it, is a world of second class signification which could be viewed as a cultural association, so as to be distinguished from denotation (Barthes, 1972).

Myth can be best studied through language, as it takes the shape of words and, for that matter, the words of news; such words are not to be underestimated due to the large social implications they could have, as Lule (2001) explains. Lule suggests that there is no better way of studying news other than immediately examining articles themselves as illustrations of myth, and hence, the chief focus of researchers should be placed on words and the language of news. Lule (2001, p. 5) stresses the significance of paying careful heed to what news tends to say, remarking that the 'language of the news is what matters'. It is his advice for researchers, readers, and even journalists to pay more attention to the words of the news as to entirely comprehend 'what is

being said' and probe all of its possible meanings and implications. Lule also asserts that more scrutiny and analysis needs to be paid to the study of myth through language (Lule, 2001, p. 5).

### **2.3.5 Aesthetics of mythological storytelling: what about it?**

Throughout history, a key objective of journalistic storytelling has been seen to reside in success at immersing the audience in real-world events and situations, exciting them on both intellectual and emotional levels. In their pursuit to entice and captivate the audience's attention and engage them personally, journalists are known to have been employing literary techniques in their own writings.

Moreover, journalists draw on storytelling practices that range from 'the use of an anecdotal lead in a news report to the crafting of full-blown stories that closely resemble literary fiction' (Van Krieken, 2018, pp. 1 - 2).

Such literary practices, as explained by Hoogland (2004), lie within the general field of aesthetics, which is:

*a field of practice that values imaginative, sensory, and emotional experience for the intellectual thoughts, connections, and expressions that such experience enables*

(Hoogland, 2004, pp. 43 - 44)

Literary journalism, as seen by Hartsock (2016), holds the value of narrative or storytelling, and hence, offers a particular aesthetics of experience. In simple words, aesthetic experience concerns itself with the perception, appreciation, and production of art, and more particularly, with emotions experienced as a result of engagement with a given artistic creation, as seen in narrative. Such emotions are said to be akin to those felt in real life and range between positive feelings (such as pleasure, surprise, and pride) and others that are negative (such as suffering, empathy, anger, disgust, etc.). It also includes emotions, according to Marković (2012), that are associated with self-consciousness (as in the feeling of shame, guilt, regret, etc.), as well as cognitive ones (such as confusion).

As far as this research is concerned, the artistic activity of aesthetics is of central importance to the mythical archetypes<sup>6</sup>, which is a theory outlined by Jung (1981) and drawn on heavily by

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<sup>6</sup> A note on the concept: Archetypes are universal patterns that are deep-rooted in humans' collective unconscious. Exhibiting intrinsic tendencies of how the human mind conceptualises the physical world, archetypes can manifest in various forms of narratives, as symbolic and mythic content. Today, the theory of the archetypes is employed by researchers in analysis of modern discourses, such as that those of news media.

Joseph Campbell in (1949; 1959; 1988a; 1990; 2008) and Jack Lule in (Lule, 2001) – whose both ideas along with Jung himself are of particular contribution to the adopted DMA framework. According to Potash (2015), archetypes link to aesthetics as they connect personal experiences to the collective through ‘framing viewers’ responses within comprehensible patterns’ (Potash, 2015, p. 139). He adds that archetypes help in activating the sense of engagement with art and provide it with vitality through emotional awareness that is enhanced by imagination.

In highlighting the aesthetic quality of archetypes, Stalker-Firth (2017) suggests the following:

*They (archetypes) bring energy based on the story patterns we know from when us humans first started telling stories. They are ritualistic and encourage the reader to infuse the narrative with their own emotions. Archetypes can arouse fears and anxieties or yearnings and desires.*

(Stalker-Firth, 2017)

On the relationship between archetypes and emotions and how the latter is experienced through the former, Jung *et al.* (1964, p. 97) state that archetypes ‘are the pieces of life itself—images that are integrally connected to the living individual by the bridge of the emotions’.

Joseph Campbell, whose theories on mythical archetypes are drawn on by Kelsey in informing his DMA framework (Kelsey, 2015c; Kelsey, 2017a), as well as by Lule (2001), has addressed the aesthetic qualities of myths in (Campbell, 1949; Campbell, 1988a; Campbell and Moyers, 2011); particularly, in what he refers to as the “the aesthetic arrest” and “aesthetic experience”, in which he describes what people perceive as beautiful and captivating.

Based on the theory of archetypes outlined by Jung (Jung, 1981), Campbell, in his concepts of the hero’s journey and archetypal symbols (Campbell, 1949) identifies the basic structure of archetypal experience as existing in all sorts of myths hailing from various cultures in human history (Chang *et al.*, 2013).

Moreover, as argued by Chang *et al.* (2013, p. 205), archetypal symbolism as ‘components of the deepest level of knowledge for cognition, the collective unconsciousness, defining the basic structure of the life-world’ is a crucial resource of aesthetic experience and pushes for a new a direction in the study of memory and emotion.

## 2.4 Why study Al-Jazeera?

The following section is dedicated to presenting a rationale behind the need for choosing Al-Jazeera for this investigation. However, a brief background about the network's inception, highlighting the difference between its Arabic and English language versions, is worth presenting.

### 2.4.1 Al-Jazeera Media Network (AJMN)

Al-Jazeera is a Qatari-based state-funded broadcaster, which is argued by a number of researchers to have been playing a major role in revolutionising the Arab media, attracting regional and international attention. Since its establishment in 1996, Al-Jazeera has been the centre of attention by academics (Lynch, 2006), policy makers, and journalists. There was a claim made by a number of researchers (Hafez, 2008, p. 330) that Al-Jazeera has been exercising a level of independence that is arguably "higher" than other Arab news networks, something that has even made researchers go as far as declaring it as the "*The CNN of the Arab World*" (Abunimah and Ibish, 2001). As far as various surveys and reports are concerned (Alhumaidi, 2013b), Al-Jazeera is said to be the first news network in the Arab world to have been providing uncensored 24-hour news feeds. With the passage of time, Al-Jazeera's news services have been fed to viewers all around the world, thanks to their foreign offices, which are believed to be more than those of other Arab television networks (Elmasry *et al.*, 2013, p. 751). Thanks to the wide-reaching advent of the internet, emerging from the technological revolution of the 1990s, the vast majority of traditional media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, were meant to have their own websites from which they could deliver the news online (Severin and Tankard, 2010). Since the inception of Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA) in 1996, its website was set to launch in 2001, with the English-language website (AJE) following suit in 2006 (Satti, 2020).

The environment within which Al-Jazeera started to operate was regarded as a nascent pan-Arab media. Back then, Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA) had established a new brand in journalism which centred on a confrontational editorial line, challenging and provoking most of the Arab countries, and a few years later, the U.S. and other Western governments (Kraidy, 2008, p. 23). Al-Jazeera English (AJE), meanwhile, was launched in 2006 with the aim of finding a strong position within the global English-language news market, hiring journalists and experts who previously worked at large news networks such as the BBC and CNN (Abdulmajid and Herring, 2008; Kraidy, 2008). According to scholars, the declared goals of AJE are said to be centred on



confronting the Western hegemony over news production and bridging the communication gap between the Western and the Arab societies (Khamis, 2007; Naomi, 2007; Al-Najjar, 2009). Indeed, both AJA and AJE channels have different codes of practice and different editorial policies. As stated by Barkho (2021):

*The two channels have separate editorial setups, each with its own managing editor. The managing editors report to a director general who works under the direct supervision of the network's chairman, Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, who is a member of Qatar royal family.*

(Barkho, 2021, p. 1358)

As held by Abdulmajid and Herring (2008) and Kraidy (2008), drawn on by Maziad (2021, p. 1068), Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA) is diametrically different from Al-Jazeera English (AJE) in the sense that the former addresses, mainly the Arab world, whereas the latter pays attention to the English-speaking international audiences 'with their expected sensibilities of established journalistic standard'. In a 2009 interview conducted with the Former Director-General of the network, Waddah Khanfar, the researcher, Maziad (2021), asked him to explain the ways in which the coverage of AJA is believed to be different to that of AJE. As maintained by Khanfar:

*AJA speaks the language of a territory (the Arab world) that has integrity of land; that has continuity of culture; and that has a collective mind. In the English Channel, they are reporting to English-speaking people worldwide. Now all of that kind of diversity does not have a collective mind, does not have anything shared besides the language.*

(Maziad, 2021, p. 1076)

Additionally, in accordance with Maziad (2021), whilst drawing on Samuel-Azran (2013), researchers endeavouring to compare AJA with AJE mostly concur that they are 'different products, with substantially different broadcasting norms' (Maziad, 2021, p. 1076). Maziad (2021) also adds that scholars, such as Abdulmajid and Herring (2008) and Youssef (2009), amongst others, find that AJA appears to be more hostile, for instance, in its coverage of U.S. affairs, as opposed to the filtered version of AJE. As clarified by the abovementioned scholars, while AJE is focused on maintaining its credibility in the West, AJA seems to be mainly interested in advancing Qatar's regional interests in the Middle East (Abdulmajid and Herring, 2008).

On further highlighting the differences between AJA and AJE, Barkho (2021) has more to say about internal guidelines and the use of language adhered by each. According to the researcher, AJA, unlike AJE, does not possess any written guidelines but rather relies on them being transmitted verbally. AJE, meanwhile, ‘has an extensive style guide of more than 20,000 words, but it is only available and accessible for internal use’ (Barkho, 2021, p. 1365). As explained by the former editor and head of the quality unit of AJA, Aref Hajjawi, in an interview conducted by Barkho (2021):

*We do not have a style guide. Previously, we had put together a few entries, which were accessible online, but they were deleted later. We rely on the editor-in-chief’s reading of content, which occurs at least 24 hours after its publication (on air and online). The editor sends out occasionally a few comments to staff about what is preferable and not preferable and what not to say next time [...] We use “commando operations” instead of “suicide bombing” which Western media and AJE employ. We feel the phrase “suicide bombing” is biased, expressing merely a Western viewpoint [...] Take the word “terrorist.” The BBC generally shuns the word unless attributed, but it employs it to refer to “terror” acts taking place locally. For Al Jazeera (AJA), the term “locally” is the whole region (the Middle East) and the larger Muslim World (Islamic countries).*

(Barkho, 2021, p. 1365)

In addition, Barkho (2021) notes that AJA’s editorial policies and practices do, indeed, reflect the close integration of the station into the Qatari state’s state operations. Moreover, Hajjawi (the head of the quality unit) suggests that AJA relies on its editorial line being:

*Unwritten and implicit. It is subject to exaggeration and discretion. It is often connected to the wishes and desires of the sponsors and financiers who may even interfere in the selection of a word or phrase. [...] The danger comes when the sponsor uses the broadcaster to achieve his ends. Many editorial decisions originate with the owners of capital. This is dangerous.*

Barkho (2021, p. 1366)

This, in turn, fuels AJA's staff to turn to 'expressive and eloquent language regardless of it being neutral or objective' (Barkho, 2021, p. 1372). On this aspect, Hajjawi explains:

*A correspondent or reporter who is well versed and fluent in Arabic, is skilful in the use of expressive terms always has an edge in Al Jazeera over a counterpart who pays great attention to impartiality and objectivity over eloquence [...] Eloquence of style is a barometer of excellence.*

(Barkho, 2021, p. 1364)

Due to the implicit impact of AJA's editorial lines, as maintained by Hajjawi, 'correspondents become part of the story and take sides in their reports. So do anchors and presenters' (Barkho, 2021, p. 1366). In another interview, such an observation is upheld by the former editor-in-chief, and presently, the consultant of AJA, Ahmad Al-Sheikh. According to Al-Sheikh, AJA's presenters, correspondents, and anchors tend to become part of the story they cover. In addition, they draw on 'mannerisms to drive their message home' (Barkho, 2021, p. 1368). As suggested by Al-Sheikh:

*We had reporters, anchors and presenters citing verses from the Holy Koran during news bulletins when former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned. They employed proverbs and verses from Hadeeth (sayings of the prophet) and the holy Koran, for instance, to disparage Bashar al-Assad. There has been so much reliance on heritage, religion, sectarianism and history in interpreting present communicative events. These are mannerisms. They are destructive to journalism.*

(Barkho, 2021, p. 1368)

In another interview conducted by Barkho (2021) with the acting managing editor of AJE Giles Trendle, the latter remarks that AJA is more impressionistic than AJE. As added by Trendle, this reflects its discourse and output (Barkho, 2021, p. 1369). He also remarks that some of the documentaries produced by AJA 'are written in a more poetic way, the circular logic, taking a wide view before moving to a central point' (Barkho, 2021, p. 1369). Moreover, Trendle mentions that 'the logic tends to be more circular (in Arabic), whereas, in the western sense, it is more linear' (Barkho, 2021, p. 1369).

Meanwhile, as suggested by the aforementioned researcher, AJE has created its own written internal guidelines with the objective of producing a less impressionistic and more neutral account of events. Such guidelines do clearly instruct what to say and what not to say

concerning ‘recurring controversial issues, the Middle East and sensitive language’ (Barkho, 2021, p. 1372). Unlike AJA, the researcher explains that internal guidelines of AJE are characterised by the use of normative language, particularly as to what concerns sensitive topics of the Middle East. These guidelines contain ‘imperative structures and obligation expressions dominating the style. Descriptive language is the characteristic of other sections’ (Barkho, 2021, p. 1372). Unlike its Arabic sister, AJE answers to external regulators which operate within the limits of legislative acts of Western countries, namely the United States and the United Kingdom. For example, AJE, since it also broadcasts from the UK, ‘is compelled to function within the power and duties set in the parliamentary acts, which are strictly adhered to by Ofcom<sup>7</sup>’ (Barkho, 2021, p. 1371).

On a different but relevant note, AJE ‘is not simply translation’, says Giles Trendle (the acting managing editor of AJE); ‘You are almost creatively producing a new product, but keeping the substance the same’ (Barkho, 2021, p. 1370). According to Zayani (2008, cited in Meltzer, 2013, p. 663), Al-Jazeera International ‘has been emphasizing that it is not a translation or an English version of the original Arabic news channel’.

Now, whilst recognising the fact that Al-Jazeera represents a breakthrough in the evolution of Arab media, as suggested by Sakr (1999), there has been room for mysterious controversy over its reputation, which can be seen in, for instance, on whether or not it is acting as a stalking horse, serving certain Islamist agendas (Seib, 2008).

For instance, and as seen in some of its Arabic programmes, Cherribi (2006, p. 121) observes that Al-Jazeera appears to be dedicating a great deal of its time to promote ‘the views of Islamic religious leaders’ as well as “Islamic practices”. He adds that this makes Al-Jazeera acting much more like the CBN (Christian Broadcasting Network) rather than an Arab CNN. For that reason, according to Cherribi (2006), Al-Jazeera can be regarded as neither liberal nor neutral, but rather a religious channel that is propagating mono-denominational religion-related messages on a more or less daily basis, despite the fact that it sometimes appears as though it adopts a pluralist approach in its broadcasting and allowing the occasional viewing of programmes which could classify as “liberal” or “neutral”.

Furthermore, in a study conducted by Dabbous-Sensenig (2006), the researcher came to conclude that Al-Jazeera is believed to be reflecting an element of hypocrisy that goes against

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<sup>7</sup> The Office of Communications, commonly known as “Ofcom”, is the government-approved regulatory and competition authority for the broadcasting, telecommunications, and postal industries of the United Kingdom: Ofcom (no date) [Website]. Available at: <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/home> (Accessed: 29th September, 2021).

the channel's famous moto 'Opinion and Another Opinion'. This is seen in one of Al-Jazeera's programmes, known as "*Al-Sharia wal-Hayat*" (Sharia and Life), which, as viewed by Dabbous-Sensenig (2006), appears to be promoting messages which are nothing like the above moto, but rather the "opinion and the same opinion". She mentions that the diversity in which Al-Jazeera is said to be revering and celebrating has no mention whatsoever in the channels' religious shows, which only continue to propagate an 'Orthodox' type of Islamist discourse.

#### **2.4.2 Al-Jazeera and MB in cahoots**

In his criticism of the relationship between the MB party and Al-Jazeera channel, Al-Qassemi (2012) explains that the love affair between the two has been obvious since the channel's early beginnings. He points out that the channel's chief religious programme's guest, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī (Yusuf Al-Qaradawi)<sup>8</sup>, has always been a member of the MB, residing in Qatar and holding Qatari citizenship. As far as Al-Qassemi (2012) is concerned, this relationship between Al-Jazeera and the MB is believed to be mutually advantageous.

Owing to Al-Jazeera's obvious bias toward the MB, the channel has come to host a number of MB's most powerful political actors in Egypt. For instance, the channel has once hosted Khairat Al-Shater, the deputy supreme guide of the MB, on various occasions.

The channel's star anchor, Ahmed Mansour, who is also known to be a member of the MB himself, was given the opportunity to conduct numerous interviews with Mohammed Badie (the Supreme guide) and Mohammed Morsi, the former president himself. According to Al-Qassemi (2012), the MB 'appreciates this relationship and even bizarrely extends official congratulations and "support" to Al-Jazeera on significant occasions'. Furthermore, Al-Jazeera's endorsement of the MB was denounced, according to Kessler (2012), by non-other than the renowned American scientist and cofounder of the Daniel Pearl Dialogue for Muslim-Jewish Understanding, Judea Pearl. As maintained by Pearl, cited in Kessler (2012, p. 53), 'I have no doubt that, today, Al Jazeera is the most powerful voice of the Muslim Brotherhood'. Kessler (2012) remarks that the channel's agenda was put "more plainly" by Pearl (2012, p. 53).

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<sup>8</sup> More background information about Al-Qaradawi can be referred to in the following sources:

- Roxanne, L.E. and Muhammad Qasim, Z. (2021) 'Princeton readings in Islamist thought', in Roxanne, L.E. and Muhammad Qasim, Z. (eds.) *Chapter 9 Yusuf al-Qaradawi*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 224-246.
- Obaid, N. (2020) *The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world*. California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO.

Indeed, Al-Jazeera has always been at the forefront of supporting the MB and the push for more “Ikhwanisation” (Bortherhoodisation) of societies, which calls for infiltrating the states with MB members or sympathisers. As seen by Obaid (2020), whilst drawing on from *The New York Times*:

*Supporting this Ikhwanistan is the leading Arab news outlet, Doha-based Al-Jazeera. The state-owned network has long provided a global platform for Al-Qaradawi and other MB leaders [...] Following Morsi's overthrow, Qatar allowed Egyptian MB leaders to regroup in Doha. Al-Jazeera put them up in a five-star hotel and gave them airtime to promote their cause. Around the same time, twenty-two Al-Jazeera journalists resigned en masse, “citing what they said was the station's biased coverage of the Brotherhood”, according to The New York Times*

(Obaid, 2020, p. 150)

In demonstration to further links between the Al-Jazeera channel and MB, Mellor and Rinnawi (2016) conducted a case study in which they drew on the views and opinions of a number of AJA's chief anchors and presenters, pertaining to their relationship with the MB and their evaluation on the coverage of MB, following the removal of Morsi from power in 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, 2013. These views and opinions were positioned in the context of Islamic ethics (which are, according to these professionals, compatible with those Anglo-American principles that call for objectivity and impartiality) and help in explaining the positions taken by those journalists regarding the coverage of the MB. In doing so, cultural analysis was carried out. According to Zelizer (2004, cited in Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016, p. 272), such analysis helps in shedding light on the manners in which journalists were seen to be acting as ‘producers of culture, who impart preference statements about what is good and bad, moral and amoral, and appropriate and inappropriate in the world’.

The researchers concluded the following findings:

*For the majority of Al Jazeera journalists, the MB are the victims, and therefore it is the channel's moral duty to defend the MB's rights against injustice as they are the ‘voice’ of the ‘voiceless’, the ‘oppressed’ and the ‘weak’. Such an issue is widely contested and Al Jazeera Arabic has chosen to stand on one side against the other, which lost the channel at least those viewers who are supporting the military role rather than the MB.*

(Mellor and Rinnawi, 2016, p. 276)

They also add that some journalists criticise the military on a regular basis, such as Ahmed Mansour and therefore, position themselves, as well as the channel, on the side of the MB.

Moreover, and in another example demonstrating Al-Jazeera's support of the MB, such pro-MB biases have been systematically extended to social platforms, such as Facebook. For instance, according to Al-Rawi (2020), the content of Al Jazeera's Facebook page appears to have demonstrated a high percentage of pro-Morsi sentiments, thanks to audience-selective exposure and ideological selectivity. Hence, such users who tend to often express pro-Morsi support are more likely expected to choose the news stories of Al Jazeera, as well as its Facebook page as a platform throughout which they could express their own beliefs (Al-Rawi, 2020). What is worth noting, as believed by Al-Rawi (2020), is that the existing political situation in Egypt appears to be written and talked about on Al Jazeera's Facebook page more frequently than the repercussions of the civil war taking place in Syria and in spite of the frightful humanitarian state of affairs in the latter country (Al-Rawi, 2020).

The researcher also adds that such content bias on the part of Al Jazeera's Facebook page appears to appeal more to Egyptian apologists and sympathisers of the MB than any other news outlet. What is more, and based on the observations made by Fandy (2007) and Rizk (2016), pertaining to the political and ideological influences behind Al-Jazeera, the researchers suggest that Al-Jazeera's pro-MB content appears to be propagated and dictated by the Qatari state, as well as the news channel's affiliations with the MB.

### **2.4.3 Why analyse news sites?**

This section will rationalise the researcher's choice for choosing to analyse news sites, as opposed to other traditional delivery means for news (e.g., print news) and what importance this constitutes in terms of CDA research.

*It is certainly striking to observe how frequently the notion of a 'tipping point' (together with variations such as 'milestone', 'watershed' or 'breakthrough') informs current debates about online news.*

(Allan, 2006, p. 1)

The adoption of the internet nowadays as a tool for news gathering is undeniably universal, as it is believed to be one of the world's single largest sources of information (Cassidy, 2007; Quinn and Lamble, 2008). Thanks to years of rapid technological advancement, the distribution of online news today has become a recognised feature of media in many countries around the

world, and their reach has been increasingly growing (Jankowski and Van Selm, 2000; De Waal and Schoenbach, 2010). As stated by Trench and Quinn (2016), one of the latest in a series of technological shifts that have hit the world of journalism was the move toward online publishing.

The shift towards publishing online news sites has been applauded for a variety of reasons, pertaining chiefly to the diversity of contents they can offer, speed (real-time updates), and the fact of enabling users to enjoy a higher level of autonomy in accessing the information they desire; something print newspapers have failed to achieve. According to Negroponte (1996), in this era, people are no longer obliged to read what they think is news and what other people justify to be worthy of the space it occupies (in his reference to newspapers); being digital instead, will cause the economic model of news selection to change and hence, will provide people with the opportunity to read what they are interested in. He continues:

*Imagine a future in which your interface agent can read every newswire and newspaper and catch every TV and radio broadcast on the planet, and then construct a personalized summary. This kind of newspaper is printed in an edition of one.*

(Negroponte, 1996, p. 153)

Moreover, the recognised news commentator and author, Jon Katz, after having been insistently asked on a discussion-based ‘community’ website on whether or not he believes newspaper deserves to die, posted the following:

*All over the information spectrum, media audiences are fragmented, drawn to the timeliness, convenience and immediacy of cable news, and the Net and the Web [...] As the Net and Web spawn ferocious and idiosyncratic commentary, democratizing opinion all over the country, newspapers cling to stuffy and elitist op-ed pages, where opinion is generally confined to a “left” and “right” and voice usually given to elite claques of pundits, academics, authors and chief executives.*

(Digital media, 2000, para(s). 3 - 5)

Moreover, the speed of news transmission and the shorter intervals between publications are substantial aspects that count towards news websites having dominance over other media, particularly print newspapers (Bødker, 2015). What is described as a significant development with regards to news, according to Bødker (2015), is seen particularly, in the diminishing intervals between news publications; from being published annually to being published



quarterly, and then, on a monthly basis to every fortnight, every week, several days a week, every day, every hour, and-now, with many news websites, to every other minute. The monopoly that newspapers used to have over time has been challenged by other forms of media and, most recently, the internet (Bødker, 2015).

Other important features that make news websites gain more dominance over other forms of media are understood to be in accumulation, searchability, and commentary. An example of accumulation is seen when news reports are being accompanied by, or sometimes include links that lead to former and otherwise relevant stories. Searchability refers to the ability to make users able to scan through the web, or alternatively, search only through the text of a given online publication.

Such a feature enables the filtration of news reports in accordance with certain terms. Adding comments is yet another significant feature and is understood as a form of content production, whereby the audience expresses its reaction to the news articles read or comments left by other users (Bødker, 2015).

#### ***2.4.3.1 Where does CDA stand from this?***

In short, the above sections include some of the reasons as to why the researcher believes analysing the content of news sites is worth conducting. However, it is important to point out why the analysis of the news websites could also be of interest to CDA research. According to KhosraviNik and Unger (2016), although large media institutions are still representing significant concentrations of power at both economic and political levels, and for this reason, still exercise influence over society, ‘print newspapers are haemorrhaging readers, and their circulation is on the decline’ (2016, p. 206). In the meantime, as explained by KhosraviNik and Unger (2016), the use of newspaper websites is flourishing, encouraging the need for subjecting digitally mediated linguistic data under CDA scrutiny. The aforementioned researchers state the following:

*The elephant in the room is that, with the increasing availability and growth of digitally mediated linguistic data and the impact of social media in various aspects of social, political and economic processes, a socially oriented critical approach such as CDS cannot remain oblivious to these changes in norms of production and dissemination of social discourses.*

(KhosraviNik and Unger, 2016, p. 206)

## 2.5 The Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

In choosing the MB as a particular case for the study, understanding who they are, their aspirations, how they evolved into a major political force, and their rise and fall is worthy of discussion.

The group was founded in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, a schoolteacher and a man who was known for his disapproval of adopting the secular and democratic model of governing, similar to that of Western countries. Yet, he wanted his MB party to promote social welfare and exercise the very political activism of which teachings come from the west, whilst at the same time remaining committed to his main goal: calling for the Islamisation of societies (Zachary, 2014). Indeed, the MB chiefly aims at instilling the Qur'ān and the Sunnah<sup>9</sup> as the only one reference point for organising the life of individuals and communities, and most importantly, the state (Kull, 2011).

In their endeavour to fulfil their aspirations, 'like no other indigenous popular movement has ever done in Egypt's history', the MB is known for resorting to 'peaceful or violent means; and often, a mixture of both' (Ibrahim, 1988, p. 640). On the use of violence, it is worth pointing out that such ideology was not officially endorsed by mainstream MB, was not officially sanctioned by its moderate leaders, and also, the founder of MB, Hassan Al-Banna, was ambivalent about it. Radicalisation started to become associated with MB in the early 1940s, which was the initial peak of the group's popularity when the group had a split between the traditional mainstream, who were not in favour of it, and those who wanted to enact "Jihad"<sup>10</sup> (armed struggle) as "a neglected duty". A duty that is seen by the MB as vital to the establishment of an Islamic state and one that is imperative upon all Muslims so as to bring down the rule of those who do not govern by Sharia law in Muslim lands. In fulfilling this, as a means of protecting the leaders of the MB and furthering the group's aspirations for dominance, a paramilitary wing, known as the "Secret Apparatus" was created to literary enact and interpret the MB's famous slogan on the ground, "Jihad is our way". Moreover, the MB is

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<sup>9</sup> In Islam, the Qur'ān "القرآن" is recognised as the literal Word of Allāh (Allah/God) "الله", may he be glorified and exalted, which was revealed by Angel Jibrīl "جبريل" (Gabriel) to Prophet Muḥammad "محمد", peace be upon him. The Sunnah "السنة", meanwhile, is defined as the orally transmitted record of everything which was either said, done, approved, or disapproved by Prophet Muḥammad during his lifetime.

Mahdi, M.S., Schimmel, A. and Rahman, F. (1999) 'Islam', in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islam> (Accessed: 20th August, 2020).

<sup>10</sup> Al-Jihād is a term that comes with multiple meanings in Islam. One of which is the armed struggle against the unbelievers and enemies of region. More on the term can be referred to in the following source:

Afsaruddin, A. (2020) 'Jihad', in *ibid.* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/jihad> (Accessed: 8th August, 2021).

known to have been fuelled by none other than the teachings and influence of Sayyid Qutb, a well-known chief articulator of radical Islamism, who is known for justifying the use of violence as a means of bringing about Islamic states and whose ideas were of key influence in the creation of al Qaeda (Kull, 2011, p. 167).

Indeed, Qutb came up with a very detailed set of notions, which calls for the use of jihad, as opposed to peaceful measures, for expressing opposition against the government (Stilt, 2010; Zahid, 2010; Brekke, 2011; Ardovini, 2015).

Decades after its advent, the MB has emerged as one of the major and most influential Islamist groups in the Arab world and the most successful internationally (Rubin, 2010; Gause, 2011). Generally speaking, the success of MB, according to Rubin (2010, pp. 1 - 3), is seen in them being arguably the largest and 'the first modern Islamist group' to have been established in and outside Egypt.

Furthermore, the MB's adoption of "clever" tactics and strategies in fulfilling their goals and aspirations, being adjusted to any given circumstance they faced, is another point that counts to their success. For instance, as stated earlier, they are known for recognising the times when violence is deemed reckless or otherwise necessary, and whether or not resorting to peaceful measures is seen as a better-off option. Even though the rule of MB is expected to bring tragedy and ruin to the community they aspire to govern, Rubin (2010) suggests that what makes them the group with the brightest future, as opposed to other Islamist groups, is that they are known for displaying more stamina and better organisational skills, which makes them a formidable political actor. This can be seen, for instance, in their manoeuvring skills, their successful recruitment of both electoral and violent strategies, and their ability to patiently build bases of support and continue to pose as a moderate party. The MB has enjoyed a long and rich history of activism in Egypt, exercised at both political and cultural levels (Létourneau, 2016). Accordingly, the party

*has spread 'chapters' of its organization in multiple Arab states and elsewhere. The movement had for some time already attracted the interest of scholars, particularly since the 1980s, when the so-called Islamist revival in Muslim countries was accompanied by the increasing cultural influence of Islamist movements and the apparent marginality, in these same countries, of movements calling for secular democracy.*

(Létourneau, 2016, p. 300)

Indeed, the MB (Osman, 2016) has significantly grown into a large and very influential network from the 1930s up to the 1940s, with its existence travelling beyond Egypt as in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, inspiring and supporting other Islamist organisations elsewhere (Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005; Kull, 2011). During such a period, the party, due to becoming significantly large and influential in Egypt, has been approached by many politicians, presidents, and monarchs (e.g., Farouk of Egypt), seeking their cooperation and support. However, as much as the group enjoyed building coalitions with other political parties, they are also known to have attacked others whose interests and aspirations are different to theirs (Osman, 2016). As mentioned before, It is important to note that since the 1940s, the group was known to have founded a secretive armed division targeting political opponents, something which was practised throughout the days of monarchies and revolutions in Egypt (Ibrahim, 1988).

During the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, the fourth President of Egypt from 1981 to 2011, Létourneau (2016, p. 302), whilst calling on Wickham (2002), describes that:

*the shifts in the Brotherhood's political rhetoric in the Mubarak years towards the acceptance of democracy and the idea of a civil state (whilst simultaneously calling for the application of Sharia law) is the result of both a wilful strategic adaptation and a genuine ideational evolution in some reform-inclined members. This resulted in the Brotherhood adopting a more democratic-friendly discourse and accepting the idea of procedural democracy at the state level while its internal structure remained paradoxically averse to democratic reforms.*

(Létourneau, 2016, p. 302)

Moreover, for strategic reasons and based on previous experience in prisons, the leaders of the group were trying their hardest to circumvent any potential confrontations with the regime, nor engage much in politics. Nonetheless, younger members, as stated earlier, were not on the same page with the leadership (Létourneau, 2016).

Following Hosni Mubarak's decision to step down in 2011 as the 4<sup>th</sup> President of Egypt, the MB appeared once more as an influential political power in Egypt. In June 2012, Mohammed Morsi, the Chairman of the MB's Freedom and Justice Party, won the presidential election and took on the presidency. However, a new round of mass protests against Morsi and his party were sparked in Egypt. Millions of protesters gushed into the streets on the 30<sup>th</sup> of June, 2013, demanding Morsi's resignation on grounds to do with monopolising power, exceeding authority, failing to keep order, and reviving the economy. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 2013, Morsi was

removed from power and taken into custody by the army, under the command of General Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi, who later appointed Ādlī Mansūr (Adly Mansour), as the interim president of the country. On the 8<sup>th</sup> of June, 2014, Al-Sisi himself took over from Mansour and was officially sworn in as the fifth president of the country and remained in power until presently (Fayed and Saleh, 2013; Wedeman *et al.*, 2013; Kingsley and Abdo, 2014; Zachary, 2014).

The MB is said to have had plans to overtake the country by force following their removal from power. According to Obaid (2020, p. 64), the plan dictated the need to make confrontations with both demonstrators and government forces.

The plan instructed, for instance, that the Deputy Supreme Guide of the MB, Mahmoud Izzat<sup>11</sup> should prepare the Islamic forces in order to liquidate the military checkpoints along the way leading to Cairo using medium and heavy weapons whilst sending other groups to stop the protesters by force. The plan also entailed the establishment of a subgroup under the command of Guidance Bureau Member Muhammad Kamal<sup>12</sup>. Such a subgroup was meant to stop the flow of protesters by targeting the roads leading to Tahrir Square. It was also tasked with placing mines inside the Al-Sadat metro station through the tunnels in order to have them all explode whenever needed (Obaid, 2020).

Other violent actions following the MB removal can be seen in the creation of other militant groups affiliated with the MB, of which task was weakening and exhausting the anti-MB establishment. For instance, the establishment of “special operations committees” under the oversight of the MB member, Muhammad Kamal, who gave the go-ahead to launch violent actions in early 2014 with the purpose of disorienting and attriting the government (Awad, 2016; Awad, 2017), was one of many. At the beginning of 2015, Muhammad Kamal created the Revolutionary Punishment (RP), which is a splinter group that was ordained to carry out various violent activities. RP was responsible for launching 150 armed attacks on officers and checkpoints. Within the same year, another terrorist group by the name “Hassm” emerged and

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<sup>11</sup> More background information about Izzat can be referred to in the following sources:

- Trager, E. (2012) *Who's Who in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/whos-who-egypts-muslim-brotherhood> (Accessed: 13th August, 2021).
- Obaid, N. (2020) *The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world*. California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO.

<sup>12</sup> More background information about Muhammad Kamal can be referred to in the following sources:

- Hamama, M. (2017) 'An internal review of the Muslim Brotherhood: Reform, militancy or politics?', *Mada*. Available at: <https://www.madamasr.com/en/2017/03/22/feature/politics/an-internal-review-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-reform-militancy-or-politics/> (Accessed: 13th August, 2021).
- Obaid, N. (2020) *The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world*. California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO.

unleashed a series of violent attacks throughout the country. Hassm is suspected to be strongly connected to the MB owing to its cadres and ideology being quite similar to those of the Brotherhood. Moreover, the group appears to have come about as a successor to the former RP (Awad, 2016; Awad, 2017).

The inclination of MB to commit acts of violence is even clearly articulated in a statement published by “The Sharia Committee of the Muslim Brotherhood”, as cited by (Awad, 2017). The statement reads as follows:

*the “putschists,” meaning the post-coup Egyptian regime, are worse than the Khawarij—a despised early Muslim sect—and were worse than seditionists, as they pose a grave danger to the Ummah, or global Muslim community. They should therefore be treated as “aggressors”. The Sharia ruling against the regime is “the necessity of resistance, in all of its forms and types.” The “resistance” ranges from “disabling” to “an equilibrium in fear and terror,” to “confrontation and Hassm [decisiveness].*

(Awad, 2017, pp. 14 - 15)

## **2.6 Traditional CDA approaches and the emergence of DMA**

In this section, I will present the traditionally known approaches to critical discourse studies. Kelsey’s (2015c) Discourse-Mythological Approach (DMA), which is the one employed in the current research, will also be touched on as to the ways it is singled out from other traditional frameworks in its attempt to address mythology. Additionally, there will be a discussion regarding how such major CDA approaches have been central to the development of the DMA, especially since the latter is structured around Fairclough’s model (Fairclough, 1995a) and integrates analytical apparatuses which account for macro- and micro-levels of discourse, elaborated by Van Dijk (1998) and Wodak (2008). That said, extensive discussion on the DMA, will not be presented in this chapter, as this will be later explored in the methodology chapter.

Traditionally, major CDA frameworks are primarily found in the work of the following key figures: Norman Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1993; 1995a; 1995b; 1999a; 2001b; Fairclough, 2001a; 2003; 2006; 2010), Ruth Wodak (1995; 1996) and Teun Von Dijk (Van Dijk, 1988b; Van Dijk, 1993; van Dijk, 1997b), all of whom have their approaches compiled and updated in (Wodak and Meyer, 2016).

### **2.6.1 A dialectical-relational approach (DRA)**

Fairclough, to start with, has theorised what he refers to as *a dialectical-relation approach (DRA)* in (1989; 1992; 1993; 1995a; 1995b; 1999a; 2001b; 2003; 2006; 2010) and it was revisited in (Wodak and Meyer, 2016).

Such framework is drawn from concepts that were originally postulated by Foucault (1972), Hoare and Smith (1971), and Habermas (1984), such as “discourse”, “hegemony”, and “colonisation of discourse”. The DRA is said to offer a thorough and systemic way of analysis, linking discourse, power, and social structures together, and hence, discourse is perceived as a multi-dimensional concept. In that manner, DRA seeks to relate the discursive to the extra-discursive through examining discourse on three layers. These layers are 1) texts, the objects of linguistic investigation, 2) discursive practice, how texts are produced, distributed, and consumed, and 3) social practice, the power dynamics, ideologies, and hegemonic struggles, whereby discourses are reproduced, challenged, or restructured (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999b; Juez, 2009).

### **2.6.2 The socio-cognitive approach (SCA)**

SCA is the second approach to be discussed in this section. Such an approach is created by Van Dijk, another key founder of CDA, along with Fairclough and Wodak (Van Dijk, 2016). Elaborations on such an approach can be found in the literature by Van Dijk (1988b; 1993; 1997b) and recently in (Van Dijk, 2016; Wodak and Meyer, 2016). Generally speaking, SCA:

*is characterized by the Discourse–Cognition Society triangle. Whereas all approaches in CDS study the relations between discourse and society, a sociocognitive approach claims that such relations are cognitively mediated. Discourse structures and social structures are of a different nature, and can only be related through the mental representations of language users as individuals and as social members.*

(Van Dijk, 2016, p. 64).

### **2.6.3 Discourse-historical approach (DHA)**

The third framework, DHA, is an interdisciplinary problem-oriented approach, which was created and elaborated by Professor Ruth Wodak and collaborating colleagues from the University of Vienna (Baker *et al.*, 2008, p. 281). DHA primarily aims to examine how the

discursive practices of several genres change over time. The emphasis is not only placed on the description of discourse in its current state but also on how the discourse has changed and developed over a historical continuum.

Such framework, according to Wodak (2015), encompasses different theoretical and methodological concepts, which are ‘equally valid for other strands in critical discourse studies’, never mind the fact that each may have a toolkit that is different from those of other concepts. Furthermore, DHA is known for paying ‘an interest in identity construction and in unjustified discrimination; a focus on the historical dimensions of discourse formation’ and follows the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 24), which explains why the DHA’s epistemological foundation is unique in both research aim and methodological orientation.

#### **2.6.4 Discourse-mythological approach (DMA)**

Having briefly shed some light on the above traditional approaches, it is time to discuss how Kelsey’s DMA framework (Kelsey, 2015c) is informed, albeit different from all of the above. To begin with, it was Kelsey’s observation that all of the above approaches are appropriate to the examination of mythology and the understanding of the social and ideological role of language in media texts. He found that the CDA can actually ‘provide the technical toolkits necessary for the analytical application of cultural theory’ (Kelsey, 2015c, p. 24). Examples can be found within each of the above-mentioned frameworks (DHA, DRA, and SCA) in which narratives and storytelling are addressed in relation to national identity, collective memory, historiography, institutional discourses, legitimations, macrostructures, interaction and cognition, and conversation analysis (Somers, 1994; Wodak *et al.*, 1994; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Wodak *et al.*, 1999; Viehöver, 2001; Van Leeuwen, 2007; Wodak and Heer, 2008; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Flowerdew, 2012; Bietti, 2014; Souto-Manning, 2014; Van Dijk, 2016; Gavriely-Nuri, 2017; Rheindorf and Wodak, 2017; Stibbe, 2017). However, Kelsey (2015c) believes, after having conducted a study on the mythological construction of City Bankers (Kelsey, 2014) and before proposing the DMA as a new critical discourse study, that there is a need to have a neutral approach to ideology that is compatible with frameworks of mythology and whereby, discourse, mythology, and ideology can be accounted for as three overlapping, yet distinctly different terms, something that CDA approaches have not considered doing so before. Different to renowned tradition in which CDA ‘takes explicit socio-political positions’ in directly challenging problems in social relations’ (Kelsey, 2015c, p. 35). Whereby CDA is criticised for being “overtly subjective”, Kelsey (2015c) overcomes such criticism by



proposing a neutral approach to ideology that does not necessarily argue for one alternative oppositional standpoint but rather focuses on investigating, exploring, and uncovering such constructions, exhibiting power dynamics that political research disciplines require to understand (Kelsey, 2015b). According to Kelsey:

*It does not suffice for DMA to simply select those findings that most suit the researcher's political aims; it seeks to explore the complexities that operate within the power dynamics of discursive and social practices involved in storytelling. As such, DMA still reflects critically upon the social and ideological contexts of those media landscapes that it explores*

(Kelsey, 2015c, p. 34).

As such, DMA continues to agree with those CDA principles upholding the right of adopting an openly critical stance and the comfort of reflecting critically upon the ideological and social contexts of those media landscapes under investigation. On this note, Kelsey (2015c) adds that analysts are neither free from ideology nor superior to myth. Nevertheless, they can choose to be critical and reflective ‘without proposing truth or falsity in their own accounts when we understand how myth and ideology function through the discourses we produce and consume’ (Kelsey, 2015c, p. 25). Lastly, in order to succeed in adopting a neutral, albeit critical approach to both ideology and mythology, Kelsey (2015c) explains that his DMA framework accounts for Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, pp. 37 - 38), in which ideology is not only treated as a mere set of ideas of which evaluation revolves only around the validity or falsity of their content but also as an ideology that ‘manages social unification, which combines the interests of social class’. According to Kelsey (2015c), adopting such a neutral position approach to ideology not only paves the way for a better understanding of ideological battlegrounds and contesting power dynamics within the society but also provides the researchers with the advantage of not being:

*accused of clamming intellectual or analytical superiority through pseudo-objectivism. This approach to discourse, mythology and ideology is concerned with how meanings function and the purpose that they serve rather than proposing fixed ideals of truth versus lies or non-ideological versus ideological. But at the same time, this does not prohibit the analyst from being critical or [scrutinising] exploitative power relations that operate through discourse and mythology.*

(Kelsey, 2015c, p. 26)

Further on the originality and contribution of the DMA framework, Kelsey (2015c) points out, whilst calling on Flood's (2002) remark, that 'the detailed discursive constructions of myth have been largely absent in myth theory' (Kelsey, 2016, p. 973). It was at this point when Kelsey began to provide more explicit attention to the ways in which discourse helps the researchers construct and understand archetypal conventions of mythology, which function as vehicles for ideology:

*The rich, multidimensional, theoretical and analytical perspectives of my work to date justify the proposal of a systematic framework that adds to previous approaches to CDA and offers an analytical toolkit to researchers within (and beyond) the fields of critical discourse studies or journalism, media and cultural studies.*

(Kelsey, 2015c, p. 23)

The DMA is, therefore, proposed by Kelsey to fill in the above gaps and offer a unique synergy between journalism studies and discourse studies as research fields (Kelsey, 2015c; Kelsey, 2016).

In his definition of discourse, as to what relates to the DMA framework, Kelsey does acknowledge what was suggested by Wodak and Meyer (2009) regarding such concept being problematic to describe due to the many ways it can be used across many theoretical and analytical fields. Each scholarly approach tends to conceive discourse differently than the others and so does the DMA framework, which sees it as 'a culturally and socially organised way of speaking' (Mayr, 2008, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 31). Kelsey (2015c) agrees with Fairclough (1995a), Wodak (1999, cited in De Cillia *et al.*, 1999), and Van Dijk (1998) when viewing language and texts from a functionalist perspective, suggesting they are to be analysed in relation to the social practices in which they are part of.

He also endorses Wodak and Meyer's (2009; 2016) approach to discourse as a concept that extends beyond linguistics, stressing that it does not only deal with the language but also practice. Therefore, he sees that the breadth of discourse can be best summed up in the same way that was put forward by Wodak and Meyer (2009, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 32), suggesting that discourse can be anything 'from a historical monument, a lieu de memoire, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language per se'.

Another point in which the DMA is believed to be in agreement with other traditional approaches to critical discourse studies is that it focuses on language and meaning by expanding to the wider and social level; an expansion, whereby discourse is no longer bounded by language, nor being a product of it per se, but rather one that is reflected and sustained in the language (Kelsey, 2015c).

There are key theories and literature that have contributed to the DMA framework. These can be seen, for instance, in the work of pioneering scholars in psychology and mythology, such as Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell. The first contribution to the DMA, for example, is Jung's theory of archetypes (Jung, 1959), as it defines the earlier discussed universal patterns (e.g., ancient images, stories, and symbols) that exist in the collective unconscious and manifest in people's fantasies and emotional responses to the world around. The second contribution to the DMA is seen by Joseph Campbell (1959; 1964; 1969; 1988a; 1990; 1990; 2008).

Greatly influenced by the work of Jung (1959) and capitalising on his famous theory of archetypes, Campbell made a significant contribution to the contemporary study of world mythology. Such contribution, according to Kelsey (2017b, p. 5), was also the result of 'decades researching stories and rituals of different cultures and communities around the world', leading Campbell to outline examples of some of his best-known theories such as "Hero's monomyth" and the "four mythological functions"<sup>13</sup>.

Heavily drawn on by the DMA framework is the work of three academics, Roland Barthes (Barthes, 1972), Jack Lule (Lule, 2001), and Christopher Flood (Flood, 2002). The effort of each of the renowned names has been significant in offering the DMA framework with a richly theatrical and analytical foundation to approaching mythology. Such foundation is drawn from different disciplines such as politics (Flood, 2002), journalism, communication (Lule, 2001), linguistics, semiotics, and anthropology (Barthes, 1972).

Also crucial to informing the DMA framework are the works of other renowned scholars within the field of psychology, such as Margaret Wetherell (Wetherell, 2012), Anthony Stevens (Stevens, 1994), and Connie Zweig and Jerimiah Abrams (Zweig and Abrams, 1991).

Moreover, the DMA framework draws upon theories and descriptions outlined by each of the following: Duncan S. A. Bell, with interest in mythology, memory, and national identity (Bell, 2003); Marcus O'Donnell, focusing on the mythical function of news reporting (O'Donnell,

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<sup>13</sup> See section 2.3.2.

2003); Chiara Bottici, with attention to the philosophical understanding of political myth (Bottici, 2007); and Angela Phillips, who provides invaluable insight concerning the art of writing stories for newspapers and magazines, as well as their narrative, style, and structure (Phillip, 2011).

## **2.7 Related studies**

In this section, I will be reviewing the literature, considered so far, in which news was approached through the lens of mythological storytelling. Afterwards, I will be addressing the body of work on Al-Jazeera, its websites, and the MB. At the end of each section, the research gaps identified will be highlighted.

### **2.7.1 Myths in the news**

Approaching the study of news through the lens of mythology, storytelling, and narratives, despite encountering resistance by some journalism professionals and traditional scholars over the ongoing tension between the call for objectivity versus the need for compelling stories, has been gaining more attention amongst researchers and academics over the past ten years (Smith, 1979; Knight and Dean, 1982; Barkin, 1984; Ettema and Glasser, 1988; Bird and Dardenne, 1997; Kitch, 2000; Lule, 2001; Barnhurst and Nerone, 2002; Steiner, 2002; Kitch, 2003; O'Donnell, 2003; Zelizer, 2004; Berkowitz, 2005; Johnson-Cartee, 2005; Winch, 2005; Broersma, 2007; Forde, 2008; Nerone, 2008; Bird and Dardenne, 2009; Phillip, 2011; Rugar, 2011; Greenberg and Wheelwright, 2014b; Anslow, 2016; Hartsock, 2016; Joseph, 2016; Tenenboim-Weinblatt *et al.*, 2016; Budd, 2017; Gutsche Jr and Salkin, 2017; Hart, 2017; Kirke, 2017; Panay, 2017; Van Krieken and Sanders, 2017; Van Krieken, 2018; McQueen, 2020; Wahl-Jorgensen and Schmidt, 2020)

Of course, added to all of the above literature is the body of work by Darren Kelsey, in which he developed and recruited his DMA framework for critical discourse studies in the analysis of news (Kelsey, 2012; Kelsey, 2013b; Kelsey, 2013a; Kelsey, 2014; Kelsey, 2015c; Kelsey, 2015b; Kelsey, 2015a; Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey, 2017b; Kelsey, 2017a; Kelsey, 2018a; Kelsey, 2018b; Kelsey, 2019; Budd *et al.*, 2020; Kelsey, 2020).

Kelsey's framework has also been adopted in a limited number of studies, possibly no more than three published papers, hardly considered the case of news stories. The first two appear to have dedicated the application of DMA to the analysis of mythology in political speeches

(Nartey, 2020; Nartey and Bhatia, 2020). The third one (MacMillan, 2020) seems to have focused on analysing weekly magazines.

In deciding what sort of literature is to be discussed in this section, I will only be restricting the focus to a few representative numbers of studies that are most relevant and similar in nature to the present work. I will start with the body of work conducted by Kelsey (due to its particular importance in informing the present research) before moving on to examining the rest. Moreover, this section will only be restricting the discussion (as much as possible and where relevant) to such studies that considered the role of mythology in online coverage.

In the present research, it is expected that either one of the two monolingual sites of Al-Jazeera websites (or both) will engage in glamorising the image of ousted President Mohammed Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood members (MB), representing them as heroes through the archetypal, Hero narrative. Traits of the Hero may include dramatisations of the characters of MB members, may depict them as ones who exemplify the core values and ideals of Egyptian and Muslim societies, and that they have gone through plenty of tribulations and hardships only to end up coming back to power in the end. Hence, an example of a relevant resource demonstrating the use of the Hero narrative can be found in the body of work offered by Kelsey (Kelsey, 2012; Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey, 2017b; Kelsey, 2017a). Of course, the discursive representations of the MB across the two sites are not done in isolation of their opponents.

The heroic narrative of the MB, as presented by Al-Jazeera, is expected to be coupled with a different one that negatively depicts the image of their antagonists (e.g., the military institution under the command of President Al-Sisi). Such depiction is expected to be centred on the ideas of deception, lack of moral values, chaos, and changing the social order; hence, the Trickster archetype becomes relevant. Such narrative has been referred to in many studies (Kelsey, 2013b; Kelsey, 2014; Budd *et al.*, 2020). Moreover, the archetypal Victim is also expected to be invoked by Al-Jazeera coverage, especially when it reports to the sympathy and support of the MB. This can be seen, for example, in the ways, they are said to have been ‘afflicted with dreadful torment’ at the hands of the anti-MB establishment. In informing this study of the Victim narrative, many works are referred to (Kelsey, 2017b; Budd *et al.*, 2020).

As for the rest of the publications by Kelsey, mainly his books and contributions to edited books are to be treated as references which will be consulted whenever needed. For instance, Kelsey’s first book, “*Media, Myth and Terrorism*” (Kelsey, 2015b), is considered to be of great importance as it is the first publication where DMA’s toolkit was first articulated and declared

as a new approach to critical discourse studies. The other book entitled “*Media and Affective Mythologies*” (Kelsey, 2017b) is equally essential as it provides insights pertaining to the emotional dimensions of archetypes and mythologies in the analysis of multimedia case studies.

As stated before, there are three studies that have consulted the DMA in their analysis. However, only two of them appear to be of some relevance to the project at hand. For instance, the studies conducted by Nartey (2020) and Nartey and Bhatia (2020), even though neither of them did consider the case of news reporting and chose political speeches instead, are believed to be insightful and as they explore the discursive constructions of such archetypal narratives, which are similar to the ones to be potentially uncovered in this project (e.g., heroes and villains).

Other empirical examples which have employed alternative approaches to critical discourse studies can also be of some particular relevance to the present project. This can be seen, for instance, in a thesis project conducted by Budd (2017). Aside from the use of metaphors in her study, she paid specific attention to narratives and moral storytelling in the news, examining the discursive construction of mythical archetypes such as the Tragedy, the Victim, the Villain, and the Hero’s quest. Another example that might be of potential relevance can be seen in the work of Panay (2017). The importance of the study may have to do with its attempt to analyse the mythological discursive construction of the “fear appeal” and/or “moral panic” in online news. Likewise, Al-Jazeera is expected to draw on a more or less similar narrative in its attempt to demonise the anti-MB social actors.

Finally, Anslow (2016) has also conducted a research in which mythical archetypes in the news have also been investigated. On the word of Anslow (2016, p. 3), the study ‘explores the proposition that British tabloid journalism is driven archetypally by what Carl Jung identified as Trickster, a collective shadow reflecting an ambiguous but necessary principle portrayed in myths, folklore, literature and contemporary media as a disruptive, lascivious, limuloid troublemaker’ (Anslow, 2016). One take from Anslow’s study is that it did not resort to any approaches to critical discourse studies but rather used semiotically informed textual analysis.

### **2.7.1.1 Research gaps**

In the light of the above, it is worth reminding that none of those mentioned above literature, thus far, appear to have considered the role of mythology, being discursively expressed across any given bilingual news discourse, which is a vital research gap to be filled by the present

project. As far as monolingual Arabic news discourse, the study of myths seems to have been largely ignored, if not completely non-existent.

In addition, even with other journalism broadcasting monolingually in other languages, there appears to be very little academic research that has actually considered the case of mythology, as it takes place, specifically, in online reporting. This is particularly important, as the present research aspires to add more contribution and builds more on such a limited body of work by exploring the mythical analysis in other explored languages such as Arabic. More importantly, with such limited research in mind, there does not seem to be a single empirical study, thus far, that appears to have taken it upon itself the task of analysing the discursive constructions of mythology, as expressed through the bilingual online reporting of any given news network (i.e., the different language sites of Al-Jazeera).

Moreover, and for the sake of furthering the originality of this research, I will endeavour to present the overall discursive mythological findings through the lens of aesthetics<sup>14</sup>, which is arguably, an important under-researched concept closely associated with mythology. Bearing in mind that the analysis of aesthetics in journalism appears to be largely absent (Postema and Deuze, 2020), I would also argue that drawing on such aspect is far more absent, if not completely, in the context of deconstructing the discursive mechanism of mythology, as it occurs in Arabic news discourse and the cross-linguistics research in general. Furthermore, this may help in advancing the originality of an already novel implication of the discursive-mythological analysis of Arabic news, as well as the comparative cross-linguistic research overall. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the employment of aesthetics may help us gain a bit more insight into the manipulative nature of mythology in Al-Jazeera's news discourse and how such phenomena can further stir and mobilise the sentiments of the audience.

### **2.7.2 Al-Jazeera, its websites, and the MB**

Generally speaking, media outputs are considered to be one of the main sources of data that are approached by discourse studies (Fairclough, 1988; Van Dijk, 1988b; Van Dijk, 1988a; Fairclough, 1995b; Van Dijk, 1995d; Fairclough, 1998b; Fairclough, 1998a; Van Dijk, 1998; Fairclough, 2000; Wodak and Busch, 2004; Van Dijk, 2009; Kelsey, 2019). The ability of media in creating different social realities has been under the purview of wide and extensive

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<sup>14</sup> See section 2.2.5

academic research (Tuchman, 1978; Bell, 1991; Fowler, 1991; Trew, 1991; Richardson, 2007; Davies, 2012; Hartley, 2013).

By contemplating media studies that have paid specific attention to the case of Al-Jazeera news network, there has been a huge body of work conducted thus far, adopting along with the study of discourse, other approaches such as framing, content analysis, agenda settings, etc. (Ayish, 2001; Lahlali, 2011; Lahlali, 2016; Sadig, 2019; Zayani, 2019).

There is also a huge body of work that considers Al-Jazeera, in relation to its establishment, being a soft power tool for the Qatari government, prompting competition between other Arab media organisations, challenging Arab and Western governments and other media organisations, claiming to be pushing the boundaries of speech, and claiming to be speaking of the Arab identity (Sakr, 2001; El-Nawawy *et al.*, 2002; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003; Lamloom, 2004; Rugh, 2004; Lynch, 2006; Miladi, 2006; Thussu, 2006; Zayani and Ayish, 2006; Wojcieszak, 2007; Johnson and Fahmy, 2008; Seib, 2008; Lahlali, 2011; Samuel-Azran, 2013; Abdul Mawla, 2015; Lahlali, 2016).

There is also a growing number of studies that have applied an umbrella of non-CDA research techniques (e.g., framing, content analysis, and agenda settings) in which Al-Jazeera's news sites were either evaluated against each other or alternatively compared with other news sites belonging to other organisations (Jaspersen and El-Kikhia, 2003; Fahmy and Al Emad, 2011; Ireri, 2012; Zeng and Tahat, 2012; Bossio, 2013; Elmasry *et al.*, 2013; Abduldayim, 2015; Al Nahed, 2015; El-Nawawy and Elmasry, 2015; Ethelb, 2016a; Damanhoury and Saleh, 2017; Tahat, 2018; Daoud, 2019; Ajaoud and Elmasry, 2020; Satti, 2020).

As for comparative CDA studies that examined the case of one or both sites of Al-Jazeera against different news websites, they still remain quite a few. These can be found, for instance, in (Barkho, 2011; Alhumaidi, 2013a; Moch. Syarif and Yuliani, 2017; Abdulmajid, 2019; Hassoon, 2019; Kharbach, 2020; Tartory, 2020). The topical focus of such studies was completely different from that of the research at hand, as the studies concerned themselves with such news stories relating to oil production, the war in Syria and Yemen, and the Egyptian uprising of 25<sup>th</sup> of January, 2013.

This leaves only three studies so far that come somewhat close to the present research in the sense of evaluating different language sites of the same news provider. Two of those studies examined the case of the Arabic and English sites of Al-Jazeera. These are the studies of Abdulmajid and Herring (2008) and that of Eid (2017). The other study is an unpublished paper



by Al-Qudaimi (no date), in which the researcher examined the case of BBC English versus Arabic News websites.

Starting with the research conducted by Abdulmajid and Herring (2008), both content analysis and CDA were employed for the sole purpose of comparing the two language versions of Al-Jazeera with reference to 'their layouts and the structural features, regional and thematic coverage, and ideological perspective reflected in the headlines of news reports' (Abdulmajid and Herring, 2008, p. 1). The findings of their study reveal differences between the two sites in all aspects except for thematic coverage, demonstrating systematic partialities in reporting, coupled with efforts to preserve a degree of ideological balance.

As for the second study by Eid (2017), the researcher resorted to the use of Systemic Functional Grammar to the analysis of headlines between the Arabic and English sites of Al-Jazeera. This was also coupled with the analysis of two full articles on immigration to the US. According to the researcher, the ideological inclinations were present in the two sites and were mostly demonstrated in the forms of certain strategies such as deletion, addition, and lexical choice. However, he came to conclude that Arabic articles and headlines tend mostly to provide more informative and detailed stories than the English ones (Eid, 2017, p. 79). As for the other work carried out by Al-Qudaimi (no date), the researcher looked at the case of five English headlines which were set against their Arabic counterparts. In addition, one English news article was also contrasted with an Arabic equivalent. The general findings revealed differences between the two sites, pertaining to the ideological perspectives directed differently at each Arabic and English audience.

As for the case of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), there have been a number CDA and non-CDA bodies of work (e.g., news framing and quantitative analysis) that considered the representation of the MB in other media networks, without necessarily focusing on online reporting per se (Pasha, 2011; Dağtaş, 2013; Young and Dugan, 2014; Abunajela, 2015; Al Sawi, 2015; El-Nashar, 2015; Issa, 2015; Al-Radhi *et al.*, 2016; Ethelb, 2016b; Guzman, 2016; Hammoud, 2016; Abdul Mohsen Moustafa, 2018). However, none of those studies, so far, appear to have engaged in investigating the news coverage of events in Egypt, extending from 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2013 until the end of 2014, as intended in the present project, nor have they considered analysing a corpus comprised of complete news articles. Instead, they have generally appeared to have focused on either a) investigating certain events, each on its own (e.g., the protests of 30<sup>th</sup> of June, 2013), b) looking at a timeline or cases prior to June 2013

(e.g., the event of 25<sup>th</sup> of January), or c) focusing mainly on investigating certain components of news stories, such as the headlines or images (multimodal analysis).

### **2.7.2.1 Research gaps**

Having reviewed all of the above literature, what needs to be stressed overall, in order to demonstrate the originality of the present project, is the following: to date, none of the above empirical work, to the best of my knowledge, attempted to look at the particular representation of the MB and their opponents between the Arabic and English straight news stories and opinion articles of Al-Jazeera, and certainly, not during the time period under investigation (starting as of 30<sup>th</sup> of June, 2013 until end of 2014). Moreover, the present research is also believed to be the only one so far to have approached the analysis of Arabic news discourse through the lens of mythological storytelling, something which has not been conducted in any of the above literature. Additionally, deconstructing the discursive construction of mythology in cross-linguistic CDA research (including the Arabic language) has not yet gained the attention of any research that the author knows of. The employment of the DMA framework itself, and the analysis of mythical attributes generally in news, although have been used in other studies, were restricted to the analysis of monolingual discourse. Even with that, as stated in section 2.6.2.1, the research on news myths seems to have been largely nonexistent, if not completely absent, in the context of Arabic news discourse. Therefore, the present research pushes for more originality and novelty by extending the application of DMA to the analysis of bilingual (news) discourse (which also includes the underresearched Arabic language). Methodologically, the present research is the only one, thus far, to have improvised a new manual analysis technique to supplement the subsequent critical discourse investigation. Such strategy was created particularly for identifying potential spots of mythical archetypes across the articles, as will be demonstrated in the methodology chapter sections 3.4.2.2 and 3.6.2. Hence, all of the above highlighted constitute several research gaps to be filled by the project at hand.

## **2.8 Summary**

To conclude, the chapter has provided an assortment of literature, discussion, and rationale behind choosing mythological storytelling, as well as the particular cases of Al-Jazeera's websites, and Muslim Brotherhood (MB), for presenting critical discourse investigation. This was succeeded by a section dedicated to going through the traditional approaches to critical discourse studies. It was presented whilst briefly highlighting how the DMA framework emerged from previous approaches, focusing on the analysis of discursive construction of mythology in news. Afterwards, an appraisal of related empirical research on the cases of news storytelling, Al-Jazeera, and the MB was offered, not without identifying the research gaps in which the present project aspires to fill. The following chapter will be setting out the methodology and procedures undertaken in conducting this research.

## **Chapter 3. Methodology**

### **3.1 Introduction**

After having reviewed the relevant literature, this chapter sets out the methodology and procedures employed in the study. Beginning with section 3.2, the chapter will outline the reasons for carrying out the current project along the lines of the qualitative approach to social science. Afterwards, a rationale for choosing critical discourse research will be presented in section 3.3. Following this, the chapter will lay out the research questions in section 3.4, followed by a discussion on research methods within the same section. This will include discussing each of the following: thematic analysis, manual analysis, and Discursive Mythological Analysis (DMA). The data collection and sampling will next be detailed in section 3.5. Afterwards, the chapter will move on, in Section 3.6, to presenting the procedures undertaken in conducting the aforementioned approaches, followed by a section on validity and reliability (section 3.7). Finally, the chapter will be concluded by presenting a summary (section 3.8).

### **3.2 Why conduct qualitative research?**

In the following section, I will attempt to elucidate the reasons as to why qualitative research is believed to be appropriate for this particular project.

#### **3.2.1 Philosophical stance**

As far as the study is concerned, the overall qualitative approach I employ, comprising thematic analysis, manual analysis, and most importantly, the DMA approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA), is grounded broadly within the social constructivist philosophical paradigm (often referred to as interpretivism). In keeping with Creswell and Creswell (2018), social constructivism takes an interpretive approach to knowledge in which we seek to understand the world we inhabit and come up with subjective meanings of our experiences—meanings ‘directed toward certain objects or things’ (Creswell and Creswell, 2018, p. 56).

Essentially, the study pays explicit attention to the usage of news language, specifically on occasions where it draws on mythological storytelling as a universally cultural practice whilst portraying social events.

As a critical discourse type of research, this study, hence, seeks to understand how the discursive construction of mythology that is produced and drawn upon by news media outlets, such as Al-Jazeera, is believed to have the propensity to distort meanings, blur complexities, and create new social realities as it functions ideologically. Therefore, it is clear that the study rests on the philosophical assumption that there exists more than one version of the world, each of which could possibly be legitimate. Texts, then, are open to multiple interpretations, and language can only be regarded as non-representational. According to Cap (2019):

*since social phenomena are mediated through discourse, their meanings can never be permanently fixed. A broad array of discourses, each structuring reality in a different way, compete to define what is “true” within a particular aspect of the social world.*

(Cap, 2019, p. 4)

Indeed, it is generally known that all approaches to discourse analysis (including this research) share a degree of social constructivism within the humanities and social sciences (Johnson-Cartee, 2005; Pedersen, 2009). Theories engrained in the constructionist paradigm are known for their attempt to question and problematise the world of everyday life, which is taken for granted, according to Johnson-Cartee (2005). On the role of language constituting social realities, Johnson-Cartee (2005) states:

*What we know about the world is coloured by our social interactions with others, the naming, defining, and altering of our own personal realities during our lifetimes. Such an approach analyses the nonverbal and verbal languages we use to constitute our realities*

(Johnson-Cartee, 2005, p. 2)

On the issue of understanding reality as socially constructed, Johnson-Cartee (2005, p. 15) thinks, whilst calling on the major work of Berger and Luckmann (1967), that reality as such can be inspected through the exploration of cultural artefacts which consist of “language, symbols and myths of public discourse”. Instead of perceiving facts pertaining to our social world as merely being “out there” waiting to be exposed, constructivists would rather study the processes through which such facts are constructed and how the descriptions we make become understood as factual (Potter, 1996).

In another direct relation to the context of the study in exploring the role of myth in language, Bottici (2007 cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 31), explains that myth ‘is a process that can take place in very different settings: speeches, icons, arts, both visual and otherwise, rituals and almost all other kinds of social practices’ (Bottici, 2007, p. 206). On this point, Kelsey (2015c) adds that ‘myth is part of the social practices’, and hence, CDA is bound to be addressed more broadly whilst travelling beyond the of level language and texts. These practices, as seen by Kelsey (2015c, p. 31), are ‘part of the ideological structures and orders of society’. Furthermore, he explains that identifying myth helps in challenging and deconstructing cultural meanings and representations shaping our understanding of the world around us (Kelsey, 2015c).

Hence, in light of all the above, it becomes clear as to where the research stands in terms of its philosophical underpinnings; it is safe to say that it rests on the social constructivist worldview, which is associated with the post-modern era in qualitative research (Andrews, 2012; Creswell and Creswell, 2018).

### **3.2.2 Qualitative versus quantitative**

Looking at the approaches employed in this project, the qualitative techniques of thematic analysis will initially be applied with the sole aim of making sense of textual data, and ultimately help the subsequent and equally important qualitative approaches work better. Thematic analysis will be mainly used to describe the data at a superficial level. This will entail categorising and exploring the themes of interest across the articles concerning the positive and negative evaluations of social actors and events. Thematic analysis will neither attempt to search for mythological evidence nor engage in interpreting underlying assumptions, as these are meant to be the tasks of the subsequent approaches. Next, the manual analysis approach will take it from this point to further supplement the DMA investigation. In short, the manual analysis will endeavour to assist the subsequent critical discourse investigation by trying to pinpoint places across the articles that are worthy of investigation and demonstrating evidence of mythological narratives. Once such articles have been identified, the critical discourse investigation will then begin to examine and deconstruct the discursive constructions of mythology found and the ways in which they appear to function ideologically to the advantage of Al-Jazeera’s narrative.

In the light of the above, the reasons become clear as to why the present research prefers to adopt a qualitative direction to data analysis. However, before discussing matters in a bit more

detail, a brief comparison between quantitative and qualitative approaches to research is worth presenting.

Qualitative research can be understood as an approach to data that places emphasis on the quality of entities, what they are like, and how they can be described as opposed to their mere quantification, which is the case for quantitative research. Qualitative data, however, pays specific attention to people's judgments, feelings of comfort, emotions, and ideas which can be described in words (Miles *et al.*, 2014, p. 44) for the very simple reason that qualitative research is concerned with recording and investigating qualities rather than quantities.

In terms of reasoning, quantitative research is known to chiefly entail a deductive orientation to the role of theory in research, whereby the research is seen as one aiming to test theories rather than being interested in creating new ones (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Furthermore, a researcher that wishes to adopt the quantitative approach to research wishes to see social reality as an external objective reality, and hence, this method would suggest a positivist standpoint. Qualitative research, on the other hand, is not solely reliant on one unified theory but rather on the viability of multiple theories or approaches that can be employed (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). In addition, there exists one common element when it comes to discussing the qualitative approach to research, which is reflexivity. It entails the researcher taking part in 'knowledge production as an important one, and not exclude it from the research process' (Flick, 2009, p. 21). This appears to emphasise the need for the researcher to be part of the process.

Now, returning to the current study, one of the main reasons as to why the qualitative approach is appropriate is due to the social constructivist/interpretivist nature of this research, which was presented in an earlier section. In addition, by contemplating the first and second research questions (in Section 3.5), it is clear that they both deal with exploring and categorising themes and arguments revolving around the positive and negative evaluations and sentiments pertaining to social actors and events. As far as the study is concerned, these can only be approached qualitatively as they require a longwinded and recursive process of reading and re-reading articles, as well as ensuring a repeated process of collating and re-collating labels with textual content (as seen in the case of thematic analysis, which is essentially, a qualitative method).

The third research question concerns itself mostly with the task of reading and re-reading articles for the purpose of finding specific aspects of speech and text (in the sense of written words), indicating the presence of mythology being communicated through archetypal

narratives. With this in mind, the fourth research question concerns itself with exploring the discursive mechanisms that construct mythology and the ideological expressions that it delivers.

According to Bryman, ‘language-based approaches to the collection of qualitative data such as discourse analysis and conversation analysis’ as well as ‘the collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents’ are of ‘the main methods associated with qualitative research’ (2012, p. 383). Furthermore, the fourth research question entails dealing with ideologies and power dynamics, all of which can only be accounted for qualitatively. According to Brassington and Pettitt (2013, p. 21), ‘Qualitative research allows the researcher to delve deeper into human beliefs, their behavior and experience’.

### **3.3 Why conduct a critical discourse investigation?**

In this section, we turn to discuss the reasons as to why the approaches of CDA, from all other discourse analytical research and qualitative research techniques, are believed to be best suited for this particular study. Looking back at the general aim of this study, it is worth reminding that one of the main objectives is to examine the extent to which the discursive construction of mythology impacts the representation of the MB and their opponents between Arabic and English news sites of Al-Jazeera. Generally, Al-Jazeera is believed by academics to have been broadcasting to the sympathy and support of the MB, something which was already discussed in the literature review and introduction chapters. However, more specifically, the study seeks to understand the ways in which Al-Jazeera is believed to resort to the practice of mythological storytelling in legitimising the MB and/or otherwise delegitimising their opponents. In addition, attention is also given to the ways in which mythology appears to blur/deny complexities and interpretations that do not align with Al-Jazeera’s narrative. Hence, what the study seeks to understand is the ideological role of mythology. The study also aspires to explore the extent to which the presence of mythology appears to impact the online coverage of Al-Jazeera in various or similar degrees between the two sites (English/Arabic). This is quite important as it will raise the readers’ awareness pertaining to the role of mythology in bilingual news networks generally and how such mythology can act as a vehicle for ideological orientations (Kelsey, 2015c).

Without focusing much on the role of mythology, which has been extensively discussed in the literature review chapter, all of the above does clearly propose and articulate aims and concepts which are CDA-specific. Generally, such aims and concepts suggest that there is a *social problem* pertaining to *power abuse* or *domination* (Van Dijk, 2001), produced and reproduced



through *discourse*: ‘language use relative to social, political and cultural formations [...] it is language reflecting social order but also language shaping social order’ (Jaworski and Coupland, 2006, p. 3).

In this research, such discourse is approached for analysis as the aim is to identify ideological nuances of mythological storytelling, underpinning the representation of the MB and their opponents between the two different language sites of Al-Jazeera. Indeed, as far as CDA is concerned, power is a core concept in which researchers aim to examine the (re)production of social domination conveyed in discourse, a term that is mainly recognised as “power abuse” of one group over the other (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 8).

What is more and perhaps more relevant to this study is that such power can be ideologically sustained and reproduced by the media, which leads us to ideology, a concept that is also not less central to CDA than that of power. Clearly, ideology, as understood and described in the study, as well as in any other CDA research, is ‘not understood in the positive sense’ (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 8). Wodak and Meyer suggest that the type of ideologies to be examined are the ones which are ‘not that explicit’, but ‘rather the more hidden and latent inherent in everyday-beliefs which often appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies, thus attracting linguists’ attention’ (p. 8). Another matter worth consideration is that those types of ideologies, owing to their dominance, appear as ‘neutral’ and remain mostly unchallenged, as added by Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 8). Now, with regards to media ideologies, in particular, Van Dijk (1997a, p. 28) argues that mass media outlets have always been regarded as “domains” or “social institutions” whereby the ideologies of the members who work in such institutions are conveyed through media discourse; and so, are the ideologies (Kuo and Nakamura, 2005, p. 394) of the “dominant elites”.

On that point, a distinction worth pointing to is that the ideologies of those who work in the media (e.g., journalists) can be at times overridden by the ideologies of the elites (e.g., rulers, governments). It is the argument of some media scholars that media organisations follow the ideologies of elites who could be the state that controls them, or other groups, such as political parties, religious movements, advertisers, and their media-owning allies, etc. On that note, ideologies of elites, with the passage of time, become the dominant ideologies of media outlets (Shoemaker and Reese, 2004). Therefore, CDA is deemed to be the approach that is often employed with the intent of extracting the ideological domination that is embedded in mass media (Wang, 2009, pp. 747-748), something the present research will attempt to accomplish.

Unlike other discourse analysis research, CDA research, including the one at hand, is problem/issue-oriented, as agreed upon by Van Dijk (1995a) and Wodak and Meyer (2016).

They aspire to bring about a positive change (Page *et al.*, 2014) and ‘suggest corrections to particular discourses’ (Toolan, 1997, cited in Blommaert, 2005, p. 25). At times when researchers adopting different qualitative approaches, typically begin their research with a question about language, CDA researchers alternatively assume their point of departure by considering a question or a problem in society, such as the ‘prevalence of hate-speech directed against women in certain social media platforms’ (Page *et al.*, 2014, p. 98). This is a principle that is also adhered to in the present study and is what typically motivates any other CDA research. CDA is known for taking an overt standpoint regarding the social problem to be analysed; such position is, of course, morally and politically motivated, as seen in this study, which is a feature that has been objected to by scholars hailing from more descriptive traditions, such as Conversation Analysis (Richardson, 2007, p. 2). Furthermore, Van Dijk (1993, p. 252) points out:

*Unlike other discourse analysts, critical discourse analysts (should) take an explicit socio-political stance: they spell out their point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both within their discipline and within society at large. Although not in each stage of theory formation and analysis, their work is admittedly and ultimately political.*

(Van Dijk, 1993, p. 252)

In agreement with Van Dijk, Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 4) also stress the importance of making researchers’ positions and objectives clear and overt. However, they also caution against the need for researchers to retain their respective scientific approaches and stay self-reflective throughout the entire course of their research.

Among the groups which can be vulnerable to power abuse and control by media’s power, the “audience” can be considered (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 256). That is because the absence of power can be accounted for by ‘lack of active or controlled access to discourse’ (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 256). Media audience, as well as the other aforementioned groups, suffer in a way from controlled access to ‘bureaucrats in public agencies or to professionals’ (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 256), and for that reason, they are believed to be victimised and powerless. By exposing facets of domination and endeavouring to reduce illusions that could be potentially present in any given media discourse, CDA practitioners are fulfilling a moral responsibility that is

emancipating the powerless media audience (Van Dijk, 1993; Blommaert, 2005; Wodak and Meyer, 2016).

### **3.4 Research questions and methods**

This section concerns itself with presenting the research questions, as well as research methods recruited in this study. Whilst presenting the research methods, I will also endeavour to explain the reasons as to why each of these methods is believed to be relevant.

#### **3.4.1 Research questions**

As noted by Ritchie and Lewis (2003), researchers are best advised to ascertain a sufficient level of awareness pertaining to what they aspire to describe and explain, as well as the detailed questions they seek to address. According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003, p. 48), a researcher ‘needs to consider whether the research questions are sufficiently clear, of value and interest, and how they relate to existing research’. Whilst maintaining a focus on the research questions it seeks to answer, the research at hand did indeed go through different phases, in which I tried to ascertain its worth and novelty, and where it currently stands in regard to existing research.

Outlined below are the research questions governing the direction of this research. Presented as well in Figure 3-1 is the model of the present research, featuring each of its adopted approaches coupled with its/their own research question(s) that each one of them seeks to answer. As noted in the model:

- 1) What sort of themes are raised concerning the positive evaluation of the MB, their allies and pro-MB arguments?
- 2) What sort of themes are raised concerning the negative evaluation of the anti-MB establishment, their allies and anti-MB arguments?
- 3) What are the archetypal conventions of the Arabic and English news stories of Al-Jazeera?
- 4) If mythological, archetypal storytelling exists, how is mythology discursively constructed as it functions ideologically to deliver both positive and/or negative evaluations between the Arabic & English news stories of Al-Jazeera?




Figure 3-1: Research design

### 3.4.2 Research methods

#### 3.4.2.1 Thematic analysis

In answering the first and second research questions, the supplementary qualitative techniques of thematic analysis will initially be applied with the sole aim of categorising and exploring themes of interest pertaining to the positive and negative evaluations of social actors and events. Being treated as a supplementary and revealing approach, the use of thematic analysis, as stated before, is believed to be quite useful, particularly in helping the subsequent approaches make sense of all the data by recognising themes and patterns. It is for this reason that in the present study, the author will seek to apply the use of thematic analysis following the widely cited approach that is developed by psychologists Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Such an approach is particularly helpful due to its guidelines being clearer when compared to other approaches. For instance, the guidelines do help in striking a balance ‘between demarcating thematic analysis clearly - i.e., explaining what it is, and how to do it – and ensuring flexibility in relation to how it is used, so that it does not become limited and constrained, and lose one of its key advantages’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 78). Such description, according to the authors, fills an important gap in providing researchers with the ‘vocabulary and recipe’ to conduct a thematic analysis in such ways that is theoretically and methodologically comprehensive (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 78).

Thematic analysis is believed to be one of the most popular forms of analysis within the field of qualitative research (Guest *et al.*, 2012, p. 11). As declared by Holloway and Todres (2003, cited in Braun and Clarke, 2006), among the qualitative approaches which are known for being extremely diverse, complex, and nuanced, thematic analysis ought to be seen as a foundational

method for qualitative analysis. The authors also add that the first approach to qualitative analysis that researchers should acquire knowledge of is undoubtedly thematic analysis due to the fundamental skills it provides, which will be useful for conducting many other forms of qualitative analysis.

Furthermore, according to Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic analysis ‘should be considered a method in its own right’. In this sense, ‘qualitative researchers should become more familiar with thematic analysis as an independent and a reliable qualitative approach to analysis’ (Vaismoradi *et al.*, 2013, p. 400).

Thematic analysis centres on the provision of purely qualitative, detailed, and nuanced account of data, and for that matter, it is different to qualitative content analysis, which extends interpretation to the quantitative counts of codes (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Vaismoradi *et al.*, 2013); something in which the present research does not aspire to engage in.

As stated earlier, thematic analysis emphasises the location, examination, and recording of themes within data under investigation. Themes, in this sense, are meant to be understood as patterns found across data sets that are central to the description of a certain phenomenon and are linked to particular research questions (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis ‘minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79). That being said, such a method can go beyond this, as explained by Boyatzis (1998, cited in Braun and Clarke, 2006), in the sense that it can actually help in interpreting multiple aspects of the research topic. More on this point, it is explained that thematic analysis extends its use beyond the task of simply counting words or phrases within a particular text to identifying implicit and explicit ideas across the data (Guest *et al.*, 2012).

However, given that identifying latent themes and ideas (e.g., underlying assumptions and ideologies) will be the job of the DMA approach to critical discourse analysis, the thematic analysis will only be restricted to the surface meaning of data and categorising explicit themes and patterns that do not go beyond the level of what is said or written.

As for the philosophical and conceptual assumptions underpinning the use of thematic analysis, thematic analysis falls within the camp of qualitative research that is independent of any theoretical and epistemological standpoints (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

On this point, Braun and Clarke (2006) mention:

*Thematic analysis can be an essentialist or realist method, which reports experiences, meanings and the reality of participants, or it can be a constructionist method, which examines the ways in which events, realities, meanings, experiences and so on are the effects of a range of discourses operating within society. It can also be a 'contextualist' method, sitting between the two poles of essentialism and constructionism, and characterized by theories, such as critical realism, which acknowledge the ways individuals make meaning of their experience, and, in turn, the ways the broader social context impinges on those meanings, while retaining focus on the material and other limits of 'reality'. Therefore, thematic analysis can be a method that works both to reflect reality and to unpick or unravel the surface of 'reality'.*

(Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 81)

The above statement, according to Braun and Clarke (2006), is what makes thematic analysis flexible in the sense that it is not willed to any pre-existing theoretical framework and can be employed with most frameworks for various uses. It is actually through this freedom and flexibility that thematic analysis can offer a valuable research tool 'which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet complex, account of data' (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 78). That being said, the two scholars remind that it is important to articulate, clearly and transparently, what epistemological and theoretical positions the researchers choose to adopt for their thematic analysis, as this is frequently left unspoken of.

Thematic analysis can approach identifying themes within the data in two different ways: inductive and deductive. The inductive approach is known for being data driven, whereby themes are strongly linked to data. In conducting this, the process of coding data is done without being tailored to a pre-existing coding framework or outlined in accordance with the research's analytics preconceptions.

When conducting inductive thematic analysis, it is likely that research questions could evolve. In contrast, the other approach is one whereby the themes are driven by the analyst and identified according to pre-determined categories.

As far as thematic analysis is concerned, there are three terms or concepts worth being understood, which are themes, codes, and data. Themes, in addition to the above-mentioned description, are meant to capture something important with regards to the overall research

question and can be identified inductively in a bottom-up manner or deductively (top-down), through following a given theoretical premise (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Coding is the primary process in thematic analysis that seeks to develop themes within the raw data through identifying significant moments and encoding the data before attempting interpretation (Boyatzis, 1998). As for the data, it can be defined whilst making a distinction between two different terms, which are data corpus and data set: 'Data corpus refers to all data collected for a particular research project, while data set refers to all the data from the corpus that are being used for a particular analysis' (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79).

Thematic analysis has a number of advantages to its use, aside from the flexibility discussed above and suffice it to mention a few relevant ones. Firstly, it is known for being relatively easy and straightforward to learn and conduct. It is also accessible to researchers with either little or zero knowledge of qualitative research. Furthermore, the educated general public can easily make sense of the results. Thematic analysis, additionally, has the ability to summarise salient features of a large body of data and provide a dense description of a given data set. It can generate insights that may not have been anticipated as well. Finally, it can allow the interpretations of data from both social and psychological perspectives (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

As to the disadvantages of thematic analysis, it is mainly to do with the broadness of issues, which makes creating guidelines for higher phase-analysis challenging. Researchers, as a result, may experience difficulties when it comes to deciding on what aspects of data to focus on. Scholars also refer to another disadvantage, which is the likelihood of not being able 'to retain a sense of continuity and contradiction through any one individual account, and these contradictions and consistencies across individual accounts may be revealing' (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79).

#### **3.4.2.2 *Manual analysis***

It is important to emphasise that thematic analysis is not enough on its own to identify potential instances of mythological storytelling. That is because the thematic analysis is primarily conducted for the purpose of making sense of what is transpiring across the data regarding the positive and negative portrayals of social actors and events. In other words, thematic analysis is there to help in better understanding the nature of the thematic landscape before conducting any discourse investigation (which is an important procedure when tackling a huge amount of data). Therefore, the thematic analysis does not really inform the DMA concerning the work of

mythology. Hence, there was a need for improvising another supplementary tool that builds on the findings of the previous analysis and adds more meaning to it, mythology-wise.

Effectively, there is a need for another tool with the aim of finding evidence for the mythological archetypes emerging across the articles. This has led to the creation of a manual analysis template. Conducting manual analysis is believed to be quite useful in helping pinpoint instances of archetypal narratives throughout the articles that could be worthy of critical discourse investigation. After such procedure has finished, articles demonstrating archetypal storytelling structures will be grouped and categorised in accordance with the types of archetypes, which they have turned out to be mostly associated with. Afterwards, four articles (one per each news genre) within each archetypal category will be randomly selected for critical discourse investigation. More on such procedure will be explained in sections 3.6.2 and 3.6.3.

### **3.4.2.3 *Discourse-mythological approach (DMA)***

Before discussing the ways in which the DMA incorporates/stands out from the previous approaches to critical discourse studies (Kelsey, 2015c), I would firstly like to shed some light on its theoretical underpinnings revolving around mythology and mythical archetypes. As far as this project is concerned, all of such theories and archetypal patterns already form an integral part of the DMA framework (Kelsey, 2015c) with the exception of the Qur'anic master narrative of the Pharaoh (Halverson *et al.*, 2011b). The latter I inductively uncovered as a novel category. As for what concerns the other archetypes and theories, the novelty and originality of each still stand in their exclusive application into a new context and dataset, and hence, provide new insights which add to the studies of news as myths and narratives, as discussed in sections 1.4.2 (Chapter 1), 2.7.1.1 (Chapter 2), 4.2.2.1 (Chapter 4), and 6.2.1 (Chapter 6). The reader shall be briefed on such theories, but no detailed engagement shall be presented as it has already been done so in the literature review.

Theoretically, the DMA draws on the seven master mythical narratives or archetypes<sup>15</sup>, as outlined by professor and former journalist Jack Lule (2001) and the ways in which they are believed to play out in journalistic writings of the news. The seven master narratives themselves

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<sup>15</sup> A reminder on the concept: Archetypes are universal patterns that are deep-rooted in humans' collective unconscious. Exhibiting intrinsic tendencies of how the human mind conceptualises the physical world, archetypes can manifest in various forms of narratives as symbolic and mythic content. Today, the theory of the archetypes is employed by researchers in analysis of modern discourses such as that those of news media.



are originally based on the archetypal theory in which Lule (2001) adopts and employs through his own analysis.

Aside from such work being originally incorporated in the DMA framework to critical discourse studies, I personally believe that there does not seem to be any other work thus far that has employed and further developed the use of archetypes for the particular purpose of studying mythology in the news better than that of Jack Lule (2001). In detailing his seven master myths, such a scholar draws heavily on the prominent theories of archetypes developed by the preeminent psychoanalyst Carl G. Jung's (Jung, 1959). Moreover, he incorporates the Jungian-influenced work of the distinguished mythologist Joseph Campbell (1959; 1964; 1969; 1988a; 1990; 1990; 2008). This is seen, particularly, in drawing on Campbell's popular paradigm pertaining to the social role of myth. Hence, drawing on the work and theories of such two scholars (Jung and Campbell) becomes naturally important wherever there happens to be a need for it in the present research.

*As a possibly innovative element in how CDS could engage with narrative, Kelsey draws on the work of Carl Jung (acknowledging the latter's controversial dimensions) to show how CDS might also benefit from further engagement with psychoanalytical theory. More specifically, Kelsey discusses Jung's concepts of the collective unconscious, a set of universally shared psychic structures, and archetypes. He subsequently provides examples of two of the latter, the monomyth and the trickster. By better understanding the workings of storytelling, paying attention also to insights from psychology, evolution and biology, Kelsey ultimately seeks to provide a toolkit which enables a critical understand of the workings of ideologies.*

(Forchtner, 2021, p. 309)

The archetypal narratives in which the present project draws on in informing one of its tools<sup>16</sup> and also reflected throughout the discourse investigation are the following: The Victim, the Martyr, the Hero, the Trickster, and the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King. Each of these myths is defined and discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.3.1).

Indeed, the author of this research views news articles in the same way Lule (2001) does, as reincarnations of ancient stories that are filled with clichéd narratives or rather familiar archetypes that dispense morality tales of which purpose is to instruct, inform, and guide the

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<sup>16</sup> See the application of manual analysis discussed in Section 3.7.2.

masses to a set of prevailing beliefs. As seen by Lule (2001, cited in Kelsey, 2016, p. 972), myth ‘a societal story that expresses prevailing ideals, ideologies, values and beliefs. More broadly, myth is an essential social narrative, a rich and enduring aspect of human ... figures and forms to offer exemplary models for social life’.

By adopting the DMA framework, this research approaches myth, not only in the sense of archetypes but also in the sense of mythical expressions manifesting through archetypal storytelling. In other words, the author of this research tries to approach myth through the lenses outlined by Barthes (1972), Lule (2001), and (Kelsey, 2015c) in which myth is perceived in terms of reality-distorting metaphors, preferences, exaggerations, suppressions, or simplifications that are being used by journalists for the purpose of promoting one perspective when discussing social events, whilst at the same time, blurring, demeaning, or denying other opposing interpretations or narratives. Likewise, the distortion of meanings, resulting from myth, leading to the suppression of complexities are due to meanings being associated ‘with other concepts or ideas that appear to be connected in some way, justifying and naturalising the way in which something is defined’ (Kelsey, 2015c, pp. 5-6).

In informing the DMA’s understanding and approach of mythology (Kelsey, 2015c), the framework takes account of such concepts and definitions of myth outlined by the linguist, semiotician, and anthropologist Roland Barthes, all of which are already endorsed by other key scholars such as Bell (2003) and Flood (2002). For instance, this project regards myth as ‘a type of speech chosen by history’ (e.g., spoken or written text, image etc.) that ‘cannot possibly evolve from the nature of things’ (Barthes, 1972, p. 110).

The project’s approach to mythology and archetypes is also informed by the body of work of other intellectuals whose relevant thoughts and ideas already form an integral part of the DMA framework (Kelsey, 2015c) with the exception of the Qur’anic narrative of the Pharaoh (Halverson *et al.*, 2011b). For instance, I refer to the work of Moore and Gillette (1992) and Hyde (1998) when discussing the myth of the Trickster. When it comes to deconstructing the analysing traits of the Tyrant King, I resort to the work of Read *et al.* (1983), Moore and Gillette (1992), and Garry and El-Shamy (2017). In addition, I discuss the traits of each of the Hero and Victim in relation to work of the following scholars: Eliade and Trask (1958), Henderson (1964), Read *et al.* (1983), Faber and Mayer (2009), McCormick and White (2011), Barlow (2012; 2017), and Coman (2018). Finally, I also draw on the master narrative of the Pharaoh as a new archetypal narrative that has never been investigated in any previous research (to my best

knowledge). In discussing the Pharaoh figure, I refer to the archetypal descriptions outlined by none other than Halverson *et al.* (2011a).

Finally, the project also understands myth as a concept that is not to be equated to the popular term of falsehood or as a synonym for “lying”, but rather as a process through which meanings and realities are being manipulated to the advantage of the storyteller (Barthes, 1972; Flood, 2002; Kelsey, 2015c).

After having discussed the theories adopted by the DMA framework, now let us turn to discussing other important aspects of the framework. The DMA traces the beginnings of its development by Dr Darren Kelsey since the year 2013, particularly in his works (Kelsey, 2013a; Kelsey, 2014; Kelsey, 2015c; Kelsey, 2016), and it is still being further developed until now. Recently, Kelsey has included other tools for the particular analyses of psycho-discursive constructions of narratives which can be found, for instance, in his works (Kelsey, 2017a; Kelsey, 2020). As summarised by Forchtner (2021):

*Darren Kelsey turns to archetypal storytelling and his discourse-mythological approach. Introducing this conceptual framework in detail, Kelsey reconstructs the various stages through which his approach has evolved, delineating concepts such as myth, discourse and narrative, and discussing the relation between affect and discourse.*

(Forchtner, 2021, p. 309)

However, I try to restrict my use of his framework mostly to his 2015 development (Kelsey, 2015c) as I believe it serves the purpose of my research better. That is because I do not want to delve deep into the psycho dimensions of narratives, even though I discuss similar ideas in this project in relation to emotion and aesthetics and draw on Kelsey’s recent ideas where possible.

Integrating the tools of critical discourse studies and other aspects of critical and cultural theory, DMA is specifically designed as a systematic framework for investigating mythology as a discursive practice of journalistic storytelling. According to Kelsey (2016, p. 973), whilst calling on Flood (2002), the ‘systematic frameworks for analysing the detailed discursive constructions of myth have been largely absent in myth theory’. DMA is, therefore, proposed not only for the purpose of filling the above gap but also to propose a unique synergy bridging the gap between journalism studies, on the one hand, and discourse studies, on the other (Kelsey, 2016).

The DMA also draws heavily on the work of all the above intellectuals to inform its theoretical and analytical foundation. In addition, DMA is informed by ideas of political myth by scholars such as Flood (2002), psychology and affect by Wetherell (2012), and mythology, memory, and national identity by Bell (2003).

In line with what was mentioned in the literature review, DMA is informed by other traditional approaches to critical discourse analysis, adopting the best of what could be offered by such approaches to the particular analysis of mythology. For instance, DMA draws on Fairclough's multidimensional model (Fairclough, 1995a), which focuses on the analysis of the three layers of discourse: textual, discursive practice, and social practice. Hence, DMA is able to discover the wider social and political mechanisms of discourse, which are concerned with anything from what the texts appear to be saying about the society within which such texts are produced in to the impact they could potentially have on social relations. It also employs tools and terms drawn from Van Dijk's Socio-cognitive approach<sup>17</sup> (1998; 2009), which particularly account for analysing macro and micro-levels of discourse. In other words, the DMA acknowledges Von Dijk's distinction between micro and macro-level of analysis: 'language use, discourse, verbal interaction and communication' are always meant to operate on the micro-level, whereas issues pertaining to power, domination, and 'inequality between the social groups' are within the macro-level (Van Dijk, 1998, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 29).

Not to forget, DMA incorporates elements from Wodak's (2009; 2016) discourse-historical approach (DHA). For instance, the DMA starts by investigating the immediate texts or linguistic elements which take place at the micro-level before going to the (macro) socio-political and historical contexts.

Kelsey explains that DMA follows in the footsteps of DHA, in the sense that it 'integrates and triangulates knowledge about historical sources and the background of the social and political fields within which discursive events are embedded' (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 43). Lastly, Kelsey, in creating his own approach, has also given particular attention to the concept of re-contextualisation of both events and texts throughout various historical contexts, drawing among other researchers, on the works of (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999a; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Wodak and Fairclough, 2010). Calling on the work of Wodak *et al.* (1999), Kelsey's DMA also pays similar attention to the concepts of historical memory and narration of the nation.

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<sup>17</sup> Abbreviated as "SCA".

In terms of DMA's treatment of ideology, the framework takes a novel point of departure which is extensively discussed in the previous chapter (section, 2.6.4). Different to the well-known tradition amongst CDA practitioners, whereby they often adopt explicit and direct socio-political positions when confronting problems in social relations (Kelsey, 2015c), and therefore, end up being criticised for being "overtly subjective", Kelsey (2015c) tackles such a point of criticism by proposing a neutral approach to ideology 'that does not necessarily argue one alternative oppositional position, but it does investigate, explore and uncover those constructions that reflect particular power relations that political research disciplines need to understand' (Kelsey, 2015c, p. 35). On this point, the academic further explains, along with David Baines:

*We propose that ideology should not be used solely in accusation or criticism (a fault that often lies with media critics and theorists) but in observation and recognition – even in one's proposed political arguments and solutions. For instance, if you criticise something for its ideological intentions, a progressive approach to ideology would accept that your counter argument might be equally ideological. This approach immediately welcomes (rather than suppresses) the possibility of discussions about structural issues involved in, for example, news production.*

(Kelsey and Baines, 2013, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 26)

Lastly, I have also incorporated new strategies into the DMA toolkit. One strategy I adopt from the DHA framework is known as *perspectivisation*. The second one is *speech acts*, drawn from the theories and taxonomies outlined by Austin (1975) and Searle (1975). I have also expanded a bit on the DMA's *predicational strategy* to include other rhetorical strategies befitting the analysis of the Arabic news articles (which can be highly rhetorical). These will be discussed in more detail prior to the analysis in Chapter 4, particularly section 4.3.

Once the analysis has reached the DMA stage, the micro-discursive analysis of the Arabic and English articles will commence, whereby linguistic expressions of mythology are unpacked and deconstructed. For the purpose of attaining a better understanding concerning the ideological role of mythological discourse, the focus will shift in the subsequent macro-analysis towards inspecting the social, political, or cultural aspects surrounding their production, distribution, and consumption of the linguistic product previously examined.

### 3.5 Data collection

This study had initially aimed at analyzing a sample drawn from secondary data, comprised of 7762 online news articles, compiled between the 3rd of July, 2013 and December 2017. However, it was later decided to only consider the data that was found between the 3rd of July, 2013 and December 2014. Aside from seeking to reduce the data, and hence, being able to downsize the sample drawn to a reasonably researchable size, the decision for sticking to the data confined between 3rd July 2013 and December 2014 was made for the following reasons: a) The chosen period covers the most significant events that are worthy of investigation, b) It has the highest concentration of news stories, as opposed to the years beyond 2014, and c) It has the highest number of possible English articles, which are overall, considerably fewer than the Arabic ones and much so going past the year 2014.

The online news articles compiled are primarily made up of the two main news genres: straight and opinion. The reason as to why the analysis of this study is restricted to these two main types of news, as opposed to others, is because they are believed to be the only two that best represent the entire discourse of Al-Jazeera. The total number of articles acquired for each news genre (that is, before the sampling) can be seen in Table 3-1.

The cause for choosing an extended period (a year and six months) is to allow enough time for examining how discursive construction of mythology appears to impact Al-Jazeera's reporting over time between the two sites.

<b>Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA)</b>		<b>Al-Jazeera English (AJE)</b>	
<b>Arabic opinions (OPA)</b>	<b>4492</b>	<b>English opinions (OPE)</b>	<b>403</b>
<b>Arabic straight news (STA)</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>English straight news (STE)</b>	<b>157</b>

*Table 3-1: The total number of articles acquired per each genre*

The articles were downloaded directly from the Arabic and English websites of Al-Jazeera:

Arabic: (<http://www.aljazeera.net/portal>).

English: (<http://www.aljazeera.com/websites>).

The two sister sites above were directly approached for data collection, and hence, they were the primary sources for obtaining secondary data. It must be noted that newspaper databases available online were not of great help, as many of Al-Jazeera articles falling within different time periods were not found. Therefore, I collected everything manually and downloaded articles, one by one, with the help of a few search terms, which were typed in the search engine bar available on both websites of Al-Jazeera.

### 3.5.1 Sampling process

As stated earlier, I used news archives available on the two sites to look up all of the above-stated news articles. Both sites enable the possibility of restricting the search to particular genres (e.g., news, opinions, programme reports, etc.). However, the advanced search feature was only available on the Arabic website, not the English one. Hence, in order to ascertain more precise search results, I had to decide on a careful choice of terms so as to not end up leaving anything relevant to the investigation untouched and, at the same time, not side-tracking towards other topics that bear no connection to the case of the study. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct different search terms each time until some proved to be more useful than others.

In all cases, the typed search terms were not supposed to exceed more than two as a maximum. Extra use of terms had proven to confuse the search process and not yield relevant results.

Unlike online newspaper database providers, the search process on Al-Jazeera has a different search logic of its own. There are no connectors or any other commands, the likes of those, for instance, in *Lexis Nexis*.

Below are the terms that have proven to be useful, as opposed to others and, hence, were chosen to search for the news articles:

- On AJA site: “مصر” and “الإخوان” “*al-Ikhwān*” and “*Miṣr*” (“brotherhood” and “Egypt”).
- On AJE site: “**Egypt**” and “**Brotherhood**”.

The search was conducted a number of times; each time, it was done for a specific genre of articles. In conducting the search process, the followings steps were followed:

- The search terms were firstly typed in the search bar.
- Using the advanced search feature, the dates were then specified as well as the desired historical order of news articles on the AJA site.
- It was important on both sites of Al-Jazeera to organise articles following a chronological order. This is quite important in order to sort the order of articles and know which article(s) come(s) before the other(s). The chronological order of articles can be traced within the folder, in which articles were saved, using the folder's tool, *Sort by date modified*.
- Advanced search features, however, were absent on AJE site, and therefore, it was not possible to specify dates. To tackle this, I resorted to the one basic feature available, which was *Sort By: Latest*. Such a feature helped in organising the search results chronologically. After having done this, the dates marking the start and end of the requested time period (3<sup>rd</sup> of July, 2013 until the end of 2014), including the articles under investigation, were looked up manually. This was done via browsing through earlier pages until reaching the first article(s) published on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, 2013 and then saving every article published from that point of time until reaching the end of 2014.
- Articles of both language sites were saved, one by one, as a *Web Page, HTML Only*. Each language version was saved in a separate file of its own.
- Duplicated and unrelated articles were then removed. Duplications, in this sense, refer to the cases of repeated articles, which for some reason, were published more than one time on either of the sites. Unrelated articles are the ones that appear to report stories around MB groups outside Egypt. They also refer to the ones that were completely irrelevant, however, were accidentally compiled in the process even though they had nothing to say about the MB.
- Pages of contents that had not been displaying correctly were fixed. These were pages that, for unknown technical reasons, had been saved and later found to display unreadable characters and symbols. With the help of the *Encoding* drop-down list available on each of those downloaded pages and then clicking *Unicode (UTF-8)*, it was possible to fix such a problem and turn the content to a readable Arabic/English format.



### 3.5.1.1 *Random sampling*

Obviously, analysing a total of 5376 articles was by no means possible. Hence, there was a need to downsize the data to reasonably researchable sample size. To do this, I opted to explore a representative sample of 10-per cent of the total population, which is 538 news articles.

Importantly, the 10-percent will have to be proportionately inclusive of all the four news genres, and most importantly, randomly and unbiasedly selected. To account for this, random sampling was deemed necessary. The random sampling was conducted with the help of a simple software tool known as *Random File Picker*<sup>18</sup>, enabling me to choose random files from a set of directories.

Before conducting the sampling, however, I encountered a problem; how to ensure that each of the four categories is given an equal number of articles within the 10-per cent sample size (538 news articles). Do I take 2.50-per cent from each? How to do so despite the disproportion in the original number of articles belonging to each of these categories? Obviously, the 2.50-per cent formula did not work in this case due to such huge discrepancies in the number of articles, as seen above in Table 3-1.

After having made some calculations, the following measures were undertaken:

- It was best to treat the STA and STE news genres on the basis of ascertaining equal raw numbers between the two rather than resorting to the 2.50-per cent solution. In other words, sameness between the two was determined by raw numbers rather than percentages.
- Next, applying the very same equal raw number principle between OPA and OPE news genres was to be done.

Simply put, there will be 144 news articles taken from each of the STA and STE; this will add up to a total of 288. In addition, there will be 125 news articles taken from each of the OPA and OPE; this complements the remaining 250 news stories and makes up the total of 538.

After having identified the required number of articles, such articles were then transformed from *HTML* to *MS Word* format. This is particularly useful in order to allow for the articles to

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<sup>18</sup> Random File Picker is a lightweight software, which enables users to choose and open random files from a set of directories. A copy of the software can be found at the following link:  
<https://klocmansoftware.weebly.com/random-file-picker.html>.

be approached and treated for thematic investigation at a later point via a QDAS-software package, known as Nvivo, which unfortunately does not recognise *HTML* documents. To help in converting the 538-news articles much faster (in groups rather than individually), the author had to draw on the use of a freeware software available on the web, known as *MultiDoc Converter*<sup>19</sup>, which was quite helpful (see Figure 3-2).

At this point, news genres were ready to be placed in a separate folder of their own in order to be later approached by the Random File Picker software for random selection. Figure 3-3 features the folder containing all the four genres, whilst Figure 3-4 features the news articles themselves being placed in separate folders of their own genre (starting from top left, STA, STE, OPA and OPE).

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<sup>19</sup> MultiDoc Converter can be accessed at the following link:  
<http://www.multidoc-converter.com/en/index.html>.




Figure 3-2: MultiDoc Converter



Figure 3-3: Folder containing the four sub-folders created for each news genre




Figure 3-4: Articles being put in separate folders consistent with their own genres.

The software was then used to carry out the random selection of articles contained in each folder, each one in turn. Firstly, the folder under investigation was identified, followed by the news articles' files. Once the articles under investigation appeared, the random selection was then initiated by clicking on the button, *Random*. Depending on how many random articles were needed to be sampled from each news genre (folder), it was determined how many times the random selection had to be carried out.

What was equally important was to maintain the total number of each news genre, adding up exactly to 538 articles (10-per cent sample). For instance, if what was required was to collect a sub-sample of the 144 STA articles, then the random selection within this particular folder had to be carried out 144 times (see Figure 3-5). The same principle was adhered to when collecting the sub-samples of each STE (144 articles = 144 times), OPA (125 articles = 125 times), and OPA (125 articles = 125 times).




Figure 3-5: Conducting the random sampling of 144 STA articles

### 3.6 Pre-DMA: coding, manual analysis, and sampling of archetypal stories

In sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, respectively, I will be discussing the ways in which each of the thematic analysis and manual analysis were conducted to assist the DMA investigation. Finally, in Section 3.6.3, the research will be addressing the manner in which the articles demonstrating the use of mythical archetypes have been sampled for the discourse investigation.

#### 3.6.1 Thematic coding

The following section concerns itself with presenting the thematic coding process that is needed for the purpose of identifying themes revolving around a) The positive evaluations of MB, their allies, and pro-MB arguments, and b) The negative evaluation of the anti-MB establishment, their allies, and anti-MB arguments.

As stated before, this is meant to assist both the manual analysis and the discursive analysis of mythology to make sense of the data before engaging in any investigation. During such stage,

the strategies of thematic analysis were carried out with the help of a Qualitative Data Analysis Software (QDAS) package, known as *Nvivo 12*.

In alignment with what was noted earlier in the thematic analysis section, it is not my desire to engage much into interpreting the underlying assumptions and meanings, which are the sole task of the DMA framework to critical discourse analysis. Principles of thematic analysis will be made use of to categorise and explore the themes concerning the positive and negative evaluations of social actors and events. I found the widely cited approach to thematic analysis developed by psychologists Braun and Clarke (2006) to be the most suited for this research; the reasons have already been justified in section 3.5.1.

### **3.6.1.1 Coding via *Nvivo 12*:**

Given the large number of news articles being electronic, and in order to assist in establishing a more organised and rigorous thematic analysis, there was a need to go about the coding process via a Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). To this end, it was my decision to use *Nvivo 12*<sup>20</sup>, as it seemed to be the best option by far when it comes to dealing with a large volume of textual data. Moreover, *Nvivo 12*, as opposed to other CAQDAS software applications, is the most frequently used at Newcastle University, where the present research is being conducted, and on which I have received much training.

When looking at its most basic features, *Nvivo 12* lends itself quite well to conducting huge data management and has helped a great deal in minimising the use of manual coding, which can often be chaotic (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). It has also contributed to more reliable research outcomes that can be particularly seen in its perspicuous pathway of analysis and the ways in which data is stored (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). More generally, the utilisation of CAQDA software applications warrants the unique advantage of speeding up the process of searching through information and the ability of creating codes and identifying relationships much faster (David and Sutton, 2007).

Such method of analysis and dealing with data was described by Sarantakos (2013, p. 396), as being ‘accurate, reliable and flexible’. In stating this, it is a fair point to say that *Nvivo 12* is not fully compatible with working with right-to-left scripts, such as Arabic.

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<sup>20</sup> *Nvivo 12* can be accessed at the following link:  
<https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo/nvivo-products/nvivo-12-plus>.

As a problem that I have personally encountered, *Nvivo 12* did not display the right margins properly and hence, some minor parts of the Arabic scripts would disappear. However, it was not much of a major issue, particularly in the latest version of the software, as I was able to read, code, and analyse to a reasonable degree. On occasions where reading through the scripts was deemed a bit challenging, I would simply resort to using a Microsoft Word document (MS), running besides *Nvivo 12*. The unclear text under examination was then copied from *Nvivo 12* into the MS document, and I would later read and highlight it more clearly. Afterwards, the very same document would be used as a guide to model on and thereafter, the whole process would be repeated on *Nvivo 12*, whereby other actions were taken, and other annotations were added. Returning to thematic analysis, I will now demonstrate the steps undertaken for conducting the analysis through *Nvivo 12*, following the framework of Braun and Clarke (2006):

### **1) Establishing familiarity with the data:**

In this step, I devoted a considerable portion of time to read and re-read the Arabic and English news articles of Al-Jazeera (AJA and AJE) with the intent of becoming more immersed and intimately familiar with their content. This phase also entailed the need for creating personal provisional notes pertaining to the themes under investigation. All that was needed was to go through each script, be it in English or Arabic, and quite simply add general notes covering the entire content as a means of signposting places or arguments concerning positive and negative evaluations. Figure 3-6 demonstrates the process through which such notes were created with the help of Nvivo's *annotation*.

Below are examples of statements that were included in the descriptive notes:

**Al-Jazeera Arabic:**

*According to AJA, Hamas which is affiliated to MB, has been under vicious and irresponsible defamation campaign that is led by the Egyptian media on grounds of plotting with MB.*

**Al-Jazeera English:**

*According to AJE, Al-Sisi has brought about an undesirable change to Egypt, which AJE constructs as an "evil one".*




Figure 3-6: Descriptive notes being added to each article using Nvivo's annotation feature



## 2) Coding:

At this point, succinct labels were generated using the very same *annotation* feature with the aim of capturing salient patterns and features across the news, which might constitute the types of themes in which the first and second research questions aim to answer. In this phase, the complete dataset was coded via the *annotation* feature collated with and assigned to different parts of relevant extracts (see Figure 3-7). Below are examples of the added codes:

**Al-Jazeera Arabic** accuses the state media of being:

*misleading*

*vicious*

*vilifying*

*conspiratorial*

**Al-Jazeera English** accuses the anti-MB establishment of the following:

*rehashing  
Islamophobia*

*justifying the  
killings*

*capitalizing on the  
fears of the Copts*






Figure 3-7: Generating labels (codes) across the scripts using Nivio's "annotation"

### 3) Looking for themes:

At this stage, the codes (labels) created previously and collated within the data were examined in order to identify important broader patterns of relevant meanings so as to create what is known as "candidate themes". In other words, there now comes a need to create two sets of initial themes for each of AJA and AJE. During this phase, candidate themes were created with the help of the *nodes* feature to represent themes, concepts, opinions, or experiences across the data (see Figure 3-8). Such *nodes* were collated with different parts of the texts that already had labels of codes attached to them and which were previously created through the the *annotation* feature in stage 2.

Furthermore, Nvivo's 12's *coding strips* were also used to help in displaying the parts of the content underwent the coding process via the use *nodes* (see Figure 3-9). Below are examples of such initial themes:

**Both Al-Jazeera Arabic and English** suggest conspiracies on the part of the anti-MB establishment whilst also pointing the finger at anti-MB parties and countries:






Figure 3-8: Nvivo's "nodes" being used for creating candidate themes




Figure 3-9: The coding process and the creation of strips representing the coded content

#### 4) Reviewing the themes:

This phase included the task of verifying the candidate themes against the dataset in order to determine whether or not such themes communicate a conclusive story of the data. It also manages to answer the first two research questions pertaining to the positive representation of the MB/their allies and the negative representation of the anti-MBs/their allies (see research questions in section 3.4). The refining process also entailed the combination or otherwise removal of certain themes. For instance, themes of “*economy*” and “*predictions*” in both articles of Al-Jazeera were merged in one single theme entitled, “*Status quo & predictions*”. This was done via the *Cut and Merge-Into-Selected-Node* process. Some themes were simply removed due to their limited reoccurrence across both sites of Al-Jazeera (such as “*Islamophobia*”).

#### 5) Defining and naming themes

With the help of the software, this phase focused mainly on thoroughly reviewing the themes and further refining the names of each. In addition, it is producing suitable informative definitions so as to better highlight and determine the focus of each and what aspect of the data each theme captures. Table 3-2 demonstrates the refined names (for both AJA and AJE combined) coupled with their descriptions of each theme, whilst Figure 3-10 demonstrates the themes (*nodes*) after having been finalised and coded.

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Descriptions</i>
<b>Criticising anti-MB gov &amp; their allies</b>	
Anti-MB media	Where media state-media attacking MB is criticised
Anti-MB gov allies	Where parties and states supporting anti-MB government are criticised
Judiciary	Where judicial system is criticised for being biased
Al-Sisi	Where president Al-Sisi is personally criticised
Status quo & predictions	Where state of affairs & the future of Egypt under the rule of post-MB government is criticised
Aligned with Israel	Where post-MB Egyptian is said to be partaking in blockading Gaza and being aligned with Israel
Anti-MB gov	Where anti-MB Egyptian government is criticised
Military & security forces	Where the military and security forces are criticised
<b>Defending MB &amp;/or their allies</b>	
Hamas	Where Hamas is defended
MB	Where MB is defended
Morsi	Where Morsi is personally defended
Pro-MB states	Where states supporting MB are defended
Rabaa	Where Rabaa’s event is talked about

*Table 3-2: Refined themes and the description of each*




Figure 3-10: The themes (nodes) after having been finalised and coded

### 3.6.2 Applying manual analysis

The manual analysis will now take on from thematic analysis by trying to make sense of how the findings of the earlier approach appeared to communicate any traces of mythical archetypes, of which discursive constructions could be later analysed in the DMA stage. In conducting the manual analysis, a template with various sections was created for recording notes and observations about the potential types of mythical archetypes that could be identified across the Arabic and English online articles of Al-Jazeera. Each and every article, be it an opinion or straight news across the two sites, was read and re-read plus evaluated against the template. The template contained sections that are informed by theories of mythical archetypes, as adopted and organised by Lule (2001) – e.g., the Victim, the Hero, and the Trickster (see Figure 3-11).

An important point to be made is that the investigation was not only conducted deductively, based on pre-determined theories but also inductively, allowing a small room for inductive investigation. In other words, other narratives could be potentially identified, which might be different to the ones adopted by Lule (2001), or might not have been even drawn on for the analysis of news discourse. The main reason for opting to devise “manual analysis” as the only tool that could best handle the second-stage examination as opposed to thematic analysis has to

do with the former being more practical and capable of fulfilling the desired objectives faster and with more efficiency. Indeed, the element of time is quite crucial; thematic analysis already served its purpose by this point. Had this been carried out through the application of thematic analysis once more, this project research would have taken a much longer time to finish due to the extensively high number of articles and the extremely longwinded procedures typically known to such an approach.

<b>Title</b>						
<b>Genre</b>	STA		STE		OPA	OPE
<b>Are there any archetypes?</b>						
<b>Yes</b>					<b>No</b>	
<b>The Hero</b>						
<b>Notes</b>						
<b>The Trickster</b>						
<b>Notes</b>						
<b>The Victim</b>						
<b>Notes</b>						
<b>The Scapegoat</b>						
<b>Notes</b>						
<b>The Flood</b>						
<b>Notes</b>						
<b>The Good Mother</b>						
<b>Notes</b>						
<b>The Other World</b>						
<b>Notes</b>						
<b>Others</b>						
<b>Notes</b>						

*Figure 3-11: Manual analysis template*

After having conducted the manual analysis, attained the results<sup>21</sup>, and identified the articles containing the archetypes, articles are then categorised and grouped according to the types of archetypes they are mostly associated with (see Figure 3-12). In other words, there will be folders for archetypes containing the news genres they are mostly identified with. For instance, the identified four news genres of the Trickster are grouped and placed within the Trickster folder, as shown in Figure 3-13. Meanwhile, in Figure 3-14, all of the OPA genre articles of the Trickster can be observed. Of course, this is done after having excluded articles, which do not seem to reflect any forms of archetypal storytelling, be it of the Trickster, the Victim, or the

<sup>21</sup> See chapter 4 Section 4.2.2.



Hero archetype. This is quite critical, as such folders will be approached later for the random sampling of the articles that are needed in the critical discourse investigation.




Figure 3-12: Articles being placed in folders based on their archetypal affiliation




Figure 3-13: Sub-folders containing the four news genres associated with the Trickster




Figure 3-14: A list of OPA articles reflecting Trickster narrative

### 3.6.3 Sampling of archetypal stories

In this stage, and in order to ensure the random sampling of articles assigned for the later critical discourse investigation, the target folders containing the articles will be accessed by the *Random File Picker* for random selection. There will be an article taken from each of the four genres found within each of the three major archetypes identified. For instance, from each of the sub-folders of the four news genres that are found within the Trickster archetype (as seen in Figure 3-13), there will be an article pulled out that is randomly picked by *Random File Picker* for the DMA investigation. The same principle will be applied to the other four sub-folders within the Victim archetype as well as those four within the Hero. Eventually, there will be 12 articles in total that are picked for the DMA investigation, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

## 3.7 Validity and reliability considerations

It is highly important for any empirical project to undergo a validity and reliability assessment. As noted by Patton (2001), these two principles are amongst the key aspects to be taken into account whilst designing, analysing, and evaluating any piece of research. In reference to validity and reliability, Creswell and Creswell (2018, p. 323) equally stress that the ‘researchers need to convey the steps they will take in their studies to check for the accuracy and credibility of their findings’. As far as this research is concerned, I will be providing a brief overview of the terminologies, as particularly applied in qualitative research. Afterwards, the author will describe the measures undertaken to ensure validity and reliability being met in the context of the present project.

Briefly speaking, Creswell and Creswell (2018, p. 323) define “validity” in qualitative research as an attempt to check for ‘the accuracy of the findings by employing certain procedures’. Reliability, meanwhile, they add, ‘indicates that the researcher’s approach is consistent across different researchers and among different projects’. As seen by LeCompte and Goetz (1982, cited in Bryman, 2012), the two concepts pay specific attention to the internal validity and reliability of the empirical project (e.g., consistent analysis and the relationship between researcher and theory). The two scholars developed certain criteria and terminologies for the particular assessment of qualitative research, which view validity and reliability along the lines of “trustworthiness” and “authenticity”. According to LeCompte and Goetz (1982), trustworthiness comprises credibility (internal validity), transferability (external validity), dependability (reliability), and confirmability (objectivity). Authenticity, meanwhile, accounts



for principles revolving around fairness and ontological, catalytic, educative, and tactical authenticities.

As far as the study is concerned, both internal validity and internal reliability were undertaken as means of ensuring the accuracy and consistency of the project. In short, internal reliability, as defined by LeCompte and Goetz (1982), refers to the involvement of more than one observer to see whether or not they would agree on a given explanation of a particular behaviour. Internal validity, meanwhile, concerns itself with whether or not ‘there is a match between researcher’s observations and the theoretical ideas they develop’ (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982, p. 379).

Internal reliability, however, was only associated with assigning other interpreters with the task of going over and verifying the English translations of Arabic news articles, which was entirely done by me in the first place (see *Appendix A*). To do this, I sought the help of two colleagues, Dr Sami Almalki and Dr Abduh Almashi, who work as English Language academics and hold PhD degrees in Applied Linguistics. These colleagues have gone over the translations and also kindly engaged other academics in the verifying process. They have both concluded that my original translations were precise and adapted to the context, idiomatic, and free of transfer and language errors. As far as Arabic transliteration is concerned, the thesis does not require any to be included, other than in the bibliography section. Nonetheless, I endeavoured to apply some transliteration in order to further simplify the description of some linguistic and rhetorical strategies, namely, modality, and rhymed prose. The transliteration was carried out in line with the Arabic romanisation table set by the Library of Congress and recommended by Newcastle University (<https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpsa/roman.html>)<sup>22</sup>.

In fulfilling the second aspect associated with internal validity, my colleagues were also entrusted with the task of checking, throughout the analysis process, regarding both thematic and manual analysis. Each one of them was given access to a) Folders containing data - online news articles, b) *Nivo 12* software application through which thematic analysis was conducted, and c) Templates which were improvised and used as a tool for conducting the manual analysis. After having inspected, whether each of thematic analysis and manual analysis truly measures that which was intended to be measured and how truthful the research results were, these colleagues have generally expressed their approval, stating that the validity was up to appropriate standards. Nevertheless, each one of them has kindly made a few recommendations. For instance, after having checked the coding process of some themes, Dr Almalki highlighted

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<sup>22</sup> The Library of Congress (2017) *ALA-LC Romanization Tables* [Website]. Available at: <https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpsa/roman.html> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).

the need to consider minimising the number of themes by, perhaps, further merging some of them. Dr Almashi, meanwhile, advised that it would be best to remove some themes altogether due to possible irrelevance and to be of low frequency.

On another note, validity was also deemed important, particularly when it comes to dealing with the task of translating religious texts borrowed from the Qur'ān<sup>23</sup>. Such texts are encountered in a number of Arabic articles and mostly comprise Qur'anic verses. In tackling this, I had no other option but to resort to the use of websites providing English translations of the Qur'ān, namely, *The Noble Qur'ān* (<https://quran.com/>)<sup>25</sup>. While using the aforementioned site, I drew, most specifically, on the translation contributions of Abdel Haleem (2004), Khattab (2015), Ali (2015), and Saheeh International (2012). The trustworthiness and accuracy of such sites have been acknowledged in a recent CDA doctoral project conducted by Alsamdani (2017). According to Alsamdani (2017, p. 72), the key advantage to such a website is that it 'offers a keyword search service, in both English and Arabic' along with 'side-by-side English translations with original Arabic texts'.

### 3.8 Summary

The chapter started by discussing the reasons for choosing to conduct the present project along with the qualitative approach to social science. Similarly, rationalised in the chapter were also the reasons for adopting and declaring CDA, among all other discourse analytical research, as particularly suitable for this project. The chapter also presented the research questions, steering the direction of this study, not without providing a detailed discussion concerning the supplementary approaches employed to supporting the DMA investigation. Afterwards, the process of data collection and sampling of articles was detailed and presented. This was succeeded by outlining the process undertaken in carrying out the thematic coding and manual analysis prior to the discourse investigation. The chapter, finally, concluded by briefly touching

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<sup>23</sup> As stated before, the Qur'ān “القرآن” along with the Sunnah “السنة” are two of the major sources of Islamic doctrinal and social views. The Qur'ān simply refers of the verbatim word of Allāh “الله” (Allah/God), may he be glorified and exalted, while the “Sunnah” refers to the sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad “محمد”, peace be upon him:

Mahdi, M.S., Schimmel, A. and Rahman, F. (1999) 'Islam', in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islam> (Accessed: 20th August, 2020).

In dealing with translating the aforementioned sacred texts, as stated before, I consulted each of the following resources:

- Quran.com (no date) *The Noble Quran* [Website]. Available at: <https://quran.com/> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).
- Sunnah.com (no date) *The Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him)* [Website]. Available at: <https://sunnah.com/> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).

on such considerations that are associated with the notions of validity and reliability and how they were fulfilled in this study. The following chapter will present the salient thematic findings that emerged under the first thematic and manual analysis stage before handing it over to the critical discourse investigation. The primary focus will be on the micro-discursive examination of articles in order to account for the linguistic constructions constituting mythology and archetypal storytelling.

## Chapter 4. Results and micro-discursive analysis

### 4.1 Introduction

The present chapter concerns itself with presenting the salient thematic findings that emerged under the first phase of the investigation (thematic and manual analysis). The themes uncovered are meant to demonstrate the positive and negative evaluations attributed to social actors and events across the Arabic and English sites of Al-Jazeera (AJA and AJE). As stated in the previous chapter, thematic analysis was mainly conducted to help the critical discourse investigation make sense of the data. Hence, it was not enough on its own to ascertain the existence of potential archetypal conventions impacting the news reporting. Therefore, I improvised “manual analysis” as another supplementary approach to take it further from the thematic analysis. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the latter method (manual analysis) was carried out for the sole purpose of directly supplementing the subsequent critical discourse investigation by attempting to reveal any potential traces of mythical archetypes. The findings of manual analysis will be included in this chapter for elucidation. Afterwards, the micro-discursive analysis of articles will be presented<sup>26</sup>. Such a type of analysis aims to explore the ways in which the archetypal conventions/mythological expressions are linguistically constructed. On this note, it is worth reminding that the micro-discursive analysis stage of the critical discourse investigation serves as a prerequisite for the subsequent macro-discursive stage (which is yet to be discussed in Chapter 5). In other words, only after the former analysis is performed will the latter be able to extend the examination to the contextual, macro-level of discourse (be it social, political, or cultural) to acquire more of a bigger picture pertaining to the ideological nuances and dynamics of mythological storytelling.

Using the DMA's<sup>27</sup> macro-discursive strategies outlined by Kelsey (2015c, pp. 40 - 49), coupled with a few additional ones I personally incorporated, the language of articles will be approached from a functional perspective. The reason for doing so is to do with the DMA framework seeing discourse as ‘a culturally and socially organised way of speaking’ (Mayr, 2008, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, pp. 31). Hence, the language is expected to be inspected in relation to ‘the social practices of which they are part’ (Fairclough, 1995a, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, pp. 31).

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<sup>26</sup> The micro-discursive analysis will occupy the greater bulk of this chapter.

<sup>27</sup> Discourse-mythological approach.

The structure of the chapter will be presented as follows: In section 4.2., the findings of each of the thematic analysis and manual analysis will be presented in subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively. Afterwards, the micro-discursive analysis will take place in section 4.3. However, at the start of the section, an overview of the macro-discursive strategies will be offered in subsection 4.3.1. Afterwards, in subsection 4.3.2, the examination of articles will commence. Each archetypal category will be allocated a dedicated section of its own: The Victim, the Hero, the Trickster and, the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King in sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.3, and 4.3.2.4, in the order given. Finally, a summary of the entire chapter will be presented in section 4.4.

**Note:**

As previously introduced in Chapter 2, section 2.3.2, and once more in Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.3, the project identifies another original, albeit secondary archetypal category, known as the Martyr figure. Nonetheless, the aforementioned narrative was deemed best not to be included in either of the two analysis chapters for obvious reasons. Firstly, the emergence of the Martyr archetype was not the direct result of the manual analysis technique. In fact, it was only identified after having already analysed and discussed the Victim and the Hero archetypal figures. Being the child of parent archetypes (the Victim and the Hero), the Martyr already shares common traits with the two narratives. By the end of the two analysis chapters, such traits will have already been discussed as part of the Hero and the Victim. As such, it will also not be allocated a dedicated section of its own in either of the analysis chapters. Instead, it will be briefly discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.2.6.

## **4.2 Findings of thematic and manual analysis**

This section below is split into two parts. The first one (subsection 4.2.1) will address the thematic landscape pertaining to the positive and negative evaluations of the social actors and events, along with extract examples. Subsection 4.2.2, meanwhile, will present the findings of the manual analysis in which the initial traces of mythical archetypes were identified to supplement the critical discourse investigation.

### **4.2.1 Thematic analysis**

As seen in the methodology chapter, thematic analysis techniques were carried out with the help of the Qualitative Data Analysis software (QDAS), *Nvivo 12*. The task was primarily to explore and identify the common themes throughout the articles revolving around a) the positive portrayals of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and/or their allies and b) the negative

portrayal of the anti-MB social actors and/or their allies. Of course, such themes, as mentioned before, were not enough on their own to confirm the existence of archetypal patterns. This owes to the fact that thematic analysis was simply employed to aid discourse analysis in understanding the general patterns and trends within the data, but not to engage in the identification of mythical archetypes; a task was left the manual analysis to handle.

As will be discussed below, subsection 4.2.1.1 will focus on addressing the types of themes that emerged across the two sites of Al-Jazeera (AJA and AJE). Next, the differences between the thematic concentrations, either within the one single monolingual site or between the two sites, will be discussed in subsection 4.2.1.2. Finally, subsection 4.2.1.3 will present extract examples of every theme identified: There will be four extracts per each theme, one extract taken from each news genre.

#### 4.2.1.1 Themes identified between AJA and AJE

As can be seen in Table 1-1, the overall themes identified across the two sites of Al-Jazeera are listed along with their descriptions. The top section of the table (Criticising anti-MB gov & their allies) encompasses the kind of themes in which the anti-MB social actors and their allies are negatively qualified. Meanwhile, the lower section (Defending MB &/or their allies) contains themes that revolve around the positive portrayals of the MB and their allies.

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Descriptions</i>
<b>Criticising anti-MB gov &amp; their allies</b>	
Anti-MB media	Where media state-media attacking MB is criticised
Anti-MB gov allies	Where parties and states supporting anti-MB government are criticised
Judiciary	Where judicial system is criticised for being biased
Al-Sisi	Where president Al-Sisi is personally criticised
Status quo & predictions	Where state of affairs & the future of Egypt under the rule of post-MB government is criticised
Aligned with Israel	Where post-MB Egyptian is said to be partaking in blockading Gaza and being aligned with Israel
Anti-MB gov	Where anti-MB Egyptian government is criticised
Military & security forces	Where the military and security forces are criticised
<b>Defending MB &amp;/or their allies</b>	
Hamas	Where Hamas is defended
MB	Where MB is defended
Morsi	Where Morsi is personally defended
Pro-MB states	Where states supporting MB are defended
Rabaa	Where Rabaa's event is talked about

*Table 4-1: Emerged themes and the description of each*

Looking at the two diagrams in Picture 4-1, there does not seem to be much of a huge difference in relation to the thematic categories between the two sites. The only difference, perhaps, can be seen in AJE being only short of three categories as opposed to AJA. These are “*Hamis*”, “*Aligned with Israel*”, and “*pro-MB states*”.




Figure 4-1: Thematic diagrams featuring similarities and variations between the two sites

#### 4.2.1.2 Construction of themes between the two sites and within each

Of course, both AJA and AJE websites exhibit thematic variations pertaining to their positive and negative evaluations of social actors and events. Such variations are also found within each individual monolingual site. Further differences are also revealed after having compared similar news genres against each other (e.g., OPA vs OPE or STA vs STE).

As shown in Tables 4-2 and 4-3, such categories focusing on the negative representation of anti-MB social actors (listed under “*Criticising anti-MB gov & their allies*”) seem to have received more attention than those that revolve around the positive portrayals of their opponents (listed under “*Defending MB &/or their allies*”). This can be determined by looking at the “*Number of stories*”, associated with the negative thematic category<sup>28</sup> being higher than the

<sup>28</sup> The negative category represents the themes listed under “*Criticising anti-MB gov & their allies*”.

positive category<sup>29</sup> in both tables. More importantly, such varying emphasis can also be interpreted by considering the number of “References”<sup>30</sup> in both tables. Likewise, the references associated with negative categories are generally higher than those belonging to positive ones. In other words, both AJA and AJE, represented by all of their four news genres, appear to be more engaged in attacking the anti-MB social actors and their allies than defending the MB and their allies.

Another variation between the thematic categories can also be identified when attempting to compare similar news genres against each other (e.g., OPA versus OPE or STA versus STE). As illustrated in Table 4-2, all the positive and negative categories appear to have attracted more OPA articles than OPE ones. Likewise, the number of references associated with the OPA articles appears to be higher than that of the OPE articles. In the same way, as evidenced in Table 4-3, the positive and negative categories seem to have scored a higher number of STA reports than is the case with the STE ones. The references are also found to be higher in the former group than they are in the latter one.

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<sup>29</sup> The positive category represents the themes listed under “Defending MB &/or their allies”.

<sup>30</sup> “References” is an NVivo term that stands for the total number of times each theme is coded in a single article and across all the articles within the sample:

Edhlund, B. and McDougall, A. (2020) *NVivo 12 essentials*. London: Lulu Press.



<i>Themes</i>	<i>Arabic opinion articles (OPA)</i>		<i>English opinion articles (OPE)</i>	
	<i>No. of stories</i>	<i>References</i>	<i>No. of stories</i>	<i>References</i>
<b>Criticising anti-MB gov &amp; their allies</b>				
Anti-MB media	37	59	17	27
Anti-MB gov allies	54	118	31	61
Judiciary	80	192	47	161
Al-Sisi	84	319	48	262
Status quo & predictions	97	273	65	159
Aligned with Israel			Nothing found	Nothing found
Anti-MB gov	117	823	76	424
Military & security forces	102	286	75	333
<b>Defending MB &amp;/or their allies</b>				
Hamas	39	270	Nothing found	Nothing found
MB	81	244	24	111
Morsi	37	129	8	100
Pro-MB states	25	60	Nothing found	Nothing found
Rabaa	33	65	10	50

*Table 4-2: Arabic opinion articles (OPA) versus their English counterparts (OPE)*

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Arabic straight news (STA)</i>		<i>English straight news (STE)</i>	
	<i>No. of stories</i>	<i>References</i>	<i>No. of stories</i>	<i>References</i>
<b>Criticising anti-MB gov &amp; their allies</b>				
Anti-MB media	25	43	21	28
Anti-MB gov allies	12	15	21	33
Judiciary	71	297	73	333
Al-Sisi	64	348	55	226
Status quo & predictions	40	69	52	99
Aligned with Israel	9	20	Nothing found	Nothing found
Anti-MB gov	101	363	58	127
Military & security forces	100	370	108	299
<b>Defending MB &amp;/or their allies</b>				
Hamas	12	41	Nothing found	Nothing found
MB	53	102	15	61
Morsi	11	56	2	15
Pro-MB states	11	44	Nothing found	Nothing found
Rabaa	44	138	9	26

*Table 4-3: Arabic straight news stories (STA) versus their English counterparts (STE)*

In other words, irrespective of the news genres, all of the above themes, as indicated in Table 4-4, seem to have gained the attention of more Arabic articles than English ones. Furthermore, the very themes appear to have recorded a higher number of references in the former language group as opposed to the latter one.

<i>Themes</i>	<i>All Arabic articles (OPA + STA)</i>		<i>All English articles (OPE + STE)</i>	
	No. of stories	References	No. of stories	References
<b>Criticising anti-MB gov &amp; their allies</b>				
Anti-MB media	49	102	38	55
Anti-MB gov allies	66	133	52	94
Judiciary	151	489	120	501
Al-Sisi	148	667	103	488
Status quo & predictions	137	342	117	258
Aligned with Israel	46	174	Nothing found	Nothing found
Anti-MB gov	218	1186	134	551
Military & security forces	202	686	183	676
<b>Defending MB &amp;/or their allies</b>				
Hamas	51	311	Nothing found	Nothing found
MB	134	346	39	172
Morsi	48	185	10	115
Pro-MB states	36	104	Nothing found	Nothing found
Rabaa	77	203	19	76

*Table 4-4: Arabic articles on AJA contrasted with the English ones on AJE*

#### **4.2.1.3 Extract examples**

The chapter, at this point, will endeavour to offer some textual examples of the themes obtained from the two sites. As there are four news genres (OPA, OPE, STA and STE), there will be four extracts allocated to each theme. Extracts will be listed in two different tables: Table 4-5 will include the sort of extracts associated with the negative portrayals of the anti-MB social actors and their allies. Table 4-6, on the other hand, will include such categories expressing support for the MB and their allies.

Themes	Genres	Extract examples
Anti-MB media	<b>OPA</b> (Arabic)	لم تفتأ تنكي نار الفتنة من خلال منات الأخبار والتقارير <b>Translation:</b> never cease from reviving the fire of fitmah (sedition)
	<b>OPE</b> (English)	outsmarting even Goebbels', in instituting lies and vilifying the Egyptians
	<b>STA</b> (Arabic)	في عهد مرسي استمر العديد من الصحفيين والإعلاميين في مهاجمته <b>Translation:</b> During Morsi's presidency, many journalists and media personnel continued to attack him
	<b>STE</b> (English)	false reports in pro-military media outlets
Al-Sisi	<b>OPA</b> (Arabic)	السيبي ومن معه كانوا أكثر جرماً من فرعون ومن معه <b>Translation:</b> Al-Sisi and his soldiers were much worse than Pharaoh and his soldiers
	<b>OPE</b> (English)	El-Sisi's reign of terror and the propoganda of 'fascism'
	<b>STA</b> (Arabic)	إن السيبي شخصية سايكوباثية كاملة الأوصاف <b>Translation:</b> Al-Sisi is a full-fledged psychopath
	<b>STE</b> (English)	Sisi played a leading role in the July 2013 military coup
Aligned with Israel	<b>OPA</b> (Arabic)	تتقاطع (الحملة الإعلامية المصرية ضد حماس) مع مصالح وأجندات الاحتلال <b>Translation:</b> The media campaign against Hamas shares common interests and agendas with the Israeli occupation
	<b>OPE</b> (English)	Egypt joins Israel as Gaza's jailer
	<b>STA</b> (Arabic)	هل ستلجأ إلى إسرائيل لتعصمك من الأحرار؟ <b>Translation:</b> Will you turn to Israel to shield you from the freemen (of Egypt)?
	<b>STE</b> (English)	Egypt's military rulers have fallen into a "conspiracy" hatched by the US and Israel to weaken Muslims
Anti-MB gov	<b>OPA</b> (Arabic)	تعلم ميلاد جمهورية القتل <b>Translation:</b> announcing the birth of the republic of murder
	<b>OPE</b> (English)	fuses the state and society so solidly that nothing substantially political remains in between
	<b>STA</b> (Arabic)	دولة السيبي ساعة، ودولة الحق إلى قيام الساعة <b>Translation:</b> A state that is built on falsehood such as that of Al-Sisi's will only last for an hour, and a state that is built on truth will last until the coming of the Day of Judgment
	<b>STE</b> (English)	We trust that the peaceful and popular will of the people shall triumph over force and oppression
Military & security forces	<b>OPA</b> (Arabic)	تكشّر عن أنيابها وتمارس فعل الاقتراس <b>Translation:</b> monstrous creatures, grinning their fangs to exercise predation
	<b>OPE</b> (English)	What did the army and police do when not one or two but dozens of churches were set on fire?
	<b>STA</b> (Arabic)	مقتل العشرات بمجزرة الحرس الجمهوري ثم مقتل أربع سيدات بمدينة المنصورة كانا أكبر هذه الأحداث أثراً وإيلاماً <b>Translation:</b> The killing of dozens at the Republican Guard headquarters and the killing of four women in the city of Mansoura are two of the biggest and most painful of these events.
	<b>STE</b> (English)	military trying to turn the clock back to dictatorships of the past

Table 4-5: Extract examples of themes criticising anti-MB social actors and/or their allies

Themes	Genres	Extract examples
Hammas	OPA (Arabic)	تشق طريقها نحو تحرير الأرض والمقدسات <b>Translation:</b> works its way up to the liberation of the land and holy sanctuaries
	OPE (English)	For all the rumours of a Hamas takeover of Sinai, it was actually Israel that extended its military operations into Egyptian territory
	STA (Arabic)	كان مشهدا غريبا أن تشيد القناة "الثانية" في التلفزيون الإسرائيلي بمنبوعة مصرية تطالب الجيش صراحة بمساعدة جيش الاحتلال الإسرائيلي للقضاء على حركة المقاومة الإسلامية (حماس) <b>Translation:</b> It was a strange sight seeing the Israeli "Channel 2", praising an Egyptian female anchor who overtly called on the Egyptian army to aid the Israeli occupation and join forces in obliterating the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hammas)
	STE (English)	Egyptian media have focused the criticism more at Hamas than on the Israeli bombardment
MB	OPA (Arabic)	الإسلام السياسي الأكثر توافقا مع التركيبة الدينية، والنفسية، والاجتماعية، والثقافية، والحضارية للإنسان في المنطقة <b>Translation:</b> Political Islam is simply the most compatible thought with the spiritual, psychological, social, and cultural formation of an individual in the region
	OPE (English)	fighting for 'democracy' and 'democratic values'
	STA (Arabic)	قتاوى حمل السلاح وقتل المزيد في صفوف الإخوان أخطاء فردية <b>Translation:</b> fatwas that call for bearing arms and killing more among the Brotherhood are the mistakes of individuals
	STE (English)	sticking to our ground, we will not be brought into a cycle of violence
Morsi	OPA (Arabic)	مرسي منتخب بارادة شعبية، فضلا عن وجود تأييد شعبي للرئيس مرسي على الأرض لا يمكن تجاهله <b>Translation:</b> Morsi was elected by the will of the people. The president already enjoys popular support on the ground, which cannot be overlooked
	OPE (English)	illegal imprisonment of Morsi
	STA (Arabic)	دفاعاً عن الحرية التي اشتهم المصريون أولى نسماتها في عهد مرسي <b>Translation:</b> not in defence of anyone or any party other than the very freedom from the days of Morsi
	STE (English)	the army's overthrow of Egypt's first the democratically-elected president, Mohamed Morsi
Pro-MB states	OPA (Arabic)	شقت تركيا طريقها إلى الحرية السياسية والازدهار الاقتصادي والانسجام الاجتماعي <b>Translation:</b> Turkey has made its way towards freedom, economic prosperity, and social harmony
	OPE (English)	In this impassioned denunciation, Erdogan is not just giving a knee-jerk response but articulating Turkey's lessons of history
	STA (Arabic)	الأثر اك أكثر من يفهم الفارق بين حكم العسكر المرير والحكم المدني الديمقراطي <b>Translation:</b> Turkish people are the ones who understand the most the difference between a bitter military rule as opposed to that which is civil and democratic
	STE (English)	Prime Minister Erdogan's realism is the reason for the success of political Islam in Turkey
Rabaa	OPA (Arabic)	رابعة بأنه مجزرة القرن، بل قد تكون مجزرة الإنسانية جمعاء <b>Translation:</b> Rabaa is, indeed, the massacre of the century, or rather the entire humanity
	OPE (English)	The Rabaa massacre will haunt the people of Egypt for years
	STA (Arabic)	تواصل الإدانات لمجزرة رابعة العدوية <b>Translation:</b> Commendations of Rabaa's massacre continue
	STE (English)	Egypt's Rabaa deaths 'crime against humanity'

Table 4-6: Extract examples of themes supporting MB and/or their allies

## 4.2.2 Manual analysis

The section at hand presents the findings of the manual analysis, which was the second supplementary stage directly supporting the critical discourse investigation. By capitalising on the earlier stage of thematic analysis and, more importantly, drawing on the archetypal narratives adopted and applied by Lule (2001) through his own work, the manual analysis was meant to reveal the initial traces of mythical archetypes impacting the positive and negative representation of social actors and events.

As shown in Table 4-7, the three major mythical archetypes which were made possible to detect across the ten per cent sample (comprising of 538 news articles) are the Victim, the Hero, and the Trickster. The table features which archetype appears to be more dominant than others. For example, the Trickster seems to be the one most recurrent throughout the stories. Since the Trickster, as far as the analysis is concerned, is mostly associated with the negative portrayals of the anti-MB social actors and their allies, this backs up what was similarly demonstrated early on in the thematic analysis section (4.2.1): Al-Jazeera is, indeed, engaged in vilifying anti-MB social actors more so than defending the MB. The second most dominant archetype is the Victim, followed by the Hero, which is the lowest one of the three. Indeed, both the Victim and the Hero archetypes are linked to the positive portrayals of the MB and pro-MB social actors. What can also be observed in Table 4-7 is that the three aforementioned archetypes appear to be slightly more present across the Arabic articles than in the English ones. Moreover, they are similarly more prevalent in the opinion articles as opposed to the straight news reports.

<i>The archetypes</i>	<i>The total number of stories containing each archetype</i>			
	<i>OPA (out 125)</i>	<i>OPE (out 125)</i>	<i>STA (out 144)</i>	<i>STE (out 144)</i>
The Trickster	121	83	119	91
The Victim	94	67	81	57
The Hero	36	21	11	7

*Table 4-7: The total number of news stories containing each archetype*

### 4.2.2.1 New archetypes

Aside from the above major archetypes, there other articles which appear to be sharing interesting archetypal depiction. Based on personal observation, such depiction appears to be substantially recurrent throughout Al-Jazeera's reporting overall (i.e., within and beyond the scope of the data). Thanks to the application of manual analysis, allowing some room for an inductive search for mythical narratives, it was interestingly possibly to identify new more

categories. These are the Pharaoh and the Tyrant King figures. The two patterns, more specifically, the archetypal Pharaoh, appear to be of particular relevance to the context of Egypt. As far as this project is concerned, the Pharaoh and the Tyrant figures are merged into one single category due to both narratives sharing similar aspects. Hence, I propose the “The Tyrant (Pharaoh) King” archetype. Now the Pharaoh narrative, as discussed before in the literature and methodology chapters and will later be revisited in the discussion chapter, is of an Islamic and cultural significance that appears to be mostly exclusive to the land of Egypt. Being deeply ingrained in the country’s national DNA and memory, such an archetype is expected to resonate with the collective psyche of the Egyptian audience. This is, firstly, due to Egyptians themselves being of a Muslim majority who can frequently draw on and relate to similar stories in the Qur’ān. Secondly, and by no means less important, it is due to the Egyptians being self-aware of their past and their country’s ancient pharaonic heritage.

The habit of a) portraying President Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi as a “pharaoh” and b) summoning the nation’s pharaonic past every now and then can be easily identified across the numerous stories of Al-Jazeera. Within the small sample of the project, however, such references appear to be found only within three articles. All such articles belong to one single Arabic category, the opinion (OPA). Despite the scarcity encountered of such a narrative within the present sample, it would still be a good idea to account for it where it is found as it can yield interesting insights, warranting originality and contribution. Accordingly, the chapter will allocate a dedicated section for the archetypal category of the “pharaoh” to be discussed along with the others.

### **4.3 Micro-discursive analysis**

Before moving on to the actual analysis of the articles, the DMA’s micro-discursive strategies will first be defined and discussed. Such devices are different to the macro-discursive ones, which are yet to be discussed in Chapter 5. Of course, as Kelsey (2015c) states in his book, the DMA’s toolkit is never intended to be fixed. Instead, he welcomes the inclusion of new tools as they become required. Therefore, it is equally important to mention that the research at hand also incorporates some new strategies into the DMA apparatus. The first strategy is adopted from the well-known discourse-historical approach (DHA) to critical discourse studies. Such a tool is termed as “*perspectivisation*” (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33).

The second strategy incorporated is known as “*speech acts*”. Such a tool is informed by the theories and taxonomies outlined by Austin (1975) and Searle (1975). Furthermore, the project at hand does slightly expand on the use of “*predication*”. This is done by means of including

further rhetorical strategies befitting the specific analysis of the Arabic language, of which usage and style can be highly rhetorical. The reasons as to why all of the above devices are integrated into the DMA framework will be detailed in the section below.

### **4.3.1 The micro-discursive strategies**

#### **4.3.1.1 Lexical choice:**

Such strategy is crucial if we are to understand the reinforcement of us-and-them dichotomy in the portrayals of events and social actors. Lexical devices are known for playing an ideological role that is manifested in the positive and the negative labelling of social actors and ideas. Van Dijk (1995, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 45) provides an example of an occasion where an individual can be referred to either in positive or negative lexicons. This can be demonstrated in the use of the term “freedom fighter” as opposed to “terrorist”. He points out that the lexical strategies can be used indirectly and that they can be coded. This can also be exemplified in referring to certain groups and parties as either “moderate” or “radical”, depending on whether or not they are viewed as friends, foes, or neutral. Such representations reflect clear biases, and hence, intended to shape the opinions of those who attempt to interpret them. Furthermore, lexical strategies possess the propensity of delegitimising groups and justifying actions.

#### **4.3.1.2 Indexical meanings:**

Indexicality is known for playing referential roles within the texts. ‘The way that they refer to, and label, certain characters in a story acts ideologically’ (Kelsey, 2015c, p. 44). For instance, one who is accused of committing certain offences could be labelled in such terms exhibiting a sense of sub-humanity, depravity, or animalistic abandon. This can be exemplified in referring to a male character as a “monster”, “maniac”, “beast”, etc. On the other hand, a male who is to be perceived as “innocent” features inferences to his domestic role such as “family man” or “hubby” (Richardson, 2007, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 44).

#### **4.3.1.3 Predication:**

According to Wodak and Meyer (2016, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 47) , predication is ‘the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena’.

Moreover, it considers the choice of expressions used in representing ‘more directly the values and characteristics of social actors’ (Richardson, 2007, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 47). This, of course, is all carried out ‘more or less positively or negatively’ (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33).

▪ ***Expanding on predication:***

Kelsey’s (2015c) *predication* is elaborated on in the project to include further rhetorical devices outlined by Wodak and Meyer (2016). Due to Arabic data being at times highly rhetorical, it was deemed important to incorporate further apparatuses into the predicational toolkit, which befit the use and style of the very language per se. These include *asyndeton*<sup>31</sup>, *enumeration*<sup>32</sup>, *anaphora*<sup>33</sup>, *metanoia*<sup>34</sup>, *antithesis*<sup>35</sup>, and *simile*<sup>36</sup>. All of such devices are detailed by Harris (1980) - as seen in the footnotes - with the exception of *al-Saj* ‘السجع’<sup>37</sup> (rhymed prose), of which understanding comes from Prendergast (2015).

**4.3.1.4 Metaphors:**

Metaphors, as viewed by Edelman, (1971, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 46) are the sort of words being used for ‘simplifying and giving meaning to complex and bewildering sets of observations that evoke concern’. Kelsey (2015c) also draws on Bastow (2008, p. 155), who states that the importance of metaphorical comparison lies in the fact that it offers sets of assertions or evaluations that, when constantly repeated to a certain degree, they become in time ‘naturalized part of the mental framework of its producers and consumers’. Metaphors are also argued to be mostly associated with cogitation. Hence, they can be seen as aspects of human thought whose task is to make it possible for people to make sense and structure any given thoughts by means of connections drawn between diverse experiences (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980 cited in Kelsey, 2015c).

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<sup>31</sup> Asyndeton consists of omitting conjunctions between words, phrases, or clauses.

<sup>32</sup> Enumeration is the detailing of parts, causes, effects, or consequences to make a point more forcibly.

<sup>33</sup> Anaphora is the repetition of the same utterance or utterances at the beginning of successive phrases, clauses, or sentences, commonly in conjunction with climax and with parallelism.

<sup>34</sup> Metanoia is the attempt of qualifying a statement by recalling it (or part of it) and expressing it in a better, milder, or stronger way.

<sup>35</sup> Antithesis establishes a clear, contrasting relationship between two ideas by joining them together or juxtaposing them, often in parallel structure.

<sup>36</sup> Simile is the comparison between two different things that resemble each other in at least one way.

<sup>37</sup> Although *al-Saj* (السجع) is often translated in an elaborated form of rhymed prose, it is almost certainly a very early form of poetic expression that is mostly associated with Arabic literature and religious texts, including the Qur’ān “القرآن”. More on this literary device can be referred to in the following source:

Allen, R. (1999) 'Arabic literature', in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/art/Arabic-literature> (Accessed: 8th December, 2020).



#### **4.3.1.5 Hyperbole:**

The strategy concerns itself, according to Van Dijk (1995c cited in Kelsey, 2015c), with any forms of excessive exaggeration of certain aspects within given texts. In other words, the term considers the ways in which events or actions are described ‘in strongly exaggerated terms’ (Van Dijk, 1995c cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 44).

#### **4.3.1.6 Generalisation:**

Generalisation can be described as instances within a given text exhibiting broader oversimplifying discursive processes whereby a given issue expands beyond ‘one person or a small group to a larger group or category’ (Van Dijk, 1995c, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 44).

#### **4.3.1.7 Modality:**

Modality is an important strategy that aims at revealing the attitudes and opinions of authors/writers pertaining to what they deem right or wrong. As explained by Mayr (2008, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 46), modality considers the ‘different ways in which people can temper or qualify their messages and express attitudes and judgements of various kinds’. They normally take the form of ‘modal verbs’, ‘modal adverbs’, ‘copular verbs’ or ‘cognition verbs’ (Mayr, 2008, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 46).

#### **4.3.1.8 Perspectivisation:**

The strategy helps in revealing more about the authors’ personal views and biases. Briefly, perspectivisation, as described by Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 33), considers the speakers or writers’ positions and viewpoints and how they express involvement or distance themselves. As will be seen later in the analysis, the use of perspectivisation appears to be mostly carried out via personal deixes<sup>38</sup>.

#### **4.3.1.9 Speech acts:**

Both Arabic and English news articles at times (particularly straight news reports) do not necessarily reflect enough cases of modality if nothing at all. As a result, attempting to pinpoint

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<sup>38</sup> Personal deixes are pronouns, such as I, you, we, etc. According to Trifonas (2015, p. 283), personal deixes, generally, ‘indicate relationships among people. These could be indicated by gesture (e.g., pointing at someone) or through language (e.g., pronouns).’:

Trifonas, P.P. (2015) *International handbook of semiotics*. New York: Springer.

the viewpoints of the authors and the ways in which they temper certain situations can become slightly more challenging. Hence, “speech acts” come into play as substitutes for modalities. As far as this project is concerned, there are two types of speech acts that I particularly need and, therefore, incorporate into the DMA framework. Both are drawn from the theories and taxonomies outlined by Austin (1975) and Searle (1975). The first one is known as the “assertive speech act”, which, in the context of the research, intends to inform readers as to how things are in the world, based on the point of view of the writer. Therefore, it does commit the latter to the truth of his/her propositions. This can be found, for instance, in the authors’ statements, descriptions, clarifications, etc. The second one is known as the “indirect speech act”. At least in the context of the study, indirect speech acts tend to mostly take the forms of rhetorical questions. Although they appear as interrogative in structure, they exhibit an assertive force and usually do not expect an answer.

### **4.3.2 The analysis of articles**

Moving on to the analysis of articles, the archetypes, as stated in the introduction, will be discussed in the following order: the Victim archetype in section 4.3.2.1, the Hero archetype in section 4.3.2.2, the Trickster archetype in section 4.3.2.3 and finally, the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King archetype in section 4.3.2.4. Since the focus of this chapter is centred on mythical archetypes, it would be sensible, therefore, to depart from the findings of manual analysis rather than those of thematic analysis. That said, thematic categories will be referred to near the start of each archetypal section. At the start of each section, a brief description of the article under examination will be presented. This will be followed, as stated before, by a table featuring the themes identified within the very article coupled with some descriptions. Finally, it is worth reminding that the articles were randomly selected with the help of a software tool known as *Random File Picker*<sup>39</sup>. This was previously discussed in the methodology, section 3.7.3. The micro-discursive analysis will now start as of section 4.3.2.

#### **A note to the reader:**

Progressing from this point forward, the reader may observe some instances throughout the analysis where the agency and intent of certain discursive practices are overstated in the Arabic news stories more so than in the sanitised English ones. In other words, the reader may find out that the AJA articles, particularly the opinion pieces, appear to be written in a more assertive,

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<sup>39</sup> Random File Picker is a lightweight software, which enables users to choose and open random files from a set of directories. A copy of the software can be found at the following link: <https://klocmansoftware.weebly.com/random-file-picker.html>.

passionate, impressionistic, and poetic type of style. Moreover, it seems to employ more rhetorical devices and assertive modalities and draw a lot on Arabic literature and Islamic texts. The reasons as to why this appears to be the case are extensively discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.4. Indeed, I dedicated the aforementioned section to address the different editorial lines between the two language versions of Al-Jazeera and the ways in which they appear to impact on the discourse and output of each channel differently. For, unlike its English sister, AJA relies on no written or explicit guidelines. Additionally, it does not answer to any external regulators other than communicating the direct wishes and desires of its Qatari sponsors and financiers (Barkho, 2021). This has resulted in the AJA's editorial lines being 'subject to exaggeration and discretion' (Barkho, 2021, pp. 1366), something which has mirrored in its reporting style. For instance, there have been occasions where a number of AJA's reporters, anchors, and presenters have been found 'citing verses from the Holy Koran during news bulletins' and employing 'proverbs and verses from Hadeeth (sayings of the prophet)', as observed by Barkho (2021, p. 1368). There has also been 'so much reliance on heritage, religion, sectarianism, and history in interpreting present communicative events' (Barkho, 2021, p. 1368). Moreover, AJA, as highlighted by Barkho (2021, p. 1364), is extremely keen on recruiting reporters who are 'well versed and fluent in Arabic', and most importantly, 'skillful, in their use of expressive terms'. As far as AJA is concerned, 'eloquence of style is a barometer of excellence', and it is of greater importance than the principles of impartiality and objectivity (Barkho, 2021, p. 1364). With all of the abovementioned points in mind, it is also worth pointing out that some of the writers and columnists are of Islamist/pro-Islamist backgrounds themselves (see Chapter 5). This may also justify the overuse of sensationalist and assertive language use, as will be demonstrated in this chapter and the ones to follow.

### 4.3.2.1 *The Victim*

This section provides the micro-discursive analysis of articles obtained from four random news genres. The analysis intends to explore the ways in which the archetypal Victim is linguistically constructed. The four news genres include:

- Two monolingual opinion articles, one from each of AJA and AJE.
- Two monolingual straight news reports, one from each of AJA and AJE.

The macro-discursive analysis of the articles can be found in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.2.1). Articles in this section will be referred to by the following abbreviations:

- **OPA-V** (An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

*الطريق إلى المذبحة*

*The road to the carnage*

#### **Section 4.3.2.1.1**

- **OPE-V** (An English opinion piece)

*The tragedy of Rabaa*

#### **Section 4.3.2.1.2**

- **STA-V** (An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

*بأي ذنب قتلوا سيدات المنصورة؟*

*For what sin they killed the ladies of Mansoura?*

#### **Section 4.3.2.1.3**

- **STE-V** (An English straight news story)

*Massacre in Cairo deepens Egypt crisis*

#### **Section 4.3.2.1.4**

#### 4.3.2.1.1 OPA-V

### الطريق إلى المذبحة

### The road to the carnage <sup>40</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

#### Brief description:

Husam Shakir (حسام شاكر), the author of the following opinion piece (Shakir, 2013) criticises what he refers to as “the coup” for being responsible, as far as he sees it, of committing “massacres” in Egypt. According to Shakir, despite how already shocking those killings were, what is equally shocking, is that the anti-MB social actors appear to have the audacity to lay the blame on the MB and their supporters for the killings that have befallen upon them. It is in that sense that Shakir seems to depict MB and their supporters along the lines of the Victim narrative.

#### Themes covered in the article:

- **Anti-MB gov** *The anti-MB government is criticised as “illegitimate and anti-democratic”. Both the government and the media are said to exercise “victim-blaming” against the MB supporters and encourage their obliteration.*
- **Anti-MB media**
- **Military & security** *Military is strongly condemned for allegedly killing the MB and the use of excessive force.*
- **Rabaa** *Rabaa is condemned and referred to as a “massacre” and “tragedy”. The “slain” demonstrators are mourned.*

#### Micro-discursive analysis:

Starting with lexical choice, the strategy can be evident in the employment of labels and lexicons, supporting what the columnist generally sees as “atrocities” and “injustice” taking place in Egypt. All of such negative categories appear to support the representation of the MB and their supporters as “victims”. For instance, the military is said to have committed a *carnage* “مقتلة”, and the removal of the MB is labelled as *military coup* “إنقلاب عسكري”, led by *the republic of murder* “جمهورية القتل” (the Egyptian government). Moreover, the anti-MB social actors are referred to as *the lords of the coup* “أرباب الانقلاب”, while the army and security forces

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<sup>40</sup> For full article, see Script 1 (OPA-V), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.1.1.

are called *the forces of the coup* “قوات الانقلاب”. Furthermore, the anti-MB media are referred to as *misinformation machine* “آلة التضليل”. The deeds of the anti-MB social actors are termed as *massacres* “مجازر”, *bloodshed* “سفك الدماء”, *carnage* “مذبحة”, *atrocities* “فظائع”, *violations* “إنتهاكات”, *torture* “تعذيب”, *attacks* “هجمات”, *crimes* “جرائم”, *eradication* “فتك”, and *liquidation* “تصفية جسدية”.

Moreover, a tone of grief and dismay appears to be expressed throughout the representation of Rābi‘ah event<sup>41</sup> (Rabaa). This can be exemplified in referring to Rabaa in terms and phrases, such as *the day of the tragedy* “يوم الفاجعة”, *scandal* “فضيحة”, and *targeting* “إستهداف”. Similar references can be found in labelling the MB as *victims* “ضحايا” and *fellow countrymen* “شركاء الوطن”. Additionally, “the cause” for which the MB is said to be “fighting”, is branded as *the cause of right and freedom* “قضية حق وحرية”. Lexical choices denoting indexical meanings are also identified. This seems to be part of an effort to emphasise the idea of “innocence” on the part of the MB and their supporters. These cases can be highlighted in using the following social and professional anthroponyms when referring to those who are said to have “fallen” (killed):

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*Amongst the fallen ones are the young man and woman, the father and mother, the scientist and doctor, the worker and employee, the rich and poor*

*فمن تنساقطوا [...] فيهم الشباب والشابات، الأب والأم، العالم والطبيب، العامل والموظف، الغني والفقير*

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Lastly, the rule of the MB is referred to at times as *democracy* “ديموقراطية”, which seems to be an attempt at stressing legitimisation.

Moving on to predicational devices, the article seems to be filled with such strategies. Some of these are possibly used for defending the MB supporters, while others may be for scolding their opponents. Looking at the headline itself, *the road to the carnage* “الطريق إلى المذبحة”, one may notice the idea of victimhood seems to be linguistically constructed metaphorically and hyperbolically. The metaphor in question can be understood, perhaps, in attempting to paint a picture of a group of victims heading to their death. However, it does not seem to be a typical death, but rather a “violent” one, a “carnage”.

Indeed, the whole scene appears to be depicted through the use of intensified expressions of which purpose are to bestow a sense of gravity as, probably, intended by the columnist. For

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<sup>41</sup> Rabaa’s event (most frequently referred to by Al-Jazeera as “Rabaa’s massacre” مجزرة رابعة *Majzarat Rābi‘ah*) is an incident in Egypt at which the security forces are said to have raided and dispersed two camps of demonstrators gathered at Rābi‘ah al-‘Adawīya and al-Naḍah squares.

instance, the experiences spoken of in the article are described as *appalling* “مفجعاً”, the bloodshed as *staggering* “مذهل” and *innocent* “بريئة (دماء)”, the slaughter as *great* “عظيمة”, the attacks as *bloody* “دموية”, and the “carnage” as *colossal* “عظيمة”.

To further portray the MB and their supporters along the lines of the Victim narrative, a number of predicational strategies can be identified. For example, the columnist appears to align the “sufferings” of the MB and their supporters at the hands of President Al-Sisi and the military with those endured by the people of Prophet Moses (the Israelites), as found in Islamic<sup>42</sup> and Judaeo-Christian literature. This can be observed in stating that the MB and their supporters were:

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*subjected to oppressions, afflicting them with dreadful torment*<sup>43</sup>

... المظالم التي تسومهم سوء العذاب

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Due to them (the MB and their supporters) being continuously killed “overtime”, they are also said to have:

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*become no more than numbers*

ويتحوّل الضحايا بمضي الوقت إلى مجرد أعداد

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Moreover, the MB are said to be:

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*driven into the corner of political classification. Their demands, meanwhile, are excessively vilified and delegitimised*

يتم حشرهم في زاوية التصنيف السياسي مع الإمعان في تشويه مطالبهم

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<sup>42</sup> More on the Qur’anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses), peace be upon him, and Fir‘awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) can be referred to in the following sources:

- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā’ Imād al-Dīn Ismā‘īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).

<sup>43</sup> The Qur’ān 7:141 (Translated by Mustafa Khattab).

Whilst protesting against what the author appears to perceive as “constant verbal abuse” being aimed at the MB, he remarks that the latter group are still being *abused even in death* “يتم الإساءة “ إليهم وهم في القبور”.

Meanwhile, as stated earlier, the anti-MB social actors are negatively evaluated. This can be seen in accusing them of:

---

*laying the blame on the protesters for the great killing that befell on them*

تحميل المعتصمين المسؤولية عن المقتلة العظيمة

---

The anti-MB establishment is also accused of *practising an abhorrent seclusion* “إنغلاق ذميم” and perpetuating a *colossal carnage on the Nile* “مذبحة هائلة على النيل”. The government is also castigated for allegedly *liquidating* the protesters “تصفية جسدية”. In a more or less hyperbolic and metaphorical use of language, the anti-MB government seems to be equated to a *killer* “قاتل” who is due to excessive killing:

---

*no longer enjoys the hobby of counting his victims*

يترك القاتل هواية عدّهم بعد أن يسأمها

---

Another hyperbolic statement can be found in the writer’s attempt to criticise the anti-MB social actors (mostly the anti-MB media) for attempting to demonise their opponents and justify their killing. As stated by the author, the media stands accused of:

---

*unleashing an excessive barrage of feverish verbal abuse and insults at the MB and their supporters*

فيض الشتائم والنعوت، التي تم إغداقه

---

Other negative predicational attributes that are ascribed to the anti-MB establishment can also be identified (perhaps, at a stronger figurative level).

This can be exemplified in the government being reduced to:



---

*monstrous creatures [...] grinning their fangs to exercise predation*

كائنات متوحشة [...] تكشر عن أنيابها وتمارس فعل الاقتراس

---

Additionally, the government is criticised for being:

---

*a troll state run by a military class and a group of elites who enjoy power and privilege*

دولة متغولة تديرها طبقة العسكر والنخب التي تحظى بامتيازات السلطة

---

The military, meanwhile, is equated to:

---

*killing machines devoid of emotions*

آلات قتل خالية المشاعر

---

The slaying of the MB supporters appears to be also condemned via the use of metonymies and hyperboles. For instance, the writer explains that the government:

---

*rips out dozens of still-beating every day (i.e., killing)*

تنتزع كل يوم عشرات القلوب النابضة

---

Another similar metaphorical image is spotted in equating the process of “victim-blaming” to:

---

*a local anesthesia being administered for the subsequent amputation of the body part*

التخدير الموضعي الذي يسبق البتر

---

Other anti-MB social actors, such as the liberals, secularists, intellectuals, and artists who are said to be “rooting for the anti-MB establishment”, are also metaphorically and hyperbolically reproved for their “decadence and lack of morality”.

For example, the above-mentioned coalitions are said to have:

---

*fallen into sins up to their ears*

ولغت في الخطايا حتى أذنيها

---

In his continuous criticism of the media, the author also explains that the latter engages in *pathetic moralisation attempts* “مزایدات بانسة”, and that it tries to:

---

*redefine the victim (the MB) through bestial/sub-human descriptions*

تعيد تعريف الضحية بعيدا عن الوصف الإنساني

---

Such labels can be evident in the use of what he describes as *inhumane terms* “مفردات غير”, such as the following indexical items:

---

*worms, germs, and animals*

ديدان وجراثيم وحيوانات

---

Whilst referring to the media as the *misinformation machine* “آلة التضليل”, the columnist states that the media aspires:

---

*to sway the public opinion into embracing the government’s narrative*

تكييف الجمهور وتطبيعهم مع رواية السلطة

---

The media are also equated to a machine that tries to *set up more traps* “تحاول تكثيف أحابيلها” in an attempt to obstruct any public attention being paid to the “tragedy in Egypt (as believed by the author). Moreover, the media are accused of trying to avert any chances of sympathy being paid to the victims by means of administering *emotional restraint* “كبح نسبي للعاطفة”.

Furthermore, the *televised mobilisation* “التعبئة المتلفزة” that is exercised by the media, is denounced as *fascist* “فاشي” and one that is:

---

*hard to sweep under the rug*

يصعب كنهه تحت البساط

---

Now, generalisation is yet another discursive component in this article, which appears to also feed into the linguistic establishment of the Victim image. An example can be seen in frequently mentioning unspecified numerical categories of pro-MB “victims” being “killed” or “fallen”. This can be seen in phrases, such as *the killing of crowds* “الفتك بالجمهير” and *fallen by the hundreds* “تساقطوا بالمئات”. Others unspecified quantities can be found in phrases, such as *massacres elsewhere* “مجازر أخرى”, *thousands of houses* “آلاف البيوت”, *for months* “لشهور”. Generalisation appears to be also expressed in the following hyperbolic statement:

---

*hundreds of people gathered in the squares being crushed all at once*

سحق مئات المحتشدين في الميادين دفعة واحدة

---

Detected in this piece is also the use of speech act strategy, particularly that of assertion. Assertive speech acts can be found all the way through the article. All of such instances appear to equally contribute to the creation of the Victim narrative. The followings are a few examples:

---

*This is called “victim-blaming”, an approach that has always been endorsed over the long course of history*

هو مذهب “لوم الضحية” الذي ظلّ نهجاً مفضلاً عبر التاريخ لتبرير الفظائع

*those who fell in the squares [...] are, at the end of the day, Egyptians*

فمن تساقطوا في الميادين بالمئات هم في أول الأمر وآخره مصريون

---

Indirect speech act is also identified. The following rhetorical question is an example case:

---

*Have not the signs been clear enough from the early beginnings that the massacre of (Rabaa) was surely about to happen sooner or later?*

مع كلّ هذه الإرهاصات المتضافرة، ألم يكن واضحا منذ وقت مبكر أن كثيرا من الطرّق في مصر كانت تؤدي إلى المذبحة؟

---

#### 4.3.2.1.2 OPE-V

### My brother was killed at Rabaa <sup>44</sup>

(An English opinion piece)

#### Brief description:

As seen from the headline and the content, the following article (Bedier, 2014) appears to be written in the form of lamentation over the loss of someone who is very dear to the writer, Ahmed Bedier. The author here appears to mourn the death of his brother, “Amir”. He narrates the “tragedy” from the start until the end and along the lines of what seems to read as the Victim archetype. However, the victim of the story is also hailed as a hero. The image of Amir seems to go in harmony with either form of depiction, and hence, the Victim as Hero figure seems appropriate to draw on. The heuristic narrative seems to be articulated by Bedier every time he commends and praises the “sacrifice” and “valour” that are said to be shown by his brother.

#### Themes covered in the article:

- **Anti-MB gov**                      *The anti-MB government is condemned as a “coup regime” that is said to have “betrayed the revolution”.*
- **Al-Sisi**                              *Al-Sisi and the military are said to be responsible for the systematic and intentional killings of the protesters.*
- **Military & security**
- **Rabaa**                                *Rabaa is described as a “tragedy”, a “massacre”, and “one of the largest single-day killings of demonstrators in modern history”.*

#### Micro-discursive analysis:

As seen in the article, lexical choices do not seem to be only used to express the feelings of sorrow and sympathy, but perhaps to also emphasise the sense of bravery on the part of Amir and the protesters. Hence, they appear to feed into the linguistic formation of the Victim as Hero archetype. These can be observed in the use of terms, such as “*massacre*”, “*scarified*”, “*fight*”, “*tragedy*”, “*victims*”, and “*loved ones*”. In a possible appeal to the readers’ sense of empathy, the article also appears to display the use of references that represent relational categories. Examples can be seen in the writer’s use of personal determiners such as “*my mother*”, “*my father*”, “*my brother*”, “*my family*”, “*my youngest son*”, as well as the constant mentioning of the proper name “*Amir*”. Collectivised terms are also included. This can be

---

<sup>44</sup> For full article, see Script 2 (OPE-V), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.1.2.

found in utterances such as “*mothers*”, “*friends*”, and “*mourners*”. Proper names coupled with titles are also identified. Some of which appear to communicate a sense of indexicality, meaning-wise. For instance, referring to “*Morsi*” as “*President*” may classify as an attempt at legitimising his rule.

Meanwhile, negative lexical choices are also assigned to the anti-MB social actors (the government and the military). For instance, attempting to refer to the anti-MB rule as “*tyranny*” and “*coup*” is a clear way of de-legitimatising their presence in Egypt.

The perspective of the author seems to be also stressed. This can be detected through the use of personal deixes, such as “*I was*”, “*I witnessed*”, “*I travelled*”, “*I felt*”, “*we hold*”, “*we would*”, “*we identified*”, and “*we did*”.

Moving on to the predicational strategies, negative and positive evaluations seem to push forward the construction of the Victim narrative. An example can be found in the hyperbolic and intensified descriptions of Rabaa’s “massacre”:

---

*(Rabaa is) one of the largest single-day killings of demonstrators in modern history*

---

Metaphorical image can also be seen in defining the event:

---

*a nightmare of death and mourning*

---

Prior to Rabaa’s event, the atmosphere of the city is also depicted through the use of simile. It can also be accounted for metaphorically as it seems to foreshadow a “looming disaster”. The following is an example:

---

*almost like the quiet before the storm*

---

To further underline the “*tragedy*”, the writer appears to turn to the use of more hyperbolic expressions, all of which form integral parts of the predicational process. For instance, he describes the carpet of the mosque as “*soaked in blood*” due to “excessive killings”. He also goes on to describe the traumatised faces of those who lost “loved ones”. The author suggests that people were “*in various states of shock*”. Moreover, he states that the aftermath “*forever changed*” him on a personal level. On this note, he adds:

---

*There are no words to express the pain my mother and father endured that day and since losing their son, murdered by his own government*

---

Different figures of speech continue to be expressed across the article. The following metaphor is an example:

---

*My heart sank when we identified Amir's body*

---

In summoning the Hero as Victim figure into the story, Amir is described favourably and in such a manner that reinforces the foreshadowing of his “*martyrdom*”. For example, he is said to have possessed a “*calm and peaceful presence*” at the wedding (hours before his death). He is also said to have been emitting “*a radiant aura*”. In more direct praise of his heroism, Amir, along with other protesters, are said to have:

---

*struggled for freedom and democracy conscientiously and unwaveringly*

---

Amir is also classified as:

---

*one of the unsung heroes who peacefully protested and protected the revolution*

---

Moreover, Amir’s heroism is hyperopically hailed. This can be seen in suggesting that he was:

---

*determined to make history and remained steadfast while being beaten in the Battle of the Camel*

---

Meanwhile, some negative predications are attributed to anti-MB social actors, namely “General Al-Sisi” and the “Interior Minister Muhammad Ibrahim”. According to the author, the two are:

---

*responsible for the systematic and intentional killing of the protesters*

---

### 4.3.2.1.3 STA-V

بأي ذنب قتلوا سيدات المنصورة؟

#### For what sin they killed the ladies of Mansoura? <sup>45</sup>

(An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

#### Brief description:

The report at hand (Al-Ruwayni and Zaki, 2013) appears to be written to the sympathy and support of “the ladies of Mansoura” who are said to have been “targeted and killed” whilst part-taking in a pro-Morsi protest. The Victim figure appears to be linguistically summoned and formed through the expressions of grieve and bereavement over the death of the aforementioned “ladies” who are labelled as “martyresses”.

#### Themes covered in the report:

- **MB** *The killing of the “ladies of Mansoura” at the hands of the so-called “thugs” is strongly condemned. Sorrow is expressed over the death of female “victims” who are described as “martyresses”.*
- **Morsi** *Morsi’s rule is briefly defended. Morsi is said to be a “president who came to power through ballots and the votes of constituents”.*

#### Micro-discursive analysis:

Lexical choice, as the first strategy to begin with, appears to be mostly employed to support the representation of the “slain female victims” along the lines of the Victim as Hero narrative. “*The ladies of Mansoura*” who are said to have been “murdered” at the hands of the *Baltajīyah* “بلطجية” (thugs) are referred to collectively as both *martyresses* “شهيدات” and *victims* “ضحايا”. Generally, the killing of women and protestors is criticised and negatively castigated. For instance, the killing is labelled as *targeting* “استهداف”, *massacre* “مجزرة”, *bloodshed* “إراقة الدم”, *attack* “هجوم” and *crimes* “جرائم”. Moreover, calling the female victims as “ladies” and “martyresses” appears to communicate an indexical meaning, which may feed into the Victim as Hero portrayal. Indexicality in the first phrase, “ladies”, seems to bestow a sense of chastity and virtue on their part. “Martyresses”, meanwhile, appears to invite the notion of “Islamic

---

<sup>45</sup> For full article, see Script 3 (STA-V), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.1.3.



martyrdom” as a belief warranting admittance of Paradise in the hereafter (i.e., heroic death for the sake of God).

Predication is yet another important discursive component that can be noted in this story. Predicational instances appear to be recruited to either convey a sentiment of grieve over the death of the “victims” or, probably, to speak out against their “targeting”. For instance, “the killing of the ladies of Mansoura” is denounced as follows:

---

*it goes against the teachings of religion, patriotism and even chivalry*

يتنافى مع الدين وكذلك الوطنية وحتى المروءة

---

Their killing is also described as *treacherous* “غادر” and *a crime and disgrace* “جريمة و عار”. Additionally, it is hyperbolically declared as:

---

*the biggest and most painful of all events*

أكبر هذه الأحداث أثرا وإيلاما

---

When the report turns to cite the statements made by the family of the “victims”, the emotional states of the speakers are emphasised. At one place in the story, the husband of one of the victims is said to have been found *touched* “متأثراً” and *spoke with sorrow* “حكى بأسى”. Other examples can be read in summoning other extra details into the story, perhaps, to further emphasise the “tragedy”. This can be exemplified in stating that one of the victims actually died whilst:

---

*leaving behind a child in his third year*

فارقته وهو في عامه الثالث

---

Extra details are also included, perhaps, to further magnify the tragedy. For instance, the “ambient ” and “events” experienced are described as *sad* “حزين” an *unfortunate* “مؤسفة”.

Moreover, Egypt, as a whole, is said to have been:

---

*unfamiliar with seeing protesters being targeted and killed, let alone ladies shot dead*

مصر لم تعتد استهداف متظاهرين وقتلهم، فما بالك إذا كان الاستهداف موجها لسيدات

---

The third identified strategy in the report is the use of modality devices. All of the detected cases of modal expressions seem to convey a high degree of certainty. All of such examples seem to further endorse the “victimhood” of the slain women. Modal phrases can be seen in the below statements, underlined, and transliterated:

---

*All Egyptians must understand that shedding innocent blood is disgraceful...*

على (alā) المصريين جميعا أن يدركوا أن إراقة الدماء دون ذنب تمثل عارا...

*A friend of one of the martyresses was asserting to have seen thugs attacking the marches with white weapons, stones, and cartridge firearms*

كما تحدثت صديقة الشهيدة مؤكددة (mu'akkidatan) أن البلطجية هاجموا المسيرة بالأسلحة البيضاء والحجارة ثم بالخرطوش

---

Lastly, speech act strategies are equally expressed in a number of places throughout the report, all of which appear to feed into the construction of the archetypal Victim. Among these, for example, is the below rhetorical question, which is the very headline of the article itself:

---

*For what sin they killed the ladies of Mansoura?*

بأي ذنب قتلوا سيدات المنصورة؟

---

Moreover, the above condemning rhetorical question, interestingly, borrows its wording from a Qur'anic verse<sup>46</sup>.

---

<sup>46</sup> The Qur'an 81:9 (Translated by Abdul Haleem).

The similarity between the wording of the headline and that of the Qur’anic verse<sup>47</sup> can be easily highlighted in the following transliteration:

The Qur’anic verse: *Bi-ayyī dhanbin qutilat?*  
For what sin **she was killed**?

The headline: *Bi-ayyī dhanbin qatalū sayyidāt al-Mansūrah?*  
For what sin **they killed the ladies of Mansoura**?

The news story appears to have only replaced the original third-person feminine singular passive construction *qutilat* “قُتِلَتْ” (she was killed) with a third-person masculine plural verb construction *qatalū* “قتلوا” (they killed). In the Qur’ān, the verse addresses and condemns the unjust practice of infanticide, the killing of infant girls in pre-Islamic Arabia (Giladi, 1990). In the original context, the Qur’ān speaks about the slain infant girl who is buried alive. In the rhetorical question, the author speaks about “the ladies of Mansoura” being “innocently” assassinated by “thugs”. The reason(s) as to why the above rhetorical question is formed in a Qur’anic-like style will be discussed more in Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.1.3.

---

<sup>47</sup> The Qur’ān 81:9 (Translated by Abdul Haleem).

#### 4.3.2.1.4 STE-V

### Massacre in Cairo deepens Egypt crisis <sup>48</sup>

(An English straight news story)

#### Brief description:

In this report (Al-Jazeera, 2013a), the Victim archetype can be seen linguistically invoked in the ways in which Rabaa is depicted as a “massacre” and “bloodbath”. The Victim as Hero model can also be identified in the ways in which the MB are being portrayed as heroes who are willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of democracy.

#### Themes covered in the report:

- **MB** *MB is praised for their defiance in the face of what the report describes as a “bloodbath”. The author hailed them as the “adamants of bringing democracy”.*
- **Military & security** *The military is criticised for committing a “bloodbath” and “massacre” against the protesters.*

#### Micro-discursive analysis:

Beginning with lexical choice, the news story seems to deploy a number of categories, mostly for the negative portrayals of the anti-MB social actors (e.g., the military). For instance, the report labels the military’s activities metaphorically as “*bloodbath*” and “*cycle of violence*”. Moreover, the sorts of measures that the military is said to have done against the MB seem to revolve around terms, such as “*targeting*” and “*massacre*”.

As far as the predicational strategies are concerned, the practices of the anti-MB social actors are also negatively spoken of. Such depictions are carried out in such a manner that seems to contribute to the linguistic construction of archetypal Victim coupled with the Victim as Hero figure. An example of this can be seen in stating that the MB were the subject of “*deadly shooting*” and “*criminal activity*” which is claimed to have taken place “*during the dawn prayer*” (one of the five mandatory prayers in Islam, offered about an hour before sunrise).

While the military in the article at hand is negatively evaluated and aligned with “*tyranny*”, the MB members, meanwhile, are hailed as heroes. For example, the MB are said to be “*adamants*

---

<sup>48</sup> For full article, see Script 4 (STE-V), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 5.2.2.1.4.

*of bringing democracy to Egypt”* and the ones who are *“sticking their ground”* (a metonymy for fortitude). Another example can be pointed out in stressing that their blood is *“not cheaper than any other’s blood in Egypt”*. The use of anaphora as part of the positive predication is also exhibited. The very device is expressed through the reuse of the pronoun *“we”* as in the following statement made by the MB’s spokesman, Jihad Al-Haddad:

---

***We** are sticking to our ground, **we** will not be brought into a cycle of violence, **we** know how deadly that would be.”*

---

Modality is yet another strategy that seems to be drawn on in the story. It appears to display a high of degree confidence on the part of MB’s spokesman, who casts the MB as heroes, willing to give up their souls and blood in exchange for democracy:

---

*We are sticking to our ground, we **will not** be brought into a cycle of violence, we know how deadly that would be. Even if that means we **will** have to become the punching bag of the rest of society and our blood **will** flow for the rest of Egyptians to wake up and the rest of the world to understand that we are adamant of bringing democracy to our country*

---

Looking at the statement above, the idea of bravery and sacrifice on the part of the MB seems to be given emphasis, particularly through the employment of hyperboles and metaphors.

What can also be identified in this report is the frequent usage of assertive speech acts. Examples can be found in the following statements made by each of the prominent MB leaders (Al-Biltaji’s and Al-Haddad):

- 
- *This is just a criminal activity targeting protesters*
  - *We know how deadly that would be*
-

#### 4.3.2.2 *The Hero*

This section provides the micro-discursive analysis of articles obtained from four random news genres. The analysis is to explore the ways in which the archetypal Hero is linguistically constructed. The four news genres include:

- Two monolingual opinion articles, one from each of AJA and AJE.
- Two monolingual straight news reports, one from each of AJA and AJE.

The macro-discursive analysis of the articles can be found in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.2.2). Articles in this section will be referred to by the following abbreviations:

- **OPA-H** (An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

*الإسلام السياسي.. خطوة للخلف نحو قفزة للأمام*

*Political Islam: A step back toward a leap forward*

##### **Section 4.3.2.2.1**

- **OPE-H** (An English opinion piece)

*The Egyptian coup and the lessons of Turkey*

##### **Section 4.3.2.2.2**

- **STA-H** (An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

*أعواد المشانق... أيقونة مصرية في تركيا*

*The gallows... an Egyptian icon in Turkey*

##### **Section 4.3.2.2.3**

- **STE-H** (An English straight news story)

*Morsi will never compromise says family*

##### **Section 4.3.2.2.4**

#### 4.3.2.2.1 OPA-H

الإسلام السياسي.. خطوة للخلف نحو قفزة للأمام

### Political Islam: A step back toward a leap forward <sup>49</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

#### Brief description:

Overall, the following article (Salih, 2013) appears to be written to emphasise the imminent return of the MB to power in Egypt. As seems to be stressed by Muhsin M. Salih (محسن صالح), the author of the opinion piece, the removal of the MB is nothing but a “step back for a leap forward”. He explains that the anti-MB social actors are deluded for thinking that political Islam is defeated. Salih also cautions the anti-MB social actors to stop gloating as the divine laws of Allāh (God) entail the ultimate coming back and triumph of political Islam in the end. In other words, Allah, as appears to be believed by the columnist, is on the side of the MB and will aid their return. The columnist also talks about the tribulations faced by the MB whilst suggesting that the kind of hardship they are said to have endured will only make them more powerful. All of such descriptions appear to feed into the linguistic construction of the Hero figure: The writer speaks of the MB embarking on a journey that starts with failure, fights and struggle in the face of hardship but later culminates in their triumph.

#### Themes covered in the article:

- **MB** *The MB are praised and presented as heroes who are destined to return stronger, more vigorous and popular.*
- **Anti-MB gov allies** *The anti-MB are ridiculed as sycophantic “putschists” and “tambourine players” for gloating over the fall of the MB.*

#### Micro-discursive analysis:

The article begins by reprimanding the anti-MB social actors by means of ascribing negative labels coupled with lexical meanings. Belittling and mocking them, all of such references appear to project some Trickster-related traits on the part of the anti-MB social actors. For instance, (and aside from being referred to as *putschists* “انقلابيون”), they are also called *tambourine players* “قارعي الدفوف”, and *incense servers* “وحملي البخور”. In the context of the

---

<sup>49</sup> For full article, see Script 5 (OPA-H), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.2.1.

Arabic culture as well as that of the article, the last two labels metaphorically bespeak the malevolent qualities of “hypocrisy” and “sycophancy”, which are, in this case, attributed to the anti-MB social actors, as probably intended by the writer.

What also appears to be found within the article are a lot of instances of positive predication, all of which partake in the linguistic construction of the MB along with the archetypal Hero. The gist of the aforementioned discursive component can be summarised as follows: The MB are hailed as heroes who carry the social ideals of Muslims and Arabs in the region. Heroism can also be understood in the sense of being powerful and invincible. The author seems to acknowledge that the MB did fall short of achieving certain democratic objectives. According to him, they did go through trials and hardships along the way, which led to their political failure. Nonetheless, he reassures that they will return and emerge stronger than ever before after having learned their lessons. Examples of all of the above can be found in a number of statements. For instance, political Islam is described as one that:

---

*can never be marginalised or eradicated*

لا يمكن تهيميشه ولا اجتثاثه

---

In addition, political Islam is considered by the author to be “simply”:

---

*the most compatible thought with the spiritual, psychological, social, cultural formation of an individual in the region*

ببساطة الأكثر توافقا مع التركيبة الدينية، والنفسية، والاجتماعية، والثقافية، والحضارية للإنسان في المنطقة

---

The above evaluation of political Islam seems to be coupled with an act of generalisation. Looking at the very statement above, there seems to be oversimplifying presupposition that Islam (the religion) is practised by the entire people in the region without the possibilities of exception. Another oversimplification can be identified in the following predication:

---

*the values and ideals upheld by political Islam are the very same ones sustained by almost every Arab and Muslim in the region and without any pretence*

القيم والمثل التي يحملها (الاسلام السياسي) هي القيم والمثل التي يحملها العربي والمسلم دونما تكلف أو تصنع



A positively constructed and slightly intensified predication seems to be also expressed in the following example:

---

*Political Islam shall return stronger, more vigorous, more popular, and with a higher propensity for change*

سيعود من جديد بقوة وعنقوان وشعبية أكبر وقدرة أعلى على التغيير

---

Another case of positive predication delivered by means of oversimplification can be noted in describing political Islam as:

---

*an authentic, strong, and profound movement, deep-rooted in the Arab and Islamic nations*

هو تيار أصيل عميق وقوي ومتجذر في الأمة العربية والأمة الإسلامية

---

Attempts at further intensification and generalisation can also be displayed in the following:

---

*Judging by the high number of young, competent members subscribing to it, political Islam is surely the most affluent in this sense. It is equally the most popular, powerful, and prevalent within universities.*

أغنى التيارات بالشباب والكفاءات الشبابية والأكثر شعبية وقوة وانتشارا في أوساط الجامعات

---

Political Islam is also endorsed as ***part and parcel of this religion (Islam)*** “لا يتجزأ من هذا الدين”. In keeping with the positive predicational strategies, the author further praises the movement by stating the following:

---

*Political Islam is a centrist and moderate movement. It possesses a civilised project, believes in partnership, and veers away from violence*

الإسلام السياسي تيار معتدل يملك مشروعا حضاريا، ويؤمن بالشراكة الوطنية، ويبتعد عن العنف

---

In sympathising with the MB, the writer goes on to highlight the kinds of “sufferings” endured by political Islam in Egypt.

For instance, the writer mentions that:

---

*... political Islam has received a severe blow in Egypt and endured a lot of great difficulties. There have been operations in different states, all of which have sought to thwart it. These may have, truly, contributed to its decline in recent times*

*... الإسلام السياسي قد تلقى ضربة قاسية في مصر، بينما يعاني صعوبات جمّة وعمليات إسقاط في دول أخرى، قد تؤدي إلى تراجعها وإفشاله*

---

Indeed, faults and follies are integral parts of any Hero narrative. As will be discussed later in Chapter 6, such traits appear to be necessary at times if the narrative is to be made more believable. Hence, the MB's "heroic" image is no safe haven from imperfections being assigned to it, as perhaps intended by the columnist. This seems to be expressed in the following disclaimer:

---

*Islamists are not angels, for they can be right and wrong. They stumble and learn. They have been kept away from running the state for decades. They have endured a lot of marginalisation attempts*

*الإسلاميون ليسوا ملائكة، وهم يخطئون ويصيبون، وهم يتعثرون ويتعلمون. لقد تم إبعاد الإسلاميين عن إدارة الدولة وعن مؤسساتها لعشرات السنين، وعانوا من محاولات التهميش*

---

Lastly, modality devices are also identified in the article, all of which appear to communicate a strong degree of certainty on the part of the author. Additionally, they all seem to emphasise important core ideas to the Hero's journey: "the imminent return and the rebirth after defeat". Modality examples can be found in the use of a) assertive particles such as *inna* "إنّ" and *anna* "أنّ" (indeed) and b) future prefix *sa-* "سـ" (shall) added to present tense verbs in Arabic. For instance, the verb *ya ūd* "يعود" (return) becomes *sa-ya ūd* "سيعود" (shall return). The following statements provide more context:

---

**Indeed**, the inductive understanding of [...] indicates **that** "political Islam" **shall return**

إنّ (inna) الاستقراء لـ [...] يشير إلى أنّ (anna) "الإسلام السياسي" سيعود (sa-ya ūd)

---

Other cases of Arabic modality are also expressed in adding, for instance, the negative marker for future *lan* “لن” (will not) before verbs in the present tense as in *lan takūn* (will not be).

Another modal particle, known as *lā* “لا” (not) is also used for negating the present tense. This is done by simply placing the particle right before the verb. Hence, the *yumkin* “يمكن” (can) becomes *lā yumkin* “لا يمكن” (cannot). These can be further demonstrated in the following examples:

---

*The backlash [...] **will not be** anything to them other than “a step back towards a leap forward*

فإن الموجة الارتدادية [...] **لن تكون** (lan takūn) بالنسبة لهم سوى "خطوة إلى الوراء، نحو قفزة إلى الأمام."

*This movement **cannot** be marginalised*

هذا التيار **لا يمكن** (lā yumkin) تهميشه

---

#### 4.3.2.2.2 OPE-H

### The Egyptian coup and the lessons of Turkey <sup>50</sup>

(An English opinion piece)

#### Brief description:

The Egyptians protesters, including the MB, in this article (Ibrahim, 2013) are said to have stood up against what the author, Anwar Ibrahim, describes as the “military dictatorship”. As probably intended by the author, the Egyptians are talked about as resilient heroes, fighting “tooth and nail” for “real freedom and democracy”. Ibrahim, who seems to express involvement in the opinion piece, advises them to take lessons from Turkey. Hence, the Turkish people appear to be also portrayed as heroes and exemplary models for the Egyptians to look up to. The former group are said to have fought a great deal and endured a lot for the sake of democracy. The author encourages the Egyptians to follow in the footsteps of the Turkish people: He encourages them to carry on the fight against what he dismisses as an “unconstitutional and immoral coup” until “the glory of January 25 Revolution is regained”.

#### Themes covered in the article:

- **Anti-MB gov**                      *The anti-MB government is described as “illegitimate, unconstitutional and immoral”.*
- **Military & security**            *The military is criticised for committing “slaughter” and ‘turning back the clock of the Arab world’s most populous country’.*
- **Al-Sisi**                              *Al-Sisi and other leaders are said to “have blood on their hands and must be held to account”.*
- **MB**                                  *Protesters (including the MB supporters) are hailed as heroes “who fought tooth and nail for their freedom”.*
- **Rabaa**                               *Rabaa is classified as a “massacre of more than 100 pro-Morsi supporters and members”.*
- **Pro-MB states**                    *Turkey is set as an example for the Egyptians to look up to. The Turkish people are said to have “fought with blood, sweat and tears” for the sake of democracy.*

---

<sup>50</sup> For full article, see Script 6 (OPE-H), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.2.2.

### Micro-discursive analysis:

Lexical choice, to begin with, appears to be mostly employed for the negative portrayal of the anti-MB social actors (President Al-Sisi, the government, and the military). Examples can be found in referring to the anti-MB establishment as “*coup*” and “*military dictatorship*”. Further instances can be observed in the equally negative labels assigned to their activities. For example, “*massacre*” and “*slaughter*”.

Moreover, the employment of predicational strategies can be found in a number of places across the story. Such a device is drawn on to legitimise the Turkish protesters and the MB supporters on the one hand and to delegitimise their opponents on the other. Starting with the heroic predicational strategies, examples can be seen in the below statement:

---

*The people of Egypt stood united and fought tooth and nail in ending six decades of military dictatorship*

---

Furthermore, the Egyptians are said to have:

---

*paid their price for the revolution and now are being burdened once more to pay the price for defending it.*

---

Hence, they are metaphorically praised for being “*on the right side of history*”. Meanwhile, the Turkish protesters seem to be set by the author as a role model for the Egyptians to emulate and take inspiration from. Hence, the former group are equally applauded (via positive predication) for:

---

*fighting hard for (democracy) and even harder to keep it*

---

In keeping with the positive evaluations, the columnist further praises the Turkish protestors by suggesting that they:

---

*fought with blood, sweat and tears for what they believe in [...] (and were) united by the love for freedom and democracy and their conviction*

---

As for the negative predication, an example can be identified in dismissing the anti-MB rule as “*illegitimate, unconstitutional and immoral*”. Additionally, the anti-MB social actors stand accused of “*having blood on their hands*”. As maintained by the author, the “coup”, as he prefers to label it, is likewise accused of:

---

*undermining democracy and feeding radicalism*

---

The “coup” is also described as:

---

*damaging, inhuman and against the people, national will and democracy*

---

The author also draws on metaphorical descriptions in his bid to demonise the military. For instance, he suggests that the military has:

---

*turned back the clock of the Arab world's most populous country*

---

Moreover, he accuses the military of trying:

---

*to seize back power and privileges*

---

Modality is yet another important strategy that seems to be spotted in a number of places across the opinion piece. Such a device appears to be mostly drawn on to communicate the author’s perspective pertaining to what he deems the right or wrong course of action. The followings are a few examples:

---

***Let us** not be complicit to this unconstitutional and immoral coup*

*This slaughter of innocent people **must** be condemned*

*Turkey's, **undoubtedly** a thriving democracy with a painful and bitter history of military interventions*

*That **can only** be done through ballots*

---

The author of the article also resorts to the use of assertive speech acts. This can be seen in him making a point about Western democracies being of “double standards”. An example can be found in the following statement:

---

*But the failure to refer to it as a coup, let alone condemn it, bespeaks the double standards of these democracies.*

---

Indirect speech act supporting the aforementioned point is also expressed in the form of a rhetorical question:

---

*So, why are the supposed flagship democracies like the US and the EU unable or unwilling to call a coup a coup?*

---

### 4.3.2.2.3 STA-H

أعواد المشانق... أيقونة مصرية في تركيا

#### The gallows... an Egyptian icon in Turkey <sup>51</sup>

(An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

#### **Brief description:**

The following news report (Mabruk, 2014) presents an account of a public display in Turkey, which was organised by a group of human rights activists. Actors at the sight are said to have performed a scene that symbolises the death-sentencing of MB prisoners in Egypt. The display is said to have been held as part of a protest against what the activists perceive as *crimes* “جرائم” against the MB in Egypt. Among the attendees was Adil Rashid, the former member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the People's Assembly in Egypt. Rashid is said to have delivered a speech on this occasion, praising and thanking the Turkish government for standing up for the rights of the MB. In a sensationalist statement, Rashid delivered the following words: “The Ark of Nūḥ (Noah), which once delivered humanity, did land in Turkey. And in the very land of Turkey, there shall land another Ark one day, delivering all the free people of the world” <sup>52</sup>.

The report continues to quote Rashid’s statements as he “challenges” the Egyptian President Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi pertaining to the death-sentencing he is said to have overseen: “Will you turn to Israel to shield you from the freemen (of Egypt)? Or is it that you are going to resort to (the Egyptian) jury to protect you by speeding up the death sentencing of the protesters?”. Perhaps what is most evident in the story is the heroic representation of the Turkish government (under the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan<sup>53</sup>) and the pro-MB activists in and outside Egypt. For instance, Turkey is said to be willing to continue the fight on behalf of Egyptians and the MB until “freedom” in Egypt is regained. Although not all the discursive components

---

<sup>51</sup> For full article, see Script 7 (STA-H), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.2.3.

<sup>52</sup> Prophet Nūḥ “نوح” (Noah), peace be upon him, is a recognised prophet and apostle of Allāh “الله” (God), may He be glorified and exalted, in the Islamic theology and one of the most significant of all prophets. His full story can be referred to in the following source:

Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019b) 'The Story of Noah', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them)* by *Abū al-Fidā' Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 58 – 89.

<sup>53</sup> The current President of Turkey since 2014.

BBC World News (2020) 'Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey's pugnacious president', *BBC News*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13746679> (Accessed: 23rd August, 2021).



appear to capture the entire traits of the Hero archetype, they do reflect aspects of the narrative and places more emphasis on the idea of “return”.

### Themes covered in the report:

- **Anti-MB gov**                      *Anti-MB government is referred to as a “coup”.*
- **Al-Sisi**                              *Al-Sisi is personally criticised and held accountable for the death sentences.*
- **MB**                                      *The death sentences held against the MB are criticised throughout the whole report. The MB are described as the “oppressed ones”.*
- **Morsi**                                  *Morsi’s legitimacy is endorsed. He is described as “the first elected civilian president in the history of Egypt”.*
- **Pro-MB states**                      *Turkey is spoken highly of for expressing solidarity with the Egyptians. They are said to be in constant defence and support of the Arab causes.*

### Micro-discursive analysis:

Starting with lexical choice, the MB and their advocates are represented positively via generalised anthroponyms. Examples can be found in referring to both groups as *the freemen* “الأحرار” and *the oppressed ones* “المظلومين”. Other examples can be seen in pronouncing the MB’s rule as *the democratic legitimacy* “الشرعية الديمقراطية” and *the civil governance* “الحكم المدني”. Meanwhile, the rule of anti-MB social actors is dismissed as *the military coup* “الانقلاب العسكري” and *the military rule* “حكم العسكر”. Moreover, the sorts of measures taken against the MB are classified as *crimes* “جرائم”.

As for the predicational devices, both positive and negative attributes are also assigned to social actors. Starting with the positive evaluations, the MB authority is described as one *that is democratically elected* “سلطة انتخبت ديمقراطيا”. Furthermore, the Turkish people are described as:

---

*the ones who understand the most, the difference between a bitter military rule as opposed to that which is civil and democratic*

الأتراك أكثر من يفهم الفارق بين حكم العسكر المرير والحكم المدني الديمقراطي

---

Moreover, people in Turkey are said to:

---

*feel great sympathy for the just causes of the Arabs, particularly the conflict between the legitimate rule of the MB and the coup in Egypt.*

ويظهر الأتراك تعاطفاً كبيراً مع القضايا العربية لا سيما نزاع الشرعية والانتقال في مصر

---

As for the negative the predicational occasions, an example can be found in calling President Al-Sisi a *killer* “قاتل”. Further examples can be found in reproving the international institutions for *resorting to silence* “تلوذ بالصمت” and:

---

*holding back from denouncing the crimes of the coup*

لا تتطرق بكلمة تدين جرائم الانقلاب

---

One last instance of the negative reproval of the anti-MB establishment can be exemplified in condemning the Egyptian judiciary for *turning a deaf ear* “يضم أذنيه” to what the anti-coup opposition has to say.

The report appears to also play on the use of metaphorical language, which contains Qur’anic references. An example can be seen in claiming that there will be an *Ark* “سفينة” akin to that one of Prophet *Nūḥ* “نوح”<sup>54</sup> upon which, all the free people of the world will be delivered.

Moreover, the story demonstrates a form of rhythmized prose, known as *al-Saj* “السجع”<sup>55</sup>. This can be found, for instance, in the two linguistic constituents, *aḥrār* “أحرار” (freemen) and *thuwwār* “الثوار” (protestors), ending with the similar sound, /är/. The below rhetorical questions feature the aforementioned elements:

---

<sup>54</sup> Prophet Nūḥ “نوح” (Noah), peace be upon him, is a recognised prophet and apostle of Allāh “الله” (God), may He be glorified and exalted, in the Islamic theology and one of the most significant of all prophets. His full story can be referred to in the following source:

Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019b) 'The Story of Noah', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them)* by *Abū al-Fidā’ Imād al-Dīn Ismā’īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 58 – 89.

<sup>55</sup> Although *al-Saj* (السجع) is often translated in an elaborated form of rhymed prose, it is almost certainly a very early form of poetic expression that is mostly associated with Arabic literature and religious texts, including the Qur’ān “القرآن”. More on this literary device can be referred to in the following source:

Allen, R. (1999) 'Arabic literature', in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/art/Arabic-literature> (Accessed: 8th December, 2020).

---

Will you turn to Israel to shield you from the **freemen** (of Egypt)? Or is it that you are going to resort to (the Egyptian) jury to protect you by speeding up the death sentencing of the **protesters**?

هل ستلجأ إلى إسرائيل لتعصمك من الأحرار (al-ahrār)؟ أم إلى القضاء ليعصمك بأحكام الإعدام على الثوار (al-thuwwār)؟

---

The report also demonstrates instances of modality in several places. All of which appear to convey a strong level of certainty on the part of the writer concerning future events in Egypt. For instance, note the use of the Arabic prefix *sa-* “سـ” (will) being attached to the beginning of each of the present verbs *tazūl* “تزول” (disappear) and *yuwāṣil* “يواصل” (continue):

---

Everything that came about in Egypt as a result of the coup **will disappear** the minute it is vanquished

وكل ما ترتب على الانقلاب من قرارات وأوامر **سيتزول** (sa-tazūl) مع انكساره

The Turkish people **will continue** to stand up for the oppressed ones

إن الشعب التركي **سيواصل** (sa-yuwāṣil) تحركه في نصرة المظلومين

---

#### 4.3.2.2.4 STE-H

### Morsi will never compromise says family <sup>56</sup>

(An English straight news story)

#### Brief description:

The following story (Reuters, 2013) is mostly comprised of statements made by Morsi's family through the MB's website. In their statements, Morsi seems to be described as someone who is resolute and defiant in the face of his opponents and as one who is never willing to give any compromises. Moreover, the statements appear to depict him as someone who is willing to sacrifice himself for the sake of democracy. All such descriptions appear to be of particular relevance to the Hero narrative.

#### Themes covered in the report:

- **Morsi** *Morsi's assumed legitimacy is endorsed. He is presented as one "who will not retreat from a return to the democratic path, even if his soul is the price of this".*
- **MB** *Casualties amongst the MB during protests are described as "martyrs".*

#### Micro-discursive analysis:

The choice of labels and references appear to play out ideologically in this story. For instance, "*Morsi*" is constantly referred to as "*the President*", which may read as a way of endorsing his rule. Moreover, the lexical references assigned to the MB protesters appear to feed into the Victim as Hero image. For instance, referring to the protesters as "*martyrs*" appear to play on the notion of sacrifice in Islam<sup>57</sup>.

As for the predicational strategies, such occurrences appear to be mostly associated with Morsi as it seems to linguistically construct his image along the lines Victim as Hero figure. In other

---

<sup>56</sup> For full article, see Script 8 (STE-H), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.4.

<sup>57</sup> The heroic death in the cause of Allāh (God). Islam accords a special status to those who sacrifice their lives in the service of their religion. According to the Islamic teachings, martyrs proceed directly to the highest abode in Paradise as their eternal reward in the hereafter. More on the concept can be referred to in the following sources:

- Lawson, B.T. (no date) *Martyrdom* [Web page]. Available at: <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/opr/t236/e0508> (Accessed: 1st November, 2020).
- Torok, R. (2012) 'Al-Jihad Fi Sabilillah: in the heart of green birds', *Australian Counter Terrorism Conference*. Perth, Western Australia. SRI Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University, pp. 37-46.

words, the emphasis seems to be placed on sacrificial heroism on the part of Morsi, representing him as someone who is determined to fight until the end, without giving any concessions or compromises. The followings are a few examples:

---

*President Morsi will not retreat from a return to the democratic path (nor) negotiate or accept compromises*

---

Further predicational instances are coupled with hyperbolic expressions, all of which appear to emphasise the quality of “fortitude” and “sacrifice” on Morsi’s part. These can be found in the below

---

*No matter how much they try to keep him away, the president will not retreat [...] even if his soul is the price of this democratic path*

---

Morsi’s “resilience” appears to be also emphasised through the use of assertive modal expressions:

---

*Morsi **will never** compromise says family<sup>58</sup>*

*the president **will not** retreat from a return to the democratic path*

---

---

<sup>58</sup> The headline itself.

### 4.3.2.3 *The Trickster*

The section provides the micro-discursive analysis of articles obtained from four random news genres. The analysis is to explore the ways in which the archetypal Trickster is linguistically constructed. The four news genres include:

- Two monolingual opinion articles, one from each of AJA and AJE.
- Two monolingual straight news reports, one from each of AJA and AJE.

The macro-discursive analysis of the articles can be found in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.2.3). Articles in this section will be referred to by the following abbreviations:

- **OPA-T** (An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

فَلَمْ يُضِرْهَا..

*Remained unharmed..*

#### **Section 4.3.2.3.1**

- **OPE-T** (An English opinion piece)

*Al-Sisi's reign of terror and the propaganda of 'fascism'*

#### **Section 4.3.2.3.2**

- **STA-T** (An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

هل السيسي "سايكوباتي"؟

*Is Al-Sisi a "psychopath"?*

#### **Section 4.3.2.3.3**

- **STE-T** (An English straight news story)

*Video shows Egypt generals plotting media gag*

#### **Section 4.3.2.3.4**

#### 4.3.2.3.1 OPA-T

فلم يُضِرَّها..

**Remained unharmed..** <sup>59</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

#### **Brief description**

The following opinion article (Al-Risheq, 2013) is written entirely in criticism of the Egyptian media for “slandering and fabricating false news against Hamas”, as claimed by Izzat al-Risheq (عزت الرشق) - the author of this piece. The media are called out by Al-Risheq on the basis of what he sees as “dishonesty” and “forgery” being exercised. The article shows instances in which the author ridicules the Egyptian media. The dominant archetypal pattern in the article appears to be that of the Trickster. According to Al-Risheq, the media have engaged in a great deal of deception, which could possibly justify the writer’s use of the archetypal Trickster. Moreover, the latter image appears to be linguistically established thanks to the core qualities of the Trickster being frequently invoked and summoned (e.g., social actors being worthy of mockery and contempt). Although the Trickster archetype appears to be heavily drawn on across the article, the Hero figure is also summoned in places where Hamas is praised and positively evaluated.

#### **Themes covered in the article:**

- **Aligned with Israel.** *The Egyptian media are accused of conspiring with the Israeli government against Hamas and the Palestinian people. The media are said to “share common interests and agendas with the Israeli occupation”.*
- **Anti-MB media** *The Egyptian media are accused of “creating forgery” and “fabricating news” against Hamas.*
- **Hamas** *Hamas is represented as heroes and strongly praised throughout the article: Hamas’s is said to be “unaffected by the media campaign”.*
- **MB** *Hamas is said to pride itself to have drawn on the teachings and school of thought of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence, the MB is equally praised.*

---

<sup>59</sup> For full article, see Script 9 (OPA-T), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.3.1.

## Micro-discursive analysis:

Looking at the lexical choice strategy, labels and references utilised are to either speak highly of Hamas's "heroic journey of fight and struggle" or, otherwise, scold their adversaries (e.g., the Egyptian media and the Israeli state). In criticising the latter group, the portrayals appear to be conducted in line with the Trickster narrative. For instance, the lexicons deployed seem to mostly speak of the malevolent qualities that include deception, ill-will, conspiracy, and the tendencies to rebel against norms and morality. For instance, the Egyptian media are scolded:

---

*the media of misinformation and fitnah (sedition)*

إعلام التضليل والفتنة

---

Moreover, journalists, writers, and media personalities are metaphorically reduced to *trumpets* "أبواق" (an Arabic metaphor for "sycophantic mouthpiece"), *poisoned pens* "أقلام مسمومة" and *pens for hire (hack writers)* "أقلام مأجورة". Their practices are dismissed as *partisan propaganda* "دعاية حزبية", *media campaigns* "حملات إعلامية", *conspiracy* "تأمر", *fabrication* "تلفيق", *forgery* "تزيوير", *vilification* "تشويه", *deceit* "تدليس", *slander* "إفراء", *misinformation* "تضليل", *lies* "أكاذيب", *propagation of fitnah* "بث الفتنة" (sedition), *incitement* "تحريض", and *fishing in a muddy/troubled water* "إصطياد في الماء العكر". Moreover, the Israeli government, with which the Egyptian media are said to be siding, is also represented via negative references. For instance, the Israeli state is branded as an *occupation* "الإحتلال" and *the Zionist enemy* "العدو الصهيوني".

Meanwhile, positive categories are ascribed to Hamas, featuring traits of the Hero archetype coupled with indexical meanings. This can be exemplified in dubbing and labelling Hamas as *the Mills* "الطواحين" (a metaphor for fortitude and robustness), *the Islamic Resistance* "المقاومة", and *the fighters* "المناضلين". The activities of Hamas are also sold as *struggle* "نضال", *resistance* "مقاومة", *victories* "إنتصارات" and *achievements* "إنجازات".

In relation to the predicational strategies, the anti-MB social actors, consisting of the pro-government press, media personnel, journalists, and writers, are negatively evaluated along the lines of the image of Trickster. Most of such attributes seem to depict the aforementioned group as unwise, immoral and of deceiving and conspiring temperaments. For example, the anti-MB media personnel, journalists, and writers stand accused of *operating in harmony with the occupation* "يتسابق مع الإحتلال".



In addition, they are said to:

---

*suffer from a real crisis, amounting to moral bankruptcy and remoteness from professional ethics*

تعاني من أزمة حقيقية قد تصل إلى حد الإفلاس والبعد عن أدبيات وأخلاقيات المهنة

---

Moreover, the aforementioned social actors are criticised for having:

---

*no other business than speaking ill of the Palestinian resistance as well as Hamas*

لا هم لهم إلا تشويه المقاومة الفلسطينية وحركة حماس

---

In a rather metaphorical and idiomatic sense, the media personnel, journalists, and writers are said to be:

---

*good at fishing in troubled waters and excel in cooking up false accusations*

يتقنون الاصطياد في الماء العك ويتقنون في حيك الاتهامات الباطلة

---

They are further scolded for being:

---

*stripped of their professionalism and senses*

أفقد بعض إعلاميي مصر مهنتهم ومنطقهم

---

As seen in the article, the aforementioned social actors (e.g., media personnel) are represented as brainless and cold-hearted:

---

*they are just as empty as their brains, conscience, and recollection are*

خواء عقولهم وضمائرهم وذاكرتهم وتفكيرهم

---

In his possible attempt at mockery and ridicule, the author mentions that he actually feels sorry for the ways in which such journalists and media personnel choose to conduct themselves:

---

*We pity some of those Egyptian journalists ...*

نشفق على بعض الإعلاميين ...

---

According to the author, any journalist who dares to partake in the “fierce media campaign” critical to Hamas is a *conspiring enemy* “عدو متآمر” and will be treated as such. The author then continues to belittle and reprimand the media personnel for:

---

*building a false media glory at the expense of their principles, and never mind the honour and dignity of the profession*

ويبنون مجدا إعلاميا زائفا على حساب المبادئ وشرف المهنة

---

As for the Egyptian media in general, they are discredited by the author for:

---

*being in cahoots with the Israeli occupation, sharing common interests and agendas with it*

تتقاطع مع مصالح وأجندات الاحتلال

---

The media campaign is further criticised for:

---

*indulging excessively in lying and deception*

إمعان في الكذب والتضليل

---

As maintained by the author of this piece, all that is published in the news about Hamas’s meddling in Egypt’s internal affairs is nothing but *sheer lie and slander* “محض افتراء وكذب” and:

---

*comes along the lines of the narrow partisan propaganda [...] It serves no interests other than those of the enemies who despise Egypt and its people*

ويأتي في إطار الدعاية الحزبية الضيقة [...] ولا يخدم إلا أعداء مصر وشعبها

---

Metaphorically speaking, the media are further condemned for:

---

*never ceasing from reviving the fire of fitnah (sedition) through publishing hundreds of false news reports*

لم تفتأ تنكي نار الفتنة من خلال مئات الأخبار والتقارير

---

The media's smear campaigns are also said to be:

---

*continuously aimed at the Palestinian people and those that live in Gaza strip*

مستمرة ضد الشعب الفلسطيني وقطاع غزة

---

The media campaigns are also shunned for being *venomous* “مسمومة”, *fierce* “محمومة”, *systematic* “ممنهج”, and *calling for suspicion* “مشبوهة”. As put by the author, the very journalism exercised by those media outlets is known for being *oriented* “موجه”. Moreover, the level of “deceit”, “misinformation” and “fantasies” being spread is *laughable* “مضحك”, and:

---

*defies the boundaries of reason and logic*

يتجاوز حدود المعقول والمنطق

---

As far as the writer is concerned, all that is being fed to people by the Egyptian media:

---

*calls for mockery and humour*

قد وصل حد التندر والفكاهة

---

In addition, the conduct, coverage, and professionalism of the media, as seen by the author, are also described as *low-level* “هابط” and *reckless* “أرعن” and that:

---

*belittles the minds of the Egyptian and Arab audience*

يستهخف بعقل الجمهور المصري والعربي

---

Meanwhile, Hamas appears to be spoken highly of via positive predicational strategies. As stated earlier, such favourable evaluations appear to be carried out along the discursive construction of the Hero archetype. For instance, Hamas is hailed for:

---

*holding fast to the Rope of their Lord*

متمسكة بحبل ربها

---

The above statement is a borrowed Qur'anic metaphor<sup>60</sup>, which enjoining the Muslims to stay steadfast and stand united along the path of Allah, never mind the tribulations and challenges encountered (Islam Question and Answer, 2020).

Hamas is also praised for staying:

---

*unaffected by the media campaign,*

لن تؤثر فيها تلك الحملات الإعلامية

---

Furthermore, Hamas is endorsed for:

---

*moving forward along the path of resistance, [...], working its way up to the liberation of the land and holy sanctuaries*

تمضي الحركة في طريقها المقاوم، [...] تشق طريقها نحو تحرير الأرض والمقدسات

---

Moreover, the group is hyperbolically applauded for:

---

*achieving victories upon victories [...] and fighting above every ground and under every sky*

تحقق الانتصارات والإنجازات تلو الإنجازات [...] وتوسع دائرة نضالها فوق الأرض وتحتها

---

As stressed by the author, any attacks aimed at Hamas are destined to go in vain and pass *like a fleeting summer cloud* “كسحابة صيف عابرة”. Moreover, Hamas's position is praised for being

---

<sup>60</sup> The Qur'an 3:103 (Translated by Saheeh International).

*consistent and clear* “لديها موقف ثابت وواضح”. On being affiliated to the MB, the author mentions the following:

---

*We (Hammas) truly pride ourselves and take great honour to have drawn on the teachings and school of thought of the Muslim Brotherhood*

غاب عن ذاكرتهم فخرنا واعتزازنا بأننا نهلنا من معين وفكر جماعة الإخوان المسلمين

---

Finally, the writer defends Hamas by stressing that the group:

---

*wishes nothing but the best to Egypt and its people*

تتمنى الخير لمصر ولشعبها

---

The employment of indirect speech acts can also be found in several places across the article, most of which take the forms of rhetorical questions. For instance, the writer mocks Al-Watan newspaper over statements he deems “absurd”. The mockery is delivered through the following rhetorical question:

---

*Is there a single meaningful sentence (in any of that which Al-Watan reports)?*

هل هناك جملة واحدة مفيدة؟

---

Another example can be seen in attempting to reject and ridicule the content of another newspaper, Akhbar Al-Yawm:

---

*Can such a (ludicrous) talk even fool the youngest of kids?*

فهل يمكن أن ينطلي مثل هذا الكلام على أصغر طفل؟

---

Finally, another rhetorical question is found in representing Hamas as brave warriors:

---

*Who [...] fought valiantly during the war of 2008/2009 and the war of 2012 and won all of them ... Was it not Hamas?*

Perspectivisation is another essential strategy to consider in this article as it seems to be heavily drawn on. Such a device expresses the writer's clear involvement, being a member of Hamas himself. The involvement can be identified in the author's use of the first-person singular pronouns, both enclitic or covert<sup>61</sup>, which are assigned to verbs, nouns, or accusative particles in Arabic. The aforementioned first-person singular pronouns are equivalent to the pronoun "I" in English. A case example can be found in the subject *inanī* "إنني" in which the attached pronoun -ī "ي" appends the accusative particle *ina* "إن". The other representative case to look at is the use of covert first-person singular pronouns. This can be found in verbs such as *aqūl* "أقول": the covert pronoun associated with verb *aqūl* "أقول" is *anā* "أنا" (I). Moreover, involvement is also expressed in the form of enclitic first-person plural, which is equivalent to "we" in English. An example can be observed in the case of *-nā* "نا" as it suffixes the accusative particle *ina* "إن" in the subject constituent *inanā* "إننا" (see the underlined part). The enclitic first-person plural pronoun *-nā* "نا" can also be identified in other examples. In such cases, the pronoun corresponds to its English counterpart, "our". Here, *-nā* "نا" functions as a possessive plural determiner that suffixes nouns in Arabic. A good example can be found in the predicate *ardunā* "أرضنا" (our land), which comprises of the noun *ard* "أرض" (land), appended by *-nā* "نا" (our).

All of the above cases can be demonstrated in the following examples:

---

*I exalt some of the well-regarded writers and thinkers above choosing to fight on the same side as the Zionist enemy*

*إنني (inanī) لأربأ بكتآب ومفكرين ذوي قامات وأقلام لها وزنها أن تلتقي نصالهم مع نصال العدو الصهيوني*

*I say this not in fear of Hamas being stabbed from behind*

*لا أقول (aqūl [anā])<sup>62</sup> ذلك خوفا على ظهر حماس*

*We pity some of those Egyptian journalists*

---

<sup>61</sup> In Arabic, enclitic pronouns belong to the overt category which are affixed to various parts of speech, with varying meanings. Covert pronouns, meanwhile, are implied ones:

Ahmed, N. (2018) *Arabic Language and Its Linguistics: Linguistic Concerns*. Chennai: Notion Press.

<sup>62</sup> Covert first-person pronoun.

إِنِنَا (inanā) نشفق على بعض الإعلاميين المصريين

*The Zionist war machine [...] goes to extremes in Judaizing, obliterating and stealing our homeland*

آلة الحرب الصهيونية التي تمعن [...] في أرضنا (ardunā) تهويدا وطمسا وسرقة

---

#### 4.3.2.3.2 OPE-T

### Al-Sisi's reign of terror and the propaganda of 'fascism' <sup>63</sup>

(An English opinion piece)

#### **Brief description:**

An overall analysis of the following article (Ahmad, 2013), written by Irfan Ahmad, demonstrates a number of mythical traits that seem to be primarily associated with the Trickster figure. As far as the context of this opinion piece is concerned, the Trickster archetype appears to be constructed and communicated through the character of President Al-Sisi, his government officials, the “liberal secularists”, and the pro-government media. The conduct of the aforementioned social factors appears to echo the characteristics of the Trickster archetype, particularly on such aspects revolving around the ideas of deception, breaking the laws of the normal, and spreading chaos. More specifically, in this report, such traits can be seen in the anti-MB social actors being criticised for allegedly spreading terror, creating bloodbaths, behaving illogically, instigating against the MB, and destroying the country. Being the subject of mockery and contempt is also typical of the Trickster archetype. This is also reflected in a number of instances throughout the article.

#### **Themes covered in the article:**

- **Anti-MB media**                      *Egyptian media are criticised for allegedly “fashioning a narrative of terrorism”, “vilifying the Egyptians fighting for civil rights”, “suppressing the truth”, and “hiding falsehood”.*
  
- **Anti-MB gov**                      *Anti-MB gov, Al-Sisi and the military are all criticised for allegedly creating “a totalitarian military regime” fusing “the state and society so solidly that nothing substantially political remains in-between”.*
- **Al-Sisi**
- **Military & security**
  
- **Morsi**                                *Morsi is endorsed as “an elected president”. His imprisonment is dismissed as “illegal” and “a disgrace to anyone with even a minimum respect for democracy”.*

---

<sup>63</sup> For full article, see Script 10 (OPE-T), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.3.2.



### Micro-discursive analysis:

The opinion article appears to be filled with lexical choice categories, which are mostly dedicated to the negative representation of the anti-MB social actors. Positive references are also used, however, to a lesser extent. Starting with the former categories, the anti-MB rule is labelled as *“authoritarianism”*, *“military junta”*, *“state terror”*, *“coup”*, *“coup d’état”*, *“military regime”* and *“reign of terror”*. The people in power are metonymically referred to as *“men in uniforms”*. Their activities are classified as *“bloodbath”*, *“crackdown”*, and *“usurpation of power”*. The pro-government media are rejected as the *“propaganda of fascism”*. Pro-MB protestors, meanwhile, are referred to as *“pro-democracy demonstrators”*, *“pro-democracy protests”*, *“civilians”*, *“resistance”*, and *“anti-coup protesters”*.

Moving on to the predicational strategies, a long list of negative attributes can be identified. These are mostly assigned to the anti-MB social actors and their allies (e.g., the government officials as well as the Egyptian and Western media). All of the aforementioned actors are said to engage in practices, such as *“manufacturing terrorism and fascism”*, *“vilifying the Egyptians fighting for civil rights”*, *“suppressing the truth”*, *“hiding falsehood”*, and *“justifying the brutality of the regime”*, and *“obediently rehearsing Islamophobia”*. They are also said to have *“fashioned a narrative of terrorism [...] similar to colonial narratives”* and that they are *“silent about the terrorism of the military regime led by Al-Sisi”*. Moreover, they are accused of *“circulating the fictitious stories of FJP's so-called terrorism”*, as argued by the writer.

The pro-government media, meanwhile, is described as a *“shameless propaganda”* that *“outsmarted even Goebbels', in instituting lies and vilifying the Egyptians”*.

As to what concerns the Egyptian government, the very government is dismissed as nothing but a *“totalitarian military regime”*. The writer accuses the authority of *“cold-bloodedly killing the demonstrators”* and *“orchestrating hundreds of deaths”*. The government is also condemned for *“exercising terrorism, authoritarianism, brutality, arbitrary power, instilling uncivil rule and neo-imperial hegemony”*. Moreover, it is accused of *“curtailing citizens' liberties, even democratic politics”*. The alleged *“illegal imprisonment of Morsi”* is also denounced as:

---

*a disgrace to anyone with even a minimum respect for democracy*

---

In a metaphorical and hyperbolic choice of words, the government is described as one that:

---

*fuses the state and society so solidly that nothing substantially political remains in between*

---

Another metaphor and hyperbole can be seen in the following rhetorical question, which directly calls out and takes aim at “General Abdul Fattah El-Sisi-led military regime”:

---

*How many monsoons will it take to wash the stains of macabre bloodbath engineered against the resolute pro-democracy protesters by General Abdul Fattah El-Sisi-led military regime?*

---

Furthermore, the “*crackdown*” against the MB is described as “*heinous*”, and the condemnation of which by Western governments is rejected as “*wishy-washy*” and “*futile*”. The West itself is also accused of “*bestowing a modicum of legitimacy on the military regime*”.

Other anti-MB states (e.g., Saudi Arabia and UAE) are also shunned by the author as “*anti-democratic, royalist and monarchist*”.

The situation in Egypt is summarised through the use of asyndeton, as seen in the underlined phrases below:

---

*Men in uniforms killed civilians resisting the coup everywhere – in streets,  
in makeshift camps, in mosques, in government vans, in police custody*

---

In keeping up with the negative predication, the military’s so-called “continuous killings” are hyperbolically and metaphorically assessed. For instance, the killings are said to have:

---

*shockingly become mere statistics –robbed off the very touch of life: bare deaths*

---

Lastly, on the negative predication, some “secular ideas” objected to by the columnist are mocked and belittled. For example, “lecturing Muslims to separate religion from Church” is rejected as “*illogical*” and “*ridiculous*”.

In further reference to this statement, the author states:

---

*even an elementary student of religion knows that does not exist in Islam*

---

The positive predication, meanwhile, can also be found in a number of examples. For example, The MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) is hailed for “*fighting for 'democracy' and 'democratic values'*”. Furthermore, Morsi himself is endorsed as “*an elected president*”. The protesters are praised for being “*peaceful*”, “*resolute*”, and “*pro-democracy*”.

In another discursive device, the writer puts forward several rhetorical questions in condemnation of the President Al-Sisi and his government:

- 
- *Does not history tell us that it is a totalitarian military regime such as El-Sisi's which fuses the state and society so solidly that nothing substantially political remains in between?*
- 

Modality is yet another discursive strategy that is also drawn on in a number of places within the article. Most of such occurrences appear to communicate a strong sense of certainty on the part of the columnist. The followings are a few examples:

- 
- *Hegazi's press conference **will** go down in history as shameless propaganda*
  - *His attack on foreign media to suppress truth was **indeed** to hide the falsehood of the military regime*
-

### 4.3.2.3.3 STA-T

هل السيسي "سايكوباتي"؟

#### Is Al-Sisi a "psychopath"? <sup>64</sup>

(An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

#### Brief description:

As seen in this straight news report (Abu Al-Rub, 2014), the image of President Al-Sisi is portrayed as crude and irrational, who is worthy of mockery and ridicule. The story depicts Al-Sisi as senseless unreflective, and that his disposition is derived from his own greed. All of these traits are specific to the Trickster archetype.

#### Themes covered in the report:

- **Al-Sisi** *Al-Sisi is depicted through the entire report as a "psychopath" who is "ready to burn Egypt to ashes, all of the sake of achieving his own end."*

#### Micro-discursive analysis:

The lexical choices attributed to President Al-Sisi appear to be quite limited in this article. There are only two categories that can be identified. These can be exemplified in President Al-Sisi being continuously referred to as, *field marshal* "المشير". Meanwhile, Morsi's is constantly spoken of as *the President* "الرئيس".

Moving on to the predicational strategies, all of the identified cases seem to be mostly linked to the negative portrayals of Al-Sisi. In all of these instances, Al-Sisi is represented as someone who lusts after his own desires. He is described as immoral, deceptive, dishonest, and crude. Moreover, Al-Sisi is depicted as a psychopath who is full of contradictions. Examples of these are evident in the statements produced by the two psychiatrists. For instance, Al-Sisi is accused of *turning against his own president* "إنقلب على رئيسه". Hence, he is represented as someone who is:

---

*devoid of conscience, moralities, and principles*

---

<sup>64</sup> For full article, see Script 11 (STA-T), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.3.3.

As explained by one of the psychiatrists, Al-Sisi is of character that:

---

*seeks to fulfill the desires and dreams of its own bearer, never mind the negative impact this may afflict on others*

وأفعالها تحقق شهوات وأحلام صاحبها بغض النظر عن تأثيرها السلبي على الآخرين

---

Moreover, Al-Sisi is diagnosed as an individual who:

---

*lies, betrays, deceives, steals, pretends, and spoofs until reaching his own end*

يكذب ويخون ويخدع ويسرق ويمثل ويتحايل حتى يصل إلى مراده

---

As stated in the report, Al-Sisi is also said to have:

---

*resorted to dishonesty many times and reneged on his promises*

استخدم الكذب مرات عديدة من خلال وعود زائفة

---

One of the psychiatrists also postulates that Al-Sisi has tendencies at times to:

---

*play the role of the devout and the tender-hearted*

يقوم بتمثيل دور المتدين الورع والإنسان الحنون

---

Moreover, one of the psychiatrists explicitly lays the blame on him (Al-Sisi) for:

---

*betraying his own president and stealing a homeland, a legitimate rule, and constitutional entitlements*

سرق وطننا وسرق حكما شرعيا وسرق استحقاقات دستورية وخان رئيسه

---

Al-Sisi is also suggested to *possess clear contradictions* “لديه تناقضات واضحة”. According to one of the psychiatrists, this can be deduced from his “speaking style”, which:

---

*raises eyebrows and questions*

تشير علامات استفهام

---

Furthermore, the president is characterised as an individual who is *mysterious and incomprehensible* “غامض وعصي على الفهم”. As noted by one of the psychiatrists, Al-Sisi:

---

*expresses a heterogeneous mindset*

يعبر عن عقل خليط غير متجانس

---

In addition, he is said to suffer from:

---

*inability to suppress his own outbursts*

عدم كبت الإنفعالات

---

The state of “mental filtering”, as assessed by one of the psychiatrists, is described as:

---

*immature (underdeveloped)*

غير ناضجة

---

Furthermore, Al-Sisi is defined as:

---

*a full-fledged psychopath who possesses a narcissistic disposition*

شخص سايكوباتي كامل الأوصاف ولديه شخصية نرجسية

---

Possessing such a “narcissistic” character, as noted by the psychiatrist, paves the way for Al-Sisi to become a *dictator* “دكتاتور”.

Despite the sorts of shams ascribed to his character, Al-Sisi is also accused of perpetrating the following grievances: *murdering thousands of people* “قتل الآلاف”, *burning a lot of bodies* “وحرق الجثث”, *arresting the finest sons of the Egyptians* “واعتقال خيرة أبناء الشعب المصري” and *accusing them of the ugliest charges* “واتهامهم بأبشع التهم”. All of such predicational instances are constructed by means of hyperboles and oversimplifications. Moreover, Al-Sisi is said to be:

---

*ready to burn Egypt to ashes, all for the sake of achieving his own end*

مستعد أن يحرق مصر في سبيل تحقيق هدفه

---

Moving on to the use of modality, such a strategy can be identified in some places within the report. All such occasions appear to deliver a strong sense of assertion on the part of the psychiatrists pertaining to their own evaluations of Al-Sisi. These can be found in phrases, such as *mu'akkidan* “مؤكداً” (stressing) and *bi-lā adnā shakk* “بلا أدنى شك” (without a shred doubt). The followings provide more context:

---

*Al-Sisi, without a shred doubt, is a full-fledged psychopath*

السييسي بلا أدنى شك (*bi-lā adnā shakk*) هو شخص سايكوباتي كامل الأوصاف

... *stressing that Al-Sisi is a man with no moral compass*

مؤكداً (*mu'akkidan*) أنه رجل بلا أخلاق

---

#### 4.3.2.3.4 STE\_T

### Video shows Egypt generals plotting media gag <sup>65</sup>

(An English straight news story)

#### Brief description:

The present story (Al-Jazeera, 2013b) provides an account concerning a leaked video, which is said to feature the Egyptian military generals along with Al-Sisi “attempting to plot and decide” on ways to bring the media to submission. Plotting and conspiring, portrayals of Al-Sisi and the generals in this story appear to adhere to the Trickster narrative.

#### Themes covered in the report:

- **Al-Sisi** *Al-Sisi along with the military generals, are said to be “plotting a media gag” as a means of “controlling the media”. They are criticised in the report for “furthering violations against fundamental freedoms, including freedom of information”.*
- **Military & security**

#### Micro-discursive analysis:

Looking at the story, a few negative lexical references seem to have been drawn on. These can be exemplified in the use of the following labels: “*military coup*”, “*dictatorship*”, “*frightening*”, “*targeting*”, “*plotting*”, “*raiding*”, “*gag*”, and “*violations*”.

Moving on to the predicational strategies, most of such instances appear to feed into the linguistic construction of the Trickster in two main ways. The first one is where the Trickster figure(s) are usually constructed based on the qualities of plotting and planning. For instance, the military generals, including Al-Sisi, are said to be “*plotting a media gag*”, “*deciding how to deal with the country’s media*”, “*putting together a strategy where they could either win journalists over or have them threatened*”. The second way considers the Tricksters as individuals or entities that try to change the order of things. For example, the military is figuratively accused of “*trying to turn the clock back to dictatorships of the past*”. It is also condemned for “*furthering the violations of fundamental freedoms*”.

---

<sup>65</sup> For full article, see Script 12 (STE-T), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.3.4.



#### 4.3.2.4 *The Tyrant (Pharaoh) King*

The section provides the micro-discursive analysis of three translated opinion articles (OPA) obtained from Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA). The analysis is to explore the ways in which the archetypal Tyrant (Pharaoh) King are linguistically constructed. The macro-discursive analysis of the articles can be found in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.2.4). Articles in this section will be referred to by the following abbreviations:

- **OPA-A** (An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

*العلاقات التركية المصرية... إلى أين؟*

*The Turkish-Egyptian relations... Where are they heading?*

##### **Section 4.3.2.4.1**

- **OPA-B** (An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

*في رد الادعاء بخيار الضرورة*

*Rebutting the “choice of necessity” argument*

##### **Section 4.3.2.4.2**

- **OPA-B** (An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

*تجارب قديمة ومتجددة في تحويل الفرعون إلى رئيس*

*Ancient, yet viable traditions in transforming the pharaoh into a president*

##### **Section 4.3.2.4.3**

#### 4.3.2.4.1 OPA-A

العلاقات التركية المصرية.. إلى أين؟

### The Turkish-Egyptian relations... Where are they heading? <sup>66</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

#### Brief description:

Muhammad Gul in his article (Gul, 2013a), condemns the “killing the protesters” during what has come to be known (and frequently to by Al-Jazeera) as Rabaa’s massacre “مجزرة رابعة”. The article seems to equate Al-Sisi and the military to Pharaoh and his soldiers “فرعون ومن معه” from the Qur’anic stories. In this opinion piece, Al-Sisi is said to have committed such atrocities “فظائع” that are far greater than those of Pharaoh himself in the ancient times. Meanwhile, the MB protesters who are said to have stood up against Al-Sisi and the military are equated to Prophet Mūsā “موسى” and his people in Islamic theology<sup>67</sup> (Moses as in the Judaeo-Christian theology). Gul, in this article, depict the MB and their supporters as both heroes and victims. Meanwhile, the anti-MB social actors (Al-Sisi and the military) are negatively portrayed in such archetypal categories, fluctuating between the Trickster and the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King. For example, the anti-MB social actors are equated to Fir’awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) and his soldiers (the antagonists of Prophet Moses from the Qur’ān and Sunnah<sup>68</sup>).

<sup>66</sup> For full article, see Script 13 (OPA-A), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.4.1.

<sup>67</sup> More on the Qur’anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses), peace be upon him, and Fir’awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) can be referred to in the following sources:

- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā' Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).

<sup>68</sup> As stated before, the Qur’ān “القرآن” and Sunnah “السنّة” are two of the major sources of Islamic doctrinal and social views. The Qur’ān simply refers of the verbatim word of Allāh “الله” (God), may He be glorified and exalted, while the “Sunnah” refers to the sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad “محمد”, peace be upon him: Mahdi, M.S., Schimmel, A. and Rahman, F. (1999) 'Islam', in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islam> (Accessed: 20th August, 2020).

## Themes covered in the article:

- **Anti-MB gov**                      *The rule of the anti-MB government is branded as a “coup”.*
- **Al-Sisi**                              *Al-Sisi and the military are depicted as evil figures, of which adoption comes from the Qur’anic stories. They are accused of “killing the believers of Allah, slaughtering the male children of the weak ones, and sparing only the women”.*
- **Military & security**
- **Rabaa**                                *Rabaa is described as ‘the massacre of the century; or rather the entire humanity’.*

## Micro-discursive analysis:

Looking at the lexical level of discourse, the anti-MB social actors are labelled as *the putschists* “الانقلابيين” and *the slayers* “السفاحين”. The event of Rabaa is frequently referred to as a *massacre* “مجزرة” and the rule of anti-MB government is rejected as a *coup* “انقلاب”. Indexical meanings can also be identified in the article. All such references seem to construct the event in such ways that reassemble the Qur’anic stories of Prophet Moses versus Pharaoh<sup>69</sup>. This can be seen in labelling the protesters as *the believers of Allah* “المؤمنين بالله” and *the weak ones* “المستضعفين”; the women are referred to as *the women of the freemen* “نساء الأحرار”.

At a predicational level, Al-Sisi and the military are depicted as evil figures. The representations of whom are comparable to Pharaoh and his soldiers in the Islamic texts. For instance, they are hyperbolically described as:

---

*much worse than Pharaoh and his soldiers in committing crimes*

أكثر جرماً من فرعون ومن معه

---

Moreover, Rabaa’s “killings” are said to have been:

---

*committed in the spirit of retaliation*

تم تنفيذها بروح انتقامية

---

---

<sup>69</sup> The Qur’ān 7:141 (Translated by Abdul Haleem).

Rabaa's event is further criticised via hyperbolic expressions:

---

*Rabaa is, indeed, the massacre of the century, or rather the entire humanity*

*إن رابعة مجزرة القرن، بل (bal) قد تكون مجزرة الإنسانية جمعاء*

---

The above statement also demonstrates the use of metanoia, which can be seen in the author self-modifying his statement for rhetorical impact. This is accomplished using the underlined and transliterated adverb *bal* “بل” (rather). Furthermore, the author condemns the practices of the anti-MB social actors and accuse the “perpetrators” of the following grievances:

---

*killing the believers of Allah, slaughtering of the male children of the weak ones, and sparing only the women of freemen of Egypt.*

*قتلهم المؤمنين بالله، وفي ذبحهم أبناء المستضعفين في الأرض، وفي استحباتهم نساء الأحرار من الشعب المصري*

---

Generalisation can also be identified in the above statement. Examples of which can be seen in the use of unspecified categories when referring to “the casualties”.

Moreover, the fight between the MB, on the one hand, and the anti-MB establishment on the other, seems to be constantly equated with the Qur’anic struggle between *Truth and Falsehood* “الحق والباطل”<sup>70</sup>, which are both a metaphor and antithesis.

Hyperbolic and metaphorical comparisons can also be evident in the article, particularly at the part where Rabaa hand gesture<sup>71</sup> is mentioned. Al-Sisi and his men are said to shrink away from looking at Rabaa sign. The hand gesture is said to inflict a painful sight in the eyes of Al-Sisi and his men as it reminds them of the willpower and resolve of the protesters.

---

<sup>70</sup> The Qur’ān 17:81 (Translated by Mustafa Khattab).

<sup>71</sup> Rabaa hand gesture “شارة رابعة”: *shārat Rābi‘ah*” is a four-finger salute used by pro-MB protesters to commemorate the alleged death of the protestors at Rabaa’s event. More on its origins can found in following reference:

Zelinsky, N. (2013) 'What this hand gesture means for Egypt's future', *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/what-this-hand-gesture-means-for-egypts-future/279730/> (Accessed: 19th August, 2021).

As stated by the author:

---

*Rabaa hand is much more powerful in the eyes of Al-Sisi and his soldiers than the Staff of Moses<sup>72</sup>*

أشد على السيسي ومن معه من عصا موسى

---

As seen in the above statement, the very hand gesture is metaphorically equated to *the Staff of Moses* “عصا موسى”, and hence, dubbed as *the Staff of Truth* “عصا الحق”.

Further metaphorical expressions coupled with hyperboles can also be identified. For instance, the so-called “putschist and slayers” are promised to be haunted by the aforementioned Staff of Truth, “Rabaa sign” in and outside Egypt:

---

*Rabaa sign shall remain the staff of Truth and the symbol of freedom, which will haunt the putschists and slayers in Egypt and all around the world*

إن إشارة "رابعة" ستكون عصا وستبقى رمزا للحرية التي تلاحق الانقلابيين والسفاحين في مصر وفي كل مكان

---

Drawing on the Victim as Hero archetype, the use of assertive modal expressions appears to feed in the linguistic construction of the aforementioned narrative. These can be found in adding the Arabic modal prefix *-sa* “سـ” (shall) to the beginning of verbs such as *tabqā* “تبقى” (remain) and *takūn* “تكون” (be). The inflicted forms later become *sa-tabqā* (shall remain) and *sa-takūn* (shall be). The following examples provide more context:

---

*the souls and slogans of those slain **shall remain** irrefutable evidence*

سَتَبْقَى (sa-tabqā) أرواحهم وشهادتهم وشعارهم دليلاً دامغاً

*Rabaa sign **shall become** the Staff of Truth that vanquishes the falsehood*

إن إشارة "رابعة" ستكون (sa-takūn) عصا الحق الذي يزهق الباطل

---

---

<sup>72</sup> The Qur’ān 26:63 (Translated by Abdul Haleem).

#### 4.3.2.4.2 OPA-B

في رد الادعاء بخيار الضرورة

### Rebutting the “choice of necessity” argument <sup>73</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

#### Brief description:

Drawing on the geopolitical thoughts of Dr Jamāl Ḥamdān (Jamal Hamdan), the author of the following article (Huwaidi, 2014), Fahmi Huwaidi, tries to make sense of the ways in which modern-day, post-MB Egypt is run by President Al-Sisi by delving into the early history of “despotism” in the land. The author revisits the ancient Egyptian times and contemplates the ancient role of the pharaoh and the ways in which the “repressive” practices of the past can explain how Egypt is governed today. The article does show some elements and attempts to construct Al-Sisi, not only as a Trickster that changes the order of things but also a Tyrant (Pharaoh) King who dominates and reigns tyrannically.

#### Themes covered in the article:

- **Al-Sisi** *Al-Sisi is depicted as an evil pharaoh who “exercises despotism and political tyranny”.*

#### Micro-discursive analysis:

The opinion piece seems to demonstrate the use of ideological references coupled with indexical meanings, all of which aimed at the negative portrayals of President Al-Sisi and his way of running the country. This can be exemplified in the report referring to him as *the Pharaoh* “فرعون”, *God-King* “الملك الإله”, and *Regulator of the River* “ضابط النهر”. Meanwhile, his authority is substituted with terms such as *tyranny* “الطغیان” and *absolutism* “الحكم المطلق”.

Predicational strategies appear to be equally employed for the negative evaluation of contemporary forms of governing, including that of Al-Sisi. The overall representations seem to suggest that despotism and political tyranny in modern-day Egypt has come a long way.

---

<sup>73</sup> For full article, see Script 14 (OPE-B), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.4.2.

The following statement provides more context:

---

*In ancient Egypt, it was necessary for the pharaoh to be set up as a God-King [...] Although the world has changed in later times, [...] “the God-King” continues to play his role in authoritarian regimes yet under different names*

*في التاريخ المصري القديم اقتضت الضرورة أن يصنف الفرعون باعتباره الملك الإله [...] تغيرت الدنيا في العصور اللاحقة [...] وإن ظلّ "الملك الإله" يؤدي دوره بمسميات أخرى في الأنظمة الاستبدادية دون غيرها*

---

Moreover, “despotism” and “political tyranny”, as far as the author is concerned, are of particular relevance to river culture of Egypt and the practices of the pharaohs in ancient times. On this note, the author mentions:

---

*The river culture of Egypt is more acquiescent and accommodating of despotism and absolutism. Indeed, regulating the river paves the way for controlling the people and steering their destinies*

*تلك البيئة (بيئة مصر النهرية) أكثر استعدادا للقبول بالطغيان والحكم المطلق، ذلك أن ضبط النهر يصبح مسوغا لضبط الناس والتحكم في مصائرهم*

---

In other words, Al-Sisi (who is indirectly referred to as “God-King” and “Pharaoh”) is said to be exercising “despotism” and “political tyranny” in Egypt, just like in the old times.

#### 4.3.2.4.3 OPA-C

تجارب قديمة ومتجددة في تحويل الفرعون إلى رئيس

### Ancient, yet viable traditions in transforming the pharaoh into a president <sup>74</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

#### Brief description:

As seen in the following article by Muhammad Al-Jawadi (Al-Jawadi, 2013), the image of President Al-Sisi appears to be heavily criticised and represented as a Trickster who is driven by his own animalistic desires and, hence, he is worthy of ridicule and contempt. He also seems to be portrayed as a tyrant pharaoh who is insolently proud and deluded.

#### Themes covered in the article:

- **Al-Sisi** *Al-Sisi is presented as an evil pharaoh and assigned with a number of negative attributes.*

#### Micro-discursive analysis:

The use of the term *Pharaoh* “فرعون” in the headline serves as an allusion to President Al-Sisi. As stated early on, Al-Sisi does not seem to be only depicted as a tyrant pharaoh but also as a crude Trickster who is worthy of contempt and ridicule. For instance, the author describes Al-Sisi as:

---

*a leader who thinks rightfully or otherwise that he truly takes precedence in becoming the president, never mind the need for any elections and referendums*

*قائد يتصور بالحق ويغير الحق أنه صاحب الأولوية في أن يرث منصب الرئاسة من دون انتخابات ولا استفتاءات*

---

<sup>74</sup> For full article, see Script 15 (OPA-C), Appendix A. For the macro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.4.3.



Aside from accusing Al-Sisi of leading a “coup”, he is also depicted as a person who does whatever he pleases. The author rhetorically asks:

---

*Why not? He is the one who removed and imprisoned the president himself, read out the coup statement himself, and had thousands of people killed with a single command*

*ولم لا؟ وهو الذي حبس الرئيس بنفسه وأزاحه بنفسه، وقرأ بيان الانقلاب بنفسه وقتل الآلاف بأمر*

---

In a hyperbolic sort of description, Al-Sisi’s is also heavily chastised. He is assigned with a list of severe moral defects, which include:

---

*treachery, deviance, immorality, cuckoldry, profanity, dishonesty, and slander*

*خيانة وشنوذ وعهر وديانة وفحش وكذب وافتراء*

---

Perspectivisation can also be identified in the article, particularly in the ways in which the author expresses his own involvement in the article. The delivery writer’s involvement is carried out via the personal deixis prefix *-nā* “نا” (an enclitic subject pronoun for plurality, which corresponds to “we” in English). The aforementioned prefix is connected to verbs such as *aṣbaḥ* “أصبح” (*aṣbaḥ-nā*) as shown in the following statement:

---

***We found** ourselves coming face-to-face with a leader who thinks rightfully or otherwise...*

*أصبحنا (aṣbaḥnā) أمام قائد يتصور بالحق ويغير الحق أنه...*

---

## 4.4 Summary

The chapter at hand discussed the findings of both thematic and manual analysis as two distinct methods, supplementing the subsequent critical discourse investigation. The former approach was carried out for the purpose of capturing the salient thematic landscape concerning the positive and negative evaluations, the findings of which suggest that the two sites of Al-Jazeera appear to be focused on attacking the anti-MB social actors slightly more than defending the MB. Themes revolving around the positive and negative portrayals of social actors and events appear to be more prevalent in the Arabic articles than is the case with the English ones. Discussed in this chapter, as well, are the findings of manual analysis. Such a tool was particularly improvised to aid the DMA framework in quickly identifying mythological patterns worthy of investigation. The findings of the manual analysis reveal that the most dominant archetype reflected is that of the Trickster, followed by the Victim. The one with the considerably lower number of stories is the archetype, Hero. Finally, the chapter proceeded to present the macro-discursive analysis of the articles. A total of 15 stories belonging to different news genres were randomly sampled for the purpose of examination. The micro-discursive analysis was carried out for the purpose of exploring the ways in which each of the mythical archetypes identified were linguistically constructed. However, conducting the micro-analysis, as stated earlier in the chapter, is not enough on its own since it serves as an important prerequisite for the subsequent macro-discursive investigation (to be discussed in Chapter 5). The latter stage is equally important if we are to fully comprehend the overall dynamics and nuances of mythology and how it functions ideologically. During the macro-analysis stage, the textual elements will be discussed in relation to the macro- (contextual) aspects, informing and shaping the production, distribution, and consumption of the text under investigation and how the latter (the text) represents such aspects in forms of cultural meanings, belief systems, hierarchy, etc.

## **Chapter 5. Macro-discursive analysis**

### **5.1 Introduction**

Previously, in Chapter 4, the micro-discursive strategies were utilised to deconstruct the linguistic expressions of the archetypal conventions found within the articles. Going beyond the level of words, phrases, and sentences, this chapter, however, seeks to build on the previous linguistic analysis by shifting the focus to the contextual, macro-level of mythological discourse to fully comprehend how myth functions ideologically. In other words, the chapter will endeavour to answer the who, how, and why of discourse. To this end, the DMA's macro-discursive strategies, outlined by Kelsey (2015c, pp. 40 - 49), will be drawn on to examine the ways in which what is written appears to represent the power structure, as well as the social, political, or cultural beliefs and values, informing and shaping the production, distribution, and consumption of texts. Before delving into all of these, it is worth laying out the general structure of this chapter first. In section 5.2, the entire macro-analysis will be presented. However, at the start of it, particularly in section 5.2.1, an overview of the macro-discursive strategies will be discussed. In section 5.2.2, the analysis of articles will resume, allocating a dedicated section for every archetypal category. Accordingly, the Victim, the Hero, the Trickster, and the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King archetypes will be discussed, respectively, in sections 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.2.2.3, and 5.2.2.4. In section 5.3, the chapter will conclude by providing a summary of the discussed issues.

Finally, it is worth reminding that the Martyr subcategory will not be discussed, as part of Chapter 5, for the same reasons it was not included in Chapter 4. The reasons were already justified in the introduction of Chapter 4.

### **5.2 The macro-analysis**

Before moving to the macro-inspection of the news stories, A brief discussion of the DMA's macro-discursive strategies is worth presenting.

## 5.2.1 The macro-discursive strategies

### 5.2.1.1 *Context:*

Such a strategy is closely related to the process of production, interpretation, and consumption in discursive exchanges. It concerns itself mostly in attempting to understand and answer questions relating to the who, what, how, and why of the discourse(s) produced.

For example, retrieving background or historical knowledge about the source - be it that of Al-Jazeera news network (AJ), the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the writers and columnists, some of the key events, or any other relevant aspect(s) - is quite important if we are to gain more insights into the underlying intention(s) or belief(s) behind the texts produced.

As pointed out by Kelsey (2015c, p. 43), 'it is not necessary to take one fixed approach or definition of context since contextual mechanisms are so complex'. Therefore, a significant part of the context (about Al-Jazeera and the MB), as far as this project is concerned, can already be found in the social and contextual background information discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. However, this chapter will also endeavour (where possible) to provide different type(s) of contextual and background information, revolving this time around the writers and columnists themselves. This I deem to be extremely valuable if we are to further understand where belief systems appear to come from. In doing so, contextual information will be mostly obtained from the writers and columnists' personal websites, professional/academic records, articles, books, interviews, statements, etc. Of course, such a process may not apply to all of the news stories at hand, as some articles are produced, independent of any references or clues pointing out to any specific authors.

### 5.2.1.2 *Intertextuality:*

The device considers the interconnection between various texts 'in both present and past contexts' (Kelsey, 2015c, p. 45). This could be either seen in any references, pointing out to the same event(s), being repeated or in key arguments shifting from one text into another. It can also be seen in the constantly repeated referencing to key players or subjects within stories throughout the texts (Wodak, 2008 cited in Kelsey, 2015c). Vásquez (2015) also provides the following description of such an important discursive mechanism:<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> The quote is found on the following page.

*Every spoken utterance, written text, or instance of computer-mediated communication (CMC) always bears traces of texts that came before it. Intertextuality refers to this historic relationship that exists among texts. In the process of constructing any text, speakers, writers, and users of digital media draw not only upon a whole range of intertextual links but also on their intertextual knowledge of wider conventional genres as a whole.*

(Vásquez, 2015, p. 66)

### **5.2.1.3 Interdiscursivity:**

According to Wodak *et al.* (1999 cited in Kelsey, 2015c), interdiscursivity considers the overlap and spread of discourse topics with other socio-functionally connected discourses and fields. In another description, interdiscursivity concerns itself with the overlapping or joining of diverse genres or discourses into an original discursive order (Fairclough, 1995a). Moreover, Fairclough (2001a, p. 124) defines the aforementioned device as the ‘study of which genres, discourses and styles it draws upon, and how it works them into particular articulations’. Kelsey (2015c) notes that interdiscursivity distinguishes itself from intertextuality in the sense that discourses are actually connected with each other in various manners across and within texts.

### **5.2.1.4 Narration of the nation:**

Wodak *et al.* (1999 cited in Kelsey 2015c) explain that discourse is known to construct identities, influencing how people are meant to conceive their own culture and nation. A national culture can be seen as a discourse, shaping and organising both the actions of people and their perceptions of themselves. According to the scholars:

*National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about ‘the nation’ with which we can identify; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and imagines which are constructed of it.*

(Wodak *et al.*, 1999 cited in Kelsey 2015c, p. 46)

As explained by Hall (1994), drawn on by Wodak *et al.* (1999, cited in Kelsey 2015c, pp. 46 – 47), the narration of the nation centres itself on five key aspects. The first one is termed “*narrative of the nation*”, which stands for the everyday cultural elements joining together anything that represents ‘shared experiences’ (e.g., stories, scenarios, historical events, etc.).

The second one puts emphasis on the notions of “*origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness*”, all of which represent original and natural identities. However, such representations, at times, lie dormant and will have to be awakened. The third feature is called “*invention of tradition*”, which basically focuses on the need to produce new ritualistic or symbolic traditions as a means for creating historical perplexity and countering the understandable. The fourth feature is referred to as “*foundational myth*”. Such aspect considers the ways in which the origins of nations are frequently ‘set so far back in time that it is lost in the fog of time and is no longer “real”, that is it “exists” somewhere in mythical times’. The fifth feature deals with the made-up idea of “*the pure, original people*” or “*folk*”, which is drawn upon to sustain national identities (Wodak *et al.*, 1999 cited in Kelsey 2015c, p. 47).

#### **5.2.1.5 Historical memory:**

As explained by Kelsey (2015c), such a concept was originally discussed by Wodak in (Wodak *et al.*, 1999) and is incorporated into the discursive historical approach (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, pp. 24 - 58). Just like a myth or collective/popular memory, Wodak explains that the content of historical memory does not matter in terms of whether or not it is ‘true, partly true, or legendary’ (Wodak *et al.*, 1999, p. 25). What is really important, however, is that ‘the further into the past the real or imaginary memories reach, the more securely the nation is supported’ (Wodak *et al.*, 1999 cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 44). Hence, historical memory is seen as an indispensable prerequisite for national identities (Wodak *et al.*, 1999 cited in Kelsey, 2015c).

#### **5.2.1.6 Recontextualisation:**

Recontextualisation, according to Wodak and Fairclough (2010, cited in Kelsey, 2015c, p. 49), takes place through such processes which function ‘simultaneously in different spheres, domains and social fields, and through relationships between them and between events and texts within them’. These concurrent negotiations make it possible for discourses and texts to operate in diverse historical and spatial contexts. In keeping with the aforementioned scholars:

*Temporal and spatial relationships between texts also involve relations recontextualization whereby texts, including the types of discourses and genres they deploy, transfer between temporally and spatially diverse contexts, and become subject to transformations of which nature relies on the relationships and differences between such contexts*

(Wodak and Fairclough, 2010 cited in Kelsey, 2015c p. 49)

## 5.2.2 The analysis of articles

The chapter will progress at this point to the analysis of articles. As stated in the introduction, the Victim, the Hero, the Trickster, and the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King archetypal categories will be discussed in sections 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, 5.2.2.3, and 5.2.2.4, respectively.

### 5.2.2.1 *The Victim*

The articles to be discussed in this section are the ones reflecting the mythical archetype of the Victim. The micro-discursive (linguistic) analysis of the articles can be found in Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.1. The following analyses are organised as follows:

- **OPA-V** (An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

*الطريق إلى المذبحة*

*The road to the carnage*

#### **Section 5.2.2.1.1**

- **OPE-V** (An English opinion piece)

*My brother was killed at Rabaa*

#### **Section 5.2.2.1.2**

- **STA-V** (An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

*بأي ذنب قتلوا سيدات المنصورة؟*

*For what sin they killed the ladies of Mansoura?*

#### **Section 5.2.2.1.3**

- **STE-V** (An English straight news story)

*Massacre in Cairo deepens Egypt crisis*

#### **Section 5.2.2.1.4**

### 5.2.2.1.1 OPA-V

#### الطريق إلى المذبحة

#### The road to the carnage <sup>76</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

The columnist, Husam Shakir (حسام شاكير), as identified on Al-Jazeera website<sup>77</sup> and his personal social media account, Twitter<sup>78</sup>, is a researcher, author, and media consultant with interest in the analysis of European and international affairs, as well as social and media-related issues. Being a regular contributor for Al-Jazeera, Shakir's articles mostly focus on Islamism, Islamophobia, and secularism.

To gain more insights into Shakir's political views and leanings, it is worth looking into examples of some of the news outlets he has been writing for. The first example can be seen in Shakir publishing articles for the Middle East Eye<sup>79</sup> (MEE), which is a London-based online news outlet covering events in the Middle East. The MEE is criticised for being established by MB affiliates in an attempt to provide an alternative platform to Al-Jazeera for the Western audience, whilst working together with former staff members of Al-Jazeera (The National staff, 2014; Tadros, 2015). Moreover, David Hearst, the owner of the MEE where Shakir writes for, is reported by Michael Rubin (a former Pentagon official now working for the American Enterprise Institute) to have penned a number of editorials praising and supporting the MB (Rubin, 2017). Shakir also writes for the Middle East Mentor (MEMO)<sup>80</sup>, which is a non-profit press monitoring organisation, criticised for promoting strongly pro-MB and pro-Hamas viewpoints (Ware, 2011; Gilligan, 2015). A third news network in which Shakir writes for is the TRT Arabic: a Turkish state international news channel broadcasting in Arabic<sup>81</sup>. The

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<sup>76</sup> For full article, see Script 1 (OPA-V), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.1.1.

<sup>77</sup> A brief biography about Shakir can be found at the top and bottom sides of the following article: Shakir, H. (2013) 'الطريق إلى المذبحة' *al-Ṭarīq ila al-madhbahāh* [The road to the carnage], *Al-Jazeera.net*. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2013/8/16/الطريق-إلى-المذبحة> (Accessed: 12th August, 2021).

<sup>78</sup> Shakir's Twitter account:

Shakir, H. (2015) @Hos\_Shaker. [Twitter]. Available at: [https://twitter.com/hos\\_shaker?lang=en](https://twitter.com/hos_shaker?lang=en) (Accessed: 15th August, 2021).

<sup>79</sup> Articles written by Shakir on MEE are compiled in the following source:

*Hossam Shaker's articles* (no date) [MEE web page]. Available at: <https://www.middleeasteye.net/users/hossam-shaker> (Accessed: 15th August, 2021).

<sup>80</sup> Articles written by Shakir on MEMO are compiled in the following source:

*Items by Hossam Shaker* (no date) [MEMO web page]. Available at: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/6-author/hossam-shaker/> (Accessed: 15th August, 2021).

<sup>81</sup> Articles written by Shakir on TRT Arabi are compiled in the following source:



aforementioned channel is equally criticised in the West for failing to uphold accepted journalism ethics and standards for press freedom and neutrality. It is also described as “a mouthpiece” or “propaganda” arm of President Erdoğan’s administration<sup>82</sup>, who is himself the leader of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Asani, 2016; Yildirim and Lynch, 2016; Roettgers, 2017; Stalinsky, 2019; Yilmaz *et al.*, 2020). Working for such organisations may be indicative of the political positions and ideological inclinations of the columnist, which are presumably pro-Islamist. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, section 4.3.2.1.1, similar pro-MB expressions already seem to feed into the linguistic construction of the archetypal Victim. Now, we shall see how such ideas and linguistic representations can be discursively communicated with the help of the following macro-devices: intertextuality, recontextualisation, national narrative, and interdiscursivity.

Looking at the content of the article (Shakir, 2013), intertextuality seems to manifest in drawing on phrases and stories borrowed from the Qur’ān<sup>83</sup>, Islamic history, criminology, the Yemeni revolution, and American politics. All such attempts can make this article interdiscursive due to the overlap between several genres and discourses. For instance, this can be seen in suggesting that the MB supporters were *afflicted with dreadful torment* “تسومهم سوء العذاب”, which is a Qur’anic verse<sup>84</sup>:

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*‘Remember’ how We delivered you from the people of Pharaoh, who **afflicted you with dreadful torment***

وَإِذْ نَجَّيْنَاكُمْ مِنْ آلِ فِرْعَوْنَ يَسُومُونَكُمْ سُوءَ الْعَذَابِ

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The purpose of the given example is to, perhaps, magnify the severity of the situation “endured” by the MB at the hands of President Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi and the security forces. There does not seem to be a better way for depicting and expressing this than equating such suffering and

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مقالات حسام شاكير *Maqālāt Husām Shākir [Husam Shakir's articles]* (no date) [TRT Arabi web page]. Available at: <https://www.trtarabi.com/author/حسام-شاكير/> (Accessed: 15th August, 2021).

<sup>82</sup> Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current president of Turkey since 2014:

BBC World News (2020) 'Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey's pugnacious president', *BBC News*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13746679> (Accessed: 23rd August, 2021).

<sup>83</sup> As stated before, the Qur’ān “القرآن” along with the Sunnah “السنة” are two of the major sources of Islamic doctrinal and social views. The Qur’ān simply refers to the verbatim word of Allāh “الله” (God), may He be glorified and exalted, while the “Sunnah” refers to the sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad “محمد”, peace be upon him:

Mahdi, M.S., Schimmel, A. and Rahman, F. (1999) 'Islam', in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islam> (Accessed: 20th August, 2020).

<sup>84</sup> The Qur’ān 7:141 (Translated by Mustafa Khattab).

torture with those of Prophet *Mūsā* “موسى”<sup>85</sup> and his people at the hands of *Fir‘awn* “فرعون” and his soldiers<sup>86</sup>.

In another place, the employment of narration of the nation strategy can also be identified in the intertextual use of the term *Arḍ al-Kinānah* “أرض الكنانة” (Land of Kinānah), an affectionate term for Egypt. Such a phrase is said to have been coined and used by ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ, a companion of Prophet Muḥammad and the first Muslim governor of Egypt. Hence, it bestows a historically Islamic significance that is essential in invigorating the sense of zeal and earnest solicitude amongst the Muslims in Egypt over the welfare, honour, and dignity of their country. The term portrays Egypt as a “quiver<sup>87</sup>” packed with arrows, which is a reference to the land being forever secured and protected by God (Sulayman, 1990).

Another place where drawing on national narrative seems to be triggered, can be seen in the affectionate use of the long-established term, *Umm al-Dunyā* “أم الدنيا” (Mother of the World). The term is often used for stimulating national zeal and pride amongst the Egyptians. As maintained by Yusuf (2003, p. 3), calling Egypt the “Mother of the World” ‘comes from one of the old proverbs heard down to the present day. It gives the Egyptians the feeling of noble descent and inherited wisdom’.

Furthermore, intertextual recontextualisation appears to be also detected in associating *the atrocities* “الفظائع” that are said to be committed at the hands of the anti-MB social actors in Egypt, with those in Yemen. A similar instance can be found, perhaps, in comparing the exercise of “victim-blaming” with what George W Bush’s administration is said to have done to Guantanamo detainees. Moreover, an intertextual recontextualisation can also be found in referring to the Libyan context. For example, the representative case of the former Libyan President, Mu‘ammar al-Qadhdfāfi (Muammar Al-Qaddafi) is summoned as a means of reminding the readers of how Al-Qaddafi is said to have resorted to victim-blaming by dehumanising the protesters (e.g., he is to have frequently referred to them as *rats* “جرذان”).

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<sup>85</sup> Moses as in the Judaeo-Christian theology.

<sup>86</sup> More on the Qur’anic story of *Mūsā* “موسى” (Moses), peace be upon him, and *Fir‘awn* “فرعون” (Pharaoh) can be referred to in the following sources:

- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā’ ‘Imād al-Dīn Ismā‘īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).

<sup>87</sup> A quiver is the English equivalent for the Arabic word, “Kinānah”.

Lastly, on intertextuality, the writer tries to substantiate his argument by resorting to some quotes by *The Independent* newspaper, seconding his criticism of the situation in Egypt.

In terms of interdiscursivity, the author of the article appears to draw heavily on the concept of victim-blaming<sup>88</sup> along with other relevant discourses (e.g., morality and human rights), perhaps, for the purpose of supporting the overall construction of the Victim archetype.

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<sup>88</sup> Victim-blaming is the act of laying the blame for violence on the victim while the perpetrator is absolved from guilt or fault.

### 5.2.2.1.2 OPE-V

#### **My brother was killed at Rabaa** <sup>89</sup>

(An English opinion piece)

The author, Ahmed Bedier, as stated in his article (Bedier, 2014), is the brother of the man who is said to have been “slain” at Rabaa event<sup>90</sup>. At the bottom of the article, Bedier identifies himself as ‘an Egyptian-American, social entrepreneur, a non-profit CEO, radio show host, a human rights and democracy advocate, and a television commentator’ (Bedier, 2014, para. 24). On his personal social media account, Twitter<sup>91</sup>, he includes other professions and interests (e.g., being a journalist as well as someone who is passionate about ‘bringing youth of colour to politics’). Bedier also highlights, in the article, the following information:

*His brother was shot and killed by Egypt's security forces during the violent dispersal of Rabaa square sit-in.*

(Bedier, 2014, para. 24)

Aside from writing this story from the perspective of the brother of someone who is said to have been “slain”, Bedier’s support of the MB appears to come as no surprise as he was the former executive director of the Council on American–Islamic Relations (CAIR)<sup>92</sup>. As argued by academics and top American politicians, CAIR is accused of possessing significant connections with the MB (Merley, 2009; Vidino, 2010; Skerry, 2011; Lebl, 2013; Rhodan, 2015; Douglass-Williams, 2019; Augusto and Gagliano, 2020; Westrop, 2020).

To gain more insights into Bedier’s political and Islamist leanings, it is worth including some of the statements he previously made (which was also recorded and put on YouTube<sup>93</sup>).

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<sup>89</sup> For full article, see Script 2 (OPE-V), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.1.2.

<sup>90</sup> Rabaa’s event (most frequently referred to by Al-Jazeera as “Rabaa’s massacre” مجزرة رابعة *Majzarat Rābi‘ah*) is an incident in Egypt at which the security forces are said to have raided and dispersed two camps of demonstrators gathered at Rābi‘ah al-‘Adawīya and al-Naḍah squares.

<sup>91</sup> Bedier’s Twitter account:

Bedier, A. (2008) @bedier. [Twitter]. Available at: <https://twitter.com/bedier> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).

<sup>92</sup> More about CAIR can be referred to in the following source:

CAIR (2010) *CAIR: Who we are* [Web page]. Available at: [https://www.cair.com/about\\_cair/cair-who-we-are/](https://www.cair.com/about_cair/cair-who-we-are/) (Accessed: 1st July, 2020).

<sup>93</sup> The above statement by Bedier, unfortunately, has only one video source. I tried to look for the full speech delivered by Bedier from, perhaps, more objective sources but to no avail.

Whilst addressing the attendees of the Muslim Capitol Day event in 2012, Bedier stated the following words:

*... and those senators and those representatives learned the lesson. If you are going to go after the Muslim community, the Muslim community is going to go after you. And we are not going to stay quiet. We are not going to sit back. When you punch, we are going to punch you twice as hard. When you fight us twice, we are going to fight you twice three times as hard. And we are not going to stop fighting politically until you are out of office because we deserve better ...*

(Theunitedwest, 2013)

The above statement appears to reflect some of Bedier's political Islamist leanings, as can be evident in the use of phrases such as **“fighting you politically”**. His politically charged ideas, as seen in the statement above and other places within the article, appear to fuse the so-called **“heroic death and sacrifice”** made by his brother and **“fellow Egyptians”** with the need to fight for **“democracy and freedom”**. Although this can be seen more clearly in the micro-discursive analysis in Chapter 4, the other macro-discursive strategies below can also reveal other aspects worthy of observation.

Aside from the writer's “tragic” description of Rabaa's aftermath as side observations (e.g., the scene of the mosque being **“soaked in blood”** and **“the mothers mourning their sons”**), an attempt at interdiscursive and intertextual mechanisms can also be found. For instance, the writer draws on some memories and stories in which he deems exemplary enough of his brother's “bravery and sacrifice” during the first wave of “the Egyptian revolution”, particularly at what has come to be known as the **“Battle of the Camel”**<sup>94</sup>. During the latter incident, as maintained in the reports, men on horses and camels are said to have attacked the protesters arrayed in Tahrir Square, in such a sight that was once described by Al-Jazeera as ‘reminiscent of the Middle Ages’ (Abd al-Hakim, 2017). He also recounts how his brother, Amir, was determined ‘to join the encampment at Rabaa Square to protest the ouster of Morsi’ (Mohammed Morsi). Moreover, the writer also recounts memories of his brother's wedding and their last family reunion, suggesting he had sensed something about his brother's appearance at

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<sup>94</sup> Interestingly, the event borrows its name from the first major civil war in Islamic historic: *Mawqī‘at al-Jamal* “موقعة الجمل” (The Battle of the Camel). According to Muslim historians, such a battle is believed to be “one the greatest tragedies” that has struck the death blow to the unity of the Muslim nation since 655 C.E. until today. More one this event can be referred to in the following source:

Ibn Kathīr, I. (1998) 'ابتداء وقعة الجمل' *Ibtidā' Waq'at al-Jamal* [The start of the Battle of the Camel], in: البداية والنهاية: المجلد العاشر *al-Bidāyah wa-al-nihāyah: al-Mujallad al-'āshir* [From the beginning to the end: Vol. 10]. Cairo: Dār Hajr, pp. 431 - 473.

the time, foreshadowing his death (e.g., “*the radiant aura*” emanating from his brother whilst ‘*gliding from one table to table greeting family members*’). The writer also speaks on behalf of other Egyptians, who are said to have “sacrificed their lives” ‘*in their unwavering struggle for freedom and democracy*’. Whilst stating this, he also stresses the need for the Egyptians to fight on until “*democracy is reinstated*”.

### 5.2.2.1.3 STA-V

بأي ذنب قتلوا سيدات المنصورة؟

#### For what sin they killed the ladies of Mansoura? <sup>95</sup>

(An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

The following report (Al-Ruwayni and Zaki, 2013) seems to highlight the use of a number of intertextual references, mostly comprised of statements made by eye-witnesses, family members, and friends of the “slain” ladies. The first example can be seen in the words of the taxi driver who weighs in on one of the incidents from the perspectives of morality, religion, and patriotism:

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*Egypt is unfamiliar with seeing protesters being targeted and killed, let alone ladies shot dead, something which not only goes against the teachings of religion and patriotism but also chivalry*

فإن مصر لم تعتد استهداف متظاهرين وقتلهم، "فما بالك إذا كان الاستهداف موجها لسيدات بما يتنافى مع الدين وكذلك الوطنية وحتى المروءة."

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The second case can be found in drawing on the words of Ismail, a bother of Amaal Farahat, who is said to have been a *martyress* “شهيدة”. In speaking about the death of his sister, Ismail declares the need for the Egyptians to denounce what he describes as *bloodshed* “إراقة الدماء”.

Intertextuality can also be noted in drawing on the story of Halla Muhammad Abu Shu‘aisha, a protestor who is said to have been killed at the hands of *thugs* “بطلجية”:

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*An anonymous friend of Halla Muhammad Abu Shu‘aisha, one of the " martyred " women, confirms that she saw thugs attacking the marches with white weapons, stones, and cartridge firearms before firing live bullets. She later found out that Halla had fallen victim to this "treacherous attack".<sup>96</sup>*

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<sup>95</sup> For full article, see Script 3 (STA-V), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.1.3.

<sup>96</sup> The follow-up translation is on the next page.

كما تحدثت صديقة الشهيدة هالة محمد أبو شعيشع وقالت إنها كانت شاهدة على الأحداث مؤكدة أن البطولية هاجموا المسيرة بالأسلحة البيضاء والحجارة ثم بالخرطوش قبل أن يبدأ إطلاق الرصاص الحي، مما دفع المتظاهرات للإسراع نحو الشوارع الجانبية وهي معهن لتكتشف أن صديقتها المقربة راحت ضحية هذا الهجوم الغادر

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Another example is found in the case of Al-Ghazali's story about his wife who, according to him, chose to go out, protesting until she died as a "martyress":

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*leaving behind a child in his third year.*

فارقته وهو في عامه الثالث

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The intertextual strategy also appears to reflect pro-MB sentiments. This can be highlighted, for example, in suggesting that Morsi came to power *through ballots* "عبر صناديق الاقتراع". A similar occasion can be seen in suggesting that "the ladies of Mansoura" were simply "protesting":

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*not in defence of anyone or any party other than the very freedom from the days of Morsi*

ليس دفاعا عن شخص أو عن جماعة وإنما عن الحرية التي اشتهم المصريون أولى نسمااتها في عهد مرسي

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Such a statement appears to paint "the ladies of Mansoura" not only as victims but also as "sacrificial heroines".

Interdiscursivity, meanwhile, may be found in the case of approaching the topic not only through the discourse of victimhood but also through morality, which is said to have been violated.



Different form intertextuality can also be observed in the headline itself, which appears to borrow the wording of a Qur'anic verse<sup>97</sup>:

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*Bi-ayyī dhanbin qutilat? (For what sin she was killed?)*<sup>98</sup>

بِأَيِّ ذَنْبٍ قُتِلَتْ؟

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Such form of borrowing appears to have been performed rhetorically, perhaps, to align the gravity of the “crimes” on the part of “slayers” with the one spoken of in the Qur’ān. As stated before in the previous chapter, section 4.3.2.1.3, the verse addresses and condemns the unjust pre-Islamic practice of infanticide, the killing of infant girls in pre-Islamic Arabia (Giladi, 1990), which is the original context of the Qur’anic condemning rhetorical question. The very question is summoned into a new context, which addresses a different kind of “victimhood” which bears no connection to the one spoken of in the report.

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<sup>97</sup> The Qur’ān 81:9 (Translated by Abdul Haleem).

<sup>98</sup> See Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.1.2.

#### 5.2.2.1.4 STE-V

### Massacre in Cairo deepens Egypt crisis <sup>99</sup>

(An English straight news story)

Drawing on intertextuality in the following story (Al-Jazeera, 2013a) seems to be crucial as it contributes to the discursive construction of the Victim figure. Such strategy seems to be mostly employed in this report in directly citing the statements of non-other than the leading members of the MB, Muḥammad al-Biltāji (Muhammad Al-Biltaji) and Jihād al-Haddād (Jihad Al-Haddad). To demonstrate how the MB are depicted as both victims and heroes, Al-Haddad states the following whilst speaking on behalf of the MB:

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*We are sticking to our ground, we will not be brought into a cycle of violence, we know how deadly that would be. Even if that means we will have to become the punching bag of the rest of society and our blood will flow for the rest of Egyptians to wake up and the rest of the world to understand that we are adamant of bringing democracy to our country*

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The two figures, of course, as stated above, are key members of the MB. Al-Betajy<sup>100</sup>, for instance, according to Trager *et al.* (2012), is believed to be one of the most prominent and influential MB members who also served as general secretary of the FJP when Morsi was still in power. Al-Biltaji is known to have been a prominent critic of former President Mubarak ever since he was elected to the People's Assembly. He was an anti-regime parliament member in 2010, participated in the 2011 uprising and exercised great influence in the decision-making at the Guidance Office of the MB itself. Aside from being the general secretary of the FJP, Al-Biltaji also served on the Constituent Assembly, particularly in writing Egypt's second constitution (Trager *et al.*, 2012). As for Jihad Al-Haddad<sup>101</sup>, he was the media spokesman for

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<sup>99</sup> For full article, see Script 4 (STE-V), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.1.4.

<sup>100</sup> More background information about Al-Biltaji can be referred to in the following sources:

- Trager, E. (2012) *Who's Who in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/whos-who-egypts-muslim-brotherhood> (Accessed: 13th August, 2021).
- Obaid, N. (2020) *The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world*. California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO.

<sup>101</sup> More background information about Al-Haddad can be referred to in the following sources:

the MB from May, 2013 until his arrest in September of the same year. He is also the son of Issam Al-Haddad, a member of the MB Guidance Bureau. He served as a Senior Advisor on Foreign Affairs to the Brotherhood's FJP since May 2011, as well (The Global MB Watch, 2015b).

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- The Global MB Watch (2015b) *Gehad El-Haddad*. The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.globalmbwatch.com/wiki/gehad-el-haddad/> (Accessed: 1st July, 2020).
  - Obaid, N. (2020) *The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world*. California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO.

### 5.2.2.2 *The Hero*

The articles to be discussed in this section are the ones reflecting the mythical archetype of the Hero. The micro-discursive (linguistic) analysis of the articles can be found in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.2.2). The following analyses are organised as follows:

- **OPA-H** (An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

*الإسلام السياسي.. خطوة للخلف نحو قفزة للأمام*

*Political Islam: A step back toward a leap forward*

#### **Section 5.2.2.2.1**

- **OPE-H** (An English opinion piece)

*The Egyptian coup and the lessons of Turkey*

#### **Section 5.2.2.2.2**

- **STA-H** (An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

*أعواد المشانق... أيقونة مصرية في تركيا*

*The gallows... an Egyptian icon in Turkey*

#### **Section 5.2.2.2.3**

- **STE-H** (An English straight news story)

*Morsi will never compromise says family*

#### **Section 5.2.2.2.4**

### 5.2.2.2.1 OPA-H

الإسلام السياسي.. خطوة للخلف نحو قفزة للأمام

#### Political Islam: A step back toward a leap forward <sup>102</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

In this article (Salih, 2013), we shall be looking into the ways in which the linguistic construction of the Hero narrative appears to be facilitated by the macro-level strategies of discourse. In doing so, an important part of the analysis entails the need to go through some of the contextual information about the writer as the first discursive strategy, to begin with.

The writer, Muhsin M. Salih (محسن صالح), as identified on his own personal website<sup>103</sup>, is an Associate Professor of Modern and Contemporary Arab History. He formally worked as the Head of Department of History and Civilisation at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Currently, Dr Salih works as ‘the General-Manager of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations (Salih, 2018). As seen on his personal website, His books, publications, and conference participation appear to be mostly dedicated to the defence of Palestinian rights and in criticism of what he terms as the “Israeli occupation” and “Zionist project”. Aside from his interest in the political affairs of the Palestinians, he is also interested in other aspects such as Jerusalem affairs, Palestinian Islamic movements, Palestinian resistance, and modern and contemporary Palestinian history. Interestingly, Salih, in one of his published books written in support of the Islamic movement ‘ Hamas’ (Saleh, 2017), praises the contributions of Hamas’s senior leaders, Ismā‘īl Hanīyah (Ismail Haniyeh)<sup>104</sup> and Mūsā Abū Marzūq (Mousa Abu Marzouq)<sup>105</sup>. This appears to offer a bit more insight into his own personal relations with the

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<sup>102</sup> For full article, see Script 5 (OPA-H), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.2.1.

<sup>103</sup> Salih’s personal website:

Salih, M. (2018) سيرة ذاتية (مختصرة): أ.د. محسن محمد صالح *Sīrah dhātīyah (mukhtaṣarah): al-Ustādh al-Duktūr Muḥsin Muḥammad Sālīh [Short résumé: Professor Muhsin Muhammad Salih]* [Personal website]. Available at: <https://www.alzaytouna.net/2017/09/18/سيرة-ذاتية-مختصرة/#.YOKXb-hKg2w> (Accessed: 1st July, 2020).

<sup>104</sup> More background information about Haniyeh can be referred to in the following sources:

- Britannica (1999) 'Ismail Haniyeh', in The Editors of Encyclopaedia (ed.) *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ismail-Haniya> (Accessed: 13th August, 2021).
- Hamas (no date-a) إسماعيل هنية، رئيس المكتب السياسي لحركة حماس *Ismā‘īl Hanīyah, ra‘īs al-maktab al-siyāsī li-harakat Ḥamās [Ismail Haniyeh, the chief of Hamas's politburo]*. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). [Online]. Available at: <https://info.hamas.ps/post/63/إسماعيل-هنية> (Accessed: 13th August, 2021).

<sup>105</sup> More background information about Abu Marzouq can be referred to in the following sources:

other Islamist parties. Moreover, all of the above can offer further insights into the author's ideological inclinations, propagating his use of language.

Moving on now to the macro-discursive strategies, the writer appears to heavily invest in the use of the following devices: historical memory, intertextuality, and interdiscursivity. Such strategies are often used inseparably as the mention of one can trigger the other.

In terms of historical memory, perhaps, one of the most evident cases can be seen in the writer attempting to establish a historical continuum, linking all of the contemporary Islamic "reformist" groups and parties with other ones from the past. In other words, the author attempts to establish a strong historical foundation for the present-day Islamist movements as a means of substantiating his arguments. In doing so, the writer summons examples of Muslim and Arab figures from the ancient past, roughly during the time period between the Rāshidūn and Umayyad Caliphates (632–750 CE):

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*A movement that adopts Islam as a thought, conduct and way of life, is, indeed, an authentic, strong, and profound movement. It is deep-rooted in the Arab and Islamic nations. Indeed, the Islamist revivalist and reformist movements that played major political and revolutionary roles trace their roots to the first century AH. This can be seen in the revolts of Al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alīy, 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr, and 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ash'ath. Such movements have come a long way and have never grown weary for centuries*

*التيار الذي يتبنى الإسلام فكرا وسلوكا ومنهج حياة، هو تيار أصيل عميق وقوي ومتجذر في الأمة العربية والأمة الإسلامية. وأن حركات التجديد والإصلاح الإسلامي التي لعبت أدوارا سياسية وثورية، تعود بجذورها إلى القرن الهجري الأول، حيث تجلت مثلا بثورات الحسين بن علي، وعبد الله بن الزبير، وعبد الرحمن بن الأشعث، ولم تتوقف على مرّ العصور*

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Of course, drawing on those examples appears to be useful when it comes to the discursive construction of the Hero narrative. The above use of historical memory seems to suggest that

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- CEP (no date) *Moussa Mohammed Abu Marzouk*. The Counter Extremism Project. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/moussa-mohammed-abu-marzouk> (Accessed: 13th August, 2021).
  - Hamas (no date-c) *موسى أبو مرزوق، عضو المكتب السياسي لحركة حماس* [Mūsā Abū Marzūq, 'uḏū al-maktab al-siyāsī li-harakat Ḥamās] [Mousa Abu Marzouq, a member of Hamas's politburo]. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). [Online]. Available at: <https://info.hamas.ps/post/72/موسى-أبو-مرزوق> (Accessed: 13th August, 2021).

the present-day Islamist movements have actually come a long way and possibly, endured a lota great deal throughout their journey of fight and struggle.

Moreover, the writer seems to suggest that the above-mentioned movements (which are said to have “played political and revolutionary roles”) trace their roots to the first century of Islamic history. This, according to him, can be seen:

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*... in the revolts of Al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alīy, ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr, and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ash‘ath. And it has never ceased for centuries*

*... بثورات الحسين بن علي، وعبد الله بن الزبير، وعبد الرحمن بن الأشعث، ولم تتوقف على مرّ العصور*

---

It is through revisiting the past and the use of the above intertextual processes that the writer is, perhaps, able to recontextualise the experience of the present-day Islamic movements, and hence, validate his claims: The Islamist movements are simply here to carry on the legacy of their predecessors as they are on the same “heroic” mission, as suggested by the writer. In justifying and legitimising the existence of such movements today, the author seems to suppress the fact that both past and present cases do not align with each other in any shape or form.

What is even more problematic about such statements is that the writer puts the names of two of the known noble companions of Prophet Muḥammad (Al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alīy and ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr) with another third military commander (‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ash‘ath) who is neither a companion of the Prophet nor equivalent in Islamic status to the previous two. Most importantly, Ibn al-Ash‘ath is argued by some Islamic historians to have been involved in *fitnah* (sedition) during the early caliphate of the Umayyad dynasty (Ibn Kathīr, 1997). Such *fitnah*, as remarked by historians, gave rise to military disorder and conflicts amongst the ranks of the Muslim community. In other words, such mixing of names, figures, and events together may run the risk of blurring some historical complexities. What is also worth adding to the previous act of intertextuality is that it does, indeed, make the above statements interdiscursive since the topic of Islamism is approached through the lens of Islamic history.

Further intertextual occurrences can also be observed in the below paragraph, which appears to construct the Islamist movements as the kind of heroes who rose against the forces of evil in the Islamic world (*colonisation* “الاستعمار” and *backwardness* “التخلف”):<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> The statement is found on the following page.

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*In contemporary history, the main constituent of such a force that has taken upon itself to stand up against the colonisation of our homelands and confront the state of backwardness ravaging our Ummah, has been, in fact, of an Islamist origin. The impetus behind it has been equally Islamist. This can be seen in each of the following cases: The Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula, the Mahdism in Sudan, the Senussism in Libya, the movement of Ahmad Khan in India, the movement of Ben Badis in Algeria, the Muslim Brothers in the Indian subcontinent, and the Nursism in Turkey. All of these truly are an extension of their reformist predecessors*

في التاريخ الحديث والمعاصر، فإن القوة الرئيسية التي واجهت حالة التخلف في أمتنا وواجهت الاستعمار في ديارنا، كان مكونها الرئيس إسلامياً، وروحها الدافعة إسلامية، كالوهابية في الجزيرة العربية، والمهدية في السودان، والسنوسية في ليبيا، وحركة الشهيد أحمد خان في الهند، وبين باديس في الجزائر، وغيرها، وحركات الإخوان المسلمين أو الجماعة الإسلامية في القارة الهندية، والنورية في تركيا، وغيرها هي امتداد لهذا التيار الإصلاحية

---

The writer above lists a number of Islamic movements from modern and contemporary history as major forces of change in the Muslim and Arab world. This seems to be part of the author's attempt to make a point about the Islamist movements being of a heavier weight in terms of indigenusness to the Islamic and Arab world as opposed to other non-Islamist groups.

Aside from the writer's oversimplifying assumption about Islamists being the only forces that stood up in the face of *colonisation* "الاستعمار" and the controversial use of the term *Wahhabism* "الوهابية" (Lodi, 2011), aligning and putting all of these "revivalist" movements in one basket also overlook the possible intellectual differences and rivalries between the movements themselves. On the same note, turning a blind eye to such potential disagreements may also communicate an attempt at paradoxical persuasion on the part of the writer. Paradoxical persuasion can be seen in the writer's proposing some sort of temporary alliance between the Islamist movements, at least, in the face of a common problem: Rival forces in the region, subscribing to non-Islamist ideologies (e.g., secularist and nationalist parties and coalitions). Moreover, the statement also seems to speak of an anti-colonial, Islamist mindset on the part of the author, which calls for sociopolitical solidarity among all Muslims and rejection of the rule



and influence of Western colonial powers in the region (Esposito, 2003). Other intertextual and interdiscursive references can also be identified in the following statement:<sup>107</sup>

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*Over the years, all of such military and non-military regimes that once raised nationalist and secularist slogans [...] have, in fact, failed at putting some of the critical questions to rest, such as those to do with the notions of identity, unity, development, including how to counter the Zionist project. Meanwhile, the Islamist movement has not yet taken its real shot at governing*

*طوال السنوات الماضية، فشلت الأنظمة العسكرية، والأنظمة التي رفعت شعارات قومية كالبعثية والناصرية، والأنظمة العلمانية [...] في الإجابة عن أسئلة الهوية والوحدة والتنمية ومواجهة المشروع الصهيوني، ولم يبقَ إلا ذلك التيار الإسلامي الحضاري الذي لم يأخذ بعد فرصته الحقيقية في الحكم*

---

Beyond the oversimplifying claims about the Islamist movements being the only groups in the region that hold all the answers for the above-raised challenges, the writer seems to speak the mindset of the Islamists themselves and the ways in which they perceive parties and ideas different to their own. Key beliefs and standpoints can also be seen expressed by the author, which includes “anti-nationalism”<sup>108</sup>, “anti-secularism”<sup>109</sup>, and “anti-Zionism”<sup>110</sup>.

What appears to be paradoxical about political Islam’s distrust of secularist ideas, as suggested in the above statement, is the fact that their rhetoric itself is argued to be widely adopted from the very same non-Islamist rhetoric they are at odds with. For instance, the MB in Egypt is argued to have provided an economic programme in 2007 that can be hardly told apart from the economic policies outlined by the National Democratic Party. In fact, it was the idea of the Islamists themselves in different states to adjust and harmonise their views in line with democratic principles for political gains and to receive more support from the public. On the

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<sup>107</sup> The statement is found on the following page.

<sup>108</sup> Anti-nationalism is an ‘Islamic belief that advocates that all Muslims should constitute a united community, namely the ummah, which cuts across differences in status, tribe, and ancestry’. More on the concept can be referred to in the following source:

Yenen, A. (2020) ‘Pan-Islamism (Ottoman Empire)’, in Daniel, U., Gatrell, P., Janz, O., Jones, H., Keene, J., Kramer, A. and Nasson, B. (eds.) *1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War*. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin [Online]. Available at: [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pan-islamism\\_ottoman\\_empire](https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pan-islamism_ottoman_empire) (Accessed: 1st July, 2020).

<sup>109</sup> Anti-secularism stresses the refusal of secularist thoughts that are centred on the separation of the state from religious institutions. Secularism is seen by Islamists ‘as a factor of weakness and a sign of dependence on foreign powers’. More on the concept can be referred to in the following source:

Zebiri, K. (1998) ‘Muslim anti-secularist discourse in the context of Muslim-Christian relations’, *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 9(1), pp. 47-64.

<sup>110</sup> Anti-Zionism stands for the opposition to the establishment or support of the state of Israel. More on the concept can be referred to in the following source:

Wistrich, R. (2004) ‘Anti-zionism and anti-semitism’, *Jewish Political Studies Review*, pp. 27-31.

notion of political Islam being the only movement that is able to confront the challenges of identity and devolvement in the region, suffice it to mention that Islamists themselves are still unable to explain nor operationalise their own slogan “Islam is the solution”<sup>111</sup> into solving social and economic problems. So long there is an absence of clear democratic goals and strategies, political Islam will forever be in bewilderment and conflict of interests with other non-Islamist parties (Bubalo, 2008; Wittes, 2008; Sinno and Khanani, 2009).

In another example of intertextual and interdiscursive mechanisms within the article, the writer seems to draw on the notions of “faith” and “the course of history” in silencing the anti-MB social actors who are said to “gloat” over the death of political Islam:

---

*... as it seems, they (the anti-MB social actors) are still heedless of the divine laws of Allah, May He be praised and exalted, and the just course of history*

*... لأنهم على ما يبدو لم يتعلموا سنن الله سبحانه في الكون، ولا حركة التاريخ*

---

An attempt at intertextual recontextualisation can also be highlighted in quoting a verse from the Qur’ān to serve and fit into a new context: the MB’s return. As seen in the following example, the writer soothes the MB by reassuring them that what seems to have befallen upon them is for their own greater good:

---

*Hence, may the following words of Allah in the Holy Qur’ān be of solace to them (the MB): “...think it not to be an evil to you; On the contrary, it is good for you”<sup>112</sup>*

*ولذلك فلعل قوله تعالى: "لا تحسبوه شراً لكم بل هو خير لكم" ينطبق عليهم*

---

The writer continues to suggest that Allāh (God), perhaps, wants to

---

*bring out the best in them (the MB)*

*يستخرج أفضل ما عندهم (الإخوان)*

---

In other words, the writer says that Allah, perhaps, desires to:<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> al-Islām huwa al-ḥal: الإسلام هو الحل.

<sup>112</sup> The Qur’ān 24:11 (Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).

<sup>113</sup> The statement is found on the following page.

---

*better prepare the MBs not only for running the state and society but also for confronting the Zionist and Western projects in the region.*

*ويرتقوا إلى مستوى إدارة المجتمع والدولة، ومستوى إدارة الصراع مع المشروع الصهيوني والمشروع الغربي في المنطقة*

---

In the above statement, another layer of both intertextuality and interdiscursivity can be noted: The reference to what the writer labels as the “Zionist” and “Western” ambitions in the region.

Lastly on intertextuality, another occasion of which can be found in both the headline and the concluding paragraph of the article, which clearly summarises the Hero journey in just a few words:

---

*The backlash wave that toppled the Islamists in Egypt will not be anything to them other than “a step back towards a leap forward”*

*إن الموجة الارتدادية المضادة التي أطاحت بالإسلاميين في مصر لن تكون بالنسبة لهم سوى “خطوة إلى الوراء، نحو قفزة إلى الأمام”*

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The above phrase is simply a translated quote from the French diplomat and letter writer Dudley Carleton (1574–1632)<sup>114</sup>. Used in this context, it may have been in defence of the MB, as it seems to suggest that what has befallen upon them may very well improve their chances in the future.

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<sup>114</sup> More on the definition and origins of the phrase can be referred to in the following source: OUP (2021) *Reculer pour mieux sauter* [Lexico web page]. Available at: [https://www.lexico.com/definition/reculer\\_pour\\_mieux\\_sauter](https://www.lexico.com/definition/reculer_pour_mieux_sauter) (Accessed: 20th August, 2021).

#### 5.2.2.2.2 OPE-H

### The Egyptian coup and the lessons of Turkey <sup>115</sup>

(An English opinion piece)

As seen in the following opinion piece (Ibrahim, 2013), the writer appears to exhibit sympathy towards the MB and endorses the statements made by the Turkish president. He praises the Turkish model of democracy whilst criticising those of Western democracies. In order to better understand the reasons as to why the writer seems to hold these views, it is worth putting forward some contextual information first. Indeed, the answer lies in the fact that the author, Anwar Ibrahim, is an Islamist himself and a well-known politician in Malaysia (Malek, 2011; Malik and Shukri, 2018). He is also known to have established:

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*many known ties to the global U.S Muslim Brotherhood including helping to found the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) where he currently serves as a director, serving as a trustee for the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) during the 1970's and early 1980's, and appearances at numerous Brotherhood-linked conferences. In 2011, he was a participant in the 2011 U.S.-Islamic World Forum, held in the US for the first time and which included a large number of individuals tied to the Global Muslim Brotherhood as well as their supporters.*

---

(The global MB Watch, 2015a, para. 2)

Moreover, Ibrahim is also the founder of the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement ABIM<sup>116</sup>, which is classified as one of the most influential Islamic NGOs in the 70s (Nagata, 1980, cited in Malik and Shukri, 2018). In fulfilling its objectives, calling for the promotion of Islam in its thorough understanding and implementation in the lives of Muslims in Malaysia, ABIM is said to have:

*formulated its mission under two main Islamic principles: tajdīd (renewal) and Islāh (reform) of the Muslim society by imparting da'wah (call to Islam) and tarbiyah (process of education). ABIM activists picked up these ideals through their*

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<sup>115</sup> For full article, see Script 6 (OPE-H), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.2.2.

<sup>116</sup> As known by its Malay acronym.

*interaction with MB leaders, activists, and through ABIM activists who were educated abroad and had been exposed to MB's educational system.*

(Malik and Shukri, 2018, p. 173)

As stated at the top and bottom sides of the article (Ibrahim, 2013), Ibrahim used to work as the opposition leader of Malaysia. He was also the former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister.

Moving on to the other macro-strategies, the author's use of intertextuality appears to be the most dominant aspect in the article (Ibrahim, 2013). Such a device can be seen in Ibrahim's frequent references to the Turkish democratic experience as well as his praise of the "heroic fight and resilience" of the Turkish people in confronting the so-called "**military interventions**". This all seems to be done for the purpose of setting an example out of the Turkish model for the Egyptians to look upon. According to Ibrahim:

---

*The Turkish people were never handed democracy on a silver platter. Just as what we are witnessing now in Egypt, the Turkish people had to fight hard for it and even harder to keep it. It was fought with the blood, sweat and tears of those united by the love for freedom and democracy [...] it is in this shared past that Egypt may yet be able to find new hope for a destiny akin to Turkey's', undoubtedly a thriving democracy with a painful and bitter history of military interventions*

---

Other instances of intertextuality can be seen in quoting and endorsing statements of each of the Turkish and Tunisian administrations, criticising the Egyptian government.

### 5.2.2.2.3 STA-H

أعواد المشانق... أيقونة مصرية في تركيا

#### The gallows... an Egyptian icon in Turkey <sup>117</sup>

(An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

One of the possibly most evident macro-strategies in this straight news report (Mabruk, 2014) is intertextuality. Such a device can be frequently seen, for instance, in drawing on the denouncements made by each of the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan<sup>118</sup>, and the former Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adil Rāshid. It can also be identified in the statements given by the event organisers, activists, and participants, criticising and condemning the death-sentencing of the MB. Probably one of the most significant acts of intertextuality is a statement made by the activist Abdulhamid Jamal. The activist puts Turkey and Egypt side by side owing to both countries' shared experience in resisting “*coups*”. Ultimately, historical memory is triggered:

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*According to the Egyptian activist Abdulhamid Jamal, Turkey's solidarity with the Egyptian people is nothing unusual. He adds that Turkey has equally suffered from military coups for a very long time and have actually fallen into the hands of military rule in the second half of the 20th century.*

*من ناحيته، اعتبر الناشط المصري عبد الحميد جمال التفاعل التركي الكبير مع الأحداث التي تشهدها مصر أمراً طبيعياً بالنظر لتشابه التجربتين، مضيفاً أن تركيا عانت من مرارة الانقلابات العسكرية لزم من طويل ألقى فيه البلاد في حكم العسكر، في إشارة إلى الانقلابات التي شهدتها تركيا في النصف الثاني من القرن العشرين.*

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Further on intertextuality, Qur'anic references seem to be also drawn upon. This can be identified in the very statement made by the former Egyptian minister, Adil Rashid, where he briefly invokes the story of Prophet Nūḥ's Ark<sup>119</sup> whilst praising Turkey.

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<sup>117</sup> For full article, see Script 7 (STA-H), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.2.3.

<sup>118</sup> The current president of Turkey since 2014:

BBC World News (2020) 'Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey's pugnacious president', *BBC News*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13746679> (Accessed: 23rd August, 2021).

<sup>119</sup> Prophet Nūḥ “نوح” (Noah), peace be upon him, is a recognised prophet and apostle of Allāh “الله” (God), may He be glorified and exalted, in the Islamic theology and one of the most significant of all prophets. His full story can be referred to in the following source:

Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019b) 'The Story of Noah', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā' Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 58 – 89.

According to Rashid:

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*The Ark of Nūḥ (Noah), which once delivered humanity, did land in Turkey. And in the very land of Turkey, there shall land another Ark one day, delivering all the free people of the world*

*إن سفينة نوح التي نجت فيها البشرية حطت في تركيا، كما ستحط سفينة نجاه الأحرار رحالها اليوم في ذات البلد*

---

Intertextuality can also be seen in other places across the story, all of which can be highlighted in the use of rhetorical devices such as the rhythmized prose and rhetorical questions (see the micro-discursive analysis in Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.2.3).

Lastly, bringing up the name of Al-Jazeera's most frequently criticised social actor, *the Israeli State* "إسرائيل" out of no apparent reason other than, perhaps, to vilify President Al-Sisi, represents another intertextual occasion. The attempt at smearing the image of Al-Sisi or that of any other anti-MB social actors, for that matter, seems to be best carried out through aligning them with other social actors in which Al-Jazeera frequently depicts as "the enemy". The state of Israel has been perhaps the most shunned and attacked throughout the major bulk of Al-Jazeera's reporting, and hence, would probably serve the purpose the best.

#### 5.2.2.2.4 STE-H

### **Morsi will never compromise says family** <sup>120</sup>

(An English straight news story)

Perhaps, the only macro-discursive device to be found in this report (Reuters, 2013) is intertextually-constructed. Intertextuality appears to be exclusively expressed in the statements shared by Morsi's family, in which the ousted president is praised along the lines of the sacrificial Hero narrative. For instance, according to his family:

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*The president will not retreat, or negotiate or accept compromises especially after all the martyrs, the wounded, the arrested and missing [...] No matter how much they try to keep him away, the president will not retreat from a return to the democratic path, even if his soul is the price of this democratic path*

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<sup>120</sup> For full article, see Script 8 (STE-H), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.2.4.



### 5.2.2.3 *The Trickster*

The articles to be discussed in this section are the ones reflecting the mythical archetype of the Trickster. The micro-discursive (linguistic) analysis of the articles can be found in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.2.3). The following analyses are organised as follows:

- **OPA-T** (Al-Jazeera Arabic coupled with English translation)

فَلَمْ يُضِرْهَا..

*Remained unharmed..*

#### **Section 5.2.2.3.1**

- **OPE-T** (Al-Jazeera English)

*Al-Sisi's reign of terror and the propaganda of 'fascism'*

#### **Section 5.2.2.3.2**

- **STA-T** (Al-Jazeera Arabic coupled with English translation)

هل السيسي "سايكوباتي"؟

*Is Al-Sisi a "psychopath"?*

#### **Section 5.2.2.3.3**

- **STE-T** (Al-Jazeera English)

*Video shows Egypt generals plotting media gag*

#### **Section 5.2.2.3.4**

### 5.2.2.3.1 OPA-T

فَلَمْ يُضِرْهَا..

**Remained unharmed..** <sup>121</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

The following opinion piece (Al-Risheq, 2013) is written by none other than the senior member of Hamas's political bureau, Izzat al-Risheq (عزت الرشق)<sup>122</sup>. Therefore, it would come as no surprise where the author of the article comes from in relation to his defence of Hamas. His Islamist background can also give insights into his own rhetorical style and efficient use of the Arabic language. This was already linguistically demonstrated in the previous chapter, section 4.3.2.3.1. Nonetheless, it will be elaborated on a bit more through the author's use of macro-discursive strategies, namely intertextuality and interdiscursivity.

As mentioned before in the previous chapter, the Egyptian media are called out by Al-Risheq for engaging in what he sees as *slander* “إفتراء” and *fabrication* “تلفيق” against Hamas. Hence, the author resorts to defending Hamas by means of ridiculing and criticising the media campaign, on the one hand, and praising Hamas and its “resolve”, on the other. To achieve such forms of portrayals, the author resorts to the Trickster narrative, of which traits are not only limited to the qualities of “slyness” and “deception” but also crudity (on the part of the media) that calls for mockery and contempt. Although the Trickster archetype appears to be heavily drawn on across the article, the Hero figure is also summoned in places where Hamas is praised and positively evaluated.

Going back to intertextuality and interdiscursivity, both strategies seem to be used, side by side, in a number of places across the article. Perhaps some of the easily identified attempts at intertextuality are exemplified in quoting statements obtained from two Egyptian newspapers, Al-Watan and Akhbar Al-Yawm, as a means of poking fun at their purportedly *absurd* “سخيف” *illogical* “سخيف” content.

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<sup>121</sup> For full article, see Script 9 (OPA-T), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.3.1.

<sup>122</sup> More background information about al-Risheq can be referred to in the following source: Hamas (no date-b) عزت الرشق، عضو المكتب السياسي لحركة حماس *Izzat al-Risheq, 'udū al-maktab al-siyāsī li-harakat Hamās [Izzat al-Risheq, a member of Hamas's politburo]*. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). [Online]. Available at: <https://info.hamas.ps/post/79/عزت-الرشق> (Accessed: 13th August, 2021).

Below are the two statements rephrased by the author and coupled with his sarcastic remarks:

---

*I beg the indulgence of the honourable reader to mention examples of how decadent and reckless the media have become. The following examples show how the media try to belittle the minds of the Egyptian and Arab audience who are taken for fools:*

*Al-Watan newspaper once published an extremely alarming news article - I say "extremely alarming" as in the sarcastic sense of the words – in which it identifies the whereabouts of Ayman Al-Dhawahiri <sup>123</sup>. The newspaper stresses and warns of al-Qaeda elements in Yemen and Syria, preparing to travel to Egypt through Hamas's tunnels [...] This, according to the newspaper, will be carried out with the help of Hamas and the facilitation of each of Turkey and Qatar.*

*Is there a single meaningful sentence in any of this?*

*In another story published by the online news site, Akhbar Al-Yawm, the site quotes a statement made by the journalist and member of the People's Assembly, Mustafa Bakri, stating that "the ousted President Morsi had plans to participate in the establishment of a state for Gaza in Sinai and that there were voice recordings of Morsi, revealing that he also wanted to establish an Egyptian consulate in Gaza and another one for Gaza in Egypt. Can such a ludicrous talk even fool the youngest of kids? Had there not been already once before an Egyptian consulate in Gaza?*

*أستسمح القارئ الكريم بذكر نماذج من هذا المستوى الإعلامي الهابط الذي وصل إلى مستوى الرعونة المهنية والاستخفاف بعقل الجمهور المصري والعربي*

*نشرت جريدة الوطن خبرا غايبه في الخطورة -أقول الخطورة على سبيل التندر- كشفت فيه مكان أيمن الظواهري، وأكدت انتقال عناصر القاعدة من اليمن وسوريا إلى مصر عبر أنفاق حماس!*

*فهل هناك جملة واحدة مفيدة؟*

*وقد نقلت بوابة أخبار اليوم عن عضو مجلس الشعب والإعلامي مصطفى بكري قوله "إن الرئيس المعزول محمد مرسي كان سيشارك في إقامة دولة لغزة بسيناء، وأن هناك تسجيلات لمرسي تؤكد أنه كان ينوي إقامة قنصلية مصرية في غزة وإقامة قنصلية لغزة في مصر." فهل يمكن أن ينطلي مثل هذا الكلام على أصغر طفل؟*

---

<sup>123</sup> Ayman Al-Dhawahiri (Ayman al-Dhawāhirī) is the second and last "emir" of the terrorist organisation, Al-Qaeda (al-Qā'idah)

As stated before, intertextuality is also brought into play as part of the heroic discursive construction of Hamas and highlighting their ascribed *fortitude* “ثبات”. This can be found in quoting the following famous line from classical Arabic poetry by, Al-‘Ashā<sup>124</sup>:

---

*The media’s futile attempts against Hamas brings to mind a famous line by the Arab poet Maymūn Ibn Qays (Al-‘Ash ā), which goes:*

*Like a mountain goat thrusting (with his horn) at a solid boulder one day, to*

*weaken it, leaving it without any damage and damaging his horn in the process.*

وكأنني بالشاعر العربي ميمون بن قيس (الأعشى) قد وصف هذه الفنة من الإعلاميين بقوله:

كناطح صخرة يوماً ليؤهئها

فلم يضرها وأوهى قرنه الوعل

---

Poetry has always been of particular appeal in the Arab world. As far as the Arabs are concerned, poetry still enjoys the same old propensity of reflecting their ‘deepest sense of self-identity, communal history, and aspirations for the future’ in the same ways it did in ancient times (Allen, 1999, para. 1). To further demonstrate how the Arabs take quite a shine to Arabic poetry, Hitti (1946) states the following words:

*No people in the world manifest such enthusiastic admiration for literary expression and are so moved by the word, spoken or written, as the Arabs. Modern audiences in Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo can be stirred to the highest degree by the recital of poems, only vaguely comprehended, and by the delivery of orations in the classical tongue, though only partially understood. The rhythm, the rhyme and the music, produce on them the effect of what they call “lawful magic (sihr halal)”*

(Hitti, 1946, p. 90)

Now, the earlier verse can be understood as an allegory, representing the media’s “futile campaign” against Hamas. Looking at this verse, Hamas’s “resolve” seems to be praised along

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<sup>124</sup> A prominent poet in pre-Islamic Arabia:

Britannica (1998a) 'Al-A‘shā', in The Editors of Encyclopaedia (ed.) *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/al-Asha> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).

the lines of the Hero archetype. Meanwhile, the media are ridiculed and shunned through the crude and animalistic traits of the archetypal Trickster.

Another attempt at intertextuality is found in the following line:

---

*(Hammas) holding fast to the rope or their Lord (Allah's covenant).*

(حماس) متمسكة بحبل ربها

---

Such Qur'anic expression<sup>125</sup> is widely found within Islamic texts and literature. It metaphorically emphasises the notion of unity amongst the main body of Muslims as well as the need of adhering to the covenant of Allah and staying strong and upright throughout the path of fight and struggle (Islam Question and Answer, 2020):

---

*Hold fast to God's rope all together; do not split into factions*

وَاعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا وَلَا تَفَرَّقُوا

---

As far as the given context is concerned, the borrowed expression can be seen as a form of high praise to Hamas, feeding into the heroic construction of the group.

Triggered within the article are also a number of interdiscursive references. All such occasions can be found in the author briefly touching upon different topics in his bid to praise Hamas's purportedly heroic activities; an example of which can be found in the author speaking highly of the group's efforts in freeing Palestinian prisoners as part of the *Wafā' al-Ahrār* exchange deal with Israel (<sup>126</sup>“وفاء الأحرار”).

Other interdiscursive instances in which the author seems to invest in as part of glamorising and defending Hamas are also noted. This can be found in emphasising the group's roles, as believed by the author, in “upfitting the suffering of the Palestinians”, “fighting for the common good of the Arab nations”, and “resisting the Zionist projects” in the region.

In all of the above intertextual and interdiscursive occasions, a number of ideological views and positions seem to have been equally expressed. Such views and positions appear to revolve

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<sup>125</sup> The Qur'an 3:103 (Translated by Saheeh International).

<sup>126</sup> Also known as Wafa al-Ahrar agreement, which translates as “The True Promise of Freemen”.

around pan-Islamism, anti-Zionism, and the spirit of Jihad<sup>127</sup> against the “Zionist enemy”, as termed by the author. Indeed, being an offshoot of the MB, all such ideas are arguably at the heart of the doctrinal principles and beliefs of Hamas (Schumer, 1993; Levitt, 2008; Higgins, 2009; Litvak, 2010; Farahat, 2017; Hannase, 2020; Obaid, 2020).

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<sup>127</sup> Al-Jihād is a term that comes with multiple meanings in Islam. One of which is the armed struggle against the unbelievers and enemies of region. More on the term can be referred to in the following source: Afsaruddin, A. (2020) 'Jihad', in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/jihad> (Accessed: 8th August, 2021).

### 5.2.2.3.2 OPE-T

#### Al-Sisi's reign of terror and the propaganda of 'fascism'<sup>128</sup>

(An English opinion piece)

As stated before in the previous chapter, section 4.3.2.3.2, an overall analysis of the article written by Irfan Ahmad (Ahmad, 2013), demonstrates a number of mythical traits that seem to be largely associated with the Trickster figure. These are heavily invested in the archetypal depiction of President Al-Sisi, his government officials, the “liberal secularists”, and the pro-government media. The discursive depiction of the Trickster archetype seems to revolve around the figure being sly, deceptive and with tendencies to violate the normal unpredictably. The figures are also constructed as ones who are crude, immoral, and subject to mockery and contempt. Prior to looking into the ways in which such descriptions are macro-discursively informed, some contextual information about the writer is worth presenting.

As identified in his article, Ahmad was once an associate professor of political anthropology at the Institute for Religion, Politics and Society at the Australian Catholic University in Melbourne. He now serves as a political anthropologist at Max Planck Institute in Göttingen in Germany, as stated on his Twitter account<sup>129</sup>. He is said to have written a lot on Islamism and democracy and produced several books and publications critiquing, comforting and challenging secularism, islamophobia, as well as Western scholarship, which view Islam as hostile to critical thinking (Reset DOC - Dialogues on Civilizations, 2010; OUPIndia, 2018; TEDx Talks, 2020; Irfan Ahmad, no date). In one of his books on political Islam and democracy (Ahmad, 2010a), Ahmed states the following as part of a synopsis in which he lays the responsibility for the rise of Islamic radicalism on the practices of “majoritarianism and exclusion” in some countries:

*when secular democracy is responsive to the traditions and aspirations of its Muslim citizens, Muslims in turn embrace pluralism and democracy. But when democracy becomes majoritarian and exclusionary, Muslims turn radical.*

(Ahmad, 2010a, para. 3)

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<sup>128</sup> For full article, see Script 10 (OPE-T), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.3.2.

<sup>129</sup> Ahmad's Twitter account:

Ahmad, I. (2018) @IrfanHindustan. [Twitter]. Available at: <https://twitter.com/irfanhindustan?lang=en> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).

Looking at his article, Ahmad's opinions do not seem to differ from the sort of views he has generally embraced and reproduced over the course of his professional and intellectual journey. For instance, his pro-Islamist and anti-secular views seem to correspond to his criticism of "*authoritarianism*" (being allegedly exercised by the anti-MB establishment) and his attack of "*liberal secularists*", whom he accuses of conspiring against the MB. Moreover, such views seem ageable with his attacks on "*Islamophobia*" and the demonisation of the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party of the MB<sup>130</sup> (FJP).

The columnist ideological leanings appear to be further reflected via his use of historical memory and intertextual recontextualisation. Both discursive strategies are, perhaps, utilised for the purpose of comparing and contrasting the democratic experiences of various countries from past and present times with the one in Egypt. In the below statement, for instance, the author urges the readers to remember and consider the following:

---

*Let's not forget that various states and regimes throughout the world have practiced terror—for instance, Pinochet's in Chile, Suharto's in Indonesia and the regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia, not to speak of earlier colonial regimes.*

---

To further make sense of what was going on in Egypt at the time, he also draws on the observations made by the American political scientist Alfred Stepan concerning the democratisation efforts in different countries around the world.

The columnist continues to draw on historical memory and recontextualisation as he urges the churches in Egypt to follow the suit of Christianity in the West and the efforts of Martin Luther King in enlightening and inspiring their followers:

---

*to fight for civil rights and confront the racist power hierarchy*

---

The writer summons examples of countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America where the churches over there are said to:

---

*have historically served as motors of democratisation, centers of political dissent, and advocates of liberation theology*

---

---

<sup>130</sup> An Egyptian Islamist political party which was formally led by ex-president Morsi.



Historical memory on its own can be found in different places across the text. For example, the author, at one place, summons stories and incidents from the past, namely when President Jamal Abdul Nasser (Jamāl ‘Abd al-Naṣir)<sup>131</sup> was still in power, all for the purpose of argumentation. Such stories are drawn upon as a means of responding, discrediting and trivialising the sort of statements given by the interim president’s advisor <sup>132</sup>, Mustafa Hijazy in which the MB members stand accused of **“fascism”** and **“terrorism”**. According to the author, Hijazi’s attempts to “yoke fascism with terrorism” are odd and faulty, remarking that even Abdul Nasser himself (whom Hijazi’s admires and speaks highly of) was once labelled by the Western press as **“fascist”** for wanting to nationalise the Suez Canal. The below statement reveals how the writer takes further aims at Hijazi and the liberal secularists:

---

*The lack of historical depth in Hegazy's understanding of fascism was compensated by the abundance of its Islamophobia which Hegazy photocopied from the West and which Egypt's 'liberal-secular' elites also share.*

---

Another attempt at historical memory and intertextuality can be seen in the writer trying to challenge the **“Egyptian liberals”** over the concept of “secularism” and whether or not they should call themselves as such. According to the author:

---

*(Egyptian liberals who are) uncritically beholden to the incorrect narrative of a secular West’ should ‘recall that during the long Cold War, the West, certainly the USA, rarely defined itself as ‘secular’*

---

Lastly, intertextuality can be found in the columnist’s attempting to draw on the views of the American expert on Middle East politics and affairs, Alon Ben-Meir’s, in which the latter challenges the compatibility of Islam with democracy. The author of the article dismisses such views as **“boring, orientalist cliché”**.

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<sup>131</sup> 23<sup>rd</sup> The second President of Egypt from June, 1956 to 28th September, 1970: Rubin, B. (1982) 'America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957', *Political Science Quarterly*, 97(1), pp. 73-90.

<sup>132</sup> Ādlī Mansūr (Adly Mansour), the interim President of Egypt from 4<sup>th</sup> July, 2013 to 8<sup>th</sup> of June, 2014: BBC World News (2013) 'Profile: Interim Egyptian President Adly Mansour', *BBC News*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23176293> (Accessed: 21st August, 2021).

### 5.2.2.3.3 STA-T

هل السيسي "سايكوباتي"؟

#### Is Al-Sisi a "psychopath"? <sup>133</sup>

(An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

As discussed in the previous chapter, section 4.3.2.3.3, the following report (Abu Al-Rub, 2014) pays specific attention to the character of President Al-Sisi, depicting him as a senseless Trickster, hunkering after his own desires.

There is not much to pull out from the following article in relation Dr Osama Abu Al-Rub's contextual background. As stated on his official social media accounts<sup>134</sup>, Abu Al-Rub is the Medical Affairs Editor at Al Jazeera media network and the Editor and Presenter of Al-Jazeera Clinic Programme.

As for the micro-discursive strategies employed, intertextuality and interdiscursivity appear to be the most dominant of all. Intertextuality can be seen in the author attempting to draw on the sort of quotes, insights and observations provided by the two psychiatrists, Dr Maḥmūd Abū Dannūn (Mahmoud Abu Danoun) and Dr Muḥammad al-Ḥabāshnah (Muhammad al-Habashneh), pertaining to their own assessment of President Al-Sisi. Interdiscursivity can be seen in the summoning and merging of different subjects such as psychology, morality, politics, and human rights.

What seems to be more problematic about this story is the seemingly strong sense of certainty on the part of the experts pertaining to their own evaluation of Al-Sisi's condition. This can be particularly evident in Abu Danoun's description more so than that of Al-Habashneh. Unlike Dr al-Habashneh, who does not seem to engage much in providing politically charged opinions and appears to sustain a slightly higher degree of professionalism, Abu Danoun appears to be more assertive, passionate, and emotionally driven in passing his own judgments. Aside from being driven by emotion and politics, his statements seem more hyperbolic and oversimplified.

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<sup>133</sup> For full article, see Script 11 (STA-T), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.3.3.

<sup>134</sup> Abu Al-Rub's Facebook and LinkedIn:

- Journalist and Doctor Osama Abu Al-Rub (no date). [Facebook]. Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/drosamarub/> (Accessed: 1st July, 2020).
- Osama Abu Al-Rub (no date). [LinkedIn]. Available at: [https://qa.linkedin.com/in/osama-abu-el-rub-908451101/ar-ae?trk=people-guest\\_people\\_search-card](https://qa.linkedin.com/in/osama-abu-el-rub-908451101/ar-ae?trk=people-guest_people_search-card) (Accessed: 1st July, 2020).

Now, the reasons as to why Abu Danoun comes across as being very passionate and judgmental in presenting his own thoughts may have to do with him being a member of MB leadership in Jourdan himself<sup>135</sup>.

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<sup>135</sup> Abu Danoun, a member of the MB's leadership in Jordan: Assabeel (2016) وفاة الدكتور محمود أبو دنون أحد قيادات الإخوان' *Wafāt al-Duktūr Maḥmūd Abū Dannūn aḥad qiyādād al-Ikhwān* [A Muslim Brotherhood leader, Dr Mahmoud Abu Danoun, is announced dead]', *Assabeel.net*. Available at: <http://assabeel.net/news/2016/9/24/الإخوان-أحد-قيادات-الإخوان> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).

#### 5.2.2.3.4 STE-T

### Video shows Egypt generals plotting media gag<sup>136</sup>

(An English straight news story)

Intertextuality appears to be the only discursive strategy utilised in conducting this report (Al-Jazeera, 2013b). Such a case is mostly exhibited in drawing on the statements of Jamal Dajani, the journalist and the vice-president for the Middle East and North Africa at Internews<sup>137</sup> (Dajani's personal website is included in the footnotes<sup>138</sup>). In one of his quotes, Dajani remarks that Al-Sisi and the military were trying to plot against the journalists to either intimidate them or win them over. The report also draws on the observations given by Reporters Without Borders (RSF<sup>139</sup>), in which it expresses concerns over what it sees as “*increasing violations*” and “*hostility*” being exercised against the freedom of the press.

One thing to note about the above-mentioned sources is the question of whether or not they can classify as independent, credible, and neutral enough. Starting with Dajani, the jauntiest is known to be a regular contributor to the *Listening Post*<sup>140</sup> programme on Al-Jazeera English (AJE). Therefore, his statement is expected to be in line with the viewpoints of the channel. As for the RSF, it has once acknowledged the receipt of American government funds. Nonetheless, it does not seem to shy away from describing itself as a non-profit organisation (Campbell, 2005; Capote, 2005). RSF is also criticised for producing biased reporting covering in favour of European governments and possessing hidden political agendas aimed mostly at discrediting third-world countries (Rosenthal, 2007a; Rosenthal, 2007b; Lamrani, 2009).

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<sup>136</sup> For full article, see Script 12 (STE-T), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.3.4.

<sup>137</sup> Internews is a supposedly international non-profit organisation of which aim is to provide training for media professionals to strengthen democracy and freedom of expression worldwide: Internews (no date) *Our Work* [Website]. Available at: <https://internews.org/work/our-work/> (Accessed: 19th August, 2021).

<sup>138</sup> Dajani's website: Jamal Dajani (no date) [Personal website]. Available at: <http://www.jamaldajani.com/> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).

<sup>139</sup> RSF is a supposedly international non-profit and non-governmental organisation, safeguarding the right to freedom of information:

RSF (no date) [Website]. Available at: <https://rsf.org/en> (Accessed: 19th August, 2021).

<sup>140</sup> Listening Post is a weekly programme, which is said to examine and dissect the world's media, how they operate, and the stories they cover:

*The Listening Post* (2006) Directed by Gizbert, R. [Al-Jazeera English Television]. United Kingdom: London. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/the-listening-post/>.

#### 5.2.2.4 *The Tyrant (Pharaoh) King*

The articles to be discussed in this section are the ones reflecting the mythical archetypes of the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King and/or the Trickster. The micro-discursive (linguistic) analysis of the articles can be found in Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.4. The following analyses are organised as follows:

- **OPA-A** (Al-Jazeera Arabic coupled with English translation)

*العلاقات التركية المصرية... إلى أين؟*

*The Turkish-Egyptian relations... Where are they heading?*

##### **Section 5.2.2.4.1**

- **OPA-B** (An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

*في رد الادعاء بخيار الضرورة*

*Rebutting the “choice of necessity” argument*

##### **Section 5.2.2.4.2**

- **STA-C** (An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

*تجارب قديمة ومتجددة في تحويل الفرعون إلى رئيس*

*Ancient, yet viable traditions in transforming the pharaoh into a president*

##### **Section 5.2.2.4.3**

#### 5.2.2.4.1 OPA-A

العلاقات التركية المصرية.. إلى أين؟

#### The Turkish-Egyptian relations.. Where are they heading? <sup>141</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

Drawing on stories from Islamic literature, the article at hand - as previously discussed in chapter 4, section 4.3.2.4.1 - seems to align the archetypal portrayals of President Al-Sisi and his men to *Pharaoh and his soldiers* “فرعون ومن معه”. Meanwhile, former President Morsi along with the MB protesters are equated to Prophet *Mūsā* “موسى” and his followers. In further looking into the ways in which the archetypal depictions of the aforementioned social actors are informed and facilitated at the macro-level of discourse, it is expedient to consider some contextual information about the author if we are to gain more insights into the who, why, and how of mythological expressions.

The journalist, Muhammad Gul, as identified in the article<sup>142</sup> and his Twitter account<sup>143</sup>, is a journalist, political analyst, and researcher of Turkish origins. He is also the editor-in-chief of the Turkish language version of *The Independent* newspaper. As evident in many of his articles, Gul enjoys a good command of Arabic, both written and spoken. By looking into the sort of articles he published between the years 2013 and 2016 on Al-Jazeera’s website<sup>144</sup>, Gul presents himself as a supporter of the government of President Erdoğan<sup>145</sup> - the leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP): an indigenous Islamist movement, taking its inspiration from the MB (Obaid, 2020; Yilmaz *et al.*, 2020). Hence, perhaps, the reason as to why his articles appear to be generally written to the sympathy and support of political Islam. Gul, in many of his articles, appears to yearn for the former days of the Ottoman caliphate. The journalist lays the

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<sup>141</sup> For full article, see Script 13 (OPA-A), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.4.1.

<sup>142</sup> A brief biography about Shakir about Gul can found at the top and bottom sides of the following article: Gul, M.Z. (2013a) ‘العلاقات التركية المصرية.. إلى أين؟’ *al-‘Alāqāt al-Turkīyah al-Maṣrīyah.. ilā ayn?* [*The Turkish-Egyptian relations.. Where are they heading?*], *Al-Jazeera.net*. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2013/11/27/العلاقات-التركية-إلى-أين-العلاقات-التركية> (Accessed: 12th August, 2021).

<sup>143</sup> Gul’s Twitter account:

Gul, M.Z. (2011) @ZahidGol. [Twitter]. Available at: <https://twitter.com/ZahidGol> (Accessed: 1st July, 2020).

<sup>144</sup> Articles written by Gul are compiled in the following source:

محمد زاهد غل *الجدید من الکتب محمد زاهد غل* *al-Jadīd min al-kātib Muḥammad Zāhid Gul* [*Newly published by the author, Muhammad Zahid Gul*] (no data) [Al-Jazeera.net web page]. Available at: [https://www.aljazeera.net/author/محمد\\_زاهد\\_غل](https://www.aljazeera.net/author/محمد_زاهد_غل) (Accessed: 19th August, 2021).

<sup>145</sup> Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current president of Turkey since 2014:

BBC World News (2020) ‘Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey’s pugnacious president’, *BBC News*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13746679> (Accessed: 23rd August, 2021).

blame on secularism for the abolishment of the caliphate. The result of which, according to Gul, has been the grave loss of a lot of knowledge and Islamic heritage. He also criticises the removal of the MB in Egypt and the former “coups” in Turkey. Gul constantly associates the overthrow of Islamist governments with secularism. (Gul, 2013b; Gul, 2014a; Gul, 2014b; Gul, 2015; Gul, 2016).

In this particular piece (Gul, 2013a), one of the most evident macro-discursive strategies being employed appears to be national narrative and recontextualisation. Such devices are used, side by side, perhaps through revisiting stories from the earlier times which appear to resonate with the cultural memory of the Egyptians today. This is all done as part of the columnist attempting to remind the Egyptians as to who they were back then (in the ancient pharaonic times) and, ultimately, who they are in this day and age. The recontextualising of events, the invocation of collective memory and shared experiences, the discursive teleportation between times and spaces, all of such strategies help in establishing some sort of continuity between the past and present. This can be seen, for instance, in drawing on stories from Islamic literature such as those of Prophet Moses and Pharaoh<sup>146</sup>. Indeed, the confrontations between the MB and anti-MB social actors are equated with the ones that took place the two Qur’anic figures. As stated before, Al-Sisi and his fellow men are aligned with Pharaoh and his soldiers, who are said to have persecuted the believers of Allah<sup>147</sup>, as narrated in the Qur’ān. By the same token, the suffering experienced by Morsi and his supporters can be regarded as the modern incarnation of the pain and torture endured by Moses and the Israelites (in Judeo-Christian-Islamic theology).

To cleverly succeed in recontextualising and magnifying the aforementioned “persecutions”, the author draws upon a selection of highly relevant Qur’anic references<sup>148</sup>, all of which appear to be used for the purpose of condemning the practices of the anti-MB social actors (President Al-Sisi and his security forces).

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<sup>146</sup> More on the Qur’anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses), peace be upon him, and Fir‘awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) can be referred to in the following sources:

- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā' Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).

<sup>147</sup> Moses and the Israelites.

<sup>148</sup> The Qur’ān 7:141 (Translated by Abdul Haleem).

This can be seen in accusing the so-called “perpetrators” of the following grievances:

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*killing the believers of Allah, slaughtering the male children of the weak ones, and sparing only the women of freemen of Egypt.*

قتلهم المؤمنين بالله، وفي ذبحهم أبناء المستضعفين في الأرض، وفي استحيايتهم نساء الأحرار من الشعب المصري

---

The above grievances appear to be driven from the following Qur’anic verse<sup>149</sup> which reads as follows:

---

*‘Remember’ how We delivered you from the people of Pharaoh, who afflicted you with dreadful torment, **slaughtering your sons and keeping your women***

وَإِذْ نَجَّيْنَاكُمْ مِنْ آلِ فِرْعَوْنَ يَسُومُونَكُمْ سُوءَ الْعَذَابِ يُبْجِحُونَ أَبْنَاءَكُمْ وَيَسْتَحْيُونَ نِسَاءَكُمْ

---

Furthermore, referring to Rabaa hand gesture<sup>150</sup> as the new *Staff of Moses* “عصا موسى”<sup>151</sup> and framing the political “struggle” through the lens of the Qur’anic battle between *Truth and Falsehood* “الحق والباطل” seem to bestow more powerful and compelling meanings on the story. On speaking about “Truth versus Falsehood”, such expressions appear to be driven from the following verse<sup>152</sup>:

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*And declare, “The truth has come and falsehood has vanished”*

وَقُلْ جَاءَ الْحَقُّ وَزَهَقَ الْبَاطِلُ

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<sup>149</sup> The Qur’ān 7:141 (Translated by Abdul Haleem).

<sup>150</sup> Rabaa hand gesture “شارة رابعة: shārat Rābi‘ah” is a four-finger salute used by pro-MB protesters to commemorate the alleged death of the protestors at Rabaa’s event. More on its origins can found in following reference:

Zelinsky, N. (2013) 'What this hand gesture means for Egypt's future', *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/what-this-hand-gesture-means-for-egypts-future/279730/> (Accessed: 19th August, 2021).

<sup>151</sup> The Qur’ān 26:63 (Translated by Abdul Haleem).

<sup>152</sup> The Qur’ān 17:81 (Translated by Mustafa Khattab).



#### 5.2.2.4.2 OPA-B

### في رد الادعاء بخيار الضرورة

#### Rebutting the “choice of necessity” argument <sup>153</sup>

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

Drawing on the geopolitical thoughts of Dr Jamāl Ḥamdān (Jamal Hamdan), Fahmi Huwaidi in this article (Huwaidi, 2014), tries to make sense of the ways in which present-day Egypt is run by President Al-Sisi and his government. In doing so, Huwaidi revisits the past and ponders upon the “repressive” practices of the pharaohs back then to find some answers. As stated, before in Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.4.2. The article shows elements and attempts to construct Al-Sisi, not only as a Trickster that changes the order of things but also as a Tyrant (Pharaoh) King who dominates and reigns tyrannically. Prior to considering the macro-discursive strategies used in supporting the aforesaid construction, it is worth considering some contextual information about the columnist.

Fahmi Huwaidi is an Egyptian writer and one of the prominent Egyptian Islamists who is said to be following a “moderate” view of Islamism. He is classified as an Islamic thinker who ‘appreciates the weight of Islamic centrism in the long term’ (Baker, 2015, p. 198). According to Huwaidi, the journey along the path of Islamism has been largely the influence of his father, one of the founders of the MB and a member of the constituent assembly of the party (Sadek, 2010).

Huwaidi writes regularly for Al Jazeera and the Egyptian opposition newspaper al-Dustūr<sup>154</sup> (Haddad, 1993; Lo, 2019; Latif, 2020). As seen in many of his opinion articles on Al-Jazeera<sup>155</sup>, Huwaidi frequently criticises the anti-MB government. In an interview with Al-Jazeera channel, two days before the overthrow of Morsi (on 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, 2013), he describes the statement of the armed forces (whereby Morsi was given an ultimatum to agree on an inclusive roadmap for the country’s future) as “white coup: إنقلاب أبيض” (Al Jazeera Mubasher, 2013). That said, Huwaidi would also criticise the MB back in time when Morsi was still in office, particularly on their

<sup>153</sup> For full article, see Script 14 (OPA-B), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.4.2.

<sup>154</sup> al-Dustūr newspaper’s website:

Al-Dustour (no date) [Website]. Available at: <https://www.dostor.org/> (Accessed: 23rd August, 2021).

<sup>155</sup> Articles written by Huwaidi are compiled in the following source:

فهمي هويدي الجديد من الكاتب فهمي هويدي *al-Jadīd min al-kātib Fahmī Huwaydī* [Newly published by the author, Fahmi Huwaidi] (no data) [Al-Jazeera.net web page]. Available at: [https://www.aljazeera.net/author/فهمي\\_هويدي](https://www.aljazeera.net/author/فهمي_هويدي) (Accessed: 20th August, 2021).

lack of political vision and experience. However, it was his decision to refrain from criticising them any longer. In an interview with BBC News Arabic, Huwaidi states the following:

*I abstained from partaking in the critical campaigns against Brotherhood since the day they were put in incarceration. There is nothing noble, dignified, or magnanimous in criticising those who no longer enjoy the same equal opportunity to respond in their defence.*

*أحجمت عن المشاركة في حملات النقد بعدما دخل (الأخوان) السجن لأنه ليس من المروءة ولا من الكرامة ولا من الشهامة أن تنتقد من يعجزون عن الرد عليك.*

(BBC News Arabic, 2015)

Interestingly, when Huwaidi used to take aims at the anti-MB social actors, the MB would be quick to endorse his criticism and upload his critical articles onto their website<sup>156</sup>.

Following the removal of Morsi, Huwaidi has been constantly critical of the practices of the anti-MB establishment and its supporters amongst the media and religious institutions. For instance, in an interview with the Arab digital newspaper, Rai al-Youm, he explains the following:

*We were once before talking about politics being militarised. Today we are confronted with the militarisation of journalism. And then, the militarisation of drama ushered in, followed by that of “religiosity” where we now have religious scholars, looking like “military generals”, jabbering on about weird stuff!*

*كنا سابقا نتكلم عن عسكرية السياسة، فحدثت عسكرية الصحافة ودخلنا فيما يسمى عسكرية الدراما، ثم دخلنا مرحلة “عسكرية التدين” عند شيوخ أشبه بـ “الجنرالات”، يتحدثون عن أشياء غريبة!*

(Rai al-Youm, 2019, para(s). 14 - 15)

Following the removal of Morsi, Huwaidi states the following:

*We have, indeed, stepped out of history [...] Egypt has disappeared from the scene, and the Arab nation has fallen into a coma in consequence [...] The use of weapons today has made the regimes more brutal.*

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<sup>156</sup> Articles written by Huwaidi and officially endorsed by the MB can be referred to in the following source: *Maqālāt Fahmī Huwaydī [Fahmi Huwaidi's articles]* (no date) [Ikhwan Online web page] (Accessed: 20th August, 2021).

نحن بالفعل خرجنا من التاريخ [...] غابت مصر، فأصبحت الأمة العربية بالإغماء [...] السلاح الآن أدى الى  
توحش الأنظمة

(Rai al-Youm, 2019, para(s). 27 - 49)

Such views of Huwaidi on the anti-MB social actors, particularly President Al-Sisi, do not differ much from those expressed in this opinion article (Huwaidi, 2014), something which was demonstrated in the micro-discursive analysis in Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.4.2.

The author of this article seems to mostly make use of narration of the nation strategy in recontextualising the events under description. For instance, the reins of power in ancient Egyptian times are revisited by the author as part of him attempting to explain and understand how the present-day Egyptian government operates under the administration of President Al-Sisi. The discursive teleportation between the past and present is aimed at establishing a sense of continuity, which is built on the premise that the sort of tyrannical practices of the bygone pharaonic era were no different from the ones being exercised today (as claimed by the author). Of course, in doing so, the author of this piece draws on the thoughts and ideas of the geopolitical scholar, Dr Jamal Hamdan<sup>157</sup>, which are mostly adopted from his famous book, *Egypt's Identity* “شخصية مصر” (Hamdan, 1970).

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<sup>157</sup> A prominent Egyptian scholar and geographer:

Essam, A. (2018) 'Gamal Hemdan: Egypt's faithful lover', *Egypt Today*. Available at: <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/4/61795/Gamal-Hemdan-Egypt-s-Faithful-lover> (Accessed: 20th August, 2021).

### 5.2.2.4.3 OPA-C

تجارب قديمة ومتجددة في تحويل الفرعون إلى رئيس

#### **Ancient, yet viable traditions in transforming the pharaoh into a president <sup>158</sup>**

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

As discussed in the previous chapter, section 4.3.2.4.3, Muhammad Al-Jawadi, the author of this article, appears to represent President Al-Sisi as a Trickster, lusting after his own desires, and hence, worthy of mockery and contempt. More importantly, he is described as a pharaoh who is driven by insolent pride and delusion.

Muhammad Al-Jawadi, as identified in this opinion piece (Al-Jawadi, 2013) as well as his personal website (Al-Jawadi, 2014b), is a contemporary Egyptian writer and an Arab thinker. Besides being a professor of medicine, he is also a historian and has expertise in literature, criticism, language, and politics. As seen in many of his articles on Al-Jazeera website<sup>159</sup>, as well as many of his videos available on his YouTube channel<sup>160</sup>, Al-Jawadi is known for being a die-hard supporter of Morsi. In one of his videos, he dedicates the following high praise and expressions of solidarity to Morsi following his ousting from office:

*Muhammad Morsi will go down in history [...] as the once poor slave of Allah by whom Allah has honoured and reinforced Islam. He was the once poor slave of Allah by whom Allah has changed the course of the Islamic and Arab nations. He was the once poor slave of Allah who has ended the era of coup d'états. He was the once poor slave of Allah who has put a halt to the electoral fraud and usurpation of power. He was the once poor slave of Allah who worshipped his Lord (Allah), and in return, Allah has made him a beacon to those who would follow in his footsteps.<sup>161</sup>*

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<sup>158</sup> For full article, see Script 15 (OPA-C), Appendix A. For the micro-discursive analysis of the article, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.4.3.

<sup>159</sup> الجديد من الكاتب محمد الجوادي *al-Jadīd min al-kātib Muḥammad al-Jawādī* [Newly published by the author, Muhammad al-Jawadi] (no data) [Al-Jazeera.net web page]. Available at: [https://www.aljazeera.net/author/محمد\\_الجوادي](https://www.aljazeera.net/author/محمد_الجوادي) (Accessed: 15th August, 2021).

<sup>160</sup> Al-Jawadi's YouTube account:

Dr Muhammad Al-Jawadi (2014). [YouTube]. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/user/DrMohamedElgawady/featured> (Accessed: 1st July, 2020).

<sup>161</sup> The follow up translation is on the next page.

محمد مرسي هو ذلك الرجل الذي سيكتب في التاريخ [...] أنه ذلك العبد الضعيف الذي أعز الله به الإسلام. ذلك العبد الضعيف الذي حول به الله سبحانه وتعالى مسار الأمة الإسلامية والعربية. هو ذلك العبد الضعيف الذي انتهى به تزوير الانتخابات والإستيلاء على السلطة بالقوة. هو ذلك العبد الضعيف الذي عبد ربه فجعله نبيراً سائماً وهداية لكل من سيأتي بعده.

(Al-Jawadi, 2014a)

In criticising President Al-Sisi, he once tweeted:

*Allah has already revealed in the Qur'ān a detailed description pertaining to the traits and characteristics of Pharaoh. I am amazed how the Egyptians (today) are still in denial about the fact that this Pharaoh who is spoken of in the Qur'ān is actually their own president.*

... علمنا القرآن بوضوح شديد وصف فرعون مصر. عجبت لشعب أنزل الله في حاكمهم (وحده) محكم آياته ومع هذا يخادعون أنفسهم.

(Al-Jawadi, 2018)

As seen in the above statement and many others of Al-Jawadi, representing Al-Sisi as both Pharaoh and Trickster corresponds to the ways in which he is linguistically constructed (see chapter 4, section, 4.3.2.4.3). Such portrayal is further facilitated through the recruitment of the following macro-devices: narration of the nation and recontextualisation.

Looking at the story, the above macro-strategies are brought into play right from the start and beginning with the title itself in which Al-Sisi is labelled as *Pharaoh* “فرعون”:

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*transforming the pharaoh into a president*

تحويل الفرعون إلى رئيس

---

He is then ascribed with a list of villainous attributes, all of which are reminiscent of the traits and characteristics of the Pharaoh in the Qur'ān (Pharaoh of the Exodus in Judeo-Christian theology). Such traits range from delusion to narcissism, to dishonesty, to coercion, to clinging to power, to propensity for murder.

Other villainous qualities assigned to Al-Sisi appear to also represent him as a Trickster, driven by his animalistic desires:

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*treachery, deviance, immorality, cuckoldry, profanity, dishonesty, and slander*

خيانه وشنوذ وعهر وديانة وفحش وكذب واقتراء

---

In the light of the above, “Egypt under the reign of President Al-Sisi” is recontextualised into another space and time that is of highly relevant religious and historical significance<sup>162</sup>. Moreover, the employment of national narrative evokes the cultural memory among the Egyptian audience and play on their collective psyche through offering certain references and stories, representing shared experiences.

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<sup>162</sup> The significance can be understood in relation to two aspects: a) the pharaonic heritage of Egypt and b) the Qur’anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses) and Fir‘awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh). More on these is discussed in the following sources:

- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).
- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā' Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- History.com Editors (2009) *Ancient Egypt* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/ancient-egypt> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).

### 5.3 Summary

Following up on the micro-discursive investigation, the chapter at hand extended the linguistic analysis of expressions to the social level of discourse. The purpose, as demonstrated in this chapter, was to learn more about the who, how, and why of the mythological statements. It was also to understand and reveal how the production, distribution, and consumption of the textual elements are informed and shaped by the contextual aspects surrounding them. These may include power dynamics, belief systems (e.g., values, attitudes, etc.) or any forms of social, political, or cultural connotations. To carry out such type of analysis, some of DMA's macro-discursive tools were consulted. These include "intertextuality", "interdiscursivity", "narration of the nation", and "recontextualisation". Moving forward, the following chapter will endeavour to select textual examples from the analysis as a means of attempting to demonstrate how they appear to echo existing literature on mythology and mythical archetypes.

## Chapter 6. Discussion

### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to discuss the implications and significance of the findings emerged. More specifically, it seeks to provide the analysis conducted, with meanings, by showing how the discursive expressions of mythology across the two monolingual sites of Al-Jazeera (AJ and AJE) appear to echo existing literature or otherwise reveal new aspects on mythology and how it functions ideologically to the service of Al-Jazeera's narrative. To this end, the chapter will begin by addressing the identified mythical structures in section 6.2, starting with the Victim, Hero and Trickster archetypes. In addition, the new archetypal categories of the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King and Martyr will also be discussed since they grace the project with an important layer of contribution. Next, in section 6.3, the chapter will be addressing the other opposing narratives and complexities that seem to have been suppressed throughout the mythological storytelling of Al-Jazeera. Revealing counter-narratives that may have been demeaned or restricted by storytellers is an important task in the DMA endeavours to fulfil. This will be done as part of an attempt to expose the manipulative mechanisms of exploiting mythology to political and ideological ends.

Afterwards, in section 6.4, the overall discursive portrayals of social actors and events across the two sites will be presented. This will be particularly helpful if we are to compare and contrast the Arabic and English representations from a wider angle. Most importantly, it will also allow me to address other important aspects of mythology, which may have underpinned Al-Jazeera's narratives across the two sites. Whilst doing so, and also for the sake of furthering the originality and implication of this research, I will endeavour to present the overall discursive mythological findings, coupled with the role of aesthetics, which is an important and arguably under-researched concept closely associated with mythology. Such a concept is believed to be largely absent in the study of journalism (Postema and Deuze, 2020), with possibly zero cases existing in the context of the mythological analysis of Arabic news discourse. Therefore, section 6.4 will include other subsections which will discuss, for instance, the aesthetical power of moral storytelling, archetypes, origins, national culture, and religious references. Thereafter, in section 6.5, the chapter will conclude by presenting a summary of the matters discussed.



## 6.2 The mythical narratives

In this section, the chapter will be discussing the following archetypal narratives, manifesting across the Arabic and English websites of Al-Jazeera: The Victim (section, 6.2.2), the Hero (section, 6.2.3), the Trickster (section, 6.2.4), the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King (section, 6.2.5), and the Martyr (section 6.2.6). Listed below are the list of articles, classified into groups of five. Each group of articles is assigned to a mythical narrative in which the former represents.

Each archetypal category/section shall be presented with examples of the salient discursive findings found within the articles, followed by a discussion section of its own. In order to provide more insights into the mythological nuances of each narrative, there will also be an additional (fifth) article included in each section, usually borrowed from another archetypal category. Nonetheless, the Martyr, though, due to being a secondary subcategory, will only stick to what is available in terms of examples:

<b>The Victim</b>  <b>Section, 6.2.2</b>	Arabic opinion ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>OPA-V:</b> The road to the carnage
	English opinion	<b>OPE-V:</b> My brother was killed at Rabaa
	Arabic straight news ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>STA-V:</b> For what sin they killed the ladies of Mansoura?
	English straight news	<b>STE-V:</b> Massacre in Cairo deepens Egypt crisis
	Arabic opinion ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>OPA-A:</b> The Turkish-Egyptian relations ... ( <b>EXTRA</b> )
<b>The Hero</b>  <b>Section, 6.2.3</b>	Al-Jazeera Arabic ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>OPA-H:</b> Political Islam: A step back toward a leap ...
	English opinion	<b>OPE-H:</b> The Egyptian coup and the lessons of Turkey
	Arabic straight news ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>STA-H:</b> The gallows... an Egyptian icon in Turkey
	English straight news	<b>STE-H:</b> Morsi will never compromise says family
	Arabic opinion ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>OPA-T:</b> Remained unharmed.. ( <b>EXTRA</b> )
<b>The Trickster</b>  <b>Section, 6.2.3</b>	Al-Jazeera Arabic ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>OPA-T:</b> Remained unharmed..
	English opinion	<b>OPE-T:</b> Al-Sisi's reign of terror and the propaganda ...
	Arabic straight news ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>STA-T:</b> Is Al-Sisi a “psychopath”?
	English straight news	<b>STE-T:</b> Video shows Egypt generals plotting media gag
	Arabic opinion ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>OPA-V:</b> The road to the carnage ( <b>EXTRA</b> )
<b>The Tyrant</b> <b>(Pharaoh) King</b>  <b>Section, 6.2.3</b>	Arabic opinion ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>OPA-A:</b> The Turkish-Egyptian relations ...
	Arabic opinion ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>OPA-B:</b> Rebutting the “choice of necessity” argument
	Arabic opinion ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>OPA-C:</b> Ancient, yet viable traditions ...
	Arabic opinion ( <b>translated</b> )	<b>OPA-V:</b> The road to the carnage ( <b>EXTRA</b> )

### 6.2.1 Another archetypal contribution

As previously discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.6.11, the above three archetypes, namely, the Victim, the Hero and the Trickster, are already known for constituting major contribution due to them not having been investigated before in the context of bilingual news discourse overall, nor in the specific context of the bilingual online reporting of any single news agent. When it comes to the (monolingual) Arabic news discourse, the study of myths seems to have been largely absent, if not completely. That said, the other two newly emerged archetypes of the Tyrant King and the Pharaoh<sup>163</sup> are also deemed to offer yet another salient layer of contribution. The two figures were inductively identified thanks to the application of manual analysis that preceded the critical discourse investigation.

Essentially, the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King archetype to be discussed in section 6.2.5 is comprised of the two above-mentioned categories. Both were deliberately fused into one figure due to them being of similar characteristics. These are a) the Qur'anic master narrative of the Pharaoh (Ibn Kathīr, 1997; Firestone, 2004; Halverson *et al.*, 2011a; Halverson *et al.*, 2011b) and b) the Tyrant King archetype (Moore and Gillette, 1992). To the best of my knowledge, there does not seem to be any research thus far that seems to have employed the Qur'anic narrative of the Pharaoh<sup>164</sup> into the mythological analysis of Arabic news discourse nor cannot it be found in any kind of news-related literature, be it an Arabic, Islamic, or otherwise. Likewise, the Tyrant King, although is a well-known archetype outlined by Moore and Gillette (1992) and drawn on by other researchers, its application, to date, has still not extended to the context of Arabic news discourse.

Furthermore, as previously introduced in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the project identifies another original, albeit minor archetypal category, known as the Martyr figure (Barlow, 2012; 2017). Such an archetype, although it does constitute yet another level of originality, it does not enjoy the same level of significance as the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King for the following reasons: As far as the project is concerned, the emergence of the Martyr archetype was not the direct result of the manual analysis technique. In fact, it was only identified after having already analysed and discussed the Victim and the Hero archetypal figures. Being the child of parent archetypes (the Victim and the Hero), the Martyr already shares common traits with the two narratives.

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<sup>163</sup> These two are now merged into one archetypal category: The Tyrant (Pharaoh) King.

<sup>164</sup> Fir'awn "فرعون" (The Pharaoh) is one of the major master narratives in Islamic literature:

Halverson, J., Corman, S. and Goodall, H.L. (2011b) 'The Pharaoh', in Halverson, J., Corman, S. and Goodall, H.L. (eds.) *Master narratives of Islamist extremism*. New York: Springer, pp. 28 - 36.

## 6.2.2 The Victim

### 6.2.2.1 Examples of the archetypal “Victim” construction

#### *OPA-V: The road to the carnage*

##### *الطريق إلى المذبحة*

(An Arabic opinion piece - translated)

With the events in Egypt calumniating in power transition, the headline of the following article (Shakir, 2013) appears to cleverly play on the sentiments of tragedy and moral panic, priming the minds to only think of fear and destruction let loose in Egypt now that the days of old masters are gone (i.e., the MB). Drawing heavily on comparable stories and incidents from different geopolitical contexts (such as the so-called “bloody” دموي killing of protesters in Yemen and the “inhumane” غير إنساني exercise of “victim-blaming”<sup>165</sup> لوم الضحية against Guantanamo detainees), Husam Shakir, the author of this article, appears to use certain phrases, labels, and descriptions (some of which are figurative and hyperbolic) for the purpose of centring the narrative on tragedy and victimhood on the part of the MB and their supporters.

For example, on the linguistic side of the analysis, the author refers to the killing of the MB and protesters as “physical liquidation” تصفية جسدية, “crushing lives out” إزهاق أرواح, “massacres” مجازر, “great killing” مقتلة عظيمة, “bloodshed” سفك دماء, “atrocities” فظائع, and “colossal butchery” مذبحة هائلة. Rabaa’s event<sup>166</sup> is branded as both “scandal” فضيحة and “tragedy” فاجعة. People who are said to have “fallen by the hundreds” تساقطوا بالمئات amongst the MB and protesters are spoken of with such terms and descriptions, loaded with indexical meanings (e.g., “victims” ضحايا, “martyrs” شهداء, “innocents” أبرياء etc.). The author also describes the killings as “catastrophic” كارثي, “bloody” دموي, and “tragic” مأساوي. The demonisation of the MB and protesters is rejected as one that “is hard to sweep under the rug” يصعب كَنسُهُ تحت البساط. Moreover, the MB and protesters are said to have constantly endured “feverish verbal abuse” حمى تشنج لفظي.

<sup>165</sup> Victim-blaming can be defined as the act of placing the blame for violence on the victim while the perpetrator is absolved from guilt or fault.

<sup>166</sup> Rabaa’s event (most frequently referred to by Al-Jazeera as “Rabaa’s massacre” مجزرة رابعة *Majzarat Rābi‘ah*) is an incident in Egypt at which the security forces are said to have raided and dispersed two camps of demonstrators gathered at Rābi‘ah al-‘Adawīya and al-Naḍah squares.

According to the columnist, they (the MB and protesters) have been:

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*redefined through such bestial and subhuman descriptions*

تعيد تعريف الضحية بعيدا عن الوصف الإنساني

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The columnist also seems to appeal to the readers not to forget “those who fell in the squares” الذين تساقطوا في الميادين whilst protesting. According to the author, such individuals “are ultimately Egyptians” هم في أول الأمر وآخره مصريون and “fellow-countrymen” شركاء وطن. He also remarks that seeing them being “crushed in the squares” أن يتم سحقهم في الميادين overwhelms the feelings.

In emphasising the victimhood of the MB and protesters, they are also said to have been:

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*subjected to such oppressions afflicting them with dreadful torment*<sup>167</sup>

المظالم التي تسومهم سوء العذاب

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Such description is, in fact, an adopted verse from the Qur’ān, which originally speaks of the persecution of the Israelites at the hands of Pharaoh and his soldiers<sup>168</sup>. Moreover, the article engages in highlighting the social and professional anthroponyms of the “slain” protesters, perhaps, in emphasis of their vulnerability and innocence. According to the author:

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*amongst the fallen ones are the young man and woman, the father and mother, the scientist and doctor, the worker and employee, the rich and poor*

فمن تساقطوا [...] فيهم الشاب والشابة، الأب والأم، العالم والطبيب، العامل والموظف، الغني والفقير

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<sup>167</sup> The Qur’ān 7:141 (Translated by Mustafa Khattab).

<sup>168</sup> More on the Qur’anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses), peace be upon him, and Fir‘awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) can be referred to in the following sources:

- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā' Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).

### *OPE-V: My brother was killed at Rabaa*

(An English opinion piece)

In this article written by Ahmed Bedier (Bedier, 2014), the author seems to approach the idea of victimhood on a personal level. The article appears to be written in the form of a letter in which the author laments the “tragic” death of someone who is very dear to him, his brother Amir. Given the “sacrifice and struggle for freedom and democracy” shown by Amir (as claimed by the author), his persona seems to be constructed along the lines of the Victim as Hero archetype. The author also expresses solidarity and pays great sympathy to those who are said to have been slain by the hundreds amongst the MB and protesters. Apart from the hyperbolic and figurative use of language, the columnist seems to also draw on the use of intertextuality and interdiscursivity. The latter devices are brought into play through the recall of memories and stories, attesting to the “bravery and sacrifice” of Amir.

In emphasising the tragic side of the story, the author speaks of “mothers”, “friends”, and “mourners”, weeping and grieving the loss of their “loved ones”. He also describes Rabaa as a “nightmare of death and mourning”. He further classifies the event as “one of the largest single-day killings of demonstrators in modern history”. In describing the atmosphere prior to the aftermath, the author states that the “city seemed empty, almost like the quiet before the storm”.

The author also makes side-observations, which appear to add more to the discursive construction of “the tragedy”. For instance, the families of the “slain” protesters are reported to have been “in various states of shock”. In addition, one of the mosque’s carpets is said to have been “soaked in blood”. The writer recounts sensing something about his brother, foreshadowing his “martyrdom”. For instance, he claims to have seen his brother Amir emanating a “radiant aura” as he was gliding from one table to table to greet his family members. As maintained by the author, Amir is “one of the unsung heroes who peacefully protested and protected the revolution”. He also is said to have been “determined to make history and remained steadfast” along the way. According to the author, although his brother Amir “was beaten” times before, he was still showing no signs of “giving up”. Following his death, the columnist explains that his heart “sank” almost immediately, rendering him completely “speechless”. According to the author, “there are no words to express the pain my mother and father endured that day and since losing their son, murdered by his own government”.

## STA-V: For what sin they killed the ladies of Mansoura?

### بأي ننب قتلوا سيدات المنصورة؟

(An Arabic straight news story - translated)

The following report (Al-Ruwayni and Zaki, 2013) appears to be written to the sympathy and support of “the ladies of Mansoura”, “targeted and killed” whilst partaking in a pro-MB protest. The report is mostly comprised of statements by family members, friends, and bystanders, witnessing the “martyrdom” of the ladies, as stated in the report. Looking at the linguistic side of the analysis, the expressions of victimhood appear to be mostly delivered via the following strategies: lexical choice, indexical meanings and predication. Examples can be seen, for instance, in using terms such as “targeting” إستهداف, “massacre” مجزرة, “bloodshed” إراقاة دماء, “martyresses” شهيدات, and “martyrdom”<sup>169</sup> إستشهاد.

The overall situation is described as “sad” حزين and “unfortunate” مؤسف. The report sheds some light on the state of mind of the family members and friends of the “slain” ladies. This can be found in the use of phrases such as “touched” متأثر, and “speaks with sorrow” تحدث بأسى. The targeting of the ladies is denounced as:

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*a crime and disgrace [...] that not only goes against the teachings of religion and patriotism but also chivalry*

*جريمة وعار [...] بما تتنافى مع الدين وكذلك الوطنية وحتى المروءة*

---

It is also described as “treacherous” and “the biggest and most painful of all events”.

---

<sup>169</sup> The heroic death in the cause of Allāh (God). Islam accords a special status to those who sacrifice their lives in the service of their religion. According to the Islamic teachings, martyrs proceed directly to the highest abode in Paradise as their eternal reward in the hereafter. More on the concept can be referred to in the following sources:

- Lawson, B.T. (no date) *Martyrdom* [Web page]. Available at: <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/opr/t236/e0508> (Accessed: 1st November, 2020).
- Torok, R. (2012) 'Al-Jihad Fi Sabilillah: in the heart of green birds', *Australian Counter Terrorism Conference*. Perth, Western Australia. SRI Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University, pp. 37-46.

Egypt is said to have been:

---

*unfamiliar with seeing protesters being targeted and killed, let alone ladies shot dead*

*إن مصر لم تعتد استهداف متظاهرين وقتلهم، فما بالك إذا كان الاستهداف موجها لسيدات*

---

The headline of the article itself is written in the form of a condemning rhetorical question:

---

*For what sin they killed the ladies of Mansoura*

*بأي ذنب قتلوا سيدات المنصورة؟*

---

Moreover, the very question borrows its wording from a Qur’anic verse, addressing and condemning the unjust pre-Islamic practice of infanticide. This is done, perhaps, to align the gravity of “the crimes” الجرائم on the part of the “the slayers” السفاحين with the one described in the Qur’ān<sup>170</sup>. The verse<sup>171</sup> reads as follows:

---

*For what sin she was killed?*

*بأي ذنب قُتِلَتْ؟*

---

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<sup>170</sup> The verse addresses and condemns the unjust practice of infanticide, the killing of infant girls in pre-Islamic Arabia (Giladi, 1990), which is the original context of the Qur’anic rhetorical question. The very question is summoned into a new context, which addresses a different kind of “victimhood” which bears no connection to the one spoken of in the report.

<sup>171</sup> The Qur’ān 81:9 (Translated by Abdul Haleem). For more on this, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.1.3 and Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.1.3.

### *STE-V: Massacre in Cairo deepens Egypt crisis*

(An English straight news story)

In this story (Al-Jazeera, 2013a), Rabaa's event at which the military is said to have crack-downed on the MB seems to be both depicted and labelled as a "massacre" and "bloodbath". Meanwhile, the MB appear to be portrayed along the lines of the narrative of Victim as Hero, "sticking their ground" and willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of democracy. Drawing exclusively on the statements of the two prominent MB leaders, Muḥammad al-Biltāji (Muhammad Al-Biltaji) and Jihād al-Haddād (Jihad Al-Haddad), the report intertextually condemns the practices of the security forces, labelling them as mere "targeting", of which end is to "drag" the MB "into the cycle of violence". On a predicational level, the alleged killing is denounced as "deadly" and a "criminal activity".

Putting emphasis on the notion of sacrifice, the following summarises the ways in which the MB leaders appear to represent themselves figuratively and hyperbolically along the lines of the Victim as Hero narrative:

---

*We will not be brought into a cycle of violence, we know how deadly that would be. Even if that means we will have to become the punching bag of the rest of society and our blood will flow for the rest of Egyptians to wake up and the rest of the world*

---



*OPA-A: The Turkish-Egyptian relations.. Where are they heading? (EXTRA)*

*العلاقات التركية المصرية.. إلى أين؟*

(An Arabic opinion piece - translated)

In this article (Gul, 2013a), the protestors who are said to have been “slaughtered” ذُبحوا at the hands of the security forces after having valiantly stood their ground (as suggested by the author), appear to be spoken of along the lines of Victim as Hero narrative. Drawing on various linguistic devices, both figuratively and hyperbolically, facilitated by the use of national narrative and recontextualisation, the author, Muhammad Gul, denounces the event by calling it:

---

*the massacre of the century, or rather the entire humanity*

*مجزرة القرن، بل قد تكون مجزرة الإنسانية جمعاء*

---

He explains that the souls and slogans of those slain shall not go in vain. He adds that they shall “remain irrefutable evidence” استبقى شعارهم دليلا دامغا attesting to the “crimes” جرائم carried out by Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi and his men. The security forces stand accused, according to the author, of “slaughtering the believers of Allah” قتلهم المؤمنين بالله. Whilst seeming to represent the protestors rather heroically, the author draws on the Islamic concept of “martyrdom”<sup>172</sup> استشهاد. He then quotes the following part of a Qur’anic verse<sup>173</sup>, which addresses the martyrs’ rewards in the hereafter:

---

*Think not of those who are slain in Allah’s way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord*

*وَلَا تَحْسَبَنَّ الَّذِينَ قُتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ أَمْوَاتًا ۚ بَلْ أَحْيَاءٌ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ يُرْزَقُونَ*

---

<sup>172</sup> The heroic death in the cause of Allāh (God). Islam accords a special status to those who sacrifice their lives in the service of their religion. According to the Islamic teachings, martyrs proceed directly to the highest abode in Paradise as their eternal reward in the hereafter. More on the concept can be referred to in the following sources:

- Lawson, B.T. (no date) *Martyrdom* [Web page]. Available at: <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/opr/t236/e0508> (Accessed: 1st November, 2020).
- Torok, R. (2012) 'Al-Jihad Fi Sabilillah: in the heart of green birds', *Australian Counter Terrorism Conference*. Perth, Western Australia. SRI Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University, pp. 37-46.

<sup>173</sup> The Qur’ān 3:169 (Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).

According to the author, those who were slain amongst the protesters are the victorious ones in this life and after.

### 6.2.2.2 Discussion on “The Victim” construction

As seen in the above examples, the archetypal myth of the Victim<sup>174</sup> seems to be generally constructed around two important notions, tragedy and sacrifice (Lule, 2001). Whilst all of the represented cases of “killings”, “slaughter”, “massacre”, “persecution”, and “victim-blaming”, which are said to have been perpetrated “in the spirit of retaliation”, as argued by Al-Jazeera, are portrayed as unquestionably “tragic”, the second concept of sacrifice, however, appears to be more dominant across the narrative, particularly in the following articles: *OPE-V*, *STA-V*, *STE-V* and *OPA-A*. This can be seen more vividly in the cases of “the heroic martyrdom of Amir”, “the tragic martyrdom of the Ladies of Mansoura”, “the sacrifice of the MB leaders”, and “the martyrdom of the MB and pro-MB protesters at Rabaa massacre”. Indeed, the aspect of sacrifice appears to be linked to the “Islamic martyrdom”, which stands for the heroic death in the cause of Allāh (God). Islam accords a special status to those who sacrifice their lives in the service of their religion. According to the Islamic teachings, martyrs proceed directly to the highest abode in Paradise as their eternal reward in the hereafter (Torok, 2012; Lawson, no date).

Generally speaking, all the linguistic and non-linguistic strategies appear to echo what is stated by different scholars in relation to the construction of the Victim archetype. Lying at the heart of many myths which are constantly told and retold by societies, Lule (2001) explains that the Victim archetype is there to comfort, console, and explain life in the face of death. He also states that:

*Myth reconciles people to the tragic and seemingly randomness of human experience. [...] Life must be lived in the presence of death. Myth confronts death. Myth turns death into sacrifice. Through the stories of the sacrifice of the Victim, myths offer reconciliation and elevates life in the face of death.*

(Lule, 2001, p. 22)

In a demonstration of its importance, Jung (1981) points at the symbolical power underpinning the Victim narrative figure, explaining that it revolves around the concept of “the self”. Likewise, Lule (2001) explains that humans tend to see and place themselves more in the stories of the victim. In addition, Barlow (2017), who expresses deep entrenchment of victimhood in the human psyche, suggests that audiences are more inclined towards supporting the Victim

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<sup>174</sup> Further definitions and descriptions relating the archetypal Victim can be found Chapter 2 (section, 2.3.3.1.1).

and relating more easily to such an experience. She believes that there is an undeniably cultural attachment to the Victim narrative on the part of the audience. According to Barlow (2017), people supporting the victimised do so in the hope that he/she will eventually become the victor in the end.

Barlow (2017) believes that such an archetype is not only shown in people having difficulty sustaining their physical survival but also the survival of their aspirations, dreams, and identities. The Victim is always painted emotionally as suffering from a villain of some kind that seems to have inflicted some sort of injury or distress upon the former. Similar to Barlow (2017), McCormick and White (2011) describe the Victim as a character who is helpless, persecuted, innocent, under oppression, fighting evil, seeking attention, sacrificing him/herself for a better world, and somehow linked with the divine. Moreover, Read *et al.* (1983) view the victim archetype as being brutalised by morally defective forces. All of the foregoing images of the Victim appear to have been drawn on by Al-Jazeera throughout its narrative.

As for what relates to the concept of sacrifice, or “martyrdom”, as in the case of Al-Jazeera, Henderson (1964) blends the narrative of such figure with that of the Hero. The author explains that one of the most common archetypal tales that is being constantly repeated tends to involve a hero of some kind, battling with evil, and then dying following a heroic sacrifice. Eliade and Trask (1958, p. 136) find that such a particular type of narrative tends to play on ‘man’s eternal longing to find a positive meaning in death, to accept death as a transition rite to a lighter mode of being’. Looking at the articles, particularly *OPA-V*, *STA-V*, and *STE-V*, one can observe some instances in which the people who are said to have been slain may fit the category of normal causalities. In other words, they might not have necessarily died “heroically”. Yet, Al-Jazeera is still able to add a touch of heroism to their demise, going so far as to call them “martyrs” and “martyresses”, “finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord”<sup>175</sup> (in Paradise). On this note, Lule remarks:

*We know these victims are not really heroes, in the usual sense of that word, unless they have died while doing some heroic deed. Yet, the portrayals of victims as heroes seem appropriate and somehow comforting. In their attempts to give meaning to the death an innocent person, to somehow explain lives lost to the fire and floods, news stories turn death into sacrifice and victims into heroes. Myth has been doing that for centuries.*

---

<sup>175</sup> The Qur’ān 3:169 (Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).

As for other cases, namely those of “Amir” and “the MB leaders”, which are found in *OPA-V*, *STE-V*, and *OPA-A*, respectively, one may notice that the heroic descriptions of the Victim in those stories are far more explicit than the above category. This is due to the latter social actors being portrayed as deliberately willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of others. For instance, Amir is said to be “one of the unsung heroes [...] who wanted to make history”. The MB leaders, likewise, seek to “become the punching bag of the rest of society (and) to wake up the rest of Egyptians and the world”. The MB and pro-MB protesters are similarly painted as through marching to their demise knowingly in defiance of the anti-MB establishment and exposing its “crimes”. Such statements, cleverly drawn on by Al-Jazeera, appear to resonate quite well with the Martyr archetype outlined by Barlow (2012):

*The core of the Martyr archetype is about doing the right thing. They realize that part of their life's journey involves sacrificing for others and doing so brings them a sense of purpose and joy [...] The Martyr knows that their sacrifice matters and that they can be a source of redemption for others as well as for themselves.*

(Barlow, 2012, para(s). 6 - 8)

Furthermore, the above examples seem to echo McCormick and White's description of the Victim (2011), being someone who is subjected to persecution during a crusade he/she has undertaken for the sake of good against evil. This seems to be the kind of narrative that Al-Jazeera wants to sell to its audience.

## 6.2.3 The Hero

### 6.2.3.1 Examples of the archetypal “Hero” construction

#### *OPA-H: Political Islam: A step back toward a leap forward*

الإسلام السياسي.. خطوة للخلف نحو قفزة للأمام

(An Arabic opinion piece - translated)

In keeping with the Hero’s journey narrative, Muhsin Salih, the author of the following article (Salih, 2013), appears to portray the removal of the MB from power and the number of hardships they are said to have endured as nothing but temporary setbacks which will yield their heroic triumph eventually. This, according to the author, is part and parcel of “the divine laws of Allah in the universe”<sup>176</sup> سنن الله في الكون. As seen mostly in linguistic analysis, facilitated by the usage of intertextual, recontextual, and interdiscursive mechanisms, the heroic journey of political Islam is summarised as the following:

---

*The backlash wave that toppled the Islamists in Egypt will not be anything to them other than “a step back towards a leap forward”*

إن الموجة الارتدادية المضادة التي أطاحت بالإسلاميين في مصر لن تكون بالنسبة لهم سوى “خطوة إلى الوراء، نحو قفزة إلى الأمام”

---

Indeed, the author seems to strongly assert the imminent return of political Islam:

---

*stronger, more vigorous, more popular, and with a higher propensity for change*

بقوة وعنفوان وشعبية أكبر وقدرة أعلى على التغيير

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<sup>176</sup> The divine laws of Allāh (God), may He be glorified and exalted, governing the universe and the social phenomena and leading to the fulfilment of justice:

Brague, R. (2007) *The law of God: The philosophical history of an idea*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

According to author, political Islam:

---

*can never be marginalised or eradicated*

لا يمكن تهيمشه ولا اجتثاثه

---

That is because:

---

*the values and ideals upheld by political Islam are the very same ones sustained by almost every Arab and Muslim in the region and without any pretence*

القيم والمثل التي يحملها (الاسلام السياسي) هي القيم والمثل التي يحملها العربي والمسلم دونما تكلف أو تصنع

---

Political Islam is further described as:

---

*an authentic, strong, and profound movement, deep-rooted in the Arab and Islamic nations*

هو تيار أصيل عميق وقوي ومتجذر في الأمة العربية والأمة الإسلامية

---

Nonetheless, the author does not seem to shy away from acknowledging that political Islam:

---

*has received a severe blow in Egypt and endured a lot of great difficulties. There have been operations in different states, all of which have sought to thwart it. These may have, truly, contributed to its decline in recent times*

الإسلام السياسي قد تلقى ضربة قاسية في مصر، بينما يعاني صعوبات جمة وعمليات إسقاط في دول أخرى، قد تؤدي إلى تراجع وإفشاله

---

The author explains that “Islamists” الإسلاميون at the end of the day:

---

*are not angels, for they can be right and wrong. They stumble and learn*

الإسلاميون ليسوا ملائكة، وهم بخطئون وبصيبون، وهم يتعثرون ويتعلمون

---

Nonetheless, “what has befallen upon the Islamists”, the author stresses, is for their own greater good as it is part of “Allah’s Predestination” قدر الله. The author concludes the article with the following statement, which includes a Qur’anic verse<sup>177</sup>:

---

*Perhaps, Allah, in His Wise Predestination, desires to bring out the best in the Islamists and better prepare them not only for running the state and society but also for confronting the Zionist and Western projects in the region. Hence, may the following words of Allah in the Holy Qur’ān be of solace to them: “...think it not to be an evil to you; On the contrary, it is good for you”.*

ولعل الله سبحانه قدر هذا الأمر حتى يستخرج من الإسلاميين أفضل ما عندهم، وحتى ينفوا خبثهم، ويرتقوا إلى مستوى إدارة المجتمع والدولة، ومستوى إدارة الصراع مع المشروع الصهيوني والمشروع الغربي في المنطقة، ولذلك فلعل قوله تعالى: "لا تحسبوه شراً لكم بل هو خير لكم" ينطبق عليهم

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<sup>177</sup> The Qur’ān 24:11 (Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).



### *OPE-H: The Egyptian coup and the lessons of Turkey*

(An English opinion piece)

In this opinion article written Anwar Ibrahim (Ibrahim, 2013), the Egyptians who are said to have stood up against the anti-MB establishment seem to be portrayed as defiant heroes. Drawing predominantly on the use of predication, modality and intertextuality, the author advises the Egyptians to take lessons from Turkey, represented by its people and government who are also constructed as heroes, rooting for their friends in Egyptians, and willing to do so until democracy in Egypt is restored. The author portrays the Egyptians as heroes, fighting “on the right side of history”. They are also said to have “stood united and fought tooth and nail” to end six decades of military dictatorship. The author explains that the Egyptians have “paid their price for the revolution and now are being burdened once more to pay the price for defending it”. Likewise, the Turkish people are praised for “fighting hard for (democracy) and even harder to keep it”. They are also praised for fighting “with blood, sweat and tears” and for staying “united by the love for freedom and democracy and conviction”. The Egyptians, at the end of the article, are advised to take inspiration from the Turkish people. Using assertive modal expressions such as “must” and “let”, the author urges the Egyptians to pursue the right course of action, that is, to continue the fight until “the revolution is regained”.

## STA-H: The gallows... an Egyptian icon in Turkey

أعواد المشانق... أيقونة مصرية في تركيا

(An Arabic straight news story - translated)

Drawing mostly on predicational and rhetorical strategies and intertextuality, the following report (Mabruk, 2014) appears to be generally written in high praise of Turkey and the pro-MB activists in and outside Egypt. Speaking up for the Egyptians, Turkey appears to receive a greater deal of attention in terms of heroic representation. Nonetheless, the Egyptians are still spoken highly of, even though to a lesser degree than Turkey. For instance, they are spoken of as “freemen” أحرار, fighting for democracy and the reinstatement of legitimacy. The Turkish people, meanwhile, are praised for:

---

*continuing to stand up for the oppressed ones in Egypt and determining to do so until the coup in Egypt is subdued*

مواصلة تحركه في نصرة المظلومين في مصر حتى ينكسر الانقلاب

He further praises them for determining to do so “until the coup in Egypt is subdued”. Moreover, “the Turkish people” are said to:

---

*the ones who understand the most, the difference between a bitter military rule as opposed to that which is civil and democratic*

الأتراك أكثر من يفهم الفارق بين حكم العسكر المرير والحكم المدني الديمقراطي

That is because “Turkey”, according to the report:

---

*has equally suffered from military coups for a very long time and have actually fallen into the hands of the military rule in the second half of the 20th century*

تركيا عانت من مرارة الانقلابات العسكرية لزمّنٍ طويلٍ أقيمت فيه البلاد في حكم العسكر، في إشارة إلى الانقلابات التي شهدتها تركيا في النصف الثاني من القرن العشرين

As stated in the report:

---

*Turkish people feel great sympathy for the just causes of the Arabs, particularly the conflict between the legitimate rule of the MB and the coup in Egypt*

ويظهر الأتراك تعاطفاً كبيراً مع القضايا العربية لا سيما نزاع الشرعية والانتقال في مصر

---

In showing gratitude to the Turkish government for supporting the MB, one of the former Egyptian senior officials delivers the following sensationalist statement:

---

*The Ark of Nūḥ (Noah), which once delivered humanity, did land in Turkey. And in the very land of Turkey, there shall land another Ark one day, delivering all the free people of the world*<sup>178</sup>

إن سفينة نوح التي نجت فيها البشرية حطت في تركيا، كما ستحط سفينة نجاه الأحرار رحالها اليوم في ذات  
البلد

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<sup>178</sup> Prophet Nūḥ “نوح” (Noah), peace be upon him, is a recognised prophet and apostle of Allāh “الله” (God), may He be glorified and exalted, in the Islamic theology and one of the most significant of all prophets. His full story can be referred to in the following sources:

Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019b) 'The Story of Noah', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them)* by Abū al-Fidā' Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 58 – 89.

*STE-H: Morsi will never compromise says family*

(An English straight news story)

The following report (Reuters, 2013) seems to be mostly made up of statements delivered by Mohammed Morsi's family through the MB's official website in solidarity with the ousted president. In such statements, Morsi seems to be depicted as someone who is brave and defiant in the face of his opponents. Looking at linguistic side of the analysis (comprising of assertive modalities, predications, and hyperboles), emphasis seems to be placed on the sacrificial side of the Hero archetype whereby Morsi is represented as someone who is determined to fight until the end, without giving any concessions or compromises:

---

*The president will not retreat, or negotiate or accept compromises especially after all the martyrs, the wounded, the arrested and missing [...] No matter how much they try to keep him away, the president will not retreat from a return to the democratic path, even if his soul is the price of this democratic path*

---

In more emphasis on the idea of sacrifice, the "slain" protesters are equally labelled as "martyrs".

قَلَمُ يُضِرُّهَا..

(An Arabic opinion piece - translated)

In this opinion piece by Izzat al-Risheq (Al-Risheq, 2013), Hamas's attributed qualities of heroism and defiance in the face of the media campaign appear to be spoken highly of mostly through the use of figurative and hyperbolic predicational strategies, coupled with various instances of intertextuality. For instance, Hamas is said to be "holding fast to the Rope of their Lord" متمسكة بحبل ربها<sup>179</sup>, which is a borrowed Qur'anic metaphor<sup>179</sup>, enjoining the Muslims to stay steadfast and stand united along the path of Allah, never mind the tribulations and challenges encountered (Islam Question and Answer, 2020):

---

*Hold fast to God's rope all together; do not split into factions*

وَاعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا وَلَا تَفَرَّقُوا

---

Moreover, the group seems to be hailed for staying "unaffected by the media" لم تؤثر فيها الحملات, "moving forward along the path of resistance" تمضي الحركة في طريقها المقاوم, "working its way up to the liberation of the land and holy sanctuaries" تشق طريقها نحو تحرير الأرض والمقدسات, "archiving victories upon victories" تحقق الانتصارات والإنجازات تلو الإنجازات, and "fighting above every ground and under every sky" تناضل فوق الأرض وتحتها. As the columnist puts it, any attacks against Hamas:

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*are destined to go in vain and pass like a fleeting summer cloud*

مصيرها الفشل والزوال دون أي أثر، كسحابة صيف عابرة

---

Hamas is also praised for supposedly possessing "consistent and clear position" موقف ثابت حاربت. Moreover, the group is celebrated by the author for having "fought valiantly" حاربت ببسالة in previous wars and "won all of them" انتصر فيها جميعا. As far as the author is concerned, Hamas is "part of the Palestinian Resistance" جزء من المقاومة الفلسطينية.

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<sup>179</sup> The Qur'an 3:103 (Translated by Saheeh International).

He adds:

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*Hamas stands up for the honour and dignity of the Arab and Islamic ummahs  
(nations)*

حماس تدافع عن شرف الأمتين العربية والإسلامية

---

### 6.2.3.2 Discussion on “The Hero” construction

The archetypal Hero<sup>180</sup> appears to be mostly identified in constructing the images of the following social actors: the MB members (including the ousted president), Hamas, the Egyptian protesters, and pro-MB Turkey. Overall, Al-Jazeera, seems to have drawn on different forms and conventions of the archetypal Hero. Each article, to a variable degree, seems to have placed enough emphasis on the notions of courage, struggle, and defiance as supposedly shown by the preceding social actors in the face of adversity. Extra attention is paid to the Hero upholding social values and ideals, which are, in this case, inspired by the Arab and Muslim culture. That said, article *OPA-H* appears to be the only one that captures a fair amount of Campbell’s “Monomyth” (1949), which is also known as the Hero’s Journey. Interestingly, such an article can speak on behalf of the rest of the news stories, which seem to have paid specific attention to fewer/certain stage(s) of the Hero’s quest as opposed to all/most of them. Generally speaking, as noted by Lule (2012):

*The Hero myth, like many archetypal stories, often takes on similar forms from age to age. The Hero is born into humble circumstance. The Hero initiates a quest or journey. The Hero faces battles or trials and wins a decisive victory. The Hero returns triumphant. The pattern, in more or less detail, can be found throughout mythology.*

(Lule, 2001, p. 82)

That said, it is important to remember that the archetypal representations of the Hero itself do not necessarily follow one single pattern. As stressed by Kelsey (2016, p. 975), whilst calling on (Campbell, 1949; Lule, 2001) there are various forms of Heroism functioning ‘through different contexts and dimensions of moral storytelling. Hero figures do not carry a monolithic form or set of characteristics and values’.

Indeed, the aforementioned social actors appear to be represented by Al-Jazeera as ones who have undertaken more or less the same journey as the one described above by Lule (2001). A journey of which stages seem to go along the lines of Campbell’s Monomyth (Campbell, 1949). Now, the structure of the Monomyth quest represents a universal pattern of narrative, which clearly manifests in numerous forms of art and media (Faber and Mayer, 2009). The narrative itself is probably ‘one of the most common myths to be found in news’ (Coman, 2018, p. 22). The

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<sup>180</sup> Further definitions and descriptions relating the archetypal Hero can be found Chapter 2 (section, 2.3.3.1.3).

Hero figure in the Monomyth theory involves individuals or people undergoing a self-evolution process and a series of tests and trials throughout which they become better or more able to bring greatness to others (Faber and Mayer, 2009). As outlined by Campbell (1949), there are 17 stages to the Monomyth, all of which are divided into three main “acts”. These can be summarised as follows:

**I. *Departure:***

*Call to Adventure, Refusal of the Call, Supernatural Aid, Crossing of the First Threshold, and Belly of the Whale.*

**II. *Initiation:***

*The Road of Trials, Meeting with the Goddess, Woman as the Temptress, Atonement with the Father, Apotheosis, and Ultimate Boon.*

**III. *Return:***

*Refusal of the Return, Magic Flight, Rescue from Without, Crossing of the Return Threshold, Master of the Two Worlds, and Freedom to Live.*

(Campbell, 1949, pp. 45-221)

The diagram in Figure 6-1 is outlined by Christopher Vogler (1985) to feature the basic path of the Hero’s Journey, even though it does not strictly follow the exact same stages detailed by Campbell (1949).



Figure 6-1: Illustration of the Monomyth (the Hero’s Journey)



As seen in article *OPA-H*, some stages of the Hero's Journey can be seen undertaken by the MB who see themselves as the rightful heirs of their "reformist" predecessors". That said, it is important to stress that the MB's journey may not follow the exact same order of the Monomyth (from start to end), nor may it feature all of its components. It may, however, reflect some aspects of the heroic journey, as to be shown below.

### 1) The departure: Carrying on the mission of Islamic revival

Passed down from their predecessors, "the mission" is now handed over to the MB who set out to carry on the former's "legacy". Answering the "Call of Adventure", this stage traces its start, perhaps, since the day the MB was founded in 1928 with the mission to Islamise the societies and instil the Qur'ān and Sunnah<sup>181</sup> as the only one reference point for organising the lives of people and the state (Zachary, 2014; Kull, 2011). In keeping with Campbell (2008, p. 59), the Hero, at this point, 'goes forth of their own volition to accomplish the adventure' and commits himself to the quest'.

As seen in article *OPA-H*, the "heroic" journey of the MB is established through the author of the article attempting to create a historical continuum, linking all of the contemporary Islamist "reformist" groups and parties with other ones from the past. In other words, the author attempts to establish a strong historical foundation for the present-day Islamist movements as a means of substantiating his arguments. In doing so, the writer summons examples of Muslim and Arab figures from the ancient past, roughly during the time period between the Rāshidūn and Umayyad Caliphates (632–750 CE):

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*Indeed, the Islamist revivalist and reformist movements that played major political and revolutionary roles trace their roots to the first century AH. This can be seen in the revolts of Al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alīy, 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr, and 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ash'ath. Such movements have come a long way and have never grown weary for centuries*

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<sup>181</sup> In Islam, the Qur'ān "القرآن" is recognised as the literal Word of Allāh (God) "الله", may He be glorified and exalted, which was revealed by Angel Jibrīl "جبريل" (Gabriel) to Prophet Muḥammad "محمد", peace be upon him. The Sunnah "السنة", meanwhile, is defined as the orally transmitted record of everything which was either said, done, approved or disapproved by Prophet Muḥammad during his lifetime: Mahdi, M.S., Schimmel, A. and Rahman, F. (1999) 'Islam', in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islam> (Accessed: 20th August, 2020).

أن حركات التجديد والإصلاح الإسلامي التي لعبت أدوارا سياسية وثورية، تعود بجنورها إلى القرن الهجري الأول، حيث تجلت مثلا بثورات الحسين بن علي، وعبد الله بن الزبير، وعبد الرحمن بن الأشعث، ولم تتوقف على مَرَّ العصور

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Of course, drawing on those examples appears to be useful when it comes to the discursive construction of the Hero narrative. The above use of historical memory seems to suggest that the present-day Islamist movements have actually come a long way and possibly, endured a great deal throughout their journey of fight and struggle.

Further intertextual occurrences can also be observed in the below paragraph, which appears to construct the Islamist movements as the kind of heroes who rose against the forces of evil in the Islamic world (“colonisation” and “backwardness”):

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*In contemporary history, the main constituent of such a force that has taken upon itself to stand up against the colonisation of our homelands and confront the state of backwardness ravaging our Ummah has been, in fact, of an Islamist origin. The impetus behind it has been equally Islamist. This can be seen in each of the following cases: The Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula, the Mahdism in Sudan, the Senussism in Libya, the movement of Ahmad Khan in India, the movement of Ben Badis in Algeria, the Muslim Brothers in the Indian subcontinent, and the Nursism in Turkey. All of these truly are an extension of their reformist predecessors*

في التاريخ الحديث والمعاصر، فإن القوة الرئيسية التي واجهت حالة التخلف في أمتنا وواجهت الاستعمار في ديارنا، كان مكونها الرئيس إسلاميا، وروحها الدافعة إسلامية، كالهابية في الجزيرة العربية، والمهدية في السودان، والسنوسية في ليبيا، وحركة الشهيد أحمد خان في الهند، وبن باديس في الجزائر، وغيرها، وحركات الإخوان المسلمين أو الجماعة الإسلامية في القارة الهندية، والنورية في تركيا، وغيرها هي امتداد لهذا التيار الإصلاحية

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## 2) Crossing into the road of trials

The MB members now cross through “First Threshold”, enter the “Belly of the Whale”, and venture into the “Road of Trials”. In keeping with Campbell (2008), the Hero figures, at this point, cross into the field of adventure to begin their real quest. They will have to leave all of the known limits behind whilst advancing into the dangerous realm of the unknown. Now, the timeline of this stage may extend from the point upon which Mohammed Morsi, the Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, took on the presidency in June 2012 all the way through to the present day. Of course, this period includes a number of key events

taking places, such as the ousting of the MB, Rabaa's event, the mass sentencing, and other incidents in which Al-Jazeera regards as "setbacks" and "persecutions".

As the phrase suggests, "the Road of Trials" offers a series of tests and trials which the "Heroes" have no other options but to embrace and undergo if they are to improve and transform. In most cases, they are expected to fail one or more of such tests, but ultimately, they will emerge triumphant (Campbell, 2008), which is the very conviction embraced by Al-Jazeera. The heroes figures throughout the above-mentioned stage must enjoy a number of heroic traits and qualities to help them surpass the challenges and ordeals thrown their ways:

*Courage, a hero always overcomes his fears and any challenge head on. Virtuosity is the skill that usually hero has like extraordinary power or magic power, etc. Sacrifice is giving up something that is valuable you in order to help another. Determination is a positive emotional feeling that involves persevering towards a difficult goal in spite of obstacles. Being Focus is also the foremost traits. The hero knows where he or she is going and has strong mission to help people. A true hero must have compassion. Compassion is when feeling empathy and thoughts include the desire to help. Perseverance is the quality that makes a hero special. Hero dedicated his or herself to their task to save people. Honesty is the basic of all their effort. Honesty helps hero to respect and lead his followers to the goal. The next trait is loyalty. Loyalty is faithfulness or a devotion to a person, country, group, or cause. A hero must have strong Conviction as their strong belief, because it is a set of immovable thought or beliefs. Wisdom is the last traits of hero, which a leader must have. A fool can lead a horde of beasts but not human beings set on a definite purpose.*

(Rosianah *et al.*, 2018, p. 55)

Rose (2004) also relates the elements of self-sacrifice, resilience, relentlessness, and perseverance to the Hero archetype. Similarly, Lule (2001, p. 15) views the mythical narrative in terms of 'strength or bravery or compassion'. According to İşleyen (2019) the archetypal traits of the Hero can take the forms of extraordinary bravery and courage. The bearers of such attributes are always ready to take action, never mind the dangers, turns, and twists thrown their ways. They are ready to go out of their ways or even sacrifice themselves for the sake of their ideals (İşleyen, 2019).

Indeed, the MB, along with the rest of the pro-MB social actors, are depicted by Al-Jazeera along the lines of the attributes highlighted above. For instance, in the article *STE-H*, the following qualities and descriptions are assigned to the former president:

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*The president will not retreat, or negotiate or accept compromises especially after all the martyrs, the wounded, the arrested and missing [...] No matter how much they try to keep him away, the president will not retreat from a return to the democratic path, even if his soul is the price of this democratic path*

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In another example, the author of the article *OPE-H* portrays the Egyptians as “heroes”, fighting “on the right side of history”. As far as the author is concerned, the pro-MB protesters “have stood united and fought tooth and nail” to end six decades of military dictatorship. They are said to have “paid their price for the revolution” once before and that they will need to pay the price once more “for defending it”. Using assertive modal expressions, such as “must” and “let”, the author urges the Egyptians to pursue the right course of action, that is, to continue the fight until “the revolution is regained”. In the third example drawn from the article *OPA-T*, Hamas is praised for standing its ground in the face of its foes and slanderers:

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*Despite the intrigue of the enemy, misrepresentation of the spiteful, and the vilification of the schemer, Hamas, whilst holding fast to the rope or their Lord, stays unaffected and continues to move forward along the path of resistance, working its way up to the liberation of the land and holy sanctuaries*

*تمضي الحركة في طريقها المقاوم متمسكة بحبل ربها لن تؤثر فيها مؤامرة عدو أو تضليل حاقد أو تشويه متآمر، تشق طريقها نحو تحرير الأرض والمقدسات*

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### 3) The promise of rebirth and return

Again, not all of the social actors are yet shown to have fully completed the mythical quest of the Hero. For, unlike the Turkish people who are said to have struggled, fought, and won “their freedom”, Each of the MB, the ousted president, Hamas, and the protesters have not yet made it to the point at which they can be declared as victors. Nevertheless, Al-Jazeera still brings “the good tidings” of a decisive, albeit pending victory in which Allah is yet to deliver to the Islamists, so long they stick to the path of sacrifice and resistance. For instance, the author of the article *OPA-H* stresses that what has befallen upon the Islamists is for their own greater good as it is part of “Allah’s Predestination”. This can be seen in the below statement coupled

with a Qur'anic verse<sup>182</sup> in a bid to substantiate the above argument and paint the Islamists as holy and upright men of God:

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*Perhaps, Allah, in His Wise Predestination, desires to bring out the best in the Islamists and better prepare them not only for running the state and society but also for confronting the Zionist and Western projects in the region. Hence, may the following words of Allah in the Holy Qur'ān be of solace to them: "...think it not to be an evil to you; On the contrary, it is good for you".*

*ولعل الله سبحانه قدر هذا الأمر حتى يستخرج من الإسلاميين أفضل ما عندهم، وحتى ينفوا خبثهم، ويرتقوا إلى مستوى إدارة المجتمع والدولة، ومستوى إدارة الصراع مع المشروع الصهيوني والمشروع الغربي في المنطقة، ولذلك فلعل قوله تعالى: "لا تحسبوه شراً لكم بل هو خير لكم" ينطبق عليهم*

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As such, the author reassures the MBs of their imminent return given that they learn from their mistakes and improve on their practices. Accordingly, he states:

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*The backlash wave that toppled the Islamists in Egypt will not be anything to them other than "a step back towards a leap forward"*

*إن الموجة الارتدادية المضادة التي أطاحت بالإسلاميين في مصر لن تكون بالنسبة لهم سوى "خطوة إلى الوراء، نحو قفزة إلى الأمام"*

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According to Kelsey (2015c), defeat and victory of movements are natural occurrences to their heroic character that surpasses all challenges in their path. Breithaupt (2003) also adds to that, envisioning the return of a champion to fight mythical evil as typical for the Hero archetype, something which is very close to what Al-Jazeera seems to have cleverly depicted.

- **Reflecting the core social ideals**

Moreover, as stated by Kelsey (2017), whilst drawing on Lule (2001) and Campbell (1949), 'Heroes are dramatised and personified to reflect the core values and ideals of the societies in which their stories feature' (Kelsey, 2017b, p. 41). According to Lule (2001, p. 82), whilst drawing (Carlyle, 1896; Campbell, 1949; Eliade, 1960; Eliade, 1963; Fishwick, 1969):

*Though often the story pattern is similar, the nature of the Hero changes from society to society and from era to era. The nature of the Hero shapes and is shaped by the*

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<sup>182</sup> The Qur'ān 24:11 (Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).

*society. The Hero can reveal much about society. Heroes serve as exemplary models [...] for qualities that an individual society prizes, such as modesty, hand work, courage, virtue, wisdom, or loyalty. In this vein, heroes can indeed have thousand faces [...] They can be warriors or pacifists, leaders or rebels, saints or sinners, rocket scientists, rock musicians, or sports stars.*

(Lule, 2001, pp. 82-83)

Now the above can be exemplified in a number of examples throughout the news stories. For instance, in article **OPA-H**, it can be seen in suggesting, for instance, that political Islam embraces “centrist” and “moderate” leanings, which “adopt Islam as a thought, conduct, and way of life”. Political Islam is equally praised for purportedly “possessing a civilised project, believing in partnership, and veering away from violence”. Deep-rooted “in the Arab and Islamic communities”, the followers of political Islam are also said to “uphold the very values and ideals sustained by almost every Arab and Muslim in the region, and without any pretence”. Similarly, in articles **OPA-T**, **OPE-H**, and **STA-H**, Hamas and pro-MB Turkey are also approved of and endorsed for purportedly upholding the aforementioned values. Each group is praised for “standing up for honour and dignity of the Arab and Muslim communities” and “defending the oppressed ones in and outside Egypt”.

▪ **To err is human... and “hero-like”**

Lastly, it is important to point out that one of the most significant conventions of the Hero narrative, particularly within contemporary storytelling (Campbell, 1949; Boorstin, 1979, p. 51; Lule, 2001; Kelsey, 2017b) dictates that the heroes are not to be represented as faultless. As put by Kelsey (2016, pp. 975 - 976), ‘we often need the faults and follies of hero figures to make them believable or more realistic than disposable celebrities’. This particular case can be seen in Al-Jazeera’s going over some of the shortcomings of the Islamists, albeit gently, as seen in the following statement from article **OPA-H**:

---

*Islamists are not angels, for they can be right and wrong. They stumble and learn. They have been kept away from running the state for decades. They have endured a lot of marginalisation attempts*

*الإسلاميون ليسوا ملائكة، وهم يخطئون ويصيبون، وهم يتعثرون ويتعلمون. لقد تم إبعاد الإسلاميين عن إدارة الدولة وعن مؤسساتها لعشرات السنين، وعانوا من محاولات التهميش*

---

Further examples can also be shown across other articles where Al-Jazeera appears to admit that the MB have committed mistakes, pitfalls, and blunders along their political journey. However, one might ask, does this not contradict the overall pro-MB narrative of Al-Jazeera? As explained by Kelsey (2015a), such a strategy is known as paradoxical persuasion, which is commonly used by the media for serving an immediate purpose only. Now, this purpose, although seemingly contradictory to ‘the ideological interests or political position of a particular source or newspaper’, still maintains ‘a broader, social and political agenda’ (Kelsey, 2015a, p. 9). In other words, the heroes being prone to faults and follies at times are paradoxically more persuasive than consistent, linear narratives (Kelsey, 2015c; Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey, 2017b).

## 6.2.4 The Trickster

### 6.2.4.1 Examples of the archetypal “Trickster” construction

#### *OPA-T: Remained unharmed..*

فَلَمْ يُضِرْهَا..

(An Arabic opinion piece - translated)

The entire opinion piece by Izzat al-Risheq (Al-Risheq, 2013) accuses the Egyptian media of “slandering and fabricating false reports” إفتراء وتلفيق التقارير الكاذبة against Hamas, basing the depiction at the centre of the archetypal Trickster of which qualities are mostly associated with dishonesty, deception, plotting, challenging values, and spreading chaos. As demonstrated by the lexical choice strategies, “the media” are labelled as those “of misinformation and fitnah (sedition)” إعلام تضليل وفتنة. According to the author, the media are involved in exercising the following practices: “conspiracy” تأمر, “deceit” تدليس, “misinformation” تضليل, “lies” كذب, “vilification” تشويه, “forgery” تزوير, and “partisan propaganda” دعابة حزبية. On a predicational level, the media are described as “misleading” مضللة, “spiteful” حاقدة, and “conspiring” متآمرة. As the author puts it, the media personnel only “fish in troubled water” يصطادون في الماء العكر, “excel in creating false accusations” يتفننون في حيك الاتهامات الباطلة, “operate in harmony with the Israeli occupation” تتساق مع الاحتلال, “belittle the minds of the Egyptian and Arab audience” تتستخف بعقل الجمهور المصري والعربي, “serve no interests except those of the enemies of Egypt and its people” لا تخدم إلا أعداء مصر وشعبها, and “never cease from reviving the fire of fitnah (sedition)” لم تفتأ تذكى نار الفتنة.

At the same time, the media are also portrayed as crude and irrational, and hence, worthy of ridicule and contempt. For instance, the state-controlled media are figuratively referred to as “trumpets” أبواق, which is an Arabic metaphor for “sycophancy”. The anti-Hamas reports being published are dismissed as “false” كاذبة, “suspicious” مشبوهة, “fierce” محمومة, and “fragments of imaginations” من نسج الخيال. They are also mocked for their ascribed “absurdity” سخافة. Moreover, the media’s professionalism is denounced for its attributed “decadence” انحطاط, “recklessness” رعونة, and for “defying the boundaries of reason and logic” تجاوز حدود المعقول والمنطق. As the writer puts it, what is being put forward by the Egyptian media “has reached the point of sarcasm and humour” وصل حد التندر والفكاهة.



Moreover, Egyptian journalists and writers, according to the author:

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*suffer from a real crisis, amounting to moral bankruptcy and remoteness from professional ethics*

تعاني من أزمة حقيقية قد تصل إلى حد الإفلاس والبعد عن أدبيات وأخلاقيات المهنة

---

To further ridicule the media, the author seems to draw on Arabic literature via the use of intertextuality. For instance, he quotes one of the famous lines from classical Arabic poetry by Al-‘Ashā<sup>183</sup> to rhetorically underrate the media’s efforts in attacking Hamas. According to the author:

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*The media’s futile attempts against Hamas brings to mind a famous line by the Arab poet Maymūn Ibn Qays (Al-‘Ashā), which goes:*

*Like a mountain goat thrusting (with his horn) at a solid boulder one day to*

*weaken it, leaving it without any damage and damaging his horn in the process.*

وكانني بالشاعر العربي ميمون بن قيس (الأعشى) قد وصف هذه الفئة من الإعلاميين بقوله:

كناطح صخرة يوماً لئيو هنها

فلم يضرها وأوهى قرنه الرعل

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In other words, the media campaigns against Hamas, according to the author, will only backfire and land on the heads of those waging them.

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<sup>183</sup> A prominent poet in pre-Islamic Arabia:

Britannica (1998a) 'Al-A‘shā', in The Editors of Encyclopaedia (ed.) *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/al-Asha> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).

*OPE-T: Al-Sisi's reign of terror and the propaganda of 'fascism'*

(An English opinion piece)

As seen in the following opinion piece (Ahmad, 2013), written by Irfan Ahmad, the archetypal Trickster does not seem to be only represented in the character of President Al-Sisi but also in the portrayals of his fellow government officials, state-owned media, and other anti-MB groups and coalitions, including Western and Egyptian liberals and secularists. The Trickster-related attributes can be evident in the social actors, showing a propensity for destruction, usurping power, creating chaos, spreading terror, and most importantly, engaging in deception. Drawing on different figurative and rhetorical strategies, coupled with historical memory, intertextuality, and recontextualisation, the above players stand accused of exercising the followings grievances: “suppressing the truth”, “hiding falsehood”, “vilifying the Egyptians”, “rehearsing Islamophobia”, “circulating fictitious stories”, “orchestrating deaths”, “curtailing citizens’ liberties and democratic politics”, “fashioning a narrative of terrorism and fascism”, and “fusing the state and society so solidly that nothing substantially political remains in-between”. Such practices are also scolded and dismissed as “heinous”, “uncivil”, “arbitrary”, “shameless”, “absurd”, and “a disgrace to anyone with even a minimum respect for democracy”. Moreover, the liberals and secularists who are said to be rooting for the anti-MB establishment are criticised for being naïve, uncritical and superficial.

## STA-T: Is Al-Sisi a “psychopath”?

هل السيسي "سايكوباتي"؟

(An Arabic straight news story - translated)

Calling on the use of predicational strategies and intertextuality, the following story (Abu Al-Rub, 2014) centres the Trickster depiction of President Al-Sisi on the qualities of immorality, deception, destruction, and tendencies to rebel against the normal. For example, the president is described as someone who:

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*lies betrays, deceives, steals, pretends, and spoofs until reaching his goal*

يكذب ويخون ويخدع ويسرق ويمثل ويتحايل حتى يصل إلى مراده

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According to the report, Al-Sisi capitalises on “pretending to be devout and tender-hearted” whilst at the same:

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*betrays his president and steals a homeland, a legitimate rule, and constitutional entitlements*

سرق وطننا وسرق حكما شرعيا وسرق استحقاقات دستورية وخان رئيسه

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Hyperbolically, President Al-Sisi is said to have “murdered the thousands” قتل الآلاف, “burned the bodies” حرق الجثث, “arrested the finest sons of the Egyptians” إعتقل خيرة أبناء الشعب المصري, and “accused them of the ugliest charges” إتهمهم بأبشع التهم.

The story also depicts Al-Sisi as a senseless, unreflective psychopath who is driven by his own greed and animalistic desires. For example, he is described as “mysterious” غامض, “incomprehensible” عصي على الفهم, “narcissistic” نرجسي, and “devoid of conscience, moralities and principles” بلا ضمير ولا أخلاق ولا مبادئ. He is also declared as a:

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*a full-fledged psychopath who possesses a narcissistic disposition and expresses a heterogeneous mindset*

شخص سايكوباتي كامل الأوصاف ولديه شخصية نرجسية ويعبر عن عقل خليط غير متجانس

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As noted in the article, being of a “narcissistic” character “paves the way for Al-Sisi to become a dictator” مقدمات للتحويل إلى ديكتاتور. One this note, the article warns against Al-Sisi being:

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*ready to burn Egypt to ashes, all of the sake of achieving his own end*

مستعد أن يحرق مصر في سبيل تحقيق هدفه

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### **STE-T: Video shows Egypt generals plotting media gag**

(An English straight news story)

In this article (Al-Jazeera, 2013b), President Al-Sisi, along with his military generals are characterised on the basis of the Trickster narrative. This can be seen in accusing them of “conspiring, plotting and deciding on ways to bring the media to submission”. According to the article, Al-Sisi and his generals aspire to control the media via means of “targeting” and “intimidation”. On this note, the military is accused on its own capacity of “trying to turn the clock back to dictatorships of the past”. In conducting the Trickster portrayals, lexical choice, predication, and intertextuality appear to be the only three strategies brought into play.

الطريق إلى المذبحة

(An Arabic opinion piece - translated)

In this article, written by Husam Shakir (Shakir, 2013), the archetypal traits of the Trickster seem to be established in representing the anti-MB establishment and its proponents as shameless, crude, cruel, contemptible and governed by animalistic desires. For instance, the Egyptian government is equated to a killer who is, due to excessive killing, no longer takes pleasure in counting his victims. Moreover, the practices of the anti-MB establishment are denounced as “abhorrent” ذميم. The media are criticised for indulging in “feverish verbal abuse” حمى تشنج لفظي against the MB. Moreover, they are equated to a machine “that tries to set up more traps” تحاول تكثيف أحابيلها in an attempt to obstruct any public attention being paid to the alleged “persecution” of the MB and their supporters in Egypt. The military and security forces, likewise, are compared to “killing machines devoid of emotions” آلات قتل خالية المشاعر. They are also described as:

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*monstrous creatures [...] grinning their fangs to exercise predation*

كائنات متوحشة [...] تكشر عن أنيابها وتمارس فعل الافتراس

---

The pro-government liberal and secularist coalitions are chastised for purportedly indulging in slandering the MB and their supporters. As the author puts it, they have “fallen into sins up to their ears” ولغت في الخطايا حتى أذنيها. Looking at the article, the archetypal Trickster seems to operate chiefly through the use of highly figurative and hyperbolic evaluations (i.e., predicational strategies). Of course, such expressions appear to be the result of complex intertextual and interdiscursive mechanisms, drawing on different subjects, such as morality, history, and human rights.

#### 6.2.4.2 Discussion on “The Trickster” construction

The traits of the Trickster archetype<sup>184</sup> highlighted in the above articles appear to generally fall within the following descriptions outlined by Campbell (1988b), Hyde (1998), Radin *et al.* (1956), and Brand (2014). Such descriptions are mostly centred on the notions of changing the social order, bringing about the unexpected, and challenging/disregarding the accepted norms and values:

*Almost all non-literate mythology has a trickster-hero of some kind . . . And there’s a very special property in the trickster: he always breaks in, just as the unconscious does, to trip up the rational situation. He’s both a fool and someone who’s beyond the system. And the trickster represents all those possibilities of life that your mind hasn’t decided it wants to deal with. The mind structures a lifestyle, and the fool or trickster represents another whole range of possibilities. He doesn’t respect the values that you’ve set up for yourself and smashes them.*

(Campbell, 1988b, p. 2)

Relevant to the above descriptions is what is also noted by scholars with reference to the Trickster exhibiting tendencies to violate the principles of the social and natural order (Hyde, 1998), break barriers to create change (Radin, 1956), and bring uncertainty and instability (Brand, 2014). Additionally, as remarked by Kelsey (2017b), the Trickster challenges the orders at times and ‘mixes things up with chaos that raises otherwise absent questions’ (Kelsey, 2017b, p. 143).

The archetypal traits of the villainous Trickster are also mirrored in each of the above examples of articles. Consistent with Hathaway (2001, pp. 42-43), ‘tricksters are slippery, selfish, and occasionally evil. They lie, cheat, do stupid things, and cause trouble’. Furthermore, Zouidi (2021, p. 93) maintains, whilst calling on (Jung, 1981), that the ‘maleficent doings and evil actions’ of people are, in fact, ‘the workings of the Trickster’:

*Any human being who does evil actions would never revert to the trickster (i.e., himself) as the sole reason behind such maleficent doings but would always blame external circumstances instead. Even if the daemon is within the gates, the evildoer would find it very difficult to admit that these are the workings of the trickster. The trickster is, thus, “a primitive “cosmic” being of divine-animal nature, on the one*

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<sup>184</sup> Further definitions and descriptions relating the archetypal Trickster can be found Chapter 2 (section, 2.3.3.1.4).

*hand superior to man because of his superhuman qualities, and on the other hand, inferior to him because of his unreason and unconsciousness” (Jung, 1981, 473). By joining the divine and bestial elements, the trickster believes he has the upper hand in all events including life and death, in addition to seeing himself as a monstrous, unruly animal who should be obeyed*

(Zouidi, 2021, p. 93)

With that being said, Jung (1981) reminds us that the Trickster, notwithstanding his uncontrollable behaviour, ‘is not really evil’, but rather ‘does the most atrocious things from sheer unconsciousness and unrelatedness’ (Jung, 1981, p. 473), plus being enslaved to his half-animal self. Nonetheless, being seen as “purely evil” seems the quiet impression in which Al-Jazeera seeks to instil into the hearts and minds of the audience.

Condemned in all of the above articles as being ‘devoid of conscience, moralities, or principles’, the anti-MB establishment with all of its figures and supporters are, indeed, depicted along the lines of the archetypal traits of the villainous Trickster. As stated by Zouidi (2021), whilst drawing on (Alford, 1997), the Trickster infiltrates the self in the absence of ‘philanthropic qualities’. ‘The divine-bestial’ qualities take over and decide to annihilate the existence of the innocent self’ (Alford, 1997, cited in Zouidi, 2021, pp. 95 - 96). Being the “oppressors” and “evildoers” they “allegedly” are, this may justify the reason as to why Al-Jazeera insists on constructing the identities of the anti-MB social actors through the maleficent Trickster. As suggested by Zouidi (2021, p. 94) whilst calling on (Jung, 1981; Alford, 1997) ‘if, according to the primitive world, man is either a victim or an executioner, the trickster would certainly choose to be the latter.

Hynes (1993) also explains that the Trickster has the ability to turn a place of safety and security into a place of danger and risk. He can shift a good situation into an evil one and turn tranquillity into disaster. Nonetheless, as remarked by Hynes (1993), the Trickster can also turn events back again to normal, for such a figure can be good, evil, or amoral. That said, Al-Jazeera seems to have mostly centred the narratives on the evil and mischievous sides of the Trickster. In another description, the aforementioned scholar:

*The trickster exhibits typically the ability to overturn any person, place, or belief, no matter how prestigious. There is no “too much” for this figure. No order is too rooted, no taboo too sacred, no god too high that it cannot be broached or inverted. What prevails is toppled, what is bottom becomes top, what is outside turns inside,*



*what is inside turns outside, and on and on in an unending concatenation of contingency.*

(Hynes, 1993, p. 37)

The above does, indeed, resonate with the sort of grounds on which Al-Jazeera constantly criticises the anti-MB establishment and its proponents. As far as Al-Jazeera is concerned, the latter group stands accused of perpetrating (amongst many) the following offences: overthrowing a legitimate rule, sparking a bloodbath, hijacking the country, reviving the fire of fitnah (sedition), turning the clock back to dictatorships of the past, doing away with the Islamic and Arab historicity of Egypt and its agency in the region, and plunging with the society into the depths of decadence and mayhem.

As seen in all of the above in the articles, there also appear to be another two generic traits in which the Trickster can be identified. The first one can be seen in the figure being presented as sly and cunning, whilst the second image casts him as a “crude” one who is worthy of mockery and contempt. Now, the first category highlighting the deceptive tendencies of the Trickster is highly evident in articles, *OPA*, *OPE*, *STA*, and *STE*. Such attributes are ascribed, most specifically, to President Al-Sisi, the state-controlled media, and the pro-state liberals and secularist coalitions. For instance, the media and pro-state memories stand accused of purportedly fabricating false reports, engaging in forgery, conspiring with Israel, orchestrating deaths, and fashioning a narrative of terrorism and Islamophobia. President Al-Sisi, likewise, is assigned with a number of mischievous qualities, which include, among many, dishonesty, treachery, fraudulence, spoofery, and pretence. At one place, he is also described as a “full-fledged psychopath, pretending to be devout and tender-hearted”. In another place, he is said to “conspire, plot, and decide on ways to bring the media to submission” so that it would “sing to the army’s praise”.

Even though there is much more to the Trickster than to be perceived as mischievously deceptive, such an aspect is still one of the most common incarnations of the Trickster figure (Jung, 1981; Hynes, 1993; Hyde, 1998; Lule, 2001; Garry and El-Shamy, 2017). According to Hynes (1993, p. 34), the Trickster, as his name suggests, is a ‘consummate and continuous trick-player’ who deceives, cheats, and lies. He is in various cultures and religions, Hynes (1993, p. 34) adds, ‘the prima cause of disruptions and disorders, misfortunes and improprieties’. Likewise, Jung (1981) also identifies the Trickster as a deceptive prankster whose representations can be at times malevolent, benign, or a combination of both. However, the

scholar stresses that such incarnations always represent the power to shatter the boundaries of ordinary experience and to bring into reality a greater cosmological existence (Jung, 1981). Other researchers also acknowledge the Trickster as someone who is devious, treacherous, and trouble-making (Wigington, 2018). He is also described as someone who enjoys ‘capricious acts of sly deception’ (Irizarry, 1987, p. 227). Moreover, as maintained by Salinas (2013):

*Duplicity is a particular kind of deception and one of Trickster’s more useful tools of disruption. Where deception suggests making others believe something that is not true, the kind of duplicity employed by Trickster suggests a kind of double-dealing, of speaking with one voice and meaning with another.*

(Salinas, 2013, pp. 54 - 55)

Moore and Gillette (1992) further support the archetypal representation of the Trickster by associating him with such qualities revolving around intimidation, betrayal, deception, manipulation, and troublemaking. These, as stated above, are also not far from Al-Jazeera’s depiction of the anti-MB social actors. However, Jung (2014b) is not necessarily in alignment with Moore and Gillette (1992), as he sets a fundamental characteristic of the Trickster archetype as a shapeshifter who possesses many sides and dispositions. This appears to contrast with how Al-Jazeera portrays, for instance, President Al-Sisi, who seems to be represented in the articles as an inflexible, one-dimensional dictator, not changing himself towards what his opponents demand of him.

As briefly noted above, the Trickster is a lot more formidable than to be perceived in simple terms and descriptions - e.g., being only a ‘sly or cunning figure’ - (Lule, 2001, p. 24). According to the aforementioned scholar, an archetype can often manifest as crude and unwise, ‘half animal, half human’. In addition, the Trickster is ‘senseless and unreflective and brings on himself and others all manners of suffering. He is subject of mockery, contempt, and ridicule’ (Lule, 2001, p. 24). Moreover, the mocking and shunning of the Trickster, as suggested by the literature, is the result of his ‘inferiority’, ‘sub-humanity’, ‘monstrosity’, ‘irrationality’, ‘unconsciousness’, and ‘crudeness’ in the eyes of his ridiculers (Radin *et al.*, 1956; Jung, 1981; Hynes, 1993; Hyde, 1998; Lule, 2001; O’Donnell, 2003; Kelsey, 2014; Anslow, 2016; Farrant, 2016; Kelsey, 2017b; Zouidi, 2021). Moreover, as put by Zouidi (2021, p. 94), ‘since the trickster is part of our primitivity or collective unconscious, then it does not belong to the civilized world with its manners and ethics’. Indeed, all of such descriptions are particularly reproduced and mirrored in articles, *OPA-T*, *OPE-T*, *STA-T*, and *OPA-V* and are most specifically true to the discursive representations of President Al-Sisi, the military and security

forces, the state-controlled media, and the anti-MB groups and coalitions (including Western and Egyptian liberals and secularists). To present a few examples (among many others from the articles in this section), the practices of the anti-MB social actors are described as “uncivil”, “shameless”, “arbitrary”, “decadent”, “abhorrent”, “absurd”, and “calling for sarcasm”. President Al-Sisi is labelled/depicted as “narcissist”, “psychopath”, “mysterious”, and “incomprehensible”. He is also assigned with a number of moral flaws and villainous attributes, including “treachery, deviance, immorality, cuckoldry, profanity, dishonesty and slander”. The military and security forces are described as “killing machines devoid of emotions” and as “monstrous creatures, monstrous creatures, grinning their fangs to exercise predation”. The state-owned media and pro-Al-Sisi secularist/liberal coalitions are labelled and belittled as “sycophantic tambourine players and incense servers who have fallen into sins up to their ears”. With these descriptions in mind, Lule (2001, p. 24) explains that one of the incarnations of the archetypal Trickster can be seen him being ‘stupid’, ‘crude’, ‘contemptible’, and ‘governed by seemingly animal instincts’, something which in turn brings ridicule and mockery upon himself (Lule, 2001, p. 24). Moreover, Lule (2001) explains that the Trickster is forever hungry and driven by his own lust, desires, and impulses. Furthermore, as maintained by Hynes (1993), his ‘lying, cheating, tricking, and deceiving’ tendencies are the result of him ‘being simply an unconscious numbskull, or, at other times [...] a malicious spoiler’ (Hynes, 1993, p. 34).

On the Trickster being the object of derision and ridicule, Messer (1982) stresses whilst drawing on Jungian analysis (Jung, 2014a), that while the archetypal Hero is often ascribed with positive attributes, the Trickster, meanwhile, tend not to make it beyond the circle of scorn and ridicule (Messer, 1982). Lule (2021, cited in Kelsey, 2017b, p. 43) also explains that the Trickster qualities in some news stories are always associated with ‘stupid criminals, dumb and dangerous athletes, hapless hit men, classless and crude rich people’. Seconding Messer (1982), Lule also explains that such people ‘are offered up in the news as objects for mockery and contempt’ (Lule, 2021, cited in Kelsey, 2017b, p. 43).

Finally, Jung (2014b) describes the Trickster as a figure whose suffering is self-imposed. Hynes (1993) similarly reminds us that the Trickster can fall victim to his own tricks at times. Nonetheless, this very aspect is partially in contrast to Al-Jazeera’s depictions with respect to President Al-Sisi. For as far as Al-Jazeera is concerned, it seems the ongoing narrative that the president is, in fact, the one who inflicts pain and distress upon others and none to himself. That said, it is different from suggesting that the president and other anti-MB social actors, such as the state-controlled media, are said to reap (or may already have reaped) their own punishment owing to the “divine laws of Allah”, ascertaining His justice in the universe. In any case, suffice

it to mention that “malice” as maintained by Jung (2014b), is one of the important qualities of the mythical Trickster, which appears to resonate with Al-Jazeera’s depictions of President Al-Sisi and his supporters since, according to the network, they are shown to possess such a trait abundantly.

## 6.2.5 The Tyrant (Pharaoh) King

### 6.2.5.1 Examples of the archetypal “Tyrant (Pharaoh) King” construction

#### OPA-A: The Turkish-Egyptian relations.. Where are they heading?

العلاقات التركية المصرية.. إلى أين؟

(An Arabic opinion piece - translated)

As seen in this article written by Muhammad Gul (Gul, 2013a), the representation of the social actors at odds with each other takes its inspiration from the Qur’anic stories<sup>185</sup> of Prophet Mūsā (Moses) and Fir‘awn (Pharaoh)<sup>186</sup>. For instance, the portrayals of President “Al-Sisi and his security forces” *السياسي ومن معه* are conducted through the archetypal image and traits of “Pharaoh and his soldiers” *فرعون ومن معه*. Meanwhile, the ousted President Morsi, along with his supporters, are equated to Prophet Moses and his followers (the Israelites). Drawing on intertextuality and national narrative, the opinion article summons the above Qur’anic accounts and references owing to their unique relevance to the context of Egypt, and hence perhaps, makes a good case for recontextualisation. As stated before, such stories are deeply ingrained in Egypt’s national DNA and memory. They are expected to resonate with the collective psyche of the Egyptian audience, being of a Muslim majority who are self-aware of their own a) Islamic identity and b) their ancient pharaonic heritage.

The opinion piece resorts to a number of figurative and hyperbolic representational strategies in high praise and celebration of the “fortitude” shown by the MB protesters in resisting their persecutors, as claimed by the author.

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<sup>185</sup> More on the Qur’anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses), peace be upon him, and Fir‘awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) can be referred to in the following sources:

- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā’ ‘Imād al-Dīn Ismā‘īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).

<sup>186</sup> Pharaoh of the Exodus in Judeo-Christian theology.

For instance, this can be seen in describing the four-fingered Rabaa sign<sup>187</sup> as the new Staff of Turth *عصا الحق*, which will forever haunt, as suggested by the writer, the so-called “putschists and slayers” *الانقلابيين والسفاحين* in and outside Egypt.

Moreover, Rabaa sign is said to be of such painful sight in the eyes of Al-Sisi and his men as it reminds them of the willpower and resolve of the protesters. According to the author:

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*The sign of Rabaa has now become more of a tough sight in the eyes of Al-Sisi and his men and much tougher on them than the Staff of Moses as it splits the sea*

*حتى أصبحت إشارة الأصابع الأربعة أشد على السيسي ومن معه من عصا موسى وشقها البحر نصفين*

---

Additionally, the confrontations between the MB, on the one hand, and the anti-MB establishment on the other, are constantly equated with the Qur’anic battle between “Truth and Falsehood” *الحق والباطل*.

More specifically, the expressions appear to be driven from the following verse<sup>188</sup>:

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*And declare, “The truth has come and falsehood has vanished”*

*وَقُلْ جَاءَ الْحَقُّ وَزَهَقَ الْبَاطِلُ*

---

Looking more into the portrayals of the social actors, Al-Sisi and his soldiers are hyperopically described as much worse than Pharaoh and his soldiers *أكثر جرما من فرعون ومن معه*. The crimes committed in their names, as purported by the author, were done “in the spirit of retaliation” *بروح انتقامية*.

To cleverly succeed in recontextualising and magnifying the alleged severity of the “persecutions” attributed to the foregoing social actors, the author draws upon a selection of highly relevant Qur’anic references, all of which appear to be used for the purpose of condemning the practices of President Al-Sisi and his security forces.

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<sup>187</sup> Rabaa hand gesture “شارة رابعة: shārat Rābi‘ah” is a four-finger salute used by pro-MB protesters to commemorate the alleged death of the protestors at Rabaa’s event. More on its origins can found in following reference:

Zelinsky, N. (2013) 'What this hand gesture means for Egypt's future', *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/what-this-hand-gesture-means-for-egypts-future/279730/> (Accessed: 19th August, 2021).

<sup>188</sup> The Qur’ān 17:81 (Translated by Mustafa Khattab).

This can be found, for instance, in laying the blame on them for perpetuating the following grievances:

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*killing the believers of Allah, slaughtering the male children of the weak ones, and sparing only the women of freemen of Egypt*

قتلهم المؤمنين بالله، وفي ذبحهم أبناء المستضعفين في الأرض، وفي استحياهم نساء الأحرار من الشعب المصري

---

The Qur’anic verse<sup>189</sup> in which the above references are found reads as follows:

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*‘Remember’ how We delivered you from the people of Pharaoh, who afflicted you with dreadful torment, **slaughtering your sons and keeping your women***

وَإِذْ نَجَّيْنَاكُمْ مِنْ آلِ فِرْعَوْنَ يَسُومُونَكُمْ سُوءَ الْعَذَابِ يُدَبِّحُونَ أَبْنَاءَكُمْ وَيَسْتَحْيُونَ نِسَاءَكُمْ

---

Meanwhile, the writer hails the MB and pro-MB protesters for doing everything within their power, as stated by the author, in confronting their opponents before meeting their “martyrdom”.

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<sup>189</sup> The Qur’ān 7:141 (Translated by Abdul Haleem).

## OPA-B: Rebutting the “choice of necessity” argument

### في رد الادعاء بخيار الضرورة

(An Arabic opinion piece - translated)

Drawing on the geopolitical thoughts of a prominent Egyptian scholar, Dr Jamāl Ḥamdān (Jamal Hamdan), found in his book, “Egypt's Identity” *شخصية مصر* (Hamdan, 1970)<sup>190</sup>, the reins of power in the ancient Egyptian times are revisited by Fahmi Huwaidi, the author of the following piece (Huwaidi, 2014) as part of him attempting to explain and understand how the present-day Egyptian government operates under the administration of President Al-Sisi. The discursive teleportation between the past and present is aimed at establishing a sense of continuity, which is built on the premise that the sort of tyrannical practices of the bygone pharaonic era were no different from the ones being exercised today (as claimed by the author). Through the use of linguistic strategies, such as indexical meanings, lexical choice, and predication, the author of this piece attempts at representing the anti-MB establishment in terms of ideas, labels, and descriptions, revolving around “tyranny” *الطغيان*, “despotism” *الاستبداد*, and “absolutism” *الحكم المطلق*. President Al-Sisi himself is referred to as a “Pharaoh” *فرعون*, “God-King” *الملك الإله*, and “Regulator of the River” *ضابط النهر*.

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<sup>190</sup> A prominent Egyptian scholar and geographer:

Essam, A. (2018) 'Gamal Hemdan: Egypt's faithful lover', *Egypt Today*. Available at: <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/4/61795/Gamal-Hemdan-Egypt-s-Faithful-lover> (Accessed: 20th August, 2021).



**OPA-C: Ancient, yet viable traditions in transforming the pharaoh into a president**

تجارب قديمة ومتجددة في تحويل الفرعون إلى رئيس

(An Arabic opinion piece - translated)

President Al-Sisi, in this article (Al-Jawadi, 2013), written by Muhammad Al-Jawadi, is heavily chastised as a Trickster who lusts after his own desires, and hence, worthy of mockery and contempt. More importantly, he is described as a pharaoh who is driven by insolent pride and delusion. Drawing on predicational devices and hyperboles, the president is ascribed with a list of villainous attributes, all of which are reminiscent of the traits and characteristics of Pharaoh in the Qur'ān (Pharaoh of the Exodus in Judeo-Christian theology). Such traits are generally equated with delusion, narcissism, dishonesty, coercion, clinging to power, propensity for murder. More specific descriptions can be found in dismissing Al-Sisi as a “Pharaoh” فرعون and:

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*a leader who thinks rightfully or otherwise that he truly takes precedence in becoming the president, never mind the need for any elections and referendums.*

قائد يتصور بالحق وبغير الحق أنه صاحب الأولوية في أن يرث منصب الرئاسة من دون انتخابات ولا استفتاءات

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Moreover, the author of the article rhetorically asks:

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*Why not? He is the one who removed and imprisoned the president himself, read out the coup statement himself and had thousands of people killed with a single command.*

ولم لا؟ وهو الذي حبس الرئيس بنفسه وأزاحه بنفسه، وقرأ بيان الانقلاب بنفسه وقتل الآلاف بأمر

---

Further moral deficiencies are also assigned to the president, such as:

---

*treachery, deviance, immorality, cuckoldry, profanity, dishonesty, and slander*

خيانة وشنوذ وعهر وديانة وفحش وكذب وافتراء

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## OPA-V: The road to the carnage (EXTRA)

### الطريق إلى المذبحة

(An Arabic opinion piece - translated)

Drawing on the intertextual use of the Qur'ān, Husam Shakir (Shakir, 2013) speaks up against the alleged “persecution” of the MB and pro-MB protesters at the hands of President Al-Sisi and the scrutiny forces, as claimed by the author. More specially, the author borrows a Qur'anic verse in which Allah condemns the torture and sufferings of the Israelites at the hands of Pharaoh and his soldiers<sup>191</sup> in order to draw an analogy between two events for the purpose of recontextualisation and re-enactment of history. The verse<sup>192</sup> reads as follows:

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*Remember how We delivered you from the people of Pharaoh, **who afflicted you with dreadful torment***

وَإِذْ نَجَّيْنَاكَ مِنْ آلِ فِرْعَوْنَ يَسُومُونَكَ سُوءَ الْعَذَابِ

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Another underlying significance<sup>193</sup> to the above recontextualisation is the attempt at tapping into the collective psyche of the Egyptian audience through offering stories representing shared experiences. Stories to which the audience can strongly relate and orient to (e.g., the pharaonic heritage of the land of Egypt).

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<sup>191</sup> More on the Qur'anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses), peace be upon him, and Fir'awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) can be referred to in the following sources:

- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā' Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).

<sup>192</sup> The Qur'ān 7:141 (Translated by Mustafa Khattab).

<sup>193</sup> The significance can be understood in relation to two aspects: a) the Qur'anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses) and Fir'awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) and b) the pharaonic heritage of Egypt. More on the latter aspect is discussed in the following source:

- History.com Editors (2009) *Ancient Egypt* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/ancient-egypt> (Accessed: 17th August, 2021).

### 6.2.5.2 Discussion on “The Tyrant (Pharaoh) King” construction

#### ▪ The Pharaoh

As seen in the above examples, the “struggle” between the two campaigns of social actors (i.e., former President Morsi, the MB and MB supporters, on the one hand, and President Al-Sisi and the security forces, on the other) is constructed along the lines of Prophet Moses versus Pharaoh type of narrative. Aside from being the most prominent and reoccurring master narrative in the Qur’ān (Firestone, 2004), the Pharaoh archetype is also the most widely used by Islamists in rationalising their ongoing “holy war” against what they dismiss as ‘tyrannical, irreligious and anti-Islamic forms of governance’ (e.g., secularism, nationalism, etc.). As evident from the analysis, the narrative of the Pharaoh and his soldiers is mostly projected on the personas of President Al-Sisi and his men. The Pharaoh image is constantly evoked as an archetype for autocracy (Sherif, 1985) and a symbol of arrogance and evil (Firestone, 2004).

As described by Halverson *et al.* (2011a, p. 28), the archetypal Pharaoh in the Qur’ān (in the light of which Al-Sisi’s image is constructed) is centred on:

*the personification of human arrogance, disobedience, pride, and self-deification. He is an authoritarian and rules his dominion with an iron fist, obsessed with its illusions of power and wealth. [...] Ultimately, Pharaoh's destruction is ensured by his own stubbornness and refusal to submit to the Will of Allah, despite all the clear signs and miracles that are presented to him by the prophet.*

(Halverson *et al.*, 2011a, p. 28)

Such descriptions can be easily found in all of the above articles. According to Halverson *et al.* (2011a), the Pharaoh master narrative amongst others (in the Qur’ān) are well-recognised and greatly appreciated by Muslims all around the world. Nonetheless, for the large proportion of Muslims, the meanings and the political implications of such narratives vary greatly from those perceived and frequently used by extremists.

Where the MB are proven to resort to violent and radical means in emphasising their religious identity, fulfilling their own agendas, or rejecting different ideas of fellow countrymen, stakeholders, monarchies, or rulers they are at odds with, they would certainly fit the bill of being labelled as extremists. Hence, just like any other fundamental Islamists, the Pharaoh archetype, among other Qur’anic narratives, will continue to manifest and reproduce throughout their fanatical discourse and their portrayals of their foes.

It must be acknowledged that there are several examples that may expose the radical mindsets of the MB and their rejection of the different other. All such cases are extensively discussed in section 6.3. For instance, it is the MB, among other Islamists parties, who are reported to have inflamed the political and ideological polarisation and engaged in stigmatising their rivals as ‘infidels and made them targets for violence’ (International Federation for Human Rights, 2013, para. 2). It is also the Egyptian Qatari-based intellectual and spiritual leader of the MB himself, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (Yusuf Al-Qaradawi)<sup>194</sup>, who calls on his followers to wage war against all of those who oppose the MB or try to rebel against the ousted president.

For instance, Al-Qaradawi describes Morsi’s opposition as “Kharijites” - an Islamic term for secessionists or seceders<sup>195</sup> (Wahab, 2019) - who try to cause disunity amongst the ranks of the Muslims’ and hence, deserve to be ‘killed or stricken by the sword’, as encouraged by Al-Qaradawi (Al Arabiya, 2018). Indeed, as far as the Islamist fanatics are concerned:

*the master narrative of the Pharaoh vividly reflected their own struggles against rulers and state regimes deemed to be irreligious, anti-Islamic, or even atheistic. Their deployment of the master narrative is far-reaching and can be found in extremist literature and media from as far away as Indonesia. But one of the earliest and most shocking modern extremist invocations of the master narrative appeared in the land where it was originally set, the land of Egypt. [...] The stories that comprise the master narrative of the Pharaoh and Moses meet our criterion for "transhistorical" importance within a culture. The Pharaoh, as the tyrant, is a powerful narrative archetype readily understood by Muslims across the world. Its prominence in the text of the Qur’ān has ensured its longevity and continued dissemination. But the enduring political turmoil and tensions across much of the postcolonial Muslim world has also ensured a particularly virulent appropriation of the archetype.*

(Halverson *et al.*, 2011a, pp. 32 - 35)

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<sup>194</sup> More background information about Al-Qaradawi can be referred to in the following sources:

- Roxanne, L.E. and Muhammad Qasim, Z. (2021) 'Princeton readings in Islamist thought', in Roxanne, L.E. and Muhammad Qasim, Z. (eds.) *Chapter 9 Yusuf al-Qaradawi*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 224-246.
- Obaid, N. (2020) *The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world*. California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO.

<sup>195</sup> al-Khawārij “خوارج” (Kharijites) are a despised early Muslim sect and regarded to be worse than seditionists. The term is of a historical use dating back to the first Islamic century and is used in a derogatory way to describe people those who exit the community of Muslims and deviate from its ideal and norms. More on the complex use of the term can found in the following source (pp. 203 - 204): Halverson, J., Corman, S. and Goodall, H.L. (2011a) *Master narratives of Islamist extremism*. New York: Springer.

Moreover, the authors of the above news stories, among many others, also appear to share with the MB (probably to a variable, milder degree) the frequent use of the Pharaoh archetype, which may characterise their perceptions and portrayals of some Egyptian presidents. This is due to some of them either being of Islamist backgrounds themselves (e.g., Fahmi Huwaidi and Izzat al-Rishq) or possibly possessing pro-Islamist sentiments without necessarily affiliating to any Islamist group. For instance, the author of the article *OPA-C*, Muhammad Al-Jawadi, once tweeted, among other similar tweets, in criticism of President Al-Sisi:

*... Allah has already revealed in the Qur'ān a detailed description pertaining to the traits and characteristics of Pharaoh. I am amazed how the Egyptians (today) are still in denial about the fact that this Pharaoh who is spoken of in the Qur'ān is actually their own president.*

... علمنا القرآن بوضوح شديد وصف فرعون مصر. عجبت لشعب أنزل الله في حاكمهم (وحده) محكم آياته ومع هذا يخادعون أنفسهم.

(Al-Jawadi, 2018)

#### ▪ **The Tyrant King**

The Pharaoh, at the end of the day, is a king and based on the above descriptions, he is also a tyrant. This takes us to another archetypal image that appears to frequently manifest in stories, attacking the persona of President Al-Sisi. Such an image is known as the Tyrant King: an archetypal figure whose traits are mostly outlined by the Jungian psychologist Robert Moore and mythologist Douglas Gillette (Moore and Gillette, 1992). According to the authors, the image of the Tyrant is centred on the propensity for destruction and tearing down. The Tyrant, according to Moore and Gillette (1992), is one who is cursed with self-absorption (narcissism). The Tyrant thinks of himself as above all else and that the universe revolves around him according to his will. An example can be vividly seen in the Trickster section, 6.2.3 (e.g., article *STA-T*).

The authors carry on to mention that the Tyrant is ‘ruthless, merciless and without feeling when he is pursuing what he thinks is his own self-interest’ (Moore and Gillette, 1992, p. 64). The figure is also described as someone who is deluded, extremely insecure, and driven by false beliefs. As such, whenever the Tyrant detects any form of peril, undermining his own supremacy and authority, he will lash out immediately. He will take all that is necessary to secure himself, never mind the physical, mental, or emotional harm he may inflict upon others.

Garry and El-Shamy (2017) second the aforementioned views, considering the Tyrant as someone who demands to be worshipped, subjects others to cruelty and oppression, and eradicates any threat to his power. Read *et al.* (1983) also offer another view, describing the Tyrant by his blind ignorant narrowmindedness and through his inclinations to terror over wisdom or understanding, something which will eventually guarantee his downfall, as argued by the scholars. Indeed, most of such attributes are not only shown in the articles associated with Tyrant (Pharaoh) King but also evident across the Trickster-related articles.

## 6.2.6 The Martyr: A subcategory

### 6.2.6.1 Examples of the archetypal “Martyr” construction

The examples to be discussed in relation to the Martyr archetype are entirely drawn from those of the archetypal Victim (section 6.2.2.1) and Hero (section 6.2.3.1). These can be mostly found in articles, *OPA-V*, *OPE-V*, *STA-V*, *STE-V*, *OPA-A*, and *STE-H* (Shakir, 2013; Bedier, 2014; Al-Ruwayni and Zaki, 2013; Al-Jazeera, 2013a; Gul, 2013a; Reuters, 2013). Given that the archetypal traits of the Martyr already classify as part of the Victim and, to a lesser degree, the Hero, I will only be discussing a few random examples which explicitly point at the concepts of martyrdom and sacrificial heroism.

The archetypal traits of the Martyr are mostly delivered through the use of micro-discursive strategies, which namely include lexical strategies, indexical meanings, and figurative predications. Of course, the constructions of the linguistic elements are communicated through intertextual and interdiscursive mechanisms, some of which include Qur’anic verses and references.

Random examples of all of the above can be seen, for instance, in articles *OPA-V* (Shakir, 2013) and *STA-V* (Al-Ruwayni and Zaki, 2013), in which the male and female casualties amongst the Pro-MB protesters are not only labelled as “martyrs” شهداء and “martyresses” شهيدات but are also described as such. The article, *OPE-V* (Bedier, 2014), also speaks highly of the “heroism” shown by the author’s brother, Amir, who is said to have sacrificed himself for freedom and democracy. The author recounts the event whilst sensing something about his brother, Amir, foreshadowing his “martyrdom” (e.g., emanating a “radiant aura” whilst greeting his family members). As maintained by the author, Amir is “one of the unsung heroes who peacefully protested and protected the revolution”. He is also said to have been “determined to make history and remained steadfast” along the path of “resistance and struggle”. *STE-V* (Al-Jazeera, 2013a) is yet another example in which the sacrificial spirit and “heroism” of the MB leaders are spoken figuratively and hyperbolically of, as seen in the below statement:

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*We will not be brought into a cycle of violence, we know how deadly that would be. Even if that means we will have to become the punching bag of the rest of society and our blood will flow for the rest of Egyptians to wake up and the rest of the world*

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In another example drawn from article *OPA-A* (Gul, 2013a), the security forces stand accused of slaughtering the protesters at Rabaa<sup>196</sup> and elsewhere in Egypt. The author refers to the latter group as “the believers of Allah”. The demise of the protesters is represented rather heroically through the concept of Islamic “martyrdom” (الشهادة في سبيل الله: *al-shahādah fī sabīl Illāh*)<sup>197</sup>. According to the author, those who were slain amongst the protesters are the victorious ones in this life and after. The article then quotes the following part of a Qur’anic verse<sup>198</sup>, addressing the martyrs’ rewards in the afterlife:

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*Think not of those who are slain in Allah’s way as dead. Nay, **they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord***

وَلَا تَحْسَبَنَّ الَّذِينَ قُتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ أَمْوَاتًا ۚ بَلْ أَحْيَاءٌ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ يُرْزُقُونَ

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Finally, as seen in article *STE-H*, a number of linguistic strategies (comprising of assertive modalities, predications, and hyperboles) are used to emphasise the sacrificial heroism attributed to ousted President Morsi along with his followers and supporters who are also labelled below as “martyrs”:

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*The president will not retreat, or negotiate or accept compromises especially after all the martyrs, the wounded, the arrested and missing [...] No matter how much they try to keep him away, the president will not retreat from a return to the democratic path, even if his soul is the price of this democratic path*

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Further to the above statement is yet another sensationalist “tribute” to Morsi, delivered by the author of article *OPA-C* (Al-Jawadi, 2013), Muhammad Al-Jawadi, a passionate supporter of the former president.

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<sup>196</sup> Rabaa’s event (most frequently referred to by Al-Jazeera as “Rabaa’s massacre” مجزرة رابعة *Majzarat Rābi‘ah*) is an incident in Egypt at which the security forces are said to have raided and dispersed two camps of demonstrators gathered at Rābi‘ah al-‘Adawīya and al-Naḍah squares.

<sup>197</sup> The heroic death in the cause of Allāh (God). Islam accords a special status to those who sacrifice their lives in the service of their religion. According to the Islamic teachings, martyrs proceed directly to the highest abode in Paradise as their eternal reward in the hereafter. More on the concept can be referred to in the following sources:

- Lawson, B.T. (no date) *Martyrdom* [Web page]. Available at: <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/opr/t236/e0508> (Accessed: 1st November, 2020).
- Torok, R. (2012) 'Al-Jihad Fi Sabilillah: in the heart of green birds', *Australian Counter Terrorism Conference*. Perth, Western Australia. SRI Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University, pp. 37-46.

<sup>198</sup> The Qur’ān 3:169 (Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).



During a televised interview, Al-Jawadi dedicated an excessive high praise and tribute to the ousted president whilst the latter was still in incarceration, speaking highly of his “sacrificial heroism”, almost equating him to an apostle or a prophet of God. Although Morsi was still alive at the time, his death sentence was greatly anticipated, even though he eventually died in prison. Moreover, the sort of qualities and attributes articulated by Al-Jawadi whilst praising Morsi, as seen below, can only be assigned to a “holy martyr”:

*Muhammad Morsi will go down in history [...] as the once poor slave of Allah by whom Allah has honoured and reinforced Islam. He was the once poor slave of Allah by whom Allah has changed the course of the Islamic and Arab nations. He was the once poor slave of Allah who has ended the era of coup d'états. He was the once poor slave of Allah who has put a halt to the electoral fraud and usurpation of power. He was the once poor slave of Allah who worshipped his Lord (Allah), and in return, Allah has made him a beacon to those who would follow in his footsteps.*

محمد مرسي هو ذلك الرجل الذي سيكتب في التاريخ [...] أنه ذلك العبد الضعيف الذي أعز الله به الإسلام. ذلك العبد الضعيف الذي حول به الله سبحانه وتعالى مسار الأمة الإسلامية والعربية. هو ذلك العبد الضعيف الذي انتهى به عصر الانقلابات العسكرية. هو ذلك العبد الضعيف الذي انتهى به تزوير الانتخابات والإستيلاء على السلطة بالقوة. هو ذلك العبد الضعيف الذي عبد ربه فجعله نبيراً سائراً وهداية لكل من سيأتي بعده.

(Al-Jawadi, 2014a)

### 6.2.6.2 Discussion on “The Martyr” construction

As seen in the above examples, the sacrificial heroism of the MB members and their supporters appears to be mostly delivered through the concept of Islamic martyrdom or what is commonly known as “dying in the cause of Allāh (God)” الشهادة في سبيل الله *al-shahādah fī sabīl Illāh* (Torok, 2012; Lawson, no date; Halverson *et al.*, 2011a).

As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the mythical stories of victims and heroes are known for being part of enduring universal concepts adopted by diverse cultures and societies since ancient times and have continued to work themselves into modern discourses. As explained by Lule (2001), the “martyrdom” of an individual often entails a transformation of character, whereby a victim transcends into a hero (Lule, 2001). In Christian mythology, Jesus of Nazareth, ‘the divine incarnation of Yahweh on earth, died, executed at the hands of the Roman Empire on the cross in brutal fashion’ (Halverson *et al.*, 2011a, p. 170). Although Jesus, in this sense, has become a victim of religious “bigotry”, he has also emerged as a hero and Redeemer of Christianity (Jung, 1976; Jung, 1981; Lule, 2001; Khouliani, 2019). Similarly, in materials attributed to the supporters of Umayyad Caliphate between 661 and 750 CE, the “treacherous” assassination of the third Rightly Guided Caliph and companion of Prophet Muḥammad, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān (in 656 CE), was equated to the heroic martyrdom of Jesus Christ. The governor of Iraq back then, Al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf al-Thaqafī, is reported to have once said: “Jesus the son of Mary in the eyes of Allah is like ‘Uthmān” (Cook, p. 49). Likewise, the suffering and slaughter of the grandson of Prophet Muḥammad and the Shī‘a<sup>199</sup> Muslims’ much-revered martyr, Al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alīy, has become a symbol of sacrificial heroism and struggle for truth and justice against falsehood and injustice in the eyes of the Shī‘a communities (Hasanov and Shirinov, 2017; Halverson *et al.*, 2011a). Such stories are, indeed, significant to individuals and societies since people not only tend to mostly view themselves through the lens of the archetypal Victim and the representation of the “self” (Lule, 2001; Jung, 1981; Jung, 1976) but also orient themselves to the Hero being an exemplar of individuality (Neumann, 1970). The same can be said about the mythical archetype of the Martyr in Islamic cultures: “The slain” is not only a victim but also a celebrated hero whose legacy lives through the collective memory of a given Muslim society.

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<sup>199</sup> al-Madthab al-shī‘ī “المذهب الشيعي” (Shī‘a practice) and al-Madthab al-Sunnī “المذهب السني” (Sunni practice) are the two major denominations of Islam. Although both agree on most of the fundamentals of Islam, the divisions between the two are the result of historical events, ideological heritage, and issues of leadership.

According to Cole and Cole (2009):

*The martyr is an almost universal concept in both religious and national histories from around the world. Throughout recorded history, the altruistic self-sacrifice of the martyr for the greater good is reversed. The actions of martyrs are ingrained into the history and folklore of the communities for which they died through repeated remembrances and retelling of stories. This imbues them and their deeds with a measure of historical immortality [...] Particularly, insurgent organisations have sought to use religious or national discourse identities to garner support for their causes and therefore martyrs become central to their discourse as well. The ultimate aim of these organisations is to subvert religious or national identities so that they provide justification for their actions.*

(Cole and Cole, 2009, pp. 257-258)

Nonetheless, while the sacrificial and heroic attributes of the Martyr archetype are acknowledged in the ways discussed above, Halverson *et al.* (2011a) explain that such a figure is only slightly less significant than the archetypal Champion. As posited by Halverson *et al.* (2011a, p. 189):

*The martyr, who sacrifices his or her life in a just and righteous cause, is only slightly less central than the champion. This archetype has similar motives to the champion and functions in a similar way; indeed, would-be champions who do not succeed in surmounting their deadly challenges are usually treated as martyrs.*

(Halverson *et al.*, 2011a, p. 189)

Halverson *et al.* (2011a, pp. 92-93) explain that ‘the conflict between good and evil mediated by a hero accepting his destiny as an archetypal martyr for God's cause is therefore only satisfied by standing against an oppressor and accepting death in defiance of tyranny’. Sacrificing themselves in the service of religion, martyrs, according to the Islamic teachings, proceed directly to the highest abode in Paradise as their eternal reward in the hereafter (Torok, 2012; Lawson, no date). According to some traditions, as detailed by Halverson *et al.* (2011a, p. 174), ‘the souls of the martyrs immediately ascend into heaven and inhabit the bodies of green birds, flying about freely and eating from the fruits of paradise until the Day of Judgment when they will return to their earthly bodies for resurrection’. Indeed, due to the glorification of the

martyrdom in both the Qur'ān and Sunnah<sup>200</sup>, he/she who carries out such an act is accorded along with his/her family 'a special consideration in judgment, making this a divinely ordained archetype that any believer would seek to emulate' (Halverson *et al.* 2011a, p. 195). An important note to be made, however, about the Martyr, and the Victim for that matter, is that the bearer of such archetypal traits does not necessarily need to have died "heroically". Normal casualties can still be represented as Martyrs since 'the portrayals of victims as heroes seem appropriate and somehow comforting' (Lule, 2001, p. 54).

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<sup>200</sup> As stated before, the Qur'ān "القرآن" and Sunnah "السنة" are two of the major sources of Islamic doctrinal and social views. The Qur'ān simply refers of the verbatim word of Allāh "الله" (God), may He be glorified and exalted, while the "Sunnah" refers to the sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad "محمد", peace be upon him: Mahdi, M.S., Schimmel, A. and Rahman, F. (1999) 'Islam', in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islam> (Accessed: 20th August, 2020).

## 6.3 The suppressed complexities

As argued by Kelsey (2015c), mythical conventions are known to suppress ideological, historical, and contextual complexities or other narratives that appear to contradict / not align with the narrative of the storyteller. Myths are summoned in the forms of reality-distorting metaphors, preferences, exaggerations, suppressions, or simplifications, promoting one way of seeing or discussing the events whilst ‘restricting and denying other interpretations’ (Kelsey, 2015c, p. 5). Hence, it becomes important to identify such narratives in which Al-Jazeera appears to suppress, attack, or skip any mention throughout their own reporting. Of course, addressing all of such complexities is a herculean job as they are numerous instances which can overwhelm the chapter. Therefore, it was my decision to focus only on the most common ones and the ones repeated much across the articles.

### 6.3.1 Has not the MB equally exercised victim-blaming?

Although the complexity to be addressed here is mostly associated with article *OPA-V*, it can also be used to argue against any attempts throughout the rest of the articles in which the MB are being represented as a peaceful party with no inclination to promoting violence.

Using the archetypal narrative of the Victim, the author of the article at hand addresses the practice of victim-blaming, which is said to have been exercised against the MB and pro-MB protesters. The author argues that the aforesaid social actors were subject to a great deal of vilifications, which long paved the way for their persecution. However, the author fails to mention that the MB members and the pro-MB media, themselves, actually engaged in vilifying the opposition back in the days when Morsi was still in power. For instance, according to a report published by Freedom House in 2013 (Freedom House, 2013)<sup>201</sup>:

*11 10 The Brotherhood's party newspaper, Freedom and Justice, and its affiliated satellite television network, Misr25, both became platforms for the overt promotion of the Morsi government's policies and rarely offered any criticism of its performance. During volatile periods in Morsi's presidency – such as the aftermath of a November 22 decree in which he appeared to claim absolute power, or the rushing of the divisive constitutional draft to a referendum – the Brotherhood's media arms served as trusted supporters of the president's decisions.*

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<sup>201</sup> The very observation is also stressed in the 2014's report (para. 10): Freedom House (2014) *Freedom of the press 2014 - Egypt*. Refworld. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/536b342db.html> (Accessed: 1st July, 2020).

*They also actively vilified the opposition as either disgruntled members of the old regime, thugs, or infidels.*

(Freedom House, 2013, para. 11)

In keeping with Dib and Sayed (2014), Islamist media during the MB rule were only focused on communicating their own side of stories regarding the affairs in Egypt.

Dib and Sayed (2014) explain that the type of figures featured in the news and hosted on programmes were only Islamists and that all the oppositionists and those who dare to protest against Morsi were depicted as “blasphemers” and “paid thugs” of the “feloul”<sup>202</sup> (remnants of Mubarak). Furthermore, they explain that the discourse of “feloul/heretic conspiracy against the legitimate MB president” is adopted by all Islamist media for the purpose of demonising the oppositionists. According to the two researchers:

*During Morsi’s last week in power, Islamist TV channels had turned into platforms for incitement, both accusing Morsi’s rivals of infidelity and promoting fatwas that allowed for their killing on political/religious basis.*

(Dib and Sayed, 2014, p. 7)

Another case of vilification endorsed by the MB includes dehumanising slurs. This can be found in the words of Misr25’s anchor Nouredine Abdulhafith who, whilst attacking the opposition of the MB, calls them “low-life geckos and lizards” (Hamid, 2013; Kassab, 2013).

Moreover, the MB and their allies from other Islamists parties are said to have inflamed the political and ideological polarisation and engaged in stigmatising those who happened to be of different views to their political project, calling them “infidels” and declaring them as “targets for violence” (International Federation for Human Rights, 2013, para. 2).

A clear example of another instigation and name-calling is also found in the statements made by the Egyptian Qatari-based intellectual and spiritual leader of the MB, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī (Yusuf Al-Qaradawi)<sup>203</sup>.

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<sup>202</sup> Fulūl “فلول” is a pejorative term to refer to the “remnants” of the Mubarak regime.

<sup>203</sup> More background information about Al-Qaradawi can be referred to in the following sources:

- Roxanne, L.E. and Muhammad Qasim, Z. (2021) 'Princeton readings in Islamist thought', in Roxanne, L.E. and Muhammad Qasim, Z. (eds.) *Chapter 9 Yusuf al-Qaradawi*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 224-246.

Al-Qaradawi once appeared on one of Al-Jazeera's TV programmes (of which clips were republished by Al-Arabiya) calling the opposition and anti-Morsi protestors as "Kharijites" that deserve to be "killed or stricken by the sword":

*The Kharijites are, undoubtedly, the ones who rebelled against Mohammed Morsi. Whoever says otherwise is not a scholar. Those people befit the descriptions of the Kharijites whose characteristics and traits are detailed in the traditions and sayings of Prophet Muhammad: Anyone who tries to cause disunity amongst your ranks, you should kill him or strike him by the sword, no matter who he is.*

الخوارج هنا الذين خرجوا على محمد مرسى. هذا من غير شك. من يقول غير هذا ليس بعالم. نحن نقول هؤلاء تنطبق عليهم الأحاديث: من أتاكم وأمركم جميعاً على رجلٍ واحدٍ يريد أن يفرق عصاكم ويشق جماعتكم فاقتلوه أو فاضربوه بالسيف كائناً من كان.

(Al Arabiya, 2018)

### 6.3.2 The MB is a moderate group... Or is it?

Such complexity is found in many different articles. However, since it is difficult to go over all of such examples, article *OPA-H* was chosen as a representative case. By utilising the Hero archetype, political Islam in this opinion piece is hailed as "a centrist and moderate movement" that "possesses a civilised project, believes in partnership, and veers away from violence"

Despite the above positive attributes, it is questionable whether or not such descriptions speak of the true reality of the MB, particularly on the aspect of "veering away from violence". As stated by Pargeter (2013), violence is enriched in the motto of the MB. Pargeter (2013, p. 198) adds that 'Fighting Jihad has been core to the Ikhwan's (MB) political ideology since it's very inception'. Just in recent years, following the removal of Mohammed Morsi, the prominent MB leader, Muhammad Kamal<sup>204</sup>, created a splinter group in which he gave the green light to engage in violent retaliatory activities (Awad, 2017). Such a group, according to Awad (2017),

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▪ Obaid, N. (2020) *The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world*. California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO.

<sup>204</sup> More background information about Muhammad Kamal can be referred to in the following sources:

▪ Hamama, M. (2017) 'An internal review of the Muslim Brotherhood: Reform, militancy or politics?', *Mada*. Available at: <https://www.madamasr.com/en/2017/03/22/feature/politics/an-internal-review-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-reform-militancy-or-politics/> (Accessed: 13th August, 2021).

▪ Obaid, N. (2020) *The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world*. California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO.

was given the name Revolutionary Punishment (RP) and has launched about 150 armed attacks on officers and checkpoints.

As for believing in partnership and leading a civilised project, AL-Sharif (2014) says in this regard that the MB, since early 2011 until mid-2013, failed to lead an inclusive democratic transition, appreciate the full diversity of the Egyptian society, or understand the need for a completely reinvented political culture. The MB leaders did not marshal the resources, networks, and knowledge necessary for the implementation of effective reform policies. Furthermore, the MB demonstrated unclear stances and policies regarding the rights of those whose agendas are different to theirs. Moreover, their views on other political parties and institutions are described as “ambivalent and unsettling”. Lastly, the MB are argued to have been intolerant to any form of opposition, owing to their ideology being of rigid and coercive nature (Obaid, 2020).

### **6.3.3 What is not told about Hamas?**

The following section is particularly dedicated to revealing the sort of details and aspects about Hamas in which the author seems to have turned a blind eye to, particularly those revolving around the group’s complex records and their ties with the MB. For instance, in the article *OPA-T*, the author appears to reject any claims of existing partnership between the MB and Hamas, apart from admitting that the latter does take pride in subscribing to the same school of thought laid out by the former. Moreover, the author appears to skip any mention of the sort of complexities addressing Hamas’s engagement in terrorist activities. Furthermore, whilst the author seems to be engrossed in praising what he sees as the heroic achievements of Hamas, he appears to hide the fact that Hamas itself plays a major role in worsening the Palestinian suffering and committing human rights abuses against its own people. All such complexities appear to have been suppressed via the columnist being busy attacking and rebranding the anti-MB social actors as “vicious” Tricksters whilst constructing Hamas along the lines of the “sacrificial” and “defiant” Hero figures.

Besides being an offshoot of the MB, embodying their philosophy, rationale, and positions on fundamental causes (e.g., waging Jihad against the Israeli government), Hamas is also labelled as a terrorist organisation that is shunned and denounced on the world diplomatic stage (Schumer, 1993; Levitt, 2008; Higgins, 2009; Litvak, 2010; Farahat, 2017; Hannase, 2020; Obaid, 2020). Concerning Hamas’s ties with the MB, Obaid (2020, p. xix) states that ‘Hamas is built on the mother organisation’s extensive infrastructure in expanding its public base of



operations, facilitating useful vehicles for spreading its ideas and influence and enlisting supporters'. Moreover, on the word of Musallam (2005), the MB's ideology embraced by Hamas does not separate much from that of Sayyid Qutb (the MB ideologue whose thoughts and ideas have been playing a fundamental role in informing and shaping the views of some of the infamous jihadist groups, such as ISIS). On being influenced by Qutb and others, Hannase (2020) explains that the MB's ideology sustained by Hamas:

*reflects the ideas of Islamic ideological leaders such as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam. These three figures are the central ideological-leaders that affect al-Qaeda and construct the doctrine of jihad, Islamic militancy and the war against the West*

(Hannase, 2020, p. 61)

As for what concerns the MB's support of Hamas (Farahat, 2017), the former group does indeed stand accused of giving financial support to Hamas in recent years, something in which five MB leaders were found complicit. As stated in a published hearing by the U.S Subcommittee on National Security:

*Muslim Brotherhood networks raise money here in the U.S. to support Hamas' terrorist activities in the Middle East. According to the Department of Justice, in the early 1990s, Hamas' parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, planned to establish a network of organizations in the U.S. to spread a militant Islamist message and raise money for Hamas.*

'The Muslim Brotherhood's global threat' (2018, p. 2)

Hamas is also found responsible for further complicating the suffering of the Palestinians through its extremely rigid approach and exercise of human rights abuses (Hannase, 2020). This goes against what the author tries to stress about Hamas being focused on liberating their land and fighting for the welfare of its own people.

Hamas is mostly criticised for being too strict as it continues to reject the fulfilment of the Palestinian peace project. According to the group, the only way to overcome the problems of Palestinians is via waging armed jihad against the Israeli state (Hannase, 2020). As maintained by the researcher, 'what makes the Palestinian problem becomes complicated, especially when Hamas decided to pursue a democratic system on the one hand, and refuses a peaceful political solution on the other' (Hannase, 2020, p. 57). He adds that Hamas is criticised for prolonging

the already long-standing crisis in Gaza strip due to the group constantly refusing the proposed peace projects. Moreover, Hannase (2020) adds the number of Palestinian casualties fallen amid the conflicts between Hamas and Israel in 2004 were estimated between 104 and 133, whilst the Israeli side sustained only five casualties. All the aforementioned details, as stressed by Hannase (2020), do expose Hamas's stubborn approach. As things stand, Hamas is mostly preoccupied with instilling a patriotic image amongst its people, more so than fighting for their true welfare (Hannase, 2020). In relation to the group's violations of human rights, Hamas is said to have exercised repression against its own people in Gaza, crushed the dissents, and engaged in their torture. As reported by the HRW:

*Hamas carried out scores of arbitrary arrests for peaceful criticism of the authorities, particularly on social media, among independent journalists, on university campuses, and at demonstrations. Hamas uses detention to punish critics and deter them and others from further activism. In detention, security forces routinely taunt, threaten, beat, and force detainees into painful stress positions for hours at a time.*

(Human Rights Watch, 2018, para. 2)

Moreover, Amnesty International accuses Hamas 'of a brutal campaign of abduction, torture and killings against its own people' (Connolly, 2015).

#### **6.3.4 Has the MB stood up for freedom of the press?**

Through the archetypal Trickster, President Al-Sisi and other anti-MB social actors are constantly criticised across many articles on the grounds of plotting and conspiring against freedom of expression. For example, article *STE-T* accuses the military generals of plotting against the media and doing harm to such outlets that "fail to sing the army's praises". What the article seems to skip any mention of is the fact that the MB themselves stand accused of tightening their control over journalism and free media during the days of Morsi.

Based on a report published by Freedom House (2013), the status of free media dropped from "partly free" to "not free", owing to what was described as 'officially tolerated campaigns to intimidate journalists' (Freedom House, 2013, para. 1). As stated in the report, after Morsi of the MB's FJP party won the presidency, there were increased efforts aimed at prosecuting commentators, journalists, and antigovernment outlets who were found guilty of insulting the political leadership or engaging in defaming the religion. As a result, anti-defamation laws were

set out and used against the press, coupled with journalists being physically harassed by non-state actors with the tacit support of MB authorities.

The report also states that Morsi was working aggressively to push the new constitution through the approval process, containing articles which leave:

*media professionals exposed to excessive punishments under the law, including prison sentences for "malpractice." In addition, it upholds preexisting laws pertaining to the sanctity of the president. The constitution's ambiguity regarding the media leaves significant room for censorship and paves the way for self-censorship on social, cultural, and political issues.*

(Freedom House, 2013, para. 3)

Furthermore, according to the above-cited report, new government laws were passed, resulting in the detention of non-Islamist journalists and media personalities on defamation charges, such as the journalist Islam Afifi and the TV presenter Tawfeeq Okasha. The reports state that there were about 24 criminal cases filed ‘for insulting the president during the six months after Morsi's election, significantly more than under the country's previous presidents’ (Freedom House, 2013, para. 5).

### **6.3.5 Rabaa: the untold story**

As evident from the analysis, Rabaa’s incident highly dominates most of the news stories examined. The event is mostly constructed through the Victim (as Hero) versus the Trickster /Tyrant (Pharaoh) King narratives. However, since it is by no means possible to address every article in relation to the complexities surrounding the event, this section attempts to address the complexities found within one example, which is article *OPA-A*. The columnist in this opinion piece mainly directs his criticism to President Al-Sisi and the security forces over the bloodshed they are said to have perpetrated, representing them as villainous and aggressors. However, there is nothing to report about the MB themselves being equally complicit.

There are a number of accounts that accuse the MB of playing a crucial role in Rabaa’s event, which can be found for instance, in the words of none other than the previous long-serving member of the MB, Emad Abo Hashim (Emād Abū Hāshim)<sup>205</sup>, who has personally spent time

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<sup>205</sup> More background information about Emad Abo Hashim can be referred to in the following source:

at Rabaa's sit-in before fleeing to Turkey and later abandoning the MB. According to Abu Hashem, the MB leaders knew that there was going to be a military involvement, resulting in grave bloodshed (Obaid, 2020). Nonetheless, they lied to the protesters about the likelihood of government operations. Abu Hashem explains that the MB had a plan of offering 100,000 "martyrs", as outlined by the MB spokesman, Jihad Al-Haddad<sup>206</sup> himself, in order to maximise the number of victims, achieve political endgames and succeed in pressurising the government through the game of numbers. However, in order to fulfil such an objective, the MB leaders would, firstly, need to ensure protesters of their safety. According to Abu Hashem, the MB explained to the protesters that the government would never resort to the use of force and that the security forces would return from whence they came (Obaid, 2020, p. 62).

There is also another opposing narrative to that of Al-Jazeera. This time it is relayed by none other than Ahmed Almogheer (Aḥmad al-Mughīr), a distinct member of the MB and the son-in-law of former MB leader, Khairat Al-Shater (Khayrat al-Shātīr)<sup>207</sup>. Almogheer sparked controversy upon admitting on Facebook that there were, in fact, protesters at the sit-ins, carrying armed guns, Kalashnikovs, cartridges, firearms, and grenades. According to Almogheer, there were also militants amongst the protesters who were using them as human shields. As added by Almogheer, it was, in fact, the protesters themselves who drew the first blood and started to fire at the security forces. Therefore, it was sensible for the other side to respond to the hail of fire launched at them. Among the ones who were slain by the protesters was an officer trying to guide the protesters to a safe exit (Abd al-Aziz, 2016; Alwaqei, 2016; Obaid, 2020).

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- Sayed, N. (2019) 'Significant quotes by dissident Muslim Brotherhood member Abu Hashim', *Sada Elbalad English*. Available at: <https://see.news/significant-quotes-by-dissident-muslim-brotherhood-member-abu-hashim/> (Accessed: 9th August, 2021).

<sup>206</sup> More background information about Al-Haddad can be referred to in the following sources:

- The Global MB Watch (2015b) *Gehad El-Haddad*. The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.globalmbwatch.com/wiki/gehad-el-haddad/> (Accessed: 1st July, 2020).
- Obaid, N. (2020) *The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world*. California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO.

<sup>207</sup> More background information about Khairat Al-Shater can be referred to in the following sources:

- CEP (no date) *Moussa Mohammed Abu Marzouk*. The Counter Extremism Project. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/moussa-mohammed-abu-marzouk> (Accessed: 13th August, 2021).
- Obaid, N. (2020) *The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world*. California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO.

## **6.4 The mythology and aesthetics of Al-Jazeera**

This section will be focusing mainly on revealing how mythology and aesthetical capability appear to impact the overall portrayals of Al-Jazeera. More specifically, the section will be shedding some light on how Al-Jazeera appears to cleverly trade on emotions through drawing on moral storytelling, appealing to different audiences' psyches, capitalising on ideas such as national culture, and infusing their narratives with verses and references from the Qur'ān. However, before moving on to discussing each of these, the implication of aesthetics in this project will first be addressed.

### **6.4.1 The new implication of aesthetics**

As briefly stated in the introduction of this chapter and extensively discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2, section 2.2.5), approaching the aesthetic role of mythology in news discourse appears to be under-researched. Nonetheless, a seemingly similar concept is already drawn on by Kelsey (2017a; 2017b) and Wetherell (2012). Such a concept is known as “affect”, which can be explained as ‘the discursive and psychological processes and interactions that both stir emotions and use emotions to broader conceptual information, personal feelings, and social values’ (Kelsey, 2017b, pp. 16 - 17). However, just like what appears to be zero studies focusing on the role of mythology and mythical archetypes within the context of Arabic news discourse or the cross-linguistic critical discourse studies (CDS), there do not seem to be any studies thus far, addressing the role of aesthetics within the two above-stated contexts. Moreover, in the wide-ranging context of news research, Postema and Deuze (2020) argue that although the absence of aesthetics, as applied to journalism research, has been noted by a number of key scholars, ‘a comprehensive theory on news work as “artistic” does not seem to have made it into the mainstream of journalism studies and education’ (Postema and Deuze, 2020, p. 1306). With this in mind, and as far as the particular context and focus of this research are concerned (which is to explore the role of mythology in news discourse), I would also argue that the aesthetic role of mythology appears to be more absent if not completely missing in similar studies. In other words, the discussion of aesthetics in this research may push the boundary for more novel and unprecedented implications, particularly and more importantly, in the context of Arabic news discourse and cross-linguistic CDS.

#### 6.4.2 The overall impact

There is already consensual agreement among media theorists that news media do not provide a natural reflection of reality, nor can they be seen as a copy of logical consequences of events (Erjavec, 2001, p. 702). With this in mind, and as seen from the analysis, what seems to have emerged is the much-overlooked fact that the aesthetics of mythology plays in depicting political events more so than their simplistic subjective description. In that regard, whoever masters such art, will have the upper hand in dominating the political narrative in media presentations (Bleiker, 2009). Following the removal of the MB from power in Egypt, different pro and anti-MB news networks in and outside Egypt attempted to control the narratives on the ground, resulting in social events being portrayed differently (Fowler, 1991; Trew, 1991). For instance, what is seen as a “revolution” in Egypt by different news outlets, the Qatari-funded and pro-MB Al-Jazeera, while trying every trick of the trade, brands and affectively constructs as a “coup”, “scandal”, “betrayal”, and “moral bankruptcy”.

More importantly, such a form of moral portrayal is further facilitated through columnists and writers across the two sites of Al-Jazeera (AJA and AJE) resorting to the practice of mythological storytelling. The stories are found to draw on the rich treasure trove of ‘archetypical stories’ (Lule, 2001, p. 18) and ‘conventional structures’ (Bird and Dardenne, 2009, p. 205) that long ago proved their ability to captivate the audience (Lule, 2001, p. 3). Myths are summoned in the forms of reality-distorting metaphors, preferences, exaggerations, suppressions, or simplifications, promoting one way of seeing or discussing the events whilst ‘restricting and denying other interpretations’ (Kelsey, 2015c, p. 5). Of course, this is all done as part of Al-Jazeera attempt to immerse the audience and engage them personally and emotionally, and hence, induce a profound emotional and aesthetic experience towards a specifically desired version of reality (Oatley, 1999; Chang *et al.*, 2013; Hartsock, 2016; Stalker-Firth, 2017). As maintained by Kelsey (2017b):

*Mythology plays an affective role in our lives—across the historical, cultural, and psychological complexities of individuals and societies. It is not merely the case that stories affect us because they communicate ideas that arouse thoughts and stir emotions. Stories often mean much more than this, since they are produced and understood from the depths of our psyche through to the archetypal expressions of language, representation, experience, and ideology.*

(Kelsey, 2017b, p. 1)

As seen from the analysis of the earlier discussed mythical archetypes, Al-Jazeera appears to have tried its hardest, although to a variable degree between the two Arabic and English sites, to utilise aesthetics for advancing its own political ideology (which is that of its sponsor as well, the Qatari government). As explained by Bleiker and Hutchison (2008), aesthetics as a resource for influencing emotion more than reason is believed to possess the propensity for painting social events in such ways that most benefit the painter's desires. The two monolingual sites of Al-Jazeera, although agreeing on supporting the MB, on the one hand, and vilifying their anti-MB social actors, on the other, each appear to have made a decision to paint the Egyptian events in a dissimilar fashion. For instance, AJA appears to have done so in such a manner that would appeal and resonate with the Arab psyche. Meanwhile, AJE appears to orientate towards the psyche of the Western and non-Arabic speaking audience.

For instance, when contemplating the ways in which AJE tries to cover the social events under investigation, one can notice that the site attempts at shaping and framing the events in terms of issues and sentiments associated with human rights, the fight for freedom, the struggle for democracy, and the pain and groaning under the yoke of despotism. On the other hand, whilst AJA does equally try to draw on the afore-stated themes, the site seems to capitalise greatly on representing events through the lens of moral values that are sacred for the Arab and Muslim culture (e.g., chivalry, honour, dignity, and zeal for noble causes). Moreover, AJA draws on Qur'anic stories, verses, and references as well as Arabic literature for rhetorical and symbolic purposes. AJA also tries to draw on the notions of faith and conviction whilst attempting to rationalise and explain the unfolding of events in Egypt (e.g., the universal laws of Allah as well as His Will, Wisdom, and Predestination).

Al-Jazeera, across the two sites, also centres its narrative on common emotional and epic themes revolving around the ideas of suffering, tragedy, betrayal, moral bankruptcy, deception, bravery, hope, etc. Indeed, it is through all of the above complex processes that myth is created, functions affectively, and plays aesthetically on emotions.

This, in turn, results in stories, memories, and identities being manipulated. Moreover, meanings become distorted thanks to ideas being muddled up with other ones that appear to be connected. What this does, thanks to the constant employment of reality-distorting strategies (e.g., exaggerations or simplifications), is that dominant beliefs and values begin to suppress other narratives that do not align with the views of the storyteller and surface over them (Kelsey, 2015c).

### 6.4.3 Manipulations and trading on emotions

This section considers the different cases and places across Al-Jazeera's reporting whereby myth is created to trade on emotions through the deliberate and cautious associations of random meanings, stories, memories, and identities. Such practice is particularly dominant throughout the Arabic stories and can be seen, for instance, in the ways in which Al-Jazeera appears to draw on national narrative and Qur'anic references.

#### 6.4.3.1 *Stimulating national zeal and pride*

At many points across the articles, Al-Jazeera appears to capitalise on evoking a sense of national identity (i.e., through drawing on national narrative and historical memory as discursive mythological strategies) for the purpose of prioritising and legitimising the existence of Islamist groups in the Arab and Muslim world over non-Islamist ones. For instance, Al-Jazeera tries to establish a historical continuum, linking all of the contemporary Islamist "reformist" groups and parties with other ones from the ancient past. In doing so, Al-Jazeera summons examples of Muslim and Arab figures from the bygone days - roughly during the time period between the Rāshidūn Caliphate (632–661 CE) and the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE) - in a bid to argue for a solid historical foundation for the present-day Islamist movements which are said to have come a long way to carry on the "heroic" legacy of their predecessors.

In doing so, Al-Jazeera overlooks the complexities arising from the ancient and contemporary movements being born within different socio-political dimensions, which means they may not be on the same page intellectually. Putting everything in one basket, Al-Jazeera also blurs the potential distinctions and rivalries between such groups and figures which come from the same time period. This may produce further argumentative fallacies.

For instance, Al-Jazeera associates the names of two of the known noble companions of Prophet Muḥammad (Al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alīy and 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr) with another third military commander ('Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ash'ath) who is neither a companion of the Prophet nor equivalent to the previous two figures in Islamic reverence. Most importantly, Ibn al-Ash'ath is argued by some Islamic historians to have been involved in fitnah (sedition) during the early caliphate of the Umayyad dynasty. Such fitnah, as remarked by historians, resulted in military disorder and conflicts amongst the ranks of the Muslim community (Ibn Kathīr, 1997). In other words, such mixing of names and historical figures may run the risk of blurring important historical complexities, leading to fallacious arguments and comparisons.



Another example of different meanings being associated with each other can be seen in the deliberate use of long-established references, which are odd to use in the context of a supposedly “objective” news reporting due to their affectionate connotation. For instance, Al-Jazeera in some places refers to Egypt as “Arḍ al-Kinānah” (The Land of Kinānah) and “Umm al-Dunyā” (Mother of the World). These two phrases are known for their affectionate, historical, Islamic, and cultural appeal among the Egyptians who are vigorously bound to their Muslim and Egyptian identity. The first term, Arḍ al-Kinānah, is coined by ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ, a companion of Prophet Muḥammad and the first Muslim governor of Egypt. Hence, it bestows a historically Islamic significance that is essential in invigorating the sense of zeal and earnest solicitude amongst the Muslims in Egypt over the welfare, honour, and dignity of their country. The term portrays Egypt as a “quiver<sup>208</sup>” packed with arrows, which is a reference to the land being forever secured and protected by God (Sulayman, 1990). The second term is “Umm al-Dunyā” (Mother of the World). The term is equally used for stimulating national pride amongst the Egyptians and stirring up their zeal over the welfare of their own nation. As maintained by Yusuf (2003, p. 3), calling Egypt the “Mother of the World” ‘comes from one of the old proverbs heard down to the present day. It gives the Egyptians the feeling of noble descent and inherited wisdom’.

Again, the use of the above terms appears to be part of a deliberate attempt by Al-Jazeera to tap into the collective psyche of the Egyptian audience by means of resurrecting pan-Islamist and nationalist sentiments, which may have been lying dormant in their slumber.

#### ***6.4.3.2 Propping up the narratives with the Qur’ān***

Another form of manipulations and trading on emotions can be seen in the frequent borrowing of Qur’anic verses/references to the sympathy and support of the MB and their supporters. For instance, in evoking the sense of victimhood, the MB and the pro-MB protestors are equated to the Israelites who were, as narrated in the Qur’ān, “afflicted with dreadful torment”<sup>209</sup> at the hands of Pharaoh and his soldiers<sup>210</sup>. Meanwhile, President Al-Sisi and his soldiers are represented as though the reincarnations of the foregoing evil figures (i.e., Pharaoh and his soldiers).

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<sup>208</sup> A quiver is the English equivalent for the Arabic word, “Kinānah”.

<sup>209</sup> The Qur’ān 7:141 (Translated by Mustafa Khattab).

<sup>210</sup> The Pharaoh of the Exodus from Qur’anic stories and Judaeo-Christian theology.

The full verse reads as follows:

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*'Remember' how We delivered you from the people of Pharaoh, who afflicted you with dreadful torment*

وَإِذْ نَجَّيْنَاكُمْ مِنْ آلِ فِرْعَوْنَ يَسُومُونَكُمْ سُوءَ الْعَذَابِ

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In condemning what Al-Jazeera denounces as the unjust murder of the female protesters “ladies of Mansoura”, Al-Jazeera aligns the gravity of “the crime” perpetrated to a totally different one in the Qur’ān<sup>211</sup>, quoting the following verse<sup>212</sup> (with some alliterations):

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*For what sin she was killed?*

بِأَيِّ ذَنْبٍ قُتِلَتْ؟

---

In another example, the MB are depicted as heroes and martyrs<sup>213</sup>, sacrificing their lives in the cause of Allah and for the sake of democracy, hence, earning eternal life in the afterlife. Such description is coupled with the following verse<sup>214</sup> from the Qur’ān:

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*Think not of those who are slain in Allah’s way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord*

وَلَا تَحْسَبَنَّ الَّذِينَ قُتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ أَمْوَاتًا بَلْ أَحْيَاءٌ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ يُرْزَقُونَ

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In another place, the confrontations between the MB, on the one hand, and the anti-MB establishment, on the other, are constantly equated with the Qur’anic battle between “Truth and

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<sup>211</sup> The verse addresses and condemns the unjust practice of infanticide, the killing of infant girls in pre-Islamic Arabia (Giladi, 1990), which is the original context of the Qur’anic rhetorical question. The very question is summoned into a new context, which addresses a different kind of “victimhood” which bears no connection to the one spoken of in the report.

<sup>212</sup> The Qur’ān 81:9 (Translated by Abdul Haleem). For more on this, see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.1.3 and Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.1.3.

<sup>213</sup> The heroic death in the cause of Allāh (God). Islam accords a special status to those who sacrifice their lives in the service of their religion. According to the Islamic teachings, martyrs proceed directly to the highest abode in Paradise as their eternal reward in the afterlife. More on the concept can be referred to in the following sources:

- Cook, D. (2007) *Martyrdom in Islam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Torok, R. (2012) 'Al-Jihad Fi Sabilillah: in the heart of green birds', *Australian Counter Terrorism Conference*. Perth, Western Australia. SRI Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University, pp. 37-46.

<sup>214</sup> The Qur’ān 3:169 (Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali).

Falsehood”. More specifically, the above-mentioned expressions appear to be driven from the following verse among many others<sup>215</sup>:

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*And declare, “The truth has come and falsehood has vanished”*

وَقُلْ جَاءَ الْحَقُّ وَزَهَقَ الْبَاطِلُ

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Another Qur’anic reference can be seen in equating Rabaa hand gesture<sup>216</sup> to the “Staff of Moses” (the Prophet). As described by Al-Jazeera, the psychological force of the Rabaa sign in the eyes of “President Al-Sisi and his soldiers” is mightier on them than “the Parting of the Sea” miracle of Prophet Moses. Such expressions are adopted from the following Qur’anic verse, among many others<sup>217</sup>:

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*Then We inspired to Moses, "Strike with your staff the sea," and it parted, and each portion was like a great towering mountain*

فَأَوْحَيْنَا إِلَىٰ مُوسَىٰ أَنْ اضْرِبْ بِعَصَاكَ الْبَحْرَ فَانْفَلَقَ فَكَانَ كُلُّ فِرْقٍ كَالطَّوْدِ الْعَظِيمِ

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In another article, the members of the offshoot MB movement, Hamas, are hailed as heroes, “holding fast to the rope of their Lord” (Allah’s covenant). The description is, in fact, a borrowed Qur’anic metaphor<sup>218</sup>, enjoining the Muslims to stand united along the path of Allah, never mind the tribulations and challenges encountered (Islam Question and Answer 2020):

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*Hold fast to God’s rope all together; do not split into factions*

وَاعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا وَلَا تَفَرَّقُوا

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<sup>215</sup> The Qur’ān 17:81 (Translated by Mustafa Khattab).

<sup>216</sup> Rabaa hand gesture “شارة رابعة”: shārat Rābi’ah” is a four-finger salute used by pro-MB protesters to commemorate the alleged death of the protestors at Rabaa’s event. More on its origins can be found in following reference:

Zelinsky, N. (2013) 'What this hand gesture means for Egypt's future', *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/what-this-hand-gesture-means-for-egypts-future/279730/> (Accessed: 19th August, 2021).

<sup>217</sup> The Qur’ān 26:63 (Translated by Saheeh International).

<sup>218</sup> The Qur’ān 3:103 (Translated by Saheeh International).

Finally, pro-MB Turkey is praised in a sensationalist statement for harbouring and delivering “the free people of the world”, equating the country to the new Ark of Prophet Nūḥ<sup>219</sup>:

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*The Ark of Nūḥ (Noah), which once delivered humanity, did land in Turkey. And in the very land of Turkey, there shall land another Ark one day, delivering all the free people of the world*

*إن سفينة نوح التي نجت فيها البشرية حطت في تركيا، كما ستحط سفينة نجاه الأحرار رحالها اليوم في ذات البلد*

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The above Qur’anic references could be inspired from the following verse among many others in the Qur’ān<sup>220</sup>:

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*And ‘so` the Ark sailed with them through waves like mountains. Noah called out to his son, who stood apart, “O my dear son! Come aboard with us and do not be with the disbelievers.”*

*وَهِيَ تَجْرِي بِهِمْ فِي مَوْجٍ كَالْجِبَالِ وَنَادَى نُوحٌ ابْنَهُ وَكَانَ فِي مَعْزِلٍ يَا بُنَيَّ ارْكَبْ مَعَنَا وَلَا تَكُنْ مَعَ الْكَافِرِينَ*

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### 6.4.3.3 What is going on?

By highlighting the above cases of discursive manipulations, it seems that Al-Jazeera is caught in the act of trying to “affectively” appeal to the audience through capitalising on sacred values and sentiments associated with the Islamic and Arab identity. It also does so through tapping into the collective unconscious of the Egyptian audience whereby shared stories, memories, and experiences linked to the above-discussed ideas lie dormant, ready to be awakened from their slumber. Al-Jazeera appears to endorse the Islamists’ claim of the nativity to the Islamic and Arab world (as opposed to other non-Islamist groups and parties), stressing that they are the successors of earlier Islamic figures. The channel also resorts to the use of long-established affectionate references to the land of Egypt that have long been imprinted and hardwired into their collective memory. In other places, they call upon Qur’anic or, otherwise, traditional stories that are of specific relevance to the land of Egypt. For instance, this can be found in

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<sup>219</sup> Prophet Nūḥ “نوح” (Noah), peace be upon him, is a recognised prophet and apostle of Allāh “الله” (God), may He be glorified and exalted, in the Islamic theology and one of the most significant of all prophets. His full story can be referred to in the following source:

Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019b) 'The Story of Noah', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them)* by *Abū al-Fidā’ Imād al-Dīn Ismā‘il ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 58 – 89.

<sup>220</sup> The Qur’ān 11:42 (Translated by Saheeh International).

evoking stories playing on the Egyptians' perceptions of themselves and their nation, being both of an Islamic heritage and ancient pharaonic descent, and hence, the ways in which they are expected to act accordingly based on such perceptions. In other words, such references and resonating stories do affirm and inculcate the Egyptians' sense of national narrative, collective responsibility, and shared moral code.

This invokes what is stated by Wodak *et al.* (1999 cited in Kelsey, 2015c) about national culture being a discourse with an ability of affecting and organising the actions of people according to the ways in which they conceive themselves. They add that national cultures do indeed construct identities through the production of meanings about "the nation" to which people are believed to relate.

Such meanings are found within stories that speak about the nation and evoke memories that link its past and present. Moreover, such meanings are contained in images that are constructed of it. As stated earlier and demonstrated in the analysis, capitalising on such sentiments associated with the Islamic and Arab identity as well as the notion of origins are facilitated throughout a discursive strategy, known as "narration of the nation". As Kelsey (2015c) puts it, memories and stories of the past construct identities, including that of a nation. For instance, Egypt is constructed via ancient stories/memories hailing either from the Qur'ān, Islamic history, or the country's pharaonic legacy. What Al-Jazeera simply does in helping the audience make sense of what is going on in Egypt today is that it engages them to collectively draw on shared stories, national symbols, and historical events with which they can relate to (being of the same religious and cultural heritage). In other words, Al-Jazeera summons stories, memories, sentiments, and historical events, representing shared experiences amongst the Egyptians audience (e.g., the legacy of Egypt under Rāshidūn Caliphate, Egypt as the "Land of Kinānah", the Qur'anic story of the Prophet Moses and Pharaoh, the ancient Egyptian times, etc.) as part of its bid to immerse them on both intellectual and emotional levels. Moreover, treading on the notions of 'origins, continuity, traditions and timelessness' (Kelsey, 2015c, pp. 46 - 47) reduces the temporal distance and helps in recontextualising the experiences more effectively and in such ways that serve best the purpose of the storyteller.

As for what concerns the use of aesthetics, the intertextual use of Qur'anic verses and expressions which seem to have been manipulatively invested on by Al-Jazeera as part of the national culture narrative lends itself to aesthetic qualities on its own right due to the high rhetorical and expressive capacity of the Qur'ān.

On this note, Ahmad (2020, p. 206) explains:

*linguistic superiority, style, clarity of message, strength of argument, quality of rhetoric, and the human inability to match even its shortest chapter till the end of time grant it an exquisite uniqueness*

(Ahmad, 2020, p. 206)

Since the Qur'ān is one of the two major sources of guidance in Islam<sup>221</sup>, it is important to understand that the appeal of Islamic aesthetics overall (propagated mostly by Qur'ān and Sunnah), lies in the fact that it revolves around certain principles of belief that are central to the Muslim world. Such principles of belief concern themselves with 'the deeper, metaphysical aspects of a worldview' which 'impact one's sense of art's meaning and expressiveness in a profound manner' (Jale Nejd, 2007, p. 70). Moreover, as described by Kermani (2015), Islam can provide an exceptionally striking illustration, demonstrating a close correlation that is grounded in common origins between religious and aesthetic experiences. As for the aesthetic qualities of the Qur'ān itself, there is much more to this than meets the eye, something which seems to have been capitalised on by Al-Jazeera very well (e.g., stories and moral lessons). According to Abbas and Shoaib (2014, p. 71):

*The aesthetics of the stories of holy Quran means identification of beauty and art in its expression. The Quran is not a book of fictions, but its real stories, with religious and educational purpose, have artistically been expressed, with a rhetorical style and dynamic images that one can realize its artistic aspects in content and structure. The geometric structure of its stories makes it possible to find and study most of fiction writing elements such as character, incident, dialogue, plot, time and place in its text.*

(Abbas and Shoaib, 2014, p. 71)

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<sup>221</sup> As stated before, the Qur'ān "القرآن" along with the Sunnah "السنة" are two of the major sources of Islamic doctrinal and social views. The Qur'ān simply refers to the verbatim word of Allāh "الله" (God), may He be glorified and exalted, while the "Sunnah" refers to the sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad "محمد", peace be upon him:

Mahdi, M.S., Schimmel, A. and Rahman, F. (1999) 'Islam', in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islam> (Accessed: 20th August, 2020).

#### 6.4.4 Orienting to the psyche of both audiences

On another observation, Al-Jazeera's attempt of separating the MB from any forms of extremism or conservatism is also evident between the two Arabic and English sites (AJE and AJE). However, it appears to be more dominant across AJA's narrative as opposed to that of AJE. For instance, the MB is carefully portrayed as a "democratic movement", being suppressed by a "military regime", similar to those seen in Latin America and Eastern Europe during the times of the Cold War. This explicit comparison is believed to have a strong affective appeal among the Western audience of AJE due to them being able to relate to and remember the evils of communist dictatorships either in Latin America or Eastern Europe. In this manner, Al-Jazeera attempts at tapping into the collective memory of the Western audience for the purpose of engaging them emotionally.

As far as AJA's reporting is concerned, clear ideas and connotations adopted from Islamic teachings<sup>222</sup>, Islamic history, and Arab culture are equally visible. There is no intention to repeat them but rather demonstrate their aesthetic prominence and show how the inferences of certain linguistic elements revolving around these ideas have the power of actually changing the narrative, which is in this case, to the favour of Al-Jazeera. For instance, this can be seen in referring to Egypt in such terms that are of strong affectionate appeal among the Egyptians due to the strong Islamic, historical, and cultural significance they carry. Examples can be seen in the use of the long-established references discussed earlier such as "Arḍ al-Kinānah" (The Land of Kinānah) and "Umm al-Dunyā" (Mother of the World) for stimulating national zeal and pride. Moreover, certain religious and cultural themes and discourses are both drawn on for the purpose of stimulating the spirit of pan-Islamism/Arabism amongst the Arab audience. These can be seen in stories addressing, for instance, the notions of suffering for the sake of Allah, Islamic martyrdom, the eminent triumph of Islam, the Predestinations of Allah, conspiracy theories involving Israel, the persecution of the Palestinians, and the confrontation with the "Zionist project". Other examples can also be found in stories touching on such moral values that are sacred and prominent in the Arab and Muslim culture (e.g., chivalry, honour, dignity, and zeal for noble causes).

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<sup>222</sup> As stated before, the Qur'ān "القرآن" along with the Sunnah "السنة" are two of the major sources of Islamic doctrinal and social views. The Qur'ān simply refers to the verbatim word of Allāh "الله" (God), may He be glorified and exalted, while the "Sunnah" refers to the sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad "محمد", peace be upon him:

Mahdi, M.S., Schimmel, A. and Rahman, F. (1999) 'Islam', in *Encyclopedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islam> (Accessed: 20th August, 2020).

#### 6.4.5 Aesthetics of moral storytelling

Considering the analysis, it is evident that Al-Jazeera's portrayal of events is not only a matter of mere demonisation of one side and glorifying the other, but travelling deeper than the aforementioned aspects of propaganda by engaging in emotional, moral storytelling which is associated with certain archetypes, all of which echo the affective, moral storytelling discussed in (Kelsey, 2017b; Budd *et al.*, 2020).

For instance, Al-Jazeera, and through the narrative of the archetypal Trickster who brings about chaos and destruction (Lule, 2001), seems to have painted the removal of MB from power and the accession of the so-called "unconstitutional and immoral" government as a "moral failure" and "disgrace" that has befallen upon the Egyptian society. Such form of "scandal", according to Al-Jazeera, "bespeaks of the double standards" of Western democracies who are also said to have failed in dismissing the anti-MB establishment as a "coup".

Moreover, as far as Al-Jazeera is concerned, the removal of the MB is not only a matter of one group losing power to another but rather a profound deterioration of national and social values. Indeed, it is through such a form of affective, moral storytelling that Al-Jazeera appears to try to capitalise on the concerns and fears of the people in its own favour. This can be evident, for example, in Al-Jazeera trying to warn the Egyptians of some evils threatening the well-being of society. In other words, Al-Jazeera seems to invoke the feeling of what is known as "moral panic" amongst its readers. According to Goode (2017):

*Moral panic is an intense, heightened sense of exaggerated concern about a threat or supposed threat posed by deviants or "folk devils," a category of people who, presumably, engage in evil practices and are responsible for menacing the physical safety or the culture or way of life of society or sectors of society.*

(Goode, 2017, p. 1)

On the use of moral panic narrative, Altheide (2009 cited in Hier, 2011) explains that media tend to magnify deviance and attribute hostility towards certain targets through the fear factor:

*The major impact of the discourse of fear is to promote a sense of disorder and a belief that 'things are out of control.' Fear, crime, and victimization, and more recently, terrorism, are experienced and known vicariously through the mass media by audience members.*



*The discourse of fear has been constructed through news and popular culture accounts*

(Altheide, 2009, cited in Hier, 2011, p. 106)

Furthermore, and as seen in many places across the articles of which narratives are constructed along the lines of every mythical archetype, Al-Jazeera seems to position itself explicitly and implicitly as the moral authority and representative of the Egyptian people, let alone speaking on behalf of Islamic and Arab Ummah (nation).

According to Kelsey (2015c), morality in myth delivers a convincing dynamic that is frequently seen in storytelling as it reflects the conventions of commonly acknowledged and agreed upon cultural values, ideals, and archetypes. Moreover, it is suggested by Budd *et al.* (2020, p. 4) whilst drawing on Lule (2001) that the “moral salience” of such stories and ideals is believed to be useful in helping to ‘establish and reconfirm our own values, whilst constructing immoral or unwelcome social traits’ Budd *et al.* (2020, p. 4).

A good example of moral storytelling can be found in the case of Trickster (Lule, 2001), particularly in highlighting the malicious qualities of the aforementioned figure, which call for mockery and contempt. This can be found mostly in Al-Jazeera’s continuous bashing of the anti-MB social actors. For instance, the accession of the post-MB establishment is overly rejected as “shameless”, “disgraceful”, and “immoral”; a coup that must be resisted at all costs by true Egyptians who stand “on the right side of history”. Moreover, the killing of the pro-MB female protesters is condemned as a “traitorous” crime that defies the “teachings of religion, patriotism, and chivalry”. Al-Jazeera also describes the anti-MB social actors and the pro-government supporters, such as the liberal and secular coalitions, as “sinners up to their ears”. Moreover, it depicts them as an elite minority, out of touch with the daily concerns of the common Egyptian men or women, only lusting after lavish lifestyles. Pro-government media personnel are also chastised for “building a false media glory at the expense of principles, never mind the honour and dignity of the profession”. President Al-Sisi himself is depicted as a “Pharaoh” and assigned with a number of moral flaws and villainous attributes, such as “treachery, deviance, immorality, cuckoldry, profanity, dishonesty and slander”. In another place, Al-Jazeera takes the moral high ground in lecturing the churches in Egypt on the importance of following the suit of Christianity in the West and the efforts of Martin Luther King in enlightening and inspiring their followers to fight for civil rights and confront the racist power hierarchy.

On a final note concerning the aesthetic quality of morality, Schellekens (2007) explains that morality and aesthetics go hand in hand. As suggested by Schellekens (2007), the two concepts are not only inseparable in the practical sense but also on a theoretical level.

#### **6.4.5.1 *The power of archetypes***

As seen from the analysis, Al-Jazeera capitalises on the use of mythological archetypes as aesthetic instruments for painting the social events in Egypt in the manner that it desires. By doing so, Al-Jazeera manages to control the narrative affectively and effectively in alignment with its own agenda as it offers a representation of events through its own lens rather than simply being a mirror of what transpires in reality (Rancière and Corcoran, 2010).

It must be noted that the archetypes are undeniably powerful universal symbols in their own right. Aside from their bodiliness, communality, and their imaginal significance, their power also lies in their propensity for reprogramming the subconscious and creating human experiences that, even though symbolic, are powerfully linked to real-life aspects (Brooke, 2000; Jones, 2017). Generations upon generations, the archetypes have been continuously found and recounted within almost all stories, folklores, aphorisms, legends, myths, fables, parables, human conditions, religious teachings, maxims, sagas, and adages (Campbell, 1949; Radin, 1956; Eliade and Trask, 1958; Henderson, 1964; Guirand, 1968; Jung, 1981; Read *et al.*, 1983; Campbell, 1988b; Moore and Gillette, 1992; Hynes, 1993; Hyde, 1998; Lule, 2001; Faber and Mayer, 2009; Halverson *et al.*, 2011a; Halverson *et al.*, 2011b; McCormick and White, 2011; Barlow, 2012; Brand, 2014; Kelsey, 2015c; Barlow, 2017; Garry and El-Shamy, 2017; Kelsey, 2017b; Coman, 2018). They are already ingrained and deeply rooted in the human psyche (Jacobi, 1999). Embodying patterns of behaviour that are present through the ages, the archetypes also possess a massive emotional and moral potency that is capable of instilling a preferred way of thinking into the hearts and minds of the audience; hence, paying specific attention to the analysis of archetypes can provide researchers with interesting insights into the ways in which they work emotionally.

On this note, Kelsey (2017b) explains:

*Archetypes take on a powerful form in the ways that we tell stories to provide meaning. From the collective unconscious through to the social and cultural salience of consciousness, we can analyze the affective trajectory of archetypes as they become personally and collectively fused within popular narratives and stories of our times.*

(Kelsey, 2017b, p. 40)

To briefly highlight the affective moral qualities of the archetypes, it would be best to consider the three main archetypal categories that are heavily drawn on by Al-Jazeera in this project. These are, the Victim, the Hero, and the Trickster. As posited by Farrant (2016) whilst drawing on Jung's view of mythology in (Segal, 1987; Segal, 1998):

*The imaginaries of such tales serve a positive, life-affirming end. It is through mythological stories that we recognize and integrate ourselves. The true subjects of mythology in Jungian analysis are, therefore, the archetypes themselves: myths do not symbolize but are symbolized. In thinking about viscous culture, the relationship between the archetype and lived experience is not simplistic, causal or representative but recognizes the complex, sticky nexus of relationships between the symbolic and symbolized.*

(Farrant, 2016, p. 33)

As explained by Kelsey, the affective, moral qualities of each of these archetypes can be summarised as follows: the Victim creates emotional and personal responses pertaining to the notion of injustice and victimisation; the Hero makes people reflect on their own challenges, experiences, and journeys; the Trickster makes the audience ponder and stimulate the idea of potential change and prompt them to reflect upon those repressed, good and evil aspects in their psyche (Kelsey, 2017b, pp. 40 - 45). According to Farrant (2016, p. 176), 'the trickster equates with the collective shadow, the dark part of society's psyche that consists of feelings of guilt and fear'.

Nonetheless, for the archetypes to work effectively in delivering their affective moral promise, they have to conform to the cultural norms of the target audience. According to Phillips (2011, p. 12), the moral codes of storytelling 'are told and retold in ways that conform to the needs and the norms of the particular society in which they are being written, and they are adapted as societal norms change'. As seen from the analysis, Al-Jazeera appears to have done well in

conforming to the cultural norms and the values of the target audience and in aesthetically hacking the minds and hearts of its audience through such mythical narratives. For instance, as part of its bid to excite and immerse the Egyptian Muslim audience on both intellectual and emotional levels, Al-Jazeera is seen tapping into the minds of through revisiting/summoning memories, sentiments, and historical events, representing shared experiences, which are long ingrained in their collective psyche. An example can be seen in the ways in which the character of President Al-Sisi is discursively constructed along the lines of the archetypal figure of the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King. In this example, the president is represented as the reincarnation of the evil Pharaoh of the Exodus (the antagonist of Prophet Moses in the Qur'ān<sup>223</sup> and Judeo-Christian theology). President Al-Sisi is also portrayed as a Trickster who is worthy of mockery and contempt for allegedly “betraying his own president, and stealing a homeland, a legitimate rule, and constitutional entitlements”. As depicted by Al-Jazeera, Al-Sisi’s “obsession” with power and control, coupled with his “despotic, narcissistic, and deranged” tendencies, are said to resemble those of the evil Pharaoh in Qur'ān who is driven by insolent pride and false claim to divinity and omnipotence. Meanwhile, the alleged persecutions of former President Morsi and his fellow MB members and supporters are aligned to those of Prophet Moses and the Israelites. As such, and with the help of further Qur'anic verses and references, the latter group are not only painted as victims but also as sacrificial heroes and martyrs fighting for the welfare, honour, and dignity of their country. Moreover, the confrontations between the two campaigns are constantly aligned to the Qur'anic sacred battle between “Truth and Falsehood”<sup>224</sup>. Indeed, what seems to add more to the manipulative narratives of Al-Jazeera lies in its occasional use of Qur'anic narratives, which are already perceived as highly rhetorical and expressive on their own right, leading to a profound aesthetic experience on the part of the audience (Jale Nejd, 2007; Abbas and Shoaib, 2014; Kermani, 2015; Ahmad, 2020).

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<sup>223</sup> More on the Qur'anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses), peace be upon him, and Fir'awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) can be referred to in the following sources:

- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā' 'Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).

<sup>224</sup> The Qur'ān 17:81 (Translated by Mustafa Khattab).

## **6.5 Summary**

In this chapter, Al-Jazeera's use of archetypal storytelling was thoroughly discussed in relation to existing theories, demonstrating the ways in which they are drawn upon by the media giant for advancing its own ideologies. Whilst going over the mythical narratives of the Victim, the Hero, and the Trickster, the chapter also considered the case of the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King as a novel archetypal category, embellishing the project with an important layer of innovative insight. Thereafter, the chapter provided a discussion on the counter-narratives/complexities suppressed by Al-Jazeera, thanks to the latter's investment in manipulative mythological storytelling. Discussed as well in this chapter was the overall discursive landscape of the two sites combined. Specific attention was paid to the aesthetic role of mythology, which is perhaps an under-researched concept, that is of key relevance to the project.

## Chapter 7. Conclusion

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a brief summary of the project at hand with its key findings. Among the aspects to be discussed as well are the contributions, limitations, and implications of the study coupled with suggestions for further research. Finally, the chapter will finish by offering concluding remarks.

### 7.2 Summary of the study

Drawing on DMA framework<sup>225</sup> (Kelsey, 2015) to the analysis of mythology in news discourse, the project at hand was carried out to explore the representation of the MB versus their opponents between the Arabic and English online news articles of Al-Jazeera. In conducting this research, a corpus of straight news reports and opinion articles covering the period between the ousting of Mohammed Morsi (Muḥammad Mursī) on 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, 2013 until end of 2014, was collected downsized, and analysed. In an attempt to make sense of the overall thematic and discursive evaluations, minimise the large amount of data, and most importantly, assist the critical discourse investigation to better identify potential places of mythological storytelling, two supplementary approaches were deemed essential prerequisites to the DMA application: Thematic analysis and manual analysis.

The first supplementary approach was conducted for the purpose of categorising and exploring themes of interest pertaining to the overall positive and negative evaluations of social actors and events. In conducting thematic analysis, the research made use of the most widely cited framework by Braun and Clarke (2006). Building on the findings of the aforesaid approach, whilst guided by the theories of archetypes, as adopted and further outlined by Lule (2001), the second supplementary approach was then improvised with the intention of exploring potential areas of mythological mechanisms across the data. Such a technique made it more feasible for the subsequent DMA framework to quickly identify mythological patterns across the sample before zooming in for fine-grained critical discourse analysis. Articles demonstrating mythological evidence were afterwards singled out and inspected.

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<sup>225</sup> Discourse-mythological approach.

The discourse-mythological analysis entailed the news stories undergoing two levels of analysis: micro and macro. During the micro-stage, attention was paid to the overall language use. The micro-discourse investigation was driven by “what” and “how” the expressions of mythology and archetypal storytelling were linguistically constructed. Moving on to the next macro-discourse analysis stage, the linguistic findings (the text) were then inspected in relation to social, political, and cultural aspects surrounding their production, distribution, and consumption. The idea was to explore how the contextual, macro-aspects of discourse were reflected and reproduced in language and how the latter was shaped/informed by such aspects. This was particularly important in the hope of acquiring a bigger picture of the overall construction and nuances of mythology and learning more about the “who, what, and why” of discourse. Finally, Al-Jazeera’s selections of archetypal categories and other aspects of mythology (e.g., aesthetics) were discussed in relation to existing theories to further understand how mythology appears to function as a vehicle for ideology. The counter-narratives and complexities which are believed to have been suppressed by Al-Jazeera were also addressed as a means of exposing the manipulative nature of mythological storytelling.

### **7.3 Summary of the main findings**

Overall, Al-Jazeera appears to be more inclined towards attacking the anti-MB social actors than defending the MB and their allies across the two sites. Interestingly, such a case appears to be more evident across the Arabic data as opposed to the English ones and even more prevalent among the opinion articles than it is the case with the straight news reports.

#### **7.3.1 Thematic and manual analysis**

Probing the thematic analysis utilised, it is evident that themes revolving around the positive and negative portrayals of social actors and events tend to be more concentrated across the Arabic articles, as opposed to English ones. Similarly, themes appear to be more dominant and clustered around the opinion articles than they are with straight news reports.

The findings of manual analysis, meanwhile, appear to back up those of thematic analysis, demonstrating a heavier emphasis being placed on the negative evaluations than the positive ones. Mythology-wise, the manual analysis shows that the most dominant archetypal category being frequently drawn on by Al-Jazeera to the negative portrayals of the anti-MB establishment and its key social actors is that of the Trickster. The second most recurrent one is that of the Victim, followed by the Hero archetype. Unlike the Trickster narrative, the last

two figures appear to be used to the positive representations of the MB and their allies. Thanks to the application of manual analysis, allowing some room for an inductive search of archetypes, two more archetypal figures thankfully emerged. These are the Pharaoh and the Tyrant King archetypes<sup>226</sup>.

### 7.3.2 Discourse-mythological analysis

The foregoing archetypes were later subjected to critical discourse investigation as a means of deconstructing their mythical attributes and learning more about their ideological roles.

Starting with the Victim archetype, such a figure appears to be generally constructed around two important notions, tragedy and sacrifice (Lule, 2001). Whilst all the represented cases of “killings”, “persecutions” and “victim-blaming” of the MB and pro-MB protestors, as suggested by Al-Jazeera, are portrayed as unquestionably tragic, the second concept of sacrifice, however, seems to dominate the narrative, particularly, in the following articles: *OPE-V*, *STA-V*, *STE-V*, and *OPA-A*. Generally, the Victim is known to comfort, console, and explain life in the face of death (Eliade and Trask, 1958; Henderson, 1964; Read *et al.*, 1983; Faber and Mayer, 2009; McCormick and White, 2011; Barlow, 2017; Coman, 2018). As explained by Kelsey (2017a), the affective power of the Victim lies in the fact that it creates emotional and personal responses pertaining to the notions of injustice and victimisation.

Discussed afterwards was the Hero archetype which is exclusively projected on the personas and images of the following social actors: former President Morsi, the MB, Hamas, the pro-MB protestors, and pro-MB Turkey. Overall, Al-Jazeera seems to have drawn on different forms and conventions of the Hero narratives, as seen in the following articles: *OPA-H*, *OPE-H*, *STA-H*, *STE-H*, and *OPA-T*. Each of the aforementioned articles, to a variable degree, places great emphasis on the qualities of courage, struggle, and defiance, on the part of the social actors. Moreover, extra attention is paid to the Hero upholding social values and ideals, which are, in this case, inspired from the Arab and Muslim societies (Campbell, 1949b; Campbell, 1949a; Lule, 2001). Nonetheless, article *OPA-H* appears to be the one that captures a fair amount of the Monomyth components. As far as the affective dimension of the Hero is concerned, Kelsey (2017a) explains that heroic narratives enable people to ponder upon their own challenges, experiences, and journeys.

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<sup>226</sup> These two are now merged into one archetypal category: The Tyrant (Pharaoh) King.



Next, the archetypal traits of the Trickster are found within each of the following articles: *OPA-T*, *OPE-T*, *STA-T*, *STE-T*, and *OPA-V*. Looking at these stories, there appear to be two overall generic traits in which this figure can be identified. The first one can be seen in the Trickster coming across as sly and unpredictable, whilst the second image represents the figure as a “crude” and as one who is worthy of mockery and contempt (Moore and Gillette, 1992; Hyde, 1998; Lule, 2001). Examples of such qualities can be found in Al-Jazeera’s negative portrayals of President Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi (e.g., representing him as a fraudulent scammer at some places and a vile psychopath at some others). Overall, the affective, moral qualities of the Trickster can be explained in its propensity for prompting the audience to ponder upon such repressed good or evil traits within themselves whilst relating to those of other individuals (Kelsey, 2017b, pp. 40 - 45). According to Farrant (2016, p. 176) ‘the trickster equates with the collective shadow, the dark part of society’s psyche that consists of feelings of guilt and fear’.

Finally, the new archetypal figure of the Tyrant (Pharaoh) King is found in the following articles: *OPA-A*, *OPA-B*, *OPA-C*, and *OPA-V*. The preceding figure is, in fact, comprised of two categories: The Pharaoh and the Tyrant King. However, they are merged into one category due to both being of similar qualities. As seen from the analysis, the two images are exclusively drawn on in the demonisation of President Al-Sisi, who is discursively constructed as the reincarnation of the evil Pharaoh of the Exodus (the antagonist of Prophet Moses in the Qur’ān<sup>227</sup> and Judeo-Christian theology). Accordingly, Al-Sisi’s is portrayed as a tyrannical and deranged despot whose “obsession” with power and control is akin to that of the evil Pharaoh who is driven by insolent pride and false claim to divinity and omnipotence. The Pharaoh figure is well-recognised and acknowledged amongst the Muslims as a symbol of autocracy, human arrogance, stubbornness, and evil (Sherif, 1985; Firestone, 2004; Halverson *et al.*, 2011a). The Tyrant figure, meanwhile, seems to be drawn on by Al-Jazeera for depicting Al-Sisi as a king who is narcissist, ruthless, merciless, and driven by his own greed (Read *et al.*, 1983; Moore and Gillette, 1992; Garry and El-Shamy, 2017).

As far what it concerns the overall mythological discourse of Al-Jazeera, the two sites appear to agree with one another on the need of legitimising the MB, on the one hand, and delegitimising their opponents on the other. Moreover, the channel across the two sites tends to

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<sup>227</sup> More on the Qur’anic story of Mūsā “موسى” (Moses), peace be upon him, and Fir‘awn “فرعون” (Pharaoh) can be referred to in the following sources:

- Ibn Kathīr, I. (2019a) 'The Story of Moses (Musa)', in Azami, R.A. (ed.) *Stories of the prophets (Peace be upon them) by Abū al-Fidā' Imād al-Dīn Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī*. Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, pp. 318 - 452.
- BBC Religions (2009) *Musa - the Muslim view of Moses* [Web page]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/musa.shtml> (Accessed: 16th August, 2021).

centre its overall narrative on common themes revolving around the concepts of “suffering”, “tragedy”, “betrayal”, “moral bankruptcy”, “deception”, “bravery”, “hope”, etc. Nonetheless, each site seems to have decided to paint the unfolding of events in its own style.

For instance, Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA) seems to have done so in such a manner that appeals and resonates with the Arab and Muslim psyche. This can be seen, for instance, in framing the events around the notions of Islamic and Arab unity (pan-Islamist and Arabist sentiments) as well as moral values that are prominent in the Arab and Muslim world (e.g., chivalry, honour, dignity, and zeal for noble causes). On this note, the channel tends to occasionally play on the aforesaid sentiments through stirring up conspiracy theories involving Israel and the “persecution of the Palestinians”. Moreover, AJA stirs up national pride and zeal amongst the Egyptian audience, being of Islamic heritage and ancient pharaonic descent, through the use of affectionate expressions and resonating stories affirming and inculcating their sense of national narrative, collective responsibility, and shared moral code, all for the purpose of mobilising the sentiments in line with its own agendas. AJA also draws on the use of Qur’ān and Arabic literature for the purpose of bestowing a rhetorically aesthetic touch on its own narrative. Furthermore, AJA tries to draw on the notions of faith and conviction whilst attempting to rationalise and explain the unfolding of events in Egypt.

Orienting to the psyche of the Western and non-Arabic speaking audiences, Al-Jazeera English (AJE), meanwhile, appears to frame the social events in relation to principles and stories revolving around human rights, the fight for freedom and democracy, and the pain and groaning under the yoke of despotism. In doing so, the MB is carefully portrayed as a “democratic and inclusive movement”, being repressed by an “unconstitutional and immoral coup”, similar to the ones history had witnessed in Latin America and Eastern Europe during the times of the Cold War.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that Al-Jazeera’s portrayal of events is not only a matter of mere demonisation of one side and glorification of the other but travels deeper than the above-stated aspects of propaganda by engaging in emotional, moral storytelling. For instance, Al-Jazeera, across the two sites, resorts to the use of “moral panic” and capitalises on the notion of fear to its own favour. For example, Al-Jazeera forewarns the Egyptians against the sort of evils threatening the well-being of their society should President Al-Sisi, for instance, stay longer in power (Altheide, 2009; Hier, 2011; Goode, 2017).

## 7.4 Contributions of the study

### 7.4.1 Contributions to knowledge

As stated in Chapter 2, sections 2.7.1.1 and 2.7.2.1, approaching the study of news through the lens of mythology, storytelling, and narratives has mostly been restricted to the monolingual news discourse. Accordingly, to the best of my knowledge, no other scholar has, thus far, attempted to address such phenomena as it occurs in Arabic language. Therefore, this study is hoped to be the first of its kind to provide insights into the potential implication of mythological analysis, not only in the context of bilingual news discourse but also in the Arabic language in general.

Moreover, as also stated in sections 2.7.1.1 and 2.7.2.1, the interest in conducting a CDA research for the purpose of comparing the two sites of Al-Jazeera has been oddly under-researched. The only two CDA projects so far that sought to identify the similarities and differences between the two different language sites in relation to what they cover are those of Abdulmajid and Herring (2008) and Eid (2017). Nonetheless, neither of the two focused on the topic of Islamists. For instance, the study by Abdulmajid and Herring (2008) did not maintain any topical focus while the latter exclusively considered the case of “immigration”. Hence, the research at hand takes yet another novel point of departure by not only considering the specific case of the MB and their opponents but also how the discussion of each is mythologically and discursively constructed between the specific case of Arabic and English websites of Al-Jazeera.

Furthermore, thanks to the pre-DMA manual analysis stage, which allowed some room for an inductive search of new mythological patterns, two archetypes were thankfully identified, offering yet another layer of contribution. The first one is known as the Pharaoh archetype (Ibn Kathīr, 1997; Firestone, 2004; Halverson *et al.*, 2011a; Halverson *et al.*, 2011b), and the second is known as Tyrant King (Moore and Gillette, 1992).

To the best of my knowledge, there does not seem to be any research thus far that seems to have applied the Qur’anic narrative of the Pharaoh<sup>228</sup> to the mythological analysis of Arabic news discourse, nor can it be found in any kind of news-related literature, be it Arabic, Islamic, or otherwise. Likewise, Tyrant King, although a well-known archetype that is outlined by Moore

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<sup>228</sup> One of the major master narratives in the Qur’ān: Halverson, J., Corman, S. and Goodall, H.L. (2011b) 'The Pharaoh', in Halverson, J., Corman, S. and Goodall, H.L. (eds.) *Master narratives of Islamist extremism*. New York: Springer, pp. 28 - 36.

and Gillette (1992) and found in other studies, its application to date has not extended to the context of Arabic news discourse.

Finally, and as briefly stated in the introduction of this chapter and extensively discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.2.5, approaching the aesthetic role of mythology appears to be largely absent in journalism studies (Postema and Deuze, 2020). Hence, I could argue that there is a possibility of finding zero instances of empirical work in which aesthetics is drawn on in contexts similar to that of my own project. In other words, the discussion of aesthetics in this research may push the boundary for more novel investigations, particularly in the context of Arabic news discourse and cross-linguistic CDA.

## **7.4.2 Methodological contribution**

### ***7.4.2.1 Working with a new dataset***

The present research is believed to be the first one of its kind to have collected, translated, and dealt with a huge corpus of Arabic and English news stories, comprising of straight news reports and opinion articles, covering the period between 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2013 and 31<sup>st</sup> of December, 2014. To the best of my knowledge, there has never been a single empirical investigation thus far in which the online representation of the MB and their opponents are explored between the Arabic and English articles of Al-Jazeera. Moreover, the choice of news genres and the timeframe of events are of equal originality and novelty.

### ***7.4.2.2 Improvising a new approach***

The present research is believed to be the only one by far to have improvised manual analysis as a new inductive technique supplementing the subsequent critical discourse investigation of mythological storytelling. As extensively discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.4.2.2, conducting thematic analysis was not enough on its own in informing the DMA framework as to the potential places of mythological patterns and attributes across the data. Hence, there was a need for producing another supplementary tool building on the findings of the previous method, and most importantly, adding more meaning to them mythologically. In other words, conducting manual analysis was quite useful in pinpointing the probable whereabouts of mythology across the data that would be worthy of investigation.

### **7.4.2.3 Incorporating new strategies**

As discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.4.2.3 and extensively in Chapter 4, section 4.3, the study incorporated new strategies into the DMA toolkit. One strategy I adopted from the DHA's framework is "perspectivisation", which was essential in revealing more about the authors' personal views and biases. The second one is "speech acts", drawn from the theories and taxonomies outlined by Austin (1975) and Searle (1975). Such strategy comes into play as a substitute for "modality" where the latter device is not found. I also expanded a bit more on DMA's *predicational strategy* to include further rhetorical devices befitting the analysis of the Arabic news articles (which can be highly rhetorical and expressive).

## **7.5 Limitations of the study**

Perhaps one of the biggest limitations of this research is to do with the dataset collected being extremely large. This, in turn, resulted in the sample itself being similarly large as it had to be representative and proportionate in size, relative to the data from which it was taken. The reason I ended up compiling such a huge amount of news stories and opinion pieces is to do with my original aim to cover as many social events as possible that could be worthy of investigation.

An additional problem encountered was the laborious and longwinded process of having to manually download such a large quantity of news articles one at a time and right straight from the websites. Thanks to the somewhat complicated search logic coupled with the slow loading of pages, compiling the articles took me nearly a year to complete. Other online databases were not of great help due to many of them failing at times to include all news stories being published by Al-Jazeera. Therefore, everything had to be collected manually to ensure nothing is left behind, notwithstanding the inconvenience of the search process.

Moreover, I also encountered a difficulty associated with using the qualitative data analysis software package, *Nvivo 12*. The programme, unfortunately, had a habit of not displaying the right margins properly when attempting to work with Arabic scripts. However, this was not much of a major issue in the latest version of the software, as I was able to read, code, and analyse to a reasonable degree. On occasions where reading through the scripts was deemed challenging, I would simply read such scripts on a *MS Word*, running besides *Nvivo 12*. The unclear text under examination was simply copied from *Nvivo 12* into the *MS Word* document. Afterwards, I would read and highlight through the document more clearly.

Thereafter, I would use the very document as a guide to model on and repeat this time on *Nvivo 12*, whereby other sophisticated coding actions were taken.

## 7.6 Implications and suggestions for future research

The research at hand on Al-Jazeera's mythological narratives paves the way for more avenues and implications to be explored, whether in media, politics, or psychology. For instance, in politics, particularly that of the Middle East, the research may provide insights into how certain Arab media giants engage in manipulative practices, such as manufacturing consent, psychological warfare, population control, human hacking, etc. On this note, what this project tries to generally get across is how the intangible acts of mythological storytelling can have the affective and artistic propensity for influencing the tangible. This can be seen, for example, in Al-Jazeera hacking the minds of the masses and penetrating their psyche through emotional narratives and resonating stories as a means of mobilising the public opinion towards taking certain courses of action. Hence, the study may have the implication of cautioning governments and people of authority concerning the risks and dangers of the tabloidisation and sensationalisation of news discourse in the Arab world as some may result in undesirable acts of violence and disorder. The research may also help in prompting decision-makers and scholars to join forces in confronting such forms of mind manipulations. A possible implication of this research is that it may lend itself to the use of academics, policymakers, and decision-makers who are keen on rectifying the sensationalist practices of the media. For instance, the project may be treated as part of training and mentoring programmes designed to help media practitioners develop and ascertain a higher level of professionalism.

In another implication, I believe the project at hand may stimulate the search and dig for more undiscovered mythological narratives that are specific and peculiar to the Arab and Muslim culture. These would not only contribute to the studies of comparative world mythologies at large but also in revealing the ways in which such archetypes tend to be drawn on and incorporated by the media into constructing their own narratives. For instance, researchers may wish to explore how some of the master narratives found within the Sunnī versus Shī'a<sup>229</sup> sectarian discourses are frequently summoned and brought into play by regional religious media for solidifying, advancing, and advocating geopolitical positions. An example can be seen in

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<sup>229</sup> al-Madthab al-shī'ī "المذهب الشيعي" (Shi'a practice) and al-Madthab al-Sunnī "المذهب السني" (Sunnī practice) are the two major denominations of Islam. Although both agree on most of the fundamentals of Islam, the divisions between the two are the result of historical events, ideological heritage, and issues of leadership.

the case of the pro-Hezbollah<sup>230</sup> mouthpiece, *Al-Manar* (al-Manār: المنار)<sup>231</sup>, which stands accused of promoting radical and transnational agendas (Jorisch, 2004). Based on personal observations, some of the ancient mythological narratives (Halverson *et al.*, 2011a) which tend to be frequently invoked by the aforementioned broadcaster revolve mostly around the *Battle of Karbala* (Ma‘rakat Karbalā’: معركة كربلاء)<sup>232</sup> and the tale of *Al-Mahdi, The Awaited One* (al-Mahdī al-Muntadhar: المهدي المنتظر)<sup>233</sup>. Hinging on stirring up ancient grievances and dramatised victimhood, deep-rooted into the cultural imaginary and collective memory of the Shī‘a audience, the two narratives are capable of reviving and inflaming serious anti-Sunnī sentiments. A similar case from the sectarian Sunnī side is the controversial television network, *Al-Wesal* (الوصال: al-Wisāl)<sup>234</sup>. Leveraging on the accounts of the past (albeit may have been fraught with complexities) to sensationally explain the present, the broadcaster tends to weaponise history to stimulate sectarian attitudes against the Shī‘a. In doing so, a number of accounts and stories may have been called upon and used irresponsibly in the demonisation process. An example of such narratives (Halverson *et al.*, 2011a; Hayes, 2020) may be found in the tale of the *Abdullah ibn Saba’* (‘Abd Allāh ibn Saba’: عبد الله بن سبأ)<sup>235</sup>.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that this study not only aspires to provide insights into the discursive mythological narratives of Al-Jazeera but also seeks to contribute to the overall understanding of political Islam as one of the major and highly complex challenges confronting the world today, including the Arab nations. An example of such challenges can be evident in

<sup>230</sup> Hizb Allāh “حزب الله” (Party of God) is a Lebanese Shi‘a Islamist political, military, and social organisation, wielding considerable power:

Britannica (1998b) 'Hezbollah', in The Editors of Encyclopaedia (ed.) *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/al-Asha> (Accessed: 21st September, 2021).

<sup>231</sup> Al-Manar television channel:

Al-Manar Television Channel (no date) [Website]. Available at: <https://www.almanar.com.lb/> (Accessed: 19th August, 2021).

<sup>232</sup> A centuries-old, albeit ever-present “tragedy” in the hearts and minds of the Muslims, mostly the Shī‘a. The Battle of Karbala marks the death of the grandson of Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) and the much-revered martyr by the Shī‘a, Al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alīy (الحسين بن علي):

Hasanov, B. and Shirinov, A. (2017) 'Suffering for the sake of cosmic order: Twelver Shī‘ah Islam’s coping with trauma', *Ilahiyat Studies: A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies*, 8(1), pp. 65-93.

<sup>233</sup> According to the Shī‘a sources, Al-Mahdī is an eschatological redeemer of Islam and the ultimate saviour of humankind. He is the Twelver of the twelve divinely ordained successors to the Prophet, known as “The Twelve Imams” (al-A‘immah al-Ithnā ‘Ashar: الأئمة الاثنا عشر):

Fazlhashemi, M. (2021) 'Imāmiyya Shī‘a (The Twelvers)', in Upal, M.A. and Cusack, C.M. (eds.) *Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements*. Boston: Brill, pp. 181-202.

<sup>234</sup> Al-Wesal television channel:

Al Wesal Television Channel (no date) [Website]. Available at: <http://tvwesal.com/> (Accessed: 12th August, 2021).

<sup>235</sup> According to Sunnī sources, Ibn Saba’ is a Yemenite Jew who is said to have embraced Islam in the 7th century, albeit with ill and insincere intent (i.e., setting out to divide Islam from within). Aside from standing accused of heresy and hypocrisy, Ibn Saba’ is regarded as the enigmatic founder of Shī‘a creed:

Anthony, S. (2012) *The caliph and the heretic: Ibn Saba’ and the origins of Shī‘ism*. Leiden: Brill.

Al-Jazeera's support of the MB, being a major constituent of one of the most topical subjects in world politics today: the diplomatic crisis of Qatar.

As for what concerns the suggestions for future research, a novel direction, in my view, can be one whereby a researcher may wish to go beyond the comparative analysis of bilingual news discourse. In other words, researchers may also consider looking into the sort of mythological patterns/attributes manifesting in multilingual contexts. Moreover, with Arabic language and culture already not gaining the attention of enough scholarship with specific interests in the cross-linguistic comparisons of mythological storytelling across the bilingual news discourse (if anything all), Arab researchers may also wish to consider the greater originality in conducting cross-linguistic comparisons between the archetypal narratives produced by multilingual news providers or otherwise those of different monolingual news outlets, belonging to different news providers. Of course, the bigger the cultural divide between the two or more languages being set against each other for cross-linguistic investigation, the more interesting archetypal findings are likely to emerge, and the more manipulative, inconsistent, and (linguistically) marked the patterns are likely to be exposed in relation mythological storytelling. In doing so, as stated before, researchers should not feel restricted to investigating bilingual or multilingual news services per se, but can definitely, consider the case of various monolingual broadcasters and compare the coverages of each against one another.

Another important aspect to point out when attempting to explore the archetypal storytelling practices of news in monolingual, bilingual, or multilingual contexts is to consider the other types of news media, such as print and broadcast media. Researchers may also wish to consider the potential applications of multimodality and what it can bring to the table in analysing other meaning-making elements (e.g., images, videos, etc.) which feeds into the bigger construction of mythology.

Researchers may wish to focus on the cases of bilingual/multilingual tabloids and yellow news outlets of which publications come in different languages. Owing to their sensationalist tendencies, such types of news media would make an interesting case for discourse-mythological analysis.

Last but not least, researchers may also want to explore the notion of audience participation as it takes place on the latest generations of participative and semantic Web (e.g., Web 3.0 and



beyond)<sup>236</sup>. Much of the work conducted on exploring mythological practices of online news seems to have neglected the role of the audience and how they themselves also draw on archetypal patterns as a means of making sense of the sort of content being fed to them. Hence, the “comment section”, for instance, whereby the audience is given a chance to engage and interact with what they read, watch, or listen can definitely provide interesting sights into the ways in which they appear to resort to the same or otherwise different choices of archetypal narratives whilst attempting to understand and rationalise the outside world.

## 7.7 Concluding remarks

At the end of this project, I believe it is safe to suggest that everything appears to be pointing to one issue. It is no longer important what is or what one knows, nor the evidence one possesses, nor how much credibility one has. What matters most is that whoever does a better job at controlling the narrative shall have the upper hand. The representation becomes more important than what is actually being presented. Truth becomes created rather than existing.

This is where the power of mythological storytelling comes into play as a vehicle for ideology; a mythology is summoned aesthetically through such narrational patterns, which are deeply imprinted and hardwired into the collective psyche. What happens then is that the truth becomes distorted through the use of preferences, exaggerations, and simplifications. Ideas and meanings are also mixed up and manipulated. Complexities and nuances are blurred, and opposing accounts are demeaned or suppressed (Barthes, 1972; Lule, 2001; Kelsey, 2015c; Kelsey, 2017b).

Moreover, Van Krieken and Sanders (2017, p. 1364) conclude that such a form of narrative journalism (as seen in the case of Al-Jazeera) is considered as ‘the highest achievable goal for journalists’ and a practice that is fraught with risks and dangers, as it encourages journalists to desert principles of factuality and objectivity, something which in the end, erodes them of credibility and authority. As narrative journalism is also known to be a form of literary journalism (Greenberg and Wheelwright, 2014a; Hartsock, 2016; Joseph, 2016; Van Krieken and Sanders, 2017), journalists can be expected to construct aesthetic experiences (Hartsock, 2016) and capitalise on the power of emotions produced through affective storytelling, not only

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<sup>236</sup> While Web 2.0 refers to websites (including those of news) that support user-generated content, ease of use, participatory culture, and interoperability for end users, Web 3.0 extends to the semantic web concept by using artificial intelligence. More on this can be referred to in the following source:

Bellatreche, L., Goyal, V., Fujita, H., Mondal, A. and Reddy, P.K. (2020) *Big Data Analytics: 8th International Conference, BDA 2020, Sonapat, India, December 15-18, 2020, Proceedings*. Cham: Springer Nature.

for sheer entertainment but also for informing, convincing, or even spurring audiences into taking certain courses of action (e.g., agent provocateur) which hopefully are ‘in the best scenarios with desirable social outcomes’ (McQueen, 2020, p. 30).

The project places these ideas into the more specific perspective of language, involving literary language that functions aesthetically as an expression of affective mythology. According to Ahmadian (2020), who calls on the ideas of Roland Barthes (Barthes, 1970), one of the key icons in studies of mythology, semiotics, aesthetics, and linguistics, and whose ideas are central to the DMA framework (Barthes, 1972):

*Words, especially aesthetically arranged words which appeal to human emotions, feelings, sentiments, tastes, subjective perceptions, and the deep instinct of beauty (such as poetry), have had the power to fill the souls of masses with a personal vision that they could have imagined was their own.*

(Ahmadian, 2020, p. 34)

Al-Jazeera is a strong example, demonstrating much of what is discussed above and seen in the analysis. Indeed, it is through such forms of aesthetics and affective mythological storytelling that the representation of reality is cleverly crafted to a more manipulative and distorting level. This, in turn, and as stated before, results in complexities being suppressed, realities distorted, emotions mobilised, causes exploited, and sensitivities abused, to the point that men are of the firm belief that they belong to a worthy cause but are nothing more than mere pawns in precisely opposing what they valued without even being aware of and even dying for.

## **7.8 Short reflections on my journey**

Conducting this research has by no means been an easy experience, for the journey was definitely the most challenging one I have ever embarked on by far. Completing this project was, indeed, a major feat that could have never been accomplished were it not for the constant guidance and support of my supervisory team and the prayer, love, and care of my family and friends. In spite of the many obstacles encountered along the way, and recently, the COVID-19 outbreak, I have thankfully been able to pull through and not lose sight of my aim, which was completing this work in the best possible manner. Despite the pain and struggles, this journey has been the most rewarding and worthwhile in my life, which I cannot ever forget. It must also be mentioned that during my studies at Newcastle University, I was privileged to have acquired a number of important research skills and expertise. Specifically, throughout the first two years

of my study, I completed a wide range of 200-credit modules, which helped greatly in expanding my theoretical and methodological skill set. I partook in organising academic events, taught seminars, attended workshops, and presented at conferences. I even had one of my papers published in a reputable journal, annually published by the school. As far as my research is concerned, suffice it to say that I have humbly tried to conduct a thesis that is hopefully going to be interesting, of novel appeal, and most importantly, worthy of Newcastle University's name.

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## Appendices

### Appendix A. The Arabic and English news scripts of Al-Jazeera

#### Script 1 (OPA-V)

##### الطريق إلى المذبحة

##### *The road to the carnage*

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

حسام شاكر

2013/8/16

بدا مفاجئاً في حضرة مجازر مصر أن ينهمك متحدثون في تفسير السفك المذهل للدماء البريئة، بتشديد النكير على "أداء الإخوان" وتحميل المعتصمين المسؤولية عن المقتلة العظيمة. هو مذهب "لوم الضحية" الذي ظلّ نهجاً مفضلاً عبر التاريخ لتبرير الفظائع، بتحميل من تستهدفهم الانتهاكات المسؤولية عن المظالم التي تسومهم سوء العذاب.

فلعل بعض ما يجري في أرض الكنانة يستعيد تجربة السلطات اليمنية مع "ساحات التغيير"، التي ظلت مفتوحة على هجمات دامية وأعمال قنص، فجعت آلاف البيوت اليمنية بصفوة من أبنائها وبناتها على مدى شهور.

هي التجربة السورية ذاتها التي تنتصب مثلاً على ارتفاع منسوب الوحشية باطراد. ذلك أنّ شعور الأنظمة بالتهديد يجعلها تكشف عن أنيابها وتمارس فعل الاقتراس.

كتشف القتلة أنّ أشقّ عملية تصفية جسدية هي الأولى، ثمّ يسهل سفك الدماء وإزهاق الأرواح، ويحوّل الضحايا بمضي الوقت إلى مجرد أعداد، وقد يترك القاتل هوابة عدّهم بعد أن يسأمها.

حتى قبل أن يسقط أوائل الضحايا بعد الانقلاب العسكري، كان يمكن استشراف المذبحة الهائلة على النيل منذ وقت مبكر. كان يكفي مثلاً تحليل فيض الشتائم والنعوت، التي تم إغداقها على جماهير مصرية اختارت التعبير عن موقفها بشكل سلمي في الميادين رفضاً للانقلاب العسكري على الديمقراطية.

فمن يتم وصفهم بالديدان أو نعتهم بالجرانيم أو تشبيههم بحيوانات الحظيرة، وهو ما تحفل به في الواقع حمى التشنج اللفظي الداعم للانقلاب في مصر.

هي ممارسة مألوفة في الشرق والغرب، وقد اقترفتها إدارة بوش مع معتقلي غوانتانامو مثلاً، عندما اشتقت سابقة في استثنائهم من التعريفات المعتمدة، وهو ما كان مقدمة لحرمانهم من حقوق الإنسان والمعايير المكفولة لأسرى الحرب أو السجناء السياسيين أو حتى عتاة الجريمة، بل تم نفيهم خارج الجغرافيا، في قاعدة مقطعة من كوبا، كي لا تسري عليهم القوانين الأميركية ذاتها.

"كان مفاجئاً أن يتجرأ متحدثون في مننديات عامة مصرية، على وصف شركاء الوطن بمفردات غير إنسانية، من القسط القول إن تلك لم تكن شنائم مجردة، بل سيقت تسويغاً لفعل الفتك الآتي بالجمهير"

فمن تساقطوا في الميادين بالمئات هم في أول الأمر وآخره مصريون، فيهم الشاب والشابة، الأب والأم، العالم والطبيب، العامل والموظف، الغني والفقير. ومع ذلك فقد تم حجب هؤلاء عن الجمهور والعالم تحاشياً لخطر تماثل المجتمع مع ذاته، ومنعا لتعاطف الشعب مع آلامه، أو تضامن الضمير الإنساني مع قضية حق وحرية.

إنه فعل التخدير الموضعي الذي يسبق البتر، وهو عندما يستهدف تياراً مركزياً في المجتمع، حاضراً في المدن والقرى والنجوع في أرجاء مصر، وفي شتى الشرائح عموماً، فإن الاستئصال المنشود سيعني الإجهاز على المجتمع لصالح دولة متغولة تديرها طبقة العسكر والنخب التي تحظى بامتيازات السلطة.

حسام شاكر

باحث ومؤلف واستشاري إعلامي، متخصص في الشؤون الأوروبية

### [Translation]

**Husam Shakir**

**16/8/2013**

*It is shocking to see the coup that stands accused of committing massacres and shedding innocent blood is now trying to lay the blame on the MB and their supporters for the great killings that befell upon them. It is equally appalling that the coup supporters are also trying to exercise "victim-blaming" to justify their atrocities and subjugations against the MB and their supporters, afflicting them with the worst of torments.*

*What recently happened in the Land of Kinānah (Egypt) is reminiscent of the bloody confrontation between the security forces and the protesters in Yemen. The latter group are said to have been 'gruesomely shot by snipers. The incident has rendered thousands of families grief-stricken for months over the loss of their finest sons and daughters.*

*The killers may find liquidating people difficult at first. Nevertheless, it becomes easier as time progresses. Victims become nothing but mere numbers. The killing becomes a hobby, which the killer may no longer enjoy.*

*The colossal carnage on the Nile has been greatly anticipated. Have not the signs been clear enough from the early beginnings that the massacre was surely about to happen sooner or later? The barrage of inhuman labels and the feverish verbal assaults aimed at the masses, as in calling them “worms”, “germs”, and “animals”, had been done to justify their subsequent killings.*

*Such practices (e.g., victim-blaming) were once endorsed by the Bush administration when dealing with Guantanamo detainees. The latter were stripped of their own human attributes in a bid to have them deprived of their human rights and legal entitlements. The prisoners ended up being expelled to such a place in Cuba, far beyond the known geographical boundaries.*

*Those who fell in the squares by the hundreds” are ultimately Egyptians. Those include the young man and woman, the father and mother, the scientist and doctor, the worker and employee, the rich and poor.*

*The media tries to set up more traps for the purpose of obstructing any public attention being paid to the tragedy. It tries to sway the public opinion into embracing the government’s narrative and avert any chances of sympathy being paid to the victims by means of administering emotional restraint.*

***Husam Shakir***

***Researcher, author, and media consultant, specialising in sociology and European affairs***

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## Script 2 (OPE-V)

### *My brother was killed at Rabaa*

(An English opinion piece)

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*Ahmed Bedier is an Egyptian-American social entrepreneur, non-profit CEO, radio show host, human rights and democracy advocate and television commentator.*

**14 Aug 2014**

*One year ago today, on August 14, 2013, my younger brother Amir Bedier was murdered on the streets of Cairo in one of the largest single-day killings of demonstrators in modern history, the Rabaa massacre. I was in Egypt at the time and the aftermath I witnessed has forever changed me.*

*My family and I travelled to Egypt last August to celebrate the Eid holiday marking the end of Ramadan and to attend my other brother's wedding. What started out as a great family vacation and reunion ended as a nightmare of death and mourning.*

#### ***A revolution betrayed***

*My brother joined the call to protest police brutality in Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011, which coincided with National Police Day - a national holiday instituted by Hosni Mubarak to commemorate Egypt's security forces. Like the millions who descended onto the streets, Amir was determined to make history and remained steadfast in Tahrir during the January 25 Revolution until Mubarak stepped down on February 11. He was one of the unsung heroes who peacefully protested and protected the revolution. He was there during the Battle of the Camel where he was beaten, but did not give up.*

*Amir did not view Mubarak's resignation as the culmination of the revolution, but merely an agreement to preserve military rule. Amir loved the united spirit of Tahrir. But that spirit was quickly vanishing, replaced by political divisions and chaos, brought on by the security forces and remnants of the former regime.*

*Like many Egyptians who protested the military coup and set up camp at Rabaa Square, Amir was never a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and was highly critical of them.*

*He felt they betrayed the revolutionaries by abandoning them for elections. In a way he blamed them for killing the revolution because of their naivete and political ambitions.*

*Equally, President Morsi was not Amir's first choice for president in the first round of elections but he voted for him in the second round against Ahmed Shafiq, who symbolised the remnants of the old regime.*

### ***Protesting the military coup***

*On July 3, my brother called me very distraught, when President Morsi was overthrown in a military coup by General el-Sisi. Amir called me from Mecca, where he was performing umrah, and was very upset that the US government was supporting the coup and refusing to acknowledge it as such. After voting democratically in five different elections and referendums, everything was now overturned. He ended the phone call by vowing to join the encampment at Rabaa Square to protest the ouster of President Morsi.*

*Amir returned to Cairo in mid-July, keeping his word to join the sit-in each day - until his very last. He never spoke on stage or took an official role. He was simply there with thousands of other Egyptians calling for the return of President Morsi because they supported democracy.*

### ***Massacre at Rabaa Square***

*I arrived in Cairo shortly before the massacre. The city seemed empty, almost like the quiet before the storm. Amir insisted on inviting us over for dinner to his mother-in-law's apartment close to Rabaa. When we arrived, it felt like the entire country was there; like a river, hundreds of thousands of people were flowing towards the square from every street. It was the first time Amir had seen my youngest son, and I felt my brother had a calm and peaceful presence about him.*

### ***Egypt's Rabaa deaths 'crime against humanity'***

*After dinner, Amir gave us a tour of what looked like a makeshift tent city in Rabaa Square. There were barber shops, restaurants, cafes and various kiosks located within the tents. There was a vibrant atmosphere throughout the encampment. On stage, there were speeches, couples getting married, and announcements being made. I never saw any weapons or heard any incitement to violence. It felt safe.*



*The next day was my brother Abdulatif's wedding. Despite political differences within my own extended family, we were all united that evening in dance and celebration. Amir and his wife showed up briefly; he had a radiant aura about him and glided from table to table greeting family members. We did not know it would be the last time we would see him alive. Hours later Amir would be killed in Rabaa.*

*On August 14, I woke up early in the morning and saw images on the news of military and police forces beginning the dispersal of Rabaa. Amir had been there since 5am and returned home at noon for just a few minutes to upload photos he had taken to Facebook. His wife noticed he was injured in his leg and begged him to stay, but Amir told her he felt obligated to help the others. By then, he reported, hundreds were already killed with thousands more injured. He felt it would be wrong for him to abandon them with no help, particularly the women and children.*

*My mother repeatedly called Amir's phone to try to convince him to return home, until someone else finally answered at 2:30pm. She immediately sensed something was wrong, but there was no word for the next 12 hours. Amir's wife eventually found his dead body on the street in Rabaa, but because the country was under curfew, my family and I were prevented from retrieving him.*

#### ***A makeshift morgue at Masjid al-Iman***

*With the help of a neighbour, my sister-in-law carried her husband's body to a makeshift morgue set up at the al-Iman Mosque. That's where I found Amir's body on August 15, among 350 bodies I personally counted of murdered protesters.*

*I drove my parents to the mosque and as we pulled near Rabaa, it looked like a war zone. We were in disbelief. The mosque was wall to wall with dead bodies. It was a hot day and, with no refrigeration, all anyone could smell was death. Rows and rows of bodies were covered in white sheets. To find Amir's body, we had to uncover the faces of some 50 corpses. I had never seen that many dead people in my life.*

*My heart sank when we identified Amir's body. He had a gaping hole in his neck, which appeared to be the result of a high-caliber single bullet. The carpet of the mosque was soaked in blood, and there were mothers, friends, and mourners sitting by the bodies of their loved ones in various states of shock.*

### ***Death by 'natural causes'***

*We wanted to remove Amir's body from the Al-Iman Mosque for burial, but were told that we would first need a death certificate. The coup regime had virtually kept the dead bodies hostage until family members accepted death certificates claiming that the murdered protesters had died of "natural causes". Otherwise, we were told, the process would be delayed for days while bodies simply decomposed.*

*While many people were pressured to accept this lie, my parents were determined otherwise. The next steps were to file a police report, get a case number, and hire a medical examiner to examine my brother and sign the death certificate with the real cause of death. The ordeal took an entire day, during which some relatives and I visited a nearby morgue where hundreds of dead protestors were piled.*

*Despite the state of emergency, my brother's funeral was attended by a thousand people. Travelling from the mosque to the graveyard was challenging, as many of the roads were blocked, and groups of thugs were running checkpoints, robbing, and beating people, all under the watchful eye of security forces. At one point we lost hope of reaching our destination, but we persisted and buried my brother late at night under the glow of our flashlights.*

### ***Justice for the victims***

*As eyewitnesses to the peaceful demonstrations held at Rabaa Square before the violent government crackdown, my family and I are under no illusions about who is responsible for these crimes against humanity. There are no words to express the pain my mother and father endured that day and since losing their son, murdered by his own government.*

*We hold General Sisi, Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim, and their administration responsible for the systematic and intentional killing of Amir and his fellow protestors, whose lives were sacrificed in their unwavering struggle for freedom and democracy. Since the Rabaa tragedy one year ago, many conscientious Egyptians have sought to honour the victims by continuing their fight against tyranny and to reinstate democracy.*

*Sadly, my brother was correct in recognising the incompleteness of the January 25 Revolution that failed to bring an end to a brutal, repressive regime. Sisi's military government has committed a series of horrific crimes, including mass killings and arrests, torture and abuse in prisons, and stifling all political dissent.*

*As I remember Amir on the one year anniversary of his death, I remember his July 3 phone call urging me to do what I can to ensure that the US government supports democracy and freedom in Egypt and not military rule. The US, the European Union, and the United Nations must commission an official investigation of the Rabaa Massacre and bring the perpetrators to justice.*

*The international community must isolate Egypt's military regime and deny them any form of legitimacy. Because without justice, there will never be peace or stability in Egypt.*

***Ahmed Bedier is an Egyptian-American social entrepreneur, non-profit CEO, radio show host, human rights and democracy advocate and television commentator. His brother Amir was shot and killed by Egypt's security forces during the violent dispersal of Rabaa square sit-in.***

***Follow him on Twitter: @bedier***

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بأي ذنب قتلوا سيدات المنصورة؟

*For what sin they killed the ladies of Mansoura?*

(An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

2013/7/22

محمد الرويني-المنصورة

أنس زكي-القاهرة

منذ تدخل الجيش لعزل الرئيس محمد مرسي والشارع المصري يبدو ملتعباً، ومع تكرار شبيه يومي لصراعات وأحداث مؤسفة إلا أن مقتل العشرات بمجزرة الحرس الجمهوري ثم مقتل أربع سيدات بمدينة المنصورة كانا أكبر هذه الأحداث أثراً وإيلاماً.

هاجم من يعرفون بالبلطجية هذه المسيرة واختاروا استهداف السيدات ليقتلوا ثلاثاً منهن إضافة إلى فتاة.

أجواء حزينة

ورغم أن المنصورة كغيرها من مدن مصر تؤوي مؤيدين لمرسي ومعارضين له على حد سواء، فإن الأجواء بدت حزينة، وحسب سائق سيارة التقينا بالمدينة فإن مصر لم تعند استهداف متظاهرين وقتلهم، "فما بالك إذا كان الاستهداف موجهاً لسيدات بما يتنافى مع الدين وكذلك الوطنية وحتى المرأة".

واللافت أن القاسم المشترك لمن تحدثوا من أهالي الشهداء هو سعادتهم وفخرهم باستشهاد السيدات وهن يشاركن الرجال في التعبير عن رأيهن بالتمسك بحقوقهن بالاحتفاظ بالرئيس الذي جاء إلى السلطة بأصوات الناخبين عبر صناديق الاقتراع

جريمة وعار

ورأى إسماعيل أن على المصريين جميعاً أن يدركوا أن إراقة الدماء دون ذنب تمثل عارا على كل من ارتكب هذه الجرائم ومن حرض عليها ولم يتدخل لإيقافها

كما تحدثت صديقة الشهيذة هالة محمد أبو شعيشع وقالت إنها كانت شاهدة على الأحداث مؤكدة أن البلطجية هاجموا المسيرة بالأسلحة البيضاء والحجارة ثم بالخرطوش قبل أن يبدأ إطلاق الرصاص الحي، مما دفع المتظاهرات للإسراع نحو الشوارع الجانبية وهي معهن لتكتشف أن صديقتها المقربة راحت ضحية هذا الهجوم الغادر.

وأوضح سامح الغزالي زوج الشهيذة إسلام أنه توجه إلى المنصورة مساء ليشارك في عزاء أقيم للشهيدات الأربع، وحكى بأسى كيف أنه كان يشارك في اعتصام رابعة العدوية الجمعة واستأذنته زوجته بالمشاركة بمسيرة المنصورة وقال إنه سمح لها لأنها كانت تتوق للمشاركة بعد أن حرمت حقها في التظاهر منذ ثورة يناير/كانون الثاني 2011 بسبب انشغالها بتربية وليدها الذي فارقتة وهو في عامه الثالث .

وبدا الغزالي متأثرا وهو يحكي عن زوجته التي كانت زميلته في كلية الصيدلة قبل أن يتزوجا قبل 15 عاما أنجبا خلالها أربعة أولاد، وقال إنها خرجت للتظاهر ليس دفاعا عن شخص أو عن جماعة وإنما عن الحرية التي اشتهم المصريون أولى نسماتها في عهد مرسي قبل أن يأتي ضباط في الجيش ويستكثروا هذه الحرية على بني وطنهم.

المصدر : الجزيرة

### [Translation]

22/7/2013

**Muhammad al-Ruwayni - al-Mansura**

**Anas Zaki - Cairo**

*Since the military intervention to isolate President Mohamed Morsi, there has been a daily recurrence of unfortunate events. The killing of dozens at the Republican Guard headquarters and the killing of four women in the city of Mansoura are just two of the biggest and most painful of these events. Thugs attacked the march of protesters and chose to target three women and a girl.*

**Sad ambient**

*Mansoura, like other cities, harbours both pro-Morsi supporters and opponents alike. The atmosphere felt sad over the killings of women. One taxi driver explained that Egypt is unfamiliar with seeing protesters being targeted and killed, let alone ladies shot dead. According to a taxi driver, this “not only goes against the teachings of religion and patriotism but also chivalry”.*

*Nonetheless, the families of the slain women expressed joy and pride over the latter's martyrdom. “They died for what they believed”, they say, “and whilst expressing support for President Morsi, who came to power through ballots”.*

### ***Crime and disgrace***

*Ismail, a bother of Amaal Farahat, one of the “martyresses”, is heard saying that all Egyptians “must understand that committing any act of bloodshed without reasons calling for it is disgraceful”. “It is a disgrace upon all those who carried out these crimes and those who incited them”, he adds.*

*An anonymous friend of Halla Muhammad Abu Shu’aisha, one of the “martyred” women, confirms that she saw thugs attacking the marches with white weapons, stones, and cartridge firearms before firing live bullets. She later found out that Halla had fallen victim to this “treacherous attack”.*

*Sameh Al-Ghazali also talked about the martyrdom of Islam, whom he says he had been married to for 15 years, bearing him four kids. She died whilst leaving behind a child in his third year. Sameh spoke about his wife with sorrow. He recalls her going out protesting, not in defence of anyone or any party. She was only after defending the very freedom from the days of Morsi, which was later deemed as something too much to afford by officers in the army.*

***Source: Al-Jazeera***

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## Script 4 (STE-V)

### *Massacre in Cairo deepens Egypt crisis*

(An English straight news story)

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**8 Jul 2013**

*A deadly shooting at the site of a sit-in by Muslim Brotherhood supporters in Cairo*

*Mohamed Ibrahim El-Beltagy, a Brotherhood MP, described the incident during dawn prayers after police had stormed the site, as a "massacre".*

#### **'Hit in the head'**

*"Every police force in the world understands how to disperse a sit-in. This is just a criminal activity targeting protesters."*

*Brotherhood's Haddad said there were two things "the bloodbath" was trying to do.*

*"First is that we leave streets and forego the objective of bringing democracy in Egypt after 60 sixty years of military tyranny or they think that our blood is cheaper than any other's blood in Egypt and no one would care," he said.*

*"We are sticking to our ground, we will not be brought into a cycle of violence, we know how deadly that would be. Even if that means we will have to become the punching bag of the rest of society and our blood will flow for the rest of Egyptians to wake up and the rest of the world to understand that we are adamant of bringing democracy to our country."*

**SOURCE: AL JAZEERA, NEWS AGENCIES**

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الإسلام السياسي.. خطوة للخلف نحو قفزة للأمام

*Political Islam: A step back toward a leap forward*

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

2013/9/8

محسن صالح

الذين انتشوا ورقصوا فرحا لما سموه "سقوط الإسلام السياسي" بعد الانقلاب العسكري في مصر واهمون، وكان على قارعي الدفوف وحاملي البخور ممن امتلأت بهم وسائل الإعلام المختلفة، ألا يستعجلوا في مراسم الدفن أو الثماتة، لأنهم على ما يبدو لم يتعلموا سنن الله سبحانه في الكون، ولا حركة التاريخ.

الجانب السياسي جزء لا يتجزأ من هذا الدين. وحديثنا هنا ينطبق بشكل عام على التيار الأوسع بين الإسلاميين، وهو التيار الوسطي المعتدل الذي يملك مشروعا حضاريا، ويؤمن بالشراكة الوطنية، ويبتعد عن العنف في ممارساته وعلاقاته مع أبناء وطنه.

تشير هذه المعطيات إلى أن "الإسلام السياسي" قد تلقى ضربة قاسية في مصر، بينما يعاني صعوبات جمة وعمليات إسقاط في دول أخرى، قد تؤدي إلى تراجع وإفشاله.

ومع ذلك فإن الاستقراء العام للمشهد السياسي والإستراتيجي، وفهم طبيعة المنطقة وشعوبها، تشير إلى أن "الإسلام السياسي" سيعود من جديد بقوة وحنفوان وشعبية أكبر، وقدرة أعلى على التغيير وقيادة العمل السياسي في المنطقة،

هذا التيار لا يمكن تهيمشه ولا اجتثاثه، لأنه هو ببساطة الأكثر توافقا مع التركيبة الدينية، والنفسية، والاجتماعية، والثقافية، والحضارية للإنسان في المنطقة، ولأن القيم والمثل التي يحملها هي القيم والمثل التي يحملها العربي والمسلم دونما تكلف أو تصنع.

التيار الذي يتبنى الإسلام فكرا وسلوكا ومنهج حياة، هو تيار أصيل عميق وقوي ومتجذر في الأمة العربية والأمة الإسلامية. وأن حركات التجديد والإصلاح الإسلامي التي لعبت أدوارا سياسية وثورية، تعود بجذورها إلى القرن الهجري الأول، حيث تجلت مثلا بثورات الحسين بن علي، وعبد الله بن الزبير، وعبد الرحمن بن الأشعث، ولم تتوقف على مر العصور.



في التاريخ الحديث والمعاصر، فإن القوة الرئيسية التي واجهت حالة التخلف في أمتنا وواجهت الاستعمار في ديارنا، كان مكونها الرئيس إسلامياً، وروحها الدافعة إسلامية، كالهابية في الجزيرة العربية، والمهدية في السودان، والسنوسية في ليبيا، وحركة الشهيد أحمد خان في الهند، وبين باديس في الجزائر، وغيرها، وحركات الإخوان المسلمين أو الجماعة الإسلامية في القارة الهندية، والنورسية في تركيا، وغيرها هي امتداد لهذا التيار الإصلاحية.

طوال السنوات الماضية، فشلت الأنظمة العسكرية، والأنظمة التي رفعت شعارات قومية كالبعثية والناصرية، والأنظمة العلمانية (سواء أكانت يسارية اشتراكية أم ليبرالية رأسمالية)، كما فشلت الأنظمة الوراثية، في الإجابة عن أسئلة الهوية والوحدة والتنمية ومواجهة المشروع الصهيوني، ولم يبق إلا ذلك التيار الإسلامي الحضاري الذي لم يأخذ بعد فرصته الحقيقية في الحكم.

الإسلاميون ليسوا ملائكة، وهم يخطئون ويصيبون، وهم يتعثرون ويتعلمون. لقد تم إبعاد الإسلاميين عن إدارة الدولة وعن مؤسساتها لعشرات السنين، وعانوا من محاولات التهميش.

ولعل الله سبحانه قدر هذا الأمر حتى يستخرج من الإسلاميين أفضل ما عندهم، وحتى ينفوا خيبتهم، ويرتقوا إلى مستوى إدارة المجتمع والدولة، ومستوى إدارة الصراع مع المشروع الصهيوني والمشروع الغربي في المنطقة، ولذلك فعل قوله تعالى: "لا تحسبوه شراً لكم بل هو خير لكم" ينطبق عليهم.

ولذلك، فإن الموجة الارتدادية المضادة التي أطاحت بالإسلاميين في مصر لن تكون بالنسبة لهم سوى "خطوة إلى الوراء، نحو قفزة إلى الأمام".

محسن صالح

خبير في الدراسات السياسية والإستراتيجية

[Translation]

8/9/2013

**Muhsin Salih**

*Those who danced and gloated at the "the fall of political Islam" following the coup in Egypt are deluded. Indeed, those sycophantic tambourine players and incense servers (Arabic metaphors for sycophantic media outlets) should not have gloated too soon. For as it seems, they are still heedless of the divine laws of Allah, May He be praised and exalted, and the just course of history.*

*The political aspect is an indivisible part of this religion (Islam). Political Islam is a centrist and moderate movement. It possesses a civilised project, believes in partnership, and veers away from violence.*

*Judging by the high number of young, competent members subscribing to it, Political Islam is surely the most affluent in this sense. It is equally the most popular, powerful, and prevalent within universities.*

*The facts do indicate that “political Islam” has received a severe blow in Egypt and endured a lot of great difficulties. There have been operations in different states, all of which have sought to thwart it. These operations may have, truly, contributed to its decline in recent times.*

*Indeed, the inductive understanding of the political landscape and the nature of both the region and the people, prove that “Political Islam” shall return stronger, more vigorous, more popular, and with a higher propensity for change.*

*This movement cannot be marginalised or eradicated. That is simply because it is the most compatible thought with the spiritual, psychological, social, and cultural formation of an individual in the region. In addition, the values and ideals upheld by political Islam are the very same ones sustained by almost every Arab and Muslim in the region, and without any pretence.*

*A movement that adopts Islam as a thought, conduct, and way of life is an authentic, strong, and profound movement. It is deep-rooted in the Arab and Islamic nations. Indeed, the Islamist revivalist and reformist movements that played major political and revolutionary roles, trace their roots to the first century AH. This can be seen in the revolts of Al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr, and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ash‘ath. Such movements have come a long way and have never grown weary for centuries.*

*In contemporary history, the main constituent of such a force that has taken upon itself to stand up against the colonisation of our homelands and confront the state of backwardness ravaging our Ummah, has been, in fact, of an Islamist origin. The impetus behind it has been equally Islamist. This can be seen in each of the following cases: The Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula, the Mahdism in Sudan, the Senussism in Libya, the movement of Ahmad Khan in India, the movement of Ben Badis in Algeria, the Muslim Brothers in the Indian subcontinent, and the Nursism in Turkey. All of these truly are an extension of their reformist predecessors.*

*Over the years, all of such military and non-military regimes that once raised nationalist and secularist slogans [...] have, in fact, failed at putting some of the critical questions to rest, such as those to do with the notions of identity, unity,*

*development, including how to counter the Zionist project. Meanwhile, the Islamist movement has not yet taken its real shot at governing.*

*Islamists are not angels, for they can be right and wrong. They stumble and learn. They have been kept away from running the state for decades. They have endured a lot of marginalisation attempts.*

*Perhaps, Allah, in His Wise Predestination, desires to bring out the best in the Islamists, and better prepare them not only for running the state and society but also for confronting the Zionist and Western projects in the region. Hence, may the following words of Allah in the Holy Qur'ān be of solace to them: "...think it not to be an evil to you; On the contrary, it is good for you".*

*The backlash wave that toppled the Islamists in Egypt will not be anything to them other than "a step back towards a leap forward".*

***Muhsin Salih***

***Expert on political and strategic studies***

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*The Egyptian coup and the lessons of Turkey*

(An English opinion piece)

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*Anwar Ibrahim is currently opposition leader of Malaysia and was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister*

*13 Aug 2013*

*So, why are the supposed flagship democracies like the US and the EU unable or unwilling to call a coup a coup?*

*But the failure to refer to it as a coup, let alone condemn it, bespeaks the double standards of these democracies.*

*Turkey's recent past reminds us of the unceasing attempts by the military to stage one coup after another in it's a bid to seize back power and privileges. The Turkish people were never handed democracy on a silver platter. Just as what we are witnessing now in Egypt, the Turkish people had to fight hard for it and even harder to keep it. It was fought with the blood, sweat and tears of those united by the love for freedom and democracy and the conviction that the role of the military must remain that of defending the nation's realm, not determining the government of the day. That can only be done through ballots.*

*Tunisia condemned the overthrow as a "flagrant coup", which undermined democracy and would feed radicalism. In a speech in Istanbul on July 5th, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan condemned it: "No matter where or against whom, coups are damaging, inhuman and against the people, national will and democracy.*

*In this impassioned denunciation, Erdogan is not just giving a knee-jerk response but articulating Turkey's lessons of history. It is in this shared past that Egypt may yet be able to find new hope for a destiny akin to Turkey's, undoubtedly a thriving democracy with a painful and bitter history of military interventions.*

*The people of Egypt stood united and fought tooth and nail in ending six decades of military dictatorship so that they could taste real freedom and democracy.*

*Let us not be complicit to this unconstitutional and immoral coup but instead be among those on the right side of history. Let us do our part to see the people of Egypt regain the glory of their great January 25 Revolution.*

*Thus, in one fell swoop, the fragile edifice of Egypt's newly minted constitutional democracy came tumbling down.*

*No amount of window dressing - such as appointing a Supreme Court chief judge to head an 'interim government' - will change the fact that the iron hand of the military has turned back the clock of the Arab world's most populous country.*

*While the Revolution saw the overthrow of a dictator who had ruled by force for close to three decades, this was the ouster of a president who had been democratically elected through free and fair elections.*

*Egyptians too paid their price for the revolution and now are being burdened once more to pay the price for defending it. This is exacted on the Egyptian people culminating tragically in the massacre of more than 100 pro-Morsi supporters and members of the Brotherhood around the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque in Cairo.*

*Army chief Gen Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi and the leaders of the illegitimate interim government have blood on their hands and must be held to account. This slaughter of innocent people must be condemned. Attempts to justify the coup on 'peculiar circumstances' such as the incompetence of Morsi's administration, its exclusivist nature, and the protests by millions of Egyptians, are facile and highly subjective.*

***Anwar Ibrahim is currently opposition leader of Malaysia and was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister.***

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أعواد المشانق... أيقونة مصرية في تركيا

*The gallows... an Egyptian icon in Turkey*

(An Arabic straight news story coupled with English translation)

2014/4/21

خليل مبروك-إسطنبول

وتجلت رمزية المشهد المصري في كلمة ألقاها عضو لجنة الشؤون الخارجية بمجلس الشعب عادل راشد، قال فيها إن سفينة نوح التي نجت فيها البشرية حطت في تركيا، كما ستحط سفينة نجاة الأحرار رحالها اليوم في ذات البلد

وتحدى راشد المرشح الرئاسي السيسي قائلاً " هل ستلجأ إلى إسرائيل لتعصمك من الأحرار؟ أم إلى القضاء ليعصمك بأحكام الإعدام على الثوار؟ "

وينسجم الموقف الشعبي المتضامن مع المحكومين بالإعدام في مصر مع موقف تركيا الرسمي تجاه انقلاب الثالث من يوليو/ تموز الماضي، والذي انتقده رئيس الوزراء رجب طيب أردوغان وأدانه وزير الخارجية أحمد داود أوغلو والبرلمان التركي أيضاً.

وقال مراد كوليب أحد منظمي الوقفة إن الموقف "إن الشعب التركي سيواصل تحركه في نصرة "المظلومين" في مصر بدافع الأخوة والروابط بين الشعبين، وأضاف وهو يرفع شارة رابعة أن "تركيا لن تتخلى عن موقفها هذا أبداً".

من ناحيته، اعتبر الناشط المصري عبد الحميد جمال التفاعل التركي الكبير مع الأحداث التي تشهدها مصر أمراً طبيعياً بالنظر لتشابه التجربتين، مضيفاً أن تركيا عانت من مرارة الانقلابات العسكرية لزم من طويل ألقى فيه البلاد في حكم العسكر، في إشارة إلى الانقلابات التي شهدتها تركيا في النصف الثاني من القرن العشرين. وأضاف أن كل ما ترتب على الانقلاب من قرارات وأوامر ستزول مع انكساره.

أما ياسين شاهين أحد المشاركين أكد أن تركيا لن تهدأ دون أن يتحقق الأمن في مصر، وقيل أن تعود الشرعية لأهلها في إشارة للرئيس المعزول محمد مرسي الذي كان أول رئيس مدني منتخب في تاريخ مصر.

ويظهر الأتراك تعاطفاً كبيراً مع القضايا العربية لا سيما نزاع الشرعية والانقلاب في مصر، لكن قرارات الإعدام جعلت بينهم حافزاً جديداً لمواصلة الحراك بدت صورة المشنقة فيه أيقونة واضحة الدلالات.

وقال سرجان راتيكين (أحد منظمي الوقفة) أن أول هؤلاء الثلاثة يمثل الغرب الذي لا يريد أن يرى أن ما جرى ويجري في مصر هو انقلاب، والثاني هو المؤسسات الدولية التي تلوذ بالصمت فلا تنطق بكلمة تدين جرائم الانقلاب، أما الثالث فيرمز للقضاء المصري الذي يصم أذنيه أمام ما يقوله من يعرضون أمامه من رافضي الانقلاب ويصدر بحقهم أحكام الإعدام.

المصدر: الجزيرة

### [Translation]

21/4/2014

#### ***Khalil Mabruk-Istanbul***

*The symbolism of such events taking place in Egypt was evident in a speech delivered by the member of Foreign Affairs Committee of the People's Assembly, Adil Rashid. According to Rashid, The Ark of Nūḥ (Noah), which once delivered humanity, did land in Turkey. And in the very land of Turkey, there shall land another Ark one day, delivering all the free people of the world.*

*The presidential candidate, Al-Sisi, was challenged during the event by one of the activists: "Will you turn to Israel to shield you from the freemen (of Egypt)? Or is it that you are going to resort to (the Egyptian) jury to protect you by speeding up death-sentencing of the protesters?"*

*Today's gesture of solidarity is consistent with where Turkey officially stands from the events unfolding in Egypt. The coup continues to be criticised by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and condemned by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the Turkish Parliament.*

*Ahmed Koulib, one of the organisers, remarks that "the Turkish people will continue to stand up for the oppressed ones in Egypt. While displaying Rabaa's sign, he added that "Turkey has already taken it upon itself never to abandon such an obligation".*

*On the word of the Egyptian activist, Abdulhamid Jamal, Turkey's solidarity with the Egyptian people is nothing unusual. He adds that Turkey has equally suffered from military coups for a very long time and have actually fallen into the hands of the military rule in the second half of the 20th century. According to Jamal, "Everything that came about in Egypt as a result of the coup will disappear the minute it is vanquished"*

*The participant, Yassin Shaheen, stressed that “Turkey will not rest without security in Egypt is restored, and surely not before the legitimacy is reinstalled”, in his reference to the ousted president, Mohamed Morsi, the first elected president in the history of Egypt.*

*The Turkish people generally feel great sympathy for the just causes of the Arabs, particularly the conflict between the legitimate rule of the MB and the coup in Egypt. The death sentences have made the Turkish people even more eager to continue the solidarity movement in defence of the MB. The scene of the gallows has now become an icon representing such a spirit.*

*Sarjan Ratikin, one of the organisers, explains that the man with the eye-band represents the ways in which the West appear to turn a blind eye to the coup in Egypt. The second man represents how the international institutions choose to remain mute to the crimes of the coup. The third actor with his ears covered symbolises the Egyptian judiciary, turning a deaf ear to what the anti-coup opposition has to say.*

**Source: Al-Jazeera**

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## Script 8 (STE-H)

### *Morsi will never compromise says family*

(An English straight news story)

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*Statement through Muslim Brotherhood says deposed Egyptian president will not negotiate with military-backed government.*

**14 Oct 2013**

*Morsi, Egypt's first freely elected president, was removed by the military on July 3 following mass protests against his rule. Authorities have since launched a crackdown on his backers, the Muslim Brotherhood, killing hundreds at protest camps and marches and arresting about 2,000 Islamist activists and group members.*

*"The president will not retreat or negotiate or accept compromises especially after all the martyrs, the wounded, the arrested and missing," his family said in a statement carried on the Muslim Brotherhood's website.*

*"No matter how much they try to keep him away, the president will not retreat from a return to the democratic path, even if his soul is the price of this democratic path," the family said in a statement to mark the Muslim feast of Eid al-Adha.*

**SOURCE: REUTERS**

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فَلَمْ يُضِرْهَا..

*Remained unharmed..*

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

عزت الرشق

عضو المكتب السياسي بحماس

2013/11/28

إعلام التضليل والفتنة يتساقون مع الاحتلال

يعاني بعض الإعلاميين والكتاب والصحفيين العرب أزمة حقيقية قد تصل إلى حد الإفلاس والبعد عن أدبيات وأخلاقيات المهنة في البحث عن أخبار ملفقة وتقارير كاذبة وسيناريوهات من نسج الخيال ضد حركة المقاومة الإسلامية (حماس) ونهجها المقاوم وقادتها.

وقد نفذت جعبتهم من كل السهام المسمومة والأقلام المأجورة ولم يتركوا وسيلة إلا انتهجوها أو طريقا إلا سلكوه، ذلك أنهم كلما أعدوا عدة خبير أو تقرير أو مقال فيبركة ونسجا وتلفيقا وتزويرا وألقوا بها بين الناس في قنواتهم وإعلامهم فاح كذبها وتدليسها وزورها وبهتانها واحترقت أفلامهم المدسوسة ودبجتهم المغشوشة.

وكأنني بالشاعر العربي ميمون بن قيس (الأعشى) قد وصف هذه الفئة من الإعلاميين بقوله:

كناطح صخرة يوما لئوهنتها فلم يضرها وأوهى قرنه الوعل

فالحملات الإعلامية المسمومة المستمرة ضد الشعب الفلسطيني ومقاومته الباسلة وضد قطاع غزة وحركة حماس -مهما كان منبعها أو حجمها- مصيرها الفشل والزوال دون أي أثر، كسحابة صيف عابرة.

تساقون مع الاحتلال

تمضي الحركة في طريقها المقاوم متمسكة بحبل ربها لن تؤثر فيها مؤامرة عدو أو تضليل حاقد أو تشويه متأمر، تشق طريقها نحو تحرير الأرض والمقدسات وبوصلتها موجهة ضد العدو الصهيوني لا تخطئ هدفها، ولن تتشغل بمعارك جانبية يراد لها أن تقع فيها، وهي واعية أن معركتها الوحيدة منذ انطلاقتها هي ضد العدو الصهيوني الغاشم.

وعلى الشوكة ذاتها تحقق الانتصارات والإنجازات تلو الإنجازات، توسع دائرة نضالها فوق الأرض وتحتها، ومع هذا تتصاعد الحملة الإعلامية ضدها عبر كتاب وصحفيين وإعلاميين وقنوات فضائية ومواقع إلكترونية، وكأن مصالحي هؤلاء تتقاطع مع مصالح وأجندات الاحتلال، إذ تتساقط هذه الأبواق الضالة والأقلام المسمومة مع آلة الحرب الصهيونية التي تمعن في شعبنا حصارا وقتلا وتهجيرا، وفي أرضنا ومقدساتنا تهويدا وطمسا وسرقة، وفي شعبنا وقياداته ملاحقة وأسرا وإبعادا .

وعلى الرغم من ذلك كله تبقى بوصلة الحركة ومقاومتها ثابتة لم ولن تتغير، ولم تؤثر فيها تلك الحملات الإعلامية، وإنني في هذا السياق لأربأ بكتّاب ومفكرين ذوي قامات وأقلام لها وزنها أن تلتقي نصالهم مع نصال العدو الصهيوني ووكلائه الذين لا هم لهم إلا تشويه المقاومة الفلسطينية وحركة حماس.. لا أقول ذلك خوفا على ظهر حماس، ولكن حرصا على ألا تتحرف بوصلة البعض فيهاجم المقاومة، متساوقا بذلك مع المشروع النقيض مهما كانت ذريعتة .

### الصحافة المصرية.. إلى أين؟

لم يعد خافيا على أي متابع لمعظم الوسائل الإعلامية المصرية حجم الأخبار والتقارير التي تهاجم الحركة ومقاومتها وتمعن في نسج الأحداث بشكل يومي، حيث تطل علينا بشكل شبه يومي باقتراء وتضليل جديد، لسنا هنا بصدد الرد عليها، وإنما لبيان أن جلها مضحك مبنى ومعنى، وبعضها يتجاوز حدود المعقول والمنطق

فإلى أين تتجه الصحافة المصرية القائمة على هذه الأكاذيب؟ وإلى أين يسير الإعلام المصري الذي يروج لهذه الفتن بين الشيعيين الشقيقين؟

وكل ما ينشر من تدخل حماس في مصر من أخبار هو محض افتراء وكذب، ويأتي في إطار الدعاية الحزبية الضيقة، ولا يخدم إلا أعداء مصر وشعبها، وبيئت الحركة مرارا أنها ليست جزءا من الصراع الداخلي في أي دولة عربية، وهي تتمنى الخير لمصر ولشعبها الكريم الذي وقف دوما مع فلسطين وحقوق الشعب الفلسطيني.

وعلى الرغم من هذا الموقف الثابت والواضح إلا أن هذه الأبواق الإعلامية لم تفتأ تنكي نار الفتنة من خلال منات الأخبار والتقارير التي تتهم حماس بالتدخل في الشأن المصري ومحاوله زعزعة أمن مصر دون أن تقدم أي دليل أو حتى شبهة دليل .

وكل ما تسمعونه في وسائل الإعلام ما هو إلا محض افتراءات تولى كبرها بعض الإعلاميين، بدءا من أكذوبة تفجير كنيسة القديسين واقتحام السجون إبان ثورة يناير مرورا بحوادث رفح وسيناء وقتنة الخصاص، وليس انتهاء بالخبر الذي أوردته أعلاه .

### إمعان في الكذب والتضليل

إن ما تروج له بعض وسائل الإعلام المصرية قد وصل حد التندر والفكاهة لما آلت إليه مستويات بعض الأبواق إلى الكذب والتدليس وتلفيق التهم بعيدا عن الحقيقة والواقع، بل عن العقل والمنطق.

وأستسمح القارئ الكريم بذكر نماذج من هذا المستوى الإعلامي الهابط الذي وصل إلى مستوى الرعونة المهنية والاستخفاف بعقل الجمهور المصري والعربي، ففي 28 أكتوبر/تشرين الأول نشرت جريدة الوطن خبرا غاية في الخطورة -أقول الخطورة على سبيل التندر- كشفت فيه مكان أيمن الظواهري، وأكدت انتقال عناصر القاعدة من اليمن وسوريا إلى مصر عبر أنفاق حماس !

في ما يلي نص الخبر حرفيا "أوضحت المصادر أنه تم رصد تحركات التنظيم الدولي بالتعاون مع تركيا وقطر، حيث اجتمع أعضاء التنظيم في اليمن مع أيمن الظواهري زعيم تنظيم القاعدة والذي ظهر خلال الفترة الأخيرة في اليمن، لمخاطبة العناصر المسلحة التابعة لتنظيم القاعدة في اليمن وسوريا للاستعداد للسفر إلى مصر خلال المرحلة المقبلة التي تسبق الاستفتاء على الدستور، وتسهيل تسللهم إلى مصر عبر الأنفاق بمساعدة حركة حماس". انتهى كلام الصحيفة..

فهل هناك جملة واحدة مفيدة؟

وفي يوم السبت 2 نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني نقلت بوابة أخبار اليوم عن عضو مجلس الشعب والإعلامي مصطفى بكري قوله "إن الرئيس المعزول محمد مرسي كان سيشارك في إقامة دولة لغزة بسياء، وأن هناك تسجيلات لمرسي تؤكد أنه كان ينوي إقامة قنصلية مصرية في غزة وإقامة قنصلية لغزة في مصر". فهل يمكن أن ينطلي مثل هذا الكلام على أصغر طفل؟

وبعد هذا الكم من الشحن والحقد والتشويه الممنهج الموجه -الذي أفقد بعض إعلاميي مصر مهنتهم ومنطقهم وضرب بصرهم وبصائرهم

تهم معلبة "وقت الزنقة"

إنها طلاس معقدة أعيت عقولهم عن فهمها وإدراكها، ولا بأس بها في نظرهم وجعية سهامهم قد باتت خاوية خواء عقولهم وضمايرهم وذاكرتهم وتفكيرهم، فقد غاب عن ذاكرتهم فخرنا واعتزازنا بأننا نهلنا من معين وفكر جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، وقد صمت آذانهم وعميت بصائرهم عن إنجازات المقاومة وانتصاراتها على العدو الصهيوني، فمن الذي مرغ أنف جيش الاحتلال بالتراب قبل عام من الآن.. ألم تكن حماس؟ من الذي خطف "شاليط" وخاض ببسالة حرب 2009/2008 وحرب 2012 وانتصر فيها جميعا.. ألم تكن حماس؟ ومن الذي خاض معركة إنجاز صفقة وقاء الأحرار وانتصر فيها وحرر أكثر من ألف أسير فلسطيني.. ألم تكن حماس؟ ومن الذي اشتبك، وواجه، وطعن، وحفر الأنفاق في عمق الكيان الصهيوني؟

إننا نشفق على بعض الإعلاميين المصريين الذين يتقنون الاضطهاد في الماء العكر ويتقنون في حيك الاتهامات الباطلة ضد شعبنا ومقاومته، ويبنون مجدا إعلاميا زائفا على حساب المبادئ وشرف المهنة، فلمصلحة من هذه الحملات الإعلامية المحمومة والمشبوهة؟

لا شك في أن هذه الحملات الإعلامية المغرضة في بعض الوسائل الإعلامية المصرية لا تعبر عن الشعب المصري الشقي، ولا عن موقف مصر التي مثلت دوما السند الكبير لشعبنا وقضيتنا، ولا عن حقيقة الأواصر العميقة التي تربط الشعب المصري بالقضية الفلسطينية وحبه للمقاومة الفلسطينية التي تدافع عن شرف الأمتين العربية والإسلامية.

بالتأكيد أنها ليست مصلحة مصرية ولا مصلحة فلسطينية ولا مصلحة عربية.. ماذا يريد هؤلاء، وإلى ماذا يهدفون؟ هل المطلوب هو بث الفتنة بين الشعبين المصري والفلسطيني؟ هل المطلوب صناعة العداوة بين الشعب المصري والمقاومة؟ هل المطلوب البحث عن عدو لشد الانتباه عن الأوضاع الداخلية؟

متى سيدرك هؤلاء أنهم بأكاذيبهم هذه يقاتلون الطواحين، وأنهم لن ينالوا من المقاومة ولن يهزوا شعرة من رؤوس المقاومين من جهة، وأنهم بكل حرف يقولونه زورا إنما يخدمون الكيان الصهيوني من جهة أخرى!

عزت الرشق

عضو المكتب السياسي بحماس

### [Translation]

**Izzat al-Risheq**

**Member of Hamas's Politburo**

**28/11/2013**

*The media of misinformation and fitnah (sedition) operates in harmony with the Israeli occupation.*

*Some Arab media personnel, writers and journalists suffer from a real crisis amounting to moral bankruptcy. They distance themselves from professional ethics by fabricating news and false scenarios critical to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Such fake reports and forgeries are nothing but figments of their own imagination.*

*Sadly, their poisoned arrows have run out for them. No sooner had they attempted at fabricating something than the smell of all of their lies, sham, and forgery preceded them and exposed them almost immediately.*

*The media's futile attempts against Hamas brings to mind a famous line by the Arab poet Maymūn Ibn Qays (Al-`Ashā), which goes:*

*Like a mountain goat thrusting (with his horn) at a solid boulder one day, to*

*weaken it, leaving it without any damage and damaging his horn in the process.*

*The non-stop vicious campaigns against the Palestinian people, Gaza strip, and the valiant Islamic Resistance of Hamas are only destined to pass and go in vain, just like a fleeting summer cloud.*

*Despite the intrigue of the enemy, misrepresentation of the spiteful and the vilification of the schemer, Hamas, whilst holding fast to the rope or their Lord, stays unaffected and continues to move forward along the path of resistance, working its way up to the liberation of the land and holy sanctuaries. Their compass only points in the direction of the Zionist enemy. They are alert enough not to preoccupy themselves with side battles. Their one and only war is waged against the Zionist enemy.*

*The misleading and sycophantic media appears to operate alongside the Zionist war machines. Those fierce media campaigns and hostilities towards Hamas are led by people who appear to share common interests and agendas with the Israeli occupation. The Zionist war machine, meanwhile, continues to blockade, displace, kill more of our people, and goes to extremes in Judaizing, obliterating and stealing our homeland and holy sanctuaries.*

*The Egyptian media outlets seem to have no other business than vilifying the Palestinian Resistance.*

*The fabrication of false events and the spreading of slanderous news and misinformation are practised on a daily basis. Yet, we are not here to respond to those fabrications but rather demonstrate how laughable and senseless they are. Some of those fantasies defy the boundaries of reason and logic.*

*Where is the Egyptian press heading with such lies and spreading of fitnahs (seditions) between the Egyptians and Palestinians?*

*All that is published in the news about Hamas's meddling in Egyptian affairs are nothing but blatant lies. These lies come along the lines of the narrow partisan propaganda, which serves no interests other than those of the enemies who despise Egypt and its people.*

*Despite the consistently clear stance of Hamas, the sycophantic media outlets are never tired of reviving the fire of fitnah (sedition) by insisting on publishing hundreds of fake news reports accusing Hamas of meddling in Egypt in a bid to destabilise its security.*

*All that you hear in the media are nothing but pure lies and fabrications. The followings are just a few examples of these fantasies: the bombing Elkedeseen Church, the storming of prisons during the revolution of 25<sup>th</sup> January, and the incidents each of Rafah, Sinai and Khusus.*

### ***Indulging excessively in lying and deception***

*What is being put forward by some of the Egyptian media outlets has become ludicrous and preposterous. The level of falsehood and fabrication exercised by some of those sycophantic mouthpieces is laughable. It is not only remote from reality but reason and logic.*

*I beg the indulgence of the honourable reader to mention examples of how decadent and reckless the media have become. These examples show how the media try to belittle the minds of the Egyptian and Arab audience who are taken for fools.*

*Al-Watan newspaper once published an extremely alarming news article - I say "extremely alarming" as in the sarcastic sense of the words – in which it identifies the whereabouts of Ayman Al-Dhawahiri. The newspaper stresses and warns of al-Qaeda elements in Yemen and Syria, preparing to travel to Egypt through Hamas's tunnels.*

*[The writer quotes a few more lines, suggesting that "this will be carried out with the help of Hamas and the facilitation of each of Turkey and Qatar". In the end, the writer weighs in on these statements by rhetorically asking in a rather sarcastic tone: "Is there a single meaningful sentence in any of this?"]*

*In another story published by the online news site, Akhbar Al-Yawm, the site quotes a statement made by the journalist and member of the People's Assembly, Mustafa Bakri, stating that "the ousted President Morsi had plans to participate in the establishment of a state for Gaza in Sinai and that there were voice recordings of Morsi, revealing that he also wanted to establish an Egyptian consulate in Gaza and another one for Gaza in Egypt. Can such a ludicrous talk even fool the youngest of kids? Had there not been already once before an Egyptian consulate in Gaza?*

*The media personnel are stripped of both their senses and professionalism. They create readymade one-size-fits-all accusations. They are unable to make any sense. They are just as empty as their brains, conscience, and recollection are. We (Hamas) truly pride ourselves and take great honour to have drawn on the teachings and school of thought of the Muslim Brotherhood.*

*Unfortunately, when it comes to our own achievements against the Zionist enemy, the media is all too quick to turn a blind eye and deaf ear.*

*We pity those journalists who are good at nothing but fishing in troubled waters and excel in creating false accusations. They seek to build a false media glory at the expense of their principles, and never mind the honour and dignity of the profession.*

*The Palestinian Resistance of Hamas stands up for the honour and dignity of the Arab and Islamic nations.*

*One must ask: Who is the true beneficiary of these vicious and suspicious media campaigns?*

*This is, certainly, not in the interest of Egypt, nor that of Palestine or any other Arab country. What do these people want? What is it that they are trying to achieve? Do they really hope to cause disunity amongst the ranks of both the Egyptian and Palestinian people?*

*Do they want to instil hostility between the Egyptian people and the Islamic Resistance? Is it about diverting attention from the country's real problems by scapegoating and searching for a new enemy?*

*When will these people come to realise that they are up against "the Mills"? They will not defeat us, nor will they cause us the slightest distress.*

***Izzat al-Risheq***

***Member of Hamas's Politburo***

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## Script 10 (OPE-T)

### *Al-Sisi's reign of terror and the propaganda of 'fascism'*

(An English script)

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*Irfan Ahmad is Associate Professor of Political Anthropology at Australian Catholic University, Melbourne.*

*23 Aug 2013*

*How many monsoons will it take to wash the stains of macabre bloodbath engineered against the resolute pro-democracy protesters by General Abdul Fattah El-Sisi-led military regime?*

*The bloodbath began publicly on July 8 when the army cold-bloodedly killed over 50 pro-democracy demonstrators staging a sit-in in front of the Republican Guard headquarters. On 27 July, at least 80 more were killed at Cairo's Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque. On August 14 several hundreds of them were killed as the state's brutal crackdown on peaceful anti-coup protesters began. On Friday, when they took to streets, several hundreds more were killed.*

*Men in uniforms killed civilians resisting the coup everywhere –in streets, in makeshift camps, in mosques, in government vans, in police custody. Killings are shockingly becoming mere statistics –robbed off the very touch of life: bare deaths.*

*The wishy-washy condemnation of the bloodbath by the US, UK, France, Germany –the so-called international community –was at best futile because by not calling the usurpation of power by El-Sisi a coup d'état they had already bestowed a modicum of legitimacy on the military regime which enacted the bloodbath. It is plausible to say that in the absence of such legitimacy from the West the military junta would have acted differently vis-à-vis the pro-democracy demonstrators.*

*Much of politics, especially in Western plutocracies, is arithmetic: politicians' ratings by 'independent' media and candidates' claims to increase or decrease certain percentages in budget allocations. In Egypt, people themselves were turned into arithmetic. On July 26, El-Sisi ordered Egyptians to give him an arithmetic mandate to stem 'potential terrorism'. Those opposing El-Sisi resisted military's arithmetic with a basic ethic: is a coup d'état legitimate and shouldn't an elected President be ousted democratically?*

## ***Manufacturing Terrorism and Fascism***

*On August 17, the military regime's mention of 'potential terrorism' as the enemy became amply official with the press conference of Mustafa Hegazy, advisor to the 'President' Adly Mansour.*

*As he began to speak in English, itself quite a statement about who his principal audience was, on the top left of the TV screen appeared a crisp phrase in English: 'Egypt Fights Terrorism'. Obediently rehearsing Islamophobia, Hegazi mentioned 'religious fascism' and 'theological fascism' more than once to justify the brutality of the regime and hundreds of deaths it orchestrated. His attack on foreign media to suppress truth was indeed to hide the falsehood of the military regime he was paid to speak for. Hegazi's press conference will go down in history as shameless propaganda, in some respects outsmarting even Goebbels', in instituting lies and vilifying the Egyptians fighting for civil rights, freedom and democracy.*

*Importantly, the pro-coup Egyptian media as well as the mainstream Western media like CNN continued to call the anti-coup demonstrators either pro-Morsi or Brotherhood supporters. The designation 'Pro-Morsi' personalised the issue without ever telling people the just cause they stood for. It also downplayed the fact that those participating in sit-ins were not just pro-Morsi supporters; they also included people unaffiliated with the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) but supporting democracy. The day the military launched its heinous crackdown, Cairo's Ayesha Jadhav wrote an email: 'I'm tired of hearing that only people in Rabaa al-Adawiya are either Pro-Morsi or MB. They are not. I have close friends and family who support democracy.'*

*Messages such as Jadhav's never became the headlines of BBC which continued to depict pro-democracy protesters as MB men, not as supporters of Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). The continuous use of Brotherhood rather than FJP ensured that freedom and justice were the monopoly of liberal secularists like El-Baradie and Mohammed Aboul-Ghar.*

*Despite the repeated assertions by Waleed Haddad, MB spokesman, who the BBC interviewed after the crackdown, that FJP was fighting for 'democracy' and 'democratic values', the BBC never made democracy central to any of its reporting. Instead, it fashioned a narrative of terrorism. The BBC interviewed a Cairo woman who said that she felt 'complete terror' as a result of pro-democracy protests. The BBC anchor concurred with her as he repeated 'complete terror'.*

*Already on July 9, several weeks before the bloodbath, Frank Gardner, BBC's security correspondent, had published a piece 'Is Egypt Heading for Holy War'? Devoid of evidence, it was less a description of events and more a prescription for future. Gardner never mentioned that anti-coup protesters fought for democracy.*

*Splashed throughout his report instead were words like 'jihadist', 'holy war', 'religiously-inspired violence'. Gardner also linked his report on Egypt's 'holy war' with Libya, Yemen, and Iraq.*

*Media's attempts such as these aim at including Egypt in the ambit of global terrorism. That this terrorism is 'Islamic' need no mention because media and security industries have already rendered them as substitutes. This terrorism narrative, however, is similar to colonial narratives, both French and British, which in 19<sup>th</sup> century crafted a narrative of pan-Islamic 'Wahhabism' wherever they faced resistance to their brute rule even as those engaged in resistance in India, West Africa or North Africa did not necessarily call themselves Wahhabi. It was a colonial term to produce a seamless narrative to first create and define and subsequently vanquish the enemy. Domination works not simply through the policy of divide and rule; it equally works, as Mahmood Mamdani notes, through 'define and rule'.*

### ***Terror of the Military Regime***

*While media, both Egyptian and Western, and officials of military junta frantically circulate the fictitious stories of FJP's so-called terrorism they are criminally silent about the terrorism of the military regime led by El-Sisi. Let's not forget that various states and regimes throughout the world have practiced terror—for instance, Pinochet's in Chile, Suharto's in Indonesia and the regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia, not to speak of earlier colonial regimes.*

*By regime terror I don't simply mean the hundreds of people killed by Egypt's security forces but the very suspension, in fact abolition, of politics—the ultimate terror. In the Press Conference Hegazy denied that the crisis in Egypt was 'political'. He said: 'We are facing ...a terrorist war' and we are united 'against forces of terrorism and darkness'. Replying to a question about the ban on political parties, he came close to suggest that to fight terrorism Egyptian people themselves should be banned. Without mincing words, a spokesman of the ministry of defence proclaimed: 'When dealing with terrorism, the consideration of civil and human rights are not applicable'. This state terror is already in full swing with the ongoing arrests of top leaders of FJP and Muslim Brotherhood with no effective voice raised against them, in Egypt as well as outside.*

*While the dictator Hosni Mubarak who for decades throttled Egypt's democracy stands released, the elected President Morsi remains in military custody with no one loudly saying that his illegal imprisonment is a disgrace to anyone with even a minimum respect for democracy. Shockingly, the illegal arrests of political activists such as Mohamed Badie are being paraded by the pro-coup media as achievements. Is it not the triumph of the state terror by virtue of its almost total control over most segments of society and media that a robust opposition voice gradually seems to be fading? Does not history tell us that it is a totalitarian military regime such as El-Sisi's which fuses the state and society so solidly that nothing substantially political remains in between?*

*The military regime's terror is equally symbolic. Justifying the killings of Egyptians on August 14, Hegazy yoked terrorism to fascism and both to protesters fighting for democracy. In the context of Egypt's history, there was something a little odd about his use of the term fascism. In 1956, as President Jamal Abdul Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal the French press screamed that Nasser was a new Hitler. In British opinion too he was 'another Mussolini', 'a mad dog'. Earlier, in 1939, Karl Barth had observed: 'It is impossible to understand National Socialism unless we see it in fact as a new Islam, its myth as a new Allah, and Hitler as this new Allah's prophet.' The lack of historical depth in Hegazy's understanding of fascism was compensated by the abundance of its Islamophobia which Hegazy photocopied from the West and which Egypt's 'liberal-secular' elites also share.*

### ***Burning the Churches and Mosques of Democracy***

*An important weapon the El-Sisi's regime used to demonstrate 'fascism' and justify its usurpation of power was the growing insecurity among the Coptic minority and burning of Churches. Undoubtedly those responsible for burning churches must be punished. However, a vital question remains unanswered: what did the army and police do when not one or two but dozens of churches were set on fire? Would not have even half of the surgical efficiency with which El-Sisi's men killed the pro-democracy demonstrators saved many churches from vandalism and arson? Why were the military and police unwilling to respond to the call Michael Kastour, a Church member, and his father made to the security agencies while churches were being looted? Is not Kastour right in saying that the military allowed such ravaging so as to create evidence for terrorism? Hegazy's press conference proved Kastour's point as the former, rather than issuing any statement of action against the burning of churches, hurriedly referred to them as mere evidence to legitimise the coup.*

*In the current climate, the relevant issue, therefore, is not just the burning of churches but the deployment of that vandalism by the military to terrorise the Coptic minority into supporting the military coup. If in Poland and many countries of Latin America Churches have historically served as motors of democratisation, centres of political dissent, and advocates of liberation theology, we ought to ask, what was the manufactured condition which compelled Pope Tawadros II, leader of the Coptic Church, to lend support to the coup? It would be sheer prejudice to say that since his followers are not like Western Protestants they don't favour democracy. If Christianity inspired Martin Luther King to fight for civil rights and confront the racist power hierarchy, we should likewise ponder why a similar mobilisation by church in Egypt is currently less than evident.*

*Allegedly, according to some reports, members of the El-Sisi's regime also set mosques on fire. In mosques, so goes the military logic, were not partisans of democracy, but 'terrorists' and 'fascists'. Such logic is plainly pernicious. For millions, Islam is the motor and inspiration for democracy, freedom, civil rights and justice which liberal secularists either deliberately ignore or don't sufficiently know about. Rather than forge a creative alliance with the democratic voices like Freedom and Justice Party, FJP, liberal secularists demonise them. Parties such as FJP don't represent theocracy as liberal secularists allege. To begin with in Islam there is no overarching centralising authority often associated with medieval church. Yet soon after the military coup against President Mursi, Alon Ben-Meir of New York University resurrected the long, though boring, orientalist cliché –Is Islam compatible with democracy? –popularised by Samuel Huntington in his clash of civilization thesis. Ben-Meir wrote: 'Islam is inherently and by definition inconsistent with the separation of Church and state'. Is it not illogical, if not ridiculous, to lecture Muslims to separate religion from Church which, even an elementary student of religion knows, does not exist in Islam?*

*It is clear what purpose Ben-Meir's question sought to serve: legitimise military rule which indeed is the primary reason for the absence of democracy not just in Egypt but elsewhere too, including in non-Muslim polities. Thirteen years ago, in 2000, Alfred Stepan of Columbia University who has studied democratisation across continents made a stark observation which rings so true as we make sense of Egypt today: '...the greatest obstacle to democracy is posed not by Islam but by military and intelligence organisations unaccountable to democratic authority'. If they are serious about creating a healthy and democratic world, liberal secularists should soberly practice Stepan's thoughtful observation.*

*The Egyptian liberals, uncritically beholden to the incorrect narrative of a 'secular West', should recall that during the long Cold War, the West, certainly the USA, rarely defined itself as 'secular'. The non-religious Communist bloc was not just a threat to capitalist 'free world' but 'equally to Christian society as expressed in Western bloc democratic nations'. In fact, free world and Christian civilisation were nearly the same. No less significantly, as Jose Casanova notes: 'the initial project of a European Union was fundamentally a Christian? Democratic project, sanctioned by the Vatican'. My point is that the assumption of a 'secular West' is as much naïve and erroneous as the notion of a 'theocratic' Muslim Brotherhood.*

*In distant past, for many liberals' liberalism stood for checking the arbitrary power of the state in order to protect and enhance citizens' political rights; in contrast, most contemporary liberal secularists –in West and Egypt alike –scream to increase and sanctify the arbitrary power of the state and curtail citizens' liberties, even democratic politics. By not endorsing the forces and voices of democratisation such as those of Freedom and Justice Party liberal secularists display, if unwittingly, their deep complicity with authoritarianism, uncivil rule and neo-imperial hegemony. How else can one understand the unstinted support to Egypt's military regime instituted in the name of liberalism and secularism by such anti-democratic, royalist and monarchist regimes as Saudi Arabia and UAE which use Islam to serve their patriarchal families' rule?*

***Irfan Ahmad is a political anthropologist and a senior lecturer at Monash University, Australia and author of Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami (Princeton University Press, 2009) which was short-listed for the 2011 International Convention of Asian Scholars Book Prize for the best study in the field of Social Sciences. Currently, he is finishing a book manuscript on theory and practice of critique in modernity and Islamic tradition.***

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هل السيسي "سايكوباتي"؟

### Is Al-Sisi a "psychopath"?

(An Arabic script coupled with English translation)

2014/5/22

د. أسامة أبو الرُّب

ويقول مستشار الطب النفسي الدكتور محمود أبو دنون إن السيسي شخصية سايكوباتية كاملة الأوصاف، مؤكداً أنه لا يستدل على ذلك بلغة الجسد وإنما بلغة الفعل "فهذه الشخصية لا ضمير لديها ولا أخلاق ولا مبادئ، وأفعالها تحقق شهوات وأحلام صاحبها بغض النظر عن تأثيرها السلبي على الآخرين".

ويشرح -في حديث للجزيرة نت- أن صاحب هذه الشخصية يكذب ويخون ويخدع ويسرق ويمثل ويتحايل حتى يصل إلى مراده. وأضاف "عند تطبيق ذلك على السيسي نجده قد استخدم الكذب مرات عديدة من خلال وعود زائفة، كما نراه وقد سرق وطننا وسرق حكماً شرعياً وسرق استحقاقات دستورية وخان رئيسه الذي حلف أمامه بيمين الولاء".

ويلفت الدكتور أبو دنون إلى أن "السيسي قام بتمثيل دور المتدين الورع والإنسان الحنون صاحب الدمعة، وفي نفس الوقت قام بقتل الآلاف وأحرق الجثث واعتقل خيرة أبناء الشعب المصري، واتهمهم بأبشع التهم" مؤكداً أنه "رجل بلا أخلاق، وهو مستعد أن يحرق مصر في سبيل تحقيق هدفه". وختم بقوله إن "السيسي بلا أدنى شك هو شخص سايكوباتي كامل الأوصاف".

المصدر : الجزيرة

#### [Translation]

22/5/2014

**Dr Osama Abu Al-Rub**

According to Psychiatric counsellor, Dr. Mahmoud Abu Danoun, Al-Sisi is a full-fledged psychopath. He has no conscience, morals, or principles. He is only after fulfilling his own desires and dreams, never mind the negative impact he might afflict on others.

*He explains - in an interview with Al-Jazeera Net – that Al-Sisi, the bearer of such a personality, lies, betrays, deceives, steals, acts, and spoofs until reaching his own end.*

*He adds, “We find Al-Sisi to have lied many times. He also stole a homeland, a legitimate rule, and constitutional entitlements. He betrayed his president before whom he swore the oath of allegiance”.*

*Dr. Abu Danoun also notes that “Al-Sisi played the role of the devout and the tender-hearted. Meanwhile, he murdered thousands of people, burned a lot of bodies, arrested the finest sons of Egypt, and accused them of the ugliest charges”. Abu Danoun stresses that Al-Sisi is “a man with no moral compass and that he is ready to burn Egypt to ashes, all for the sake of achieving his own ends”. He concluded that Al-Sisi “without a shred of doubt, is a full-fledged psychopath”.*

*Meanwhile, as maintained by Dr al-Habashneh, Al-Sisi expresses a heterogeneous mindset. He does not possess the knowledge necessary to answer questions, nor is he able to suppress his own outbursts. This, according to Dr al-Habashneh, indicates that Al-Sisi possesses an underdeveloped mental filtering. He stresses that Al-Sisi also possesses a narcissistic character. These are clear signs of him becoming a dictator.*

**Source: Al-Jazeera**

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## Script 12 (STE\_T)

### *Video shows Egypt generals plotting media gag*

(An English straight news story)

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**3 Oct 2013**

***New footage released by activists shows army top brass discussing ways to tighten control over country's media.***

*A new video has emerged which appears to show Egypt's military generals deciding how to deal with the country's media.*

*The footage, released by activists on Wednesday, shows army chief General Abdul Fatah el-Sisi addressing senior officers of the army in the months before Mohamed Morsi was ousted from power.*

*Once a minister of defence in Morsi's government, Sisi played a leading role in the July 2013 military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood-backed president.*

*The new recording starts with an officer urging Sisi to find a way to frighten journalists from criticising the army.*

*Since the military takeover on July 3, dozens of journalists have been arrested and several television stations shut down in Egypt.*

*Al Jazeera became one of several media outlets that have come under increasing pressure. Its offices have been raided a number of times and its journalists arrested.*

*Speaking to Al Jazeera, Jamal Dajani, the vice-president for Middle East and North Africa at Internews - an NGO which aims to empower domestic media worldwide - said the video showed the military trying to turn the clock back to dictatorships of the past.*

*"But after the revolution, they lost control. So they are putting together a strategy where they could either win journalists over or threaten them to enforce the red lines they had before," Dajani, speaking from Washington D C, said.*

*“We are very disturbed by a renewed increase in violations of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of information, and by a wave of official statements displaying clear hostility towards media that fail to sing the army’s praises,”*  
*Reporters Without Borders said in a statement.*

**SOURCE: AL JAZEERA**

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العلاقات التركية المصرية.. إلى أين؟

*The Turkish-Egyptian relations.. Where are they heading?*

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

محمد زاهد غل

2013/11/27

ولم يخطئ من وصف ما وقع يوم 14 أغسطس/آب الماضي في ميدان رابعة بأنه مجزرة القرن، بل قد تكون مجزرة الإنسانية جمعاء تم تنفيذها بروح انتقامية من السيسي على من أفضلوا انقلابه العسكري وهم أحياء في الميادين أولاً، ثم وهم أحياء عند ربهم يرزقون ثانياً، وستبقى أرواحهم وشهادتهم وشعارهم دليلاً دامغاً على أن السيسي ومن معه كانوا أكثر جرماً من فرعون ومن معه في قتلهم المؤمنين بالله، وفي ذبحهم أبناء المستضعفين في الأرض، وفي استحياهم نساء الأحرار من الشعب المصري، حتى أصبحت إشارة الأصابع الأربعة أشد على السيسي ومن معه من عصا موسى وشقها البحر نصفين. إن إشارة "رابعة" ستكون عصا الحق الذي يزهق الباطل، وستكون قريباً جزءاً من العلم المصري بقرار من مجلس الشعب، وستبقى رمزا للحرية التي تلاحق الانقلابيين والسفاحين في مصر وفي كل مكان بالعالم.

محمد زاهد غل

محمد زاهد غل، كاتب ومحلل سياسي، من مواليد إسطنبول 1982

[Translation]

*Muhammad Zahid Gul*

27/11/2013

*According to the author, Rabaa is, indeed, the massacre of the century, or rather the entire humanity. It was carried out by Al-Sisi in the spirit of retaliation. Those who were slain proved the failure of his military coup twice. The first time whilst they were still alive, protesting in the squares, and the second time after having been martyred, finding their sustenance now in the presence of their Lord.*

*The souls of those slain shall remain irrefutable evidence, attesting that Al-Sisi and his soldiers (who engaged in killing the believers of Allah, slaughtering the male children of the weak ones, sparing only the women) were much worse than Pharaoh and his soldiers.*

*The sign of Rabaa has now become more of a tough sight in the eyes of Al-Sisi and his men, and much tougher on them than the Staff of Moses as it splits the sea. Rabaa sign will be the new Staff of Truth that vanquishes the falsehood; and will soon be part of the Egyptian flag. It shall remain a symbol of freedom which will forever haunt the putschists and slayers in Egypt and all around the world.*

***Muhammad Zahid Gul***

***Writer and political analyst, born in 1982, Istanbul***

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في رد الادعاء بخيار الضرورة

*Rebutting the “choice of necessity” argument*

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

فهمي هويدي

2014/1/6

في التاريخ المصري القديم اقتضت الضرورة أن يصنف الفرعون باعتباره الملك الإله لأنه كان يعد ضابط النهر، على أساس أن ضبط النهر هو بداية كل شيء، عليه يتوقف النماء ويتحقق خصب مصر وبمنها، كما ذكر جمال حمدان في كتابه "شخصية مصر".

وجمال حمدان هو من أفرد في كتابه فصلا عن العلاقة بين البيئة النهرية والطغيان السياسي، وعرض فيه للنظريات التي اعتبرت تلك البيئة أكثر استعدادا للقبول بالطغيان والحكم المطلق، ذلك أن ضبط النهر يصبح مسوغا لضبط الناس والتحكم في مصائرهم.

تغيرت الدنيا في العصور اللاحقة حتى صار "ضبط الناس" موكولا إلى مؤسسات المجتمع، وإن ظل "الملك الإله" يؤدي دوره بمسميات أخرى في الأنظمة الاستبدادية دون غيرها.

فهمي هويدي

كاتب وصحفي مصري

[Translation]

*Fahmi Huwaidi*

6/1/2014

[Drawing on the geopolitical thoughts of Dr Jamāl Ḥamdān, the author of the article, Fahmi Huwaidi, tries to make sense of the ways in which modern-day, post-MB Egypt is run by President Al-Sisi, who is referred to in the article as the “God-king”.]

As stated by the author, ‘In ancient Egypt, it was necessary for the pharaoh to be set up as a God-King. Although the world has changed in later times, “the God-King” continues to play his role in authoritarian regimes yet under different names’.

*He also adds that 'The river culture of Egypt is more acquiescent and accommodating of despotism and absolutism. Indeed, regulating the river paves the way for controlling the people and steering their destinies'*

*[The author delves into the early history of "despotism", revisits the ancient Egyptian times, and contemplates the role of the pharaoh, all for the purpose of explaining how Egypt is governed today. In doing so, he describes how modern-day Egypt has become a place for "despotic regimes" - as believed by the author - and then explores the links between the river culture environments and tyranny.*

*As seen by the author, it had all started back in ancient times when a pharaoh once took upon himself the task of controlling the river, which is the beginning of everything, before becoming a god, eventually. The flourishing of Egypt was known to be entirely based on the river and, hence, regulating the river was seen as extremely vital. With the passage of time, regulating the river has progressed into controlling the people and steering destinies. This, according to Dr Jamāl Ḥamdān, explains how despotism has first appeared in Egypt and made it into modern times.]*

***Fahmi Huwaidi***

***Egyptian writer and journalist***

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تجارب قديمة ومتجددة في تحويل الفرعون إلى رئيس

*Ancient, yet viable traditions in transforming the pharaoh into a president*

(An Arabic opinion piece coupled with English translation)

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محمد الجوادي

2013/12/2

أصبحنا أمام قائد يتصور بالحق وبغير الحق أنه صاحب الأولوية في أن يرث منصب الرئاسة من دون انتخابات ولا استفتاءات، ولم لا وهو الذي حبس الرئيس بنفسه وأزاحه بنفسه، وقرأ بيان الانقلاب بنفسه وقتل الآلاف بأمر.

وقد تطور حجم هذه المشكلة الكبيرة إلى حد أن مواصفات البطولة بدأت في التشكل والتحول تبعاً لتجارب وخبرات ذهنية قديمة بعضها يمكن وصفه بأنه منحرف أو شاذ، لكن التصور الملح لضرورة وجود بطل يتمتع بما هو غير طبيعي يكاد يجعل هؤلاء المتصورين يرحبون أو يضحون بالبطل حتى لو أنه استبعد أو جمع كل ما أمكنه من المثالب الشخصية من خيانة وشنوذ وعهر وديانة وفحش وكذب وافتراء.

[Translation]

**Muhammad Al-Jawadi**

2/12/2013

*We found ourselves coming face-to-face with a leader who thinks rightfully or otherwise that he truly takes precedence in becoming the president, never mind the need for any elections and referendums. Why not? He is the one who removed and imprisoned the president himself, read out the coup statement himself and had thousands of people killed with a single command.*

*Thanks to his treacherous, deviant, immoral, cuckolding, profane, dishonest, and slanderous tendencies, Al-Sisi is the right type of "Pharaoh" who fits the bill for running the country (as deemed by the ones around him).*

**Muhammad Al-Jawadi**

*Egyptian writer, historian, and professor of medicine*

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