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TELEVISUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE "WAR ON TERROR":
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AL-JAZEERA AND CNN IN COVERING
THE 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ

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To those who believed in me even in times when I did not believe in myself...

My mother Alia and my father Ahmed

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Chapter One

Introduction: Televisual Representation of War

I- Introduction:

At first glance, who would disagree? A tower of the World Trade Center on fire. Frightened workers hanging from the windows. An aircraft flashing across the sky and slamming into the second tower. A fireball. The collapse. The screams of the on-lookers, the dust, the rubble, the darkness, and then the silence. As ugly a reality as anyone would never wish to see again.¹

September 11, 2001. The day the most devastating terrorist attack ever took place in New York and Washington. The televised scene was far beyond words, beyond imagination, beyond description. The images had unprecedented authority, unmatched power. And with global news networks airing the catastrophe live, the worldwide shock enhanced a consensual fearful reaction: the world is not any more a safe place.

The event was then framed, “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror, they were acts of war,” asserted President George W. Bush, the morning following the assaults. “This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve... This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail.”² By these words and others, and in those days, the “war on terror” was constructed as a concept, simply by emotionally defining the event as an “act of war,” where retaliation against the “evil enemy” was definitely a must. These words and the like were repeated over and over by distinguished members of the US administration, alongside the strikingly shocking images/evidence, to illustrate, define and redefine the event.

Repetition of such terms and expressions was central to the “strategy of framing September 11 to ‘unite’ the country behind its solution: a *war* against terrorism, and initially, military intervention to topple the Taliban government of Afghanistan.” The repetition of both words and images was central to this framing, by constantly arousing public consciousness about its dreadful reality and appalling veracity. “Reminding the public of the ‘evil’ helped to maintain their support; merely mentioning the word could cue a whole series of conscious and

¹ David Campbell, “Imaging the Real, Struggling for Meaning” Watson Institute (<http://www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/911/index.cfm?id=4#>, October 6, 2001).

² Robert Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11” Political Communication, 20, 2003, 415.

unconscious thoughts and feelings about September 11,”³ argues Entman. The theatrical and dramatic fashion, in addition, in which these words were said and repeated over and over, and emphasized in a way that appealed to the public, is a notable dimension to its framing.

Essentially depicted as a media event, 9/11 was in effect framed via television. Imagery and televisual representation, thus, accompanied with effective narratives, were central to framing the “war on terror” since its very outset. Though many doubt the authenticity and perceived impact of images, instant television is still the most reliable information source in wartime and crisis situations. In the US-led “war on terror,” not only is the mass media integral to its very planning and conduct, but even central to its “perceived” success or failure. This is not only because arrangements to control the mass media was central to its planning, since 9/11, but also because the technological facilities, largely dependent on Information Technology (IT), through which contemporary wars are conducted, open up new ways to exercise deeper pressure on the news media. Such measures range from monitoring satellite communications between the news media in the war zone and their headquarters, to encrypting its transmission in some areas, to targeting and subjecting media centres and wartime correspondents to the aerial bombardment to force them to cooperate with the military. Spying on Al-Jazeera communications at its Doha headquarters during the invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent targeting of its offices is a case in point.

Throughout the military attacks against Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003, the great majority of the US and UK mainstream media were decisively employed and intimidated to guarantee favourable representation. Accordingly, they presented a surgically clean, fully sanitized, version of the assaults, devoid of their human aspects: the dead bodies or anything perceived as “disturbing scenes.” The Pentagon’s controlling of the imagery included producing its own images and video footage in direct cooperation with Hollywood, barring journalists’ access to the war zone in Afghanistan, embedding them with the military in Iraq, and establishing a network of communication centres aimed at orchestrating a singular representation of the “war.”⁴ In this process, both the US and UK news media were generally cooperative, to avoid being regarded as “less patriotic” and to have their share of the “war” coverage, a news scoop that nobody would want to miss. I may assume, thus, that both the Pentagon and the news media each had its specific interests in declining the public the right to be served critical and balanced reporting of the heated events.

³ Entman, “Cascading Activation” 416.

⁴ David Miller, “The Propaganda Machine,” in David Miller ed., Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 80-91.

Unfortunately, however, the Pentagon-produced “clean” images, displayed on most, if not all, global news outlets, were vehemently challenged by the undesired images of death, pain, agony and destruction. Those images were exclusively displayed on Arabic satellite channels, where the most influential was the Qatar-based, Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel. Unavoidably the widespread expansion of satellite television across the Arab world has allowed for an alternative coverage viewpoint to be instantly aired to a global Arab audience, largely focusing on the attacks’ direct repercussions: the human losses and the destruction of the cultural and religious infrastructure. Such exclusive scoops, during both assaults, Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003, were certainly eased by the tactical planning of the countries invaded, who deliberately utilized those networks as a milieu for expressing their viewpoints and granted media access to areas of civilian death and destruction to grab ultimate public sympathy for their cause. The Arab networks’ as well encouraged such utilization, for both its newsworthiness and for its potential to appeal to a wider Arab public, featuring them as pan-Arab stations and, thus, earning them credibility and popularity. I may, thus, speculate that a unity of interests between the Arab networks and the governments of the attacked countries in each military assault have largely fed into a new alternative coverage, to which the western audience was never fully exposed.

As a result, the so-called US-led “war on terror,” with its two military assaults to date, was from its very outset a “media war” between two contesting sides, in each assault and at both media and governmental levels. In the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Jazeera, in particular, was the only television station covering the assault from inside the Taliban controlled territories, a location that gave the station an unprecedented opportunity to air the single live coverage of the operations to a global Arab audience. Then, in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the former Iraqi government favoured Al-Jazeera, as well as several other Arabic and foreign news media, which were given special locations and exclusive scoops from inside its borders. It is, thus, safe to claim that the “war on terror,” especially when materialized in two military invasions, became essentially, a “media war.” This is because both sides of the conflict, in each assault, decisively utilized instant television imagery, not only to promote their cause and publicize their viewpoints, but to define and illustrate their perceived victories and/or enemy defeats, as integral to their wartime strategies.

This dissertation examines the power relationship binding the military and the media in the television coverage of contemporary wars, and shaping the visual representations that help produce public opinion. Those power relations, which are further theorized in the following section, are thematically categorized as: (1) military propaganda and censorship

measures; (2) subsequent physical and discursive wartime media-military interactions, often described as mutually beneficial whether cooperative or adversarial; (3) and consequential info-strategic warfare, eased by IT, and communicated via the mass media to affect the war strategy and define perceived victories and potential gains.

By examining cable and satellite television coverage of the US-led “War on Terror,” which materialized in two military assaults so far, I explore the ways in which military and media structures intersect to constrain critical coverage. This study is organized around a comparative analysis of Al-Jazeera, based in Qatar, and the Cable News Network (CNN), based in the US, and the way each reported the US/UK-led “war on terror,” with empirical application to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It uses thematic content and discourse analyses comparatively in order to ascertain how the above-mentioned three power relations materialized in the television coverage, and the subsequent potential of televised “war” images together with their accompanying narratives in shaping public opinion in a fashion that serves the war cause and fulfils its potential strategy.

The choice of Al-Jazeera is based on the fact that its coverage of the two assaults has deeply challenged the Pentagon version of the whole issue, shown on CNN and other US and Western television stations. This has placed Al-Jazeera as a strategic target in battle confrontation, with the Pentagon’s decisive bombing of both its Afghanistan and Iraq offices, and the killing of its Baghdad correspondent, Tarek Ayyoub. Taking the best positions, and beaming the most sensational accurate close-up images of death, pain and destruction, Al-Jazeera was in extreme contrast and contest with CNN International (CNNI), widely perceived as central to the US war machinery, which strictly presented a pro-western sanitized benign version of the military assault, devoid of its human aspects. CNNI has often aired selected Al-Jazeera-exclusive images which seemed less harmful to American/Western public opinion, in addition to its own deliberately well-edited footages. Accordingly, I argue that Al-Jazeera has presented a by-large informative and critical account of the heated events.

Situated in two diverse cultural contexts, each channel sources its credibility from the social and political heritage of its specific region. In a predominantly authoritarian Arab region, Al-Jazeera’s perceived credibility is earned from the volume and quality of instant coverage it imparts, often perceived among the Arab audience as “the truth.” CNN, however, gains its credibility from the round-the-clock official speeches and statements, often accepted at face value among the US and Western audience. The significant disparities between the two channels’ coverage of the military assaults, as well as their perceived impact, thus make them an extraordinary case study and a rich soil for research.

II- Theoretical Illuminations:

Examining the wartime power relations involved in the complex intertwined relationship between the conduct of current warfare and its visual representation, this dissertation essentially deals with the inherently volatile concept of power and its various interpretations and applications. While power is defined by Bertrand Russell as “the production of intended effects,” Lincoln Allison identified limitations to this definition: *Intentionality*, as “the possession of power can have unintentional consequences,” *Comparability* or *Quantifiability*, as “it is very difficult to compare the power of two individuals, groups or institutions,” and *Time* and *Causation*, since “the use of power may be self-diminishing” or “self-increasing” as it is by-and-large unpredictable. Power, says Allison, is often accumulated by one or a combination of several means: (1) *Force*, i.e. “control of the body rather than the person”; (2) *Persuasion*, by “the offering of ideas”; (3) *Authority*, often seen as “legitimate power” and include the “existence of rights to command and corresponding duties to obey”; (4) *Coercion*, by “controlling people through threats, whether overt or tacit”; (5) *Manipulation*, which “involves control exercised without threats, typically using resources of information and ideas,” where “people do not realize they are being manipulated or the process would not work.”⁵

As this research essentially focus on the televisual representation of the “war on terror,” the media-military power relations analyzed essentially refer to each party’s successful attempt to control the televisual images and their accompanying discourse, directly and indirectly, in a fashion that serve its policy and strategic interests. Using the evidence of actions, reactions and interactions between both parties, in simple terms this analysis reflects each party’s ability and success in making the other party do what it would not otherwise do. In this power contest, most of the above-mentioned means by which power is accumulated seem to be applicable for both parties’ perceived power⁶, except that the military power comprises *force, coercion and authority*, which are evidently not possessed by the news media, despite the arguable authority of images at some points. To apply this on the case understudy, we find the media discourses of retaliation in the US and invasion and occupation in the Arab World entail a great deal of *persuasion*, for the ideas they are publicizing, and

⁵ Lincoln Allison, “power,” in Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics Oxford Reference Online. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)

(<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t86.e1065>)

⁶ The frequent use of “perceived power” and “perceived victory” in this dissertation for both governments and media institutions involved, directly and indirectly, in the televisual representation of the “war on terror” is meant to highlight the relative nature of power exercised or victory embodied as there is no way to ascertain of the extent of power or victory each party attributes to itself.

manipulation, especially when those ideas are backed by images/evidence, which are likely to make the audience miss the manipulation process. Also, the wartime rules imposed by the military of both sides of the conflict on the movement of reporters and the limitations of what they can report require an exercise of *authority* and *coercion*. The Pentagon's embedment of war journalists with the military escorts reflects a practice of *persuasion*, *manipulation* as well *coercion*, as the journalists tend to believe they are being favoured by their closeness to the soldiers and the live reporting, persuaded they are serving their country's national security by following the rules, and at the same time, coerced by their inability to leave positions in fear of the war dangers and of violating the rules and becoming excluded.

Nevertheless, those facets of power have limitations that require consciousness of the inherent relativity of power in terms of intentions, comparability, volume, time and causation. Those limitations make the attempt to trace the pace of wartime media-military power relations by-large indefinite, as power keep evolving from each party to the other. For example, Al-Jazeera's appalling images of the 2001 attack on Afghanistan seems to have yielded the channel more power against the US Pentagon, urging the US officials to explain their position to both American and Arab audience, which they would not have otherwise done. Then, while the subsequent bombing of the channel's Kabul offices demonstrates the prevalence of the Pentagon's military power, it was utilized by Al-Jazeera, as evidence of the military brutality their news describe, grabbing diverse public sympathy and earning the channel eventual credibility⁷ and power!

Consulting the concrete evidence of measures and actions taken by each side to control, affect, and challenge the other, subsequent actions and reactions to such measures, and the consequential televisual representation, can clearly indicate the extent of power each party could exercise at a given time. This explains why those power relations are thematically built on each other as, military/governmental propaganda⁸ and censorship⁹ measures, leading

⁷ Credibility of the news media, in this research, refers to the media's being generally regarded as trustworthy among its target audience who tend to perceive its reporting as 'truthful'. A news media's 'power' often relates to its perceived credibility. Al-Jazeera's perceived credibility is verified by different authors. See El-Nawawy and Iskander (2002); Hugh Miles (2005).

⁸ Propaganda refers to "any technique, whether in writing, speech, music, film or other means, that attempts to influence mass public opinion. Propaganda was used by both sides in World War I to demonize the enemy and so make the war more acceptable at home... Propaganda is also used in democratic societies, although it is rarely called that-except by those who oppose its content or message. Any group that advocates its cause with the intent of influencing opinion might be said to be practicing propaganda-especially if its methods are blatantly biased or misrepresent facts." American Spirit, Political Dictionary, (<http://www.fast-times.com/politicaldictionary.html>) accessible through alphadictionary.com

⁹ Censorship is defined as "the prevention of publication, transmission, or exhibition of material considered undesirable for the general public to possess or be exposed to. This can include the censorship, in the national

to subsequent physical and discursive wartime media-military interactions, and resulting on consequential info-strategic warfare being communicated via television discourse.

Power in this dissertation is perceived as by-and-large coercive/repressive for the simple fact that resistance to such power, as represented in Al-Jazeera's discourse, is deemed mostly unsuccessful for its inability to prevail or alter the course of state policy. Power is however productive within the boundaries of military control and war policy, as reflected in the televisual state-of-the-art discourse, essentially produced to accumulate and/or challenge strategic ends. Consulting and analyzing discourse as a repressive/productive vehicle of power invites Michelle Foucault's knowledge and power theory, essentially focussing on its productive facet. As Hall explains Foucault's notion, "Power is not only negative, repressing what it seeks to control. It is also productive. It doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but... it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse."¹⁰ Evidently the military control and monopoly of the artistic and cinematic representations of wars over history, as shown in Chapter Two, demonstrates this repressive/productive notion of power, later extended to other forms of productions in the Pentagon/Hollywood produced images aired by instant television in the "war on terror".

Power, thinks Foucault, is evolving, as the history of war coverage suggests. It "does not 'function in the form of a chain' – it circulates. It is never monopolized by one centre. It is deployed and exercised through a net-like organization,"¹¹ states Hall. This conforms to Allison's perception on the limitations of the unpredictable concept of power. It is also well-proven over the history of war coverage when the exercise of power on the war coverage evolved from the British in WWI to the Germans in WWII, to the media in Vietnam, and back to the US military in the 1991 Gulf War. Power is, thus, evidently evolving, and it is not necessarily evil or repressing, as it obviously produces discourse.

So, the wartime suppressing role of the military power is also productive and entertaining as it shapes the war's visual representation by producing its own media records and coercing the news media by all means to shape wartime representations according to its info-strategic goals. Power's ability to produce discourse and knowledge, and thus affect the way history is shaped and documented, corresponds to Foucault's arguments on the application and perceived impact of knowledge/power. According to Hall,

interest, of military secrets, or of obscene material." American Spirit, Political Dictionary, (<http://www.fast-times.com/politicaldictionary.html>) accessible through alphadictionary.com

¹⁰ Stuart Hall, "Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse," in Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates, Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader. (London: Sage Publications, 2001) 77.

¹¹ Hall, "Foucault," 77.

Foucault argued that not only is knowledge always a form of power, but power is implicated in the questions of whether and in what circumstances knowledge is to be applied or not. This question of the application and effectiveness of power/knowledge was more important to the question of 'truth'. Knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of 'the truth' but has the power to *make itself true*.¹²

Especially for the representation of war, Foucault's suggestion that knowledge is a form of power that is applied to meet specific ends denotes that the televisual representation of contemporary wars is in fact central to its very conduct. Foucault believes, however, "in each period, discourse produced forms of knowledge, objects, subjects and practices of knowledge, which differed radically from period to period, with no necessary continuity between them"¹³ In this sense, the news media becomes the primary vehicle of discourse in the current era through which power is applied.

According to Barker, Foucault thinks, "we can locate particular kinds of 'regimes of the self' in specific historical and cultural conjunctures so that different types of subject are the outcome of particular historical and social formations."¹⁴ This indicates that the institutional regimes or systems governing or determining the way war coverage is implemented differ over history according to the surrounding historical and social conditions and atmosphere, creating a state of discontinuity between the different historical periods. This may not be, however, quite accurate, as the propaganda and censorship strategies applied throughout the 20th century's wars seem to resemble each other, slightly developing in each war to meet the media-military technological development as clarified in Chapter Two. The evident replication of propaganda and censorship measures has created a state of continuity among the different historical periods. These include the centralization of news sources via specific government bodies, the abundance of faked stories, the intimidation and exploitation of media people for the pure sake of propaganda, and the employment of cinematic effects and fiction for the sake of deception.

This view of Foucault contradicts the views of authors who thought the advancing audio-visual media technology, including film newsreel, television and instant television, negatively affects the military and the media control of battlefield. According to Young and Jesser, "The biggest problem confronting the military is the unprecedented advances in communications technology that have largely made the reporter independent of the military." The military, thus, is unable to be in full control of the media reports transmitted from the war

¹² Hall, "Foucault," 76.

¹³ Hall, "Foucault," 74.

¹⁴ Chris Barker, Television, Globalization and Cultural Identities. (Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1999) 25-26.

zone. "This mobility," they add, "limits even further the ability of the military to block transmissions through electronic jamming."¹⁵ This view is also not so accurate given the fact that advances in military technology have made the war zone much more dangerous pushing the great majority of media people to cooperate with the military to gain safe battlefield access. The advanced communications technologies can, thus, only operate within the confines of the total military control of journalists' movement and reporting. Adding to this the fact that military in today's wars, especially from the aggressing side is the one making and possessing the war news/knowledge, steadily supplied to all the news media. This totally discredits the view that the news media can fully operate independently from the military.

Technology, thus, can only be empowered when associated with institutions, media and/or military, which direct it according to their policy goals. This invites Foucault's concern about "how knowledge was put to work through discursive practices in specific institutional settings to regulate the conduct of others." The perceived power of the mass media here is well represented in Foucault's focus on "the relationship between knowledge and power, and how power operated within what he called an institutional apparatus and its technologies." This apparatus consists of "strategies of relations of forces supporting and supported by types of knowledge."¹⁶ The role of media technology is also well clarified in Hall's explanation of Foucault's thought. "Knowledge does not operate in a void. It is put to work through certain technologies and strategies of application, in specific situations, historical contexts and institutional regimes."¹⁷ So, they are not only the institutional policies that shape visual representation of knowledge, but also the technologies and strategies adopted for such representation. In wartime, despite apparent forms of resistance, those strategies are predominantly in the hand of the most powerful party, the military institution, as the basic source of war news and knowledge.

Such power of knowledge when mixed with an inherent media bias characterizing the global media coverage of the orient, often delimited by stereotypes and prejudices, produces a totally distorted image. As Edward Said describes, "Muslims and Arabs are essentially covered, discussed, apprehended, either as oil suppliers or as potential terrorists."¹⁸ Radical scholars also played a significant role in the Western media misrepresentation of Arabs and Muslims, says Karim H. Karim. He adds that while some academics, such as Samuel

¹⁵ Peter Young and Peter Jesser, The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert Strike. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997) 14-16.

¹⁶ Hall, "Foucault," 75.

¹⁷ Hall, "Foucault," 76.

¹⁸ Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1996), 26.

Huntington and Benjamin Barber, considered Muslims as “the new major threat to the West,” some scholars, such as Bernard Lewis and Elie Kedourie, “acting more as propagandists than as academics,” attempted to prove that “militants among contemporary Muslims are present-day incarnations of terrorists from the beginning of Muslim history.” The mass media, rather than attempting to ‘objectively’ scrutinize those views and question their validity, adopted them as “frameworks in their reporting about Muslims,”¹⁹ adds Karim. This is well reflected in the way CNN reported the “war on terror” since its very outset, as this study proves, where absence of such critical reporting when added to caution and scepticism about the traditions and norms of the countries/cultures being attacked and covered fed into the kind of distorted coverage it purports.

In addition, different authors have attempted to theorize the above-mentioned power relations and the doubted authenticity of their pictorial outcome. Contemporary theoretical views suggest that the orchestrated Pentagon-led efforts to determine the visual representations of its military operations, as well as the attempts of both Afghani and Iraqi governments to resist such discourses by utilizing antagonistic media such as Al-Jazeera, are no more than what Michael Shapiro describes as “practices of cultural governance.” As states’ identities, definitions of boundaries, coherence and perceived threats are only constructed and articulated through the communal-driven cultural and visual representations of official discourses, the interdependent relationship between both sites seems inescapable. As paraphrased by David Campbell, Shapiro argues,

Cultural governance involves support for diverse genres of expression to constitute and legitimise practices of sovereignty, while restricting or preventing those representations that challenge that sovereignty.²⁰

Shapiro’s illumination of cultural governance, including support of legitimizing representations and prevention of challenging ones, seems to best explain the Pentagon-led measures of controlling its representation, as well as attacking, by all means, those who deliberate challenging discourses and obviously threaten its perceived credibility. The concept of hegemony seems central to the processes of cultural governance aimed at building consensus via the news media. As Michael X. Delli Carpini analyses, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony “requires the development of a consensus that is woven into the cultural fibre of a nation and that makes citizens willing participants in either their own liberation or their own

¹⁹ Karim H. Karim, “War, Propaganda, and Islam in Muslim and Western Sources” in Yahya Kamalipour and Nancy Snow, eds, *War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective*, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 112-113.

²⁰ David Campbell, “Cultural Governance and Pictorial Resistance: Reflections on the Imaging of War” *Review of International Studies* 29, 2003, 57.

exploitation.” In these terms, he adds, “the media are viewed as the central institutions for the reproduction of values, norms and behaviours.”²¹ This explains the strategic importance of propaganda in wartime, when all the world media orchestrate the same piece of information circulated by the Pentagon, without verifying it through the challenging discourses. As Richard Jackson concurs, “Political discourses are constructed and employed for specific purposes, most importantly, the creation, maintenance and extension of power.” He adds,

Discourses are an exercise of power; that is, they try to become dominant or hegemonic by discrediting alternative or rival discourses, by promoting themselves as the full and final truth and by drowning out the sound any other discourse. A hegemonic political discourse then is one where the public debate uses mainly the language, terms, ideas, and ‘knowledge’ of the dominant discourse, and where alternative words and meanings are rarely found and dissenting voices are almost never heard.²²

Those hegemonic practices can only materialize through decisive planning, from the side of Pentagon, empowered by information and military technologies that enables their deployment. The “Revolution in Military Affairs,” or RMA, is claimed to have strategically fed into the construction of what Campbell hails as, “the interweaving and interdependence of the military, media and information industries.” RMA, which includes the incorporation of “networked information technology” into strategic developments in the US military battlefield, seems to lead naturally to what James Der Derian’s analyzes as “military-industrial-media-entertainment network” or MIME-NET. The power of MIME-NET, according to Der Derian, lies in the merging of “production, representation, and execution of war. The result is not merely the copy of a copy, or the creation of something new: it represents a convergence of the means by which we distinguish the original and the new, the real from the reproduced.”²³ Der Derian’s analysis of the way contemporary wars are being conducted, through MIME-NET, can best explain how the cinematic wartime military imagery and video footage feed into the Pentagon’s info-war strategy. The dramatic rescue of Private Jessica Lynch, who was claimed to have fought despite being injured, during the military invasion of Iraq seems to best illustrate this (Chapter Five).

This evidently cooperative media-military relationship, specifically in the US, is also explained in Robert Entman’s “cascading activation” model, which especially explains how “thoughts and feelings that support a frame extend downward from the White House through the rest of the system—and who thus wins the framing contest and gains the upper hand

²¹ Michael X. Delli Carpini, “US Media Coverage of the Vietnam Conflict in 1968” in Michael Klein (ed.) *The Vietnam Era: Media and Popular Culture in the US and Vietnam*, (London: Pluto Press, 1990), 41–42.

²² Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) 19.

²³ Campbell, “Cultural Governance and Pictorial Resistance” 62.

politically.” In this realm, “the cascading flow of influence” links all system levels downwards from the Administration, White House, State and Pentagon, to the elites, Congress members, ex-official, experts, and foreign leaders, to the media, journalists and news outlets, to the news frames, text and images, and finally to public opinion, measured through polls and other indicators. In this hierarchy of impact, the “activation of thoughts and feelings in the minds of journalists and leaders almost immediately spawns conversations that spread ideas between participants.” In such conversations, the more simultaneous are the thoughts and ideas expressed by journalists’ sources and other outlets, “the more likely their own thoughts will run along those lines, with the result that the news they produce will feature words and visuals that confirm the same framing.”²⁴

Entman’s cascading activation model seems to be applied through the above-mentioned practices of hegemony, described by Carpini. Entman’s model clearly explains how the wartime Pentagon’s efforts to control its representation could simultaneously run along different hierarchal circles, in a singular unified frame. It suggests, however, necessarily direct reactions expressed among all parties involved, just by the constant exposure to simultaneous opinions and perceptions. This may not be quite realistic as the experts and people’s reactions are hard to predict or generalize, especially when they lie in the existing ideas and feelings they hold towards a certain situation. Entman’s theory fails, for instance, to explain the anti-war movements organizing demonstrations around the globe, throughout the war, even in the very countries perpetuating the attacks, where the media is constantly acting as a mere mouthpiece to the official discourse.

Several theses have attempted to theorize the perceived impact of television imagery and its accompanied discourse. These mainly include Susan Moeller’s thesis, *Compassion Fatigue*, arguing that the “abundant supply of imagery has dulled our senses and created a new syndrome of communal inaction,” in which the people’s feeling of helplessness in front of images/evidence of suffering and hardship places them in denial of those facts. In contrast, the CNN Effect thesis claims that the “power of news imagery is such that it can alter the course of state policy simply by virtue of being broadcast,”²⁵ which suggests an essentially positive audience reaction pressuring governments to react towards crises. The audience in these two cases, thus, either has no reaction out of a sense of helplessness, or has a powerful reaction amounting to forcing change in state policy. Both theories, however, suggest a direct reaction

²⁴ Robert Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S Foreign Policy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 9-10.

²⁵ David Campbell, *Representing Contemporary War*, *Ethics and International Affairs*, 2003, 17 (2) 99.

toward television imagery without paying attention to the different cultural backgrounds of viewers, normally resulting in different reactions and perceptions of issues and events.

An image, however, is neither depicted nor displayed in a vacuum. The cultural background of an image depicter and viewer, determine the message it carries and the way it is perceived by a specific audience. As suggests David Campbell, “The power of images rests on a fair amount of political consciousnesses for both its depicter and its viewer.”²⁶ Campbell elaborates that the “structural undecidability” of an image may incur any number of responses to a particular image depending on the cultural background. “Given the time for contemplation allowed by the fixing of the image, the construction of meaning arises from the complex interplay of the photographic representation, its location, accompanying text, moment of reading, as well as the frames of reference brought to it by the viewer/reader.”²⁷ Probably the intentions of an image depicter are best represented, during the assault on Afghanistan, when the American audience started to question its morality upon watching Al-Jazeera’s video footage on CNN. Depicted in a completely different cultural context those images eventually carried the natural outcome of war: death, pain, agony and destruction, things that apparently negated the cultural context of retaliation in which the invasion was justified in America.

As those theories attempt to explain the three power relations determining the visual representation of contemporary war—military propaganda and censorship measures, physical and discursive media-military relationship and info-strategic warfare—they would be further tested in the dissertation and applied on the cases under study.

III- Research Problem and Questions:

Contemporary wars are essentially defined through their media representation, and in particular television imagery, where perceived victory and defeat is often framed and illustrated. The complexity of the issue of media coverage of war, however, lies in the many facets and dimensions it purports to give. On the one hand, the news media, and specifically television, employs the latest information technology and thus is technically capable of airing global events and issues live and instantaneously, especially if granted access to the war zone and freedom of movement and reporting. Such technological dimension yields the news media a great deal of authority and power, which it is supposed to exercise from a critical distance as a watchdog or a fourth estate.

²⁶ David Campbell, Representing Contemporary War, Ethics and International Affairs, 2003, 17 (2) 99.

²⁷ David Campbell, Representing Contemporary War, Ethics and International Affairs, 2003, 17, (2) 101.

On the other hand, the military would like to enhance and sustain public support throughout the war, which it can only accommodate through favourable media representation, illustrating and characterizing its perceived victories. The technological power granted to the news media, however, means it may air instant visual reports of things that may harm the military's info-strategic warfare, and cast the military in an unfavourable light, as the thin line between the information collected by the media and the intelligence collected by the military tends to be eroded. The military, thus, exerts its ultimate efforts to control its media representations, via measures of propaganda and censorship, as integral to the war planning itself. The military supplies the news media with a great deal of propaganda, while imposing both direct and indirect censorship. Direct censorship mainly entails scrutinizing the media content and indirect censorship includes barring the reporters access to the war zone, and delimiting their movement and the issues that they are permitted to report on.

Nevertheless, the news media in liberal democracies has a professional and moral duty of reporting independently from government/military control, presenting a critical account of events and issues. It is supposed to exert every possible effort to seek objectivity, which is "the ability to consider or represent facts, information, etc., without being influenced by personal feelings or opinions."²⁸ The news media's closeness to the war zone on both sides of the conflict, together with the propaganda and censorship effort exerted by the military, however, delimits reporters' vision and eliminates the spatial distance required to report in an impartial fashion. Objectivity, thus, I believe, becomes some kind of mirage. Bearing witness to global events, the reporters' ability to detach themselves from their surrounding context is constrained by their closeness to a crisis situation, where their own lives together with those of the people they report on, whether civilians or combatants, are under constant threat. Accordingly, the news media's attitude and performance, throughout this dissertation, is judged according to the effort exerted to seek relative objectivity.

As the positivist notion of objectivity – entailing journalists' seeking truthful impartial reporting – negates Foucault's power and knowledge theory, where there is no 'truth', the journalists' attitude is judged in this research according to their adherence to their own "code of ethics". The international journalists' codes of ethics, normally conforms to Article 19 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating that "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media

²⁸ Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, (<http://dictionary.oed.com>)

and regardless of frontiers.”²⁹ Professional journalists’ associations and societies tend to base their codes of ethics according to this declaration. As states the Radio-Television News Directors Association and Foundation (RTNDA), “Professional electronic journalists should operate as trustees of the public, seek the truth, report it fairly and with integrity and independence, and stand accountable for their actions.”³⁰ Likewise, the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) states that the journalist’s duty includes “seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues. Conscientious journalists from all media and specialties strive to serve the public with thoroughness and honesty. Professional integrity is the cornerstone of a journalist’s credibility.”³¹

To do so, journalists must “pursue truth aggressively and present the news accurately, in context, and as completely as possible.” They should also “present the news fairly and impartially, placing primary value on significance and relevance,” and “defend the independence of all journalists from those seeking influence or control over news content.”³² Journalists, thus, who do not resist measures of controlling and censoring their reporting are in clear violation of their ethical integrity. This is why, in wartime, when such rigorous measures are stiffly imposed, many journalists prefer to report unilaterally, and even those placed under the control of media pool or embedment process, seek to violate such control at some points, realizing that it negates the essence of professional journalism.

Nevertheless, in wartime, the news media’s need to access the war zone can only be accumulated through government/military arrangements, at both sides of the conflict. At this point, the media’s critical role and authority as a fourth estate or watchdog can be easily sacrificed by the need to access and report from the war zone. This may happen unavoidably in exchange for some sort of favourable coverage, at both sides of the conflict, which ranges in intensity and volume according to the nature of the media-military power relationship, including the power each side of the conflict can exercise on the media, and the effort exerted by the news media to resist such power. The news media is thus squeezed between the two contesting sides, each is striving to win the “media war” by strategically utilizing it to define perceived victories and guarantee a certain level of favourable or uncritical coverage, which is sought to legitimize its actions and sustain public support during the war. Willingly or not, the news media becomes an adversarial party in the actual fight and a target for both verbal and

²⁹ “Article 19” Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, (<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>)

³⁰ “Ethics: Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct,” Radio-Television News Directors Association and Foundation, (<http://www.rtna.org/ethics/coe.html>)

³¹ “Code of Ethics,” Society of Professional Journalists, (http://www.spj.org/ethics_code.asp)

³² “Ethics” (<http://www.rtna.org/ethics/coe.html>)

military attacks, especially in modern wars where the line between combatant and non-combatant is often blurred. The media's moral and professional task, then, is to genuinely attempt to seek objectivity, and exert its utmost effort to disassociate itself from the contesting powers.

Studying the power contest and struggle between the media and the military, at both sides of the conflict, over the war imagery and its visual representation, this thesis essentially examines the intertwining power relationships combining the media and military in wartime. The above-mentioned intertwining angles entailing the media-military wartime power relationship are thematically categorized as follow: (1) the measures of propaganda and censorship practised by the military, (2) the subsequent physical and discursive nature of the media-military relationship, (3) and the consequential info-strategic warfare communicated through the televised imagery.

While the military strive to censor the mass media by delimiting its movement and determining the type and style of information it is being fed, the mass media is engaged with the military in a love-hate relationship, assumingly trying to meet its requirements while keeping its apparently objective position before its audience to avoid losing credibility. The resulting visual representation of this war on television screens seems to clearly expose those power contests while striving to fulfil info-strategic warfare goals. This exposure eventually raises questions about the effectiveness of propaganda and censorship measures practised by the military to win the "media war", especially with the demise of one-sided coverage, which the US often enjoyed before its "war on terror," and the sheer presence of diverse coverage viewpoints, sometimes being solely communicated, as in the case with Al-Jazeera in Afghanistan in 2001. It also raises questions about the nature of the media-military relationship in wartime, and the likeliness of the resulting media coverage to fulfil info-strategic warfare goals for both sides of the conflict.

In the case under study, the "war on terror", those power relations are to be located both in the literature on the two channels being analyzed, Al-Jazeera and CNN, and the war itself, including its two military assaults so far, Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003. The dissertation then shows how these power relations are reflected in the visual representation of the military assault on television screens, comparing Al-Jazeera and CNN coverage of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, in terms of both content and discourse. *By locating the operational status of those power relations, the dissertation aims at explaining and highlighting how those wartime power relationships intertwine to constrain critical reporting and shape the visual representation of contemporary wars.* This leads to the central hypothesis arguing that *the*

abundant supply of controversial imagery of death, suffering and destruction, as well as speeches and viewpoints of official figures from the invaded countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, in the televisual representation of the “War on Terror,” via Al-Jazeera, not only has challenged the American official discourse, shown on CNN, but also harmed and eroded US info-strategic warfare goals in many instances. This has placed the news media as strategic target in battle confrontations.

By consulting the above-mentioned power relations through thematic content and discourse analyses of the war coverage, the dissertation attempts to determine: What role is played by instant television, and in particular Al-Jazeera and CNN, in the US-led “war on terror” in two diverse parts of the world, concerning both the audience and the military of both sides of the conflict, for each of the military assaults? And to what extent does their communicated imagery and context reflect this role? What impact are the Pentagon-led propaganda and censorship measures having on the visual representation of the televisual representation of the “war on terror”? What is the subsequent nature of “reality” televised through both Al-Jazeera and CNN to the audiences of two diverse worlds? And is this “visual reality” instrumental in supporting or harming the strategic US war policy, or not? What does this televised reality tell about the operational status of the three power relations understudy?

To tackle these questions, I need to pose others concerning each of the themes under study. For the Military Propaganda and Censorship Measures, I may question,

- What type of censorship and propaganda measures were being practised by the military during the two wars, and why and how were these being implemented?
- Whether or not the advance in information and communication technologies, both the ones used by the media and military, have eased or complicated this process.
- Whether or not the wartime propaganda leaked by the military is effective in defining perceived victory and deceiving the perceived enemy.
- Whether or not the propaganda and censorship measures imposed on the media are enough to prevent unfavourable coverage or undesired images and video footage.
- Whether or not those measures are clearly exposed to the audience, thus affecting the media’s credibility and the perceived military honesty of the governments engaged in such processes

Regarding the Media-Military Wartime Power Relationship, it may be asked,

- What are the limits and determinants of the mutually beneficial love-hate relationship between the media and the military? To what extent is the military able to take advantage of the media to achieve its perceived goals? And to what extent is the news media cooperating with or resisting measures of propaganda and censorship?
- Whether or not the mass media in wartime is able to balance fulfilling its reporting role with its professional and ethical grounds of striving to seek objectivity, or does one have to be simply sacrificed to the other?

- Whether or not the antagonistic media-military relationship, between the aggressors and the unilateral mass media, usually operating behind enemy lines, has legitimated military targeting of the mass media.
- Is the military's intentional targeting of the mass media installations behind perceived enemy lines a new trend for unlawful, unethical, immoral and unjustified military assaults?

As for Info-Strategic Warfare, I shall wonder,

- Whether or not 'information' in modern warfare has become a strategic commodity for the military, which cannot be easily left to the mass media. How strategically central is the mass media to the military planning of contemporary wars?
- Whether or not the media coverage of contemporary wars is serving or harming their strategic conduct, especially with the existence of diverse mass media covering the same conflicts for diverse audiences.
- Whether or not the military targeting of media installations behind perceived enemy lines can be strategically explained or verified. What does it say about future of military conflicts?

VI- Research Methodology:

Tackling the power relations between the military and the media—in terms of the military attempts to restrict war coverage, its subsequent relationship with the mass media and the resulting info-strategic warfare displayed by the media—entails critically and empirically testing and analyzing the content of television coverage of the war under study. Television content, when efficiently and thoroughly analyzed, is thought to produce a meaningful description of the above-mentioned power relations. This analysis in itself, however, has to be carefully designed and linked to the thesis objectives, its research questions, as well as combining the different elements to explain and attest the perceived meanings of those video images.

Gillian Rose suggests three sites that can together form or produce the meaning of a visual image: the production of an image, the image itself, and the way it is interpreted by specific audiences. These sites have corresponding aspects or modalities: technological, which deals with the way an image is constructed to be seen and to enhance a certain viewing; compositional, which looks at the content of the image itself; and social, which refers to the “economic, social, and political relations, institutions and practices” surrounding an image and determining the way it is seen and used.³³ In this study, however, we shall only focus on two sites: the site of production and its technological construction, and the site of the image itself and its compositional qualities. Studying those two sites is deliberately meant to

³³ Gillian Rose, Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials, (London: Sage Publications, 2001) 16-17.

speculate about the hidden meanings of war video images together with the possible intentions of those behind them, which eventually tells the status of the above-mentioned power relations.

To make this empirical research as fruitful and as meaningful as possible, the site of the image itself has to be connected to the site of production, which can only happen by conducting both content and discourse analyses on the audio-visual images being studied. This is because the content analysis, even though the only means of producing accurate descriptive results, is solely looking at the visual content of an image, which does not tell much about the power relations involved or the possible intentions of institutions behind the image. It is, however, necessary for its likelihood of coming up with precise data that could serve the research directions in indicating the volume and time allocated to specific elements. Content analysis, in this research, is thus only meant to be indicative. Accordingly, I have conducted discourse analysis, in addition to content analysis, as the primary means of locating the power relations under study as embedded in the televised images and their accompanying discourse. Discourse Analysis looks at the images collectively and attempts to construct the intertextuality and discursive formations of images, which both refer to the way meanings are connected together in a certain discourse, and directly relate them to the power relations being investigated.

Though the relationship between discourse analysis and content analysis seems problematic, many authors suggest they can fit together perfectly in some cases, as in the case under study. According to Kimberly Neuendorf, in analyzing “some aspects of human communication from a carefully selected set of messages,” both approaches seem necessary because they are essentially “concerned with drawing conclusions.” Despite reaching those conclusions from different routes, “but ultimately their findings can fit together quite nicely, providing a good example of triangulation of methods, a highly desirable situation.”³⁴ So, both methodologies seem to complement each other in the analysis of Al-Jazeera and CNN’s televised news reports. Neuendorf further clarifies that while content analysis “serve as a stimulant to the conduct” of discourse analysis, discourse analysis, “provides a rich source of contextual data,” yielding “a ‘big picture’ of a realm of communication activity, ostensibly leaving no stone unturned in a consideration of all critical messages,” and opening up of “the

³⁴ Kimberly A. Neuendorf, “Content Analysis—A Contrast and Complement to Discourse Analysis.” Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section in Qualitative Methods, 2, 1, Spring 2004, 33.

discovery of variety and texture of communication.”³⁵ Accordingly the application of discourse analysis is considered the main methodology determining the power relations understudy, while content analysis is just meant to be indicative, leading the way to the more in-depth analysis provided by the different types of discourse analyses outlined below. According to Neuendorf, the “triangulation of methods... is the ideal. When the findings agree, the conclusions of the researchers are strengthened multi-fold.”³⁶

To be able to employ discourse analysis in this fashion, I have specified two types of discourse analysis, identified by Rose as, “discourse analysis I” and “discourse analysis II”. Discourse analysis I essentially deals with the audio-visual images of this research, focusing on how their production and rhetorical organization is articulated via the visual images themselves. Discourse analysis II, however, is more concerned with the intersection of the power employed by institutions and technologies and their practices in the production of visual images, which corresponds more clearly and directly to the research questions and objectives of this research. While discourse analysis I will be empirically applied on the material studied, representing the site of the image itself, discourse analysis II will be applied through the theoretical literature discussed in Chapters Three, Four and the first section of Chapter Five, representing the site of production.

While Chapter Three consults the institutional practices of Al-Jazeera and CNN, and the nature of the medium itself, Chapter Four and the first section of Chapter Five, explores how both channels, Al-Jazeera and CNN, covered the so-called “war on terror”, with its two military assaults against Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003. The methodology for Chapter Two, however, is a historical one, tracing and analyzing the status of media-military power throughout the twentieth century’s history, which set the stage for making more sense of the current status of this relationship. The following sections, thus, detail how content and discourse analyses are conducted to analyze the audio-visual content of the instant TV coverage of the alleged embodiment of the US-led “war on terror”.

A- Content Analysis:

Content Analysis is inescapably ‘the’ most efficient way of analyzing data, including written, visual, and audio-visual, as it is the most likely to produce valid countable results that can be critically interpreted to produce meanings and/or give directions on the specific power relations being reviewed. The first step to undertaking content analysis is finding and

³⁵ Neuendorf, “Content Analysis” 33-34.

³⁶ Neuendorf, “Content Analysis” 33.

selecting the samples or video images to be analyzed. At this stage, I have selected three evening daily news reports of each war, which range in total between 25-35 minutes. This sampling is deliberately meant to be representative of the coverage variations. After videotaping those samples from the actual satellite coverage of both channels for the 2003 attack on Iraq, and repetitively watching them, I have transcribed them, described in full detail what actually appeared in the accompanying images, and calculated the time given to each speaker in each news report. I have also made literal translations into English of Al-Jazeera's broadcasts, which are originally produced in Arabic. As this content analysis is essentially focussed on analyzing the imagery, it exclusively utilizes my human description, which was carefully conducted to be as accurate as possible, to assess, analyze and evaluate Al-Jazeera and CNN's visual imagery. Accordingly, the findings and results of this content analysis are purely meant to be indicative and to lead the way for further in-depth analysis provided in the further explained two types of discourse analysis.

The second step, then, was setting the categories for coding the video images. Coding, as Rose defines, is "attaching a set of descriptive labels (or categories) to the images."³⁷ Those categories are best developed according to the central theoretical concerns of the research (the three power relations). They must be *exhaustive*, "categorizing every aspect of the image," *exclusive*, categories not overlapping, and *enlightening*, "analytically interesting and coherent".³⁸ To develop these codes/categories, I have closely consulted the video images accompanied with each channel's reporting as objectively as possible, and tried to first list all the possible codes that could be associated with those video images. These mainly include the following:

- 1- Time of Speaker Location (calculated in minutes): The exact time given to reports from different locations is to be calculated in minutes, such as, in the studio, in Iraq, Washington, Kuwait, London... and so on.
- 2- Frequency of Image Location: The frequency of reports depicted in Iraqi cities, Arab cities, non-Arab cities, as well as different specified locations including the Pentagon, the White House, open-air, battleground and so on, are to be counted. The importance of this element lies in the fact that it purely focuses on the location that is actually depicted and appearing before the camera lens. As in many instances while the news is reported by an in-studio anchor, the images show different places and cities. Also, throughout some recorded news reports, the reporter is sometimes not physically featured before the camera. So the image location is not necessarily the same as the speaker's location.

³⁷ Rose, Visual Methodologies, 59.

³⁸ Rose, Visual Methodologies, 60.

- 3- Time Allocated to Speaker: The exact time given to every speaker throughout the sample coverage is to be calculated. These include, In-Studio Anchors, Correspondents, Iraqi Officials, American Officials, British Officials, Arab Officials, UN Officials, Experts/Analysts and so on.
- 4- Frequency of Visual elements depicted: Including Persons, Objects and Actions: These include Speakers, Live Pictures of Places, Recorded Pictures of Places, Still Photos of Places, War Equipment (Tanks, Vans, Aeroplanes), Action or activity of person/s in images (speaking, firing, attacking, looting, saving the wounded, or celebrating perceived victory...), Surroundings of person/s in images (Press Conferences, Battleground, desert, highways, destruction, demolished buildings, fire, or people running...)
- 5- Timing of News Report Types: The total time given to each type of news report included in the daily newscast shall be analyzed and calculated. These include, In-Studio News Report Newscast (News headlines, followed by news items), Live News Report/Update (by correspondents), Recorded News Report (by correspondents), Live Interviews (with officials), Live Officials' Speeches (from press conferences), Recorded Officials' Interviews/Speeches (from press conferences and so on..), Live Interviews With Experts/Analysts, Recorded Interviews with Experts/Analysts.

In picking up those elements, special focus is put on the duration or frequency of the focus on each of them, as it is likely to indicate the message/s behind the image, and the amount of visual truth allowed to be seen. For instance, if the image depicts dead bodies, angry people, prisoners of war, internal parts of palaces or prisons, the time and/or frequency given to each or any of those elements is a crucial indicator of what the media wants the people to see or know. What truth? Or what part of the truth is deliberately depicted?

As the above-mentioned codes are purely meant to be indicative and to give some directions to answering the thesis research questions, they are then complemented by the discourse analysis in the following section. The locations of speaker and image depicted are meant to serve in assessing and discussing the issue of reporters' access to the war zone, the limits of media closeness to the war and the subsequent quality and quantity of actual war coverage possible. This will help in suggesting a possible answer to the questions on military censorship, and the wartime restrictions imposed on the news media.

The time given to the person/s depicted in the image is supposed to show whose viewpoint is mostly addressed, which indicates the amount of free expression or power exercised on the media coverage. This visual element, together with the voiceover or the accompanying words tend to indicate the amount and limits of military propaganda exercised, as well as pointing out the media-military relationship and who is apparently exercising more power in the war zone. The type of news report also is deliberately meant to indicate the amount of live and recorded news reports, as well as the visual representation of officials,

experts, anchors and correspondents in the news. The type of report represents the means each of the news channels uses or depends on in delivering its message. This also indicates the amount of free expression versus propaganda, assuming that “live” reports are supposed to empower the news media with authority and credibility unlike the well-edited recorded news reports.

The Frequency of Visual elements depicted: including persons, objects and actions are meant to show what truth is being presented. What expressions, actions, activities, surroundings, culture and ethnicity are deliberately shown? Assessing these elements will help set the limits of free expression vs. censorship allowed in the coverage of this war. They will primarily deal with the question of propaganda and censorship, as they should indicate what is overexposed and what is ill-exposed in the images. Then, regarding the info-strategic warfare question, they should show from each side of the war what realities are probably helpful in the strategic war conduct when shown at certain times and in certain manners.

The above-mentioned analysis codes are then laid out, in Chapter Five, in separate tables for each element, depicting the element, its duration or frequency, and its percentage, for each channel, where they were analyzed according to the power relations understudy. This has helped list easily ‘what’ is being shown in each of the video footages, as well as its frequency/duration and percentage. The quantitative results are analyzed afterwards to help draw general directions and indicative results on the status of the above-mentioned power relations.

B- Discourse Analysis I:

Despite the ability of content analysis to produce credible, countable and reliable results, giving an air of objectivity to the entire project, it cannot really explain the hidden meanings of power embedded in an image discourse. Such power of discourse, according to Rose’s illumination of Foucault’s thought, is proved by the dominance of certain discourses, operating via powerful institutions and technologies that are claiming “absolute truth.” In these terms, knowledge intersects with power, not only for being discursive, but also for its claims of being true.³⁹ To apply Foucault’s ideas on the cases researched, the knowledge claiming to be true would be the audio-visual images of the US-led invasion of Iraq. The powerful institutions which cooperate, voluntarily or not, in producing such knowledge, are mainly the US government, its allies, and its wartime rivals and the satellite channels, Al-

³⁹ Rose, Visual Methodologies, 138.

Jazeera and CNN. The technology associating such power to those institutions is definitely IT for the military, and for media institutions, the instant/live satellite coverage of the war under study.

Unlike content analysis, which can only analyze the content images, discourse analysis I attempts to construct the inescapable relationship between an image, its production elements and its impact. It is crucial at the beginning of applying discourse analysis on the case under study to find out or determine the sources/images. These would be definitely selected from the samples used above in content analysis. I must note, however, that discourse analysis, unlike content analysis, depends on the quality of material analyzed rather than its quantity. I would, thus, select a few samples that tend to particularly expose controversial or strikingly unique points of the war coverage. Conducting this analysis has also entailed literally translating Al-Jazeera newscasts, which are originally produced in Arabic. Though the translations from which the discourse analysis was undertaken were conducted with extra care to be as accurate as possible, it is crucial to note that some of the translations from Arabic to English are made of texts originally translated from English into Arabic, i.e. Al-Jazeera's airing of live official speeches for western officials. So, they are twice removed from the words actually spoken. Accordingly, the author is not fully certain of the accuracy of their first hand translation. Nevertheless, as examining Al-Jazeera's discourse specifically entails judging its policy those translations are purely treated as what Al-Jazeera chose to air from the speeches of western officials.

The second step to discourse analysis would be iconography, which is more concerned with the "subject matter or meaning of works of art, as opposed to their form."⁴⁰ The iconographic interpretation of specific images, as Rose quotes Panofsky, requires having a broad knowledge of its historical context, which needs both familiarity with the audio-visual images as well as applying personal intuition or "common sense" on the images involved. Such iconographical analysis of images is essentially non-Foucauldian, as it depends on showing how the "essential tendencies of the human mind" are translated into visual themes and concepts, while Foucault insists that there are no such "essential tendencies" as human subjectivity is exclusively constructed.⁴¹ Just like iconography, discourse analysis, despite its attempts to make itself objective, depends on the personal interpretation of intertextuality and discursive formation of images and texts. It focuses on two areas of the subject matter: analyzing the structure of discursive statements/images, exploring their social context, and

⁴⁰ Rose, Visual Methodologies, 144.

⁴¹ Rose, Visual Methodologies, 147.

who says them and in what conditions. Rose suggests a working strategy to applying discourse analysis I,

- 1- Looking at the sources with fresh eyes: This means genuinely attempting to be as objective as possible by trying to forget all pre-held conceptions and thoughts about the material under study.
- 2- Immersing oneself into the sources: This is repetitively exposing oneself to the sources, on an intense and frequent basis, in order to achieve maximum familiarization with the audio-visual image to be analyzed.
- 3- Identifying key themes: This requires deep thinking of the possible connection between words and images, to construct the most likely possible meanings of them. A central theme would be how a particular discourse is organized or structured to produce some kind of knowledge.
- 4- Examining their effects of truth: This, as explains Rose, “entails focusing on claims to truth, or to scientific certainty, or to the natural way of things.” Because those “visual and textual devices” claim to be true, it is crucial to identify the times at which “dissent from a discourse is acknowledged (even if implicitly) and dealt with.” It is vital to “search for the work that is being done to reconcile conflicting ideas, to cope with contradiction or uncertainty, or to counter alternatives, because this work will highlight processes that may otherwise be difficult to detect.”⁴² In the coverage of wars, the fact that the images are shot ‘live’ and from ‘actual’ life occurrences makes them inherently claim to be true, while they are actually only representing a very small part of a diverse and controversial concept of ‘truth’
- 5- Paying attention to their complexity and contradictions: Even though the discursive formations are usually well structured, this does not essentially mean that they must be logical or coherent. Rather, “part of the power of a specific discursive formation may rest precisely on the multiplicity of different arguments that can be produced in its terms.”⁴³ This is very typical of the way news is mixed with opinion in satellite channels’ reporting that claims objectivity by proudly presenting “the opinion and the other opinion,” as the central label of Al-Jazeera satellite channel states.
- 6- Recognizing both the visible and the invisible: it is most important, as well, in discourse analysis to detect what is missing in both images and words. “Absences can be as productive as explicit naming, *invisibility* can have just as powerful effects as visibility.”⁴⁴ This is also typical with the CNN and most non-Arab satellite channels who usually dismiss the images of death and destruction, leaving their audience ill-informed of the direct consequences of their decision to go to war.
- 7- Paying attention to the details: Recognizing the small details of pictures and reading between the lines is also vital in discourse analysis. Unlike content analysis, discourse analysis “requires the careful reading and interpretation of

⁴² Rose, Visual Methodologies, 154.

⁴³ Rose, Visual Methodologies, 155-156.

⁴⁴ Rose, Visual Methodologies, 157-158.

texts, rigorous scholarship rather than adherence to formal procedures.”⁴⁵ Familiarity with the details is crucial to identify key themes, claims to truth, complexities and contradictions, as well as the visible and the invisible.

It is necessary to note, at this point, that discourse analysis I is meant to critically challenge taken-for-granted statements and meanings, and openly question claims to objectivity. This apparently means that the analyst himself cannot claim to be fully objective or truthful, despite all genuine attempts to be so. Discourse analysis I aims at producing a persuasive critical account of the material studied rather than a truthful one. It is more about raising questions than providing answers.

C- Discourse Analysis II:

In this research project, discourse analysis II would be a key element to applying discourse analysis I, as it entirely focuses on the internal policies and practices of media institutions as well as the power granted to them via instant satellite technology, which both intersect to produce the audio-visual images of the “war on terror.” Discourse analysis II, thus, is more of a theoretical, rather than empirical, approach to analysis, representing the site of production rather than the site of the image itself. A working strategy to discourse analysis II, then, would be useful to accurately apply such an approach.

- 1- Examining specific institutions and their discipline: This would be providing background information on Al-Jazeera and CNN, their ownership, policies and roles-played in covering the “war on terror.”
- 2- The rise of those institutions: A discussion of the position of Al-Jazeera in the Arab World, and CNN in the western World, as integral parts of the rise and development of satellite and cable technologies in these two broad areas.
- 3- Institutional apparatuses of power: A discussion of the limits and determinants of power those media institutions are likely to exercise in general, and in relation the government/military system especially in wartime.
- 4- Social subjectivities produced through these discursive apparatuses: What subsequent opinion/messages are delivered via those institutions to construct the way the general public thinks?
- 5- Institutional technologies: What technologies do those institutions use, and what power do they entail? What techniques are deliberately used in conjunction with other technologies to produce precise effects? How are the images framed, by the use of words, music, special sound effects as well as animation, to determine the way they are perceived?

⁴⁵ Rose, Visual Methodologies, 158.

- 6- Audiencing: Who is the target audience? And what message is deliberately directed to him to serve the war policy? Is the audience is a passive or active element in the image production? Are images produced according to the characteristics of a certain audience, or do they solely construct the audience knowledge and characteristics?
- 7- The 'automatic' resulting power relation: How the use of specific technologies and framing apparatus intersects with the audience's knowledge to make the power exercised by the mass media on the audience 'automatically' applied. In this realm, the power exercised by the military on the media, especially in wartime, would also be discussed.

Discourse analysis II, to conclude, attempts to understand the “visual images as embedded in the practices of institutions and their exercise of power.” It focuses on the “institutional apparatus and the technologies that surround them,” and “produce them as particular kinds of images and objects.” It is also concerned with the “social production and effects of visual images.” As, concludes Rose, discourse analysis II “offers a methodology that allows detailed consideration of how the effects of dominant power relations work through the details of an institution's practice.”⁴⁶

To apply this methodology on the three-power relations being studied, it seems evident that the internal discipline and policies of media institutions, as well as their rise and development, will help set their power apparatus. This helps in understanding how the processes of wartime censorship and propaganda successfully function during most wars. It also helps clarify the nature of the media-military wartime power relationship. The discursive apparatuses of knowledge, as well as the different technologies intersecting to produce certain knowledge, help set the stage to understand info-strategic warfare and how knowledge empowered by live satellite technology can play a central role in the strategic apparatus of today's wars. In this realm, the audience would be less likely to play any positive role, as an 'automatic' power relation takes place, where the military is certainly, as usual, in full control, setting and effectively applying the rules of the game.

In this dissertation, Discourse Analysis II is specifically represented in Chapter Three, where Al-Jazeera and CNN's institutional apparatuses of power are outlined together with the nature of TV as a news industry. Then, in Chapter Four, it is theoretically applied on the kinds of reporting each channel purported for the “war on terror” and the subsequent assault on Afghanistan, and in Chapter Five, where the disparities between the two channels' coverage of the attack on Iraq are analyzed in terms of the three power relations understudy.

⁴⁶ Rose, Visual Methodologies, 184-185.

The usage of both content and discourse analysis, as two different methodologies, in undertaking this empirical research is deliberately meant as a means of methodological triangulation, as explained earlier, which is basically the usage of more than one research methodology in approaching the same research. The multiplicity of techniques is essentially meant to add to the value and credibility of the research. While Content Analysis puts an air of objectivity into the research outcome, considering its liability of producing valid and accurate results, Discourse Analysis complements the picture by consulting the images collectively and attempting to construct the intertextuality and discursive formations of images, the ways in which meanings are connected together in a certain discourse, and directly relates them to the power relations.

This dissertation, to conclude, attempts to locate the power relations under study through the institutional practices of media and military establishments and within the image itself, as reflected in the actual television coverage of the “war on terror.” The study is essentially structured in seven chapters. Chapter One introduces the issue being studied, the televisual representation of the US/UK-led “war on terror,” and the significance of empirically comparing Al-Jazeera and CNN. It elucidates the complexities surrounding the wartime media-military relationship, specifying the three power relationships being studied. Then, it outlines the theoretical framework and the research methodologies—content and discourse analyses—detailing a workable strategy to applying them. Chapter Two, then, historically applying a set of analytical categories, attempts to locate the status of the above-mentioned three power relationships throughout the 20th century’s wars to evaluate their historical status and detect their development. In specific, it consults the development of the application of military propaganda and censorship measures, the status of the physical and discursive media-military relationship and the subsequent info-strategic warfare throughout World War One, World War Two, Vietnam War and the 1991 Gulf War. It draws parallels along those wars and compare and contrast them to the current situation of the “war on terror”. This enriches the analysis offered in this thesis, and helps routing through history the development and continuity of some measures and their relations to the corresponding technological development in the means of both war imagery and conduct.

Chapter Three—representing the first application of Discourse Analysis II—consults the structure of the news industry and the institutional apparatuses of CNN and Al-Jazeera to explain how policies and practices of media institutions determine the production of a visual image and its technological construction. It consults the rise and establishment of the two channels, their internal disciplines and media policies and their discursive apparatuses of

knowledge and technologies producing them. Then, tackling CNN and Al-Jazeera's televisual representation of the "war on terror" and the subsequent assault on Afghanistan, Chapter Four, continues the application of Discourse Analysis II on the case being studied. It describes how the nature of media-military power relationships determined its representation, since 9/11 and throughout the 2001 assault on Afghanistan, looking at the ways in which each channel have treated the "war on terror," and evaluating the forces that shaped their visual representations.

Chapter Five, then, apply Discourse Analysis II on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, by first providing detailed theoretical analysis of CNN and Al-Jazeera coverage. Then—representing the empirical application of Content Analysis—it locates the status power relations in the image itself and its compositional qualities through a thematic content analysis, which is by-large indicative, setting the stage to the application of critical discourse analysis in the following chapter. It consults and analyzes the visual elements of both channels' televisual coverage in terms of speaker location, image location, speaker airtime, visual elements depicted, and type of news report. These help indicating what types of 'truth' was deliberately depicted by each channel. Chapter Six, then, exclusively illustrates the power relations are through a thematic discourse analysis of the two channels' coverage. Those themes are essentially represented on each channel's coverage of the aerial bombardment and military operations, the official speeches by both sides of the conflict, the global reactions and worldwide anti-war demonstrations, and the humanitarian situation and civilian casualties. As for Chapter Seven, it attempts to link all those bits and parts together; thoroughly analyzing the main findings of each chapter, drawing a cumulative conclusion for the whole thesis and foreseeing future research areas.

Chapter Two

Historical Relationship between Media and War: Visual Representation of the Twentieth Century's Wars

Introduction:

Historically applying a set of analytical categories on the historical relationship between media and war, this chapter demonstrates how developments in media technologies over the contemporary history of war coverage have led to significant strategic developments in the media representation of twentieth century's wars. Thoroughly tracing the status of the three power-relations understudy—propaganda and censorship measures, subsequent media-military interactions, and consequential info-strategic warfare—over the twentieth century's history would help contextualizing and making more sense of the current status of those power-relations in contemporary wars, and in specific, in the US-led “war on terror.”

As history tells, the more sophisticated are the techniques used in the visual representations of wars, the more intense were the military attempts to utilize those techniques in fulfilling strategic goals. Coincidental with the First World War (1914-1918) was the introduction of film newsreel, and the increasing deployment of print media. This has determined the way WWI was covered and documented. Reported via film newsreel, it was the first war in history to be extensively documented by the military in audio and visual forms. By the Second World War, then, the development of film industry brought about a multiplicity of films, including features, documentaries, newsreels, and short movies, which have largely fed into the visual representation of WWII. This marked a mounting strategic importance of the moving image in affecting public opinion by the 1930s. Feature films were decisively utilized as indirect propaganda, which was thought to be more powerful. As research proves, “Fictional media accounts can also structure and shape perceptions and beliefs, and may in some cases be a more powerful influence than factual accounts.”³⁵ This explains why television approaches to infotainment news and cinematic techniques in current warfare have proved effective.

A few decades later, the US war in Vietnam was dubbed “the first television war,” with the widespread expansion of television in the 1960s. As this war was widely covered by television, the medium, though tightly controlled by the military at the beginning, is often

³⁵ Miller and Philo, “The Effective Media,” 30.

claimed to have a direct impact over the outcomes of the American war in Vietnam, eventually leading the US to retreat from the whole country. The perceived role of television in the Vietnam War incurred in the US what most authors call the “Vietnam Syndrome.” Thereby television is claimed to have lost the US the Vietnam War. This led to the notable absence of the mass media from a number of small wars and military interventions, such as the US wars in Panama and Grenada and the UK war in the Falklands, where the idea of the “media pool” was first implemented by the UK for war coverage, to control its visual representation. The same idea was then proliferated on a wider scale by the coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War, when cable and satellite television were thought to be airing the first instant war ever, from the Pentagon’s very narrow scope. So, in each of those cases, a striking development in the news media technology medium led to a subsequent development in the military propaganda and censorship measures, decisively aimed at utilizing the new medium in serving strategic war goals.

With the widespread deployment of satellite transmissions and videophone, as means of instant coverage, during the US/UK-led military assaults on Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, the mass media, on the aggressors’ side, was kept away from the battleground in the former and embedded with the military escorts in the later. This is because the sanitized coverage of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was challenged by antagonistic media, situated at the disposal of the Taliban government, reflecting their official views and airing a substantial account of civilian casualties and infrastructure demolition. To avoid such embarrassment, the US/UK military establishments allowed journalists from their side to be embedded with the military, to air visual reports from the Iraqi battleground two years later. This was a decisive propaganda campaign aimed at enhancing the public illusion of watching a live war, while eliminating the reporters’ ability to seek objectivity.

Applying the three main analytical categories of power relations discussed earlier entails closely examining the development of the historical relationship between media and war. Accordingly, I have thoroughly traced the status of the three power relations binding the news media and the military in wartime: military propaganda and censorship measures; subsequent physical and discursive media-military relationship; and the consequential info-strategic warfare aimed at affecting the war strategy. Those power relations seem to have been largely dependent on the advance of media technology, and its ability to challenge the military control of the battleground versus the advancing war techniques, allowing the military to control the media coverage of war better. Reviewing the historical development of such technologies and techniques over the twentieth century’s wars, this chapter aims at providing

historical insight into the status of the power relations under study. Demonstrating the limitations and determinants of power exercised by the military versus the news media on the historical representation of war and their perceived consequences eventually helps in contextualizing the way those power relations worked throughout the US-led “war on terror.” Providing this background on the historical status of these power relations helps explaining their current status and the elements determining their pace of development.

I- Physical and Discursive Military Propaganda and Censorship Measures:

1- The First World War:

Since the First World War, propaganda techniques used by the military to control the media coverage were highly effective, as authors concur. According to Carruthers, it was the first fully organized propaganda war, where all combatants dedicated their media to carrying out propaganda campaigns both on the home front, and towards the enemy, including both neutral and allied states³⁶. Knightley concurs that WWI witnessed the first use of propaganda in “an organized, scientific manner,”³⁷ where the rules and regulations of censorship exceeded all subsequent limits,³⁸ says Allen. Holman and Kelly affirm that it was the first war to witness the use of propaganda as a weapon on a large scale, whose “effectiveness” was “closely observed by all belligerents.” Such demonstrated decisiveness in propaganda techniques, since WWI, signifies the growing importance of public opinion, teaching the world a significant warfare lesson: “public opinion could no longer be ignored as a determining factor in the formulation of government policies,”³⁹ say Holman and Kelly. Propaganda measures, adds Knightley, were vital to the very continuation of the war, “To enable the war to go on, the people had to be steeled for further sacrifices, and this could not be done if the full story of what was happening on the Western front was known.”⁴⁰ Propaganda, thus, was central to the war planning and conduct, aimed at affecting public opinion, both at home and abroad.

³⁶ Susan Carruthers, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd. 2000), 29.

³⁷ Philip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker from the Crimea to Vietnam, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975), 81.

³⁸ John Allen, “From Morse to Modem: Developments in Transmission Technologies and their Impact Upon the Military-Media Relationship” in Ian Stewart and Susan Carruthers, eds., War, Culture and the Media: Representations of the Military in 20th Century Britain, (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996), 151.

³⁹ Valerie Holman and Debra Kelly “Myth and Metaphor: The Power of Propaganda in Twentieth-Century Warfare,” in Valerie Holman and Debra Kelly eds., France at War in the Twentieth Century: Propaganda, Myth and Metaphor, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000), 4.

⁴⁰ Knightley, The First Casualty, 80.

British and German Propaganda and Censorship Measures:

The British and German measures to apply propaganda and censorship to the news media can be traced in both their official government efforts to operate those measures via specialized government bodies, especially formulated to fulfil this role, and the nature of the coverage itself, as reflected in authors' views and analyses. In WWI, the German tools for managing wartime propaganda are thought to have been much behind those of the British. The Germans, says Carruthers, were less cautious about managing the First World War media, as they could not deny the apparent fact that "they were the aggressors."⁴¹ Their repression of press freedom seems to have failed for several reasons, the foremost being the "civil-military strife," which is the media's loss of credibility among the public due to the military's management of war news and exclusion of editors and publishers from the whole process. Despite later employing more journalists, the German media "reflected a gulf between its initiators and its audience which, by 1917, was unbridgeable."⁴² This failure of the Germans turned out to be of benefit to the British. Although Britain did not have a centralized propaganda machine until a Department of Information was formed in 1917,⁴³ asserts Balfour, propaganda was widely credited for Britain's victory in 1918.⁴⁴

A major trait for both German and British propaganda measures was forming governmental bodies to manage news propaganda and censorship, via centralizing all news sources. For Germany, all news items in peace and wartime came out of one governmental wire service, the 'semi-official' Wolff Telegraph Bureau (WTB). "The German press was completely reliant on the censored-at-source WTB for front-line news," says Carruthers, as the regular press conferences held by the War Press Office, the *Kriegspresseamt*, were the primary source from which the WTB got its news stories.⁴⁵ The British established the Parliamentary War Aims Committee and a department at Wellington House to manage its propaganda campaign, which both represented the "model" on which the Germans built their propaganda machine more than twenty years later.⁴⁶

To centralize news sources the British stopped radio and telegraph services in the whole Empire so that all outgoing and incoming traffic went through the press bureau. In

⁴¹ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 58-9.

⁴² Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 60-1.

⁴³ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 62.

⁴⁴ Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 3.

⁴⁵ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 58-9.

⁴⁶ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 82.

addition, they deployed of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) prohibiting the “collection and publication of information about the war, or any material which might, directly or indirectly, be useful to the enemy,” says Carruthers.⁴⁷ Accordingly, “the Post Office had re-routed Britain’s world-wide cable network so that all commercial cables come together at a single point,” where the headquarters of the Press Association, based in London, was in the same building where Reuters was located. This is where news was pre-censored at source by the Ministry of Information (MOI) before reaching the media. Writers and editors, then, adapted it to their house styles, adding their opinions to give credibility to the news once it reached the reader, providing “an effective disguise for official propaganda and a clearer conscience for a liberal democracy at war.” This deceived media observers, and it thus explains “why Britain’s wartime propaganda gained its reputation for telling the truth when, in reality, the truth was rarely being told whole,” says Taylor.⁴⁸ This has eased news censorship at source “unobtrusively and without reducing the reassuring variety of its presentation,”⁴⁹ adds Pronay.

Another peculiar speciality of WWI was the British propaganda directed to allied and neutral states, public diplomacy, deployed by Charles Masterman, the head of the pre-1914 censorship department. He utilized authors, publicists and press representatives in organizing a statement calling the British and “‘all the English-speaking race’ to defend ‘the ideals of Western Europe’ against the rule of ‘Blood and Iron’.” He worked on the basis of three principles: to keep the propaganda origins secret, as “manipulation directed at opinion-leaders would not succeed if they knew the source of the information they were receiving,” to build propaganda on facts, which was not kept all the time, and to selectively distribute propaganda on specific countries to serve foreign policy goals. Masterman, thus, opened offices for his department in different areas and countries, such as Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States.⁵⁰

A third speciality of WWI was the decisive use of faked stories aimed at demoralizing the enemy. A notorious illustration for this is the Bryce Report, which described the inhumane war attitudes adopted by the Germans in terrorizing enemy civilians and troops. Translated into 30 languages, and with 41,000 copies shipped to the United States to be extensively

⁴⁷ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 62.

⁴⁸ Philip Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 213.

⁴⁹ Nicolas Pronay, “The News Media at War,” in Nicolas Pronay and D.W.Spring, eds., *Propaganda, Politics and Film, 1918-45*, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1982), 177-8.

⁵⁰ Steed, “British Propaganda and the First World War,” 26.

covered by its Media,⁵¹ the report stated how the Germans “systematically murdered, outraged, and violated innocent men, women, and children in Belgium.” Lord Bryce’s signature on the report yielded great credibility, even though it was evident after the war that no single witness was interviewed before the writing of this report. The report was instrumental in building hatred against the Germans, as the war’s most successful piece of propaganda,⁵² as well as inducing the Americans to join the war, a major goal of British propaganda at the time.

German atrocity stories, in addition, filled the British media to sustain passion for the war, or as Knightley quotes Robert Graves, “to make the English hate the Germans as they had never hated anyone before.” The most prominent story said that the Germans established corpse factories to boil their soldiers’ corpses and distil glycerine. Circulated around the world, the story played an important role in the propaganda war between Britain and Germany. It was not until December 1925 when the House of Commons admitted there was no realistic basis for it, which was apparently after it had done its job rallying public opinion in Britain and France and lowering resistance to the war in the United States. The faked series of German atrocities reported in the British press were purely inspired by the government, and had nothing to do with war correspondents.⁵³

Even cartoon illustrations emphasised the issue, as “A Dutch cartoonist, Louis Raemaeker, provided a very powerful series of cartoons showing German atrocities,”⁵⁴ marking the first drawn visual imagery propaganda impact in a total war. Those cartoons were used by British Prime Minister as proof against the Germans, “He [Raemaeker] shows us our enemies as they appear to the unbiased eyes of a neutral, and whenever his pictures are seen determination will be strengthened to tolerate no end to the war save the final overthrow of the Prussian military power.”⁵⁵ Propaganda of this type, circulating inhumane and probably illogical stories, was later applied in most other wars, and strangely enough, enhanced existing stereotypes and helped in building and sustaining support for the war cause.

Soon after the US joined the war, the Americans established their own propaganda institution, the Committee on Public Information (CPI), directed by George Creel, which favoured “expression rather than suppression,” as Creel put it. Creel, however, later described his job as “a plain publicity proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world’s greatest

⁵¹ Steed, “British Propaganda and the First World War,” 26

⁵² Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 84.

⁵³ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 105-7.

⁵⁴ Hudson and Stanier, *War and the Media*, 52.

⁵⁵ Hudson and Stanier, *War and the Media*, 52.

adventure in advertising.” The Creel Committee, just like Masterman’s, directed propaganda at both domestic and foreign levels. The domestic aimed at mobilizing America for war, while the foreign one combined the Foreign Press Bureau, the Wireless and Cable Service and the Foreign Film Service. The foreign section combined offices in more than thirty countries around the world.⁵⁶ The Americans have, thus, skilfully imitated the British techniques in both establishing specialized government bodies to manage propaganda and in exporting propaganda material to meet strategic public diplomacy goals.

For the Americans, however, radio was among the effective propaganda tools. As describes Taylor, “With radio still largely at the stage of morse-code transmissions, a network of speakers was formed known as the Four Minute Men who gave a million four-minute speeches to perhaps 400 million people. They were highly successful in stirring up emotions, increasing the level of popular involvement in the war, promoting the sale of war bonds, and aiding recruitment.” At the same time the US advertising companies had the task of using their “professional expertise” in favour of the war campaign. The US motion picture industry, thus, appeared as the strongest in the world when the war affected the production levels of European films.⁵⁷ Both audio and visual technologies seem to have started to be valued as effective propaganda techniques to gain public opinion, which were applied in the British, American and German film newsreel industries.

Although the British, the Germans and the Americans applied similar propaganda and censorship policies and measures, success was only on the side of those who skilfully mastered those techniques. Germany’s mishandling of the mass media via its military personnel, who focused on the news element rather than the morale, led to the media’s subsequent loss of credibility, at both local and international levels. The perceived success of the British propaganda campaign, however, was aided by the techniques of mixing news with opinion in a fashion that sustained a credible reputation, making its illogical atrocity stories believable, applying indirect propaganda measures, the public urge for war news and the failure of German media. It was persuading enough to convince the Americans to join the war through its factual approach and its control of cable networks between Europe and the United States, and thereby all US news sources. Likewise, the Americans followed the British propaganda path, establishing the Creel committee after joining the war, through which similar measures were applied to affect both domestic and overseas audiences.

⁵⁶ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 183.

⁵⁷ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 185.

Film Newsreel Propaganda and Censorship Measures

Film newsreel was central to the application of propaganda and censorship measures. British cinematographers were the first to disseminate propaganda through their movie images, presenting *Britain Prepared* as the first official British war film to appear towards the end of 1915.⁵⁸ Aimed at fulfilling a significant propaganda task, the impact of the film on public opinion was unquestionable. Despite the anxiety caused to officials by war images, whether moving or not, film was capable of attracting state attention for its capability of “winning millions of devotees,” says Carruthers, regardless of their social or educational level,⁵⁹ as it addresses emotions rather than minds. As Lord Balfour admitted, “Cinema has the ability to reach the intelligence of the least intelligent”.⁶⁰ Cinema was, thus, regarded as a unique cross-section media that reached all social and educational levels of society, a role that is currently played by instant television news in wartime.

Film newsreel, therefore, appeared as the medium representing the most real war experiences to the local audience with more than 200 films, in Britain, shown twice weekly through the official newsreel.⁶¹ The film industry apparently allowed propaganda to reach the masses and manipulate public opinion with film offering itself as “a more authentic and memorable mode of witnessing war.”⁶² Thanks to film newsreels the British waged a propaganda war during WWI, says Hoffman. Anti-German films produced by the British, such as *The Kaiser*, *Beast of Berlin*, were advertised with great hostility to be most appealing, with one of its advertisements stating, “Keep your gun in your pocket and don’t shoot at the screen next Friday, because that’s the day we’re showing *The Beast of Berlin*”.⁶³ Film newsreels were thus distributed in more than twenty thousand European cinemas,⁶⁴ as a part of the public diplomacy effort.

In America, says Taylor, “spy films brought the German threat to American soil itself, whilst films such as *The Hun Within* (1918) and *The Claws of the Hun* (1918) also helped to maintain the overall climate of anti-German sentiment.” After its slow start, the Committee on Public Information (CPI) Films Division produced more than sixty official films, including features and weekly newsreels: *The Official War Review*. Those official films were not overtly

⁵⁸ Steed, “British Propaganda and the First World War,” 28.

⁵⁹ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 69.

⁶⁰ Steed, “British Propaganda and the First World War,” 22.

⁶¹ Steed, “British Propaganda and the First World War,” 22.

⁶² Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 70.

⁶³ Hoffmann, *The Triumph of Propaganda*, 76-7.

⁶⁴ Hoffmann, *The Triumph of Propaganda*, 78.

propagandistic, as they were serving military needs in educating, informing and recording history. “With an average weekly audience of 80 million, together with a growing appreciation of the role of the cinema’s power to persuade and inform, the CPI could ill afford to ignore the movies as an instrument of propaganda,”⁶⁵ says Taylor.

The apparent success of British-American film propaganda was even praised by their German rivals. General Ludendorff, says Taylor, was very much impressed by the work of “The Ministry for the Destruction of the German Confidence,” saying, “we were hypnotized by the enemy propaganda as a rabbit by a snake.” Propaganda, adds Taylor, was often used by many German figures as an excuse for their defeat. They accused the Allied propaganda of causing “a collapse of morale at home,” which led the German army to be “stabbed in the back.” This, asserts Taylor, is largely true as the British began their psychological warfare as early as 1915.⁶⁶

In Germany, however, conflicts erupted between the government and the military over the importance of film propaganda and who should be in control of it, which incurred great delay. It was in July 1917 that the UFA (Universum Film *Aktengesellschaft*) was created, after the German officials recognized the role of the moving picture in maintaining public morale. At that time the Germans viewed themselves as inferior to the Entente powers, and their films as imitations of those of Britain.⁶⁷ The German’s problem with films, says Taylor, was partly due to the inadequate “propaganda machinery” it employed. Despite long preparations, “Germany’s war propaganda was poorly organized and coordinated,” paying more attention to the news rather than the morale, which led to significant tardiness in attempting to counter the British propaganda machine. Rather than addressing the public, the German film propaganda was essentially presented to the troops, and conducted by military personnel, who put “waging war” as their top priority. The German film propaganda, thus, failed as “They appreciated too late that modern warfare required as much attention to the munitions of the mind as to the planning of battles,”⁶⁸ declares Taylor.

The Germans established *Deulig*, a film company dedicated to producing documentary films aimed at publicizing the fatherland both inside Germany and abroad, with the *Deutsche Lichtspiel-Gesellschaft* (German Motion Picture Company) undertaking the duty of producing and distributing propaganda films. It was early 1917 when the Royal Picture and Film Office was formed in Berlin, as the government agency carrying the production of film posters,

⁶⁵ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 186.

⁶⁶ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 188.

⁶⁷ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 69.

⁶⁸ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 181.

declaring “The heroic exploits of our incomparable soldiers.” General Ludendorff, who put film production under his authority, centralized filmmaking to acquire “systematic” and decisive impact on the large majority of the masses by using “general standardized themes.” The mission was to publicize the greatness of Germany and inform the people of foreign countries about the German culture.⁶⁹

German feature films, as well, were produced to finance documentaries and newsreels from their income. According to Hoffmann, “Feature films with a heroic content... acted as boosters of patriotism along with some footage of documentary material. In the 2,446 cinemas that existed in 1914 as the only place of diversion, the folks back home were to be told what they owed to the soldiers at the front.” From October 1914 “Documents on the War” put on the screen heroic “extracts” of the war, delimiting the differences between documentaries and newsreels.⁷⁰ This merging was decisively aimed at accomplishing the propaganda goals of the German government. Equally, in France the production of war films was initially confronted by many obstacles. According to Steed, as soon as films had been permitted in France, the debates over financial and distribution rights started. It was only in November 1915 when the first two cameramen started shooting the first films.⁷¹ Taylor agrees, adding that the French propaganda organization was “the constant subject of political suspicion and infighting.”⁷²

To sum up, even though all parties applied similar film propaganda measures in WWI, such as creating specialized governmental institutions/film production companies and distributing in other countries, still the British and American films are deemed more successful. The British invested in their film production experience, their perceived credibility and the Germans’ lack of credibility. As Hudson and Stanier justify, the British won the film propaganda campaign because “there was more truth in the British than in the German accusations. The British public was convinced that Britain was fighting against a very great evil and that God was unequivocally on the British side.”⁷³ Internal conflict in Germany about the role of film in wartime propaganda resulted in apparent delay and poor planning. Disseminating pure propaganda, the German movies focused on the greatness of Germany and gave more attention to the news element rather than the morale, deepening the lack of trust they already suffered. Such evident failure of the Germans seems to have fuelled the

⁶⁹ Hoffmann, The Triumph of Propaganda, 80-1.

⁷⁰ Hoffmann, The Triumph of Propaganda, 137.

⁷¹ Steed, “British Propaganda and the First World War,” 31.

⁷² Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 187.

⁷³ Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, 54.

perceived success of British-American film propaganda, providing great insight into their enduring collaboration since WWI.

2- The Second World War:

German and British Propaganda and Censorship Measures

Propaganda and censorship measures in WWII, for both Britain and Germany, represented a mere continuation and perfection of those of WWI. In the Second World War, however, the German propaganda campaign is thought to have yielded great success, way beyond that of the British. On top of the perceived explanations for such success is Hitler's Nazi ideology, which itself came to power by the force of a strong and decisive propaganda campaign. While the Germans greatly developed their propaganda techniques, the British were ill-organized, mostly relying on their perceived credibility.

Hitler, says Carruthers, believed his own propaganda was the driving force behind the success of his National Socialist party, while the British propaganda was behind the defeat of his country in WWI. With the "Nazification" of Germany, at all levels, driven by his own propaganda effort based on controlling the mass media, Hitler's passion for propaganda heightened. "Visual symbolism" played an intensive role in capturing people's support for the Nazi regime, through its Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda symbols such as flags, banners, uniforms, and rallies were deliberately organized to symbolize the unity of the people, and affecting the feelings and emotions of the Germans.⁷⁴ The Nazi regime's belief in propaganda and its visual codes, thus explains its enthusiasm for wartime film production.

Established in 1933, the German Propaganda Ministry headed by Joseph Goebbels had the purpose of publicizing the Reich government's policies and the reconstruction of German fatherland,⁷⁵ using film as one of the major tools to propagate Nazi ideas. Hitler's propaganda rules included that it "had to be simple, it had to aim at the lowest level of intelligence; it had to be reduced to easily learned slogans, which then had to be repeated many times, concentrating on such emotional elements as love and hatred."⁷⁶ The traits of German propaganda rules thus combined simplicity, repetitiveness, and the ability to address emotions rather than minds. As Hoffman describes,

He wanted to conquer the soul of the ordinary people. This is why all propaganda 'had to be popular and its intellectual level had to be geared to the receptivity of the most limited

⁷⁴ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 73-4.

⁷⁵ Hoffmann, *The Triumph of Propaganda*, 89-90.

⁷⁶ David Welsh, *Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945*. (London: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 2001), 34-5.

minds among those who it is designed to address... The more it exclusively takes into account the feelings of the masses, the more penetrating will be its success...⁷⁷

Britain, in contrast, did not plan deeply for WWII propaganda, although it started organizing itself so early. It was as early as July 1935, when a special agency, a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, responsible for wartime censorship, was established to manage wartime news. This later emerged, in 1939, as the Ministry of Information. Believing that the war would be short and intense, and victory would be to the side delivering the most “decisive aerial knockout,” the British were keen to maintain civilian morale.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, their propaganda effort was incompetent compared to that of the Germans. As Chapman states, “The fact that Britain had neither an organization nor a policy for propaganda when the war broke out meant that Germany was able to steal a march in the propaganda war.”⁷⁹

Upon the outbreak of war, the Ministry of Information was directed by Scottish Judge Lord Macmillan, who had “absolutely no experience whatever of the media in any form.” The result was absolute “chaos,”⁸⁰ say Hudson and Stanier. The allied forces, adds Knightley, decided as early as 1938 that the war would be “a newsless one” and the system controlling correspondents should be identical to that of WWI: a limited number of correspondents, assisted by trained officials, would be allowed to send “carefully censored dispatches on subjects unlikely to affect morale from the frontline.”⁸¹ The censors, thus, considered that their initial task was to “pass nothing at all”, creating a state of extreme anxiety among the media people, due to the unsuitable staff chosen for the censors’ job.⁸² This censorship system was deemed voluntary, as editors used to send material only to the Censorship Bureau if they needed “advice” about the government’s “desirability of suppressing the information in the piece concerned.”⁸³ This explains the long-standing cooperative relationship between the media and the military propaganda effort in Britain, which has always gone unnoticed by the general public.

In Britain, explains Taylor, propaganda “has never been an activity with which the British have felt comfortable.” It was always thought to be the work of German officials like

⁷⁷ Hoffmann, *The Triumph of Propaganda*, 141.

⁷⁸ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 75-6.

⁷⁹ James Chapman, *The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-1945*, (London: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 1998), 41.

⁸⁰ Hudson and Stanier, *War and the Media*, 62.

⁸¹ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 218.

⁸² Pronay, “The News Media at War,” 178.

⁸³ Hudson and Stanier, *War and the Media*, 63.

Joseph Goebbels, though the Nazi propaganda Minister recognized: “the British have proved that they have a peculiar talent for propaganda, particularly in wartime.” Even Hitler dedicated two chapters in his memoirs, *Mein Kampf*, to “praising the role of British propaganda in helping to defeat Germany in 1918.”⁸⁴ The British, however, paid more attention to censorship rather than propaganda,

Censorship as negative propaganda, designed not only to prevent valuable information from reaching the enemy but also to prevent news that might damage morale, had long been recognized as invaluable in the manipulation of opinion.⁸⁵

They believed news had to be “censored at source,” through the news agencies upon which all the British news media relied, including the press, the BBC, and newsreels.⁸⁶ This strictly centralized censorship system guaranteed absolute abidance by the media people without subtle resistance, as the following sections show.

To conclude, thus, while the German propaganda effort in WWII stemmed from Hitler’s Nazi ideology, professionally applied by Joseph Goebbels, the British propaganda effort was a mere continuation of its WWI techniques. German policymakers paid more attention to morale, and adhered to principles of simplicity, repetitiveness, and the ability to address emotions rather than minds, to gain success. The British propaganda policy, however, was poorly-planned, undertaken by unprofessional personnel who focused on censorship, prevented any news from reaching the public at all, which eventually led to the primacy of the German propaganda over the British in WWII.

German and British Film Propaganda:

The centralization of German film production was the first measure taken by the Germans to control WWII films, after merging the four German newsreel companies in one state-owned and directed company: The *Deutsche Wochenschauen*, supplied with film by the military film unit, *Propaganda Kompanien*, or PK.

The German films, directed at a wider European audience, combined much misinformation aimed at showing off the power of the German army. The PK cameramen responsible for shooting the films were in fact soldiers fighting with the camera and willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the German cause. This is why more than 1000 PK men were either killed or went missing during the war.⁸⁷ Goebbels, in 1943, says Hoffmann,

⁸⁴ Taylor, “Introduction: Film, the Historian and the Second World War,” 3.

⁸⁵ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 211.

⁸⁶ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 213.

⁸⁷ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 79.

“attributed the success of the newsreel exclusively to the PK men.” He said many of them sacrificed their lives for the sake of German cause: “Here the modern way of conducting a war finds its highest manifestations with which the amateurish propaganda of the enemy powers cannot even begin to compete.”⁸⁸ This saying of Goebbels does not only prove the primacy of German film propaganda, but also shows its instrumental role in the conduct of the war. These cameramen were fighters who not only wished to be victorious in the war itself, but also in the war for public opinion, both local and across borders. This marks a new way of fighting where the soldier seeks to wage two wars at once: the actual and the media one. Here the difference between the two wars is somehow blurred, just as the difference between the soldier and reporter, with soldiers fighting and documenting history in the meantime.

The mass media, according to Goebbels’ diary, was used as a weapon to wage war, where the media war became a part and parcel of the war itself. In his memoirs, Goebbels says, the “highest manifestation” of propaganda is instrumental when affecting the people’s hearts and minds to the extent of pushing them to give up their lives voluntarily in support of the Nazi regime. “News policy,” he adds, “is a weapon of war in wartime. It is used to wage war, not to provide information.”⁸⁹ Goebbels’ ideology explains the logic behind the PK men’s fighting two battles and willingness to die. It provides a historical insight into the embedding of journalists with the military escorts in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, eliminating the reporters’ ability to seek objectivity, while facing war dangers with the fighting soldiers.

Film newsreels, documentaries and features were, thus, the primary weapons of the German propaganda war. Decisively designed to influence the people’s emotions in favour of the German cause, says Hoffmann, “The propagandists wanted every German man to see his own mother, wife or sister, and every German woman to see her own husband, son, brother, or father in the figure of the dead fellow German projected on the screen.” The visual media, he adds, was the primary way of spreading the German propaganda because Nazism was a spiritual movement rather than an intellectual one. Cinema, thus, in Goebbels’ words, was “one of the most modern means of mass persuasion” and therefore, “could not be left to its own devices.”⁹⁰ Films of all types were deliberately produced to win the country youth for the German mission via slogans and visual symbols.

Targeted through documentaries and newsreels, the audience is easily deceived because of the natural and authentic look of the images, and their lack of knowledge about the

⁸⁸ Hoffmann, The Triumph of Propaganda, 212.

⁸⁹ Hoffmann, The Triumph of Propaganda, 93.

⁹⁰ Hoffmann, The Triumph of Propaganda, 93, 95.

processes of omission and commission. According to Hoffmann, “The newsreel camera captures real people living within a real world and depicts them as real phenomena.”⁹¹ The audience always believes in the authenticity of the filmed materials, an illusion created by the moving image and exploited by the Nazi propaganda machine to meet strategic goals. In such documentaries, says Hoffmann, the main focus was on “genuine” optimistic pictures, while the negative ones were omitted. The German ideology was powerfully and skilfully imposed on the people to convince them that they should be proud to witness “a globally historic moment.”⁹² Presenting information that reflected Nazi propaganda values, documentaries and newsreels, adds Hoffmann, “gave an impression of factuality that was unaccountable. It mesmerized viewers and led them to believe that the film was taken directly at the front line and under life threatening conditions.”⁹³

Accordingly, concurs Welsh, the role of journalistic investigation diminished, while the “political ideas and authoritarian claims to the film industry became more pervasive.” The goal of newsreels, since 1933, was “to create mass intoxication and to obtain mass approval for the projected deeds of the regime in both domestic and foreign affairs.” Newsreels thus became the formal artistic projection of a carefully designed reality to accommodate the Nazi propaganda intentions. Censorship was directly practised by the *Wochenschauzentrale*, which incorporated the former four German film companies, under the direct control of Goebbels. Its tasks included “the arrangement of film reports according to the political and cultural points of view of the State.”⁹⁴ Goebbels’ policy thus included three main elements: the secrecy of propaganda, obtaining popular support for Nazi ideology, and accommodating the Nazi propaganda goals, which eventually resembled those of Masterman in WWI.

War was a good opportunity for achieving those goals, producing large amounts of propaganda material which, by controlling the cameramen, could be easily captured. “Such a concentration of resources permitted speedy and economic reporting of events both at home and abroad,” states Welsh, where all films shots were “at the exclusive disposal of the Propaganda Ministry,” and only very small parts of them were shown to the people.⁹⁵ World War II was thus the best era for German film propaganda, in which decisions of omission and

⁹¹ Hoffmann, *The Triumph of Propaganda*, 142-3.

⁹² Hoffmann, *The Triumph of Propaganda*, 143.

⁹³ Hoffmann, *The Triumph of Propaganda*, 211.

⁹⁴ Welsh, *Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945*, 164-6.

⁹⁵ Welsh, *Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945*, 166-7.

commission were taken by Hippler, the director of German Newsreel Centre, who was in charge of “the political and overall dramaturgical shape of the newsreels.”⁹⁶

The newsreels, adds Welsh, multiplied the number of cinemagoers, doubling the audience numbers in two years, especially in rural areas where mobile cinemas deliberately travelled around the country to make sure that the Germans watched a newsreel at least once a month. The increased length of newsreels added to the people’s fascination with seeing war news in cinemas seems to have fed into their unprecedented success. “In May 1940, it was announced that all German newsreel would last for 40 minutes. This enabled... means of continuous and uniform repetition, to illustrate the fighting attitude of Germans abroad and also to reinforce firmly held prejudices at home,” says Welsh. Such repetition was central to Goebbels’ propaganda campaign, “but not beyond the point of diminishing effectiveness.” The newsreels were thus effective in highlighting prejudices, especially when viewers were put under the pressure of witnessing a “historical truth” and a “factual reportage.”⁹⁷

At the time the Germans were still celebrating their victories, “The propagandistic quality of the German war newsreel was obviously higher than that of the Allies’ offerings.” The newsreels exported to other countries, especially, had a very distinctive propaganda task: “the visual and verbal arguments” shifted into “a National Socialist iconography” in order to stimulate the sympathy of neutral states. This policy was designed by Hitler to psychologically reinforce his tactics and to avoid criticism of neutral states while motivated to reach his goals.⁹⁸ This task of public diplomacy, says Pronay, is illustrated in the extensive addition of commentaries in foreign languages to their newsreels after 1936, a *filmpolitik* policy that “succeeded in making Hitler and Nazism the idol of many young men in central Europe, Scandinavia and the Low Countries.” Nazism was, consequently, able to communicate its ideas by audiovisual means much easier than the printed words. It was not, however, until 1940 that the British newsreels started to be issued in foreign languages rather than English and sent abroad.⁹⁹

The German heavy-handed propaganda policy covered all forms of mass media, including, print media, radio and film. The three mediums, says Welsh, “had a circular interrelationship in that they supplied each other with themes in the manner prescribed by the State.” In this way they supported each other in their impact on the audience, as their

⁹⁶ Hoffmann, *The Triumph of Propaganda*, 211.

⁹⁷ Welsh, *Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945*, 167-8.

⁹⁸ Hoffmann, *The Triumph of Propaganda*, 213.

⁹⁹ Pronay, “The News Media at War,” 188.

information was “circulated, controlled and modulated by the State.”¹⁰⁰ This greatly resembles the British policy of centralizing news sources, while mediating diverse representations of the same realities to attain credibility, a wartime media policy that is still pervasive in contemporary wars.

Mixing propaganda with entertainment was another means by which the Germans appealed to the European public; a survey of feature films demonstrates that filmmakers attempted to mix art and propaganda together. “The German newsreel would spearhead the more overt, aggressive kind of propaganda where news could be manipulated more easily.” Goebbels deliberately pushed filmmakers to mix entertainment with propaganda, in order to disguise the propaganda content.¹⁰¹ According to Welsh, the “so-called ‘entertainment films’ tend to promote the official ‘world view’ of things and reinforce the existing social and economic order.” Goebbels widely institutionalized this concept, believing that “Entertainment can occasionally have the purpose of supporting a nation in its struggle for existence, providing it with the edification diversion and relaxation needed to see it through the drama of everyday life.”¹⁰² The policy was thus to relax the people’s minds away from the war news and views, and this is where propaganda was best disseminated to the public.

Cinema, adds Welsh, was indirectly able to shape the people’s thinking towards the concepts of Nazi ideology, such as nationalism, the superiority of the Aryan race, the *Volk* community, militarism and elitism.¹⁰³ In feature films such concepts were hidden in the day-to-day life of Germans shown, not directly dictated in an odd verbal manner. Hitler’s message had the task of getting the German public to a state of “absolute obedience, a willingness to die, and an unshakeable belief in final victory,” says Welsh, adding that,

Film was particularly suited to this type of “appeal with emotion.” The whole notion of “self sacrifice” inevitably evokes emotional rather than intellectual responses. It is prompted by a polarity of emotional extremes that ranges from universal despair to a blind faith in the rightness of a particular cause. What it invariably lacks is a middle ground of rational thought.¹⁰⁴

To reach this stage, films were filled with ideas, such as “the nobility of self-sacrifice,” and “heroic death” in an especially decisive way designed to appeal to the young people.¹⁰⁵ The German film propaganda thus included some crucial measures. The first is centralizing all

¹⁰⁰ Welsh, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945, 264.

¹⁰¹ David Welsh, “Nazi Wartime Newsreel Propaganda,” in K.R.M. Short, ed., Film & Radio Propaganda in World War II, (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1983), 35.

¹⁰² Welsh, “Nazi Wartime Newsreel Propaganda,” 37.

¹⁰³ Welsh, “Nazi Wartime Newsreel Propaganda,” 38.

¹⁰⁴ Welsh, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945, 161.

¹⁰⁵ Welsh, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945, 161.

news types and productions while enhancing the notions of self sacrifice among PK men and the German youth. The second is reaching all sects of German society via moving cinemas while enhancing the length and repetitions in newsreels for maximum impact. The third is publicizing the German ideology in Western Europe via means of propaganda and public diplomacy while the fourth measure is utilizing several types of film including documentaries, newsreels and features, where entertainment is skilfully mixed with propaganda to appeal to the people's emotions.

British/American Film Propaganda:

In Britain, however, even though film newsreels were conducted and controlled by state bodies, practising "pre- and post-censorship" on all newsreels, they are thought to have been much behind the German movies in the propaganda war. It not before 1940, a year after the war started, when the Ministry of Information (MoI) put film newsreels on the top of its film propaganda agenda, before documentaries and feature films, as newsreels were regarded as more persuasive abroad. It was not, however, until the US joined the war, that Anglo-American films started to be viewed as more successful and decisive in their propaganda efforts, greatly resembling the Germans in their propaganda and censorship measures.

Centralization of British film propaganda included securing the approval of the MoI for a film to be shown on wartime cinema screens. In addition to producing its own "official" films and documentaries, the MoI was also the sole official body in charge of approving newsreel issues and feature films. Its impact was thus "more real than apparent," in large because of the strict censorship system employed after its "disastrous start" in the war. As described by Taylor, "In effect no newspaper article, radio broadcast or clip of film was allowed to reach the public unless the British government, operating through the MoI, allowed it to do so."¹⁰⁶ British film propaganda thus was solely censored by one government body, the MoI.

Despite its failure abroad, the perceived credibility of British film propaganda at home was due to the dominant belief that propaganda is more associated with dictatorships. For the British public, even though "the Nazis had a Ministry of Propaganda which told lies, the British had a Ministry of Information which told the truth," says Taylor. This is because the reputation of the British media in wartime "appeared to symbolize the integrity of a democratic government at war."¹⁰⁷ The effectiveness of propaganda in Britain thus stems from

¹⁰⁶ Taylor, "Introduction: Film, the Historian and the Second World War," 7.

¹⁰⁷ Taylor, "Introduction: Film, the Historian and the Second World War," 3.

the fact that “most people in Britain do not believe that the British normally go in for that sort of thing is, which in itself good propaganda.”¹⁰⁸ Chapman agrees, the dominant “assumption” in democratic political cultures, that “propaganda ‘itself’ was ‘undemocratic’,” led to the “deep antipathy” in terms of propaganda as an idea, widely considered “an ‘unBritish’ practice.” This dominant attitude among public and official circles resulted in little thought being given to the “techniques of propaganda.”¹⁰⁹ This partly explains the inadequate planning and organization of the British propaganda effort in WWII.

What placed British film propaganda way behind German was the way it was approached at the beginning of the war, which eventually fuelled the success of the German film propaganda. Worried about the scale of civilian casualties, British officials believed “the bomber will always get through,” as large cities were vulnerable and apparently close to the fighting. Chamberlain consequently decided to close all cinemas and places of entertainment, which were viewed as imminent war targets.¹¹⁰ The slow start of British film propaganda, at a very critical stage, contributed to its loss of international credibility. Even though the MoI planning started in 1935, it was too slow, mismanaged and disorganized to compete by 1939.¹¹¹

The MoI was producing its own official films from 1940, after establishing the Crown Film Unit for that purpose. The action of the MoI towards that project was too late, says Taylor, as the first propaganda film of the war, *The Lion Has Wings* (1939) was made by Alexander Korda totally independently from the MoI’s censorship. Nevertheless, all films shown in Britain during the war were in a way “official” as they had to bear the MoI’s approval¹¹². The five newsreel companies were given a top priority of importance and placed at “the frontline of the British film propaganda war,” says Taylor. These newsreels were “the most stridently aggressive” in presenting the war and their propagandistic role was overtly obvious. Presenting a great deal of information, just like the documentaries, they showed “not reality but an illusion of reality, an illusion determined by the cameraman and where he pointed his camera, the director and where he placed his subjects, the editor and where he cut his footage, and by the exhibitor and where and when he showed the final film,” says Taylor.¹¹³ This illusion of reality, however, seems to have carried the seeds of its failure.

¹⁰⁸ Taylor, “Introduction: Film, the Historian and the Second World War,” 3.

¹⁰⁹ James Chapman, *The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-1945*, (London: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 1998), 42-3

¹¹⁰ Murphy, Robert *British Cinema and the Second World War*, (London: Continuum, 2000), 10-11.

¹¹¹ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 216.

¹¹² Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 217-8.

¹¹³ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 219.

The handling of newsreels, especially at the beginning of the war, fed into the perceived disastrous British loss of the propaganda war. According to Murphy, "If the MoI's reliance on the makers of advertising and commercial feature films for its documentary and informational films in the first months of the war was a mistake, its reliance on War Office personnel to provide newsreel footage was a disaster." This is because advertising and commercial producers, on the one hand were not specialized or adept to producing documentaries. On the other hand, the War Office prohibited the photography of military subjects which led to the loss of records of important historical moments on the part of the British. As notes Murphy, "the War Office seemed to think that revealing anything newsworthy might be dangerous."¹¹⁴ The immediate result was that they did not allow filming of the departure of the British Expeditionary Force. According to Pronay, the Head of the Films Division asked the Chief Censor to think again about filming the departure of British forces saying, "The event would soon be history and not news," he regretted saying "Newsreels of the troops departing for overseas or preparing to depart overseas are absolutely forbidden." The reasons, says Pronay, firstly included "that as far as the Admiralty was concerned ports were naval installations which may not be photographed and secondly that the War Office could not permit films showing any military equipment."¹¹⁵

So, while the German films widely shown in most neutral countries from Norway, Holland, and Belgium to the United States, "pictured vast armies marching into Poland, the only film available of the British Army was of a platoon of Royal Engineers marching through a suburban street, carrying shovels and pickaxes. The British Expeditionary Force had not been filmed on its departure for France and there was no film reporting its activities there." This loss of major historical moments could only help the German propaganda campaign led by Goebbels in demoralizing the French army, and leading it to question, "Where ARE your British Allies?"¹¹⁶ As Pronay points out "British audiences, at home and in the Empire were reduced to seeing the start of the war chiefly through German footage purchased in neutral countries."¹¹⁷ This misuse of censorship power, especially at the very outset of the war, was, according to most authors, the main illustration of the British loss of propaganda war. Even though their credibility at home was not much shaken, it was totally destroyed abroad with the beyond-competition German footage of the British soldiers.

¹¹⁴ Murphy, British Cinema and the Second World War, 60.

¹¹⁵ Pronay, "The News Media at War," 183.

¹¹⁶ Murphy, British Cinema and the Second World War, 60.

¹¹⁷ Pronay, "The News Media at War," 174.

Soon after 1940, these harsh censorship measures were relaxed, which led to more successful propaganda policies later in the war. As Pronay explains, the ignorance of censors made it difficult for them “to comprehend the use of the press in modern propaganda war,” the uses of newsfilm, thus, were even more difficult to comprehend. The “photographic” nature of newsfilm scared the censors who were “not bound to show *something* recognizable by the enemy?” Accordingly, “The first round of propaganda war,” he adds “went to the Germans.” Afterwards, however, a special framework for the new propaganda administration was set up to put into action the new British propaganda approach, based on supplying the public “with facts, if not *the* facts, truth, if not the *whole* truth.”¹¹⁸

The newsreels, in Britain, were viewed and treated as integral to the news media, not the cinema industry. Classified with the BBC and the press as one thing, they were given “top priority” both in stock and personnel allocation, as well as “a far greater degree” of control and attention than other film productions. The newsreels, thus, played the most difficult role in the victorious policy of “propaganda with facts” because of the “innate realism” embedded in the nature of the newsreel camera and the development of the news reportage system in Britain, making the newsreel a real “weapon of propaganda.” This perceived success of newsreel propaganda can be estimated when placed among other media, the press and the BBC. Most significant is the fact that “all the different and apparently independent instruments must play the same tune.”¹¹⁹

The newsreels especially, as described by Pronay, “were conscious of being the medium of the working classes and by trial and error learned to be highly effective in that role.”¹²⁰ They enjoyed a “middle position” in importance and popularity among the press and the BBC. Although only five newsreel companies were operating in the whole country, the smallest of them, *Universal News*, achieved larger numbers of spectators than the leading national daily paper, the *Daily Express*. This credibility was achieved due to the well-known fact that they had “definitely” private ownerships, a fact that was “publicly” emphasized through the “personalized approach” they adhered to and their apparent “competitiveness.” This marked a “clear contrast” to the government monopoly of the BBC. In wartime, the public never realized that all the mass media were “linked together at one point.”¹²¹ The newsreels, thus, “bore the brunt of propaganda war in Britain.” This was firstly because of “the illusion of completeness which a well-produced newsreel created,” which allowed for

¹¹⁸ Pronay, “The News Media at War,” 183, 186.

¹¹⁹ Pronay, “The News Media at War,” 174.

¹²⁰ Pronay, “The News Media at War,” 176, 188.

¹²¹ Pronay, “The News Media at War,” 176.

dismissing lots of information and getting away with it, as what was excluded did not appear to be missing, especially when coupled with the relatively long length of newsreel. Secondly it was because the audience was denied the fact that the government enjoyed full control of the newsreel production and showing.¹²²

As for feature films, despite the main role they played in the British film propaganda war, Alexander Korda's film, *The Lion Has Wings* (1939), says Chapman, was the first "feature-length" propaganda film of the war. Though produced by a commercial producer, without any governmental guidelines, its production "illustrates the ad hoc nature of official involvement with the film industry at the beginning of the war," says Chapman. This is because the film contained lots of newsreel material, shots from old documentaries as well as new scenes, "intended to show how and why Britain was fighting against Germany." The majority of commentators agreed that the film was a type of old-fashioned direct propaganda, "overtly patriotic," starting with the statement, "This is Britain where we believe in freedom."¹²³

Fostering film credibility, feature films were designed to appeal to the people's emotions. Mixing facts with entertainment, as did Goebbels, the MoI decided, says Taylor, "for the film to be good propaganda, it must also be good entertainment." The cinemas thus presented in every show a newsreel, an official short film and a supporting film, which were not the basic point of attraction for cinemagoers. "People went to the cinema to see the main feature, and it was there that propaganda, if skilfully handled, could most effectively be insinuated, while the audience was relaxed and thus off its guard,"¹²⁴ says Taylor. Chapman concurs,

The Foreign Office was by no means the only party to consider that commercial feature films were the most useful vehicles for propaganda. The same view was quite naturally taken by the feature producers themselves and it was expressed many times in the trade press.¹²⁵

The similarity in views and attitudes between the Foreign office and film producers demonstrates an inherent cooperation in terms of the film industry body, as a medium, with the MoI. In addition, there was also a financial problem strangulating feature film production. Both the MoI and the film industry realized that a policy was vital for the government to bind the resources of commercial producers in service of the war effort. The issue was not resolved

¹²² Pronay, "The News Media at War," 202.

¹²³ Chapman, *The British at War*, 59-60.

¹²⁴ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 219.

¹²⁵ Chapman, *The British at War*, 48-9.

before August 1940, when a Report regulating the government's involvement with feature film propaganda was issued. It was not until January 1941 when a Film Finance Corporation was established to cover the production costs of British films during the war.¹²⁶ That was one of the reasons for the delay of the British film propaganda.

Film producers were also worried about the propaganda content of feature films and the type of themes that should be addressed.¹²⁷ Between 1942 and 1943 there was a sort of "consensus" between the MoI and the film producers about the nature of propaganda. The control exercised by the government was by large "informal" and, from the film-makers' side, "voluntary," but as Chapman quotes Aldgate, it was "sufficient to ensure that British film production in general, and not just 'official' films, followed precisely the line that the Ministry wished it to follow in mobilizing support for the war effort and in constructing the essential wartime ideology of popular national unity." So the British feature film propaganda, asserts Chapman, was not meant to seek immediate propaganda, rather it was a sort of series of long-term propaganda films, presenting a more general image of the British at war.¹²⁸ This direct voluntary control exercised by the MoI over the feature films demonstrates the enduring cooperation between the film industry and the military, still being implemented in contemporary wars, between Hollywood and the Pentagon.

Although the MoI was no longer financing the feature films, yet it had in many cases been very much involved in the production procedures. Official records, says Chapman, prove that the script of Launder and Gilliat's *Millions Like Us* (1943) "was first commissioned by the Films Division and then sold at cost price to a feature production company."¹²⁹ Feature films, thus, remained all the time under the direct control of the MoI, whether formally or informally. The MoI was able to determine the types of feature films made, although the British Board of Film Censorship (BBFC)'s task of film censorship was kept the same. While the BBFC applied its censorship rules in banning films dealing with sensitive or controversial issues, such as politics, sex, race and royalty, as well as anything that may be viewed as "immoral or in bad taste," still the MoI played a major role in film propaganda.¹³⁰ The BBFC rules seem to resemble today's "taste and decency" approach to news reporting, whereby the images of death and suffering are prohibited in most Western television stations.

¹²⁶ Chapman, *The British at War*, 65-7.

¹²⁷ Chapman, *The British at War*, 67.

¹²⁸ Chapman, *The British at War*, 81.

¹²⁹ Chapman, *The British at War*, 82.

¹³⁰ Murphy, *British Cinema and the Second World War*, 62-3.

As for documentaries, their filmmakers were the primary focus of the British government's wartime film propaganda. During the war, says Murphy, the Films Division of the MoI developed a network of mobile film units displaying a government-set programme of documentary movies in town and village halls, Women's Institutes, factories, schools and libraries. Much effort was exerted as well to reach the audiences of popular cinema.¹³¹ Documentaries, thus, adds Murphy, became an essential part of government propaganda. Nevertheless, says Pronay, they were not only considered "a part of the art of the cinema" but also were "dealing with 'larger issues' in a manner calculated to appeal to educated people." The newsreels, however, as well as the popular press had the task of dealing with everyday news. They were "tailored to conveying news and views in the entertainment context of the popular cinema and on a level which was calculated to appeal to an audience which did not possess sophisticated literacy."¹³² The measures of mixing entertainment with news and reaching people in their workplaces and far away locations were equally applied by the Germans, as mentioned above. The mobile cinemas, however, seem to have been an initial attempt to reach "everyone" before the deployment of television a couple of decades later.

Just like the Germans, the British utilized different types of films to disseminate their propaganda, which were geared at meeting strategic goals, beyond the borders of Britain. Since the very beginning, film propaganda, as a governmental policy, was aimed at backing up the "uncommitted nations of Europe" as well as those of the Commonwealth. The necessity of waging another propaganda campaign to persuade the United States to join the war was another crucial dimension,¹³³ says Pronay. There were two strategic public diplomacy tasks: inducing the Americans to join the war and gaining the support of Europe's neutral states. As for the Americans, since the outset of the war they had a problem in considering Britain a "democracy," as England was seen as an imperial power, from which the US democracy was insurgent. Despite fighting against the Nazi threat, it was not regarded by the US citizens as the "land of the free." The British Ambassador in the US, thus, contended that the best way to affect American public opinion was through "emotional appeals," and the most effective way was "via the cinema."¹³⁴

What eased the propaganda campaign for winning the Americans' hearts towards the British cause was the cooperation between media and government in the US. According to

¹³¹ Murphy, British Cinema and the Second World War, 59.

¹³² Pronay, "The News Media at War," 173.

¹³³ Pronay, "The News Media at War," 173.

¹³⁴ K.R.M Short "Cinematic Support for the Anglo-American Détente, 1939-43," in Philip M. Taylor, ed., Britain and the Cinema in the Second World War. (London: MacMillan Press Ltd. , 1988), 121-2.

Strobel, “World War II was the high-water mark of wartime cooperation between the military and the media.” Although the tension between the reporters and the military was always present, it was camouflaged by the consensus on the war goals. Such consensus is what allowed media restrictions to be better imposed and applied.¹³⁵ This elite consensus demonstrates the long line of physical and discursive wartime media-military cooperation in the US, which has taken deeper dimensions in recent wars.

With a wholeheartedly cooperative cinema industry, in WWII, both “deeds” and “words” had to be communicated through the cinema. It was in autumn 1940 when Warner Brothers conducted a deal of eight feature films with the British MoI, which resulted in films like *London Can Take It* (1940) and *Christmas Under Fire* (1941). Also, the first British film of Alexander Korda, as well, *The Lion Has Wings* (1939) was successfully distributed via Korda’s links with United Artists in America. Those films, says Short, included “long speeches... employed to remind North American audiences the war would quite easily cross the Atlantic Ocean.”¹³⁶ The deal between Warner Brothers and the British MoI seems to be a stark base for today’s concerted propaganda effort on both sides of the Atlantic, with government and media and entertainment bodies included in covering military assaults committed in the name of the “war on terror.”

To induce the Americans to join the war, those joint films criticized the American government for not doing its best to help the British, stressing that “Britain had taken ‘the torch of liberty and had not dropped it’: the Statute of Liberty was not the only guardian of freedom.” The cinema also presented an irresistible political and religious (emotional) dimension, such as the use of Christmas and children fulfilling a religious pledge in *Christmas Under Fire*.¹³⁷ The films also featured lots of casualties, making Strobel contend the general norm, “World War II demonstrates that what matters for public opinion purposes is not the casualties themselves, or even whether they are reported in black-and-white photograph or real-time television, but the context in which they are received.” He added, “Violence and suffering were represented within a framework highly supportive of the overall war effort.”¹³⁸ This view supports Campbell’s theory on the role of image/s’ contexts and narratives in determining the way they are perceived by a specific audience.

The cinema also stressed that under the pressure of war, British society and politics were taking large steps towards democracy. The “selling of new Britain” was a crucial theme

¹³⁵ Strobel, *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*, 25.

¹³⁶ Strobel, *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*, 25.

¹³⁷ Short, “Cinematic Support for the Anglo-American Détente, 1939-43”, 124-5.

¹³⁸ Strobel, *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*, 26.

in wartime films, especially when the Americans were watching. The films were also concerned about defining what America was to the British people,¹³⁹ and drawing the people of the two countries closer together across the Atlantic. An Office of War Information (OWI) was then established in the US to take care of film propaganda issues; and Hollywood had an office within the OWI, in both its local and international offices. “Staffed by committed New Deal internationalists, these offices immediately began to assess the contributions by films – features, shorts, cartoons and newsreels – to the war effort, and their reports provide some fascinating contemporary evaluations.”¹⁴⁰ Hollywood’s cooperation in wartime propaganda provides an insightful proof of the historical role it played in backing American wars, which is still persistent in today’s televised war news, as forthcoming evidence suggests.

It was not, however, until March 1944, says Krome, that the Joint Anglo-American Film Planning Committee (JAAFPC) was established, upon the request of the Washington War Department to picture fighting operations for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) in order “to prepare a plan for cinematic coverage of the coming invasion of France.”¹⁴¹ The joint planning was crucial for two purposes. Firstly was the “appearance of Allied unity,” as the “individually-produced films gave the impression that each nation was fighting the war alone.” Secondly, an even more crucial goal was the troops’ morale, as the American soldier fighting in the United Kingdom had to see a newsreel combining the British with the Americans, not showing that “the British are winning the war single-handedly.”¹⁴² To accomplish these goals the committee had to fulfil a most important joint propaganda task to meet the more strategic goals of inducing the Americans to join the war, as well as regaining the lost credibility of the British among allied and neutral countries. This decisive propaganda effort earned the British a strong position in the war for hearts and minds which was central to waging the actual war.

And as cinema and film industry played a central role in waging the allied forces two world wars by the inherent power of the moving image, television is thought to have been central in losing the US the Vietnam War. It was not however television in itself that played such role but the relative freedom that TV reporters enjoyed at some point in this specific war and the subsequent context in which the televisual image was framed. As detailed in the following section, Vietnam War was a turning point in the contemporary history of war

¹³⁹ Short, “Cinematic Support for the Anglo-American Détente, 1939-43”, 126.

¹⁴⁰ Short, “Cinematic Support for the Anglo-American Détente, 1939-43”, 128.

¹⁴¹ Frederic Krome, “*The True Glory* and the Failure of Anglo-American Film Propaganda in the Second World War” *Journal of Contemporary History* 33 (1), 1998, 21-34

¹⁴² Krome, “*The True Glory* and the Failure of Anglo-American Film Propaganda in the Second World War”, 23.

coverage that helped government and military officials realize how central is the news media and its visual representation to waging or losing wars.

3- The Vietnam War:

Dubbed as “the first television war,” most authors disagree about the amount of propaganda and censorship practised by the military on the mass media, and especially television, in covering the Vietnam War. While some consider Vietnam the first, and probably last, fully “uncensored” war in the contemporary history of war coverage, others claim that propaganda and censorship measures were imposed prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive, limiting the people’s knowledge and reaction about the war. Those claiming it was covered by uncensored television tend to think that such coverage had an unprecedented impact on American public opinion, and thus pushed for the US retreat from the war as a result. In fact, both views are to some extent right, as the following analysis proves.

Part of the unlimited freedom of the media is attributed to the fact that Vietnam was a “limited war” in comparison to the First and Second World Wars, often dubbed by authors as “total wars.” As Strobel comments, “the more limited the conflict in its objectives, the less likely the government can impose strict social controls, including curbs on the news media.”¹⁴³ Hallin agrees, assenting that Vietnam pushed journalists towards a greater degree of press freedom. “The peculiar circumstances of that war, for one thing, removed an important remnant of direct governmental control over the media: military censorship in wartime.” This, explains Hallin, is due to the fact that Vietnam was a limited war in which the US forces were formally “guests” of the South Vietnamese government and there was no practical room for political censorship.¹⁴⁴ So, from the outset of the war there was an evident high degree freedom of movement and reporting that journalists covering Vietnam enjoyed.

This freedom, however, was not absolute. Terrance Fox attests that “there is little doubt” that the media coverage was “carried out in an atmosphere virtually free of overt censorship.” He further states that journalists were obliged to “follow a set of guidelines and voluntary compliance was almost total.” Fox adds, then, “The result of a severe violation of the guidelines was likely to be revocation of credentials or, for correspondents who were outside the country at the time, denial of a visa to re-enter South Vietnam.” Nevertheless, Fox does not negate Hallin’s view of the environment in which journalists operated during Vietnam,

¹⁴³ Strobel, *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*, 29.

¹⁴⁴ Daniel Hallin, *The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); 9.

The physical environment in which the correspondents operated was perhaps the most comfortable and civilized ever accorded a press contingent. Accredited journalists had access to all the amenities available to rear-echelon military officers, were accorded reserved space on military transport flights and were provided with press camps at the major outlying centers, with telephone communications and daily flights to Saigon. In addition, helicopters from individual units were often assigned exclusively for use of correspondents. The helicopter was especially suited to the requirements of television journalism.¹⁴⁵

So, the environment and facilities provided for journalists during the Vietnam War were exceptionally the most civilized and sophisticated ever, in comparison to all prior and subsequent wars. Nevertheless, their relative freedom and facilities provided were only utilized within the rigid boundaries of rules and guidelines, with which they almost totally abided at a certain stage, clearly before Tet Offensive. This conforms to the thesis' realist perception of power, arguing the power of representation can only be productive within the confines of the greater and repressive military power. Vietnam, however, remains a unique case among all the history of war coverage, representing a middle era between the fully restricted World Wars system, associated with the novelty of the idea of war coverage in itself, and the conflicts following Vietnam, which put an end to the practice of free war coverage, probably forever, as contemporary military assaults indicate. Neither before nor after Vietnam, had journalists covering war ever enjoyed such convenient amenities and respect for the nature of their job as occurred in Vietnam.

Authors also disagreed whether the mass media was behind the US losing the war or not. While some claim that television lost the US the Vietnam War, and led the US to defeat, others claim that the news media did its job well. As Hallin argues, "Liberals and conservatives disagree about who was being 'more honest with the American people' and about the implications of conflict between the media and government—whether it means more vigorous democracy or a decline 'of unity and strength of purpose.'"¹⁴⁶ But what appears to be the case is that the media gained unprecedented power and credibility through its coverage of the Vietnam War for two evident reasons. One is the relatively new media technology, represented in television, wielding more power in the new wartime role it played as a relatively new medium. As Rodger Streitmatter thinks, the technological advances of the 1960s "boosted the capabilities of television news,"

¹⁴⁵ Terrance Fox, "The Media and the Military: An Historical Perspective on the Gulf War," in Jeffrey Walsh ed., The Gulf War Did Not Happen: Politics, Culture and Warfare Post-Vietnam, (Vermont: Arena, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1995), 141.

¹⁴⁶ Hallin, The "Uncensored War", 3.

New lightweight cameras combined with jet air transportation and communication satellites meant that for the first time film from the front became a regular part of daily news coverage. Further advances, meant that black-and-white images were transformed into color ones—blood could be seen in all its horrific brilliance.¹⁴⁷

Second is the evidently wide limit of free expression, which the mass media never enjoyed before. According to Hallin, the media “had extraordinary freedom to cover the war in Vietnam without direct government control: it was the first war in which reporters were routinely accredited to accompany military forces yet not subject to censorship, and it was a war in which the journalists clearly did not think of themselves simply as ‘soldiers of the typewriter’ whose mission was to serve the war effort.”¹⁴⁸ This unprecedented freedom of expression, which Hallin describes, does not necessarily mean that there was no indirect propaganda and censorship, probably by deeply convincing journalists of the nobility of the cause and by deciding on the sites they could visit and, thus, the amount of information they produced.

Particularly before Tet Offensive incident of 1968, the television coverage included much propaganda footage, very supportive of the war effort, reflecting a well-managed and conducted military-led propaganda system. According to Michael Delli Carpini, the coverage of the US war in Vietnam was operating under the “Cold War consensus,” which is a widespread consensus along media and popular circles of the moral cause of fighting communism in Indochina. The media, thus, depended on government sources to guarantee a reporting supportive of US policy. “Broadcasts,” adds Carpini, “focused on young recruits anxiously waiting to be shipped overseas; on gentle officers describing how US troops provide food and shelter for temporarily displaced and extremely grateful villagers; on playful soldiers sunning themselves on a beach during ‘R and R.’” These images, he adds, assisted the “hegemonic consensus” in providing those in doubt of the US war aims with information supporting the American policy, as well as informing the ordinary public.¹⁴⁹

This view supports that of Fox, who stressed that there were strict guidelines for news coverage which journalists were obliged to follow, and were severely punished when violating them. So, journalists evidently had ‘limits’ on their freedom of expression, but probably the widest limits ever in the war coverage history. As described by Hallin, the ordinary report about government policy in Vietnam would

¹⁴⁷ Rodger Streitmatter, Mightier than the Sword: How the News Media Have Shaped American History, (Westview Press, 1997), 191.

¹⁴⁸ Hallin, The “Uncensored” War, 6.

¹⁴⁹ Michael X. Delli Carpini, “US Media Coverage of the Vietnam Conflict in 1968” in Michael Klein (ed.) The Vietnam Era: Media and Popular Culture in the US and Vietnam, (London: Pluto Press, 1990), 45.

Consist of lengthy film clips of public statements by officials, introduced and wrapped up by the anchor, who relied primarily on wire service material. Perhaps this is one reason television tended to take official rhetoric so often at face value, and to fall back on stereotypes: a great deal of the news was put together by anchors, producers, and newswriters in the New York office, people who did not have the familiarity with particular areas of policy.¹⁵⁰

The reporting was based, as well, on press conferences, making it “no longer a mere summary of wire reports, backed by film of the press conferences.” So, the government-led propaganda measures were by-and-large successful. Especially before the Tet offensive, says Hallin, and the subsequent shift in American foreign policy from “escalation to de-escalation, most news coverage was highly supportive of American intervention in Vietnam, and despite occasional crises, Kennedy and Johnson were usually able to ‘manage’ the news very effectively.”¹⁵¹ This demonstrates the effectiveness of military-government propaganda in the Vietnam War, at some point.

The television coverage was very powerful at the time, heavily relied on stereotypes and the dominant notions of good vs. bad. The dominant policy was supplying the mass media with positive images identical with the already-held beliefs. As describes Hallin, the “peace offensive” emerged as “a kind of morality play.” This is, he explains, because the war on television had shown “a dramatic contrast between good, represented by the American peace offensive, and evil, represented by Hanoi.” So it tends to dramatize events, in search “for conflict and controversy.”¹⁵² This policy is evidently still practised in contemporary US wars. Unfortunately, however, comments Rick Berg, “America won no hearts or minds in Vietnam—it lost them.”¹⁵³

The war coverage, thus, had two major characteristics at the beginning: journalists practising freedom of expression under the “cold war consensus,” coupled with unlimited trust in the government war endeavours. The US government could, therefore, impose its propaganda measures and skilfully manage public opinion, making journalists primarily dependent on government reports in covering the Vietnam War. The American government could not sustain its propaganda effort, however, when what they used to convince journalists and the American people for many years turned out to be untrue, causing a deeply rooted breach of trust between the government and the mass media. This breach of trust was further reflected in the way the Gulf War 1991 was covered featuring the media pool system and

¹⁵⁰ Hallin, *The “Uncensored” War*, 121.

¹⁵¹ Hallin, *The “Uncensored War”*, 122.

¹⁵² Hallin, *The “Uncensored War”*, 124.

¹⁵³ Rick Berg, “Losing Vietnam: Covering the War in an Age of Technology” in John Carlos Rowe and Rick Berg (eds.) *The Vietnam War and American Culture*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 1.

barring the journalists' access to the war zone almost completely, as the following part demonstrates.

4- The 1991 Gulf War:

Especially in the 1991 Gulf War, measures of propaganda and censorship were strategically central to defining its perceived victory. The changes in the "world order," accompanying the fall of communism together with the massive improvement in IT and communication technology, for both the military and the news media, urged the US to exert its utmost effort to sustain its role as the world superpower. This included both leading the coalition forces in the war itself, as well as taking advantage of the new technologies, to control its visual representation.

The Gulf War witnessed the first extensive use of cable and satellite technology, allowing the world audience to watch the war 'Live' on their television sets, yielding the audience a false impression of being empowered. Paradoxically enough, this very illusion in itself, as well as its purporting technology, seems to have opened up new ways of applying much more heavy censorship measures on the war coverage, strangulating the media efforts to professionally fulfil its reporting task. This is because the Gulf War witnessed what Campbell calls the "Revolution in Military Affairs," strategically leading to "the interweaving and interdependence of the military, media and information industries." RMA, which includes the incorporation of "networked information technology" into strategic developments in the US military battlefield,¹⁵⁴ dictates that the military is the single information source for the news media, if journalists wish to avoid endangering their own lives. This has eventually pushed for much more, voluntary or not, physical and discursive media-military cooperation.

Central to controlling the media representation was fading away the "Vietnam Syndrome," whereby television imagery is widely thought to have led to the US retreat. So, there was a government and military determination to prevent the media from losing the US another war. To kick away this syndrome, important lessons drawn from Vietnam had to be learnt and well applied. The most crucial, says Neuman, was "if you don't want to erode the public's confidence in the government's war aims, then you cannot allow that public's sons to be wounded or maimed right in front of them via their TV sets at home."¹⁵⁵ Measures of censorship and propaganda, thus, had to be rigidly applied on the televisual representation.

¹⁵⁴ Campbell, "Cultural Governance and Pictorial Resistance" 62.

¹⁵⁵ Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, 205.

Both direct and indirect censorship measures, thus, were designed to curb the wartime media coverage. Censorship arrangements, explains Peter Braestrup, were agreed by both of the military and the press with direct censorship, including “pools, access, and military handling of communication and logistics.” Quoting Michael Gartner, head of NBC News, “Here’s something you should know about the war that’s going on in the Gulf: much of the news that you read, hear or see is being censored... There is no excuse for this kind of censorship... exceeds even the most stringent censorship of World War II.”¹⁵⁶ Such a statement, however, neither helped in curbing censorship practices nor limited the viewers’ stark dependency on the most censored war medium: satellite television.

At the top of the direct measures impeding critical wartime reporting was the media pool system. A media pool, says Fialka, means that “all of the news products from the war be shared” between all reporters from all TV networks and media bodies. Fialka comments that the idea of a pool is evil because it makes journalists focus on internal fighting rather than the war itself;¹⁵⁷ it erodes competition among journalists and forces them to report as a team. As this sharing of war information essentially negates the essence of professional journalism, based on the competition among the news outlets for the best scoop, this has created internal fighting among journalists due to the struggles to get the news piece, and thus, distracted their attention from focusing on the war itself. MacArthur agrees, the pool system “initiated a program of playing off the various media companies against one another... all of whom were competing for the meagre, carefully doled out table scraps to be known thereafter as ‘access.’”¹⁵⁸ Most notably, the pool system was the new way of centralizing news sources applied in WWI and WWII.

The media pool system, however, was not a novelty. According to Neuman, the Americans benefited from the British approach to dealing with the media in the Falklands which, along with the US intervention in Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf, she insists, are “a series of incursions, not wars really.” She thinks of the pool system as a “straight line” starting from the Falklands in 1982 to the Gulf War of 1991.¹⁵⁹ First, in the conflict between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, the UK government and military system initiated the pool system, where the journalists were deliberately chosen according to their

¹⁵⁶ Peter Braestrup, “Foreword” in John J. Fialka, Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War, (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991), ix-x.

¹⁵⁷ Fialka, Hotel Warriors, 35.

¹⁵⁸ MacArthur, Second Front, 6.

¹⁵⁹ Neuman, Lights, Camera, War, 205.

lack of knowledge about war coverage,¹⁶⁰ to be easily pacified and controlled. Journalists were not even sure if there would be a war, until the moment they were embarked to cover it,¹⁶¹ so that they did not have a chance to gather any background information.

In the 1982 Falklands War, the conflict management lacked many organization procedures, due to the officials' fear of leaking any information to the media. This made the journalists rush into a military expedition, ill-informed of its nature and key elements. Also, the fact that the attack took place in an island group so they had to travel by ship, to cover the important events from ships, via their military minders, added to their lack of knowledge about the conflict, and the lack of proper management made things even more complicated. As Morrison and Tumber describe, the government suffered "poor organization, lack of planning and the absence of any agreed procedure or criteria... There was simply no policy; that is the key...no centralized system of control, no coordination between departments."¹⁶² The media people, as a result, were "hastily assembled, badly briefed, poorly prepared and in some cases bizarrely equipped, the journalists set sail to cover a war that hardly any of them thought would happen."¹⁶³

In addition to their lack of information, they were also shocked at the pool system, which negated the essence of good journalism. It was meant to fully control the news media's coverage, as confessed the Chief of the Defence Staff, "Newsmen were 'most helpful with our deception plans.'" As a result of the omission of crucial pieces of information and the restrictions on press briefings, a war image was created that has nothing to do with the truth.¹⁶⁴ The Ministry of Defence insisted on not revealing its submarines' positions, making the press look "as if it was deliberately misled." That was useful for the British in making, "the Argentine Navy believe there was a submarine lurking close by to deter it from venturing into the Harbour."¹⁶⁵ Misleading the news media, thus, was strategically successful for the military for its perceived victory.

To recover the public image of both the press and the military, while serving the war strategy, Mrs. Thatcher decided that the media war had to be won. The morning newspapers were ordered to announce in their front-page headlines the great "victory" the British were achieving in the Falklands, which was shocking to the marines themselves who wondered,

¹⁶⁰ David E. Morrison and Howard Tumber, Journalists at War: The Dynamics of News Reporting during the Falklands Conflict, (London: Sage Publications, 1988), 4.

¹⁶¹ Morrison and Tumber, Journalists at War, 10.

¹⁶² Morrison and Tumber, Journalists at War, 189-190.

¹⁶³ Morrison and Tumber, Journalists at War, 21.

¹⁶⁴ Robert Harris, Gotcha! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1983), 93.

¹⁶⁵ Harris, Gotcha!, 98.

“who had been feeding them [the newspapers] all this stuff...” That was “one of the major disinformation operations of this campaign,” commented the Chief of Military Staff,¹⁶⁶ later on. It was the first time in history that disinformation reached the stage of claiming a “victory” that never happened, comments Harris, “The Government’s triumph over the media was almost as great as the victory over Argentina.”¹⁶⁷

In the 1983 Grenada War, then, “reporters were kept off the island for several days while the American troops operated a two-pronged mission: to restore democratic rule after Marxist hard-liners had overthrown the government, and to evacuate U.S. medical students. Journalists who did not reach the island were detained.” This invasion, thinks Neuman, was instrumental in diverting the public’s attention from the “massacre of 241 marines in a barracks bombing in Beirut a few days earlier,” which was “met with angry denials by the administration.” Grenada, which Fialka describes as a “war without witnesses,” was a significant US diversion from protecting democracy, as he comments, “Leaving an increasingly elite military force with total control over information... would be a dark day for those who can recall that the point of national security is to protect a democracy.”¹⁶⁸

After the Grenada invasion, a new system of war coverage was agreed upon between the journalists and the Pentagon. That was, says Neuman, a “representative ‘pool’ of journalists and photographers, representing newspapers, magazines, wire services, radio, and television, who would report back to the rest of the media housed at a military headquarters.”¹⁶⁹ This newly acquired pool system of the Pentagon was also used in Panama in 1989, and was not very successful.

In the attack on Panama, the US wanted to support the coup attempt of Manuel Noriega, after he failed to win a democratic election in October. “In December, a U.S. attack was launched to avoid criticism.”¹⁷⁰ That was the first organized use of wartime official media censorship. The pool system gave the Pentagon more power and control of events and access, opening up the way for more indirect censorship measures, as “using the media pools and staged press conferences satisfied the public’s thirst for news at a reduced expense to them.” As Roberts describes, “In Grenada and Panama the media were kept out for hours or days, and

¹⁶⁶ Harris, *Gotcha!*, 100.

¹⁶⁷ Harris, *Gotcha!*, 100.

¹⁶⁸ John J. Fialka, *Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War*, (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991), 62.

¹⁶⁹ Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, 206.

¹⁷⁰ Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, 206-207.

were excluded from areas of conflict.”¹⁷¹ Denial of access was part and parcel of the newly applied pool system, based on keeping the media people away from the war, and obliging them to depend entirely on the military for their information.

It seems notable for the above-mentioned three military engagements that the military greatly benefited from the conflicts’ locations. The two countries’ being situated in far-away lands, which reporters barely knew anything about and feared to access on their own, definitely eased the methods of censorship by barring access. The lack of knowledge about the proximity of a conflict, added to the lack of time to conduct enough research about the area and conflict being covered, was also a notable dimension. In those conflicts the journalists were either barred suitable access or taken, by surprise, to cover something they know nothing about, by a means they had never used before: the pool system.

The Gulf War media pool system, thus, was not a novelty, primarily ensuring that the news was censored at source. This happened through the press conferences, the generals’ interviews, the military minders and the set of rules the journalists had to sign regarding what they could and could not report. Indirect censorship, in addition, included the denial of journalists’ access to the war zone and the decisive tardiness in sending their reports. Employed by army commanders, headed by General Schwarzkopf, who intentionally gave interviews during the war to control the news flow at source, the pool system rigidly controlled the information flow. Referring to General Schwarzkopf’s interviews, Fialka says, “He often used the opportunity as another level of control over the media, which he watched with an ever-vigilant eye. Reporters whose stories he liked got interviews.”¹⁷²

Under the pool system reporters were encircled in a web of procedures. According to Hudson and Stanier, it was of great benefit to the commanders because the reporters were “obliged to abide by the coalition rules of reporting” and had to rely on the commanders’ briefings. Reporters could only access the troops and file stories on them through the army commanders. They submitted these reports to “military minders,” who, “under the guise of checking for security breaches, in fact imposed a powerful censorship.” Their reports were sent to their varying destinations by “militarily controlled communications systems which were frequently criticized by the newsmen for their slowness.”¹⁷³ After following these procedures, the journalists were strictly constrained by the reporting rules, the military

¹⁷¹ J. Timmons Roberts, “The Military-Industrial-Media Complex: Old Biases, New Linkages,” in Paul Leslie ed., The Gulf War As Popular Entertainment: An Analysis of the Military-Industrial Media Complex, (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, Symposium Series, Volume 42, 1997), 49.

¹⁷² Fialka, Hotel Warriors, 33.

¹⁷³ Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, 223.

briefings, the limited access to troops, the military minders and the significant slowness of communication systems, which is obviously because they were strictly monitored.

All pool reporters, says MacArthur, were obliged to “sign a lengthy document promising to abide by the military rules, greatly restricting their movements away from the hotel.”¹⁷⁴ Such direct military censorship measure made the very existence of journalists in the war zone pointless. According to MacArthur, “the twelve hundred U.S. journalists covering the mostly American side in Saudi Arabia simply weren’t permitted to file much of that was worth either reading or watching.”¹⁷⁵ Hudson and Stanier concur, “Despite the presence of this army of journalists, much that happened went unreported and much that was reported was only part of the whole truth.”¹⁷⁶

MacArthur claims access was the journalists’ greater setback. “With such poor access to soldiers and real action, the pool of reporters never turned in much that was worth censoring down at the JIB [Joint Information Bureau] in Dhahran.”¹⁷⁷ The Joint Information Bureau, established by six military officials, says Fox, was “the chief censorship agency in the combat theatre.”¹⁷⁸ The JIB evidently parallels the world wars’ state bodies in charge of overt and covert propaganda and censorship, a system that was later employed on a greater scale in the US-led “war on terror,” in the two invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The natural result, says Fialka, was a war with no witnesses. Situated in hotels near the battlefield, journalists had the illusion of being near the war. This illusion in itself reduced the reporters’ urge to physically go to the battlefield and cover the war. “The military had found ways to make the hotel warrior’s life much easier. Televised briefings, the pool reports, and CNN all provided the heightened illusion of being near the war.”¹⁷⁹ Such pacifying efforts aimed at diverting the journalists’ attention from their original task, left no room for critical reporting, and almost nothing for direct official censorship. As Fialka describes, “Officially sanctioned censorship was rarely present. Of the 1,300 reports by reporters working in the pools, only one was officially censored by the Pentagon. What got into those reports, however, was heavily influenced by access. Publication of the reports was seriously influenced by delay.”¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁴ MacArthur, Second Front, 164-165.

¹⁷⁵ MacArthur, Second Front, 146.

¹⁷⁶ Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, 209.

¹⁷⁷ MacArthur, Second Front, 192.

¹⁷⁸ Fox, “The Media and the Military”, 144.

¹⁷⁹ MacArthur, Second Front, 56.

¹⁸⁰ Fialka, Hotel Warriors, 57.

Despite the advances in media technology, allowing the journalists to air their stories live, the technological limitations on news gathering and transmission were quite severe, according to O’Heffernan,

It is not correct to assume that anything can be beamed from anywhere to anywhere via uplinks and satellites. Television crews must often utilize government-owned uplinks which can be denied for political reasons, or which can be given only after review and editing of copy. This was the case in the Gulf War for many reporters who did not have flyaways (portable uplinks). Even when a broadcaster is allowed (or pays bribes) to bring in a flyaway free of government control, satellite time-availability, costs and the location of news events can impede transmission.¹⁸¹

Censorship by delay was another significant indirect measure applied by the military. According to MacArthur, upon the announcement of the invasion, the Pentagon imposed a news blackout for twelve hours. Pete Williams, the Pentagon man dealing with the media, refused to call it a blackout, and insisted, “It was merely a delay.”¹⁸² Delay, however, kills the essence of journalism, mainly depending on presenting prompt reports and images. AP photographer, John Gaps “sent on a packet of film out with a courier on the first day of the war, and for some unknown reason got it back on the third day.” He got back another film, shot at the beginning of war, “more than a month later.” Such colossal delays were enough to distract journalists’ attention from the actual war. As MacArthur comments, “For journalists the enormous delays were the hidden enemy out in the field. They annihilated the news. Not many of us focused on the problem out in the combat units, however. There were other things to worry about.”¹⁸³

Fialka asserts that much of the videotaped material was never shown,

Much of what we wrote and videotaped out there remains unread and unseen to this day because the ‘100-Hour War’ was presented to most viewers and readers in a tidy, antiseptic package. It was a finely orchestrated burst of high-tech violence where smart bombs lanced precisely on the cross hairs; where generals made Babe Ruth style predictions that came true in real time; where the ‘news’ and its accompanying imagery were canned, wrapped and delivered before the shooting was over.¹⁸⁴

Narrowing down videotapes, thus, was integral to the whole censorship process. As Donald Mell, an AP photo editor who coordinated the pool during the ground war, explains “There were nights when we had as many as 180 rolls of film coming in. That means over 6,000 images.” Editors of the five main organizations “would sit down and winnow them down to about 20 pictures” so that they became “the official photo pool report of the day.”

¹⁸¹ O’Heffernan, “A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence on Foreign Policy,” 241-243.

¹⁸² MacArthur, *Second Front*, 189.

¹⁸³ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 21.

¹⁸⁴ Fialka, *Hotel Warriors*, 1.

The same two wire services “would transmit the same 20 pictures to some 1,500 newspaper customers throughout the U.S.”¹⁸⁵ This demonstrates how far the news media wholeheartedly denied the essence of professional journalism. Military footage, as well, say Watson and Easterbrook, was provided to all media outlets. “When the Americans hit Baghdad, television recorded the high-tech blitz. Allied warplanes made their own visual records as well, and when the U.S generals played some tapes for the press, they selected highlights from the most successful missions. Reporters were not shown tapes of bombs or missiles that went astray.”¹⁸⁶ Accordingly the war was deeply sanitized, reported from the narrow military viewpoint of the US Pentagon.

To apply the above-mentioned direct and indirect censorship measures, there was a skilfully implemented public relations strategy. This included, says O’Heffernan, a system of state secrecy, whereby information was “not completely provided,” such as the performance of weapons and the volume of death and destruction. Also, the elite consensus, that is the foreign policy effort exerted by the White House to build “a consensus around a desired policy,” was based on eliminating the media’s ability to report policy related information, mainly the “highly popular” war policy itself. And thirdly, the physical danger that may be inflicted on reporters was used to inflate their fear of uncontrolled wartime reporting,¹⁸⁷ which was effective, as comments MacArthur, “Most reporters want to survive to tell the story, or just survive.”¹⁸⁸

Evidently, the Pentagon barred reporters’ access to feed them propaganda via the press pools, and guarantee favourable coverage, where a grand public relations strategy was taking place. Pete Williams, says MacArthur, “intended to create the feeling among the news executives that coverage of the Gulf conflict was a joint production of the Pentagon and the media.” As an “intelligence press agent” dealing with reporters, he often sympathized with them, and assured them that he was on their side.¹⁸⁹ After the war ended, however, the media realized he had “...so easily convinced dozens of veteran journalists into thinking he was on their side, and successfully guaranteed the Administration favourable news coverage of the war.”¹⁹⁰ Assuring the bureau chiefs of his cooperative intentions and “commitment to freedom of the press, if not freedom of movement,” the journalists, despite their suspicion, appreciated

¹⁸⁵ Fialka, *Hotel Warriors*, 37.

¹⁸⁶ Russell Watson and Gregg Easterbrook, “A New Kind of Warfare,” in Nathaniel Lande ed., *Dispatches from the Front: News Accounts of American Wars, 1776-1991*. (New York: H. Holt, 1995), 367

¹⁸⁷ O’Heffernan, “A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence on Foreign Policy,” 243.

¹⁸⁸ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 147.

¹⁸⁹ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 24.

¹⁹⁰ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 25-26.

his offer to convince Secretary of Defense Cheney, General Powell, and General Schwarzkopf on their behalf of “the importance of unescorted coverage.”¹⁹¹ This trust from the journalists’ side illustrates how successful was the public relations effort exercised by the US Pentagon and intelligence to apply forms of direct and indirect censorship throughout the war.

Not only the Pentagon is to blame, however, for the lack of crucial information, but the media people for their “superficial reporting.” According to Fialka, “Although pool reports from journalists in the field were meant to provide pieces of the big picture on the battlefield, some reporters simply did not bother filling in the rest,” while “...20 other people back in Dhahran were depending on them.”¹⁹² The media failed to provide the US and world public with enough background on the war. As Burkart says, “The initial failure of the press was that it did not provide Americans with the historical and cultural background of the region.”¹⁹³ The audience, thus, had no knowledge of the elements leading to the war, nor the coalition stakes for being there. According to Lang and Lang, “The public did not know what it needed to know to judge foreign policy performance in relation to vital national interests.” For instance, the US public never knew of the past ties between Saddam Hussein and their administration, as comment Lang and Lang, on the ill-informed public opinion,

It behooves us to repeat a question raised by A. M. Rosenthal in November 1992: “Would the Gulf War have taken place if American citizens had known from the beginning that Saddam Hussein was the beneficiary of a Western buildup, military and political? Since Washington knew, and Saddam knew, and foreign offices friend and foe knew, why was the policy kept secret from the American public?” For whatever reason, the press did not, and could not, fulfill its adversary function against a government intent on exercising its prerogative of classifying and withholding information necessary to the formation of an informed public opinion.¹⁹⁴

Rather than raising such a crucial point, war reporters emphasized impressionistic elements instead of the news elements. According to Burkart, “Emphasis on strangeness of culture and inhospitality of climate were more entertaining and preserved the ignorance of the substantial issues at stake.”¹⁹⁵ The press thus suffered a lack of responsibility towards its audience, before the censorship measures, and thus failed to provide the public with “accurate

¹⁹¹ MacArthur, Second Front, 26-27.

¹⁹² Fialka, Hotel Warriors, 40.

¹⁹³ Burkart, “The Media in the Persian Gulf War”, 19

¹⁹⁴ Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang, “The Press as Prologue: Media Coverage of Saddam’s Iraq, 1979-1990,” in W. Lance Bennet and David Paletz eds., Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 59-60.

¹⁹⁵ Burkart, “The Media in the Persian Gulf War”, 19

and timely information about political options, about the consequences of their decisions, and conditions about their leadership which a free press can provide.”¹⁹⁶

A perceived reason for this, says Hackworth, is in the poor knowledge of reporters to a large extent. “Today’s war story comes from another breed. His or her base is more often a five-star hotel than a foxhole. Few have served as soldiers. Most of the almost 1,500 member U.S. press corps I saw during Desert Storm couldn’t tell a tank from a turtle.”¹⁹⁷ The locations of war reporters, as well as the different censorship measures exercised on them, are deemed no excuse for failing to deliver basic and background information of the Gulf War. According to William Kennedy, “it [the press] did not fail because of government censorship. Rather it failed because of the inadequacies of its own training and organization, deficiencies that prevented it from reporting matters of crucial importance, even when all the essential facts were in the public domain.”¹⁹⁸

Such lack of basic knowledge is, to a large extent, due to what authors call, “crisis driven reporting” exercised by parachute journalists who suddenly fly from one place to another, trained in dealing with crises, but with no background knowledge. The press, in this case, adds Burkart was acting as both victim and agent of disinformation. “They were wooed by the U.S military and themselves became victims as well as agents of distorted information.”¹⁹⁹ Reporters were victims of the military censorship system, and agents of the “crisis driven reporting” system they willingly and unprofessionally serve. Instant reporting, added to the journalists’ lack of basic knowledge, sacrificed accuracy and depth. Even though “nothing could match the immediacy with which events in the Middle East reached Americans,” despite all the technology, “the scope of the reports and dispatches from the hotel warriors were frustratingly limited.”²⁰⁰ “Truth,” if it exists, was, thus, the first casualty of the censored Gulf War.

The censorship measures, in addition, eased the Pentagon’s dissemination of propaganda through the mass media, aimed at grabbing public support for the war policy. These included “myths” and great exaggerations in the threat posed by Iraq to its oil rich neighbouring countries, mainly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Such exaggerations, or lies, ranged from overestimating Iraq’s military capabilities, which included conventional and mass

¹⁹⁶ Burkart, “The Media in the Persian Gulf War”, 19

¹⁹⁷ David H. Hackworth, “Learning How to Cover a War,” in Nathaniel Lande ed., Dispatches from the Front: News Accounts of American Wars, 1776-1991. (New York: H. Holt, 1995), 384.

¹⁹⁸ William V. Kennedy, The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War, (London: Praeger, 1993), x.

¹⁹⁹ Burkart, “The Media in the Persian Gulf War”, 21.

²⁰⁰ Arnett, Live From the Battlefield, 352.

destruction weapons, the threat they posed to Saudi Arabia after taking over Kuwait, to the inhumane Iraqi killers throwing babies out of their incubators, and the cruel dictator threatening their oil interests in the Gulf.

The first of these measures apparently, say Hudson and Stanier, was exaggerating the military power at the disposal of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. "The news media gave graphic description of the extremely powerful Iraqi forces which had to swiftly and completely overrun the tiny state, putting 100,000 men on to the next frontier of Saudi Arabia."²⁰¹ Nevertheless, the great exaggerations were not convincingly effective in obtaining support for the war. As Hudson and Stanier add, "Among the Western countries, however, there remained a marked lack of urgent response."²⁰² The US propaganda effort, thus, was thought to be ineffective at the beginning. Patriotic feelings had to be raised enough to appeal to the US public, thinks Burkart.²⁰³

George Bush, who disliked "formal television appearances", say Hudson and Stanier, addressed the US people "live from the White House," as follows: "If history teaches us anything," he said, "it is that we must destroy aggression or it will destroy our freedom. Appeasement does not work; as in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein a military dictator threatening his neighbors...." ²⁰⁴ Such a speech was thought to be powerful enough to gain Bush public support, at least at the local level. As describes Zoglin, "More than 61 million TV households were turned to Bush's speech, the biggest audience for a single event in TV history."²⁰⁵

Another more decisive propaganda measure was turning Saddam Hussein from ally to Hitler overnight. According to Dorman and Livingston, "Saddam, the ally, became Hitler incarnate virtually overnight," as the press "failed to *systematically* inform the American people of the U.S. role in helping Saddam Hussein throughout the eight-year Iran-Iraq war and beyond." Although "the general contours of the relationship *were* publicly available in the summer of 1990," this phase of history, however, was deliberately "missing from reporting during the establishing phase"²⁰⁶ Mentioning this part of history would have discredited the Hitler analogy, which arguably started even before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. "On April 5,

²⁰¹ Fialka, Hotel Warriors, 3.

²⁰² Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, 214.

²⁰³ Burkart, "The Media in the Persian Gulf War", 26.

²⁰⁴ Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, 217.

²⁰⁵ Zoglin, "Live from the Middle East!", 362.

²⁰⁶ William A. Dorman and Steven Livingston, "News and Historical Content: The Establishing Phase of the Persian Gulf Policy Debate," in W. Lance Bennet and David Paletz eds., Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 66-67.

after Saddam threatened to ‘scorch half of Israel’ if it attacked Iraq, the *New York Times* columnist A. M. Rosenthal compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler.”²⁰⁷

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, then, came to support and deepens this stereotype. “According to a survey conducted on August 9 and 10 for the *New York Times*, 60 percent of the public ‘accepted Mr. Bush’s comparison of Saddam Hussein of Iraq to Hitler.’”²⁰⁸ Such an analogy gained its credibility, says MacArthur, due to Bush’s repetitions and the media’s emphasizing of it. “Bush had accused Hussein’s troops of ‘outrageous acts of barbarism that even Adolf Hitler never committed,’ and reporters were unwilling to challenge the obvious speciousness of the comparison.”²⁰⁹

The third propaganda measure, then, was terming the Iraqi soldiers and their dictator, Saddam Hussein, as “baby killers” throwing Kuwaiti babies out of their incubators. According to MacArthur, “of all the accusations made against the dictator, none had more impact on American public opinion than the one about Iraqi soldiers removing 312 babies from their incubators and leaving them to die on the cold hospital floors of Kuwait city.” The main reason for the credibility of such a story, thinks MacArthur, is that Hussein was “not genius” enough in public relations. After invading Kuwait, Hussein, kicked out reporters and human rights investigators, leaving the US to sell its claims properly without being able to “refute the charges” or prove the opposite,²¹⁰ a mistake that was skilfully avoided by 2003, when Western reporters, Robert Fisk and Peter Arnett, were utilized by Iraqi and Arab media to confirm and validate Iraqi reports on the volume of civilian casualties inside Baghdad.

To validate their baby incubator story, however, the 1991 Bush administration utilized Human Rights organizations in proving their case, which turned out to be largely inaccurate. Amnesty International and Hill and Knowlton were given the first opportunity to provide the congress Human Rights caucus with their “evidence against Iraq.” Such evidence was convincing enough as this body is not one of the standing committees of congress, and thus, is “unencumbered by the legal accoutrements that would make a witness hesitate before he or she lied.”²¹¹ Lying, thus, “under the cover of anonymity to a caucus” is considered “merely public relations,” says MacArthur, The most credible story of the atrocity was given by Hill and Knowlton who sent a fifteen-year-old Kuwaiti girl, Nayirah, who testified saying, “I volunteered at al-Addan hospital... while I was there, I saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the

²⁰⁷ Dorman and Livingston, “News and Historical Content”, 70.

²⁰⁸ Dorman and Livingston, “News and Historical Content”, 72. .

²⁰⁹ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 70.

²¹⁰ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 53-54.

²¹¹ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 57-58.

hospital with guns, and go into the room where 15 babies were in incubators. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the incubators, and left the babies on the cold floor to die.”²¹²

Hired by the Kuwaiti government in exile to launch a public relations campaign aimed at liberating Kuwait, Hill and Knowlton’s story was overtly staged. “Particularly everyone listening to her horror story was also unaware of something significant—that she was the daughter of Saud al-Sabah, Kuwait’s ambassador to the United States,” and she had never seen what she was talking about. The story was widely circulated by Amnesty International who attended the caucus in Capitol Hill.²¹³ Amnesty’s huge report on human rights violations in Kuwait had a great impact. The baby incubator story...was “promoted as a fact in the second paragraph of Amnesty’s press release: ‘Amnesty International details how Iraqi forces have... left more than 300 premature babies to die after looting incubators from at least three of Kuwait City’s main hospitals.’”²¹⁴

Before the story was discredited, however, it was decisively instrumental in selling the war to the international public opinion. As describes MacArthur, “President Bush began spinning political gold out of dead babies. ‘I met with the Emir of Kuwait. And I heard horrible tales: newborn babies thrown out of incubators and the incubators being shipped off to Baghdad.’ Bush referred to the baby incubator story five more times in the next five weeks.”²¹⁵ The story was again told by Bush on January 9, in “an open letter to college students that was sent to campus newspapers all over the country.”²¹⁶ It was also presented in 27 November in front of the UN Security Council, to legitimize the war.²¹⁷ The baby incubators story was, thus, significant in deepening the Saddam-is-Hitler analogy, “Without it, the comparison of Hussein with Hitler loses its luster; to make the case effectively, one had to prove Hussein’s utter depravity.”²¹⁸ The concept of child murderers was certainly integral to the US policy building up towards the war. Evidently the issue clearly resembles the faked German atrocity stories about distilling glycerine out of the corpses of their dead soldiers, widely circulated by the British in WWI.

Just as the British rumour was later exposed, after the Gulf War ended the false information had to be sorted out. John Martin of ABC News interviewed Dr. Mohammed

²¹² MacArthur, Second Front, 58.

²¹³ MacArthur, Second Front, 59.

²¹⁴ MacArthur, Second Front, 66.

²¹⁵ MacArthur, Second Front, 65.

²¹⁶ MacArthur, Second Front, 66-67.

²¹⁷ MacArthur, Second Front, 63.

²¹⁸ MacArthur, Second Front, 68.

Matar, director of Kuwait's primary health-care system, and his wife, Dr. Fayeza Youssef, chief of obstetrics at the maternity hospital. They reported Youssef saying, "No, [the Iraqis] did not take [the babies] away from their incubator... to tell the truth... No nurses to take care of these babies and that's why they died." Martin then asked the follow-up question, "But, I mean, this very specific... Iraqi soldiers took them out of the incubators and put them on the floor to die." Dr. Matar replied, "I think this is something for propaganda." Martin, then, reported, "People, including babies, did die, when large numbers of Kuwait's doctors and nurses stopped working or fled the country in terror."²¹⁹ Behbehani, in addition, director of Kuwait's Red Crescent Society, "was unable to provide documentation on what had happened in Kuwait during the occupation," saying all of the medical records of deaths were destroyed. "On the incubator atrocity question, Behbehani admitted, 'I can't tell you if they [the babies] were taken from incubators... I didn't see it.'"²²⁰

The fourth propaganda measure, then, was naturally claiming the coalition victory against the Iraqi dictator. This could not be possible without emphasizing the nobility of the cause, as Burkart describes the way victory was claimed,

The good side must be triumphant and the evil side must be destroyed with precision and planning. This was to be the first 'clean' sanitized war with its surgical hits, its precise bombing of military targets and avoidance of civilian casualties. The Persian Gulf War, then was brief and fierce, a modern crusade, with a well defined villain, a victim needing rescue, and means that were appropriate—high technology that punished only the wicked.²²¹

Drawing this rosy picture for the coalitions certainly entailed the omission of crucial facts. According to Burkart, "The press did not inform the public that the smart bombs were less than ten percent of those dropped, that more than ninety percent were unguided bombs and seventy-five percent of these missed their targets." To make this image convincingly strong, it was vital "to emphasize the might of the enemy." To do so, "the Pentagon deliberately overstated by forty percent the strength of Iraqi forces on Kuwait border."²²² With a series of educated lies, backed up with patriotism, the President's speeches played a vital role in meeting the dire need for public support, "Speeches by President Bush convey the high moral ground claimed by America."²²³ Gaining public support entailed creating both material and humanitarian causes for the war: the oil wealth in danger, the material, and the baby incubators, the humanitarian aspects. Ensuring supportive public opinion at home, comments

²¹⁹ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 73.

²²⁰ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 73-74

²²¹ Burkart, "The Media in the Persian Gulf War", 24

²²² Burkart, "The Media in the Persian Gulf War", 24.

²²³ Burkart, "The Media in the Persian Gulf War", 24.

Neuman, was “the major lesson, from Vietnam to the Falklands” which the “US military planners brought to the Persian Gulf War.”²²⁴ The natural outcome, says Burkart, was that “the majority of Americans who supported the troops and enjoyed the spectacle of this war in their living rooms did not realize they were being served propaganda.”²²⁵

On the other side of the war, however, the Iraqis, as well, did their best to control their media representation. The presence of CNN and other international media crews in Iraq upon the start of the war, and during the war, put Iraq in the position of competing with the US in the flow of information to the international mass media. Positioning the CNN crew in Baghdad throughout the war, says Fox, was the “most controversial aspect of the media coverage.” CNN correspondent Peter Arnett had live transmission facilities at hand, a satellite uplink, to go live on CNN. “Arnett had an Iraqi censor standing at his shoulder just off camera during these live broadcasts.”²²⁶

As Arnett confirms, the Iraqis completely prohibited live broadcasts at the beginning of the war. He says that he was able to report live for seventeen hours “without a second of censorship,” before the Iraqi authorities “prohibited live news broadcasting,” and ordered them to “shut down immediately.” In day four of the war, CNN competitors, ABC and CBS, were “hurried out of the hotel by impatient officials.”²²⁷ The list of Iraqi bans, adds Arnett, included, “no logistical information, no military information, no travel without permission, no comment.”²²⁸ This is because from the military-intelligence viewpoint, says Fox, “live television transmission of enemy missile attacks of friendly territory... provide the enemy access to bomb damage assessment information to some limited degree.”²²⁹

This policy however was not well crystallized at the beginning of war. According to O’Heffernan, for some time, when the war began, “CNN broadcasts from Iraq were probably less censored than any news from JIB because the Iraqi Ministry of Information had not yet organized itself to deal with Peter Arnett and his satellite phone.” Overall, however, all of the war adversaries skilfully censored what they opposed.²³⁰ The Iraqis, nevertheless, had a long-run plan, say Hudson and Stanier, wishing for “unlimited opportunities to show these journalists scenes of civilian slaughter as a result of the allied bombing which would be

²²⁴ Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, 222.

²²⁵ Burkart, “The Media in the Persian Gulf War”, 28.

²²⁶ Fox, “The Media and the Military”, 144.

²²⁷ Peter Arnett, *Live from the Battlefield: From Vietnam to Baghdad 35 Years in the World’s War Zones*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1994), 374.

²²⁸ Arnett, *Live From the Battlefield*, 378-379.

²²⁹ Fox, “The Media and the Military”, 145.

²³⁰ O’Heffernan, “A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence on Foreign Policy,” 242.

certain to turn at least the uncommitted nations against the war.” Nevertheless, they comment, “their opportunities turned out to be extremely few.”²³¹

Arnett concurs that he was used to serve Iraqi propaganda purposes. “For the fourth day in a row we were taken to residential areas damaged in the war. I did not complain because each place was a dramatic story. That’s what war is about. I asked to visit damaged military sites but my requests were turned down on security grounds.” Arnett was not concerned that his reports covered “only one side to the story,” as he knew that the allied headquarters in Saudi Arabia announced every day a list of the destroyed Iraqi targets, which were “not acknowledging civilian casualties.” Arnett, thus, willingly covered this missing angle, “I knew that Iraqi officials believed their interests could be served by an emphasis on the innocent victims of war. I felt my reporting outweighed their propaganda gain.”²³²

The attack on Amiriya shelter was a great opportunity for the Iraqis to utilize foreign reporters in serving their propaganda goals. The event not only stresses the killing of innocent civilians, but also challenges the coalition claims about the accuracy of their smart bombs, as a means to fighting a “clean” war. Smart bombs, say Hudson and Stanier, were constantly praised for representing “the pinpoint accuracy of the allied attacks onto military targets, even to the point of directing weapons into specific windows of selected buildings.” Such claims were proved wrong, as the attack on Amiriya shelter on the night of 13 February happened to be undoubtedly “the most damaging single event of the air war.”²³³ On that day, two allied bombs hit a building in Baghdad that was identified by US intelligence as military target, and was in fact used as “a civilian air-raid shelter.” It was a great opportunity for the Iraqis, who “were quick to take advantage of the presence of Western reporters in the capital and all censorship restrictions were immediately lifted. They were soon being shown grisly pictures of the dead and wounded, captioned in harsh criticism of the Americans in those countries that remained unaligned.”²³⁴

²³¹ Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, 229.

²³² Arnett, Live from the Battlefield, 395.

²³³ Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, 229.

²³⁴ Hudson and Stanier, War and the Media, 229.

II- Subsequent Physical and Discursive Media Military Wartime Relationship:

1- The First World War

The media-military wartime relationship is determined by both the Military censorship and propaganda measures and the news media itself. The military determines its physical and discursive relationship to the media through the censorship and propaganda measures by which it attempts to control the news media, and the news media's relationship to the military is verified according to the effort it exerts to resist such control and fulfil its professional fourth estate role. In WWI, the vagueness of the above-mentioned terms of Masterman's DORA (Defence of the Realm Act), in Britain, says Carruthers, pushed the press towards more and more self-censorship. "If in doubt, ask the censors", became the editors' unwritten rule at a time when the margin for doubt was extremely wide, and penalties for miscalculation potentially severe," she adds.²³⁵

Controlling the British news media, in WWI, was easily proliferated and applied because, according to Knightley, once the war began "an overwhelming majority of the nation's political and intellectual leaders joined this propaganda campaign,"²³⁶ War officials, in addition, officially excluded correspondents and photographers from the war zone between August 1914 and May 1915. An "Eye Witness" was appointed instead, in September 1914, to report on the war. His job was to "avoid helping the enemy" rather than "the purveyance of news to our own people," and his function was "to guard against depression and pessimism, and to check unjustified optimism which might lead to a relaxation of effort."²³⁷ The vague terms of DORA, added to the support of intellectual and political leaders for the propaganda policy, and the replacement of journalists by the Eye Witness demonstrates that, on the British front, the power relation between the military and the media was mostly in favour of the military, as the journalists were not allowed to report on the war, and the Eye Witness played their role instead.

When speaking of the journalists' attitude towards the censorship measures, there is no room for generalizations because even if the majority of them were supportive of the war effort, still some had to face prison sentences for the sake of their freedom of expression. Not all journalists, especially at the beginning of war, were cooperative in the British propaganda campaign. According to Knightley, at the time war correspondents were facing prison sentences, the Eye Witness was reporting about the conditions of the troops, the weather, and

²³⁵ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 63.

²³⁶ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 82.

²³⁷ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 65.

No Man's Land. Heroic stories, as well, filled the French newspapers, without a scrap of news.²³⁸

Very soon, however, four journalists, among them American correspondents, replaced the Eye Witness in an effort to persuade America to enter the war, and that was the beginning of opening up the way for correspondents to cover the war. Unexpectedly, newspaper correspondents were pacified this easily. According to Carruthers, "they constructed their wartime role as patriotic chroniclers of 'the splendid deeds of our heroes.'" Reporters, in these terms, turned out to be friends of the military people and "apologists for the British cause."²³⁹ This closely-tied wartime relationship between the reporters and the military seems to greatly resemble the role fulfilled by embedded reporters in the 2003 attack on Iraq. Allen agrees, adding that the war correspondents provided the public with "colourful stories of heroism and glory calculated to sustain enthusiasm for the war and ensure a supply of recruits for the front."²⁴⁰ So the media-military relationship on British shores seems to have been more cooperative than adversarial with regard to the small minority who resisted the military control of the news.

Such cooperation of the British war correspondents with the military officers made the news management system more appealing and compelling to the people, unlike the German system, mainly conducted by military personnel. The voluntary application of censorship measures resulted in an "apparently" free press, not bearing a trace of censorship. While facts were skilfully hidden from the news items, "views were presented with a 'highly spiced vocabulary.'"²⁴¹ Knightley concurs, clarifying that the war was good business for British newspapers, as it did not only create news supply, but also a demand for news.²⁴²

The Germans, in contrast, did not allow correspondents to cover the war and all news was supplied through a press conference held twice weekly between war officers and journalists. "The items for this conference might theoretically have been vetted by six different censors and fifteen other bureaux, and the officer in charge followed standing instructions," such as "it is not so much the accuracy of news as its effect that matters." This shows that the official news was the only source of information to the German public. "No criticism of the conduct of the war was permitted, and editors were told not only what facts

²³⁸ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 89.

²³⁹ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 65.

²⁴⁰ Allen, "From Morse to Modern", 151.

²⁴¹ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 66-8.

²⁴² Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 86.

could be printed, but also what views could be expressed on them.”²⁴³ This system of German censorship, in dealing with the news media, explains its failure to reach the people, reflecting what is earlier called by Carruthers “the civil-military strife,” in the German war effort. The Germans, just like the British, exercised more power over their news media than the media people, creating a system of obedience to the strict censorship measures. Such a controlled system of wartime reporting, unlike the British, seems to explain the lack of credibility from which the Germans suffered.

The British rules, in contrast, were put in action through the war correspondents who were given direct instructions from the Chief of Intelligence: “Say what you like, old man. But don’t mention any places or people,” quotes Knightley. He added that newspaper correspondents were given an old house in a village as their war headquarters and supplied with orderlies, lorries, cars, conducting officers, as well as *censors*. They could not go anywhere without the conducting officers, whose job was to waste their time as much as they could. And the censors were given first-hand their pieces of writing, to check and revise. Their goals were to present stories of heroism to sustain the people’s enthusiasm for the war, and to prevent any criticism of the high command and save its reputation.²⁴⁴ Such a monitoring system of news items, the rules involved, and the great delays it caused, seems to greatly resemble the way the 1991 Gulf War was covered.

In WWI, the photographers’ efforts, as well, to cover the war properly were hampered. Only two photographers were allowed to cover the Western front. But their job was more of a historical compilation of war material, rather than providing newspapers with photos. Artists were prevented from access to the war until 1916, when they were allowed but faced numerous limitations on their movement.²⁴⁵ There was no room whatsoever to resist the government propaganda and censorship measures imposed on the cinema, as the audio-visual coverage was essentially conducted by the military, with great cooperation from the film producers. It seems evident, though, that the secret behind the perceived success of the British propaganda, over the German, lies in the fact that the media people were mostly cooperative with the military in putting their control measures into action. Probably the humane environment in which the British correspondents lived helped in creating a system of voluntary obedience from the side of the media people.

²⁴³ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 86.

²⁴⁴ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 96-7.

²⁴⁵ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 110, 99, 108.

2- The Second World War:

Apparently, in WWII the power relationship between the mass media and the military, just like WWI, was weighted even more heavily on the side of the military. The propaganda advantage, however, of the key players, Germany and Britain, shifted to the side of the Germans who seemed to exercise more effective management of wartime media coverage in the early phases of the conflict. Germany had learned much from the way the British managed their news in WWI, which is best reflected in their attempts to manipulate war journalists. The Ministry of Propaganda, under Goebbels' control, says Knightley, was instrumental in taking care of the "neutral war correspondents" through the Foreign Press Department, run by Karl Bonner. "Correspondents were given special privileges such as extra rations, a petrol allowance, and a special exchange rate for their currency." A distinctive house outside Berlin was set up as a special country resort where "friendly correspondents" were invited to stay, he adds. This was not however the case with all correspondents. The correspondent who dared to write "unfavourable" stories was subject to "an escalating scale of harassment" which ranged from a warning to the disconnection of his telephone line, to arrest and trial for espionage, an easy charge to bring as the information a spy needs is not too different from that needed by a correspondent.²⁴⁶ That was the German "carrot and stick" policy with regard to journalists covering WWII on the German side.

Such events, however, did not happen regularly, as the German arrangements for war correspondents were very different from those of WWI. As Knightley says, Goebbels decided from the very beginning that "there would be no German war correspondent as such." Instead, all those involved in the work of the mass media, including journalists, writers, poets, photographers, cameramen, film and radio producers, publishers, printers, painters, and commercial artists were enrolled into the army's Propaganda Division. Their primary task was to make use of their skills and experience to psychologically control the people's mood at home, on the Front line, abroad and throughout enemy lands. They represented a major part of German's war effort, combining the skills of correspondents and publicists, and mastering what was later called by the British "Black Propaganda".²⁴⁷ Working as messengers rather than reporters reduced the amount of clashes between the media and government officials to an unprecedented minimum, ensuring a system of loyalty to the government from the side of the journalists and, thus, reducing the media power against that of the military.

²⁴⁶ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 220.

²⁴⁷ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 220-1.

News dispatches from the Germans, thus, dominated the mass media of most neutral countries. It was especially significant that the German news dispatches dominated the American media, while very few came from Britain, and most of the information was wrong. Knightley quotes Ed Murrow of the Columbia Broadcasting System telling his listeners, "There can be no question that the handling by press and radio in this country of the news from Norway in the past ten days had undermined the confidence of a considerable section of the British public in the integrity and accuracy of its news sources."²⁴⁸ This shows how the German propaganda machine was so powerful, to the extent of making the British media lose credibility both at home and abroad. The harsh censorship system employed by the British censors to the extent of stopping war news from reaching the public played, as well, an important role in its loss of credibility.

The German propaganda machinery, however, was very appealing to the Germans themselves, including those journalists and artists exerting every possible effort for war reporting. The power that the German military exercised on media people was not only applied through the use of coercion, but also due to the appeal of Nazi ideology, and the charismatic role played by Hitler and designed by his propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels. The German wartime coverage, therefore, appeared so natural and truthful as it was undertaken by loyal personnel, and was able to affect the people's emotions both inside Germany and across its borders and over the Atlantic Ocean.

At the same time, in the United States, even though they were hoping to gain American public opinion on their side and induce the Americans to join the war, the British were severely losing credibility. As Knightley points out,

Every British claim, every story put out by the ministry, was automatically labelled propaganda. Any statement from British war correspondent that showed Britain in a good light was dismissed as an attempt to influence American opinion, an effort to drag the United States once again in a European war. Complaints from American war correspondents about British censorship and restrictions on their movements were seen as proof of Britain's determination to hide the truth about the war.²⁴⁹

It was not, thus, the British propaganda campaign that convinced the American public of the worthiness of joining the war. As mentioned earlier, it was the cooperation between the US media and government, aided by the British cinema industry, which helped design a decisive campaign to convince US public opinion. This is evidently because the US government had the strategic goal of preventing the dominance of the fascist Nazi ideology.

²⁴⁸ Knightley, The First Casualty, 227-8.

²⁴⁹ Knightley, The First Casualty, 228.

So, the US joining the war is essentially a government-imposed policy, from above rather than below. Propaganda was, thus, only successful when the two nations coordinated together the propaganda effort.

The success of such a joint propaganda campaign, however, could never be possible without a great deal of cooperation from the side of the media people. What is mystifying, however, about the British media people in WWII was, says Taylor, the very few clashes that occurred between the government and the media. “It is important to stress that those clashes that occurred were so few in number... That there should be no more than half a dozen serious clashes with the press in six years of war was an impressive achievement for a liberal democracy at war.” The Ministry of Information, he adds, “brought only four prosecutions against the press in the entire war.” The sole logical explanation for this is that both the media and the government had similar objectives for the war, especially concerning victory. As adds Taylor, their “partnership in shaping morale” easily led to mutual appreciation and cooperation rather than confrontation about the limits of reporting.²⁵⁰

The cooperation of many journalists is well reflected in Knightley’s statistics and the system they undertook for their work in the MoI. According to Knightley, The number of journalists appointed, which reached 43 out of the Ministry of Information’s 999 staff, was the subject of much criticism in the House of Commons, says Knightley.²⁵¹ Only official photographers were allowed to take photos of the war, hand them to the Ministry of Information, to distribute what had been approved. Only the Ministry’s press officers were allowed to go to air stations, write news, and hand it in to the correspondents, who used to telephone it to their newspapers. The correspondents themselves, however, were prevented from talking with media officers under any conditions. To protest against such restrictive measures, some correspondents used to contact their offices and demand to be recalled. The BBC correspondent, Charles Gardner, was the first to return to London.²⁵² Even though there were correspondents who refused to go on with this system which was humiliating to their job, still the great majority seem to have been cooperative.

As Pronay details the relationship between the journalist and the editor in the British censorship system, the British system was “a system of *pre*-censorship as opposed to *post*-censorship, and that it sought to achieve its aims in the first instance by co-operation rather than confrontation with those who produced the newspapers.” The censored information was

²⁵⁰ Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, 213-214.

²⁵¹ Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 221.

²⁵² Knightley, *The First Casualty*, 224.

the basic information based on which the stories were written rather than the article itself. It was possible, thus, for an editor to print something undesirable “in wilful defiance of the censorship.” As Pronay describes,

It was editorial ‘voluntas’ not the control of the means of printing which determined what *might* get into newspaper. To understand the system of press censorship in Britain, it is more meaningful to regard it as a system based on the pre-censorship of information, buttressed and elaborated by regular confidential guidance given to the editors in matters of interpretation, separating as far as possible national interests, that is security and high morale, from party-political interests, and relying on that patriotism and responsibility which could be expected in wartime of the vast majority of people including journalists.²⁵³

WWII, thus, marked more of a media-government cooperation and harmony rather than confrontation and conflict. As Taylor notes, “what was striking about the overall record of wartime censorship in Britain is not the number of press articles or broadcasts or films that were banned, but rather the number that were not.” The effective censorship system employed by the MoI by 1942 fed into the unawareness of most cinema-goers, who reached 20 to 30 million people weekly, of the “extent to which the images before them were being controlled by the government.” Cinema-goers were totally unaware of the process of censorship in spite of the certificate that appeared on the screen before every film declaring “This is to certify that this film has been passed by the British Board of Film Censors.”²⁵⁴ The people’s ignorance of this fact seems to reflect a great credibility for the cinema as mass media inside Britain. This credibility has a lot to do with the media people’s loyalty and cooperation with the system.

Alexander Korda was the first cooperative filmmaker to join the British propaganda machinery. He soon realized that he had to deal directly with the MoI, rather than the BBFC, which most filmmakers did “at their own risk” at the beginning. Alexander Korda set the pattern for this early “by producing his renowned film, *The Lion Has Wings* (1939), the first wartime propaganda feature film and one for which the MoI was grateful, though not responsible.”²⁵⁵ Korda, says Murphy, was encouraged by Winston Churchill to go to Hollywood to promote the British cause there. “The most vital role British film-makers could play was to present Britain’s cause sympathetically to the American audience.”²⁵⁶ Korda’s loyalty reached the limit of fulfilling government-directed missions abroad. Such public

²⁵³ Pronay, “The News Media at War,” 194-5

²⁵⁴ Taylor, “Introduction: Film, the Historian and the Second World War,” 7-8.

²⁵⁵ Taylor, “Introduction: Film, the Historian and the Second World War,” 9.

²⁵⁶ Murphy, British Cinema and the Second World War, 11.

diplomacy through a filmmaker was probably the seed for the joint cinema effort applied by the two countries afterwards.

Inside Britain, in addition, most of the producers of the five newsreel companies supported the government efforts, which made it unnecessary to bring them under the BBFC control. They were, however, liable to government censorship, “both before and after production,” says Taylor.²⁵⁷ According to Pronay, the newsreel men exerted great efforts to come up with pro-government films. They skilfully used “the rules of their art” in creating new propaganda values out of the original news values, by deliberately shifting “the rules of ‘balance’” and “dressing up” the direct governmental propaganda messages as if they were their own.²⁵⁸

Pronay states “The newsreels had the hardest job within the trinity of the news media. Their job was to present the news in the realistic form of film and they could do little else.” They could not present entertainment or other material alongside the news like the BBC. “Newsreels,” adds Pronay, “always had to report from the front line – and there was no good news to present from the fronts for almost three years. People hate bad news and the bearer of bad news is never popular.” To avoid losing popularity, the newsreels often “asked time and again to be allowed to ‘lighten’ the reel.”²⁵⁹

This could not be possible without complete cooperation from the media side. Though tight censorship measures determined the newsreel content, still the number of omitted shots during the war years is considered too little in relation to the huge number of newsreels produced. According to Pronay, “Only 166 cuts out of some 1500 stories... show a remarkable degree of harmony and understanding between the companies and the Ministry and between the censors and the newsreel men.” Evidence shows that despite complaints, “the companies acted in a thoroughly patriotic fashion, obeying their orders and seeking to anticipate them.”²⁶⁰ Such cross-section cooperation covered the whole of the production teams, from the producers themselves to the newsreel ‘boys.’ As Pronay says,

It was on the level of the ‘newsreel-boys’ however that willing cooperation with Ministry really mattered. What happened on that level was simply that they acted like patriotic, straightforward and relatively unsophisticated Englishmen tend to act when ‘there is a war on’. They knew they had an important job to do and they carried out what they understood to be expected of them, without too much arguing.²⁶¹

²⁵⁷ Taylor, “Introduction: Film, the Historian and the Second World War,” 8-9.

²⁵⁸ Pronay, “The News Media at War”, 202-3.

²⁵⁹ Pronay, “The News Media at War”, 203.

²⁶⁰ Pronay, “The News Media at War”, 198-199.

²⁶¹ Pronay, “The News Media at War”, 199.

The media-military wartime power relationship, thus, on both the German and British sides was by and large cooperative. Even though the German propaganda effort can be judged to have been much more successful than the British, still the military bodies of the two countries were able to fully control the media coverage of WWII. This control was applied via both coercion and persuasion. Coercion is represented in the strict censorship and propaganda measures applied by both the British and the Germans, and persuasion is applied through convincing the media people of the noble goal of the war, the concept of “our boys are fighting”, and the inescapable goal of preserving the “dignity” of “our nation.” In my view, the Germans were more successful because they applied persuasion ahead of coercion through the appeal of the Nazi ideology from the very beginning of the war. The British starting the war with a coercive censorship, which was lightened afterwards, resulted in losing the media war for some time, before achieving the cooperation of media people later on.

3- The Vietnam War:

Contrary to the popular notion that a critical news media lost the US the Vietnam War, evidence suggests that the media-military relationship had been friendly and cooperative all the way until the 1968 Tet Offensive, which represented a complete U-turn in the nature of relations. According to Philip Seib,

As Americans received the news, they were also getting an unusually bloody dose of television reporting. Although a study of television news stories that aired between 1968 and 1973 has found that only 3 percent contained combat footage and 2 percent showed any dead or wounded, the level of violence in the televised stories was considerably higher during the 1968 Tet period (January 31-March 31). A viewer watching network news five times a week ‘would have seen film of civilian casualties 3.9 times a week... more than four times the overall average of 0.85 times a week. Film of military casualties jumped from 2.4 to 6.8 times a week.²⁶²

Such small volume of visual imagery that included scenes of combat and casualties proves that journalists were not altogether critical of the war effort; it only intensified during the Tet Offensive period. As verified by Hallin, in the early years of the war, “the journalists relied primarily on two kinds of sources: government officials, particularly in the executive branch, and American soldiers in the field—the latter being particularly important in the case of television.” But when conflicts escalated between these sources and divisions among them sharpened, they became more critical and less enthusiastic about the war. “The news ‘reflected’ these divisions,” which is very natural in journalism. When the political system is

²⁶² Philip Seib, *Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy*, (London: Preager, 1997), 17.

divided the media becomes more “detached” or “adversarial” and in situations of political consensus, they act as “responsible” members of the political system. So it was natural at such a stage that the media coverage became “less positive”.²⁶³

So, what appears to be the case is that journalists backed their country as long as they believed in the righteousness of its endeavours, at the beginning of the war, and specifically until Tet Offensive. However, when internal conflicts within the US government escalated, the news media reflected those divisions, and thus, appeared adversarial. Such enduring Vietnam conflicts between government officials and soldiers on the one hand, and the enraged public opinion on the other hand, have precipitated what some authors and officials perceive as negative coverage. Such conflicts started to erupt when the war seemed to have been spilling out of US hands, and many officials were trying to push the US administration to back away, while more troops were being sent to Vietnam. The mass media, having lost confidence in the administrations’ policies, started reflecting such conflicts, worsening its relationship with the government more than ever. This explains why, in the following wars, the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent “war on terror,” sustaining elite consensus was, and still is, central to the war policy, so that it is never a subject for criticism.

Unlike previous and later military conflicts, however, in Vietnam the US did not rally enough public support for the war, as the conflict was thought of as a “limited conflict” that did not need much media management. “The war was lost on the college campuses where young men did not want to die imposing an imperialist view on an unwilling people,” says Neuman. Criticizing the former US President, “Johnson tried to fight a war on the battlefield without waging it on the home front,” she said. Even though Johnson was addicted to television, putting three TV sets in his Oval Office, still the media put him down. “The new medium vexed him, defying his best efforts to reach the public and mocking his intentions by highlighting the hound-dog look of his face. Johnson tried, how he tried, to do television do his bidding, to earn its respect and see its honor reflected in his television image.” Nevertheless, the content of his words and promises contradicted his actions, and thus affected his credibility, “He promised a limited war and kept calling for more troops. He offered negotiations, and kept bombing. This dissonance between words and action doomed him. They called it the credibility gap.”²⁶⁴

²⁶³ Hallin, *The “Uncensored War”*, 10.

²⁶⁴ Johanna Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 174-6.

This credibility gap was intensified by a *New York Times*' front page headline, "Westmoreland Requests 206,000 More Men, Stirring Debate in Administration." This article says Philip Seib, had a "double-barrelled effect,"

First the need to commit to many more troops to Vietnam was likely to generate even more public doubts about U.S. war policy; second, the 'debate in Administration' seemed evidence of disarray in the ranks and was certain to erode further public's confidence in policymakers' competence.²⁶⁵

The loss of public support for the war added to the shock of the Tet Offensive further intensified the credibility gap. According to Neuman, the "Tet Offensive stunned a nation that 'had been led to believe that success in Vietnam was just around the corner. Tet was the final blow to the sagging credibility of Johnson administration and to the waning patience of the American People with this remote and inconclusive war.'" In defence of the media, she says,

It was not so much the pictures of bloodshed, it was the fact that the pictures did not match the optimistic chatter coming from the administration that doomed LBJ's policy. That war is hell is well understood by both soldiers and the parents who wait at home; that it has a purpose is the saving grace for both. When blood is shed without a cause, public opinion is sure to turn, even if there are no television cameras in the war zone. Lyndon Johnson's presidency was destroyed not by television pictures of the Vietnam War but by his own inability to sell the policy—on television and in other ways—to the public. Perhaps that war was unsaleable, but it is not television's fault that it was unpopular.²⁶⁶

The failure of the media-government relationship in Vietnam, thus, relates to the fact that the stated goal of the administration "did not match its strategic activity."²⁶⁷ Seib quotes AP correspondent Peter Arnett reporting an unnamed American major, "It became necessary to destroy the town to save it." Herbert Schandler, also, says Seib, noted, "This widely repeated sentence seemed to sum up the irony and the contradictions in the use of American power in Vietnam and caused many to question the purpose of our being there. If we had to destroy our friends in order to save them, was the effort really worthwhile, either for us or our friends?"²⁶⁸ So, the stated goal of stopping the Communists from overrunning south Vietnam was being implemented by inhuman and immoral means. The clear strategy was killing civilians and destroying whole villages rather than fighting actual troops.

The media people, just like the rest of the people, were shocked and their shock, coupled with their principles, seems to have affected their reporting. Journalists, says Hallin, refute the idea that the media is to blame for any "breakdown in the governability" of

²⁶⁵ Philip Seib, *Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy*, (London: Preager, 1997), 19.

²⁶⁶ Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, 177.

²⁶⁷ Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, 178.

²⁶⁸ Seib, *Headline Diplomacy*, 17.

American society. Quoting David Brinkley, “what television did in the sixties was to show the American people to the American people... Some they liked and some they didn’t. It wasn’t that television produced or created any of it.” Hallin argues, “This is the ‘mirror’ or the ‘messenger’ analogy,” in which “journalists have come to see themselves as neutral professionals standing above the political fray.” Reporters, thus, sought to play the “fourth estate” role as “adversaries” of government in the sense of being “champions of truth and openness, checking the tendency of the powerful to conceal and dissemble.” These two analogies the messenger and the watchdog roles, tend to “portray the media as autonomous institutions standing apart from the institutions of state power,” where Vietnam seems to be a “perfect illustration of the separation between media and state in modern American politics.”

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In this sense, says Hallin, “The relation of the modern American news media to political authority is highly ambivalent.” The wartime media-military relationship, thus, became more “depersonalized and depoliticized”, which made the media more integrated in the political process. Journalists, thus “gave up the right to speak with a political voice of their own, and in turn they were granted a regular right of access to the inner counsels of government.”²⁷⁰ Such integration of journalists in political circles allowed them to closely witness the internal separation in government circles, the arguments raised, and earned them their own anti-war views, eventually affecting their coverage of Vietnam.

The mass media, thus, started to be sceptical of the news they received from government sources. Walter Cronkite’s reporting of the Tet Offensive, says Carpini, symbolizes this idea, “Again, it was not that television reported the offensive as a military defeat for the US and ARVN forces. Cronkite’s statement of 14 February—‘first and simplest, the Vietcong suffered a military defeat’—was typical. Instead the media presented a picture and commentary on that picture that suggested individual military victories did not add up to winning the war.”²⁷¹ In addition to this new line of coverage, the theme of having to “destroy a village in order to save it” was best illustrated in television images. According to Carpini, “Scenes of civilian casualties and urban destruction in South Vietnam were four times more frequent during the Tet period than during the rest of the war, and scenes of military casualties

²⁶⁹ Hallin, *The “Uncensored War”*, 5-6.

²⁷⁰ Hallin, *The “Uncensored War”*, 7-8.

²⁷¹ Carpini, “US Media Coverage of the Vietnam Conflict in 1968”, 50.

were almost three times more common.”²⁷² Such scenes and the comments on them are claimed by most authors to have helped in ending the war.

It seems to be that when the war lasted for too long, both officials inside the government and the general public started criticizing its policy. At the same time the idea of “having to destroy a village in order to save it”, coupled with the Tet Offensive, and the government loss of credibility both for journalists and public opinion empowered the media against the government, especially with the media’s ability to bring images of death and destruction to the people’s living rooms. Reporters who used to support the war effort, positioned themselves as policymakers and ended the war on the television screens.

Cronkite, CBS war correspondent and main anchorman, who used to be a strong supporter of the war, seems to have helped to end the war by his television reports, sending “shock waves” through the administration while presenting the immediate war situation. In his prominent policy statement, Cronkite concluded,

It seems now certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate... To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.²⁷³

In Carpini’s analysis, this shift in reporting did not happen “out of the blue.” First, underneath the apparent Cold War consensus, there was a myriad of people who did not believe in the morality of the war goals. The Tet Offensive allowed those who “questioned the war effort to gain access to the agenda.” Second, “the negative coverage of the war resulted because of an expansion of the sphere of legitimate controversy, and not because the media began sympathetically to cover those with deviant views.” The media simply “reflected this growing debate,” fuelling those who were famous supporters of the war, including Cronkite. Third, the display of warfare doubt naturally had its impact on public opinion, with reporting leading “a plurality of the US public” to feel that “getting involved in Vietnam had been ‘a mistake.’” Fourth, Johnson’s administration was responsible for the negative reporting during and after Tet for two reasons. Firstly, “The film footage and stories of Viet Cong successes” dramatically opposed “the years of exaggerated US and South Vietnamese control,”²⁷⁴ Secondly, the LBJ administration failed “to react to the Tet offensive effectively by dealing forcefully and directly with the public and the press.” Rather, “retreating into brooding

²⁷² Carpini, “US Media Coverage of the Vietnam Conflict in 1968”, 51.

²⁷³ Carpini, “US Media Coverage of the Vietnam Conflict in 1968”, 52.

²⁷⁴ Carpini, “US Media Coverage of the Vietnam Conflict in 1968”, 55-56.

silence,” allowed for policy reports like that of Cronkite.²⁷⁵ Hallin concurs, “If the administration had been clear enough on its direction to maintain an active public stance, Cronkite might never have ended his famous broadcast... with a policy statement of his own.”²⁷⁶ Fifth, after the Tet offensive, journalists were “no longer getting information second-hand or in the limited environment of military control.”²⁷⁷ This allowed for uncensored first-hand footage to be covered directly by the TV crews.

The case of Vietnam’s coverage, thus, says Hallin, created a consensus among the political elite that there was a conflictual relationship between the media and the government:

The media contradicted the more positive view the war officials sought to project, and for better or worse was the journalists’ view that prevailed with the public, whose disenchantment forced an end to American involvement. Often this view is coupled with its corollary, that television has decisively changed the political dynamics of war so that no ‘television war’ can long retain political support.²⁷⁸

To conclude thus, the media-military interactions during the Vietnam war were cooperative at the beginning with the news media supporting and backing their fighting soldiers in the war zone, and largely dependent on the military to get their war news. This situation has later changed with the divisions among officials, official-military lines and the growing public disenchantment with the war effort. These complex divisions have naturally pushed off the censorship and propaganda limits exercised on journalists, providing them with unprecedented freedom to report the war, reflect those divisions, and infuriate everybody! This has intensified the government officials’ fear of the power of the press and led them to contain the media afterwards in both peace and wartime.

4- The 1991 Gulf War:

The physical and discursive media-military relationship throughout the Gulf War, under stiff military censorship and propaganda measures, was largely cooperative. The media people certainly did not have much choice with the Pentagon measures delimiting their movement and vision, while they were expected to send back regular reports on a frequent basis. What seems evident, however, for most authors, is that both the media and the military were integral parts of the same orchestra. As Roper assumes, the American media “broadly” supported the administration’s “domestic political agenda in the Gulf War.” He clarifies that

²⁷⁵ Carpini, “US Media Coverage of the Vietnam Conflict in 1968”, 57.

²⁷⁶ Hallin, *The “Uncensored” War*, 49.

²⁷⁷ Carpini, “US Media Coverage of the Vietnam Conflict in 1968”, 57.

²⁷⁸ Hallin, *The “Uncensored” War*, 3-4.

the direct access between the military and the public throughout the war press conferences undermined the “credibility of journalistic interpretations.”²⁷⁹

The journalistic role of war correspondents had shifted shockingly since Vietnam, “where the press called military credibility into question.” Roper quotes a Swedish journalist who commented that it was “remarkable to see how the US journalists took part in a show arranged by the military, how they walked around the passages at the press center dressed in combat uniforms thinking they were covering the war.”²⁸⁰ Willingly or not, war reporters ended up fulfilling a military-dictated role and serving in delimiting the people’s knowledge of the war, rather than broadening it. Hackworth comments “Those few pool members who were out with the troops became part of a military machine that imposed total control over what the public would see, hear or read.”²⁸¹ This demonstrates the contradictory conduct of American journalism, especially in wartime, as Ben Bagdikian criticizes,

“Our news regularly proclaims its power to remain independent from officialdom. Yet with rare exceptions, the American mainstream news during combat has been much like the hired bards of mediaeval monarchs: when war has come, our journalists have become propagandists.”²⁸²

This propagandist function of the news media, in relation to the military, is also evident in the tiny percentage of formally censored stories during the war. According to MacArthur, Pete Williams was proud to indicate that “only five stories were referred for clearance in Washington by the JIB in Dhahran, and that just one of them was kept from the public by a news organization, a case of self-censorship.” This, in Williams’ view, is enough proof that there was “no government censorship in the Gulf War.” MacArthur criticizes that if all of the censorship measures applied, including “censorship by delay,” “direct intimidation of soldiers and interference with pool reporters doing interviews,” “outright arrest of unilateral reporters,” “preventing reporters from seeing anything interesting,” and “censorship of pool dispatches”..., are acknowledged as “standard press relations, we are in great danger indeed.”²⁸³ Evidently, the numerous indirect censorship measures applied during the war not only minimized the likelihood of direct censorship but also gave the government representatives a golden chance to entirely deny the use of censorship.

The news media arguably has stakes in such a cooperative attitude. According to MacArthur, many of the journalists “simply thrill to the excitement of military conflict and

²⁷⁹ Roper, “Overcoming the Vietnam Syndrome”, 38.

²⁸⁰ Roper, “Overcoming the Vietnam Syndrome”, 38.

²⁸¹ Hackworth, “Learning How to Cover a War,” 385-386.

²⁸² Bagdikian, “Foreword”, xi.

²⁸³ MacArthur, Second Front, 192.

are easily swept up by the martial spirit of the moment.” While some find war “an opportunity for self-promotion,” many, including editors, anchors, reporters and bureau chiefs, “who expressed themselves publicly during the Gulf crisis” tend to be “apolitical, respectful of power and careerist to a fault.” As a result, most reporters “picked up the drumbeat of war” to avoid missing “a rich opportunity for career advancement,” or “the displeasure of their colleagues and bosses.”²⁸⁴ So, it is perhaps the attraction of the bright star of fame, as well as the associated material benefit, that causes journalists to abandon their reporting task and turn out to be no more than propagandists. This is not, however, a good excuse, thinks MacArthur,

Simple careerism can explain the soldierlike behavior of the network graphic designers and the producers who ordered them around. The pressures of commerce can explain the pathetic nature of *Newsweek* and *Time* pullout maps. But neither factor can account entirely for the out-and-out war boosterism and jingoism display by the major media as the White House Moved the nation toward war.²⁸⁵

There was definitely another option for the reporters to professionally fulfil their journalistic tasks. They could simply choose not to join the Pentagon pool and to report the war unilaterally, as some did, and had to face up to many dangers. “Unilateral reporters decided that the only way to get the news was to break the rules,” says Fialka. The dangers of breaking the rules, however, were quite high. The rules were based on an agreement between the US press and the Pentagon that “combat coverage would be carried out by journalists working in pools with media escorts.” And the Saudis not only wanted to deal solely with the pools, but also issued a decree saying, “any unescorted journalists found within 100 miles of the war zone would be arrested and deported.”²⁸⁶ Such life-risking conditions were quite affordable for the unilaterals who apparently enjoyed the adventure, and were able to come up with some other versions of the military-imposed truth.

As unilaterals represented an unorganized resistance to the rigid military rules, they were mostly ineffective, with the exception of the very few ones who could come across significant pieces of news and manage to actually report them to the general public. As Fialka declares, “They could operate only at the fringes of this war.” They were unable to come up with conclusive accounts of what was going on in the battlefield. “With few exceptions, the lead stories were drawn from pool reporters or official briefings and not from unilaterals’ accounts.”²⁸⁷ This happened due to many elements, at the top of which were the small number of unilaterals and the fact that no one trusted them or wanted to cooperate with them. Hudson

²⁸⁴ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 95.

²⁸⁵ MacArthur, *Second Front*, 95.

²⁸⁶ Fialka, *Hotel Warriors*, 45.

²⁸⁷ Fialka, *Hotel Warriors*, 45.

and Stanier clarify that even though they were “heavily distrusted by the troops,” they did “make important contributions to the reporting of the war.”²⁸⁸ Such contributions, however, were few in number compared with the flow of military briefings and officialdom coming out of the pools.

Despite all obstacles, however, the unilaterals seem to have proved effective, at some points. Some of them turned out to be war heroes, received high ranking journalism prizes after the war, and were public speakers on significant television programmes for their ability to boil the calm lake of officialdom. They simply contributed remarkable and distinctive reporting that the media could not miss or disregard, although it was harshly attacked. Most striking were the reports coming out of Baghdad, from CNN’s Peter Arnett, and the BBC’s John Simpson. Arnett, say Hudson and Stanier, “gave moment by moment accounts of raids on the enemy capitals by smart bombs and cruise missiles, giving to their audience breathtaking description of the accuracy with which these weapons sought out and destroyed military targets within the capital.” They add, “Similar fascinating accounts were reported by John Simpson of the BBC from the viewpoint of his hotel window in downtown Baghdad.”²⁸⁹

Neuman asserts, “CNN was able to bring to viewers the sights and sounds of war in part because its reporters were still in Baghdad when the fighting began.” She adds, “Peter Arnett set a new marker for journalism, establishing a toehold in the enemy camp. In truth, he was hardly behind hostile lines, having been invited to stay by an Iraqi regime that was convinced his reports would rebound to its benefit.”²⁹⁰ As Arnett describes upon the outbreak of war, “The allies made it clear that the first target would be Baghdad.” So, “Baghdad was going to be the most dangerous place in the world in a few days and, yes, I wanted to be there. It was not a question of bravery; I believed that I could do what had to be done, and that I could survive it.”²⁹¹

Arnett, however, was not the only journalist in Baghdad. However he was the only one equipped with the latest CNN transmission facilities, and the only one allowed by the Iraqis to stay throughout the war. Criticizing Arnett, Hamilton says,

Firstly, he was not, as he claimed on air, the only western journalist in Iraq. There was also Alfonso Rojo of the Spanish newspaper *El Mundo* and the *Guardian*. Secondly, it fails to mention the public row between Arnett and Rojo over the former’s refusal to allow the latter use of CNN’s telephone, making it difficult for Rojo to get his copy out of Iraq.²⁹²

²⁸⁸ Hudson and Stanier, *War and the Media*, 223

²⁸⁹ Hudson and Stanier, *War and the Media*, 223.

²⁹⁰ Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, 216.

²⁹¹ Arnett, *Live from the Battlefield*, 349.

²⁹² Hamilton, “Pools, Minders, Unilaterals and Scud Studs”, 164.

Arnett clarified that he had orders from Atlanta not to let any other media outlets use his transmission facilities, as competition remains the essence of critical journalism, especially in wartime. CNN's screen, thus, was the only one carrying live reports from Baghdad throughout the entire war. As described by Zoglin,

The undisputed star of the initial coverage was CNN, the 24-hour-news channel, which affirmed its credibility and worldwide clout with new authority. Though ABC, NBC and CNN managed to air telephone reports with their correspondents in Baghdad during the initial shelling, ABC and NBC lost contact after few minutes. Only CNN was able to keep its line open and broadcast continuously throughout the attack.²⁹³

Like all unilaterals, Arnett was not trusted by either side in the war, the Iraqis or the coalition, for his critical accounts of a war he was reporting live from the battlefield and from behind the perceived "enemy" lines. According to Neuman, two of his reports enraged the US,

One was about the bombing of a facility the Iraqis claimed was a baby-formula factory. The Americans insisted the plant was for producing biological weapons, and when Arnett gave the Iraqi claims, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater called CNN 'a conduit for Iraqi disinformation.' The second was about civilians killed in a bomb shelter that the United States insisted was a military command headquarters.²⁹⁴

It was not Arnett's claims or analyses that infuriated the US and coalition military authorities, it was the pictures; the images of death and destruction, that yielded his report's authority over that of the "Pentagon," at some points. The dangerousness of such images for the Pentagon not only lay in their likelihood to inspire public sympathy and assist Iraq's strategic goals, but also in the fact that they negated the US claims for a surgically clean war. The pictures provided evidence that there were civilians being injured and killed and that the smart bombs were not totally smart. This eventually exposed the propaganda effort exerted to cover up those points.

The images, thus, together with Arnett's reports, had some "authority" that resembled the Vietnam reports of the Tet Offensive, which intensified the fear of losing the media war. Soon allegations started to circulate that CNN was tied up for Iraq's benefit. Arnett's position, inside Iraq, and his challenging of the Pentagon's rules inside the media pool system were totally unaccounted and unprepared for by a military machine that had been settled on taking advantage of journalism to serve its military purposes. It is true, however, that the Iraqis had the goal of using CNN to show the ugly side of the war: its direct repercussions on civilians and infrastructure. According to Neuman, "In truth, both sides used Arnett to carry messages,

²⁹³ Zoglin, "Live from the Middle East!", 359.

²⁹⁴ Neuman, Lights, Camera, War, 217.

stake out claims, and fight for public support, functions journalism has traditionally provided in wartime. What seemed to anger some viewers is that Arnett had pictures of the destruction, pictures of the signs, in English, that said Baby Milk Factory. The pictures did not make this report more or less accurate, but they did lend them an air of authority.”²⁹⁵

By planning and allowing for such repercussions to be pictured and aired, the Iraqis could skilfully access US public opinion and challenge the dominant Pentagon claims of a clean war. “Baghdad had calculated that it could influence public opinion through CNN’s cameras, and let them stay when the others were booted out.”²⁹⁶ But the Iraqi authorities, just like the coalition, never trusted Arnett, nor allowed him to move freely and report directly from the battlefield, with military minders accompanying him like his own shadow. In Arnett’s words, “Perhaps Atlanta thought I had lost my marbles. Hadn’t the producers been listening to my broadcasts and figured out otherwise? I hoped my critics would not equate my amiability with the minders with disloyalty. If I were really trusted by the Iraqis I would not have needed minders at all.”²⁹⁷

Nevertheless, the Iraqis were keen to let Arnett use all the necessary facilities. In Arnett’s words, “Only CNN had worked out an arrangement with the Iraqi government to use the system [wire system connected to a microwave transmitter to Amman, and then by satellite to the United States].” He adds, “We could talk with the United States any time we wanted and they could talk to us.”²⁹⁸ Even though all satellite broadcasting was cut between Iraq and the outside world, by day six of the war only CNN was allowed to report live from Baghdad. By day six, says Arnett, “Naji, the information director general, came to the hotel with startling news. His government had decided to allow CNN to bring in a portable TV satellite uplink, giving us the ability to relay pictures and news reports live from the battlefield.”²⁹⁹ With this decision the Iraqi government provided Arnett with power that he would never have enjoyed if he had adhered to the military pool system.

Arnett was deliberately sent by the Iraqi authorities to cover stories with human-interest dimensions so that the world would start sympathizing with them. This seems evident from the baby milk factory story, as well as the Amiriyya Shelter, discussed above. It was not just showing the entrance sign reading “Baby Milk Plant,” that enraged the audience; it was the human interest dimension that Arnett provided in his coverage. Arnett was literally

²⁹⁵ Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, 217.

²⁹⁶ Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, 216.

²⁹⁷ Arnett, *Live from the Battlefield*, 396.

²⁹⁸ Arnett, *Live from the Battlefield*, 354.

²⁹⁹ Arnett, *Live from the Battlefield*, 285.

dictated certain phrases by his military minder, Naji, who told him to end the report saying, “This was the evidence of indiscriminate bombing, the only baby milk plant in the country. Its purpose was the well being of children of Iraq.” In addition the Iraqis skilfully attempted to entice Arnett to their side, with Naji telling him, “Your President Bush said he would not bomb civilian targets, yet look at this...” As Arnett’s report went on,

The officials claimed that the factory produced twenty tons of infant formula powder each day, and had been destroyed in raids... They pointed to the ruins of what they said had been large drying towers. They showed me the plastic spoon-making machines with the output strewn by the thousands on the floor. There were iron wagons packed with milk powder along a wall. I saw carbonized incinerated packets... I gathered up an armful of powder packages to distribute to the children back at the hotel because they were complaining there was no milk.³⁰⁰

In reporting this story, apparently, Arnett was reporting the “truth” that he witnessed. No doubt, however, he sympathized with the Iraqis, as the situation’s nature dictates. This story demonstrates how the journalists’ closeness to the battleground eliminates their ability to professionally distance themselves from the story they are covering as they are directly affected by the immediate situation around them. Evidently, Arnett’s reports had lots of impact or perceived “power” that challenged the Pentagon’s authority. This power, however, had limitations. The Iraqis always chose for Arnett what he should cover, provided him with information/propaganda, and a military minder accompanied him all the time. This does not negate the fact that Arnett reported what he thought was newsworthy. But it was all from the limited scope of what the Iraqis allowed. For better or worse, Arnett showed the world a different version of the story that no other journalist could access or report. That was the true value of Arnett’s one-sided reporting, which he did not find worrying at all, as he was sure that other journalists in the pools and in other areas were reporting other facets of the war.

As a result of such sensational reporting, the White House spokesman called him a liar and described the CNN as “a conduit for Iraqi disinformation,” insisting that the installation they hit was a “production facility for biological weapons,” and claiming that the “infant formula production” was just a cover. Arnett, at that time, badly needed to prove his credibility as he needed more proof that it was an infant milk factory, as he describes, “It was getting down to my word against the word of the White House. My credibility was on the line. I need convincing documentation on the history of the factory.” But his minder asserted, “Everyone in Baghdad knows that’s a baby milk plant. The French built it and ran it for

³⁰⁰ Arnett, Live from the Battlefield, 385-386.

years.”³⁰¹ Arnett was then invited to other places of death and destruction, where the Americans committed one of the most prominent war massacres: the Amiriyya Shelter, at that time the US claims were losing credibility in Arnett’s eyes.

Soon afterwards, congress members started calling him ‘Saddam’s voice’. “Now I learned that I had been denounced on the floor of the Congress. Representative Lawrence Coughlin of Pennsylvania had charged, ‘Arnett is the Joseph Goebbels of Saddam Hussein’s Hitler-like regime.’” Other members “complained that my coverage ‘gives the demented dictator a propaganda mouthpiece to over one hundred nations.’”³⁰² It was not, however, clear whether they were angry because he reported what he saw as the “truth” or because it happened at a moment when the whole world was turning open eyes and ears to the CNN screen, or maybe both. But what was positive in that issue was the supportive position of the CNN in backing up Arnett and resisting the calls for his removal. According to Arnett, “On February 12, Ed Turner issued a statement: ‘Some of the words and pictures are painful, but so is war. The censorship is onerous but so are the restrictions in other countries, including the United States.’ He concluded, ‘Arnett and CNN are there so that our viewers can be there, as imperfect, restricted and dangerous as the conditions are.’”³⁰³ Such a statement was, for Arnett, the green light to go on and continue his exclusive reporting.

In addition to the significant role played by Arnett in the war coverage, Robert Fisk of the *Independent* played a most important role. Hudson and Stanier say, at a time when the coalition forces were angry with those unilaterals reporting outside the pools, the *Independent* published on 13 January, just before the outbreak of war, a piece by the notable unilateral, Robert Fisk, entitled “Bogged Down in the Desert.” As they describe, “In this piece, Fisk not only reported military units becoming lost in the desert but went on to describe the complete breakdown of convoy discipline on the supply route which he described as ‘littered with the wreckage of disabled or smashed vehicles.’”³⁰⁴ They add that the most disturbing parts, from the military viewpoint, were the reports concerning the medical preparations, “He reported a military doctor as saying: ‘We have refrigeration trucks to take bodies to the rear but we may be overwhelmed. So we have dug two mass graves.’”³⁰⁵ Although this report was really fearful, it was extremely helpful for many families in Britain who refrained from sending their sons and daughters to the war zone.

³⁰¹ Arnett, *Live from the Battlefield*, 388-389.

³⁰² Arnett, *Live from the Battlefield*, 408.

³⁰³ Arnett, *Live from the Battlefield*, 410.

³⁰⁴ Hudson and Stanier, *War and the Media*, 233.

³⁰⁵ Hudson and Stanier, *War and the Media*, 234.

Unilaterals were thus able to earn their media outlets great prominence and credibility for their reports making the audience think there was real-time coverage from the battlefield. As Neuman describes,

By the time allied troops began targeting Baghdad with nightly runs in January of 1991, CNN ranked 7 million viewers, just a few million short of the other networks, the audience for CNN was worldwide. As CNN's Bernard Shaw, Peter Arnett, and John Holliman described the sights and sounds of aerial attacks outside their hotel window in Baghdad, viewers could watch war... There is simply no precedence for this experience. This was real-time war.³⁰⁶

Evidently, the news media was easily pacified, both inside Baghdad and in the media pools. Those in the media pool seem to have been cooperating with the military and serving the war effort, as best as a faithful soldier would do. According to Hudson and Stanier, "Among those who established close relationships with British troops were such well-known television reporters as Martin Bell and Kate Adie, whose reports from the units as they trained brought home vividly to the watching audiences in Britain the circumstances in which our soldiers were living and training."³⁰⁷ Inspired by fame, careerism or patriotism, those media people played an important role in materializing the Pentagon's war plans for the mass media. Lang and Lang concur that the media people were situated under the direct influence of policymakers. "Although the relationship becomes strained whenever policy-makers attempt to exploit the insatiable need of the press for usable copy, the members of the fourth estate do function on occasion, perhaps unwittingly, as tools of an establishment whose influence, according to their own professional code, they are supposed to balance."³⁰⁸

As for the unilaterals, who were apparently much fewer in number, in frequency of reports provided and in influence, they seem to have served with the war machinery on the Iraqi side. In addition, they gave a section of the US media an image of practising its highest manifestation of free expression, gaining their media outlets record audience numbers. Despite the life-threatening dangers, the unilaterals had to face subsequent attacks on them due to their critical reports and the worsening relationship between their media outlets and the US government. The unilaterals were thus stuck in a controversial position. On the one hand, they were, willingly or not, serving the Iraqi strategic goals by reporting the war from an Iraqi viewpoint. On the other hand, in comparison to the pool reporters, they seem to have provided the most "independent" reports on the war at some point, before the Iraqis started utilizing

³⁰⁶ Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War*, 211.

³⁰⁷ Hudson and Stanier, *War and the Media*, 232.

³⁰⁸ Lang and Lang, "The Press as Prologue", 43.

them by the fourth day of the war and censoring their reports. Even after they were exploited by the Iraqis, they were widely perceived as the most “objective,” and the credibility of their reports reached record levels.

So, if we are to judge the discursive and physical media-military relationship during the 1991 Gulf War, we find that the unilaterals, despite acting as a mouthpiece for the Iraqi government on some occasions, were at other times the ones by and large exerting the ultimate effort to seek “objectivity.” At least they chose to operate outside the Pentagon’s pool system to protect their professional honesty and integrity, to which freedom of reporting is central, and face up to all sorts of dangers. On the contrary, pool reporters almost always acted as a mouthpiece for the US Pentagon and its public relations machinery. Despite the frustration of many of them with their hampered freedom, delayed reports and the inadequacy of equipment, they willingly signed the Pentagon rules regarding the things they could and could not report and diligently followed them.

In this specific war, however, it seems hard to expect all reporters to risk their own lives to tell their stories. The very nature of the war itself, the technological war, seems to have played the most central role in determining the physical and discursive media-military relationship. The way the war was conducted, thinks MacArthur was “another obstacle [to professional journalism],” mainly represented in “the briefness of the fighting, and that it was conducted mostly from the air,”³⁰⁹ intensifying the dangers of the war zone and making its conventional reporting nearly impossible.

C- Consequential Info-Strategic Warfare:

This section attempts to find out how information in modern warfare has become a strategic commodity for the military, which cannot be easily left to the mass media. In this realm, information or knowledge, as a form of power, is decisively utilized to sustain public support. Both local and international public opinion has become more central to waging or losing wars, resembling a thermometer for defining perceived victory and relative defeat. The purported media representation of the 20th century’s wars, thus, has reflected a great deal of military manipulation aimed at meeting strategic goals.

In WWI, film newsreel was the most crucial media that deeply affected public opinion, and played a vital role in war strategy. Even though the moving image is so credible for looking so authentic, real, and truthful, it can so easily include a great deal of fakery. Fakery,

³⁰⁹ MacArthur, Second Front, 146.

thus, was heavily applied in the production of both British and German movies. *Battle of the Somme*, the second British film to be released about the war, was the first ever to present dead and wounded soldiers on the screen, passionately affecting the audience all over Britain, as well as gaining great viewership and success. Carruthers, however, says that many of the feature films were reconstructed; most notable was “a soldier depicted going ‘over the top’ and appears to collapse back dead in the trench, under the camera’s watchful gaze.” She clarifies, “real battle may be too dangerous for cameramen to capture, its actions spanning vast, stunted landscapes, with its most ‘dramatic’ moments frequently unobservable.” Producers even confess, “fakery was necessary to make war footage compelling and to convey a sense of emotional, if not literal, realism, a conclusion also reached by still photographers.”³¹⁰ Fakery in the British films was strategically instrumental in affecting the people’s sympathy with the army war effort, and thus, in acquiring audience support for the war itself. The German newsreel and documentary films, as well, included a great deal of manipulation. According to Hoffmann, “although the drama is often missing, World War I comes across in the newsreel on the whole as something horrific; however, it does not appear as the catastrophe that it was.” He adds, “They glorified the war as a cleansing storm of steel.”³¹¹

Fakery thus, in both the British and German films helped in gaining audience support, especially the distant audience beyond the British and the German borders, as the supremacy of the cinema, created by its faked images, was the hidden secret behind its credibility and wide distribution. Only in this way, paradoxically, were the war films able to play an important role in the war strategy. It is hard to guess or assess, however, how far this role was effective in the strategic conduct of war. But, it is enough, at this point, to note that in the First World War, the moving image played an important role as a tool of public diplomacy.

In WWII, as well, the purported cinematic coverage of the war was strategically decisive as a form of info-warfare. While fakery as a vehicle of fulfilling info-strategic warfare goals persisted, both the Germans and the British diversified the types of films they employed to inflict maximum impact on public opinion. These included film newsreels, documentaries, short films and feature films. Although all of them contained a great deal of direct propaganda, indirect propaganda was thought more decisive when hidden in the societal values being communicated in feature films. This was strategically crucial to the very conduct of the war. With film production totally controlled by both governments, each decisively

³¹⁰ Carruthers, *The Media at War*, 70.

³¹¹ Hoffmann, *The Triumph of Propaganda*, 139.

employed the medium to fulfil info-strategic warfare goals. Such goals included publicizing their country's politics, policies, military power and perceived victorious achievements. The British in particular had the goal of stimulating the US to join the war, directing a great deal of its info-warfare to the American audience.

Although both countries greatly depended on film newsreel and documentaries to disseminate their direct propaganda, indirect propaganda was more effectively communicated through feature films, where propaganda news mixed with entertainment went unnoticed. This effort greatly extended after the US joined the war and Hollywood started playing a significant role in its visual representation. Collaboration of effort between the US and UK film production deeply served the info-strategic warfare on both sides of the Atlantic.

In Vietnam, however, where the mass media is widely thought to have enjoyed much greater liberty in the battlefield, television coverage is widely claimed to have severely harmed the US info-strategic warfare. This eventually led to the US retreat from Vietnam, without being able to claim any perceived victory, with the media's rigorous criticism of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Before this event, however, the mass media was greatly supportive of the war policy, reporting the war exclusively from military sources and acting as an agent of wartime propaganda. However the disparities between what the government was saying and the inhumane killing they were witnessing on the battlefield created a breach of trust between the media and the US government. This led to the prevalence of a media discourse that severely harmed US info-strategic warfare during the Vietnam War.

The 1991 Gulf War, then, marked a strategic shift in media freedom, where the mass media were largely locked up in the pool system unable to provide any critical reporting of the war itself, and even unable to seek objectivity. In the Gulf War, however, it was the military that purposely utilized the mass media to positively serve its warfare purposes, regarding the tight limits of freedom of expression throughout the war, as the previous sections suggest. It is even questionable whether or not the unilaterals negatively affected the military-designed war scenario. The advancing media technology, rather than representing an imminent threat to the military for its instantaneous liability of wartime 'live' reporting, the control of news and regulating its technical facilities was, however, almost fully at the military's disposal due to its relentless control of the press.

When the technology of live transmission of news is left freely at the mass media's disposal, they become dangerous, as they are used for communicating with the general public, which naturally empowers journalists with new 'authority' against the military and their own governments. This explains why such communication facilities were intentionally controlled

by the military throughout the war, not allowing the latest media technology to fulfil its intended mission. Due to the severe military censorship, both directly and indirectly, of this war, no close-up video footage of the war was shown at all, except for the disturbing ones of Arnett, which apparently infuriated the military, and discredited the 'clean war' scenario.

Conclusion:

Having traced the power relationships binding the media with the military in wartime, throughout the wars of the 20th century, and with theoretical and practical application on the US-led "war on terror", the three power relations being studied seem to have always been going in the same direction. Despite advances in media technology, the military measures of propaganda and censorship seem to have almost always been the same. Throughout the twentieth century's history, those measures included disseminating propaganda to the mass media to help raise morale at home and demoralise the enemy, launching a public relations campaign aimed at collaborative efforts along officials, the elite, mass media, and downwards to the general public, and employing the latest audio visual technologies of the time to produce effective imagery, where news and ideas are disseminated as a form of entertainment. Censorship measures, however, included imposing specific rules and regulations on wartime reporting with which all journalists, willingly or not, have to abide, barring journalists' access to the war zone and delimiting their movement, hampering or delaying the coverage of major strategic events and strangulating critical reporting.

WWI is claimed by many authors to have witnessed the first use of propaganda and censorship measures in such an extensive and effective fashion. Despite the Germans losing the propaganda war to the British, both sides of the war employed rigorous propaganda techniques to affect public opinion to their benefit. The propaganda and censorship measures mainly included establishing specialised government bodies aimed at centralizing news sources and managing propaganda and censorship, represented in the Wolf Telegraph Bureau for the Germans and the British Ministry of Defence (MOI) supervising the Parliamentary War Aims Committee, the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), and later the Creel Committee, after the US joined the war. In addition the British started circulating faked stories about the German atrocities including the Bryce Report. In addition, film newsreel was decisively employed to serve the propaganda agenda, and closely controlled by specialized government bodies for the sake of deception. Feature films as well were utilized, on a smaller scale, where propaganda was well mixed with entertainment.

In WWII, the propaganda war was mostly run in favour of the Germans, which is mainly due to the British being disorganized for a long time at the beginning. The Germans, however, skilfully imitated the British propaganda techniques of the earlier conflict and applied them on a much wider scale. With the development in film technologies, the Germans, in addition to using newsreels, used documentaries and feature films, in addition to the special films produced by their military bodies. Though the British used almost the same propaganda and censorship techniques, they were much behind the Germans, until the US joined the war and things started taking a different pace, when they joined their propaganda effort.

In Vietnam, however, dubbed as the “first television war” journalists for the first time, and last, in history enjoyed a great deal of freedom of movement and reporting. Their relationship to the government dictated the tone of their coverage. When they trusted their government, at the beginning of the war, they mostly reported government statements and speeches, which were no more than government propaganda, trusting they were serving their country in wartime. After the Tet Offensive, however, things have changed when reporters realized that the government claims did not match the reality on the grounds. At this point, television coverage became more critical of the US government showing bloody footages of killed Vietnamese, which enraged the US public opinion, led to the loss of the war itself at the end.

As a result, such unlimited freedom that the journalists enjoyed turned out to be considered by the government a mistake that lost them the Vietnam war, and accordingly it never happened again. In the 1991 Gulf War journalists were barred access to the battleground and obliged to join a media pool from which they could get their stories. They suffered throughout the conflict many forms of direct and indirect censorship which led many of them at the end to be furious at the military mismanagement of the news media.

As for the media-military relationship, it seems to have been largely cooperative throughout the 20th century's wars, due to the above-mentioned public relations efforts aimed at pacifying media people and opinion leaders. Nevertheless, throughout the twentieth century's history, there have always been exclusions, with media people resisting military control, violating its rules and even asking their news outlets to call them back from the battlefield, as happened with the British in WWII. Also, in the Vietnam War the media-military relationship was at its most tense, with the local US media showing the public through television bloody accounts of US aggression against civilian Vietnamese. Later in the

1991 Gulf War, however, the media-military relationship, turned out to be more cooperative with the stiff military control of the news media, plentiful direct and indirect censorship measures and its steady supply of propaganda stories to the media people. Nevertheless the journalists disenchantment with the censorship and propaganda measures to which they were subjected were loudly expressed throughout the war, and in its aftermath with the wealth of literature they produced about the treatment they received their denial of their basic reporting rights. Often described as a love-hate one, the media-military relationship has always been based on mutual exchange, where each party attempts to fulfil what it believes is in its best interest, which is most likely to cause clashes and tensions. This is simply because of the inherent contradictions of both sides interests, in the first place.

Such perceived interest, however, seems to vary according to the culture of the media and military involved. In the US, for example, where the government is perceived by both the media and the public as legitimate and trustworthy, the mass media's backing of the military in wartime seems to be perceived as a patriotic duty, which is the case with CNN and most Western networks till nowadays. This negates, however, the essence of good journalism where the mass media is supposed to provide the public with critical and factual accounts of the issues being covered, exerting its utmost effort to seek objectivity.

This probably explains the status of info-strategic warfare over the contemporary history of war coverage seems to have greatly fulfilled military ends, with the mass media exclusively presenting favourable discourses. Probably the only deviance from such steady stream of favourable media representation to the military was the Vietnam War when television coverage for the first, and last, time in history undermined the military's info-strategic warfare, and was later blamed for the US defeat.

Chapter Three

Structure of the News Industry: Al-Jazeera and CNN Institutional Apparatuses

Introduction:

The uniquely influential wartime functions of both CNN and Al-Jazeera, seem to have contributed considerably to their worldwide-perceived power over their relatively short histories. CNN's unique live coverage of the 1991 Gulf War put the renowned channel as a key player on the world map, leading former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to describe it as the "16th member of the Security Council."³¹³ It also produced of a wealth of literature, attempting to theorize the impact of its coverage as the "CNN Effect," a theory assuming an inherent aptitude of news images to drive policy just by the "virtue of being broadcast."³¹⁴ CNN's singular "Live" and round the clock coverage was aired to a worldwide audience who had, for the first time in history, the privilege of following a "Live" war on their TV sets, among whom the Arab audience were no exception.

Just as the 1991 Gulf War came to be regarded as the "CNN War," the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan was also in effect "Al-Jazeera's War." Al-Jazeera earned international recognition from its "controversial" live coverage of the 2001 US-led assault against Afghanistan. It was not only the single satellite network covering the military invasion live, but also repetitively aired videos of the US's arch enemy, Osama Bin Laden, the prime suspect behind the 9/11 attacks against the US, giving him "six and a half minutes of fame" to make "his case to a worldwide audience—Western and Eastern, Muslim and Christian,"³¹⁵ as described by El-Nawawy and Iskander. Al-Jazeera gained this exceptional role in Afghanistan for being solely chosen by its former government, the Taliban, to cover the military assault against the country.

This role was greatly extended with its subsequent coverage of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, with its web of locations in Iraqi cities and correspondents unilaterally covering the attack around the country exposing and emphasizing perceived US weaknesses and Iraqi strengths. Empowered by the decisiveness of its audio-visual images/evidence, most striking was its airing of the notorious unedited Iraqi television video of dead and captured US and UK PoWs, inspiring

³¹³ Lucy Kung-Shankleman, Inside the BBC and CNN: Managing Media Organizations, (London: Routledge, 2000), 115-116.

³¹⁴ David Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War," 99.

³¹⁵ Mohammed El-Nawawy and Adel Iskander, Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East, (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002), 21.

rage in the US and the West in general, while strengthening its perceived credibility in the Arab World for daring to air what everyone else avoids.

War, and war coverage in particular, have thus greatly contributed to both channels' international recognition and perceived impact. Both CNN and Al-Jazeera have achieved distinctive positions, each in its region, for revolutionizing new waves of journalistic reporting. CNN was the first American 24-hour news service, seizing viewers' attention in the West, as well as pushing other US and European networks to extend their daily newscasts, just to keep up with the intense competition posed by CNN. The market-driven news network gained its diverse audience by providing a great deal of round-the-clock international news, with special in-depth coverage dedicated to its international version, CNN International (CNNI). In the Arab world, however, where all local and satellite transmissions are owned and controlled, both directly and indirectly, by authoritarian Arab governments, Al-Jazeera, though funded by Qatar's government, was the first to be perceived as "independent" for challenging the pervasive official tone of news, breaking taboos and enraging Arab governments. It is thus perceived as the sole credible news source for a worldwide Arab audience. No doubt it is widely dubbed the Arab World CNN.

With the goal of elucidating the perceived worldwide recognition and impact, accumulated by both CNN and Al-Jazeera through their wartime reporting, this chapter sheds some light on many aspects of the rise, development, and distinct roles each played in its region. Representing the "Site of Production", or Discourse Analysis II, this chapter entirely focuses on how the internal policies and practices of media institutions, represented in Al-Jazeera and CNN, together with the power they acquired via instant satellite technology, intersect to determine the nature of their audio-visual representations of the "War on Terror." This will help contextualize and make sense of the kind of televisual representation of the "War on Terror," since 9/11, and throughout the assaults on Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

To do so, the chapter first illuminates some of the main traits and structures of instant television³¹⁶, as a news industry, that directly affect the kind of reporting and imagery it conveys. This helps to illustrate the perceived power of the nature of war coverage each channel presents. The first of those traits is the nature of technology and its subsequent coverage type and imagery requirements. Second is the ownership of worldwide broadcasting outlets and how this affects the news agenda aired to a global audience. And thirdly are the resulting characteristics of the

³¹⁶ Instant television refers to the capacity of television to bring "Live" images and coverage of news and events via cable and satellite technologies. Nowadays, almost all television broadcasters can provide instant coverage, including local, cable and satellite channels.

televised news reports, including amplification, decontextualization and the intense coverage of some areas of the world at the expense of others.

Moving to the case under study, the chapter then highlights the positions of CNN in the Western World and Al-Jazeera in the Arab World as integral to the rise and development of satellite and cable technologies in these two broad areas. This helps constructing the limits and determinants of power those media institutions are likely to exercise in general, and in relation to the wartime government/military system specifically. Those power determinants, I believe, naturally dictate the subsequent opinions and messages delivered via both institutions to help construct the way the general public thinks. This includes examining the special techniques and technologies deliberately intersecting to produce precise imagery and framing, aimed at determining audience perceptions. In this realm, identifying the target audience and its impact on image production is central to evaluating the “automatic” resulting power-relations, combining framing technologies with audience knowledge to apply their perceived media power effect.

A- Structure of Televisual News Industry:

Instant television has yielded enormous power to the televised image especially in wartime and crisis situations. The literature on the nature of the news industry suggests that many medium-related elements to have together contributed to enhancing the perceived power of television images. These include the technology itself and its subsequent coverage and imagery requirements, ownership of media establishments and the subsequent news agenda, and the resulting traits of a televised news report. It is worth noting that those medium-related analyses are largely focused on the situation inside the US, where the technology was initiated in the first place. Although they may not be generalized on other parts of the world, they provide great insight into the structure of the medium and what it conveys, especially in relation to CNN. Consulting those elements helps to fairly consult the institutional apparatuses of Al-Jazeera and CNN, as individual channels, their perceived power and their subsequent narratives and imagery. It is crucial to note at this point that the analysis focus on the birth and approach of CNN International, the international version of CNN, because it is the version being analyzed in this thesis, and in specific the version directed to the Middle East area. It is more or less the same channel, carries exactly the same programming, but with special additional focuses on the Middle East.

1- Nature of Technology and its Subsequent Imagery:

The developments that have taken place in television technology since the 1970s seem to have incurred great changes in the perception of the medium’s power, especially in the US. During

the 1970s, says Gergen, portable videotape cameras (or mini-cams) were introduced, allowing for the “editing” of shortcuts. Very soon afterwards, “satellites were sent aloft and earth [receiving] stations were built in most nations.” By the end of the decade, the American television possessed the technology to air instant broadcasts from around the world. “The ‘global village’ was upon us.”³¹⁷

The perceived power of instant television, thus, seems to stem from both its complex capacity to decode messages in an attractive fashion and the fear of its perceived impact, especially from the side of politicians and policymakers. According to David Webster, television’s capacity to transcend “all classes and borders,” has created “instantaneous transborder imagery difficult to access and impossible to control, it has added to the complexity of international relations.” Webster warns that even fictional television has created a “cultural context in which complicated political messages are correctly and incorrectly decoded.”³¹⁸ As Gergen concurs, the camera, as “an extraordinarily powerful instrument,” has in effect influenced culture more than any other medium, “leading officials to be mesmerized or intimidated by television and public opinion.”³¹⁹ Believing in the magnitude of the televised images, points out Seib,

policymakers find this enormously frustrating, they claim, often correctly, that snap news judgments pull incidents out of context and impose the news media’s frantic pace of events that are, by their nature, slow-moving and that may change considerably as time passes... but once the failure has been declared, who will care about the eventual outcome?³²⁰

Not only does the instant coverage impose forensic news judgment, but also it has a direct impact on foreign policy decision-making. As Trevor Thrall describes, “The immediacy of the news today makes foreign policy more difficult to manage, especially during crisis situations.” As former White House counsel for Carter presumes, “television coverage often robs the government of time to deliberate thoroughly when making decisions.”³²¹ Instant television, thus, seems to be sometimes harmful for decision makers, which make the medium a serious instrument for politicians to strangle. Television, however, seems to be often well utilized to deliver political messages in an affectively appealing fashion.

The special characteristics for instant television coverage seem to dictate both its hassled attitude and its likeliness to be well utilized by politicians in meeting political endeavours. Firstly, by its nature, television is preoccupied with imagery. This makes the networks more concerned

³¹⁷ David R. Gergen, “Diplomacy in a Television Age: The Dangers of Teledemocracy” in Simon Serfaty (ed.) The Media and Foreign Policy. (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1991) 48.

³¹⁸ David Webster, “New Communications Technology and the International Political Process” in Simon Serfaty (ed.) The Media and Foreign Policy. (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1991), 221.

³¹⁹ Gergen, “Diplomacy in a Television Age”, 49.

³²⁰ Seib, Headline Diplomacy: How New Coverage Affects Foreign Policy, 15.

³²¹ A. Trevor Thrall, War in the Media Age. (New Jersey, Cresskill: Hampton Press, Inc., 2000) 66.

about getting hold of the images than providing detailed background and context for those images. As Webster describes, even when serious issues are tackled, television “is preoccupied with imagery.” Accordingly, he adds, leaders tend to often “rely on pictures rather than argument,” avoiding any kind of “rational discourse.” As a result, the televised information is just often moved, and “rarely analyzed or explained.”³²²

Especially in wartime and crisis coverage, the accuracy and sharpness of images play an important role in gaining the people’s sympathy, and even in capturing their attention in the first place. According to Susan Moeller, “Crisis coverage demands pictures. If a story doesn’t have a visual hook, an audience will ignore it. Better to have their interest for a time, than not to have their interest at all.”³²³ An image, thus, seems to help defining and redefining events, and probably legitimating “the word ‘crisis’ for an event.”³²⁴ Evidently television’s ability focus and emphasise events makes them more easily believable and comprehended, especially with the sympathizing human aspects usually accompanying crises coverage. As describes Moeller,

Pain, violence or destruction becomes concrete on a scale large enough to attract attention. It is the role of imagery to make the incorporeal, corporeal. That is how images tap so easily into our emotions, which respond more readily to flesh-and-blood people than to ephemeral concepts, however transcendent. News needs to be related to an individual’s experience in order for that individual to take it in.³²⁵

Secondly, the continuous and instantaneous production of televised images has eventually led to the decontextualizaion of news, a trait that can be utilized by policymakers in passing unpopular policies without much explanation. Describing television as “an instrument of simplicity in a world of complexity,” Gergen explains that an 80 seconds report, containing at most 150 words “cannot provide context or background.” He adds that a “thirty-minute news broadcast must essentially be a headline service. It cannot be educational nor it attempts to.”³²⁶ This seems to have been easily utilized in embarking on controversial war policies. As adds Thrall, live television lacks “even the rudimentary explanation and context necessary to understand a conflict. Without such context... the public may be unduly swayed by images and forget or dismiss the logic behind the rational for... action.”³²⁷

Probably, however, it is the other way around. The nature of television technology and the governments’ attempts to control the process of war coverage increase the inaccuracy of news.

³²² Webster, “New Communications Technology and the International Political Process”, 222.

³²³ Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death. (New York and London: Routledge, 1999) 37.

³²⁴ Moeller, Compassion Fatigue, 38.

³²⁵ Moeller, Compassion Fatigue, 38.

³²⁶ Gergen, “Diplomacy in a Television Age”, 50.

³²⁷ Thrall, War in the Media Age. 66.

According to Taylor, the job of a journalist “as an observer of events” is too limited. The journalists’ duty to meet deadlines against their competitors in addition to the lack of access to timely events strangles their ability to acknowledge the causes and courses of the events they cover. Accordingly it becomes often impossible for journalists to contextualize and interpret “information to the public about matters of historical significance.” Workforces, in addition, seems to be “deliberately attempting,” by commission or omission, to influence how the world perceives news stories,³²⁸ as editors and regulations often dictate the way news are captured and framed.

Infotainment television, in addition, seems to have added to the decontextualization of TV news, as a former editor confesses. Moeller quotes Juan Tamayo of the *Miami Herald*,

We’re heading into a period in which foreign reporting, which used to inform and educate, is now being asked to entertain... How can we change our product to attract or keep our readers? And the answer is, give them entertaining stuff. Let’s not bog them down with all of this heavy carp, let’s entertain them. We’re not giving our readers news anymore. We’re not giving them something to chew on. It’s light. It’s fluffy. It’s crap.³²⁹

Thirdly, instant television seems to overstress and exaggerate the scope of events in order to attract more attention and even justify its broadcasting in the first place. Amplification, thus, is another repercussion of the advancing television technology. According to Webster, “Stories, issues and trends both nationally and internationally seem to be exaggerated by television.” Mixing exaggeration with the accelerated nature of television has severe repercussions. Webster adds, “Information moves faster and people react faster. Instant response and instant interaction help generate those choppy waters in the sea of international politics.”³³⁰ Television is even arguably more adept to crisis reporting. According to Gergen, television, as a medium largely depending on drama, “is drawn to conflict and crisis. It shuns the quiet periods in which most people live.”³³¹

Crises, says Moeller, thus, represent the main pillar of television news. “Media moguls have long known that suffering, rather than good news, sells.” She quotes Tom Palmer of the Boston Globe, “People being killed is definitely a good, objective criteria for whether a story is important... And innocent people being killed is better.” Human suffering, thus, is arguably the most rewarding currency for television news, as describes Moeller,

Watching and reading about suffering, especially suffering that exists somewhere else, somewhere interestingly exotic or perhaps deliciously close, has become a form of entertainment. Images of trauma have become intrinsic to the marketing of the media... Television news is packaged to make the most of emotional images of crisis.³³²

³²⁸ Philip Taylor, *War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998) 100.

³²⁹ Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*, 24.

³³⁰ Webster, “New Communications Technology and the International Political Process”, 223.

³³¹ Gergen, “Diplomacy in a Television Age”, 50.

³³² Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*, 34.

War and crises, however, are not fully optional to broadcast. According to Taylor, in war and crisis situations, where heavy censorship is imposed on the news coverage, reporters become less keen about reporting the whole truth, or what is perceived as such, as they need public support to run their news business. As comments Taylor, “Now so prevalent among critics of the media, that if only the ‘*reality*’ of war could be shown, public support would be undermined?” This, Taylor explains, has supported “the assumption that a sanitised version of war via the media helps to sustain public support for it.” This is mainly because wars are about killing and inflicting more damage on the adversary, which if reported may reduce the public support for the war cause. This supports the notion that, “If TV cameras had been present on the Western Front that brutal conflict would not have lasted as long as it did.”³³³ This would seem unlikely, however, thinks Taylor, for several reasons. First, “the military authorities would never have let such cameras anywhere near the fighting.” Second, “it assumes that ‘the camera never lies’.” Third, “The public and media in the victorious countries for the most part continued to support the war.” Taylor clarified that “the media tend to be every bit as patriotic as the public they are serving. They are not uncritical in this support, but when ‘our boys’ are fighting, the instinctive reaction of press and public alike is to support them.”³³⁴

To conclude, while instant television has allowed for instantaneous reporting, it seems to have catalysed demands for more control and censorship to curb its purported freedom. Satellite and cable technology and the hastened pace of televisual news have inflated concern about imagery rather than context. Some commentators claim that the more violent and brutal are the images the more publicity they receive, which seems to have led to the tendency of amplifying and exaggerating the pace of events. This may not, however, be quite accurate when wartime cameras are prevented by censorship and military regulations from shooting scenes of death and violence.

2- Ownership and Agenda Setting:

Despite the widespread expansion of instant television networks all over the world and the great advances in production and transmission technologies, paradoxically a very small number of players seem to control much of the news flow. According to Webster, “The dominant characteristic of what we are now experiencing is private rather than governmental.”³³⁵ Television news agencies, in particular, says Paterson, have significantly affected the way videotaped news circulated globally round-the-clock, with the concentration of news in the hands of very few

³³³ Taylor, *War and the Media*, 104.

³³⁴ Taylor, *War and the media*, 105.

³³⁵ Webster, “New Communications Technology and the International Political Process”, 227.

providers. These companies “exercise considerable control over the world’s television news agenda, for most broadcasters have no other non-local sources for these influential and ideological products – the visual component of TV news.” These three television news agencies, says Patterson, are namely Reuters Television, Worldwide Television News (WTN), and the relatively new Associated Press Television (APTV), all based in London.³³⁶ Such a virtual monopoly of televised news however seems to have a lot of harmful repercussions on the news outcome, says Taylor.

Reporting an event ‘as it happens’ under the banner of ‘Breaking News Story’ often requires reporters to talk without thinking or to speculate on causes and consequences that might not yet be fully understood. In other words, live TV coverage threatens the traditional role of the pluralistic media as considered mediators of news to the public via various means and in various styles. Further, it may replace their mediation with a single, almost monolithic, instantaneous, yet endlessly recyclable (and possibly inappropriate) version of events. People may continue to rely on multiple news sources. But if all these outlets are relying on the same source, whether it be Reuters or CNN, monopoly masquerades as plurality. And if the driving imperative is the speed of reporting rather than context, then snapshots masquerade as panoramas.³³⁷

News agencies are just companies caring more in the final analysis for their revenues than for the cultural and ideological impact of their production. The decision of news production is made by a small number of people, and based on their business needs to maximize income and reduce expenditure. According to Paterson, “Concentration of television news provision is the result of two significant trends in global news media. The first is the concentration of power over news selection at the individual and organizational level. The second is the industrial level trends of corporate downsizing and media concentration.”³³⁸ Cable and satellite technologies, accompanied with the common desire to cut costs, have played important roles in proliferating agencies’ business on a global level. As Paterson describes, “The growth of the agency sector of the television news industry is the result of many interconnected factors resulting from the globalization of television news.”³³⁹ Multinational news operations are the outspoken implementation of news globalization. “The rapid spread of cable and satellite technologies has given rise to many fledgling news operations, most multinational in character. The process can be seen out of one aspect of the internationalisation of television. Leading the way has been the US news network, CNN international.”³⁴⁰

³³⁶ Chris. Paterson, “Global Battlefields” in Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen eds., The Globalization of News, (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1998), 79.

³³⁷ Taylor, War and the media, 102.

³³⁸ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 80.

³³⁹ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 86.

³⁴⁰ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 87.

While at the present time the penetration of the international television networks are ever increasing, however the sources of news they tend to present are largely decreasing, suggesting a unified view of the world for much of the audience. “Importantly,” attests Paterson, “while these trends suggest substantial growth of television news channels at the local, regional and global levels, the sources of international television news – the television news agencies – remain a highly concentrated few.” According to Paterson, the worldwide congruence in international television news coverage is evident in Malik’s words, “What our pages show is that the power of the exchange systems and the TV news agencies is much greater than the public generally feel or know.” Malik’s data demonstrates that the same video footages and the same stories coming from the same news sources are “running in roughly the same position in newscasts all over the world on the evening.” So, as Paterson comments, “The recent trends in European television news suggest further homogenization of international news, despite the increase in news channels.” With cutbacks in their news operations in 1993, for instance, the British ITN was “exclusively” using the news footage of its shareholder, Reuters. As a result, “Reuters was supplying international news to every major British television newscast (BBC, ITN and Sky) –virtually giving the British television viewer just one ideological window on much of the world.”³⁴¹

Such “homogenization of news” is never taken into account, says Paterson, as long as the material benefit is guaranteed.

The contract between agency members and broadcasters members of each alliance make the sharing of news footage and news gathering resources in the field possible, and ensure that each member of each alliance, and all the clients of each agency in each alliance, get the best pictures and best interviews shot by any of several news crews covering the story. It was just a set of alliances which allowed CNN and WTN to work together to dominate coverage from Iraq during the Gulf War, thereby not only shutting out the BBC, NBC and Visnews, but also bolstering the position of BBC rival ITN and NBC’s rivals ABC and CBS.³⁴²

This analysis lends credibility to Herman and Chomsky’s “Propaganda Model” which can best explain the hidden economic powers or “filters” producing the kind of media discourse of news/images often seen on American/Western networks. Those filters, they argue, “fix the premises of discourse and interpretation, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place” and “explain the basis of operations of what amount to propaganda campaigns.”³⁴³ The first filter is the concentration of media ownership, wealth and the orientation of its profit. “Many of the large media companies are fully integrated into the market, and for the others, too, the pressures of

³⁴¹ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 88.

³⁴² Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 90-91.

³⁴³ Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002) 2.

stockholders, directors and bankers to focus on the bottom line are powerful.”³⁴⁴ Such integration is further “accelerated by the loosening of rules limiting media concentration, cross-ownership, and control by non-media companies,”³⁴⁵ and with large media companies diversifying “beyond the media field.”³⁴⁶ These developments have eventually built strong ties between media and government, as all media companies and networks “require government licenses and franchises,” and are thus “potentially subject to government control and harassment.” Such technical-legal dependency has for decades been utilized “to discipline the media.”³⁴⁷

The second filter is advertising—the primary source of income for television—which “buy and pay for the programs.” The news media, thus, “compete for their patronage,” and develop specialized staff trained “to explain how their programs serve advertisers’ needs.”³⁴⁸ Advertisers, accordingly, may choose to exercise their full power on television programming, avoid “programs with serious complexities and disturbing controversies that interfere with the ‘buying mood,’” and focus on what would “lightly entertain and thus fit with the spirit of the primary purpose of program purchases—the dissemination of a selling message.”³⁴⁹

The third filter, then, is the news media reliance on “information provided by government, business and ‘experts’ funded and approved by those primary sources and agents of power.”³⁵⁰ As the media cannot afford to be everywhere for breaking news, they tend to “concentrate their resources where significant news often occurs, where important rumors and leaks abound, and where regular press conferences are held.” Such locations mainly include the White House, the Pentagon, and the Washington State Department, as “central nodes of such news activity,” in addition to business corporations and trade groups, as “regular and credible purveyors of stories deemed newsworthy.” This helps the news media claim to be “‘objective’ dispensers of the news,” sustain its credibility and protect against “criticisms of bias and the threat of libel suits,”³⁵¹ which would certainly affect its advertising revenues.

The fourth filter is “Flak,” which essentially refers to the “negative responses to a media statement or program.” Flak, thus, if produced on a large scale is likely to be “both uncomfortable and costly to the media” this is because it entails defending the organization’s position before legislators and probably in the court. “Television advertising is mainly of consumer goods that are readily subject to organized boycott.” As a result, advertisers are “concerned to avoid offending

³⁴⁴ Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 5.

³⁴⁵ Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 8.

³⁴⁶ Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 12.

³⁴⁷ Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 13.

³⁴⁸ Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 16.

³⁴⁹ Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 17-18.

³⁵⁰ Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 2.

³⁵¹ Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 18-19.

constituencies that might produce flak, and their demand for suitable programming is a continuing feature of the media environment.”³⁵² This simply explains the long hours of entertainment programming filling US television in peacetime and the sanitized coverage it purports in wartime. Those filters often work within “sustained news campaigns” or “propaganda campaigns,” which entails prioritizing news from “primary establishment sources.” These are normally meeting “filter requirements” and are “readily accommodated by the mass media.” As a result,

Messages from and about dissidents and weak, unorganized individuals and groups, domestic and foreign, are at initial disadvantage in sourcing costs and credibility, and they often do not comport with the ideology or interests of gatekeepers and other powerful parties that influence the filtering process.³⁵³

The globalization of media institutions entails penetration of diverse markets abroad. Barker estimates proves that between 1984 and 1994, “the number of television households grew most quickly in the developing world... where the number of television sets trebled.” This feature of globalization reflects the growing impact such television institutions exercise on much of the world. Globalization in television institutions, in Barker’s view, stems from the “dynamic logic of capitalism... stems from the pursuit of profit as the primary goal. This requires the constant production of new commodities and new markets so that capitalism is inherently expansionist and dynamic.”³⁵⁴ Synergy, thus, adds Barker, is another concept related to the New World Information Order. It means “the bringing together of the various elements of television and other media at the levels of both production and distribution so that they fit together and complement each other to produce lower costs and higher profits.”³⁵⁵ Such synergy of corporations makes them all benefit from each other, and complement each other rather than waste time in competition.

As Barker asserts, “news is gathered, selected and controlled by western transnational corporations who treat news as a commodity to be bought and sold. For example, two large western services, Visnews and Worldwide Television News (WTN), are powerful forces within television news.” He adds further, “the fact that western news agencies tend to supply ‘spot news’ and visual reports without commentary allows different interpretations of events to be dubbed over the pictures, leading to what Gurevitch et al. (1991) call the ‘domestication’ of global news which is regarded as a ‘countervailing force to the pull of globalization’.”³⁵⁶ These agencies or news corporations thus play a major role in setting the agenda for the global audience on the quality and quantity of televised images they view about any event.

³⁵² Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 26.

³⁵³ Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 31.

³⁵⁴ Barker, Television, Globalization and Cultural Identities, 45.

³⁵⁵ Barker, Television, Globalization and Cultural Identities, 47.

³⁵⁶ Barker, Television, Globalization and Cultural Identities, 55.

They are thus, believes Paterson, “agenda-setters and more,” as they are the primary people who take decisions about the way international stories are covered for television. “This is done through the choice of where to allocate their resources, the selection of stories they distribute to clients, the amount of visuals provided, and the nature and amount of accompanying audio and textual information.” The visual image availability and quality also determine what stories are ready for broadcasting. The Broadcasters’ stories are written according to the video footage given by these organizations, and if there are no videos offered the stories are not reported, or are immensely minimized. As Paterson asserts, studies about TV newsrooms assure that “the availability of visual images is an important factor in determining whether a foreign news story is included in a newscast.” This supports Moeller’s observation that the “coverage [is] preoccupied with imagery,” whereby the absence of images simply means that an event is not covered. Paterson then argues, “research demonstrates a bi-directional agenda-setting effect between television news agencies and other mass media. Other media set the agency agenda by what they report and by what coverage they request from the agencies. The agencies set the agenda for other media through their choice of topics to cover heavily and first-time coverage of new topics.”³⁵⁷

Especially when the US is engaged in a conflict, the rest of the world is literally neglected in the newscast. Money, time and space are all dedicated to that event. “In the spring of 1991, for example, the news organizations were suffering from having spent too much on covering the war in the Gulf. A conflict in which Americans are engaged absorbs all the dollars, time and space allotted for international affairs.” When the Americans are involved in a crisis, it makes a big difference for the media. Moeller concurs, “The media don’t necessarily cover crises on the basis of how many people are involved. The allocation of resources is decided on grounds other than the sheer number of those at risk.” As she quotes Koppel, “It becomes a question of American involvement.”³⁵⁸

Competition, which is supposedly eliminated, as well as cost, plays a role in the coverage decisions. According to Paterson, “The coverage decisions of the international television news agencies are based largely upon what their rival company is doing, the costs of allocating resources to areas from which it is expensive to provide coverage, and the will of the most powerful international broadcasters.” This monopoly of very “few powerful media alliances” in providing international items of news “means that news, in both print and electronic form, from much of the world, is now determined and provided by what is essentially a single editorial perspective – that

³⁵⁷ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 82-83.

³⁵⁸ Moeller, Compassion Fatigue, 20-21.

of a small number of culturally homogenous news workers in a few very similar and often allied Anglo-American news organizations based in London.”³⁵⁹

Economic factors also help determine the news coverage, contrary to the principles of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). NWICO is a term that was widely used by the MacBride Commission, a UNESCO-based panel, aimed at creating “a set of recommendations to make global media representation more equitable.”³⁶⁰ NWICO suggests a new communication order to analyze and solve communication problems in modern societies. These problems include the “concentration of the media, commercialization of the media, and unequal access to information and communication. The commission called for democratization of communication and strengthening of national media to avoid dependence on external sources...”³⁶¹

According to Paterson,

The discourse of the New World Information and Communication Order, and the specific demands it put upon international print and television news agencies, lingers in the consciousness of news agency journalists – and the international broadcasters whom they supply – like a sort of vaguely recalled bad dream involving totalitarian governments and annoying academics trying to wrest control of the international news agenda.³⁶²

Television news agencies did not exert much effort to address the complaints expressed in the NWICO. However “minor efforts are being made now – in each case justified by wholly economic, not political or cultural, rationales. But substantial efforts have not been made, nor will they.”³⁶³ The world news agenda, thus, is set by economic rather than cultural, ideological or legal standards.

3- Subsequent Traits of Televised News Reports:

All such synergies have led to excessive cutbacks of reporters covering global events, greatly affecting the kind of reporting they profess. Such cutbacks resulted from the advancing newsgathering, reporting and broadcasting technologies together with the agencies’ need to cut costs, which challenges their claims of being “everywhere.” According to Paterson, “The notion that the agencies are everywhere when broadcasters cannot be must itself be problematized.” The agencies, he clarifies, are “tight-lipped” about the amount of cutbacks in their staff of international coverage, which came at the same time as similar cutbacks among main television broadcasters, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many “stringers” lost their jobs in the 1980s as the agencies

³⁵⁹ Paterson, “Global Battlefields” 94.

³⁶⁰ NWICO, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_World_Information_Order)

³⁶¹ NWICO, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacBride_Report)

³⁶² Paterson, “Global Battlefields” 94.

³⁶³ Paterson, “Global Battlefields” 95.

“decided the cost of maintaining them was not justified by their very limited use.”³⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the agencies claim increases in their worldwide bureaux, states Paterson, “to obscure the decreases in the number of countries they cover.” He adds, “A lone stringer with an obsolete camera in 1985 might be called a bureaux in 1990s, and be charged with covering a wider area because other neighbouring stringers have been let go.”³⁶⁵

This has led to what Gergen hails as “parachute journalism”, which contradicts the notions usually associated with the development of television technology in providing balanced and detailed coverage of the world. Unlike the notion that “new technologies would make television more thorough and complete in its coverage of the world, but the most recent breakthrough—mini-cams and satellites—have actually been a setback to the quality of coverage... television is even more addicted to ‘parachute journalism’.”³⁶⁶ As Moeller concurs,

Journalists become parachutists jetting madly to regional crises, jumping into situations cold. This manner of covering the world is nothing new; it’s just becoming more common in more places. Transportation and communication technology have made parachute journalism feasible now for television.³⁶⁷

Paradoxically enough, as fewer people tend to journalistically cover today’s world, more areas and stories tend to be covered, providing the viewers with a wider picture of the world but from a very narrow perspective, resulting in a less informed audience. According to Paterson, “The number of people agencies claim in their promotional literature to be in different parts of the world has declined over the last several years, while the amount of news each company produces has increased, suggesting a trend of providing more with less.”³⁶⁸ Moeller notes that such cutbacks have their harmful repercussions on the quality of reporting and coverage. “Lack of a sufficient number of correspondents to adequately cover a region also hampers coverage... As news budgets tighten and bureaux abroad are shut down—especially in network television—foreign correspondents are forced to cover more and more territory.” As a result, “Parachutists are generalists, ‘trained on crisis, not countries,’.”³⁶⁹

Parachute journalism has created what authors call “global” or “shared” reality. This “global” reality is not only created by the above-mentioned business and market forces, but also by the fact that all these shareholders are Western ones, reflecting only a Westernized view of the world. According to Paterson, “People who do not live in or routinely travel to other countries

³⁶⁴ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 86.

³⁶⁵ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 86.

³⁶⁶ Gergen, “Diplomacy in a Television Age”, 51.

³⁶⁷ Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*, 26.

³⁶⁸ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 86.

³⁶⁹ Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*, 25-26.

generally have little or no opportunity to test or challenge their conception of the (mass media-provided) 'reality' of those countries." This reality is Westernized because the agencies are required by market forces to cover what pleases their clients. Television news agencies, says Patterson, seek to "please all of their clients, all of the time." They exert a great deal of effort for the clients of their station "to create the appearance of objectivity and neutrality." They tend to "manufacture an ideologically distinctive and homogeneous view of the world."³⁷⁰

Due to the limited ownership, agenda-setting and perspectives, the news story seems to have common characteristics, which determine popular perceptions. Paterson quotes Gurevitch et al., in their study about international television news images, declaring that they "find considerable commonality in the images used by broadcasters worldwide." There are, however, many theoretical approaches, says Paterson, "suggesting that news images themselves convey meanings which cannot be, or routinely are not, substantially altered by the end-users of those images. It is for this reason that the images of the world distributed by television news agencies are crucial determinants of popular perceptions."³⁷¹ He further clarifies,

News values are those particular characteristics of an event which make it more likely to be chosen for the news agenda (or newsworthy). Providing that the vast intra-organizational and extra-organizational factors affecting news production are also considered, a review of key news determination factors of international television news agency journalists from a news values perspective is useful. According to this approach, the more of these qualities a news story substantially exhibits, the more prominence it will be given by journalists.³⁷²

Such news determination factors or news values are determined according to the cultural and ideological background of their creators and depictees. According to Moeller, newsworthiness is traditionally determined according to such questions as: "*Timeliness*: Did the event just happen? *Proximity*: How close the event, physically and psychologically? *Prominence*: How many people have some knowledge or interest in the subject? *Significance*: How many people will (potentially) be affected by the event? *Controversy*: Is there conflict or drama? *Novelty*: Is the event unusual? *Currency*: Is the event part of an ongoing issue? If not, should people know? And then the medium is television, a final question looms: How good are the pictures?" She adds, then, asks, "News values are not universal; they are culturally, politically, and ideologically determined."³⁷³

All Western limitations of agenda setting perspective, accompanied by the cutback in foreign reporters, naturally results in a limited coverage of much of the world, both in places and perspectives. Even though instantly transmitted TV news in the age of agencies and synergies

³⁷⁰ Paterson, "Global Battlefields", 82.

³⁷¹ Paterson, "Global Battlefields" 83.

³⁷² Paterson, "Global Battlefields" 93.

³⁷³ Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*, 17.

enhances the idea that all parts of the world are covered, there are still many poorly-covered and ignored locations, both in perception and intensity. Gergen declares it is obvious that “television has terrible blind spots.” He quotes James Larson who points out, “the major networks rarely cover Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia or Australia.” Canada, he adds, would be “lucky if it made the news.” Stories are rather “heavily centered on Europe, the Soviet Union and the Middle East.”³⁷⁴ Gergen explains that the reason for such limited coverage partly lies in the restrictions imposed by some of the governments being covered. “To be fair, networks are often handicapped by government restrictions on movement and coverage.”³⁷⁵ Moeller also addresses this lack of access “through governments’ prohibitions or failures in transportation.” She adds, “The media are often handicapped by official restrictions on movement and coverage.”³⁷⁶

Among the limitations put on reporters for coverage is limited print space or air to broadcast time, as well as their obligations to bring the story fast. According to Moeller, “Because news gathering for each story can take so long, other stories are consequently missed.” The limited televised time is just another drawback. As she says, “The most insidious of the reasons for minimalist reporting is the constant restriction of time and space. The world cannot really be covered in the 21 or 22 minutes of news broadcast in the networks’ evening program.” She adds, “The finiteness of time and space in all three mediums—television, newspapers and newsmagazines—is exacerbated by the media’s proclivity to feature domestic news, especially of an ‘entertaining’ nature.”³⁷⁷

Agenda setters, economic conditions, and the priority given to one piece of news at a certain time, rather than another also hamper television access to these areas of the world. The concentration of news resulting from the existence of very few news agencies simply aggravates this phenomenon. Those agencies, says Patterson, are adopting policies that guarantee their dominance over news production of much of the world. “Barring major shifts in ownership or corporate policy, these agencies are likely to remain the dominant providers of international television news, especially from the developing world for at least the next several years.” Paterson, further adds, “An agency’s decision to cover a story in the developing world may be influenced by the general interest of international media, by the choice of what to photograph is an ideological one, as is the choice of who to interview, of how many seconds to give each aspect of the story, and who to send the story to.”³⁷⁸ Moeller also focuses on the location factor. “When deciding

³⁷⁴ Gergen, “Diplomacy in a Television Age”, 50.

³⁷⁵ Gergen, “Diplomacy in a Television Age”, 51.

³⁷⁶ Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*, 27.

³⁷⁷ Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*, 28-29.

³⁷⁸ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 80, 83.

where or whether to go to cover a story,” she says, “location is another factor. How do the media choose which crises to cover? Crises are covered for political, strategic, commercial and historical considerations. But even when foreign editors think that there is news that needs to be covered, where it comes from makes a difference.”³⁷⁹

These “ethnocentric news priorities,” says Paterson, can be highly “significant,” as he continues, referring to “the human life equation; the tendency to attach far greater value to loss of human life as the victims are geographically, ethnically, politically and culturally more proximate to the news producer.” As for developing countries, says Patterson, one WTN journalist responded about the question of the ‘human life equation’ suggesting that journalists usually tend to “attach less value to the lives of people from such areas.” Paterson further quotes Herman and Chomsky’s referring to the “worthy and unworthy” victims, as they empirically demonstrated the US media inclination to present “far greater coverage of the deaths of people at the hands of ‘enemy’ states versus those killed by nations which the US government is supporting.” Paterson, added, “The trend seems to be that television news coverage of the developing world is likely to diminish, and to become increasingly more homogenous.”³⁸⁰

In addition to the human life equation, the limitation and unbalanced reporting of the news stories circulated around the world stem from elements related to the fact that the world is largely viewed through western eyes. Paterson’s ethnographic research with the television news agencies proves that “they are more inclined to treat major corporations and western governments as acceptable sources (of information and video images) than institutions from developing countries, and that management and news-processing structures are designed not to insulate journalists’ decisions from commercial considerations but to ensure that such considerations prevail at all levels of news production.”³⁸¹ Moeller concurs, “Journalists, like the rest of us, see the world through the lens of their own culture. They, like we, can’t much help it—but they could try harder to explain the world in its own terms.”³⁸²

As a result of all this, Paterson says the television coverage of the developing world is “infrequent and misleading.” He adds, “the developing world appears now to be more excluded from contribution to the globally flow of television news than it has ever been. For now the homogeneity of international television news sources is a concern. Despite the increasing number of new services, ownership is highly concentrated, and broadcasters are becoming increasingly dependent upon a few news providers to supply the international images they use on the air: the

³⁷⁹ Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*, 20.

³⁸⁰ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 92, 94.

³⁸¹ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 94.

³⁸² Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue*, 15.

images which shape our global reality.”³⁸³ Audience research conducted by Glasgow University Media Unit demonstrated that television audiences in Britain, for instance, have “very little understanding of events in the developing world or of major international institutions or relationships. This is in part the result of TV coverage which tends to focus on dramatic, violent and tragic images while giving very little context or explanation to the events which are being portrayed.”³⁸⁴

B- Al-Jazeera and CNN Institutional Apparatuses:

Making sense of the audio-visual message delivered via either of the two satellite television channels under study, CNN and Al-Jazeera, by consulting its founding and funding, philosophies, style, technologies, audience and its resulting “perceived” impact, would help explain the nature of wartime media-military relationship. The background of both channels and the goals each represents in its region, for instance, would explain the limits and determinants of their wartime power relationship with the military, and why it is cooperative, adversarial or a love-hate mutually beneficial relationship.

In undertaking this methodology, I will draw sharp comparisons between Al-Jazeera and CNN first in terms of their internal disciplines and policies, which include their background, ownerships, policies and roles played in the “War on Terror.” This entails first comparing the two channels’ rise and development, each in its region, which indicates the perceived power each possesses in its region. Secondly, the two channels’ discursive apparatuses of knowledge and the technologies intersecting to produce them, such as the kind of messages constructed to affect a specific audience in a certain fashion, via specific techniques and technologies, then, helps make sense of their role in info-strategic warfare. It explains how specific knowledge, when empowered by live satellite technology, can fulfil strategic goals in contemporary wars. Thirdly, specifying each channel’s audience, its nature, knowledge system, and the ways it may be affecting the framing of specific issues, assists in identifying how specific technologies intersect with audience knowledge to “automatically” apply the media-military’s power in info-strategic warfare.

³⁸³ Paterson, “Global Battlefields”, 96.

³⁸⁴ “Media Coverage of the Developing World: Audience Understanding and Interest,” Glasgow University Media Unit, Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Applied Social Science, University of Glasgow (<http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/sociology/units/media/debate.htm#conclusions>)

1-Rise and Establishment of Al-Jazeera and CNN:

In attempting to compare CNN and Al-Jazeera's institutional settings, it seems significant that each channel's goals, or perceived goals, are most likely to explain the nature of its audio-visual reporting of events and issues. While CNN started as an essentially commercial media venture of one man's effort, Ted Turner, Al-Jazeera was the brainchild of an apparently open-minded decision-maker, Qatar's emir, Hamad Bin Kalifa Al Thani, who wished to liberalize a mind-numbing Arab media system. CNN's intentions are, thus, primarily commercial, in a market-driven environment, while Al-Jazeera seems to have a strong political ethos, in a highly politicized region. Accordingly, CNN is more interested in airing officials' views and statements which represent a major component of its perceived credibility. At the same time, Al-Jazeera presents more critical news and views, to challenge the pervasive official tone of Arab channels.

A brief look at each channel's founding, ownership, and managerial policies helps to explain the way each of them has covered the "War on Terror" since its very outset. Cable News Network, or CNN, was founded as early as 1979, when Turner's "diversified" Communication Company, Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc. (TBS), ventured CNN as a 24-hour news channel bringing news "live" from around the globe. It was not until 1996, however, that CNN became part of "the largest media and entertainment company in the world," after Time Warner, a TBS shareholder, bought all its residual shares.³⁸⁵

The significance of this merger lies in the high revenues it could accommodate by mixing Time Warner's "distribution capabilities" with TBS's strong live news content, with Ted Turner as Chair of Time Warner Inc. and head of CNN. Being part of Time Warner, the market-driven "CNN News Group" had diverse broadcasting activities, highly dependent on subscriptions and advertising,³⁸⁶ with CNN International (CNNI), which is the focus of this research, just an added segment of the whole corporation. It is crucial to note here that the merger with Time Warner and the birth of CNNI came some time after CNN's remarkable role in covering the 1991 Gulf War, earning it worldwide popularity and credibility. It seems evident that the fast growth of CNN since its birth was behind the significant success it accumulated in its own region, before gaining worldwide popularity.

The obstacles which CNN had to face have set the foundation of CNN's "cooperation agreements" with "single broadcasters," granting it "access to national and international news-

³⁸⁵ Kung-Shankleman, *Inside the BBC and CNN*, 77.

³⁸⁶ Kung-Shankleman, *Inside the BBC and CNN*, 77.

events video footages.”³⁸⁷ This means that CNN had skilfully set up global cooperation agreements with other broadcasters to utilize the new technologies it is utilizing to air its round-the-clock news flow around the globe. By the early 1980s, CNN’s satellite signals were sent overseas, granting it the “right to use news footage from international broadcasters.”³⁸⁸ Its eagerness for covering international news “live” led to its ability to exchange programmes with more than a hundred broadcasters around the globe, and the subsequent launching of *CNN World Report* in 1987. It was also one the first international broadcasters to employ satellite technology, using several satellite signals, to “blanket the globe,” to guarantee maximum worldwide presence.³⁸⁹ Nevertheless, its news scope kept focusing on the US market and its audience, for a while.³⁹⁰

The 1990s, thus, marked significant collaborations between “joint venture partners” and CNN. A period of intense investment and consistent “strategic focus” on news and news services occurred for CNN, at a time when other major networks were “forced to scale back their news operations” due to inflation in entertainment and sports costs. By late 1998, CBS, ABC, and NBC were discussing with Time Warner “outsourcing their news operations to CNN.”³⁹¹ This certainly marks CNN’s becoming essentially “the” single news source for a wide American and global audience.

The privately owned market-driven CNNI, the international version of CNN, depends heavily on advertising, subscription fees from international broadcasters and fees from domestic and international cable operators. CNN has even “invented an international hotel subscription,” to guarantee its presence around the world, even in areas where satellite and cable technologies are quite rare or not so popular. To achieve its universal approach and exercise its “global participatory model of journalism,” CNNI shies away from overt conflict with governments, and “readily avoids regional problems and, furthermore, opens otherwise closed television markets.”³⁹² As Thussu says, “By the late 1990s, CNN had regional versions for audiences and advertisers in Europe/the Middle East, Asia-Pacific and Latin American and the United States,” representing various CNNIs. In 1998, CNNI became “Europe’s most watched news channel,”³⁹³ possessing “32

³⁸⁷ Ingrid Volkmer, *News in the Global Sphere: A study of CNN and its Impact on Global Communication*. (Luton: University of Luton Press, 1999), 131.

³⁸⁸ Kung-Shankleman, *Inside the BBC and CNN*, 109.

³⁸⁹ Daya Kishan Thussu, *International Communication: Continuity and Change*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 156.

³⁹⁰ Volkmer, *News in the Global Sphere*, 133.

³⁹¹ Kung-Shankleman, *Inside the BBC and CNN*, 110.

³⁹² Volkmer, *News in the Global Sphere*, 128-129.

³⁹³ Thussu, *International Communication*, 157.

international bureaux with 150 correspondents and its communication recourses – in 2000 it was beaming its programs through a network of 23 satellites to cover the entire globe.”³⁹⁴

CNN, thus, established itself as a commercial media venture aimed for profit. It kept expanding and exploring new markets to acquire more power and control of news operations, and thus accumulate further revenues. First, it was the merging with Time Warner that brought the channel to international recognition using Warner’s distribution capabilities. Secondly were the cooperation agreements with single broadcasters that affirmed the channel’s control over much of the world news images, leading competitor channels to outsource their news operations to CNN. And thirdly was the founding of CNNI, after CNN’s popularity due to its unique coverage of the 1991 Gulf War. This has opened up another power dimension for CNN through establishing offices all over the globe aimed at airing news to a worldwide audience.

Despite resembling CNN in being the first 24-hour all-news Arabic satellite channel in the Arab and Islamic worlds, Al-Jazeera, says Rugh, aims at accomplishing political goals for Qatar’s government. It is acclaimed as the only free and independent Arabic news channel. Although it was established in 1996 by a Qatari governmental decree, Al-Jazeera is widely proclaimed as an “independent television station,” in terms of management and editorial decisions.³⁹⁵ Qatar’s Emir “agreed with the editorial board” that Al-Jazeera would be “independent of his control and that if he were ever to break this pact the result would be their mass resignation.”³⁹⁶ Officially, however, it was founded as a “nominally private enterprise” receiving “start-up funding” for five years from Qatar’s government,³⁹⁷ aiming to achieve its aspired-to commercial independence from advertising, programmes, exclusive footage, and hiring equipment to other television stations. Though Al-Jazeera did not achieve financial independence by raising such revenues, and still receives government aid, “it has never had a single owner, some of the company’s shares being owned by the Qatari government, some by private citizens,”³⁹⁸ says Miles.

In terms of ownership, thus, we may claim that Al-Jazeera stands in the middle ground between private and official outlets, being officially a private enterprise but subsidized by Qatar’s Emir at the same time. The relatively high degree of freedom which Al-Jazeera reporters enjoy, based on the above-mentioned agreement seems to resemble the freedom CNN reporters enjoyed in the inherent simplicity of the news organization. Also while Al-Jazeera seems to resemble CNN in being officially private, revenues do not represent its top priority. Unlike CNN’s commercial

³⁹⁴ Thussu, *International Communication*, 158.

³⁹⁵ Willam A. Rugh, *Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio and Television in Arab Politics*, (London: Preager, 2004), 214.

³⁹⁶ Hugh Miles, *Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World*, (London: Abacus, 2005), 28.

³⁹⁷ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 214.

³⁹⁸ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 29.

stakes, several motivations are thought to have inspired Qatar to establish Al-Jazeera, says Rugh. Firstly, it was established soon after Prince Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani “seized power” from his father in a “bloodless coup d’etat” 1995. It is thus regarded as a part of his “pro-active and somewhat liberal trend in the country’s leadership.” This included abolishing the Information Ministry, sponsoring municipal elections and granting women the right to vote. Al-Jazeera, thus, is seen as central to the liberalization of Qatar’s politics by “increasing political transparency and public participation.”³⁹⁹

Secondly, Al-Jazeera is meant to act as a tool of publicity and public diplomacy for Qatar’s management, both in the Arab region and the whole world. Though Qatar possesses “one of the largest natural gas reserves on earth,” and has developed “significant military cooperation with the United States,” it is a very tiny country, relatively trivial even in its region, and hardly known abroad. “Putting his country ‘on the map’ was clearly one of the emir’s motives in founding Al-Jazeera,” says Rugh. He adds that a Qatari official has confessed, “Al-Jazeera is the government’s instrument of political self-defense in its competition with Saudi Arabia, which indirectly controls MBC, ART, Orbit, and al-Sharq al-Awsat,”⁴⁰⁰ the Saudi media ventures by which it was able to dominate the Arab satellite television market for years. Thirdly, Qatar, even before Prince Hamad took power, had been in a political struggle to attain an independent stance from its neighbours on foreign policy by deliberately adopting outrageous policies to avoid being regarded as “a small Saudi appendage.” Successful Saudi investment in pan-Arab satellite television to the extent of dominating its market thus encouraged Qatar’s officials to “try the same for themselves.”⁴⁰¹

Qatar’s apparent stakes in Al-Jazeera, coupled with the channel’s benign coverage of its host country certainly raises questions and doubts about the authenticity of its claims to independence, let alone objectivity. Nevertheless, its being regarded as “independent” and “objective” in its region, which is in itself a novelty, certainly yields the channel unmatched influence in the Arab World such as no media outlet was seen to have before. Grasping Al-Jazeera’s news policy, thus, requires shedding more light on its relationship to Qatar, its host and subsidizing country, which is rarely covered or criticized on its screen. El-Nawawy and Iskander pointed to a Kuwaiti professor who criticized in a broadcast Qatar’s hosting of the 1997 Middle East economic summit held in Doha, accusing the country of “playing into the hands of Zionists,” as the sole critical view of Qatar, and an exception to its absolute no-mention of Qatar. Al-Jazeera, they say, is known to neglect Qatar’s domestic and foreign policy issues, such as the struggle for

³⁹⁹ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 215.

⁴⁰⁰ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 215.

⁴⁰¹ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 215-216.

power between Prince Hamad and his father, and the Prince's decision in 2001 to postpone Parliamentary elections in Qatar for two years without justification.⁴⁰² Miles, in addition, pointed out that political parties are still "outlawed" in Qatar, "opposition is not tolerated and there is still no real debate about how the country is run."⁴⁰³

He adds that in May 2000, a Tunisian newspaper criticized Al-Jazeera's failure to report "the fact that dish antennas are banned in Qatar," wondering "why it has not mentioned that citizens and residents of Qatar can only use television that transmits a few channels selected and approved only by the Qatari authorities?" A true accusation, as up to 2001 Qatar forbade satellite receivers, though Al-Jazeera was free on all cable systems. Al-Jazeera officials, however, point to Al-Jazeera's featuring of "jailed Qatari dissidents who accused the government of torture," along with the 1997 criticism of Israel's participation in Doha's Economic Summit Conference, as "an implicit criticism of Qatari government policy."⁴⁰⁴ Nevertheless, Qatar's hosting of the largest American defence systems in the region, Al Seliyya Military Camp, is also never an issue for criticism!

Al-Jazeera's explanations for such policy include the channel's focus on its target audience, reporting the Arab world for the Arab world, as a pan-Arab transnational network, rather than a governmental one. Or as Faisal Al-Kasim, the renowned host of Al-Jazeera's controversial programme, *The Opposite Direction*, put it, "Nothing that happens in Qatar is worth covering."⁴⁰⁵ El-Nawawy and Iskander, however, argue against that: "The fact is that events in Qatar *are* important, if for no other reason is that it is a member of the network's target audience—the Arab world." They point to Al-Jazeera's criticism of the tiny island of Bahrain, one of the smallest countries in the region, wondering,

Are events in Bahrain of greater importance? Do Bahraini domestic politics affect the region more than Qatar? The reality is that Al-Jazeera has host an opposition figure or dissenting voice from every Arab country *except* Qatar. And though Al-Jazeera claim its interest in serving its Arab audience, it has mastered the art of setting a political agenda.⁴⁰⁶

Not only Arab regimes, but also Qataris themselves are confused about the position of Al-Jazeera on their own soil, with more and more critical coverage of the whole world, and almost nothing at all about their own country. Contradictions in the policies of Al-Jazeera and Qatar's domestic stations have put Qataris in "a state of media schizophrenia." Through Al-Jazeera they have "a real taste of freedom of expression, but when it comes to local issues they see nothing but

⁴⁰² El-Nawawy and Iskander, *Al-Jazeera*, 83.

⁴⁰³ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 16.

⁴⁰⁴ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 60.

⁴⁰⁵ El-Nawawy and Iskander, *Al-Jazeera*, 84.

⁴⁰⁶ El-Nawawy and Iskander, *Al-Jazeera*, 85.

tiresome government public relations.” Such policies of Qatar’s local channels, just like all local channels in the Arab world, are directly determined and directed by specialized governmental institutions, such as Information Ministries and the like. What is certainly confusing is that Al-Jazeera’s official claims that “the station is its own governor,” are blurred with the fact that Sheikh Hamad Bin Thamer Al-Thani, a senior member of Qatar’s ruling family and chair of Al-Jazeera’s board, is also acting as head of the General Association for Qatari Radio and Television, the “less visible” institution that replaced the Information Ministry under Qatar’s new government. “Can this be constructed as an obvious conflict of interest? We think there is little doubt that it can be so constructed,” assume El-Nawawy and Iskander.⁴⁰⁷

Nevertheless, Al-Jazeera keeps claiming an imminent ending of the governmental subsidies. As its officials insist, “The channel has been studying other means of financing,” by generating money through advertising, licensing, distribution rights, renting technical equipment, subscriptions, joint productions, and buying and selling programmes. No formal statement however is made about Al-Jazeera’s official independence from government subsidy. According to the station’s management, four years after its establishment Al-Jazeera could cover 64% of its expenses, using advertising and news footage sale revenues.⁴⁰⁸ In fact, “none of the Arab satellite stations has been able to cover costs by advertising revenues,” claims Rugh, clarifying that this is due to the weakness of the advertising market, the difficulty of conducting audience research, which blurs advertisers’ knowledge about the volume of their prospective audience. In addition, “Politics steers ads to regime-loyal outlets such as for example Saudi TV in preference to Al-Jazeera. Arab satellite TV therefore helps build prestige more than income,” with Saudi Arabia being “the most lucrative television advertising market.”⁴⁰⁹

The power of the Saudi advertising market was decisively used to financially besiege Al-Jazeera due to its negative coverage of Saudi affairs. The Saudi authorities not only exercised pressure on the Saudi company, Al-Tuhama Advertising Company, closely tied to the royal family and which had initially managed Al-Jazeera’s advertising, to cancel its contract in 1999⁴¹⁰, but also pushed the Gulf Cooperation Council in 2002 to “ban all sorts of dealings with Al-Jazeera whether on the professional media level or in terms of placing advertisement,” states Kilani. This sharply contributed to a financial crisis for the channel.⁴¹¹ Miles also concurs, “the biggest problem for Al-Jazeera is that the way in which the advertising dollar is spent in the Middle East is a political

⁴⁰⁷ El-Nawawy and Iskander, *Al-Jazeera*, 85, 88.

⁴⁰⁸ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 221.

⁴⁰⁹ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 219.

⁴¹⁰ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 64.

⁴¹¹ Sa’eda Kilani, *Freedom Fries: Fried Freedoms, Arab Satellite Channels Struggle between State Control and Western Pressure*, (Amman: Arab Archives Institute, 2004), 78.

decision and Qatar's rich Gulf neighbors have used this as a weapon to fight Al-Jazeera on commercial grounds," by which advertisers who may be "tempted" to use Al-Jazeera are "coerced by their government into taking their business elsewhere."⁴¹²

Integral to the advertising hardship is the lack of viewership statistics. According to Miles, "There is a serious dearth of accurate viewing data in the Middle East and this makes advertisers nervous."⁴¹³ He adds that it is nearly impossible, with many people watching satellite television "sourced from illegal dishes or via illegally shared connections." In Lebanon alone satellite viewership is claimed to have increased five times in 1999, with most households "watching satellite television illegally. A whole street could share one subscription by running a wire from house to house." Even in countries where satellite television is banned, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran, a glance at their skyline demonstrates that the law is emphatically violated.⁴¹⁴ Paradoxically, such concerted efforts by regional powers to censor Al-Jazeera helped raise its profile while harming its revenues. "Despite its ranking as the region's most-viewed news network, Al-Jazeera generated only \$15 million in advertisement revenue in 2000 while the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) garnered \$76 million in ad revenues in 1998, and Lebanon's entertainment network, LBC took in about \$93 million."⁴¹⁵

Paradoxically, however, the scarcity of advertisements on Al-Jazeera screen boosts its credibility, giving the viewers an impression that it is not an essentially commercial station like its Saudi and Lebanese counterparts. Ultimately the politicization of the Arab advertising market only prolongs Al-Jazeera's financial dependence on the Qatari government. But one still wonders, if Al-Jazeera achieved its desired financial independence in the future, would it be able to strongly criticize Qatar while positioned inside its mainland? Would the chair of Al-Jazeera board be a non-Qatari official? Or will Al-Jazeera just continue to fulfil Qatar's foreign policy agenda??

2- Internal Disciplines and Uniqueness of Media Policies:

As for its style, internal policies and structure, since its founding CNN was meant to be different by its non-stop 24-hour news broadcasting, "global" orientation, reporting and beaming around the globe, and "liveliness," covering the news as it happens. CNN was also the first to give a role for viewers. This approach proved to grab "real attraction for viewers," and give "an impression of immediacy and authenticity, of real news stories evolving as viewers watched." This is claimed to have "redefined news from something that *has* happened to something that *is*

⁴¹² Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 63.

⁴¹³ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 65.

⁴¹⁴ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 65.

⁴¹⁵ Kilani, *Freedom Fries*, 78.

happening.” CNN is also different with its paradoxical structure; both centralized and decentralized, with its essentially managerial centralization as part of Time Warner, and decentralized in its internationalization of policy scope.⁴¹⁶ Revolutionizing those special qualities in the US, and probably the whole world earned CNN substantial power that no other channel has enjoyed before. Likewise, about a decade later, Al-Jazeera used the same techniques to earn its popularity and credibility.

To be able to deliver round the clock news programming, says Ingrid Volkmer, CNN pioneered “new methods of news journalism and political reporting, a new organization of newsgathering, and a definition of the term ‘information’. The driving force was to cut down bureaucracy and keep the organization simple.”⁴¹⁷ The internal organization of CNN’s news production since its outset is claimed to have “designed its control facility in the CNN centre in Atlanta, its production and anchor desks, and its news area specifically for crisis situation.”⁴¹⁸ This explains why CNN has always been present in inflammatory areas and crisis-prone locations to air global events live.

Being an essentially commercial media venture aimed for profit seems to explain CNN’s global orientation, aiming to achieve distant markets in addition to the local US one in order to multiply its profits. CNN’s approach to news reporting, airing the news globally, live, and round-the-clock, was thus the novelty that brought the channel to the forefront of US channels, yielding it unmatched power at the time. Combining professionalism with managerial simplicity was deliberately meant to ensure that work would go smoothly within the institution, while opening up for on-spot creativity and new techniques, things that have earned the channel greater attraction and credibility. All these elements together seem to explain the power CNN could exercise on global news reporting for some time.

To sum up, CNN’s establishment as a commercial media venture seems to have dictated its revolutionary approach to news reporting. Presenting the news live, globally and round the clock was a novelty in the US and the West that earned the channel unmatched popularity and credibility. Also the internal organizational policy of cutting down bureaucracy and easing the process of news reporting made things easier for its reporters and opened opportunities for creativity in news reporting. All these elements directly increased the channel’s profile, and led to a sharp increase in its revenues, meeting the direct goals for which it was established. CNN’s

⁴¹⁶ Kung-Shankleman, *Inside the BBC and CNN*, 79.

⁴¹⁷ Volkmer, *News in the Global Sphere*, 135.

⁴¹⁸ Perry Smith, *How CNN Fought the War: A View from the Inside* (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991) 17.

market-driven reporting, however, stands in stark contrast to Al-Jazeera's political stakes as evidence demonstrates.

Al-Jazeera acquired its perceived power from the professional approach to news reporting it purports to have through the distinguished personnel it hired upon its founding. Established as a purely news channel, the first of its kind in the Arab world, Al-Jazeera was on-air 6 hours daily between 1996 and 1998, and then moved to its 24 hour non-stop coverage from 1999 to the present. Widely characterized with "good luck" as well as "hard work," at the time of its establishment, Al-Jazeera recruited "a number of highly qualified Arab professional broadcasters" who worked for the BBC Arabic Service in London, which collapsed in 1996 due to the failure of the BBC-Orbit agreement. Those professionals, representing "the core of the new Al-Jazeera station," continued to hold "leading roles" there. Al-Jazeera, thus, acquired its pan-Arab character and dimension as a news channel from the diversity of its reporters and presenters who have "no root in Qatar."⁴¹⁹

This pan-Arab approach of Al-Jazeera to news reporting seems to parallel CNN's global approach, both aimed to appeal to audiences beyond their original territories. Despite hiring anchors from all parts of the world, however, CNN did not have a clearly defined approach, other than keeping itself outside of political conflicts to guarantee further expansions and more revenues. In contrast, Al-Jazeera, aimed at fulfilling a political role and prestige for Qatar's government. From its very outset, it was engaged in conflicts with Arab governments over the kinds of issues it reports. In wartime, its pan-Arab approach positioned Al-Jazeera in an antagonizing position against the attacking forces, the US and UK, leading to the bombardment of its offices in Kabul and Baghdad, and the killing of its correspondent Tarek Ayyoub.

From the day it was born, Al-Jazeera was meant to be different by focusing solely on news and current news, among a multiplicity of Arab satellite channels carrying a great deal of entertainment. "There was no all-news channel in Arabic," states Rugh, adding that this was a "risky" approach as "news and commentary programs" are more likely to create sensitivities for different governments.⁴²⁰ Al-Jazeera's pan-Arab news-centred approach, certainly aimed at a worldwide Arab audience, was demonstrated in a study by media researcher Mohammed Ayish which showed that 73.3 percent of Al-Jazeera's coverage is pan-Arab, while almost none is local to Qatar.⁴²¹ Al-Jazeera's global pan-Arab approach to news reporting seems to parallel that of CNN as an all-news channel airing globally. CNN, however, seems to have skilfully avoided the risks

⁴¹⁹ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 216.

⁴²⁰ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 217.

⁴²¹ El-Nawawy and Iskander, *Al-Jazeera*, 49.

taken by Al-Jazeera, by siding itself away from all political conflicts and avoiding issues that may anger its stakeholders.

Each channel's approach to news reporting, in its own region, seems to have yielded them another significant power dimension in comparison with, and in relation to, competitor broadcasters in their regions. In the US, CNN was born in an environment of intense competition among US broadcasters, and with "news" losing depth, and gaining new dimensions. Since the mid-1970s, the American networks had grown in staff numbers and were unable to generate enough advertising to cover news programme costs, losing money on news, which is only kept as a "duty" to meet "the public's right to know." By the late 1970s, the recession cut out "advertising spending," and the desire to inform was only backed by a need to "boost ratings." Resources, thus, were concentrated on cheaper feature programmes, while news footage became highly based on agencies and pooled White House briefs, marking the beginning of the "infotainment" industry – soft "current affairs" news specifically "designed to appeal to audiences."⁴²² As the by-products of a free-market-economy, the privately owned US networks had a single goal of "profit maximization," with "viewers are the market" and programmes are "scheduled interruptions of marketing bulletins."⁴²³

For CNN, thus, "infotainment" was the simple answer to meet the ubiquitous demands of a market driven 24-hour news channel. It just picked the idea and put it in gear to deliver news with three attractive and, eventually, credible dimensions: "breaking news," "live coverage," and "fact journalism," a policy that helped fill the unlimited airtime, while gaining credibility, viewership, and thus, accumulating high advertising rates. As it is practically impossible to be everywhere all the time, the idea of reporting "breaking news," says Volkmer, rests on discovering "a small story that would grow bigger over time." Then, "while the story was unfolding, CNN journalists would already be sending back live reports."⁴²⁴

The "live coverage" approach was perfect for a "full-time news network" with "an incredible amount of time to fill." Live coverage, simply "eliminates the opportunity for editing and reduces the inclination for insertion of interpretive material." The audience consequently obtains "timely, first hand 'primary source', rather than delayed, secondary, edited information." As for "fact journalism," CNN "downplayed" the role of the presenter in order to focus on the "facts" being presented. By inventing the usage of "video journalism," CNN could cut costs and

⁴²² Kung-Shankleman, *Inside the BBC and CNN*, 81.

⁴²³ Kung-Shankleman, *Inside the BBC and CNN*, 83.

⁴²⁴ Volkmer, *News in the Global Sphere*, 138.

hire young journalists on small wages, and “give them the opportunity to do everything,”⁴²⁵ which eventually provided more information with less and less analysis and background. For better or worse, in these terms CNN is considered to have redefined “information” on its television screen.

Those three dimensions of CNN’s news reporting combined earned the channel, since its early years, popularity and credibility unmatched by any of the other networks, and greatly benefited its revenues. In such a market-driven environment, the growth of a 24-hour news network, CNN, taking steps forward in news reporting, with its “global” and “live” approaches along with “dynamism, opportunism and strong commercial instinct,”⁴²⁶ was a marked novelty for the audience, while representing a potential threat to existing networks. Widely seen in its early years as “a marginal player delivering a niche service using what was widely perceived as inferior delivery system,”⁴²⁷ CNN had to face up to many obstacles springing from its competitor networks. It was denied access to White House pools and political events, transmission lines of major telephone networks, and had its video images banned just for their being produced by “non-union crews.”⁴²⁸ Nevertheless, it was up to the challenge and could demonstrate its professionalism day after day, and its ability to access the most sophisticated groups in the US.

In the Arab World, unlike CNN, the impact and popularity of Al-Jazeera in dealing with heated Arab-Islamic events, however, lies in the unique coverage and close-up footage it broadcasts. Al-Jazeera is widely known with its sustained close up shots of death and destruction images from heated Arab and Islamic areas mixed with a sympathizing discourse, attacking officials and heads of governments. Watching such image discourse has raised the people’s attention about the consequences of their governments’ drawbacks and earned the channel unprecedented credibility and popularity for what it purports as “the” truth. This is in addition to the fact that other Arab channels, local or satellite ones, were not at any point at the same level of competition.

To elucidate the perceived impact and role played by Al-Jazeera at the Arab level, it is crucial to shed some light on the status of Arab media in general and satellite television in particular. The Arab mass media in general, including satellite television, have always been monopolized by Arab governments, acting as mere public relation tools for them, locally and internationally. One reason for this is the weak economic base of most Arab countries, along with the fact that establishing electronic media is considerably expensive. Even in the oil-rich countries “in most cases private Arab entrepreneurs have not been able to afford such an undertaking.” Also,

⁴²⁵ Volkmer, News in the Global Sphere, 139.

⁴²⁶ Kung-Shankleman, Inside the BBC and CNN, 84.

⁴²⁷ Kung-Shankleman, Inside the BBC and CNN, 109.

⁴²⁸ Volkmer, News in the Global Sphere, 131.

politicization of the media, or the fact that the Arab media have always been tied to politics, is another reason, especially with the advent of electronic media. As soon as most governments recognized “the value of media for political purposes,” the commonly accepted argument became that “the media must further the national interest by supporting governmental policies.”⁴²⁹

Consequently, the above-mentioned factors have led to the “political patronization” of the Arab media, which is basically the fact that the newspapers are heavily subsidized by governments, directly and indirectly, while radio and television are “sponsored almost without exception by governments, because of their considerably high cost, the limited number of broadcast frequencies, and broader (mass) political importance they are assumed to have.”⁴³⁰ This has certainly affected the media content, with a mass media constantly presenting mere government propaganda. Miles states, “The Egyptian national news still often looks like the Mubarak family show.”⁴³¹ Fragmentation of the Arab media is another predicament, which is mainly due to the deep-rooted historical conflicts among Arab nations. Even in the age of Arab satellite, in the 1990s, “most television channels also are closely identified with the country in which they are based, because no Arab government wants these media to be controlled in any way by other countries.” As a result, there is no “genuine 100 percent pan-Arab broadcasting station, and attempts at cooperation among national systems have not met with much success.” The decline of media credibility and the low prestige of journalism across the Arab world has been a third direct consequence,

The most sophisticated groups, and to a large extent other people as well, do not accept the news in the mass media entirely at face value, but assume that it may not be completely objective or reliable. They read between the lines, looking for significant omissions and implied meanings. The credibility for the news writers and political columnists in the media tends to be lower than in the West. They are frequently suspected of being politically motivated rather than professionals dedicated solely to accurate factual reporting and enlightenment of the public.⁴³²

Although the launch of satellite television in the Arab world was inspired by the CNN’s distinctive “live” coverage of the 1991 Gulf crisis, along with its widely recognized bias, no Arab channel was as provocative and as daring in its reporting as Al-Jazeera. The government-owned and controlled satellite channels were, and still are, presenting sanitized versions of their dreary local programming. Despite the fact that “They regarded CNN as having a Western bias and decided that it might be possible to create a similar TV channel that was controlled by Arabs and

⁴²⁹ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 5.

⁴³⁰ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 7-8.

⁴³¹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 27.

⁴³² Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 9-10.

reflected Arab perspectives,”⁴³³ as Rugh thinks, they apparently failed to do so. Satellite television technology was available in the region since the launch of the Arab League satellite, Arabsat, in 1985, but its first usage was by Egypt during the Gulf conflict. Egypt aired a short programme on its channel on Arabsat about the Egyptian troops involved in the military action against Iraq, an experiment that was soon expanded with the launch of the *Egyptian Satellite Channel (ESC)*,⁴³⁴ and followed by all the others.

The Saudis, then, fashioned a “satellite revolution,” by establishing *MBC*, in 1991, followed by *ART* and *Orbit*, two major groups of entertainment pay-per-view channels. Saudi billionaires, with close ties to the royal family, established all these channels, in collaboration with members of the House of Saud. By the mid-1990s, most Arab states had at least one satellite channel, largely resembling their local ones,⁴³⁵ which helped the Saudi channels consolidate their dominance of the Arab satellite market with their attractive and expensive productions of mainly social and entertainment programmes. Newscasts of all satellite channels remained just another version of those of the local channels. It was not until 1996, when Al-Jazeera was born as the first all-news Arabic channel, followed by the Syrian-based *ANN*, in 1999,⁴³⁶ and Al-Arabiyya, in 2003, all three all-news channels, that news started to take a different shape.

Nevertheless, the very birth of satellite television in the Arab region, with all that it entails, is widely seen as a positive transformation. Ayad claims, “satellite broadcasting has helped turn TV into a major factor in the political life of a region which has never been noted for audiovisual pluralism.”⁴³⁷ Rugh concurs, adding that satellite television has invited,

A new style in news coverage and in political discussion programs. News reporting was more aggressive and thorough. Talk shows explored topics new to Arab television that had only been dealt with previously in private conversations or to some extent in Western broadcasts like CNN. Now with Arab satellite television, they were being discussed in the media in Arabic, including call-ins, on a pan-Arab level so the content was by Arabs for Arabs. That was new.⁴³⁸

The perceived pluralism or pan-Arabism approach of satellite channels, suggested by authors and apparently applied by a few channels, does not seem realistic as it requires a great degree of free expression. However, the fact that most, if not all, satellite channels are established, owned, and run by Arab authoritarian governments, raises doubts about such generalizations. What is significant about the launch of satellite television in the Arab world, in addition to the new look

⁴³³ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 211-212.

⁴³⁴ Christophe Ayad, “Middle East: Media Pluralism Via Satellite”, *The Unesco Courier*, January 2000, 43.

⁴³⁵ Ayad, “Middle East”, 44.

⁴³⁶ Ayad, “Middle East”, 44.

⁴³⁷ Ayad, “Middle East”, 44.

⁴³⁸ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 201-202.

and style it is adopting, are the perceived goals of those behind it. Mostly established by the Arab governments themselves, or those with close ties to governmental circles, and presenting specially directed versions of their local programming, the satellite channels are apparently meant to extend governmental power and control on news and information flow beyond borders.

The pan-Arab approach to news reporting, and opening up for issues that used to be discussed behind closed doors still remains the exception among the satellite channels in the Arab world. Such a provocative news style, described by Rugh, did not emerge before Al-Jazeera was born. Then it was followed, in a lower tone, by a few other channels that wished to put up with the hard-earned competition, popularity and credibility of Al-Jazeera. As acclaims El-Nawawy, “one can safely argue that Al-Jazeera has pushed the limits for other Arab networks to be more critical of Arab regimes and to tackle all kinds of sensitive issues. Nowadays the philosophy among some of the Arab networks is ‘If we don’t air that story, Al-Jazeera will.’”⁴³⁹

The rise and development of both channels, each in its region, seems to have been revolutionary according to the status of the media at the time of their birth, for the novelty of each channel’s approach to news reporting. While CNN had to face strong competition, revolutionize “infotainment” and “live” approaches to journalism while concentrating on revenues, Al-Jazeera had to contend with waves of attacks, allegations and criticism from Arab governments and the public for the kind of issues and the taboos it was boldly breaking on its screen.

3- Discursive apparatuses of knowledge and technologies producing them:

Although CNN from its outset pioneered news reporting standards, war and crisis reporting, in general, seems to have redefined the channel’s history transforming it from just an ordinary local-based American network, with a worldwide vision, into a highly distributed worldwide commodity widely diversifying its news services day after day. It was not until the 1990s when its competition with American broadcasters “intensified,”⁴⁴⁰ after the immeasurable worldwide recognition it gained from covering the US-led military operations in the Gulf. Contributing to making “the world’s first ‘real-time’ war,” CNN created a wartime function for television, being “the first and principal source of news for most people, as well as a major source of military and political intelligence for both sides.” The power granted to CNN by its worldwide viewership is even thought to have defined the actions of people making the news events. As Thussu claims, the “Chinese students protesting against authorities in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square

⁴³⁹ Mohammed el-Nawawy and Adel Iskander Farag, “Speech Transcripts: Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East” Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, (<http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/prmID/133>, 15 April, 2002).

⁴⁴⁰ Kung-Shankleman, Inside the BBC and CNN, 109.

in 1989 were aware that through CNN the world was watching the unfolding events.” Such events claim to deliver “a new version of TV-inspired public diplomacy, presenting opportunities to constantly monitor news events and disseminate timely diplomatic news information,”⁴⁴¹ an idea that was later theorized as the “CNN effect,” a highly debatable concept on the impact of its imagery on a worldwide audience. The late 1980s and early 1990s thus marked CNN’s becoming more “authentically international.”⁴⁴²

By 1995, CNNI was launched in the US, serving an international American audience including “former US citizens, international tourists and travelling professionals.” Then, in 1996, CNN merged with Time Warner, boosting CNNI’s news dimension and perceived power. To meet its dire need for live international news supply, it kept diversifying, hiring anchors from various nationalities around the globe. CNNI version essentially focused on “special program segments for different world markets.”⁴⁴³ In short, as described by Volkmer,

CNN keeps expanding internationally, and collaborating locally in order to gain local advertisers and explore new market niches, such as out-of-home markets, and customize news markets by using the local languages. CNN is interested in getting international news first and for this purpose has hired anchors from other countries.⁴⁴⁴

CNN’s “perceived” power thus seems to be largely determined by its stakeholders, with whom it has to deal and certainly seeks to please, to meet its market-oriented pledge. Stakeholders include viewers, politicians and advertisers, and many others. Despite its international approach, CNN is claimed to care more about its viewers’ “volume” rather than “diversity,” and about its “attractiveness” rather than “accountability.” This not only reflects its primarily commercial stakes, as “viewer volume” dictates “advertising income,” but also explains its infotainment approach to news, broadcast for viewers seeking “relevancy, immediacy, drama, speed and accuracy.”⁴⁴⁵ Paradoxically, however, CNN is only watched by “a relatively small proportion of viewers” which it calls “influentials.” These essentially include, “government ministers, top bureaucrats, company chief executives, military chiefs, religious and academic elites,” and most importantly journalists and worldwide “news organizations” attentive for “any breaking news story.”⁴⁴⁶

This certainly explains CNN’s dramatic or cinematic coverage of wartime crises in a fashion that appeals to viewers, guarantees extreme attractiveness, and thus maximizes their

⁴⁴¹ Thussu, *International Communication*, 157.

⁴⁴² Volkmer, *News in the Global Sphere*, 134.

⁴⁴³ Volkmer, *News in the Global Sphere*, 136.

⁴⁴⁴ Volkmer, *News in the Global Sphere*, 134.

⁴⁴⁵ Kung-Shankleman, *Inside the BBC and CNN*, 116.

⁴⁴⁶ Thussu, *International Communication*, 158.

wartime volume and the subsequent advertising rate. Attractiveness however, for viewers, has to entail accountability, as it is unlikely that viewers would keep watching a discredited news source. Unlike Kung-Shankleman's view, CNN's exercise of power on viewers lies in its ability to appeal to them, as well as its subsequent credibility. This credibility seems to have encouraged politicians to take advantage of the channel's decisive impact and popularity, as well as its global approach, to address a worldwide audience. In these terms, CNN becomes merely a channel of public diplomacy for US politicians and decision makers.

As stakeholders, politicians are claimed to be "performers or pundits" rather than "pressure groups," as CNN has no access to public subsidy. Nevertheless, CNN needs to "comply with national regulations governing broadcasting." It is thus considered to have a "straightforward" relationship with politicians, and even claimed to have an "upper hand." Politicians are said to depend on CNN to "communicate with people" as well as be informed by its "unique ability" of covering "breaking news" from "hard-to-reach parts of the globe." As a result, CNN is "reportedly available in all State Department offices."⁴⁴⁷ This assumed relationship with politicians, which is largely based on the highly doubted CNN Effect concept, does not, however, seem quite accurate.

Undoubtedly politicians have stakes in CNN, but CNN as well has stakes in politicians. It gains its importance from their very appearance on its screen, which directly boosts its credibility and thus its viewer volume and revenues. Also, its obligation to comply with broadcasting regulations—such as the rules of taste and decency regarding the display of death and destruction images in wartime, for instance—definitely reflects the government-backed sensitivities on the types of images and narratives allowed to be shown on its screens. Bearing in mind, in addition, the news filters suggested earlier in Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model, this certainly suggests a, willing or not, obligation from the side of CNN to toe the government line on many issues, if not all, or at least to refrain from showing anything violating such regulations or filters. As concurs Thussu, "For many non-Americans, CNN was and remains the voice of the US Government and corporate elite, despite its international presence, its multinational staff and its claims to be free from US geo-strategic and economic interests."⁴⁴⁸

The perceived power of CNN, thus, lies in its relative pioneering of a variety of rudiments to its deep-rooted presence. First of all, its policy of covering the news "live" round the clock and round the globe eventually changed the nature of news broadcasting itself, not only transforming it from something that has happened to something that is happening, but also cutting facts short, providing mere entertainment with no background or analysis. CNN cleverly took advantage of

⁴⁴⁷ Kung-Shankleman, *Inside the BBC and CNN*, 115.

⁴⁴⁸ Thussu, *International Communication*, 158.

infotainment news values, which filled the US broadcasting environment by the mid-1970s, packaging and presenting the news from around the globe in an irresistibly attractive fashion. Being live, global, informative and round the clock while entertaining at the same time, not only guaranteed a wide variety of viewers, including officials and decision makers, but more importantly gained the channel high advertising revenues, both from inside and outside the US.

CNN's pioneering news values, thus, have accelerated its second power dimension: the economic power, the central goal of a market-driven media venture. Such perceived power lies, in effect, in the expanding advertising revenues it accumulates worldwide coupled with the merger with Time Warner, an entertainment company with persistent economic power in itself, which fostered both CNN's expansion and distribution capabilities. This merger allowed CNN to expand further in the late 1990s, making joint venture collaborations and exploring new markets across the globe with its functional international version: CNNI. Stakeholders or influentials, then, including politicians, advertisers and viewers, which CNN seeks to attract, seem to represent the third dimension of CNN's perceived power.

This is essentially because some of those stakeholders have an inherent potential for raising the channel's revenues. For instance, officials' appearing on the CNN's yields the channel great credibility, as most viewers tend to perceive official statements as truth. Advertisers in addition, as described earlier in Herman and Chomsky's analysis, are central stakeholders as they finance the programming, and thus represent a main source of income for the renowned channel. Viewers and subscribers, then, come next as their dedication to watching CNN largely depend on their positive reception of its content. Stakeholders, thus, determine, both directly and indirectly, the channel's content and context, despite all claims denying this, as they directly affect its saleability while in essence contributing to its perceived power. CNN's perceived power, thus, lies in its pioneering style, its strong economic position in the US market, and its stakeholders.

Unlike CNN, since its foundation Al-Jazeera's pan-Arab approach to news reporting was evident in its mere concentration on Arab and Islamic news, not only opening offices in major Arab and Muslim cities, but also seeking the ones with constant inflammatory events, including Gaza and Ramallah in Palestine, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. It is even claimed to be "the only Arab channel with a regular correspondent inside Israel."⁴⁴⁹ Its presence in those crucial locations helped consolidate its position as the sole Arab channel reporting major events "live", taking the best locations and the most accurate images. When the US-led coalition carried out Operation Desert Fox against Iraq in December 1998, "Al-Jazeera was there while Western

⁴⁴⁹ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 216.

networks were not"- a scoop regarded by the channel's management as "the milestone event that brought it to the international attention of many Arab viewers," and "international prominence," as "many international networks depended on Al-Jazeera for coverage."⁴⁵⁰ As Miles describes, "Fifteen minutes after the explosions appeared on Al-Jazeera, they were on other networks all over the world, as the exclusive footage was sold." This "sensational scoop" certainly guaranteed, "Al-Jazeera would become the Iraqi regime's news network of choice," teaching the former regime "a lesson about working with rather than against the media." Al-Jazeera, then, became a mere forum for Iraqi officials, who quickly offered interviews to speak about their case.⁴⁵¹

Also, in 1999 Al-Jazeera was the only channel to accept the former Taliban regime's offer to open an office in Afghanistan, an offer that CNN, Reuters and AP Television News declined, "apparently regarding Afghanistan as insufficiently important." Accordingly, it also became the favoured channel for the Taliban regime, and in the best location for airing exclusive scoops,

On June 10, 1999, it became the first network to interview Usama Bin Laden, and on January 9, 2001 it covered the wedding of Usama's sons, events which attracted considerable attention in the Arab World although no great deal in the West. It provided exclusive footage of the Taliban destruction of the Buddha statues in March 2001, which gave it some brief notoriety.⁴⁵²

Al-Jazeera, then, earned an unprecedented popularity throughout the Arab world for its coverage of the Palestinian Al-Aqsa intifada, since October 2000. Al-Jazeera reported from the West Bank, Gaza and Israel, "covering the story as it evolved," carrying "graphic footages of Palestinian civilians being killed or made homeless." As its scoops of the intifada continued Al-Jazeera kept attracting a wide range of the Arab audience, "because it was reporting in Arabic and dealing in detail with issues and events that were of importance to Arabs, unlike CNN or any other Western stations."⁴⁵³ It was also the only Arabic channel to broadcast live the hijacked planes crashing into New York's twin towers on September 11, 2001. "Al-Jazeera reporters were there, and they transmitted scenes of the twin towers crashing to the ground,"⁴⁵⁴ say El-Nawawy and Iskander. Soon after 9/11, when the Taliban "expelled all journalists except those from Al-Jazeera," it became "the only network to cover the U.S. bombing of Kabul live," as well as other events,

On September 26, 2001, it broadcast the only pictures of Taliban attacking the U.S embassy in Kabul. After 9/11 it also rebroadcast the 1998 interview with Bin Laden with English subtitles. On October 7, November 3, and December 27, 2001, it broadcast exclusive footage of

⁴⁵⁰ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 216.

⁴⁵¹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 49.

⁴⁵² Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 217.

⁴⁵³ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 217.

⁴⁵⁴ El-Nawawy and Iskander, *Al-Jazeera*, 51.

statements by bin Laden, all of which brought the network worldwide attention because they were used by CNN and many other broadcasters. During the US-led invasion of Iraq, in 2003, al-Jazeera's coverage of the fighting from an Arab perspective made it widely popular in the Arab World.⁴⁵⁵

This explains why Al-Jazeera, since its very establishment, was able to fill a huge media gap in a highly politicized region filled with heated issues and conflicts, some apparent and some always hidden behind closed doors. While filling this gap and earning popularity and credibility, Al-Jazeera has always inspired rage and anger across the Arab world first, among both citizens and governments, a fury that was later extended internationally following its coverage of the 2001 US-led assault on Afghanistan. While undertaking a highly accredited pan-Arab approach in news reporting, Al-Jazeera's perceived power and credibility was acquired from reporting on issues that used to be considered taboos in the Arab world, including political, social, economic and religious issues. Viewpoints of those widely perceived as dissidents or opposition figures, and most notoriously Israeli officials, were first shown on Arab television through Al-Jazeera. "Guests were deliberately selected to be as controversial as possible and for the first time Israelis speaking Hebrew appeared on Arab television. This was a major departure from anything done before and was truly shocking for the Arab public. Many Arabs had never seen an Israeli speak before."⁴⁵⁶

Al-Jazeera's renowned programmes and live talk shows, such as *More Than One Opinion*, *Open Dialogue*, *Without Borders*, *For Women Only*, *Top Secret* and the most famous, *Religion and Life*, and *The Opposite Direction* an Arabic version of CNN's *Crossfire*, have been the main pillars that made its name in the Arab world. On these talk shows taboos were repeatedly broken and provocative issues were openly discussed and, for the first time, the presenters invited the Arab audience across the world to play a role and express their views by telephone, fax and e-mail. From those programmes and others, Al-Jazeera first earned its popularity and credibility in the Arab world, and acquired a web of contradictory accusations and hatred of people and governments at the same time. "In the same breath we were being accused of being anti-Israeli by the Israelis, Islamists by seculars and Arab nationalists, Arab nationalists by Israelis, Americans and Islamists, funded by the CIA, funded by Bin Laden and funded by Saddam Hussein. And then it just became funny," comments Al-Jazeera's manager of media relations, Jihad Ballout.⁴⁵⁷

Al-Jazeera, thus, started making the news as well as covering it, by shocking and enraging Arab governments and forcing them in many instances to recall their ambassadors from Doha in protest at what they perceived as Al-Jazeera's "incitements against their governments, leaders, or

⁴⁵⁵ Rugh, *Arab Mass Media*, 217-218.

⁴⁵⁶ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 37.

⁴⁵⁷ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 56.

value systems.” Many of Al-Jazeera’s regional bureaus were temporarily shut down in consequence of its critical reporting of issues considered sensitive.⁴⁵⁸ The measures taken by Arab states against Al-Jazeera mounted from launching media campaigns against the channel, “in the name of nationalism and patriotism” and spreading rumours about the channel’s “suspicious” relationships with Zionism and the CIA, to confiscating journalists’ equipment, withdrawing their accreditations and putting them in custody. This is in addition to the continuous threats, pressure and lawsuits against the channel.⁴⁵⁹ This notoriety and controversy of Al-Jazeera in the Arab world has eventually fed its popularity and credibility, so that it is seen as a bold channel that dares to air what everyone else avoids, which encourages extremists and terrorists to approach the channel in order to express their viewpoints.

Al-Jazeera’s notoriety became international, then, when it started inspiring anger in the US and the West in general, soon after airing Bin Laden’s videotapes following 9/11, and its subsequent coverage of the 2001 US-UK assault against Afghanistan. It first enraged the US in October 2001, for repetitively showing videos of Osama bin Laden, who called on the world’s Muslims for “Jihad” against America. “US officials were concerned that bin Laden’s videotaped statements included secret body language codes that might be used to relay certain messages”.⁴⁶⁰ Accordingly, in the US and Britain, television networks were “advised” by American and British officials not to show the footage.⁴⁶¹

Conclusion:

The developmental trajectory of both channels, Al-Jazeera and CNN, seems to explain their policies, perceived power and their assumed roles in the US-led “war on terror”. For both channels, ownership does not seem to be the prime mover behind their policies and attitudes. Even though both channels, technically speaking, are private companies, many combined elements seem to dictate their policies, attitudes towards situations, and thus, their perceived power as central players in the “war on terror”.

For CNN, as an essentially profit maximizing company, stakeholders seem to exercise most power over what appears on the screen. In wartime it has to balance meeting the viewers’ thirst for information without exposing things that enrage government/military circles, from which it seeks information and limited access to the war zone. Also norm and culture are central to the nature of

⁴⁵⁸ Muhammad I. Ayish, “Political Communication on Arab World Television: Evolving Patterns,” Political Communication, 19, 2002, 143.

⁴⁵⁹ Kilani, Freedom Fries, 78-80.

⁴⁶⁰ Ayish, “Political Communication on Arab World Television” 143.

⁴⁶¹ Miles, Al-Jazeera, 118.

CNN's coverage. Officials' views and experts' opinions are the main sources from which CNN derives its credibility, and thus its perceived power, as its target audience perceives such statements as fact or truth. Also, any contradictory or controversial opinion, especially in wartime, is most likely to be perceived as less patriotic, given the zero-sum Bush policy of "you are either with us or against us".

This certainly blocks the way for any possibility of showing counter-viewpoints, which are always cut short and harshly criticized on its screen, when eventually shown. Accordingly the channel is trapped between viewers in denial of the direct repercussions of the military invasion, and seeking a "sanitized" version of the military assault, and officials and military experts wishing to communicate their messages via credible medium and in fact imposing both direct and indirect censorship, as demonstrated in the next chapter. CNN, thus, chooses to support the rally-round-the-flag calls from all its stakeholders, exercising self-censorship and backing the official discourse by all means, as it has crucial stakes in officials, experts and viewers, as much as they do in it.

The specifications of the nature of news industry tend to elucidate such attitude of CNN. First of all, Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model demonstrates the deep involvement between the media, the market and the government, where the concentration of media ownership coupled with the full integration of the news media into the market is claimed to have led to the media's loosening the rules for such concentration, cross ownerships and control by non-media companies, in addition to media companies diversifying to other fields. The loosening of such journalistic rules has eventually made the news media a potential subject for government control. Advertisers, in addition, exercise major indirect control on the news media, first by financing all programming, and by seeking the dissemination of the "selling message" that would not affect the "buying mood," where "flak" has to be avoided, as it is deemed likely to affect popularity and viewership, and thus, advertising revenues.

The news media in addition, seeking to cut costs and get the news from the safest milieu, heavily relies on information provided by the government and primary sources. This is in addition to the decontextualization of news, the fast pace of news reporting that does not allow reporters to seek enough background information about the issues they are covering. Also, the proliferation of "parachute journalism" where journalists jump on crisis situations ill-prepared due to the global trend towards cutting costs by getting rid of numerous stringers and reducing an office to a single reporter covering a whole region. Moreover, the role of news agencies in supplying all news outlets with the "rough" pieces of news to utilize, in addition to the synergies between media institutions, simply means that the whole world is covered from a very narrow perspective, which is usually a pro-Western one. This results on the lack of coverage of entire countries and regions

due to their perceived insignificance, as happened when CNN refused to open an office in Afghanistan for instance. This leads to the kind of distorted coverage of such ill-represented areas, which journalists do not know much about.

In contrary, for Al-Jazeera, profit is not the top priority in its political agenda. Al-Jazeera's refraining from covering Qatar's internal issues, especially those negating its liberalizing and pan-Arab claims, demonstrates the high stakes it holds in its hosting and subsidizing country. Established to fulfil Qatar's foreign policy goals, Al-Jazeera's role, both in the Arab region and the wider world, has brought notoriety and prestige to a less significant country on the world map. Among its target audience, the Arab World, Al-Jazeera's credibility and viewership is driven by its bold attitude and daring coverage, its pan-Arab approach to news reporting, and the volume and quality of wartime death and destruction images/evidence, which are more credible than official statements in this part of the world.

Al-Jazeera's perceived power, also, lies in its capability of enraging governments in both the Arab and non-Arab worlds, something that no other regional medium can politically afford. In covering the "war on terror", with its two military assaults to date, Al-Jazeera's credibility and perceived power was driven by both content and context of its coverage, exposing the human costs of the invasions, in a sympathizing pan-Arab frame, and enraging both Arab and Western audiences against their governments for assisting in undertaking those crimes. Unlike CNN, thus, officials on both sides of the conflict have strong stakes in Al-Jazeera to contain the popular anger against them and justify their positions, while Al-Jazeera does not. Unlike CNN, showing contradictory viewpoints eventually boosts the channel's credibility, as its renowned slogan of showing "The Opinion and the Other Opinion" materializes!

As a result, in covering the US-led "war on terror", both channels were, and still are, running in opposite directions. While CNN is taking a pro-US stance, backing the US policy and military invasions, Al-Jazeera is taking a pan-Arab approach, vehemently anti-American and wholeheartedly against the "war on terror". Both channels' approaches conform to their policies, stakes, culture and target audience, which eventually explains why things are covered in the way they are, and what roles those channels are positioned to play in the "war on terror".

Chapter Four

Television Coverage of the “War on Terror”: Reflections on the 2001 Invasion of Afghanistan

“Language is a terrorist organization and we stand united against terrorism.”

John Collins and Ross Glover

Introduction:

The mass media, and specifically television, was always integral to the US effort in setting the stage for an open-ended “war on terror” that was due to start with an attack against the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and the Taliban Government. The US official and media discourses of threats and accusations directed towards the Al-Qaeda organization, the Taliban and on top of them Osama bin Laden were enough proof to propagate anger and prepare the nation for retaliation. There was no evidence needed whatsoever. The imagery and media frames were ready to be repeated over and over again: the collapsing towers, the pain and the human loss. There was no room for dissent or alternative voices in the US media. The volume of catastrophe was unspeakable, probably unlikely to be challenged, at some points, and the discourse was not new! History tells.

The zero-sum American discourse of “us against them” is a typical one for the American fashion of defining perceived enemies, as demonstrated throughout its 20th century’s wars. In a history marked with wars and military assaults, the enemy of the US has always been represented in its mass media as brutal, ruthless and unlikely to survive American military might. As discussed earlier, the two World Wars, Vietnam and Iraq 1991 are just a few examples. The media campaign against Afghanistan, and then Iraq, thus, was simply a continuation of a long-running media policy. The familiarity of media discourse certainly helps legitimating the assaults, especially when mixed with the dramatic live images of the collapsing twin towers. The media discourse was exceptionally powerful because of the fact that it was the first time ever that a huge catastrophe was aired “live,” yielding the images a new dimension of authority. As Hoskins describes,

On 11 September, 2001, the global visual media were transfixed by the instantly iconic imagery of the planes and the World Trade Center and promptly went into repeat mode. The images were overexposed simply because there was nothing that could be said or shown that could compete with the enormity of the event.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁶ Andrew Hoskins “Television and the Collapse of Memory” *Time and Society*, 13 (1), 2004, 113.

The event was specifically peculiar, together with its media coverage. Television anchors left their studios and used the scene as “a real backdrop to continuous programming, and even when anchoring from inside, a live ‘window’ of the scene was often included in the televisual frame.”⁴⁴⁷ The instant and continuous coverage of the disaster, together with the anchors placed “as both part of and also as bearing witness to the spectacle,” lent supreme authority to the catastrophe being covered live from its original scene. This crisis-prone discourse, mixed with non-stop accusations focused on bin Laden, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, helped to prepare the US public for an imminent war, gaining their unconditional support and backing and thus legitimizing the unlawful assault, at least at home. This has been demonstrated in the high levels of presidential support, mounting to 90 percent, at some points before the attack on Afghanistan started, despite all anti-war movements all over the country.

The US media coverage of the military invasion of Afghanistan was essentially built as a necessary retaliation aimed at delimiting the possibility of any further terrorist attacks, simply by eliminating the terrorists. The patriotic discourse especially when mixed with the image had an unmatched power. As Nacos says, “The mainstream media were in fact part of the massive rally-round-the-flag that placed the overwhelming majority of America firmly behind the war against terrorism.”⁴⁴⁸ It employed an essentially patriotic emotional declamation, which no one could easily deter or rationalize especially when mixed with the disastrous images. As President Bush proclaimed, on 12/09/2001, “Every one of the victims who died on September 11th is the most important person on earth to somebody.”⁴⁴⁹ Who can challenge such a statement? The US media discourse was simply designed to be hardly challengeable. Accordingly, it could easily prevail throughout the subsequent military attack.

Nevertheless, unlike the usual pace of events, where the US simply dominates the media scene, from inside Afghanistan there was an alternative media voice airing live to a worldwide audience, from an exclusive location that was unavailable to US or Western journalists wishing to cover the global event. The Qatar-based Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel situated itself inside the Taliban-controlled territories since an invitation from the Taliban government in 1998, an invitation which CNN declined at the time for the perceived insignificance of the country. This specific location of Al-Jazeera, as a result, not only put it in a position to challenge the dominant American pronouncements, since the outset of the US-led “war on terror,” but also opened a new strategic front for this “war,” a media one.

⁴⁴⁷ Hoskins, “Television and the Collapse of Memory” 114.

⁴⁴⁸ Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002) 159-160.

⁴⁴⁹ “The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days,” The Coalitions Information Centers, 5.

Accordingly the war, since its very outset, was marked by a media race between two contesting media, Al-Jazeera and the CNN and the US television networks, eventually representing the two conflicting sides, the American and Taliban governments in wartime.

Most strikingly, on October the 7th, as soon as President George W. Bush announced the beginning of “strikes against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,” American television networks broadcast from Al-Jazeera a pre-taped lengthy statement by Osama bin Laden, leader of Al-Qaeda, which is claimed to be his most powerful to date. In his video-taped speech, which was taken as evidence against him, bin Laden praised those who committed the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington, “God has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America,” adding that “America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine, and before all the army of infidels depart the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him.”⁴⁵⁰ On this specific day, upon the launch of the military attack, both speeches, of Bush and bin Laden, were exceptionally powerful, embodying a clear struggle by both sides of the conflict to gain public opinion.

The mass media, thus, willingly or not, became a significant player in this challenge. On one side, CNN was central to the US war machinery, presenting news and propaganda that fed into the Pentagon’s info-strategic warfare. On the other side, Al-Jazeera, despite keeping its apparently objective tone by airing speeches of both sides of the conflict, took a pan-Arab/Islamic stance, focusing on the humanitarian impact of the military attack, which eventually fed the Taliban/Al-Qaeda propaganda apparatus. Al-Jazeera was evidently utilized by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban government, for airing exclusive footage of bin Laden speeches and interviews with Taliban officials, even before the military assault began. Obviously those speeches as well as the images of death and destruction aired by Al-Jazeera are no more than the most newsworthy items that were made available to the channel from its specific location inside Afghanistan. Those news items were also central to Al-Jazeera’s pan-Arab approach to news reporting, arguably boosting its popularity and credibility. This kind of reporting strategically helped erode the US public diplomacy effort in the Arab World, and later pushed US officials to utilize the medium to explain their position to an angry Arab public.

For better or worse, throughout the military invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Jazeera showed the world a different facet of the military assault, vehemently challenging the predominantly sanitized US media discourse, with its substantive footages of death and destruction caused by the US aerial bombardment. In contrast, CNN, among the mainstream US networks, stood firmly behind the

⁴⁵⁰ Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism, 146.

invasion and in support of the dominant American discourse. Probably a most significant difference between the two channels, at this point in history, was that CNN in fact belonged to, and deeply supported, the US side as an American channel, while Al-Jazeera, as an Arab channel not belonging to Afghanistan, could emphasize estrangement from the events surrounding it, which often represented a solid base for its claims to objectivity. This has definitely earned Al-Jazeera a great deal of professionalism, credibility among its target audience, the Arab people, and substantial worldwide popularity.

This chapter tackles the media framing and construction of the US-led “war on terror,” in the US and the Arab world, the central issue being studied in this dissertation. It focuses on the power relations that determined the media discourse shown on the mainstream US media, with special focus on CNN, in comparison to that shown on Al-Jazeera. Those relations are both represented in the governmental attempts to impose both direct and indirect censorship, spreading propaganda and misinformation via the mass media, and the subsequent physical and discursive media-military relationship, on both the US and the Taliban government sides of the conflict, and how they have strategically affected the pace of events.

It first highlights some of the literature elucidating and analyzing the structural decisiveness of such discursive practices, and how the official language that framed and contextualized the “war on terror” discourse had been deliberately constructed to fulfil political-military goals. It tackles, then, the “media war” between the two opposing forces, as demonstrated in two contradicting official discourses shown on each channel, essentially reflecting the contest between George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden to gain media attention and public support from the 9/11 terrorist attack against New York and Washington until the beginning of the military assault, then throughout the military invasion of Afghanistan. This “media war” was specifically marked with clashes and conflicts at media and governmental levels, both between Al-Jazeera and CNN and Al-Jazeera and the US administration, mounting to the military bombing of the channel’s office in Kabul. It is necessary to note, at this point, that this chapter relies heavily on Hugh Miles’ book “Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World,” as the most up-to-date and comprehensive resource that thoroughly tackled those issues, providing much essential evidence.

1- Discursive Construction of the “War on Terror”:

Despite the appalling images of collapsing twin towers that kept repeating over and over on television screens, the discursive framing of the “war on terror” was primarily constructed and contextualized in words, with the images/evidence just acting as undeniable proof of the horrific enormity of the event. This section considers the language through which the so-called “war on terror” was constructed, which helped justify the assaults on two sovereign countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, the killing of their people, and the destruction of their properties and their infrastructures. As John Collins and Ross Glover argue, “Language, like terrorism, targets civilians and generates fear in order to effect political change.” Referring to the US government discourse in constructing the “war on terror”, they add, “When our political leaders and our media outlets use terms like Anthrax, terrorist threat, madmen, and biological weapons, a specific type of fearfulness emerges, both intentionally and unintentionally... Regardless of the truth of the words, collateral language produces effects beyond its meaning.”⁴⁵¹

Beyond the decisiveness of this linguistic practice in inflating fear, collateral language is arguably an actual practice of political violence. “The actual practice of counter-terrorism gives concrete expression to the language of counter-terrorism – in effect, it turns the initial words into reality. Language and practice, in other words, are inextricably linked; they mutually reinforce each other; together they co-constitute social and political reality.”⁴⁵² This is evidently true because along with the proliferation of those linguistic icons there has always been decisive action taking place: innocent people detained and tortured, unpopular laws implemented, and sovereign countries invaded and government systems toppled. As Collins and Glover concur, “language matters in the most concrete immediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (including genocide), the physical destruction of human communities, and the devastation of the natural environment.”⁴⁵³

Accordingly, the deployment of such discursive construction of the “war on terrorism” is deemed deliberate and central to its very planning and conduct, as argues Jackson,

It is not the only way to talk and think about counter-terrorism. Rather, it is a deliberately and meticulously composed set of words, assumptions, metaphors, grammatical forms, myths and forms of knowledge – it is a carefully constructed *discourse* – that is designed to achieve a number of key political goals; to normalise and legitimise the current counter-terrorist approach; to empower the authorities and shield them from criticism; to discipline domestic society by

⁴⁵¹ John Collins and Ross Glover, Collateral Language: A User’s Guide to America’s New War (New York: New York University Press, 2002) 2.

⁴⁵² Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 9.

⁴⁵³ Collins and Glover, Collateral Language, 6.

marginalising dissent or protest; and to enforce national unity by reifying a narrow conception of national identity. The discourse of the ‘war on terrorism’ has a clear *political* purpose; it works for someone and for something; it is an exercise of power.⁴⁵⁴

The terrorist attacks against New York and Washington seems, thus, to have provided politicians and policymakers with a golden opportunity to fulfil pre-held political and military goals through such linguistic practice. Whilst the televisual images of the Twin Towers collapsing have left almost everybody speechless, with reporters and anchors struggling to say anything that could match the appalling scene, “there appeared to be no accurate words, no appropriate vocabulary to express what the events signified or meant.” Accordingly, argues Jackson, “In an important sense, the events created a ‘void of meaning’; language itself appeared to collapse along with the Twin Towers.”⁴⁵⁵ As a result, “into this void, administration officials inserted a politically driven narrative that has since come to dominate the public interpretation of events.” The linguistic description of those attacks, he adds, “worked to enforce a particular understanding or reading of the political, military and cultural meaning of the attack... The narrative worked to justify and normalise the military response at the heart of the ‘war on terrorism’.”⁴⁵⁶

Jackson identifies four main features for the language that discursively constructed the “war on terror”: (1) the events are “an exceptional tragedy,” where America is the “primary victim”; (2) the attacks are “an act of war” rather than “a crime against humanity” or “mass murder,” which is arguably “the most important rhetorical construction of the entire discourse”; (3) the discourse invites “a number of pre-existing and highly popular meta-narratives,” including WWII, Pearl Harbor, Cold War, civilization vs. barbarism and globalisation; (4) it also attempts “to deny or suppress any alternative reading of the events, particularly those which implicate American foreign policy.”⁴⁵⁷ Those features seem to elucidate how retaliation was deemed necessary. When America is the primary victim of an act of war, a powerful benign civilized country that often won wars against barbaric others, and it is unpatriotic to challenge those notions, then retaliation in the form of a “war on terror” becomes the simple logical response. The fourth feature is definitely well applied to the US attempts to curb Al-Jazeera’s coverage, which frequently criticized US foreign policy practices.

Central to defining or justifying the US/UK-led “war on terror” is the issue of identity and how it is discursively constructed through the official language of the “war on terror”. While the terrorists are often “endlessly demonised and vilified as being evil, barbaric and inhuman,” the US and its

⁴⁵⁴ Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 2.

⁴⁵⁵ Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 29.

⁴⁵⁶ Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 31.

⁴⁵⁷ Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 31.

wartime allies are seen as “heroic, decent and peaceful – the defenders of freedom.” Most significant about this language is supposing that “identity rather than deliberation is the basis for human action: terrorists behave as they do not because they are rationally calculating political actors but simply because it is in their nature to be evil.” And the same for America, it “acts to bring the terrorists to justice and secure freedom because that is what America is like – Americans are freedom-loving and dependable nation.” Accordingly, argues Jackson, “the process of ‘othering’ so apparent in the discourse of the ‘war on terrorism’ was not inevitable or a natural consequence of the horrific terrorist assault on September 11, 2001. Rather, it was carefully and deliberately created to satisfy a number of political objectives.” At the simplest, defining the good and the bad guys “was a key element in constructing the overall narrative of the ‘war on terrorism’.”⁴⁵⁸ It is safe to claim, thus, that through the discursive construction of the “war on terror”, as good vs. evil, American could redefine its identity, rebuild its self-image, through the role it sought to play in its alleged ‘war’.

In addition, the new “war on terrorism” had to be established as a “good war.” Establishing the new war as a struggle between good and evil certainly implies that by definition “it must be a good and just war.” A ‘good war’ had to fit the UN rules for a just war. Accordingly, the war rhetoric had to be constructed as legal, “defensive rather than expansionist,” “rightly conducted,” unlikely to “cause a greater injustice than the initial harm,” and a “last resort” after seeking all diplomatic venues. There were, however, some major problems for the US administration to resolve. First is the problem of justifying “a war against an amorphous non-state enemy with no defined territory, no government and no conventional army.” Second, conceptually speaking, “‘war’ in conventional sense is impossible against a phenomenon like ‘terrorism’.” Third, there was no “clear end point”; simply, “if there was no conventional terrorist army to defeat or actual terrorist territory to occupy, could the war ever be over?” Fourth, various aspects of the war conduct itself were highly questionable,

How could the assassination of foreign heads of state and terrorist suspects in other countries be considered the right conduct of a ‘good’ war? Were the many thousands of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq really part of a proportional response? Was the use of cluster bombs ‘daisy cutters’ and other indiscriminate weapons justified against an enemy that hid among a civilian population? And how was the status of the ‘illegal combatants’ held at Guantanamo Bay or the mistreatment of prisoners in Iraq to be reconciled with the ‘good war’ language of defending freedom and democracy?⁴⁵⁹

To deal with all those issues, the US administration had to construct the “war on terror”, as a new, exceptional, and unprecedented crisis situation. The rhetorical construction of the “war on terror”

⁴⁵⁸ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 59.

⁴⁵⁹ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 123.

had to entail that it was “a ‘new’ and ‘different war’ unlike any seen before,” with officials arguing that it is “the first war of the twenty first century.” This strategy, says Jackson, “proved very useful for explaining away the contradictions as an unavoidable feature of the necessarily ‘new’ situation.”⁴⁶⁰ This has been demonstrated in the amount of public support that the “war on terror” has accumulated throughout all of its stages. The expression of “war on terrorism” or “war on terror” seems to rest on a fair amount of social and political consciousness in the American collective mind. It is simply “obvious and unproblematic” because it “bears an interesting resemblance to the ‘war on drugs’ and even the ‘war on poverty’ of the 1960s.” So, declaring a ‘war’ against an abstract meaning seems to be familiar for most Americans, which may appear vague or illogical for most other people from different cultures. “The importance of words lies not in the words themselves, but rather in the way they are used, by whom, and to what effect,”⁴⁶¹ explain Collins and Glover.

As the success of a discourse can be examined by consulting “the extent to which it allows the authorities to enact their policies with significant support, and the extent to which alternative narratives and approaches are marginalised and silenced in the public arena,”⁴⁶² Jackson assumes that “the ‘war on terrorism’ has been extremely successful in this regard, and that it now stands as the dominant foreign policy approach in American politics.”⁴⁶³ Jackson offers different explanations to the perceived success that the “war on terror” discourse has arguably accumulated. First of all are the main characteristics or features of the counter-terrorism discourse. With the “overall body of language” drawing upon “many existing narratives or myths common to American political and cultural discourse,” the discourse is characterized with “*hybridity* and *intertextuality*.” This is because “its whole is a kind of discursive amalgam or hybrid which weaves together a range of other discourses, myths and narratives.”⁴⁶⁴ Central to the intertextuality is the *genealogy* of the discourse, demonstrated in the “clear lines of continuity with earlier responses by American governments to national crises and security threats.” Because there is “little that is new or unique about the language of the ‘war on terrorism’,” this is in effect “one of the reasons the discourse has been so uncritically accepted.”⁴⁶⁵

The discourse is also “highly *reflexive*” as it continues to “reconstruct and reinvent earlier discursive formations in order to maintain coherence in the face of internal and external contradictions and challenges.” For instance, as soon as the terrorist attack was defined as “an act of war,” and a “war” against terrorism would follow, there has to be explanations that it is a “new” and “different”

⁴⁶⁰ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 124.

⁴⁶¹ Collins, and Glover, *Collateral Language*, 10.

⁴⁶² Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 159.

⁴⁶³ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 153.

⁴⁶⁴ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 154.

⁴⁶⁵ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 155-156.

kind of war. The abstract terrorist enemy required “a whole new linguistic term and legal-military category” to be invented, such as “enemy combatant” and the “war on terrorism” transformed into a war against “outlaw nations and their terrorist allies.”⁴⁶⁶

Characterized, as well, with *opacity*, or the “lack of transparency,” the discourse never properly explained key terms and phases, resulting in “their meanings having to be assumed or inferred through the context in which they occur.” For instance, “there is no clear explanation of what actually constitutes ‘evil’ or what the ethical boundaries of ‘good’ behaviour are: does it include bombing a wedding party in Afghanistan, or the use of cluster bombs in urban areas...?” The opacity of concepts like freedom, civilization or victory, raises questions about the double standard policy of bringing “freedom” to nations while supporting “brutal dictators,” about the how “the treatment of terrorist suspects in Guantanamo or Abu Gharib fit into ‘civilized’ behaviour,” and about the criteria for achieving “victory” over terrorism. Those terms, argues Jackson, are “deliberately” kept undefined to be utilized in “politically defined ways and for specific purposes, such as denigrating or delegitimising particular opponents.”⁴⁶⁷ The usage of such vague terms is often central to any propaganda machinery because they tend to oversimplify complex realities. As Collins and Glover concur, “We all want freedom and justice and we all oppose evil and terrorism, but we rarely question the meaning of these terms; we believe we know what they mean until we attempt to define them.”⁴⁶⁸ On the other side of the “war on terror” terms like ‘Jihad’, ‘martyrdom’ and ‘infidels’ were decisively used by bin Laden in benign contexts to justify brutal terrorists assaults.

In addition, the language of the US-led “war on terror” is evidently *gendered*, presenting “an overwhelmingly masculine narrative full of stereotypical masculine heroes (firefighters and police officers, soldiers/warriors, the courageous president)” It equally showed “stereotypical female victims (the oppressed women of Afghanistan, Private Jessica Lynch, the ‘Homeland’) accompanying a set of traditional masculine behaviours and images,” rendering women “largely invisible, both in the media and in the decision-making arena since September 11, 2001.” The proliferation of masculinity in the US foreign policy arguably explains “the militarised approach to the ‘war on terrorism’” as “the reflexive need to appear ‘tough’ in the face of any crisis or challenge makes a war-like response appear natural and normal, and privileges the use of military force as a foreign policy tool.”⁴⁶⁹ Likewise, on the other side of the “war on terror”, masculinity mastered the game, with all the male ‘vanguard

⁴⁶⁶ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 156.

⁴⁶⁷ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 157.

⁴⁶⁸ Collins and Glover, *Collateral Language*, 4.

⁴⁶⁹ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 157.

Muslims', 'Taliban and Al-Qaeda officials', 'martyrs', 'emir of the faithful' and 'sons of clans' who appeared on the counter discourse, before and throughout the attacks against Afghanistan and Iraq.

The US discourse is also *ideological*, when ideology is defined as "meaning in the service of power." The "war on terror" evidently attempts to enhance "an ideological position and a set of ideological policies." Fitting into the neo-liberal approach of globalization, officials continuously argue that terrorism "threatens the positive gains of globalization and thus must be opposed." As clarified by Jackson, "This is an attempt to protect the existing relations of domination inherent in the global capitalist order over which America presides." Adding this to its embedded masculinity, argues Jackson, "the discourse seeks to maintain and continually reproduce the power of the (highly-gendered) military-industrial complex which is so central to the American political economy."⁴⁷⁰ No doubt, bin Laden's distorted view of Islam, often aired on Al-Jazeera, constitutes a radical ideology that can play on the hearts and minds of many.

Lastly and equally significant are the notable *silences* and gaps in the US "war on terror" discourse, reflected in "a number of glaring omission," apart from the stories of dead and injured Afghani and Iraqi civilians. There are no mentions of history or context, except for "the analogies of the 'good wars' against fascism and communism." Such missing history include, "the record of American involvement in the politics of the Middle East – its support for Israel, its military bases in the Arabian Peninsula, its alliances with despotic regimes, its murky dealings with the Taliban and the Mujahaddin before them, its oil politics; the history and context of Al-Qaeda's decade-long struggle against American policy in the region; the global context of state failure and breakdown, arms trading and increasing levels of violence and disorder." Rather than discussing all those issues, the discourse "assumes a 'ground zero' or 'year zero' attitude, as if it were the start of a new phase in history, rather than a continuation (or repetition)."⁴⁷¹ Those missing issues are the ones that a critical media system in a democratic country was supposed to raise. The fact that they were completely absent from the news media despite their availability in the public arena signifies how the news media was deliberately censored and silenced.

While the combination of those main features of the discursive representation of the "war on terror" partly explains why and how it has been so successful, so far, in achieving its aspired goals, for its perceived uniqueness, the power of the discourse is also instigated from a few other elements. First of all, it has "marginalized alternative discourses and established itself as the main language of counter-terrorism – even for opponents of the administration," as proven in John Kerry's employment

⁴⁷⁰ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 158.

⁴⁷¹ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 158.

of “the same discursive constructions as administration officials.”⁴⁷² The marginalization of different discourses is demonstrated in the processes of silencing/pacifying the news media, as further explained below, where “alternative and critical voice are rarely heard in the political arena in America, and virtually all of the debate is confined to contestations over tactics and strategies, rather than over substantive or foundational issues.”⁴⁷³ Secondly the success is also measured through the discourse’s ability to penetrate the operation and practices of institutions, as it is now “embedded into a number of major pieces of legislations, into policy documents, and within standard operating procedures and guiding principles for security organizations from the CIA to the Department of Homeland Security and the Coastguard.”⁴⁷⁴

Lastly is the extent to which the discourse is uncritically adopted among the entire society. Through this element is hard to measure, the popularity of Bush, mounting to 90 percent before the assault on Afghanistan and 50 percent before the invasion of Iraq, indicates that “Americans generally believe the discourse; that is, they accept the administration’s interpretation of the WTC attacks and the necessity for a ‘war’ against terrorism. Most Americans believe the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq have aided the ‘war on terrorism’ and have made Americans safer.”⁴⁷⁵ Explaining the proliferation of the discourse to develop “democratic” consent, Collins and Glover argue, “the most ‘civilized’ people are potential killers, if they are convinced of the ‘rightness’ or ‘necessity’ of their actions... if the state knows how to use correct language, it can convince its people to commit the most atrocious acts.”⁴⁷⁶ But the question is was the discourse accepted at face value elsewhere, and specifically in the Middle East where the assaults have taken place? The following sections consult the discursive representation of the “war on terror” as embedded in two distinctive channels, representing two varied cultures: Al-Jazeera and CNN. It attempts to assess the success or failure of the US discourse in different cultures, and even inside the US at some points, and the perceived obstacles and challenges posed by Al-Jazeera, at this point in history.

2- Media Discourse on Al-Jazeera and CNN from 9/11 to 10/7:

In the run up to the invasion of Afghanistan both channels, Al-Jazeera and CNN, were running completely opposing discourses of the two contesting sides the US represented by President George W. Bush and Afghanistan mostly represented by Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect behind the 9/11

⁴⁷² Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 159-160.

⁴⁷³ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 160.

⁴⁷⁴ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 161.

⁴⁷⁵ Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 162.

⁴⁷⁶ Collins and Glover, *Collateral Language*, 3.

terrorist attacks. While CNN, along with all American networks, kept repeating the official accusations against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and bin Laden, Al-Jazeera consecutively aired statements and videos of bin Laden making his point to a worldwide audience, as well as Taliban officials, almost on a daily basis. Each channel's background, culture, and policies dictated the representation of events on its screen. On CNN, the accompanying media discussion significantly supported the US position and was highly sceptical about bin Laden, mentioning him with suspicion and criticism. Al-Jazeera, from its side, kept its serious, apparently objective stance, refraining from mixing news with opinion and constantly showing both sides of the conflict, following its slogan by showing "the opinion and the other opinion," which earned the channel much credibility among its viewers. Showing both opinions, however, did not limit Al-Jazeera's constant sympathizing with the Afghans' disastrous situation, as well as portraying their pain and suffering in full detail, certainly reflecting its pan-Arab/Islamic stance. This had eventually infuriated the US administration as it raised questions about the morality of the assault. The two channels, thus, appeared to be running in opposite directions.

CNN essentially reflected the American side, as the orchestrated effort of the US media in gaining public support for the forthcoming military assault was quite evident. The American public, claims Nacos, was not surprised at President Bush's declaration of the "War on Terror," as television networks inside America were running screen banners like "America's New War" or "War against Terrorism." Televised stories containing the terms "war" and "terrorism" mounted to 316 on CNN. Also, before the address on October 7th, President Bush mentioned "war" and "terrorism" in 29 public appearances, "more than one such association per day,"⁴⁷⁷ comments Nacos. The cumulative presidential effort in selling the presumed "war" to both the national and international audience was far beyond that number. Nacos states, "In the twenty-six days from September 11th to October 6th, President Bush made more than 50 public statements from short exchanges with the press to long speeches or joint news conferences with foreign leaders"; all of them were aired on TV networks raising his public approval percentage to a record of 90 to 91 percent.⁴⁷⁸ Such an attentively concentrated effort at grabbing public and international support for the "war on terror" as a concept and strategy for facing the anti-American odds, demonstrates skilful intentions at utilizing the mass media to meet foreign policy goals. As Nacos describes,

George W. Bush has used the weeks since the attacks on New York and Washington to enlist broad public and elite support at home and significantly international cooperation for a multi-front

⁴⁷⁷ Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism, 146-147.

⁴⁷⁸ Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism, 148.

war against terrorism—military measures included. In this respect, he followed the presidential playbook for handling international crises to the letter.⁴⁷⁹

Paradoxically, however, Osama bin Laden was not less popular than George Bush in the US media. “The American television networks mentioned Osama bin Laden more often in their stories than they referred to President Bush,” asserts Nacos. Although bin Laden was not available to the media, nor did he make any public appearance, statistics show that the name of President George W. Bush was mentioned 292 times in CNN’s televised stories, in comparison to 469 for Osama bin Laden, mainly due to “a few statements via videotape or fax and news briefings by Taliban representatives in Pakistan who acted as stand-ins for bin Laden,” says Nacos.⁴⁸⁰ Interestingly enough, Nacos did not mention that those statements came to be public and required media concern though the Qatar-based, Al-Jazeera, just as the US media refrained from mentioning it upon the Pentagon’s advice!

Contrary to CNN, at the time bin Laden became the prime suspect behind September 11, to US officials and on the US media, by September 16, 2001 an Al-Jazeera anchor read the first statement faxed by bin Laden, “I stress that I have not carried out this act, which appears to have been carried out by individuals with their own motivation.” On that date, Al-Jazeera’s airing this statement in itself became news, as the Western audience started to become acquainted with its Arabic name and artistic logo. The newsworthiness of bin Laden’s speech opened the way for a new Arab perspective to penetrate the all-American coverage of the global event. The statement, as described by Hugh Miles, “was to propel the station to instant notoriety in the eyes of the West.” In the statement bin Laden assured that he is an obedient citizen under the Taliban government, “On this occasion, I affirm that I did not carry out this act. I live in the Emirate of Afghanistan and I have pledged allegiance to the emir of the faithful, who does not allow such acts.” In response, Bush insisted, “No question he is the prime suspect, no question about that,” catching up with the “war rhetoric” from his Camp David retreat.⁴⁸¹

The Al-Jazeera-run statement seems to have inspired the anger of the US President who threatened to launch a “crusade to rid the world of evildoers,” insisting, “We will find ’em, get ’em running and hunt ’em down,”⁴⁸² a statement that was aired to a global audience and inspired debates in both Arab and European media, as well as anti-American sentiments in the Arab World. Bush’s reference to the mediaeval Crusades against Muslims was enough evidence for this part of the world that the presumed “War on Terror” was no more than a faked camouflage for a “War on Islam.” The terminology, Crusade, for Arabs and Europeans, “conjures images from the Middle Ages of bloody

⁴⁷⁹ Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism*, 147.

⁴⁸⁰ Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism*, 149.

⁴⁸¹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 108.

⁴⁸² Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 108.

Christian military campaigns against the Muslims in an effort to capture the Holy Land.”⁴⁸³ This idea was later reaffirmed by the images/evidence of destroyed mosques in Afghanistan, which Al-Jazeera ran constantly in its subsequent coverage of the military assault.

Al-Jazeera’s showing of bin Laden’s statements and videotapes, however, was not new. In December 1998, he was interviewed by the channel for more than an hour, in which he remembered his childhood and claimed a duty on all Muslims to “wage” religious war, “targeting all Americans.” At the time, this statement precipitated protests by the US embassy in Doha to Qatar’s officials. On September 20, 2001, Al-Jazeera re-ran the December 1998 interview, in which bin Laden was shown as a “gun-wielding millionaire turned into a legend by the West.” The exclusive reportage cast bin Laden in a favourable light. The most wanted man on earth was shown in his childhood riding a horse, firing an AK-47 and driving a bulldozer. Leaving behind the lavish lifestyle he enjoyed in Saudi Arabia, he appeared from an “undisclosed location in Afghanistan” assuring, “Every Muslim should seek a place to fight the Jihad... to please God,” concluding with an open-ended question, “What is wrong with resisting the aggressors?”⁴⁸⁴ Who can disagree with such a statement? It is quite notable here how bin Laden’s discourse was clearly simplifying immoral acts of terror, so that they would be simply hardly challenged by ordinary people, just like Bush’s speeches following 9/11.

Al-Jazeera’s re-running of this interview at this point in time, after 9/11 and in the middle of the propaganda campaign launched by the US against bin Laden, had an earthquake effect in both parts of the world. Even though the interview was claimed to have significantly raised bin Laden’s popularity across the Arab World, casting him as the man who left behind the life of millionaires for the sake of his faith, it raised questions and debates in the Arab media on Al-Jazeera’s motivation, and whether it helps or harms the Muslims’ image by his radical interpretation of the concept of Jihad. Nevertheless, the popular reaction proved that bin Laden is a charismatic man, able to play on the hearts and minds of the mostly less-educated Arab public, more than George W. Bush, arguably the most powerful man on earth. And this was disastrous for the US public diplomacy effort; especially in that it intensified the frequency of stories about bin Laden on American television. While Al-Jazeera was regarded by the US administration as a mouthpiece for the terrorists, “world television networks queued to pay for the pictures,”⁴⁸⁵ which were more frequently aired and cited by all types of media inside the US, more than the president himself.⁴⁸⁶ From its side, Al-Jazeera, which kept re-running it

⁴⁸³ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 111.

⁴⁸⁴ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 110.

⁴⁸⁵ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 110.

⁴⁸⁶ Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism*, 150.

several more times, claiming it was necessary to re-air the interview “to give viewers an insight into the ideology of the alleged terrorist mastermind.”⁴⁸⁷

The power and appeal of both Bush’s and bin Laden’s rhetoric at this point is certainly quite significant. They skilfully tend to simplify issues, cast them in a benign light aimed at fulfilling good deeds, for the sake of humanity, for the sake of religion and for the sake of patriotism. Bin Laden’s question, “What is wrong with fighting the aggressors?” does not really seem to be any different from Bush’s crusade war, aimed at eradicating terror and making the world a safe place, simply because “every one of the victims who died on September 11th is the most important person on earth for to somebody.” Both discourses would seem to be beyond challenge for most ordinary people. Who can negate such statements, especially in the patriotic context in which they were placed? This is not because of anything right or ethical about them, but simply they tend to simplify things, exclude their direct repercussions, and even exclude the very religious grounds they purport. The discourse is just designed or meant to be so simple, so that it would be convincing enough, and thus appeal to the largest proportion of the general public, who have no background knowledge on the issue.

The media contest then continued. Again, on 24th September 2001, a typewritten message, hand-signed in the full name of Osama bin Mohammad bin Laden, rolled off the fax machine of Al-Jazeera’s centre in Doha, making the top scoop of the day’s news. As the Al-Jazeera presenter read the message, a still picture showed a copy of bin Laden’s statement filling the entire screen. Entitled, “Message to the Muslims of Pakistan,” the statement read, “We incite our Muslim brothers in Pakistan to deter with all their capabilities the American crusaders from invading Pakistan and Afghanistan. The new Jewish crusader campaign is led by the biggest crusader, Bush, under the banner of the Cross.”⁴⁸⁸ The sheer repetition of the word crusader was clearly in response to Bush’s repetitive usage of the same term; “Now it was being thrown back to him by Osama bin Laden,”⁴⁸⁹ comments Miles. It became clear by then, that Al-Jazeera was bin Laden’s channel of choice, acting as “his favored conduit to the outside world.”⁴⁹⁰ Al-Jazeera was condemned by both Arab and Western media, who all rushed to doubt the authenticity and credibility of his statements. Fury against Al-Jazeera in the West was then fuelled by airing bin Laden’s statements and dictating the way this presumed war was to be covered.

There was no room, thus, for a singular American coverage of the issue with pictures and statements of bin Laden and Taliban aired to a global audience via Al-Jazeera. The newsworthiness of

⁴⁸⁷ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 110.

⁴⁸⁸ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 111.

⁴⁸⁹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 111.

⁴⁹⁰ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 115.

those statements, at that point in time, explained why American networks kept airing and referring to them, as well as analyzing them, increasing the frequency with which bin Laden's name was mentioned, at a much higher rate than that of George W. Bush. Al-Jazeera is, thus, said to have started the "media war," by airing those statements, heating the contest between Bush and bin Laden for public approval, even before the actual military assault materialized.

3- Al-Jazeera and CNN coverage of the US-Led Invasion of Afghanistan

a. Propaganda and Censorship Measures:

"The propagandist's purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of people are human."

Aldous Huxley

Propaganda measures, as the processes of silencing alternative discourses, were central to the "war on terror" from its very outset, and were essentially accumulated by dedicating huge material and organizational resources, by both the US and UK, to fulfilling them. According to David Miller, since the 9/11 terrorist attack on America took place, the US and UK governments have "comprehensively overhauled their internal and external propaganda apparatus," aimed at justifying the "war on terror" military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. As Miller describes,

The UK Foreign Office public diplomacy operation alone costs £340 million annually for operations taking place in London and not including work done in embassies around the world. In the US the Pentagon has its own machinery and the State Department has the Office of Public Diplomacy. The latter tries to win hearts and minds in the Arab world and operates with a budget in excess of \$1 billion. The overall cost of the propaganda campaigns to justify the "war on terror" and the attack on Afghanistan and Iraq is a secret, but it must run into billions of dollars in the US and hundreds of millions of pounds in the UK.⁴⁹¹

The coordination of such an extensive propaganda effort between two apparently democratic countries seems to stand vehemently against the main principles governing the flow of information in democracies. Miller adds that the "unprecedented coordination" of centralized propaganda effort across the White House, the Pentagon and Downing Street "indicates the determination of the clique around Bush and Blair to pursue their project." Such operation demonstrates "a great deal of contempt for the process of democracy, since the lies are constructed to misinform and persuade – in part – the electorate of the US and UK as well as world opinion."⁴⁹² Those agents of propaganda have taken a wider dimension in the subsequent attack on Iraq in 2003, which are further detailed in Chapter Five.

⁴⁹¹ Miller, "The Propaganda Machine," 80.

⁴⁹² Miller, "The Propaganda Machine," 95.

In addition to allocating resources for the extensive propaganda effort described above, in Afghanistan, indirect censorship was practised by barring journalists' access to the battleground where the military operations were taking place, and making absolutely no arrangements or plans for journalists to base themselves nearer to the areas being hit. This highly criticized drawback was later avoided by the US and UK militaries in the following military assault on Iraq. In Afghanistan, however, the US and UK censorship were indirectly aided by the Taliban government's barring foreign journalists from entering its borders. By this act the Taliban censored information from its side as well, and guaranteed no news was leaving Afghanistan by Western sources. Journalists were in effect squeezed between two conflicting sides, both barring them any access to cover the forthcoming attack. According to Miles, "the world's media were waiting to move into Kabul to cover the imminent US assault on the Taliban. Before 9/11 the only journalists in Kabul were three Afghan nationals working for three international news agencies – AFP, AP and Reuters. After the attacks all foreigners were asked to leave and no others were allowed in."⁴⁹³

As the American attack was imminent, journalists sought to reach Afghanistan through Pakistan. As reported, 450 foreign journalists were officially registered in Pakistan, "though the real number was estimated more than seven hundred," since many had slipped in for public approval. As they waited in Islamabad "impatiently" hoping to get Afghan visas, the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar "had decided to close the borders for foreign journalists." The only way for foreign journalists to get into Afghanistan was "by enlisting the help of the Northern Alliance, foes of the Taliban," who allowed passage through Tajikistan of about 250 journalists by the 1st of October.⁴⁹⁴ Not allowed to access "Taliban-controlled Afghanistan," coalition journalists were obliged to form a "press pool," to share the "little information they had, while compensating heavily with news from the Pentagon", whose sensitivities pushed Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to justify the Pentagon's "secretive" attitude, claiming that any information may leak to the other side, "Our goal is not to demystify things for the other side."⁴⁹⁵ In fact, he barred undesired information from the media and the general public, which may have hurt his policy.

The three agency journalists in Kabul were thus the only representatives of foreign media inside the Taliban controlled areas. Although the international telephone lines were cut, they were each "equipped with a satellite phone," through which they communicated with their nearest bureaux in Islamabad. "They did despite the Taliban decree that anyone found using a satellite phone would be

⁴⁹³ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 114.

⁴⁹⁴ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 114.

⁴⁹⁵ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 139.

hanged,” a law which was never practised as “most of the Taliban did not know what a satellite phone looked like.” As a result, Al-Jazeera had the “only camera crew in the country and so the channel’s news team was the only one able to transmit pictures.” Its correspondents in Afghanistan were Taysir Alluni in Kabul and Mohammed al-Burini in the southern Taliban area of Kandahar. “They delivered regular live broadcasts to the Doha studio via their uplink in Kabul,” a facility that no other network possessed in the country. Its chief editor, Ibrahim Hilal, proudly told AFP, “We are the only [television] present in the Taliban-controlled zone.” Even Al-Jazeera’s main competitor, Abu Dhabi TV, was covering events from Peshawar and Islamabad in Pakistan.⁴⁹⁶

This definitely meant that Al-Jazeera had “a monopoly on all the pictures, stories and interviews coming from Afghanistan.” As the situation deteriorated and the attack was approaching, Al-Jazeera was airing “almost daily interviews with Taliban officials”; each was widely considered “a valuable exclusive.” These significant scoops included Taysir Alluni’s reports on “how the Taliban’s heavy machine guns had brought down an unmanned American plane or how Afghan demonstrators had stormed the US Embassy in Kabul.” Those reports were “quickly devoured with analysts trying to make sense of the situation inside a country which few people knew much about,” describes Miles, referring to the US media. When Taliban clerics met to discuss handing over bin Laden to the US only Al-Jazeera was there. “Al-Jazeera’s live coverage was broadcast to Doha and then syndicated around the world.”⁴⁹⁷ Al-Jazeera, thus, “began to set the visual agenda for American news coverage of the war by supplying images of unfolding events in Afghanistan,”⁴⁹⁸ describe Jasperson and El-Kikhia. Accordingly the pace of reporting was significantly different.

On 7 October 2001, as soon as the US-led assault against Afghanistan erupted, Al-Jazeera “dramatically interrupted its regular programming schedule to go live to Afghanistan,” sending live transmissions from Doha to CNN, the BBC and Sky News. Al-Jazeera’s studio in Doha launched a live interview with its correspondent Taysir Alluni, who was standing on the roof of its studio in Kabul. As the Taliban cut off the electricity before nightfall, the camera spotted “large explosions” shaking the city, and “followed by the chatter of anti-aircraft fire,” as “the first Tomahawk cruise missile” was launched. As Alluni was speaking, “one missile landed close to Al-Jazeera team that it blew the cameraman off the roof.” As the picture was cut off, Alluni said, “I am sorry the cameraman has disappeared and I don’t know where he is.” As he set up a spotlight on top of the roof, he explained, “I

⁴⁹⁶ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 115.

⁴⁹⁷ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 115.

⁴⁹⁸ Amy E. Jasperson and Mansour O. El-Kikhia. “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” in *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public*, ed. P Norris, M. Keru and M. Just (New York: Routledge, 2003) 115.

don't want to be a target too or you will be without news." When the cameraman reappeared, he started shooting "the planes flying overhead, while tremendous explosions could be seen and heard in the sky."⁴⁹⁹ At this point in history, the world audience was attentively sitting in front of their TV sets, watching all this happening. Al-Jazeera's conscious and decisive signalling of the fact that they were the only source of news inside the Taliban seems to have dictated the way it covered the situation. The exclusiveness they enjoyed gave them unmatched power, and put them, for the first time in history, in a position to be able challenge the US official reports.

The day the invasion started, shortly after the speeches of George W. Bush and Tony Blair were aired live, Al-Jazeera had a second exclusive the same night: a videotaped speech from Osama bin Laden. Taysir Alluni announced he had just received a video from Al-Qaeda, which "he would transmit live immediately, although he did not know what it contained." This statement in itself was a striking revelation, heating up the issues and making everybody attentive to listen to bin Laden's speech, which Al-Jazeera trusted was newsworthy, to the extent of airing it right away without knowing its details! The US networks had instant reactions towards the surprise situation. While some "scrambled to go across to Al-Jazeera at once," during the speech, others were "caught by surprise and unsure of the authenticity of what they were about to see, only managed to broadcast the speech later."⁵⁰⁰

This video of bin Laden, which was "first broadcast over Al-Jazeera and then re-broadcast by CNN and other U.S. and European networks, provided America's most wanted man with his most visible platform to date. He used it to deliver his distorted view of Muslim history and the jihad [holy war] against the Western world," comment El-Nawawy and Iskander.⁵⁰¹ From its side, CNN, which had "signed a deal with Al-Jazeera by which it could broadcast Al-Jazeera's pictures six hours before anyone else could touch them," was furious at the other US networks' disregarding this agreement and airing the footage. "Although this usage is considered an act of piracy, CNN and Al-Jazeera made a decision to ignore it for one day only," as Al-Jazeera's managing director mentioned in a letter that was sent to the other networks.⁵⁰²

On the tape, hailed as bin Laden's "most powerful message yet," he did not claim any responsibility for 9/11, but supported those who committed it, threatening, "America has been filled with horror from north to south and from east to west, and thanks be to God what America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have tasted." He concluded, then, "I swear to God that America will not

⁴⁹⁹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 126-127.

⁵⁰⁰ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 128.

⁵⁰¹ El-Nawawy and Iskander, *Al-Jazeera*, 144.

⁵⁰² Miles, *Al-Jazeera* 131.

live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine.”⁵⁰³ Al-Jazeera was clearly being utilized as bin Laden’s milieu to make his point. Apparently he was trying to win more Arab hearts and minds by referring to the Palestinian issue, as well as using the most watched Arabic news network in the region. For Al-Jazeera, the exclusive scoop that was “replayed again and again on all the [American] networks over the next few days,”⁵⁰⁴ had an unprecedented news value for both its timing and its “chilling” content. Accordingly all these crucial scoops intensified the channel’s notoriety in the eyes of the West, as its role clearly and consciously dictated.

Things deteriorated even more, for Al-Jazeera, when it first clashed with the US government over its airing of a story on the Afghani forces’ seizure of five members of the US Special Forces in a mission near the borders with Iran. “The Americans vehemently denied this was true – the US Ambassador in Doha even lodged a formal protest with the Qatari Foreign Minister – but Al-Jazeera stuck by its story saying it had come from the same Taliban source who had invited the channel’s reporter Ahmad Zaydan to bin Laden’s son’s wedding,”⁵⁰⁵ states Miles.

As a result, the US attempted to censor Al-Jazeera, as it did both directly and indirectly with its own media, by exercising pressure on Qatar’s Emir and asking him “to moderate the tone” of Al-Jazeera’s coverage of Afghanistan. Surprisingly, however, “the Emir told the press,” announcing that he was asked by the US government to “influence” Al-Jazeera to “tone down” its reporting. As quoted by CNN, he said, “We heard from the US administration, and also from the previous administration... Naturally we take these things as a kind of advice.” The Emir challenged their claim of Al-Jazeera’s lack of balance saying, “We are balanced and objective and never interfere in the news. We give all opposing views,” adding that “bin Laden is a party to the conflict and his opinions must be heard.” Accordingly the Emir assured that he did not intend to interfere with Al-Jazeera “because parliamentary life requires you have free and credible media and that is what we are trying to do.”⁵⁰⁶

The “media war” between Qatar’s Emir and the US government, then, intensified. The Emir’s “bombshell” pushed the US to try and explain its position to the US public. Richard Boucher, spokesman of the US Department of State, told the press, “We’ve expressed our concerns about some of the kinds of things we’ve seen on their air, particularly inflammatory stories, totally untrue stories, things like that... we would certainly like to see them tone down the rhetoric.” The Emir then replied that the US did not present “any clear evidence of bin Laden’s involvement in 9/11.” He added that though Al-Jazeera had its mistakes, “there is no reason to shut it down.” While criticizing Al-Jazeera

⁵⁰³ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 129.

⁵⁰⁴ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 129.

⁵⁰⁵ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 116.

⁵⁰⁶ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 122-123.

“boosted the network’s notoriety,” it touched on something in “which the United States once took considerable pride: the freedom that the American media enjoys from government interference.”⁵⁰⁷ The American fashion of exercising pressure on Qatar’s Emir to curb Al-Jazeera’s impact proves a lack of basic knowledge of Qatar’s politics and culture, and the role Al-Jazeera sought to play for this country. The US administration only gave the Emir a golden opportunity to publicize Qatar’s status in free expression versus that of the US, boosting the networks’ popularity and credibility, in its region, and that of its host country, of course. Most remarkably, the US attempt to curb down Al-Jazeera’s reporting failed.

Here Al-Jazeera was not only making the news, but challenging the US war policy, and putting American officials on the defensive. The media coverage of the assault became a major topic to be reported in addition to the invasion itself. Al-Jazeera images of civilian casualties even pushed officials to deny responsibility for many of the repercussions of the aerial bombardment. Boucher’s claim about the “totally untrue” things that Al-Jazeera runs is a case in point. According to Jasperson and El-Kikhia, in a press conference for the US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, he was asked, “Mr. Secretary, we are getting reports of... from CNN rather, there are bombs exploding in Kabul, Afghanistan. Are we at the moment striking back and if so, is the target Osama bin Laden and his organization?” Rumsfeld replied, “In no way is the United States government connected to those explosions.”⁵⁰⁸ The reporter’s question about the CNN reports is clearly about those exclusives taken from Al-Jazeera. Evidently, Al-Jazeera’s images of civilian casualties and blown up infrastructure were inspiring journalists to question what the US bombs were targeting, and opening the way for issues to be questioned that the US administration would not want to answer. They were those questions that needed to be censored as well. But the question is, was Rumsfeld’s answer convincing enough to the US and Western public? Did the American people believe that the Taliban was bombing its own people, in an aggression primarily initiated by America? I doubt it.

Al-Jazeera’s images and accounts often negated the Pentagon’s claims. “When Al-Jazeera reported the Taliban claim that US bombers had killed a hundred doctors, nurses and patients in a military hospital on the outskirts of Herat, the Pentagon denied it,” while AFP reported the same claim. A week after the bombing, while the Pentagon denied another story about a hospital that was hit in the bombardment and Rumsfeld called the reports of civilian casualties “ridiculous,” Al-Jazeera “showed pictures of badly burned Afghan children, injured in the bombing, lying in hospital and crying in pain.” Another instance when Al-Jazeera images challenged Pentagon claims was,

⁵⁰⁷ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 123.

⁵⁰⁸ Jasperson and El-Kikhia. “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 115.

When Al-Jazeera ran a story that the Taliban had shot down a US helicopter near the southern city of Kandahar, the Pentagon denied this. Then the Taliban produced two sets of charred and punctured landing gear, brandishing them in front of Al-Jazeera's cameras like a war trophy. They claimed these were from the downed helicopter. The undercarriage appeared to come from a Chinook transport helicopter and the model number and the manufacturer's name, Boeing, were clearly stenciled on the side. Donald Rumsfeld still described the claim as 'false'.⁵⁰⁹

The antagonistic relationship between the Pentagon and Al-Jazeera, thus, intensified "both sides were generating their own propaganda, with each side trying to turn the fog of this under-reported war to its advantage." While Al-Jazeera was exclusively reporting information supplied by the Taliban government side, which evidently included a great deal of propaganda, the US Pentagon was supplying US media, including CNN, with challenging claims, which are likely to be perceived as "the" truth. Images of civilian casualties on Al-Jazeera "took a heavy toll on the morale of America's more skeptical allies,"⁵¹⁰ risking the coalition being destabilized. Such images were, thus, able to affect the Pentagon's info-strategic warfare; that is controlling the flow of information in a fashion that serves the strategic conduct of the alleged war, inviting even more pressure to be exercised on Al-Jazeera.

Al-Jazeera was first threatened with having its license to broadcast in the European Union suspended for breaching the "EU Television Without Frontiers directive." As Al-Jazeera's license to broadcast in Europe is based in France, the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA), based on a complaint from the British Embassy in Paris, "warned Al-Jazeera that if it failed to respect its contractual obligations by transmitting any more unedited statements from bin Laden, it would be taken off air." The CSA president ruled that "Al-Jazeera has breached its license agreement by broadcasting live images without providing proper context and by broadcasting false information without subsequently providing the necessary corrections." Reporters Sans Frontiers condemned the ruling, saying it was based on "openly discriminatory measures."⁵¹¹

Al-Jazeera was then placed under surveillance, by both the US and UK governments, at both its London and Washington offices. The London bureau started receiving so many visitors coming and asking lots of detailed questions, visits which Al-Jazeera reporters believed were meant to inform them they are being watched. "I always assume that somebody is watching and I have to make an understanding of this. And if you are watched it is probably not because you are under suspicion, it is probably because you are point of contact for so many people," pragmatically commented Yosri Fouda, Executive Producer at Al-Jazeera's London Bureau. "The only difference between me and them

⁵⁰⁹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 143.

⁵¹⁰ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 143.

⁵¹¹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 143-144.

is that perhaps we are after the same piece of information, but they are after it to suppress it and I am after it to let it out. The area of common interest between journalists and security agencies is much larger than the area of conflict,”⁵¹² Fouda adds.

Fouda’s statement eventually raises again the question of info-strategic warfare, where the thin line between the information collected by journalists and intelligence collected by the military tends to blur. It explains thus how crucial are the measures for controlling the media, especially from the aggressors’ side, led by the Pentagon. Al-Jazeera’s Washington bureau chief, Hafez al-Mirazi concurs with Fouda, “I think I am fortunate or unfortunate that nobody from the FBI needed to sit down with me. I considered this a sign that they didn’t need any more information, since they had everything on me 24/7 anyway.”⁵¹³ In addition to monitoring Al-Jazeera’s bureaus in London and Washington, the US intelligence had also been “routinely eavesdropping on all the communication between the Kabul bureau and Doha.” Upon Al-Jazeera’s receipt of a bin Laden letter, they were approached by the US administration asking them for an opportunity to refute its content when it was eventually aired,⁵¹⁴ which meant airing the US response to the statement at the same time.

Al-Jazeera’s perceived threat was also online, with its highly sophisticated website, Al-Jazeera.net, forming a wartime forum criticizing the attacks on Afghanistan. The forum described the US policy in the Arab World as “absolute support for Israel,” questioning “Bush’s motives and connections with the Zionist lobby.” It referred “sarcastically” to the US fight against “what it calls terrorism,” as a fight “against Arab and Islamic groups and countries,” which it does “without evidence and without considering the implications in terms of economic and human loss.” This discourse was essentially considered “the kind of inflammatory threat to the unity of the coalition that America wanted to stamp out.”⁵¹⁵ At this point, it was thought necessary for the coalition to start working with rather than against Al-Jazeera, utilizing the medium as a vehicle for propaganda in the Arab world.

That was accumulated by both allocating resources to a public relations campaign in the Arab world, aimed at communicating the “coalition messages,” and by arranging “six appearances on Al-Jazeera of top-ranking US officials.” These included the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William Burns, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the President’s National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice. Dr. Rice’s speech centred on clarifying that the US “war on terror” was not against Islam, and the Bush administration hopes to find more peace in Palestine. “The President of the United

⁵¹² Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 146-147.

⁵¹³ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 147.

⁵¹⁴ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 163.

⁵¹⁵ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 155.

States understands Islam to be a faith of peace, a faith that protects innocents, and the policy of the United States is to do the same.” The same rhetoric was repeated over and over by US officials. Donald Rumsfeld assured it is not a “crusade against Muslims,” but just “a matter of self-defence,” denying all the Taliban officials’ claims for civilian casualties. “This effort is not against Afghanistan’s people. It is not against any race or any religion, it is against terrorism, and terrorists, and the senior people that are harboring terrorists.”⁵¹⁶

Although this was a sea of change for the coalition wartime media policy, nobody bought the story, especially when Al-Jazeera pictures negated officials’ claims. “Within a few hours Al-Jazeera showed American-made Israeli tanks rumbling into Palestinian towns. Neither the Arab press nor viewers missed the irony,”⁵¹⁷ comments Miles. The coalition attempt to utilize Al-Jazeera to justify their case, together with the content of these justifications, however, demonstrates a sheer lack of knowledge and understanding of the culture of the widely politicized Arab public. The people never doubted they were being served official propaganda. In this part of the world, where the great majority of people suffer in their daily lives from “bad politics,” all official speeches are simply perceived as lies and government propaganda. Al-Jazeera understood this very well, and earned its credibility from its appalling images/evidence, which were widely perceived as facts or “the” truth among the Arab people. For the coalition officials to convince the Arab people of their points, they needed to shift their actual policy, not their media policy. Nothing could be convincing, in this area, but a complete U-turn!

Even in the US and Britain, the people started losing confidence in their own governments. “US Appears To Be Losing Public Relations War So Far,” read a *New York Times* headline, says Miles. During the Talk Back Live show, CNN asked the audience to reconsider the “heavily loaded question”: “Is it unpatriotic to speak out against the war?” Though the majority of the people were still backing the alleged war, the polls showed their support had “slanted.” According to Miles, “The American public was becoming tetchy about the lack of good news and more importantly, the lack of good television pictures, coming out of the war. In terms of dramatic impact, coalition reports of bombed-out, empty caves and demolished Taliban training camps did not compare with Al-Jazeera’s grisly pictures.” On the other side of the Atlantic, British support had fallen from about three quarters of the people to two-thirds. “French support dropped from two-thirds to a half and in both Germany and Italy well over half the population wanted the war to end right away.”⁵¹⁸ It was evident by then

⁵¹⁶ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 157.

⁵¹⁷ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 156-157.

⁵¹⁸ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 162.

that the coalition forces not only underestimated the intelligence of the Arab public, but that of people in the West as well, especially with Al-Jazeera pictures frequently negating coalition claims.

A more brutal measure, thus, had to be taken against Al-Jazeera. As the military assault escalated and the Taliban started fleeing, Al-Jazeera's Doha offices told Alluni to leave. However, after assuring them he was on his way out, he changed his mind, being reassured by the Northern Alliance that there would be no harm if he wished to stay. "At about 1.30 that morning two American five-hundred-pound bombs landed on Al-Jazeera bureau in Kabul," which was situated in a residential area, with "no obvious military targets nearby." Fortunately no one was inside, as the technical staff had left the office a few hours earlier. While the Arab media featured the issue as a "vengeful and deliberate strike against Al-Jazeera, the Pentagon denied it was on purpose." Despite constantly using Al-Jazeera pictures, the Western media, "unwilling to speak on the network's behalf", barely reported the incident. While ITV and Channel 4 in Britain did not mention the issue at all, the only American station mentioning it was CBS, saying "the network might have been 'damaged' by an accidental missile strike"⁵¹⁹ !

Al-Jazeera insisted it had "officially notified the Pentagon of the bureau's exact location," while the Pentagon "denied ever receiving them." A claim that did not stand for long, as it was evident that the "US intelligence had, however, been routinely monitoring Doha-Kabul communication, so one might assume they knew where the bureau was," commented Miles. The Pentagon later confirmed in a BBC investigation that "the missile strike had, in fact, been deliberate," as they claimed the bureau had "military significance." Admiral Craig Quigley told BBC World that the office was considered "at the time, a facility used by Al-Qaeda." "It is not relevant to us to know that it was a broadcast facility," as any "target" that was "directly relevant to prosecuting the war" was "permissible,"⁵²⁰ he added.

In a letter written by General Tommy Franks, commander of US operations in Afghanistan, he claimed the office "had been monitored for a significant time and had repeatedly been the location of significant Al-Qaeda activity," although he provided no evidence for the truthfulness of this claim. He also claimed that one of bin Laden associates, Mohammed Ataf, was killed in the attack, while the BBC reporters who visited the scene a few hours later "found no trace of blood or body parts." Under the rule of the Taliban, Alluni had to keep in contact with officials, and frequently held interviews with them, which was considered by the Pentagon of "military significance." Also, Al-Jazeera's airing of bin Laden's tapes, dropped by couriers, made the station "a facility used by a Al-Qaeda", where the Pentagon's line between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was a very fine one. Most significantly, the BBC

⁵¹⁹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 165.

⁵²⁰ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 166.

investigation concluded that “all news organizations working behind what the Pentagon viewed as enemy lines” were evidently “placed in mortal danger.”⁵²¹

The American perception of Al-Jazeera, however, which precipitated the attack, is deemed unreasonable by Taysir Alluni. According to Alluni, “we feel we were biased towards the US during the war in Afghanistan, and statistics prove it. The amount of information we broadcasted about the US and its officials is way more than what we broadcasted about Taliban or Al-Qaeda or their officials. So the American reaction was totally imbalanced and unexpected from a superpower like the US, which is supposed to have more confidence in its actions, and not to deal with Al-Jazeera the way it did.”⁵²² Alluni’s statement does not seem quite accurate as the media bias did not necessarily correspond to the volume of stories aired on one side of the conflict, especially when it was sharply criticized, treated with suspicion, and aired among a multitude of stories sympathizing with the Afghani civilians.

b. Subsequent Physical and Discursive Media-Military Relationship:

While concern in the US thus intensified about how the war was being covered and direct censorship, from its side, was deemed necessary, crucial steps were taken “to prevent the retransmissions of Al-Jazeera’s footage in America.” To accommodate this direct governmental “request” that the US networks were given, the networks themselves practised self-censorship, demonstrating absolute compliance and a harmonious wartime media-military relationship. On the 10th of October, 2001, the White House revealed “it had asked the five major US television networks, ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox and NBC, to censor Al-Qaeda footage, which meant in practical terms material from Al-Jazeera, since it was the only network in a position to deliver it.” In a 30-minutes-conference, Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Adviser, urged all networks chiefs to refrain from screening bin Laden’s videos.⁵²³

At the same time, broadcasters agreed they would scrutinize all clips coming from Afghanistan, and never use any of Al-Jazeera’s live. “We will do what ever is our patriotic duty,” assured media mogul Rupert Murdoch, owner of Fox News, while a CNN statement stated, “Our policy is to avoid directly transmitting any report we think will facilitate any terrorist action. To determine what should be transmitted, CNN will take the advice of the pertinent authorities.”⁵²⁴ Such a statement from CNN is enough evidence of the channel’s inclinations and policy, and cooperative relationship to the military. It simply clears any doubt about its wholehearted cooperation with the US propaganda machinery,

⁵²¹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 166.

⁵²² Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 168.

⁵²³ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 116.

⁵²⁴ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 116-117.

together with all the renowned US networks that had more or less similar comments. The following day, adds Miles, Ari Fleisher, the White House press secretary, asked “America’s newspaper editors not to publish full transcripts of bin Laden’s or Al-Qaeda’s statements.”⁵²⁵ So the ban was deliberate on all types of media, and was explained as well. Exercising such censorship measure on the American networks was deemed necessary with statistics still showing more televised stories about bin Laden than President Bush, despite all the efforts and resources dedicated to their propaganda campaigns. CNN had the highest figures among American networks, with mention of bin Laden’s reaching 571 times, compared to 425 for George W. Bush,⁵²⁶ a few days before the military assault.

In Britain, the situation was not any better. The same censorship measures were employed, with the difference that the government demand was in the form of an order rather than the official request placed by Dr. Rice. Miles says, “Tony Blair summoned the top British broadcasters, the BBC, ITN and Sky News, to Downing Street, where his media adviser, Alastair Campbell, gave them a stern lesson on what constitutes acceptable reporting.” Campbell specified that they should be “more skeptical” of Taliban-based tolls of “civilians killed in the bombing,” they must “avoid seeking out extremist Islamic voices,” and any more videos of bin Laden “have to be censored,” as there is a “real danger that they could be sending out messages to terrorists members of their networks.”⁵²⁷ Unlike the American broadcasters, the British were “unimpressed.” The three networks issued a joint statement reading, “As responsible broadcasters we are mindful of national and international security issues and the impact reports can have in different communities and cultures. But we will retain the right to exercise our own independent and impartial editorial judgment... the provision of independent and impartial news is a fundamental part of a free society and the democratic process.”

So, though the same censorship measures were practised in the two attacking countries, the resulting media-military relationship in the US was cooperative while in the UK it turned into an adversarial one. Probably the way the censorship measure was handled in each country, request vs. order, dictated the reaction. Nevertheless, that was the direct outcome of direct censorship imposed on the media of a country that is known to be democratic. Such efforts aimed at censoring Al-Jazeera’s footages are hailed by Miles as “a dim appreciation of Al-Qaeda’s proven ability to manipulate modern telecommunication.” The claims that bin Laden might attempt to pass secret messages through news clips was deemed ridiculous, criticises Miles:

After all, if the members of an Al-Qaeda sleeper cell were expecting a secret tip-off from bin Laden, would they really be watching the BBC or CNN? Surely they would just subscribe to Al-

⁵²⁵ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 117.

⁵²⁶ Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism*, 151.

⁵²⁷ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 117.

Jazeera itself and watch the unedited version? If they were banking on getting their orders from a retransmission of bin Laden's speech on the BBC they might have a problem, as the clip the BBC ran lasted less than a minute and bin Laden's full speech had been twenty five minutes long.⁵²⁸

Even bin Laden himself picked up the issue and commented later in a video message, "They made hilarious claims. They said that Osama's messages have codes in them to the terrorists. It's as if we were living in the time of mail by carrier pigeon, when there are no phones, no travellers, no Internet, no regular mail, no express mail and no electronic mail. I mean these are very humorous things. They discount people's intellects."⁵²⁹ The claim was well exposed, then. But what was really at stake for the US and UK? Were they really afraid of the secret codes that might be embedded in bin Laden's messages? That was not the issue. There was a media war going on, and there was real concern about losing it to Al-Jazeera. That was the whole story, I assume.

The bin Laden reports through Al-Jazeera were seen by the US administration as unpatriotic, with the White House Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer warning "all five major American networks, as well as the wire services, not to carry any advance information about Bush and Cheney's schedule, nor use the names of military personnel engaged in combat mission." Though the networks abided by orders, there was still a problem. The media were still asking questions and raising issues that were not supposed to be raised, for the US administration. "It's not what government officials are saying that's the issue," says Fleischer, "It's the type of questions that reporters are asking that's the issue. The press is asking a lot of questions that I suspect the American people would prefer not to be asked, or answered."⁵³⁰ Fleischer certainly means those questions challenging the US official discourse, such as that one posed earlier to Rumsfeld, for instance. His suggestion, however, as to what the American people would or would not prefer here seems quite naïve and unconvincing, and exposes a perceived weakness of the US administration. It is crystal clear that it is the administration, not the US public, who would prefer those kinds of questions not to be asked, certainly the ones about the heavy bombardment and civilian casualties shown on Al-Jazeera.

To abide with the Pentagon-set rules of reporting, US networks, led by CNN, announced absolute compliance in the name of patriotism. Walter Isaacson, CNN's CEO and chairman, released a memo "asking his staff to slant the news in America's favor,

'As we get good reports from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, we must redouble our efforts to make sure we do not seem to be simply reporting from their vantage or perspective. We must talk

⁵²⁸ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 118.

⁵²⁹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 120.

⁵³⁰ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 140.

about how the Taliban are using civilian shields and how the Taliban have harbored the terrorists responsible for killing close to 5000 innocent people.’⁵³¹

As for reporting civilian casualties, the memo added that when CNN reporters find themselves in a position to cover civilian casualties, it is crucial that they do not “forget it is that country’s leaders who are responsible for the situation Afghanistan is now in.” A follow-up email was then sent by a CNN senior executive suggesting specific formats or frames for reporting,

‘We must keep in mind, after seeing reports like this from Taliban-controlled areas, that these US military actions are in response to a terrorist attack that killed 5000 innocent people in the US’ or, ‘The Pentagon has repeatedly stressed that it is trying to minimize civilian casualties in Afghanistan, even as the Taliban regime continues to harbor terrorists who are connected to the September 11 attacks that claimed thousands of innocent lives in the US.’ ‘Even though it may start sounding rote, it is important that we make this point each time,’ stressed the executive.⁵³²

CNN was also determined to be clear that it is “not in the side of the Taliban,” when one of its correspondents “filed a report from a bombed medical facility in Kandahar.”⁵³³ This policy was effectively applied in CNN’s inaccurate translation of bin Laden’s statements from Al-Jazeera, which reportedly underwent heavy editing beforehand and were often mistranslated. Linguistic experts say bin Laden’s Arabic statements were “butchered” by translators, note El-Nawawy and Iskander. The CNN translator “was putting his own spin on it, selectively translating,” says Professor Bernard Haykel of New York University. Also, linguistic expert, Nabil Baradei concurs, “The simultaneous translation omitted a great deal, and used the wrong terms, and it seems to me that the interpreter was not a professional one at all.”⁵³⁴ This intentional unprofessional misrepresentation of bin Laden’s statements certainly reflects CNN’s determination to support the war cause, even by sacrificing its professionalism and by twisting bin Laden’s words to suit its methods of framing the issue.

Such explicit policy towards bin Laden’s videos appearing on Al-Jazeera certainly implies a clear accusation that Al-Jazeera was siding with the Taliban, especially that it was not part of the Pentagon’s press pool, nor did it have any direct access to its reports. This surely conforms to the Pentagon’s measures against Al-Jazeera. CNN’s instructions of not transmitting Al-Jazeera’s material from the same vantage point as it was taken thus also suggests Al-Jazeera was considered a pro-Taliban channel. Certainly, Al-Jazeera’s position/location in the Taliban controlled area, together with its constant airing of their viewpoint, while sympathizing with the Afghani people’s suffering, eased the US-UK allegations of bias. The US networks seem to have invested a lot in the US public’s lack of

⁵³¹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 140.

⁵³² Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 140-141.

⁵³³ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 141.

⁵³⁴ El-Nawawy and Iskander, *Al-Jazeera*, 147.

knowledge about the culture and traditions in the region being attacked in their name. Also, avoiding the mentioning of Al-Jazeera's name in the above statements, while it was the only source of visual information for the assault, also seems to be tactical, and reflect how powerful and successful the "war on terror" discourse is. Such internal measures taken by CNN, however, not only demonstrate that it had cooperatively abided with the censorship rules imposed by the US administration, but even materialized them by imposing self-censorship on its own reporting, and detailing them in the above statement.

The mutually beneficial Al-Jazeera-CNN relations, based on their sharing agreement, then, turned overnight into an antagonizing relationship that escalated from a significant incident that embodied an apparently fierce contest between the two networks for media scoops. On 17th October 2001, both channels, Al-Jazeera and CNN, were invited by an Al-Qaeda representative to submit questions to the organization's leader, Osama bin Laden. Announcing the issue to its viewers, CNN stressed that "it had no connection with bin Laden," and "did not know even if he was alive or dead and was communicating with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan solely through Al-Jazeera contacts," warning the response would only be aired if deemed "newsworthy."⁵³⁵ While CNN was showing Al-Jazeera as its indirect link to Al-Qaeda, Al-Jazeera's story, however, was quite different. According to Al-Jazeera's manager of media relations, Jihad Ballout, "There was a choice between CNN and Al-Jazeera. We were both approached independently and submitted questions independently and Al-Jazeera was chosen by Al-Qaeda." Ballout explained that CNN's not having an office inside Kabul did not mean they could not communicate with the Taliban; "Telephones are there," he added, and "the Taliban, as has been proved so far, are quite adept at using high technology."⁵³⁶

CNN said that it gave Al-Jazeera six questions, which Al-Jazeera faxed to its Kabul office, together with its twenty five other questions, and its correspondent read them to an Al-Qaeda contact over the phone. A week later, when asked by the mass media about the outcome, Al-Jazeera's managing director said, "There has been nothing. We are still waiting," speculating that bin Laden may have refused to answer the critical questions or been unable to do so. But what happened, in fact, was that Al-Jazeera correspondent Taysir Alluni, had interviewed Osama bin Laden on 20th October, 2001, face-to-face, an interview that Al-Jazeera had deliberately hidden from CNN despite the mutual sharing agreement they signed together. Strangely enough, by January the 31st 2002, the interview was aired for the first time on CNN, after "an unknown party gave a copy of the tape to CNN."⁵³⁷

⁵³⁵ Miles, Al-Jazeera, 175.

⁵³⁶ Miles, Al-Jazeera, 179-180.

⁵³⁷ Miles, Al-Jazeera, 176-177.

The strangeness of the incident lies in both Al-Jazeera's denial and hiding of the interview tape, and CNN's getting it from an unsolicited source, a puzzling situation that put both parties in a curious position. Al-Jazeera's explanation for hiding the interview from CNN and not airing it was because of the unprofessional and unethical conditions under which the interview was held. According to Al-Jazeera, Alluni was never told he was going to interview Osama bin Laden. He was taken blindfolded to cover what Al-Qaeda representatives claimed was an important event, not knowing he was going to meet with bin Laden. Al-Jazeera's statement on the issue said, "The correspondent... was surprised by bin Laden's presence."⁵³⁸ The interview was, thus, considered to be held "under duress," and "in an environment of intimidation," where "Alluni was given a list of questions by the interviewee," which did not include any of Al-Jazeera's questions. Secondly, "bin Laden was using Al-Jazeera to give out a very edited and sanitized statement to his people. It was a message, a pure message,"⁵³⁹ explained Ballout to Miles. Although Al-Jazeera's explanation seems logical and convincing, the message included in the tape was certainly news that Al-Jazeera deliberately chose to miss.

The content of the interview, however, was enough for CNN to open fire on Al-Jazeera, and start raising questions about the network's possible intentions in not airing the tape. It was the first clear bin Laden admission of responsibility for 9/11, and was certainly crucial for the Pentagon to legitimise the military assault on Afghanistan. In the interview, Alluni asked, "America claims it has convincing evidence of your collusion in the events in New York and Washington. What is your answer?" Bin Laden first denied it: "America has made many accusations against us and many other Muslims around the world. Its charge that we are carrying out acts of terrorism is unwarranted." He declared, then, in a few minutes, "If inciting people to do that is terrorism, and if killing those who kill our sons is terrorism, then let history be witness that we are terrorists."⁵⁴⁰ Bin Laden's statement was a crucial scoop for CNN, taking the channel a step ahead of Al-Jazeera, by both its exclusiveness and newsworthiness, and its potential of helping the US and UK governments legitimise their military assault against Afghanistan. By then, bin Laden's video was not censored for containing a hidden body-language message, nor it was raising his profile in the US against that of George Bush! Bin Laden's confession seems to have caused a sea-change in the way his statements are sought to be handled by the US media. For CNN, Al-Jazeera's hiding it was a great opportunity to attack the network and doubt its perceived honesty and credibility.

⁵³⁸ Miles, Al-Jazeera, 177.

⁵³⁹ Miles, Al-Jazeera, 179.

⁵⁴⁰ Miles, Al-Jazeera, 177.

CNN, however, never gave an explanation of how and when it received the tape aired on 31 January 2002, assuring “it was not from a government source.”⁵⁴¹ Miles, however, argues “there is circumstantial evidence that it was the American administration who gave the video to CNN, albeit through a third party.” First of all, the Pentagon and the US secret service did their best since 9/11 “to know all of Al-Jazeera’s internal affairs,” constantly monitoring its Kabul office, and all its communication with Doha, and its bureaus on both sides of the Atlantic. Secondly, “Tony Blair had certainly seen the tape before it was broadcast on CNN,” as he cited some of it in a House of Commons speech three months earlier, “Bin Laden himself said on 20 October in a broadcast videotape that, and I quote, ‘If avenging the killing of our people is terrorism, let history be a witness that we are terrorists.’ Mr. Speaker, they are terrorists and history will judge them as such.”⁵⁴² CNN’s assurance that the tape was not supplied from a government source is thus proved to be false.

Furious at CNN’s airing the tape without its knowledge and permission, Al-Jazeera’s managing director issued a statement in which he said that he “expected CNN to ‘respect its special relationship with Al-Jazeera by not airing material that Al-Jazeera chose not to broadcast... Al-Jazeera will sever its relationship with CNN and will take the necessary action to punish the organization and individuals who stole this video and distributed it illegally.” From its side, CNN refused to say how it got the tape, “casting doubt on Al-Jazeera’s reasons for suppressing it.” As CNN’s Easton Jordan explained, “Once the videotape was in our possession, we felt we had to report on it, and show it because it is extremely newsworthy... And we really were dumbfounded as to why Al-Jazeera would decide not to air or even acknowledge the existence of the videotape... the only television interview with Osama bin Laden since 9/11 was not something we could ignore or sweep under the rug. It not only absolutely warrants being seen, it must be seen.”⁵⁴³ Jordan certainly implies that Al-Jazeera probably wished to protect bin Laden by hiding his admission of responsibility for the 9/11 events.

This incident, in addition to demonstrating the fierce competition between the two networks for media scoops, and in particular those of bin Laden, it tells a lot about the networks’ policies, stance on the military invasion, and relationship to the two conflicting governments, the US and the Taliban. CNN, from its side, was keen not to lose its perceived credibility and popularity amongst the US audience, denying that any contact had taken place between the network and Al-Qaeda, and putting all the responsibility and implied blame on Al-Jazeera. It kept repeating the Pentagon propaganda rhetoric that there was no confirmation whether bin Laden was dead or alive, and assuring it would not run any

⁵⁴¹ Miles, Al-Jazeera, 178.

⁵⁴² Miles, Al-Jazeera, 181.

⁵⁴³ Miles, Al-Jazeera, 178.

“propaganda” statement of the alleged terrorist. CNN not only suggested that all communication was going on through Al-Jazeera, but also implied a suspicious stance from Al-Jazeera aimed at harming its perceived authenticity and credibility, by doubting the existence of bin Laden in the first place in order to discredit the whole issue from the root. Then, after airing the tape, CNN’s attacking of Al-Jazeera was further demonstrated in its explicit media attack on Al-Jazeera for not airing the videotape, speculating on explanations for why the network refrained from airing bin Laden’s confession about 9/11. Whether those claims are true or not, they both feed into CNN’s unconditional support and backing for the Pentagon’s strategy. Firstly, suggesting that all communication with Al-Qaeda is taking place through Al-Jazeera has the potential of clearing CNN’s position before the Pentagon and the US public from having any linkage whatsoever with Al-Qaeda, which may antagonize the network at home. Secondly, casting doubt on the status of communication between Al-Jazeera and Al-Qaeda, both implicitly and explicitly, CNN is shaming its rival network for having close ties with a terrorist organization, which is certainly likely to harm its perceived credibility and authenticity.

Al-Jazeera’s actions and reactions, first by hiding the tape and refraining from airing it, then by suspending the agreement with CNN, as a reaction to CNN’s airing the tape, is deemed more professional. Al-Jazeera’s explanation for hiding the tape because it was recorded under duress conforms to the highest professional standards and ethical grounds of journalism of an independent news medium. A news medium may not be forced or coerced to disseminate government and dissident groups’ messages, nor be denied its rights to pose critical questions. This situation demonstrates the nature of the relationship between the Taliban/Al-Qaeda and Al-Jazeera. Al-Jazeera chose to air bin Laden’s statements, held interviews with Taliban officials, before and during the military invasion, which are to be considered exclusive media scoops. Positioned inside Afghanistan throughout the alleged war, it chose to represent the Taliban and Al-Qaeda viewpoints, in order to gain access to the war zone, media credit and recognition. Nevertheless, it would not accept being coerced to do so.

This explains why Al-Jazeera’s relationship to the Taliban “remained cordial,” throughout the bombing, though they “declined to be interviewed as often and access to military installations became more limited.” Accordingly, news gathering became a daily challenge, as described by Alluni,

We get information through personal contacts and by traveling on the street and asking some people... When a great number of people confirm a certain report, we relay it to Al-Jazeera. There are times when we receive so many conflicting reports. We find it really difficult to get news, especially since the phone service is here very bad, and our contacts have now been cut, especially with the officials.⁵⁴⁴

⁵⁴⁴ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 141.

Alluni's report demonstrates that the Taliban as well had exercised censorship, by barring access to military sites and refraining from supplying any information, and of course, the propaganda measures are evident in the interviews and bin Laden tapes that they chose to release through Al-Jazeera. From Al-Jazeera's side, however, there is nothing to prove any sympathy with the Taliban or bin Laden in their framing and political language. Rather, the lack of official information left the news teams with the civilian suffering and the Afghan population to report on, given the fact that they were "the only other witnesses on what was happening inside Taliban-controlled Afghanistan."⁵⁴⁵

Taliban censorship included providing Al-Jazeera reporters in Kabul and Kandahar with military minders, who consequently put them "under constant pressure to pay lip service to the regime." Al-Jazeera reporters were obliged at the end of each news bulletin to note "they were reporting from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – the Taliban name for the country," which provoked accusations about the channel's partial stance. Nevertheless, correspondents of AFP and Reuters in Kabul "filed damning reports of their own, reinforcing Al-Jazeera's stories about Afghan civilian casualties,"⁵⁴⁶ to defend the channel against such accusations. Though Al-Jazeera did not support the Taliban nor the pressures practised by their military minders, unlike CNN it was not in a position to resist them, or its world audience would be without news, as Alluni put it the first day of the raids. Maybe at this point, we may describe Al-Jazeera's wartime relations with the Taliban, as a love-hate one, where each side has major stakes in the other, which are only achieved by taking extreme precautions. In contrast, CNN's statement, and its working strategy for reporting, leaves no doubt about its unconditional support for the assault, and the government it is representing.

c. Al-Jazeera and CNN Coverage of the 2001 Invasion of Afghanistan: Consequential Info-Strategic Warfare

The contradicting media frames were strongly reflected in the sanitized coverage presented on CNN versus Al-Jazeera's bloody images of the civilians' suffering from the repercussions of attacks. Jasperson and El-Kikhia's comparative study on the content of both channels' coverage focused on how each channel framed the issue. A frame, they define, is the "active construction, selection, and structuring of information to organize a particular reality in a meaningful manner for the public." They thematically categorized the war coverage into three major frame types. The "Governance" frames refer to the news reflecting "support for the government and political leaders in each country, including issues of national unity and the public support for the government". "Military" frames include

⁵⁴⁵ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 141.

⁵⁴⁶ Miles, *Al-Jazeera* 143.

“depictions of the strategy used by each side in the Afghan war and particularly the use of technology of war.” And the “humanitarian” frames include the “images of victims of the conflict, notably the suffering and damage caused by the war.”⁵⁴⁷

As for the governance frames on CNN, they are well-reflected in the way the speeches of President Bush were treated. In airing the speech by Bush on the launch of the military assault CNN, using a “rally-around-the-flag” literature, positioned the speeches in the context of retaliating to the September 11 terrorist attacks stating, “Bush is not letting up on the quest for justice.” Accordingly, Gallup poll results revealed a great rise in his public approval in handling foreign affairs from 54 percent on July 10-11, to 81 percent early October before the beginning of military invasion, to 88 percent by late October, at the height of the assault. Media reflection of the reactions towards Bush’s speech included an interview with Israel’s Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, who said, “I don’t have the slightest doubt that the decision that was taken by the President of the United States is the right one...” Equally, the EU Commissioner for External Affairs, assured on CNN the “legitimacy of the Western actions against Afghanistan”, stating, “We think this operation is fully legitimate, according to the UN Security Council and the European Union has all the solidarity with the United States in these operations. The fight against terrorism is our fight, and together we are going to win it.”⁵⁴⁸ While it was necessary for the administration at that point to reflect that there is international approval for the unlawful attacks, the discourse evidently has been reproduced and replicated by various actors, with CNN being a vehicle for such cheer repetitions.

Reporters and media people rallied around the alleged “war” effort, acknowledging “in candid self-reflection that their humanity caused them to support America’s president,” say Jasperson and El-Kikhia. As one journalist, Howard Kurts pointed out, “journalists, believe it or not, are human beings, and they’re spooked by what’s going on. They want a strong leader so their own emotions made you lean towards giving the guy the benefit of the doubt.” The media rhetoric approved the president’s words and expressions and repeated them over and over. Themes like “targeting ‘evil-doers,’ not innocent Afghans, and that this battle against them could take an extended effort,” were quite dominant. One reporter even claimed that “Afghans recognized that they were not the targets of American operations in Afghanistan,” stating, “I think more and more people are beginning to understand that the war is not going to be directed against Afghanistan’s civilian population, and they’re not willing to take their chances by going back to the cities.”⁵⁴⁹ The images of people leaving

⁵⁴⁷ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 116.

⁵⁴⁸ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 117.

⁵⁴⁹ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 118.

their villages and moving towards the city appeared, in contrast, on Al-Jazeera as civilians fleeing the US brutal bombardment for their lives. The position of CNN journalists, skilfully replicating the official discourse, is no more than a reflection of its cooperative stance, earlier reflected in its CNN statement upon the “request” of Dr. Rice to stop airing bin Laden’s speeches.

On CNN, when opposition to the military assault in Afghanistan was featured, it was cast in an environment where protesters were portrayed as “not fully engaged in their opposition to the U.S. effort.” Reporters assured the US public that “Dissent” is “under control and better than expected, rendering a more optimistic picture of the reaction of the world to our action.” As a CNN report states, “obviously there are civilian casualties, then, then those inflame people’s passions. But so far, all of the protests, not only in Pakistan but elsewhere around the Islamic world, have been for the most part peaceful, although loud and noisy, but controlled.”⁵⁵⁰ It was necessary for the US administration to lighten the impact of the images of people demonstrating against the attacks. So they must have been inflamed by the views of civilian casualties because they are incompetent to think beyond those images, to think that this attack is unlawful or unjustified, or to protest a crime against humanity taking place before their eyes! This type of reporting is deemed convincing among the American public because it supports existing media-based stereotypes and prejudices against Arabs and Muslims in general, along with the sheer lack of proper knowledge about the culture of people in this part of the world at all.

Governance frames, on Al-Jazeera, in contrast, were reported from a different *cultural lens*. The rhetoric revolved around rallying the support of Arab and Muslim masses to confront the “arrogance” of the United States, and its “disproportional” response to 9/11. Showing the impact of the bombing of mosques on Afghanistan, as describes Jasperson and El-Kikhia,

Al-Jazeera footage depicted destroyed mosques and pictures of torn Qurans lying amidst the rubble. These images meant little to the average American viewer, who unless told they were images of mosques would have no idea that they were places of worship. However, the Arab or Muslim viewer recognized the images without the need for any commentary.⁵⁵¹

Taysir Alluni then commented on the images, “Afghans are looking towards brothers of faith for support, but will they find support in the hurried attempts by the Arabs and Muslims to satisfy America’s arrogance?” Then, in another broadcast from the Tora Bora Mountains, Alluni wondered, “Why doesn’t the Arab League or Arab countries provide a third alternative to either surrender or death and hence remove off them the charge of collaboration with the United States?” This media

⁵⁵⁰ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 118.

⁵⁵¹ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 126.

frame supported with the images/evidence of mosques under attack is likely to reinforce “the popular perception among Arabs that the war in Afghanistan was not against Taliban per se but rather against Islam and Arabs.” In an Arab political environment where the general public was already infuriated by the US unconditional support for the Israeli continuous occupation and military attacks against the Palestinians, this was a natural reaction. Eventually, it was this type of reporting and these particular frames that “angered the US government and military establishment and ultimately led to the ‘mistaken’ bombing of Al-Jazeera’s offices in Kabul,”⁵⁵² comment Jasperson and El-Kikhia. In addition to angering the US administration, Alluni here is enraging the existing Arab regimes as well, pointing out their weaknesses and helplessness not only in front of the US power, but also in front of their own people, and thus subjecting them to opposition and dissent inside their own countries. Alluni is harshly criticizing both the US “arrogance” and the Arabs’ collaboration in those attacks which certainly boosts Al-Jazeera’s pan-Arab stance.

In the meantime, Al-Jazeera conducted interviews with both Taliban and US officials, showing both sides of the conflict, as its slogan goes, “providing a forum for American policymakers to address the Arab world.” Appearing on Al-Jazeera, rather than censoring it, seemed more reasonable to the US officials who feared losing the media war. “Senior members of the Bush administration realized that dismissing these new Arab stations as censored and hence irrelevant was detrimental to U.S. interests in the region. Hence, they went out of their way to give interviews during the Afghan campaign and in its aftermath, to explain America’s reasoning and position on the Arabs and Islam.”⁵⁵³

Secondly, the military frames on CNN mainly focused on military technology, general military activity, in addition to the “military capabilities, precision technology, ‘clean language’ and euphemisms by military experts and media that allowed Western audiences to remove any idea that lives were being lost in the battles.”⁵⁵⁴ The reporters’ detailed description of the munitions and bombs were decisively aimed at distracting the public from their lethal impact. The military effort was often illustrated by graphics and described on CNN as “accurate, precise and an abstraction.” As states a military expert, “Usually it is a strip of targeted land and positions longer than it is wide. It’s very detailed in this location. And it’s very accurate.... So the ‘carpet bombing’ does lead you to believe it’s not very accurate but, in fact, it is... It’s mainly to eliminate personnel; to take out enemy personnel and soft targets.”⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵² Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 126.

⁵⁵³ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 124.

⁵⁵⁴ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 119.

⁵⁵⁵ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 119.

This sanitized language not only focuses on the accuracy of the US weaponry, but it eliminates crucial facts, and forces the audience to think militarily rather than humanely about the issue, not perceiving “soft targets” as human beings, and thus missing the fact that they are being killed by those munitions. The prevalence of those frames and discussion throughout the first three months of the invasion, when the heaviest attacks were taking place, “served to focus attention on a clean antiseptic and controllable version of events,”⁵⁵⁶ which in fact negated the actual pace of events.

For better or worse, the lack of access, and thus of proper imagery, for CNN even fostered this distorted coverage. Though CNN was the nearest Western media to Kabul and their “pictures of bombs exploding at night were taken from a great distance with a videophone looking through a telescopic scope,” says Miles. “Videophone pictures taken at night are green and pixelated, so the resulting footage normally needs a good deal of explanation and no small amount of imagination if you are to understand what you are looking at,” he adds. As a result, “most of the twenty-four-hour news cycle was filled with rambling and speculative dialogue.”⁵⁵⁷

On Al-Jazeera, however, the military frame emphasized the “collateral damage” resulting from the aerial bombardment on the buildings and infrastructure. “Images comparing the Taliban’s antiquated arms with the modern military of the United States provided a vivid image of a forgone conclusion that it was going to be a one-sided war that will end with the decimation of the Taliban.” This type of reporting reinforces beliefs and assumptions in the Arab world of the unfairness of this assault, and the imbalance of power which eventually renders fellow Muslims homeless or dead, especially with Al-Jazeera’s reports showing the damaged “schools, homes, mosques, and the loss of innocent Afghani life.” Nevertheless, Al-Jazeera’s military frames were identical to those of CNN at some points, focusing on “the newness” of the American weapons and the “infallibility of American military technology,”⁵⁵⁸ as the scarcity of its news sources throughout the invasion dictated.

Those aspects were completely unrelated to bin Laden and the Taliban, to whom Al-Jazeera never showed any sympathy or support in its general discourse, despite regularly airing their statements. Al-Jazeera held interviews with Afghani survivors, who frequently labelled the United States and Americans as “infidels,” and drew close comparisons between the US and Soviet invasions of their country. Among the dominant themes in such interviews was, “Why is the U.S. targeting civilians who have nothing to do with Al-Qaeda or bin Laden?”⁵⁵⁹ Such comparisons are likely to embarrass the US administration, putting them in the same category as their old communist enemies.

⁵⁵⁶ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 119.

⁵⁵⁷ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 148.

⁵⁵⁸ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 127.

⁵⁵⁹ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan”, 127.

Although Al-Jazeera seems to have reported both sides of the conflict, with reports on the US supremacy of weaponry as well as the repercussions of using such weapons, it continued its anti-US rhetoric, first by comparing it to the inferior Taliban munitions, which triggers public fury over the military attack, and then by focusing its imagery on its repercussions on infrastructure, mosques and civilians, which inspired more anger and hatred among the Arab and Muslim populations across the world.

Thirdly, humanitarian frames on CNN were only available through the reports of Al-Jazeera, based on the mutual agreement between the two channels. Al-Jazeera provided CNN with reports carrying an alternative view of events than that of the Pentagon, which put the CNN and the administration in a defensive position before their public opinion. One of Taysir Alluni's reports stated, "As you have seen, the American missiles have actually hit a humanitarian aid building and a poor populated area was completely destroyed. But it seems that the fighting concentrates on airports and the air defense installations." As Alluni's report then continued, "There were pictures from the hospital inside Kabul, which showed some injuries, showed some children, women, and men who the Taliban claim have been injured in the previous night's attack. Reports of fear from ordinary civilians." By this report and the like, Al-Jazeera "helped to shape the discourse on strategy covered by CNN."⁵⁶⁰ Al-Jazeera provided the US audience with a different picture of the assault than the one they were used to receive. Undoubtedly it had its impact on US public opinion, and pushed reporters to ask the questions that angered the US administration, and many times put them in a defensive situation.

But reporters learned the lesson and CNN did its best to curb Al-Jazeera's impact, as the "brutal accounts of civilian deaths" was in sharp contrast to what the US network showed. "Filtered once by the Pentagon and then a second time by the editors and journalists themselves, fleeting picture of civilian casualties, sandwiched between smarmy pundits and frequent images from 9/11, were all that American viewers saw." At the same time the CNN anchor kept reminding viewers of those who died in the twin towers whose "biggest crime was going to work and getting there on time." The framework for self censorship was diligently followed throughout the coverage. "When American networks ran Al-Jazeera footage, presenters would warn that what was about to be shown 'could not be independently confirmed'," says Miles. "This tag, which was never applied to exclusives from other American or international networks came with more than a hint of racism."⁵⁶¹ Here again it is quite evident that 9/11 remained the singular US frame throughout the invasion.

⁵⁶⁰ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, "CNN and Al-Jazeera's Media Coverage of America's War in Afghanistan" 120-121.

⁵⁶¹ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 148.

On Al-Jazeera's screen, however, the humanitarian situation was framed in terms of the death toll and human suffering of Afghani people. Reporting from Kabul, the first night of the war, Alluni said, "If the United States prepared its citizens and citizens of the world with a long campaign, the Afghan had nothing to prepare him except his patience, his poverty and his faith, factors that have distinguished him throughout history."⁵⁶² By these words, and the graphic video footage of death and destruction Al-Jazeera profoundly enraged the Arab audience. It never listened to the US requests to sanitize its Afghan coverage. Rather, it decisively focused on the human aspect as never before. Al-Jazeera showed pictures of death in Kabul and other Afghani cities, totally decimated by the US carpet bombing. As Jasperson and El-Kikhia describe,

Al-Jazeera reporters conducted interviews with surviving wounded children who had lost all their families. In the village of Tche Agha, seventy houses were destroyed by the bombing, resulting in the death of 120 of the village's 500 inhabitants. Similar scenes were seen from the village of Ismarzi where 200 of its 1500 inhabitants died. The dead had to be interred in mass graves and the remaining inhabitants had to leave and seek shelter because no structure remained standing in the village.⁵⁶³

The sheer embodiment of those human atrocities and suffering on Al-Jazeera screens had the potential to yield its coverage and imagery unmatched power against the sanitized content of CNN's coverage. Since the second day of the invasion the human aspect was central to Al-Jazeera's reporting. "Taysir Alluni was wandering around the rubble in the streets of Kabul assessing the damage caused by the air assault and interviewing bewildered citizens whose homes have been destroyed," describes Miles. "The camera showed one old man squatting in the ruins of his house, throwing fistfuls of dirt into the air in anguish. Another was helping his neighbor make repairs" Alluni assessed,

Not so many people have been killed, because the raids had been so accurately targeted, but this was only day one and who knew what was yet to come? The American government has urged patience, but these people were poor and hungry, without enough food for the winter.⁵⁶⁴

Al-Jazeera had to report extensively on the human aspect of the assault, simply because it was "the safest milieu," think Jasperson and El-Kikhia. For Al-Jazeera, it was the first time it covered such an event solely and to a global audience, as its position dictated. At the beginning reporters were unsure what to cover, what to look for, and what to focus on. They were in the process of learning how to deal with the situation. So they imposed on themselves self censorship and focused on the humanitarian aspects, attempting to avoid antagonizing their own government. The experience in Afghanistan, however, has proved that conservative owners of Arab stations are more tolerant than

⁵⁶² Jasperson and El-Kikhia, "CNN and Al-Jazeera's Media Coverage of America's War in Afghanistan" 128.

⁵⁶³ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, "CNN and Al-Jazeera's Media Coverage of America's War in Afghanistan" 128.

⁵⁶⁴ Miles, *Al-Jazeera*, 142.

expected, and interestingly enough owners themselves “discovered that freedom of the press can be beneficial, legitimate and also profitable.”⁵⁶⁵ This was definitely because of the high rates of subscriptions, coupled with the global selling of exclusive footages.

Conclusion:

Evidently the news media’s visual and discursive representation of the “war on terror” has been central to the very planning of such war, and has surely reflected a great degree of success and dominance for this discourse, at least inside the US, at some specific stages. This has apparently precipitated resistance in the form of counter-discourses appearing on Al-Jazeera, since 9/11 and throughout the assault on Afghanistan and Iraq, inspiring rage against the US and threatening its public diplomacy effort in the Arab World. Specifically, its appalling coverage of the military assault against Afghanistan inspired anger inside the US at some points, and along its allied countries, actively cooperating in its “war on terror”. But how far and for how long did this ‘Al-Jazeera effect’ stand in front of the power of the US discursive construction of the “war on terror”?

Definitely the discursive construction of the “war on terror” in itself carried the seeds of its eventual success and prevalence, especially inside the US: casting the event as a national tragedy, an “act of war” that required responses in the form of an open-ended “war on terror”; drawing on meta-narratives, including the US struggles against Communism and Fascism, civilization vs. barbarism, defining the good and bad guys and threatening globalization effort; and suppressing any alternative interpretations. The specific features of the discourse, which are central to the practice of any propaganda machinery, also inherently carry a crystal-clear recipe for success, including its hybridity, intertextuality and genealogy, including responding in the same fashion as earlier crises and drawing upon pre-existing narrative and stereotypes, and creating a state of continuity with former discourses; its reflexivity by reconstructing and reinventing earlier discourses to maintain coherence; its opacity in the decisive usage of vague terms and ill-defined expressions; its gendered masculinity which serve legitimating brutal activities including the act of war itself; its ideological character in constructing meanings that serve hegemonic state practices, and its evident silences where major issues are just meant not to be discussed despite their availability in the public space.

As a result, the success of the US discourse on the “war on terror” is reflected in many facets of the public life, where it penetrated major official and military documents, legislative law; it has been adopted by the US news media as a framework for coverage, and especially CNN, as proven in its

⁵⁶⁵ Jasperson and El-Kikhia, “CNN and Al-Jazeera’s Media Coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan” 124.

statements, and thus highly affected the public life and the US people's perceptions of the "war on terror". On the other side of the world, the Arab World, the US was widely seen as an aggressive attacking brutal racist country. The US unlimited arrogance and expansionist ambitions along with its military power have led to its unlawful and unethical invasions of sovereign states, toppling of their governments, and committing atrocities and mass killing among civilian populations, who already suffered harsh living conditions for decades. This was the general perception of the American attacks in the Arab World, which Al-Jazeera has essentially reflected since 9/11 and throughout the military assault on Afghanistan.

Unlike CNN, Al-Jazeera has always been critical of both the US and Arab positions concerning the whole issue, which consisted a major pillar of its professional approach in journalism, and the way it covered the events. Evidently since 9/11, there was a decisive propaganda/discursive contest between Al-Jazeera, on the one side, and the US mainstream media, on the other side, in presenting the situation in a fashion that serves its news policies, its cultural inclination and fulfils its endeavours. While CNN and other US networks played a significant role in legitimising the assault and preparing the nation for retaliation, even before President Bush announced the military operations against Afghanistan Al-Jazeera constantly aired news and videotapes of the alleged terrorist, Bin Laden. Both channels were constantly utilized by the two opposing parties, President Bush and Osama bin Laden, in their media war for gaining public support. However, while CNN supported the US position, Al-Jazeera could side itself from the issue being covered and never showed any support or sympathy with bin Laden or the Taliban. While CNN's close relations and mutual benefits with the US government, as explained by Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model (Chapter Three) dictates its cooperative position, Al-Jazeera's pan-Arab/Islamic stance, its airing of 'the opinion and the other opinion' and its professional approach to journalism, based on a willingness to criticise anybody dictated the way it covered the unfolding events.

As the attack on Afghanistan came close, both sides of the conflict exercised their utmost efforts to bar journalists access to the war zone, and thus from the opportunity to cover the event. From its side, the Taliban government prohibited all foreign media from entering the territories under its control and expelled those who were there beforehand. Al-Jazeera was the only channel allowed to have an office in Afghanistan and earn exclusive footage of bin Laden and interviews with the Taliban officials throughout the assault. From its side, the Pentagon also barred journalists' access to the war zone, supplying journalists with its one-sided news/propaganda through a daily media pool.

As Al-Jazeera became the single channel able to air the event live, extensive effort from the side of the US/UK was exerted to curb its coverage. These included exercising pressure on Qatar's

Emir to tone down Al-Jazeera's coverage, attacking the channel and creating a false impression on its inclinations towards Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the surveillance of Al-Jazeera offices and communications through their intelligence bodies across the Atlantic, addressing the Arab public through Al-Jazeera in an attempt to sell the "war on terror" discourse by US officials, and finally, bombing its Kabul office by missiles. As a result of such direct and indirect censorship measures and attempts, the media-military relationship between Al-Jazeera and the Pentagon was a deeply adversarial one.

On the other side of the conflict, Al-Jazeera's relationship with the Taliban appeared more cooperative, with the channel's constant airing of officials' interviews and bin Laden's statements, despite the scarcity of Taliban appearances throughout the attack itself, which left Al-Jazeera to report on the civilian populations surrounding them. As for CNN, its wholehearted cooperation with the Pentagon is unquestionable, as proven by its supporting statement for the war effort, and its subsequent coverage, and as previously reflected in Chapter Three, in the long rooted interests linking the US media and government together, as outlined by Herman and Chomsky. However, CNN's media-media relationship to Al-Jazeera was adversarial, for the hard competition it entailed, and with CNN's airing of Al-Jazeera's interview with bin Laden, which was unprofessionally conducted under direct threat and intimidation.

As for the consequential info-strategic warfare reflected on both channels' screens, it is definite that each channel framed the issue according to its own set of priorities, cultural backgrounds, and journalistic standards. While CNN framed the war in a patriotic fashion, as a rally-round-the-flag event, Al-Jazeera kept criticizing the Arab and Muslim governments' inaction, attempting to generate sympathetic Arab/Muslim public opinion around the issue. It insistently utilized imagery of death and destruction in an extensive fashion to fulfil such goals. CNN, however, focused emphatically on the US official side, the power and might of US military machinery, and its decisive impact, while airing very selective pictures from Al-Jazeera's humanitarian accounts, which were deemed unlikely to incite American public opinion against the war. Both channels seem to have followed a similar course in covering the subsequent 2003 US-led attack on Iraq.

Before and throughout the televisual representation of the assault on Afghanistan, the perceived success of the US discursive construction of the "war on terror" has evidently been hindered by Al-Jazeera at some clear points. First, following 9/11 when Al-Jazeera kept airing statements and interviews of bin Laden, which were circulated throughout the US networks, being criticized and analyzed, resulted in a strangely high popularity for the alleged terrorist in the US, exceeding that of George W. Bush. This has led the administration to bar television networks from airing bin Laden's statements claiming they might have contained a body language, a claim that was later mocked by bin

Laden himself. Second, the appalling images of civilian casualties that Al-Jazeera aired from Afghanistan pushed many US journalists to question the morality of the war and exactly what was being fought, raising the kind of alternative discourse that has to be silent for the discourse to prevail. This led the US administration to start instructing journalists again on the kind of questions that they think the public would not prefer to see asked.

Third, as for the coherence of the discourse, the US public, which has always been proud of the freedom of expression that its news media enjoys, is not supposed to know that there is a process of media censorship taking place under the new “war on terror” discourse. When Qatar’s Emir told the press about the Administration’s asking him to exercise control Al-Jazeera’s coverage, and he started publicizing Qatar’s position on free media expression versus that of the US, the US officials were again on the defensive, trying to explain their position. Fourth, despite all the effort exercised by the US government to control Al-Jazeera’s coverage and imagery, still its singular war coverage kept raising doubts about the nature of the war. This has hindered the popularity of the “war on terror” discourse to some degree in the US and to even larger degrees in its allied countries. I can safely argue, then, that despite the power, success and prevalence of the US discursive construction for the “war on terror”, at some important points in history, Al-Jazeera posed strong challenges to such discourse, pushing US officials to explain and re-explain their positions to the US public, and even to the Arab public through Al-Jazeera itself. Such an ‘Al-Jazeera effect’, however, soon vanished with the end of the military assault, leaving the US and world public to inhale from the their news media the collateral language of the “war on terror”, which has had definitely a more decisive impact than a news channel widely labelled as adversarial, and often challenging their day to day vocabulary, grammar and beliefs!

Chapter Five

Television Coverage of the 2003 US-Led Invasion of Iraq: Content Analysis of Al-Jazeera and CNN

Introduction:

Empirically studying the actual television coverage of the latest, 2003, US-led invasion of Iraq, this chapter draws a comparative analysis between CNN and Al-Jazeera in war coverage, in terms of both channels' content. This audio-visual coverage in itself essentially represents "the site of the image and its compositional qualities", formerly outlined in the research methodology, detailed in Chapter One of this thesis. Focusing on the image itself and what it consists of, the "site of the image", complements the "site of production and its technological construction", previously outlined in the structure of the news industry for both channels, and reflected in the television coverage of the "war on terror", with special application to the former US-led 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. These two sites together, the site of the "image" and its "production", are bound to construct the meanings of the visual television images presented by CNN and Al-Jazeera in covering the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.

The special selection of the military assault on Iraq as an empirical case-study to research is not only meant for the fact that it has proven to be "the most media-saturated war in human history,"⁵⁴⁰ but also because the media played, in effect, a central part of the war strategy, posing hitherto unthinkable challenges at some points. The news media not only covered the news, but made the news, so it often and actively affected the course of events. Also, the relative availability of this war's audio-visual data, as it took place coincidentally with the construction of this research, posed it as a strikingly irresistible case study for any researcher to undertake. Although it is not the first time that instant television has fulfilled a decisive strategic role in war coverage, evidence from the upcoming literature and the subsequent content and discourse analyses demonstrate that it is the utmost point in war coverage history, so far, in which visual imagery plays a crucial role in both fulfilling and challenging war strategy, on both sides of the conflict. Comparing Al-Jazeera and CNN coverage proves a strategic info-war contest between the two conflicting sides, ubiquitously

⁵⁴⁰ David Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War", 101.

reflected in the extreme disparities of their news perception and context, resulting from their original ownership, policies, and the roles they have played historically in war coverage.

Before outlining the perceived outcomes of the application of content and discourse analyses on the television coverage of the invasion of Iraq, however, we shall first shed substantive light on the literature tackling the status of its media coverage. This entails analyzing its different aspects in terms of the three power relations being studied – censorship and propaganda measures, media-military relationship and info-strategic warfare – with special focus on the specific role played by Al-Jazeera vis à vis CNN.

Television Coverage of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq:

“CNN and Al-Jazeera [are] covering different wars.”⁵⁴¹

Danny Schechter, April 2003

The extreme disparities between Al-Jazeera and CNN in their coverage of the US/UK-led military assault against Iraq certainly reflect the widely varied coverage from the aggressors’ media machine, to the anti-war, sometimes neutral media, to the different Arab news networks, making any cross-cultural audience think they are covering absolutely different wars. Comparing the US coverage with international news streams certainly yields “different wars underway,” starting with “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” on FOX News Channel, “Showdown with Iraq,” on CNN, to Al-Jazeera’s “America’s Imperial War for Domination and Occupation”—“not only beaming into the living rooms of Saudi Arabia and Lebanon but also across Asia and Europe.”⁵⁴² While the US and UK media orchestrated a patriotic propaganda campaign producing news reports on the “coalition” victories with constant detailed description of the smart precision munitions, surgically eliminating a “regime” without harming its “people”, the Arab news networks featured a bloody assault on the Arab collective body, a relentless invasion of Iraq, killing its people, and destroying its infrastructure, with substantive visual accounts of death, pain, agony and destruction.

To the opposite of the 1991 Gulf War, with CNN providing the only “globally-available” satellite coverage, the 2003 worldwide audience was exposed to widely varied cultures, watching Al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi, Al-Arabia and many relatively new Arab satellite channels. Journalists possessed “different histories and different motivations and so

⁵⁴¹ Danny Schechter, “April 5: TV at War, TV as War”, (<http://www.mediachannel.org>, April 5, 2003).

⁵⁴² Nancy Snow, “From Bombs and Bullets to Hearts and Minds: U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Age of Propaganda,” in Yahya Kamalipour and Nancy Snow, eds, War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 21.

constructed different templates through which to frame the Iraq War,”⁵⁴³ so that a new Arab taste for war coverage proliferated. At the same time, CNN (domestically aired to a US audience) and CNN International “split their coverage,” with CNN keeping the US audience with a “relatively isolationist vision of the war,” while CNN International provided “a more internationalist perspective for viewers outside the States.”⁵⁴⁴ The empirical research of this study has exclusively analyzed the International version of CNN, aired to the Arab World and the Middle East, which always carried the same CNN label on its screen, and focussed on issues that are deemed important to the audience of this region.

Inescapably, the media coverage of the US-led invasion of Iraq was determined and constrained by harsh factors, delimiting its prospects and restricting its endeavours, originating from both the mass media themselves, as well as direct and indirect external military/governmental controls. While the US Pentagon imposed harsh propaganda and censorship measures, incorporating the process of “embedding” journalists and correspondents, and devoting large portions of the war budget to accommodating them, the former Iraqi government, from its side as well, exercised extensive pressure on Arab and Western journalists covering the assault from inside Iraq. Such pressure started from limiting their movements inside the Iraqi cities to areas authorized by the Iraqi government, accompanying reporters to ensure favourable coverage, restricting any reference to places, other than those named by officials, frequently threatening to eject journalists from Iraq, and even, in effect, shutting Al-Jazeera offices twice during the war, and expelling two of its reporters, each time, outside of Iraq. As Sa’eda Kilani describes, one of the Al-Jazeera correspondents inside Iraq has “been physically assaulted” by former Information minister Mohammed Said Al-Sahhaf “for daring to broadcast events which cast the regime in an unfavorable light.”⁵⁴⁵ Such measures against Al-Jazeera certainly prove that it was not, at least willingly, representing the Iraqi government’s side throughout the military assault.

Those measures of the former Iraqi government, however, were nothing compared to those used by the US Pentagon, which included locking journalists out in the embedment process, and subjecting those outside the embedding to its military attacks, which eventually led to the killing of many unilateral journalists. The deliberate targeting of Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi offices in Baghdad and the Palestine Hotel, which hosted all foreign journalists who have chosen to report outside the embedding process demonstrates this. Such pressures

⁵⁴³ Andrew Hoskins, *Televising War: From Vietnam to Iraq*, (London: Continuum, 2004), 66.

⁵⁴⁴ Hoskins, *Televising War*, 66.

⁵⁴⁵ Kilani, *Freedom Fries*, 144-145.

on journalists covering the war did not leave any room for any form of critical coverage, by making them strategic targets for the Pentagon's both propaganda and military campaigns. Journalists were, thus, either embedded and constantly supplied with substantial amounts of propaganda along with the news, or physically subjected to sporadic bombardment as adversarial unilaterals toeing the enemy line. This has made them part of the conflict and pushed them, on both sides of the conflict, unavoidably to take sides and cover the war accordingly.

Nevertheless, Al-Jazeera, could professionally preserve relative objectivity both by showing all sides of the conflict and by reporting from a multiplicity of locations both inside and outside of Iraq, giving a strong impression that it had been "almost everywhere." As a result, all such measures of controlling journalism and utilizing the information flow in fulfilling policy agendas, exercised by both sides of the conflict, were at some points challenged by uncountable and unforeseen obstacles and limitations, namely the undesired video images. This has not only raised official questions about the effectiveness of such measures, but also publicly exposed their weaknesses and policy deficiencies, and thus, challenged the perceived strength of their war strategies.

As Hoskins describes, "the new global spaces covered by the Arab media did pose some difficulties for American news management."⁵⁴⁶ Such images, in addition, brought into question the righteousness and effectiveness of the war's media policy, making the media "the" news, and posing the mass media outlets, and their personnel, as strategic targets in "battle" confrontations, as happened in the April 8th bombardments of the Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi channels offices, as well as the Palestine Hotel, which was acting as a house and centre for all foreign journalism inside Baghdad. As describes Campbell, "Imagery was central to the conflict and often the subject of conflict itself."⁵⁴⁷

Through this empirical study, I shall explore the limitations and obstacles to critical media coverage, as well as the challenges often posed by airing undesired images, while attempting to figure out how the above-mentioned three power-relations—censorship and propaganda measures, media-military relationship and info-strategic warfare—operated throughout the assault. This should naturally set the stage for making sense of the war images being analyzed, in terms of both content and discourse. Comprehending the framing of war issues and their potential of decisively feeding its policy agenda, and meeting the "assumed" public needs, will demonstrate how an image or a set of video images can help or harm the

⁵⁴⁶ Hoskins, *Televising War*, 67.

⁵⁴⁷ Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War," 102.

strategic agenda of war, embarrass military and political leaders, or enhance their confidence in their claims and assumptions.

a. Propaganda and Censorship Measures:

From the outset of war, controlling the information flow was central to its strategic planning, primarily representing the *direct* propaganda and censorship measures, practised throughout this military invasion. From the attacking US/UK side, these essentially included establishing communication offices and/or centres aimed at centralizing the operations of misleading the mass media, for the pure sake of propaganda. These encompassed the White House-based, Office of Global Communication (OGC), set up by the Bush administration. Among its procedures, for example, describes David Miller, is that “civilian and military personnel refer to the invasion of Iraq as a ‘war of liberation’. Iraqi paramilitary forces are to be called ‘death squads’.” Also controlled by the White House is the State Department Office of Public Diplomacy, operating via the US embassies around the world. The office is responsible for overseas propaganda, and gaining hearts and minds in the Arab world. On a daily basis, it sends an e-mail bulletin called the “Global Messenger” which contains “talking points and ready-to-use quotes”. Parallel to these in the UK, the Communication and Information Centre (CIC), coordinates the biggest propaganda operations between the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office and Downing Street. It was later changed to Coalition Information Centre (CIC), since the war against Afghanistan, for the UK to play the major part in war propaganda and public diplomacy. The CIC administration is based in the Foreign Office, but is effectively run from Downing Street. It had the No. 10 Committee, called the Iraq Communication Group, directly responsible for misleading the media about the existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) inside Iraq.⁵⁴⁸

All these bodies operate the following four tasks. First, the external propaganda system run by the Foreign Office and coordinated by the Public Diplomacy Policy Committee. The military invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 occasioned the forming of a unit inside the Foreign Office with the specific task of dealing with “Islamic media” such as Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi channels. Second, the internal propaganda focusing on the “terrorist threat” coordinated by the Cabinet and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), aimed at confronting internal protests against this war through the media, using its News Co-ordination Centre and the Media Emergency Forum. Through applying these systems, the UK

⁵⁴⁸ Miller, “The Propaganda Machine,” 80-82.

government could easily apply its propaganda schemes, both for going to war and legitimising its assaults on civil liberties.⁵⁴⁹

Third, the “in theatre” operations, in which other centres played complimentary roles, such as CENTCOM, Doha, Qatar, the Forward Press Information Centre in Kuwait, and the Embedded Reporters with their Military Minders. Although these information centres, including CENTCOM in Qatar and the Forward Press and Information Centre (FPIC) in Kuwait, suffered a severe lack of information flowing from them, most importantly however, they guaranteed consistency of reporting. According to Miller, “When the question aroused about the inability of the US to find Saddam Hussein, US spokespersons from the “White House, to the Pentagon to the Central Command in Qatar – simultaneously insisted that the war was ‘not about one man’.”⁵⁵⁰ Such orchestrated role-play by those three agents of propaganda – CENTCOM, FPIC, and the embedded reporters – seems to have helped not only in uniting the discourse, but also in delimiting vision and insight. As Campbell describes, “The five hundred or more ‘embeds’ (with one hundred cameras) were ‘close up at the front’ while the six hundred CMC journalists were ‘tied up in the rear’. This meant the military could be confident that journalists would produce ‘maximum imagery with minimum insight’.”⁵⁵¹

This is in addition to the US-UK military Psy-Ops, or Psychological Operations, undertaking overt and covert operations inside Iraq, targeting enemy opinion to break down resistance. The US-UK coordinated Psy-Ops included producing and distributing a substantial amount of leaflets, running “white” radio operations inside Iraq including “Information Radio” broadcast by the US, and Radio Nahran (two rivers) run by the UK in Basra during the war. Also, upon the fall of Baghdad, the UK and US Psy-Ops launched their first television channel, Towards Freedom, featuring messages from both Bush and Blair.⁵⁵²

All of these extensive efforts exerted for the sake of totally controlling the flow of official information to the mass media, as well as the media’s ability to accumulate information not based on official sources, in effect, not only proves that controlling the mass media, and in particular the television coverage, is a an essential part of the war strategy, but also signifies that most of the war news, based on official sources, must have included a great deal of military propaganda. As Campbell argues, “At no stage post-World War II period has

⁵⁴⁹ Miller, “The Propaganda Machine”, 84.

⁵⁵⁰ Miller, “The Propaganda Machine”, 88-89.

⁵⁵¹ Campbell, “Representing Contemporary War”, 105.

⁵⁵² Miller, “The Propaganda Machine”, 92-93.

the US or UK military operated without detailed media management procedures designed to influence the information (specifically the pictorial) outcomes.”⁵⁵³

Controlling the pictorial outcome thus entailed, in effect, occupying television studios to exercise “full spectrum dominance on cable and network TV as well as on commercial and public radio.”⁵⁵⁴ This “force-multiplier” of wartime media control is what Der Derian calls, military-industrial-media-entertainment network, or MIME-NET, merging the “production, representation and execution of war.”⁵⁵⁵ Inside the television studios, “computer generated graphics of the Iraq battlespace were created by the same defense industries and commercial satellite firms that supply the US military.” The application of MIME-NET, in addition, included dedicating “public affairs officers” to each TV network, including CNN, ABC, CBS, NBC, and NPR. “Color commentary and shades of opinion were effectively reduced to the nightscope-green of videophone verite in the desert and red, white and blue in the studios.”⁵⁵⁶

Hollywood’s cooperation with the military in defining such pictorial outcome is also another domain, from where American “strategic information operations has been and will be pursued,”⁵⁵⁷ as describes Campbell. Decisively arranged since the initial phase of the US-led “war on terror,” concurs Jackson, since “November 2001, White House advisers met with the heads of Viacom, Disney, MGM, Fox, Warner Bros and Paramount to discuss how the Hollywood machine could be retrofitted for more explicit propaganda purposes.”⁵⁵⁸ Such cooperation is evident in the cinematic fashion in which many of the war events were evidently staged to convey effective messages. Imaging of the Private Jessica Lynch rescue story, detailed further, is a case in point. The *indirect* propaganda and censorship measures, thus, on both sides of the conflict, ranged from supplying reporters with propaganda and disinformation aimed at misleading the “perceived enemy,” for both sides of the conflict, to strangulating the embedded journalists’ access to special locations and war zones as well as crucial broadcasting equipment, to targeting and killing unilateral reporters, largely regarded as adversarial, later in the war.

Propaganda and censorship efforts, thus, seem to have diligently followed the same lines adhered to over the twentieth century. This is clearly reflected in establishing governmental bodies and institutions at both sides of the Atlantic and in the war zone aimed at

⁵⁵³ Campbell, “Representing Contemporary War”, 102.

⁵⁵⁴ James Der Derian, “Who’s Embedding Whom?”, InfoTechWarPeace Project, (www.washingtoninstitute.org/infopeace/911/index.cfm?id=13) March 26, 2003

⁵⁵⁵ David Campbell, “Cultural Governance and Pictorial Resistance,” 62.

⁵⁵⁶ Der Derian, “Who’s Embedding Whom?”

⁵⁵⁷ Campbell, “Cultural Governance and Pictorial Resistance”, 61.

⁵⁵⁸ Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 170.

orchestrating unified info-warfare to be supplied to the news media. The news media's assumed independence was strangled by the Pentagon-produced imagery it is being fed throughout. This had been implemented by military-friendly firms occupying television studios for the production of war graphics and imagery, as well as military experts who kept explaining the Pentagon's viewpoints throughout the war. Utilizing Hollywood directors and producers to enhance the dramatic production of war imagery is an added technique with strong historical basis in the twentieth century's world wars.

b. Embedding the Media-Military Relationship:

Part and parcel of controlling the pictorial/narrative outcome was the strategy of "embedding" the journalists and correspondents with the "fighting" military escorts. As Campbell points out, the Coalition Media Centre (CMC) at the US central command headquarters in Qatar "was integral to the strategy of embedding reporters with military units for those on the front line provided images and stories from an unavoidably narrow perspective, while the journalists at the CMC were given what was said to be the broad overview but in effect desired by the Pentagon and its partners."⁵⁵⁹ This obligatory procedure has pushed many of the journalists, willingly or not, to be wholeheartedly in support of the soldiers protecting them from war dangers, and guaranteed a harmonious media-military relationship throughout the war, which eventually "continues the long-running tradition of a close relationship between the media and the military."⁵⁶⁰

The media-military relationship, thus, during the US-led invasion of Iraq was by-large cooperative, especially from the side of the embedded journalists who were absolutely controlled by the military. According to Miller, "Embeds agreed to give up most of their autonomy in exchange for access to the fighting on military terms." This included not only living with the story they are supposed to report on, but also "utterly" depending on the military "for their field of vision and whole capacity to report, not to mention their safety."⁵⁶¹ To deserve the military protection from physical harm, then, they had to sign a 50-point plan issued by the Pentagon, detailing what they could and could not report, where the list of what they could report was "significantly much shorter from what they could not."⁵⁶² Doubting the "embedded" reporters' "ability to be objective", Douglas Kellner criticized that they solely depended for their protection on "coalition" military, lived with the troops, and signed a

⁵⁵⁹ Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War", 103.

⁵⁶⁰ Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War", 102.

⁵⁶¹ Hoskins, *Televising War*, 61.

⁵⁶² Miller, "The Propaganda Machine", 88-89.

“rigorous set of restrictions on their reporting.”⁵⁶³ Hoskins, as well, concurs that such “unprecedented contact between the media and the military,” led to “diminishing prospects for objective and detached reporting.”⁵⁶⁴

This has been demonstrated in one of the embedded reporters’ – Roland Paul Larson – accounts on the war coverage. As Larson describes the “bonding” relationship he established with the soldiers, “We were all Americans in a foreign land and in danger. It was quite difficult not to psychologically surround the wagons and see yourself as an *us* against a *them*.” Although Larson admits that “bonding” with the soldiers was a “potential source of professional complications,” he concludes: “it never seriously affected my reporting,” clarifying that his “obligations as a journalist” never intertwined with his “friendship for a soldier.” Accordingly, he thinks the bonding was “positive”, as “soldiers became helpful and forthcoming with information and opinions,” noting that because he had accompanied a supporting division, the news was very scarce.⁵⁶⁵

While Larson’s position cannot be generalized on all “embedded” reporters, as it is just one person’s opinion, it is generally supported by a study conducted by a research team at Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, which largely depended on interviews with media and military people and presented relatively similar views of embedded reporters, equally attempting to protect their “perceived” objectivity and integrity. The study essentially claims that “embedding” was positive, allowing “an unprecedented degree of media access to unfolding events,” which made broadcasters “better able to offer independent accounts of the military campaigns,” with a significantly lower “degree of interference and censorship.” It also claims that embedded journalists made remarkable efforts to “protect their objectivity,” providing “a much more balanced account of events than some non-embedded reporters,” especially those in-studio reading ready-made pro-war scripts. The study also suggests that the distinction between embeds and unilaterals was “often blurred on the ground,” with unilaterals becoming “temporarily” embedded and embeds “abandoning their units” to report “independently.” It suggests that the unilaterals’ scope of events was “inevitably limited,” due to its dangers, while embeds provided “a *higher* degree of

⁵⁶³ Douglass Kellner, “Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq”, in Yahya Kamalipour and Nancy Snow, eds, War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 72-73.

⁵⁶⁴ Hoskins, Televising War, 60.

⁵⁶⁵ Roland Paul Larson, “Anatomy of a Bonding: An Embedded Reporter’s Account of the Bonding Process with the Soldiers” in Yahya Kamalipour and Nancy Snow, eds, War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 126-130.

independent scrutiny than would have been possible without them,” mentioning instances where embeds “were able to correct misleading claims made by military sources.”⁵⁶⁶

The Cardiff research, accordingly, suggests that embeds were not necessarily “in bed,” for their diligent attempts to report independently. They were no exception in the profusion of “less careful attribution of information sources,” nor did they largely contribute to the “abundance of rumors and misleading reports,” while correcting deceptive military claims. Embedding, rather, was seen as a success, from the military viewpoint, and as a “professional” public relations operation aimed at discouraging “unilateral reporting,” from the journalists’ viewpoint, suggesting that “the fact that so many unilaterals were killed during the war may make embedding the *only* option for broadcasters in future conflict of this kind.” The research, however, found a consensus among broadcasters and the public that “a *multiplicity of sources and perspectives* is essential for objective and balanced war coverage,” in which both embedded and independent reporting contribute to complementing the picture.⁵⁶⁷

To look up those recommendations and findings, concerning the role of embedded reporting in comparison to unilaterals, we shall find that objectivity is probably out of question. It is just practically impossible for any correspondent, embedded or not, to absolutely isolate himself and his personal accounts from the story he is covering, especially in circumstances when news is scarce, because it is censored at its very source, and reporters are just expected to provide continuous accounts of what is going on. A journalist, thus, is simply expected to exert all possible effort to get nearer to objectivity and critical reporting, wherever he is positioned. Evidence in embedded journalists’ accounts, concerning their ability to go “on” and “off” the embedding process, as well as their claims for challenging military disinformation tends to demonstrate an obvious willingness of some of the embedded journalists to seek objectivity and resist military disinformation, at some points. Though such accounts tend to prove that some of the embedded journalists were able to challenge the strictness of the embedding process, however, the study omits that their reporting was always kept within the “allowed” list signed by each and every one of them.

Also, the journalists’ own view of their embedding, though valuable evidence, is inherently neither objective nor balanced, because it directly touches their own integrity and

⁵⁶⁶ Justin Lewis, Terry Threadgold, Rod Brookes, Nick Mosdell, Kirsten Brander, Sadie Clifford, Ehab Bessaiso and Zahera Harb, “The Role of Embedded Reporting During the 2003 Iraq War: Summary Report,” Report by the Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, commissioned by the BBC, November 2003, 2.

⁵⁶⁷ Lewis, Threadgold, Brookes, Mosdell, Brander, Clifford, Bessaiso and Harb, “The Role of Embedded Reporting During the 2003 Iraq War,” 3.

abundance with journalistic codes of ethics, which few would admit breaching. Embedded journalists, as well as Larson, for instance, admitted a significantly low degree of censorship and interference with their reporting, unprecedented access and closeness to the war zone, along with an apparent scarcity of news. This view by embedded journalists, of itself, proves the great degree of success of the embedding policy, not only in accomplishing harmony between journalists and soldiers, but also in giving the journalists the illusion of completeness, by their very existence side by side with the fighting soldiers.

This closeness in itself blurred their vision and perception of the indirect censorship being applied on them by keeping them at the war fringes, away from the bombarded sites, the civilian casualties and even the fighting locations, where “perceived” enemy soldiers are often claimed to have been fighting back. Such closeness to the soldiers simply obliged them to take whatever information/propaganda they are being fed, mostly from official sources, and report it, simply because “news is scarce,” as they mostly admitted. They did not, however, admit, or probably realize, that such scarcity is due to the fact that they are being simply kept away from the news area, and being mostly fed with “propaganda”, rather than news. This certainly reflects their unavoidably tunnel vision of the war. Such limited scope of the war naturally explains the scarcity of news, as well as the low level of censorship and interference.

There was no need, thus, for the military to practise any form of direct censorship, while the embedding itself was a successful indirect form of censorship, and their pre-set rules and regulations were diligently followed under the supervision of military minders. The embedding or “bonding” with the military, by its very nature, not only put journalists in one camp with the fighting soldiers, but also made them miss the war they were supposed to witness from a broader critical scale. They certainly missed this spatial distance from the soldiers, which could have allowed them to envision a wider scope of the conflict, and open the possibilities for critical thinking and mere objectivity. As describes Hoskins,

The journalists closest to the heart of the battle itself ironically contributed mostly narrow and decontextualized snapshots of the war. Moreover, the shrinking of the physical distance between embed and soldier was matched by a shrinking of the critical distance between journalist and the story.⁵⁶⁸

This is what some of the embedded journalists tried to restore by temporarily escaping their embedding and acting as if they were absolutely free. They did not miss, however, the “rigorous” list of restrictions and sensitivities they signed ahead of the war, of which “Journalists are acutely aware,” and thus, “fashion their coverage accordingly,” as admits the

⁵⁶⁸ Hoskins, Televising War, 60.

Cardiff-based research. The embedding claims of enjoying “unprecedented media access” to war zone is, thus, largely discredited, as such “access” was only granted to areas and events pre-set and pre-determined by the Pentagon. Even when they break outside the embedding, their reporting had to be strictly within the “allowed” list each journalist signed to be there. What would be the value of “access,” then, with the strident limits to reporting what has been already “accessed”? Such control of journalists and restriction of their ability to seek objectivity have certainly eased and fed into the Pentagon’s propaganda and media distortion strategy, producing a highly sanitized version of war coverage that “seems to take us closer to the reality of war, and yet excludes the ugly side of that reality.”⁵⁶⁹

To be fair, however, one must not underestimate the embedded journalists’ attempts to seek objectivity by breaking out of the embedding process. Despite their being mostly unsuccessful in terms of actually accumulating some sort of a relatively balanced reporting, due to the rules they were obliged to follow, evidently those journalists attempted balance between seeking objectivity and preserving their professional integrity, while accessing the war zone in a relatively safe way. This is because it is generally professional for journalists to deal with recurrent obstacles, such as the various censorship measures, in order to accumulate their reporting task as objectively as possible. The success in seeking such objectivity, however, is another issue.

In addition, the advancing media technology in war reporting, paradoxically, has also eased the application of propaganda and censorship measures. The proliferation of videophone “as the standard of television war reporting rather than the exception” has contributed a sense of propinquity and liveliness unmatched in any previous military assault. As a result, “visual immediacy ruled supreme,”⁵⁷⁰ raising audience expectations, as well as constraining the journalists’ ability “to perform their jobs effectively,”⁵⁷¹ since verifying the accuracy of sources is more likely to slow the news-flow to the competitors’ advantage. As Hoskins describes,

The 2003 war ushered in a much faster pace of event time and an apparent closeness – or even intimacy – with the war and those involved in it. Intense competition and audience expectations have become driven by a compulsion for reality television in the form of reporters embedded in amongst the events they are reporting on and these being watched by audiences unfolding in real time on TV screens.⁵⁷²

⁵⁶⁹ Lewis, Threadgold, Brookes, Mosdell, Brander, Clifford, Bessaiso and Harb, “The Role of Embedded Reporting During the 2003 Iraq War,” 3.

⁵⁷⁰ Hoskins, *Televising War*, 57.

⁵⁷¹ Hoskins, *Televising War*, 46.

⁵⁷² Hoskins, *Televising War*, 48.

Such embedding of reporters has guaranteed a largely cooperative media-military relationship along the aggressors' side of the assault. Despite some of the embedded reporters' attempts to seek objectivity, it was practically impossible for them to violate the rules or break out of the small compass within which they were supposed to operate. Though such closeness between the reporters and the unfolding events they were covering ushered a new visual immediacy in the assault coverage, it led to a more distorted de-contextualized coverage, providing "maximum imagery with minimum insight." This has opened it up to new propaganda measures to be proliferated, as reflected in the following info-strategic warfare story and its cinematic imagery.

c. Subsequent Info-Strategic Warfare:

Staging Media Events: Private Jessica Lynch

While the embedding was meant, to "ensure that the stream of images coming back from the front line revolved around allied military hardware and personnel,"⁵⁷³ still with the continued anti-war demonstrations around the globe throughout the alleged war, it seemed necessary to stage heroic stories aimed at seizing ultimate public sympathy. A most striking example of such decisive manipulation and media distortion is the story of saving Private Jessica Lynch from the hands of her captors "presented in the form of an entertainment show, drawing visual techniques borrowed from Hollywood,"⁵⁷⁴ as described by Daya Kishan Thussue. Likewise, Kellner adds that US media footage of "her dramatic rescue" was "obviously staged like a spectacle on reality television."⁵⁷⁵ The political message of airing such an affective video is certainly clear in its pictorial details and accompanied narratives. According to Campbell, the video narrative, together with its images, was "cinematically" designed to show that the US never leaves any of its fighting men and women in trouble. The narrative was "full of heroic stories for her captivity and rescue," saying that she "suffered gunshots, stab wounds," and was mistreated in an Iraqi hospital, after she "bravely fought in a battle firing repeatedly despite being hit, and seeing many of her colleagues killed."⁵⁷⁶

This infotainment construction of the rescue by US Special Forces was, then, widely exposed after a BBC documentary "showed that Iraqi doctors had looked after her."⁵⁷⁷ The

⁵⁷³ Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War", 105.

⁵⁷⁴ Daya Kishan Thussue, "Murdoch's War—A Transnational Perspective" in Yahya Kamalipour and Nancy Snow, eds, War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 96.

⁵⁷⁵ Kellner, "Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq", 73.

⁵⁷⁶ Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War", 104.

⁵⁷⁷ Thussue, "Murdoch's War", 96.

fact, as appeared in doctors' interviews to several media outlets, is that the doctors tried to take her to the Americans, but they [the US forces] fired on them, shooting through the hospital's doors, endangering and terrorizing doctors and patients, "simply to get some dramatic rescue footage for television audience,"⁵⁷⁸ says Kellner. This cinematic description of the story accompanied by TV documentaries demonstrates the decisiveness of truth manipulation, aimed at fulfilling war-related strategic goals. The BBC role in exposing this story, in addition, poses a strong limitation to the perceived power and might of the US-led propaganda effort, as other television networks as well have strongly challenged its attempts to dramatize the war on television screens, in order to maximise sympathy for the war cause.

Another striking instance of decisive disinformation and manipulation of the truth is mentioned by Dana Hull, of the *San Jose Mercury News*, who refused to be "embedded" with the soldiers she was supposed to report on: "I wanted to spend as much time as possible with Iraqi civilians, talking with them about their lives over the past decade in their homes and schools and mosques."⁵⁷⁹ Hull, then, chose to report the aftermath of the war, where news distortion and manipulation seems to have continued. Of the several instances of media disinformation that Hull mentions, the killing of a 12-years-old Iraqi boy by US soldiers while playing on his house roof was most significant. Hull first saw the story on Al-Jazeera. But tuning into other Arab and Western channels, she found nothing. She rushed into the boy's house, and found the sad family furious with anger and tears.

Hull was surprised to discover she was the only Western journalist who visited them. The family said the boy went to play on the house roof at night and when one of the soldiers saw him, he shot more than five times, ignoring a neighbour's loud call "Baby!! Baby!! Don't shoot!!" The US army spokesman, however, claimed the boy had an AK-47 in his hands, adding that in many cases adults use children to carry weapons, and in the darkness a 12-year-old looks the same as a 20-years-old. As Hull quotes him, "We all hate that this has happened. But we're not admitting guilt in any way, shape or form. He had a weapon."⁵⁸⁰ This story is not only a striking example of possible media disinformation, as the power lies in the hands of its beholder, especially when there is no way to prove the opposite, but also shows how the aggressors' media tends to neglect stories about the people on behalf of whom their army claims to fight, reducing them to nothing!

⁵⁷⁸ Kellner, "Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq", 73.

⁵⁷⁹ Dana Hull, "The War on Iraq: A Reporter's Observations" in Yahya Kamalipour and Nancy Snow, eds, *War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective*, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 131.

⁵⁸⁰ Hull, "The War on Iraq", 134-135

The relative freedom of movement and reporting that Hull enjoyed, as opposed to Larson, allowed her to show the Western audience a different facet of war: the human aspect. Hull's relative freedom, however, did not prevent the US army spokesman proclaiming its righteousness, and denying any responsibility, a policy that was practised in all atrocities committed throughout the invasion. The fact that Al-Jazeera, alone, covered the event at the time, proves the continued challenge placed by influential Arab networks on the US attempted manipulation and monopoly of news.

Possible or logical explanations for this attitude of the US and British media/army towards the Iraqis' misrepresentation is given by Karim H. Karim. Karim highlights four main dominant stereotypes about Arabs in the Western/American media as "greed, barbarism, lust and violence," explaining that "basic Western notions" about Muslims' characteristics date from centuries ago, and still determine the media frameworks used when portraying today's events involving Muslims. "The historically entrenched image of the 'bad Muslim' has been quite useful to Western governments planning to attack Muslim-majority lands. If public opinion in their countries can be convinced that Muslims are barbaric and violent, then killing them and destroying their property appears more acceptable," states Karim.⁵⁸¹ This apparently justifies the claim of the US army spokesman that the boy had a weapon in his hand. The boy has to be violent, for his killing to be justified. The prevalence of such notions also explains why wartime embeds could easily frame their reporting accordingly, mostly believe and repeat a great of the propaganda they were fed, and tend to perceive things in terms of "us against them."

Disappearing the Dead: Al-Jazeera Breaks US Taboos

In addition to staging heroic events for television cameras, and misrepresenting the Iraqi people, another striking characteristic of the war images is the disappearance of the dead on Western media outlets, together with the double standards treatment of allies vs. enemy deaths. As criticizes Jay Shaft,

Every time you hear of an American soldier dying it is trumpeted as an assault at the very heart of America and its values. When an Iraqi or Afghani dies it is excused as the price of liberating and occupying a country in the process of civilizing a war torn nation, in order to democratize it. That is if the deaths are ever even admitted in the first place.⁵⁸²

⁵⁸¹ Karim, "War, Propaganda, and Islam in Muslim and Western Sources" 111-112.

⁵⁸² Jay Shaft, "Us Versus Them: Some Lives Seem More Important in the War on Terror" Information Clearing House, (<http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3898.htm>) 23 June, 2003

This has been deliberately tactical by the Pentagon, evidently to mislead the public about the brutal human costs of this war. Reluctant to offer a body count the civilian or military deaths, Donald Rumsfeld “firmly stated” that the counting of civilian deaths “is pointless and would serve no useful purpose”. When asked about civilian casualties, Rumsfeld replied,

As long as the people of Iraq have been liberated our goal was achieved. If some civilian casualties occurred in the liberation, that was most unfortunate. You have some inevitable civilian casualties in any war. Civilians always die, that's a fact you can't deny. Everyone agrees on this. You have to look at the fact that Iraq has had a regime change and is now liberated. That makes any inevitable sacrifice worthwhile.⁵⁸³

This intentional disregard of the value of Iraqis' lives, the people in whose name this war was claimed to be fought, is vehemently reflected in the deliberate absence of a body count as well as the sanitized imagery accompanying the war coverage. According to Campbell, “the way in which the images of the conflict produced by the allies' media were so relatively clean, being largely devoid of the dead bodies that mark a major conflict.”⁵⁸⁴ While the media outlets' concern in selecting the war images was based on “taste” and “decency”, the military's long history of sensitivity dates back to the world wars and Vietnam.

Such sensitivities, adds Campbell, were “extended to the captured as well as the dead.” When Al-Jazeera broadcast images of US and UK war prisoners and casualties, the American networks refrained from displaying the footage “for at least one day before releasing it in short clips with identified features obscured.”⁵⁸⁵ Significantly enough it has been a “key issue” for television networks, “whether or not to run” this video footage. CBS was the only American network to show the obscured footage, never shown on CNN, which only displayed still photos of blurred corpses, apparently taken from Al-Jazeera.

Showing those images on western networks, though with obscured faces, seems to have been forced by the perceived power of the images, and thus of Al-Jazeera, reluctantly putting the renowned Arabic network at the centre of story, making the news as well as covering it. Hoskins argues that the very fact that those images came to be public through Al-Jazeera, provided “an excuse to Western channels to use them,” as they firstly could cite their availability in the “public domain” and, secondly, their broadcasting by Al-Jazeera was “a significant part of the news story as the actual capture of POWs.”⁵⁸⁶ As Campbell agrees:

⁵⁸³ Shaft, “Us Versus Them”

⁵⁸⁴ Campbell, “Representing Contemporary War”, 106

⁵⁸⁵ Campbell, “Representing Contemporary War”, 107.

⁵⁸⁶ Hoskins, Televising War, 67.

The fact that al-Jazeera's images were, in the words of John MacArthur, "too honest," had the paradoxical effect of making al-Jazeera the story rather than the images and what they represented.⁵⁸⁷

Attacks on Al-Jazeera by the US Pentagon and many of its representatives started, accusing the channel of breaching the Geneva Conventions for its very display of recognizable individuals. In particular, says Elizabeth Ptacek, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld "chastised" Al-Jazeera for airing "Iraqi-conducted interviews with American POWs", a clear violation of the Geneva Conventions. Secretary of State, Colin Powell complained: "Al-Jazeera has an editorial line and a way of presenting news that appealed to the Arab public. They ... magnify the minor successes of the regime. And they tend to portray our efforts in a negative light."⁵⁸⁸ Though Powell is partly right, accusations of breaching the Geneva Conventions were not accurate, Campbell argues, for two reasons. Firstly, Al-Jazeera was broadcasting footage from Iraqi television, rather than producing it, and secondly, it was doing so at the same time many US and European networks were equally showing pictures of Iraqi POWs, with images supplied by Pentagon and MoD film crews inside Iraq.⁵⁸⁹ Campbell's view is evident in Human Rights Watch criticism of both the Iraqi and the US administrations stating, "The provision of POWs from 'public curiosity' appears to have been violated by both the Iraqi and the US governments."⁵⁹⁰

In addition to airing blurred images, by some, and refraining from airing them completely, by others, the American media used these incidents brilliantly to draw a media template from the 1991 Gulf War, in a way to counter the power and authority of images shown on Arab networks. Those captured in 1991 "were in great demand by the news networks for their authoritative take on the experience of being an Iraqi POW," says Hoskins. John Nichol, who appeared repeatedly on several television networks and newspapers, along with his 1991 images "as a visual template to frame the story," and one of the 2003 POW images, providing personal accounts of his experience, conveyed "a certain authority to comment on this story and conjectured on its likely outcomes."⁵⁹¹ This is a clear example of how the Western media framed events to serve its pre-set agenda and meet the perceived public needs. There is no way, however, of knowing the actual public perception of such events, and how effective they are. Apparently, however, while the Iraqis, and Arabs, saw the

⁵⁸⁷ Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War", 107.

⁵⁸⁸ Elizabeth Ptacek, "Backlash Against Al-Jazeera", *In These Times*, (http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/backlash_against_al_jazeera, April 3, 2003).

⁵⁸⁹ David Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War", 107.

⁵⁹⁰ Ptacek, "Backlash Against Al-Jazeera".

⁵⁹¹ Hoskins, *Televising War*, 39-40.

story as an achievement, at least, elsewhere it was an opportunity to draw on existing media templates and remind the western audience of the Iraqis' past experience in doing this, and losing at the end. Hoskins analysis is:

Human eyewitness memory and visual media connect and re-connect in influential ways to construct definitive and historical accounts of the past and make sense of present media events through those accounts.⁵⁹²

The power of those images [of the US/UK POWs] and their actual potential to challenge US war policy, not only lies in the fact of their being broadcast, but also in their "sense of immediacy and proximity" and that they were "unedited and unpackaged", which granted them power "unmatched by the cleaner, more distanced pictures produced by journalists at the CMC, just down the road from Al-Jazeera in Qatar." Such assumed "horrific" impact of those images is not only due to the fact that Al-Jazeera alone was standing outside the embedding, but also because it did not adhere to Western channels' "taste and decency" codes. Its images, yet, were "no more than what appeared, in actuality, before its camera lenses," comments Campbell. With those images, Al-Jazeera, not only challenged the US military strategy, but also its foreign competitors covering the war, leading television executives to argue that they suffered "a credibility problem," with international audiences exposed to "the shocking images of non-Western channels."⁵⁹³ This apparently explains why other Western channels attempted to draw media templates, in an attempt to counter what may be called, on this occasion, the 'Al-Jazeera Effect'.

Airing those images as well as many more pictures of death and destruction on Al-Jazeera screens throughout the assault was central to its ongoing editorial line, in war and peacetimes. According to Campbell, "Al-Jazeera took an editorial decision during the Iraq war to show all the shocking images that came its way (whether taken by its eight crews inside Iraq or from tapes supplied by other sources)."⁵⁹⁴ In contrast, CNN had its hands tied by the military rules, conforming to its "taste and decency" principles, and supported by the "perceived" public needs. When CNN's Walter Rogers's report showed only once a dead Iraqi, the switchboard of CNN "lit up like a Christmas tree" as viewers were enraged "demanding that CNN not show any dead bodies, as if the US audience were in denial concerning the human costs of the war," comments Kellner.⁵⁹⁵ Apparently, thus, while Al-Jazeera posed an actual challenge to the strategic conduct of the war, constantly enraging the

⁵⁹² Hoskins, *Televising War*, 40.

⁵⁹³ Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War", 107.

⁵⁹⁴ Campbell, "Representing Contemporary War", 107.

⁵⁹⁵ Douglas Kellner, "9/11, Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation: A critique of Jihadist and Bush Media Politics," *Critical Discourse Studies*, 1 (1) 1994, 56.

coalition and Iraqi leadership, often resulting in constant attacks against the channel and ending with hitting its office towards the end of the military invasion and killing its reporter Tarek Ayyoub, CNN, just like most Western channels, wholeheartedly sided with the allied forces and US military, mostly providing “little but propaganda and one-sided patriotism.”⁵⁹⁶ This is not to claim absolute objectivity for Al-Jazeera, which had its faults as well in presenting substantive accounts of personalized experiences of its reporters and, at some points, misleading the Arab public about the pace of events. It is just to suggest that Al-Jazeera neither toed the Iraqi nor the American lines, but rather, adhered to an “Arab nationalistic” line, mostly reporting on the Arab people and for the Arab people, from where it earns its credibility, while airing images that constantly enraged both Iraqi and coalition leaderships.

The challenge posed by Al-Jazeera to the very strategic conduct of the war, was often evident in the many instances of contradictions between what the coalition media “said” and what the Arab networks “showed,” says Kellner, providing evidence exposing coalition media deception throughout the war to the Arab viewers, which is one of the main features of its wartime reporting. At the time Donald Rumsfeld described the bombardment as “the most precise in history”, “aimed at military not civilian targets”, Arab as well as many global networks “focused on civilian casualties and presented painful spectacles of Iraqi suffering.”⁵⁹⁷ The Arab channels, concurs Hashem, “showed Iraqi residential neighborhoods, hospitals and schools that were hit by the so-called smart weapons”.⁵⁹⁸ Another instance, adds Kellner, is when British and US sources claimed, in the first days of war, the capture of Um Qasr port and Basra city while “television images showed quite the opposite.”⁵⁹⁹ The Arab networks, including Al-Jazeera, certainly challenged the Pentagon-led propaganda machine, by constantly exposing images of death and destruction, contradicting perceived victory, as well as drawing clear comparisons between the Iraqi and Palestinian cases, putting Americans and Israelis in one camp as a single enemy. Al-Jazeera did not miss the opportunity to report on the “legitimate” Palestinian struggle against the Israelis’ “illegitimate” occupation of their lands, drawing critical comparisons between the Palestinian and Iraqi cases. “The Iraqis and

⁵⁹⁶ Kellner, “9/11, Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation”, 57.

⁵⁹⁷ Kellner, “Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq”, 71.

⁵⁹⁸ Mahboub E. Hashem, “War on Iraq and Media Coverage: A Middle Eastern Perspective” in Yahya Kamalipour and Nancy Snow, eds, War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 160.

⁵⁹⁹ Kellner, “Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq”, 72.

Palestinians were seen as ‘freedom fighters,’ ‘resistance forces,’ ‘Mujahideen,’ or ‘Fedayeen.’”⁶⁰⁰

Throughout the assault coverage, thus, the three power relations have deliberately intertwined to accomplish strategic goals. The governmental bodies employed to disseminate propaganda and censor unfavourable information have directed the process of embedding journalists, which is a form of indirect censorship, and fed them with distorted news aimed at fulfilling info-strategic warfare goals. While the mostly cooperative media-military relationship assisted the aggressor’s side of the conflict to achieve most of its goals, the undesired images of death and destruction aired on Al-Jazeera deeply challenged the unified stance of Western channels. Al-Jazeera’s shocking images and appalling discourse exposed the deficiencies of Western media coverage, enraged the Arab/Western public being fed propaganda and cast the Iraqis in a favourable light. The following analysis illustrates the realities of these power relations, as reflected in the volume of times, objects, locations, speakers and types of news reports that appeared on both channels.

Comparative Content Analysis between Al-Jazeera and CNN

This section aims to outline the results of a detailed analysis of the content of Al-Jazeera and CNN coverage of the US-led invasion of Iraq, which was undertaken to assess the power relations binding the media with the military, in terms of the military attempts to restrict war coverage, its subsequent relationship with the mass media and the possible strategic role played by the media in today’s warfare. As mentioned above, the value of content analysis, as a research technique, lies in its ability to quantitatively assess media content and its potential to produce precise data about what the video images and their accompanying wordings/narratives contained. It is, thus, inescapably “the” most efficient way of producing countable results that can be critically and objectively interpreted to produce meaningful evidence on the specific power-relations under study. Before getting into the application of those power-relations, we shall first highlight the main visual features, characteristics or attitudes of the two channels’ screens throughout the assault.

Throughout the 21 days of military operations, both Al-Jazeera and CNN International cancelled all of their routinely presented programmes and talk shows, and became fully dedicated to covering the war, 24 hours per day. Their coverage basically consisted of a consecutive set of newscasts or news updates mainly separated by war advertisements and

⁶⁰⁰ Hashem, “War on Iraq and Media Coverage”, 161.

commercials, conveying many symbolic connotations. The newscasts usually started by in-studio anchors, based in Doha, Qatar, for Al-Jazeera, or at CNN Centres, primarily based in Kuwait City, Atlanta, London and Hong Kong, for CNN. In each and every newscast analyzed, while the anchor reads the main news headlines or news items, quick video images representing the events are being displayed. This is usually followed by an introductory musical war advert, displayed before the anchor restates the news items in more depth. The thorough newscast may combine some, or all, sorts of possible news reports, including live or recorded reports by correspondents, live or recorded interviews or speeches by officials and live or recorded interviews with analysts/experts, who may all be in studio, on the phone or on videophone. Accordingly, there is no specific timing for a single Newscast. It may range from 10-15 minutes, up to a complete hour, and even more. This explains the variations of timing in the analyzed reports of this case study. The time variations between Al-Jazeera and CNN, however, may also be culturally and/or tactically explained. It was certainly clear that Al-Jazeera devoted longer times to its reports and their accompanying images, a central source to its popularity in the Arab region, in comparison to CNN who only showed quick snapshots of images and apparently quick telegraphic reports, throughout the war.

Accompanying this scenario, there are stable and changing visual icons appearing on both channels' screens throughout the entire coverage. The sole stable visual icon was the channel logo, which remained at the bottom left corner for the two channels: the light blue "CNN" beside a tiny globe, and the golden Al-Jazeera logo. The changing icons mainly included: the "war logo", the "main news headline", in a large and clear font, down the screen, the graphic calendar, exclusive to Al-Jazeera, the tiny news headlines, passing down the screen, the "Live" banner, at the top right corner of the screen when there is a live report, and the "Exclusive" banner when there are exclusive or special images being shown.

For CNN, the war logo represented a graphic mixture of the US and Iraqi flags together, placed beside each other and overshadowed with a red colour, in a not clearly defined way. Located down the screen to the right side all the time, the logo had a changing headline on its top. At the beginning of the war, it read, "Strike on Iraq" and, after a few days, "War in Iraq". Also, at the beginning of each newscast, it read, "Latest Developments", and then changed to "War in Iraq". As for Al-Jazeera's war logo, it also mixed the US and Iraqi flags, but in a different fashion, clearly placing the Iraqi flag on top of the US. The logo was placed behind the in-studio anchor's left shoulder, and always read, "War on Iraq". Al-Jazeera also counted the days since the outset of the invasion, putting a graphic calendar behind the in-studio anchor's right shoulder, reading "Day 1", "Day 2" and so on. The CNN's war logo

seems to reflect a concern for showing that there is a military engagement between the US and Iraq, with special focus on the changing headlines on top of the logo, rather than the logo itself. These headlines keep the viewer alerted to the “latest developments” being read, or whether it is a “military strike” or a “war” is going on. On Al-Jazeera, however, the more defined war logo reflects the channel’s sharp personality, and clearly implies favouring or supporting the Iraqi cause, by putting its flag on top of the US one, while reading “War on Iraq” at all times, to reflect there is a military assault against Iraq taking place.

The tiny white news headlines, passing all the time on a thin red banner, at the bottom of the screen for both channels, seem to reflect a keen attempt for keeping the viewer informed of the news he might have missed. For CNN, the news headlines passed from right to left, and for Al-Jazeera, from left to right, opposite to the direction each language reads. Those headlines may be considered stable icons, in the sense that they are continuously appearing, as well as changing, as they, themselves, are frequently changing. Those headlines, mainly detailing and repeating all the time the news items of each newscast, apparently tend to give the illusion of the continuous flow of news, keeping the audiences thinking of being quite well-informed about the news they might have missed. The written news items, like newspapers, have the ability to persist in the memory for a longer time, more than the read-out ones, being only heard once in a newscast, and then vanishing forever.

In addition, the “Live” banner, appearing at the top-right side of the screen for both channels every time a live report is taking place, also frequently changes according to the nature of the report being aired. This banner provides each channel with an apparent “authority” on the news, giving the impression of being in control of covering what is going on, minute by minute and second by second, even if there are no accompanying “live” images being displayed or no significant images with important incidents appearing. For instance, CNN had a live intact camera placed in Baghdad throughout the war, essentially showing a building, trees and part of a mosque, and sometimes a bridge with cars passing. It was always used to convey that life is going on naturally in Baghdad, unaffected by the heavy bombardment. The live images of Baghdad, on Al-Jazeera, however, are accompanied by a correspondent’s live report as well, and last for longer lengths of time. They showed air explosions taking place, as well as allowing listening to far away and close bombardment.

Usually accompanying the “live” image, in addition to recorded footage, especially for Al-Jazeera, was the “Exclusive” banner, which appears to be just exclusive to Al-Jazeera, in the selected sample of this case study. Reading “Al-Jazeera Exclusive”, in both Arabic and English, it appears at the right and left top corners of the screen every time special images or

reportage of Al-Jazeera is being shown. This banner provides Al-Jazeera with even more “authority” on the news, having a special correspondent in every major Iraqi city and battlefield providing it with exclusive and live reports on a frequent basis. The “Exclusive” banner is prominently displayed in both Arabic and English, as Al-Jazeera realized that English-language channels would air its special reports, and thus the English native audience should easily identify its name. The Exclusive banner, thus, seems to provide Al-Jazeera with more worldwide popularity and, therefore, authority, not only for being live in militarily targeted cities, but also for providing live images of bombardment.

Most significant, however, of these visual symbols and banners is the main screen headline appearing, disappearing and changing all the time. The actual usage of the main headline banner is to clarify what the piece of news and the images being displayed are about and/or to show the speaker/s’ name and title. The main news headline represents in this specific coverage, however, not only the news item the channel intends to give ultimate focus and emphasis, but more significantly the political message embedded in the news headline language, and shows what message is deliberately meant to be delivered by the channel at this specific moment. This is because the single news item may be articulated in different ways to convey different meanings. Because of its inherent ability of being outspoken, the main news headline frankly delivers the message or sets the context in which the audience is to acknowledge or perceive the displayed news. It, thus, clearly and verbally reflects the channel’s news policy, and the viewpoint it is strongly backing or representing. The next chapter’s discourse analysis will show practically how the main headline is acting as an image vantage or focal point in many instances of the coverage.

The first step to undertaking content analysis was finding and selecting the samples and video footages to be analyzed. At this stage, a sample of up to three daily news reports on each channel was selected, from the evening broadcasts, ranging in total between 25-35 minutes daily, which covered most of the war days. Such a massive volume of sampling is deliberately intended to be representative of the coverage variations, despite some missing days of the CNN coverage, which were absolutely inaccessible to the researcher. Accordingly, the news reports analyzed from Al-Jazeera records were 32 news reports compared to 22 news reports from CNN. The total duration of sampling used in this study is 582.48 minutes from Al-Jazeera, compared to about 275 minutes, from CNN. The wide variations in the duration of analyzed samples are not only due to the scarcity of some of the CNN material, but also due to cultural, as well as policy-related, aspects of the nature of the coverage itself, making Al-Jazeera newscasts significantly longer than those of CNN. While most of CNN’s newscasts

quickly state the main headlines, with short length news reports, Al-Jazeera dedicated a lot of relatively 'open' time for live interviews with correspondents, officials, and analysts, as well as long 'live' videos of the aerial bombardment on Iraqi cities and long video footages of death and destruction images throughout the war coverage.

The second step to undertaking this analysis was the coding categories for those videos, which is basically categorizing the image content in a fashion that helps fulfil the central research questions, naturally revolving around the above-mentioned three power relations. Developing these categories required detailed consultation of each channel's visual coverage, as objectively as possible, to list all possible associated codes that help to suggest possible answers to the research questions. These codes were measured in terms of duration and/or frequency, according to each code's measurement liability. In selecting these codes, it was impossible to separate the images from their associated wording, as they both constitute each channel's coverage itself and put it in a defined context.

I shall now discuss each of those codes, having analyzed them, and highlighting their major and minor findings and what they tend to prove or suggest in terms of the direction of power relations under study. We caution, however, that although every effort has been made to guarantee that these codes are *exhaustive*, categorizing every aspect of image, *exclusive*, not overlapping, and *enlightening*, analytically coherent, some codes might have been unintentionally omitted, due to the multiplicity of likely codes. Also, the possible lack of presence of some codes throughout the analysis of this selected sample does not necessarily mean that they were completely absent throughout the whole coverage. It just means that their coverage was significantly low, so that they never appeared in this highly representative sample.

The first code analyzed is the location of both speaker and the analyzed image. Throughout both channels' coverage, it was clearly recognizable that the speaker's location varied almost constantly from the image location. For both channels, while the in-studio anchor read the news headlines, the images depicted locations in Iraqi cities, Arab cities, and even in the Pentagon and the White House. It was, thus, necessary to measure location in terms of "speaker location" and "image location" separately. While it was possible to accurately measure the time given to each speaker's location, in terms of cities in which the speaker was present, it was impractical to time the image location, due to the speedy and overlapping nature of the image changes. Thus, measuring the frequency of image location in terms of cities and specifications made it possible to produce a valid account of data for such a crucial code.

The “speaker location” essentially indicates the news coverage proximity to the war zone, and thus, reflects the strength of limitations and determinants of power granted to each channel upon the war coverage, as shown in Table 1. The speaker location also indicates the outcome of “indirect” censorship practised by the governments involved on the movement and placement of the war reporters around the war zone, as well as the channel’s policy in levels of locations’ representations, and focusing on certain locations more than others. As for the speaker location, we find that CNN newscasts were mostly carried out from its wartime-established CNN Centre in Kuwait City, representing 26.9 percent of its total coverage, in terms of speaker location. The major CNN Centre in Atlanta follows that of Kuwait City representing (12.2) percent of its total coverage. Similarly, most of Al-Jazeera’s war coverage came from its Qatar-based studio, representing the highest percentage (28.5 percent) of its war coverage. For Al-Jazeera, however, unlike CNN, Baghdad came next in percentage, representing a high percentage of 26.5 of its total coverage. Comparatively, however, Baghdad-based reports represented only 3.7% of the CNN coverage, mostly taken from Arab channels and Al-Jazeera reports, as well as a telephone interview with a Red Cross worker.

Table 1- Duration of Speaker Location

<u>Duration of Speaker Location</u>	<u>CNN</u>		<u>Al-Jazeera</u>	
	<u>Duration (M/S)</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Duration (M/S)</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Baghdad, Iraq	10 m/34.2 s	3.7 %	154m/9 s	26.5 %
Washington, US	18 m/ 53.7 s	6.7 %	80 m/34.3 s	13.7 %
New York, US	-----	-----	2 m/ 42.3 s	0.41 %
Maryland, Philadelphia and Boston, US	8 m / 33.2 s	3 %	-----	-----
London, UK	21 m / 0.5 s	7.6 %	29 m/ 6 s	5 %
CNN Centre, Atlanta, US	33 m/56.8 s	12.2 %	-----	-----
United Nations, US	3 m / 41.3 s	1.2 %	1 m/ 54.1 s	0.26 %
Paris, France and Geneva, Switzerland	4 m / 4.1 sec	1.2 %	-----	-----
Brussels, Tokyo, and Moscow	-----	-----	4 m/ 53.3 s	1 %
Hong Kong, Beijing, China and Delhi, India	14 m /10.8 s	5.3 %	-----	-----
NBC Network, US	29.2 s	0.10 %	32 s	0.05 %
Fox News, US	-----	-----	2 m/ 3.8 s	0.39 %
CENTCOM	57.7 s	0.36 %	-----	-----
Ankara, Turkey and Tehran, Iran	-----	-----	5 m/ 10.9 s	0.8 %
Palestine – Israel/Palestine	5 m/ 21 s	1.8 %	6 m/ 22.2 s	1 %
Al-Jazeera Studio, Doha, Qatar	-----	-----	166 m/15.2 s	28.5 %
Seliyya, Qatar	45.7 sec	0.16 %	13 m/16.6 s	2.2 %
Amman, Jordan	20 m / 6.9 s	7.5 %	6 m/57 s	1.1 %
Damascus, Syria	4 m / 6.1 s	1.6 %	-----	-----
Beirut, Lebanon	-----	-----	4 m/ 31.8 s	0.73 %
Cairo, Egypt	4 m / 3.4 s	1.5 %	7 m/ 55.4 s	1.2 %
Kuwait City, Kuwait	74 m/ 2.5 s	26.9 %	6 m/ 57.7 s	1.1 %
Basra, Iraq	6 m / 4 s	2.3 %	12 m/45.2 s	2.1 %
Nasiriyya, Iraq	3 m / 36.4 s	1.2 %	7 m/ 29.7 s	1.2 %
Mosul, Iraq	-----	-----	23 m/ 1.5 s	3.9 %
Um Qasr, Iraq	6 m / 38.3 s	2.3 %	2 m/ 44.5 s	0.41 %
Najaf, Northern Iraq	2 m / 30 s	0.83 %	5 m/ 56.8 s	0.95 %
Dohuk, Northern Iraq	7 m / 26.1 s	2.6 %	1 m 2.6 s	0.20 %
Southern Iraq	16 m/34.7 s	5.9 %	1 m/ 37.9 s	0.23 %
Central Iraq	8 m / 28.8 s	3 %	3 m/ 20.4 s	0.54 %

Arbeel, Iraq	7 m / 28.4 s	2.6 %	8 m/ 56.4 s	1.4 %
Hella, Suliymaniyya, Iraq's Battleground	-----	-----	6 m/ 58.7 s	1.2 %
Northern Iraq, Al Kut, Kirkuk, Kalak, Najaf and Dohuk	16 m / 41.3 s	6.2 %	-----	-----
Report from Al-Jazeera and Pictures from Arab Networks	3 m / 5.7 s	0.9 %	-----	-----
Unknown (embedded reporters)	9 m / 2.3 s	3.3 %	-----	-----
Adverts	22.3 s	0.08 %	-----	-----
Special Reports: Report on the Arab fighters, Report of Iraq vs. Palestine, Report on the Iraqi opposition, Report on Tarek Ayyoub (the martyred reporter), Report on US attacks on Al-Jazeera offices, and Reports from Iraqi Television	-----	-----	16 m /25.7 s	2.5 %
Total	274m/55.7 s	100%	582m/47.96s	100%

Although the highest percentage of coverage, for both channels, is based in their war-studios, the striking difference between CNN and Al-Jazeera in the Baghdad-based reports indicates how the Pentagon’s propaganda and censorship measures, involving the embedding of reporters with military escorts, resulted in a significantly low volume of CNN reports based in Baghdad, the strategic centre of the war zone, and thus severely affecting the volume of audience viewing the direct consequences of the war. On the other hand, Al-Jazeera’s positioning itself inside the Iraqi capital was strongly reflected in the abundance of live and recorded reports it could provide from such a crucial location.

As for reports based in London and Washington, the main aggressors’ capital cities, they also had varying percentages in the two channel’s coverage, which seemed more or less close to each other. While the London-based news reports represented 7.6 percent of the CNN’s total coverage, on Al-Jazeera the percentage of London reports represented 5 percent of its total coverage. This reflects a relative balance between the two channels in their representation of London-based reports, the capital city of the second main military forces invading Iraq. Washington’s reports on CNN, however, represented a low percentage of 6.7 percent of its total coverage, while the Washington-based reports on Al-Jazeera represented 13.7 percent. Such a high percentage of Al-Jazeera reports from Washington stems from the multiplicity of locations it represented, including 4.1 percent of reports from Al-Jazeera’s Washington studio, 5.2% from the Pentagon, 2.6% from the White House and 1.4% from the US Foreign Ministry. Comparatively, on CNN the Washington-based reports included 3.7 percent from the Pentagon, in addition to 2.9 percent from the White House and correspondents’ reports from Washington itself.

Although the high percentage of Al-Jazeera reports from Washington seems to reflect the channel’s eagerness to dedicate a fair volume of its coverage to the counter viewpoint, as well as to its criticism, given its pro-Arab line of reporting, yet the wide differences between

the two channels' coverage of US locations highly reflects the policy lines followed by each of them, as well as the cultural variations mentioned above. While CNN, for unspecified reasons, did not open up its airtime to extensive in-depth analyses, limiting itself to relatively frequent quick reports, as well as certain specific locations, Al-Jazeera from the outset of the war provided maximum airtime to all of its speakers, including anchors, correspondents, officials or experts, to the extent that it was sometimes hard for anchors to shorten the talks, with speakers unaccustomed to short-length telegraphic reports. The abundance of Al-Jazeera's reports from Washington D.C. demonstrates the channel's eagerness to showing "The Opinion and the Other Opinion," as its label promises.

As for the reports from inside Iraq, and I do not say Iraqi cities, as many of the CNN reports came from unspecified locations inside Iraq, we find that Al-Jazeera's reports from Iraqi cities, excluding Baghdad, reached a total of 12.4 percent of its total coverage, compared to a high percentage of 30.8 of CNN's total coverage from locations inside Iraq. This significantly higher percentage of CNN reports from Iraqi locations, than those of Al-Jazeera, seems to reflect the CNN policy of dedicating large amounts of its airtime to the warfare reports of journalists embedded with military escorts, giving the viewers the illusion of watching the actual war on the actual battlefield.

Those reports, however, as the following discourse analyses prove, contained much disinformation, sometimes staged, and deliberately dimmed night images that did not amount to the level of decently objective journalism regarding being informative and reflective at the same time. The comparatively low level of reports from inside Iraq that appeared on Al-Jazeera seem to reflect its multiple sources policy, not only focusing on the battlefield, but keeping an on-going analysis, and updates from different Arab and Western destinations. Al-Jazeera's reports from inside Iraq were neither definitely clear, nor fully unbiased, containing many dulled images and personalized accounts and speculations. Nevertheless, they seemed relatively accurate and clear when compared to those of CNN.

The two channels' policies and power relations are also reflected in the inexistence and existence of certain locations, both inside and outside Iraq. While CNN's reports came from cities in the north and south of Iraq, as well as unspecified fighting locations referred to as "Southern Iraq", "Central Iraq" and "Northern Iraq", Al-Jazeera's reports came essentially from a variety of cities representing most of the Iraqi map. The presence of the Coalition forces in some areas, and the Iraqis in others was also reflected in the coverage of those embedded with the coalition, and those "supervised" by the former Iraqi government. In addition to CNN's unspecified locations, for instance, some of the CNN reports came from

areas and cities, such as Al-Kut, Kirkuk, and Kalak, which never appeared on the selected coverage of Al-Jazeera. These are essentially northern-Kurdish cities and Shiite areas near Iraq's centre, where the coalition forces received strong support. Al-Jazeera, however, presented reports from Mosul, Hella, and Sulimaniyya, which equally never appeared on the selected coverage of CNN. Those are essentially Sunni areas, with ultimate hostility to the invading forces. There are certainly cities and areas that received coverage from both channels, such as Basra, Nasiriyya, Baghdad, Um Qasr, Najaf and Dohuk.

The significance of the appearance or non-appearance of some areas on one channel rather than the other, however, not only reflects its policy in selecting areas with people supporting the policy they represent and their line of reporting, but also reflects the military strategy in employing the mass media for such purposes, given the fact that most of the media, on both sides, was under extensive military control. The disparities and divisions of locations covered by both channels seem to enhance the concept that each channel was covering a different war. While Al-Jazeera was predominantly present in the streets, hospitals, and among the civilian population, CNN was predominantly in the desert, around the city fringes, and among the coalition military personnel.

Likewise, reports from Arab and Western cities widely varied in the two channels' coverage. CNN reports, for instance, included several American cities, such as Maryland, Philadelphia and Boston, European cities, such as Paris and Geneva, as well as Far Eastern cities, such as Hong Kong, Beijing and Delhi. Covering those locations not only reflects its self-centred view of the world, European inclinations and Far East interests, while the SARS virus was breaking out there, but also indicates its pro-Western line of analysis, mostly excluding the region where its military forces were risking their lives. This is especially striking given the fact that the selected sample was taken from the international version of CNN directed to the Middle East, which is normally expected to dedicate a wider space of reporting and analysis to this specific location. Al-Jazeera, in comparison, presented reports from Brussels, Tokyo and Russia, where anti-war sentiments intensified, as well as a report from the NBC network showing Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, and from Fox News Channel, showing the counter US viewpoint, as well as regional reports from Ankara and Tehran, on the fortifying relations between the two rivals. Such areas were never shown on CNN throughout the sample coverage.

As for the Arab cities' representation, both CNN and Al-Jazeera reports only included certain specific locations that seemed to fulfil their interests and its policy lines. On CNN, these included Cairo, where Arab League reports were essential, Israel/Palestine, where the

recurrent Middle Eastern crisis is almost always breaking, Kuwait City and Amman, where two of its correspondents were positioned to cover the war from there, and CENTCOM in Seliyya, Qatar, from where media/military operations were being conducted. Al-Jazeera, however, presented reports from Palestine, Amman, and Cairo, essentially focusing on the anti-war demonstrations, as well as Seliyya and Kuwait to show the counter viewpoint as well, conforming with its showing the “Opinion and the Other Opinion” policy. It is crucial to note here that the non-appearance of cities and areas in a channel’s coverage does not necessarily mean that such areas were never covered, but simply that their coverage was too low to appear on a highly representative sample.

Al-Jazeera also showed specific reports, not location-based. These mainly included its notorious report from Iraqi Television of captured and killed American and British POWs, a report on the Arab fighters who flooded into Iraq from Muslim countries to fight the invading forces, a report drawing comparisons between the Anglo-American invasion and occupation of Iraq and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, a critical report on the unpopular made-up London-based Iraqi opposition, several reports on the Martyrdom of its correspondent Tarek Ayyoub at the relentless hands of invading forces throughout the day he was killed, and a report on the constant American attacks against Al-Jazeera offices in war zones. Those reports certainly demonstrate by images and narratives the pro-Arab nationalist policy line of Al-Jazeera aimed at gaining the sympathy and support of Arab viewers. They also demonstrate how Al-Jazeera was deliberately eroding the US public diplomacy in the region, challenging its war policy, by presenting in-depth reports and analyses that clearly exposes its sins, weaknesses and inhuman policy, to say the least.

They were probably those kinds of reports that pushed CNN to present a few reports on how the Arab television networks covered the war, highlighting their focus on the human aspects as a clear lack of objectivity, while translating a report from Al-Jazeera. This demonstrates the media war that was taking place between the two channels. Significantly enough, another special report on CNN discussed and showed how the coalition forces benefited from the Israeli experience in dealing with urban populated areas in wartime, and countering the threat of suicide bombers. This report is certainly enough evidence on the validity of Al-Jazeera’s point, when comparing coalition and Israeli forces, and putting them in one camp as a single enemy. On both sides of the conflict, these reports were strongly outspoken about each channel’s policy and stance on the military attack, the role it is sought to play in each specific region.

More significant than the “Speaker Location” is the analysis of “Image Location,” showing what specific locations in fact appeared before the lens of each channel’s screen, as indicated in Table 2. Due to the varying nature of locations’ appearance, it was necessary to categorize them according to their proximity to the war zone, starting with Iraqi cities and areas, followed by Arab cities, non-Arab cities, and then according to the frequency of special specifications depicted on both channels’ screens. As for the Iraqi cities, the visual representation of Baghdad-based reports on Al-Jazeera reached a high percent of 47.7 of its total visual reports from Iraqi cities, compared to 14.2 percent of visual reports from Baghdad on CNN. The high percentage of Baghdad-based visual reports on Al-Jazeera, compared to CNN, seems to reflect its deep presence in the city throughout the war, formerly reflected in its “Speaker Location” findings. CNN’s still camera in Baghdad allowed the channel to show some live images from the city, taking its visual representation on CNN to a higher degree compared to its representation by speaker location.

Table 2 – Frequency of Image Location

<u>Frequency of Image Location</u>	<u>CNN</u>		<u>Al-Jazeera</u>	
	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
<u>Location by Iraqi Cities/Areas</u>				
Visual Reports from Baghdad	4 times	14.2 %	21 times	47.7 %
Visual Reports from Arbeel, Northern Iraq	3 times	10.7 %	3 times	6.8 %
Visual Reports from Basra, Southern Iraq	4 times	14.2 %	4 times	9 %
Visual Reports from Nasiriyya	1 time	3.5 %	3 times	6.8 %
Visual Reports from Mosul	-----	-----	5 times	11.3 %
Visual Reports from Um Qasr	3 times	10.7 %	2 times	4.5 %
Visual Reports from Najaf	1 time	3.5 %	3 times	6.8 %
Visual Report from Dohuk	2 time	7.1 %	1 time	2.2 %
Visual Reports from Hella and Sulaymaniyya	-----	-----	2 times	4.4 %
Visual Reports from Kalak, Al Kut and Northern Iraq	3 times	10.5 %	-----	-----
Visual Report from Southern Iraq	6 times	21.4 %	-----	-----
Visual Report from Central Iraq	3 times	10.7 %	-----	-----
<u>Total</u>	<u>28 Times</u>	<u>100 %</u>	<u>44 times</u>	<u>100 %</u>
<u>Location by Arab Cities</u>				
Visual Reports from Cairo	2 times	6.8 %	5 times	10.6 %
Visual Reports from Damascus	1 time	3.4 %	-----	-----
Visual Reports From Beirut	-----	-----	2 times	4.2 %
Visual Reports from Palestine/Israel	2 times	6.8 %	2 times	4.2 %
Visual Reports from Kuwait	16 times	55.1 %	4 times	8.5 %
Visual Reports from Doha, Qatar	-----	-----	24 times	51 %
Visual Reports from Seliyya, Qatar	3 times	10.3 %	6 times	12.7 %
Visual Reports from Amman, Jordan	5 times	17.2 %	4 times	8.5 %
<u>Total</u>	<u>29 times</u>	<u>100 %</u>	<u>47 Times</u>	<u>100 %</u>
<u>Location by non-Arab Cities</u>				
Visual Reports from London	6 times	16.2 %	3 times	13.6 %

Visual Reports from Washington	8 times	27 %	15 times	68.1 %
Visual Reports from New York	-----	-----	1 time	4.5 %
Visual Reports from CNN Centre, Atlanta	12 times	32.4 %	-----	-----
Visual Report from Maryland, Philadelphia and Boston	3 times	8.1 %	-----	-----
Visual Reports from Paris and Geneva	2 times	5.4 %	-----	-----
Visual Report from Hong Kong, Beijing and Delhi	4 times	10.8 %	-----	-----
Visual Reports from Moscow, Ankara and Brussels	-----	-----	3 times	13.5 %
Total	37 times	100 %	22 Times	100 %
Location by Specifications				
Visual Reports of Reporter/s in Open Air	13 times	4.8 %	9 times	6.5 %
Visual Reports of Official/s in Open-Air	9 times	3.3 %	3 times	2.1 %
Visual Reports from the Battleground / Open-Air	58 times	21.7 %	6 times	4.3 %
Visual Reports of Civilian Casualties in Hospitals	16 times	5.9 %	10 times	7.2 %
Visual Reports from the United Nations	4 times	1.4 %	4 times	2.9 %
Recorded Images of Open-Air Places	51 times	19.1 %	-----	-----
Visual Reports in front of the White House / Capitol Hill	-----	-----	3 times	2.1 %
Visual Reports from the Pentagon	-----	-----	18 times	13.1 %
Visual Reports from the top of Al-Jazeera Baghdad office	-----	-----	4 times	2.9 %
Visual Reports from the Arab League	-----	-----	2 times	1.4 %
Visual Reports of Detained exhibited by Coalition Forces	3 times	1.1 %	3 times	2.1 %
Visual Reports of Destroyed buildings inside Iraq	15 times	5.6 %	11 times	8 %
Visual Reports of Officials in Press Conferences	17 times	6.3 %	40 times	29.1 %
Visual Reports of Explosion/s	32 times	11.9 %	19 times	13.8 %
Total Visual Reports of Demonstrations / Protesters	20 times	7.4 %	3 times	2.1 %
Visual Reports of Egyptian Demonstrations	3 times	1.1 %	2 times	1.4 %
Highway/s	17 times	6.3 %	12 times	8.7 %
Visual Report of Oil Wells put in fire	9 times	3.3 %	-----	-----
Total	267 times	100 %	137 times	100 %

The frequency of CNN's visual reports from Southern Iraq, however, represented its highest percentage of visual reports representation from Iraqi cities, reaching 21.4 percent of its total coverage from Iraqi cities. Reports from Basra, where coalition forces were hoping to receive the support and welcome of the Iraqis, reached as high as Baghdad, representing 14.2 percent of Iraq-based reports. On Al-Jazeera, comparatively, visual reports from Mosul followed Baghdad in percentage, representing 11.3 percent of Al-Jazeera visual reports from Iraqi cities, followed by Basra representing 9 percent of visual reports from Iraqi cities. This reflects a gradual focus on the country's three most important and central cities from the side of Al-Jazeera. On CNN, however, other cities/areas received equally significant high representation such as Central Iraq, Um Qasr and Arbeel, in Northern and Southern Iraq, each

representing 10.7 percent of CNN's total coverage. This seems to reflect a relatively equal distribution of aired visuals on the cities/areas being covered. Though this seems to support the notion that the two channels were standing at opposite extremes, covering different areas of the country, still Al-Jazeera seems to be more present in most locations, which definitely feeds into its notion of objectivity.

As for the visual representation of Arab cities, on both CNN and Al-Jazeera, we shall find that they varied widely according to each channel's reporting nature, policy and decisive focus. The highest percentage of both channels' visual reports from Arab cities came essentially from the major cities from where each channel essentially conducted its wartime coverage. While Doha in Qatar, where Al-Jazeera is based and its major coverage is conducted, occupied 51 percent of its total visual reports from Arab cities, Kuwait City, where CNN's wartime centre is located and the war itself is conducted, also occupied 55.1 percent, both representing the highest percentages of Arab cities' visual representation for both channels. For CNN, Amman, from where a great deal of its coverage was conducted, followed Kuwait City, representing 17.2% of CNN's visual reports from Arab cities. For Al-Jazeera, however, visual reports from Seliyya followed Qatar, where the coalition daily press conference took place, representing 12.7 percent of its total visuals from Arab cities, compared to 10.3 percent of Seliyya-based CNN visual reports. Al-Jazeera's dominance over CNN in its percentage of Seliyya-based visual reports, as well as its Kuwait City and Amman-based reports each representing 8.5 percent of its total coverage, tend to demonstrate special eagerness to dedicate a great deal of its visual reporting to a wide range of views and opinions. While Al-Jazeera's reports from Seliyya purely reflect the coalition viewpoint, reports from Kuwait City and Amman reflect pro-coalition Arab position.

More significantly, however, are the percentages of Cairo-based Al-Jazeera visual reports, mostly showing demonstrations of angry crowds, and thus reflecting the Arab fury against the Anglo-American invasion of an Arab land, representing 10.6 percent of its total coverage from Arab cities. Consulting Al-Jazeera reports from Cairo in comparison to those from Seliyya and Kuwait City suggests the channel's zeal to present relatively different accounts of contradicting viewpoints. However, looking at CNN's reports from Kuwait City, Amman where its major pro-war coverage was conducted, and Seliyya where the daily coalition press conference took place, we find a unified viewpoint being presented, from not widely diverse positions across the region. This reflects how the orchestrated propaganda measures, described above, were diligently applied.

The visual reports from Israel/Palestine, however, for both channels had a relatively low representation, 6.8 percent on CNN and 4.2 percent on Al-Jazeera, reflecting the minor attention given to such a heated area of the region, while a more current disaster is breaking out. Nevertheless, the discourse of Al-Jazeera reports on Israel/Palestine deeply contradicts that of CNN. While CNN showed interviews with Israeli officials/experts on dealing with freedom fighters in urban cities, Al-Jazeera focused on the Palestinian viewpoint, with visual accounts of death and destruction caused by the Israeli air raids on Palestinian cities, drawing clear comparisons between them and the US-UK ones on Iraq.

As for the depicted locations of non-Arab cities, we find that Al-Jazeera's visual reports from non-Arab cities are centred around Washington (68.1%), where it has a coverage centre and correspondents in the White House, the Pentagon and the US Foreign Ministry, and London (13.6%), where its correspondents were covering and analyzing events, and conducting live interviews with anti-war sources. CNN's reports were distributed between Atlanta (32.4%), where its Centre is located and its formal war coverage is conducted, Washington (27%) and London (16.2%), where its correspondents were covering events from there. The high percentage of Al-Jazeera reports from Washington stems from the multiple locations it occupied there, including the Pentagon, the White House, the Foreign Ministry, as well as its own Washington-based office.

The appearance and non-appearance of cities in both channels' coverage also seems interestingly significant. CNN showed reports from different American cities such as Boston, Philadelphia and Maryland, European cities such as Paris and Geneva, and Far Eastern cities such as Delhi, Hong Kong and Beijing, which never appeared on the Al-Jazeera samples being analyzed. Al-Jazeera equally showed reports from regional Middle Eastern and European cities, Ankara, Tehran and Brussels, that never appeared on CNN's sample coverage. While CNN's essential focus was on the war itself, as an American war, as well as preserving US-European relations, and reporting on the SARS virus that appeared in South East Asia, Al-Jazeera reports from non-Arab cities focused on the status of Iranian-Turkish relations, the Russian condemnation of the military invasion, and the Brussels-based journalists committee condemning inhumane assaults against reporters.

In addition to the definite city-specified locations, it was necessary to assess each channel's visual reports according to specific war-related locations/specifications which were constantly repeated throughout the coverage, including battlefield/open-air, hospitals, destroyed/demolished buildings, detainees exhibited in public, explosions, demonstrations, highways and burning out oil wells. Also, the focus on special coverage locations has its

significance, such as the UN, White House, Capitol Hill, Pentagon, and the Arab League. The specific wartime locations depicted varied according to each channel's personality, focus, editorial policy, and powers involved in its practice. Consulting the representation of those specific visual locations in depth, we find that each channel has stressed the elements supporting the policy process it is representing, and marginalized those tarnishing the image it sought deliver.

CNN's overtly constrained reporting, highly dependent on battlefield embedded correspondents, showed battlefield/open-air reports reaching 21.7 percent of its total specifications reports, followed by recorded reports from open-air locations, which apparently had undergone extensive editing, reaching 19.1 percent, while its visual reports of explosions represented 11.9 percent. Comparatively, Al-Jazeera analysis reflected a special focus on visual reports of officials in press conferences (29.1%), images of explosions (13.8%), and Pentagon-based visual reports (13.1%). On CNN visuals of officials in press conferences only represented 6.3 percent of its location specific visuals, reflecting its high dependence on the embedded reporters' contributions more than most other elements.

The high percentage of officials in press conferences, as well as the Pentagon-based reports, on Al-Jazeera apparently reflects its policy of showing all contradicting official, unofficial and analytical viewpoints, as well as demonstrating its liability to have been exploited in this realm by both sides of the conflict, who wished to air disinformation aimed at countering and misleading the other side, or even just negating its information. Images of explosions are crucial for both channels to present, as they convey this war feeling, to the audience, while their distant nature does not allow any specific details of death and destruction to be clearly shown. This is in addition to the fact that they were the only essence of war available almost all the time throughout the bombardment of cities that was taking place. This explains their pervasiveness in high percentages on both channel's screens. While CNN focused on giving the viewers the illusion of following the fighting process all the time, Al-Jazeera focused on the humanitarian by-product of such fighting.

Specific images of destruction, as well as those of death and injuries inside hospitals, had relatively high representations on Al-Jazeera. Images of destroyed buildings inside Iraq reached 8 percent of Al-Jazeera's visual reports, compared to 5.6 percent on CNN discrediting claims of surgically hitting strategic targets with minimal civilian casualties. As for the images of dead and injured Iraqi civilians, they reached 7.2 percent on Al-Jazeera, which was constantly keen to show the direct outcome of the invasion, compared to 5.9% on CNN, accompanied with claims of the Iraqi regime's responsibility for their death and injury, either

by placing military targets in civilian areas, or by hitting them with its own missiles and blaming it on the coalition. The slightly higher percentage of those elements on Al-Jazeera reflects its policy of appealing to the hearts and minds of Arab people, which fulfils its nationalistic pro-Arab line of reporting. The relatively lower percentage of Iraqi casualties on CNN reflects its abidance with the editors' instructions of showing minimal amounts of civilian deaths and accompanying it with doubts and allegations against the perceived enemy.

Also, the marginalisation of the role of the United Nations by the coalition forces was also reflected in CNN's visuals based there, reaching only 1.4 percent of its visual reports. Al-Jazeera, in comparison, was keen to show the Arab insistence on rightfulness and the rule of law, with visual UN reports representing 6.4 percent of its total visual reports from specific locations. Images of Iraqi detainees and captured war prisoners, inhumanely dragged and treated by soldiers, were more likely to tarnish the coalition image of US and British "liberators". So, they had a significantly low representation on CNN (1.1%) compared to Al-Jazeera (4.8%), as they enhance its discourse on the inhumane nature of this assault.

The visual reports of anti-war demonstrations and protests reached a relatively high percentage of 7.4 on CNN, which was probably meant to show a certain level of objectivity, although it was often shown with no comment, or followed by experts' contempt and criticism. In comparison, demonstrations on Al-Jazeera represented 2.1 percent of its visual locations, which comprised all worldwide and Arab demonstrations. The Egyptian demonstrations, however, which appeared repeatedly throughout the war and were imitated in some Arab countries, represented an additional 3.2 percent of Al-Jazeera reports, reflecting an incomparable amount of rage and anger in all sections of this heavily populated country. This compares with 1.1 percent on CNN, which probably sought to marginalize the intensity of "demonstrations" impact, reducing them to "protests" in its news language. Images of highways in the Iraqi desert throughout the war, mainly used for the passage of coalition troops north, and into their captured cities, represented 19.3 percent of Al-Jazeera reports, compared to 6.3 percent on CNN, which reflects that Al-Jazeera dedicated a fair amount of coverage to the coalition activity. Paradoxically however, these images of empty highways have the potential of proving that there is no advance at all taking place. So, they might have been used differently on the two channels to convey different meanings.

In addition to those common codes that appeared on both channels, each of the channels had separate special location codes that did not appear at all on the other in the sample in this research. This does not necessarily mean that they were not covered, but just indicates that their coverage was significantly low to appear on the selected sample. On CNN,

for instance, there was a high presence of recorded images of open-air places representing 19.1 percent of its total coverage. This relatively high percentage of recorded images indicates the importance of editing and decisively producing special depicted images placed in a certain context to convey certain meanings. Also, the visual report of oil wells set on fire represented 3.3 percent of CNN’s total coverage, usually placed in the context of criminal actions committed by the Iraqi regime to destroy such valuable wealth of the Iraqi people. Also, fire-fighters and engineers are often shown trying to limit or control these heavy fires to preserve the oil wealth of Iraqi people.

On Al-Jazeera, however, the visual reports from the Pentagon, from an open-air location between the White House and Capitol Hill and from the Arab League tend to indicate the channel’s eagerness to keep to its principle of showing “The Opinion and the Other Opinion.” This does not necessarily mean taking an objective stance, as opinions are often shown in favourable or unfavourable contexts, as later proven in the discourse analysis.

The next element, then, analyzed is the total time provided to speakers, which is not necessarily the same as speakers actually depicted, as many speakers are just speaking on the telephone or not appearing, as indicated in Table 3. This element shows whose words are deliberately and extensively presented, who is less represented, and who is ultimately marginalized throughout the coverage.

Table 3 – Speakers Airtime Representation

<u>Speakers Airtime Representation</u>	<u>CNN</u>		<u>Al-Jazeera</u>	
	<u>Duration</u> <u>M/S</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Duration</u> <u>M/S</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Anchor/s Speaking	131 m/12 s	47.4%	187 m/33.3 s	32.1 %
Correspondents Speaking	108 m/17.5 s	39.4 %	258 m/27.9 s	44.3 %
Iraqi Officials Speaking	1 m/ 33.1 s	0.4 %	42 m/44.6 s	7.2 %
Arab Officials Speaking	10 m/ 49 s	3.8 %	9 m/52.5 s	1.6 %
American Officials Speaking	5 m/ 37 s	1.9 %	28 m/ 2.1 s	4.8 %
British Officials Speaking	37.8 s	0.1 %	23 m/16.5 s	3.9 %
French Officials Speaking	21 s	0.07 %	-----	-----
UN Officials Speaking	3 m / 31.7 s	1 %	43.3 s	0.07 %
Experts/ Analysts Speaking	10 m/ 43.8 s	3.8 %	28 m/44.2 s	4.8 %
Arab TV Networks	3 m/ 3.5 s	1.1 %	-----	-----
War Adverts	18.5 sec	0.06 %	2 m/59.9 s	0.4 %
<u>Total</u>	<u>274 m/55.7 s</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>582m/24.6 s</u>	<u>100%</u>

Apparently both channels were heavily dependent on correspondents throughout the war coverage, both inside and outside Iraq. While Al-Jazeera correspondents occupied 44.3 percent of its airtime coverage, CNN correspondents represented 39.4 percent of its total coverage, the highest levels of representation for both channels. The higher representation of Al-Jazeera correspondents is due to their prevalence in most Iraqi cities across the nation, as

well as the long “live” time dedicated to their reports, filled with humanitarian stories of anger and grief, death and destruction.

The in-studio reporters, then, followed the correspondents of the two channels representation. While the CNN reports from its anchors in Kuwait City open-air studio, the main location from which the coverage was conducted represented 30.7 percent of its airtime, which may be added to its anchors’ reports from CNN Centres in Atlanta, London, and Hong Kong representing 16.7 percent of its total airtime. Al-Jazeera in-studio anchors in Doha represented 32.1 percent of its total airtime, the second highest percentage after its correspondents. The higher percentage of representation of CNN’s in-studio anchors than Al-Jazeera’s may be due to the poor representation of officials from both sides on CNN, compared to Al-Jazeera, which dedicated some of its airtime to officials’ speeches. This has been demonstrated in the percentages of officials’ representation on Al-Jazeera: Iraqi officials (7.2%), American officials (4.8%) and British officials (3.9%). Representation of officials on CNN, in contrast, is significantly low with Iraqi officials only representing 0.48 percent, American officials 1.9 percent, and British officials 0.13 percent. This significantly low volume of officials’ representation, demonstrates that CNN did not source its wartime credibility from officials’ speeches. In addition, experts/analysts airtime on both channels are also relatively low, getting near to each other in percentage, with Al-Jazeera representing 4.8 percent in comparison to CNN, only reaching 3.8 percent of airtime representation. This indicates that for both channels neither officials nor experts/analysts had much impact on their representation of the war. Rather their dependence on the embedded reporters seems more significant and crucial for creating the illusion of airing the war live from first-hand sources.

In addition to airtime representation of speakers, it was necessary, then, to analyze the frequency of visual elements depicted on both channels, including persons, actions and objects, as indicated in Table 4. This is meant to assess the quality and quantity of facts each channel intends to depict or focus on, and those deliberately marginalized or neglected. This indicates what truth or what part of the truth is being told to fulfil a certain policy agenda that, willingly or not, each channel is dedicated to fulfil throughout the war. Those elements include the frequency of appearance for the above-mentioned speakers, as well as soldiers and local persons, dead and injured military personnel or civilians depicted. They are separately analyzed to all possible types of persons’ representations on both channels’ screens throughout the war, including speakers and non-speakers, combatants and civilians.

Special particulars, in addition, are also separately analyzed to assess all other possible elements that appeared in war imagery throughout the war. These include live and recorded

images of places, wealth indicators including war machinery, actions of bombing, fighting, and shooting depicted, battlegrounds, highways, streets, press conferences, destruction, explosions, smoke fumes, flags, banners, mosques, houses, maps, and main screen headlines. In selecting those elements the researcher attempted to be as exhaustive as possible, combining all possible visual aspects of the war images. Given the fact that it was fully conducted manually, however, some elements may have mistakenly been missed out.

Table 4 – Frequency of Visual Elements Depicted

Frequency of Visual Elements Depicted	CNN		Al-Jazeera	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Persons				
In-Studio Anchors Depicted	225	26 %	350	22.6 %
Correspondents in Iraq Depicted	62	7.1 %	150	9.7 %
Correspondents Worldwide Depicted	65	7.5 %	130	8.4 %
Arab Officials Appearing/Speaking	10	1.1 %	12	0.77 %
Iraqi Officials Appearing/Speaking	64	7.4 %	193	12.4 %
US/UK Officials Appearing/Speaking	50	5.7 %	156	10 %
UN Officials Depicted	5	0.5 %	2	0.12 %
Experts/Analysts Depicted	31	3.5 %	32	2 %
US/UK Military Personnel Depicted	37	4.2 %	165	10 %
Iraqi Military Personnel/Soldiers Depicted	10	1.1 %	11	0.71 %
Local Iraqi People / Civilians Depicted	238	27.5 %	127	8.2 %
Arab Locals	-----	-----	22	1.42 %
Worldwide/Foreign Locals	13	1.5 %	14	0.90 %
Still Photos of Officials	1	0.11 %	9	0.58 %
Still Photos of Correspondents	6	0.6 %	9	0.58 %
Dead Military Personnel Depicted	1	0.11 %	15	0.97 %
Dead Civilians Depicted	4	0.4 %	33	2.1 %
Captured Civilians or Military People	3	0.34 %	25	1.6 %
Injured Civilians in Hospitals/ Hospitals	40	4.6 %	90	5.8 %
Total	865		1545	
Particulars/Objects/Places/Actions				
Live Images/pictures of Places	22	1.3 %	94	5.1 %
Recorded Images/pictures of Places	51	3.2 %	7	0.38 %
Battleground/Desert/Highways/ Greenery/Squares Depicted/Streetlights/ City Streets/Checkpoints	103	6.5 %	219	12 %
Destructed/Demolished Buildings	7	0.44 %	55	3 %
Buildings/Houses Depicted	64	4 %	221	12.1 %
Mosques Depicted	21	1.3 %	25	1.3 %
Still Photos of Persons/Places	8	0.5 %	13	0.71 %
Wealth Indicators/War Machinery Depicted	128	8.1 %	322	17.7 %
Fire Explosions / Smoke Fumes Coming up the Sky Depicted	39	2.4 %	134	7.3 %
Bombing/Shooting/Fighting Depicted	83	5.2 %	81	4.4%
Demonstrations	13	0.82 %	23	1.2 %
Press Conferences Depicted	17	1 %	17	0.93 %
CNN Centres Depicted	21	1 %	-----	-----
Kuwait Towers	21	1.3 %	-----	-----
Television Sets	9	0.57 %	14	0.77 %
Maps/ Flags/Banners/Symbols Depicted	289	18.3 %	162	8.9 %
Main Headlines (News and Speakers' Titles)	678	43 %	431	23.7 %
Total	1574	100 %	1818	100%

Consulting the results of this analysis of visual elements depicted, it seems significant that both channels had high percentages of representations for their in-studio anchors, from where their main coverage was conducted, reaching 26 percent of CNN's persons' coverage, compared to 22.6 percent of Al-Jazeera coverage. This shows that even though the coverage largely depended on correspondents, empowered with live transmission facilities, the depiction of in-studio anchors, who delivered most of the news items throughout the war is much higher. Although CNN coverage is known to have largely depended on embedded reporters, as well as correspondents outside Iraq, their percentage among visual elements it depicted was significantly much less than those of Al-Jazeera.

With the relatively high percentage of Al-Jazeera correspondents depicted, both inside and outside Iraq, representing 18.1 percent of its persons depicted, CNN's correspondents' appearance represented 14.6 percent of its depicted people. The relatively high representation of correspondents has been a central characteristic of this war's coverage, due to the embedment of journalists with military units, the only source of "actual" war images shown on western media outlets, giving the audience a sense of continuity with the war events, which many authors described as some sort of reality television. Al-Jazeera's higher percentage of correspondents' appearances certainly indicates its eagerness for seeking diversity in locations and areas both inside and outside Iraq, upon which it earned its credibility, giving the Arab viewer the sense that Al-Jazeera is just "everywhere", "timely" covering "everything" that happens.

Equally remarkable is the depiction of Iraqi officials versus US/UK officials on both channels. Iraqi officials had a significantly high appearance on Al-Jazeera, in comparison to CNN, which tends to support the notion that Al-Jazeera, willingly or not, was frequently utilized as a milieu for the former Iraqi government throughout the war. The Iraqi officials' visual appearance on Al-Jazeera reached 12.4 percent of its persons depicted, while on CNN they only represented 7.4 percent of its total portrayed persons. As for the US/UK officials, their depiction on Al-Jazeera represented 10 percent of its total persons depicted, conforming with its adherence to showing diverse opinions, in comparison to a much lower representation of US/UK officials, 5.7 percent of people shown on CNN. The low percentages of Western officials representations on CNN, reflects its wartime coverage policy, mainly focussing on in-studios and embeds, as well as its culture of showing quick snapshots of official speeches, rather than dedicating the maximum possible time for them as Al-Jazeera did, which largely corresponds to its popularity and credibility in the Arab region. Also, the misrepresentation of

Iraqi officials on CNN is certainly central to the censorship measures detailed earlier, demonstrating how well they materialized.

Some elements, however, appear to have greater representation on CNN than Al-Jazeera, which seems to largely meet its policy agenda. These included the depiction of local Iraqi civilians, which amounted to 27.5 percent on CNN, compared to 8.2 percent on Al-Jazeera. The significance of this element, however, is not only in its demonstrated volume, as the percentage shows, but also in the context in which they were shown. While on CNN Iraqis were shown being treated by coalition doctors supporting and helping the coalition troops, and in minor instances, captured, hospitalized, or even welcoming the troops, on Al-Jazeera, Iraqi civilians expressed continuous rage and hostility against the ruthless invasion of their lands, captured and utterly humiliated, as well as a substantive visual account of severely injured and killed Iraqi civilians. The high volume of Iraqi civilians depiction on CNN is essentially meant to show the western audience the positive role played by the coalition in liberating the long-suppressed Iraqi public, healing their injuries, and civilizing them, in effect, as they are deliberately shown as mostly poor, less educated and, surely, less civilized.

As for the depiction of dead and injured civilians, it seems to be equally significant, as their percentage is definitely much higher on Al-Jazeera than CNN. While the frequency of dead and injured Iraqi civilians shown on Al-Jazeera reached 7.9 percent of its persons depicted, on CNN they only represented 5.1 percent. Such a relatively higher volume of dead and injured Iraqis representation on Al-Jazeera certainly fuelled the Arab public's rage and fury, while on CNN they were reduced to minimal, highly edited snapshots, mostly aired from Arab stations. Such closeness between CNN and Al-Jazeera in their representation of dead and injured Iraqis reflects CNN's eagerness to show some of the direct outcomes of war. This volume, however, which is only meant to be indicative, does not tell about the quality of those images, and what in fact appeared before each channel's cameras. While civilians on Al-Jazeera were seriously injured and usually shown covered with blood beside their dead relatives in the places attacked, as well as in hospitals, CNN's injured Iraqis did not have serious injuries, and some of them were shown being treated by coalition doctors, who certainly paid attention to children as well as adults.

Also, on Al-Jazeera, the US/UK military personnel appeared more frequently than on CNN, representing 10.6 percent of people shown, compared to 4.2 percent on CNN. This probably indicates the high presence of Al-Jazeera correspondents throughout Iraq, as well as the high usage of images of coalition military, whether taken by Al-Jazeera's own cameras or supplied by the military itself. But this certainly feeds into the channel's policy of showing

everything that comes its way, regardless of its source, as well as showing “the opinion and the other opinion.” The low representation of US/UK military personnel on CNN probably corresponds to its focus on the other surrounding elements, where the correspondents usually appeared only at the beginning and ending of news reports, and sometimes, just in the ending.

As for the depiction of other elements and particularities, it seems recognizable that the volume of recorded images, which has obviously undergone extensive editing, in comparison to the live images, widely differed on CNN from Al-Jazeera. While CNN’s recorded images exceeded those of Al-Jazeera, representing 3.2 percent of its total coverage of depicted visuals, compared to under 1 percent of Al-Jazeera coverage, the live images on Al-Jazeera, representing a major source of its credibility, reached 5.1 percent of its visuals, compared to 1.3 percent on CNN. This definitely demonstrates that Al-Jazeera’s enthusiasm for presenting live images of real occurrences, are met with CNN’s keenness on revising and editing most of its visuals before they are shown publicly.

This reflects the stiffness of Pentagon-led censorship and propaganda measures being practiced on the CNN’s “pictorial outcome,” to a level that obviously exceeds any possible sort of control exercised on Al-Jazeera. On the contrary, the Iraqi fury at Al-Jazeera, expelling of its correspondents, and closure of its Baghdad office twice, demonstrate that the pressure exercised on the channel’s coverage was not very effective throughout the assault, despite the rules and regulations given to all correspondents inside Iraq. This also indicates the imbalance of power between the two conflicting sides: the Pentagon and the former Iraqi government.

Likewise, the volume of images showing battlefields, desert, greenery, highways, squares, city streets and checkpoints differed widely in the two channel’s coverage, representing 12 percent of Al-Jazeera coverage of locations, compared to 6.5 of CNN’s. Those kinds of images do not really tell much about the war on their own. They just show different aspects of Iraq, with its southern desert and northern greenery, with its highways, squares and city streets. They are just a “neutral” kind of image, which are probably used with different discourses to convey different meanings. But most importantly they have the potential of giving a “sense of presence there,” at these locations, and maybe it is just this “sense of presence” that both channels needed to be credited for just being there. Unavoidably, however, Al-Jazeera seems to have demonstrated a much deeper “presence” in and around Iraq, with a volume of natural locations twice that of CNN.

Maybe Al-Jazeera’s wider presence in Iraqi cities corresponded to the high percentage of buildings/houses depicted on its screens, reaching 12.1 percent of its coverage, compared to only four percent on CNN. Accordingly, the volume of destroyed/demolished

houses/buildings shown on Al-Jazeera (3%) is not matched by those featured on CNN (0.44%). Amazingly, however, mosques, as a symbolic icon of being present in a Moslem country, were almost equally shown on both channels, representing 1.3 percent of Al-Jazeera coverage, compared to 1.3 percent of CNN's coverage of visual elements depicted. The presence of a live CNN camera directed towards the central mosque in Baghdad evidently helped give the illusion of being there, while raising the volume of mosques depicted on its screen throughout the invasion.

Strangely enough, as well, although CNN, just like most Western channels, is renowned for focusing on war machinery, technology and wealth indicators, Al-Jazeera doubled CNN's showing of those features. They represented 17.7 percent of Al-Jazeera's coverage, compared to 8.1% of CNN's coverage. This certainly reflects the channel's policy of showing all different aspects of reporting, as well as its eagerness to give the impression of being everywhere. Warfare action, however, such as bombing, shooting and fighting on CNN slightly exceeded their counterparts on Al-Jazeera, representing 5.2 percent of CNN's coverage compared to 4.4 percent of Al-Jazeera visuals. This element corresponds to CNN's reports from inside Iraq, which essentially focused on the power of the US war machinery and technology, which is definitely central to the propaganda effort being exerted.

Focusing, however, on the outcomes of such fighting, Al-Jazeera, in addition to its renowned images of death and destruction, showed extensive visuals of fire explosions and smoke fumes rising into the sky, reaching 7.3 percent of its visual codes, compared to 2.4 percent of CNN's depiction of such images. Those fire explosions and bombardments were certainly central to Al-Jazeera's policy of reporting whatever comes its way, and its willingness to show those kinds of images more than CNN. The pervasiveness of those images is probably more likely to anger a Western public, who are constantly given the impression of a surgical war being fought, with limited repercussions.

Presenting significantly less imagery than Al-Jazeera, CNN showed extensive images of essentially graphic maps, flags, banners and symbols, reaching 18.3 percent of its visuals, compared to 8.9 percent of Al-Jazeera imagery. Even more significant are the main news headlines, which helped set every channel's agenda of important issues, and represented a remarkably high percentage of CNN's visuals (43 %), in comparison to Al-Jazeera (23.7%). While this definitely demonstrates the remarkable significance of the usage of artificial visual effects and graphic technology in covering this war for both channels, it shows how the directly and severely censored Western channels heavily relied on them as a substitute for "actual" war imagery that was just unavailable for them. Even in reporting on their advancing

forces, where no clear video images were available, graphic and satellite-based maps were widely used to show the areas, and appear as if troops are moving forward.

To accompany the image, then, the durations dedicated to the different types of news reports shown are accurately assessed to find out the levels of vocal representations of all possible speakers, throughout the chosen types of news reports being featured, as shown in Table 5. These essentially include in-studio newscasts, live reports/updates, recorded news reports, live interviews with officials, live official speeches, recorded officials' interviews/speeches, live and recorded interviews with experts/analysts, as well as the war advertisements, appearing in between the newscasts. These are meant to reflect in a cumulative fashion the amount of live versus recorded news reports together with their speakers' duration representation to indicate how propaganda and censorship measures are located and reflected in the whole coverage of both channels.

Table 5 – Type of News Report

<u>Type of News Report</u>	<u>CNN</u>		<u>Al-Jazeera</u>	
	<u>Duration M/S</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Duration M/S</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
In-Studio News Report / Newscast (News headlines, followed by news items)	60 m/0.6 s	21.8 %	73 m/39.9 s	12.4 %
Live News Report/Update (By correspondents)	92 m/5.2 s	33.6 %	201 m/24.1 s	34.2 %
Recorded News Report (By correspondents)	88 m/5 s	32.1 %	134 m/1.3 s	22.7 %
Live Interviews (with officials)	2 m/1.9 s	0.79 %	30 m/24.9 s	5.1 %
Live Officials' Speeches (From press conferences)	-----	-----	21 m/13.3 s	3.5 %
Recorded Officials' Interviews / Speeches (Mostly from press conferences)	8 m/2.6 s	3 %	87 m/20.1 s	14.8 %
Live Interviews With Experts/ Analysts	22 m/7 s	8.2 %	33 m/36.5 s	5.6 %
Recorded Interviews With Experts/ Analysts	-----	-----	2 m/46 s	0.41 %
War adverts	18.5 sec	0.06 %	3 m/59.3 s	0.61 %
Total	274 m, 55.7 s	100%	588m/25.76s	100 %

Live and recorded news reports of correspondents on both channels, however, had the highest airtime representation. Although the volume of live images depicted on CNN proved to be much than that of Al-Jazeera, their airtime representation appear quite similar, with more CNN reporters speaking on the telephone, while a graphic or still map is displayed on screen. CNN's live updates/news reports by correspondents, then, reached 33.6 percent of its airtime representation compared to 34.2 percent of Al-Jazeera coverage. Al-Jazeera's ubiquitous presence all around Iraq is definitely reflected in its highest percentage of live reports, certainly for their ability to enhance its wartime credibility. CNN's recorded news

reports, however, far exceeded those of Al-Jazeera, certainly due to the censorship and propaganda measures involved in their editing, reaching 32.1 percent of its airtime, compared to 22.7 percent of Al-Jazeera representation. The relatively high volume of recorded news reports of Al-Jazeera is mostly featured at times when its reporters were banned, and thus, unable to report events live.

Although, in-studio reporters are proven in the previous analysis to be the most depicted wartime visual element, they did not occupy most of the airtime. The in-studio newscasts came next in airtime duration, representing 21.8 percent of CNN's coverage, compared to only 12.4 percent of Al-Jazeera coverage. The high representation of CNN's in-studio reports reflects the shortage of imagery it suffered throughout the war, in comparison to Al-Jazeera, which enjoyed relatively much more freedom, reflected in its imagery that angered all conflicting parties. Al-Jazeera, thus, widely exceeded CNN in the airtime it dedicated to officials. While its live interviews with officials reached 5.1 percent of Al-Jazeera's total airtime, CNN's did not exceed 1.0 percent of its total coverage. As for the live officials' speeches from press conferences, while they completely failed to exist on CNN's sample coverage, they represented 3.5 percent of Al-Jazeera total coverage. Al-Jazeera even exceeded CNN in the airtime dedicated to recorded officials' interviews and press conference speeches, representing 14.8 percent of its total airtime, compared to 3 percent of CNN's airtime. This reflects the cultural differences between both channels, with Al-Jazeera airing fully unedited official speeches and CNN just showing snapshots of short phrases, which also relates to the censorship effort being practised.

Seemingly providing the audience with more analytical views than Al-Jazeera, CNN's live interviews with experts and analysts have significantly exceeded those of Al-Jazeera, mounting to 8.2 percent of its total airtime compared to 5.6 percent of analysis provided by Al-Jazeera. Those live interviews were trying to make sense of a controversial situation to an unconvinced international audience. Eventually they replaced the inaccessible images from inside Iraq, which were indirectly censored by the embedment process. While no recorded interviews with experts and analysts, however, appeared on CNN's sample coverage, they only represented 0.4 percent of Al-Jazeera's total airtime. Probably there was no need to record such interviews as they did not require much editing, with military experts knowing what to say and how to frame the issue in favour of the aggressors' side.

Conclusion:

The operational implications of the three power relations outlined in Chapter 1 seem to have been clearly reflected both in the literature on the 2003 attack on Iraq and the content analysis of Al-Jazeera and CNN. Measures of propaganda and censorship, the physical and discursive media-military relationship and the subsequent info-strategic warfare, were demonstrated in the war coverage literature and the highly indicated in the content of both channels' coverage.

Evidently throughout the military operations, extensive propaganda and censorship measures were imposed on the news media by both sides of the conflict. On the one hand, the former Iraqi regime imposed a set of rules and regulations on journalists operating in its controlled-territories, which they evidently had to follow to gain access to press conferences and areas of civilian casualties, and above all to keep their positions inside Iraq and avoid being expelled outside the country as happened with two of Al-Jazeera reporters. On the other hand, the orchestrated propaganda and censorship measures, central to the war planning itself, were demonstrated in the specialized bodies created since the outset of the "war on terror" at both sides of the Atlantic and war operations locations. Indirect censorship, in addition, included embedding journalists with the military escorts and obliging them to sign a lengthy set of restrictions on what they can and cannot report on.

As for the physical and discursive media-military relationship, it seems to have been by-and-large cooperative along the aggressors' side, with the great majority of foreign journalists chose to be embedded with the military, thinking it would guarantee access to the 'war zone' and safety, at the same time. CNN specifically represents this position in this study. On the other side of the conflict, the Iraqi side, most of the news media that existed inside Baghdad and major Iraqi cities were also generally cooperative, simply to gain access as well. As for Al-Jazeera, it seems to have been able to balance its relations with both sides of the conflict, by both having offices inside Baghdad and most of the Iraqi cities and embedding two of its reporters with the US/UK military, at the same time. Its clashes with both sides of the conflict, mainly for reporting with the other side, were reflected in Sahhaf's attacking one of its reporters for criticizing the regime, and expelling two of its reporters out of Iraq in the middle of war. Those measures, however, were nothing compared to the hate campaign against Al-Jazeera following its airing of the notorious footage of killed and captured US/UK POWs and the deliberate targeting of its Baghdad offices and killing of its reporter Tarek Ayyoub.

As for the subsequent info-strategic warfare, it seemed evident that CNN's coverage, along with most western networks, included loads of official propaganda. The policy of controlling the imagery was well reflected in the military personnel who occupied television studios to ensure that the pace of reporting was diligently according to the Pentagon's agenda, to the graphic and video footages supplied by the Pentagon and constantly aired on all networks, and to the staging of media events, as proved in the story of Jessica Lynch. The end result was a fully sanitized coverage totally excluding "disturbing" scenes or anything violating the media principles of "taste and decency". On the other side of the conflict, Al-Jazeera's more critical and professional practice was reflected in the stream of bloody footages that exposed the "ugly reality" of the military assault, which certainly enraged everybody at some points in the conflict.

The direction of those power relations is also clearly indicated in the outcome of both channels' content analyses. The fashion in which each channel framed the invasion of Iraq was certainly determined and delimited by both the channel's policy and background, described in Chapter Three, and the censorship and propaganda measures exercised by both sides of the conflict on the media coverage from its side, the subsequent media-military relationship and the consequential info-strategic warfare aired on its screen.

Al-Jazeera's pan-Arab approach and policy of reporting "the opinion and the other opinion" was deeply reflected in the outcome of its content analysis, largely focusing on the Arab side of the issue, the ways in which the coverage may appeal to the Arab audience and the diversity of opinions and viewpoints it decisively aired. This is well reflected in the high percentage of its reports from Washington throughout the war, for instance. Al-Jazeera's pan-Arab approach was reflected in the large volume of reports from Arab cities, compared to several American cities that appeared on CNN.

The Pentagon's censorship measures of embedding reporters were also reflected in CNN's reporters' locations inside Iraq. The fact that they were mostly embedded with the military escorts, while those of Al-Jazeera mostly existed outside the Pentagon's embedding process and had their offices inside various Iraqi cities, was reflected in the geographical distribution of each channel's reporters. Those of Al-Jazeera had their reports from major Iraqi cities, mostly located in the centre of Iraq, while CNN reports came from the South, from the North, and from unidentified locations in the Iraqi desert with the fighting units. The extensive Al-Jazeera reports from Baghdad were strongly reflected in the analysis of image location, in comparison to CNN. Also, CNN's focusing on unspecified locations where it

claimed perceived victories, such as Um Qasr, Southern Iraq, and Northern Iraq, was greater in frequency.

Analyzing the image location has greatly reflected the distribution of embedded and unilateral reporters around Iraq, and reflected the kind of wartime media-military relationship each channel exercised. The mostly embedded reporters of CNN demonstrated how cooperative was the channel with Pentagon bodies operating to control the flow of information. Al-Jazeera's reporters, however, scattered around Iraqi cities, have evidently cooperated with the former Iraqi regime to gain such access. Such cooperation may be indicated in the speakers airtime representation, the frequency of visual elements depicted, and the types of news reports. There is no way, however, to demonstrate the levels or the directions of such cooperation before getting to Chapter Six, where discourse analysis demonstrates the line of each channel's reporting and the kind of wartime media-military relationship adhered by both channels.

The speakers airtime representation largely indicated the policies of both channels, and the amount of free expression and representation of all parties as reflected in its airtime. Evidently in-studio anchors and correspondents represented a large volume of airtime for both channels. With its limited representation inside Iraq, CNN's anchor occupied a larger volume of its airtime compared to Al-Jazeera, whose correspondents represented the highest percentage of its airtime representation. This reflects a larger degree of free expression exercised by Al-Jazeera reporters in comparison to CNN's, having their hands tied behind the embedding process. This indicates a largely cooperative media-military relationship between CNN reporters and the US Pentagon, with the great majority of journalists abiding with its reporting policy. The high appearance of Iraqi officials on Al-Jazeera in comparison to CNN, however, reflects a cooperative relationship between Al-Jazeera and the former Iraqi government, with its pan-Arab approach in reflecting the Iraqi viewpoints so frequently.

The frequency of visual elements depicted evidently indicates the amount of truth or the parts of truth each channel has deliberately focussed on. This not only indicates the status of propaganda and censorship measures, but also the kind of info-strategic warfare being communicated through the televised image to fulfil military goals. To illustrate, the high volume of Iraqi officials depicted on Al-Jazeera in comparison to CNN indicates the channel's inclination towards airing the Iraqi viewpoint, usually neglected on CNN. For CNN, however, this indicates an obvious attempt to marginalize Iraqi officials in power. The CNN discourse of disdain and contempt accompanying the images of those officials even demonstrates this,

and the same for Al-Jazeera when depicting western officials. Equally significant are the images of dead and injured aired by both channels, which tell a lot about the strategic usage of such images for both sides of the conflict through these channels. The high volume of death and injured Iraqis that appeared on Al-Jazeera is in stark contrast to its counterpart on CNN. While those images are utilized by Al-Jazeera to fuel anger along the Arab and Western streets, their volume and quality are evidently sanitized on CNN to contain the US/UK public opinion and sustain support for the assault.

The type of news report has also indicated each channel's policies and limitations. As both channels wished to give a strong impression of being in the war zone to gain lots of credibility, for each channel the correspondents' live reports represented the highest percentage. CNN's recorded reports, however, were much larger than those of Al-Jazeera, which reflects CNN's preference of recorded, edited material over the live unedited ones. This indicates how processes of censorship and propaganda were decisively taking place through the editing process. Al-Jazeera, however, started depending on recorded reports only when two of its correspondents were expelled outside of Iraq in the middle of war, and the channels was barred the right to live reporting for some days. Al-Jazeera's attempts, however, to balance between its apparently independent reporting and the strategic desires of the regime it needs to access its territories are clearly reflected in the great volume of officials' representation on Al-Jazeera, whether live or recorded.

Chapter Six

Comparative Critical Discourse Analysis: Al-Jazeera and CNN Representation of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq

Introduction:

Analyzing the discourse of Al-Jazeera and CNN coverage of the military assault against Iraq is central to demonstrating the power of institutional technologies in constructing dominant discourses, claiming “absolute truth,” as a result of a direct intersection of knowledge and power. In the case under study, the institutions cooperating, voluntarily or not, in the production of knowledge mainly include the US and UK governments, allies, wartime rivals, and the satellite channels, Al-Jazeera and CNN. The technological dimension of their power is certainly the instant live coverage of the assault, eased by means of videophone and the like. This chapter aims at locating the hidden meanings of power implanted in satellite television imagery and their accompanying discourse, through constructing/locating the inescapable relationship between an image, its production elements and its potential/perceived impact.

To do so, a selected sample, which particularly exposes controversial or strikingly unique points of the coverage, has been chosen and analyzed according to their discursive structure, social context, and who says them and in what conditions. To do so, the following steps were carefully carried out: genuinely attempting to be objective, constantly immersing oneself in the audio-visual images analyzed, identifying the main themes/frames, examining their relation to truth, paying attention to their complexity and contradiction, recognizing the visible and invisible, and paying attention to their details. It is crucial to note at this point that the goal of this chapter is not studying the relation of television discourses to truth, but to describe how the intersection between knowledge and power produces a television discourse that claims absolute truth. Inherently dependent on the researcher’s personal interpretation of images discourse, despite following the above-mentioned workable strategy, critical discourse analysis does not claim to be absolutely objective. It is meant to critically challenge taken-for-granted statements and meanings, and openly question claims to objectivity. It aims at producing a persuasive critical account of the material under study rather than a truthful one. So, it is more about raising questions rather than providing answers.

The audiovisual material being analyzed also reflects the possible intentions of an image depicter in affecting audience perception in a certain fashion, together with the external forces aimed at

controlling and curbing the coverage. Each channel's news agenda and stance are also powerfully communicated through the illustrative image discourse, accompanying the narratives and their affective – usually patriotic – background music. In undertaking critical discourse analysis, news reports from each channel's selected sample are consecutively outlined, for drawing clear comparisons between their coverage of on-spot major events. This is followed by a critical account of what they specifically entail and represent, where the three power relations under study—propaganda and censorship measures, media-military relationship and info-strategic warfare—are critically located in the images discourse and their accompanying narratives. The selected transcripts from the same news reports are given the same number. So, for example, *Al-Jazeera Transcript 1* is given to all transcripts from the same newscast, and then when moving to another news report, the transcript is labelled *Al-Jazeera Transcript 2*, and so on. The main events and issues start with the invasion's military operations and aerial bombardment news, as the central war theme or action taking place. They are then followed by the officials' speeches from both sides of the conflict, the worldwide anti-war demonstrations, the airing of captured and killed US/UK POWs video, and the humanitarian situation inside Iraq.

Critical Discourse Analysis:

1- Aerial Bombardment and Military Operations:

As the military invasion of Iraq started, news of the aerial bombardment of Iraqi cities filled television screens around the globe with midnight fire explosions and substantive scenes of reporters hanging around military units in the Iraqi deserts. Giving a sense of war, those scenes, coupled with varied narrative discourses, were decisively meant to convey different meanings to diverse audiences. While Al-Jazeera in the Arab world reported the bombardment of Iraqi cities as a bloody assault against the civilian population, a lawless invasion destroying a peaceful country's infrastructure and killing its people, CNN International showed a benign war of good deeds, disarming Iraq from WMD, liberating its people, and making the world more peaceful. The following samples from the two channels' reports tend to demonstrate the great disparities in their framing of events, and the power implanted in their discursive practices.

Al-Jazeera:

In reporting on the military operations and aerial bombardment, Al-Jazeera's live approach seems to have yielded great authority to the channel, regardless of the significance of what the images in fact contained. Describing the current status of the Baghdad bombardment Al-Jazeera's

correspondent, Maged, highlights the situation he experiences, the Pentagon's side and a detailed description of the developments on the raids to which the capital is subjected,

Jomana (Al-Jazeera in-studio anchor): We have now from Baghdad, Maged Abdel Hadi. Maged, what is happening, where you are?

Maged (Baghdad Correspondent): Now the alarm sirens are on, announcing the closeness of another raid on the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. The last raid ended by a similar siren that went on about 20 minutes ago.

Jomana: The Pentagon announced today that there are hundreds of targets that will be continuously targeted during the coming hours. Do you think that the time lag between each raid and the other will continue to be so short?

Maged: The first raid started from 8:15 pm and lasted till about 11:00 pm. Baghdad then witnessed a stop of the raids for about half an hour. Then, the alarm sirens were on once again, for a new raid, but none of the missiles that were thrown in the second raid [hit] any of the areas close to Baghdad. It seems that it had attacked targets surrounding Baghdad, or nearby the city. Now the sirens have been on again, to announce the third raid. It is expected, according to the last two days' tradition, that these missiles reach the city within a few minutes. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 1*

Maged is shown standing in the open-air on top of the Al-Jazeera office in Baghdad, where we can see behind him the black sky of late-night Baghdad. Evidently the image does not show anything newsworthy. However, the headline reading "Live Baghdad", on top of the screen and the main screen headline first reading, "Maged Abdel Hadi, Al-Jazeera Correspondent," then "Alarm Sirens are Loudly Heard all Around Baghdad," enhance the perceived power of the live report and the state of alert it purports. Part of the report's perceived power is the journalistically professional approach it adheres to, with the screen dividing to show Jomana from Doha, to the right, every time she speaks, and Maged from Baghdad, as he speaks. This is just the same way as live reports are aired on CNN and other western channels.

The live image of Baghdad by night, though without anything occurring, coupled with the live report of Maged gives a strong impression that Al-Jazeera is there, monitoring the situation from inside Iraq. This definitely adds to the perceived power of the report together with the channel airing it. Maged's reference to the expected third raid coupled with the clearly heard alarm sirens – evidence – adds to the perceived credibility and authenticity of the report and its accompanying headline. The audience is most likely to miss the fact that they are just served one person's opinion and accounts, who happened to be an eye witness and reporter at the same time. Acting as more of a witness than a reporter, Maged is evidently expected to narrate his own expectations as an eyewitness. This added wartime role of the journalist yields him another power dimension that he seems to exercise.

Not only is it the immediacy of the report that makes it so powerful, but also the discourse within which the issues are framed. While Al-Jazeera attempts to appear objective, by distancing itself from the news being reported, it decisively focuses on aspects of the story which are normally ignored by other news outlets. Unlike the Western news media, Al-Jazeera speaks about Iraqi officials with respect, using their official titles rather than their first names as the Western media does, which

indicates the channel's legitimising of their positions. Al-Jazeera is partly obliged to do so apparently because it is airing from inside their controlled territories, where any perceived disrespect might result in losing their crucial position in the heart of the war. In addition, legitimizing the Iraqi leadership in wartime when Iraq is subjected to a military attack is deemed patriotic and an evident pan-Arab approach to reporting, which definitely feeds into the channel's credibility and popularity. This, however, totally negates the CNN approach, and probably angers the US Pentagon, which probably even adds to the channel's perceived power in the region, especially at a time when the Arab people are already enraged at the US's unlawful invasion. Al-Jazeera, also, stresses the contradictions between Iraqi and Coalition reports, which conforms to its slogan of airing "The Opinion and the Other Opinion." In this realm, it exposes US and Coalition weaknesses by showing the Arab audience other hidden dimensions from what is normally stated as truth. The following sample demonstrates this.

As the report continues,

Jomana: After the press conference of Iraqi Defence Minister, there has not been any military report about the development of battles and military engagement, or what is mentioned by the Americans about the advance of their forces?

Maged: First, concerning the press conference of the Defense Minister, the minister entirely denied the American and British news about occupying al Faw and Um Qasr. He assured that there are fighting operations going on, and the Port of Um Qasr, still the Iraqi forces are undergoing harsh resistance there, and also in al Faw area. He also assured that the Iraqi forces are fighting harsh battles with the British forces moving towards the city of Nassiriya. Also, the Iraqi Defense Minister signalled about "downing operations" in the Western Iraqi desert. And afterward, an Iraqi military report, issued by the General Command of Iraqi Armed Defense, about the launching of Soumoud and Fateh Missiles, the Iraqi missiles Soumoud and Fateh, on gatherings or compounds of American and British military forces in the Kuwaiti territories. He assured also the continuing of engagements and battles in the Faw area, and also talked about "downing operations" that the American forces did in the Western desert of Iraq, from the North to South, and especially in three areas: the area called el-Oafor in the North-West, al Waleed air base, in the middle of Western Desert, and el-Nokhail (palms) area, to the South-West of the Iraqi territories.

Jomana: Did this report mention anything of what the terrestrial resistance has done tonight? Was it able to resist any of the missiles?

Maged: No. The military report did not mention the raids on Baghdad. It mentioned that the siblings of families and the members of Baath Party in the Western Desert areas of Iraq have resisted the American "downing operations" and forced many of them to return back or to runaway. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 1*

Maged evidently reports on Iraq's Defence Minister's denial of the capture of Faw and Um Qasr, in an apparently objective way without commenting. This conforms to Al-Jazeera's official tone in news reporting, giving an impression of seriousness, professionalism, and authenticity. Nevertheless, reporting the official Iraqi description of resistance forces, Iraqi missiles hitting back and the families' siblings success in stopping the US downing operations and forcing them to back away yields great power to the news report for the quality of detailed information it entails. Eventually it demonstrates how information/knowledge is decisively utilized as a form of power. Al-Jazeera is evidently running Iraqi propaganda, which it did not and even cannot verify. The detailed description of the Iraqi missiles attacking the US/UK forces in northern Kuwait, the downing operations, the

names of places where those operations were taking place, details which are never found on CNN, exposes Al-Jazeera's pro-Iraqi version of the war, which eventually fulfils its pan-Arab reporting approach and enhance its credibility. The sense of imminence provided by the live coverage, also, adds more power, as it goes on,

Maged: I can hear now, Jomana, a missile falling. I think it is a very near distance from Baghdad.

Jomana: Can we watch it? Or it is too far that the camera cannot get it?

Maged: It is not clear, till now, in what area it fell. But, all what happened is that I have just heard it falling.

Al-Jazeera Transcript 1

The accompanying images show Maged looking fearful and worried as he speaks. He is looking around, as he appears and sounds very alerted to the voices around him while speaking, an impression that is most likely to inflate fear and alertness among the channel's target audience. I assume, the audience at such a time is simply forced to share the Iraqi people's feelings of imminent fear and pain resulting from the US-led air raids. This has probably inspired more global anti-war reactions among a wider audience. In addition to reporting the Iraqi side on the development of military operations, Al-Jazeera verifies the US official discourse, as the live report continues,

Jomana: An American military official mentioned today that the American military forces have controlled, as he says, two military airports to the west of Baghdad. He said this is an attempt to surround the Iraqi capital. Do you have any idea? It was said that the two airports are 280 km distant from Baghdad. Is this distance considered close or far away approximately?

Maged: Maybe, what is meant here is what the Iraqi military spokesman mentioned about al Waleed air base that is situated in the middle of the Iraqi western desert and the spokesman mentioned here, the sons of clans there, and the members of the Baath party, who live in this area, have dealt with these "downing operations".

Al-Jazeera Transcript 1

Jomana's question is apparently tends to verify the authenticity of the American report, where the forces' proximity to Baghdad is central to both sides in evaluating their perceived victories and defeats. While the US forces assure that the two military airports they say they controlled are just located to the west of Baghdad, as an attempt to surround the city, Al-Jazeera highlights a report mentioning they are 280km away from Baghdad, as a fact, certainly empowered with the kilometre evidence. This clearly challenges the US official statement as apparently 280 km, by all accounts, does not really seem so close to the capital and the subsequent question of whether it is considered close or far away becomes just a clear attempt to appear fair and objective. This second question is not answered by Maged, as there is no answer needed. It is clearly an open-ended question aimed at pushing the audience to think and evaluate the evidence at hand.

Maged, also, answers in terms of his own information gained from his presence in Baghdad and attendance at the Iraqi officials' press conferences, where the airbase is claimed to be situated "in the middle of western Iraqi desert," and was clearly not US controlled as the members of Baath Party clans

have “dealt with them.” Al-Jazeera thus challenged the American official discourse, by both evidence of kilometres and countering speeches by Iraqi spokesmen, denying both the US control of airbases together with its perceived proximity to the capital.

In a different report by Maged Abdel Hadi, where he is shown in the same position and background, the main screen headline reads, “The American Forces say that it had put for a short while its flag on the Iraqi city of Um Qasr.” The screen divides to show Maged to the right and to the left pictures from Iraqi TV showing images of building destruction. There is a close up picture of the Holy Quran in a fully destroyed building, and only the Holy book is still intact. The image gets closer to the page to which it was left opened, so that the words of God are clearly readable on the screen. The headline then reads, “British and American forces say it controlled the city of Um Qasr, Southern Iraq,” and more images of destruction are displayed from Iraq’s satellite channel. A close-up image of a man hospitalized with an oxygen mask on his face, his wife and relatives surrounding him. More close up images of people’s injuries in a hospital, showing cut legs, and arms, and women crying. The headline then reads, “The Iraqi Forces Resist the first Attack by the American Forces in Nassiriya,” while more images of destruction are displayed, and repeated over and over.

Images here probably speak louder than words. The set of accompanying imagery to Maged’s report is inherently liable to enrage the Arab and Moslem public around the world. It embodies the “war on terror” as a war against Islam as always claimed and thought, with the close up on the Holy book. It enhances existing beliefs on the racist and imperialist nature of the military assault against Iraq. The images provide evidence of a long-existing set of feelings and beliefs, and are thus very likely to fuel anger among the target audience as never before. First the headline reading that the US forces has placed, for a short while, its flag on Um Qasr, which not only implies the city was captured, but also that it was occupied, as the positioning of the US flag indicates.

The Nassiriya images decisively focus on demolition and destruction, and the Holy Quran, as a symbol of Islam, is harshly destroyed and burned, just like the house in which it was placed. Those kinds of images are most likely to enrage Moslems around the world. It brings back the images of attacks on Moslem cities from the crusade wars to the latest assault against Afghanistan. Then the images of injured people being hospitalized tend to represent enough evidence that the attack is targeting the Iraqi people, hurting them, and thus everyone watching is in extreme pain for their sake. Then a light of hope is represented in the perceived the strength of the Iraqis is spelled out with the headline assuring the people that the Iraqis are still resisting in Nassiriya, despite all the damage and destruction, of wealth and lives. Those images are also empowered by the fact that they are displayed

while Maged is reporting “live”, as the accompanying narrative goes on, describing the situation in Baghdad,

Maged: Till now, none of the photographers or journalists in Iraq could get to know any of the repercussions of the attacks. What was included in the tours organized by the Iraqi Information Ministry for journalists is visiting some of the hospitals in which the injured were transferred. There are tens of civilian injuries now, about 37 injured today, and five, I think, yesterday, were transferred to hospitals. And they are, according to what appeared in today's tours, all of them civilians, women and children. We did not recognize any military personnel among the injured. Concerning the situation in Baghdad, it is not at all in its natural condition. It is difficult, as I said before, that a city witnesses the fall of 70 missiles on it by night, and gets back to its nature by day, especially that the attack is expected to continue the following night, and the other [coming] nights. The people try, maybe based on their experience in going through two wars during the last two decades, or can sometimes overcome their worries and fears, and get out of their homes by day and move around the city. There is a close-to-natural movement in the capital, Baghdad. But this movement, as I signalled, disappears step by step, as the night hours get closer. Now the movement, that we witness today, is at its lowest levels due to the fall of night. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 2*

Maged is clearly describing the situation in Baghdad, but most important is his reference to the Information Ministry's organizing hospital visits for journalists and the clear lack of information they suffer. This proves how journalists, even when located behind fire-line, were denied access and information. This indirect criticism of the Iraqi government is a clear attempt to appear objective, to expose the obstacles to his reporting and to signal to the censorship by denial of access that is taking place. At the same time, Maged is simply stating his impressions and guesses, as an eye witness, as well as a reporter, which is inherently a complex situation in itself. Throughout the war, those impressions are the news when there is no access to actual events, and with journalists themselves bearing witnesses to the unfolding situation. The Information Ministry's favouring hospitals' visits demonstrates what type of information and images the Iraqi government would like the world to watch: the images of death, pain, injuries and destruction, those things that anyone anywhere would find unacceptable. Evidently, the Iraqi government is utilizing Al-Jazeera and other unilateral channels to expose the direct repercussions of the aerial bombardment and grab international public sympathy. This strategy, I assume, is deemed successful given the anti-war worldwide demonstration that erupted throughout the assault.

In conclusion, despite Al-Jazeera's apparently objective tone, it seems to be, willingly or not, fulfilling Iraqi propaganda goals, which eventually coincide with its own pan-Arab approach. Al-Jazeera's live coverage, together with its airing of the news and views of both sides of the conflict certainly fulfil its renowned slogan of reporting “The Opinion and the Other Opinion.” Nevertheless, the kind of information it chooses to report on and the fashion in which it is reported about both sides of the conflict prove its pro-Iraqi pan-Arab approach to news reporting, which in wartime is more likely to earn the channel great credibility and popularity. The kind of images, however, it is showing are most likely to inflate fear and anger among the target audience, yielding the channel incredible

power and authority on the wartime situation. Just like all journalists, Al-Jazeera reporters were not allowed to access military sites, but were evidently invited into hospitals and destruction sites to show the world the direct repercussions of the military assaults, which definitely fulfil Iraqi strategic goals at the time by fuelling the world's anger against the invasion.

By attending news conferences of Iraqi officials, which are surely newsworthy for any channel to report, Al-Jazeera eventually helped them deliver their propaganda to a worldwide audience. Voluntarily or not, Al-Jazeera served the info-strategic warfare from the Iraqi side by acting as a vehicle of propaganda. In the meantime, reporting the war from an essentially Arab perspective, and sympathizing with the Iraqi people and reporting their pain and agony to a worldwide audience, certainly fulfilled Al-Jazeera's pan-Arab line of reporting, and eventually helped in humanizing the Iraqi people on television screens, featuring a facet that was not previously available to a worldwide audience in wartime. Nevertheless the media-military relationship on between Al-Jazeera and the Iraqi side of the conflict may be described as a love-hate one, as Al-Jazeera was neither pro nor against the Iraqi side all the time, while its antagonistic relationship to the coalition side had been evident since the outset, by fulfilling its pan-Arab approach and inherently challenging their propaganda schemes.

CNN International:

Unlike Al-Jazeera, CNN's reports on the second day of the "war," revolved around the Iraqis surrendering to coalition forces, the "live" fighting going on, and the easily captured Iraqi cities. From CNN studio in Kuwait city, Jim Clancy starts up his report as follows,

Waving the white flag, some Iraqi troops lay down their arms as more territories fall to coalition forces in southern Iraq. But it is not all easy going. The US and British troops also encounter pockets of what is being described as stern resistance. On bound for Baghdad, US ground forces are meeting few obstacles as they roll across Iraq's Southern desert. But Iraq's central minister says their pace is being greatly exaggerated. *CNN Transcript 1*

The accompanying images/evidence show about five to six Iraqis in civilian clothes waving white flags while walking on top of a little hill in the desert. In the direction they are moving, there appears on the side of the image the face of a US soldier holding his weapon, as if they are moving towards him. The camera moves from their side to their back to show another US soldier from behind walking some steps and looking at them. The image then shows a US war truck moving in the desert, in the middle of a sand storm. The images/evidence of Iraqis surrendering certainly yields a lot of power and authority to Clancy's report. Those images and their accompanying discourse clearly foster the US opinion that the war would be easy and quick, especially with the images of Iraqis surrendering and holding white flags. The issue of proximity is yet another dimension to define perceived strength. The expression "on bound for Baghdad," coupled with "few obstacles" makes the coalition mission

looks so easy and simple, and gives the viewers an impression that they are getting close to Baghdad quickly. The fact that most viewers have no idea about the actual dimensions of the Iraqi maps, together with the constant description of the coalition military might make any Iraqi resistance in their way appear insignificant and eases the process of deceiving the public about the actual pace of the assault.

Jim Clancy, then, continues,

About 250 Iraqi soldiers have surrendered to US marines, 30 more to British forces in Um Qasr, one group of 40 Iraqis marched at two laying roads towards the Americans and gave themselves up. *CNN Transcript 1*

The images show a queue of Iraqis in civilian clothes, hands on heads, walking in the sun, along what seems to be a highway in the middle of the desert. Then there is a repetition of the image of Iraqis waving white flags and the US soldier holding his weapon on the other side of the screen. We shall recognize here that though the claim of surrender is backed up with images of captured Iraqis, the first image of Iraqis does not suggest that they belong to the army, as they do not wear military clothes, nor have they necessarily surrendered in the first place. It could well be some who were just unwillingly captured as happened quite often. Also, there is no evidence of the number of surrendered Iraqis nor the fact that they are army personnel, as none of them was wearing military uniform. Nevertheless, the news item as a whole, backed up with images, is deemed likely to demoralize Iraqis and make them, along with a wider Arab audience, feel shameful of their forces surrendering. As for the US and British audience, this news seems more likely to consolidate their belief in the strength of their armies, and the common prejudices about the Iraqis as well. Those images, however, were challenged by Al-Jazeera reports featuring Iraqi officials denying these are Iraqi soldiers, as well an Iraqi general denying his unit surrendered, which are further detailed in the officials' speeches sections.

CNN in addition, provided detailed descriptions of the fighting and weaponry, and advancing of their armed forces throughout its news reports, as the following statement by Jim Clancy, shows,

The US Army's seventh Cavalry is now pushing north towards Iraq's southern desert. The army stood in three divisions behind it, is moving toward Baghdad. Iraqi forces fired a tactical ballistic missile at a regiment. It fell harmlessly. *CNN Transcript 1*

The images show a couple of tanks driving in the sandy desert and surrounded by a sand storm. It is quite notable that the image does not really match the news item. No large armoured forces is shown, no three divisions, and no Iraqi firing or even its repercussions, if any. This is of course because there are no repercussions, as the news item states, "it fell harmlessly." The news item certainly attempts to describe the unmatched power of the US army with its huge cavalry consisting

of three divisions safely moving north, and on its way it is met with an Iraqi missile that it could easily deal with without harm. The existence of Iraqis firing, whether true or not, yields more meaning to the operations, as they give an illusion that they are fighting and prevailing. The non-existence of Iraqi soldiers in CNN images is meant to reduce them to nothing, which strengthens the idea that the coalition is prevailing. If the enemy is visible (on the television screen), however, he becomes a “real” danger for the target audience. The dominant CNN discourse was “telling” about the fighting without showing any enemy personnel, because they simply do not exist “as a power.” This might well be tactical and central to the propaganda and censorship measures being applied on CNN reports. The content of the report itself, with no pictorial evidence, might be pure military propaganda. While the absence of corresponding images for what the report contained is probably central to the censorship rules on what can and cannot be shown.

CNN also stressed the capture of Iraqi cities and areas as perceived victory, and signalled often to the oil wealth that would be in their hands afterwards, as the following news item tells,

A US military spokesman said that strategic Faw peninsula is now under the complete control of US and British forces. The peninsula includes key oil installations, in the port city of Um Qasr. *CNN Transcript 1*

The images from Abu Dhabi TV show several US soldiers walking safely in the desert. The screen headline reads, “Um Qasr Faw Peninsula Now Controlled by Coalition Forces.” Apparently the US media is treating the port of Um Qasr and the Faw Peninsula as a singular entity, which is not true. Um Qasr is a very small city situated on the Gulf inside a larger piece of land representing the Faw Peninsula. They are not the same thing. This news item apparently attempts to indicate that the fighting coalition forces are achieving victory, capturing cities and strategic locations with significant oil installations, which clearly reflect the US concern for securing/capturing oil installations. However, there is no way to verify that those images are of the Faw peninsula, such as a live report or a street banner, for instance. Nevertheless, official speeches on CNN are deemed more credible than images, as British Defence Secretary Jeff Hoon is then shown describing the achievement,

Importantly, most of the oil infrastructure on the peninsula has been secured intact. I can confirm, however, reports that the Iraqi regime set fire to a number of oil wells. Our latest information is that up to 30 oil wells were alight among hundreds in Southern Iraq. A primary aim of current operations is to prevent further opportunities for such deliberate destruction, and to enable remedial action to take place as soon as this is practical. *CNN Transcript 1*

The accompanying images show The British Defence Secretary, Jeff Hoon speaking from papers in Parliament, and a table appears in front of him. Two members appear sitting at either side of him, and two other members standing behind him. He sounds angry, and nervous, though he tries to appear firm and serious, and combines objectivity with patriotism. The speech of Hoon is certainly timely and significant with the announced event. It is more likely to be positively perceived as victory

by the British and American public, who are known to trust their officials, which represents a main source of credibility for CNN itself.

In Hoon's speech, however, the invasion's concern for controlling oil wells are clearly well exposed, which tends to support anti-war claims that it is a war for oil. Though it might be meant to show that those oil wells would not be torched, as happened in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, which would mean a safer and cleaner environment, still stressing the importance of the Peninsula's containing important oil wells that were secured can also confirm the claims that it was a "blood for oil" war, for those standing against the invasion. Stressing those points, thus, probably negates the official claims to liberating the Iraqi people and disarming the country from WMD. We may thus claim that the official and media discourse on the development of military operations inadvertently exposed some of the hidden stakes behind this war, eventually eroding benign claims of making the world safer. This leads us to question whether or not those claims are strong enough to persist throughout the military operations or was the reference to the captured oil wells enough to erode them, at least for some parts of the world?

Jim Clancy, then, speaks of the situation in Southern Iraq, based on Walter Rogers' report, **Let's get an overview now of what has been taking place first in the desert of Southern Iraq. CNN's Walter Rogers is there. He has been travelling with the US troops as part of an arrangement with the Pentagon. He cannot tell us exactly where he and the units are. But Walter does say, wherever they are, they are moving rapidly towards Baghdad. He gave us an update short while ago. *CNN Transcript 1***

The picture shows Clancy in Kuwait, then the map of Iraq, with the red banner on top of the screen reading, "U.S. Coalition Heads North". CNN's stressing, by words and text, that there is a rapid movement towards the north, is quite evident. It is notable, however, that the reporting process and the on-site Pentagon censorship are well exposed as part and parcel of the news item, and even as important as the moving north news itself. This is crystal clear in Clancy's saying first that Rogers is "travelling with the US troops as part of an arrangement with the Pentagon," then, that he cannot say where exactly he is or the units are. So, he apparently cannot say because he is positioned under the scrutiny of military minders and the protection of the Pentagon, and thus obliged to follow orders just like all other soldiers.

Censorship and propaganda measures are equally crystal clear in the news item and its accompanying imagery. Evidently there are no images, and this is why the graphic map is used instead, which definitely reflects that the images were probably censored, or journalists were barred from taking them in the first place, which is definitely some form of indirect censorship. Then the most important piece of news/propaganda is that the Cavalry is "moving rapidly towards Baghdad," which

probably gives a false impression that it is getting close to Baghdad. The same news/propaganda was also indicated in the main screen headline, for viewers who may have missed the crucial news.

Journalistically, the reporter should exert all efforts to keep himself outside of the story he is covering, which is not the case here. The reporter is part of the story/the invasion, and even cooperating in enhancing the illusion about its perceived success, as Rogers' report aired by via videophone proves,

The Cavalry has been walking so quickly across the southern Iraqi desert.... They are moving with tanks and armoured vehicles. There is so much dust here that we had to change the air filters of the armoured tanks. I swear, the sky here is not blue, it is brown. There is so much dust here, that each of us has to take off some layers of dust. Still, the Cavalry is going to punch on and punch on overnight and this Cavalry is growing in strength. The third infantry's mechanized division has drawn up upon us. That is the biggest firepower. Now we have three troops of tanks plus the entire third infantry division with their mechanized armour. If the Iraqis are watching this, they would be advised to see how much power the Americans and the British are bringing in on them, and it is coming and crashing into Baghdad in the course of the next few days. The goal of the infantry, the armour here is to force a regime change in Iraq, and of course if that would happen, these armed divisions will move very quickly towards the Iraqi capital and try to stabilize the situation there, should Saddam Hussein get the support, or not get the support of his army. But right now Saddam is still in charge, and the seventh Cavalry and the third infantry division are moving very quickly towards Baghdad, covering a very large stretch of ground, a large stretch of desert. The third infantry division has over two hundred main battle tanks, the greatest collection of tanks in history, and all punching towards the regime of Saddam Hussein with the sole intent of laying down the regime and liberating the people of Kuwait. *CNN Transcript 1*

The images show Rogers's face, which barely appears from the semi-dark weather, and the all-sky background behind him. With his echo-filled voice, he is almost shouting rather than talking. Though his voice is not very clear, he sounds too patriotic and optimistic about the expected speed and advance of the coalition forces towards Baghdad, due to the highly advanced war machinery they employ. The main screen headline reads, "Via videophone: voice of Walter Rogers southern Iraq." It is quite notable that the description above does not match the accompanying images. Although the videophone technology often used in reporting this assault is supposed to deliver visual real-time reports, it is just showing nothing. And this is the power of it. The importance of this report lies in its ability to give the audience illusions of watching the alleged war live, yielding great power to the news report. In the news item, the Cavalry seem to be just moving, and the moving is the news, which everyone knows! Viewers would just believe they are seeing "the" truth. And this is the important thing. This is a clear illustration of the intersection of institutional technologies and military power in the execution of today's wars.

Rogers also sounds so patriotic and excited when describing the volume and power of the coalition army, speaking of its ability of overthrowing Saddam and liberating his people, which apparently serves the Pentagon agenda. The clear lack of respect when referring to any of the Iraqi officials, including Saddam Hussein, is notable. In describing the layers of dust they have taken off themselves he says, "us," referring to him and the soldiers he is accompanying. Coupling this reference

with the fashion in which he spoke about the Iraqi forces saying, “if the Iraqis are watching this, they would be advised to see how much power the Americans and the British are bringing in on them,” proves how many embedded reporters could only perceive things as “us against them.” The coverage discourse is designed in a fashion that primarily serves the Pentagon agenda and strategy. He was even so excited that he mixed up covering the 1991 war with the current invasion, and concluded by “liberating the people of Kuwait,” rather than Iraq! The media-military relationship, thus, is clearly wholeheartedly cooperative. There seems to be no doubt about that.

The newscast then continues with more details of the coalitions’ coming under fire by Iraqis,

Let’s get a look now on some of the latest developments we are following right now. US forces near the southern Iraqi city of Basra have reportedly come under fire. It was a rocket-propelled grenade fired at this marine unit. A group of them were accompanied by CNN reporter Martin Savage. They were in the process of destroying abandoned tanks in the area when they reacted to what was believed to be hostile fire.

CNN Transcript 1

The accompanying images to this news item first show Jim Clancy, with a background of Kuwait towers behind his right shoulder. Then there is a close-up picture of a US soldier looking through the telescope on the top of a war tank, to select a target before shooting. Then, the target he shoots appears in fire and smoke, a far-away small tank in the middle of a desert area. The camera then shows the war tank moving farther, and shooting more targets. This kind of imagery is definitely meant to illustrate the power of coalition military machinery. However the Iraqis who attacked them are also invisible!

Jim Clancy’s image with the background shown, Kuwait Towers, certainly demonstrates he is in Kuwait City. Then the images of shooting tanks are apparently of the alleged war taking place, just in front of the camera. It is quite notable, however, that the fact they are shown completely in the desert does not constitute any evidence that they are just near Basra, as the news item states. They could be anywhere in the mostly-desert Iraq. The cinematic focus on the tanks and soldiers on the tops of them is apparently meant to show off the power and decisiveness of weaponry along with the well-trained soldiers, and support the idea of a surgical war, liberating the country without killing its people, while keeping the soldiers safe.

The tank is shown to be very advanced where you can select your target from the telescope, shoot, and destroy it completely, creating this far away explosion that does not harm the soldiers. The tanks are so well organized that they shoot consecutively, as planned, and finish off their targets quickly. However, we cannot see any of the “hostile fire” against them mentioned, nor even any of its repercussions. There is absolutely no existence of Iraqi forces in the images. However, their existence in the discourse is crucial because they are probably meant to add meaning to what the coalition forces

are shown doing. They give the illusion that there is an “enemy” there that they are “fighting,” even if it is an invisible one!

The newscast, then, continues,

“.... into Baghdad are surveying the damage after an intense series of US-led bombing and missile attacks... from several buildings that were hit during the bombardment. *CNN Transcript 1*

The accompanying footage shows close-up images of building destruction, papers on the floor, old typewriter. Another close-up image of destruction, showing what appears to be wooden furniture, in the middle of it scattered blood on a cloth, then a totally destroyed white bus. Though the close-up images give an illusion of reality by their sharpness, they are decisively selected to tell us nothing. It is not clear what building has been destroyed or what strategic importance it had, if any at all. The absence of Iraqis who were directly affected by this attack is another element. The blood certainly tells that there had been a dead or injured person/s in this place, who was certainly removed before the cameras were turned on!

The captured Iraqi cities still constitute a significant perceived victory, as the news proves,

A US military spokesman said that US forces have captured the Southern Iraqi town of Nasiriya. Now that is a key crossing point on the Euphrates River in Southern Iraq. It could be used by US marines racing across the desert there, headed for Baghdad. Just moments ago, the leader of the US central command Tommy Franks held his first news conference since the beginning of the Iraq conflict. He was talking about the status of the leadership. *CNN Transcript 1*

The images show the map of Iraq, with Nasiriya city highlighted in red, with a close-up on it. On the red banner up the screen, “U.S. Forces Capture Nasiriya”, down the screen, “Spokesman says U.S. forces have Captured Nasiriya”. Then, Jim Clancy appears again, reading from papers and on the bottom of the screen headline “Leader of US Central Command Speaks.” Again the graphic maps naturally substitute for the lack of images. This again raises questions about the authenticity of the news item, with no images/evidence supporting it, keeping in mind that those troops are accompanied with embedded journalists, empowered by means of videophone who can report such a significant event diligently. The censorship measures, however, are imposed on those reporters. So at some points there is no clearly justified reason for the absence of images other than the harsh censorship and propaganda measures imposed on the mass media, given the fact that on Al-Jazeera Iraqi officials have confirmed that strong resistance is taking place in Nassiriya! We may wonder thus, are there coalition casualties and images that harm the discourse of a clean war that were barred from being shown on CNN? Or were reporters not allowed to take such images in the first place, based on the Pentagon set rules they have to follow?

To sum up, based on the above newscast, CNN's embodiment of the aerial bombardment and the fighting seems to have diligently followed the channel's stance on the invasion together with the Pentagon's propaganda and censorship rules. Much of the news, especially when there are no images/evidence or when the images do not show anything that relates to the news item being reported, may be considered pure propaganda, given the harsh set of propaganda and censorship measures applied by the Pentagon in this specific military operation, detailed earlier in chapter five. The cooperative media-military relationship is evident in the report of Walter Rogers. The patriotic stance he is taking throughout the news report, together with the content of his report praising the strength and power of military machinery, and even directing warnings and criticisms at the Iraqi government, just like any politician, not journalist, demonstrate a wholehearted cooperation from the side of the embedded mass media with the Pentagon. There is a clear absence of the Iraqi side, whether officials, military or civilians, which negates the essence of good journalism, of showing or presenting both sides of the conflict. The newscast, with all its items combined, seems to serve a strategic wartime agenda, keeping the powerful image of coalition forces, advancing north, engaging with the Iraqi forces and superseding them, even without images, while demoralizing the Iraqi public by showing their forces surrendering, even in civilian clothes.

2- Official Speeches by Both Sides of the Conflict:

The way in which official speeches of both sides of the conflict were featured on each channel's screen seems to reflect a lot about the power relations binding the media and the military/government of both sides of the conflict in wartime. When the media-military relationship is an antagonistic one, officials are harshly criticized on television screens, and when it is a cooperative one, officials are cast in a positive –apparently objective—light. Also the disparities between the two channels' reporting of official speeches lies in the nature and culture each channel is promoting. Al-Jazeera's long newscasts provide officials and correspondents with a much greater amount of airtime, airing larger parts of speeches and dedicating special analytical reports to scrutinizing and criticizing them. CNN, however, had a quick-passing approach to news reporting, reported official speeches, after undergoing heavy editing, in a telegraphic fashion and without providing much analysis and scrutiny to their content.

This reflects the cultural disparities between both channels. While in the Arab region people tend to speak a lot and repeat much of what they say, in the Western world briefness is a valued attitude that entertains and saves time. This also reflects the heavy toll of censorship imposed on CNN by the Pentagon, which is definitely not the case with Al-Jazeera. Also, the cooperative media-military

relationship based on common interests and dominant culture among Western networks, usually taking officials' speeches at face value, stands in absolute contrast with Al-Jazeera's culture of scrutinizing officials' speeches, as they are usually perceived among the Arab public as government propaganda. It is crucial to note here that Al-Jazeera earns its credibility in the Arab world from analyzing, criticizing and examining everything that comes its way in general and governmental policies in particular.

Al-Jazeera:

As the military operations broke out, Al-Jazeera critically scrutinized the accompanying official discourse on the aggressors' side of the conflict, reporting both sides, to ensure its apparent objectivity. On the first day of the war, Al-Jazeera's in-studio newscast, read by its anchor Adnaan reported on Blair's forthcoming speech, and Straw's speech, by first airing parts of it, then conducting a live interview with the London correspondent, Malik Al-Turaiki, who harshly criticized the speech, and reported on the forthcoming UK anti-war demonstrations. Adnan's report started up as follow,

Journalistic sources in Britain said that British Prime Minister, Tony Blair will talk to the British [people] later this evening. The British Foreign Minister, Jack Straw, also, said that the military operation that has started to materialize against Iraq is based on the [Security Council] resolution 1441, and said in a press conference that was held in London that other documents clarified that Iraq has hidden its weapons of mass destruction from the Movic committee. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 3*

The accompanying images shows Adnaan, in the Al-Jazeera studio, speaking; from behind him appears the logo "War on Iraq" on the mixed flags of Iraq and the US, and the calendar reading: "Day One" and the red banner reads "Breaking news." The news agenda here is very indicative of Al-Jazeera's position, while not failing to report and comment thoroughly on non-Arab news and views. This feeds both into its pan-Arab approach to reporting and with its apparent objectivity, by dedicating airspace to contradicting viewpoints and scrutinizing them. Al-Jazeera, then, shows part of Jack Straw's speech, mainly focusing on two elements: Iraq's insistence on hiding its alleged weapons and the claim that the military operation is based on Security Council resolution 1441,

In report after report for the Movic [committee], the issues of disarming and how Saddam has failed to abide with what he had to abide with towards the Security Council are crystal clear. As a result of this, it is certainly clear for us that Saddam is insisting on his situation of confronting and challenging the international community and not taking a firm political decision. And as stated in the resolution 1441, we had no choice but the use of force. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 3*

Straw, then, addresses the Iraqi people in the following words,

Our message to the Iraqi people is that we are with you, we support you and support your will to get rid of terrible leadership of Saddam Hussein that has horrified the Iraqi people during two centuries, oh two decades of time. We would like to see your suffering vanished. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 3*

While reporting Straw's speech is meant to act as a tool of gaining credibility by showing the aggressors' viewpoint of the conflict, Al-Jazeera's focusing on these two main items in Straw's speech seems to expose coalition weaknesses to the Arab public, which seems likely to serve the Iraqi cause indirectly. The British attempts to legitimize the attack by claiming its abidance with the Security Council resolution, combined with the sudden address of care and concern towards the Iraqi people, demonstrates a hesitant stance for the coalition's attacks and a clear attempt to justify their actions, widely perceived as unlawful in the Arab world.

Probably these two items in Straw's speech were the most newsworthy ones. However, deciding the newsworthiness of a news item largely rests on the cultural background and inclinations of the journalist selecting it, which is dictated by what are perceived as the viewers' needs, who normally share the same culture. I may thus assume that the selective usage of these two news elements in Straw's speech to show and analyze is decisively aimed at exposing coalition weaknesses, which reflects the antagonistic relationship between Al-Jazeera and the coalition in general, since the very beginning of the attack, which would be further intensified. Justifying the assault in this fashion also seems to be a reaction towards the worldwide demonstrations taking place, even inside their own countries, as Malik's following report on the status of London's demonstrations indicates,

Malik: It seems that this demonstration is one of the initial [actions] that were announced by the 'Coalition against the War,' and it is maybe believed that it will be organized in a matter of two days, maybe next Saturday. And its organizers believe that hundreds of thousands will participate, and maybe the number reaches one million, like what happened in the middle of last month, February. We know also that MPs, George Galloway and Jeremy Cowen, will participate as well in another demonstration tonight that may include between 5 to 7 thousand people, and will take place in front of the British parliament. And surely this demonstration as you know, Adnaan, is a sort of expressing the gap that occurred in the British public opinion between supporters of the war on Iraq, and those against the war, while the majority, according to the latest opinion polls, proves that the majority of the British public opinion are against this war, which has already started against Iraq, as there is neither ethical nor lawful explanation to it. This is despite the government's desperate attempts to convince the parliament MPs and the public opinion of its legal explanation, as the biggest British counsellor for the government, Lord Goldsmith, has provided few days ago what can be called a Legal 'Fatwa' that says that even if there was no resolution from the UN Security Council that frankly allows the use of force against Iraq, the resolution 1441 and the resolution 678 for the year 1990, and the resolution 687 for the year 1991, three resolutions are enough and include what is enough to allow the use of power against Iraq. Of course this opinion is held surely solely by both the British and the Americans.

Al-Jazeera Transcript 3

Malik is shown in his own with Big Ben appearing behind him, the banner reading "Live London," certainly to demonstrate he is speaking live from London. The critical nature of Malik's report makes it more of an analytical one. Nevertheless, his report contained crucial news, such as the size of the coming demonstration, the people and politicians participating, and the Legal ruling or Fatwa about legitimising the attacks. Nevertheless, especially for the Arab audience, who are generally against the invasion, his report seems to be empowered by the authority of being "live," lending the impression that Al-Jazeera is in the aggressors' own lands, bringing the news contemporaneously and

fresh. The verbal discourse, thus, which clearly reveal Al-Jazeera's stance on the alleged war since its very beginning, has the potential of incurring an ultimate positive impact among its target audience, the Arab people. It is assuring them of the weakness of their perceived enemy, though it contains a great deal of opinion alongside the news and seems to treat the issue with a great deal of contempt towards the aggressors' side, the same way in which the Western media treats Iraqi officials.

Al-Jazeera's attempts to discredit the British official discourse are evident in speaking of the significantly high volume of protesters, and the impending demonstration, in which popular governmental figures are taking part. This is in addition to the opinion polls proving that the great majority of the British are against the invasion. Coupling the huge volume of demonstrations with opinion poll results is certainly meant to show the local disenchantment with the attacks, in addition to the fact that even the governing party itself is in overt disagreement about the issue, which had no ethical or legal grounds. Straw's attempts to legalize or legitimize the attacks are further criticized as "the government's desperate attempts to convince public opinion," by pushing a trustworthy legal figure, Lord Goldsmith, the government's Chief Legal Adviser, to justify the unjustified attacks, and claim the UN resolutions are sufficient reason for using force. Then, concluding with the personal statement, "of course this opinion is held surely solely by both the British and the Americans [governments]" makes Al-Jazeera's anti-war stance clear. In addition to emphasizing the inconsistent positions inside Britain, Al-Jazeera's report stressed the perceived divisions along British-American lines too. As Adnaan wonders,

Of course, there are some attempts along journalistic or analytic shores, saying that the US is today trying to marginalize the British role in planning for the war, which gave an impression that Britain did not know of the zero hour. Is there some fear along the British side that may affect their situation? *Al-Jazeera Transcript 3*

Malik, then, replies from London,

Of course, analysts doubted, since the news of the beginning of attacks against Iraq came up last night, that Britain was aware at all of these attacks, even though the British Defense minister, Jeff Hoon, since the morning has denied this in many interviews. Then, afterwards, in front of the British Parliament, he said Britain was aware of the attacks and the planning between the two allies, the US and the British, is perfectly fine. But there are surely doubts about this issue. Especially, you remember Adnaan that few days ago the US Defense Minister, Donald Rumsfeld, said that if the US had to start the war without the help of any of her friends and allies, especially the British ally, it would go to war without any allies. And this was very painful for the British, who had to spend about 24 hours convincing opinion leaders here, and especially the mass media, that the British has an effective role in the military operations. As if the issue is about Britain's military importance to the US, while what is well known for all military analysts is that the US militarily can go to war without any allies. Yes, there is some fear from marginalizing the British role, especially that there is journalistic news that appeared few days ago saying that dividing the economic cake, if this is the right expression, after the war has been set at the expense of the British, especially that many of the contracts, especially the oil ones, will be given to American companies, not British. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 3*

Al-Jazeera's sceptical position about the unified coalition stance of the US and Britain is even backed up with evidence clearly suggesting its authenticity. It is first verified by referring to Rumsfeld's speech that the US can go alone, and then by stating the experts' views that the US is

militarily able to go alone, and lastly by the unfair division of the US/UK perceived economic gains. Al-Jazeera even challenged Jeff Hoon's claims to the mass media, doubting any British knowledge of the military planning itself, let alone the zero hour. In addition to the evidence provided in the content of Malik's report, his tone reflects a lack of respect to the American and British governments' actions and attitude as evident in his wordings.

The description of the British Defence Minister's denial of not knowing the invasion's zero hour and his attempts to convince the media of this reflects not only a great contempt to those attempts, but also implies it is not true in the first place, and being covered up by those actions. Then, commenting on those actions by saying, "As if the issue is about Britain's military importance to the US" makes Al-Jazeera's ridiculing of the British position obvious. Also, the expression, "dividing the economic cake" enhances such contempt. This vehemently contradicts the way CNN has utilized Jeff Hoon's speech earlier to provide evidence on perceived victory. Al-Jazeera overtly stressed the deep disparities between the fighting coalition forces, which definitely weakens their unified image from which they earn their credibility and perceived power among their own audience and the Arab audience, which certainly affects their war strategy. We may assume thus that the antagonistic relationship between Al-Jazeera, on the one hand, and the Pentagon and its allies and partners on the other, partly resulted from the channel's overt criticism of their strategies and policies in the so-called "war on terror," which had potential to harm the Pentagon's info-strategic warfare, especially in the Arab world.

This position of Al-Jazeera not only conforms with that of its target audience who are mostly against the invasion, but is also central to an enduring culture in the Arab World, perceiving any official discourse as pure governmental propaganda. This daring attitude and linguistic tone of Al-Jazeera, especially at this point of history, where the Arab people around the world were feeling humiliated and standing wholeheartedly against the invasion, could only enhance the channel's popularity. Inescapably, however, this also indirectly, I think, strengthens the position of the Iraqi side by negating the Arab public perception of the coalition forces' perceived power and thus heightening false hopes for the Iraqis' aspired victory. I may thus speculate that Al-Jazeera's fulfilling of its critical role fed into Iraq's strategic position/policy in the forthcoming war, and misled the Arab public at some points.

From the White House, then, Thabet El-Bardisi, Al-Jazeera correspondent in Washington, updates Adnaan about the latest news, a few minutes before the speech of Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld,

The news from the White House, half an hour ago, Ari Fleisher, the spokesman of the White House said that the US would not stop the war even if Saddam Hussein came out. He said that even if Saddam Hussein left Iraq now, our mission of disarming Iraq from its WMD, as he say, will continue. Also, he was asked about the US reaction on the public address of the Iraqi President challenging the US war, he said first we don't know who is on the tape, and if it was Saddam Hussein, we don't know when it was recorded. What is worth mentioning that the Iraqi President mentioned the date when he read his address to the people. So, this is an attempt from the White House to doubt the authenticity of this presidential address of Saddam Hussein, saying that is either not him or it was previously recorded. Also, he said that the analysts are still trying to find out the truth of this record. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 3*

Thabet is shown live in the open-air between the White House and Capitol Hill. Reporting live and from such a strategically important location in the US, Thabet's report greatly yields Al-Jazeera much credibility/authority. Evidently he tries to discredit the American official discourse, firstly by stressing that Saddam Hussein's mentioning of the day's date in his address to prove it is concurrent with the invasion, and secondly by describing the White House speech as attempting "to doubt the authenticity of this presidential address of Saddam Hussein, saying that is either not him or it was previously recorded." This statement clearly challenges the official statement, firstly by suggesting the authenticity of Saddam Hussein's speech, and the word "presidential" which certainly consolidates and legitimizes Saddam's position at the time as the president, and secondly by stressing the White House claims or attempts to justify its position, which simply implies it is not a strong position.

The critical nature of Thabet's report seems to be surely aimed at stressing the inherent weakness of the US official discourse, which, I think, tends reassures the Arab public, that their perceived enemy is not as strong as they may be thinking. Also, Al-Jazeera's choice to scrutinize this part of the US official discourse in itself, which exposes a perceived weakness in the US position, demonstrates its attempt at challenging it. Thabet was also asked about his own expectations concerning the pace of US Pentagon's official speeches, as Adnaan asks, "Thabet, what do we expect from the conference of the US Defense Minister, Donald Rumsfeld?" Thabet replies,

There are a lot of issues that the journalists can think of, like asking him about the Iraqi missiles that attacked Kuwait and the American forces gathering there, why the operations had this unexpected and unannounced beginning of the war, as they were talking that the attacks will cause a complete shock to Iraq, and we did not find anything from this. Was that unaccounted or for tactical reasons? Will this shock still happen or some sand filled the missiles and they cannot work again? All these questions are legitimate for the journalists, and sure he will be faced with lots of questions as the mere appearance of the Iraqi president on TV will embarrass the [US] administration. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 3*

The headline reads, "American Defense Minister, Donald Rumsfeld Held a Press Conference Shortly," then changes, "The American Forces in Kuwait Received Orders to Get Ready to Fight Within an Hour," then, "The American Forces Northern Kuwait Attacked by Nine Missiles from the Iraqi Side." Thabet's words together with the accompanying visual screen headlines shows a clear pro-Iraqi stance taken by Al-Jazeera, highlighting perceived Iraqi victory, while keeping its apparent objectivity by reporting the latest news promptly, the imminent beginning of Rumsfeld's first press

conference during the invasion. This is also clearly indicated in the main screen headline above. The following headline, also, on the US forces getting ready to fight in an hour, shows how Al-Jazeera is frequently updating its news items while running this live report from Washington. It is also reporting both sides of the conflict, with the third headline indicating the Iraqi missiles that attacked US forces in northern Kuwait.

The analytical discourse, however, reflects Al-Jazeera's decisive challenging of US perceived power. Thabet's speculations of the possible questions and issues that might be raised by journalists during the forthcoming conference suggest an attempt at discrediting the perceived American power. The questions about the Iraqi missiles that attacked Kuwait reflect a strong presence by the Iraqi armed forces, which are never shown on CNN, and their perceived victory. It also clearly exposes perceived weakness for the US forces being attacked, without responding to such attacks or clearly announcing its repercussions. Also, questioning the "unexpected and unannounced" beginning of the invasion together with the non-existent 'shock' to the Iraqis which may have been unaccounted for by the Americans clearly, I believe, exposes American weaknesses to the Arab public. The Arab contempt of the US attacks is reflected in Thabet's assumption that "some sand filled the missiles and they cannot work again"! Then assuming the legitimacy of such questions definitely consolidates Thabet's assumptions, which probably corresponds to Rogers' above-mentioned description of the sand storm. Those questions are probably those kinds of questions that the Pentagon would not want to be asked in the first place, as the White House warned US television networks much earlier in the "war on terror". Ending with the definite embarrassment caused to the US administration by the appearance of Saddam Hussein surely indicates another attempt at weakening its perceived power.

In addition to reporting and scrutinizing the coalition official discourse, Al-Jazeera was often utilized by Iraqi officials to deliver their messages, which were not treated with the same caution and scrutiny as the coalition ones. This is evidently just the opposite of what CNN did. The former Iraqi information minister was the most skilled in utilizing Al-Jazeera as a milieu to deliver his speeches. On the second day of the assault, Al-Jazeera aired a news report showing the former Iraqi Information Minister, Mohammed Said Al-Sahhaf, commenting on the images of captured Iraqis. Sahhaf appears from behind a high stand where all the microphones are placed, behind him an old image of Saddam Hussein surrounded by two large Iraqi flags and an Iraqi military official is standing beside him. As he starts speaking, the main screen headlines reads, "Mohammed Said Al-Sahhaf, Iraqi Information Minister,"

They distributed a tape showing as if their war tanks are advancing. And they distributed a tape showing as if it includes Iraqi war prisoners. First of all, these are not Iraqi soldiers. We announce that these are not members of the Iraqi Military Forces at all. From where [have] they brought them? How [have] they brought them? How [have]

they organized this? From where [have] they brought these faces? This will be known in the coming days. But, I announce to you that these are not Iraqi soldiers. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 4*

Sahhaf then continues, from the same location,

We will not let them get out of the swamp, into which we drag them. We dragged them, and we will drag them more and more. This gang of international bitches will witness their end because they dared to attack Iraq. The second point, yesterday, because they are a gang of international bitches, they announced that they confiscated the Iraqi assets and money. OK. I am not astonished. I mean, what do we expect from a gang? I think the whole world has become convinced, even though many of them have been convinced a long time ago, that this [is a] lawless country, the country of unlawful persons who attempted to describe the others with these characteristics. Now in a series of failing measures, which reflects that they have started to lose temper, they started to fall like daisies... *Al-Jazeera Transcript 4*

This report, which came on top of Al-Jazeera's news agenda, is meant to counter the images displayed on global television of the Iraqis surrendering, with the Pentagon's narratives stating that they are Iraqi forces. The images are clearly playing a central role in this war and making the news headlines, for their perceived impact. The intemperate words of Sahhaf, by all means, however, are quite far from countering the power of those images. Firstly because words are naturally unable to compete with images power-wise, especially officials' speeches, usually perceived as propaganda. And secondly because his constant and continuous usage of insults bad language, only signifies a hesitant and weak position and failed attempts to cover up losses and fatalities.

The position of a large image of Saddam Hussein beside the Iraqi flags is surely meant to signify he is still in power and control, a claim that Sahhaf's words could easily blur with his unconvincing illogical words, neither presenting any evidence that the shown people do not belong to the Iraqi Armed Force, nor for the failure or loss of temper, he claims, for the coalition forces. Significantly, no comment or analysis was provided by Al-Jazeera for Sahhaf's speech. Such lack of adequate analysis can be explained in two possible ways. Firstly, Al-Jazeera was not in a position to criticize Iraqi officials in wartime because it would risk losing access to the war zone with its office situated in an Iraqi controlled area and under Iraqi authority. Secondly, criticizing Iraqi officials at a time when the Arab public is furious at the coalition forces committing daily atrocities against the Iraqi people would simply negate its pan-Arab approach. This would certainly lose the channel credibility among its own audience. In addition, Al-Jazeera is decisively challenging the discourse of the coalition media, by simply dealing with the Iraqi officials as the legitimate government in power in the peaceful country being attacked.

The Iraqi government's utilization of Al-Jazeera to show the war's repercussions is also evident in another incident. On a tour for journalists in the location of some palaces destroyed because of the air raids, Sahhaf incidentally said while selecting his location, apparently not paying attention that Al-Jazeera's camera was recording:

Where are the microphones? Where is Al-Jazeera? Where are the rest of microphones? Let's shoot here. Come around me. (Voice not very clear, then he starts speaking to the cameras) The bitch, the bitch, the American war minister, Rumsfeld, we say it shamelessly because these don't know shame. These are criminals. The world listens to the alarm sirens, now. This is Al Salaam (Peace) Palace. This is the Palace of hospitality. It is specialized for the accommodation of Presidents and leaders' delegations....and a large number of Prime Ministers, and world presidents, peace lovers and freedom supporters. This is al Salaam Palace that the Iraqis constructed to be a palace for peace, without shame of this sad criminal, Rumsfeld. He says in his press conference tonight, while the bombs and cruise missiles attack this place, he says 'today we hit hundred of military targets'. This is al Salaam Palace. And this criminal dog says it is a military site. Here nearby, is el Zouhour (Flowers) Palace, and this is the Crown Palace that used to be inhabited by the Royal Family... a small little palace that we transferred into a museum in a stage of political development in Iraq. They also attacked el Zhouhour (flowers) Palace, and demolished it like this one. I just would like to tell the world that these criminals, this gang of international bitches, please, to all the free people of the world: these only deserve to be treated by shoes. This criminal, sitting and hiding in the White House, he is a trivial criminal. His defence minister does not deserve but to be beaten on the head. These criminals are lying to the world because they are criminals by nature and criminals by... *Al-Jazeera Transcript 5*

The images show Sahhaf walking in the demolished al Salaam Palace, where images of destruction surround him; the footage is not clear, as it was shot in absolute darkness. He selects a place, where the destruction appears clearly behind him, and starts gathering the journalists around him to talk. The headline reads, "Sahhaf Tours the Journalists on the Consequences of Knocking Down Iraq." The alarm sirens are loudly heard while he speaks. The headline changes, "Iraqi Information Minister Replies to the American Attacks on Baghdad". As he speaks, his personal security guard appears from behind him looking all around, all the time.

This speech, as the headline reads, is clearly meant to reply to the raids. This reply, however, is overwhelmed by two elements. First Sahhaf's clear concern about the presence of Al-Jazeera exposes his attempt at utilizing the channel for disseminating his message to the world, as he states, "I would like to tell the world..." And secondly, again, the tone and the bad language he uses just clearly shows how weak and vulnerable is the situation of the Iraqi leadership. By those images Sahhaf wanted to demonstrate that the targets hit were not military targets. Also, his specific concern about those palaces, maybe more than the Iraqis killed or being treated in hospitals, for instance, is likely to raise doubts about the content of these palaces, often claimed by the US to have WMD hidden in their basements.

In conclusion, Al-Jazeera's treatment of the official speeches of both sides of the conflict definitely exposes its pan-Arab position, which willingly or not served the Iraqi strategic goals, by showing off the perceived weaknesses of the coalition and emphasizing perceived Iraqi victories. Evidently Al-Jazeera is reporting the official discourse of both sides of the conflict, to conform to its slogan of reporting the opinion and the other opinion. However, the coalition's official reports are treated with suspicion and harshly scrutinized by its correspondents on both sides of the Atlantic. To do so, Al-Jazeera sacrifices much of its professional approach to news reporting, with its correspondents purely presenting their personal accounts of events and issues. Although most of its

reports are aired live, it seems to largely depend of the power of imminence created by the spontaneity of its reports rather than the imagery it presents in such reports, with static backgrounds not really showing much behind its correspondents.

CNN International:

Contrary to Al-Jazeera, CNN International did not comment on and analyze any official discourse on its screen. Rather, official speeches appeared mostly quick and focused serving as part of a set of news items, more than being news in themselves, as the news item read by Jim Clancy goes,

A US military spokesman said that US forces have captured the Southern Iraqi town of Nasiriya. Now that is a key crossing point on the Euphrates River in Southern Iraq. It could be used by US marines racing across the desert there, headed for Baghdad. Just moments ago, the leader of the US central command Tommy Franks held his first news conference since the beginning of the Iraq conflict. He was talking about the status of the leadership. *CNN Transcript 2*

The accompanying images show a graphic map of Iraq, then, the city of Nassiriya appears highlighted in red. The red banner on the top of the screen reads, “U.S. Forces Capture Nasiriya” and the main headline, down the screen, “Spokesman says U.S. forces have Captured Nasiriya”. As Jim appears reading from papers, the headline reads, “Leader of US Central Command Speaks.” Tommy Franks starts speaking, then, while the image shows him speaking very slowly, in a hesitant tone behind a tall stand holding the logo of the US army. Two of his assistants are behind him, on either side. The main screen headline reads: “Gen. Tommy Franks, CMOR, US Central Command”. The camera then moves onto a large number of journalists in front of him writing and listening to him,

Tommy Franks: There is a sort of confusion that is going on within the regime. I believe command and control is not exactly as advertised on Baghdad television. I believe that we should all be very confident that the application of force that is going into that country is designed to be superseding that it avoids in every way possible exposure of non-combatants to that. *CNN Transcript 2*

Apparently CNN’s reporting of the official discourse begins by describing perceived coalition victory, the capture of Nasiriyya city, and then the press conference by Franks in itself is news rather than what Franks says. Franks, I think, is clearly trying to contain public opinion and reply to things that have been shown on Iraqi or Arab television by simply saying that they are not true, or they are not the way they are. He presents no proof on his point, and seems quite hesitant and unconfident while saying so, which seems to discredit his claims in the first place. Nevertheless, official speeches as such are used on CNN as evidence, as it is deemed credible and thought to earn the channel popularity. Frank’s speech is evidently recorded and well-edited, and only a small segment of it is shown to the public, which raises questions of the limits of credibility of such official statements, and how effectively the Western media in general deals with the undesired images. Are the general public

convinced this is enough evidence, especially with the gruesome images/evidence shown on Al-Jazeera? Is it enough to say those images are not true or are not as bad as they look and expect the people to believe this? I do not think so.

In addition, the news of capturing the city of Nasiriyya at the beginning of the newscast gives the impression that Franks is going to speak about it. However, it was not mentioned on the shown segment of his speech at all. It seems that the media discourse on Arab television dictated the official discourse of coalition forces, forcing them to be on the defensive a lot. This defensive attitude was even reflected in Frank's hesitant tone and the uncertain manner in which he spoke, while not telling anything newsworthy in fact. Also, the graphic map of Iraq indicating the location of Nasiriyya is clearly a substitution for the non-existent images, although the capture of a city by the US military should be a great event to be covered by embedded reporters who are supposed to report the issue in more depth and show actual live images by means of videophone and the like.

CNN, however, has aired fully the Presidential address of the US President, George Bush, which, I think, is strategically meant to raise the soldiers' morale and assure the public opinion on the progress of the invasion. As Ralitsa reports,

Here with President George W. Bush, at the presidential retreat in Maryland this weekend. He met with his war counsellor about the progress coalition forces are making in the War in Iraq. Mr. Bush spoke to his country about that in his first radio address since the campaign began. Let's listen to him... *CNN Transcript 3*

The images show Ralitsa Vassileva, at the CNN centre, with screens and people sitting in the background behind her. The headline reads, "Bush Radio Address". Her image is then replaced by a still image of George Bush in a box to the right side of the screen, and to the left side we can read, "Presidential Radio Address," as he starts speaking,

Good morning. American and coalition forces have begun a concerted campaign against the regime of Saddam Hussein. In this war our coalition is broad. More than 40 countries from across the globe. Our cause is just. The security of the nations we serve and the peace of the world. And our mission is clear. To disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. To end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism. And to free the Iraqi people. The future of peace and the hopes of the Iraqi people now depend on our fighting forces in the Middle East. They are conducting themselves on the highest traditions of the American military. They are doing their job with skill and bravery and with the finest allies beside them. At every stage of this conflict the war will see both the power of our military and the honourable and decent spirit of the men and women who serve in this conflict. American and coalition forces face enemies who have no regards for the conventions of war or rules of morality. Iraqi troops have placed troops and equipment in civilian areas, attempting to use innocent men, women and children as shields for the dictator's army. I want Americans and the entire world to know. The coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm. A campaign on harsh terrain. In a vast country. Could be longer and more difficult than some have predicted. And Helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable and free country will require our sustained commitment. But whatever it will require us; we will carry out all the duties we have accepted. Across America, this weekend, the families of our military are praying that our men and women will return safely and soon. Millions of Americans are also praying with them for the safety of their loved ones, and for the protection of all the innocent. Our entire nation appreciates the sacrifices made by military families. And many citizens who live near military families are showing their support in practical ways, such as by helping with childcare or home repairs. All families with loved ones certainly in this war can know this. Our forces will be coming home as soon as their work is done. Our nation entered this conflict reluctantly, yet with a clear and firm purpose. The people of the United States, and

our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlawed regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. Now the conflict has come the only way to limit its duration is to apply decisive force. This will not be a campaign of half measures. It is a fight for the security of our nation and the peace of the world. And we will accept no outcome but victory. Thank you for listening. *CNN Transcript 3*

The speech of President Bush is used by CNN as evidence, without presenting any comment or scrutiny of what he says. The speech is certainly meant to raise the morale of the US forces fighting in Iraq, especially with the fact that it is meant to be a radio address so that it reaches them easily. In doing so, Bush is raising the value of what they are doing in a very patriotic fashion, first by stressing that they are not alone but in the middle of a coalition of forty countries, then by emphasizing the sacred humanitarian goals for which they are fighting: disarm Iraq, end Saddam's regime that supports terrorism, and free the Iraqi people. The speech is evidently over-simplifying things, which is a good key to making the case easily convincing. I assume, the more the simple the mission or the concept the more likely it meets public support and approval. The slow and organized fashion, I believe, is clearly meant to positively affect the US public and touch on their feelings. He moves then to praising the unusual qualities and bravery of those personnel who committed themselves to the fighting.

Bush then justifies the killing of civilians, by claiming that the Iraqi troops and equipment are deliberately placed in civilian areas by the government to use them as human shields, which seems to be a clear attempt to contain the worldwide public anger at the images of civilians being killed in their own homes. This claim lies at the heart of the constant American speculation of connections between Saddam and Bin Laden, which eventually makes Saddam a terrorist as well, who would likewise use human beings as explosives. This is since it might be a convincing claim to the American people, of whom 70 percent stood behind this unlawful invasion. But is it convincing to all Americans? Is it providing enough guarantee that no dissenting voices would be heard in America, or anti-war movements? But is it convincing for everybody else? I think the pervasiveness of anti-war demonstrations and movements inside the US demonstrate the opposite.

CNN's airing of Bush's presidential address fully and without comment rests on the common culture that official speeches are to be treated as absolute evidence. The lack of any comment or criticism towards everything he says surely reflects also a, willingly or not, cooperative media-military relationship. Despite the fact that the lack of analysis may be a tactical channel policy to keep gaining its access to the White House, still the statement of support issued by CNN to approve the Pentagon's propaganda and censorship policy since the beginning of the "war on terror" proves wholehearted cooperation from the side of CNN. Airing Bush's speech as it is and in full also demonstrates how

CNN was equally utilized by US and coalition officials to deliver their messages to their own people, and to the worldwide audience as well, given the perceived popularity of the channel.

3- Global Reactions and Worldwide Anti-War Demonstrations:

As soon as the US-led military assault against Iraq erupted, the global worldwide anti-war demonstrations filled television screens along with the invasion news and views. Disparities between CNN and Al-Jazeera in reporting such demonstrations can be explained in terms of each channel's background, culture, inclination, and of course the types and degrees of power exercised by the military on its wartime coverage. While those demonstrations served Al-Jazeera's anti-war policy and provided the channel with enough evidence on the rightfulness of its position, CNN showed only quick snapshots of those demonstrations giving its viewers the impression that they are quite few, subtle and limited. The following critical discourse analysis attempts to elucidate this.

Al-Jazeera:

At the time CNN focused on the perceived power of coalition military, surrendering Iraqis and captured cities, Al-Jazeera was concerned with the Iraqi and Arab reactions, the global demonstrations against the assault and the perceived Iraqi victories. Al-Jazeera did not fail to thoroughly report the Arab reactions, and the eruption of worldwide global demonstrations, as the following significant report, read by Al-Jazeera's in-studio anchor Rima, shows,

Rima: The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine called for opening the borders with Iraq to the caravans of martyrs to resist, what it called the crusade attack on Iraq. The movement said in a report, that Al-Jazeera received a copy of, that that the terrorists from the Americans or British are fighting a new crusading war against Iraq to embezzle its resources of goodness, and draw a new map for the region according to the Israeli goals. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 6*

The images first show Rima, and then a full-screen picture of the Palestinian report, hardly readable, while she reads the news item. The report is certainly meant to act as evidence enhancing the authenticity of the news item. The linguistic discourse of Al-Jazeera not only legitimizes the popular non-governmental Palestinian resistance organization, Hamas, as a powerful and credible news source, but also endorses their resistance personnel who sacrifice their own lives to kill the perceived enemy. At the same time, the channel attempts to appear objective, when it cautions about Hamas's calling of the American-British invasion, "crusade attack," by adding, "what it called," when referring to the report.

Al-Jazeera's evident double standards in referring to the "caravans of martyrs," rests on a long line of live reporting of the Second Palestinian Intifada against the Israeli occupation, since its beginning in the 2000. This explains its being less cautious about the report's calling American and

British invaders “terrorists” launching a “new crusading war” aimed at meeting “Israeli goals.” In its coverage of the Intifada, since its beginning, Al-Jazeera adhered to a strong pan-Arab stance, supporting its symbols, operations and manners, and reporting it live to a wider Arab public across the globe, which earned the channel immeasurable popularity, together with the Palestinian Intifada itself. It was not thus wise to contradict this long-running stance. Rather, putting this news item at the top of its agenda is likely to enhance the linkage in the Arab mind between Iraq and Palestine as one issue, putting the Americans and British invaders together with the Israelis in one camp as a single enemy.

By placing Hamas’ report on top of its wartime news agenda, Al-Jazeera is militarily challenging the US and its coalition, not only by legitimising Hamas, the Intifada and endorsing its acts and manners, which have the potential of inflicting murder among American and coalition soldiers attacking Iraq. Al-Jazeera is also harming the US foreign policy in the Arab world and its continuous effort to gain hearts and minds in this region, by drawing comparisons between the coalition invasion of Iraq and the Israeli invasion and occupation of Palestine. By airing this report Al-Jazeera seeks to prove it is first and foremost a pan-Arab channel, while worsening, at the same time, the already combative relationship with the Pentagon and the West, and positioning itself as a potential target for their aerial bombardment. Eventually this earns the channel more credibility in the Arab world.

Al-Jazeera then moves to report on the global demonstrations taking place. Most significant was the American demonstration,

Many American cities witnessed demonstrations against the war on Iraq. In New York City, thousands went out in the cold weather and under the rain insulting US President George Bush and calling for his dismissal from power. They repeated slogans saying that the sole terrorists in the world today are Bush and the CIA. And similar demonstrations took place in other American cities, including Chicago, San Francisco and Philadelphia. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 6*

The corresponding images showed very dark pictures of the New York demonstration, and people holding their umbrellas in the rain, and then pictures of people holding banners, and other people holding an effigy of President George Bush, as the camera focuses on someone holding the Iraqi flag. The view of this demonstration is certainly meant to challenge the claim that the great majority of the American people stand behind the invasion, by utilizing images/evidence proving there are counter-viewpoints being expressed in the US in a number of cities. Though the images only showed the New York ones, the news item listed Chicago, San Francisco and Philadelphia also. Most significantly, it is highlighting the fact that the New York demonstration, springing from where the twin towers collapsed, “insulted President George Bush and called for his dismissal from power,” as well as calling him and the CIA “terrorists,” as the news item states. Focusing on the images of anti-

war banners, the effigy of George Bush, and a person holding the Iraqi flag demonstrate that many of the Americans are strongly against the invasion, and expressing this in different ways.

The news report strongly negates the dominant discourse in the US media, usually referring to the American people as standing together behind this invasion, in retaliation for what they suffered in 9/11. It has the potential of challenging dominant media perceptions in the West about this assault, and thus harming the US war policy and information strategy. Placing this news item in the same newscast, after the Palestinian report, which equally called the American and British forces “terrorists,” I think, seems to suggest a unified stance and perception between American and the Palestinian public opinion. Such stance apparently stems from the fact that what was being committed in Iraq negates most, if not all, ethical and moral standards. More demonstrations, backed with pictures, then follow from China, Germany, Japan and Australia:

And in Peking, hundreds of foreign citizens demonstrated opposing the war the US is undertaking nowadays on Iraq. They organized a protest walk in Retan Park in the Chinese capital, after the Chinese police forces suppressed their plan to go to the American embassy. And in the German city of Munich, thousands of people demonstrated expressing their contempt and opposition to the war on Iraq. And they demanded, in their slogans, for not sacrificing blood for oil, and called for stopping the war immediately. Another similar demonstration took place in the city of Frankfort, and the organizers of these demonstrations say that 350 demonstrations will be organized in all parts of Germany in protest against the war. In Tokyo, thousands of Japanese demonstrated in front of the American embassy protesting the American war against Iraq. Hundreds of the police forces personnel encircled the embassy building to prevent the demonstrators from spilling into the embassy. And the demonstration witnessed a lot of violence and attacks between the police forces and the demonstrators. Also, thousands of Australians have demonstrated for the second consecutive day, in the country’s biggest city, protesting the war the US and Britain are undertaking against Iraq, and their country’s cooperation in the military operations. In Melbourne, the second largest Australian city, about eight thousand persons went out to the streets to protest against the American-British attack against Iraq, and holding flags and placards calling for peace. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 6*

The accompanying pictures show the Peking demonstration, with people holding white banners with apparently Chinese and other writing, in a wide park. Then pictures of the Munich demonstration with a huge number of people in the street holding white and red banners, while marching. Then, a close-up image of a German girl who wrote on her face “no war”, is shown and behind her, another one putting around her neck the Palestinian scarf, then other close up images of banners and pictures of Bush and Saddam behind prison fences. In Tokyo things look more violent, with violence taking place between the police and demonstrators who try to break into the US embassy, and others holding so many banners. Another close-up image shows someone holding a picture of George Bush, with the word “Terrorist” in red and covering his face. The images then show a distant picture of the crowd by night holding lamps and banners, and a close-up one showing the police force attacking the demonstrators with sticks, and another close-up picture showing a Japanese covering his head with the Palestinian scarf. The images then shift to Australia, where the demonstration is equally huge, and a large yellow banner read, “Moscow Refuses the American Request to Expel the Iraqi Diplomats,” and

a smaller one, “No War,” in addition to so many colourful banners in the background. A banner reads, “Bush Must Be Eradicated at Int. War Criminal Court” and another reads, “Bush Murderer.”

The accompanying imagery of the demonstrations proves Al-Jazeera’s policy of emphasizing the global discontent with the US military assault on Iraq. The images tend to specifically focus on the banners held by ordinary people, where anti-war slogans and words are clearly expressed. It focuses as well on symbols and signals, such as the German girl putting the Palestinian scarf around her neck, or the wreaths, signifying that war means death. The concentration of those demonstrations in non-Arab and non-Moslem countries is also another significant dimension. It indicates that not only fellow Arabs and Moslems are the ones sympathizing with Iraq and the suffering of its people, but many human beings from different nationalities and races and religions refute this criminal assault. The embodiment of this strong message on Al-Jazeera screens in the middle of military operations, I think, is deemed likely to harm the US war policy, essentially based on gaining public support for the allegedly benign goals behind this attack. Specifically, Al-Jazeera’s clear policy of focusing on the demonstrations in the countries perpetuating the assault, the US and Australia in this report and the earlier reference to the demonstrations in the UK, is likely to break the apparent unity of the coalition at its root. This is because, I assume, it makes the task of convincing public opinion in those countries much harder, if not impossible.

The wording of the newscast in itself contains a great deal of data and evidence, most of it backed with images, in an accurate fashion that provides great authority to the news report. These include the failure of Chinese demonstrators to penetrate the US embassy, the demonstrators in Munich calling for an immediate stop to the war, the Frankfurt demonstrators organizing 350 more demonstrations to be held around Germany, and the Australians’ anger about their country’s cooperation with the assaults. The pictures of violence erupting between the Japanese demonstrators and police force as they try to cross the iron fences in front of the US embassy are also especially powerful. This kind of discourse and the accompanying images is specifically what the US and its coalition would want to suppress.

In addition to reporting international demonstrations, the Arab demonstrations and especially the ones from the Cairo demonstrations were most significant, I think, in reflecting the popular disenchantment with the assault among the Arab public. Egyptian demonstrations, particularly, are generally newsworthy as they are the most massive and violent in a highly suppressed region, given the fact that demonstrations are usually permanently banned in Egypt, under an enduring emergency law. They were exceptionally allowed during the invasion under sharp government scrutiny and violent police procedures to guarantee no criticism whatsoever is directed towards the government’s alignment

and involvement in the assault. Egyptian demonstrations, thus, due to their significantly high frequency and huge volume, were especially significant when aired on Al-Jazeera, in recorded reports by its correspondent Lina El Ghaban,

The Egyptians' demonstrations supporting Iraq and rejecting the outbreak of war against it never stopped since the beginning of military operations. And the outbreak of popular anger rejecting the war did not stop at the capital borders, but exceeded it to the different cities and districts. In Zagazig city about 25 thousands gathered, preceded by the representative of the Sacred Azhar and the Egyptian Church, and the different powers and political sects, from the far left to the far right to shout in one voice, "no to the attack and yes to the resistance". *Al-Jazeera Transcript 7*

In the words of the news report, which are said with great enthusiasm, it is crystal clear that the demonstration was organized by the government and was not a popular reaction as reported. Representatives from Al-Azhar Mosque and the Coptic Church, and all political parties are simply gathering to give the impression of national unity, among all sectors of society, against the assault. The accompanying images show a huge crowd of people gathering in Tahrir Square, from far away; holding large banners and the flags of Egypt and Iraq, the mosque appearing in the background. The headline reads, "Lina El-Ghaban's Report, Cairo", as the camera shows a much closer image of the crowd of people. The camera focuses on a group of women chanting unclear slogans, which is also meant to demonstrate that women are well-represented politically.

The image then shows some of the banners, reading in Arabic "No to the War against Iraq", as the pictures show the demonstration in Zagazig city. The camera focuses on the two hands holding each other of senior Moslem and Christian religious men, in their formal religious costume. The images then show representatives of the different political parties and syndicates, in front of a banner listing them. The headline reads, "Mohammed Morsi, Parliament Representative," as he protests,

The Islamic Arab Umma all resist on the heart of one man, all types of invasion and occupation. And ask history. This Umma will never be superseded. The interests of America, the interests of Britain, and the interests of attackers are endangered and no one will be able to stop the popular reactions in the future, if this leakage of blood continued. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 7*

As Lina then continues,

And the demonstration expressed the strict order imposed by the Egyptian authorities that oblige the coordination of political forces with it before getting out in a demonstration, either still or moving, at the end of the huge popular demonstrations that Cairo has witnessed last Friday. The Egyptian popular rejection of the American-British War on Iraq, after a week of the beginning of military operations, did not only include the popular and student demonstrations, but exceeded them to include the labour syndicates in Egypt, whose members have expressed in different ways the increasing state of anger in the Egyptian street towards the war. These syndicates, due to their experience in public work, have been keen that the government's systematizing is just a way of putting things in order to stop aggressive and outrageous acts, but not to avert the people's right of expressing their anger against, what the Arab League described as 'attack and invasion against brotherly Arab people'. Lina El Ghaban, Al-Jazeera, Cairo. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 7*

As she speaks, the images shows different angles of the demonstration, people holding microphones and speaking, others holding banners and shouting the slogans on the banners, others are holding Iraqi and Egyptian flags. It also includes scenes from the Cairo demonstrations, where the police are separating the demonstrators in Tahrir Square, using water cannons, as she mentions the Friday demonstration. Lina then appears talking in the microphone. Then the camera focuses on the banner on the door of the “Journalists Syndicate”, and moves away to show the people protesting at the syndicate gate, shouting unclear slogans, and carrying Bush’s image; the camera then focuses on schoolchildren protesting among them as well. The fact that it was organized by the government does not make the demonstration faked, because it was organized in the first place to contain the people’s anger and fury. It is, however, meant to prevent any expression of contempt or criticism of the Egyptian-American cooperation against Iraq, which the people are sick of. This sort of imagery, I think, sends a clear message to America that it will not be able to fool the Arab public about its aims in the region. It is, thus, equally deemed liable to worsen things for the US war policy in the region.

To conclude, Al-Jazeera’s reporting of the anti-war demonstration had been strongly pan-Arab both in its approach and discourse. Reporting the Palestinian report condemning the attack in a fashion that legitimates Palestinians actions and manners in resisting the Israeli occupation, greatly denigrates the US among the Arab audience, positioning it in one camp with Israel as a single enemy. Demonstrations inside the US, and especially in New York, were decisively aimed at breaking the apparent unity of the country in its war endeavours, by stressing through words and images that there is a great deal of disenchantment inside America. The worldwide demonstrations, then, prove the unethical endeavours of the assault, reflected in global rejection from many significant parts of the world. Then the significance of the Egyptian demonstrations, I assume, lies in the fact that Egypt is the most populated and highly-politicized country in the region, usually able to affect Arab public opinion in general. The pan-Arab approach of Al-Jazeera is supported by images of anger and violence erupting in worldwide demonstrations to embody the state of anger and fury caused by the inhumane and unjustified assault on Iraq. Both the reporting approach/agenda and its images/narratives discourse are evidently liable to harm the US info-strategic warfare in the region.

CNN International:

In contrast, CNN International’s reporting of the worldwide demonstrations represented only small and quick segments of their whole newscasts, overshadowed by the news of fighting forces, cities captured, and the continuous coalition advance, which is evidently central to the policy it is

following. The first demonstration reported on CNN, reported by Jim Clancy in Kuwait City, went on as follows,

Welcome to CNN's continuous coverage of the strike on Iraq. With a quick look at the latest developments including some anti-war protests that are turning violent. Angry demonstrators from Egyptian capital clashed with police. The police use water cannons to disperse some of those protesters. This is the second consecutive day of protest since the war on Iraq began with demonstrators chanting anti-American slogans. *CNN Transcript 4*

Images from Al-Jazeera show a large crowd of people on a bridge in the middle of Cairo, and the camera focuses on some smoke appearing from a fire towards the left end of the crowd, in the left corner of the screen. It is notable here that the only images of the demonstration available for CNN are those of Al-Jazeera, which might be in effect be the only Arab channel that could cover the protest, as reporting such events in Egypt is usually prohibited. The lack of CNN images, however, signifies the absence of its camera from such an important location at the outset of the alleged war. Reporting on this demonstration, however, proves CNN's attempt to show the different viewpoints of the war and appear objective. Also, CNN's choice of reporting this demonstration, thus, lies in its newsworthiness and its likeliness to enhance pre-held perceptions of this part of the world as barbaric and violent.

CNN's reporting of the London demonstration was even more subtle and unfocused. Read by Jim Clancy, in Kuwait City, it starts with the following,

Coalition air strikes reduce parts of Baghdad to rubble where residents of the Iraqi capital brace for more to come. An anti-war protest begins in London. We are looking at a live picture of one of many protests planned around the world. *CNN Transcript 4*

The accompanying images show Baghdad's night aerial attacks and bombs lightening the sky of Baghdad and exploding on the ground, making spontaneous and continuous fires across the images. The footage looks as if it is specifically designated footage in a Hollywood movie. The screen is, then, filled with people marching in the streets of London, demonstrating against the war. The introductory music then starts, with the different pictures of weapons, artillery and US war planes, US soldiers, and quotes from Bush's war speeches, and ends with the heading filling the upper half of the screen: "Strike on Iraq".

It is quite notable in this display of images how only the US/UK sides are represented. The US or coalition forces are running spectacular night bombardment, without any sort of reference to the Iraqi side whatsoever, let alone the Iraqi civilians. Then, the quick image of British demonstrators is shown. Its possible impact on the public, I think, is quickly overshadowed by the US martial music with the still photos of all types of weapons possessed, and the selected quotes from Bush speeches, and finally, "Strike on Iraq" fills the screen. Nothing is mentioned about this demonstration throughout the rest of the newscast.

Later on during the military invasion of Iraq, news of demonstrations appeared on CNN, but also as a small segment of a whole newscast. Following a recorded interview with Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, in which Larry King questioned the state of Australian disenchantment with their country's invasion of Iraq, reflected in the frequent demonstrations, Tumi Makgabo at CNN Centre, reports the following demonstrations,

Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, speaking there to CNN's Larry King. Well, it is not just in Australia where people have taken to the streets against the war. In Mexico City, three thousand people protested by the United States embassy and at one point tearing down the fence protecting the building. In Algiers, protesters denounced the US-led military campaign, and voiced their support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. And about seven thousands people marched in Bahrain capital chanting 'death to America, death to Israel'. What you are seeing here about the war depends on who's reporting it and where. As Octavia Nasr reports, that has been graphically demonstrated by the different coverage of a variety of stories. *CNN Transcript 5*

The accompanying images first show Tumi at CNN Centre, and the same outlook. Then images of demonstrations, where the headline reads, "Anti-War Demonstrations Around the World", then, "Mexico City", where the US flag is hung on the fence in front of US embassy and burned. The headline reads, "Crowd Tears Down Fence Protecting U.S. Embassy". Next, the pictures from Abu Dhabi TV show the demonstration in Algiers, as the headline reads "Algiers", then, "Protesters Denounce US Actions in Iraq". Pictures show a large banner reading in Arabic, "No to Separation of Iraq", and a man wearing around his neck a large image of Saddam Hussein, and many carrying the Iraqi flag. Other pictures from the Bahrain demonstration, where the headline reads "Manama," look more peaceful and silent people in local dress march carrying large flags, unlike Mexico City and Algiers. Tumi appears again, the same scene at CNN Centre, as the headline reads, "Global Perspective". The reporting of demonstrations is quick and not so detailed in terms of either words or pictures, unlike those of Al-Jazeera, where much more airtime was dedicated to anti-war demonstrations. The demonstrations however are followed by an explanation of such hostile attitudes towards the 'benign' war, which are blamed on the Arabic mass media.

4- Video of Captured and Killed US/UK POWs:

On the fourth day of the military assault, Al-Jazeera aired, from Iraqi television, an unedited video showing captured and killed coalition POWs. The airing of this video footage, together with Al-Jazeera itself, then, became a subject of condemnation and criticism by the attacking governments, the US and UK, throughout the invasion, with all the controversies it entails.

Al-Jazeera:

On the fourth day of the alleged war, by Al-Jazeera's accounts, Al-Jazeera's in-studio news report, read by its anchor Laila, stated the following,

We are now following the development of war on Iraq, in our continuous news coverage. The Iraqi television displays images of American soldiers killed and caught in skirmishing with the Iraqi forces. Bush requests Iraq to treat its war prisoners in humanitarian way and Iraq say that it will respect the Geneva Conventions. American and British forces send new air raids on Mosul tonight. And a leader of an Iraqi military unit denies to Al-Jazeera his or his forces' surrender to the American and British forces. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 8*

Along with those words, we first see Laila in the Al-Jazeera studio, and then as she reads the headlines we watch close-up video images of dead US soldiers on the ground, then another soldier, from his back, sitting on a bench, hands on his head. Then, Bush in the open-air outside the White House, where large trees appear behind him, and the White House, talking to journalists and only he appears in the image. Mosul in darkness where the image shows an ambulance rushing fast along a highway, and the air-raid sirens are heard very loudly in the background. Then an Iraqi military leader, with his soldiers behind him, is speaking to the Al-Jazeera correspondent outside, where "Al-Jazeera Exclusive" appears in both Arabic and English in the top right and left corners of the screen.

Evidently, everything mentioned in the news headlines is backed by timely images that certainly tend to ensure its credibility. The news items are apparently showing consecutively both sides of the conflict, along with their images, demonstrating in effect Al-Jazeera's slogan of showing "The Opinion and the Other Opinion." Also, showing the recent images of dead and captured first signals their extreme importance, while attributing them to Iraqi television, is probably meant to deny direct responsibility for them. Then the Bush reaction is certainly shown to support claims to objectivity, by representing both sides of the conflict. Once more the human costs of the raids on Mosul are indicated in the loud sirens of ambulance rushing in its streets. Nevertheless, the Iraqis are still standing up to the assault, with the evidence of their military leader denying surrender "live" on Al-Jazeera screen. Though the image discourse is meant to appear objective, showing both sides of the conflict, I think it still focuses on the points most appealing to the Arab public, the Iraqi casualties in Mosul, along with the perceived Iraqi victory demonstrated in the images of POWs and the military leader denying surrender.

As the images go on, the introductory war music shows a US aeroplane flying by night, then bombing in between two apparently civilian dwellings, then a huge fire coming out up to the sky, lightening the darkness of the night sky, where the words in graphic fire read, "War on Iraq," appear in clear red. The image is apparently factual, showing clearly how civilian buildings are harshly hit.

However, the graphic “War on Iraq” appearing in the middle of the fire is very artistic, resembling the beginning or ending of a Hollywood blockbuster.

As Al-Jazeera’s newscast then continues,

Al-Jazeera received the exclusive first images of dead and caught Americans and British in the War on Iraq. And it appears in the photos, recorded by the Iraqi television, a number of American soldiers who were killed or caught after a battle with the Iraqi forces in one of the Nassiriya districts, south of Baghdad. And we raise the audience attention that the pictures include distressing images, so it was necessary to notify. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 8*

In the accompanying images, Laila appears anew in the studio. It appears in the wordings that Al-Jazeera, in its caution about the images, tries to imitate Western channels in their way of presenting such types of image. Attributing the images to Iraqi television is clearly meant to deny responsibility for them, as Al-Jazeera can definitely foresee the Western reaction.

The video footage is then displayed. The pictures first show two US war tanks abandoned, then a close up image of the dead body of a US soldier beside one of the tanks. On the screen the headline reads, “Pictures that came to Al-Jazeera of dead US soldiers in the Nassiriya battle,” beside the red banner, “Breaking News.” “Al-Jazeera Exclusive” appears both in Arabic and English on the top right and left of the screen, the Arabic on a clear red banner and the English in faint white. The camera focuses on the US flags on the war tank, and a close-up of the dead body of a US soldier. Another picture in the same area is of a third tank and another dead soldier behind it, then a third dead body, where the images show more close-ups of the dead bodies from different directions. Then, more images from indoors show more dead bodies lying on the floor where someone tries to cover one of the bodies with his own (the dead man’s) jacket, as the US badge appears on it. The camera moves very slowly to show all the details closely, as the above-mentioned voiceover starts up,

Our dear audience, this is the fate of American attacking forces to the Iraqi territories. This is a group of the sons of Dikar district, who could make from the land of civilizations, the land of saints, a grave for its attackers. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 8*

The appalling unedited and unpackaged footage lasted for two whole minutes and 14.43 seconds, mostly silent, so that no words interfered or created a specific context or discourse for the images, until the very end, when the anchor from Iraqi television, said “this is the fate of American attacking forces...” It is definitely meant to be that way to inflict maximum reaction and maximum anger. Its length and accompanying silence, and the use of focus and close-up shots together are meant to make things appear as natural as possible, as if they are live, as if everyone in the audience is there, on the battlefield, looking and inspecting the corpses by themselves to make sure they are absolutely dead. The headline, “Pictures that came to Al-Jazeera of dead US soldiers in the Nassiriya battle,” not only aims at denying responsibility for the pictures, but also assumes there was a harsh battle taking

place. The “battle” expression in Al-Jazeera’s headline along with the images of its outcome demonstrates a perceived Iraqi victory. This expression, together with the accompanying images, which entail Iraqi soldiers fighting back and defending their country, however, I believe, negates the Western media discourse, where the public are only supposed to know that their forces are welcomed as liberators, meeting very limited resistance.

Accordingly, American spokesmen ‘went ballistic’ about this footage, and about the channel airing it - the Pentagon, the media, and certainly the public. The anger, though challenging their dominant discourse, seems to have brought them together in one camp against a single ruthless Iraqi enemy, for daring to show them what they have been in denial about. As the fear and fury syndrome proliferated, the images helped the invading forces justify their unjustified attacks and further more raids and bombings, making the hate speeches by officials against the images and the channel airing them, Al-Jazeera, look more valid and rational. The images harmed the Arab cause, and certainly harmed Al-Jazeera, when its offices were bombed. Nevertheless, they showed a crucial facet of reality that has long been in denial, the ugly face of a military invasion and what it entails.

Al-Jazeera newscast, then, went on to air the American reaction in detail,

In addition, the American President, George Bush said he expects Iraq to treat its American war prisoners in a humanitarian way, as the Americans treat the Iraqi war prisoners in a humanitarian way. And the American President has warned that any Iraqi who badly treats the American war prisoners will be considered a war criminal. Our audiences, now we move to Seliyya where a press conference is taking place. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 2*

Here we should recognize that Al-Jazeera is fully airing the American reaction, first by stating what President Bush said, and then by airing live what the military leaders had to say in their daily press conference. Along with those words, Laila appeared in the Al-Jazeera studio, and then the images moved to Seliyya, Qatar, for a crucial press conference by a military spokesman,

We are now in the fourth day of the operations in Iraq, and we continue to achieve good improvement, on land, air and sea, also. According to the pre-set plans for our military campaign. The operation in the West is continuing by pressuring the Iraqi units, and we continue to attack the command and control units, as well as the logistic units. And in the North we are settling down our sites, and target the support units and the Republican Guards Forces. Inside and around of Baghdad, our special operations go on with great success. To the South, our air units continue its campaign, and moves towards Baghdad, and also continues to materialize its operations inside and around the areas where our land forces are. The fighting operations were met with resistance in many sites; the most obvious is around Nassiriya. The US Marine forces inflicted severe losses in the enemy, and were left with death and injuries as well. And around Nassiriya as well, the US Forces and a support convoy met with an attack from the Iraqi forces, a number of the American forces were injured. And as a result of this, there are 12 missing now from the American forces. And afterwards, the Iraqi command officials, displayed pictures of caught and killed Americans in television, and this was a violation of the Geneva conventions. And earlier, a Patriot missile brought down a British plane by mistake, which is a crisis, and the investigation is taking place about it, and the plane’s crew is still considered missing. And in addition to the accident that actually took a lot of the effort of this campaign, we, as a result, present our deep condolences, thoughts and prayers to the families of those missing, killed and injured. And despite our losses, victory is still fated and assured for us. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 8*

Three military spokespersons appear in the image. One is talking behind the stand, Tommy Franks to the right, and another one, to the left, as they will talk consecutively. The pictures show the speaker from one side, and the journalists sitting in front of him, taking notes, then a close-up image of the spokesman reading from papers with the banner reading, "Live: Seliyya."

It is quite recognizable that the pictures, shown by Al-Jazeera, obliged military leaders, for the first and assumedly the last time in this assault, to admit their losses, not only the pictures. The speech starts with the successes and achievements of the coalition, to deny any perceived weakness or defeat and counter the fear syndrome. Then when referring to Nassiriya, first the losses inflicted on the enemy are mentioned, which are not shown by images/evidence, then the injuries as a result of their being "attacked," - no attackers are mentioned - along with the 12 missing, which were displayed by the Iraqi television, as dead and captured. The airing of such footage, as officials insisted, is a violation of the Geneva Conventions, without justification. The brief mention of the US missile that has mistakenly brought down a British plane was significant. And finally the necessary condolences are presented to the families of the dead, killed and injured. The fear embedded in this official speech is evident from its tone and content, and the attempts to counter such fear are also evident.

Another military spokesman, then, continues,

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to start by expressing my condolences too to the families of members of American and British Armed Forces, who lost their lives in this campaign. Our thoughts and condolences are also for the missing, both from the military forces of the coalition or members of the mass media. Even in peacetime there are dangers, but in wartime these danger incredibly increase. But, anyway this is what our forces are trained to face. They are well trained, professional, and committed to fulfilling their missions. We don't know what happened in today's accident, but there is evidence indicating that a Patriot missile brought down a British Tornado plane GR4. And there is a detailed investigation going on now. This is why we should not rush to expectations, and conclusions. We will take the necessary steps to prevent the repetition of such an accident. And we are completely satisfied on the development of our procedures concerning this issue. And we also understand that we face dangers that are always present. But, we do our best to avoid them. Don't forget that the Patriot missiles are originally meant for defence, and they have so far brought down four missiles that the Iraq has haphazardly sent, against our forces and the Kuwaiti people. But for these [patriot] missiles, many people would have lost their lives. We have to share, in this coalition, all dangers and victories, as our goal, even if we don't forget about this accident, is to continue in our missions. The British forces have given significant support to this campaign so far. And, as you saw, our operations are smoothly coordinated, and complement each other, with the US forces. We are fighting side by side with them. Also, the special television coverage has showed how a Marine Cavalry and a US Marine Cavalry are still busy in fighting the latest pockets of resistance in Um Qasr and the other areas. The greatest resistance, so far, comes from Saddam Fedaein and from the Special Security Forces; because they know that they will never have a role or a future in the new Iraq. At the time all this is going on... *Al-Jazeera Transcript 8*

Both speeches, as well, evidently focus more on justifying what has happened, affirming the dangers surrounding their forces, their courage and good training to face any danger. This is in addition to defending the military value of Patriot missiles, and assuring the strength of coordination between US and British forces, while emphasizing the crucial role of the British, and the courage of US forces still fighting what they call "resistance pockets" in Um Qasr. It is clear in both speeches that Al-

Jazeera-run images are likely to create a state of fear and panic across the political and military leadership on the coalition side. Their global image was deeply tarnished, and their constant descriptions of the unmatched power they possessed, since the beginning of the assault, was challenged by Al-Jazeera images, discrediting their claims and obliging them to be on the defensive in front of their own people.

The second speech attempts to justify the losses by the fact that war is dangerous, and even in peacetime there is danger, which is logically true for everyone, but definitely not conclusive. The speech did not offer any justification to the Western audience, who was always denied any knowledge about the Iraqi side all the way. Being predominantly exposed to video images that only showed and enhanced the unlimited power of coalition forces and their war machinery, the Iraqis were always out of the equation, never existing, never fighting back, because they are only good at shaking hands and greeting their liberators/soldiers. The Iraqi army is referred to as “resistance-pockets” which suggests that they are small in size, desperately suicidal, belonging to Saddam’s ruthless regime, only “attacking” because they will never have a role in the post-Saddam era.

Tommy Franks, then, starts speaking of the captured and killed POWs, saying,

And we think that they are kept in the custody of Iraqi Forces and we don’t know their fate. And lastly, at the time the coalition forces attacks continue in the North of Nassiriya, they were met also with forces that showed all its readiness for surrendering, and when [our forces] honestly moved towards them, they were harshly attacked by them, and inflicted losses and harsh fighting that our forces have confronted in the last 24 hours. But it is continuing and determined to continue, even with more power, to achieve its goals. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 8*

Franks is apparently trying to justify the clear coalition failure, demonstrated by Al-Jazeera-shown images, by describing a natural combat situation in which each side is supposed to deceive the other, as “harsh and dishonest.” The discourse does not seem convincing, inflating even more fear among the Western audience. By saying, “we don’t know their fate,” Franks simply killed their sons and daughters, by strengthening the possibility of their being killed, just to condemn the Iraqi enemy. Although the unknown fate entails rescuing and getting them home, all the time they are in Iraqi custody death is still a very likely option, just like the rest of their colleagues, shown in full detail by Iraqi cameras. This fear rests on a long running anti-Iraq media campaign on the ruthless and despotic nature of Saddam’s regime and its subjects, which also validates the accusation of violating the Geneva Conventions. It rests on a sustained media representation of Arabs and Muslims as barbaric, merciless and immoral people. It is necessary to note, however, that Al-Jazeera showed both discourses of fear, run by both sides of the conflict to counter fear, and eventually inspire more fear. CNN’s one-sided reporting is evident in the following discourse analysis.

CNN International:

CNN refrained from showing the notorious video footage from Iraqi television. Strangely enough, CNN did not seem to have mentioned or discussed the whole issue of killed and captured coalition POWs throughout the whole day. It was not until the fifth day when CNN reported the issue, at the end of a very long newscast, read by Stan Grant, at CNN Centre in Hong Kong,

Stan Grant, re-cap on the latest developments on the War on Iraq. US apache helicopters attack Iraqi Republican Guards units in an intense three-hour battle. It happened as a US ground unit was reported about one hundred kilometres south of Baghdad. The US led forces now appear to be facing the fiercest fighting in Iraq since the invasion began, four days ago. US military officials say up to nine marines were killed by Iraqi forces in Southern Iraq. They say the marines were ambushed. Within the last hour, British defence officials reported that two British soldiers are missing after coming under attack in the South. Earlier a dozen US soldiers were reported missing after Iraqi forces stopped an army supply convoy that lost its way in Southern Iraq. It is believed that some of those missing US soldiers have been shown on some of the Arab television networks. The video also showed what appeared to be the bodies of some other US soldiers. US President, George W. Bush, said he expects Baghdad to follow the Geneva Convention regarding prisoners of war. *CNN Transcript 6*

Stan appears in a CNN studio, with the headline, "Latest Developments." As he speaks, we see the map of Iraq, with the red banner reading "Republican Guard Attacked", and the cities of Baghdad and Najaf highlighted in red. Then, the red banner changes to "South Iraq: U.S. Casualties", then to, "U.S. Troops Unaccounted For", as the city of Nasiriya is highlighted. The graphic maps and headlines are apparently used as a substitution for Al-Jazeera-aired images, which the CNN chose not to air. Accordingly the pictures do not accurately go with the words. When Stan refers to the South of Baghdad, the cities of Baghdad and Najaf are highlighted on the map. Southern Iraq then seems to refer to Nasiriya. The mentioned video, however, that was shown on Arab television is also not shown at all, nor even pictures of President Bush's reference to the abidance to Geneva Conventions. Journalistically speaking, this is the most crucial news item in the whole newscast, simply because it entails the death of army personnel, the military's crucial vehicle of victory and the sons of those who believed in the alleged war. It might, however, have come so late in order to guarantee minimum viewing and less significance in viewers' perceptions, which indicates a clear underestimation of the audience's feelings and intelligence towards the whole issue, along with their ability to obtain the news from other sources, including Al-Jazeera's website, if not the channel itself.

It appears to be the first time, and probably the last, that the coalition mass media admits failure and defeat. And this admission in itself is not specifically outspoken although we can easily trace it in the wordings of newscasts. First the mentioning of a "three-hour battle," never occurred before, as the US forces were always reported as attacking, with no counter-reaction. However, they have to be definitely "attacked" by "Iraqi Republican Guards Units," who belong to Saddam's despotic regime, not the Iraqi people. Then, mentioning that the "US ground unit" is only "one hundred kilometres

south of Baghdad” is necessary to show how close they are to achieving their goals, which does not really seem convincing on the fifth day, when they actually got inside Baghdad by the 21st day. Nevertheless, they need to admit to, “facing the fiercest fighting in Iraq since the invasion began, four days ago,” which along with implying the existence of Iraqi forces, clarifies that the marines were fighting fiercely before they were irrationally killed in an “ambush.”

Equally central to the news item is that some of the missing military personnel were shown on “Arab television networks,” as the mentioning of a competitor’s name, Al-Jazeera, would just raise its popularity. This, I think, is a clear underestimation of the public intelligence, as if no one would know from other channels it was run on Al-Jazeera’s screen. Then, referring to the video’s showing of dead US soldiers has to be subsequently camouflaged by George Bush’s expectation that the captured will be treated “humanely.” Al-Jazeera-run pictures from Iraqi television of the story seem to have forced CNN to report the issue, which might have gone unreported if there were no images. It is worth mentioning at this point that much of the US media’s reporting of soldiers killed in accidents are claimed by the Iraqi officials to be their own victories, well-camouflaged for the lack of images. This might well be pure Iraqi propaganda or may equally be true. But certainly, in this incident, the notorious images made the news, forced its reporting even without showing the images, and eventually documented a perceived Iraqi victory. The news was then followed by Bush’s famous statement,

The POWs, I expect to be treated humanely. And just like we’re treating the prisoners that we have captured humanely. If not, the people who mistreat the prisoners will be treated as war criminals. *CNN Transcript 6*

Bush is shown in the White House garden. He talks firmly and arrogantly, as usual, thinking of what to say next. The headline reads, “George W. Bush, U.S. President”, and then changes to, “Video Airs Pictures of What are Believed to be U.S. POWs”. He signals at the end with his right hand for the camera to stop, as if a movie director, not noticing it was showing him doing this. The headline is amazing, “What are Believed to be U.S. POWs.” It looks as if the news is the “video airing” not the “US POWs,” and it does not tell what happened to them, which is even more appalling. The statement of President Bush is too short and concise and does not equate to the value of the situation. His condolences for the families of the killed were necessary, especially in case their dead bodies were shown on international television. He seems to have ‘killed’ them again by such neglect. Also, journalistically speaking, in war and crime reporting, deaths are considered the most important, then the injured, then anything else comes afterwards, according to the hierarchy of importance. In this case, the fact that some of the POWs are killed and some are captured are supposedly “the” most important, then the fact that they were aired by Iraqi video footage should come later.

So, it seems to me that CNN wished to “kill” the story, first by putting it at the very end of the newscast, then by diminishing the importance that some of the Americans were killed and captured. This is evidently strategically meant to trivialize any perceived Iraqi victory. It did not pay attention, however, to the fact that by doing this it is diminishing the lives of its own men and women, and trivializing their importance. The words of President Bush, thus, did not mean much beside such neglect. Rather, they were even more vehemently discredited a year later, when the Abu Ghraib prison images showed how US and UK soldiers humiliated and sexually abused Iraqi detainees, both POWs and civilians. There was no mention of the Geneva conventions by then. It was simply killed as well!

5- Humanitarian Situation and Iraqi Civilian Casualties:

Reporting on the humanitarian situation inside Iraq and the status of Iraqi casualties, both the dead and the injured were significant in each channel’s reporting. Not only does this theme indicate each channel’s stance on the alleged war, but also how the Iraqi civilian population was utilized by both sides of the conflict, the Iraqi government and the coalition, to fulfil strategic military goals and gain public sympathy at the same time. Also, each channel’s proximity to the war zone and editorial policy played a central role in reporting such a sensitive issue, in which culture was also another significant dimension. As the following reporting demonstrates, Al-Jazeera showed the ugliest face of this military assault in the substantial volume of dead and injured civilians, while CNN’s treatment of the issue was at a great distance, speaking on the telephone with aid workers inside Iraq and airing selected images from Arab channels of injured civilians.

Al-Jazeera:

The humanitarian conditions inside Iraq were intensively tackled in Al-Jazeera’s coverage, which, I think, certainly reflects the channel’s pro-Arab stance, and eventually fulfils Iraq’s former government’s strategic goals, gaining ultimate public sympathy for the Iraqi cause. In this part, we shall thus shed some light on the content of Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the humanitarian situation inside Iraq while it was subjected to one of the most brutal military assaults in modern times. In one of Al-Jazeera’s live reports with its wartime correspondent inside Baghdad, Maged Abdel Hadi was interviewed by in-studio anchor Jomana as follows,

Jomana: About the humanitarian situation in Iraq, there was a lot of humanitarian organization warning about the probability of a humanitarian crisis as a result of the American war on Iraq, as the situation has been already deteriorating. How are these expectations dealt with?

Maged: The Iraqis are using all their local and national efforts to the highest possible level. Before the start of this war, the hospitals and the Civil Defense announced their highest level of emergency, the Iraqis were able to secure nutrition materials enough for five or six coming months. This doesn’t mean that they will not face a problem. It

means that they are trying their utmost effort to avoid the negative or harmful expected repercussions of war. But, there are still many problems resulting from the boycott that is continuing from about 12 years. And it is natural that these problems pile up if this war continued for a long time.

Jomana: Maged, maybe the state of alert always controls the situation after hearing the alarm sirens. Do the residents move to shelters? Are these shelters considered or perceived by them as relatively safe?

Maged: Mostly the residents go to these shelters. And Baghdad, and Iraq in general, due to living the experience of two former wars during the last 20 years, mostly it has got many of these shelters, which are safe and secure. But by experience as well, the experience of the 1991 war, and the advanced weaponry that was used in this war, did not leave a space for the Iraqi citizen to feel too secure. I refer here to the experience of Amiriyya shelter, which was strong enough to face heavy, strong and powerful missiles, yet the missiles could destroy it and killed hundreds of refugees, and of civilian citizens in there. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 9*

The accompanying images show Maged on top of the Al-Jazeera building in Baghdad, speaking to Jomana who appears from the Doha studios. Although there are no sympathetic images to support Maged's report, it is quite significant his clear attempt is to blame the worsening humanitarian conditions inside Iraq on the Americans, which gives power to his report, backed up with evidence. He first refers to the existing problems which resulted from the 12-year UN economic embargo on Iraq, in which the US played a crucial part, and secondly refreshes the memory of the 1991 Gulf War, when a US missile hit the Amiriyya Shelter and killed hundreds of Iraqi civilians.

Al-Jazeera's bold exposure of perceived US war crimes is most likely to incite more hatred against the coalition forces among the Arab audience, especially in wartime. This definitely endangers the US and coalition strategic effort to win hearts and minds in the Arab world. The Iraqis however are reported as exerting their utmost efforts to put up with the situation, depending on their internal strength and past experience. Supporting the Iraqi people, however, by describing their relative sustainability, certainly feeds into the channels' pan-Arab agenda and the Iraqi wartime cause.

Another report recorded from Mosul city by Al-Jazeera correspondent Mohammed Khair El Borini, describes the repercussions of the air raids on the civilian population. The report contains a collection of gruesome images of death, anguish and pain, as the following words and images tell,

At 6 a.m., when the American missiles fell on this residential compound, and levelled seven houses and their Iraqi inhabitants to the ground, and resulted in wide range destruction in many of the nearby houses. Fifty Iraqi civilians died as a result of what had been described by the inhabitants of residential district as a massacre, among whom are children, men, women and elderly people. At the time we repeated the question on the inhabitants of nearby houses who survived, whether there are in the blown up houses military targets. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 10*

The images from Mosul show a car passing in the street and the destroyed buildings of the compound. The close-up image of the ruined building pulls back to show a number of people searching for bodies under the remnants of a house, where the camera focuses on the destruction of more houses. The images then show more destruction and people gathering equipment for searching under the ruins, and an ambulance and nurses running towards the damaged sites.

Most significant about this report, in addition to the volume of death and destruction shown, is the focus on the fact that it is a civilian target, not a military one, which is both confirmed by words and images and evidence. In this sense it challenges the official coalition discourse of excluding civilians. Rather it shows by words and images that civilians were deliberately targeted, describing the incident as a massacre and showing it as well. The appalling images of death and destruction in this report, I assume, are very likely to incite public disenchantment with the attacks, not only in the Arab world, but throughout the whole world. This is fostered by the “exclusive” headlines in both Arabic and English, not only attributing the report to Al-Jazeera, but also assuring it is directed to an English speaking world, in addition to the Arabic speaking world, which reflects the policy of exposing coalition crimes at a global level. The report, then, continues by featuring one of the survivors speaking. The high representation of the Iraqi people in Al-Jazeera’s coverage of such stories stands in contrast to their total non-existence in CNN reports. El-Borini, then continues,

And at the time the emergency and ambulance men were busy searching for the dead bodies, under the destruction, using manual tools, some inhabitants of the residential compound were leaving the area in a rush, using taxis, small trucks, and any other movement facilities they found available. They try to move to much safer areas. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 10*

The image focuses on a man searching, using his own hands, for the dead in the remnants of a house, then cars, small taxis and trucks filled with people and their belongings passing in the streets, as the camera turns to the street banner reading “Administration of Faïda district”. Then, another far-away image of a small truck filled with household furniture, and a refrigerator appearing on the back of a car. It is crucial to note, as well, that Al-Jazeera’s pictures in this report are strongly backed with images/evidence which provides much power and accuracy to its description. Iraqi women are also well-represented on Al-Jazeera, as an angry woman speaks,

Families, I swear they are all families, children and families, I swear by God, I swear. These infidels. Why? Why? What did families do to them? Would a family hurt the American missiles, or blow them up? *Al-Jazeera Transcript 10*

Then an old man is speaking, as well,

I request from the Arabs a positive commitment to defend their own people. Their faithful people, who only want the truth, abide with everything. The Iraqi people and military have to take a unified position. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 10*

Those images of furious civilians expressing their anger and disdain, I believe, are most likely to capture ultimate public sympathy for the Iraqi people and incite more anti-war demonstrations around the world, and especially in the Arab world. They challenge the American political discourse that the Iraqi people are greeting them with flowers, together with the surgical war concept of eradicating the regime without killing the people. Those Iraqis are never represented on CNN or any

other station. This in itself adds another power dimension to those kinds of report, although it is a recorded one, as coalition claims on CNN and the like are challenged by the narrative-enhanced pictures/evidence of Al-Jazeera. Mohammed Khair El Borini, then continues,

Hundreds of Iraqi citizens have participated in the funerals of 17 citizens, among the casualties of raids, repeating slogans challenging the United States and promising to protect Iraq. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 10*

The images show a street filled with people carrying coffins, and repeating slogans that are not clearly heard. Another close-up image shows the anger and grief in the faces of people carrying the coffins. All of the coffins are apparently made of cheap wood, and covered by large Iraqi flags on their upper side, which signifies that the dead are probably middle-class or not well-off people. The appalling images of coffins and the funeral turning into a small demonstration definitely harms the US war cause and tarnishes its strategic image. Then another woman in black is shouting,

All the people are willing to give up their lives for the cause of this beloved homeland, kill the Zionists invading our lands, the criminals. By soul and blood we die for our nation, our loved Iraq, and the Iraqi flag remains high in the sky of our beloved Iraq. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 10*

She is shown speaking in grief and passion among a crowd of women and men appearing in the background. Putting the US with Israel as a single anti-Arab enemy in one camp was a major characteristic of this alleged war coverage on Al-Jazeera, either by dedicating special reports to that matter or by quoting people stressing it. The US unconditional backing of the Israeli crimes against civilian Palestinians, over the previous two decades, seems to have consolidated this anti-American feeling in the Arab world. Al-Jazeera then quotes a member of the district leadership in Baath Party, Samir Aziz Negm,

Who listens to Bush and his lies, and his Defense Minister that they hit military targets? This is a safe village; all houses are about eight floors, residential. You can go and see it. It is all a residential area, and there is not any military instalment located nearby. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 10*

The Iraqi official calmly speaks, showing contempt and disdain towards the Americans, as he speaks of them. Behind him we can see two personal guards in military uniform and some people in the background. As he speaks, the headline reads, "Samir Aziz El Negm, member of the district leadership in Baath Party." Al-Jazeera is here showing a government viewpoint in addition to the popular one. Whether or not it is obliged to do so, it has eventually acted as a vehicle of policy for the Iraqi government, giving an impression that the whole of Iraq, government and people, are standing together against the assault. This is probably true, but each is rejecting the invasion for his own reasons. El-Borini, then, ends the report,

The people at the protesting funerals say the fall of more civilian Iraqi casualties will not stop them from holding the weapons to guard and defend Iraq against the American attack and invasion, to which it is subjected. Mohammed Khair El Borini, Al-Jazeera, Mosul city, Iraq. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 10*

Pictures again of people carrying coffins, and passionately and clearly shouting, “No God But Allah”. El Borini then appears, speaking passionately, firmly and angrily, while the image shows a crowd of people in the background and some others stopping a small truck. Reporting with passion, El-Borini was far from being objective, neither in his tone nor his verbal content. The report is strongly focused on anti-American sentiments for both the people and government of Iraq due to the brutal attack to which they are subjected. It did not include a US or British viewpoint. Rather, it only focused on the natural outcome of the military attack: death and destruction. But the question still remains; could he possibly be objective in such a situation? I doubt this. The closeness of the reporter to the situation he is covering eliminates his ability to disassociate himself from the story he is witnessing.

Another similar report of Al-Jazeera tackled the air raids targeting a popular market inside Baghdad and causing a large number of dead and injured. The news item is first read by in-studio anchor, Rima, as follows,

And the American-British raids, that targeted El Nasra Popular Market, in Al Shula district, to the west of the Iraqi capital, have resulted on the killing of 55 Iraqis and the injury of about 50 others. And an Iraqi official source told Al-Jazeera that the search operations are still going on for the missing among the remnants of buildings which an American missile hit, which is thought to be a Scud or Tomahawk missile. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 11*

The report is then detailed in Maged Abdel Hadi’s recorded report from Baghdad,

More than 50 killed, and like them injured, in addition to tens of missing under the remnants was the first outcome of the fall of an American or British missile on El Nasra Popular Market located in Al Shula district, to the west of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 11*

At the top right and left sides of the screen we can read “Al-Jazeera Exclusive” in both Arabic and English. The camera focuses on the dead bodies, on the floor of a fully-booked hospital, a group of Iraqi boys standing up and crying as the camera shows a covered dead body on the floor in front of them. A hand takes off the heavily bloodstained cover to show the body, overshadowed with blood. Another dead body is then shown as well, where the clothes of the dead person are fully covered with blood as well as the cover itself; the camera focuses on the dead man’s face.

The visual account is simply horrific, beyond description. Despite Maged’s clear attempt to seek objectivity, I think, the facts he is narrating, together with the images, preclude anyone’s ability to be objective, both the image depicter and viewer. Al-Jazeera’s intensive focusing on those scenes, I assume, is definitely meant to propagate public anger against the invasion. Even the Pentagon and the aggressors’ media/military machinery were angry about the images, but for some other reasons. They were furious with Al-Jazeera and the Arab media because those images challenged their official claims

and raised questions about their rightfulness and perceived authenticity. It simply tarnished their image, both in the Arab and the Western worlds, eroding their regional efforts to win hearts and minds.

As the report goes on, an Iraqi doctor describes the situation,

While we are in the hospital taking care of and treating the injured and attacked, in this morning we heard the sound of aircraft and the explosion of missiles, and in minutes, we received scaring numbers of injured and martyrs, parts of bodies, and scattered dead bodies, children, women, and old people. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 11*

The Iraqi doctor is shown, in a white robe, angrily speaking in front of Al-Jazeera's microphone, behind him a low partition, separating patients from each other. The appalling evidence he presents both as a doctor and witness to a brutal crime, together with his deep anger, yields the report even greater power. Maged then continues,

And according to what the pictures of this massacre showed, after about an hour of its taking place, all its casualties are civilians including men, women and children, who were shopping upon the end of Friday Prayer in Al-Kazemeyya, which is located nearby the attacked site, which is considered one of the most significant and holy shrines for the Shiite Muslims in Iraq. And while tens of injured were removed to the nearby hospitals, tens of Iraqi citizens who witnessed the massacre expressed an immense state of anger against the American-British invasion to which their country is being subjected. And on the light of the large number of casualties, and the huge area of destruction that has affected the market, watchers here think that the missile that has targeted the place is of this huge type that is launched by airplanes V2, with a warhead of 2000 kg. Maged Abdel Hadi, Al-Jazeera, Baghdad. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 11*

As he speaks, the camera shows a large drawer in the hospital that opens on a covered dead body, and a hand takes off the cover to show a little girl wearing a red top and blue shorts. He closes her eyes. The camera focuses for a while on her body. The camera then shows women in black veils crying and shouting. The image of the injured baby girl that appeared in the initial headlines is shown, followed by another image of an injured baby boy. The camera then focuses on the arm of a man, while an operation is performed on him. Then an ambulance passing in the street, by night, appears with the loud voice of its sirens.

The appalling images have clearly become part and parcel of the news itself. Surely they cannot be neglected in the news item, as they represent enough evidence about the brutality of the acclaimed massacre. The long close-up on the little dead girl, the injured babies and civilians, the women's grief, and the ambulances' loud sirens as they rush along the street are enough evidence of the targeting of civilians. Although those images are simply what appeared before Al-Jazeera's camera lens, they have an immeasurable power to support the Iraqi cause. They can vehemently prove Iraqi government claims about the deliberate targeting of Iraqi civilians, which is likely to increase anger across the Arab and Western worlds.

Maged's accompanying description of the situation together with the timing of the bombardment is deemed likely to inspire more rage and anger across the Arab and Muslim worlds. First of all, he assumes it is a massacre, which definitely entails the deliberate killing of civilians, an

expression that is never used in the Western media to describe such attacks. Secondly, the bombardment or the massacre has taken place near one of the Shiite Muslims' holy shrines. For the Arab and Muslim audience this means that the bombing is directly endangering, if not targeting, their places of worship, which instigates more hatred amongst them against the US and its coalition, and against the invasion as a whole. This not only also makes the coalition claims of being supported by the Shiite Muslims reprehensible, as they are reported as attacking them, endangering their holy shrines, and thus, unable to claim friendship with them, but also worsens their aspired relationships with Shiite Muslims and makes any cooperation from the side of Shiites unlikely. This piece of fact/truth, thus, has the potential of simply harming the US war policy in the Arab region, and especially inside Iraq, and among the Iraqi Shiites in particular.

In addition to its blood and grief-filled reports which, I believe, tend to grab ultimate public sympathy and support for the Iraqi cause, Al-Jazeera have also utilized the renowned correspondent of the British Independent newspaper, Robert Fisk, to verify the truthfulness of the Iraqi reports to the whole world. As the news report read by Al-Jazeera's in-studio anchor went on,

Robert Fisk, correspondent of the British Independent newspaper, assured that the latest reports prove the accuracy of information announced by Iraqi officials about the progress of war. And Fisk said in a previous report to Al-Jazeera that what Baghdad has announced about the fall of a number of killed and captured Americans was proved right afterwards from the pictures shown by Al-Jazeera channel, and the same about the fall of civilian deaths as a result of the American air raids on Baghdad. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 12*

The accompanying images show the Al-Jazeera anchor, and then Robert Fisk is shown speaking in Baghdad's daylight dark grey sky, in front of one of its rivers, where there is a bridge and cars rushing, as the headline down the screen reads "Robert Fisk, Correspondent of The Independent Newspaper in Baghdad," as he starts speaking and is voiced-over in Arabic by Al-Jazeera. Referring to another bombardment at one of the popular markets in Iraq, in Al-Shaab district, for which the US has denied responsibility and doubted Iraqi claims of casualties, Robert Fisk said,

In many cases when we hear the reports from Najaf and Nasiriya, we cannot be assured of these reports and what the Iraqi officials say independently. We would like to go there and see the facts, and we can do this without the permission of the Iraqi authorities. Of course some of the claims that were mentioned by them were met with some kind of doubt, were proved afterwards to be true. When they first said they captured American soldiers, we considered it publicity and propaganda. But when we watched the images on the screens of Al-Jazeera, in fact, and also the Iraqi television, we knew that this is true. Afterwards, we watched burned war tanks. And we understand now and perceive that not only the Iraqis are severely fighting, but also the military plans of the Americans and British have been stopped. They claim that they have plans going on, and to be going according to plan, but it does not appear like this from our side. Also the issue that needs attention is the statistics of the Health and Information Ministries, and the Defense Ministry, specifically about the number of casualties. The numbers of casualties that could be exaggerated sounds for us very reasonable, and could be accurately true. Also when we heard that there are casualties, and deaths of civilians, of course we are not invited to see the military casualties and the military sites, but the Iraqi numbers seem to be true, as when I went to Al Shaab District when an American-British airplane launched a missile on this district, and killed at least 20 Iraqi civilians, I counted the names of about ¾ of the 20 that were killed. And I have absolutely no doubt that the number was true. *Al-Jazeera Transcript 12*

This statement of Robert Fisk yields a lot of power to the Al-Jazeera images, together with those of the Iraqi officials' statements and images. By this statement, Fisk issued a convincing certificate of honesty for Al-Jazeera, and the former Iraqi government. The power of Fisk's statement lies not only in its logically convincing argument, but also in the fact that it is a statement by a foreign and popular journalist whose views are widely respected in the West. By such a statement, in which Fisk has questioned not only the Western denial of casualties but the pace of war planning itself, Al-Jazeera is vehemently challenging the Pentagon and the alleged planners of this military assault. It has probably exercised some form of public diplomacy, as Fisk is a widely-trusted personality in the US/UK in particular and among the Western audience at large. His statement thus powerfully challenges official statements on the nature of the assault. Equally notable was the role of Al-Jazeera and Iraqi television images/evidence in constructing his argument.

To conclude, Al-Jazeera's reporting of the humanitarian situation inside Iraq was specifically unique for its bloody nature and tendency to portray all sorts of pain, anger and agony in the Iraqi streets. As a result, I assume, it had an unmatched power of fuelling the Arab and international streets with anger, and creating a unified public stance against the US-UK military assault. Al-Jazeera's images and discourse have both eventually helped the former Iraqi government win the battle for public opinion, throughout and even after the assault, but was evidently unlikely to win the real battle because of the disparate military power between the two conflicting sides. At the same time, they seem to have severely harmed the Pentagon efforts to sustain a supportive public opinion throughout the assault in the aggressors' countries, the US and UK. It is thus true to say that Al-Jazeera's substantive reporting of the direct humanitarian repercussions of the attacks, both by words and images, have lost the coalition a very significant part of their alleged battle, the one for hearts and minds, inside Iraq and throughout the Arab/Muslim world.

CNN International:

In the face of the bloody images constantly displayed on Al-Jazeera, showing the kindness of the coalition's forces and concern for the wellbeing of the Iraqi people was deemed crucial for CNN's apparently balanced reporting. But because there were no CNN correspondents inside Iraqi controlled areas, where civilians could be accessed, the issue was sometimes covered by a telephone conversation with an aid worker, who seemed to be the single CNN news source, and sometimes by embedded reporters who happened to be accompanying forces that made their way inside Iraqi cities. Yet pictures of the impact of the invasion on civilians are definitely so easy to find from Iraqi and Arab television networks, running them day and night, and heavily focusing on the direct repercussions of the

invasion: the civilian casualties. Those are not reported on CNN, however, as casualties, they are just sick, as if they became sick due to a natural catastrophe, not a man-made one!

CNN did not show any concern for the people, not even a false one, as the conversation with the aid worker just focused on the “medical conditions” and the equipment available. The people in whose name this alleged war is fought are vehemently neglected, as if they just don’t exist or they are just not humans. They are simply reduced to nothing, as the 20-second short interview tells,

Mini Mate: Meantime, aid workers are trying to keep up with medical needs.

Aid Worker: Well, we have two main concerns, which are mainly making sure that hospitals do have the surgical equipments available to perform operations, and the other thing is making sure that water and electricity are uninterrupted because this has dramatic consequences. *CNN Transcript 7*

The accompanying images show pictures from Iraqi television of a sick woman in hospital, sick or injured children on hospital beds, and an old man in his hospital bed. The headline reads, “Aid Workers Monitor Medical Needs.” Then the map of Iraq, with Baghdad highlighted, to the left side of the screen, and to the right side the Red Cross logo. On the logo we can read, “On the Phone”, and down the logo, “Roland Huguenin Benjamin, International Committee of the Red Cross.”

The accompanying images are clearly sanitized, selected to be as bland as possible so that they may not harm the war cause. They are selected to simply show people who are sick without any blood spilled. And of course there are no dead at all. The short conversation, which does not match the images, is only focused on hospital equipment and supplies, without any reference to the Iraqi people, those in whose name this war is claimed to be fought. This certainly exposes CNN’s wholehearted pro-coalition stance, as it refrains from showing anything that may harm the coalition cause in any way. Its sheer neglect of the Iraqi people, however, exposes its actual stance, and propaganda policy, such as to avoid humanizing the civilian population of Iraq, so that their killing would be justified.

Caring for the health conditions, however, is meant to reduce the suffering of the Iraqis only because of some lack in medical supplies or even doctors, as the coming report indicates. It attempts to show the world that the sole problem of the Iraqis is a health one, not death and loss of human life, not destruction of their own homes and infrastructure, and of course, no fear and threat of living under wartime conditions. As the Iraqis’ problem is solely reduced to the health conditions, a British doctor amongst the fighting forces in Southern Iraq can simply relieve the pain of those few who were injured. In a recorded report from Southern Iraq, treating the injured Iraqis was crucial for CNN’s battle for hearts and minds. Those images help consolidate the CNN rhetoric of the Iraqis’ welcoming their liberators,

Becky Anderson: Also, in Southern Iraq, the Royal Air Force doctors have opened an impromptu clinic for treating Iraqis injured during the war and those in need of basic medical attention. Andrea Catherwood, with this story.

Andrea Catherwood: The control of this Iraqi airstrip is vital to the allies push forward. A refuelling point for US attack helicopters and base for British pumas evacuate injured soldiers. But the Iraqis knew that the airstrip can be a minefield literally. British soldiers are searching through the dirt for antitank mines. They find one, attach plastic explosives, blow the mine. Having taken the airstrip, the RAF is now engaged in securing its perimeter. However, there are still pockets of instability, in the nearby town. They hope that by delivering even basic aid, they will begin to win the hearts and minds of local people; that too is fraught with danger. This inhospitable territory provides hiding places for Iraqi snipers and guerrilla attacks. Despite the threat, RAF doctor Simon Chappell ventured to a local farmhouse and began impromptu clinic for Iraqi children, sick from drinking stagnant water since the war began. His arrival brings a young man who need to have shrapnel wounds, cleaned and dressed. He says he was injured when an allied bomb destroyed his farmhouse and killed his family. Dr. Chappell told me why to him this work is so important.

Dr. Chappell: In this area, people feel threatened by the regime. And we must certainly think that we need to win their hearts and minds to show them that we are the side of security rather than evil, not as being portrayed by the regime.

Andrea Catherwood: The farmhouse clinic has to be heavily guarded. The local town too is hostile to accept help. This is far from the rapturous as welcome many soldiers were led to expect. But in one dusty corner of Iraq, a British doctor is winning his own small battle against fear and mistrust. Andrea Catherwood, Southern Iraq. *CNN Transcript 7*

The images start by showing helicopters landing at an airport, and some personnel trucks are parking beside them, while some soldiers are walking around. Then there is a close-up picture of a helicopter landing or taking off, and a soldier walking towards it, another close-up view of a helicopter stopping, from its side, with its door open and soldiers rushing and queuing at its door. Another view of a soldier lying on the ground on his chest to clear mines, other views of soldiers doing the same, then an explosion of mines is shown. All the time the headline remains, "Royal Air Force Doctors Open Clinic in Southern Iraq". Andrea then is shown talking to the camera as soldiers in the background keep searching for mines. The camera then shows the road, as she is apparently riding in a car while she speaks and the camera focuses on the places she claims are good for hiding snipers.

The images clearly start with scenes of fighting the odds, the perceived mines, by finding and exploding them to secure the coalition path into the city they claim to have captured. There is no evidence of the truthfulness about the hiding snipers. Rather the well-edited and organized nature of the images and words gives an impression that the report contains lots of pure Pentagon propaganda. As usual, it entails claiming there are perceived dangers from the Iraqi side that the fighting coalition is successfully containing and eliminating.

The images then show a British doctor in a farmhouse clinic treating injured Iraqi locals, filled with old men, women and children, who all appear to be poor villagers, as the camera focuses on the innocent face of a little boy. Andrea is then shown in the open air, from behind, wearing soldiers' uniform and talking to the doctor whose face appears as he speaks. The images of poor Iraqis being treated certainly supports the Pentagon propaganda rules of showing kindness to local people. Also, the selective focus on poor villagers is meant to enhance pre-held beliefs about this region, as being predominantly primitive and not well-civilized.

The pictures show soldiers guarding around and behind the clinic. As she speaks from a passing car, another stand with a large colourful image of Saddam Hussein appears at the side of the road. As she describes the people's hostilities, the car passes among shops and shows a soldier walking in front of one of the shops. Then the image of Dr. Chappell is shown treating an old Iraqi woman, in village clothes, as the woman speaks to someone else standing. This set of images is probably meant to show the perceived danger the coalition is facing while trying to prove their good intentions to the local Iraqis, as the guard around the clinic becomes necessary. The hostilities of people are explained as resulting from the existence of Saddam Hussein in power not because of the military invasion constantly threatening their lives.

The recorded news report is clearly well-edited as the images follow the words in a well-organized fashion. The report shows that caring for and treating the injured civilians is part of military missions that start with refuelling US attack helicopters, searching for mines, and exploding them. The language used is well-selected according to the Pentagon-set rules, as the Iraqi resistance forces are sanitized as "pockets of instability". However, they are controllable and can be contained by delivering basic aid, to win their hearts and minds, which is in itself a dangerous task that requires guarding against the 'enemy'. The report clearly tries to show the dangers to which the fighting forces are exposed, first the land mines, then the local Iraqis being unfriendly. However both dangers can be contained. The mines are to be exploded and the local people treated as a part of the battle for hearts and minds.

The doctor claims the people "feel threatened by the regime." This claim is clearly meant to deny coalition responsibility for the state of fear and anger among local people, even though it does not even provide any explanation of how the regime put them under such threat. Also the mass media is to be attacked as being deemed responsible for the adversarial position of the Iraqi people. All the Iraqis' problems are just reduced to the regime's misrepresentation of the coalition forces. Guarding the farmhouse clinic is, thus, a must to keep it intact from the surrounding hostilities of local people, as if the people are the attackers not the coalition forces.

Focusing on the health situation, however, does not seem likely to gain the coalition hearts and minds. Claiming to care for their health status by establishing a primitive clinic to look after those injured is not enough to do that. Those civilians are suffering far more problems caused by the bombardment than health ones. They are having their close relatives killed, houses, work and worship places demolished, no access to proper food, water and electricity in some areas and their infrastructure is under constant bombardment. Consequently they suffer chronic fear, pain, agony and anger, and they have great contempt and disdain for those causing them all this suffering. On top of all

this, the health situation becomes a minor problem for the Iraqis who are having their whole lives threatened by the military invasion of their country. It is, thus, very unlikely, I assume, that a clinic for treating the injured would help win the hearts and minds of local people. This report, however, is deemed newsworthy and good propaganda for the Pentagon, as the Western audience is most likely to perceive it as fact, and as proof of the good deeds behind the military invasion of Iraq.

CNN also aired from Al-Jazeera a special report on the humanitarian situation in a village located to the south of Baghdad that came under heavy bombardment in the early morning. As voiced over by CNN, the Al-Jazeera report goes on with the following,

Faeza (Al-Jazeera Correspondent): That is how the family of Awwad started their day, explosion, death and tears. **Little boy:** We were sitting in the kitchen when the explosion happened. We fell on the ground, and my brother fell. He was hit in his abdomen.

Faeza: We headed to the city hospital where the family of eight was there. They were being treated.

A man: Our house is located in the farm area. After the prayer, we were sitting for breakfast. We heard the flame, and we were hit. And then, we couldn't see anybody.

A woman: My son was hit in the abdomen.

Faeza: This woman fled Baghdad with her husband to escape the bombardment, to live with her sister in Manar village. From Manar village, South of Baghdad. *CNN Transcript 8*

All the footage is clearly from Al-Jazeera. The images show two veiled Iraqi women crying and shouting, and a woman trying to calm one of them down. Another woman in black is crying, and a crowd of women in black is in the background. Other women, then, are sitting on the floor of a hospital. A little boy is crying, while he speaks to Al-Jazeera. His mother is standing beside him, and the headline reads, "Iraqi Family Witnessed Strike South of Baghdad". The camera then focuses on a little girl seriously injured in the head, suffering and crying, and her head is wrapped in white, after an operation. Another little boy has blood on the white cloths covering his stomach, and his mother standing beside him.

Then, a man is moving his little boy on the hospital bed where the oxygen pipe is attached to his nose, and a veiled woman doctor wearing white is standing beside him and giving him instructions. Then, an old man is shown in a hospital bed as well. Then another man is talking to Al-Jazeera, with a doctor standing beside him, wearing white and a woman sitting on a bed speaks about her son to Al-Jazeera. Another woman then is shown hospitalized in bed, as the anchor says that she fled Baghdad to the countryside; the camera shows her husband hospitalized as well, heavily injured, and in a much worse condition. Then a close-up image shows parts of the missile on the floor, with a crowd of people surrounding it. Then Faeza ends the news report, standing among a crowd of village women and children, as the headline changes, "Explosion Injured Several in Family".

CNN's showing of Al-Jazeera video footage, I think, is probably meant to show the US public what the public at the other end of the world are watching, or probably to prove that things are not so

bad inside Iraq. Although the selected report shows a great deal of injury and pain, it does not include the most notorious news element of the Al-Jazeera reports: the dead bodies. The report is probably also selected to be as simple and insignificant as possible. It is not about a major bombardment of a whole city, nor is it about a large number of casualties, as in Al-Jazeera's reports of the market bombardment. It is simply tackling a morning bombardment of a small village in which a few people were injured, but not killed. And they are being immediately treated in hospital. So the footage goes along with the controllable casualties' concept of CNN, where it is easy to deal with the repercussions of bombardment.

Conclusion:

The three power relations researched seem to have taken different dimensions in each channel's reporting. The propaganda and censorship measures, practised by both sides of the conflict on both channels were definitely evident. Running pure Iraqi propaganda sometimes, which eventually met the channel's pan-Arab policy, Al-Jazeera played a major role in fulfilling strategic propaganda goals for the former Iraqi government. The most obvious of these was its running of the notorious Iraqi television video of captured and killed US/UK POWs. Al-Jazeera reporters, just like all journalists, were also obliged to follow a set of censorship rules in their reporting and were barred access to military sites and military casualties, as its discourse indicated.

Equally, on the other side of the conflict, CNN reporters embedded with the military were obliged to follow the Pentagon's rigorous set of propaganda and censorship rules and regulations to be able to fulfil its reporting task. In comparison, however, CNN seems to have enjoyed much less freedom of movement and reporting than Al-Jazeera, where the limited movement of its reporters delimited the line of free expression on the quality and volume of its news reports. In contrast, despite the Iraqi censorship and propaganda measures, Al-Jazeera enjoyed a much wider level of free expression, leading the channel to harm the interests of both sides of the conflict at some points.

As for the discursive media-military relationship, Al-Jazeera's discourse reflected a discordant relationship to the coalition's forces, decisively harming their info-warfare strategy throughout the assault, while its relationship with the former Iraqi government was not altogether cooperative. Located inside Iraq in wartime, under the former system's authority, Al-Jazeera never directly criticized the regime, though its indirect criticisms were quite obvious. For instance, its references to the limitations on journalists' movement and the kinds of things they are allowed to report clearly exposed the Iraqi censorship measures being exercised. Nevertheless, Al-Jazeera's extensive account of the gruesome imagery of death, pain and destruction, indirectly fed into Baghdad's wartime

strategy, and fulfilled the channel's pan-Arab mission, at the same time. Expelling two of Al-Jazeera's reporters in the middle of military operations outside Iraq, coupled with its reporting approach, are enough proof of the channel's attempts to seek objectivity.

While Al-Jazeera's relationship to the Pentagon was deeply antagonizing, leading to the deliberate targeting of its Baghdad offices and killing of its correspondent Tarek Ayyoub, CNN's relationship to the Pentagon, reflected absolute wholehearted compliance to its rules and regulations throughout the assault. Diligently following the Pentagon's rules, CNN's reporting followed the literary formula of references when speaking of the former government, referring to officials by their surnames, rather than titles, for instance, and referring to the Iraqi forces as pockets of resistance. It does not seem to have had any relationship to the former Iraqi government, though its representation of it was deeply negative.

As a result, each channel has played a significant role in fulfilling info-strategic warfare goals for both sides of the conflict. Fulfilling its pan-Arab approach in reporting, Al-Jazeera indirectly met Iraq's goals of gaining the sympathy of international public opinion. Also, Al-Jazeera's presence inside Iraq in wartime allowed for its constant coverage of Iraqi officials' speeches which included a great deal of propaganda. CNN, however, wholeheartedly supported the Pentagon's propaganda and censorship policy. It did so firstly by endorsing it in an official statement by the channel, early in the war on terror, and secondly, in effect, by applying it in its pro-US and pro-coalition coverage.

Chapter Seven

Dissertation Conclusion

Analyzing the wartime media-military power relationships—propaganda and censorship measures, physical and discursive media-military relationship, and info-strategic warfare—in the so-called “war on terror,” this dissertation has demonstrated the decisive impact of military power on televisual knowledge as well as its limitations in fulfilling strategic military goals. The evident power exercised by the aggressors’ media-military machinery on its televisual representation seems to have been deeply resisted, and even challenged, by Al-Jazeera’s abundant supply of controversial imagery of death, suffering and destruction, as well as speeches and viewpoints of official figures from the invaded countries, Afghanistan and Iraq. This has been indicated in the many instances where Al-Jazeera images put US officials on the defensive trying to explain their positions, as well as subjecting Al-Jazeera to direct verbal and physical attacks. The perceived power of Al-Jazeera’s imagery, and its accompanying discourse, vis a vis CNN, was strikingly indicated in the comparative content and discourse analyses, where the “collateral” language and imagery of Al-Jazeera seems to have ruled supreme!

The pace of the three media-military power relations, analyzed throughout this thesis, has been reflected in the stark disparities between both channel’s institutional apparatuses of power. The nature of television, as a news industry, and the different powers/stakeholders seems to particularly dictate channels’ policies, principles and subsequent content and imagery. CNN, as a profit maximizing media venture, seems to seek the coverage approach that yields revenues and guarantees higher rates of distribution and viewership. Different intersecting powers, however, tend to shape such policy, as Herman and Chomsky’s “propaganda model” asserts. The concentration of ownership and the full integration of the news media into the market is claimed to have led to the media’s sacrificing its public duty, as well as its professional obligation of seeking “objective reporting”. With the proliferation of cross ownerships, the concentration of media organizations in a few firms and the diversifying of media firms to other business have eventually weakened the special independence of the news media, making it a potential subject for government control. In addition, the news media, seeking to cut costs, tend to get the news from the safest governmental milieu, and thus heavily relies on information provided by governmental and primary/official sources. The impact of advertisers, as well, exercising great control on the news media and financing all programming, is also well reflected in the dissemination of the “selling message” that would not affect the “buying mood.”

For the above-mentioned elements, and others, shaping the media policy of western news outlets, including CNN, the media seeks to maintain good relations with the government, especially in wartime. This certainly explains its deliberate disseminating of a great deal of favourable coverage about the coalition and the US army in particular and unfavourable coverage of the US's perceived enemies, during the so-called "war on terror". Also, prevailing norms and culture, which are fully constructed, are central to the nature of CNN's coverage. Officials' views and experts' opinions are known to be main sources from which CNN derives its credibility, and thus its perceived power. Accordingly, any controversial viewpoints are most likely to be perceived as less patriotic. This blocks the way for any possibility of showing counter-viewpoints, which are always cut short and harshly criticized on its screen, when eventually shown. This explains CNN's cooperative media-military relationship to the US Pentagon in wartime, in abstract terms, which entails complete abidance and wholehearted support to its propaganda and censorship effort, resulting in its disseminating of favourable info-strategic warfare.

Al-Jazeera's political goals, however, are only achievable by following a pan-Arab approach and presenting critical accounts of both Arab and non-Arab governments. Fulfilling political stakes for Qatar's government, Al-Jazeera aims at exposing news and issues that infuriate Arab and non-Arab states, bringing worldwide notoriety and recognition to its hosting and subsidizing country. This explains Al-Jazeera's pro-Arab and sometimes pro-Iraqi/Afghani coverage, and its substantial airing of appalling imagery, earning the channel its perceived credibility and power. Accordingly, Al-Jazeera's diversifying of news gathering resources and its constant unwillingness to toe the lines of any of the belligerents appear to be more professional and "independent" than CNN, presenting the kind of critical reporting that is now almost absent from the western media. Constantly airing all contradictory viewpoints, while keeping its pan-Arab approach to news reporting, from which it derives its personality and earns its credibility and power among its target audience, Al-Jazeera's focussing on whatever infuriates everybody is also thought to bring prestige and recognition to its hosting country.

Such specialities of the two channels explain their policy line in covering the "war on terror" since 9/11 and throughout the assaults on Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003. Consulting Al-Jazeera and CNN coverage since 9/11, demonstrates an inherent contest between the two channels for representing the situation in a way that serves for each of them its policies and fulfils its endeavours. While CNN and other US networks aimed at legitimising the assault on Afghanistan for the sake of retaliation, Al-Jazeera kept airing news and videotapes of the alleged terrorist, Osama bin Laden, inspiring fury in both Arab/Muslim and Western worlds. The two channels were evidently running in opposite directions, being utilized by the two opposing parties, President Bush and Osama bin Laden, in their

“media war” for gaining public support and sympathy. Nevertheless, while CNN wholeheartedly belonged to and supported the US side, Al-Jazeera never showed any sympathy towards bin Laden or any Afghani officials, keeping a cordial relationship with them while reporting “independently” without subservience to either the US or the Afghani side. By doing so, Al-Jazeera has diligently followed the international journalists’ “code of ethics”, constantly defending its rights to free expression, while resisting any official pressure on the nature of its reporting.

Evidently CNN and the western networks adopted the US discursive construction of the “war on terror” as a framework for its reporting. This framework, as outlined by Richard Jackson, mainly focuses on the fact that the 9/11 represented a national tragedy and an act of war, that required retaliation in the form of an open-ended “war on terror”; drawing on a meta-narrative of the US struggles against communism and fascism, good vs. evil, civilization vs. barbarism and the terrorist threat to globalization; as well as the decisive marginalization of alternative discourses. This is deemed, however, a natural attitude given the power of the discourse and the way it has permeated public discourses in the US official and popular circles since 9/11, its enormous usage through major governmental documents and legislations, impact on the public life and the US people’s perceptions of the “war on terror”. Evidently the news media has played a substantive role in the decisive proliferation of this discourse along official and public circles in America, demonstrating a wholehearted media-military cooperation, since the very beginning.

In another part of the world, however, the Arab World, the US was widely seen as an attacking brutal country, with unlimited arrogance and expansionist ambitions leading it to undertake unlawful invasions of sovereign states, toppling governments, and committing atrocities against civilians. This was the general perception of the American attacks, which Al-Jazeera has essentially reflected since 9/11 and throughout the military assaults on Afghanistan and Iraq. At some crucial points, I argue, Al-Jazeera was able to erode the US public diplomacy in the Arab and Western Worlds, pushing officials to shift policies and putting in a defensive position vis a vis international public opinion.

Firstly, especially since 9/11 and throughout the assault on Afghanistan, there was a fierce contest for public support, mainly between George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden, reflected on CNN and US networks on the one side, and Al-Jazeera, on the other side. This eventually raised bin Laden’s public profile in the US, with the US networks frequently airing his news and speeches. Al-Jazeera’s presenting of bin Laden’s speeches and those of Taliban officials, thus, has frequently eroded the US info-war strategy, pushing the US and UK governments to advise their news media to stop airing those videos implausibly claiming they must have contained some kind of a body language. Secondly, Al-Jazeera’s running of the appalling images of civilian casualties in Afghanistan raised public and

journalistic questions in the US about the morality of the assault, pushing the government to insist that those questions must not be asked. Thirdly, when the US asked Qatar's Emir to curb Al-Jazeera's coverage, he declined to do so on the grounds of free media expression, putting US officials on the defensive trying to explain their position. Accordingly, I argue that the "Al-Jazeera effect" in Afghanistan has successfully eroded to Pentagon's info-war strategy at several points.

Then in covering the 2003 attack on Iraq, both channels' content and discourse analyses has clearly reflected each channel's nature, goals, inclination, and the kinds of pressures being exercised on its wartime reporting. Nevertheless, the relative "freedom" and "independence" that Al-Jazeera has enjoyed was strikingly evident. Throughout the war, US Pentagon imposed on the news media harsh censorship measures, embedding reporters with military escorts and forcing them to follow a set or rigorous guidelines on what they could and could not report, establishing specialized bodies and centres aimed at orchestrating a singular war discourse, across the Atlantic, and in locations surrounding the war zone. This is addition to the military analysts occupying television studios to impose the kind of analysis on the news that serves the Pentagon's strategic agenda. Television networks were also constantly fed with military-produced footages, in cooperation with Hollywood, and supplied with graphic maps produced by the same company that served the military. The Pentagon's propaganda was, thus, steadily fed to the embedded reporters, where staging media events, i.e. the 'rescue' of Jessica Lynch, the sanitized coverage, and the disappearance of dead bodies, represented central feature US discourse, appearing on CNN, in this case study.

In addition, the measures imposed by the former Iraqi government only included rules regarding the reporting, a list of allowed and prohibited reporting elements, and some control, though limited, on the locations that the journalist could visit and report on, which of course never included any military site and nor were they exposed to military casualties. The Iraqi government could only impose such rules from inside its controlled territories, on the unilateral journalists and media organizations, who chose to operate outside the embedding process. While CNN reporters chose to be embedded with the military, for the above-mentioned power apparatuses, Al-Jazeera, fulfilling its policy of reporting "the opinion and the other opinion" had two of its reporters embedded in the US military and opened offices in most Iraqi cities to cover the unfolding events from most angles. This, in effect, reflects a diligent attempt at seeking "objectivity" and following the journalistic "code of ethics" to the word.

Evidently, many such propaganda and censorship measures, imposed by the Pentagon, directly correspond to a long running tradition in war reporting that ran across the twentieth century's wars. The Pentagon's centralizing of news sources and orchestrating a unified propaganda scheme through

specialized bodies in the US and UK simply continues a long running pattern of wartime propaganda throughout the World Wars. The UK Foreign Office for Public Diplomacy, established following 9/11, to work side by side with the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy simply reminds us of the Parliamentary War Aims Committee and the Creel Committee for Public Information in WWI, and the Committee for Imperial Defence and the JAAPIC Committee of WWII, each concerned with managing propaganda and media framing across the war, with a joint parallel effort between Britain and America.

In addition, the proliferation of "faked" or "staged" stories aimed at demoralizing the enemy is central to the US/UK propaganda techniques long ago. The stories about the Germans atrocity stories, and their distilling glycerine from the bodies of their soldiers, seems to correspond somehow to the 1991 Iraq War's story of Iraqis throwing infants out of baby incubators to steal them, and the Hitler-Saddam analogy that proliferated throughout the US mainstream media and so often in presidential speeches of George Bush the Father. Then, the claims for Iraqi and/or Afghani systems bombing their own citizens, along with the dramatic rescue of Private Jessica Lynch from the hands of her captors, featuring the people/governments of the two countries as killers, barbaric and uncivilized, seems to continue this long-running tradition of dramatic propaganda.

Moreover, imagery has almost always been central to the framing of war strategy, and to the process of disseminating propaganda to the general public for the sake of morale, even if it entailed pure deception. This has been crucial to war planning for the last century, since invented, with its powerful appeal to the hearts and minds of the general public, more than written words. The Pentagon's attentive shaping of the televisual representation of the "war on terror" was reflected in its produced footages, graphic maps and military experts framing the war on television. Likewise, the British, German and American employment of film newsreel, in WWI, illustrates the same process at work. Then, in WWII, the advances in cinematography allowed for all types of films to be utilized for propaganda purposes through imagery with the most effective pieces of propaganda arguably being disseminated through feature films. War reporting was then transformed with horrific colourful video images, when television for the first time in history covered the US war in Vietnam. This role of television was later extended with the proliferation of satellite television, in the 1991 Gulf War, widely perceived as the "CNN War," where the whole world was watching Peter Arnett's live coverage on CNN from inside Iraq. Despite the sanitized nature of those reports, the power of live reportage lent them extreme authority on the heated situation.

Quite notably, as well, is the clear line of direct and indirect censorship measure imposed on journalists that linked old and new wars together. While journalists were prohibited from accessing the

war zone, in WWI, they started gaining limited access accompanied with military minders, in WWII, and then they gained “unlimited” freedom of access in Vietnam, with conservative critics often claiming that the media lost the US the Vietnam War. Accordingly, journalists have never freely accessed a war zone again, with the proliferation of the media pool system in the 1991 Iraq war, previously used in small conflicts/wars such as the Falklands and Grenada. During the 2001 assault on Afghanistan, it was also applied, when Taliban prohibited all foreign journalists from covering the war from inside. The 2003 attack on Iraq, then, witnessed the full realisation of the embedding process, where journalists accessed the war zone with their hands effectively tied, fully dependent on the military for their safety, to get basic war news/propaganda, and generally often obliged to abide by the Pentagon’s rigorous rules they signed to be there.

Most significantly, the technological advances in warfare technologies enlarging and endangering the war zones, unlike the World Wars and Vietnam, seems to have helped the Pentagon’s imposing of more stiff measures on the journalists guaranteeing their full abidance, as otherwise they simply risk getting targeted and killed. Advances in media technology, however, despite its obvious liability of making many journalists challenge such control and chose to report unilaterally, were unable to yield a greater degree of free expression at the overall level, nor shield the principles of professional journalism from military interference and total control, in many instances. For Al-Jazeera, instant reporting allowed in Afghanistan for airing the singular live coverage of the coalition assaults, enabling interviews with Afghani officials and to show the world substantive images of death and destruction in cities and villages decimated by the US carpet bombing. Al-Jazeera images, thus, could challenge the dominant American discourse and influence public opinion for some time, at least until the end of the military assault. In Iraq, this “Al-Jazeera Impact” was clearly superseded after the dramatic toppling of Saddam’s statue, at the end of the military attack. This limited “power” of Al-Jazeera imagery demonstrates the volatile and evolving nature of power, together with the assumption of power as being only productive within the confines of a suppressive and controlling other power.

Those measures of propaganda censorship, the subsequent media military relationship and the consequential info-strategic warfare were clearly reflected in the empirical analysis undertaken on the televisual images of Al-Jazeera and CNN’s coverage of the invasion of Iraq. Analyzing the content of the two channels’ coverage, the Pentagon’s measure of embedding reporters with the military escorts was clearly indicated in the location of journalists inside Iraq. While those of Al-Jazeera reported from major Iraqi cities, in the centre of Iraq, CNN reports came from the South, from the North, and unsolicited locations in the desert, and seemed to solely exist on the fringes of the war. This indicates a largely cooperative media-military relationship between the two channels and the opposing sides of the

conflict, as those of CNN have clearly abided with the censorship measures those of Al-Jazeera have gained special positions inside Iraqi cities probably in exchange for substantive airtime and favourable representation of Iraqi officials, as the speakers' airtime representation indicated. Moreover, a couple of Al-Jazeera reporters' existence inside the embedding arrangement of the coalition forces allowed for the constant featuring of the counter viewpoint. Paradoxically, however, this professional attitude and its refraining from slanting its coverage towards any of the belligerents led to the Iraqis expelling of two Al-Jazeera reporters from Iraq in the midst of the attack, and the subsequent bombing of its Baghdad offices by the US Pentagon, towards end of the assault.

As for the discourse analysis, CNN's coverage of the US-led "war on terror" seems to have essentially fulfilled the Pentagon's info-strategic warfare, while Al-Jazeera's discourse was decisively aimed at harming and hardening its endeavours, conforming to its pan-Arab position. As evident from the content and discourse analyses, CNN aired an exclusively pro-coalition coverage focusing on the elements that serve the Pentagon's info-strategic warfare, such as the power and might of the coalition's army and military machinery, the good intentions with which this war was allegedly fought, liberating the country and eradicating WMD, and the large volume of achievements illustrated in graphic images and smoke-filled footages of perceived victories and captured cities. On the other hand, Al-Jazeera's reporting presented a completely opposing discourse, focusing on perceived Iraqi victories and coalition losses, defeats and weaknesses. Al-Jazeera's appalling imagery often showed long close-up footages of death, pain, anger, sadness and a substantive account of infrastructure demolition and people fleeing for their lives. Accordingly, Al-Jazeera deeply challenged the Pentagon's discursive structure presented on CNN. Most striking was its running of the Iraqi television footages of killed and captured US/UK POWs, which I believe, was the main factor leading to the decisive bombardment of its Baghdad office and the killing of Al-Jazeera reporter Tarek Ayyoub.

Applying the theoretical framework, outlined in Chapter One, on the different intertwined facets of the case study, we find that controlling and delimiting the flow of televised knowledge in wartime through specific institutions, media and military ones, is well understood by means of Foucault's concern about the role of technology when associated with institutions, which is "how knowledge was put to work through discursive practices in specific institutional settings to regulate the conduct of others." The power of the mass media here operates through "an institutional apparatus and its technologies." This apparatus consists of "strategies of relations of forces supporting and supported by types of knowledge."⁵⁹⁸ This is evidently applied through the strategic use and decisive military

⁵⁹⁸ Hall, "Foucault," 75.

control of the televised news media in wartime to meet military-political purposes. Not only are the institutional policies effective in shaping visual representation of knowledge, but also the technologies and strategies are adopted for such representation. As Hall explains, drawing on Foucault, “Knowledge does not operate in a void. It is put to work through certain technologies and strategies of application, in specific situations, historical contexts and institutional regimes.”⁵⁹⁹

The evidently wholeheartedly cooperative wartime media-military relationship along CNN-Pentagon lines seems to have created what Shapiro hails as “practices of cultural governance,” which requires the support of different forms of expression to legitimize sovereignty, and restrict or prevent other representations that challenge such sovereignty. The US government’s attempts to control and curb Al-Jazeera’s coverage by all means, before and during the assault on Afghanistan, is evidently applied on this. This included exercising some pressure on Qatar’s Emir to curb down Al-Jazeera’s coverage, attacking the channel’s inclinations in the US media, surveillance of Al-Jazeera offices and communications through intelligence bodies across the Atlantic and, finally, attacking its Kabul and Baghdad offices by missiles, and the killing of its correspondent Tarek Ayyoub.

The changing or evolving nature of power was evidently reflected in Al-Jazeera’s discourse and that of the Pentagon, largely seen on CNN. This has been demonstrated in their fierce competition for media scoops during the assault on Afghanistan, which supports Foucault’s notion that “power is evolving,” often “circulates” and is never for long “monopolized by one centre.” While Al-Jazeera seemed to exercise more control on the imagery throughout the assault, as the only channel covering it behind the Taliban lines, this control was eroded when CNN suddenly aired an interview with Al-Jazeera correspondent, Tayseer Allouni had conducted with bin Laden. CNN, at that point, could powerfully criticize Al-Jazeera and signal its involvement with the Taliban, using the tape evidence, for the simple fact that the interview carried the most valuable piece of evidence for the US to utilize in legitimating its assault on Afghanistan: bin Laden’s confession about the planning and conduct of 9/11.

This powerful position of CNN, however, was soon eroded, at least in the Arab World, by Al-Jazeera’s announcement that the interview was run under duress and intimidation, and thus it negates the essence of free journalism, which clearly explained the issue, and credited the channel airing it. Historically speaking, as well, this evolving nature of power can also be applied on the position of the British and the Germans in the World Wars. While the propaganda war in WWI worked to the benefit of the British who were more organized and mastered its techniques well, in WWII Germany is

⁵⁹⁹ Hall, “Foucault,” 76.

claimed by most authors to have won the propaganda war, throughout the conflict, by simply and skilfully applying the British techniques utilized in WWI.

In addition, the close relationship binding the US government and the media outlets, in war and peace times, as described in Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model and reflected in CNN's statement, the media's wholehearted participation in the US propaganda campaign exemplifies well James DerDerian's MIME-NET. This is because of the clear linkage between the media-entertainment industries and the military in the construction of visual imagery. This is well represented in the military personnel occupying television studios to shape the Pentagon representation, and the Pentagon-Hollywood produced video footages and graphics, aimed to substitute the missing/censored images, which are disseminated through the television. This analysis is also well applied in the Revolution of Military Affairs, RMA, entailing the interdependence of media-military-entertainment industries.

The status of info-strategic warfare over the history of war coverage, and in current warfare, thus, seems to largely depend on the media-military relationship and the subsequent coverage each channel purports to provide. When such a relationship is cooperative, the news media is most likely to run the discourse serving the war strategy and fulfilling its endeavours, which is mostly the case with CNN. When the media-military relationship is hostile, the media discourse is most likely to undermine the military's info-strategic warfare, and thus the media finds itself in an adversarial situation with the military, as illustrated in Al-Jazeera's case. This eventually positions the channel as subject to all forms of physical and discursive assaults, especially in wartime, when adversarial media becomes perceived as a legitimate target in battle confrontations, as the thin line between combatant and non-combatant is often blurred.

Lastly, future research areas may include, for the US, studying other discursive structures perceived as deeply effective such as Fox News, which is widely believed to have helped shape the US public perception about the involvement of Saddam in 9/11. In the Arab world, the multiplicity of news channels that appeared, following Al-Jazeera, with many of them funded by conservative Saudi owners, seems to require more research attention, and to require comparison of their discourse with that of Al-Jazeera. In addition, the global widespread Internet users along the poorest and the less developed countries of the world, as well as the well-off countries, seem to have broken boundaries and created some sort of an open dialogue or internet-based democracy, where voting on issues of common concern and interests are deemed likely to affect the development of world politics. Also, the proliferation of terrorists' organizations and freedom fighters websites, often airing their actions and martyrdom operations in a "live" and "recorded" fashion, tends to raise concern about the different

usages of the internet, as an audio/visual and text medium at the same time, where people can watch things that are never fully aired on television.

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Note: All transcripts/translations were produced by the author from the recorded videotapes of the original channels' coverage of the 2003 attack on Iraq.

Al-Jazeera Transcripts:

Al-Jazeera Transcript 1, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 21 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 2, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 20 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 3, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 19 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 4, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 20 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 5, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 21 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 6, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 31 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 7, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 28 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 8, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 23 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 9, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 21 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 10, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 27 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 11, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 29 March, 2003

Al-Jazeera Transcript 12, recorded from Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel's evening newscast, 30 March, 2003

CNN Transcripts:

CNN Transcript 1, recorded from CNN International's evening newscast, 21 March, 2003

CNN Transcript 2, recorded from CNN International's evening newscast, 23 March, 2003

CNN Transcript 3, recorded from CNN International's evening newscast, 21 March 2003

CNN Transcript 4, recorded from CNN International's evening newscast, 24 March 2003

CNN Transcript 5, recorded from CNN International's evening newscast, 28 March 2003

CNN Transcript 6, recorded from CNN International's evening newscast, 23 March 2003

CNN Transcript 7, recorded from CNN International's evening newscast, 24 March 2003

CNN Transcript 8, recorded from CNN International's evening newscast, 30 March 2003