Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Conflict, Colonialism and the Politics of Remembrance

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Abstract

This thesis examines the ideological and socio-political discourses shaping the remembrance and representation of Britain and the Cyprus conflict of 1974 within Greek Cypriot society. In moving beyond the politics of conflict and directly analysing the memory of British actions in 1974, this thesis shows how different societal forces shape and utilise the image of Britain within their construct of modern Cypriot history.

With the consequences of 1974 deeply infused into the collective memory of all Greek Cypriots, an analysis of public remembrance rituals, popular publications, official school textbooks and a series of oral history interviews allows for an in depth examination of the explicit and subconscious frameworks shaping the history and memory of conflict on Cyprus. From this basis, this thesis demonstrates how the connection between Britain’s colonial legacy, which continues in a changed form through their military bases, and British ambiguities as a post-colonial Guarantor creates an ideological discourse of inherent suspicion that frames the image and understanding of British actions on Cyprus. The influence of this socio-political discourse, combined with a collectivised discourse of trauma, sustains the power of the conspiracy theories associated with the division of the island. In turn these discourses influence the distortions and counter-memories of oral history interviews associated with the actions of Britain in 1974. From this foundation, wider conclusions are offered into the socio-political debates related to the conflict and partition of the island, with a particular focus on the influence of the transnational discourses of Greece in shaping internal forms of development on Cyprus.

As Cyprus is an island divided by multiple competing forms of history, memory and identity discourses, each of which draws on and creates a selective image of the past to frame developments in the present, the analysis of this thesis provides a direct insight into the wider frameworks of memory active within a society scarred by conflict but shaped by the hope for reunification.
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Glossary

EOKA - National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (1955-59)
EOKA-B - Greek Cypriot Paramilitary Organisation
PTR - Police Tactical Reserve
UNFICYP - United Nations Forces in Cyprus
DISY - Cyprus Conservative party
AKEL - Progressive Party of Working People (Communist Party)
EDEK - Cyprus Socialist Party
DIKO - Cyprus Democratic Party
NFC - National Federation of Cypriots
MOEC - Greek Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture
TFSC - Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (1975-1983)
TRNC - Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1983 onwards)
SBA - British Sovereign Base Area
WSBA - Episkopi-Akrotiri Base, near Limassol
ESBA - Dhekelia Base, near Larnaca.
CBFNE - Commander British Forces Near East.
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ASA - Advertising Standard Authority
TNA - The National Archives
PIO - Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office
IWM - Imperial War Museum
ECHR - European Court of Human Rights

Note on Referencing
The newspapers from Cyprus referenced throughout this thesis have a Latinised title of the original Greek variant. Full Greek titles alongside their Latinised counterparts are in the bibliography. When referencing a publication, such as a newspaper article with a Greek title, the original reference will provide the Greek title alongside the English translation in brackets. Thereafter it will be translated into English in all subsequent references.
Chapter 1: Introduction

On the 15 July 1974, after a long period of tension between the governments of Athens and Nicosia, a coup d'état against the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III, signified the beginning of a major international crisis on this small Mediterranean island. While the instigators of the coup attempted to depict this action as a ‘purely internal affair between Greeks and Greeks’, this was from the outset a crisis with an international dimension. The Treaty of Guarantee provided Britain, Greece and Turkey with the purported right to take action in the internal affairs of Cyprus in order to protect the ‘independence, territorial integrity and security’ of this island republic. Through this treaty, on the 20 July 1974, Turkey directly intervened in the conflict by landing an army on the beaches of northern Cyprus. Over the course of the next month however, this Turkish invasion force illegally partitioned and subsequently occupied one-third of the island. In response, the military Junta in Athens collapsed after ordering a full mobilisation, Britain took the controversial decision not to intervene, and a wave of anti-American protests resulted in the death of the US ambassador in Nicosia. By the end of hostilities in August 1974, Cyprus was divided, with an unrecognised Turkish Cypriot state in the north, and a de jure and internationally recognised Greek Cypriot dominated state in the south.

Although four decades have now passed since Cyprus was divided, the events of 1974 continue to carry a personal and collective sensitivity irrespective of the passage of time. With one-third of the population still displaced from their homes and over 1500 still declared missing, the consequences of conflict remain deeply felt across Greek Cypriot society. Within the commemorative structures of the state, the obligations of Den Xehno, meaning ‘I

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1 From radio broadcast on day of coup in Attila 74: The Rape of Cyprus, Film, Dir. Michael Cacoyannis, (Nicosia: Fox Lorber, 1975).
5 For current figures regarding the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Missing see Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/, (last accessed 6 March 2015); For European Court of Human Rights ordering Turkey to pay substantial damages to the relatives of the missing and the enclaved see ECHR, 1974 and Greek Cypriot Identity: The Division of Cyprus as Cultural Trauma’, in Ron Eyerman, Jeffrey Alexander & Elizabeth Butler Breese (eds.), Narrating Trauma: On the Impact of Collective Suffering, (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2011), pp.163-187.
Don’t Forget’, draw on and collate these emotive issues within official discourses, such as educational texts, in order to compel all Greek Cypriots to ‘never forget’ the occupied areas.\(^7\) In turn, annual rituals on the ‘black anniversaries’ of the coup and invasion seek to focus an internal and international attention towards the issue of reunification and ‘return’ by linking the suffering of the individual to that of the state. However forty years of negotiations have achieved relatively little, as the issue of Cypriot division remains amongst the most intractable of the modern world.\(^8\) Simply put therefore, the consequences of 1974 are an ever present reality within the national construct of Greek Cypriot society, as to forget is effectively tantamount to accepting the fait accompli of the Turkish invasion and continued occupation of northern Cyprus.

Figure 1.1: US map of Cyprus showing the 6 administrative districts of Cyprus and the UN buffer zone created in 1974 which divides the north and south of Cyprus effectively into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot states, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/Cyprus_admin.jpg/image.jpg (last accessed 15 November 2014).

Yet within a society so focussed on the collective requirement to ‘never forget’ emerges the secondary issue of what should actually be remembered in relation to the broader causes of conflict on the island. Indeed, whilst the state places a strong emphasis on the


collective consequences of conflict, a variety of different national and political forces attempt to influence and control a particular form of collective memory associated with its causality. As this period of history was punctuated by acts of external intervention and outbreaks of internal violence, its representation in a modern context remains deeply contested. This is particularly marked between the left and right, who in drawing on the discourses of Cypriotism and Cypriot-Hellenism, selectively emphasise or marginalise elements of this past to suit their particular requirements in the present. Therefore alongside the often polarised historical discourses propagated by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities is a significant level of socio-political contestation within Greek Cypriot society over what should be remembered about the events of 1974. Whilst previous academic research has tended to focus on the depiction of the Turkish Cypriot form within Greek Cypriot historical discourses, it is the focus of this thesis to analyse the Greek Cypriot memory of conflict through the image and actions of Britain.

With well over a century of direct physical and political involvement on Cyprus marked by colonial occupation, anti-colonial confrontation and an ambiguously orientated Guarantor status, the actions of multiple British governments have left a significant imprint on the Greek Cypriot national consciousness. This is evident in some of the negative terminology, such as ‘Pontius Pilate’ and ‘anti-Cypriot nemesis’, utilised by both Cypriots and scholars alike to describe Britain and their connection to the division of this small Mediterranean island. Indeed the legacy of British colonial rule, 1878-1960, is still much debated amongst historians for its impact on the post-colonial state of Cyprus, particularly in relation to the lasting effects of the policy of ‘divide and rule’. In turn, the British decision

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not to act in 1974 beyond diplomatic measures and the defence of Nicosia airport, despite maintaining an army within their Sovereign Base Areas (hereafter SBAs), remains one of the most debated issues associated with the final de facto partition of the island.\textsuperscript{14} It has formed the basis for an array of conspiracy theories questioning true British, and by extension, Western motivations on Cyprus.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore if one were to utilise three words to encapsulate the Anglo-Greek Cypriot relationship in the twentieth century, these would undoubtedly be conflict, colonialism and conspiracies. As the analysis of this thesis will show, the collective influence of what these three concepts represent are synthesised in the events of 1974. Although the opening of the British and American archives has, in theory at least, eroded any form of factual basis for these conspiracy theories, they continue to be widely disseminated across Cyprus.\textsuperscript{16} Yet comparatively little research has been undertaken to understand the roots of these conspiracies or the broader socio-political structures shaping the contemporary memory of British actions in the conflict of 1974.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{14} For criticism of British actions see for example \textit{Report from the Select Committee on Cyprus}, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 8 April 1976); Christopher Hitchens, \textit{Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger}, (London: Verso, 1997); For analysis see Clement Dodd, \textit{The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict}, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010); William Mallinson, \textit{Cyprus: A Modern History}, (London: I.B. Taurus, 2009); Jan Asmussen, \textit{Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis}, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008); Andreas Constandinos, \textit{America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure?}, (Milton Keynes: Authorhouse, 2009).


\textsuperscript{16} See for example Movement for Freedom and Justice in Cyprus, \textit{Bloody Truth}, (Nicosia: Haidemenos, 2009); Nikola Nikola, ‘Ετσι προδόθηκε η Κύπρος… (So was Cyprus Betrayed…),’ Haravghi, 15 July 2014, p.6.

while others, such as school texts, significantly marginalise the role of Britain within their narratives of the independence period? How does the image of Britain fit into the commemorative and public remembrance ceremonies of Greek Cypriot society? To what extent does the historical memory of Britain’s colonial past shape the remembrance of their post-colonial activities? How influential are the transnational ideologies of Greece in shaping forms of Cypriot development and the wider image of conflict on Cyprus? Through the process of asking and answering questions such as these, this thesis will analyse a period of seminal importance in the inter-state connection between Britain and Cyprus. Given the British still maintain a particularly visible presence on Cyprus through their SBAs, in understanding the forces shaping the memory of British actions in 1974, one can understand in greater detail the Anglo-Greek Cypriot connection in a modern context.

1.1 Britain on Cyprus: History and Memory

Whilst much has been written about the British connection to Cyprus in 1974, the attention of historians has tended towards the politics of the British response to conflict rather than the forces shaping its remembrance. Indeed, of those studies undertaken on the prominence of conspiracy theories, such as those by Jan Asmussen and Demetris Assos, the concept of ‘blame transference’ is rightly highlighted as a significant factor in their emergence, but little analysis is provided to explain their impact on personal memory. This is particularly marked in relation to the ‘Big Lie’, a wide-ranging accusation of Anglo-Turkish collusion in 1974 centred on the concept of ‘British pilots-Turkish planes’, which Asmussen detailed in depth as a form of political propaganda emergent from Greece. What is not discussed is the impact of this concept on Greek Cypriot society, particularly the meaning that can be ascribed from the personal memory ‘distortions’ that have developed out of this political concept. In this sense, while blame transference is potent on a political

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20 Asmussen, Cyprus at War, pp.241-248.
level, to fully understand conspiratorial concepts such as the ‘Big Lie’, one needs to consider their prevalence not just through a political prism, but as an extension of a much wider discourse shaping the image and memory of British actions on Cyprus.

This thesis, in studying the memory of conflict rather than its politics, will argue that this approach is more suited to analysing the direct, subconscious, physical and symbolic structures actively shaping the interlinked processes of history, memory and identity construction on Cyprus. In structuring this analysis, there are a variety of different approaches and terminologies linked to the study of memory which could be utilised. Some approach memory from the dimension of politics in order to assess, particularly in divided societies, the processes of inclusion and exclusion within the structures of a particular state. By doing this one can understand, as Benedict Anderson put it, how the ‘narrative of identity’ of that particular nation is created and perpetuated. Others such as Alon Confino have criticised the politicisation of memory within scholarly analysis, arguing in contrast that memory is an extension of culture and should ultimately be considered as a form of ‘collective mentality’. Despite this divergence however, the ultimate focus of Confino remains the same, to explore and understand the shared identity of a particular social unit. As such the analysis of this thesis will adopt a midway point between these ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches. Through the examination of personal testimonies, remembrance ceremonies, school textbooks and museum displays, this thesis will engage with both the political and the socio-cultural influences active within Greek Cypriot society. To structure this analysis therefore, the concept of collective memory pioneered by Maurice Halbwachs will be subdivided, as set out by Aleida Assmann, into the interlinked variants of social memory, cultural memory and political memory.

The process of social memory is shaped by lived experience and social interaction, and can be defined as the generational experiences of the ‘eyewitnesses’. Indeed as Halbwachs has argued, whilst it is individuals who actually remember, they do so by drawing

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on the wider social frameworks of the various groups in which they live. This form of memory therefore is communicative and never once and for all. Its content can fluctuate and change each time it is drawn on and effectively recreated anew from its remaining conceptual fragments. As this memory maintains a generational element that is embodied through individual interaction, the passing of this generation can, in theory at least, mark the end of this particular form of memory. Cultural memory in comparison is founded on the trans-generational preservation of memory through symbols and material representations, such as historical artefacts or school texts, whose cultivation is designed to stabilise and convey that society’s self-image. This process can take the personal memories of particular individuals, say the refugees of northern Cyprus, and institutionalise their narratives within the commemorative frameworks of the state or wider collective. This is defined by Assmann as a ‘canon’ memory, as it has been consciously selected and perpetuated by society, both in literary and visual forms, in order to perpetuate what is ‘salient and vital for a common orientation and a shared remembering’. In turn a latent form of ‘archive’ memory exists alongside the ‘canon’ which is not necessarily common knowledge, at least at a state level, but continues to be ‘stored’ within the socio-cultural frameworks of a particular social unit. However the delineation between the ‘archive’ and ‘canon’ is not once and for all. Their borders are permeable, as some elements can fade whilst others emerge depending on the needs and structures of the individual and society. Political memory shares the inter-generational focus of cultural memory and reliance on material representations, but this process seeks more directly to homogenise a particular form of memory around a clear national ideal. In this sense, political memory is more focussed than cultural memory. It has a clear message and purpose that is designed to solidify the identity of a particular collective or state.

As such, within this reading there is a considerable overlap and interconnected nature between the frameworks of social memory, cultural memory and political memory. All are socially framed and involve an interaction between the individual and collective. None offer

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27 Halbwachs On Collective Memory, p.38.
29 Assmann, ‘Reframing memory’, pp.43-44.
unmediated access to a past reality. All are open to distortion by a variety of socio-cultural and socio-political forces. Indeed the main difference is that social memory is ‘direct’ and embodied in human experience, whereas cultural memory and political memory are ‘indirect’ and structured around those ‘prosthetic devices’ which attempt to shape and continue a form of active remembrance associated with a particular historical period. In adopting this multi-layered approach to memory construction, the issue of the continuity and rupture within a social group following the passing of a generation, one not fully clarified by Halbwachs, can be explained as a transition from social memory to the shared habits and structured designs of cultural memory. This understanding is particularly important in a society whose inter-generational focus, as the decades continue to pass, is on the collective requirement to ‘never forget’ the consequences of 1974. Likewise, as every generation learns about their past within the confines of a particular social entity, the socio-cultural influences of society, be it through the political designs of the state, the media or other cultural forms, can structure and influence the content of the social, or communicative, memories of the eyewitnesses. As such this thesis considers social memory and cultural memory in particular to be deeply intertwined, as the understanding of one can deepen the understanding of the other. Therefore these dual processes will be considered throughout this thesis in a socio-cultural interplay. Indeed, as this thesis is focussed on the interconnection between the individual and the collective, this subdivision of collective memory into three interlinked processes allows for a deeper analysis of the influences shaping the direct and indirect memories associated with 1974, as ultimately the interplay between the individual and collective is a cyclical process.

In the context of those social memories of conflict, this thesis will argue in Chapter 3 that one can only truly understand the power of conspiracy theories through their impact on personal memory. Indeed, with the passage of time and the constant interaction between different individuals and the wider collective, distortions of memory can enter one’s personal narrative at multiple points. This can be marked by a change in one’s socio-economic position, in the influence of political forces, or simply through the increased distance between

the individual and the events of their past. This in turn can lead to modifications and a ‘colouring’ of the contemporary story given, as Alessandro Portelli has noted, the narrator of today ‘is not the same person as took part in the distant events which he or she is now relating’. Therefore these ‘direct’ memories, as socially framed reconstructions of a past reality, are open to political manipulation or cultural distortion, as Halbwachs noted society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them so that, however convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not possess.

There is the issue of individual agency, or lack thereof, within Halbwachs’s reading of social memory, given this thesis will argue the personal can influence the collective as much as the other way around. The fact remains however that the act of memory is fundamentally a constructive process, meaning it can be shaped and distorted, be it directly or subconsciously, in fundamental ways by the political and cultural frameworks of a given society. As Portelli and Richard Bessel have noted for example, the existence of such ‘distortions’ of memory, be they shaped by propaganda or selective interpolated learning, operate irrespective of the archival evidence and thereby provide a direct insight into the social memory of a particular society. This reading of memory is particularly important within this thesis for gaining a full understanding of the impact of the ‘Big Lie’ on Cyprus.

In the context of the ‘indirect’ or historical memories of conflict, analysed in Chapter 4 and influenced by commemorative rallies and educational texts, their structured content maintains both a cultural and political dimension. With their lack of direct proximity to an historical event, these memories are not lived but learnt via ‘external objects’ that are drawn from the shared memorial heritage of a particular society. Much like the direct memories of the eyewitnesses, their content and form is shaped by the interlinked processes of active remembrance and selective forgetting. Therefore in understanding what is included in this shared story of the nation, one can understand in greater detail the dominant ideals of those forces shaping its construction. However previous academic research on Greek Cypriot

forms of history and memory has tended to significantly marginalise the figure of Britain to passing comments concerning their colonial legacy, and not on their actions in 1974.\textsuperscript{41} This is curious given the prevalence of popular conspiracy theories on Cyprus and has raised a number of fundamental questions regarding the content of these mnemonic devices. Indeed, given these constructions maintain a political dimension, whichever political group controls the museums or textbooks of a particular community can attempt to instigate its own version of historiography onto the ‘mainstream memory’ of this collective unit.\textsuperscript{42} The extent to which this official discourse is accepted is debateable however, as while politics can help structure a form of remembrance associated with a particular period; it does not necessarily define the personal memories of the wider collective. It is an influence not an imposition. Multiple voices and interpretations will always be present in the act of shared remembrance. Yet the content of these productions provide a direct insight into the particular values of a ruling elite, their definition of the ‘nation’, and the way in which they attempt to structure an ‘official’ image of Britain on Cyprus.

As a final point to draw on the use of memory, the concept of ‘rupture’ within the work of Pierre Nora is of particular importance to the wider analysis of this thesis. For Nora the functions of history and memory operate in a form of conceptual opposition. As a consequence, the so-called ‘acceleration of history’, with the increased ‘organisation’ and storage of documents within archives and texts, not only brought forth the erosion of real ‘environments of memory’, or a truly social and unviolated memory, but created the need for symbolic sites as an effective substitute to that which was lost.\textsuperscript{43} These lieux de mémoire were defined by Nora as

any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by the dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community.\textsuperscript{44}

Therefore in seeking to ‘inhibit forgetting’ by operating as a focal point for national memories, these sites not only maintain a form of recyclable meaning for different

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generations, but attempt to provide the ‘maximum possible meaning with the fewest possible signs’. The ‘sites’ can be both mundane and fantastic, personal and collective, as photographs, memorials and homes are all infused with a particular societal power as important symbols of identity and commemoration. Whilst Nora’s fatalistic tone regarding the end of memory is somewhat erroneous, given history and memory can still operate in a shared space, the central point that can be drawn from Nora is ultimately that of rupture. This rupture is not necessarily conceptual on Cyprus but physical, as the continued physical displacement from northern Cyprus has created the requirement to replace, through the process of ritual, those real ‘environments of memory’ lost through conflict and occupation.

Although acts of commemoration and public remembrance simplify the complexity of individual recollections and historical memories, in understanding the memorial foundations of a particular society in both its physical and conceptual state, one can understand in greater detail the dominant socio-political and socio-cultural discourses active in that society. Indeed as Halbwachs argued, while:

we preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually reproduced; through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is perpetuated. But precisely because these memories are repetitions, because they are successively engaged in very different systems of notions, at different periods of our lives, they have lost the form and appearance they once had.

As these recollections cannot truly be reconstructed as they ‘once were’, a perfect analogy is to consider memory as akin to a shadow of the past. These shadows follow an event; they generally maintain the same outline, but the exact content is shrouded and can never truly be recovered, making it open to interpretation and distortion. In certain cases, as Portelli has shown, the shadows cast by other events can cross and thereby reshape the meaning of this original event to the extent that it is almost completely reinvented and remodelled. In other cases, given the act of recollection is a form of reconstruction, these shadows are open to both subtle and more direct influences from the media, political propaganda and social interactions with others. Whilst memory markers can be maintained via particular rituals of commemoration or through specific sites of memorial importance, they merely offer a simplified version of this original event. The central point therefore is that memory is an

48 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p.47.
inherently fluid process, reinvented through remembrance, as while there are frameworks that help shape it, and sites of memory that help cultivate it, the direction of memory is dictated by the needs and processes of the particular group that requires it, and therefore defines it. As such, by drawing on individual recollections of past events, one can understand in greater detail the broader socio-political frameworks shaping the representation of conflict within Greek Cypriot society.

1.2 Methodological Foundations: Oral History

In developing from this theoretical basis, as Barry Schwartz argued, while the content of newspapers, TV programs and history textbooks can tell us what communicative and academic elites believe about the past, they do not necessarily say what ordinary people believe, or how they feel about what they believe. Indeed, although the majority of historians over the past decade have challenged the view that 1974 was the result of a western conspiracy, such beliefs remain widely disseminated on Cyprus and are the dominant perspective of those Greek Cypriots interviewed for this project. Therefore to fully understand why, this thesis draws on the popular and the official, the museums and the memorials, and ultimately the written and the spoken word to analyse the power of those cultural and socio-political frameworks actively seeking to shape the modern construct of Cypriot history. As Luisa Passerini noted in relation to the wider insights offered via the utilisation of oral history and personal testimonies:

We should not ignore the fact that the raw material of oral history consists not just in factual statements, but is pre-eminently an expression and representation of culture, and therefore includes not only literal narrations but also the dimensions of memory, ideology and subconscious desires.

Therefore through these narratives, irrespective of their factual veracity, one can understand in greater detail the influence of the collective on that of the individual. As such the content of a personal testimony can provide a conduit into the collective meaning ascribed from a particular event through its remembrance and representation in the present. With the development of oral history as a methodology, its use has ranged from scholars attempting to give voice to the marginalised of society, to those who seek to understand the socio-cultural influences that shape the construct of individual memory. It is the latter development that is drawn on for this analysis. This approach, pioneered by scholars such as Passerini and

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Portelli, moved the emphasis of oral history away from the factual details of a particular account and onto the broader understanding that can be drawn from its distortions. With this transition, the importance of personal testimony was framed both by what was said, and also by what was ‘silenced’ about a particular past.\(^{53}\) Therefore as Paula Hamilton has argued, the oral historian is today predominantly a ‘memorist’, whose self-appointed role is to chart the connections between history and memory within a particular society through the narratives of individual respondents.\(^{54}\) This is the central focus of those oral history interviews undertaken for this project. The importance of these narratives is concerned less with events as with their description by the narrator, as through this process broader connections can be drawn between the personal and the socio-cultural influence of the wider collective. In representing these oral narratives within this thesis, whilst some sections will be shortened, the language and words will not be changed or corrected, and will be quoted exactly how it was said by the individual respondent.

An oral history interview is a collaborative endeavour, as the inter-subjectivity of the interviewing process actively creates a ‘shared-narrative’ framed by the actions of the interviewer and the articulations of the respondent.\(^{55}\) Through this interactive process, the structured nature of an interview can make the life-narrative of a respondent ‘anthropologically strange’. This can be both direct and subconscious, as certain situations can arise that may impel the respondent to attempt to justify certain actions and ideas which they may never have thought would require justification.\(^{56}\) However, rather than an inherent weakness akin to a survey research project, where a highly structured question and answer model provides little room for deviation or personal elaboration beyond the frameworks set by the interviewer, this inter-subjectivity is the inherent strength of oral history. Take for example, as a comparison, the results of Maria Hadjipavlou’s survey project regarding Cypriot views on the division of Cyprus from 1998-2000. This project involved 1,073 Greek Cypriots and provided some intriguing results, such as the fact that 85 percent of this sample deemed the role of western powers as ‘very’ responsible for the ‘creation and perpetuation’ of conflict, whilst only 38 percent deemed Greece as ‘very’ responsible.\(^{57}\) However the availability of the answers to the participants involved, drawn from a ‘list of the most

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\(^{56}\) Grele, ‘Can anyone over thirty be trusted’, p.43.

frequently cited causes in the literature on Cyprus’, and the respondents’ requirement to merely chose the relevant response from ‘very’ to ‘don’t know’ limits the methodological appeal of such approaches.\textsuperscript{58} Although this creates cumulative and quantitative results that the total number of interviews for this project could not hope to match, it leaves many questions unanswered. Why did those who marked the British as ‘very responsible’ for the conflict believe this was the case? Was it purely based upon British actions in 1974 or combined with the legacy of their colonial occupation? How closely do they view the connection between Britain and America? Did those who deemed the British ‘very responsible’ also believe Greece, Turkey and/or ‘Cypriot nationalisms’ were very responsible? These questions are directly approached within this thesis through the methodology of oral history. Indeed as Portelli has shown, by ‘accepting’ what the respondent wants to say, including any ‘colouring’ that may occur, one can try and understand not only why individuals believe or remember as they do, but in turn offer wider insights into the social frameworks shaping the memory and identity narratives of the community in which this individual is placed.\textsuperscript{59} As personal memories are not merely static reflections of a past reality but are constantly reworked and reshaped through the act of remembrance, the power of oral history for this thesis lies less in the accuracy of the description, and more in the meaning that can be drawn from these articulated usages of the past in a present context.

For this project a total of 36 interviews were conducted with 43 respondents in both Britain and Cyprus.\textsuperscript{60} Within the Cypriot diaspora community of London, a total of 20 interviews were undertaken with 26 Greek Cypriots. Of these interactions, 17 interviews were one-to-one and three were undertaken as group affairs, with 4-3-2 respondents respectively. Within Cyprus a total of nine individual interviews were undertaken with Greek Cypriots in Limassol and Nicosia. A further eight interviews were undertaken with British residents in Paphos and Limassol who were either soldiers stationed on Cyprus between 1950-1974, or who lived on the island during the events of 1974. These interviews were all conducted in English. Whilst the use of English was not ideal, it was an unfortunate necessity at the beginning of this project. When one compares the content and themes reflected within these interviews to other oral history projects recently undertaken on Cyprus, it is clear that language is not an issue that intrinsically affects the validity of the information

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, p.352.
\textsuperscript{60} List of key information is detailed in Appendix 1.
received. In turn, while it is accepted that there are many voices and localities on Cyprus that have not been covered within these interviews, given the focus on urban areas, the content of the information received can provide an insight into the socio-cultural and socio-political forces shaping forms of memory on Cyprus.

As a final point, although the majority of interviews undertaken for this project were with diasporic Cypriots, the general theme of their narratives, especially in relation to the period 1955-1974, effectively mirrored those undertaken on Cyprus. Indeed, whilst the diaspora community within Britain maintains its own forms of identity, which can either be close or distant from Cyprus, previous analyses of the diaspora have emphasised a strong affiliation to the discourse of Cypriotism within this community. As such this thesis will adopt the concept of ‘long-distance nationalism’ for this analysis, where the borders of the ‘state’ do not necessarily delineate the borders of the community, as a means of placing diasporic memories alongside and occasionally in comparison to their ‘mainland’ variants. This framework does not overlook the accepted differences between the communities of the diaspora and those on Cyprus, but rather places the commemorative structures of the diaspora alongside that of the ‘mainland’. The reason for this is clear, while the diaspora may be physically separated from Cyprus, many individuals now living in Britain are not politically or emotionally separated from the consequences of conflict. Therefore the utilisation of both diasporic and ‘mainland’ narratives can provide a direct insight into a much wider framework of memory active within this broad stratum of Greek Cypriot society. Equally, this framework also allows for a comparison between the diaspora and Cyprus. Of particular interest are the views of diasporic Cypriots, who claim to live and work together with their Turkish Cypriot neighbours, on the continuing division of Cyprus. These views can offer an intriguing counterpoint to the ongoing debates on Cyprus concerning the construct of identities, and whether the island can truly be both ‘Greek’ and inter-communally ‘Cypriot’.

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1.3 Research Structure

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the ‘British perspective’ towards the Cyprus conflict through archival documents and the British press. It considers the British response to the events of 1974, what motivated their actions and reactions, and the extent to which the British government could be deemed a ‘scapegoat’ for the actions of others. Chapter 3 analyses the ‘popular’ Greek Cypriot response to British actions in the conflict by examining the foundations for the conspiracies and collusive accusations expressed widely within oral history interviews, media reports, documentaries and satirical cartoons. After setting these speculations within a wider socio-political discourse of inherent suspicion, framed by British (neo)-colonial interests and the actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereafter NATO), it considers the memory distortions associated with the ‘Big Lie’ as both a collective extension of this ideological framework, and an individualised means of applying understanding to British actions. Chapter 4 analyses the content of Greek Cypriot school texts, the public debates concerning their content, and how the power of the historical memory of British colonialism can frame the image and understanding of British actions in 1974. Chapter 5 examines the content of public rituals of remembrance through two specific case studies, the annual diasporic Peace and Freedom Rally and the British Kyrenia memorial controversy of 2009. The first case study approaches the public remembrance of 1974, how the image of Britain and other forms of causality for conflict are referenced, the inclusivity of this diasporic ritual, and the wider social importance of such ceremonies within Greek Cypriot society. The second case study scrutinises the controversial construction of a British war memorial in Kyrenia dedicated to the 371 British service personnel who died in the anti-colonial Emergency of 1955-59. This section utilises the Kyrenia memorial as a lens through which to assess Britain’s historic relationship with Cyprus, the memory of the EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) period, and how one monument can reflect multiple forms of public memory associated with the actions of Britain on Cyprus. Chapter 6 approaches the influence, both historical and contemporary, of Greece on the formation of historical narratives and identities on Cyprus. In setting this relationship within a dual national and informal colonial framework, the chapter considers the memory of Greek actions in the conflict of 1974 and how these often divergent narratives, drawn from individual testimonies, can reflect the reaction of the internalised discourses of Cypriotism and Cypriot-Hellenism to the continued influence of Greece on Cyprus. Indeed one cannot consider the Anglo-Greek Cypriot relationship without also considering the relationship between Greece and Cyprus, as it was
the British opposition to *enosis*, or political union, which placed Cyprus and its motherland as separate independent states. With this separation, and the interlinked development of polarised forms of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism, the question of identity on Cyprus has historically tightened the perceived intractability of the Cyprus ‘Gordian knot’.\(^6\)

To conclude this opening chapter, in utilising oral history interviews and analysing the content of archival records, popular publications, commemorative rituals and school history texts, a more comprehensive foundation is set than has previously been utilised to understand the frameworks of memory shaping the image of Britain, and in turn, the wider image of conflict on Cyprus. As the events of 1974 continue to retain an active position within the contemporary socio-political landscape of Greek Cypriot society, an analysis of these memory processes can provide direct insights into the commemorative frameworks active on an island scarred by conflict but shaped by the desire for reunification.

Figure 1.2: From http://www.cyprus-maps.com/, (Last accessed 1 April 2015).

Following the coup against President Makarios on the 15 July 1974, Harold Wilson and his Foreign Secretary James Callaghan were faced with an international crisis that would severely test the limitations of British diplomacy. A series of treaty obligations and a substantial military and civilian presence on Cyprus made this conflict ‘one of our problems’. However the British government’s ‘diminished international power’ and general desire for political ‘detachment’ from Cypriot affairs infused British policy with an acute ambiguity towards Cyprus. This ambiguity, coupled to the British ‘failure’ to adequately fulfil their treaty obligations, sustains the debates and conspiracies associated with the actions of Britain in 1974. It led the Parliamentary Select Committee Report of 1976, described as amongst the most ‘deadly’ works ever published by Her Majesty's Stationary Office, to state:

Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had a moral obligation to intervene, she had the military capacity to intervene. She did not intervene for reasons the government do not wish to give.

The chairman of the Select Committee, Hugh Rossi MP, reinforced this sentiment by describing Cyprus as a ‘lamentable chapter in British history’. In turn The Times stated clearly that the government ‘cannot escape its failure... [as] Britain neither took action itself nor requested action by the UN’. The response of the Foreign Office to such criticisms was marked with a deep level of frustration, as ‘we accept that people should feel indignation at some of the events that occurred in Cyprus, but not that this indignation should be turned against the British government’. Indeed Callaghan defined Britain’s role in the conflict as one of ‘responsibility without power’, as official reports repeatedly stressed that the ‘Guarantor’ powers of Greece and Turkey, the USA and ultimately the Cypriots themselves

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1 See John Akass, ‘Now they’ve a puppet who thinks with his gun’, The Sun, 17 July 1974, p.6.
2 On ‘diminished status’ see James Callaghan, Time and Chance, (Glasgow: Collins/Fontana, 1988), p.296; For ambiguity and example of Turkish Cypriot criticism concerning British recognition of the Republic of Cyprus following the Greek Cypriot ‘usurpation’ of 1963-64 see Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic, p.366; For Greek Cypriot criticism of the British failure to denounce Turkish bombing raids across Cyprus in 1964 see PIO: ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou’, 29 July 1965.
3 See O’Malley & Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy; Movement for Freedom and Justice in Cyprus, Bloody Truth.
4 Reddaway, Burdened With Cyprus, p.167; Report from the Select Committee, pp.vii-x.
were far more responsible than Britain for the division of this small Mediterranean island.\(^8\) Therefore, while Cyprus may have been ‘one of our problems’, the British government did not deem it to be one of their making.

With the opening of the British archives in 2004, the interpretation of the available evidence has effectively created two broadly defined positions within the secondary literature. One on side are scholars such as Andreas Constandinos who have directly challenged the conspiracy theories associated with 1974 by stressing British weaknesses over British culpability.\(^9\) On the other are those such as William Mallinson who have drawn on examples of British ‘duplicity’ to argue the division of Cyprus was a form of imperialism by proxy, as Turkey simply imposed, without any firm opposition, the policy of partition long favoured by the western powers.\(^10\) This chapter will argue there is no evidence to support the accusation that Britain directly colluded with Turkey to partition Cyprus in 1974, but there is enough ambiguity in their actions to allow for the development of such accusations. To structure this analysis, this chapter will first consider the ‘official’ British view as to why there was a conflict in 1974 through the archival records. Secondly it will explore the official British interpretation of their obligations towards the island. Thirdly it will survey general British policy towards Cyprus, and the perceived difficulties associated with maintaining a physical presence on an island polarised by ethno-political differences. The final section will consider the belief, noted in multiple official documents, that the British government was ‘scapegoated’ for the divisive actions of others. In order to understand the Greek Cypriot reaction to the British response in 1974, it is important to first understand how the British government viewed and reacted to the conflict in Cyprus.

2.1 Roots of Conflict: An ‘Official’ View

In his political memoirs, James Callaghan described Cyprus in the lead up to 1974 as akin to that of an active volcano, ‘knowing it is always likely to erupt, but not expecting every subterranean rumble to lead to disaster’.\(^11\) With the outbreak of major political crises in 1963-64, 1967 and 1971, multiple assassination attempts against Makarios, regular incidents of internal violence and repeated threats of invasion by Turkey, Cyprus had faced a

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\(^9\) Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis; Asmussen, Cyprus at War; Dodd, The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict.

\(^10\) Mallinson, Cyprus: Diplomatic History; Fouskas & Tackie, Cyprus: The Post-Imperial Constitution; Mallinson, ‘US interests, British acquiescence’, pp.494-508; Mallinson, ‘Cyprus, Britain, the USA’, pp.737-752.

\(^11\) Callaghan, Time and Chance, p.335.
great many ‘subterranean rumbles’ since acquiring its independence in 1960. When the island did finally erupt in 1974, *The Times* described the British connection to Cyprus as one ‘a responsible British citizen finds difficult to contemplate with a completely easy conscience’.

The clear ‘failure’ of the British government to protect the independence granted to this fellow Commonwealth nation, despite maintaining treaty obligations and an army on Cyprus, was deemed to fundamentally undermine the credibility of British adherence to the ‘sanctity of international laws and treaties’.

In response to such criticism, Callaghan wrote in his memoirs that ‘others may distribute blame but I do not feel ashamed of what we tried to do’. The Foreign Office however was far more combative in their reply. Following reports in the Greek Cypriot press alleging Anglo-Turkish cooperation in Cyprus, it was stated that ‘it was Greek intransigence [and] Greek hubris that summoned up the furies’ in 1974, not Britain.

For those British officials who attempted to defend Britain’s role in the conflict, it was the inherent inflexibility of the Greek Cypriot authorities to accept compromises on constitutional matters that brought disaster to the island, as this political ‘intransigence’ played directly into the hands of Turkey.

This ‘official’ British reading of the foundations of conflict is satirically visualised in figure 2.1, published in the *Daily Express* during the constitutional crisis of 1963-64. This cartoon and the others used in this thesis have a variety of political and cultural meanings, however for the purpose of this analysis, it provides both a reflection of the official British reports on Cyprus, and a satirical retelling of a crisis that led to the ‘first partition’ of the island. Indeed, this Greek Cypriot attempt to revise the constitution by removing many of its ‘unworkable’ provisions, such as the Turkish Cypriot veto, led to the complete Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from government, the outbreak of a significant level of intercommunal violence, and the first notable threat of invasion by Turkey. This cartoon therefore, with its depiction of the Greek Cypriots effectively condemning both sides to their doom, reflects to a

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12 Anonymous, ‘Cyprus’, p.11.
13 See *Report from the Select Committee*, p.xx.
degree the observation of James Callaghan in September 1974 that Makarios maintained one particularly damaging ‘blind spot’: ‘he could not see the position through Turkish eyes’. 

As such Makarios faced considerable criticism within official reports regarding his ‘obdurate’ stance towards the intercommunal negotiations, as a Foreign Office document from April 1975 stated:

the Archbishop had for years followed a policy of denying to the Turkish Cypriot community fundamental rights to which they were, in all humanity, entitled. That policy was no foundation for a lasting settlement.

Yet the settlement of this particular ‘Cyprus Problem’, or the rights and status of the minority in relation to the rights and status of the majority, was not necessarily deemed to be the immediate priority of Makarios’s government. The formation of the United Nations Peace

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Keeping Force (hereafter UNFICYP) on the 4 March 1964 provided, in the words of its former commander James Wilson, ‘valuable support to the Cyprus government’s position… [as it] consolidated the dominant Greek Cypriot position’ in power.\(^{22}\) This international recognition allowed Makarios, at least until the Turkish invasion of 1974, to play ‘the long game’ in the intercommunal negotiations by not accepting any ‘compromised’ solutions.\(^ {23} \) However with the volatility of Cypriot politics providing the potential spark for an inter-alliance war between Greece and Turkey, a solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ was much sought after by the NATO alliance.\(^ {24} \) As such a Foreign Office memo from November 1971 noted that Makarios’s removal and replacement with Glafcos Clerides ‘may be satisfactory to our own interests’, as it was felt Clerides would accept the required compromises to create a Cyprus settlement.\(^ {25} \) Although these archival documents state the British authorities had no intention of actually removing Makarios themselves, given it is ‘safer to live with the problems one knew than jumping into the unknown’, they do suggest, at the very least, that diplomats within the Foreign Office had considered the potential benefits of such an action.\(^ {26} \)

However the British authorities were also well aware of the difficulties faced by Makarios, as it was recognised that all sides attempted to twist the constitutional system to their own advantage. On the 2 August 1974, the Chief of the Defence Staff Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver wrote to Callaghan that the ‘Turks had never tried to make the constitution work... they merely used their position negatively to veto everything, however trivial, to which they objected’.\(^ {27} \) The reason was simple; Turkey wanted the constitution to fail to justify an intervention for means of national defence and national pride. On the 21 August 1974, A.C. Goodison of the Foreign Office agreed with this statement, noting that Turkey’s interest in the Turkish minorities of Cyprus and Greece, as opposed to those in Serbia and Central Asia, formed part of an ‘Ataturkist preoccupation with her own security’.\(^ {28} \)

\(^ {28} \) TNA: FCO 51/355, fl.2, ‘Notes on research department memorandum “Greco/Turkish Relations” by A.C. Goodison’, 21 August 1974.
strategic interests meant that despite the strong relations and national affinity held between the Turkish Cypriots and their ‘motherland’, the Turkish government ‘do not care tuppence for the real interests of the Turkish Cypriots’. In an attitude apparently shared with that of mainland Greece, the Turkish government viewed Cypriots ‘with contempt and irritation as pampered provincials’. As such, Turkey’s plans and designs towards Cyprus did not seek to protect the Turkish Cypriot community, but rather their own military and strategic interests.

Nevertheless the Greek Cypriot authorities did not help to prevent the implementation of these strategic plans. Indeed, despite the obvious and accepted difficulties faced in the intercommunal negotiations, the ‘Archbishop’s equivocations on the subject of enosis’ greatly increased ‘the probability of a violent Turkish reaction’. While the British authorities believed that the vast majority of Greek Cypriots, including Makarios, were by 1974 strongly opposed to the concept of enosis, the Archbishop would still publicly express his national desire for union with Greece. On the 16 May 1974, at a time when relations with the Greek government were almost non-existent and rumours of a coup were growing, Makarios stated to a German newspaper that ‘independence is a compromise… [and] if I had a free choice between enosis and independence I would support enosis’. Although this sentiment may have been directed towards his increasingly violent internal critics, as the paramilitary force EOKA-B had on multiple occasions sought to assassinate Makarios due to his ‘betrayal’ of enosis, such statements unsurprisingly led the Turkish Cypriot media to argue the ‘Greek side are only paying lip service to independence’. On the Turkish Cypriot side however, there was an equally ambivalent attitude towards a united form of Cypriot independence. In the British High Commission’s annual review of 1974 it was noted that the year opened with Rauf Denktash publicly pushing for the creation of two separate states. In turn the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires told the High Commissioner that Turkey maintained plans for geographical federation. In the context of a retrospective review, it was noted that ‘the intention was there but not yet the way’ to fulfil this Turkish goal.

34 Ibid.
Within this ‘official’ British version of the roots of the Cyprus conflict therefore, it is internal forces that are held responsible for the creation and exacerbation of the ‘Cyprus Problem’. The political obduracy of the Greek Cypriot authorities and their continued public flirtations with enosis played directly into the hands of Turkey and their strategic designs for the island. The British role in this narrative was portrayed as one of detached ‘neutrality’, marked by concern but little discernible action beyond the ‘preaching [of] moderation and compromise’ to officials in Athens and Nicosia who were recognised as unlikely to actually listen. Through this somewhat narrow reading, a direct parallel can be drawn to the observation of John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary in relation to Ireland. Here, much like Cyprus, British officials would often adopt a ‘functionally appropriate amnesia’ over their own colonial contribution to the creation and exacerbation of this national, ethnic and communal conflict. In those criticisms of the Cypriot reaction to the constitutional provisions for example, little reference is made to the British role in authoring this document, save for the need to protect British interests in any reforms that may be undertaken. Yet irrespective of this colonial legacy, British officials were clear in their view, so detailed in a May 1975 memorandum, that ‘the unsatisfactory situation in the island cannot be in any way regarded as the responsibility of Her Majesty’s Government’. In turn the Foreign Office was clear who was responsible: Greece, Turkey and the Cypriots themselves.

Indeed the direct spark for the outbreak of conflict in 1974 was the complete breakdown in relations between Athens and Nicosia. In the succinct words of a British report from the 1 July 1974, ‘the simple fact seems to be that the Greeks do not trust Makarios, and Makarios is intensely suspicious of the Greeks’. The Cyprus Foreign Minister described this relationship more acutely on the 3 July when he stated ‘there were members of the Junta who could not accept that the whole of the Greek Government should be thwarted by a priest at the head of only 500,000 people’. This struggle between Greece and Cyprus was effectively played out on two interlinked fronts. On the one hand, the Junta was directly funding and supplying the paramilitary organisation EOKA-B, established in 1971 under the command of General Grivas, in their pursuit of enosis and overthrow of the ‘arch-traitor’

38 See TNA: PREM 15/287, ‘Brief about the Cyprus Foreign Minister’s call on the Prime Minister’, 9 March 1971; For British rights enshrined in the constitution see O’Malley & Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.77-86.  

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Makarios. On the other, Athens and Nicosia were locked in a sustained political struggle for control of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, with the former concerned about a communist incursion and the latter its loyalty towards Makarios. Although Makarios had established the National Guard on the 2 June 1964 in order to protect the Greek Cypriot populace from Turkish Cypriot ‘extremists’, the role and power of the mainland Greek officers who commanded its forces led it to become ‘a Frankenstein’s monster’ that ultimately turned on and sought Makarios’s life. With a clear ‘cloak of disloyalty’ displayed by these mainland Greek officers, Makarios increasingly turned to his ‘left-orientated’ Police Tactical Reserve (hereafter PTR). A British Defence Adviser sent to report on the deteriorating situation on Cyprus noted in April 1974 that this paramilitary organisation of around 800 men was, much like EOKA-B, an equally potent ‘force for evil’. The tactics of the PTR were described as akin to ‘those of a bulldozer’, with no respect shown to personal property, religious sensibilities or the British presence on the island.

As a result, following the overthrow of Makarios on the 15 July, the British media was filled with reports of violence and brutality undertaken by the forces of Makarios. Yet both paramilitary organisations, one supported by the Junta and the other by the Cypriot government, were equally guilty of ‘unsavoury acts’, as certain sections of Greek Cypriot society effectively descended into a fratricidal civil war over the concept of enosis or independence.

Within this climate the British security forces were fully aware of the potential for the Junta to make a move against Makarios; it was simply a matter of when this would occur and how it would be undertaken. As Jan Asmussen has noted, the British anticipated any move against Makarios to occur in October rather than July, as this would have taken place after the rotation of Greek army officers on Cyprus. In turn this meant the British were not fully prepared for the crisis that did erupt on the 15 July, forcing them to act largely on an ‘ad hoc’ basis.

43 See TNA: FCO 9/1950, fl.17, ‘Relations between Greece and Cyprus’.
44 TNA: FCO 9/1950, fl.11A, ‘Relations between Greece and Cyprus’.
48 Asmussen, Cyprus at War, p.26.
against Makarios. In early July 1974 for example, the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Stephen Olver, reflected in multiple reports the options facing the Junta in relation to the National Guard issue, from assassinating Makarios to a face-saving climb-down. On each occasion a coup was effectively ‘ruled out’ given the ‘severe international repercussions’ it would bring, especially given ‘neither of the superpowers wanted any sharp change in the internal situation in Cyprus’. Despite these ‘logical’ assessments however, ‘with the Junta one never knew’. In contrast, an overview of the ‘troubles’ produced in March 1975 by the RAF security forces on Cyprus provided a series of intercepted intelligence reports from early 1974 that clearly showed the British ‘had been aware of the likelihood of a coup for some time’. Ultimately what directly precipitated this coup was Makarios’s open letter to the President of Greece, General Gizikis, on the 2 July 1974. In this letter Makarios directly accused the Junta of criminal activity on Cyprus, including assassination attempts and ‘political murders’, which he deemed formed part of a concerted ‘policy calculated to abolish the Cyprus state’. With this letter the High Commission suggested Makarios had finally ‘overplayed his hand’, as two weeks later he was fleeing Cyprus in a British helicopter. Yet irrespective of the when, with the intelligence that was available, it was generally accepted that the Junta and their ‘nationalist allies’ would eventually make a move against Makarios. As such, while the British authorities clearly felt the outbreak of this crisis was everyone’s fault but theirs, its eruption meant the British had no choice but to become deeply embroiled in its settlement, which was a far from easy task.

2.2 British Rights and Obligations

The response of the Foreign Office to this coup was swift, as Britain ‘took the initiative’ and called on their fellow Guarantor powers of Greece and Turkey to urge restraint on all sides. On Cyprus, forces within the SBAs were mobilised, and following reports that Makarios had survived, the British instigated their long-standing contingency plan, Operation Skylark, for his evacuation. However, given the vulnerability of British families in the dormitory towns to the ‘probable adverse reaction’ of the National Guard, British involvement was kept covert as an unmarked helicopter transferred Makarios to Akrotiri.

(hereafter WSBA), from where he was flown to London via a stopover in Malta.\(^{54}\) In Downing Street and Whitehall, throughout this first week plans were drawn up and meetings held to discuss potential British responses to the coup, including the feasibility of intervention.\(^{55}\) Within the House of Commons, a series of debates were held where the ‘obligations’ and ‘rights’ of the Treaty of Guarantee were raised, but Callaghan would not be drawn on the issue of intervention and merely confirmed diplomatic consultations would be held with their fellow Guarantor powers.\(^{56}\) Although the authorities in Athens repeatedly rebuffed these invitations for consultation, a Turkish delegation visited Downing Street on the 17 July. Here the prospect of joint-intervention through the SBAs was raised by Bulent Ecevit but rejected by Harold Wilson, as Callaghan stated ‘the island needed fewer Greek troops, not more Turkish troops’.\(^{57}\) Yet Turkish impatience with Britain over their reluctance to intervene was known to be growing. In turn British officials accepted that Turkish intervention was highly likely given ‘the Turks will on no account accept a Greek Cyprus’.\(^{58}\) On the 20 July the conflict escalated beyond British control. Not only was the opportunity for a peaceful settlement based on the removal of Nicos Sampson and the Greek officers of the National Guard lost, but it was abundantly clear that Britain would not intervene under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee. As such Turkey was effectively given freedom to manoeuvre on Cyprus.

Before moving further it is important to fully assess why Britain took the particularly controversial decision not to militarily intervene in the conflict. Officially three interlinking reasons were provided for not fulfilling this ‘right of intervention’:

1) Britain did not maintain the armed forces capable of viable intervention
2) The threat of war with an Allied government was ‘unacceptable’
3) Direct military engagement could potentially bring forth ‘savage reprisals’ against British residents in Cyprus and Greece.\(^{59}\)

This response however provoked significant debate within the British press regarding the overall merits of British foreign policy. Both *The Sun* and *The Guardian* argued, in the words of the latter:

> If we cannot meet an obligation in the case of Cyprus… it seems pointless to go on pretending to the world we could or would meet any of our other commitments… [or continue] footing the huge bills for armies and weapons which are strictly not for use.\(^6^0\)

The *Daily Mail* stated Britain and the USA ‘bear a grave responsibility for failing to act promptly to prevent the war’, whilst the Labour MP Christopher Price argued ‘the West have a great deal to be ashamed over Cyprus’.\(^6^1\) Some ten years later, during the Falklands Crisis, the *Financial Times* reflected on Britain’s ‘double standards’ towards these two islands rocked by external intervention. Whilst the British government were willing to travel 8,000 miles to the Falklands, they would not act on Cyprus where they had ‘both the on-site forces… and the clearest of international rights (and indeed obligations)’ to do so.\(^6^2\) Consequently as Chapter 3 will attest, accusations of Anglo-Turkish collusion continue to be widely disseminated and accepted on Cyprus as one of the key reasons for Britain’s lack of intervention in 1974. Yet the British authorities found such criticism grossly misrepresentative of the actual situation, as officials repeatedly stressed that Britain did everything in its power to prevent the division of Cyprus, and that ‘only those who overestimate our power can reproach us for the outcome’.\(^6^3\)

This effective description of weakness, and indeed *The Sun*'s criticism of British foreign policy, is aptly encapsulated in figure 2.2, as although it was Makarios who was fleeing from a crisis following an attempt on his life, it is the figure of Britain that exudes an image of ruin and defeat.\(^6^4\) Indeed *The Sun* stressed throughout the conflict that Britain ‘cannot opt out’ of Cyprus given their treaty obligations, and was therefore fiercely critical of the government’s failure, ‘whatever her historical responsibility’, to protect Cyprus from an invasion that was described as akin to Hitler bulldozing the Czechs in 1938.\(^6^5\) As such this far from flattering depiction of a battered and bruised Harold Wilson, bloodied by a series of

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\(^{63}\) TNA: FCO 9/2186, fl.26, ‘British Policy on Cyprus’.


‘Commons defeats’, standing beside the starved and toothless lion of Britain both satirises and reinforces this image of failure.

Figure 2.2: Paul Rigby, ‘...er, how have you been since I last called for help?’, *The Sun*, 18 July 1974, p.6.

Yet this cartoon also reflects Callaghan’s assertion that Britain in 1974 was militarily ‘impotent’ in their desire to help Cyprus. At the time of the coup, 2,995 soldiers were housed within the SBAs. By the 31 July this number totalled 11,700, and a sizeable naval presence was stationed around Cyprus. Yet according to Government sources these forces were merely equipped to protect the SBAs, and were not capable of meaningfully intervening in the affairs of the Cyprus Republic. Roy Hattersley, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, made this clear in his evidentiary interview with the Select Committee, as:

> had we wanted (I hope we would not have wanted and we did not want) to take military action, which I believe would have been counterproductive, it would not have been within our powers to do so.

This reading did not sit well with wide sections of the British press. On the 22 July the *Daily Mail* called the British response to the coup ‘gutless’, as with firm US backing the British could easily have dealt with Sampson and his supporters prior to the Turkish invasion. As such ‘history will record: We had the means. We lacked the will’. This criticism was

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68 Report from the Select Committee, p.15.
repeated in *The Guardian*. Here the link drawn by officials regarding the safety of British residents and the lack of military intervention was mocked with the question of what the authorities would have done if the SBAs had been directly attacked. This was followed by the quip that it was good planning to provide potential hostages so as to ensure ‘we have a good reason for failing to meet our obligations as a Guarantor’.\(^70\) Other sections of the press were less critical, as the *Daily Express* argued the British were not bound by any treaty and should ‘never intervene’ in Cyprus, as ‘we must not become embroiled in a struggle between Greek and Greek’.\(^71\) In an echo of the *Express*, Callaghan stated that while Britain may have maintained post-colonial ‘residual responsibilities’ through the *Treaty of Guarantee*, it was the USA who ultimately maintained the power to bring ‘peace to Cyprus by force’.\(^72\)

However this was not to be forthcoming. Prior to the Turkish invasion the US administration gave partial recognition to the Sampson regime, whilst post-invasion American military action against Turkey was categorically ‘ruled out’.\(^73\) As the British ambassador to the USA, Peter Ramsbotham, noted with the commencement of the second Turkish invasion on 14 August 1974, ‘while the Turks could not justifiably claim to have American approval… they could reasonably gamble that American disapproval would not be so forceful as to compel them to stop’.\(^74\) Indeed the main focus of Henry Kissinger’s policy was to protect NATO and ‘avoid giving the Soviet Union an opportunity to expand their influence and presence in the Eastern Mediterranean’.\(^75\) This form of Cold War realpolitik has in turn created the conditions for the proliferation of criticism and conspiracy theories in Greece and Cyprus over the actions of the USA.\(^76\) Within Britain, the Labour MP Christopher Price also condemned the Anglo-American connection over Cyprus, stating Britain’s failure to intervene was because ‘we were so slavishly following the Kissinger policies… [as] NATO considerations became more important than humanitarian issues’.\(^77\)

\(^70\) Jenkins, ‘By jingo if only…’, p.12.
\(^75\) Ibid.
\(^77\) PIO: ‘Chairman of the Select Committee’, p.3.
Therefore in a perspective satirically reflected in figure 2.3, American foreign policy would inevitably be seen to fail towards Cyprus simply because it was not focussed on Cyprus. This sentiment was clearly expressed by Kissinger to Ramsbotham with the comment:

> With all due respect to the special position of the United Kingdom, Cyprus was a peripheral issue from the US perspective... [as] if Turkey’s security was undermined, there would no longer be any barrier between the Soviet Union and Syria.\(^7\)

For that reason, an escalation of the Cyprus conflict must be avoided at all costs. The territorial integrity of Cyprus was secondary to the potential ramifications of an inter-alliance conflict, be it Greek-Turkish or Anglo-Turkish, in the wider context of the Cold War.

Although the British acquiesced to American policy throughout the conflict, in part due to their accepted but unwanted position of ‘responsibility without power’, there was a significant level of frustration targeted towards American officials.\(^7\) In January 1976 Tom McNally, an advisor to Callaghan during the Cyprus conflict, wrote that the USA ‘were never willing to commit their strength on the basis of our judgement’, as ‘tragically the outcome of

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\(^7\) TNA: FCO 16/321, fl.5, ‘FCO Telno by Ramsbotham on Cyprus’, 9 January 1975.

\(^7\) See Callaghan’s comments in O’Malley & Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, p.vii.
American policy was to doom our efforts to failure’. An example of this process can be seen during the second Geneva ‘peace’ conference from the 8-14 August 1974. Here the British delegation attempted to pressurise Turkey to halt its persistent ceasefire breaches by threatening to heavily reinforce the UNFICYP, and then ordering it to stand its ground in the face of further Turkish advances. In his memoirs Callaghan described this pronouncement as directed by the belief that ‘if we showed ourselves sufficiently resolute the Turks would at the last moment back off’. There was a direct precedent on Cyprus to support this assertion. Between the 23-25 July a combined UN-British stand at Nicosia airport successfully prevented the Turkish army occupying this strategically vital site in an event described by Harold Wilson as ‘probably the closest Britain came to war with another nation since 1945’. However this later British proposal of deterrence, rather than intervention, required active US support which was not forthcoming. Although Callaghan was convinced the only deterrent to further Turkish advancement was the threat of military opposition, Kissinger called it ‘one of the stupidest things I have ever heard’. As a result, on the 14 August the second Turkish advance commenced largely unopposed, as the USA would do nothing militarily; the UNFICYP would keep their heads down, and the UK ‘could not act unilaterally’. The one saving grace for the British was an acceptance, mainly based on military prudence, that ‘the Turks were very concerned not to embarrass us and would leave the SBAs alone’. Indeed, the Turkish armed forces did not need to assault the SBAs to fulfil their targets, as the tense but brief standoff outside Dhekelia (hereafter ESBA) proved on the 15 August. To do so would merely complicate what was otherwise a relatively straightforward advance. As such this British failure to mobilise international support led McNally to state Cyprus was ‘the last in a long line of salutary lessons that in the modern world, no matter how good our analysis and judgement, we can no longer unilaterally deliver the goods’.

81 TNA: AIR 8/2628, ‘Report by CBFNE’, pp.77-84.
82 Callaghan, Time and Chance, p.351; A.M. Rendel, ‘Mr Callaghan warns the Turks that their advances in Cyprus must be stopped at once’, The Times, 9 August 1974, p.8.
Nevertheless, this episode suggests that aspects of those public pronouncements regarding a lack of adequate force levels were somewhat exaggerated. This is not to say the British government were willing to unilaterally intervene in the conflict, but rather their forces on Cyprus, at least in the initial stages, were more equipped for intervention than the authorities were willing to retrospectively admit. In addition to the Nicosia airport standoff, which proved a strong UN force could achieve certain results, the SBA commanders had contemplated launching a UN-backed naval blockade of Northern Cyprus on the 25 July to prevent Turkey’s ‘continuous and provocative violations’ of the ceasefire agreements. At 13:25 hours on the 25 July, with Turkish forces occupying a relatively small enclave around Kyrenia (figure 2.4), the Commander of the British forces on Cyprus mobilised and dispatched a Royal Naval taskforce of four ships to Cape Andreas, off the Karpass Peninsula, for the purpose of undertaking this blockade. However at 11:25 on the morning of the 26 July, the task group was ordered to withdraw as reports from Turkey not only indicated that a blockade would be ‘tantamount to war’, but a telegram from the British delegation at the UN

noted that the USA ‘would in no circumstance use force or the threat of force to deter Turkey’.\textsuperscript{89} This twenty-four hour episode, although merely a proposal that was not instigated, was perhaps the closest Britain came to militarily acting as a Guarantor power during the entire crisis of 1974. The deployment of this fleet was not focussed on protecting British-UN forces, but was a more direct intervention designed to curb Turkey’s ability to continue its advance on the island. It is a particularly important example when one considers the existence of the ‘Big Lie’, detailed in Chapter 3, and the continued widespread belief in Cyprus that Britain directly supported the Turkish invasion. Yet this proposal was in no way linked to Britain’s status as a Guarantor. Unlike the unilateral rights of that treaty, it was clear Britain would only act as a force of deterrence with the firmest assurance of international assistance, namely from the USA. Without this assistance, Callaghan argued that any form of unilateral military intervention ‘would have resembled a second Suez’.\textsuperscript{90} Therefore, while Callaghan adopted a hard-line stance at the Geneva conferences and the Base commanders proposed acts of military intervention, it was simply inconceivable to risk the prospect of war with a NATO ally over a country which, aside from the largely unthreatened SBAs, provided little in the way of direct and discernible benefit to Anglo-American interests. As a result, although Greece may have opened the door, the British reluctance to militarily close it ‘gave the Turks freedom of manoeuvre in Cyprus’.\textsuperscript{91}

Although Callaghan and his ministers believed they did not maintain the power to oppose Turkish interests after the invasion, it is important to consider as the Select Committee did whether Britain could have intervened against Nicos Sampson prior to the escalation of the 20 July. In their deliberations, the Select Committee were clear that although it is easy to be wise retrospectively, ‘there seems little doubt that, had she so wished, Britain could have intervened either alone or in conjunction with Turkey as a fellow Guarantor power to have overthrown the Sampson regime’.\textsuperscript{92} In reality there was no real prospect of either eventuality. In the case of joint-intervention, Turkey’s known desire for geographical federation would have left the British ‘utterly friendless’ amongst the dominant Greek Cypriot community.\textsuperscript{93} Indeed the British Ambassador to Turkey, Horace Phillips, noted that Turkey had long been waiting for the ‘opportunity to get out from under the Greek yoke in Cyprus’, which meant there was a strong fear that Britain ‘couldn’t have controlled

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, p.54.  
\textsuperscript{90} Callaghan, \textit{Time and Chance}, p.356.  
\textsuperscript{91} TNA: FCO 9/2379, ‘British Policy on Cyprus’.  
\textsuperscript{92} Report from the Select Committee, p.ix.  
\textsuperscript{93} Callaghan, \textit{Time and Chance}, p.356.
the Turks or how far they went’ in seizing this opportunity. As such Callaghan stated that ‘for Britain to have cooperated with the Turks to impose a Turkish regime in the north of the island was unthinkable’.  

In the case of unilateral intervention against Sampson, in a position satirically reflected in figure 2.5 with an aloof looking Wilson providing meaningless help to a bewildered looking Makarios, there was no real prospect of any form of independent British military engagement in Cyprus. Whilst multiple scholars have rightly emphasised Britain’s lack of power and distinct lack of will to intervene, it is argued here that more direct consideration should also be drawn to the memory of EOKA and the spectre of Ireland.

Figure 2.5: Joe Martin, ‘The Scillies’, Daily Mail, 18 July 1974, p.17.

Indeed, on the 17 July 1974 an MOD report showed that a force of 8-10,000 soldiers could theoretically be mobilised within a two-week timeframe in order to reinstate Makarios against

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95 Callaghan, Time and Chance, p.356.
97 See for example Nicolet, ‘Lack of Concern’, pp.491-507; Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis.
the forces of Sampson. Whilst the ability to prevent a Turkish intervention during this two-week window is highly debateable, this report does show that the British maintained the general force levels required to fulfil their right of intervention if they so wished. However, aside from the protection of British service families, who ‘would be entirely at the mercy of the opposing forces’, it was the long-term ramifications of intervention that directly prevented any action. During the anti-colonial Emergency of 1955-59, the actions of EOKA had tied up the equivalent of three divisions and cost the British taxpayer tens of millions of pounds. As the following chapters will indicate, the historical memory of this period resonates deeply within Greek Cypriot society, as it helps shape the foundation of the image of Britain within the collective national consciousness. In 1974 this period maintained a strong resonance amongst many British officials, as a Foreign Office diplomat noted on the 20 August that ‘we had not forgotten the unpleasant experiences of the 1950s or the difficulties these had revealed… [in the] attempt to impose outside solutions on the people of Cyprus’. Although the British military could readily reinstate Makarios, his long-term protection against the guerrilla elements of EOKA-B would make a British withdrawal almost impossible. Indeed the MOD report noted that ‘bitter experience has shown us that even a small number of dedicated men with support from the local population can pin down an inordinately large force for an indefinite period’. In this sense intervention would be yet another burden on a nation that was, at this particular time, seeking to ‘get off the hook’ by fully removing themselves from Cyprus and the SBAs. Therefore as Roy Hattersley stated to the Select Committee in relation to unilateral intervention against Sampson, ‘I do not believe it would have solved the Cyprus problem, I believe it would have resulted in a similar sort of dispute and action and war’. This time however against the ‘colonial’ force of Britain rather than Turkey.

When considering the British government’s reaction to the Cyprus conflict of 1974, one cannot ignore the spectre of Northern Ireland. From reports in the media to official defence memoranda, the general sentiment was ‘one Northern Ireland at a time is enough’ for

98 See TNA: PREM 16/20, fl.2B, ‘MOD report on reinstatement’.
99 For prominence of service family security in British thinking see TNA: AIR 8/2628, ‘Report by CBFNE’, pp.78-85.
101 TNA: PREM 16/20, fl.2B, ‘MOD report on reinstatement’.
103 Report from the Select Committee, p.17.
the British army. As the MOD report on intervention noted, not only would the deployment of British troops to Cyprus directly influence operational levels in Ireland, but following Makarios’s reinstatement, ‘we might well end up by facing an open-ended and expensive situation similar to Northern Ireland’. Indeed it was Callaghan that had deployed the British army into Northern Ireland on the 14 August 1969 following a series of disturbances and sectarian riots. By July 1974 this British force totalled some 15,000 troops, and across the period of 1969-1975 a total of 270 soldiers had been killed in the conflict. On the political front, in May 1974 a proposed power sharing agreement in Ireland, the Sunningdale Agreement, had collapsed and the Ulster Workers’ Council had called a general strike that had effectively brought sections of Northern Ireland ‘to a standstill’. As such, with the clear parallels that could be drawn between the troubles in Ireland and those in Cyprus, there was a marked desire in official memoranda to avoid becoming directly embroiled in yet another communal conflict. With 15,000 troops in Ireland and a further 11,700 in Cyprus, the conservative MP John Biggs-Davison somewhat ‘mischievously’ asked the Defence Secretary Roy Mason on the 30 July if the government had considered bringing back National Service. While this question was dismissed by Mason, he did accept the strain of maintaining a ‘peace-keeping’ force on both Cyprus and Ireland was significant, meaning the burdens of a full military intervention would be even more onerous. Therefore given the potential ‘bottomless pit’ Cyprus could become for the British military, there was no real prospect of any form of intervention beyond diplomatic and humanitarian endeavours. This sentiment was clearly detailed by Mason on the 13 August 1974, as with the ‘fear of being bogged-down – think Northern Ireland’, Mason stated that:

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111 Ibid; PREM 16/20, fl.5A, ‘Cyprus Force Levels by Roy Mason’.
we can plan to do no more than look after our own families, defend if necessary the SBAs, act ad hoc on a humanitarian basis and be in a position to help the UNFICYP after the completion of the Turkish move if asked.\footnote{112}

Ultimately for the British authorities the ramifications of military intervention far outweighed their potential benefits. This is not to say the British actively supported Turkish military interests on Cyprus; far from it, they just did not do anything to prevent them. Indeed British policy towards Turkey was marked as one of deterrence rather than intervention, as although stern demarches were made and firm positions adopted, a lack of power coupled with a fear of escalation ultimately limited their effectiveness. Yet as The Sun and the Select Committee noted, irrespective of the burdens of Ireland, Britain maintained responsibilities and obligations towards Cyprus that they failed to uphold, as beyond direct intervention, more should have been done to protect Cyprus through the UN.\footnote{113} However as J.E. Cable of the Foreign Office noted on the 12 August 1974, whilst the British government were looking for the ‘least damaging way of passing the buck’, the direct involvement of the UN could allow the ‘Russians’ to exert a damaging influence over Cyprus.\footnote{114} Therefore as Chapter 3 will detail, Britain’s failure to protect and uphold the independence, security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus has allowed for the continued dissemination of conspiratorial themes aimed at understanding true British motivations in the conflict.

In turn, it is important to note that whilst Callaghan was highly critical of the Turkish government and their invasion of Cyprus, he did nevertheless maintain a level of sympathy, given the historical ‘obduracy’ of the Greek Cypriot authorities, to elements of the Turkish cause on Cyprus.\footnote{115} This was made clear following the commencement of the second Turkish military advance on the 14 August 1974, as Callaghan stated to Kissinger that:

> If I can put the position in a nutshell, I think it comes to this: that the Turks have got a good case. In my view this can now only be resolved by the creation of a zone. A zone in which they will have autonomy within a federal republic.\footnote{116}

The creation of this bi-communal federated state, which ‘would include some geographical separation’ and a considerable movement of people, was favoured by Callaghan at the second

\footnote{112} See TNA: PREM 16/20, fl.18, ‘Letter to Prime Minister by Minister of State for Defence’, 13 August 1974.
\footnote{113} Editorial, ‘How important is Cyprus?’, The Sun, 13 August 1974, p.6; See also Editorial, ‘Cyprus Deadlock’, Northern Echo, 14 August 1974, p.8.
\footnote{114} TNA: FCO 49/548, fl.4, ‘Cyprus and Europe’.
\footnote{115} For criticism of Turkey see Callaghan, Time and Chance, pp.348-349; Rory Macpherson, ‘Lack of progress over talks’, ITV News at Ten, 13 August 1974.
Geneva Conference as a means of providing a ‘greater sense of security’ for the Turkish Cypriot community.\textsuperscript{117} This general acceptance of the need to divide Cyprus into ‘autonomous’ Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ‘zones’, the major details of which Callaghan was willing to negotiate at Geneva, should not be interpreted as active British support for the aims of the Turkish invasion. On the contrary, Callaghan described the Turks as ‘too jingoistic, indeed too close to Hitler for my liking’, as he felt a solution to this crisis should have been found through diplomatic negotiation rather than military action.\textsuperscript{118} Indeed, what these reflections emphasise most strongly is the widespread recognition, as the conflict progressed, that a form of communal separation, with its attendant human consequences, would now be required on Cyprus.\textsuperscript{119} The British authorities however were clear that although they were unable, and unwilling, to stop the Turkish advance, the actions of Greece and their Greek Cypriot supporters brought this tragedy upon themselves, and in so doing dragged Britain reluctantly into a conflict that brought forth criticism from all sides.\textsuperscript{120}

With the historical responsibilities and physical presence Britain maintained on Cyprus, officials needed to publicly and politically justify their inaction, especially to the Select Committee, and did so in a number of novel ways. Callaghan for example adopted the ‘profoundly depressing’ tactic of playing dumb, as he avoided even the most basic of questions and would not elaborate on his views concerning the USA, Greece or Turkey.\textsuperscript{121} His junior minister Hattersley did provide more information, as he stressed that although it was often assumed British obligations under the treaty would involve military action, ‘this is certainly not the legal interpretation of the treaty which I think any lawyer would offer you’.\textsuperscript{122} Hattersley argued that the provisions of the \textit{Treaty of Guarantee} were open to interpretation, as ‘our obligation is to consult, our right if we think it proper and desirable is to take action. Our obligation we have fulfilled, our right we chose not to fulfil’.\textsuperscript{123} Although this reasoning was heavily criticised by the Committee, this definition of

\textsuperscript{117} See conversation between Callaghan and Clerides on the 12 August 1974 in Hamilton & Salmon (eds.), \textit{The Southern Flank in Crisis}, pp.210-212.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid, p.247.
\textsuperscript{119} For proposals and negotiations at Geneva see Constandinos, \textit{America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis}, pp.337-353; O’Malley & Craig, \textit{The Cyprus Conspiracy}, pp.206-215.
\textsuperscript{121} See Callaghan’s evidence in \textit{Report from the Select Committee}, pp.105-115; For the committee’s stance towards Callaghan’s tactics see p.40.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Report from the Select Committee}, pp.13-15.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid, pp.13-15. (Italics added for emphasis).
‘obligation’ over ‘right’ meant following the conflict the British authorities were clear in their
belief that ‘Britain behaved honourably and fulfilled her obligations to the limits of the
possibilities open to us’. 124

2.3 An ‘Eternal Balancing Act’

While the British authorities were swift in their response to the outbreak of crisis in
1974, for over a decade prior to this eruption the British had attempted to detach themselves
from the internal vicissitudes of Cypriot politics. 125 The reasoning behind this was relatively
simple. The protection of British interests was best served by maintaining a detached stance,
as ultimately backing one side would inevitably alienate and anger that of the other. As a
result the Treaty of Guarantee was deemed an unwanted burden. 126 However the conflict of
1974 brought Britain somewhat reluctantly to the fore. Accordingly the British managed the
special feat, in the words of Sir John Killick, of ensuring that ‘all parties were disenchanted
with us in one way or another for not having used our military force on the island on their
behalf’. For Killick, ‘responsibility without power was an unpalatable situation which left
HMG open to adverse criticism’. 127 Indeed the events of 1974 were particularly damaging
for this policy of political detachment, as the presence of 10,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees
within the SBAs dragged the British into the polarised atmosphere of Cypriot politics. This
reluctance is aptly encapsulated in figure 2.6. Published during the constitutional crisis of
1963-64, this cartoon reflects the frustration detailed by British officials who were caught
between two conflicting nationalist interests for the island. 128 Whilst this had long been a
concern, it was especially so after the partition of 1974, as Britain’s ‘special position’ was
utilised by both communities in their attempts to exert pressure on the other.

On the part of the Greek Cypriots, Makarios’s tactics of ‘internationalising’ the
problem through the Security Council and the Commonwealth, coupled with Britain’s
continued recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, meant the British government ‘can rarely
avoid taking a line which appears to lean towards the Greek Cypriots’. 129 On the part of the
Turkish Cypriots, while Britain would not offer international recognition to the Turkish
Federated State of Cyprus (hereafter TFSC), the Turkish Cypriot authorities utilised the

124 Callaghan, Time and Chance, p.357.
128 See for example TNA: FCO 9/2186, fl.36, ‘Stephen Olver on Anglo-Cypriot relations’, 10 June 1975; TNA:
129 Ibid.
requirement for the registration of property within northern Cyprus to ‘twist’ the British authorities into providing a de facto form of recognition.\textsuperscript{130}

This registration, undertaken solely by those British residents with property in the north and not by the British government, was condemned as ‘illegal’ by the Greek Cypriot authorities.\textsuperscript{131} This in turn witnessed an increase in Anglo-Greek Cypriot tensions, as the Greek Cypriot Mayor of Nicosia stated that ‘the only people in Cyprus HMG seemed to care about were the British subjects’.\textsuperscript{132} Therefore the desire to ‘detach’ from this polarised atmosphere was deemed prudent, as A.C. Goodison noted that:

\begin{quote}
Every time a decision is forced on us, our desire to maintain a balanced position involves disappointing, in some measure, the expectations of both sides. Our relations with each are, in my view deteriorating.\textsuperscript{133}
\end{quote}

This even-handed policy of ‘equality of dissatisfaction’, which involved an ‘eternal balancing act’, was deemed a necessary evil to protect British interests on the island from the oppositional desires of the Cypriot authorities.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{130} TNA: FCO 9/2186, fl.32A, ‘Letter by Stephen Olver to A.C. Goodison’, 20 May 1975
\textsuperscript{131} TNA: FCO 9/2186, fl.36, ‘Anglo-Cypriot relations’.
\textsuperscript{132} TNA: FCO 9/2209, fl.22, ‘British property in the Turkish Cypriot area of Cyprus’, 10 March 1975.
\textsuperscript{133} TNA: FCO 9/2186, fl.38A, ‘British Policy on Cyprus’.
\textsuperscript{134} See TNA: FCO 9/2186, fl.36, ‘Anglo-Cypriot relations’. 
Nowhere was this balancing act more focussed, and the British desire to ‘get off the hook’ more pronounced, than over the future of the Turkish Cypriot refugees sheltering within the SBAs. During the crisis of 1974, the SBAs became a magnet for thousands of Cypriots and foreign nationals fleeing the conflict. It was estimated upwards of 120,000 people passed through or sought refuge within their borders at one time or another. However it was the continued presence of almost 10,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees who refused, or were unable, to leave that caused substantial issues for the British authorities, as the debate over their future placed Britain directly in the crosshairs of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities. On one side, the Turkish Cypriot authorities repeatedly pressed the British government, in an increasingly hardening tone, for the release of those ‘hostages’ and ‘martyrs’ housed within the SBAs. This hardening attitude was publicly expressed on the 16 December 1974 when Rauf Denktash effectively issued an ultimatum, ‘release’ the refugees or sanctions would be imposed on the British community within the ‘Turkish zone’. On the other side, the Greek Cypriot authorities were clear that Britain ‘was not entitled to accede to the Turkish request’. On the 11 September 1974 Makarios stated bluntly that any transfer ‘would in effect be helping the Turks to populate the Northern area vacated by the Greeks’. This warning was clear to the British government, as it was accepted that ‘without the goodwill of the Republican authorities our position in the island would rapidly become untenable’. Consequently British officials felt they were caught in a dual bind, as to acquiesce to one demand had potentially damaging ramifications towards the other. As this situation was deemed untenable in the long-term, the British attempted to transfer responsibility for a decision to the intercommunal negotiations between Denktash and Clerides that commenced in September 1974.

These negotiations however provided little in the way of encouragement for the British authorities. Not only was progress on multiple humanitarian and political issues desperately slow, but it was felt both sides were attempting to use the SBA refugees as pawns.

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in a much wider political game. All the while, pressure continued to mount and the SBA authorities in particular grew increasingly frustrated. The reason from a ‘military point of view’ was clear: ‘the longer the refugees remain in the WSBA the greater the risk of a real security problem... with its attendant political embarrassments’. With ‘primitive’ living conditions, coupled to the onset of a particularly harsh winter, came an increasingly militant attitude amongst many of the refugees. This was not helped, from a British perspective, by the unrelenting ‘encouragement’ proffered by the Turkish Cypriot media and ‘camp administrations’ organised and controlled by politicians housed as refugees within the bases. As a result, the base commanders noted on the 20 December that many refugees were ‘straining to have a go at us’. Consequently the military authorities were clear; the refugees had to go sooner rather than later, irrespective of the costs. In a reflection of this feeling, on the 12 December the Chief of the Defence staff recommended that if a small Turkish naval force happened to approach Akrotiri to evacuate these refugees, strong demarches would be made for what would be a highly ‘embarrassing’ episode, but no attempt should be made to ‘interfere’, as there was nothing to prevent them leaving the SBAs ‘if they wish’. This was accepted to be a highly unlikely scenario that would inevitably and understandably lead to accusations of collusion from the Greek Cypriot authorities. However it underlines the fact that by December 1974, in the words of another Defence Report, ‘CBFNE [Commander British Forces Near East] would much rather deal with an external threat from limited numbers of EOKA-B than the continuous threat from 8,500 Turkish Cypriots on the doorstep of our HQs and large married family [living] areas’.

With these clear military considerations, on the 21 December 1974 Callaghan informed Kissinger that Denktash and Clerides had been given fourteen days to agree a phased programme of withdrawal for the refugees, by which time Britain would make its own arrangements with Turkey. Accordingly, in a Cabinet meeting on the 4 January 1975 Callaghan proposed to inform the Turkish authorities that, as a humanitarian gesture, ‘we

140 TNA: PREM 16/21, fl.10, ‘Record of a conversation’.
were prepared to allow the refugees to be evacuated from Akrotiri by Turkish aircraft at an agreed rate.' 147 Some ten days later, after officials in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus had been informed; Callaghan officially decided ‘that the Turkish Cypriots in the WSBA should go.’ 148 As speed was vitally important, given the village of Paramali on the border of the WSBA could easily become ‘the funnel through which poured all the Turkish Cypriots from the South’, a ‘census’ was hastily arranged for the 16 January which showed the near unanimous decision of a ‘desire to be evacuated to Turkey’. 149 The following day the transfer commenced and some ten days later it was complete.

Although Christopher Hitchens and Peter Kellner suggested this transfer formed part of a wider agreement of cooperation between Britain, Turkey and the USA, given Kissinger needed something to offer Turkey whilst Congress enforced their arms embargo, this thesis would argue the direct British motivation was more localised. 150 Whilst US pressure certainly influenced the actions of Britain during the crisis of 1974, this transfer was directed more by a distinct British desire to ‘get off the hook’ than any form of geopolitical manoeuvring. This was done by removing the problem, in this case the refugees, quite literally from ‘the doorstep of our HQs’ in the hope that the Cypriot authorities could ‘pursue their dissensions without succeeding in their constant attempts to make us take sides’. 151 Yet this was a particularly controversial decision. Within Britain the Select Committee deemed it an ‘error of judgement’, whilst wide sections of the British press stated the government were effectively ‘giving in’ to Turkish demands by providing de facto support for partition. 152 The official retort, as articulated by The Guardian, was to stress this refugee problem would never have existed if not for fourteen-years of Greek Cypriot harassment and six-months of Turkish intransigence. Whilst this transfer would not bring forth a Cyprus solution, ‘it does bring urgent relief to a lot of cold, wet, dispirited people’. 153 The British government undoubtedly could have approached the refugee transfer more sensitively by demanding, rather than

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expecting, a ‘reciprocal gesture of goodwill’ from the Turkish authorities for those British and Greek Cypriots displaced from their homes. Ultimately though the British authorities had no desire to remain embroiled in the frontline of Cypriot politics any longer than was absolutely necessary, as in the words of the High Commissioner on the 8 January 1975:

any odium from the Greek side which we might incur by evacuating the camps would be just as severe if, as might well happen, we were forced by mob reaction among the Turkish Cypriots into acting before we were ready.

Whilst this British decision had a strong political foundation, public pronouncements stressed it was a solely humanitarian endeavour, as to state otherwise ‘would open the way to the Greeks to come back with demands of their own’. The humanitarian situation was bleak and certainly influenced British policy-makers. Yet it also provided an ideal cover for the wider security considerations underpinning this decision. Equally, given the clear recognition that these refugees could not be housed indefinitely within the SBAs, and that other population transfers had occurred under the direction of the Cypriot authorities, the British effectively chose to sacrifice considerable short term pain, in the form of Greek Cypriot protests, in the hope of long-term stability for the SBAs.

These protests were significant. On the 17 January 1975, twelve civilian and military vehicles in addition to a life-sized effigy of the Queen were burnt at the gates of the WSBA during a sizable Greek Cypriot protest march. On the following day, the British consulate in Nicosia was ‘ransacked’ by over 2000 ‘Greek Cypriot youths’, whilst in Limassol a NAAFI (UK army-navy-air force) store and institute was gutted causing £80,000 of damage. During these protests slogans such as ‘British pigs out of Cyprus’ and ‘British go home, the island is ours’ were common, whilst on the 20 January 1975 a crowd of 5000 chanted ‘Akrotiri must be burned down’. This cycle was repeated in Athens with six days of anti-British marches, demonstrations and political speeches denouncing Britain’s ‘scandalous policy’ of partition. On the political front, accusations of Anglo-Turkish collusion were repeatedly addressed, as Makarios described this transfer as ‘a condition of partition’ whilst his Foreign Minister argued this action violated the provisions of the Treaty

154 For expected reciprocal gesture see TNA: FCO 9/2211, fl.49a, ‘Record of a Conversation between James Callaghan and the Greek Ambassador’, 13 January 1975.
of Establishment, which in turn raised questions concerning the future of the SBAs.\textsuperscript{161} The British authorities recognised there was a ritualistic nature underlying many of these protests, given the only real threat to the SBAs emerged from their own defence expenditure cuts. Yet as Olver bluntly stated to Makarios, if Britain succumbed to this public pressure and withdrew from Cyprus, there would no longer be any barrier to prevent the Turkish armed forces occupying Dhekelia, and ‘very likely Larnaca’.\textsuperscript{162}

Nevertheless the British authorities were unrepentant in their decision to authorise the transfer, as Callaghan stated the onset of winter made it ‘inhumane to withhold agreement any longer’. Furthermore he refuted suggestions that British policy had changed towards Cyprus and that the British government now actively supported the partition of the island.\textsuperscript{163} Yet if anything, this episode highlighted how little the British policy of detachment had actually changed. Rather than officially supporting partition, the British authorities simply wished to disengage directly from the damaging internal vicissitudes of Cypriot politics, as Goodison noted that:

\begin{quote}
Whatever resentment we might arouse among Greeks and Greek Cypriots would be a small, and, we could hope, ephemeral price to pay for reducing the direct involvement in the problems of the island which the presence of the Turkish Cypriots represented for us.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

This somewhat aloof stance was not seen to be perfect, but there appeared little viable alternative than to try and maintain strong relations with all parties, whilst recognising this in itself ‘means our relations with none will be as good as if we adopted a policy favouring one over the other’.\textsuperscript{165} As such, a Cabinet meeting on the 28 January 1975 noted that the refugee transfer had ‘embarrassed our relations with the Governments of Greece and Cyprus’, without providing any real improvement in British relations with Turkey.\textsuperscript{166}

This last point is particularly important as it places Britain’s detached policy in its wider context; Britain was in Cyprus not for the Cypriots, but for the wider defence interests associated with NATO, the USA and the Eastern Mediterranean. This was made clear on the 26 February 1975 when A.C. Goodison stated that Britain’s long-term interests in Cyprus, given their ‘obligation’ to keep the SBAs for the USA, ‘are primarily a function of our

\begin{footnotes}
\item[164] TNA: FCO 9/2186, fl.26, ‘British Policy on Cyprus’.
\item[165] TNA: FCO 9/2186, fl.38A, ‘British Policy on Cyprus’.
\item[166] TNA: CAB/128/58/6, ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’, 28 January 1975.
\end{footnotes}
interests in Greece and Turkey, rather than important for themselves’.\(^{167}\) Whilst Ankara was deemed the most important for trade and wider defence issues, in a sentiment repeatedly stressed by British officials, Britain was ‘neutral’ in relation to Cypriot affairs. Yet as Chapter 3 will detail, events such as the refugee transfer did not help to dispel rumours of Anglo-Turkish collusion within Greek Cypriot society. Indeed, unlike Kissinger’s clear pro-Turkish stance, such a policy for Britain would not only threaten their ‘detached’ status throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, but would bring forth significant public and political opposition from the sizable Greek Cypriot community in Britain, and the ‘vociferous’ British community in Cyprus.\(^{168}\) To emphasise this detached nature in its broader context, on the 10 June 1975 Stephen Olver suggested to the Foreign Office that although Turkey was ultimately more important to Britain than Greece or Cyprus, as a means of managing anti-British feeling following the refugee crisis, we must ‘try for the moment to balance – or at least give an impression of balancing – slightly more on the Greek side’.\(^{169}\) This request was deemed impossible by Goodison, as given British policy on Cyprus was focussed on the security of the Eastern Mediterranean; it could not be formulated without considering the impact on Greece and Turkey. With the importance of the latter, ‘we cannot therefore adopt a policy favourable to the Greek Cypriots’\(^{170}\) Consequently, although the British balancing act may have had Cyprus in the middle, it had Greece and Turkey on the ends, as considerations for one would invariably lead to ramifications and criticisms by the other.

### 2.4 A British ‘scapegoat’?

Following the end of hostilities and the conclusion of the refugee transfer, the British authorities were clear in their public pronouncements that Britain was not responsible in any way for the current and inherently tragic situation on the island. That dishonour lay at the feet of Greece and Turkey, whose political schemes had undermined the independence of Cyprus, and between the two Cypriot communities who simply could not respect and countenance the views and fears of the other. Although this reading overlooked the actions of the British as a colonial ruler in fostering division on Cyprus, or indeed their failures as a Guarantor, it was clear that sections of the British government saw Cyprus as something of a


This embarrassment did not simply stem from the island’s eruption into conflict, as Cyprus was far from unique in that regard, but more from the onerous burdens and ‘obligations’ placed upon the British due to this colonial legacy. Indeed, whilst the troubles in Ireland for example could not totally be ignored due to its physical proximity, the distance to Cyprus allowed for the development of a detached indifference within official policy. This indifference was clear in a conversation between Callaghan and Makarios in September 1974. During this discussion Makarios criticised and objected to Britain’s self-adopted role as a ‘mediator’ on Cyprus, as he argued Britain should be acting as a Guarantor power and directly campaigning ‘to ensure a return to the 1960 constitution’. In response Callaghan briskly pointed out that following his ‘miraculous’ escape from Cyprus, Makarios had made clear that ‘force was no solution to the problem’. Without any indications to the contrary, Britain had ‘pursued her role as a Guarantor power by diplomatic means, and must herself be the best judge of those means’. In pressing further, Callaghan stated categorically that:

The Archbishop should remember that this was basically a problem involving Greece and Turkey. Greece was also a Guarantor power, and could take the action proposed by the Archbishop at the UN if she so desired. Britain was a Guarantor power only as a result of a post-colonial situation, and it was not for us, with our colonialisit past, to strike an attitude of benevolent Victorianism in the Eastern Mediterranean. Clearly Cyprus was not deemed to be a British problem. That burden lay with Greece and Turkey. Therefore it was up to those nations to push for a settlement, as not only did they maintain ‘influence’ over the Cypriot leadership, but it was their actions that brought forth this crisis in the first place. British involvement in Cyprus was merely deemed the result of the ‘residual responsibilities’ bequeathed by a colonial past that was better left forgotten. For that reason Cyprus was not a place for Britain to once more try and impose solutions. Within this reaction by Callaghan a number of wider themes can be observed regarding the overall ‘official’ British perspective of the conflict. Firstly, echoing the policy of detachment, the British government did not want to be directly involved in the political quest for a settlement on the island, as other nations were better placed to deal with this issue. Secondly, the Treaty of Guarantee was an unwanted burden that could be used to drag Britain reluctantly into the polarised intercommunal affairs of the island. Thirdly, although the British did not intervene in the conflict, they fulfilled their obligations to Cyprus exactly and precisely through

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172 TNA: PREM 16/21, fl.10, ‘Record of conversation’.
diplomatic means. Finally, the ‘judging’ of the actions and reactions of the British government should only be done by those involved, as Greek and Greek Cypriot accusations of impropriety were merely the ‘scapegoating’ tactics of those truly responsible.

As such the concept of a British ‘scapegoat’ was an oft repeated concern of the British authorities in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, as it was felt its strength and potency emerged from the feeling of ‘national humiliation’ in Greece and national disaster in Cyprus. As Chapter 3 will detail, repeated accusations within the Greek Cypriot press of direct British involvement in both the coup and invasion were repeatedly dismissed as ‘slanderous’ and without base by annoyed British officials. In turn threats of legal action by Greek Cypriot businessmen were largely met with frustration by officials who felt Britain had acted ‘honourably and fairly’ throughout the conflict. Indeed this British annoyance was clear on the 17 February 1975 when Stephen Olver accosted the Cypriot Foreign Minister and stated:

we are getting pretty fed up with always being blamed for everything that went wrong in Cyprus and getting remarkably little praise for the very considerable efforts that we have been making to help the Government.

From this base, Olver then offered a point by point description detailing all of the ‘very considerable’ efforts the British authorities had undertaken in 1974. First Olver argued that it was Britain who ‘rescued’ Makarios after the coup, acknowledged his status as President when others, such the USA, were not so forthcoming, and then assisted Makarios in his return to Cyprus in December 1974. Second, he argued that it was Britain who provided land within the SBAs for refugee camps and provided any assistance that was requested by the Cyprus Government. Finally, Olver stressed that it was Britain who condemned the establishment of the TFSC in February 1975 and continued to recognise the legality of the Republic of Cyprus. In all of these actions, Olver was at pains to emphasise that Britain had gone further than any of the Cyprus Government’s other allies from the non-aligned movement, Eastern Europe or indeed from its ‘motherland’ of Greece. However the Cyprus government responded to this ‘positive’ list of British actions with their own list of ‘crimes’.


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such as the illegal import of citrus fruit from the occupied areas, undertaken by the British government.\textsuperscript{178}

Indeed, despite these considerable acts in support of the Cyprus Government, the British authorities ultimately failed in their most important role; they did not act with enough vigour in 1974 to protect and guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic they helped create and vowed to defend. They then exacerbated this failure through the insensitive and abrupt nature of the refugee transfer, as the lack of agreement for reciprocal measures by Turkey made this venture particularly damaging to Greek Cypriot public opinion. Likewise the ‘painful impression’ caused by the resumption of British arm sales to Turkey did little to stem the accusations of Anglo-Turkish cooperation. Although British officials stressed they were the only Government who considered ‘the sale of individual items in the light of the Cyprus situation’, with the French for example utilising only commercial considerations, this did little to sway the opinion of the Cyprus government.\textsuperscript{179} However in an important note for Chapter 3, it bears repetition that during the conflict itself the British government came closer to undertaking action against Turkey than providing any form of direct support for their military advance on the island. In this sense, there is some justification for the ‘official’ belief that the British were ‘scapegoated’ by those truly responsible in 1974. The British government was the least culpable of the three Guarantor powers for the outbreak of this crisis. Whilst this is perhaps not saying a great deal, it was Greece and Turkey who actively interfered with and then sought to divide Cyprus; the British role was predominantly that of a concerned observer. The British government then faced accusations of collusion and impropriety from all sides, which as the \textit{Daily Express} stated is the sign of a good and impartial ‘referee’.\textsuperscript{180} Yet as an October 1974 report from the High Commission noted, there was a general feeling that Britain should have ‘done something’ during the conflict, as ultimately the \textit{Treaty of Guarantee} did place ‘special and unique responsibilities on us’.\textsuperscript{181} This sentiment also found traction within Britain, as Hugh Foot, the British signatory of the \textit{Treaty of Guarantee} in 1960, whilst acknowledging the full facts were not known to him, still stated it was ‘totally wrong for us to give a pledge and then not take action’, adding this was ‘the original fault which brought other disasters’.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{179} TNA: FCO 9/2186, fl.34, ‘Call by the Cypriot High Commissioner’, 3 June 1975.
\textsuperscript{180} Editorial, ‘No Participant!’, \textit{Daily Express}, 13 August 1974, p.8; For counterclaims of collusion see Dodd, \textit{The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict}, p.130; Asmussen, \textit{Cyprus at War}, pp.177-190.
This sentiment of ‘doing nothing’ was further reinforced by Michael Neale Harbottle. As a former Chief of the UNFICYP and particularly prominent ‘friend of Cyprus’, Harbottle argued that if the British government had moved a small armed force into the Republic prior to the Turkish invasion, solely for the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community:

then I don’t think the coup would have lasted the seven days it did and would have fizzled out. Because we were not prepared to take action under treaty… what happened might have been totally avoided.183

Likewise the former Conservative MP C.M. Woodhouse questioned the actual point of being a Guarantor if Britain had no intention of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the island.184

However the most damning criticism of British policy emerged from the Select Committee Report of 1976, which attacked at almost every level the actions, or indeed inactions, of the British government.185 One of its authors, Christopher Price MP, announced after its publication that their findings would show the Cypriot people that ‘we the members of the House and the people of Britain care about them’.186 Perhaps understandably, given the report lambasted Britain’s failure to intervene, its findings brought the British government ‘worse press than we need’ on Cyprus.187 Within the British press the reception was more mixed. Although there was widespread recognition that Callaghan ‘muffed it’ and ultimately ‘got it wrong’ over Cyprus, the report was widely criticised for its ‘paucity of evidence’ and overall reliance, in the words of The Guardian, on ‘that all-purpose truth serum: hindsight’.188

In turn the government dismissed its findings as ‘misleading and biased, and in a number of respects inaccurate’, as Britain simply did not have the power or international support to unilaterally intervene in the conflict.189 However in providing a guarantee and then not acting upon this pledge, irrespective of the perceived ability to do so, allows for accusations of ‘incompetence’ or ‘betrayal’ from the public and political forum. Indeed, given the British could dismiss but not prevent accusations of Anglo-Turkish collusion emerging from Greek Cypriot society, the High Commission suggested in October 1974 that moves should be made

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185 See Report from the Select Committee.
186 PIO: ‘Chairman of the Select Committee’, p.1.
to ‘divert attention away from our alleged iniquities’ by emphasising those of USSR and the non-aligned movement. The reason was simple, ‘if we cannot prove ourselves to be lilywhite let us not leave others with the title’. Yet despite these moves, the High Commission noted in March 1975 that ‘in the continued absence of a settlement, the British Government, as a Guarantor power, is an obvious target on which the parties can vent their frustration’. As the following chapters will attest, irrespective of the evidence within the archives, the work of historians or indeed the arguments of British politicians, the fact remains that Britain did not intervene in the conflict of 1974, and questions continue to surround this controversial decision.

2.5 Conclusion

In the conclusion to the Chairman’s draft of the Select Committee Report it was stated that a nation’s true greatness was not measured by military might or economic power, but rather by its standards of justice, integrity and humanity. The Committee declared that Britain had failed Cyprus on all of these counts. Whether Britain could and indeed should have intervened in Cyprus is a question that continues to provoke considerable scholarly and public debate on Cyprus. Undoubtedly Britain could have intervened, and the comments of Wilson and Callaghan suggest intervention or at least a tougher stance towards Turkey was considered. On the question of whether Britain would intervene, the long-term implications clearly outweighed the benefits for British, and by extension, western interests on the island and in the area. Not only was US support not forthcoming, but the spectre of ‘another Ireland’ weighed heavily on British policy makers. Therefore, despite the threats against Turkey during the second Geneva conference, Britain would not intervene in Cyprus unless the SBAs were directly attacked. Ultimately, in 1974 the obligations of the Treaty of Guarantee, and indeed the island of Cyprus itself, were a burden to the British government. As such a lack of power and a general reluctance to intervene ‘in a problem which is no longer directly relevant to specific British interests’, meant that by the end of hostilities ‘all parties were disenchanted with us in one way or another’. Indeed, as The Sun put it on the 20 January 1975, ‘all we can Guarantee these days with certainty is that if incendiary mobs are not milling about us in Athens, they will be setting fire to us in Ankara instead. We are in

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192 See ‘Chairman’s draft Report’ in Report from the Select Committee, p.40.
193 TNA: FCO 49/548, fl.4, ‘Cyprus and Europe’.
the middle, loathed equally by both warring parties, a location we are becoming miserably accustomed’.¹⁹⁴

However the desire to maintain a detached stance on Cyprus made this policy of an ‘equality of dissatisfaction’ the only viable option for the maintenance of British interests. The presence of the Turkish Cypriot refugees within the SBAs damaged this equilibrium, as it forced the British to take centre stage in the polarised internal politics of the island. In the end, undoubtedly spurred by humanitarian issues but fundamentally necessitated for political and security reasons, the British government sacrificed short-term pain, in the face of Greek Cypriot protests and riots, for long-term peace within and more importantly for the SBAs. This did not mean Britain was supportive of Turkish interests on the island, even if it allowed for the development of such accusations. Indeed, what the refugee transfer highlighted most prominently was that in the pursuit of detachment, the British authorities would rather face politically manageable criticism outside the SBAs, than face issues within them. Although it was accepted that Turkey was far more important than Cyprus to wider British interests, on purely Cypriot issues, the British government sought to maintain a detached ‘neutral’ stance irrespective of the public criticisms that were directed their way.

In approaching Cyprus from a ‘British perspective’ before an analysis of the Greek Cypriot response and reaction to this perspective, it was abundantly clear that the island would eventually erupt. With the meddling and influence of Greece and Turkey coupled with the intransigence of the Cypriot leaders, Cyprus was an active ‘volcano’ the British could not escape, no matter how hard they tried. This therefore was Britain’s ‘Cyprus Problem’. Waiting for the inevitability of a crisis with the knowledge that a lack of power and an unwillingness to intervene would see Britain placed reluctantly at its centre. Indeed, for those British officials involved in the conflict, the obligations of a colonial past were the burdens of a post-colonial future, as ultimately all Britain was able to guarantee in 1974 was over forty years of debate and criticism over their true motivations for the island.

¹⁹⁴ Akass, ‘It’s Britain with her bucket and shovel again’, p.6.
Chapter 3: Imagining Conflict and its Causes: Structuring a Popular Greek Cypriot Response

Although the British authorities were quick to publicly declare a clear conscience towards the tragedy that befell Cyprus in 1974, within Cyprus the controversy surrounding the British and wider NATO response to the conflict retains a particularly strong internal resonance. In the immediate aftermath of hostilities, wide sections of the Greek Cypriot media launched an ‘inspired’ campaign denouncing the ‘partitionist’ aims of Britain and their NATO allies.  

More recently, on the fortieth anniversary of ‘Black July’, the AKEL (Communist) affiliated newspaper Haravghi openly propagated that ‘the coup and invasion was a double crime, the result of a longstanding conspiracy by the darkest circles of the USA and NATO’.  

In drawing on the theme of ‘international interference’, in which the actions of Britain are rarely disassociated with those of the USA, these articles provide a direct insight into what is a particularly prominent discourse within the narratives of Greek Cypriot history.  

The passage of time, alongside the opening of the British and American archives, has failed to diminish the potency of such beliefs. Indeed, the impression of a ‘partitionist’ Anglo-American conspiracy remains the foremost concept expressed within the oral history interviews undertaken for this project. Within these narratives, some maintain an historical ‘distortion’ the British called the ‘Big Lie’, or the concept of direct British aerial and naval support for Turkish military advancements on Cyprus, which first emerged as a form of political propaganda from the Greek MOD.  

When compared solely to the available evidence, be they archival documents or research undertaken by historians, there is nothing that can substantiate the belief that British pilots flew Turkish planes over Cyprus in 1974.  

This does not necessarily make these narratives wrong or untrue, especially given the

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1 As examples see Anonymous, ‘Αμερικανοί καί Άγγλοι έλαβον μέρος στην είσβολη (Americans and British took part in the invasion)’, Phileleftheros, 28 February 1975, p.1; Anonymous, Πράκτορες της CIA στην Αθήνα καί τη Λευκωσία (CIA Agents in Athens and Nicosia)’, Haravghi, 15 October 1974, p.1.  
2 See Nikola, ‘So was Cyprus betrayed…’, p.6; Mikhalis Mikali, ‘Οι ΗΠΑ μετέιχαν ενεργά στην υπόθεση ανατροπής Μακαρίου (The USA actively participated in the Business of overthrowing Makarios)’, Haravghi, 15 July 2014, p.3; Gandalf, ‘Ο λαός δεν ξεχνά τους φασίστες, τα τανκ και το NATO… (People do not forget the fascists, the tanks and NATO…)’, Haravghi, 20 July 2014, p.5; Eleni Mavrou, ‘Με το Βλέμμα στο μέλλον, παίρνοντας μαθήματα από το παρελθόν – (Gazing to the future, taking lessons from the past)’, Haravghi, 20 July 2014, p.5.  
5 Asmussen, Cyprus at War, pp.242-248; Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, pp.272-273.
ambiguities of British actions on Cyprus, as oral narratives can often provide information on ‘unknown events’ that maintain no written record. What they ultimately lack is verification. However this does not fundamentally undermine their credibility, as for the purpose of this analysis it is not their factual veracity that is paramount, rather the meaning that can be drawn from their construction.\(^6\)

While much has been written on the conspiracies of the Cyprus conflict, the focus of historians has tended to gravitate towards their political roots and not on their wider societal construct, impact and continued dissemination.\(^7\) Yet to fully understand concepts such as the ‘Big Lie’ and the enduring nature of conspiratorial narratives, one needs to consider both their political foundations and the broader socio-cultural meaning that can be drawn from their formation. Indeed, personal remembrance is a creative process in which the fragmented remains of a past reality are recreated through the act of articulation. As this ‘recreation’ is a partial and highly selective process, ‘facts’ can be adapted or can infiltrate one’s narrative through the collective influence of films, the media, commemorative rituals, political propaganda and social interaction. Through these influences, the form and construct of memory can be reshaped and ‘distorted’, be it deliberate or unconscious, to coincide with the dominant collective discourses of society. Yet as Passerini and Portelli have shown, these ‘distortions’ should not simply be discounted as unreliable, as factually ‘untrue’ statements are still ‘psychologically true’ to those who expressed them.\(^8\) In a concept that resonates deeply in this chapter and its approach to the structures shaping the ‘Big Lie’, Portelli’s reference to the value that can be ascribed from the discrepancy between ‘fact and memory’ in oral history is particularly important, as:

> It is not caused by faulty recollections (some of the motifs and symbols found in oral narratives were already present in embryo in coeval written sources) but actively and creatively generated by memory and imagination in an effort to make sense of crucial events and of history in general.\(^9\)

In this sense, the shape and form of personal recollection is not necessarily an imposition on the individual by the collective, but rather a creative extension that can reflect the dominant values and priorities of the society in which the individual is situated. In turn the errors and distortions that emerge from this creative process can be directly utilised to reveal the

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collective forces of symbolisation and ‘myth-making’ of the particular society in which they were formed.10

On Cyprus this process of collective symbolisation is shaped by a series of socio-political processes, incorporating both national and transnational influences. These forces strive to not only understand the conflict and place meaning onto the ambiguity of British actions, but also attempt to create a collective ideal that can be embraced across the political spectrum. Indeed the broader image and understanding of Cypriot history, memory and identity are particularly polarised between the left and right of Greek Cypriot society. Yet the image of Britain invariably remains little changed irrespective of these political divergences, as the combined influence of their colonial legacy and post-colonial ambiguities can provide a shared figure onto which differing ‘parties can vent their frustration’.11 With the presence of the SBAs providing a form of colonial continuity on Cyprus, this shared image can draw on two interlinked discourses. First, the ‘resistive’ ideologies emergent from the anti-colonial struggle against British rule can create a ‘cultural discourse of suspicion’ within the independent Republic that frames the broader image and understanding of British actions.12 This post-colonial response to British domination, disseminated in educational texts and commemorative ceremonies, can structure a foundational image of Britain on Cyprus that is framed by the memory of their divisive colonial legacy. Second, with the issues associated with the periodization of the ‘post’ in post-colonial, given British influences did not stop in 1960 but merely changed in form, a secondary system of indirect neo-colonial interference associated with the SBAs and NATO can expand and elaborate on this foundational image.13 In describing neo-colonialism, Gayatri Spivak’s metaphor of radiation is apt, as often ‘you feel it less like you don’t feel it – you feel like you’re independent’, as both subtle and coercive forces are utilised to influence developments within an independent state.14 These influences can be economic, ideological, cultural or geopolitical, as it is the pursuit of

effective ‘dependencies’ that powers the direction of these neo-colonial forces. Whilst these connections are invariably ‘felt’ on Cyprus, given the physicality of the SBAs and the much criticised form of ‘dependency’ imposed within the provisions of the independence agreements, it is the reaction against the actuality of neo-colonial ‘interference’ as much as the internal self-perception of a neo-colonial relationship that is key to this process.

In developing these combined influences therefore, a socio-ideological framework can be drawn whereby a post-colonial ‘discourse of suspicion’, framed by a divisive colonial legacy, is subconsciously fused to the ‘displaced’ structures of neo-colonial interference, grounded within the SBAs and NATO, to frame an image of Britain in 1974 that is bound by the language and policies of their colonial domination. This thesis defines this socio-ideological framework as a discourse of inherent suspicion. This discourse can take the ambiguity of British actions after 1960, given their policy of detachment and failure to intervene, and construct a narrative framed by the dual concept of NATO interference and an effective form of colonial culmination associated with the policy of ‘divide and rule’. It is from this framework, fuelled by the ambivalent relationship Cyprus maintained with NATO in a time of Cold War realpolitik, that the roots of the widely held concept of a Western, Anglo-American conspiracy for the partition of Cyprus are drawn.

In charting the influence of this discourse, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will analyse the historical structures of this discourse by considering the image and perceived influence of NATO on Cyprus. This is followed by an analysis of the broader influences imparted by the continued British position on Cyprus through the SBAs, and the interlinked internal questions raised regarding the actuality of Cypriot independence. This will incorporate ‘official’ Press and Information Office (hereafter PIO) publications, political pronouncements, some popular cartoons and a series of oral history interviews, thereby offering a counterpoint to the ‘British perspective’ of why there was a conflict on Cyprus. From this foundation the chapter will then consider the ‘Big Lie’ and how these socio-political forces can influence the personal memory of British actions in 1974. In drawing on the intrinsic subjectivity of oral history sources, and connecting these to public expressions of remembrance and opinion, a better understanding of the ideological undercurrents shaping the construct of personal memories associated with 1974 may be gained.

3.1 NATO ‘conspiracies’ and the Cold War

There is one trope within the discourses of Cypriot history that is widely embraced across the political spectrum: if the people of Cyprus had historically been left alone, free from the geo-political machinations of external powers, the island would never have been divided. In the words of Glafcos from Morphou however, ‘it is the destiny of small nations, really, not to do things the way they like’, as the ‘curse’ of an alluring geographical location historically attracted a variety of international and colonial forces into Cyprus.\(^{17}\) It was geopolitics that attracted the British in 1878, helped direct their staunch opposition to Greek Cypriot desires for enosis in the 1950s, and ultimately framed their policy of ‘decolonisation’ through the retention of a ‘neo-colonial’ presence within the SBAs after 1960. Likewise, with the ideological polarisation of the Cold War, a distinctly Western concern regarding the destabilising effects Cyprus could impart on wider Greek-Turkish relations conjured the broader spectre of NATO and the USA into Cypriot affairs.\(^{18}\) In each case, these external influences are invariably viewed and depicted as pervasive and negative, as they sought the division of Cyprus for their own political goals. Take for example the dual narratives of Alexandros and Giannis, whose immediate response to the question of why there was a conflict on Cyprus was to state:

*Alexandros*: Because the Americans and English wanted it...
*Giannis*: We put it politely as foreign interference...
*Alexandros*: The English government, they don’t like Cyprus, they side with the Turkish all the time.

When asked why they thought this was the case, Giannis responded:

The reason is because they got the bases there, and they know if the Cyprus problem is solved or anything like that, then they know gradually they would have to give up the bases. That’s the reason they are holding onto the island, and to be quite honest, siding with the Turks.\(^{19}\)

In linking the physical interests of the Anglo-Americans, the SBAs, to the lasting division of Cyprus, this narrative draws on and reflects an innate socio-political suspicion that British motivations within the independent Republic, much like their colonial policies, are essentially pro-Turkish and ‘anti-[Greek]-Cypriot’.\(^{20}\) Indeed it is often stated that Turkey ‘only’ took a reenergised interest in Cyprus through British colonial encouragement. Although this ‘only’

\(^{17}\) Interview with Glafcos, London, 7 March 2013; For geographical ‘curse’ PIO: A Place in History.


\(^{19}\) Group Interview 1, London, 3 July 2012.

argument can be overemphasised, given Cyprus was once an Ottoman territory and the modern Turkish state also maintained some interests in this island some 50 miles off its south coast, it is clear that the British authorities encouraged and have historically utilised Turkey to counterbalance Greek Cypriot threats to British interests on Cyprus.\(^{21}\) However through this external influence, which was at times both sustained and particularly pervasive, emerges an internal reactive discourse of unity through passivity, whereby the emergence of conflict can be presented as primarily the result, in the words of a 2010 PIO documentary, of ‘foreign conspiracies and interference’.\(^{22}\)

This discourse of ‘international interference’, structured around a strong conspiratorial motif, has long been drawn on by politicians and the public alike to interpret and understand the developments, and ultimately the ruptures, of Cypriot history. In August 1965 for example, the Cyprus Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou publicly stated to an assembly of Cypriot students that Cyprus had faced, and was still combatting, a number of divisive imperialist ‘conspiracies’ against its independent status.\(^{23}\) In April 2005 the then-President of the Cyprus House of Representatives, Demetris Christofias, reiterated this point to an assembled audience in Athens:

> the coup and the invasion [of 1974] constituted the culmination of conspiracies and interventions in the affairs of the independent Republic of Cyprus, which aimed at keeping Cyprus in the sphere of political and military control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.\(^{24}\)

In these speeches two points emerge, firstly the neo-colonial nature of NATO ‘control’, and secondly the plurality of ‘conspiracies’. In approaching this first point, it must be noted that Cyprus, even more so than its ‘motherland’ of Greece, maintained an inherently uneven and ambivalent relationship with the Western Alliance.\(^{25}\) Cyprus was not an official member of NATO, in part as William Mallinson noted, because of British opposition in 1960. The reasoning behind this was twofold. Firstly NATO membership could well have questioned

\(^{21}\) For ‘only’ perspective see for example Fouskas & Tackie, *Cyprus: The Post-Imperial Constitution*, pp.10-17; For a counterpoint see Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-59*, p.67; Niyazi Kizilyurek, ‘The Turkish Cypriot from an Ottoman-Muslim Community to a National Community’, in Hubert Faustmann & Nicos Peristianis (eds.), *Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1876-2006*, (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2006), pp.315-326.

\(^{22}\) PIO: ‘Speech by the Foreign Minister’, 18 August 1965.

\(^{23}\) PIO: ‘Speech by the President of the House of Representatives in Athens’, 19 April 2005.

\(^{24}\) PIO: ‘Speech by the President of the House of Representatives in Athens’, 19 April 2005.

the need for ‘sovereign’ British bases at a time when Britain was opposed to unilaterally leaving the island. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, there was a general concern that any conflict on the island, which would invariably involve Greece and Turkey, could well allow the USSR through the auspices of the UN to interfere in NATO’s sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{26}

Whilst Cyprus was from 1961-2004 an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the island was ostensibly a satellite, and to a significant extent de facto ‘client state’ of NATO through both the SBAs, and the wider internal influence imparted by the NATO states of Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{27}

This curious arrangement placed Cyprus effectively as a partial presence with regards NATO; there but not there, influenced by but externalised from its policy decisions. These decisions were generally focussed, as reflected in figure 3.1, in both maintaining Cyprus as ‘the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the West’, and removing it as a bone of contention between Greece and Turkey. However given this unofficial ‘client status’, the solutions for the ‘Cyprus Problem’ posed predominantly by the NATO allies of the USA, Greece and Turkey, each time supported by the British rather than actively projected due to their desire for political detachment, were consistently placed within the broader considerations of Greek-Turkish relations, and did not therefore include a Cypriot voice.


\textsuperscript{27} For reference to the ‘controlling’ actions of Greece on Cyprus see Makarios comments in TNA: PREM 15/1353, ‘Memorandum entitled “Cyprus” for the Prime Minister’; TNA: FCO 51/192, fl.2, ‘Research department memorandum: The relations of the Cypriot Greeks with Greece’, 28 September 1971; PIO: ‘Letter by Makarios to the President of the Greek Republic’. 
Through this process of ‘silence’ and associated ‘outsider’ mentality towards the acts and perception of the NATO alliance, a second point emerges from the reflective speeches of Kyprianou and Christofias, the plurality of ‘conspiracies’ throughout the modern history of Cyprus. From the colonial period to the present day, an inherent suspicion of externally authored proposals has long elicited accusations of ‘conspiracies’ from both the public and political forum. Indeed as Daniel Pipes has noted, a ‘conspiracy’ can be a real act whereas a ‘conspiracy theory’ is a perception, and whilst they often overlap, the central unifying factor is the concept of control and power. As such the strength of a ‘conspiracy theory’ is drawn from the uneven distribution of resources, the ‘big fish against the little fish’, as whilst they can maintain a degree of scapegoating, there is often enough truth in their structures to make these narratives plausible. On Cyprus these suspicions are often historically justified. Prior to 1974 a number of ‘solutions’ to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ were proposed by external powers that effectively placed the interests of Nicosia secondary to those of Athens and Ankara. Take for example the events which followed the constitutional crisis of 1963-64, when the outbreak of significant levels of intercommunal violence led to a Turkish invasion threat that was only prevented by the forceful diplomatic intervention of the USA. In an attempt to ease tensions, both the US-led Acheson Plan of July-August 1964 and the Greek-Turkish dialogue of 1966-67, which offered ‘solutions’ based on the concept of enosis with Turkish concessions, were negotiated without the direct involvement of the Cypriot authorities. This Cypriot marginalisation resulted in strong political accusations of ‘conspiratorial’ motives, as Makarios denounced any form of enosis with concessions as little more than ‘partition or tripartition of the island under the umbrella of enosis’. Consequently Makarios was known through both diplomatic and more covert channels to have done ‘all he could behind the scenes to wreck the chances of an external agreement’.

30 Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp.xiii-xvi.
34 TNA: FCO 51/353, fl.1, ‘History of Proposals’. 
contemplated through their return of General Grivas to Cyprus in June 1964 of overthrowing Makarios.\textsuperscript{35}

Although these plans did not translate into direct action, they were often depicted in the Greek Cypriot media as ‘NATO traps’ which utilised the lure of *enosis* to try and ensnare Cyprus within the Alliance.\textsuperscript{36} The reason for this ‘trap’, stretching from the crisis of 1963-64 to the ‘culmination’ of 1974, was detailed by the Cyprus Foreign Minister Ioannis Christophides on the 16 May 1974. In conversation with British officials he stated clearly that the CIA ‘would prefer to see Cyprus ruled by someone who did not favour AKEL (as they believed Makarios did) and who would be more willing to make Cyprus a “client state” of Greece’.\textsuperscript{38} Although the British dismissed this allegation, Makarios’s direct flirtations with the USSR were a significant concern in the 1960s, as they resulted in both public and political references to Cyprus as a new Cuba, and the ‘red priest’ a new Castro.\textsuperscript{38} This public perception was not helped, as Christophides noted, by Makarios’s long-term and ‘mutually beneficial’ political alliance with AKEL, the Cyprus Communist Party. Although ideologically incompatible, both shared a common belief in Cypriot non-alignment and a common enemy in the ‘ultranationalist’ forces of Grivas, and after 1967, the military Junta in Athens.\textsuperscript{39} However despite Makarios’s links to AKEL, a High Commission report from the 12 July 1974 reinforced a long prevailing view amongst British officials; Makarios despite his public criticisms of NATO was ostensibly pro-Western and therefore not, as his critics argued, ‘a prisoner of the left’.\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, in a reflection of the words of Marios from Limassol who argued ‘there were no communists on Cyprus, just people of the left’, the British report concluded that:

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{38} For British cartoons showing Makarios as Castro see Papas, ‘Let’s swap islands’, *The Guardian*, 17 February 1964, p.9; Stanley Franklin, ‘Makarios negotiating closer ties with Russia’, *Daily Mirror*, 24 February 1964, p.5; For Cyprus-USSR links see PIO: ‘The President has asked the Soviet Union for military and other assistance’, 10 August 1964; Malinsson, *Cyprus: A Modern History*, pp.43-61.
\bibitem{40} TNA: FCO 9/1886, DS(L)441, ‘Report entitled “The Left in Cyprus” by the British High Commission’, 12 July 1974.
\end{thebibliography}
there is a good deal to his [Makarios’s] claim that most of the so-called Communists in Cyprus are first and foremost members of his flock, who would abandon the Party were the Ethnarchic shepherd to recall them.\textsuperscript{41} As a result AKEL was defined as an ‘elderly and bourgeois party’ that was close to the USSR but not crucial to its interests, whilst Cyprus in general was not deemed to be ‘intrinsically important to the Russians, who have bigger fish elsewhere in the Middle East’.\textsuperscript{42}

Indeed for both NATO and the USSR, Cyprus was largely a peripheral issue in the broader context of its geographical location. Andreas Constandinos for example has noted that Turkish connections to the Soviet Union were far more concerning to the USA and NATO than those of Cyprus and the USSR.\textsuperscript{43} The British government viewed their strategic interests in both Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean as ‘relatively small’ in 1974, largely due to defence expenditure cuts.\textsuperscript{44} Henry Kissinger readily admitted, given strong US interests in the Middle East, that harmonious relations with Greece and in particular Turkey, who if alienated could adopt a position of ‘hostile neutrality’, took precedent over the internal issues of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{45} As such the policies resulting from this ‘peripheral’ approach were clearly defined proposals for double-enosis in 1964 and 1966, and a strongly held belief on Cyprus, drawn in figure 3.2, of a Greek ‘client state’ coupled to a Turkish invasion in 1974. This cartoon from the AKEL-affiliated \textit{Haravghi}, whilst shaped by AKEL’s inherently negative attitude towards NATO, also reflects this much broader placement of Cyprus as a problem between Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{46} Consequently a ‘solution’ required their appeasement as much, if not more than those of the Cypriots themselves. This is not to say that a ‘solution’ could, or indeed was imposed on Cyprus by the British in 1974. Rather the issues on the island were viewed predominantly by those in a position to ‘promote’ them, primarily the USA, Greece and Turkey, through an ‘internationalised’ perspective in the case of the former, and a ‘nationalised’ perspective in the dual case of the latter. Therefore much like the image in figure 3.2 depicts, the internal perception of this process places Cyprus as a mere ragdoll, and Greece and Turkey mere children in a much wider political game, as in the

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid; Interview with Marios, Limassol, 3 April 2014.
\textsuperscript{42} TNA: FCO 9/1886, DS(L)441, ‘The Left in Cyprus’; Similar sentiments were expressed by the NATO Secretary-General in TNA: AIR 8/2628, fl.E57/1, ‘Conversation between the Secretary-General of NATO and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State FCO’, 19 July 1974.
\textsuperscript{44} TNA: FCO 9/2186, fl.11, ‘Report on British interests’.
\textsuperscript{45} TNA: FCO 16/321, fl.5, ‘FCO Telno by Ramsbotham on Cyprus’.
\textsuperscript{46} For AKEL’s continued criticism of NATO see Aristos Damianou, ‘AKEL denounces President’s position for NATO guarantees’, undated, \url{http://www.akel.org.cy/en/?p=672#.VUoloZXwvIU}, (last accessed 4 May 2015).
words of Vas from Limassol, ‘the big fish eats the little fish, and Cyprus gets slapped everyday by everyone because they are small’.\footnote{Interview with Vas, London, 7 March 2013.}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3_2.png}
\caption{‘\textit{TO NATO PIZEI THN ELLADA} (NATO puts pressure on Greece)’, \textit{Haravghi}, 29 December 1974, p.5. Caption reads: ‘If you don’t come, I will give her [Cyprus] to the other girl to play with’.

With this effective marginalisation by the NATO ‘allies’, marked by the inherent ambiguities of Anglo-American policy (given the British were habitually placed as an ‘echo’ of the USA) and the direct actions of Greece and Turkey, a natural suspicion of the neo-colonial designs of external forces is simultaneously created and sustained on Cyprus.\footnote{For British ‘echo’ of Washington see TNA: FCO 9/2819, ‘Britain and Cyprus by P.A. Rhodes’, 24 May 1979.}

Beyond the monolithic ‘corrupting force’ depiction of NATO in figure 3.2, each individual ‘conspirator’ associated with the conflict maintained their own interests towards Cyprus which could either be separate or intertwined with those of their fellow ‘allies’. Yet the central unifying factor between these perceived neo-colonial designs was ultimately ‘control’, as in the words of Softonis from Morphou:

\begin{quote}
the problem of Cyprus comes over from the Guarantors. From Greece and from Turkey, because they want to have the influence on the island. And also from the British, because they want to have their own bases on the island, for their own purpose, all over the Middle East.\footnote{Interview with Softonis, Limassol, 7 April 2014.}
\end{quote}

For Softonis, none of these international powers maintained any real interest in Cyprus beyond their own strategic designs. If the Cypriots were just left alone, Softonis argued, reunification would occur in a matter of days. Through this argument the implication is clear,
these external forces utilise their influence, be it ideological, economic or political, as a means of controlling Cyprus and protecting their own interests in the region. As there are multiple examples of externally orientated solutions, or ‘conspiracies’, authored by these three NATO powers from across the modern history of Cyprus, the majority of which involved partition, an inherent suspicion of their actual motivations towards the island is somewhat of a natural consequence.

Therefore in approaching the sustained reference within Greek Cypriot public pronouncements associated with NATO’s ‘imperialist’ designs for Cyprus, these internal reactions can draw on the ‘outsider’ mentality of Cyprus to the Alliance, and in turn frame an internalised socio-political ideology of resistance to both the perception of, and ultimately actions associated with this ‘NATOised’ neo-colonial discourse. The influence of this discourse is reflected in multiple contemporary and historical representations, as the diasporic newspaper Eleuthere Kupros for example stated in January 1975 that:

> the CIA backed Junta inspired coup and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus were part of an American imperialist plan to eventually partition Cyprus, in order to keep it firmly within NATO’s military and political control.

Likewise in a 2010 PIO documentary, it was stated that Turkey’s long-term ‘ambitions’ towards Cyprus were never withheld from their allies, ‘especially Britain’. In turn their final implementation in 1974 was merely the result of ‘a well-designed effort by Turkey, with the tolerance of its Cold War allies, to weaken and finally dissolve the Republic of Cyprus and partition the island’. This sentiment was repeated by Charalambos from Morphou, who fought against the Turkish invasion in 1974, as after describing the coup as a co-designed plot by the Junta and the CIA, he argued:

> When Turkey invaded Cyprus, we went to UN and we asked Greece and England to come together, you are co-Guarantors, but they told us it is not their problem... They don’t want to have problems with Turkey or each other. There was no profit in it, either economical, national or any other agreement. I think it was our mistake to be with the Russians... They send us guns and cars for the army. I believe that this was wrong. We had to be part of NATO. If we were inside NATO, as Greece and Turkey were, we would face the problems differently.

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50 See Woddis, An Introduction to neo-colonialism, pp.69-71.
51 See for example PIO: ‘Draft notes of the Speech of Dr Vassos Lyssarides, President of EDEK’, 19 July 1977; Gandalf, ‘People do not forget the fascists’, p.5.
53 PIO: A Place in History; See also Attila 74: The Rape of Cyprus.
54 Interview with Charalambos, Limassol, 7 March 2014; For wider association with NATO see Christos Kassimeris, ‘Greek Response to the Cyprus Invasion’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.19, No.2, (2008).
Whilst this narrative was intriguing for its distinction between the Junta, who launched the coup, and Greece, who subsequently failed to help Cyprus, a concept explained further in Chapter 6, the central unifying theme of these tropes are clear: a Cyprus divided is a Cyprus controlled. There was no ‘profit’ to be had in protecting Cyprus in 1974. This view is tacitly supported by the British ‘failure’ to intervene in Cyprus and the direct focus of US policy towards Greece, and in particular Turkey. Indeed the Daily Mail for example stated that the USA in 1974 ‘seemed to be backing the wrong side throughout’. 55 As a result it can, and indeed has been convincingly argued that in 1974 Turkey finally acquired its desire for a ‘strategic base’ in Northern Cyprus, Britain and the USA retained and protected ‘their’ SBAs, whilst Greece maintained, albeit without enosis, a significant influence over the remnants of what became a predominantly Greek Cypriot Republic. 56

Indeed, the British military authorities noted in 1979 for example that the survival of the SBAs, which were now ‘totally’ NATO orientated, ‘could well be because of the Turkish occupation of the North’. 57 As Greek Cypriot attention was now focussed towards the much greater national interest of reunification and return, it was concluded that ‘perversely enough, most of the signs are that a Cyprus settlement, or even defusing of the problem, could well lead to more not less pressure to leave the SBAs’. 58 This is not to say the British government wanted or actively sought the division of Cyprus, or indeed undermined potential agreements for reunification. Rather it shows that there were clear benefits to the British authorities emergent from the division of Cyprus. This recognition was not lost on the Greek Cypriots, as in a sentiment reflected in multiple interviews, Christodoulos from Famagusta stated that ‘as long as there is a problem in Cyprus, the Cypriot people will not talk about the British Bases. That leaves them alone to do what they want to in Cyprus’. 59 In turn, given a divided Cyprus is a controlled Cyprus, Christos from Larnaca argued that the British and Americans:
believed that Makarios was Castro of that part of the Mediterranean area. That’s what they thought. But I don’t think they were justified there. They only wanted Turkey to occupy Cyprus because in that way there would have been a division in Cyprus, and this program says divide and rule, and that’s what they implemented in Cyprus.60

This narrative, and multiple others with a similar focus, reflect the structures of this discourse of inherent suspicion, as it draws on the perceived neo-colonial Cold War concerns of the ‘Anglo-Americans’, a communist incursion, and articulates it through the language of British colonialism, which is strongly tied to the legacy of ‘divide and rule’. Given the importance of Turkey to the British in the 1950s and to NATO throughout this period, a clear unifying theme, or temporal overlap, can be created between the memory of British colonial policies on the one hand, and the understanding of their actions within the independent Republic on the other. These activities and interests are given physical form through the SBAs, and it is these sites that provide the physical conduit for the broader connection between colonial rule and neo-colonial interference. Indeed, echoing the opening words of Glafcos regarding the ‘destiny of small nations’, in January 2014 President Anastasiades described the imposition of the bases in 1960 as anything but the ‘result of the free will of the Cypriot people’.61

3.2 The SBAs and (neo)-colonial continuity

The creation and continued presence of the SBAs have long been a source of contention, and often a thorn in the side of the Anglo-Greek Cypriot relationship. Their borders not only draw the British directly into the internal affairs of Cyprus, but they provide the last physical vestige of direct British colonial domination over the island. To take but one example of the many criticisms directed towards the SBAs down the years, during the highly controversial Turkish Cypriot refugee transfer of January 1975, Eleuthere Kupros stated that:

Britain and her bases in Cyprus serve only the interests of imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a complete disregard for the wishes and welfare of the people of Cyprus.52

Indeed strong criticisms and protests against the SBAs primarily occur during times of political upheaval. They can be provoked either by British actions or the broader perception of their actions, as these protests can often draw as much on what the bases reflect, a

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60 Interview with Christos, London, 29 November 2012.
61 PIO: ‘Statement by the President of the Republic on the agreement with Great Britain for the development of the British Base Area’, 22 January 2014.
‘colonial bloodstain’ and neo-colonial ‘interference’, as the act of protest itself. However there has never been a concerted action to seek their removal by the Cypriot authorities, which is perhaps motivated by both political and economic considerations. For example figures from May 1974 showed British defence expenditure comprised 10% of Cyprus’s GNP, whilst businesses in Limassol were estimated to have lost upwards of £100,000 a week following the evacuation of British service families in August 1974. Likewise, beyond this economic ‘dependence’ and the particularly vocal criticisms of AKEL, Stephen Olver noted on the 12 July 1974 that:

it does not suit AKEL to agitate too much against the SBAs for local reasons: the Bases are the largest employer in the island and AKEL would lose popularity if the golden goose were killed as a result of its activities.

Indeed the SBAs often provide a convenient outlet for Cypriot frustration, as they provide the physical manifestation of the continuation of British colonial interference in Cyprus. The SBAs were formed as part of the independence agreements of 1960, although in the words of a British press briefing in May 1979, their territory ‘never have been a part of Cyprus’; they are retained sovereign British territories that ‘are not colonies, but in law are so regarded’. Therefore, although these 98 square miles of ‘sovereign’ British territory are not technically ‘colonial’ possessions, in reality they are a hybridised form of ‘neo-colonies’ that are ostensibly the remnants of the British Crown Colony of Cyprus that ceased to exist in 1960.

However from this continued ‘occupation’, albeit in a changed form, comes an inherent suspicion rooted within the discourses of Cypriot post-coloniality that posits the protection of these ‘neo-colonies’ utilises the same tactics as full British colonialism, the policy of ‘divide and rule’. This was reflected in multiple interviews, as Margarita from Kythrea stated for example that:

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65 TNA: FCO 9/1886, DS(L)441, ‘The Left in Cyprus’.
67 For agreement not to create ‘colonies’ see TNA: ‘Declarations by Her Majesty’s Government regarding the administration of the Sovereign Base Area mentioned in Article 1 of the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus which remain under the Sovereignty of the United Kingdom’, in Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 16 August 1960), pp.96-100.
Cyprus is nothing for them [British]; it’s just the place so they control all the Middle East. This is the reason they… try to get us separate, and they try to make us fight between the two communities… it’s their policy, divide and rule.69

This colonial continuity has a dual effect. On the one hand, as reflected by Margarita, the actions and perceived designs of Britain within the post-colonial state are invariably framed and articulated through the language and historical memory of their colonial policies. On the other, in a concept that will be expanded later in this chapter, an emphasis on this continued British ‘interference’ can allow certain political forces to embrace and depict a level of Cypriot passivity in the narratives of their own history.70 Ultimately this framework is given tacit support by three interlinked facts. During the anti-colonial Emergency of 1955-59 Britain utilised Turkey to counteract Greek demands for enosis. During the Cold War Turkey was far more important to the Western Alliance than Cyprus. In 1974 Britain did not act, irrespective of its perceived ability to do so, to prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Therefore this temporal connection between Britain’s colonial legacy and their perceived neo-colonial designs for Cyprus can root this socio-political discourse of inherent suspicion within the wider structures of the Greek Cypriot national consciousness, and in turn frame individual articulations and understandings of British actions in the conflict of 1974.

The British government did not help to dispel such suspicions, as they often reinforced them through their ambiguous policy of detachment. Although the British authorities refused to publicly ‘take sides’ after 1960, they were willing to act swiftly and controversially ‘against’ the Greek Cypriot authorities, given their position as the dominant force on the island, if they felt their interests in the SBAs were threatened. A particularly potent example of this was noted in Chapter 2 regarding the Turkish Cypriot refugee transfer, as the British authorities brought forth a significant level of Greek Cypriot anger in return for protecting the internal security of the SBAs. This anger is artistically reflected in figure 3.3. Here the British are effectively sacrificing the small, passive and childlike figure of Cyprus by pushing the island into the awaiting jaws of the more powerful and particularly ominous, backward and ‘barbarian’ figure of Turkey as Attila. In drawing on these themes, Turkey is powerful and Cyprus is small, Turkey is aggressive and Cyprus is passive, Turkey is important and Cyprus is not. In the context of the Cold War and British colonialism, in the words of Christos from Larnaca, ‘the interests of Britain, most of them could be found in cooperation with Turkey… that’s why the British supported, and still support Turkey in

69 Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012.
As such, following the refugee transfer Yangos Potamitis declared in the Cyprus House of Representatives that ‘we always said the bases were a knife in the back of our country. Now that knife has become an Anglo-Turkish hatchet for the dismemberment of Cyprus’.  

Figure 3.3: ‘Cyprus and Attila’, Haravghi, 22 January 1975, p.1. The child is Cyprus, the Attila figure is Turkey.

This example and the implication in figure 3.3 that Britain was inherently ‘pro-Turkish’ has long plagued the British authorities, and played a crucial role in the development of the ‘Big Lie’ in 1974; to be addressed later in this chapter. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis in 1974, the British High Commission noted that there was a widespread belief across Greek Cypriot society ‘that despite public protestations, which are comparatively easy, HMG is in reality in the things that matter (commerce, arms, NATO policy) pro-Turkish’. Likewise, prior to the Treaty of Guarantee being deemed an unwanted burden, which increasingly emerged in the late 1960s, the British authorities were known to utilise its provisions to question, and invariably protest against the actions of the dominant Greek Cypriot authorities. The British government was technically a Guarantor for all of the ‘communities’ of Cyprus, irrespective of their size, through its continued recognition of ‘the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of... [the Republic’s 1960]

71 Interview with Christos, London, 29 November 2012.
constitution’.\textsuperscript{74} In July 1965 for example, an Anglo-Turkish protest regarding the passing of a Bill amending the provisions of Cypriot electoral law was denounced as wholly ‘unacceptable’ by the Greek Cypriot authorities.\textsuperscript{75} This Bill ultimately had little to do with the British, but was considered ‘controversial’ primarily because those Turkish Cypriot MPs who withdrew from the House of Representatives during the crisis of 1963-64 were barred from participation.\textsuperscript{76} Consequently the Cyprus Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, in his denunciation of this ‘neo-colonial protest’ queried, with some validity, why Britain was willing to act as a Guarantor power now, when they had not acted when Turkey was bombing Cyprus in August 1964.\textsuperscript{77}

In both instances therefore the implication is clear, and as noted in Chapter 2, while the British vigorously protested against accusations they were ‘pro-Turkish’, these demarches cut little sway in Cyprus. The reason in the words of Markos Kyprianou, the Cyprus Foreign Minister in 2008, was that ‘this perception is based on the fact that, inter alia, the UK failed to carry out its obligations against the Turkish invasion and occupation’.\textsuperscript{78} Indeed, through the accusations and comments outlined throughout this chapter, the British were invariably thought to have helped and supported the Turkish invasion, despite their protestations to the contrary. The evidence within the British archives would support these defensive protestations, although the actions of the British government would often suggest otherwise. As such there remains this strongly held belief within Greek Cypriot society, voiced by Yiangos from Famagusta, that ‘Turkey went with the approval of Britain and America, and stayed with the approval of Britain and America’.\textsuperscript{79} Given the continued importance of the SBAs to Britain and especially NATO, a strong parallel can be drawn between British policies in July 1974 and those in July 1954, when the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs announced somewhat incongruously that some colonies could ‘never expect to be fully independent’, the protection of British strategic interests through the use of Turkey.\textsuperscript{80} This was clearly the view of Yiangos, and was further reinforced by Eleuthere Kupros in January 1975 when it was stated that ‘the partitioning of Cyprus is what Turkey, and the Americans,  

\textsuperscript{74} See Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee.  
\textsuperscript{75} PIO: ‘Law providing for the extension of the term of office of the President and the Members of the House of Representatives’, 22 July 1965.  
\textsuperscript{76} For barring of Turkish Cypriot members see PIO: ‘Statement by the President of the House of Representatives’, 22 July 1965.  
\textsuperscript{77} PIO: ‘Statement by Foreign Minister’.  
\textsuperscript{78} PIO: ‘Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Markos Kyprianou in London’, 29 October 2008.  
\textsuperscript{79} Interview with Yiangos, London, 25 June 2010.  
\textsuperscript{80} See Hansard HC Deb, Vol.531, 28 July 1954, p.508.
and the British imperialists want and what their actions since the 15 July 1974 have aimed at. \(^{81}\)

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 3.4: KYR, 'Ἡ σταύρωσις τῆς Κύπρου ἀπὸ τῇ Βρετανίᾳ (The Crucifixion of Cyprus by Britain)', Phileleftheros, 23 January 1975, p.1.**

As such the modification of the British colonial presence from direct rule to indirect influence can bring forth a sense of continuity in both action and perception. Accordingly, a temporal connection can be drawn between the pervasive designs of ‘full’ colonialism and the inherent ambiguities of British neo-colonial interference, which can lead to 1974 being depicted as the ultimate culmination of British colonialism.\(^{82}\) Indeed, as Andros from Famagusta stated:

> The reason Cyprus suffered then and now is because of Britain. They are the main fact, because the British never left Cyprus. They still got bases there, and they are interfering with the affairs of Cyprus. The constitution they gave us, Zurich Agreements, it was enforced by the British, so we never have peace.\(^{83}\)

In drawing on the historical ‘suffering’ associated with British colonialism and connecting this to their ‘interference’ within the post-colonial state, depicted in figure 3.4, this narrative reflects not only a form of colonial continuity on Cyprus, but also the concept that the suffering of the Cypriot people, and therefore the root of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ itself, lies with the British and the independence agreements of 1960.

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\(^{81}\) Anonymous, ‘National Liberation Struggle’, p.4.


\(^{83}\) Interview with Andros, London, 7 March 2013.
The imposed nature of independence, with an externally authored and ‘unwieldy’ constitution that granted significant rights to the Turkish Cypriot community and extensive provisions to its authors in Greece, Turkey and Britain, has received considerable scholarly and political debate regarding its fairness and its workability. The essence of these debates can be drawn from a 2010 PIO documentary and a 1965 speech by the Cypriot representative to the UN Zenon Rossides. Here these agreements were labelled as the product of ‘British blackmail’, implemented so as ‘not to promote the liberation of Cyprus’, but rather ‘to rob Cyprus of the very substance of its sovereignty, and its internal independence, and to place it under the tutelage of three foreign powers’. In drawing on the ‘fettered’ nature of Cypriot independence, this internal understanding of Cypriot development embraces many of the hallmarks of Jack Woddis’s definition of political neo-colonialism. In order to maintain a degree of ‘dependency’ to external interests, this post-colonial state is encumbered ‘with problems which weaken them and enable the old game of Divide and Rule to be continued after independence’. These readings, although implying a considerable level of internal passivity, do nevertheless maintain a strong degree of validity. The provisions of the independence agreements were undoubtedly designed and utilised by the governments of Greece, Turkey and Britain to maintain their interests and influence on Cyprus, irrespective of the wishes of the Cypriot authorities. In turn these treaties could not be altered without the full agreement of the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the three Guarantor powers who wrote them. As such Vas from Limassol stated that ‘Cyprus has independence, but it is not independent’, whilst Yiangos from Famagusta queried how Cyprus can truly be independent when Britain still maintains ‘sovereignty over another country’s territory’.

84 For different approaches to the aims and workability of the Cyprus constitution see Hatzivassiliou, ‘Cyprus at the Crossroads’, pp.523-540; O’Malley & Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.77-86; Fouskas & Tackie, Cyprus: The Post-Imperial Constitution.
86 For Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou criticising the influence of Greece and Turkey on Cyprus see TNA: PREM 15/287, ‘The Cyprus Foreign Minister’s call on the Prime Minister’, 9 March 1971; For criticism of British interference through the Treaty of Guarantee see PIO: ‘Statement by Foreign Minister’.
87 For Greek Cypriot denouncements of the Cyprus Treaties see PIO: ‘The President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios has announced his decision to abrogate the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance’, 1 January 1964; PIO: ‘Statement by ambassador Zenon Rossides on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the domestic affairs of state’, 4 January 1967; For Turkish Cypriot interests in maintaining the treaties see PIO: ‘Today’s meeting between Mr Clerides and Mr Denktash’, 9 August 1971; For British interests see TNA: FCO 9/1371, ‘Policy towards Cyprus’.
With this continued British presence on Cyprus, writers such as Christopher Hitchens and scholars such as Vassilis Fouskas and Alex Tackie refer almost exclusively to the (neo)-colonial designs of external forces in breeding tension on Cyprus through their manipulation of the independence agreements. However within such readings, despite the obvious manipulative role external forces played on Cyprus, there is a tendency to disregard significant internal issues, especially regarding the concept of enosis, which can oversimplify many of the complexities of the ‘Cyprus Problem’. That is however one of its political appeals; an emphasis on passivity allows sections of the political establishment, and indeed society itself, to not only externalise the roots of conflict, but to simplify what is ultimately an innately complicated and ‘untidy’ past for the purposes of collective acceptance. This is not to say that internal mistakes or examples of political violence are entirely forgotten, especially by the political left who unlike many of their counterparts on the right were historically opposed to EOKA-B, but rather these issues can be masked within the broader concept of ‘international interference’. As such the acts of EOKA-B and other internal ‘Trojans’ in precipitating the crisis of 1974 can be partly externalised, as they were merely following the orders of their ‘NATO bosses’. Indeed, given the questionable actions of certain external forces across the modern history of Cyprus, there are many foreign acts and ‘conspiracies’ that can be focussed on within official publications and the popular media. Therefore this reading finds a strong resonance within many oral history interviews and ‘popular’ accounts associated with the modern history of Cyprus, as in the particularly apt words of Softonis from Morphou, Cyprus is divided because ‘Turkey wants to have its own bases on the island, British want to have their own bases, [and] Greece wants to have the influence of the Greek Cypriots’.

3.3 Britain and the ‘Big Lie’

From these ideological foundations, it is perhaps unsurprising that the roots of these discourses are deeply embedded within the structures of the Greek Cypriot national consciousness. Over the decades repeated references have been made within political pronouncements, media reports, documentaries, popular images and indeed historical

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92 For the conflicting commemoration of political parties see Papadakis, ‘Nation, Narrative and Commemoration’, pp.253-270.
93 For internal ‘Trojans’ see Mavrou, ‘Gazing to the future’, p.5.
94 Interview with Softonis, Limassol, 7 April 2014.
novelisations to the sustained concept of ‘partitionist’ and invariably NATO orientated ‘foreign conspiracies’. It is a concept that ‘everybody knows’ and often reflects within their public articulations of remembrance. As Demetris Assos noted in relation to the collective imagination of the colonial period, ‘conspiracy theories’ maintain a ‘disproportionate influence’ on non-academic historical knowledge, as their frameworks and ideas, for both political and national reasons, are deeply embedded within the public discourses of Greek Cypriot society. Therefore the conspiracies associated with 1974, which involve many of the same actors and states as those associated with the colonial period or 1963-64, should be interpreted not in isolation, but rather as the continuation of a much broader discourse associated with British colonialism and the Cold War. For that reason, in approaching the continued prevalence of these conspiratorial themes within public remembrance, it is of particular use to consider their foundations as a collective discourse of inherent suspicion, as although they may not maintain total factual credibility, they are discussed, disseminated and actively remembered irrespective of this. Through this approach, one can better understand the process of temporality that subconsciously draws together and fuses the historical memory of British colonialism to the ‘displaced’ structures of neo-colonial interference, rooted around the borders of the SBAs and the Cold War realpolitik of the NATO ‘allies’.

From this footing therefore, it is now important to approach a significant historical ‘distortion’ the British referred to in 1974 as the ‘Big Lie’. This encompassed not only direct British knowledge of, and subsequent military aid for the Turkish invasion, but also a psychological element rooted around a public campaign of ‘misinformation’ and anti-Greek sentiment, for which the BBC was deemed particularly guilty. In approaching its structures, it can be considered a natural and extreme extension of the discourses of Anglo-Turkish collusion and western conspiracies that culminated in 1974. The first accusation of the ‘Big Lie’, so detailed in a May 1975 report, emerged on the 20 July 1974 when the Cyprus Foreign Minister openly alleged that ‘British warships were assisting the Turkish invasion and, in particular, that British helicopters were carrying military supplies to a Turkish village.

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95 See Movement for Freedom and Justice in Cyprus, Bloody Truth; PIO: ‘Declaration on International Student Solidarity week’, 17 March 1976; For media reports see Anonymous, ‘Americans and British took part in the invasion’, p.1; Gandalf, ‘People do not forget the fascists’, p.5; For a novelisation see Michael Jansen, The Aphrodite Plot, (Limassol: K.P. Kyriakou, 1983); For documentary see references in Attila 74: The Rape of Cyprus; PIO: A Place in History; For films see Constandinides & Papadakis (eds.), Cypriot Cinemas.
near Cape Andreas’. This was followed on the 22 July by further allegations from the Greek Cypriot forces in Limassol that the British were ‘re-arming the Turkish Cypriots who had fled to the WSBA, and then sending them out to continue their fight’. In Athens, the dissemination of these accusations assumed the dimensions of ‘an inspired campaign’, as press reports, political denunciations and mass demonstrations all played a part in its widespread diffusion. The British ambassador to Greece, Robin Hooper, was clearly exasperated by the sustained nature of these accusations, as on the 2 August he noted ‘there is no doubt that the stories are being invented and spread by followers of Ioannidis who are still in their jobs in the Ministry of Defence’. On the 3 August 1974, the ‘under-secretary for Press and Information’ in Greece admitted to British officials that ‘the press campaign was orchestrated entirely from the pentagon, because the Greek military needed a scapegoat’. However despite admitting this fabrication in private, it was noted that this official ‘was not willing to consider a public statement at this time’, but he would suggest to the editors of the Greek press to ‘lay off’ the subject. Unsurprisingly, as noted in Chapter 2, the British government were particularly irritated by this state of affairs, as accusations and ‘revelations’ of direct Anglo-Turkish collusion in 1974 continued to be published in Cyprus and Greece.

In approaching these ‘revelations’ and the wider structures of the ‘Big Lie’, it is important to move beyond the framework of previous analyses, such as the insightful works of Constandinos and Asmussen whose primary focus was on their political roots, and rather consider this concept through its cultural dissemination and subsequent influence on personal memory. Through this process, taking as its base the discourse of inherent suspicion outlined earlier, one can better understand the subconscious effect these ideological discourses and socio-political ‘influences’ impart on this modern ‘reconstruction’ of the past. As Portelli has shown, the subconscious boundaries between the construct of individual recollections and collective understandings of the past are particularly malleable and ‘thin’, as it is through the act of articulation that ‘personal “truth” may coincide with collective

100 See Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, pp.272-273; For demonstrations see Mario Modiano, ‘Mob Attacks British embassy as Athens police watch’, The Times, 23 July 1974, p.5; Brian Silk, ‘Britain blamed by Greeks for big Turkish successes’, Daily Telegraph, 1 August 1974, p.1.
103 Ibid.
105 Asmussen, Cyprus at War, pp.242-248; Asmussen, ‘Conspiracy theories and Cypriot history’, pp.127-145; Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, pp.272-273.
“imagination”’. These memories, revealed through oral history approaches, are not merely static reflections of a past reality, but contemporised reconstructions that ‘tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they did, what they now think they did’. 106 These socially framed reconstructions therefore may be charged with the weight of an event, but their internal imagination and recreation are not solely dictated by it, as personal memories are subconsciously reworked and reshaped by the popular beliefs and political ‘distortions’ of the wider collective.

In accepting the benefits of this ‘plasticity of memory’, or the means in which memory can ‘manipulate’ factual details, the ‘errors’ and ‘distortions’ associated with the ‘Big Lie’ can be considered as extensions of two socio-political processes emergent from and associated with conflict. 107 The first concerns the influence of ‘official distortions’ emergent from both Greece and Cyprus that operate at a political level as effective attempts at blame transference. These distortions can draw on and reinforce the broader socio-political discourse of inherent suspicion already framing the image of Britain on Cyprus, and in turn can subconsciously, or indeed more directly permeate into the individual recollections of those interviewed for this project. 108 The second point concerns the dramatic, and indeed for many, the traumatic nature of the conflict, which can result in a form of rupture and temporal displacement within both collective and individual forms of recollection. 109 These concepts are not mutually exclusive, but can subconsciously work together to create an internalised narrative shaped by collective ideals.

This duality is evident in the narrative of Costas from Famagusta who, when recollecting the conflict, stated:

In 1974 they [The British] didn’t do anything against the Turks, and… I was born in Famagusta and one week before the war all the hotels in Famagusta were empty and the British sent their aircraft here to pick up the tourists to send them back to their countries. That means they were already informed about that. 110 This narrative, drawing on the concept of prior collusion, reflects a similar accusation associated with the ‘Big Lie’ and the alleged British evacuation of 70 tourists from Kyrenia on the 16 July, four days prior to the Turkish landing. 111 If one were to take ‘the war’ as

108 For parallel associated with political propaganda see Portelli, The Order Has Been Carried Out.
110 Interview with Costas, Nicosia, 9 August 2011.
111 Asmussen, Cyprus at War, p.243.
commencing on the 20 July with the ‘first’ and main Turkish invasion, based on the available evidence, this narrative is a ‘distortion’ or is at least ‘misremembered’. In considering the archival documents, it was repeatedly stated that the British authorities intentionally held back on any form of major evacuation prior to the 20 July so as not to confirm the Greek and Greek Cypriot ‘suspicion that we were in collusion with the Turks’.\(^{112}\) This policy in turn led to criticism from some British residents and tourists on Cyprus who subsequently became embroiled in the conflict, as ‘why were we not warned to leave sooner?’\(^{113}\) This does not mean to say however that the British authorities did not undertake any form of evacuation from the city prior to the 20 July, as this may have occurred but simply not have been recorded. What was recorded and is now in the public domain would suggest that the British authorities did not order a mass removal of their residents before the Turkish landed. Yet if one were to take ‘the war’ as commencing with the ‘second’ Turkish invasion (14-16 August) and the occupation of Famagusta, which would be very rare given the collective focus is on the 20 July, the narrative becomes more complex. By this point the British had evacuated over 23,000 British and foreign nationals from Cyprus through RAF Akrotiri, whilst a further 3000 had been extricated from the beaches of Northern Cyprus by the Royal Navy.\(^{114}\) In turn, on 12 August the Greek Cypriot press were directly accusing Britain of colluding with Turkey, as in a reflection of the narrative of Costas, it was reported that ‘because British tourists were taken from hotels in Famagusta just half an hour before Turkish jets struck, Britain must have known the attack was coming’.\(^{115}\) In this sense, Costas was right that Famagusta was evacuated and indeed emptied itself prior to the ‘second Turkish invasion’ in August 1974.

Therefore one can interpret the narrative of Costas through this dual form of influence. On the one hand, as a refugee displaced from his home in 1974, the traumatic nature of this event can, as Miranda Christou noted, lead not only to a romanticised imagination of the pre-war period, but result in the conflict itself being presented as a shock, and something that could not have been predicted or contained.\(^{116}\) Consequently, as outlined in Chapter 2, although the British government viewed the conflict as almost inevitable given the political developments on the island, the traumatic nature of displacement caused by this crisis marks it as beyond an ordinary event, a rupture, and therefore expectation of disaster.


\(^{113}\) See Anonymous, ‘Why didn’t they tell us?’, Daily Mail, 22 July 1974, p.4.


can be interpreted as foreknowledge or even collusion. Indeed as Mary Childers has noted, ‘the unreliability of memories is increased when they engage traumatic materials’, as an individual’s post-war life can often be experienced as a continuation of their traumatic wartime experiences. As the personal trauma of displacement frames the identity of Costas as a refugee, this rupture from normalcy can summon a personal need to make sense of these events through the telling and retelling of his story. Within this process, this personal narrative of conflict can be subtly influenced by political and psychological forces which can reshape the specific form and direction of this memory. As such, through the rupture caused by conflict, a temporal displacement can occur whereby a known event, the British evacuation of tourists, can subconsciously be moved to fit the internalised narrative of disaster that is collectivised and disseminated at a state level. With the continuing scar of partition cutting across Cyprus, this discourse continues to exert a significant collective influence, as in the words of Marios from Limassol ‘1974 is not history yet, we live with it every day’.

Alternatively, with a significant overlap, this ‘distortion’ could be viewed as reflective of the popular belief that ‘Britain always favours Turkey’, fuelled by their ambiguous actions in 1974-75 and reinforced by popular and political ‘propaganda’. For example in October 1974 a memorandum by the British High Commission warned that the ‘coordinated and vigorous press campaign’ of the Greek Cypriot media, which focussed on the divisive and ‘selfish ends of western imperialism’, had achieved the ‘partial brainwashing of the Greek-Cypriots’ against Britain and America. Indeed headlines such as ‘CIA Agents in Athens and Nicosia’ and ‘Americans and British took part in the invasion’ were particularly prominent in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. These demarches and accusations would occasionally receive support from Turkish politicians. In May 1975 for example, the President of Turkey asserted that British officials in July 1974 told the then-Prime Minister

120 For parallels in Italy see Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, pp.1-26.
121 Interview with Marios, Limassol, 3 April 2014.
Bulent Ecevit that ‘if you are able, then land on the island on your own’. This was dismissed by the British government as a complete fabrication, as their official minutes of the Guarantors’ meeting on the 17 July 1974 made no reference to any such assertion, and therefore its publication was classed as merely ‘slander’ and ‘lies’. However this ‘legend’ is particularly strong in mobilising popular support, as evidenced when Stephen Olver protested to the Cypriot Foreign Minister in February 1975 that it was ‘particularly monstrous that we should be blamed for failing to prevent the coup’. Indeed the enduring strength of this discourse lies in its ability to project an ideal of unity which can embrace positions across the political divide through the externalisation of the main causes of conflict on the island.

Through this dual form of influence therefore, the distortions in the narrative of Costas can be viewed as reflective of two ideological undercurrents within Greek Cypriot society, a discourse of collective trauma on the one hand, and a discourse of inherent suspicion on the other. Of these discourses, the secondary form of inherent suspicion is perhaps more inclusive, especially in relation to the spread of ‘conspiratorial’ themes, as not everyone was displaced by the conflict in 1974, but ‘everyone knows’ Britain, America and NATO might have been involved in it. For some this involvement was particularly direct, as Margarita from Kythrea stated:

You know, there are people that know the Turkish planes [in 1974]… it was not Turks… [that] fly with the aeroplanes, it was British pilots… and the Turkish troops, they get information from the bases, Dhekelia and Episkopi, so when the British see the Turks coming to the South, [that’s] why they don’t stop them. So we believe, that is all together against the Greek Cypriots, because the Cypriots, they are fighters, they want, freedom is like a religion to them… that’s why they fight.

This sentiment was echoed by Vassilis from Paphos who moved to Britain in 1975 but was a soldier during the conflict of 1974. Within this interview, after Vassilis and his friend Nicos had detailed their views on the history of Cyprus and why they felt there was a conflict in 1974, the question was posed whether it was felt Britain should have done more to help Cyprus:

_Nicos_: British actually was a Guarantor of Cyprus, that’s why they kept the two big bases there… They haven’t done nothing. On the other side they were helping the Turks to invade Cyprus.

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127 Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012.
Vassilis: I tell you myself, I shot an aeroplane down. The first time we hit an aeroplane, we found the British soldiers in. But they changed the planes… they changed the colour; it had on the side the Turkish one, not the British number.

When asked if that was during the war, Vassilis proceeded to state:

The Turkish… because they did not know the area well, they would throw their bombs from high and they would kill their own people. When the British hit us, they would go down… and do it very well, they know everything. So I must admit I was in one place facing Nicosia and when [the planes] they go down, I shoot it, it goes down. We ran after it… and when we found them, they were British. What should I say to them. One said kill them. No I can’t kill them. You can’t kill somebody, if he tries to shoot me, I shoot him, but how can I shoot somebody if he is surrendering. He’s surrendering. Afterwards we said that to the officers, after the closing, the big people in the army from Greece, but these people they create the problem, they want Cyprus divided in two, one for them and one for Turkey. [But] we try fighting for independence.128

These narratives draw on one of the central themes of the ‘Big Lie’, direct British military support for Turkey. This alleged support, so detailed in a British report listing the accusations of the ‘Big Lie’, included amongst others the loan of aircraft, so ‘proved’ by the ‘U’ for UK on their side, and the concept of ‘Turkish planes, British pilots’ so ‘proved’, as Vassilis noted, by the capture of a downed British pilot.129 In emphasising the broader impact of these concepts, they were also directly raised in 1987 during a Greek Parliamentary enquiry into the Cyprus crisis. Here, as The Times reported, Greek army officers ‘under persistent questioning from Socialist and Communist panel members’ stated not only that British helicopters resupplied Turkish forces during the crisis, reflecting a dominant concept strongly propagated by Greek officials and the media in 1974, but also that ‘the pilot of a Turkish jet fighter downed during the invasion turned out to be British’. However, of particular significance, it was also noted that ‘when the wreckage was located, it was clear that the crash pre-dated the invasion’.130

This final point regarding the ‘crash’ pre-dating the invasion is important from a purely archival perspective, as none of the available files within the British archives or research undertaken by historians can provide any form of support for the recollections of Margarita and Vassilis.131 Indeed, in a converse to the accusations of the ‘Big Lie’, British intransigence towards Turkey actually led to the emergence of the ‘Little Lie’ and the Turkish

129 See Asmussen, Cyprus at War, p.243; TNA: FCO 9/1907, fl.1714, ‘Stories circulating in Cyprus about British-Turkish collusion’, 2 August 1974.
131 See Asmussen, Cyprus at War, pp.242-248; Asmussen, ‘Conspiracy theories and Cypriot history’, pp.127-145; Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, pp.272-273.
allegation that the British were inherently ‘pro-Greek’.\(^{132}\) However this was not the first time British airmen had been accused of directly assisting the Turks on Cyprus. In May 1964 a number of British airmen were arrested by the Greek Cypriot authorities and admitted to transporting ‘arms and messages to the Turkish terrorists’, an act which was deemed to have ‘seriously undermined the relations between Cyprus and Britain’.\(^{133}\) In August 1964 the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ were then accused of supporting Turkish bombing runs across Cyprus as a means of enforcing their policy of ‘divide and rule’.\(^{134}\) Although the British High Commission sent a demarche strongly refuting this allegation, it was rejected by the Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou who stated:

> I regret to say that the circumstances of the attacks point clearly that the Turkish bombing raids had been made with the tolerance of the US and British governments who have failed to condemn, even a posteriori, this brutal attack on civilian populations.\(^{135}\)

Therefore while the British authorities were deeply concerned about the Turkish air force during the conflict of 1974, especially given the potential for heavy British casualties in Limassol when ‘SBA air defence fighters [were] close by and available to intercede’, it is safe to say the British authorities and the Turkish air force maintained a history on Cyprus.\(^{136}\) Nevertheless, if any British born or English speaking pilots were engaged within the Turkish air force in 1974, no evidence has been found by the author of this thesis to say they were flying under the direct orders of the RAF. Another potential factor here is a case of mistaken identity. The psychologist Daniel Schacter for example has referred to the ‘misattribution of memory’ amongst eyewitnesses, as internal processes and the influence of external media, all framed by the general vagueness of memory, mean an individual can often correctly recall an event, but misremember some of its key details.\(^{137}\) This process can also be direct at the source. In Panikos Neokleus’s oral history collection for instance, one of his informants named ‘Shakallis David’ from Kyrenia, whilst in captivity in the Dome Hotel, mistook a ‘blond and blue-eyed’ Turkish soldier as being British. However when he spoke to him in English it was revealed this soldier was rather a descendant of the Greek community of

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\(^{132}\) Asmussen, *Cyprus at War*, p.245; For Turkish denunciations of Britain see TNA: PREM 16/20, fl.9, ‘British Troops in Cyprus’; Anonymous, ‘Mr Ecevit calls for talks to form a Federal Republic’, p.4.


Yet while this process may be significant on an individual level, it does not necessarily explain the collective nature of the ‘Big Lie’.

As such one needs to consider the narratives of Vassilis and Margarita not as faulty recollections, but through a reading of the societies in which they were created. Indeed, rather than discounting these recollections as mere fabrications or ‘lies’, their comparable content drawn from multiple narratives and three different countries, Cyprus (Margarita), Britain (Vassilis) and Greece, provides an insight into a ‘shared symbolic universe’ whereby individual memories can be shaped through the collective frameworks of a broader transnational ideology. As Portelli has noted:

The causes of this collective error must be sought, rather than in the event itself, in the meaning which it derived from the actors’ state of mind at the time; from its relation to subsequent historical developments; and from the activity of memory and imagination.

The events of 1974 were a dramatic event on a personal and collective level, perhaps the most significant in the modern history of Cyprus, as Margarita was displaced from her home and Vassilis was directly engaged in a fighting a war. As such there is the personal trauma of conflict influencing the direction and form of personal remembrance. In relation to historical developments and the explanations associated with the causation of conflict, a variety of contemporary publications, as the previous analysis has emphasised, were focussed on the ‘conspiratorial’ reasons behind Britain’s non-intervention in the conflict. Thus, on the 2 August 1974 the diasporic newspaper Eleuthere Kupros reported that ‘the “Turkish” jets which bombed Cyprus, and the “Turkish” helicopters that landed troops on Cyprus, took off from a secret NATO base in Eastern Turkey’. The implication of this article was clear; these ‘Turkish’ jets may not be as ‘Turkish’ as they look. Likewise, on the 28 February 1975 Phileleftheros published an article based on information from ‘American sources’, and reflective of an earlier article from the ‘centre-left’ Athenian newspaper Ta Nea, which stated Britain and America directly assisted the Turkish landing on the 20 July by providing ‘special ships’. In turn this article also noted that American agents were despatched to Cyprus via Israel in order to prepare the ground for the Turkish invasion. As a final example, the aforementioned Greek parliamentary enquiry of 1987, established by the ‘anti-western’ and ‘anti-NATO’ socialist government of Andreas Papandreou, was effectively organised to

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140 Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, p.15.
‘prove’ Britain and America conspired against both Cyprus and Greece in 1974.\textsuperscript{143} However after 10 months of investigation and over 80 interviews with ‘witnesses’ linked to the conflict, including the former leaders of the Junta, the British press reported that no definitive evidence could be found to substantiate claims that Britain or America actively colluded with Turkey to enforce partition in Cyprus.\textsuperscript{144} In Cyprus however, on the 15 July 2014, Haravghi utilised this same report to ‘confirm the active involvement of the USA in the destruction of Cyprus’ was an historical fact.\textsuperscript{145} In response, the English language Cyprus Mail not only refuted these allegations, but suggested this ‘mouthpiece of AKEL’, in peddling their ‘anti-West myths’, was merely trying to cling nostalgically to the ‘collapse’ of their beloved ‘conspiracy theories’.\textsuperscript{146}

As such, in approaching the narratives of Costas, Vassilis and Margarita with their ‘historical distortions’, coupled to the various oral history narratives reflected throughout this chapter, one can understand their construction and continued dissemination as reflective of a broad symbolic process embedded within the structures of Greek Cypriot society. This symbolic process is framed by an inherent suspicion of externalised acts and policies towards Cyprus. This was initially formulated in opposition to the historic legacy of British colonialism but subsequently developed against the actions and perception of their neo-colonial interference. As the act of remembrance is partial and highly selective, these subconscious recreations of a past reality are framed as much by what one believes occurred as by the socio-political influences of the society in which they were formulated. With the sheer volume of ‘conspiratorial’ motifs expressed at a public level by political groups, the media, and indeed other cultural productions, subconscious ‘distortions’ at both a personal and collective level can permeate the act of remembrance.\textsuperscript{147} Therefore a concept that began life from an official British perspective as the ‘scapegoating propaganda’ of the Greek MOD, in engaging with an existing discourse of inherent suspicion within Greek Cypriot society, can sustain the power of these memories some forty years later. Yet as Portelli has noted, these memories remain true to those who expressed them, as despite the historical evidence, it is what they believe.\textsuperscript{148} Indeed the strength and continuation of these beliefs invariably lie in their ability to mobilise popular support irrespective of the historical record, as it can provide

\textsuperscript{143} See Coufoudakis, ‘Greek Foreign Policy since 1974’, pp.55-79.
\textsuperscript{144} Modiano, ‘Athens fails to Prove Cyprus invasion theory’, p.8.
\textsuperscript{145} Mikhalis Mikali, ‘ΠΡΑΣΙΝΟ ΦΩΣ για ανατροπή Μακάριου (Green Light for the Overthrow of Makarios)’, Haravghi, 15 July 2014, p.1.
\textsuperscript{146} See Editorial, ‘It’s good to know the facts, even after 40 years’, Cyprus Mail, 16 July 2014.
\textsuperscript{147} Schwartz, Fukuoka & Takita-Ishii, ‘Collective Memory’, p.257.
both understanding and a collective ideal of unity at a time of separation and division. Given the act of recollection is invariably based on a reduction of complexity, the fact Britain did not intervene in 1974 allows for the ‘legend’ to develop that Britain was colluding with Turkey, as it both explains and accounts for British actions and the division of the island. Ultimately therefore, given ‘everybody knows’ why Cyprus was divided in 1974, it could be argued some just know more than others.

3.4 Conclusion

In approaching the image of Britain on Cyprus, it is important to consider the duality of action and perception, both what Britain did, and what individuals and wider collectives believe Britain did. This imagination is invariably shaped by the fusion of a post-colonial discourse of suspicion to a neo-colonial framework of continued and sustained ‘interference’ associated with their ‘neo-colonies’, the SBAs. This combined ideological framework has been referred to within this chapter as a discourse of inherent suspicion. Unlike the negative connotations associated with a ‘conspiracy’, the historic actions of Britain and their NATO ‘allies’ were often imbued with enough ambiguity to provide a level of tacit support for the construction of ‘accusatory’ narratives, as ultimately ‘what is the point in being a Guarantor if your Guarantee is without value’.149 The power of this ideological discourse, which is subsequently sustained by both popular and political ‘distortions’, is its universal nature and potential to embrace positions across the political divide. The emergence of memory distortions and errors from this process, such as the ‘Big Lie’, offer an insight into their socio-cultural power to sustain such concepts irrespective of the available evidence. These distortions can be seen as a reflection of, amongst others, a need to explain a psychological shock or rupture in normal time, a desire to ‘heal the feeling of humiliation’, and ultimately as an attempt to seek wider meaning from what was the seminal event in the modern history of Cyprus. From this process, in a complete contrast to the ‘official’ British view regarding the roots of the Cyprus conflict outlined in Chapter 2, it is the ‘Anglo-Americans’ that invariably take centre stage within the discourses of ‘public’ history in Cyprus. Although both perspectives maintain a degree of validity, if also a form of blame transference, they also reflect the comparative mentality of each side; Britain was ‘burdened’ with Cyprus, and Cyprus was ‘burdened’ with Britain. Whilst the power of conspiracies permeate the popular articulations of Greek Cypriot history, as the following chapter will attest, official narratives often take a more subtle approach to the actions of Britain in 1974 by drawing more on the

149 See Report from the Select Committee, p.xx.
collective trauma of conflict. Yet the power of this discourse of inherent suspicion, shaped by a potent colonial legacy and the ambiguous actions of a post-colonial Guarantor, provides a broad historical construct that can frame the image and collective understanding of British actions on Cyprus.
When considering the contemporary representation of British actions and influences on Cyprus during the crisis of 1974, the predominant ‘popular’ concept of ‘foreign conspiracies’ detailed in the previous chapter operates in somewhat of a contrast to the content of Greek Cypriot school texts. Indeed, rather than directly reflecting the widespread popular belief perpetuated in numerous media, including some ‘official’ PIO publications, of the ‘collusive’ culpability of Britain in 1974; the school text versions of a History of Cyprus from 2004 and 2011 significantly marginalise the role of Britain within their narratives of the post-colonial period.\(^1\) This divergence is not only peculiar, but a particularly neglected area of research given the significant scholarly attention directed towards the content of Greek Cypriot school texts. For example the analysis of Andrekos Varnava and Stavroula Philippou on the ‘assignment of responsibility’ for the division of Cyprus within history texts and ‘social studies subjects’ raises a number of intriguing points regarding the depiction of the Greek Junta, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community in this ‘official’ narrative of conflict. Minimal reference is provided, save for a brief geographic analysis of the formation of the Green Line in 1964, to the perceived culpability of Britain within this narrative.\(^2\) Aside from occasional and particularly brief references to Britain’s colonial legacy, scholarly productions on school texts are invariably focussed more on the official depiction of the Turkish Cypriot ‘other’ than that of the British ‘other’.\(^3\)

In focussing on the image of Britain and the events of 1974, this chapter will show that the content of official texts draw on the same ideological frameworks as ‘popular’ narratives: a ritualised discourse of collective trauma associated with the occupied areas, and a politicised discourse of inherent suspicion associated with Britain. Whilst the consequences of conflict remains rooted around the suffering of the individual and the state, it is the latter form of suspicion that is different, framed more directly around the historical memory of

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\(^1\) For references to ‘conspiracies’ and questions within ‘official’ publications see PIO: A Place in History; William Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Historical Overview*, (Nicosia: PIO & Theopress Ltd, 2012); For school texts see Cleanthis Georgiades, *History of Cyprus*, (Nicosia: Demetrakis Christophorou, 2004); Andrea Polydorou, *Ιστορία της Κύπρου (History of Cyprus)*, (Nicosia: Ministry of Education, 2011).

\(^2\) Philippou & Varnava, ‘Constructions of Solution(s)’, pp.194-213.

Britain’s colonial occupation. Using this structure, official narratives do not contradict or challenge the conspiratorial themes of popular publications, as they are simply not referenced. Instead, what these texts provide are the foundations for a particularly potent historical memory associated with a colonial legacy marked by Anglo-Greek Cypriot confrontation, Anglo-Turkish cooperation, and the concept of ‘divide and rule’. Therefore this divergence of content is not as stark as it would first appear. As the oral history interviews reported in Chapter 3 reflect, the image of Britain on Cyprus is intrinsically framed by their colonial legacy, as the policies and consequences emergent from this period provides the foundational image, and often the language of reference, for the articulation and understanding of British actions in 1974.

In turn, as these British actions in 1974 are not given significant form within school texts, it is the second focus of this chapter to consider what is. As school history texts are potent vehicles for the construction of historical memories, their content and form occupy a significant and strongly contested position within the memorial frameworks of Greek Cypriot society. On the one hand, through the national imperative of Den Xehno, or ‘I Don’t Forget’, these texts operate within Pierre Nora’s definition of a lieux de memoire by providing a ritualised framework for the construct of historical memories associated with the occupied areas.\(^4\) On the other, their selective interpretation of Cypriot history via a ‘chosen glories chosen traumas’ model of historiography has long raised debate and controversy between the different political and nationalist factions of Cypriot society. As historical memories are never formless but are actively designed and perpetuated through rituals, textbooks and pictorial images, as Robin Wagner-Pacifici noted, their meaning:

emerges and is sustained through the dynamic interaction between the content of historical events and the forms of collective memory available to those intent on their preservation and public inscription.\(^5\)

Indeed the structured content of a school text maintains a defined purpose, and whilst the individual interpretation of these structures cannot be controlled, their narratives reflect the dominant historical ideals of a particular collective at a certain time. By analysing how these texts inscribe their image of Britain onto Cypriot history, a series of wider conclusions will be

offered on the link between the self and the other, and between the culture and politics of history and memory within Greek Cypriot society.\(^6\)

In structuring this analysis, two theoretical outlines are of use. In approaching the consequences of conflict through the ritualised frameworks of *Den Xehno*, this chapter will draw on the work of Pierre Nora. The school text created and utilised for this process, *Γνωρίζω, Δεν Ξεχνώ και Αγωνίζομαι* (hereafter *I know, I don’t forget and I struggle*), is not a history book per se, given it has no factual detail, but is a ritualised book of memory signifiers for a generation externalised from the lands lost through conflict. As such this text is filled with personal stories, poems and evocative images linked to the loss of the refugees, the tragedy of the missing, and the ultimate need for children to remember the injustice of partition. When approaching the causes of conflict, the content of these texts will not be considered in a form of conceptual opposition to memory, as Nora seemed to define it, but rather through Jay Winter’s concept of ‘historical remembrance’, or the convergence of history and memory into a story of a shared past.\(^7\) Whilst accepting that history seeks to simplify and ‘appropriate’ a form of memory within a textually ordered narrative structure, raising the question of whose ‘story’ is actually disseminated, the concept of ‘historical remembrance’ reflects in a more direct sense the intertwined nature of history and memory on an island that can ‘never forget’, and therefore utilises all of the performative acts at its disposal to maintain this national imperative.\(^8\) This chapter and the one that follows are directly intertwined, as education and commemorative rituals are two of the key tools used by a state or community to maintain commemorative awareness and disseminate a shared image of the past.

The content of this chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section will approach the socio-political debates ignited by the controversial ‘rewriting’ of Greek Cypriot history in 2008. The following two sections analyse the dual levels of representation and meaning associated with the events of 1974. Section two will approach the consequences of conflict through the images and ritualised construct of the 2007 elementary level text *I know, I don’t forget and I struggle*.\(^9\) Section three will analyse the causality of conflict through the narrative content of the 2004 and 2011 secondary level versions of a *History of Cyprus* by

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\(^6\) For links between culture and politics see Confino, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural History’, pp.1386-1403.


\(^8\) For ‘appropriation’ see Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, pp.7-24.

\(^9\) Nikos Leontiou, (ed.), *Γνωρίζω, Δεν Ξεχνώ και Αγωνίζομαι* (*I know, I don’t forget and I struggle*), (Nicosia: Renos Agrotis & Sons, 2007).
Cleanthis Georgiades and Andrea Polydorou respectively.\textsuperscript{10} The final section, given the marginalised position of Britain within these textual narratives of the post-colonial period, considers how the historical memory of their colonial legacy can implicitly frame an image of Britain associated with the division of Cyprus in 1974. Interspersed throughout will be evidence from interviews with Greek Cypriot teachers on the content of the educational system. By approaching these texts through the representation of Britain and the two seminal periods in which they were involved, an in-depth analysis of the images of the past perpetuated within these texts will reveal the explicit and implicit ideological frameworks shaping the construction of the ‘official’ historical narratives of the Greek Cypriot state.

4.1 Politics of History Construction

Although the process of history education is but one of the many means used by the state of Cyprus to construct a form of historical awareness and a sense of identity amongst its populace, the power of the structured content of school textbooks should not be underestimated. Indeed as Stuart Foster notes in relation to the USA but equally valid in Cyprus:

no matter how superficial history textbooks may appear in their construction, they prove ideologically important because typically they seek to imbue in the young a shared set of values, a national ethos and an incontrovertible sense of identity.\textsuperscript{11}

As a result, the content and form of school textbooks are a model of structured ‘power’ relationships, between the state and school, between the teacher and student, and ultimately between past events and their reconstruction and representation as an officially narrated historiographical form.\textsuperscript{12} Yet given the concepts of history and identity are deeply contested on Cyprus, which still maintains an educational system based on a pre-1974 system of separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot schools, the content of school texts have faced equally strong contestation. In 1966 J.A. Lauwerys criticised the ‘ethno-nationalistic propaganda’ which acted as history on Cyprus, as Cypriot schools were deemed ‘the chief institutions through which prejudices are transmitted and fostered… [by teaching] children the difference between us and they’.\textsuperscript{13} In 2009 this sentiment was reinforced by Andrekos Varnava who again referenced and criticised the significant ‘errors and anachronisms’ found

\textsuperscript{10} Georgiades, \textit{History of Cyprus}; Polydorou, \textit{History of Cyprus}.
\textsuperscript{13} Education Advisory Committee of the Parliamentary Group for World Government, \textit{Cyprus School History Textbooks}, (Sussex: Oliver Burrige, 1966), p.7.
within the ‘exclusionist’ frameworks of these texts. Both Varnava and Lauwerys therefore called for a complete ‘rewriting’ of these school texts, as their strongly ethno-nationalistic content not only fostered a significant level of historical ‘ignorance’, but prepared the ground for ‘dissension and dispute, rather than for harmony and co-operation’.

When the AKEL-led Government of the Republic of Cyprus in 2008 instigated a systematic two-year process of ‘rewriting’ the official history of Cyprus to promote more directly ‘the conditions for a peaceful co-existence’, the socio-political debates this triggered proved to be equally controversial. Reflecting on this sustained and often polarised public debate, the Cyprus Mail noted in January 2009 that:

> all of a sudden the country is full of self-taught historians… [each] expounding their views about Cyprus’s modern history, with all of them insisting that their own version is the only true account of events.

This heated ‘battle over the hearts and minds of children’ was marked by accusations of politically motivated ‘distortions’ from an array of political and nationalist forces. Yet it is important to note that within these societal debates, it does not appear that the image of Britain was raised or focussed upon as a significant issue that required revision. As the final section of this chapter will explore in detail, given what is referred to within these texts, it could be argued there was little need to fundamentally redefine the ‘official’ image of Britain on Cyprus. Indeed, whilst Britain’s colonial legacy is debated by scholars, Hadjipavlou’s survey project noted for example that 79.8 percent of her 1,073 respondents cited ‘divide and rule’ as very responsible for the creation and perpetuation of the ‘Cyprus Problem’. As such it is a period that is well-known across Cyprus for its divisive legacy. In relation to these debates, however, one issue or ‘distortion’ that did receive considerable public debate concerned an alleged process of historical ‘de-Hellenisation’. One particularly vocal critic was Archbishop Chrysostomos II who threatened to ‘burn the new history books’ if they fundamentally changed the history of the island.

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15 See also Alexia Saoulli, ‘Teachers join forces in call for history book change’, Cyprus Mail, 8 March 2009.
17 Anonymous, ‘History is about Understanding, not blame’, Cyprus Mail, 21 January 2009.
19 See Stefanos Evripidou, ‘New School Curriculum in Place’, Cyprus Mail, 31 August 2010; For further alleged de-Hellenising processes in education see Poly Pantelides, ‘The great Greek debate a “straw man”’, Cyprus Mail, 22 September 2013.
framed as much by the perception of AKEL’s Cypriotist ideology, which emphasises an ideal of inter-communality externalised from the ‘motherlands’, as by their planned or indeed actually implemented reforms.\textsuperscript{20} While the influence and connection of Greece to the internal discourses of Cypriotism and Cypriot-Hellenism will be approached in Chapter 6, alongside a wider analysis of the historical roots of the segregated educational system of Cyprus, it is pertinent to note that the Greek Cypriot educational system of today still remains ‘culturally tied’ to that of Greece, and its official history remains ‘very much a Greek history’.\textsuperscript{21} This process in turn led Michalinos Zembylas to state these revisions would ultimately fail in their objectives, as the historic ‘us and them divide’ would never be overcome whilst students are still taught that they are specifically defined ‘Greeks’ or ‘Turks’.\textsuperscript{22}

A second alleged ‘distortion’, this time associated directly with AKEL’s historic policy of Turkish Cypriot ‘rapprochement’, concerned the belief that these revisions were undertaken solely for the purpose of expediting the cause of reunification. In March 2009 the EDEK (Socialist) deputy Georgios Varnavas offered a strongly worded criticism of these historical revisions, as he argued they risked ‘sending the wrong message that the Cyprus Problem was of a bicomunal nature, and not one of invasion and occupation’.\textsuperscript{23} Underlying the argument of Varnavas is an issue that has long plagued the polarising discourses of Cypriot history: How old is the Cyprus Problem? Within the official discourses of the Greek Cypriot side, as Varnavas reflected, it is an issue of invasion and occupation that began in 1974. Within the official discourses of the Turkish Cypriot side, it is invariably depicted as beginning in 1963-64 with the Greek Cypriot ‘usurpation’ of the Cyprus treaties.\textsuperscript{24} Whilst any date can be chosen and all can be embraced across the modern history of Cyprus, ultimately within these polarised narratives, the point at which the answer to this question commences significantly influences the structure of the narrative that follows. In Greek Cypriot educational models, in the words of a secondary school teacher supportive of the need for reforms:

\begin{quote}
history was taught in such a way that little reference was made to the struggles suffered by Turkish Cypriots in the 1960s... and that many were under the
\end{quote}

impression that up until the invasion, the island had been a happy Greek Cypriot country and then the bad Turks came along.\textsuperscript{25}

This form of externalisation by the Greek Cypriot authorities is in marked contrast to the internalised focus of the Turkish Cypriot authorities, who place a significant emphasis on acts of ‘brutality’ undertaken by the Greek Cypriots.\textsuperscript{26} In turn this Greek Cypriot ‘externalisation’ reflects a much broader scholarly discourse which posits, in the words of Vassilis Fouskas, that the Cypriots were ‘very little, if at all, responsible for the current situation’ on the island.\textsuperscript{27} Whilst this discourse of effective passivity is an overly simplistic reading of an inherently complex situation, its emergence and wider dissemination is possible, and for some politically expedient, due to the significant levels of ‘international interference’ that can be drawn on to construct a narrative that will be partial, but not necessarily ‘wrong’. Nevertheless, in a direct response to the criticisms levelled at this ‘rewriting of the past’, the AKEL education minister Andreas Demetriou accused Varnavas, and others who propagated such views, as pursuing a form of ‘jingoism which has brought tragedy to our place’.\textsuperscript{28}

Within this highly politicised process of ‘rewriting the past’ therefore, several organisations have a vested interest in ‘forgetting’ or marginalising certain aspects of Cypriot history. Indeed both EDEK and DISY have historically maintained members associated with the intercommunal violence of 1963-64 and the coup of 1974.\textsuperscript{29} Consequently, as the teacher Eleni from Famagusta noted, the construction and dissemination of official historical narratives are:

very political, [and] I don’t think you are going to get a true version of history. So it depends on what kind of policies and messages you want to pass as a state and country… and what kind of notions you want to reinforce through your books and through your curriculum.\textsuperscript{30}

Yet beyond the debates regarding political culpability or national ideals, the main ‘policy’ of Greek Cypriot education in relation to the events of 1974 was, and remains, focussed on helping children of all ages to get ‘to know our enslaved land, and to keep it alive in their

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Saoulli} Saoulli, ‘Teachers join forces’.
\bibitem{content} For content and revision of Turkish Cypriot school texts see Yucel Vural & Eurim Ozuyanik, ‘Redefining Identity in the Turkish-Cypriot School History Textbooks: A Step Towards a United Federal Cyprus?’, \textit{South European Society and Politics}, Vol.13, No.3, (2008), pp.133-154; Papadakis, ‘Narrative, Memory and History Education’, pp.128-148.
\bibitem{Fouskas} Fouskas, ‘Reflections on the Cyprus Issue’, p.127; Scherer, \textit{Blocking the Sun}; Hitchens, \textit{Hostage to History}.
\bibitem{Evripidou} Evripidou, ‘New front opens in school history battle’; See also Editorial, ‘About time minister hit back at campaign of lies’, \textit{Cyprus Mail}, 11 February 2009.
\bibitem{EDEK} For EDEK see Loucas Charalambous, ‘Guardians of official myths and lies’, \textit{Cyprus Mail}, 30 November 2008; For DISY see Papadakis, ‘Nation, Narrative and Commemoration’, pp.256-257.
\end{thebibliography}
memories until the day of return’. To forget is tantamount to accepting the fait accompli of the Turkish occupation, as in the words of the speaker of the Greek Parliament Apostolos Kaklamanis ‘whoever loses his past sooner or later loses his ethnic identity and his national independence’. In this sense therefore, it is the human effects as much as the actual events that are deemed crucial to impart within these school texts. As such, a clear focus on the long-term ‘divisive’ effects of British colonialism, coupled to the well-known actions of Turkey and the ‘fascist’ Greek Junta in 1974, can create an historical narrative that is widely, if not fully, embraced across the different national-political factions of Greek Cypriot society. While these narratives can theoretically be expanded by teachers and students to embrace different points or elements based on their own political convictions and personal beliefs, the mere existence of these texts provides an officially sanctioned historical narrative that is reflective of the incumbent government’s accepted ‘truth as history’.

4.2 Consequences of Conflict

In moving beyond the politics of history construction to the actual content of these texts, it is important to consider the dual level of meaning associated with 1974; its causes and its consequences. As these texts do not give Britain a significant position within the narrative of 1974, this section will first consider what is described by analysing how the consequences of conflict are depicted, and then approaching its causality. This analytical structure directly mirrors the educational structure of Greek Cypriot society. Indeed, the elementary level text I know I don’t forget and I struggle provides the image of conflict, whilst the secondary level text History of Cyprus is designed to provide the details. The reason for this, as the primary level teacher Koula from Morphou stated, is based on the maturity of children, as ‘to say what happened is easier, but to give excuses why is more complicated to understand… Our curriculum says just to say the events’. However with the ‘complicated’ and highly politicised nature of Cypriot history, Miranda Christou has noted that many teachers at a secondary level will also not describe in detail ‘the troubles’ of the

31 See Leontiou, I Know I don’t forget and I struggle, p.8.
1963-1974 period beyond the content of the textbook material.\textsuperscript{35} This observation was reinforced by the diasporic teacher Andreas who stated children on Cyprus ‘learn history, they don’t study history’, and also by the first generation refugee Theo who described his schooling in Limassol as simply ‘this happened, then this happened, and that is all you need to know’.\textsuperscript{36} Nevertheless, while there is a reluctance to develop the clear causes of conflict in 1974, there is a clearly defined national narrative associated with its consequences.

Indeed the social impact of conflict was significant, as a *History of Cyprus* describes:

the victims of the invasion in battle dead, massacred, people executed in cold blood, raped women, amount to some 2000. In addition there are 1619 missing persons whose fate remains unknown to this day. In addition to these, another 200,000 people were chased out of their homes, living as refugees in their own country.\textsuperscript{37}

With this forced physical displacement, as Chapter 5 will detail, there emerged the need to ‘remember Cyprus’ by creating ritualised replacements for a life and land lost through conflict and partition. In turn, mundane objects such as a blanket given to a child refugee or a photograph of a lost home operate as symbolic artefacts that can draw a connection between


\textsuperscript{36} Interview with Andreas, London, 6 March 2013; Interview with Theo, Limassol, 17 March 2013.

\textsuperscript{37} Georgiades, *History of Cyprus*, p.255.
an identity that was once, and an identity that is now framed by conflict. As such the consequences of conflict are infused into the national structures of the Republic of Cyprus.

As the wounds of partition, depicted in figure 4.1, ‘still bleed’ across Cyprus through the unresolved nature of the missing persons issue and the continued displacement of the refugees, the pain of the personal is collectivised and nationalised through processes such as education. This is made clear in the opening words of the elementary level text *I know I don’t forget and I struggle*, as the sole aim of this book is:

> for our children to get to know about the occupied regions of our homeland... [as stories] inspired by the tragedy of the refugees and the occupation will help them to know our enslaved land and to keep alive in their memory until the day of return.

Through this process, it is the memory of places rather than the specifics of events or times that are of paramount importance. By drawing on evocative imagery and poems, this text attempts to frame a particularly potent historical memory within the subconscious of those ‘too young to know our enslaved lands’ that is directly associated with the tragedy and continuing injustice of conflict. As an example, figure 4.2, which depicts an image of a young woman bearing a striking resemblance to that of the Virgin Mary mourning for the loss of her son, draws directly on the theme of the missing and an interlinked concept of nationalised ‘victimhood’. This evocative image is reinforced through the related 1979 poem by Kupros Tokas which refers to his unknown fate, ‘Is her child alive? Is he well? The agony like a storm beats her.’ In drawing on images of the divine and a figuration of mourning echoed throughout Greek Cypriot society, the struggle for ‘national compurgation’ and the mythic ‘day of return’ is theoretically furthered by combining the suffering of the personal to that of the national. Within this process these texts become *lieux de mémoire*. As Pierre Nora defined the concept, their fundamental purpose is to inhibit the act of forgetting by capturing ‘the maximum possible meaning with the fewest possible signs’.

Whilst Nora noted the emergence of these ‘sites’ in France came in part due to the ordering

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38 Reference made to the importance of a blanket given to a refugee, detailed by his British wife, in Interview with Susan, Limassol, 9 July 2012; ‘The power of a photo of a lost home was raised in Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012; For parallel in educational forms see Filisa Hadjihanna, ‘Δυο φωτογραφίες (Two Photographs)’, in Nikos Leontiou, (ed.), *I know, I don’t forget and I struggle*, (Nicosia: Renos Agrotis, 2007), pp.16-18.

39 Leontiou, (ed.), *I know, I don’t forget and I struggle*, p.7.

40 For victimhood see Yakinthou, ‘The Quiet Deflation of Den Xehno?’, pp.15-33.


principles of history, he also noted that those historical texts which ‘reshape memory in some fundamental way or that epitomise a revision of memory for pedagogical purposes’, operate as *lieux de mémoire* when placed within the ritualised structures of a particular community.\(^{44}\)

![Figure 4.2: Leontiou, (ed.), *I know, I don’t forget and I struggle*, p.24.](image)

This school text follows this ritualistic mantra through the concept that ‘learning is living’, as the clear ‘will to remember’ is buttressed by the knowledge that ‘to forget’ would be tantamount to accepting the injustice of partition.\(^{45}\) In turn the occupied areas are imbued with a symbolic aura that seeks to frame the historical memories of conflict not through events, but through the pain and tragedy of displacement. Through this tragedy comes the subtle political imperative for action, as in the words of a grandfather mourning the loss of his home, ‘even though my soul weeps and is in pain, I have hope on you’.\(^{46}\) As Chapter 5 will show, these textbooks do not operate in isolation, but rather act as supplementary tools within a much wider memorial framework associated with the conflict and partition of 1974.

The structures of this ritualised process of history education were directly referenced by Koula from Morphou, who was displaced as a child in 1974 and is now a teacher, as she stated:

We have the subject of remembrance of our occupied areas, we can’t forget them... we have to give them the message, the children, that this area is ours as

\(^{44}\) Ibid, pp.14-18.
\(^{45}\) Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, pp.19-20.
well... it is not something you can forget; even the youngest generation know this is an occupied area. We struggle to get them back.47

This process therefore attempts to create a series of ‘received’ memories shared between different generations that are associated directly with the trauma of conflict and displacement. As has been noted in South Africa for example, this intergenerational sharing of traumatic memories, transmitted through familial units and communal activities, can play a significant role in shaping the identities and perceptions of those generations without a direct connection to an historical past.48 Therefore in taking the ‘canon’ memory of the refugees and setting these narratives within a literary text, making them ‘belong to everyone and no-one’, educational processes attempt to collectivise the trauma of conflict by placing it within the shared story of the nation.49 This process was reflected in the narrative of Eleni from Famagusta, another teacher and refugee, who also highlighted an issue which developed following the failed Annan Plan vote for reunification in 2004, as:

I belong to the generation just after 1974, so for us it was very, the teachers and the education system overall were really emphasising the fact that we shouldn’t forget this has happened, this was Greek territory. My parents were refugees, so it was very much alive throughout our lives on a daily basis. As a teacher I do feel I need to stress this. [But] after 2004 it sort of diminished, the importance of talking about 1974[...] or maybe we don’t know how to interpret this[...] [after Annan] somehow you were like, so what should we say. This is how I felt. I wasn’t sure how to approach the whole teaching of that period.50

For both Eleni and Koula, as refugees, the consequences of conflict are lived with on a ‘daily basis’. In seeking to collectivise this pain, even in a simplified form, through the commemorative structures of the state and the content of school textbooks, the struggle for ‘national compurgation’ is theoretically furthered by creating a series of direct and unconscious memory signifiers framed by emotional attachments. Yet as Eleni also noted, the surprise opening of the Green Line in April 2003, coupled with the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004, brought forth a series of questions and challenges regarding the representation and structure of Greek Cypriot history. As Rebecca Bryant has noted, the idyllic imagination of the occupied areas through the national dream of a ‘return to the way things were’, constructed around the divisive acts of ‘international interference’, was complicated by the more direct connection to a Turkish Cypriot form of remembrance rooted as much around

internal, as well as external oppression. This form of ‘oppression’, as noted earlier, does not feature prominently within official Greek Cypriot historical narratives, due in part to the strong desire for elements of Greek Cypriot society to ‘forget’ certain parts of their history. As a result, within concepts such as Den Xehno, the overriding aim is to create an emotional attachment to the occupied areas by presenting an image of suffering and hardship against the cruel excesses of the Turkish invasion.

Therefore despite contemporary questions regarding ‘what we should say’ in relation to 1974, the emphasis on the ‘struggle for return’ remains the central national focus of remembrance. In turn, images of women in mourning are placed at the symbolic heart of the collective figuration of Greek Cypriot suffering. This universal sign is drawn on throughout the world, from antiquity to the present, as the female form acts as both the symbolic carrier of the future of the nation, and ultimately that of its contemporary suffering. This figuration, as Miranda Christou noted, can create an ‘obligation’ amongst the young to remember the consequences of the invasion and occupation. To forget would not only desecrate the memory of those who were lost, but would offend those wives and mothers that

52 See as example Ibrahim, ‘Connecting Testimony, Trauma and Memory’, pp.249-271.
remain in this perpetual state of mourning. In developing this point further, within the pages of I know I don’t forget and I struggle, a form of gender difference is evident. Generally speaking women mourn the missing, whilst men mourn the loss of homes and property. In the case of numerous depictions of men in mourning, reflected in figure 4.3, which draws on the associated themes of ‘patience, endurance [and] fight’ for the long sought after hope for ‘return’, it could be argued this is perhaps even more evocative given the old adage ‘men don’t cry’. Indeed this figure of mourning is not a sign of weakness, but of the collective trauma of conflict affecting the totality of Greek Cypriot society, both male and female. However in the broader context of national remembrance, men could feasibly fight, whilst women were the main passive victims of the crisis. Consequently, as the ‘popular’ images in Chapter 3 invariably reflect, the figuration of Cyprus as a young, almost childlike female figure facing the older, more powerful, and often masculine figuration of external ‘others’, can subtly reinforce this official national narrative of general passivity in the face of external manipulation. As this focus on remembrance permeates history, language and citizenship studies, it is a national requirement to not only ‘Remember Cyprus’, but to continue the struggle for ‘return’.  

4.3 Causality of Conflict  

With the consequences of 1974 clearly set out for younger schoolchildren, it is the role of a History of Cyprus to provide the reasons for why this tragedy occurred. In structuring this understanding, it is useful to consider an editorial from the British Daily Mail on the 15 August 1974, which stated ‘where in the longer perspective you place the ultimate blame depends on when you stop the clock of Cypriot history’. Yet this process also fundamentally depends on when you start the clock of Cypriot history, especially in the context of British influences. In relation to the content of a History of Cyprus, which is a general text charting Cypriot history from the Neolithic onwards, the narrative is significantly condensed and largely descriptive. Within Polydorou’s 2011 text, the two chapters detailing the ‘British Occupation’ (1878-1960) and the ‘Cyprus Republic’ (1960-1977), which includes a section on the ‘coup and invasion’ and a section on the death of Makarios, are presented across twenty-eight pages of text and images, of which seven are focussed directly on the

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events and human consequences of 1974. Accordingly, these school texts adopt a highly descriptive narrativist form which provides little analysis of the situations they describe, as the main focus is on imparting knowledge rather than analysing its content. As previously noted, it is effectively designed to be structurally followed with little deviation. As such the ‘facts’ within these historical narratives can be considered a reflection of the key information the Cypriot authorities deemed too important to omit for their contemporary readership. In considering the content of these texts within the prism of ‘historical remembrance’, their attempted construct of an actively created shared past, or a ‘trans-generational memory’, narrativises the emergence of the nation in order to inform Greek Cypriot children ‘who they are and from whence they have come’. In order to do this, certain facts are highlighted and others are suppressed, as the sole purpose of the section analysed here is to detail the events that led to the division of the island in 1974. This is made clear with the single task outlined at the conclusion of the Independence period narrative of Polydorou’s text: ‘Discuss the problems or questions raised to you through the study of this chapter’.

In providing a brief overview of the key points detailed within this chapter of a History of Cyprus, the narrative commences with a reflection on the Independence agreements, which were described as ‘not equal to the sacrifices of the Greeks of Cyprus, the inalienable right of self-determination was not given to the Cypriots’. From this imposed settlement and the continued ‘Turkish abuse of their privileges’ emerged the crisis of 1963-64. Alongside the details associated with the first Turkish invasion threat and the ‘illegal’ actions of the Turkish Cypriot authorities, the failed British proposal for ‘NATO to temporarily assume the occupation of Cyprus’ is referenced. Whilst this point is not developed, save for the comment that its ‘unacceptable’ nature led the Greek Cypriot authorities to manoeuvre for a UN Peace Keeping force, its reference is important as it is the first point in which Britain enters the narrative of the Republican period. This Anglo-American policy, designed primarily to avoid the USSR influencing Cyprus through the UN, maintained the backing and active support of both Greece and Turkey, but the Cypriot authorities could not be convinced to accept it, and it was never implemented. The next significant event described within a History of Cyprus is the Kofinou crisis of November 1967. This crisis, the second major intercommunal eruption of the independence period, is

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57 Polydorou, History of Cyprus, pp.103-131.
depicted as emergent from the actions and provocations of ‘Turkish rebels’ and the separatist acts of the Turkish Cypriot authorities. However this was exacerbated by the actions of the National Guard and a ‘secret Greek army’ on Cyprus, originally sent by Greece in 1964 and led by General Grivas, whose response to these provocations was to directly assault this small Turkish Cypriot village near Larnaca. This led to a second Turkish invasion threat and forced Grivas and his Greek army to be ‘returned to Greece’.62 From this crisis and linked directly to the negative influences of the Greek military Junta, which rose to power in April 1967, came the emergence and ‘unlawful actions of EOKA-B’. These actions not only ‘managed to divide Cypriot Hellenism’ through ‘ambushes and attacks, murders and kidnappings’, but on the 15 July 1974 they undertook ‘the greatest act of treason in Cypriot history’. This coup, described as amongst the most ‘tragic and calamitous’ on a ‘world-wide historic scale’, directly opened the door to ‘Turkey’s partitionist and expansionist aspirations’.63 Understandably, given their role as a Guarantor power, this is the second point in which the British enter the narrative. However the description of British actions is limited to their position at the Geneva conferences, and perhaps more importantly, their refusal of the Turkish request for joint-intervention on the 17 July.64 No analysis is provided to explain why Britain refused this request.

Within this brief overview of the key details within a History of Cyprus, it is clear that whilst there is nothing fundamentally ‘wrong’ in relation to their content, their form of language shapes the depiction of each crisis as precipitated predominantly by the actions and influences of an internal or external ‘other’. Indeed, despite the aim of AKEL’s planned revisions, the principal role of the Turkish Cypriot ‘community’ remains focussed on their ‘unfair’ constitutional ‘privileges’ and ‘illegal’ actions which directly triggered the crises of 1964 and 1967. Likewise the pervasive external designs of the Junta and Turkey, with the former controlling EOKA-B and the latter the Turkish Cypriot leadership, not only fosters an effective narrative of inevitability associated with 1974, but allows for a level of Cypriot passivity within these depictions through the placement of internal conflict as the direct result of external manipulation.65 However one significant external ‘other’ not given a prominent role within this post-1960 narrative is Britain.

65 For references to the Junta precipitating conflict within other educational processes see Philippou and Varnava, ‘Constructions of Solution(s)’, p.202; See also Patrick Devine-Wright, ‘A theoretical overview of memory and conflict’, in Ed Cairns & Michael Roe (eds.), The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp.15-17.
The somewhat minimal, albeit not ‘incorrect’ description of British actions from 1960-1974 operates in a marked contrast to the widespread popular ‘memory’, detailed in Chapter 3, which focussed heavily on Britain’s collusive acts and direct culpability for the division of Cyprus in 1974. Whilst these ‘conspiratorial’ themes are directly drawn on within some official PIO publications, they are not referenced in school texts. This in turn drew the annoyance of the diasporic teacher Andreas from Morphou who criticised the content of a *History of Cyprus* for:

they might say that [colonial secretary] Hopkinson said [in 1954] no we cannot give freedom to Cyprus, we need it for the Queen, and it stops at that. But, later in 1963 and so on, you don’t see in the history books that, for example in 1963 and even during 1974, the British soldiers were giving continuously information to the Turkish divisions.

As a former community militia, Andreas stated that he had first-hand experience of British-UN forces relaying the ‘demands’ of a nearby Turkish Cypriot militia to his village checkpoint in 1964. In taking his personal recollections of 1964 and wider beliefs concerning British actions in 1974, which reflects elements of the ‘Big Lie’, Andreas can develop and add to the narrative of a *History of Cyprus* when he teaches the key facts of this period, as he views them, to his students. This point emphasises the performative and selective nature of both history and historical remembrance. The construct of a ‘shared story’ is framed by what is selected and what is excluded, by what is embraced and what is dismissed, and ultimately by those issues and ‘memories’ which are deemed of particular relevance to the homogeneity of the wider collective. Whilst this form of ‘political memory’ draws on and utilises a ‘top down’ framework to support its dissemination, the resultant historical memories that emerge are not necessarily imposed from above, but co-authored from below. This co-authored process draws on the interplay between the politics of education and the wider ‘cultural tools’ and influences of society, as much like the collective takes from the individual, the individual takes, be it direct or subconscious, what it deems important from the collective.

To further this point, one can turn to and develop James Wertsch’s reflections on the construct of ‘national narratives’ and collective memory. However rather than adopting a defined and arbitrary delineation between ‘specific narratives’, which impart concrete

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66 PIO: *A Place in History*.  
67 Interview with Andreas, London, 6 March 2013.  
68 For arrest of British airmen in 1964 see PIO: ‘Note of Protest’.  
69 For the power and role of teachers in knowledge transference see Kreisberg, *Transforming Power*.  
information, and ‘narrative templates’, which provide generalised schematic structures, this thesis would argue a *History of Cyprus* operates in an effective midway between these definitions. It is conversely both concrete and flexible. It provides key details but allows for creative development, if one is so inclined, through their inherently skeletal narratives.71

Through these ‘cookie cutter plots’, irrespective of the designs of the state, different teachers and students can take, develop or simply ignore those historical themes which are deemed of most importance to them. For some this can mean trying to ignore the history of this period entirely by simply not teaching it.72 For others, such as Eleni from Famagusta, it can be shaped by their national sentiment. Indeed Eleni, who thinks of Cyprus as an effective extension of Greece, stated when considering her teaching of 1974 that ‘I never refer to the role of Britain and the non-intervention’. Instead Eleni’s focus was to stress that ‘Cyprus had to be sacrificed for Greece to get democracy. This is how I see it, and this is the message I am giving’ to the children.73

In considering therefore the discussion point posed within Polydorou’s text regarding the ‘questions raised’ by this narrative, with the minimalistic reference to British actions, a series of alternative questions could easily be posed which these texts do not answer. Why did Britain want NATO to occupy Cyprus in 1964? Why did Britain not intervene in 1974? Why did Britain not do more to stop Turkey? If a reader were to adopt a form of ‘creative development’ associated with the content of a *History of Cyprus*, these minimalist and descriptive narratives would not fundamentally challenge any conspiratorial, or indeed supportive view of Britain’s role in the crisis of 1974. For example the refusal for joint-intervention on the 17 July 1974 could reflect the official British opposition to the ‘illegal’ Turkish invasion.74 Alternatively it could reflect those views expressed in multiple oral history interviews that Britain did not need to directly intervene, as they were already supporting Turkey ‘like they always do’.75 From a purely archival perspective, this marginalisation of Britain ultimately reflects the fact that the British authorities, aside from a ‘few bad apples’, were through their policy of detachment largely a marginal figure during this period, especially compared to Greece and Turkey. In this sense, a lack of information regarding British actions can make these texts more encompassing. They provide a

75 Reflected in, amongst others, Interview with Sofonis, Limassol, 7 April 2014; Interview with Christos, London, 29 November 2012; Interview with Anastasia, Limassol, 9 August 2011; Anonymous, ‘Evasive silence conceals the real trail of events in Cyprus’, p.2.
chronological narrative that can be interpreted differently, and developed accordingly, to coincide with or reinforce the personal beliefs, desires and experiences of their readership. However it also emphasises the fact that these texts do not work in isolation, they are collaborative endeavours between the text and the reader, between the teacher and the student, and between the individual and the collective.

Ultimately historical narratives require evidence to support their assumptions and conclusions. The construct of memory does not require the same level or form of evidence, as beyond accepting your own memories are correct irrespective of what others may say or do, there is an innate fluidity to memory that the structured nature of history ultimately lacks. In this sense Nora is correct that ‘memory is life borne by living societies’ while history is the problematic and incomplete reconstruction of ‘what is no longer’. Yet history is also a story that engages with particular forms of memory and places this alongside other evidence to construct a shared narrative of an historical event. Therefore reference within a History of Cyprus to Andreas’s memory that Britain actively supported the Turkish invasion in 1974 would be factually unsound based on the evidence that is currently available. However this process has not stopped other official publications or politicians reflecting more directly on the actions of Britain in 1974, either by criticising their failure to intervene or by referring to their ‘conspiratorial’ intent. Why then are the British so marginalised? Part of the answer lies in the socio-cultural discourses outlined in Chapter 3. Given the sustained power of the widespread popular belief, perpetuated in numerous media, that the British actively assisted the Turkish invasion in 1974, these official texts, which face significant scrutiny over their content, simply do not need to refer to unsubstantiated conspiratorial themes. This can be raised independently by teachers or learnt by children through the media, familial units or a simple search of the internet. The second part of the answer lies in the broader content of a History of Cyprus. When one considers what invariably defines the ‘popular’ memory of British actions in 1974 – Anglo-Turkish collusion, support for partition, defence of their strategic interests – these themes are already drawn on heavily within a History of Cyprus, not within the narrative of 1974, but through the narrative of the colonial period.

4.4 A British legacy

One central and unifying theme that permeates both official and popular forms of history and memory associated with British actions on Cyprus is the concept of ‘divide and

78 PIO: A Place in History; Mallinson, Cyprus: A Historical Overview; PIO: ‘Speech by the President of the House of Representatives’. 
rule’. This colonial policy resonates deeply within the Greek Cypriot national consciousness. It defines the legacy of British colonialism, and as noted in Chapter 3, frames the image of British political actions within the post-colonial period. The reason for this relates both to the power of this colonial image, and the fact that British interests towards Cyprus did not fundamentally change in 1960; it was merely the size and style of their occupation. Indeed, the colonial period is infused into the memorial fabric of Greek Cypriot society, as street names, statues, museums, national days and the content of school texts are all dedicated to remembering the Greek Cypriot ‘struggle for freedom’ against the iniquities of British colonialism. Within a *History of Cyprus*, the chapter detailing the British colonial period commences in 1857, some twenty years before the British actually acquired the island, with a description of the Suez Canal. This introduction emphasises Cyprus’s geo-strategic value to Britain.

The conclusion poses eleven questions encouraging discussion on a wide range of themes. These topics include the ‘heroic acts of the EOKA struggle’, the connection to ‘mother Greece’, the image of the British ‘occupier’, and ultimately ‘what you think... about the measures of the British against the Greeks’. These measures included curfews, mass prisoner detentions, executions and the use of torture. This range of questions contrasts starkly with the singular reflective assignment of remembrance posed by the ‘Cyprus Republic’ chapter. This difference can be considered a reflection of two central points. First, the fight against British colonial rule led directly to the emergence of the Cyprus Republic and therefore should be studied extensively for its message of heroism against a foreign and brutal occupation. Second, the seminal importance and lasting consequences of 1974 effectively negates the need for more than one particularly broad question, as any further elaboration has the potential to raise politically sensitive issues over internal forms of causality. Yet of all the questions posed within a *History of Cyprus*, there is one guiding statement set at the conclusion of the ‘British Occupation’ chapter that maintains a particular

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80 For analysis of this early period, and the failure of Cyprus to live up to British interests in the initial years of acquisition, see Andrekos Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).


82 See Anonymous, ‘Students should “fight to reunite Cyprus”’, *Cyprus Mail*, 13 March 2013.
resonance: ‘support with arguments that the British practiced in Cyprus the policy of “divide and rule”’.

Finding support for this argument within the pages of a *History of Cyprus* is not difficult. It was the British who organised and ‘reenergised’ mainland Turkish interests in Cyprus through the tripartite conference of 1955. This conference, held in response to the significant pressure emergent from the actions of EOKA and the wider *enosis* movement saw the British ‘trap’ Greece, simply through their attendance, into accepting Turkey’s ‘right to have a say in the Cyprus issue’. It was the British who then officially brought forth ‘the idea of partition of the island’ with a parliamentary statement by the Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd in December 1956, and then, ‘even more clearly’, through the 1958 Macmillan Plan of ‘tridominion’ between Britain, Greece and Turkey. This ‘partitionist’ proposal was accepted by Turkey, rejected by Greece, and ultimately provided the final incentive for Makarios to accept the compromise of independence over the dream of *enosis*. Finally, it was the British in 1958 that ‘emboldened the Turks’ of Cyprus to commit a series of ‘atrocities’ against the Greeks in order to ‘convince the world that the coexistence of Greeks and Turks was impossible’. As a result Georgiades’s text stated that 1958 is ‘now considered the year of the start of grievous events between the two communities’, as a series of attacks on property, people and indeed ‘massacres’ ensued. From this divisive colonial foundation, in a broader historiographical context, Makarios stated in 1973 for example that ‘the greatest responsibility for the complication of the Cyprus Problem must rest with the British’, as the idea of separatism was of ‘British parentage and Turkish adoption’. In turn multiple scholars, such as Eugene Rossides, have argued that ‘Britain bears the original and primary responsibility for the post-World War II tragedies that have befallen Cyprus’. This sentiment is reinforced within a *History of Cyprus*. The root cause of each crisis in the narrative of the Republican period can be traced directly back to the actions of the British

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colonial authorities. The British opposition to *enosis* forced Cyprus to become a reluctant Republic in 1960 that was externalised from Greece. In turn, the British ‘invention’ of Cypriot ‘bi-communality’ was enshrined within an ‘unequal’ and imposed constitution. This then allowed the overly ‘empowered’ Turkish Cypriot authorities in 1963 to provoke ‘incidents that drove the conflict with the legitimate power of the Government’. Through the long-term consequences of these separatist ‘incidents’ came ‘the present tragedy as its sequel’.

Therefore ample evidence is provided within a *History of Cyprus* to argue that, yes, the British did enforce the particularly damaging policy of ‘divide and rule’ on Cyprus, the lasting consequences of which Cypriots are still living with today. While these official narratives preclude any reference to the exclusionist nature of the *enosis* movement or examples of Turkish Cypriot suffering, their content is selected and simplified to focus on those issues deemed of most importance by the state. Indeed, given the process of education is an important tool for the state in their construction of national identities and historical memories, their structured content provides a shared ‘school-transmitted culture’ that attempts to link a specific form of history to a particular form of identity. Within this official narrative of the colonial period, it is the heroism of EOKA against the divisive and brutal tactics of the British colonial regime that is emphasised, primarily to honour those who died so Cyprus could be free. This story of heroism against brutality is visually reinforced, as the following chapter will show, through the displays and artefacts housed within the museums dedicated to the anti-colonial struggle. Whilst elements of this official discourse are not accepted by all, with the image and actions of EOKA often contested between forces on the left and right, the impact of British colonial policy is for both sides collectively rooted around the long-term consequences of ‘divide and rule’. The power of this legacy was evident in a series of interviews undertaken with British expatriates on Cyprus. When the Cypriot educational system was mentioned, it was stated that their children would often come home from school ‘ashamed and embarrassed’ after learning about the destructive and

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92 Criticism of EOKA and the *enosis* movement for fostering internal forms of separation raised in Interview with Christodoulos, London, 3 July 2012; Interview with Theo, Limassol, 4 April 2014; Interview with Grigori, London, 3 July 2012; Group Interview 1, London, 3 July 2012.
divisive nature of the British occupation.\textsuperscript{96} Through this commemorative focus therefore, a particularly potent historical memory of British interference on Cyprus can be created which is marked by Anglo-Turkish cooperation, Anglo-Greek Cypriot confrontation, and a lasting connection to the traumatic effects of Cypriot division.\textsuperscript{97} The power of this shared narrative of history and memory, in providing the foundational image of British interference on Cyprus, can in turn frame and define the image and understanding of British actions across the modern history of Cyprus.

In considering the wider resonance of ‘divide and rule’ and the British colonial legacy on Cyprus, Glafcos from Morphou for example argued that while the Cypriots made their own mistakes:

> there is a lot of proof that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots lived for many years with no problems at all. It is later on that external powers, for their own interests, exploited things. I mean Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In Northern Ireland, Catholics and Protestants. In Asia you have India and Pakistan. You know the game is the same.\textsuperscript{98}

Indeed for Glafcos, if Cyprus had simply been closer to Greece, or even Turkey, and not on the strategic cornerstone of three continents, ‘there would never have been a conflict, and the island would never have been divided’. To test the validity of this point, a statistical analysis of 160 countries by Matthew Lange and Andrew Dawson noted that outbreaks of communal violence were, on average, more prevalent in former British colonies than those of their major European rivals.\textsuperscript{99} Although there are considerable issues with broad scale statistical analyses, notably the loss of state-specific developments within such frameworks, these findings do emphasise that British policy towards Cyprus was far from unique.\textsuperscript{100} As David Abernethy has noted, whether ‘divide and rule’ was adopted as a defined policy or manifested out of administrative developments, its utilisation by the British ‘reinforced diversity, as groups became more conscious of their separate identities and interests’.\textsuperscript{101} This

\textsuperscript{96} Raised in Interview with Susan, Limassol, 9 July 2012; Interview with Daisy, Paphos, 26 March 2013; Interview with Penny, Limassol, 1 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{97} For latent fear of partition emergent from British colonialism see Coufoudakis, \textit{Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem}, pp.72-73.

\textsuperscript{98} Interview with Glafcos, London, 7 March 2013.


view is particularly focussed on Cyprus. In the narrative of Margarita from Kythrea, for example, when asked why it was felt there was a conflict on Cyprus, Margarita began a long and largely unbroken thirteen minute narrative that commenced in 1878 with the British acquisition of Cyprus and concluded in 1974 with the ‘Big Lie’ and alleged British support for the Turkish invasion. Although references were made to the influence and actions of the USA, the Junta and Turkey, the central figure throughout this narrative was Britain and its use of ‘divide and rule’ in both a colonial and post-colonial context. Whilst Margarita’s description of 1974 was quoted in Chapter 3, in the case of the colonial period, Margarita stated:

In 1956, 1957, the British, as usual divide and rule, they pushed in a way the Cypriots, Muslim Cypriots, they are not Turks, they are Muslim Cypriots. The name Turkish Cypriots is a British [invention]. When they come they want to separate us... from the beginning, they put them on a struggle against the Greeks... [which] was full of hate because of the British propaganda.  

This reference to the historical impact of ‘divide and rule’ on the emergence of Turkish national sentiment, prefaced by the comment that Cyprus has been Greek since antiquity, is an issue not only reflected within multiple oral history interviews, but remains widely debated amongst scholars. While the connection to Greece in the context of Greek Cypriot identities will be approached in Chapter 6, it is important to note that although the British did encourage internal ‘Turkish’ development to counter those increasingly vocal Greek Cypriot demands for enosis, the rise of Turkish national sentiment, and indeed the wider Turkish Cypriot resistance to enosis, were not solely a symptom of British colonial policy. However in the context of the ‘Cyprus Problem’, for Margarita to deny the ‘Muslim Cypriots’ a national ‘Turkish’ identity, whilst simultaneously arguing Cyprus is a ‘Greek’ country, is to reinforce the Turkish Cypriot position as a ‘minority’ rather than as the ‘community’ the British ‘emboldened’ them to become. For Margarita, who lived through the events of the British colonial occupation and the events of 1974, her image and memory of Cypriot division is intrinsically framed by the actions and influence of Britain.


102 Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012.
103 For British links to national sentiment see Fouskas & Tackie, *Cyprus: The Post-Imperial Constitution*, pp.5-15; Fouskas, ‘Reflections on the Cyprus Issue’, pp.16-17; For more balanced assessment see Rebecca Bryant, ‘On the condition of Postcoloniality in Cyprus’ in Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis & Gisela Welz (eds.), *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp.47-65.
104 For emergence of national sentiment and Turkish Cypriot resistance to enosis see Kizilyurek, ‘The Turkish Cypriot’, pp.315-326; Bryant, ‘On the condition of Postcoloniality’, pp.47-65.
On a national scale, the lasting effects of policies such as ‘divide and rule’ are deeply infused into the collective historical memory of the Greek Cypriot state, as in the oft repeated words of Yiangos from Famagusta, ‘if Britain had never been here, there would never have been a problem, no way’. Indeed, the 2011 PIO publication The Cyprus Question stated for example that:

British rule did not encourage the emergence of a Cypriot national identity. Instead, Britain used “divide and rule” policy as an instrument to control anti-colonial sentiment on the island... thereby planting the seeds of intercommunal discord and polarisation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, a development that was to prove detrimental to their cooperation upon independence.

This reading is again somewhat simplified, given the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities also did not help to foster a ‘Cypriot national identity’ through their own nationalist discourses linked directly to their respective ‘motherlands’. However the emphasis within these narratives on the colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’ directly connects the image and actions of Britain to the lasting consequences of Cypriot separation. From this colonial foundation is constructed a broader socio-political discourse of inherent suspicion which, as Chapter 3 detailed, can frame an understanding of British post-colonial actions and ambiguities through the language and connotations of their divisive colonial policies. In this sense, therefore, it could be argued that the power of this historical memory of British colonialism effectively negates the need for explicit references to British actions in 1974 within a History of Cyprus, as an image of Britain is already constructed that is directly associated with the issue of Cypriot division. To provide an example, the connotations and political capital infused within the policy of ‘divide and rule’ was drawn on by Phileleftheros in April 2004, shown in figure 4.4, in relation to their opposition to the Annan Plan. This satirical cartoon, published in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, utilises ‘divide and rule’ to draw a direct connection between Annan and the strategic interests of the Anglo-Americans. Indeed the Annan Plan was a particularly polarising issue, as it would have reunified Cyprus by creating a bi-zonal and bi-communal federated state based on a Swiss model of Greek and Turkish Cypriot cantons. With the significant Anglo-American involvement in the formulation of this plan, Yiouli Taki noted that Phileleftheros in

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107 For analysis and different views associated with the Annan Plan see Andrekos Varnava & Hubert Faustmann (eds.), Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009).
particular, whilst offering a plurality of perspectives, invariably framed their depictions of this proposal as an Anglo-American foreign conspiracy aimed at once more ensnaring the Republic within an externally orientated ‘solution’. This cartoon therefore, in drawing on this ‘well-known’ colonial and conspiratorial connection, reflects the direct link that can be made between Britain’s colonial legacy and their post-colonial activities towards Cyprus. In constructing this image, this cartoon and the narratives of a History of Cyprus can draw on the ‘resistive’ power imbued within the internalised ideological frameworks emergent from, and reactive to, the confrontational nature of British colonial rule. These frameworks are instilled with an inherent suspicion of British political intentions for Cyprus.

![Figure 4.4: From Demitri Papadimitri, ‘ΦΙΛΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΣ ΣΤΟΜΙΕΣ (The Mouth of Phileleftheros)', Phileleftheros, 25 April 2004, p.2.](image)

George Bush: ‘If one votes yes and the other votes no, what do I do Tony?’
Tony Blair: ‘Divide and Rule George!’

With the provisions of the independence agreements and the presence of the SBAs, as chapter 3 noted, a form of (neo)-colonial continuity can be established that posits the protection of these British bases utilises the same colonial mantra that a Cyprus divided is a Cyprus controlled. Through this continued connection, the historical memory of Britain’s colonial policies can frame the understanding of British ambiguities as a Guarantor power towards the ‘independent’ Republic. Therefore these subconscious ideological structures, in reacting to this continued colonial connection, can frame a ‘shared narrative’ of historical remembrance that can encompass the totality of the British presence on Cyprus, with the policies of one

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period transcending the designs of the other. This in turn can create an implicit connection between the acts of British colonialism and the ambiguities of British actions as a post-colonial Guarantor.

This implicit connection was directly raised by Eleni from Famagusta. As a first generation refugee and teacher, Eleni’s memories of 1974 and the colonial period are actively created through forms of historical remembrance, familial influences, and the socio-cultural processes of the state and wider collective. From these multiple influences, when referring to the image of Britain on Cyprus, Eleni stated:

I think the way we see the British today is influenced by this presumption we have about the British, so I’m not sure if we can differentiate with what is happening today with what has happened in the past… As Greek Cypriots we think the British played a role in terms of how the Turkish Cypriot community was empowered… because by 1950 the two communities seemed to be living okay. That’s the feeling we have. They were living in mixed villages, the Turkish Cypriots were thinking, Greek Cypriots are dominating, and they didn’t seem to have a problem with that… After the 1950s, divide and rule, this is a very common thing said in Cyprus about what Britain has done. Maybe they are still doing it… they have interests and I guess they find a way to get the most out of the situation.\footnote{Interview with Eleni, London, 25 March 2014.}

This narrative reflects many of the processes shaping the historical memory of Britain on Cyprus. First, in a direct reflection of the key points within a History of Cyprus, Eleni frames the roots of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ as emergent from Britain’s colonial ‘empowerment’ of the Turkish Cypriots. Second, Eleni directly refers to the damaging effects of ‘divide and rule’ in fostering separation on Cyprus. Third and perhaps most crucially, Eleni articulates her contemporary imagination of continued British ‘influence’ on Cyprus through this divisive colonial legacy, as ‘maybe they are still doing it’. Through this ‘presumption’ therefore, articulated in multiple oral history interviews, by politicians and within the popular media, these school texts can draw on the potency of Britain’s colonial legacy to subconsciously structure an image of Britain associated with the tragedy of 1974 not through direct references, but through the historical memory of their colonial manoeuvring.\footnote{Referenced in, amongst others, Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012; Interview with Charalambos, Limassol, 7 April 2014; Interview with Glafcos, London, 7 March 2013; Interview with Andreas, London, 6 March 2013; For politician see Anonymous, ‘Christofias slams EU fiscal policies’.} This image does not work in isolation, nor is it simply imposed from above, but it does draw on a broader socio-political discourse focussed on the lasting consequences of colonial rule. These consequences, which are infused into the national frameworks of the Greek Cypriot state, are invariably articulated as the root cause for the later troubles that befell Cyprus.
As such, in the construct of this shared narrative of historical remembrance associated with British influences on Cyprus, the history of colonial rule and the memory of British actions across the colonial and post-colonial periods are ‘braided together’ within a discourse of inherent suspicion.\textsuperscript{113} From this discourse an image can be drawn, be it colonial or conspiratorial, to suit the needs of the particular individual or collective who requires it. This does not counter popular conspiracy theories, as it does not refer to them. It can however offer a subtle form of support dependant on how one reads and interprets the content of these texts. This in turn can place the events of 1974 as an effective form of colonial culmination, at least in the sense ‘divide and rule’ reached its zenith, as by either directly supporting Turkey or not doing anything to prevent them, the British ‘familial’ connection to partition finally came of age through the Turkish invasion.

4.5 Conclusion

Within Cyprus the requirement to remember is a national necessity. To forget is to effectively accept the injustice of partition. The content of school texts are designed to impart a form of historical awareness and an imperative for action amongst those generations who have no physical connection or personal memories of those lands and lives lost through conflict. Therefore the content of primary and secondary level texts are designed to work in tandem to foster this imperative to remember. \textit{I know I don’t forget and I struggle} provides the emotional foundation for remembrance, whilst \textit{History of Cyprus} provides a description of the key events that led to this tragedy. In fostering this need to continue the struggle for ‘national compurgation’, the former draws on the power of the site, the latter draws on the power of events. A ritualised focus on the consequences of conflict frames the personal injustices of the displaced and seeks to collectivise this pain as an extension of the self and state. This ritualised approach is further reinforced through acts of public remembrance and the broader commemorative processes of the Greek Cypriot state which will be detailed in Chapter 5. The extent to which this official narrative of suffering is absorbed and accepted by the individual will depend on a number of factors, such as one’s personal interests or status as a refugee.\textsuperscript{114} However this message of collective pain is nevertheless what the state wants its citizens to remember about 1974.


A description detailing the direct roots of conflict is more complex and politically contested. The often polarised socio-political debates concerning the content and revision of school texts emphasises the societal importance and power associated with the historical narratives of school textbooks. In considering the content of a *History of Cyprus*, the language utilised to depict the staged progression towards the effective culmination of 1974 is framed predominantly by the actions and influences of an internal or external ‘other’. Within both Georgiades’s and Polydorou’s *History of Cyprus*, one could synthesise the central causes of conflict as emergent from British colonial rule, developed by the Turkish Cypriot authorities and EOKA-B, exacerbated by the Junta and finalised by Turkey. References to British actions in 1974 are minimal but open to ‘creative development’ given questions can be asked as to why the British government acted as it did. These questions can effectively be answered through the historical memory of Britain’s colonial legacy. The power of this historical memory, framed by examples of Anglo-Turkish cooperation and the policy of ‘divide and rule’, can negate the need for any reference to unsubstantiated conspiracy theories within these texts. Through the power of this shared narrative, the content of a *History of Cyprus* does not work in opposition to the popular narratives detailed in Chapter 3 as they are simply not referenced. They do however provide, through the construction of a potent historical memory associated with the legacy of British colonialism, the foundational image for a broader socio-political discourse of inherent suspicion that ultimately frames the understanding of the contemporary and historical actions of the British authorities towards Cyprus.
Chapter 5: Reconciling the Past: Sites of Memory and acts of Public Remembrance

On the 1 October 2014, the Republic of Cyprus officially celebrated its fifty-fourth year of existence and independence from British colonial rule. To mark this anniversary, in the traditional President’s message to the Cypriot people, Nicos Anastasiades offered reflection on the national and economic issues facing the island. In turn he paid tribute to the heroism and sacrifice of ‘the leaders and fighters of the 1955-59 era’, and all those ‘who defended the existence of the Republic’ in 1963-64 and 1974. However, while the Republic may have been in existence for fifty-four years, the passing of 2014 witnessed both the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the UNFICYP, established in March 1964 in response to the outbreak of intercommunal conflict, and the fortieth anniversary of the Republic’s partition. Although the former is but a date in the calendar, the events of ‘Black July’ were commemorated across the Republic, and within the Cypriot diasporic community of Britain, with church services, remembrance ceremonies and political functions designed to remember that which was lost, and renew the enduring rallying cry that ‘we will return’. One such ceremony within Britain, combining a commemorative and political focus, was the annual ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’ held in Trafalgar Square, organised by the National Federation of Cypriots (hereafter NFC). The President of the NFC, Peter Droussiotis, reflected the general tone of these remembrance rituals when he stated during the 2013 rally that ‘a generation may have passed, but the memory of injustice still burns, and our passion for justice remains deeply engrained’. This ‘injustice’ is not only at the hands of the Turks, whose illegal regime in the North continues unabated, but to all those who have ‘betrayed’ or failed to support Cyprus in one way or another throughout the years. Therefore these ceremonies maintain both an internal and international focus, with calls for international assistance tempered by warnings that only those ‘solutions’ deemed fair and just to ‘the expectations of the Greek Cypriots’ will be accepted. However with this ‘passion for justice’ comes the question of inclusivity, as aside from the collective trauma of conflict, the modern history of Cyprus, much like the island itself, is nationally and politically conflicted. As a result, the

1 The Independence Day Holiday is held on 1 October, Cyprus was granted independence on the 16 August 1960.
2 PIO: ‘Message by the President of the Republic on the Occasion of Cyprus’s Independence’, 30 September 2014.
4 PIO: ‘Message by the President’.
fusion of politics and commemoration brings forth significant questions concerning what conception of the past is being remembered, and how this relates to the future path of Cyprus.

Indeed, from the museums of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (hereafter ‘TRNC’) to those of the Republic, from the memory of EOKA to that of EOKA-B, from controversial British memorials to the contentious honouring of National Guard coupists, and from the political left to the political right, the contested content of commemorative rituals reflect the culture and politics of history, memory and identity construction across the island of Cyprus. These rituals of public remembrance are by their very nature composite and multi-vocal, at once individual and collective, emotional and political, unifying and divisive. The engagement of visual and performative acts through the artefacts of museums, the festivities of national days, and the emotive tone of remembrance ceremonies aim to preserve and shape a form of commemorative vigilance and social identity. While different understandings can be evoked through the process of memorialisation and the effective construct of ‘presentist’ sites of memory within museums, their existence helps to reinforce the contemporary needs of a particular socio-political collective in their interpretation of the past.5 As Maurice Halbwachs argues, individual memories of past events are primarily structured and maintained through the acts and ideological frameworks of social units, which foreground and memorialise those activities, memories and traditions of greatest importance to them.6 The significance of this process, especially within a state that emphasises the need to ‘never forget’, is magnified in those generations without a direct connection to an historical past. Here the construct of historical memories, as noted in Chapter 4 and reflected by Halbwachs, ‘can only be stimulated in indirect ways through reading or listening or in commemoration and festive occasions when people gather together to remember in common’.7 Pierre Nora developed this line of thought further by distinguishing within the symbolic construct of the nation two forms of memorialised ‘sites of memory’, those ‘imposed’ and those ‘constructed’. In the case of the former, official state symbols are ‘imposed’; they have memorial intention inscribed into their formation. In the case of the latter, ‘constructed’ sites emerge from unforeseen mechanisms, such as the passage of time, human effort and history itself.8 In the context of this analysis, museums and memorials can

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6 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, pp.129-141.
7 Ibid, p.24.
be deemed ‘imposed’ as they are designed to foster a specific form of commemoration. The homes and ‘ghost-towns’ of the occupied North, with their personal and collective narratives of displacement, are ‘constructed’ through the result of historical developments. Although this distinction is not arbitrary, as both symbolic compositions can be ‘simple and ambiguous, natural and artificial’, given for example the development of international heritage tourism associated with the occupied areas, these ‘sites of memory’ work to frame and culturally support a form of collective remembrance.9

Therefore taking as its base this symbolic structure, this chapter will analyse the public remembrance of the two foremost periods shaping the construct of Modern Greek Cypriot society, the British colonial period and the events of 1974. The first main section will examine the images, questions and controversies that arise from public ceremonies of remembrance, such as the diasporic ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’, and sites of memory, such as the ‘ghost-town’ of Famagusta, associated with the conflict of 1974. The second will consider more directly the image of Britain on Cyprus by approaching the issues emergent from the Kyrenia memorial controversy of 2009, and the public legacy of the anti-colonial struggle. As the previous chapters of this thesis have raised a direct awareness of, it would be remiss of the author to analyse the remembrance practices of 1974 without referring to the EOKA struggle. Indeed, the lasting consequences of the British colonial occupation, coupled to the fact many of the same actors were involved in both historical periods, makes understanding the memory of one vital to understanding the remembrance of the other. As a result, through the debates and controversies emergent from the Kyrenia memorial, wider insights into the Anglo-Greek Cypriot political and memorial connection can be garnered. Given acts of public remembrance reflect the ‘shared story’ of a particular community, the content of these rituals provide direct insights into what this society wants to remember, and in turn, what they might wish to forget.

5.1 Sites of Memory for 1974: Politics and Mourning

In approaching the contemporary commemorative practices embedded within the construct of Greek Cypriot society, the oft repeated quote of William Faulkner that ‘the past is never dead, in fact, it’s not even past’ seems particularly apt.10 Indeed as the mayor (in exile) of the occupied town of Morphou, Charalambos Pittas, wrote in the preface to a 2006 photographic album, or ‘book of memory’ associated with the occupation of this town:

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9 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, p.18.
We, the people of Morphou, though we fled our town, betrayed and wounded by friends and foe that bitter summer of 1974, will carry its memory with us every waking moment of our daily lives, in our joys and in our sorrows, in our celebrations and in our griefs (sic), until the blessed day we return.\footnote{11} With ‘the wounds of 1974 still bleeding’ through the continued displacement of the refugees, and the pain of the relatives of the missing as potent as ever, the events of those summer months of 1974 retain a personal and collective sensitivity irrespective of the passage of time.\footnote{12} The mental and physical scars of partition are deeply embedded across Greek Cypriot society. Miranda Christou and Victor Roudometof have noted that the consequences of 1974 are the ‘only lens through which Greek Cypriots refract their current concerns and future aspirations’.\footnote{13} Although the financial crash of March 2013 may have altered this process somewhat, the official collectivisation of personal suffering into a form of cultural trauma, so defined as the diffusion of ‘social pain’ through collective agency, is predicated on the universal preoccupation to ‘never forget’.\footnote{14} This is undertaken through the use of ‘functional objects’ such as school texts, the inheritance of recollections and indeed refugee status from familial units, and the process of local and national forms of commemorative ritualization.\footnote{15} The result of this collective process was reflected in the programme notes for the 2013 London theatre production of James Phillips’s *Hidden in the Sand*. As this story centred around two refugee sisters from Famagusta living with the grief of a missing relative, it was stated that:

> Even though a generation has passed, I do not know of any UK Greek Cypriots, young or old, British- or Cypriot-born, who do not remember the unforgettable bitter past or do not feel, in their hearts, the intensity of the injustice that remains.\footnote{16}

Yet despite this ‘injustice’ forged by the hands of ‘friends and foe’ alike in 1974, the figure of Britain, which could encapsulate either description, is significantly marginalised within ceremonies of public remembrance associated with this period. This is not to say the British do not receive some attention, or indeed criticism, for not doing more to help Cyprus in its

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item\footnote{12}{Ibid, p.15; 'The continual pain of the refugees and relatives of the missing was reflected in, amongst others, Interview with Theo, Nicosia, 4 April 2014; Interview with Koula, London, 19 November 2013; Interview with Maria, London, 23 January 2013; Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012.}
\item\footnote{13}{Christou & Roudometof, '1974 and Greek Cypriot Identity', p.164.}
\item\footnote{14}{See Jeffrey Alexander, 'Toward a theory of Cultural Trauma’ in Jeffrey Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil Smelser and Piotr Sztompka (eds.), *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, (London: University of California Press, 2004), pp.1-30.}
\item\footnote{16}{Program for James Phillips, *Hidden in the Sand*, (London: Trafalgar Studios 2, ATG, 2013).}
\end{itemize}}
struggle for a ‘just’ form of reunification. Rather, in a reflection of the previous chapter, the British are but one causal element within a much wider narrative of collectivised suffering, the potency of which focusses public acts of remembrance less on the reasons for conflict, and more on their consequences.

5.1.1 Contested Content

Indeed this focus on consequences rather than causes is understandable when one considers not only the continuing pain caused by division, but also the contemporary socio-political issues and contestations associated with the historical legacy of inter- and intra-communal conflict on the island. To provide but one example, in October 2014 the official reburial from a mass grave, crucially with full state and military honours, of twelve National Guard commandos killed whilst instigating the coup against Makarios in 1974 was denounced by AKEL, amongst others, as ‘provocative and condemnable’. This ‘provocative’ action was exacerbated by the DISY Interior Minister Sokratis Hasikos who controversially stated within his eulogy that these soldiers ‘bear none of the responsibility’ for the coup, that lay with the Junta, they merely ‘had the misfortune of serving their military service at the wrong time’.17 Although AKEL have long criticised the presence of state and church officials at memorial services for those commandos involved in the coup, the bestowing of ‘glory and honour to those who tried to break the Republic’ was deemed an ‘insult to the memory of all who fought and sacrificed themselves for freedom and democracy’.18 Therefore the content and reaction to this ceremony provides an insight into the historical divergence between AKEL and DISY, or the left and right, who maintain conflictual forms of commemorative awareness associated with the internal causality of the ‘Cyprus Problem’. As Yiannis Papadakis noted, DISY and their historic links to former members of EOKA-B have long tried to forget the 15 July, whilst AKEL, historically the target and counterweight to EOKA-B violence, actively emphasise the need for remembrance.19 Yet this commemorative conflict also reflects how alive this period remains in Cyprus, both politically and emotionally, as the significant fact remains that no-one, aside from Nicos Sampson, has ever been charged for complicity in the ‘treasonous’ coup of 1974, an event which more than any other brought forth the disaster of the Turkish invasion.

18 Ανωνύμος, ‘Προκαλούν τα δημοκρατικά αισθήματα (Challenging democratic sentiments)’, *Haravghi*, 25 October 2014, p.7; For criticism of Archbishop Chrysostomos II attending memorial services associated with coupist soldiers see Constantinos Psillides, ‘Church is forgiving by nature says Archbishop’, *Cyprus Mail*, 15 July 2014.
At this point it is pertinent to refer to the memorial legacy of General Grivas, and in particular the decision in 2008 by the Limassol Municipal Council to refuse permission for the construction of a museum associated with his memory. Indeed Grivas maintains a particularly complicated and polarised position within the modern history of Cyprus. As an official hero of the state, if not the political left, through his command of EOKA during the anti-colonial struggle of 1955-59, Grivas is venerated with statues and roads named in his honour.

Yet as figure 5.1 illustrates, the conflict of ideologies between Grivas (enosis) and Makarios (independence) in the 1960s, and ultimately his role with EOKA-B from 1971 until his death in January 1974, placed Grivas both as a liability to Makarios’s rule, and later an effective terrorist of the state. While the government officially afforded Grivas a state funeral, albeit without representation, on the occasion of his death, the ‘Grivas Digenis Foundation’ in November 2008 was not afforded a museum, ironically on Grivas Digenis Avenue, by the AKEL, DIKO (centrist) and EDEK (Socialist) councillors of Limassol. The reason for this rejection, so defined by the DIKO councillor Evi Tsolaki, was:

for political and historical reasons our group cannot approve such a development... as the name of Grivas is connected not only with the 1955-59
period, but also with the subsequent period that marked the tragic events of 1974.\textsuperscript{20}

The potency of these ‘political and historical’ issues was also raised by Eleni from Famagusta. As a Limassol based teacher in 2008, Eleni stated that the political polarisation associated with the memory of both Grivas and Makarios meant her lessons on the history of Cyprus covering the period after 1960 would not directly refer to either. Indeed, beyond being unsure of what to actually say, Eleni disliked the contemporary political ‘manipulation’ of these figures.\textsuperscript{21} Within the other interviews undertaken for this project, the image of Grivas in particular fluctuates significantly but on the whole it is rarely positive. Christos from Larnaca, for instance, be it subconscious or deliberate, not only appeared to extend the life of Grivas into July 1974, but merged the actions of EOKA and EOKA-B when he stated:

\begin{quote}
The right wing of Cyprus commanded by Grivas who came from Greece to organise support for the patriotic army to fight the British, and so he did, but also he came to beat the left of Cyprus, because in those days the right wing of Cyprus and some British elements were propagating that Cyprus will become the Cuba of Mediterranean sea... so he organised a fight against Makarios... because Makarios was hated by the Americans and the British, and also by Grivas, [so] they did a coup against Makarios.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Through these narratives and debates, the polarised approach to the internal causality of conflict, without even considering the image of the Turkish Cypriot ‘other’, can in part help explain why the concept of foreign conspiracies remains so prevalent. At the very least conspiracies can be bipartisan and externally imposed. Nevertheless, in moving beyond this political contestation over memorial intent, both the left and right emphasise the victimisation and suffering of the Greek Cypriot people in 1974. Indeed, notwithstanding political differences over causality and the status of the coupists, or indeed after 2004 the provisions of the Annan Plan, all sides can embrace a united focus associated with the personal consequences of the Turkish invasion.\textsuperscript{23} As a result, there are a series of bipartisan politico-commemorative rallies within Cyprus and Britain, such as the diasporic ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’, whose use of politics is predominantly orientated towards an international audience.

\subsection*{5.1.2 ‘Imposed’ Sites of Memory – Peace and Freedom Rally}

This rally, organised by the NFC and held annually in July, maintains a dual focus of commemoration and political renewal. In defining its memorial intention, this annual act of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Interview with Eleni, London, 25 March 2014.
\item Interview with Christos, London, 29 November 2012.
\item See the outspoken criticism of the annual ‘March for Morphou’ following the rejection of the Annan Plan in Loucas Charalambous, ‘If Morphou residents really wanted to go home, they should have voted “yes”’, \textit{Cyprus Mail}, 6 October 2013.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
remembrance would be placed within Nora’s framework of memory signifiers as an ‘imposed’ site of memory, insofar as its themes of collective pain, mourning and political activism are inscribed into its structures by active design.\textsuperscript{24} Indeed the rally is part of the memorial heritage of the diasporic community of London. It is a communal event where acquaintances are remade, memories and identities are shaped and reinforced, and political activism associated with the cause of reunification is promoted. For its organisers the NFC, a ‘representative body’ for Cypriot community associations within Britain, it is the public manifestation of their political activities with British and Greek Cypriot politicians aimed at promoting a free and reunited Cyprus ‘for the benefit of all Cypriots’.\textsuperscript{25} This political element was clearly reflected by those British and Greek Cypriot politicians invited to the rally as speakers and official ‘friends of Cyprus’. The British presence in particular provides a show of solidarity and act of legitimacy for these Greek Cypriot demands. Amongst those in attendance in 2013 were the Northern Ireland Secretary Theresa Villiers MP, a number of Cypriot politicians led by the Agriculture Minister Nicos Kouyialis, and the mayors (in-exile) of Kyrenia and Akanthou, Glafcos Kariolou and Savvas Savvides respectively. In 2014, in addition to those British and Cypriot politicians in attendance, the rally welcomed to its stage for the first time the Greek ambassador to Britain, Konstantinos Bikas, in a supportive albeit non-speaking role. This array of officials, and indeed the commemorative focus of the rally, framed by the suffering of the refugees and the agony of the missing, parallels the direct focus of those state rituals undertaken in Cyprus. Indeed many of those diasporic Cypriots interviewed for this project are refugees, or at least define themselves as refugees if their arrival pre-dated 1974, as their ancestral homes are now occupied. Therefore the ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’, akin to say the annual ‘March for Morphou’ in Cyprus, held in October for all displaced Morphites and attended by British and Cypriot politicians, maintain the same structure and commemorative core, to ‘preserve’ and ‘revive’ the memory of the occupied areas, and to enlighten the international community of ‘Turkey’s illegal actions in Cyprus’.\textsuperscript{26}

At the ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’ this duality of memorial focus was reinforced and collectivised through the repeated chanting of the names of the occupied towns, through the distribution of material items such as leaflets and t-shirts, and through the speeches of the delegates in attendance. In one such example, the president of the NFC Peter Droussiotis

\textsuperscript{24} Nora, ‘Introduction to Realms of Memory Volume III’, pp.x-xi.
stated in July 2014 that whilst the internal struggle for ‘freedom’ and ‘return’ will continue undiminished by time:

Today we remind the world of the utter injustice of the continuing division of Cyprus, the disgrace of a divided capital in a united Europe. We condemn the ethnic cleansing, the cultural genocide, the religious desecration – these consequences are the pernicious legacy of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974.  

This concept of lost heritage, ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide are issues repeatedly raised and emphasised within the memorial processes of both the Republic of Cyprus (focused after 1974) and the TRNC (focused pre-1974) in order to justify, in the case of the former, the legitimacy of their continued struggle against a foreign invasion, and in the case of the latter, their emergence and existence as a state. However through this international ‘reminder’ of the ‘pernicious’ collective consequences of the Turkish invasion comes a subtle form of externalisation through an implied narrative of causality, whereby the international community, from the EU to the UN, have allowed this injustice to continue. Indeed it is through this process that the British enter this memorial framework. The anniversary of partition is also the anniversary of the ‘failure’ of the British Guarantor, with their ‘moral and treaty obligations’, to hold Turkey to account for their actions and continued destructive occupation of northern Cyprus. Although no direct references were made to British actions in 1974, or indeed any form of overt causality for the conflict beyond the Turkish invasion, Droussiotis did call on Britain during the rally of 2013 to cease their appeasement of Turkish demands and ‘exert pressure on its strategic ally’ to help form a just and lasting settlement for the island. These demands were reinforced with the presentation of a petition to Downing Street on the morning of the rally. However this political sentiment, an oft repeated cause and criticism raised by Cypriot politicians, rarely leads to action by the British authorities beyond the continued recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. This inaction, both contemporary and historical, in turn led President Christofias in July 2012 to state:

The British, unfortunately, continue not to favour us at all... in the UN, and other international organisations, they do not help us like they should... [so] we fight


29 NFC, ‘UK Cypriots demand an end’.

30 NFC, ‘Britain can reverse the Tragic Failure’.
them, along with friendly countries, to secure UN resolutions that are a weapon for us to exert pressure on Turkey.\footnote{See Stefanos Evripidou, ‘Christofias: “stepmother” Britain imposed bases on us’, \textit{Cyprus Mail}, 14 July 2012.}

With the roots of the Anglo-Greek Cypriot relationship framed by colonial confrontation and post-colonial suspicion, it is not a significant leap, given the points raised in previous chapters, to connect the perception of the British not ‘favouring’ Cyprus to the British ‘supporting’ the Turkish partition of the island. While this is not directly referenced within this ceremonial process, through the multi-vocal and composite nature of remembrance rituals, or as Nora put it, the ‘unpredictable proliferation of their ramifications’, individuals and collectives can utilise their symbolic structures to reflect and reinforce that which is already known from other societal formations.\footnote{Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, p.19.} Given all Cypriots maintain an image of the conflict of 1974 within their ‘historical memories’, shaped by education, the media and familial units, the focus of this rally on consequences over causality allows any number of views to proliferate regarding why Cyprus is actually divided, as ultimately ‘what matters is not what the past imposes on us but what we bring to it’.\footnote{Pierre Nora, ‘The era of commemoration’, in Pierre Nora & Lawrence Kritzmann (eds.), \textit{Realms of Memory Vol.III: Symbols}, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.618.}

However, while this British connection is repeated in multiple interviews, publications and popular images associated with the modern history of Cyprus, it bears repetition that this implied image of Britain is merely one small part, albeit a significant small part, of the commemorative focus on the consequences of the Turkish occupation. Indeed this rally of remembrance does not refer to any historical content beyond the actions of Turkey. Its design and focus is on the ‘preservation’ of the memory of northern Cyprus and the annual renewal of political activism aimed at ‘return’. This duality of commemorative emphasis is structurally designed to be self-reinforcing, as the use of speeches, symbols and images, such as those in figure 5.2, aim to focus meaning by drawing on a collective sense of solidarity against injustice. Indeed, references to the ‘apartheid’ of Cyprus and the concept of ‘no surrender’, with their connotations of suffering in places such as South Africa, draw on international themes of injustice with a particular significance in both Britain and Cyprus.\footnote{See Adrian Forty & Susanne Kücher (eds.), \textit{The Art of Forgetting}, (Oxford: Berg, 1999); Angel David Nieves, ‘Places of Pain as tools for Social Justice in the “new” South Africa: Black Heritage preservation in the “rainbow” nation’s townships’, in William Logan & Keir Reeves (eds.), \textit{Places of Pain and Shame: Dealing with “Difficult Heritage”}, (London: Routledge, 2009), pp.198-214.}

This was evident in the official opening of the ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’, as a wreath in the name of Cyprus, carried by a small group of women at the head of a much larger processional
march from the Turkish embassy to Trafalgar Square, was ceremonially laid to rest at the foot of the stage at Nelson’s Column.

Figure 5.2: Image taken by author during the Peace and Freedom Rally on the 14 July 2013.

This single action, before any words were spoken, is heavily charged with symbolism and meaning. The use of a wreath with its connotations and connections to funereal practices reflects a Cyprus, through its people and places, lost through conflict and partition. The role of the female figures, socially framed as the main passive victims of conflict, carry the symbolic grief and victimisation of the nation. This personal and collective victimisation, in addition to the political messages and imperatives of the placards of figure 5.2, stress both internally and internationally that there can be ‘no surrender’ to injustice or compromised solutions. Only a full ‘return of our lands’ can offer a form of comfort for those who have suffered and lost so much. As a result the concept of injustice and personal suffering charges the internal political necessity to continue the struggle for ‘return’, while the political focus on reunification collectivises the concept of suffering in order to project an internal and international image of victimhood, as ultimately ‘return’ can only be accomplished with the right form of international assistance. The multi-vocal nature of public ceremonies therefore create the conditions where the individual can take from the collective, and the collective can take and disseminate from the individual, those views and issues which are deemed, either directly or subconsciously, of most importance to it. In turn a cultural circuit is created where the personal shapes the collective and the collective shapes the personal. In the case of the rupture caused by partition, it is the occupied areas and the memories of the displaced, as
‘carrier groups’ of traumatic dislocations and suffering, which are emphasised most strongly within these acts of public remembrance, as it is through this process that the concept of internal unity and international legitimacy are intertwined.35

5.1.3 ‘Constructed’ Sites of Memory - The Occupation

Before moving on to the wider importance of these commemorative ceremonies, it is pertinent to consider the ‘constructed’ sites of memory that provide the images and foundational narratives for these ‘imposed’ rituals of remembrance: the occupied homes and ‘ghost-towns’ of northern Cyprus.36 As sites ‘constructed’ in their modern manifestation through the direct legacy of conflict and partition, these areas operate in a dual memorial space. The collective socio-political desire for ‘return’ is framed by a nostalgic memory of what was once in existence.37 The requirement to ‘never forget’ is marked by the personal tragedies of the refugees and the mournful knowledge of what these occupied areas have now become. As a result these areas operate as sites of pilgrimage for some, for a sense of identity lost and for familial reflection. For others they are an area to be avoided, as the pain is simply too much to bear. Therefore these areas may be likened to Jay Winter’s observations regarding the physical and symbolic preservation of ‘battlefield sites’ in the process of war remembrance. Here the semi-sacred aura of a battlefield, operating in the metaphysical space between a cemetery and museum, provides the individual with an immersive and direct geographic and temporal link to those landscapes and values forged through conflict.38 While the occupied areas, aside from the ‘ghost-towns’, are not physically preserved ‘as they were’ but remain alive and active under the auspices of the ‘TRNC’, these civilian sites are psychologically preserved, by families and the state, within the memorial construct of Greek Cypriot society. Indeed the visceral silence of a battlefield and the emotive physicality of a lost home and way of life maintain a parallel form of symbolic power within the memorial and physical landscape of the nation: they offer focal points for the construct of collective identities and national values.39

The effects of the occupation are well illustrated by the existence of the largest ‘ghost-town’ on the island, the city of Famagusta. Once home to 30,000 people and today sealed off

37 For reflections on this see Bryant, The Past in Pieces.
behind a barbed wire partition, it is the emotional pain of the physical, the imaginative influence of the individual, and ultimately the memories of the survivors, now refugees, which construct and frame its individual and collective influence. In the years preceding 1974, divided between the old town (Turkish Cypriot) and suburb of Varosha (Greek Cypriot), Famagusta provided a salient representation of the Republic’s economic and commercial development, with Varosha in particular a major site of international tourism. However during the second stage of the Turkish invasion of the 14-16 August 1974, the Greek Cypriot population of Varosha fled the city, and unlike most areas now under occupation, it was sealed off within a Turkish military buffer zone.

Since this ‘preservation’ by the Turkish military, the crumbling ‘urban gravestones’ of this once great metropolis, directly adjacent to the very much alive Turkish Cypriot old-town, is perennially raised within the intercommunal negotiations, and in turn has become infused with multiple layers of symbolic meaning. Indeed the ‘ghost-town’ operates as an effective internal and international ‘memorial-museum’, especially given its status as a site of heritage tourism from the ‘free areas’ of the Republic, to the effects and consequences emergent from

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40 For figures of economic growth see PIO: Famagusta: Europe’s Eastern most Town under Turkish occupation, DVD, (Nicosia: PIO, 2007).
the Turkish invasion. As there is no direct narrative content imbued within the physicality of this ‘memorial-museum’, its symbolic presence can mean and reflect many things to many people. These include, amongst others, the wider ‘brutality’ and ‘mental torture’ of the Turkish occupation; the intransigence of those Greek Cypriots who rejected the Annan Plan; the ‘inactivity’ and ‘failures’ of the international community; the historical intractability of the ‘Cyprus Problem’, and ultimately the hope for a future of unity through regeneration.

As a result the commemorative existence of this ‘memorial’ is framed by a series of distinct and complementary images associated with the invasion and occupation, as this city symbolically marks the boundary between a world before 1974, and an existence emergent from it. In crossing this internalised thought-world, it is the narratives of the refugees, collectivised within family units and by the state through education and public rituals of remembrance, that root these sites within the local and national consciousness of the wider population.

Take the narratives of Eleni and John, both born in the immediate years after 1974, who maintain direct familial connections to Famagusta. Eleni as a child grew up in Limassol. Her parents would constantly refer to their lost home in Famagusta, and in turn she would often be ‘told off’ for saying she was from Limassol, as ‘you are not from Limassol, you are from Famagusta, so you should always say you are from Famagusta’. Eleni’s identity therefore was rooted, as a refugee, in a city she has never seen or physically known. When the Green Line opened in 2003, despite a desire to see Famagusta, Eleni refused to go with her parents as she did not want to show her passport and thereby recognise the ‘TRNC’ as a state. British born Cypriot John’s one and only time crossing into the north was on the insistence of his father, who was held in a ‘Turkish concentration camp’ in 1974, as he wanted to show John his real family home. Much like Eleni though, John was reluctant to go and attempted to dissuade his father from doing so, saying ‘it will make you ill’, but his father would not be deterred. However when they crossed into Famagusta, each site of his

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43 ‘Torture’ by Turkey raised in relation to occupation in Interview with Maria, London, 23 January 2013; Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012; Annan Plan raised in Interview with Susan, Limassol, 9 July 2012 (married to a refugee from Famagusta); For parallels to critiques concerning Morphou see Charalambous, ‘If Morphou residents really wanted to go home, they should have voted “yes”’; For international inactivity see ‘Famagusta Association of Great Britain’, http://www.famagusta.org.uk/about.php, (last accessed 1 December 2014); For the hope of regeneration see ‘The Famagusta Eco city Project’, http://ecocityproject.com/famagusta/, (last accessed 1 December 2014).


father’s youth was inaccessible, from the family home in the ‘cordoned-off area’ to his father’s workplace now within the confines of a Turkish military base. Indeed the only area they could visit with a direct link to his father’s past was the small stretch of beach marking the partition from the old-town to the ‘ghost-town’:

That was upsetting, it was the first time I have ever seen my father like that, he was lost for words, he could barely walk, he was very upset, very upset. When we left the Famagusta area, we came back home and seriously for 2 days he was out of it, he was gone, he was so upset, and the only thing he could ask was “why?” And much the same question as I am asking, I mean why after so many years are (sic) Turkey still deploying Turkish troops to the North of the island… what are they afraid of… we have shown we want peace.46

In John’s case, his physical exclusion from the sites of his father’s youth, and indeed the foundations of his identity, meant the only connection created with this occupied area was forged through the immediate reality of his father’s agony. For both Eleni and John as first generation refugees, their identities and historical memories are framed by the experiences and memorial transferences of their familial units. Through these connections, the pain, injustice and questions of ‘why’ cross between the generations and are infused into their image of the self and state. These questions and emotive feelings are in turn collectivised across society through the creation of a ‘master-narrative’ of social suffering by drawing together these refugee narratives within the practices of education and ritualised forms of remembrance.47

Indeed for all those displaced through conflict, the memory of loss retains a particular personal potency.48 For example Koula from Morphou, displaced as a child in 1974, described taking her own children to the ruins of her former home, after being forewarned of its state by her siblings:

when I saw it, it is nothing like hearing it or seeing it in the video, it was completely different. It was like open the hole in the ground and being in there. Like you had a tower and demolished it at the same time. You can’t describe it when you live it, when you see it.49

The primary reason for Koula’s visit, despite crossing into the ‘TRNC’ being ‘against my beliefs’, was much the same as the parents of Eleni and John, so that her children could understand the roots of their family identity. At a communal and indeed national level the focus remains the same, maintaining a collective connection to a Cyprus lost through conflict

and partition. This was emphasised by President Anastasiades in July 2014 when he warned that ‘as time passes, the danger will increase that this temporary situation will turn into a permanent one’.\textsuperscript{50} Indeed a common refrain raised by those interviewed for this project was the feeling of ‘suffocation’ when visiting their properties in the occupied areas. According to Dinos from Karpasia ‘it felt like we were trespassing in our own lands’.\textsuperscript{51} However, contrary to the rallying cry of the state, it was predominately stated by those who felt ‘suffocated’ that they would never return again, as the north was now effectively a ‘foreign country’.\textsuperscript{52} Therefore public rituals such as the ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’, or indeed photographic albums such as those by the Municipality of Morphou, can take on a symbolic force beyond simply the politics of ‘return’. They can act as a displaced ritualised construct for a lost form of locality, memory and identity. The power of photography was drawn on directly by Margarita from Kythrea. With the invasion in 1974, Margarita lost all the photos, or ‘memories’, of her family in this home and village which is now occupied. Although Margarita has long tried to forget her lost home in order ‘to be without pain’, today it is one contemporary photograph, taken by a relative after the opening of the Green Line and whose initial existence made her ‘physically sick’, which acts as an effective replacement for a land, and indeed former life lost through partition.\textsuperscript{53} The Municipality of Morphou also noted in their own photographic album that, in viewing these images, those who remember can ‘walk each single corner’, while those who were born as refugees can ‘become acquainted with our occupied town’.\textsuperscript{54} The same focus and ideals are transmitted through public rituals of remembrance. Glafcos from Morphou for example, another not ‘psychologically ready to return’, referred to his annual attendance at both the London Rally and the ‘March for Morphou’, which in effect offered a ritualised replacement and connection to the city, and indeed the people, he once knew and remembered.\textsuperscript{55}

Nora’s framework and the concept of rupture, or the loss of ‘real environments of memory’ through the process of modernisation, is relevant to this process. Indeed the physical and historical dislocation caused by the rupture of 1974 created a personal and collective disjuncture with the memorial heritage of the lands of the occupation. This in turn

\textsuperscript{50} PIO: ‘The President of the Republic spoke at the event for the black anniversaries of the coup and the Turkish invasion’, 20 July 2014.
\textsuperscript{51} Interview with Dinos, London, 23 January 2013.
\textsuperscript{52} Interview with Giorgos & Maria, London, 23 January 2013; Interview with Charalambos, Limassol, 7 April 2014; Interview with Theo, Limassol, 17 March 2013.
\textsuperscript{53} Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012.
\textsuperscript{55} Interview with Glafcos, London, 7 March 2013.
forged a new form of memorial identity for the self and nation that was rooted in, but externalised from this environment. Through this externalisation emerged the condition and wider necessity for ritualised forms of remembrance through symbolic ceremonies (remembrance rallies), functional processes (education) and material sites (ghost-towns), as a means of inhibiting the act of forgetting and effectively replacing, in a simplified form, the memorial heritage and social connection to these areas lost through conflict. In this sense therefore the collective ritual can become a personal ritual, as in gathering together to continue the political struggle for reunification; these commemorative ceremonies can, through their memorial intent, act as focal points for the construct of an inter-generational communal consciousness, one which was lost in its physicality in 1974. As nations and communities forge their political and cultural identities through the process of memorialisation and commemoration, acts of public remembrance double as acts of citizenship; they provide a reaffirmation of the connection between the individual and collective, and between the past and present. As a result these public rituals are marked by a duality of memorial intent. On the one hand they reinforce the identities and direct memories of the refugees, shaped by nostalgia and grief. On the other they collectivise this grief within the commemorative frameworks of the nation by creating and disseminating a collective, albeit simplified, vicarious memory associated with the injustice brought forth by a foreign and ‘alien’ force. Indeed, the greater the significance of an event and one’s externalisation from this, be it through time or place, the greater the requirement for commemorative ritualization, as ultimately to forget is to accept the injustice of partition.

5.1.4 Inclusivity

Through this process comes the question of inclusivity, not only intra-communally but inter-communally as well. The ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’ for example had no official Turkish Cypriot representation on stage and ended with the national anthem of Greece. The Republic of Cyprus does not maintain its own national anthem. Neither does the ‘TRNC’ which utilises the Turkish equivalent. This historical development reflects to a degree the compromised nature of Cypriot independence. As Archbishop Makarios stated in May 1974, the Republic was ‘a new state but not a new nation’. Although the events of 1974 marked a change within the Republic, with the inauguration of the first official celebration of Cyprus Independence Day in 1979, as Chapter 6 will develop, the socio-political debates concerning identities and history remain particularly marked on the island. In the context of this

57 TNA: FCO 9/1886, fl.29, ‘Attitude of Archbishop Makarios towards enosis’. 
analysis, the links between inclusivity, Cypriot suffering and acts of political remembrance have posed issues for the NFC. In 2006, an advert showing an image of Cyprus dripping with blood, akin to those in figure 5.2, was reported to the Advertising Standards Authority (hereafter ASA) by an unnamed human rights organisation as being ‘offensive to the Turkish community and likely to incite racial hatred’. Although the ASA rejected the ninety-three complaints associated with this image, the ninth-highest total of 2006, the potential for historical provocation through an emphasis on the injustices of the Turkish occupation poses a direct issue for a community aimed towards political reunification with an increasingly distinct Turkish Cypriot community, one which maintains its own form of official commemoration against the ‘barbarity’ of the Greek Cypriot population.

Indeed a common refrain from those Greek Cypriots interviewed for this project was that the real Turkish Cypriots, not the Turkish settlers, are in effect ‘prisoners’ of Turkey and want reunification. However, irrespective of what views the Turkish Cypriot community may hold, in reality these rituals of remembrance are not targeted towards them. As Glafcos from Morphou argued, ‘the coup in Cyprus, they didn’t harm any Turkish Cypriots at all… it is the Greek Cypriots that have suffered the most since the coup’. With this suffering comes a sense of both internal and international legitimacy, as Christos from Larnaca argued ‘the whole world community is in favour of the struggle of the Greek Cypriots, they agree, we have the right with us’. In May 2014, the European Court of Human Rights reinforced this sentiment when it ordered Turkey to pay ninety-million euros in damages to the Republic of Cyprus for the relatives of the missing and the enclaved Greek Cypriots of the Karpass Peninsula. Nevertheless the ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’ does not make any reference to the internal causality of conflict on Cyprus; it merely charts the consequences and international failures associated with the Turkish invasion. Therefore its content aims to move beyond these political and nationalist rivalries. In theory, beyond the actions of Turkey and the personal views of those in attendance, if one were to follow the mantra of the NFC, all

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60 Interview with Glafcos, London, 7 March 2013.

61 Interview with Christos, London, 29 November 2012.

Cypriots are victims of the conflict and partition of Cyprus. Indeed the ultimate focus of this rally was aptly described by Droussiotis in the program notes for the theatrical play *Hidden in the Sand*, as ‘we shall never let ourselves or those who will follow us, forget that we shall return to Ammochostos [Famagusta]... we shall transcend the politics, brutality and atrocities of an unequal war and, like Odysseus, we shall strive towards and we shall reach our Ithaca’.

5.2 ‘Stepmother’ Britain: A memorial heritage

With the rupture caused by partition in 1974, the British authorities have long faced the issue of providing a form of assistance to Cyprus without attempting to directly take sides in the intercommunal affairs of the island. This British ‘balancing act’ has in turn brought forth criticism from all sides. Whilst the image of Britain is not given significant focus within the public remembrance frameworks of 1974, their actions associated with the consequences of conflict can be approached and developed more directly through the Kyrenia memorial controversy of 2009. This monument, dedicated to the memory of the 371 British service personnel who died during the anti-colonial Emergency of 1955-59 provoked ‘outrage’ and ‘disgust’ amongst EOKA veterans’ associations for its memorial intent, and notable political controversy for its location and the manner in which it was undertaken. In constructing this memorial within the occupied town of Kyrenia, this monument is framed by the legacy of British colonialism and intertwined with the commemorative frameworks associated with the events and consequences of 1974.

5.2.1 ‘Forgotten Conflict’

The construction of this memorial, situated within the British cemetery of Kyrenia, was a private enterprise drawn together by a series of British community associations within Northern Cyprus, British veterans’ associations and the *Daily Telegraph*. Their remit was to combat the perception that the Cyprus Emergency of 1955-59 has become a ‘forgotten’ conflict within Britain by providing a physical site to foster remembrance. The central argument to support this ‘forgotten’ assertion invariably concerns the restricted accessibility to the main British cemetery on Cyprus, Wayne’s Keep near Nicosia, which following the

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64 Jean Christou, ‘EOKA veterans’ anger at Kyrenia Monument to their British victims’, *Cyprus Mail*, 29 November 2008.
events of 1974 has been located within the confines of the UN buffer zone. However one could equally argue, beyond the relatives of those who were lost and indeed those still serving within the armed forces, on a national level a form of collective amnesia is preferable than having to reconcile with a particularly troublesome imperial past.

The broader spectre of this imperial past came to the fore in Britain in 2012. Following a High Court ruling in relation to British abuses against the Mau Mau in Kenya, a total of 60 Greek Cypriots began their own legal proceedings against Britain for ‘human rights abuses’, with a particular focus on the use of torture during the Emergency period. The official response from the Foreign Office to these legal claims was to state:

\[\text{The UK Government abhors all abuses of human rights. Much has happened in the past which we may regret today. We should keep in mind that these events did happen over half a century ago and bear no relation to the present government's policies towards Cyprus.}\]

However when approaching the image of Britain on Cyprus, events that happened over fifty years ago retain a particular sensitivity irrespective of the passage of time. As the chapters throughout this thesis have shown, the inherent suspicion born from the wider effects and confrontational nature of the anti-colonial struggle invariably frames the image of British

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67 Correspondent, ‘EOKA cases against Britain moving forward’, Cyprus Mail, 9 August 2013.
actions within the post-colonial state of Cyprus. With the foundational importance of the EOKA struggle in the creation of the Cyprus Republic, the potency of this colonial image is given specific focus within state museums and educational processes.

Within the *Museum of National Struggle* in Nicosia, the exhibitions are filled with images and details of the ‘abominable’ practices utilised by the British colonial regime. These range from images of mass prisoner detentions in concentration camps to descriptions and artefacts associated with the violence undertaken by the British security forces. One display for example entitled ‘English Interrogators-Torturers’ has photographs of fourteen British intelligence officers alongside a series of images and documents detailing their body of work. Another exhibition displays three of the ‘big knives’ utilised by the Turkish auxiliary police, a force established by the British during the EOKA Emergency, alongside a caption that states ‘similar knives (sic) were used for the massacre of a number of Kontemenos people at Geunyeli’ on the 12 June 1958.69 Whilst the Geunyeli massacre was undertaken by a Turkish Cypriot militia during a period of acute intercommunal tension, its instigation is directly associated with the actions of the British colonial regime. Indeed, following reports of unrest in the north-west of Cyprus, the British arrested a group of 35 Greek Cypriots near the mixed village of Skylloura, ‘bussed’ them to the outskirts of the Turkish Cypriot town of Geunyeli, and released them with the expectation they should walk the thirteen miles back to their homes in Kontemenos (see map in figure 1.2). However shortly after their release, this unarmed group of Greek Cypriots were intercepted by a Turkish Cypriot militia and eight were beaten to death.70 The heightened Greek Cypriot anger over this event was compounded in August 1958 when nine Turkish Cypriots charged in connection to the massacre were acquitted due to a lack of evidence. Shortly thereafter, amidst accusations of Anglo-Turkish ‘connivance’, an official enquiry absolved the British security forces of blame due to the ‘unforeseen’ nature of the Turkish ambush.71 The knives displayed in this museum therefore, as ‘memory objects’ linked to acts of colonial violence, are infused with a symbolic power associated with the personal pain, and by extension, the collective suffering caused by the British occupation. As Anna Lisa Tota has argued, the power of these singular artefacts of violence is their ability to focus and embody, through their institutionalisation within a museum, a wider form of social memory associated with a

69 Nicosia *Museum of National Struggle*, (Last visit April 2014).
much broader historical event. Indeed, by embodying the ‘weight’ of an event, these ‘commemorative artefacts’ do not explain why violence erupted, but do provide a shared physical object that can initiate the process of personal and collective remembrance associated with its consequences. As such the memorial power of these artefacts are derived as much from the object as from the different meanings and imaginations than can be drawn and projected onto their physical form. Through this process these machetes can symbolise, amongst others, the collective trauma of conflict, the brutality of Turkish Cypriot extremists, the British encouragement of these extremists to foster intercommunal separation, and ultimately the concept of historic Anglo-Turkish ‘connivance’ and cooperation on Cyprus.

As a consequence of the violence that defined this anti-colonial struggle, images of death and suffering are drawn on throughout the museum in two particular ways.

Figure 5.5: ‘Dead Heroes’, Museum of National Struggle, July 2012.

Photographs of Greek Cypriot fatalities, such as those in figure 5.5, are utilised to frame the bravery and heroism of all those who sacrificed their lives in the pursuit of freedom and

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national liberation.\footnote{For the use of photography within Greek and Turkish Cypriot ‘war’ museums see Toumazis, ‘Pride and Prejudice’, pp.79-97; Theopisti Stylianou-Lambert & Alexandra Bounia, ‘War Museums and Photography’, Museum and Society, Vol.10, No.3, (2012), pp.183-196.} To emphasise the moral legitimacy of this armed guerrilla struggle, images of dead EOKA fighters are interspersed with details of the civilian costs of the British occupation. Therefore alongside a tribute to Grigoris Afxentiou, who was burnt alive on the 3 March 1957 after holding off 60 British troops in the Troodos Mountains, is a memorial to the 12 year old girl Ioanna Zachariadou who ‘died of fear’ during British acts of violence in Famagusta in 1958.

Figure 5.6: ‘Execution of British Intelligence Service Officers’, Museum of National Struggle, July 2012.

In turn photographs of British fatalities, depicted in figure 5.6, which were described by the Daily Telegraph in their memorial campaign as caused by the ‘murderous attacks’ of EOKA, are labelled here as ‘executions’.\footnote{Gordon Rayner, ‘Forgotten soldiers of Cyprus campaign will get memorial at last’, Daily Telegraph, 3 August 2009; For analysis of these polarised descriptions see David French, Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus 1955-59, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).} The specific actions that led to these British fatalities, unlike those of the dead EOKA fighters, are not developed beyond this photographic representation. However with the depiction of death comes the requirement to offer a form of

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{figure56.png}
\caption{‘Execution of British Intelligence Service Officers’, Museum of National Struggle, July 2012.}
\end{figure}
moral justification for its causality. This collective process can be witnessed in the small Museum of Struggle in the village of Omodos in the Troodos Mountains. Here the introductory board to this small rural museum housed within the halls of the Monastery of the Holy Cross states directly that ‘British policy against the colony left no other option except to take up arms. The EOKA struggle was a guerrilla war because of the military superiority of the British’. Indeed the forceful British reaction to the initially peaceful Greek Cypriot calls for enosis, likened to ‘Hitler’s and Mussolini’s abominable criminal methods’, ‘forced’ EOKA to fight for freedom in a manner akin to those citizens of Omodos killed during the Greek revolution of 1821 or the two World Wars of the twentieth century. As such the ‘memory authorities’ involved in the construction of these museums, the state, the church and the veterans of EOKA, justify an ‘execution’ in the pursuit of freedom as a necessary evil given the colonial authorities ‘left no other option’. In turn the depiction of a killing or ‘murder’ undertaken against EOKA maintains no such moral foundation.

However this form of internal justification maintains a significant level of socio-political contestation, particularly between the left and right. Within the interviews undertaken for this project, the heroism of EOKA is not in doubt, but their ‘right-wing’ politics and acts of inter- and intra-communal violence are often severely criticised. In December 2012, President Christofias (a member of AKEL) provoked considerable controversy when he officially pardoned 19 Greek Cypriot ‘traitors’ who were ‘executed/murdered’ by EOKA in the 1950s for being communists. As of April 2014 however, a number of Greek Cypriots were still classified as ‘traitors’ within the Museum of National Struggle. As museums operate as national and local expressions of social identities, with the preservation of artefacts providing collective signifiers for personal memories, their structured content seeks to direct a form of shared remembering associated with a particular


77 Omodos Museum of Struggle, (Last visit August 2011).

78 Ibid; For ‘Hitler’ link see EOKA letter in Nicosia Museum of National Struggle.

79 Heroism and criticism raised in, amongst others, Interview with Grigori, London, 3 July 2012; Interview with Andreas, London, 6 March 2013; Interview with Theo, Limassol, 17 March 2013; Interview with Marios, Limassol, 3 April 2014; George Koumoullis, ‘The EOKA struggle: what was it all for?’, Cyprus Mail, 1 April 2015.

historical ideal. As a consequence, these acts of commemoration and memorialisation, as performances of a particular group identity, are inevitably framed by a political dimension. For the ‘memory authorities’ of these two museums, with their close affiliation to the EOKA struggle, their remit is to provide a ‘tribute to the fallen’, to educate future generations about the sacrifice of the anti-colonial struggle, and if needed, to protect the legacy of EOKA from internal and external forces. Therefore the content of both museums attempt to foster a sense of national unity out of a difficult colonial past by focussing on, and paying homage to, the pain and trauma of all those who suffered in the struggle for national liberation. Indeed as David Lowenthal contends, whilst acts of individual martyrdom can be drawn on to help unify a particular community, it is from examples of collective suffering, particularly those instigated by an external force, that the lasting bonds of national unity can be forged. As such, a concerted focus on acts of British violence at both an individual and collective level can marginalise, although not completely obscure, forms of inter- and intra-communal conflict within these ‘official’ narrations of the EOKA period.

This process was evident on the upper level of the Museum of National Struggle in Nicosia, depicted in figure 5.7, where an image of each Greek Cypriot killed during the anti-colonial struggle is built around a central hangman’s noose. As an official instrument of death, the noose embodies the brutal punitive tactics adopted by the British colonial authorities against those Greek Cypriots, depicted in official narratives, whose ‘only crime was their love for freedom’. The ‘execution’ of EOKA fighters, therefore, irrespective of the crime for which they were condemned, is an unjustified ‘murder’ in this museum. With this arrangement centred on the noose, a direct connection is drawn to the Imprisoned Graves memorial within Nicosia central prison. As the site in which members of EOKA were executed, and where 13 were subsequently buried, a section of this still working prison is

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82 For different influence of EOKA in rural and urban areas see Spyrou, ‘Children constructing ethnic identities’, pp.121-139.
87 Ibid.
preserved as a site of national commemorative importance. As a result, both the Museum of National Struggle and the Imprisoned Graves act as focal points for school trips during the national celebrations associated with EOKA Day on the 1 April. The teacher Eleni, who maintains family connections to EOKA, described these school fieldtrips as ‘very emotional’, whilst the teacher Koula argued that because ‘to us they are heroes… we have a duty to tell our children these things. They need to know’.

In furthering this ‘need to know’, in April 2011 a primary school in Paphos constructed a special set of gallows within their playground to illustrate ‘how British colonial forces ended the lives of members of EOKA’. Perhaps unsurprisingly this provoked a great deal of controversy; the Cyprus Mail quoted one Cypriot parent as stating:

I just wish they would stop frightening children like this... the fact that my husband is English makes it all so much more difficult to handle when they come home from school and say that daddy’s people were murderers.

Through this focus of remembrance, the ‘successful’ collective struggle against the military might and brutality of the British occupation can be drawn on as an example to further the modern struggle against the military superiority and inhumane acts of the Turkish occupation. Indeed that was the parallel drawn by the DIKO education minister Kyriacos Kenevezos in

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90 Anonymous, ‘Primary school parents horrified by plans for 1 April celebration’, Cyprus Mail, 30 March 2011.
March 2013. After calling on Cypriot youths to learn from the ‘hero-students’ of EOKA that the ‘love for one’s nation should know no limits’, Kenevezos impelled them to ‘fight together with the rest of Cypriot-Hellenism to free the country from occupation’.  

5.2.2 Controversies over Content and Location

Therefore whilst this period may be largely forgotten in Britain, it is anything but forgotten in Cyprus. As a result the Kyrenia memorial was controversial from the outset. One particularly vocal critic was Thasos Sophocleous, President of the EOKA Veterans’ Association, who argued Britain had ‘no right’ to construct a monument on Cyprus given:

what was planned for Kyrenia was like the Germans and Italians creating monuments to their World War II dead in Britain, or like the Greeks building monuments to their dead killed in Turkey in 1922.  

As enemy combatants in an uneven and at times brutal colonial conflict, the construction of this memorial on Cyprus was deemed ‘unethical’ and an ‘insult’ to the memory of those Greek Cypriots who fought and suffered in the pursuit of national liberation. For the British Memorial Trust, however, given the majority of those soldiers who died during the Emergency were buried on Cyprus, it was only fitting to honour their memory with a monument on Cyprus. Although the Memorial Trust recognised this would be a politically sensitive issue, in the words of Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, a retired RAF officer who owns a property within the ‘TRNC’, this was not designed to be a political statement, ‘it is simply about commemorating lives lost’. Nevertheless the Daily Telegraph’s description of EOKA as a terrorist organisation, whose acts of ‘brutality’ included shooting off-duty British troops ‘in the back’, did little to improve the opinion of critics such as Sophocleous.

In drawing on these examples of Greek Cypriot brutality against the British victims of the Emergency, the Telegraph attempted to create an emotional imperative to remember the suffering, not the politics, of this difficult and conflicted period in Anglo-Greek Cypriot history. This emotional connection was reinforced by connecting the ‘forgotten’ fatalities of the Cyprus Emergency with the memory of those British troops killed during the Irish troubles and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, the British and Greek Cypriot

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91 Anonymous, ‘Students should “fight to reunite Cyprus”’.  
92 Christou, ‘EOKA veterans’ anger’.  
93 Simon Bahceli, ‘A snub to Greek Cypriots’, Cyprus Mail, 1 November 2009; Simon Bahceli & George Psyllides, ‘Controversial Memorial Unveiled’, Cyprus Mail, 10 November 2009.  
‘memory authorities’ associated with this particular narration of the Emergency period effectively mirror that of the other. Both focus on the collective suffering and personal trauma of the anti-colonial struggle through the memory of the survivors and the image of their fallen comrades.

As war memorials, be they monuments or museums, directly address a country’s political history, the meaning that can be drawn from their existence is never fixed and often contested. Within a divided post-colonial state such as Cyprus, these memorials can reflect anything from the shared story of a particular community to the ‘impossible to ignore blunt statements’ of a troubled colonial past. Indeed for veterans and relatives of those fallen in conflict, sites such as the Kyrenia memorial or the Imprisoned Graves can offer focal points for acts of mourning and personal remembrance. For those opposed to their existence, these sites can represent a challenge to their shared narrative of struggle, and particularly in the case of the Kyrenia memorial, a perceived form of ‘colonial arrogance’. For example, after Donald Crawford of the Memorial Trust stated in November 2009 that ‘it would be much more chivalrous if EOKA came and laid a wreath at the [Kyrenia] monument’ rather than condemning its existence, an anonymous contributor to the Cyprus Mail responded that:

A man who has exploited the misfortune of others, and moved into a house in the sun on the cheap and against the wishes of the owner, has as much right to give lessons in chivalry as a car thief and a rapist. Of course pompous, arrogant Brits suffering from delusions of moral and intellectual superiority do not see it that way. This particularly forceful repudiation of Crawford reflects the level of anger directed towards the Kyrenia memorial by sections of Greek Cypriot society. Whilst the most vocal critics of this memorial tended to emerge from the EOKA Veterans’ Association, as guardians of the official memory of the anti-colonial period, a second level of political criticism was directed towards the location of this British memorial in the occupied town of Kyrenia.

Officially the British cemetery in Kyrenia was chosen by the Memorial Trust to provide a form of cyclical finality. Those who died as the British occupation came to an end would be honoured alongside the remains of those who died when the British occupation began. If the island was ever to be politically reunified and the UN buffer zone was no

longer required, the construction of the memorial as eight stone pillars was designed to be transferable to the cemetery at Wayne’s Keep. However the choice of Kyrenia and the failure to consult with the Cyprus Government over its construction was deemed an ‘insult’ by the Cyprus High Commissioner to Britain, Alexandros Zenon, who remarked that:

in principle we are not against a country honouring its soldiers… [but] the problem is that the memorial was built and unveiled in the occupied part of Cyprus. It could have been erected in the British Sovereign Base Area.\(^{101}\)

From a public relations standpoint, the Memorial Trust did not help to appease Greek Cypriot concerns when the somewhat polarising figure of Donald Crawford dismissed the need to consult with the Greek Cypriot authorities over the choice of Kyrenia, stating ‘I don't want to play politics but the Turks didn't take that attitude at Gallipoli’\(^{102}\). In addition, the Turkish Cypriot authorities had already provided ‘permission’ to construct this monument in Kyrenia irrespective of the concerns of the Greek Cypriots. Yet if one were to consider other potential sites for this ‘moveable’ memorial within the ‘free’ areas of Cyprus, both the British cemetery in Nicosia and the Polemidia Military cemetery near Limassol are specifically British cemeteries which are of a comparable size to the site in Kyrenia.\(^{103}\) The construction of a memorial within one of these southern based sites would doubtless still have provoked a level of controversy for its sensitive subject matter. Yet this may not have been as significant as the issues associated with building a monument in the occupied areas.\(^{104}\) Nevertheless, while the *Daily Telegraph* argued Kyrenia was chosen because the Greek Cypriots ‘turned down a request for the memorial to be sited on their part of the island’, this reading faced contestation amongst the British residents of Cyprus.\(^{105}\) Whilst the *Cyprus Mail* quoted a series of British residents from Kyrenia who argued the Memorial Trust were ‘determined to stick their fingers up at the Greek Cypriots’, the interviews of this project with southern based expatriates revealed a general north-south divide amongst the British community of Cyprus.\(^{106}\) According to the Paphos based expatriate Peter for example, a soldier during the 1963-64 crisis, it was:

the high ranking veterans who now live in northern Cyprus, who were young officers in the 1950s, they hold a lot of political clout. The veterans in the south of the island, on the whole, didn’t support it [the memorial] or oppose it... it was


\(^{102}\) Bahceli, ‘A snub to Greek Cypriots’.


\(^{104}\) See Anonymous, ‘It’s not the Monument, it’s the place’, *Cyprus Mail*, 10 November 2009.

\(^{105}\) Rayner, ‘The forgotten soldiers’.

\(^{106}\) Bahceli, ‘A snub to Greek Cypriots’.
the very large community in the north. In the end, Donald the politician [Donald Crawford] made it happen, and he accused southern expats of worrying more about property rights than their former comrades.\textsuperscript{107}

Indeed a common refrain of these southern expatriates was that those British residents living within northern Cyprus are more ‘naturalised’ to the official Turkish Cypriot historical discourse of ‘intervention’ rather than ‘invasion’.\textsuperscript{108} Associated with this view, albeit minor when one considers numbers, in 2012 a group of expatriates living in northern Cyprus attempted to launch a petition for the UK government to ‘finally recognise the TRNC’ as a state. While this petition only managed 1,092 signatures before its closure, its existence can reflect back to the widespread accusation that the Memorial Trust was deliberately provocative and ‘colonially arrogant’ in their desire to build in Kyrenia.\textsuperscript{109}

Indeed, by constructing the memorial in Kyrenia, its commemorative structures became bound to the Greek Cypriot memorial structures of the Turkish invasion, in which the British position is already closely associated with that of Turkey. Given memorials can mean many things to many people, the perceived ‘insults’ associated with the construct of this monument, coupled to the widespread denunciation of Britain for failing to ‘support’ Cyprus, can create a commemorative framework whereby this memorial reflects a wider form of British ‘contempt’ and ‘insensitivity’ for the plight of the Greek Cypriots in general, and the refugees in particular. During the ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’, the diasporic association \textit{Lobby for Cyprus} freely provided to those in attendance a pre-written letter addressed to the ‘London Taxi and Private Hire’ group that detailed:

\begin{quote}
The offense caused to me by advertising on London taxis that promotes the occupied north of Cyprus as a legitimate holiday destination... it is highly offensive and provocative that unsuspecting British tourists are tempted... to enjoy the stolen homes, lands, hotels and businesses of the Greek Cypriots... who so desperately long to return.
\end{quote}

These advertisements were raised in a number of interviews undertaken within the diaspora community.\textsuperscript{111} British born Cypriot John, a first generation refugee, stated:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{107} Interview with Peter, Paphos, 21 March 2013.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid; Interview with David, Paphos, 21 March 2013; Interview with Mark, Paphos, 21 March 2013; Interview with Helen, Paphos, 26 March 2013.
\textsuperscript{111} See also criticism of the \textit{Daily Telegraph} advertising properties within the occupied areas in ‘Press Complaints Commission’, http://www.pcc.org.uk/cases/adjudicated.html?article=NTUwNA==&type=, (last accessed 17 April 2015).
\end{flushright}
it is not right… claiming the North as a Republic is worse than a war-crime. It is a war-crime, born through violence and invasion. It shouldn’t count. It doesn’t count.  

With property rights within the occupied areas a particularly sensitive subject, any form of recognition for the ‘TRNC’ has long been an issue of contention between the British and Greek Cypriot authorities. A salient example of this can be drawn from the long-running legal saga of the Oram’s land ownership case of 2003-2010, fought out between a British family and a displaced Greek Cypriot from Lapithos. This case traversed conflictual rulings within the Cyprus and British courts before the European Court of Justice eventually ruled that the land purchased by this British family in the north rightfully belonged to a displaced Greek Cypriot. A level of political contestation was associated with this case through the ‘provocative’ role of Cherie Blair in representing the British couple. As a consequence of these political sensitivities, the British Government attempted to distance themselves from the Kyrenia memorial campaign. Indeed Andrew Dismore for example, the MP for Hendon in North London and a regular attendee at the ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’, argued the Kyrenia memorial ‘just serves to remind Greek Cypriots of the UK's less than glorious role as the colonial power, when we are trying to be positive in our support for the talks’. As a result this monument was not state sponsored but was funded through private donations. However tacit approval was granted to its existence on Remembrance Sunday 2009 when the British High Commissioner laid a wreath at its base on behalf of the Queen. This action in turn raised the displeasure of President Christofias who was ‘not happy’ about the location of memorial or the actions of the High Commissioner, as he vowed to ‘discuss it further’ with the British authorities.

5.2.3 Layers of Memorial Meaning

Within these debates a series of interconnecting themes associated with the Anglo-Greek Cypriot relationship can be drawn. A ‘less than glorious’ colonial past whose divisive legacy continues into the present, as Margarita from Kythrea for example argued that Cyprus will never be reunified because:

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112 Interview with John, London, 29 November 2012; Also raised in Interview with Vas, London, 7 March 2013.
116 Summers, ‘Can Cyprus overcome its bloody history’.
117 PIO: ‘Statements by the President of the Republic’, 9 November 2009.
For so many years, not only Turkey, but British too, they plant the flower or the tree and they put some fertiliser around this tree, and make this tree. This tree is the hate between the Greeks and the Muslims.118

A lingering suspicion of Anglo-Turkish collusion through the ‘failure’ of the British to not only act as a Guarantor in 1974, but to push for the contemporary reunification of Cyprus, as in the words of Christos from Larnaca:

Now Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus is divided in two parts, and always the British while Berlin was two parts divided, they were trying to demolish the wall of the division of the two Berlins. And with the division of Nicosia nothing happens as far as the British are concerned. They didn’t do anything about it to avoid the division of Nicosia.119

A form of ‘British insensitivity’ towards the suffering of the Greek Cypriot people, shaped by the failure of the British Government to pressurise Turkey over Cyprus and marked by the ‘provocative’ actions of certain private enterprises, as in the words of the Cyprus Mail over the Kyrenia memorial:

the truth is that some of those individuals who undertook the initiative to erect the monument were more than happy to show their contempt for the Cyprus government and the Greek Cypriots.120

Finally, while certain events and actions may be decades past or indeed ‘forgotten’ within Britain, the continuing ‘sensitivity’ of the anti-colonial struggle and the lasting consequences of the Turkish invasion are not simply historical events on Cyprus, ‘we live with it every day’.121

Therefore the controversies associated with the Kyrenia memorial can be considered through Anna Lisa Tota’s frameworks of commemoration and remembrance within contested societies. These frameworks ostensibly ascribe a ‘simple’ event with a clear public memory. The socio-political unity of a particular community, and the degree of internal and external contestation over the representation of an event, in turn shapes the public form and focus of a remembrance process. This form of memory is then strengthened or weakened by the moral status of the victims, the power of their ‘memory associations’, the degree of uncertainty in attributing blame, and ultimately the level of controversy caused by its representation.122

Given the conflicted nature of the modern history of Cyprus, the representation of historical events and the content of public remembrance ceremonies are often highly contested. Indeed

118 Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012.
119 Interview with Christos, London, 29 November 2012.
120 Anonymous, ‘It’s Not the Monument, it’s the place’.
121 Interview with Marios, Limassol, 3 April 2014.
the Kyrenia memorial can represent multiple competing and overlapping forms of memory. For some it can evoke the memory of British soldiers killed whilst doing their duty. For others it can reflect the brutalities of a colonial conflict. For others still, its construction in the occupied areas can reinforce the historic concept of Anglo-Turkish cooperation on Cyprus. As every community is pluralistic in its sense of history and identity, the particular ‘identity’ of a war memorial can be equally interchangeable.¹²³ In many of the interviews undertaken with Cypriots who lived through the colonial period, they often refer to the fact it was not the British soldiers who were the problem, but rather the British imperialists who gave them the orders.¹²⁴ Yet when one considers the position of EOKA and the concept of enosis within these interviews, an equally contested image is reflected. Some respondents, such as Eleni, spoke of their pride in EOKA and continued dream, rather than political desire, for enosis with Greece.¹²⁵ Others such as Marios argued that enosis was ‘never a good idea’, and that the actions of EOKA, who ‘killed more Cypriots than the British’, merely provoked a defensive and divisive response from Britain.¹²⁶ Within the museums of the anti-colonial period, EOKA are heroes fighting an oppressive imperial regime. In the depictions of the Daily Telegraph, they were a terrorist organisation who brutally murdered British soldiers. On the political left this image is more complex and contested. In certain rural areas, the image of EOKA has been shown to maintain a significant influence on the construction of local identities.¹²⁷ In the official narratives of the Turkish Cypriot state, EOKA are represented as terrorists.¹²⁸ Therefore the moral status of the victims of the Cyprus Emergency, both British and Cypriot, the degree of uncertainty in attaching blame for their deaths, and ultimately the divisions in Cypriot society regarding history and identity mean multiple competing collective memories emerge over these events. As such the Kyrenia memorial can be considered a signifier for a variety of different public memories, spanning a commemoration of the dead to a representation of the suspicion of British motivations on Cyprus, and potentially everything else in-between.

¹²³ Mayo, ‘War memorials as political memory’, p.65.
¹²⁶ Interview with Marios, Limassol, 3 April 2014; Group Interview 1, London, 3 July 2012; Koumoullis, ‘The EOKA struggle’.
¹²⁷ Spyrou, ‘Children constructing ethnic identities’, pp.121-139.
5.3 Conclusion

Within the commemorative structures of Greek Cypriot society, a general focus on the consequences of conflict rather than its causality is both politically expedient given the contested nature of modern Cypriot history, and also reflective of the fact that the personal and collective impact of this conflict retains a particular sensitivity irrespective of the passage of time. Indeed, everyone knows and maintains a view as to why Cyprus is divided, as different national and political organisations maintain their own images and commemorative rituals intended to shape and manage this memorial knowledge. These collective processes, fostered via education, museums and commemorative ceremonies, in turn attempt to engage with and structure more personal forms of remembrance born through individual experience and shared between family units. Therefore, with the multi-vocal nature of public remembrance ceremonies, a dual process can occur where the individual can take from the collective, and the collective can take and disseminate from the individual, those views and issues which are deemed of most importance to it. Yet despite any political or nationalist differences over causality, all can agree a united focus on the personal consequences of division. As such, in developing Christou and Roudometof’s statement that 1974 is ‘only lens through which Greek Cypriots refract their current concerns and future aspirations’, one could equally argue it is the only lens through which the pre-1974 period can now be viewed. Indeed the crisis of 1974 was an effective culmination for a series of divisive socio-political processes which commenced during the British colonial period. In this sense therefore, the image of Britain and their colonial domination of Cyprus is today refracted through the lens of 1974, as if the British had never come, ‘there would never have been a problem’.

The image of Britain within the public commemorative frameworks of Greek Cypriot society is ambiguous, interchangeable and often negative. The memory of the British colonial period provides an early example in a modern context of collective suffering but ultimate victory against a formidable foreign power. This period therefore provides the foundation for the collectivisation of Greek Cypriot pain and suffering in the post-colonial period, remodelled against the pervasive influences of international interference and ultimately Turkish aggression in 1974. As such the collective remembrance practices of Greek Cypriot society are shaped by a communal association of mourning, fostered around the refugees, the missing and a dual image of northern Cyprus marked by nostalgia and loss. As this form of loss was directly precipitated by the actions of the Junta, from this

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commemorative milieu, the image and influence of Greece, as a maternal figure but external force, requires further attention in relation to the commemorative and identity structures of Greek Cypriot society.
Chapter 6: Cyprus as a ‘Crypto-Colony’: Informal Colonialism and the National Politics of Remembrance

The island of Cyprus, situated on the periphery of Europe and acting as a bridge from East to West, has witnessed multiple forms of colonial domination over the centuries. From physical occupation by foreign powers to the symbolic domination of external ideals and concepts, Cyprus and its people have been shaped and transformed by the structured interplay of external forces on internal developments.\(^1\) Although Cyprus gained its somewhat reluctant independence in 1960, given few Cypriots initially sought this outcome, these power relationships did not rupture but merely changed in form, as the island remained tied to the sociocultural and geopolitical machinations of motherlands, stepmothers and world powers. Within these colonial discourses, this thesis has argued the reaction against the physical and symbolic influence of ‘stepmother’ Britain, framed by the effects of direct domination and neo-colonial interference, has forged an inherent socio-cultural suspicion of British political motivations towards Cyprus. The power of this discourse of inherent suspicion in turn frames the remembrance and representation of British actions across the modern history of Cyprus. However in order to fully understand the internalised discourses shaping the construction of history, memory and identities on Cyprus, one must now turn to a secondary form of external influence emergent from Greece.

As part of the Hellenic world but externalised from its centre, predominantly due to British colonial manoeuvring, Cyprus maintains an uneven and at times deeply troubled relationship with its ‘motherland’ of Greece. On a political level, this externalisation led to a sustained struggle between Athens and Nicosia for ‘control’ over the national affairs of Cyprus, a struggle which culminated in the coup engineered by the Greek Junta in 1974. On an ideological level, the frameworks which prepared Cyprus for entrance into the Greek state, by synthesising indigenous concepts of ‘culture’ and the self around and within the transnational models of the mainland, continued to exert an informal colonial influence on internalised modes of Cypriot development and historical narration within the ‘independent’ Republic. This continued influence led Michael Herzfeld to note the existence today of a ‘neokiprii’, or young intellectuals, who are now moved to consider Greece’s role on Cyprus

as a form of ‘cultural as well as political colonialism in itself’.\textsuperscript{2} Although Herzfeld did not develop this point, his observation maintains a significant degree of validity and will be considered more fully in this chapter. This however is not a ‘colonial’ connection akin to the direct and inherently foreign nature of British domination. Nor is it seen by all as a colonial connection. It is multi-layered and hybridised, as the image and actions of Greece can be embraced as those of a national partner, or distanced as those of an external force.

Indeed there are some, such as Eleni, who believe Cyprus is the ‘East border of Greece’, and that the Cypriot people are first and foremost a Greek people.\textsuperscript{3} In this variant of ‘long-distance nationalism’, Cyprus may be externalised from Greece physically, but its identity and culture is fundamentally Greek. There are others, such as Softonis, who believe Cyprus is an independent nation with an independent identity, and that Greece merely wants to control Cyprus for its own benefits.\textsuperscript{4} In this reading of the ‘nation’, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities are deemed to share more common values than those between Greece and Cyprus. In turn there are some who believe ‘Greece would never betray Cyprus’ in their political actions, whilst others have argued ‘every time anything wrong has gone in Cyprus, Greeks were involved’.\textsuperscript{5} Yet these national sentiments and historical delineations are not arbitrary. One can be a ‘Greek on Cyprus’ that criticises the controlling actions of Greece, much as one can be a ‘Cypriot of Greek origin’ that embraces the need for Greece as a fraternal partner.\textsuperscript{6} It is not a process of ‘good’ nationalism versus ‘bad’ nationalism, as this connection can fluctuate depending on a variety of national, political, cultural and economic issues. Therefore a connection that could be deemed national for one could theoretically be deemed colonial or post-colonial to another. However understanding this connection is important as it has underlain the analysis of this thesis, from the political roots of conflict to the ‘propaganda’ influencing its remembrance, and from the content of educational texts to the inclusivity of commemorative rituals. Ultimately the construct of history, memory and


\textsuperscript{3}Interview with Eleni, London, 25 March 2014; Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012; Interview with Anastasia, Limassol, 9 August 2011.

\textsuperscript{4}Interview with Softonis, Limassol, 7 April 2014; Interview with Marios, Limassol, 3 April 2014; Interview with Nicos, London, 3 July 2012.

\textsuperscript{5}Interview with Glafcos, London, 7 March 2013; Interview with Christodoulos, London, 3 July 2012.

\textsuperscript{6}See comments in Maria Margaronis, \textit{Cyprus: Divided Memory, United Future?}, BBC Radio 4 Documentary, first broadcast 6 May 2014; Evripidou, “Stepmother” Britain does not favour us’, p.2.
what it is that defines a Greek Cypriot are all intrinsically shaped by the internal reaction to those forces born through the interrelationship between Cyprus, Greece and Britain.7

In order to analyse this multifaceted connection, the Greek Cypriot reaction to the influence and actions of Greece within the discourses of Cypriotism and Cypriot-Hellenism will be considered through both a national and informal colonial reading. The ‘national’ reading will draw on the works of Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawn to understand how some Greek Cypriots negotiate and imagine a shared community between Greece and Cyprus. The informal colonial reading will consider the hybridity of Cypriot identities through the work of Homi Bhabha, particularly his concept of ‘resemblance and menace’, and combine this with the inferred cultural frameworks of Herzfeld’s model of crypto-colonialism.8 Indeed crypto-colonialism connects and charts the power of external cultural ideals on internal state developments, which in the case of Greece for example referred to the influence of the Western imagination of the ‘Hellenic ideal’ as the ‘Cradle of Europe’ shaping the civilizational models and language developments of the emergent Greek state.9 As such these crypto-colonies:

were compelled to acquire their political independence at the expense of massive economic dependence, this relationship being articulated in the iconic guise of aggressively national culture fashioned to suit foreign models.10

Therefore these crypto-colonial states often do not realise they are bound to ‘colonial’ conditions, be they political or cultural, as they are ‘nominally independent, but that independence comes at the price of a sometimes humiliating form of effective dependence’ to externalised concepts.11 While Herzfeld’s model was used to connect Greece to the idea of Europe, this concept will be used here alongside Bhabha’s considerations of ‘colonial’ interdependency to analyse the connection between Greece and Cyprus. There are issues with both approaches. Anderson for example has been criticised for his ‘horizontal’ reading and lack of detail on colonial identities, while Bhabha has been critiqued for his overemphasis on difference and almost ‘anti-nationalist’ approach to identity formation.12

7 For parallels to Turkish Cypriot development see Argyrou, ‘Independent Cyprus?’, pp.39-47; Bryant, ‘On the condition of Postcoloniality’, pp.47-65.
8 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (London: Routledge, 2008), pp.123-130.
11 Ibid, p.920.
However both can offer direct insights into the processes shaping the construct of history, memory and identities on Cyprus.

Adopting this multi-layered framework rather than focussing solely on a model of ethno-nationalism is pertinent, and indeed necessary, in order to better understand the internal Cypriot reaction to, and transformation of, the ideological power structures infused within the transnational influences of Greece.\(^{13}\) As with all forms of power relationships, ‘influence’ can breed ‘resistance’, of which the internal discourse of Cypriotism, historically embraced by AKEL and emphasising an idealised intercommunal affinity, could be deemed ‘resistive’ to certain elements of this inter-state connection. This was certainly deemed the case by those critics in Chapter 4 who alleged that AKEL’s reform of school textbooks sought to ‘de-Hellenise’ Cypriot history by placing Greece as just another conqueror of Cyprus. As such this analysis will utilise the views of diasporic Cypriots alongside narratives from Cyprus. This allows for both a broader comparison of identity construction, and also an intriguing insight into the ongoing debates within Cyprus regarding the ‘Cypriotness’ or ‘Greekness’ of the historical discourses linked to reunification. Indeed, as British born Cypriot John stated:

\[\text{at the moment we’ve got two communities and instead of looking to pool their resources and find a viable solution, one is looking at Ankara and one is looking at Athens, and that is wrong.}\]\(^{14}\)

Therefore this chapter will approach the connection to Greece and the structures shaping Greek Cypriot identities and historical discourses through two specific examples, one in relation to education and the other in relation to language, two of the foremost processes in the construction of states and nations. From this base it will then consider how the image and memory of Greece in 1974 can be influenced by two ideological frameworks, a cultural affinity and a political suspicion. The final section will analyse the discourse of Cypriotism. As Cypriotism is traditionally associated with the political left and the Communist Party in particular, it can be placed historically as an active form of resistance against the dominant ideal of Cypriot-Hellenism so forcefully pursued in the 1950s by EOKA, and in a modern context as a ‘secondary, ideological resistance’ against the continued links to the Greek


\(^{14}\) Interview with John, London, 22 November 2012.
motherland. By directly understanding the connection between Greece and Cyprus, one can better understand the internal discourses shaping the image of Britain, and in turn the broader construct and content of Greek Cypriot historical narratives.

6.1 National Foundations of Crypto-Colonial Cyprus

When Cyprus emerged as a ‘state’ in 1960 through the British imposition of independence over the Cypriot national desire for enosis or taksim, it did so without the creation of a clearly defined or unified concept of a ‘nation’. As independence was a compromise, this transition from colony to Republic was marked by a considerable level of continuity. The British did not leave Cyprus but merely reduced the size and style of their occupation; Greece and Turkey were still actively influencing the direction of Cypriot politics, and significant sections of the Cypriot populace did not totally embrace the concept of independence over enosis or taksim. This was made clear by Makarios when he stated in May 1974 that:

it is not the intention of the Government to create a Cypriot national feeling. The Greeks and Turks of Cyprus can preserve their national identity. What is important is their peaceful co-existence in the Cyprus state.

This does not mean to say that a ‘Cypriot national feeling’ was not in existence at a local or individual level, just that the government had no intention of directly promoting one at a state level. As a result, following the publication of an official British research memorandum on Greco-Turkish relations in September 1974, a question was posed that was deemed to reach the ‘nub’ of the Cyprus Problem: ‘whether there is such a thing as a Cypriot’. In a handwritten note atop this report, R.O. Miles of the Foreign Office responded with a ‘yes, but the Cypriots don’t seem to realise it’. While this question is potentially infused with many connotations from the Anglo-Greek Cypriot relationship, given the colonial authorities had historically questioned the ‘Greekness’ of Greek Cypriot identities, its general sentiment continues to provoke considerable debate. Within Cyprus, although partition led the Republic of Cyprus to adopt and elevate certain Cypriotist ideals in order to promote reunification, such as the first official celebration of Cyprus Independence Day in 1979, the socio-political disputes regarding the content of educational reforms in particular remain

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15 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p.xii.
16 For differences see Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp.4-6; For focus on Greek and Turkish nationalism over ‘Cypriotism’ see Bryant, ‘On the condition of Postcoloniality’, pp.47-65.
17 TNA: FCO 9/1886, fl.29, ‘Attitude of Archbishop Makarios towards enosis’.
deeply polarised between different national and political forces.\textsuperscript{21} Outside of Cyprus, considerations on the ‘Cyprus Question’ led to a particularly heated debate in May 2014 within the mailing list of the \textit{Modern Greek Studies Association}. The juncture for this debate, which encompassed the legacy of British colonialism and the historical foundations of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ‘communities’, came after a collective email in which the EOKA fighters ‘Mihalakis Karaolis and Andreas Dimitriou’ were referred to as Greeks, rather than Cypriots or indeed Greek Cypriots.\textsuperscript{22} These debates, which will be developed further throughout this chapter, emphasise that Cyprus is an island with a variety of differing forms of identity discourses linked to a number of distinct and often overlapping imagined communities. Therefore a sentiment deemed a natural national connection by one could be deemed an external or indeed internal imposition by another. As each national community looks to the past to structure their imagination of the future, there is not a single or simple answer to the ‘Cyprus Question’.

In understanding the roots of this ‘Cyprus Question’, one needs to first consider the two ways that expansive or irredentist national movements can be interpreted. Indeed as Anderson argued, the modern construction of nation-states are imagined communities which draw on the use of history and myth to create the conditions for the simultaneous imagination of a particular people or peoples as a reflection and extension of the self. It is imagined as sovereign because of developments from the Enlightenment, and as a community because ‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship’.\textsuperscript{23} Although these political communities are territorially bounded, the ‘building’ of this nation involves national expansion in order to fulfill the ‘hope’ of living together within one state.\textsuperscript{24} It is through this irredentist expansion that Cyprus was politically connected to the imagined nation-state of Greece following its emergence in 1832. Indeed, this nationalist dream of a Greater Greece, housing all those ‘unredeemed Greeks’ beyond the borders of the initial state, was the driving force of Greek foreign policy for almost a century. This irredentist process sought the political and cultural extension of the national borders of Greece into hitherto ‘foreign’, but ultimately perceived as


\textsuperscript{23} Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, pp.4-7.

‘natural’ national areas. These areas housed both ‘foreign’ and ‘national’ communities, which in the case of the latter could often maintain an existent Greek culture distinct from the wider state model, who would in turn become engaged in a cultural interplay with this state-structured culture. These specifically defined state ideals were cultivated, disseminated and directed by a highly centralised administration. This included, amongst others, an extension of the consular system into specifically ‘Hellenic areas’, the nationalisation of the church, and the establishment of Greek schools and cultural associations to allow for the linguistic ‘rehellenisation’ of certain Turkophone and ‘archaic’ dialectical Greek communities. This was further supported by the creation of nationalist histories which proclaimed the unity and continuity of the ‘Greek nation’ from antiquity, through Byzantium and into the present, thereby providing an historical imperative for Greek expansion. Each element of this process was designed to cultivate and foster within this disparate imagined community a ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’ of shared ideals and a wider, centralised Greek national consciousness structured around a common history and cultural awareness. In doing this it utilised both constructive and destructive elements to instil within these ‘unredeemed’ communities a specific Hellenic ideal, forged around ‘fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous’ concepts of ethnicity and identity, framed by the central ideals of the state.

However, with expansion, these ‘horizontal’ connections can often acquire a vertical structure, thereby placing the national within an imperial framework. In this sense, national expansion can be compared to a form of cultural imperialism, whereby the ‘autonomy of a culture’, or the right to develop along its own lines, is threatened by the imposition of external forces. A crucial component of this process concerns the fact that the ‘exalting and spreading of [these] values and habits’ is not necessarily deemed by the host society, save perhaps for some objections, as an imposition given a feeling of ‘domination’ only exists when it is perceived as such. Therefore this process creates a cultural interplay between the internal and the external which is not simply implanted and accepted, but negotiated and transformed to meet local demands. This negotiation, as Bhabha put it, can create a ‘recognisable other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same but not quite’. This form of hybridity can make the reaction to this discourse ‘at once resemblance and menace’.

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27 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp.4-7.
28 Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism, pp.1-12.
30 Bhabha, Location of Culture, p.122.
as it maintains within it an ‘insurgent counter-appeal’ that can disrupt its authority.\textsuperscript{31} Within Cyprus this can feasibly be viewed as the concept of Cypriotism, and within Greece the cultural idiosyncrasies of the Asia Minor refugees who descended onto the state in 1922-23.\textsuperscript{32} Nevertheless this process is rooted around an indigenous ‘cultural’ core, based on the Greek Orthodox religion and the Greek language, which is then cultivated through a crypto-colonial discourse into a hybridised concept of the self that is founded on the internal, but is framed and influenced by the subtleties of the models of the external. Therefore unlike the forces of British colonialism in places such as Cyprus or Corfu which were inherently foreign, the influence of Greece before \textit{enosis} can draw on a set of shared ‘national’ ideals which its state-structures can attempt to subtly guide so as to conform to the national-imperial models set by the Greek ‘state’. In positioning these expansionist discourses within a national-imperial framework, one can better recognise and understand the reaction to and interplay between internal processes and external forces in the creation and narration of the internal self.

It is the cultural interplay of these two forces that have shaped the developments of the Modern Greek Cypriot state. In a political sense, Cyprus was largely a peripheral issue in the context of Greek expansion until the late 1940s and early 1950s. The catalyst for this change included both the wider effects of the Second World War, as Cyprus was one of the last achievable goals of irredentism, and the actions of the Greek Cypriots themselves.\textsuperscript{33} For example a church plebiscite on the question of \textit{enosis} in January 1950 indicated that 95 percent of the Greek Cypriot population were in favour of union with Greece. The British government, elements of which had contemplated giving Cyprus to Greece in the 1940s, rejected the results of this plebiscite and then steadfastly refused to acquiesce to Greek demands for \textit{enosis} due to the increased strategic importance of the island in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{34} This British rejection led to a decade long struggle for \textit{enosis} which culminated in 1960 with the compromised acquisition of independence, and the creation of a Cypriot state without a clearly defined Cypriot nation. This referendum however also emphasised the organisational

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, pp.123-130.
\textsuperscript{34} For alleged church ‘intimidation of waverers’ see TNA: FCO 51/192, fl.1, ‘Research department memorandum’; For importance see Anonymous, ‘Prime Minister on need to defend oil supplies’, \textit{The Times}, 2 June 1956, p.6.
power of the church, as the Archbishop was also the Ethnarch, meaning he was the spiritual, national and political leader of the Greek Cypriot people. As such the historic role of the Orthodox Church in fostering and nurturing the development of Greek Cypriot national identities was particularly significant. This was further developed through the modernisation policies of the Ottoman administration, especially in the 1830s and 1850s, which increasingly categorised peoples into national or ethnic groupings rather than religious groups. The ‘interference’ of international powers, through European trade, helped create a new mercantilist class on Cyprus, whilst the British imposition of a new legal and administrative system after 1878 increased literacy levels and brought an increase in urbanisation, all of which helped foster and extend the spread of Greek nationalism.\(^{35}\) As such the main carriers of this nationalist sentiment were the urban bourgeoisie, the church and the Greek educators on Cyprus. However the most significant development of this period, at least from the perspective of many of those Cypriots interviewed for this project, were the ‘separatist’ policies adopted by the British colonial authorities. These policies, in conjunction with the rise of two increasingly vocal, powerful and widespread nationalist movements eroded the basis of inter-communality, and witnessed the hardening of Greek Cypriot demands for *enosis*.\(^{36}\) Through these demands, a form of internal separation was itself fostered through the marginalisation of the Turkish Cypriot ‘other’ within the *enosis* struggle. Nevertheless these nationalist sentiments found, emerging from Greece, models and frameworks that could mould and structure these ‘values and habits’ within a collective national ideal, one which was designed to prepare Cypriots for entrance into the Greek state. One arena which not only concerned the British colonial authorities, but as Chapter 4 noted, continues to provoke significant contemporary debate, was the Cypriot educational system. As a result it is here that one can best witness the continued influence and legacy of Greek models on the independent trajectory of Cypriot history and identities, as this institution perhaps more than any other is directly linked to the emergence and development of the ‘Cyprus Problem’.

### 6.2 Structuring Shared Values

The educational system on Cyprus has long been a focal point of debate and concern amongst officials and scholars alike. In December 2014 the rector of the University of Cyprus, Constantinos Christofides, reflected on the importance of education for the process of reunification, and in turn noted that historically:


Cyprus did not create an educational system [after independence] that encouraged constructive dialogue and cultural exchanges between the communities in a way that would have fostered shared values and a common future.  

On the contrary, this reluctant Republic maintained a separatist and segregated system rooted within the educational models of Greece and Turkey. As a result the external frameworks of the motherlands continued, by the active design of the Cypriot authorities, to structure the educational development of Cyprus. This was made clear in March 1967 for example when the Minister of Education for the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot Constantinos Spyridakis, stated that:

the Greek educational policy has been and is the educational policy of Cyprus… [and] I cannot agree to the view that our educational policy should change… because if our association with Greece, and consequently, our whole civilisation and historic tradition ceases to exist, then what will be left to connect us with her?  

This inter-state connection was further emphasised in 2009, as plans for a joint educational reform within Greece and Cyprus was designed, according to the Chairman of the Cypriot Committee, Nicos Tornaritis of DISY, to construct ‘a bigger connection between the two committees that will manage the future of our education’s content; the future of Greece and Cyprus’s analytical programs [curriculum]’. The crucial point here is the reference to ‘our’ educational content. This suggests this connection is not deemed an imposition but rather a natural connection that continues to join these two sovereign states together.

Indeed, Ernest Gellner noted that education, through its transmission of a shared and standardised culture, is a vital component in the construct of nations and national identities. This process of ‘exo-socialisation’, which is the ‘production or reproduction of men outside the local intimate unit’, not only disseminates the culture and story of a particular society’s shared past, but through this process can provide the basis for the development of its future political attitudes. As such, culture becomes the central unifying trope of the nation, and for the continued survival and development of this nation, ‘it must be one in which they can all breathe and speak and produce; so it must be the same culture’. However this process depends on what nation is being imagined and constructed. Indeed, for those such as Spyridakis and the critics of historical revisions detailed in Chapter 4, while Cyprus is

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37 Jean Christou, ‘UCY secures €80m more for expansion’, *Cyprus Mail*, 13 December 2014.
38 PIO: ‘Speech by the Minister of Education’, 30 March 1967, p.3.
39 See Panayiotis Afxentiou, ‘Some issues of structure and educational reform’, *Cyprus Mail*, 11 January 2009; Theodoulou, ‘Cyprus and Greece to work together’.
41 Ibid, p.38.
physically and politically removed from Greece, in this instrumentalist reading of the nation, it is culture that connects this imagined community, and the shared values of education that is vital to its continued existence. Consequently the revision of historical narratives undertaken by AKEL in 2008, whilst attempting to foster shared Cypriot ideals, were controversial to their critics in part because these alleged acts of de-Hellenisation could fundamentally challenge the structures of this culturally imagined ‘Greek nation’. For AKEL and their traditionally Cypriotist mentality, their use of education was designed to structure a shared culture and history with their Turkish Cypriot brethren, or their version of a culturally imagined ‘Cypriot nation’. Thus these institutions can draw on an indigenous cultural and historical core, but structure the dissemination of their values within a co-authored framework, be it between Greece and Cyprus or the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The influence of these shared external frameworks in drawing on and structuring the internal development of Cypriot discourses was noted by the teacher Eleni from Famagusta, who stated:

we tend to do Greek history in the history curriculum. Maybe there has been a slight shift over the last few years, but we do ancient Greece, then a little bit about ancient Cyprus, Byzantium in year 5 and then Greek revolution in year 6, and then we stop... so it’s very much focussed in the context around Greek history and Cyprus history... and you don’t really teach the period between 1960 and 74, it’s more like in the surface that you say a few things, that this is what has happened, but it is not a part of the curriculum... it is very much a Greek history.\footnote{42 Interview with Eleni, London, 25 March 2014.}

Although Eleni noted that the position of the Turkish Cypriot people, not community, are now referred to as a separate entity from that of Turkey, ultimately the educational system on Cyprus has historically failed to produce the basis for a shared ‘Cypriot nation’.\footnote{43 See Bryant, ‘On the condition of Postcoloniality’, pp.47-65; For Turkish Cypriot education see Vural & Ozuyanik, ‘Redefining Identity’, pp.133-154.} Therefore beyond the long-term influences of British ‘divide and rule’ policies, which are often emphasised to the marginalisation of all else, the Cypriot authorities maintained their own frameworks and institutions which helped divide these communities into separate and particular national entities. This does not downplay the role of the British, but rather emphasises more directly that there were push and pull factors in the internal division of Cyprus.

Indeed this form of exclusivity began before the British landed on Cyprus in 1878, as educational processes under the Ottoman administration were run by local authorities under the auspices of the Orthodox Church, and the curriculum within these Greek schools ‘ran
parallel to that of Greece’.\(^{44}\) When the British made Cyprus a Crown Colony in 1925, the Church lost much of its direct control over this formal system, but did retain a significant financial presence in a number of institutions. This presence, coupled to the ‘threats’ of the nationalists and the financial incentives offered to teachers and institutions from Greece, prevented the British from ‘adequately’ exerting their own influence within many educational establishments.\(^{45}\) Consequently this British failure to reform or remove this inter-state connection placed schools as particularly ‘subversive’ societal institutions. As noted in a 1955 intelligence report, the system ‘tends to train Greek Cypriots to think of themselves as Greeks, and Turkish Cypriots to think of themselves as Turks, and none to think of themselves as Cypriots, still less British subjects’.\(^{46}\) Within this process, the continued import and utilisation of textbooks from Greece and Turkey was met with consternation by the newly appointed British ‘Director of Education’ in 1956, as he reported the system was:

> almost incredible [as] readers are bought from Greece for Greek schools and from Turkey for the Turkish schools… [and their] strongly nationalist character… must have made an impressive impact on the immature minds of the generations of children who have been brought up on such material.\(^{47}\)

Within these texts, pages with images of ‘unredeemed Cyprus’ were often removed by the British authorities, whilst following the uprising of 1931, the ‘Seditious Publications Act’ prohibited any maps, specifically from Greece, with words or images that would ‘convey the impression that the island of Cyprus forms part of, or belongs, or should form part of… any foreign country’ other than Britain.\(^{48}\) However the banning of such material had a limited effect, as beyond simply the utilisation of textbooks, teaching methods were influenced by ‘Greek thought owing to the high proportion of teachers trained in Greece’.\(^{49}\) The influence of this ‘Greek thought’ was noted by Charalambos from Morphou, who was twelve years old in 1955 and maintained family connections to EOKA, as he recalled:


\(^{45}\) For financial incentives from Greece see TNA: CO 926/158, ‘Notes on “Cyprus Intelligence Committee” report by C.J.J.T. Barton’, 6 October 1955; For nationalist ‘encouragement’ of teachers see TNA: CO 926/588, ‘EOKA activities in Schools: Captured and Deciphered texts by A.F. Thompson’, 29 November 1958.

\(^{46}\) TNA: CO 926/158, ‘Cyprus Intelligence Committee: Security Implications of the system of Education in Cyprus’, 12 September 1955.


\(^{49}\) TNA: CO 926/158, ‘Cyprus Intelligence Committee’.  

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everywhere all the people hope to be free, so the teachers instead of the usual lessons, they teach us secretly about freedom, about our roots, that we are Greek and we have to be union (sic) with Greece. Afterwards if we had time we made mathematics and other lessons... sometimes our teachers were so fanatic in their speeches and lessons to us, they make us feel very strongly against the British.\textsuperscript{50}

As a result, the actions of teachers and students were a perennial concern to the British colonial authorities. School closures were a frequent occurrence, as Charalambos and others recalled throwing stones or ‘oranges laced with razors’ at the British soldiers.\textsuperscript{51} In turn the colonial authorities noted that ‘acts of violence since the 1st April 1955 have shown the extent to which the youth of Cyprus, particularly those of secondary school age, have been indoctrinated with Greek nationalism’.\textsuperscript{52} This form of educational ‘indoctrination’ via a focus on the ‘Greek nature of education to the exclusion of all else’ was therefore condemned in a 1956 colonial report as ‘not one of which any government can be reasonably proud’.\textsuperscript{53} Likewise, in August 1974 Michael Carver relayed to James Callaghan his belief that a ‘significant factor’ in breeding tension on the island occurred in 1925, when ‘we foolishly agreed that mainland Greek and Turkish schoolmasters could teach in schools. They are primarily responsible for the development of Greek and Turkish nationalism as opposed to Cypriot patriotism’.\textsuperscript{54}

These ‘developments’ were not helped, at least from a British perspective, by the fact that there was no state university on Cyprus until 1992, as not only could the British not afford to construct one prior to 1960, but after independence it was noted in a May 1974 High Commission memo that:

\begin{quote}
it is considered one of the gravest heresies among the Greek Cypriot community to attempt to promote a Cyprus national consciousness; that is one of the reasons why no university of Cyprus has ever been established.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

This state of affairs was a considerable concern to the British colonial authorities. Of those students known to be attending university in 1955, almost two-thirds were ‘safely’ enrolled at British institutions, whilst almost a quarter were attending Greek universities and were therefore open to ‘indoctrination with Greek nationalism’. Consequently a recommendation was made for British universities to lift their tariffs on maximum numbers and ‘accept more

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Charalambos, Limassol, 7 April 2014.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid; Interview with Andreas, London, 6 March 2013; Interview with Grigori, London, 3 July 2012.
\textsuperscript{52} TNA: CO 926/158, ‘Cyprus Intelligence Committee’.
\textsuperscript{53} TNA: CO 926/157, fl.E10, ‘Education in Cyprus’.
\textsuperscript{54} TNA: FCO 9/1886, fl.38, ‘Letter by Michael Carver’.
[students] to prevent their going elsewhere’, as all that was required to attend Greek institutions was a school leaver’s certificate. In a more modern context, and not therefore as open to nationalist sentiment but still reflecting the cultural affiliation and external models of development linked to Greek Cypriot education, in the academic year of 2009-10 just under half of all students in tertiary education, totalling some 20,051 Cypriots, chose to study abroad. Of these students, 51.2 percent chose to attend institutions in Greece whilst 39.8 percent chose to study at British institutions. Although not necessarily the case today given the figures above, historically British universities, and the English School in Nicosia, were the institutions of choice for those able to afford such scholarly activities. This process, according to Yiannis Ioannou, was linked to a ‘neo-colonial inferiority complex’ amongst Cypriots who often returned from these institutes with an Anglicised identity, as their attendance was a way of exorcising the ‘humiliations of the past’ by embracing the habits and perceived advanced ideals of those ‘powerful Europeans’. Within this reading, Ioannou does not reflect on the changes fostered amongst the significant number of Cypriots attending the universities of Greece, who were themselves engaged in an assimilative process rooted around ‘external’ ideals. This reflects, in a way, both the perceived ‘natural’ links to the motherland and the consideration that the concept of domination, and the imposition of these specific ideals, only exists when it is perceived as such.

Indeed a second way of considering this educational connection is through the prism of informal colonialism. In taking the central element of crypto-colonialism, the power of external models structuring internal cultural developments, this educational process and the broader state structures of Cyprus are intentionally shaped to coincide with the inferred ideals of an external force. Therefore within these educational frameworks, Cypriot development was engaged in a process of ideological assimilation to the dominant discourse of mainland Greece through the dispersion of their ideals via a ‘soft power’ technique. This process of ‘soft power’ utilises the performative force of persuasion, within a co-optive framework, to attract and shape a particular community to its cultural ideal. Central to this is the export of these ideals through ‘contacts, visits and exchanges’, such as the fostering of ‘Greek nationalism’ in those Cypriots enrolled in the universities of Greece, to provide the basis for

56 TNA: CO 926/158, ‘Cyprus Intelligence Committee’.
their wider dissemination. Consequent the host community does not realise it is under the influence of a ‘colonial’ system as it subtly disguises its frameworks around existing models of development in order to create, in the words of Bhabha, “the colonised as a social reality which is at once an “other” yet entirely knowable and visible”. Taking the model of Michel Foucault, these structures of power were not simply a negative force implanting a foreign system on Cyprus, but a productive network that ‘induces pleasure [and] forms knowledge’ by engaging with indigenous concepts of ‘culture’ and history and structuring their development within a system the wider community would ‘accept and make function as true’. In other words the creation of this Cypriot ideal as ‘almost the same but not quite’ was governed by a complex interplay of internal desire influenced, and to a degree framed, by external models that postulated what should constitute a Greek Cypriot. As such AKEL’s attempted revision of school history texts could be considered a means of trying to reformulate this connection by focussing more on the ‘shared national values’ of the Cypriot people, than those shared between Greece and Cyprus. This process however does not impose an outside system onto Cyprus that demands adherence akin to British rule, but rather provides the frameworks to aid the development of Cypriot national ideals which can either be close to, or distant from Greece.

6.3 Defending Cultural Ideals

Indeed for many interviewed for this project, their Hellenic identity is indigenously rooted in a clear historical continuity from antiquity to the present, as Anastasia from Limassol stated:

Cyprus was a Greek island for twelve centuries; it was inhabited by the Mycenaean’s... [and] by the heroes of the Trojan War who created our cities, so we consider ourselves the sacred children of the heroes of the Trojan War.

While the existence of a ‘Greek nation’ in antiquity, at least in a modern sense, is somewhat of a misnomer given different communities would often share customs but only maintain loyalty to the city, not a specific ‘nation’, modern identities are nevertheless founded on this sense of continuity. There are clear and visible signs of this ancient Hellenic heritage across Cyprus, from archaeological sites to the artefacts within museums, which not only

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61 Bhabha, Location of Culture, p.101.
63 Bhabha, Location of Culture, p.122.
64 Christou, ‘UCY secures €80m more’.
65 Interview with Anastasia, Nicosia, 9 August 2011; Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012.
binds this modern construct of identities to an ancient past, but in doing so places them within an ideal that has been utilised in European modernity as the cultural foundation of western civilisation.67 Indeed as Demetris Christofias stated during the accession process of Cyprus into the European Union in July 2003, Cyprus was a country which directly ‘contributed to the creation of a European civilisation’.68 In connecting these statements to Herzfeld’s definition of a crypto-colony, states under this ‘colonial’ condition often adopt an ‘aggressive promotion of their claims to civilizational superiority or antiquity’ as a means of buttressing their identities against ‘some vague category of barbarians’.69 With the presence of an increasing number of mainland Turkish settlers within northern Cyprus, coupled to the historic questioning of Greek Cypriot identities by the British colonial authorities, there has long been a perceived need to protect and defend the ‘civilised’ and Hellenic nature of Cyprus. In 1954 for example, a call was made to boycott a British educational magazine by the Ethnarchy, as one complaint amongst many concerned the image of Alexander the Great, who conquered/liberated Cyprus in 333BC, as ‘it fails to stress that one of his greatest achievements of the past, the spreading of Greek civilisation or that his plans, aims and culture were all Greek’.70 As Maria Koundoura has noted, the symbolic importance of Alexander within Greek models of development has seen his image be utilised to justify irredentist expansion, to resist the ‘subjugating projections of European Philhellenism’, to ward off the ‘danger of Slavicisation’, and ultimately to project a narrative of continuity from antiquity to modernity.71 Within Cyprus this model is paralleled, as British questioning of Cypriot roots understandably provoked a defensive response, as being Greek is not only a natural development but it is also European, and therefore part of the image of civilisation rooted within modern European ideologies. Theoretically this can also be achieved in both Cyprus and the diasporic community by embracing elements of ‘Britishness’, which is something Ioannou noted amongst those Cypriots who attended British educational institutes. However in the diasporic instance, the first generation of Cypriots living in Britain will always maintain a cultural and linguistic difference that distinguishes them in both a physical and imagined sense.72 On Cyprus, although one can accept and adopt certain ‘British’ concepts and influences both actively and unconsciously, ultimately to be ‘British’ is to be

67 See Herzfeld, Ours Once More.
foreign whereas the ‘Greekness’ of Cyprus is ‘natural’ and rooted around a visible and physical ‘culture’, heritage and language. Therefore the Republic of Cyprus utilises the Aphrodite model to root the island’s identity in an ancient ideal linked to westernised concepts. The state then staunchly defends this process, as in the words of the Cyprus Tourism Organisation, ‘a country’s cultural heritage is the most important living treasure of its people, [as] it is through this that its identity can be expressed and an awareness of its historical continuity through time can be created’.

This ‘aggressive’ defence of Cypriot roots was further reflected in Georgiades’s History of Cyprus. This school text detailed that it was the Ancient Greeks who ‘created a national spirit’ amongst Cypriots that meant ‘no power on Earth could deflect the orientation of Cyprus towards the rest of the Hellenic world’, be they the Saracens in the ninth century, or the Ottomans and British more recently. This sentiment was also noted by Glafcos Clerides on the 1 April 1967, some twenty days before the military coup in Greece that would have such significant repercussions on Cyprus, when he stated:

the unity which links Greece and Cyprus is not based on temporary calculations but on foundations of granite, which in spite of the long slavery of Cyprus, have not been shaken… [by those] who tried unsuccessfully to drive Cyprus away from Greece.

As a final more recent example, in September 2013 the European Party (a splinter of the conservative DISY) MP Demetris Syllouris warned that educational reforms must not serve as ‘an excuse to unGreekify what is historically a most Greek country’. As such this island of Aphrodite is involved in a cultural interplay with both the influence and image of Greece, and also the broader concept of ‘civilisation’ framed within the discourses of European modernity. Indeed as Vassos Argyrou contends, to understand Cyprus is to understand how European hegemony works in the margins of Europe. In this reading Cyprus is ‘ruled by the

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75 Quote from description of the influence of the Cypriot leader Evagoras in the Fourth Century BC in Georgiades, History of Cyprus, p.75; References to the ‘distortion of historical fact’ regarding the loss of Hellenism during Saracen incursions pp.140-144; Ottoman and British domination pp.209-245.

76 PIO: ‘Speech by the President of the House of Representatives’, 1 April 1967, p.3.

77 Pantelides, ‘The great Greek debate a “straw man”’. 

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idea of Europe’ through internal attempts to conform to these European ideologies of modernity and civilisation as a means of ‘cultural security’ against ‘contaminated’, and therefore backward inferences of the ‘orient’. This is a particularly valid observation, although equally this crypto-colonial process reveals the anxiety inherent within the transnational discourse of Greece, as both Greece and Cyprus are effectively ‘bound’ to crypto-colonial frameworks and external models for their internal self-perception. By synthesising this crypto-colonial approach to Bhabha’s concept of ‘mirroring’, the frameworks shaping this anxiety on Cyprus are brought into clearer focus.

This process of mirroring is an element of the ‘stereotype’ inherent within Bhabha’s reading of colonial discourse, as it engages a double imagination of ‘narcissism and aggressivity’. This is played out both on the part of the colonised who assume a ‘discrete image which allows it to postulate a series of equivalences, sameness’s [and] identities between the objects of the surrounding world’, and on the part of the coloniser whose aggressive ‘superiority’ belies the narcissistic anxiety inherent within their own self-identity. On both levels there is a latent anxiety. On the part of the colonised who are ‘almost the same, but not quite’ as their image of identity ‘is always threatened by “lack”’, and on the part of the coloniser whose own self-image is influenced by the cultural interplay of the colonial system that leads to an erosion of the stability of their ideals.

Elements of this concept are not directly relevant to Cyprus given both the ‘soft power’ assimilative techniques of the informal colonial model, and the fact that Bhabha is referring to forms of direct colonial domination sustained with particularly racialised examples of European dominance. In turn his reading has been criticised by, amongst others Anthony Easthope, for this ‘adversarial discourse’ and overemphasis on difference, as ultimately everything is different from something in one way or another. Through this emphasis, not only is there a lack of historical or political analysis linked to the concept of identity, but ‘his failure to relativize identity means he is stuck with the notion of absolute identity which he is opposed to; he is therefore driven back to a binary opposition: either full identity or no identity at all, only difference’. As such Bhabha’s reading could almost be defined as akin to those interpretations his theories were developed against, as a universalistic reading that lacks individual agency. However, despite this critique, the notion of anxiety

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79 Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, pp.110-117.
80 Ibid, p.110.
can be used to reflect and expand the crypto-colonial model which is also structured around a strong centralised authority, but one rooted in the struggle to conform to externalised imaginations. Within this informal colonial model there is a negotiation of cultural meaning. The anxiety inherent within mainland Greek discourses fostered an aggressively dominant ideal of Hellenism that was exported through the ‘imperialistic’ frameworks of its national structures. In Cyprus the acceptance and adaptation of these ideals can reveal an anxiety in their internal self-perception as being ‘almost the same, but not quite’. This is evident in the occasional mirroring of mainland political models, as developments in Greece have historically influenced Cypriot politics. This can be witnessed both in the staunch conservatism of Greece and the interconnected marginalisation of the left by EOKA in the 1950s, and again in the 1980s with the re-emergence of Cypriot-Hellenism as a mainstream ideology following the electoral victory of Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) party in Greece.\textsuperscript{82} Equally this anxiety can be embraced as a form of colonial ‘menace’. This ‘difference’ has been used for some to emphasise the historical superiority of Cyprus in areas such as education and economics over mainland Greek models. For others, however, certain elements of Cypriot culture such as art and language have often been deemed to ‘lack something’.\textsuperscript{83} In the case of language, although the Cypriot dialect retains elements of ancient Greek ‘which have been lost to its modern [Greek] descendant’, it also retains distinctive idioms from many of the other rulers of Cyprus over the years, including British and Turkish influences.\textsuperscript{84} Indeed the Cypriot vernacular is distinct from mainland Greece to the extent it is often said to be difficult to comprehend for speakers of ‘standard Greek’.\textsuperscript{85} In turn it was suggested in the \textit{Cyprus Mail} that during the economic downturn in Greece, some Cypriot employers preferred to hire ‘Greeks because they speak better Greek than Cypriots do’.\textsuperscript{86} 

This process can therefore reflect the latent anxiety inherent within the national-imperial frameworks of this informal colonial system, as it creates an internal otherness with


an underlying potential for ‘menace’ through the unease inherent in being ‘almost the same but not quite’. This is particularly evident in the peculiarity of Cyprus having an official written language based on demotic Greek, and an ‘official’ spoken language based on a distinct Cypriot vernacular. Issues linked to this process are particularly illuminating. In 1957, British attempts to reform the educational system with textbooks produced in Cyprus were blocked by the Greek Cypriot members of the ‘Executive Council of Education’, in part, because it was argued ‘Athens-produced readers were necessary linguistically if the influence of local style idiom etc. (sic) was to be avoided’. This quote maintains remarkable parallels to a controversy from September 2013 when Archbishop Chrysostomos II criticised in a church circular the elevation of the Cypriot dialect to the status of a language within educational reforms, ominously stating this process would create a language ‘which may come from Greek… but will not be Greek’. These criticisms were supported by President Anastasiades, as after the unveiling of a new EOKA memorial, he spoke of the need to ‘safeguard religion and the Greek language, the constituent elements of our national identity… [as] we must never forget our Greek ancestry’. Central to this denunciation was the perennial fear, particularly among some conservative elements, that this reform could create, as Chrysostomos stated, a ‘Cypriot national conscience, which will be clearly distinguished from our Greek national conscience’. This last quote is particularly revealing and again refers back to 1954 and criticisms by the Ethnarchy regarding the introduction of a British educational magazine in Cypriot schools, as ‘Cypriot children are not (repeat not) cosmopolitan, but Greek with Greek conscience and they should only (repeat only) read magazines of that nature’.

Within these three examples, each reflecting particularly conservative positions, there is the underlying assumption of the inferiority of the local dialect, which in turn can reflect many of the anxieties inherent in the construction of Greek Cypriot identities as being of Greek, but not Greek in the sense of being part of the mainland. Indeed Tabitha Morgan

87 Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, p.122.
89 TNA: CO 926/157, fl.14, ‘Note by Christopher Cox’, 31 January 1957.
91 PIO: ‘Speech of the President of the Republic’, 15 September 2013.
92 Pantelides, ‘The great Greek debate a “straw man”’.
93 TNA: CO 926/157, fl.77, ‘Link between Ethnarchy and Communists’. 174
postulated this ‘pervading lack of belief in anything Cypriot’ was singularly the result of the British colonial occupation. This certainly has value as two of those examples outlined above maintained cultural undertones designed to question the ‘Greekness’ of Cypriots to justify British domination of the island. However this reading should not overshadow the influence of the ‘motherlands’ in shaping this unease. For example, the poet Mehmet Yashin has referred to the ‘ritual of self-annihilation’ inherent within many Greek Cypriot literary productions which often marginalise their ‘mother tongue’ of Kypriaka to associate with their demotic ‘step-mothertongue’ from Greece. This process maintains a parallel to the concerns of Chrysostomos II, as with his conservative supporters he feared the elevation of the Cypriot dialect would disassociate Cyprus from Greece, and thereby forge a distinct identity which would be ‘almost the same but not quite’. This concept of an internal otherness, or colonial ‘menace’, is embraced by some, particularly those of a Cypriotist perspective, whilst for others such as Chrysostomos II it can provide an anxious cultural difference marked by ‘lack’. Indeed this internal otherness can create the Cypriot as a ‘partial presence’, as their identification is not fixed but is ‘dependant for its representation upon some strategic limitation or prohibition within the authoritative discourse’.

To elaborate on this Bhabha utilises the example of a ‘flawed colonial mimesis’ in which a colonial subject can be ‘Anglicised’ but not English. In re-reading this for the Cypriot condition, Greek Cypriots were ‘Hellenised’ through the cultural interplay of external ideals modelled and adapted around internal concepts of ‘culture’, but they were not ‘Greek’ in the sense of the mainland and retained their particular idiosyncrasies, especially linguistically.

Equally, however, in the national reading embraced by figures such as Chrysostomos II, whereby Cyprus and Greece form part of the same cultural nation, language is a central process in creating a form of solidarity within this imagined community. Indeed Hobsbawn has noted that language and nationalism are deeply intertwined, as a particular form of language can be deemed the ‘soul of the nation’ and a crucial criterion of nationality. As these national languages are almost always ‘semi-artificial constructs’, framed by a standardised idiom through the downgrading of dialectical variances, the elevation of the Cypriot dialect can fundamentally challenge the structures of this shared community. It is language, or more precisely ‘print language’ that provides one of the foundations for the

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94 Morgan, Sweet and Bitter Island, p.256.
96 Bhabha, Location of Culture, p.123.
97 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp.133-135.
98 Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism, p.95.
construct of a national ‘community’, meaning for this community to survive and develop, it must be the same language. As such reforms attempted by AKEL, or those imposed by the British colonial authorities, can challenge this concept of the nation. In the case of British influences, it was done to continue and justify colonial domination. In the case of AKEL and other Cypriotist forces, it is undertaken to reinforce and structure their own concept of ‘community’ on Cyprus, a community which overlaps with but is different from those held by figures such as Chrysostomos II. Therefore, while these imaginations are distinct to Cyprus, they are far from unified and are engaged in a constant interplay between internal imaginings and external ideals.

6.4 ‘Who are the Cypriots?’

As such these dual influences can create tensions on Cyprus regarding what it is that defines a ‘Cypriot’ or indeed a ‘Greek Cypriot’. At a state level, there are in effect two dominant imagined communities within Greek Cypriot society, one that embraces Greece as a natural national extension of Cyprus, and one that is close to but distinct from its historic ‘motherland’. Both of these ‘communities’, which are not arbitrary but maintain many of the same features, negotiate the cultural influences of Greece, and indeed the subjugating forces of British colonialism, in order to construct their imagination of a particular ‘nation’. In order to analyse these influences further, it is useful to consider the underlying connotations bound in the opening lines of a letter from the British High Commission in February 1974 which stated ‘Cyprus is a fairly rum place, and the Cypriots a rum people’. This description can be interpreted in two particular ways, firstly linked to the wider implications of the Romeic ideal rooted around the Ottoman Millet system, and secondly as a means of analysing the peculiarities of Cyprus through a particularly English way of describing a ‘queer old place’. Although British definitions of ‘Cypriots’ are invariably fraught with colonial undertones of race and superiority, both of these definitions are useful within this analysis given the conflicting concept of ‘the self’ on Cyprus.

The term Romaios, or ‘Romans’ was initially a concept that emerged from the Byzantine Empire and was utilised within the Ottoman Millet system as a classification of all Orthodox Christians, although increasingly this became linked more directly to ‘Greeks’ above all else. Indeed this term was, and often remains used as an internal cultural

identification of the self, as it was strongly linked to the familiar attractions of Orthodox Christianity. The ‘Rock of Aphrodite’ near Paphos, for example, which is the mythic birthplace of Aphrodite and is also closely identified to the Byzantine hero Digenis, is still called *Petra tou Romiou*, or the Rock of the Greek. With the rise of political nationalism in the nineteenth century, there developed a divergence between Hellenic and *Romeic* ideals within the emergent Greece, as, simply put, political Hellenism was outwardly directed to link to European ideals, whereas *Romaios* was an introspective image of the self. As such the potential utilisation of this term by a British national, in the context of this perspective, can feasibly be seen as reflecting the ‘foreign’ criticisms of the Hellenic ideology of the wider Greek, and by inference, the Cypriot state. This in turn can highlight the anxiety inherent within Cyprus and the desire to be recognised as a Greek and a European entity, and not as the British often referred to the island as of the ‘Levant’. This was articulated by the President of the Republic, George Vassiliou, in June 1988 when he declared that ‘we may, in some respect, be considered to be a part of the Third World, but our culture is European.’ As such, this concept of a European culture is rooted in a westernised ideal of antiquity, to which Greek Cypriots claim a cultural continuity.

As an extension of this analysis, and linked to the second definition of ‘rum’ as a ‘queer strange’ place, is the internal definition of what constitutes a ‘Cypriot’ and whether this concept of ‘Europeaness’ extends to Turkish Cypriots. Indeed to the casual observer, identities on Cyprus are particularly anomalous as rather than simply being a Cypriot, one’s definition is usually prefixed with the accompanying ‘Greek’ or ‘Turkish’ element, thereby attaching one’s identity to particular and exclusive ethnic characteristics and models. This process is something that particularly agitates British born Cypriot John, as he stated:

I hate the thing, this thing where we are called Greek Cypriot – Turkish Cypriot, I just think is wrong. That in itself provokes segregation, just by calling somebody by his ethnic background, it’s like you are racially saying to him right you are on that side and you’re on that side. No, we are all Cypriots... If you are calling someone a Greek Cypriot, it means you’ve just called them a Greek, but we’re not Greek... I don’t feel Greek, I am not Greek, I am Cypriot. My origins are

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105 PIO: ‘Speech by the President of the Republic’, 7 June 1988.
106 Reflected in multiple interviews with British residents in Cyprus, including Interview with David, Paphos, 21 March 2013; Interview with Peter, Paphos, 21 March 2013.
Greek, but I am not Greek... we are Cypriot... Why should we call ourselves Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, why not just say Cypriot?\textsuperscript{107}

For John, ‘Cypriot is the main word, the key’ in defining his identity as ‘if my heart is elsewhere and not on this rock, it won’t work’. Yet for others such as Margarita from Kythrea, the Hellenic aspect of her identity is equally crucial, as she stated:

we are Greeks for 10,000 years, nobody says that Cyprus, it was something else, you can see from the history and the ancient places, our culture is Greek... [But] after Christofias became president... [educational reforms were] not in favour of the Greeks but against the Greeks... they say we just speak Greek, we are not Greeks, we are Cypriots, and it [or we] happens to speak Greek because the Greeks invade Cyprus at the ancient times, they conquer Cyprus. Yes but the Cypriots, who are the Cypriots?\textsuperscript{108}

These perspectives reflect the two dominant internal ideologies shaping identities and historical narratives on Cyprus, and indeed the diaspora community of London. The narrative of Margarita draws on the Cypriot-Hellenist model of nationality, which developed from an historic desire for \textit{enosis} to a modern defence of the Hellenic foundations of the island. The narrative of John reflects the Cypriotist model as he acknowledges his ‘Greek origins’, but stresses the central ‘Cypriot’ element of his identity and the physical independence of Cyprus from Greece. Also reflected within these narratives, although not solely directed by this, are latent political undertones and affiliations. Margarita criticises the reforms of AKEL as almost de-Hellenising. John praised these efforts as making ‘leaps and bounds’ in his perception of a fairer system. As noted in Chapter 5, politics and remembrance are inextricably bound on Cyprus, and one of the central issues at play within these debates and political conflicts, and something reflected within the narratives of John and Margarita, concerns what it is that actually defines a Cypriot.

If one were to look for this definition through the PIO documentary \textit{People of Cyprus}, one would find a ‘contemporary Cypriot’ is:

demonstrative, sociable and hardworking... [and] also deeply religious, the Orthodox Christian faith is a significant part of his culture, his very existence. The church has for centuries been his spiritual refuge at difficult moments in his life.\textsuperscript{109}

Within this description, a ‘contemporary Cypriot’ is effectively a Greek Cypriot. Although this documentary utilises the term ‘Cypriots’ in an apparently plural sense, the singular reference to the Orthodox religion belies any notion of inter-communality by excluding all

\textsuperscript{107} Interview with John, London, 22 November 2012.
\textsuperscript{108} Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012.
the other communities on the island from being ‘contemporary’ Cypriots. From this description, one can witness the foundations of Argyrou’s observation that if an ‘ideal solution’ for reunification is impossible, many Greek Cypriots would prefer the continued total exclusion of Turkish Cypriots from the Republic, as although Cyprus would remain divided ‘the part that counts would at least be purely Greek (and European)’. This process also reflects the negotiation of cultural meaning inherent in the construction of an identity that is, to varying personal degrees, both ‘Cypriot’ and ‘Greek’.

Although there are a number of different ways of considering the formation of national and cultural identities, it is argued here that the concept of Greek Cypriot identities, at least at a national level, are involved in a cultural and symbolic interplay between external ideals of conformity, and internal imaginations of the self. These identities are not static but evolve and change over time based on personal and collective needs. At a state level the construction of a ‘Greek Cypriot’ is subconsciously tied to external imaginations and frameworks. In considering this through a particular reading of Bhabha’s concept of the ‘transitional social reality’ of a colonial nation, the assimilative force of these frameworks aims to induce, through persuasive and performative idioms and ideals, ‘the transformation of the subject’ into an image of similarity rooted to the collective Greek ideal. However the structures transmitting this image maintain a latent anxiety at their core, given both the independence of Cyprus and the struggle of mainland Greek models to conform to Western ideals, meaning Cyprus and its people become ‘double natives’. Shaped both by internal forms of intimacy linked to their independent ‘Cypriot’ identity and cultural development, and by externalised imaginations of ‘Greekness’ rooted in the ideologies and cultural affinity to an ‘imagined’ ideal of Greece. It is this latter process that engages Cyprus in a relationship of ‘effective dependence’ to these externalised models, as both Hellenist and Cypriotist conceptualisations of ‘the self’ are reactions, albeit in differing forms, to the influences of Greece, which is itself shaped by the need to conform to a wider European discourse of civilisational ‘advancement’.

6.5 Cultural Affinity and Political Suspicion

It is perhaps no surprise therefore to note that in November 2013 the governments of Greece and Cyprus signed a ‘Memorandum of Cooperation for Overseas Greeks’, which set out to deepen the cooperation between these two states and contribute support to the

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110 Argyrou, ‘Independent Cyprus?’, p.44; See also Ozay Mehmet, ‘The end of the Cyprus Problem?’, Cyprus Mail, 8 March 2009.
111 Bhabha, Location of Culture, p.64.
‘organisational structures of overseas Hellenism’ in a variety of fields such as education, art and culture. Although these memoranda are not uncommon across the Balkan region, they reflect both the cultural affiliation between these states, and also the more general need to defend one’s shared nationalist discourse as distinctly European. As the Greek President Karolos Papoulias stated in October 2005:

the cooperation and coordination between our two governments are an important element of our national front... this position is determined by history, our fate is indissolubly linked with that of Cyprus.

This fate, given Cyprus is a ‘very weak, small country’ facing the ‘might’ of the Turkish army, involves assuming the mantle of protector of Cypriot Hellenism, as regular contact between these ‘governments, parliaments and political leadership’ reflects the ‘brotherly ties between Greece and Cyprus’.

However, this mantle, born through the external imposition of independence and placement of Cyprus and Greece as ‘brothers in different houses’, has historically brought significant political issues. For example, the desire of the Cyprus Government to be the ‘master of its own house’ after 1960, given the exclusion of the Cypriot authorities from the initial negotiations linked to the independence agreements, led to a series of struggles between Makarios and the respective governments of Greece, alongside their agents in Cyprus, for ‘leadership in the direction of Cyprus policy’. The British authorities in their analysis of the situation felt that Athens maintained an ‘ambivalent’ attitude towards Cyprus, and ultimately a ‘reluctance to accept full independence of action by the Cyprus Government because of the possible repercussions of its actions and policies on Greece’. As noted in Chapter 3, the Greek authorities were often willing to impose solutions on Cyprus, be it through the Acheson Plan of 1964, the Greek-Turkish dialogue of 1966-67 or the coup of 1974. In turn they would utilise their internal agents such as General Grivas or the officers of the National Guard to effectively seek ‘control’ of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and garner a solution beneficial to their own interests. Although the authorities in Nicosia disdained such imposed solutions and were reluctant to cede control over their own affairs, they recognised the need for continued Greek support as a means of countering pressure from Turkey, even

116 Interview with Charalambos, Limassol, 7 April 2014.
117 TNA: FCO 51/192, fl.2, ‘Research department memorandum’.
when political relations were strained. Following the attempted assassination of Makarios in March 1970, in which the alleged involvement of mainland Greek officers was ‘accepted’ by all, an official British report noted that Makarios was nevertheless still keen ‘to keep the Greek Government’s image sepulchral white’.

Therefore, whilst the British authorities felt they were being wrongfully ‘impugned’ for orchestrating this act, Makarios’s policy was driven in part by a ‘promise’ from Athens to ‘restrain [the] mainland Greek intrigues’ of Grivas and the officers of the National Guard.

Figure 6.1: G. Mavrogennis, ‘Η Ιστορία Επαναλαμβάνεται (History Repeats Itself)’, Satiriki, 21 May 1966, p.1. Reprinted on the 6 December 1974, p.6. (Both shields read ‘No’).

Although this was an empty promise, it reflects the fact that Makarios could not simply turn his back on Greece given their political, military and emotional power on and towards Cyprus. He could however ‘twist’ the image of Britain, or so British officials felt, given the perception and memory of their ‘Machiavellian’ policies towards both Cyprus and Greece.

In turn, when Makarios could not impose his will on Greece, he adopted the role of spoiler against the ‘solutions’ and ‘intrigues’ of the mainland, a role that led to multiple assassination attempts and ultimately a coup in 1974.

The power of these ‘intrigues’, and in turn the wider role of Greece within the construct of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ is aptly encapsulated in figure 6.1. This cartoon, originally published in Satiriki during the Greek-Turkish dialogue of 1966 but reproduced in 1974, draws a clear parallel between the Greek ‘betrayal’ of Leonidas to the Persians in antiquity, and the Greek ‘betrayal’ of Makarios to NATO and Turkey in modernity. Taking the place

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of the ‘traitor’ Ephialtes, who sold his soul to the Persians at Thermopylae, is the Greek Prime Minister in 1966 Stefanos Stephanopoulos. In return for a sack of US dollars:

the Government of Athens, faithful to their NATO advisors, undermined the [intercommunal] Greek-Turkish dialogue, the Government of Makarios, and like a new Ephialtes betrayed the struggle of Pan-Hellenism.\(^{122}\)

Indeed, Makarios and Stephanopoulos were known not to harbour strong relations with one another, with Makarios described as ‘Lucerific’ by Stephanopoulos for his opposition to the Acheson Plan. Therefore this short-lived Greek government of 1965-66, much like a variety of Greek governments throughout this period, tried to control Makarios with imposed solutions.\(^{123}\) However, in what could be deemed an extension, or alternatively a conceptual consequence of the socio-political intimacy infused within the inter-state connection of Greece and Cyprus, following the signing of the 2013 ‘Memorandum of Cooperation’, the Cyprus Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides (DISY) stated ‘that under no circumstances should Greece be likened to Turkey as regards the Cyprus problem’.\(^{124}\)

This statement, and the socio-political ideologies it represents, can have a significant influence on the construct of historical discourses and personal memories associated with the modern history of Cyprus. An influence which as the example of the 1970 assassination plot or the continued influence of the ‘Big Lie’ from 1974 emphasised, involves not only the image of Greece, but that of Britain as well. Within those interviews undertaken for this project, the statement of Kasoulides has, to varying degrees, both supporters and critics. The image of Greece, or one should perhaps say the Junta as these are often portrayed as separate entities, fluctuates significantly. This divergence is not simply between the diaspora and Cyprus, but between the political affiliations and the national sentiments of different individuals. Indeed Grigori from Famagusta stated in a somewhat understated fashion that ‘the role of Greece wasn’t the one it should be’ in 1974, whilst Christodoulos was less restrained in his observation, covering both Cypriot history and recent financial issues, that:

every time they put their hand into any situation it has gone wrong… I don’t think any Greek government so far has shown any real interest in Cyprus… they tell the people in Greece, well we do care and this is our problem, they do it for their own political reasons. Somehow I don’t trust them.\(^{125}\)

\(^{122}\) Mavrogennis, ‘History Repeats Itself’, p.6.


\(^{124}\) Anonymous, ‘Cyprus and Greece sign Memorandum of Cooperation’.

\(^{125}\) Interview with Grigori, London, 3 July 2012; Interview with Christodoulos, London, 3 July 2012.
This narrative of ‘distrust’ directly corresponds with the political sentiment infused in figure 6.1, and the sense that the designs of Greece did not always correspond with those of the Cypriots. In turn this sentiment was reflected in multiple British Foreign Office reports throughout this period, such as one from 1982 which suggested that the government of Andreas Papandreou was ‘fed up with the Cypriots’ and their demands for assistance.\(^\text{126}\) Although relations between Papandreou and President Kyprianou of Cyprus were tense in the early 1980s, primarily due to Kyprianou’s links to AKEL, this Foreign Office report also noted that the placement of the ‘Cyprus issue’ into the context of Greek-Turkish relations reflected Papandreou’s ‘obsession with Turkey’ and ‘limited concern for the interests of the Greek Cypriots’.\(^\text{127}\) Whilst the British government arguably maintained even less interest in the ‘Cyprus Problem’ than Greece, actions such as these reflect Softonis’s view that Greece simply wants to ‘control’ Cyprus, and the view of British born Cypriot John that:

> Greece has done more bad to us than good. What they have done to us is just to satisfy their own needs. I think Greece, rather than have a neighbour the size of Turkey cross with them, the Greek governments of the past have said: “alright we’ll turn a blind eye to Cyprus so long as we [Greece and Turkey] can be friends”.\(^\text{128}\)

Within these four reflections from both the diaspora and Cyprus, two respondents offered clear praise to AKEL whilst the others did not refer to politics directly but reflected a Cypriotist mentality when describing their views of Cypriot history. As such, within this reading Greece can be embraced as a national partner, but it is also a foreign power with its own controlling interests towards Cyprus.

However, within other narratives a very different image emerges. Glafcos from Morphou was equally critical of the naivety of the Junta in launching the coup, yet he punctuated this statement with the comment that ‘no democratic government in Greece would do that, no way’.\(^\text{129}\) This exemplification of the Junta from ‘normal’ Greek models was further developed within the narratives of Giannis and Margarita who spoke of the coup being ‘engineered by the Americans’, thereby fixing the Junta to the wider remembrance archetype of ‘international interference’.\(^\text{130}\) However, as noted in Chapter 3, the democratic governments of Athens prior to 1967 also actively contemplated overthrowing Makarios. In

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\(^{128}\) Interview with Softonis, Limassol, 7 April 2014; Interview with John, London, 29 November 2012.

\(^{129}\) Interview with Glafcos, London, 7 March 2013; Similar themes are referenced by Makarios in PIO: ‘Speech by Makarios on the anniversary of the July 15 Coup’, 15 July 1975, p.3.

\(^{130}\) Interview with Giannis, London, 3 July 2012; Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012.
turn, Athens deployed a ‘secret army’ to Cyprus in 1964 in order to both ‘protect’ Cyprus and also act as a means of continuing the struggle for enosis. Yet despite their surreptitious deployment, Charalambos from Morphou remembered these soldiers as clearly visible from ‘real Cypriots’. The reason was once more language, ‘the idiom of Greek language is different from us, we speak the same language but with a different voice’. This brought a wry smile to Charalambos as he gave the example of the Greek soldiers who claimed they came from the Cypriot town of ‘Asia’ in the district of Famagusta. In ‘Cypriot-Greek’ this is pronounced ‘Asha’, whereas in ‘Greek-Greek’ it is pronounced ‘Assia’, with a stress on the ‘I’. Therefore those soldiers who claimed to come from ‘Assia’ were not in fact stating their Cypriot roots at all, but rather were claiming they came from the geographical area of Asia, which meant they came from Turkey. Although this army division was withdrawn from Cyprus following the Kofinou Crisis of 1967 and a threat of invasion by Turkey, their presence on the island emphasises it was not just the Junta who interfered in the internal affairs of Cyprus. Ultimately the main difference was that the Junta was ‘foolish’ enough to follow through with its ‘suicidal’ plans in 1974.

In drawing on Charalambos’s comment that Greece and Cyprus ‘speak the same language but with a different voice’ and applying it to the process of remembrance associated with the statement of Kasoulides’s, one can understand many of the tensions inherent in the position of Cyprus as both ‘Greek’ and independently ‘Cypriot’. Within this process the image of Greece can be shaped by a duality of influence. On the one hand a socio-cultural intimacy created through the shared frameworks of a ‘national’ discourse, and on the other a socio-political reaction against the informal colonial and controlling ‘interference’ of an external force. This dual framework has the power to shape both a critical imagination of Greece within Greek Cypriot society, and equally transfer significant aspects of blame for the issues of Cyprus away from their actions, and invariably onto that of NATO, Britain and the USA. However this is not an arbitrary delineation between the left and right, or between Cypriotists and Cypriot-Hellenists. For example, Eleni from Famagusta, who believes Cyprus and Greece belong to the same nation, was highly critical of some of the actions of Greece towards Cyprus, as ‘they have probably done more bad than good’ down the years.

131 Charalambos wrote the name of this town as ‘Asia’, in Greek it is Ασσια and translated into English as either ‘Assia’ or ‘Askeia’.
132 Interview with Charalambos, Limassol, 7 April 2014.
This statement does not change Eleni’s national sentiment towards Greece, but rather placed the crisis of 1974 for Eleni as the Cypriot sacrifice for Greek democracy.\textsuperscript{134}

This form of remembrance therefore reflects an element of this dual framework of national sentiment, as this ‘brotherly image’ projected and transmitted at a state level is subconsciously negotiated and moulded at a personal level to construct one’s imagination of the past. The narratives of Glafcos, Giannis and Margarita reflect elements of Papadakis’s observation concerning the ideal cultivated by conservative forces on the political right who wish to erase the stain of the calamitous coup from the collective memory of Cyprus and Cypriot Hellenism.\textsuperscript{135} The extent to which this is accepted by an individual or collective is dependent on their internal self-image, political affiliation and the types of knowledge they wish to ‘accept and make function as true’. Ultimately this process is undertaken at a symbolic and subconscious level. However the existence of this discourse and the developments that emanate from it, both Hellenist and Cypriotist in nature, reflect the latent influences of Greece in moulding the trajectory of Cypriot history.

6.6 Cypriotism

From these foundations, consideration will now be given to the concept of Cypriotism more directly. As the previous analysis indicated, the Cypriotist ideology can be used to embrace the internal otherness, or ‘menace’, inherent within the national-imperial discourses that symbolically influence the construction of Greek Cypriot identities and historical narratives. It does this by providing an ‘insurgent counter-appeal’, or alternative ideology, that attempts to embrace both the ideal of inter-communality, and the cultural difference inherent in being ‘almost the same but not quite’. These ideals, structured around an emphasis on ‘independence’ and the shared cultural traits between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities are traditionally associated with the political left, although its presence can be witnessed at times across the political spectrum. Given these projections, the concept of Cypriotism has been defined as almost ‘anti-ethnic’ by rejecting, or at least minimising the ‘Greek’ or ‘Turkish’ aspect of Cypriot identities.\textsuperscript{136} As an example of this, in May 2004, one month after the overall rejection of the Annan Plan, Demetris Christofias in a speech to British Cypriots at the Houses of Parliament in London stated:

\textsuperscript{134} Interview with Eleni, London, 25 March 2014.
\textsuperscript{135} See Papadakis, ‘Nation, Narrative and Commemoration’, pp.256-257.
\textsuperscript{136} See Mavratsas, ‘The ideological contest’, p.723.
I don’t want to separate the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. When we speak about a solution… we speak about the happiness… of Cypriots. So, I would try and speak as a Cypriot and I will not apologise to anyone.\textsuperscript{137}

As ‘children of the same motherland’, which in this instance is Cyprus, this speech reflects AKEL’s focus on the fraternal bonds amongst all Cypriots, irrespective of their ethnic identity, by embracing the concept of ‘mother’ Cyprus over ‘mother’ Greece or Turkey. Within this analysis it can be considered as an internal attempt to transcend the externalised frameworks that symbolically influence and shape the trajectory of internalised forms of self-perception and historical awareness.

The ‘counter-narrative’ of this, and the one Christofias will not ‘apologise to’, is Cypriot-Hellenism, which transitioned after the events of 1974 from a desire for enosis to an equally strong emphasis on Cypriot independence, an independence marked by a concomitant cultural and political affiliation to Greece. This is evident from comments made by the Minister of Education Andreas Christophides in June 1985, when he stated Cyprus maintains ‘unadulterated Greek traditions and a Greek culture’, and that ‘distances in this case, instead of a negative have played a positive role. The further we are, the closer we feel to Greece’.\textsuperscript{138}

In this sense, Cypriot-Hellenism is an internal discourse of ‘transformation’, framed with a more outwardly directed ideological structure compared to Cypriotist models, in order to link more readily to European ideals. A central theme within this ideology is the defence of Cyprus as a ‘most Greek country’ against both ‘Turkification’ in the North, and ‘de-Hellenisation’ in the South. Through the concept of ‘transformation’, both of these ideologies are postcolonial. Both operate against the latent effects of the British colonialism and undertake a cultural interplay with the wider influences of Greece. In turn both seek to ‘reconstitute a shattered community’, albeit in differing fashions and at times different communities, from the influences and ideals of the various externalised discourses that have shaped the trajectory of Cypriot history.

Indeed if one were to consider Herzfeld’s observation that the connection to Greece is a form of ‘cultural as well as political colonialism in itself’, could these discourses, and in particular the concept of Cypriotism, be defined as a form of ‘post-colonial’ resistance to these influences? As Bill Ashcroft has noted, not all ‘post-colonial’ discourse is anti-colonial, as competing ideologies will operate alongside one another to create, or recreate a sense of being at the national level.\textsuperscript{139} The concept of Cypriotism increasingly emerged in

\textsuperscript{137} PIO: ‘Speech by the President of the House of Representatives’, 25 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{138} PIO: ‘Lecture by the Minister of Education’, 7 June 1985, p.2.
\textsuperscript{139} Ashcroft, \textit{On Post-Colonial Futures}, p.24.
the 1920s within the pronouncements of the Cyprus Communist Party, reflecting in part the Marxist rejection of nationalism, at a time when the Church of Cyprus had adopted a strongly nationalist character in its political desire for enosis.\textsuperscript{140} As Caesar Mavratsas has argued, Cypriots and communists are often described as ‘not real Greeks’ by their critics, as their ideological focus is often distinct from those who maintain a strong national affiliation to Greece.\textsuperscript{141} However within previous analyses of the development of Cypriotism as an ideological concept, it is often defined as ‘anti-ethnic’ or ‘anti-nationalist’, but its foundations as a ‘post-colonial’ discourse of ‘resistance’ and ‘transformation’ are overlooked.\textsuperscript{142} Yet as Ashcroft noted, if one were to understand the term ‘post-colonial’ to mean simply the discourse of the ‘colonised’, then post-colonial analysis becomes ‘that which analyses the full range of responses to colonialism, from absolute complicity to violent rebellion’.\textsuperscript{143} This, however, is not a ‘colonial’ connection akin to British rule, which was foreign and imposed, meaning this ‘post-colonial’ analysis is itself hybridised. There are considerable issues with the term post-colonial, as it is both ambiguous and universalising, as it implies the end of a particular type of relationship and can often falsely homogenise a set of diverse conditions within a particularly broad term.\textsuperscript{144} In turn it can inflate the significance of culture over the political and often the national. Nevertheless, in the context of this analysis, if one were to consider the connection to Greece as ‘colonial’, in the sense that the structures of power between these states are recognised as designed to control or subjugate, then the reaction against these power structures, even whilst they are still ongoing, could feasibly be defined in ‘post-colonial’ terms.

From this reading, one can re-interpret these Cypriotist discourses in particular as a form of nationalised ‘counter-narrative’, which Bhabha has described as seeking to ‘disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which “imagined communities” are given essentialist identities’.\textsuperscript{145} This is partially evident in the narrative of Christodoulos from Famagusta, as he stated:

\textsuperscript{140} See Mavratsas, ‘The ideological contest’, p.722.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, p.729.
\textsuperscript{145} Bhabha, ‘DissemiNation’, p.300.
I believe Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, they are closer, they are nearer to each other than Greeks [Cypriot] to Greeks [Greece], or Turks [Cypriot] to Turkey. We have more customs and tradition between us with the Turkish Cypriot than we have with the Greeks. We speak Greek, or a dialect of Greek, a Greek dialect, but at the same time I don’t believe that, somehow, where do you start your history, in 1821?... So when you go back some people say Cyprus belonged to Greece, alright it belonged to Greece, when?... tell me the year and I’ll tell you who to blame [for the division of Cyprus].

While this could equally be defined as an ‘essentialist’ reading of the nation, as it is just focussed on a different shared community, Christodoulos also embraces his ‘internal otherness’ by not totally discounting his connections to ‘other Greeks’, but rather roots his conceptualisation of the self with ‘other Cypriots’, be they Greek or Turkish, before all else. This process was repeated by Charalampos from Morphou, who argued ‘we are all Cypriot, and our difference is religion, Christian Cypriots and Muslim Cypriots’. In turn British born Cypriot John stated that the Republic of Cyprus ‘has and always will cater for Turkish Cypriots, the key is in their title, Cypriots, they are Cypriots too’. Those who are not Cypriots are the ‘other other’ of Turkish settlers, who in Greek Cypriot state models are manifestly ‘un-European’, and to a significant degree distinct from the Turkish Cypriot community with whom Greek Cypriots share a cultural bond. It is this cultural bond that is embraced more prominently within Cypriotist discourses, from its roots in the 1920s to AKEL’s policy of rapprochement in the post-1974 period. This is also evident in Cypriot-Hellenist discourses, but it is not as prominent or as overt as those Cypriotist projections. This is reflected particularly prominently within those diasporic informants who are physically, although not emotionally or politically detached from their birthplace, or ‘second home’ of Cyprus. Therefore in limiting, although generally not fully removing the ‘Greek’ or ‘Turkish’ element from their definition of ‘Cypriots’, the ideal of Cypriotism effectively challenges the latent ‘essentialist’ quality of many state, and indeed international models that tend directly and subconsciously to embrace and disseminate an ideal of identity and history that is promulgated as intercommunal, but which ultimately is imbued with a separatist quality of exclusion. As such it is the power to narrate one’s own history and culture that is central to these debates, as the ‘seizing of self-representation’ imbues the ‘colonised’ with

146 Interview with Christodoulos, London, 3 July 2012.
147 Interview with Charalampos, Limassol, 7 April 2014.
their own ‘self-empowerment’ to transform the colonial discourse to suit a particular community’s internal self-perception, which for many today is focussed on reunification.\footnote{Ashcroft, \textit{On Post-Colonial Futures}, p.46.}

However the reconstitution of this ‘shattered society’ and the competing fraternities with Greece on the one hand and the Turkish Cypriots on the other complicates this ‘appropriation’ of meaning. For example, embracing the Turkish Cypriot community at a state level means negotiating a recent history truncated by conflict and division, without removing, ‘simply for the sake of reunification’, the particular characteristics and cultural distinctiveness of the wider Greek Cypriot community.\footnote{See Anonymous, ‘Is the Cyprus Problem 40 or 50 years old?’, \textit{Cyprus Mail}, 27 October 2013.} Within this process, the image of the EOKA struggle has been partially and symbolically transformed from a struggle for \textit{enosis}, which was exclusively a Greek Cypriot struggle, to the broader struggle for national liberation which, in theory at least, can embrace all Cypriots irrespective of their politics or identity. In attempting to bring forth reunification therefore, the ‘doubleness’ of Cypriot identities becomes apparent, as Cypriotist ideologies embrace more directly the cultural intimacy of their ‘internal otherness’. However the transmission of these discourses will generally not completely break from their ‘ethnic’ heritage, to not only gain widespread public support, but also to ‘protect’ the ‘European’ nature of Greek Cypriot society.\footnote{See Anonymous, ‘History is about understanding not blame’, \textit{Cyprus Mail}, 21 January 2009; PIO: ‘Interview by President Vassiliou to Turkish Television’, 23 August 1988.}

As such the transmission of Cypriotist ideologies can be considered in two distinct ways. On the one hand it could be deemed as an internal cultural identification of the ‘self’ akin to the affiliation of \textit{romaios} within Greece. On the other it could be considered a form of active ‘post-colonial’ resistance against the foreign models and actions of Britain and Greece. Therefore if one were to consider Cypriotism through Said’s concept of transformative resistance, its structures emerged following:

the period of primary resistance, literally fighting against outside intrusion, there comes the period of secondary, ideological, resistance, when efforts are made to reconstitute a “shattered community, to save or restore the sense and fact of community against all the pressures of the colonial system”.\footnote{Said, \textit{Culture and Imperialism}, pp.252-253.}

The colonial system therefore creates, or shapes, specific national ideals and ideological concepts within the post-colonial state that are designed to overcome the latent effects of colonial domination. In this sense the ‘colonial system’ is a hybridised collaboration between the influences of Greece, the ‘manipulation’ of Britain, and the interplay and negotiation of these influences by the Cypriot community. As such this first phase of ‘primary resistance’
can be interpreted as the period leading up to 1974 when Cypriotism was largely marginalised by the dominant ideologies of *enosis* and *taksim*, whilst the second emerged after 1974 through the desire for reunification. Indeed 1974 and the great Greek ‘betrayal’ is the key date in this process, as in comparison to the 16 August 1960, the transition from colony to independence was not as marked, or abrupt, as the transition from a ‘unified’ Republic to a partitioned island. As such this resistance is targeted against British domination, both colonial and neo-colonial, and the influence and actions of the motherlands. During the first phase, the concept of Cypriotism was embraced by elements of the left, who were often targeted and labelled by EOKA, especially in the 1950s, as ‘traitors’ to the cause of *enosis* and Hellenism.\(^{155}\) In turn it was embraced, often alongside the concept of independence, by others across the political spectrum, such as Archbishop Makarios after 1960, for political or commercial reasons. Drawing on Said’s conceptualisation, this fighting of ‘outside intrusion’ should, as being more ideological than physical, be extended to the defence and ‘protection’ of Cyprus’s intercommunal integrity, and later independence, from the ‘control’ of external ideals, and ultimately in 1974, direct ‘interference’ aimed at destabilising the independence of the island. The events of 1974 mark this transition to the period of ‘secondary, ideological resistance’. The Greek ‘betrayal’ and concomitant marginalisation of Greek Cypriot nationalism, which itself re-emerged in the 1980s, resulted in the rise of Cypriotist discourses into mainstream politics and society, primarily as a means of reconstituting the ‘shattered’ ideal, both real and imagined, of peaceful coexistence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. This heralded an increased emphasis on specifically Cypriot symbols and ceremonies, such as Cypriot Independence Day, whilst more recently aspects of the Cypriotist ideology have influenced the revisions and rewriting of historical narratives within educational reforms. However, as figure 6.2 illustrates, with the military umbrella offered by the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis in 1975, this was not a full transition and complete break. The events of 1974 also brought about a concomitant revival and reaffirmation, financially, politically and militarily, of the strong ties between the newly democratic state of Greece and the now largely Greek-dominated Republic of Cyprus. This was clear for example through the creation of the Greece-Cyprus ‘Joint Defence Doctrine’ of the 1990s, and more generally in the placement of Cyprus’s reunification process within the wider realm of Greek and Turkish international politics.\(^{156}\) While this

\(^{155}\) See Pantelides, ‘No longer traitors to the EOKA cause’.

cartoon could be considered a biting satire of the actions of Greece towards Cyprus, given the events precipitated by the Junta in 1974, it also reflects the fact that Cyprus and Greece remain close partners in a number of national and political affairs. In a paradoxical sense therefore, the events of 1974 led to a rise in specific Cypriotist symbols of independence, yet also prevented the complete break of Cyprus from the ‘motherland’.

Indeed this can also be witnessed at a public level across both sides of the Cyprus divide, as the concept of Cypriotism is not wholly or even widely embraced within modern Cyprus. One only needs to observe the allegations of ‘de-Hellenisation’ within educational reforms to witness the significant resistance elements of society exert against this Cypriotist discourse.157 However this ideological ‘counter-narrative’, in attempting to ‘save or restore the sense and fact of community’, sought the transformation and elevation of the concept of a ‘Cypriot’ from beyond the colonial ideologies and transnational ideals of Britain and the motherlands, by rooting this collective re-imagination to an idealised image of inter-communality. By rooting this in Bhabha’s reading of the ‘nation’, this re-imagination ‘fills

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157 For examples from the TRNC see Anonymous, ‘Lone Turkish Cypriot marks Cyprus's independence’, *Cyprus Mail*, 18 August 2012; Stefanos Evripidou, ‘When they call me a traitor, I feel more Cypriot’, *Cyprus Mail*, 25 December 2009.

the void left in the uprooting of communities and kin, and turns that loss into the language of metaphor’, by transforming the ‘scraps, patches and rags of daily life’ into signs of national culture. However there are tensions inherent within this national culture, as the transformation of the ‘colonial’ discourse into a post-colonial ideal requires subconsciously traversing the issues of resistance and complicity, imitation and originality, in the construction, and indeed reconstruction of a modern conceptualisation of the self and ‘other’. As such the Cypriotist ideology and its inflections into mainstream Cypriot narratives maintain a complicated and ambivalent relationship with Greece, at times shaped by a ‘cultural discourse of suspicion’, and at other times embraced as a distant, or indeed close fraternal partner.

This complicated relationship, and the fluctuating affiliation to these discourses based on socio-political and cultural issues, are evident in two statements made by the former President of Cyprus Demetris Christofias. In November 2004 he spoke of the ‘importance of the brotherly ties’ between Greece and Cyprus for the defence of Cypriot interests. In July 2012 he stated ‘we do not need motherlands, guardians, Turkey, Greece or “stepmother” Britain’. Although there are political undertones within both of these comments, his embracing of Greece on the one hand and rejection on the other is particularly revealing in understanding the inter-state connection between Greece and Cyprus. In the first example, the reference to ‘brothers’ implies a level of equality between the discourses of mainland Hellenism and Cypriot Hellenism, as although they may have differing forms, they share a central ideal and focus. This was evidenced by the signing of the ‘Memorandum of Cooperation’ in November 2013, and the mutual desire to defend their shared nationalist discourse as distinctly European. Furthermore, when Christofias evoked this statement in 2004, significant sections of society in Greece and Cyprus were celebrating Cyprus’s accession into the European Union as the final triumph of the dream of enosis. Therefore Greece and Cyprus were truly ‘European’ brothers, although equally brothers can be competitive, and by embracing the ‘internal otherness’ inherent in being ‘almost the same but not quite’, this ideal of advancement can be fully projected across the ideological divide.

In the second example, the rejection of a need for a ‘motherland’ could feasibly be viewed as the repudiation of the ‘child-like’ status of Cyprus inherent within imperialistic discourses, be they British, ‘internationalist’, Greek or Turkish. This concept of ‘childhood’,

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160 Evripidou, “‘Stepmother’ Britain does not favour us”, p.2.  
as primitive, educable and able to form in the image of the ‘imperial mother’, is inherent in the model of colonial ‘stereotype’ that not only serves as justification for the ‘colonisers’ domination, but is negotiated and transformed by the ‘colonised’ through the ‘shadowy’ image of the ‘mimicking other’. This transformation is often marked by uncertainty concerning whether the ‘past is really past’, as the latent influences of this discourse continue to permeate into the collective subconscious by symbolically influencing the trajectory of post-colonial identities. Through the issues expressed within these two statements, one can witness the anxiety inherent in the position of Cyprus as closely affiliated to Greece on the one hand, and its desire for a return and reunification with an increasingly distant, but ultimately fraternal, Turkish Cypriot community on the other. Indeed as Christodoulos from Famagusta stated concerning the diasporic community of London:

I can’t go out there and say, here is a Greek Cypriot, here is a Turkish Cypriot, you can’t tell them [apart], unless you ask their name, unless they talk to you... some of them have broken Greek. [But] we are mixed; we never had any problem in this country [UK] because no-one else interferes with the community.

This view was echoed in Cyprus by Softonis from Morphou, as after detailing the interference of international forces on Cyprus, Softonis argued:

we don’t want to have this influence, not from Greece, not from Turkey, [and] not from the British... I am sure if the people of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot, live alone it will only be a few hours, only one day to agree to sign a solution.

It is this form of foreign interference therefore, shaped by the concomitant reactions and transformation of these ideals by sections of the Cypriot community, that the discourse of Cypriotism emerged as a mainstream ideology after the events of 1974, and why it continues to have an influence to this day.

Equally, in a more abstract reading, an aspect of this Cypriotist ideology provides an alternative ideal for Cypriot development that can emphasise the European nature of the island, whilst still embracing the otherness inherent in Cypriot identities. For example, if both communities are ‘Cypriot above all else’ through the marginalisation and subsequent reinvention of one’s ‘ethnic’ roots, and given ‘the fact’ historically the people of Cyprus moulded the ‘creation of a European civilisation’, the embracement of elements of Cypriotist ideologies allows for the projection of an inter-communality that will maintain, internally at

\[162\] See Ashcroft, On Post-Colonial Futures, pp.36-53; Bhabha, Location of Culture, pp.110-117; Said, Orientalism, p.219.

\[163\] Said, Culture and Imperialism, p.1.

\[164\] Interview with Christodoulos, London, 3 July 2012.

\[165\] Interview with Softonis, Limassol, 7 April 2014.
least, the ‘European’ and ‘civilised’ status of the island, especially against the looming figure of the Turkish settlers. This ideal was clearly evident in the PIO documentary *Multicultural Cyprus*, which stated:

> the average Cypriot, in character and behaviour, may be described both as a European of the East and as an Oriental European. This double identity defines Cypriots as people with sensitivity that others who do not have this peculiar relation with both aspects of the modern world would have difficulty in understanding.\(^{166}\)

However in striving to be ‘European’, be it Eastern or Oriental, there is still a tendency to subconsciously conform to the symbolic ideals and latent influences of externalised imaginations concerning the image and ideal of the internal self. Nevertheless both the Cypriotist and Cypriot-Hellenist ideologies attempts to transcend this, as in the words of Demetris Christofias, ‘the Cypriot people deserve a better fate, a better future’ beyond the projections and influences of international frameworks and models.\(^ {167}\)

### 6.7 Conclusion

In drawing this analysis to a close, it is important to note that attaining Christofias’s ideal of a ‘better fate’ and ‘better future’ for all Cypriots requires negotiating not only with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, but with the discourses of Cypriot Hellenism and Cypriotism which compete for representational authority at a national level within the Republic of Cyprus. These discourses are both reactions to, and transformations of the nationalist ideals of the ‘motherland’ of Greece that continues, to a significant extent, to symbolically influence and frame the construction of historical narratives, ceremonies of remembrance and the conceptualisation of identities in Cyprus. These discourses initially functioned to prepare Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot community, via a process of cultural and political assimilation, for entrance into a wider Greek state. However the failure of the *enosis* dream and the catastrophe of 1974 brought forth the need for a collective re-imagination at a state level of the internal self, often by drawing on the pre-existing concept of Cypriotism which had been a feature of the political left from the mid-1920s, in order to create an internal ideal that was at once both ‘Greek’ and inter-communally ‘Cypriot’. This transition was imbued with a latent anxiety regarding what actually constitutes a Cypriot, especially given the historical focus on ‘Greek’ and ‘Turkish’ education ‘above all else’, and ultimately the continued focus within educational models after 1960 on ‘Greek history’. As such depending on how one

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\(^{167}\) PIO: ‘House of Commons Meeting’. 

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reacts to these structures, the otherness inherent in being ‘almost the same but not quite’ from wider Hellenic models can be marked by ‘lack’ and imbued with an anxious defence of cultural idioms, or it can be embraced as a form of difference and potentially betterment from that of the ‘motherland’. As a result Cyprus is now connected to its historic motherlands through a largely fraternal rather than maternal bond, which in turn can be marked in personal narratives and historical discourses both by a close affinity and a cultural discourse of suspicion, depending on the social, economic or political situation.

However, beyond the influences of the motherlands, Cyprus is also marked by an ‘effective dependency’ to conform to the inferred ideals of western modernity and European ‘advancement’. Given the fact that Cyprus is situated on the periphery of Europe, closer geographically to Turkey and consequently Asia than to Greece and therefore Europe, there is a strong desire to protect the European integrity and ‘spirit’ of Cyprus as a European, and therefore ‘civilised’ entity. This was clearly marked in the PIO documentary Multicultural Cyprus, which stated that despite the conflicts that have engulfed the island over the years, the Republic of Cyprus has continued to ‘survive and develop’, and as such there is ‘no reason [for Cyprus] to be envious of the other developed countries of the European Union’.

In attaining EU membership in 2004, Cyprus, or perhaps more accurately the ‘Greek’ Republic of Cyprus, finally achieved, in theory at least, full political equality with both its motherland and its ‘stepmother’ of Britain, who historically had questioned the European nature of the Greek Cypriot community. As a result the discourses of Cypriot Hellenism and Cypriotism may be used to defend against latent inferences to Cypriot backwardness through an aggressive promulgation of national culture, one rooted around a Hellenic ideal, and the other to a de-ethnicised intercommunal ideal. These socio-cultural discourses regarding the concept of Cypriot identities and historical narratives are not static but evolve and change based on personal and collective needs. In shaping this collective imagination, however, these discourses, through the negotiation and transformation of colonial frameworks, attempt to construct, or indeed reconstruct an image of Cyprus that will both conform and be rooted within the realms of European modernity. Therefore in repositioning the conceptual foundations of these discourses not merely as extensions or developments from the transnational ideals of the motherlands, but as transformative nationalisms rooted within a

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169 PIO: ‘Multicultural Cyprus’.
crypto-colonial framework, one can better understand the structures shaping their representation of the past, and consequently their imagination of an idealised future.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

The object of this thesis has been to analyse and understand the ideological and socio-political structures shaping the image of Britain, and in turn the wider image of conflict, within the historical narratives and remembrance practices of Greek Cypriot society. This analysis was directed by one central research question: How is the image of Britain shaped and utilised within the Greek Cypriot historical discourses associated with the conflict of 1974? This question developed as previous work on the subject of Britain has tended to focus on political matters rather than the forces shaping the memory of British actions, or indeed inactions, during this crisis.\(^1\) Therefore such studies have invariably neglected to fully analyse the internal discourses and socio-cultural institutions that sustain the power of the conspiracy theories associated with this period. Indeed, notwithstanding the available evidence or the work of historians, concepts such as the ‘Big Lie’ remain actively remembered and disseminated irrespective of their factual veracity. Likewise, those studies focussed on the content and form of Greek Cypriot history texts and remembrance ceremonies are predominantly directed towards the image of the Turkish Cypriot ‘other’ rather than that of the British ‘other’. This again leads to passing references rather than a concerted analysis of the figure of Britain within the structures of Greek Cypriot historical discourses.\(^2\) The work of this thesis has directly approached and analysed these neglected areas of research. From this central focus, a series of wider conclusions have been offered on the legacy of Britain’s colonial past, the content and form of commemorative rituals associated with 1974, the socio-political influences shaping the construct of Greek Cypriot historical narratives and identity formation, and the connection between Greece and Cyprus created as a consequence of British colonial manoeuvring.

As a means of contextualising this analysis, the thesis first approached the British government’s perspective as to why there was a conflict on Cyprus. From this analysis it was clear that the British government in 1974 viewed the ‘troubles’ of Cyprus as largely ‘home-grown’ and an issue to be solved between Greece and Turkey. The British authorities, with their policy of detachment, maintained little interest in becoming once more embroiled in the polarised internal politics of Cyprus. This was made clear in multiple official memos throughout this period, such as one from the 12 August 1974 which stated directly that:

\(^1\) See for example O’Malley & Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy*; Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis*; Asmussen, *Cyprus at War*; Dodd, *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*.

Unless we can find friendly and reliable partners to share our burdens and responsibilities, there is a risk that, for purely historical reasons, we shall become deeply and expensively involved in a problem which is no longer directly relevant to specific British interests. Therefore, beyond the lack of international support and fear of escalation that military intervention could create, Chapter 2 also highlighted that the more localised spectre of Ireland and the historical memory of the EOKA struggle played a significant role in shaping British policy decisions. Although the military authorities despatched a naval taskforce to Cape Andreas and Callaghan threatened Turkey with military action, the ramifications of intervention far outweighed the potential benefits for Britain, the USA and NATO. As such these historical and contemporary examples of the ‘burdens’ of British involvement in other intercommunal affairs were used to officially justify a lack of British military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. While there is no evidence to suggest the British government directly supported the Turkish invasion and forced military partition of Cyprus, beyond the sympathy shown to the general aim of geographical federation, there is enough overall ambiguity in their actions and policies to allow for the development of such suspicions. Indeed the Turkish Cypriot refugee transfer of January 1975 provided a form of tacit British approval for the partition of the island. Unlike Hitchens, however, who argued this transfer was orchestrated by the USA, this chapter showed that the British motivation was more localised and an effective extension of their official policy of detachment, or indifferent neutrality, towards Cyprus. By removing the refugees from the SBAs, the British authorities sought to remove themselves from the centre of the polarised internal vicissitudes of Cypriot politics. As a consequence, while the British government could feel justifiable anger against the ‘scapegoating’ tactics of others, the fact that Britain was a Guarantor power who failed to guarantee Cypriot independence, irrespective of their abilities to do so, opened the way for the development of such critical demarches.

In developing from this introduction, Chapter 3 was directed by two subsidiary questions from the main research theme: What sustains the power and appeal of conspiracy theories associated with 1974? Why do some Greek Cypriots interviewed for this project remember events from 1974 which all the available evidence would suggest did not occur? These questions developed as previous analyses on ‘popular’ forms of history and memory, such as the insightful work of Papadakis and Asmussen, have tended to either marginalise the

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3 TNA: FCO 49/548, fl.4, ‘Cyprus and Europe’.
4 For diplomatic, not military, support offered to geographical federation see Hamilton & Salmon (eds.), The Southern Flank in Crisis, pp.242-247.
5 Hitchens & Kellner, Callaghan: The Road to Number 10, p.139.
role of Britain to passing comments concerning the prevalence of conspiracies, or have approached them from a predominantly political or archival perspective. Yet as this chapter showed, while issues such as the ‘Big Lie’ or the concept of ‘British pilots-Turkish planes’ may have started as a form of political propaganda, it is now part of a much wider socio-cultural discourse that actively shapes the act of personal and collective memory irrespective of its factual veracity. Therefore this chapter argued that to fully understand the image of Britain on Cyprus one must consider the duality of action and perception, both what Britain did, and what individuals and wider collectives believe the British did. This imagination is invariably shaped by a discourse of inherent suspicion, so defined as an ideological fusion of the ‘resistive’ forces of Cypriot post-coloniality with the ‘displaced’ structures of neo-colonial ‘interference’, which can frame the understanding of British political actions through the colonial mentality of a Cyprus divided is a Cyprus controlled. The structures of this discourse can draw from and are reinforced by Britain’s divisive colonial legacy, the actions of and Cypriot mentality towards NATO, the presence of the SBAs and ultimately the direct and ambiguous polices adopted by the British government and their ‘allies’ throughout this period. As conspiracies merely require ambiguity of action to support their existence, ‘evidence’ can often be found through revelations in the media or accusations of cover-ups, such as the National Archives retaining files due to their ability to ‘harm our relations with both Cyprus and the US’, when information is required to reinforce their frameworks. Therefore, whilst there is no available evidence to suggest Britain directly supported the actions of the Turkish military in 1974, and much to say they strongly opposed them, there is enough ambiguity and suspicion associated with the designs of the NATO ‘allies’ to sustain these conspiratorial narratives. Indeed examples of ‘partitionist’ proposals such as the Macmillan Plan of 1958, the Acheson Plan of 1964 and the Greek-Turkish dialogue of 1966-67, help structure and reinforce this natural suspicion of external ‘solutions’ to the ‘Cyprus Problem’. It is from this amalgam that the concept of the ‘anti-Cypriot’ British ‘nemesis’ emerges, which in turn provides a form of tacit support for the continued widespread

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7 Interview with Costas, Nicosia, 9 August 2011; Interview with Margarita, Nicosia, 11 July 2012; Interview with Nicos and Vassilis, London, 22 January 2013.


9 See Mallinson, ‘US Interests, British Acquiescence’, p.505; For list of retained files see Mallinson, *Cyprus: Diplomatic History*, pp.149-190.
dissemination of conspiratorial ideas and their interlinked memory ‘distortions’ from the events of 1974.

These memory ‘distortions’ associated with the structures of the ‘Big Lie’ were considered here as extensions of two interlinked processes. First, with the rupture from normalcy caused by the trauma of conflict and displacement, an individual’s memory of a known event, such as the British evacuation of Famagusta or the extrication of tourists via military helicopter from northern Cyprus, can be subconsciously reshaped and moved in time or context in order to understand this psychological shock.10 The second process, given personal memories are at once individual and collective, shaped by the politics, culture and social influences of the society in which they were formed, is framed by the innate socio-cultural suspicion of British political motivations towards Cyprus. The power of these combined discourses, one of collective trauma and the other of inherent suspicion, can then subtly influence these personal narratives of conflict and their interlinked attempts to understand and place meaning onto the actions of Britain during a traumatic period in the life of the individual and state. As conspiracies and accusations of Anglo-Turkish collusion were, and remain widely disseminated within media productions, political pronouncements and some ‘official’ PIO publications, the combined influence of these socio-political forces can reshape the content and form of personal memories associated with the actions of Britain in 1974.11 Indeed, the strength and continuation of these beliefs invariably lie in their ability to mobilise popular support irrespective of the historical record, as it can provide both understanding and a collective ideal of unity at a time of separation and division. Given the act of recollection is invariably based on a reduction of complexity, the fact Britain did not intervene in 1974 allows for the ‘legend’ to develop that Britain was colluding with Turkey, as it both explains and accounts for British actions and the division of the island. Therefore beyond simply a form of ‘blame transference’, which is how the ‘Big Lie’ began, this thesis argued that these conspiratorial concepts form part of a much wider symbolic process that not only seeks to understand the ambiguities of British actions in 1974, but attempts to reconcile this with the psychological shock, or rupture in normal time caused by invasion and partition.

From these ‘popular’ influences on memory, Chapter 4 approached the foundations of this discourse of inherent suspicion through an analysis of school texts and ‘official’ history narratives. The two subsidiary questions shaping this analysis were: Why do some official

11 For parallels see Portelli, The Order Has Been Carried Out; Bessel, ‘The Great War in German Memory’, pp.20-34.
publications directly refer to the actions of Britain in 1974 while others marginalise the image of Britain in the post-colonial period? To what extent does the historical memory of Britain’s colonial past shape the remembrance of their post-colonial activities? Indeed, much like the previous work undertaken on ‘popular’ forms of memory, scholarly analyses on the content of school texts have again lacked a concerted analysis of the image of Britain.\(^\text{12}\) This chapter rectified this significant gap in the literature on Cyprus. With the collective requirement to ‘never forget’ the conflict of 1974, these texts are infused with a significant power, and are therefore much debated over their content, as they seek to construct and sustain a sense of the past amongst those generations ‘too young to know our enslaved land’. In the context of 1974, given the role and actions of Britain are significantly marginalised, it is argued that the primary focus is on emphasising the collective trauma of conflict through the clear consequences of the Turkish invasion. These texts draw on a series of memory signifiers through evocative imagery, stories of displacement and details of collective suffering, in order to create both an imperative to remember, and a ritualised framework for the construct of historical memories associated with the occupied areas. This process is structured so elements of the personal, in this case the ‘canon’ memories and suffering of the refugees, are officially disseminated to become part of the collective. In turn, through its wider transmission, these parts of the collective can then draw back and become an element of the personal. Therefore this process, which is not simply imposed by the authorities but is internally reformulated and negotiated to suit the interests of the individual, can create a cultural circuit of memory whereby the individual and collective continually shape and reinforce the narratives of the other.

As the focus of school texts are on the consequences of conflict, the narrative detailing its causes is simplified and invariably framed by the actions of an internal or external ‘other’. This is shaped in part by the considerable socio-political contestation over the events that occurred in 1974, as ‘to say what happened is easier, but to give excuses why is more complicated to understand’.\(^\text{13}\) As the actions of Britain in the independence period are marginalised to passing references to the crisis of 1964 and their limited role as a Guarantor power in 1974, this chapter argued that these texts still draw on the same ideological frameworks as ‘popular’ narratives, a discourse of trauma and a discourse of inherent suspicion, but frame this suspicion more directly around the ‘well-known’ acts of the

\(^{12}\) See for example Papadakis, ‘Narrative, Memory and History Education’, pp.128-148; Philippou & Varnava, ‘Constructions of Solution(s)’, pp.194-213.

\(^{13}\) Interview with Koula, London, 19 November 2013.
British colonial occupation. Indeed the legacy of British colonialism, marked by Anglo-Turkish collusion, support for partition and the policy of ‘divide and rule’, can create a particularly potent historical memory of British interference on Cyprus that is indelibly linked to the lasting division of the island. As such, whilst these texts do not directly refer to any of the conspiracy theories associated with 1974, unlike the content of some ‘official’ PIO publications, they do nevertheless draw on many of the same themes. In this sense, these texts can create an image of Britain associated with the consequences of conflict not through explicit references to their alleged actions in 1974, but through an implicit connection via the historical memory of their colonial policies. Although these school texts do not work in isolation, as familial units and the media are particularly important in shaping forms of memory, they can provide a foundational image of Britain that is framed by the colonial mantra of ‘divide and rule’. With the power of this historical memory, this thesis showed that the connotations and political capital infused within the policy of ‘divide and rule’ can transcend the colonial period and encompass the entirety of the British presence on Cyprus. Indeed it was drawn on throughout the interviews of this thesis to describe the actions of the British government in 1974. The historical memory of this policy, combined with the broader effects of the colonial occupation, provides the foundational image and invariably the language of reference to describe acts of British interference on Cyprus. It has been used by contemporary politicians, such as Ioannis Kasoulides, to criticise Britain in the European Parliament, by media outlets to emphasise the ‘conspiratorial’ nature of the Annan Plan, and in multiple oral history interviews to describe how the British protect their interests within the SBAs.\(^\text{14}\)

In developing from this focus, Chapter 5 reinforced the power of this image through its central question: How does the image of Britain fit into the commemorative and public remembrance ceremonies of Greek Cypriot society? To analyse this question, this chapter was subdivided into two case studies. The first case study approached the public commemoration of 1974 primarily through the diasporic ‘Peace and Freedom Rally’. Within this ritual of remembrance and political renewal, no overt form of causality was referenced beyond the Turkish invasion. This chapter argued this was again due, in part, to the considerable political contestation over forms of internal culpability for 1974, such as the role of the National Guard in the coup, which are still disputed between different factions of

Greek Cypriot society. However it also noted that this rally, by calling for Britain as a Guarantor power to cease their appeasement of Turkey, can subtly reinforce existent images of Britain constructed through both official and popular media. As the roots of the Anglo-Greek Cypriot relationship are framed by colonial confrontation and post-colonial suspicion, it is not a significant leap, given the points raised throughout this thesis, to connect the perception of Britain not ‘favouring’ Cyprus to the idea that Britain ‘supports’ the Turkish partition of the island. Nevertheless the main focus of these commemorative rituals, beyond the political call for renewal, is on the consequences of conflict and providing, in a simplified form, a ritualised replacement for a land and life lost through partition. Through this physical rupture, this case study showed that these commemorative ceremonies can, and are ultimately designed, to act as focal points for the construct of an inter-generational communal consciousness, one which was lost in its physicality in 1974.

The second case study considered the broader consequences of 1974 and the interconnected legacy of British colonial rule through the Kyrenia memorial controversy of 2009. This analysis showed that this memorial, honouring an anti-colonial Emergency and built in an occupied town, directly frames an amalgam of differing public memories associated with British actions on Cyprus. As all memorials maintain an identity which is never fixed but dependant on the views of the observer, it can mean and reflect many things to many people. This can encompass the memory of Britain’s colonial occupation, the brutalities of which are strongly emphasised within museums across the Republic. The ‘insensitive’ actions of certain British nationals and often that of the British government, so evidenced by the 1975 Turkish Cypriot refugee transfer, towards the plight and suffering of the Greek Cypriot refugees. As a final example, it can reflect the failure of Britain as a Guarantor power to prevent the Turkish invasion in 1974, and then the subsequent and repeated failure of the British government to take any form of meaningful political action aimed at ending the illegal occupation of northern Cyprus. For the British Memorial Trust however, it was simply about commemorating those lives lost in a conflict that is now deemed to be one that is ‘forgotten’ within Britain. Through this analysis, therefore, it is clear that the image of Britain on Cyprus is intrinsically framed by their colonial legacy, and the events of 1974 are invariably articulated as an extension, or indeed effective culmination, of events and forces which commenced during their colonial occupation.

As the actions of Britain were but one causal element in a much wider narrative of conflict, the content of Chapter 6 was directed by one final subsidiary question: How influential are the transnational ideologies of Greece in shaping forms of Cypriot
development and the image of conflict in 1974? Indeed, in order to fully understand the processes shaping the construct of Greek Cypriot historical discourses, acts of remembrance and identity formations, the Greek Cypriot connection to Greece could not be overlooked. The influence of this connection was evident throughout the thesis, and in real terms, is more significant today than the connection between Britain and Cyprus. As such this chapter considered the image and influence of Greece on Cyprus through both a ‘national’ and ‘informal colonial’ reading, as through the interviews of this project, Greece can be embraced as a national partner or distanced as a controlling foreign power. These views are marked by a variety of influences, such as politics, economics and culture, and can fluctuate depending on the time, the place and the individual. However adopting this dual approach rather than focussing on a traditional ethno-nationalistic reading is pertinent as it provides more detail into the internal Cypriot reaction to, and transformation of, the ideological power structures infused within the transnational influences of Greece. As this connection can, and indeed has been defined in both colonial and national terms, overlooking one form of influence means that one cannot truly understand the other. With the focus of the Greek Cypriot state on the national desire for reunification, the discourses of Cypriotism and Cypriot-Hellenism are engaged in a cultural interplay between the models of external forces and the development and internal narration of the self and other. Although the crisis of 1974 led to an increased focus on specifically Cypriot symbols, such as the commencement of a state-wide celebration of Cyprus Independence Day in 1979, there remains considerable socio-political opposition to the fostering of a ‘Cypriot national conscience’ over ‘our Greek national conscience’.15 As there are multiple, and often overlapping forms of ‘imagined communities’ on Cyprus, each of which draws on a version of the past to structure their image of the future, a connection that could be deemed natural for one can be considered an imposition for another. Through this process, the otherness inherent in being ‘almost the same but not quite’ from the models of Greece can be marked by ‘lack’ and imbued with an anxious defence of cultural idioms, or it can be embraced as a form of difference and potentially betterment from that of the ‘motherland’.16 As the question of Cypriot identities remains a central part of the ‘Cyprus Problem’, this chapter argued that the adoption of a dual framework can provide a better understanding into the issues underlying the socio-political debates regarding educational reforms and the inclusivity of commemorative rituals, because these issues contain the essence of what it is that actually defines a Cypriot. Given there is no clear answer to this

15 Pantelides, ‘The great Greek debate a “straw man”’.
16 Bhabha, Location of Culture, pp.110-117.
‘Cyprus Question’, as individuals and collectives continue to maintain and project different national affiliations across Cyprus, this dual approach provides a more detailed analysis concerning the forces shaping these identities, and ultimately the interplay between the internal and external on an island that remains divided.

In turn this chapter showed how the internalised reaction to the direct and ideological influences of Greece can frame the memory and image of Greek actions, especially in 1974, within contrasting frameworks: a socio-cultural intimacy rooted in a shared Hellenic ideal, and a socio-political reaction against their neo-colonial ‘interference’. As this dual framework has the power to shape both a positive and critical imagination of Greece within Cypriot discourses, there is a tendency for this form of cultural intimacy to allow for a degree of blame transference away from Greece and onto the actions of NATO, Britain and the USA. This concept, reflected in multiple oral history interviews, does not ‘forget’ mainland Greek actions in launching the coup. Rather, in drawing on a narrative of ‘international interference’, the actions of the Junta, who are invariably depicted as operating on behalf of their NATO ‘paymasters’, can be depicted as different from the actions of Greece, who in normal circumstances would ‘never’ betray Cyprus. The extent to which this is accepted by an individual or collective is dependent on a number of socio-political factors; however its existence can reflect the latent influence of the inter-state connection between Greece and Cyprus shaping the modern trajectory of Cypriot history.

By answering these subsidiary questions within the individual chapters of this thesis, a series of broad connective themes were drawn linked to the main research focus of this project. First the image of Britain on Cyprus is framed by the legacy and historical memory of their colonial occupation. The connotations infused within concepts such as ‘divide and rule’ transcend the colonial period and are utilised to understand and explain British actions across the modern history of Cyprus. It is a policy that is deeply imprinted onto the national consciousness, transmitted and reinforced through the media, education and commemorative rituals. As detailed in Chapter 4, while the content of school textbooks are shaped and rewritten by different political parties based on their own national ideals, the image of Britain invariably remains little changed. This image is framed by a particularly potent nationalised historical memory of colonial rule. Indeed, the British transition from a ‘partitionist’ colonial ruler to an ambiguously orientated post-colonial Guarantor, without physically leaving Cyprus, brings forth a sense of continuity, in both action and ‘influence’, and in turn a lingering suspicion that the policies of one period shape the actions of another.
Second, through this lingering suspicion comes the emergence of conspiracy theories associated with the actions of Britain across the modern history of Cyprus. These conspiratorial narratives, framed by a discourse of inherent suspicion, are rooted in the legacy of British colonial rule and are developed against the neo-colonial actions and policies of Britain and their NATO ‘allies’. The continued dissemination of these narratives can take the ambiguity of these actions, given the British policy of detachment and failure to intervene, and construct a narrative framed by the concept of NATO ‘interference’ and an effective form of colonial culmination associated with the SBAs. While the influence of this historical framework can result in a divergence of content between some ‘popular’ publications, which draw directly on the neo-colonial actions of NATO, and those school texts which emphasise the collusive connotations of British colonial policy, these representations share at their core the centrality of British strategic (neo)-colonial interests, and the unifying impression that a Cyprus divided is a Cyprus controlled.

The third concerns the broader influence of external forces on the narration of the internal self. The interplay and internal transformation of the influences imparted by both Britain and Greece have left significant marks on the history, memory and identity of Cyprus. In understanding the internal reaction to these ‘national’ and ‘colonial’ influences, one can consider in greater detail the forces shaping the often divergent views associated with a specifically Cypriot future for the island. Indeed, given the often polarised nature of such imaginations, and in turn the lack of any discernible movement towards an agreement to politically reunite Cyprus, the British diplomat David Hannay stated in February 2014 that ‘nobody ever lost money betting against a Cyprus solution’. Yet Cyprus is not overly unique in this sense. Many of the long-standing issues that have affected Cyprus have parallels with the troubles in Ireland, in the continuing issues between Israel and Palestine, and to a certain extent with the ‘national’ crisis that engulfed the Ukraine, and particularly the Crimea, in early 2014. Therefore in understanding the interplay between the internal and external on Cyprus, wider models can be constructed that can be applied to other areas with equally troubled pasts.

As long as Cyprus remains a divided island, the image of Britain will remain indelibly linked to its troubles through their colonial legacy, ambiguities as a Guarantor power and ultimate ‘failure’ to protect the Republic in 1974. In turn, although Cyprus has been ‘independent’ for over fifty years, with the concept of enosis largely marginalised to the

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fringes of nationalist sentiment, the debates concerning the rewriting of Cypriot history, the commemoration of historical events, and the contrasting models of Cypriot identities emphasises the continued influence of Greece on internal modes of development. Had the British not opposed the concept of *enosis* in the 1950s, or indeed ever landed on the island in 1878, the future of Cyprus may well have been very different. As it is, given the British are still deeply intertwined with Cyprus through their continued physical presence on the island, their historical legacy and contemporary actions will continue to leave a significant imprint on the Greek Cypriot national consciousness. Although the Anglo-Greek Cypriot relationship is not always negative, it has something of a love-hate element to it, when it is linked to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and the issue of division, Britain is invariably portrayed as one of the ‘nemeses’ of the Cypriot people.

From the analysis undertaken for this thesis, there are a number of areas that could be developed through further research. Firstly, more interviews could be undertaken on Cyprus to supplement those already undertaken on the island and within the diaspora community of London. The interviews undertaken for this project provide an insight into the commemorative frameworks of Greek Cypriot society, but it is accepted that this is only a partial insight. Increasing the number of interviews in Cyprus in both urban and rural locations would offer a more rounded view. Through this process, a further comparative element could be drawn in relation to both the actions of Britain on Cyprus, and the image and actions of Greece.\(^\text{18}\) From this basis, with the voices of the London diaspora community, the urban populations of Limassol and Nicosia, and a select number of rural localities in different regions, one could examine the connections and contrasts between the different influences shaping the construction of history, memory and identity formations across this broad stratum of Greek Cypriot society. A second focus that is referenced briefly in this thesis but could be expanded greatly is the memorial legacy of General Grivas. Not only could a comparative element be drawn with a figure from another country with a troubled past, such as Ireland, but one could trace the life and legacy of Grivas, and his wider connection to Britain, from his early actions in Greece to his death in Cyprus and subsequent remembrance on the island. A third focus would be to develop further the cartoons and satirical depictions associated with the Anglo-Greek Cypriot relationship within the British and Greek Cypriot press. As cartoons can reflect many things to many people, with both a

\(^{18}\) See Spyrou, ‘Children Constructing Ethnic Identities’, pp.121-139.
cultural and political dimension, this analysis would provide intriguing new insights into the Anglo-Greek Cypriot relationship at a ‘popular’ level.
Appendix 1: Interview Details

Interviews in Cyprus

Maria, From Limassol, Age 40-50, Female, Location Limassol, 6/8/2011. (Unrecorded)
A student in Limassol 1974.

Costas, From Famagusta, Age 40-50, Male, Location Nicosia, 9/8/2011. (Recorded)
Refugee from Famagusta.

Anastasia, From Limassol, Age 50-60, Female, Location Nicosia, 9/8/2011. (Recorded)
From Limassol, now lives in Nicosia.

Margarita, From Kythrea, Age 69, Female, Location Nicosia, 11/7/2012. (Recorded)
Refugee from Kythrea.

Theo, From Limassol, Age 30-40, Male, Location Limassol, 17/3/2013. (Unrecorded)
First generation refugee, father from Famagusta, mother from Kyrenia.

Marios, From Limassol, Age 50-60, Male, Location Limassol, 3/4/2014. (Unrecorded)
Highly critical of the actions of General Grivas on Cyprus.

Theo, From Nicosia, Age 54, Male, Location Nicosia, 4/4/2014. (Unrecorded)
Refugee from an occupied village near Nicosia, his brother is one of the missing.

Softonis, From Morphou, Age 60-70, Male, Location Limassol, 7/4/2014. (Recorded)
Refugee from Morphou.

Charalambos, From Morphou, Age 60-70, Male, Location Limassol, 7/4/2014. (Recorded)
Refugee from Morphou and a soldier in 1974.

Interviews with British Residents in Cyprus

Susan, British, Age 50-60, Female, Location Limassol, 9/7/2012. (Unrecorded)
Married to a Greek Cypriot refugee from Famagusta.

Mark, British, Age 60-70, Male, Location Paphos, 21/3/2013. (Recorded)
A British soldier during the EOKA struggle of 1955-59, now resides in Cyprus.

Peter, British, Age 60-70, Male, Location Paphos, 21/3/2013. (Unrecorded)
A British soldier who served on Cyprus during the crisis of 1963-64, now resides in Cyprus.

David, British, Age 70-80, Male, Location Paphos, 21/3/2013. (Unrecorded)
A British resident on Cyprus in 1974.

Helen, British, Age 60-70, Female, Location Paphos, 26/3/2013. (Unrecorded)
A regular visitor to Cyprus prior to 1974, and a tourist on the island in 1974.

Daisy, British-Cypriot, Age 71, Female, Location Paphos, 26/3/2013. (Unrecorded)
First moved to Cyprus in 1957 and has acquired Cypriot citizenship. A refugee from Famagusta.

_Penny, British-Cypriot, Age 60-70, Female, Location Limassol, 1/4/2013. (Recorded)_

_Colin, British, Age 60-70, Male, Location Limassol, 4/4/2013. (Unrecorded)_
A British soldier on Cyprus in the 1950s. Part of the UNFICYP in 1965-66.

**Greek Cypriot Diaspora Interviews in London**

_Christodoulos, From Famagusta, Age 69, Male, Moved to Britain 1958, Date of Interview 3/7/2012. (Recorded)_
Moved to Britain aged 15 to bring his brother’s infant child to the country.

_Grigori, From Famagusta, Age 77, Male, Moved to Britain 1964, Date of Interview 3/7/2012. (Recorded)_
Moved to Britain in 1964 for a better life.

_Nicos, From Famagusta, Age 84, Male, Moved to Britain 1947, Date of Interview 3/7/2012. (Recorded)_
From area now occupied, moved to Britain aged 18.

_Christos, From Larnaca, Age 83, Male, Moved to Britain 1953, Date of Interview 29/11/2012. (Recorded)_
Former teacher in the diaspora schools of London.

_Panos, From Nicosia, Age 68, Male, Moved to Britain 1968-69, Date of Interview 29/11/2012. (Recorded)_
From occupied village near Nicosia, initially moved to Britain for studies.

_John, British Born, Age 33, Male, Date of interview, 29/11/2012. (Recorded)_
British born Cypriot and first generation refugee. Mother from a village near Nicosia and father from Famagusta. Family moved to Britain in 1976. Lived in Cyprus for several years.

_Liana, British Born, Age 72, Female, Date of Interview 23/1/2013. (Recorded)_
British born Cypriot. Father moved to Britain in the 1930s.

_Andreas, From Morphou, Age 70, Male, Moved to Britain 1969, Date of interview 6/3/2013. (Recorded)_

_Glafrhos, From Morphou, Age 68, Male, Moved to Britain 1967, Date of Interview 7/3/2013. (Recorded)_
Refugee from Morphou.

**Vas, From Limassol, Age 72, Moved to Britain 1960-61, Date of interview 7/3/2013.** (Unrecorded)

Moved to Britain aged 19 for a better life, helped by a Turkish Cypriot family in London.

**Andros, From Famagusta, Age 77, Male, Moved to Britain 1964, Date of Interview 7/3/2013.** (Recorded)

Repeatedly arrested by the British in the 1950s for his support of EOKA.

**Charis, From Famagusta, Age 73, Male, Moved to Britain 1960, Date of Interview 7/3/2013.** (Recorded)

Worked on the British bases in the 1950s. Moved to Britain in 1960, with the aid of a British army captain, for medical treatment.

**Koula, From Morphou, Age 40-50, Female, Moved to Britain 2003, Date of Interview 19/11/2013.** (Recorded)

Displaced as a child in 1974 from a village near Morphou. A teacher in Cyprus. Moved to Britain to teach in the Greek schools in London.

**Eleni, From Famagusta, Age 30-40, Female, Moved to Britain 2010. Date of Interview 25/3/2014.** (Recorded)

First generation refugee. Grew up in Limassol but family from Famagusta. A teacher in Cyprus. Moved to Britain to teach in the Greek schools in London.

**Yiangos, From Famagusta, Age 60-70, Male, Date of Interview, 25/6/2010.** (Recorded)

From Famagusta. Age and date moved to Britain unknown.

**Alexis, Area from Cyprus unknown, Age 70-80, Male, Moved to Britain 1950. Date of Interview 25/6/2010.** (Recorded)

Highly critical of the Cypriot communities for creating conflict on Cyprus.

**Andreas, Area from Cyprus unknown, Age 60-70, Male, Date of Interview 25/6/2010.** (Unrecorded)

Stated he had many Turkish Cypriot friends in London and did not want to talk about politics.

**Group Interviews**

Group Interview 1 held on the 3/7/2012 (Recorded):

**Alexandros, Area from Cyprus unknown, Age 68, Male, Moved to Britain in 1963.**

**Giannis, From Paphos, Age 60-70, Male, Dated moved to Britain unknown**

**George, British Born, Age 68, Male.**

**Michalis, Area from Cyprus unknown, Age 68, Male, Moved to Britain 1960**
Interview covered a range of topics, with criticism for the division of Cyprus focused on Britain, the USA, Turkey, Greece and the *enosis* movement on Cyprus.

Group Interview 2 held on the 22/1/2013 (Recorded):

Vassilis, From Paphos, Age 60, Male, Moved to Britain 1975.  
Nicos, From Paphos, Age 60, Male, Moved to Britain 1973.

Vassilis and Nicos come from the same village near Paphos. Vassilis was a soldier in 1974, moved to Britain after the war. Nicos moved to Britain in 1973.

Group Interview 3 held on the 22/1/2013 (Recorded):

Dinos, From Karpasia, Age 72, Male, Moved to Britain 1958.  
Giorgos, From Karpasia, Age 60-70, Male, Moved to Britain 1974.  
Maria, British Born, Age 30-40, Female, Family from Limassol Region.

Dinos and Giorgos are brothers from a village in the Karpass region of Cyprus. Giorgos was arrested by the Turkish army in 1974, taken to Turkey, and held captive for 63 days. Upon his release he moved to Britain. Maria is a British born Cypriot whose family moved to Britain in 1956.
Appendix 2: Letter

Letter handed out by the *Lobby for Cyprus* during the Peace and Freedom Rally in London in July 2013.

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London Taxi and Private Hire
Palestra
4th Floor
197 Blackfriars Road
London
SE1 8NU

RE: Advertising on London taxis

Dear London Taxi and Private Hire

I am writing to you because of the offense caused to me by advertising on London taxis that promotes the occupied north of Cyprus as a legitimate holiday destination.

The northern area of the Republic of Cyprus is currently under illegal Turkish military occupation, in violation of international law. The area has been ethnically cleansed of its population of 200,000 Greek Cypriots, who are prevented from returning by an apartheid regime controlled by Turkey.

Thousands of Greek Cypriot refugees, such as myself, family or friends now reside in the UK and the advertisements cause us great distress.

It is highly offensive and provocative that unsuspecting British tourists are tempted by the advertisements to enjoy the stolen homes, lands, hotels and businesses of the Greek Cypriots while the legitimate owners, who so desperately long to return, are prevented from doing so.

Furthermore, the advertisements are paid for by an illegal entity, the so-called ‘North Cyprus tourist board’, an organ of the occupation regime. As the occupation regime has been deemed illegal, then so is its subordinate organisation that is financing the advertisements.

I therefore call on TFL, London Taxi and Private Hire to take action regarding the advertisements on the basis of the grave offense they cause to a vast number of UK citizens such as myself.

I look forward to a response.

Yours faithfully
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| CAB 129/115 | CAB 129/116 | CAB 129/178/2 | CAB 129/93 |
| CAB 129/96 |

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| FCO 9/2012 | FCO 9/2013 | FCO 9/2149 | FCO 9/2186 |
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