Progress Beyond Development:
Reclaiming the Active Individual

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Submitted for the qualification of Doctor of Philosophy

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December 2017
Abstract
This thesis follows in development theory's post-impasse attempts to theorise an understanding of social change according to which people in developing countries would be active producers of their own development without this descending into the relativistic impotence of post-development; that is, the search for an understanding of development in which the field can retain its normative commitment and contribution to a better world for all without the neo-imperialistic implications this has had in the past. To do so we must first overcome prevalent caricatures of twentieth century development's 'we develop it' mentality and recognise that this search is not a uniquely modern one: it has been an implicit concern of development theory since the field's conception. The concept of 'development' itself, particularly the way in which it theorises the relationship between the internal and external aspects of social change, lies at the heart of development theory's failures to meet this challenge. A reconceptualisation of the internal-external problem, based on the concept of 'progress' from which development was initially differentiated and which puts the active individual at the heart of social change, can provide a way forward, with important implications for development policy and theorists.
Acknowledgements

My supervisors, Hartmut Behr and Jesse Ovadia, for their advice, encouragement, and – above all – their patience.

Everyone who took part in Hartmut's colloquium meetings over the years.

My friends inside and outside the university, for keeping me sane.

My parents, for all their support.

Thank you all.
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"[T]he secret hope of our time [is] that man's life in politics, which is to say, man's life in history, shall come to an end. History, as we now understand it, envisions its own extinction – that is really what we nowadays mean by 'progress' – and with all the passion of a desire kept secret even from ourselves, we yearn to elect a way of life which shall be satisfactory once and for all..."

– Lionel Trilling (1951[1970]: 200)

Introduction

1. Context and Argument

“What they ... accept, adapt, or reject [from the Western example] is a matter which each man will, in due course, decide for himself.”

The above citation expresses an attitude towards development that many would identify as peculiarly modern and sensitive. It speaks to the foundation of 'development' as an enterprise: the belief that however imperfectly realised in practice the West has done something right – democracy, prosperity, freedom, equality – which it would be valuable to share with the rest of the world. Yet it also speaks to the understanding – a modern and sensitive understanding – that these desirable things cannot simply be transplanted from one society to another, and certainly ought not to be imposed. It reminds us that development must ultimately be something done by a people rather than for them. This is, according to Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2012: 5), the twenty-first century thing to say: 'we develop' rather than 'we develop it,' which was the twentieth century way of thinking. Yet this citation comes from the 1950s, the period of pro-Western development hubris, the quintessential 'we develop it.' (Although the gendered language may have given it away – we know better now). Moreover, it is found in a prominent book whose title alone is enough for Mehmet (1995[1999]: 61) to condemn it: Daniel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society (1958[1968: 411). This thesis will find that this should not come as a surprise, for development theorists have never truly held the arrogantly simplistic views we are wont to attribute to them. They have always been concerned with this 'internal-external problem'; that is, the problem of finding a balance between the desire to achieve the values of development and the recognition that they cannot and must not simply be imposed. Consequently, the means of overcoming the failures of twentieth century development theory and practice must lie elsewhere.
Of course, development theory has a long history filled with a diversity of approaches and the present thesis does not claim to capture the dynamism of its story in all its glory. It shall make use of broad categories such as 'modernisation theory' and 'development theorists.' Readers familiar with the complexity concealed beneath such terms may find their presence jarring, particularly giving the contemporary fixation with the particular over the universal, the concrete over the abstract, the multiform over the unified. It must be said in this regard that there is no question of abstracting or generalising versus not abstracting or not generalising. The latter is not possible. It is instead a question of what level or kind of abstraction is appropriate for one's own purposes. When this thesis uses a term such as 'development theory' or 'modernisation theorist' it has in mind what Husserl called 'ideational abstraction,' which represents a unity of direction rather than a unity of being. The German philosopher Ernst Cassirer described this mode of abstraction in his *The Logic of the Cultural Sciences* (1942[2000]) with reference to Jakob Burckhardt's famous account of the 'Renaissance Man.' The Renaissance Man does not correspond to any particular individual associated with the Italian Renaissance – Botticelli, Leonardo, Petrarch, Raphael, Michaelangelo Brunelleschi, Machiavelli et al present us with as wide a variety of characters to have ever been grouped together. Burckhardt unites them not because they look alike but because, writes Cassirer,

“they stand in a certain ideal connection to one another; ... each in his own way cooperates in the construction of what we call the 'spirit' ... or the culture of the Renaissance. ... The particular individuals belong together not because they are alike or resemble each other but because they cooperate in a common task, which, in contrast to the Middle Ages, we sense to be new and to be the distinctive 'meaning' of the Renaissance.” (1942[2000]: 70-73)

The general concern of this thesis might be described in these terms as identifying the distinctive 'meaning' of development, the common task in which development theorists cooperate, and with that in mind seeking a way beyond its problems. Three main claims will be made: first, that development ought to be understood as a particular conceptualisation of social change built upon a differentiation from the concept of progress; second, that the basic problem with the concept of development is that, because it is self-conscious – intentional and teleological – social change, it sees the internal and external motive forces of change as originally separate, and that the history of
development theory can be read as an attempt to overcome this problem by reconciling the two; and third, that a conscious, as opposed to self-conscious, understanding of social change, based upon the concept of progress and with what will be called the 'active individual' at its heart, can reassess this problem and thus offer the basis for a true alternative to development. The active individual will be conceptualised as mediating between the internal and external, giving both their meaning in this interaction. This active individual, it will be argued, plays an important role in the understanding of social change contained in the concept of progress but was pushed into the background in the concept of development, leaving behind a 'reactive' individual.

The distinction between the two – and its policy consequences – will be illustrated in the sections on education: education is intimately bound up with ideas about social change, because it is to produce the types of individuals one expects to do the work of making social change a positive thing. Consequently, looking at approaches to education prevalent in eras of 'progress' and of 'development' can reveal assumptions about individuals and their role and place in the practice of social change that otherwise would remain obscure. It will be argued in these sections that, reflecting development's 'self-conscious' understanding of social change, education for development sees the role schools as one of preparing the advent of a future society; conversely, reflecting progress' 'conscious' understanding of social change, the goal education for progress will be conceptualised as helping people create a meaningful present.

Thus the central argument of the thesis is twofold: critical and constructive. On the critical side it argues that we must move away from existing critiques of twentieth century approaches to development which exaggerate their strength and their Eurocentrism. Development is here critiqued as a particular conceptualisation of social change rather than the Western conceptualisation. On the constructive side the thesis argues that moving beyond development must involve reclaiming the active individual, returning to the concept of progress from which development was initially differentiated to find a basis for an alternative that would transcend the dichotomies constructed by development theorists between the world of development and the world without it. The concept of progress, it will be argued, allows us to reintegrate the active individual into our understanding of social change and thus rethink the internal-external problem.
As we enter the post-2015 development era this is an issue of great importance. In a field that is overwhelmingly concerned with reinventing itself in order to overcome its past failures, the interpretation of the past plays a significant role in shaping the future. According to the documents published for the Post-2015 development agenda the UN (2013: 40) believes that its new era cannot represent 'business as usual.' What does this refer to? Not the Millennium Development Goals, of which the new 2030 Agenda has been presented as a necessary and natural evolution (UN, 2015: 4), nor even to the 'lost decades' of neo-liberal structural adjustment, which can scarcely be considered 'development' at all (Clark, 2015). In fact it refers to the vague idea of 'twentieth century development' mentioned above, the 'we develop it' attitude to which today's development industry can oppose a 'we develop.' The interpretation of that era is therefore still highly relevant. By re-interpreting what it is in the 'twentieth century' approach that must be overcome, this thesis will attempt to lay the foundations for an alternative future path for development theory and practice.

Contrary to modern caricatures of twentieth century approaches it has always been recognised by development theorists that development cannot simply be 'given' to the developing nations. Nor, however, can it be a purely internally generated, inward-looking phenomenon. Development, positive social change, must always be a combination of internal and external motive forces. The history of development theory, this thesis will argue, is characterised by a series of attempts to reconcile the two and solve what we shall call the 'internal-external problem,' which has generally taken the form of how external Western influences can be incorporated into the internal life of another society in a way that would constitute genuine development. That past approaches failed, in modern eyes, to find a satisfactory balance does not alter this fact. Yet we imagine monsters of error in development theory's past – assumptions of Western superiority, disdain for and mistrust of developing societies, neo-imperialist attempts to Westernise the world – and these monsters have a great influence on what we imagine for the future of the field.

Said monsters have haunted development theory for decades. Almost 25 years ago Wolfgang Sachs issued the now-famous proclamation that development was dead. With the characteristic literary flourish of the post-development theorist, he wrote that the dreams and schemes of development stood “like a ruin in the intellectual landscape” (Saches, 1992: 1). At the time there were good reasons for believing this to be the case.
The post-war optimism, according to which the developing nations might be able to 'catch up' with the industrialised West within a few decades, had faded with each successive year of stagnation, until in the 1980s it finally morphed into a full-blown crisis of faith. To the modern reader, however, Sachs' proclamation must seem premature. The development industry is thriving: innumerable NGOs, INGOs, charities, and governmental agencies compete for our attentions and funds; universities across the globe turn out thousands of graduates in development studies; hundreds of conferences are organised for academics and policy-makers. Most prominently, the UN continues to exercise its influence. The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) era came to an end in 2015, and for the past few years the UN has sought to define a new, post-2015 development era. Yet despite talk of a 'people-centred' and 'transformative' new approach that will put an end to 'business as usual' and bring about the 'most inclusive development era to date,' the familiar idealistic rhetoric of development, formerly so full of life, rings hollow in the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015). Its 169 goals (compared to the eight MDGs) are too narrow to capture the imagination and too unreachable to inspire. The 2030 Agenda reads like a list of desirable things, and it is only by imagining monsters of error in the past – imagining that we are the first to be concerned about 'participation' or 'local cultures' or 'sustainability' – that we can convince ourselves that it represents is a bold new era.

The source of this peculiar situation lies in the field of development's difficulties in dealing with the challenges it faced in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to the failures of real-world development there were severe theoretical challenges, with post-development theorists such as Wolfgang Sachs calling into question the virtues of development as an enterprise pursued by the West for the global South. Particularly painful were the links made between the development discourse and colonial or imperial discourses of cultural and racial superiority. Development, it was argued, was Eurocentric, combining an arrogant assumption that the European trajectory of social change was a universal model and a neo-imperialist imposition of the Western way of life. These critiques are, of course, not unique to development studies. Every intellectual tradition and social convention has been interrogated for its supposed origins in some form of exploitation or exclusion. But in development studies, with its consciously normative and idealistic underpinnings, they have hit harder than most; they have eaten away at its sense of self and its raison d'etre. Yet on the other hand, this very raison d'etre, the sense that
development studies is necessary for progressive and positive social change, has kept the
field alive while its carefully constructed edifice was being deconstructed. Thus it has
simultaneously enhanced the impact of the post-development critique and prevented it
from having the full destructive force envisioned by Sachs.

The result of this dual process is a development era that is oddly uncomfortable in its own
skin. One particularly damaging aspect of the post-development critique was that
development involved a neo-imperialist imposition of Western ideals and institutions.
Thus development became seen as a threat to non-Western peoples, rather than the
friendly helping hand it was supposed to be. As mentioned above, the idealistic rhetoric,
implicit or explicit virtues, and universal aspirations have changed little since the post-
war era. The UN wants development to do the same job as it always has – the creation of
a world free from want and fear. But according to Ban Ki Moon, the post-2015 era will be
different: it will be the most inclusive development era to date. The *A Million Voices*
(2013) report is the result of a worldwide consultation process conducted by the UN over
a number of years in preparation for the post-2015 era. It summarises the outcome of a
vast, inclusive conversation on 'the world we want.' By coincidence, the world we want is
the same as the UN has been advocating for over half a century. Indeed, the report reads
like most other 'statement of purpose' documents produced by the UN. The difference
now is that each statement on the 'world we want' can be prefigured by “The consultation
in Peru concluded...” or “As was repeatedly brought up during the consultation in
Ukraine...” Thus rather than being proudly proclaimed by Western intellectuals and the
UN itself, the ideals that the post-2015 era stands for – the same ideals that development
has always stood for – are the outcome of a million-man focus group. The UN can
therefore reassure itself that it is not imposing Western values, but simply giving the
people what they want. Development education has not escaped this assessment of the
problems of twentieth century development and the associated attempt to move away
from Eurocentrism. It is now largely subsumed under the rubric of 'global citizenship
education,' which, as the name implies, takes a global perspective rather than promoting a
narrowly Western one.

It goes without saying that for many this will not be good enough from a supposedly fresh
new development approach, but how much further are critiques such as those advanced
by the likes of Sachs likely to take us? Their effectiveness requires policy-makers who do
not believe that universally valid ideals exist, but do not know that the ideals they are promoting actually belong to a specific cultural tradition. Only then will the revelation that policy x relies on a Western understanding of y have the desired effect. It is by no means contradictory to recognise on the hand that democracy rests on a certain understanding of the individual's relationship with society, and to believe on the other that it is a political system to be emulated by all. We are more aware than ever of the assumptions that shape our understanding of development and our visions for the future; it does not necessarily follow that these visions cannot be propagated globally. If it did, development would be as dead as Sachs hoped. As it doesn't, there is room for further critiques which take its universalist impulse as a given.

That is what this thesis hopes to contribute to: the search for an understanding of development in which the field can retain its normative commitment and contribution to a better world for all without the neo-imperialistic implications this has had in the past. The errors of development theory's past seem monstrous indeed and it is no wonder that we should want to distance ourselves from them. Yet the effort of distancing is not the same as change. Decades of caricaturing post-war development theory has given us the impression that we are already in a new development era simply by virtue of the fact we want to be. However, “it is not enough to want change, not even enough to work for it – we must want it and work for it with intelligence.” (Trilling, 1951[1970]: 223) That is, we must work for change with a sound historical sense. With that in mind, this thesis aims to help us reconsider what it is in development theory's past that needs to be critiqued in order for the field to move beyond its failures. In so doing it looks for a way of conceptualising social change through which the normative element of development studies could be maintained without this becoming an imposition of Western values and practices and hence implying the passivity of the developing people in their own development.

Certainly the reader should not expect to find a fully fleshed out alternative to development; that would be beyond the scope just mentioned, the assessment of development theory in light of the internal-external problem and the consequent need for the active individual to be explicitly re-incorporated into our basic conceptualisation of social change.. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the MDGs and their SDG successor was a key motivating factor in the conception of this project, and they shall be returned to in
the conclusion where it will be possible to consider what the development landscape might look like were the active individual to be re-housed in its ruins. The post-2015, like so many development eras before it, represents an attempt to 'bring the people back' into a process of development from which they have become detached. Going forward, it is important to think clearly about the nature of the 'people' who can be accommodated in our understanding of social change: are they active producers, as we profess to desire them to be, or merely passive recipients?

2. Methodology

“The truth is that good reading does not come out of systems, just because each great book ... establishes its own language, manner, and point of view. A great book is in effect a view of the universe, complete for the time being. You must get inside it to look out upon the old familiar world with the author's unfamiliar eyes.”


The material with which this thesis works is written texts – primarily books but also scholarly articles and policy documents. This raises a number of problems, concerns, and limitations including but not limited to bias, choice of texts, and interpretation. What the reader is, understandably, concerned about is a lack of objectivity. Is the author not 'just' reading books, picking individual ones from the shelf almost at random and interpreting them according to subjective bias and interest? What the reader expects is that the desired objectivity be supplied by a methodology. Although it is today a commonplace to say that there is no such thing as true objectivity – no 'view from nowhere' – a methodology offers the reader an objective standard, in the sense of existing outside the subjectivity of the author, by which to judge the work. Is the method appropriate to the author's aims? Did the author follow the method properly? Were the proper sources identified and tested according to the procedure? The methodology tells the researcher what to look for, where to find it, and how to identify it; and by passing it on to the reader the study gains in objective merit. Given this understanding of the purpose of methodologies, it seems odd that this section, although it appears at the beginning of the thesis, is being written towards the end. One could not imagine a physicist, a chemist, or a statistician performing their study and only then turning to the methodology. However, it does make sense within the approach to reading followed in the thesis. The initial approach – and underlying rationale – is based on the work of the American literary critic Lionel Trilling and French
historian Jacques Barzun. The fruits of this initial approach form the basis for a more focussed re-reading of the material, guided by the methodology of Quentin Skinner.

Trilling and Barzun developed their method while working together at Columbia University (Trilling, 1966: 4-6; Barzun, 1976[2002]: 176). Because they did not regard it as a methodology in the strict sense of the word they never gave it systematic treatment, but its guiding principles can be gleaned from various essays and from their approach to the teaching of modern literature at Columbia. Both believed strongly that modern literature should not be studied at university, and until the middle of the nineteenth century most would have agreed with them. Contemporary literature – like all aspects of contemporary culture – was to be experienced on one's own; only then could it aid in an individual's prolonged effort towards the cultivation of the self. When modern poets, novelists, and artists appeared in the curriculum it was to provide biographical and historical background to the work, along with an explanation of difficult passages. “That was all. It amounted to a sort of beginner's workout for reading reflectively, reading for self-cultivation.” (1989: 18) For Trilling, understanding art was about experiencing the vitality of its creation (1966: 10). While scholarly analysis can help us recover the lost power of classic literature this is not necessary in the case of modern literature because the context that gives it life is still with us. Analysis tends only to accelerate the process by which a modern work becomes a classic, thereby distancing us from it. Too much scholarship in the humanities and social sciences, Barzun felt, is concerned with the application of systems that allow the scholar to uncover hidden motives or list themes and metaphors (1991[1992]: 165-166). While these studies are certainly not without value, Barzun believed that they conflated a distinction made by Pascal (1660: I.1-2) between two orientations of the mind, l'esprit de geometrie and l'esprit de finesse.

The root of the distinction lies in the familiarity of their objects of study. The mathematical spirit is concerned with objects that are “palpable, but removed from ordinary use” (Pascal, 1660: 1.1). That is, they are strange in the sense that they exist outside ordinary human understanding, but they are 'palpable' in the sense that once this strangeness has been overcome they are easy to understand and use because their definitions are clear and their principles unchanging. For example, scientists can demonstrate that the universe is expanding by identifying 'redshift' in light reaching the Earth from supernovae: an expanding universe would stretch the waves of light, shifting
them towards the red end of the colour spectrum. Remoteness and palpability combine to make rigorous methodologies the foundation of research in l'esprit de geometrie. Pascal's 'intuitive mind,' by contrast, is concerned with objects of study that exist within everyday speech and understanding but that are, for that very reason, far more fluid and changeable. They are in plain view, but messy. The concepts it is concerned with are easy to recognise yet difficult to grasp because each individual uses them in slightly different ways, and in using them alters the concepts themselves. Moreover, the relationships between the elements are not clear or definable in advance. It is 'conditions,' numerous and tangled, that produce effects, not identifiable 'causes.' As a consequence, the wisdom of starting one's research with a methodology that tells one where to look – which all must do to be of any use – is rather more dubious in this case. Rather, writes Pascal (1660: 1.1), "[o]ne has only to look, and no effort is necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be good, for the principles are so subtle and so numerous that it is almost impossible but that some escape notice."

Underlying Pascal's distinction is an ontological claim that the reality investigated by l'esprit de finesse is one of human action – of conscious individual activity, contingency, and uncertainty – whereas the reality of l'esprit de geometrie is governed by 'forces.' In the former there are no determining forces; only individuals pursuing their consciously-chosen ends. This is the realm of culture, art, ideas, economics, history – life in general. Over the past half century or so much work has been done in the various branches of the study of culture to counter this supposedly bourgeois tendency to exaggerate the imprint of individual action and creativity and intention on the course of ideas and events. Foucault, in the introduction to his Archaeology of Knowledge (1972[1977]: 12-13), praises Marx for effecting this "decentering [of] human consciousness from the 'original subject of historical development." As a consequence, a good deal of scholarship that Pascal would have associated with l'esprit de finesse is now concerned with uncovering the hidden forces underlying our social reality. Edward Said, who while using Foucault's methodology claims to appreciate the imprint of individuals and their works on the shape of a discourse, nevertheless subordinates this individuality to the influence of power relations:

"[I]f it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its authors' involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances, then it
must also be true that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second.\(\text{(1978[2003]: 11 – emphasis added)}\)

Thus the individual's thoughts are ultimately determined by his or her place in the West-Rest power structure; a racial and cultural distinction to Marx' class distinction. The denigration of the influence of the individual author is similarly implied in the phrase 'production of knowledge'. To the Romantic mind, knowledge is created or discovered in an act of individual genius. For Said, to show that an author exists within a set of power relations is to demonstrate their lack of freedom as a knowledge-creator. Their knowledge is socially produced, reflecting a place in those power relations in their historical moment. Said continues:

"And to be a European or an American in such a situation ... meant and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with defined interests in the Orient, and more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient almost since the times of Homer." \(\text{(1978[2003]: 11)}\)

It is true enough that an awareness of the long history of European involvement in the Orient could make it seem 'natural' or legitimate to a European that the continue that involvement, although there are of course many who have studied the West's involvement in the non-Western world and concluded that it would be better off had it been left alone. But what this method does not tell us much about is the content of the knowledge that is created. It has something to do with the interests of the West in the non-Western world, but Said does not explain how every European or American knows – however dimly – what those interests are and how best to achieve them. Nor does this account for the work of scholars from nations with little imperial interest in the Orient, such as Germany. More importantly for our present purposes, the applicability of such a methodology requires, according to Pascal's distinction, that its object of study be implicit – that is, 'removed from ordinary use.' The work of Said and others who make similar arguments rest on the largely unexamined proposition that these biases about Western superiority and non-Western inferiority exist at a deeper level than ordinary ideas, hidden from individuals who believe that they are studying the Orient objectively but are in fact coloured by a
'dim awareness' of the West's superiority over that part of the world. Only then can even a dim awareness of something colour the entire superstructure of knowledge built upon it. If, however, we look at development theory we see that it is an explicit idea rather than an implicit assumption that there is something universal in the Western trajectory of social change. The West has or aspires to something that the rest of the world should also possess – democracy, equality, free markets, human rights, prosperity, universal education and healthcare, and so on. It is an idea that exists alongside other, often conflicting, ideas, influencing them and being influenced by them – ideas about how development ultimately has to be indigenous, how universal models must be adapted by local leaders to fit local contexts, and so on. One does not have to uncover nefarious power relationships and hidden forces to demonstrate that the 'West is best' idea exists. The trick is not to uncover something hidden from ordinary sight but to investigate the place of something visible yet out-of-focus within development thinking and to determine its place within the whole.

The consequences of confusing this are visible in Arturo Escobar's famous and influential *Encountering Development* (1995) particularly in how he interprets speeches, which frequently require decontextualisation to make them fit a discourse that is held to be independent of the individual intentions of the speaker. For example, Escobar discusses a speech given by Robert McNamara to his fellow World Bank board members, in which the then-president of the Bank advocates setting an ambitious target of a 5% annual increase in small farm output in Africa. McNamara believed this was possible based in part on the example of Japan. Thus the speech was given to people known to McNamara, who shared a similar background knowledge of land and agricultural policies in developing countries, and was intended to gain support for an expressly ambitious target. The desirability of adopting this target is the focus of the speech rather than the specific means that would actually be used to achieve it wherever it came to be implemented. This context is entirely ignored by Escobar. He criticises McNamara's "reliance on a model (Japan), without recognizing any historical specificity" (Escobar, 1995: 160). In fact, this was as a prominent example of successful land reform, which contributed in the post-war years to a rapid expansion of the Japanese agricultural sector. It was not intended to provide a model to be replicated elsewhere; it was, rather, evidence that the rapid expansion of agriculture envisaged by McNamara is not as over-optimistic as it may have first appeared. That it has been done before is evidence that it *can* be done, not that it
must be done in the same way everywhere else.

Escobar (1995: 60) continues: “The principle of authority [in McNamara's speech] is clear: 'I believe the goal to be feasible', when the 'I' is uttered as representative of all bankers investing in development.” On the contrary, it is quite clear from the context of the speech, which is a personal appeal to fellow World Bank board members, that the 'I' refers to McNamara himself. The speech is aimed at 'bankers investing in development,' not representative of them. The goal he has proposed may seem unrealistic to his fellow bankers, but he believes it is possible and has tried to convince them with his speech. McNamara concludes by admitting that the World Bank, like everyone else, does not have all the answers. They have enough general knowledge to get the project started, but beyond that experiments will have to be undertaken and learned from, specific to local situations. According to Escobar's (1995: 160) interpretation, “[q]ualifying this principle of authority only makes it stronger ... If 'the Bank' does not have clear answers, nobody else does.” Here Escobar has altered the emphasis of the statement, from the modest 'nobody, including the World Bank, has all the answers' to the arrogant 'the World Bank does not have all the answers, therefore no one else can either.' Again, the former makes sense within the context of a speech designed to garner support for an ambitious project: 'I know we don't have all the answers but no one else does either, so we should not let that deter us.' The latter makes sense only given Escobar methodological approach which straitjackets what it is possible for McNamara to say.

It is worth making clear that there is nothing in principle wrong with what Escobar is trying to do here – bring to light assumptions of Western superiority within development thinking. Problems arise when it becomes the basis for textual interpretation and for one's understanding of development thinking generally. Ultimately, Escobar is not reading texts on development theory; he is reading power relations through the medium of texts. As such, he ignores – or his methodology blinds him to – the individual tone of McNamara speech, instead reducing it to an instance of Western-centric arrogance. As with Said, he attributes such supreme power to the development discourse over the minds of individual development theorists and practitioners that their identities, interests, and intentions are finally reduced to those of one of the two monolithic categories that he finds at the heart of the problems of the development discourse: the West and the Third World. Where Foucault had said that a discourse becomes linked with institutions and practices of
power, Escobar elides the two. Which knowledge is created and how knowledge is used become conflated. Because the focus is on a power relationship, his critique is most interested in what power does with knowledge. Though it aims to analyse the relations between institutions, knowledge, socio-economic processes, technologies etc, there is a failure to distinguish adequately between them. Everything is condensed into a single unit. The analysis of this unit is diverted toward the end user – power – and the individual elements are retrospectively judged based on this perception. Thus with Escobar, the methodology works like a template. It is placed over the material and it is the job of the researcher to see what shows through the gaps. His object of study – whether development theory as a whole or a specific text – is reduced to a mere appendage, a case study to demonstrate the usefulness of the methodology. As a consequence, what the reader of Encountering Development receives from Escobar is not a view of development theory but a facsimile, “an offprint made for methodic purposes,” in Barzun's (1989: 16) words.

This was, to repeat, precisely the concern Barzun and Trilling had about the analytical study of modern literature: “it is fair to say that the modern student, the 'major' in English or American studies or in one of the other departments, has no cultivating encounter with the works of art he or she has been assigned. George Eliot has been read for the plight of women or for images of running water; the Post-Impressionists testify to sordid society and individual alienation...” (1989:15) Having finally been persuaded by the university hierarchy to introduce a modern literature module, Barzun and Trilling developed an approach to reading texts that would avoid the pitfalls of misapplying l'esprit de geometrie and maintain the immediacy and vitality from which literature gains its value as a vehicle for personal development. Barzun (1989: 83) described the 'method' as follows:

“[T]he group [of students] would read the books assigned and discuss them with the aid of all relevant knowledge – historical, aesthetic, logical, comparative, philosophical, [etc.] ... no holds barred. But what was relevant? Ah, that was the purpose of the exercise: to develop judgement to the point where nothing foolish, nothing forced, nothing 'viewy,' nothing unnecessary is used that might stand in the way of understanding and enjoyment.”
There are three key aspects to this. First, the work itself should be read rather than, or at least before, summaries of it. “Some of the results of scholarship may be brought in to shed occasional light on and around the work, but the work is there to shed its own light.” (1991[1992]: 146) Second, the work should be read comprehensively – that is, the whole work should be read and read reflexively rather than strategically. “Only at this price can the mind form true and distinct images.” (1991[1992]: 145) Third, the work should be read with a good deal of surrounding knowledge. This is slightly different from saying that it should be read 'in context.' To identify beforehand what the 'proper' context is requires a methodology. What Barzun and Trilling had in mind was simply varied and voracious reading, which would produce “a map of the mental life with one region of it extremely familiar, because it is 'home.'” (1976[2002]: 390) That is, a region of which one has specialist knowledge but that is not cut off from the rest of the world of ideas. Context-relevant knowledge “can grow in regions apparently far removed from [the work being studied]. … The great point is that none of the elements brought to bear is ever regarded as determinant, as cause; it is only a condition whose force is gauged, like everything else in immediate experience, by the esprit de finesse.” (1989: 84)

Consistent with Pascal's (1660: 1.1) belief that in matter of the intuitive understanding “[w]e must see the matter at once, in one glance, and not by a process of reasoning, at least to a certain degree,” Barzun and Trilling's 'method,' which they named cultural criticism, presupposes “the factitiousness of theory and the unsuitability of system…” (Barzun, 1989: 84) The point of the approach was not to analyse and break down or to discover hidden meanings or instances of this or that, but to “[seize] upon the character of the whole altogether, by inspection.” (Barzun, 1989: 14) It achieved this by attempting, as far as possible, to create a situation where “there are no barriers between ideas, there is no jargon, no prevailing theory or method. There are books and readers, as on the first day of publication.” (Barzun, 1991[1992]: 196) Identifying the steps to take, what to look for, where to look and so forth is in the case of l'esprit de finesse itself an act of judgement that must be informed by an engagement with the material itself from the perspective of one's prior knowledge and experience. Thus the work must be read with “a great deal of attention, knowledge, and experience of reading,” rather than being guided by a methodology devised and applied in advance; for Barzun and Trilling, the reader is and must be “ultimately on his own, his sole resources being strenuous reading and a demanding imagination.” (Barzun, 1976[2002]: 135)
That last citation raises the problem of personal bias and rigour noted in the opening paragraph. There is no easy answer to this question as there is, according to the understanding of ‘reading’ expressed here, no special technique to supply it. One’s ‘demanding imagination’ is of course subject to and coloured by a host of assumptions, preferences, and prejudices. This is not in itself a bad thing. Indeed, Trilling (1966: 5) regarded a sense of oneself as “a person rather than as a bundle of attitudes and responses” as a precondition for the ‘imagination of the real.’ The ‘view from nowhere’ is not only impossible, it is in the case of l’esprit de finesse also undesirable because the intuitive understanding is predicated upon a meaningful engagement among the material, the self, and the world. This sense of self is also an important part of intellectual honesty, which demands that we are honest with ourselves; that is, that we are aware of the intellectual and social position from which we are reading and writing. However, Barzun pointed out in his Clio and the Doctors (1974: 48) that the strongest safeguard against bias lies in the nature of l’esprit de finesse itself. Because it avoids dealing in signs, metaphors, and hidden motives that can only be accessed using the correct methodology, the ‘evidence’ it considers “is in plain sight and the bias also.” The sources still need to be interpreted, but they are public: there is nowhere to hide and thus biases will soon be exposed, though they may have been overlooked by the researcher.

Barzun and Trilling hoped that the outcome of their method of reading would be to encourage in the reader the development of a ‘historical sense,’ different aspects of which appear throughout their writings. This thesis will return to it later, as it has an important role to play in the understanding of the ‘active individual.’ For now we need only note that the historical sense “enables the independent mind to criticize ... the advanced attitudes that misread the present from ignorance of the past. All the novelty-hunting that is later seen as faddishness, and not discovery, is assessed sooner and more truly than the mind ballasted with history.” (Barzun, 1974: 128) 'Faddishness' is, as was mentioned in the first part of the introduction, rife in development studies. In a field of theory and practice built upon hope yet haunted by failure the new is seized upon and the past discarded more readily than elsewhere. Barzun (1974: 128-9) could easily have been describing modern development studies when he wrote that by “[i]magining monsters of error in the past, they overvalue their own fresh proposals and attitudes, and in their name persuade men to acts and opinions as inept or unjust as those they supplant. Too often the new is old
error painted over, and the indignation that sustains it blinds the projector to drawbacks and difficulties.” The 'monsters of error' implanted into our imagination by the radical critiques of the post-war development model give rise to a great deal of indignation. W.W. Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1960[1977]), for example, has come down to us through the lens of post-development critiques as an instance of a linear understanding of social change with Western capitalism at the apex. This is what Brohman (1995: 125) had in mind when he dismissed an entire school of thought as having offered little more than a 'celebration of the achievements of the advanced industrial countries.'

Even if an interested student looks past the reference books and picks up the work itself they will find a summary in the introduction containing precisely what they have been led to believe: a linear model of development ending with Western capitalism. Having found the instance of Eurocentrism they were looking for there would be no need to read on through a book so riddled with old-fashioned biases and prejudices. Yet they would have found in later chapters Rostow's conjectures on the post-capitalist society in which development would come to fruition: “the end of all this [development] is not compound interest forever; it is in the adventure of seeing what man can and will do when the pressure of scarcity is substantially lifted from him.” (1960[1977]: 166) Capitalist society, for Rostow, would eventually consume its own conditions. Development would not end with capitalist mass consumption but once it had overcome that society. Nor was Western historical social change something to be emulated; indeed, it was to be avoided as far as possible. Certainly this student would not be as confused as Mehmet (1995[1999]: 72) upon finding that Rostow, 'the prophet of capitalism,' legitimised state intervention in the economy as a vital part of development.

These sections are not hidden away; it takes no special methodology to uncover them or to divine their meaning. Indeed, it is more likely a methodology that hides them from us. What it requires is that one reads “as one reads a face – with a great deal of attention, knowledge, and experience of reading.” (Barzun, 1989: 84) The great benefit of Barzun and Trilling's approach to reading is that by its comprehensiveness and breadth of scope it encourages – indeed requires – this. It may be questioned at this point how, if one is 'just' reading texts, it is possible to come up with a different interpretation than anyone else. This question could easily be turned around: it is in fact far more likely that one
would produce a different interpretation with this method, with its emphasis on independence and a personal encounter resulting in an individual synthesis. Indeed, an individual synthesis is precisely the point. It is only when one is strictly following a methodology that the question of how and why you have found something original can be raised. If you're following the same procedure as others, how have you reached different results? Avoiding fashionable methodologies helps avoid the equally fashionable misinterpretations they have engendered, bringing into focus problems and alternatives obscured by them. Concern with the Eurocentrism of development theory has, it will be argued, obscured the internal-external problem and elided the concept of development with what was once and could be again an alternative to it: the concept of progress.

The approach initially taken in this thesis, based on the thoughts of Barzun and Trilling, is thus a highly inductive one, even within the context of textual interpretation. The method is one designed not to be a method, in the formal sense, at all, in order to enhance and maintain for as long as possible the open-ended nature of inductive research. This, Barzun and Trilling believed, was of particular interest to the disciplines dearest to them – history and literary criticism – where the researcher must form from a vast range of largely qualitative data a coherent narrative and where, therefore, critical judgement rather than the application of concepts will produce the most valuable results. Any work in these fields will, consciously or unconsciously, extend far beyond their strict boundaries into different academic territories. The same is true of development theory, where one must grapple with a fantastic range of thought, including politics, economics, history, sociology, philosophy, sociology, psychology, international relations and more, not to mention areas of study dealing with the more technical aspects of social change.

There are, however, dangers stemming from this interdisciplinary nature. It is too easy to fall into the trap of thinking that development theory merely touches upon these and incorporates aspects of them. Such an approach leads students of development to learn about the 'politics of state-building' or the 'economics of urbanisation' without an appropriate grounding in the first-order disciplines of politics or economics, resulting in an understanding of these subjects based on the ready-made concepts provided rather than critical judgement. Elsewhere I have explored the consequences of this with regards to the concept of 'neo-liberalism', a catch-all caricature of economic thought at the height of the Chicago school used to judge past and present approaches to development which is the
closest many students of development get to this key discipline (Clark, 2015). The avoidance of such interdisciplinary narrowness, as one might call it, ought to be built in to the research process. Barzun and Trilling's approach does precisely that, for while it allows, like all inductive approaches, for a shifting focus it aims to keep the initial exploratory phase open as long as possible so that on the winding path one takes through the material one is always accompanied by “a map of the mental life” (1976[2002]: 390). The aim is that the narrowing down phase of inductive research is not accompanied by narrowness.

As a consequence early reading for this project was, as Barzun (1974: 144) recommends for all new students, “hearty and catholic to the verge of indiscriminate,” being aimed at building up a ‘map of the mental life’ prior to charting a path through it. As a rule the whole book was read, except in cases of essay collections comprising various authors. Given the modern preoccupation with contextualisation this should not be a particularly strange approach, inefficient though it may be. Adding to the inefficiency, thorough notes were taken along the way. 'Thorough' here means that notes were taken in a way that summarised the whole work as opposed to 'strategically' in line with particular interests held at the time. This has the double benefit of allowing one to revisit notes with a new focus and have something spring out that seemed only of contextualising relevance before, and of allowing one to easily return to a specific section of the book.

At this stage the choice of authors and texts was guided by three main considerations. First, the need to fill in the ‘home’ region of the mental map, development studies. Particularly for the post-war era this was based on the overview of development theory received during my master's in international development (although we certainly did not actually read such out-dated texts. What would be the point? They are but museum-pieces of an ethnocentric age). Of course, the plentiful references in academic texts helps one expand beyond the original set of known texts and build up a mental picture of a network of books and articles and the environment in which they were written and read. Second, reading in neighbouring regions which, following the frequently-shifting overall argument held in view, seemed of potential importance. Some of this reading, such as the economics of Frank Knight, ultimately did not feature in the final product, but others became extremely important, such as the interest in the idea of progress sparked by Cowen and Shenton’s *Doctrines of Development* (1996). Third, reading from regions
further afield which held some personal interest but had, at the time, no clear link to the project. In a sense this was done in order to maintain some level of sanity – it is important to remember, during such a long process, that reading is something to be done for its own sake as well as for the purpose of the thesis. In the event, however, these far-off regions of the mental map have had a significant influence, none less so than the work of Ernst Cassirer, who was first encountered via his *The Myth of the State* (1946). These three aspects were largely pursued simultaneously, their relative importance at any given time being determined by what the provisional overall argument was and how solid it was felt to be.

Thus the build-up of surrounding knowledge followed existing and emerging interests in various aspects of political economy (especially Ludwig von Mises' approach), philosophy (e.g. Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms), and history, each of which have contributed in their own way to what this thesis has become. History in particular, with a long-standing interest in the history of ideas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, would prove valuable in my interpretation of development as a concept. Combined with my reading of post-war and modern development theory it led to the distinction between progress and development which forms the basis of the thesis, and a search for their differentiation. Ernst Cassirer will feature prominently later when we come to conceptualise the active individual. In hindsight, at least, it is possible to say that the search for a solution to the problems of development theory in the form of an 'individual' was influenced in no small part by the work of Ludwig von Mises. His individualist ontological outlook framed that search, making certain possible avenues look more fruitful than others. For Mises as for Pascal the human world is one of uncertainty and freedom – of choice and action as opposed to social laws; and “all actions are performed by individuals.” (Mises, 1949[2007]: 42) This should not, as it so often has been, be taken to imply some kind of atomism. Mises regarded all questions of whether the part (individuals) was prior to the whole (society) as vain. They are correlative: one cannot exist without the other.

As human beings we are necessarily involved in social processes. “As a thinking and acting being man emerges from his prehuman existence already as a social being” (Mises, 1949[2007]: 43). Everything we call uniquely human – reason, language, politics – would not exist without society. For Mises, however, the key point was that all these
social processes become operative and discernible only in the actions of individuals. Whatever the social process, it “took place in individuals. It consisted in changes in the behavior of individuals. There is no other substance in which it occurred than the individuals. There is no substratum of society other than the actions of individuals.” (Mises, 1949[2007]: 43) Collectives such as nations, states, classes, and churches have a real influence on the course of events, but they exist and are visible only in the meaning given to actions performed by individuals. Based on this ontological perspective, collectivist or communitarian approaches to development look at best secondary to the more important task of re-emphasising the centrality of the active individual – which is what this thesis tries to do.

While not an efficient approach by any means Barzun's and Trilling's approach is, for the above reasons, a necessary precursor to more strategic forms of reading and makes a greater contribution than the latter to the final outcome. Once the whole has been apprehended in this way – according to the mode of perception called l'esprit de finesse – methodologies in the traditional sense show their value as guides for text selection and reading. It is the understanding gained using Barzun and Trilling's approach that allowed me to be progressively more targeted and strategic in my (re-)reading of development literature. Once a clear picture of the material has been built it is possible to look for that picture in one's further reading. Ideally this would not be necessary and the 'picture' would continue to evolve with further reading in the style of Barzun and Trilling. Pragmatically this cannot be so as there is clearly not enough time in a Ph.D. for even the most voracious reader to cover everything. Moreover, the final thesis is a definite text rather than an evolving one – at some point a settled argument must be reached, supporting evidence sought, and key texts selected. It is here that a more formal methodology may be useful. The key point is that it is chosen after the whole has been surveyed, the discoveries have been made, the arguments formulated, and even in part, as mentioned at the top of this section, after the thesis has been written.

For this thesis, Quentin Skinner's approach, elaborated in a series of articles in the '60s and '70s (1966; 1969; 1974; 1975) and utilised most famously in his *Machiavelli* (1981), has been found useful. Skinner's method arose out of a dissatisfaction with two leading approaches to the history of ideas, which he termed textualism and contextualism. As these terms imply, the former assumes the primacy of the text, the latter of the social
context. Both, he believed, produced certain 'mythologies.' For example, textualism leads to the mythology of prolepsis, which conflates the intentions of an author with the later significance of their work. That we now see e.g. Adam Smith as the father of economics ought not to imply that he deliberately set out to create a new discipline. When interpreting a text, some context must be called upon in order to provide specific meanings to words and concepts; by failing to take the social context into account, textualism implicitly replaces the contemporary context with our own. Contextualism, on the other hand, goes too far in the other direction, assuming that the context is a determining factor in the production of a work. What Skinner recommends in his *Machiavelli* (1981: 1-2) is “to begin by recovering the problems he evidently saw himself as confronting in The Prince and The Discourses and his other writings on political philosophy” via a broader understanding of the historical context. In this way the textual interpretation is contextualised without losing sight of the importance of the individual author.

Two considerations prompted the decision to utilise Skinner’s approach when identifying key texts: the results of Barzun and Trilling’s cultural criticism approach to reading, as outlined above, and the individualist ontological outlook of Ludwig von Mises. The latter, championed by Mises in the opening chapters of his *Human Action* (1949[2007]), informed the general framework for that search. Mises, as we have seen, viewed all social phenomena from the perspective of acting individuals and their continuous efforts to respond to the imperfect and unpredictable real world. Thus the act of differentiation between progress and development is in this thesis assumed to be one pursued by individuals. Consequently the thesis identifies the oeuvre of development theory by looking at how development as an idea was distinguished from other ideas by particular authors. It approaches these authors as individuals rather than as members of collectives or abstractions, and therefore interprets, based on what they wrote, the particular intentions of these authors – what did they object to in previous ideas?; how did they understand their task as a knowledge-creator in relation to previous approaches?; how were they trying to achieve something different? It does not (just) look at what an author meant by what they said, but what they intended to achieve, as a knowledge-creator, by saying it; that is, how they understood themselves as an author.

The former helps overcome a key weakness in Skinner’s method, namely, that there is no
reason to believe that any of its guiding principles are necessarily true. For example, he argues that in order to understand a text we must try to grasp “what sort of society the given author was writing for and trying to persuade” (1969: 40). In many cases this will be true, but it is not difficult to think of counter-examples of authors who saw themselves as writing not for their contemporary society but for posterity. Indeed, Skinner's own objection to the 'great books' approach to intellectual history was that these authors are generally not representative of their age. To give a second example, Skinner (1969: 50) writes that every statement is “the embodiment of a particular intention, on a particular occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem, and is thus specific to its situation that it can only be naive to try to transcend.” The first part is a call to treat texts as the work of human beings with their own intentions and individual existence, but the 'thus' does not follow unless one can first establish a significant degree of difference. Up until that point, successful reading is predicated upon effecting precisely the 'transcendence' that Skinner here regards as naive; to, as Barzun (1945[1981]: 215) put it, "look out upon the old familiar world with the author's unfamiliar eyes." Skinner (1969: 53) seems to admit as much in the final sentence of the same article when he says that the ability to distinguish between the necessary and the contingent is the key to “self-awareness itself,” which would surely make it prior to the application of a methodology.

Looking back on his original articles in the mid-seventies Skinner further acknowledged that “before we can hope to identify the context which helps to disclose the meaning of a given work, we must already have arrived at an interpretation which serves to suggest what contexts may most profitably be investigated as further aids to interpretation.” (Skinner, 1975: 227) Tarcov (1982) criticises Skinner for this, arguing that it demonstrates that the methodology fails to provide enough guidance for the textual interpretation that must be prior to the identification of the proper context. However, from our perspective, as has been argued in this section, methodology is not appropriate here anyway: the initial textual interpretation belongs to the realm of l'esprit de finesse, to be conducted along the lines proposed by Barzun and Trilling. Skinner's methodology thus functions as a harmonious addition to Barzun and Trilling's 'non-method.' In the present case, that initial reading produced a picture of development studies which, contrary to accounts of it as the Western way of thinking about social change (e.g. Rist, 1997), consistently set itself against the eighteenth and nineteenth century conceptualisation of social change as 'progress.' On the basis of this general idea, the consequences of which
will be a major concern of this thesis, Skinner's methodology could prove useful in guiding the selection of key texts and, in part, the re-reading of them.

If, as Skinner suggests, understanding in the history of ideas comes from an understanding of the problems an author was confronting, then if one is looking for a clear picture of both problem and proposed alternative it would makes sense to pick texts written at times when the distinction between the current and a new way of doing things was keenly felt, and from authors who were particularly conscious in their dealings with both. For this reason Part I, which covers social change as ‘development,’ is loosely based on three key periods identified in the history of development theory. First, the differentiation of ‘development’ as a conceptualisation of social change from that of ‘progress’ during the so-called static interlude in the mid-nineteenth century. Second, the return of ‘growth’ as a central concern of economics in the 1920s and 1930s. And third, the emergence of what we know as development theory in the post-war period. In each of these periods it was necessary for ‘development’ to justify its existence, which was done by contrasting it with a vision of what the world would be like without it. Herein lies the significance of these periods for the present thesis, for in them we see most clearly and explicitly the self-image of ‘development’ and the construction of its alternative within the Western tradition, ‘progress.’

The first two periods focus on specific individuals, all prominent British economists: John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, and John Maynard Keynes. It goes without saying that these three men do not represent the entirety of political-economic thought. The prominence of Keynes seems relatively uncontroversial given his significant and well-documented contribution to economic thought in the post-war era that saw the emergence of development studies. As this thesis is primarily interested in his contributions to the philosophy of growth rather than the economics of it, the focus is on his earlier writings. While the technical economics of Keynes' *General Theory* (1936) was a response to the Great Depression, we find in his early work, as Joseph Schumpeter (1951[1997]: 268) noted, “the whole of the vision of things social and economic of which [the General Theory] is the technical complement.” Moreover, for the present thesis Keynes forms something of a pivot upon which the whole turns, as his eventual rejection of Marshallian orthodoxy brought to light (and passed on to his followers) certain problems within the concept of development that were obscured by assumptions held by Mill and Marshall
about the role of individual action in social change.

Mill and Marshall are rarely given pride of place in works on the history of development theory despite their importance to the economic and political thought out of which development theory would grow. One exception to this is Cowen and Shenton's *Doctrines of Development* (1996), where Mill in particular features prominently. A key criticism of their work, which also finds the origins of development in a nineteenth-century distancing from progress, is that although their story begins as development emerges from progress they give scant attention to the latter or how the two differ. As this thesis attempts to remedy that it makes more sense to start with Mill and look at the people, ideas, and practices he differentiated himself from rather than at his own influences, as Cowen and Shenton do. Specifically, Mill is compared with Wilhelm von Humboldt because the ideological similarities between the two (a key line from Humboldt's *Limits of State Action* (1854) serves as the epigraph for Mill's *On Liberty* (1859[1977])) help highlight the differences between the concepts of progress and development.

Cowen and Shenton themselves trace Mill's influences back to Auguste Comte and Saint-Simon, and while that influence is certainly present, particularly in Mill's early writings, Comte and Saint-Simon represent too clean a break from social-change-as-progress for this thesis to begin with them. Their proposals are technocratic in the extreme and only with a methodology that renders one immune to subtlety could one find any real resonance in modern development studies beyond the basic idea, hardly unique to them, that legislation can reshape society. Mill, while innovative, was no revolutionary. He is extremely useful from the perspective of Skinner’s methodology because his conscious and deeply-felt dissatisfaction with the existing way of being was mixed with an equally conscious connection with the spirit behind it. Thus Mill and Marshall, who was seen by contemporaries as the spiritual successor to Mill, are useful to the aim of the opening sections, namely, to establish that there are important differences between them and the advocates of 'progress' (rather than to chronicle the processes by which these differences came about, which would require another dissertation). Once we get to the consequences of the move from development to progress the range of authors can be diversified somewhat, as is done in the sections on modernisation theory. Here too, however, there is, in accordance with the methodological approach, a focus on authors such as Daniel Lerner who consciously saw themselves as at the beginning of something new.
Breaking up these chronological periods, the work of Georg Simmel (1908[2000]) is used to frame the internal-external problem. Simmel is certainly not the only person to have thought about the problems of internal spirit and external forms. However, the response to this problem from countless philosophers and artists has been negation. Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Marcuse – in all the ideal is for the alienation of the self caused by imposed conditions to reach its final conclusion in a total rejection of those conditions and hence the liberation of the self. Marx, of course, is one thinker prominent in the mid-nineteenth century who does often find himself in histories of development theory, and his ideas have trickled down to us in the form of, for example, dependency theory and world-systems theory. Their concern with the centre-periphery relationship might profitably be compared and contrasted with the internal-external problem which is the focus of this thesis. However, it would be viewed in a different light than in what we might loosely call 'mainstream' development theory.

The specific way that the internal-external relationship is problematised in development theory is predicated on the dual assumption that on the one hand somewhere in the Western 'example' there is something that is part of a universal human heritage which it would be valuable to share with the rest of the world, and on the other that one cannot and ought not simply 'give' to a society the 'proper' outcome of social change. For the purposes of this thesis' argument the dual assumption of development theory will be taken for granted, and this moves approaches in the Marxist tradition sufficiently outside its scope that including him and them would have greatly added to the bulk of the finished product without a correspondingly high contribution to its value. The 'de-linking' solution offered by dependency is theory, for example, is not an option for mainstream development theory if it is to survive as a global project, and the relevance of Simmel lies in the fact that although to a significant degree he shares the common concerns it is not an option for him either. True growth, he knew, needs both internal and external aspects. Thus this is not a question of tracing influence from Simmel's way of thinking to development theory. What Simmel provides is a way of shedding light on an issue that is central to, and arises directly from, social change in today's world. Simmel's work helps highlight the tragedy of this situation, and hence the need to think more clearly about its origins and possible alternatives.
The chronological narrative will end with the modernisation era, meaning that a few more notable contributions to the history of development theory, such as neoliberalism or the more recent literature surrounding the MDGs and SDGs, will not come under active consideration. That is so because they lie beyond the scope of this part of the thesis, which has as its aim the evaluation of the idea of a ‘20th century, we develop it’ approach to development – an idea which has loomed large over development theory's attempts to re-invent itself in the past couple of decades. It is the basis of that re-invention that is the concern of this thesis – whether the concept of development is a suitable foundation or if the concept of progress might provide an alternative starting point – and that concern has guided the choice of literature. A large section on neoliberalism was cut for this very reason, though the interested reader can find the thrust of the argument in Clark (2015).

Finally, a brief note on terminology is necessary. The term ‘social change’ will be used throughout this thesis as a neutral reference to the phenomenon that ‘development’ and ‘progress’ seek to explain and evaluate. The inescapable reality is that societies change, but this can be conceptualised in different ways; hence the cumbersome terms ‘social-change-as-development’ and ‘social-change-as-progress.’ Both are ways of conceptualising the nature and origins of ‘positive social change,’ which will also be used as a neutral term referring to neither development nor progress specifically but to social change that is considered, by some common standard, good.

3. Chapter Outline
This thesis will argue that conceptualising social change according to the concept of progress can help us move beyond development theory's past failures without having to give up on the normative confidence that gave life to the field and its practice. To that end it is divided into two parts, reflecting its critical and constructive aspects. The first part it is concerned with the conceptualisation of 'development' as a specific form of social change. Consistent with the methodology it is primarily concerned with periods of emergence, when development as a concept and then as a distinct theoretical field came into existence. It deals first with the differentiation from the concept of progress, using the work of J.S. Mill and Alfred Marshall to make the argument. It is argued that social-change-as-development is concerned with a societal overcoming of the economic problem – scarcity. True individual development could only occur when the 'art of getting on' was replaced by the 'art of living.' Development occurs as society moves to the point where it
can leave the struggle for resources behind it and embark upon a new adventure with the art of living. Development is self-conscious – intentional and teleological – social change. Without the guidance development theory and practice, social change would be given over to the impulses that development theorists have associated with the art of getting on, including selfishness, individualism, materialism, and social Darwinism. These were aspects of social change as it has taken place in the West, and it was not desirable that the Third World should go through the same experience. Thus it is argued that the concept of development does not contain a vision of the West for other to imitate. Western history is as much a warning as a guide along the road to a developed world for all. The present condition of the West is not something to be followed: even in Rostow's theory of the stages of growth it is not the telos of social change.

The theoretical implications of this method of conceptualising social change are explored in a section on the 'concept and tragedy of development,' which frames the issue using the German sociologist Georg Simmel's work on the concept and tragedy of culture (1908[2000]). Simmel argued that the process of genuine cultivation must always be a combination of forces coming from within and from without the individual, but that because these forces operated according to different logics they would gradually become more distinct and hence incapable of fulfilling that function. It is argued that through the concept of development social change is seen in this way, with the internal and external forces originally separate, because it is a self-conscious endeavour: it is teleological and intentional. A section on Keynes details how this implicit problem was passed on to post-war development in explicit form due to the great economist’s removal of the active individual from the centre of social change.

The rest of the first part presents a reading of modernisation theory as an attempt to reconcile the internal and external motive forces of social change, rather than a Eurocentric attempt to make 'them' like 'us.' It finds their failure in the fact that these forces must remain conceptually separate, with the consequence that the stuff of development, created according to an external motivation, do not raise the internal, the developing society, to its own 'higher' level of development. Recognition of this situation in practice leads to criticisms that existing approaches to development have attempted to impose an external model of development, the proposed solution being a new approach that will unite development process and developing people. Analysing development
theory in this way helps explain some aspects of the modernisation approach that are otherwise written off as disingenuous or paradoxical. It is argued that the modernisation theorists’ attempts to incorporate developing people into the process of development were genuine, but that the teleological intent implicit in the concept of development itself prevented these ideals from gaining full expression in theory and policy. In trying to move us away from simplistic critiques of modernisation theorists as rationalisers of Western power, this part of the thesis attempts to alter our understanding of what it is in that approach that must be critically reconsidered if the field of development studies is to meaningfully move beyond past failures.

The second part puts forward a re-assessment of the internal-external problem. It starts by considering two attempts from outside the mainstream to move beyond the tragedy of development: post-development and hybridity. On the former it argues that in order to achieve their goal of ending development as a field of study using a Foucauldian critique, post-development theorists had to exaggerate the strength and coherence of development and, as a corollary, the passivity of the developing world. Hence the return to dichotomies one finds in a lot of post-development literature. On the latter it argues that hybridity’s conceptualisation of the problem using spatial metaphors is limiting: it pictures two discrete entities and prejudges their relationship. Based on these two critiques some requirements for a true alternative are elaborated. Section II.4 begins this thesis’ theorisation of the internal-external problem. It rejects the idea that the internal-external distinction should be considered the ‘original’ problem of social change, arguing that it appears so only according to social-change-as-development. Instead it uses primarily the work of German philosopher Ernst Cassirer to argue that the division of internal and external is something to be found rather than overcome. It is found on an individual level, with the ‘active individual’ acting with regards to society as Barzun’s and Trilling’s reader does with literature. Through Cassirer’s understanding of the internal-external problem we can think of a social change that is neither self-conscious nor unconscious, teleological nor blind. It argues that by focussing on the active individual, effaced by Keynes, as the mediator of the inherited and the new, the internal and the external, the societal-level teleology that characterises the concept of development can be dropped without fear that social change would be blind. Rather, social change can be analysed as something that is individually teleological. Moreover, the future-orientation of development can be replaced by a present-orientation without fear of conservatism. The following section
argues that the concept of progress, because it is not teleological, can provide a foundation for this alternative way of thinking about social change. This case is made with reference to a range of eighteenth century theorists of progress such as Ferguson, Hutcheson, Condorcet, and von Humboldt.

The policy consequences of this are explored in a section of education for progress, which elaborates on the type of individual theorists of progress had in mind when thinking about positive social change. It argues that the mark of educated individuals was that they could act as Cassirer's active recipient. This is contrasted with education for development as promoted by UNESCO, so that a key difference between them becomes clear: if development asks of education that it contribute to the construction of its envisioned future, progress asks that it contribute to the construction of an individually meaningful present. This again reinforces the distinction between development as self-conscious change and progress as conscious change. The final section of this part draws implications from the previous sections to address the place of ‘the West’ in development today. Is it possible to allow a ‘conscious’ approach to social change, as opposed to ‘self-conscious,’ when such a powerful and prominent example of what it means to be developed already exists? Finally, the conclusion brings together the arguments made throughout the thesis, returning to the post-2015 agenda and making recommendations for an alternative way of thinking about the role of development theory. It is argued that development theory must retain its bold normativity while simultaneously recognising that it is no more than an auxiliary to the active individual's feat of creation. Rather than the present function of problem-solver and guide, an alternative conception of the role is put forward that would be consistent with the conception of active individuals described in Part II. The role is based on the art critic, whose function, while important, does not imply the passivity of its object of study.
Part I – Social Change as Development

“The economist, like everyone else, must concern himself with the ultimate aims of man.”


“I give you the toast of the Royal Economic Society, of economics and economists, who are the trustees not of civilisation, but of the possibility of civilisation.”

– John Maynard Keynes (in Higgins, 1959: 3)

I.1 – Introduction
Wisdom, it is said, begins with a definition of terms. If true, it says much about the field development studies that 'development' itself has proved so difficult to pin down. Definitions of development are many and often contentious. To give a few examples. Economist Arthur Lewis (1955:10) used the term, along with 'growth' and 'progress' as an abbreviation of “Growth of output per head of the population.” Kofi Anan (UN Secretary-General, 2000) thought that "[a] developed country is one that allows all its citizens to enjoy a free and healthy life in a safe environment.” According to Harriss (2005: 17), development is concerned with “structural and institutional change, in contexts where countries are engaged in transformations towards an 'image of their own future' drawn from models usually provided by the experience of 'first comers.” Watts (1995: 49) associates it with “the unregulated desire for accumulation... [The] capacity to grow without end.” Gunnar Myrdal (1974: 729), the prominent modernisation theorist, argued that the only logically tenable definition of development is “the movement upward of the entire social system.” The task becomes even more daunting if we pass from general to more specific definitions: sustainable development, equitable development, human development, basic needs, pro-poor growth, feminist development, and so on. Not surprisingly, it has been asserted that there is no singular 'development,' and that any attempt to define such would either do great injustice to the diversity of approaches or be so broad as to be essentially meaningless.

Yet if the term 'development theory' is to have any meaning at all, there must be something that unites it. The contours of development theory are reasonably clear from World War II onwards. Modernisation, dependency theory, neoliberalism, post-development and so on are all identifiable as theories of development, related to each
other despite their diversity and distinct from other social sciences disciplines. Prior to World War II, however, the waters are muddier. Development studies clearly did not emerge \textit{ex novo}; but what it emerged from is a matter of debate. Mainstream histories of the field will, to the extent that they look past the post-war period, often start with Adam Smith. The full title of his famous \textit{magnum opus}, \textit{An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations}, certainly reflects the concern with economic growth generally associated with development studies. After him comes David Ricardo, the great systematiser of Smithian economics. Yet after the Ricardians there tends to be a gap (perhaps filled by Karl Marx) of around one hundred years until the tale resumes with the likes of John Maynard Keynes and Joseph Schumpeter. The period between the classical economics of Smith and Ricardo and the Keynesian revolution has been called the 'static interlude' (Meier, 1984: 125). While there were great advances in economics during this time – particularly in the realm of value theory and methodology – economists did not share the Smithian/Ricardian/Keynesian interest in the theory of growth.

In this section we shall argue that this static interlude is in fact vital to a full understanding of development theory. Looking at the work of John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall, the two most prominent economists in the English-speaking world during this period, we shall argue that though the economics of growth may not have changed much, the philosophy of growth certainly did. We shall see that how social change was thought about at the beginning of this period, with the imprint of the concept of progress, is quite different from how it was by the end with the concept of development. The crux of the difference is the teleological nature of social-change-as-development. Where social change, according to the idea of progress, was in principle unlimited, development has an end in mind. It is hardly controversial to say that development is (or was) teleological, but we shall find in this thesis that the \textit{telos} was never existing Western capitalist society; rather, it consisted in overcoming certain undesirable aspects of that social system which nevertheless needed to be temporarily harnessed. Thus in the concept of development social change becomes something that must to a significant degree be deliberately done by a society to itself. For this reason this section will argue that development may be defined as a 'self-conscious' understanding of social change, in the sense that if social change is to be positive society must become conscious of its own change. This is in stark contrast with the understanding of social change found in the concept of progress, which will be called 'conscious,' in the sense that it sees positive change as arising from the
deliberate actions of individuals to “fit [themselves] for a future of which they have no knowledge.” (Molinari, 1899[1904]: 95) The significance of this transition from progress to development is rarely recognised and shall be the over-riding concern of this half of the thesis.

The argument is made as follows. The first three sections of Part I are concerned with the emergence of 'development' as a particular conceptualisation of social change. It starts by considering two prominent methods of identifying the pre-history of development theory: the first finds the pre-history of development theory in evolutionism and is represented by Gilbert Rist's *History of Development* (1997[2008]); the second finds it in the West's position of power over the non-Western world and is represented primarily by Edward Said's famous *Orientalism* (1978[2003]). The second section sets out what we shall be looking for when we try to identify the concept of development. It utilises Michel Foucault's idea of an 'initial field of differentiation,' where a new discourse finds a way of differentiating itself from other discourses – development from progress in the present case. That differentiation is followed in sections I.3 and I.4 through the work of J.S. Mill and Alfred Marshall respectively. The two sections that follow are concerned with the consequences of conceptualising social change as development, using the work of Georg Simmel to detail the internal-external problem – the attempt to reconcile the two contradictory yet equally valid aspects of development – and then arguing that this general problem, which was implicit in Mill and Marshall, became explicit in Keynes as he removed the rational individual from the centre of social change. With Keynes' belief that individuals were too caught up in the 'money motive' to be responsible for development Mill's 'barbarians' and Marshall's 'Residuum,' irrational elements of society, came to cover the whole of society. Thus in Keynes the internal and external forces are not just separate but also, ultimately, antagonistic. The remaining three sections present a reading of modernisation theory as an attempt to reconcile the internal and external motive forces of social change, rather than a Eurocentric attempt to make 'them' like 'us.' It finds their failures in the fact that these forces must remain conceptually separate, with the consequence that the products of development, created according to an external motivation, do not raise the internal, the developing society, to their own 'higher' level of development. It is in this understanding of the internal-external problem, and the implications of it, that must be critically reconsidered if development theory is to move beyond its past failures.
I.2 – Development Theory's Initial Field of Differentiation

First, then, we shall consider methods of identifying the pre-history of development theory. We can find one way of mapping the contours of development theory in Gilbert Rist's *History of Development* (1997[2008]). Rist finds a largely unbroken line of development thinking reaching back through the Western tradition to the Greeks. Following Nisbet (1969), he argues that development thinking has been based on an analogy with the growth of a plant or living organism – an analogy that, unfortunately, has become confused with reality. Four features are implied when one thinks of development according to the growth analogy. First, *directionality*. This follows from Aristotle's theory of forms, in which the potential is contained, from the beginning, in the actual. Development thus becomes a process of perfecting or completing the organism. Second, *continuity*, as encapsulated in the phrase 'nature makes no leaps.' The appearance of a thing changes, but not its nature. Third, *cumulativeness*. Each new stage depends on the previous, and cannot come into being before its predecessor has finished. As with directionality, this implies that development is positive. Finally, *irreversibility*. It is not possible to regress into a previous stage. (1997[2008]: 27). This metaphor lies at “the heart of Western thought”, and implies the possibility of a natural history of humanity, in which “the 'development' of societies, knowledge and wealth corresponds to a 'natural' principle with its own source of dynamism, [and] which grounds the possibility of a grand narrative. It is on the basis of this idea … that a totalizing discourse can be constructed which reveals the continuity of a single process, from the origins down to our own times” (1997[2008]: 39).

Our idea of development, according to Rist, comes in a 'straight line' from the Enlightenment idea of progress, which was merely “given the finishing touches in the nineteenth century, when the doctrine of social evolutionism firmly rooted in the popular imagination the supposed superiority of the West over other societies” (1997[2008]: 40). Rist has, of course, just done for the idea of development precisely what he condemns it for doing to human history: he has constructed a 'totalizing discourse' which 'reveals the continuity of a single process, from the origins down to our own times.' He does, however, see one break: “the abandonment of the notion of decline and decay” (1997[2008]: 43). In the 17th and 18th centuries the idea of a limit to growth, an optimum level from whence the only way was down, was dismissed as mere mysticism and superstition. There was, in principle, no end to mankind's progress. There certainly could
be periods of decline, but these were not inherent in social change. As Wilhelm von Humboldt (1792[1854]:15) put it – in keeping with the metaphor of growth – whereas the flower, once blossomed, fades and dies, “when, in man, the blossom fades away, it is only to give place to another still more exquisitely beautiful.”

Rist does not recognise the significance of this change. The key to Rist's critique of the growth metaphor is its first aspect: directionality. The idea of development as an unfolding of an immanent potentiality is what supposedly gives the West its sense of superiority. It allows one to, in Foucault's (1972[1977]: 22) words, “discover, already at work in each beginning, a principle of coherence and the outline of a future unity”. The West is further along (and at any given point in time believes itself to have reached) the homogenising path universally and inevitably followed by all mankind. It is familiar with the path, and can therefore help others travel it. The path, however, is much less clear without the notion of directionality. If there is no ultimate perfection there is, on the basis of the growth metaphor alone, no basis on which to judge and rank the perfection of societies. Aristotle's theory of forms, Rist's origin of the growth metaphor, is certainly defined by directionality; but Darwin's theory of evolution, which Rist regards as a mere addition to it, no longer relies on it (Cantor, 2009: 29-32). In fact, despite his teleological, even religious, language, Darwin's theory is not an alternative account of how Aristotle's perfectly unfolded order comes into being or how the divine order could have come into being without the guiding hand of the Creator: it jettisons the idea of a perfect order completely. Darwinian evolution is defined by its imperfections as much as by its perfections; it is an account of the principles underlying the apparent disorder of the natural world. Thus its great contribution is to show how what would appear to be mistakes in the perfect order, such as vestigial organs, are in fact demonstrative of a deeper order – one that proceeds according to principles rather than a divine plan. 'Perfection', to the extent that it still exists, becomes context-relative: the organism is 'perfect' to the degree that it can thrive in its environment. If the concept of development comes to us from Aristotle's theory of forms via Darwinian evolution, this change must be accounted for.

Another approach to identifying the canon of development theory – which does recognise the importance of the telos to the analysis of development – proceeds by uncovering the dichotomies that are said to underlie it. Development, argues Escobar (1995), creates and
recreates a division of the world into West and non-West, in which the West essentially 'constructs' the non-West as a mirror image of itself – an 'Other' to the Western 'Self': “the 'Third World' ... is produced by the discourses and practices of development” (Escobar, 1995:4; Said, 1978). It is represented “in terms of absences, delinquencies or alienness” (Harrison, 2010:2) which need to be brought up to Western (-defined) standards, thus justifying continued Western intervention (see e.g. Kothari, 1988; Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997). This method is associated with, but certainly not limited to, the movement of post-development. Works such as Said's *Orientalism*, Arturo Escobar's *Encountering Development*, and Immanuel Wallerstein's *European Universalism* (2006) find the origins of the development discourse in an unequal power relationship between the Western and the non-Western world which places the West in a position to define who is developed and who is underdeveloped and to produce knowledge supposedly intended to make 'them' more like 'us'. In this approach, the history of development theory and practice lies in the 'knowledge' about the non-Western world created in, by, and for the West which had the effect – intentionally or not – of rationalising European colonial and imperial activities. The felt need to convert the American Indians to Catholicism or the nineteenth century's notion of imperialism as a civilising mission would be prominent examples.

The dichotomous system of thought reached its apogee in the field of Orientalism, the study of 'the Orient', which arose in the 19th century. In his seminal study of the discipline, Edward Said, making use of Foucauldian concepts of discourse and power, argued that “Orientalism is an exercise in cultural strength” whose essence “is the ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Eastern inferiority.” (Said, 1978[2003]: 40, 42). The Orientalists created the Orient, ascribing to it, in all its plurality, an eternally fixed character that was in every way different from the West. Starting from the "division ... of men into 'us' (Westerners) and 'they' (Orientals) ", the Orientalist's worked served to continually reinforce that division: every new idea about 'our' values, culture, and so forth, binds 'us' together and excludes the 'other' (1978[2003]:45, 227). Said (1978[2003]: 227) noted the “culturally sanctioned habit” - in the West - “of deploying large generalisations by which reality is divided into various collectives ..., each category being not so much a neutral designation as an evaluative interpretation.” The binary distinction between 'us' and 'them' is presented as the observations of a neutral academic, but in fact implies the superiority of the West, which is always associated with the 'positive category'. The West represented the values, norms, and customs of
'modernity', which "was said to be by definition the incarnation of the true universal values" (Wallerstein, 2006:33). As non-Western civilisations – whatever their other merits – had not achieved, and seemed to be making no progress toward, the universal values of modernity, there must be something intrinsically wrong with those civilisations; something that has prevented them from achieving modernity. Only the West, as the bearer of universal truths, could step in to save them from themselves. And only by becoming like 'us', by stepping over to 'our' side of Orientalism's many dichotomies, could the non-Western nations become truly civilised. Thus Orientalism reveals itself as an "adversarial knowledge" built upon a "notion of difference that implies hostility, a frozen reified set of opposed essences" (Said, 1978[2003]:352)

This division of the world into 'Self' and 'Other' is held to be inherent in traditional Western thought. Founded on what Adorno (1973) called the 'logic of identity', it is accused of being prone to the heroicisation of the universal and the marginalisation of the particular. This is because the logic of identity expresses "an urge to think things together, to reduce them to unity. To give a rational account is to find the universal, the one principle, the law, covering the phenomenon to be accounted for" (Young, 1990:98). Because of its attempts to reduce everything to universal first principles, there must be a "disavowal of the particular and a refusal of specificity." (Mouffe, 1988:36). Young (1990:99) notes the unfortunate consequences of this particular 'regime of truth':

"The irony of the logic of identity is that by seeking to reduce the differently similar to the same, it turns the merely different into the absolutely other. It inevitably generates dichotomy instead of unity, because the move to bring particulars under a universal category creates a distinction between inside and outside."

Thus Western thought "functions so as to set up and reinforce distinctions and dichotomies ... that appear innocuous but actually function in such a way as to privilege one side of the distinction and relegate the other." Distinctions such as man/woman, normal/deviant, developed/developing, good/bad, may appear innocent and objective, but in fact they "reinforce and justify a set of unequal power relations and often ... downgrade the moral status of people who find themselves on the wrong side of the dichotomies." (Roberts and Sutch, 2004:267, 268). Difference, approached in this manner, "congeals as the binary opposition a/not-a", in which "the unity of the positive
category is achieved only at the expense of an expelled, unaccounted for chaotic realm of the accidental” (Young, 1990:99). Differences are thus expressed as mutually exclusive oppositions, eternally separated in the minds of those trapped in the dominant discourse of the West.

One objection to this view is that dichotomies such as good/bad, man/woman, developed/underdeveloped, modern/traditional are not contradictory. Their form is clearly not a/not-a, as Young claims it to be. A/not-a would be modern/not-modern, rather than modern/traditional, developed/not-developed, rather than developed/undeveloped. The difference, particularly in the latter example, may be subtle but it is important. Of course, it is often said that what it means to be traditional is in effect the same as not-modern. It is a residue: the things that aren't modern are, by definition, traditional (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001a: 21). However, in the Aristotelian law of a/not-a, not-a has no specified content. It is quite simply everything conceivable that is not 'a'. This is why there can be no middle-ground between 'a' and 'not-a': there is nothing left to form that middle-ground. If 'a' is a cat, then 'not-a' is not given the characteristics of, for example, a dog. What it means to be a cat includes what it means to not be a dog, but they are not the same thing. Similarly, white/black is not the same as white/not-white even though white and black are opposites. Modern/traditional and developed/undeveloped are examples of contraries, rather than contradictions. They are two ends of a spectrum. As such, they will share some dichotomous aspects but the key point is that there is plenty of room between them for things that are neither modern nor traditional, developed nor undeveloped:

“We have explained Contrary terms as those which express the widest possible difference among classes belonging to the same genus, e.g. 'white, black', 'convex, concave', 'love, hatred'. There is, of course, a mean between terms such as these. Objects possessed of any other variety of colour are neither white nor black.” (Joyce, 1908:74)

“If something is, or has the property, A, it cannot, according to classical logic, not be, or not have the property, A, at the same time. But if something is, or has the property, A, that does not exclude the possibility that it might also be, or have the property, B, at the same time.” (Devaney, 1997:65)

An identity is defined as much by what it is not as by what it is. What it means to be tall
and what it means to be not-short, or what it means to be masculine and what it means to be not-feminine, are two sides of the same coin; likewise with Western and non-Western. The Self needs an Other. However, as for Said and Escobar all knowledge created in the West serves to reinforce the Western identity, it is not clear from their analysis why a field called development studies should actually exist. Just as we need differences in height for words such as 'tall' and 'short' to make sense, so academic disciplines need to differentiate themselves in order to justify their existence – one prominent example being the separate fields of economics and political science, formerly subsumed under the title 'political economy'. To carve out a field of its own, economics had to be 'about' something different from what concerned political scientists, and vice versa.

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972[1977]), Michel Foucault was concerned with just this: how concepts we regard as natural – such as economics or politics – come into being; that is, how they become differentiated from other concepts. For Foucault, concepts such as economics are not based on something objectively definable. The discourse on madness, for example, is not based on the existence of an object called 'madness'. Rather, the concept is defined by the collection of statements that are accepted as being about madness and those that are not. The question for Foucault is how and why certain statements emerge and are associated with the subject of madness, and others either do not emerge or are not accepted as part of the discourse. The conditions of existence, coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance Foucault calls the “rules of formation” of a discourse (1972[1977]: 38). There are three inter-related aspects of the rules of formation: the “field of initial differentiation” where the discourse defines its object and differentiates itself from other discourses; the “authorities of delimitation” who are regarded as having the authority to make truth statements about the object; and the “grids of specification”, according to which the various parts of the discourse are “divided, contested, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one another.” (1972[1977]: 41-2). As our concern here is with development theory as a distinct body of knowledge the relevant aspect is the first, where a new discourse “finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object – and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable.” (1972[1977]: 41) How does development theory identify its domain? That is, what is it 'about'?

Escobar's and Said's analyses of development studies are based on the idea that the object
of development theory is the Third World. Through development theory (or Orientalism, for Said) the West creates and defines the underdeveloped (or Oriental) world as an object upon which it can act. Yet development theorists are not so much concerned with the Third World as such, with the categories of 'modern' and 'traditional', 'developed' and 'undeveloped'; rather, they are concerned with 'developing,' with social change. That is the object of development theory, what it is about. 'Development' as a phenomenon is a particular form of social change, and development theory is the body of knowledge that conceptualises and describes it. As we shall see throughout this thesis, when development theorists define their field they do so by differentiating it from alternative ways of conceptualising social change – this, not West-non-West, is the identity foremost in their minds.

Though it may be a useful rhetorical device, it is clear to all development theorists that there are no developed countries – at least not yet. Everyone is in a process of development. Consequently, development theory is not (primarily) concerned with recreating the West in the non-Western world. As Daniel Lerner put it: “[t]here is no uniform Tomorrow just as there was no single Yesterday.” (1958[1966]: 74). Even Walt Rostow's famous stages of growth theory – a favourite target of this type of critique – does not end with his book's 'final' stage. It was not the stage of capitalist mass consumption – the stage in which the industrial West found itself – that was the ultimate aim. Development would find its fulfilment only in a later stage; for even in the contemporary West, “[t]he problem of choice and allocation – the problem of scarcity – has not yet been lifted...” (1960[1977]:81) The telos of social-change-as-development is not the universalisation of Western (capitalist) society. Rather, it consists in overcoming the problem of scarcity, of freeing mankind from the burdens of the struggle for mere existence. In this explicitly Anti-Communist Manifesto, Marx was conceded to be correct on one point: “the end of all this [development] is not compound interest forever; it is in the adventure of seeing what man can and will do when the pressure of scarcity is substantially lifted from him.” (1960[1977]: 166) This process of development, for Rostow as for other theorists, was seen as a common and cooperative human endeavour:

“The creation of a setting of assured affluence and security for men and nations – and seeing what man will make of it – is the object of much striving by many hands for social an economic progress and for stable peace. But ... the human community still has a long,
... hard road ahead on which all it can summon in human dedication and endurance, talent and idealism – and resources – will be required for ultimate success. “ (Rostow, 1971: 360)

The developed-undeveloped dichotomy doesn't convey this sense of cooperation, nor can it account for any movement beyond a simple Westernisation. Yet both are important parts of how development theory sees itself. To be sure, aspects of Western society were regarded as universally desirable. Many of them, such as democracy and human rights, still are. Yet as we shall see, it is far more interesting to consider the aspects of Western society that were, and still are, considered universally undesirable. With that in mind we can now turn to an analysis of development theory's initial field of differentiation, where it was distinguished from a rival conceptualisation of social change: the idea of progress.

In the section to follow we shall demonstrate this differentiation through the work of John Stuart Mill, comparing him with Wilhelm von Humboldt whom we associate with the idea of progress. The section after that traces the further evolution of the concept of development in the work of Alfred Marshall.

I.3 – Development's Differentiation from Progress I: John Stuart Mill

As we saw above with Gilbert Rist's work, progress and development are, in the minds of many, essentially the same thing. However, in this section we shall see that this equation does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Moreover, we shall see throughout the thesis that the perceived differences between the concepts of development and of progress have remained a vital aspect of development theory long after the initial differentiation had been effected. For the moment, though, we shall be concerned with the emergence of the concept of development in the middle of the nineteenth century. Cowen and Shenton, in Doctrines of Development (1996), similarly found the origins of development thinking in this period, and have important distinction between the two. According to them, early development theory, such as that of Auguste Comte, “was based upon the idea that 'development' may be used to ameliorate the disordered faults of progress. ... [D]evelopment was the means toward which development might be ordered but it was not the idea of progress itself” (1996:7-8). Thus it was intentional development that was to combat the problems of immanent progress. Cowen and Shenton stress underdevelopment and disorder as inherent parts of the capitalist system, to which doctrines of development are “one possible means to construct the positive alternative” (1996: 56). Development
was to be achieved “through trusteeship” (60); that is, in the words of Passmore (1969:204), by the guidance of “sages ... who, religious and scientific at once, are fit to guide mankind 'by the light of reason on the path to perfection'”. Indeed, Cowen and Shenton (1996: 4) argue that trusteeship is an inherent part of the idea of development, which is based on “an old utilitarian tautology. Because development, whatever definition is used, appears as both means and goal, the goal is most often unwittingly assumed to be present at the onset of the process of development itself.” The solution to this problem was the doctrine of trusteeship: “Those who took themselves to be developed could act to determine the process of development for those who were deemed to be less developed.” The implications of this idea for later theories of development should be quite clear.

However, the concept of immanence, in the Marxist sense used by Cowen and Shenton, implies an economic determinism. It is the progress of capitalism, as an economic system, that inevitably creates problems, but that cannot be halted. The internal logic of capitalism is the sole motive force of change. The role of the state, of intention, of development policy, is therefore essentially reactive. It can only ameliorate the problems caused by capitalist progress. For all the talk of intentionality, then, Cowen and Shenton's account of the emergence of doctrines of development is reminiscent of Karl Polanyi's work on the emergence of social policies in *The Great Transformation* (1944[2001]), in which every restriction placed on the market in the 19th century emerged spontaneously and inevitably, as a recognition of social need, rather than deliberate – intentional – choice governed by definite ideas. Thus for Cowen and Shenton (1996: 438): “Intentional development, we have argued, consists of the means to compensate for the destructive propensities of immanent change.” And: “Development emerged to ameliorate the perceived chaos caused by progress” (1995:29). But in that case it becomes rather difficult to distinguish development from progress. Adam Smith, whom Cowen and Shenton (1995:31) place under 'progress', famously wrote that “Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice.” Are these not intentional state policies, without which, Smith believed, chaos would result? He adds: “all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things” (1795[1982]:236). 'The rest' may be more broadly conceived than in most thinkers who followed him, but Smith's 'system of natural liberty' was no stateless society; and even if it was, it would not be an intention-less society.
While the reactive role implied in the immanence-intentionality distinction may arguably be the dominant function of government in a mature, predominantly market-based economy – or in the system of a predominantly pro-market thinker such as Adam Smith – it is clearly not the only one. Development economist Albert Hirschman (1958[1970]: 202-5) likened the functions of government in a developing economy to a Charlie Chaplin film in which the iconic comedian, playing a glazier, has a friend throw stones through shop windows, whereupon he passes by and offers his services in repairing the damage. This demonstrates by analogy the two functions of government: unbalancing and balancing: “To be effective, [governments] also must create incentives and pressures for further action; and then they must stand ready to react to, and to alleviate, these pressures in a variety of areas” (1958[1970]: 202). The first, unbalancing, function is more than just a Smithian maintenance of law and order, creation of the right institutions, or provision of infrastructure. These, writes Hirschman (1958[1970]: 203), are insufficient, because they do not

“...set up imbalances that cry out to be corrected. They are rather conceived as the laying down of what have often been called the 'prerequisites' for further development. As such they permit and invite, rather than compel, other activities to follow suit. We have argued that in underdeveloped countries purely permissive sequences may be ineffective in inducing growth; and that in some cases government may well have to take the first step in the compulsive sequences that may be indicated, for example through active leadership in industrialization.”

Thus the supposed continuity of Western ideas of social change – explicit in Rist and implicit in Said – does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Certainly it is not possible to equate development with the idea of progress or to see the former as a simple extension of the latter, as Rist does. However, by themselves accepting the inevitability of immanent chaos Cowen and Shenton fail to appreciate the role of ideas about social change underlying progress versus development. In Cowen and Shenton progress appears as a natural phenomenon to which development theory and policy reacts, but it too is produced by ideas and must be understood as such – as another way of conceptualising social change. Indeed, it is in an explicit and conscious opposition to the concept of progress no less than its reality that development theory emerges. Cowen and Shenton's reluctance to analyse progress except as it was portrayed by development theorists – they
do not actually discuss any theorists associated with the idea – is a fundamental weakness of their otherwise well-researched and sophisticated work. To redress this imbalance, this thesis will, in addition to the brief consideration of the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt that follows, consider the idea of progress on its own terms in the second part. This was the alternative discourse from which development theory had to differentiate itself; a differentiation which occurred during the nineteenth century and, as we shall see, has continued throughout the history of development theory.

In 1899 the Belgian political theorist Gustave de Molinari published a short book, The Society of Tomorrow (1899[1904]). It was, perhaps, the last great expression of what we call in this thesis the concept of progress. According to Molinari, the purpose of the progress of civilisation, of positive social change, can not be defined “more clearly than by saying that it is the enlargement of human powers to fit men for a future of which they have no knowledge” (1899[1904]: 95). This is the final sentence of the book. In his introduction to the 1904 English edition, Hodgson Pratt objects to ending an exploration of social change at that point. Pratt argued that leaving things so open-ended was unsatisfactory to those who, like him, were “in consternation at the existing state of society.” Molinari was part of a dying breed who represented a way of doing things that was now perceived to be too “haphazard and non-organised” (Pratt, in Molinari, 1899[1904]: 11).

The emergence of this new understanding of positive social change shall be traced in the remainder of this section and the next through the work of John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall. Both are giants of the Anglophone economic tradition, yet are rarely mentioned in conventional histories of development theory – by which is usually meant economic development. The influences of development economics are traced back to the supposed founder of the discipline, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo. Both were concerned with, to use the title of Smith's famous work, the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. After Ricardo, so the story goes, there was a period in which the problem of growth fell from the limelight. This so-called 'static interlude' ended with John Maynard Keynes, who was the direct influence on the post-war development economists. Keynes will also have a part to play in our story, but Mill and Marshall, who wrote during the static interlude, cannot be ignored. Economic theory may not have been greatly concerned with growth, but both thinkers were notable for their social philosophy. Contemporary reviewers of
Marshall's immensely influential *Principles of Economics* praised him for bringing ethics into a discipline that, apart from the work of Mill, seemed cold and uncaring. The Pall Mall Gazette's review for example, stated that: "*It is a great thing to have a Professor at one of our old universities devoting the work of his life to recasting the science of Political Economy as the Science of Social Perfectibility.*" (in Keynes, 1925a: 41).

Keynes returned to the problem of growth precisely because the Smithian-Ricardian account was ill-suited to the social philosophy of his teacher. Thus what happened during the static interlude cannot be omitted from the oeuvre of development theory: that is precisely where the field was differentiated as a new way of conceptualising social change.

To appreciate the change we can compare notions of self-development in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, representing the side progress, and John Stuart Mill, an early representative of development (Cowen and Shenton, 1995;1996). These two are of particular interest because, as Valls (1999) has argued, their apparent similarities mask deeper and more profound differences, which are revealed in the policy implications of their ideas. Self-development was central to the philosophies of both men. For Humboldt (1972[1854]:13) "*the true end of man ... is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.*" Likewise for Mill, who revealed in his Autobiography how important Humboldt's *The Limits of State Action* had been as an inspiration for his famous defence of individuality in *On Liberty*. For both, the character of the developed individual is marked by "*desires and impulses [that] are his own – are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture*" (Mill, 1848[1909]:267). As good individualists, both believed that the self-development of each individual "*from his inmost nature and for his own sake*" (Humboldt, 1792[1854]:15) would result in a harmonious and diverse society. For it would seem that as one can only aim for one end at a time, "*man is inevitably destined to a partial cultivation.*" This fate can be avoided by combining one's activities with others, rather than aiming at disparate ends. Society can thus solve the problem "*by the mutual cooperation of its different single members.*" Through social union "*each is enabled to participate in the rich collective resources of all the others*" (Humboldt, 1792[1854]:13). Mill (1848[1909]:269) likewise stresses the invigorating effect of an individual's self-development on the rest of society: "*In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more*
On the one hand, then, there are clear similarities between Humboldt and Mill in their views of the development of the individual and what this entails for society. On the other hand, there is a significant difference – a difference that marks the transition from the idea of progress to the doctrine of development. Once progress transcended the growth metaphor and became, in principle, unending, it necessarily becomes “a dynamic process, rather than a goal that can be specified in advance” (Valls, 1999: 255). If there is no end, no end can be specified. Hence Humboldt's analysis is not concerned with the content of self-development, but with the attitude individuals must take toward themselves and one another if it is to flourish – whatever the direction it takes. There are, on this view, but two prerequisites for self-development: freedom and a 'variety of conditions', which are provided by the free actions of others. Each individual requires the freedom to be able to provide their own, internal motive force toward development, and the external stimulus of other self-developing individuals. These conditions granted, “[d]evelopment can take place in any context” (Valls, 1999: 260). Positive state action is therefore not necessary for development, and in fact can only retard it.

The ultimate direction of social change is not, as Mill implies, a 'further question' to be tacked on to the analysis of a Humboldt: it represents a fundamental alternation to the understanding of social change upon which that analysis was based. For Humboldt, as for other Enlightenment thinkers, progress was itself a good thing. It was the natural state of man, opposed not only to the state of stagnation but also to one of perfection. In Samuel Johnson's *Rasselas, Prince of Abyssinia* (1759[1889]: 7-8) the eponymous hero escapes the secluded valley he lives in and where all his desires are sated: “I am, like [the animals here], pained with want, but am not, like [them], satisfied with fulness. The intermediate hours are tedious and gloomy; I long again to be hungry that I may again quicken the attention.” He does not envy the felicity of the animals in this happy valley, “for it is not the felicity of man.” Joseph Addison (1710[1804]: 270) famously believed that even in heaven the soul “is still to shine for ever with new accessions of glory and brighten to all eternity ... still adding virtue to virtue and knowledge to knowledge.” And as the mutualist anarchist P.J. Proudhon wrote (1853: 1.1):

“*Progress ... is the affirmation of universal movement, consequently the negation of*
every immutable form and formula, of every doctrine of eternity, permanence, impeccability, etc., applied to any being whatever; it is the negation of every permanent order, even that of the universe, and of every subject or object, empirical or transcendental, which does not change."

Being a liberal, Mill leant toward similar conclusions as Humboldt regarding the limits of state action. But like so many of his generation, confronted with the Industrial Revolution's 'satanic mills,' he no longer believed in the virtues of unlimited or immanent progress: he would “by no means join with those political economists who think no state of national existence desirable in which there is not a rapid increase of wealth” (1859[1977]:V.VIII). Indeed, he castigated his economic forebears for basing their analysis on the idea that the increase of wealth would be – and ought to be – unlimited. Unlike them, he was 'not charmed' with what he tellingly referred to as “the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of social life” (1848: IV: VI). But if progress is not unending it must have a terminus, it must be progress toward something, a more or less well-defined end. Mill, in contrast to Molinari, believed that “in contemplating any progressive movement, not in its nature unlimited, the mind is not satisfied with merely tracing the laws of the movement; it cannot but ask the further question, to what goal? Towards what ultimate point is society tending by its industrial progress? When the progress ceases, in what condition are we to expect that it will leave mankind?” (1848: IV:VI) Mill called his end-point the 'stationary state'. It is a term that crops up throughout his Principles, and refers to a state of economic life in which capital accumulation has ceased. Mill did not regard it as possible that this ultimate economic stagnation could be avoided; but it could be put off until mankind has reached a sufficient level of material wealth for everyone to be able to develop their mental faculties. At this point it would become not only an economic inevitability, but also a normatively desirable goal.

Thus the present system, while not a “kind of social perfection which philanthropists to come will feel any very eager desire to assist in realizing,” is nevertheless a necessary stage, for while capitalist development may not be pretty, it is necessary as a means toward that end: “Competition may not be the best stimulus, but it is at present a necessary one, and no one can foresee a time when it will not be indispensable to progress” (1859[1977]: IV.VII) This unashamedly negative view of the competitive
process stems from a basic dualism that, as Cook (2009) argues, was widely accepted at the time: the distinction between the altruistic and selfish parts of human nature, which had replaced the classical distinction between the moral human self and the impulsive natural self (Babbitt, 1919: 130). Mill, in a passage that “left economics deservedly open to ridicule as false to the nature of man” (Rothbard, 1995[2006]: 280), argued that political economy ought to treat only of the individual as “a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. It predicts only such of the phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth.” (1844[1967]: V.38) Thus economics, for Mill, looks only to the selfish in man, abstracting entirely from the altruistic. While he acknowledged that no political economist “was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted,” (1844[1967]: V.38) he argued that for the sake of social change the impulses that drive Homo Economicus must be accepted for now, but for no longer than is necessary:

“That the energies of mankind should be kept in employment by the struggle for riches, as they were formerly by the struggle of war, until the better minds succeed in educating the others into better things, is undoubtedly more desirable than that they should rust and stagnate. While minds are coarse they require coarse stimuli, and let them have them.”

(1859[1977]:IV.VI)

The last citation points to another important implication of the more value-laden idea of development as compared to progress. The open-endedness of Humboldtian self-development kept its prerequisites to a minimum: freedom and a 'variety of conditions'. Given these prerequisites “[t]here is no pursuit whatever, nothing with which a man can concern himself, that may not give to human nature some worthy and determinate form, and furnish fair means for its ennoblement. The manner of its performance is the only thing to be considered” (1792[1854]:22). The poorest labourer no less than the richest aristocrat can ennoble the soul through their pursuits. Mill’s more substantive concept of development, which has in mind the exercise of the 'higher' faculties, presupposes greater entry requirements. This immediately excludes all those who are too poor or uneducated to think of more than immediate and material concerns. In the stationary state, Mill is keen to emphasise, wealth may not grow, but there would be as much scope as ever for moral and social progress; as much room for improving the art of living. Indeed, with
minds no longer debased by the 'art of getting on' there would be a greater likelihood of improvements in that area. “Even the industrial arts might be as earnestly and as successfully cultivated, with this sole difference, that instead of serving no purpose but the increase of wealth, industrial improvements would produce their legitimate effect, that of abridging labour” (1859[1977]:IV.VI). It is only in the stationary state that everyone can develop the higher faculties. Below a certain level of wealth, where one is concerned only with 'getting on', there can be no self-development, and self-development being the highest end of man, the state and other actors may step in without the consent of the to-be-developed in order to elevate them to a sufficient standard. Having asserted that the object of his On Liberty is to expound the principle that “[o]ver himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign”, Mill reminds the reader:

“It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end.” (1859[1977]:236)

Thus rather than being 'merely' a project of ameliorating the problems caused by progress, as Cowen and Shenton implicitly portray it, the idea of development adds substantive content to that of progress: it adds a desired direction. More specifically, development was the means by which the 'economic problem' would be solved, freeing us all from the baser instincts that accompany the struggle for survival and allowing us to develop our higher faculties. The idea of development wants more from the individual or society under consideration than they could achieve for themselves. Because of this, it must place greater emphasis on the external motive forces of change: the developing society is no longer deemed capable of indigenously producing the desired results.
With Mill's deviation from the idea of progress, development thinking enters the mainstream mind. It has, however, not yet matured. Dutch sociologist Fred Polak (1973) suggested a double distinction in thinking about the future between essence-optimism or pessimism on the one hand, and influence-optimism or pessimism on the other. "The essence categories refer to an unchangeable course of events; the influence categories refer to the supposed or rejected possibility of human intervention" (Polak, 1973:17).

Conventional development thinking is optimistic on both counts. The future will be brighter, and we can make it so. By contrast, nineteenth-century liberalism, according to Polak, falls under essence-optimism, influence-pessimism: the course of history is essentially harmonious and positive, but operates according to laws, in this case that of self-interest, over which 'man' has little deliberate influence: "He is a sojourner in a world progressing steadily toward perfection." (1973: 17). Mill is mentioned only in passing in Polak's work: his image of the future is perhaps not grand enough to be called utopian. Nevertheless, he represents a watershed moment in the history of liberal thought.

With Mill, essence-optimism declines (though never reaching essence-pessimism) and influence-pessimism begins its transformation to influence-optimism. Development, as Pearson (1970: 6) would later put it, "unites ... the belief in progress and the conviction that man can master his destiny." Thus in the concept of development, social change is no longer considered unlimited, unguided, or good for its own sake. Social change is good, but only if society can harness its energies and direct its course towards the ultimate goal of ending the conditions upon which it rests. To do so, society itself must become aware of where it is heading: it must become self-conscious and future-oriented.

I.4 – Development's Differentiation from Progress II: Alfred Marshall

According to Jacob Viner (1941), Mill's spiritual heir was Alfred Marshall, and in this section it will be argued that he did indeed build upon the foundations of the concept of development laid by his illustrious predecessor. Like Mill, Marshall saw the solution of the economic problem as a prior condition to the exercise of man's higher faculties, which was the goal of social progress; he sympathised with socialist vision for mankind's future; he had misgivings over the nature, if not the material results, of competition; he saw political economy as, potentially, "the Science of Social Perfectibility" (Keynes, 1925a: 44); and he believed that economics treats of the self-interested side of man, rather than the whole man. Accordingly, Marshall spoke of his 'mission' as a public intellectual in
words that could have been penned by Mill:

“I read the Socialists: and found much with which anyone who has a heart at all must sympathise, and yet I found not one Socialist who has really grasped economic science. ... The problem rose before me: How to get rid of such evils in society as arise for a lack of material wealth? ... If [man] is used up in a hand to mouth struggle for existence he cannot develop as he should. ... The work I have set before myself is this: – How to get rid of the evils of competition while retaining its advantages” (in Keynes, 1925a: 16)

Mill, as we saw above, had “reacted against his father's and Bentham's social philosophy as unduly cold and hard, and as lacking the moderating element obtainable from giving a larger role to 'feeling'” (Viner, 1941: 229) and Marshall continued this new direction. He came to economics via ethics and philosophy, viewing political economy as a subset of ethics, and consequently necessarily value-laden. More specifically, it was a normative concern for the poor that pushed Marshall toward economics: “I saw in a shop window a small oil painting [of a man's face with a strikingly gaunt and wistful expression, as of one 'down and out'] and bought it ... I set it above the chimney-piece in my room in college and thenceforth called it my patron saint, and devoted myself to trying how to fit men like that for heaven.” (in Keynes, 1925a: 37-8). Poverty was the chief, if not the only, cause of the problems of the working classes (Marshall, 1890[1920]: I.I.3).

The key to understanding Marshall's thoughts on how to actually achieve this appears in his highly influential Principles of Economics, first published in 1890, in which Marshall developed the lower-higher faculties dualism introduced by Mill into a more complete theory of wants. Already implicit in his earlier writings and speeches, it forms the basis of his thinking on social development. Marshall (1890[1920]: III) divides wants into three kinds: natural wants correspond, essentially, to basic biological needs: food, shelter, clothing, and so on. As civilisation progresses, people become concerned with the quality of goods, rather than just their quantity. These artificial wants arise more from the desire for social distinction that any actual need: “even in those grades in which everyone has [for example] house room sufficient for the higher activities of himself and his family, a yet further and almost unlimited increase is desired as a requisite for the exercise of many of the higher social activities” (1890[1920]: III.II.8). Finally, there are what
Marshall calls 'wants in relation to activities'. In this highest stage, instead of wants providing the impetus for new activity, activities are pursued for their own sake and in turn give rise to new wants. This final stage would be a "condition in which every man's energies will be fully developed – a condition in which man will work not less than they do now but more; only, to use a good old phrase, most of their work will be a work of love" (1873[1925]: 118; 1890[1920]: App.A). 'Fitting the poor to heaven' was therefore a question of solving the economic problem, which was for Marshall, as for Mill, "not an application of the hedonistic calculus, but a prior condition of the exercise of man's higher faculties" (1925a: 9).

The final stage was inspired by his reading of the socialists, with whom he sympathised, according to Keynes, "in every way but intellectually."(1925a: 50). It was his frequently stated belief that the error of the socialists was their implicit assumption that human nature would improve at sufficient speed for their 'Utopian experiments' to succeed (1925: 366; 1907[1925]: 341;1890[1925]: 284). Marshall, though he shared the conviction that the new type of being and the society they would call forth would be an improvement, argued that such a change would only come about gradually: "Projects for great and sudden changes are now, as ever, foredoomed to fail, and to cause reaction; we cannot move safely, if we move so fast that our new plans of life altogether outrun our instincts. It is true that human nature can be modified ... But still it is a growth, and therefore gradual; and changes of our social organization must wait on it, and therefore they must be gradual too" (Marshall, 1890[1925]: App. A.85). Yet he also sought to distance himself from the classical economists, who, on the assumption that the desire for wealth was man's primary motivation, had thought that property rights and individual freedom would produce economic progress. Marshall criticises them for such narrow dogmatism. Free individual responsibility is indeed a prerequisite of progress, but property rights are not, insofar as they "lead to extreme inequalities of wealth." (1890[1925]: 282). This opposition to economic inequality stems from the substantive conception of development in which some level of economic prosperity is necessary before development can occur without external assistance: "when wealth is very unevenly distributed, some have more of it than they can turn to any great account in promoting their own well-being; while many others lack the material conditions of a healthy, clean, vigorous and effective family life. That is to say that wealth is distributed in a manner less conducive to the well-being of mankind than it would be if the rich were somewhat less
rich and the poor somewhat less poor." The problem is how to achieve a more desirable distribution of wealth “without danger to freedom and to social order; and without impairing the springs of initiative, enterprise and energy.” (1925: 366). Marshall believed that this could be done by keeping the social organization slightly in advance of human nature, thus “promoting the growth of our higher social nature by giving it some new and higher work to do, some practical ideal toward which to strive.” (1890[1920]: App.A.85-6) For Marshall, it was his work that moulded a man's character (1890[1920]: I.I.2) and hence that was where we must look for an improvement.

Regarding this he had, early in his academic career, in 'The Future of the Working Classes', made a distinction between working class and gentlemanly occupations. A working class occupation is one in which “a man's daily task tends to keep his character rude and coarse”; a gentlemanly occupation, by contrast, “tends to give culture and refinement to his character.” (1873[1925]: 103) The working classes are “those vast masses of men who, after long hours of hard and unintellectual toil, are wont to return to their homes with bodies exhausted and minds dull and sluggish” (1873[1925]: 105). The labourer may, of course, be happy there is a healthy home to return to; but given his lack of education, a healthy home is unlikely. Instead, the exhausted worker seeks coarse pleasure in the public house: “men such as these value high wages mainly as affording the opportunity of using their bodies as furnaces for the conversion of alcohol into fumes” (1873[1925]: 107). Thus even if individuals such as these become objectively richer, they will not become better persons because the degrading and exhausting nature of their work prevents them from developing their higher faculties. They maintain their present squalid standard of living, but additional wealth gives little impetus to improve it further; that is, they fail to develop their character in such a way that the artificial wants that characterise modern, civilised individual arise in any great number. Marshall was, however, glad to see that the intermediate class – whose work exposes them to both degrading and elevating influences – were steadily striving upward. “They are steadily becoming gentlemen” (1873[1925]: 105). Hence for this group Marshall was hopeful that progress could be made by means of a basic moral principle to be adopted by all: “a man is bound to give his children an education better and more thorough than he himself has received.” (1873[1925]: 117)

Gains in material prosperity since the Industrial Revolution had, Marshall thought, solved
the economic problem for a small part of society, allowing the fuller and further
development of their character. This was what the middle and – with some help –
working classes were striving toward: the model of the Victorian gentleman. A
gentlemanly occupation tends to keep one away, almost entirely, from the 'lowering
influences' which the lower classes, stilled mired in the 'art of getting on', are exposed to.
Rather, it demands the use of one's mind, the maintenance of social intercourse with
many people, the habit of anticipating the feelings of others, and the avoidance of causing
offence (1873[1925]: 103-4). It opens one up to an appreciation of the finer things in life.
Wealth is no longer a problem for the gentleman – their personal economic problem has
been solved. The issue now is how they use their wealth, and here Marshall finds fault
with the present conditions: “It is a common saying that we have more reasons to be
proud of our ways of making wealth than of our ways of using it.” (1907[1925]: 324).
Thus like Mill before him – and Saint-Simon before him – Marshall believed that once
the problem of production of wealth had been solved, the focus of mankind must turn to
the problem of its distribution. Marshall regarded this as of particular importance, as he
did not believe that the current rate of progress would continue. “Great ... as has been the
rate of social progress of Britain during the last generation, we may not be contented
with it. There is an urgent duty on us to make even more rapid advance during this age of
economic grace, for it may run out before the end of the [twentieth] century.” (Marshall,
1907[1925]: 326) Innovations – particularly in transport – and the expansion of peoples
into hitherto unoccupied territories had temporarily suspended the law of diminishing
returns from land. Consequently, real wages were able to rise regardless of population
growth. This state of affairs could not last long in a finite world. Something would have
to change; not in order to secure more growth but in order to make proper use of the
bounty already provided.

Marshall’s answer is already implied in his theory of wants. There he identified 'artificial
wants', which arise once the economic problem has been solved for a segment of society,
as being primarily motivated by the desire for social distinction. This Marshall regarded
as a great waste, calling it “a vast expenditure which contributes very little towards social
progress, and which does not confer any large and solid benefits on the spenders beyond
the honour, the position, and the influence which it buys from them in society,”
(1907[1925]: 325) This is what Thorstein Veblen (1899[2007]) would refer to, in even
more moralistic language, as 'conspicuous consumption'. Marshall was by no means
opposed to some having more influence or prestige than others in a society; indeed, he regarded the striving for social prestige as an invigorating and commendable part of human existence. Given the problems resulting from economic inequality, however, it would be preferable “if to have earned a moderate income gave as good a social position as a large one does now; if [a moderate income] ... were a strong presumptive proof that a man had surpassed able rivals in the attempt to do a difficult thing well, then the hope of earning such an income would offer to all but the most sordid natures inducements almost as strong as they are now when there is equal hope of earning a large one.” (1890[1925]: 282) If society thus changed its standards of success a great deal of socially wasteful spending would cease, and the resources saved would be free to “open out to the masses of the people new possibilities of a higher life and of larger and more varied intellectual and artistic activities.” – and all without causing “any great distress to those from whom it was taken.” (1907[1925]: 325) Unfortunately, “[t]here is ... no good ground for thinking that human nature is yet far enough improved away from its primitive barbarity, selfishness, and sloth, to be ready for any [rapid] movement in this direction” (1925: 366). A change in human nature would be needed for the level of development reached by the Victorian gentleman to be disseminated down to the lower strata of society. What we need, says Marshall, is 'economic chivalry'. Economic chivalry would be to laissez-faire capitalism what the chivalric code had been to medieval warfare:

“Chivalry in business includes public spirit, as chivalry in war includes unselfish loyalty to the cause of prince ... But is includes also a delight in doing noble and difficult things because they are noble and difficult ... It includes a scorn for cheap victories, and a delight in succouring those who need a helping hand. It does not disdain the gains to be won on the way, bit it ... esteems [them] mainly for the sake of the achievements to which they testify, and only in the second degree for the value at which they are appraised in the money of the market.” (1907[1925]: 330-1)

In short, economic chivalry represents the first stirrings of the final stage of social development, of 'wants in relation to activities'. Inculcating this public-spirited economic behaviour was, Marshall thought, the only way for the entire society to flourish under private enterprise. Competition, under the present system, was “a monster grown of overwhelming strength” who, if resisted, would plunge society into poverty and anarchy. Only economic chivalry can tame the beast, and bend it to the socially desirable task of
“the removal of poverty” (1925: 361). Thus as did Mill, Marshall saw the economic system of the West as but a stepping stone toward a higher state, in which the monster that is material progress would no longer hold sway over mankind:

“those improvements in method and in appliances, by which man's power over nature has been acquired in the past, are not likely to continue with even moderate vigour if free enterprise be stopped, before the human race has been brought up to a much higher general level of economic chivalry than has ever yet been attained. The world under free enterprise will fall far short of the finest ideals until economic chivalry is developed. But until it is developed, every great step in the direction of collectivism is a grave menace to the maintenance even of our present moderate rate of progress.” (1907[1925]: 342)

Only once economic chivalry is common can the collectivists' schemes be put into practice without running the risk of violence; then, “some other civilisation than that which we can now conceive may take the place of that which now exists. It may, of course, be higher” (1907[1925]: 346). For Marshall, the classical economists' opposition to these schemes was not the outcome of disinterested economic analysis, but rather a product of the times. Marshall thought that they looked upon the state with such suspicion because the government of their time was peculiarly corrupt and inefficient. Matters had steadily improved since then – as J.S. Mill saw more clearly than most of his contemporaries: “Mill had seen a vast increase in the probity, the strength, the unselfishness, and the resources of Government during his life; and it seems that each succeeding decade had enlarged the scope of those interventions of Government for the promotion of general well-being.” This improvement in the moral nature of government combines with technological progress to “enlarge the scope for the beneficial intervention of Government.” (1907[1925]: 335) The state is now more able to determine where it can do good, and has more power to translate its schemes into effective action. The people are more able to check abuses of power – not by the institutions of democracy but due to “general education and a general surplus of energy over that required for earning a living.” As a result, “we can now more safely venture on many public undertakings which a little while ago would have been technically unavailable, or which would have probably been perverted to the selfish and corrupt purposes of those who had the ear of government.” Thus Marshall rejected the old ideal of the night watchman state: “I cry 'Laissez-faire: - Let the state be up and doing.'” (1907[1925]: 336)
Marshall’s social philosophy and policy, then, is concerned with getting everyone from one stage to the next. Although he believed that everyone would rationally want to do so, his great concern was that people would, due to their conditions, remain where they were: the working classes would spend any extra income on drink and gambling, the upper classes would spend waste their money on what Veblen would have called 'conspicuous consumption', and the middle classes would be pulled now in one direction, now in the other. They would have to be helped along the way toward Marshall ultimate aim of 'development'. The classical economists were, to use Polak's (1973) terminology, influence-pessimistic in this regard. Mill rather less so, and Marshall less so than him.

The theories of Ricardo and his followers contained, says Marshall, 'many truths', but he frequently criticises them for their narrow focus on England and its problems and their dogmatic adherence to free competition (1890[1920]: I.I.27-30; 1890[1925]: 257-8). Competition was for Marshall “beast grown of overwhelming strength”, a “huge untrained monster” that the Ricardians set free to “run its wayward course” (1925: 361; 1890[1920]: I.I.27). A critical reaction had set in against this one-sidedness, which in its tendency to exaggerate the evils of free competition is itself no less one-sided. Marshall positioned himself – and the majority of economists – in a compromise position between these two extremes: the beast of competition must not be set free, but nor must it be put down: “more experience, more leisure, and greater material resources have enabled us to bring free enterprise somewhat under control, to diminish its power of doing evil and increase its power of doing good. ... [I]f [competition] can be guided so as to work on our side, then even the removal of poverty will not be too great a task.” (1890[1920]: I.I.31; 1925: 361) Once people realised that the old model of unending growth was not in their interests they would, of their own rational volition, turn from the art of getting on to the art of living.

Most people, that is. Like Mill, Marshall believed that the “early difficulties in the way of progress are ... great” (Mill, 1848[1909]:236). Mill’s backward states of society became in Marshall the 'Residuum': “people who are physically, mentally, or morally incapable of doing a good day's work with which to earn a good day's wage” (Marshall, 1890[1920]: VI.XIII.58). And as with Mill’s barbarians, for whom the liberal arguments of On Liberty were of no relevance, so too with Marshall's Residuum, who represented an 'exceptional case' to whom the broadly pro-market argument of the Principles did not
apply. For the Residuum, Marshall called for compulsory education, in 'decent clothing'. Should the parents fail they would first be 'warned and advised' and then, as a last resort, “homes might be closed or regulated with some limitation of the freedom of the parents.”

(1890[1920]: VI.XIII, n169):

“The system of economic freedom is probably the best from both a moral and material point of view for those who are in fairly good health of mind and body. But the Residuum cannot turn it to good account: and if they are allowed to bring up children in their own pattern, then Anglo-Saxon freedom must work badly through them on the coming generation. It would be better for them and much better for the nation that they should come under a paternal discipline something like that which prevails in Germany.”

(1890[1920]: VI.XIII.88)

The Residuum were a class apart because unlike the working, middle, and upper classes in Marshall's analysis, the unguided actions of this lowest section of society were deemed incapable of producing satisfactory social change. Therefore, for this small group, development would have to be externally given. As the next section will argue, this conclusion is in fact inherent in the concept of development, as there is no particular reason to expect the developing to share the developer's evaluation of actual and future social change and hence no particular reason to expect them to move in the 'correct' direction.

I.5 – The Concept and Tragedy of Development

So far it has been argued that the object of development theory is social change, and that it therefore had to be distinguished from other methods of conceptualising social change – notably, the idea of progress. Though it would be something of an anachronism to call Mill and Marshall development theorists in the sense we understand that term today, we can see in their work the process by which development was differentiated from progress. To reiterate: Mill and Marshall do not (merely) reflect a shift from the idea of progress to development thinking; their works, influence, and ideas were a major factor contributing to that shift. Their ideas, moreover, did not emerge spontaneously in response to the objective problems of immanent capitalist social change; they emerged as a deliberate response to those existing ideas of what social change was and what it ought to be. It has been argued that what sets the idea of development apart from that of progress is not the
distinction between immanence and intentionality: they are clearly present in both. The
difference lies in what their adherents envisaged as the location and aims of intentionality.
What is manifested in the move from progress to development is a new orientation, from
progress as an end in itself to development as a means toward an end. To be more
specific, the goal of development is the creation of a world in which the conditions of
social change have been overcome. Selfishness, materialism, and individualism must be
temporarily harnessed and directed in socially rational directions so that they may
eventually wither away. Positive social change will thus only occur when society
becomes aware of and takes control of where it is heading. Once completed mankind will
no longer be consumed by the degrading pursuit of wealth or the exhausting labouring for
the next meal, leaving them free to develop their higher faculties. That is, humanity
would be free from the 'art of getting on,' as Mill put it, and ready for a new adventure in
the 'art of living'.

To say that development theory and practice is teleological is hardly controversial.
Development, particularly in the forms of modernisation and neo-liberalism, is seen as a
way of remaking the non-Western world in the image of the West. But, as we shall see
below, just as the non-West is not the object of development so the West is not its goal.
The West, clearly, could not serve as a template for a society in which selfishness,
materialism, and individualism are no longer present. Development accept that these
aspects of social change are necessary for now, but the aim of social change is to
overcome them. Thus while the dichotomy of West and non-West may be a useful one for
policy-makers and laymen, it was never prominent in the minds of theorists of
development. The Western and non-Western worlds are both developing and both will
have to discard aspects of their culture previously dear to them if they are to continue
along it. Development, in short, contains a vision for the West rather than as a vision of
the West.

One common criticism of the radical re-interpretations of development thinking that
appeared in the late '80s and early '90s has been that they were unable to account for the
diversity within development theory. They analysed the field as if it were uniformly pro-
Western and pro-capitalist. Although we do not believe it is either, a similar objection
could be made of the above approach to identifying the origins of development theory.
We have described the concept of 'development' as being a definable and coherent way of
conceptualising social change, which has been differentiated from other conceptualisations. The first response to this concern is that we are not looking for a unity in the products of development theorising, which are indeed bewilderingly diverse. At the end of the process is the wrong place to look. What we seek instead is a formative principle of development theory. As German philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1923[1950]:113-4) put it in relation to the philosophy of culture:

“If all culture is manifested in the creation of specific world-images, of specific symbolic forms, the aim of philosophy is not to go behind all these creations, but rather to understand and elucidate their basic formative principle. ... If we approach spiritual life, not as the static contemplation of being, but as functions and energies of formation, we shall find certain common and typical principles of formation, diverse and dissimilar as the forms may be. If the philosophy of culture succeeds in apprehending and elucidating such basic principles, it will have fulfilled, in a new sense, its task of demonstrating the unity of the spirit as opposed to the multiplicity of its manifestations – for ... the diversity of the products of the human spirit does not impair the unity of its productive process ...”

What Cassirer sought, then, was a basis for a philosophy of culture that would reflect the unity of the cultural forms, yet at the same time would not only reflect but account for their diversity. He sought a philosophical synthesis: “we seek not a unity of effects but a unity of action; not a unity of products but a unity of the creative process” (1944[1970]:70). Of course, this creative process does not end with the initial differentiation of development from progress. It is a distinction continually reinforced – often implicitly, but explicitly so when the existence of the field as a whole is under threat, as will be argued later. Thus the initial differentiation now acts as an external defence rather than an internal source of dynamism. It reproduces the distinctiveness of development theory as a discipline but cannot of itself account for the diversity within.

In the final interview before his death, Michel Foucault (1983[1991]: 388-389) pondered the possibility of a history of thought, which would be “distinct from both the history of ideas – by which I mean the analysis of systems of representation – and from the history of mentalities – by which I mean analysis of attitudes and types of action ... It seemed to me there was one element that was capable of describing the history of thought: this was what one would call the history of problems...” The social, political, and economic forces
that were previously counted as determining factors are in the history of problems given
the role of instigators. They do not spontaneously call for a solution: “They can exist and
perform their action for a very long time, before there is effective problematization of
thought.” And even when problematisation does occur, thought is not determined by the
forces that instigated it: “it doesn't assume a unique form that is the direct result or the
necessary expression of these difficulties...” Foucault goes on to describe the aim of a
history of problems analysis of thought:

“To one single set of difficulties, several responses can be made. And most of the time
different responses are actually proposed. But what has to be understood is what makes
them simultaneously possible: it is the point in which the simultaneity is rooted; it is the
soil that can nourish them all in their diversity and sometimes in spite of their
contradictions. ... [T]he work of a history of thought would be to rediscover at the root of
these diverse solutions a general form of problematization that has made these possible –
even in their opposition...”

In this short passage Foucault does not explain why problematisation occurs when it does,
where it comes from, or on what basis; but by freeing thought from the determining
influence of social, political, and economic forces he makes it a type of analysis more
amenable to our approach. We look for a unity of development theory not in a
comparison of the diverse set of approaches that exist within the discipline, but rather in
their principles of formation – why an individual author sought to create a certain type of
knowledge, and on what basis he sought to do so. This section will propose a 'tragedy of
development' in the form of what shall be called the internal-external problem, which is
the basic problem confronted by social-change-as-development. This problem has been
hinted at above but can now be elaborated upon using German sociologist Georg
Simmel's (1908[1997]) work on the 'concept and tragedy of culture.'

For Simmel, all progressive growth must involve both internal and external forces. “We
deny that the concept of culture applies to those cases where perfection is not felt to be
the personal development of the psychological centre. Similarly, the concept does not
hold where it appears only as such a personal development that requires no objective
means and stages external to itself” (1908[1997]: 57). Self-development, or cultivation, is
not just inner development (a seed growing into a wild tree) nor just external development
(a tree trunk turned into ship's mast); rather, it is a combination of the two (a seed cultivated into orchard tree): “the fruit, despite the fact that it could not have come about without human effort, still ultimately springs from the tree's own motive force and only fulfils the possibilities which are sketched out in its tendencies, whereas the mast form is added to the trunk from an instrumental system quite alien to it and without any preformation in the tendencies of its own nature” (1908[1997]: 57). External constructs and constraints must be included within the individual self, rather than as hangers on:

“[A]ll possible knowledge, virtuosities and refinements of a person cannot lead us to credit that person with genuine cultivation if they simply act like additions, as it were, that come from a sphere of values external to, and always remaining external to, their personality. In such a case, a person has aspects of cultivation, but they are not yet cultivated ... But [on the other hand] cultivation in its purest and deepest sense does not exist where the psyche travels that path from itself to itself ... exclusively under its own subjective powers ... The specific meaning of culture is thus fulfilled only where a person adds something external to that development ... Individuals must include these constructs and constraints [art, morality, science, law, religion, economic goods, technology, social norms] within themselves, but they must really include them within the individual self, and not simply allow them to continue to exist as objective values.” (1908[1997]: 57-8)

Or, as Humboldt (1792[1854]:22) put it:

“Whatever man is inclined to, without the free exercise of his own choice, or whatever only implies instruction and guidance, does not enter into his very being, but still remains alien to his true nature, and is, indeed, effected by him, not so much with human agency, as with the mere exactness of mechanical routine.”

Works of culture – laws, morals, economic goods, art – can be considered according to the values that are valid for themselves, and how they fit in to wider culture. They have a subjective, cultural value, and an objective value, which is its wider significance. A work can be perfect considered by its own standards, but not fit into one's development path. Conversely, a work below the level of what has been achieved artistically, intellectually, or technically, may fit in most efficaciously. A one-sided focus on the quality of the work considered in itself is therefore not enough: the objective side of culture may make us
better or wiser or happier, but may not actually develop *us*, only an objective side that pertains to us. The external-directed nourishment is cut off from our inner-directed meaning. We become better at something, but not more cultured. We possess a higher quality, but not a higher state of ourselves.

According to Simmel, this unhappy state will be so unless the two aspects – internal and external – fit with one another. Unfortunately, the inner logics by which they develop do not necessarily coincide. This is the tragedy of culture, as Simmel calls it, or the tragedy of development for us. For Simmel, once the primary motifs of law, art, and morality have been created, their further growth is no longer in our hands. They are no more concerned with the demands of our individuality than are physical laws. The contents with which we organise the unity of the 'I' are given to us from outside, and they possess a form that do not necessarily coincide with the self. “The external world seizes hold of the self with these contents, in order to draw it into themselves, and because they form the contents according to their own demands, they do not permit them to become centred around the self” (1908[1997]: 67). Yet we still consider ourselves not only the centre around which the elements of life are ordered according to our personalities – we also feel a solidarity with those elements, which belong to another sphere and ordering principle. Our nature is caught between the self and an alien sphere of demands, and if the two spheres do not evolve in the same fashion, the bridge may be broken. The object becomes isolated and alienated vis-a-vis the creative subject through the division of labour, but Marx' concept of alienation with regards economic commodities just a special instance of a more general fate of our cultural contents. “These contents are subject to the paradox – and increasingly so as 'culture' develops – that they are indeed created by human subjects and are meant for human subjects, but follow an immanent developmental logic in the intermediate form of objectivity which they take on at either side of these instances and thereby become alienated from both their origin and their purpose” (1908[1997]: 70).

Increasingly, cultural objects “deviate from the direction in which they could incorporate themselves into the personal development of human minds” (1908[1997]: 72). But the object continues to develop, and draws individuals into its orbit without returning to them and elevating them to its height. Where we try to follow it anyway, “the development runs into a cul-de-sac or a vacuity of our innermost and most genuine life” (1908[1997]: 72).
Thus the division of labour divides the cultural content from its subject, leaving it with soulless objectivity, detached from the real cultural process. The objectified spirit becomes formless, and hence capable of infinite expansion into a mass of things claiming cultural value which awaken in us a desire to see them as such. The subject is increasingly overwhelmed and dominated. Thousands of superfluous things are created from which we are unable to free ourselves, which passively stimulate us rather than actively stimulating us toward our own creativity – it is “nothing more than the phenomena of the emancipation of the objectified spirit” which leads cultural contents according to its own developmental logic, diverting them from the goal of culture. Moreover, cultural products can expand indefinitely which further externalises the subject, as an individual's absorptive capacity is limited. It is not easy to simply ignore what cannot be assimilated, because its very existence arouses aspirations, and fills one with feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. Hence the typical problematic of modern man: “the feeling of being surrounded by an immense number of cultural elements, which are not meaningless, but not profoundly meaningful to the individual either; elements which have a certain crushing quality as a mass, because an individual cannot inwardly assimilate every individual thing, but cannot simply reject it either, since it belongs potentially, as it were, to the sphere of his or her cultural development” (1908[1997]: 73). For Simmel, there is no way out of this tragedy.

The tragedy of development proceeds in much the same way. The internal of development comprises those aspects of a society's inner being – its culture, its mores and customs, its religion, its preferences, its values, its economic structure, its institutions; in short, its metis (Scott, 1998: ch. 9) – that may help or hinder development. The external consists of all that comes from the outside – international economic structures, international institutions, governments, INGOs, missionaries, advisers, transnational corporations, and all those internal aspects of other societies that have influenced the society under consideration. The 'primary motifs' of development, its institutions, practices, and goals, are exogenous to the society to be developed, emerging and evolving according to demands and principles that do not necessarily coincide with that society. They are attached to the developing society but do not fit into it: – they “simply act like additions, as it were, that come from a sphere of values external to, and always remaining external to [it]” (Simmel, 1908[1997]: 57) – and hence the developing society cannot be lifted through them to their 'higher' level. At the same time, the developing society is
drawn to these motifs, as they are held up as the means by which one can achieve prosperity and modernity, to escape the inadequacy of 'underdevelopment'.

One might argue that because the internal and external are both by their own powers insufficient they represent two extremes, between which we need only compromise. The problem with this response is the ambiguity in how we are to define the compromise position. One often hears that we should be 'practical' about such matters, but that is only a call to action and not a guide for how to act, and hence does not help us. In fact, as Dworkin (2011:261-4) argues, we cannot identify a middle-ground between two opposing perspectives “without first deciding which of [the] perspectives should govern ... There is no third perspective – no perspective of 'reason' itself – from which the balance might be struck. We can't know what reason requires without first deciding from which perspective that question should be decided” (2011: 261-2). We can see this in action in Francis Fukuyama’s State Building (2004[2005]). Fukuyama recognises the internal-external problem, and his solution to it is instructive. He notes the 'contradiction' in donor policy, where “outside donors want both to increase the local government's capacity to provide a particular service like irrigation, public health, or primary education, and to actually provide those services to the end users. ... While many donors believe they can work toward both goals simultaneously, in practice the direct provision of services almost always undermines the local government's capacity to provide them once the aid program is terminated” (2004[2005]: 54).

Internally, the developing state cannot provide the services Fukuyama desires, but if the services are provided for them they won't progress. The program, in Simmel's terminology, would act merely as an 'external construct' that does not lift the developing society to its higher level. On the other hand, people will lack the service that was to be provided until the uncertain time in the future when the government is capable of providing it. Fukuyama decides that the donor should help the state stand on its own two feet, rather than doing its work for it. He asserts that “the problem of capacity destruction cannot be fixed unless donors make a clear choice that capacity-building is their primary objective, rather than the services that the capacity is meant to provide” (2004[2005]: 55). The well-intentioned efforts to provide services ought to be relegated in favour of the 'tough love' of 'true capacity-building' (2004[2005]: 56).
This has the air of a quite practical compromise: Fukuyama is simply looking at the long run. But in fact his dilemma regarding the proper role of the external force was impossible to answer without first deciding which perspective should govern. Fukuyama chooses his perspective based on his overriding concern: the national security threat to the United States posed by failed states. On that basis does he define the role of the external donor. In fact, his concern for national security is so deep-seated that he stands by this role for developed states even after showing the immense, even insoluble, difficulties involved in state building in this manner. As this 'solution' demonstrates, when we seek the proper mix of internal and external elements, when we define their role in the process of development, we must, if we conceive the two as fundamentally antagonistic, start from one perspective and on that basis seek a compromise. As Dworkin points out, if there is contradiction rather than consistency in our basic concepts, the choice between them may reflect "unfiltered personal history like party affiliation ... political ambition ... emotions, preferences, tastes, and prejudices" (2011:108). Either way, a compromise must privilege one or the other position.

In fact, the situation for development is even worse than Simmel thought it for the process of culture. Simmel held out little hope for a resolution of the tragedy of culture because the internal and external logics would naturally diverge from their harmonious origin. His concern was that having originated in individual creativity, cultural products would become gradually more distant, more external from us and our needs, until the tension becomes pure antithesis. However, as we have seen, it is a foundational principle of the idea of development that the two logics are inherently antagonistic, because a specific goal or an end has already been set for the internal by the external. Thus even the original act of creativity is externally given. On Simmel's road from harmony to tension to antithesis, development takes a head start. Yet it is nevertheless recognised that both are necessary components of development. Development theorists have always recognised this fact, and the search for a solution to the problem has been a constant one since their field's emergence after World War II. Modernisation theory was surely the most optimistic regarding the ability of external forces to elevate a 'backward' society, but as we shall see it was not believed that they could do so single-handedly: "Forces outside the economy can stimulate and facilitate the indigenous forces, but they can only complement sustained development; they cannot serve as a substitute for it" (Meier and Baldwin, 1957[1962]:335). A society cannot be 'developed' entirely from without, but on
the other hand, a society that closes itself off – culturally, intellectually, economically – from others does itself great harm: the internal motive force can carry one only so far. The variety of situations a society can provide internally can only delay the inevitable stagnation. It is in the search for a compromise between the two that we find the formative principle of development: how do we find an acceptable middle-ground between two aspects of social change that are mutually antagonistic yet both, in their own way, valid and necessary?

This question, the rest of Part I will argue, has been a constant problem for development theory since its post-war emergence. Sections I.7, I.8, and I.9 will look at modernisation theory and the post-war approach to education in this light. The next section, however, picks up the historical narrative with Alfred Marshall's star pupil, John Maynard Keynes. This is necessary because while the distinction between internal and external forces is apparent is Mill and Marshall it is not yet a problem. What obscured this conclusion was Mill's and Marshall's belief that rational individual action would lead those who were capable of it – everyone but Mill's barbarians and Marshall's Residuum – on the path of positive social change. We shall see how Keynes did not share his master's faith.

I.6 – J.M. Keynes and the Rational Individual

Alfred Marshall's influence on economic thought in the English-speaking world was akin to that of Adam Smith over a century prior, in that he seemed to make everything that had come before him obsolete. 'It's all in Marshall,' as the saying went (Rothbard, 1992[2010]: 12-3). The importance of Marshall's deviations from classical political economy were recognised and welcomed upon the release of his *Principles of Economics* in 1890. He was praised by reviewers and scholars alike for bringing ethical and social concerns into the dismal science. Marshall was an important part of a movement away from competition, viewing it as alienating, exhausting, degrading, wasteful, and as creating unnecessary tensions in the social fabric. Given the previous section, Marshall's thoughts on this issue should be clear. Despite his concessions, however, Marshall and other mainstream economists still held on, albeit with declining fervour, to influence-pessimistic *laissez-faire* (Viner, 1941: 225). It was, in end, Marshall's social philosophy – his concept of development – which made a greater impression on Keynes than his economics. Armed with this understanding of the social purpose of change, Keynes returned the field to the problem of growth.
Keynes' early economic writings are rather orthodox – it was, after all, all in Marshall – but he would eventually free himself from the confines of neoclassicism. For Marshall, we saw, social development was not an inevitable process: the basis of his policy recommendations was the concern that people would 'overshoot', rather than progressing to the next stage. Yet development ultimately remained a rational process, pursued by individuals because they perceived it to be in their best interests. Though he certainly deviated from laissez-faire, it was the increasingly chivalrous realm of private enterprise that would lead the way: “A government could print a good edition of Shakespeare's works, but it could not get them written” (1907[1925]: 339). There was, however, one section of society about whom Marshall was less optimistic: the Residuum. Like Mill's barbarians they were deemed too mired in what Mill would have called the art of getting on, too exhausted by the day's work, for their actions to contribute, unaided, to social-change-as-development. With Keynes, this analysis of the Residuum is essentially expanded to cover the whole of society. As we shall see, he does this by removing the rational individual actor from its classical position as the driving force of development, thus emancipating development thinking from the strict confines of classical economics.

In this, he reflected what Schivelbusch (2006: 45) has identified as “one of the main leitmotifs of the postliberal generation,” namely, “the idea of liberating the state from the businessmen, promoting it from the role of a mere night watchman working in the service of capital to one of a powerful director telling the moneymen what to do.” What development sought to accomplish – the eradication of scarcity in Marshall's narrow definition of the term – was now given new impetus, and economists were ready to take their place in government as, in Keynes' words, “the trustees not of civilisation, but of the possibility of civilisation.” (in Higgins, 1959: 3) In the act, a problem is brought to light that was only implicit in the concept of development as it emerged with Mill; a problem the attempted solutions of which are the basis for our understanding of the formative process of modern development theory.

Following Mill and Marshall before him, what interested Keynes was the possibility of development leading to a stage in which mankind has solved “its economic problem.” In this he is optimistic, and he makes clear that capitalism, the distasteful means to his higher end, would not survive the coming of the new age. As he put it in a short essay on 'The Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren' (1930):
“When the accumulation of wealth is no longer of high social importance, there will be great changes in the code of morals. We shall be able to rid ourselves of many of the pseudo-moral principles which have hag-ridden us for two hundred years, by which we have exalted some of the most distasteful of human qualities into the position of the highest virtues. We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the money-motive at its true value. The love of money as a possession -as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the enjoyments and realities of life -will be recognised for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease. All kinds of social customs and economic practices, affecting the distribution of wealth and of economic rewards and penalties, which we now maintain at all costs, however distasteful and unjust they may be in themselves, because they are tremendously useful in promoting the accumulation of capital, we shall then be free, at last, to discard. ... But beware! The time for all this is not yet. For at least another hundred years we must pretend to ourselves and to every one that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is useful and fair is not. Avarice and usury and precaution must be our gods for a little longer still. For only they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight.”

Keynes believed that the capacity to attain such a state was available but (and in this he follows Marshall) that this further development would occur only if men were content to play the game of economic competition for lower rewards than at present (1936:374). Unlike Marshall, however, he did not believe this likely to happen within a capitalist system, due to the predominance of the 'money motive.' The individual and his or her pursuit of self-interest – even that of Marshall's chivalrous economic man – was no longer the driving force of development; he was, in fact, more likely to retard it. The calculating nature of the *homo economicus* could see only economic value, and could therefore not be relied upon to care for matters of poverty relief or environmental protection:

“*We have to remain poor because it does not "pay" to be rich. We have to live in hovels, not because we cannot build palaces but because we cannot "afford" them. The same rule of self-destructive financial calculation governs every walk of life. We destroy the beauty of the countryside because the unappropriated splendors of nature have no economic value. We are capable of shutting off the sun and the stars because they do not pay a*
There was still a place for businessmen as creators of the wealth needed to solve the economic problem; but they were not fit to enter the new society thus created. Keynes looked forward to his 'euthanasia' in no uncertain terms: “as a means he is tolerable; regarded as an end he is not satisfactory.” (1925b[1963]: 307)

But why have people for so long held on to a system that “is not beautiful ... is not just ... is not virtuous”? (Keynes, 1933: 759) Benjamin Kidd (1894) had confronted this very problem, and in Keynes' answer he is comes closer to Kidd's brand of social evolutionism than he is to Marshall, with important consequences for later development theory. Kidd (1894: 68) argued that the conditions of development are, minor improvements notwithstanding, “incompatible with the welfare of a large proportion of the individuals comprising any species." Not only is the production of progress difficult, involving constant rivalry and competition with one's fellows, it also inevitably results in the exclusion from the highest possibilities of life of most individuals in a society. Given that, for Kidd, individual rationality cannot look beyond its own immediate horizon, it would therefore be in the interests of almost everyone to put “an immediate stop to those onerous conditions from which progress resulted, and which pressed so severely on them.” (1894: 68) The interests in the masses lies in the programme of the socialists: in abolishing competition within their community, protecting the community from external competition, and maintaining by communal ownership a comfortable means of existence for all. This would be rational; development is profoundly irrational from the point of view of the individual (1894: 80-2). Yet development is in the interests of Society as a whole, an organism with longer life and broader interests than the individuals of an entire generation – and hence an organism whose interests, in the grand scheme of things, are to be given predominance. “[T]he interests of the social organism and of the individual are, and must remain, antagonistic, and as the former must always be predominant, there can never be found any sanction in individual reason for conduct in societies where the conditions of progress prevail.” (1894:86-7) For Kidd, then, individual reason can never justify the progress that society needs. This is the importance of religion:
“[T]he function of these [religious] beliefs in human evolution must be to provide a super-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual, necessary to the maintenance of the development which is proceeding, but for which there can never be, in the nature of things, any rational, sanction.” (1894:108)

This is quite different from Marshall's view of social change as individually rational and in the interests (albeit perhaps only the 'rightly understood' interests) of everyone. Yet Keynesian development, because the individual is conceptualised as dominated by the short-termist ‘money motive,’ is far closer to Kidd's. This represents the first of Keynes' innovations referred to above. In *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1920), Keynes argued that the progress made in the 19th century rested on a 'double bluff'. European society was so organised “as to secure the maximum accumulation of capital.” In that, it was certainly successful. Yet the masses, some improvements in their condition notwithstanding, had not reaped the benefits: “Society was so framed as to throw a great part of the increased income into the control of the class least likely to consume it” – the capitalists (1920: 11). Development could occur only because of an inequality of wealth in favour of the capitalists, who were most likely to reinvest their income but at the same time were not able to actually enjoy their extra income. Hence the need for a double bluff: the masses must accept the conditions of progress, despite the fact that they could enjoy very little of the cake they helped produce, and the capitalists, though they got plenty of cake, had to accept that they could consume only very little of it. From the point of view of the individuals involved, there could be no rational justification for such a state of affairs. And considering that, for Keynes (1926: 254), people are “often ... too ignorant or too weak” to effectively pursue even their own ends, one could hardly expect them to work rationally toward the benefit of future generations. Hence the importance of a super-rational justification for the survival of nineteenth century capitalism:

“The duty of 'saving' became nine-tenths of virtue and the growth of the cake the object of true religion. There grew up around the non-consumption of the cake all those instincts of puritanism which in other ages has withdrawn itself from the world and has neglected the arts of production as well as those of enjoyment. And so the cake increased; but to what end was not clearly contemplated. ... [T]he virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed, neither by you nor by your children after you.” (Keynes, 1920: 12)
As in Kidd, the 'bluff' was carried out by an unconscious 'Society', working mysteriously upon its members: “In the unconscious recesses of its beings Society knew what it was about. ... Society was working not for the small pleasures of today but for the future security and improvement of the race, --- in fact for progress” (Keynes, 1920: 12). Had the capitalists increased their consumption the deception would have been unmasked, and capitalism, the system it had supported, revealed for what it was: intolerable.

With the rational individual effectively removed from development – being a process incapable of individual rational justification – capital formation as such becomes the true agent of development. The key lies in the Keynes' Marshallian conception of scarcity, and by extension the economic problem, as relating only to 'natural' wants – that is, “those needs which are absolute in the sense that we feel them whatever the situation of our fellow human beings may be,” as opposed to artificial wants: “those which are relative in the sense that we feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows” (Keynes, 1930). The latter type of wants may be insatiable, but the former are not. As Salerno (1992) notes, it is the Marshallian conception of wants as limited and identifiable that creates the impression that wants could be finally satisfied with a hundred years or so additional capital accumulation (Keynes, 1930). The demand for capital is, on this assumption, limited and capable of reaching a point “where its marginal efficiency had fallen to a very low figure” - the 'low figure' being just enough to cover “their exhaustion by wastage and obsolescence together with some margin to cover risk and the exercise of skill and judgement.” (Keynes, 1936: 375) Thus Keynes harks back to Mill's concept of the stationary state, in which there would be no additional capital accumulation, and would therefore be free of the problems that follow it. If only our public policies were expressly aimed at it, predicts Keynes, we could achieve “an increase in the volume of capital until it ceases to be scarce ... [which] would mean the euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, the euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalists to exploit the scarcity value of capital.” (1936: 376) Hence, according to Keynes, “the economic problem is not – if we look into the future – the permanent problem of the human race.” (1930) As it was for Mill and Marshall, the permanent resolution of the economic problem was for Keynes a normative issue, for only when freed from the degrading and exhausting struggle for food, shelter, and clothing would mankind be free to pursue more ennobling activities:
“A point may soon be reached, much sooner perhaps than we are all of us aware of, when these needs are satisfied in the sense that we prefer to devote our further energies to non-economic purposes.... [I]t will be those peoples, who can keep alive, and cultivate into a fuller perfection, the art of life itself and do not sell themselves for the means of life, who will be able to enjoy the abundance when it comes” (1930)

Like Marshall, he applies this view to a threefold division of human history. Keynes (1925c[1963]) adopts the stages-of-development terminology of the American economist Joseph R. Commons (Marshall never named his stages), whom he praises for recognising “the nature of the economic transition amidst the early stages of which we are now living” (1925c[1963]: 335). Commons distinguished between an Era of Scarcity, which prevailed universally up to 16th century Europe when wealth started to accumulate. The industrial and democratic revolutions of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries marked the end of the Era of Scarcity in Europe, ushering in the Era of Abundance whose distinctive philosophy was that of laissez-faire liberalism. This era, however, was starting to give way to the culminating Era of Stabilisation – in Commons' words, “the actual alternative to Marx's communism.” This represented, for Keynes, a “transition from economic anarchy to a regime which deliberately aims at controlling and directing economic forces in the interests of social justice and social stability.” (1925c[1963]: 335)

The transition was not to be left to the 'people'. Though sympathetic to the socialist cause, he could not bring himself to join them in their exaltation of the “boorish proletariat” (1925b[1963]: 300): “I can be influenced by what seems to me to be Justice and good sense; but the Class war will find me on the side of the educated bourgeoisie” (1925c[1963]: 329). The problem with Soviet Russia was not the end, about which Keynes waxed lyrical, but the means: revolution. It is a mistake, he said, to consider revolution an inherent part of the New Order being created in Russia. A gradual transition was possible with new knowledge. It was the task of the New Liberals, in whose vanguard sat Keynes, to make this transition as smooth as possible. As mentioned, the key to this transformation was for Keynes not private economic enterprise, as in Marshall, but capital formation by any means. The laissez-faire economic system had, as had said in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, been geared toward this end; yet it was only able to effect it because of its elaborate double bluff. Now, however, the mask was slipping, revealing the monster behind:
“We used to believe that modern capitalism was capable, not merely of maintaining the existing standards of life, but of leading us gradually into an economic paradise where we should be comparatively free from economic cares. Now we doubt whether the business man us leading us to a destination far better than our present place.” (Keynes, 1925b[1963]: 307)

“There was nothing which it was not our duty to sacrifice to this Moloch and Mammon in one; for we faithfully believed that the worship of these monsters would overcome the evil of poverty and lead the next generation safely and comfortably, on the back of compound interest, into economic peace.... The decadent international but individualistic capitalism, in the hands of which we found ourselves after the war, is not a success. It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous--and it doesn't deliver the goods. In short, we dislike it, and we are beginning to despise it.” (Keynes, 1933: 761)

Keynes had lost faith in society's ability to carry itself, unaided and unimpeded, toward the ultimate goal that he, following Mill and Marshall, had set for it. Hence for the task he had set himself – easing the development of society toward the next stage - the old political economy was far too restrictive. His initial rejection of Marshallian orthodoxy was not based on a rejection of its fundamental truths, but rather on a changed
“orientation of my mind ...; and I share this change with many others. ... I attribute my change of outlook to ... my hopes and fears and preoccupations, along with those of many or most, I believe, of this generation throughout the world, being different from what they were” (Keynes, 1933: 755). The old truths may have been correct for its time, but new problems have arisen: “they have ceased to be applicable under modern conditions.” (1925c[1963]: 330). Keynes (1925a: 44) praises Marshall for proving that laissez-faire political economy was theoretically as well as practically flawed, but, held back by 'a bundle of obsolete habiliments' inherited from the nineteenth century, he had failed to recognise the full implications of his teachings. The watchwords of the British government remained “Negation, Restriction, Inactivity”:

“Under their leadership we have been forced to button up our waistcoats and compress our lungs. Fears and doubts and hypochondriac precautions are keeping us muffled up indoors. ... We need the breath of life. There is nothing to be afraid of. On the contrary.
The future holds in store for us more wealth and economic freedom and possibilities of personal life than the past ever offered.

There is no reason why we should not feel ourselves free to be bold, to be open, to experiment, to take action, to try the possibilities of things.” (1929[1963]: 135)

Hence the need for “new wisdom for a new age” (1925c[1963]: 337). Keynes was no utopian in the traditional sense of the word: he was sure that the economic problem was in the process of being solved and in the next stage of development it would be solved, but, like Marx, did not think much more could be said about the final stage. His own contribution to the ‘new wisdom’ – the technical economics and policy recommendations in The General Theory (1936) – sought to demonstrate how a world shorn of its belief in the virtues of capitalism and the truths of orthodox economics could get to that final, post-scarcity stage. The nations of the world were steadily rejecting the assumption of the nineteenth-century free trader, who thought that “the whole world was, or would be, organized on a basis of private competitive capitalism and of the freedom of private contract inviolably protected by the sanctions of law – in various phases, of course, of complexity and development, but conforming to a uniform type which it would be the general object to perfect and certainly not to destroy.” (Keynes, 1933) Instead, they were embarking on their own political-economic experiments. “We do not know what will be the outcome. We are – all of us, I expect – about to make many mistakes. No one can tell which of the new systems will prove itself best” (Keynes, 1933: 759).

By rejecting the classical doctrine of the harmony of interests, Keynes brought to light two implications hidden by that assumption yet nevertheless present in the concept of development in Mill and Marshall. Keynes rejected the idea that development was a process driven by rational individual action; instead, it was irrational and therefore in need of intentional direction. Thus with Keynes, the concept of development makes society conscious of its own change, of its direction and purpose: it is self-conscious change. Because of its open-ended and harmonious nature, adherents of the idea of progress believed that the internal motive forces of development could be harmonised with the external by the ‘system of natural liberty’, as both were the work of rational individuals. By contrast, in the idea of development, there is an inherent tension between the two: because of the prerequisites of its more substantive end, not everyone or every society is deemed capable of development: an external force must step in not just to
correct the faults of the internal, but also to guide it along its proper path – a path it would otherwise, according to its present tendencies, not have taken. The internal is irrationally working against the desires of the external. Thus it is not, as one might expect based on the post-modernist critique, the developing nation or people that are considered irrational, but society – Western or non-Western – itself. This internal-external divide is already implicit in the concept of development, as opposed to that of progress, because of the conception of the relationship between the forces motivating change that is entailed in the greater importance that must be given to the external motive force in the idea of development. In Mill and Marshall this was only made explicit in their analyses of the development of barbarians and the Residuum, respectively. Essentially, Keynes has taken Mill’s analysis of ‘barbarians’ and Marshall’s analysis of the Residuum, and expanded them to cover the whole of society. Now it was not just the Residuum through whom ‘Anglo-Saxon freedom must work badly.’ Keynes saw no problem with this – he believed that the further development of mankind toward a post-scarcity age rested with the state, led by economists. Until then, the will of the people, who were trapped within the socially determined mind-set of the 'money motive,' could and indeed must be ignored. However, this concept of development would prove rather more problematic for those who founded the field of development studies in the post-war era. For, as we shall see in the final sections of Part I, they did so with the explicit intention of bringing the developing people back into the process of development.

I.7 – Post-War Development I: Economic Modernisation

Keynes himself had little to say on the fate of the poorer nations: his policy recommendations were designed to solve First World socio-economic problems. But the Second World War made clear that just as Western societies had begun to resolve domestic tensions with various social policies – now with the backing of economists – so too international society would have to secure peace by helping the poorer nations develop. Just as government had previously tried to halt the rise of domestic socialism by establishing social policies to keep the masses happy, so too must they keep the world from revolution and total war by aiding the poorer nations. As Semmel put it:

“In time, it must prove possible to duplicate, on an international scale, the decision taken in the first quarter of the century within the advanced nations of the West. It must prove possible to satisfy the poorer nations of Asia and Africa so that their peoples will not be
persuaded to follow the path taken by the so-called 'have-not' nations of central Europe, during the 'thirties, a much more dangerous course in our day. Technological progress can provide the plenty required to resolve international tensions caused by too great disparities in wealth between nations as it already has significantly solved such tensions within the nations of the West.” (1960: 262)

Sir Hans Singer, one of Keynes' first PhD students, was among the first of economists to be explicitly and primarily concerned with the problem of the economic development of the poorer nations. His “animating spirit,” according to Toye (2006: 830-831), was “the concern for equality and redistribution, the concern for social security and for a broad range of international institutions in the social field to act as guarantors of peace.” For Toye, this spirit distinguishes Singer from his mentor; but in approaching economics in general and social change in particular from an ethical perspective, Singer certainly followed in Keynes’ footsteps. Of course, by Singer's time, economists had long donned the 'mantle of science' and proclaimed their value-neutrality. Statements as boldly value-laden as we saw in Mill, Marshall, and Keynes would henceforth rarely be acceptable in scientific, academic circles. As development economist Alexander Gerschenkron (1952[1962]:5) put it: “we no longer announce to the world what inevitably will, or at least what ideally should happen. We have grown modest.” Consequently, few words were written in the economic modernisation literature on why economic growth was actually desirable. Yet the normative vision contained in the concept of development remained.

In 1949, Singer's 'Economic Progress in Underdeveloped Countries,' set out the issues associated with the hitherto under-explored subject of Third World development. He distinguished between the fruits of development – better nutrition, social security, lower death rates, luxury consumption, a complex administrative system, and so on – and the seeds of development, which included capital accumulation and the spread of technology. The seeds of development – that is, the actual process of development – finds its meaning and justification only in its results, its fruits. The fruits being both the most easily identifiable and the only morally desirable aspect of the whole process, it is tempting to simply transplant them, divorced from the seeds. But that, Singer (1949: 4) warns, would be a mistake:
“Such things as medical improvements, low death rates, advanced social legislation, a complex machinery of planning, are the end results of economic development in the industrialised countries, and as such they not only fulfil a definite economic function, but are the things in which economic development finds its meaning and fulfilment. It is fatally easy to transplant them, not as end products but in isolation, divorced from the process which has created them in the industrialised countries. Treated in such fashion, these fruits of economic development have a way of putrefying and even checking development itself.”

Notice that for Singer the accumulation of capital is part of the process of development, rather than an outcome. It is a stage each nation must go through before it can reach the true end of development. As it was for Keynes, capital accumulation is the force driving development. Hence it could assumed by Singer that the transfer of capital does not pose the same difficulties as the transfer of fruits of development. Quite the opposite, in fact: an influx of capital was precisely what the underdeveloped countries needed. Singer believed that in an international free market, nations producing primary goods would experience a steady decline in their terms of trade. On the international stage, “the working of capitalism would maintain the same unequal world division of labour as has previously been enforced by imperial might” (Toye, 2006: 829). The failure of the poorer nations to approach the levels of the industrialised nations was, therefore, not entirely due to “domestic weaknesses or handicaps implicit in the economic structure”. Consequently, the present state of things need not be accepted as inevitable. “There is little doubt that a sufficient stream of additional capital goods flowing into the underdeveloped countries ... could ... [transform] the economic picture in many of these countries” (Singer, 1949: 4). Unfortunately, notes Singer, the underdeveloped countries are impatient: they want to import the fruits of development without going through the painful processes that produced them in the West. The elaborate but premature projects they engage in are initially popular, but soon fail due to a lack of external economies. What is needed is “a long period of heavy and seemingly fruitless expenditure prior to the stage when further expenditure brings tangible results” (Singer, 1949: 6). Again, development is something to be endured. “What is required is a big initial effort to carry through the barren period” (Singer, 1949: 6). Without an initial 'big push', the developing country would remain trapped in one of the many viscous circles of poverty. For example: low production yields no investment surplus, which precludes capital accumulation, which is
the cause of low production. Hence Nurkse's (1953: 4) famous 'trite proposition': "a country is poor because it is poor." With a healthy influx of capital, however, the developing countries would be able to move from stagnant viscous circles to upward virtuous spirals.

Not everyone was happy with the big push strategy, and the debate in the economic development literature quickly settled down into two main camps: those who favoured balanced growth, and those who favoured unbalanced growth. The terms of the debate were very narrow, essentially revolving around the selection of industries to be 'pushed'. The balanced growth advocates favoured broad, economy-wide investment, whereas the unbalanced growth advocates wanted investment in leading sectors that would call for a response from other industries. The great champion of unbalanced growth was Albert Hirschman, whose 1958 work *The Strategy of Economic Development* was structured as an argument against his balanced growth adversaries (Krugman, 1994). He argued that the balanced growth doctrine was based on the idea of two still photographs of society; two points of equilibrium, one where the society was at present, one where it aimed to be in the future. A focus on these two points led, he thought, to a "certain impatience with the process" of moving from one to the other (1958: 65). They looked for short-cuts – one big push. In fact, Hirshmann pointed out, "development is a lengthy process during which [disequilibrating] interaction ... takes place ... up and down and across the whole of an economy's input-output matrix, and for many decades." Hence it was the task of development policy to maintain, rather than avoid, "tensions, disruptions, and disequilibrium." (1958: 66)

Hirschman also objected to the common idea of prerequisites of development. The literature had identified such factors as natural resources, capital, and entrepreneurship as direct prerequisites, along with a constantly growing list of indirect prerequisites – law, order, rationalisation of bureaucracy, certain values, and so on. All valuable insights, but, he argued, most of them are in fact already present in the underdeveloped countries "and only need suitable occasions to manifest themselves" (1958: 4). Thus the poor nations' "economic backwardness cannot be explained in terms of any outright absence or scarcity of this or that human type or factor of production." The so-called prerequisites "are not so scarce or so difficult to realize, provided, however, that economic development itself first raises its head. *This is of course only a positive way of stating the*
well-known proposition that economic development is held back by a series of interlinking vicious circles ... But this also means that once development has started, the circle is likely to become an upward spiral as all the prerequisites and conditions for development are brought into being ... [A]ll the ... 'prerequisites' climb unexpectedly on the bandwagon of economic development once it has started to roll” (1958:4-5 – emphasis in original). Seeing resources as latent rather than absent shifted Hirschman's focus to the dynamic and strategic aspects of development. Development became about calling forth potential rather than coordinating existing resources (1958: 6; Krishna and Perez, 2005).

Hirschman's ideal pattern of development is similar to what historian Arnold Toynbee called 'challenge and response'. A society grows, according to Toynbee, when the successful meeting of a challenge brings it face-to-face with another challenge, previously hidden or non-existent, which it also overcomes. So too for Hischman – recall the discussion of the unbalancing and balancing functions of government above in section I.3. Rather than a broad investment strategy, Hirschman argued for targeted investment in what he called 'growing points' – sectors of the economy with many forward and backward linkages to other sectors which, if stimulated, would call forth investment in those sectors too. However, Alexander Gerschenkron, an advocate of balanced growth, had also used Toynbee's challenge-and-response pattern, arguing that only broad industrial investment create a challenge “sufficiently strong to overcome the existing obstacles and to liberate the forces that make for industrial progress.” (1952[1962]: 11)

Balanced or unbalanced, for this task laissez-faire was considered singularly ill-suited. Its continuous stream of “development in small doses is apt to be very disappointing” (Singer, 1949: 6). Add to this the fact that economic conditions in the underdeveloped countries tend to be unfavourable toward the emergence of private entrepreneurs, and it follows that it “is always government that has to formulate the desire [to develop] and translate it into action.” Hence the need for political stability: “political instability is reflected in confused, contradictory, or abortive economic policies. Underdeveloped countries need stability of government far more than industrialised countries, where development has become automatic” (Singer, 1949: 9-10). Laissez-faire was also not considered an inspiring enough doctrine to allow for a radical break from the past; it could not provide the necessary super-rational sanction. “What is needed to remove
mountains of routine and prejudice,” wrote Gerschenkron (1952[1962]: 24-5), “is faith – faith, in the words of Saint-Simon, that the golden age lies not behind but ahead of mankind. ... In a backward country the great and sudden industrialisation effort calls for a New Deal in emotions.”

But what if the faith necessary for development to occur did not take hold throughout the whole country? Hirschman anticipated a potential criticism of his approach: that it would lead to what we have called the tragedy of development. There is, he admitted, a “tendency of growth to round itself out for a long time within some subgroup, region, or country while backwardness retains its hold elsewhere” (1958:184). What is more, the division that results from this is self-perpetuating and deteriorates over time: “The progressive sectors and regions of an underdeveloped economy are easily over-impressed with their own rate of development.” They tend to exaggerate their distinctiveness vis a vis the less developed areas. Having established that “their success was due to hard work and virtuous living, they must willy-nilly live up to their own story, or at the least will make their children do so.” Conversely, those left behind deride the progressive groups as crassly materialistic (Hirschman, 1958: 185). The Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal (1957; 1968; 1970) had likewise noticed that the “onslaught of modernisation from the outside ... leads to a situation where modernism becomes sprinkled throughout a society in which many conditions have remained almost the same for centuries. As Jawaharl Nehru said of India: ‘We have atomic energy and we also have cow dung’” (Myrdal, 1970:57). The problem in such cases is that growth in one sector has not induced growth in other sectors. For both men, however, this did not constitute a case against unbalanced growth: growth was inherently unbalanced. It was, rather, a case against laissez-faire. These problems arose when growth occurred absent rational planning. Only a rational, intentional force could identify the ‘correct’ industries for targeted investment: “development will not come about by a 'natural' evolution, and this constitutes the case for planning” (1970: 183).

The need for 'faith' stems from the perception that although development was in the long-run interests of the people of the developing societies, they could not see that far ahead. Indeed, this type of development was not deemed capable of rational justification by those involved in the process. For while development was in the long-run collective interest, it was rarely in the immediate interests of those involved. Consequently, people
may reject pro-development reform. As Seers and Joy (1971:271) put it: “The irrationality of society is sustained by the rationality of its individual members.” The interests of people and development would be reconciled only after development had completed its task of solving the economic problem. This is why development, the means justified by this end, had to be as quick as possible. Even Hirschman, who criticised the impatience with the process of development in the work of his colleagues, only spoke of development lasting a matter of decades. But it never got that far; no one in this golden age of economic modernisation – from Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) to Hirschman (1958) – was able to find a way out of the tragedy of development. Big Push, balanced growth, and unbalanced growth, the great paradigms of this era, all had the same result when applied in the real world: a modern sector superimposed by an external force onto a traditional sector, which it failed to lift to modernist heights. Rational planning was supposed to make development quicker and easier than it had been in the West. Yet in practice it was found that development had become limited to small sectors of the economy – just as Hirschman and Myrdal had feared would happen absent planning. The economies of the developing nations seemed to have split into two sectors – one touched by modernisation and one not – which did not interact with one another and developed according to their own pattern.

From this outcome stems the perception of modernisation theory as one that out of Eurocentric arrogance believed that development could simply be given to another society. For Mehmet (1995[1999]: 66) the theories of development that emerged from Keynesian premises in the post-war era were “no more than a distorted projection of non-European 'irrationality', the reverse side of the rational behaviour assumption.” Yet, on the other hand, he also has to admit that the economic modernisation approaches were solutions originally designed to solve European problems. If so, European rationality and non-European irrationality can hardly have been a formative dichotomy in this school of thought. As we have seen, in the Keynesian conception of development, rational motivation was indeed externally given to an irrational internal, but external and internal were not developed and developing societies. The post-war theorists did not believe that pro-development attitudes were synonymous with those existing in the West, nor that they needed to be adopted wholesale by the developing countries. Development theory could convey to the developing nations what had worked in the West, and even develop general policy recommendations based on their findings, but it was ultimately supposed
to be the developing nation itself that decided which to adopt and which to reject. They
did not believe that development could occur absent Western aid, but neither did they
believe it could happen without the input and commitment of the developing people
themselves. For example, the first section in Meier and Baldwin's (1957[1962]) chapter
on 'General Requirements for Development' deals with indigenous forces. They argue that
a 'major requirement' of successful development

“is that the development process be established on an indigenous base within the society
of the poor country. ... Forces outside the economy can stimulate and facilitate the
indigenous forces, but they can only complement sustained development; they cannot
serve as a substitute for it. ... If the process is to become cumulative and long-lasting, the
development forces must be fundamentally based within the developing country.”

(1957[1962]: 334-5)

Statements such as these from modernisation theorists, as well as those claiming concern
for the poor of this world as an overriding motivation, are easy to dismiss as having a
"disingenuous quality" (Gendzier, 1985:179), as being mere rationalisations for a pro-
Western foreign policy – particularly if one is committed to the idea that modernist
development saw the developing nations as nothing more than passive recipients of the
West's rational agency. But accepting them at face value results in no paradox, no
contradiction between theory and practice. The post-war theorists saw development
through the lens of Keynes' dichotomy, in which society as a whole is the irrational
element. Stripped of rational intention, society clearly could not be left to its own devices.
Indeed, to do so would be profoundly immoral. The modernisation literature is full of
strictures against letting development take its course in a natural evolution. Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943: 204), in the founding text of modernisation theory, noted that the "social
conscience" could no longer accept the miseries that accompanied development in the
"darwinist nineteenth century." Most theorists set themselves explicitly against the free
trade liberalism of that era which, in the modern world, "would maintain the same
unequal world division of labour as has previously been enforced by imperial might"
(Toye, 2006: 829).

It was this conviction that the 'natural evolution' of the international economy under free
trade would perpetuate inequality internationally that led them to advocate technocratic
planning (e.g. Singer, 1949; Myrdal, 1957). The nineteenth century prescription of allowing the market to take care of development seemed impossibly harsh, and the notion that the developing nations might be able to withstand international market forces without aid seemed fanciful. Displaying little insight into the future of development studies, Thomas Balogh (1966[1974]: 130) wrote that both of these ideas “denies this possibility of development aid and decries the motives of deliberately helping the poor and weak on their way. ... Let the market take over, say Chicago and the LSE. Let the underdeveloped governments plan, say the radicals of the Left, and lift themselves up by their own bootstraps. Fortunately, such views have met with little success.” Although there were some, such as P.T. Bauer, who were conceded to genuinely believe that a return to the liberal economic policies of the nineteenth century would benefit Third World development, such an attitude was more often considered a mark of an uncaring stance regarding the fate of the poorer nations (Rostow, 1984: 245-7). The economic modernisation theorists looked back on the nineteenth century through Keynes’ eyes: it was spontaneous, unguided, Darwinian. Twentieth century development could be none of those things.

However, by the concept of development itself, the post-war theorists were led to precisely that disregard of the human element that they found so distasteful in laissez-faire. In the previous section it was argued that by removing the rational individual from the centre of development theory, Keynes had done for society as a whole what Mill and Marshall had done for what they thought of as the lowest sections of society; that is, he had denied that society itself could be the motive force of development. Instead, if society was to make progressive movement it would have to be guided by an external force. In doing so, Keynes created a paradox that was transmitted to post-war development theory: development, if it is to be worthy of the positive connotations of that term, must be about people; yet the people themselves are not considered capable of producing development worthy of the name. If development is to proceed correctly – that is, according to the needs of the developing people – the developing people must remain remote from the process of development. Only once development had completed its task of solving the economic problem could the interests of people and process become realigned. Until then it was acceptable to use practices that would otherwise be considered distasteful: “to desire [people's] freedom is scarcely to treat them as means in the Kantian sense.” (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953[1992]: 523).
This is, of course, entirely consistent with what we have been saying about the concept of development: that it is an unfortunately necessary yet fortunately temporary stage on the way to an era in which the Marshallian conception of scarcity no longer applies. More often than not this was an assumption, made explicit only when provoked. John Kenneth Galbraith, in the third edition of his *The Affluent Society* (1958[1976]: xxiv) recalls the reaction from economists concerned with poverty to his assertion that production for economic growth was no longer necessary: “How can Galbraith be so callous when a named percentage of our people have a disposable income of less than the necessary minimum? When everyone has that minimum, it will be time to worry about the problems of social balance.” Three years before the publication of Galbraith’s work, the prominent development economist Sir Arthur Lewis (1955:434) had expressed precisely that sentiment, in an appendix on the desirability of economic growth:

“Whether [the poorer nations] will have the courage, and the necessary internal and external support, to raise the necessary resources may be doubted. And it is also doubtful whether in any case aspirations will not continue to outdistance production. But those who believe that it would be wrong to speed up production because of the effects on social relations, or on moral order, usually forget both that these are already rapidly changing, and also that the results of frustrated aspirations may be even more dangerous to existing patterns than speeding up production would be.”

This was the difference between the modernisation theorists and their New Left critics, who were wont to portray development as a mindless pursuit of endless growth. W.W. Rostow (1971: 356-360) noted that the New Left scholars such as Herbert Marcuse seemed to believe that the economic conditions needed to unleash the freedom of the individual had already been achieved. Like Galbraith, they seemed to believe that the economic problem of scarcity could now be solved not with more production but with redistribution. Rostow disagreed not with the principle behind their arguments but with this assessment of current economic reality:

“The creation of a setting of assured affluence and security for men and nations – and seeing what man will make of it – is the object of much striving by many hands for social an economic progress and for stable peace. But ... the human community still has a long,
hard road ahead on which all it can summon in human dedication and endurance, talent and idealism – and resources – will be required for ultimate success.” (1971: 360)

We should, therefore, not share Mehmet’s surprise that “Rostow, the prophet of capitalism, far from advocating reliance on market forces, ended up legitimizing state intervention in Third World development, based on planning and foreign aid” (1995[1999]: 72). Rostow, like Mill, Marshall, and Keynes before him and contemporary development theorists with him, was the prophet not of capitalism but of its fall, and the coming of a post-capitalist age. Rostow is best known for his stages-of-growth model of development (1960[1977]), which is regarded as the prime example of linear, Eurocentric development thinking. Indeed it is. Yet it was not the stage of capitalist mass consumption – the stage in which the industrial West found itself – that was the ultimate aim. Development would find its fulfilment only in a later stage; for in the contemporary West, “[t]he problem of choice and allocation – the problem of scarcity – has not yet been lifted...” (1960[1977]:81). In this famous Anti-Communist Manifesto, Marx was conceded to be correct on one point: “the end of all this [development] is not compound interest forever; it is in the adventure of seeing what man can and will do when the pressure of scarcity is substantially lifted from him” (1960[1977]: 166). The normative perspective, then, remained as an underlying assumption: the social conscience, as mentioned, could no longer ignore the miseries deemed acceptable or inevitable in Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943: 204) “Darwinist nineteenth century.” Overcoming the economic problem was still seen as a necessary condition for the attainment of more worthy goals, but it was necessary that something be done about it; society would not find that noble end of its own accord (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953[1992]: 519).

It is often said that the economic modernisation theorists were optimistic, and naively so. They were – not in the sense that they believed development would be easy and painless, but in the sense that they thought that, if rationally planned, it could be quick enough that the difficulties and pains would be temporary. In the event, development had become what Singer had argued it could not, if it was to work, ever be: an external force placing modern things in a society to which they had no connection. The solution to this situation, as proposed by a group of thinkers we shall refer to as political modernisation theorists, was precisely the alternative the economic modernisation theorists had believed they were offering to the ‘Darwinist nineteenth century’: bring the people back in to development.
What the economists failed to recognise, argued Daniel Lerner, was that “[e]ither individuals and their environments modernize together or modernization leads elsewhere than intended” (Lerner, 1958[1966]: 78). In the next section we shall how Daniel Lerner and the political modernisation school attempted to ensure that modernisation did proceed as intended. We shall see that although Lerner approaches modernisation with the intention of making the developing people themselves more active, using the concept of development as a starting point meant that in fact they could be little more than reactive to a social change that remained beyond their control.

I.8 – Post-War Development II: Political Modernisation
The political modernisation school has been an easy target for criticism. It is generally their type of analysis that critics generally have in mind when they describe development, as Brohman (1995: 125) does, as a mere celebration of the achievements of the United States. Irene Gendzier, for example, states simply: “That theorists of Political Development were committed to the interpretation of Third World change in a manner compatible with the expansion of capitalism is beyond controversy” (1985: 12). Gendzier's thesis is that the modernisation theorists' elitist interpretations of political change holds “the key to the nature of Political Development theories and the more general orientation to political analysis to which they gave rise” (1985: 12). Their theories, she says, arose from the attempt to reconcile two principles they regarded as universally desirable and necessary: capitalist development and democratic change. She continues from the sentence quoted above: “That many ... were committed to the proposition that capitalism and democracy were historically linked in Western experience is also beyond question.” (1985: 12) Unfortunately, she argues, the two are incompatible, as capitalist development creates the very class differentiation and tension that democracy asserts ought not to exist. Gendzier argues that they gave prominence to capitalist development, allowing that to take its course in the present while the coming of participatory politics was delayed. Hence the new title in later reprints of her work: Development Against Democracy.

“Caught between their support for a form of socio-political change that conformed to their interest and supported their world view and the recognition that it generated precisely the instability that they feared, theorists of Political Development responded by relying on the elitist, pluralist, equilibrium model of political change that most effectively
This explains the oft-noted authoritarian bias and aversion to change found in modernisation theory (Huntington, 1971; Kesselman, 1973; Leys, 1985). Gendzier finds an analogy for their “blatant fear of political participation” in the origins of liberal political theory: Locke's “justificatory theory” for capitalist society. (1985: 160; 158). According to MacPherson's (1962) reading of his work, Locke had tried to find a justification for the new bourgeois order in terms of a system of morality derived for a pre-bourgeois order. Yet he was unable to “surmount an inconsistency inherent in market society. A market society generates class differentiation in effective rights and rationality, yet requires for its justification a postulate of equal rights and rationality.” (1962: 264)

The analogy goes further: Locke, again according to Macpherson, had made unlimited accumulation rational. Accordingly, the labouring classes, who failed to live up to this standard, could not lead a fully rational life. Similarly, the political development theorists reduced political differences to personality types, enabling them to view dissidents and those outside the established political system as not fully rational and hence not to be trusted with political participation. The elites were both the source of power and “the rock on which the process of state formation was believed to depend” (Gendzier, 1985: 178). From them came the initiative. Gendzier has to acknowledge that theorists of political development did not believe that the masses should adopt an attitude of slavish devotion and trust, but dismisses such statements as “disingenuous” given the overall nature of their theories (1985: 179).

However, the elitist theory of democracy, the supposed solution to the problem of reconciling capitalist inequality and democratic equality, came before the development contradiction ever arose. It had been the mainstream view of democracy for half a century. Hence there was no contradiction between capitalism and democracy, because democracy was already interpreted in a way that fit. Walter Lippmann, for example, in his influential *Public Opinion* (1922), had exposed the 'democratic fallacy' of being concerned with the origins of government to the exclusion of the process of government. He accused democrats of focussing on one part of the individual – the desire for self-government. Human dignity, however, involved more than that:

“But if, instead of hanging human dignity on the one assumption about self-government,
you insist that man's dignity requires a standard of living in which his capacities are properly exercised, the whole problem changes. The criterion which you apply to government are whether it is producing a certain minimum amount of health, of decent housing, of material necessities, of education, of freedom, of pleasures, of beauty, not simply whether at the sacrifice of all these things, it vibrates to the self-centered opinions that happen to be floating around in men's minds. In the degree to which these criteria can be made exact and objective, political decision, which is inevitably the decision of comparatively few people, is actually brought into relation with the interests of men”

(1922: 313-4)

This early statement of what would become known as the Lippmann-Almond consensus, which asserts the volatility, irrationality, and hence irrelevance of public opinion, was far more influential on the political development literature – of which Almond, of course, was part – than any notion of perfect democratic equality. It may be argued that this would lead to contradictions in practice, but that is not Gendzier argument. Her thesis is that the contradiction between capitalist inequality and democratic equality influenced political development theory. Yet in the minds of those who developed those theories there was no contradiction. What was a problem – and recognised as a problem necessary to be overcome by actual development theorists – was the fact that though these irrational individuals could not be trusted to bring about development, development was still ultimately about them. In this, they confronted precisely the same problem as the economic modernisation theorists. In The Passing of Traditional Society, Daniel Lerner asserted that the need for a political development stemmed from the lack of concern for developing people apparent in economic development:

“The problem with this cogent technical solution [i.e. quickly raising incomes through economic development] is people. They don't do what, on any rational course of behaviour, they should do. They want more consumption, but they don't worry about saving and think little about productive investment. ... We now recognise that modernization can succeed only in the measure that it meets its second paramount difficulty – its 'people problems.'” (1958[1966]: vii)

As we have seen, the economic modernisation theorists believed that the interests of people and development could only be reconciled after the process had been completed,
because the process itself could have no rational sanction from the individuals involved. There would likely be some instability, but less so as the nation grew wealthier. This assumption came under heavy criticism in the late fifties and early sixties (e.g. Olson, 1963). It was now argued that while a fully developed society would be a stable society, a poor society was also stable; it was the process of getting from one to the other that was “a highly destabilizing process.” (Huntington, 1968: 49). Indeed, the process could be so destabilising that development may be halted altogether. Hence the question that the political development theorists all sought to address: how can the “societies-in-a-hurry hope to achieve stability while achieving mobility?” (Lerner, 1958[1966]: 68)

Kesselman (1973: 142) argues that in answering this question they came to regard order as “the highest political good” rather than as “a prerequisite for achieving the highest political good.” This is clearly untrue. If it were true, there would be no reason for them to advocate that the already-stable poor nations embark upon the destabilising process of development in the first place. In fact, the poorer nations were heading to the same ultimate goal as the West: the vision of a world in which Marshall’s natural wants – or basic needs – were universally satisfied. Cyril Black (1966: 84), for example, put it as follows: “The end of this process is not easy to foresee, but as automation reduces the labor force required to sustain economic growth it is not unlikely that a substantial proportion of the work force of an integrated society will be guaranteed an income regardless of whether or not they work.” In speaking of an ‘integrated society’ as part of the end of development, Black harks back to Semmel’s (1960: 262) words quoted above, that “[i]n time, it must prove possible to duplicate, on an international scale, the decision taken in the first quarter of the century within the advanced nations of the West” – the decision, that is, taken by political elites to enact social policies to benefit the masses. Development was to achieve on a world scale what the Western nations had been trying to do domestically.

Contra Gendzier (1985), it was certainly not a Lockean brand of individualistic capitalism that was to lead the way in this. Following Keynes and the economic modernisation theorists, capitalism was to be temporarily harnessed and tamed by the ‘trustees of the possibility of civilisation,’ and guided toward socially desirable ends before being cast aside. Left unguided, wrote David Apter, “capitalism ... becomes the repugnant purveyor of anti-humanism.” It is “at best a gambler’s environment. ... It is a private system of
forced savings and concentrated development strategies in which the immediate social impact is less relevant than the creation of deployable capital funds. Under these circumstances, ‘valued’ patterns of life of a more ‘traditional’ character (i.e. that are not functional ... for development) are themselves seen as obstacles to be swept away...” (1971: 201; 197). The idea of progress, which served as a justification for capitalism, was dismissed as an unwarranted universalization. Cyril Black (1966: 7) described it as “a projection for the whole world of a conception of change that was believed, erroneously, to be true of the societies of Western Europe.” Thus, like other “serious students of society” (Black, 1966: 27), they looked forward to a world free of poverty and war within the foreseeable future, but they recognised better than the economic modernisation theorists how difficult a road it would be. According to Kesselman (1973: 150), the political development theorists ignored “the destabilizing (and occasionally devastating) effects of American power on other nations.” Their predecessors had arguably done so, believing that the great problem would be how to kick-start development in societies that had changed little over the past few centuries; but for the political development theorists it was the excessive influence of outside (i.e. Western) forces that was the fundamental concern: “modernizing societies exist in a world environment that in spite of outside aid and multilateral alliances is essentially hostile” (Apter, 1971: 46; cf. Black, 1966: 98-9; Huntington, 1968: 46). Apter continues:

“The adaptive strains produced by the combination of internal and external inputs create political problems that can never be adequately resolved by centralized planning, because the modernizing society has little control over the externally induced pressures of industrialization. Development may occur, but the relationship between allocation and equity may be upset and may produce a threat to order.” (1971: 47)

This recognition of the need to reconcile internal and external forces – which economic planning had failed to do – was present in the work that is often considered to mark the beginning of the ‘golden decade’ of political development: Danier Lerner’s *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958[1966]). Lerner saw that the hitherto dominant economistic approach to development, with its technocratic planning, had not been able to avoid what we have called the tragedy of development. He recognises the economistic approach for what it had become: an external, paternalistic force, distant from the needs of the developing people. In words that could have been written by Georg Simmel, Lerner
expressed his belief that political modernisation was to change that:

“[This] book seeks to explain why and show how individuals and their institutions modernize together. ... [S]ocial change operates through persons and places. Either individuals and their environments modernize together or modernization leads elsewhere than intended. If new institutions of political, economic, cultural behaviour are to change in compatible ways, their inner coherence must be provided by the personality matrix which governs individual behaviour.” (1958[1966]: 78)

This implies that if the developing people are to be a part of the process of development, Western models could not serve as a blueprint for the modernising societies, as that would represent a form of institutional change not necessarily compatible with the ‘personality matrix’ of the developing people. This was a conclusion that Lerner came to, and one that most political development theorists explicitly followed him in. He argued that due to the tendency of the elites in developing countries to gain their education in the West, there was a disconnect in developing societies between ‘Moderns’ and ‘Traditionals.’ The elites returned to their country armed with Western ideas that did not resonate with the masses; consequently, the institutions these ideas helped build would not last. Despite the title of his book, Lerner did not believe that development was a process of the Traditionals gradually coming to accept the ideals and institutions of the Westernised elites. He takes issue with those who suggest it might be so, asserting that “[t]here is no uniform Tomorrow just as there was no single Yesterday” (1958[1966]: 74). For society and its institutions to 'change in compatible ways' the gulf between modern and traditional would have to be bridged. This could be achieved neither by the Traditionals, nor the Westernised Moderns. To Lerner, both were ‘relatively static,’ and neither could produce social change that would be compatible with the ‘personality matrix’ of the other. The Moderns were trying to provide the developing society with an impulse that was completely external to it, while the Traditionals clung on to their society's old ways. The future lay with a class Lerner named the ‘Transitionals,’ “the men-in-motion,” who seek new channels of their own design that the already-modern elites fail to provide for them. They are the middle class that unites top and bottom, interpreting and adapting foreign models and influences in a way that is acceptable to their own preconceptions and relevant to the challenges faced by their own society (1958[1966]: 101; 410).
Lerner finds a small-scale example of this process in the Chief and the Grocer of the rural Turkish village of Balgat. The Chief of the village embodies the Ottoman imperial virtues of loyalty, obedience, and courage. A life spent in his village and in the army has given him no cause to question these values. The Grocer, by contrast, “lives in a different world, an expansive world, populated more actively with imaginings and fantasies – hungering for what is unfamiliar” (1958[1966]: 23). The Grocer has dreams beyond the village, of a bigger shop in the city, a nicer house, a better clothing. The Grocer's aspirations – and in particular is open expression of his aspirations – offended the traditional sensibilities of the rest of his village; his opinions marked him off as “heterodox and probably infidel” (1958[1966]: 23). For Lerner, it is the Grocer's ability – and willingness – to imagine himself in different, unfamiliar surroundings, and to imagine how things might change in Balgat that sets him apart from the other villagers. Unlike them, he has been to Ankara. The Chief, too, visits Ankara on occasion, but comes back with his belief in traditional values reinforced. The Grocer can see the same sights, the same modern films, and find in them something to aspire to. It is the Grocer's ‘empathetic' character that is the mark of the Transitional, “Needed then is a massive growth in imaginativeness [among the Traditionals] about alternatives to their present lifeways” (1958[1966]: 411). Upon his own visit to Balgat, four years after the original interviews were conducted, Lerner finds that this new imaginativeness has emerged, stimulated by the example of the now-deceased Grocer, of whom the villagers now say:

“Ah, he was the cleverest of us all. We did not know it then, but he saw better than all what lay in the path ahead. We have none like this among us now. He was a prophet.” (in 1958[1966]: 41)

This seems like a reasonable solution to the tragedy of development. Lerner saw that neither externally-given Western models nor uninfluenced indigenous models could by their own powers result in coherent and sustainable modernisation. Therefore, a compromise position is needed, which is where the Transitionals come in. Due to their place in society – between modernity and tradition – they could add to modern ideas the unique flavour of their circumstances, in the act becoming source of inspiration for the Traditionals, and tempering the Westernism of the Moderns. “What they subsequently accept, adapt, or reject [from the Western experience of development] is a matter which
each man will, in due course, decide for himself.” (1958[1966]: 411). The problem with Lerner's response is, as was noted above, the ambiguity in how we are to define the compromise position. We have already seen that it is the peculiar and constant feature of the concept of development, as opposed to that of progress, that the internal and external motive forces are seen as divided. Yet how do we find an acceptable middle-ground between two items that are mutually antagonistic yet both, in their own way, valid and necessary? One often hears that we should be 'practical' about such matters, but that is only a call to action not a guide on how to act, and hence does not help us. In fact, as Dworkin (2011:261-4) argues, we cannot identify a middle-ground between two perspectives “without first deciding which of [the] perspectives should govern ... There is no third perspective – no perspective of 'reason' itself – from which the balance might be struck. We can't know what reason requires without first deciding from which perspective that question should be decided.” (2011: 261-2) When we seek the proper mix of internal and external forces, when we define their role in the process of development, we must, if we conceive the two as fundamentally antagonistic, start from one perspective and on that basis seek a compromise. Development's understanding of positive social change as a 'self-conscious' process colours the attempt to reconcile the internal and external.

What Lerner saw himself as doing is precisely what the economic modernisation theorists had seen their own task: he was trying to bring the developing people back into development. We have seen how they failed in that task due to the implication in the concept of development itself that development be externally motivated. Lerner runs into the same problem. He is able to bring the developing people back into the analysis, but not actively into the process. If we look a little closer, Lerner's Transitionals are not the ones motivating development; they are only representative of it. They represent the enquiring spirit of modernity, the curiosity and imagination from which arise "the human skills needed for social growth and economic development” (1958[1966]: 411). One could imagine von Humboldt, or any other believer in the idea of progress, writing the same: this inventive, entrepreneurial, constantly striving view of life they praised above all others. Yet while for Humboldt an individual with this attitude was the driving force of progress, for Lerner it simply helps individuals to adapt to changes that are – and must necessarily be – beyond their control. Where Humboldt's spirit of modernity was active and creative, Lerner's is reactive and adaptive. It is not for the Transitionals to create “the institutional capacity to provide this new style of life,” nor even are they trusted to
produce the goods and services they now desire as the difficulties involved “seem almost insurmountable within the framework of classical market economics” (1958[1966]: 412; 259). Development itself must be given to them; they need only accept it.

All this is rather implicit in Lerner, but the political modernisation theorists would develop a more explicit authoritarian bias and preference for elites over social movements that has drawn frequent and severe criticism (e.g. O’Brien, 1972; Kesselman, 1973; Gendzier, 1985). Like Lerner, later political development theorists – including Edward Shils, David Apter, Cyril Black, Karl Deutsch, Samuel Huntington – thought it necessary that developing societies be protected from excessive external (i.e. Western) influence. Lerner’s argument that development required that the developing society must decide for itself which parts of the example set by other nations to ‘accept, adapt, or reject’ was still explicitly present. Thus Shils defined modernization as a “progressive sharing by the public in an understanding of modern life in such a way that, no longer passive agents acted upon by outside forces, they can utilise their potentialities and their creativity” (in Apter, 1965: 22-3). Similarly, Black (1966: 50) argued that “outside forces [of development] are so powerful that modernization is sometimes thought of primarily as acculturation – the adoption of the cultural traits of another society.” Yet modernising societies, he argues, should also be considered in terms of the domestic process of change, by which the traditional institutions of the society are evolving. Development must be the outcome of the interplay between the two:

“The stimulus of foreign models is an intense and vitalizing force in the later-modernizing societies. Yet unless the leaders of these societies have the wisdom to distinguish between the generally applicable functions of modernity and the institutional forms derived from alien traditions, the influence of foreign models is likely to divert them from empirical experimentation and to interfere with a more discriminating consideration of the adaptability to modern functions of the native traditional heritage of ideas and institutions.” (Black, 1966: 97-8)

Notice, however, that the function of interpreting modern ideas, attributed by Lerner to the Transitionals, has now become the task of the ‘leaders.’ The problem was that the developing people, seeing what the Western nations had to offer in terms of material prosperity, not only accepted the conditions of development, but wanted even more than
could be provided. The economic modernisation theorists had seen this issue too, but had believed that with good planning production would be able to keep up with this demand spurt. The political development theorists were not so sure: “[Developing] people have learned to want more than they can get. As a result, the ‘revolution of rising expectations’ we celebrated so confidently fifteen years ago has, in many places, become a ‘revolution of rising frustrations.’ Modernization, it now appears, is harder than one supposed” (Lerner, 1958[1966]: vii).

This rather throws a spanner in the works of Lerner’s model of development – Lerner didn’t recognise it, but others did. The Transitionals themselves seem too enamoured with Westernism to point the way forward. They have become impatient, and want to do in years what took the West centuries. They therefore seek to impose modern institutions where the correct ‘personality matrix’ has not appeared. “Wanted are modern institutions, but not modern ideologies, modern power but not modern purposes, modern wealth but not modern wisdom, modern commodities but not modern cant. It is not clear, however, that modern ways and words can be so easily and so totally sundered” (Lerner, 1958[1966]: 48). Lerner tries to associate this type of attitude with the Moderns, but for the political development theorists who followed him it was clear that this internal Eurocentrism was a more widespread mentality: “The ‘demonstration effect’ which the early modernizers have on the later modernizers first intensifies aspirations and then exacerbates frustrations” (Huntington, 1968: 46; c.f. Deutsch, 1970[1974]: 550). Consequently, it was necessary that the developing society be protected from its own Eurocentrism – and specifically the Eurocentrism of the middle classes, with whom Lerner had identified the Transitionals. For, according to Black (1966: 161), “[t]he institutional pattern of any one society cannot serve as a model for others except in a general sense. Each society must to a considerable extent work out its own solutions.” It was not the task of the elites to speed up or slow down a process of development that was leading them inexorably toward a mirror-image of the modern West; their importance lay in “the strong imprint that they stamp on the manner in which change takes place.” (Black, 1966: 157) Leaders were to interpret foreign models, ideas, and expectations where in the masses they would lead to a revolution of rising frustrations. It is the people who expect their society to become like the West, and become frustrated when it does not. It is the political leaders who had to interpret the Western models and adapt them to fit their own society.
This idea was firmly entrenched by the time Samuel Huntington released his famous *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) – the last great work of the golden decade of political modernisation and the primary target of Kesselman’s (1973) critique of modernisation theory’s apparent preoccupation with order and authority. According to Huntington, US development policy has focused too much on the income gap, to the detriment of what he calls the ‘political gap’: “The rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low. The result is instability and disorder” (1968: 5). Poor societies, he argues, are relatively stable, but once economic development starts and the ‘demonstration effect’ comes into play, aspirations rise faster than the society’s capacity to meet them. Lerner, we saw, hoped that the Transitionals could mediate, but for Huntington this task belongs to the political elites, as the middle classes are the ones whose aspirations have become excessively Westernised. He states that the two functions of a political system in modernising societies are, first, to “promote social and economic reform by state action,” and second, “to assimilate successfully into the system the social forces produced by modernization” (1968: 140). A single- or dominant-party system, he argues, is best equipped for this task.

Thus the theorists who followed Lerner ended up making explicit the authoritarianism implicit in his work: the developing people are not considered capable of actually producing development, only of adapting to its demands. However, the very reason that, to Lerner’s thinking, the Transitionals would be able to overcome what we have called the tragedy of development was that he was originally not asking them to dictate a plan for the country, but simply to provide inspiration for others in how to adapt modern ideas to fit their needs. “What they subsequently accept, adapt, or reject [from the Western example] is a matter which each man will, in due course, decide for himself” (Lerner, 1958[1966]: 411). This is why they were able to mediate between the top and the bottom of the developing society, to find a way to reconcile modern influences and traditional lifeways. Once the Transitionals come into power, however, their role in development ceases to be one of inspiring the Traditionals and tempering the Moderns by setting an example, instead becoming one of compulsion, which makes them indistinguishable from the Modern elites imposing ideas and institutions that do not fit the ‘personality matrix’ of the developing people. They can no longer provide the link between top and bottom,
because they are at the top. The internal and external forces of development, though they were recognised as being in need of reconciliation, remain separate and antagonistic.

I.9 – Education as a Bridge Between Tradition and Modernity

The failure of development theorists to conceptualise a truly active role for the people of developing society was, it has been argued, due to the concept of development itself. We cannot concur with the assessment of scholars such as Gendzier (1985), Mehmet (1995), or Nederveen Pieterse (2001a) that attempts to do so were at best half-hearted, at worst dishonest, with the ultimate intention of modernisation theory being the global diffusion of American capitalist power. Rather, the concern for the welfare of the developing world and the belief that development policy was necessary to secure that welfare were genuine and informed attempts to alter development theory and practice. However, it has been argued that because social-change-as-development must be evaluated and motivated by a force external to the developing society – because internal forces cannot be trusted to move in the correct direction – the developing society itself can at best be made more adaptable to the demands of development. Alternatively, or additionally, the external force can be adapted so that it is more recognisable to the developing society. Ultimately, though, these forces must remain conceptually separate, with the consequence that the 'stuff' of development, created according to an external motivation, does not raise the internal, the developing society, to its own 'higher' level of development. As Simmel (1908[1997]: 57) put it, they “simply act like additions, as it were, that come from a sphere of values external to, and always remaining external to [it].”

Recognition of this situation in practice leads to criticisms that existing approaches to development have failed, the proposed solution being a new approach that will unite development process and developing people. The problem, however, as it flows from the concept of development, remains. In the previous section we saw how this occurred in the response of political modernisation theorists to the failures of economic modernisation. We can find the same process at work in more directly policy-relevant areas. In this final section we shall look at the relationship between education and development. We shall see familiar critiques – that existing schooling was too distant from the lifeways of the people of the developing society to be relevant – familiar consequences – that the schools failed to make people truly 'modern' – familiar solutions – a reorientation of schools to make the more responsive to the needs and lives of the people – and a familiar outcome – a reacquisition of the characteristics for which the old system was criticised.
John Dewey (1937: 235-238), whose work was the great inspiration for education policy in this era, discussed three possible choices regarding education and social change. One can deliberately maintain an existing order, as with Plato; one can ignore the school's role in social change resulting in them acting “so as to perpetuate the present confusion and possibly increase it”; or one can make a scientific prognosis of social forces and plan schooling accordingly. Dewey advised the third course of action, and his advice was followed by educationists and officials working in development. The intended purpose of schools in the developing nations was to act as “mediators of the culture, the intersection point between the traditional and the modern” (Hanson and Brembeck, 1966: 310). They were to prepare the child for a role in the modernisation process. Consequently, the nature of education in these societies had to change: “Formerly an instrument for promoting social stability and continuity, it increasingly had to serve as an instrument for promoting and controlling change, for creating discontinuities. Previously an instrument for communicating the values and skills possessed by the adult members of a culture, it now had to transmit new national values and new economic and other skills which most adults might well not possess.” (Thompson, 1981: 27-28). There were three basic purposes for education to fulfil in support of development: education for economic growth, education for national unity and political development, and education for personal and social development (Hanson, 1964[1966]: 35-40).

Before 1945, education for economic growth had been limited by the principle that a colony should have no services that could not be paid for by its own resources. This changed with the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 which accepted the need to deliberately promote the rapid development of the colonies. Though WWII was well under way, ministers were urged by the Act “not [to] let slip the experienced skill of our guiding hand”. UNESCO's push for universal education and the general feeling of optimism in the development community meant that post-war policy was almost entirely geared toward increasing enrolment figures and the number of schools and education materials. UNESCO justified the rapid expansion of free and compulsory education with reference to the UN's Declaration on Human Rights – which includes a right to education – but also to the potential economic return. This claim was backed up by studies of

1 HC Deb 21 May 1940 vol 361 cc 41-125
education and economic growth in the US, the USSR, and Japan (e.g. Harbison and Myers, 1964). A series of conferences in Karachi, Santiago, Tokyo, and Addis Ababa were to set the stage for national plans to link education and economic growth. “The Conference [in Addis Ababa, 1961] notes that education cannot make its fullest contribution to economic development unless it is particularly geared to needs of economic development ... Education more than pays for itself, but only if it is of the right kind and is mixed quantitatively in the right proportions. ... For this reason, education needs to be planned continuously in relation to economic development” (UNESCO, 1961).

The first national plan to consciously attempt to integrate education into the general development plan was Nigeria's. It was guided by the Ashby Commission's 1961 report, *Investment in Education*. Written for Nigeria, the report was imitated in many other developing countries (Hanson, 1964[1966]: 35). Twenty years after its publication its principles of education as an investment, integrated development planning, and education according to manpower needs had become “almost unquestioned orthodoxy” (Thompson, 1981: 82). The essence of the report was “an orientation toward the future: an orientation toward the type of Nigeria one might envisage with the passing of two decades. The Commission recognized that only when the vision of the goal is clear can sound programmes of action be planned” (Hanson, 1964[1966]: 35). In background papers to the Addis Ababa conference, Harbison and Lewis had both argued that economic development required above all the skills associated with secondary education. Following this advice, the Ashby Commission recommended a programme of education designed to achieve a revolutionary increase in the production of young people capable of filling managerial, technical, and administrative roles. The focus of the conference and the Ashby Commission's report was on secondary education, although universal primary education remained a target.

The post-war world was one of decolonisation, and as well as economic growth many of the new nations needed to foster a sense of national unity if the nation was to make a cooperative effort for development. Many of the new national leaders had been brought together from diverse background by the colonial education system, and were initially confident that common schooling would bring their new nation together in similar fashion (see Davidson, 1993). The form of Nigeria's education system was designed with
precisely this in mind. Every secondary school, for example, was expected to take in pupils from other areas. The content of education was likewise geared toward national unity. The virtues of co-operation, selfless service to the nation, and respect for the legitimate political authorities were high on the agenda. The Zambian government's Syllabuses on Political Education in Zambia noted that while “[t]he Party, being the only mass movement in the country, has demonstrated beyond doubt the support it enjoys from the people of Zambia [, this] should not be taken for granted as such support, if not backed by political education on a wide scale, can very easily fade away overnight.” (in Thompson, 1981: 71)

Development was also an international project and education would have to transmit the skills and values suitable to life as a citizen of the world. This was an important part of UNESCO's work. An early report, reviewing the organisation's first six years of work, argued that “an alphabet of hygiene, of technology and of citizenship has to be taught to illiterates along with an alphabet of reading and writing. Fundamental education is an all-round training, combining the main branches of instruction needed for the moulding of human beings, that is to say, responsible individuals and citizens alive to their duties towards their country and the human family” (UNESCO, 1951: 4). Young people would be taught to understand the nature of international forces and the institutions designed to control them and to advance peace and prosperity. They would have to be concerned with inequality and oppression wherever they existed, and demand that their government take steps to combat them. Unforeseen difficulties in the developing nations, not least the social and political tensions stimulated by the modernisation process, limited the implementation of this internationalist perspective. The newly independent nations would have to ensure national solidarity before they would be prepared to turn to the international level. UNESCO would return to this task later. Meanwhile, education for personal and social development would seek to transform familial and tribal loyalties into loyalties and responsibilities to wider social groups; it would promote a scientific view of the natural and social world; and it would tackle more specific problems associated with development such as adapting to rural-urban migration.

Thus the inculcation of correct values via the school was seen as the way to turn mere growth into development. “In nations which have newly gained their independence it is important ... that any advance in economic productivity be accompanied by a
development of those political skills and knowledges and those democratic and human ideals which will enable the people to assure not only the just distribution of the goods the economy produces but the widest availability of other social and human advantages which a modern economy makes possible.” (Hanson, 1964[1966]: 37) It is the task of education to inculcate those values that will be supportive of development's vision of the future. In the West this was enough, as economic growth was assumed to happen essentially automatically. In Africa it required, for the time being, more deliberate planning and so education also required a more explicit economic role. This economic role, however, was to produce administrators and managers – that is, people able to carry out development plans made elsewhere.

Here too, reality did not live up to the plan. A major concern to Western observers was the proportion of school leavers who were unemployed. In Western Nigeria, for example, it was estimated in the early '60s that 650,000 of 800,000 school leavers were without work. This was closely related a theme current in the development literature at the time, namely, the revolution of rising frustrations. The theory went that closer contact with the West and their own first steps on the road to prosperity and democracy had whetted the appetite of people in the developing nations, who were starting to demand more than their economy was capable of providing. The expansion of education was now perceived to have contributed to these frustrations, as many school leavers had developed a disdain for the manual work done by their parents and sought managerial and administrative work in the cities. Those who were incapable of being absorbed by the modern sector remained in the city, unemployed and a growing source of social unrest.

“The school leaver expects a higher standard of living than his farmer father, a better house, pure water and easy access to medical and other public services. He is willing to drive a tractor or a lathe, but can hardly be expected to respect the back-breaking energies with meagre output yields, which are forced upon his father through lack of modern equipment. In other words, the boy whom the primary schools turn out is ready for an economy in which technological revolution is occurring rapidly, in agriculture as well as in urban occupations. So, when the primary schools turn out large numbers who are expected to accommodate themselves to a three-acres-and-a-hoe civilization, what can be expected but frustration and exasperation?” (UNESCO, 1961: 11)
These problems led many to question how relevant the education system was to African society. This is one instance of the general problem faced by development theorists: how reconcile development process and developing people. The assumption underlying most criticisms of education in developing nations was that the schools, designed by Westerners, were attempting to transmit to the child an alien culture. This had served to uproot young people from their traditional environment while failing to secure for them a life in the modern sector. Siaka Stevens, president of Sierra Leone, noted in 1974 that “[t]he most serious danger which confronts us today as a people is the danger of losing our hold on our traditional past and heritage while we have not yet fully grasped the cultures and traditions presented to us. ... Most of us are 'displaced persons' from the educational and cultural point of view.” Similarly, the participants at the 1961 Addis Ababa conference expressed concern that development as it existed was producing people “suspended between two worlds.” The solution was then to reform the education system so that it would be less Eurocentric and more relevant to the particular society's values and culture:

“The leaders of education speaking of their countries’ needs, have stressed a second major aspect - the desire to accelerate the reorientation of the education patterns and systems to the economic and social needs of their individual areas. They wish to give proper stress in education at all levels and by all possible means to their own culture. As the students of Africa are exposed to the scientific and cultural aspects of the outside world, they need to be thoroughly grounded in a firm knowledge of their own cultural heritage. The education for the future citizen of Africa must be a modern African education.” (UNESCO, 1961: 3)

These sentiments were not new. Contrary to the critics, education in the developing nations (and previously in the colonies) had long been designed on such lines. As far back as 1847 it had been argued by the Education Committee of the Privy Council that colonial education should include rural and agricultural studies, rather than simply imitating Britain's traditional liberal education. The recommendation was put into practice e.g. in Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast in the early 1880s. After WWI it was increasingly believed that the indigenous cultures in the colonies were valuable in themselves, and deserving of protection from Eurocentric influences. The concerns were precisely the
same as in the post-war years: young people caught between traditional and modern society, deserting their villages to fulfil their aspirations with white-collar jobs in the cities. The traditional societies they were leaving behind were fragile and in grave danger of being completely destroyed.

The education system was identified as both cause and solution to this problem. In what would become a constant refrain of would-be education reformers, the existing system was said to be producing self-interested, materialistic individuals with no respect for the proper authorities, who, lacking any grounding in their own culture, blindly copied Western ways. “It was argued that the healthy modernisation of these societies required opportunities for them to evolve without losing their own identity, and that a reformed school and education system might serve to cement and strengthen those aspects of traditional societies which would enable them to adapt to change and to come to terms with the modern world through stable, integrated community progress” (Thompson, 1981: 35). Thus in the Phelps-Stokes Fund’s influential policy reports on education in Africa it was argued that “[t]he wholesale transfer of the educational conventions of Europe and America to the peoples of Africa has certainly not been an act of wisdom,” with its failures “traceable in part to the lack of educational adaptation to Native life.” The authors noted that complaints had been made by “[Afri]can chiefs who have observed that their youth were estranged from their own people and no longer willing to cooperate in the life of their Native communities.” (1922: ch.2)

The reports consequently defined three aims for education: “to render the individual more efficient in his or her condition of life”; “to promote the advancement of the community as a whole” (by, among other things, “the inculcation of true ideals of citizenship and service”); and, “the raising up of capable, trustworthy, public-spirited leaders of the people belonging to their own race” (in Thompson, 1981: 36). The idea was that education would act as a bridge between tradition and modernity. Modern values and knowledge would be taught in terms of tradition, by using the vernacular language, for example. Having been educated in modern ways in a manner that could be related to their own society, children thus educated would be able to return to that society, now capable of aiding in its further development.

Governments throughout the developing world have tried to use education to reconcile
the modernisation effort with the preservation of traditional society and values. The question immediately becomes: who decides which aspects of traditional culture are worthy of preservation? Certainly it could not “be left to the whims and caprices of individual choice” as it was put in Nigeria’s Second National Development Plan, 1970-74 (cited in Ekundare, 1971: 155). It was not for the individual to decide which of their traditions they value enough to preserve, in what form they should be preserved, and which might be left to slip away. The people were portrayed as either irrationally clinging to their development-inhibiting traditions or as so enamoured with Western ways that they were willing to discard their heritage entirely. The educated urban minority was regarded as self-seeking and materialistic, and disruptive of attempts to promote community development. The consequence of the need for education to be part of the nation's development plan – that is, its role in the promotion of a specific image of modernity – was that the type and amount of education on offer would have to be decided by those with the responsibility of determining the form the nation's development should take. Channelling Dewey, the former prime minister of Jamaica Michael Manley declared that education would always have some political purpose; it would be best if this function was planned by the proper authorities rather than left to chance. Because the concept of development has given 'modernity' a specific form, the 'traditional' is what currently is and the 'modern' is what must come into being. When attempting to reconcile tradition and modernity, therefore, only those aspects of tradition can be maintained that either do not impede or are directly conducive to attaining development. But equally, only those aspects of Western society that were conducive to development should be adopted. The adoption of Western ways by African youths was considered so deplorable not simply because they were abandoning their traditional heritage, but more specifically because they were abandoning that heritage in favour of those aspects of the West that, according to the concept of development, were not supposed to make it to 'modernity' – namely, values that were associated with self-seeking, materialistic individualism.

Not surprisingly given this development-orientation, the schools soon reacquired the modern bias for which they had been criticised. While Hanson and Brembeck, (1966: 309-310) argued that schools were seen as the “intersection point between the traditional and the modern” this is not to be seen as a synthesis of the two but rather as a stepping stone from one to the other: “schools in the developing countries represent the modern elements in the societies. They tend to teach modern rather than traditional values, and
Schooling was made more 'relevant' to the indigenous culture, but in practice this was in order to make modernity seem more acceptable, as not so great a leap from the traditional world. Thus as we saw with the political modernisation theorists' attempts to incorporate an active developing people into the theory of development, education policy could ultimately not be about creating truly active participants but rather about creating people who would be more able to adapt to the demands of a development process that was necessarily beyond them. Section II.7 will return to education policy, looking at the approach pursued by UNESCO today and finding that it too, although it attempts to create active citizens, in fact produces reactive citizens. It will also explore how education conceptualised according to the idea of progress might form truly active individuals.

I.10 – Conclusion

We can see, at the end of Part I, why development defies definition. Sustainable development, equitable development, human development, economic growth: there are as many definitions of development as there are ends toward which society might be directed. The first half of this thesis has sought to identify something that gives the idea of development its distinctive contours but in no two approaches takes exactly the same shape. We found a more substantive conception of social change in which development is not desired as an end in itself, as it was in the idea of progress, but as a temporary and often unpleasant means to a higher end. The aim of development was to free people from the economic problem; a prerequisite in pursuit of their true end: the development of the higher faculties. The idea of development was originally a vision not of the West for others to follow but for the West. At its beginning is Mill's insistence that true individual self-development must involve the use of one's higher faculties. Running through development thinking is the Marshallian conception of scarcity as applicable only to 'natural' wants, and his vision of a society in which those wants would be satiated, and mankind as a whole would be free to pursue true self-development. Keynes made more explicit the short-sightedness and corruption of those who had not yet reached this exalted stage, and emphasised the need for Society to wrest development from the hands of irrational forces within and without. When Keynes argued that rational individual action was in fact socially irrational, the tenuous link between progress and development was cut.
The post-war development theorists whom we encountered in the second half of Part I had, as Gerschenkron (1952[1962]: 6) put it, grown modest. They no longer sought to “announce to the world what inevitably should, or at least what ideally should, happen.” But they inherited this vision of development. They looked back on the 19th century and its idea of progress with utter disdain, believing as they did that if the corresponding policies were enacted, the present inequality between rich and poor nations would only widen. What was needed, they believed, was a worldwide effort to achieve what the Western nations had been trying to do domestically. Having grown modest, however, they were well aware that the developed nations could not simply impose alien institutions and policies. If development was to occur, the developing people would have to be brought back into the process of development – a process from which they had been excluded, the modernisation theorists believed, by the old understanding of progress.

From the Keynesian perspective, from the perspective of the concept of development, the concept of progress left social change and with it people to the mercy of unguided, uncontrollable (market) forces. The likes of Wilhelm von Humboldt certainly would not have seen things that way – and, for the most part, neither would Mill and Marshall. Quite the opposite: for them, true development could only be driven by rational individual action. Where Mill and Marshall depart from Humboldt is in their treatment of 'barbarians' and the Residuum. Due to their more substantive conception of social change, neither deemed these lowest groups capable of that rational action by which the rest of society was able to produce development. It is this type of analysis, however, that forms the basis of development thinking. We argued in the section on Keynes that by removing the rational individual from its role as instigator of social change – that is, by disassociating the individually rational from the socially rational – Keynes in effect applied the analysis of the Residuum to the whole of society. Society could not, by its own unguided efforts, produce development outcomes.

It was argued that this culminates in what we called call, after Georg Simmel's essay on 'The concept and tragedy of culture', the tragedy of development. For Simmel, all progressive growth must involve forces that emerge both from within and without the individual. Self-development, or cultivation, is not just inner development (a seed growing into a wild tree) nor just external development (a tree trunk turned into ship's mast); rather, it is a combination of the two (a seed cultivated into orchard tree): The two aspects – internal and external – must fit with one another. However, in development
theory, the internal and external logics are separated by Keynes' removal of the rational individual from development. While both progress and development involve internal and external motive forces, it is the peculiar feature of development thinking that the two are in some sense seen as originally divided. Hence there is a need to integrate them somehow, to fit these opposing forces into a single mould. For Mill and Marshall, presupposing a society largely consisting of rational individuals, this reconciliation could in principle happen automatically, or at least with only a little prodding. For Keynes, who had little confidence in the progressive power of individuals, 'society' would have to become aware of its own social change if that change was to be positive. Development is self-conscious social change.

Following the evolution of development theory into the post-war era, we argued that thinking in terms of the concept of development leads to a contradiction when one is called upon to put people first in development: development, if it is to be worthy of the positive connotations of that term, must be about people; yet the people themselves are not considered capable of producing social change worthy of the name development. Thus if social change is to proceed correctly – that is, according to the needs of the developing people – the developing people must remain remote from the process of development. The attempt to fit the developing people into a process of development that by its own assumptions excludes them, can be seen as the formative principle of development theory as it emerged in the post-war era. We have also seen how this theoretical struggle was similarly present in a major policy area: education. There too, one can see that practitioners recognised the inability of an existing external force – the modern institutional school, focused on development – to produce a modern, developed society. As was the case with the political modernisation school, we saw how genuine attempts to solve this problem, which here involved adjusting the school to local needs, ultimately reacquired the characteristics for which the new approach had criticised the old.

Thus the problems of development do not lie in its ethnocentrism – even in modernisation theory, surely the most pro-Western of approaches – and moving the field beyond its past failures must involve more than remedying this aspect. In order to re-think the internal-external problem it must be possible to avoid the dichotomy present in development thinking which says that social change is either deliberate (self-conscious) or unguided
(unconscious). In the next half of the thesis it will be argued that escaping the tragedy of development must involve reclaiming the active individual removed by Keynes. It will be argued that by doing so it is possible to think of positive social change as something that happens 'consciously,' and in the act look at the internal-external problem in a new light. The basis for this will be the concept of progress, from which development was initially differentiated.
Part II – Social Change as Progress

“And so I hold it is no treason
To advance this simple reason
For the sorry lack of progress we decry.
It is this: instead of working
On himself, each man is shirking
And trying to reform some other guy.”
– Author unknown,
cited in Read (1980: 52)

“Obey time; do everything what the day calls for; do not be obstinate in keeping up what is collapsing, or too hasty in establishing what seems to announce itself. Remain faithful to justice, which belongs to all ages; respect liberty, which prepares every sort of good; let many things develop without you, and leave to the past its own defence, to the future its own accomplishment.”
– Benjamin Constant (1815[1988]: 157)

II.1 – Introduction
So far in this thesis we have been looking at the conceptualisation of social change, particularly as it concerns the relationship between the internal and external aspects of change. Both are necessary for genuine growth, and, as mentioned in the Introduction, this thesis takes for granted that at least part of the external will consist in something already achieved or aspired to in the West. The great problem confronted by development theorists has been to reconcile the internal and external motive forces. In Part I it was argued that the concept of development, because it understands positive social change as something that happens self-consciously – in the sense that it posits that ‘society’ must take charge of its own growth – separates the two. The motifs of development come from the outside, formulate with reference to an end that does not fit the internal spirit. These motifs can be attached to a developing society but struggle to contribute, in the way intended, to its ‘development.’ While the modern institutional school, for example, did not fully fit African societies it was incorporated into those societies, interpreted and used in a way that conformed to the lifeways of the people involved, but it did not produce the
desired form of change. Development has its ways of trying to solve this problem – this is what mainstream development theory as it emerged in the post-war era is about. Development policies can be made more rational and efficient; the developing society itself can be made more adaptable to the demands of development; development policies can attempt to better approximate the developing society. But there remains the disconnect between how social change ought to proceed, according to development, and how it would proceed without the input and guidance of development policy. Thus the external products of development come to take on the appearance of an imposition with no genuine connection to the developing society. Development theory, with its focus on liberation, empowerment, and taking control of one's destiny, cannot abide this situation, leading to renewed attempts to bring 'the people' of the developing society back in to development. Development's raison d'etre as people-focused social change means it cannot ignore the problem, but its substantive conception of the social makes the problem ever-present.

Part I will have hopefully contributed to a re-assessment of development theory away from caricatures portraying post-war development theory as an arrogant and blindly optimistic 'big tradition.' That interpretation sought not to absolve the post-war modernisation theory of its sins, but rather to alter our understanding of what it is in that approach that must be critically reconsidered if the field is to meaningfully move 'beyond the impasse.' The problem with the concept of development as a way of conceptualising social change is that while it does not ignore the importance of the motive forces internal to developing people (though it often stands accused of this), it cannot truly reconcile the internal and external because it cannot trust the developing people to move toward the end it has in mind. There is always an external object that seems more objectively perfect, from the higher vantage point of the developed, than any alternative visible to the developing. What an alternative to the concept of development would need (at least) is to be able account for how the internal and external forces, conceptually separated in development, can be reconciled – not reconciled after the fact, as development theories try to do, but from the beginning. This second part of the thesis attempts to contribute to this by putting forward a re-assessment of the internal-external problem. It rejects the idea that this should be considered the 'original' problem of social change, arguing that it appears so only according to social-change-as-development. Instead it uses primarily the work of German philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1923; 1932; 1942; 1944; 1946) to argue that
the division of internal and external is something to be found rather than overcome. In so
doing it tries to move us beyond the dichotomies set up by development theory,
particularly that between self-conscious (intentional, teleological) and unconscious
(unintentional, blind) social change, pointing instead to a 'conscious' social change based
on the re-assessment of the internal-external problem and arguing that the concept of
progress, from which development was initially differentiated, can provide a basis for this
understanding of social change.

The argument proceeds as follows. The first section will use Part I to detail the alternative
development from the perspective of the concept of development itself, demonstrating
that its 'self-conscious' social change is contrasted with an 'unconscious' alternative.
Sections II.3 and II.4 consider and reject two attempts to rethink development – post-
development, which gives primacy to the internal, and the recent literature on hybridity,
which seeks a middle-ground. Section II.5 argues that what is in fact needed is to reclaim
the active individual removed by Keynes. It argues that by focussing on the individual as
the mediator of the internal and the external, the societal-level teleology that characterises
the concept of development can be dropped without fear that social change would be
blind. Rather, social change can be analysed as something that is individually
teleological. Moreover, the future-orientation of development can be replaced by a
present-orientation without fear of conservatism. The next section argues that the concept
of progress can form a theoretical foundation for this understanding of social change,
making this case with reference to eighteenth century theorists of progress such as
Ferguson, Hutcheson, Condorcet, and Humboldt. Section II.7 applies this to education
policy, contrasting the future-orientation of modern education for development with the
present-orientation of the proposed education for progress. In so doing it elaborates on the
function of the active individual. The final section explores and addresses some of the
implications as well as potential difficulties and critiques that would accompany applying
this type of education in the modern world.

II.2 – The Alternative to Development

In the first half of the thesis we saw how alongside the debates within development
studies – about the problem of the disassociation of people and process – there was a
continued reinforcement of the distinctive identity of social-change-as-development.
While there was no longer a prominent alternative to development such as the idea of
progress had represented, the basis upon which the two were initially differentiated was still how development studies justified its existence. Now contrasted with the perceived selfishness, materialism, and Darwinism of classical liberalism in general and the nineteenth century's experience with social change in particular, modernisation theorists were concerned at the appearance of these characteristics as developing nations sought to adopt Western ways. They believed it necessary to protect the developing world from this internal Eurocentrism, lest they experience the same slow, halting, and painful development of the West. Thus development theory saw itself as the guide and guardian of a cooperative endeavour of striving toward a developed world for all – a striving that both the popularly-called developed and underdeveloped countries are part of. By contrast, the alternative form of social change has been ascribed at least four key characteristics since Mill and Marshall distinguished their approach from the idea of progress. They are the opposite of those given to social-change-as-development: the Other is selfish/materialistic, Darwinian, Eurocentric, and conservative/cynical. This is the 'unconscious' social change that is set up by development theorists as the alternative to the 'self-conscious' social change promised by development. The present section will utilise the analysis of Part I to enunciate these characteristics in greater detail.

The primary and overriding characteristic of the conceptualisation of social change from which development is attempting to distinguish itself from is its selfish and materialistic impulses. In all four periods in which this process of 'othering' was dominant, the then existing form of social was presented by development theorists as being solely motivated by selfishness and materialism. In Alfred Marshall this is evident in how he contrasts nineteenth century capitalism with his ideal of economic chivalry, which is to the existing competitive system what the chivalric code was to medieval warfare:

“Chivalry in business includes public spirit, as chivalry in war includes unselfish loyalty to the cause of a prince, or of country, or of crusade. But it includes also a delight in doing noble and difficult things because they are noble and difficult. ... It includes a scorn for cheap victories, and a delight in succoring those who need a helping hand. It does not disdain the gains to be won on the way, but it ... esteems [them] mainly for the sake of the achievements to which they testify, and only in the second degree for the value at which they are appraised in the money of the market.” (1907[1925]: 330-1)
Competitive capitalism had carried civilisation as far as it could, but the individualistic and self-interested impulses it had unleashed and legitimised and which formed the basis of its success now prevented the emergence of a higher civilisation. The “sordid natures” of the money-obsessed nineteenth century businessman would have to be overcome, so that they would learn to play the game for lower stakes. Then, the profits spent on the vanity of the businessman - “which contributes very little towards social progress” - could be spent on the masses:

“[T]here is a general agreement among thoughtful people ... that if society could award the same honour, position, and influence by methods less bland and less wasteful; and if it could at the same time maintain all that stimulus which the free enterprise of the strongest business man derives from present conditions, then the resources thus set free would open out to the mass of the people new possibilities of a higher life, and of larger and more varied intellectual and artistic activities.” (1907[1925]: 325)

Only if this economic chivalry could be taught to the populace could England “flourish under private enterprise.” Then and only then could “some other civilization than that which we can now conceive ... take the place of that which now exists. It may, of course, be higher.” (1907[1925]: 346) Marshall recognises that his higher civilisation, in which the evils but not the prosperity of Western capitalism have been overcome, bears some resemblance to the future society envisaged by the collectivists of his day. But he makes clear that human nature is currently too corrupted by the existing system for any revolutionary change in the social order to succeed: “There is unfortunately no good ground for thinking that human nature is yet far enough from its primitive barbarity, selfishness, and sloth to be ready for any [rapid] movement in this direction...” (1925: 366). A gradual improvement in human nature would be required to reach Marshall’s ideal society. Marshall believed that there was greater potential for unselfish service than many realised, and it was “the supreme aim of the economist ... to discover how this latent social asset can be developed most quickly, and turned to account most wisely.” (1920: I.I.23)

Like Marshall, Keynes saw selfishness and materialism at the heart of social change as it existed. He argued that the ruling passion in the individualistic, capitalist society in which he lived was the 'money motive', which he described as a 'somewhat disgusting morbidity'
and a 'semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensity' which should be handed over to 'the specialists in mental disease.' He agreed with Marshall that the 'game' of capitalism ought to be played for lower stakes than at present – that true social progress would require society to overcome all that condoned and encouraged self-seeking activity (1936[1960]: 374). Keynes described the moral problems of present society as: love of money; the dominance of the money motive; individual economic security as the highest good; the 'hoarding instinct' as the means of providing for one's family. He saw in Soviet Russia the "first confused stirrings" of a non-supernatural social religion which would finally condemn these immoralities, a social experiment which "tries to construct a framework of society in which pecuniary motives as influencing action shall have a changed relative importance, in which social approbations shall be differently distributed, and where behaviour which was previously normal and respectable ceases to be either one or the other." (1925b[1963]: 305, 302).

In the post-war era too we find that the argument for 'development' rests in part on a portrayal of social change as otherwise being based on selfishness and materialism. David Apter, for example, warned that an unplanned social change effected by private entrepreneurs would result in mounting "social dysfunctionalities". This is because people would be concerned with their own interests rather than the wider social consequences of their activities. It would be "at best a gambler's environment in which planning for the game takes second place to the overall consideration of winning." (1971: 197) According to Arthur Lewis, who was one the few modernisation theorists to write an explicitly normative justification of economic growth, counted increased 'economism' and 'individualism' among the costs of growth, arguing that both would have to be limited if the desired benefits were to materialise (1955: Appendix). More recently, a UNESCO report on citizenship education argued that a deliberate inculcation of civic virtues was necessary because existing society is characterised by "a lack of cohesive spiritual and social values, and unrestricted acquisitiveness ...; this ruling social passion is tied to a peculiar conception of 'freedom,' one shaped by highly individualist perceptions and impulses around crass indifference and materialism." (Howe and Marshall, 1999: 11)

The second characteristic of the threatening Other is a societal-level consequence of the selfish individual-level motivations guiding social change: it is presented as Darwinian, in the sense that the weak are left to the mercy of the strong who are set free to act on these
selfish and materialistic impulses. John Stuart Mill, for example, referred to the liberalism of his father as 'cold and uncaring' and characterised the society it had brought into being as one of “trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels” (1848: IV: VI). Marshall (1925: 361) accused the Ricardian economists of a 'narrow dogmatism' when it came to free competition, and argued that they had created a society in which competition had become a 'huge untrained monster' that they had set free to 'run its wayward course'. This “old-fashioned individualism and laissez-faire” was again characterised as a system of “economic anarchy” (Keynes, 1925c[1963]: 329, 335). Keynes identified the uncertainty and lack of direction inherent in the present system as the source of the problem, and proposed instead the economic activity ought to be guided by considerations of social justice rather than individual whim, which would only perpetuate the present inequalities. For this the world needed a “new wisdom for a new age” (1925c[1963]: 337) which he provided in his General Theory (1936[1960]).

The new wisdom was necessary because the old way had served to benefit the rich without providing them with an incentive to help the poor out of their vicious circle of poverty. Clearly it would not do for those who saw themselves as helping the poorer nations out of their present economic misery. The approach of the “darwinist nineteenth century” was no longer acceptable (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943: 204). Post-war development theorists were particularly suspicious of the operation of the international economic system, where the economic anarchy that was being overcome within Western societies still reigned. Some had argued in the post-war era that the task of US foreign policy ought to be to recreate the world of nineteenth century Europe. But most modernisation theorists set themselves explicitly against the free trade liberalism of that era. It was believed that “the working of capitalism would maintain the same unequal world division of labour as has previously been enforced by imperial might” (Toye, 2006: 829). Walt Rostow, reflecting on the motives of those who denied this, concluded that most simply did not care about the future of poorer nations (Rostow, 1984: 245-7). David Apter saw the international system a “hit and miss, private and public pattern of manipulative and exploitative aid” which, despite the best efforts of multilateral agencies, rendered it “essentially hostile” (1971: 204n, 46). He described it as “the repugnant purveyor of anti-humanism” (1971: 201). It was not 'development,' for, as Thomas Balogh (1966[1974]: 130) put it, its defenders “decried the motives of deliberately helping the poor” and would leave them to their fate as the plaything of powerful market
forces. True development policies would have to protect the poor from the selfish and materialistic impulses that still existed.

A third characteristic of the threatening Other is that it is Eurocentric. It is presented as being derived in theory from the Western experience and imposed in practice as a template for the non-Western world to follow. Alfred Marshall (1890[1925]: 257-8), for example, accused the Ricardian economists' support for free trade of being based on an unwarranted universalisation of the English experience. And post-war development theorists argued that people like P.T. Bauer were promoting "a projection for the whole world of a conception of change that was believed, erroneously, to be true of the societies of Western Europe" (Black, 1966:7). Today, we are quite used to hearing that the old approaches to and theories of development – from colonialism to post-war modernisation to neoliberalism – were Eurocentric. Yet the unquestioned acceptance of this account obscures the fact that those development theorists saw themselves as providing a bulwark against Eurocentrism. Thus Daniel Lerner wrote his The Passing of Traditional Society (1958[1966]) in opposition to existing methods of development which he believed sought to impose Western models on non-Western societies. Despite the title of his book, Lerner did not believe that development was a process of the Traditionals gradually coming to accept the ideals and institutions of the modern, Westernised elites, asserting that "[t]here is no uniform Tomorrow just as there was no single Yesterday" (1958[1966]: 74). For society and its institutions to change in compatible ways the gulf between modern and traditional would have to be bridged. This could be achieved neither by the Traditionals, nor the Westernised Moderns. To Lerner, both were ‘relatively static,’ and neither could produce social change that would be compatible with the ‘personality matrix’ of the other. The Moderns were trying to provide the developing society with an impulse that was completely external to it, while the Traditionals clung on to their society's old ways. The future lay with a class Lerner named the ‘Transitionals,’ who seek new channels of their own design that the already-modern elites fail to provide for them. They are the middle class that unites top and bottom, interpreting and adapting foreign models and influences in a way that is acceptable to their own preconceptions and relevant to the challenges faced by their own society (1958[1966]: 101; 410).

Later theorists took a similar view: that the Western experience was useful in a very broad sense, but that developing countries must decide for themselves which parts to
adopt, adapt, and reject. They must "have the wisdom to distinguish between the
generally applicable functions of modernity and the institutional forms derived from alien
traditions..." (Black, 1966:97). The modernisation theorists were far more clear and in far
greater agreement about which aspects of the West ought to be rejected than which ought
to be adapted or adopted by the developing nations. The latter were largely at the
discretion of the particular developing nation; the former were threatening to social-
change-as-development wherever it occurred. To be rejected were of course the values
and practices associated with social change that was not development – represented again
by selfishness and materialism. Throughout the modernisation literature these are
presented as constant dangers of the development process; they could be kept in check
with the help of the knowledge created by development theorists. Modernisation theorists
argued that this threatening Other would, if it wasn't for the protection afforded by the
development industry, sweep away all valued patterns of life that were not conducive to
growth. Development theorists and practitioners have always seen it as part of their task
to protect indigenous peoples and cultures from destruction by the pernicious influence of
Western ways of life. As we saw above, one of the costs of economic growth identified
by Arthur Lewis (1955: Appendix) was an increase in 'economism' and individualism. If
these were set free, as they would be without proper development policies, a country's
'valued patterns of life' would be threatened from within, by an *internal* Eurocentrism.
These individualistic Western values led young people to abandon their fragile traditional
villages and cultures to seek white-collar jobs in the cities. This educated urban minority
was regarded as self-seeking and materialistic, and disruptive of attempts to promote
community and national development. Disconnected from their traditions, these displaced
persons could not hope to be the engine of true development.

Finally, the alternative to development is conservative of the existing system, with all its
inequalities and miseries, and cynical of the possibility of promoting change. Alfred
Marshall criticised the Ricardian economists for unduly limiting the role of the state.
Under them, *laissez-faire* was “twisted to mean: - Let government keep up its police, but
in other matters fold its hands and go to sleep” (1907[1925]: 334). According to Marshall
(1907[1925]: 335) it was John Stuart Mill who had first challenged this: “*Mill had seen a
vast increase in the probity, the strength, the unselfishness, and the resources of
Government during his life; and it seems that each succeeding decade had enlarged the
scope of those interventions of Government for the promotion of general well-being.” The
state was now more able to determine where it could do good, and had the resources and public-spiritedness to put its schemes effectively into practice for the common good.

“Thus we can now safely venture on many public undertakings which a little while ago would have been technically unworkable or which would have probably been perverted by the selfish and corrupt purposes of those who had the ear of government.” The selfish world created by the Ricardian economists was – due to its own success – being overcome, such that society could now deliberately work towards a common good. “So I cry 'Laissez-faire: - Let the State be up and doing.'” (1907[1925]: 336)

Yet for to Keynes, the watchwords of the British government in his day remained “Negation, Restriction, Inactivity. ... Under their leadership we have been forced to button up our waistcoats and compress our lungs. Fears and doubts and hypochondriac precautions are keeping us muffled up indoors” (1929[1963]: 125). Keynes' new wisdom required a more optimistic outlook: “There is no reason why we should not feel ourselves free to be bold, to be open, to experiment, to take action, to try the possibilities of things. And over against us, standing in the path there is nothing but a few old gentlemen tightly buttoned-up in their frock coats, who only need to be treated with a little friendly disrespect and bowled over like ninepins” (1929[1963]: 125). Modernisation theorists similarly argued that the old way was too “slow [and] halting” and “unlikely to be satisfying” (Pearson, 1970: 7; Singer, 1949). Like Marshall and Keynes they presented themselves as occupying a middle-ground between the unguided social change envisaged by liberal economists such as P.T. Bauer, and the revolutionary social change advocated by socialists. The former would maintain the status quo, the latter would not produce lasting, stable change. Thus according to Rostow: “The central task of an effective political leader consists in narrowing the gap between the status quo and the theoretical optimum dynamic political equilibrium position, without destroying the leader’s underlying basis of political support or the constitutional system itself...” (1971: 25).

In conclusion, development theory defines itself in opposition to an alternative form of social change to which it ascribes threatening and undesirable characteristics: selfishness, materialism, individualism, Eurocentrism, social Darwinism, cynicism. This form of social change is presented as what would exist without the protection of the development industry. As Rostow claimed with respect to the development industry's work on the international scene: “in an inherently divisive, world, with ample capacity to generate
international violence, institutionalized development aid has been perhaps the strongest tempering force, quietly at work, giving some operational meaning to the notion of a human community with serious elements of common interest” (1984: 258). Development is of course a form of social change that is the opposite of these things. It is motivated by altruism, not selfishness; community spirit, not individualism; normative values, not crass materialism; concern for the poor, not social Darwinism; it respects traditional cultures, rather than simply imposing Western ways; and it is optimistic, not cynical. In short, it helps people rather than leaving them to their fate. Development is society becoming aware of it its own change and taking control of its destiny. How can its alternative be anything other than unconscious: haphazard and directionless? The next three sections will consider alternatives from outside the development paradigm. First, a prominent alternative to development in post-development; then, hybridity, an emerging approach. Finally in section II.5 it will be argued that with the help of the active individual we can find an alternative to the self-conscious social change of development not in 'unconsciousness' but in a 'conscious' understanding of social change.

II.3 – Beyond the Tragedy of Development I: Post-Development

According to Kothari and Minogue (2002: 7), post-development differs from conventional critiques of development in that it focuses on the basic concepts underlying the development discourse: “Our starting point, which diverges from that of those who analyze the failure of development in terms of factors external to the ideas/concepts of development, is that the problems of development theory and practice are firmly located within the dominant, almost universal ideologies that have long been shaped and continue to inform development theory, policy, and practice.” Development promotes a vision of reality that purports to be universal but is in fact peculiar to the West. The peoples of the Third World must reclaim their own histories and lifeways by removing the dead hand of development theory and practice. By doing so they would cease to be the object of development theory and become instead the subjects of their own story. However, the reader will recall from previous sections of this thesis that modernisation theorists considered the adaptation of general theories and experiences of development to particular contexts vital if people and their institutions were to modernise together. In this section it will be argued that by not fully appreciating this post-development fails to move us beyond development. The source of this failure will be found not in the content of the critique but in the rhetorical strategy used to effect the desired change. By portraying
Western knowledge as a rigid form imposed upon a relatively passive Third World, the post-development critique does disservice both to the modernisation theorists and to the Third World itself. Indeed, in the critiques of the most influential post-development theorists the Third World appears more passive and more helpless than ever, and the dichotomies they found at the heart of mainstream development more rigidly divided.

The focus in Edward Said's influential *Orientalism* (1978[1995]), for example, is on how the discourse of Orientalism is *produced* and *imposed* rather than how it is received or interpreted or adapted in the Orient itself. Said, we saw above, criticised Orientalism for being exterior to its object – the Orient. The Orientalist is always “outside the Orient, both as an existential and moral fact” (1978[1995]: 21). This exteriority allows Orientalists to view their object as an object, as a thing to be observed, analysed, categorised, and judged. According to Said, this type of knowledge is governed by the assumption that the Orient cannot represent itself. In the act of knowledge production, Orientalism created an Orient that was “silent, available to Europe for the realization of projects that involved but were never responsible to the native inhabitants, and unable to resist the projects, images, or mere descriptions devised for it” (1978[1995]: 94). The aim was to create an Orient where “'we' might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for those lesser people to follow” (1978[1995]: xiii). In critiques such as Said's, the production of a discourse under conditions of unequal power seems to imply the complete passivity of the weaker party. Mohanty called this the 'colonialist move,' which “entails specific constructions of the colonial/Third World subject in/through discourse in ways that allow the exercise of power over it” (in Escobar, 1996: 9). The discourse of development is constructed in the West with no influence from outside it, either in theory or in practice. Orientalism, argued Said, merely seeks to confirm the prejudices of the reader rather than overturn old prejudices, such that in hundreds of years of Orientalist discourse it is “Western ignorance that becomes more refined and complete, not some body of positive Western knowledge which increases in size and accuracy” (1978[1995]: 62-65). Empirical data thus plays a very small role in the production of the discourse: the discourse merely refers to and reproduces itself.

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2 Incidentally, the source Said uses to back up this remarkable claim actually affirms the complete opposite. R.W. Southern's *Western Views of Islam* (1962) concludes: “Was there any progress [in Christian knowledge of Islam]? I must express my conviction that there was.”
However, that one can produce knowledge in a way that makes the domination and manipulation of the object possible does not imply that one actually ought to dominate and manipulate, nor does it imply that the knowledge must be interpreted as making domination and manipulation possible. Yet for Said the two are necessarily inseparable: Orientalism does not merely express a will to dominate the Orient, it is that will. The knowledge that constructs the Orient as silent and passive is thus intertwined with imperialistic practices which both act on Orientalist knowledge and confirm it. In Said, the Orient is no more capable of resisting or adapting Western practices in the Orient itself than it is of resisting or adapting the knowledge produced far away in the West. Thus he writes that since Napoleon the Orient “has been made and remade countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the Orient's nature, and we must deal with it accordingly” (1978[1995]: 65). The non-Western world is silent and helpless in the theory they critique, but in the critique it also becomes silent and helpless in practice. This seems odd from a critique that wanted to question the West's view of itself as the source of agency. Scholars such as Said and Escobar uncover dichotomies and power relations underlying the development discourse, but they remain eternal and fixed. Instead of destroying or moving beyond development's dichotomies, they switch the sides associated with good and bad – a process Hicks (2004) has termed 'reversing Thrasymachus' after the Greek philosopher who asserted that might makes right. On Hicks' analysis, that assertion simply becomes 'might makes wrong': the West remains the sole source of agency, but its role is maleficent rather than beneficent. The post-development critique mirrors its object. This, we would argue, was a deliberate strategy adapted from Foucault.

For Foucault the passive Third World of the post-development critique would not be a power relationship in the way he understands the term. “If one or the other were completely at the disposition of the other and became his thing, an object on which he can exercise an infinite and unlimited violence, there would not be relations of power. In order to exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least a certain form of liberty” (Foucault, 1987: 123). Power relations are human relations, and although the aim is to influence the behaviour of the other their key feature is that they are “changeable, reversible, and unstable.” For both subjects there is the possibility of altering the relationship, and neither has the ability to unconditionally direct the behaviour of the other. However, “[I]t seems to me that we must distinguish the
relationships of power as strategic games between liberties – strategic games that result in the fact that some people try to determine the conduct of others – and the states of domination, which are what we ordinarily call power.” These states of domination are power relations in which power has become solidified on one side in such a way that the relationship is “perpetually asymmetrical.” It is the task of philosophy to prevent this hardening of power relations (Foucault, 1987: 130, 123).

Foucault once said he had “never written anything but fictions.” (1980: 193) The standard interpretation of this is that Foucault dramatises a world that he believes is in fact infiltrated with solidified power relations and bio-power. However, Johnson (1997) and Hoy (1986) have both argued that Foucault was actually following a “rhetorical strategy of exaggeration aimed at establishing a critical perspective from which he assesses modern social and political arrangements” (Johnson, 1997: 574). For them, Foucault's fictions are deliberate misrepresentations, depicting a world fully permeated by the states of domination he would have us struggle against. In reading his genealogies, says Foucault (1979: 139), “we must seek not a meaning, but a precaution.” His fictions are dystopias, serving as a warning of what is to come if we do not recognise certain types of power relations for what they are. Writes Hoy (1986: 14): “Foucault paints the picture of a totally normalized society not because he believes our present society is one, but because he hopes we will find the picture threatening. He could hope for this effect on us only if we have not been completely normalized.” Thus by exaggerating the extent to which our society is characterised by states of domination rather than fluid relationships of power, Foucault's critique attempts to alert the reader to the processes of solidification. It is only when power relations become states of domination that they become normatively undesirable. No power relationship itself, however, is inherently undesirable; that would imbue the relationship with the type of fixed essence that Foucault believes do not exist. Nor is the problem an inequality of power. Rather, the issue is an inequality of power that is fixed on one side of the relationship. So long as the balance of power remains fluid, the relationship can be reciprocal. Thus on the teacher-student relationship he says:

“I don’t see where evil is in the practice of someone who, in a given game of truth, knowing more than another, tells him what he must do, teaches him, transmits knowledge to him, communicates skills to him. The problem is rather to know how you are to avoid
in these practices – where power cannot not play and where it is not evil in itself – the effects of domination which will make a child subject to the arbitrary and useless authority of a teacher, or put a student under the power of an abusively authoritarian professor, and so forth.” (1987: 129)

Similarly for concepts such as madness. Foucault does not claim that madness does not exist, or that the existence of the concept reveals the power of the not-mad over the mad: “It was a question of knowing how madness, under the various definitions that we could give it, could be at a certain moment, integrated in an institutional field which considered it a mental illness, occupying a certain place alongside other illnesses” (1987: 128). Madness has been linked to institutions and practices of power, but it is not the same as them. Revealing the power relations underlying a certain conceptualisation of madness does not, for Foucault, undermine the validity or efficacy of psychiatry. Rather, it shows us how a particular definition of the borders of madness came into being and how it is maintained. Consistent with the Foucauldian strategy, post-development does not deal with its object of critique on its own terms. It does not say in any detail that modernisation or neoliberalism were incorrect as theories. Writes Escobar: “The aim ... is not to decide whether the early development economists were right or wrong, but to develop a historical, epistemological, and cultural awareness of the conditions under which they made their choices” (1996: 58). For Foucault, this style of critique would attempt to undermine the processes by which a certain definition of a concept comes to be regarded as 'natural,' or by which a power relationship solidifies.

The use Said and Escobar had in mind for Foucault's critical strategy, however, is subtly different: for them, the very existence of developmental concepts is evidence of the power of the West over the non-West (e.g. Escobar, 1996: 8-9) and consequently they wanted to abolish the development discourse. Where Foucault wanted us to question the definitions we regard as natural and fixed, the aim of post-development was to have us question the definitions of development concepts but as a direct consequence of that questioning to reject certain definitions from the bounds of acceptable discourse. More specifically, the definitions of Western capitalist society were not permitted to enter the future conversation that would shape the post-developmental world.

This explains why post-development returned to the dichotomies it claimed to have
uncovered in the mainstream development discourse. For a Foucauldian analysis on its own would not imply anything about the validity, normative desirability, or chances of success of development theory and practice. It would provide no grounds for rejecting the development discourse – unless one could show that it involved a state of domination, that is, a fixed and therefore normatively undesirable power relationship. Rather than Foucault's cautionary tale of power relations solidifying into states of domination, post-development's critique would have to claim to represent the reality of a world actually infiltrated with states of domination. Portraying the development discourse as a state of domination requires antagonistic, incommensurable, monolithic entities. Thus the relationship between West and non-West would have to be fixed and rigid rather than changeable and fluid – it had to be inextricably linked with imperialism, racism, and so on. It had to be shown to be constant over time – the longer the better. Its origins had to be in an expression of Western power over the non-Western world, regardless of how it was conceived by the actual individuals involved. Western modernity could ultimately not be seen as one culture among many. It was portrayed instead as a culture inherently prone to the destruction of other cultures. Western capitalist society is, in Serge Latouche's (1989[1996]: ch.2) phrasing, an anti-culture.

Moreover, the development discourse itself could not just be something that has become linked with power in colonialism and racism and domination – implying that it could be de-linked – but something that is those things. They would have to be irreversibly built in to the development discourse. The development discourse could not just been seen as one discourse among many on the subject of social change. It had to be portrayed as an inherently imperialistic discourse that actively delegitimised other ways of thinking. Thus Escobar (1996: 5): “Reality ... had been colonized by the development discourse, and those who were dissatisfied with this state of affairs had to struggle for bits and pieces of freedom within it, in the hope that in the process a different reality could be constructed.” Just as Western culture is an anti-culture, so the development discourse is a conversation-stopping anti-discourse.

In this way the strategy of exaggeration, which was for Foucault just that – a strategy – becomes in post-development a constituent part of the critique, without which it could not hope to achieve its aim of bringing an end to the development discourse. This required portraying development as being part of a power relationship that was inherently and
significantly biased toward the dominant side. The power of the West over the Third World, through the development discourse, was thus exaggerated to the point that all agency is removed from the latter. The relationship itself is given, fixed, eternal. It cannot be modified, only destroyed.

It was argued in Part I that modernisation theorists did not see themselves as engaged in a one way street, with development knowledge being created in the West and implemented elsewhere by Western practitioners. Rather, it was explicitly recognised that any insights regarding the development process derived from the Western experience or created using Western categories would have to be adapted to particular contexts elsewhere. Moreover, it was the job of leaders in the developing nations to enact this process of adopting, adapting, or rejecting these insights. This is vitally important to the self-perception of development theorists, yet it is completely obscured in the post-development critique. The supreme power of the development discourse over the minds of individual theorists and practitioners means that, in the post-development critique, their identities and interests are finally reduced to those of one of the two monolithic universal categories that post-development finds at the heart of the problems of the development discourse: West and Third World. Where Foucault had said that a discourse becomes linked with institutions and practices of power, post-development, we saw, elides the two. What knowledge is created and how knowledge is used become conflated. Because the focus is a power relationship, post-development's critique is most interested in what power does with knowledge. Though it aims to analyse the relations between institutions, knowledge, socio-economic processes, technologies etc., there is often a failure to distinguish adequately between them. Everything is condensed into a single unit. The analysis of this unit is diverted toward the end user – power – and the individual elements are retrospectively judged based on this perception.

Starting and ending with the West-Rest dichotomy in this way strengthens it, as Said (1978[1995]: 46) himself pointed out in his critique of the working of the Orientalist discourse: “When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting points and the end points of analysis, research, public policy (as the categories were used by Balfour and Cromer), the result is usually to polarize the distinction – the Orient becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western – and limit the human encounter between cultures, traditions, and societies.” The oppositional nature of the post-
development strategy led them to approach those associated with post-war development in particular in a manner that Foucault may have described as polemical. For the polemicist, “the person he confronts [in a discourse] is not a partner in the search for the truth, but an adversary an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, the game does not consist of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak, but of abolishing him, as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be, not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth, but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning” (Foucault, 1984[1991]: 382). In post-development the development theorist cannot speak, having no intentions or motivations of their own, except as determined by the interests of the West in its relation with the developing world.

Although this rhetorical and reductionist side of post-development has been criticised, the criticism tends to be that it reduces all the various approaches to development theory and practice to the power of West over non-West. Interpreting approaches such as sustainable development and pro-poor growth based on the analysis modernisation theory and neoliberalism results, it is argued, in an unfair appraisal of the former: post-development did not appreciate the diversity of the development discourse. On the interpretation of this thesis this reduction to Western power is also a distortion of modernisation theory, yet the post-development critique is the basis upon which that much maligned approach is rejected. Post-development's insights that the modernisation approach homogenised the Third World, that it regarded development as inevitable, that the West was the telos of development – all of which we would reject – are now part of the consensus interpretation of post-war development theory and policy.

Thus according to Nederveen Pieterse (2001a: 8-22), modern development theory has been fundamentally homogenising and generalizing. “Those who declare themselves furthest advanced along its course claim privileged knowledge of the direction of change. Developmentalism is the truth from the point of view of the centre of power”. (2001a: 18) He writes: “The central thesis of developmentalism is that social change occurs according to a pre-established pattern, the logic and direction of which is known.” The theory is teleological – the destination is modernity, which is a universalisation of Western values and ways of life. “Modernization meant the adoption of 'Western' political institutions” or more precisely, those of “the American and French Revolutions,
updated in American discourse such that the United States emerges as the culmination of
the 'the West'.” Modernisation theory, moreover, was about American power: “What
Victorian anthropology was to the British Empire, modernization is to United States
hegemony – its justification, rationale and agenda.” Development, in the post-war years,
was the “ideologization” of the West's – or America's – own path of development. That
modernisation theory was fundamentally ideological – in the Marxist sense of a
rationalisation of certain structures and interests – is largely taken for granted. “Grand
theories have typically been fashioned in the West and therefore articulate Western
political interests and follow Western intellectual styles and priorities...” (cf. Mehmet,
1995[1999]).

Note that the aspects of the post-development critique that have entered the mainstream
discourse are those that we have broadly associated with the rhetorical strategy of the
critique. We argued above that things like the conceptualisation of poverty and education
in the development discourse were of greater concern: how those conceptualisations came
into being is in principle quite independent of the analysis of their real-world, present day
consequences. What makes a universal category bad for post-development it is the very
fact that it is universal, which is always a universalisation of the local. For post-impasse
theorists, on the other hand, what matters is precisely how the universal came into being.
Was it imposed unilaterally, or was it created pluralistically? Post-development, it is now
said, was correct in its assertion that the supposedly universal truths of Western capitalist
modernity were a “veil of Western ethnocentrism” but wrong to conclude that universals
therefore cannot exist. Rather, “the question of what is universal is to be posed anew, not
in Eurocentric but in polycentric ways” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001a: 30).

The end result is not a rejection of developmentalism but a disassociation from the
modernisation paradigm. The critique of development is accepted, but in a way that
allows it to be associated primarily with modernisation theory. This sets modernisation
theorising apart from post-impasse theorising, regardless of the policy outcome. Thus in
Nederveen Pieterse's (2012) distinction between 20th century and 21st century
globalisation it is the source of rational intention (the West, as identified by post-
development), rather than its existence, that was the problem in modernisation theory. In
the outdated, 20th century conception of development, he argues, “implicitly or explicitly,
development is thought of as an external intervention. The root paradigm is not 'we
"develop’ but ‘we develop it’. ” However, since the turn of the millennium a new development era has begun, which involves, among others, a “change in the agency of development from metropolitan institutions to developing countries, along with a shift in perspective from ‘we develop it’ to ‘we develop’” and a “pendulum swing from market forces back to developmental states” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2012: 7, 5). Of course, the developmental state is still conceived as rational force called upon to “steer, push, cajole, persuade, entice, coordinate and at times instruct the wide range of economic agents and their groupings to go this way instead of that, to do this and not that” (Leftwich, 2000: 7; 2005; 2008). Now, however, it is indigenous, as opposed to a development guided by Western technocrats. Is it, therefore, not internal to the developing society?

Yet this is not what Cowen and Shenton (1996) had in mind when they spoke of 'immanence'. The developmental state is not part of 'we develop'; rather, it lies at the very heart of 'we develop it'. For the idea of development, as was argued in Part I, did not originate in the West's relation with the rest of the world, but within itself. Development began with the state acting upon its own society; only later did it become associated with the West acting upon the non-Western world. It is precisely this focus, in post-development's critique, on the West versus non-West relationship that permits the impression that post-impasse development might have moved beyond the post-war modernisation era. It permits the conclusion that the problem with development in that era was the wrong kind of intention. Nederveen Pieterse's (2012: 7) interpretation of Cowen and Shenton's (1996) distinction between immanent and intentional development is symptomatic of this. His 'we develop' and 'we develop it' are both intentional; the difference between them is the source of the force attempting to provide rational direction. The implication, as we saw with political modernisation versus economic modernisation and economic modernisation versus the 'darwinian nineteenth century,' is that an intentional development that is truly concerned with people, rather than merely claiming to be so, is the answer.

How past development theorists actually saw their own role as knowledge-creators is, however, of little relevance to the post-development critique, except as it fits the West and non-West dichotomy. Consequently, post-development critics did not recognise how well the rhetorical part of their critique fit – rather than challenged – development's view of its self. The Foucauldian strategy was to produce threatening images of Westernised
social change – yet that is precisely how the concept of development was distinguished from the idea of progress. Their portrayal and assessment of Western modernity is more polemical but ultimately little different to that given by many modernisation theorists and by Mill, Marshall, and Keynes before them. Both sides agree that Western capitalist society is something to be overcome – the difference of opinion lies in whether it can and should be temporarily controlled for developmental purposes. As Frans Schuurman (2000: 19) put it, the task of development is to “re-establish its continued relevance to study and to understand processes of exclusion, emancipation and development – not particularly by clinging to its once cherished paradigms but by incorporating creatively the new Zeitgeist without giving up on its normative basis, i.e. the awareness that only with a universal morality of justice is there a future for humanity.”

To this task post-development was singularly ill-suited. It denies both the possibility of the universal normative basis of social-change-as-development and the possibility of intentional social change. Development studies has taken on board its critical insights, now recognising that “the rulebook for developing countries must be written at home, not in Washington” (Rodrik, 2008a). Similarly, “[t]he idea that there should be a single forward path and development model lies well behind us” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2012: 8). There is still a role for Western advisers, but they can only provide the ingredients, not the recipe. Scholars can sift through Western history to determine which aspects of it are universal and which the products of historical contingency, and developing nations must decide for themselves – within limits – what to adopt, adapt, and reject: a 'selective globalization' as Nederveen Pieterse puts it. The new development will ask what kind of growth, rather than pursuing growth for its own sake (2000: 12; Rodrik, 2008b).

These elements of the new development era – the need for the state to turn mere growth into development, the need for developing nations to be protected from Western economic and social influence, the fear that economic liberalism would perpetuate inequality domestically and globally, the recognition that Western values and models cannot be adopted wholesale, the need for those models to be adapted by the developing nation itself, the consequent role of Western advisers as conducive to rather than prescriptive of development – all these elements, we have argued, went into the production of modernisation theories. Post-development's critique of modernisation as no
more than a projection onto the rest of the world of Western values and history has hidden these aspects of that paradigm, allowing them to be brushed under the rug as having a 'disingenuous quality'. This incomplete picture of modernisation gives our present development era a sense of 'newness' that it does not deserve.

The next section turns to hybridity, an approach coming to development theory from peace studies that recognises the return to dichotomies problem contained in many alternatives to dominant liberal models. Instead it explicitly seeks a middle-ground, making it potentially attractive as a way of moving beyond the failures of twentieth century development without giving up on its normative aspirations.

II.4 – Beyond the Tragedy of Development II: Hybridity

Many existing critiques of the modernisation approach in particular have focused on its use of temporal metaphors such as 'catching up,' according to which the West is placed at the pinnacle of a linear path of development and the developing world is distant from it in time. Walter Mignolo, tracing time-according-to-development back to the colonial era, has called it a 'denial of coevalness.' That is, the act of denying that the underdeveloped world occupies the same point in time as the developed: to be modern and developed is to be in the present; to be traditional and underdeveloped is to be in past. That the West has been thought of as more advanced than other parts of the world is undeniable, but the idea that existing Western capitalist society or the means by which it came into existence are to be emulated does not come through in our reading of development theory's history. Instead we have argued that the key to understanding development theory lies in its conceptual separation of the internal and external forces of social change and its recognition that they must nevertheless be reconciled. This separation is spatial rather than temporal. This section will argue that spatial metaphors are limiting, as they fail to capture the mutual dynamism of the internal-external relationship. The argument shall be made with reference to hybridity, an emerging approach that seeks to overcome the dichotomous conceptions of the local and the international found in both proponents and critics of liberal peace and development interventions.

Hybridity scholars such as Mac Ginty (2010, 2011), Mac Ginty and Sanghera (2012), Richmond (2010, 2011), Johnson and Hutchison (2012), and Peterson (2012) speak of an emerging consensus on the inadequacies of “liberal models of externally led peace and
development assistance” as well as “a growing recognition that critiques of these models are also saddled with a number of their own limitations ... including their tendency to homogenise practices and impacts of aid and to offer only critique as opposed to alternatives” (Peterson, 2012: 9; Richmond, 2011). As with post-development, so with these critiques of liberal peace-building: Mac Ginty (2011: 6) argues that they “inflate its coherence and strength,” attributing to the liberal peace a static identity and the power to steamroller local alternatives or resistance. Thus peace-building remains an either-or proposition, a struggle between two separate and pure entities, namely, the romanticised, internal local and the demonised, external international. To escape this dichotomous thinking Mac Ginty et al propose 'hybridity,' which “is taken as the composite of social thinking and practice that emerge as the result of the interaction of different groups, practices and worldviews” (Mac Ginty, 2011: 8).

Most relevant to us, however, is that hybridity is explicitly concerned with how internal and external forces combine to produce an outcome which for the indigenous society is more than the grafting on of forms which, in Simmel’s words, “simply act like additions, as it were, that come from a sphere of values external to, and always remaining external to [it]” (Simmel, 1908[1997]: 57). Hybridity focusses the gaze on “the interface between the 'traditional, indigenous and customary' and internationally supported external peace and development operations” (Peterson, 2012: 10). These scholars contend that most if not all peaces are and should be understood as forms of 'hybrid peace,’ resulting not from the imposition of an alien form by external interveners nor solely the alternatives offered by indigenous actors, but from the negotiations and adaptations that emerge from the meeting of the two. Liberal peace agents never have things entirely their own way: they are not confronted with a blank slate upon which their model of peace can be written. Rather, the local population will, in various ways, “confront, resist, ignore, disobey, subvert, exploit, and string-along the liberal peace” (Mac Ginty, 2011: 10). Building on this, Mac Ginty (2011: 77-78) offers a four-part model of hybridity: 1) the ability of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures to compel other actors to follow its will; 2) the ability of the same to incentivise others to follow its will; 3) the ability of local actors, networks, and structures to resist, adapt, and reject the liberal peace; and 4) the ability of the same to offer alternatives or modifications to the liberal peace. Hybridity is the result of the interactions among the parts, which will of course be different in each peace intervention.
As a lens through which to view empirical phenomena hybridity offers some important benefits, which result in a broader and more nuanced perspective on peace interventions than offered by the international or local vantage points taken by themselves. By considering the interactions of internal and external actors it encourages us, for example, to recognise the diversity of both and to look beyond elite-level interactions. It helps us see the agency of external and internal actors as more than imposition and acquiescence respectively. It helps us see types of political order that do not conform to the liberal ideal – be they informal or simply non-liberal – as potentially important aspects of peace and reconciliation rather than subversive of it. Valuable insights for the analyst of peace interventions, but for many the true appeal of hybridity lies in its potential as a normatively desirable alternative model. Homi Bhabha is credited with popularising the concept, and since those early days in post-colonial thought hybridity has been hailed as a revolutionary and emancipatory way of looking at the interactions among powerful, developed, or colonising and less powerful, underdeveloped, or colonised cultures.

Scholars such Ivan Illich (1971: 60) and Esteva and Prakash (1998: 113) argued that one of the most pernicious effects of the development discourse was the mind-set it induced among the developing, a mind-set that suggested that they would have to passively wait for social services to be provided for them. Hybridity, one might argue, would counteract this by allowing people in developing nations to see the active role they have played and can continue to play, even in the face of powerful external actors. Conversely, those external actors would be forced to reconsider their own role, no longer arrogantly seeing themselves as bringers of political order to a society where none exists. Hybridity would mean emancipation from the homogenising imposition of liberal models of what political order and society ought to look like. Thus acting upon hybridity would, it is hoped, lead to contextual, hybrid alternatives to Western liberal models that would have remained invisible to external or internal actors looking at the world solely based on their own perspective.

For our present purposes the concept of hybridity and what it is trying to do – break down the dichotomy between external and internal actors – is certainly interesting. As an analytic lens it is very useful in certain situations, such as colonialism or peace interventions, where there is a clear case of an external actor stepping across borders,
however defined, and into another society to impose something on them. It makes sense in such cases to think of this internal-external divide in terms of such spatial metaphors – of discrete entities being 'internal' or 'external' relative to the borders of a given society.

Even in these narrow confines, however, there are limitations, and Peterson (2012: 18) has quite rightly called for a little more caution. She raises doubts, acknowledged by Mac Ginty and Sanghera (2012: 7), as to the extent to which the insights of hybridity will change practice. The history of development studies is littered with examples of potentially radical ideas reduced to buzzwords and then discarded: hybridity may go the same way. Thus Peterson (2012: 16) argues that the growing prevalence within the liberal peace discourse of 'hybrid peace operations,' 'local ownership,' and 'participation' “hint at the trend towards hybridisation as a badge worn by those seeking greater legitimacy.” Rather than a fundamentally new practice, hybridity becomes a label used to distance practitioners from “the charges of neo-colonialism and self-interest” – not unlike our argument in the previous section that the insights of post-development have been used by other theorists to distance themselves from the modernisation approach. Moreover, the optimism that characterises a good deal of the hybridity literature comes close to romanticising the hybrid, bringing with it the tendency to overlook issues such as the degree to which a hybrid outcome could be conservative of existing power relations rather than emancipatory. Thus Moss (2003) has questioned the utility of the concept on the grounds that its analyses still present us with two 'pure' entities interacting with each other, ignoring the inequalities and power relations within them.

These problems are exacerbated once we turn to the more complex problem of social change, and are joined by a few others. Although hybridity theorists often tack on 'and development' when writing about liberal peace interventions, the complexity of the former makes it quite different and limits the usefulness of hybridity as a tool for reconceptualising the internal-external relationship. These limitations stem from the spatial imagery which is used to conceptualise the relationship. The separation of the internal and external into distinct forces, effected by the concept of development, gives rise to spatial metaphors of separate entities meeting across a gap or border which must be elided if the two are to become reconciled. Viewing the relationship in this way has implications for who or what the internal and the external are conceived to be, which
affects the perception of the relationship between them and, as we shall see in the next section, implies a certain method for transcending their divide.

In the hybridity literature (e.g. Mac Ginty, 2011) internal and external are used interchangeably with local and international respectively. Both are either actors or structures, with hybridisation occurring in the contact zones between the two. In Mac Ginty's four-part model, the international actor attempts to intervene in the lives and structures of local actors with a certain model of peace in mind, to which local actors and structures respond in a variety of ways – resistance, modification, acceptance, and so on. Immediately we can see that we are dealing with two separate entities. Moss (2003) has argued that therefore hybridity still essentialises: within a given analysis it treats its two subjects as pure forms, even if it cautions us to recognise that they are in fact hybrids of hybrids themselves. The focus of an analysis of hybridisation is, understandably, on how two entities interact to create a hybrid rather than on the two entities themselves.

Depending on the case, this may not be a great issue. The well-organised military of a single nation may be able to intervene in a relatively coherent and unified manner, making the fact that its own organisation and decisions are the outcome of hybridisation less relevant to the analysis of its interactions with locals than it would be in the case of, for example, a multilateral peace intervention involving INGOs, civil society organisations and so on. Social change, however, is so wide-ranging a phenomenon that the idea of it occurring as a meeting between two entities – e.g. the Western and non-Western worlds, the developed and the developing, the modern and the traditional – becomes inherently problematic. It was argued in the previous section that one of post-development's failings was its inability move beyond these homogenising and essentialising dichotomies: a true alternative to development must not fall into that trap.

Similarly limiting is an implication of seeing internal and external factors as local and international actors or structures; namely, that they are internal or external in relation to the borders of the 'local,' be it a nation, community, or culture. Even when we are asked to look beyond the usual external actors – that is, Western nations – the alternatives suggested are just new players in international development such as China, India, and Brazil (Peterson, 2012: 18). While this broadening of the perspective at least moves us away from the West-non-West dichotomy, it still treats the internal and external as
discrete units. Accepting this means that we start from the assumption that anything coming from outside the borders of a nation is alien to it and, conversely, that anything coming from inside the border is part of it. Serge Latouche (1989[1996] 54-55), for example, says that the interaction among cultures must not involve culture A adopting too much from culture B. Why not? The statement makes sense only on the basis of this assumption of external alien-ness. An alternative conceptualisation of the internal-external relationship would have to account for how something coming from within a society might be alien to it and vice versa. Moreover, it would have to avoid the strong tendency in the internal-external as local-international approach to view the relationship as a top-down one, which colours the perception of both. The external is not only alien but bad. Although romanticising the local is recognised as a problem, demonising the international can be overlooked. It is important to move beyond this because taken together they end up reproducing the type of conceptually antagonistic relationship that we have criticised the concept of development for implying. An alternative to development must be able to see this relationship as something more than a (attempted) top-down imposition of an alien form. This problem will be revisited in the final section of the thesis.

Finally, a closely related issue is that a top-down relationship prejudges the roles of both internal and external actors and structures. The external here is a limiting force, constraining the otherwise free spirit of the internal so that it changes in acceptable ways. Thus the activity of external structures and actors is something to which their internal counterparts must react. They can be genuinely active only insofar as they can “confront, resist, ignore, disobey, subvert, exploit, and string-along” external actors and structures (Mac Ginty, 2011: 10). This assumption, according to which the behaviour of internal actors is couched in terms of 'resistance to,' is most obvious in post-colonial accounts of hybridity, such as Homi Bhabha's, but is (implicitly) retained in the work of scholars such as Mac Ginty. It underpins much of the optimism that characterises the hybridity literature: emancipation from, resistance to, and modifications of external actors and structures is seen as an inherently good thing. Of course, it is true that external things can be a constraint, but assuming that they necessarily are again implies an understanding of the internal-external relationship as antagonistic. It is precisely this divisive understanding that an alternative to the concept of development will have to alter if the two are to be reconciled and the tragedy of development avoided.
Thus once we turn our attention from peace-building back to development (as analysed in this thesis) it becomes clear that hybridity as a lens is not enough: recognising the importance of internal actors, though a key insight, will not have the desired effect if external actors are still seen as vital to a positive outcome. In Part I it was argued that modernisation theorists were well aware of the problems associated with merely imposing local models in different contexts. Samuel Huntington, in his *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), criticised the United States for its attempts to do so and attributed the growing international influence of the Soviet Union in part to its refusal to follow suit. He also praised the Soviet Union for recognising that the imposition of governmental institutions was pointless without existing local authority and legitimacy. Moreover, the modernisation approach was quite infamous for accepting the (temporary) necessity of non-liberal political orders (Kesselman, 1973). Thus Huntington argued in favour of a single-party system and David Apter (1971: 19n) claimed that a period of 'unfreedom' may be necessary early on in the development process. Admittedly these analyses rarely account for informal political orders – a gap the recent literature on neo-patrimonialism is partly filling – but it does demonstrate that unlike peace interventions, development interventions have always been thought of as more than an external imposition. Indeed, because development is such a complex and wide-ranging phenomenon it is almost impossible to think of it in that way. That development, whatever the precise form it takes, is the outcome of an interaction between 'internal' and 'external' forces is no secret, even if it is believed that the external model is better in some objective sense. The problem is how that relationship is conceptualised.

To summarise this section, we have seen that the concept of hybridity is intended to move the study of peace (and development) interventions away from the idea that they involve two pure and discrete entities, the international and local or external and internal, coming together with one side 'winning' and imposing its own model of peace. Either the international interveners impose a liberal peace or local actors and structures manage to flush the foreign bodies from their system. Instead of this, hybridity offers a lens through which one can see how external and internal actors interact to create a hybrid peace. Identifying the limitations of this approach as a solution to the internal-external divide that characterises the tragedy of development helps us see, in part, what is needed from an alternative to the concept of development. It will have to: avoid seeing internal-external
as an essentialist dichotomy; look beyond convenient borders as the location of interaction, separating a familiar inside and an alien outside; see the relationship as more than top-down; see the external as more than a limitation on the otherwise free and natural internal. To which we can add the point made in the previous section that our alternative must be non-teleological. The next section will start with a consideration of what the normative pursuit of hybridity as a solution to the tragedy of development would look like. The critique of it will serve as the basis for our own theorisation of the reconciliation of the internal and external.

II.5 – Beyond the Tragedy of Development III: Reclaiming the Active Individual

“The business man who assumes that this life is everything, and the mystic who asserts that it is nothing, fail, on this side and on that, to hit the truth. 'Yes, I see, dear; it's about halfway between,' Aunt Juley had hazarded in earlier years. No; truth, being alive, was not halfway between anything. It was only to be found by continuous excursions into either realm, and though proportion is the final secret, to espouse it at the outset is to ensure sterility”

Overcoming the limitations noted in the previous section will involve rethinking the terms of the internal-external relationship, and in particular the spatial metaphors which underpin the thinking of hybridity theorists and post-colonial/post-development theorists as well as more mainstream development theorists. The remainder of next couple of section will attempt to provide a basis for this rethinking, with the present one focussing on the importance of the 'active individual.' This will involve returning the individual to the central role they enjoyed prior to Keynes' contributions to development theory, as detailed in section I.6 above. They are called 'active' because they will be conceptualised as standing between internal and external – in that sense not unlike Lerner's transitionals – giving meaning to both and mediating their relationship. Neither internal nor external, it will be argued, can be given any real meaning outside this individual process. From the previous section we conclude that the spatial imagery – of inside and outside, international and local, top and bottom (not to mention 'internal' and 'external' themselves) with borders separating them and hybrid, transitional borderlands between them – cannot serve as a general lens through which to view social change because it fails to capture the dynamic nature of the relationship. The type of relationship it posits is only
active on one side at a time. The reconciliation offered by spatial metaphors is one of 'crossing over,' of reaching beyond one's own sphere, of bridging the divide between two separate entities. Traditionally in development theory and critiques of it this has been seen as taking the form of a more or less necessary imposition of the 'developed' onto the 'underdeveloped.' Recognising that their crossings over must be welcomed by the developing society, development theorists have tried to make them more palatable; interpreting them as invasions, post-development theorists have sought to set up impenetrable barriers: 'each culture is another reality.'

Wishing neither to be associated with the imposition of external, Western forms nor to romanticise internal, local forms, hybridity theorists and others have taken the obvious alternative route within the spatial imagination. If past thinkers have seen the two as solid, discrete entities with one imposing itself on the other, then their reconciliation must lie in de-solidifying them. Thus as Nederveen Pieterse (2001b) has argued, if both external and internal actors see themselves and each other as hybrids, rather than as pure and coherent entities, they will be more likely to devise and accept unique outcomes. Solid entities cannot mix: they must become more fluid. In this way hybridity can deflect the criticism made by Moss (2003) that it still posits two separate entities: by becoming more fluid the international will be able to go beyond its own sphere and reach over into one that is foreign to it (Peterson, 2012).

It is not just hybridity theorists for whom this 'de-solidification' seems an attractive way out. Walter Mignolo's discussion in Local Histories/Global Designs (2000) has a similar flavour. Most thinking, he says, is territorial thinking: solipsistic, trapped in its own reality, and prone to projecting itself beyond its borders with little regard for or sympathetic understanding of what it finds there. All local histories are prone to becoming global designs, which naturally makes territorial thinking a problematic means by which to govern the relations among societies. In the centuries-old conflict between Europe and the Arab world, for example, it has become "a machine of mutual misunderstanding" (2000: 67). Mignolo's alternative is what he call 'border thinking;' that is, thinking from the borders between territories rather than exclusively from one's own territory. This involves simultaneously thinking from and critiquing both local histories. "This is the key configuration of border thinking: thinking from dichotomous concepts
rather than ordering the world in dichotomies” (2000: 85). Again, two separate entities are posited but in a way that will, it is hoped, allow for a more harmonious interaction.

With these solutions, which operate within the existing spatial metaphors used to conceptualise the internal-external aspect of development, there are theoretical and practical difficulties. On the practical side, the desolidification solution undermines the basis upon which hybridity occurs. Mac Ginty (2012: 4) himself admits that deliberately pursuing a hybrid outcome may be problematic. It is not possible to devise it beforehand. The hybrid emerges from the interactions between external and internal actors meeting at the metaphorical borders; it is not something that can be created in a lab then implemented in the real world. It is a necessarily interactive process. It would seem that the desolidification solution provides a sound foundation for this process: clearly there can be no genuine interaction if one party imposes it will on the other, whether overtly or covertly. This is the argument we saw Nederveen Pieterse (2001b) and Mignolo (2000) making above, and it has a long history in philosophies linking tolerance with skepticism on the one hand and intolerance with dogmatism on the other. The assumption here, applied to development, is that the problem with development theory – a key component of the modern West’s 'global design' – is its understanding of its own knowledge claims. In particular the arrogantly Eurocentric belief that what worked for the West will work for the rest. To de-solidify means to be more humble, to recognise that there are different ways of achieving and conceiving development. If external and internal actors perceive themselves to be 'hybrids of hybrids' and accept that they do not have all the answers, then their interaction will no longer by a clash often ending with an imposition by the external actor but a mixing resulting in a new hybrid.

The desolidification approach conflates the process and outcome with the starting position: it assumes that, in the interaction of external and internal actors, for the process to be a mixing and the outcome a mixture the two opposing starting points have to be mixable. Making them so is a large part of the normative aim of hybridity and border thinking. The problem with this becomes apparent once we leave peace and development interventions and turn to more everyday forms of negotiations such as those that occur between businesses. Both parties recognise that their interaction will be a form of negotiation and that the outcome will be a compromise. If it was believed by either side that they could impose their will unilaterally, there would be no negotiation in the first
place. Yet both enter into the process with an idea of what they want the outcome to be. Each has a definite starting point and in the course of the negotiation each will try to find an outcome that is acceptable to the other and as close to their own ideal as possible. It would of course be problematic if one party attempts to impose their ideal on the other, but the act of negotiation does not preclude the existence of an ideal as a starting point. Indeed, it presupposes it.

By undermining the solidity of the starting point, aiming for hybridity may, paradoxically, obstruct the achievement of hybridity. If both parties, having taken on board the normative implication of hybridity and border thinking that they must be humble with regards their knowledge claims, are discouraged from saying 'I want...' or 'I believe...' for fear or appearing dogmatic or universalist or ethnocentric then the basis of negotiation, even ultimately of conversation, is undermined. For not only is a solid foundation necessary to put forward a coherent argument, it is also the basis upon which the other participant analyses and judges the argument and returns another. It is for this reason that Socrates, a philosopher famous for knowing that he knew nothing, counselled that we should always assume that we're right. In the Phaedo Plato has him say: “[T]his was the method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue” (Plato, in Jowett, 1892: 228). His concern was that although we should be aware that we do not have all the answers – that our will at the start of a negotiation will not be its final outcome – doubt will prevent progress toward a positive outcome as you'll abandon your starting position at the first sign of trouble (Frappier, 2009). Without a solid starting position from which to interpret new ideas, there is nothing left but conformity to the arguments coming at you from outside – precisely the outcome that hybridity theorists and Mignolo are trying to avoid.

Theoretically, we can take the problem raised by Peterson (2012) a little further. Peterson, we saw above, expressed concern that 'hybridity' is becoming another of development's buzzwords, a 'badge of legitimacy' used by external actors to mask the same old practices. Let us assume, however, that external actors influenced by hybridity are not using it as a badge of legitimacy but genuinely accept and desire that the eventual intervention will be the outcome of various modes of interaction with local actors. They may on this basis
recognise the potential for non-liberal and informal institutions to contribute; they may be encouraged to engage with a wider range of local actors; they may take care not to regard attempts to resist their activities as subversive and dangerous. Yet all this is quite compatible with the criticism Mac Ginty (2011: 45) makes of the liberal peace's use of notions of local ownership and participation, namely that this “is often a superficial exercise that encourages local actors to conform to norms and practices established in the global north.” A hybrid outcome must, by definition, include some influences from the external actor, which may mean that norms and practices from the global north are 'adopted' in the local society. What is the status of these adopted practices? It is not clear from the literature on hybridity how one would distinguish between a 'superficial exercise' and a genuinely hybrid process. If the answer is that it would be visible in the outcome – a hybrid peace that is neither local nor international rather than a liberal peace implemented more subtly – then there are no clear standards according to which the distinction could be made, beyond commonly-held assumptions that parts of the liberal peace model – neoliberal economic reforms, for example – could not possibly be acceptable on their own terms; their very existence in the local society is taken as evidence that they have been imposed upon it by manipulation or misinformation. If so, however, the agency that hybridity supposedly affords local actors is undermined: they are apparently not allowed to accept certain norms and practices of the liberal model as part of a true hybrid. Hybridity would then suffer from the problem we identified with post-development: it pretends to offer unlimited agency to the local while in fact blocking off certain pathways by excluding them from the realm of acceptable conversation.

The difficulty in distinguishing the truly hybrid from a ‘superficial exercise,’ that is, good hybridity from bad or artificial hybridity, becomes particularly problematic when we apply this conceptualisation of the internal and external to social change. It may be argued that what counts as 'good hybridity' has a relatively simple answer when it comes to peace intervention: a peace intervention is good when it produces a lasting peace (although even this is obviously more complex that it seems). Applying hybridity to social change, however, it is evident that such an apparently neutral and objective definition of what constitutes 'good hybridity' – that is, what constitutes good social change, or, development – is no longer available to us. Defining in advance what counts as good social change undermines attempts made by development theorists to reconcile the internal and external. Yet if we abandon this teleological view of social change then
there is nothing in the mere existence in a developing society of 'norms and practices established in the global north,' or of anything else we associate with development, that would tell us that these forms came from, or are interpreted as coming from, the global north. Nor can their simple existence provide an explanation of their representative significance within the developing society – that is, their contribution to genuine social change in that society. There is, to use Simmel's terminology, no way to know by virtue of similar contents whether an external form contributes to genuine growth or acts as a 'mere addition' which always remains external to the host. And this was, of course, precisely Simmel's problem: not how external objects could jump the border and 'cross over' into the internal life of the individual but how they could become part of the internal in such a way as to contribute to its growth. The problem confronted by development theorists is not so different. As was noted earlier, later economic modernisation theorists had been disappointed to find that their efforts had created 'islands of modernity' in developing societies, largely disconnected from the traditional sea. Desolidification may make it easier for internal and external actors to come together and create a hybrid outcome, but it cannot tell us whether this outcome constitutes good social change. External Western, developed cultural forms are seen as necessary to some degree to the development of non-Western nations, yet at the same time the process of development is seen as stifling the fluid and 'natural' movement of those societies by burdening them with these forms that, while objectively necessary, do not always 'fit' and therefore struggle to contribute to genuine development – hence the tragedy of development.

This problem, it will now be argued, has always been looked at from the wrong perspective. On the belief that we are confronted with two independent acting entities and the consequent use of spatial metaphors to conceptualise it, the internal-external problem has been seen as just that: a problem. It has been seen as the 'original' relationship, the starting point of social change which, being problematic, must be overcome. Yet it appears so only on the basis of social-change-as-development, because the concept of development posits the necessity of external guidance for the potentially irrational energies of the internal. Consequently there is an inherent antagonism between them: “Those leading the modernisation always fear that the individual energies suddenly liberated in a traditional society will not be deployed in the right direction” (Latouche, 1991[1993]: 88). However, if instead of thinking of internal and external as two discrete entities, one acting from within the borders of a developing society and the other from
without, we imagine them existing in an active relationship, then the problem appears in a new light. The separation of internal and external factors is no longer a starting point but a goal, no longer something to be overcome but something to be found and found again. It is in this process that we rediscover the true importance of the individual actor, who, as we argued in section I.6, was removed from its central position in the process of social change by Keynes.

To understand why, we can look at how Ernst Cassirer (1942[2000]) responded to Simmel's argument on the tragedy of culture. Simmel, much like development theorists who have confronted the same problem, saw the internal and external as two 'actors': in Simmel's case, the individual on the one hand and cultural works on the other, each developing according to their own independent logics. External cultural works, though necessary for individual cultivation, are too rigid to satisfy the fluidity of internal spirit and can only hinder its free movement – hence the tragedy of culture. According to Cassirer, however, Simmel ended his analysis too early. Simmel's concern was primarily with the relationship between the creator and the work – he neglected the recipient, the 'You' (as Cassirer puts it) who stands at the other end of the process, the subject who receives the work in order to incorporate it into their own life. In doing so, they transform the work back into the medium from which it originates; that is, that free movement of spirit Simmel thought to be lost upon creation of the work. Thus the work achieves its genuine task “not by transporting a finished content from the one to the other, but in that the activity of one is kindled by that of the other” (1942[2000]: 111). Cassirer stresses that this does not involve a picking and choosing of elements from the work – in that case, “this fruitful effect will not yet manifest itself. At best, it remains a superficial borrowing of individual elements of formation” (1942[2000]: 112). Exposure to individual elements is not enough: travelling does not make one worldly; attending the opera does not make one cultured. What matters is the effect these things have on you – whether you are able to change and grow through them. What is required therefore is “the will or the ability to penetrate into their genuine centre, into their particular form” (1942[2000]: 112). Thus it is not a question of copying certain aspects of this external work that may fit the internal force, but rather of understanding the formative powers that created them.

Every renaissance, says Cassirer, is an example of this process. A renaissance may be inspired by a foreign or bygone culture, but it is never a mere reception or continuation of
that culture. Nor is it a task of sifting out what was 'universal' in the foreign culture and adding it to one's own. They are "triumphs of spontaneity and not of mere receptivity" (1942[2000]: 111). In the Italian Renaissance, for example, people like Petrarch found "in antiquity an incomparable source of power that they use to help bring forward their own ideas and ideals" (1942[2000]: 112). The encounter was not a hybrid-producing meeting of two pre-existing entities, classical antiquity and medieval Italy. The former did not leave an impression on the latter, but rather became a new vehicle of expression for individuals such as Petrarch who could no longer fully find such in their inherited tradition. By discovering for himself the 'life forms' of antiquity, through the cultural products it had left behind, Petrarch "fashioned his own original feeling of life" (1942[2000]: 112). To Petrarch, 'antiquity' was not an inert mass but a "conglomeration of huge potential energies, which are only waiting for the moment when they are to come forward again and make themselves manifest in new effects" (1942[2000]: 113). What this 'spirit' or 'fluidity' consists in and what recalling a work to it entails is perhaps unclear, and Cassirer and Simmel are both a little vague here. It can probably best be grasped via personal experience: anyone who has tried to put thoughts to paper will know that the end result is often unsatisfactory in some intangible way. The fluidity and limitlessness of thought is, to some degree, lost when they are given definite form in words. This is the spirit to which a work can be recalled. The word 'epiphany,' in its original meaning of 'showing forth,' reflects exactly this. It takes for granted that life is full of the rigidities of routine and habit, necessity and triviality, but that moments of transcendence may nevertheless show forth on occasion. 'Spirit' refers to what is visible during these moments of epiphany. By recalling apparently rigid forms to their original vitality, the active individual can take from them the personal and contextual meaning that Simmel recognised was vital to genuine growth.

For Cassirer this was a uniquely individual process. After Petrarch the likes of Rabelais, Montaigne, Racine, Goethe, von Humboldt, and many others had to discover, through the same cultural remains they encountered, their 'own' antiquity. It was 'theirs' in the sense that it was only valuable and meaningful as a vehicle of expression because they had something to express. And although it is possible to 'take possession of' a new tradition simply as one finds it, "as a fixed cultural possession," Cassirer maintains that its true formative potential is released only when it "becomes the expression of a new individual feeling of life" by refining it (1942[2000]: 115). In this case, the new individual feeling
of life could not be adequately expressed through the inherited traditions. The individual's relationship to the inherited is not, however, less important for that fact. What starts out as an individual deviation from the inherited, inspired or enabled by something outside it, must, if it is to become more than a mere deviation and have a transformative influence, show continuity with the inherited tradition. Continuity makes the deviation communicable to many other individuals and hence capable of kindling their activity. As the process continues through the activity of these other individuals the work, initially a deviation, is reincorporated into the inherited tradition, thereby enriching it by adding modes of expression of which it was not previously capable. In this act of enlarging the imagination of their society, the active individual provides new ways of finding meaning in and assimilating works that would otherwise appear inflexible (Shelley, 1840[1915]: 108-110).

The solution to the internal-external problem we can derive from Cassirer is, therefore, not really a solution at all, there being strictly speaking no problem to be solved. This is not to say that their interaction is an easy or natural one without tensions or challenges, just that it is not a problem calling for a solution. Jacques Barzun (1991[1992]: 14) distinguished between problems on the one hand and difficulties on the other. Problems, he argued, are solvable once and for all. Once a generation has discovered the correct technique for, say, growing rice in wet environments, it can be transmitted to future generations for whom this will no longer exist as a problem. Difficulties, by contrast, are eternally recurring. They can be met but not overcome; there is no technique that will solve them for all time. Each new generation will have to meet the difficulty of, for example, parenting or dealing with the loss of loved ones. Past generations can transmit to them the values and ideas they found useful in this area, but it is ultimately something that each must do on their own terms. This is what was meant when we said above that the separation of the internal and external is something to be found rather than something to be overcome. Overcoming a division between two discrete acting entities implies breaking down the barriers existing between them in order to make possible a transfer of contents from one to the other – from the developed to the developing in the case of development theory. What we can take from Cassirer, however, is that it is only on the basis of individual judgement, gained by placing oneself in an active relationship with the 'new' from the perspective of the 'inherited,' that the distinction between internal and external acquires its meaning and that the representative significance of one to the other is
discovered: “Their content exists for us only by virtue of the fact that it is constantly taken possession of anew and as a result always created anew” (1942[2000]: 111). Thus internal and external are not the 'prime elements' in the relationship between them since it is that relationship which both defines and changes them.

What we imagine, then, is internal and external as 'inherited' and 'new' vehicles of expression respectively, defined and redefined as such by a conscious or unconscious act of individual judgement. This understanding of the internal-external problem avoids some the limitations of the spatial understanding, as outlined above. First, and perhaps most importantly, it does not make – or at least does not rely on – a sharp distinction between developed and developing countries. The external motive force of change is not equated with the developed, the modern, the international, the Western; nor is the internal force equated with the underdeveloped, the traditional, the local, the non-Western. Second, it does not essentialise either side; that is, it does not treat internal and external traditions as discrete and eternal categories. At the same time, however, it recognises the importance from the active individual's perspective of 'concretising' the internal and external, of turning the abstract conglomerations of potential energy into something finite with which they can work.

Moreover, viewing the process as something that is created on the individual level also forces us to recognise the importance of the present configuration of the internal in the general sense. For a change that originates with an individual or small group of individuals to resonate throughout the broader society it must be a change that is (perceived as) compatible with 'the things that are part of us.' It has to be compatible with the 'local' culture not because of the inherent worth of that culture but because that is the perspective from which other individuals will incorporate the new into their own lives. Third, and related to the second point, this understanding of the internal-external problem does not prejudge the content of change from an outside perspective. The relevant point in differentiating good from bad social change is not so much where change is going but how it arose. The focus of analysis is therefore no longer on which contents ought to be transferred from the external to the internal or the efficiency with which this can occur (both the focus of traditional development thinking), but on the individual person and how one learns about society and the principles that sustain it, how one incorporate those values into one's own life and conduct oneself by them and grow through them, how one
can interact with people and things which, again, allows one to recognise and incorporate what they have to offer into one's own internal life and reciprocate something that is similarly valuable to others. Thus it does not judge social change according to a similarity of contents (whether that means recreating Western society in the non-Western world or just those aspects of Western society deemed universal) but a similarity of processes.

If this still seems abstract and only subtly different from that of development thinking, it becomes more distinct the closer one gets to the real world. This will be expanded upon in section II.8 below, but for now we can mention as an example the fact that, as we enter the post-2015 development era the issue of the role and relevance of Western knowledge and experience has become particularly pressing. Critical of both the arrogant Eurocentrism they find in development theory's past and the complete rejection of Western influence they find in post-development, many development theorists have counselled that we ought to steer a middle course between them. Thus Nederveen Pieterse (2001a: 32) argues that we ought to look through Western history to determine which aspects of it are part of a 'universal human heritage' and which are particularistic and context-specific. The former can legitimately be part of a transfer of contents from developed to developing; the latter cannot and may be disregarded by developing nations. These calls for us to distinguish between the universal and the particular (the contents that can be transferred and those that are context-specific) imagine a world like a pizza with every other slice removed: the remaining slices have no connection with one another apart from the 'universal' middle where their tips converge. There is a tendency to interpret the existence in a developing nation of anything identified as context-specific – from MacDonald's and jeans to science and individualism – as impositions stifling the free movement of the local culture: they will always be external things.

The Caribbean philosopher Edouard Glissant asks the readers of his Poetics of Relation (1990[1997]) to avoid this type of thinking. He argues that people in developing countries should not see the influences coming from the developed world as a “monolithic necessity” (which is how it is portrayed) that must be adopted or rejected but as a “multiform elsewhere” that can be engaged with on the basis of “the things that are part of us” (1990[1997]: 153, 155). “Integrate what we have, even if it is sea and sun, with the adventure of a culture that is ours to share and for which we take responsibility” (Glissant: 1990[1997]: 153). Placing the active individual at the heart of the internal-
external problem helps us conceptualise that. Like Simmel on culture, what the aforementioned proposal fails to conceptualise is the role of the 'you,' the active individual who takes possession these things, approaching them not as 'inert masses' (the particular) on the one hand or 'finished contents' (the universal) on the other but as new vehicles for their own expression. Rather than trying to decide in advance what is universal and therefore part of true development, and what is particular and therefore not part of true development, it is for us a question of how people can approach the myriad products of the West and the creative processes behind them – from morality and art to institutions and economic goods – in such a way that they can 'kindle the activity' of those individuals and to what extent the products of that activity can do the same for others. The precise outcome can only be found individually, and it must be found again and again.

This re-framing of the internal-external question, away from inherent division and toward something that must be found based on an individual encounter, helps us rethink our conceptualisation of social change in a way that genuinely transcends the dichotomies of development thinking. In previous sections this thesis has argued that development theorists have presented us with a dichotomous view of how social change can operate: that it can either be self-conscious (intentional, deliberate) or unconscious (unintentional, random). Post-war development theorists looked back on social change as it occurred in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and argued that it was an unconscious, spontaneously occurring phenomenon. This view would have been reinforced by the criticisms received from all sides of the political spectrum: the social evolutionism of F.A. Hayek and, to a lesser extent, early neo-liberals such as P.T. Bauer and the post-colonial/post-development approaches both prized the spontaneity that would exist without the dead hand of development policy. As we saw, however, modernisation theorists maintained that allowing societies to change 'naturally' was, for various reasons, no longer a viable option. Without deliberate guidance, social change would be haphazard, left to individual whim, cruel market forces, the money motive, internal and external Eurocentrism, and so on, as it was in the 'darwinist nineteenth century.' It is on the basis of this dichotomy that the existence of development studies in its present form is justified: development studies creates the knowledge necessary for and helps put into practice the *direction* needed for a society to turn mere change into development. Thus society must instead become self-conscious of growth, of its own development. It was argued that this separates the internal and external aspects of development as they operate...
according to different logics, and hence the latter cannot raise the former to its 'higher' level of development.

However, through Cassirer's understanding of the internal-external problem and the role of the individual it entails there emerges a third option: conscious social change. By focusing on the individual as the mediator of the inherited and the new, the internal and the external, the societal-level teleology that characterises the concept of development can be dropped without fear that social change would be blind. Rather, social change can be analysed as something that is individually teleological. C.S. Lewis has a useful metaphor which we can use to demonstrate the difference between conscious and self-conscious change. On the one hand, he says, imagine a linguist viewing language from the 'outside,' recommending changes to the grammar and idiom which they believe will make it simpler, more convenient, and so forth. The linguist sees problems in a language, which would be solved if only people would learn to accept the appropriate solutions and adjust as the language to develop in a specific, superior direction.

By contrast, a poet sees difficulties in the language which must be met in the quest for self-expression. In this attempt to make the inherited language capable of expressing the new 'feeling of life' it is now asked to express, the poet “may also make great alterations to it, but his changes of the language are made in the spirit of the language itself; he works from within” (Lewis, 1944[1974]: 45). The poet does not expect to 'solve' the 'problem' of self-expression. They understand the spirit and principles of their chosen medium, language, and take them in new directions. Only those who understand the spirit of a thing, says Lewis, “can modify it in direction which that spirit itself demands. Only they can know what those directions are...” (1944[1974]: 47). In the act of expressing themselves, the poet enriches the language: “it now contains possibilities of expression that ... earlier were still unknown” (Cassirer, 1942[2000]: 116). Thus with the poet the basis of change is not the future state toward which language 'objectively' ought to develop, but rather their understanding of the principles and spirit upon which the present configuration is based, their acceptance of the demands this places upon them if their changes are to be communicable, and the goals they personally have for it.

Talk of poets and epiphanies may give the impression that the active individual must be a kind of genius or a visionary – certainly someone with uncommon talents – and it goes
without saying that not everyone can have the impact of a Petrarch. Cassirer (1942[2000]: 115) makes clear, however, that every action follows this basic principle: “The recipient does not take the gift as he would a stamped coin. For he can take it up only by using it, and in this use he imprints upon it a new shape.” Everyone who uses language changes it in imperceptible ways, just as everyone who acts in society does not leave it as it was; but the poet consciously uses language, and consequently the impact on it is more powerful. While it is not possible to know how others will 'take up' the work they create, they are nevertheless conscious of the imprint they are trying to leave and the material they are leaving it on. The active individual operates in society in just this way: their role in social change is one of conscious judgement. It is the individual who, by means of this judgement, makes the relationship between internal and external an 'active' one capable of having a cultivating effect on them. The internal and external motifs of development cannot simply be made more fluid on another's behalf. In their expression they must necessarily take a definite form and to try to avoid this is to empty those forms of their content. What matters is how these forms are approached, and the active individual, as with the poet and language, does not take them as inert masses but as bundles of potential energies. Indeed, the success of George Orwell, as Lionel Trilling (1955: 157-158) describes it, demonstrates that the role requires nothing of the sort. Orwell, Trilling argues, was no genius, let alone an uncommon genius. His mind is simply what ours could be

“if we but surrendered a little of the cant that comforts us, if for a few weeks we paid no attention to the little group with which we habitually exchange opinions, if we took our chance of being wrong or inadequate, if we looked at things simply and directly, having in mind only our intention of finding out what they really are, not the prestige of our great intellectual act of looking at them. He tells us that we can understand our political and social life merely by looking around us; he frees us from the need for the inside dope. He implies that our job is not to be intellectual, certainly not to be intellectual in this fashion or that, but merely to be intelligent according to our lights.”

In this sense of being 'intelligent according to our lights' rather than 'intellectual in this fashion or that' the active individual resembles Barzun's and Trilling's reader. They objected to the study of modern literature, it will be recalled, because its cultivating personal experience would be reduced to instances of 'the alienation of modern man' and
other such fashionable topics. Their method sought to satisfy the demand for a modern literature course without devitalising the books that were being studied. For this personal experience there is no standardised technique or universal method to follow; it is a matter of *l'esprit de finesse*. What the spirit of a work will look like when it 'kindles the activity' is not possible to say in advance due to its individual nature. This is why this section has spoken of active *individuals* as opposed to groups. Although others can lend aid in this process – as will be argued later – its personal nature means that the encounter must ultimately be an individual one. New ideas, practices, ways of thinking and being and so forth always implicitly ask us whether we are happy with who we are and with the way things are. Ideas and practices associated with social change ask intimate questions about how we conduct our lives as well as about how we wish to organise our society, and their transformative value lies in the former rather than the latter. Focusing on the latter set of questions, as the self-consciousness of social-change-as-development demands, robs the new ideas etc. of the personal immediacy and vitality according to which they can be incorporated into our selves. It is in the conscious response to the first set that active individuals take their place between the internal and external and at the heart of social change. In the next section it will be argued that the concept of progress provides an understanding of social change in which the conceptual space required for active individuals to work is central. Moreover, as we shall see in the section after that, II.7, the future-orientation of development, long recognised as problematic yet thought to be necessary, can be replaced by a present-orientation without fear of conservatism. It will make that argument by elaborating on the 'character' of the active individual by the system of education that came with social-change-as-progress.

**II.6 – The Concept of Progress**

The reader may at this point be reminded of Daniel Lerner's take on the internal-external problem. He believed that the 'traditional' internal and the 'modern' external were relatively powerless forces in development. More important was what occurred in the middle, where the group of people he called the Transitionals were both one and the other. It was argued earlier that the problem with Lerner's solution was that the Transitionals are transitional by virtue of where they are going rather than what they are doing. If they go elsewhere than intended they may be classified as Moderns or Traditionals depending on their bent (Lerner has been accused of 'pathologising' those in his case studies who would do anything entirely different) but they are not Transitionals.
What counts as good social change has been decided elsewhere, and the Transitionals are those who can adapt to its demands. The problems Lerner had conceiving of a truly active role for people in developing countries stem not from Eurocentric biases but from the teleological nature of social-change-as-development. The active individual, as described above, requires space in which this role can be performed. This section will argue that social-change-as-progress offers an understanding in which this space is not only present but vital to positive change. The term 'concept of progress' rather than 'idea of progress' will be used throughout this section. This is because the latter is linked to an array ideas providing a broader moral framework with which we shall not be concerned.

That division is, it must be admitted, a rather artificial one given the naturally close connection between a conceptualisation of 'good social change' and the moral framework required to define 'good'. Necessary as such a framework is for a full account of a theory of progress, however, the focus of the present thesis remains on the internal-external problem and the place of the active individual within it. The aim of this section will be to build on the distinction between development and progress introduced in section I.3 by arguing that the concept of progress provides a way of understanding how good social change occurs that is consistent with our aim of reclaiming the active individual.

Thus the concern here is with the ontological question of 'What is this thing we are analysing?' and how that is answered differently if social change is thought of as development or as progress. The concept of development, as analysed in this thesis, is not a theory of development, nor does it refer to an actual process of development. It is a fundamental way of thinking about social change. It is a concept that judges observed social change, directs the gaze, picks out the elements deemed important, and in doing so shapes our further theorising about social change. The concept of progress is an alternative way of doing this. By 'theorists of progress' and variations thereon this section has in mind a host of familiar names from the long eighteenth century, primarily from the Scottish and French Enlightenments: Adam Ferguson (1767[1782]), David Hume(1739[1896]), Adam Smith (1759[1976]; 1795[1892]), Condorcet (1796), Voltaire (1778), Benjamin Constant (1815[1988]), and Wilhelm von Humboldt (1792[1854]), who we met in section I.3.

According to Alfred Marshall, "[t]he economist, like everyone else, must concern himself
with the ultimate aims of man” (in Galbraith, 1958[1976]: vii). What development seeks from social change is an end to the economic problem – the condition of scarcity – at least with regards ‘natural wants,’ or, basic needs. It analyses changes in the social world from this vantage point. It looks at the content of an action, and asks whether it is conducive to this end. In other words, where a change is going is more important than where the change comes from or, to a large degree, the context in which the change is occurring, which is considered only in in terms of the degree to which it is conducive to the desired change. By contrast, the theorists of progress set out to analyse individuals as they actually existed in society, without reference to ultimate ends for either. This concern arose out of a distrust of scholastic understandings of the world, which judged individuals and society from the perspective of what ought to be, and of the abstract rationalistic systems prominent in the previous century. Both sought to discover what Hume (1739[1896]: 11) referred to as “the ultimate principles of the soul” – an endeavour which “ought to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.” Although the great rationalist thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes, certainly remained influential, the contractarian view of society was criticised for starting from a condition in which the individual, being outside society, could not be a moral agent and hence could not enter into a social contract (Cassirer, 1946: 175). Contra the contractarian conception of a pre-social essence of individuals and society, Harris (2007: 7) argues in his introduction to Lord Kames' Sketches of the History of Man (1778[2007]) that Kames and his contemporaries had come to regard individuals as “having been social beings from the first and as being naturally fitted to a life of coexistence and cooperation.” Thus Adam Ferguson (1767[1782]: 13) argued that the 'state of nature,' rather than being an abstract thought-experiment, was in fact all around us:

“If we are asked ... Where is the state of nature to be found? We may answer, It is here; and it matters not whether we are understood to speak in the island of Great Britain, at the Cape of Good Hope, or the Straits of Magellan. While this active being is in the train of employing his talents, and of operating on the subjects around him, all situations are equally natural.”

The state of nature, he continued, is “not prior to the exercise of [our] faculties, but procured by their just application” (Ferguson, 1767[1782]: 15). Thus Hume proposed that instead of the 'presumptuous and chimerical' search for ultimate principles, the
'science of man' must proceed from “a cautious observation of human life, [taking] them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures” (1739[1896]: 12). This “new species of philosophical investigation” was variously known as natural history, histoire raisonne, or, as Dugald Stewart (1793) opted to call it, conjectural history. It was conjectural in the sense that due to a lack of direct evidence deductive reasoning had to fill the gaps between the few scraps of information available on ancient and geographically distant societies: “when we are unable to ascertain how men have actually conducted themselves upon particular occasions, [we must consider] in what manner they are likely to have proceeded, from the principles of their nature, and the circumstances of their external situation” (Stewart, 1793). The basic principle was the individual's ability to use reason to transform the world, rather than merely adapt to it, on top of which was added limited altruism and what economists call 'time preference' – the degree to which one is willing to sacrifice long-run advantages for present satisfaction (Barry, 1982: B.96-97).

It is true that it had long been recognised that the unique feature of humankind, as opposed to animals, was the reasoning and moral faculties with which they could deliberately interact with and transform the world around them; this had been the basis of natural law theories in Greek and Christian philosophy. However, it was argued in Part I that the differentiation of development from progress involved a gradual expansion in the number of beings whose activity could not be trusted to produce positive social change. To Mill's barbarians Marshall added the very poor, before Keynes, finding the majority of his society consumed by the 'money motive,' argued that only those with knowledge of where social change ought to go could be trusted to produce development: the economist as the trustee of the possibility of civilisation. The insight underlying the concept of progress was that Ferguson's 'active beings,' making decisions about their person and property, were the foundational reality of “the astonishing fabric of the political union” (Stewart, 1793). From Bernard Mandeville's fable of the bees to Adam Smith's invisible hand, it was recognised that the most complex phenomena, from language to European society itself, were, in Ferguson's famous phrase, “the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design” (Ferguson, 1767[1782]: 90). “[T]he people,” Hume (1777[1987]: 435) observed, “are no such dangerous monster as they have been represented.” Hence they could “supply the order ... formerly secured through authority” (Appleby, 1987: 188). Voltaire (1778: Letter VI) observed this in action at the
Royal Exchange in London:

“There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian transact together, as though they all professed the same religion, and give the name of infidel to none but bankrupts. ... If one religion only were allowed in England, the Government would very possibly become arbitrary; if there were but two, the people would cut one another's throats; but as there are such a multitude, they all live happy and in peace.

What this meant for the study of social change was that historical accounts of the emergence of European society did not require a teleological force to guide and shape social change—providence, fortune, the will of a leviathan. Instead, the progress of society could be interpreted individualistically, as the outcome of a process of action and interaction among 'active beings' and their 'external situation.' Social change itself, the outcome of these interactions, was interpreted as a 'catallaxy,' to use a phrase popularised by F.A. Hayek (1976[1998]: ch. 10). That is, it was a form of spontaneous order, with no common purpose or pre-determined goals of its own. It was, instead, a dynamic, complex, open-ended, and contingent process of interaction in which the different purposes of the participants are reconciled to their mutual benefit.

The assertion that the defining feature of the concept of progress is that it is non-teleological may seem odd given that the conjectural histories produced in this era—by Kames, Ferguson, Condorcet, etc. — are often considered precursors of the evolutionist understandings of civilisation, with Western society at the apex, that people find in the stages of development approach most intimately associated with W.W. Rostow (e.g. Rist, 1997; Hindess, 2007). They are, however, of a fundamentally different character. Rostow's book was a work of economic history, using statistical data to identify the conditions of the transition from one stage to the next. As Nisbet (1969) has argued, the conjectural histories of the eighteenth century were not intended to account for stadial transitions. The stages were snapshots, constructed using deductive reasoning and whatever information was available from all over the world, and arranged in logical order. Only in this strictly logical sense could one say that a particular stage was inherently 'higher' than another, in the same way that language must develop before poetry can exist. For Ferguson (1767[1782]: 25) the fact that modern societies 'know' more than the Greeks and Romans, by a simple process of accumulation, was not a...
relevant consideration.

“[Are they] on that account their superior? Men are to be estimated, not from what they know, but from what they are able to perform; from their skill in adapting materials to the several purposes of life; from their vigour and conduct in pursuing the objects of policy, and in finding the expediencies of war and national defence.”

The focus was not on the direction of change but on how the basic facts of human existence – which Barry (1982: B.44) describes as “scarcity, limited altruism, and an ever-present desire ... to forgo long-run advantages in favor of immediate satisfactions” – manifest themselves in a variety of social, political, economic, and environmental situations. Adding the stages together into an evolutionary theory is a distortion: there was no fixed order, no necessity, and no exclusion of alternative stages. Thus Dugald Stewart (1793) observed that due to the nature of conjectural history, different accounts “of the progress of the human mind in any one line of exertion ... are not always to be understood as standing in opposition to each other.” This was because “human affairs never exhibit, in any two instances, a perfect uniformity.” Although a logical exposition of the manifestations of “that general provision which nature has made for the improvement of the race” required, as Nisbet (1962) recognised, a certain linearity, progress as it actually occurs “is not always the most natural. It may have been determined by particular accidents, which are not likely again to occur” (Stewart, 1793). Indeed, Stewart justifies this mode of inquiry not on the basis that it could give a true account of how European man, society, or some aspect thereof had come into existence, but rather on the basis that could give a plausible account of how it might have come into existence. This was valuable because in providing such an account it would discourage the tendency to ascribe the emergence of some complex phenomenon to miracles, divine and human. Writes Stewart (1793): “a check is given to that indolent philosophy, which refers to a miracle, whatever appearances, both in the natural and moral worlds, it is unable to explain.”

Thus the proper focus of a study of social change according to the concept of progress is not the teleological intent of change itself – where social change is heading – but rather the teleological intent of the individuals involved, whose pursuit of their own goals produces a spontaneous order. This was the distinction noted back in sections I.3 between
the understandings of social change in Wilhelm von Humboldt and J.S. Mill. Mill (1848: IV:VI) was, unlike his predecessors, not satisfied with “merely tracing the laws of the movement” of society and sought to ask the further question, “to what goal? Towards what ultimate point is society tending by its industrial progress?” Humboldt, we saw, thought of positive social change as in principle unending, through which it necessarily becomes “a dynamic process, rather than a goal that can be specified in advance” (Valls, 1999: 259). If there is no end, no end can be specified. Hence Humboldt's analysis is not concerned with the content of self-development, but with the attitude individuals must take toward themselves and one another if it is to flourish – whatever the direction it takes. There are, for Humboldt, but two prerequisites for self-development: freedom and a 'variety of conditions', which are provided by the free actions of others. Thus, again, actual social change is evaluated based on where it has come from rather than where it is going. The ultimate direction of social change is not a 'further question' to be tacked on to the analysis of a Humboldt: it represents a fundamental alternation to the understanding of social change upon which that analysis was based.

What genuine growth requires, said Simmel, is a reciprocal interaction between what he called the internal and external logics, between the individual's spirit and the cultural forms it encounters. They must feed and be fed by each other's development. This is precisely how the theorists of progress saw the relationship between individuals in a progressing society and the stuff of development (that is, Simmel's externals). It is not the objective value of a cultural form that raises society to a higher plane, but rather the subjective value it holds for individuals. Benjamin Constant, for example, said of a society's legal system:

“The inherent merit of the law is ... far less important than the spirit with which a nation subjects itself to its laws and obeys them. If it cherishes them and observes them because they seem to it derived from a sacred source, the legacy of generations whose ghosts it venerates, then they fuse themselves intimately with its morality, they ennoble its character, and even when they are faulty, they produce greater virtue, and consequently greater happiness, than would better laws that rested upon the orders of authority.”

(1815[1988]: 75)

Thus what the concept of progress provides is a way of thinking about social change in
which the future-orientation of the concept of development is unnecessary, even detrimental. It is not necessary, as the like of Marhsall and Rostow believed, that institutions ought to be placed slightly in advance of existing society in order to give it something to aim for. There is, for Constant, no correct direction for the law to change, but there is a correct way for that change to occur – namely, one in which there is a mutual development between individual and institution. By contrast, the concept of development, looking at social change from the perspective of an ultimate end, is primarily concerned with the objective value of an institution, and therefore cannot maintain this contextualising distinction with any consistency. There is a correct direction, though the speed with which an institution is adopted may be altered if the people have not yet been made ready for it. Daniel Lerner, as we saw, made a similar argument to Constant regarding institutions - “individuals and their institutions must modernize together, or modernization leads elsewhere than intended” (1958[1966]: 78). But in Lerner, individuals and institutions appear as Simmel's internal and external in his tragedy of culture – two forces guided by different logics.

The individuals Lerner speaks of are not creative of their institutions but reactive to them. Hence his concern with the emergence of more adaptable personality types. The people still need a push in the right direction – and a pull back should they threaten to “not be deployed in the right direction” (Lataouche, 1991[1993]: 88). For Constant ((1815[1988]: 76), this attempt to impose upon society a form that is not its own is to destroy it.

“Nothing is more absurd than to do violence to customs on the pretext of serving people's interests. ... The series of ideas by which their moral being has been gradually formed since birth can hardly be modified by an arrangement that is purely nominal, exterior and independent of their will.” In Lerner, individuals and their institutions are to modernise together but independently; in Constant, they are to change together, as a result of mutual influence.

Of course, not all change is good change. But for progress, contra development, it is not where change is going that is the relevant consideration, but where it came from. What the idea of progress is concerned with is not the content of social change, but with the attitude individuals must take toward themselves, the context in which they exist, and one another if they and their society are to flourish – whatever the direction it takes. Change is the result of the efforts of people to deal with scarcity, to grasp the context in which they
exist and in so doing to adapt it to their needs. Progress – good change – was believed to occur wherever these activities could take place on a voluntary basis. Progress was thought to occur in a way analogous to Simmel's ideal of personal development. He said that true self-development is not just inner development (like a seed growing into a wild tree) nor just external development (like a tree trunk turned into ship's mast); rather, it is a combination of the two – a seed cultivated into orchard tree: “the fruit, despite the fact that it could not have come about without human effort, still ultimately springs from the tree's own motive force and only fulfils the possibilities which are sketched out in its tendencies, whereas the mast form is added to the trunk from an instrumental system quite alien to it and without any preformation in the tendencies of its own nature” (Simmel, 1908[1997]: 57).

In the same way, progress would not occur when a rigid form was imposed upon a person or a society – as Constant makes clear. Nor can it occur without the input and assistance of others which would, in Humboldt's words, be no more than a “partial cultivation.” It occurs only when these internal and external forces were combined harmoniously, on the basis of voluntary interaction. As Humboldt (1792[1854]: 22) put it: “Whatever man is inclined to, without the free exercise of his own choice, or whatever only implies instruction and guidance, does not enter into his very being, but still remains alien to his true nature, and is, indeed, effected by him, not so much with human agency, as with the mere exactness of mechanical routine.” Thus Augustin Thierry: “Each time the governed gain space, there is progress.” (in Raico, 2012: 201) Thus is not because he thinks that society is moving toward some ideal model of Western liberal institutions: the governed gaining space is not in itself progress. Rather, there is progress when the governed gain space because that space is one of voluntary interaction, a space in which a person's or a community's attempts to deal with scarcity are governed by their own ends rather than being imposed upon them – that is, a space has been created in which progress can occur.

In the early nineteenth century Benjamin Constant summed up the approach to social change contained in the concept of progress with this piece of advice to his government: “Obey time; do everything what the day calls for; do not be obstinate in keeping up what is collapsing, or too hasty in establishing what seems to announce itself. Remain faithful to justice, which belongs to all ages; respect liberty, which prepares every sort of good; let many things develop without you, and leave to the past its own defence, to the future
its own accomplishment” (1815[1988]: 157). From this apparent faith in the inevitability of positive social change arises the perception of 'progress' as a philosophy of optimism. The alternatives to self-conscious social-change-as-development would appear to be some form of immanent or unconscious social change, and this is how they have been portrayed by development theorists. These alternatives, as was argued in section II.2, are portrayed as leaving people to be swept along by history or frozen in time by tradition. Only development, by taking deliberate control of social change, is liberating and empowering.

Post-development attempted to provide an alternative to this: a conceptualisation of social change not based on a particular end. Yet of course not all social change is good social change. With an end in mind – the universalisation of Western consumer society for example – actual and future social change can be evaluated according to the degree that it furthers that end. If social change is unlimited, however, then there is no end upon which to base an evaluation of actual and future social change. Instead, it is in post-development evaluated based on its unlimitedness: change is bad if it limits potentialities. Post-development theorists were mistrustful of claims of universal standards in the means and ends of development, and in this sense they envisaged social change as truly unlimited. Social change would be, ideally, a big conversation rather than a universalised local story. As was argued in section II.2, however, if in this type of thinking a theorist does not approve of a particular form of change – Western capitalist, usually – it must be portrayed conversation-stopping. It has to be imperialistic, racist,universalist, sexist, and generally domineering; otherwise there are no grounds, no standards, for excluding it from the future conversation. This results in a certain interpretation – or exaggeration – of the development discourse. Moreover, whatever is being portrayed as conversation-stopping has to be powerful enough to actually do so, which results in other participants in the conversation being portrayed as passive or defenceless. In this way, post-development retains – indeed, strengthens – many of the dichotomies it was supposed to undermine. The West is more Western and more powerful, the non-West is more non-Western and more powerless.

The concept of progress is unlimited in the sense that it presents no specific end, but it isn't unbounded: there are standards, in addition to unlimitedness. What is envisaged here is a social change that is in principle unlimited but in practice bounded at the individual level by the individual. Consequently theorists of progress were interested in the attitudes,
values, virtues, and practices that reproduce and further society. And 'further' here simply
means an increase in the prevalence of those practices that reproduce society. The focus is
on the individual person and how they learn about society and the principles that sustain
it, how they incorporate those values into their own lives and conduct themselves by them
and grow through them, how they can interact with people and things which, again,
allows them to recognise and incorporate what others have to offer into their own internal
life and reciprocate something to the external world that is similarly valuable to others.
This kind of individual-level reciprocal interaction, between both people and things, is the
foundation of society and the font of progress.

Humboldt in particular placed few prerequisites upon a person's ability to approach life as
an 'active individual,' yet was he was he in this respect severely underestimating the
material barriers that stand in the way of so many people? Certainly that was the opinion
of Mill, otherwise an admirer of Humboldt, and others who have followed in his broad
footsteps and there can be no doubt that there a levels of material deprivation where it is a
correct opinion. Beyond such extremes, however, one must recall the lessons found in the
post-impasse development literature reminding us how easy it is to make the leap from
the observance of material poverty to the assumption of helplessness and passivity (see
e.g. (Harrison, 2010). When Humboldt (1792[1854]: 29) declares that “all peasants and
craftsmen might be elevated into artists” he is asking people to find something in their
lives that is or can be done for its own sake, to see it as such, and to cultivate oneself
through so that one can consciously see this external thing for what it in fact already is: an
expression of one's inner self. Mill linked this all explicitly with the 'higher faculties'
thereby implying the need for more stringent material (and intellectual) preconditions, but
for Humboldt there was an impulse towards it to be found in human nature and capable of
expression in all manner of human activity – he argued only that people ought to give it
more conscious expression so as to reap the full rewards.

Hence Humboldt's concern with 'the manner of the performance rather than the activity
itself or the material results of it. He is not expecting each individual to pursue great
social projects or pen literary masterpieces but merely, in Voltaire's famous phrase, to
cultivate their own garden, to take responsibility for and care of the small part of the
world they can affect and make it their own, so that by an accumulation of individual
effort “humanity would be ennobled by the very things which now ... so often go to
degrade it” (Humboldt, 1792[1854]: 21). The contrast with Mill, who resolved to leave 'coarse things to coarse minds' until the development of society had done away with them for good is stark and significant. Mill's innovation was not merely to recognise that material preconditions may frustrate Humboldt's romantic vision; rather, the preconditions he saw were the product of a very different way of approach social change which, by the logic followed in Part I via Mill, Marshall, and Keynes, raises the internal-external relationship to the status of a problem to be solved. Though it is important not to downplay the effects of poverty it must be emphasised, given the focus of this thesis, that poverty, beyond its most debilitating forms, does not alter the nature of the internal-external relationship in social-change-as-progress or the centrality of the individual to it. At the same time, however, these individuals were not conceptualised as the rational egoists of economic myth (another of Mill's innovations) pushed by an invisible hand to guide society along the path of progress. The next section will look at the eighteenth century conception of education in order to elaborate upon who was to fill the space of voluntary interaction.

II.7 – Education for Development and Education for Progress

So far it has been argued that the missing link common to mainstream and post development thinking on the internal and external forces of social change is the active individual who can stand between the internal and the external. The synthesis produced in one that emanates from within the individual and is in this sense natural, rather than the artificiality of a synthesis imposed from without. Yet it is therefore inevitable. As we shall see in this section, education – and, in part, schooling – has an important role to play in creating individuals capable of performing this role. We shall argue that this conception of education and task of the school was held by many prominent scholars in the long eighteenth century. The approach to education adds to the understanding of social change expressed in the previous section, countering the criticism that the idea of progress foresaw a world of atomistic, selfish individuals out of whose interactions positive consequences would arise. In addition to these thinkers we shall make use of a number of writers from the mid-twentieth century – including C.S. Lewis (1944[1976]), George Roche (1969), Albert J. Nock (1932), and Jacques Barzun – who sought to defend or revive this tradition in the face of what they considered the pernicious influence of Progressive education, which would go on to form the foundation of education for development.
Thus the section will add flesh to the bones of the active individuals at the centre of social-change-as-progress, contrasting them with the reactive individuals of social-change-as-development. Ultimately a key difference between education for development and for progress should become clear: if development asks of education that it contribute to the construction of its envisioned future, progress asks that it contribute to the construction of an individually meaningful present. The former seeks to give meaning to the future through an understanding of the present; the latter seeks to give meaning to the present through an understanding of the past. Based on this understanding of the role of the schools in social change, these two approaches to education will be termed 'future-oriented' and 'present-oriented' respectively.

General disappointment with the performance of schools around the world has long prompted myriad critiques from across the political spectrum, accompanied by a proliferation of pedagogical methods. With teaching methods we shall not be explicitly concerned in this section. Rather, our focus shall be on the raison d'être of the school and the purpose of learning, and what the concept of progress would mean in this respect compared to the concept of development. While thinkers in the field of education have spent decades debating technique, seeking a new method of teaching that will restore the school to its formerly held position of respect, Neil Postman (1996; 2000) has argued that they have ignored the importance of such a purpose: “There was a time when educators became famous for providing new reasons for learning; now they become famous for inventing a method” (1996: 26). Postman covers some narratives that have in the past provided meaning for American society, and with it schooling in American society, which have been steadily undermined – the Protestant Ethic, the melting pot, liberal democracy – and some from the wider world which have lacked staying power – communism, Nazism, fascism, American democracy. One narrative he does not mention, but which has been inspirational for a great part of humanity since the Second World War, is that of development.

Development, as many others have pointed out, bears all the hallmarks of a faith, of the type of narrative Postman believes is necessary: it has its saints and sinners, its heaven and hell, its rules of conduct, its sources of authority, its vision of the future, and its explanation of the past. Of course, for scholars such as Rist (1997), heaven, virtue, and
authority and located in the West, and hell, sin, and subservience in the Third World. It is worth mentioning once more that we do not believe this to be the case: if development was seen merely as a process of Westernisation we should not expect to see the types of debates, proposals, and critiques that we have noted in the previous sections. As we saw in section I.9, the critiques of existing systems of education were precisely concerned with how distant they were from the everyday lives of people in developing countries. It was argued by theorists, practitioners, and politicians alike that schools should be part of the local environment, lest they produce graduates suspended between two worlds – divorced from the traditional, yet not quite modern. Such graduates would attempt, often unsuccessfully, to replicate individualistic Western ways rather than promoting the development of their community.

This, at least, was how the existence of thousands of unemployed graduates leaving their traditional communities for white-collar work in the cities was interpreted; a problem that education for development, i.e. education organised around the development narrative, was intended to rectify. Although we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of these concerns or the good faith in which an intentional education for development was proposed as a solution, it was argued that because the concept of development contains a specific vision of what will be allowed to enter into 'modernity', education for development must ultimately remain oriented toward that desirable future. Thus, although the aim of post-war education for development was in theory to make schooling more suited to local needs and lifeways so that people could actively contribute to the process of development, in practice it tried to produce young people who could react correctly to the demands of modernisation. The school in the developing world remained, therefore, a modern thing dressed up in traditional clothing (Thompson, 1981).

The failure of developing nations to achieve universal, free, and compulsory primary education by 1980, as promised in the education conferences of the early 1960s, was a source of great disappointment. The World Conference on Education for All, held in Jomtien in 1990, aimed to bring education back to the forefront of development practice. In effect it and the educational philosophy subsequently promoted by UNESCO reasserted the education discourse of the late colonial and post-war development era: the existing system was accused of producing selfish and materialistic individuals divorced from their cultures; if true development was to take place the system would have to be
reformed according to local needs and the correct civic values. This new approach has been called global citizenship education, citizenship education, cosmopolitan education, global education, and a variety of others sharing the same content and origins in education for development. This section will use 'global citizenship education' which, according to Manion et al (2011: 446), has “virtually superseded DE [development education] as a term.”

Global citizenship education has become an important part of UNESCO’s work for the post-2015 development era. The core competencies include: 1) knowledge and understanding of specific global issues and trends, and knowledge of and respect for key universal values (e.g., peace and human rights, diversity, justice, democracy, caring, non-discrimination, tolerance); 2) cognitive skills for critical, creative and innovative thinking, problem-solving and decision-making; 3) non-cognitive skills such as empathy, openness to experiences and other perspectives, interpersonal and communicative skills and aptitude for networking and interacting with people of different backgrounds and origins; and 4) behavioural capacities to launch and engage in proactive actions (UNESCO, 2012: 4). From their analysis of the official policy discourse surrounding it, Manion et al (2011: 450) found that the “dominant themes [of global citizenship education] are solely about making an economic and cultural response to a fixed content, rather than any consideration of the possibility of making a political response to a content that might be changeable.” They argue that it is “best understood as a reaction to the presumed 'fact' of the development of a certain kind of global world economy and society or, the need for one, or a fear that it is threatened.” This, however, represents at most only half the story. Somewhat ironically, it is precisely the missing half of the story that makes global citizenship education a quintessentially development education.

Manion et al.’s (2011) focus on the construction of the new reality is perhaps the result of their concern with the Eurocentrism of global citizenship education, which they suggest is “being used to tacitly advance particularly Western perspectives over other culture's views.” However, if we look at the education discourse as an expression of the concept of development, as being concerned with social change understood in a certain way, then a slightly different picture emerges. The rhetoric Manion et al. find in the policy discourse, according to which reality has already changed and the schools must reflect it, is the means by which alternatives ways of doing education are dismissed rather than the
organising narrative for education. That is, its function is critical rather than constructive. Due to its function Mirel (2003) refers to this rhetoric as a 'rhetoric of revolution' and traces it back to the rise of Progressive education in early twentieth century America. Mirel makes clear, however, that the new reality is not seen as an unmixed good. Thus while Manion et al. are quite correct when they argue that the citizenship education discourse posits the emergence of a new reality, that reality is not the fixed content they believe it to be. It most certainly does require the kind of political response Manion et al. find lacking if mankind is to take advantage of the opportunities it has opened up. The key point is not that the world has become a certain way but that having become so it is now changing in a certain direction. It is the direction of change rather than the new reality itself to which individuals must adjust by making the correct political response to the new reality. Thus according to Learning: The Treasure Within (1996: 11), UNESCO's statement of its educational philosophy, today's generation of adults is “all too inclined to concentrate on their own problems.” People were too concerned with short-term, materialistic considerations - “the ephemeral and the instantaneous” (1996: 5) Although the developing nations could not yet afford to disregard the imperatives of economic growth, it was now evident that “all-out economic growth can no longer be viewed as the ideal way of reconciling material progress with equity, respect for the human condition and respect for the natural assets that we have a duty to hand on in good condition to future generations” (1996: 13). It was the task of education to guide society in the proper use of the resources created by economic growth.

UNESCO (2012: 3) has more recently described global citizenship education as “a psychosocial framework for collectiveness,” portraying it as a bulwark against selfishness and materialism. One report for UNESCO on citizenship education in Barbados talked about “low voter turnout at general elections, and escalation in the rates and intensity of crime and racially motivated attacks” in countries such as the US and the UK and even the genocide in Rwanda as evidence of the need for continuous citizenship education. Turning specifically to the situation in Barbados, the authors noted “a lack of cohesive spiritual and social values, and unrestricted acquisitiveness in Barbadian society; this ruling social passion is tied to a peculiar conception of ‘freedom,’ one shaped by highly individualist perceptions and impulses around crass indifference and materialism” (Howe and Marshall, 1999: 11). Note that this 'peculiar conception of freedom' is based on perceptions and impulses rather than reason and learning. These people are
'uninformed citizens,' who “may have radically different conceptions and understanding of the meaning of citizenship for women, the disabled, and other disadvantaged or discriminated against groups in the society” compared to informed citizens. “They may, likewise, have a very different understanding of the effects and implications of the many changes and challenges being produced by globalization.” For 'different', read 'not compatible with a truly developed world.' To counter this, citizenship education must “inculcate in students values consistent with and supportive of democracy.” In doing so it “will be helping to forge the type of citizen the region needs” (Howe and Marshall, 1999: 6).

Here one can clearly see what the concept of development as an organisational narrative for education calls upon the schools to do: it asks them to mould from the young of today adults for a specific tomorrow. That is, it calls for schools to be specifically concerned with the future. For example, Papastephanou (2002: 69) writes with regards to cosmopolitan education – aka global citizenship education – that it “undertakes to impart this [cosmopolitan] ideal to the young so as to prepare the advent of such a society. Like all visions that regulate actions, the educational ideal of cosmopolitanism is necessarily and centrally oriented toward the future.” This future-orientation is clearly evident in UNESCO’s official literature on education. As it returned education to the development agenda UNESCO promoted the idea of a 'necessary Utopia' – an optimistic vision of a peaceful and prosperous future society toward which it was the task of UNESCO and its education programmes to guide us. “We must be guided by the Utopian aim of steering the world towards greater mutual understanding, a greater sense of responsibility and greater solidarity, through acceptance of our spiritual and cultural differences. Education, by providing access to knowledge for all, has precisely this universal task of helping people to understand the world and to understand others” (UNESCO, 1996: 34). To this end education would be guided by four pillars: learning to live together, learning to know, learning to do, and learning to be. Interestingly, of those four the first was given prominence:

“... the Commission has put greater emphasis on one of the four pillars that it proposes and describes as the foundations of education: learning to live together, by developing an understanding of others and their history, traditions and spiritual values and, on this basis, creating a new spirit which, guided by recognition of our growing interdependence
and a common analysis of the risks and challenges of the future, would induce people to implement common projects or to manage the inevitable conflicts in an intelligent and peaceful way. Utopia, some might think, but it is a necessary Utopia, indeed a vital one if we are to escape from a dangerous cycle sustained by cynicism or by resignation.”

(UNESCO, 1996: 20)

This single passage implies a great deal about how UNESCO views positive social change and conforms to all that we have said about development's construction of its self and its other. Social-change-as-development is motivated by altruism, not selfishness; community spirit, not individualism; normative values, not crass materialism; concern for the poor, not social Darwinism; it respects traditional cultures, rather than simply imposing Western ways; and it is optimistic, not cynical. “Real development is human development”, according to the background paper to the Jomtien conference, and basic education is its “very foundation” (UNESCO, 1990: 1). Though the paper spoke of 'basic education' – a phrase that evokes images of children learning reading, writing, and arithmetic – it was promoting an 'expanded vision', in which 'basic' education went beyond these essential skills to encompass the values that would be transmitted at the secondary school: “Now ... there is a need to reinforce and extend basic education to bring into being forms of sustainable national development that reconcile cultural and technological change within social and economic development” (UNESCO, 1990: 2). As Thompson had noted with regard to education for national unity in Africa, this emphasis on secondary school education clearly “implies a desire to form the minds and outlook of those who are most likely to assume positions of leadership in the society” (1981: 71).

What UNESCO (1990: 8) had in mind was an active citizen with “the skills to participate in a literate, technological world and the knowledge to transform their environment”. Education would provide these tools; to be deprived of it would leave the individual incapable of “modern living” (UNESCO, 1990: 8). Of course, the 'active' citizen would be active in a specific way and for specific ends:

“The satisfaction of these [educational] needs empowers individuals in any society and confers upon them a responsibility to respect and build upon their collective cultural, linguistic and spiritual heritage, to promote the education of others, to further the cause of social justice, to achieve environmental protection, to be tolerant towards social, political and religious systems which differ from their own, ensuring that commonly
accepted humanistic values and human rights are upheld, and to work for international peace and solidarity in an interdependent world.” (UNESCO, 1990: 11)

Just as post-war development education in practice sought to produce people who could react properly to the demands of modernisation, so too is the type of activity envisioned in global citizenship education more adequately described as reactivity to an external motive force. 'Participation in public life' consists here of the individual demanding that the state provide those values inculcated during their education. In effect, education teaches people to want and demand the specific form of social change called development. It helps people “realise their rights” and gives them the skills to demand them (UNESCO, 2012: 3; Hanson, 1964[1966]). Thus 'activity' in this sense becomes asking for something to be given to you, rather than working to provide it for yourself, either individually or collectively. This is quite the opposite of what Humboldt had in mind by activity, and indeed works to suppress it: “He [the citizen] now conceives himself not only irresponsible for the performance of any duty which the State has not expressly imposed upon him, but exonerated at the same time from every personal effort to ameliorate his own condition...” (1792[1854]: 20). It discourages both self-reliance and the ability of individuals to rely on each other, and is thus anathema to individual self-development and social progress. Early in the nineteenth century, Herbert Spencer had argued that this conception of the active citizen, who is active in pre-approved channels, would be the inevitable consequence of adopting the proposals for national education that had at the time started to gain prominence in the Western world:

“For what is meant by saying that a government ought to educate the people? Why should they be educated? What is the education for? Clearly to fit the people for social life — to make them good citizens? And who is to say what are good citizens? The government: there is no other judge. And who is to say how these good citizens may be made? The government: there is no other judge. Hence the proposition is convertible into this — a government ought to mould children into good citizens. ... It must first form for itself a definite conception of a pattern citizen; and having done this, must elaborate such system of discipline as seems best calculated to produce citizens after that pattern.”

(Spencer, 1851: 205)

A similar critique was made by post-development theorists as well as some of their
forebears in the New Left. They approach the problem from a different vantage point but reach the same conclusion. Esteva and Prakash (1998: 112), for example, criticised the 'secular religion' expressed in the UN's Declaration on Human Rights for urging people to demand what they 'need' from the state. Developers have long been trying and failing to provide these services to indigenous peoples; now they need only 'educate' them as to their 'needs' and 'rights', so that they will actually demand these services previously rejected. In doing so, however, people lose the ability to provide for themselves through their communal support networks, and fall into modern ruts: “addictive dependencies on 'social services' that fail to genuinely satisfy or be 'social'” (1998: 113). Helping oneself is seen as irresponsible and unreliable, and community solutions not provided or approved by the political authority are seen as “a form of aggression or subversion.” For both the New Left and the 'old right' demanding one's rights does not constitute activity – with both 'rights' and 'activity' understood in the sense used here. Speaking of a right to aspects of development is a demand for something that has already been created in and for a different context, the product of a prior engagement with internal and external, and hence discourages the kind of activity we have in mind, namely, the kind that consists in placing oneself between internal and external and finding their synthesis anew. A right is a settled question, in principle non-negotiable, and absolute except with regards to other rights:

It is not incompatible with this to acknowledge that there are things that people, by virtue of being people, have a right to. Humboldt's aim in The Limits of State Action (1792[1865]) was as much to argue that individuals had a right to protection from the state as to argue that they ought not, in the interests of human excellence and flourishing, demand any more than that. It is not even incompatible to suggest that there may be, in addition to this, positive rights that individuals ought to be able to claim. The key consideration to this thesis, however, is that if active individuals are central to the internal-external problem their field of action must remain broad, and any additional 'right' that must be provided for them narrows that field. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has 30 articles, sufficiently broad of scope for Esteva and Prakash (1998: 112) to speak of it as a Trojan Horse, together forming a 'manufactured maturity' (Illich, 1971: 60), forcing developing countries down the path followed by Western democracies. This approach, according to Ivan Illich (1971: 2-3), leads to a “progressive underdevelopment of self- and community-reliance.” The problem here is not merely the
imposition of Western ways on the developing world – the critique we have seen levelled at schooling in the developing world since the Phelps-Stokes report – but rather the attitude that its teaching encourages among the poor; namely, that they have a right to be helped. Writes Illich (1971: 60): “Demand for manufactured maturity is a far greater abnegation of self-initiated activity that the demand for manufactured goods. ... By making men abdicate responsibility for their own growth, schools lead many to a kind of spiritual suicide.” Thus students are taught that they and their community cannot or should not provide certain services for themselves, that they cannot develop themselves. Education and schools are here still conceptualised, as in the post-war era, as a bridge between tradition and modernity, with an activist role in the pursuit of social-change-as-development.

If we reject the idea of a deliberately future-oriented education, does education not become a conservative force merely reproducing existing society? As we saw above, John Dewey (1937:235-238) certainly presented the possible roles of the school in such terms: assuming we do not ignore its influence on social change, the school must either help build a new future or maintain what is. This claim mirrors the one we have frequently seen made by development theorists; namely, that the alternative to intentional social change must be conservative of the existing system, with all its follies and injustices. The dichotomy, however, is no less false applied to the field of education. Here again the concept of progress provides a true alternative. Dewey argued that a present-oriented education system would not contribute to social change; we shall now argue that though it would not contribute to social-change-as-development, it is vital to social-change-as-progress.

Much of the thinking on education in the eighteenth century proceeded on the basis of the cultivation metaphor, which describes the vital role of education in the journey from childhood to adulthood. The metaphor comes in a number of variants. Rousseau, for example, in his famous Emile (1762[1921]: 9), envisioned children as seedlings with the potential to blossom into a flower given proper nurturing: “Plants are fashioned by cultivation, man by education.” Similarly Fordyce (1745: 191-2) wrote that: “[A]s the Minds of Children resemble the uncultivated Garden of Nature, their Improvement will be according to the Nature of the Soil, and the Care and Skill of the Gardeners they meet with.” Benjamin Franklin (1749), in a pamphlet on education in colonial America,
compared education with the tilling of soil: “though the American Youth are allow'd not to want Capacity; yet the best Capacities require Cultivation, it being truly with them, as with the best Ground, which unless well tilled and sowed with profitable Seed, produces only ranker Weeds.” Meanwhile Felton compares the child to a rough diamond: “the fairest diamonds are rough till they are polished. ... We are untaught by Nature, and the finest Qualities will grow wild and degenerate, if the mind is not formed by Discipline, and cultivated with an early Care” (1713: 8).

Further examples could be drawn from tracts on education from throughout the eighteenth century; the education as cultivation metaphor was ubiquitous. This is important for an obvious reason: it tells us what these writers thought education was supposed to be. Implied in the metaphor is a conception of education as a process of maturing. The child, the little seedling, contains within the potential to grow into a flower, if their soil provides sufficient nourishment and the gardeners they meet along the way provide proper care. It is, therefore, explicitly teleological; its aim is to turn the child into an adult human, to “initiate him in the Elements of the Perfection of his Being...” (Fordyce, 1745: 197). This has important implications for the curriculum, the most obvious of which being that it must be centrally concerned with what was then called the nature of man, its telos. This is why, as Turnbull put it, “man is the properest study of man.” He continues: “Whatever else one may have learned, if he comes into the world from his schooling and masters a mere stranger to the world, quite unacquainted with the nature, rank, and condition of mankind, and the duties of human life (in its more ordinary circumstances at least) he hath lost his time; he is not educated; he is not prepared for the world; he is not qualified for society; he is not fitted for discharging the proper business of man” (1742[003]: 161; Fordyce, 1745: 30). The 'nature of man' is, of course, an unfashionable phrase these days. It has too often been used as a lazy rationalisation of what is – it is 'human nature' to be selfish, to make war, to care only for one’s own kind, and so forth. As it is used here, however, the phrase does not have such a specific content. As Turnbull saw it, for education to impart to the child an understanding of the nature of 'man' the curriculum would have to address questions concerning

“what is the perfection to which man may be cultivated, and what is the culture and what the means for accomplishing this noble end. And to know the stock, the furniture, with which nature hath favoured man, the best use of this provision, the end for which it is..."
bestowed upon us, the dignity to which we may arrive by the proper cultivation and employment of it; and what is this due culture and best employment of the powers conferred upon us, that make our stock for use and enjoyment.—This is to know man; to know his rank in nature, the end of his creation, and his relation to the universe, and to its supreme Maker and Lord. And thus alone can one know what he was designed for, or what he ought to aim at and intend; what is his best employment and truest good, the noblest and wisest course he can pursue”. (1742[2003]: 164)

Mankind's 'rank in nature' fell between the divine (pure spirit) and the animals (pure appetite), the 'furniture with which nature hath favoured him' being the reason by which an individual could regulate their impulses and become their unique self: “we have it in our power to examine our opinions, and to chastise and correct our fancies, and by this discipline to take off our affections from improper objects, and to place them aright, or according to the true estimations of pleasures and pains” (1742[2003]: 176-177). It was the “chief business of man” to govern oneself according to one's reason, which involves not the suppression of the affections – the passions and imagination – but rather the ability reflect maturely before we choose and the commitment to act accordingly: it is evident, Turnbull said, “that the perfection, the dignity of a being endowed with the power of comparing, computing, judging and choosing, called reason, consists in reason’s holding the reins of government with a steady hand, and letting out or taking in the affections, and directing all their courses according to its best views, upon duly weighing and balancing the consequences of pursuits and actions” (1742[2003]: 164).

Thus Turnbull argued, in light of the 'nature of man,' that one of the most important aims of education was to teach children how to gain self-mastery over their 'affections' by imposing on themselves a set of values and practices which they had made their own.

Education is here based on the belief that “the really valuable power in this universe is not the power over other men, but the power over oneself. This power reflects not only knowledge, but restraint; not only energy, but will. To maintain standards means to develop the capacity to choose and reject, to have so disciplined ones attitudes as to have established an ethical center uniquely oriented to self, producing right conduct in the individual no matter what the conduct of the world around him might be” (Roche, 1969: 80). It is in the formulation of a style or decorum that is uniquely one's own that, in Irving Babbitt's words, “man attains to the truth of his nature” (1919: 128). Thus education was
considered formative because it sought to “powerfully inculcate the views of life and the demands on life that are appropriate to maturity and that are indeed the specific marks, the outward and visible signs, of the inward and spiritual grace of maturity. [T]he establishment of these views and the direction of these demands is what is traditionally meant ... by the word 'education'” (Nock, 1932: 53).

How was this to be achieved, and in what respect do we believe that these adults are the active individuals described above? Before we look at the type of subjects recommended, one point is of vital importance: education is ultimately something that has to be achieved by the individual. The modern expression that one goes to school to 'receive' an education is entirely out of place here. It is clear from the cultivation metaphor that education was thought of as formative, that there was a plant toward which the seedling was progressing; but the child is not taught citizenship, or tolerance, or how to get along with others (all of which have been part of education for development). These may result from education but are not part of it. C.S. Lewis (1944[1974]: 23) described the difference as follows: “When the old [style of education] initiated, the new merely 'conditions.' The old dealt with pupils as grown birds deal with young birds when they teach them to fly; the new deals with them more as the poultry-keeper deals with young birds – making them thus or thus for purposes of which the birds know nothing.” John Locke, who’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education was immensely influential to eighteenth century thinkers, stressed this point: “Every man must some time or other be trusted to himself and his own conduct; and to be a good, a virtuous and able man, one must be made so within. And therefore, what he is to receive from education, what is to sway and influence his life, must be something put into him betimes: Habits woven into the very principles of his nature, and not a counterfeit carriage and dissembled outside ...” (Locke, 1690[1824]: 24). The curriculum was designed, as J.W. Gardner would later put it, to “shift to the individual the burden of pursuing his own education.” The teacher does not form the child, but rather is there to provide the tools, the building blocks, and the example of an educated adult that children will need if they are to cultivate themselves. For, as Percy Shelley reminds us, “[t]he plant must spring again from its seed or it will bear no flower...” (1821: 4)

We might broadly divide education into the three aspects just mentioned – examples, tools, building blocks – with the caveat that they were not intended to be as distinct in
practice as that would imply: all are present at every stage in the child's education, though their relative importance changes. Fordyce divided education into four stages, of which the last, 'commerce with the world,' takes prominence only after school. The other three are infancy (up to 5 years old), domestic (up to 14 years old), and academic (up to 20 years old). On the importance of examples we need not say too much, as this was of primary importance only during the very early years of education – Fordyce's 'infancy' stage. Locke's associationist psychology had taught that the child's mind was susceptible to picking up good and bad habits from an early age, and the earlier they are picked up the more ingrained they become. As the child familiarises himself with the uses of reason – the capacity to understand, compare, judge, etc – the relevance of good examples gradually diminishes. The exception to this is the example set by the teacher, which must, according to Fordyce (1745: 15), always contain "more persuasive and emphatic lessons than all his Precepts." The teacher must live their lessons rather than merely preach them, otherwise their students are likely to reject them.

More relevant here are the other two aspects: the tools and the building blocks. The master tool was, of course, the reason with which nature hath favoured man. Like any tool, the child would require training in order to gain proficiency. Here we find in curriculum proposals from this era (such as Robert Dodsley's The Preceptor and Benjamin Franklin's Education of Youth) familiar subjects such as reading, writing, arithmetic, and English. In addition, there were subjects which have since fallen out of the curriculum, the most prominent of which were oratory or rhetoric, the art of public speaking and argumentation, and logic, the art of thinking. These latter two were rightly considered absolutely vital if the schools were to turn out adults capable of calm judgement and independence of thought. Both analyse statements and arguments, and how they can be used either to discover truths about reality or abused to hide them (Fordyce, 1745: xxiv). Mastery of these subjects would provide the student with "everything ... one needs to know in order to use a language in a disciplined way and to know when others aren't" (Postman, 2000: 163). In short, they teach the student how to think for themselves. This was both a guard against political and religious propaganda and other fallacious arguments made by others, but also key to Turnbull's assertion that individuals ought to examine their own opinions and 'chastise their fancies.'

During this stage the child would also become acquainted with more academic subjects
such as history and geography. At this point, however, they are taught primarily with a view to their formative potential. By introducing the idea of distance in space and time the child gains a sense of perspective, learning that there are many interesting things going on outside their own small part of the world. Benjamin Franklin, in his pamphlet on education, gave this introduction to history a special name: chronology. The child would here learn the 'several principal Epochs' into which the past can be divided, through which they would gain a sense of how long ago some major event happened, “what Princes were Cotemporaries, what States of famous Men flourish'd about that Time, &c.” At the same time, in geography the child would be “required to point out the Places where the greatest Actions were done, to give their old and new Names, with the Bounds, Situation, Extent of the Countries concern'd,&c.” (Franklin, 1749; Dodsley, 1748: xxi) From these studies, according to Jacques Barzun, “[w]hat should be left in the young mind is: the doings and the names of men and women who actually lived on this earth 'like you and me' and the vision of their dress, hairstyles, equipment, and modes of speech. With these fundamentals should go the notion that each of us has a history of our own, each of us is part of the stream of history. [And that] 'one of us in the class' may in the future be 'important historically'” (1984[2002]: 404).

The aim of education for progress, to repeat, was to turn out adults capable of judging, choosing, and acting well in the world. For this, as Turnbull noted, it was necessary to have the type of knowledge of things that could only be gained by formal learning: “wisdom consists in having just ideas of pleasures and pans, true notions of the moments and consequences of different actions and pursuits, whereby we may be able to measure, direct or control our desires or aversions” (1742[2003]: 177). Thus as the child grows older the curriculum becomes increasingly oriented toward academic content – Fordyce's final stage of schooling. The subjects are generally familiar to us, though not all remain in the school curriculum: natural sciences, mathematics, economics, literature, history, law, religion, ethics. Again, however, their role in the formation of mature adults influences how these subjects are presented to the student: they were all to be taught historically. According to William James (1907[1987]: 1243):

“You can give humanistic value to almost anything by teaching it historically. Geology, economics, mechanics, are humanities when taught with reference to the successive achievements of the geniuses to which these sciences owe their being. Not taught thus,
literature remains grammar, art a catalogue, history a list of dates, and natural science a sheet of formulas and weights and measures.”

In practice this meant that the subjects were taught in terms of the knowledge mankind has created about the world (sciences, economics, maths, languages), the values and beliefs past generations have found useful when acting in the world (ethics, law, religion, literature, arts), and, of course, accounts of what they have actually done with their knowledge and values (history). Thus the student, having become acquainted with the nature of man, now surveys and scrutinises “the ... record of what the human mind has hitherto done with those [fundamental] instincts [of mankind]; what it has made out of them; what its successes and failures have been; and what is to be learned from both” (Nock, 1932: 54). Most importantly they were to be taught as that record. Teaching economics historically, for example, would involve not just modern orthodoxies but also past successes and failures, the innovations and struggles which give those orthodoxies contextualising meaning and life. This gives context to the facts the child learns – without which, says Dodsley (1748: xxi), the child would only “darken his mind with a Crowd of unconnected Events.” – as well as providing examples of what the human mind can accomplish in skilful hands, the struggles behind all achievements, and the values and attitudes others have found useful in meeting such struggles.

By the end of their school career, the child, it was hoped, would be furnished with the tools (reason, self-command, vicarious experience) and the building blocks (knowledge, values) with which they could complete their own transformation from seedling to plant, from child to mature adult. The child is then no longer “a mere stranger to the world, quite unacquainted with the nature, rank, and condition of mankind, and the duties of human life...” Rather, they are “prepared for the world ... qualified for society ... [and] fitted for discharging the proper business of man” (Turnbull, 1742[2003]: 161) An understanding of what one is, where one is, and what one sees allows the child to “feel more at home in our inescapably double environment, natural and man-made.” (Barzun, 1991: 95). The individual who is educated in this traditional sense is one in possession of a mind that is both disciplined and experienced: disciplined by the content of its studies, experienced by their historical perspective. It is “a mind that instinctively views any contemporary phenomenon from the vantage point of an immensely long perspective attained through this profound and weighty experience of the human spirit's operations”
(Nock, 1932: 52). It is this ability to stand back from the vicissitudes of life, to judge and compare and choose from a position of knowledge both of oneself and of the outside world that was considered the mark of maturity: “One able to oppose desires, and to call his opinions to account, and furnished with the knowledge of the effects and consequences of actions requisite to shew him how he ought to behave in every case, is qualified for life. But without the latter, one cannot judge, but is in darkness. And knowledge, without the former, can only serve to create remorse for not taking or following its counsels” (Turnbull, 1742[2003]: 177).

The similarities between the role played in the progress of society by this educated adult and by the active individuals described above should now be evident. Convinced, as we have seen, that progress required on the one hand voluntary social interaction and on the other individually structured practices of freedom – that is, societally unlimited and individually teleological social change – education for progress was to turn out the types of individuals who could put the theory into practice. “This educational goal,” says Roche (1969: 14, 22), “might be described as the quest for 'structured freedom,' freedom for the individual to choose within a framework of values ... It is this capacity to choose, limited by the framework we have inherited, which man must come to understand and deal with if he is to be truly 'educated.’” This educated individual is able to perform the task attributed by Cassirer to the individual recipient of cultural forms. Cassirer's individual sees these forms not as something solid to which one must 'adjust' (the goal of education for development), nor as something made up of smaller but equally solid entities from which one might pick and choose. Rather, because they have, thanks to their education, “the will or the ability to penetrate into their genuine centre, into their particular form,” these individuals can turn the apparently solid cultural form back into the spirit Simmel thought was lost (Cassirer, 1942[2000]: 112). It is not, as Simmel believed, the nature of the form itself that is relevant here, but the individual receiving it, and whether that individual is willing and able to judge it for what it is and incorporate it into their self.

There is no methodology to work with here, to tell one where to go and what to look for: only individual judgement of what is relevant. Hence what Goethe thought was the modern thing to say: “But is this really true – is it true for me?” (in Trilling, 1961[2008]: 382). Felton contrasted these approaches to cultural forms in his Dissertation on Reading.
the Classics (1707). He had little respect for those who merely look for and record what various classical authors said on a certain theme, rather than reading the works reflectively and as a whole. He accepts that the latter is necessarily lacking in a rigorous method, but argues that this is not to be held against it: “how many Scribblers are there who observe the [method], and neglect the meaning, and what number of Pedants do we meet with, that keep to the Letter and lose the Spirit?” (1707: ix-x). He compares this with someone taking down a beautiful old building and arranging the different materials into groups. “The materials are certainly very good, but they understand not the Rule of Architecture, as to form these into just and masterly Proportions any more. And yet how beautiful would they stand in another Model upon another Plan!” He advised that the proper way to study and remember the ancients is not through pedantry: one must “relish their way of Writing, enter into their Thoughts, and Imbibe their Sense.” That is, there is no need to imitate the ancients, but rather to enter into their spirit and take inspiration from them. The great schools of artistic endeavour that emerged during the Renaissance, he points out, took inspiration from the Greek artistic spirit, yet are esteemed as original and valuable in their own right. Thus he concludes: “this is what I would have Your Lordship do: Mix and incorporate with those ancient Streams; and tho’ Your own Wit will be improved and heightened by such a strong Infusion, yet the Spirit, the Thought, the Fancy, the Expression which shall flow from Your Pen, will be entirely your own” (1707: 43-47).

For this to work as intended one needs not a method but a framework of values that one has made one's own, a sense of self from which the cultural form can be approached. A self - “that is to say, a solid entity that you can trust, because you have made it yourself and made it well” - which is not a haphazard collection of habit and prejudices and notions but “an ordered set of reflections, conclusions, and convictions” (Barzun, 1991: 199, 200). The formative side of education in the traditional sense aimed to provide students with the tools (logic, rhetoric, language, historical perspective) and the building blocks (history, art, literature, economics, sciences) to construct their own unique sense of self. This solid self, furnished with knowledge and judgement, would provide a reference point, allowing the educated adult to understand and judge the world around and to act in the world based on that judgement from within a framework of values giving meaning to his or her actions. Writes Turnbull (1742[2003]: 162-263):
As mentioned above, one criticism of this approach, which became increasingly prevalent as Progressivism took over education, was that it merely sought to transmit traditional views and ways of life to the young. Worse, those traditions were said to be the product of a world that no longer existed. It seemed both conservative and anachronistic. The old way, Dewey said, was “very much at odds with democracy” as it developed behaviours “in which most individuals are expected to submit constantly and docilely to the authority of superiors” (Dewey and Dewey, 1915: 163). He thought very little of the conception of education based on the cultivation metaphor, mocking the idea that “education is making a little savage into a little man, that there are many virtues as well as facts that have to be taught to all children so that they may as nearly as possible approach the adult standard” (Dewey and Dewey, 1915: 135). Just as Keynes argued that the industrial age called for 'new wisdom' in economics, so Progressive educators such as John and Evelyn Dewey (1915), Harold Rugg and Ann Shumaker (1928), and W.H. Kilpatrick (1918) felt the need for a revolution in education to fit the new age: “We are living to day in a totally new civilization – an order of life utterly unlike that known to men or conceived prior to the nineteenth century. Industrialism has transformed an individualistic order into a mutually interactive group life” (Rugg and Shumaker, 1928: 13). The world, they argued, was now changing at such a rapid pace that there was little point in learning the traditional discipline(s). Children would have to learn practical knowledge and skills, as well as what we would now call 'critical thinking' (which then as now does not involve the study of logic and rhetoric but, as Lionel Trilling (1966: 5) wryly notes, “means to think in the progressive pieties rather than in the conservative pieties.”) The quest for the mature adult, who could structure his or her world and guide their actions according to a well-developed self was not a fit goal for education in the industrial, democratic age. It produced rigid, stubborn individuals who could never be at home in the new world, which
required more adaptable and group-focussed citizens:

“The idea of perfecting an "inner" personality is a sure sign of social divisions. What is called inner is simply that which does not connect with others—which is not capable of free and full communication. What is termed spiritual culture has usually been futile, with something rotten about it, just because it has been conceived as a thing which a man might have internally—and therefore exclusively. What one is as a person is what one is as associated with others, in a free give and take of intercourse.” (Dewey, 1916: 143)

How different from Voltaire's injunction in his Candide (1759[1901]) to cultivate your own garden, according to which each individual's perfection of their own inner personality is a vital component of social progress. How different from Goethe's maxim that “Anything that emancipates the spirit without a corresponding growth in self-mastery, is pernicious.” Rather, 'society' produces its own growth; teaching the child anything but conformity to it clearly has 'something rotten about it.' We can see here why Dewey's ideas were so influential among post-war educators working in development: the world is changing in a certain way, to which the individual must be taught to adjust. This is the new goal of education for the new age. The child must learn, as we have seen, the technical skills required carry out the plans made by others, and the social-democratic values of adjustment.

Education for progress, on the other hand, aimed to turn out individuals who approach life in society as a poet approaches language: with an understanding of its principles, an understanding of the demands it places upon them, a recognition that while it is not wholly their own they can nevertheless, with this understanding and the commitment to act upon it, use it to nourish themselves and others. Progress is teleological at the individual level; education for progress is concerned with how that telos is chosen: “The individual must be free to choose, yet must be provided with a framework of values within which meaningful, civilized choice can take place” (Roche, 1969: 24). It is, to quote Albert J. Nock (1932: 54), “the establishment of certain views of life and the direction of certain demands on life, views and demands which take proper account of the fundamental instincts of mankind, all in due measure and balance; the instinct of workmanship, the instinct of intellect and knowledge, of religion and morals, of beauty and poetry, of social life and manners.” A recent Oxfam (2006: 3) publication, by
contrast, asked that schools produce adults who are “outraged by social injustice” – as if outrage is a suitable foundation for change in society. The 'historical sense' one gains through the vicarious experience of reading history guards against precisely this: seeing the world in terms of extremes, of good and evil. It reminds us that all motives are mixed; that abstract ideas must be filtered through concrete interests and experience. It tells us that there are practical limits to utopias and comforts us with the knowledge that our present-day problems have been and are being faced by others. It guards against the tendency to be taken in by panics and fads.

Whether such a present-oriented educational system contributes positively to social change depends on how one conceptualises social change. One can easily imagine that from the perspective of social-change-as-development, education for progress would seem unreliable and conservative. Recall Papastephanou (2002: 69), for example, describing citizenship education as the means to “prepare the advent of [a cosmopolitan] society” which entails that it is “necessarily and centrally oriented toward the future.” Clearly if the school is no more than a reflection of existing society there is no reason to expect the emergence of the desired future state. However, from the perspective of social-change-as-progress, because it focuses on how the individual acts in the present as the key to progress, it is important to have an education system that instructs the child in how to understand that present and the making of choices within it, based in part on the experiences of past generations. Thus, such an educational system does not, as Dewey claimed, neglect its role in social change. Its envisioned role is based on a different conception of social change: it does not presume to know where the children of today will take society tomorrow; rather, it attempts to ensure that they understand both themselves and what they are changing. The shift from one to the other, writes Richard Weaver (1964: 260-261), was nothing short of a revolution:

“[I]n the past every educational system has reflected to a great extent the social and political constitution of the society which supported it. This was assumed to be a natural and proper thing, since the young were to be trained to take places in the world that existed around them. They were "indoctrinated" with this world because its laws and relations were those by which they were expected to order their lives. In the period just mentioned, however, we have witnessed something never before seen in the form of a systematic attempt to undermine a society's traditions and beliefs through the educational
establishment which is usually employed to maintain them. ... they have issued a virtual call to arms to use publicly created facilities for the purpose of actualizing a concept of society not espoused by the people. The result has been an educational system ... increasingly at war with the aims of the community which authorizes it...."

Properly considered, then, education for progress is not a conservative barrier to social change. Recognising this avoids the dilemma which, as we saw in section II.9, was experienced by post-war educationists working in developing countries. They wanted schools to contribute positively to social change, yet simultaneously knew it was important that they were perceived to be part of the indigenous community. The solution, whereby schools were intended to act as a ‘bridge from tradition to modernity,’ failed because the school remained modern in spirit and was not incorporated into the developing society in the way intended. But the problem itself, the disconnect between the two requirements for the school, exists only when social change is viewed from a particular perspective – social-change-as-development – according to which the school must first be taken out of ‘traditional’ society and made more ‘modern' before it can contribute to social change, whereupon it is returned to society disguised in a manner that will make its modern spirit seem less alien. According to the concept of progress, this dilemma never existed: a school that contributes positively to social change and a school that reflects in spirit ‘the community which authorizes it’ are one and the same thing. A present-oriented education does not merely reproduce existing society, as Dewey believed it would, because it enables people to take conscious possession of their present. Just as a poet has a more conscious relationship with their language than do people who simply grew up with it, so too is that kind of relationship possible with the rest of the social context in which we live.

This understanding of who the educated individual is and why they are key to positive social change fills a gap often left by analysts of the eighteenth century idea of progress who would portray its proponents as naïve idealists. As Peter Gay (1964: ch.9) long argued, although the eighteenth century has often been derided for its apparent ahistorical optimism, for believing that progress was inevitable, for writing off the Middle Ages as a 'blip' in the story of progress, the great histories of this century – Voltaire’s, Vico’s, Gibbon’s – all attest to and investigate the rise to and fall from civilisation. Progress was not something that had been 'done,' nor a thing to be 'achieved' or a problem to be 'solved'
once and for all. It is only in the work of modern development theorists that we find any suggestion that the material progress of society in the West has become automatic and that it can become so elsewhere. Rather, there was a recognition that, as the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset pointed out, “[c]ivilisation is not 'just there,’ it is not self-supporting. It is artificial and requires the artist or the artisan. If you want to make use of the advantages of civilisation, but are not prepared to concern yourself with the upholding of civilisation - you are done. In a trice you find yourself left without civilisation. Just a slip, and when you look around everything has vanished into air. The primitive forest appears in its native state, just as if curtains covering pure Nature had been drawn back” (1930: 61). He warned that forgetting this is a tragic failing. Writing in 1930, he argued that society was producing people who did not

“see the civilisation of the world around [them], but [who use] it as if it were a natural force. The new man wants his motor-car, and enjoys it, but he believes that it is the spontaneous fruit of an Edenic tree. In the depths of his soul he is unaware of the artificial, almost incredible, character of civilisation, and does not extend his enthusiasm for the instruments to the principles which make them possible. ... The principles on which the civilised world – which has to be maintained – is based, simply do not exist for the average man of to-day. He has no interest in the basic cultural values, no solidarity with them, is not prepared to place himself at their service.” (1930: 56, 62)

Around the same time we have seen that Georg Simmel had made a similar observation, attributing the disconnect between individuals and the various cultural forms to a seemingly inevitable tragedy of culture. He believed it was inevitable because the finite forms a culture produces – its arts, laws, morals, economic products, etc. as they actually exist – can never fully satisfy the fluidity of the spirit which produced them. He argued that cultural objects would increasingly “deviate from the direction in which they could incorporate themselves into the personal development of human minds” ((1908[2000]: 72). Ernst Cassirer, we saw above, proposed that Simmel's mistake was to consider only the creator and the created, and to ignore the recipient of the cultural form who can turn it back into the spirit which produced it. If so, the phenomena Simmel attributed to a tragedy of culture are in fact, as y Gasset recognised, evidence of a human failing, a decline in the qualities and attitudes required to act as Cassirer's active recipient. C.S. Lewis (1944[1974]) saw it too, and argued in his short work on education that the decline
of traditional curricula and standards was leading to an 'abolition of man' in the sense which the likes of Turnbull used that word. As we have argued in this section, education for progress aims precisely to create and nourish in the child the capacity and inclination to judge, understand, and incorporate, – all from the perspective of one's individual self and within a framework of values – which the eighteenth century associated with the mature, civilised, educated adult. The mature adult was the key to positive social change because of their capacity to operate in the spaces for voluntary (inter)action opened up by the idea of progress: a good, present-oriented education provided them with, on the one hand, the ability to give meaning to the world based on their own knowledge, values, and convictions, and, on the other, with the understanding of and solidarity with the principles upon which previous generations had built the world they found themselves in which is necessary to change it in compatible ways. Satisfied that it had done this work, the school could send its charges out into the world, confident that although it had not sought to prepare the advent of a desired society, the future of society had not therefore been left to chance or whim.

II.8 – Implications: Development, Progress, and the West

Any attempt to take lessons for the contemporary approach to social change, both theoretically in terms of how it is conceptualised and practically in terms of how it feeds into areas such as education, must take into account an important feature of the modern world, namely, the existence of ‘developed’ nations. For the eighteenth century theorists of progress and education whom we have met in the previous two sections this was not a major concern. For development theorists it is inescapable, however problematic the term ‘developed world' might be. Indeed, the form that the internal-external problem has taken has been, as was mentioned in the introduction, the proper relationship between developed and developing in the process of development. Undoubtedly it is difficult not to be self-conscious of the social change of one's own society when such prominent examples of development exist. In this section the issue how to act 'consciously,' as an active individual, in a world where one is encouraged to act 'self-consciously' according to the powerful example set by e.g. the West (which may also take the form of deliberately rejecting that example) will be considered. It will do so by exploring the place of the experience of the developed world in the process of development in light of the foregoing discussion of the internal-external problem as conceptualised by the concepts of development and progress. The reintroduction of the active individual allows
us to conceptualise the Western example as a focus for creative 'imitation' rather than as a 'monolithic necessity' to be adopted, adapted, or rejected. The implications for an education for progress updated for the modern world will be explored as the section proceeds, along with some potential objections.

The role of the developed world in the process of development is more ambiguous than it first appears – even in modernisation theory, which, we are told, was little more than a 'celebration of the achievements of the advanced industrial countries' (Brohman, 1995: 125). It was argued in Part I that development is a self-conscious understanding of social change, in the sense that it posits that for social change to be positive a society must become aware of its own future and take control of its movement towards it. As Pearson (1970: 6) put it, development “unites ... the belief in progress and the conviction that man can master his destiny.” Thus development requires something outside of the spontaneous, internally-generated change of the society itself in order to turn mere social change into development. The problem is not that the 'internal' element is ignored by development theorists, but rather that while both it and the external force are both necessary they are operating according to different logics. Development theorists have been charged with placing agency in the hands of the developers rather than the developing, but that is only half the story. It is in fact recognised by all that it is the internal which must remain the ultimate font of agency. Thus the problem confronted by development theorists is how to retain a role for the external, though it is understood to impose an alien form, so that change occurs in desirable directions and by desirable means, but to simultaneously give to the internal, which is perceived to be the ultimately creative force, a large enough role such that the external influences will not become 'mere additions' but will constitute genuine and sustainable development.

Consequently, on the understanding social-change-as-development the Western example is emphatically not the great creative force in social change. It is suppressive of the free movement of developing societies. Of the three possible responses Lerner believed developing nations could make to the various elements of the Western example, only adapting and rejecting are creative. ‘Accepting’ is seen as a mere copying of an external model, to which the other two are necessary additions borne of a recognition that development must be something more than that. This is why Samuel Huntington could find more to praise in the Soviet government's interactions with the Third World than he
could in the United States'. The US, he felt, tried to dictate too much to developing nations, while the USSR allowed for far more room to manoeuvre provided the country in questions remained within the Soviet sphere of influence. Learning from the Soviet approach, he believed, would benefit both the US in its fight against communism and the Third World in its quest for development. The difference between 'mainstream' development theory and alternative approaches such as dependency or post-development is on this point rather small, being one of degree rather than principle. All are in agreement that imitation of the external – that is, adopting certain aspects of it without significant alteration – is not a creative act. They differ only in the degree to which they believe that it is a necessary one. Either way, the external is thought of as a force that suppresses the free movement of the internal, and the acceptance of its demands are an acquiescence to power.

We see this, for example, in the modernisation theorists' concern with the 'internal Eurocentrism' of developing societies, which would cause them simply to passively accept Western influences rather than adapting them to their specific context or rejecting them as incompatible with it. It is visible more concretely in policies aimed at protecting indigenous languages from the spread of English or protecting traditional products and methods of production from alternatives imported from overseas. More clearly, however, we can see the implications of this understanding of the relationship between developed, developing, and social change in the realm of education.

The stand-out feature of modern education for development – the variations on 'citizenship education' – is its global outlook. Unsurprisingly many scholars – such as Gough (2002), Jickling and Wals (2007), Manion et al (2011) – have expressed skepticism about the globality of global citizenship education (GCE). Manion et al (2011: 452) argue that GCE is a Western response to Western concerns about “the presumed 'fact' of the development of certain kind of global world economy and society.” Consequently it is “worth interrogating for signs that it is being used to tacitly advance particularly Western perspectives over other culture's views.” For, being a Western rather than a truly global perspective on and response to globalisation, GCE serves to reduce “conceptual space, autonomy, and alternative ways of thinking” (Jickling and Wals, 2007: 4). Accurate as these critiques may be, there is no reason, given the presumed place of the West just mentioned, to believe that it will cause great concern among development
theorists and practitioners, who are presumably aware of their Western influences. For example, Gough's (2002) primary concern is the environment and sustainability in GCE, which he finds to be based on a Western understanding of mankind's relationship with the natural world. However, he must admit that the authors of the work on which he focuses his critique engaged carefully and sympathetically with non-Western alternatives before reaching their conclusions. They are, therefore, well aware of their 'Eurocentrism' (as Gough still insists on calling it) and the change in outlook it will require in many societies.

What has happened – missed in Manion et al.’s (2011) account of education's 'global turn' – is that the perceived 'development of a certain kind of global world economy and society' has required a re-evaluation in what it is in the Western example that is relevant today. Thus Howe and Marshall (1999: 6) argue for the necessity of GCE in the Caribbean based on the new reality of a “Western hegemonic power which is now no longer about repression, but rather characterised by a deceptive subtlety capable of undermining Caribbean sovereignty, dignity, and identity.” As we saw in the previous section, combating this includes some classics such as education regarding democracy and equality, to which are added modern concerns such as respect for diversity and sustainability. These are the new global values, necessary for development to occur in the modern world.

This has an obvious benefit for the advocates of GCE, for it allows them to associate 'bad' citizens with those who have uncritically adopted the subtly hegemonic negative aspects of Western culture. This allows them to avoid the charge that they are essentially criticising a society for not being Western enough. When Howe and Marshall say that the "uninformed citizen" may have “radically different” understandings of the role of women and minorities or of the origins and effects of globalisation, they do so in the context of a Barbadian society they say is currently in the grip of “crass indifference and materialism” (1999: 6, 11). It is the deceptive subtlety of Western political and economic power, rather than any deficiency in the local culture, which necessitates the inculcation of values no less Western in reality yet said to be part of a universal human heritage.

'Protecting' developing societies from excessive Western influence is one of the few areas where the old paternalism of development, so heavily criticised, remains acceptable.
Indeed, with the portrayal of the modernisation approach as being rabidly pro-Western this particular form of paternalism has been disguised as the product of modern enlightened sensibilities. Yet it is at heart little different to the modernisation theorists’ concern with internal Eurocentrism. As times change and our understanding of what it is in the experience of developed nations that is worthy of being shared with others shifts, so the old understanding comes to be seen as less necessary and therefore merely restrictive of the developing world. On that basis it can be reinterpreted as never having had any real concern with the developing world, being merely a celebration of the achievements of the West, as Brohman said of modernisation theory, or an attempt to spread globally what was thought to have worked for the West, as Cyril Black alleged of nineteenth century liberalism. The new approach will be different because it will recognise the central importance of the developing society itself, as Lerner claimed political modernisation would do, and hence become a more inclusive approach to development, as Ban Ki Moon has said of the post-2015 agenda.

It may be thought that this is, in the real world, a reasonable balance. It is not perfect, but is it not idealistic to imagine that the developing world could be a fully active producer of its own development without ‘de-linking’ from the developed world? For better or worse, there exists a developed world, and we would be foolish to ignore it in our pursuit of the world we want. Given that the wealthier nations have knowledge, expertise, or at the very least resources that could be of some benefit to the developing world, why not try to use them even if some of the ‘spontaneity’ with which social change may have occurred in the past is lost? Of course, there are some things which we count as universal aspirations – democracy, equality, etc. – but if development can be pursued without it involving the imposition of a certain way of life, with the wealthier nations using their power not to dictate to the developing world but to facilitate their own conception of positive social change, flavoured with those universal aspirations, would it not be wise to take that course regardless of abstract considerations of what really constitutes an ‘active’ role in social change? At the very least it sounds like a step in the right direction, signalling a recognition that development must be a global conversation in which all can have a voice rather than being a Western story imposed upon the world. However, understanding social change according to the concept of progress, with the active individual at its centre, we can see that the world does not have to settle for this. Re-imagining the place of the developed world is vital to moving development beyond this situation and beyond its past
failures.

The place of the experience of developed societies in the process of development appears differently when viewed according to social-change-as-progress. Thinking of social change as a conscious rather than self-conscious endeavour helps us see how 'imitation' of the external can be a creative act on the part of individuals. Imitation of an external example can be creative from the point of view of conscious social change because the internal and external exist in a relationship given concrete meaning by this imaginative effort of individuals. Take, for example, the issue of gender equality, a key component of the new post-2015 development agenda and an important value for GCE to inculcate. Gender equality is considered not only a good in itself, it is also an instrumental good in relation to development. For instance, it unleashes the creative and productive power of women in economic, political, and social life, thus driving and shaping social change in ways that in principle reflect the entire society rather than just half of it. Now, concepts such as gender equality do not exist in isolation from other concepts because they do not, as Hume pointed out, refer to a 'fact' in the real world. Instead, they refer to other concepts. Gender equality is and must be defined with reference to concepts such as liberty, justice, democracy and so on in a self-referential web (see Dworkin, 2011: Part 1). The totality of this web is the current form of the intellectual, moral, and cultural tradition just mentioned, the reality with which the term gender equality is connected. Incorporating a concept such as gender equality into one's life and worldview involves more than accepting its demands in an abstract way. To do so would be to treat it, as Locke put it, as a 'counterfeit carriage,' in the sense that it has a tendency to assert itself over other concepts when called upon but remains silent when not. Creative imitation involves, in Babbitt's (1919: 18) phrase, an "immediate insight into the universal" – that is, in the present case, an insight into the intellectual, moral, and cultural totality of which the concept is part. As we are here concerned with the interaction of internal and external, developing society and a Western example, we can go further and say that it involves an insight into two totalities: that of the external concept and the internal life into which it is to be placed. Reconciling them is a process that involves subtle refinements of the concept itself and delicate alterations to the strands of the web into which it is to be fitted. Imitation thus conceived is a 'soul to soul encounter,' and insofar as the apprehension of the 'soul' of a thing requires an insight that cannot simply be communicated to someone else it is profoundly creative.
It should go without saying that there is no final definition of this totality. There is no essence or entity that can be approached. At the same time, however, the active individual needs something solid. Out of the abstract and fluid 'conglomerations of huge potential energies' that are the internal and external, the individual must create something concrete and approachable to work with. “Their content exists for us only by virtue of the fact that it is constantly taken possession of anew and as a result always created anew” (Cassirer: 1942[2000]: 111). Once again we find ourselves in the realm of l’esprit de finesse, where the concepts are familiar yet unclear and where only individual judgement can help us find our way. There is a reciprocity here which is too often overlooked. Each attempt to 'define' the Western example, to give definite form to its fluid energy, will be incomplete and ultimately unsatisfactory. This is as inevitable as it is irrelevant. For at the other end of the process there is that being ignored by Simmel: an active individual, for whom this incomplete definition of 'the West' functions as “a working model. It allows us to imagine” (Glissant, 1990[1997]: 169). Or more precisely: it allows us to re-imagine. It is not a rigid form suppressing the free movement of developing societies from which they need to be protected so that they can accept, adapt, and reject aspects of it. Rather, it is as the classical world was to Renaissance Italy: a “conglomeration of huge potential energies, which are only waiting for the moment when they are to come forward again and make themselves manifest in new effects” (Cassirer: 1942[2000]: 113). Thus neither external nor internal is the creative force; only the active individual standing between them, giving them shape and meaning.

Presenting Western ideals as universal and necessary has generally been criticised for silencing alternative voices. Based on the analysis of this thesis we might say instead that the practice should be condemned for failing to provide a 'conversation partner,' a vehicle for the further expression and articulation of the internal conducted by individuals. The problem is not that schools pass on to students Western concepts which suppress their own culture, but that the interaction between them is so heavily mediated (in order to avoid rather than achieve the suppression of the internal wherever possible) that the possibilities for a cultivating encounter are severely reduced. In effect, students are taught to accept some aspects of the Western experience as 'global' things and on that basis – rather than on the basis of 'the things that are part of [them]' as Glissant advised – reject other aspects. This reflects the focus on the place of the developed world, which stems
from the belief that imitating (aspects of) it is not a creative act on the part of the
developing society and hence that the developing society needs to be protected from it in
some measure. The external consequently does not interact with the internal until the
former has been 'sanitised.' When the two do finally meet the external has been largely
emptied of the intellectual, moral, and cultural baggage which filled it with the 'spirit'
necessary for it to serve as a vehicle for transformative engagement. Removing this
baggage means that it has little connection to a reality of its own and consequently no
obvious connection with the 'internal' intellectual, moral, and cultural reality in which the
student exists (Manda, 2007: 36).

Faced with the overbearing power of the Western example the impulse is to make it less
'active.' This has been the goal of modern development theory, but the attempt to 'de-
Westernise' development has the opposite of the desired effect. It upsets what Glissant
calls the 'age-old ways' of cultural interaction, which involved active relay agents who
“needed relative obscurity ... in relation to their perception of the results of their action”
before they could be picked up by the host society. Today, Glissant argues, we have
neutral 'flash agents.' They are neutral not in the sense of being ineffective but in the
sense that they are obscured beneath the spectacle they produce: “what is spectacular
about the agent overrides the continuum of its effect, and masks it through the very
organization of its spectacle” (Glissant, 1990[1997]:166, 177). The neutrality of the
agents of modern cultural interactions – which Glissant finds manifested in international
institutions, globalised ideas and ways of life and so forth – impedes the reciprocal re-
imagining noted above because the context of a concept such as gender equality is
masked beneath the spectacle of the concept itself. As a consequence these agents “send
consciousness hurtling into the sudden certainty that is the possession of the obvious keys
of interaction or, usually, into the assurance that it does not need such keys” (Glissant,
1990[1997]: 166). Where once the neutrality of the Western example came from its
universality, now it comes from the denial of its universality. It is the spectacle thus
produced – the spectacle that sends consciousness hurtling – that it must be possible to
stand back from if the Western example is to be approached by active individuals as a
focus for creative imitation. The Western example – or any other external example – does
not need to be hammered into shapes or expressed in terms that are more 'relevant' to
other societies prior to its interactions with them. It is more important that the sense of
vitality and potential energy, of the concept's complex and varied connection with a
recalcitrant reality, be maintained, for it is this rather than isolated concepts that must be engaged with if the encounter is to be a cultivating one.

Post-colonial theorists have also criticised GCE for ignoring the degree to which the concepts and values it covers are embedded in a Western context, yet because they, too, tend to understand the Western example as an imposition the conclusions they draw are similarly detrimental to the work of the active individual. The post-colonial premise is that the claims to universality present in development education – as taught in both the West and elsewhere – serves to mask and reproduce colonial attitudes and unequal power relationships. Hantzopoulos and Shirazi (2014), for example, studying GCE in Jordan and the United States, argue that the discourses of ‘choice,’ ‘accountability,’ and ‘participation’ surrounding GCE produce and are produced by an image of the citizen which suits the needs to the state in the seemingly inescapable reality of the neo-liberal world economic order. By failing to problematise these concepts GCE reproduces the structures that produced them. Moreover, Andreotti (2006) and Dobson (2006) have argued that by struggling to acknowledge the historical, social, and cultural roots of the injustices it seeks to address (by which they mean the West’s complicity in them) development education leaves people with a vague moral commitment to a common humanity rather than a desire to do justice to those who have been wronged. This, worries Andreotti (2006: 83), “may end up promoting a new civilising mission as the slogan for a generation who take up the ‘burden’ of saving/educating/civilising the world. This generation, encouraged and motivated to ‘make a difference,’ will then project their beliefs and myths as universal and reproduce power relations and violences similar to those in colonial times.” Well-meaning as development education is, if it does not recognise the depth and complexity of the power relations in which it is embedded it will be doomed to reinforce rather than challenge Western superiority.

Development education ought, from this post-colonial perspective, be geared towards confronting and challenging the historical nature of the injustices of the present and the assumptions and attitudes that sustain them. The ‘Through Other Eyes’ project was one attempt to put the theory into practice in Western classrooms. According to Andreotti and de Souza (2008) the project conceptualised four learning aims: 1) learning to unlearn, which involves perceiving our ‘cultural baggage,’ how it came into being, and what sustains it; 2) learning to listen, which involves recognising the limits of our own
perceptions and being receptive of others’; 3) learning to learn, which involves learning how to re-arrange and expand our own perspective, to be comfortable ‘crossing boundaries’ without the desire to turn the other into the self or the self into the other; and 4) learning to reach out, which involves learning, engaging, and teaching with respect and accountability in the unpredictable space in which identities and power and negotiated. It is instructive that they speak, in the first place, of ‘unlearning.’ It is, in this view, the social duty of schools to stand as a bulwark against all the inherited prejudices and assumptions of normalcy that are transmitted to young people via everything from newspapers and entertainment to parents and politicians. A major part of traditional education, argues Spivak (1999: 2), has been to ‘teach’ students to ignore that “[t]he mainstream has never run clean,” amounting to a “sanctioned ignorance.” Western society is trying to reinforce its own position of power relative to the developing world; the great hope for positive social change is an education system that stands against society in order to help its students break the cycle.

This understanding of the social duty of the school permeates the post-colonial educational literature (see e.g. Beverley, 1999; Moore-Gilbert, 1997). Thus Paulo Freire, who in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968[2000]) was one of the first to articulate a post-colonial approach to education, argued that the ‘oppressors’ have created an “unauthentic view of the world” in which the reality of oppression is hidden or justified (Freire, 1968[2000]: 50). Traditional education would only reproduce this false yet powerful ‘reality,’ and thus it was necessary for people to be educated in a way that “presents this very situation ... as a problem. ... A degree of consciousness of their situation leads men to apprehend that situation as a historical reality susceptible to transformation” (1968[2000]: 73). Herein lies the value of ‘unlearning.’ People are submerged in what presents itself as a “dense, enveloping reality” and emerging from it is a step towards consciousness (1968[2000]: 100). Based on this, Freire argued that the eponymous pedagogy would have two parts: first, the world of oppression must be unveiled and the student committed to transforming it; second, the myths of the old order which are confronting the new must themselves be confronted.

Thus it is, from the post-colonial perspective, by unlearning the West and the ‘reality’ that its example creates that the West’s position of power and dominance over our minds will be reduced. Now, ‘unlearning’ implies some prior learning, but it what sense have the
students of development education learnt the social context they are to question? In Freire (1968[2000]: 100), the Latin American poor with whom he is concerned are already ‘submerged’ in the false reality; Spivak speaks of inherited prejudices and a sense of certain things as ‘normal’ (Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 31); Andreotti and de Souza (2008), in their discussion of the Through Other Eyes project, are concerned with the ideas, values, and attitudes written on to our identities by the social context in which we live. In each case the process of learning that which is to be unlearned is rather passive. Students have not held the social context before them as an object of contemplation or study. They are at this stage surely only partially immersed in it and are at best only vaguely aware of its constituent parts and their meaning. TOE used a metaphor to explain that we all have our own experiences, values, and concepts: they are the shoes we wear as we walk through life. What they do not say is that it takes time for a child to grow into shoes that have been handed down by previous generations, to learn how to tie their laces so that the shoes are a help not a hindrance, and to learn how to take such care of their shoes that they can be handed down, marked by another life of use yet still intact, to the next generation.

This is important because the stated aim of these approaches is to encourage critical thought about aspects of our social context that appear natural or universal. This is, as mentioned above, how post-colonial education proposes to deal with the place of the West in the modern world. Yet without prior engagement with the target of ‘unlearning’ there is no foundation for critical thinking. Critical engagement requires the ability to make the object of critique ‘speak’ back to you, and this will not occur if you cannot give it voice. Some vaguely-held prejudices will offer no resistance and thus give students little sense of the recalcitrance of the reality they are confronting. At best the result will be a phenomenon that Lionel Trilling observed in progressive education, namely, the replacement of the conservative pieties by the progressive pieties. It is difficult, for example, to imagine how a person, having gone through development education along the lines of Freire, could come to the conclusion that the capitalist system is just and still be considered to have demonstrated critical thought.

At worst unlearning without learning would result in the distortion of both the target and the critique itself. Some anecdotal evidence may suffice to make this clearer. In essays relating to post-colonialism many students use Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*
(1990[2008]) as an example of Western portrayals of Africans as savage and primitive, because it is an example popular in their reading. In fact, in *Heart of Darkness* and other short stories such as *An Outpost of Progress*, first published in 1899 and 1897 respectively, Conrad effectively mocks the liberal pretensions of later imperialism, but as most of these students do not actually read his work Conrad becomes, in their mind, just another Western imperialist, too submerged in the prejudices of his day to see things from our enlightened perspective. Moreover, without engaging with its target the critique itself loses its nuance and sense of its limitations. The significance and meaning of a rich story, full of insights into the human condition and with a complex relationship with contemporary imperialism, is collapsed into a single word – savages – and thrown out with other examples of imperialistic racism. The part highlighted by the critique becomes the whole, because the rest is unknown and, indeed, not worth knowing.

While post-colonial education envisions school as a place where students learn to think critically about a reality thrust upon them by the rest of society, the conceptualisation of that reality as something passively received, half-formed and vague precisely because it seems ‘normal,’ undermines that goal. There is a significant difference between being able to criticise something and being able to think critically about it. The post-colonial approach focuses on the ability to criticise a world that from the outset is assumed to be unjust in specific ways, and is thus likely to produce individuals who, like the students who saw no need to read Conrad, have little willingness to engage with a society so full of prejudice and injustice. Unlearning something you have never learned amounts to a refusal to learn, a refusal to engage with it on its own terms. Clearly this is not conducive to the active individual’s need to approach the Western example as a ‘conglomeration of potential energies’ rather than as something that is necessarily restrictive. The post-colonial perspective is, like education for development, hampered by the assumption that to contribute to social change schools must in some way stand against society as it currently exists. The concept of progress, as was argued above, denies this and gives schools the task of creating a meaningful present rather than of guiding society towards a more progressive future. The individual is, to be sure, born into and shaped by a social context; but it is only through education that they actually *take possession* of it and make it a part of themselves. Although both may be said to ‘re-produce’ existing society they are of a very different nature, just as the poet ‘possesses’ a language in a different way from the average native speaker. This process of becoming conscious of one's social
context is education in the truest sense of the word: the effort of cultivating a self that is more than a bundle of attitudes, prejudices, and values received from society. It is, from the perspective of education for progress, the social role of schools to start children on this lifelong journey.

An important part of that is what post-colonial education tries to do: point out the constructed and contested nature of most of what makes up our social contexts. Yet individuals must be able to turn those formless conglomerations into something more concrete and personal with which they can act. Engaging with them creatively – as opposed to merely accepting, adapting, or rejecting them – requires the ability to see past the neutralising spectacle produced by the modern world. It requires a mind that refuses to see things in terms of extremes of good and evil; that recognises that all motives are mixed and that no virtue and no vice need imply another; that understands that abstract ideas must be filtered through interests and practicalities; that knows there are limits to utopias but does not let this lead to cynicism; that, seeing how our present-day difficulties have been and are being confronted by others, does not get taken in by panics and fads; and that accepts that we, other people, and the world do not need to be perfect to be good. The education for progress described in the previous section aims to help individuals achieve this, not by providing a clear method or by simply telling students, as the TOE project did, that all cultures have an internal dynamism, but by accustoming their minds to the vision of this human drama. For above all it requires a mind that knows these things not in the abstract but through experience. That experience comes from encountering and engaging with the history, literature, art, poetry, ideas, and values that make up our social contexts.

In order to achieve this what is needed in schools is not less of the West but more of it, approached and taught differently. Development-related concepts with origins in an e.g. Western intellectual tradition ought to be taught as Western concepts rather than as global or universal – even if one believes them to be the latter. With a contextualised understanding of how people have dealt with the issue of e.g. gender equality in the past, how its scope and definition have been contested, and the implications this has had for wider society students will be far more capable of effecting lasting change than if they are taught merely that they ought to be 'outraged by social injustices.' The Western example ought to be treated in schools as Barzun and Trilling argued literature ought to be treated.
There, too, one is confronted with concepts that are in plain view but messy and unfocussed, and 'reading' them requires experienced, individual judgement if they are to be turned into something meaningful. As mentioned in the introduction, they objected to studying modern literature academically because we are already part of the social context that gives life to those works, but they recognised that it was still necessary to have the skills – no longer supplied by the education of their day – to stand back and use that context. Hence their approach to teaching literature: "[T]he group [of students] would read the books assigned and discuss them with the aid of all relevant knowledge – historical, aesthetic, logical, comparative, philosophical, [etc] ... no holds barred. But what was relevant? Ah, that was the purpose of the exercise: to develop judgement to the point where nothing foolish, nothing forced, nothing 'viewy,' nothing unnecessary is used that might stand in the way of understanding and enjoyment" (Barzun, 1989: 83). The judgement thus developed is what is required to act as the 'You' in Cassirer's response to Simmel; the active individual who can approach a cultural form not as something rigid but as something that can be incorporated into them and 'kindle their activity.'

Education for progress, then, would seek neither to deny the 'Western-ness' of the Western example, as GCE does, nor to follow post-colonialism and undermine its influence; rather, education for progress would seek to enable people to stand back from the spectacle produced by the Western example. This will naturally require a broader study of Western thought, art, and history than is presently the case. However, it should not be taken to imply that the Western example is a kind of 'package deal' – that incorporating a concept such as gender equality requires the acceptance of a broad range of the Western developmental experience. This, it is rightly feared, would mean either that 'development' is so uniquely Western that it cannot take root elsewhere or that it must consist in a Westernisation of the world and hence a return to the neo-imperialistic implications of twentieth century development. Such a fear only makes sense if the Western example is viewed as an imposition. Approaching it as a 'multiform elsewhere' raises the question not of whether a concept can be transferred as it is or contorted in order to fit into a new context, but rather of whether it can be confronted in such a way that its vitality can be maintained. This is done precisely by not trying to make it 'relevant' on behalf of someone else. Finding concrete form in this 'conglomeration of huge potential energy' is the first part of the active individual's creative role.
The other side of the coin is a similarly structured but deeper and broader engagement with one's inherited culture, the internal, which is the web into which external concepts are to be fitted. It was argued above that education for progress would be a 'present-oriented' education – that it would enable students to give meaning to their present through an understanding of the past rather than asking them to build a specific future. This present does not have to be twisted and contorted in an effort to make it resemble something that it is not or serve a purpose that is not its own. Again, the urge to make the inherited cultural possession 'relevant' to modern concerns ought to be resisted. Starting plans for schooling, as the GCE proposes, from the values we think it would be useful for children to find in their engagement with their society and the wider world places a significant obstacle between the child and the goal of education for progress. Reading great books (fiction and non-fiction), poetry, traditional songs and so on in order to find lessons on modern understandings of equality, democracy, the rule of law, and tolerance flattens and homogenises one's history and culture, narrowing its relevance to current political concerns and fashions. It implies that 'unfashionable' thinkers can find little connection with their cultural inheritance, and that even for the rest of us its value will fade as attitudes change. Again, it is precisely by to make the cultural inheritance ‘relevant’ to today’s problems that the transcendent, enduring value of that inheritance is indirectly communicated to the next generation and that makes it a worthy focal point source of a sense of belonging. It is the most compelling reason for a student to take possession of 'the things that are part of us.'

All this points to the conclusion that a policy of education for progress would reverse the 'global turn' witnessed in education since the 1990s (Manion et al, 2011; Hutcheson, 2011). Does this not make it quite provincial, quite ethnocentric? The answer must be yes. 'History' to the eighteenth century pedagogue meant national or European history, and 'universal history' was Western civilisation since the Greeks, which dealt with other cultures only as they impact or are impacted by the West. There are, however, good reasons for doing so. Dodsley and Franklin both argued that studying history would not reach its full formative potential if the student had no notion of the historical, social, and geographical context of the events and peoples they were learning about. Mere information is pointless. “No one was ridiculed more in the eighteenth century ... than the pedant, the person who collected information without purpose, without connection to social life” (Postman, 2000: 86). We learn not by accumulating disconnected facts but by
making connections from what we know to what we does not yet know. This is why one's own culture is a logical starting point for the study of history: the child has more existing knowledge to make connections with. Writes Barzun (1991: 72-73): “He or she understands what houses look like, what being married means, and why people go to church or to an election booth. The very words for these and a thousand other things, as well as the motives and feelings linked with the actions or conditions they denote, do not need to be taught at all: they are the well-known facts of daily life.” When one considers that even with this foundation the study of Western history is too great a task to be completed by the time one leaves school, proposals along the lines of teaching the history, arts, and ideas of non-Western cultures – the construction of an other-oriented curriculum (Papastephanou, 2002) – seem sadly impractical. Inevitably, and despite the best of intentions, they descend into mere exotica; students spending a week or two learning about 'African' dance or 'South American' art, for example. The contextualised encounters with non-Western cultures in the universal histories of the eighteenth century are not meant to imply that only the Western world has historical agency or is worthy of deep study; rather, they are to act as a meaningful starting point from which the student can undertake the study of a culture to which their schooling can do no justice. Moreover, the recognition gained through historical study that one's own culture, which initially seems familiar and uniform, is in many ways strange and messy guards against the tendency to see these encounters as all the foreign culture has to offer.

Clearly there is a distancing at work here, and with it an impulse towards the 'us' and 'them' categories we find it so important to break down. Yet the sense of distance gained by this 'provincialism' – by approaching the internal and external as distinct yet formless conglomerations – serves to reduce the apparently overwhelming power of Western influences. Moreover, there is a simultaneous distancing in relation to 'the things that are part of us.' This ability to stand back was the great benefit foreseen by Turnbull and the other theorists of education cited above of their proposals. “Cultivation ... calls for a certain detachment – standing off and looking, comparing, reflecting, concluding” (Barzun, 1991: 201). What convinced them of the need for such an education was the rise of 'public opinion' in the national newspapers and metropolitan coffee shops, through which people were exposed to a cacophony of opinions and ways of seeing the world. Education was intended to help people take a step back from the apparent confusion within their own society and not get swept along in its flow. The prominent position of
the West in the modern world – which similarly subjects the developing world in particular to “the constant influence, the literal in-flowing, of the mental processes of others” (Trilling, 1972: 61) – is a difference of degree not type compared to Turnbull's time and makes his proposals all the more relevant.

Nevertheless, one of the objections raised by the Progressives against what we have called education for progress was that what it taught and how it sought to teach it did not fit the plurality of the modern world. Their rhetoric of educational revolution, as Mirel (2003) has shown, has never truly left us. Where Dewey and others saw a world rapidly changing due to first-world industrialism, post-war development educationists saw a world rapidly changing due to third-world industrialism and modern educational reformers see a world rapidly changing due to globalisation. In each case it was argued that the new world was a more connected world, that individuals and communities could no longer see themselves as separate from one another, and that it was therefore an important task of education to promote the collectiveness and solidarity which the contemporary world was perceived to be lacking. Thus global citizenship education is, according to UNESCO (2012), “a psychosocial framework for collectiveness” which promotes “a sense of belonging to the global community and common humanity, with its presumed members experiencing solidarity and collective identity among themselves and collective responsibility at the global level.” It is certainly true that traditionally schools taught nothing of the sort: they did not teach children how to be tolerant, empathetic, global citizens. It is questionable, however, whether the failure to do so is a valid criticism of an institution which has contact with children for a few hours a day for ten to fifteen years of their life. Citizenship education has its ideal of the citizen just as what we have called education for progress has its ideal of the mature adult. However, as argued above, the task of the schools was to give students the tools and building blocks to effect this themselves. The self each child would create with these tools – as well as a myriad of other influences from their life – adds flesh to the abstract skeleton of the ideal of the mature adult, and must be uniquely and truly their own rather than, in Locke's words, “a counterfeit carriage.” It is a long process, which by no means ends with the child's school career. Education so conceived is ultimately an individual undertaking in which schooling has a clearly and narrowly defined role. Whatever qualities one associates with the educated individual, they were by-products of schooling. Education may be the hope of the world, but schooling alone certainly is not.
By contrast, as we saw above, Oxfam (2006) gives schools the unenviable task of teaching children values such as a commitment to social justice, concern for the environment, self-esteem, a sense of identity, and value and respect for diversity, as well as skills such as the ability to challenge injustice and inequality. The teacher, in addition to imparting knowledge and setting a good example, is asked to be a social worker and a psychiatrist. At best we might say that this is ambitious, at worst, folly. The values we expect of the ‘good citizens’ schools are supposed to turn out – tolerance, democratic participation, concern for social justice, respect for rule of law – are by-products of schooling. You can’t directly teach someone to be tolerant any more than you can teach them to be happy or proud. Tolerance is an attitude, and attitudes are learned by repetition and moralising – neither of which are conducive to good teaching. Soon enough students will catch on and realise that all they need to do is display the outward signs of the appropriate attitude. It does not become a part of them, to be carried with them for the rest of their lives, as it would if it was the result of education rather than schooling.

As Manion et al (2011: 453) argue, the idea present in GCE that something like self-esteem or a commitment to social justice can and ought to be directly taught in schools reflects an “understanding of citizenship as a competence (i.e. as a set of skills and dispositions that individuals can possess).” It suggests that “if all citizens have the right competencies, democracy [or any other positive social outcome] will simply happen.” Certainly not all those who advocate citizenship education have such a simple view of what citizenship is or how democracy can be achieved. But in trying to reduce it to a systematic, teachable subject the end result seems inevitable. Instead, say Manion et al (2011: 453), citizenship should be seen as “an ongoing practice … something people do.” It is an art, and like all arts it cannot be ‘given’ to a student any more than development can be ‘given’ to a society. As Dodsley (1748: xvii) counsels with regards to the teaching of poetry, rhetoric, and drawing, their practice cannot be taught, so “nothing is attempted here but to teach the Mind some general Heads of Observation.” He recognised that the school must limit its activities and ambitions to what is teachable; its role in an individual’s education extends no further. This may not be the most inspiring role for the school to play in social change, but once again we must insist that it is not an abdication of such a role: it is a call to do well what can be done.
Something else to remember when we are told that our rapidly changing world has rendered the educational philosophies of the eighteenth century irrelevant is that the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw significant changes of their own. Indeed, the shift from the horse-and-cart to the steam engine, from a rural and agricultural to an urban and industrial society was greater than anything seen in the twentieth century. It is precisely in times such as these that the classical education shows its true value. The habits of mind it is intended to instil – “of persistent scrutiny, of sensitivity to what is not said but implied, of patient meditation after encountering what is strange” (Barzun, 1987[2002]: 416) – guard against the tendency to get swept up in what others proclaim to be the course of history, to, in Turnbull’s (1742[2003]176) words, “live in a most tumultuous, irregular manner, and be a prey to every specious fancy that may be presented to [the] sense or imagination.” In short, it teaches students that they must deal with a rapidly changing society not by merely adjusting to it or to a perceived future state of it but by understanding the principles upon which the present had been built and by judging it and the changes taking place for themselves from the perspective of the solid self they have built, the inward liberty they have achieved, using the tools and building blocks found at school and elsewhere. The idea that we have to use what is new merely because we can without consulting prior knowledge and understanding is precisely what Goethe’s maxim, cited above, cautioned against: “Anything that emancipates the spirit without a corresponding growth in self-mastery, is pernicious.”

A corollary to the caution that schools can only teach teachable subjects is that they can only teach teachable children. Although perhaps offensive to our modern, democratic sensibilities, the courses of education described by Locke, Turnbull, Dodsley, Felton, and Franklin were not designed with universal education in mind. Indeed, there was a debate in the eighteenth century as to whether education so conceived could even be properly pursued in a classroom setting rather than with an individual tutor. Perhaps by force of argument, perhaps by practicality, the classroom won the day. Nevertheless, it remained a demanding form of education which not everyone was expected to complete. As Thomas Jefferson put it – a little harshly – the school system was to ensure that “the best geniuses shall be raked from the rubbish annually.” At least one commentator, Albert J. Nock (1932: 54-55), attributed the decline of this traditional education to the attempt to democratise it, to make it available to all. “Bring on your children [they said], and we will put them through this process under the sanction of an equalitarian and democratic
theory. It did not work. We discovered almost at once that it did not work, and that apparently there was no way of making it work. The reason it did not work was that this process postulated an educable person, and not everyone is educable.” Nock argued that what other critics saw as a decline in educational standards at the hands of Progressivism – such as vocationalism, the project method etc. – was in fact a succession of failed attempts to make of the classical education something that could be absorbed by all. If true, there would appear to be a conflict between this type of education and the modern goal – human right, even – of education for all.

There are a few points we can make to downplay that conflict, although it remains a limitation of this approach. First, from the perspective expressed here a ‘right’ to an education is a misnomer, education being a result that the individual must achieve for himself. It cannot be guaranteed by an external power. At best we can say that the individual has a right to schooling, and with the goal of ‘schooling for all’ there is no necessary conflict. Still, it would remain the case that if Nock is correct not everyone can benefit from schooling based on the classical understanding of education. A second point, however, is that this overlooks the fact that, as William James argued, “[y]ou can give humanistic value to almost anything by teaching it historically.” This counts for anything from carpentry to chemistry as much as it does for history and literature. The habits of mind that education for progress is intended to instil come from studying historically rather than from studying history. Finally, Nock’s distinction between the educable and non-educable seems rather too rigid. He speaks of educable and non-educable as Jefferson spoke of geniuses and rubbish, but Jefferson certainly did not believe that the 'rubbish' did not benefit from their education. The 'geniuses' were those who performance in school had qualified them to attend university. By that point, however, schooling had already done its work of producing responsible, mature adults – active individuals. John W. Burgess, who founded the first graduate school in the US at Columbia University, recognised this. As Barzun (1989: 17) reports, the two stated aims of his school were “to train teachers who would also do research and to form the minds of future politicians and civil servants. No nonsense about culture. ... He explicitly took it for granted that the applicants for his school would have completed 'their study of universal history and general literature'. ” Similarly, Locke, Turnbull, Dodsley, Felton, and Franklin dealt with schools, not universities. Whereas university provided the opportunity to specialise in an area of interest, the crucial task of constructing a map of intellectual life, filling the mind
with vicarious experience, and generally developing the habits of mind associated with maturity was the task of the child during their school years. This could be so because, as we saw in Felton's analogy, it does not take any special knowledge or technique to function as a mature adult, only experienced judgement: *l'esprit de finesse*. As Trilling put it: “*Our job is not to be intellectual, certainly not to be intellectual in this fashion or that, but merely to be intelligent according to our lights.*”

Being 'intelligent according to our lights' is something everyone can do; it is not the preserve of an intellectual elite. The school's aim is to create stout readers, not scholars (Barzun, 1945[1981]: ch. 11). The latter may be left to the universities. Nevertheless, some conflict between schooling for all and education for progress may remain. Because it is so vital that students truly imbibe what they learn, that they make it a part of themselves, it is of immense benefit if the teacher can tailor the style, pace, and – within limits – content of the lessons to the individual child. For this reason parental guidance or individual tutoring has generally been held up the ideal form of teaching. It has, however, always been economically prohibitive for the vast majority and so with schooling for all parents must turn to the best alternative: mass tutoring. This increases the distance between teacher and student, meaning that there will be some students who struggle to keep up and others who get bored waiting for them. While this much is unavoidable there is no reason to increase the distance further by following a method based on generalities about how 'the child' learns or by imposing a standardised curriculum. As far as possible schooling should approach the ideal of individual tutoring through a combination of good teachers, attentive parents, and some flexibility in the choice of subjects.

Finally we must ask whether this is not a very Western understanding of education, based on a Western understanding of the relationship between individual and society, and hence not necessarily applicable to non-Western contexts. This is certainly an important consideration, although it seems less of a problem for education for progress than for its developmental counterpart. The school is seen as giving meaning to the present by connecting it with the past, rather than being a bridge to a completely different world. Consequently it must necessarily be context-specific if it is to adequately perform its role in social change. In addition, because it downplays the role of the institutional school relative to the individual and the community, education for progress leaves a great deal of a child's education to the latter. Thus it would not, for example, try to demonstrate its
connection to the local context by teaching practices traditionally handed down by the community. Moreover, the situation that gave rise to this type of education and the associated ideal of the mature adult in eighteenth century Europe – the emergence of a 'public' to whose ideas and opinions the individual was exposed – is now a global phenomenon, exacerbated by the emergence of modern telecommunications, to which some response must be made. Whether the response offered by education for progress will prove a valuable source of inspiration outside the Western world is impossible to say, but it certainly is important to recognise that it is not a uniquely modern problem that we are confronting. The knowledge that others have dealt with these difficulties is a sobering one and their experience valuable, even if their approach seems idiosyncratic or irrelevant to a particular circumstance. What has been offered here, it must be remembered, is not a method for schooling to be applied universally but a reason for schooling. Developing a comprehensive education for progress for today or for a specific community will involve taking this raison d'etre, the ideas and principles behind education for progress, and seeing what new meaning we can fill them with. That is, it must be treated as the active individual treats external things.

Clearly that is not a task that can be completed in these pages because it cannot be done in isolation from the internal, but hopefully an example of what is meant will suffice. As Neil Postman has argued, due to the increased importance of technology in our modern world, understanding and judgement now requires a school subject on the history or philosophy of technology. “If we want our students to live intelligently in a technological society, I don’t see how this can be done if they are ignorant of the full meaning and context of technological change” (Postman, 2000: 171; 1996: 39-43). Put simply, the child would study the emergence, implementation, and spread of important technological innovations, from the alphabet and the printing press to the car and the internet, for the positive and negative effects they had on society. He hopes that this will encourage a more critical relationship with technology: a recognition that, being both good and bad, new technologies are not something that society and its institutions must adapt to but rather must be able to incorporate in compatible ways, investigating how they have changed our society in the past and continue to do so in the present. Postman recognises that there is no need for schooling to be forward looking for it to contribute to social change because there is, strictly speaking, “nothing yet to see in the future. If looking ahead means anything, it must mean finding in our own past useful and humane ideas
with which to fill the future. ... I am referring to ideas of which we can say they have advanced our understanding of ourselves, enlarged our definitions of humanness” (Postman, 2000: 13-14). For this reason it fits so well with social-change-as-progress.

Education for progress reminds students that they are already making a political response whenever they act in the world, including their own education. “The recipient does not take the gift as he would a stamped coin. For he can take it up only by using it, and in this use he imprints upon it a new shape” (Cassirer, 1942[2000]: 115). It asks of them only that they leave their imprint with consciousness of its shape, the material in which it is left, and the person making it.

In sum, by conceptualising the Western example as a 'multiform elsewhere' that must be given concrete shape in its interaction, conducted by individuals, with 'the things that are part of us' we can see it not as something inherently oppressive of the free movement of societies but as a potential source of creative energy. Mediating this relationship from the outside – which has been a large part of the task development theorists and practitioners – makes little sense as it is only in this uniquely individual interaction that they gain their temporary shape. This breaks down the one aspect of twentieth century development's paternalism that has survived relatively unscathed, namely, the need for developing societies to be protected from internal Eurocentrism. This has neutralised (in Glissant’s sense) the Western example, taking away its connection with a specific cultural totality and hence making it less amenable to creative 'imitation.' Re-imagining the place of the Western example as part of such creative engagement helps further solidify the active individual’s role at the heart of social change. Education, it was argued, must change to reflect this, with the global turn making way for education for progress with its focus on the knowledge and habits of mind necessary to create an individually meaningful present.

Does this not reduce greatly the place and significance of development theory and theorists in the process of social change? In fact, it will be argued in thesis’ conclusion that this understanding of social change as progress and the active individual's role within it provides a way of doing what development theory has been trying to do since the impasse: make a positive and normative contribution to social change in developing societies from the 'outside' without falling back into the paternalistic or technocratic tendencies of past approaches.
“Soon we will know everything the 18th century didn’t know, and nothing it did, and it will be hard to live with us.”


**Conclusion**

Back in the introduction it was noted that the UN’s post-2015 development agenda was one that seemed oddly uncomfortable in its own skin. This uncomfortableness, it was argued, stems from a failure to reconcile the idea that development must be something done by people rather than for them or to them with the idea that deliberate guidance is absolutely necessary to positive social change – or, in short, the failure the overcome the internal-external problem. Now in the conclusion we can return to the post-2015 agenda, bringing together the arguments made in the intervening pages to outline an alternative way forward for development theory and theorists. Development theorists in the modern facilitator role are in principle envisaged as standing outside the process of deciding where social change is heading and how it occurs – any meddling here could be interpreted as an imposition. Once the ‘world we want’ is clear they may step in to act, accomplishing what others have demanded of them but cannot achieve themselves. Intuitively this seems a wise, sensitive, and uniquely modern compromise. Utilising the understanding of development and progress expressed in this thesis it shall be argued that it is not. In its place, the conclusion will give some consideration to the requirements for a broader theory of progress which takes the centrality of the active individual as a starting point, leading us to an understanding of the development theorist's role based on that of the art critic, who fulfils a normative and 'expert' task which influences change without implying the passivity of the people involved.

The problems of twentieth century development theory lay, by common estimation, in its 'we develop it' mentality; that is, in the arrogance of theorists who presumed to know the universal desires of mankind and assumed that the fulfilment of these desires would involve the re-creation of Western societies across the world. The cure follows from the diagnosis: development theorists must be more humble in their dealings with the developing world. The search for universals must be a collaborative effort and we must recognise that the particulars of our own society cannot simply be transferred to another. At the same time, however, this normative foundation cannot be lost. As Frans Schuurman (2000: 19) put it, the task of development is studies is to “re-establish its
continued relevance to study and to understand processes of exclusion, emancipation and development – not particularly by clinging to its once treasured paradigms but by incorporating creatively the new Zeitgeist without giving up on its normative basis, i.e. the awareness that only with a universal morality of justice is there a future for humanity.” Critical of both the arrogant Eurocentrism they find in development theory's past and the complete rejection of Western influence they find in post-development, many development theorists have counselled precisely this: we ought to steer a middle course between them. Thus Nederveen Pieterse argues that we ought to look through Western history to determine which aspects of it are part of a 'universal human heritage' and which are particularistic and context-specific. The former can legitimately be part of a transfer of contents from developed to developing; the latter cannot and may be disregarded by developing nations. Post-development, according to Nederveen Pieterse (2001a: 30), was correct in its assertion that the supposedly universal truths of capitalist modernity were a “veil of Western ethnocentrism” but wrong to conclude that universals therefore cannot exist. Rather, “the question of what is universal is to be posed anew, not in Eurocentric but in polycentric ways.”

The post-2015 agenda fits neatly into this assessment of the problems of development and the appropriate response to them. When the 'A Million Voices' report says that the post-2015 era cannot be 'business as usual,' it is not referring to the era it is replacing, the Millennium Development Goals which were destined to end in 2015 anyway, but to that semi-mythical era of development where it was not yet known that external intervention alone is not enough to produce positive social change. In contrast to this the post-2015 era will, according to Ban-Ki Moon, be the most inclusive to date. The inclusiveness of the post-2015 agenda is manifested in both its formulation and its content. The former because defining the agenda was a 'bottom-up' process; the latter because the agenda is designed so that the fruits of development reach all members of society. The build-up to the post-2015 era involved a global campaign known as 'The World We Want,' as part of which the UN held consultations on every continent, bringing together people from all walks of life to have their say on what they wanted the new development era to look like. In addition, an associated website featured an online poll through which people could identify the aspects of development that were most important to them. The findings from this process were published in a report entitled 'A Million Voices' – a polycentric statement of the universal aspirations of development. The most immediately striking
feature of the report is that the world we want is, coincidentally, precisely the world that the UN has been advocating since it was founded. It is a world free from poverty and hunger, political persecution and discrimination, ignorance and fear; a world where every child can receive a good education and look forward to secure employment; a world of peaceful societies coexisting with an understanding of the universal humanity underlying their diversity. Looking at how these idealistic aspirations are understood reveals quite clearly that the post-2015 agenda still envisions a world of prosperous, liberal, social-democratic nation-states.

It would be easy to conclude from this that the consultation process functions as a badge of legitimacy rather than providing any formative influence. However, if this were the case we would surely expect it to feature more prominently in the final draft of the post-2015 agenda, which was released in July 2015. A badge of legitimacy must be worn proudly to have any effect, yet the consultation process is alluded to just once. If, however, we look at it with what we have described in this thesis as the concept and tragedy of development, the intention behind the 'World We Want' campaign is clear and familiar: it is an attempt to overcome the internal-external problem, to bridge the divide between the internal and external forces motivating development. The post-2015 approach attempts to resolve the internal-external from the other side, as it were. 'Development' remains a transfer of finished contents from one discrete entity to another – the external to the internal across the border dividing them. Now, however, this transfer occurs only at the request of the internal. The consultations have revealed the world they want; it is for the post-2015 agenda to provide it for them. Thus development theorists take the role of facilitator (a nicer word than 'technocrat') of the autonomous demands of the developing society.

Contemporary development approaches overstate their own novelty by portraying modernisation theory as little more than a celebration of the achievements of the West. This thesis has instead argued that it has always been seen as a key aspect of the development theorist's role to protect developing societies from excessive Eurocentrism. The post-war modernisation theorists were far more clear and in far greater agreement about which aspects of the West ought to be rejected than which ought to be adapted or adopted by the developing nations. The latter were largely at the discretion of the particular developing nation; the former were threatening to social-change-as-
development wherever it occurred. To be rejected were of course the values and practices associated with social change that was not development – represented again by selfishness and materialism. Throughout the modernisation literature these are presented as constant dangers of the development process; they could be kept in check with the help of the knowledge created by development theorists. If it wasn’t for the protection afforded by the development industry, all traditional patterns of life that were not conducive to growth would be swept away. Moreover, one of the costs of economic growth, as identified by Arthur Lewis, was an increase in economism and individualism. If set free, as they would be without proper development policies, a country’s ‘valued patterns of life’ would be threatened from within, by an internal Eurocentrism. These individualistic Western values led young people to abandon their fragile traditional villages and cultures to seek white-collar jobs in the cities. This educated urban minority was regarded as self-seeking and materialistic, and disruptive of attempts to promote community and national development. Disconnected from their traditions, these displaced persons could not hope to be the engine of true development (see e.g. UNESCO, 1961; Thompson, 1981).

Understanding the importance of the threat of this internal Eurocentrism is vital to a full understanding of the modernisation approach. It is an approach that led to a mistrust of the ‘masses’ which has been interpreted by critics as authoritarian and anti-democratic (Kesselman, 1973; Gendzier, 1985). While the policy consequences may have been such, we must recognise the theoretical underpinning as based not on some ill-defined assumption of Western superiority, but rather on a genuine concern that without them developing countries would experience the unguided and hence egoistic and Darwinist social change they believed the West had gone through in the nineteenth century – particularly in an international system which due to the power of the developed nations was deemed “essentially hostile” to the developing (Apter, 1971: 46). The failure to appreciate this results in a failure to move beyond it. The history of development theory has been characterised by a succession of failed attempts to bring the people back in to development, of which the post-2015 agenda is the latest. The search for a middle ground between external or internal dominance is not one that we with our modern sensibilities are uniquely capable of pursuing; rather, it practically defines development.

It has been argued in this thesis that development thinking sees the internal and external motive forces as originally separate because positive social change is conceptualised as a
self-conscious endeavour; that is, something that is deliberately pursued rather than something that happens spontaneously. This is so for two reasons. First, social-change-as-development has a telos in mind. We found this telos expressed in Mill's distinction between the 'art of getting on' and the 'art of living,' Marshall's conception of gentlemanly occupations, and Keynes' predictions for the society of our grandchildren. It was most clearly expressed in the modernisation era by W.W. Rostow in his final, post-mass consumption stage of economic growth. All describe social change as a deliberate harnessing of the unsavoury forces within capitalist society with a view to their abolition. Thus if social change is to be positive, society will need intentional guidance. A society can change without such guidance but it cannot develop. Although this division exists in Mill, Marshall, and Keynes its full significance is not felt because they were concerned with development done by a society to itself along principles that exist throughout it. Marshall did not believe that the development of the working classes needed to be rooted in working class culture, for example. Its full significance is felt when the external foresees a different development than the internal would pursue on its own. Hence lies the significance of Keynes, according to whom society itself was irrationally mired in the 'money motive' and hence incapable of spontaneously producing positive social change. This is the second reason that social-change-as-development must be intentionally given: individuals cannot be trusted to pursue true development. They are either susceptible to or controlled by precisely those forces that require abolition, and hence cannot be trusted to spontaneously effect the transition from the art of getting on to the art of living. However, while development has as a consequence of this often been interpreted as an imposition of alien (i.e. Western) values the very recognition of an internal external problem (in addition to the distinction previously observed by Mill and Marshall) is evidence that development in the post-war era was always more than mere Westernisation. The development of non-Western societies would ultimately have to be rooted in those societies – it could not simply be given from developed to developing. Any attempt to do so would, it was recognised, not be development, as the mere imposition of new forms upon a society would not raise that society to their level, even if they were objectively 'higher' in the linear trajectory of social change.

It is not an assumption of Western superiority that causes the role of people in developing societies to be undermined, but rather the conceptualisation of social-change-as-development itself, according to which deliberate guidance – by those with superior
knowledge of such matters – is necessary for positive social change to occur. Social-
change-as-development's positing of the supremacy of the external as the guiding force of positive social change a truly active role for the internal is precluded. How can one reconcile the sincere desire to conceptualise people as active producers of their own development and the perceived necessity of a conceptualisation of the role of development theory and theorists in which those people must ultimately be passive recipients of development, guided along a proper path? In such situations, where one is confronted with two contradictory yet desirable aspects, there is no neutral middle-ground from which to interpret their relationship. Instead, one side must be given primacy and the other interpreted on that basis. We saw above how this is manifested in the UN's attempts to devise an education for development which would produce active citizens. 'Active,' in this approach, has been interpreted according to the perceived need for the world to be guided toward a new society, and consequently extends little further than demanding the 'rights' that are part of that society. In other words, the role of the 'active citizen' in the creation of a new society consists in demanding that it be created for them.

This is precisely how the 'activity' of developing societies has been interpreted for the post-2015 agenda, which the language of the A Million Voices report makes that quite clear. Bringing together the results of the consultations held across the globe, it at no point states, for example, that participants at the consultation in X stated that they wanted to do Y. Rather, the consultation in X has, according to the report, revealed that participants demand that Y be done. Responsibility for actually 'doing' development has been ceded to those with superior knowledge – the technocrats and development professionals at the UN and development agencies. As previously mentioned, this is not activity in the sense that Humboldt or Cassirer would have understood the term – nor as Illich or Esteva would have understood it, though coming from a different perspective. People in developing societies are here no more active in the process of their own development than a customer in a restaurant is active in the process of cooking their meal – the customer demands, the chef facilitates.

What is missing here, the second part of the thesis has argued, is an 'active individual' standing between internal and external and in whose activity those two conglomerations of energy gain meaningful shape. Although everyone contributes to social change unconsciously – in the sense that any action within a given context alters it in some way –
the active individual is engaged in a conscious relationship with their inherited context and with the external influences which they perceive have made that inherited context appear inadequate in some way. Positive social change according to the concept of progress is something that happens consciously in that it occurs through a deliberate and active engagement with a recalcitrant reality, in much the same way as a poet grapples with the inherited language in order to turn it into a vehicle for the expression of something new. This is a process that takes place at the individual level, occurring on the basis of an individual-level goal. Social change from this perspective is therefore individually teleological. It is not socially teleological because progress does not – and indeed cannot – occur according to societal-level goals. Internal and external are turned from abstract conglomerations of energy into concretely meaningful entities by an act of individual creativity. It is not a self-conscious growth, that is, 'society' deliberately and intentionally acting towards a vision of what it ought to be. Rather, it is the contingent and unplanned (although not therefore unforeseen) outcome of many individual-level teleological actions and interactions. It is conscious by virtue of its engagement with the present, rather than self-conscious by virtue of its engagement with the future: it occurs within and emerges from a given context. This, it must be stressed, quite different from the truism that we need to take the social context into account when making changes to the way a society functions. The linguist in C.S. Lewis' analogy already does this. The changes themselves must emerge from (rather than simply being made in) the inherited context, through an engagement of it with 'the multiform elsewhere,' as Glissant put it. It is not a normative commitment to that inherited context that makes this necessary, but rather the individual-level understanding of social change, the consequence of this being that any change made by an individual must be communicable to others if it is to make a noticeable contribution to social change and not remain a minor idiosyncrasy. Thus according to Cassirer the work – the product of an individual engagement with the internal and external – completes its task by 'kindling the activity of others' and in so doing repeating the cycle. The work once again becomes an external thing – seemingly rigid and unsatisfactory from the point of view of the creator yet able to be incorporated into a new life on the basis of a new understanding and appraisal of it and the inherited context.

Ultimately that engagement with and reconciliation of the internal and external must be an individual one, because only on that level and from that perspective – from the
perspective of one's 'solid self' – can these conglomerations of potential energy be given concrete meaning. In this way the fluidity of cultural forms can be regained, which Simmel recognised was necessary for one to have a cultivating encounter with them: only in this way do they become 'a part of us' and can one grow through them. In this sense, the active individual is akin to Barzun's and Trilling's reader. Both are ultimately on their own, with no method to follow and no pre-made syntheses to adopt. Both find themselves in a world whose interpretation requires l'esprit de finesse. It must be stressed once again that this does not require uncommon ability, precisely because there is no special method to learn and no hidden reality to discover. The active individual is not a genius, nor does one need to be. As cited above, George Orwell, writes Trilling (1955: 157-158), was no genius, but through his example one can see that you don't have to be in order to function as an active individual. His mind is what ours could be

“if we but surrendered a little of the cant that comforts us, if for a few weeks we paid no attention to the little group with which we habitually exchange opinions, if we took our chance of being wrong or inadequate, if we looked at things simply and directly, having in mind only our intention of finding out what they really are, not the prestige of our great intellectual act of looking at them. He tells us that we can understand our political and social life merely be looking around us; he frees us from the need for the inside dope. He implies that our job is not to be intellectual, certainly not to be intellectual in this fashion or that, but merely to be intelligent according to our lights.”

It is the specific type of independence of mind expressed here that education for progress is intended to instil. It became important in eighteenth century Europe when the emergence of an urban 'public' exposed individuals to all manner of ideas, opinions, and practices, and is surely no less important today when internet, television, and radio have made that exposure almost constant. The habits of mind it encourages provides a bulwark against being swept along in what others imagine is the course of history. By teaching historically and with a focus on reading it gives a sense of perspective and proportion, vicarious experience with the strange and unfamiliar, and the “solid Self, full of experience, which stands as a back-stop to the every-day Self, which is engaged in dealing with the vicissitudes of life” (Barzun, 1991: 200). In this sense it is the diametric opposite of modern education for development – the global citizenship education advocated by the UN and major charities and NGOs – which seeks to prepare the advent
of a new society by teaching students to be 'outraged by social injustice' (Oxfam, 2006). Education for progress provides the knowledge of the social world in which action takes place (as opposed to the future which action ought to lead to) and the values and habits of mind to construct the 'solid self' from which action takes place. In short, it gives students the tools that enable them to act consciously in the world.

This understanding of the concept of progress offers a fresh perspective on and response to the challenges faced by development theory in the post-2015 era and beyond. In its attempts to move beyond the perceived problems of twentieth century development the post-2015 approach has counselled humility, understood in contrast to the supposed Western arrogance and blind optimism of the past. It shall be argued here that in doing so it has weakened the very aspect of that period which must, from the perspective of social-change-as-progress, be salvaged: its bold normativity. The post-2015 agenda is certainly bold, in the sense that it sets ambitious targets, and normative, in the sense that it contains a vision of what ought to be, but it is not boldly normative in the way post-war development in particular was. Despite what we now see as the absurdly optimistic belief that the developing nations could 'catch up' within a decade, the modernisation theorists counselled against the impatience they observed in what Daniel Lerner called the 'societies-in-a-hurry' (1958[1966]: 68). They were at pains to remind everyone of how momentous the task of development was, of achieving what the West had achieved and more in a fraction of the time. Following Mill, Marshall, and Keynes they were aware of the fact that the 'fruits' of development lay at the end of a long road which would require letting go of some traditional ways of life and adopting or adapting to aspects of Western civilisation for which they themselves had no love. The art of living comes after the art of getting on. The criticism Rostow – apparently the 'prophet of capitalism – had of the New Left was not that they wanted to abolish capitalism, but that they wanted to do it too early:

“The creation of a setting of assured affluence and security for men and nations – and seeing what man will make of it – is the object of much striving by many hands for social an economic progress and for stable peace. But ... the human community still has a long, hard road ahead on which all it can summon in human dedication and endurance, talent and idealism – and resources – will be required for ultimate success.” (Rostow, 1971: 360)
The present system was not something that could simply be abolished, but that had to be harnessed and overcome. The modernisation theorists did not hide from these difficulties, as Rostow believed the New Left were doing, but tackled them head on. Somewhat paradoxically, it may have been their Eurocentrism that enabled this. They assumed that people in the developing world would want the world people in the West wanted – prosperity, democracy, equality – so they did not need to propagandise it. Instead, they had to remind people in the developing world (and in the developed) that it would not be enough for them to simply want these things: it would involve hard work (intellectual and spiritual as well as manual) and a lot of difficult choices. Critics such as Gilbert Rist have portrayed development as a secular faith in an attempt to make it appear ridiculous, but its post-war era proponents would not have been ashamed of that fact. Indeed, they quite explicitly believed that development required such a narrative in order to give flesh and meaning to the tough choices it entailed.

The post-2015 agenda does try to be inspirational. It still puts forward the bold vision of a world of prosperous, liberal, democratic nation-states and will do what is required to achieve it. Yet one cannot help but feel that it is impatient for the former and ashamed of the latter. Now ideology is seen as a bad thing and big ideas, boldly proclaimed are seen as conversation-stopping. Unwilling to be associated with the old all-encompassing 'faith' of development, which is considered an exercise in Eurocentric arrogance, the UN has soughed with the post-2015 era not a new ideology – in the sense of a coherent body of ideas or a 'grand narrative' – but bureaucracy: development by focus group. While it would seem that the UN has taken on board the idea that social change ought to proceed via a 'global conversation' – to which we shall return in a moment – this has been interpreted quite literally: as people coming together in a given location to talk about a given topic. That significant economic growth and industrialisation will be required if broader development objectives are to be met is rather implicit in the UN's publications, as is the need for many countries to adopt more open, market-oriented economies to secure the required growth. The same can be said for formal institutional structures, bureaucratic rationality, and for Western attitudes toward work, society, and political life. These aspects of development have been swept under the rug, with the focus instead turning to areas such as equality, the environment, and discrimination. That the difficulties and demands of development have been hidden under kinder rhetoric has led some to argue that this is all a ploy to mask the 'capitalist rationality' that is the true nature
of development. A less conspiratorial explanation would be that having imbibed the post-development critiques these manifestations of development have been found guilty, but that having retained our basic conception of social change, they cannot be left out of a development agenda. Thus they are implicit, but difficult to acknowledge and confront.

As a direct consequence, while the words and ideas of the post-2015 agenda sound similar to previous eras they no longer contain that recognition of the recalcitrant nature of the reality they deal with which permits an individual to continue, on their own terms, the task of grappling with them. Its 'democratic' nature, whereby development theorists and practitioners act merely as conduits for the will of the people, may bring it closer to those actually consulted but distances it from everyone else. The 'we' in the 'world we want' is not the UN but the entire world speaking through it and therefore already includes the 'you' whose activity it is supposed to kindle. That 'you' is not the active recipient of ideas as is envisioned by the concept of progress but the passive recipient of the results of a conversation already held. A million voices have already revealed the 'world we want' – the remaining task is to raise the support to give it to us. Thus the approach to formulating the post-2015 agenda gives it a false finality, an impression that this is the final word on the matter and that all that is left is to put it into practice. Consequently it will be no great surprise to see the familiar critiques of development resurface for the post-2015 agenda: that it has become an external force attempting to impose 'development' from without and that the solution is to bring the people back in. William Easterly's recent *Tyranny of Experts* (2014) makes this argument about what Nobel-prize winner Angus Deaton (2015: 411) calls in a review, “a modern development industry that somehow believes that it is possible to 'develop' someone else's country from the outside.” Public action, proposes Easterly (2014: 193) as a solution, must be “democratically demanded by the populace.” This thesis will hopefully remind the reader that such diagnoses and cures have been proposed before, only to founder upon the concept of development and its separation of the internal and the external as the original problem of social change.

The post-2015 agenda is, in short, too concerned with which ideas it is acceptable to put forward; with which 'finished contents' can be transferred from the external to the internal without this being interpreted as an imposition. It seeks an approach to development which everyone can agree on rather than one people can engage with. What it neglects is
the process by which these two terms – internal and external – are given meaning and acquire their significance for individuals; the process by which these ideas would complete their proper task of 'kindling the activity of others.' By failing to explicitly re-think the concept of development the activity of the developing people extends little further than demanding a 'manufactured maturity.' By failing to engage with big ideas it fails to stimulate the individual-level inspiration that is key to large-scale social change. By finding a substitute for ideology in bureaucracy – development by focus groups – it compounds both of these problems. The great challenge of social change now appears as a bureaucratic one, a technical issue of resource allocation. Here we might return to Sachs' ruins metaphor, referred to back in the introduction, and find that it is perhaps more apt than he knew. What he saw was the deconstruction of development thinking, now ripe for reconstruction upon a different scheme – not alternative development but an alternative to development. This deconstruction/reconstruction dichotomy overlooks the fact that a deconstructed edifice may not be completely destroyed. Like a fallen empire, development, as theory and practice, has not disappeared – its ruins are still with us, but its animating spirit has faded. We are rather like the peoples who, after the fall of Rome, took up residence in the Colosseum. We live inside this great but crumbling edifice with the feeling ever-present in the back of our minds that its makers must have intended it for grander purposes than we are now using it; yet we dare not rebuild it, for fear of losing what little we have left.

Social-change-as-progress offers a way forward which reconciles the normative ambitions of development theorists with the activity of developing societies. To allow for a genuinely active role for development people, so that they become producers of their own development, development theory and theorists will indeed need an injection of humility regarding the place and significance of their contribution to the process of social change – a humility of a different kind than offered by the post-2015 understanding. Simultaneously, they will need to regain the explicitly normative and, to a degree, the 'expert' role lost to accusations of Eurocentrism and neo-imperialism. From the perspective of the concept of progress social change is an intellectual, spiritual, and moral problem. It is a problem of ideas and ideologies. And above all it is difficult. It is not a problem that can be solved once and for all but a challenge that must be met repeatedly by individuals on their own terms. It involves choosing ways of living that are incompatible with other possible choices. These are not choices that are made the UN or
by national governments but by people in their everyday lives. How an individual evaluates their society, approaches social change, decides what it means to them and it requires of them, how it is incorporated into their own lives, is not something that can be decided for them at the UN, no matter how many people attend their focus groups. These choices can only be informed by an active and personal engagement with ideas and events, new and inherited, by turning the abstract conglomerations of potential energy we have called internal and external into something tangible.

The idea that social change might operate as a grand conversation has quite rightly caught the imagination, and it would be on much firmer ground with the concept of progress, with its understanding of social change as a conscious rather than self-conscious process and its insistence on the centrality of the active individual. Future thinking about a full theory of progress could fruitfully be based on the conversational model, for conversations are a paradigmatic example of a ‘wandering without getting lost’ beneficial to all involved. Conversations take place between voluntarily and freely interacting rational beings on a foundation of a shared but often unspoken understanding, yet they are crucially different from similarly voluntary relationships, such as contracts, in the sense that they have no directional purpose or goal. Contractual relationships benefit all involved and are geared toward achieving those benefits; conversations also produce many valuable goods – fun, friendship, mutual respect – but these are by-products of an activity that is essentially purposeless. Indeed, to deliberately and explicitly pursue friendship by means of a given conversation, to reform that conversation into a self-consciously friendship-producing device, would be to undermine the nature of the conversation and hence the process by which it results in friendship. The place and significance of the participants in a conversation is fundamentally altered when one of them is clearly pushing it toward a specific end, just as the concept of development’s addition of a purpose to the purposeless process of social change displaced the active individual.

To say that social change ought to be thought of as occurring without a self-conscious purpose is, however, not to deny the possibility of morally evaluating actual social change. The analogy with conversations makes that clear, for while identifying a ‘successful’ conversation may be difficult it is undoubtedly possible to distinguish good and bad conversations. There are rules involved in a good conversation that go far beyond
the libertarian position that anything goes so long as a fight does not break out. Politeness, manners, etiquette, a basic level of knowledge, formal procedures and so on all serve to impose a certain discipline on the participants. These will differ considerably over time and space but the basic purpose remains to facilitate this particular form of social interaction by coordinating the activity of individuals in such a manner that they freely and willingly – even unknowingly – maintain and renew the conditions that make the conversation possible.

At this level – the level of the practices and attitudes that maintain and renew the conversation as an interaction among free and rational beings – a broader theory of progress would require a clear moral framework, despite the fact that specifying in advance a morally desirable end would be out of bounds to the extent that it undermines the fundamental objective of ‘renewing’ the conversation. This was, in part, the moral justification for the ‘present-oriented’ approach to education set out in section II.7 which Roche (1969: 14, 24) described as “the quest for 'structured freedom,' freedom for the individual to choose within a framework of values. ... The individual must be free to choose, yet must be provided with a framework of values within which meaningful, civilized choice can take place.” In other words, it did not set out to prepare the advent of a new society but rather sought to ensure that children became adults capable to the responsible exercise of the freedoms afforded by modern society – adults capable of being good conversation partners.

At this level too we might find the role of the state in a full theory of progress to be something more than a mere nightwatchman. Certainly the state must not be ‘up and doing’ as Marshall proposed, attempting to shape society according to some purpose not already contained within it, yet at the same time the spaces it leaves open for individual action ought not to be a vacuum into which anything but physical harm is permitted to flow. Both would undermine, directly or indirectly, the stability and renewability of conversational relationships. We see here the logic behind some of the arguments made by post-development theorists which have led them to be accused of ‘romanticising the local’ or downplaying the impact of poverty. When Esteva and Prakash (1998: 113), for example, complain of “‘social services' that fail to genuinely satisfy or be 'social’” they do so in memory of local means of poverty relief which were the beneficial by-product of a communal relationship very different to the deal offered by the modern state to its
A theory of progress would surely have to recognise the importance of these local and autonomous institutions created by the voluntary association of active individuals, and impress upon the state a duty to protect rather than undermine them by re-organising them according to a goal that is not their own. This role may extend to the delicate task of protecting the shared identity and common stock of knowledge required to make conversational relationships possible. The point to remember is that it is the role of the state not to prop up particular forms but to ensure that the new forms are protected from excessive incursion by non-conversational relationships, whatever form they may eventually take. Hence the advice offered by Benjamin Constant (1815[1988]: 157) would make an excellent starting point:

“Obey time; do everything what the day calls for; do not be obstinate in keeping up what is collapsing, or too hasty in establishing what seems to announce itself. Remain faithful to justice, which belongs to all ages; respect liberty, which prepares every sort of good; let many things develop without you, and leave to the past its own defence, to the future its own accomplishment.”

It is, of course, quite possible for a conversation to follow a course one finds objectionable, though the standards of good conversation have been followed, in the same way that one might be displeased at the outcome of an election despite acknowledging the validity of the process. At this level too a moral framework must be brought to bear in order to evaluate good and bad social change, and a full theory of progress would need to account for this. Here we might find a role for development theorists within the grand conversation, which would involve neither drowning out other voices nor simply implementing the results. A model for this new role may be found in the art critic. It goes without saying that there are numerous understandings of that role, but inspiration has been taken from Jacques Barzun and Lionel Trilling, with whom the reader will by now be familiar, and the American poet and critic Randall Jarrell (1955[1973]), whose understanding of the role of the critic in relation to art bears some similarities with the aforementioned pair. If the active individual at the heart of social-change-as-progress is akin to their mature reader, the development theorist may find a counterpart in their critic. As we shall, the great benefit is of this role is that its understanding of the relationship
between the critic, the artist, and the public would allow development theorists to make a genuine and empowering contribution to social change without implying the passivity of people in developing societies.

Barzun, Trilling, and Jarrell believed that the critics of their day overstated their own importance in the relationship between criticism and art (Barzun 1989: 19-20; Jarrell, 1955[1973]: 73). At best these critics saw themselves as standing side by side with artists, as creative partners in the production of art. At worst, these critics saw pieces of art as 'raw material' with which they worked, as if they themselves were the real creative force. They argued that art critics should be far more humble than this. Not in the sense of refusing to make bold statements or hiding away from one's own normative position – which is how humility has been interpreted in post-2015 development. Quite the opposite. Humility was instead about recognising that criticism is ancillary to the arts, coming after the ‘feat of creation’ and adding nothing to the work of art as it actually exists (Barzun, 1989: 72; Jarrell, 1955[1973]: 90). Critics are certainly not indispensable to the creation and development of art. Much like the critics opposed by Barzun, Trilling, and Jarrell, development theorists have overstated the significance of their place in social change. The knowledge they create is perceived to be indispensable to positive social change, because in the world of self-conscious social-change-as-development there is a need for them to envision, design, and guide the world towards a new order. Even without a strictly defined telos this guidance remains necessary because the alternative to the world of 'development' is, according to the concept of development, a world of unconscious social change in which individuals remain (or become) mired in a materialistic and selfish individualism. The contribution of development theory is therefore vital to social-change-as-development: positive social change will not occur without it. It is here rather than in its Eurocentrism that the arrogance of development lies, and it is here rather than in its Eurocentrism that humility is needed.

That humility is present in social-change-as-progress, according to which the act of social change occurs at the level of the active individual in their personal engagement with the internal and the external. Because it is a personal engagement development theorists must be thought of as standing outside it – they cannot effect it on behalf of another – yet because it is a conscious rather than a purely spontaneous process they can aid it in some specific ways. The art critic's role is, for Barzun, Trilling, and Jarrell, to help the public
engage with art. From their various writings on this subject we can identify, for the sake of brevity, three functions that enable the critic to perform their role which will be called the ordering, critical, and communicative functions. The role Barzun, Trilling, and Jarrell had in mind for art critics involved them standing as a mediator between the artist and the public, clearing the path to art but adding nothing to it themselves.

The ordering function sees the theorist supply some degree of order and unity to a diverse and messy world. In the world of art this involves establishing connections between artists, tracing influences, and detailing styles, techniques, and approaches. For the development theorist it involves investigating the rules by which the social order hangs together, thereby creating the general ideas according to which the whole or a part of that whole can be understood. Here the development theorist acts as a student of social change. Coyne and Boettke (2006) have contrasted this 'student' function with that of the 'saviour,' where the economist – their primary concern – steps in to cure some ill in the social order. In the latter case, they argue, the desire to understand what can be done takes a back seat to the desire to do something. Because the theorist-as-critic's focus is on the recipient rather than the feat of creation this will not do. Rather, their expert knowledge of the social order – the ideas, concepts, and information they create and disseminate – serves to help others in their interpretation of the workings of the social order and the effects of their actions within it.

The critical function acts as a sort of counter-balance to the ordering function, serving to prevent stagnation in general and in particular solidification into specific categories. It involves taking ideas, practices and so on related to social change that seem rigid, inflexible, or simple and recalling them to their original vitality, implying a recognition of difficulty and complexity (Trilling: 1951[1970]: 14). In development theory as in other intellectual fields ideas and concepts can become sterile and empty. Concepts such as sustainability, empowerment, education, democracy are thrown about as if we know exactly what they mean, but are prone to becoming buzzwords. This happens when ideas lose their connection with concrete reality and become generic 'Good Things,' which makes them seem simple and certain. The critical function tries to prevent this sterility by recalling the complexity, difficulty, and recalcitrance of these concepts. This is important, because it is only when the complexity of a thing is recognised that it can serve as material for the cultivating personal encounter described in section II.5.
The communicative function overlaps with the other two, both of which require communication with the public, but is a little more neutral. It consists for the art critic in making difficult aspects of the art world intelligible to the interested layman (Jarrell, 1955[1973]: 92; Barzun, 1989: 19). It requires knowledge that extends far beyond the bounds of the work itself because it involves, for example, clearing up obscure passages or placing a work that is distant in time or space in its proper context and in a way that is understandable to one's audience. This function serves to bring the work closer to the public, and it is an important function for development theorists to have in their aid of the active individual. New ideas and practices, which are part and parcel of social change, frequently come with more cultural 'baggage' than meets the eye. While the theorist certainly does not need to (and indeed cannot) remove this baggage, which would undermine the recognition of difficulty and complexity involved in the critical function, placing it in its proper context and providing a background for these ideas and practices nevertheless makes them less distant and hence more approachable. In addition, the communicative function involves communicating to people other individuals like them have done in their personal engagements with the internal and external. Consequently, the theorist must be intelligible to non-specialists. Impenetrable jargon may impress one's peers, but it forms a linguistic barrier which prevents the proper functioning of this 'public service' aspect of the development theorist's place in social change.

Applied to social change, these three functions combine to carve out a place for development theorists within social-change-as-progress that is both empowering of others and humble. Social-change-as-progress is about individuals making an active engagement with the internal and external aspects of social change. Active individuals can correspond to the artist or the public depending on the individuality and consciousness of their engagement: the more conscious that engagement is, the more powerful in terms of its potential contribution to actual social change. The development theorist's role is to help individuals make that engagement as conscious as possible: people empower themselves with their engagement with the internal and external; theorists can empower people by making those individual syntheses and changes more conscious. It must be stressed that this is the whole role, and indeed it is precisely the fact that the role extends no further that gives theorists a formative influence. There is no saviour function to be added, nor guide or facilitator. To do so would distract from and diminish the true focus of the role,
which is the consciousness of the active individual. While they cannot, as social-change-as-development proposes they do, effect this reconciliation of internal and external on behalf of others, it being a process that occurs within the individual mind, they can make a positive contribution to the process by helping to give shape and meaning to the inherited context and by presenting new cultural forms as a 'multiform elsewhere' rather than as 'monolithic necessities' (to use Glissant's phrases). Theorists can bring order to the various individual reconciliations occurring, make them intelligible, communicate them to others, and recall them to their original vitality.

As mentioned above, the primary value of this understanding of the role of development theorist lies in its relation to the active individual. In this sense it functions in tandem with education as described earlier. Education for progress aims to create and nourish in the child the capacity and inclination to judge, understand, and incorporate – all from the perspective of one's individual self and within a framework of values – which defines the active individual. Because education is according to this understanding ultimately an individual endeavour rather than a transmission of knowledge from one mind to another, people will not be capable or desirous of educating themselves to the same level. If they were, development theorists would be entirely unnecessary: “Around the throne of God, where all the angels read perfectly, there are no critics – there is no need for them” (Jarrell, 1955[1973]: 90). The critic, lacking a special language that sets them apart or a special technique that affords unique insights invisible to everyone else, is simply a particularly sensitive and voracious 'reader' of art (Jarrell, 1955[1973]: 89). The same is true of the development theorist in social-change-as-progress, who is also simply a particularly good 'reader' of social change. This is not to imply that it is an easy task. As Barzun (1989: 20) puts it: “It is foolish to think that these are tasks for journeyman labor; on the contrary, they require the greatest of tact and sensibility; they call for cultivated minds willing to do a certain amount of drudgery for the sake of giving a jewel the setting it deserves.” It requires broad knowledge – history, economics, politics, culture, ethics, current affairs, as well as an intuitive 'finger on the pulse' of contemporary life and it requires the right mindset – the 'historical sense' described in the introduction.

In sum, the theorist as critic still has an important role to play: they remain 'experts' and regain their normative input, but their influence on social change, like the critic's on the development of art, is based on an evaluation and judgement of the past and the present
rather than a vision for the future and techniques for moving towards it. They do not act as 'saviours,' stepping in to help move social change in pre-approved directions. Ultimately they remain ancillary to the changes that occur rather than productive of them. Their influence works indirectly: they examine and communicate the nature of changes that occur within the world, and by evaluating changes they help popularise some and reject others as incompatible, thereby aiding the individual judgement required to reconcile the internal and external.

This is, we believe, consistent with the contemporary desire to find a place for development theory that recognises the need (normative and pragmatic) for people to be the producers of their own development on the one hand, and the desire for development theorists to have an empowering influence on the course of social change on the other. However, it presupposes a way of thinking about social change which the concept of development does not provide. If we think of social change as something that is self-conscious, as a society acting upon itself or another society with the intention of creating a definite future, this role will seem like an abdication of responsibility, much like Dewey believed that a school that did not educate its students towards a society of the future was neglecting its social duty. If, however, we think of social change as something that happens consciously, with active individuals as mediators of the inherited and the new as they seek new vehicles for their self-expression, the development theorist as critic shows its value. The combination of the 'critic' role and the understanding of social-change-as-progress means that development theorists can limit themselves to this role without thinking they've given up their formative influence on social change and left it to blind forces. Back in section I.3 a line from Gustave de Molinari's *Society of Tomorrow* (1899[1904]: 95) was cited in which he defines the purpose of progress, concluding that, at least with regards the future of society, this cannot be done. This is a social change neither blindly rushing forwards nor dutifully marching towards a goal, but instead a 'wandering without ever getting lost.' To the chagrin of Hodgson Pratt, who wrote the introductory essay to the English translation, it was Molinari's final sentence, as it will be ours. Hopefully the reader will now find it less unsatisfactory than did Pratt.

“Less suffering and more pleasure may be accidents of progress, but they are not its end and purpose. Nor can we define that purpose more clearly than by saying that it is the enlargement of human powers to fit men for a future of which they have no knowledge.”
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