STRATEGIES OF LEGITIMISATION

The Case of Women Driving in Saudi Arabia

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Abstract

Since women are not allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia, two campaigns were launched in June 2011 and October 2013 calling to lift the ban. Both proponents and opponents of women driving have their own reasons to legitimize or de-legitimize women driving. This study is mainly concerned about the use of language as a legitimization tool in society. It seeks to reveal the strategies used by both proponents and opponents on mass media to legitimize their attitudes and to find out how do public react and reflect on this discourse through the little available space of YouTube comments.

The data are in two types and they are all gathered from YouTube; first, videos of TV shows that are uploaded on YouTube representing the mass media content. Second, the online public comments and reflections posted on these videos as the User-Generated Content (UGC). An interdisciplinary framework based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) theory, the researcher adopts a Discourse-Historical approach (DHA) for the analysis of strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (Wodak, 2001). Moreover, employing analytical tools from Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) when needed to gain a deep understanding of the manipulation of linguistic elements to attain legitimization by both parties on mass media (Halliday 1985). Comments posted with regard to lifting the ban on women driving were coded into three responses; *(opposing, support or neutral)*. Comments under each response were monitored and analysed and showed the formation of various discursive themes (e.g. racist, evaluative, supportive, feminist grievance). However, the study originality stems from the fact that it develops and proposes some key strategies of legitimization by applying them in a different social context (Van Leeuwen 1996, 2007; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Reyes, 2011). It also compares and contrasts the legitimation strategies with their similar argumentation schemes *(e.g. Argument from consequence, analogy, expert opinion…etc)* proposed by Douglas Walton (1995). Through comments analysis, the circulation and recurrence of many stereotypical statements, used to demonstrate the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the status quo, was noted.

Dedication

To the Souls of My Mother Fatimah and Father Eid.

Acknowledgement

All praises and thanks go first to Allah the Almighty who supplied me with determination and patience to manage all challenges throughout this work.

I also thank:

My parents and my mother specifically who pushed me and emotionally backed me up.

Prof. Steve Walsh for his continuous support and understanding throughout the research and Dr. Spencer Hazel who joined the supervisory team near the end but his contribution was remarkable.

Declaration

I certify that all materials in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material is included which has been submitted for any other award or qualification.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia is an issue that is globally linked to women's rights and gender inequality. According to the 2014 Global Gender Gap Report, Saudi Arabia is ranked at 141 out of 144 globally, despite recording the region's largest improvement on overall index (economic participation, educational attainment, health and survival and political empowerment) over the past decade. Among numerous related issues in Saudi Arabia, women driving appears as one of the most controversial, yet it remains unsettled. However, to date, only three campaigns calling to lift the ban have been launched in Saudi Arabia. During these three campaigns, the discourse of both proponents and opponents has changed and developed under the influence of the national socio-political situation. For example, in 1990 (during the first campaign) the ban was based on a religious fatwa, while in recent years, religion has been open to women driving; thereby demonstrating a dramatic change in the religious establishment discourse. Regardless of the reason/s behind the ban, the issue of not allowing women to drive has been taken out of context by some advocates and opponents of women driving to probably change or perpetuate the status quo in cases beyond merely women driving.

In the last decade, women rights in Saudi Arabia have progressed considerably in terms of education, work, political participation and judicial amendments. Several consecutive governmental reforms stimulated the public and women in particular, to demand the authorities to take greater steps towards change. The issue of women driving was high on the list of some Saudi activists. During the 2011 and 2013 campaigns, social media paved the way for activists to be part of the public sphere, deliver their initiatives to larger communities nationally or internationally, and therefore gain more support. Overall, calls for women driving trivial gained very limited popularity and women driving is still considered as a secondary issue within Saudi society.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

Considering the importance of language and discourse (what is beyond language) in shaping or maintaining identities, changing social values and naturalising dominance, this research endeavours to investigate how legitimisation is exercised within the discourse of two dichotomous groups. The ban on women driving appears to be a social problem that is seemingly a consequence of gender social inequality. From a linguistic perspective, language has played a significant role in the portrayal of the issue; thus, the study discusses what strategies of legitimisation are used by proponents and opponents of women driving to de-legitimize or legitimize the ban, and what micro-linguistic devices are used to perform legitimacy of Self and de-legitimacy of Other. It seeks to uncover the potential hidden practice of power, exploitation of authority, and hegemony of one group over the other. Through this, the study will result in greater understanding of how social change can be legitimised or de-legitimised through words, thereby minimising the practice of inequality in society. Moreover, the discourse surrounding women driving is similar to other previous or current discourses discussing comparable issues within Saudi society (e.g. girls schooling, shura council participation, feminisation of shops). There is potential for this to raise public awareness and limit unequal power relations between social groups (Fairclough, 1992; Van Dijk, 1993a). It is noteworthy that the issue has significantly greater scope than being for or against women driving; it is a matter that evokes the interrelationship between women, politics and religion. Whenever this subject is brought to the table, somehow religion and politics are involved to varying degrees and used to perform legitimisation or de-legitimisation. Consequently, this study adopts a discourse-historical approach (DHA) that attempts to clarify and understand the problem of the women driving ban by exploring it from the socio-political perspective.

1.3 Research Questions

Taking into account the study's main objectives in providing a wider contextualisation of how legitimisation is constructed and substantiated via discourse, the study attempts to provide a macro-level analysis by answering the following research question:

- What discursive mechanisms do proponents and opponents of women driving cars in Saudi Arabia use to legitimise their arguments?

Furthermore, the study considers the micro-level analysis of this discourse and examines its micro-linguistic mechanism as an essential component in the construction of Self and Other legitimacy. Thus, the study seeks to answer the following sub-question:

- What strategies of legitimisation do proponents and opponents of women driving use to legitimise their arguments in the mass media?
- How do proponents and opponents' arguments in the mass media differ from their counterparts in the online public comments/user-generated content?
- How are the Self and the Other groups represented in the discourse of women driving?

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study contributes to the literature of critical discourse analysis (CDA) by combining and considering the use of social and linguistic theories to tackle a social problem from a critical linguistic perspective; specifically, the ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia. It triangulates three important components in one CDA enterprise; socio-political context, linguistic analysis and argumentation theory. Answering the questions will enhance the understanding of the powerful effect of legitimisation and the aspects of *behind discourse*, which empower these discursive strategies in societies. The study accounts not only for what legitimisation strategies are used but also emphasises the comparison between the discourse and argumentation of two dichotomous groups. The online public opinion is not studied adequately and perhaps neglected despite its power in instigating social change. In this particular study, online comments are regarded as a valuable resource in examining how the public deliver their opinions through user-generated content; thereby yielding new insights into the interrelationship between mass media content (e.g. TV, newspapers) and user-generated content (e.g. online comments, tweets).

Moreover, this study adopts and develops Van Leeuwen's (1996; 2007) four categories of legitimisation, and proposes some new ones by applying them in a different context. It highlights the potential development of legitimisation strategies when they are applied to new contexts and discourses. Furthermore, to the researcher's knowledge, discourse on women driving in Saudi Arabia has not been researched or investigated critically from a linguistic perspective; in particular, investigating the representation of Self and Other, which accounts for a further unique aspect of this study.

1.5 Terminology

	TERMS & ABBREVIATIONS	EXPLANATION
1	CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
2	DHA	Discourse-Historical Approach
3	CL	Critical Linguistics
4	CMC	Computer Mediated Communication
5	UGC	User Generated Content
6	*Fatwa*	A religious opinion presented by a cleric/s
7	*Ulama*	Religious scholars
8	*Qiyas*	Analogical reasoning
9	*Bay'a*	Oath of Allegiance for new rulers
10	*Wah'y*	Revelation from Allah
11	*Khutba*	Religious preaching
12	*Sharia*	The Islamic law
13	*Al-Sahwah*	A religious reforming stream that emerged during late 1960s.
14	*Sadd Aldharayie*	A jurisprudential principle that is coined and heavily adopted by clerics
15	*Sunnah Nabawiya*	The prophetic sayings, actions and silent assertions
16	*Ijma*	The consensus of Ulama upon a specific opinion
17	*Katateeb*	Early forms of schools where education is limited to literacy, the Quran and maths
18	*Shura*	An Arabic word that signifies the state or groups' consultive act prior to making decisions.

1.6 Thesis Layout

This thesis comprises eight chapters. Firstly, an introductory chapter provides a brief illustration of the topic under investigation. The purpose and significance of the study, the research questions and key terminologies are also outlined. The second chapter presents a theoretical background and a framework of the study, reviewing literature and other intrinsic notions related to CDA; for example, discourse, critique, power and ideology. It also discusses the major approach used in this study; namely, DHA with the discursive practice of legitimisation in discourse. Moreover, it explains the notion of the online public sphere represented in the UGC, paying specific attention to YouTube as a central platform in this research.

Chapter Three provides a cultural history in relation to the study, and is divided into four parts. The sections cover: the establishment and sacredness of Saudi Arabia and the formation of its discourse; the principles of legitimisation in Islam; a historical review of Saudi women's status, from its establishment until the present; and a synopsis of mass media and social media in the Kingdom.

Chapter Four presents the research methodology by outlining the historical background of women driving in the Saudi context, alongside a brief biography of speakers. It also touches upon some common critiques and methodological issues related to CDA, and illustrates the conceptual design of the study alongside the data collection and sampling procedure. The chapter concludes by presenting a display of the methodology of analysis for both mass media content and public comments. The data analysis section is distributed over two chapters: Chapter Five represents the analysis of both proponents and opponents discourse on mass media; whereas Chapter Six presents the analysis of public opinion through online comments. Chapter Seven summarises and discusses the findings of the analysis, provides brief answers to the research questions, and compares them with the literature. Finally, a conclusion to the thesis is proposed, highlighting the study limitations, contribution, and recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to provide readers with a general synopsis of the various essential axes about Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and this study in particular. It briefly illustrates the notion of CDA, its objectives and aspirations to social change. Other concepts linked to CDA (*e.g. critique, power. ideology*) will be discussed extensively. Furthermore, a particular attention has been given to the Discourse-Historical Approach (Wodak et al. 1999) -regarding its principles and mechanisms- as the primary analytical approach used in this study. However, parts of the structure and order of this chapter, including some referenced quotations and paraphrasing, were drawn from KhosraviNik (2015). On the macro-argumentative level, legitimisation is debated extensively as a central theme in this study, with particular reference to Van Leeuwen's (1996) four categories of legitimisation (Authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopesis). Finally, a discussion on the concept of the online public sphere and the computer-mediated communication – or user-generated content- has been presented, touching upon YouTube as a public opinion platform from which both types of data (mass media content and user-generated content) have been retrieved.

2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical linguistics, also known as CDA, is considered as a notion of analysing discourse in its various forms seeking a better understanding of any potential occurrence of power abuse, inequality, discrimination among societies from a linguistic perspective. Connerton (1976:20) describes the aim of critical linguistics as "changing or even removing conditions of what is considered to be a false or distorted consciousness". This concept of raising awareness struck a chord with scholars across Britain, Europe and Australia who together were the leading proponents of CDA.

The use of the term *critical* can be linked back to the Frankfurt School, which founded 'critical theory'. Critical theory attempts to provide an accurate interpretation of Marxist philosophy, and the work of Jürgen Habermas shaped its adoption in the social sciences. In language studies, the term 'critical' first took hold in describing the approach of 'critical linguistics,' which emerged in the 1970s and was first used by a group at the University of East Anglia (Fowler et al, 1979). Among other ideas, language was perceived as a tool that could lead to a mystification of social events (e.g. the construction of a passive sentence whereby reference to an agent is concealed might be seen as ideologically motivated) (Chilton, 2008). CDA, though it was situated initially under a host of titles including Critical Language Studies, Critical Language Awareness and Critical Linguistics. Critical Linguistics has been used interchangeably in reference to CDA. Critical theories, including CDA, attempt to convey critical knowledge to allow humans to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through the process of self-reflection. The aim is to achieve 'enlightenment and emancipation' through description and explanation while extracting particular forms of delusion. As described by Pierre Bourdieu's (1991) theories of 'violence symbolique' and '*meconnaisaance*' (lack of knowledge), critical theory endeavours to foster awareness in agents of their personal needs and interests. Fairclough describes 'critique' as 'making visible the interconnectedness of things' (1995: 747).

> critique brings a normative element into analysis…it focuses on what is wrong with a society (an institution, an organisation etc), and how 'wrongs' might be 'righted' or 'mitigated', from a particular normative standpoint. Critique is grounded in values.
>
> (Fairclough, 2010: 7)

Essentially, this addresses the reality that a society denies or hides by claiming to be the opposite of that reality (*e.g. claiming equality while enacting discriminatory laws*). Criticality is linked with the concept of contextualisation in CDA covering both the top-bottom and bottom-top dynamics. Van Dijk (2006) prefers the term Critical Discourse Studies by way of a more generalised term that encompasses critical theory as well as critical applications. He summarises critical studies of discourse to typically analyse and contribute to the solution of a social problem, such as social inequality and social power abuse. Secondly, the analysis within a normative perspective, i.e. standard guide pertaining to international human rights, should critically assess abusive discursive practices and formulate guidelines for effective

intervention and resistance against illegitimate domination. The crucial point is that it is not sufficient to merely describe a social inequality, but to contribute to its solution. Finally, analysis should consider the interests, expertise and resistance of the groups who are the victims of discursive injustice.

However, although CDA emerged primarily in the late 1970s, its development can be attributed broadly to a unique gathering of scholars in the early 1990s. In collaboration with the University of Amsterdam, Teun Van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo Van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak met over a period of two days to share theories and methodologies of discourse analysis, namely that of CDA. The approaches discussed at the time have been since developed and improved to a large extent; however, the meeting served as a catalyst in aiding this early development and progression. The founding collective identified CDA as a school/programme that united competing methodologies and theories together to form a multidisciplinary approach offering an abundance of methods from which to choose (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

Despite these varying methodologies and scholarly influences, Wodak and Meyer highlights the broadly agreed agenda among researchers as comprising of "fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted and legitimised, and so on by language use (or in discourse)" (2001: 2).

2.3 The notion of critique in CDA

Critique is central to the theory of CDA. Both terms critique and critical are used interchangeably in CDA studies with little distinction; this could be attributed to the interdisciplinary nature of CDA as it combines theoretical and methodological reflexivity with socio-political critique (KhosraviNik, 2015). This concurs with the view proffered by Weiss & Wodak (2007), which demands critical analysts be self-critical and considers the term critical as a reflexive process. Unlike other discourse analysts, critical discourse analysts

view themselves as critical of the present social order, taking into account the 'macro' dimension of society rather dealing primarily with text and talk, and hence a typical 'micro' dimension (for example, Van Dijk, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2009; Fairclough, 2010). In a discussion of CDA, Jonathan Potter, indicates that CDA addresses "criticism as if it were intrinsic to the enterprise (and, implicitly, absent from other forms of discourse analysis)" (1996: 227). This highlights that CDA is distinguished because it perceives critique - including self-critique- as the core of any CDA project. This agrees with Wodak and Meyer's view, "Critical theories, thus also CDA, want to produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection. Thus they are aimed at producing enlightenment and emancipation" (2009: 7).

Furthermore, critical discourse analysts tend to see the approaches of conversation analysis and traditional linguistics as 'non-critical', as such approaches disregard the connections between language and power (Wetherell & Potter 1992). Conversely, Van Dijk (1993a) claims that the targets of CDA are power elites that sustain social inequality and injustice. Meanwhile, Fairclough (1985) argues that the notion of critique should include the process of denaturalising the naturalised ideologies, or as he further adds, "Critical implies showing connections and causes that are hidden" (1992: 9). In other words, decoding the operations of ideology discursive practice will conceal features of domination in society (Billig 1995, Van Dijk 1996). This is achieved by providing insight into the mutual effect between social structures and discourse which will enable us to understand social determinations and effects of discourse better. Critique takes into account the wider socio-political context as it plays a major role in shaping discourse (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; Wodak et al., 1994; Resigil & Wodak, 2001, 2009; Baker et al. 2008: KhosraviNik, 2010, 2015). The inclusion of the socio-political context in the process of critique appears to be essential in the CDA principles, the importance of the notion critique can be extracted from the primary objectives of CDA as proposed by Bloor & Bloor (2007: 12):

- to analyse discourse practices that reflect or construct social problems;
- to investigate how ideologies can become frozen in language and find ways to break the ice;
- to increase awareness of how to apply these objectives to specific cases of injustice, prejudice, and misuse of power.

Being critical can be an enterprise that may include different forms of analysis, ranging from the identification of a social problem, the data selection to the methodology of analysis. However, CDA analysts must be aware that their work is driven by the same economic, political and social motives as any other academic work and that they are not in a superior position. “Naming oneself ‘critical’ does only implie specific ethical standards: an intention to make their position, research interests and values explicit and their criteria as transparent as possible without feeling the need to apologise for the critical stance of their work” (Van Leeuwen, 2006: 293). Although CDA tends to take an inductive or deductive approach when explaining the connection between the linguistic analysis and socio-political context, it highlights the necessity to a close examination of microlinguistic categories and macro-argumentative assumptions. The analytical requirement of a particular context can also explain the extent of criticality in CDA. CDA considers the textual-linguistic characteristics as essential but the primary level of analysis. The criticality of CDA is distinctive since CDA researchers endeavour to unmask the mediation between language and society through taking into account macro-sociological structures or socio-historical concepts (KhosraviNik, 2015). “Criticality in CDA is associated with having a reflexive view on both the level of the research methodology and the contextualisation of the findings of the (descriptive) discourse analysis level” (Wodak, as cited in KhosraviNik, 2015: 52). This contextualisation seeks to emphasise the role of the history in the process of production and interpretation and shaping discourse through an interdisciplinary procedure that includes looking at social, psychological and political components (Meyer, 2001). Another significant CDA commitment to critical theory, is its aspiration to engage with actual social change. This stemmed largely from the ideas of the Frankfurt School and critical theory, which both goes beyond the mere descriptive approach to adopt emancipatory insights within the social sciences (KhosraviNik, 2015). Therefore, CDA is not critical because of the methodological identity. Instead this is the result of CDA being rooted in a fundamental critique of social relations (Blommaert, 2005).

However, how discourse is categorized or identified reflects implicitly the notion of critique. In other words, the correspondence between the name of the discussion and the attitude of the analyst can indicate the recognition and engagement with the given discourse, such as discriminatory, feminist and neoliberal speech. As KhosraviNik suggests:

> The subject matter of the critique in this approach to discourse identification becomes mere analysis of the qualities of such discourses because the point of critique should automatically be clear through the discourse-naming process, e.g. feminist discourse entails the critique of sexist ideologies, among other lines. That is, engagement in the critical analysis of these discourses will simultaneously be the operationalization and realization of critique. (2015: 54)

KhosraviNik expands on this by comparing the approach with the 'Wodakian' approach which involves 'macro-topic relatedness' alongside with a potential 'pluri-perspectivity' in attitudes rather than a mono-perspectivity. This Wodakian discourse analysis requires to some extent an autonomous level of justification for critique, in which analysts draw more explicitly on critical theory (2015: 54). Overall, it is important to highlight that most CDA studies tend to avoid engaging specifically in debates of 'critique justification' and find it enough to make some normative assumptions instead.

2.4 The notion of discourse in CDA

It is hard if not impossible to reasonably describe 'Discourse' in one holistic definition that can be applicable across various disciplines of social sciences. This might refer to the constitutive nature of discourse within a society and its function in drawing beliefs, thinking patterns and understandings of social phenomena through language. The term 'discourse' is used frequently to represent both written and oral texts. In CDA, social practices e.g. racism against refugees and xenophobic attitude are thought to be shaped by particular discursive events (Weiss & Wodak, 2007).

Regarding Laclau's social-constructivist approach, discourse is seen as an abstract 'system of meaning-making' where various entities or groups allocated with different values (Laclau et al, 2001). In harmony with Laclau's notion, Jager (2001) highlights that all meanings are extrapolated from an epistemology that is controlled by discourse, and any changes of values and meanings are linked to a change in discourse. Drawing on the Foucauldian perspective of discourse, Jürgen Link defines discourse as "an institutionalised way of talking that regulates and reinforces action and thereby exerts power" (1983: 60). In response to Link's definition, Jager and Maier (2009: 35) portray the image of discourse as being 'a flow of knowledge

throughout time', in which 'different discourses are intimately entangled with each other and together from the giant milling mass of overall societal discourse'. Fairclough (1995) states that the role of language is not limited to the construction of social identities; rather, it is also constitutive in creating paradigms of knowledge and beliefs. This perspective is likely influenced by Systemic Linguistics, since Fairclough views language as having three primary functions: Ideational, Interpersonal and Textual (Halliday, 1994). Similar to CDA, the ideational aspect of language emphasises the use of discourse/language moves beyond being representative of the world; it constitutes, defines and characterises it (KhosraviNik, 2015). Moreover, Fairclough elaborates in explaining the notion of discourse:

> I see discourse as ways of representing aspects of the world- the processes, relations and structures of the material world…different discourses are different perspectives on the world, which in turn depends on their positions in the world, their social and personal identities, and social relationships in which they stand to other people. Discourses not only represent the world as it is (or rather is seen to be), they are also projective imaginaries, representing possible worlds which are different from actual world, and tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions. (2003: 124)

Wetherell and Potter (1992) argue that discourse is thoroughly constitutive and not partially constitutive or only constitutive under some conditions, concluding that reality has different versions in which each is represented through various discourses. However, Weiss and Wodak (2007) highlight a distinguishing factor regarding defining discourse; that is, the level of abstractness. In connection with the sociocognitive theory (Van Dijk, 1984, 1993b, 1998), the Discourse-Historical Approach, view 'discourse' as "a form of knowledge and memory, whereas text illustrates concrete oral utterances or written documents" (Weiss & Wodak, 2007:13). Many CDA scholars, including Wodak and Fairclough, stress the differentiation between the theoretical aspect of discourse and its linguistic recognition. This is also emphasised by Van Dijk who argues that CDA "needs a solid-linguistic basis while understanding language in a broad structural-functional sense" (2001: 112). Although Wodak preserves the view of CDA as a form of social practice, she considers the linguistic element her priority in the 'demystification journey' of a CDA study. She describes discourse as:

> A complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifests themselves within and a cross social fields of action and thematically semiotic, oral and written tokens, very often as 'texts', that belong to specific semiotic types, that is genre. (2001: 66)

Fairclough combines aspects of perspective and topic and considers them as major elements in the process of discourse construction/identification. According to Fairclough, discourse is perceived as "(a) representing some particular part of the world, and (b) representing it from a particular perspective" (as cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 60). Similarly, Chouliaraki views the notion of discourse as 'constitutive of social practice'. She points out that power is obtained through social positions and that a "discourse sets up a constitutive relationship between meaning and power within social practice" (2002: 84). Wodak and Meyer note the similarities in the relationship between discourse and language use, and that between grammar and realised language, they illustrate that "in the same way as grammar characterises the structure of sentences, discourse rules characterise utterances/ texts that are acceptable within a certain practice" (2009: 17). In other words, discourse "implies patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures whereas a text is specific and unique realisation of a discourse", meaning, "a text creates no sense in itself but only in connection with knowledge of the world and of the text" (Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008: 6, 8).

However, it is important to highlight that many CDA scholars do not consider discourse as being restricted to verbal communication. For instance, Bloomaert regards discourse as 'a general mode of semiosis' and describes it as 'language in action' (2005: 2). In a similar way, Van Dijk attempts to compile the different dimensions of discourse under one definition and concludes that discourse:

> [is] at the same time a linguistic (verbal, grammatical) object (meaning sequences of words or sentences), an action (such as an assertion or a threat), a form of social interaction (like a conversation), a social practice (such as a lecture), a mental representation (a meaning, a mental model, an opinion, knowledge), an interactional or communicative event or activity (like parliamentary debates), a cultural product (like a telenovela) or even an economic commodity that is being sold and bought (like a novel).
>
> (Van Dijk, cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 61)

Furthermore, Wodak explains that that although discourse is described as a 'linguistic action', its more accepted interpretation is that it can be realised by in all semiotic forms; e.g. "written, visual or oral communication, verbal or nonverbal, undertaken by social actors in a specific setting determined by social rule, norms and conventions" (2008: 5). In this particular project, discourse is perceived as a medium that plays a role beyond utterances or

written texts, it is a tool by which social identity is represented, power is practiced, and domination is legitimised. Discourse is the way whereby a small group could control large groups willingly.

2.5 Analysis in the context of CDA

Initially, it is essential to understand the interdisciplinary nature of CDA. This is confirmed by several theoretical paradigms, from various schools to achieve its explanatory aspirations. Therefore, CDA is theoretically and methodologically diverse which supplies CDA with a defiant, eclectic aspect (Kendall,2007; Weiss & Wodak 2007; KhosraviNik 2015). Based on research questions and the available data, CDA demonstrates a notable flexibility, offering researchers to choose from a wide range of grand to micro-level theories along with a broad spectrum of methodological frameworks. However, since the central value of CDA is its aspiration to uncover the inequality practice or misuse of power within societies, it is essential to highlight that CDA is heavily interconnected with other disciplines like politics and sociology. Bloor & Bloor argue that: "CDA shares interests, and sometimes methods, with disciplines that study social groups and social structures, such as anthropology, sociology, ethnography and ethnomethodology, and with disciplines that are concerned with human cognition and behaviour, such as cognitive and social psychology" (2007: 2). In other words, at any CDA project, the relationship between the social and the linguistic theories rely heavily on the aspirations of that particular project. This relationship could lead to difficulties when operating the research process (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; KhosraviNik 2015). Weiss & Wodak highlight that "the complex interrelations between discourse and society cannot be analysed adequately unless linguistic and sociological approaches are combined" (2007: 7). Furthermore, Wodak emphasises the need to develop a model of analysis that incorporates a combination of cognitive, linguistics and sociological categories (2006). Moreover, she asserts that CDA researchers should take into account the conceptual tools that relate best to their research questions, rather than questioning the need, or otherwise, for a grand theory (as cited in KhosraviNik, 2015). Seeking to decode the relation between discourse and society, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) depends significantly on the integration of the socio-political, cultural and historical characteristics of society; thereby rendering it highly

eclectic. This eclectic aspect does not appear to be limited to DHA. KhosraviNik points out that "Eclecticism, in any case, seems to be a common analytical feature of most applied CDA studies carried out by different researchers in different contexts" (2015: 63).

However, Chilton (2005) argues that attempts to integrate cognitive procedures within discourse-analytical approaches are to some extent insufficient in relation to their cognitive contents. As a solution, he suggests that a discourse analysis enterprise should adopt an entirely cognitive scheme, giving more attention to human-cognitive capacities. Chilton (2004) claims, if we do so, this will demonstrate how CDA is redundant as bringing nothing new to human knowledge. Nonetheless, such a view seems to minimise CDA's awareness and interest in social change. Wodak highlights that discourse analysis "provides a general framework for problem-oriented social research", and at the same time is open for "the integration of different dimensions of interdisciplinary and multiple perspectives on the object investigated" (Wodak, cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 63). The criticality of discourse studies is not limited to analysis. Indeed, they are critical in terms of theory and application (Van Dijk 2009); thus, "the interdisciplinarity of CDA is not only geared towards academic rigour, it also contributes to critique in terms of commitment to change" (KhosraviNik 2015: 63). In response to Chilton's (2004,2005) arguments, Fairclough acknowledges that cognitively-oriented research on discourse can 'complement the dialectical-relational approach'. nevertheless, he rejects the claim that "an absence of attention to cognitive issues is a 'blindspot' in the approach, still less that it in some sense invalidates the approach" (2009: 183). Fairclough argues:

> The fact that people have cognitive capacities which make them in principle capable of seeing through manipulative intentions and even doing their own political critique (which CDA, far from discounting presupposes) does not mean they are generally capable in practice of seeing through the complex dialectical relations between semiotic and non-semiotic elements which constitute the social, political and economic conditions of their lives. (2009: 183)

Another criticism of CDA was presented by Billig (2008) who alerts analysts to using technical language (particularly, nominalisation and passivisation) in the construction of their CDA research. He argues that critical discourse analysts "sometimes depict language (rather than language-users) as doing things, as if language, or particular forms of language, is the

agent of action" (as cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 64). Meanwhile, many language analysts predominantly use active verbs that commonly attribute agency to humans. He goes on to suggest that "critical analysts can use this way of writing even when warning of the ideological dangers of attributing agency to non-agentic entities" (2008: 793). In response, Van Dijk (2008) refutes this critique and refers to Billig's concern over the use of nominalisation in CDA writings as a 'pseudo-problem' claiming that nominalisations are modestly utilised and that CDA does not consider power as an outcome of language per se. According to Weiss and Wodak (2007) and Fairclough (2008), power can be challenged, manipulated, maximised or minimised by language but it is not driven by language per se, and the context of the language used should be considered within the analysis (as cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 64).

2.6 Power and Ideology within CDA

The notions of power and ideology are core in any critical enterprise and CDA studies in particular since CDA interest is 'revealing structures of power and unmasking ideologies' (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 8). The relationship between language and power yields a particular interest in CDA, Within this context, power refers to 'relations of difference' and, more specifically, to 'the effects of differences' in social structures (Weiss & Wodak, 2007: 15). However, power is indicated not only by grammatical forms within a text, but also by an individual's social status and the control they wield over a group. This could elucidate why CDA typically pays more attention to the language of those in power, 'who are responsible for the existence of inequalities' (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 9). Weiss and Wodak argue that "power does not derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and the long term" (2007: 15). This interpretation does not downplay the role of language in constituting social power at all but explains the interrelationship between both language and power in which the former could strengthen the latter and vice versa. Habermas claims "language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimise relations of organised power. Insofar as the legitimisations of power relations…are not articulated…language is also ideological" (1967: 259).

However, despite the complexity of power relations and the distinct concepts in which it can be defined, CDA is concerned specifically with power 'abuse', which includes unaccepted social practices such as: 'dominance', 'control', 'hegemony' and 'inequality'. Regarding CDA, power is often perceived as being "central for understanding the dynamics and specifics of control (of action) in modern societies, but power remains mostly invisible" (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 10). Similarly, Van Dijk (1993b) argues: "Power involves control, namely by (members of) one group over (those of) other groups. Such control may pertain to action and cognition: that is, a powerful group may limit the freedom of action of others, but also influence their minds" (p. 254). He highlights that power can be exercised directly using 'force' to take control of an action (e.g police Vs. protesters), or through what he calls 'modern' and 'more effective' power, which is exercised subconsciously through 'persuasion', 'dissimulation' or 'manipulation'(Van Dijk, 1993b).

With regard to the relationship between power and language, Fairclough (2001) identifies two major aspects of this relationship; power 'in discourse' and power 'behind discourse'. Power in discourse refers to the exercise and enactment of 'relations of power' within a specific discourse. This could manifest in a face-to-face conversation (e.g. professor vs. student) or a 'cross-cultural' discourse (e.g. job interviewer vs. foreign applicants). Conversely, power behind discourse pertains to the effects of power relations in shaping and constituting the dimensions of social orders within individual institutions or societies (Fairclough, 2001). A remarkable characteristic of 'power behind discourse' is that it often subtly controls access to orders of discourse and elite social institutions or positions (Fairclough 2001). This view concurs with Van Dijk, who claims:

> Lack of power is also measured by its lack of active or controlled access to discourse: in everyday life, most 'ordinary' people only have active access to conversations with family members, friends or colleagues. They have more or less passive access to bureaucrats in public agencies ot to professionals (e.g. doctors, teachers, police officers).
>
> (1993b: 256)

From a post-structuralist view, power is connected primarily to human agency and regarded as a non-transitional practice; whereby no individual/group can be dominant across all discourse. Indeed, an individual/group might be influential in one context and powerless in another (Rudvin 2005; Baker & Ellece 2010). Overall, it seems that there is a consensus

among many CDA analysts that power is not an individual practice. Wodak and Meyer claim "it is rare that a text is the work of only one person" (2009: 10). Fairclough also adds a crucial note and asserts that "power, whether it be 'in' or 'behind' discourse, is never definitely held by any one person" (2001: 36). Furthermore, Van Dijk argues, that power and social dominance are commonly 'organised and institutionalised', therefore they are 'not merely enacted individually', they could be supported by other group members, 'legitimised by law' and 'reproduced by media' (1993b: 255).

Conversely, the concept of ideology is firmly connected to power and therefore, to language/discourse. The ideology/power relationship is manifested in the role that power relations play and underlie many ideological assumptions, and thus, ideologies work as legitimising tools for existing social relations and power variation. Fairclough (2001) depicts the relationship between ideology and language as 'closely linked' and explains that "because using language is the commonest form of social behaviour, and the form of social behaviour where we rely most on 'common-sense' assumptions" (2001: 2). This concurs with Van Dijk's view that, "ideologies are the fundamental social cognitions that reflect the basic aims, interests and values of groups" (1993b: 258). Similarly, Thompson points out that ideology refers to social forms and processes within which, and using which, symbolic forms circulate in the social world (cited in Weiss & Wodak, 2007). For CDA, ideology is perceived as an intrinsic factor in "establishing and maintaining unequal power relations"; therefore, it is not regarded positively (Weiss & Wodak, 2007:14). Another aspect of ideology is that it is mostly inexplicitly exercised and indirectly presented as a typical everyday belief. Van Dik describes ideologies as being "(metaphorically and hence vaguely) be seen as the fundamental cognitive 'programmers' or 'operating systems' that organize and monitor the more specific social attitudes of groups and their members" (1993b: 258). Wodak and Meyer (2009) characterise it as being the more 'hidden and latent' pattern of our common beliefs. Fairclough holds a more Marxist view of ideologies and sees them as discursive practices stemming from particular stances or perspectives:

> Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They may be enacted in ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in ways of being identities (and therefore styles). (Fairclough, 2003: 218)

However, he argues that ideologies can not be 'read off' from texts because 'meanings are produced through interpretations of texts' (Fairclough, 1992: 88-89). Critical analysis of ideology offers us the chance to dismantle the construction of cognitive, vague relationships between ideas and discourse on the one hand and the relationship between ideology and 'mental management' of discourse on the other (Van Dijk 1995, Balfaqeeh 2007).

2.7 The Discourse-Historical Approach

One of the most influential approaches to discourse analysis and CDA, in particular, is DHA, developed by Ruth Wodak and collaborators at Vienna University (Wodak, Menz, Mitten & Stern 1994; Wodak, 1997a; Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart 1999). The DHA claimed to be the most linguistically focused on the approaches; it is concerned with establishing a theory of discourse through a connection of fields of action, genres, discourses and text. It is an approach that works interdisciplinary, multi-methodically and utilises a variety of empirical data to unite the textual and contextual levels of analysis. Although the emergence of DHA was centred on political issues, it "seeks to integrate as many as of the genres of discourse referring to a particular matter as possible, as well as the historical dimension of that issue" (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999: 91). It is known for its openness to interdiciplinarity and combining theoretical discourse studies with ethnographic fieldwork (Baker, Gabrielatos, KhosraviNik, Krzyzanowski, McEnery & Wodak 2008). Together with Van Dijk's approach, DHA constitutes a distinctive paradigm in analysing the presentation of Self and Other (KhosraviNik, 2105). As its name suggests, the DHA pays great attention to the historical dimension of the issue under investigation, by emphasising the historical analysis of 'discourse in place' (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). The DHA distinguishes between 'discourse' and 'text'; it perceives text as being a component of discourse, and characterises discourse as having '(a) a macro-topic relatedness, (b) pluri-perspectivity and (c) argumentativity' as its constitutive elements (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 89). In application, the DHA takes into account three required procedures; 'the content of the data, the discursive strategies employed and the linguistic realisation of these contents and strategies' (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999: 91). Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 95) summarise the most important principles of DHA as follows:

1. The approach is interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinarity involves theory, methods, methodology, research practice and practical application.
2. The approach is problem-oriented.
3. Various theories and methods are combined, wherever integration leads to an adequate understanding and explanation of the research object.
4. Research incorporates fieldwork and ethnography (study from 'inside') if it is required for a thorough analysis and theorising of the object under investigation.
5. Research necessarily moves recursively between theory and empirical data.
6. Numerous genres and public spaces, as well as intertextual and interdiscursive relationships, are studied.
7. Historical context is taken into account in interpreting texts and discourses. A historical orientation permits the reconstruction of how recontexualisation functions as an important process linking texts and discourses intertextually and interdiscursively over time.
8. Categories and tools are not fixed once and for all. They must be elaborated for each analysis, according to the specific problem under investigation.
9. 'Grand theories' often serves as a foundation. In specific analyses, however, 'middle-range theories' frequently provide a better theoretical basis.
10. The application/applicability of results is an important target. Results should be made available to and applied by experts and be communicated to the public.

Compared to other CDA approaches, Wodak and Meyer (2009: 87-119) describe DHA as 'the most linguistically oriented of the approaches'. In comparison with Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach, DHA appears interested in the broader impact of the socio-political events on the process of discourse production and interpretation (KhosraviNik, 2015). Being historically-oriented, the DHA addresses the historical dimension of a discursive act methodologically in two ways: 'The first is the integration of all available information on the historical background and the original course in which discursive 'events' are embedded, the second is the exploration of the ways in which particular types and genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change' (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, cited in KhosraviNik 2015: 69).

2.7.1 *The representation of Self/Other in CDA*

An effective way in the constitution of social power and shaping power relations and ideologies is the construction of group identities within discourses. Group identities equip those in power to preserve their own ascendancy, legitimise inequality, and naturalise discriminatory practice. "Social identities reflect the way individuals and groups internalise established social categories within their societies, such as their cultural (or ethnic) identities, gender identities, class identities, and so on. These social categories shape our ideas about who we think we are, how we want to be seen by others, and the groups to which we belong" (Zevallos, 2011). The group's identification/representations in societies based on race, ethnicity, religion…etc., paves the way for unequal power relations "where hegemonic ideologies enforce a dichotomous representation of Us vs Them" (KhosraviNik, 2015: 71). Andrew Okolie argues:

> Social identities are relational; groups typically define themselves in relation to others. This is because identity has little meaning without the "other". So, by defining itself a group defines others. Identity is rarely claimed or assigned for its own sake. These definitions of self and others have purposes and consequences. They are tied to rewards and punishment, which may be material or symbolic. There is usually an expectation of gain or loss as a consequence of identity claims. This is why identities are contested. Power is implicated here, and because groups do not have equal powers to define both *self* and the *other*, the consequences reflect these power differentials. Often notions of superiority and inferiority are embedded in particular identities. (2003: 2)

Whether through media, education, law or even politicians statements, language contributes significantly to the construction of Self and Other group/s. Moving from the theoretical level to the operational level, DHA (Wodak, 2001) proposes a set of strategies, utilised in varying degrees in analysing the prejudiced discourses against the minority out-groups. These include: *Referential strategies* which aim to construct the in-groups and out-groups through membership categorization devices such as: biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches; *Predicational strategies* which occur by labelling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively through the use of some stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits; *Argumentation*

strategies which rely on some *topoi*[1] in the justification of positive or negative attributions, political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment of the receptive persons or groups; *Perspectivation* where speakers express their involvement in discourse, and position their point of view; finally *Intensification and mitigation* which aim to modify the epistemic status of a proposition through emphasizing or de-emphasizing the illocutionary force or discriminatory utterances (see Table 1, p.24).

Nevertheless, the contemplation of all or some of these strategies is determined by the type of data and the socio-political characteristics of the context. In the interest of the dichotomous representation of Us vs Them, many studies explore the construction of Self and Other group in discriminatory discourses and discuss various functions of these strategies (Wodak et al., 1990; Wodak & Matouscheck, 1993; Wodak et al., 1994; Wodak et al., 1999; Resigil & Wodak, 2001, 2009; KhosraviNik, 2015). These studies have developed an analytical paradigm that embraces strategies of argumentation, perspectiviation and mitigation together with topoi analysis. Other studies integrate features from cognitive psychology (Van Dijk 1987, 1989, 1991; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) and investigate how social practices; for example, racism and ethnic prejudice are exercised through the construction of in-group and out-group.

[1] Reisigl and Wodak (2001) characterize topoi as "parts of argumentation which belongs to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises" (2001: 5-74). They justify the transition from the argument to the conclusion.

Table 1. Strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (*adapted from Wodak, 2001*)

Strategies	*Objective*	*Devices*	*Examples from the news corpus*
Referential/Nomination	Construction of in-groups and out-groups	Membership categorization Biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies Synecdoches	'. . . the **pitiful convoy**' '. . . an **army** of 110,000 Iraqi refugees'
Predication	Labelling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively	Stereotypical, evaluative attribution of negative or positive traits Implicit and explicit predicates	'Calais is still **crawling** with asylum seekers **trying to break into Britain**.'
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributions	Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment.	'… if too many arrive in an uncontrolled manner, the structure of society in an already overcrowded island cannot cope'
Perspectivation, framing or discourse representation	Expressing involvement positioning speakers' point of view	Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances	'BRITAIN **was warned last night** it faces a massive benefits bill to pay for the looming influx of immigrants . . .'
Intensification, mitigation	Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition	Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force or (discriminatory) utterances	'. . . the politically correct dictators of liberal fashion . . . will **never** concede that **most** asylum-seekers are economic migrants, rather than people fleeing persecution.'

2.8 Legitimisation in Discourse

Since CDA aims to reveal structures of power and ideological practice in societies from a linguistic perspective, it also identifies the discursive strategies used by social actors to achieve them. Different systems of authority frequently seek to use language to persuade or legitimise their audience of taking or not taking action to change or perpetuate the status quo. Although this is not always the case as sometimes legitimisation may occur by forcing others to do or believe what we want them to do or believe (Balfaqeeh, 2007), language, undoubtedly, is considered the most important vehicle for constructing legitimacy (Van Leeuwen, 2007). Therefore, in this study the researcher draws more attention to language of 'legitimisation' as a core aspect of achieving goals through the discursive practice of words. Various strategies may occur by social actors within discourse consciously or subconsciously, to legitimise or de-legitimise an action. That is to say, "through discourse, social actors constitute knowledge, situations, social roles as well as identities and interpersonal relations between various interacting social groups" (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999: 92).

Van Leeuwen and Wodak identified four types of strategies in which discursive acts can be socially constitutive:

1- Constructive strategies
2- Strategies of perpetuation and justification
3- Strategies of transformation
4- Destructive strategies (1999: 92)

First, they can work as constructive policies where they serve to build and establish social groups using linguistic utterances which determine the in-group 'we, us' and the out-group 'they, them'. This is usually achieved by calling for audience solidarity with the in-group and at the same time widening the gap and creating more barriers with the out-group (e.g. conservative vs. liberals). Secondly, strategies of perpetuation and justification are intended to preserve identities by justifying the rejection of a potential change to the status quo. For example, it is claimed that the rejection of women driving will save the nation's religious identity. Thirdly, strategies of transformation, endeavour to change one situation into another, for instance, by reformulating words of the laws into others that serve the oncoming

transformation. Finally, destructive strategies are thought to be adopted more frequently by the opposition, as they aim to eliminate the current situation (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999).

2.8.1 *Van Leeuwen's four categories of legitimisation*

In this study, the researcher's primary interest is to discover which legitimization strategies are utilised within the discourse of both the opponents and the proponents of women driving in Saudi Arabia. The researcher believes that focusing on the language of legitimation would raise critical awareness of many issues that are worth considering. Van Leeuwen (1996, 2007), developed a set of four major categories of legitimation with several sub-types that aimed to uncover the mechanism of constructing legitimation in discourse and reflect on the problems that currently encounter legitimisation. The four major categories are as follows:

1- Authorisation
2- Moral Evaluation
3- Rationalisation
4- Mythopoesis

Authorisation

Authorisation is a common strategy employed to legitimise or de-legitimise actions by referring them to an authority figure. It may take different forms (e.g. personal authority, impersonal authority, expert authority…etc) but all lead to a single goal; legitimisation. Van Leeuwen (2007), classified authorisation into six sub-types: personal authority, expert authority, role model authority, impersonal authority, authority of tradition and authority of conformity.

- Personal authority occurs when a whole legitimate authority is represented in one person decision or opinion because of the position or role he/she occupies in a particular institution. Although such authorities may provide explanations to support their arguments, in some institutions they are not expected to justify what they ask others to do for the sake of their

authority. For example, when teachers or parents give verbal instructions containing some form of obligation modality, such orders specify the relationship between the speaker and the addressee, as the speaker positions himself in command and others are expected to obey; for example, *open the book on, wash your hands…etc*. (Halliday, 1985; Hu Zhuanglin, 1988).

- Expert authority occurs when an expert voice is expressed. This may include naming a well-known figure's opinion in the context rather than constructing a strong logical argument. This type of authority gains its power from the fact that although those experts are trusted and heavily respected among their societies, the use of exact numbers and statistics adds a more compelling feature to their arguments (Van Dijk, 1988; Reyes, 2011). For example:

Dr. Paul says it is best not to use a computer for more than four hours each day.

- Role model authority is legitimisation through the reliance on a role model popularity among people. Whether in the form of a group (e.g. Chelsea footballers support the decision of...) or as an individual celebrity (e.g. Lionel Messi agrees with...), the fact that those role models believe or adopt a certain stance or attitude is enough to legitimise their followers' actions without further questioning. This role model authority may occur implicitly by revealing the celebrities involved in the activities purporting to be legitimised (Van Leeuwen, 2007).

- Impersonal authority is practiced through reference to rules, policies and regulations. Unlike personal authority in this authority an action might be legitimate not because 'the boss said that', instead because the 'rules say that…'. This legitimation does not always take the explicit form as in (e.g. the regulations state that….). However, it may occur in the shape of some obligatory adjectives or adverbs (e.g. compulsory, mandatory); for example: 'It is compulsory to achieve an overall score of 7 in IELTS to be accepted'.

- Authority of tradition is another type of legitimation where terms like ' traditions', ' habits' and 'customs' can be used to persuade the audience of the legitimacy of a particular action. In this type of authority, it is assumed that 'because we have been doing this in the past' it is enough to claim legitimacy (Van Leeuwen, 2007).

- Authority of conformity occurs when the speaker assumes that 'because everyone else is doing this, we should do it as well'. This conformity legitimation can be performed implicitly (e.g. everybody is doing that) or explicitly by comparison with others (e.g. my classmates have done that, so I did). However, these days conformity is mostly practiced by the inclusion of high-frequency modality (e.g. most, many, the majority of…etc) that reflects a statistical-based argument, although no real numbers are revealed. "Contemporary law makers increasingly believe that, if most people are doing it, it cannot be wrong. And should be legalized" (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 97).

Moral Evaluation

Moral evaluation legitimation is constructed in accordance with morality and values. The use of evaluative adjectives such as 'good', 'evil', 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' when describing social acts or actors triggers a moral concept for audience. Therefore, an action to stop 'evil' will be morally accepted and welcomed (*e.g. the US 'war on terror'*). Moral evaluation has three sub-types: evaluation, abstraction and analogies. Moral evaluation abstraction is practiced by foregrounding desired status or qualities (e.g. 'freedom' 'independence') within discourse in a straightway that adds a moral value to a potential action. For instance, instead of saying 'women will drive soon' we might say 'women will be independent soon'.

Another type of moral evaluation in discourse is the analogy comparisons. This kind of legitimation is practiced implicitly by comparing an activity to a similar one who had positive outcomes, or a one with adverse results in the case of de-legitimation. This can be stemmed from the fourth source of legitimation in Islam called in Arabic '*Qiyas*' meaning analogical reason, as we will see later in more details. However, an analogical comparison can also be expressed explicitly using similar conjunctions (e.g. like, similar to, same as).

Rationalisation

Rationalisation is another strategy of legitimation where a speaker pictures his/her proposal to the audience as a result of a thoughtful, pre-planned and discussed procedure. This type of rationalisation is recognised linguistically by clauses that contain verbs or phrases of 'consulting' or its equivalents, such as 'after consultations, recommendations, discussions,

advise' (Thompson, 2004; Reyes, 2011). According to Van Leeuwen, there are two types of rationality, instrumental and theoretical. Instrumental rationalisation is constructed in discourse to explain why social practices exist, what are their purposes? To some extent, it is similar to legitimisation whereby they explain the purposes of taking or not taking action, but to serve as a legitimisation, Van Leeuwen believes: "Purpose constructions must contain an element of moralization" (2007: 101). Theoretical rationalisation is close to the process of naturalisation in which legitimation is grounded in whether the action is established on some kind of truth, 'on the way things are'. Van Leeuwen states three forms of what he calls 'theoretical legitimation':

The first is the definition, in which one activity is defined in terms of another, moralised activity. The second is the explanation, where one or more of the actors involved in the social practice are defined or characterised therefore, the legitimisation is because 'doing things this way is appropriate to the nature of these actors'. The final form of theoretical legitimisation is the predictions, they are meant to be based on expertise and they can therefore be denied by contrary experience at least in principle. Like moral evaluations, they function as common-sense knowledge, regardless of whether they originate in theoretical rationalisations or not, but they are more explicitly formulated, and therefore more open to debate (2007: 104).

Mythopoesis

Another legitimation strategy is through the narrative and storytelling. On the one hand, this can take the form of moral tales, where in case of legitimation, a story character is rewarded and praised for engaging in noble social practices. This hero may face some difficulties throughout the story but at the end, consequences are usually happy and valuable. On the other hand, cautionary tales is mainly the opposite since instead of following the norms of social practices, the story character engage in an odd activity that normally leads to a shameful and unhappy ending. These strategies of legitimation may take place individually or in combination. They have been adopted to the analysis of the political discourse of some Austrians officials when justifying the rejection of immigrants' petitions to be reunited with their families in Austria (Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999).

However, legitimisation is not limited necessarily to these four main categories proposed by Van Leeuwen (1996, 2007, 2008) they are possible to some further developments and alterations. Antonio Reyes (2011) in his analysis of the political speeches given by George W.Bush and Barack Obama to justify their military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, applied and developed some of these categories. He proposed five strategies of legitimisation that have been used to justify social practices; these strategies are: legitimatisation through emotions, legitimatisation through a hypothetical future, legitimatisation through rationality, legitimatisation through voices of expertise and altruism (Reyes, 2011).

2.9 Computer-Mediated Communication and the Online Public Sphere

2.9.1 *The online public sphere*

With the growing popularity and the quick spread of the Internet, many people around the globe turn daily to the online media or social media for interacting, sharing news and information. Online media attract millions of users for its ease of access and the speed of data transferring. Another important reason is the low cost they offer, since browsing online newspapers cost less than buying its hard copy version, and predominantly they are free of charge. After decades of the mainstream media domination on news reporting, commercial advertising and shaping public opinion, the Internet era and the burst of new media outlets (e.g. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) has broken to some extent the hegemony of the old media (e.g. television, radio and journalism). New media platforms that stem from the power of the Internet technology in all its different versions trounce mass media; whereby they offer ordinary people the chance to free themselves from being in the recipient position. Unlike the mass media norms where public involvement is limited and highly monitored, new media facilitate the inclusion of public into an extensive broadcasting network, sharing their opinions about a certain topic or news, exchanging experiences or even broadcasting themselves.

In fact, in some cases new media allowed the ordinary people to be the primary source of information and to act as the news agency that provides main TV channels with exclusive video clips regarding a particular issue of public interest. These distinctive features opened the road for public to create their own communities of discussion, widen their freedom of

speech and to enjoy safer platforms of expression regarding their political, social or personal matters, this is noted most in the authoritarian and repressive states (Lynch, 2007). These spaces of discussions are considered as the online public sphere where public use computers, or its equivalents (e.g. tablets, mobile phones) as a mediation to do so away from the unjust censorship. Jürgen Habermas, a pioneering scholar on this topic defined the public sphere first as: "An entity that comes into being when private individuals assemble to form a public body. They then behave neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy" (cited in Elvin 2002: 49). Later, Habermas (1989) developed his concept of the public sphere: "A domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens….citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion" (1989: 231). Ordinary people who used to claim that their voices have been neglected, marginalised or suppressed by their authoritarian regimes who usually control mass media, those people can now participate online in various taboo topics with more identity privacy. Whether they post comments following a news published on an official journal website, make their fora or pages where debates and discussions occur after events or even having a dialectically mediated conversation following a video uploaded on YouTube. According to Habermas (1989), a public sphere is viewed as an independent arena, accessible universally, where public opinion is constructed by tackling bold unfiltered discussions.

However, Nancy Fraser (1992) argued that Habermas's original theory of the public sphere was not reachable nor perceived by all. Habermas's first envisioned the public sphere as a solo space where privileged men gather to discuss and debate in a more democratic atmosphere, with an exclusion of women and other marginalised groups in society (Loke, 2013). Fraser (1992) disagrees with this single concept as she theorised that the public sphere comprises multi-public spaces offering ordinary people to anticipate regardless of their sex or class.

Moreover, the public sphere is regarded as a democratic online plaza where public opinions are heard and discussed on their own merits, without paying attention to the blogger's race, religion or social class (Poor 2005). Further studies favour the democratic conception of the public sphere and enhance its role in facilitating the online civic engagement (e.g. Paulussen, 2004; Lowrey & Anderson, 2005; Ng & Detenber, 2005). Anonymity is another essential

feature that encourages a massive number of people to create their accounts in these public spaces, interact and deliver their voices safely (as will elaborate on later).

However, this excessive visualisation about the democracy of online public spheres was faced with some constraints regarding the Internet's limited ability (Dahlberg, 2001; Cammaerts & Audenhove, 2003). Dahlberg (2001) evaluated the conception of the online public sphere based on a set of six normative conditions stemmed from Habermas' theory of democratic communication. These normative conditions are autonomy from state and economic power, Exchange and critique of criticisable moral-practical validity claims, reflexivity, ideal role-taking, sincerity, and finally discursive inclusion and equality. After observing and evaluating cyber discourse using these conditions, Dahlberg argues that cyber discourse that is constructed when people engage in political discussions does not meet the criteria of a public sphere model because:

> First, the increasing commodification of cyberspace threatens the autonomy of public interaction online. Second, reflexivity is often a very minimal part of cyber-deliberations. Third, many online fora experience a lack of respectful listening to others and minimal commitment to working with difference. Fourth, there is difficulty verifying identity claims and information put forward. Fifth, extensive exclusions from online fora result from social inequalities. Finally, discourse tends to be quantitatively and qualitatively dominated by certain individuals and groups. (2001, n.p)

In evaluating Habermas's model, Poor (2005) does not see that 'online' is enough to distinguish an online public sphere from a face-to-face public domain. He presented four criteria for the online public sphere to be called so:

1- Public spheres are spaces of discourse, often mediated
2- Public spheres often allow for new, previously excluded, discussants
3- Issues discussed are often political in nature
4- Ideas are judged by their merit, not by the standing of the speaker. (p.4)

A further critique about the online public spheres as Dahlberg (2001) noted, that discussions that occur in online communities or as he call it "communities of interest", are not helping to establish a rational and critical debate. He illustrates this is because people online tend to join discussions with others of similar or same interests, beliefs and values, to offer each other or

seek from others emotional support and advice. This results in displaying sympathy and reinforcing each other's ideas, rather than evaluating them critically.

However, if these critics struck a chord with some sceptics, this is not always the case. Occasionally, the public sphere reflects not only the content broadcast on mainstream media, but also covers and discusses some real-world actions, subsequently inspiring or imposing the mainstream media to do so 'as will see later' (Ayres, 2009; Van Langendonck, 2009). Social media generally, and the YouTube website more accurately as our study interest are thought to provide more democratic and independent public sphere than other online platforms. Their democracy appears in the fact that they provide equal opportunities to all users to represent their opinions. Whether by creating a private channel and uploading videos, posting comments, rating others video or reporting inappropriate content, YouTube thrusts the public into an unprecedented era.

2.9.2 *YouTube comments as the online public sphere*

February 2005 saw the launch of the online video-sharing website, YouTube. The site was designed to allow people on the web to share vlogs of notorious events (Hopkins, 2006). Within a short space of time, YouTube spread widely and grew its popularity worldwide; soon becoming the second most popular website (Alexa.com, 2017). Its fast growing popularity stems from the fact that YouTube as a social media site with its slogan "Broadcast yourself", came to break the mainstream media monopoly by allowing people with online access from all over the world to simply and independently broadcast themselves. Although YouTube videos are available for everyone to watch; registering is essential to be able to post comments. This may explain the small proportion of comments (0.5% of viewers leave a comment) compared with the number of hits (Thelwall, Sud & Vis, 2012). Nevertheless, online comments are worth investigating as they provide a deeper insight into the YouTube audience and discussions. Many studies have examined the potential differences between online communication and offline communications (Herring, 2002). "In contrast to typical face-to-face communication, online communication might be anonymous, textual, asynchronous, remote, permanent, and very public, although some online forms can be none of these…public comments in YouTube have them all" (Thelwall, Sud & Vis 2012: 617). In YouTube, the public sphere in its textual form is constructed through the comments made on

the uploaded videos. Whether a video that was broadcast previously on mass media and re-uploaded to YouTube or was aired exclusively by the channel owner to interact with his/her subscribers, registered users tend to communicate intensively through comments.

Alongside alternative social media platforms, YouTube is considered a haven for those who have been unable to express their real opinions of mass media. This is not necessarily due to repression or marginalisation, but perhaps the result of other cultural, social or religious constraints (Friedman, Khan, & Howe, 2000). Building on Fraser's theory of the online multi-spaces, YouTube offers people a safer and less monitored public space than some other online spaces (e.g. political fora, comment sections in news' websites). Many online fora are usually controlled or monitored by a person or a group with certain orientations. Other online public spaces like the commentary section presented by some news or journals' websites to allow readers to interact and share their voices with others are not much different. Although this service seems to provide a convincing space of public discussions ensuring the anonymity of commenters, yet the comments are not instantly published as they are highly monitored and subject to some content regulations by the website administration before they are posted (Al-Saggaf, 2006). Such acts of interference may affect the reader's trust of whether or not their opinions will be delivered to others safely, which may minimise the quality of the posted comments. Furthermore, in similar public spaces, online tracking or surveillance may even threaten free speech and hinder natural public interaction (Dahlberg, 2001).

Unlike these online public spaces, the YouTube comments section is regarded as an autonomous platform free from the monitoring of the authoritarian states and groups (Al-Saggaf, 2006). YouTube is also considered a neutral platform where all opinions are welcomed with no ideological bias; thereby distinguishing it from other online public spheres where pressure may be exerted to express a particular opinion. This might occur explicitly; for example, by creating a specific political forum or page with opposing orientations against a specific party where opinions criticising this party are usually welcomed but those in favour are not. It may also happen implicitly by monitoring and filtering comments, and tracking down bloggers as in some authoritarian states.

It used to be less flagrant for these states to block or remove any online fora that are known locally and attract little or no attention globally. However, as a global phenomenon with more

than 1 billion users (Youtube.com, 2017) and a powerful tool for political activism, YouTube is placing some authoritarian states in a real bind. Blocking such a website perhaps uncovers the hidden intentions of these regimes in limiting and controlling people freedom of expression; thus, rallying global condemnation (e.g. Al-Assad's regime blocking YouTube after the spread of Syrian protests' videos at early 2011). Another example of the counter effect that YouTube videos may have on the outside world is the video of the death of Iranian protester, Neda, in June 2009 (Van Langendonck, 2009). There is also evidence that some salient news events were broadcast on mass media after several YouTube video posting (Sykora & Panek, 2009). YouTube would facilitate interactivity between users in various ways unless the owner disabled these features. This includes: posting a video response, posting a comment, liking or disliking the video or a comment and reporting a spam or abuse on both the video or any comment. Although users need to create accounts with some personal information (e.g. name, DOB, gender and location) to be able to use these features, they typically tend to use pseudonyms (Thelwall, Sud & Vis, 2012).

However, this anonymity is justified, as it seems to be a crucial component for those who use comments on YouTube as their online public sphere and seek refuge from their state repression or other society constraints. In fact, anonymity induces discussants to critically evaluate others' comments on their own merits (Poor, 2005). Moreover, anonymity is thought to encourage commenters to speak their true opinions (Loke, 2013) freely. Although YouTube videos popularity are measured quantitatively by the number of hits, the number of comments and the positive or negative rating a video has, yet comments and discussions that follow a video are thought to enhance a better understanding of the content (Thelwall, Sud & Vis, 2012).

The second part of this study focuses on the online public sphere that exists on YouTube; namely, the textual comments that follow some videos regarding the issue of women driving in Saudi Arabia. These comments are thought to reflect videos that are broadcast on TV before being uploaded to YouTube. They are considered an excellent tool with which to gauge the public pulse and reveal society's cultural ideologies (Lange, 2008; Loke, 2013). In addition to the various interactivity features that YouTube offers its users, navigation through a massive video library is easy using a smart search engine that suggests any similar or relevant videos to the searched one. YouTubers can gain access to videos of their own interest

so they can share, discuss, argue and challenge opinions with others through the comments function. They can create accounts to be able to create their channels, upload videos, and post comments on others' videos.

2.10 Summary

Since critical discourse analysis is the study's central methodology, this chapter endeavoured to provide a broad understanding of the interdisciplinary nature of CDA. In this chapter, a summary was provided of the notion of CDA, alongside an explanation of CDA criticality, and its perception of other notions (e.g. power, ideology). The chapter also discussed how CDA views the concept of discourse, and language in society. Moreover, the central value of CDA that aspires to uncover and reduce the inequality practice in society was discussed, together with the CDA's commitment to social change and its applicability. A background was given of the DHA as a fundamental approach in this study and the strategies of Self and Other presentations. Furthermore, Van Leeuwen's four categories of legitimation (authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis) are explained extensively. Finally, a brief discussion of the concept of computer-mediated communication and the online public sphere are given, with particular interest in the YouTube comments as the source from which this study retrieved its data.

CHAPTER 3: THE CULTURAL HISTORY

Since, in the Saudi context, women driving is perceived by many outsiders and insiders as purely a social issue, it is crucial to review the historic background of the Kingdom to gain a deeper understanding of its structure. In the hope of uncovering any potential historic reasons for the status quo, this chapter explores the political and social formation of the Kingdom, alongside their development, since its establishment in 1932. The researcher believes that this chapter will present the reader with brief but substantially associated factors, which influenced the formation of the Saudi social discourse and continue to do so.

3.1 Historical background of Saudi Arabia

3.1.1 *The establishment and the sacredness*

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932 by King Abdulaziz bin Abdurrahman Al-Saud, a man belonging to the tribes of Najd; the central region in the Arabian Peninsula. King Abdul-Aziz began unifying the tribes and states of Arabia motivated by the emersion of the religious movement, *Wahhabiya*, by its founder Muhammad Abdulwahhab. Wahhabiya was considered an Islamic reformative movement that aims to eliminate the practice of blasphemy and rectify incorrect applications of many acts of worship in Islam. "Wahhabiya transformed personal piety into a public project, the objective of which was to create a moral community under the authority of a political centre" (Al-Rasheed, 2013:43). The ruling system of Saudi Arabia is monarchy, where the country's leaders are among the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz bin Abdurrahman Al-Saud and their descendants. The most eligible receive the '*bay'a'* (oath of allegiance) from family members and other citizens expressing their loyalty in times of hardship and ease.

With a population of almost 30 million spread over an area of 2,149.690 km2, modern Saudi Arabia comprises 13 main provinces. Each has a capital and many governorates; moreover, each province is ruled by a Governor who is typically a member of the Royal Family and is

appointed by the king. Islam is the main religion and Arabic the official language in Saudi Arabia; however, English is taught as a foreign language in schools and is used modestly in some urban cities. Arabs represent the vast majority of the population in Saudi Arabia, with few Afro-Asian ethnicities. The Kingdom plays an important role in the region and internationally. Economically, it derives its importance as the world's largest producer and exporter of oil. Given that the country is home to approximately 25% of the world's oil reserve so, there is no doubting the potential of a major impact on the energy market and the global economy.

Of greater significance is the historical and religious sacredness of the Arabian Peninsula; specifically in Hijaz, the western region of the current Saudi Arabia, which has its roots of thousands of years ago. The holy city of Makkah is where prophet Ibrahim built *al-bait al-haram* (the God's home) and started practicing '*Al-Hajj'* (pilgrimage) based upon the '*wah'y'* (revelation from Allah). Since then, Makkah is known as the holiest place on earth (Al-Badah, 2010). However, the dramatic influence began more than 14 centuries ago, when the first revelation of Quran occurred; prophet Muhammad started spreading the message of Islam from the holy land of Makkah, where he was born and raised. He immigrated to Yathreb (a city know currently as Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah), where he built and established the first mosque in Islam known as *'Masjid Quba'*. Moreover, prophet Muhammad built the holy mosque of Al-Madinah and his house within where he was interred in year 11 Hijri (632 AC) since then and to the present day, Muslims from around the globe gather every year to pray in the two holy mosques and occasionally practice Umra and Hajj.

Alhussein argues that "since the country is the birthplace of Islam and the land of the religion's two most holy cities, Saudi Arabia must preserve a unique Islamic identity and the distinct social characteristics of Saudi society" (2014:2). This distinctive Islamic heritage and the sacredness of the places make Makkah and Madinah the primary holy destinations for Muslims worldwide; therefore, this has a significant influence on the Saudi role and political weight among the Islamic world and internationally. Furthermore, it adds pressure to the Saudi '*ulama'* (religious scholars) as their voice is constantly sought, heard and heavily respected among other Muslims. This could explain the prestigious nature of Islamic religious discourse generally, and that delivered by the Saudi ulama in particular (Al-Badah, 2010). However, the power of religious discourse in Islam stems from the fact that the Holy Quran was the miracle of Prophet Muhammad. He was sent for some Arab people known for their

rhetoric and oratory in versification, storytelling and giving public speeches, hundreds of years before the creation of Islam. The words of Allah (the Holy Quran) was outstanding, unpredictable and above and beyond human oratory. The fascinating power of the Quranic discourse was unprecedented; therefore, the people of Makkah where astounded on their first hearing of it.

However, after the vast spread of Islam and more than 14 centuries of its existence, the Holy Quran is the book read most widely by Muslims worldwide. Moreover, every Friday, Muslims attend the *'Khutba'* (religious preaching); consequently, the effect and power of the religious discourse in Islamic societies are deeply rooted. Quranic and prophetic discourse is used extensively as authoritative references in many aspects of Muslim life, upon which we will touch later. It is important to be aware, as a conservative Muslim society, Saudi people respect and trust the voice of ulama in their daily issues that relate largely to the principles of Islam. However, this voice is not always taken for granted. In fact, it should be legitimised and reasonably explained under the cover of *'Sharia'* (Islamic law).

3.1.2 *The formation of the Saudi discourse*

It is essential for any researcher examining the Saudi context with a specific interest in a social issue (or as it seems to be), such as women driving, to adopt an ethnographic attitude in order to understand its roots and causes. In this study, although the main interest is how language is used as a legitimation tool among opponents and proponents of women driving, the researcher believes there are different socio-political factors that play varying roles in the formation of the interlocutors discourse. For this reason, the researcher adopts a discourse historical approach to display some of the main historic events influencing or shaping the discourse of the Saudi society in general; thereby, having a remarkable effect when discussing women driving (as will be presented in the data analysis) or similar issues.

In the Saudi case, there is an enormous overlap between society and the state, as reflected in the writings of many researchers. This overlap refers to the nature of the Saudi state as it is closer to the multi-tasking state, "where the state is everything therefore, it can positively or negatively engage into all aspects of life. It is above the civil society and prevails it" (Ibrahim

et al, 1996: 68). Saudi Arabia was established through the formation of a tribal coalition supported by the Wahhabi call; the state has specific constants that shape its political, religious and social identity. The Salafist ideology had a huge influence when it constructed its religious school and appeared strong through the emergence of Wahhabism since the establishment of the 1st Saudi state more than two centuries ago. Moreover, the tribe has social and political importance as it is perceived as the main organising unit socially, politically and economically in the Arabian Peninsula (House, 2013).

However, it seems that the Saudi political development remained slow in comparison with other economic and social spheres. According to Al-khedr (2011), the strategy of speeding up the development more than three decades ago aimed to maintain political stability and marginalise the notion of any political change. This view agrees with Huntington, who states: "Presumably, also, rapid economic growth creates new opportunities for entrepreneurship and employment and thereby diverts into money-making ambitions and talents which might otherwise go into coup-making" (1968: 49).

This is not always the case as he also sees that economic development may enhance political ambitions and create instability. This could occur through the emergence of a new wealthy class that does not adapt to the political order; thereby, calling for a political participation or empowerment (Ibrahim et al, 1996). In Saudi society, it appears that political awareness remained comparable to four decades ago and did not develop, as evidenced in other Arab countries (for example, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait). In their resistance to the colonisers, these nations formed western-style political parties with the aim of gaining independence. However, the Saudis did not have any experience of colonisation; therefore, they established a national liberation movement to represent their voices.

Social structure

Numerous studies address the structure and development of Saudi society. They tackle issues such as the change of some social values associated with economic development and investigate the effect of media, education or the prevalence of crime, drugs addiction, and divorce….etc (Shalabi, 1990; Al-Tuwaijri, 2000; Al-Shehri, 2012). However, these studies provide neither deep critical insight nor intelligent characterisation since the results and interpretations are repeated and discussed as normal explanations; for example, working

parents, lack of education, family financial crisis. Saudi society comprises three different structures: Bedouin, rural and urban. Bedouins represent 21.77%, rural represents 26.87%, while 51.36% are urbans (General Authority for Statistics, 2016).

At this point, it is worth noting that attempts to provide pragmatic insight into Saudi society are challenging. The developmental leap since the early 1970s transformed the society from the Bedouin, rural and simple urban mentality to one of modern and fast-growing cities and settlements. This included rapid progression in the economy, industry, education and health; all of which fell under the supervision of the state and are based on its political, religious and media plans, and criteria. For this reason, during this social transition over a period of three decades, there was no other essential resource of societal change. During this period, three generations were raised under a specific governmental attitude where there were no parties, organisations or media; thereby holding an evaluative independent discourse or perspective towards society and the world (Cordesman, 2009; House, 2013). However, it is essential to highlight that this extensive control over influential sources in the Saudi discourse is not necessarily a result of an authoritarian scheme; indeed, the society structure was mostly illiterate, which can be a part of a spontaneous historic paternalistic development.

> The sources of knowledge that formed these generations were limited to an educational governmental discourse based on traditional cultural vision and agendas in religion and politics. Also a religious preaching discourse where multi-jurisprudence is not allowed within the state's religious organizations and finally to a media discourse (TV, broadcast and journalism) that is controlled by an official stance in the follow-up and coverage of every social, economic and political change or event. (Al-Khedr, 2011:48)

Saudi society has been exposed to other influential sources that should have shaped its features; for instance, during the economic boom of the 1970s, high numbers of foreigners and other Arabs who arrived from different cultures and multi-faiths. Moreover, the increase in individuals' income helped increased incidences of travelling outside the Kingdom for purposes of studying and tourism, alongside the thousands of students who obtained scholarships to study overseas. Many researchers were relying on the elite members of society to return and help create an enlightenment narrative. However, the reality was completely different, since many contributed in the society development, albeit in the same governmental way. A few others adopted an enlightening role in the 1970s through the press, but before

long they followed the governmental discourse and became part of its theoreticians. Since then, the majority of Saudi elites have two different worlds that form their discourse, which has transferred gradually to the rest of the society. These are the official and public presence; whereby society should retain its values and identity, and the private and non-official presence in which society is portrayed as a strict and backward society. Unfortunately, this social hypocrisy is symbolised as a smart individual skill that is socially accepted to maintain personal interests; "otherwise, if you couldn't master this social, cultural, political and media hypocrisy, you will be considered as a naïve" (Al-khedr, 2011: 50). This situation led elites to strive for key government positions and focus on personal benefits rather than enlightening society.

Another critical factor in shaping the Saudi discourse emerged in the 1980s, following the rise of *Al-Sahwah* (a religious stream that aimed to adopt an Islamic attitude rather than a national), which promoted the narrative of adherence to values with an Islamic character. Manifestations of conservatism began to appear in society to shape its political and media discourse. The emphasis on privacy and similar allegations that enhance uniqueness and adhere to customs, became a main component of Saudi logic and speech. This discourse was the highest among Saudis, since it is practised in schools, universities and mosques; thereby, touching almost all aspects of life from a religious perspective. It is important to mention that although the Wahhabi school protected Saudi society from sinking in many of the polytheism acts common in many other societies in the region, it failed to maintain pace with the rapid developments experienced by Saudis. At the time, it appeared that Saudi social life became more and more complicated as generation after generation were living and struggling with the contradiction of developmental growth and a constant narrative that did not address the new changes in society. This narrative was sceptical and adopted a precautious attitude towards many emerging events that relate to social or individuals' life without considering the creation of a religious awareness of social, political and economic problems. This attitude led many clerics to issue fatwas that forbid what is permissible in other non-Saudi contexts (e.g women driving), claiming the privacy of the Saudi society and based on a jurisprudential principle called *'Sadd Aldharayie'* (سد الذرائع), which depends on forbidding the permissible if it is thought to lead to a forbidden act (Al-Munajjed, 1997; Abou El-Fadl, 2001). In his book *Ayam M'a Juhiman* 'Days with Juhaiman', Nasser Al-Huzaimi states:

> This the Salafi thinking mechanism and it is still the same as we find them keeping templates of ready-made arguments….but you find in their rhetoric, the prevention as a precaution and activating the Jurisprudential principle *'Sadd Aldharayie'* which through it they prohibited what Allah has permitted. (2011:90)

This rhetoric was heavily dominant and powerful in Saudi society until the 9/11 attacks. At this point, it began losing some of its power as a result of the emergence of some writings and critiques that unprecedentedly attacked many of *Al-Sahwah's* biggest names (such as Salman Al-Ouda and Saad Al-Buraik). These critiques blamed the extreme interpretation of some religious texts by the Saudi religious schools, claiming that these attacks were a normal reaction to such an extreme rhetoric. However, this response was motivated by the heavy international campaign that targeted the Saudi state in the wake of the 9/11 attacks; in particular, religious schools. These international pressures and the expansion of mass media encouraged opposing voices (whether liberals or reformists), which were once silent or marginalised, to appear less timidly on the scene. These developments were regarded as a first step towards a slow but a growing change of Saudi social discourse (Al-Ghadhami, 2004).

3.2 Principles of legitimisation/ legislation in Islam

Since the dawn of Islam, Muslims were encouraged to ask and seek *'fatwa'* (religious opinion) from clerics whenever they the feel the need, and about any issue. This means that when it comes to the application of their '*deen'* (religion), Muslims can seek knowledge from their ulama, which gives those clerics the honour of being respected among their societies. However, according to the doctrine of Sunnah, seeking *fatwa* in Islam is set by four principles of legislation (sources of Sharia). In order of importance, these sources are:

1- The Holy Quran
2- '*Sunnah Nabawiya'* (Prophetic sayings, actions, silent assertions)
3- *'Ijma'* (Consensus of ulama)
4- *'Qiyas'* (Analogical reason)

(Zidane, 1969).

Fatwa should be issued by referring to Quran primarily and Sunnah subsequently. Quran – as the words of Allah - followed by sunnah are believed to be the main sources of all teachings of Islam; whereas Ijma and Qiyas are considered subsidiary and dependant resources of legislation (Abdullah, 2005). Actually, Ijma and Qiyas are the opinions of the clerics pertaining to an issue that is neither clearly stated nor discussed in either the Quran or Sunnah. These opinions should be derived from the Quran and Sunnah and might change over time or from one place to another, depending on the nature and the situation of the society. Ijma and Qiyas focus more on debates and argument, while Quran and Sunnah are more concerned with interpretation. This facilitates greater flexibility in discussions and more freedom in *'Ijtihad'* (diligence) among scholars prior to issuing a fatwa, while simultaneously raising the issue of intertextuality (Fairclough, 1992).

In 1971, with a royal decree, the council of senior Ulama was established in a Saudi Arabia as a permanent council. It consists of a number of male clerics specialising in Islamic Sharia and has the primary objective of issuing fatwas regarding worship, creed and transactions (Al-Rasheed, 2013). These fatwas are sometimes local and pertain to Saudi society issues, while the majority are concerned with global Muslim issues. However, since the foundation of this council, fatwas are thought to be more legitimate as opinions and decisions are discussed and evaluated among a group of privileged clerics prior to their issue. In other words, a fatwa that is issued officially through the council usually gains more authority and acceptance than one that is issued unofficially.

However, it is worth noting that these principles of legislation in Islam have their own equivalents in Van Leeuwen's four strategies of legitimisation. To clarify, a Quranic verse that is used within someone's text to maintain power or legitimacy could be classified as an impersonal authority; whereby a speaker delivers God's word as powerful law from heaven to support his/her argument. The prophetic Sunnah is equally important since it acts as a powerful impersonal authority; thereby contributing to the legitimacy of a speaker's argument. The third principle of legislation in Islam is *'Ijma'*, which could be classified as an expert authority, since a speaker may refer to it to deliver to audience the agreement of different clerics over an issue. Similar to Van Leeuwens' moral or analougous evaluation, the final principle is *'Qiyas'* which is referred to usually by a speaker to convince the audience of

the similarity between the issue discussed (e.g. women driving) and another issue that has either positive or negative consequences to legitimise or de-legitimatise the status quo.

3.3 Women in Saudi Arabia

It is unsurprising that many arguments in conservative societies, such as the Saudi society, pertain to women's issues. This is one of the biggest challenges for such societies, since they involve religious, social and political voices (Felemban, 1998; Baki, 2004). Although women in Saudi Arabia scored higher than men in the health and educational attainment, the 2014 Global Gender Gap Report demonstrated that women lag behind in political empowerment and economic participation (Global Gender Gap, 2014). Saudi women have gone through various stages that have impacted substantially on their roles and presence within society. In this historic review, three stages are specified from the current Saudi state establishment until present to highlight some of the key issues that have shaped or changed Saudi women's societal presence. This section should help readers draw a better understanding of why and how women driving was previously banned.

3.3.1 *From establishment to 1979 (pre-1979 incident)*

In the early stages of the Saudi state, particularly during the 1930s-1950s, there was almost no presence of, or tangible roles for, Saudi women in the formation of the political structure. Socially, women's roles remained as they had been prior to 1932; these differed between regions based on local institutions, whether as Bedouins, rural and urbans. During the 1930s, education was delivered to women through *Katateeb* 'in plural, places where education is limited to literacy, Quran and basics of math'. Katateeb were very limited and run by locals rather than official authorities. In the 1940s and 50s, home education and semi-formal schools appeared and started spreading with very limited numbers (fewer than 20 schools). These schools were considered semi-formal as some were established within the royal court, thus targeting certain segments of society, while others were built initially as orphanages. There

were extensions to the subjects taught in Katateeb, in addition to teaching music, sewing, embroidery and other physical activities, such as swimming (Hamdan, 2005). Teachers were all females and from other Arab countries; for example, Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine.

However, women's education was not deemed necessary initially by Saudi society, since female roles in society were secondary and very limited, while major roles were usually dominated by men. For the same aforementioned precautious attitude, religious authorities were against the establishment of formal girls' education for three main reasons:

- What they heard about teaching music and swimming in the semi-formal schools.
- What they heard about women taking off hijab in neighbouring countries, like Syria and Egypt.
- The fear of the foreign teachers' influence (who belong to other non-conservative societies) on Saudi society.

(Al-Washmi, 2009)

This narrative was influential during the 1940s and 1950s, and it slowed the authorisation for formal girls' schooling. Most of society was not against education itself, but rather to what it might lead. Their fear of the consequences besides the pressure of the social customs led them not to engage their daughters in the semi-formal schools; therefore, these schools were occupied largely by expatriates and non-Saudi residents.

Historically, over the last five decades, Saudi society has experienced various struggles with issues related to women, mostly due to the gender segregation policy and the male guardianship policy[2] adopted heavily by religious scholars in Saudi Arabia. However, since the state establishment to the present day, girls' education has been the most fundamental shift in Saudi women's history. Although there were demands for girls' schooling by some writers, columnists and intellectuals as early as the 1920s, girls' mass education in Saudi Arabia began as late as 1960. After waves of condemnations against girls' schooling among society evoked by the Wahhabi conservatism, King Faisal made the revolutionary step of providing a non-compulsory girls education (Al-Rasheed, 2013). This was thought to be a wise move towards modernism, especially within a conservative tribal society where dialectical debates

[2] The Male Guardianship policy in Saudi Arabia, is a system that assigns a male relative to each woman as her male guardian who could act as her representative in many governmental agencies and maybe make critical decisions on her behalf. Women are required to present their male-guardians approval before: e.g. issuing a passport, travelling outside the country or applying for a studying abroad scholarship. This policy has always been criticised for its constraints over women mobility and because some guardians could abuse it. However, this policy is in change after the King Salman order in April 2017, ordering governmental agencies to skip the male-guardian consent when serving women in many situations.

of whether girls should be educated outside their homes were present. However, although the Ministry of Education was established in 1954, it was not concerned with girls' education. Girls' education was formally introduced in 1960 and was assigned to the General Presidency for Girls' Education (GPGE). This was a separate governmental institution under the supervision of the highest religious authority, which empowered this authority's hold over educational and social sphere later on; this could explain how the state remained loyal to the religious authority while taking a step towards modernism.

However, "In early 1960s, the objections of the religious scholars to girls' education became notorious, marking the first clash between the state as moderniser and religious nationalism" (Al-Rasheed, 2013: 90). A decade after the establishment of the first school, the Riyadh College of Education opened in 1970 as the first higher education college for women. It aimed to provide female teachers to replace the non-Saudi teachers. Since that time, the number of girls joining schools has increased year-on-year. Women proved their excellence through education and gained the opportunity to share and help push the development wheel in the Kingdom. In conjunction with the emergence of national TV and the rapid growth of the Saudi economy since the mid-1960s and 1970s, more openness was witnessed among the conservative society. Although they were non-Saudis, more females appeared on TV, presenting News, acting or singing, which was perceived as a further step towards the integration of women into society and normalising their public presence.

3.3.2 *From 1980 - 2005*

After almost two decades (from 1960 to 1979) of social development, some religious fundamentalist were not pleased with the increase in aspects of openness among Saudi society. This was regarded as a result of the excessive westernisation by some religious extremists, whom in October 1979 besieged the holy mosque in Makkah for two weeks to express their anger and resistance against westernisation. One of their main views was the opposition of formal education for both boys and girls, claiming its outcomes were part of a western conspiracy (Al-Huzaimi 2011).

The holy mosque crisis raised the concerns of both the state and the religious establishment regarding the fundamentalist forces among the Saudi society. This incident had its tangible

consequences on the Saudi society and on women particularly. Consequently, in the 1980s, "traditional and conservative religious opinions were revived, and new interpretations were constructed to create a strict moral order dependant on the conformity of women and their exclusion from the public sphere" (Al-Rasheed, 2013:109). Women's presence in media and workplaces were minimised afterwards and several gender segregation policies were adopted by the government to appease the religious fundamentalists (Alhussein, 2014). This was in conjunction with the emergence of *Al-Sahwah* religious stream, which acted as the religious establishment's spokesman. Here, many fatwas appeared to reinforce gender segregation and portray the truly traditional Muslim community through that image, neglecting debates, interpretations and opinions among other Muslim scholars. These fatwas had notable effects on Saudis' daily, as they delve deeply into details regarding a woman's appearance in the public sphere, to the extent of the colour or fabric of her clothes.

However, in relation to the research focus, the most notable event occurred in November 1990, when the first women driving campaign took place in the heart of the capital city Riyadh (see Methodology chapter for more details). This campaign was the first of its kind and consisted of solely women gathering to proclaim their right; it was the first protest against the ban on women driving. However, this campaign yielded no change. On the contrary, the ban continued and became a catalyst for an even stricter religious narrative, which used the timing (during the 1st Gulf War and the American military presence in Saudi Arabia) as proof of a western conspiracy targeting women in the conservative Saudi society. Many of *Al-Sahwah's* advocates nominated themselves as 'guards of virtue' and legitimated the calls to end the implementation of more strict policies targeting women for the sake of society. This narrative remained influential and a strong as it was since 1980; two generations were taught that this was the general attitude of the community and the most discreet one. However, the case changed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, when many international and local institutions placed more pressure on the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia; thereby minimising to some extent its sharp narrative and creating a better opportunity for other voices to emerge. Moreover, these pressures served to ease the tension between the state as a reformer and the religious nationalism establishments, who found themselves obliged to accept some concessions in order to avoid colliding with the state. Consequently, with a royal decree in March 2002, the General Presidency for Girls' Education was integrated with the Ministry of

Education; yielding some objections from the religious mainstream. Many of the GPGE advocates accused those behind the integration of paving the way for coeducation.

Overall, regarding Saudi women rights, there was no serious reforming except the noticeable increase of women issues being raised courageously on media and press in the post-9/11 era. This encouraged taking serious steps towards further future developments, as we will see in the next stage.

3.3.3. *From 2005 - present*

If girls' schooling is considered the most fundamental shift in Saudi women history, it could be claimed that the ruling era of King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz (2005-2015) is the golden age of Saudi women (Al-Ghamdi & Al-Moheimeed, 2014; Al-Qurashi, 2015). For a decade, Saudis had lived in a historic reforming period that included reforms of various aspects of life; ranging from service sectors such as education, health and transportation, to other judicial, economic and political reforms. However, it seems that reforms regarding women were the most remarkable overall. Since the start of the King Abdullah scholarships programme in 2005, girls were afforded the same opportunities as their male counterparts to benefit from studying overseas and continuing their higher education to participate effectively in the new reforming era. Women were given more leadership positions in universities, hospitals and ministries; latterly, they even appeared to shine internationally, gaining many global prizes of academic excellence and granting other patents in different fields of knowledge. Nowadays, thousands of girls are studying overseas and working in both governmental and private sectors. Women became more aware of their rights and gained more confidence, respect and support from all social classes in Saudi society. Their immunity against the social constraints and criticisms improved and left them less restricted than ever before. Enhanced by the expansion of social media platforms, women were encouraged more than ever to define their rights and make their voices heard. Their continuous presence through online public spheres made it easier for them to share their needs, express their demands and organise acts on the ground, as evidenced in the 'women2drive campaign' in June 2011 (see Methodology chapter). Prior to the day of the campaign, and to encourage others, some female activists in

Saudi uploaded videos of themselves to YouTube and other social media platforms, in which they appeared to be driving their own cars and gaining approval from the public. This is just one example of an issue that attracted significant local and global attention, while other issues remain concealed.

One issue presented to the Saudi Parliament and discussed widely on media is the 'feminisation of shops', as women previously were forbidden from working in shops. This proposal was first faced with several criticisms and disapproval from many religious extremists, which brought to the public attention the opposition against girl's schooling in the past. "This discussion of norms and practices related to gender segregation has historically hindered Saudi women's access and entry to the labour market" (Alhussein, 2014: 3). Nonetheless, following a royal decree in June 2011, the process of feminising women shops began. This was followed by two other phases in 2012 and 2014 to increase the rate of female employment in the country. Another remarkable step towards reforming was the inclusion of female members in the 'Shura council', the Kingdom's highest political body. In January 2013, a royal decree by King Abduallah was issued to allocate women with 20% of the Shura council total seats. The importance of this step comes from the fact that Shura council offers women the opportunity to discuss their situations, claim their rights and make their voices heard on a formal platform. This step is promising for women's future as it will allow a faster processing to further reforms. Not surprisingly, in October 2013, three female members submitted a recommendation to lift the driving ban because of its negative effects on women's mobility and causing financial constraints.

Furthermore, women gained the right to participate as both voters and candidates for their first time in the 2015 municipal elections. Moreover, Saudi women became a role player in the international Saudi political representation. In Jan 2015, Manal Redwan addressed the UN as the first female diplomat to represent Saudi Arabia; which adds more credit and opens a wider horizon to how far the Saudi women ambitions and aspirations could go. Again, these reforms were faced with, and continue to face, some opposition from active religious fundamentalist; however, their impact is limited, as these reforms are all legitimated by the power of the political authority. Although the recession of their influence, religious fundamentalist discourse still achieved the upper hand in Saudi society (Alhussein, 2014). Despite King

Abduallah's reforming attitude, women's rights in the Kingdom are still behind in comparison with neighbouring countries, such as Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Saudi women's rights activists claim that although these reforms are unprecedented and sketch the start of a new transformation in the Saudi women future in the society, they remain insufficient (Al-Rasheed, 2013; Alhussein, 2014). However, the recent rapid reforms instigated by the promising 2030 vision of the new Saudi leadership should contribute in bringing more openness to women rights generally, and could accelerate lifting the ban on women driving specifically.

3.4 Mass media and social media in the Kingdom

> Throughout its history, the Saudi media have been considered as distinctive, influential and an effective strategic tool in the Saudi interior policy. It is also known of its ability to respond to the constant media attacks from abroad and using the Saudi media machine as a mediator for enhancing the national feeling of belonging; it is also used as a tool to fight the deviant thought and a motivation to introduce the various Saudi cultures.
>
> (Ministry of Culture and Information, 2016)

3.4.1 *Mass media*

Prior to the establishment of the current state of Saudi Arabia, the primary official version of mass media was the printed one, which appeared in 1924 during the process of unifying the Kingdom. The weekly journal *Umm Al-Qura* was launched from Makkah to be the first official journal owned by the government and aimed to publish the state's decisions, and governmental statements that relate to the Saudi citizens: it continues to be published today. After the establishment, *Sawt Al-Hijaz* was the first non-official journal that was launched in April 1932 from Makkah; publishing twice a week and owned by two independent persons (KingSaud.org, no date). Ever since, other printed journals continued to appear respectively, for instance: *Al-Bilad* in 1932, *Al Manhal and Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah* in 1936, *Al-Yamamah* in 1953, *Al-Fajr Al-Jadeed and Akhbar Al-Dhahran in* 1955. Some discontinued while others continued to be published under the same or different names. Presently, there are more than 15 printed journals that are well known in Saudi Arabia. Some are issued in Arabic (e.g. Okaz, Al-Madinah, Al-Watan, Al-Jazirah), while others are issued in English (e.g. Arab

News, Saudi Gazette). After the internet revolution, all these printed journals designed their own websites where they offered their audience easier access and a better opportunity to interact with the editorial team or other readers through comment spaces.

However, another turning point in the history of the Saudi media emerged in radio broadcasting. With a royal decree in 1949 that aimed to connect the Kingdom with the outside world and disseminate knowledge and information in the country, the official Saudi Radio was first broadcast from Jeddah. Another radio station broadcast from Makkah in 1952 and another from Riyadh in 1965 (Ministry of Culture and Information, 2016). Today, there are six official Saudi radio stations: Neda Al-Islam, Al-Quran Al-Kreem, Saudia radio, Riyadh radio, Jeddah radio and the international Saudi radios. There are other more popular FM radio stations, such as MBC FM, Rotana FM and Alif Alif FM. The unofficial FM radio stations are widely heard and attract large audiences for their renewed, modern and unconventional content; conversely, the official radio stations are less popular due to their repetitive traditional content.

In 1965, the television broadcasting started primarily from Riyadh and Jeddah; thus representing another important development in the Saudi media. The Saudi official channel was first introduced as the only TV channel to broadcast. Two years later, in 1967, the TV broadcasting involved Makkah and Taif, followed by Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah in the same year, Qassim and Dammam in 1968, Baha and Hail in 1969 and so on, until TV covered all regions of the Kingdom in 1971. 'Saudi Channel 2' was added in 1983; broadcasting in English and targeting non-Arab residents. During the prevalence of satellite TV channels in Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s, many people started watching non-official TV channels that attracted audiences from different social classes; because of the wide spectrum of choices they provide and probably the unprecedented openness they offer. However, many of those network channels were owned predominantly by Saudi tycoons (e.g. ART by Saleh Kamel, MBC by Waleed Al-Ibrahim) or members of the Saudi royal family (e.g. Rotana by prince Al-Waleed bin Talal). According to some western writers (Cochrane, 2007; Hammond, 2007; Neate, 2010), the Saudi strategy of dealing with media changed following the Gulf War in 1990; unlike before, Saudis now own and buy newspapers and other media institutions that publish or broadcast to all countries in the region, which formed a powerful Saudi media empire. In his book, Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World, Hugh Miles

indicates that between 40% to 70% of what is spent on advertising on other non-Saudi channels in the region comes from Saudi Arabia; thereby, imposing its prestige media and leaving these channels subject to its media pressure (2006). After a period, it was realised that these network channels are an extension of the official channels, enhancing the construction of the same image and the formation of the same governmental discourse. Currently, six channels comprise official Saudi TV, covering national, political, religious and cultural interests; in addition to sports and childrens' channels.

In terms of the history of Saudi media, it is important to note that the press generally, whether governmental or not, were under the supervision of the State since the establishment of the *'General Directorate of Press and Publication'* in 1955. The radio commission was integrated within this directorate and its main role was; "The organization, coordination and supervision over all means of publication in the Kingdom" (King Saud Foundation, 2012). This enabled greater systematic governmental control and central censorship over the content delivered to the audience. Years later, as a result of the growing interest and responsibilities in media locally and internationally, the general directorate became the Ministry of Information in 1962. Later, like other mass media, when TV broadcasting begun, it was under the supervision of the same Ministry, which became the current Ministry of Culture and Information in 2003.

Overall, the Saudi journalistic experience produced for society a special journalistic narrative commensurate with the political traditions of the state, formed a specific language that has limits of acceptable critique as a convention among journalists. Although the public opinion is that mass media is controlled by the state and censored strictly, Saudi media succeeded in creating a traditional governmental mentality and a unified national official narrative among both elites and the public. Radio broadcasting played a historic role in the formation of this narrative, followed by TV. The latter continues to be regarded as the most influential medium in the formation of public mentality since the 1970s.

3.4.2 *Social media*

Undoubtedly, there has been a tangible impact of the digital revolution on the world in terms of the speed, quality, cost and ease of communication. In this section, the internet is observed as a new medium that helped individuals free themselves to some extent from the ideological

ascendancy of mass media; since it offers them a worldwide interaction with less censorship regardless of the geographic location. In the Saudi context, the internet was introduced in 1994 for educational, medical and research institutions; becoming publicly available in late 1998. From 200,000 users in December 2000, the number of internet users in the Kingdom rose dramatically to 16 million in 2013 (Communication and Information Technology Commission, 2016). This indicates the high popularity and the rapid spread of the internet as a transforming communication medium. However, as a governmental institute, King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology was set to provide companies and citizens with the service, management and supervision. The city also presents other moral roles, in which it blocks some websites that contain inappropriate contents or violate religious and social norms (e.g. pornographic, drug dealing, gambling). When the internet was introduced in Saudi Arabia, the most popular social websites were forums where people gather to share, discuss and post views, ideas or interests regarding a social, political, economic, or a religious issue. There were also free voice/video chats communities (e.g. paltalk messenger) where there are no governmental restrictions; however, control and censorship are practiced by the forum or chat room administrators. Consequently, in most cases, these forums and chat rooms failed to inspire fruitful dialogues and platforms where interlocutors have equal rights to participate and freely express their opinions. Many of these platforms represented a stance where the proponents are welcomed and supported, while opponents are unwelcomed or neglected. Nevertheless, the emergence of the new social media, starting with Facebook in 2004, YouTube in 2005, Twitter in 2006 and Instagram in 2010, yielded a new era of social networking. In this part, it is essential to highlight the high rate of social media usage and the great impact in Saudi Arabia.

According to The Online Project 'TOP 2015 report', a regional social media agency, in terms of the number of users, Facebook remains the largest social media platform in Saudi Arabia; 11 million active users until mid-2015. Male users represents 79% while 21% are female. With an average of five tweets a day, Twitter is second on the list with 9 million active users; thus representing 40% of Twitter users in the Arab region. Instagram is third with 8.8 million active users posting, on average, 12 posts a week. Finally, YouTube has an average of 606,872 subscribers per channel, and 105,900 average views per video (The Online Project, 2015). However, the popularity of YouTube reached high levels, with more than 2.9 million video views; thereby becoming the second most visited website in Saudi Arabia after Google

(Baghdadi, 2015). In addition, the vast spread of smartphone technology helped facilitate accessibility to social media; therefore, increasing its users' social engagement. According to Statista (the leading statistics company), the number of smartphone users in Saudi Arabia has reached 15.9 million in 2016 and is expected to reach 19.1 million users by 2019; surely this encourages Saudis to engage and communicate easily through social media (Statista, 2016).



Figure 1. Number of smartphone users in Saudi Arabia from 2014 to 2019 in millions (Statista, 2016).

It is important to note the shift in Saudi society, caused by social media; ordinary Saudi people became free of mass media monopoly and censorship. They independently created their own Facebook pages, YouTube channels and/or Twitter hashtags to deliver their voices and represent themselves the way they like. Away from the mass media restrictions, Saudis proved themselves key players in the new media industry in the country and the wider region. They used YouTube channels to create talk shows, series', short films and other satirical shows that deal with and criticise unprecedentedly the mainstream media and many social, economic and political issues. Saudis also became aware of the influential role that social media could play when putting pressure on decision makers. Twitter hashtags became a tool to shed light on any personal, institutional or governmental shortages. Saudis use social media to interact with officials, intellectuals, clerics, media people, celebrities and even members of the Royal Family. Mass media and social media have mutual influence; an issue or a case raised on social media could be discussed on mass media afterwards, and vice versa.

3.5 Summary

Regarding the interdisciplinary nature of this CDA project, the cultural history chapter is a complementary means of explaining the socio-political context, albeit an essential one in the process of discourse analysis. In this chapter, since the case under investigation is located in Saudi Arabia, a historical background was provided to the country regarding establishment and its sacredness. Moreover, a brief discussion of the circumstances that shaped the Saudi discourse and the four principles of legalisation in Islam (Quran, Sunnah, consensus, and analogy) were outlined end explained. However, since the case under investigation relates to women, the chapter discussed the Saudi women history over three critical phases; *from the establishment of Saudi Arabia to 1979, from 1980 to 2005*, and from *2005 to present.* Finally, the chapter provided a brief historical background to the mechanism and popularity of both mass media and social media in the Kingdom. In conclusion, this chapter provided a better understanding of the socio-political atmosphere surrounding the debates on women driving, which contributes to the formation of a specific discourse; thereby leading to the perpetuation of the status quo or social change.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

Since it is crucial to justify how data were collected, this chapter outlines the historical background to the issue of women driving in Saudi Arabia. It also provides insight into speakers' history. Then, a conceptual design of the research will be clarified by introducing the proposed data and approaches to analysis and highlighting their importance in answering the research questions. Moreover, the pilot analysis, data collection and transcription will be discussed in detail followed by a summary of the chapter.

4.2 Historical Background of the Issue and Speakers

4.2.1 *Historical background of women driving in KSA*

To obtain a good understanding of the collected data and its importance in answering the research questions, it is essential first to clarify why the discourse of an issue like women driving was selected for analysis. As indicated previously, women's issues, in general, attract the attention of critical analysts and feminist thinkers since they may imply gender inequality or discrimination in society. The ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia is an issue that remains controversial and surprisingly unsolved. Although Saudi traffic law does not forbid women to drive, driving licences are issued only to men. The issue has traversed several periods where the ban was legitimised from various angles. The reasons given primarily to legitimise the ban relate to one or more of three axes: religion, traditions and law. This was obvious after the first campaign to lift the ban on 6th November 1990, when a collection of 47 female academics, teachers, businesswomen and university students gathered and drove their own cars in Riyadh streets. After this unprecedented movement, religious fatwas were used extensively to express the clerics and intellectuals' opinions about what was considered a recalcitrance on the ruler which is forbidden in Islam, morally rejected and punishable by law. The most notable fatwa was issued by the late cleric, Sheikh Abdulaziz Ibn Baz, and other scholars on 7th November, the day after the campaign. The fatwa was clearly opposed to

women driving and was used by the Ministry of Interiors to legitimise the ban (Al-Jazirah, issue 6621, 16/11/1990, as cited in Al-Busairi, n.d.).

However, the Saudi police arrested all 47 women on the day of the campaign; they were investigated and asked to write pledges to stop, and not to repeat their actions. They all were sacked from their jobs or studies and banned from travel for a year; however, after 32 months, they were reinstated in their jobs by Royal decree. It is important to note that this campaign was in conjunction with the first Gulf War in 1990-1991. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and when Saudi Arabia and the US decided to ally against the Iraqi regime, more than 500,000 American soldiers came to Saudi Arabia in the preparation for the Kuwait liberation war. These American troops were unwelcomed by the radical religious voice in the Kingdom. American female soldiers were seen driving their own cars freely in streets without Saudi police interference. According to Aisha Al-Mane' and Hes'ah Al-Shaikh, two of the main participants in the 1990 campaign, the Saudi national enthusiasm and the American presence in the Saudi land, encouraged some women to express their demands and drag attention towards their right to drive (Al-Manie & Al-Sheikh, 2013). However, the timing had an adverse impact on the campaign as the religious fundamentalists who used to have a strong fist on religious discourse whether in Mosques, universities or schools, mounted a counter-campaign. They accused those who supported the women driving campaign generally and those women who drove their cars specifically of being westernised and advocates of debauchery and vice. The counter-campaign aimed to raise social awareness about the danger of a secular conspiracy instigated by western liberalism. Leaflets displaying the names of all women who participated in the driving campaign and their males' guardians, including moral and religious accusations, were distributed in streets and public institutions to generate a bad reputation for the activists' intentions. The mere fact that some of those activists studied in the US was sufficient for some extremists to accuse them of serving American or western agendas and conspiracy on the state. From that time, the issue seemed to be neglected and forgotten until September 2007 when a group of female activists submitted 1,100 signature petition to King Abdullah asking to lift the ban on women driving. The group was led by Wajeha al-Huwaider, the co-founder of a non-governmental organisation named as the Association for the Protection and Defense of Women's Rights in Saudi Arabia,. However, no serious action were taken on ground.

Two decades after the first campaign, in similar conditions during the chaos in neighbouring countries and the revolutionary Arab Spring in 2011, appeals via social media platforms to lift the ban on women driving appeared to lay the groundwork for a new women driving campaign. Manal Al-Sharif and other female activists instigated Saudi women to participate in what they called 'Women2Drive' campaign by creating a Facebook page that encouraged women to exchange emotional support and to prepare to drive their own cars on 17 June 2011. Unlike the 1990 campaign when women planned in secret and agreed to gather and lead the demonstration, social media were used heavily and played an essential role in mushrooming the proponents of the 2011 campaign. It helped activists to gauge the pulse of the society in advance and seek support and empathy. In the 2011 campaign, social media played three essential roles: first, it helped in a fast spread of the campaign nationally and internationally, therefore, getting more supporters from different sexes. This was evident as more than 12,000 visitors to the campaigners' Facebook page declared their support for the cause.

The second important role is that it was used to gauge the pulse of the society. The Facebook page in the first stage and the number of likes and dislikes were all indications of the campaign popularity. Moreover, an uploaded YouTube video showing Manal Al-Sharif driving her own car on 20th May was the catalyst for change. Manal's video caused a storm of controversial discussions on the online public sphere; many proponents expressed their admiration and support to Manal and the campaigners for being courageous to stand for women's rights and speak them out loud. Many others expressed a huge disapproval and accused Manal and other campaigners of being recalcitrant and passing seditious messages to the public. The third crucial role was the power of the online public sphere in creating a mutual sympathetic home for activists, and accommodating supporters from Saudi Arabia and other parts of the world.

4.2.2 *Brief biography and historical background to the main speakers and channels*

The three videos used to investigate and analyse the proponents and opponents of women driving discourse included the participation of many interlocutors. However, the five main speakers are briefly introduced in the following paragraphs:

- Manal Alsharief is a Saudi female who was born in April 1979, Makkah, Saudi Arabia. She graduated from King Abdulaziz University with BSc. in Computing and worked as an internal security consultant for ARAMCO. However, she was publically known after her call for what is called 'women to drive' campaign in June 2011 when she uploaded a video of herself driving her own car in Al-Khobar city, Saudi Arabia. Manal then introduced herself as women's right activists and became well-known on both social media and mainstream media locally and globally. Manal gave a worldwide speech when she participated in one of the most famous shows (TED talks). She also appeared and spoke to western media on different occasions after her video on YouTube. Following her detention, she moved to Dubai where she continues to reside.

- Saad Al-Buraik is a male Saudi academic and religious preacher. He was born in February 1962 and earned his BA in Economy from Sharia school, Imam Muhammad bin Saud University and worked as a teaching assistant in the same college. He then received his MA in comparative *Fiqh* from the Higher Judicial Institute in Riyadh and, later, his PhD in the same subject. He wrote numerous books and articles and participated in several TV discussions surrounding various issues related to the westernisation wave and the liberal thought. However, Al-Buraik was known primarily for contributing to the *Al-Sahwah* movement during the 1980s. This aimed to raise awareness of the danger of western values on the Saudi Muslim community and focused largely on widening the gap between males and females in almost all aspects of life. Saad was one of the first preachers to strongly oppose the women driving campaign in 1990.

- Najla Hariry and Lamia Bukhari are both female Saudi activists who drove their own cars during the women driving campaigns in June 2011 and October 2013. Najla is a housewife who lives in Jeddah and gained notoriety after she filmed herself driving her car many times, including once while escorted by the MBC TV team. Lamia is also known for her activism

on women's rights issues; specifically, women driving. She expressed her support by driving her own car in Jeddah.

- Mohammad Al-nojaimy is a male Saudi academic in the Higher Judicial Institute in Riyadh. He was born in 1961. He earned his BA in Sharia, Imam Muhammad bin Saud University and received his MA in comparative *Fiqh* from the Higher Judicial Institute. He also awarded his PhD from *Figh* Department in Sharia school. Al-Nojaimi authored many books and supervised many other theses in *Fiqh,* and appeared on different TV shows.

However, it is important to briefly introduce the three TV channels that hosted the main social actors. These are Al Arabiya, Al-Majd and DMTV:

Al Arabiya:

Al Arabiya channel, based in Dubai Media City, UAE, was launched in March 2003. It is a news channel that broadcasts in modern standard Arabic and is owned by the Middle East Broadcasting Centre group, the Saudi TV broadcaster. Since its launch, Al Arabiya has gained popularity in the Arab world and became the second most popular TV news channel after Al-Jazeera (Trending Top Most, 2017).

Al-Majd:

Al-Majd TV Network was launched in November 2002 as a Saudi-owned broadcasting group that takes a conservative stance. The channel contains a mixture of modern standard and colloquial Arabic shows. Al-Majd provides its audience with a variety of shows with protected content (no violence, no adult contents...etc); thereby making it family-friendly. However, Al-Majd channel and the overall network are renowned for their religious input and extreme views with regards to the visual presence of women on TV. Indeed, few or no females appear on Al-Majd TV.

DMTV:

Launched in August 2006, the Distinguished Man TV (DMTV) is a lifestyle channel dedicated solely to men. It is located in Dubai Media City and broadcasts various shows covering men's lifestyle, sports, health, business…etc in modern standard Arabic. The channel ceased broadcasting in March 2015.

4.3 Conceptual Design

Since the researcher seeks to uncover the potential existence of social inequality behind the ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia, CDA is considered a central theory of analysis in this study. However, discourse is not a language, as "it is constitutive of the social world that is a focus of interest or concern" (Bryman, 2008: 499). In other words, the text relates to a broader social context in which analysts should consider avoiding a textually-oriented analysis. Therefore, the researcher adopts the DHA (Wodak, 2001) to investigate the interdisciplinary nature of the issue and maintain a proper understanding of the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between genres, texts, utterances and discourses. In the current study, this includes looking at the history of the case under investigation, speakers' ideological attitudes and any sociological variables. Further to the DHA, the researcher develops and proposes some key strategies of legitimisation. These are used either by both proponents and opponents or by one of them to legitimise and justify their arguments (Martin Rojo & Van Dijk, 1997; Van Dijk, 2005; Van Leeuwen, 1996, 2007, 2008; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Reyes, 2011).

As the main study objective is to reveal which discursive strategies of legitimisation were used, these procedures will be identified and analysed in further detail. This will be based on a macro-structural category adopted from the DHA focusing on constructive strategies for the analysis of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). This analysis includes strategies employed by social actors for reference and prediction. These constructive strategies are constituted through the use of some linguistics acts/indicators such as some lexical items/pronouns that establish an in-group and out-group (i.e. we and they, us and them) besides the use of some verbs and adjectives to construct certain identities of each group and maintain the distinction between them. Furthermore, some tools from SFL were applied as, alongside DHA, they explain how strategies of legitimisation were constructed and shaped from a linguistic perspective. However, these strategies of legitimisation will be compared with some of the argumentation schemes proposed by Douglas Walton (1995); thereby explaining how social actors' arguments are constructed.

4.4 Data collection

This section examines the method of data collection adopted, the period of data gathering, the criteria used when collecting videos and comments, and how data were retrieved and transcribed. Data collection in CDA research is not usually considered as the toughest stage, although a justification of the way data were collected is crucial. In this study, since all data are taken from YouTube, collecting data was easy and saved a lot of time and effort because all data are accessible on from anywhere and at any time. Before explaining how data were collected, it is important to mention that all target data are taken from YouTube in two types:

1- Mass media content; all the Saudi mainstream media TV shows or officials statements that discussed women driving issue and were rebroadcasted on YouTube.
2- User-generated content; the comments posted following these videos in the form of user-generated content representing the online public sphere.

4.4.1 *Mass media content*

Bearing in mind the potentially huge volume of available data and to ensure reaching the most valuable ones, the necessity for preliminary data collection strategies was essential to eliminate any redundant data (e.g. YouTube videos replication). To do so in this study, the process of collecting data took three main phases: specifying the appropriate timescale, applying certain criteria for video search (will be explained in details) and finally filtering and narrowing down the available data to decide what to analyse.



Figure 2: The process of collecting the data of mass media content.

First, the timescale of data collection was determined, which was over a period of three years (February 2011 until January 2014) to cover both women driving campaigns of June 2011 and October 2013. Secondly, the main YouTube search engine was used primarily to search for videos using Arabic words and phrases such as: (e.g. 'قيادة المرأة' women driving, ' قيادة المرأة السعودية' Saudi woman driving, قيادة المرأة السعودية للسيارة 'Saudi woman driving car'). However, the search was restricted to the following criteria:

- It should be a video broadcasted on Saudi mass media and uploaded to YouTube within the specified timescale.

- When the same video is uploaded many times by different YouTube channels, the one with most hits or uploaded first is only considered.

After searching for available videos that are compatible with the aforementioned criteria, the search resulted in 51 videos, varying from less than a minute to over an hour and a half's duration. Some were uploaded by individual YouTube accounts, while others were uploaded by the official mass media YouTube accounts (i.e. Rotana Khalejia, Al-Majd Network), some

by anonymous activists (i.e. Rights905, ch905) and other videos were uploaded by individual media figures and intellectuals (i.e. Turki Aldakhil, Ayed Alqarni). Some videos were found through the search engine, while others were reached using the smart function of YouTube 'SUGGESTIONS', which groups together related videos. The videos popularities (No. of hits) ranged from just over 500 views to over than 328,000 views and with comments from as few as seven to more than 1300 comments on some. Overall, it was noted that the periods (about six weeks) before and after each campaign had the highest rate of uploaded videos. This was evident in the campaign of June 2011, as 27 videos out of the total number of 51 were uploaded in May and June 2011.

The Final phase involved choosing the best available videos to analyse. This step was challenging, as a further filtering process is required to minimise the volume of data with the lowest level of subjectivity. Since comments are a crucial part of the study, there were five videos that had disabled their comments section; therefore, they were eliminated from the list (Fig. 2). Another video was removed later from YouTube for copyrights issues. However, after classifying videos based on the top 5 most viewed videos and the top 5 most commented on videos, it appeared that three videos existed in both lists. Most of these videos are TV shows that represent a stance or hosted people who are heavily supporting women driving and seem to be offering little or no voice for the other opposing team. For this reason, the researcher had to choose three videos of almost equal opportunities for both voices to be analysed. The first is only hosting the female activist Manal Al-Sharif (supporting women driving), while the second is hosting Saad Al-Buraik a well-known male academic (opposing). The third video took the form of a debate, which hosted both (supporting and opposing) guests. The first video is from the top 5 most viewed and most commented on videos, while the other two were not. The total length of all videos combined is about 160 minutes; the time is distributed almost equally across all three videos.

4.4.2 *User-generated content*

After deciding on the videos that will be analysed, comments following these videos in the form of UGC were essential to gauge the public pulse and reflection on what is discussed on mainstream media. However, it was noted that some of these comments reflected on the video content and discussion, while many others took the form of a conversation where commenters

post responses to each other's opinions. The least number of comments on one of the videos was 75; for this reason, only the first 75 posted (oldest) comments on each video were collected. Therefore, 225 comments in total will be considered for analysis. A few remarks were posted under pseudonyms while others posted under real or like real names, some comments were as short as three words while others comprised more than 90 words. The researcher assumes they all are important since they reflect the poster's stance towards the central issue of women driving. However, after several checks over an extended period, there was cases where the number of comments decreased, which means some comments were removed whether by its poster, by the video uploader or by the several reports of other users against a comment. For this reason and for the record, all videos and comments were saved to a separate storage disc. The videos are:

- Edaat: (Al Arabiya, 2011)

This video is an interview of a very popular talk-show called Edaat. It is presented by the famous media figure Turki Aldakhil and broadcasted weekly on one of the most widely watched Arabic TV channels, Al Arabiya. The show is not aired live and has a one-guest style, where the presenter discusses particular matters related to the guest's interests or activity (e.g. political, economic, literary). Consequently,the show features no phone calls, Tweets or any audience intervention. In this specific episode, Manal Al-Sharif discussed issues related to the women driving campaign of 17th June 2011, her revolutionary video that was filmed while she was driving her car and encouraging Saudi women to do likewise, and her subsequent detention and release.

- Myadeen: (Al-Majd, 2011)

This video is another TV talk-show called (Myadeen) and broadcasted on Al-Majd channel, which is known for its conservative stance. The show is televised live once a month, and phone calls and Tweets from the public are considered. The guest is Saad Al-Buraik, who is the permanent guest of the show where each episode features a current issue for discussion. This episode aired in the days prior to the 17th June 2011 campaign to discuss the pros and cons of women driving in KSA.

- # khaliji: (DMTV, 2013)

This video is a debate-like TV show called (# khaliji) and broadcasted on DMTV channel, where guests of opposing opinions discussed the 26th October 2013 campaign of women driving. The guests are two female activists Lamia Bukhari and Najla Hariry, and a male academic Mohammad Alnojaimy. It airs live and some audience Tweets are considered throughout the show.

4.5 Data transcription & translation

Since all data in this study (mass media content and user-generated content) are originally in Arabic[3], all three videos were transcribed in Arabic before being translated into English. No conventions were used as the mere transcription of words is adequate to gain answers to the research questions. "The best choice of conventions in a given instance depends on the nature of the interaction, the theoretical framework, and the research question" (Edwards, 2003: 321). The comments were copied and pasted verbatim (including original misspellings made by some commenters), and translated later into English. Overall, the translated data were kept as close to its original Arabic form as possible. For example, attempts have been made to maintain the changes in Arabic nominal and verb forms to a minimum. In some cases, it was necessary to consider the linguistic forms of Arabic within the analysis to achieve a more accurate understanding of the text; further explanation is provided when needed.

4.6 Modern standard Arabic vs. colloquial Arabic

Modern standard Arabic (MSA) can be described as the form understood by pan-Arabs, regardless of their dialects or geographical origins. It is the formal form of the language, which is close to Classical Arabic and dominates most current formal platforms. Moreover, it is the common medium of formal discourse in political speeches, news channels and

[3] Refer to appendixes for original Arabic texts: mass media content is all excerpts taken from the proponents discourse (see appendix I) and the opponents discourse (see appendix II). User-generated content is all comments used in this analysis grouped as the following: the opposing comments (see appendix III), the support comments (see appendix IV) and the neutral comments (see appendix V).

children's books. MSA is "the modern descendant of Classical Arabic, unchanged in the essentials of its syntax but very much changed, and still changing in its vocabulary and phraseology" (Holes, 2004: 5). Conversely, colloquial Arabic is described as the informal language used in everyday communication between friends and family members. It relies significantly on local dialects rather than pure Arabic vocabulary. Colloquial Arabic could vary between countries regarding vocabularies and pronunciation (e.g. Gulf dialect, Egyptian dialect). Sometimes, these variations are observed between different regions within the same country; for example, where speakers are from Saudi Arabia but demonstrate some language varieties (e.g. Hijazi, Najdi). However, although some linguistic variations were noted in both forms of data, spoken (mass media content) and written one (user-generated content), these variations were limited to some accent diversity with little to some commonly used vocabulary of different Saudi dialects. Therefore, they did not appear amibiguous and social actors demonstrated a good perception of them. Thus, with regard to these varieties, the researcher did not experience difficulties in understanding, translating and analysing the data.

4.7 Methodology of Analysis

CDA as a school and method of discourse analysis has a distinctive feature. In other words, CDA has no fixed method of analysis, the same way as there is no specific method or set for data collection. This flexibility of CDA fostered the emergence of a variety of approaches and sub-schools as we saw earlier. Each approach has its justifications for the choice of the linguistic devices it uses for analysis. This depends significantly on the research questions and what we want to understand from the target discourse. In this study, since our main concern is to reveal the discursive strategies of legitimisations that both proponents and opponents of women driving use to legitimise their arguments and positions, the researcher expands on some of the legitimisation strategies that have been raised in previous works (Van Leeuwen, 1996, 2007, 2008; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Reyes, 2011). The researcher also makes new proposals and explains them by exploring the linguistics devices employed by speakers to construct their arguments. However, the general strategy of creating two groups (Us and Them) used in legitimisation constantly to construct the division between both 'our group' and 'their group' will be traced by analysing the discursive strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation from Wodak (2001). This will include looking at

the referential and prediction strategies used by both groups to portray Self, Other and women driving. Furthermore, each strategy of legitimisation will be compared with and explained by the argumentation schemes presented in Walton (1995), while SFL tools will be deployed when necessary.

Another essential component of the study is an examination of the way the public reflects on these videos through the comments sections. This includes exploring their perspectives towards the call of lifting the ban on women driving (oppose, support or neutral). It also seeks to discover the themes formed through these comments. This will be explained in more detail in the analysis of the UGC.

4.7.1 *Analysis of the mass media content*

In the current study, six strategies of legitimisation are highlighted and extensively analysed. Those are the newly proposed strategy in this study (custody), the four categories prposed by Van Leeuwen (1996, 2007, 2008), and the (hypothetical future/potential implication) prposed by Reyes (2011):

1- Legitimisation through custody

This strategy occurs when speakers on mass media portray themselves as custodians of the public, fighting and pleading for their own good. They say what they say to save civil rights and enlighten them about a lost right or a potential conspiracy. This is identified through the constitution of two groups by the use of pronouns like ‘we’ and ‘they’, in which the speaker of the We group is associated with verbs or phrases that reflect care and sympathy (e.g. we care about, we will defend, we want to save…etc).

2- Legitimisation through authorisation

Authority legitimisation is the most common strategy and it has many subtypes; personal, impersonal, role model, expert, tradition, conformity (Van Leeuwen 1996, 2007; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). Speakers use some of them individually or in combination with others to legitimise a change or the perpetuation of the status quo. This strategy can be

identified when social actors back up their claims with the power of a third-party knowledge, control and/or social acceptance. This can happen when referring to an official's statement (e.g. Minister of interiors states...), rules and laws (e.g. the 8th article of the civil law...), a cleric or expertise opinion (e.g. Sheikh Ibn Baz said....), customs and social privacy or conformity (e.g. Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world where women prohibited to drive).

3- Legitimisation through analogous evaluation/moral evaluation

In this strategy, legitimisation is based on a comparison between women driving and other similar activities/issues that have been conducted in the past, locally or internationally, and had adverse outcomes in case of de-legitimation or had positive results in the event of legitimation. It aims to highlight the potential results in both cases and what construction or destruction will happen to the values. However, this analogous evaluation might be used inversely to invalidate others claims, for example, Al-Nojaimi's analogy in reply to the proponents use of the entire world conformity regarding women driving: "Most Islamic countries sell alcohol....does this mean they are right!?". Moreover, it occurs when speakers try to exploit audience emotions by the process of moral evaluation whether in the form of evaluating themselves (e.g. Manal "I didn't violate the law....,and I didn't rebel against the ruler...) or by the evaluation of public audience (e.g. Najla: " I trust our society....it is a society that is characterised with Islamic manners").

4- Legitimisation through rationalisation

This legitimisation occurs when social actors present the legitimisation process as one where decisions have been made following thoughtful, pre-planned and evaluated procedures. This strategy is constructed linguistically through the use of some clauses such as Manal: "This is a result of a study and intensive reading", or verbs that indicate verbal and mental processes like 'consult' and 'investigate'. In other cases, the mere use of some hedging words that are not built on accurate statistics (e.g. 'most' and 'minority') but reflect some sense of precision can rationalise claims made by speakers.

5- Legitimisation through mythopesis

Here, legitimisation is achieved through telling stories where the hero follows a socially accepted practice that leads him/her to a happy ending or unhappy one when the hero is involved in immoral acts. Stories may also include the speaker's personal experience in which he/she faced troubles or avoided them because of the status quo.

6- Legitimatisation through hypothetical future/potential implications (public chaos or women independence)

In this strategy, legitimisation occurs by creating good or bad potential future consequences for whether to change or perpetuate the status quo. In this study, proponents of women driving claims that it should be allowed for the sake of the future benefits it will bring to women and society in general while opponents pose a threat and severe repercussions to maintain the ban. This strategy is usually articulated through the use of some linguistic choices and structures like conditional sentences of If (e.g. If + present → will + infinitive), or phrases in other formats, but function as conditional sentence (e.g. Manal: "once we give a woman this right, we will open her a wide welcoming space").

4.7.2 *Analysis of the User-generated content (YouTube comments)*

After collecting the first 75 comments posted on each video in a total number of 225 comments for all three videos, the analysis was performed in two phases. First, comments were classified manually into three different responses: 'support', 'oppose' or 'neutral'. Regarding the issue of women driving, any comment that demonstrated clear support for lifting the ban and allowing women to drive were coded as 'support'. Comments that clearly object to women driving or the calls to lifting the ban were coded as 'oppose', while those reflecting none of the previous responses were coded as 'neutral'. The second phase examined the main frames drawn from these observations regarding the issue of women driving. However, these frames are worth investigating because they may not necessarily correspond to what have been discussed on mass media. In fact, they may yield some taboo topics, present causal interpretations and moral evaluations, and suggest solutions or ideas to solve the problem.

4.8 Summary

In this chapter, a historical background is provided to the issue of women driving in Saudi Arabia, highlighting the three campaigns to lift the ban since 1990. In addition, a brief biography of the main speakers of both groups was presented. More importantly, the conceptual design was discussed in brief, alongside an explanation of the method of data collection for both types; mass media content and user-generated content represented in the YouTube comments. Furthermore, it provided an explanation of the way data were transcribed and translated. Finally, the chapter outlined the methodology used in the analysis of both forms of data (*mass media content and YouTube comments*).

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF MASS MEDIA CONTENT

5.1 Introduction

Before delving into the textual analysis of the data gathered from YouTube in the form of both mass media content and UGC, we must first go through the questions the study aims to answer. Our initial interest is in discovering the discursive mechanisms used by proponents and opponents of women driving cars in Saudi Arabia to legitimise their arguments. This is hoped to be answered by analysing the discourse of some key figures who appear regularly on TV or during campaigns for women driving (2011 and 2013), and are watched or followed by many members of the public. The significance of analysing their discourse arises from the fact that their voice is widely heard and supported by many on social media; therefore, it may play a role in shaping public perspectives or reflecting certain stances. However, the strategies of legitimisation and self, and other representations, that are used by both proponents and opponents will be analysed separately in this chapter and will be compared and discussed in the discussion chapter. The second focus of the research is to gauge public opinion, reveal the themes constructed through comments and understand how their discourse is different from or similar to that in mass media. The UGC will be analysed in Chapter Six.

5.2 Proponents discourse

5.2.1 *Strategies of legitimisation*

When examining the discourse of the women driving proponents -given in this study- from a macro-analysis level, they depict the ban as a hindrance that affects the whole society, rather than a particular group. If women are permitted to drive, society as a whole will benefit, and it will count as a victory for social justice in Saudi Arabia. This view seems to reflect a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo among proponents; a sense of inequality and injustice. Legitimation can be used to perpetuate or change the status quo; undoubtedly, the latter is to the direction in which proponents are heading. However, in order to understand how this cataleptic discourse is constructed, we need to subject it to a microanalysis. This involves

investigating the speaker's use of the legitimisation strategies and the positive self and negative-other presentations strategies; thus, it seeks to understand how some tiny linguistic devices leave a noticeable impression on the audience's perspective when used purposively (as we will see later in the public comments analysis). This section explores the discourse of three female activists who called for the ban to be lifted and appeared on two TV channels. We will analyse their use of the six strategies of legitimisation when delivering their voices in mass media.

1- Legitimisation through custody.



Figure 3. The employment of custody in the proponents' discourse.

The first legitimisation strategy is used heavily within the discourse of the proponents. This involves speakers positioning themselves as the spearhead of all proponents within the Saudi society. Their promotion of 'women2drive' campaigns is for the Saudi women's sake and the good of society. Although they recognise that they may pay the price for such demands in a conservative society, they dedicate themselves to fighting voluntarily for others' and their own rights. The mere use of verbs like 'نوعي' (enlighten) alongside the 'نحن' (we) pronoun reflects the speaker's message to the audience that what activists are doing is positive, would reveal hidden, distorted or unknown facts regarding women driving. The proponents here introduced their custody under three different frames: *enlightening and raising the public awareness*, *taking action on the ground*, and by *showing sympathy for other women*. The following excerpts illustrate how proponents discursively portray their custody over Saudi women and society by *enlightening and raising awareness*:

(5.1)

"We enlighten women there is nothing in religion or Sharia nor in law that forbids you from driving, even the officials."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.2)

"We are enlightening women with their rights, and there was a minor imitative called (teach me how to drive). We were teaching women who don't know how to drive; we teach them driving"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.3)

"We did this campaign especially to show the society's voice, change and the growth in numbers demanding this right."

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.4)

"What is happening now is that a woman, unfortunately, doesn't know her rights, or she might know them but keeps silent."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

After using the word 'enlighten' in excerpt (5.1) to deliver the good intentions and to indicate the activists' aim of making women aware of their rights, Manal makes a big claim that attracts the audience's attention and evokes their thinking towards a key reason for not driving until now. Her claim reflects how serious she and other activists take the case and confirms that they have reached a point where there is nothing in religion, Sharia, law and even by officials to forbid women driving. Consequently, they find themselves duty-bound to raise awareness among women and society in general. In excerpt (5.2), the speaker continues assuring the audience that the main idea is to make women aware of their rights. By using the pronoun 'we' followed by two verbs that reflect supremacy over the other 'enlighten' and 'teach', Manal creates two groups of women: those who are knowledgeable about their rights and already know how to drive and others who still need to be taught. This is evident since Manal and other activists in the 'we' group launched an initiative called 'teach me driving' to instruct Saudi women. Even the name of the initiative reflects the complementary roles between the social actors (we–*the activists*- teach, you –*Saudi women*- learn); moreover, this is all done for the good of Saudi women. Furthermore, in excerpt (5.3), Lamia provides reasonable justification for the campaign; thereby reflecting society's voice and demonstrating the change that occurred. Lamia discursively reveals her and other activists'

role as society's custodians; 'we did this campaign' and 'to show the society's voice'. The verb 'show' is not usually in conjunction with the word 'voice', but in this context it delivers to the audience a metaphor of a voice that needs to be heard. Similarly, in excerpt (5.4), Manal justifies her calls and activism by drawing the audience's attention to another classification of Saudi women regarding the case of driving, whether those who are not aware of their rights or those who aware but keep silent. In this case, what she and other activists are doing is a legitimate and heroic act as they raise awareness among other women and stand for their own rights. However, based on this classification, Manal invites the former to learn their rights and the latter to speak out against the status quo. In other words, she and other activists belong to another classification where they already know their rights and continue fighting for them.

Moreover, the proponents framed their custody as being the group *taking action on the ground* (the call and initiative of lifting the ban) on behalf of others (e.g. Saudi women), this was constructed in the following excerpts:

(5.5)

"I represent the resistant Saudi woman, who tries to live with dignity."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.6)

"I have priorities, I ordered them…my current priority is to concentrate on the initiative because my concern is bigger than Manal."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.7)

"After 17th June, I appeared again because this is the initiative launch date and I want to be among the girls (the members of the initiative). I will try to help because the issue I experienced has become an issue of getting my dignity back as well as all other Saudi women's dignity who appealed for this right and were violently attacked. God willing we won't stop…we won't stop until the issue of the 1st driving licence for a Saudi woman."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

By using the verb 'represent' in excerpt (5.5), Manal nominates herself as a representative of all Saudi women striving to live with dignity. Within the broad context, this sentence has significantly more to say as it subconsciously delivers three essential messages to the audience: first, Saudi women's dignity is connected to lifting the ban, which implies that

Saudi women's dignity does not exist or incomplete. Second, the speaker represents all Saudi women who are striving for their dignity. Finally, Manal is a custodian of those women's rights that require support. The use of a word like 'dignity' triggers audience emotions and yields more sympathetic reactions. She also elaborates in excerpt (5.7). By saying: 'an issue of getting my dignity back as well as all other Saudi women's dignity', Manal explains that after her detention she is back not only to rehabilitate herself but all Saudi women who want the right to drive. She considers her detention as a humiliation for all women sharing her interest in driving. Furthermore, it targets other women and their dignity. Her audience is assured that she is not seeking a personal reward; rather, she strives for the benefit of all women. In excerpt (5.6), she adds that her priority is the initiative and implies her altruism by stating: 'my concern is bigger than Manal'. Finally, the proponents' custody was framed by *expressing sympathy for other women* and displaying understanding and care for their individual suffering. This frame was proposed as an appeal to the audience emotions to exchange sympathy with the activists in their fight for the right (lifting the ban) as the following excerpts demonstrate:

(5.8)

"The divorced ladies, widowed and those earning the modest social security benefits -as the Sheikh said- could save some of their money to buy a car instead of spending it on the driver rent, accommodation and visa fees… Allah knows how much these cost…they all paid from the social security benefits which is modest as you said."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.9)

"She has a car but the matter is already social...it is a social matter…indeed, it relates to women in need. The one compelled to hire a driver and pay all his visa expenses, accommodation, and monthly salary…..it is a bigger burden on her."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

Again, in excerpts (5.8) and (5.9), proponents appeal to their audience by revealing their understanding and sympathy with the current situation regarding the burden of Saudi women being unable to drive; especially those who are divorced or widowed, and their only income comes from 'social security benefits'. This was evident in reminding the audience that a woman that cannot drive has to 'hire' a driver and 'pay' his visa, expenses, and monthly salary. The speaker also demonstrated her custody by describing the issue as a 'social matter' that 'relates to women in need'. This sympathetic tone stems from a group of Saudi women

who had the same or similar experiences to those of the audience, which require them to take responsibility on behalf of others. The activists' understanding of women's suffering triggers those who care about society and women, in particular, to sympathise with the activists and support the campaign. Overall, the three frames of custody served the proponents to portray their altruistic position, therefore, gaining legitimacy among the audience.

2- Legitimisation through Authorisation.



Figure 4. The employment of authority in the proponents' discourse.

The diversity of six sub-types of authority may explain why this strategy is the highest legitimisation strategy adopted by proponents. The advocate speakers often refer to authority to support their claims by a third-party opinion and to present evidence from what is considered as neutral but powerful people or institutions; for example, government officials, religious clerics, and state laws. Proponents used the following sub-types of authority – ordered according to their frequency- to achieve legitimisation; personal, impersonal, conformity, as a role model and as an expert opinion. Each of these sub-types is analysed separately.

Personal authority

Personal authority is where proponents quote from or refer to an opinion or a statement of someone in power or a position of power to reinforce their own position. This type of authority is the most frequently used within the proponents' discourse and is illustrated in the following excerpts:

(5.10)

"We read all officials' statements in the state and none of them is opposing, they all refer to it as a social issue."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.11)

"Even the Saudi traffic law, the general director of traffic, Maj. Gen./ Fahad Al-Bisher assured that the new traffic law that will be implemented today, doesn't include any term that forbids women driving, and this was published in Al-Wattan newspaper in 2002."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.12)

"Let me tell you, the foreign minister himself said; for us, it isn't a political issue, it is a social one. The Prince Saud Al-Faisal (foreign affairs minister) said these words; - it is not a political or religious issue, it is a social one.-"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.13)

"The Saudi society heard the King..he said it clearly, the crown prince Sultan also said it…it was said many times that it is a social matter, a society decision and the society should make its decision."

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

In excerpt (5.10), Manal refers to 'officials' statements' to refute allegations that women driving is forbidden by law or for religious reasons. She used the verb 'read' followed by 'all' to reflect the amount of time and effort spent reading and tracking the opinions of government officials (personal authority) to extract their position regarding women driving. Moreover, although no numbers, names or references were given, the mere use of certain words, like 'none' and 'all', strengthens the claim raised and reflects the speaker's rigorous research and confidence in her argument.

In excerpt (5.11), Manal continued the implementation of some discursive strategies by using the power of personal and impersonal authority, the word 'even' used here to add a further claim or evidence to previous ones to strengthen the speaker's argument. 'Traffic law' represents an impersonal authority that should be considered as a key reason for whether or not women should be allowed to drive. Furthermore, the speaker added 'the general director of traffic, Maj. Gen. Fahad Al-Bisher' to express a significant personal authority represented in a statement made by the general director of traffic in the kingdom. The use of the verb

‘assured’ is essential to refute that women driving is forbidden by law strongly. The same argument was supported later in excerpt (5.12) by another personal authority represented by Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs, who stated: ‘it is not a political or religious issue, it is a social one’. However, the speaker here used the reflexive pronoun ‘himself’ directly after naming the position ‘foreign minister’ to emphasise more power to the force of the reported speech. This occurred again when the same information was reported differently by reminding the audience of another form of the speaker’s authority (Saud Al-Faisal) using the word ‘prince’ followed by another assurance clause, ‘said these words’. It plays two important roles in this sentence: firstly, it confirms the power of the speaker (Saud Al-Faisal). Secondly, it delivers to the audiences the importance of the quotation used afterwards. Similarly, in excerpt (5.13), Lamia cited ‘the King’ ‘the Crown Prince’ as personal authorities to illustrate that the issue is a society’s choice and, more importantly, to persuade the audience that this is not her individual opinion. However, the speaker appeared interested in the positions rather than the names, as she used only their titles. This may indicate the speaker’s interest in the power and influence of positions. Overall, the speaker's employment of personal authority delivered their message explicitly to the audience. In other words, according to our government officials, women driving is neither a religious nor political issue; therefore, we are calling for entirely legal action without breaking the law.

Impersonal authority

The second most used authority in the proponents’ discourse is impersonal authority, whereby non-personal powers matter most (e.g. law or institution). The power of impersonal authority relies primarily on the fact that it is regarded as “an autonomous institution which requires no anchoring in some overarching moral order” (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999: 104). The following excerpts explain how proponents employed this authority to earn legitimacy:

(5.14)

"The 8th article of the basic law of government is: [Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, shura (consultation) and equality according to Islamic Sharia]."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.15)

"I drove my car in Jeddah more than once, each time I was stopped by the police they look at my driving licence and instantly let me go. I was also told by many officers that we have commands not to stop you."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.16)

"You say we are minorities…Ok, we are minorities and wherever in the world, the minorities' rights don't fall. The world recoils for human rights and minorities' rights."

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

In excerpt (5.14), the impersonal authority was employed through Manal's use of a quotation from some official documents by referring to 'The 8th article of the basic law of government'. The simple use of words like 'article' and 'basic law' prepare the audiences to take for granted subsequent atatements, regardless of whether it relatttes to the point of the discussion. It is the power of impersonal authority that usually and subconsciously disrupts the audience criticality and eliminates doubts on what has been said by the speaker. However, impersonal authority does not always appear in the explicit form of a specific written law (e.g. the 8th article), it could be a verbal claim attributed to a governmental institution where it becomes unchallenged. In excerpt (5.15), the speaker used the impersonal authority of 'police' and 'many officers' to highlight that this is not something forbidden by the law of traffic, as claimed by many opponents. Therefore, her action of driving and her demands of lifting the ban are legitimate. Although this claim cannot be verified, it discursively serves in the legitimacy of the statements because Police is an autonomous institution regarded as a legitimate authority. 'Human rights' is another impersonal authority used by Lamia in excerpt (5.16) to refute the opponents' claim that driving is a minority demand. She used the convention of human rights as a globally agreed authority that goes beyond the Saudi context and should legitimise their right to demand and claim what she refers to as 'minorities' rights'.

Conformity

This type of authority occurs when the proponents try to convince the audience that when everyone else permits women to drive, we are no better than they are; thus, women driving

should be allowed. The comparison of the situation in Saudi Arabia with other parts of the world regarding women driving is deemed to authorise lifting the ban. The following excerpts reveal how proponents used the authority of conformity to legitimise their own position:

(5.17)

"Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world where women don't drive."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.18)

"We are 1% or 3% of Muslims around the world; we are the only country that do not allow women driving…so, are we the only Muslims who know that women driving is forbidden!?. How about the rest of 97%, are they non-Muslims or do not understand religion properly."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

In excerpt (5.17) the speaker used the oddness as a way of criticising the status quo and legitimising the demand change. Manal could be able to say: women drive everywhere in the world but by saying "the only state in the world where women do not drive", she is emphasising the comparison between Saudi Arabian and the rest of the world and encouraging the audience to think reasonably about why this is the case solely in our country. By the use of words like 'the only country' and 'in the world', Manal raises many questions to the audience regarding the current situation and most importantly We (Saudis) are right, and They (rest of the world) are wrong. This information was employed and delivered intelligently in a negative sentence to intensify the feeling of oddness among the audience and to invalidate/refuse the so-called "uniqueness of Saudi Arabia" proposed by opponents as we will see later. Similarly, in response to some opponents' claims regarding the religious reason behind the ban, Najla in excerpt (5.18) used the authority of conformity among the Muslim world. First, she tells the audience what percentage of Muslims of Saudi Arabia represents those around the world: 'We are 1% or 3% of Muslims around the world'. Second, she states that Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world that does not allow women to drive. Finally, she leaves the audience with some sarcastic questions that reflect the oddity of Saudi society regarding women driving compared with the rest of the Muslim world. The speakers are trying to evoke the audience's thinking and encourage them to adopt a positive response towards the campaign and activists.

Role Model authority

However, legitimisation can be embodied within a role model's authority where speakers quote or use the opinion of a role model to support their own position. The role model can be a religious character, a celebrity, or a well-known media figure that is followed or admired by many in society. It can be said that the employment of a role model opinion here is similar to that voice of a celebrity when used in a presidential campaign to add legitimacy to one party over the other. In excerpt (5.19), Manal purposively names four different people, each referred to by the prestigious religious title, 'Sheikh', and mentions their own view in the case of women driving.

(5.19)

"Sheikh Al-Muhimeed, other Sheikhs like Ahmad bin Baz, bin Jubair, and many others talked about the topic, now Alqarni talked as well and they all said the origin of the case is permissibility."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

The 'Sheikh' title portrays simultaneously an admired persona from a largely religious background, which perfectly constitutes a role model whose position the audience is encouraged accept.

Expert authority

Expert authority is when proponents referred to an expert's opinion about women driving to conclude to its legitimacy. The view could be taken from experts in different disciplines such as: economics, politics and Sharia as long as it serves in the legitimacy of women driving. The position or specialisation of the expert is usually essential to differentiate between the opinions as an outcome of expertise or merely as a role model opinion. The following excerpt illustrates how expert authority is employed:

(5.20)

"Qais Al-Mubarak, a member of the senior council of Ulama and a professor in Fiqh (jurisprudence) at King Faisal University said: the question about women driving should be directed to the traffic department of the kingdom…why it is directed to a scholar like me?"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

Another name mentioned by Manal was Qais Al-Mubarak, but this time as an expert authority Manal introduced Mr Al-Mubarak in excerpt (5.20) as a member of the senior council of *Ulama* and a professor in *Fiqh* (religious jurisprudence) at King Faisal University. This introduction was necessary since Al-Mubarak perhaps is not deemed as famous as previous names. Besides, it delivers to the audience what is reported based on an expert voice. Clearly, his speciality and membership in the senior council of Ulama frame him as a person with expertise from a religious perspective; therefore, Manal used his voice to persuade the audience that the ban has nothing to do with religion, as claimed or used to be claimed by many opponents of women driving.

3- Legitimisation through analogous/moral evaluation



Figure 5. The employment of moral evaluation in the proponents' discourse.

This strategy was the least explicit form of legitimisation (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). The proponents' use of moral evaluation constructed three domains that together achieved legitimacy; those are: *value of being nationalist, value of adherence to law* and *analogous evaluation.* All three areas are demonstrated and analysed in the following excerpts:

- The value of being nationalist:

(5.21)

"Harassment exists in all societies…it is shameful that someone accuses our youths. In our initiative, we have Saudi boys who are among our biggest proponents and supporters, how do you dare to accuse the Saudi man of being a sexual predator that cannot control himself if a woman drive..!!"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.22)

"We didn't address foreign bodies, this is clear. None of the initiative members addressed or got help from any foreign body. Although some of the human rights organisations tried to help us, we refused, we said: we are Saudis and the change is in our hands. I believe that the change happens from inside and if you tried to make it happen from outside you will fail."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

In response to one of the most common arguments made by opponents, which is the potential spread of harassment cases if women were allowed to drive, Manal in excerpt (5.21) defended the Saudi youth morality and accused the opponents of questioning it. Using words like 'shameful', 'accuses our youths' 'Saudi boys' and 'the Saudi man' clearly highlight how Manal positioned her audience as part of the in-group 'our youth', expressed her dissatisfaction with the way they are portrayed, and raised the proponent's national values by defending what she calls 'the Saudi man'. Another example of reinforcing morality by increasing the national/ist values is in excerpt (5.22), where Manal emphatically assures the proponents' rejection of any intervention of any 'foreign bodies' in the Saudi situation. Moreover, she confirms to her audience that some foreign organisations offered she and her group support, but they refused by saying 'we are Saudis'. The proponents are accentuating their nationalism to assure the audience of their commitment to the national and traditional values of the Saudi society. It also falsifies the opponents' accusations or hints that the activists are outsiders who are supported by foreign organisations or trying to impose western values in our society as in excerpt (5.86) and (5.87) (see opponents' discourse page 112).

- The value of adherence to law and Islamic moralities:

Another domain of legitimisation through moral evaluation was by highlighting the value of adherence to law and Islamic teachings. In this domain, the proponent's expressed their trust in the public reaction to women driving, which is because they are following the Islamic teachings and law. It is the advocates' way to implicitly deliver to the audience that we 'the activists' are not against the Islamic values held by society. Indeed, we appreciate them. This could be a reaction to some of the opponents' traditional accusations against them being advocates to a very liberal society that targets our Islamic values (see excerpts 5.38 and 5.39). The following excerpts demonstrate how the value of adherence to law and Islamic moralities were constructed:

(5.23)

"I didn't violate a law; I violated a custom…I didn't rebel against *'wali al-amr'* (the ruler)"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.24)

"When you make doubts about the society acceptance to women driving or what immoral acts may result from women driving, it means you are making doubts about the moralities of our society which adhere to religion and Sharia."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.25)

"I trust our society that there will be no harassments or assaults because they are committing to Islamic moralities, there will not be any of these because I tried it myself I was not harassed..……because our society, our youth, and our men are good, they have the manners of Islam that our society is adhering to"

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

In excerpt (5.23), Manal assured her audience that by doing what she does, she has neither broken any law nor disobeyed *'wali al-amr'*. Her use of the word 'law' demonstrates respect for the state regulations or rules; whereas by using a word like *'wali al-amr'*[4]- the Islamic jargon of ruler- Manal implies that she also respects the religious law of being obedient to the ruler of the state. Similarly, in reply to the hypothetical social immorality claimed by Al-Nojaimy, Najla in excerpt (5.24), used the verb 'make doubts' to reflect the speaker's

[4] In Arabic, *'wali al-amr'* is a term that also refers to the person in charge of or in position of guardianship over a family or minor person/s (e.g. a father can be described as *wali al-amr* for his wife and kids). However, in Saudi Arabia this guardianship is an issue that is not limited to certain age in case of women, as by law they must have a male guardian regardless of their age, education, financial or marital status.

uncertainty and pessimism and to undermine his credibility. This is evident when she connects the subject to questioning 'the moralities of our society' that 'adhere to religion and Sharia'.

In excerpt (5.25), she continues with the moral evaluation strategy and criticises the opponents' view by validating her previous accusation, made in excerpt (5.31). This time, she expresses her sympathy and understanding for any woman who attempts to drive her own car, and demonstrates her trust and appreciation for the men and youth of 'our society', as they are 'committed to Islamic morals'. The same compliment was used twice in this excerpt; thereby reflecting the speaker's emphasis on highlighting their views and expectations towards the society. Moreover, it hints to the audience that unlike our counterparts (opponents), we as proponents hold better perspectives towards the moralities of our community. This was obvious through the use of words that demonstrate and construct trust and confidence between the speaker and audience; for example, 'I trust our society', 'no harassments will happen', and 'our society, youth and men are good'. However, the third domain of evaluation used by the proponents was the analogous evaluation where speakers remind the audience of a similar historic situation to legitimise their position as in the following excerpt:

(5.26)

"Girls' education is a big and important example that changed the history in Saudi Arabia."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

Through analogy, the proponents offer the audience the opportunity to evaluate the status quo by reminding them of a similar case from the past that led ultimately to a successful outcome. In excerpt (5.26), Najla cites 'girls' education' as an example of a previous similar experience before 1959 when girls' education was rejected socially and by some clerics. This analogous evaluation of girls' education is expected to deliver the following:

- The current opponents are similar to those who delayed our girl's education in the past.
- If the ban is lifted it would herald benefits to the society the same way as girls' education did. This is evident as the speaker followed her analogy by a positive result 'changed the history of Saudi'.
- Reassure audience of the activists' good intentions and to demolish the conspiracy accusations made by opponents against them (see excerpts 5.33 and 5.34).

4- **Legitimisation through Rationalisation**

Legitimisation occurs when proponents display their calls as a result of deep thinking, consultations, and evaluated procedures. It is based on studies rather than personal interests or perspectives. Van Leeuwen refers to this process of rationalisation as 'Theoretical Rationalisation' (Van Leeuwen, 2007). In this sense, rationalisation is linguistically articulated by clauses such as: 'This was the result of…' or by the inclusion of verbs denoting mental or research processes (Thompson 2004, Reyes 2011) such as: 'conducted' and 'studied' from the proponents' discourse. The following excerpts illustrate how the supporters used rationality to serve legitimacy:

(5.27)

"We conducted a research-like; we found that officials don't oppose women driving. We read all officials' statements in the state and none of them is opposing"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.28)

"We have studied it; we did that from a legality perspective."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.29)

"This was the result of a study and deep reading; we found that there isn't any reason to ban women driving except the society itself. Even the officials used to say the society… the society."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

In the three excerpts above, it is obvious how the speaker wants to rationally legitimise her group demands by convincing the audience that all the points raised are based on studies and thoughtful decisions. In excerpt (5.27), Manal claims that based on 'a research-like' that advocates 'conducted' and after they 'read' all officials' statements, they 'found' out that 'all' officials do not oppose women driving and again 'all of them' refer it back to society. She further adds in excerpt (5.28), the words 'read' and 'studied it…from a legality perspective', accentuating that the advocates' claims are legal and a result of a research-based process. Manal explicitly illustrates this in excerpt (5.29), 'This was the product of a study and deep reading'. Although no specific studies are mentioned, the mere use of words like 'a study' and 'deep reading' conveys to the audience the reliability and trustworthiness of the speaker. They all aim to falsify any claims that relate the ban to any religious or legal reasons and assure the audience that it is a society thing.

5- Legitimisation through mythopesis

Here, proponents tell stories that are negative and attribute their adverse consequences to the status quo to legitimise their demands for change. The threatening story would not have happened if women currently were allowed to drive. In mythopoesis, one story or event can be taken as evidence for a general norm of behaviour (Mitten and Wodak, 1993; Wodak et al, 1990). Interestingly, positive stories always serve as an exception (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). The following story demonstrates how storytelling could help legitimacy:

(5.30)

> "I was leaving my clinic in AL-Dhahran Street, they closed the clinic and I had no driver to drive me home back. It was 9:00 pm, I walked for 45 mins looking for a taxi but I could not find one. Someone in a car kept following me and I was terrified. I threw a stone at him because I had no other options for defending myself."
>
> (Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

In excerpt (5.30), Manal recalled a negative story that she experienced herself and explained clearly her situation when she left the clinic at 9:00 pm: 'I had no driver to drive me home', 'It was 9:00 pm, I walked for 45 mins', 'looking for a taxi', 'but I could not find one'. All these words and phrases reflect the speaker's suffering, and it is evident that her experience was a dangerous one. Manal elaborates by telling the cautionary tale of being followed by an unknown car; she was scared and had to defend herself by throwing a stone at it. The message is although previous incidents are negative, they could have been worse; she was lucky at this time, but she might not be next time. However, by using the strategy of legitimisation through mythopoesis, the speaker implies that this negative and scary experience would not happen if she were able to drive and what happened to her could happen to any other female as long as women driving is banned.

6- Legitimisation through hypothetical/potential implications

In this context, legitimisation occurs when proponents portray the bright shiny image that if women are allowed to drive the future will be flourishing. To stop the current suffering and guarantee a better future, immediate lifting of the ban is required. This is achieved by highlighting the main problems caused by the ban and combining their collective solutions. The following excerpts illustrate the construction of this strategy:

(5.31)

"Once you give this right to a woman you are opening her a wide, welcoming space, how many girls didn't continue their higher education because there was no mean of transportation or jobs which they quit because they pay half or 3/4 of the salary to their drivers….this is real and I have names and numbers"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.32)

"Economically, we have over 800 thousand hired drivers who transfer about 2 billion Riyal monthly outside the kingdom so; I would imagine the country economic returns will be huge."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

In excerpt (5.31), Manal states clearly that 'once' women are allowed to drive, this will create a wide, welcoming space. The use of a word like 'once' notifies the audience that the primary barrier and cause of the current suffering is the ban on women driving. Manal glorifies this hypothetical future by identifying some miserable outcomes of the current situation; for example, 'how many girls did not continue their higher education' 'jobs which they quit'. This strategy of reminding the audience with some issues that resulted from the difficulty of mobility triggers their emotions generally, and females in particular. In excerpt (5.32), Najla examined the issue from an economic perspective and produced positive potential implications of lifting the driving ban. Using some simple statistics, which ought to reflect more credibility for the speaker, Najla predicts better results in the future. She used this strategy to legitimise audience through the potential advantage of allowing women to drive which will lead to a reduction in the number of drivers; therefore, the state will reap great rewards as a result. Overall, the proponents employment of the hypothetical implications strategy relied on highlighting the current social problems about the ban on women driving and the portrayal of a positive future that is linked to lifting the embargo.

Summary

In the previous part of the analysis, six strategies of legitimisation employed by the proponents were separately and extensively analysed. Those strategies demonstrated that legitimation can be practised through: custody, authorisation, analogous/moral evaluation, rationalisation, mythopesis and hypothetical/potential implications. The proponent's

legitimisation through custody was constructed in three themes; *enlightening public, taking action, and showing sympathy* (Fig. 3). The second legitimisation strategy was authorisation that was constructed through five sub-types of authority: *personal, impersonal, conformity, role model, and expert opinion* (Fig. 4). The third strategy was the analogous/moral evaluation which employed through three domains: *value of being nationalist, value of adherence to law, and analogy* (Fig. 5). Regarding the strategies of rationalisation, mythopoesis, and the potential implication, they were employed less than the others, but all demonstrated their effectiveness in serving legitimacy.

5.2.2 *Positive self & negative-other presentations (Referentiality)*

1- Referential Strategy: Self (The Proponents)

In this study, the proponents of women driving adopted a referential strategy that reflects a hedging approach when using the in-group pronouns we and us. Regarding the references to the self, the proponents maintained a conservative attitude in the construction of the in-group as it remained frequently limited to the 'activists' and seldom extended to include outsiders (e.g. non-activist Saudi women, Saudi society). In other words, the proponents' reference to the Self was represented through; *reference to the activists only* and *reference to a larger community* where activists and other segments of society are included. The following excerpts illustrate how the in-group remained limited to the women driving *activists only*:

(5.33)

Host: You say we..we, who are you?

Manal: "**Members of the initiative**, myself and a female student from the Faculty of Islamic Sharia at King Faisal University started it."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.34)

"**We** launched the initiative to shed the lights on women driving issue"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.35)

"**We** were teaching women who don't know how to drive"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.36)

"**We** didn't address foreign bodies"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.37)

"**We** are delivering **our** opinion to the society; **we** don't hide."

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

However, in reference to the self, proponents occasionally expanded the in-group to include the *larger community* (e.g. Saudi women, Saudi Society). By using the same pronoun, 'we', to refer to Saudi women or Saudis, the speakers positioned themselves within the community to gain more sympathy and to accentuate their sense of belonging to the Saudi society. Accordingly, they refute the opponents' (the other) allegations of them being minorities and being excluded from society (see excerpts 5.68 and 5.69). The following excerpts demonstrate how the advocates integrate themselves into the society:

(5.38)

"**We** are waiting for a Royal Decree…just like what happened with the girls' education….**we** hope it is a firm way to block the way against any opposition or anything else…**we** are in need."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.39)

"**Our society**, **our youth** and **our men** are good; they have the manners of Islam that **our society** is adhering to"

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.40)

"**We** are a **civil society,** or **we** are a **civil state**."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.41)

"If custom has no religious basis and is delaying **us** from developing, why do **we** not change this custom?"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

2- Referential Strategy: Other (The Opponents)

In reference to the Other, proponents adopted a professional referential approach that tends mainly to use neutral, rather than evaluative, references. However, the proponents' reference to the Other was constructed through*; neutral reference* and *evaluative reference*. The former is when proponents mention the Other group solely as 'the opponents', while the latter is when other descriptions or names are linked to them (e.g. 'religious men'). Overall, the mere use of a neutral reference, such as 'the opponents', could leave a negative impression of people adopting this stance, as it has adverse connotations that may portray them as a stumbling block to society's progress (Porter, 2005). The following excerpts demonstrate the proponents' *neutral reference* to the Other group:

(5.42)

"**The opponents** want us to wait until peace prevails earth."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.43)

"I have read many of **the opponents**' reactions."

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.44)

"If there is any incitation or anything else against us, it will be from **the opponents.**"

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

However, on rare occasions, the proponents' reference to 'the other' was *evaluative*; thereby classifying them morally and religiously. As demonstrated in the excerpts below, the speaker framed the Other as 'religious men' (excerpt 5.45) and later ironically represented them as being 'the judge and jury' (excerpt 5.46) when they reacted to the campaign in June 2011.

(5.45)

"We found out that most **religious men** say there is no *Tahreem* (religious ban)...those are **within them***"*

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.46)

"**They** were **the judge and jury**…they launched the charges. Charges of a revolution against the King and breaking laws and they used them to attack me…I was not charged, and these accusations are refuted."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

3- Referential Strategy: Women Driving

The proponents' referential strategy regarding women driving appeared to adopt a defensive and explanatory approach. The referential themes used to represent women driving were classified into two notions: women driving (*the issue*) and women driving (*the campaign*). The former was used to enlighten audiences about the inherent inequality, while the latter was used primarily to defend and explain the campaigns' intentions. As an issue, women driving has an extensive and comprehensive meaning; it tackles the problem in a broader context and time scale; whereas the campaign for women driving focuses on recent attempts to lift the ban concerning particular people within a specific period. The following excerpts reveal how the proponents refer to *women driving (the issue)*:

(5.47)

"The opponents want us to wait until peace prevails earth, in order to begin demanding simple things, like **the freedom of mobility**."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.48)

"We clearly declare, driving is **a choice, not a coercion.**"

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.49)

"We did this campaign especially to reflect the society's voice, change and the growth in numbers demanding **this right.**"

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.50)

"Basically, **driving isn't a religious matter** to ask someone for fatwa."

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

Conversely, the proponents' construction of women driving as a campaign was slightly justificatory and focused on enlightening the public about the campaign/s legitimacy, defending and correcting any possible mistaken conceptions about the intentions behind these campaigns. This is obvious through the use of either negative form tied with acts that are considered socially unacceptable (e.g. 'I didn't violate a law', 'I didn't rebel against the ruler', 'it was not organised'), or through the direct usage of some positive assertions in reference to the campaigns (e.g. 'was spontaneous', 'it was just an initiative to enlighten women').

However, the references to *women driving as a campaign* are best illustrated in the following excerpts:

(5.51)

"**I didn't violate a law,** I violated a custom…**I didn't rebel against the ruler**"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.52)

"Believe me, **the initiative** thing was **spontaneous, it was not organised**"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.53)

"It is **neither a gathering nor a demonstration**…it is only **a campaign** to support the claim"

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

All three excerpts above portrayed women driving (*the campaign*) as a legitimate action that adheres to the law. It is important to highlight that the proponents' justificatory approach aimed to refute the Other's portrayal of the campaign as 'a protest' that is 'aggravating the society' and plans to 'break the law' (see Table 2, p.100). The proponents in excerpt (5.52) emphasise that the campaign was 'spontaneous' and 'not organised'. However, Manal asserts that by leading this movement (women driving campaign), she did not 'violate a law' or 'rebel against the ruler' as claimed by their opponents.

5.2.3 *Positive self & negative other-representations (Predicationality)*

1- Predicational Strategy: Self (The Proponents)

The construction of the positive self through predicational strategy has represented the Us group as striving to 'raise women awareness', continue to fight for the right of Saudi women 'will not stop' and as the group that suffered a lot and been victims of social inequality 'we were heavily attacked'**,** 'we have no other solutions'**.** The following excerpts illustrate how the self group was portrayed as *strivers*:

(5.54)

"We are **delivering our opinion to the society; we don't hide**…by the way, people who register their opinions writes their full names and they are known…**we don't do something wrong to hide**"

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.55)

"Our group, which started the initiative, is **still active and didn't stop** even when I was detained."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.56)

"**We didn't stop claiming** since that time"

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.57)

"God willing, we **won't stop**…we **won't stop** until the issue of the first driving licence for a Saudi woman."

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

Another predication of self-presentation framed the Us group as being *victims* of social marginalisation, opponents' unfair attacks and being left without options, as illustrated in the following excerpts:

(5.58)

"We have a need, and you are unable to provide us with, **we have no other solutions**"

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.59)

"**We are in need** and, for this reason, we organised this initiative"

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.60)

"**We were heavily attacked** for seeking help from outsiders, of course, this is not true"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

2- Predicational Strategy: Other (The Opponents)

Primarily, the proponents' representation of the other frame two themes: the other as a group with an *offensive* attitude; and the other as *selfish*, sceptical and careless people. However, these topics were represented within the acts of the other, rather than naming or describing them directly. This is a professional way of drawing a negative image of the other through predicational strategy when adopting a mostly neutral referential approach. The construction of the other as *an offensive group* is evident in the following excerpts:

(5.61)

"They were the judge and jury…they **launched the charges**. Charges of a revolution against the King and breaking laws, which they **used to attack me**…I was not charged and these accusations are refuted"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.62)

"They had some perceptions of the initiative and Manal Al-Sharif; based on which, they **began their unjustified and violent attack**"

(Manal, Al Arabiya, 8 Sep 2011)

(5.63)

"If there is any incitation or anything else against us, it **will be from the opponents**"

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

The predicational representation of the Other as being offensive is a complement to the proponents' self portrayal as victims (see Table 2, p.100). As we discussed previously that the proponents represented themselves as the victims in this dichotomous hassle, here they further construct the hostile image of the opponents by emphasising explicitly the Other's *offensive* acts; for example, in the excerpts (5.61, 5.62): 'they used to attack me' and 'their unjustified and violent attack'. Lamia in excerpt (5.63) attributes 'any incitation' that could cause harm or but the advocates in danger to 'the opponents'. This could be taken as a speaker's exaggeration rather than a fact but it still serves in the negative portrayal of the Other; therefore, de-legitmising them. However, the second predicational theme in the proponents' discourse is portraying the Other as the *selfish, careless and sceptic group,* as illustrated in the following excerpts:

(5.64)

"If you can't sort out my mobility issue, don't tell me not to drive, don't ask me to wait until they launch trains…you know this is not a solution…**don't disregard us anymore**"

(Lamia, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.65)

"The opponents **want us to wait until peace prevails earth,** before we begin demanding simple things, like the freedom of mobility"

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.66)

"**You are creating doubts about the moralities of our society,** which adheres to religion and Sharia"

(Najla, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

In their justification for organising a campaign, the advocates depicted the Other as the selfish group that does not care about our suffering and had a tendency to 'disregard' our demands. Consequently, we as advocates must initiate and move towards change, rather than listening to a group that 'want us to wait until peace prevails earth'. Again, this exaggerated metaphor aids the negative presentation of the Other and legitimises the proponents' calls for change.

5.2.4 Summary of the proponents' discourse

In the previous set of data, the discourse of women driving proponents was extensively analysed by integrating the analytical approach of legitimisation strategies developed by Van Leeuwen (1996, 2007) and Reyes (2011) together with the strategies of positive self and negative-other presentation from Wodak (2001). On the one hand, the analysis of the proponents' strategies of legitimisation, demonstrated the employment of all six strategies of legitimisation: custody, authorisation, moral/analogous evaluation, rationalisation, mythopoesis and the hypothetical/potential implication. Furthermore, the construction of various themes within some strategies was noted, all serving the legitimacy. In other words, the proponents' custody was constructed from three themes: *enlightening public, taking action on ground, and showing sympathy* (Fig. 3). Legitimisation through authorisation was developed through the employment of five sub-types of authority: *personal, impersonal,*

conformity, role model, and expert opinion (Fig. 4). The third strategy used by proponents is the analogous/moral evaluation, which was employed by the construction of three domains: value of being nationalist, value of adherence to law, and the mere analogy (Fig. 5). However, legitimisation through rationalisation, mythopoesis and hypothetical/potential implication were used modestly and did not form any themes.

Conversely, the analysis of the referential and predicational strategies of positive self-presentation and negative-other-presentation (see Table 1, p.24) revealed the following: reference to the Self as (*the activists only,* and *as a larger community*) whereas reference to the Other was in two forms; (*neutral reference* and *evaluative reference*). Regarding women driving, the proponents' referential strategy constructed women driving in two ways: *the campaign* (e.g. 'spontaneous', 'initiative') and *the issue* (e.g. 'right', 'freedom of mobility'). In terms of the predicational strategies, the Self group was depicted as a group of *strivers* (e.g. still active, we did not stop'), and sometimes as *victims* (e.g. 'we were heavily attacked', 'we have no other solutions'). In contrast, the proponents portrayed the Other group first as *the offensive group* (e.g. 'launched the charges', 'their violent attack'), and second as *the selfish and careless group* (e.g. 'disregard us', 'want us to wait until peace prevails earth'). Overall, it can be said that the proponents' macro-argumentation adopted a justificatory approach that appeared more defensive than demanding or inciting.

Table 2. The strategies of Self and Other presentation in the proponents of women driving discourse.

Discursive Strategy	Objectives	Categories
Referential	Discursive construction/legitimation of Self	**Pronouns:** *We, Us, Our* **Reference to the activists only:** *'members of the initiative', 'we are teaching women', 'we are Saudis', 'we don't hide'* **Reference to a larger community:** *'we don't drive', 'we are a civil society', 'we have a need', 'delaying us'*
	Discursive construction/ de-legitimation of the Other	**Pronouns:** *They, Them, Their* **Neutral reference:** *'the opponents'* **Evaluative reference:** *'Religious men', 'they were the judge and jury'.*
	Discursive construction of women driving	**As a campaign:** *'spontaneous', 'initiative to enlighten women', 'not a gathering nor a protest'* **As an issue:** *'right', 'a social issue', 'a need more than a priority', 'a choice not a coercion'*
Predicational	Discursive construction/legitimation of Self	**WE as strivers:** *'still active', 'we didn't stop', 'we won't stop'* **WE as victims:** *'we have no other solutions', 'we were heavily attacked', 'we are in need'*
	Discursive construction/ de-legitimation of the Other	**THEY as offensive:** *'they launched the charges', 'they began their..violent attack'* **THEY as sceptical and careless:** *'you doubt', 'you are questioning', 'don't disregard us anymore', 'want us to wait until peace prevails earth'*

5.3 Opponents' discourse

5.3.1 *Strategies of legitimisation*

1- Legitimisation through custody:



Figure 6. The employment of custody in the opponents' discourse.

Just as the proponents' self-portrayal as custodians for others goodness, the opponents' discourse demonstrates how custody can be employed to serve legitimacy by opposing groups. The opponents framed their custody over the Saudi society through two main themes by presenting themselves as: *virtue defenders* and people from a *religious background*. In the former, opponents emphasise their interest in and care for virtues, women's feelings and safety in society. Meanwhile, the latter declares their religious backgrounds or accentuates that custody is part of the clerics' duty. The highlighting of such concerns reflects the sense of custody over society; thereby legitimising the opponents' presence against the calls to women driving. The following excerpts demonstrate how opponents adopted the custody of *virtue defenders* to achieve legitimisation:

(5.67)

"The truth is when we discuss women issues we stand with women; we all stand in one line side by side to defend virtues"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.68)

"We need to prepare the society; the society must be ready in terms of women safety when they drive"

(Nizar, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.69)

"From our perspective, women driving will lead to some consequences…first, it is an outraging for the majority of Saudi girls and women's feelings who oppose driving"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

One of the most remarkable aspects of the discourse of *Al-Sahwa* movement during the 1980s is the women's prudishness and sense of privacy. Despite the growing vulnerability in their discourse, many of *Al-Sahwah* principles remaina ta the centre of daily life in Saudi society; in particular, those related to women. Furthermore, many of *Al-Sahwah* advocates continue to oppose women driving, asserting the existence of a conspiracy against the virtues of the Saudi society; specifically, women. Their opposition is based on preserving the virtues of Saudi society and the safety of Saudi women. However, the major criticism levelled by liberals and western society against advocates of such discourse is the unnecessary restrictions implemented against women in many issues related to work, study and mobility. Accordingly, *Al-Sahwah* advocates tend to justify this by the highlighting their custody over society. One of *Al-Sahwah* chief advocates, Saad Al-Buraik in excerpt (5.67), begins by emphasising his and other opponents' attitudes to women issues. He used the verb 'stand with' and the act of 'defend' to reflect that they are supporting and protecting women and probably the whole society from an attack on their virtues. The speaker argues that they are standing shoulder-to-shoulder with women to defend virtues. He also used 'we all' to explicitly create the *Us* group that unite opponents with women under one goal that is defending virtues. Similarly, in excerpt (5.68), the speaker constructs custody by revealing the opponents' concern for women's safety; 'society must be ready in terms of women safety' and to show that the opposition to lifting the ban is because the society is not yet safe enough and 'we need' to prepare. The use of the modal verb 'must' reflects the absolute need for a safer society for women and that opponents are aware that the Saudi society is not ready yet. Proponents' are showing their custody by being worried about the possible negative consequence (morally, socially and physically) that may cause harm for our women. In another expression of custody, the opponents in excerpt (5.69) legitimise their opposition by showing their concerns about the majority of women's feelings. Opponents appoint themselves as attorneys who try to act on behalf of the majority of Saudi women who oppose female driving. Opponents portray lifting the ban as an 'outraging' for those 'women's feelings'.

However, in such a conservative society, the employment of custody from a religious perspective is deemed to gain a greater approval among the audience; the following excerpts reveal the insertion of the religious view to aid legitimisation through custody:

(5.70)

"The clerics are custodians on the society members whether men or women, by clarifying the right and warning about the wrong, the distinction between the similar issues to prevent confusion among people"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.71)

"I'm a man who adopts a democratic Sharia approach which I don't want people to be forced to anything except with their wishes. When I notice that the society is annoyed of any decision, I say they should have the right to vote and if they are happy to support it, I have no objection."

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

Since the speakers themselves and most of those who actively oppose women driving are considered religious or specialising in Sharia and other Islamic studies, the speaker in excerpt (5.70) was required to identify their custody over society: 'the clerics are custodians on the society members, whether men or women'. This custody is legitimised by stating those clerics' roles in 'clarifying the right', 'warning about the wrong', 'the distinction between the similar issues' not to be vague on people, 'to prevent confusion among people'. This is thought to legitimate this custody, therefore, legitimise opponents' position regarding women driving. Similarly, the speaker in excerpt (5.71) employed the religious factor to describe his stance by identifying himself as someone who adopts the 'democratic Sharia approach'. The inclusion of a word like Sharia triggers a religious attitude, therefore, enhancing the speakers' custody as a religious professor. The speaker extends further by saying: 'I do not want people to be forced to anything except with their wishes' to imply that his opposition is because a minority that wants to impose their opinions on the majority of people. This is another method of legitimisation through custody where the speaker reflects the audience his concern about their future and their current needs.

Moreover, he demonstrates his commitment to their choices as long as there is a referendum: 'I say they should have the right to vote and if they are happy to support it, I have no objection'. Through this statement, the speaker cites his opposition as more for the sake of public democracy than personal opinion. This claim reflects the speaker's objectivity; therefore, his position is afforded greater credibility.

2- Legitimisation through Authorisation



Figure 7. The employment of authority in the opponents' discourse.

Opponents referred to four sub-types of authority to serve legitimisation: impersonal authority, personal authority, expert opinion authority and the role model authority. Impersonal authority is the type used most frequently. Each type will be discussed and analysed separately. The following excerpts - classified under each category - illustrate how legitimisation through different types of power was constructed:

Impersonal authority

Through impersonal authority, the opponents try to persuade the audience that some indifferent authorities (e.g. laws, fatwas and governmental institutions) support the ban. The typical form in which legitimisation through impersonal authority is expressed involves either a circumstance of attribution (according to,…., as affirmed by….) or a saying verb with the relevant authority as a subject ('the 3rd article states…', 'the ministry declares….') (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). The following excerpts illustrate how the opponents employed this authority to serve legitimacy:

(5.72)

"This topic is agreed upon among society and it was affirmed by the ministry of interior resolution to ban women driving over 22 years ago so, nothing has changed"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.73)

"One of the clearest things in moral and democratic issues around the globe is that the minority don't impose their opinion on the majority. This exists in Sharia, law and everywhere around the world"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.74)

"These ways of claim are not democratic or Sharia-legitimate; the right Sharia-legitimate way to settle the issue and the democratic way everywhere in the world is to hold a referendum"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

Following the first campaign to repeal the ban in November 1990, a fatwa was issued by the highest religious establishment in opposition to women driving. Soon after, the Ministry of Interiors employed this fatwa to legitimise the ban (see chapter 4, page 57). Subsequently, opponents have relied on the impersonal authority of the fatwa and the resolution of the Ministry when opposing women driving. In excerpt (5.72), Saad referred to the power and impersonal authority of the 'ministry of interior resolution' to remind the audience of the legitimacy of the ban. However, the speaker also used the authority of tradition; 'this topic is agreed upon among society' to persuade the audience that even our traditions oppose women driving. The power of the impersonal authority stems from the fact that it is a third-party decision purporting to be a neutral one.

In excerpts (5.73) and (5.74), the speaker used the impersonal authority of Sharia and law to legitimise his opinion that 'the minority do not impose their opinion on the majority'. Al-Nojaimy repeated the word 'Sharia' and 'democratic' many times in the previous excerpts, 'This exist in Sharia, 'Sharia-legitimate', 'in moral and democratic issues' and 'the democratic way'. This repetition reflects the speaker's awareness of the impersonal authority power since it is considered a third-party opinion or decision. However, law was used as another impersonal power to enhance legitimisation through authorisation. Although no evidence was cited, the use of words like Sharia and law resemble legitimacy to public ears. Furthermore, the speaker harnesses the power of words like Sharia and democracy to delegitimise the women driving campaign led by some female activists. He claims the actions of activisits are neither democratic nor based on Sharia: 'These ways of claim are not democratic or Sharia-legitimate'. He then argues that the solution to this issue is to conduct a referendum; describing this as 'the right Sharia-legitimate way'. Al-Nojaimy expands further

by highlighting the power of democracy as a global value or law -'the democratic way everywhere in the world'. Therefore, this acts as an impersonal authority that would not accept imposition. A verb like 'impose' could also hint that lifting the ban on women driving would not be welcomed by the majority.

Personal authority

Personal authority occurs when opponents depend on an opinion or a statement of a person in power or authority over a large group of individuals to support their own stance in legitimising the ban on women driving, therefore, perpetuating the status quo. Similar to the impersonal authority, the typical form in which legitimisation through personal authority expressed could be (e.g. 'Prince Ahmad says…', 'the CEO announced…'). It is more about the influence of the person name or position rather than the organisation rules. The following excerpts reveal how the opponents used personal authority for this purpose:

(5.75)

"There is a regulation issued and was confirmed by Prince Ahmad bin Abdul-Aziz the Deputy Minister of the Interior"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.76)

"…days ago, Prince Ahmad bin Abdul-Aziz declared that there is a regulation that bans women driving and the ministry of interior is committed to it"

(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

In excerpt (5.75) and (5.76), both speakers used the personal authority of 'the prince' or 'the deputy interior minister' to confirm the aforementioned impersonal authority of law. Although in both extracts almost the same piece of information was delivered, the speakers used the word 'confirmed' in excerpt (5.75) to refute any allegations of having no law that bans women driving and used 'declared' in excerpt (5.76) to deny any allegations of being unaware of this law. However, in excerpt (5.75), Saad's subliminal message to the audience was that by organising this campaign and driving in streets, proponents are breaking a law that bans women driving. In excerpt (5.76), Norah declared that proponents are neglecting previous alerts and assertions by the authorities, probably intentionally. This is supported by some quotes of the opponents' discourse, as will be seen later in the legitimisation through moral evaluation section.

Expert opinion authority

In this type of authority, the opponents made an explicit reference to the opinion of a person or a group of experts not necessarily because of their powerful positions or authority over others, but predominantly because they are the experts. Their expertise comes from their knowledge based on speciality or experience in a particular field (e.g. Sharia, psychology). The following excerpts explain how the opponents employed this authority to serve legitimacy:

(5.77)

"Dr. Nizar said the society need more of maturity, awareness and safety"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.78)

"I'm a professor in Sharia and law, I know how do they deal with it everywhere in the world, such controversial decisions are taken by holding a referendum not by force"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

Expert authority had been one of the most effective strategies of legitimisation in the discourse of the religious establishment (Al-Rasheed, 2013). This is because it predominately depends on the voice of the religious experts in issuing fatwas, enacting legislations or taking decisions. However, it is noted that concurrently with the retreat in the religious discourse, the opponents' employment of this authority is very limited in relation to women driving. In the above excerpts, the speakers used the expert opinion authority to serve legitimisation. In excerpt (5.77), to insist the society need for more maturity, Al-Buraik referred to 'Dr. Nizar' as an expert opinion in psychology to legitimise the ban and maintain the status quo. Another employment of expert opinion was by Al-Nojaimy in excerpt (5.78), when he declared his position and expertise as 'a professor in Sharia and law' to gain further legitimacy and to assure the audience that his comments stem from his knowledge and expertise, rather than personal opinion.

Role model authority

The opponents use of this type of authority occur when they discursively refer to the opinion or perspective of widely popular characters (e.g. historical heroes, religious figures) in an attempt to convince the audience of acting like them. The following excerpt illustrates how the opponents used this type of authority to achieve legitimisation:

(5.79)

"There are matters that can be reviewed and discussed, not by protests but through advice. The chief of the martyrs Hamza[5] is a man who stood up for an unjust ruler and advised him"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

In excerpt (5.79), Al-Buraik used the authority of a role model 'chief of the martyrs Hamza' to legitimise his refusal for the proponents' campaigns or what he calls 'demonstrations'. Hamza ibn Abdul-Muttalib was a paternal uncle of Prophet Muhammad PBUH and one of his companions and known of his honour and courage. The speaker used Hamza's story as a role model to highlight how such a well-respected Islamic character was loyal to an unjust ruler and Hamza chose to advise, rather than rebel against, that ruler. This role model authority serves in de-legitimising the Other's act while at the same time legitimising the Self's opposition to lifting the ban. By using the example of Hamza as a role model, Saad suggests that women driving is a matter that should be discussed and reviewed around the table, rather than taking the form of street demonstrations.

[5] Hamza ibn Abdul-Muttalib the parental uncle and the companion of Prophet Muhammad PBUH. He was born in Makkah in 54 BH/ 568 AD. He belongs to an honoured family where his father Abdul-Muttalib was the leader of Quraysh tribe in Makkah. Hamza is known as a skilled brave knight who converted to Islam two years after the Prophet's call. His entry to Islam was remarkable as Muslims became stronger. He was killed in the battle of Badr in year 3H/ 625 AD when Prophet Muhammed PBUH gave him the posthumous title *Sayyidush-Shuhada'* (Arabic: سَيِّدُ الشُّهَدَاء, "Chief of the Martyrs").

3- Legitimisation through analogous/ moral evaluation



Figure 8. The employment of moral evaluation in the opponents' discourse.

The moral evaluation strategy is intrinsic in the opponents' discourse of legitimisation, not only because it is highly frequent, but also because it is based on morality from where many other categories of the opponents' legitimacy were framed. As noted previously, one of the opponents' themes when constructing custody was acting like *virtue defender* where social and religious values are threatened and require preservation. Furthermore, when employing the role model authority, the opponents implied some moral criticism of the advocates' campaign (see excerpt 5.79). However, following this strategy, opponents constructed legitimacy in four different forms: *demolishing Their analogy*, *constructing Our analogy*, *evaluating the Them group, and evaluating the Us group*. All serving legitimacy through analogous/moral evaluation, the four categories are explained and analysed in the subsequent excerpts:

Demolishing *Their* analogy

In this type of assessment, the opponents attempt to falsify any analogous evaluation conducted by the proponents of women driving. They deconstruct any resemblance or comparison –made by advocates- between the Saudi society and other countries or cultures, to emphasise the uniqueness of the *Us* group. The following excerpts explain this occurrence:

(5.80)

"First, we mustn't analogically compare countries that adultery and mixed-sex solitude are normal and not prohibited by law with countries that ruled by the holy book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.81)

"Many Islamic countries sell alcohol and have night clubs, does this mean they are right? No, they are not….therefore, neither sister Najla nor any other should analogically compare us with others because their situations are different."

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.82)

"The claim about number of drivers….how much they cost..!? 800 million Riyal or 1 billion Riyal….how much do housemaids cost? while some ladies do not even work. The issue is not an issue of drivers; it is a big social one for Saudis."

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

In all of the aforementioned excerpts, the main aim of the speakers was to destroy any analogy or evaluation constructed by the proponents to legitimise their calls to lift the ban. For instance, in excerpt (5.80), the speaker delegitimised the proponents' analogous evaluation between Saudi society and other societies by rejecting the comparison for moral differences. His rejection to the proponents' analogy clearly expressed using the negative form of a modal verb alongside the comparing verb: for example, 'we mustn't analogically compare' and 'neither..nor..should analogically compare'. Following this, a moral evaluation of our society (Saudi society) and theirs' (western societies) takes place to differentiate between both sides and to falsify the proponents' comparison. This differentiation between the two groups, emerges in excerpt (5.80), wherein the *Them* group 'adultery and mixed-sex solitude are normal' and 'not prohibited by law'; however, in the *Us* group, we are 'ruled by the holy book of Allah and the Sunnah of the prophet'. This differentiation serves to reject the proponents' analogy and enhance the notion of the unique nature of Saudi society. Another demolition of their moral evaluation is in excerpt (5.81), where Al-Nojaimy uses a counter example to the similar one used previously by Najla to falsify hers. He morally evaluates the current situation in many Islamic countries as many of them sell alcohols and have nights clubs, he then leaves the audience with a question: Are they right in doing so? He answers No and continues the moral evaluation by stating: 'the other part of our Islamic world is still developing', 'did not reach the Saudi level in terms of applying Sharia law'. This evaluation

to the rest of the Islamic world was to emphasise the Saudi uniqueness and lead in implementing Sharia, which discursively may justify the ban or other future decisions that differ from other Islamic states. Finally, in excerpt (5.82), Al-Nojaimy used analogous evaluation to refute the proponents' claim regarding the high cost and the economic effects of having foreign drivers. He compared the example of drivers with the housemaid's cost. His example was used to minimise the importance of the proponents' example and to deliver to the audience that we have more numbers of housemaids in comparison to drivers. Thus, if proponents are anxious about our economy, they should first consider the enormous number of housemaids. This was evident when the speaker left the audience with an unanswered question; 'how much do housemaids cost?' Overall, the deconstruction of the proponents' analogies is deemed to diminish their credibility; thereby delegitimising their arguments.

Constructing *Our* analogy

The second form of moral/analogous evaluation that opponents used to achieve legitimisation discursively is the construction of our analogy. Under this category, the opponents seek to legitimise their perspectives through the establishment of their analogy that discursively concludes to the legitimacy of the status quo. The following excerpts illustrate how this manifests:

(5.83)

"In the US, a village near to New York ban women driving and call to have its own privacy….the American law approved this. There are colleges that apply gender segregation in Britain and America."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.84)

"Allah said: [They ask you -O Muhammad- concerning alcoholic drink and gambling, say in them is a great sin] no good in it…and said: [and some benefits for people, but the sin of them is greater than their benefit], so there is a harm and benefit but the harm if greater than the benefit."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.85)

"When the British wanted to withdraw from the euro zone, they hold a referendum."

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

Constructing *Our* analogy was the proponents' evaluation and comparison of the women driving outcomes and/or the status quo in Saudi with similar issues and/or countries where the final results should encourage the perpetuation of the ban. In excerpt (5.83), legitimisation is practised through the analogous evaluation between the ban in Saudi Arabia and the ban on women driving applied in the US, Lancaster by the Amish group. In response to some of the proponents' most common arguments regarding the unconformity of Saudi Arabia ban on women driving with the rest of the world (see excerpts 5.17 and 5.18), Saad asserts the example of the Amish group in the US as an analogous case where privacy is respected and legitimised by local law. Moreover, the speaker strengthens his analogous evaluation by another example of colleges of some western countries, mainly the UK and the US, which apply 'gender segregation' similar to Saudi Arabia. By constructing these similar evaluations, the opponents delegitimise the advocates' authority of conformity; thereby legitimising the status quo and their calls to maintain it.

In excerpt (5.84), legitimisation is constructed according to the fourth principle of legitimisation in Islam (*Qiyas*) analogy, which strengthens the argument. This differs from the previous evaluations, whereby the speaker cites Qur'anic verses in support of his claim of moral evaluation. It is not using the Qur'anic verses as an impersonal authority but to legitimise/justify a moral evaluation. For instance, to notify audience that based on our Islamic teachings, we should evaluate things objectively with no bias. In excerpt (5.84), the speaker reminds the audience of drinking alcohol and gambling using the Qur'anic evaluation;

> **[They ask you -O Muhammad- concerning alcoholic drink and gambling, say in them is a great sin and some benefits for people, but the sin of them is greater than their benefit]**. (*Al-Baqarah: 219*)

He further explains there is a 'harm' and there is a 'benefit', but 'the harm is greater than the benefit'. However, although the speaker did not mention women driving, by quoting this verse, he communicated to his audience the number of advantages in comparison with

disadvantages. Therefore, drinking alcohol and gambling are forbidden in Islam for this reason, and other situations should be evaluated the same way, with the assumption the advantages of women driving outweigh the disadvantages. Furthermore, the opponents support their claims of being democratic and standing with the public's will (public choice), the speaker in excerpt (5.85) used the the UK's withdrawal from the EU as an analogous evaluation of the importance of holding a public referendum to resolve controversial issues. By using such an analogy, the speaker seeks to provide a reasonable example that legitimises his demands for a referendum.

Evaluating the Them group

The third form of legitimisation through moral assessment in the opponents' discourse is *evaluating the Them group.* Under this category, the opponents present their evaluation of the proponents. These attributions are deemed to demonise the advocates, doubt their intentions, and harm their reputation or credibility among the public, therefore de-legitimising their calls to lift the ban. The following excerpts clarify how such an evaluation occurs:

(5.86)

"The important thing about those who raise the women driving issue and compare us to other societies…some of those people and I'm not saying all of them, only some of them has a liberal pollution, which means having a western mentality or something"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.87)

"I talk about the fabrication of this crisis at this time, the sisters who participated in the driving campaign in 1411H/ 1990 told me: 'we wanted to get the advantage of the situation'. Therefore there are subtle parties that want to make an advantage of the current situation to twist the inner organisation's arm."

(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.88)

"there is another group, they don't care about women or women driving..but they want to adopt a stance to break the rules…the call to a protest on 15th Rajab/ 17th June…the call to break the law…to break the prestige of the law."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

The above excerpts aim to achieve legitimisation through analogous/moral evaluation, primarily by demonising the *Them* group. For example, in excerpt (5.86), the speaker used a strategy that evaluates the *Them* group and might serve simultaneously to delegitimise their analogy. In this excerpt, the speaker described some of the proponents as being polluted with some liberal western thought 'has a liberal pollution', 'a western mentality' to delegitimise their comparisons between our society and other societies 'those who raise the women driving issue and compare us to other societies'. The insertion of words like liberal[6], polluted and westernised thought is enough for many of the public to morally doubt the activists, therefore, rejecting the idea of lifting the ban and standing against its callers. Although such accusations or evaluations are more built on personal intuitions and interpretations rather than on real facts, it works as a useful tool in demonising the other (as will be seen later in public comments); thereby legitimising their rejection.

Moreover, in excerpt (5.87), Norah continues to question the intentions of the current campaign by comparing the circumstances with those of the first campaign in 1990. Based on a previous personal experience, Dr. Norah evaluates this campaign and calls it as 'crisis'. In other words, she describes its supporters as troublemakers and makes reference to a devilish act. However, the intentions behind such calls are an important part of the speaker's moral evaluation, so she used the word 'fabrication' to hint to an audience that this is intentional. She further explains that some unknown groups are exploiting, or would exploit, the current situation to cause us harm; therefore enhancing their viciousness. 'There are subtle parties that want to make an advantage of the current situation to twist the inner organisation arm'. This demonises the proponents and, specifically, the callers of the campaign.

This demonisation continues in excerpt (5.88) when the speaker highlights that a group of those callers are not really concerned about women driving: 'there is another group, they don't care about women or women driving' and 'do not care whether women drive or not' as much as they aim to break the law and cause chaos 'they want to adopt a stance to break the rules', 'the call to break the law'. Overall, the three previous excerpts provided by Norah and

[6] The liberalism term has a negative connotations in the Saudi context. According to Al-Khedr (2011), in their conflict with the conservatives, some of the enlightening elite or as they used to be called (*Islamic liberals*) in Saudi rushed foolishly into the *new liberalism* which simulates the extreme western liberalism. This led to the emergence of a whole new term of liberalism starting from 2003 which helped the Other camp (conservatives) to use the term to stigmatize their opponents in many different arguments.

Saad depict proponents as traitors to their nation and homeland, thus categorising them in the *'Them'* group rather than the *'Us'* group. They are portrayed as demons planning to transform our social, political cohesion into a state of chaos.

Evaluating the Us group

In their legitimisation through moral evaluation, the opponents forth form of assessment is *evaluating the Us group*. Unlike the previous category, the opponents here try to present an evaluation of their group. Positive aspects were attributed to the opponents of women driving. The following excerpts explain how such an assessment takes place:

(5.89)

"It is proven that this religious society with its vast majority, the Saudi society religious pressure became the biggest obstruction for liberal projects in the country"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.90)

"As we ask Allah to insert goodness in our rulers and in our security apparatus, we don't only count on this but we strongly count with the same level or more of our zeal, our unity, the stability of our position and our strength gathering against any liberal thought or project from its beginning until we eliminate it"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

In excerpts (5.89) and (5.90), the speaker uses another strategy of legitimisation through moral evaluation. In this instance, rather than concentrating on the negative-other-presentation, Saad focused on the positive self-presentation through highlighting the perceived good qualities of our 'religious society', 'our zeal', 'our unity', 'the stability of our position' and 'our strength gathering'. This strategy along with these words are thought to trigger the audience emotions and help foster a hostile reaction towards the proponents' position. Such an incitement was made explicitly in excerpt (5.89), where Saad portrays the Saudi religious society as clashing with the expanding liberal plans. He claims that the 'religious pressure' of the Saudi society is 'the biggest obstruction for liberal projects in the country'. The incitement continues in excerpt (5.90), when Saad enhances the alignment 'against any liberal thought or project from its beginning until we eliminate it'. However,

through the intensive use of the pronouns (our) and (we), it is obvious that the speaker created two groups; one is the religious Saudi society where he belongs to ('our zeal', 'our unity', 'our position', 'our strength', 'we count on', 'we eliminate'), and the other is an unknown group that have liberal ideologies, against which we shall stand.

4- Legitimisation through Rationalisation

Legitimisation through rationalisation is achieved by reference to a reasonable justification of supporting or opposing the status quo. The speakers here try to convince the audience that their opposition is based on some research and facts rather than personal opinions. However, "it may be established in some form of common sense" (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999: 105). The opponents' reference to rationalisation explains the existence of the current social practice and whether or not action is required. The following excerpts are examples of how opponents employed rationalisation to serve legitimisation:

(5.91)

"Women driving isn't a forbidden act in its self…there is no verse in Quran or Hadeeth that forbids women to drive. When we research women driving, we talk about the ban because of what women driving would lead to, result in and in which country."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.92)

"The vast majority of Saudi, of the Saudi society men and women, don't want women driving. In Al-Bayan Attaly survey; 97% of voters oppose women driving and 3% said they do not oppose."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.93)

"Social issues reflect politics. Why? Because the vast majority of Saudi people especially those who belongs to tribes (whom the majority), refuse women driving. Maybe not for a religious reason, but for social and economic reasons."

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

In the above excerpts, the speakers legitimise opposing women driving through rationalisation or common sense. Initially, Saad in excerpt (5.91) reminds the audience of being aware that

‘women driving is not a forbidden act in its self’ neither in Quran nor Sunnah ‘there is no verse in Quran or Hadeeth which forbid women to drive’. He then rationally explains that when women driving is researched ‘when we research women driving’, we should consider ‘what women driving would lead to, result in and in which country’. The speaker used ‘when we research’ to convince the audience that women driving is banned based on some research that has been done to evaluate the experience of women driving in our society, it is not a personal preference or for a particular group interest. Moreover, in excerpt (5.92), Saad legitimises his opposition to women driving because the vast majority of Saudis oppose it. He argues that based on a survey that was conducted by the popular TV programme *Al-Byan Attali,* 97% of Saudis oppose women driving, which explains why it has not been permitted until now.

In accordance with the previous excerpts, Al-Nojaimi in excerpt (5.93) discursively used a rational persuasive strategy to legitimise why he is against lifting the ban. To do so, he claims that even social issues reflects on politics and explains that using rationalisation by using no accurate numbers but common sense. He made this clear in his assertion that ‘Social issues reflect politically’. Furthermore, he raises the question ‘why?’ before answering it by explaining the reasons and stating some unproven claims; ‘because the vast majority of the Saudi people especially those who belongs to tribes (whom the majority) refuse women driving’. Overall, from the above, it is evident that the opponents’ message to the audience is that we did not oppose women driving until we researched its pros and cons, and some surveys are considered. Subsequently, they concluded that lifting the ban has some negative consequence and appears to be against the will of the majority. Therefore they oppose it.

5- Legitimisation through Mythopoesis

Storytelling can also achieve legitimation. This occurs when the tellers invent or recount a story that happened, and its conclusion serves his/her interest. Protagonists usually represent social actors within the specific social action where those who follow the legitimate social practice are rewarded, and those who do not are punished. However, the opponent’s discourse made no reference to this strategy within the given data. This could be an indicator of the

radical change that happened in the tone of the religious establishment as being the leading opponent of women driving. Storytelling used to be an intrinsic part of the religious preaching rhetoric in Saudi Arabia and employed extensively during the 80s and 90s (the peak of *Al-Sahawah movement*) to legitimise the extreme policies of sex segregation (Abdullah, 2005, Al-Huzaimi, 2011).

6- Legitimisation through hypothetical/ potential implications

In this strategy, opponents practised legitimisation by highlighting some theoretical consequences that will happen and change the status quo (for worse) if the ban on women driving is lifted. They picture the calls to lift the ban as a part of a massive conspiracy that aims to create chaos and political instability leading to a frightening and insecure future if the ban lifted. Potential implications are linguistically constructed mainly by the use of some conditional structures (e.g. conditional if clause + main clause) or through the use of some markers of modalisation (would, could) together with an unpleasant future scenario (Fairclough, 2003; Reyes, 2011). The following excerpts demonstrate how this strategy was discursively employed within opponents' discourse:

(5.94)

"Women driving will lead to traffic problems, will lead to a disruption in a family budget but it is a need….a real need."

(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.95)

"Honestly, my sisters who wish to drive, we should help in making our society in a state of security and safety, not a further tension."

(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.96)

"If a woman could realise what she will suffer from because of women driving - besides other issues that we will discuss later- She will definitely say: this is a poisonous and harmful call for both women and society."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.97)

"I told you that women driving will result in economic, social and political problems"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

All the excerpts above are deemed to serve legitimisation through hypothetical/potential implications. It is the opponents' strategy to trigger the audience fear of a bleak future that is portrayed as negative if the ban was lifted. Even though these implications are hypothetical and predominately based on nothing but anticipations, it is claimed that the indexical meaning evoked by them will participate in forming a 'shared belief', which will be naturalised by the repetitive pattern in which they are represented (Lee, 2001; Reyes, 2011). For instance, in excerpt (5.94), using the fear of the unknown future, the speaker represents lifting the ban as leading to traffic troubles 'traffic problems' and putting families' financial budgets into a crisis 'disruption in a family budget'. Although no studies are given, stimulating the audience fear of future would accumulate a fear of change, therefore, hate and rejection to lifting the ban. Another way of using this strategy was through raising the issue of security. The speaker visualises audience with an irritated and unsafe society if the ban was lifted. This is seen in Norah's appeal to the ladies who want to drive in excerpt (5.95) 'we should help in making our society in a state of security and safety, not a further tension'. In excerpt (5.96), the speaker portrays female audience with a predictive conditional sentence expressing a theoretical implication. He argues that if the ban was lifted, women would not be happy with their situations in future and they would realise how harmful this will be for them and society as a whole. He made the statement, 'if a woman could realise what she will suffer from', to deliver to the audience an impression of certainty about what a future implication. He then adds, 'she will say: this is a poisonous and harmful call for both women and society'. However, it seems that the speaker wanted to deliver fear to the audience of unknown consequences but certainly unpleasant. In a similar way, Al-Nojaimi in excerpt (5.97) evokes the fear of lifting the ban and asserts that it will cause 'economic', 'social' and 'political' troubles.

Summary

Similar to the proponent's six strategies of legitimisation, the opponents employed; *custody, authorisation, analogous/moral evaluation, rationalisation and hypothetical/potential implications* strategies except *mythopoesis* to legitimise their opposition to lifting the ban. The opponent's custody was framed through two main themes: virtue defenders, and being from *religious background* (Fig. 6). Another main strategy in the opponents' discourse is authorisation, which they used four sub-types of authority to serve legitimisation: *personal authority, impersonal authority, role model authority, and authority of expert opinion* (Fig.7). Moreover, the opponents employed the moral evaluation strategy to achieve legitimisation, in doing so their assessment was constructed through four forms: *demolishing their analogy, constructing our analogy, evaluating the Them group, and evaluating the Us group* (Fig. 8). Finally, the strategies of rationalisation and hypothetical/ potential implications were also employed as legitimisation tools in the opponent's discourse while no reference was made to mythopoesis.

5.3.2 *Positive self & negative other-representations (Referentiality)*

1- Referential Strategy: Self (The Opponents)

Reference to the self by the opponents aimed to portray an image of the group as having quantitative superiority and religious backgrounds. This could be noted through the usage of words like: 'majority', 'clerics' and 'preachers' when referring to the opponents. However, the following excerpts highlight the portrayal of the Self *quantitative superiority*:

(5.98)

"**The vast majority of Saudi, the Saudi society** men and women don't want women driving."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.99)

"**The vast majority of Saudi people,** especially those who belongs to tribes (whom the majority), reject women driving"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.100)

"The evidence on how it may reflect politically is the people split into two parts; **the majority** are opposing of course."

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

However, the second reference to the *Self* framed the opponents' religious identity. The following excerpts illustrate how *religious and moral identity* represented the Self group:

(5.101)

"It is proven that **this religious society** with its vast majority, the Saudi society religious pressure became the biggest obstruction for liberal projects in the country"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.102)

"It was proven that **clerics**, **people of the propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice**, **preachers**, **people of the sincere word** and **real reformers** became a real nightmare for the liberal thought when they met and worked together in various fields, issues and matters."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.103)

"**The clerics** are custodians on the society members whether men or women, by clarifying the right and warning about the wrong."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

In such a conservative society, where the religious establishment imposed itself and preserved a prestigious status, religious people are treated predominately as role-models; their opinions are widely believed and accepted without question (Al-Khedr, 2011). This hegemony over the Saudi discourse is recognised and maintained by the employment of religion in many cases, which are considered by the other groups as non-religious (e.g. women driving). However, reference to the opponents as people from religious backgrounds is likely to legitimise the *Self* group.

2- Referential Strategy: Other (The Proponents)

The construction of the *Other* group by opponents through the referential strategy aimed to: first, *diminish their popularity* by describing them as 'minorities' and second, to *demonise them and their acts* by calling them as 'the enemies' and 'the liberal blocs'. However, it is important to know that some adjectives have a different connotation in the Saudi context; for instance, when a group is described as 'liberal', this could denote a devilish side of them as adopting many unacceptable western values and working to legalise these values within a conservative society. Furthermore, it could indicate that they are relinquishing their Islamic moralities and antagonising the clerics. Examples of how the *Other* group was diminished within the discourse of opponents are provided in the following excerpts:

(5.104)

"One of the clearest things in moral and democratic issues around the globe is that **the minority** don't impose their opinion on the majority."

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.105)

"We say: if it is a must, at the end you are still **minorities.**"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

Furthermore, another negative presentation of the *Other* aimed to demonise the proponents through referential strategy. This demonisation manifests when opponents classify the proponents as 'liberal' and probably in harmony with 'the Safavid camp' or the 'westernisation project'. All previous groups are perceived as outsiders targeting the Saudi society; thereby delegitimising the proponents. This discursive demonisation is expressed clearly in the following excerpts:

(5.106)

"Host: Now, you mentioned that some preachers might be accused of looking down to women…do not do this do not do that…do not leave the house…you job is to cook, raise children and take care of your husband…you have no other roles in life except these…

Saad: **These are the enemies' accusations…these are the other team accusations**. None of the authorised scholars said: a women job is cooking or vacuuming the house."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.107)

"There is a attempts to exploit under these circumstances. This could assure the harmony between the streams working for **the Safavid camp** and those working for **the westernisation or liberal project.**"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.108)

"As Dr. Abdullah Al-Nofaisi said when I asked him prior to *Al-Bayan Attaly* show whether he thought **the liberal blocs** contributed either intentionally or unintentionally to serving the Safavid project? He replied: 'Yes, they did'."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

The opponents references to the *Other* can be described as an exclusionary one. Regarding the above references, proponents are portrayed as outsiders or a group that share interests with our enemies. Advocates of women driving have always been classified as 'liberals' (the negative way) and mostly accused of working for the benefit of western parties, hence

excluded from society. Al-Kheder claims that *Al-Sahwah* and the local religious stream has a history of dropping the legitimacy of the others and doubting them (2011).

3- Referential Strategy: Women Driving

Similar to their counterparts when referring to women driving, the opponents adopted referential strategies to refer to women driving as *a campaign* and *an issue*. In the former, women driving was delegitimised by portraying it as a 'protest' and an act that aimed to 'break the law'; whereas in the latter, women driving was delegitimised beyond the current acts. It is portrayed as 'outraging for the majority of Saudi girls' and being 'not a priority'. The following excerpts illustrate how women driving *as a campaign* is portrayed:

(5.109)

"You are making **a protest**, do you want me to say nothing..?!!"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.110)

"The call to **a protest on 15th Rajab/ 17th June…the call to break the law.**"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.111)

"**It is a matter of aggravating society** by putting it in **a state of congestion and challenge to the state's rules.**"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

The above excerpts demonstrate precisely the negative presentation of women driving (the campaign) within the opponents' discourse. For example, the portrayal of the campaign as a 'protest' or describing it as 'the call to break the law' surely delegitimise it and legitimise its opposition. However, women driving was also depicted as *an issue* through the following excerpts:

(5.112)

"Host: What has the crisis in the neighbouring countries to do with a purely social matter in Saudi Arabia?
Al-Nojaimi: No, **it is not a social matter**"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.113)

"Women driving **isn't a forbidden act in its self**…there is no verse in Quran or Hadeeth that forbids women to drive."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.114)

"Women driving will lead to traffic problems, disruption to the family budget; but **it is a need….a real need.**"

(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.115)

"Huda Al-Qahtani wrote a fantastic unbiased article for both sides. She spoke about why we now globalise the issue, we do not downplay it, but **it is not a priority;** especially now in our society."

(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

The opponents appeared unsure of their reference to women driving as an issue. For example, while they admit it 'is not a forbidden act' in Quran or Sunnah and regard it as a 'need', they still consider women driving as a secondary issue that should not be globalised because 'it is not a priority'. Al-Nojaimi in excerpt (5.112) argues; 'it is not a social matter'. This could legitimise the intervention of other religious figures in opposition to these campaigns.

5.3.3 *Positive self & negative other-representations (Predicationality)*

1- Predicational Strategy: Self (The Opponents)

Regarding the self-presentation through predicational strategy, the opponents demonstrated a modest usage of this strategy that highlights two main qualities: *objectivity* and *democracy*. The positive self-presentation of opponents as being an objective group aimed to portray the Self as a fair, balanced and rational group that deals with no bias against the *Other* group. The opponents assert their objectivity when discussing women driving by avoiding the negative generalisation as in excerpt (2.87), 'we don't accuse whoever call to women driving of being liberal….etc'. Further, they recognise that women driving is a need for some as in excerpt (2.88), 'we don't deny…etc' which reinforce their credibility and objectivity in their research

about the issue regardless of its callers whom negatively represented (see excerpts: 5.106, 5.107, 5.108). The following extracts demonstrate the construction of the first quality of the opponents' self-presentation (*objectivity*):

(5.116)

"As we said previously: **we don't accuse whoever call to women driving of being liberal, westernised, refusenik or bad….etc**. No, there are some who don't mind lifting the ban, but he and his family are pure."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.117)

"**We don't deny that some women need to drive** because they have nobody to do this for them….no comfortable transportation or men to drive them around."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

The second quality constructed through the predicational strategy of positive self-presentation is *'democracy'*. In other words, opponents nominate themselves as being democratic and favouring public preference,which counts in the legitimacy of the *Self* as evidenced in the following excerpt:

(5.118)

"**We want to vote on many outstanding social issues,** like the financial and administrative corruption **to solve our issues democratically and by opinion and the other opinion manner.**"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

In conclusion, the opponent's predicational construction of the *Self* as being; objective and democratic could be attributed to the broadly propagated representation of the religious stream as a dominant power that imposes its perspectives over other segments of society (Al-Ghathami, 2004). However, it is vital to note that although none of the study objectives concerned about the school of thoughts to which opponents or proponents belong, the opponents represent themselves as traditional, religious structure, which the proponents also assert. In Saudi society, the opponents gain legitimacy when accentuating their religious orientations.

2- Predicational Strategy: Other (The Proponents)

The opponents' presentation of *Other* using predicational strategy mainly framed two themes; *selfishness* and *betrayal*. In the former, proponents are portrayed as a little group that only care about themselves while the latter is to describe the proponents acts as disloyal to *Us* (the state and society). The opponents' construction of the *Other* selfishness is presented clearly in the following excerpts:

(5.119)

"It is incredible that **the minority imposes its opinion** over the majority."

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.120)

"The sisters are from a specific class.. **they watch from a high ivory tower**….whereas the majority of Saudi women want their financial and social problems to be solved."

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.121)

"I'm annoyed that **they don't accept the other opinion.**"

(Al-Nojaimi, DMTV, 21 Oct 2013)

(5.122)

"We draw a circle on those who **don't care about women status**, the most important thing for them is to access women"

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

From the above excerpts, the negative-other presentation through predicationl strategy is expressed linguistically through the use of the negative form of the model verb do (don't) followed by a clause of a commonly positive action. This can be seen in excerpt (2.95); 'don't accept the other opinion' and in excerpt (2.96); 'don't care about women status'. Moreover, this negative presentation was expressed through the use of an obligation verb 'impose' as an act that proponents are doing to force their own 'opinion' over the majority of the society. Apparently, this negative presentation is aimed to degrade the proponents' credibility, and popularity; thereby delegitimising their calls. In terms of the second theme, the proponents' (*betrayal*) is demonstrated in the following excerpts:

(5.123)

"I talk about **the fabrication of this crisis at this time**, the sisters who participated in the driving campaign in 1411H/ 1990 told me: 'we wanted to get the advantage of the situation'. Therefore, there are subtle parties that **want to make an advantage of the current situation to twist the inner organisation arm.**"

(Norah, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.124)

"As Dr. Abdullah Al-Nofaisi said when I asked him prior to *Al-Bayan Attaly* show whether he thought the liberal blocs contributed either intentionally or unintentionally to serving the Safavid project. He replied: 'Yes, the liberal blocs **contributed either intentionally or unintentionally to serving the Safavid project'**."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

(5.125)

"There is another group, they do not care about women or women driving, but they **want to adopt a stance to break the rules,**…the call to a protest on 15th Rajab/ 17th June…the call **to break the law**."

(Saad, Al-Majd TV, 15 June 2011)

One of the most sensitive charges in the exclusionary rhetoric is national betrayal, although the opponents did not articulate the word (betrayal) in their argument against the *Other*; rather, it was implied. The proponents' calls were linked to situations in the outside world and depicted as activities that target our society. This can be observed in excerpt (2.99); 'the fabrication of this crisis', 'to twist the internal organisation arm', and in excerpt (2.100); 'serving the Safavid project'. Furthermore, Saad assert the conspiracy of the *Other* against our state rules as in excerpt (2.101); 'to break the rules' and 'to break the law'. Overall, the opponents' employment of the predicational strategy to achieve negative-other presentation appears to be in accordance with the moral evaluation discussed previously under the form *evaluating the Them group* (see page 112).

Table 3. The strategies of Self and Other presentation in the opponents of women driving discourse.

Discursive strategy	Objectives	Categories
Referential	Discursive construction/legitimation of Self	**Pronouns:** *We, Us, Our* **Reference as the quantitative superiority:** *'the majority', 'the vast majority'* **Reference as religious/moral identity:** *'clerics', 'preachers', 'people of sincere word'.*
	Discursive construction/ de-legitimation of the Other	**Pronouns:** *They, Them, Their* **Diminish reference:** *'the minority', 'minorities'* **Demonised reference:** *'the enemies', 'the Safavid camp', 'the liberal blocs'*
	Discursive construction of women driving	**As a campaign:** *'a protest', 'aggravating the society', 'break the law'* **As an issue:** *'outraging for the majority of Saudi girls', 'isn't a social', 'need', 'not a priority'*
Predicational	Discursive construction/legitimation of Self	**WE as objective:** *'we don't accuse whoever call to women driving', 'we don't deny'* **WE as democratic:** *'we want to vote', 'to solve our issues democratically'*
	Discursive construction/ de-legitimation of the Other	**THEY as selfish:** *'the minority imposes its opinion', 'watch from a high ivory tower', 'don't accept the other opinion'* **THEY as traitors:** *'speak like this about her society', 'the fabrication of this crisis', 'to twist the inner organisation arm', 'serving the Safavid project', 'to break the rules'*

5.3.4 Summary of the opponents' discourse

Having examined both the strategies of legitimisation and the strategies of positive self and negative-other presentation employed by those opposed to women driving, it can be claimed that the macro-argumentation of the opponents' discourse was exclusionary and doubtful regarding the proponents and their calls. In the analysis of the legitimisation strategies, the opponents' speech demonstrated the employment of the following strategies: custody, authorisation, analogous/moral evaluation, rationalisation and hypothetical/potential implications. First, legitimisation through custody, which was constructed through the Self-portrayal as being: *virtue defenders* and *from religious background* (Fig. 6). Second, legitimisation through authorisation was another strategy adopted through the use of four sub-types of authority: *personal, impersonal, role model, and expert opinion* (Fig. 7). The third approach to legitimisation taken by opponents was the analogous/moral evaluation, which is their most common strategy of all. The opponents' assessment was framed in four categories: *demolishing their analogy, constructing our analogy, evaluating the Them group, and evaluating the Us group* (Fig. 8). Moreover, strategies of rationalisation and hypothetical/potential implications were employed to serve legitimacy.

However, the analysis of the positive self and negative-other presentation focused on the referential and predicational strategies adopted by the opponents (see Table 3, p.129). In reference to the *Self*, opponents portrayed as (*quantitative superiority* and *religious/moral identity*) whereas, in reference to the *Other*, opponents aimed to (*diminish Them* and *demonise Them*). Opponents referred to women driving *as a campaign* (e.g. 'protest', 'break the law') and *as an issue* (*e.g. 'not a priority', 'is not a social matter'*). Regarding the predicational strategy, opponents portrayed the *Self* as the *objective* group (e.g. 'we don't deny', 'we don't accuse') and as the *democratic* group (*e.g. 'we want to vote', 'to solve our issues democratically'*). On the contrary, the negative presentation of the *Other* through predicational strategy portrayed the proponents as selfish (*e.g. 'the minority imposes its opinion', 'don't accept the other opinion'*) and traitors (*e.g. 'to break the rules', 'serving the Safavid project'*). In brief, the opponents use of the strategies of legitimisation relied primarily on the moral evaluation and authorisation as key ideas in the process of legitimisation while making no reference to mythopoesis.

5.4 Summary

In this chapter the discourse of both the proponents and the opponents of women driving were analysed. From the six strategies of legitimisation (*custody, authorisation, analogous/moral evaluation, rationalisation, mythopesis, and hypothetical/potential implications*), each group employed all or some of them to legitimise its position. However, it was noted that even though the same strategy can be used by each group, the themes constructed were different. For instance, while the proponents' custody was portrayed through *enlightening public*, the opponent's custody appeared to be through *defending virtues*. The chapter presented a detailed analysis of all strategies of legitimisation used by the two dichotomous groups. Moreover, the referential and predicational strategies of positive self and negative other presentation were investigated. Reference to the Self, Other and women driving and the employment of predicational strategies of Self and Other were considered and extensively analysed.

CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS OF USER-GENERATED CONTENT

6.1. Introduction

The second part of data for this study is the online public reflection on women driving; it is the user-generated content presented through YouTube comments. This is important in gauging the public pulse and drawing a better understanding of how mass media content affects public opinions and vice versa. However, to gain the most reliable possible results, it was crucial to systemise the data retrieval, compilation and collection. This is achieved in three phases, in phase 1, the researcher retrieved the first 75 comments on all three videos used for analysis; this means looking at a total of 225 comments. Phase 2 classified these comments into three different responses either; support, oppose or neutrals. Comments in favour of women driving and that demonstrated an apparent support to proponents were classified as 'support', comments that clearly object women driving or reflected support to its opponents were classified as 'oppose', and finally comments that failed to articulate any of the previous stances were classified as 'neutral'. Phase 3 analysed the comments of support, opposition and neutrals and spotting the discursive themes constructed from these observations.

6.2 Public reflection on videos (oppose, support, neutral)

Although there are various online platforms where public can react to the videos used in this study, the credibility of YouTube comments stems from their freshness and accessibility. It allows viewers to engage interactivelywith other's opinions, whether through posting or just reading a comment/s. The total number of comments retrieved from the three videos are 225 comments (see methodology for sampling info); only 198 were considered in this analysis, the remainder were excluded as being vague or completely irrelevant. With regard to women driving, these comments represented three different perspectives: oppose, support or neutral. The comments coded as *oppose* were those that clearly articulated a refusal to accept women driving, demonstrated pride or agreement with opponents, and expressed anger or discomfort towards its advocates. Conversely, the comments coded as *support* were those generating support for women driving, displayed pride or agreement with proponents, and expressed

anger or discomfort towards opponents or the status quo. Finally, *neutral* comments were those that failed to articulate any of the above and remained ambiguous. All submissions under each response are thematically analysed and extensively discussed in the following section.

6.3. Themes constructed through comments

6.3.1 *Opposing comments*

A total of 68 opponents' comments were retrieved from the three videos. These comprise 36 comments on the *#Khaliji* video, and 32 on the *Idaa't* video. No opposing comments were retrieved from *Miadeen* video. However, the four most dominant attitudes extracted from opponents' comments are listed according to their frequency in terms of the following types of language: racist, sceptical, evaluative and offensive.



Figure 9. The most dominant attitudes from the opposing comments.

Racist:

Comments labelled as racist are those that articulate insults to social actors based on their race (e.g. non-Arabs), their religious doctrine (e.g. Shiite) and their citizenship (non-Saudis, immigrants). The racist attitude was highest among opponents featuring in 32% of the total number of the opposing comments. In this string of observations, commenters described and portrayed social actors in favour of women driving as outsiders, immigrants, non-Arabs or

Shiite whom only bringing troubles and interfere in our private affairs. The following comments illustrate how the racist theme was constructed:

(6.1) Al-Nojaimi is a hero. May Allah create more like him, to disallow a minority of nationalised rabble and others from controlling the majority.

(6.2) The show is full of refugees…moreover, it is in Jeddah. I don't trust you.

(6.3) Boukharstan has nothing to do in Saudi Arabia!! We call for their nationality to be withdrawn.

(6.4) The foreigners and nationalised women are the only people demanding to drive!! I hope that Ministry of Interiors beat with an iron fist any rebelling woman who wants to disrupt the system.

(6.5) Lamia Bukhari….the girl of Buoukarstan, go back to your motherland. You illegal residents have corrupted the country.

(6.6) Send the refugees back to their countries and free us of their opinions. Why is the interviewer is hosting an Indian and other Indonesian ladies?

In the above observations, commenters reflected on the social actors who condone women driving in a racist manner to degrade and classify them as outsiders. Some commenters used racist words and hinted at or directly accused social actors of being disruptive and interfering in 'our own' society. Others found it acceptable to label social actors as outsiders and not belonging to 'our society'. Similar to the Self and Other presentation strategies used by speakers in mass media, the opponents aimed to express their rejection of the women driving calls by classifying its advocates as different group; thereby stigmatising them as outsiders or non-Saudis. Therefore, they expect them to be less loyal to our country, less committed to our Saudi conservative customs and acting as tools of foreign governments.

Sceptical:

Opponents' comments that were classified under scepticism are those that articulate doubts regarding the *Other's* intentions and portray the women driving campaign as a premeditated conspiracy targeting *Us* and *Our* society. The submissions raise concerns about the true intentions behind the campaigns (e.g. "the matter is far bigger than driving", "the whole thing is planned to distract people"), and the activists' credibility and loyalty (e.g. "backed up by

the trash Hilary", "the time you picked, the Shiite camerawoman"). The comments below illustrate how the opponent commenters have doubts and are sceptical of the initiative and its advocates:

(6.7) The time you picked the Shiite camerawoman and your statements to the foreign media made us sceptical about your initiative.

(6.8) Let us think about it. When we see people like Manal and Wajiha backed up by the trash Hilary interested in this topic, be assured that nothing but troubles will arise..Will you solve women's problems through driving? What about other women's issues? Why don't you suggest alternatives or solutions? The country is he biggest oil exporter country, yet all of its cities has no other transport except cars.

(6.9) The matter is far bigger than driving. Think about it…it is only a tool for other purposes that aim to destroy the Islamic society by focusing on secondary issues like women driving.

(6.10) Since she is on Al-Arabiya channel, the whole thing is planned to distract people attention away from bigger issues such as housing and unemployment.

(6.11) I am a Saudi girl and thanks to Allah I belong to the peaceful and safe country of the two holy mosques. We are queens in our houses but wondering why the west wants us to drive? Why are they interested in it!?

Drawing such a picture against the intentions of the women driving advocates reflects how some public are against women driving, not because the mere fact of women being behind the wheels; rather, they oppose it because they have doubts or do not trust its advocates. This could be a typical reaction to the moral evaluation of the *Other* proposed by opponents on mass media which encourage the theory of conspiracy and betrayal of the country. Based on the posted comments, the online opponents seem to be reproducing the same rhetoric of doubting the advocates' intentions proposed in the mass media (see Chapter 5).

Evaluative:

Opponents' comments that were classified as evaluative ones articulated some judgemental words regarding whether to evaluate the issue, social actors or even other commenters' opinion. In terms of evaluating the social actors, positive evaluation tends to go to the *Us* group while negative ones are reserved for the *Them* group. The following comments illustrate how the online opponents constructed the evaluative theme:

(6.12) Regardless of my opinion of this campaign, I say if this cued lady is leading you, you are in trouble. I hoped she was more wise and spontaneous. By the way, although she prepared for this interview as she said through her account on Twitter, you should notice in most questions how shamefully she was reading from her notes and files.

(6.13) Let me know who did say Shariah forbids women driving!? All those discussing the issue say it is permissible, but it will lead to catastrophes…got it??

(6.14) Regarding the customs, it has nothing to do with customs, I say women driving isn't banned because of customs, it is because if women drive, it will lead to catastrophes…did you understand? You are in Saudi society, we travel abroad for vice how about if vice is within us….hope you got it.

(6.15) My brothers and sisters favour women driving; the problem is not merely in driving, it is that all countries allowing women driving are mixed-sex societies. A guy in those societies will not harass a woman driving her own car, but in our society, controlling men is a problem. What happened with Manal (guys chasing her) is not an individual case as she tried to portray it.

(6.16) Although the host was not neutral and did not give the Sheikh the right to reply, also the channel was not neutral, and this is obvious from their public interviews, Al-Nojaimy done well to refute them. I am with Sheikh Al-Nojaimy and against women driving.

Most of the above comments reveal a straightforward evaluative approach arriving at one conclusion: we are opposed to women driving. This is because, based on their evaluation, women driving will lead to trouble: 'it will lead to catastrophes', 'if women drive, it will lead to catastrophes', 'Riyadh is crowded while it is only men, what will happen if women drive' or because the women driving advocates are evaluated as degraded people by doing socially unaccepted acts: 'Does she deserve to have the reputation of the Prophet Muhammads' family?', 'this fool is looking for fame', 'may Allah curse you Manal, we thought you are respectful'. However, the construction of the evaluative comments suggests that the online opponents are influenced by or agree with the portrayal of a frightening hypothetical future and the negative moral evaluation of the *Them* group presented by the opponents speakers on mass media (see Chapter 5).

Offensive:

The offensive comments articulated harsh, personal insults targeting the speakers' appearance or morality to express anger and disagreement with the issue to women driving. What distinguishes these comments is that they all adopt an arrogant, hostile attitude towards social

actors and do not provide any logical reasoning to their opposition stances. Indeed, they find it sufficient to insult and threaten to harm the reputation of advocates; thereby diminishing their supporters. As illustrated in the following comments, they included harsh insults such as: 'العانسة' *spinster*, 'السافلة' *immoral*, 'يا نجسة' *dirty*:

(6.17) No driving bitch Manal.

(6.18) All of us are against you dirty, jail is not enough for you. I think you need recycling away from this pure land. Unfortunately, those people gave you more than your dirtiness.

(6.19) Stay at your home Manal. Otherwise, if I see you driving, I will come at you with my 86 GMC and pull you over.

(6.20) OK, if this spinster drives a car, no one will know she is a lady…I am a man and yet I look better than her, hahahahahahaha! They should reward the policeman who caught her….he recognised that she is a lady. Hahahahahha!

(6.21) The hosts, Lamia and Najla, are two faces of a deluxe secular shoe. Hahahahahahaha!

(6.22) Nine thousand bitches are demanding.

6.3.2 *Support comments*

A total of 88 observations in favour of women driving retrieved from the three videos. This represents the highest among all three public reactions towards women driving. In total, the four main perspectives constructed through these comments were: supportive, evaluative, enlightening and feminist grievance.



Figure 10. The most dominant attitudes from the support comments.

Supportive:

Supportive comments are those demonstrating their agreement or support for what advocates are saying or doing. These observations also contained a sense of appreciation and heroes' portrayal to reflect the sincere admiration to the proponents, (e.g. 'you are heroes and strong', 'your names will be written within the Saudi history', 'Najla and Lamia may Allah save you',). They also expressed the commenters' enthusiasm towards change and their encouragement to advocates of continuing, (e.g. 'Lamia and others, go ahead and we are with you', 'go ahead', 'We are all with you Manal'). The comments below illustrate how the supportive tone was constructed:

(6.23) Master Lamia and Master Najla your names will be written within the Saudi history, you are heroes and strong, and hopefully, you will see the fruit of your seeds. May Allah help you, I am with you in heart and soul.

(6.24) Well-done Lamia, you are better than a thousand men.

(6.25) Good job Lamia and others, go ahead, and we are with you, the ignorant will stay ignorant forever.

(6.26) We thank Sister Najla Hariri for her good answers; we are with you in supporting women driving.

(6.27) I am very proud of you the pure, free and brave Manal Al-Sharif, Allah with you.

(6.28) Go ahead Manal; every great Saudi is with you.

Evaluative:

Similar to the opponents' construction of evaluative comments, the proponents' comments classified as evaluative ones articulated some judgements or decisions regarding the social actors, women driving issue or even other comments. They positively portrayed the *Us* group describing them as e.g. 'senior intellects', 'among the best', 'normal human being', while the *Them* group was negatively portrayed as e.g. 'the godfathers of extremism', 'leaders of ignorance'. Other comments evaluated the issue without addressing social actors or other commenters e.g. 'Women driving is personal freedom because of the necessity and sake of women privacy', 'women driving is a right for each female citizen'. The following comments explain how the online proponents framed this evaluative theme:

(6.29) Al-Nojaimi is provocative, he speaks as if we are the elites among people and our system is a democratic one from A-Z !! Is he crazy?

(6.30) Al-Nojaimi insists on calling it a protest because he has not a good argument.

(6.31) Women driving is personal freedom because of the necessity and sake of women privacy.

(6.32) Backwards people, taxi cars are more than our cars, besides they stay a longer time in streets, so it will not be the case if women drove their cars....sometimes, while waiting for the traffic light, you find yourself surrounded by many taxis. It is stupid and indicates how silly you are. Are you happy with your family standing in the street and people are looking at them while they are waiting for a taxi!?

(6.33) When opponents fail to provide any evidence from Quran or Sunnah to support their opinion, we find them manoeuvring to mention some of the old stories about women oppression in ancient times which has nothing to do with a necessary right for a Muslim woman. They are contradicting themselves, and the aim behind this is to distract the public among Muslim community……etc

(6.34) We all know that driving is not forbidden by Shariah so it is not a shame to make all this noise. Some girls don't have brothers to drive them, so it is best for them to drive their cars instead of hiring a driver, paying his salary and dealing with his harassments. It is only a matter of time to lift the ban.

Enlightening:

To some extent, comments under this theme are similar to the evaluative ones but are characterised with their tone of admonishment and educating other readers of what is the issue is indeed like based on the commenter's opinion. This could include; correcting information or ideas presented by opponents whether on mass media or through online comments, and or explaining why the ban on women driving should be lifted. These observations adopt an intellectual stance and rely on logic and knowledge when making an argument, which could indicate that people who posted these comments are characterised with a higher level of education or maturity. Commenters aim to raise public awareness rather than only speaking their support out. The following examples illustrate how enlightenment was constructed through online proponents' comments:

(6.35) Prof. Al-Nojaimi, the right is a right even for one person; it is not true that the minority has no rights.

(6.36) The preacher Ayed Al-Qarni states there is no evidence (from Quran or Sunnah) on which opponents could rely.

(6.37) There is no Hadeeth or Quranic verse that indicates the ban; it is futile mentalities and customs…..if I don't have a man drive and can't hire a driver what shall I do!? Damn futile mentalities.

(6.38) First, feminising the rights does not turn it into horrible topics. Second, some rules in Saudi forbid women from the permissible to save men from committing the sin!!.....in what religion and mind is this? Sick people…

(6.39) Oh girl, Islam has nothing to do with a tribe or family roots. This is a right for women that has been taken from them in the homeland of Islam, the country that opposes women driving in cities arguing for their safety. Meanwhile, they travel hundreds of kilometres outside cities via dangerous roads to get to schools without a male guardian, even if they are in danger daily…what a contradiction!

(6.40) May Allah guide us to goodness, women driving is a right for each female citizen.

Feminist grievance:

Comments under this theme expressed sympathy and understanding of what activists are calling for and the amount of suffering that Saudi women are experiencing because of the ban. From a micro-linguistic perspective, the feminine Arabic pronouns indicate the potential that all comments were posted by female users e.g. 'لنا كسعوديات' (*for us Saudi women*), 'كفاية كبتنا' (*it is enough oppressing us)*, 'متى نسوق' (*when will we drive*). The comments agreed on the need to lift the ban by portraying a gloomy picture of the situation experienced by Saudi women; e.g. 'we are suffering a lot', 'we complain to Allah those who oppressed us by depriving our right', 'don't care about our girls honour', 'It is enough oppressing us from the simplest basics of life'. The examples below illustrate how feminist grievance was constructed:

(6.41) I am a tribal girl and living in Riyadh; I support the ladies' opinion…it is true we are suffering a lot because of the ban...we complain to Allah those who oppressed us through abusing religion.

(6.42) For us Saudi women, driving is a necessity, we complain to Allah those who oppressed us by depriving our right.

(6.43) Oooooh when will we drive; we are fed up of ignorance?

(6.44) I hope and wait for the day when our children laugh on the backwardness we are living now as I did on the Sheikhs of the past when they opposed girls' education, mobile phones and cars. It is oppressing enough us from the simplest basics of life.

(6.45) We want to drive….please it is enough, think maturely.

6.3.3 *Neutrals comments*

Almost 20% of comments on the three videos adopted a neutral stance regarding women driving. Neutral comments are those that failed to articulate a clear-cut opinion of whether or not women should drive. Instead of supporting or opposing, commenters remained conservative or ambiguous regarding women driving. Their neutral observations resulted in the emergence of four main themes: evaluative, admonishing, correcting and enlightening.



Figure 11. The most dominant attitudes from the neutral comments.

Evaluative:

The evaluative comments dominated almost 50% of the total number of neutral comments. In general, these comments were criticising social actors appearances or manner of speech rather than discussing the points they rose: e.g 'you look confused', 'I don't like his tone', 'why your chest is uncovered!?' or objectively criticised both parties (opponents and proponents) e.g. 'why we never see a cleric talking about the citizen main problems such as: housing and unemployment', 'look for solutions then build your civilisation'. Other evaluative comments criticised the show: e.g. 'A silly interview, especially at the end', 'Why you didn't let Sheikh Al-Nojaimi talk…you interrupt him continuously'. The comments below illustrate the construction of the evaluative theme by online neutral commenters:

(6.46) A silly interview, especially at the end.

(6.47) I think the issue is over discussed.

(6.48) Media is using the issue to create more action; in my opinion, the report was a bit biased.

(6.49) Ryan Al-Zahrani, with all respect, you don't evaluate what you say….you accused them of many bad things, I don't know based on what?. I am not supporting or opposing driving, but the way you comment is a reason for them to drive if the opponents are morally accusing girls…how do we take their opinion, you are reflecting a negative image about the opponents.

(6.50) Why you did not let Sheikh Al-Nojaimi talk…you interrupt him continuously.

(6.51) Women driving is a mean not an aim. Uunfortunately, it became an aim for every Saudi women in favour of driving.

Admonishing:

Comments classified as admonishing were those that adopted a preaching style targeting other commenters and readers. Admonishing comments are distinguished for their social reformative approach; their primary concern is the people way of thinking and expression when discussing such issues rather than who is right or wrong e.g. 'Disagreement doesn't ruin amicability', 'Regardless of our stance towards women driving'. They all denounce the harsh, offensive comments from both sides and call to a more sophisticated way of expression e.g. 'think better', 'why cursing and showing disrespect to others? ', 'may Allah forgive us about some comments here'. The following comments explain how this admonishing theme was constructed:

(6.52) Disagreement does not ruin amicability….think better.

(6.53) In this verse of Quran, a reminder for believers about what an individual say that every single saying is counted and recorded in his personal list that will be revealed on the Day of Judgement…..I hope we all act sincerely to Allah when we write each single letter.

(6.54) Regardless of our stance towards women driving, why cursing and showing disrespect to others?? It is true, the little minds speak about persons, while the big ones discuss principles and thoughts.

(6.55) May Allah forgive us for some comments here. Women driving is not a religious issue, and if we want it to be, there is disagreement among clerics. However, I am pretty sure that the Islamic nation, with all its sects or doctrines, agrees upon the criminalisation of cursing or accusing others morally without any evidence.

(6.56) We all need to respect each other and comment responsibly. You should not hurt someone else only because he has a different opinion than yours.

Correcting:

The comments classified as correcting are those that embraced modifying some mistaken views or information provided by social actors on TV or by commenters. For example, 'The host Turki committed a mistake when he quoted Sheikh Al-Munajid opinion', 'A blouse not her chest', 'This date is the launch date, there was no campaigns or gatherings'. Apparently, since these comments hold a neutral stance regarding women driving, they failed to declare their posters' positions. The following examples illustrates how the correcting theme was framed through neutral comments:

(6.57) It is a T-Shirt. Hahahahaha! You thought it is her chest that prompted criticism.

(6.58) The host Turki committed a mistake when he quoted Sheikh Al-Munajid opinion as if it was said about Manal. Actually Al-Munajid was talking about Wajiha Al-Hwaider.

(6.59) My dear, be sincere to Allah when you talk, she is wearing a beige blouse…if you saw her on TV, it was obvious.

(6.60) A blouse, not her chest….what is this stupid way of thinking?

(6.61) This date is the launch date; there were no campaigns or gatherings.

Enlightening:

Regarding the number of neutral comments, the enlightening theme was the least frequent to occur. Enlightening comments provided readers with some informative suggestions that are unbiased, but present some potential solutions and advice to other users. For example, 'Whoever wants to drive should be allowed and for those who don't want to drive, it is their option….the issue is solved', 'A public referendum on women driving should be done….people should choose what they want', 'As a precaution, teenagers should not be allowed to drive….the statistics of public security are full of frightening numbers of accidents'. The following comments are examples that show how neutral comments constructed the enlightening theme:

(6.62) Whoever wants to drive should be allowed and for those who don't want to drive. It is their choice….the issue is solved.

(6.63) Some people are against development…they completely believe in the conspiracy theory as if the whole world is planning against them!!, my dear…nobody knows you.

(6.64) A public referendum on women driving should be done: Do you support women driving or not? People should choose what they want and not be left under the hegemony of a strict minority.

(6.65) As a precaution, teenagers should not be allowed to drive….the statistics of public security are full of frightening numbers of accidents.

(6.66) A public referendum will help us to take the right decision.

6.4 Summary

The analysis of the user-generated content represented in the public comments on YouTube is substantial in numerous ways; primarily, it gauges the public pulse and provides new levels of understanding in the case under investigation. In this regard, the analysis of the public comments revealed the formation of three main responses to lifting the ban on women driving; *oppose, support and neutral*. This chapter provided a theme-based analysis of the opposing, supporting and neutral comments, constructing different themes within each category. The opposing comments framed four main topics; racist, sceptical, evaluative, and offensive whereas thos in favour of women driving framed the following themes; supportive, evaluative, enlightening, and feminist grievance. Moreover, the chapter represented an analysis of the comments that failed to articulate any opposing or supporting response to lifting the ban, classified as neutral comments. These observations took on the following themes: evaluative, admonishing, correcting, and enlightening. Overall, the topics extracted from these comments represented a valuable content that demonstrates public reflection on the discourse of their mass media counterparts.

CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION

7.1 Introduction

Having analysed the strategies of legitimisation employed by the proponents and opponents of women driving alongside their strategies of the positive self and negative other presentation, this chapter attempts to combine and discuss the data obtained from both discourses. In Chapter 5, although some data were discussed briefly and a focus on the micro-legitimation strategies and devices, an overall discussion will be presented in this chapter to aid the understanding of the macro-legitimation scheme on which each group relied most to legitimise its position. First, a quantitative comparison of the similarities and differences in the discourse of each group will be provided, whether on mass media or through comments. Second, a more qualitative comparison of the strategies of legitimisation employed by both groups is given alongside the argumentation schemes proposed by Walton (1995). Furthermore, the way the proponents or opponents legitimised the *Self* and delegitimised the *Other* will be discussed jointly. Finally, overall remarks will be drawn to explain the interconnectedness between the socio-political context and the current discourse in relation to women driving.

7.2 Similarities and differences in discourse of both groups

In comparison with Van Leeuwen's four categories of legitimisation (1996, 2007) and Reyes (2011), this study has confirmed, developed and proposed some new key strategies of legitimisation by applying them to a different social context tackling the interdisciplinary issue of women driving ban in Saudi Arabia. Alongside strategies of authorisation, rationalisation, moral evaluation and mythopesis, this study introduced legitimisation through custody as a new category in legitimacy. Moreover, it can be claimed that analogous evaluation is a distinct strategy from the ordinary moral evaluation, since it does not

necessarily evaluate a group or an issue morally. However, it relies on highlighting the similarities between a previous and current issue that eventually will yield similar outcomes. Hypothetical future, or as it is called in this study hypothetical/potential implications, was also developed as an essential strategy of legitimisation. This research investigates how such an approach was adopted by two dichotomous groups in the process of legitimising or delegitimising one particular action; namely, women driving.

Table 4. Frequency of the legitimization strategies used by interlocutors.

Legitimisation strategy	***Proponents***		***Opponents***	
	(n)	(%)	*(n)*	(%)
Custody	11	25.58	9	15.52
Authority	19	44.19	13	22.41
Analogous/moral evaluation	6	13.95	19	32.76
Rationalization	3	6.98	4	6.90
Mythopesis	1	2.32	-	-
Hypothetical/potential implications	3	6.98	13	22.41

Although the six strategies of legitimisation were predominantly used interchangeably on mass media by both proponents and opponents, reference to them was made in varying degrees and serving two dichotomous perspectives. This could provide greater insight into how interlocutors view their audience and why they tend to use a particular strategy more than the others. Moreover, it explains what argument do speakers account for most to persuade public of changing or accepting the status-quo. Regarding frequency, proponents' most common strategy of legitimisation was authorisation as used 19 times, followed by legitimisation through custody scoring 11 times. On the other hand, opponents' most frequent strategy was the analogous/moral evaluation, which also was used 19 times followed by both strategies of authorisation and hypothetical/potential implications sharing equal usage times; namely, 13 times each. Although in a purely qualitative research with such limited amount of data, findings cannot be generalised, these variations indicate the power distributions within the Saudi society in which proponents show more reliance on authority –especially the personal authority as the most frequent used among other types- in achieving social change by lifting the ban. By doing this, proponents probably seek to instigate the government or some members of the royal family to take serious steps towards change and to embarrass the *Other* by putting them in a confrontation with public and officials. Conversely, opponents

demonstrate more reliance on the analogous/moral evaluation to perpetuate the ban. This is probably a sign that opponents do not account for authority as much as they do with moral evaluation. As a social issue, they believe that if they could keep the majority of public against women driving and its advocates, no change will occur; therefore, the authorities (governmental institutions) will not lift the ban. However, interestingly in a culture where traditions are an intrinsic part of its heritage and daily life, the authority of tradition was not used by any of the groups. Additionally, legitimisation through mythopesis was not used at all by opponents, and only on one occasion within proponents' discourse.



Figure 12. The commenters' responses with regard to women driving.

Regarding the public opinions gathered through YouTube comments, comments that favour women driving has scored the highest number among the three responses (*support, oppose, neutral*), with 88 comments out of 198 comments. This is followed by opponents with 68 comments, and neutral comments with 42 comments. However, proponents' comments were concerned initially with expressing support, encouragement and appreciation for speakers and calls to lift the ban. Second, supporters' comments demonstrated an evaluative theme whereby an evaluation was provided for social actors and/or their arguments, or by assessing the women driving issue. Conversely, the most prevalent theme in opponents' comments displayed a racist rhetoric towards advocates, in which they were excluded from society and portrayed as outsiders. Scepticism was the second important topic within opponents' comments reflecting on and reproducing the issue of conspiracy raised by the opponents on mass media (*e.g. 'there are subtle parties', 'there is attempts to exploit', 'serving the Safavid*

camp'). These themes or online public rhetoric of each group brings insights into the extent to which public opinion circulates or reproduces mass media discourse. Furthermore, it reveals some of what mainstream media may censor.

7.3 Comparison with argumentation schemes

The six strategies of legitimisation indicated in this study are to some extent similar or predominantly correspond with some argumentation schemes introduced by Douglas Walton (1995). These argumentation schemes converge with some of the legitimisation strategies, whereby they can be "inconclusive and defeasible arguments that nevertheless have a practical function of shifting a burden of proof in a dialogue" (Walton, 1995: ix). However, argumentation is something inherent to the use of language and as Diaz states; "the theory of the argumentation should be understood as a pragmatic semantics or a semantics which integrates pragmatic elements" (2009: 2). From this sense, in some cases (e.g. moral evaluations, rational explanations or even authority statements), the argument is powerful because it relies on a system of beliefs, values and norms that support it and hence performing beyond the limits of the content (Anscombre & Ducrot, 1994). Although argumentation schemes are used primarily in the process of evaluating arguments, this particular study is concerned solely with the strategies of legitimisation. Taking a closer look at these schemes could explain how some of the proponents and opponents' arguments were accepted and taken for granted by public, while others were challenged, considered fallacies and rejected.

In this study, authorisation has been used – in its different sub-types - as a useful tool in constructing credibility to a particular opinion through generally argumentative or persuasive strategies. The power of authorisation is that it allows preferential access to elite discourse and institutional discourse which, therefore, enhances the possibility of picking specific topics and organising agendas (Van Dijk, 1992; Diaz, 2009). According to Diaz, "this is the real link between authorisation and argumentative structures and other properties of the discourse that sustain it. That can be translated into an ability to set constraints on the most important communicative events" (2009: 7). The argumentative structure of authority relies on the long time process of manufacturing a vision of reality and the creation of some concepts in which

what is normal or what is deviant are defined and therefore legitimised over time (Martin Rojo & Callejo, 1995). This explains why interlocutors do not rationalise their reference to authority; the mere fact of using actors' positions is used as an argument (Diaz, 2009).

However, compared with Walton's argumentation schemes, legitimisation through the authority of conformity at a similar or almost identical level to *the argument from popularity*. The argument here is: since the vast majority do this act, we are then no different and we should do it as well (*e.g. Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world where women do not drive*). Another type of authority was the expert authority which falls under the argument from expert opinion where an argument is based largely on the position to know about a specific domain of knowledge, in which expert opinion is highly valued and conclusive (*e.g. Dr. Nizar said the society need more of maturity, awareness and safety*). Impersonal authority and argument from established rule are almost the references of two or more persons or groups to a third party position – mostly a rule- to legitimise or persuade the other/s of taking or not taking action (*e.g. the 8th article of the basic law of government…etc*).

Legitimisation through analogous evaluation is another strategy that is probably the same as *the argument from the analogy scheme*. The argument here highlights the similarities between the current and previous issue/situation, resulting in the same conclusion whether or not action is taken (*e.g. when the British wanted to withdraw from the euro zone, they hold a referendum*). As one of the most remarkable characteristics of the argumentation (Foucault, 1972; Martin Rojo & Callejo, 1995), rationalisation was also used frequently to achieve legitimacy. In argumentation theory, rationalisation could be described as the discursive act of *plausible reasoning* as no values to be included in this kind of argumentations (Walton 1995). Indeed, rationalisation is powerful because it provides rational explanations of actions based on common sense in which opinions are contrasted with truth (Sayer, 2006). Actors tend to use rationalisation or plausible reasoning in order to logically make something (*e.g. a value, a feeling, an opinion…etc*) acceptable (Clyne, 2005). Rationalisation explains the use of some socially agreed-upon procedures or norms (*study, research, analysis*) that were taken into consideration to reach a valid opinion or conclusion (*e.g. we conducted a research-like...we read all officials' statements in the state and none of them is opposing*).

Finally, the legitimisation through hypothetical or potential implications is more or less represented in *the argument from consequence*. Walton explains; "this type of argumentation is used in a delibration or critical discussions where there is a divided opinion on a contemplated course of action –one side supporting the action, and the other opposing it, or doubting the wisdom of it" (1995: 75). However, in this particular study, the proponents' argument highlighted the positive aspects of lifting the ban (*e.g. I would imagine the country economic returns will be huge*). Meanwhile, the opponents' argument concentrated on the negative consequences of taking such an action (*e.g. women driving will lead to traffic problems, will result in disruption in a family budget*).

7.4 Legitimising Self and delegitimising Other

Taking into account the historical, socio-political situation, social roles and numerous genres of power embedded within the construction of Saudi society, it was unsurprising that advocates of women driving legitimised the *Self* group. Overall, they adopted a justificatory attitude positioning themselves in a defensive zone. Here, they had to justify themselves first either by proving their good intentions and caring about society (*e.g. 'we are enlightening women', 'we were teaching women', 'we are Saudis'),* or by countering the Other's accusations (*e.g. 'we don't hide', 'we didn't address foreign bodies', 'we don't do something wrong')*. Learning from the past, proponents probably anticipated such accusations from the *Other* before declaring the 17th June 2011 as the campaign launch day. The reaction of opponents (mainly the extreme religious stream) following the 1990 campaign was an exclusionary one when women activists at that time were portrayed as outsiders or traitors to their country. Similarly, the reaction to recent campaigns was, women driving activists and other advocates were under a robust attack by opponents who accused them of being traitors, mercenaries and destroyers of virtues and values (Al-Manie & Al-Sheikh, 2013). That is possibly one reason why advocates tried to refute any similar allegations in advance by introducing themselves to mass media and taking many steps forward by using social media to rally public support. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that following the government, the religious establishment is considered the group in power within the Saudi society and probably the most trusted (Al-Khedr, 2011). Therefore, contradictory opinions are more likely to arise from the *Other* whom usually characterised as outsiders and enemies of

religion or country. Considering such historical insights may go some way to explain why and how power influences discourses in society, and how different groups position themselves to change or maintain a social practice (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). Another essential aspect of legitimising the Self within the proponents' discourse is how they portrayed women driving. By labelling it a campaign, the proponents described it as *'spontaneous'* and *'not a gathering nor a protest'* to assure the audience that it was an unplanned *'initiative'* with no previous meticulous intentions. When referring to it as an issue, proponents legitimise their calls as pursuing a *'social issue'* that is perceived simultaneously as a *'right'* and a *'need'*. Proponents extend in legitimiszing the *Self* through playing the role of the weak, helpless group that has *'no other solutions'* and being *'heavily attacked'* by the *Other*.

With regard to delegitimising the *Other*, proponents were cautious in their definition of the *Other*, to whom they referred frequently and simply as *'opponents'*. However, the mere description of *'opponents'* has a somewhat negative connotation as it portrays the *Other* as resisting inevitable social change and perhaps creating a barrier to social development. Another reference to the *Other* was *'religious men'*, this is probably used to quantitatively minimise the opponents and perhaps isolate or distinguish them from public. Nevertheless, the de-legitimation of *Other* was employed primarily through predicational strategy; opponents were portrayed as the aggressors adopting an attacking approach (e.g. *'they launched the charges', 'their unjustified and violent attack', 'they used to attack me'*). Moreover, opponents were depicted as a group that does not care a lot about the *Us* group (proponents); a member of the *Other* group *'shouldn't impose his/her opinion'* or *'disregard us anymore'*.

Conversely, the opponents of women driving had their discursive strategies in legitimising the *Self* and delegitimising the *Other.* The opponents tend to assure their quantitative superiority over the *Other* group by referring to the *Self group* in many occasions as representing *'the majority'* or *'the vast majority'* of Saudi society. They also positively identified some individuals opposed to women driving (*e.g. 'clerics', 'real reformers', 'people of sincere word'*). Moreover, predicational strategy was employed by opponents to discursively construct the *Self* group as being the fair and rational group that understand and consider others' needs. For example, *'we don't accuse whoever call to women driving of being liberal*

or westernised', 'we don't deny that some women need to drive'. They were also depicted as adopting a democratic approach that accepts nothing but people's choice (*e.g. 'we want to vote', 'to solve our issues democratically'*) to achieve legitimacy.

Regarding the de-legitimisation of the *Other*, opponents used the referential strategy to construct the *Them* group as being '*the minority*' but '*the enemies*' of our unity and social values. In terms of numbers, degrading the *Them* group is thought to undermine its demands and aspirations. Meanwhile, the implicit portrayal of the *Them* group as being *'the enemies'* and belonging or serving *'the liberal blocs'* and *'Safavid camp'* is meant to demonise its members and nominate them probably as a national threat. Therefore, their position is de-legitimised. Likewise, the predicational strategy was utilised to construct a distorted image about the *Other* group discursively, they were portrayed as the selfish, arrogant group that '*watch from a high ivory tower'*, '*imposes its opinion over the majority'* and '*don't accept the other opinion*'. In addition, the opponents raised some doubts about the *Other's* loyalty to Saudi Arabia, while accusing them of creating unrest in society and risks to national security (*e.g. 'speak like this about her society', 'to break the laws', 'serving the Safavid project'*). Nevertheless, the *Other's* legitimacy was also targeted by reference to women driving. Regarding women driving as a campaign, opponents see it as an illegal action that may lead to chaos and maybe other unwanted consequences (*e.g. 'a protest', 'breaking the law', 'aggravating the society'*). Opponents also de-legitimised the *Other* group when referring to women driving as an issue; they depict it as an *'outrage for the majority of Saudi girls'* and a *'thorny issue'* that probably *'will lead to traffic problems'*. Realising that religion is entirely disassociated with the ban on women driving, opponents' *Self*-legitimisation and *Other*-delegitimisation has revealed almost no direct reference to Islam or Sharia. Unlike the case in 1990, when the whole issue was rejected in the name of religion by the issuing of a fatwa from the higher council of Ulama, it seems that two decades were almost enough to change the opponents' argument regarding the ban radically. Although they tried implicitly to insert religion in the construction of *Self*-legitimacy (*e.g. 'clerics' and 'preachers'*) or *Other*-de-legitimacy (*e.g. 'the Safavid camp' and 'the liberal blocs'*), opponents' discourse demonstrated more and explicit reliance on law and democracy rather than religion.

7.5 Overall remarks

The overall structure of the analysis in this research has endeavoured to bring together levels of textual analysis and genre-specific categories alongside the socio-political context to address the processes of discourse production, distribution and consumption about women driving in Saudi Arabia. The discursive construction of *Self* and *Other* within the discourse of both proponents and opponents of women driving leaves a significant impact on the credibility of the legitimate argumentation which could hinder or obstruct processes of distribution and consumption of a particular group discourse. However, shedding light on the socio-political context offers "an overview of the existing body of shared knowledge, which may be drawn upon in the interpretation and production processes of discourse" (KhosraviNik, 2015: 264). For example, in this study in the case of opponents, the discussion of the women driving ban was positioned as part of broader frames regarding a long historical conspiracy that is targeting the country's stability. It has been constructed as a conflict between those nationalists and patriots (the opponents) against those outsiders and conspirators (the proponents) who keep trying to destroy the state's unity. Moreover, it is portrayed as a clash between the religious conservative values (the Self) and the western liberal values (the Other) targeting the Saudi women and society.

The issue of women driving ban should be viewed within the development in the socio-political context of Saudi Arabia. With regard to gender-related issues, the turning point in the Saudi society was significantly salient following the 1979 incident (besiege of the holy mosque), leading to extreme interpretations of some religious texts within the discourse of the religious establishment. Furthermore, the emergence of *Al-Sahwah* as a religious movement has contributed significantly to widening the gap between both sexes in almost all spheres of life (e.g. education, work, transportation). Between 1990 and 2011, the socio-political development had a notable impact on the discourse of the religious establishment that transformed the issue of women driving in Saudi from a merely religious to a subject that is used by enemies of *our* country to perpetuate harm on *Us* and create political instability. This radical transformation has facilitated a tangible shift in the public awareness and attitudes with regard to women driving (*e.g. 'we don't care about such clerics and their fatwas', 'There is no Hadeeth or Quranic verse that indicates the ban'*). In fact, it developed into a counter argument used by advocates to invalidate opponents' credibility (*e.g. 'we found out*

that most religious men say there is no Tahreem (religious ban)', 'it is not a political or religious issue'). While the overall argumentation of opponents in this study did not refer explicitly to or rely on the persuasive authority of religion as it did in 1990, there are covert tendencies towards using some religious categorisation terms by portraying the *Self* (the opponents) as people with religious orientations; for example, 'clerics', 'preachers'. Whereas the *Other* (proponents) are perceived as 'the liberal', 'the Safavid camp'. It is important to highlight the negative connotations linked to the term 'liberal' within the general Saudi context. This is fundamental as liberalism is identified by the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia as an oppositional mindset to the religious values. In other words, by describing the proponents as liberals, they are illegitimate, while *Us* (the opponents) are legitimate because we are resisting *Them.*

It might be petulant to assign all blame to the religious establishment in perpetuating the ban, but their contribution is undoubtedly high. Moreover, they have mostly acted as being the main antagonists in such disputes. Over the past few decades, the anti-Western/liberal values stance of the religious establishment in a range of similar issues, especially those about women has established a repellent conventionalised frame of production and reception towards calls for social change and activating women role in the society. This stance has fostered a sceptical view among the public if calls for social change were not made or approved by the religious stream in the country. Clearly, this dependency appears to be favoured by the religious establishment as it seems to enhance its powerful authority, therefore gaining a better grip over the social identity of Saudis. The sceptical attitude of public in lifting the ban on women driving is promoted by the rhetoric of distrust of the *Other* framed over the years by the religious establishment to maintain the status-quo on issues, such as girls schooling and feminisation of shops. This overarching rhetoric has succeeded on many occasions to legitimise or de-legitimise social changes based on whether intentionally or unintentionally extreme interpretations or misinterpretations of some religious texts. Another intrinsic frame that has been constructed over the years by the religious establishment and has been used continuously to naturalise the existing situation is the uniqueness of Saudi Arabia as being the mecca of all Muslims around the globe. Under this frame, many issues (e.g. gender segregation schooling, applying Sharia law) are embedded where being distinctive is overly portrayed as a value. This requires *Us* (the Saudis) to act as models for

other Islamic nations and feel proud of being distinctive (*e.g. 'this country has its own privacy'*). Lifting the ban could threaten *Our* uniqueness and distort *Our* identity (e.g. 'women driving will result in economic, social and political harms').

Conversely, it is hard to claim that advocates of women driving belong to an organisational structure where a specific discourse is established and constituted. This is probably because of their lack of power and organised physical appearance within the Saudi society, unlike their counterparts. As a result, this led activists to act discreetly to some extent and then organise such campaigns to attract attention nationally and internationally to their issue. Although some Saudi and international mass media (TV channels, newspapers) demonstrated some support and criticised the driving ban on women, locally, this support has enhanced the sceptical view of opponents and legitimised their allegations against activists, especially when the western media is involved. Furthermore, some advocates have declared being in contact with foreign media, embassies and probably met some political and human rights figures which adds further doubts and tensions among the public, therefore, diminishing the credibility of advocates. However, it appears that as a reaction to the usual negative portrayal of activists of women driving or other similar issues, advocates' overall rhetoric tends to be justificatory and appeals for public trust and support (explaining who are they? what do they do? and why they do it?). Anyway, it is important to note that social media has heavily contributed in transforming the proponents' ignored voice into a heard one; thereby granting them a mostly neutral platform where they can present their views, discuss, debate and argue with opponents.

Regarding the online public comments, it is noted that this UGC has brought to the study some invisible aspects of arguments on mass media. The most frequent theme of opponents' comments was 'racist', which probably would not be explicitly spoken or broadcasted on mass media. Generally speaking, the public voice in such dialectical issues were often marginalised or unheard. With regard to women driving issue, public has mostly acted as recipients to the discourses of (the many) opponents –led by the religious establishment- and (the few) proponents – individually organised- rather than sharing their views. The powerful discourse of the religious establishment has had its tangible impact on the opponents' comments which framed 'racist' and 'sceptical' themes as the highest among comments.

Unsurprisingly, these two topics are embedded within the macro-analysis of the opponents discourse on mass media who portray advocates as outsider plotters and picture the true Saudi women as being opposed to driving.

In contrast, the observations of proponents responded to the advocates' justificatory and appealing rhetoric by expressing sympathy, understanding and support for them and the campaign of women driving. However, proponents' enlightening comments were addressed primarily to their counterparts (opponents) and other uncertain or neutral readers by explaining them the legitimacy of women driving since it has nothing to do with religion as portrayed by the opponents. Compared with the opponents, the proponents' comments revealed greater focus on the issue rather than targeting individuals. Overall, it can be said that the macro-strategies of opponents' discourse are *constructive*, whereby they have constructed a national religious identity (e.g. Saudis vs. the outsider enemies), and *perpetuating* to justify and maintain the status-quo (e.g. the legitimation of the ban on women driving). In the case of the proponents' discourse, its macro-strategies are *transformational and destructive* in which it aspires to transform or destruct the status-quo (e.g. lifting the ban on women driving) (Wodak 1997b, Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999).

7.6 Summary

This chapter endeavoured to present a broader understanding of the current discourse of the two dichotomous groups, opponents and opponents of women driving in Saudi Arabia. The similarities and difference in the discussion of both groups were detailed, along with a comparison of the argumentation schemes developed by Walton (1995). However, the strategies of positive *Self* and negative *Other* presentation employed by each group were both compared and discussed. Referential and predicational strategies worked as essential tools serving in the formation of the *Us* and *Them* groups, thus the construction and development of the exclusionary rhetoric of each group. In summary, the chapter illustrated briefly the discursive mechanisms that each group used to achieve legitimacy; thereby, maintaining or altering the status-quo.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

8.1 Contribution of the study (in terms of results)

The main purpose of conducting this study is the researcher's belief of the major contribution of language to the process of legitimisation in society. The main study focus was to investigate the strategies of legitimisation used by both proponents and opponents of women driving in Saudi Arabia to legitimise or de-legitimise the ban. Accordingly, the study's uniqueness lies in three different categories; theoretical, methodological and practical.

Regarding the theoretical contribution, it provides some valuable additions to the existing body of literature in the field of CDA; in particular, the discourse of legitimisation. This research builds on the works conducted on strategies of legitimisation by Van Leeuwen (1996, 2007), Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), and Reyes (2011). It is developing an understanding of some key strategies of legimisation by applying them to a different social context than has been studied before and proposes a new key strategy of legitimisation. However, the novel contribution of this study lies in the fact that it contributes to the understanding of how legitimation and de-legitimation are framed within the discourse of two dichotomous groups that share a context. Previous works examined legitimacy in the political sphere and focused primarily on the discussion of the dominant group to legitimise taking action (e,g, military action, rejection of immigrants' applications) against the other controlled group. In this particular work, the discourse of legitimacy is central to the issue of women driving (proponents vs. opponents); hence, the discussion of both groups within the same social context is considered, examined and compared regarding how each group legitimises or de-legitimises the status-quo. With regard to the strategies of legitimisation, the study proposes a new strategy; namely, legitimisation through 'custody', which is used extensively by both groups as a major category of legitimation. Furthermore, in this study, although 'analogy' was introduced in alignment with the 'moral evaluation' strategy, 'analogous evaluation' can be claimed as an independent category of legitimisation. Another novel contribution of this particular work is that it takes into account the online public opinion as a valuable source of understanding how public opinion is shaped by the legitimation discourse proposed by speakers on mass media. To the researcher's knowledge, no previous CDA work

incorporated both the analysis of the legitimacy discourse by key speakers on mass media and the analysis of the UGC of online public opinion in one study. This is a distinctive feature of this research, by which it presents to some extent a broader perception of how discourse is produced, perceived and reproduced in society.

Regarding the methodological contribution, although CDA has been used previously to disclose the practice of legitimation embedded in political or institutional discourse, earlier works analysing discourse of legitimacy (except Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999) ignored the historical aspect of the issue. However, this study examines the legitimacy discourse of women driving by incorporating the discourse-historical approach; in particular, strategies of positive-Self and negative-Other. Consequently, the study contributes to the literature in proving the applicability and usefulness of the discourse-historical approach within a certain social context. To the extent of the researcher's knowledge, the study provides a novel methodological contribution. It is the first CDA work to examine the employment of the strategies of positive-Self and negative-Other presentation alongside those of legitimisation to legitimise or de-legitimise a social change. For example, in 'Legitimising immigration control' by Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), although the use of DHA demystified how legitimisation is historically embedded within discourse, the study ignored the essential feature of the Self and Other representation and its role in constructing groups and identifying social actors and social actions. This undoubtedly influences the discourse of legitimacy or de-legitimacy. Furthermore, Reyes (2011) investigated the strategies of legitimisation used by US presidents to legitimise the so-called 'war on terror' with little reference to the nominational and predicational strategies used by one side. In this particular work, the strategies of Self and Other representation are intrinsic for both dichotomous groups because they explicitly explain why and how (de-)legitimacy is maintained. However, the emergence of the new category of legitimisation 'custody' indicates to some extent the validity of this methodological integration in providing new insights into the analysis of the legitimacy discourse.

On a practical level, the study contributes by adding to the emancipatory project of CDA, by which it uncovers the hidden meanings and naturalised ideologies through discourse. With regard to the local context, the study is the first to tackle the women driving issue by considering the discourse of both the proponents and opponents via mass media and online

public opinion. To some extent, this study makes a unique contribution to the issue of women driving in Saudi Arabia and lays the foundation for further research to investigate the issue from a linguistic perspective. The study seeks to help eliminate the practice of inequality in Saudi society by enlightening the public on the construction of legitimacy, hoping to raise public awareness, rectifying wrongdoings and injustice; thereby leading to a positive social change. Furthermore, this particular work is expected to contribute to lessening the exploitation of the religious texts in other similar issues within the Saudi society. In addition, the findings of this study reveal how each group (proponents and opponents) is mutually representative, and how the online commenters reflect on these representations. However, for the sake of an essential CDA principle that is 'self-critique', it is an illusion if the researcher tries to place himself in a privileged position. In fact, this work is nothing but a single interpretation by a researcher who is part of the society, influenced by it and socially constructed by the discourses he seeks to deconstruct.

8.2 Limitations of the Study

As with any research, the present study acknowledges some limitations. Although the issue under investigation – women driving ban- suggests the practice of sexism, the gender aspect was ignored in this research by collecting and analysing data (videos and comments) without or with little consideration given to the gender of the social actors. Gender has the potential to influence the style of discourse produced by speakers or commenters. Another limitation is that although CDA was an appropriate and relevant methodology that provided the tools for an in-depth investigation of the strategies of legitimisation, the use of a larger volume of data with the employment of a corpus analysis could back up the analysis with quantitatively reliable figures. Regarding the analysis, it is crucial to highlight that although considerable attention was paid to the process of data translation, the mere fact that the original text has been translated will inevitably influence the discourse analysis; thereby adding a further limitation to this research. With regard to the public online comments, although the anonymity of commenters could carry multiple advantages for the study (see Chapter 4), it is hard to claim they are true public opinions, which appears as another limitation of this study and related research. However, these limitations and any possible others could foster future research and pave the way for further works related to legitimisation.

8.3 Recommendations for Further Research

This section illustrates some potential avenues for further research emanating from this piece of work. Regarding theory, although this study provides a section where it compares the strategies of legitimisation with some argumentation schemes (see Chapter 7), this comparison is simply an insight that should encourage further research. An evaluation of the arguments used in the discourse of legitimisation would be of significant value and would contribute to the CDA literature; particularly that related to legitimacy and argumentation. With regard to the issue of women driving, although the study proposed some new insights, the researcher believes that a further research that collects a larger amount of data and adopts a corpus-based analysis would demystify the power abuse and strengthen the findings. While this study was restricted to the spoken discourse on mass media, it would be interesting to see some future research that includes some forms of written discourse (e.g. newspaper columns, articles, books) alongside the spoken dialogue to enrich the case under investigation with valuable data. Moreover, since this study adopted a discourse-historical approach, a dramatic change in the opponent's discourse was noted; thereby suggesting the necessity for further comparative research to investigate and compare the discourse of women driving during the first campaign in the 1990s with that following the campaigns in 2011 and 2013. Moreover, this study remained limited to YouTube comments; another recommendation would encourage considering other UGC platforms when collecting online public opinions such as; Twitter, Facebook and comments from online journals. Considering large numbers could conclude to more reliable results. However, the applied framework in this research could be adopted in future works to fruitfully study discourses of legitimation related to the Male Guardianship policy, which shares similar conditions to those of women driving and could contribute to a better understanding of its existence.

Overall, it is important to highlight that this research is merely a synopsis of the discourse of women driving in Saudi and the discussion of legitimacy in general. Any further research investigating the issue from a linguistic perspective by applying critical discourse analysis or other discourse analytical approaches will be valued and will contribute to assuring or developing previous works by providing new insights into the existing body of literature.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: The Proponents' excerpts in Arabic.

NO.		EXCERPT
5.1	E	"We enlighten women there is nothing in religion or Sharia nor in law that forbid you from driving, even the officials."
	A	إحنا نوعي النساء، لا يوجد لا في الدين ولا في الشرع ولا في القانون ما يمنعك...ولا المسؤولين.
5.2	E	"We are enlightening women with their rights and there was a minor imitative called (teach me how to drive). We were teaching women who don't know how to drive, we teach them driving…why? Because in emergency cases if a woman needed to drive she knows how to handle the situation."
	A	فالفكرة أنه احنا توعية و إنا نوعي النساء بحقوقهم وكان فيه مبادرة مصغرة اسمها علميني أسوق , كنا نعلم النساء اللي ما يعرفوا يسوقوا , نعلمهم السواقة ليش ؟ لأنه لا قدر الله صار خلنا نقول طارئ واحتاجت أنها تسوق تعرف تتعامل مع المركبة ما تتعطل.
5.3	E	"We did this campaign especially to show the society's voice, change and the growth in numbers demanding this right"
	A	إحنا هنا عاملين دي الحملة خاص عشان نوري الصوت .. صوت المجتمع والتغيير اللي حصل في المجتمع و الأعداد التي تزايدت بأنها صارت تطالب بهذا الحق
5.4	E	"What is happening now is that a woman unfortunately doesn't know her rights, or she might know them but keeps silent."
	A	اللي صاير الآن أنه المرأة للأسف الشديد ما تعرف حقوقها أو تعرف حقوقها وتصمت
5.5	E	"I represent the resistant Saudi woman, who tries to live with dignity."
	A	أنا أمثل المرأة السعودية المكافحة اللي قاعدة تحاول تعيش بكرامة
5.6	E	"I have priorities, I ordered them…my current priority is to concentrate on the initiative because my concern is bigger than Manal."
	A	أنا عندي أولويات ..رتبت أولوياتي ..أولويتي الآن التركيز على المبادرة لأن قضيتي أكبر من منال
5.7	E	"After 17th June, I appeared again because this is the initiative launch date and I want to be among the girls (the members of the initiative). I will try to help because the issue I experienced has become an issue of getting my dignity back as well as all other Saudi women's dignity who appealed for this right and were violently attacked. God willing we won't stop…we won't stop until the issue of the 1st driving licence for a Saudi woman."
	A	بعد 17 جون عدت مرة اخرى للضوء لأنه خلاص الآن إحنا هذا تاريخ انطلاق المبادرة وأبا أكون مع البنات ..أكون موجودة معاهم عضوات المبادرة و بحاول أعطي ..لأنه الآن صارت القضية اللي مريت فيها , صارت القضية كمان أنها قضية رد اعتبار لي و لكل النساء السعوديات اللي طالبوا بهذا الحق وهوجموا بهذا الشكل ..ما راح نوقف...ما راح نوقف إن شاء الله بإذن الواحد الأحد حتى إصدار أول رخصة لإمرأة سعودية
5.8	E	"The divorced ladies, widowed and those earning the modest social security benefits -as the Sheikh said- could save some of their money to buy a car instead of spending it on the driver rent, accommodation and visa fees… Allah knows how much these cost…they all paid from the social security benefits which is modest as you said."
	A	المطلقات والأرامل واللي عندها الضمان زي ما قال الشيخ الضمان البسيط هذا...اللي هوه يبغاها تصرفه على السواق ..هيه يمكن ريال على ريال تقدر تشتري سيارة لكن السواق اللي هوه بيأخذ منها أجار شهري و بيأخذ منها معيشة و بيأخذ منها فيزا بـ ..الله يعلم بكم .. هذا كله مصاريف من الضمان اللي أنت بتقول أساساً أنه هوه بسيط
5.9	E	"She has a car but the matter is already social...it is a social matter…indeed, it relates to women in need. The one compelled to hire a driver and pay all his visa expenses, accommodation, and monthly salary…..it is a bigger burden on her."
	A	عندها سيارة .. لكن بتجيب .. مضطرة already اجتماعياً ..هي مسألة اجتماعية ..هي فعلا تمس نساء محتاجات فعلاً .. اللي هي تجيب سواق .. وتتكفل بفيزته ومعيشته و راتبه الشهري .. هذا عبء عليها أكثر
5.10	E	"We read all officials' statements in the state and none of them is opposing, they all refer to it as a social issue."
	A	قرأنا كل تصريحات المسؤولين في الدولة محد فيهم معارض كلهم يعيزونها أنها قضية اجتماعية
5.11	E	"Even the Saudi traffic law, the general director of traffic, Maj. Gen./ Fahad Al-Bisher assured that the new traffic law that will be implemented today, doesn't include any term that forbids women driving, and this was published in Al-Wattan newspaper in 2002."

	A	حتى قانون المرور السعودي أنا أقولك أكد مدير عام المرور اللواء /فهد البشر أن نظام المرور الجديد الذي سيبدأ تطبيقه اليوم لا يتضمن أي نص قانوني يحرم (يمنع) المرأة من قيادة السيارة وهذي نشرت في الوطن في عام 2002
5.12	E	"Let me tell you, the foreign minister himself said; for us, it isn't a political issue, it is a social one. The prince Saud Al-Faisal (foreign affairs minister) said these words; - it is not a political or religious issue, it is a social one.-"
	A	خلني أقولك يعني وزير الخارجية نفسه قال بالنسبة لنا ليست مسألة سياسية إنها مسألة اجتماعية الأمير سعود الفيصل قال هذي الكلمة، هي ليست مسألة سياسية أومسألة دينية هي مسألة اجتماعية
5.13	E	"The Saudi society heard the king..he said it clearly, the crown prince Sultan also said it…it was said many times that it is a social matter, a society decision and the society should make its decision."
	A	المجتمع السعودي سمع الملك .. وقالها بكل وضوح و ولي العهد قالها والأمير سلطان الله يرحمه قالها .. انقالت كذا مره بأنه هذا شأن اجتماعي و قرار مجتمع و المجتمع يقرر
5.14	E	"The 8th article of the basic law of government is: [Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, shura (consultation) and equality according to Islamic Sharia]."
	A	المادة الثامنة في النظام الأساسي للحكم (يقوم الحكم في المملكة العربية السعودية على أساس العدل والشورى والمساواة وفق الشريعة الإسلامية)
5.15	E	"I drove my car in Jeddah more than once, each time I was stopped by the police they look at my driving licence and instantly let me go. I was also told by many officers that we have commands not to stop you."
	A	سقت كذا مرة في جدة .. كذا مرة وقفني المرور ..كانوا بيشوفوا رخصتي وبيمشيني على طول و سمعت حكاية إنه احنا عندنا توجيهات بعدم إيقافكم من كذا ضابط
5.16	E	"You say we are minorities…Ok, we are minorities and wherever in the world, the minorities' rights don't fall. The world recoils for human rights and minorities' rights."
	A	أنتوا بتقولوا احنا أقليات ..خلونا أقليات , الأقليات لا تسقط حقوقهم في العالم كله أينما كانوا .. العالم بيقوم وبيقعد على حقوق الانسان عشان حقوق الأقليات
5.17	E	"Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world where women don't drive."
	A	السعودية هي الدولة الوحيدة في العالم التي المرأة لا تقود فيها
5.18	E	"We are 1% or 3% of Muslims around the world, we are the only country that do not allow women driving…so, are we the only Muslims who know that women driving is forbidden!?. How about the rest of 97%, are they non-Muslims or do not understand religion properly."
	A	احنا واحد أو 3 بالميه من عدد مسلمين العالم كله فاحنا الوحيدين يعني الدولة الوحيدة في العالم اللي ما بتسمح بقيادة المرأة ..الجانب الديني زي أنتو بتقولوا أنه جانب ديني فهل احنا المسلمين الوحيدين اللي نعرف أنه القيادة محرمة ؟ وبقية ال 97 بالمية هذولا كلهم اللي بيسوقوا نسائهم ..ما هم مسلمين ولا ما هم عارفين الدين مزبوط!
5.19	E	"Sheikh Al-Muhimeed, other Sheikhs like Ahmad bin Baz, bin Jubair, and many others talked about the topic, now Alqarni talked as well and they all said the origin of the case is permissibility."
	A	الشيخ المحيميد, شيوخ مثل أحمد بن باز , شيوخ مثل بن جبير, شيوخ كثيرين تكلموا في الموضوع, الآن تكلم القرني كلهم قالوا بأن الأصل هو الإباحة
5.20	E	"Qais Al-Mubarak, a member of the senior council of Ulama and a professor in Fiqh (jurisprudence) at King Faisal University said: the question about women driving should be directed to the traffic department of the kingdom…why it is directed to a scholar like me."
	A	قيس المبارك هوه عضو هيئة كبار العلماء وأستاذ الفقه بجامعة الملك فيصل...قال: السؤال عن قيادة المرأة يوجه لإدارة المرور بالمملكة..يعني ليه يوجه لي أنا كرجل دين ؟
5.21	E	"Harassment exists in all societies…it is shameful that someone accuses our youths. In our initiative, we have Saudi boys who are among our biggest proponents and supporters, how do you dare to accuse the Saudi man of being a sexual predator that cannot control himself if a woman drive..!!."
	A	التحرش هوه أصلاً موجود في جميع المجتمعات، والله شيء مخزي إنه الانسان يتهم شبابنا ..احنا معانا ناس في المبادرة ..من أكبر المؤيدين والداعمين لنا...شباب سعودي .....أنت كيف أنت تتهم الرجل السعودي بأنه هوه ذئب بشري لا يتحكم في غرائزه إذا طلعت المرأة ساقت
5.22	E	"We didn't address foreign bodies, this is clear. None of the initiative members addressed or got help from any foreign body. Although some of the human rights organisations tried to help us, we refused, we said: we are Saudis and the change is in our hands. I believe that the change happens from inside and if you tried to make it happen from outside you will fail."
	A	لم نخاطب جهات أجنبية ,هذي واضحة , ولا أحد من أعضاء المبادرة خاطب أي جهة أجنبية أو استعان بأي جهة أجنبية مع إنه فيه جهات أجنبية زي منظمات اللي هيه .. هذه المنظمات هي معروف إنها حقوقية ..حاولوا معانا إنهم يساعدونا إحنا رفضنا, إحنا قلنا إحنا سعوديين وإحنا بيدنا الت.. أنا أؤمن إنه التغيير يأتي من الداخل وإذا أنت تبي تحاول إنك ..التغيير يأتي من الخارج راح تفشل
5.23	E	"I didn't violate a law, I violated a custom…I didn't rebel against *'wali al-amr'* (the ruler)"
	A	لم أخالف قانون , خالفت عرف , ولم أخرج عن ولي الأمر
5.24	E	"When you make doubts about the society acceptance to women driving or what immoral acts may result from women driving, it means you are making doubts about the moralities of our society

		which adhere to religion and Sharia.”
	A	أنت لما تشكك في تقبل المجتمع و المفاسد الأخلاقية اللي حتتنتج من قيادة النساء .. هذا معناته أنت بتشكك في أخلاقيات مجتمعنا اللي هو متمسك بالدين وبالشريعة
5.25	E	“I trust our society that there will be no harassments or assaults because they are committing to Islamic moralities, there will not be any of these because I tried it myself I was not harassed..…..because our society, our youth, and our men are good, they have the manners of Islam that our society is adhering to”
	A	أنا أثق في مجتمعنا جداً أنه هو مجتمع .. باربي لك الحمد .. متحلي بالأخلاق الإسلامية .. ولا حيحصل فيه أي تحرشات ولا أي اعتداءات لانه أنا جربت .. و مع الأسف .. الشيخ ديك الأيام قالي: لأنك من القواعد من النساء .. فيا ربي لك الحمد .. أنا من القواعد من النساء لكن تمنيت أنه هو يقولي إن أنا ما تعرضت للتحرش ..مو عشان كدا .. إنو مجتمعنا وشبابنا و رجالنا فيهم الخير وفيهم أخلاق الدين الإسلامي اللي إحنا مجتمعنا متمسك بيه
5.26	E	“Girls’ education is a big and important example that changed the history in Saudi Arabia.”
	A	تعليم البنات عندنا مثال يا شيخ .. تعليم البنات عندنا مثال كبير يا شيخ ومهم .. غير التاريخ في السعودية
5.27	E	“We conducted a research-like; we found that officials don’t oppose women driving. We read all officials’ statements in the state and none of them is opposing.”
	A	سوينا زي الدراسة لقينا لا المسؤولين يعارضوا، قرأنا كل تصريحات المسؤولين في الدولة محد فيهم معارض
5.28	E	“We have studied it; we did that from a legality perspective.”
	A	يعني قرأنا إحنا درسناها ,لما درسناها من ناحية قانونية
5.29	E	“This was the result of a study and deep reading; we found that there isn’t any reason to ban women driving except the society itself. Even the officials used to say the society… the society.”
	A	هذا كان نتاج دراسة وقراءة متمعنه وجدنا إنه فعلاً لا يوجد ما يمنع إلا هو المجتمع ..حتى المسؤولين كان دائما يقولون المجتمع المجتمع
5.30	E	“I was leaving my clinic in AL-Dhahran Street, they closed the clinic and I had no driver to drive me home back. It was 9:00 pm, I walked for 45 mins looking for a taxi but I could not find one. Someone in a car kept following me and I was terrified. I threw a stone at him because I had no other options for defending myself. “
	A	كنت في عيادتي في شارع الظهران وطلعت وحاولت ..سكروا العيادة وما جاء يعني ما لقيت سواق يرجعني البيت فنزلت في الشارع أحاول أدورعلى ليموزين , مشيت 45 دقيقة في الشارع في الليل كانت الساعة 9 المساء ما لقيت ليموزين , فلحقتني سيارة و السيارة هذي يعني رعبني كان يلحقني في النهاية , أنا ما ذكرت هذا الشيء , أخذت حجر من الأرض و رميتوه بيه لأنه ما كان فيه عندي أي وسيلة دفاع
5.31	E	“Once you give this right to a woman, you are opening her a wide welcoming space, how many girls didn’t continue their higher education because there was no mean of transportation or jobs which they quit because they pay half or 3/4 of the salary to their drivers….this is real and I have names and numbers"
	A	يعني مجرد إنك تعطي المرأة هذا الحق بتفتح لها فضاء واسع ورحب يعني كم من بنات ما كملوا التعليم العالي بسبب عدم وجود وسيلة مواصلات ..تعليمهم قصدي.. أو وظائف تخلوا عنها بسبب إنها بتدفع نص الراتب أوثلاث أرباع الراتب وهذا واقع وعندي أنا أرقام وأسماء
5.32	E	“Economically, we have over 800 thousand hired drivers who transfer about 2 billion Riyal monthly outside the kingdom so, I would imagine the country economic returns will be huge.”
	A	إذا اقتصاديا إحنا عندنا .. فوق الـ 800 ألف سائق .. بيحولوا تقريبا 2 مليار ريال شهريا خارج المملكة .. فأظن العائد حيكون اقتصادي على البلد كبير جداً
5.33	E	Host: You say we. We, who are you? Manal: “Members of the initiative, myself and a female student from the Faculty of Islamic Sharia at King Faisal University started it.”
	A	المقدِم: أنتِ تقولي إحنا إحنا من أنتم؟ منال: أعضاء المبادرة اللي بدأنا , أنا كنت بدأتها أنا وطالبة في جامعة شريعة إسلامية في جامعة فيصل
5.34	E	“We launched the initiative to shed the lights on women driving issue”
	A	نطلق المبادرة بحيث انو إحنا نسلط الضوء على قضية قيادة المرأة
5.35	E	“We were teaching women who don’t know how to drive.”
	A	كنا نعلم النساء اللي ما يعرفوا يسوقوا
5.36	E	“We didn’t address foreign bodies”
	A	لم نخاطب جهات أجنبية
5.37	E	“We are delivering our opinion to the society, **we** don’t hide”
	A	نحنا بنقول رأينا للمجتمع و نحنا ما بنندس ولا بنتخبى
5.38	E	“We are waiting for a Royal Decree…just like what happneed with the girls’ education….we hope it is a firm way to block the way against any opposition or anything else…we are in need.”
	A	فإحنا بننتظر قرار الملك الله يحفظه.. زي ما حصل في تعليم البنات .. ننتظر إنه هوه يكون قرار حازم , يعني يقطع الطريق على أي معارضة أو أي كلام ماله داعي يعني .. إحنا محتاجات

5.39	E	“Our society, our youth and our men are good; they have the manners of Islam that our society is adhering to”
	A	إنو مجتمعنا وشبابنا و رجالنا فيهم الخير وفيهم أخلاق الدين الإسلامي اللي إحنا مجتمعنا متمسك بيه
5.40	E	“We are a civil society or we are a civil state”
	A	إحنا مجتمع مدني أو إحنا دولة مدنية
5.41	E	“If custom has no religious basis and is delaying **us** from developing, why do we not change this custom?”
	A	اذا العرف لا .. ليس له أساس ديني .. وهذا العرف بيأخرنا عن التطور ..عن لحق ركب التطور ليش ما نغير هذا العرف ؟
5.42	E	“The opponents want us to wait until peace prevails earth.”
	A	المعارضين يعني .. يبغونا نستنى إلين السلام يعم الأرض
5.43	E	“I have read many of the opponents’ reactions.”
	A	أنا يعني قرأت ردود أفعال كثير من المعارضين
5.44	E	“If there is any incitation or anything else against us, it will be from the opponents.”
	A	لو فيه يعني أي تحريض أو حاجة يعني ضدنا نحنا بدها تحصل من المعارضين
5.45	E	“We found out that most religious men say there is no *Tahreem* (religious ban)….those are within them.”
	A	وجدنا أن معظم الرجال المتدينين يقولون أنه لا يوجد تحريم.. يعني منهم
5.46	E	“They were the judge and jury…they launched the charges. Charges of a revolution against the King and breaking laws and they used them to attack me…I was not charged and these accusations are refuted.”
	A	همه كانوا الخصم والحكم ..هما أطلقوا الاتهامات .. أنا لم توجه لي أي اتهامات ..اتهامات خروج على ولي الأمر ومخالفة القوانين وهذي الاتهامات مردودة عليهم واستخدموها كقاعدة للهجوم
5.47	E	“The opponents want us to wait until peace prevails earth, in order to begin demanding simple things, like the freedom of mobility.”
	A	المعارضين يعني .. يبغونا نستنى إلين السلام يعم الأرض ..عشان نبدأ نطالب بأشياء بسيطة ..زي كدا .. اللي هي حرية التنقل فقط
5.48	E	“We clearly declare, driving is a choice not a coercion”
	A	نحنا بنقول وبإعلان و بكل كلمة بنقولها .. القيادة خيار وليست إجبار
5.49	E	“We did this campaign especially to reflect the society’s voice, change and the growth in numbers demanding this right.”
	A	عاملين دي الحملة خاص عشان نوري الصوت .. صوت المجتمع والتغيير اللي حصل في المجتمع والأعداد التي تزايدت بأنها صارت تطالب بهذا الحق
5.50	E	“Basically, driving isn’t a religious matter to ask someone for fatwa.”
	A	أصلا القيادة ماهي شأن ديني عشان نستفتي أحد
5.51	E	“I didn’t violate a law, I violated a custom…I didn’t rebel against the ruler”
	A	لم أخالف قانون , خالفت عرف , ولم أخرج عن ولي الأمر
5.52	E	“Believe me, the initiative thing was spontaneous, it was not organised”
	A	موضوع المبادرة ..يعني كان .. صدقني كان عفوي ..ما كان شيء منظم
5.53	E	“It is neither a gathering nor a demonstration…it is only a campaign to support the claim.”
	A	لا تجمع ولا مظاهرة ولا أي حاجة ...هي حملة لتأييد المطالبة فقط.
5.54	E	“We are delivering our opinion to the society, we don’t hide…by the way, people who register their opinions writes their full names and they are known…we don’t do something wrong to hide”
	A	نحنا بنقول رأينا للمجتمع ونحنا ما بنندس ولا بنتخبى .. الناس اللي بتسجل رأيها على فكرة بتكتب اسمها بالكامل و معروفين من هما .. نحنا ما بنسوي شئ غلط عشان نتخبى
5.55	E	“Our group, which started the initiative, is still active and didn’t stop even when I was detained.”
	A	إحنا مجموعتنا موجودة اللي هي بدأنا المبادرة ولسه إحنا موجودين وما وقفنا حتى بدخولي ..يتوقيفي ما وقفنا
5.56	E	“We didn’t stop claiming since that time”
	A	كل السنين هذي إحنا ما توقفنا عن المطالبة
5.57	E	“God willing, we won’t stop…we won’t stop until the issue of the first driving license for a Saudi woman.”
	A	ما راح نوقف ..ما راح نوقف إن شاء الله بإذن الواحد الأحد حتى إصدار أول رخصه لإمرأة سعودية
5.58	E	“We have a need and you are unable to provide us with, we have no other solutions”
	A	نحنا عندنا حاجه وإنتوا منتوا قادرين توفروا لنا هيه ..نحنا ما لاقين حلول أخرى
5.59	E	“We are in need and, for this reason, we organised this initiative”
	A	إحنا محتاجات وعشان كذا عملنا هذي الحملة
5.60	E	“We were heavily attacked for seeking help from outsiders, of course this is not true”
	A	تم الهجوم علينا بشكل غير طبيعي إنه إحنا نستعين بأطراف خارجية وطبعا هذا الشيء غير صحيح
5.61	E	“They were the judge and jury…they launched the charges. Charges of a revolution against the King and breaking laws, which they used to attack me…I was not charged and these accusations are

		refuted”
	A	همه كانوا الخصم والحكم ..هما أطلقوا الاتهامات .. أنا لم توجه لي أي اتهامات ..اتهامات خروج على ولي الأمر ومخالفة القوانين وهذي الاتهامات مردودة عليهم واستخدموها كقاعدة للهجوم
5.62	E	“They had some perceptions of the initiative and Manal Al-Sharif; based on which, they began their unjustified and violent attack”
	A	كان عندهم أفكار عن المبادرة وعن منال الشريف وعلى أساسها هاجموا هجوم كان غير مبرر وغير طبيعي
5.63	E	“If there is any incitation or anything else against us, it will be from the opponents”
	A	لو فيه يعني أي تحريض أو حاجه يعني ضدنا نحنا بدها تحصل من المعارضين
5.64	E	“If you can’t sort out my mobility issue, don’t tell me not to drive, don’t ask me to wait until they launch trains…you know this is not a solution…don’t disregard us anymore”
	A	إذا أنت ما تقدر تحللي قضيتي إن أنا كيف أقدر أتنقل بكره بالسيارة .. لا تناقشني بأنه لا تسوقي .. يا تقولي إيوه يا تقولي لا .. أما ما تجي تقولي نستنى يبنوا قطارات و نستنى ... يعني تعرف .. هذا ما هو حل .. هذا ما هو حل .. ما عليه يعني .. لا تستخفوا فينا أكثر من كذا
5.65	E	“The opponents want us to wait until peace prevails earth, before we begin demanding simple things, like the freedom of mobility”
	A	المعارضين يعني .. يبغونا نستنى إلين السلام يعم الأرض ..عشان نبدأ نطالب بأشياء بسيطة ..زي كدا .. اللي هي حرية التنقل فقط
5.66	E	“You are creating doubts about the moralities of our society, which adheres to religion and Sharia”
	A	أنت بتشكك في أخلاقيات مجتمعنا اللي هو متمسك بالدين وبالشريعة

Appendix II: The Opponents' excerpts in Arabic.

NO.		EXCERPT
5.67	E	"The truth is when we discuss women issues we stand with women; we all stand in one line side by side to defend virtues"
	A	الحقيقة حينما نناقش قضايا المرأة ..نحن نقف مع المرأة و كلنا في صف واحد جنباً الى جنب من أجل الدفاع عن الفضائل
5.68	E	"We need to prepare the society; the society must be ready in terms of women safety when they drive"
	A	نحتاج إلى أن نجهزالمجتمع ..يعني المجتمع لازم يكون جاهز من ناحية الأمان بالنسبة للمرأة يعني إذا قادت السيارة
5.69	E	"From our perspective, women driving will lead to some consequences…first, it is an outraging for the majority of Saudi girls and women's feelings who oppose driving"
	A	يترتب على قيادة المرأة للسيارة عدة أمور من وجهة نظرنا نحن .. أولاً أن فيه انتهاك لمشاعر الأكثرية من نساء وبنات المملكة اللائي يرفضن القيادة
5.70	E	"…the clerics are custodians on the society members whether men or women by clarifying the right and warning about the wrong, the distinction between the similar issues to prevent confusion among people"
	A	وأهل العلم والشريعة أوصياء على المجتمع برجاله ونسائه في بيان الحق و في التحذير من الباطل و في فصل الأمور والأوراق المختلطة حتى لا تشتبه على الناس
5.71	E	"I'm a man who adopts a democratic Sharia approach which I don't want people to be forced to anything except with their wishes. When I notice that the society is annoyed of any decision, I say they should have the right to vote and if they are happy to support it, I have no objection."
	A	أنا رجل يا إبراهيم أنتهج المنهج الشرعي الديمقراطي الذي لا أريد أن يفرض شئ على الناس إلا بإرادتهم .. وهذا يجري في أنا أي قرار أرى أنه ينزعج منه المجتمع .. أقول يُستفتى المجتمع فإذا وافق المجتمع .. ليس لدي مانع
5.72	E	"This topic is agreed upon among society and it was affirmed by the ministry of interior resolution to ban women driving over 22 years ago so, nothing has changed"
	A	هذا الأمر مقرر في هذا المجتمع و زاده تقريراً و تكريساً وترسيخاً حينما أصدر .. أصدرت الجهة المعنية وزارة الداخلية منذ أكثر من 22 سنة قراراً يمنع قيادة المرأة و من ثم فلم يتغير شيء
5.73	E	"One of the clearest things in moral and democratic issues around the globe is that the minority don't impose their opinion on the majority. This exists in Sharia, law and everywhere around the world"
	A	من أبسط الأمور في القضايا الأخلاق وفي القضايا الديمقراطية في العالم أن الأقلية لا تفرض رأيها على الأكثرية ,هذا موجود في الشريعة وموجود في القانون وموجود في جميع أنحاء العالم
5.74	E	"These ways of claim are not democratic or Sharia-legitimate; the right Sharia-legitimate way to settle the issue and the democratic way everywhere in the world is to hold a referendum"
	A	هذه الأساليب في المطالبة ..ليست أساليب ديمقراطية و لا أساليب شرعية .. الأسلوب الشرعي الصحيح إذا أردنا أن نحسم هذه القضية و حتى الأسلوب الديمقراطي في جميع أنحاء العالم أنك تُجري استفتاء على هذا الموضوع
5.75	E	"There is a regulation issued and was confirmed by Prince Ahmad bin Abdul-Aziz –the Deputy Minister of the Interior"
	A	فيه نظام صادر و أكد عليه الأمير أحمد بن عبدالعزيز نائب وزير ..نائب وزير الداخلية
5.76	E	"…days ago, Prince Ahmad bin Abdul-Aziz declared that there is a regulation that bans women driving and the ministry of interior is committed to it"
	A	الامير أحمد بن عبد العزيز أعلنها منذ أيام أن هناك نظام يمنع قيادة المرأة للسيارة و وزارة الداخلية ملتزمة بهذا النظام
5.77	E	"Dr. Nizar said the society need more of maturity, awareness and safety"
	A	دكتور نزار جزاه الله خير .. قال المجتمع يحتاج إلى مزيد من النضج و الوعي والسلامة
5.78	E	"I'm a professor in Sharia and law, I know how do they deal with it everywhere in the world, such controversial decisions are taken by holding a referendum not by force"
	A	أنا استاذ شريعة و أستاذ قانون وعارف العملية هذي كلها في جميع أنحاء العالم ..في الدنيا كلها .. القرارات المثيرة يتم الاستفتاء عليها ولا تفرض من فوق
5.79	E	"There are matters that can be reviewed and discussed, not by protests but through advice. The chief of the martyrs Hamza is a man who stood up for an unjust ruler and advised him"
	A	هناك أمور يمكن أن تناقش وتراجع ..ما تناقش بالمظاهرات ..هناك النصيحة سيد الشهداء حمزة وهو رجل قام الى إمام جائرفأمره
5.80	E	"First, we mustn't analogically compare countries that adultery and mixed-sex solitude are normal and not prohibited by law with countries that ruled by the holy book of Allah and the Sunnah of the prophet"
	A	أولاً يجب أن لا نقيس واقع بلاد الخلوة والفاحشة بالنسبة لها أمر طبيعي .. لا يعاقب عليه النظام ..مع بلاد الله ورسوله يحكم.. يعني

		كتاب الله وسنة نبيه تحكم هذه البلاد
5.81	E	"Many Islamic countries sell alcohol and have night clubs, does this mean they are right? No, they are not….therefore, neither sister Najla nor any other should analogically compare us with others because their situations are different."
	A	كثر الدول الاسلامية ..تباع فيها الخمور و تباع فيها الـ .. وفيها مراقص وفيها أماكن .. فهل معنى هذا أنهم مصيبون؟ .....فبالتالي هذا الكلام لا ينبغي للأخت نجلاء ولا غيرها أنها تقيس على الآخرين لأن ظروفهم تختلف
5.82	E	"The claim about number of drivers….how much..!? 800 million Riyal or 1 billion Riyal….how much do housemaids cost? while some ladies do not even work. The issue is not an issue of drivers; it is a big social one for Saudis."
	A	و القول بأن عدد الـ .. الـ عدد السائقين ..كم ... 800 مليون ريال أو مليار ريال ... فكم يكلفن الخادمات والنساء بعضهن جالسات في البيت ..فالقضية ليست قضية سائقين .. القضية اجتماعية كبيرة عند السعوديين
5.83	E	"In the US, a village near to New York ban women driving and call to have its own privacy….the American law approved this. There are colleges that apply gender segregation in Britain and America."
	A	الولايات المتحدة بجوار نيويورك قرية تمنع قيادة المرأة وتطالب بخصوصيتها وأقر لها النظام الأمريكي ..يوجد في بريطانيا وأمريكا كليات تمنع اختلاط الأولاد بالبنات
5.84	E	"Allah said: [They ask you -O Muhammad- concerning alcoholic drink and gambling, say in them is a great sin] no good in it…and said: [and some benefits for people, but the sin of them is greater than their benefit], so there is a harm and benefit but the harm if greater than the benefit."
	A	الله عز و جل قال (يسألونك عن الخمر والميسر، قل فيهما إثم كبير) لا خير فيه .. قال (و منافع للناس), فهنا مفسدة و هنا مصلحة لكن غلبت المفسدة (وإثمهما أكبر من نفعهما)
5.85	E	"When the British wanted to withdraw from the euro zone, they hold a referendum."
	A	يا أخي لما بريطانيا أرادت أنها تنسحب من العملة الأوروبية أجروا استفتاء على ذلك
5.86	E	"The important thing about those who raise the women driving issue and compare us to other societies…some of those people and I'm not saying all of them, only some of them has a liberal pollution, which means having a western mentality or something"
	A	الأمر المهم الذين يناقشون قضية قيادة المرأة و يقارنوننا بمجتمعات .. بعض المجتمعات التي ينظر إليها من يتكلم وخاصة ممن يعني بعض.. بعض ولا أقول كل ..بعض من يتحدث في هذا الموضوع ..تجد عنده لوثه ليبرالية ولا عنده تلوث يعني في ..في فكر تغريبي أو غيره
5.87	E	"I talk about the fabrication of this crisis at this time, the sisters who participated in the driving campaign in 1411H/ 1990 told me: 'we wanted to get the advantage of the situation', therefore there are subtle parties that want to make an advantage of the current situation to twist the inner organisation's arm."
	A	أنا أتحدث الآن عن إفتعال هذه الازمة في هذه المرحلة، الاخوات التي شاركن في القيادة سابقا في 1411 قالوا لي بألسنتهن كنا نريد أن نستفيد من الموقف إذن الآن فيه يعني قضايا خفية تريد أن تستفيد من هذا الموقف للوي ذراع التنظيم الداخلي
5.88	E	"..there is another group, they don't care about women or women driving..but they want to adopt a stance to break the rules…the call to a protest on 15th Rajab/ 17th June…the call to break the law…to break the prestige of the law."
	A	فيه طائفة أخرى, ليس همها أن تقود المرأة و القضية ..المرأة لا تعنيها في شئ لكن تريد أن تتبنى موقف يكسر الأنظمة ..يعني قضية الدعوة إلى مظاهرة في 15 رجب الدعوة إلى أن توجد.. يوجد عمل يكسر النظام ..وش معنى كسر النظام يعني كسر هيبة النظام
5.89	E	"It is proven that this religious society with its vast majority, the Saudi society religious pressure became the biggest obstruction for liberal projects in the country"
	A	لكن ثبت أن هذا المجتمع المتدين بغالبيته الساحقة وسواده الأعظم ..المجتمع السعودي أصبح ضغطه الديني أكبر معرقل للمشروعات الليبرالية في البلد
5.90	E	"As we ask Allah to insert goodness in our rulers and in our security apparatus, we don't only count on this but we strongly count with the same level or more of our zeal, our unity, the stability of our position and our strength gathering against any liberal thought or project from its beginning until we eliminate it"
	A	ومن ثم فإننا نقول كما أننا نرجو الله أن يجعل البركة في ولاة الأمر و في أجهزة الأمن إلا أننا لا نعول فقط على ذلك بل نعول تعويلاً كبيراً بنفس الدرجة أو أعلى منها على غيرتنا وعلى وحدة صفنا وعلى ثبات موقفنا وعلى قوة تجمعنا في مواجهة كل فكر و مشروع ليبرالي من بدايته حتى نجهضه
5.91	E	"Women driving isn't a forbidden act in its self…there is no verse in Quran or Hadeeth that forbids women to drive. When we research women driving, we talk about the ban because of what women driving would lead to, result in and in which country."
	A	قيادة المرأة للسيارة ليست أمراً ممنوعاً في ذاته ..يعني ما فيه آية في القرآن ولا حديث في القرآن يمنع المرأة أنها تضع يدها على مقود سيارة أو تركب على مركبة ..على كرسي السائق، القيادة حينما نبحثها ..نتكلم في المنع من جهة المئآلات والنتائج و أي بلد
5.92	E	"The vast majority of Saudi, of the Saudi society men and women, don't want women driving. In Al-Bayan Attaly survey; 97% of voters oppose women driving and 3% said they do not oppose."

	A	السواد الأعظم والغالبية السعودية من المجتمع السعودي رجالاً ونساء لا يريدون قيادة المرأة ..التصويت في البيان التالي 97 فالمئة يرفضون قيادة المرأة من المصوتين و 3 في المئة يقولون لا مانع أو ليس هناك ما يمنع
5.93	E	"Social issues reflect politics. Why? Because the vast majority of Saudi people especially those who belongs to tribes (whom the majority), refuse women driving. Maybe not for a religious reason, but for social and economic reasons."
	A	القضايا الإجتماعية تنعكس سياسياً .. لماذا ؟ لأن الأغلبية الساحقة من الشعب السعودي وخاصة أبناء وبنات القبائل وهم الأكثرية الساحقة ..يرفضون هذا ..قد لا يرفضونه بعض الأحيان من ناحية دينية ولكن من نواحي اجتماعية ومن نواحي اقتصادية
5.94	E	"Women driving will lead to traffic problems, will lead to a disruption in a family budget but it is a need….a real need."
	A	القيادة ستؤدي إلى مشكلات مرورية نعم ستؤدي إلى خلل في ميزانية الأسرة ولكنها احتياج ..حقيقة احتياج
5.95	E	"Honestly, my sisters who wish to drive, we should help in making our society in a state of security and safety, not a further tension."
	A	حقيقة يا أخواتي الراغبات في القيادة لابد أن نعين على أن يكون مجتمعنا في أمن وأمان وليس مزيداً من الإحتقان والإنفعال
5.96	E	"If a woman could realise what she will suffer from because of women driving -besides other issues that we will discuss later- She will definitely say: this is a poisonous and harmful call for both women and society."
	A	لو تشعر المرأة حقيقة ما سوف تعانيه وتلاقيه من هذا الأمر فضلاً عن أمور سوف نأتي إليها لقالت والله هذه دعوة سامة ضارة بالمجتمع و بالمرأة
5.97	E	"I told you that women driving will result in economic, social and political problems."
	A	أنا قلت لكم أنه تترتب عليها أضرار اقتصادية واجتماعية وسياسية
5.98	E	"The vast majority of Saudi, the Saudi society men and women don't want women driving."
	A	السواد الأعظم والغالبية السعودية من المجتمع السعودي رجالاً ونساء لا يريدون قيادة المرأة ..التصويت في البيان التالي 97 فالمئة يرفضون قيادة المرأة من المصوتين و 3 في المئة يقولون لا مانع أو ليس هناك ما يمنع
5.99	E	"The vast majority of Saudi people, especially those who belongs to tribes (whom the majority), reject women driving"
	A	الأغلبية الساحقة من الشعب السعودي وخاصة أبناء وبنات القبائل وهم الأكثرية الساحقة ..يرفضون هذا ..
5.100	E	"The evidence on how it may reflect politically is the people split into two parts, the majority are opposing of course."
	A	والدليل على ذلك كيف أن له أضرار سياسية .. الآن أصبح .. انقسموا الناس إلى قسمين الان .. الأكثرية بطبيعة الحال معارضة
5.101	E	"It is proven that this religious society with its vast majority, the Saudi society religious pressure became the biggest obstruction for liberal projects in the country"
	A	ثبت أن هذا المجتمع المتدين بغالبيته الساحقة وسواده ..الأعظم ..المجتمع السعودي أصبح ضغطه الديني أكبر معرقل للمشروعات الليبرالية في البلد
5.102	E	"It was proven that clerics, people of the propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice, preachers, people of the sincere word and real reformers became a real nightmare for the liberal thought when they met and worked together in various fields, issues and matters."
	A	ثبت أن العلماء , أن الآمرين بالمعروف و الناهين عن المنكر , أن الدعاة , أن أصحاب الكلمة الصادقة أن رجال الإصلاح الحقيقي .. اجتماعهم و لما هبوا هبة واحدة في مجالات شتى.. في قضايا متعددة في أمور متنوعة , أصبحوا بالفعل كابوس على .. جثم على صدور الفكر الليبرالي
5.103	E	"The clerics are custodians on the society members whether men or women, by clarifying the right and warning about the wrong."
	A	وأهل العلم والشريعة أوصياء على المجتمع برجاله ونسائه في بيان الحق و في التحذير من الباطل
5.104	E	"One of the clearest things in moral and democratic issues around the globe is that the minority don't impose their opinion on the majority."
	A	من أبسط الأمور في القضايا الأخلاق وفي القضايا الديمقراطية في العالم أن الأقلية لا تفرض رأيها على الأكثرية
5.105	E	"We say: if it is a must, at the end you are still minorities."
	A	نحن نقول إذا كان ولا بد .. أنتوا تبقوا أقليات في النهاية
5.106	E	"Host: Now, you mentioned that some preachers might be accused of looking down to women…do not do this do not do that…do not leave the house…you job is to cook, raise children and take care of your husband…you have no other roles in life except these... Saad: These are the enemies' accusations…these are the other team accusations. None of the authorised scholars said: a women job is cooking or vacuuming the house."
	A	المذيع : الآن أنت ذكرت يعني أن الدعاة وغيرهم ينظرون يعني.. أو قد يُتهموا أنهم ينظروا للمرأة بأنها أقل من المستوى ..لا تفعلي كذا لا تفعلي كذا لا تف .. البيت فقط ولا تخرجي من البيت أبداً أنتِ للبيت لتربية الأطفال و للطبخ و.. يعني للقيام على شؤون الزوج والأولاد فقط ..و ليس لكي دور في الحياة إلا هذا .. سعد : هذه تهم الأعداء ..هذه تهم الفريق الآخر ..ما أحد من أهل العلم الذين يُعتد بهم ..قال والله المرأة للطبخ ولا المرأة لكنس المنزل
5.107	E	"There is a try for exploitation under these circumstances. This could assure the harmony between the streams working for the Safavid camp and those working for the westernisation or liberal

		project.”
	A	فهناك محاولة استغلال ..هذا يؤكد أن هناك تناغم و انسجام ما بين التيارات التي تنسجم مع المعسكر الصفوي زائد المخطط التغريبي أو الليبرالي
5.108	E	“As Dr. Abdullah Al-Nofaisi said when I asked him prior to *Al-Bayan Attaly* show whether he thought the liberal blocs contributed either intentionally or unintentionally to serving the Safavid project? He replied: ‘Yes, they did’.”
	A	كما قال الدكتور عبدالله النفيسي وسألته...قبل حلقة الدكتور النفيسي في البيان التالي قلت له :...هل ترى أن الكتل الليبرالية أسهمت في خدمة المشروع الصفوي من حيث تدري أو لا تدري؟ قال: نعم
5.109	E	“You are making a protest, do you want me to say nothing..?!!”
	A	أنت عاملة مظاهرة و ما تبغيني أقول حاجة ؟!
5.110	E	“The call to a protest on 15th Rajab/ 17th June…the call to break the law.”
	A	الدعوة إلى مظاهرة في 15 رجب الدعوة إلى أن توجد عمل يكسر النظام
5.111	E	“It is a matter of aggravating society by putting it in a state of congestion and challenge to the state’s rules.”
	A	هي قضية تأزيم المجتمع ووضعه في حالة من الإحتقان والتحدي لأنظمة الدولة
5.112	E	“Host: What has the crisis in the neighbouring countries to do with a purely social matter in Saudi Arabia? Al-Nojaimi: “No, it is not a social matter.”
	A	المذيع: و ما علاقة الأزمات المحيطة بالسعودية بأمر اجتماعي بحت بالنسبة للسعودية ؟ النجيمي : لا هو ليس أمر اجتماعي .
5.113	E	“Women driving isn’t a forbidden act in its self…there is no verse in Quran or Hadeeth that forbids women to drive.”
	A	قيادة المرأة للسيارة ليست أمراً ممنوعاً في ذاته ..يعني ما فيه آية في القرآن ولا حديث في القرآن يمنع المرأة أنها تضع يدها على مقود سيارة
5.114	E	“Women driving will lead to traffic problems, disruption to the family budget; but it is a need….a real need.”
	A	القيادة ستؤدي إلى مشكلات مرورية نعم ستؤدي إلى خلل في ميزانية الأسرة ولكنها إحتياج ..حقيقة إحتياج
5.115	E	“Huda Al-Qahtani wrote a fantastic unbiased article for both sides. She spoke about why we now globalise the issue…. we do not downplay it, but it is not a priority; especially now in our society.”
	A	هدى القحطاني كتبت مقالة في قمة الروعة ..مقالة منصفة للجانبين تحدثت عن كيف لنا الآن ندول القضية، لا نهون منها ولكنها ليست من الأولويات خصوصاً الآن في مجتمعنا
5.116	E	“As we said previously: we don’t accuse whoever call to women driving of being liberal, westernised, refusenik or bad….etc. No, there are some who don’t mind lifting the ban, but he and his family are pure.”
	A	و كما قلنا لا نتهم كل من دعى إلى القيادة بأنه ليبرالي وتغريبي و رافضي و سيء وأنه و أنه ..لا هناك من لا يمانع من القيادة و يتمنى ذلك لكن مع صلاحه و عفاف أهله
5.117	E	“We don’t deny that some women need to drive because they have nobody to do this for them….no comfortable transportation or men to drive them around.”
	A	نحن لا ننكر أن عندنا عدد من النساء بالفعل يحتجن إلى هذه الخدمة لعدم وجود من يقوم بها لا وسائل نقل مريحة ولا رجال يقومون بها
5.118	E	“We want to vote on many outstanding social issues, like the financial and administrative corruption to solve our issues democratically and by opinion and the other opinion manner.”
	A	إحنا نريد أن نستفتي على كثير من القضايا الاجتماعية المعلقة ومنها الفساد المالي .. ومنها الفساد الإداري عشان نحل قضايانا بأساليب ديمقراطية .. وبأساليب الرأي والرأي الآخر
5.119	E	“It is incredible that the minority imposes its opinion over the majority.”
	A	فلا يعقل أن الأقلية تفرض رأيها على الأكثرية ..هذا من الناحية الاجتماعية
5.120	E	“The sisters are from a specific class.. they watch from a high ivory tower….whereas the majority of Saudi women want their financial and social problems to be solved.”
	A	فالأخوات من طبقة معينة ..ينظرن من قصر عاجي ومن قصر ... ومن مكان عالي والأكثرية من نساء المملكة يردن أن تحل مشاكلهن الاقتصادية والاجتماعية
5.121	E	“I’m annoyed that they don’t accept the other opinion.”
	A	أنا متضجر من كونهن لا يقبلن الرأي الآخر
5.122	E	“We draw a circle on those who don’t care about women status, the most important thing for them is to access women.”
	A	و نضع دائرة على الذين لا يعنيهم قضية والله .. وضع المرأة في داهية بالنسبة لهم المهم أننا نستطيع أن ندخل إلى المرأة ونخلو بالمرأة و نصل بها
5.123	E	“I talk about the fabrication of this crisis at this time, the sisters who participated in the driving campaign in 1411H/ 1990 told me: ‘we wanted to get the advantage of the situation’. Therefore,

		there are subtle parties that want to make an advantage of the current situation to twist the inner organisation arm.”
	A	أنا أتحدث الآن عن افتعال هذه الأزمة في هذه المرحلة, الأخوات التي شاركن في القيادة سابقاً في 1411 قالوا لي بألسنتهن كنا نريد أن نستفيد من الموقف إذن الآن فيه يعني قضايا خفية تريد أن تستفيد من هذا الموقف للوي ذراع التنظيم الداخلي
5.124	E	“As Dr. Abdullah Al-Nofaisi said when I asked him prior to *Al-Bayan Attaly* show whether he thought the liberal blocs contributed either intentionally or unintentionally to serving the Safavid project. He replied: ‘Yes, the liberal blocs contributed either intentionally or unintentionally to serving the Safavid project’.”
	A	كما قال الدكتور عبدالله النفيسي وسألته... قبل حلقة الدكتور النفيسي في البيان التالي قلت له:..هل ترى أن الكتل الليبرالية أسهمت في خدمة المشروع الصفوي من حيث تدري أو لا تدري ؟ قال: نعم بالتأكيد الكتل الليبرالية خدمت المشروع الصفوي من حيث تدري أو لا تدري
5.125	E	“..there is another group. They don’t care about women or women driving. But they want to adopt a stance to break the rules…the call to a protest on 15th Rajab/ 17th June…the call to break the law.”
	A	فيه طائفة أخرى, ليس همها أن تقود المرأة و القضية ..المرأة لا تعنيها في شيء لكن تريد أن تتبنى موقف يكسر الأنظمة ..يعني قضية الدعوة إلى مظاهرة في 15 رجب الدعوة إلى أن توجد..يوجد عمل يكسر النظام.

Appendix III: The Opponents' comments from YouTube

NO.		COMMENT
6.1	E	Al-Nojaimi is a hero. May Allah create more like him, to disallow a minority of nationalised rabble and others from controlling the majority.
	A	النجيمي بطل الله يكثر من امثالك يالنجيمي كي يتحكم اقلية الرعاع من المجنسين وغيرهم في في الأكثرية
6.2	E	The show is full of refugees…moreover, it is in Jeddah. I don't trust you.
	A	البرنامج كلو طروش لا وفي جدة انا غاسل يدي منكم
6.3	E	Boukharstan has nothing to do in Saudi Arabia!! We call for their nationality to be withdrawn.
	A	بخارستان وش دخلها بالسعوديه نطالب بسحب الجنسيه
6.4	E	The foreigners and nationalised women are the only people demanding to drive!! I hope that Ministry of Interiors beat with an iron fist any rebelling woman who wants to disrupt the system.
	A	الاجنبيات والمتجنسات هم الفئة الوحيدة المطالبة بقيادة السيارة!! اتمنى من وزارة الداخلية الضرب بيد من حديد لكل متمردة تريد الاخلال بالنظام
6.5	E	Lamia Bukhari….the girl of Buoukarstan, go back to your motherland. You illegal residentshave corrupted the country.
	A	لمياء بخاري .....روحي ارجع لدولتك الام يابنت بخارى ....افسدتو البلد يامتخلفين
6.6	E	Send the refugees back to their countries and free us of their opinions. Why is the interviewer is hosting an Indian and other Indonesian ladies?
	A	رجعو طروش البحر كل وحده لبلدها وفكونا من افكارهم جايب المذيع طروش ليه وحده هنديه والثانيه اندنوسيه الحمد لله الذي عافانا
6.7	E	The time you picked the Shiite camerawoman and your statements to the foreign media made us sceptical about your initiative.
	A	الوقت الذي اخترتيه والمصوره الشيعيه وظهورك للاعلام الخارجي جعلنا لا نثق في مبادرت
6.8	E	Let us think about it. When we see people like Manal and Wajiha backed up by the trash Hilary interested in this topic, be assured that nothing but troubles will arise..Will you solve women's problems through driving? What about other women's issues? Why don't you suggest alternatives or solutions? The country is he biggest oil exporter country, yet all of its cities has no other transport except cars.
	A	خلونا نحسبها ببساطة لما نشوف أمثال منال الزفت ووجيهة التبن ووراهم هيلاري الزبالة مهتمين في هالموضوع تيقنو ان ما وراه إلا الشر والمصايب !! يعني بسواقة النساء حليتو مشاكل حريمنا طيب وين مبادراتكم للأمور الثانية اللي تخص جانب المرأة ليه ماتطرحون حلول وبدائل قبل ماتجعجعون علينا وتسوون لنا افلام هندية الان اكبر دولة مصدر للنفط وجميع مدنها ماعندها وسيلة مواصلات إلا السيارة
6.9	E	The matter is far bigger than driving. Think about it…it is only a tool for other purposes that aim to destroy the Islamic society by focusing on secondary issues like women driving.
	A	المسالة ابعادها اكبر من مجرد السواقة فكرو شوي يا خلق الله هذا فقط باب ليستخدم في اغراض اخرى الغاية وحدة تدمير المجتمع والكيان الاسلامي من كل جهة باي طريقة عن طريق التدقيق في امور تافهة مثل السواقة للمراة
6.10	E	Since she is on Al-Arabiya channel, the whole thing is planned to distract people attention away from bigger issues such as housing and unemployment.
	A	دامها طلعت في العربيه فالموضوع مدبر الالهاء الناس عن قضايا اهم مثل مشاكل الاسكان والبطاله
6.11	E	I am a Saudi girl and thanks to Allah I belong to the peaceful and safe country of the two holy mosques. We are queens in our houses but wondering why the west wants us to drive? Why are they interested in it!?
	A	انا سعوديه ..والحمدلله اني في بلاد الحرمين امان وامان وملكات في بيوتنا ولكن لماذا الغرب يردون منا ان نسوق السيارات لماذا يهمهم الامر..!!
6.12	E	Regardless of my opinion of this campaign, I say if this cued lady is leading you, you are in trouble. I hoped she was more wise and spontaneous. By the way, although she prepared for this interview as she said through her account on Twitter, you should notice in most questions how shamefully she was reading from her notes and files.
	A	بغض النظر عن موقفي من هذه الحملة أقول ان كانت هذه [المُـلـقّـنـة] هي من تقودكم فالله يعينكم بصراحة تمنيت أن تكون أكثر رجاحة وتلقائية مما شاهدت في هذا المقطع على فكرة مع كل هذا العك والتأتأة والتلعثم الذي ظهر منها في هذه الحلقة الا أنها قد جهزت مسبقا العديد من الملفات والاسئلة المتوقعة لهذا اللقاء كما قالت هي في تويتر ولاحظوا انها في أغلب الأسئلة تقرأ من أوراقها وملفاتها بشكل مخجل
6.13	E	Let me know who did say Shariah forbids women driving!? All those discussing the issue say it is permissible, but it will lead to catastrophes…got it??
	A	مين قال ان سواقه المراه حرام ..؟؟ ابي افهم مين قال ..؟ كل الي يتكلمون ع سواقه المراه ويحرمونها يقولون ان سواقه المراه حلال

		لكن ركز على لكن سواقتها راح تجر كوارث فهمت ..؟؟
6.14	E	Regarding the customs, it has nothing to do with customs, I say women driving is not banned because of customs, it is because if women drive, it will lead to catastrophes…did you understand? You are in Saudi society, we travel abroad for vice how about if vice is within us….hope you got it.
	A	بالنسبة لي العادات مالها دخل العادات وانا اعارض السواقة مو من اجل عادات الله يلعن العادات اذا كان تحرم شي الله حله .. انا اقول سبب منع سواقه المراه في السعوديه ليسسست العادات احنا نقول ممنوعه عشان اذا ساقو الحريم راح تجي وراها كوارث فهمت انت في محتمع سعودي افهم احنا نروح برا اذا نبي نخرب كيف لو الخراب صار عندنا اتمنى انها وصلت المعلومه
6.15	E	My brothers and sisters favour women driving; the problem is not merely in driving, it is that all countries allowing women driving are mixed-sex societies. A guy in those societies will not harass a woman driving her own car, but in our society, controlling men is a problem. What happened with Manal (guys chasing her) is not an individual case as she tried to portray it.
	A	أخواني وأخواتي المؤيدين لقيادة المرأة للسيارة المشكلة ليست قيادة السيارة بحد ذاتها المشكله الفعليه أن جميع الدول التي يسمح فيها للمرأة بالقيادة هي مجتمعات مختلطه فالشاب هناك لن ينظر بعين خبيثه الى امرأة تقود سيارتها أما في مجتمعنا فالمشكله هي الشباب و كيفيه السيطرة عليهم وعلى غرائزهم ما حدث مع الأخت منال (من ملاحقة بعض الشباب لها) للأسف ليس حاله فردية كما حاولت هي أن تصور
6.16	E	Although the host was not neutral and did not give the Sheikh the right to reply, also the channel was not neutral, and this is obvious from their public interviews, Al-Nojaimy done well to refute them. I am with Sheikh Al-Nojaimy and against women driving.
	A	ما شاء الله على الشيخ النجيمي .. افحمهم طوال الحلقه ، مع ان المقدم للحلقه غير محايز و لا يعطي الشيخ حقه بالرد ، وكذلك القناه غير محايده و هذا واضح من لقاء القناه الشارع !! و انا مع الشيخ النجيمي وضد قيادة المرأه لسياره
6.17	E	No driving bitch Manal.
	A	مع نفسك يامنال ياتسلبة وسواقة مافيه
6.18	E	All of us are against you dirty, jail is not enough for you. I think you need recycling away from this pure land. Unfortunately, those people gave you more than your dirtiness.
	A	كلنا ضدك يا نجسة اما كفاك السجن اعتقد تحتاجين التدوير وابعادك عن البلاد الطاهرة وللاسف هؤلاء اعطوك اكثر من وساختك
6.19	E	Stay at your home Manal. Otherwise, if I see you driving, I will come at you with my 86 GMC and pull you over.
	A	الزمي بيتك يامنال ابرك لك وربي لو شفتك تسوقين لأجيكي بالجمس 86 واحدك على الرصيف اركدي
6.20	E	OK, if this spinster drives a car, no one will know she is a lady…I am a man and yet I look better than her, hahahahahahaha! They should reward the policeman who caught her….he recognised that she is a lady. Hahahahahha!
	A	طيب اصلا لو ساقت العانسه هذي ما احد راح يعرف انها حرمه... يا عمي انا رجال واحلى منها.... هههههههههههههههه المفروض يكافئوا العسكري اللي مسكها... ما شاء الله عليه قدر يميز انها حرمه هههههههههه
6.21	E	The hosts, Lamia and Najla, are two faces of a deluxe secular shoe. Hahahahahahaha!
	A	المذيع ولمياء ونجلاء ثلاث وجيه لجزمة علماني فاخر هههههههه
6.22	E	Nine thousand bitches are demanding.
	A	تسعة الاف قحبه تطالب

Appendix IV: The Proponents' comments from YouTube

NO.		COMMENT
6.23	E	Master Lamia and Master Najla your names will be written within the Saudi history, you are heroes and strong, and hopefully, you will see the fruit of your seeds. May Allah help you, I am with you in heart and soul.
	A	استاذه لمياء واستاذه نجلاء.. اسمكم بينكتب في التاريخ السعودي.. انتم بطلات وقويات وان شا الله رح تشوفون ثمرات جهودكم ربي يوفقهم وانا معكم قلبا وقالبا ♥♥♥
6.24	E	Well-done Lamia, you are better than a thousand men.
	A	كفو والله يالمياء والله انها عن الف رجل
6.25	E	Good job Lamia and others, go ahead, and we are with you, the ignorant will stay ignorant forever.
	A	لمياء والباقيات روحوا وحنا وياكم والجاهل بيكون جاهل للابد برافو عليكم
6.26	E	We thank Sister Najla Hariri for her good answers; we are with you in supporting women driving.
	A	نشكر الأخت نجلاء حريري على حسن إجاباتها ونحن معكم في تأييد سياقة المرأة السيارة
6.27	E	I am very proud of you the pure, free and brave Manal Al-Sharif, Allah with you.
	A	كلي فخر فيك يا منال الشريف الشريفه الحره الشجاعه .. الله معك
6.28	E	Go ahead Manal; every great Saudi is with you.
	A	منال الى الامام، كل سعودي شريف معك
6.29	E	Al-Nojaimi is provocative, he speaks as if we are the elites among people and our system is a democratic one from A-Z!! Is he crazy?
	A	النجيمي مستفز بكلامه كأننا شعب الله المختار و نظامنا ديموقراطي من . . . . إلى ؟ مجنون هذا ؟
6.30	E	Al-Nojaimi insists on calling it a protest because he has not a good argument.
	A	النجيمي مصر أنها مظاهرة لأن ماعنده حجة قوية
6.31	E	Women driving is personal freedom because of the necessity and sake of women privacy.
	A	قيادة المرأة حرية شخصية لضرورة أوضاعها وظروف بيتها
6.32	E	Backwards people, taxi cars are more than our cars, besides they stay a longer time in streets, so it will not be the case if women drove their cars....sometimes, while waiting for the traffic light, you find yourself surrounded by many taxis. It is stupid and indicates how silly you are. Are you happy with your family standing in the street and people are looking at them while they are waiting for a taxi!?
	A	شعب متخلف صحيح السائق يضر المجتمع وسيارات الأجرة أكثر من سياراتنا هذا غير انها تبقى في الشوارع وقت طويل يعني مو مثل لو قادت المرأه السيارة بتقضي مشوارها وتوقف سيارتها اما سيارة الأجرة تبقى تحوم في الشوارع مسببة كل اللي انت شايفه من زحام لدرجة احيانا توقف في اشارة ضوئية كال اللى حوليل سيارات ليموزين امر مضحك ويدل على تفاهتكم انت راضي لأهلك يركبو بل يقفو في الشارع تنظر لهم الأعين وهن ينتظرن ليموزين
6.33	E	When opponents fail to provide any evidence from Quran or Sunnah to support their opinion, we find them manoeuvring to mention some of the old stories about women oppression in ancient times which has nothing to do with a necessary right for a Muslim woman. They are contradicting themselves, and the aim behind this is to distract the public among Muslim community……etc
	A	عندما يفلس المعترضون على قيادة المرأة للسيّارة من إيجاد دليل من الكتاب أو السنّة يسند رأيهم نجدهم يلجؤون إلى طرق أخرى منها الدّبج ونقل الكثير من أقوال وظلم المرأة في عصور الأمم السّابقة والتي لاعلاقة لها بموضع حاجة ملحّة للمرأة والأسرة المسلمة وكأنّهم يناقضون أنفسهم وهذه المحاولة لن تكلّفهم أكثر من (قص ولزق) والهدف من كلّ ذلك هو محاولة فاشلة لتتويه العوام من المسلمين والذين بعضهم لن يجد حتى الوقت لقراءة تلك القصص والتي هي أشبه بالحدّوتات لاعلاقة البتّة لتلك الحدّوتات بموضوع قيادة المرأة للسيّارة , ثمّ أنّ تلك الأمم الغابرة هي أمم كافرة (وهل بعد الكفر ذنب) وبعض قادة الجهل يتطوّعون بطرح خزعبلات وخرافات يسمّونها بدراسات علما أنّ دراساتهم مجرّد تتفيه لعقول النّاس مثل تلك الخزعبلة التي تقول أنّ قيادة المرأة للسيّارة تفقدها عذريّتها !!!!! ؟؟؟؟ (شر البليّة ما يضحك) , وكان آخر خزعبلاتهم تلك الهرطقة التي أسماها صاحبها بدراسة وخرافته تقول بأنّ قيادة المرأة للسيّارة تؤثّر على المبايض والحوض , ومع أنّ مناظرة صاحب تلك الخزعبلة مع أحد استشاريّي أمراض النّساء والولادة وهو الدكتور محمد البقنة كانت فضيحة لها أجنحة أساءت لصاحب تلك الخزعبلة وهو شيخ له سمعته ليس هذا فقط بل تلك الخزعبلة أساءت للكثير من علماء الدّين بل وشكّكت بصحّة الكثير من فتاويهم . أصحاب الأهواء يدلون بآرائهم ويصرّون عليها مهما كانت مخالفة للدّين والعقل والمنطق والكثير منهم لا يعلم أنّه ضحيّة لأفكار وتوجيهات جهات خارجيّة مشبوهة لها أجنداتها الخاصّة تتربّص في بلادنا الدّوائر عليهم دائرة السوء هؤلاء الضّحايا وبسبب ضحالة علمهم وخبرتهم وثقافتهم فهم لا يدركون فهم ما يدور حولهم وحول العالم الإسلامي من مؤامرات تسعى وتهدف لتدميره.
6.34	E	We all know that driving is not forbidden by Shariah so it is not a shame to make all this noise. Some girls don't have brothers to drive them, so it is best for them to drive their cars instead of hiring a driver, paying his salary and dealing with his harassments. It is only a matter of time to lift the ban.
	A	اول شي الكل اتفق ان القياده غير محرمه لذلك هي موعيب ولا شرك اكبر عشان تسوي هالهوليله لذلك في بنات ما عندهم اخو

		يوديهم فمن الأفضل هم يقودون بدال السواق وراتبه وتحرشاته والمسأله زمنيه ليست الا :)
6.35	E	Prof. Al-Nojaimi, the right is a right even for one person; it is not true that the minority has no rights.
	A	الاستاذ النجيمي الحق حق حتى لو كان لشخص واحد في الدولة وليس صحيح ان حق الاقلية ليس له اساس
6.36	E	The preacher Ayed Alqarni states there is no evidence (from Quran or Sunnah) on which opponents could rely.
	A	الداعية الشيخ الدكتور. عائض القرني إنه لا يوجد أي دليل(من القرآن والسنة) يمكن أن يستند إليه المعارضون لقيادة المرأة للسيارة
6.37	E	There is no Hadeeth or Quranic verse that indicates the ban; it is futile mentalities and customs…..if I don't have a man drive and can't hire a driver what shall I do!? Damn futile mentalities.
	A	لا يوجد حديث ولا ايه تدل على التحريم بس هيا عادات وتقاليد وعقليات عقيمه اذ ما عندي رجال يوديني ولا اقدر اجيب سواق اش حسوي؟! تبا للعقليات العقيمة
6.38	E	First, feminising the rights doesn't turn it into horrible topics. Second, some rules in Saudi forbid women from the permissible to save men from committing the sin!!.....in what religion and mind is this? Sick people…
	A	أولاً .. تأنيث الحقوق لا يحوّلها لمواضيع بشعة .. ثانياً : بعض القوانين في السعودية تمنع المرأة من الحلال حتى لا يقع الرجل في الحرام !!! أي عقل ودين هذآ ؟ مرضى ..
6.39	E	Oh girl, Islam has nothing to do with a tribe or family roots. This is a right for women that has been taken from them in the homeland of Islam, the country that opposes women driving in cities arguing for their safety. Meanwhile, they travel hundreds of kilometres outside cities via dangerous roads to get to schools without a male guardian, even if they are in danger daily…what a contradiction!
	A	يا بنت الحلال الاسلام ماله دخل بقبيله ولا نسب , هذا حق للمرأة ومسلوب منها في بلد الاسلام , بلد اللي يرفض قيادتها بالمدن بحجه الخوف عليها , و يسمح لها ان تقطع مئات الكيلومترات خارج مدينتها في طرق وعره لمدارس بقرى و هجر بدون محرم وان هددت يوميا بالموت تناقض
6.40	E	May Allah guide us to goodness, women driving is a right for each female citizen.
	A	اللهم اكتب لنا الخير قياده المراه للسياره حق لكل مواطنه
6.41	E	I am a tribal girl and living in Riyadh; I support the ladies' opinion…it is true we are suffering a lot because of the ban...we complain to Allah those who oppressed us through abusing religion.
	A	انا بنت قبيليه وعايشه بالرياض واؤيد كلام السيدات فعلا حنا بمعاناه لايعلم بها الا الله حسبنا الله على كل من ظلمنا من شبيحة الدين و رعاعهم
6.42	E	For us Saudi women, driving is a necessity; we complain to Allah those who oppressed us by depriving our right.
	A	القيادة حاجه ملحه لنا كسعوديات وحسبنا الله ونعم الوكيل علي كل ظالم حرمنا من حقنا
6.43	E	Ooooooh when will we drive; we are fed up of ignorance?
	A	اووووووف متى نسوق يكفيي جهل.
6.44	E	I hope and wait for the day when our children laugh on the backwardness we are living now as I did on the Sheikhs of the past when they opposed girls' education, mobile phones and cars. It is oppressing enough us from the simplest basics of life.
	A	أسأل الله أن يأتي يوم يضحك فيه أبناءنا على هذا التخلف الذي نعيشه الآن كما أضحك أنا على مشايخ الأمس حينما حرموا تعليم المرأة , و الجوالات , و السيارات .. كفاية كبتنا عن أبسط أساسيات الحياة !
6.45	E	We want to drive….please it is enough, think maturely.
	A	نبي نسوووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووووق تكفوووووووون خلاص اكبرو وكبرو عقولكم ماصارت

Appendix V: The Neutrals' comments from YouTube

NO.		COMMENT
6.46	E	A silly interview, especially at the end.
	A	مقابلة سخيفة خصوصا اخرها
6.47	E	I think the issue is over discussed.
	A	أعتقد القضية نوقشت بزيادة
6.48	E	Media is using the issue to create more action; in my opinion the report was a bit biased
	A	الإعلام يستخدم القضية عشان يسوي أكشن، بنظري التقرير كان متحيز شوي
6.49	E	Ryan Al-Zahrani, with all respect, you don't evaluate what you say….you accused them of many bad things, I don't know based on what?. I am not supporting or opposing driving, but the way you comment is a reason for them to drive if the opponents are morally accusing girls…how do we take their opinion, you are reflecting a negative image about the opponents.
	A	ريان الزهراني مع كل احترامي انتي انسان لا تثمن كلامك واتهمتهم وقذفتهم وطعنت بعرضهم مادري بأي حق انا مو مع القياده ولا ضدها لكن اسلوبك سبب لقيادتهم لان اذا كان المعارضين يطعنون بعرض البنات كيف ناخذ رايهم يا عزيزي انت تعكس صوره سلبيه للمظاهرين
6.50	E	Why you did not let Sheikh Al-Nojaimi talk…you interrupt him continuously.
	A	ليه ماخليتو الشيخ يتكلم كل شوي مقاطعه
6.51	E	Women driving is a means not an aim. Unfortunately, it became an aim for every Saudi women in favour of driving.
	A	قيادة السيارة وسيلة وليست غاية ولكن للأسف أصبحت غاية لكل راغبة بقيادة السيارة في السعودية .
6.52	E	Disagreement does not ruin amicability….think better.
	A	اختلاف الرأي لايفسد للود قضية . . ارتقو بالتفكيييير
6.53	E	In this verse of Quran, a reminder for believers about what an individual say that every single saying is counted and recorded in his personal list that will be revealed on the Day of Judgement…..I hope we all act sincerely to Allah when we write each single letter.
	A	في هذه الآية تذكير للمؤمنين وما يخرج من فمه من كلمات؛ كل قول محسوب له أو عليه، وكل كلمة مرصودة في سجل أعماله...يسجله الملكان في الدنيا ويوم القيامة ينكشف الحساب ويكون الجزاء...أرجو أن نكون جميعاً مخلصين النية لله عزوجل في كل ما نكتب وأنت نتوخى الحذر .. وأن نتقي الله عزوجل في كل حرف نقومون بكتابته
6.54	E	Regardless of our stance towards women driving, why cursing and showing disrespect to others?? It is true, the little minds speak about persons, while the big ones discuss principles and thoughts.
	A	بغض النظر كنا مع او ضد القياد .. لمااااذا السب والشتم والانتقاص من الاشخاص ؟؟ فعلا .. العقول الصغيرة تتحدث عن الاشخاص !! اما العقول الكبيرة فتناقش المبادئ والفكر !
6.55	E	May Allah forgive us for some comments here. Women driving is not a religious issue, and if we want it to be, there is disagreement among clerics. However, I am pretty sure that the Islamic nation, with all its sects or doctrines, agrees upon the criminalisation of cursing or accusing others morally without any evidence.
	A	استغفر الله العلي العظيم من بعض التعليقات هنا انتبهوا على انفسكم يا اللي يلعن واللي يقذف بنات الناس!! قضية المراة للسيارة ماهوب قضية دينية ولو خليناها دينية ففيها خلاف ارجعوا لأقوال العلماء في هالمسألة. اما اللعن والقذف فأنا متأكدة أن الأمة الإسلامية بكل طوائفها ومذاهبها تجرّم من يقذف الناس ويلعنهم بغير وجه حق.
6.57	E	We all need to respect each other and comment responsibly. You should not hurt someone else only because he has a different opinion than yours.
	A	كلنا نحتاج نحترم بعض ونعلق بمسؤولية، المفروض ما تجرح شخص بمجرد أن رأيه يختلف عنك.
6.58	E	It is a T-Shirt. Hahahahaha! You thought it is her chest that prompted criticism.
	A	تي شيرت ياهوه خليتوه صدر هههههه ناس جاهزه
6.59	E	The host Turki committed a mistake when he quoted Sheikh Al-Munajid opinion as if it was said about Manal. Actually Al-Munajid was talking about Wajiha Al-Hwaider.
	A	أخطأ تركي الدخيل عندما نقل كلام الشيخ المنجد على افتراض أنه في حق منال، ، فالمقصود من كلام المنجد هي وجيهة الحويدر.
6.60	E	My dear, be sincere to Allah when you talk, she is wearing a beige blouse…if you saw her on TV, it was obvious.
	A	يا عزيزي اتقي الله في كلامك لابسه بلوزه لونها بيج ولو شفتها على التي في كان واضح
6.61	E	A blouse, not her chest….what is this stupid way of thinking?
	A	بلوزة مو صدر شتفكير الغبي
6.62	E	This date is the launch date; there were no campaigns or gatherings.
	A	هذا التاريخ هو بدء الإنطلاقة وليس فيه حملة ولاتجمع ولاهم يحزنون

6.63	E	Whoever wants to drive should be allowed and for those who don't want to drive. It is their choice….the issue is solved.
	A	الي تبي تسوق خلوها تسوق و الي ماتبي ماتنجبر المسألة سهله
6.64	E	Some people are against development…they completely believe in the conspiracy theory as if the whole world is planning against them!!, my dear…nobody knows you.
	A	هناك البعض ممن يرفضون التطور .. ويؤمنون إيمان كامل بنظرية المؤامرة .. وكأن العالم كله يدبر ويخطط ضده !!! عزيزي ... ترى والله محد درى عنك
6.65	E	A public referendum on women driving should be done: Do you support women driving or not? People should choose what they want and not be left under the hegemony of a strict minority.
	A	المفروظ عمل أستفتاء شعبي على قيادة المرأة للسيارة " هل تأيد قيادة المرأة للسيارة أو لا تأيد " . يجب أن يختار الشعب ما يريد و لا نكون تحت رحمة أقلية متذمته.
6.66	E	As a precaution, teenagers should not be allowed to drive….the statistics of public security are full of frightening numbers of accidents.
	A	"من باب درء المفاسد .. منع المراهقين من القيادة .. احصائيات الامن العام مليئة بالأرقام المفجعة للحوادث"
6.67	E	A public referendum will help us to take the right decision.
	A	الاستفتاء بيساعدنا نتخذ القرار الصحيح