COMPLEXITIES OF LAND USE PLANNING AND NATION BUILDING IN NIGERIA’S NEW CAPITAL CITY OF ABUJA

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Policy implementation tends to be a nightmare in the South as they mostly end up unimplemented. New capital cities of the South also reflect this nightmare. In Nigeria’s new capital city of Abuja, master plan making is considered of intrinsic importance toward promoting national identity in a diverse ethnic society. However, despite a history with series of master plan making spanning over 3 decades, implementing the land uses captured in these plans tend to be difficult. This thesis explores the complexities that underline land use implementation in Abuja’s Central Area.

It seeks to make sense of the problems undermining implementation in Abuja’s Central Area. But beyond that the thesis explores the Western notions that have gone into Post-Independence nation building in new capital cities. Investigating these concerns draw insights from a multi-disciplinary body of knowledge. From policy implementation, rational planning process and action-based notions of implementation, relational planning, political economy, post-colonial critique of planning in the South, nationalism, and a wide range of themes on national capital cities. Using these insights, I develop a framework of exploring these concerns of the thesis through an inductive and qualitative process.

The thesis’ findings center around what I refer to as plan gravity. Plan gravity is the privileging of Abuja’s master plans as not only being the most important thing in Abuja, but the answer to the aspirations that Abuja as a new national capital city seeks to achieve. But the privileging leads to the marginalisation and neglect of other factors that are vital to implementation; for instance the planning system under which these plans are expected to be implemented. Again, despite the privileging, implementation is undermined by a multiplicity of actors’ interests, power play and politics, the influx of global mega projects into Abuja’s Central Area, and the kinds of Western knowledge that have driven nation building in Abuja.
Dedication

This work is dedicated to the memory of my parents. May their souls rest in peace.

Baba Nor Igbian Nyinya Agera

And

Mama Kumashe Mbazandan Nor
Acknowledgment

My gratitude goes to the Almighty God for seeing me through this research. Without God this would not have been possible!

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEPB</td>
<td>Abuja Environmental Protection Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMMC</td>
<td>Abuja Metropolitan Management Council- AMMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGIS</td>
<td>Abuja Geographic Information System- AGIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Central Area District of Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUA</td>
<td>Department of Urban Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDC</td>
<td>Department of Development Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>URP</td>
<td>Department of Urban and Regional Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Department of Land Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUP</td>
<td>Department of Public Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCDA</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authourity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCTA</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCT-FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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Chapter One. Introduction

1.1. New Capital Cities and Complexities of Development

The construction of new capital cities is now widespread across countries in the global south, and particularly among those which achieved independence following a period of colonial rule. This is reflected in Brazil’s new capital city of Brasilia, Pakistan’s Islamabad, Botswana’s Gaborone, Malawi’s Lilongwe, Tanzania’s Dodoma, Nigeria’s Abuja, Malaysia’s Putrajaya, and many others (Holston, 1989; Wofel, 2002; Vale, 2008; Marshall, 2013). A most recent of this phenomenon is Equatorial Guinea’s 2017 new capital city of Oyala (BBC, 2017). There has been some discussion of the factors which have driven the construction of these new capitals. This has been said to border on regional and economic development; military and strategic reasons; advancement of personal interests by powerful actors; prestige and image making - aimed at appealing to a certain audience about how prestigious the new capital cities are, and for being even among the league of such prestigious cities in the world; and to advance national identity especially in diverse ethnic societies. Nevertheless, there is also a recognition that local context contributes both to the decision to create a new capital as well as to its design and location (Potts, 1985a; Holston, 1989; Vale, 2008; Elleh, 2015).

Regardless of the driving factors, the construction of these new capital cities tends to be based on western planning knowledge which is expected to guide the development of these cities (Holston, 1989; Vale, 2008; Elleh 2015). Abuja too reflects this proclivity to a western planning knowledge which has been subscribed to by the national elites and planners as they seek to build a new national capital city (IPA, 1979; Ikejiofor 1989; Mabogunje, 2011). This comes in the form of a master plan - the Abuja master plan. Through the master plan, it is the intention of the national elites and planners to achieve nation building in the sense of creating national identity in a multi-ethnic society. But beyond this, it is also expected that the master plan will drive regional and economic development as well as lead to the building of a modern capital city (FCDA, 2014). The master plan is thus the ‘necessary element’ through which these concerns would be realised (IPA, 1979). Prepared in 1979 and adopted for implementation by the Nigerian federal government, since then the planners and national elites have hoped to build a new capital city driven by the master plan.

However, this endeavour has tended not to be successful in achieving the aims and development that Abuja seeks. Generally, in Abuja, there is a reverential treatment that the planners accord master plans. Everything seems to begin and end with the plans. It is common place to hear the
planners especially my colleagues whom we work together in the public planning agencies in Abuja say: “it is against the land use of the master plan; it contradicts the master plan; it is the master plan we respect…” Indeed everything is the master plan! It must be followed and implemented as intended. Yet, the planners find it difficult implementing these very reverential documents. On a daily basis the planners carry out demolitions - pulling down anything considered not in line with the provisions of the master plans.

![Figure 1: Bulldozers demolishing structures not in line with provisions of master plan; Author, 2013.](image)

But beyond Abuja the implementation of plans across much of the global south tends to be problematic, as most plans that have been formulated end up unimplemented (Ilesanmi, 1998; Rakodi, 2001; Godfellow, 2011; Manyena, 2013).

This thesis explores the complexities behind the implementation of the Abuja master plan. The focus is on the land uses of Abuja’s Central Area with a view to understanding the complexities that underline their implementation - in connection to the nation building goals that Abuja seeks to achieve.

1.2. Series of Master Plan Making, Yet Implementation Seems Far Away

The history of plan making in Abuja and attempts at implementation stretch back to 1979 when the Abuja master plan was prepared and adopted for implementation. Implementation in Abuja is treated by the planners in the sense of a linear and rational engagement. It entails that the intentions of the plan will be implemented in a straightforward manner in which the outcomes
of implementation will be in line with the plan’s intentions; and that the planners would act as neutral agents who are devoid of politics and power play or the nuances of interactions that underline the process of implementation (Chapter 3).

By 1981 and 1984, and as a follow up from the Abuja master plan, supplementary master plans were designed for the CA which covered phase 1 and 2 of the district respectively. These plans translated the broad visions of the Abuja master plan into detailed land uses and urban designs in the CA. Yet after close to 3 decades, the implementation of land uses in the CA had not been successfully implemented (FCDA, 1999; Goomsu, 2004; Ajayi, 2013).

Throughout these decades land use implementation in the CA had not only been slow but even tended to be compromised in the few implemented areas. A classic case is the presidential villa which is built on a knoll originally meant to be left as a green area - the nation’s arboretum. Another problem had been the funding of the city generally and provision of infrastructure in the CA. Since the 1980s following the collapse of the country’s oil boom and revenue, this resulted into funding crisis for the entire Abuja city and its CA - thereby limiting the Federal Capital Development Authority’s (FCDA) ability to develop infrastructure and attract private investment into developing the CA’s land uses. Again, changes in government policies resulting into policy drift, abandonment and inconsistencies have limited land use implementation in the CA (FCDA, 1999; Goomsu, 2004; Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi, 2013; Nor, 2014). These problems among others, also tended to be exacerbated by design related and topographic challenges. For instance in the CA’s Central Business District, the National Mall, and many others, their implementation had been undermined in a way too by ‘topography, overly complex urban structures’ (Speer, 2008; FCDA 1999).

Yet, Another New Master Plan

In 2008, the FCDA adopted yet another master plan in the (CA) - known as the AS&P master plan or simply Albert Speer. It replaced all the previous master plans in the CA. In the preface and foreword of the new plan, a high-level optimism for its success is expressed by the German designers of the plan and the executive secretary of the FCDA respectively. The Germans note that,

*With our background in Abuja and other international capitals we bring with us a comprehension of the uniqueness of the assignment [the review of the previous master plans of the CA and design of a new consolidated one] ... to meet the demands of the society of today and the future, and yet maintain the essence behind the original vision for a representative national capital. With this review we hope to have assisted the FCDA towards guiding the next thirty years of urban development in this unique capital city (Speer, 2008, p.ii)*
The executive secretary too observes that,

[The German consultants] have striven from the onset to achieve a concept that meets and even exceeds contemporary expectations and yet carries onward the inspirational vision of the original master plan. I am proud to present the fruits of their work in the following document and am confident it will inspire in a positive manner the further development of Abuja (Engr. Mohammed Sani Alhassan, in Speer, 2008 p.i).

Figure 2: 2008 New Master plan of the CA; Speer,2008.

 Against the optimism and with the expectation that the new plan will continue to be useful even ‘‘towards guiding the next thirty years of urban development’’ in the CA, one would assume that land use implementation in the CA will be easily carried out. But to the contrary. The planners have been finding it difficult to implement even the new plan. Land development has not been adhering to the land use provisions of the plan. Infrastructure such as arterial roads and local streets, sewer lines, among others, are yet to be on ground in certain parts of the CA especially in the phase 2 of the district; and numerous plots of land still exist in he CA without land development. It is as though some of the problems that undermined the implementation of the previous master plans are resurfacing and undermining the new plan.

1.3. Understanding the context

1.3.1. Abuja master plan, as a state-led master plan

Essentially, key notions about what constitute a master plan centres on the long-range conception of a plan. That is, a plan that is conceived and expected to be implemented over a long period of time which may be as far as twenty years or beyond. Such a plan is said to be comprehensive in that it attempts to cover wide-range aspects of a city such as transportation, housing, industries, education, among others. It is mostly also characterised by land use maps
showing where and the kind of use that land should be put to in future. In terms of implementation, it assumes that a plan’s goals should not only be implemented at an expected time in future; but that the outcomes of implementation should be in line with the goals as captured in a plan. Further, it is seen as a state’s project which captures the policies of the state toward the future development of a city (Ilesanmi, 1998; Carmona et al., 2009). These are by no means all the features of a master plan. But it must be emphasized that these key points tend to be associated with the earlier conception of master plans driven by the state.

The state is seen as possessing and exercising direct interventionist role to implement and guide long-range future goals as well as capable of carrying out development on a massive, comprehensive scale. In the early decades of the post Second World War and down to the 1970s for instance, master plans were needed in Europe and elsewhere to massively develop new towns as well as redevelop war ravaged areas. In all of these the state was primarily responsible for both the production of the plans and their implementation (Hall, 2002; Ward, 2004). Overtime however, not all the plans became implemented due to ‘the collapse of the property market in the early 1970s’ in the UK for instance, and other places which ‘left a multitude of these plans incomplete’ (Giddings and Hopwood, 2006, p. 340). Thus, most master plans were abandoned. Many other reasons have been documented against the efficacy of master plan in bringing about the desired development it canvasses over long period of time (see for instance Ilesanmi, 1998; Hall, 2002; Ward, 2004; Giddings, 2006).

Nevertheless, there has been a resurgence of master plans. This is although not necessarily in the notion of a state driven master planning but as private sector-led master plans (Ward, 2004; Giddings, 2006; Todes, 2011). As private sector-led, master plans are primarily driven by private developers mostly for property development such as residential estates, mixed developments, or as regeneration projects. Again, with the city seen as ‘centres of consumption and tourism’ (Giddings, 2006), such property developments are often driven by a quest to promote the appearance of a place to attract tourism (Carmona, 2009). Giddings (2006) explains further that,

*The new style master plans had metamorphosed [from two-dimensional land use maps, the earlier versions of master plans driven by the state in from the post-WWII decades and down to the 1970s] into three-dimensional detailed illustrations, linked to the importance of image and fund raising...Much of the new master planning is for prestige property developments. In all of these, appearance is important (Giddings, 2006)*

But while private sector-led master planning is prominent in the UK for instance, in much of sub-Saharan Africa the persistence of the old-style master planning driven by the state still
persists (Todes, 2011). In Nigeria, planning is generally treated as physical planning with strong emphasis on civic design and land use control. Sanni (2006) demonstrates this through the views of Keeble (1969) and Obateru (1984).

"... [planning is] the ordering of the use of land and character and sitting of buildings and communication routes so as to secure the maximum practical degree of economy, convenience and beauty (Keeble, 1969). Spatial arrangement of economy, convenience and beauty for the purpose of creating orderly, economically, functionally efficient and aesthetically pleasing environment for living (Obateru, 1984)."

Gyuse (2014) still reminds us that this way of looking planning in the country has not changed. In terms of hierarchy, planning at the national level is more concerned with broader issues of policy framework by proving policy guidelines for planning at the regional level, state and local councils. At the lower level it is limited to providing guidance for development at the states and local councils, and mostly through the use of master plans, subdivision plans and planning schemes (Dung-Gwon, 2014)

With regards to master plans, following the country’s Independence in 1960 from the British, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed the clamour for the use of master plans by most state governments and local councils. The underlying reason for this has been attributed to the need to provide future comprehensive development at the local level of planning in the country. Ilesanmi (1998) reports that almost every town, major local councils, and even universities in the country have had master plans. Such master plans have been largely driven by the state. The state is seen as the primary driver of development and whose responsibility among others, is the conception and implementation of master plans. The Abuja master plan falls within the category of these state-led master plans that were prepared in the country in the 1970s (Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi 2013). State-led in the sense that the federal government is both the initiator of the Abuja master plan and primarily the implementer of the master plan. The master plan however does not emanate from a national policy framework but rather from the nation-building concerns of the new capital city (IPA, 1979; FCDA, 1999; Elleh, 2015).
1.3.2. Why the Abuja master plan exists

Why the Abuja master plan exists - requires exploring the very forces that led to the creation of Abuja as a new capital city. Through the Abuja master plan, the national elites and planners of Abuja expect to achieve nation building. This is in the sense of creating national identity in a multi-ethnic society, the building of a modern city, and the promotion of regional and economic development. This requires unpacking to make sense of why the master plan is underscored by these concerns.

Nigeria is a country of over 250 diverse ethnic groups. The three largest ones are the Yorubas, Igbos and Hausas. In the colonial era (1914-1960), especially following the amalgamation of the two Protectorates (Northern and Southern Protectorates) into a single country called Nigeria in 1914 by the British, Lagos became the capital of Nigeria which was created to serve primarily British interests (Elleh, 2015). Lagos lies along the Atlantic Ocean in the western part of the country. Taking advantage of this location and the ports facilities in Lagos would facilitate the exportation of cheap labour and raw materials to Britain and other European countries. The British thus chose Lagos as the national capital. Such a decision would turn out however to create squabbles among the diverse ethnic groups (Tamuno, 1970; Moore, 1984; Mabogunje, 2011). A major contention had to do with the appropriateness of Lagos’ location as the national capital. Since the Yoruba ethnic group is the dominant in population in the western region of the country, Lagos’ location, exerted considerable social-cultural, political and economic influence over Lagos to the disadvantage of the other ethnic groups (chapter 5). Amidst the dominance, is also the problem of Lagos’ disconnection from the other regions of the country on the account of being at the tip of the Ocean; thus considered too far away from the rest of the country. These imbalances often resulted into ferocious ethnic and regional squabbles among the multiple ethnic groups over Lagos’ appropriateness as a national capital throughout the colonial era and even after the country’s Independence from Britain in 1960.

By 1976 however, Nigeria’s post-independence national elites represented by the military government, relocated the country’s national capital from Lagos to Abuja. Primarily, they desire that,

\begin{quote}
\textit{a centrally located [new] Federal Capital in a spacious area with easy access to all parts of the Federation would be an asset to the nation and would help in generating a sense of national unity (IPA, 1979 p. 27).}
\end{quote}

The new capital is expected thus to first and foremost promote national unity in a multi-ethnic society (Mabogunje, 1992; Ajayi 2013). In other words, using Abuja which is in the middle of the country, it is assumed that since its location is not dominated by any major ethnic group
especially the three largest ones (Yorubas, Hausas, Ibos), it would be devoid of ethnic dominance as hitherto characterised by Lagos’ Yoruba dominance (Chapter 5). The committee on the new capital relocation known as the Aguda Committee, set up by the federal military government in 1975, is quite clear about this in its key recommendations to the government - explaining that,

*Lagos is identified with predominately one ethnic group. [Thus] A New Capital in a more central location would provide equal access to Nigeria’s great diversity of cultural groups... [therefore] a New Capital is desirable that would be secure and ethnically neutral, centrally accessible (Abuja master plan, 1979 p. 27).

Not only that but the new capital would be also ‘comfortable and healthful, and possesses adequate land natural resources to provide a promising base for urban development’; and above all as a ‘symbol of Nigeria’s aspirations for unity and greatness’. To the Nigerian national elites, therefore, the overarching intention is to create a ‘neutral-ethnic’ (Vale, 2008) new capital on an empty land where even the indigenous peoples of Abuja would be relocated outside the Federal Capital Territory (IPA, 1979; FCDA, 1999; Jibril, 2006).

Apart from using the new capital to promote national unity, Nigeria expects to build Abuja as a modern capital to showcase to the world of her arrival as a modern nation; the pride of not just the Nigerian peoples but the entire black race by making Abuja ‘one of Africa’s great capitals and one of the world’s great New cities’ (IPA, 1979, p. 27). Further, it expects to promote regional and economic development in the country through Abuja. That is, Abuja would cause regional development in the Middle Belt Region of the country on the account of the region’s low development compared to other regions of the country. Other reasons for the new capital city are based on the need to promote an effective and efficient administrative new capital (Chapter 5 and 6). This is understandable since the former capital (Lagos) had been incapable to play both the role of a national capital and state capital to the state of Lagos (Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi, 2013). Often characterised by inadequate space for urban expansion and development, poor sanitation, traffic congestion, crime, acute housing, among others, Lagos had become as Uyanga (1989, p.130) observes, ‘a place to leave and not to live, a crowded and sprawling city, the worst on earth’.

The culmination of these problems and political agitations for a new capital motivated largely by ethnic and regional interests, would no doubt warrant a consideration for a new capital city. And indeed, the Aguda Committee did call for the creation of a new capital city for the country as earlier noted. But more than that, the oil boom the country experienced in the early 1970s, provided a huge revenue base to support the declaration of Abuja as a new national capital.
(Vale, 2008; Elleh, 2015). Without this vital resource the decision to have a new capital would perhaps never have taken place, considering that capital relocation is capital intensive and requires huge material resources (chapter 5). At the time of the Abuja declaration in 1976 also, a new military government had just come into power barely a year. The military’s proactive stance on the issue of a new capital equally provided the impetus for the declaration within the very short period of its ascendancy to power (Moore, 1984; Mabogunje, 2011).

1.3.3. Abuja’s Nation Building Theme

To the national elites represented by the military, then, Abuja is a nation building project. Nation building in the sense of advancing firstly, national identity in a multi-ethnic society of over 250 diverse ethnic groups. The term ‘national identity’ is a recent usage. Before now and stretching as far back as from the 18th through the early 20th century, there had been no such term as national identity. Rather, terms such as national character or national consciousness had been in place (Smith, 2005). Nonetheless, the notion of national identity rests on shared ‘historic territory or homeland; common myths and historical memories; a common, mass public culture; common legal rights and duties for all members; and common economy with territorial mobility for members’ (Smith, 1991, p.14, cited in Guiberbau, 2004, p.131). To Guiberbau (2004, p.133), a national identity deals with psychological, cultural, territorial, historical, and political attributes that are shared by a people. In other words, the

Belief in a shared culture, history, traditions, symbols, kinship, language, religion, territory, founding moment, and destiny have been invoked, with varying intensity at different times and places, by peoples claiming to share a particular national identity (Guibernau, 2004, p. 132).

However, in the context of Nigeria and most African states created by colonialism, they contain diverse ethnic groups. This is what Smith (1983) refers to as ‘polyethnics’ - and because of their diversities, have lacked a common shared national identity. Creating a national identity that unites the ‘polyethnics’ has been the desire of most post-independent states and national elites (Brubaker, 1996; Smith 2009). In Nigeria and as already mentioned, national capital relocation through Abuja, is seen by the national elites as a way toward creating a national identity in a diverse ethnic society.

Secondly, nation building using Abuja entails the undertaking of developmental projects by the state to advance regional and economic development as well as the building of a modern world class national capital to present Nigeria to the outside world as a modern nation (IPA, 1979; Vale, 2008). Nation building becomes a twofold action in this sense thus: the promotion of national identity and developmental projects by the state. Seeing nation building both in the
sense of advancing national identity and developmental projects by the state, is what Talentino’s (2009) describes as an expanded view of nation building when he explains that,

*As now used the term nation building refers to state building in all its technical and structural aspects rather than identity building in the sense of creating the ethos of a nation (Talentino, 2009, p. 381).*

Generally, the term nation building does represent many meanings as ‘there is no precise and unambiguous definition of the term’ (Talentino, 2004 p.559); though in this thesis, it is treated along the expanded view explained by Talentino (2009)

**1.3.4. Aim of the Abuja Master Plan**

Basically then, following the declaration of Abuja as the new capital city in 1976, the national elites and planners have desired to use Abuja to undertake nation building in the sense of creating national identity in a multi-ethnic society, and to be driven by the Abuja master plan. But beyond that, and as already noted, it is also expected that the master plan will cause regional and economic development as well as lead to the building of a modern capital city. The master plan is thus seen as the ‘necessary element’ through which these concerns would be realised. The Americans, the preparer of the master plan, explain this further.

*The master plan itself represents a milestone in the process of building the new Capital City. It is a necessary element in the monumental effort [of nation building to create national identity and other associated goals of regional and economic development, and the building of a modern capital city] about to be undertaken by the Nigerian people (IPA, 1979).*

From this broad concern, the master plan specifies different uses for land in the city. The assumption is that when the land uses are implemented they will lead to achieving nation building.

![Figure 4 Connection between nation building and land uses of Abuja’s CA](Source: Author, 2016)
One of the districts in Abuja where this is to be prominently felt is in Abuja’s CA. As the premier district of the Abuja, it is expected by the master plan to play the role of exhibiting the grandness of Abuja and its aspirations of nation building. The master plan explains further.

The Central Area [ CA] of the New Capital is the hub of both the City as well as the Nation itself. This is true not only in a symbolic sense but in physical actuality as well. All affairs in the City and the Nation will focus on it. It will also be the center to which representatives of other nations will come. Therefore, it will symbolize Nigeria to the world, thus reaching beyond national concerns alone (IPA, 1979, p. 79)

Underscoring this importance the master plan stipulated many land uses across the district. When achieved, the land uses would make the CA to become not only the ‘jewel of the nation’ but of the ‘world’ as well (IPA, 1979). The major land uses include ‘the seat of government, central business district/commercial core national cultural institution zone, high density residential community, national sports center, foreign embassy area, and central area parks and squares’- among others (IPA, 1979; KTU, 1981; Speer, 2008).

Prepared in 1979 by the International Planning Associates, an American firm, to provide long-term guidance for the orderly implementation of the new capital city for the next 25 years; and adopted for implementation by the federal government, the master plan’s process of preparation stretched over a period of 18 months with a scope covering both regional development plans and plans for the new capital city. Since then the planners and national elites have desired to build a new capital city driven by the master plan although this has tended to be unsuccessfully (FCDA 1999; Vale, 2008; Jibril, 2012; Ajayi, 2013; Nor, 2014).

1.4. A bigger Picture about Abuja’s Scenario

Abuja’s scenario narrated in the preceding sections opens many concerns. Two are of interest to this research and revolve around a question about policy implementation in the South; and the very project called Nigeria as an Imperial creation and the ways in which Nigerian elites have sought to build a post-Independent nation through Western inspired ideas.

1.4.1. A Policy Implementation Concern

Implementation in Abuja’s CA reflects some of the challenges of policy implementation in the South. Policy implementation in the South is generally treated in the sense of a top-down, rational approach. This treats implementation as prescription whereby policy is formulated and prescribed to be implemented in a certain context using administration as the means of
implementation. It generally views implementation as ‘putting policy into effect’ (Barrett, 1981, 2004) - meaning that implementation only begins after the formulation of a policy and with the assumption that administration would engage in rational decision making to translate it into reality. This ‘type of rationality emphasizes the technocratic design of means to given ends, and thoroughly convinced that as genuine professionals they have nothing to do with politics’ (Kamete, 2007, p. 168). Hence implementers of policies are seen as agents of implementation, and are expected to undertake this role without engaging in power relations or politics among a multiplicity of actors in the course of implementation.

Importantly too, it is presumed that implementation would follow a linear and ‘trouble-free’ (Davoudi, 2006) trajectory from policy intention to translation into reality; and then producing the desired outcomes (Healey, 1983, 1988, 2010; Alexander, 1995; Matland, 1995; Taylor, 1998; Satren, 2005; Hupe, 2011). Barrett (2004, p. 254) summarises some of these key points.

The top-down model ... [is tied to] traditional structures of governance and public-sector organization, emphasizing the separation of politics and administration, and co-ordination and control through authority and hierarchy... a normative ideal for putting policy into effect. Policy should be made ‘at the top’, and executed by ‘agents’ in compliance with policy objectives.

However as reflected in Abuja’s CA narration earlier, these kinds of assumptions tend to be underlined by series of problems. The contemporaries of Abuja, that is new capital cities created following political Independence across Africa - namely Malawi’s Lilongwe, Botswana’s Gaborone, Tanzania’s Dodoma, Ivory Coast’s Yamoussoukro, and Mauritania’s Nouakchott, all tend to face problems undermining their realisation (Kironde, 1993; Mosha, 1996; Vale, 2008; Vale, 2014a; Elleh, 2015). Citing Abuja and Dodoma for example, Vale (2008) illustrates that ‘some of the world’s newest cites remain largely unrealised’.

The most extensive and monumental of the new postcolonial designed capitals has been carried out over the last decades in Abuja, Nigeria. Also ambitious, but in very different ways, is Tanzania’s Dodoma, an intriguing attempt to design a monumental capital city according to socialist principles, a proposition that would seem to be at odds with city-making ideas nearly everywhere else. Like Dodoma, some of the world’s newest capital cities remain largely unrealised (Vale, 2008, p. 156).

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the non-implementation of plans and associated challenges appear throughout the South and not restricted to capital cities only. Across the South, countless planning interventions that are captured in plans end up gathering dust on the

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1 Administration in this sense refers to implementing agencies - such as the Federal Capital Development Authoritory (FCDA) of Abuja for instance.
shelves of planning authorities without being implemented (Okpala, 1984; Ilesanmi, 1998; Kamete, 2007; Watson, 2009; Goodfellow, 2013; Silva, 2015; Arku et al., 2016). Recently, Manyena (2013, pp. 315-316), exploring implementation in Zimbabwe, reminds us about this again.

The Sebungwe Regional Plan (Sebungwe Plan) and Kariba Lakeshore Combination Master Plan (Kariba Plan) that were approved in the early 1980s and in the late 1990s respectively by the Zimbabwe Government. The main goal for both plans was to improve the standard of living in the mid-Zambezi Valley (Zambezi Valley). Despite the compelling evidence of chronic poverty in the area, both plans are yet to be implemented... both development plans are now in Zimbabwe’s national archives as they have either outlived or are about to outlive their lifespan of 15–20 years.

This reality opens up an opportunity of a nagging nightmare in the South deserving attention.

1.4.2. Beyond Concerns about Policy Implementation

But beyond policy implementation, the trajectories of notions that have come to underline nation building processes in African states equally deserve consideration. Like Nigeria, most countries of the South are Imperial creations, products of Western Imperialism. Throughout colonialism, their formations have been underlined by western ideal conception of what constitutes a modern state. Building on the Western foundation, African states upon Independence, have sought to undertake nation building aimed at creating national identity especially in diverse ethnic societies (Brubaker, 1996; Anderson, 2006; Smith, 2009; Meredith, 2011). Nation building as earlier noted, has also meant the undertaking of developmental projects by these states to advance regional and economic development, and other developments be it in education, health, among others (Talentino, 2009, p. 381). But what is important and of concern to this thesis, is the kinds of notions that have underlined this process.

Imperial states: Western Modernist theories of nation building

Like most states in Africa, Nigeria’s conception as a state is essentially an Imperial project. Essentially, colonialism led to the creation of civic-territories as African states; and within these states are contained diverse ethnic groups without a common national identity. This has often led to fractures in the form of civil wars, ethnic clashes and other forms of socio-political unrests (Le Vine, 1967; Osaghae, 1998b; Collier, 2007; Dunn, 2009; Belloni, 2011; Zambakari, 2012; 2 In 1914 the Nigerian state was created by the British and by 1960 political Independence was granted to Nigeria. The history of British colonialism in Nigeria although stretches far back into the 19th Century, 1914 was when the two Protectorates – Northern and Southern Protectorates which hitherto existed independently were amalgamated into one country as Nigeria by the British.
Bandyopadhyay and Green, 2013). Post-Independent African states have thus desired to build nations to foster unity among its diverse ethnic societies. For example, Vale (2008, p. 161) illustrates a sense of this diversity using Nigeria.

Nigeria’s heterogeneous and fractious population has lived through eight military rulers and a thirty “month civil war during its first thirty-five years of independence....the schisms operate in various ways: there are tribal divisions among the Yoruba in the southwest, the Ibo in the southeast, and the Hausa/Fulani in the north; there are religious differences between the predominantly Muslim north and the largely Christian and animist south (and tensions among Muslims as well). There are socioeconomic differences between the south, influenced by Western style development, and the less"developed north; and there are further tensions between the three largest tribal groups, and the remaining multi-ethnic tribes constituting the over 250 in the country.

But of a major concern is the ways in which these states have approached this task of nation building. They have largely though, approached this using modernist theories on nationhood. As discussed in chapter 2, these theories rather accentuate a more concern for Western conception of what constitutes a nation - an ideal modern nation. They define a nation especially on the basis of distinct territory ‘with definite centre and clear and recognised borders’; as ‘a legal political community, with a unified legal system and institutions in a given territory; as ‘collective autonomy institutionalised in a sovereign state for a given nation;’ as ‘membership in an inter-national’ system or community of nations’- among other features (Smith, 2005 p. 95). Smith (2005, p. 95) narrates how these features clearly seek an ideal Western conception of a nation.

Undoubtedly [modernism] provides a clear and coherent definition, but the combination of these features produce a pure or ideal type, not of the nation per se, but of a particular kind of nation, namely modern nation. This is a particular variant of the general type of nation, and it possesses its own peculiar features. These derive from the fact that it is a product of a particular milieu: that of eighteenth century Western Europe and North America and of its rationalist, Enlightenment culture. This is the kind of nation imagined and created by a specific kind of nationalism, the civic-territorial kind...it flourished in a particular part of the world, namely Western Europe and North America.

But more than that, he goes on to reveal how these underpinnings orienting toward a Western audience, is experimented elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.

Attempts to create the Western kind of nation were made in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, whose very different conditions the civic-territorial concept had to be adapted(Smith, 2005, p. 95).
The African states, desiring to create national identity among its diverse ethnic society, find these underpinnings of the Modernist theories quite attractive.\(^3\) Thus, most of them have opted to build nations on the basis of the civic-territories; the civic-territories bequeathed to them by the colonial empires as Independent states since these civic-territories possess some of the features that Modernist theories accentuate\(^4\). It is within these civic-territories, defining the boundaries of these states, that the states have used different strategies to pursue national identity which is expected to bring the diverse ethnic society together and evoke feelings of loyalty of one common nation (Brubaker, 1996). Brubaker (1996) reports further that some have used administrative programmes that seek to create this while others explore a wide range of other strategies. For example,

*National flags and anthems: their colours, shapes and patterns, and their verses and music, epitomize the special qualities of the nation and by their simple forms and rhythms aim to conjure a vivid sense of unique history and/or destiny among the designated population... what counts is the potency of the meanings conveyed by such signs to the members of the nation. The panoply of national symbols only serves to express, represent and reinforce the boundary definition of the nation, and to unite the members inside through a common imagery of shared memories, myths and values’ (Smith, 2001 p. 8)*

Others have used capital relocation to promote national identity within the territorial nations. Schartz (2003, p. 2) indeed, demonstrates that ‘capital relocation is one of the more innovative tools for building states and national identification’. He explains further.

*In Europe capitals emerged as part and parcel of state and nation building, outside Europe capitals emerged after territoriality had been established. In the latter cases, the capital cities suited the functions of the state quite imperfectly. With decolonization, post-colonial élites had to create and locate real capital cities—cities that controlled territory and promoted loyalty in the inhabitants just as their European counterparts had done... capital relocation in post-colonial contexts is distinctive in that it turns on nation and state-building imperatives (Schartz, 2003, p. 4).*

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\(^3\) These states somehow are against building national identity on the basis of what Geerz (1973) and others refer to as ethnic cleavages. They reckon it will be difficult to do so due to diversities of cultural differences from these diverse ethnic groups that make up these post-Independent states. Then again, there is the question of which cultural cleavages would national identity be based upon. Not handled properly, there is the fear of privileging one ethnic group over another and perhaps fanning the embers of ethnic tensions.

\(^4\) It must also be noted that the use of modernist theories to build territorial nations in Africa in a way coincides with the heydays of the dominance of these theories in the 1960s, when most of these countries were having political independence - thus influenced by these theories (Chapter 2).
Imperial states: Western Modernist theories of planning to build national capitals

But again, to construct national identity in these capital cities, the states have had to rely on Western planning ideas. This comes mostly from modernist planning ideas such as master planning and underscored by the rational planning process. Chapter 2 traces the history of these kinds of planning in the South and their connection to national capital cities. Mainly, these Western planning knowledge are expected to help articulate the aspirations which these capital cities seek to achieve. In the case of Abuja, its history of master plan making spans over 3 decades. It is assumed that the plans beyond acting as the vehicle through which national identity will achieved, would equally help in the building of a modern capital city, cause regional and economic development, among other aspirations. But as can be seen in the case of Nigeria and most other contemporaries of Abuja, these kinds of planning with Western-centric underpinnings hardly work in the South. Vale (2008, p. 152) clearly illustrates this reality.

In most places where new capitals have been envisaged, they have been planned, designed, and constructed by Western consultants, and then evaluated by them as well...most remain long-dormant proposals or have emerged slowly.

But again this is not limited to only capital cities of the South but indeed across much of the South, where ‘the superimposition of Western urban planning and management models onto African contexts has attracted much criticism’ (Goodfellow, 2013, p. 84) for their failure to bring a desired result (see Mabogunje, 1990; Rakodi, 2001; Watson, 2003; Harrison, 2006b; Miraftab, 2009; Myers, 2011 ; Todes, 2012; Kamete, 2013a).

Clearly, right from colonialism with the states conceived as Western Imperial states, post-Independence efforts at nation building have again been underscored by Western ideas. The states have tended to undergo through what I refer to as a triple-linear trajectory of development as shown in fig (5)

Figure 5: Triple-linear trajectory of Western ideas driving nation building in the South

Source: Author, 2015.
Yet, the results of these endeavour as reflected in much of new capital cites of the South and the South generally, do not tend to be working. This again opens another opportunity deserving attention which the thesis questions too - beyond just exploring policy implementation and focusing only on the problems of implementation.

1.4.3. **Summary of Argument, Research Questions, Aims and Objectives**

From the discussion so far, this thesis questions beyond exploring implementation in a context like Abuja. Noting that while implementation may be the problem of implementing the plans in a new capital city, and driven by nationalistic aspirations of building a nation through capital relocation particularly in the sense of creating national identity and other associated goals, a major problem of the difficulty of realising this may well lie with the foundational conception of the whole project called Nigeria. Nigeria is largely a Western creation that has undergone through three stages of Western influence – what I earlier referred to as a triple-linear trajectory. That is, as a Western imperial project resulting in the creation of a state known as Nigeria in 1914; post-independence state desiring to build a nation in a diverse ethnic society which has adopted Western notions of nation building underlined by modernist theories of nationalism; and again, relies on modernist planning ideals in the form of master planning as it seeks to use capital relocation within its territorial nation as a strategy of creating national identity in a diverse multi-ethnic society. These three layers of interaction with the West reveal how Nigeria has fundamentally been clinging unto Western ideas.

But these Western ideas have rather tended not to be working in Nigeria. For instance, despite having adopted modernist theories of nationalism to form a territorial nation believed to be the answer to national identity of oneness in a multi ethnic society, there are still ethnic fractures in Nigeria. There is the threat of secession and actual insurgencies from different groups across the country such as the Niger Delta Avengers; Boko Haram; Oduduwa Peoples Republic; the incessant clashes between pastoral herdsmen and farmers; the resurgence of interest in Biafra; among other challenges to Nigeria’s existence. In Abuja too, modernists planning ideals underscored by master planning, do not seem to be working - often characterised by the acquisition of one master plan after the other (chapter 6 and 8). The thesis thus explores these concerns.
Research Questions, Aim and Objectives

Flowing from these concerns, the overarching question of the research seeks to explore against the backdrop of the continuous formulation of policies and plans in the global south, and driven by Western knowledge, how do we make sense of the complexities that underline their unsuccessful implementation? The thesis from this bigger picture looks at why the CA’s land uses have not been successfully implemented toward nation building; and how can we make sense of the complexities behind this. It questions not only the problems of implementation in a Southern context like Abuja but the kinds of Western notions that have underlined nation building in Abuja. It explores these concerns against the backdrop of a history of master planning in Abuja which spans over 3 decades, and is expected to lead to the attainment of Abuja’s nation building goals. In the CA, there has been two eras of master plan making - from 1979-2007 and 2008 to date. The thesis focuses on the two eras of planning in the CA. It is specifically driven by the following research questions.

1. **What kinds of Western knowledge have driven nation building process in Abuja, and how have they affected the realisation of the new capital?**

   Much of chapter 8 deals with this under the discussion on plan gravity and the Western notions that have driven this process of nation building. Again, chapter 2 provides a literature background into nation building in Post-Independence Africa and the kinds of notions that have underlined the process even in new capital cities.

2. **What are the land uses of the CA?**
   
   a. **How and why were they planned?**

   This is dealt with in chapter 6. It describes the history of master planning in Abuja and narrowing down to the CA. Through this we are able to make sense of the two eras of master planning in the CA, the kinds of land uses that have been captured by these master plans, and what they intend to achieve in the CA in connection with the bigger goals that Abuja desires to attain. The chapter also provides an insight into the kinds of actors that have driven the design process of these master plans.

3. **What has been the economic and political situation of the country in which master plan making in Abuja has taken place?**

   Addressing this requires looking at the economic and political situation of the country that has underlined master plan making in Abuja, as well as the transitions that have taken place. By extension, this borders on the global political-economic happenings that have had influence on master plan making in Abuja. Chapter 2, 5 and 7 contain discussions on these geo-political and
economic happenings of the 1970s and 1980s. Attention is on the global oil crisis of the 1970s, and the Washington consensus policies through the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced in the South in the 1980s. Chapter 7 equally presents the political environment and the transitions that have characterised master planning in Abuja and particularly the CA.

4. **Who are the stakeholders that are involved in the planning and implementation of land uses in Abuja?**
   
   **b. How do they operate and why?**

This focuses on identifying the various actors and planning agencies that are involved in the planning and implementation of master plans in Abuja - particularly the land uses, and how they go about it. Chapter 7 presents the multiplicity of actors and planning agencies that undertake this.

5. **Why has the land uses of the CA not been implemented successfully?**

This seeks to find the reasons behind the difficulties that underline land use implementation in the CA toward nation building. Chapter 8 brings to the hallmark of these reasons through the discussion on plan gravity.

### 1.5. Addressing the Concerns of the Thesis

Generally, exploring policy implementation tends to focus on rational and interactive concerns of implementation. This is often expressed in the sense of top down and bottom up approaches respectively (Alexander, 1995; Barrett, 1981, 2004; Taylor, 1998; Healey, 1989 et al). The rational concerns as highlighted earlier, are concerned with ‘putting policy into effect’ and the kinds of rational decision making that take place within an organisation acting as the means of seeing this through. The connection of implementation with organisation such as planning agencies - inevitably bounds up implementation with organisational studies. Among others, these studies are concerned with exploring the resources of organisations and rational decision making and how these influence policy implementations (Barrett, 2004). Expressed in another way, and on a more general note, rational concerns of implementation are driven by studies that seek ‘to identify the causes of implementation problems or failure, and suggest ways of enhancing the likelihood of obtaining compliance with policy objectives’; and equally dwelling ‘on strategies for improved communication of intentions, co-ordination of the ‘links in the chain’, management of resources and control of implementing agents (Barrett, 2004, P. 254).

The interactive or action-based views of implementation on the other hand are interested in ‘what happens during implementation and what equally gets done’ (Barrett, 1981; Barrett and
Hill, 1984; Barrett, 2004). This is the opposite of the rational concerns that seek a normative, prescriptive, approach to implementation of what ought to be done and on a conformance basis between policy intention and outcomes (Alterman and Hill, 1978; Alexander, 1985; Healey, 1988; Barrett, 2004; Brody and Highfield, 2005; Saetren, 2005b; Hupe, 2014). What is of utmost importance to the action-based views and most studies under them is description; describing the kinds of interactions that take place during implementation among a multiplicity of actors\(^5\). They are concerned with those nuances of power play, politics, negotiations, bargains, compromises, consensus building, and many others that take place in the course of implementation. In short documenting what the street bureaucrats do during implementation as they go about implementing policy (Lipsky, 1980; Barrett, 1981; Matland, 1995; Rice, 2013; Hupe, 2014; Hupe and Sætren, 2014; Zhan et al., 2014).

To some extent though, studies carried out under action-based views of implementation could also fall under organisational studies of policy implementation; where the concern is to explore how these nuances of interaction take place in organisations or among multiple organisations. Others however extend this discussion beyond those within or among multiple organisations, and talk about a network of actors and interactions. They are thus interested in exploring the kinds of interactions in policy implementation far beyond public organisations but across even in the private sector (Goggin, 1990; Matland, 1995; Barrett, 2004; Hupe and Sætren, 2014).

**The Southern Context**

In the context of the South however, implementation studies cannot be merely reduced to these scopes. The Southern context is underlined by series of fluidities, poverty, unemployment, civil wars, politics of clientism and patronage, rationalities of survival, among others (Todes et al., 2010; Speak, 2012; Watson, 2012; Kamete, 2013b). The Abuja’s CA ripples earlier narrated at the opening of this chapter, reflect for instance, the fluidities within which policy implementation in this case the master plans of the Abuja and CA, have gone through over 3 decades; the changes in policies on land use implementation as well as series of master plan acquisitions. The call thus for implementation studies would be to go beyond these scopes of exploring implementation and take into cognisance these contextual realities of the South (Rakodi, 2001; Watson, 2009; Goodfellow, 2013)

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\(^5\) It must equally be understood that since the concern is that of nuances of interactions as against prescription and managerial concerns of policy compliance, implementation under the action-based view is not necessarily seen in the light of ‘putting of policy into effect’ in that kind of linear trajectory already talked about. Rather, it takes what gets done at the end of interactions and not necessarily expecting a linear conformance of policy objective with outcome.
But of importance too, this would be to explore implementation in the South that recognises that the South does not exist in isolation to the rest of the world. Not just a bounded ‘container’ within which we would only be concerned with i) organisational studies of implementation whether in the sense of exploring rational decision making and organisational resources of implementation, or the nuances of actors’ interactions within and outside these organisations; ii) or, focusing on the contextual realities of the South only as if it is an enclosure without links to the outside world. These scopes of making sense of implementation are no doubt important; but of significance too, is the relational connection of the South to the rest of the world - as being interconnected by a network of relations with regional and global linkages that influence planning in the South. Again, through Abuja’s CA narration, one is able to discern a geo-political economic underlining. This is in terms of the global oil crisis of the 1970s acting both as a sponsor of the new capital project through massive oil revenues and at the same time as the underscoring factor behind the slow pace of master plan implementation in the city when oil revenue collapsed (chapter 5).

Unfortunately, the literature on policy implementation is Western-oriented where ‘the ethnocentric bias of this research field toward the Western hemisphere has been, and still is, strong’ (Saetern, 2005 p. 559). It hardly focuses on the South or explores these vital threads to policy implementation. In this thesis however, the concern is more on geo-political economy and its influence on implementation in the South.

In a way then, the thesis offers an approach of exploring implementation in the South that encompasses not only organisational concerns of implementation, contextual recognition of the Southern context, but a relational concern that embraces a geo-political economy of the South for instance. This is what I refer to as an integrative framework (Chapter 4). But while this does help in exploring implementation in the South, it is engaged with in this thesis more in the sense

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6 The use of the expression ‘container’ appears severally in planning in the semblance of a Euclidean conception of space. Space is assumed to be an absolute, stable enclosure within which we can plan, order, control and regulate it. This bounded view of looking at space is challenged and most of relational thinking does see space has having linkages, networks beyond the ‘container’ or enclosure. (See Alexander, Davoudi, 2006; Mordoch, Healey 2010.)

7 In chapter 2 an in-depth sense of this influence on planning in the South is underscored. Attention is focused on the international political economic happenings such as OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s, and the Washington consensus policies of the 1980s introduced in the South. Hence investigating implementation in the South, and to make in-depth sense of it does require looking beyond organisational concerns of implementation or limiting it cover just contextual forces that influence implementation, but to also extend this to explore the external linkages such as a global economy.
of a flexible guide than as a steadfast, deductive engagement. The thesis rather prefers an inductive process that allows for some form of flexibility while on field toward making sense of a Southern context that is often underlined by fluidities; and with which an inductive approach would be most suited to deal with it than a pre-determined deductive frame of inquiry which tends to be less flexible as compared to an inductive process. This allowed for the concerns of the thesis to be explored making sense of them while on field. In other words, even though it (integrative framework) does help make sense of policy exploration in the South, the thesis followed an inductive process guided also by the research questions and the dynamism of the field.

But it must also be pointed out it was at the end of the fieldwork that a narrative framework was developed to engage the thesis with, and through a grounded theory which helped in the development of the frame of the narrative. The frame of narrative developed from insights from the integrative framework and the results of the fieldwork. The frame of narrative is referred to as the 3-Circle grounded theory (chapter 4).

1.6. Structure of Thesis

The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter one provides a background into the research and the concerns of the thesis; how these concerns have been addressed as well as the aims driving the thesis.

Chapter two explores literature review. The first part deals with a discussion on colonialism and post-Independence nation building through capital relocation. The second part focuses on Western inspired notions of planning and influence on new capital cities within the bigger picture of nation building which these capital cities seek to achieve and other associated goals. Lastly, the last part of the chapter brings to the fore the influence of geo-political economy on planning in the South. The attention is on the Washington consensus policies (SAP) introduced in the South in the 1980s-1990s, as well as the global oil crisis of the 1970s, and how these international happenings have had influence on planning and nation building in the South.

Chapter three is a continuation of literature. It dwells on policy implementation focusing on the different ways of looking at what policy implementation is, especially through the top-down and bottom up approaches of policy implementation. Thereafter, the discussion narrows down into the planning field exploring how it treats policy implementation through the rational and action-based perspectives. Having made sense of what policy implementation is, the second
part of the chapter then explores the trajectory of policy implementation in the South looking at the diffusion of planning knowledge in the South and how this treats policy implementation in the South.

Chapter four deals with the methodology, methods of data collection, how the research was conducted, and problems encountered while on field and the appropriate measures dealing with them, and the analysis of data.

Chapter five provides an account of the study area - the context. It presents the national and regional setting of the study area, a history of capital relocation in Nigeria since the colonial era and the driving forces behind it. The chapter also contains discussions on the global political-economic influence on the planning and development of Abuja especially through the global oil crisis of the 1970s, and the Washington consensus polices of the 1980s-1990s.

Chapter six discusses the history of master plan making in the CA since 1979 with particular focus on the land uses of the CA, the design process, and the actors involved in the process.

Chapter Seven looks at the environment under which the planning and implementation of land uses take place. It explores this when the Abuja master plan was prepared in 1979 and the transitions since then. Attention is on the economic and political environment, the structure and process of planning, as well as the actors driving land use planning and implementation in the Abuja especially in the CA.

Chapter Eight brings the whole discussion to a standpoint of the most important thing or argument of what is happening in Abuja in terms of policy implementation and nation building, and particularly against the concerns of the thesis set out in chapter one. In other words, the gut sense of what is the most crucial thing about Abuja’s story. This is referred to as plan gravity and the associated challenges of translating the gravity into reality. The chapter begins by first advancing the argument and followed by explaining what is meant by plan gravity. Thereafter the rest of the chapter explains the factors that undermine plan gravity in Abuja’s CA.

Chapter nine draws conclusion in the light of the findings of the thesis and the argument set out in eight 8, as well as the concerns of the thesis as set out in chapter one. It also provides an account of the thesis’ journey and reflection, contribution to knowledge and possible areas of future research, and useful recommendations towards enhancing greater land use implementation in Abuja’s CA.
Chapter Two. Capital Relocation, Geo-Political Economy, and Nation Building in the South

This chapter first looks at the driving forces behind nation building in post-Independent states, particularly in the global South. Thereafter it draws a connection between nation building and new capital cities; and how these states use new capital cities to advance nation building. Second, the connection between Western planning ideals and their influence on nation building in the global South. Third, the political economy of sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on the global oil crises of the 1970s and the Washington consensus policies (Structural Adjustment Programme – SAP) that were introduced in the South in the 1970s and 1980s; and their influence on nation building in sub-Saharan Africa.

2.1. Forces Behind Nation Building in Post-Colonial States

Colonialism, Berlin Conference and Partition of Africa Into States and Independence

This section focuses on the forces behind colonialism and how they led to the creation of African states. The European colonisation of Africa begun in the 19th century mostly. This would be later followed by the further partitioning of Africa into smaller states among the European powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 in Germany (Griffiths, 1986; Adebajo, 2005; Meredith, 2013). The Berlin conference, as Meredith (2013) and many others observe, ‘laid down the rules for the European partition of the continent’ (Griffiths, 1993, p.204) into smaller territories. The territories were to be owned and controlled by the Europeans. Setting the rules of engagement to acquire the territories at the Berlin conference had become necessary, to avert further squabbles that often erupted among the European colonial powers as they scrambled to acquire oversea territories on the African continent (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). In the end, coming out of the Berlin conference, was an African continent carved out ‘into territories that reflected compromises struck between avaricious European imperialists – Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, and Germany’ (Adebajo, 2005).

The European colonisation of Africa would go on to last until the second half of the 20th century. Hence the 1950s and 1960s, witnessed a wave of newly Independent states on the African continent by the end of colonialism; while others obtaining Independence in the later part of the century (Meredith, 2005; Thomson, 2010).
Independence not only succeeded in the transfer of political power from the colonial powers to the African national elites; but accompanying this, were territories that defined the territorial boundaries of a state which had been created by the Europeans during colonialism (Osaghae, 1989; Meredith, 2011). This may not seem surprising. Throughout colonialism, the colonial powers’ interest was to create colonial states that were defined by territories and organised through bureaucracy (Smith, 1983; Osaghae, 1998). Thus, the bequeathed territories at Independence, would be said to have been long coming; the territorial mapping of the states having begun during colonialism, reinforced at the Berlin conference, and found their expression at Independence (Osaghae, 1998).

But more than that, the territories were drawn in disregard to pre-existing ethnic-groupings as they often split the ethnic-groupings into different territories controlled by the different colonial powers (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). Prior to the advent of colonialism, Smith (1983p.125) reports that, pre-colonial Africa was ‘characterised by a balance between unitary mono-ethnic states like Somalia today and polyethnic territorial empires like Ethiopia’. And that it was ‘a mosaic of lineage groups, clans, villages, chiefdoms, kingdoms and empires’; and ‘formed often with shifting and indeterminate frontiers and loose allegiances’ (Meredith, 2011, p. 154). However with colonialism, the balance existing between the ‘mono-ethnic’ and ‘polyethnic’ states became ‘radically altered’ with ‘little attention’ paid ‘to the question of ethnic demography in fixing the boundaries of their African empires’ (Smith, 1983).

This is what Meredith (2005, 2011) describes as ‘an external imposition, geographic boundaries of artificiality’. In Nigeria for instance, one finds the Hausas being geographically split into Nigeria which was once controlled by the British; and into Niger, Chad, and Northern part of Cameroun, all formerly controlled by the French. Similarly, the Yorubas are split into Benin and Togo, earlier controlled by the French; and into Nigeria a former British controlled territory. The Kanuris into Chad and Cameroun controlled by the French, and into Nigeria by the British. The Tiv into Nigeria controlled by the British and into Cameroun by the French (Nnoli, 1978; Makar, 1994; Afeadie, 2008; Meredith, 2013).

**Lack of National Identity**

What then got bequeathed at Independence are territories as Independent states containing within them, numerous and diverse ethnic groups. Welding them within these territories into nations has been seen as an imperative by Post-Independent national elites; but this is equally seen as a difficult task (Brubaker, 1996). An obvious example again is the case of Nigeria with well over 250 ethnicities with different cultures, languages and religious beliefs. Meredith’s
(2011, p. 154) conclusion speaks of this reality that has faced Nigeria and other post-Independent states of Africa.

_The most difficult task facing Africa’s new leaders was to weld into nations a variety of different peoples, speaking different languages and at different stages of political and social development. The new states of Africa were not ‘nations’._

What is alluded to as ‘not nations’ by Meredith (2011) comes from a lack of a common national identity among the diverse ethnic groups that are in these post-Independent states. Essentially, the idea of a national identity rests on shared ‘historic territory or homeland; common myths and historical memories; a common, mass public culture; common legal rights and duties for all members; and common economy with territorial mobility for members’ (Smith, 1991, p.14, cited in Guiberbau, 2004, p.131). Guiberbau (2004) simply summarises it as,

_Belief in a shared culture, history, traditions, symbols, kinship, language, religion, territory, founding moment, and destiny have been invoked, with varying intensity at different times and places, by peoples claiming to share a particular national identity (Guibernau, 2004, p. 132)._”

However, the diverse ethnic groups that make up these states due their diversities, have lacked a common shared national identity (Smith,1981; Brubaker,1996). Some of the political squabbles and civil wars, ethnic clashes, among others, that have characterised these states after Independence, have been linked to this problem (Osaghae, 1998b). Sudan for instance, after Independence from Britain in 1956, has had an internal civil war between its North and the South. This has been over a period of 40 years until in 2011 when the South finally seceded from Sudan to form South Sudan (Zambakari, 2013). In Nigeria, barely seven years of Independence from Britain, between 1967 and 1970 experienced a bloody civil war between the federal government and its Eastern Region, which desired to secede from the country and form a country known as Biafra (Osaghae,1998). The list of conflicts across the continent and other parts of the world is numerous. Most often though, the underlying factors behind these fractures are rooted in colonialism through the bringing of different ‘polyethnics’ together in the civic-territories created by the colonial powers. With the end of colonialism notwithstanding, the post-Independent states continue to experience these fractures; which in a way reflects lack of common national identity among the ‘polyethnics’ as well as other socio-political interests that underline these states (Nnoli, 1978; Smith, 1992; Osaghae, 1998b; Talentino, 2009; Zambakari, 2013).

This is understandably since the primary motif of colonialism was not oriented toward building national identities, but toward capitalism and other exploitative pursuits on the African continent (Meredith, 2013). Moreover during nationalistic struggle for Independence, African
nationalists were more concerned about liberation from colonialism, the considered common enemy. Smith (2001) identifies 5 forms of nationalism: as a process of nation formation, sentiment to a nation, socio-political movement, doctrine/ideology toward a nation. However, during the nationalistic struggle for independence it was the socio-political movement as a form of nationalism that was the major preoccupation of the African nationalists. This should be viewed against the back group of emancipating the continent from colonialism. As a result, the other forms of nationalism tended to be neglected. Hence, while ‘the anti-colonial cause provided a unity of purpose’ in which the nationalists ‘exploited a variety of grievances among the urban and rural populations to galvanise support for the cause’ (Meredith, 2011, p. 154); the aspect of nationalism dealing with nation building particularly in the forging of one common national identity was not deemed crucial at that time since all that matter was the attainment of independence - political liberation.

2.2. Nation Building: a quest for Territorial Nation and Modernist Inspired Nation

The "nation" in the name of which sovereignty over those territories could be claimed by anticolonial nationalists was therefore almost universally conceived in territorial terms (Brubaker, 1996, pp. 8-82)

The reality of these states lacking a common national identity among the diverse ethnic groups would instigate a need to pursue this across post-colonial states. This is in the sense of exploring avenues of achieving this. But the territories of these states, even though having been drawn arbitrarily during colonialism, nonetheless provide a locational basis within which the diverse ethnic groups could operate under (Smith, 1983; Brubaker, 1996; Meredith, 2011). Taking advantage of this, the states have desired to build what Smith (1983) and many others refer to as territorial nations within the territories toward achieving national identity. The emphasis is on the use of territory than on the basis of ‘cultural givens’ (Geertz, 1973) such as language, religion, ethnicity or race in the building of a nation8. This could be seen as a realistic way of not falling into the ‘danger of appealing’ to ethnic cleavages as nation building based on it may ‘raise the spectre of tribalism of ethnic consciousness’ and undermine the existence of the states in favour of ‘polyethnic’ states (Smith, 1983, p. 128).

But it is not just the fear of falling into ethnic primordialism that the use of territory appears most attractive. The issue of convenience and modernist’s theories of nationhood equally influence the use of territory to pursue nation building. In terms of convenience, Brubaker

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8 Nation-building to create national identities based on language, religion, ethnicity or race, among others, stemming from the underpinnings of a primordial conception of nation.
(1996) explains that, the territories appear more convenient to be used to drive national unity than the use of ethnicity which rather appears difficult if not impossible for the task.

In African colonies, territorial boundaries - as established by the colonial powers, and accepted, for the most part, as legitimate by anticolonial nationalists - were not even approximately congruent with cultural boundaries. For this reason it has been nearly impossible to equate, even approximately, an ethnocultural group with a potentially sovereign "nation" (Brubaker, 1996, p. 81).

Regarding modernist notions of a nation, the 1950s and 1960s mark the start of their dominance in the field of nationhood (Anderson, 1991; Ichijo and Uzelac, 2005; Smith, 2009; Özkırımlı, 2010). The modernist conception views a nation on the basis of ‘a well-defined territory, with a definite centre and clear and recognised borders; as well as a legal-political community, with a unified legal system and institutions in a given territory’. These features however emanate largely from a western conception of a nation, a ‘pure or ideal type’ of nation - a desired type of modern nation symbolic to western nations (Smith, 2005, p. 95). Nonetheless, the theories’ dominance coincides with the wave of the 1950s, 1960s, political Independence in Africa, and have had influence on the conception of nation building by the newly Independent states. They too desire to build nations based on these features with territory playing a crucial role.

**Mechanisms to explore national identity within the civic-territories**

Within the territories of these states therefore, many mechanisms are used toward bringing together the diverse ethnic groups to share a common identity. Brubaker (1996, p. 80) for example, talks of the use of states’ institutions which are mobilised to instigate national identity and loyalty to the nation.

In place of a welter of more parochial loyalties and identities, the citizenry is progressively united, through the gradually assimilative workings of these state-wide institutions, processes, and transactions, by a common "national" loyalty and identity.

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9 The works of Karl Deutsch, Elie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Anthony Smith, among others, provided the impetus for the popularity and dominance. It is also because of the sheer number of scholars under the approach and the explanatory potency of the approach that it is attributed to have dominated the study of nationhood. The modernist theories accentuate that nations are products of modernisation driven by capitalism, industrialisation, urbanisation and other related attributes of modernisation. In other words, they date and restrict the origin of nations to the Modernity epoch (an 18th Century European experience) only and repudiate the antiquity or perennial existence of nations. Hence, they assert that nations are simply a product or consequence of modernity or modernism. This quite contradicts the ‘timelessness’ ascribed to nations under the primordialism perspective to nation building which sees nations as being immemorial and found in any epoch of human history. This encompasses even the Renaissance or even the Enlightenment which Modernism bears its roots from.
Smith (1983, p.129) too talks about the use of political centralisation of administration, which is expected to produce a strong national identity. 

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\text{To preserve the fragile state and its artificially -created territorial domain, the leaders must centralise the means of administration and coercion, and place a heavy emphasis upon the inviolability of the territorial status quo and the need for political order. They must also extend the scope and powers of the centre throughout the territory, and hence the position of its bureaucratic personnel.}
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But besides these mechanisms and many others, national elites may use national capitals to create national identity. This involves the creation of new ones or the relocation of former capitals to new areas and is considered to promote a common national identity. The next section looks at this mechanism particularly in terms of capital relocation.

2.3. Nation Building, National Identity and Capital City Relocation

I will suggest a connection between capital relocation, and state- and nation-building efforts. I will argue that capital relocation is much more likely to seem an attractive strategy to élites when effective state bureaucracies and broad national loyalties are wanting, particularly in post-colonial situations (Schatz, 2003, p. 1).

2.3.1. The Why of Capital City Relocation

Many factors abound why states relocate national capitals to another existing city or to a completely new site. These include the need to re-address a historical imbalance and grievance; promote national identity in a diverse ethnic society; cause regional and economic development; build modern and efficient capital cities; advance personal interests especially by powerful actors; as well as for political and strategic reasons. They are articulated to appeal to a certain audience with the overarching aim of seeking legitimacy to support the relocation. The audience include international, national and sub-national (Schatz, 2003; Vale, 2008; Elleh, 2015).

Nation Building and Capital City Relocation

In the preceding discussion, an understanding of nation building is established. Sub-Saharan African states like Nigeria, for example, has desired to use capital relocation as a strategy of nation building toward creating national identity. This is expected to appeal to a national audience in a diverse ethnic society (Elleh, 2015). Nation building through capital relocation is therefore considered as the overarching aim of undertaking capital relocation to build a new capital city (Vale, 2008).

But in the first instance, why would national elites opt to use capital relocation to pursue national identity and other associated goals? A major driving force behind this attributed to
history and the need ‘to speak back to that history’ (Myers, 2011). Generally, post-Independence states are colonial creations with varied historical experiences from different colonial empires. The British, French, Portuguese, Belgians, Italians, and Spanish Empires introduced and implemented different policies in the administration of their respective colonies, being the impetus behind the varied experiences of the states (Myers, 2011). The British for example favoured a policy of indirect rule in some colonists for example Nigeria. The French on the other hand pursued a policy of assimilation which it desired to create black French citizenry on the African continent. Despite the varying historical experiences there are many shared experiences (Njoh, 2008).

In urban planning for example, the colonial towns experienced what Myers (2011) describes as ‘segregation and segmentation’. That is where the towns were divided into different segments on racial basis namely, the European Reservation Areas and Native Areas (Mabogunje, 1969; Home, 1983; Kamete, 2007; Njoh, 2008). Still, across colonial sub-Saharan Africa there was deliberate (re)assignment of roles to existing or newly created towns to serve primarily as ‘entrepot/warehouse’ or nodal towns, considered vital in the administration of raw materials to be shipped to Europe in support of industrialisation and capitalism. Most of the port towns lying along the sea served as national ‘bureaucratic capitals’ of the colonial empires for instance Lagos in Nigeria (Potts, 1985b; Uyanga, 1989; Myers, 2011). Some colonial states though did not have national capitals. They were administered from other countries and such places served as their capitals - that is distant capitals. Gaborone and Mauritania for example, were administered in Mafeking in South Africa and Saint Louis in Senegal respectively (Mosha, 1996; Vale, 2014a).

The seaboard or distant capitals however did not take into consideration the multi-ethnic structure and realities that characterised the colonial states. Again, in the case of Nigeria and as previously observed, is a country whose abstract geography produced over 250 ethnic nationalities at 1914 in what is today known as Nigeria. But the British Empire chose Lagos as the colonial capital of Nigeria - a capital located in South Western Nigeria, and dominated by the Yoruba ethnic group to the disadvantage of the others. The decision was primarily based on the fact Lagos is at the tip of the Atlantic Ocean and would easily facilitate export to Europe than any other part of the country. It thus had no bearing to the ethnic and cultural diversity of the country. Even in terms of accessibility, the rest of the country especially the hinterlands, tended to be cut off from the seaboard capital (Lagos) because of its location at the tip of the Ocean. (Nwafor, 1980; Moore, 1984; Morah, 1993; Adama, 2007; Elleh, 2015)
Upon Independence therefore, Nigeria and other post-colonial states with a similar experience, have sought to redress this colonial imbalance using capital relocation. Myers (2011) refers to this as ‘the subversion, elimination’ of colonial capital legacies by post-colonial states. Smith (2009, p. 34) simply labels it as a ‘re-interpretation’ of past history and achieved either through the ‘amendment’ of the legacy or its ‘large scale rejection’, or the ‘search for a new synthesis’. Wolfel (2002, p.487) too lends his voice in the direction of Smith observing that ‘capital cities are icons that help with the rewriting of the history of a country’ and therefore ‘the relocation of a capital city can embrace, reconstitute or disown the history of a country’. Thus to these states, capital relocation becomes a ‘symbolic action’ to advancing nationhood. Symbolic in the sense that since ‘capital cities’ are considered national ‘icons’, they become the most potent instrument considered to be revisited in order to readdress the national question of post-colonial states against the backdrop that the colonial capital legacy has been ill-suited to advance national identity and unity (Holston, 1989; Wolfel, 2002; Schatz, 2003; Elleh, 2015).

**Other goals besides national identity**

The overarching need to revisit the colonial capital imbalance in addressing the national question is invariably too articulated as an opportunity of attaining other associated benefits of capital relocation. The desire of these post-colonial states has been therefore to use capital relocation also as a means for advancing regional and economic development, modernity - the building of a modern national capital and statement making of a country’s arrival unto the global stage of important cities – that is an external appeal, among others. Vale (2014b, pp. 31-32) though believes that the external appeal is sometimes underscored by a need to seek for international funds by these states.

> National capitals are constructed to mark the ascent and arrival of newly independent nation-states, are efforts to gain legitimacy not just in the eyes of a new national citizenry, but in the eyes – and wallets- of larger international system of other powerful nation-states.

The Nigeria’s new capital city of Abuja, Botswana’s Gaborone, Tanzania’s Dodoma, among others, following Independence from the colonial powers, have been framed in this sense of having both an internal and external appeal as well as intended to score other important goals (Best, 1970b; Salau, 1977a; Vale, 2008).

**2.3.2. Geography of capital Relocation**

Geographically, it is considered not an easy task where capitals relocate to though. Hence, ‘the location of a capital city’ is considered ‘an important geographical problem’ since the ‘decision to move, or build a capital city is not simple’ (Wolfel, 2002, p. 486) It becomes a geographical
problem due to the multiplicity of actors involved in the process of capital relocation. Each with its own biased choice of geographical location underlined by interests, the geographical location of a capital becomes a contested arena of actors each struggling to have its way. In the end, even when a geographic choice (location) is arrived at, it is ‘often under challenge by the other actors who may perceive their interests not to have been sufficiently taken care of. Vale (2008) illustrates that what eventually gets implemented as capital city starting from geographic location to construction, is typically a representation of the dominant interests. Smith (2009) sums this up in the context of national identity.

There can never be a single [geographic/location] ‘version’ of the nation and its past, just as there can never be a homogeneous national community nor a single ‘national destiny’. Different classes, castes, confessions, regions and ethnic communities may espouse variant [geographic] versions and rival narratives of the nation [of the preferred geographic location] … one of these [geographic capital location] may become the dominant narrative and even the official project at any given point in time.

Perera (2004), using the case of Chandigarh, also argue that capital relocation to a new geographic location is influenced by many interests and intrigues by several actors. These include the politicians, bureaucrats, the designers and other remote actors. He concludes that capital relocation is characterised thus by ‘contestations, negotiations and compromises of’ of geographic ‘imaginations’. Mabogunje (2011) similarly in the case of Abuja, illustrates this contested nature of capital relocation to a new geography where a multiplicity of interests such as ethnic and regional groups clash. Indeed, since ‘capitals are important icons of national identity’ (Wolfel, 2002), the contestations regarding its relocation becomes even furiously debated by actors; each struggling that the capital be located in a territory of its vested interest.

Despite the contestations, capital relocation to a new geography (location) can be single-handedly driven by an authoritarian or a strong personality. Using the relocation from Almaty to Astana in Kazakhstan or from Zomba to Lilongwe in Malawi, Schatz (2003) and Potts (1985) respectively demonstrates the power of a single individual in influencing capital relocation to a desired new location. Astana’s relocation is attributed to the high influence of president Nazarbayev; and Lilongwe to president Banda where each desires to achieve its own overt or covert reasons for the interest in such a new geography (location).

Regardless of whether the quest for a location of where the capital should be located, is a contested one driven by a multiplicity of actors. Or simply an issue of a heroic-individual driven case (Perera, 2004), location plays an important role to capital relocation. For it is in the new location that national aspirations are to be expressed towards the process of attaining national
identity, for example. Smith (1983) sees this as quite important for national identity as it was quite important for the colonial empires though for different motives. The colonialists had to select a particular geographic location of a capital to enhance the motif of colonialism and particularly capitalism, as the capitals were located in locations that favoured ‘a distinct orientation toward the commercial needs of the former imperial center’ (Schatz, 2003). The post-Independent states too see geographic location as an important avenue in which national capital should be located to promote post-Independence interests such as national identity. It is thus through the post-Independence capital that national that this can be promoted (Wolfel, 2002; Myers, 2011).

**Geographic locations of symbolism**

The states have tended to explore geographic locations of symbolism to relocate national capitals toward promoting national identity. As ‘place is an important source of identity to nations’ (Wolfel, 2002, p. 487), these locations are expected to provoke a sense of national identity. Indeed, ‘nationalism’ is ‘a method of creating unique territory for a group of people’ and it is through this that ‘territory is given uniqueness by the nation through a series of subjective decisions designed to separate the territory from surrounding regions’ (Wolfel, 2002, p. 487). Hence historical sites that bear relevance to national identity are taken advantage of in the relocation of capitals as was the case with Gaborone in Botswana. Gaborone had been a historically meeting point of the traditional leaders to deliberate on issues of common concern to them. When the need to move the distant colonial capital from Mafeking in South Africa arose, among the other geographical locations considered, Gaborone was the most favoured because of this historical relevance and thus deemed a vital symbolism of promoting national unity (Best, 1970).

Also, neutral sites which are considered as centres of unity are taken advantage of to advance national identity (Nwafor, 1980; Potts, 1985b; Ikejiofor, 1998). It is considered for instance that instead of privileging a certain ethnic and regional group, the capital should be relocated to a new location of neutrality not dominated by any ethnic or regional groups. In the case of Abuja, the national elites have desired that the new capital be located in the centre of the country not dominated by the three major ethnic-nationalities of Nigeria – Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo. Thus the capital was moved from Lagos in the south western part of the country dominated by the Yorubas to the Middle Belt of the country where neither the Yorubas, nor Hausas or Ibos are the dominant ethnic-nationalities (IPA, 1979; Mabogunje, 2011).
2.4 Capital Relocation, Western Planning Ideals, and nation Building

But the building of a national capital to drive national identity or other aims also tends to draw on modernist planning ideals. There exists thus a connection between nation building and the built environment especially through planning, urban design and architecture. In terms of capital relocation, most post-Independence new capitals through their national elites, have sought to use modernist planning ideals in the design of new capitals to drive home the goals underpinning the capital development in the first place. Islamabad, Abuja, Brasilia, Lilongwe, Dodoma, Gaborone, and many others, have embraced this connection. The reasons for the connection tend to be contextual and historical though (Holston, 1989; Vale, 2008)

It is expected that through modernist planning ideals such as the master plan, national elites would use them and build modern capital cities. Modern capital cities that present their nations to the world as not only modern nations but equally announce their arrival unto the modern stage, among a league of modern capital cities and nations. Beyond this, the connection is also linked to a need to advance ‘nationalistic agenda’ by ‘a variety of regimes’ where master plans are to underscore this desire too (Vale, 2008). Generally, master plans encapsulate not only the vision of how the goals underpinning the new capitals are to be achieved; but equally articulate urban design models that seek to drive home an imagery of what the city seeks to achieve. In other words, the urban designs act as ‘display mechanisms’ that are presumed to have nationalistic appeal on the citizenry or drive home an image of the city’s arrival unto the modern stage among world class modern cities (White, 2012; Koch, 2013; Light and Young, 2013; Vale, 2014c). Again, this feeds back to what Vale (2014c) speaks of the use of ‘urban design and architecture to advance a nationalistic agenda’ by national elites. It is through these master plans that such imageries are evoked to create an appeal on the citizenry or the intended audience.

2.4.1 The Abuja Trajectory and other Post-Colonial capital cities

The connection of modernist planning ideals to post-colonial capital cities using the master plan tends to be contextual and historical. This kind of Western inspired planning knowledge and its trajectory in the Global South needs unpacking.

Generally, an understanding of planning knowledge in the South inevitably borders on the diffusion of planning into the South and the sort of knowledge underpinning such transfer (Kamete, 2013a; Njoh, 2016). The history of diffusion into the South and of relevance to this work is however limited to the colonial era and post-Independence happenings in the South.
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. To understand this history Ward (2010) uses terms such as ‘borrowing’ and ‘imposition’, or Healey (2010) as ‘emulation’ and ‘imposition’. These terms are taken advantage of in this thesis to make sense of the diffusion into the South from the West. Imposition refers to how Western planning knowledge is transferred into the South through an outright authoritative means by the West especially during colonialism; while borrowing as a conscious acquisition of the knowledge by the South especially characterising post-Independence to guide city development.

Earlier in this chapter, a brief brush of the colonial planning was highlighted especially in terms of how it led to the creation of seaboard capitals. Generally, during colonialism planning was technocratic in nature, laying emphasis on the process of planning as a technical activity concerned with the production of physical plans and zoning of land uses. This in a way reflects the roots of planning stemming generally from the engineering and architecture traditions, the pre-1960s planning orientation toward design and the production of physical plans to guide land use development. It is this ‘physical determinist’ way of looking at the environment that got diffused into the colonies from the West imported by colonial officials. Hence the planning of townships was often carried out using layout plans and zoning of land uses. Accompanying this orientation were the planning ordinances of the European countries that were brought into the colonists to provide the legal impetus for land use and zoning regulations (Home, 1990; Mabogunje, 1990; Rakodi, 2001; Kamete, 2007; Kamete and Lindell, 2010). The planning ordinances, plus the conception of planning as a ‘physical determinist’ enterprise, would continue to influence planning throughout the colonial era and even after the attainment of political Independence.

However, with the influence of the rational planning model having emerged in the 1960s-1970s in the West, and coinciding around this period with political Independence in much of Africa, the newly Independent States became inspired by the ideals of the rational planning process (Watson, 2002; Kamete, 2007; Todes et al., 2010; Kamete, 2012; Njoh, 2016). The rational planning model sees planning as a rational, scientific procedure. These procedures include problem identification; setting objectives; evaluation of programmes and alternatives; selection of optimum programme; and the implementation of chosen optimal programme as well as monitoring performance. Since it is concerned with achieving a desired end through the application of technical procedures, the model is characterised by a means-end relationship - the means of achieving the ends that planning seeks. The means-end relationship is equated to an instrumental-substantive rationality, where instrumental rationality deals with means in terms of ‘how to combine the means and use them to achieve given ends’ (Sager, 1994, p. 6);
while substantive rationality is concerned with ‘ends and their evaluations’ (Allmendinger, 2009). But it must also be noted that the model generally assumes that the planner would act as a neutral analyst.

Essentially, a patronage of the model abounds prominently in the 1960s and 1970s often underscoring the master planning of cities (Ward, 2004; Carmona et al., 2009). For these newly Independent states, driving the inspiration, would be the need to emulate the West and adopt the model for nation building and modernisation (Watson, 2003; Carmona et al., 2009; Healey, 2010; Ward, 2010). The already colonial planning foundation based on the ‘physical determinist’ approach which continued to influence planning in these states even after colonialism, provided an easy platform for the model to build on in these countries. Rakodi (2001, p. 210) explains this connection.

... i) The concerns of early colonial administrators with establishing new settlements or suburbs with adequate standards of public health and infrastructure for their own occupation, drawing on the available expertise (typically engineers) and imported sanitary regulations and building codes. ii) The influence of developments in the home countries of colonial administrators... The planning system which developed [for example] in the ex-British colonies was, therefore, an uneasy amalgam of - a technocratic approach based on a rational planning process (forecasting, analysis and land use allocation), leading to the development of long term physical blueprint plans.

She provides insights further into the logic that underpinned these plans in Sub-Saharan Africa primarily stemming from the notions of rational planning model.

The preparation of such plans is seen as a technocratic process [a scientific engagement following a normative procedure], the job of professionals [the planner as a technical analyst]. They embody a modernist or heroic view of planning, as concerned with, firstly, making public and political decisions more rational, and secondly, making use, as far as possible, of systematic social science knowledge and methods (Rakodi, 2001, p. 209).

Thus, through the master plans the newly independent states hope to embark on comprehensive physical development to be attained in future. In other words, the plans provide future direction of a city’s development on a comprehensive scale covering different sectors of the city, mostly

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10 This is a desire of the developing world to fashion the planning and development of their cities in line with planning knowledge found in the West and other developed world. At the height of the dominance of the model (the 1960s-1970s) corresponds with the decades of Independence from colonial powers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most countries thus sought to develop new capital cities, new towns, or expand existing colonial cities to cope with massive urbanization into urban centres; and the readily available planning model was the rational comprehensive model which usually came in the form of master plans. In short this had become de rigueur in Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries in which every urban center desired to acquire master plans.
expressed in the form of land uses (Illesanmi, 1998; Watson, 2003; Rakodi, 2001). In Nigeria for instance, ‘most cities and regions in Nigeria’ including Abuja had at certain times adopted it. It is even reflected in ‘institutions like Universities, polytechnic and Military formations’ which desire to use master plans ‘to order their physical development’ on a comprehensive scale (Illesanmi, 1989). Through the adoption a wide range of sectors encompassing land uses, infrastructures as well as socio-economic activities are planned for and captured in master plans.

The adoption of the rational planning model which is reflected through the master plans, has also been possible through the highly centralised decision-making structure that exists in these states, bequeathed to them at end of colonialism. This corresponds with the rational planning model which is a fan of top-down approach to decision making. Much discussion on the top-down approach to decision making and policy implementation is contained in the next chapter. But beyond this amalgam of the model with pre-existing decision making structure, the model equally desires a pluralist view of the public with a common end or purpose (Faludi, 1973). That is, since the model accentuates concerns for comprehensiveness where all conceivable courses of action are explored, and a common public or common end/ goal, it therefore emphasizes a centralized decision-making to be able to control and direct the goals for implementation. This way of looking at planning found itself easily in Sub-Saharan Africa which had already been used to public planning in the colonial era with a centralised top down approach; where plans emanated from a highly centralized system as blue print for urban planning of townships. Furthermore, since post-Independence planning had not changed much in top-down decision making, this had found its way into much of the comprehensive planning endeavours undertaken by the countries (Todes et al., 2010; Kamete, 2013b; Njoh, 2016).

The adoption of the model is equally attributed to issue of ‘government legitimacy’. This is where planning is seen as ‘a project of a state-directed future, that the state possesses developmentalist features, that planning operates in the public interest’. Therefore, undertaking rational planning by government amounts to building legitimacy; doing the right thing for the common public interest (Rakodi 2001, p. 209). It is most often assumed that the state’s intervention with its team of professional planners as advisers, the state will direct the transformation of society through the goals captured in the master plans. It is this kind of assumption that has informed the master planning of Abuja for example. The Nigerian state desires to use the plan to achieve national identity in a diverse ethnic society; cause regional and economic development in the centre of the country - the Middle Belt Region; and bring about modernity in the country by building a modern capital city that is among the best, and
through this showcase to the world that Nigeria has come of age as a modern nation (Uyang, 1989; Ikejiofor, 1998; Adama, 2007; Elleh, 2015).

2.5. Global Political Economic influence on Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa

The previous sections explored nation building in sub-Saharan Africa especially through the strategy of capital relocation. But it must equally be noted that the process of nation building in these states has not been undertaken in a vacuum without the influence of the global political economy. This section discusses this influence through the OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s, and the Washington consensus policies particularly the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced in Africa in the 1980s and stretching into the 1990s. The section starts off with a bit of history, narrating the nature of African economy from Independence prior to the influence of the global oil crisis and introduction of the SAP polices.

2.5.1. Initial economic condition

At Independence which characterised the late 1950s and much of the 1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa took over dependent economies still linked to former colonial powers and earlier established colonial trade patterns. This was primarily based on extraction and exportation of raw materials to Europe and other Metropolitan centres (Riddell, 1997; Osaghae, 1998b; Tordoff, 2002; Potts, 2008).

In the early decade of Independence, the 1960s, this continued with Sub-Saharan Africa functioning as out-posts of raw materials for the Metropolitan Europe. Later ‘attempts at industrialisation in an effort to foster development’ were undertaken by most of the countries (Riddell, 1997).

Most countries engaged in attempts at industrialisation in an effort to foster development, and factories with their employment opportunities became novel features of the largest centres. The new manufacturing plants reflected attempts at import substitution or export valorisation (Riddell, 1997, p. 1298).

Generally, even though the economies were still dependent on the West and other advanced countries, the economies in the 1960s and the early 1970s tended to be strong. This was supported by manufacturing, mining, and agriculture through the exportation of raw materials, all of which provided sources of foreign earnings for the newly Independent states. However, by the later part of the 1970s foreign earnings dwindled down leading to economic crises

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11 Washington Consensus relates to the free market, neoliberal policies introduced in developing countries in the 1980s-1990s by Washington based organisations such as the IMF, World Bank, and the US Treasury Department, as economic prescriptions and supposedly to deal with the economic crisis ravaging the countries.
(Riddell, 1997; Potts, 2008; Thomson, 2010). The experience of individual countries varies though. Nonetheless, across the generality of the continent the economies were in deep crises affecting many sectors. In the employment sector for example, Potts (2008) reports that formal urban-based employment drastically reduced and for the first time there was a significant gap between job seekers and the availability of urban-based employment not experienced in the previous decade.

Many factors have been attributed to the crises. The first relates to the decline in prices of exports and raw materials at the international market which the continent experienced in the 1970s, thereby affecting foreign earnings. The second is the OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s that led to dramatic increases in oil prices. As the case with the ‘recession in the West’ linked to the oil crises, in Sub-Saharan Africa too, the events had impact on economies and social life. For instance with high oil prices a ‘ton of African sugar’ earlier exchanged at the international market for ‘6.3 tons of oil’ in 1960 could only be exchanged for ‘0.7 tons of oil’ by the turn of the new decade - the early 1980s (Thomson, 2010, p. 194). Thirdly, following Independence, loans were procured from international lending agencies to kick start economies and development of infrastructures and other nation building projects. However, the loans accrued high rates of interests which most of the sub-Saharan countries could not afford to pay hence leading into debts. Fourthly, most of the economies were mono-economies relying heavily on a single major foreign earnings (for example agricultural raw materials) without other sources of foreign earnings. Fifthly, internal factors such as corruption and civil wars have often disrupted economic and political activities further plunging the affected areas into loss of foreign earnings. An example is the Nigeria-Biafra war that lasted for 3 years disrupting oil production in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. These factors and many others combined to undermine the economies of Sub-Sahara Africa and by the 1980s the countries were deep into debts (Riddell, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Van de Walle, 2001; Tordoff, 2002; Potts, 2008; Bauer, 2013).

2.5.2. Introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme and Influence on Planning

With foreign debts and the economies in bad shape, most countries opted to implement the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced by the IMF and World Bank. SAP among others aimed at the:

[i] removal of currency pegs that overvalued currencies and a move towards liberalized rates of exchange; [ii] the removal of price controls in agricultural marketing; [iii] the removal of subsidies for consumer goods; [iv] reduction in recurrent expenditure with a view of balancing the budget; [v] a cutting back in money supply. Other policy areas, less consistently pursued included: sectoral
SAP usually came as conditionality to the loans that the countries sought to procure from the international lending bodies. Starting from the mid-1980s and by 1989 most of the countries had secured the loans (Riddell, 1992; Harrison, 2006; Rakodi and Nkurunziza, 2007; Potts, 2008; Thompson, 2010 et al).

SAP may be seen as the panacea to the troubled economies but it nevertheless had an overarching neo-liberal economic agenda beyond just the provision of some redemptive measures to the debt-ridden economies. In the West, the 1970s characterised the dismantling of the Keynesian model of economy to supplant the market. With the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa in debts and in dire need of funds to keep the state trudging on, it would no doubt have been a veritable opportunity for the IMF and World Bank to take advantage of and introduce the neoliberal policies couched in the form of loans and underlined by SAP conditionalities.

All of these policies were expressed through lending conditionalities set out by the World Bank and IMF which came to enjoy substantial influence over indebted states from 1979. In isolation and collectively, this raft of reforms was based in the global intellectual shift towards neo-liberalism (Harrison, 2006, p.103).

The 1980s had been described as desperate moments for sub-Saharan Africa - desperately in search of loans. The bait provided by the international agencies may have been unwittingly noticed by these countries; or noticed but with less concern about the overarching agenda behind the loans. What mattered most would be the survival of these countries facing severe debt crisis and could thus take any loan to survive irrespective of the agenda underlining it. At any rate, the adoption of the international led market polices came to a climax by the 1990s with almost all the countries having adopted them.

In terms of success whether the policies succeeded, there tends to be a general consensus that SAP failed in remedying the problems of the economies. That is not to deny however that there were some marginal gains. But the degree of failure or marginal gains varies across the countries. It must also be pointed out that insomuch as SAP may not have yielded the desired result, it nonetheless led to an integration of sub-Saharan Africa economies to neo-liberal global market economy already begun in the West in the 1970s as earlier mentioned (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2001; Rakodi, 2007).

In the context of planning and even before the adoption of SAP, the global OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s which resulted in revenue reductions in most countries had impact on planning as earlier noted. Most affected states could not be able to undertake public planning in the sense
of provision of infrastructure or funding of urban projects. In short these times have been described as the lost decades (Diaw et al., 2002; Tipple, 2009 et al). In the area of nation building, in terms of provision of wide range infrastructures to encourage regional and economic development or social-cultural projects that seek to promote national identity and unity, such states would not be able to pursue it since the economic crisis would not support the development of nationalistic projects.

However, for some like Nigeria, the crises ushered in a boom in its oil sector giving rise to huge foreign earnings, making it a super oil rich state overnight. Chapter 5 contains an in-depth discussion of the Nigerian context in this regard. But the point being driven is that with the oil revenues meant a rich oil state capable of undertaking nation building through a variety of ‘big capital investments’ supported by oil dollars. In short ‘the Nigerian oil meant money and modernity; it was revitalising and glamorous’ (Apter, 2008, p. 24). Therefore,

*maintaining control of the commanding heights of the nation’s growing oil economy, the federal military government [of Nigeria] embarked on a variety of prestigious projects and structural reforms designed to lift Nigeria out postwar poverty and into mainstream industrial production and development. Over 30 billion petrodollars were budgeted in the utopian Third National Development Plan (1975-80) (Apter, 2008, p.25).*

Indeed, the Nigerian president at the time of oil boom, General Yakubu Gowon, on the account of the huge petrol at his disposal - in addressing the nation on March 29 1975 asserts that

*the nation is now on the threshold of an industrial revolution which will be characterized by the production of consumer durables such as motor cars, and capital goods such as trucks, iron and steel, and petrochemicals (General Yakubu Gowon, 1975 in Apter, 2008, p.25).*

It was around this period too that the Nigerian state would be able to declare its nation building project of Abuja to be supported by the petrol dollars (chapter 5). Undoubtedly, from the declaration of the new capital Abuja, to the master planning of the city and implementation of the master plan, and even the regional plans of the Federal Capital Territory, and every bit of the funding would be supported by the petrol dollars of the 1970s (FCDA, 1979, 2008; Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi, 2013; Nor, 2014a)

During the SAP era, stretching from the 1980s and 1990s, and coupled with the fact that most debts continued to rise even in the face of the adoption of the SAP policies, most of these countries could not be able to invest in public projects in the face of poverty, employment, and a receding role of the state in public affairs. Zambia for instance witnessed negative growth rates as well as the abandonment of public projects (Thompson, 2010). In Nigeria too its hitherto petro dollar economy which collapsed in the 1980s following a drop in global oil crisis,
and even though having adopted the SAP policies, its economies could not be revamped throughout the SAP era in the face of growing debts. This had consequences on its nation building projects such as Abuja as the development of the new capital city slowed down due to poor funding (Take, 1984; Vale, 2008; Elleh, 2015). Chapter 5 indeed explains further these consequences on the master planning and development of the new capital city.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates the rationale and forces behind nation building through capital relocation. Using capital relocation, Post-Independent states desire to undertake nation building toward promoting national unity in a multi-ethnic back ground. But capital relocation is equally expected to bring in other national aspirations. This includes to build a modern national capital city, announce to the world the coming unto stage of a modern nation, cause regional and economic development, and many other goals that underpin capital relocation. Secondly through the chapter, Western planning knowledge in form of master plans and the rational planning model are made sense of in the context of their diffusion and adoption in sub-Saharan Africa, and their relationship to new capital cities. Thirdly, the chapter narrates the political economy of the 1970s-1990s through the OPEC oil crisis and the Washington consensus (Structural Adjustment Programme) and their influence on planning.
Chapter Three. Exploring Policy Implementation in the South

Chapter two looked at the use of capital relocation as a strategy of nation building to foster national identity in diverse ethnic societies. It also explored the connection between Western planning ideals (master planning and the rational planning model) and national capitals; as well as the influence of political economy on nation building focusing mostly on the global oil crisis of the 1970s and Washington consensus policies (SAP) of the 1980s-1990s. This chapter looks at the underlying notions behind policy implementation as well as the treatment of policy implementation in the planning field. Thereafter it explores how policy implementation is treated in the Global South and challenges of implementation.

3.1. Understanding Policy Implementation

The literature on policy implementation is dominated by the top-down and bottom-up ways of making sense of policy implementation. The contending issues is about, among others, what is considered as policy implementation and when implementation is said to have taken place; the point at which implementation starts and ends; whether implementation is simply a rational, sequential process of events expected to translate policy into reality; or a messy, interactive process concerned with the ground situation of what happens during implementation and what gets implemented.

3.1.1. Top-Down Perspective

The top-down concerns of policy implementation views implementation in the sense of ‘putting policy into effect’ (Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Barrett, 2004). At the heart of this therefore, is a demarcation between policy making and policy implementation. Policy is considered to be first of all formulated and thereafter comes implementation with the aim of translating policy into reality (Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Taylor, 1998; Barrett, 2004; Hupe, 2014; Hupe et al., 2014).

There is the core assumption of implementation as a ‘later’ part in the policy process consisting of a range of ‘stages’. After the particular public policy has been formulated and decided upon, its implementation follows subsequently (Hupe, 2014, p. 169).

The rationale behind the demarcation is attributed to the ‘desire to separate politics from administration’. It is assumed that policy formulation is underlined by a complex web of politics, power relations, and undertaken by the central government or a special policy formulation body. The formulated policy is then passed down to administration (implementing
agencies) which is thought of as a rational and non-political arena devoid of the nuances of politics to implement it (Barrett, 2004). Viewing policy implementation in this way, takes a prescriptive approach with policy makers formulating and prescribing polices to be implemented in certain contexts. This assumes a hierarchical relationship in that policy is formulated from a supposedly ‘top’ and passed down for implementation (O’Toole, 2000; Sinclair, 2001; Barrett, 2004; Saetren, 2005a; Hupe, 2014; Hupe et al., 2014).

It also connects implementation with administration as the means through which policy would have to go through to be implemented. The connection of policy to administration opens up a wide range of considerations. This borders for instance on the kinds of decision making and organisational structures, and actors that are expected to bring about the implementation of policy. Administration becomes therefore an integral part of policy implementation, a means to an end through which bureaucrats would help bring policy ‘into effect’.

Implementation therefore implied the establishment of adequate bureaucratic procedures to ensure that policies are executed as accurately as possible. To this end, implementing agencies should have sufficient resources at their disposal, and there needs to be a system of clear responsibilities and hierarchical control to supervise the actions of implementers (Pulzl and Treib, 2007, p. 91).

The bureaucrats accordingly become agents of implementation which are expected to engage in series of rational decision making to bring about implementation. Nonetheless, the connection of policy implementation with administration as an inseparable part raises concerns. Barrette (1981, 2004) observes for instance that, by ‘inextricably’ bringing the two together, implementation tends to be reduced to mere ‘organisational structure and processes’. And that once this is improved upon, it is thought, implementation would be successfully achieved. Implementation thus gets narrowed down to ‘channels of communication’; as a sequential decision making toward translating policy into effect. Though, the supposedly ‘automatic follow-on from policy decisions’ by implementing agencies through their ‘organisation structures and processes’ does not necessarily lead to policy implementation (Barrett, 1981, 2004).

As would be seen later in this discussion, policy implementation rather tends to be influenced and undermined by many a factor than just stages of decision making expected to translate policy into reality.
Of importance to the top-down perspective concerns also how we establish whether policy implementation has taken place or not. In this regard, it advances a linear view of implementation by seeing implementation not only as translating policy into reality but expected to produce certain outcomes as well. That is policy ‘P’ when implemented would lead to the production of certain outcomes or results ‘R’ (fig 6).

![Diagram]

_Figure 6: linear orientation to policy implementation, policy outcomes/result becoming in conformance with policy objectives_  
Author, 2016.

Building on the linear flow from policy to implementation and outcomes, it takes therefore a conformance view in weighing the outcomes produced by implementation against policy intentions as a way of establishing whether implementation has taken place or not. Once outcomes conform to policy intentions, implementation is said to have taken place. As such, the top-down perspective espouses a conformance-based measurement of policy implementation; where policy implementers are concerned about controlling systems to bring about compliance of policy objectives with outcomes (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Alexander and Faludi, 1989; Barrett, 2004). This is sort of a ‘managerial perspective’ to policy implementation where implementation is seen ‘in terms of co-ordination, control or obtaining 'compliance' with policy’ (Barrett, 1981, p. 4).

3.1.2. Bottom-Up Orientation Approach

But conceiving policy implementation in the manner of top-down perspective raises many questions. To start with, the assumption that policy emanates from the top and is then passed down for implementation with bureaucrats playing the role as agents of implementations is questioned (Ingram, 1977; Lipsky, 1980; Barrett, 2004). Rather advanced is that policy does not necessarily come from the top but could emanate from other ways.

Policy may be a response to pressures and problems experienced on the ground. Equally, policy may be developed from specific innovations, that is, action precedes policy. Not all action relates to a specific or explicit policy (Barrett, 1981).

It is again argued that even though the top-down perspective assumes a hierarchical relationship between policy makers and the agents of implementations, appearing as though policy makers
and implementers are in a compliant relationship, in reality this however does not always be. Some of the implementing agencies may even exist as independent agencies or semi-autonomous having ‘their own interests and priorities to pursue’ quite even at variance with those of the policy formulators (Barrett, 1981; Barrett, 2004).

There is yet the issue of neglect of context by the top-down perspective. The contention is that by assuming that policy would be implemented in an apolitical environment devoid of politics, power play, negotiations and bargains by the implementers, the top-down approach neglects these nuances of policy implementation that take place on ground during implementation. (Ingram, 1977; Barrett, 1981; Matland, 1995; Barrett, 2004; Saetern, 2005).

These observations and the earlier mentioned criticisms concerning the top-down perspective in the preceding discussion, though are by no means the only shortcomings, lead to policy implementation being conceived in another perspective - the bottom up Approach. It argues against looking at implementation ‘solely in terms of putting policy into effect’. It espouses instead that implementation should equally be concerned about ‘observing what actually happens or gets done and seeking to understand how and why’.

_This kind of action perspective takes ‘what is done’ as central, focuses attention on the behaviour or actions of groups and individuals and the determinants of that behaviour, and seeks to examine the degree to which action relates to policy, rather than assuming it to follow from policy_ (Barrett, 1981, pp. 12-13).

When unpacked, this notion of looking at implementation in terms of ‘what actually happens’ or what ‘what is done’ during implementation (Barrett, 1981) takes a descriptive way of looking at the ground situation of policy implementation beyond just focusing attention on policy implementation in the sense of a dictation or prescription of what ought to be done and how it should proceed as advanced by the top-down perspective. Of value too, is the connection between ‘what happens’ during implementation and the drivers of the process (Taylor, 1989). The import of this firstly is a revelation that policy implementation is characterised by actors who drive the process. These actors are seen not just as a single set of actors, those supposedly in the public agencies expected to translate policy into effect, but as diverse actors involved in the process of implementation cutting across the public and private sectors (Taylor, 1989, Matland, 1995). This is a valid point long recognised by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) even as they advanced the top down perspective of policy implementation. They point out that for policy implementation to be effective there is need for a ‘joint action’ among the implementing agencies and actors involved in the process. The concern stems from the multiplicity of implementing agencies that are involved in policy implementation, a situation of multiply
decision making points through which policy has to pass through the ‘clearance points’ before it is translated into reality (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).

One of the most important things Pressman and Wildavsky’s work shows is that implementation of public policy rarely depends on the actions of the relevant government department or planning authority alone. Social action rarely depends solely on a single actor but usually involves and requires the cooperation of different actors. Moreover, these other actors have ‘private’ goals of their own, some of which do not coincide with those of public policy-making authorities (Taylor, 1998, p. 116).

The point becomes therefore for implementers of policy to regard implementation in the sense of the complexities that are likely to ensue from these diverse actors during implementation (Barrett, 2004; Winter, 2012a; Winter, 2012b).

Secondly, arising from the diversity of the actors in policy implementation, the bottom-up perspective draws our attention to focus on the ‘behaviour or actions’ of these actors in relation to policy implementation. This signifies that policy implementation involves an inter play of behaviour among the actors that are involved in implementation. An inter play of behaviour inevitably draws our attention to the nuances of relations that take place during implementation which could be in the form of power play, negotiations and bargains as the actors try to implement policies. This is quite at variance with the top-down perspective which as already mentioned, assumes that actors in an organisation would act as rational implementers making independent decisions based on merit and technical criteria free from political influence. But this is rarely possible to separate politics from administration. Attempts to insulate an inherently political subject matter from politics do not necessarily lead to apolitical actions. They instead may lead directly to policy failure (Matland 1995, p.148).

Thus, instead of conceiving ‘implementation as the transmission of policy into a series of consequential actions’, the call is rather to see it as ‘a process of interaction and negotiation’; not as a linear process from policy to implementation but as a messy process involving series of power play and bargains among the implementers as well as the formulators of policy (Barrett, 1981). Much of the conceptualisation of policy implementation therefore tends to be treated in terms of bargain, power relations, and adaptation (Ingram, 1977; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hjern and Hull, 1982; Barrett and Hill, 1984; Shaw et al., 1985; Barrett, 2004).

But viewing implementation as a process of negotiation equally impinges on how implementation is measured against the backdrop of whether it has been successfully achieved or not. The top down perspective as already observed, takes a linear-conformance approach to establishing whether implementation has taken place successfully or not by comparing policy
intentions with the outcomes of implementation. But if implementation is taken as an interactive and negotiated process, establishing the success or failure of implementation becomes a matter of what gets implemented at the end of negotiation, compromises, and consensus among the actors. In this sense, successful implementation would not necessarily entail a linear-conformance of policy objective with policy outcomes. Reason being that what finally gets implemented stemming from negotiations may after all be the redefined, reframed or remodeled policy by the actors and not necessarily the formulated policy. This would be a function of the interests, priorities or pressures influencing the actors’ interactions in the course of implementation (Barrette, 2004).

Thus, expecting implementation to proceed as a linear process from intention to outcome does not automatically occur in that manner. The interactions resulting from the actors involved in the implementation process are likely to remould certain aspect of the policy. Lipsky (1980) points this out through his research on the street bureaucrat. Referring to those who are supposed to be the end-decision takers on policy implementation - the street bureaucrats, he demonstrates how they remould or change policy during implementation. The extent to which implementers can exert discretion to change policy or remould certain aspects of it during implementation, nonetheless, raises the concern of whose policies get implemented in the end. Is it the formulated policy from the central policy making body passed down to be implemented by the implementing agencies; or the remodeled, negotiated policy in which certain aspects of it have been traded off during implementation?

Those that see implementation strictly in terms of negotiation and bargain, would see policy change as part of implementation process and what ever gets implemented in the end is still regarded as successful implementation. In contrast, those espousing a top-down perspective and expecting implementation to be translated into reality as formulated without change, would address such discretion of policy change exercised by the street bureaucrats in the course of implementation as implementation failure. That is, assuming ‘a direct causal link between policies and observed outcomes’ with disregard to ‘the impact of implementers on policy delivery’, where any deviation is considered as policy failure (Puzl et al, 2007 p. 91).

3.1.3. Understanding Policy Implementation through the Planning Field

Linear and Rational Concerns of implementation

From the preceding discussion especially from the top-down view of policy implementation, many key points are deduced: i) policy is seen as being distinct from implementation, and that implementation begins after policy formulation; ii) policy would lead to implementation
- sort of a trigger for implementation; iii) implementation is hierarchal and prescriptive in nature; iv) implementation would be carried out by administration, seen as a rational and non-political arena, and characterised too by rational actors who would help translate policy into reality; and iv) successful implementation is treated as a linear conformance where outcomes of implementation are weighed against policy intentions or objectives. These notions focus on the rational and linear view of how the planning field treats implementation (Alexander, 1986; Taylor, 1989; Barrett, 2004; Davoudi, 2009b). Unpacking such underpinnings, requires exploring the very trajectory of the ideas that have come to define planning as a rational process, and with special reference to the conceptualisation of plan implementation as a rational and linear process – or simply a rational process (Alexander, 1986; Barrette, 2004).

Implementation in planning generally, as Taylor (1989) and Davoudi (2009b) explain, has tended to tag along the different historical lenses of looking at planning. This starts first with the pre-1960s lenses of viewing planning as a ‘physical determinist’ (Taylor, 1989) activity - driven by the quest to order and control space to an expected end through the production of physical plans (Hall, 2002; Ward, 2004; Allmendinger, 2008). The knowledge applied in the production of the plans is said to have come from architectural and engineering traditions, as well as the conception of planning as an Enlightenment and Modernist project that seeks to order the open space to a desired and enlightened future (Hall, 2002). In terms of implementation, the lens views implementation too as requiring some guidance and control to achieve the intentions which are captured in a plan toward achieving a desired end (Allmendinger, 2008; Healey, 2010). This translates into equating implementation in the sense of both a blue print and linear engagement (Alexander, 1986; Davoudi, 2009). That is, plans would be implemented as designed and in a straight forward manner from intentions to outcomes of implementation respectively.

Allmendinger (2008) reports that the ‘physical determinist’ and linear lens of looking at planning would later be dominated by the 1960s-1970s’ treatment of planning as a rational, scientific process (Faludi, 1973a). Noted already in chapter 2, the rational process expects planning to proceed as a technical procedure toward achieving a desired end and the role of the planner to be that of a neutral expert.\footnote{12}{Being a neutral expert assumes that the planner is a value-free expert. But generally, the rational model also assumes that the environment where the planner works is equally not influenced by politics, or nuances of power play. Much of the characteristics of being a neutral expert has been dealt with in the previous discussion on the perspectives of implementation where the implementing bureaucrats are expected to act as rational, neutral agents guided by technical merits of decision making. One whose...}
In the context of implementation, these rational steps earlier mentioned in chapter 2 show that implementation is thought of as following after the adoption of the optimum solution or plan or programme. It assumes that once a plan is formulated implementation will then bring the plan’s translation into reality. In other words, ‘putting policy into effect’ - in this case bringing the formulated plan ‘into effect’ (Barrett, 1981). This is an obvious conception of implementation as being distinct from plan formulation as earlier discussed in the top-down perspective.

Furthermore, since the rational process assumes the planner’s role to be that of a neutral, value-free expert working in an apolitical environment, implementation too is taken to flow automatically as a rational engagement devoid of politics in which the planner follows a sets of organisational decision making to arrive at the implementation of the formulated plan (Alterman and Hill, 1978; Alexander, 1986; Alexander and Faludi, 1989; Talen, 1996; Alexander, 2000; Healey, 2006; Hall, 2014).

It must be pointed out too that, the pre-1960s conception of implementation as a linear engagement earlier mentioned, assuming implementation to proceed from intention to outcomes, became also integrated into the rational treatment of implementation. That is plan implementation being treated as a linear engagement under the rational process. It thus assumes that implementation in the sense of ‘putting’ plan ‘into effect’ - would proceed as straightforward and unproblematic following rational procedures.

This sure way of looking at implementation through this linear engagement and as a rational process, is what Davoudi (2006) refers to as positivism in planning, and which in terms of implementation Davoudi (2009b, p. 238) explains thus:

Positivism not only sees the relationship between evidence [outcomes of implementation] and policy as linear and unproblematic... It also considers the relationship between policy and action (or plan and its implementation) as straightforward and trouble-free. Once policies and proposals are agreed upon and formally adopted, it is assumed that actions will follow. At the height of positivist planning the procedural planning theory saw role is not only to engage in the technical process of analysing all possible means of achieving ends, but equally play an advisory role to politicians or those who weigh executive or elective powers to implement ends. It assumes further that the ends that are sought would be given to the planner, perhaps emanating from the politicians or policy makers, which are intended for the good of the public. This is a pluralist view of the public assuming that the ends being pursued are free of value, belonging uncontestably to a common public as earlier noted in the previous chapter.

Much of the conception of implementation in planning and especially most of the evaluative studies on implementation, approach the success or failure of implementation from this linear approach. They seek to find out a conformance relationship between a plan’s intention or its objectives and the outcomes of implementation. Once the outcomes that are produced by implementation tally with the plan’s intention, implementation is said to have taken place. Where there is non-conformance of outcomes with the plan’s intentions it is attributed as implementation failure (Alterman and Hill, 1978; Baer, 1997; Alexander, 1998; Hopkins, 2001; Laurian et al., 2004; Brody and Highfield, 2005). Conceiving implementation in this way is similar to the earlier discussed top-down approach to policy implementation, what Barret and Fudge (1981) earlier on discussed as ‘a managerial perspective’ to policy implementation seeking compliance of policy outcomes with policy intentions or objectives.

*Implementation not necessarily a linear, straightforward trajectory*

Yet, it must be pointed out that in reality, plan implementation does not tend to proceed in that orderly and supposedly ‘trouble-free’ linear manner (Davoudi, 2009b). This is an already valid point observed earlier under the discussion on policy implementation perspectives, in which attention was drawn to the fact that policy implementation is often characterised by complexities; and that does not necessarily flow from such a linear fashion but rather as an interactive, messy process influenced by contextual factors.

In planning too, several studies have demonstrated this reality. They point to the complexities of plan implementation as being underscored by series of nuances stemming from power relations and politics, for instance. Hence the argument is that, plan implementation cannot be reduced to just a simplistic rational and linear procession without a consideration of the contextual nuances that influence plan implementation. For instance, Barrett (2004) demonstrates this reality. Alexander (1985) too on several occasions in his writings on implementation, labels this linear and rational view of implementation as a ‘sequential limited’ view. Limited in the sense that it underrates contextual forces such as political, cultural and among other factors. Flyvbjer (1998) has likewise illustrated how a rationally conceived plan is undermined by political actors, who rather advance other intentions quite contrary to those desired by the plan.

In other words, expecting plan implementation to proceed as intended to its desired outcomes, would not be achieved as contextual forces of politics tend to undermine its implementation.
Indeed, a year much earlier than Flyvbjerg’s work, Healey’s (1988) fine grain analysis of policy implementation focusing among others on the British planning system in which policy interacts with during implementation, makes it clear how plan implementation is influenced by contextual factors. Salient among them is the structure and process of the planning system as well as the actors involved in implementation through their diverse interests. In short, these factors in a way border on the political, administrative and economic underpinnings of a context, in this case the British planning system having influence on plan implementation (Healey, 1988). Again, this stands quite contrary to a rational and linear simplistic treatment of implementation thought of as being ‘trouble free’ from contextual factors. (Davoudi, 2009b)

Of recent too Healey (2006b) reveals the weaknesses of this way of looking at implementation, as being undermined by contextual factors bordering on the uncertainties that take place in a certain context. This issue about fluidities, that is uncertainties, entails that plan implementation would not necessarily be expected to be a straightforward process as events in a city for instance economic or political, do not merely stay static and therefore tend to influence plan implementation. Davoudi (2009a) has similarly criticised the certainty of the linear/rational view of implementation in failing to take into cognisance the fluidities that confront planning.

Remnants of such a simplistic view of implementation continue to haunt plans as ‘paper tigers’. This positivist[certainty] perspective fails to recognise the alternative modes of implementation that can take place through fine adjustments and intangible processes of change over time, in which time is seen not as episodic change through event but as long-term slow movement of everyday life (Davoudi, 2009b, p238).

It is again observed that this approach to implementation being underpinned by notions of planning as a rational process, and even though implementation is captured under this notion within the sets of procedures of planning as earlier mentioned, implementation tends to be sidelined or given less attention. This is because much attention tends to be focused on the process of how planning should proceed, thereby resulting in a pre-eminent focus on plan formulation than on the actual implementation of plans (Healey, 2003; Allmendinger, 2009).

The rational planning model distracted attention away from the crucial question of how plans and policies were implemented, if they were implemented (Taylor, 1998, p. 111)

Barrett (1981) made clear - criticising what she refers to as a ‘policy-based perspective’ (in this case a plan-based orientation). This is where too much attention is placed on the formulation of policy (the plan) with less emphasis placed on action toward translating the plan into reality. The problem of poor and limited interpersonal communication among the actors involved in the implementation of plans, is yet another criticism that has trailed the rational and linear view
of implementation. Communication as observed, tends to be a one-way flow involving the planner and the politician or the policy makers and public where the planner presents his ideas or plans to them in the form of presentations. As a one way process, ‘little attention’ is paid to communication as ‘an interpersonal activity involving dialogue, debate and negotiation’ (Taylor, 1998, p. 111)

To deal with this, there is call for interpersonal communication among the actors involved in implementation through action-oriented planning. This simply stresses ‘the importance of interpersonal skills of communication and negotiation for the effective implementation of plans and policies’ (see Taylor, 1998, especially pages 111-121). This can be understood against the backdrop of a multiplicity of actors having diverse interests concerning plan implementation; hence the need to have an interpersonal communication and effective negotiations concerning the varying interests (Taylor, 1998; Healey, 2003; Allmendinger, 2008).

**Interactive and Action-based Concerns of implementation**

Generally, conceiving implementation in this way (as a linear and rational process) is trailed by many criticisms even far beyond the mentioned ones in this chapter (See Barrett, 1984; Alexander, 1985; Taylor, 1998; Allmendinger, 2009; Healey, 2006 et al). The criticisms however, open up other ways of looking at plan implementation. Much of the discussion on the bottom-up perspective of policy implementation already observed previously, offer new ways of conceiving implementation as an interactive and messy process rather than seeing it as linear and rational process.

In planning, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, diverse works have emerged in response to exploring these other alternatives. They have though tended to focus largely on the aspect of interpersonal communication skills. These works have come under the umbrella of communication planning theory (Healey, 1997; Taylor, 1998; Allmendinger, 2009). They treat plan implementation more in the sense of dialogue, participation, consensus, all motivated by an ideal democratic participation aimed at surmounting issues of domination by powerful actors in implementation.

Despite this bias of paying more attention on communication, Taylor (1998) reports that in the policy and action field however, a robust theoretical work on negotiations has been developed since the 1980s. Indeed, in the earlier discussion on the bottom-up perspective this point was underscored; that is the treatment of implementation as negotiation and the different kinds of interactions that place on ground in the course of implementation. At any rate, Taylor (1989)
sees the neglect of negotiation by communicative theorists as a sort of a missed opportunity in the planning field to have produced a robust literature on negotiation and the connection to implementation as have happened in the policy and action field. He strongly believes that negotiations would play a critical role in plan implementation since ‘it is primarily through negotiation-through bargaining and reaching agreements with other actors who have resources to invest in development- that planners can best secure implementation’ (Taylor, 1998, p. 123).

3.2. Implementation in the Global South

A sense has been made through the previous sections looking at the top-down and bottom perspectives to policy implementation. This has been followed by exploring how the planning field treats the concept of policy implementation through the linear and rational, and interactive and action-based views. This section now explores implementation in the South. The intention is to understand how plan implementation is treated in the South with special focus on sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the challenges of implementing plans in the South.

3.2.1. A colonial Legacy

In the chapter 2 a background is provided concerning the diffusion of planning knowledge into the South.

Beyond how these ideas got diffused into the South, plan implementation is largely treated as a rational prescriptive concern - already discussed in the last section. In the West, while other ways are explored through treating implementation as an interactive and action-based; in the South however, the persistence of the rational views of implementation trudge on with less concern to other ways of looking at implementation (Watson, 2009). The point is not to suggest that other ways of conceiving implementation do offer completely a better way of dealing with implementation in the South or are devoid of shortcomings. Rather, it is to point out that the technocratic rational views of planning generally tend to hold swell in the South. This tenacity though dealt with in chapter (chapter 9), does hinge on political and historical factors as well as the kinds of training and education planners in the South have had to receive, among other contextual factors. Nonetheless plan implementation as a rational concern tends to be rather unsuccessful in the South (Kironde, 1992; Arimah and Adeagbo, 2000; Kamete, 2007; Goodfellow, 2013; Manyena, 2013).

A major contributing factor is linked to the nature of the planning in the South which often acts as a clog rather than enhance implementation (Mabogunje, 1992; Njoh, 1999; Todes, 2011). Healey (1988), through her work on policy implementation on the British system of planning
and how it impinges on policy implementation, especially looking at policy implementation from the stand point of putting ‘policy into effect’ (Barrett, 1981), draws our attention to some key features of a planning system. Among others, this includes the structure and process of planning and the kinds of regulations that drive planning in a particular context. Barrett (1981) sees this in the sense of the environment in which policy is expected to interact with and gets implemented. In the context of the South and in sub-Saharan Africa, its system of planning is largely a reflection of its colonial planning legacies. In chapter 2 as already mentioned, a sense has been made concerning how planning ideas diffused into the South. In terms of the nature of the planning system during colonialism and the sort of legacy left behind, and importantly how this bears influence on implementation is treated in the next discussion.

**A weak planning system**

Implementation generally during colonialism was treated as a government activity; as the means through which a policy or plan will be implemented. Being connected to government, implementation usually proceeded as a decision-making engagement where the formulated plan was expected to pass through several channels of communication for it to be translated into reality. This tended to be a highly centralised top-down decision process and with less public participation, and lack of co-ordination of the different organs of government dealing with planning matters and implementation - hence fragmentary in nature.\(^{13}\)

Even after the end of the Second World War this did not change. Due to the colonizers’ non-interest in the development of physical planning during colonialism, it would seem to have been a misnomer to change this attitude even around this period and in the winding days of colonialism.\(^{14}\) As such it would be unsurprising if a robust planning system was to be bequeathed by the colonizers by the end of colonialism. And indeed, this proved to be so (Uyanga, 1989; Mabogunje, 1992; Home, 2013). This is because the efforts of the team of

\(^{13}\) Since the Natives were hardly involved in town planning matters, this tended equally to disfranchise the Natives in politics and policies of townships matters. But it must be pointed out that in as much as this motif continued, it was not perpetrated uncontestably. As the Natives gradually became more educated, their agitations to a have say in the running of the townships began to surge. In Nigeria and in most parts of the colonial world, such agitations were either correspondingly resisted by the colonizers as they ‘regarded urban politics with suspicion’; or marginal reforms would be instituted to quell them. Thus, in Nigeria the British colonial government had to create ‘a dozen town councils before the Second World War’ with the Natives as members. This in a sense, should be seen as an improvement in integrating the Natives within the apparatus of urban participation; but such opportunity was nevertheless limited to an ‘advisory’ role devoid of ‘staff and no fund-raising or executive powers’ (see i). Home, R.K. (1983) 'Town planning, segregation and indirect rule in colonial Nigeria', *Third World Planning Review*, 5(2), p. 165. ii) Home, R.K. (1990) 'Town planning and garden cities in the British colonial empire 1910–1940', *Planning Perspective*, 5(1), pp. 23-37.

\(^{14}\) As revealed in chapter 2, the philosophy of colonialism was built on appropriation of colonists’ resources and not one of enhancing their development-urban planning inclusive.
British planners for instance, who worked in many Nigerian towns after the Second World War achieved only very limited results. Why?

Most of them [plans prepared by the team] were more honoured in the breach because of the weaknesses of the machinery for implementing them, the lack of funds and the ambivalence of the government (Uyanga, 1989, p.129).

Furthermore, ‘the leader of the British team of planners’ observes that their efforts were frustrated by official apathy, opposition from the [colonial] Public Works department - which felt it could plan as well as anybody else, the lack of technical staff, inadequate data on existing conditions Uyanga,1989 p. 129.

And he goes on to conclude that in the real sense of it ‘there was no real authority to which’ they ‘could present’ their ‘plans with the hope of their being adhered to’ (Fry, 1974 in Uyanga, 1998 p. 129). The revelation by the British team in Nigeria does reflect the reality of the planning system in place especially in terms of organisational capability and related issues to handle the implementation of plans, and expectedly monitor compliance toward achieving result. Yet another example of these weaknesses is illustrated by Rakodi (1986 p. 214) using Zambia. She reveals that ‘even before independence, a significant proportion of the urban population had utilised unauthorised procedures to obtain access to land for the construction of housing’. As the case with Nigeria, this one too does reflect how weak the system merely existed in the face of on-going violations of planning procedures and permits.

It is this nature of the planning system that would be bequeathed to the newly Independent states at exist of colonialism15. Thus, in Cameroon ‘it is not surprising’ to find for instance ‘a flurry of urban land’ laws and the general structure of planning bearing semblance to its ‘erstwhile colonial’ framework (Njoh, 1998, p. 409). One finds this resonance throughout sub-Saharan Africa with a history of colonial rule (Kamete, 2012; Home, 2013).

What they left behind were the legal systems, policies and workings practices of the colonialists’ (Ward, 2010, p.52)

Against this backdrop one would expect to see some form of reforms concerning the legacy upon the attainment of Independence. But this was not to be the case especially in the early decades of Independence. Most of the countries seemed not interested in reforms; or interested but lacked the ability to do so; or not did not see it as a priority especially in the face of other

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15A legacy characterised by among others a technocratic emphasis to planning process; highly sectorally based; top-down approach in decision making; rivalry between administrative and technical staff; spatial segregation; disconnection between the central government and local government, hence a dichotomous central-local legacy; disfranchisement of the people (natives) in politics and policies of running townships; and a predisposition of planning towards public health concerns.
pressing issues of nation building that needed to be dealt with. Tordoff (2002, p. 144) amply reminds us of what stood before the newly Independent countries.

[Following Independence,] political leaders themselves were inexperienced in operating a governmental system on a national scale and were faced with numerous pressing problems. One of these was to Africanise- or localise (since Europeans and Asians took out the citizenship in several states) - the public services, both to satisfy political demands and to cope with the problem caused by the exodus of expatriate personnel.

As discerned from Tordoff, one of the major priorities for the newly Independent states was the political imperative of Africanising the work force across various establishments. This could have been considered more important than the imperative of reforming the establishments, even though the ‘inherited bureaucracies whose strength and experience for undertaking the immense task’ of nation building ‘was questionable’. For the bureaucracies lacked a robust ‘trained and experienced indigenous work force’ (ibid). President Kaunda of Zambia demonstrates this in 1968 too.

*We entered without a single African technician in one of the mostly industrialised societies on the continent’ (K.G Younger, 1960 in Tordoff, 2002, p. 144).*

In the field of planning this shortage was felt too. Rakodi (1986, p. 211) illustrates a sense of this - noting that ‘considerable administrative capacity’ had been deficient ‘especially in the early years after independence’. So serious was this problem that the need for a reform of the colonial planning legacy would have been subsumed by it. ‘Almost everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa’, Tordoff explains (2002, p. 148), ‘because of the shortage of qualified manpower so much energy was absorbed in keeping the state machinery going that fundamental administrative reform was neglected’. In the absence of a reform the most viable option would be to consolidate on the inherited system which most of the countries opted for. Uyanga (1989, p.130) exemplifies this using Lagos in Nigeria where

*The post-Independence government went on to consolidate the colonial framework with respect to planning and management institutions in the urban centres.*

### 3.2.2. The Planning System: Problems

The consolidation of the colonial planning legacy by Post-Independent countries can be likened to the devil’s alternative. First, the shortage of manpower characterizing planning agencies had not been resolved. Second, the weaknesses of the legacy already observed had equally not been reformed. This soon became evident as planning engagements in these countries began to reflect the institutional challenges confronting their implementation. In the case of Lagos, as earlier as
within the first decade of Nigeria’s Post-Independence in the 1960s, it started reflecting its institutional challenges. The city had multiple planning agencies with contradictory and overlapping roles that were ‘usually in conflict’ and constraining urban development than promoting it (Uyanga, 1989). Gandy (2006, p. 378) further illustrates that the same city with less than one million people in the 1960s, was ‘wrought by organizational complexities; continuing jurisdictional disputes between’ it and the ‘regional government’; and how ‘the municipal authorities lacked both the institutional mechanisms and administrative capacity to cope with the needs of the city’. In such an environment he concludes that,

*Even if enlightened planning policies had been adopted, there would have been major difficulties in implementing them since the Nigerian state had very little technical and administrative expertise available for the management of cities* (Gandy, 2006, p. 378)

Institutionally related problems bearing on the unreformed colonial legacy would go on even after two decades of Post-Independence to haunt also the United Nation inspired 1980 master plan of Lagos - thereby limiting its implementation (Gandy 2006). Post-Independence planning in Botswana had also been undermined by institutional problems. In the planning of Gaborone the new capital city of Botswana - shortly upon the completion of the 1963 master plan of Gaborone there were pessimisms and doubt about its realization because the government lacked the institutional framework for its implementation(Best, 1970a; Mosha, 1996). In the first place even the plan was designed in South Africa as Botswana lacked the technical know-how of undertaking it talk less of its implementation. (Best, 1970a, p. 14) captures the mode of this pessimism.

*They [the expatriates] question the future of the town [Gaborone] following their departure, since the country depends heavily on their experience and skills. A sudden loss of European personnel could spell disaster for Botswana in general and for Gaborone in particular.*

For Dar es Salaam and Dodoma in Tanzania, among some of the problems of planning in these cities are linked to a highly centralized planning bureaucracy (Hayuma, 1980; Kironde, 1993). Consequently, the powers to implement for instance ‘regulatory framework are centralized in the Ministry of Lands’. This has had consequences on planning in the city against the backdrop of being too ‘bureaucratic, unrealistic, and unnecessarily increasing the cost of access to legal shelter especially for poor households, and fostering a climate for corruption’. He therefore advocates the ‘decentralization of powers of land management and administration and the mobilisation of land owners, communities and the private sector to plan, regularize and service land’ as the way out (Kironde, 2006, p. 461 and 471). In Cameroon as well, planning has been limited by ‘a mammoth bureaucratic system; inadequate institutional frameworks; and a glut of
intemperate regulations’ (Njoh 1998 p.422). Kenya too is not left out as planning has been undermined by weak and out outdated regulatory framework. Tipple and Speak (2009 p. 166) demonstrate that its planning is limited by ‘a draconian legislative framework, inherited from the colonial government’, which ‘merely transferred power over land from the Crown of Great Britain to President of Kenya, without much transformation’. A semblance of these problems limiting planning and implementation equally exist in much of Southern Africa (Kamete, 2013a).

But that is not say there have been no improvement towards enhancing the planning system in the South (Todes, 2011). Yet on a much general note in Sub-Saharan Africa, some of the reforms are yet to start having effect on planning while others have rather exacerbated the situation rendering planning even ‘more exclusivist, authouritarian, and segmented (Bissell 2007, in Myers 2011, p. 17). Furthermore, across Sub-Saharan Africa issues of multiple planning agencies with duplication of duties can still be discerned; multiple planning agencies that are disconnected without a co-ordinating agency; the process of planning to secure planning permit for land allocation or building plan is sluggish due to bureaucratic delays and corruption; decision making is still highly centralized, a top down approach; among other problems (Mabogunje, 1992; Kamete, 2006; Kironde, 2006; Silva, 2012). And these issues still have effect on implementation in the South. In a fine grain analysis of master plan implementation in Nigeria for instance, a collection of several case studies on implementation in different cities and towns in the country, Illesanmi (1998) reveals how these issues undermine plan implementation in Nigeria.

3.2.3. Power play, politics, fluidities and other problems

The foregoing discussion has looked at the system of planning existing in the South drawing examples especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. They reveal how rational concerns of implementation are undermined by the planning system. These revelations mirror the concern expressed some decades ago by Smith (1973). In writing on policy implementation, and while cautioning that policy implementation research takes into cognisance the issue of the South, in terms of contextual difference from the West where most of the underpinnings on policy implementation stem from, he too draws our attention for example to the weaknesses of the bureaucracy existing in the South that,

Even if a government of a Third World nation is committed to the implementation of a particular policy, the bureaucracy that must implement the policy often is lacking in the capacity to implement (Smith, 1973, p. 198).

On the other hand, while ‘Western bureaucracies are relatively efficient and effective in policy implementation’, he observes further in the South or the Third World.

A myriad of factors can contribute to the emasculation of any government policy: lack of qualified personnel, insufficient direction and control from political leaders, opposition to the policy itself, corruption, etc. The process by which the government made the policy may have been the most rational, elaborate, "modern" method. But this may not be meaningful if the administrators cannot implement it (Smith, 1973, p. 199).

The issue of ‘control from political leaders’ or ‘opposition to policy itself,’ in a way, bear some reflections in the kinds of power play and politics that underscore implementation in the South. Generally, the point about planning and politics, has long been recognised and featured prominently in the field of planning and policy implementation. As noted previously, Healey (1988) and Flyvbjerg (1989) for instance, and much of the discussion on the bottom-up perspective on implementation, demonstrate how implementation is influenced by politics emanating from a multiplicity of interests from a wide variety of actors. In the South this appears through several ways.

A major avenue is through the politics of clientism that exists prominently in the South (Harrison, 2006; Mabogunje, 2011). It simply entails the ‘use of state resources in exchange for political allegiance’ by actors which tends to be ‘pervasive’ in the South. It must though be pointed out ‘this is hardly an ‘African’ politics’ only, as ‘it pervades all parts of the world, even if it is re-named as crony capitalism, political favouritism, ‘revolving door’ politics’, or ‘ the politics of the pork-barrel’ (Harrison, 2006a, p. 98). Nonetheless, because of the pervasiveness of this kind of politics in the South, ‘struggles over the resources of the state by elites, and the distribution of state patronage through affective networks’ are a common feature in the South (Bayart 1993 cited in Harrison 2006 p. 100). In short,

*Clientism works through shared notions of kinship, real or imagined. Elites distribute resources to their home regions, their ethno-linguistic group, powerful families with which they have matrimonial links, and so on (Harrison, 2006a, p. 100).*

In such a context, a rational view of implementation which assumes that implementation would proceed in an apolitical environment, has tended not to work as the nuances of clientism and patronage undermine it. One finds intentions captured even in a well formulated policy or plan being compromised for other interests to secure political allegiance from others (Mabogunje, 2011; Goodfellow, 2013).
But besides the politics of clientism undermining implementation, there is the issue of uncertainties – the fluidities that confront planning in the South. They range from political to economic as well as social disruptions. In much of sub-Saharan Africa political instability tends to be rife. The incessant political changes from military to civilian and then back to military, and to civilian rule again, all create instability in the planning environment. The coming of a new political regime in most instances bring on board new polices resulting in the abandonment of previous ones despite being good policies, and whose implementation may even had begun in a previous political regime (Ilesanmi, 1998). These kinds of political intrigues and interferences in implementation, are not just limited to transitions from one regime to another. Even within a so called new regime its policies are even compromised by its political actors. In Kampala, this has had severe consequences on planning in the city. Goodfellow (2013) observes this as so common that the plans in Kampala hardly follow the pathway they are planned to follow. This is because political interferences easily change the course or path of an implementation. Drawing example from the implementation of land uses in the city, he documents that a land use can change overnight thereby limiting the implementation of physical plans in Kampala. He thus equates political change of direction in Kampala as synonymous to a tradition; a tradition that renders the ‘work of local officials virtually impossible’ (Godfellow, 2013 p.88).

In all, around 50% of the buildings in Kampala’s CBD [Central Business District] were in breach of basic regulations, with more appearing all the time. According to virtually all sources interviewed, this was emphatically not because of weak legal and regulatory framework or overriding lack of bureaucratic capacity. The primary reason lay in the blockage of implementation by politicians.

Taking the severity of the case in Kampala and elsewhere, Godfellow (2013) calls for a need for planners to not only understand the political intricacies that exists in the South but to see how such can be managed so that they do not limit implementation. This is coming understandably against the backdrop of the conception of planning and implementation as a Euclidean and rational process, which assumes to be devoid of the nuances of politics that characterise planning in the South. This clearly underscores the influence that political factors in the South have on planning in the South in changing the course of a plan. But it is not just only the changing of a course or path of plan that pervades the South.

There is the issue of political and social instability in the form of urban violence, civil wars, inter-ethnic wars, religious related terrorism, among others, pervades the South. This has led to ‘cities in the Global South being branded with labels such as “world’s most violent city” or “murder capital of the world,” (Moncada, 2013, p. 218). These kinds of instabilities limit
implementation, disrupt an already begun implementation, or even puts a full stop in the first place to an intended implementation. This would be more profound especially when implementation is assumed to proceed in a linear and trouble-free manner from intention to outcome, while neglecting these contextual realities of the global South.

A mention must also be made about the ‘poverty, inequality, and informality, rapid urbanisation’ that exists in the South. These realities exist in the South and tend to limit implementation. Watson (2002, 2003, 2009, and 2012) has been prominent among others drawing our attention to these realities; and pointing out that the Western diffused ideas about planning and implementation into the South do not tend to work as they meet these realities. In short there is conflicting rationalities between the Western inspired normative and these realities. On one hand is the normative, the rational view of planning and implementation expecting implementation to proceed as a rational engagement and lead to expected outcomes; while on the other hand people in the South are more concerned with rationalities of survival stemming from high incidence of poverty and unemployment for instance.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter looked at policy implementation, its treatment in the planning field and challenges of policy implementation in the South. The discussions drew examples mostly from developing countries and Sub-Saharan Africa. This has been deliberate though not intended to undermine the rich experiences of other regions but simply to draw out useful illustrations since this research is also set in Abuja, a new capital city in a developing country in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Chapter 4. Research Methodology, Undertaking the Research, Data Collection, Challenges and Field Analysis

This chapter dwells on the research methodology, methods of data collection and how the fieldwork was carried out. It also deals with the analysis of field result, problems faced in collecting the data and the appropriate strategies used in dealing with the problems.

4.1 An Integrated, Inductive Approach to Policy Implementation

From the discussion on policy implementation and the ways in which planning treats implementation in chapter 3, a sense has been made into those seeking a top-down rational view and those advancing a bottom-up, interactive and action-based view of implementation. The rational view takes a prescriptive approach of how policy or a formulated plan should be ‘put into effect’. On the other hand, the action-based and interactive view is more concerned about description. It describes what happens during implementation - the ground situation and what gets implemented as against what to ought to be as the prescriptive approach would wish (chapter 3).

These ways of looking at implementation somehow tend to focus on rational decision making in an organisation as the means of implementation; or by paying attention to the nuances or dynamics of interactions among the multiplicity of actors within an organisation, or among different organisations as they go about implementing policy. In the South, this would relate to looking at the planning agencies that are involved in implementation whether in terms of these rational or interactive concerns of implementation. But this would also require bearing in mind that much of planning in the South as already demonstrated in chapter 3, does not really take in place in a stable environment within which we would be able to explore these rational decision-making processes. This is because planning is rather and often characterised by fluidities (uncertainties). Even within the planning system for instance, there are incessant changes in the institutional framework of planning (Ajayi, 2013). By extension, this would require that exploring the internal dynamics or nuances of interactions among the actors within the planning agencies needs to take into cognisance such fluidities and how they define or influence these interactions over the years.

Generally, in the South implementation is largely seeing as a prescriptive rational approach expected to proceed in a linear trajectory from policy or plan to implementation and outcomes (chapter 3). This kind of ‘managerial perspective’ (Barrett, 1981) seeking conformance of policy objectives with outcomes does not tend to work in the South (chapter 3). This is due in
part to the fluidities that confront implementation well beyond even those characterising the planning system or planning agencies. In other words, fluidities in the South tend to be extensive cutting across civil and political unrest such as wars or even economic instabilities. But there are equally other contextual forces such as poverty, unemployment, informality, among others, that underline the South and undermine implementation too (chapter 3). Approaching implementation in the South would therefore require looking at it in a way that takes into cognisance this reality of the South. Unfortunately, the bulk of the studies on implementation tend to be Western-biased and thus neglect this Southern context.

The overall regional bias of implementation research is quite strong...close to three out of every four publications have either an American/Canadian author or a North American empirical focus. If Europe is included, then the Western hemisphere accounts for close to 90 percent of all publications (Satren, 2005, p.571).

Again too, focusing attention on policy implementation on these ‘managerial perspective’ (Barrette, 2004) and/or action-based interactions, does appear as if implementation is only concerned with organisational decision making or the dynamics and nuances of interactions that take place in the course of implementation within these organisations (planning agencies). But if we are to understand implementation especially in the South and taking into cognisance some of the contextual forces that influence implementation, as already demonstrated in this chapter and previously in chapter 3, it then becomes important as well to consider global linkages and how they bear influence on implementation in the South since the South does not exist in isolation to the world. Of importance in this concern is exploring the global political economy with respect to the South.

In chapter two, we made sense of this influence on planning in the South through some of the international political economic happenings such as the global oil crisis of the 1970s, as well as the Washington consensus policies that were introduced in the South. The Washington consensus policies through the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) stem largely from a neoliberal, free market underpinnings that originated in the West. It is this same concern of the West that fuelled the introduction of SAP in the South (chapter2). This clearly underscores the linkages that international concern does bear on the South. Thus, exploring implementation in the South and to really grasp with some of the contextual forces influencing it in the South, would require also exploring the very regional or international political economy of the South as this also has influence on planning. What this entails is to look at planning beyond its usual treatment as ‘container’ within which space is assumed to be ordered and controlled; but to look at it as a region having networks of relations with the outside world beyond the ‘container’. 
Graham and Healey (1999, p. 624 and 629) provide insights into these kinds of network interactions.

The spaces of cities are still commonly conceived in object-centred ways, and the time-space of the city is still often conceptualized as a 'container' bounding the activities which go on there... the desired socio-spatial order of the city, and hence its associated socio-economic world, was [is] then expressed and promoted in a master plan (comprehensive plan/development plan ... we need new conceptions of place and the city based fundamentally on relational views of time and space and the notion of 'multiplex', socially constructed time-space experiences within urban life. To do this, though, we must quickly throw off the idea that places can be simply, and singly, represented in plans and planning discourses.

In the context of the South too, Watson (2002a) draws our attention to the influence of regional and global networks on planning in the South. She thus calls for what she refers to as a ‘wider view of planning’- encompassing also a relational view of planning in the South in order to make sense of the spatial dynamics of cities in the South.

Increasingly, therefore, the city [in the South] and its people are subject to forces which cannot easily be controlled and which are no easily amenable to local redirection (Watson, 2002a, p. 150)

This is particularly important if we are to see implementation in the South not at as a ‘container’ driven by organisational studies of rational concerns or action-based concerns of implementation; but equally in terms of being defined and influenced by regional or global networks. In other words, implementation in the South would be approached not only in the sense of a bounded view but essentially too as an external relation cutting across such issues as the political economy for instance. Bounded view in this sense signifies organisational focus of exploring policy implementation (as rational or action-based concerns) as well as limiting implementation to some contextual forces within a context, while failing to recognise the context’s relationship with its region or global networks.

But apart from this neglect of the Southern context by literature on policy implementation, there appears also a neglect of new capital cities. This is not though to deny that new capital cities in terms of looking at implementation are not dealt with by Scholars. In chapter 2 through a discussion of nation building through capital relocation, some of these scholars who have written on new capital cities would be discerned. Most often, these studies are carried out as case studies exploring the fine grain analysis of several themes concerning new capital cities. Vale (2008, 2014a, et al) for instance tends to focus extensively on the kinds of power relations that can be made sense of and how they drive the planning and creation of capital cities. Holston (1989) takes an ethnographic way of exploring capital cities like Brasilia, revealing thick layers of the kinds of modernists underpinnings that went into the planning of the city, the
assumptions, and the paradoxes of creating this modernist new capital city. But what is obvious is that through a reading of some of these works, one becomes immersed into the ways in which the implementation of these new capitals cities tends to be difficult or undermined. One is equally exposed to the combination of different disciplines that are brought in to make sense of what the scholars are driving at, or arguing as they undertake these fine grain case studies. In the field of policy implementation however, and as already observed, one hardly finds even a mentioning of works dealing or drawing examples on capital cities.

So far, this discussion on exploring implementation in the South and against the backdrop of the ways in which implementation is approached, is that these ways tend to be Western-biased, they neglect the Southern context and its political economy, and new capital cities. In addition to this and shown already in chapter 3, we have equally made sense of how the nature of a planning system influence policy implementation as well as the kinds of interactions that place within this planning system - for example the kinds of power relations and politics taking place among a multiplicity of actors involved in implementation. Combining all these insights offer useful ways of looking at policy implementation in a Southern context. Indeed, such a combination does mirror the multifaceted ways of exploring new capital cities by scholars, often approached as a fine grain analysis of what the researcher is addressing or arguing as already observed.

These kinds of insights offer valuable ways of looking at implementation in a context like Abuja. But rather than see them in the context of a frame of reference in ways in which they act as a deductive process of making sense of a context or the field, in this thesis however, the fieldwork was approached inductively without a steadfast clinging on to these multifaceted insights despite their usefulness. This is rather deliberate and was to allow room for some flexibility while on the field and not to get boxed into sticking to a deductive approach. Again, since I had been interested in getting a rich and fine grain analysis of making sense of implementation in the context of the Abuja, some flexibility would be needed in the fieldwork to make sense of it than limiting it to only a deductive construct or frame of reference where data has to conform to. There is danger though without being guided by a frame or reference and just getting into field; and if not properly handled could lead to the researcher wandering about in the field and getting daunted by massive data without a sense of direction. Nonetheless while being mindful of this danger, the point being driven rather is that these insights stemming largely from the review of literature both in chapter 2 and policy implementation in this chapter 3, does in no small measure help provide a reference in which to explore implementation in the South. But more importantly, an inductive approach without a steadfast stance on these insights
does equally help in allowing a look at the field in ways that allow one to make in-depth sense of it without being limited by the insights. Thus, this flexibility did come handy as I explored Abuja against the backdrop of the research concerns of this thesis earlier stated in chapter one.

4.1.1. A frame of Narrative

... the rule formulation that takes place when researchers summarize their work into theories is characteristic of the culture of research, of researchers, and of theoretical activity ...something essential may be lost by this summarizing—... [Research] cannot [necessarily] be distilled into theoretical formulae—and it is precisely... [the] fear of losing this “something” that makes case researchers cautious about summarizing their studies. Case researchers, thus, tend to be skeptical about erasing phenomenological detail in favor of conceptual closure. (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 239).

Approaching the research as an inductive process, it was at the end of the fieldwork and having analysed field result that I began to explore the ways in which the research could take. Building upon the insights discussed in the previous section, a frame of narrative was developed with which I would undertake a fine grain analysis of the thesis. In other words, this entails i) working with the results of the field plus the revelations from the literature review; ii) developing a frame of narrative or a grounded theory about what is happening as relates to policy implementation in Abuja within the bigger picture of Abuja’s nation building toward creating national identity and other related goals; and iii) the connection of this to the overarching aim of the thesis stated earlier in chapter one. This approach allows me to undertake a fine grain analysis of Abuja without being boxed into subjecting the discussion into a certain theoretical perspective. Flyvbjerg (2006) is quite sceptical about such reductions into theoretical perspectives, and he too calls for an openness of case presentation and letting a case mirrors itself out than being over concerned with theoretical perspectives.

The opposite of summing up and “closing” a case study is to keep it open... when writing up a case study, I demur from the role of omniscient narrator and summarizer... I tell the story in its diversity, allowing the story to unfold from the many-sided, complex, and sometimes conflicting stories that the actors in the case have told me... I avoid linking the case with the theories of any one academic specialization. Instead, I relate the case to broader philosophical positions that cut across specializations. In this way, I try to leave scope for readers of different backgrounds to make different interpretations and draw diverse conclusions regarding the question of what the case is a case of...Readers are not pointed down any one theoretical path or given the impression that truth might lie at the end of such a path. Readers will have to discover their own path and truth inside the case (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 238).

Watson (2002a) has equally approached case study discussions through this fine grain analysis of what is going on without necessarily subjecting it to a theoretical perspective but rather
narrating the story of the context. Hoch (1996, p.43 cited in Watson, 2002, p.10) suggests that we become ‘’ storytellers of practice’’ - of what is going on. It is with this kind of orientation that Watson (2002a) in her work on the metropolitan plan of Cape Town where she explores among other issues the implementation of the plan, approaches the case study as a context-bound storying telling without forcing the results of the field to a particular theoretical perspective. Reading the work although, one can discern several underpinnings especially in the sense of power relations and the implication of that on the plan’s implementation.

In my case while following this flow of narrating a story, I however draw insights from grounded theory which helps in constructing a frame of discussion within which to undertake this fine grain analysis of the thesis. The next discussion explores this.

**Grounded Theory**

Grounded theory (GT) emerged in the 1960s pioneered by the works of Barney G. Glass and Anselm L. Strauss. It came in the wake of dying patients in the US hospitals in the early 1960s. Around this time dying was hardly ‘talked about’ even by ‘hospital staff’. Being interested in how this takes places ‘in a variety of hospital settings’, they developed GT to provide insights into it. This led to joint publications on ‘studies of dying in hospitals’ (Charmaz, 2006, p. 4). Later works by Anselm Strauss co-authoring with Juliet Corbin, Kathy Charmaz, among others, have contributed to its popularity as a research methodology (Glaser and Strauss, 2009; Charmaz, 2013; Willig, 2013; Corbin and Strauss, 2014)

Generally, GT assumes that through theory building from data and other sources, one will be able to make sense of the phenomenon under investigation. In a sense GT plays a dual role. First, it offers a set of procedure of how theory can be generated and second, the same theory can be applied to make sense of a phenomenon. Willig (2013, p.70) succulently drives home this duality thus:

*Grounded theory as method provides us with guidelines on how to identify categories, how to make links between categories and how to establish relationships between them. Grounded theory as theory is the end-product of this process; it provides us with an explanatory framework with which to understand the phenomenon under investigation.*

**Theory building through an inductive process**

To GT, theory building is primarily through an inductive process. This is in contrast to a hypothetico-deductive reasoning which its primary concern is that of theory testing. Under it hypotheses are set out from the on-set and tested in the course of a research. This is done with
the aim to confirm or contradict the formulated hypothesis or theories driving the research. GT is not interested in this kind of theory testing but more concerned about theory building to explain a phenomenon as already observed (Haig, 1995; Southern and Devlin, 2010). This is understandable considering the historical context in which it emerged in the 1960s; a period of hypothetico-deductive dominance over an inductive, qualitative research in the social sciences. Hence, apart from Glass and Strauss’ interest in studying dying as earlier mentioned, they were equally interested in offsetting the dominance. And much of their propounded work, the discovery of GT published in 1967, repudiated the dominance by focusing instead on theory building than theory testing (Haig, 1995; Thomas and James, 2006). Charmaz (2006, p.4) demonstrates Glass and Strauss’ concern to theory building than theory testing thus:

As they constructed their analyses of dying, they developed systematic methodological strategies that social scientists could adopt for studying many other topics. Glaser and Strauss’s book The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967) first articulated these strategies and advocated developing theories from research grounded in data rather than deducing testable hypotheses from existing theories.

Since then GT has gone ahead to become extensively used in the social sciences receiving several accolades as a ‘paradigm of choice’ (Miller and Fredericks, 1999, p. 538), ‘paradigm of inquiry’ (Jeon, 2004). It is ‘perhaps the major contributor to the acceptance of the legitimacy of qualitative methods in applied social research’ (Thomas and James, 2006, p. 2).

Despite the wide application of GT in research it has been criticised on several grounds. Some of these relate first, to the question about its status as a theory whether what GT conceptualises as theory is indeed theory (Dey, 2004; Thomas and James, 2006; Willig, 2013). The reservation is that some of the so-called theory under GT are no more than mere ‘everyday inferences’ that are drawn from data - and not necessarily an in-depth explication to be labelled as theory. Related to the first criticism is that theory development tends to be ‘taken too seriously’ thereby running the risk of labelling anything as theory (Thomas and James, 2006). GT has also been labelled as a subterfuge for research that lacks a strong methodology where researchers who lack this quickly hide under the label of GT. This could in a way be linked to GT’s flexibility as a research methodology attracting different research interests. Among this attraction are even studies with weak methodologies which hide under the banner of GT. There is yet the accusation that GT engages in a process that is subjective which depends much on the abilities of the researcher in theory development17.

17 This is not an exhaustive discussion of some of the shortcomings of GT. A list of the criticisms are numerous although some of them tend to be targeted in particular to any of the two school of thoughts - Classic and Evolved Grounded theories.
School of Thought

As already mentioned, the two school of thoughts under GT are the classic (Glaserian) and evolved (Straussian) grounded theories. The classic GT is led by Barney G. Glass and other followers; while the evolved GT is advocated by Anselm L. Straus, Juliet Corbin, Kathy Charmaz, among others.

One of the principal issues of departure among the two schools relates to what each considers as a valid way of arriving at theory development. The classic GT believes that ‘truth’ exists out there; a social reality out there to be discovered by the researcher. In this sense, GT through the lens of the classic approach, takes a realist’s perspective. This is on the account of its assumption of an existence of some social reality out there ‘irrespective of the researcher’; and it is this reality that the researcher seeks to observe and document (Willig 2013). It further stretches this viewpoint by asserting that it is only through data that we can also make sense of the social reality out there. That is there is a single trajectory (through data) of making sense of the existing social reality out there. Consequently, it is only when the researcher analyses data that theory is able to emerge from the data. This takes a positivist view of believing in a single objective way of knowing.

*The processes identified by the researcher, however, are assumed to take place irrespective of whether or not they are documented by the researcher. In other words, potential knowledge is ‘out there’ and can be captured by the researcher. In this sense, grounded theory takes a positivist approach to knowledge production* (Willig, 2013, p 80).

The evolved GT however does not believe that ‘truth’ comes only from data but from a multiplicity of perspectives. It also repudiates the notion that truth is out there to be discovered but that truth can be constructed. This is a constructivist approach to building theory. Essentially, ‘constructivism is a research paradigm that denies the existence of an objective reality’ (Mills et al., 2006, p. 26). It rather asserts that ‘realities are social constructions of the mind, and that there exist as many such constructions as there are individuals (although clearly many constructions will be shared” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 43 in Mills et al 2006, p.26). By implication, the researcher can construct meaning not only from the data but from other diverse perspectives including the historical, values, or cultural attributes from where the data is sourced (Mills et al., 2006; Charmaz, 2014; Corbin and Strauss, 2014). Kathy Charmaz has been prominent in promoting the constructionist view of GT arguing that theories do not necessarily emerge from data, but are the product of interaction between the researcher and data (Charmaz, 2006). Against this backdrop,
The researcher creates an explication, organisation and presentation of the data rather than discovering order within the data. The discovery process consists of discovering the ideas the researcher has about the data after interacting with it’ (Charmaz 1990: 1169, in Willig, 2013, p. 77)

A second issue of dispute to both schools of thought deals with the treatment of literature. The contention is whether literature should be reviewed before the start of a fieldwork for a research or not. The classic GT is against the review of literature. It believes that presumptions from literature review before the undertaking of fieldwork will form biases that are likely to pollute the data during fieldwork. Instead it advocates that research should proceed from a blank slate (Glaser, 1992). This is contrary to the position of the evolved GT as it is not against the review of literature prior to the start of fieldwork. Instead it believes that presumptions that are discerned from literature review form part of the glimpse into the phenomenon under investigation, which can lead to a bigger picture about the phenomenon (Mills et al., 2006).

Thirdly, the two schools also differ on the role of the researcher in the process of theory development. It is argued by the classic GT that the involvement of the researcher into the process is likely to have effect on theory development through his/her biases. It therefore calls for a complete detachment of the researcher from the process (Howard-Payne, 2015). This equates to taking a ‘bird’s view’ to theory development with the researcher simply playing the role of an observer and with the presumption that theory will eventually crystallise out solely from data without the involvement of the researcher (Willig, 2013).

The ‘bird’s view’ is however rejected by the evolved GT. Willig’s (2013, p. 78) criticism of the ‘bird’s view’ is quite clear. In the first place, he asserts there is nothing as taking a bird’s view or a neutral position in theory development. This is because ‘all observations’ as he explains, ‘are made from a particular perspective, that is, they are standpoint-specific’; and that ‘whatever emerges from a field through observation depends on the observer’s position within it’. He continues too that ‘whatever emerges from the analysis of a set of data is theoretically informed because all analysis is necessarily guided by the questions asked by the researcher’.

Even if we accept the (doubtful) proposition that categories are discovered, what we discover will depend in some degree on what we are looking for – just as Columbus could hardly have ‘discovered’ America if he had not been looking for the ‘Indies’ in the first place (Dey, 1999, p 104 in Willig, 2013, p. 78)

The evolved GT does thus not see anything wrong with a researcher’s involvement in the process. Instead, the researcher’s experiences, knowledge, constitute part of the multiplicity of insights from which theory can developed. Hence the researcher is considered a co-producer of theory (Charmaz, 2006).
There is yet another fourth issue of disagreement among them. This relates to a theory’s credibility. The classic GT believes that a theory’s validity can best be verified through data. The evolved GT however accentuates the need for a rigorous method of theory generation, believing that through the rigour the validity or credibility of a theory will be arrived at. So credibility as contested among them, is a question revolving around data and method (Jones, 2011).

These are by no means an exhaustive list of the difference among the two schools of thought. But what is relevant, is to what extent each of the school has influence on a particular research or its illumination to that research. In this research, however insights from the evolved GT tend to be more illuminating to the research than those of the classic GT as explained in the next paragraph.

**Implication on Research**

Already mentioned, this thesis has been more informed by the evolved GT. Like it, prior to the commencement of fieldwork, I undertook a review of literature. This was to make sense of the nature of the phenomenon being investigated as earlier set out in chapter one. Starting the research as a blank slate without some literature review would not have provided some insights about the phenomenon or nature of research already done about it. But through the review some valuable insights about it through chapter 2 and 3. This helped streamline the research’s objectives toward probing more about the phenomenon.

Another preference for the evolved GT is due to its ontological underpinnings about what is ‘truth’, which is approached from a multiplicity of trajectories. This offers an opportunity of developing a frame of analysis or theory from a variety of perspectives than from just a single trajectory (data). Still, with my background as a planner working in Abuja, I would not have absolutely proceeded toward theory building in a tabula rasa approach (blank slate) - as a complete detachment from the data as suggested by the classic GT. Rather, my background concerning the planning and implementation of land uses in Abuja, forms part of the multiple realities toward the development of a GT regarding the important issues about the phenomenon. This recognition of the researcher’s role as co-producer in the development of

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18 A discussion on the methods of theory generation is presented in chapter 4
19 Have been a planner with the Abuja Metropolitan Management Council for close to ten years. In so much as my background came into the research process the issue of likely biases were not left untreated as would be seen later in this chapter concerning the process of fieldwork and how this was dealt with.
theory again agrees with the evolved GT (Charmaz, 2014). The next section explains the
developed GT, frame of narrative for this research thus.

**The 3-circle Frame of Narrative**

The later part of this chapter explores how the GT for this research, referred to as the 3-Circle frame of narrative, was developed. It essentially emanates from the major categories of the results of the fieldwork plus insights from the literature review (chapter 2 and 3) . It is an embodiment of 3 interconnected major categories. These are the plan, nature of planning, and the external environment.

**The Plan**

The plan in this context refers to the Abuja master plan (IPA) and the supplementary master plans of the CA. The supplementary plans are the Kenzo master plan (KTU), AIM master plan (AIM), and Albert Speer master plan (AS&P). Of interest to the plan category is the process of how these master plans were prepared and what they seek to achieve. In other words, this includes even the recruitment process of the consultants (designers), how they were recruited to undertake the master planning of the city and the CA; the social aspirations that went into the planning of the master plans (nation building goals of national identity and other associated goals) - that is the goals of the plans; and the content of the plan - in this case the land use provisions of the master plans (Chapter 6).

**The nature of planning**

This relates to the structure of planning in Abuja. It focuses on the planning agencies that are involved in the planning and implementation of land uses; the process of how this is done and the actors involved in the process especially since 1979 (chapter 7).

**The external environment**

This deals with the economic, political, and global linkages, and their relationship to land use planning and implementation in the CA. Since the concern of the thesis stretches from 1979 when the Abuja master plan was prepared, the external environment explores the economic and political environment of the country when the plan was adopted and the transitions that have taken place since then; as well as global economic influence on the city (chapter 7).

Through the 3 categories (the plan, nature of planning, and external environment), the issues of importance or crucial factors about the phenomenon under investigation will be made sense of.
In terms of a layout of discussion, *chapter 6 presents the formulated plan* describing what the plan is and what it seeks to achieve and why. This explores the history of planning making in Abuja and focusing on the CA particularly on the land uses. Chapter 7 contains a discussion on the nature of planning and the external environment. It deals with those issues already mentioned under the categories. Chapter 8 then brings the whole discussion to a standpoint of the most important thing or argument of what is happening in Abuja in terms of policy (land use) implementation and nation building. In other words, the gut sense of what is the most crucial thing about Abuja’s story. As a prelude, this is referred to as plan gravity and the associated challenges of translating the gravity into reality (chapter 8). These chapters 6-8 form the analytical chapters of this thesis and emanate largely from the 3-Circle frame of narrative which helps narrate Abuja’s story with respect to the concerns of the thesis driven by the research questions earlier stated in chapter one.

![3-circle force showing the three interconnected categories](image)

*Figure 7: 3-circle force showing the three interconnected categories*  
*Source: Author, 2016*

### 4.1.1. The Case Study

Mentioned in this chapter and elsewhere the case study is the CA of Abuja. The need to undertake the study in Abuja’s CA is based on a number of reasons. This relates to the idea of Abuja and why it has not been successfully implemented. Abuja is conceived as a nation building project. It sets out since 1979 through its master plan to be become a symbol for national indentity for Nigeria’s over 250 ethnic groups. In addition to this primary aim, the master plan seeks to promote regional and economic development especially in the hinterlands of the country; make Abuja a model of emulation for new communities in Nigeria and the entire West African region in the context of planning, housing, urban design, organisation of
governmental functions, public service; present it as modern city in the class of other world city thereby showcasing to the world that Nigeria has come of age as a modern nation; and other aspirations (IPA, 1979; Morah, 1993; Elleh, 2001; Ajayi, 2013; Elleh, 2016). This utopian idea underscoring Abuja stimulates my interest and more particularly in the CA.

The CA is designated by the master plan of Abuja as the premier district of Abuja. It is where the grandness and goals of Abuja will be expressed prominently than other districts of the city (chapter 6). This is further underpinned by the assumption that the master plan is the solution to achieving all this through the land uses which when been captured in the master plan. It is hoped that the land uses which are designated on plots of land once they are implemented (developed on ground) as spelt in the master plan - they would lead to the achievement of the nation building goals that Abuja seek.

In addition to the Abuja master plan - there have been series of other supplementary master plan making in the CA since 1981 and up to 2008. These master plans have sought to further translate the broad land uses of the Abuja master plan for the CA into detailed land uses and urban designs; and within the overarching notion that the answer to nation building lies through the master plans and the land uses. Despite this there have been difficulties in implementing the land uses of the CA. A visit to the CA reveals numerous unbuilt, vacant plots of land; the existence of few infrastructure for example access roads - more especially in the Phase 2 of the district; and even the few land developments that have taken place tend not to be in conformity with the provisions of the master plans. This again underscores my interests toward making sense of it.

The CA is defined by 9 land use zones which are spread into two phases: 5 zones in the phase1 and 4 zones in the Phase 2 (Speer, 2008). The zones under phase1 include the 3-Arms Zone, Ministries Zone, Cultural Zone, Central Business District, and Transportation Zone. The phase 2 covers the Market Zone, Business Zone, Sports Zone and Diplomatic Zone (fig.10, page 88). Chapter 6 discusses these zones and structure of the CA. At any rate, the CA as the case study, covers all the entire zones as a single case study - where an in-depth account regarding the thesis’ concern will be rendered drawing examples from any of the zones.
Figure 8: the case study land zone of the CA Source (KTU, 1981; Speer, 2008)
4.2 Data Collection

4.4.2. Fieldwork Divided Into 3 Interactive Phases

Data collection for the research spanned a period of six months from September 2013 to February 2014. It was divided into three phases namely – the agency phase, site phase and interview phase.

The agency phase focused mainly on the planning agencies. The interest in the agencies was to make sense of the institutional structure and process of plan implementation, and have access to relevant government memos, minutes of meetings, policy files and publications. It was also to avail me the opportunity of further identifying potential interviewees in addition to my already identified interviewees before the start of the field work. In the end, through the agency phase, I was able to make sense of the structure and nature of planning in Abuja; key actors that deal with land use planning and implementation particularly the CA; and a reading into some policy documents and records on land use planning and implementation in the CA. With this background, I was now ready for the site phase to relate the knowledge with site realities. This involved field activities such as mapping, observation, evaluation of the land use plan of the CA against existing land development, making notes, and taking of photographs where necessary.

Having made sense of the two phases there was now the need to explore the last phase of the fieldwork - the interview phase. This was essential to get answers to some of the issues that I noted down for further clarification while undertaking the previous field phases. Interviews and focused group discussions dwelled on many respondents with varying backgrounds. It covered those (mostly planners) who once worked in planning agency and had retired, those still in the system, those in the private sector and academia; land developers; construction companies; politicians and decision makers.

But it must be pointed out that the 3 phases were not treated as being mutually exclusive of each other. They were simply as broad signposts of what I should deal with at a particular period while at the same time giving room for flexibility to be able to swing in-between any of the phases. This would be likened in the sense of a jigsaw in which one action leads to another until the whole picture is made sense of. The three phases were thus interrelated.

In addition to the 3 phases a fieldwork protocol was developed. It sets out what to be done within each phase and the milestone to be achieved within a given time. I soon however realized that having a standby protocol - sort of a plan, was not working immutably as most often the
planned activities would be taken over by unforeseen circumstances. A key informant would suddenly call to cancel an appointment or not turn up at the venue of a meeting. Against this backdrop I started treating the field as an on-going modifying activity. Like a heuristic journey in which the right path is discovered along the journey but bearing in mind the goal of the journey.

*Once you have stated collecting data, you should think of yourself as an independent investigator who cannot rely on a rigid formula to guide your inquiry* (Yin, 2003, p. 63).

### 4.4.3. A Multiplicity of Data Sources

Undertaking the fieldwork, a multiple approach to data collection was adopted. This has advantages on the robustness of the data to be collected from multiple sources against the backdrop of their reliability and validity. The milestone is that through the multiplicity of data sources a convergence of facts can be achieved. This enriches a case study from different evidences and promote greater credibility of the research (Creswell and Miller, 2000; Gillham, 2000; Lewis-Beck, 2004; McNeill, 2005; Creswell, 2014; Bryman, 2016).

Thus, a wide range of data sources were explored and accessed during the data collection process. These include documentations such as letters, memoranda, minutes of meetings, progress reports, newspaper clips, policy files; maps, satellite images; interviews; archival records and local publications; and field observations. All of these came from the 3 phases of the field work of data collection earlier mentioned. Triangulating these various sources of data against the backdrop of the research questions (chapter one) was the hallmark of the field work. Despite this, the potential of getting lost through the huge data generated in the course of the fieldwork seems threatening. To overcome this a database was created to act as a repository for the immense data generated. This offered the advantage of not just a storage system but a referral point for any independent inspection (Yin, 2003). The next section explains in detail how the fieldwork was carried out through the 3-phase plan.

### 4.4.4. Agency Phase

Fieldwork under the agency phase focused mainly on four planning agencies in Abuja. The agencies are mostly relevant to land use planning and implementation in the city. These agencies are the Department of Urban and Regional Planning (URP), Department of Land and Administration (DLA), Abuja Geographic Information Systems (AGIS), and Department of Development Control (DDC). In undertaking the fieldwork, two gate keepers for each agency
apart from the Department of Development Control (DDC) who are staff were recruited to help out throughout the fieldwork. Each of them was recruited on the basis of having worked in Abuja for over twenty years. It was reckoned that with such number of years they would have sufficient information about the history of posting in the CA, know colleagues that have worked in the CA in the past, as well as have general knowledge about planning in Abuja – especially the planning agencies. Since the overarching concern of the thesis is to explore the two eras of planning in the CA (1979-2007 and 2008-to date) against the backdrop of the complexities that underlain land use implementation in the district (chapter one), recruiting the gatekeepers on the basis of 20 years work experience, proved to be quite useful in connecting me to the appropriate planners who at certain times worked in the CA either as district officers or site officers – thus shed light on any past or current issue in the CA.

An Informant is just someone who knows a lot [about the context]...is willing to chat (Stake, 1995, p. 67)

Moreover, either of the gatekeepers was to act as a substitute in case one would be absent. This became necessary due to the nature of work performed by the planning agencies. It is primarily field oriented and as such, a planning officer would suddenly leave for site monitoring, site inspections, or any urgent field engagement. Under such instances the other gatekeeper would still be available to attend to me. This helped in dealing with any potential vacuum that would have been created due to the mobile nature of the planners’ work.

**Department of Development Control**

The first planning agency visited is the Department of Development Control (DDC), a Department under the Abuja Metropolitan Management Council (AMMC). This began in September 2013. The DDC is in charge of the implementation of the Abuja master plan (IPA) and the regional plans of the FCT. The overarching objective at the DDC was among others - to make sense of land use implementation in Abuja and particularly in the CA; how the DDC goes about it and the challenges, and what has happened in terms of land use implementation in the CA since 1979. This entailed studying its structure, work process, nature of decision making, actors involved, records of planning permit, and having access to vital documents and archival records especially those dealing with policy issues.

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20 For the DDC there was no need to recruit any gatekeeper. This is simply that as I staff of the agency I knew those who had at one time or another worked in the CA. Thus my knowledge of the Department came handy in dealing with the appropriate planners in connection to the CA.
The Logistics Division

In terms of data management at the DDC, it is the Logistics Division that handles such matters. Attention was first focused on the Logistics Division thus. It is made up of the ICT /Computer Unit, Registry and Archives. In the Computer Unit one is likely to find electronic version of database but this had some limitations since much of the DDC’s database had only been created about 4 years ago (2010). Any database before then tended to be difficult to be found among the electronic version. Nonetheless, the electronic database dealing with planning permit (building plan approvals) for the CA could be assessed although this covered only from 2012 to September 2013. This was considered inadequate to be able to give an indication of what has taken place concerning planning permit in the CA since 1979, nor give an in-depth sense of the actors (for example investors/developers) driving plan implementation in the CA. To overcome this, I moved from the Computer Unit to the Registry Unit in order to access hard copies of planning permit for the CA.

The Registry Unit

The Unit is the point of entry of records for applications for planning permit where hard copies of records are kept. There, a register of entry (records) spanning the past twenty years was found though with some pages fallen out and missing. From there the next point of visit was the Archives Unit where I accessed what is known as the Green Book Record. It contains information on planning permit in Abuja including the CA and the actors behind the process (land developers) for over a period of 20 years.
Despite this other information for instance on polices dealing with land use implementation in the CA, were equally needed to have a broader sense of land use planning and implementation in the district other than planning permit, as well as the drivers of the process. This I had to look everywhere in the Archives but it soon dawned on me that there was no condensed information in a single file (folder) dealing with policy issues, or the day to day running of the CA. What prevails is that as any issue dealing with land use implementation comes up, a new separate file is opened on that particular issue and filed and sent to the Registry - what the planners refer to as ‘’Kept In View’’ (KIV)\textsuperscript{21}. In all only 2 files were found with regards to the CA. This was however inadequate to make a wider sense about policy issues dealing with land use implementation in the district. The imperative of looking elsewhere within the Department seemed the only option.

\textit{The Director’s Office}

This took me to the Director’s office where all correspondents, mails or files on a wide range of issues coming into the DDC are registered. I decided to go through the various registers in the Director’s office and traced the movement of mails dealing with any policy issues in the CA. Two categories of movements were discerned: transit and final destination. The transit movement involved tracking the files to respective desks/offices and discussing with the respective planners about the issues contained in them. During such conversations, I would first of all make it known to them the purpose of the conversation and that the outcome of the conversation would be strictly for academic purpose. This was necessary to deal with issues of ethics and confidentiality. The transit files are those that official actions had not been completed on them. They therefore move from one desk officer to another for various inputs.

Final destination on the other hand had to do with tracking the movement of files to their last destination. That is the last minuting (action) on the file and in whose custody the movement ended. Ideally, following the last action on a file, the file is expected to be reverted to the Registry and Archives for record keeping - what the planners at the DDC refer to as ‘KIV’ (keep in view). But most files may still hang in the process and not found in the Registry and Archives.

\textsuperscript{21} Such issues range from a change in land use, double allocation of title paper, encroachment on a subsisting land title by another party; conflicting statutory land uses over the CA between the Department of Urban and Regional Planning (URP) and the Abuja Geographic Information System(AGIS); to issues dealing with political interferences.
At any rate, through the process of tracking the files from the Director’s office I was able to access valuable records dealing with land use implementation in the CA beyond just planning permit or the drivers of the process.

Figure 10: Author in the Registry and Vetting Room (1), and Director’s office (2) having a chat with some planners about policy files and their movement. Author, 2013.
By the end of September at the DDC I was able to i) study the structure of plan implementation in Abuja particularly in the CA; ii) have a sense of the actors that are involved in decision making in the implementation of the Abuja master plan and particularly the master plans of the CA; iii) make sense of the nature of investors/developers in the CA, thereby giving an indication of the driving force of implementation in the CA; iv) look at some of the challenges that tend to limit plan implementation in the CA; v) obtain minutes of meetings, memos, made copies of relevant documents such as policy files, building plan approval records, publications; vi) further familiarise myself with the CA’s District Officer and Site Officers, and other relevant planners about the research which I should be interviewing at an appropriate time; vii) and obtain cadastral maps and land use maps of the CA.

**Department of Urban and Regional Planning**

By the turn of October, I left the DDC for the Department of Urban and Regional Planning (URP) - a Department under the Federal Capital Development Territory (FCDA). The URP is responsible for land use planning in Abuja and the entire Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The mission at the URP was to access policy documents on land use planning in Abuja especially on the CA; process of land use planning; actors that drive the process; and factors that limit land use planning and implementation in the CA.

*Figure 11: Department of Urban and Regional Planning (URP); Author 2014.*
Following intensive 3 weeks of fieldwork at the URP I was able to interact with the director and other key officers of the Department. These officers include i) the district officer of CA, ii) officers in charge of master planning, iii) policy and research, iv) head of the public relations unit, and v) the Liberian in charge of records and archives. This was made possible by the help of the two gatekeepers I had recruited - connecting me with the respective officers. With that valuable policy documents and publications focusing especially on the CA were accessed. This was followed by a study of the history and structure of the organisation and its record of postings. The record of posting was studied to have an idea of those who at any time worked in the CA - to be interviewed at an appropriate time in addition to the current team working in the district.

At the public relations unit, I sought and obtained recordings and hard copies of all interviews granted to the public and media organizations by the Department. In addition, photographs and video coverage of its field operations within the overall context of land use planning in Abuja and in particular the CA were also accessed. The idea was to be able to discern through the myriad evidences (data) of the underlying issues involved in the planning especially whether such issues limit land use implementation in the CA. To also enhance greater corroboration of evidences, I further accessed some of the minutes of meetings and memos and the monthly ministering briefings of the Department.

**Abuja Geographic Information System, and Department of Land Administration**

Having spent 3 weeks at the URP I headed to the Abuja Geographic Information System (AGIS), and the Department of Land and Administration (DLA). The two planning agencies are interdependently linked. The DLA deals with land administration in the FCT while the AGIS handles geo-spatial data management inclusive of land records. The objective there was to access records on the history of land allocation and revocations of land titles as well as satellite images of the CA. This was important to be able to understand the actors of plan implementation in the CA through the nature of land allocations that have been granted in the district. Equally of importance was to understand the structure and procedure of land administration in the FCT. In the end, I was able to access valuable documents and enrich the list of my potential interviewees to be interviewed in due course.
4.4.5. Site Phase

The past two months (September and October) were spent on studying the planning agencies that deal with land use planning and implementation; going through vital policy documents; selecting and refining possible interviewees, more of a build on a list of earlier potential interviewees; obtaining appropriate maps and satellite images of the CA; and other relevant data. The exercise provided an in-depth sense of what has been going on in the context of implementation of land use in the CA since 1979.

Armed with this in the month of November I began exploring the CA. This was aided by satellite images, cadastral maps, building plan approval records and detailed land use plan/urban design of the CA. The intention was to understand what has taken place or not in the CA in terms of land use development and the reasons behind that, especially with the insight I had got from the planning agencies in the past two months. Through this I made useful notes and noted special areas that I should later explore further to obtain answers to especially through interviews.

Earlier noted in this chapter, the entire CA is divided into 9 zones. I devoted Mondays through Wednesdays for intensive site study of the zones. The remaining days - Thursdays to Fridays were used to consolidate more on data that needed further probing at the planning agencies against the backdrop of site findings; follow up on some of the data I had not been able to obtain
in the past two months; get in touch with the planning agencies to discern if any new event/data had crop up other than what I got in the past two months. The milestone is that the whole fieldwork became an on-going refining process, where certain revelations will give rise to a further generation of questions that needed answers to. Sort of a system generating sub-systems!

Figure 13: CA’s site office (1); CA’s site office and site officers getting set for fieldwork (2); at the back of DDC’s main office, site officers ready to take off for fieldwork (3); Author and CA’s site officer during site work (4). Author, 2013.

4.4.6. Interview Phase

The month of November was used substantially to cover all the nine zones in the CA through the site related activities, and further consolidation of data at the planning agencies. In the month of December there was now the need to probe deeply through interviews. This was to further substantiate what I had been able to uncover from the planning agencies and site related activities.

Again, throughout the process during the past three months (September, October and November), while focusing on the agency and site phases of the fieldwork, I had substantially reviewed and refined possible interviewees as more revelations/findings from the two phases
were coming out. Of importance too, in the past three months I had been on the toes of my interviewees toward fixing appointments for interviews; study their likely movements when they are less busy and having resolved such issues, the interview phase of the field work was now ready to begin. Stake (1995, p. 56) equates the importance of such a refining process to a researcher having a ‘connoisseur’s appetite for the best persons, places, and occasions’, where the ‘’Best’’ usually means those that best help us understand the case.’ Essentially the following criteria were used to recruit the appropriate interviewees.

i. **History of Planning Agencies**

The history of postings and schedule of work in the planning agencies in the FCT as previously mentioned, was studied and the appropriate interviewees pencilled down. This became necessary because since 1979 when the master plan of Abuja was prepared, in terms of planning agencies, there have been restructuring resulting in mergers, split, or creation of more planning agencies. When that happens duties are redefined and assigned to different or new or the subsisting planning agencies (chapter 7). By studying the history I was able to identify the planning agencies that any point in time handled both the planning and implementation of the land use in the CA; thereafter would look for planners who had worked in the organisation and pencil them for interviews.

ii. **District Officer/Site Officers**

Dealt with district officers and site officers working in the CA as well as those that worked there before. Through the help of the gate keepers and administrative records of postings as earlier noted, interviewees were identified cutting across the DLA, AGIS, and URP. They were then contacted and interviews fixed. The relevant planners were thus contacted and billed for interview.

For the DDC as already mentioned earlier in this chapter, there was no need for any gate keeper. This is because as a staff of the Department I already knew those working in the CA’s site office as well as those who had worked there some time.

iii. **Long stay in an organisation**

Looked at planning officers and other professionals that have worked in an organisation above twenty years. By studying the history of posting and through the use of gate keepers, they were singled out and narrowed down to those that are knowledgeable about the history of plan implementation in the CA and about planning in Abuja generally.
iv. **Strategic Position**  
Was based on the strategic position held by a staff. This involved looking out for planning officers who handled or were currently handling strategic units that relate to plan implementation in Abuja, and who are not necessarily district officers or site officers of the CA.

v. **Directorate Level**  
The selection of interviewees under this category narrowed down to those on directorate level. These are staff that head units or superintend over districts for example the Central Area. They include for instance deputy directors in charge of planning permit or assistant directors in charge of monitoring and enforcement, among others.

vi. **Retired Planners**  
Dwelled on retired district officers, directors, deputy directors, among others, who had worked with the planning agencies since 1979 when the Abuja master plan was prepared. They were identified and contacted for interviews.

vii. **Developers/Investors**  
Looked at the drivers of plan implementation in the CA especially land developers. Thus, through the records of land allocation and building plan approval records in the CA obtained from the planning agencies, I got a fair idea of the nature of developers and investors in the CA and those to be interviewed. These sets of interviewees were equally contacted for interviews.

viii. **Construction Companies**  
Construction companies were narrowed down especially to those that have had a long history of construction in the city. Also, those that appear to be most often doing construction in Abuja but may not necessarily have got a long history of operation in Abuja. These include Julius Berger Nigeria Limited, Setraco, SCC, RCC, Dantata and Sawoe, Gilmor, among others.

ix. **Non-public planners**  
This category of interviewees focused on planners who might not necessarily be working or had working with the planning agencies, yet have sufficient knowledge about planning in Abuja. This included those in the academia, the professional bodies – especially the Nigerian Institute of Planners, and those in the private sector. The relevant interviewees were contacted and slated for interviews.
Conducting the Interviews

Generally, two types of interviews were conducted namely in-depth and focused interviews. In-depth interviews are those that took place over ‘an extended period of time, not just one sitting’. Focused interviews on the other hand exerted short periods of time (Yin, 2003, 2009, 2014). Both were extremely needed to obtain a rich and thick account about land use implementation in the CA against the backdrop of the thesis’ concern. The in-depth interviews mostly fitted some of the retired directors and planners as well as those in the private sectors who had sufficient time to hold extended interviews.

Whereas the focused interviews due to short periods of time taken to conduct them, suited the field oriented work undertaken by the planners in service. As earlier noted, because of the field nature of their work, they would suddenly leave for site engagement. This meant having short periods of between 30 minutes and 1 hour to interview them and most often having to join them at some of the sites to hold the interviews. In other words, focused interviews fitted well with the mobile nature of most of the interviewees. Yin (2009) suggests that 1 hour of focused interview is not out of order and can yield sufficient data.

Even at that, to overcome the possibility of not having sufficient periods of time with these field-oriented planners, many focused interviews were conducted. This was not only to compensate for the short period of time but act as a corroboration of ‘certain facts’ or data obtained from the interviewees (Yin, 2009, p. 106) since they share ‘multiple realities’ (Stake, 1995).

The process of the interviews covered three phases: the before, during and after. Before each interview there was always a deliberate refinement of the questions to be asked. This was done to suite the background of the interviewee and what the interview sought to uncover from the interviewee while keeping in mind the overarching interest of the research (Crabtree and Miller, 1999; Stake, 2000). This is because not all interviewees had the same background or work experience and thus could not be asked template questions. This is what Stake (1995 p.65) refers to as ‘issue oriented questions’ and further explains that,

\[a\] case study seldom proceeds as a survey with the same questions asked of each respondent; rather each interviewee is expected to have had unique experiences, special stories to tell.
The Interviews usually started off by first introducing the research. This would be followed by whether the interviews will be recorded or not and that at the end of the interview a facsimile copy of the interview will be presented to the interviewee. Such issues needed to be clarified so that the interviewee knew exactly what she/he was dealing with. Thereafter the refined questions would be asked in the form of ‘an open ended’ friendly manner to elicit ‘conversations’ and in ‘an unbiased manner’ (Yin, 2003, p. 91; Yin, 2009; Yin, 2014). Where necessary this would be followed by asking leading questions and probes (De Vaus, 2002; Creswell, 2014; Bryman, 2016).

[The focus of an interview is] not a yes and no answers but description of an episode, a linkage, an explanation. Formulating the questions and anticipating probes that evoke good responses (Stake, 1995, p. 65).

Figure 14: Author with interviewees for in-depth interviews

Author, 2014
Another valuable activity during the interview had to do with the taking of notes. Key points were especially noted and written done while paying greater attention to listening and recording, though not all were recorded. Some interviewees never wanted their voices to be recorded. In other instances, because of the field nature of the planners, recording at site constructions or demolitions sites tended to be inconvenient. The noise generated from these activities plus site vehicles made recording at such occasions quite difficult. Taking notes rather worked well than recording.

![Figure 15: Site oriented nature of the planners; planners out for demolitions; Author, 2014](image)

At the end of every interview the interviewee’s contact (telephone, emails, and post box) would be sought. This was necessary to maintain communication and follow up in case any issue came up. It thus helped in no small measure as they indeed got in touch and offered new perspective or a further clarification on an initial issue talked about.

Also, the interviews were transcribed following the end of an interview. In the late hours of the night working in my work station, the day’s interviews would be transcribed and quick drafts produced (Gillham, 2000). Stake (1995, p. 65) likewise agrees that ‘the most important thing is to’ employ ‘ample time and space immediately following the interview to prepare the facsimile [drafts] and interpretive commentary’. This helped the brain to get to issues covered in the interview while it was still fresh regarding the day’s interviews. The transcription usually
began by listening to the tapes again and underlining ‘substantive statements’ followed by the
development of a set of categories; and juxtaposition of the categories to discern areas of
conformity or non-conformity (Gillham, 2006). Facsimile reports were then produced to be
presented to the interviewees the following day or at an agreed date. By presenting a facsimile
copy of the interview, had the advantage of increasing the internal validity of the case study as
the interviewee would cross check to discern whether the report had reported out of context
what was discussed (Creswell and Miller, 2000; Yin, 2003).

4.3. Data Analysis

The field work generally was approached as an on-going probing process as earlier mentioned.
As data was being collected it would be analysed as quickly as possible to discern areas that
need more probing. Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 6) see the interrelationship between data
collection and analysis as a ‘major source of the effectiveness of the grounded theory’ since the
on-going analysis of data leads ‘the researcher toward examining all of the possibly rewarding
avenues to understanding’. This in turn helps the researcher ‘not to miss anything that may be
salient’ to the research and contributes to the development of a grounded theory.

Through the on-going analysis of data during the fieldwork I began coding the data into labels.
‘Coding means naming segments of data with a label that simultaneously categorizes,
summarizes, and accounts for each piece of data’ (Charmaz, 2006, p.43). By the time the field
work was over, numerous codes had been produced from the multiple sources of data and
properly kept in the database. Coding continued even after the field work. As earlier noted the
fieldwork began in September 2013 and ended by the start of February 2014. From late
February and stretching down to May 2015, I spent time analysing the data from the database
and coding them. This involved reviewing and building on the earlier developed codes during
fieldwork as well as the development of new ones. Generally, coding was done by going
through the multiplicity of data either ‘line–by-line’ or ‘word-by-word’ (Corbin and Strauss,
1990; Willig, 2001; Charmaz, 2014). This technique even though consumed time was applied
where necessary to make in-depth sense out of the data. Where this was not necessary, I would
go through the paragraphs or sentences as well as an entire document to bring out valuable
information which would then be coded and given a label (Gillham, 2000; Willig, 2013).

Through a repeated comparison of the codes certain categories or themes emerged. The
categories were then compared with one another and the related or most frequently occurring
ones separated from the others. This helped toward identifying the core categories (major
themes) coming out from the categories (Charmaz, 2006; Willig, 2013; Corbin and Strauss, 2014). Again, throughout the process of data collection and the on-going analysis of data, coding, development of categories and core categories, memo writing ran throughout the process. Charmaz (2006, p. 72) agrees that memo writing is ‘crucial’ to the development of a grounded theory ‘because it prompts you to analyse your data and codes early in the research process’; and that ‘writing successive memos throughout the research process keeps you involved in the analysis and helps you to increase the level of abstraction of your ideas.’ Hence throughout the process valuable memos in form of sketches, notes, ideas, concepts, were written to make sense of what was happening at each stage of the fieldwork against the backdrop of the phenomenon under study.

The core categories plus insights from the literature review, led to the development of the 3-circle frame of narrative earlier discussed in this chapter. Essentially, the core categories emante from i) the active participants’ voices - in this case the multiple actors who are involved in the planning and implementation of land uses in the CA - namely the planners, land developers, politicians, among others; ii) government documents such as the minutes of meetings, annual reports, ministerial briefings, memos of the planning agencies; iii) observations from the field work; literature review; among other sources.

4.4. Reflection

Not a smooth process

The fieldwork, even though availed me the opportunity to access evidences to answering the research questions, it was not without challenges. At the start of September 2013, accessing the documents of the DDC tended to be difficult as most of my appointments were hardly honoured. On several occasions the appointments would be abruptly cancelled by the respective officers/key informants to attend to the demands of site work. The DDC is mainly site-oriented in nature where the staff are field-workers and could at any time suddenly leave for site visitation. The very busy and on-the-move nature of the Department had been responsible for the appointments not to be honoured. This was affecting my plan of action and causing delays in accessing data. I reckoned it would be necessary to devise a means to overcome the challenge.

I thus offered myself to be going to the Department to work for 3 hours on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays for the whole of September. Since I am a staff of the Department I knew who to approach on the matter particularly the head of the Logistics Division. As previously observed, the Division oversees data management in the Department. This approach
to resolving the problem is parallel to what (O’Leary, 2010, p. 152) refers to as ‘offering something back’, or what Stake (1995, p. 59) describes as:

For much case study work, researchers had to put themselves somewhat aggressively into the position to make observation, meaning there was no chance of avoiding at least a little intrusion, but also that they had to aggressively review their behavior for indication that they were interfering with the lives of others – a difficult balance.

With the request granted, I would be at the Department as early as 8am to approach my would-be informants; have a brief chat with them; know about their engagements for the day; and keep tract of when they suddenly leave for site work and back. This afforded me more opportunity to tract and follow them even to site if it became inevitable to access the data I needed. This yielded result than the hitherto way of booking appointments without getting result. But it was not a covert operation. Any document that was accessed was presented before the Division and that such will be used strictly for academic research. It was somewhat in a sense of a mutual relationship while having access to data I would be helping by working under the Division for the whole of September for those skeletal hours.

Some fieldworks like to offer something in exchange for the favors, for the intrusion, such as a few books for the library or the arrangement of a seminar, perhaps a staff development session, preferably unrelated to the ongoing study (Stake, 1995, p. 59)

The same challenge I encountered at the DDC regarding the site-nature of the Department was experienced at the URP, AGIS and DLA. To overcome this two gatekeepers were recruited for each of the planning agencies as earlier noted. They helped keep track of the staff that were relevant to the research - and would accordingly inform me of the most appropriate time or place (in the office or at a particular site) to meet the staff. This immensely worked out in accessing the data needed from the appropriate staff. It also availed me the opportunity to focus on other issues and other places while the gatekeepers keep hold of the post for me. It is simply delegating since one cannot be everywhere at every time.

There was yet the challenge of having access to the contact details of land developers in the CA in order to screen and narrow down some for interviews. At the DLA as well as AGIS, I had accessed the history of land allocation in the CA and got a fair idea of the actors driving implementation in the district. But there was a problem of getting their contact or an updated reliable contact. This is because some of the allocations’ contacts could not be traced. Thus, I needed to access the comprehensive records of the planning agencies, most especially the application forms for land allocations in the CA to get more contact details or go through the next of kin to connect me with the land owners. This could not be obliged me by the
Departments (DLA and AGIS) as it was unethical for the planning agencies to divulge such information. This was a problem.

Therefore I decided to do a wide search for developers with regards to the CA. This involved going to the AGIS, DLA, and DDC twice every week to scot for land developers/ owners to have a chat with them. That is those that come to make applications for land titles or some land related issue or apply for planning permit. At the AGIS, and DLA, there is a gallery (room) where all prospective land developers come to make applications for land titles, receive title papers or lodge complaints. For the DDC there is the Vetting Room/Registry where developers come to make applications for planning permit and related issues. Those were my target points of where to likely meet them. It was nevertheless difficult to particularly narrow down land developers for the CA.

With as much as 10 developers every week that I would have a chat with in the month of December, I was able to have a fair idea of some of the difficulties of land development in the city. To corroborate the findings and specifically for the CA, I had to rely on the CA district team (district and site officers) in the DDC, URP and DLA who knew a couple of land developers in the district willing to have a chat with me. They were thus contacted and interviews conducted.

The construction firms in Abuja posed another challenge. Most of the interviews I sought to have with them were hardly honoured, neither were they willing to avail me the documents I sought. To tackle this I relied mostly on the internet materials hosted by the firms to access some of the data I needed - though this was limited as some of the questions I needed answers to were not found on the internet.

Also conducting focus group interviews proved difficult because of the nature of work that the planning agencies in Abuja do. Much of the work is done out there in the field as already noted previously, and most often the staff are out for site inspection or to out carry demolition. It was difficult to assemble various planning officers for a focus group thus. Within a planning agency too, it was difficult depending on chance where you suddenly find a group of planners having a chat or in a restaurant; and during such conversations you have a chat with them about the research. To overcome this, I used the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners Abuja’s meeting point (Bawa Bwari House) as a way of having focus group discussions with planners from different background including those in the private sectors. The Chapter meets the last Wednesday of the month. The meeting starts 4pm and ends 6pm.
Figure 16: Author in the vetting of the DDC waiting to have a chat with a land developer (1); just had chat with a land developer in the vetting Room of the DDC (2): Author, 2014

Figure 17: Author just had a chat with Abuja planners about possible interviewees to be interviewed for the research; Author, 2014
I would make sure to be there 30 minutes before the start of meeting and hold quick discussions with some planners. This helped in getting different angles to the research questions. But even with this, it was difficult to determine the composition of a group since I had no control of who should be part of the discussion or not; but depending rather on the early birds of planners that I find at the meeting to have a chat with.

Feed Back

The field work came to an end in the first week of February 2014 having begun in September 2013. To mark this end, a week earlier on the 29 January 2014, I presented a paper at the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners, Abuja Chapter; and focused on the issues of planning in the CA which was largely underpinned by the preliminary findings of the research. It was presented before an interesting and rich audience. This composed of the directors of the planning agencies, planning officers, retired directors, those in the private sectors and academia. The feedbacks proved quite useful to the fieldwork as I recorded the meeting and made valuable notes. The interactive presentation also acted as check and balance for the field data thereby further enhancing the credibility of the field data. Creswell and Miller (2000, p. 125) explain the importance of such interactive presentations as playing an important role to a research’s validity and credibility.

Qualitative inquirers may use... [Participants] lens to establish the validity of their account: the participants in the study. The qualitative paradigm assumes that reality is socially constructed and it is what participants perceive it to be. This lens suggests the importance of checking how accurately participants’ realities have been represented in the final account. Those who employ this lens seek to actively involve participants in assessing whether the interpretations accurately represent them... [Another] lens may be the credibility of an account by individuals external to the study. Reviewers not affiliated with the project may help establish validity as well as various readers for whom the account is written

Thus the meeting with a rich audience numbering over 100 attendees with different background as already noted, the research was able to go through these lenses talked about by Creswell and Miller (2000).

Ethical consideration

This research has taken into consideration ethical issues. Starting at the project approval stage and as part of the university requirement, ethical issues were considered. But since the research does not involve dealing with vulnerable participants or subjects for instance the sick, children, or animals, the research did not obtain an ethical approval from the university in that regard.
Nevertheless, prior to the start of the fieldwork, ethical issues dealing with credible ways of obtaining access into the field, issues of confidentiality and anonymity, among others, were discussed and strengthened out with the supervisory team and the university’s ethical committee. This was aimed at conducting the research ‘with the highest ethical standard’ (Yin, 2009, p. 73).

Gaining access into the field involved the writing of letters, telephone calls, and electronic mails; seeking the consent of the would-be respondent to participate in the research. Stake (1995, p. 57) reminds us of the very importance of sorting out access and permission since ‘data gathering is done on somebody’s home grounds’. Again during the fieldwork, the issue of confidentiality and anonymity was taken seriously. Most of the respondents are planners who have either retired from public service or are still working and did not want their views made public. This was either based on personal reasons or the fear of a possible admonishment from employers for commenting on a matter that may have presented their organisation in bad light. Thus, throughout the research the names of respondents are not included but only their job descriptions are provided. In addition, the specific planning department where a respondent works is not mentioned but only the main organisation that is mentioned. For instance, a planner working with the DDC is simply mentioned in the appendix (appendix A) as working under the Abuja Metropolitan Management Council (AMMC) which is the main organisation having other planning agencies including that of the DDC. The same applies to the URP which is provided as the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) in the appendix; the FCDA being the main organisation with many planning agencies under it including that of the URP. This becomes difficult to link a respondent to a particular planning department in Abuja. Nevertheless, few of the planners did not opt for anonymity and felt that since the research is an academic endeavour, saw nothing wrong in being identified with the thesis.

4.5. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter presents the methodology and how the fieldwork was conducted from multiple data sources. Generally, these sources were made sense of through the 3 interactive phases of the fieldwork namely the agency, site and interviews phases. The challenges of undertaking the fieldwork and ways in which these were resolved, has also been explored by the chapter. Thereafter the chapter also discusses the data analysis process and the development of a grounded theory with which the thesis can be made sense of against the concerns set out in chapter one. As a way of rounding up the chapter some reflections concerning the fieldwork is equally presented in the chapter.
Chapter 5. Research Context

Chapter 4 dealt with the methodology and methods of data collection and how the field work was conducted. It also provided a background about the study area. Building upon the background, this chapter provides an account of capital relocation in Nigeria. It explores the driving forces behind the process focusing on the multiplicity of actors and their interests that have underscored the process. The first broad section of the chapter deals with this. The chapter also explores a history of the planning of the new capital city (Abuja) - mostly from the influence of a global political economy on the city. Emphasis is on the global political economic happenings of the 1970s through the 1980s. This dwells mostly on the OPEC oil crises of the 1970s and the 1980s’, and the Washington Consensus policies (SAP) introduced in the country in the 1980s. The second section of the chapter addresses this.

5.1. Capital Relocation and Intrigues

5.1.1. British Intrigues

During colonialism, particularly prior to 1914 in what is today known as Nigeria, had been administered as two independent territories by the British: i) the Colony of Lagos and Southern Protectorate and ii) the Northern Protectorate. By 1914 however the territories were brought together to form a country known as Nigeria. The process leading to this is often referred to as the 1914 Amalgamation (Adejuyigbe, 1970; Nwafor, 1980). Despite the Amalgamation, selecting a national capital for the new country turn out to be a hotly debated and ‘volatile issue’ underlain by a multiplicity of interests and intrigues among the British officials (Moore, 1984).

The colonial authorities in the South [Southern Nigeria – formerly Colony of Lagos and Southern Protectorate] were interested in spreading their system of administration to the North [Northern Nigeria- formerly Northern Protectorate] and vice versa, and at various periods in this struggle each side sought to gain momentum through the siting of Nigeria’s capital. Administrative efficiency was brought forward as a reason both for keeping the capital at Lagos and for moving it to the major alternative location, Kaduna. Nowhere was this inconsistency more apparent than in the dispute that arose between Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard [former governor of Northern Protectorate before the Amalgamation, and first governor general of the Amalgamated Nigeria] and his successor, Sir Hugh Clifford (1984, p. 168).

The quest to spread different ‘system of administration’ to the North by the Southern colonial officials and vice versa - may have been a genuine concern of the contending parties. Beyond this however there was an underlying factor driving the supposed evangelism. Entrenched in the desire to control the vast country and exercise political power over important decisions of
national affairs, the contending parties saw capital relocation as a means to the ambition. Moore (1984) reports that throughout the colonial era ‘struggle for power’ to oversee ‘the centre of government’ and its national capital became apparent and recurrent often leading to ‘dispute’.

Lugard and Clifford [the colonial governors] were not the only men to relate the position of the centre of government to their struggle for power. Their predecessors who faced the same problem included Sir Ralph Moor, High Commissioner of the Niger Coast Protectorate, and Sir Henry McCallum, Governor of Lagos. Each administrator who followed Clifford until Nigerian independence had to deal with the exigencies of the capital’s location (Moore, 1984, pp. 168-169).

But besides the issue of power play and the supposedly evangelism to spread the different ‘system of administration’, the two locations proposed by the officials - that is Lagos and Kaduna to play the role of a capital to the new country, both had their own inherent strengths and weaknesses. Starting with Lagos, the opponents of Lagos brought to the fore Lagos’ i) unfavourable humid and hot climate experienced all year around; ii) problem of adequate land for development and future expansion; iii) swamps; iv) location at the at tip of the Atlantic Ocean with threat of coastal erosion/flooding; and v) disconnection from the rest of the country due to its location. Against this backdrop and driven by the issue of power struggle among the South and North British officials, Lord Frederick Lugard who was pro-North and at one time the governor of the Northern Protectorate before the 1914 Amalgamation, would be seen advocating for the country’s capital to be sited in Kaduna. Kaduna lies in Northern Nigeria with a geographic location quite closer to the middle of the country. Lugard employed this attribute in the campaign of a Northern city becoming the capital of the country, espousing that ‘the geographically central position of Kaduna would render it more accessible to the populace than Lagos’. Of course, this would be a valuable point against Lagos’ extreme location at the tip of the Atlantic Ocean; an isolated location fronting the Atlantic Ocean than sharing contiguous borders with much of the regions in the country thereby cutting off the rest of the country geographically.

In contrast, the proponents of Lagos represented by Hugh Clifford rejected the idea of Kaduna as a capital. It was considered ‘a virgin site relatively isolated from most of the population’ (Moore, 1984). In addition to this, Lagos’s comparative advantage over Kaduna especially in terms of infrastructure was brought to the fore by the proponents. Largely, the proximity of Lagos to the sea and its ports plus the railways in the country running from the North down to Lagos, were some of the advantages of Lagos over Kaduna that were articulated by the proponents (Adejuyigbe, 1970).
The implication of Lagos’ existing infrastructure especially the ports when juxtaposed with the very essence of colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa, which in the first place was based on the acquisition of territories as outposts of raw materials and cheap labour to support trade and industrialisation in Europe (Chapter 2), the choice of Lagos would naturally seem of greater appeal to the British government than Kaduna. Already mentioned, Kaduna is landlocked and would not fit to perform the onward evacuation of raw materials from every part of the county to Britain like Lagos. Through the country’s railways orienting toward Lagos, raw materials had always been conveyed from the various parts of the country to the ports in Lagos and shipped oversea to Britain and other European countries. With Lagos as the national capital it would not only maintain this to the advantage of Britain but equally ensure its continuance (Nwafor, 1980; Moore, 1984; Ifeanacho, 2009).

This more than any other consideration became the game changer in favour of Lagos over Kaduna, when the British government finally stepped into the matter to resolve the contending positions by the British colonial officials over the selection of a capital for the new country. The British government was more concerned about economic gains than any other consideration advanced by the opponents of Lagos’ choice. Moore (1984, p. 168) reports that the colonial committee set up by the British Secretary of State for the Colonies just ‘served simply to give official approval to the Northern Governor’s (Lugard’s) own views’. In other words, they were of no relevance to the British overarching economic interest and the very foundation of colonialism which as already explained in chapter 2 and elsewhere, had been predicated largely on economic pursuits. The British overarching economic interest would also have cared less about any covert political ambition behind the proponents of Lagos’s choice who desired to use national capital to control national affairs, since all that matters was the role Lagos would continue to play in advancing British economic interests (Tamuno, 1970).

Against this backdrop Lagos was made the capital of the newly amalgamated country starting from 1914. But before this decision another city in the South of Nigeria, Port Harcourt, was also considered. It was rejected though on many grounds. Among others, it was reckoned that even though it is close to the Atlantic ocean which would be useful for trade and exportation of raw materials to Britain just like Lagos, it will take additional two days of travel from England to the city when compared to Lagos; the cost of building new infrastructure in the city would be colossal; there was the question of un-reclaimable swamps covering much of the city; and the time frame for relocation to Port Harcourt could go as far as six years (Moore, 1984). These factors worked against the consideration.
5.1.2 Ethnic and Regional Intrigues

The colonial intrigues underscored the process of capital relocation leading to Lagos becoming the capital of Nigeria. Despite this throughout the colonial era from 1914 to 1960, ethno-regional interests would come into play against the backdrop of Lagos’ choice. The interests mainly came in two different camps: those questioning the appropriateness of Lagos and those that continued to uphold and celebrate the choice (Mabogunje, 2011).

Lagos is in the Western Region in Southern Nigeria with the Yorubas being the dominant ethnic group\(^{22}\). The location, being at the tip of the Atlantic, served the British colonial economic interest as earlier noted. The other ethnic groups in the country throughout the colonial era however felt alienated and disconnected from Lagos as it became over the years dominated by

\(^{22}\) Observed in Chapter 2 and elsewhere, colonialism resulted in the formation of arbitrary territories containing multiple ethnic-groups. The structure produced by the British called Nigeria through the 1914 Amalgamation brought together no less than 250 ethnic-groups with varying socio-cultural backgrounds. Starting from the 1940s Nigeria came to be organised along regions. 3 major regions were produced by the British resulting also in the emergence of 3 (Yorubas, Hausas, and Ibos) out of the 250 ethnic groups becoming the most dominants in these regions while the rest being referred to as the minorities. These regions include the Western Region with the Yorubas being the dominant; the Northern Region having the Hausas as the dominant; and the Eastern Region with the Ibos as the dominant. See Osaghae, E.E. (1998c) ‘Managing multiple minority problems in a divided society: the Nigerian experience’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36(01), pp. 1-24.
the Yorubas in social-cultural, economic and national affairs. These led to continued series of contest, struggle, and disputes against its appropriateness as the capital.

But the altercations tend to manifest more severely as colonialism drew to an end. This is reflected through the political dynamics of the 1950s in the country. The county was to gain Independence from the British by the end of 1950s and the issue of Lagos needed to be resolved before Independence (Tamuno, 1970). Political competition and ethnic rivalry among the diverse ethnic-groups in the country and their desire to control the country through the national capital, more than ever equated the nation’s capital as the means to relevance as well as to control and dominant others. This was a decade of political intrigues with the regional governments and ethno-regional interests playing out before the arrival of Independence. The reckoning was to secure as far as possible ethnic and regional interests to be relevant not only in the wind-up days of colonialism but more importantly, a better Post-Independence future when the British had gone. Such underpinnings reflected in the issue of where the national capital should be now that the British were headed to leave (Tamuno, 1970; Moore, 1984; Osaghae, 1998a).

For the Western Region, it considered Lagos as part of its own thus desired that a new capital for Nigeria should be created so that Lagos would be annexed to the Region. However, the Northern and Eastern Regions saw Lagos as alienating, and preferred a new capital or the status of Lagos be redefined to tackle the issue of alienation. A truce was nonetheless reached at the London conference on Nigeria in 1953 through the intervention of the British colonial secretary. This was instigated especially as ‘the colonial rulers were now more interested in maintaining the country's stability than in expanding their own influence. This played an important role in arbitrating the volatile debates on the subject’ (Moore, 1984, p. 167).

… [Oliver Lyttelton – the secretary notes that] in the wider interests of Nigeria as a whole, Lagos should remain the Federal capital of Nigeria and that the Municipal area of Lagos should become Federal Territory and should be directly under the Federal Government (Moore, 1984, p. 167).

From 1954 thus it became a federal territory in line with the recommendation of the British secretary. But in just a few years to Independence expected to come in 1960, and even with the recommendations still in force, the matter of Lagos still raged on fiercely among the ethno-regional interests (Tamuno, 1970). The intervention by the British colonial secretary would be said to have been a temporary stabilizer. When Nigeria finally got Independence in 1960 from the British, the underlying regional and ethnic interests over Lagos’ choice as the nation’s
capital would still be at play. Only the British economic interest over Lagos had gone (Moore, 1984; Uyanga, 1989).

5.1.3. Post-Colonial Reality

Not unexpectedly, post-Independence Lagos became marred partly by its colonial history. The colonial regional and ethnic politics over Lagos resonated throughout the British colonial era. Even with Independence this continued. The discussion in this section explores this and other challenges that confronted Lagos as the nation’s post-Independence capital.

Lagos: a neglected city, multiple problems

In the face of the ethno-regional battle over Lagos during colonialism, it also tended to perform poorly in terms of physical planning. This reflects throughout the colonial era where ‘for a long time, no serious attempts were made to confront many important planning issues facing’ (Salau, 1977b, p. 15). Such issues border around public health and sanitation, physical infrastructure, housing, among others. This should be seen as a general problem that pervaded the country during colonialism and not just limited to Lagos. As revealed in chapter 2, colonial planning tended to pay most attention to issues of sanitation and public health and spatial segregation. Thus, when a team of British planners visited the country shortly after World War II, they were shocked that physical planning ‘practically amounted to starting from scratch as all too often development just happens’ (Uyanga, 1989) in the face of a weak planning framework (chapter 2).

The dimension of the neglect of the physical planning of Lagos however assumed a greater scale following Independence. Due to rapid urbanisation and migrations into townships and cities, Lagos experienced an influx of population than hitherto was in the colonial era (Mabogunje, 1969). This led to acute housing shortage in the city and slum growth, further exacerbated by ineffective planning in the city. Consequently ‘rents sky-rocketed, buildable lands diminished rapidly’. The city simply just ‘found it impossible to contain all who work or provide essential services within the city’ (Nwafor, 1980, p. 360).
There was yet the problem of huge traffic congestion - ‘a city of chaotic vehicular traffic congestions, and the worst on Earth’. Even the government’s ‘policy of decongestion and deconcentration’ was essentially ‘a working hypothesis for the survival of the nation’s capital city’ (Uyanga, 1989, pp. 130-131). Lagos also became bedevilled with issues of insecurity resulting crimes; high cost of living; high mortality rate; drug abuse; the problem of inadequate space for future expansion; environmental challenges of flooding; cultural and political dominance of the Yoruba ethnic-group over the other ethnic-nations; and many other problems (Nwafor, 1980; Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi, 2013).

Figure 19: Traffic challenges of Lagos even as at 2012.
Source: CNN 2012- www.cnn.com/2012/04/05/world/africa/commuting-africa/

The planning, environmental and social related problems of Lagos plus its carryover of the ethno-regional squabbles from the colonial era, would become further compounded when in 1967 and related to the Nigerian civil war, the Regions were devolved into 12 states. From this Lagos became the state capital of one of the newly created states - the state of Lagos\(^{23}\). But

\(^{23}\) At Independence in 1960, Nigeria inherited the regions created by the British during colonialism namely the Northern, Western and Eastern Regions. By 1963 the Western Region was further subdivided into the Mid-Western Region, making a total of 4 four regions in the country. In July 1967, a civil war broke out in Nigeria, the Biafran War, which lasted till January 15 1970. In connection to the War the four regions were devolved into 12 states in 1967 and Lagos was among the 12 newly created states.
following the creation a dual role was now placed on Lagos as both the capital of the country and Lagos state. These were huge roles demanding sufficient capacity in the context of providing infrastructure, policing, urban planning and management, among others. But Lagos did not just have such a capacity (Gandy, 2006) and without this it came to the point of near ‘mechanical explosion’ (Uyanga, 1989, p. 130). Beneath this too, the ethno-regional squabbles over Lagos had not gone away but continued to challenge its appropriateness as the nation’s capital. Nevertheless, on the 9th August 1975, a panel - the Aguda Panel, was set up by a military regime led by General Murtala Muhammad to consider the issue of Lagos.

**The Aguda Panel, A new capital city**

The first issue expected of the Panel dealt with the existing situation of Lagos. It was ‘to examine the dual role of Lagos as a Federal Capital and State Capital, and advise on the desirability or otherwise of Lagos retaining role’ (Ajayi, 2013). This would seem an objective way of looking at Lagos again regarding its ability to perform the dual role. As already demonstrated in this chapter, the situation of Lagos already reached near state of ‘mechanical explosion’ (Uyanga, 1989), and not really in a sense of a new phenomenon to be examined again before discerning it inability to perform the dual. So, why this term of reference was included may be difficult to be ascertained. But at any rate it availed the Panel the opportunity of looking at Lagos again against the backdrop of its performance of the dual role.

The second term of reference is an upshot of the first term. It reads ‘in the event that Lagos is unsuitable for such a role [the dual role]’, the Panel was ‘to recommend which of the two governments [Federal or State] should move to a new capital’. It would appear that in so far as the Murtala military regime had the powers to declare Lagos of being incapable of playing the dual role as both the capital of Nigeria and the state of Lagos, after all Nigerian military regimes have always ruled with military fiats and decrees, yet it let the decision to be an upshot of the first term of reference and to be handled by the Panel. Again, it is difficult to fathom why it did so. Perhaps it desired that the public should see the regime as not being autocratic in its administration of the country and the issue regarding national capital which has tended to be a volatile issue bothering on regionalism and ethnicity.

In the third reference, the Panel was to ‘in the event of the Committee finding that the Federal Capital should move out of Lagos, to recommend suitable alternative locations having regard for the need of easy accessibility to and from every part of the Federation’. In addition to this, as the fourth reference, it ‘was to examine all relevant factors which will assist the federal
Military government in arriving at the right decision’ (Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi, 2013). These terms of references would seem to be the corner stone of all the terms of references in which the military readily needed input to aid them in decision taking in the face of a capital relocation should it became so. This may be viewed against the backdrop that it (the military) may not have had an in-depth knowledge of the likely alternatives for capital location (relocation of Lagos) or the multiplicity of factors needed to undertake a capital relocation project. But through these terms of reference, it would be in a better position to undertake an informed decision.

Having gone around the country and visited Brasilia, and other capital cities, the Panel recommended the outright relocation of the capital city from Lagos to Abuja, a vast virgin land in the Middle Belt Region of the country. In February 1976 Abuja was pronounced the new capital by the military government. The government enacted decree 6 of 1976 which established the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) with Abuja as the new capital city of Nigeria. The decree also provided the legal premise for the establishment of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) to oversee the planning, design and development of the city and the regions (Salau, 1977b; Ikejiofor, 1998).

In a way, the culmination of the deficiencies of Lagos as a dual capital, the ethnic and regional political agitations for a new capital, and the economic boom of the country in the 1970s, which is discussed more in the next section no doubt have been the motivating factors for the military government at the time to pronounce Abuja as the new capital of Nigeria. Another factor may have been underscored by the military head of state’s ethnicity. He was a Northerner and may have been interested to seeing a new capital outside the Western Region - the South of Nigeria to an entirely new location in the Middle Belt of the country which had been part of the greater Old Northern Region before the 1967 devolution of the regions. It is difficult though to establish this but the final decision for Abuja as the new capital was generally accepted by the public (IPA, 1979).

Abuja’s comparative advantages over Lagos tends to be its centrality of location from different parts of the country, low population density, vast land for future expansion and excellent climatic conditions. Another factor is its ‘neutrality of ethnicity’ being that it is not dominated by the three largest ethnic groups – the Yorubas, Hausas, and Ibos (IPA, 1979; Vale, 2008; Mabogunje 2011).
Figure 20: Abuja’s centrality within the African context; and Nigeria’s context – connecting the various parts of the country.

(Maps modified from AGIS)
As earlier noted, since the 1940s following the administration of the country into regions and particularly three massive regions – Northern, Western and Eastern Regions, the country came to be treated along a dualism of i) 3 major ethnic groups dominating these regions socio-culturally, economic, and in political affairs; and ii) the minorities which are often treated at the margins of these affairs (Tamuno, 1970; Nnoli, 1978; Osaghae, 1998a). So, in this new location of the new capital city, Abuja, which falls in the Middle Belt Region, none of the three largest ethnic nationalities namely the Yorubas, Hausas, or Ibos, holds swell as the dominant.

**Ethnic and Regional Colouration Again?**

But it must be mentioned that despite the consideration of the Middle Belt as not being dominated by any of the big three ethnic groups (Yorubas, Hausas, Ibos), which resulted in the location of the nation’s new capital, one still finds some reservations questioning whether the location is truly a neutral location not dominated by any of the big three. Those in the South, that is Southern Nigeria, do not see the Middle Belt in a sense of being a neutral location. Instead it is seen by them as an outshoot of the old Northern Region. As far as they are concerned, the capital of Lagos was moved from the South of Nigeria to a region in the North. In whatever name one calls this part of the North be it the Middle Belt (or North Central as it is currently referred to) or anything, so long as it falls under what used to be the Old Northern Region, it is assumed as being of the North (Elleh, 2015).

In a similar vein, the Hausas and Fulanis who hitherto dominated the political affairs of the Old Northern Region, still see any part of the Old Northern Region as an integral part of the North. In other words, there is nothing as the Middle Belt (North-Central), or North-East, North West, – as all of them fall under ‘One Arewa’! - the North (Old Northern Region).

But there is yet another ethno-regional voice, narratives regarding the Middle Belt apart from the often-heard voices from the South challenging the neutrality of the Middle Belt, and/or those coming from the North in defence of the Middle Belt as an integral part of the North. These other voices emanate from the very ethnic-groups of the Middle Belt region, the so-called minorities who are not among the big 3 ethnic-groups – Yorubas, Hausas, and Igbos. They generally tend to see themselves and the Middle Belt Region as distinct and not part of the North. Even before the country’s Independence in 1960 they had always sought to carve a

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24 The Middle Belt Region also refers to as the North Central Region of Nigeria, used to be part of the greater old Northern Region. The old Northern Region although administratively and politically dominated by the Hausas and Fulanis, in the Middle Belt Region the largest ethnic-groups are not the Hausas nor Fulanis. Rather, one finds the Tivs, Nupes, Jukuns, Igalas, Idomas, Bironis, Bassa, Gbagys, Ebiras, Eggons, and several others - as the dominant in terms of population strength.
political identity for themselves by forming political parties - for instance the United Middle Belt Congress, which promoted pro-Middle Belt socio-political and cultural awareness. Further, they have desired even after Independence to form a Middle Belt state or region out of the Old Northern Region. Thus, to the peoples of the Middle Belt, refereeing to them as North tends to be strange to them. Rather, they tend to see the North in some sort of a dualism: the Far North or the Core North, and then the Middle Belt. (Osaghae, 1991; Osaghae, 1995; Akinyele, 1996; Ukiwo, 2003; Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor, 2009).

Figure 21: regional-political changes in Nigeria over the years since 1960
What the different narratives about the Middle Belt (Abuja’s location) portend to capital relocation, relates to the notion already observed in chapter 2 that capital relocation is quite an exercise underlain by a multiplicity of intrigues, interests, and actors, who seek to interpret the geography of location in various ways to suit those interests.

Figure 22: current regional-political map of Nigeria showing the Middle Belt Region (North Central Region), and the other regions of the country.

5.2 Global Political Economy, Capital Relocation and Development

The last section looked at the intrigues that underpinned the choice of Lagos as the country’s national capital leading to the decision to have a new capital. The decision of the Federal government in 1976 to relocate the national capital would be regarded an appropriate one toward avoiding the imminent ‘mechanical explosion’ of Lagos (Uyanga, 1989). But equally is the recognition that despite the internal driving factors underpinning the need for the military and other national elites to undertake the decision of having a new capital, there had been other external factors particularly in the area of global economic happenings that played a crucial role in the government’s decision to have a new capital. Of interest to this research is the 1970s’
first and second waves of the global OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Export Countries) oil crises and the SAP policies earlier discussed in chapter 2.

5.2.1. OPEC Oil Crisis

The First Wave (1973-1974)

A discussion of the OPEC oil crisis has already been dealt with in chapter 2 though not with specific relationship to Nigeria. Generally, in the face of the widespread negative economic fortunes occasioned by the oil crisis (chapter 2), in the context of Nigeria the first wave of the crisis manifested in a boom in the country’s oil sector. Through the boom the country experienced enormous revenue earnings described as ‘unprecedented’ in the history of the country (Pinto, 1987, p. 18; Osaghae, 1998b).

Oil exploration in the country began in 1908 but not until in 1956 that positive result was recorded. The following year oil production started and followed by crude export in 1958 (Ariweriokuma, 2008). Between this time and 1967 oil exportation continued but due to the Nigeria-Biafra civil War (1967-1970), production and export tended to be slow as a result of the disruptive effects of the War ‘especially’ around ‘1968-69 when operations were severely disrupted’ (Madujibeya, 1976, p. 285). Much of the oil producing areas in the country are in the former Eastern Region of the country which was at the epicentre of the war. As earlier mentioned in the last section the Nigeria/Biafra war pitched the Federal government against the former Region as it sought to secede from the Nigerian federation. But by 1970 the War was over resulting in political stability in the Region and other parts of the country affected by the War. The stability, plus Nigeria’s high-quality crude with low sulphur content, corresponded in an increasing demand for it at the international market. In the same 1970 the country became also a member of the OPEC.

Revenue generation

In terms of revenue generation between 1970 and 1971 alone, the Nigerian government exported 388.54 and 542.54 million barrels of crude respectively and earning $718 and $1375

25 The remote and immediate causes of the war are numerous - with the issue of resource control particularly oil being among. Seen as a veritable source of revenue earnings each side of the war desired to not only have access to it but equally control it under its territory. (Ekwo, U.S. (2011) Collaboration-based management of petroleum pipeline rights of way in Nigeria. Newcastle University, UK [Online]. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10443/1192 (Accessed: 23/12/15).
for each of the years (table 1). This was followed in 1972 by another 640 million barrels of export yielding $1803 million. Thus the early post-civil war years of between 1970 and 1972 earned the Nigerian government a total earnings of $3,896 from the oil sector (Ariweriokuma, 2008, pp. 31-33).

Table 1: Nigeria’s crude export and earnings from 1970-1972 (early post-civil war era)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Export (million barrels)</th>
<th>Revenue ($ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>388.54</td>
<td>718.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>542.54</td>
<td>1,375.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>640.98</td>
<td>1,803.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,572.06</td>
<td>3,896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


But by 1973-74 following the OPEC oil crisis which led to increase in the price of crude (chapter 2), the already increasing demand for the country’s crude experienced a ‘fourfold leap’ in ‘market price’. From a $3.56 earned per US barrel in 1972, in 1974 Nigeria was earning $14.96 for the same barrel (Apter, 2008, p. 22). This resulted in a boom in the oil sector. The country thus made $12,026 Million between 1973-1974 during the crisis as shown in table 2 (Ariweriokuma, 2008).

Table 2: Nigeria’s crude export and earnings from 1973-1974 (boom era)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Export (million barrels)</th>
<th>Revenue ($ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>722.01</td>
<td>3,049.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>954.48</td>
<td>8,977.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,676.48</td>
<td>12,026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Second Wave (1978-1979)

By 1978 there was yet another second wave of the OPEC crisis. The effects of the crisis as excruciating as they were, were felt across Sub-Sahara Africa in varying ways (Chapter 2). Unlike the first wave that resulted in an increase in oil price the second wave was characterised by a fall in the price of oil. In the context of Nigeria this meant a drop in revenue from its oil earnings. Consequently, by the 1980s the country’s oil revenues ‘plummeted’ (Vale, 2008)
Adoption of SAP

Due to the soaring debt profile of the federal government occasioned mostly by the collapse of its primary source (oil) of foreign earnings, as a way of dealing with the situation the federal government procured a loan from International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such loans were accompanied by conditionalities set by the IMF. One of such conditionalities was the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which the IMF demanded of the recipients of the loan to implement. In short, as discussed in chapter 2, SAP policies were aimed primarily at dismantling the state’s role in matters of economy especially. Nigeria’s procurement of the loan thus led to the adoption of the SAP policies in 1986.

Originally according to the federal government under General Ibrahim Babangida as the head of state, SAP was expected to last no longer than two years – to end by 1988. But this was not to be stretching as far as 1994. One wonders whether it could have even gone beyond 1994 had the new government of General Sani Abacha another military regime not suspended it (SAP). This is because while the government of General Ibrahim Babangida held on to SAP presumably to be restructuring the economy, in reality the economy was still in shambles and there seemed to be no obvious signs of suspending the programme had the Abacha regime not truncated it 1994 (Osaghae, 1998a).

Why General Ibrahim Babangida held on to it (SAP) that long in the face of a dwindling economy with recurring budget deficits, appears unclear to fathom. For instance, in 1989 the country recorded a budget deficit of N14.3 billion and this progressed to N21.7billion in 1990. Osaghae (1998) reports that the deficit kept progressing year in year out up till 1994. Clearly SAP was not working in fixing the economy and several factors have been attributed to this. This includes the absence of a strong fiscal discipline on the part of the government, the proliferation of government establishment, corruption, among others. He reports further that even with the new regime of General Sani Abacha and having suspended SAP in 1994, the economy could get revamped overnight.

5.4.2 OPEC Crisis and SAP, Influence on Abuja

Oil Boom and New Capital Declaration

Nigeria’s boom in the oil sector in the early 1970s stemming from the first wave of the OPEC crisis translated to huge foreign earnings and revenues for the country. Plus other sources of revenue from agriculture and mining, Nigeria became a rich country. In consequence it launched a ‘state directed industrial revolution’, a prodigious third national development plan
(1975-1980), and numerous prestigious projects in various sectors such as the nationwide construction of highways, universities, hospitals, stadia, and many others. All of these were to be ‘lubricated by oil’ (Apter, 2008), the huge revenue earnings from oil.

The decision in 1976 to relocate Lagos to Abuja and build a new capital city for the county as discussed in the previous section, was also predicated on the huge oil earnings. Considering that capital relocation is financially an intensive project (chapter 2), without the global happenings in the oil sector through the OPEC crisis resulting into enormous revenues for the country, the need for capital relocation in the country would still have remained a mere wish. Previous post-colonial administrations starting from 1960 (Nigeria’s Independence from the British) and before the 1966 Nigeria civil War, in so much as may have desired to have a new capital, the financial implication of such an action might not have warranted it. At Independence the major sources of revenue for the country came largely from agriculture and mining (O’Connor, 2014). This was basically administered at the various regions of the country – North, West, and East, but would not be sufficient to support a new capital relocation26.

But besides the first wave of the OPEC oil crisis (1973-1974) resulting in an oil boom for the country, it would be interesting to note that at the time of declaring Abuja in 1976 as the new capital, while the OPEC global oil crisis had ended in 1974, the country’s foreign revenue earnings from the oil sector continued to blossom. As shown in table 3 on the next page, from 1975 to 1976 –corresponding with the years when the Aguda Panel was set up and when Abuja was declared the new capital respectively, the country earned a total of $17,188 million even much more than the $12,026 it earned from 1973 to 1974 (the oil boom years of the first wave OPEC crisis). A combination of the boom revenue and the revenues earned around the time of the Abuja declaration does reflect the huge ‘petrodollars’ (Osaghae, 1998b) at the disposal of the

---

26 Compounding this, six years into Independence (January of 1966), the country’s parliamentary government was toppled by a bloody military coup. Yet in July of the same year another counter bloody coup took place. The first and second coups brought new military head of states within a spate of six months, General Johnson Aguyi Ironsi and General Yakubu Gowon respectively. These kinds of political instabilities – would not have warranted a keen interest in the issue of capital relocation by the new leaders. More of concern to the leaders would be to fortify political power against perceived and real enemies than the issue of capital relocation. But to worsen the whole matter the following year of 1967 the country began a civil war – the Nigeria-Biafra war earlier mentioned. Again, under such a volatile state the issue of capital relocation away from Lagos would be the least thought about by the Nigerian government - as the priority from 1966 to 1970 would be the execution of the war than any other matter. With the war over in 1970 and corresponding with an oil boom in 1973-1974, conditions now seemed ripe for capital relocation. In addition to this and as already mentioned in this chapter, in 1975 Nigeria had a new military head of state, General Murtala Mohammed, who tended to be more proactive and decisive about the issue of capital relocation. And the same year of 1975 the Aguda Panel was set and by the following year of 1976 Abuja was declared the new capital.
General Murtala military regime to have warranted the Abuja declaration, and the possibility of funding it as well as other monumental projects in the country (table 3).

Table 3: Continuous flow of revenue at the time of Abuja Declaration as a national capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Export (million barrels)</th>
<th>Revenue ($ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>625.35</td>
<td>7,744.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>734.82</td>
<td>9,444.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,360.17</td>
<td>17,188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Oil Boom and State-Led Master Planning

From the huge resources accruing from the oil sector and following the Abuja declaration, an American firm - the International Planning Associate, was engaged by the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) to prepare the master plan of Abuja. The military and national elites desired Abuja to be planned as the best city in the world regardless of the cost implication of its execution (Ikejiofor, 1998).

For a short while in the 1970s, as national revenues skyrocketed due to the oil boom, Nigeria’s fortunes looked especially promising. In 1979, the Abuja master plan was published (Vale, 2008, p. 162)

Through the master plan, the state has intended to develop Abuja and achieve national identity, the building of a modern capital city, regional and economic development, and many other aspirations (chapter 6).
Nonetheless, following the collapse of the country’s oil revenues attributed to the fall in oil prices stemming from the second wave of the OPEC crisis, as mentioned earlier the country had to look elsewhere through the acquisition of loans to sustain the running of the county and some vital projects. This led to the adoption of the SAP polices in 1986. Despite this across the country the federal government could not continue with the funding of national projects throughout much of the 1980s and much of the 1990s.

Abuja being a national project too became affected by the collapse of the revenues. The Federal government through the FCDA could not sustain the funding of Abuja adequately. Take (1984) an insider, who was a member of the design team that worked on the Kenzo Master Plan (KTU) for the CA, provides insight about the gravity of the impact of the economic crisis on the CA in just less than 5 years of the adoption of the master plan.

_The economic crisis that Nigeria is facing today [1984] has slowed down implementation. The streets of the central area are now under construction, but work on the national assembly, which had top priority has been delayed_ 

In addition, the FCDA did not even have any idea of the cost of the implementation of the Abuja master plan and by extension those of the CA. This can be attributed to the mere fact that since the country had surplus oil money, it had only been interested in framing prodigious plans without any bearing to cost. Thus beautiful plans were prepared but only to become undermined by the sudden economic tumble (Vale, 2008). Take (1984) again explains.

_We don’t even know the cost, [of the KTU plan for example] and you may well ask why? It is because the government officials claim not to care how much it is going to cost. They want the best, the highest standards, some of the most monumental buildings in the world. Only now are they beginning to realise that an oil economy is not what is used to be and that the country has other priorities._


_The actual developments in the Central Area today show that the architectural landscape concept was overambitious. It required extreme public expenditure._

In the absence of the cost of the Abuja project and even if the cost had been known, the unfolding reality was that funds were no longer adequately forthcoming to support the development of the CA and the entire city. This slowed down the development of the city. The FCDA had to scale down the enormousness of some aspects of the Abuja master plan. In the CA for instance the national assembly complex had to be scaled down in which the original ‘estimated cost was tagged at $500 million’. In its place a cheaper less gigantic design was substituted (Take, 1984 p.54).
Generally, over the years Abuja has become a city funded in deficit budget; a city that was intended to be fully built and occupied in 1986 would not be attained as most districts of the city still remain undeveloped due in part to financial challenges (see chapter 7 for an in-depth discussion of this).

5.3. Chapter Conclusion

The chapter looked at the intrigues behind capital relocation in Nigeria. The first intrigues came from the colonial British interest driven by economic concerns and playing out as the decisive consideration in favour of Lagos’ selection as the country’s capital. Nonetheless, the quest for political relevance and control of national affairs tended to underscore the process of capital relocation by the British officials who saw capital relocation as a means to such ambitions. The second group of intrigues came from the ethnic and regional interests; either challenging the choice of Lagos or reinforcing it to accentuate ethnic and regional proclivities. This characterised the colonial era and even after Independence. But beneath this Lagos had also other problems relating to flooding, acute housing shortage, traffic congestion, poor sanitation, basic infrastructure, among others.

The chapter also focused on the global economic happenings of the 1970s especially the 1970s’ OPEC oil crisis (the two waves of the oil crisis). The first wave brought about a boom in the country’s oil sector through huge foreign revenues; while the second wave led to a collapse of the country’s oil revenues. Both waves affected the planning and development of Abuja and its CA. With the oil boom of the first wave of the crisis providing plenty revenue for the declaration of a new capital as well as its development; the second crisis however led to the abandonment and rescaling of the new capital’s project as result of the collapse of oil revenues
Chapter 6. Land Use Prescription

Chapter five presented the context especially the driving forces behind capital relocation in Nigeria, culminating into Abuja’s declaration as the new capital and the overarching goals of nation building that it seeks to achieve. Of importance too, the influence of the global political economy on the declaration, planning and development of Abuja was looked at. This chapter deals with one of the circles of the frame of narrative mentioned in chapter 4. The three circles deal with the plan, nature of planning, and external environment. The concerns of this chapter and as earlier indicated in chapter 4 about the layout of discussion of the frame of narrative, deals with the plan category of the narrative. It discusses the nature of the formulated policy in the CA which the national elites and planners seek to implement, and in connection with the overarching goals underpinning Abuja as a new capital city. The formulated policy is the master plans and particularly the land uses contained in these plans. These master plans are the Abuja master plan (IPA) and the supplementary master plans of the CA. The supplementary master plans include the Kenzo master plan (KTU) of 1981, AIM master plan (AIM) of 1984, and Albert Speer master plan (AS&P) plan of 2008. Organised into two major sections, the first section of the chapter deals with what the land uses are, what they seek to achieve and the reasons behind this. The second section deals with the design process of the land uses, exploring how they were planned and the intricacies that underline the process.

6.1. The Overarching Concern of CA’s Land Uses

Capital relocation in Nigeria has been a ferociously contested matter. This has been driven by ethnic and regional, political, and economic intrigues, stretching from the colonial era to the second decade (1970s) of the country’s post-Independence. The concerns for Abuja as the new capital city therefore emanates from the country’s desire to overcome these intrigues and promote nation building (chapter 5). In this regard Abuja is expected first and foremost, to achieve a common national identity in a country of over 250 diverse ethnic groups (IPA, 1979; Vale, 2008; Elleh, 2015). Among others too, it is to spur regional and economic development within the country as well as present Nigeria to the world as a modern nation as an outstanding world class city. Such aspirations are however expected to be accomplished pre-eminently in the CA than in any other district of Abuja (IPA, 1979). In other words, the CA would be “the hub of both the City as well as the nation itself”.

This is not only true in a symbolic sense but in physical actuality as well. All affairs in the City and the Nation will focus on it (IPA, 1979, p. 79).
But beyond this internal importance,

[it is equally hoped that it would become] the center to which representatives of other nations will come. Therefore, it will symbolize Nigeria to the world, thus reaching beyond national concerns (ibid).

The importance placed on the CA is deliberate. This comes from the very notion of making exhibition about Abuja’s grandiosity and the aspirations that it seeks to attain. This overarching concern underpins the design goals of the CA in the first place (table 4).

Table 4: Design Goals of Abuja Central Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CA’s Design Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. To define the CA as a unique and special place so that it may be the appropriate vehicle for the symbolic and actual seat of Government of Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. To define the Central Area as a unique and special place so that it may be the appropriate vehicle for the symbolic and actual Seat of Government of Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. To organize the principal elements of both the natural and built environments to emphasize the symbolic aspects of the Government of Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. To take advantage of the special views, vistas, and axes inherent in the selected site of the Central Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. To produce a harmonious and sequential flow of spaces in the central Area enhancing the experience of those traveling through the Central Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. To produce a sense of arrival at the Central Area of those coming to it from elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii. To impose geometries which allow flexibility and predictability in movement patterns in the Central Area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (IPA, 1979, p. 82)

A look at the goals reveal the imperative of using the CA as an exhibition to showcase Abuja’s magnificence and its aspirations of nation building. Intrinsic to this overarching desire is also the usage of even natural elements as reflected through the third and fourth design goals. These goals are to be integrated with planning to make statements or exhibitions about the importance of Abuja and its and its concern about nation building (fig 25). Right at the planning stage of the IPA (the Abuja master plan) the American planners had been conscious of this (IPA, 1979).

Figure 24: a fusion of natural elements to accentuate the importance of Abuja in the CA; Author, 2015.
This is made possible by the outstanding natural elements in the CA. In the district there is the presence of the most prominent hill in Abuja known as Aso Rock plus a general panoramic landscape.

One of the main reasons for the location of the Central Area of Abuja is Aso Hill. Aso Hill had been chosen by the master planners as the main co-ordinate of the city; the whole city development of Abuja is oriented towards, and culminates in Aso Hill (Speer, 2008, p. 9).

Integrating these natural elements into the overall design framework of the district, the planners assume would accentuate Abuja’s importance and its aspirations of nation building. The Americans explain further observing that,

The location of the CA within the city, its definition as a place, its relation to its natural and man-made surroundings, its internal organisation, and is arrangement of symbolic elements are matter of supreme importance. The way in which these abstract considerations are manifest in the form of a physical plan will determine the plan’s success (IPA, 1979, p. 79)

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Figure 25: CA orienting toward Aso Hill; KTU, 1981 and Google Image, 2016
Integrating these natural elements into the overall design framework of the district, the planners assume would accentuate Abuja’s importance and its aspirations.

*The location of the CA within the city, its definition as a place, its relation to its natural and man-made surroundings, its internal organisation, and its arrangement of symbolic elements are matter of supreme importance. The way in which these abstract considerations are manifest in the form of a physical plan will determine the plan’s success* (IPA, 1979, p. 79)

From the CA’s important role within Abuja’s conception and manifesting even in the use of natural elements to accentuate that, the next key issue for the American planners dealt with the planning of the CA’s land uses.

![Aso Hill in its natural setting](Author, 2014)

From the bigger picture of the CA’s importance, it would also underscore the driving force behind the planning of the land uses. The next section discusses this.

### 6.2 Land Uses of the CA

#### 6.2.1. Broad land uses

The IPA was prepared in 1979 to drive the attainment of Abuja’s aspirations (Chapter 5). From the importance of the CA in Abuja, already mentioned in the last section, ‘major land uses’ were designated to be implemented in the CA by the IPA. These include the ‘seat of government, central business district, national cultural institutions, high density residential community, national sports complex, transportation center’, diplomatic area, parks and open space (IPA, 1979). Table 5 on page 126 explains the land uses.
The American planners assumed that when the broad land uses of the CA are implemented, they would translate into achieving Abuja’s aspirations (chapter 5). The same logic applies to other districts of Abuja of lesser hierarchy than the CA though not on the scale of the grandness expected in the CA. It is somewhat in the sense of having federating bits with each having particular land uses on different scales. The assumption being that when the bits are implemented the whole picture about Abuja’s aspirations concerning nation building would be attained, even though one of the bits (CA) will act as the pre-eminent focal point of the city. Also, from the broad land uses of the CA, the FCDA deemed it necessary to prepare supplementary master plans for the CA. This would be seen against the backdrop of providing detailed land use plans and urban designs to further guide the development of the CA. The next section which deals with the CA’s detailed land uses explores this.

Table 5: major land uses of the CA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CA’s Major Land Uses</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seat of Government</td>
<td>The Americans intend the CA to accommodate the function through the presidential, legislative and judiciary complexes to be built in the district. Since Nigeria operates a presidential system of government, the master plan deemed it vital for these 3 arms of government to be accommodated in the premier district of the city. In addition to this, ‘municipal administration buildings’ (structures of running administration) are expected to be built in the district within the bigger function of the ‘seat of government’ (IPA, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Business District</td>
<td>Under this category the nation’s chief commercial and business activities, corporate offices, major hotels, stores, parastatals, among others, are designated to be built in the CA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National cultural institutions</td>
<td>As the premier district of the city, the nation’s cultural institutions such as national theatre, international conference center, national mosque and Christian cathedral, and many others are to be built in the CA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High density residential</td>
<td>Toward creating a lively district even after working hours, the CA is equally expected to accommodate residential land uses ‘except in the immediate areas of highest concentration of governmental and business activities’ (IPA, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic function</td>
<td>Again due its importance as the premier district of the city, the CA is to accommodate foreign embassies and high commissions (to be built in the district).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Sports Centre</td>
<td>National stadium and a wide range of other national sport facilities to be built in the district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Centre</td>
<td>To be built in the CA is also a Transportation Center consisting of an intercity bus interchange, railway terminus, and related activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks and Open Spaces</td>
<td>These include the building of a national mall along the central spine of the district, squares, open spaces and green areas at various locations within the district.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author 2016, modified from IPA master plan 1979.
Figure 27: Broad land use of the CA as envisaged by the Abuja master plan; IPA, 1979
6.2.2. Detailed land use plans

**KTU Land Use Plan**

In 1980 the FCDA commissioned a Japanese firm (Kenzo Tange Urtec) to work on the broad land uses of the CA with the overarching aim of translating them into detailed land uses and urban designs. By 1981 the master plan which is also referred to as the KTU master plan or simply as the KTU or Green Book was ready.

A member of one of the indigenous firms that worked with the Japanese’s firm on the KTU explains further:

> The government recruited Kenzo Tange so that the proposals by the Americans can be further translated into specifics. There was need to bring down the proposals into detailed land subdivision and the type of use that the subdivision should perform. This was followed by developing urban design models concerning their development (Abuja Consultant 2014, interview)

This was made possible by subdividing the CA into five land use zones. These zones as earlier mentioned in chapter 4 are the 3-Arms Zone, Ministries Zone, Cultural Zone, Central Business District, and Transport Zone. Overall the KTU covered only phase 1 of the district. In 1984 the FCDA commissioned another firm, AIM Consultants, to handle the detail land use planning and urban design of the phase 2 of the district.

> This time around we needed to complete the work on the phase 2 of the Central Area. You know Kenzo worked on the phase 1 so we commissioned AIMs to do the work (Abuja Planner BI 2013, interview).

Like the KTU, the AIM master plan subdivided the phase 2 into 4 land use zones: the Business Zone, Market Zone, Diplomatic Zone and Sport Zone. In sum, both plans (KTU and AIM) intended that the district’s land uses would be implemented into nine land use zones where each zone performs an overarching land use function (IPA, 1979). The land use zones are captured on the various land use plans of these master plans (fig 30 and 31 on page 140 and 141 show the land use plans of the KTU and AIM respectively).

**Attempts at merging the KTU and AIM land use plans into a single land use plan**

But it must be stressed that while the KTU and AIM land use plans existed for phase 1 and 2 respectively through the 1980s and 1990s and up till 2007, they primarily existed as separate documents in the two phases of the district.

> The KTU Land Use Plan for Phase 1 was supplemented by separate plans for each Central Area zone, combined with a description of the zone. The AIM Land

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Use plan for Phase 2 was represented by one drawing covering the whole area. Unfortunately, there has never been a comprehensive document for the overall Central Area (Speer, 2008, p 69.)

Attempts were made by the FCDA sometime in 1996 and 2007 to amalgamate the two plans into a single plan though unsuccessful (AS&P, 2008). The FCDA attributes this to a multitude of factors.

There was the issue of technical competence on our part [the FCDA] to undertake the task. Remember that in the 1980s and even in the 1990s we did not have such expertise, except if we had out-sourced it to consultants. We also had the challenge of funding, policy inconsistencies, and lack of political commitment. So these things were there and affected us to bring them into a single document (Abuja Planner B2 2014, interview).

Prior to this the planners consulted a German firm known as SF Cologne Consultants to carry out a comprehensive consolidation of the city’s land use plan with those of the CA. The resultant land use plan that came out of the process since it is not dated becomes difficult to ascertain when exactly it was prepared (fig 33, p. 136). A possible estimation would be that since it consolidated only the KTU land use plan and did not include the AIM land use plan28; it may have been prepared at an earlier date than 1987 hence the non-inclusion of the AIM’s land use plan in the SF Cologne consolidation land use plan. Or it might even have been prepared after 1987 but its scope limited to consolidate only the KTU’s land use plan and not the AIM’s land use plan. Interviews with most of the planners could not indicate when exactly the SF Cologne land use plan was done. Even a copy of the land use plan or any technical report accompanying it could not be found at the URP’s library. By 2008 the FCDA was able to consolidate the KTU and AIM land uses into a single land use plan. This was done by preparing a new consolidated master plan referred to as the AS&P master plan or simply the AS&P or Albert Speer. The consultancy for this was handled by a German firm. But it must be stressed that the need for the AS&P had become imperative not only on the need to bring the KTU and AIM land uses into a land use plan; but also based on the land use distortions, slow pace of development and investment into the district, and many other challenges that had occasioned the implementation of the master plans (KTU and AIM) over the years (Speer, 2008; El-Rufai, 2013; Nor, 2014b). Thus, to the FCDA, “it became necessary to undertake a new master plan to address the challenges of the master plans” (Abuja Planner B 2014, interview). The next section explores this and more especially the AS&P consolidated land use plan

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28 The AIM Land use plan was completed in 1987.
Figure 28: land use functions of the CA (A), depicted on the Land use Plan (B), followed by urban design and models (C). (KTU, 1981; Speer, 2008)
Figure 29: AIM Land use plan; Speer, 2008.
AS&P Consolidated Land Use Plan

Already mentioned, the FCDA engaged a German firm - Albert Speer & Partner GmbH to prepare yet a new master plan for the CA. This was to emerge primarily from the review of the original master plans (KTU and AIM). The whole process of the engagement, undertaking of the review of the original master plans, production of a consolidated and revised master plan, that is the AS&P master plan, and its final adoption for implementation by the FCDA spanned a period of five years between 2003 and 2008 (Speer, 2008).

Building on some of the already mentioned factors in the last section that would have necessitated the review of the original master plans, and subsequent production of the AS&P, the executive secretary of the FCDA explains that even though,

> the aesthetic and representative quality of the city vision [as envisioned by the KTU and AIM] is undisputed, many of its [their] components have proven in the thirty years since the completion of the design [the master plans - KTU and AIM] either to be very challenging to implement, no longer desirable or no longer feasible in light of the existing development situation (Engr. Mohammed Sani Alhassan, FCDA Executive Secretary in Speer, 2008, pt).

Against this backdrop he goes further to explain that,

> it was the awareness for these fundamental issues and the necessity for proactive measures that led the FCDA to review the Abuja Master Plan for the Central Area and synchronise it with the demands and expectations of today’s society. (ibid)

There had been some precursors on the need to review the Abuja master plan including the CA’s supplementary master plans. Importantly, an international workshop on the planning and development of Abuja was held in 1999, with no less than 500 attendees drawn from the private and public sectors as well as international and local scholars. This would be later followed by in the same year the setting up of an FCT ministerial committee ‘on the appraisal of physical planning and development issues in the Federal Capital Territory’ (FCDA, 1999; El-Rufai, 2011). Interestingly, all revealed a wave of land use distortions not only in the CA but in other districts of the Abuja and by extension in most satellite towns in the FCT, slow pace of development of Abuja, poor level of private investment, funding challenges, among others. For instance, in terms of land use distortions, at 1999 alone the FCT ministerial committee identified

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29 These are the plans that focused on the land uses of the district. They also contained not only the land uses of the district as captured in their respective land use plans, but equally brought out the urban design vision of the district regarding how the respective land uses should be developed. Especially for some of the public buildings, they even went ahead producing the models - ‘the architectural sculptures’, as the Executive Secretary of the FCDA refers to such urban design models. Apart from these two master plans the CA also had the Transport master plan referred to as the Sofretu master plan which was undertaken by a French firm (Sofretu) and focused on the transportation network of the of the district.
in almost all the nine zones of the CA land use distortions. A few examples include the encroachment on the land use of the Market Zone originally intended for the development of a central market by what the FCDA refers to as ‘temporary’ activities. Such activities range from the sale of fire wire wood, electronics, furniture, to food items.

*The Committee observes with dismay that traders with temporary allocations are presently occupying the area earmarked for the Central Market (FCDA, 1999, p. 143)*

In the Ministries Zone too an encroachment on the national mall was observed. It had to do with the building of a public square known as the Eagle Square not meant to be built in the national mall area. The issue of the Eagle Square is dealt with more in subsequent discussions especially in chapter 8. At any rate,

*The Committee observed that the “Eagle Square” as constructed should have been located at the site for the National Square... [But where it is constructed around the national mall area,] it has encroached on the reservation for the Sub-Transportation Centre, and portions of the reservation for the development of the ‘‘State gardens’’. It has also interfered with the ‘‘Vista Planning Concept’’ in the City Centre (FCDA, 1999, p 101)*

These and other challenges would have led the FCDA to explore ways of dealing with them. And indeed, the FCDA attributes these challenges as the impetus for its engagement of the German firm to undertake the review of the CA’s originals plans and come up with a plan that would be easily implementable, since the originals ones [KTU and AIM] had tended to be difficult to implement (Speer,2008). The attention of the FCDA in this regard tends to be placed more on design with the notion that the challenges of implementing the original plans come mostly from the plans - a function of their inherent design weaknesses. Once design challenges are tackled and through the AS&P master plan, implementation would become easily achieved. But the non-implementation of the original plans or the slow pace of development of plots or low level of private investment in the district, would not necessarily be only an issue of design related problems and consequently requiring a design solution. As would be seen in chapter 7 and 8, design related problems had been just but one among the numerous problems that has limited plot development and their land uses, the distortions of land uses in the district, low pace of land use development in the CA, or even private investment in the district. Issues of politics, power play, global political economic changes, among others, would equally render a plan unimplemented or not followed the desired path (Chapter 7 and 8).

Nonetheless, among the major design challenges associated with the original plans as the executive secretary of the FCDA explains, and which tended to discourage private investment in the district - a corollary to the slow development of plots and their land uses, relates to the
super block concept of the plans which favoured large plots to be developed into comprehensive development.

The proposed large-scale and complex superblocks does not correspond to the expectations of the real estate market today [2008] and often entails overly complicated and expensive realisation measures, which surpass capabilities. As a result key areas of the Central Area remain undeveloped today. Time has also proven that lively, mixed-use streets with pedestrian activity are the arteries of vibrant cities (Mohammed Sani Alhahsan, FCDA Executive Secretary, in Speer, 2008, p. i).

The Germans, the preparers of AS&P master plan, draw such a conclusion too.

The successful realization of the original KTU design proposals [and the AIM] relied to a great degree on the construction of large and often complex buildings. Such structures have either exceeded the capabilities of the local real estate development community or have not been seen by them as an attractive investment. The end result has been stagnant development or the realization of structures which do not conform to the original design intent (Speer, 2008, p. 14).

This becomes basically a question of dealing with the large plots and the super block concepts of the original plans, as one of the design panacea to tackling the slow pace of private investment and plot development in the district. Again, it relates to seeing how pedestrian flows are brought to the frontline of street from their hitherto separated and reclusive non-vibrant life. This is what the Germans exactly tell us. First regarding the large plots they say that,

To address this situation and promote real estate development, the Master Plan review has proposed a new pattern for subdivision of the main 200m by 200m urban blocks [large plots] (Speer, 2008, p 14).

This means scaling down the large plots originally expected to accommodate super blocks to smaller scales, especially in areas where such plots have not been developed at the time of the AS&P master plan process. Second, regarding the issue of lively streets, the Germans point out that ‘the key aspect of the revised concept is to combine pedestrian life and vehicular activity in lively, urban street spaces that serve both pedestrians and cars’ so as to deal with the problem of ‘an introverted’ separated ‘pedestrian’ flows (Speer, 2008, p.14).

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30 This is by far not an exhaustive treatment of some of the design shortcomings identified by the Germans and the FCDA as the design problems that tended to limit plot development and their land uses in the CA, or even the implementation of urban design visions or infrastructure of the district. The examples through super block concept and bringing pedestrians to the front line of street, are to buttress some of the reasons particularly stemming from design shortcomings that necessitated the preparation of the AS&P master plan.
Guided by this, in the Central Business District Zone and Business Zone and particularly in those areas where land development has not taken place on the plots, the AS&P would simply scale down the large plots into smaller ones; and bring the pedestrian to the frontline of the streets in these zones especially the in areas it designated as Boulevards. A full discussion of the Boulevard principle of the AS&P and the subsequent Boulevard policy of the FCT is discussed in chapter 8.

In the Ministries Zone too areas without land development had to be redesigned. The Zone generally is made up of four sub-land use zones. These are the national mall area, ministries gardens area, ministries buildings area, and state liaison area. The ministries area and state liaison area while they could boast of substantial land development, the ministries gardens had not been developed even as I write this thesis. For the national mall even though a public square (the Eagle Square) encroached on a part of it as mentioned earlier, the chunk of the mall has remained undeveloped over years and even now (see chapter 8 concerning the driving forces behind the development of the Eagle Square)\textsuperscript{31}. It is therefore this chunk of the undeveloped mall and the ministries gardens that the AS&P had to redesign completely, producing new concepts and designs for them.

\textsuperscript{31} The absence of funds and infrastructure especially the road networks, policy inconsistencies, among other challenges tended to limit the development of these areas and their land uses.
However, in zones such as the Cultural Zone, 3-Arms Zone, Market Zone, Transport Zone, Diplomatic Zone, and Sports Zone, the AS&P simply either retained the original land uses contained in these zones or made marginal changes. Some marginal changes came in the form of policy recommendations but not necessarily involving actual plot re-subdivision or bringing up entirely new urban designs for the zones. For example it recommends that more residential houses to be built in the Diplomatic Zone than hitherto envisaged by the previous master plans particularly the AIM; the retention of the International Conference Centre in the Cultural Zone in its present location, even though the location is not designated for it by the previous master plans (KTU); the need to rearrange the bus terminal toward connecting with the railway terminus in the Transport Zone; and many other recommendations (Speer, 2008).

It would be inferred that the AS&P master plan emerged out of a twofold action thus. First, through substantial changes in certain zones (the Central Business District and Business Zone for example) leading to the outright re-subdivision of the zones’ large and vacant plots of land into smaller ones, assigning of new land uses to the newly created smaller plots, as well as envisioning new urban design and development control guidelines to guide the development of the newly created/resubdivided plots. In the Ministries Zone the substantial changes led to the redesign of the national mall and ministries gardens area, which resulted in bringing about new urban designs for them. Second, the benign or marginal changes simply resulted in the retaining of the original land uses contained in the previous plans (KTU and AIM) without tampering with them (Speer, 2008).

Thus, while the AS&P plan helped consolidate the land use plans of the previous master plans into a single land use plan for the CA, it equally led to some substantial changes in the land uses contained in these plans. The AS&P at best then is not a complete departure from the land uses envisaged for the CA by the Abuja master plan and the respective supplementary master plans of the CA (KTU and AIM).

**Figure 31:** the two-fold action of the review process of the AS&P master plan.

*Author, 2015*
Figure 32: SF Cologne Land use Plan. Source (Speer, 2008).

The marked red portion is CA’s phase1 where the KTU Land uses are joined together with the rest of the city (Abuja) as a single land use plan. However, the marked blue portion is CA’s phase2. As can be seen, the phase 2 land use plan (AIM), just plain without the land uses (colour codes), indicating that it was not consolidated or joined with the rest of the city’s land uses.
Figure 33: Consolidated land uses of the CA for both phase 1 and 2, showing on the AS&P Land use plan of 2008; Speer, 2008
6.3. Land use Design Process

The preceding section narrated the broad land uses of the IPA intended to guide the development of land use in the CA. It also narrated the detail land uses of the CA starting from the KTU, AIM and the AS&P consolidated land uses. This section explores how the land uses were produced. Emphasis is on the multiplicity of intricacies that surrounded the process

6.3.1. IPA Design Process

Recruitment, American Dollar and Other Intricacies

By 1978 professor Akin Mabogunje, a renowned professor of Geography had completed the feasibility study of the FCT and the demographics of the existing population. With that came the need to engage a planning firm to prepare the Abuja master plan (Mabogunje, 2011). The job for the master plan was advertised with many firms biding for it. In the end, the International Planning Associate - an America firm was awarded the job. The firm was a consortium of three previously independent firms namely Planning Research, WRT, and Ach-System which came together to form it for the Abuja master plan job (Morah, 1993; Elleh, 2015; Jibrin, 2015).

Close to one hundred different groups of expatriate firms, including planning teams from Britain, West Germany, USA, Japan, Canada and Greece, submitted proposals. The International Planning Associate (IPA), an American consortium specifically formed for the competition, was eventually selected (Morah, 1993 257).

Their selection as former director in the FCDA explains, was predicated on technical competence.

As an American firm, we believed that it would be highly competent to design the master plan for the new capital city. Besides that it also scaled through the screening process for the selection of consultants (Abuja Planner A2 2013, interview).

Nigeria just got Independence in 1960 from the British but still dependent on it in several technical aspects, for instance the built sector. Under this circumstance, one makes sense of why the FCDA would opt out to engage a foreign consultant for the Abuja master plan.

To justify the selection of foreign planners over indigenous planners, the FCDA had to argue that the cumbersome and arduous of task of planning a new city was not within the indigenous technical capability... the middle of 1970s was not the bygone days when developing countries depended on the advanced countries to plan their world (Morah, 1993, p. 257).

There are however those who differ about this. They see the engagement strictly on the basis of what they refer to as the American Dollar. The American Dollar, they assert, was a two-prong deal with two mutually benefiting actors - the Americans and the Nigerian FCDA
bureaucrats. This school of thought further maintains that even before the job was advertised the FCDA had already pre-determined that the Americans will handle it.

At the time in the 1970s we were very few in the ministry. I mean at the federal ministry of economic development planning where physical planning was placed. But even before the announcement of the final selection, of who will handle the planning of Abuja, we all knew the predisposition of our seniors that they were more interested in the Americans to handle the consultancy. So all that bidding process was just a public show because truly the leadership of the ministry had already made up their mind on who should undertake the master planning of Abuja. Again we knew too that it was all about the American dollar, the hard currency, which the leadership stood to gain by manipulating the process in favour of the Americans well ahead of time even before the selection process of consultants. In fact when I went into the office of my senior, one of the leaderships, after enquiring about how the Abuja project was going and as we talked through many issues in connection to the master planning of Abuja, he told me point blank that the Americans will plan the city. I couldn’t believe just what I was hearing. How could they when we have not even done the selection? So we knew all the scheming and manipulations to get the Americans have the job and indeed they got it (Abuja Planner D 2014, interview)

But the FCDA refutes the allegation. Most of the planners interviewed during the fieldwork would either decline to comment on the matter or refute it. The refutation is often based on the issue of technical competency - asserting that the Americans got the consultancy for the Abuja master plan because they found them qualified to undertake it. Whether the American Dollar allegation is true or not, a similar scenario resonates in the planning of Chandigarh in India. Perera (2004) reports that at the start of the Chandigarh’s project, an ‘American firm known as Mayer and Whittlessey’ was consulted to handle the planning of the city ‘in January 1950 with Albert Mayer and an American-domiciled Polish émigré, Maciej Nowitzki’ as the principal designers’. However,

      According to authoritative sources, Nowick’s death in August 1950 and the American dollar’s increasing value were the reasons for replacing the Mayer team with Corbusier in November 1950 (Perera, 2004, p. 177)

He goes ahead to remind us of numerous networks of interests that take place in the planning and creation of new capitals (chapter 2). In the case of Chandigarh, he highlights the power of the bureaucrats in influencing the planning of the city right at the consultancy stage of engaging a planning firm. In Abuja too the bureaucrats through the FCDA had enormous statutory powers with the autonomy to recruit any firm it deemed competent to handle the planning of Abuja (Morah, 1993; Mabogunje, 2011). Whether this power was compromised in the selection of the Americans based on the American Dollar as reflected in the case of Chandigarh or not, the
FCDA does not seem to advance any other reasons for the commissioning of the Americans to undertake the master planning of Abuja other than the issue of technical competency.

There is yet another school of thought that questions the Americans’ selection. Just as the previous school of thought, it does not buy the argument (technical competency) advanced by the FCDA for the selection of the Americans. Its particular concern is why the FCDA would commission a foreign firm when there existed competent indigenous professionals to have handled the job. This position appears driven by professional and nationalistic motives. Thus, as soon as professor Akin Mabogunje’s feasibility and demographic report was ready in 1978 as earlier mentioned, the indigenous professionals desired to undertake the planning of the new capital. They equated it in the sense of an opportunity to plan their national capital city as the case of Brasilia. Brasilia the new capital of Brasil was planned primarily by Brazilians without the engagement of foreign consultants (Holston, 1989). Abuja too the Nigerian professionals expected to do same. In his autobiography, Professor Mabogunje still believes the indigenous professionals were not only quite qualified to undertake the endeavour but would have even done a better job than the Americans (Mabogunje, 2011).

*It is my candid opinion that if we had arranged to critique the design of a group of Nigerian planners as vigorously as we did that of the foreign firm, we could have had as good, if not better, a product for our money (Mabogunje, 2011, p 460-461).*

One thing is obvious though. As at 1978 when the Abuja job was awarded the Americans the country had limited number of professional planners.

*At federal ministry level [for instance] we were less than 5 in the 1970s (Abuja Planner D 2014, interview).*

Against this backdrop one wonders the extent to which the indigenous professionals would have executed such a job of magnitude. Perhaps the opportunity could have spurred them to reach out to one another and form a consortium of planners and allied professionals for the job. This had been done before in the case of professor Mabogunje in 1978 - where he approached the feasibility and demographic study of Abuja as a consortium and outsourced the various components of the job to his academic peers at his university of Ibadan and other universities in the country (Mabogunje, 2011).

**Planning**

With the contract finally awarded, the Americans began the planning of Abuja in 1978. The planning to some extent made use of the earlier feasibility/demographic studies done by professor Mabogunje. In addition the Americans travelled round the country studying
indigenous architecture and the customs of the people to reflect in the master plan of Abuja (IPA, 1979). This would be seen as a valuable way of ensuring that in as much as the government desired an international city, certain elements of the plan should reflect Nigerian values. Nevertheless, the degree to which the locals (Nigerians) were involved in the planning process of Abuja, or the extent to which the Americans understood the values and customs of the people tends to be questionable.

To start with, was the time frame for the job enough to warrant an in-depth ethnographic study of Nigeria and its values as well as its architectural heritage? The whole length of the Abuja master plan stretched from 1978 to 1979 - barely two years. With less than two years the Americans were expected to undertake site assessments, evolve concepts and bring up a master plan. The time would be considered inadequate to undertake the task and at the same time make sense of the indigenous values profoundly. The Americans at best would have relied substantially on secondary data about the indigenous people and their architecture, and their interactions with the people they met and held conversations with across the country. This would no doubt be a credible way to elicit information to help in the planning of Abuja. But the major problem as already mentioned laid in the adequacy of such contacts to warrant an in-depth understanding of local design values. And to exacerbate this much of the design of the master plan was actually done in the US than in Nigeria where the context (Abuja) is.

In terms of the actual dynamics of the master planning, a later article by Todd (1984: 120-1), the US planning team resident manager in charge of project direction, acknowledges that 'work on most elements of the new capital was accomplished primarily in the United States', in Washington, DC and Philadelphia (Morah, 1993, p. 258).

Morah (1993) goes further explaining how this created disharmony between the Americans and the FCDA officials.

This occurrence was 'somewhat at odds with the concept that the FCDA had that all of the work would be accomplished in Nigeria'. Todd also admits that this fact remained 'a source of discontent in the FCDA' throughout the master-planning phase, as the agency was never appeased with the alternative arrangements that were made. Commenting on the seriousness of this disharmony, the resident manager cautions: 'let this experience be a word of warning to those who would practice their profession in the distant land'. The repercussion of this warning was later to be fully felt when the FCDA had control of implementation of the master plan (Morah, 1993; p. 258)

‘The repercussion’, as one of the planners in charge of promoting the Abuja master plan to investors and enlightening the public about it, when the master plan was eventually prepared and adopted for implementation, narrates that it was quite ‘grievous’. 

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The Americans spent much of the time overseas designing the master plan. How can you design something as if it’s from the blues without being on ground? To do a design of this magnitude you need to be on ground to keep looking at the site conditions – gauging what’s happening on ground, and planning with the context. Eventually what they produced was just a Western city. This was a grievous thing to do to us by staying overseas and designing a city without understanding the context you are designing for (Abuja Planner B1 2013, interview).

Morah (1993) raises a vital question similar to the narration of the Abuja planner particularly in regard to the extent to which the Americans understood for instance, local housing demands and needs.

Given the situation where the Atlantic Ocean separated the planners from the project, the curiosity then is: from whom did the expatriate planners get their cues on the nature of local housing demands and needs (Morah, 1993, p. 259)

But beyond these concerns of the design being done overseas and the accompanying repercussions, others have questioned even the evaluation and review of the master plan when it was finally prepared.

In the end a draft of the plan was made and series of presentations made before the public. This would been seen as yet another credible way of refining the plan to meet the needs and aspirations of Nigerian government represented by the FCDA and the Military leaders. But as credible as would have been, it can at best be said that the draft presentations and reviews were rather elitist in nature. They skewed towards the educated man/woman while the village, ordinary farmer, market woman, and the street labourer, did not know what the master plan draft was all about (Abuja Planner A1 2014, interview).

Elucidating further, another planner concludes that,

In reality therefore, the eventual plan by the Americans was prepared for the Nigerian government represented by the elites in the region of bureaucrats, academics, professionals, military leaders, traditional leaders, and the likes; not for the bulk of the ordinary woman/man toiling as farmers, market women, and labourers (Abuja Planner A4 2014, interview).

In 1979 the Abuja master plan was ‘accepted by government’. Following the acceptance ‘the work of development and construction began soon after’ (Mabogunje, 2011). But the euphoria of having a master plan for the city planned by Americans could not last long. This is because,

Immediately upon the completion of the master plan the Americans got disbanded, - causing great shock and pains for us – [the FCDA]. Tell you what? This was so horrible! As any aspect of the master plan needing feedback could not be responded to by the Americans. We were thrown into disarray! Remember even the design was substantially done in America and not here. And now again these guys just went into blues nowhere to be found. Nothing like International Planning Associates on the surface of the earth (Abuja Planner B2 2013, interview).
Mabogunje (2011), reflecting after 3 decades of the episode equally reminds us about it and equates the episode to a national loss.

None of the three firms that made the consortium [International Planning Associates] could be found anywhere. Whatever they had amassed from the exercise by way of data, analytical capacity and practical experiences were now lost to the country (Mabogunje 2011, p. 461)

6.3.2. KTU Design process

Firm’s Substitution and Other Intricacies of Recruitment

Despite the vacuum created by the disbandment of the American firm (International Planning Associate) - the city had move to on. In the CA and as noted earlier in this chapter, following the completion of the Abuja master plan in 1979, a need arose to have detailed land use and urban designs for the CA toward translating the broad visions of the master into specifics (KTU, 1981; FCDA 1999; Speer, 2008; Elleh 2015). Again, the FCDA advertised the job and several international planning firms applied for it. In the end the choice was narrowed down between a Canadian and Japanese firm (Kenzo Tange Urtec).

However, making the choice between the two firms was a laborious exercise by the panel of jurors set by the FCDA to screen and assess the firms. A member of the jurors interviewed during the fieldwork reports that it was a keenly contested competition between the two firms, with the process of selecting the most qualified firm dragging deep into the night. He provides insights into the process of the assessment and what transpired.

The whole process dragged deep into the night. It was between a Canadian firm and a Japanese firm. But in the end, the Canadian firm got the highest score. Shortly after that the FCDA officials started making excuses for the Japanese firm that he may not have understood one of the questions since the whole interview was conducted in English. There and then we asked the officials that do you want the request of the examination to speak for itself, or you want to be speaking for the result? We couldn’t take it anymore and left. In the end they did what they wanted as we would later learn that the Japanese got the job (Abuja Planner E 2014, interview).

Like in the case of the alleged American Dollar involving the FCDA and the Americans, the FCDA’s position on the supposedly substitution of the Canadian Firm in favour of the Japanese firm is that of refutation. They debunk having had any underhand influence in the selection of Kenzo Tange (the Japanese) nor substituting the Canadian firm in favour of the Japanese firm. They are quick again to point out that professor Kenzo Tange was a world-renowned planner and architect and highly competent and thus scaled through the jurors’ evaluation.
Granted that he was a renowned planner and architect, but it would seem as though the selection process was undermined by the FCDA in favour of the Japanese. This is because even prior to the evaluation of the firms for the CA job, the Authority had already appeared predisposed to either the Japanese firm or the ‘designer of Milton Keynes in Britain’ – a British Outfit (Mabogunje, 2011). Mabogunje (2011) recounts the excitement of the officials as they set forth to invite the duo for the CA job.

Soon after [the completion of Abuja master plan], there was also talk of a special design for the Central Business District [the CA] of the capital city and officials were jumping up again to invite the Japanese city planner ... or the designer of Milton Keynes in Britain (Mabogunje, 2011, p. 467)

He reports further that the Japanese ‘was actually invited to the country’ although ‘nothing came of the idea’ as the time (Mabogunje, 2011, p. 467). The invitation would suggest an affinity towards the Japanese by the FCDA stretching way back even before the Jurors’ assessment of the firms would come up. Why would the officials be ‘jumping up to invite the Japanese’ prior to any assessment and certainly did invite him? Would this suggest that they would go at any length to undermine the assessment process in his favour when the Jurors eventually assessed him and the Canadian firm? Put in another way, why was there no such obvious excitement to the Canadian firm prior to the assessment? Or why was the Canadian firm not also invited prior to the advertised bidding for the job, as was done in the case of the Japanese?

It is quite a stormy issue which the FCDA considers unpalatable to hear or talk about. This re-echoed loudly at the Abuja’s monthly meeting of Town Planners held on 29 January 2014. On this day through a paper I presented before the gathering of the planners on ‘issues in the planning of the Central Area’ to mark end of the fieldwork (chapter 4), when the allegation was raised in the paper the atmosphere became charged. The house divided too. On one side were some older planners mostly in the category of district officers, retired deputy directors and directors from the various planning agencies that make up the FCDA. They were visibly uncomfortable about the allegation. One after the other they got up and responded laying rather much emphasis on the technical competency of the late renowned Professor Kenzo Tange, and the thorough master plan he bequeathed FCDA; while equally shelving off the allegation of any underhand influence in the selection process of the CA’s job in his favour.

On the other side of the divide were those that expressed shock and desired that the matter be discussed further. But since it was a paper presentation it was time bound and the matter could not be stretched longer than the time allotted for the paper. Much as I desired to pursue the
matter further even after the presentation there were obstacles in that regard. First, no report of the transaction of the jurors could be found at the FCDA’s library (particularly at the URP) regarding the Japanese’s recruitment. Second, most of the earlier planners that worked with the organisation (FCDA) had retired and some left the city. It was quite difficult therefore to triangulate from them the allegations. Third, even those still living in Abuja either seemed not to know anything about the supposed under handling of the selection process, or not interested in discussing the matter.

The planning

With the contract eventually awarded to the Japanese firm work on the CA master plan begun. But in the case of the Japanese unlike the Americans, the FCDA insisted that three indigenous firms should work alongside with the KTU. A member of one of the indigenous firms explains further. A member of the indigenous team explains further.

During the Central Area work we were drawn to be part of the Kenzo team. We came from the North, West and East of the country. That is representing the different regions of the country (Abuja Consultant 2014, interview).

This was rather a sudden change in policy by the Authourity. Such a synergy was absent during the master planning of Abuja by the Americans. The change is said to be connected to the “‘hues and cries of the indigenous professionals”’ somewhat 3 years earlier (1978) that followed the American’s selection for the job of the Abuja master (Abuja Planner A 2013, interview). At any rate by 1981 the KTU master plan for the CA was ready. The plan has been acclaimed a master piece due to its technical thoroughness

Yet it is this very technical details of the plan that would become a problem rather than enhance the development of the CA in the early years of the plan. The planners would find it rather too technical to interpret or comprehend its proposals. One had to be schooled in the science and art of the master plan to understand it. One would assume that since the KTU design process involved three Nigerian indigenous firms, they would in turn provide insights to the local planners on issues relating to the plan’s interpretation. But even at that they found the plan difficult to interpret. One of the Planners reveals that “‘it was more of an observer, learner-apprentice relationship than an equal to equal relationship”’ between the KTU and the indigenous firms (Abuja Planner A5 2014, interview). Mainly therefore, the authorship of the plan would be attributed to the Japanese (Kenzo Tange) and assisted by his lieutenants under the KTU team than a substantial input to it coming from the indigenous firms. Not long ago the Americans’ firm had been disbanded and the FCDA could not get feedbacks from the Americans on any aspect of the IPA’s broad land use provisions for CA. This was now more compounded with the KTU interpretation challenge regarding its detailed land use provisions.
6.3.3. AIM Design process

By 1984 the AIMs consult completed the design of the second phase of the CA. The firm is a Lebanese’-Nigerian based firm and two factors appear to have played out in its favour. First, the FCDA seems poised to avoid the debacle created following the disbandment of the IPA. Second, it may have been totally uncomfortable with the observer-relationship between the KTU and the indigenous firms in the planning of the CA’s phase1. Thirdly, the issue of national pride and experimentation would have been the driver, that is the need to engage a home-based firm in handling the phase 2 of the CA. One of the Planners during the AIM’s recruitment, provides insights into this.

*This time we decided that we should have a company that is domiciled in the country. Look at what happened during the Americans? - when they just vanished into air. We couldn’t get any feedbacks. We therefore decided to work with this firm for the phase 2 of the district. It’s quite easier because you can easily have access to it - should you need any information or feedback about the plan and the district (Abuja Planner B4 2014, interview).*

In the end the plan was ready in 1984 providing the detailed land use plan and urban designs for the phase 2 of the district.

6.3.4. AS&P Design Process

As already mentioned in the previous section, the FCDA engaged a German firm to undertake the review of the previous master plans (KTU and AIM). But why the FCDA consulted this foreign firm for the review is still not clear. Unlike in the case of the International Planning Associate (the Americans’ firm) that was disbanded after the completion of the Abuja master plan, the AIM that planned the CA had not been disbanded for instance. It could have been easier to recruit it for the review - one may argue. This would be on the strength that since they had done the jobs earlier they would be potentially privy to certain information and more conversant with the context than engaging an entirely new firm in a new terrain for the review. So why was the Germans recruited?

First, it is attributed to the influence of Julius Berger - another German construction giant in Abuja. Some refer to Abuja as the Julius Berger city since much of the construction in Abuja are undertaken by the firm (Ajayi, 2013). Most of the planners interviewed point to its likely influence for its fellow Germans to have secured the job for the review of the CA master plans.

*You can’t rule out that possibility. Berger has so much influence in this Abuja. It’s not a small firm. It has most of top Nigerians as shareholders and these*
people can influence anything. Even the military, the retired generals are part of the company (Abuja Planner C1 2013, interview).

The second reason may lay in Albert Speer’s long-standing association with the city of Abuja. At the bidding process of the Master plan of Abuja in which the Americans got the job, the German firm (Albert Speer) was part of the competition having submitted its proposal too although it was not selected. It is likely that due to its initial interest in participating in the planning of the city, it would have kept tract of the development of the city exploring avenues of someday contributing to the review of the development of the city (Speer, 2008).

The third factor is linked to the issue of underhand manipulation of the recruitment process that allegedly characterised the Americans’ and Japanese recruitment process for the master planning of Abuja and the CA’s phase 1 respectively as earlier observed. Whether these allegations are true or not, the engagement of a firm to undertake planning consultancy in Abuja at the massive scale of master planning tends to be greeted by these kinds of allegations. In the Germans’ recruitment too, there are some reservations about how the job of the review and consolidation of the CA master plans (KTU and AIM) was awarded to them through their firm - Albert Speer & Partner GmbH. First, the reservations bother on the issue of the American Dollar. Most of the indigenous planners interviewed express dissatisfaction over the award of the job to the foreign firm. They accuse the FCDA that foreign firms charge in hard foreign currency and the FCDA in return have a share in the hard currency and thus would always want to patronize the foreign firms. Mabogunje (2011, p. 461) too concludes that,

*It is difficult to dismiss the insinuations that it is because it is easier to secure foreign exchange through graft when contracts or professional consultancies are handed over to the foreign organisations.*

But in its usual style the FCDA debunks the allegation. It accentuates the reason for the engagement of the Germans on the basis of technical competence as usual. Be that as it may, the extent to which the indigenous planners are quick to label allegations against the FCDA regarding the engagement of foreign firms, still needs exploring further to ascertain the veracity of the allegations. But in the absent of supportive documents as evidences on either party (the FCDA and the indigenous planners) and as earlier noted, makes it even difficult to establish the veracity. Not disregarding the allegations though, it might be that the indigenous planners’ non-engagement in the CA’s jobs tends to be the impetus behind their outbursts in the form of accusations.

Whether either of the three possibilities is correct or not, in the next five years starting from 2003 to 2008 the firm undertook the review of the CA’s previous master plans (KTU and AIM).
The review resulted in producing a consolidated master plan in the CA known as the AS&P master plan as earlier noted. In terms of land uses it equally consolidated the hitherto existing land use plans into a single use plan.

**A backlash**

Despite the production of the AS&P there tends to be disappointment with the level of participation that heralded the AS&P design process, involving the German firm and the planners of the various planning agencies in Abuja. From the URP to the DDC, most of the planners especially the site officers who are involved in the day to day implementation of the land uses at the district level claim they were not fully involved in the review process.

> Most of the participations were done by the Ogas [top level planners]. We who are site officers were not so much involved it. I remember we did one or two presentations and that’s it. I think it was not enough because they needed to much more about the realities of planning in the CA than just few presentations. Instead it was more of a top-level engagement with some of the Ogas (Abuja Planner C3, 2013).

But according to the Germans the review process had engaged the planners and worked ‘closely and effectively’ with them.

> The Executive Secretary and his staff provided invaluable advice, support and encouragement. It was through their interest in the outcome of the project that the consultant’s team was able to liaise so closely and effectively with their counterparts in all involved departments of the FCDA (Speer, 2008, p.iii).

Regardless of this claim by the site officers, the public especially land developers seem to be oblivious of the AS&P master plan. Generally, the public tends to be disconnected about planning in Abuja and particularly in the CA not just about the AS&P - because of the technical verbosity of the plans (Nor, 2014).

> The public particularly land developers do not understand the land uses and urban design provisions of the master plan. They consider it too technical. The building plan approval process is equally deemed too technical and abstract. They are thus alienated by the planning jargons in the CA (Nor, 2014, p.8).

As one of the land developers observes,

> For how can you invest or be interested in something (AS&P plan) you do not know about, something that is incomprehensible to you? As far as I am concerned, even if there was a review, the process did not carry the public along. (Abuja Developer A 2014, interview).

There is another aspect of the review worth mentioning apart from the issue of participation. It has to do with the contemptuous way in which the planners regard the AS&P master plan. During my paper presentation at the Abuja Planners’ monthly meeting to mark the end of the
fieldwork for this thesis as earlier mentioned, I was again made aware of the contemptuousness to which the AS&P is held by the planners especially those in the planning agencies. Almost all the planners at the meeting as well as others I had earlier on interviewed elsewhere in Abuja, hold the AS&P in contempt due to numerous reasons.

To start with they do not believe in the AS&P review and that there was no need for the review in the first place. As one of the planers put it,

> What are you reviewing when you have not implemented much of the original plan (Abuja Planner B 3 2013, interview).

In as much as the original plans had been as old as over twenty years and many changes had taken place which ordinarily would warrant a review to update the plans, the planners still do not see the need for the review and the master plan produced by the Germans. They believe the problem primarily was not the original plans (the KTU nor AIM) but other factors were the major forces that limited the implementation of the plans. What was needed as they assert, would be to tackle the factors of politics, weak development control and funding for instance, but not the review of the CA plans.

Furthermore, each time the planners refer to the master plans of the CA they ordinarily do not imply the AIM or even the latest AS&P. But their implied reference is assumed to be the KTU than the other master plans in the district. A former director in the FCDA explains the reasons behind this.

> It is because the planners tend to religiously hold the KTU plan in high esteem and still distaste the fact that their revered plan, which they also refer to as the Green Book, has been reviewed and revised by the Germans producing another master plan [the AS&P]. How could their beautiful plan be reviewed? Even though the plan had presented some challenges in its interpretation in the early years due to its technical depth, the planners have grown over the years to love and cherish the plan. To them, when you talk about the CA you cannot talk about it without Kenzo [the KTU]. It was and still the best plan to them. And I must tell you the Jap did a thorough work! I love the plan too and we indeed started following and enjoying it once we had overcome the initial challenge of reading it and interpreting it (Abuja Planner A4 2013, interview).

One is tempted to associate the loyalty to some level of nostalgic feeling. Having become accustomed to a particular plan over twenty years and then it becomes revised; some lost-emotions about some cherish elements of the plan would be gone.

But beyond that the AS&P plan is equated to injustice and the politics of the city. Through the master plan, larger plots that were hitherto designated in the KTU and AIM were scaled down and subdivided into smaller plots. This was supposedly to encourage investment into the district
as earlier demonstrated in this chapter. But most planners do not see it so. They view the plot subdivision by the AS&P as purely a “political weapon” employed by the government (FCT Administration) to further “balkanize plot to relocate its political associates” (Abuja Planner B1 2014, interview). It is not only the planners that seem to be in this league. Property developers too feel this way. Hence the subdivision of large complex plots into smaller plots to reallocate to others has been viewed as injustice and a camouflage to “either snatch plots from previous allotees or create plots for their associates” (Abuja Developer B2 2013, interview). However, there are those who believe the subdivision was required to facilitate the development of the CA.

Of course you cannot rule out any driving interest in planning. Yes there could have been certain interests outplaying in the subdivision but the truth is those plots were very big plots and not everyone could afford developing them. Some just held on these plots over the years without doing anything. So it was great that we rescaled them down and reallocated to those with the potential to develop them than leaving the big plots expected to be built into complex developments. I am speaking from a professional point of view and am not denying that there could have been some level of interests behind the subdivision (Abuja Planner C3 2013, interview)

Regardless of these backlash that greeted the AS&P, the master plan has gone to be the most current consolidated master plan of the CA guiding land use implementation.

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter has addressed one of the three circles of the frame of narrative of the thesis. It dwelled on the plan and the land uses that national elites and planners have desired to develop in the CA. In a way then the chapter has addressed the research question 2 (chapter 1) which seeks to know what the land uses of the CA are and how the land uses were designed. In addressing this the chapter had been structured into two broad sections. The first explored the overarching role of the CA in the context of Abuja’s monumental conception and nation building. It also looked at the broad and detailed land uses of the CA toward achieving the overarching role of the CA in Abuja. The second on the other hand brought to light the multiple interests and intricacies that underpin the design process of the broad and detailed land uses of the CA.
Chapter 6 dwelled on the broad and detailed land uses of the CA which are expected to be implemented toward achieving nation building. It also looked at the design process of the land uses and the intricacies that underlain the process. This chapter and in line with the frame of narrative outlined in chapter 4, focuses on the nature of planning and environment within which planning has taken place in Abuja. It discusses the economic and political environment of the country when the land uses of the CA were planned as well as the transitions since then, and the planning agencies that have been involved in the planning and implementation of the land uses over the years. The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first discusses the changing nature of the political, economic and structure of planning in Abuja starting from 1979 when the Abuja master plan was prepared. The second looks at the process of planning and implementation of land uses in Abuja as well as the planning agencies that have been involved in the process.

7.1. An Environment of Fluidities

This section discusses the fluidities in terms of the changing nature of the political, economic and structure of planning in Abuja since 1979. It also dwells on the actors and events that have driven the fluidities.

7.1.1. 1980s Fluidities

Creation of a parallel Government Body

The master plan of Abuja (IPA) as already mentioned in chapter 6 and elsewhere was ready by 1979. Coinciding with this was the country’s return to civilian rule in the same year - with Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the president (Vale, 2008; Ajayi, 2013). The president started the implementation of the master plan - laying the foundation for the development of the city and undertaking a pilot development of one of the districts of Abuja (Garki district). This was supported by the country’s oil revenues of the 1970s (Mabogunje, 2011). As already discussed in chapter 5, the country experienced a boom in its oil sector in the 1970s and the entire Abuja project had been expected to be funded from the revenues. This provided the financial ground
for the President’s aggressive commitment to the implementation of the master plan (Moore, 1984; Mabogunje, 2011; Elleh, 2015).

Irrespective of what may have driven the commitment, in just 3 years (1979) into the decree (Decree No. 6 of 1976) that established the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), and the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) to oversee the planning and development of the entire FCT, the President created yet another parallel body known as the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory (MFCT). The MFCT was expected to be responsible for the i) planning and development of the FCT; ii) control of development within the FCT; iii) provision of social services; iv) Administration of the FCT; v) allocation of urban and rural lands in the FCT; and vi) and collaborations with the FCDA.

The roles however tended to overlap those of the FCDA which had been primarily charged with the same responsibilities as previously mentioned (FCDA, 1999; El-Rufai, 2011). The MFCT’s creation is seen more as a political consideration by the political class to create portfolios for its ruling members than in the interests of the FCT (Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi, 2013). Moved by such consideration by the political class and represented by President Shagari, they were less concerned about even the legal impetus behind the creation of the MFCT. This is because MFCT lacked any law backing it other than a presidential directive that was issued by the president directing its creation (FCDA, 1999; Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi, 2013; El-Rufai, 2013).

Before long, the overlaps led to conflicts and clashes of interests between the MFCT and the FCDA.

The responsibility of building the city [by the FCDA]. had little problem at inception since it had a board of its own but with the creation of the ministry of Federal Capital Territory, conflicts arose between the Minister and the Chairman of the FCDA board (FCDA, 1999, p. 70).

The conflicts would go on manifesting in the form of a tug of war for supremacy between the government agencies as the years roll by. The FCDA, backed by the legal provisions of Degree No. 6 1976 that established both the FCT and FCDA, continually felt it was its primary responsibility to plan and develop the Territory and not to be bullied by any other government agency. On the other hand the MFCT felt it

33 Apart from the revenues the President’s commitment to the development of Abuja appears partly underpinned by ethno-regional proclivities. Abuja though is in the Middle Belt Region of the country, it used to be part of the greater Northern Region since the colonial era until in 1963 when the Region and other Regions in the country were devolved into states. Ethno-regional interests have always played out prominently in Nigeria’s capital relocation history from the colonial era to post-Independence. The President would have been orchestrating this interest by ensuring that the ‘Arewa’ project (Abuja) is executed since he comes from the ‘Arewa’ base - Northern Region of Nigeria (Chapter 5).
had the overriding powers over the FCDA since it was created by a presidential directive (Abuja Planner D1 2014, interview)

Restructuring within the FCDA

The lingering conflicts between the FCDA and MFCT notwithstanding, within the FCDA itself, there had been some internal restructuring and which tended to be endless. Even before the creation of the MFCT by president Shagari, the FCDA had decided to decentralise some of its roles by creating other agencies. For instance,

The FCDA established the defunct FCTA [Federal Territory Capital Administration] and appointed an Administrator to administer those parts of the FCT [the regional areas and satellite towns] not covered by the Abuja Master Plan (FCDA, 1999, p. 63).

This would have been informed by the urgent need to have the new capital city developed and occupied in time. 1986 had been defined by the IPA master plan as the occupancy date for the new capital city (FCDA, 1979), and the devolution of duties to the FCTA could have been premised on this urgent need (FCDA, 1999). Or the sheer magnitude of dealing with the entire FCT seems to have overwhelmed the FCDA - hence the inevitable need to shed off some responsibilities to the FCTA. Or simply, the FCDA was merely following the recommendations of the IPA master plan which recommended the need for a regional body to be established to handle regional development matters (FCDA, 1979; Ajayi, 2013). A former director believes the creation of the FCTA was more motivated by the sheer magnitude of the task before the FCDA than any other reason that may have influenced the creation of FCTA.

The task of building the city was rather enormous for the FCDA. The task was too huge to build and at the same time manage the city. So these responsibilities far outweighs the capacity of FCDA (Abuja planner B4 2014, interview)

The FCTA would be later scrapped by the FCDA in the 1980s. Three major factors have been attributed to this. These are: the poor management of the regional areas by the FCTA, neglect of the FCTA by the FCDA, and clashes of interest between the FCDA and FCTA (Ajayi, 2013). With the dissolution of the FCTA, the FCDA went ahead to create ‘a regional planning division within the Department of Planning And Survey in 1984 and absorbed the staff of the defunct FCTA’ back into the FCDA family through a new structure known as the regional planning division. The division was later transformed into a full-fledged unit with the responsibility of overseeing the regional planning and development of the FCT’ (FCDA, 1999, p.63)

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34 The entire FCT covers an expanse of 8000km square. Out of this 250km square is originally dedicated for the city - Abuja, while the remaining is to cater for the regional towns of the FCT and the Area Councils. However the original 4 phases that make up the city have now been extended to five phases, as such the city’s landmass also extends beyond the original 250km squares.
Political Changes and Collapse of Oil Revenues

It must also be stressed that in the 1980s while the restructuring within the FCDA was taking place, at the national level the country had just experienced a military coup in December 1983. The new military administration led by General Muhammed Buhari however did not see the development of the city as a priority. A total departure from the previous Shagari’s government commitment to the development of the city.

*It was because General Buhari regarded Abuja as a patronage project by the former government of Shagari. To him Abuja reflected wasteful resources and corruption. And again we have begun to face the economic challenges because the oil money revenue went down. In short the country was in a mess economically. So he was not interested to continue with the plan (Abuja Planner A3 2013, interview).*

Much of the economic crisis experienced by the country around this time came from the second wave of the OPEC crisis of the late 1970s (chapter 5). It is not clear however whether the General’s attitude had to do with the economic crisis. Or, if in the face of an economic boom, whether he would have supported the Abuja project. Other than the apparent economic crisis and corruption that is attributed to have characterised the development of Abuja (Vale, 2008), and thus underpinning the General’s non-commitment to the city’s development, it tends to be difficult to associate him to any ulterior motive for the non-commitment to the development of the city.

The General’s military regime however lasted a year and eight months. It too was ousted in a military coup in August 1985 by General Ibrahim Babangida. The new regime nevertheless reinvigorated commitment to the development of Abuja.\(^{35}\) Whether his commitment to Abuja was driven by the Arewa affinity or not, one thing is certain though. General Babangida’s commitment to Abuja and the implementation of the IPA master plan and other districts of the city including the CA was quite vigorous throughout the 1980s – developing infrastructure and opening the districts (Olajide, 2004).

\(^{35}\) The commitment may have come from the ethno-regional idiosyncrasies of capital relocation in Nigeria. As in the case of President Shagari who is a Northerner as already observed, General Babangida also comes from the greater old Northern Region of Nigeria - the ‘Arewa Region’. This could have motivated his commitment to the Abuja project based on the Arewa affiliation. More strongly is the fact that his state, Niger state, has contiguous boundary with the FCT and is among the states that was carved out to form the FCT. Such peculiarities may have instigated deeper affinity for his commitment to the Arewa project. In the case of General Buhari, a Northern though, it is quite difficult to establish any remote affinity to the Arewa project since he showed indifference to supporting the development of Abuja as already explained in this chapter.
7.1.2. 1990s Fluidities

Official Transfer of Power to Abuja and More Political Take Overs

The 1980s reveal the fluidities that characterised planning in Abuja and the FCT. This changing nature also continued in the 1990s. At the political level, General Babangida’s commitment in the 1980s to the development of the city became further reinforced in 1991 when he effectively transferred the seat of government from Lagos to Abuja (Vale, 2008). A former director of the FCDA provides insights into this.

_The military government of Babangida tried. It was under his time that even abandoned projects by past administrations were completed. Abuja city was now linked to Shiroro Dam for power supply. We completed detailed Land use plans and layout plans, and Engineering Designs for Phase 2 of the city. We also resettled the villages in Phase 1 out of the city. So much was done under him. The regime also gave us free hand to plan and provided enough resources to get the city developed (Abuja Planner B2 2014, interview)._}

Despite this, the General’s regime through the successive ministers of the FCT, undertook other decisions that ran contrary to the provisions of the IPA master plan. For example, was the decision to allocate the houses of federal ministers on hills in the Maitama district of Abuja (Olajide, 2004). Olajide (2004) further explains that according to the Abuja master plan, hills in the district are meant to be left in their pristine state and not to be used for the construction of houses.

_This was done to take advantage of the vantage views over the city offered by the hills as well as the value of land in the district which is quite considered very expensive. You know Maitama district is strategic because of the high profile of rich people living there and quality infrastructure, and so the value of land is expensive. So, again, having a plot on top of the hill offers a vantage view; so people are either to have the plots and all these make the value of land there quite expensive (Abuja Planner B1 2013, interview)._}

Olajide (2004) reports that since then successive FCT ministers have continued to undermine the provisions of the IPA. This has ‘altered the systematic implementation of Abuja master plan’. Often, this would be done with some level of political intimidation from the ministers and powerful politicians (Olajide, 2004; Ajayi, 2013). Reflecting over the years, as a practicing planner in Abuja, Olajide (2004) observes that,

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36 Olajide worked during this period as a planner with the FCDA and rose to the rank of the Director of the Department of Urban and Regional Planning (URP) 2002-2004. In 2004 at the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners’ Day (Abuja’s Chapter), he presented this paper recounting the political decisions and intricacies that surround the development of Abuja.
The professionals, especially, the Urban and Regional Planners, were coerced into amending their plans to soothe the political leadership (Olajide, 2004, p. 9)

But by 1993 another military regime was again in power. It governed the country from then to 1998. Throughout this period General Sani Abacha, who became the military head state, continued to develop the city. Most of the city’s district plans were designed around this period. There was massive public housing for instance the Gwarinpa Housing Estate, the construction of the national assembly complex and many other projects were undertaken by the General. But upon his death in 1998, yet another military head of state - General Abdulsalami Abubakar took charge of the country and returned the country to democracy in 1999 (FCDA, 1999; Olajide, 2004; El-Rufai, 2012; Ajayi, 2013).

**Restructuring of the FCDA**

But the 1990s just as the 1980s that characterised the FCDA’s restructurings, starting in the early 1990s and particularly in 1994, the Department of Planning and Survey of the FCDA was now merged with the Department of Lands of the MFCT to form the Department of Lands, Planning and Survey. The merger does signify that despite the usual conflicts that characterised the MFCT and the FCDA, there could be some moments of collaborations between them as represented through the merger. The new Department composed of 5 divisions: urban and regional planning, inclusive of resettlement; development control; surveys; land administration; and zonal co-ordination. But then again in 1996 another FCDA restructuring took place. This time the development control division was made a full-fledged department. This again however would be scrapped toward the end of 1997. Generally, within the various departments of the FCDA or even within the divisions, some form of restructuring was always taking place. This tended to create confusion and duplication of roles among the planning agencies (FCDA 1999; El-Rufai, 2013; Ajayi, 2013).

Therefore and as previously mentioned in chapter 6, in 1999 an FCT ‘ministerial committee for the appraisal of physical planning and development issues in the FCT’ was set up, which among others explored the institutional framework of planning in the FCT. Having considered the restructuring of the FCDA by successive administrations, the Committee urgently called for a reform of the FCDA’s structure to do away with issues of duplication of roles, conflicts and related problems.

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37 There was however an interim government when General Babangida stepped down as the military head of state in August 1993. The interim government was headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan as the president of the country. But in later part of the same year, General Sani Abacha staged a military coup and took over power from President Ernest Shonekan.
Some restructuring is necessary to enable the FCDA perform its assigned functions more effectively. The restructuring would also involve the creation or upgrading of some existing divisions into full fledge departments (FCDA 1999, p. xv).

Hence among its many recommendations, it called for the establishment of

A Joint Planning Commission, as recommended in chapter 12 of the FCC Master Plan [IPA master plan] (pp258-260) to be in charge of the five Planning Districts and any that may arise in due course’’ (FCDA 1999, p.66).

This underscores the need that due to the fragmentary structures characterising the FCDA, co-ordination and collaborations became of essence. Still, it observed that,

because Land Administration [of the MFCT] has been merged [with the Department Survey and Planning of the FCDA] to form Land, Planning& Surveys too much emphasis has now shifted to land allocation matters at the expense of proper physical planning and survey works (FCDA, 1999, P. 68).

This too clearly reveals the consequences of the unending restructuring of the FCDA and its counterpart - the MFCT were having on the FCT. Consequently, the committee recommended that

The former set-up where Land Administration was a department in the MFCT, and planning & Survey Department of the FCDA, be restored as two autonomous departments (FCDA 1999, p. 68).

The recommendations of the committee when juxtaposed with the restructurings already undertaken by previous administrations, in a broader sense, can be attributed to the weak institutional framework of planning bequeathed to Nigeria at Independence in 1960 by the British (chapter 3). When Abuja was declared the new capital city of the country in 1976, post-independence planning in the country had just been sixteen years and the colonial legacy still exerted strong influence on planning in the country. As already demonstrated in chapter 3 much of sub-Saharan Africa has been influenced by a colonial legacy. Of influence in Nigeria is the British colonial town and country planning ordinance of 1946. It influenced planning in the country even after independence until 1992 when the Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning Law was enacted replacing the British Ordinance.

Against this backdrop, the FCDA’s internal restructuring would simply be a response to finding ways of improving the weak colonial legacy bequeathed the country by the British, which is characterised by a top-down approach to planning, highly centralised, fragmentary in nature , among other shortcomings (chapter 3). In a bid to reform the legacy in the context of the FCDA, there had been administrators who preferred a decentralised FCDA to create additional departments while others opted to having a strong centralised FCDA with fewer departments. These were taking place in the face of another competitor, the MFCT, - relentlessly competing
with the FCDA over jurisdiction of roles (FCDA, 1999). Interviews conducted with former directors in the FCDA who had been involved with these restructurings at different times, reveal this contrasting perspective of how the FCDA had been thought of in terms of institutional structure. First, in a support of a centralised structure, one of the directors narrates thus.

*I think what we had was better. It was easy for the FCDA to manage these bodies and achieve results. But, when you keep restructuring these bodies into cell units, what you end up with is a proliferation of bodies with fragmentary roles, and which co-ordination becomes a problem to manage. And, I believe that is one of the major problems that this city is experiencing – which is lack of co-ordination of these multiple bodies (Abuja Planner B1 2014, interview).*

In contrast, the other director represents the opposite.

*Devolution is quite of essence in the context of the FCDA. When we got implementing the plans we found out that we were dealing with a very huge city with huge roles. The best way was to devolve and create other bodies. The problem has not been with the devolution per se - when people tend to criticise against it on the strength of fragmentary roles. The problem has always been the actors in these agencies - who are always bent at manipulating them [devolutions] for their selfish ends, and making devolution looks as if it has not worked. Therefore, it is a question of dealing with these things that play out within the system and not devolution that is necessarily the problem. Of course, I do also recognise that when devolutions become too decentralised, managing them could be a challenge, but in our case the fundamental problem has always been those manipulations that take place within the system. You know, even if you got a bigger centralised body, these things are still there- these manipulations. (Abuja Planner B4 2013, interview).*

But far from the weak colonial legacy, the restructuring of the FCDA is linked to other motives. This includes power, control and fraud.

*Some administrators want to have the FCDA re-organised into tiny bits and place their cronies there. They are their knights to be bringing returns [royalties] and answering yes sir and ma to them without any form of opposition (Abuja Planner C4 2014, interview).*

In face of the fragmentary nature of planning also characterised by the ever-changing political leadership in the country from one military regime to another, in terms of economy in the 1990s, the FCT had also become a city that faced funding challenges - poor funding to deficit budgetary allocations despite the military’s commitment to its development in the 1990s (Ajayi, 2013; El-Rufai, 2013).

### 7.1.3 The 2000s-2010s Fluidities

*Massive Institutional Reforms and Stubborn Realities*
The 2000s and early 2010s have also faced changes in the political, economic and structure of planning. Between 2000 and 2013 for instance, the city has had no less than 7 ministers with varying interests and policies regarding the FCT (Ajayi, 2013).

The structure of planning however experienced some form of reforms starting especially in 2004. As previously noted, the creation of the MFCT in 1979 was without any legal backing and at best a superimposition on the FCDA. This protracted battle between the MFCT and FCDA came to an end in 2004 when the MFCT was abolished by the government. Along this, there is was an extensive restructuring of the FCDA resulting into the creation of more new agencies and secretariats. In the new framework, an overall administrative body known the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCT- Administration) now functions in the sense of an administrator. It manages all the secretariats and departments in the FCT although it still bears the same nomenclature like the defunct FCTA which hitherto managed the regional areas of the FCT (El-Rufai, 2013).

Despite the 2004 massive reforms many restructurings have taken place again. The Abuja Metropolitan Management Council (AMMC) is a case in point. As at 2006 it composed of the Departments of Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB), Department of Development Control (DDC), Department of Parks and Recreation (PR), Department of Urban Affairs (DUA), Facilities and Maintenance, among others. But following the exit of the reforming Minister, Mallam Nasir El-Rufai in May 2007, the AMMC has witnessed some restructurings. The Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) for example, was devolved from the AMMC to become a full-fledged planning agency and independent of the AMMC. In 2014 the decision was reversed and the AEBP was brought back as a department under the AMMC.

Another instance is the Department of Urban Affairs (DUA) which prior to 2013, was a department under the AMMC consisting of three major divisions: Emergency Management Services, Urban Services, and Fire Services. But in 2013 the Emergency Management Services and Fire Services divisions were taken out of the Department and merged with another division, Relief and Rehabilitation of the FCT Social Development Secretariat to form the FCT-Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The remaining Urban Services Division of the DUA was taken to Special Duties. In consequence, the DUA ceased to exist and some of its staff were transferred to the DDC and others sent to the new agency (FEMA). But again in 2014 just a year later the FEMA’s legitimacy became challenged that its creation was not established by law - not backed up by an Act of the National Assembly. The FEMA now operates as a department under the AMMC with the co-ordinator of the AMMC overseeing it while on paper it still maintains the nomenclature FCT-Emergency Management Service (FEMA). But why still bear the nomenclature?
We told the honourable minister that we [have] used this name with international organisations so we can’t start telling them that it is no longer FEMA or whatever- because they will not take us serious (Abuja Planner D6 2014, interviewee).

Or, why even the reversion to AMMC?

*It is politics and interests. The man [referring to some head of a unit] wanted to control the resources by merging them back. He wants a centralised government organ. The man is close to the president. It is there time now* (Abuja Planner D6 2014, interview).

The restructurings, have as earlier observed, tend to exacerbate the institutional framework of planning in Abuja. In the face of the weak institutional framework inherited from the British, the political manoeuvrings of the institutional structure in Abuja, and sheer lack of strategies for a robust structure of planning in the FCT, it appears the unending restructuring and is unlikely to end as evidenced even in the recent examples of the AMMC.

**More economic complexities for the FCT**

But it is not only the institutional framework of planning in Abuja that has tended to be volatile in the 2000s and 2010s. The FCT, while the collapse of the oil revenue of the 1970s has over the years become funded in budget deficits, in the 2000s however this became more exacerbated by the structure of revenue generation in the FCT. A look at the structure of revenue generation in Abuja is quite different from other states of the federation in Nigeria. Other states apart from the monthly federal allocation appropriated to them by the federal government of Nigeria, they also generate their internal revenue and use it for developmental activities. But in Abuja the internal revenue generated is ‘remitted to the Federal government’ (Ajayi, 2013).

*Before 2003 Abuja was financed as a first line charge on the finances of the federal government i.e 1% of total federally collected funds. This ‘Later changed to 1% of funds available to the Federal Government. Furthermore, all moneys generated in Abuja are paid into the distributable pool (Ajayi 2013, p. 667).*

The revenue structure does not favour Abuja thus. Arguably, had the internal revenue generation of Abuja is spent on Abuja and not remitted to the federal account, much of Abuja would have been developed to a certain level. Indeed, a minister of the FCT (Bala Abdulkadir) reinforced this argument concerning the challenges of developing the city. Hosted on the 22/1/2013 at the country’s national television, the Nigeria Television Authourity, through a live phone-in programme known as Tuesday Live, he observes that the revenue structure of Territory needs to be revisited to allow it have access to its internally generated revenue - which he believes the Territory would be more developed if it accesses its revenue (NTA, 2013).
7.2. A Labyrinthine Process

The preceding section looked at the nature of political, structure of planning and economic environment that has characterised the planning and implementation of land uses in Abuja. This section dwells on the process of planning and implementation of land uses in Abuja, the planning agencies and actors involved in the process.

7.2.1. Planning Agencies

Despite the ever-changing structure of planning in Abuja as revealed in the last section, four major planning agencies are involved in the planning and implementation of land uses in Abuja. As already mentioned in chapter 4, these are the Department of Urban and Regional Planning (URP) Department of Development Control (DDC), Department of Land Administration (DLA) and the Abuja Geographic Information Service (AGIS).

The URP is the starting point of land use planning in the city. It makes plans for the various districts of the city and regions in the FCT be it master plans, structure plans, layout plans, among others. In addition, it stipulates land uses that are to be developed in a district within the overall context of the Abuja master plan or the regional master plans of the FCT. This is done toward creating

an efficient, attractive, liveable and functional environment for the sustainable development of an inclusive city through physical planning (FCDA, 2014).

Once physical plans and their respective land use plans are prepared they are expected to be forwarded to the DLA, DDC, and AGIS. At the DLA, which is solely responsible for the administration of land in the Territory, the land use plans from the URP provide guidelines for land allocation. Since a land use plan is an exhibition of the desired land uses of a city as depicted on a map or land use plan (chapter 6), it becomes much more felt in real terms when its space implications are felt on land. In this regard the DLA undertakes the process of land allocation toward granting land titles (plots of land) to the public. At the end of each allocation it presumably follows that the allocation is an embodiment of the following:

[i] Title Deed Plan, that is the survey site plan which captures the area delineation of the plot, its cardinal orientation, access road, bearings, among others; ii] the purpose-clause, that is the use to which the plot or title is expected to be used for; and iii) which must be in line with provisions of the master plan as reflected through the land use plan or map of a district (Planner D4 2014, interview)

The issue of purpose-clause as provided on a title is of extreme importance to the planners, since it is the purpose-clause that spells out the purpose to which an allocation (title) is to be
used for. In an ideal situation, it is supposed that the purpose-clause would be in conformity with the provisions of the land use plan as dictated by the master plan.

For the AGIS, it is expected that the land use plan forwarded to it from the URP will be geo-referenced and related data will be properly stored and managed by the AGIS. It is also expected to manage the land records of the DLA. In essence it becomes the data bank manager of the FCT. On the other hand the DDC’s sole responsibility is in the implementation of the land use plans forwarded to it from the URP.  

Figure 34: flow of land use implementation  
Author, 2013

7.2.2. From land use plan to access to Land  
Access to Land in the FCT

Having looked at the basic four planning agencies involved in the planning and implementation of land uses in Abuja, this section explores in detail how the process of land use implementation is carried out by the planning agencies. It begins the discussion on access to land in the FCT and the drivers of the process. This is considered quite relevant since it is on land that the eventual land uses captured on a land use plan are expected to be translated into reality – developed on the ground. It is thus of vital to first establish this connection to how land is accessed in the Territory (FCT) generally and then particularly in the CA.

Already mentioned in the last section, the URP formulates physical plans for the Territory as well as their land uses - which are captured on a land use plan. It is expected that from the land

38 But in reality, the planning and implementation of land uses do not strictly follow the linear structure involving these major agencies. Other planning agencies of relevance are equally involved in the process. Depending on the nature of the land use to be planned and implemented, these bodies can be involved - the Department of Survey and Mapping, Department of Engineering, Department of Resettlement and Planning, Department of Mass Housing, Department of Public Buildings, and Area Councils’ Zonal Offices.
use plans that are prepared by the URP, the DLA will use them and allocate land (plot/ title paper) to would-be users or land developers.

**Land, a Difficult Thing to Access**

But having access to land in the FCT to develop the land uses as spelt out in the master plans is the most difficult thing (Mabogunje, 2011). Previously revealed in this chapter, the planning structure in the FCDA has witnessed unending restructuring. The ripple effects of that have not spared the administration of land in the Territory (Ikejiofor, 1998; FCDA, 1999; Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi, 2013; Jibrin, 2015).

As at 1999 for example, the situation is reported to have been so abysmal to the point that no less than 10 ‘different organisations engaged’ in land allocation and ‘issuance of Title documents ‘over land in the FCT’ (FCDA, 1999, pp. 172-174). These ‘organs of government’ were the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing; Federal Housing Authority (FHA); Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB), Abuja Market Management Committee; Abuja Resettlement Task Force; FCT Area Councils; the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA); among others. The multiplicity of the agencies rather than enhance the management of the process, created confusion and fragmentation in the process (FCDA,1999; Ajayi, 2013). Any organ of government would suddenly start the issuance of title over land with disregard to the land use provisions of the Abuja master plan and regional master plans. But to think that it is only the agencies of government that participated in this, will rather render an incomplete picture of the rot that pervades the system. Traditional rulers too participated in the spree, allocating land in their domains irrespective of the provisions of the master plans (Jibril, 2006; Akingbade et al., 2010). Ajayi (2013) reports thus that,

> It is on record that General Jeremiah Useni (1993 -1998) [a former minister of the FCT] legalized traditional institution in Garki and Durumi [districts of Abuja for instance] and ever since, all of them do same in their domain [that is, participate in land allocation] (Ajayi, 2013, p.666)

A major factor underscoring the tussle over land is attributed to the issue of market and patronage. Whoever controls land through allocation also controls the land market. Thus land allocations made by the government agencies end up in the open market to the highest bidder; not necessarily to the supposed beneficiaries whose names appeared on the title papers (allocations). In most cases such beneficiaries never exist but simply as fictitious names. Indeed, multiple fictitious allocations by staff of the government agencies are brazenly laundered right within the FCDA secretariat (El-Rufai, 2013). As patronage, is seen as a tool for cementing relationship (Mabogunje, 2011). Such network of friendship cuts across
Political parties, family members, business partners, religious organisations, and many others (Abuja Planner C 1 2013, interview).

Therefore, land would be allocated as a gift to concretise relationship and other benefits that the gift would bring in return.

The officials who took over the administration of the new capital city were very busy allocating plots of land to applicants, ostensibly on the basis of state of origin, but really more to friends (Mabogunje 2011, p. 468).

For the traditional rulers however, they do not necessarily need middle men (land agents) to sell land. They engage directly with interested buyers within their domain. It would seem they are yet to recognise that with the creation of the FCT, land matters became vested in the government under the presidency and not the pre-1976 status where traditional rulers had substantial influence in the management of land under their domain.

All lands carved out to form the FCT [in 1976] were governed by customary rules, laws and established codes or conducts. Land was generally regarded as the property of the communities and village heads were the ultimate authority in land matters (FCDA, 1999, pp. xiii, 172-175).

A very important issue though needs to be stressed. It is not that there exists no legal framework on land acquisition and management in the Territory. The problem lies partly in the institutional changes the FCDA has undergone since its creation in 1976 as earlier observed in this chapter. The FCT Act of 1976 and the Land use Act of 1978 are the earlier legal framework on land administration in the Territory, and the recent 1999 Federal Government constitution. They all vest power to the president of the federation (Nigerian president) who delegates it to the FCT minister to grant land to the public or any organisation. Through the FCDA structure the minister could assign that responsibility to a particular agency (FCDA, 1999). But the unending restructuring of the FCDA has resulted in fragmentary bits without proper coordination. Rather than embark on aggressive reform of land administration, most successive administrations had rather seemed uninterested. The reason for is attributed to no other than taking advantage of the situation of the poor administration of land.

As long as the system rewards more, no one cares about the repercussions, consequences on the Abuja master plan and the regional master plans of the FCT. Is as bad as that, had always been so (Abuja Planner A 7 2014, interview).

Attempted reforms, massive reforms, and stubborn realities

That is not to deny that one or two FCT Administrations have nursed the intention to reform the system or begum the reform. Even at that the forces behind patronage and land speculation have always tended to overwhelm any reform. And without any reform, by early 2003 the situation had not changed with consequences on access to land as demand for land far
outweighed supply (Akingbade et al.; El-Rufai, 2013; Jibrin, 2015). To demonstrate the imbalance in specific terms, a Land Officer in Abuja at a FIG Conference\(^{39}\) of 2006 reveals that as at April of 2003, demand for land stood at 105,701 applications while the supply was only 21,420. This translates to a 20% supply and a shortfall of 80% (Jibril, 2006, p.3). Indeed, a staggering shortfall and a revelation of how difficult accessing land had become in the Territory. The combined forces of patronage and speculation, and the weak institutional framework had been responsible for this (Jibril, 2006, 2009; El-Rufai, 2013).

As previously noted in this chapter, the entire FCDA structure witnessed massive reforms in 2004. In the context of land administration the reforming FCT minister, Mallam Nasir El-Rufai, reports that,

> Our very first big move was to computerize the land registry. The land administration situation was really dire; we had no choice but to suspend any new land grants or transfers while we undertook electronic conversion. This meant nothing was going to happen on this front for about nine months, a measure that both the president and vice president approved (El-Rufai, 2013, p. 205)

No doubt the system needed to be ‘reorganized, cleaned up and digitized’ and this, as the minister explains, was ‘a major policy step’ toward curbing the dubious, fragmentary land process (El-Rufail, 2013, P.206). To buttress this El-Rufai Administration succeeded in setting up the Abuja Geographic Information Service (AGIS) to carryout geo-spatial data management. It equally streamlined the structure of land administration with the Department of Land Administration (DLA) now the sole agency of government to administer and manage land in the FCT. It must be pointed out that to some extent the system improved with the eradication of the hitherto multiplicity of parties involved in the land business (Adeoye, 2006).

Nevertheless, the FCT Area Councils do not seem to relinquish the role of land allocation to the DLA. In June 2014, ten years after the massive reforms into the land sector, a ministerial committee had to be set up the by FCT minister to investigate the Councils. The outcome of the investigation is quite revealing.

> Following investigations by the ministerial committee on Falsification/Forgery of Land Titles, AGIS on Oct. 27, 2014 published disclaimer for 2,071 land titles in five area councils. On the list were names of prominent top politicians, businessmen, churches and private firms (Atonko, 2014)

Using the discovery the FCT informs the public that,

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\(^{39}\) FIG- International Federation of Surveyors’ conference for the year 2006 through a paper entitled ‘computerisation of the cadastral and land registry: the Abuja experience.’
The only approving authority for all land allocations is the Honourable Minister of the FCT [through the DLA]. The area councils and their agents are not by law or delegation authorised to or empowered to make any allocations whatsoever on behalf of the minister (Atonko, 2014).

The Area Councils’ scenario attests to the reality of how much still needs to be done to fully eradicate any agency acting as an appendage to the DLA in land administration in the FCT. Even so, what appears dangerous is the nature of the antics reportedly employed by the Councils in the unscrupulous land deals uncovered by the 2014 ministerial committee.

Fake layouts were defined by the committee as layouts without ministerial approval, overlapping designs and double allocations. These have constituted trouble in the area council allocations over the years. Over the years, effort to put an end to land racketeering has not yielded the expected result as daily, unsuspecting land buyers are conned. Fraud is prevalent because many buyers are ignorant of the process of land acquisition. They often rely on touts. These touts who daily hover around AGIS’ office in Area 11, Abuja do not work alone, they work in cahoots with government agents (Atonko, 2014).

Such antics are similar to what pervaded the system prior to the 2004 land reforms. The 2014 ministerial revelations are an indication of the fierce battle confronting the system to get rid of the rot.

We are dealing with evil versus good - where the former evil practices are reappearing to conquer the system. In addition to this the process of land acquisition is slow and eventually when titles are granted the approval charges are astronomical. Of course, I must tell you too that the demand for land in Abuja and even in the regional areas still fluctuates higher than the supply. And we are still dealing with the problem of corruption in the land system and theft of geo-spatial data. Am sure you must have heard about some arrests by the anti-corruption bodies in recent times about these issues (Abuja Planner B2 2013, interview).

All these tend to undermine access to land in the FCT and without land as one of the planners observes,

... how can one build? How can the land uses be implemented? Or the provisions of the master plan be implemented? Everything ends on land it is the key thing. But here the provisions are on the paper meanwhile having land is difficult. So how can we develop the city when land is so difficult to come by? (Abuja Planner C3 2014, interview).

Access to Land in the CA

The preceding discussion has so far looked into the drivers and the intricacies that have surrounded land acquisition in the FCT. Undoubtedly, they have undermined access to land in
the Territory. Since the CA exists not in isolation of the city (Abuja) and the Territory, it became essential to first make sense of the intricacies in the Territory. With that having done the nature of access to land in the CA and the drivers of the process will now be explored. This is important as without access to land the land uses of the CA stand unimplemented, for it is on land that the land uses are expected to be translated on ground as earlier observed.

Observed already in the preceding discussion, forces of patronage, land speculation, corruption, weak institutional framework, among others, have undermined access to land in the Territory generally. In the context of the CA, this appears to be more intense considering the importance of the district in Abuja. In chapter 6 this importance is demonstrated. It highlights the CA’s status as the premier district of Abuja where the grandness of Abuja and its social aspirations are expected to be exhibited toward promoting nation-building. As such, access to land in the district has tended to be a sensitive, scarce and contested issue as everyone seems to want to acquire land in the premier district (Ajayi, 2013).

**From Low Demand for Land to an Expensive Commodity**

Generally, in the 1980s with few infrastructure in the city, much of the public showed disinterest in acquiring land in the CA and the city generally. Thus, much of the 1980s witnessed a slow pace of development in the city especially from private investors. By implication pressure over land in the CA was less intense.

*Around this time people were not just interested to invest in the CA. It was bush everywhere. Some were yet to believe even in Abuja talk less of coming to take plots for investment. And again there were no infrastructure as we were just laying them, and some people didn’t want to risk that. They would prefer to invest where there is already made infrastructure in place. In fact if you say we were begging people to come and invest in the district, you will not be wrong since only very few showed interest or even responded (Abuja Planner A4 2013, interview).*

Despite the less pressure on land the influence of patronage could be discerned. This was perpetuated by the early FCDA officials and military leaders in which land would be allocated on social ties in disregard to the beneficiaries’ capability to develop same (Mabogunje, 2011). By the 1990s pressure over land in the CA soared up though. A major game changer to this has been attributed to the General Babangida’s effective transfer of the seat of government from Lagos to Abuja in 1991 - as earlier observed in this chapter.

Government ministries, diplomatic missions, corporate bodies, public servants, and related organisations were to relocate to Abuja. Even the private sector that hitherto showed a disinterest in Abuja now saw the transfer as a beacon of Abuja’s reality. But much of the transfer
felt heavily in the CA. As mentioned in chapter 6 and elsewhere, about the CA’s overarching role in the city and in particular about its nine land use zones, it was these zones that were to accommodate the relocating ministries, diplomatic mission, the seat of government, commercial, cultural and religious activities from Lagos and other parts of the country in their respective locations as depicted on the KTU and AM land use plans. This was not a smooth process as much of the CA’s infrastructure had not been substantially developed to accommodate the relocation. Nonetheless, as a former district officer in the CA observes,

...it [the CA] was working progress with infrastructure coming up and by the end of the decade (1990s) and early 2000s, we could boast of Roads B8 and B10 [major arterial roads in the CA] and others. These are very essential arterial roads in the district (Abuja Planner D5 2013, interview).

This would be considered a huge leap in contrast to the 1980s’ wide expanse of empty land with few infrastructure in the city and the CA.

These episodes increased the value of land in the CA throughout the 1990s and beyond. In a broader sense other factors too played out to increase the value. For instance, with a weak institutional framework to manage land in the city, a lopsided land market developed where supply trudged far behind demand thereby creating pressure over land in the CA. Corresponding with the pressure came along a speculative land market in the CA. Land became seen as a goldmine and all sorts of fraudulent activities could be perpetrated to acquire it. In 2008 a former special assistant (SA) to the Minister of FCT (Aliyu Modibbo Umar), in commenting on the proposed boulevard project in the CA, tellingly narrates this.

The easiest way to become a millionaire in Abuja is through land speculation. Even as we speak those who are lucky to be allocated plots by the government pay a paltry ₦2000 per square metre. A plot of one thousand square metres, for instance, costs just Two Million Naira (Onifade, 2008).

He goes on to explain the antics.

The usual practice is for the allotees to hold on to the allocation paper for a few months or years, depending on how soon the government brings infrastructure to the site, and the value jumps astronomically. Often a plot bought at two million Naira may then be sold for tens or hundreds of millions of Naira depending on the area. So people make money just by waiting and not from adding any value. In essence, what Abuja land millionaires sell are infrastructures constructed at tax payer’s expense. We are being scammed!(Onifade, 2008).

Illicit Land Business, and Series of Investigative Panels

Such illicit ways are not quite different from the early ones observed previously in this chapter about access to land in the FCT. They reveal the degree to which access to land in the CA and
the Territory is extremely difficult to access, despite the massive land reforms of 2004 ordinarily intended to put in place a robust land system administration.

Even with the reforms, in the context of the CA, access to land has been smeared by allegations of patronage and fraud resulting into land litigations and the setting up of committees of investigations. A prominent of such committees is the Senator Sodangi Committee of 2007; a senate investigative inquiry on illicit land deals and related matters. Much of the Sodangi Committee is discussed in chapter 8 under the caption Accelerated Development Programme (ADP). But generally, since the FCT 2004 reforms, there have been series of ministerial investigative committees set up by each new FCT minister to probe alleged land irregularities in the CA and other districts. This has led to confusion and accusations of irregularities in the administration of land in the CA.

All these drama in the Central Business District [CA] is nothing than to acquire land because you know land is very expensive - and all of them [referring to FCT ministers] including the big men want land there. There always will be one ministerial or senate committee to another so as to witch-hunt the previous administration or to clean up the mess left by it. But the main issue is to acquire land for themselves and their cronies. It is a fierce contest to get the land - and those who have money simply spend millions if not billions [of Naira] and buy from the open market - while others simply go through the political door using political connections( Abuja Planner C5 2014, interview)

7.2.3. From Land Use Plan to Planning Permit

Planning Permit process

The preceding section looked at access to land in the CA and drivers of the process. This section now looks at the process of planning permit, how central it is to the implementation of the land uses as well as the actors driving the process.

Earlier in this chapter on the discussion about planning agencies - a link was drawn between the master plan (particularly the land use plan) and access to land and land development as depicted in fig 35 p.162). Within this link another layer of connection can be added which is that of planning permit. That is before land development one is expected to first obtain a planning permit (building plan approval) from the Department of Development Control (Chapter 4). Generally, a building plan approval is granted to a land owner to develop his/her plot, taking into cognisance the land use provisions of a district as contained in the plan master plan and depicted on a land use plan. In the case of the CA it has supplementary master plans in addition to the master plan of the city (The Abuja master plan- IPA). The IPA contains the broad land uses for the CA while the supplementary master plans namely the KTU and AIM,
and the current consolidated master plan - the AS&P master plan, have over the years provided detailed land use plans and urban designs for the district (chapter 6). These documents are expected to guide the DDC in granting planning permit on a particular plot in the CA. This is supported also by the FCT Development Control Manual which sets out planning standards and other guidelines concerning planning permit in the CA and the Territory generally. But how does the DDC do this?

We are structured into five divisions. There is Permit, Monitoring and Enforcement, Logistics, Building Inspectorate, and Administration and Finance. For the purpose of building plan approval [planning permit] it is the Permit Division that handles it. The division is further divided into two units- that is north and south for ease of decentralisation of the building plan approval. Each unit is superintended by a deputy director who oversees all the districts under his/her unit. The flow of decision making starts from the top and runs down the ladder. At the top is the director of the Department followed by the superintending deputy directors, the district officers, and the site officers being the last in the chain of action (Abuja Planner D3 2013, interview).

In the context of the CA the Southern Unit oversees the affairs of planning permit in the district (Chapter 4). At CA’s district office which is in the CA, the district officer runs the office and is assisted by 3 site officers. When an application for a planning permit is made, the site officers conduct site inspections and report the findings to the district officer. The district officer makes her/his inputs and forward the application along the chain of officers before it reaches the deputy director. The deputy director then makes his/her inputs and the application is finally passed on to the director for final decision taking on the application (planning permit).

The process however is not as simplified as involving four actions centred around i) site officers ii) district officer; iii) deputy director; and the director. In reality a planning permit involves an army of decision making and taking.

The procedure involves so things [actions] and this cuts across the other divisions in the Department [DDC] as well as many staff that are involved in the course of granting building plan approval (Abuja Planner D3 2013, interview).

A focus group discussion with the planners reveals that the whole process is grouped into 5 broad stages. These are i) document review, ii) site review, iii) technical review, iv) superlative review, and v) director’s review. This is explained in table 6.
**Document Review**

Deals with application package. It covers issues of land title and design (architectural design, mechanical, structural designs, EIA reports, site assessment report, among others). The Logistics Division handles the process. It ensures that the documents submitted by a land developer are in order, genuine, and meet the guidelines as contained in the FCT Development Control Manual and the overall principles of the Abuja master plan.

**Site Review and Site Assessment Report**

At the end of the document review the district officer goes through the applications and forwards them to the various site officers to conduct site review. Site review focuses on issues of land use compliance and whether the application complies with the land use plan of the district and its provisions or not. It also looks at the compatibility of the application with adjoining development, how harmonious the application is with the abutting situation; building line; height regulation; terrain; among others. Following site review a site assessment report is produced by the respective site officers and sent to the district officer for further input. The district officer makes input and the application is sent to the next stage for technical review.

**Technical Review**

Involves the vetting of the application by a team of planners, architects, and engineers. Vetting is predicated on issues of aesthetic of the design (application), functionality, public health, public safety, public convenience, internal circulation, parking, pedestrian flows, among others.

At the end of the technical review, the application is sent to the stage of superlative review.

**Superlative review**

Under this stage the senior planners, architects, engineers crosscheck the work of the technical review earlier undertaken by the respective officers. Once this is done the applications are endorsed by them. This is referred to as ‘countersign’- that is countersigning the action of the previous technical staff.

**Directorate endorsement**

The next stage is the directorate review. The deputy directors in charge of permits in the two units (North and South) review the recommendations of the superlative review. For the CA the deputy director responsible for the Southern unit reviews all applications for the CA and the other districts and forward to the director for final endorsement of the permit.
Planning permit process, delays, and other intricacies

The process is not without shortcomings though. Right at the document review to the final endorsement of a permit, there is the major problem of delay. A delay could stretch into a couple of months, less than a year, 2 years or more. Among the causes of delay is the time taken to detect and compile a number of queries in regard to an application. Throughout the permit process, design queries (shortcomings) arising from an application are not unlikely to be detected and compiled.

The shortcomings [technical queries] come about because some applications are designed and submitted quite at variance to our provisions encapsulated in the Development Control Manual. Sometimes they meet the requirements but we may discover that either the title paper is not genuine, or deed of assignment is not registered, or something is just wrong that perhaps we never saw it at the beginning. You should know that building plan approval [planning permit] is a process and anything can be discovered along as we [the Department] proceed. After all there is nothing like an absolute best design and along the process of the vetting [technical review] you may come up with some issues that never were before. It is these shortcomings that we write them out in form letters to developers (Abuja Planner D3 2013, interview).

But the problem lies in the amount of time taken to do this as it might stretch into days or weeks, or several months, although according to the Department this should not exceed more than 2 working days for a file to be treated.

I submitted a design [application] since last year and nothing has happened. Nobody has visited the site and I don’t just know what is happening. I don’t just know. I don’t know. You should ask them what is causing the delay. Not me. Go and ask them and they will tell you why but am just tired of the whole thing (Abuja Developer C 2013, interview).

A delay could also be linked to the issue of staff strength and logistics. The staff strength of the DDC in terms of Planners is no more than 150. The number would be considered inadequate to undertake site reviews, vetting, monitoring, demolitions, and other field oriented activities to cover all the districts in the city, the six Area Councils and their development wards, and even the satellites towns in the FCT. This inadequacy limits the effective and efficient compilation of queries for the entire FCT- thereby delays the permit process (Danraka, 2013). In the CA for instance there is a district officer supported by 3 site officers. They are expected to cover the 9 zones of the district as well as Kukwaba Area daily - undertaking site visits to conduct site assessment, monitoring, demolitions, conflict resolution, providing strategic visions, and other activities.

Even when the queries are eventually compiled communicating them to the prospective developer takes time. The bureaucracy involved in passing the file (generated queries) from one
table to the next before it reaches the developer all contribute to the delays. Nevertheless, to overcome the delays,

We now make use of what we call SERVICON. It is basically about how we can communicate in the fastest means - such as the use of telephone, by calling the affected developers and notifying them about their application shortcomings so that they can respond. Yes, this one is giving us result unlike, where the file will have to go from one desk to another desk causing delay. This one is faster I must tell you and it is working (Abuja Planner D2 2013, interview).

But delays are not caused only by the DDC. The developers too have a share of the blame. In 2010 the DDC undertook an in-house review of all the files that had been ‘kept in view’ (KIV) through a special committee headed by a deputy director. The findings of the committee are quite revealing to find out that most of the real developers had not been aware of the raised queries. Instead, fictitious names and fake contacts had been substituted for the real developers by their supposed building agents. This appears to be deliberate and supposedly to prevent their clients (developers) from having access to the compiled technical queries.

You know, they [building agents] don’t want their clients to see them [the technical queries]. They are afraid or ashamed that the shortcomings will cast doubts about their capability. Since they did the drawing [building plan/design] and have been paid they don’t want their clients to know about any problem that we have raised. So they provide only their own contacts but give us fake contacts of the developers [their clients]. So that their clients will not be contacted by us concerning any design shortcoming that we have observed. You know, they don’t want their clients never to know about it. And the worst thing is that they hide even the signed letters [compiled list of technical or design queries] from them when they collect the letters on their behalf. It is a serious problem but we are dealing with it. They can never be smarter than us. (Abuja Planner A2 2013, interview).

There is yet another instrumental aspect of the delay that is even beyond the influence of neither the DDC nor land developers. The fragmentary nature of planning in the FCT without a robust co-ordination as noted earlier in this chapter - also plays a huge role in delaying the grant of permit. Along the permit’s process the DDC inevitably has to rely on certain vital information from other planning agencies in the FCT to aid in the grant of permit. Depending on the nature of the application the DDC usually writes to the URP, DLA, Area Council, AGIS, among others to furnish it with up to date information against the backdrop of a permit application. For instance, it might write to the URP to provide clarification on the appropriate land use plan to be used as the guiding principle to process a certain application. Or it might be the DLA to provide the status of an allocation whether it has been revoked or not.
But the problem seems to be in the time taken by the other planning agencies in responding to such requests.

*It takes time and time before you get a response and by the time you get it, the developer is already shouting on top of your head that you have delayed his submission[permit application] while it is not your effort. Therefore you see that we have no control of these things (Abuja Planner D3 2013, interview)*

7.3. Chapter conclusion

This chapter has looked at the environment within which the land uses of the CA are implemented. Generally planning in the CA and the entire FCT since 1979 when the Abuja master plan was prepared, throughout the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s and early 2010s, has been characterised by economic challenges of developing the city. This has come largely from the consequence of the collapse of oil revenue upon the development of Abuja. Changes in the structure of revenue generation in the FCT have further exacerbated the situation creating more funding deficits for Abuja. The decades also witnessed many changes in political leadership both at the national level and in the FCT. The institutional structure of planning in the FCT has equally tended to be problematic. The legal framework (decree 6 of 1976) that created the FCT also established the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) as the sole authority to plan, design and develop the Territory. But this has not been without tensions against the backdrop of the institutional structure to undertake the huge task, as the FCDA has undergone several ripples regarding the appropriate structure in which to go about executing the huge task. There had been times of decentralisation within the FCDA structure; other times a more central approach tended to be favoured in the planning and development of the Territory. Yet, there had been times when the FCDA in the execution of its statutory role has had to compete with another parallel structure, the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT). Again, in the face of all these fluidities planning has been underlain be series of intricacies and interests; the process of planning has equally been cumbersome. Through the chapter research questions 3 and 4 (chapter 1) of the thesis have been been addressed; as well as the second circle of the frame of narrative of the thesis.
Chapter 8. Forces Undermining Land Use Implementation

Chapter 6 looked at the history of plan making and the land uses of the CA through the first era (1979-2008) and second era (2008-to date). The first era is represented by the KTU and AIM master plans while the second era by the consolidated AS&P master plan. This helped in making sense of the desired land uses the city planners have sought to implement in the CA in the quest for nation building\(^{40}\), as well as the intricacies that accompanied the design process of the land uses. Chapter 7 then explored the environment within which the planning and implementation of land uses has taken place in Abuja by focusing on the nature of planning in Abuja, the socio-economic and political context of Abuja since 1979. Stemming from these chapters and in line with the frame of narrative earlier outlined in Chapter 2, this chapter presents the overarching argument of the thesis; the gut sense of what is happening in Abuja against the backdrop of the thesis concerns earlier set out in chapter one. Flowing from this, the argument of the thesis rests around what I refer to as plan gravity in nation building. Using a four-prong exposition the thesis argues that plan gravity does not successfully lead to nation building (table 7).

\(^{40}\) As noted previously throughout this thesis, nation building in the context of Abuja entails the advancement of national identity in a diverse ethnic society through the use of capital relocation. It also entails the building of a modern national capital city, promotion of regional and economic development, among other goals.

### Table 7: four-prong exposition of thesis argument

| Main Argument: Plan gravity does not successfully lead to nation building. |
| --- | --- |
| Exposition one | Plan gravity is undermined by a multiplicity of actors and interests. |
| Exposition two | Plan gravity marginalises the context under which the plan operates. |
| Exposition three | Plan gravity is undermined by external impulse - the global flow of finance capital. |
| Exposition four | Plan gravity is underpinned by Western notions, which do not seem to be working |

Source: Author 2016

To demonstrate the argument through the expositions the chapter is divided into two sections. The first clarifies the notion of plan gravity and the last discusses the expositions.
8.1. Plan Gravity

This section clarifies what plan gravity is and the various ways in which it comes about. First it contends that plan gravity emanates from the connection between nation building and modernist planning ideals. We have already made sense of this connection in chapter 2 of how modernists planning ideals are used toward achieving national aspirations. This will further be demonstrated how plan gravity comes from this connection. Second and thirdly, it will be demonstrated that plan gravity also comes about from the history of planning in the country and through political legitimisation respectively.

Plan Gravity Emanates from Nation-Building and Modernist Planning Ideals

The attainment of political Independence in Africa and elsewhere has driven the desire of Post-Independent states toward nation building. What the European colonialists bequeathed at Independence to these states are civic-territories containing multiple ethnic groups (Chapter 2). The states have thus sought to build nations that weld the groups together as one common nation since Independence. But nation building in these states especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, has tended to favour the building of territorial nations as against primordial nations which are based on ethnicity (chapter 2). The fear of not falling into ethnic primordialism and coupled with the influence of modernist theories of nationhood have driven the force behind the quest for territorial nations. But nation building among others, has equally sought to bring about for instance, regional and economic development or the building of modern capitals to announce to the world of the coming to age of these states (Chapter 2).

The territorial form of nationhood has driven Nigeria’s quest for nation-building as well. Nigeria has desired to pursue this through national capital relocation to a more considered neutral and symbolic site – the Abuja imperative (Chapter 5). Against the backdrop of Nigeria’s over 250 tribes and not to arouse ethnic tension in a country ridden with a history of ethnic and regional squabbles, Abuja is seen as the symbol to bring about a common national identity (FCDA,1979; Mabogunje, 2011). Besides this aspiration, Abuja seeks to also bring about regional development, build an exemplary, outstanding city that presents Nigeria to the world as a modern nation, among other aspirations (Chapter 2, 5 and 6).

A connection between the aspirations is through the adoption of modernists planning ideal (Chapter 2). This has led to the production of the Abuja master plan containing broad land uses and the supplementary master plans of the CA - containing detailed land uses and urban designs of national importance considered to promote nation building (chapter 5 and 6). The plan (in this case represented by the Abuja master plan and master plans of the CA) is therefore underscored by the aspirations of nation building (IPA,1979). It is the instrument that will lead
to the attainment of the aspirations (fig 36). This renders the plan as the most important thing, the centre of national attention and consequently upheld and treated as the centre of gravity (attention) in the CA (El-Rufai, 2013; Ajayi, 2013).

Plan gravity is rooted in history

This way of looking at the plan as a gravity of attention comes also from the country’s history of planning. Following the country’s Independence from Britain in 1960, Post-Independence planning in the 1960s and 1970s have focused on the production of master plans toward the future development of towns and cities. This notion was later extended to the planning of Abuja starting from 1979 when the Abuja master plan was prepared, and series of master planning in the CA over the decades (Chapter 5). Thus, the plan (master plans) over the years has consistently been seen as the guidance of future development and therefore deemed of utmost importance (Ajayi, 2013). It is this utmost importance that brings about a gravity of attention that is attached to the plan.

Plan Gravity Comes from Political Legitimisation

But plan gravity has also become an ingrained thing in the CA and the entire city because it plays the role of political legitimisation. Supporting the plan gravity amounts to commitment to the nation’s project through Abuja’s social aspirations in which the plan is the centre of the
gravity. Starting with the political ruling class from the 1970s to the 2000s they have accentuated this view (Olajide, 2004; Ajayi, 2013). President Obasanjo for instance lays emphasis on it as a top agenda of his administration between 2003 and 2007, providing huge resources to sustain it (the gravity) through what he tagged the restoration of Abuja master plan. Under this policy the plan is upheld as the centre of gravity and a commitment to its restoration legitimises commitment to nation building (Ajayi, 2013; El-Rufai, 2013). Plan gravity in this sense plays the role of legitimisation especially for the political ruling class and this has provided the much impetus for its sustenance as the gravity.

**Plan gravity leads to linearity**

Consequently, due to the importance that is attached to the plan the contents of the plan are deemed to be inviolable and must be implemented faithfully. That is, planning in the CA is viewed as a linear process (linearity) in which the intentions of the plan are expected to be implemented in a conformance basis on ground. Expressed in another way, the use of land as captured in a master plan’s land use plan is to be developed on ground as spelt out in the master plan, and it is assumed that in the end the social aspirations of Abuja will be achieved.

**8.2. Plan Gravity and Multiplicity of Actors**

The preceding discussion explains the notion behind plan gravity and how it comes about. This section now focuses on the first exposition of the thesis’ argument stated earlier at the beginning of the chapter.

Briefly it contends that Plan gravity is undermined by multiplicity of actors and interests. Who then are these actors? They are the politicians and military leaders, planners, foreign consultants, and land developers. At the design process of the Abuja master plan and the supplementary master plans of the CA, they were largely responsible for the production of the plans apart from land developers (chapter 6). At the implementation stage the planners, politicians and military leaders, and land developers have been involved in the implementation of the plans (chapter 7). But a major issue is that while plan gravity is the rallying point that brings these actors together toward achieving Abuja’s aspirations, the actors through their multiplicity of interests tend to undermine the implementation of the plan. The plan in this sense and as already mentioned, refers to the master plans of the CA and in these plans are contained the land uses of the CA. Expressed in another way, it is the contention of the thesis that the
multiplicity of the actors and their interests undermine the implementation of the land uses of the CA.

Toward making sense of this the first aspect of the discussion focuses on national elites. It looks at how the elites while professing a support to the plan tend to advance other interests that run contrary to it - in this case the intentions that the land uses of the CA seek to achieve. Three national elites are looked at to illustrate this point namely, President Shehu Shagari, General Ibrahim Babangida and General Abdulsalami Abubakar. But it is not only these elites that drive agenda or interests that tend to be quite different from the plan while publicly proclaiming a support or allegiance to the plan and its intentions.

The planners, foreign consultants, land developers, among others, are driven also by a multiplicity of interests that undermine the plan and what it seeks to achieve. The second aspect of the discussion focuses on this category of actors. It brings to light how these actors’ interests generally lead to other ways which limit the plan’s implementation - besides from the viewpoint of the actors’ interests running contrary to the plan’s intentions. This is demonstrated through some of the events that have taken place in the CA since 1979 - encompassing the two eras of planning in the district. The events dealt with under the first era (1979-2007) are i) the Bakasi re-subdivision and NNPC Mega Petrol Station, and ii) Accelerated Development Programme. Those of the second era (2008-todate) are i) the Boulevard Policy, ii) Conflicting Land Use Plans, and iii) 3-Arms Zone Re-subdivision. In all 5 events are explored thus – 2 in the first era and 3 in the second era.

8.2.1. National elites

President Shehu Shagari

A discussion on the national elites as actors, focuses on how the various presidents in the country have undermined the intentions of the plan with other agenda that are dissimilar to those being pursued by the plan.\footnote{To recap again the plan’s agenda or interests or intentions, simply narrows down to the very land uses of the CA and what they seek to achieve. The aspirations of the plan is to see how these land uses are developed and with the assumption that when they are developed the nation building concerns of Abuja will be achieved.}

The use of the plan to achieve other agenda by presidents began in the early years of Abuja. As soon as the Abuja master plan was ready in 1979, President Shagari who became the president of the country in the same year (chapter 7), saw a connection between the plan and his political
ambition (Moore, 1984; Mabogunje, 2011). The plan would be a means to further political ambitions especially to elicit public support for his administration and future elections. This does not seem surprising. Even during the campaign elections that eventually brought him into office in 1979, the issue of the development of Abuja was among his manifestos - pledging allegiance to it and promising to see to its actualisation should he became the president (Olajide, 2004; Mabogunje, 2011). Eventually he became the president although the success of the elections cannot be completely based on this pledge. But it would appeal to the public considering the very importance of Abuja to the diverse people of Nigeria which they expect will bring about national integration, regional development and become one of the top modern cities of the world. After all, following the pronouncement of Abuja as the new capital of the country in 1976 there followed a widespread celebration across the country notwithstanding the few dissenting voices against the decision (Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi, 2013; El-Rufai, 2013). This reflects the very importance of Abuja to the majority of the public and would have instigated support and won votes for the president’s 1979 election as the issue of Abuja’s actualisation featured among his manifestoes (chapter 7).

Having settled down in office, president Shagari would be seen committed to the development of Abuja (chapter 7). Beneath this commitment however, Abuja would also continue to be in some other way as a means of political advancement and sustenance of political office for the president. This is reflected through his political campaigns of the 1983 national elections. During this election as the previous 1979 election, he appealed to the people to allow him another second term in 1983, promising to continue with the good work that he had begun - the implementation of the Abuja master plan. This quest resulted in the distortion of some aspects of the very plan that he laid allegiance to implement toward nation-building. Most glaring and which has remained a scar in Abuja today reminiscent of his visible usage of Abuja as a political campaign machine, is the area of Abuja that is referred to as the Old Parade Ground (FCDA 1999; Mabogunje, 2011; Ajayi, 2013).

In the Abuja master plan (IPA) the land use for this area is meant to be developed for a hospital. The president however used it to score political points by marking the nation’s 1982 Independence Day there. Through this action the place became converted into a public space for ceremonial activities by the planners and has over the years played this role (Ajayi, 2013). The usual Independence celebrations had always been held in Lagos - the former capital. But marking the first Independence in Abuja in 1982 when the city was in its early development stage was symbolic. It was to remind Nigerians that he was more than ever committed to the actualisation of Abuja, and through this expects massive support for his re-election for a second
term to continue with the nation building project of Abuja (Ajayi, 2013). The consideration of politics above the land use provision of the plan altered the very plan he continued to lay allegiance to its implementation toward nation building. As a result of this action the area has been immortalised as the Old Parade Ground, as open space by the planners - thereby altering the original land use of the plan which desired the space to be developed into an hospital as earlier mentioned (Moore, 1984; FCDA, 1999; Ajayi, 2013).

But it is not only at the Old Parade Ground that the distortion of the plan’s intention by political interest can be discerned. In the CA also motivated by the Old Parade Ground politics, the president hurriedly built a temporary presidential house as part of the occasion of the 1982 Independence Celebrations held at the Old Parade Ground.

*On 1 October 1982, the Nigerian Independence Day celebrations were held in Abuja. For this occasion a temporary Presidential residence [was]...built (Moore, 1984, p. 175).*

But the presidential house contradicted the provision of the IPA and KTU for the CA. Discussed in chapter 6, the IPA provided broad land uses for the CA while the KTU brought out detailed land uses and urban designs for phase 1 of the CA. These plans designated the 3-Arms zone (one of the nine zones of the CA) to be developed into three major land uses - the presidential palace, legislative and judiciary complexes. However, the presidential house was not built within the presidential palace but outside the 3-Arms zone in another area meant for the nation’s Arboretum (FCDA, 1999; Ikoku, 2004)

This again, while reflecting the president’s concern for political interest of reminding Nigerians of his commitment to Abuja’s realisation, and exploring that as a means to appeal to votes for a second term in office, he ended up violating the very land uses of the CA that he proclaims support for toward achieving Abuja’s nation building goals. The distortions have remained visible scars in the city reflecting the usage of a plan’s intention for other agenda. Hence at the Old Parade Ground, for example, which is now an open space fenced with cement blocks one is reminded of this scar: Shagari’s political commitment to Abuja’s development on the surface but beneath it is a Shagari’s veiled political ambition.

**General Ibrahim Babangida**

In the 1990s General Ibrahim Babangida continued with the use of the plan for other agenda but in a different way than President Shagari. As noted in chapter 7, the official relocation of the seat of government from Lagos to Abuja was effected in 1991 by the General. The General’s commitment to Abuja since 1985 when he became the head of state had been enormous –
channelling both political support and funds for the development of Abuja’s infrastructure. This reflects his belief in Abuja as a nation building project and the plan which is expected to guide the development of Abuja (chapter 7).

However, while this cannot be gainsaid, the General’s transfer of the seat of government from Lagos to Abuja had been primarily anchored on the need to hold on to the reins of political power. In 1990 the country experienced a bloody military coup popularly referred to as the ‘Major Gideon Orkar Coup’ (Akinnola, 1998; Mustapha, 2000; Ihundu, 2004). Although aborted, it almost over threw the General’s regime at the Doodan Barracks in Lagos. With the bitter experience the General now saw Abuja more than ever as the only ‘safe haven’ for his regime (Vale, 2008), and expedited the transfer of seat of government from Lagos to Abuja the following year of 1991 and symbolising this with the building of a presidential villa – the Aso Vila (Chapter 7).

But against the backdrop of the regime’s concerns for security, the search for a ‘safe heaven’ (Vale, 2008) it relocated the presidential palace outside the 3-Arms Zone to a new location. The new location where the Aso Villa is built falls in an area designated as the nation’s arboretum. The new complex is further barricaded with military barracks in a bid to fortify it which are all sited within the national arboretum (Ikoku, 2004; Vale, 2008). The precursor to this in a way would be said to have been initiated by President Shehu Shagari when he first built a temporary presidential structure outside the presidential palace as earlier observed. A former director in the FCDA I interviewed in January 2014, concerning the intricacies behind Aso villa, simply referred me to an earlier publication he wrote on the matter. He reports thus.

_The political leaders took that decision, which is totally against the concept and spirit of the Abuja master plan, with little or no input from the relevant professionals. The barracks locations have greatly distorted the circulation patterns, infrastructural provisions and other logistic support as computed by the Abuja Master Plan and its accompanied detailed Site Development Plans [that is the KTU master plan] (Olajide, 2004 p. 13)._

The distortion of the zone however did not go without some redemptive recommendations. For instance, the FCT 1999 Ministerial Committee on the appraisal of Physical planning in Abuja was quite strong in this regard.

_The committee is of the view that the FCC, Abuja development without the complement of the original ‘Three Arms Zone’ concept of the City’s Master Plan is the most pronounced deviation from the separation of powers concept. It is therefore recommended that there should be a gradual return to the original’ concept ‘by providing a be-fitting Presidential Palace within the’ zone since both plan and site set aside for it is still intact (FCDA, 1999, p. 153)._
These recommendations have not been implemented since 1999 and the zone has had to live with the scars of the distortion just as the Old Parade Ground inflicted by President Shagari. General Babangida’s action motivated by political concern to reinforce the reins of power, thus runs contrary to the very plan and its intentions (3-Arms Zone land uses) he had been committed to implement since 1985 (FCDA 1999; Olajide 2004). This again as in the case of President Shagari reflects the conflicting interests that national elites underplay. On the surface is a proclamation to support the plan and indeed matched with commitment to that proclamation toward nation building, but beneath this is the accentuation of other interests quite different from those sought by the plan.

![Figure 36: 3-Arms Zone of Abuja’s Central Area showing Legislative land use (1) Presidential land use (2) Judiciary land use (3) (KTU, 1981).](image)

*Figure 36: 3-Arms Zone of Abuja’s Central Area showing*  

Legislative land use (1)  
Presidential land use (2)  
Judiciary land use (3)  
Urban Design/Model of the 3-Arms Zone.

1. Legislative Complex
2. Presidential Complex
3. Judiciary Complex

Presidential Complex as envisaged by KTU Master Plan

Figure 37: Presidential Complex moved out of the 3-Arms Zone, and built in a new location - the National Arboretum.

Modified from KTUC, 1981; and Google image 2016
General Abdulsalami Abubakar

General Babangida’s overt concern for political power and the need to protect it led to the distortion of the 3-Arms Zone. But if General Babangida was concerned about security driven by political power, the case of General Abdulsalami’s usage of the plan for a different purpose other than which is sought by the plan, does not appear based on political factor. It is quite difficult to link General Abubakar’s Administration to any political underplay for the usage of the plan for other purpose. Generally though, it would be summed that the contrary usage of the plan during the General’s regime, had to do with the political exigency at the moment in 1999 upon the country’s return to democracy than necessarily based on a personal or political agenda aimed at appropriating the plan in support of it. Nonetheless the General’s regime though quite short - only nine months into office, presents yet another elite while publicly supporting the Abuja project, behind this there is contrary usage of the plan for other purpose. This is illustrated through the 1999 political exigency in the country.

1999 political exigency

Already mentioned, the General’s case (usage of the plan for other purpose) is connected to the country’s 1999 return to democracy. From 1983 the country had been under one military regime to another (chapter 7). However the military would be relinquishing power to a democratically elected government led by President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. This would be his coming back into government for the second time - having been a military head of stead from 1976 to 1979. To mark the return to democracy and hand over power to President Obasanjo, General Abubakar’s regime decided to convert a section of the Ministry Zone particularly the area around the National Mall and built a public square known as the Eagle Square (chapter 6). It is at this Square that the General transferred political power to President Obasanjo.

The Square no doubt plays a major role as a public space especially in hosting such important events. Nevertheless, according to the KTU master plan and as observed previously in chapter 6, the section taken up by the Square constitutes a part of a long stretch of the National Mall. This stretch of area was intended by the KTU to be implemented into two components- the valley area and the states plaza area. In both areas the KTU emphasized the need for green gardens and a blend of activities such as disco clubs, night clubs, boutiques and amphitheatres, kiosks, restaurants among others. The overarching notion would be to create a panoramic vista in which the mentioned activities can be undertaken with pleasure and that the Ministry Zone will be ‘enlivened after office hours’ (KTU, 1981, p. 40). In the same area too the KTU
designates it to carter for four transport land uses: railway main station, city bus terminal, intercity bus terminal and transport centre as earlier noted in chapter 6. But while these four land uses could not be implemented throughout the 1990s due to lack of funds, the railway terminus (main station) was relocated to the Market Zone. This was attributed to the fact the ‘radii required for the railway tracks to enter the original location were regarded as too tight’ and that ‘the available length for the station platforms was regarded as insufficient in the original location’ (Speer, 2008, p.14). A detailed discussion on the railway terminus’ relocation to the market zone is dealt with in the next section under the caption Bakasi resubdivision/NNPC Mega Station.

But by having constructed the Square within the National Mall, the action resulted in distorting ‘the open space, landscaping and vista planning’ of the area as well as the transport land use zone particularly in area dealing with intercity bus terminus - as the Square is built around this area of the National Mall (FCDA, 1999).

Eagle Square as constructed should have been located at the site for the ‘‘National Square’’ being where it is has encroached on the reservation for the Sub-Transportation Centre, and portions of the reservation for the development of ‘‘state gardens’’. It has also interfered with the ‘‘Vista Planning’’ Concept’’ in the City Centre (FCDA, 1999, P. 101)

As earlier observed, it is quite difficult to attribute the regime’s action to any personal political agenda. The most seeming reason for the action would be attributed to the 1999 political exigency at the moment, of the need to construct a public square as a platform that will be used to transfer power from the military to a democratic government. This would be made sense of since there existed none in the CA as at 1999 despite that in the Cultural Zone the KTU made provision for the construction of a national public square. The district officer of the CA at the time the Eagle Square was constructed is quite certain about this exigency and provides insights why the General’s regime had to construct the Eagle Square at that location.

There was need to have a public square so that we can hand over power to President Obasanjo. We considered the Old Parade Ground but you know it is not so beautiful and befitting, since it is just an open space. Then again there was the thought of the national square in the master plan but it so big that you can’t build it overnight - as it will take time to build it – may be 5 to 10 years or more, and here was the need for an urgent public square. So the issue of the national square was thrown away. Eventually we settled on the area where you have the Eagle Square today. The place is close to the Aso Villa [presidential Residence] and is well served by roads going into the CA. Because it close to the ASO Villa the president can easily drive to the Eagle Square to perform the hand over. So these were some of the factors that played out (Abuja Planner B1 2013, interview).
Despite this justification for the use of the area as a public Square, it does not repudiate the fact that the Eagle Square contradicts the intentions of the KTU master plan as earlier highlighted.

Figure 38: Eagle Square Built along the National Mall /Green Mall Area.
Speer, 2008; hotels.ng(image).
8.2.2. Event One: Bakasi Market Re-subdivision and NNPC mega petrol station

The last discussion reveals how national elites carry out agenda that are contrary to the intentions of the plan. This undermines the plan’s implementation particularly its land uses. In this section, through the Bakasi Market Re-subdivision/NNPC Mega Petrol Station, the focus is on how these actors and their interests (the planners, land developers and politicians from top government circles) undermine the plan’s intentions - the land uses. Event One thus presents one of these accounts in the CA.

The area of the CA referred to as the Bakasi Market\textsuperscript{42} falls under the Market Zone in Phase 2 of the CA. The Market Zone as previously explained in chapter 6 is meant to a central market to serve ‘as an open market with large, pavilion-like sales facilities’ (Speer, 2008 p.16.). Its implementation though could not be realised throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Many factors account for this. Prominent however is the funding challenges experienced by the FCDA over the decades which limited its ability to either develop the market or provide infrastructure to attract private investors into developing it (chapter 7).

In consequence, the plot meant for the market would later be overtaken by informal activities (e.g. sale of firewood), and even its original name as the central market came to be known as the Bakasi Market (Chapter 6). Due to the non-development of the market and following the relocation of the railway main station from the Ministry Zone into the Market Zone (chapter 6), the Market Zone was re-subdivided to accommodate the new station. This altered the original layout of the Market Zone. Nonetheless the re-subdivision not only accommodated the new railway station in the north-east section of the Zone, but also produced another plot to be used for the purpose of a mall. The plot for the mall is known as the Abuja Mall which is in the southern part of the Market Zone.

But sometime in 2002 the new location for the railway station was encroached upon by a different land use - through the construction of a petrol filling station known as the NNPC mega petrol filling station.

\textsuperscript{42} Bakasi, was not an official name given by the FCDA for the Central Market but it was more of a name given to the area by the operators of the informal activities. Why it was called Bakasi is not clear.
Figure 39: NNPC Filling Station built in an area meant for the Abuja’s Railway Terminus (yellow dotted lines)
Author, 2015.
A former director in the FCDA as well as the district officer in charge of implementing the KTU and AIM master plans at that time\textsuperscript{43} - provide ample insights into the encroachment and related intricacies that surrounded it. Starting with the director he narrates that,

> **When they brought this application for a petrol filling station I told them it was not going to be possible. You know why? We just relocated the main railway terminus [main train station] into this area not too long ago, and now you want to contravene it by building a filling station? What happens when we want to build the terminus in future? So I refused to be part of the nonsense. I told them in clear terms not mincing words about the violation of the master plan. I couldn’t just let this happen. As a young officer recruited into the FCDA in the early 1980s I was in charge of explaining to investors, students, the public, and visitors into Abuja, about the beauty of the master plan and the Kenzo plan [KTU] as well as that of the AIM. So I knew everything about the plans. Again being on the directorate level it was my duty to protect these beautiful plans I always talked of and not to desecrate them or someone trying to cajole me into doing the wrong thing (Abuja Planner B4 2013, interview).**

Narrating the encroachment further, the district officer reports that,

> **About 12 years back while serving as a site officer for the Central Area District in the Development Control Department, I had cause to serve a stop work and quit notice on a petrol filling station project, which development had just commenced on a plot adjoining the central area market and along Olusegun Obasanjo Way. This petrol station is the NNPC mega filling station... there was no approval [planning permit] for the development... unfortunately, instead of commending our resilience aimed at ensuring corrections, we were astonished to learn that we were reported to the highest quarters as trying to frustrate the federal government policy of establishing NNPC mega station in Abuja, and security agencies were drafted to investigate [us]... (Shuaibu, 2014a).**

But the filling station would be eventually built despite not having planning permit. The narrations by the two planners nonetheless go to show the extent to which the planning system tends to be manipulated by the very powerful in support of other interest regardless of the intentions of the plan. As noted in chapter 7, planning in the city tends to be manipulated by powerful actors and this played out prominently in the case of the NNPC Mega Petrol station. So, who were the powerful actors behind the construction of the filing station? Another retired director unmasks this.

> **I must let you that the NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation] is a very powerful organisation - and at that time they had some backing from some very powerful people in the presidency who were interested in the project.**

\textsuperscript{43} At that time, the URP was known as the Department of Planning and Survey. The DDC as that time was yet a full-fledged Department but a unit under the Department of Planning Survey known as the Development Control Unit. Both the director and the district officer have since retired from public service. The director is now into private practice and the other one writes profoundly in national dailies on issues regarding Abuja and its master plan.
to be honest with you, they equally got some of their foot soldiers right in the planning system who were willing to justify their action. I was quite surprised that while we were resisting the pressure from these powerful people some of our colleagues were busy fronting the project underground. You know sometimes planners are enemies on to themselves – backstabbers (Abuja Planner B2 2013, interview)

Thus, the enemies within the system were responsible for the change of the land use of the new terminus in favour of the petrol station. Again the district officer explains further.

This distortion [change of land use from Railway Terminus to petrol filling station] is attributed to the allocation [land title]. Accordingly, the first point of consideration by the officers saddled with the responsibility of plots allocation in Abuja is the allocation’s compliance with the proposed land use requirement for the area. This procedure was violated [by the planners/land officers] (Shuaibu, 2014a).

But in as much as the project would be considered an illegal development since it did not have a planning permit and violated the provisions of the plan [AIM master plan], it nevertheless represented one of the few investments that existed in the CA’s phase 2. It could have been against the backdrop of boosting the investment profile of the city that the drivers of the project sought to develop it in the CA. Even at this, almost all the planners interviewed felt that Abuja in the early 2000s and even now still has numerous empty plots that could have been used as an alternative for the development of the petrol station. They reason that there was no justification for converting the land use of the new terminus in favour of the petrol filling station.

At any rate, the fate of the station as to whether it will continue existing in the new terminus’s location was finally decided in 2014. Owing to the on-going railway project in the city it would become necessary for the petrol station to give way for the construction of the railway main station. And in 2014 the planners decided the only option available would be through the demolition of the petrol station.

It is true we served three Enforcement Notices on the station. We have three kinds of Notices. These are Stop Work Notice, Quit Notice and Demolition Notice. So we have served the final demolition notice and any moment we shall demolish the station. In fact all the notices had been served some years ago and what we have done now is simply reminder (Abuja Planner C1 2014, interview).

But even now the station is yet to be demolished. A phone call to the DDC’s planners for an update on the status of the station reveals that the station is still under demolition list which would be carried out any time.

At any rate, the foregoing discussion on Event One has shown how the planners and some powerful land developers and politicians in top government circles collude to undermine the
very plan they pledge to, or are expected to support toward nation building, by executing a
different land use (the NNPC mega petrol station) at a plot meant to be used for the purpose of
a railway main station.

8.2.3. Event Two: Accelerated Development Programme (ADP)

This section continues with a discussion on these actors showing how their interests undermine
even an important policy in the CA - thereby undermining the implementation of the plan and
what its seeks to achieve through the land uses. The policy is the Accelerated Development
Programme (ADP) which was introduced in Abuja in 2004 by the FCT Administration. It aimed
primarily to fast track the development of the city. Event Two therefore, narrates this policy
and especially against the backdrop of the multiplicity of interests from the actors, which turned
out to undermine the policy and in turn limited the implementation of the CA’s land uses.

Why of the ADP

The Accelerated Development Programme (ADP) was introduced in 2004 with the primary aim
of accelerating the development of the city. In the context of the CA, and after a period of over
2 decades of the adoption of the CA’s master plans (KTU and AIM), the district could only
boast of 27% of plot development (table 8). Against such a background the ADP would no
doubt be deemed necessary in the CA (El-Rufai, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of plots</th>
<th>Period (1980 - 2005)</th>
<th>Percentage built up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>720</td>
<td>Built up</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: modified from (El-Rufai, 2013, p. 261) with focus on the CA.

Introduced by the El-Rufai Administration (2003-2007), it aimed at making land to developers
with the means of developing them. The FCT Minister (Mallam Nasir El-Rufai) explains
further.

The ADP [Accelerated Development Program] was one of the initiatives
approved by President Obasanjo [regime, 1999-2007] to enable commercial
developers of land have easier and cheaper access to land for development in
Abuja. The programme sought to ensure that land was allocated directly to the
developer and the development is required to be conducted within a specified
timeline. The terms and conditions for the grant were the result of the
Accompanying the ADP, a special planning permit was introduced to cater for it. In chapter 7 the process of planning permit (building plan approval) was discussed. Under the ADP however, instead of the usual 2 years of life span of a permit, the ADP shortened it to 6 months. This was to ensure that as soon as a permit was granted, the developer will move to site immediately to begin construction. Paragraph 3 of the permit is clear about this and reads thus:

In line with the set objective of the... Accelerated Development Program you are to mobilise to site and start construction within 30 days of the receipt of approval [planning permit] (Abuja Planner D3 2014, interview)

Further, paragraph 1 sub-item (xi) spells out the time frame of a planning permit.

That the approval [planning permit] of this plan automatically lapses after 60 days from the date of this approval if construction is not started (Abuja Planner D3 2014, interview).

With such fast track measures introduced in the permit process, the development of the city would be expected to have increased. Indeed, the former minister claims that the programme was a huge success (El-Rufai, 2013).

Intricacies surrounding the ADP

Nonetheless misgivings abound regarding the alleged success of the programme. The former district officer in charge of the CA when this policy was initiated explains this further.

There were those who never believed in the programme. They didn’t believe that it was meant to fast track the development of the city or the Central Area. They saw it as a hoax to revoke land titles and reallocate to the cronies of the Minister.

So, in that regard, many people still don’t believe it was a successful policy. You know, you are dealing with land and anybody whose land has been taken up and given to another party for the programme will definitely cry foul. So we had so many issues regarding the programme, several complaints from the public. But to be fair to the Minister, he wanted to develop Abuja despite the complaints (Abuja Planner C5 2014, interview).

The complaints led to litigations by some aggrieved parties. More than that, the National Assembly also set up an investigative committee referred to as the Senator Sodangani Committee.

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44 Life span of planning permit is the duration that a permit is expected to last. The usual practice by the DDC is 2 years in which a land developer is expected to have started the development of a plot and complete it within the 2 years. Beyond this the permit becomes obsolete although a developer can apply for a revalidation of the lapsed permit.
as earlier mentioned in chapter 7, to investigate the ADP and related matters shortly after the end of the minister’s (Mallam Nasir El-Rufai) tenure of office. The Minister’s tenure stated from 2003 and ended on May 29th, 2007 and the scope of the Committee’s investigation was to cover the tenure. But the Minister views the whole essence of the Sodangi Committee rather as a ‘contrived lie’ and a personal vendetta against him and the administration he led (El-Rufai, 2013).

Some of the members of the Senate Committee... came into the assignment [investigation] with conflict of interest and some personal grudges against me and decisions of the FCTA during my tenure (El-Rufai, 2013, p. 257).

Notwithstanding, the Sodangi Committee upon the completion of the investigation made numerous recommendations. Among others it recommended the withdrawal of land allocations that were made by the Minister (El-Rufai) between the 17th and 29th of May 2007. From the recommendations and as a follow up, Senator Muhammad Adamu Aliero the Minister of the FCT who succeeded Dr Modibbo Aliyu, announced the revocation of 700 plots that earlier on had been allocated by the former Minister, Mallam Nasir el-Rufai. 45

But in so much as this action was taken, the veracity of the allegations against Mallam El-Rufai tends to raise some level of suspicion considering the counter responses and evidences tended by him. For example, in his book - ‘The Accidental Public Servant’ published in 2013, copious counter evidences are presented in it aimed at discrediting the allegations and recommendations of the Sodangi Committee. As earlier mentioned, he labels the allegations as a ‘contrived lie’ and a witch-hunt to reverse the actions of his administration for the sole benefits of the Committee members and their sponsors. Particularly in the appendix 7 of the book he mentions some of the plots that the Committee recommended for revocation but were instead revoked and relocated to the Committee’s members, and other senate members - their colleagues; some federal executive members and other influential members of the government of the day as beneficiaries of the exercise (El-Rufai, 2013). The Committee’s report and counter defences made by Mallam Nasir El-Rufai reflect the nature of politics of land administration in the FCT as earlier observed in chapter 7.

45 The investigation was started under Dr Modibbo Aliyu, the immediate successor to Mallam Nasir El-Rufai. The Modibbo Administration began in July 2007 and ended in October 2008. Muhammed Adamu Aliero took over from there in December 2008 to April 2010. But after Mallam Nasir El-Rufai’s exist in May 2007, and following the outcome of the Sodangi Committee investigation, there have been series of revocations by successive ministers, each Minister setting up its own ministerial committee of inquiry. Senate-led committees are investigated by the senate while ministerial committees are sort of an in-house administrative committees set up by the minister of the FCT. Ideally, the senate committees are more powerful and carry far reaching actions than the ministerial committee.
But far reaching, these intrigues complicated the implementation of the CA’s master plans (KTU and AIM) during the first era of planning in the district. Rather than enhance the development of the CA through its land uses, the ADP became a bone of contention, struggle for land among several actors - land developers, the planners, politicians, among others. To demonstrate the nature of the ADP’s intricacies in the context of the CA, the following case of an ADP is presented.

**An Example of An ADP intricacy in the CA**

The case involves plot 589 as an example of the many revocations that an ADP plot underwent through and underscored by a multitude of interests from different actors. The plot was originally allocated to the National Primary Education but later revoked and relocated to the Interstate-Project Associates. Thereafter it was revoked and reallocated to the Obasanjo Farms. Finally, the plot was revoked from the Obasanjo Farms and reverted to the Interstate-Project Associates. The Sodangi Committee Report explains further especially the episodes leading to the revocation of the plot from the Interstate-Project Associates to Obasanjo Farms.

*The company [Interstate-Project Associates] developed the structure up to the third floor of the 13 storey tower of the project. However, the Development Control [DDC] refused to release the approved building plan to the Company for undisclosed reasons. While waiting for the release of the Company’s building plan from the Development Control [DDC], an agent of Obasanjo Farms approached the company and laid claim to the plot having been so allocated to Obasanjo Farms on 28 May, 2007 by the then Hon. Minister for FCT, Nasir El-Rufai, being the last day of Obasanjo’s [president Olusegun Obasanjo] administration in office. Hence, the company's structure was demolished at midnight at about 2.00 a.m. (Sodangi’ s FCT land investigation Committee)*

These episodes as the District Officer of the CA during the ADP period points out, are more underpinned by political and economic interests than any other consideration.

*Let me be honest with you. This case was a tough one. Very, very, tough one. But it was all about interest about who gets the plot – and when two elephants fight it is the grass that suffers. So, we as civil servants we just wait and see the outcome and whoever the plot is given to - we simply do our best to ensure he or she develops it in line with our controls [development control regulations] (Abuja Planner C3 2014, interview).*

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46 Other prominent examples include plot 123, 388 all in the CA, and many others in the city, in which incoming Ministers of the FCT have had to set up their own Ministerial Committees to review cases of revocations and reinstatement. All these committees give rise to revocations and counter revocations/reinstatements of plots in the city.

47 A Company belonging to the former President of Nigeria.

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He continues with the narration.

This was exactly what happened and whether it was the former allotee or the new one that got the plot, we didn’t play such politics. But all I can tell you is that big time politics was played by the big people [powerful actors] regarding the plot. And there was so much confusion because you are thinking this is the rightful allotee and before you know the plot is given to another allotee, and all this confusion of going up and down slowed down the development of the plot instead of accelerating its development which the policy [ADP] was initiated in the first place. Again when this was going on, different kinds of proposals were brought up to be implemented at the plot although some not meeting up with our regulations and the master plan (Abuja Planner C3 2014, interview).

These intricacies that surrounded the ADP would no doubt slow down rather than accelerate plot development, and by extension the land uses expected to be implemented on such plots. Despite this El-Rufai (2013) rates the success of the programme high.

By the time we left office [2003 May-May 2007] many of the plots- nearly half were at advanced stages of being developed, and some had even completed the buildings which the programme targeted for development (El-Rufai 2013, p. 256).

If El-Rufai’s statement is anything to go by, and particularly against the backdrop of the intricacies that surrounded the ADP, it could be supposed that without the intricacies the ADP would have achieved more success. This is because the intricacies which were underpinned by political and economic interests, in a way undermined the policy and in turn undermine land use implementation in the CA as revealed for instance, in the cited example of plot 589 in the CA. for instance.

8.2.4. Event Three: The Boulevard Policy

So far the preceding discussions from the two events (Event One and Two) have focused on accounts during the first era of planning in the CA represented by the KTU and AIM master plans. However, starting from Event Three and through to Event Five, the discussion focuses on the second era of planning in the CA drawing accounts from the era to also underscore the discussion on the multiplicity of actors and interests, and how this undermines the implementation of land uses.

Event Three, just like the account in Event Two, is about yet another important policy - the Boulevard Policy that was introduced in the CA in 2008. Event Three thus narrates the policy and multiplicity of interests that underlain it and how that undermined land use implementation.
What the policy was

From the Accelerated Development Programme (ADP) discussed in the preceding section, the next policy in the CA was the Boulevard Policy initiated in 2008. The proponent of the policy is Dr Aliyu Modibbo. In 2007 Dr Aliyu Modibbo was appointed the new Minister of the FCT - succeeding Mallam Nasir El-Rufai. His interest in the CA laid primarily in the development of the CA’s boulevards as conceived in the AS&P master plan (chapter 6). He had just been the Minister barely a year when the AS&P was completed in 2008 and adopted for implementation, although the process of the preparation of the master plan begun in much earlier in 2003 (Chapter 6). A look into the AS&P and as already discussed in chapter 6 shows that ‘the boulevard concept is based on shifting the main commercial activities from the inner block cores to the main, boulevard street frontages’ (Speer, 2008, p. 30)

Thus apart from their function as traffic distributors, the boulevards will be the Central Area’s main pedestrian zones with broad sidewalks and adjoining colonnades. It is important to implement public and commercial functions in the ground floor areas in order to fill the boulevards with life. (Speer, 2008, p.30)

The beauty of the boulevards and the assumption that it will lead to a vibrant city life, underscored the Minister’s interest. Through the boulevard ‘‘it is expected”, the Minster explains, ‘‘to attract and facilitate 24/7 commercial activities complemented by 24/7 vehicular and pedestrian movement” (Taiwo, 2008). The Minister would have been enthused by the boulevards of other cities of the world and desired that Abuja’s CA to become so.

[the] status of the city of Abuja [as both a national capital and desiring to be a world class city] has informed the strong desire of the FCT administration to embark on the development in the central area to provide Abuja with a downtown and make the city more befitting of its status as a world class city (Taiwo, 2008)
Taiwo (2008) succinctly captures the high-level attachment placed on the policy as it was even endorsed by the late President Umaru Yar’Adua for implementation.

_The Federal Executive Council (FEC), chaired by President Umar Musa Yar’Adua, has approved the revised master plan for the construction of Abuja Boulevard. When completed, the boulevard will be like Rodeo Drive in Los Angeles, United States, and is expected to boost tourism in the city. The boulevard will have a cluster of high rise buildings, hotels, conference centres and parks, in a bid to modernise the nation’s capital (Taiwo, 2008)._  

In all 450 plots were to be affected by the policy. The planning authorities especially the DDC in conjunction with Julius Berger Nigeria Limited, a German construction giant in Abuja, (chapter 6) undertook site appraisals of the affected plots to ascertain the site conditions of the plot.

_Please be informed that the FCT Administration is conducting a detailed survey of all plots within the area earmarked for the Boulevard project. The exercise is intended to update the Cadastral database of that sector which is so vital for the implementation of the project (AMMC/DDC Archives, 2008)._  

According to the FCT minister (Modibbo Umar Aliyu) out of the 450 plots, three categories of plots would be segregated.

_There are three categories of plots in the proposed Boulevard area - they are the undeveloped, partially developed and fully developed. Out of the plots, 71 plots have been fully developed, 72 have been partially developed while 132 have not been developed at all. Some of the developed and partially developed structures are not in conformity with the boulevard concept. They shall therefore require some upgrading for integration into the boulevard scheme or shall need to be removed subject to compensation (FCT Minister in Taiwo, 2008)._  

These plots were to be taken over by the FCT Administration for the boulevard policy and in turn the title holders of the plots would bear the cost of development levies. Those who failed to pay the expected levies would mean that they ‘opted out of the scheme’ and would be ‘relocated to other plots outside the Boulevard area’(Onifade, 2008).

**Intrigues of the policy**

But as laudable as the policy seemed, public trust toward it appeared to be a problem. Most of the title holders viewed the policy with suspicion. In a focus group discussion with some of the affected title holders while they applauded the policy as a laudable one, they nevertheless had their reservations especially with the issue of title ownership.

_The scheme [policy] sounded good. However, we didn’t believe them [government officials and planners]. They were saying we would pay for development levies of developing the scheme - but how are you sure that the process will even be transparent? How are you sure that they will not make the_
process so difficult and at the end of the day they will say you couldn’t pay and as such your plot has been given out to somebody else who has the ability to pay? Myself and most people just didn’t believe them. Because even at that time they were yet to work out exactly how much each of us was going to pay in order to participate in the scheme. My brother, land is an essential commodity in the city not even to talk of the central business district [CA], and they are always trying to bring some scheme to steal our plots to give it to their interests - you know that kind of thing (Abuja Developer A 2013, interview).

Observed in chapter 7 and elsewhere, the issue of land in the city and particularly in the CA, is quite a very sensitive one capable of scuttling even the most laudable policy if not handled properly. Under the boulevard policy this tended to be one of the most problematic issues that confronted the policy. The FCT Administration sensed this and undertook series of stakeholder meetings toward swaying away the fears of the affected plot owners and the general public of its genuine intention about the policy. But the stakeholders meeting could not completely convince the affected title holders.

All those meetings I usually attended them but I was always like sleeping with one eye opened. You know why? So that I will not be manipulated and short changed of my plot. And I want to tell you that most if not all did the same as me focus (Abuja Developer B 2014, interview).

Regardless of the suspicion the FCT Administration was hard bent on proceeding with the policy. The Special Assistant to the FCT minister on communications again explains further.

Because one way or the other the Boulevard will have to be built. This is very clear, is either the government does it long time or government gets money to do it because it is already in the master plan(Special Assistant to the Minister FCT in Onifade, 2008).

Besides all of this, there was yet another suspicious agenda surrounding the policy. The planners regard it as a hidden agenda by Julius Berger - the German construction firm. Julius Berger is a major construction giant in Abuja as previously observed with enormous influence. In the selection of the consultant to undertake the second era planning of the CA - the planners had earlier on alleged that the firm played a major influence in the final selection of a fellow German firm, Albert Speer and Partners GmbH to undertake the job. Eventually the German firm got the job and produced the consolidated master plan of the CA - the AS&P master plan (Chapter 6). Observed also chapter 6, the allegations went further that Berger was not only interested in influencing the consultancy in favour of the fellow German firm but that Berger will in turn handle most of the construction work that stem from the AS&P master plan, especially the Boulevard provision of the plan.

The allegations of underhand deals in the selection of consultants even though tends to show up at almost every planning endeavour in the city, they are difficult to substantiate without
documented evidences other than the testament of some planners (Chapter 6). Whether they are
ture or not, they point to the complex nature of the multiplicity of actors and their interests in
undertaking planning in the CA. Particularly in the case of Berger while not discrediting the
testament of the planners, it becomes difficult to agree with their allegation against the firm.
This is because it was not even the firm was eventually awarded the consultancy by the FCT to
undertake the development of the boulevard policy. Rather in 2010, an American based firm -
the Balkan Center Development Group of Companies, was to partner with the FCT for the
development of the Boulevards.

*The last may not have been heard of the Abuja Town Centre (Boulevard) project, proposed by the Aliyu Modibbo led Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA), as the incumbent administration is revisiting the proposal, with a view to ascertaining its viability. This is as the Dallas, Texas, United States based Balkan Center Development Group of companies is offering to invest $2.6 billion for the actualisation of the project*(Agbo, 2010).

Nonetheless, throughout the Minister’s (Modibbo Aliyu) tenure (2007-2008) the boulevard
policy would remain his cornerstone policy. Much efforts though were still at logistics level of
dealing with issues of title regarding the affected 450 plots, cadastral survey work, working out
the real cost of development levies, stakeholder collaboration and other related matters. But in
October 2008 the Minister was removed from office. Successor FCT ministers however could
not treat the policy as a priority. One of the planners who worked in the CA during this time
of the Boulevard policy narrates further.

*The whole thing [Boulevard policy] summersaulted and drifted apart and no longer seen as the core of other Administrations. There were too many interests from different angles. And mind you all this while we suspended the development of the CA. So you can see, the many interests resulted in delaying the development of the CA. So many issues and so many underplay with different motives and interests. People were more concerned with other private interests and not necessarily about the policy. All this while we suspended processing building plan approvals in the CA in those areas where the Boulevards are. But the funny thing is that, this thing about the Boulevards appeared as if it was something new. It was not new we have had already captured in the master plan produced by Kenzo - the Japanese [KTU], but here the minister was just doing as if it was an entirely new thing. I think the whole thing emanates from the way Albert Speer [the Germans] emphasised it in the new master plan [AS&P] as if it was something new. Not new at all! You know, when you see it from that angle then you won’t blame some of the developers who didn’t trust the government about the whole thing about the boulevards. They felt that there was more to it, perhaps to collect their plots otherwise this thing about boulevards has always being in the master plan since 1981 when Kenzo did the plan (Abuja Planner C5 2014, interview).*
8.2.5. Event Four: Conflicting Land Use Plans in the City

This Event continues with the discussion on the multiplicity of interests from actors. The focus is how these interests have even led to the city having conflicting land uses depicted on land use plans, being produced for the city by the planning agencies and how this undermines land use implementation in the CA.

The Christmas Eve Review

Shortly after the abandonment of the boulevard policy, between 2009 and 2010 the FCT Administration through the FCDA engaged an indigenous firm, Multi-Systems Consultants, to undertake a review of the city’s landscape. Tagged, ‘the review of Abuja landscape master plan’, a final draft report of the review was ready by 2011. Two years later, in 2013, the DDC held an extra-ordinary meeting to deliberate on the findings and recommendations of the report. But what would have been a supposedly simple meeting, it turned out to reveal a bigger picture of the multiplicity of actors that are behind conflicting land uses in the city; and how the contradicting land uses undermine plan implementation and driven by the actors’ interests. To make sense of what transpired at the meeting my fieldwork notes is enclosed.

Christmas Eve Meeting, December 24, 2013

On 24th December 2013 the DDC held an extra-ordinary meeting to review the final draft report of the ‘Review of Abuja Landscape Master plan’. I am privileged to attend it. The review is necessitated by the URP to solicit the DDC’s input into the report. The meeting is extraordinary because it is the eve of Christmas and most staff want to travel out of the city for the Christmas. This is not to be though as the meeting lasts from 5pm deep into 9pm and most cannot travel this night. The director and all his deputy directors, district officers, site officers, and other staff are part of the meeting.

The first session of the meeting (review) looks at the technical quality of the report - highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. The second focuses on the site context of the report, which involves a site review/verification of the report’s findings.

But the house is visibly infuriated as the deliberations continue. The crux of the infuriation centres on the site findings of the report. The findings are based

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48 Landscape in this context refers to green areas, open spaces, parks and gardens.
49 Around this time I was still undertaking the field work. I was privileged to attend the meeting both as a staff of the organisation and as a researcher. One of the Deputy Directors whom I had interviewed a week earlier, I had asked me to go through the master plan report as it may be relevant to my research. I barely finished going through the report in a couple days when the Deputy Director called my phone and asked whether I would volunteer to be the secretary of the review of the report. There and then I accepted and on the 24/12/2013 the meeting began. My stance as a researcher was clearly stated at the meeting. At the end of the meeting I sought permission to be allowed to feature some of the deliberations of the meeting into my research and this was well accepted. This was done to deal with issues of ethics of research and confidentiality.
substantially on the AGIS Land Use Plan. And they contradict in the main, the provisions of the URP Land Use Plan for the city, which the DDC strongly holds in high esteem than the AGIS Land Use Plan.

Because of this, the Site Officers for all the districts in the city including the CA, are directed by the director to review/verify the site findings of the report. This entails comparing the report’s findings with the reality on ground and against the backdrop of the URP land use plan. Latest before the end of January 2014, the outcome of the site verification demanded by the director is expected to be ready (Author’s Field notes December 24, 2013).

The DDC’s infuriation expressed during the Christmas Eve meeting would be not unexpected. According to the structure of planning in Abuja, the URP is responsible for the production of land use plans while the AGIS handles the storage of the land use plans and associated geospatial data (Chapter 7). But in reality this is not so and this creates clashes - conflicts of overlaps into another agency’s responsibilities. The underlying cause stems from the AGIS’ interference into the production of land use plans which is “completely outside its purview” (Abuja Planner B2 2014, interview).

This is because the original framework establishing AGIS - is for the purpose of data bank. The Urban Planning Department [URP] will plan the city and send the plans and their land uses to AGIS to store the data. The same data is also sent to Development Control [DDC] for guidance and implementation of land uses. With this AGIS has no business with the production of land uses plans. In fact it is completely outside its purview! Abuja PlannerB2 2014, interview).

The CA’s District Officer provides a further insight into this and more so about land use contradiction in the context of the CA.

The URP Land Use Plan\(^{50}\) ideally is based on the Abuja master plan and Albert Speer [AS&P]. You know that it is from the master plan that the URP produces a land use plan. It extracts what the master plan says in terms of the use of land and brings that out to guide development. Sometimes on the master plan what you have is broad land uses. So the URP will extract this out and break it down into sub-units of land uses that belong to that particular broad land use type - so as to guide land development on smaller plots or what we call as layout plans too. In the CA Albert Speer [AS&P] already has a complete land use plan to guide plot development. But in the area of landscape - I mean those green areas the master plan [AS&P] simply leaves broadly as green areas – and often a large chunk of land that is left as green or open space. The intention is that it is the planning agency in this case the URP that will now break it down into smaller types of green areas whether as gardens and parks, or as just open

\(^{50}\) The various land use plans produced by the master plans in the city are compiled and printed out/produced by the URP. Thus for each district, the URP prints this out and hand over to the district to guide land use implementation. In the context of the CA, the URP would simply extract out the land use plan captured in the AS&P master plan, the current consolidated master plan of the CA; or as it has done with the previous master plans of the CA, the KTU and AIM, by bringing out there land use plans to guide the implementation of land uses in the CA.
space. And that is where one of the problem lies (Abuja Planner CI 2014, interview).

What sort of problem then?

It is this chunk of land that AGIS has tampered with. What it does is to subdivide the land into smaller plots and give them new land uses. And sometimes or most times this is not in agreement with the land use plan of the district [as provided by the AS&P]. And that is what they have done in Kukwaba [bordering the Sports Zone in the CA] by changing the bulk of the green areas into residential estates, and changing as well as the green areas in other parts of the city to anything they want. It is so horrible to be having different kinds of land use plans in one district (Abuja Planner AI 2014, interview).

It is against this backdrop of interference by the AGIS that the DDC was furious, when it discovered at the Christmas Eve meeting that the findings contained in the final draft report of the ‘Review of Abuja Landscape Master Plan’, to a large extent, was based on the AGIS land use plan than that of the URP’s land use plan for the city. But it is not only the DDC that appears irritated by the existence of the AGIS land use plan in the city. Interviews conducted with the planners – mostly express displeasure about it. However some of the planners at the AGIS tend to be reluctant to talk about the issue; just as some are equally unhappy about the issue (conflicting land uses in the city).

But how did the city get to the point of having two conflicting land use plans, the one produced by the URP and the other produced by the AGIS? The quest for land which is seen as a goldmine, is attributed primarily as the major cause of the interference by the AGIS. Land is a serious business in the CA (chapter 7) and whoever controls the land use of a plot - the purpose to which the land is to be put to, potentially controls huge money and other attendant benefits linked to it.

Controlling the land use does not necessarily have to be in conformity with the dictates of the provisions of the master plan, but on the basis of the highest bidder. Those who can afford, the land use can be changed overnight and a new one is issued. It is a difficult thing to crack. A lot of people who don’t have integrity are involved in the dirty thing. The worst thing is that you have planners, land officers, and all sort of the work force, take part in this thing. They have their collaborators some powerful politician, business men, or even the street man as their land vendor. It is so terrible. And this is causing problem for the city because how can the vision of the master plan be implemented when you are having different and contradictory land use plans in one city? (Abuja Planner E 2014, interview)
Dealing with Contradictory Land Use Plans in the City

Against the backdrop of the existence of the contradicting land use plans in the city between the URP and AGIS land use plans, the planners at the DDC are quick to point to the measures they have put in place in dealing with the problem.

The director has said on several occasions that we should honour only the URP land use plan. It is what we have been using. We don’t use the AGIS land use plan (Abuja Planner C2 2014, interview).

Why?

It is because the URP is the original and legitimate organ of government that has been preparing land use plans. It is not the duty of AGIS. They have no business doing it and they are causing confusion for us. Accordingly, we are to honour the URP land use because it is genuine and that is their duty and not that of AGIS (Abuja Planner C2 2014, interview).

Despite this one cannot completely rule out the likelihood of the AGIS land use plan being used by the DDC.

Let me be frank with you. Of course we have a standing policy in favour of the URP land use plan. But if the pressure from the top is too much we might just bow down and allow the AGIS land use plan to have its way quietly. You know everything in Abuja is interest and from where it is coming from (Abuja Planner B3 2014, interview).

Deduced from the planners, the word ‘interest’ implies an underhand manipulation of the planning system and the provisions of the plan to achieve an end especially when coming from a ‘‘vertical influence’’ or ‘‘from the top’’. Expressed in another way, both the system and plan can be manipulated from the highest level of influence. This can be from the presidency, senate, ministers, governors, other powerful government portfolios, big time business moguls, among others. The list is endless but what keeps appearing is that those who weigh enormous political and/or economic resources tend to undermine the system and the plan for other reasons be it personal or political. An ‘interest’ could start for instance from the presidency – that is ‘‘from the top’’ and is passed down to the FCT Minister and then to the various planning agencies which are expected to be loyal civil servants and oblige the request of the Minister.

Since the interest is coming from the top, the vertical, some of the Departments [planning agencies] will not want to be in the bad books of the Minister, or wherever the interest is coming from. Even if a director doesn’t want to pass the file [planning application folder] they will simply side-line him or her and look for another deputy director or assistant director that is willing to play the game – to become the Minister’s right hand person. It is complicated but it is real. Dirty politics is real in this Abuja and it is all about interest and where it is coming from (Abuja Planner C4, 2014, interview).
Against this backdrop and considering that the planning system in the FCT over years has been manipulated by the powerful (chapter 7), there is the potential of the AGIS’ land use plan being used in the DDC in critical situations moderated “from the top”. This has already grown into a battle between the DDC and the powerful “from the top”.

You see we face pressure from this work every day and we are trying. We have been turning down the land use that comes from AGIS - that is allocations that have been made using AGIS land use plan. It is a real war between us and these so called big men who are causing all these wahala [trouble] for us by bringing all kinds of allocations. They just go to AGIS and get an allocation [land title paper] with a funny land use that is not the same with Urban Planning [URP], and the master plan, and come here to be mounting pressure on us using the Minister’s office or the presidency, and senators, - you can go on and on naming them (Abuja Planner D2 2014, interview).

The incessant pressure on the DDC “from the top” and how far it is able to contain this, becomes a test on its credibility as a credible agency not falling into pressure toward undermining the land use plan of the CA and by extension the entire city.

At any rate, the discussion on the Fourth Event thus reveals the actors especially within the planning agencies and their collaborators driving the issue of conflicting land uses in the city. These actors perpetrate their other interests other than the intensions of the plan and the land uses that the plan seeks to achieve. The underplaying interests thus undermine the very plan they ought to be supporting or have pledged to implement toward promoting nation building. In other words, undermining plan gravity!

8.2 6. Event Five: 3-Arms Zone Again

In this last Event - ‘Event Five’, the discussion focuses on one of the most recent happenings in the CA particularly in the 3-Arms Zone. The account is to show how the multiplicity actors and interests have not waned done in the CA but tends to persist, and by extension limits land use implementation. The account centres on the most recent land use resubdivision in the 3-Arms Zone.

Noted earlier in this chapter and elsewhere, the 3-Arms Zone was envisaged to accommodate the presidential palace, the legislative arm and the judiciary. During the 1990s the presidential palace was however built outside the Zone underscored by security concerns while the space meant for the presidential palace had been left unbuilt since the 1990s. Even during the AS&P’s consolidation of the previous master plans of the CA (the KTU and AIM), the entire 3-Arms Zone was not tempered with. As observed in chapter 6, the Zone was among the others that fell under the category of marginal or no review.
However, in 2014 the un-built presidential space for the presidential palace was re-subdivided into 3 major land uses. These are i) residential land use to house the principal staff of the national assembly members; ii) for shopping and; iii) petrol filling station. This is quite at
variance with the provisions of the earlier KTU and the consolidated AS&P which both designate this space to cater for the presidential palace.

**The blame Game**

One wonders why the URP permitted the re-subdivision and change of the land use. This is more so considering its position as the custodian of land use plans in the city and would thus have been unmistakably aware of the land use provisions of the Zone, and particularly for the unbuilt presidential space. In a defensive take on the matter the URP points out that it did not initiate the re-subdivision.

*We did not initiate the exercise. Our attention was only brought to it by the Department of Public Building [DPB] and the Federal Government concerning the design guidelines for the exercise. So we had to guide them appropriately (Abuja Planner D1 2013, interview).*

The URP may not have initiated the re-subdivision but it actually provided design guidelines for the exercise. Through this it may be argued that it inexorably became part of the re-subdivision process and cannot be exonerating itself from the exercise. But why would it agree to be part of the process against the backdrop of the design guidance it provided? On the surface, the URP’s participation in the process appears based on the need to see how the un-built presidential space could be put to productive use. This would be viewed in the sense of city development is a dynamic process as one of the planners explains,

*When the need clearly came up [for the re-subdivision] it was considered necessary- so it had to be done since the provision of Master plan may be reviewed as time goes on (Abuja Planner D1 2013, interview).*

But beyond this there were other interests or reasons behind the URP’s involvement in the re-subdivision. Considering the nature of the actors such as the Federal Government and the National Assembly that were involved in the initiation of the exercise, it would be surprising not to expect some level of pressure on the planning agencies to give into the exercise even if they had unintended to (chapter, 7).

*These are powerful people and they weigh enormous power on planning in the city. And we [URP] experienced so much pressure from them because of this exercise (Abuja planner A5,2014)*

Planning in Abuja is influenced by interests and from where such is coming from (chapter 7). When coming “from the top” it carries with it pressure in many ramifications. This could be inducement, outright intimidation, suspension from duty, transfer from one planning agency to another, side-lining, issuance of series of unsubstantiated queries aimed at slamming the
character of the concerned planner, among others. All these is done “to undermine and remove
the clog out of the way” (Abuja Planner A6 2014, interview). Thus, starting from the DPB
(Department of Public Buildings) to the URP, the might of the interests ‘from the top’
represented by the Federal Government and the National Assembly had been would have been
at work and the planning agencies ‘simply caved in’, remarked one of the planners –
explaining further that,

The Ogas [referring to planners at the directorate level] may not want to tell
you the truth. There was powerful interest on this issue. The National Assembly
members - the senators, some people in the presidency, and other powerful
people, wanted the place and we had no option. We simply caved in. Who can
resist them? Except you don’t love your job or you are willing to face harsh
treatment (Abuja Planner D1 2014, interview).

Interestingly at the end of the re-subdivision, the DDC which is responsible for granting
planning permit in the city claims ignorance of the re-subdivision too.

Honesty, we don’t know when the exercise - the redesign [re-subdivision of the
un-built presidential space] was done or why it was done. We just woke up and
saw that the place has now been altered to provide accommodation for the
national assembly, for shopping and for the purpose of a filling station (Abuja
Planner A2 2013, interview).

Despite the claim the DDC went ahead to grant a planning permit for construction work on the
un-built presidential space. But why would they grant a permit when the re-subdivision
contradicts the provision of the CA’s master plans (the KTU and AS&P)?

It is not our fault. We did not carry out the subdivision. We have a body [the
URP] that is in charge of the planning of land uses - we only implement what
they have done (Abuja Planner A2 2013, interview).

Granted it is not the primary responsibility of the DDC but that of the URP, both are expected
however to operate within the provisions of the master plan. Even with the re-subdivision, the
DDC stood in a position to reject it and equally refuse to grant permit on any aspect of it since
it contravened the AS&P land use plan. Among the DDC’s fundamentals for granting permit
stems from the provisions of the master plan (chapter 7) which in this case the re-subdivision
was an aberration to the master plan – the AS&P.

Resubdivision a justifiable action

Notwithstanding, since planning is dynamic the planning agencies simply desired to make the
un-built presidential space more productive by the re-subdivision into other uses. But bigger
than that, through the resubdivision the Federal Government and the National Assembly could
simply have desired to exist side by side in within a common location, the 3Arms zone. Since the 'president’s residence is within the 3-Arms Zone in the original proposal’ (Shuaibu, 2014b) bringing the residences of the National Assembly and its principal members, for example the senate president into the Zone could seem to give a sense of balance between the executive (federal government) and the legislature (national assembly) with the two presidents living in the same Zone. Furthermore, the 3-Arms Zone lies next to the Asokoro district southward where the residences of the Chief Justice the Vice President are located. As such it may well have been to create that balance among the legislature, executive and judiciary to have all their principal staff within a close area (Shuaibu, 2014b).

Again, it is argued that ‘since the unbuilt space has not been used since 1981 there is no point leaving it still unbuilt’ (Abuja Planner A3). This position justifies the action of the Federal Government and the National Assembly who are the initiators of the re-subdivision; and the planning agencies who provided the guidance through design controls and planning permit so that the re-subdivision will be achieved. But this position is also rejected by others who argue that due to the importance of the land use (un-built presidential space), someday it might be developed into a presidential complex. For instance, a prolific commentator on city planning in Abuja and former district officer of the CA in the early 2000s amply supports this position.

Admitted, that the main Presidential Complex is still lying unutilized, but its importance prevents all previous administrations from tempering whatsoever with the space earmarked for the entire complex. It is believed that a future administration shall one day put the structure to its proper use. We are aware of an administration that contemplated using the building for another function, but the heavy implications made it dropped that idea (Shuaibu, 2014 c).

**Process of Land use change side-lined**

Irrespective of the varying positions one thing is obvious though. The process of change of the land use of the un-built presidential palace into the other three land uses – (residence, shopping mall, and petrol filling station), appears to have been compromised by the federal government and national assembly and their collaborators - the planning agencies as they went about the re-subdivision. This is because no record of the land use change could be found in the archives of the planning agencies concerning the re-subdivision. There has been an FCT Land Use Change Committee drawn from the various planning agencies who are representative on the committee. But the committee had been moribund even before at the time of the re-subdivision in 2014 and it is unlikely it had a hand in the change of the land use.

*The committee has not been working. We used to work when the committee was set up. The first chairman of the committee was the director of Development*
Control [DDC] - then it was later moved down here in our Department [URP] - and we continued from where the former chairman stopped. But I must tell you, we suspended working some time - I think in 2011. Abuja Planner D1 2013, interview).

But what is the procedure of a change of land use in Abuja?

Normally applications are received from the public expressing their desire to change from a particular land use to another. This is usually accompanied with site analysis and environmental impact assessment reports, and the title documents of the land. The committee studies these documents critically. The next thing the committee visits the site where the land use change is sought. At this point we can assess it against the backdrop of several planning issues such as adequate parking, compatibility of land use, trend of land use development in the area, urban character of the place, issues of security, convenience, aesthetic and so many of them. When we come back we deliberate on the applications against the site findings and if the application is okay, it is then recommended for approval and sent to the Honourable minister [of the] FCT for ratification of the approval. But we have been moribund for now which I may not be able to tell you why, you know these are official matters (Abuja Planner D1, 2013 interview).

With the obvious non-involvement of the Committee, there may have been other administrative ways in which the matter was handled by the planning agencies. But since these are administrative matters, the planners declined to talk further about such.

8.3. Plan Gravity and Marginalization

8.3.1. Plan Gravity Marginalises the Context

The preceding discussions explored the first exposition of the argument of the thesis. The national elites’ account and the Five Events of accounts in the CA, all covered under the preceding sections dwelling on the first exposition of the thesis, reveal how a multitude of actors and their interests undermine plan gravity toward nation building. This section explores the second exposition of the argument of the thesis. It contends that plan gravity marginalises the context under which the plan operates.

Already explained at the beginning of this chapter, it is the plan that occupies the centre of gravity of reverence accorded it by the planners, national elites, and politicians. But while the plan is the gravity, other factors such as i) the nature of planning in the CA, which bothers on the institutional framework of planning in Abuja such as the structure and process of planning as well as the actors that are involved in the process; ii) the economic, political or global influences on the district, are expected to revolve round the plan. For the purpose of analysis the plan is designated as P; the nature of planning in Abuja as NP; and the other factors –
economic, political, global influences, - which I refer to as Marginal Environment as ME, since it is viewed by the planners as being at the margin and revolving round the plan (fig 43).

Figure 43: plan as the centre of gravity with other forces revolving round the plan.
Source: Author, 2016

In other words, the plan (P) is seen as the alpha and omega while the other factors or forces (NP and ME) are secondary and mere resources to be mobilised in achieving the aspirations of the plan. Even among these forces the next level of reverence accorded importance is the nature of planning (NP), followed by the marginal environment (ME) which most often has been treated as an accidental resource of mobilisation in the CA (fig 44).

Figure 44: varying intensities of attention on the plan and the other forces.
Author, 2016.

Throughout the two eras of planning in the CA because of these varying intensities of reverence, huge attention has been placed on the plan. There has been thus the propensity to plan making, series of plan amendments, engagement of one consultant upon the other with the overarching assumption that the problem of developing the CA toward nation building lies with the plan. Once the plan is right, it is reckoned, the development of the CA will equally be achieved (chapter 6).

In reality, it must be stressed that the three forces (plan, nature of planning and marginal environment) do not exist in that sort of a linear relationship or clearly demarcated as portrayed in fig. 43. The illustration in fig. 43 and 44 and as already noted is essentially to buttress the
importance with which the planners, national elites, and politicians accord these forces in terms of relevance. In reality they are interwoven and interdependent though. Nonetheless, since the other two forces are expected to be mobilised toward the implementation of the plan, they are indeed the forces of CA’s context with which the plan interacts with in order for it to be implemented. But due to the overarching attention that is attached to the plan than these forces of the context, it can be posited that plan gravity privileges attention on the plan than the forces of the context in the CA. Expressed in another way, plan gravity marginalises the context in which the plan operates as being less of importance to the plan. Thus, since 1979 following the adoption of the Abuja master plan (IPA) for the city and the corresponding adoption of the supplementary master plans of the CA (KTU, AIM, AS&P) there has been generally less efforts by the FCDA to see the forces of context (nature of planning and marginal environment) as a top agenda like is accorded the plan in the planning and implementation of land uses of the CA.

8.3.2. Forces of Context Undermines Plan Gravity

The marginalisation of the forces of context by plan gravity however has tended to affect land use implementation in the CA, and by extension the Abuja nation building project. Throughout the two eras of CA’s planning this can be discerned. In chapter 7, I reveal the nuances of interactions that take place among a multiplicity of actors in Abuja over the years characterising the planning agencies as they undertake land use planning. These nuances and series of ripples (problems) tend to limit land use planning and implementation whether in the sense of politics, power play, or the fluidities that have characterised planning in Abuja - for instance changes in policies, political leadership, or the ever-changing planning structure. All of these constitute some of the forces of context that Abuja has had to grapple with in the course of land use planning over the years.

Yet again, in this chapter so far in the preceding discussions on the first exposition of the thesis argument, we have equally made sense of these kinds of ripples in the context of the CA and how they underlain land use implementation through the first era of planning in the CA as well as the second era. All the five events of accounts, narrations, of planning in the CA presented in the preceding first exposition for example, reveal the nuances constituting these forces of

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51 Plan gravity - the phenomenon of focusing attention on the plan as the most important thing in nation-building simply because it encapsulates the national aspirations of the country.

52 Of course some attention had been focused on the nature of planning especially the 2004 institutional reforms of the FCT (Chapter 7). But often these attentions are of less intensity as that accorded the plan.
context in the CA. But as would have been discerned through these accounts, narrations, it is these forces of CA’s context that have primarily been responsible for undermining the implementation of the land uses captured in the master plans of the CA.

All these point to the fact that even though attention is placed on the plan as the most important thing in the CA, to the marginalisation of the forces of context, it is this same force of context that have tended to undermine land use implementation in the CA. This is not to deny that the plan – the master plans have had one or two shortcomings inherent in them, for instance the issue of supper block concepts that proved quite difficult for implementation of the CA’s first era master plans (KTU and AIM) in the sense of not being attractable to private investors (chapter 6).

To recap once more and as already noted, plan gravity in Abuja presents itself as the rallying point for the nature of planning and the marginal environment; where they are treated as being of lesser importance to the plan and are expected to be mobilised to implement the plan. But by accentuating more attention on the plan as the most important thing in the CA, to the marginalisation of nature of planning and marginal environment, that is the forces of context, has not successfully led to plan implementation as the forces of context tend to limit implementation as so far demonstrated in this thesis.

8.4. Plan Gravity and External Impulse

The last section reveals how plan gravity marginalises the context (nature of planning and marginal environment) under which the plan operates. This limits the implementation of the land uses of the CA toward nation-building. This section now focuses on the last exposition of the thesis - the influence of global capital finance on plan gravity and linearity. Using the mega projects of the CA it contends that plan gravity and linearity does not successfully lead to nation-building rather they are undermined by global capital finance.

8.4.1. The Mega Projects

Abuja World Trade Centre (AWTC)

On 31\textsuperscript{st} July 2009, the FCT Administration having evaluated many companies that showed interest in the development of the Abuja Down town mall, Messrs First Continental Properties Limited emerged as the preferred bidder. The FCT planning agency (Abuja Investments Company Limited) that handled the deal on behalf of the FCT Administration reports that,
the development of the Abuja World Trade Centre as one of the only 12(twelve) such centres in Africa, of which only six (6) are in Sub-Saharan Africa, will no doubt position Abuja as a vital hub in the global trade network (FCDA, 2011).

Such a mega project driven primarily by a private investor was happening for the very first in the history of the CA. The planners expect that when completed it will transform the entire city’s skyline as the tallest building in the city. It is equally expected to change the investment profile of the city through the project’s investment value of $1.2billion (Agbo, 2014).

Against this backdrop series of meetings were held involving the URP, DDC, AGIS, DLA and other stakeholders. The CA’s district officer at the time of the initiation of the mega project provides insights into this, especially concerning the prospects of the project and the planning process that was put in place to ensure that the project got all the necessary support particularly about planning permit.

I must confess if there is any time I was proud of Abuja and the Central Area and as a town planner, was with what we did in terms of making sure that the project came to stand. We made sure that the necessary approvals [planning permit] were secured. We were always meeting from one meeting to another. We couldn’t just afford to miss this one. Just drive there now and see the extent of development at the site and it is going to be the tallest building in Abuja with 37 floors (Abuja Planner C1, 2013 interview).

Considering the financial challenges that has faced the city over the years it could not have afforded to miss the opportunity. Already observed in chapter 5 and 7, the global slump in oil revenue in the late 1970s and 1980s limited the funding of development in the city over the decades. The FCT ministerial briefings of 2012 and 2013 again clearly demonstrate the enormity of the financial challenges facing the city. At the briefing the director of treasury reminds us that the city’s ‘outstanding liabilities profile had risen to well over 50 billion Naira’ (FCDA, 2012). Given such a background it would be unsurprising to find the planners and politicians (FCT political decision makers) rejoicing over the coming of the Abuja World Trade Centre with its expected benefits.

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53 The August 6, 2012, ministerial briefing was held at the residence of the Minister of the FCT. The Minister anchored the meeting which dwelled on the workings of the various secretariats, departments, and agencies (SDAs) as they strive to achieve the development of Abuja and the entire FCT. From one briefing to another it got to the turn of the Director of Treasury and director of Engineering Services. Both directors reported the financial liabilities of the FCT and its effect on infrastructure development. In the 2013 ministering briefings these issues still featured prominently.

54 Through this investment the city has a 5% investment as equity into the project. Through it the city stands to be reaping future gains in revenue of 5% from the investment. Other multiple benefits expected to accrue from the project include employment generation, development of secondary infrastructure (roads), change in skyline of the CA and the city as the tallest building, and many other benefits.
The project was granted a planning permit by the DDC on the 17/6/11 - having an area coverage of 6.02 Ha and to be developed into two segments in the CA’s Market Zone. The first segment is made up of 2 towers of residential apartment block (each of the towers to reach 22 floors) while the second segment consists of shopping mall, 2 residential apartments, hotel and ancillary block (Agbo, 2014).

**Abuja City Centre Development (ACC)**

In 2014 barely three years after the celebrated AWTC project, another mega project driven by direct foreign investment into the city was to be developed in the CA. It is known as the Abuja City Centre project (ACC). The ACC just like the AWTC, the planners expect that when developed it will change the investment profile of the through its $2.7 billion investment. Chicason Group - the driver of the project, while it is expected to provide the secondary infrastructure, the FCT Administration’s contribution to the project has been put at 5% equity ‘in the sum of about $135 million’ (Suleiman, 2014a).

Abuja skyline is set to change for the better when City Centre Development Limited, a subsidiary of Messrs Chicason Group, completes the $2.7 billion Abuja City Development Centre. The agreement with the company was signed on March 5, 2014, to provide the secondary infrastructure and develop the National Park and Mall for the government (Suleiman, 2014, p.129).

According to the FCDA,

> Both parties appreciated the need to be reasonable in their respective projections so as to ensure both effectiveness of the collaboration and the successful delivery of the project. We therefore agreed that FCTA’s equity should be reduced to 5% [that is $135 million book value from the initial 10% equity value of $270 million] (FCDA, 2014a).

Particularly, the project is to be developed in the Ministries Zone of the CA. As noted in chapter 6 and elsewhere, the Ministry Zone is among the nine zones of the CA.  

### 8.4.2. Mega Projects versus Plan Gravity

Despite the expected benefits of the mega projects coming largely from foreign investment into the CA and the entire city (Abuja), these projects undermine the land uses of the CA and what they seek to achieve. This is examined in detail first by exploring how the two locations were acquired for the mega projects and then secondly, showing how the two mega projects undermine land uses of the CA.

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55 Though while writing this thesis, construction had not yet started.
The AWTC Location

Earlier in this chapter, in the discussions dealing with the first exposition of the thesis, particularly in the first event dwelling on the re-subdivision of the Bakasi Market in the Market Zone, we made sense of how the resubdivision produced two major land uses. These are the railway main station and Abuja mall. The Abuja mall was further re-subdivided into two commercial plots. It is one of the plots of the Abuja mall that was taken up by the AWTC for the purpose of a mixed development.

Figure 45: plot history of Abuja World Trade Centre

(Modified from AIM Land use plan and AGIS Image)
The original intention of the AIM master plan for the area taken up by the AWTC was meant to be used for the purpose of a central market and not for the purpose of a single mega mixed development, as proposed by the AWTC (fig 46 and 47).

Figure 46: mixed development desired by AWTC
Author, 2016

Figure 47: AWTC Mixed development under construction.

The planners are divided about this infringement on the original intention of the master plan. There are those who see the master plan as something sacrosanct and its intentions ought to be implemented religiously.

*We have the master plan and we use it to regulate what should be here or there. It is our model and this helps to check any anomaly in the city - so we should follow the plan. Otherwise it will become a discretionary thing by the planners whereby anybody can just get up because he has money and therefore we [the planners] just change the provisions of the master plan to suit him or her. I am not particularly against the wonderful project that is being built now [AWTC] but am simply saying that we are too fond of changing our plans overnight for one reason or another under the excuse of any kind of reason - and this is distorting the master plans (Abuja Planner B1, 2013).*
Whereas the others see it against the backdrop of any unfolding circumstance which should moderate commitment to its implementation or not. In other words the plan should be something that is flexible and can be adjusted to suit present circumstance (needs).

Like I said before this project is something we couldn’t have missed it. Look at it - just drive along the area [CA] and you will see it towering high in the sky. So of what use is a plan when it can’t bring forth something to life? I am talking about the original land use of the master plan which set aside the place for a central market. But for a very long time nobody came for it neither was the government able to provide infrastructure to attract people to come and develop the area under the original land use - that is the central market. If we just kept following the provision of the master plan for purpose of a central market we would still be stuck with it on paper with no action on ground. But with the amendment of the central market into pockets of plots [Abuja mall e.g] we were able to get someone to develop the area. So to me, the plan is made for man and not man for the plan - where it’s necessary let us adjust or amend the plan after all it is development we are looking for and not a beautiful document called master plan (Abuja Planner C1, 2013).

In the face of the divergent views one thing is certain though. The AWTC has come to stay considering its advanced stage of construction. At the time of the field work for this thesis the first segment of the project had been built to an advanced stage (fig 49) and when completed it is expected to go as higher as 37 floors - the tallest building in the city (fig 50).

Figure 48: AWTC skyline
When completed
(www.wtcabuja.com)
The ACC location

The ACC location as earlier noted falls under the Ministries Zone. In both eras of planning in the CA, the Zone has been primarily designated to cater for government institutions with ancillary land uses. As already mentioned in chapter 6 and in this chapter previously, the zone comprises the following sub-land use zones the i) national mall, ii) ministry buildings, iii) state liaison offices and iv) ministry gardens. Apart from the national mall and ministry gardens which are yet to be developed, much of the ministry buildings and state liaison offices had already been substantially built in the first era under the guidance of the KTU (chapter 6). At any rate, during the AS&P master plan review of the KTU and AIM which produced the consolidated AS&P master plan in 2008, the mall and gardens were redesigned as earlier observed in chapter 6. Speer (2008) provides insights into this.

The review [redesign] calls for the National Mall to be developed as a large landscaped lawn akin to Washington, DC to showcase the Central Area and the ministries. The open lawn would be flanked on both sides by rows of trees to create a defined space and to reinforce the line of sight between National Square and the National Assembly in front of the backdrop of Aso Hill... [As such] The review [redesign] studied three alternatives to employing complex terraces and sunken gardens, responding to the undulating terrain (Speer, 2008 p. 26)

In the end the best alternative was selected.

It was agreed that the undulation, in addition to the lower costs of this solution (selected alternative), is a welcome feature in the visual appearance of the National Mall (Speer, 2008 p. 28.)

But toward realising the space requirement for the ACC, that is 21 Ha, numerous plots that fall under the mall, ministry gardens, and adjoining vicinity were expropriated for the ACC. Specifically, the plots that flank in-between the Independence Avenue and Constitutional Avenue and between the 3rd and 5th streets of the Ministry Zone were merged into two broad plots namely plot 1532 and 1533 and allocated to Chickason group for the purpose of the ACC project (fig 49 page 218).

The new allocation (plots 1532 and 1533) equally carried a new land use known as mixed-land use. It is primarily different from the original land uses of those merged to produce Chickason’s allocation. The intentions of the AS&P is for the original plots to be developed as government institutions as well as into national mall.

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56 This has been attributed to the challenge of funding the development of the mall and gardens; weak infrastructure, especially the connecting arterial roads which would have attracted investment in the Zone and the CA at larger; as well as policy related issues.
Figure 49: ACC Location, taking up a chunk of national mall and other plots in the ministry zone as shown on the cadastral map (1) and land use plan (2).

Modified from Speer, 2008.
As earlier noted in this chapter, the national mall is a long stretch of an area in the Ministry Zone expected to be implemented into two components - the valley area and the states plaza area. In both areas the need for green gardens and a blend of activities such as disco clubs, night clubs, boutiques and amphitheatres, kiosks, restaurants, among others, have been emphasized by the master plan. The overarching idea is to have national government institutions and supported by a beautiful national mall where the public after working from the government institutions can interact, unwind in the evenings and equally enjoy the beautiful scenery offered by the Mall. The idea had not only been meant for those working but that the diverse peoples across the country from the over 250 multi-ethnic groups can travel and visit these government land uses and the national green mall in their magnificent setting and buildings, and indeed be proud of their national capital. The whole essence is that being proud of one’s ‘national jewel’ (IPA, 1979), will promote nationalistic interest toward the nation (IPA, 1979; KTU, 1981; Speer, 2008).

But the Chikason mixed-land use allocation contradicts this intention. Essentially, the ACC proposal for the mixed land use is pre-dominantly commercial in nature and as the chairman of Chikason Group notes, it consists “of about 26 units of towers with shopping malls. Part of the tower will be a five-star hotel.” Other aspects of the proposal include residential apartments, office buildings, and shopping areas (Suleiman, 2014b, p. 131).

Nevertheless, with the abandonment of AS&P’s landscape design of the national mall as well as the reconfiguration of the original plots’ layout and land use to acquire the 21 Ha for the project, even though seen as a necessity in support of the mega project, there are planners who express disappointment with the ACC project. They maintain that in so much as the project will improve the financial profile of the city through the investment value of $2.7 Billion dollars and encourage investment in the CA, the area taken up by the project just as in the AWTC case is an expropriated one which compromises the intention of the AS&P master plan.

*Each time we do this, there is far reaching consequence. Are we just selling the plan and plots to the highest bidder? They just do this because of interests, period. Nothing more. Our master plan is for the building of Abuja and not to be sold out. Tell me, how can one use the national mall? Or how can it contribute to a sense of Abuja as a centre of unity when the big guys are just buying the whole city? Look at Albert Speer [AS&P] that we suffered to produce in 2008 and now we not even following the plan for the national mall produced by Albert Speer. This plan was produced in 2008 and now is 2014 just 6 years of the plan and we are abandoning its design for the national mall. Not only that, we are even changing all those plots in the Ministries zone as well as their land uses just to get 21 Hectares of land for this company. We are just destroying the*
master plan and calling it all sort of names as development. Nobody is talking about it as an encroachment to provisions of the master plan (Abuja Planner B1, 2013).

But there are equally others who are more than happy with the coming of the project and care less about the distortion of the AS&P master plan. One of the planners explains thus.

Of course we are aware that Albert Speer [AS&P] design has been changed to make land available for the project. But what do you expect? We have already given out the land to the company. We need the money for the city to develop. It’s investment. Can the master plan develop itself? What we hope to do and which we have strongly guided the developer of the project, is to create a balance between the original concept of the national mall and its mixed-development project. In this way, people can still use the mall (Abuja Planner C5, 2013)

Despite the planners’ different take on the proposed mega project, the project is yet to start. When developed it is expected to be indeed a massive undertaking (fig 50)

Figure 50: Proposed Abuja City Centre project
(Tell Magazine, September 2014, p128-129)
8.5 Plan Gravity Underpinned by Planning Western notions

This section presents the last of the four expositions of the argument earlier stated at the beginning of this chapter. The exposition contends that Plan gravity is underpinned by Western notions, and which do not seem to be working.

Reading through chapter 6 in the context of Abuja, one is reminded of the history of master plan making in the city for a period of close to 4 decades. What is interesting as revealed in the chapter is the propensity with which the planners and national elites have desired to plan Abuja along Western thoughts, using modernist planning ideas such as master plan making and underpinned my rational notions. In chapter 2 and 3, a sense is earlier made on the diffusion of this kind of planning ideas into the South generally and the kinds of assumptions that they tend to make. Earlier in this chapter too, under the discussion explaining what plan gravity is, a connection between modernist planning through master plans and nation building is made.

In the context of the CA a profound attachment to this kind of Western planning is strong. This reflects through the broad land uses of the CA and down to the detailed land uses and urban designs for the CA, all master planned and most especially by Western consultants (table 9). They desire to create a Western kind of city based on modernist ideas underscored by the assumptions of rational planning and master planning (chapter 2, 3 and 6).

Table 8: Master plans prepared by mostly Western consultants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Master plan</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Designer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979 Abuja master plan (IPA)</td>
<td>Broad use land uses for the entire city, including the CA</td>
<td>Americans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 Kenzo master plan (KTU)</td>
<td>Detailed land uses and urban designs for Phase 1 of the CA</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 Sofretu master plan</td>
<td>Transport network</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 AIM master plan (AIM)</td>
<td>Detailed land uses and urban designs for phase 2 of the CA</td>
<td>Lebanese-Nigeria based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC Cologne</td>
<td>Consolidation of the city’s land use plans and the CA</td>
<td>Germans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Speer master plan (AS&amp;P)</td>
<td>Consolidation of previous CA’s master plans</td>
<td>Germans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author, 2015

In other words, they seek to ‘transform an unwanted present by means of an imagined future’ (Holston, 1998: 40). Such an imagined future or utopian is assumed to be achieved through an ordered space of form and function - where the city is divided into different land uses and expected to perform different functions (Rakordi, 2006; Kamete, 2013a, 2013b; Njoh, 2016).
In short the ‘the planning context can be controlled with modern scientific knowledge and technology’ (Njoh, 2008, p.20 cited in Todes et al., 2010, p.415).

Kamete (2013b) explains further.

In many ways urban planning and management systems in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) betray a fixation with the quest for order... Those tasked with governing SSA’s growing cities are obsessed with ideals of order, orderliness and conformity which are characteristic of modernity ...... a desire to build “modern” cities: that is, cities that are ordered and orderly, are aesthetically pleasing... to attain the modern city, to maintain and sustain it, and to deal with obstacles to its attainment or existence. Undoubtedly, the major inspiration – and therefore the standard – for the desired urban modernity is the Western city, itself ..... the traditions of Western modernity have been unquestioningly incorporated into the planning and management of cities [of the South] (Kamete, 2013b, p. 17/19)

But the CA, even though with a history of master planning stretching almost 4 decades and characterised again by the acquisition of series of master plans undertaken by varying Western consultants (chapter 6), these various master plans are still underlined by difficulties of translating them into reality. The preceding discussions through the 3 expositions of the argument of the thesis on plan gravity, do reflect some of the challenges of implementing the master plans of the CA and particularly the land uses captured in these plans.

What does this reveal? It does show that modernist planning through the master plans have been underlined by problems close to 40 years since 1979; and not attaining the desired order that the plans intend to achieve through the land uses. A former national president of the Nigerian Institute of Planners explains thus.

Honesty these types of planning we have adopted in Abuja and much of Africa are not working. All these Oyibo [European] styles of planning don’t match our situation. They don’t work here - look at all the master plans that we have been doing in Nigeria. Tell me which has worked or is working? The assumptions that these plans make for an ordered procession of development just can’t work here. Our cities are different – they are so fast in terms of growth and have lots of uncertainties – therefore you can’t be making assumptions meant for a stable environment as obtainable in Europe to be implemented in an unstable environment. I have written extensively on this matter of master planning since the 1970s and even on Abuja’s master plans. I have repeatedly say these modernist planning ideas are not working but somehow the planners and decision makers still hold on to them - maybe they know why. And you what? Every time they just bring these foreign guys - spend hard currency and then the guys go back, and we are left with these plans that are not working (Abuja Planner A5, 2014)

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But he is not the only one expressing this concern. My interviews on the issue with one of the deputy directors in the FCDA explains further.

We are simply going through a cycle. We want modern cities like those of Europe, America, or what is happening in Dubai now with all those skyscrapers. We go after international consultants to give us these modern cities in Abuja. This consultant comes and makes predictions of how Abuja and the Central Area or any other district will be in a of couple years. Then we go to implement but can’t implement these assumptions of creating a western city. After some time we call for review of the master plan. We then say the problem is the plan. We then go ahead to get a new international consultant. He comes again and make predictions – he goes and leaves us with the predictions. We still can’t implement even the new predictions. We again go through the cycle of review and recruit yet another foreign consultant. What is wrong? What is wrong is the cycle! We should have broken away from it long time ago because it simply means the predictions of these modern cities based on European ideas of a city are not just working here. Look at even the latest Albert Speer that we just commissioned in 2008, is it working? It is not! So we need to focus more and realise that our cities are different. Abuja is not a Western city and stop trying to impose American, Japanese, Greek, German, or English ideas on it (Abuja Planner A5, 2014).

Indeed, as concluded by yet another planner - a former director in the FCDA, if the plans were working,

We would have long achieved all the assumptions captured in them for the past 30 something years now (Abuja Planner A5, 2013).

And in this chapter, running through all the events of narrations in the CA, does reflect the kind of context that these Western inspired master plans are introduced into. In a way then, while these plans have desired a stable environment for their rational prescriptions to work toward achieving an orderly urban development, the CA context does not come as a stable environment. It has been characterised by series of fluidities for the past 3 decades (chapter 7); nor has it been devoid of power play or politics which these rational prescriptions assume that the planning agencies would simply act as non-political. Rather, the CA has tended to be the opposite of some of the assumptions of master planning earlier discussed in chapter 2.

8.6. Conclusion

This chapter in line with the frame of narrative of the thesis set out earlier in chapter 4, has dealt with the gut sense of the thesis. In other words, the most important thing about Abuja’s story of what is happening regarding the concerns of the thesis earlier expressed in chapter one. This has been addressed through the argument presented in this chapter dwelling on plan gravity and four expositions of the argument.
The chapter has thus shown that while plan gravity is considered of importance toward nation building, it however does not successfully lead to nation building. It is rather undermined by a multiplicity of actors and interests. As the first exposition of the argument reveals, the actors’ interests tend to undermine land use implementation in the CA. This is demonstrated through i) the national elites – having varying interests, polices, quite different from the intentions that land uses seek to achieve in the CA; ii) and the five accounts of the events, narrations, that have taken place through the CA encompassing the two eras of planning in the CA and how through these accounts a multiplicity of actors’ interests – the planners, military class and politicians, land developers – tend to undermine land use implementation in the CA. Through the second exposition we made sense of how plan gravity marginalises the context in which land use planning and implementation takes place; and more importantly how this marginalisation limits land use implementation in the CA. The third exposition then demonstrates how global inspired mega projects driven by economic globalisation limit land use implementation, thereby making a mockery of plan gravity and its intended land uses in the CA. Lastly, the fourth exposition reveals how the CA and the entire Abuja has been inspired by modernist planning assumptions and master planned primarily by Western consultants. Yet, implementing the plans containing the assumptions for close to 4 decades have tended to be difficult, revealing how Western assumptions tend not to be working in the CA and by extension undermining the nation building project of Abuja, since in the first-place nation building in Abuja is intrinsically tied to the plan as the answer to nation building, what I have referred to in this chapter throughout as plan gravity. Through this chapter therefore research questions 1 and 5 (chapter 1) have been addressed.
Chapter 9. Conclusion

This chapter rounds up the thesis. The first section of the chapter returns to the research questions and demonstrates how they have been addressed. The remaining three sections of the chapter draw some conclusions about the findings of the research, contribution to knowledge, and areas of further research respectively.

9.1. Addressing the Research Questions

The research set out to understand the complexities that underline land use implementation in Abuja’s CA. It sought to look at, not only the problems that limit implementation in a Southern context like Abuja, but the kinds of Western knowledge that have driven nation building in Abuja. To undertake this the thesis has been driven by the following research questions.

i. What are the kinds of Western knowledge that have driven nation building in Abuja, and how have they affected the realisation of the new capital?

Chapter 2, chapter 5 and Chapter 8 have addressed this question. First, chapter 2 through the literature review, provided a background into nation building in Post-Independence Africa and the kinds of Western notions that have influenced this process. It went further to demonstrate the kinds of Western notions that have also driven the planning and development of new capital cities. Particularly, it revealed how the rational planning process and master plans which originate from the West, have been applied in the global south to guide the planning and development of new capital cities. Establishing this link between these Western planning ideas and how they have influenced the planning and development of new capital cities in the global south, required also looking at ways in which these ideas have been taken up by the south or diffused into the south. This had been dealt with too in the chapter.

Building further on this, chapter 5 looked at specifically, how master plans have influenced the planning and development of Abuja. Again, chapter 8 through the discussion on plan gravity and particularly through exposition 4 of the argument of the thesis, demonstrated how these Western ideas have not been successfully relisable in Abuja’s CA.

ii. a. What are the land uses of the CA?
   b. how and why were they planned?

This has been treated by Chapter 6. It discussed the history of master planning in Abuja and particularly the CA - covering the two eras of planning in the CA. There have been two eras of
planning in the CA: from 1979-2007 and from 2008 to date. The master plan of Abuja was prepared in 1979 and later followed by the preparation of supplementary master plans to address the specific needs of the CA. These supplementary master plans are the Kenzo Tange master plan of 1981 (KTU) and Aims master plan of 1984 (Aims) which covered phase 1 and 2 of the CA respectively. These plans represent the first era of planning in the CA including the Sofreu transport master plan which was prepared in 1982. The second era has been represented by the Albert Speer master plan (AS&P) of 2008. In both eras, the chapter described what the land uses of the CA are and what they seek to achieve in the CA - particularly against the backdrop of the nation building goals of Abuja (chapter 1). There after the chapter looked at the design process of the land uses, the actors that have driven the process and the complexities behind it.

**iii. What has been the economic and political situation of the country under which these land uses have been planned since 1979?**

This sought to understand the economic and political situation of the country when the Abuja master plan and the supplementary master plans of the CA were prepared. It also sought to explore the economic and political changes that have taken place over the years. Chapter 7 has handled this. It generally presents the environment under which the planning and implementation of land uses in Abuja takes place. Under this, it discussed the nature of the political and economic situation in the country in which master plan making have taken place over the years and the influence of that on plan implementation in Abuja and the CA. But much of the economic happenings in the country for instance, which have influenced master plan making and implementation in Abuja, bear some connection with the global oil crisis of the 1970s and the Washington consensus policy (Structural Adjustment Programme) that was introduced in the global south in the 1980s. Hence, apart from chapter 7 which described the economic and political situation of the country since 1979, chapter 2 and chapter 5 contained discussions on these global geo-political and economic happenings of the 1970s and 1980s. Through this, they provided a bigger background into Abuja’s economic situation and the transitions over the years for instance; and the influence of this on master planning and the implementation of land uses in Abuja’s CA. As chapter 5 revealed for example, it was the global oil crisis of the 1970s that led to the country’s oil boom and accompanying huge revenues for the state to sponsor the planning and development of the new capital city and other sectoral projects in the country. A drop in the price of oil at the international market had over the years, too, limited the development of the new capital city as funds to support the development of infrastructure and other projects had been not adequate.
iv. **Who are the stakeholders that are involved in the planning and implementation of land uses in the CA?**

b. **And how do they operate?**

This has been treated by chapter 7. As already mentioned, chapter 7 dwelled on the environment under which the planning and implementation of land uses have taken place in Abuja. Flowing from this, it discussed also the multiplicity of actors and planning agencies that undertake the planning of land uses and implementation in Abuja. These planning agencies include the URP, DDC, DLA, AGIS and many others. The URP makes policy for land use planning, prepares master plans and land use plans; the DLA deals with matters relating to land allocation; AGIS is involved in data storage and geographic information services in the FCT; and the DDC implements the plans that are prepared by the URP. Chapter 7 thus described and discussed the process of land use planning and implementation in Abuja, the actors that are involved in this, and how they do it, thereby addressing the research question.

v. **Why have the CA’s land uses not been successfully implemented?**

This sought to find out why the land uses of the CA have not been successfully implemented toward achieving the nation building concerns that Abuja as a new capital city seeks to attain. Explained in chapter 1 and throughout much of the thesis, Abuja has been conceived as a new capital city to promote nation building. This is in the sense of advancing a common national identity in a diverse society of over 250 ethnic groups. Essential to this, is the use of master plans which contain land uses and it is expected that when the land uses are implemented, they will bring about the attainment of Abuja’s nation building concerns. But implementing these land uses have tended to be unsuccessful. In chapter 1 for instance, as a city planner working in Abuja, I narrated how the planners had been finding it difficult to implement successive master plans in Abuja.

Addressing why this so, chapter 8 dealt with specifically why the CA’s land uses have not been successfully implemented. Essentially, chapter 8 presented the argument of the thesis through what I referred to as plan gravity and supported by the four expositions (sub-arguments) of the argument. Plan gravity narrates the story of the most important thing in Abuja regarding land use planning. It is about the primacy of the plan as being the most important thing in Abuja concerning the planning of land uses in Abuja; and how the planners and national elites expect that this would lead to the attainment of the nation building goals that Abuja as a new capital city seeks (chapter 1 and chapter 8). However, despite the treatment of the plan as the primacy,
land use implementation has tended to be unsuccessful in Abuja. The four expositions of the argument of the thesis demonstrate why this is so.

The first exposition revealed how a multiplicity of actors have been involved in land use implementation in Abuja and particularly in the CA. It also revealed how these actors are underlined by a number of interests. But the interests tend to run contrary to the goals that the master plans (Abuja master plan and the supplementary master plans of the CA) seek to achieve. As noted in chapter 6, these master plans contain within them certain land uses and how they should be implemented; however, the multiplicity of the actors’ interests have tended not to go in line with what the land uses seek to achieve in the CA. The discussion on national elites in chapter 8, for example, revealed how national elites have had different interests from what the land uses in the CA seek to achieve. Moreover, through some of the policies and events that have taken place in the CA throughout the two eras, further revealed how a multiplicity of interests from the planners, policy makers and land developers have undermined some policies in the CA; policies which had aimed at driving the implementation of the CA’s land uses.

The second exposition argued and illustrated how by focusing on the plan as the primacy in Abuja, has led to the marginalisation of other but very important factors which are essential to land use implementation. These include the i) the nature of planning in the CA which deals with the institutional framework of planning in Abuja such as the structure and process of planning and the actors that are involved in the process; and ii) the economic, political and global influences on the district. These factors as revealed in chapter 8, are expected to revolve round the plan since the plan is considered the most important thing in Abuja and by so doing, would lead to the plan’s implementation - in this case the land uses that are contained in the plan. Despite this implementation as demonstrated in chapter 8 has not been successful. Thus, the privileging of the plan as the most important thing by the planners and national elites, has not only led to the treatment of other important factors as being at the margin of influence, but the unsuccessful implementation of the land uses of the CA.

The third exposition focused on global external influence. It argued that despite the attention placed on the plan as the primacy in Abuja, and which is expected to be implemented as a linearity, global flows in the form of mega projects coming into Abuja’s CA have undermined Abuja’s plan linearity. In chapter 8, plan linearity is explained in the sense of viewing plan implementation as a conformance approach in which the intentions of a plan are expected to be implemented as contained in the plan. In other words, the outcomes of implementation are to be in conformance with the goals or objectives that the plan seeks. In the CA it is the land
uses which are expected to be implemented as spelt out in the master plans. But as shown in chapter 8, the global mega projects in the CA have rather supplanted the intentions of the land uses for other objectives thereby undermining the intentions of the CA’s land uses.

The last and fourth exposition, has demonstrated how inspite of focusing attention on the plan as the primacy in Abuja and driven by Western knowledge in the form of master planning, the implementation of land uses have not been successful. The master planning of Abuja and the supplementary master plans of the CA which mostly had been designed by foreign consultants, and which also had made some modernists assumptions of how Abuja should turn out to be developed as a modernist new capital city, however, developing Abuja in an orderly manner following those assumptions have tended over the years to be unsuccesful. As revealed in chapter 6 and chapter 8, there rather have been series of master planning in the CA for close to 4 decades and driven by modernist assumptions; yet Abuja and particularly the CA’s land uses have not been successfully implemented toward achieving them and in the long run attaining the nation building concerns of Abuja.

9.2. Structure of Thesis

In terms of structure, after chapter one sets out the research aim and questions, chapter two and three reviewed relevant literature. Chapter four dealt with the theoretical framework of the thesis, methods of data collection, how the research was conducted, and analysis of field result. Chapter five presented the context - study area. chapter 6 dwelled on the kinds of Western knowledge particularly master planning that have driven nation building process in Abuja and the reasons behind this; what the land uses of the CA are; how and why they were planned; and what they seek to achieve. Chapter 7 looked at the environment under which land use planning and implementation takes place in Abuja. Chapter 8 then provides a discussion on the argument of the thesis about the most important thing concerning the difficulties that underline land use implementation in the CA. This is explored through the discussion on plan gravity and the accompanying expositions of the argument.

9.3. Useful Conclusion from the Research Findings

The frame of narrative of the thesis helped in entrenching the argument of the thesis (chapter 8). But what does this knowledge portend in the context of Abuja’s CA and especially as regards to nation building? Two issues stand out in this regard through what I refer to as the lock and the vicious circle. This is explained in details.
9.3.1 The Lock

Throughout the fieldwork for this thesis it was revealed that planning in Abuja is welded to the plan. The planners, politicians, national elite, among others, are locked into what I had described and discussed in chapter 8 as plan gravity. The welding is underscored by the roles the plan is expected to play in Abuja. This in turn instigates the actors’ subscription to it. Indeed, not just the subscription, but they equally upheld its sustenance. How is this done?

First, through the plan the actors (especially the national elites) desire to build a nation that unites the diverse peoples of Nigeria as one united nation. The plan in this sense has been viewed as the means through which nation building will be attained. Through the use of land, for instance, they have assumed that land use implementation will evoke consciousness to nationhood. Some of the land uses are underlined by socio-cultural underpinnings which when developed, are expected to bring these diverse peoples to interact and exist together and through that educe a sense of a common national identity (chapter 6). This vital role to be played by the plan, as revealed in the course of the fieldwork, renders the plan as an invaluable thing with reverential status accorded it by the actors. This has made the plan to occupy the most important position in Abuja and more crucially in the CA since it is the premier district of Abuja (chapter 6). They thus subscribe to the plan and its sustenance. President Obasanjo’s policy of redemption of the Abuja master plan is a case in point, which was aimed not only at redeeming the contravened aspects of the plan but seeing to it that the plan is protected against any further contravention (Chapter 8).

Second, subscription to the plan has also been based on the belief that the plan will lead to the building of a modern national city. This was reinforced throughout the fieldwork in some of the interviews, where the planners and national elites have intended to use the Abuja master plan to build a new capital city. The underlying notion being that this will present Nigeria to the world as a modern nation. In other words, showcasing to the world the arrival of Nigeria unto modernity and something to be reckoned with. Guided by this assumption, the master plan of Abuja can best be seen as a hybridity of the plan of most international cities - Paris, Brasilia and other important cities of the world (IPA, 1979). Their design concepts informed the design of Abuja master plan. Third, the subscription has over the years not been driven just by the internal importance of nation building or the global importance, but by political legitimisation far beyond these two roles. Throughout the history of planning in the two eras in the CA, we have seen how the plan has been used as a weapon of political legitimisation by the national elites and political ruling class, and political decision makers in Abuja, among others (chapter 8). Supporting the plan and the aspirations of nation building it carries, has not only been a
publicly acclaimed thing to do, which in itself is intended to appeal to the mass of Nigerian peoples of one’s commitment to the building of a new capital city, but has equally been an avenue to promote other interests (Chapter 7 and 8). In the fieldwork, as I interacted with the respondents and began to analyse some of the field materials, I began to discern some of these nuances. Hence these actors are ever willing to subscribe to the plan as the most important thing in Abuja and the CA because of what they get from the plan (their interests) aside from their public support for the plan.

Fourthly and lastly, is what I refer to as technocratic affirmation as a subscription to the plan. In this case, especially the planners, as I interacted with them during the fieldwork revealed that, they are more than willing to assert the importance of the plan in affirming not only their expertise as planners but are convinced that the only way for directing a city’s future is through the plan. But the plan is viewed as a technocratic prescription and held as infallible and must be guided to usher in the expected future; in the sense of what I had described earlier as linearity in chapter 8. This also renders the plan as an invaluable thing in the CA by this set of actors.

Essentially therefore, the actors are welded to the plan in Abuja because of these roles or imperatives to be played by the plan. These can be broken down as the imperative of internal importance of national unity in diverse ethnic society as well as other associated goals that the plan is expected to drive e.g. economic and regional development; global importance of building a modern city to present Nigeria as a modern nation; political legitimisation of using the plan for other interests while on the surface appearing to be supporting the plan’s aspirations; and technocratic affirmation of the plan by the planners as something of immeasurable value and equally infallible (fig 51).

*Figure 51: the plan’s lock to four imperatives.*

*Author, 2016*
But a vital question would be, why do these actors tend to have faith in the plan and expected to lead to nation building? This can be made sense of through the history of planning in the country firstly, and again by the influence of modernists planning ideals.

Throughout colonialism and despite its shortcomings of spatial segregation, planning was generally based on the production of physical plans (chapter 2 and 3). Physical plans in the form of layout plans were usually designed by the Public Works Department to direct the future development of certain sections of a town or an entire township. The British colonial planning system in Nigeria accentuated importance on the plan with strong faith in it in guiding physical development in the country. By Independence in 1960 the country inherited this legacy of planning. Generally, post-Independence planning has experienced over the decades little or no reforms of the colonial legacy; not only in the area of placing attention on the plan as the guidance of future development but even the institutional framework of planning has not changed much from the colonial past. Planning agencies are still fragmentary in nature, there is a top-down approach to decision making and even the planning laws still bear semblance to colonial planning laws (chapter 2 and chapter 3). Without any change, attachment to the plan became the more entrenched in the planning of towns and cities in the country over the years.

Reinforcing further, the faith in the plan, has been the influence of modernist planning ideals. The 1960s and stretching down to the 1970s saw the global dominance of the modernist ideals especially through master planning (Chapter 2 and 5). Master plans generally accentuate the importance of a plan and as the guidance of future development. Owning to the desire of developing countries to fashion their development along the developed world, they imbibed the notion of master planning. It became the vogue in these countries to guide the development of towns and cities. In Nigeria, virtually all the towns acquired master plans - even universities engaged foreign consultants to prepare master plans for the future development of the institutions (Chapter 5). This contributed in no small measure in Nigeria in entrenching the plan as the ultimate way of bringing about a desired development.

It is with such a background and tradition of believing in the plan as the ultimate instrument of future development that was brought on board in nation building in Abuja. National elites, the planners, and foreign consultants, have believed that nation building concerns of Abuja would be attained through the plan - in this case the Abuja master plan. Absolutely, as they assume and as revealed during the fieldwork, the plan will lead to not only promoting a common national identity in a diverse ethnic society, but spur regional development and as well as.
present Nigeria to the world as a modern nation - among other aspirations. This has rendered the plan as the rallying point for the planners, investors, the politicians, national elites, welding all of them together. The plan is thus the gravity of attention with strong faith placed in it. Expectedly, since the 1976 declaration of Abuja as a new capital city, and when the Abuja master plan was prepared in 1979 and the supplementary master plans of the CA, successive administrations have been expected to proclaim and uphold this faith.

9.3.2 The Vicious Circle

Despite the faith in the plan, plan gravity has tended not to be successful in delivering the aspirations of Abuja in the CA. The four expositions of the thesis in chapter 8 have shown that plan gravity in the context of nation building has been undermined by i) multiplicity of actors’ interests; ii) marginalisation of the forces of context; iii) global flow of capital into the CA through the mega projects; iv) and modernist planning underpinnings – desiring an orderly development in a stable environment, which though have tended to be incongruent with the fluidities and other characteristics that underscore planning in Abuja generally and the CA (chapter 7 and chapter 8). Yet, the planners and political decision makers keep recruiting consultants upon consultants to prepare new plans or modify previous ones. It is intrinsically believed the solution lies with the plan and most especially through linearity. This has been the vicious circle of repeatedly subscribing to a particular way of knowledge even though it has not been working. But is there any alternative to this knowledge?

Moving away from this engrained way of doing things would seem to be the way out. But in the course of the field work it became clear that the actors do not seem so. Any move away from the plan would be interpreted as suicidal since the very roles the plan plays for them would be undermined once the current situation is changed. In other words, at the moment, it becomes for instance political suicide for the politicians to move away from plan gravity for fear of loss of a political legitimisation. The plan is important internally for nation building and externally to showcase Nigeria’s modernisation crave. These actors are not oblivious of this but fully aware of what this can be applied to when it comes to appealing for political gains or any other benefits. Their public proclamation and allegiance to the plan’s importance plus an avowed commitment to its implementation, are indeed, sufficient to instigate the peoples support for their administration or electioneering campaigns (chapter 7 and 8).

But even if they are willing to move away, there is yet the problem of technocratic affirmation that comes from the planners. Due to the profound influence of Western planning knowledge particularly the rational and modernist orientation to planning, which appears as if eternally
engrained in the planners’ veins, planning is taken normally as to proceed as a technical prescription and to be followed as a religious linearity (chapter 8). In chapter 1, I disclosed how as a city planner working in Abuja, the planners would always expect the plan to be followed faithfully; and that the outcomes or results of implementation that are produced by the plan should be in conformance with the goals or objectives of the plan as captured in the plan. This became again reinforced in the course of the fieldwork through my interviews with the planners, viewing planning only in the sense of linearity. It is the plan! And it has got to be the plan to chart the course of action and that action has got to be in a linearity manner. Time and again this has been demonstrated throughout the two eras of planning in the CA. Planning has been a pre-determined action and to proceed in that linearity trajectory through the land uses of the CA; which are intended to be implemented as planned and with the outcomes of implementation being in conformance with the intentions of the land uses.

So, the planners and the political ruling class, the national elites, and others, are welded into the plan - the lock and this vicious circle!

9.3. Contribution to Knowledge

This research makes useful contribution to knowledge in the following areas.

9.3.1. Literature on new capital cities

There exists a large body of literature on new capital cities. Largely, the literature explains the forces behind capital relocation and development. They equally attempt to explore and expose other hidden agenda behind the process than the obviously stated reasons for capital development (chapter 2). In the study of Lilongwe in Malawi for instance, Potts (1985a) points out that the primary motivation for the capital relocation from Zomba to Lilongwe, is driven by the need for president Banda to consolidate political power in his home region. Capital relocation in this context becomes an instrument of political control to consolidate political power away from rival enemies to a more trusted location. Indeed,

*An élite that seek to justify radical policy decisions will promulgate any number of explanations that are superficially plausible but that hide deeper agendas. If we accept at face value the official explanation, we should do so only after critical evaluation* (Schatz, 2003, p. 6)

Other scholars for example Perera (2004), go beyond exposing the hidden factors behind capital relocation. Instead, he draws our attention that capital relocation and the process of development is ridden in contests involving a multiplicity of actors who drive the process. This view of a heterogeneous, army of contestants who are driven by a number of interests and do
desire to see these interests play out in the development process of the new capital, is presented and argued in order to dispel the often-accentuated picture of a capital relocation and its development process by other scholars as if driven only by an authoritarian single individual or a few national elites. Using Chandigarh in India, he makes clear this point and concludes that capital relocation is characterised by ‘contestations, negotiations and compromises of’ geographic ‘imaginations’. The contributions of these scholars and many others have enriched the subject of new capital cities in diverse perspectives. Indeed, there exists numerous perspectives which this thesis may not have exhaustively brought to attention in chapter 2.

Nevertheless, through this thesis a further contribution to the literature on new capital cities is added. By focusing on plan gravity, the thesis exposes some of the difficulties with which a new capital city in the context of Abuja grapples with, and how this limits nation building. It equally brings to light that capital relocation and its development process is i) rift with other agenda that are pursued by a multiplicity of actors beyond the publicly acclaimed pursuits that a new capital city seeks to achieve; ii) undermined by global influx of finance capital – economic globalisation through mega projects; iii) and that by paying attention to plan gravity, it marginalises other factors of context for instance the institutional framework of planning under which the plan operates (chapter 8).

9.4.2. The 3-Circle Frame of Narrative: Investigating policy Implementation

The 3-circle frame of narrative has been useful to investigate the challenges of land use implementation in the context of nation building. It was though not developed in the sense of a normative but to make sense of the Abuja’s CA context; it may however be found useful in other contexts in investigating land use implementation. The narrative has the advantage of weaving together many webs under the three interwoven categories: the plan, the nature of planning, and external environment. Through this one can make sense of land use implementation challenges from the interwoven categories. For analytical purpose, we might break them as three circles of forces with each being an embodiment of numerous webs or issues that influence the planning and implementation of land uses.

Hence, the implementation of land uses or the difficulties of it could come from the plan. This could be from even the recruitment process of the consultants, the design goals of the plan, design process of the plan, or even the content of the plan that is eventually produced. Or it could come from the nature of planning, the system of planning in place. That is the structure and process of planning and implementation, the institutional framework in place, and actors
driving the process. Or it could come from the external environment. In this case the socio-economic, cultural, political, and global influences on land use planning and implementation. In reality though and as noted already in chapter 4 and 8, there is an interplay of interactions among the three categories, an interwoven nature.

9.4.3. Persistence of Western, Modernist Planning Ideals in Sub-Saharan Africa

Through the plan (Abuja master plan), Nigeria has desired to attain national identity, modernity, regional development among others - that is nation building. But something striking springs out from this endeavour. It is the plan gravity and the actors’ lock to this gravity. This lock as already demonstrated, comes partly from the influence of modernist planning ideals and the history of planning in the country. Interestingly though not with a connection to nation building, the persistence of the modernist ideals such as master planning in sub-Saharan Africa and much of the South, has been reported even in the face of other alternatives (Devas and Rakodi, 1993; Harrison, 2006b; Watson, 2009b; Kamete and Lindell, 2010; Todes et al., 2010; Todes, 2011). Todes et al. (2010, p. 414) citing others, capture this reality this way:

New approaches to spatial planning have also been emerging for some time (Healey, Khakee, Motte, & Needham, 1997), and there have been initiatives to develop more appropriate approaches for developing countries (Clarke, 1992; Singh & Steinberg, 1996). Traditional master planning nevertheless continues in several contexts (UN-Habitat, 2009), and in some cases there is a reversion to older forms of planning which have been criticised in the past (Berrisford, 2009; Mattingly & Winarso, 2000). Further, new forms of planning sometimes exist alongside traditional forms of planning (UN-Habitat, 2009).

A vital question would be why the persistence? Again making reference to others, Todes et al. (2010, p. 414) explain that the persistence would be due to the following:

Some explanations focus on political dimensions (Roy, 2009) or the dominance of modernist ideas amongst political elites and technocrats. Others argue that planning is still being shaped by perspectives and discourses linked to traditional approaches (Devas, 1993). New languages are sometimes in use, but are not always meaningful in practice. Insufficient discussion and debate about alternative approaches to spatial planning for developing countries.

And they go on to conclude that “reasons for the persistence of or reversion to master planning are contextual and remain to be fully explored” (Todes et al, 2010, p. 414). Responding to this call, it can be said that this research’s findings about the lock to the plan (modernist planning ideals - master planning), and the factors underscoring this lock already demonstrated in this chapter, offers some useful contribution to the literature on the persistence of Western planning knowledge - modernist planning ideals in sub-Saharan Africa through Abuja’s CA and the factors that underpin its durability.
9.4.4. Economic Globalisation and the Suppression of National Spaces

The findings of the thesis also contribute to the literature on the suppression of national spaces by economic globalisation. To make sense of this contribution a little background is highlighted, and in a way bearing some semblance to the already literature provided in chapter 2 concerning the Washington consensus policies (SAP)\(^57\). At any rate, the background is restricted to the kind of locations that underscore these neo-liberal global mega projects, and their quest to build iconic buildings in such locations. Thereafter the discussion narrows down to the CA’s mega projects and its contribution to literature.

**Economic Globalisation Driven by Powerful Institutions**

Economic globalisation is regarded as a powerful force; the institutions represented by the Trans-Capitalist Class (TCC) which are behind the global dispersal of economic flows are powerful (Sassen, 1994; Castells, 1996; Hall, 2002; Sklair, 2002; Kiely, 2007). Because they control huge financial resources, it becomes unsurprising to not only see the institutions dictate the nature of an investment in a country but equally drive the process. This often limits a state’s ability to control its economic affairs. In short, underpinning their capitalistic quest to create markets and profit, these institutions are capable of penetrating not only the economic affair but any sphere of a state they deem relevant toward advancing the quest. As Castells (1996) notes, *even democracies become powerless confronted with the ability of capital to circulate globally, of information to be transferred secretly, of markets to be penetrated or neglected, of planetary strategies of political-military power to be decided without the knowledge of nations, and of cultural messages to be marketed, packaged, recorded, and beamed in and out of people’s minds’*. (Castells, 1996 p. 349)

**Geographic Penetration**

Owing to the penetrative power of the global economic flows to penetrate any sphere of the state, the geographic space of a state is equally not spared (Castells, 1996; Sassen, 1996; Borja and Castells, 1997; Hall, 2014). In the first instance, it is the geographic space that finally makes a concrete meaning of *the where of an economic decision*; that is the location where such an investment is to be executed. The powerful institutions (TCC), at this level too, dictate and

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\(^57\) Generally, as noted in chapter 2 on the discussion on Washington consensus policies, we made sense of how the policies are driven by neo-liberalism and the quest of the institutions behind the policies IMF, World Bank, among others, to introduce them into Africa in the 1980s-1990s.
select their own location while the state play merely a supportive role toward the realisation of the institutions’ preferred location (Sassen, 1996; Marshall, 2003; Hall, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic globalisation</th>
<th>Economic limitation</th>
<th>Geographic Limitation</th>
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<tr>
<td>The need to establish outward markets and maximise profit results in the geographical dispersal of finance capital to the periphery.</td>
<td>The dispersal does not respect a state’s economic affairs but rather imposes its economic agenda on the state.</td>
<td>The dispersal disregards a state's prior planning or meaning of space but imposes its own desire (space) on existing geographic space.</td>
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Figure 52: double limitation of the state in the face of economic globalisation.

Author, 2015

Prime Locations and Iconic Buildings

Primarily, geographic penetration is underscored by rent seeking; that is, the search for prime locations of low costs to build investments that elevate the capitalistic interests of the TCC institutions (Marshall, 2013). Locations within a prestigious district of a city for example the Central Business Districts (CBDs); those with excellent infrastructure; enormous land; quality of manpower; cheap land and labour; mineral resources; the national capitals of a country; in areas of strategic business importance with neighbouring countries or cities; among other myriad criteria, are considered as being prime and thus appropriated to set up investments. Such investments are varied in nature. There are those that fall under what (Carmona et al., 2009) refer to as large urban projects or simply as mega projects (Marshall, 2003), which range from infrastructure projects to real estate and mixed developments. Others are extractive in nature and are setup as mining projects. In terms of mega urban projects, at the locations where they are built, there is the general propensity to build a state of the art urban design/architecture - simply labelled as ‘iconic projects’. This is basically symbolic to engender a sense of the arrival of a place unto the community of global cities (Douglass, 2000; Sklair, 2006; Dovey, 2008; Marshall, 2013).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Strategic Prime Location</th>
<th>Iconic Buildings</th>
<th>Image making</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National capitals, CBDs, locations of excellent infrastructure, enormous and cheap land, among others.</td>
<td>Tall buildings and towers State of the art urban design</td>
<td>Arrival of a place on to global community, modernity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 53: mega projects and image making.

Author, 2015
Abuja’s CA Mega Projects and suppression of national spaces

We have made sense of economic globalisation and its dispersal to take advantage of locations of prime qualities as well as the building of iconic projects. Through this thesis and especially the third exposition of the argument of the thesis demonstrated in chapter 8, a lot of the findings connect to this.

First, in terms of location, the CA’s Mega projects are located in Nigeria’s capital city - Abuja. This is where the organs of government converge and important decisions of politics and economy and other affairs of the nation are conducted. This association with the nation’s capital is assumed to foster a close relationship between the drivers of the mega projects with the Nigerian decision makers. In other words, since the capital is the epicentre of a Nigeria’s socio-political and economic affairs, being in the capital where these actions take place is equated as being close to the epicentre of the affairs. Second, it is just not being in the capital but being in the most prestigious part of the capital, as the mega projects are cited in the CA of Abuja. This again is to drive home the very importance of the projects - hence being cited in the premier district of Abuja. Third, in terms of state of the art design, the Abuja World Trade Centre (AWTC) for instance, is the first iconic project in the CA and Abuja going as far as 23 floors as the tallest in the City of Abuja (Chapter 8).

But it must also be pointed out that the locations where the projects are sited, are locations which are underlined by an already planned and laid down land uses. In countries largely driven by a regulated or what Hall (2002) refers to as ‘codified’ land use planning, such as Nigeria, lands within a city are planned and expected to be used for certain activities. Also, existing places are mapped out based on the roles they play or are expected to play. In the context of nation building through Abuja, these land uses have a crucial connection toward engendering nation building. They are viewed for instance, in the context of symbolic meanings that can stimulate a sense of a common national identity in a multi ethnic society (chapter 6). However, the mega projects of the CA erode the national importance behind the land uses by substituting them to entirely different meanings, as already demonstrated in chapter 8. This is not surprising given that their (mega projects) inclination is toward profit maximisation and the seizure of any land use that enhances this is deemed necessary (fig 52).

these institutions now wield such power in the world economy that we can no longer talk about ‘national economies’ and instead need to focus on how these institutions undermine national sovereignty and invest whatever they like in a footloose manner (Ohmae, 1991, in Kiely, 1998, p. 47)
From the foregoing, it can be discerned that this thesis contributes to the literature on economic 
globalisation as well as its suppression or denationalisation of national space (land uses). This 
is especially in the context of a Sub-Saharan city like Abuja. So far, there is growing literature on 
global capital flows in the context of Sub-Saharan African cities focusing on different ways in 
which these flows influence the cities (see for example Rod Burgess and Kolste, 1997; 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2001; Rakodi, 2007; Babere, 2013; Grant, 2014). However, this thesis in 
particular, adds to that growing literature but more in the sense of how these flows undermine 
national land uses. Beyond that, it also adds to other scholars’ work documenting the 
denationalisation, suppression or erosion of national spaces (see for instance Castells, 1996; 
Sassen, 1996; Brenner, 1998; Dovey, 2008)

9.5 Further Research

This thesis has revealed a number of findings as already demonstrated, however further research will be needed in the following discussed issues.

If Nationhood Is Still Alive, Economic Globalisation Too Is Still Alive!

For sure, nationhood is not dead. The late 20th century resurgence toward nationhood as 
advanced by the former soviet states, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia into 5 nation-states, 
Czechoslovakia into 2 nation-state, or the recent June 2016 British exit out of the European 
Union commonly tagged BREXIT, is a recent reminder of nationalistic craving by a certain 
group of people. Within even old states, citizens have had to rise up in defence of what they 
perceive as an attack on nationhood by the forces of economic globalisation (Castells, 1996;
Marshall, 2013). Yet, while nationalism is alive and active, so also is the activeness of economic globalisation. For it too is not dead. Marshal (2003) documents this activeness in the Asia Pacific Rim. Carmona et al. (2009) does the same in thirty cities which are experiencing economic globalisation. And many others have documented the activeness.

But what does this reality portend in the case of Abuja? This reality leads to the issue of engagement, resistance, and new medievalism as discussed in the next paragraphs.

**Engagement**

What this entails is that, if globalisation is a fact of life, then states and cities can no longer pretend to give a blind eye to it and should engage with it. There is the talk of specialisation by cities, for instance. This entails that cities are becoming more and more specialised in a particular sector to engage or play certain roles within economic globalisation (Graham, 1999; Sassen, 2001; Doel and Hubbard, 2002; Hall, 2002; Rennie-Short, 2013)

In Abuja’s CA, further studies will be needed to explore the specific nature of its specialisation and attraction in the global flow of capital. At the moment a major element of its attraction is its possession of enormous land (unbuilt areas, vacant lands). This is available and pooled together to support mega projects of global capital flows. The Abuja World Trade Centre and Abuja City Centre sit on 6.02Ha and 21Ha respectively of the CA’s landmass. Other districts of Abuja have started attracting global capital flow too apart from the CA. In the Jabi district for instance, the Jabi Lake and environs, which have been meant to be developed as a recreational and green areas by the Abuja master plan, have been appropriated by another mega project (fig 53). Currently under construction, it is a commercially oriented mixed development with some semblance from Cape Town Waterfront in South Africa. As the chairman of the promoters of the project explains, 

*the inspiration for it is the Cape Town Waterfront which is a development that includes malls, retail shopping, apartments, entertainment, cinemas and hotels...we are going to have probably the first five - star plus hotel in Nigeria, which would be a super luxury hotel... something that Nigerians can look at with pride and say yes what we see in Johannesburg, what we see in Dubai, what we see in London can be done in Nigeria as well (Agbo, 2014).*
This is a vast project worth $5 billion and interestingly too, sits on a 27 Ha of land encompassing the Jabi Lake and adjoining lands and stretching into another district, the Kado District. Again the issue of enormity of land comes to play where the mega project is able to pool 27Ha of land.

This is what (Carmona et al., 2009) refer to as ‘land assemblage’ in support of large urban projects in their study of 30 large urban projects across the global. In one of the 30 case studies in sub-Saharan Africa focusing on Lusaka, Zambia, reading through pages 255 to 270, one of the key opportunities of the city’s central area is that of ‘empty pockets of land’.

opportunity to globalisation. [is the existence of] a lot of empty pockets of land ... which are now being taken by LUP [large urban projects] ...the largest shopping malls, mostly funded with foreign, especially South African, capital are also located here[ taking advantage of the availability of land in the city’s centre][ see pages 255 to 270 for an in-depth treatment of Lusaka in the work].
Yet, of a concern is whether Abuja and particularly the CA will continue to attract these kinds of projects and in turn water down the very essence of Abuja’s ‘codified’ land use planning which is expected to lead to nation building (chapter 8). Or, in the face of a continuous influence of the mega projects, Abuja would simply substitute its ‘codified’ planning to what Hall (2002) refers to as enterprise planning. Enterprise planning is where a city is more concerned about investment and relaxes planning regulations in favour of that. Investment becomes the motif and guides land use planning and not a pre-determined, ‘codified’ land use planning.

Related to this is what has been described as the ‘Transformationist View’. It means that the state or city without discarding his primary roles, for instance nation building, it can equally engage with economic globalisation and acquire new roles in the process (Held, 1995; Held, 2002; Van Niekerk, 2014). The challenge though, is still how such a combination can be implemented in reality without some sort of an overbearing influence of the new roles over the old ones. But at any rate, it does bring states into engaging with the reality of economic globalisation while not losing focus of its primary role whether it the sense of nation building. Again, in the context of Abuja, this would mean a fusion between the aspiration of global mega projects which is capitalistic in nature as the new role; and that of Abuja’s land use planning driven by plan gravity and which is expected to lead to nation building (chapter 8) - the old role. The challenge in this context lies however in whether the aspiration of global mega projects will eventually overspill Abuja’s nation building role driven by plan gravity or not. It is difficult to expect the two aspirations to exist in a 50-50 ratio; or meshed together in some fusion called hybridity or ‘Transformationist view’ without having overspill from another. In other words, it is difficult to espouse with absolute assurance what will become of the two aspirations in that sort of mixture.

These are diametrically different aspirations where Abuja’s primary role through plan gravity as demonstrated in chapter 8 seeks nation building, while the global mega projects seek profit making. When it comes to nation building and especially in the sense of creating national identity, one is dealing with issues of primordial inclination to nationhood for instance and underpinned by the ineffable and yet powerful appeal to one’s nation (Geertz, 1973; Smith, 2009). And the land uses of national symbolism, memories, identity, are invariably important ingredients of that emotive appeal to nationhood (Smith, 2009). But for the mega projects, it is primarily underpinned by capitalism. In this case, the quest for better comparative production sites in disregard of national spaces as earlier demonstrated. Thus, how they are able to blend
together to give rise to hybridity or ‘Transformationist view’, becomes a challenge for planners and nationalists. More studies are required in this direction.

Nonetheless, using the national capital of Malaysia, Putrajaya, Marshal (2003) reports how the city plays this dual role of attracting economic globalisation without losing its critical role as a definer of national identity. This would be a flagship reference point for cities like Abuja to emulate while engaging with the forces of global mega project toward still pursuing nation building. Hence, ‘unlike projects such as Lujiazui’ in Malaysia, Marshal narrates, ‘whose motivation is overtly commercial, Putrajaya’s motivation is based on representing the civic and cultural ambition of Malaysia’.

*Putrajaya provides Malaysia with two very important qualities. In the nation’s search for Malaysianness, Putrajaya provides a physical manifestation of what this possibility might be. This is important in the global market. Putrajaya gives Malaysia a built image of itself which can be marketed in the global economy to signify that it too is a global player and confident enough as a nation to express itself (p.188)*

**Resistance**

But others do not see the need for an engagement. They rather advocate the need for a resistance to economic globalisation. This is seen as a sure way of fending off the suppression of land uses and places by the mega projects (Castells, 1996). This may however work in certain places or states which do not rely on the financial resources that economic globalisation brings with it. However, in sub-Saharan states this can be quite difficult. Not gainsaying the crave by the states to pursuing national identity, these states no doubt still need the financial resources for survival in the first place, and develop their infrastructure and other sectors of the economy. Against this backdrop, resistance might rather put the states at a precarious position and plunge them into reclusiveness from interconnection and engagement with economic globalisation. This has been referred to as the ‘double bind’ with which the states have to deal with it (Sutherland, 2012). Double bind in the sense that,

*Many post-colonial states are dependent on the outside capital in the form of foreign direct investment ... in order to develop their economies and thereby retain popular legitimacy. This is a double bind; the challenge is to international national links towards supporting nation-building without letting them undermine the very edifice (Sutherland, 2012, p. 176).*

This reflects in the context of Abuja too. The planners and politicians made the observation that the billions of Dollars from the CA’s mega projects would equally support nation building through infrastructure development, job provisions and a financial boast for the city, or reassert
the role of the CA as the jewel of thenation and the world (chapter 6 and 8). The challenge however, remains how much of this will be employed in pursuit of nation building in Nigeria through Abuja. Yet again, the case with Putrajaya might come as a shining example for Abuja and other similar cities especially in the context of, insomuch as not resisting economic globalisation to be in obscurity, but connecting with a difference.

[Putrajaya has] provided Malaysia with an opportunity to reflect upon itself, to identify its core values, and to understand its origins and its potential future ...a different perspective for the consideration of global urban projects. More than any other it is making conscious struggle with the tension between engagement and resistance to the forces of globalisation... an example of a nation aiming for difference with the very real understanding that in a world converging on sameness, [global capitals cities] difference will be a highly valuable commodity in the future global economy’ (Marshal 2003, P.189)

New Medievalism

The erosion of boundaries means that the current age, more than earlier periods, is marked by uncertainty, anxiety and complexity (Day, 2004, p. 177).

Due to the erosion of national spaces by economic globalisation through mega projects, there has now been the talk of a ‘deterritorialisation’. It basically conveys the notion of an eroded territory (geographic space, land use, place) caused by economic globalisation, or the threat posed by it, and that this has given way to a more interconnected boundless globe (Castells, 1996; Sassen, 1996; Hall, 2014). Nonetheless, there tends to be a considerable conclusion that in spite of the threat posed by the forces of economic globalisation, the phenomenon of nationhood is still pervasive and has not wined down (Delanty, 2002) as noted at the beginning of this section on further research. In other words, nationhood is still alive and not dead despite the incursion of forces of economic globalisation on nationhood.


Rather, what seems to wine down is the state’s role toward driving nationhood. This is attributed to the very fact that, since the state is most often concerned about attracting global investments whether in the sense of urban mega project, it finds itself in quite a precarious situation to shelve off the interests of global investments insomuch as they may go against its quest for nation building. To these states it is all about being a part of the global economy, which is what matters the most and not much of nationhood – pursuing national identity for instance (Day, 2004).
But the receding role of the state toward nationhood creates an opportunity for others to take up the responsibility. Simply, that role or ‘function’ which the state plays largely as the driver of nationhood, the conferrer of ‘ultimate identity’ (Delanty, 2002, in Day) ‘will seek another carrier’. This is because others are ‘willing to step into the void left by the state’ (Day, 2004). This is what is referred to as the new medievalism (Anderson, 1996; Day, 2004). What this means is that the state experiences two sets of pressure in its role as the driver of nationhood. First, from the global economic pressure; this is referred to as pressure from above. Second, pressure from within the state as other agents rise up to fill the receding role of the state toward nationhood; and is referred to as pressure from below.

However, in the context of Nigeria’s nation building project through Abuja, while not down playing the importance of the pressure from the above, the pressure from the below would seem to be a delicate issue. Delicate against the backdrop of a certain group rising up other than the state to pursue nationhood. This is because it is only the state that can truly sponsor nationhood in a county like Nigeria with diverse ethnic groups numbering over 250; and with an ethnopolitical history replete with ferocious squabbles over who controls Nigeria (Chapter 5). Any of them that rise up in demand for nation building in the context of Abuja, may be pursuing primordial nationalistic ideals (chapter 2) of its own ethnicity rather than the common national identity being sought by the state through Abuja.

At any rate, New Medievalism in the context of Abuja could open up a new future research on the city in face of the state’s receding role in driving nation building through Abuja being pushed to the background by pressure from above (economic globalisation). Since at the moment the city has started witnessed incursion of these mega projects not only in the CA but in other districts of the city, for example the Jabi Lake project. There is even another massive global inspired project, the Centenary City project, being expected to be developed in the city which is primarily to be driven by foreign investment. These are increasing pressures from above which tend to suppress the land uses of the city in place of something different, as well as make mockery of the linearity of the city’s planning.

9.6. Concluding thoughts

In chapter 1 I narrated how the planners in Abuja find it difficult implementing master plans. Despite the reverential treatment master plans are accorded in Abuja by the planners, national elites and politicians, and against the backdrop of the series of master plan making in Abuja spanning a period of close to 4 decades, implementing these plans have always tended to be difficult. Using the CA this thesis has revealed the complexities that underline plan
implementation and particularly land uses in Abuja. Of importance, it has shown how plan gravity does not successfully lead to land use implementation. And in the sense of Abuja, this also has influence on nation building since the plan is considered as the road map to attaining Abuja’s desired aspirations of nation building. Through the thesis, several revelations in connection to the concerns of the thesis earlier set out in chapter one, have been made and useful contribution made to knowledge including possible areas of future research.
Appendices

Appendix A: Those interviewed During Field Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Length Of interview</th>
<th>Location of interview</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Nature of recording</th>
<th>Referenced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
<td>Abuja Metropolitan Management Council (AMMC)</td>
<td>1hr.30mins (2pm - 3.30pm)</td>
<td>DDC head office Wuse Zone 6, Abuja</td>
<td>20/12/2013</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>Abuja Metropolitan Management Council (AMMC)</td>
<td>1hr.15mins (9am - 10.15am)</td>
<td>DDC head office, Wuse zone 6, Abuja</td>
<td>11/12/2013</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
<td>Abuja Planner A2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authourity (FCDA)</td>
<td>48mins (4pm-4.48pm)</td>
<td>URP head office, Garki Area 11, Abuja</td>
<td>5/12/2013</td>
<td>Electronic</td>
<td>Abuja planner A3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authourity (FCDA)</td>
<td>1hr (11am-12am)</td>
<td>URP head office, Garki Area 11, Abuja</td>
<td>16/1/2014</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner A4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authourity (FCDA)</td>
<td>2hr (3pm-5pm)</td>
<td>URP Head office, Area11, Garki Abuja</td>
<td>22/1/2014</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner A5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Length Of interview</td>
<td>Location of interview</td>
<td>Date of interview</td>
<td>Nature of recording</td>
<td>Referenced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
<td>FCT Department of Land Administration (DLA)</td>
<td>1hr.20mins (1pm-2.20pm)</td>
<td>AGIS complex, Area 11, Abuja</td>
<td>9/12/2013</td>
<td>Electronic</td>
<td>Abuja planner A6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant director</td>
<td>Abuja Geographic Information System (AGIS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>AGIS complex, Abuja</td>
<td>8/1/2014</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner A7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Director</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authourity (FCDA)</td>
<td>2hrs.35 mins (10am-12.35pm)</td>
<td>Private Office Abuja</td>
<td>18/12/2013</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner B1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retired Director</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authourity (FCDA)</td>
<td>3hours 1pm-4pm</td>
<td>Private Office Abuja</td>
<td>6/1/2014</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Federal Capital Development Authourity (FCDA)</td>
<td>2hours</td>
<td>Private Residence Abuja</td>
<td>15/1/2014</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
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<td>Retired Director</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authourity (FCDA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private office, Abuja</td>
<td>23/1/2014</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
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Retired directors of FCDA
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<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Length Of interview</th>
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<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Nature of recording</th>
<th>Referenced</th>
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<tr>
<td>Former District Officer</td>
<td>Abuja Metropolitan Management Council (AMMC)</td>
<td>30mins (1.23 pm - .53pm)</td>
<td>Karimo Demolition site, Karimo District, Abuja</td>
<td>12/12/13</td>
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<td>Abuja planner C1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current District Officer</td>
<td>Abuja Metropolitan Management Council (AMMC)</td>
<td>2hr.11mins (4pm - 6.11pm)</td>
<td>Central Area site office, Abuja</td>
<td>23/12/13</td>
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<td>Former Site Officer</td>
<td>Abuja Metropolitan Management Council (AMMC)</td>
<td>57mins (11.13am-12.10am)</td>
<td>Gudu Joint Inspection Site, Behind Gudu market, Gudu Distric, Abuja</td>
<td>24/1/14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Site Officer</td>
<td>Abuja Metropolitan Management Council (AMMC)</td>
<td>1hr (10am-12am)</td>
<td>Demolition site, behind Durumi Village1, Durumi District, Abuja</td>
<td>9/1/2014</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner C4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former District Officer</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA)</td>
<td>2hr (2pm-4pm)</td>
<td>FCDA Head office, Area11 Garki, Abuja</td>
<td>13/12/13</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner C5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current District Officer</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA)</td>
<td>30 mins (3.30pm-4pm)</td>
<td>Bawa Bwari House, Abuja</td>
<td>8/1/2014</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner C6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current District Officer</td>
<td>FCT Department of Land Administration (DLA)</td>
<td>48 mins (6pm-7pm)</td>
<td>AGIS complex, Area 11</td>
<td>15/1/2014</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner C7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Length Of interview</td>
<td>Location of interview</td>
<td>Date of interview</td>
<td>Nature of recording</td>
<td>Referenced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Town Planning officer: policy formulation and master plan</td>
<td>Federal Development Authority (FCDA)</td>
<td>1hr.30mins (2pm - 3.30pm)</td>
<td>Millennium Park Abuja</td>
<td>30/12/2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Town Planning officer: policy formulation and master plan</td>
<td>Abuja Metropolitan Management Council (AMMC)</td>
<td>1hr.15mins (9am - 10.15am)</td>
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<td>2/12/2013</td>
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<td>Town planning officer: registry and documentation</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA)</td>
<td>48mins (4pm - 4.48pm)</td>
<td>FCDA head office, Area 11, Garki, Abuja</td>
<td>7/1/2014</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Town Planning Officer: Land records</td>
<td>Department of Land and Administration (DLA)</td>
<td>30mins (3pm - 3.30pm)</td>
<td>Bawa Bwari House, Abuja</td>
<td>9/1/2014</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner D4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Planning officer: investments and evaluation</td>
<td>Abuja Investments Company Limited (AICL)</td>
<td>2hr (3pm-5pm)</td>
<td>Millennium Park, Abuja</td>
<td>22/12/2013</td>
<td>Electronic and notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner D5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Town Planning Officer: policy formulation and implementation</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory Emergency Management Agency (FCT-FEMA)</td>
<td>1hr.20mins (1pm - 2.20pm)</td>
<td>Bawa Bwari House, Abuja</td>
<td>29/11/2014</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Length Of interview</td>
<td>Location of interview</td>
<td>Date of interview</td>
<td>Nature of recording</td>
<td>Referenced</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others other than planners in public planning agencies, or have previously worked with public planning agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal executive official</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute of town Planners, national office, Abuja.</td>
<td>2 hours 10am -12pm</td>
<td>Bawa Bwari House, Abuja</td>
<td>13/1/2014</td>
<td>Electronic and Notes</td>
<td>Abuja planner E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuja Consultant</td>
<td>Multi-systems Limited Abuja</td>
<td>1 hour (10am-11am)</td>
<td>Private Office, Abuja</td>
<td>28/1/2014</td>
<td>Electronic and Notes</td>
<td>Abuja consultant</td>
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<td>Land Developer</td>
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<td>1 hour (11am-12pm)</td>
<td>AGIS Complex, Area 11, Abuja</td>
<td>19/12/2013</td>
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<td>Land developer A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land Developer</td>
<td>Police Housing Scheme, Abuja</td>
<td>30mins (3.30pm-4pm)</td>
<td>AMMC head office, Wuse Zone 6, Abuja</td>
<td>14/12/2013</td>
<td>Electronic and Notes</td>
<td>Land developer B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Developer</td>
<td>Jerry Jones Housing Abuja</td>
<td>20mins (2pm-2.40pm)</td>
<td>AMMC head office, Wuse Zone 6, Abuja</td>
<td>31/12/2013</td>
<td>notes</td>
<td>Land developer C</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix B:

Examples of Field Document; Requesting for Data

Newcastle University,
School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape,
Newcastle Upon Tyne,
UK.
15th December, 2013.

Executive Director News,
Nigeria Television Authority,
Garki, Area 11,
Abuja.

Sir/Ma

Access to Aired Programme

I am a doctoral researcher at the School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape, Newcastle University, UK and my research is concerned about new capital cities. I am interested in exploring the problems of implementing the plans of new capital cities, focusing on the Nigeria’s new capital city of Abuja and particularly its Central Area as the case study.

It is thus my desire to access some of your Tuesday-Live programmes aired. Essentially, I am interested in the programme aired on the 22/1/12, which focused on the challenges of developing Abuja city, and the one 7/1/14 which dwelled on the centenary of Nigeria. Others dealing with such context will equally be of importance to the research.

While thanking you for your anticipated response, this is to assure you that the research is strictly for academic purpose and your response will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Yours Faithfully,
Chiahemba Jesse Nor,

Doctoral Researcher
School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape
University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Access to Aired Interview with the FCT Director of Development Control Department

I am a doctoral researcher at the School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape, Newcastle University, UK and my research is concerned about new capital cities. I am interested in exploring the problems of implementing the plans of new capital cities, focusing on the Nigeria’s new capital city of Abuja and particularly its Central Area as the case study.

On Friday 19 June, 2014, you aired a live interview programme that hosted the director of the FCT Department of Development Control, Tpl Yusuf Yahaya. I am interested in accessing a recorded copy of the interview. Please be assured that the recording will strictly be used for the research.

Thanking you for your anticipated response.

Yours faithfully,
Chizemba Jesse Nor.
Examples of Field Document; Requesting for Data

VISITORS REQUEST FORM

Name of Visitor: Jasso Nor

Purpose of Visit: Official

Time: 4:30pm  Date: 38/01/13

Are you on appointment? Yes

Director’s comment:

Request Granted

For academic work, I am a PhD student from Newcastle University, undertaking my final year project in the Centre for Healthy Minds. I would wish to have a brief chat/ interview with you.
References


Collier, P. (2007) *The bottom billion : why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it*. Oxford University Press.


Devas, N. and Rakodi, C. (1993) 'Planning and managing urban development'. Longman Group UK


Vancouver: Canada


New York: Palgrave Macmillan.


Shuaibu, U. (2014b) 'The desecration of the Three Arms Zone ', *Daily Trust* edn), Monday, 05 May 2014


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