Development myths and realities: a critical analysis of the idea that community-based organizations are the key to progress in Ogoni communities in Nigeria

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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DECLARATION

I declare that the contents of this thesis are my original research work and have not been presented elsewhere for any other award.

ABSTRACT

Given the failure of top-down initiatives to bring about community development (CD) in many developing countries, attention is switching to community-based organizations (CBOs) as bottom-up CD solutions. This thesis tests the evidence for this switch in five oil-endowed and three non-oil-endowed communities across Ogoniland. In the fieldwork carried out for this research, 101 telephone interviews were conducted between December 2013 and February 2014, while between February and May, 2014, 189 open-ended questionnaires were administered, 69 key informant interviews were carried out, and three focus group discussions were conducted, and between March and April, 2015, 200 structured questionnaires were administered.

The findings of the research include the fact that in the eight Ogoni communities there is a large range of perceptions about the definition and meaning of CBOs and CD; that state, market and culture affect the performance of CBOs; that most CBO members hold a higher sense of place than sense of communality; that there is a paradox of community members adapting to the poor condition of their communities rather than adapting their communities to their needs; and that CBOs may be more a reflection of their communities than a determinant of CD. The study concludes that Ogoni CBOs are not bottom-up community development solutions but symptoms of underdevelopment.

This study recommends the decentralization of power in communities and the establishment of a partnership body for CBOs in Ogoniland to enable them to deliver bottom-up CD. It also suggests that CD policies should be built on the powerful sense of place held by Ogonis, rather than on an assumed sense of communality.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the 562 respondents who gave their consent and participated in this study, their contributions produced this thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

APC   All Progressive Congress

CA   Community Assistance

CAST   Community and Shell Together

CBNRM   Community-Based Natural Resource Management

CBO   Community-Based Organization

CCE   Council of Chiefs and Elders

CD   Community Development

CDC   Community Development Committee

CDD   Community-Driven Development

CDP   Community Development Programme

CDRA   Community Development Resource Association

CRO   Christian Religious Organizations

CSR   Corporate Social Responsibility

DPR   Department of Petroleum Resources

EGASPIN Environment Guidelines and Standards for Petroleum Industries in Nigeria

ERA   Environment Restoration Authority

FEPA   Federal Environmental Protection Agency

FGD   Focus Group Discussion

FMENV   Federal Ministry of Environment

GMoU   Global Memorandum of Understanding

HCBO   Hybrid Community-Based Organizations

HYPREP   Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project

IFAD   International Fund for Agricultural Development

IOC   International Oil Company

JIR   Joint Investigation Reports

JIT   Joint Investigation Team

JIV   Joint Investigation Visits

KI	Key Informant
LGA	Local Government Area
MCBOs	Modern Community Based Organizations
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNDA	Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs
MNOC	Multinational Oil Company
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPR	Ministry of Petroleum Resources
MWO	Men and Women Organization
NARESCON	Natural Resource Conservation Council
ND	Niger Delta
NDBDA	Niger Delta Basin Development Authority
NDDB	Niger Delta Development Board
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NDR	Niger Delta Region
NESREA	National Environmental Standards and Regulation Enforcement Agency
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIMASA	Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NOA	National Orientation Agency
NOSDR	National Oil Spill Detection and Response
NOSDRA	National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency
OERA	Ogoni Environmental Restoration Authority
OMPADEC	Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission
PDP	People Democratic Party
PTA	Parents Teachers Association
QIP	Quick Impact Project

SCD   Sustainable Community Development

SCSR   Sustainable Corporate Social Responsibility

SoC   Sense of Community

SPDC   Shell Petroleum Development Commission

SQ   Survey Questionnaire

STCBO   Second Tier Community Based Organization

TCBO   Traditional Community Based Organization

TI   Telephone Informant

UNDP   United Nations Development Programme

UNEP   United Nations Environment Programme

UNPO   United Nations and Peoples Organization

USAID   United States Agency for International Development

WHO   World Health Organization

YO   Youth Organization

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Chapter 1: Introduction

"If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin" (Charles Darwin, 1836)

1.1 Introduction
This research is a study of Ogoni communities in Rivers State, Niger Delta, Nigeria, and the efficacy of their community-based organizations (CBOs) in promoting their development. In this introductory chapter, I explain the rationale of the project, how it sits in the literature, the research questions it addresses, the theoretical framework chosen, the methodology used, and the outline of the chapters to follow.

1.2 Rationale of the thesis
Because Ogoni communities have long suffered from lack of development, despite repeated efforts by the Nigerian government and the major oil company, Shell, to stimulate regeneration by top-down initiatives, many organizations have claimed that the time has come to consider an alternative route to community development (CD) – bottom-up initiatives taken by community-based organizations (CBOs). The central objective of this thesis is to examine whether CBOs have indeed promoted CD in Ogoni communities.

1.3 Literature review
I have chosen an integrated literature review for my thesis, which means that the relevant literature is engaged throughout the thesis, rather than as a stand-alone part of a single chapter, to enhance the flow of the narrative. The relevant literature for this introductory chapter is in two parts: the literature on top-down attempts, and the literature on bottom-up attempts, at CD in Ogoniland. First, on top-down initiatives, the literature shows that since the discovery of crude oil in the mid-1950s in Ogoniland, Rivers state, Nigeria, Ogonis have suffered from a myriad of problems - environmental, and health, cultural, socio-economic and political – resulting in poverty and community underdevelopment. To mitigate these problems in Ogoniland, the Nigerian government has, since the 1960s, embarked on the creation of several interventionary agencies to develop the area. As Anya (2010) noted, the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB), the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA), the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) which replaced OMPADEC in 2000, and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) established in 2008, were all created ostensibly to help develop communities and reduce poverty. However, critics claimed that none of them succeeded because of corruption: the organisations were accused of siphoning off public funds for

private benefit, rather than using the funds to develop poor communities (Mohammed, 2013; Babalola, 2014). For example, according to Idumange (2011), NDDC has little or nothing to show for the large amount of public money invested in it, since it served mainly as a contract-awarding agency marked by clientelism. It is a top-down body that does not consult with the community, and most of their programmes are implemented haphazardly (Osuoka, 2007).

Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), which is the major company with a licence to mine for oil in Ogoni (Pyagbara, 2007), also claimed to have contributed to the development of Ogoni communities (Frynas, 2005) through its corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, and its latest innovation of sustainable corporate social responsibility (SCSR). But according to Idemudia (2007), Ogonis have yet to reap the benefits of these investments, which suggests that Shell, like the managers of the state interventionary agencies, have not learnt to consult with the communities they claim to help. According to Okorobia (2010) and Frynas (2005), this happens because Shell's SCSR is not designed for genuine CD but largely for public relations purposes. Moreover, Rexler (2010) claims that the partnership between state agencies and oil companies which was formed to develop local communities did not solve or even ameliorate the challenges faced by Ogonis in their communities, because this top-down initiative was essentially another show of public relations, and it placed the Nigerian state in a position where it finds it difficult to control Shell's activities especially in relation to environmental degradation (Rexler, 2010). According to critics, this partnership arrangement has little prospect of achieving meaningful CD because it reflects weaknesses in the governance of the Nigerian state which has shown a negligible inclination to interfere with the manner in which Shell has polluted the Ogoni environment.

Like most such initiatives, top-down efforts at developing Ogoni communities are expert-driven, with little or no contribution from communities (Meslin, 2010). For example, the NDDC Master Plan was designed by experts, and community members were not involved at any point (Idumange 2011, p. 3). So, despite the huge amount of money spent on the design of the NDDC programmes, the socio-cultural realities of the people it was meant to develop were not incorporated in them (Idumange, 2011). As a result, according to Adu and Fumilayo (2014), these interventionary agencies largely wasted money and time because they have not developed Ogoni communities, and instead have produced communities of resilient militants and vulnerable groups (Arisukwu and Nnaomah, 2012). These communities still live in extensively hydrocarbon-polluted environments without viable rivers and soils from which to earn their livelihood (UNEP, 2011). According to Ikejiaku (2009), it is for these reasons that

most Ogonis are cashless and live without basic facilities. Many resilient community members, for either selfish or ideological reasons, engaged in violent struggle for the development of their communities (Asunni, 2009). The Amnesty programme was established in June, 2009, by the late President Yar'Adua. This programme was aimed at curbing the excesses of such resilient militants and cult groups, but it failed to bring peace and development in Ogoni communities as the programme focused on only cultists and militants rather than vulnerable community members (Adegboyega and Adesola, 2013). The conclusion that many scholars have come to is that, as an oil-dependent nation, the Nigerian state and Shell are more interested in maximizing profit than promoting genuine CD of communities (Ogoni), and treat such communities virtually as their colonies (Idemudia, 2010; Rexler, 2010; Frynas, 2005).

Second, on bottom-up initiatives for CD in Ogoniland, the literature shows that CBOs are generally regarded very positively as agents of CD in Africa. Most African rural communities are not strangers to poverty and underdevelopment (poor infrastructural, human, economic and psychological capital): "as the world's poorest continent, rural Africa is home to some of the most disadvantaged and marginalised" people (Min-Harris, nd, p. 163). CBOs as solutions to this form of poverty and rural decay seem to be the dominant discourse established in the community development literature (Onyeozu, 2010; Abegunde, 2009; Jenning, 2005). This pro-CBO discourse is also endorsed and adopted by practitioners and development institutions (Narayan *et al*, 1999). By contrast, voices who are critical of the efficacy of CBOs as bottom-up agents of rural community development are rarely heard (Blaikie, 2006). Yet for Blaikie (2006) and Dill (2010), the realities on the ground in most African communities are that the performance of CBOs is inconsistent with this dominant discourse.

There is, however, a distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' CBOs, and it may be that the positive assessments are made of traditional CBOs, while the negative assessments are made of modern CBOs. Traditional CBOs are locally-based, and closely related to the indigenous power structure of hierarchical rule exercised by chiefs see (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016). Modern CBOs are externally located, and migrate into communities to perform services for their inhabitants. Hybrid CBOs (HCBOs) are crossbreed CBOs that display features of both TCBOs and MCBOs. Criticism of CBOs by Dill (2010) is of modern CBOs, not traditional CBOs. He reports that the CBOs he studied in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were not locally-based but externally-located, and for him these modern CBOs (MCBOs) were mostly built from institutional blueprints derived from the urban global north, and are a misfit for their host communities because they are exclusionary, and have achieved very little or

nothing in terms of CD. Moreover, these urban MCBOs are subject to the will of the state, hence work in accordance with the dictates of the government because they "do not dare speak publicly…or make claims that are likely to raise the ire and scrutiny of the state", but instead "pursue or implement seemingly innocuous development activities that have state support" (Dill, 2010, p. 41).

Positive assessments of traditional CBOs (TCBOs) abound in the literature. For example, many writers have advocated TCBOs as genuine bottom-up agents of CD, eulogizing their effectiveness because they, unlike MCBOs, are sacred and therefore work genuinely for their members (Kendie and Guri, nd). An empirical study of indigenous CBOs within the Gubre rural community asserted that TCBOs are influential organizations in Ethiopia because as an embodiment of goodness they provide a conducive atmosphere for CD to thrive: they

> "have informal types of rules of function, which are based upon trust, norms and cultural values. These rules of function are unwritten. Moreover, the sanction mechanisms for controlling inappropriate behaviour among CBO leaders are very strong and could lead to ostracism from the community" (Dinbaba, 2014, p. 238)

Opare (2007) and Kendie and Guri (nd), claim that TCBOs are the best agents of rural CD. Kendie and Guri (nd, p. 2), hold that indigenous CBOs in Ghana promote CD because they are built on traditional norms of "trust and reciprocity". Woolcook and Narayan (1999) note that TCBOs, like kinship organizations or indigenous organizations, are perceived as perfect models for bottom-up CD because of the assumption that they are built on communality. Kelsall (2008) gives conditional support to the work of kinship organizations, using Goran Hyden's concept of 'economy of affection' to assert that the abundant affection that abounds within them can be utilized to drive development if they are turned into ministries to represent their people at the state or regional level.

However, there are some voices in the literature that are critical of TCBOs. For example, Molyneux *et al* (2007) argue that the assumption that TCBOs are based on 'communality' is fictional since their host communities are not homogenous. For Hall (2013), the whole idea of homogenous communities is unreal because it stems from imaginations that create positive images of communities that are invented. According to Pyagbara (2007), there is evidence that TCBOs are not 'embodiments of goodness' especially in the face of globalization.

In what follows, it will become clear that the fieldwork research for this thesis finds evidence that while both MCBOs and TCBOs provide some beneficial services for Ogoni communities,

for the most part, their contributions are tarnished by too close an association with national and local political and economic elites. Following the failure of the state (Nigerian government) and market (Shell) to promote sustainable CD, the central argument of this thesis is that the prevailing influence of the state, market and local traditions negatively affects the performance of both MCBOs and TCBOs in promoting CD in both oil-endowed and non oil-endowed communities of Ogoniland.

1.4 Research questions

The challenge faced by Ogonis in Ogoniland is like "an open wound" (Donovan, 2015, p.1) that has for five decades defied several doses of treatment, some of which have actually deepened the wound. Such a depressing picture raises the issue of whether CD is actually possible in Ogoniland, and if so, whether it can be achieved by CBOs. In order to address this issue, it is necessary to deal with the following five research questions:

1. How do Ogonis perceive the concept of CBOs?
2. What are the typologies of CBOs in oil-endowed and non oil-endowed communities in Ogoniland?
3. Do these CBOs constitute a third category of governance outside the state and market?
4. To what extent do these CBOs deliver CD as perceived by Ogonis in oil- endowed and non oil-endowed communities?
5. How can CBOs be made to better promote sustainable CDs'?

1.5 Theoretical and conceptual framework

Theoretical frameworks are designed to enable researchers to organize their methods of obtaining and analysing data more clearly and coherently. Theoretical frameworks are also lenses through which researchers can interpret the meaning of their data, and explain their findings to others. The theoretical framework that I have chosen is social constructionism, which has encouraged me to look behind the outward appearance of institutions and practices to see ways in which their apparent meanings have been constructed by dominant groups to serve their own interests. This is not to say that my intention is to discredit such institutions or practices: I do not aim to debunk the roles of CBOs in Ogoni communities, but rather to understand how the CBOs have come to take on those roles. My purpose is one of friendly critic not hostile assassin. Indeed, condemnation of a social practice would be contrary to the theory of social constructionism, which postulates that all social practices are constructed in one way or another, including the practices of researchers.

> "As Yearley…observes, demonstrating that a problem has been socially constructed is not to undermine or debunk it, since 'both valid and invalid social problem claims have to be constructed'" (Hannigan, 1995, p. 30).

Conceptual frameworks are designed to enable researchers to clarify the meaning of the key concepts that they use in their studies, to avoid confusion arising from ambiguities that lie in such concepts. In my case, I have used three key concepts: CBO; CD; and community. On the concept of CBO, I have defined it as an organization that works in a community to perform a service. This does not mean that a CBO must originate or reside in a community: provided it works in a community it can be defined as a CBO. There is a perfectly legitimate distinction between traditional CBOs (which originate and reside in communities) and modern CBOs (which do not originate or reside in communities), yet both are CBOs. I am aware of the criticism that a CBO that does not originate or reside in a community is in fact an NGO not a CBO. However, my view is that the difference between an 'externally generated' CBO (an MCBO) and an NGO, is that the MCBO does not owe its allegiance to an outside agency, whereas an NGO does. On the concept of CD, I have defined it as an induced (external) or self- help (internal) idea of progress in a community that embraces different conceptualizations, such as environmental, infrastructural, human, economic and psychological capital that benefit community members and do not exclude any member or group in the community. On the concept of community, I have defined it as a settled group of people living together in a fixed geographical area which is small enough for them to interact on a regular basis. However, there are many different conceptualisations of the meaning of such a concept, the two most important of which are gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft means a community in which people are highly integrated, ideologically and psychologically, forming an organic or holistic unity, like a happy family. Gesellschaft means a mechanical unity in which people are bound together by economic rather than emotional ties - by instrumental and contractual links like a business company.

1.6 Methodology

A desk review was undertaken to conduct a comprehensive, critical appraisal of the literature and secondary sources including documentary archives to identify key themes. The fieldwork survey methods for obtaining empirical data for this project focussed on collecting in-depth and primarily qualitative evidence, consisting of face-to-face, semi-structured interviews and survey questionnaires. Fieldwork was carried out in three phases across a total of eight oil-endowed and non oil endowed Ogoni communities – Ebubu, K-Dere, Ogali, Korokoro, Nonwa, Sii, Lewe and Kanni-Babbe. Phase one was carried out between December 2013 and Febuary, 2014, during which 101 telephone interviews (TIs) were conducted to ascertain the

nature and extent of CBOs in Ogoniland. Participants in this phase were mostly founders of their own MCBOs. Phase two was carried out between February and May 2014, during which 200 survey questionnaires (SQAs) were administered (with 189 returned); 69 semi-structured key informant interviews (KIs) were conducted, and 3 focus group discussions (FGDs) were arranged. In this phase, most survey questionnaire respondents (SQAs) were current and past leaders of TCBOs and HCBOs, while KI and FGD participants were mainly community members who are the 'supposed' beneficiaries of MCBOs, HCBOs and TCBOs. SQAs provided information about how their HCBOs and TCBOs promote CD, KIs, FGDs and some SQAs (especially past leaders of HCBOs and TCBOs) evaluated the claims made by the current leaders of MCBO, HCBO and TCBO. The third phase of fieldwork was carried out between March and April 2015, to ascertain members' views of their communities. This was a follow-up to previously collected qualitative data on the nature of communities. Two hundred structured survey questionnaires (SQBs) were administered in four out of the eight case studies: 100% of these questionnaires were returned. The data obtained from these different methods were analysed thematically, with a view to understanding four key issues:

(1) The number and types of CBOs in Ogoniland. A typology of CBOs was constructed out of the 175 CBOs that participated in this study;
(2) The perceptions of CBOs held by respondents;
(3) The perceptions of CD held by respondents, and;
(4) The perceptions of community held by respondents.

Findings on these issues enabled me to determine whether respondents believe that CBOs contribute to CD, and whether there is a relationship between the nature of communities and the nature of their CBOs.

The main contributions made to the literature by the thesis are the following:

(a) To have produced a typology of CBOs in Ogoniland, showing that there is a vast number of them, with very different structures and functions. This typology adds to the debate that the concept of CBO is porous and unfenced, and it questions the criteria for judging what actually makes a CBO and how it differs from an NGO.

(b) To have proven that the distinction between TCBOs, HCBOs and MCBOs is not as significant as it may appear.

(c) To have presented evidence that questions the common assumption that CBOs in general, and traditional CBOs in particular, are necessarily agents of CD in Ogoni communities.

(d) To have found that the long-standing belief that CBOs, especially TCBOs, are an embodiment of communality on which Africans depend because of their "most robust

forms of accountability and public goods provision" (Kesall, 2008, p. 12) was not supported by the evidence in Ogoniland.

(e) To have demonstrated that in Ogoni Communities, most CBOs, even TCBOs, tend to be manipulated by governments and the oil companies.

(f) To have discovered that the relationship between Ogonis and their CBOs is mostly parasitic, in that leaders of CBOs seem to benefit at the expense of the people they claim to serve.

(g) To have demonstrated that the effectiveness of CBOs as bottom-up solutions of CD is believed more by founders/leaders of MCBOs, HCBOs and TCBOs than by their supposed beneficiaries.

The wider implications of these findings are fourfold:

(a) The thesis questions the legitimacy of categorising CBOs as bottom-up agents of CD when they are not immune from state, market and local elite pressures (all of which are top-down) which can potentially determine their performance in attaining CD goals.

(b) The thesis shows that TCBOs often do not work along the grain of their members, and that as a consequence, community members are likely to develop coping strategies in order to survive. But these coping strategies could pose problems for CD, in that community members may adapt passively to the poor condition of their communities, and thereby do not address the source of their problems.

(c) The thesis indicates that community members may tolerate or endure their community because they are umbilically tied to it as their home: their attachment is not based on a sense of communality but a sense of place. This has important implications for our understanding of attachment to Ogoni communities

(d) The thesis suggests that the nature of Ogoni communities may influence the performance of their CBOs. The wider implication of this suggestion is that CBOs may be more a reflection of their communities than a determinant of their CD.

1.7 Chapter outlines

Chapter two has three parts. The first part reviews in more detail the literature on CBOs, CD, and communities. The second part explains in more detail the theoretical framework and methodology of this thesis. The third part provides a contextual background to the case study of Ogoni communities. Chapter three is the first of three data chapters, and presents an analysis of top-down approaches to CD in Ogoniland. First, this chapter looks at the various government initiatives for environmental protection, including laws, regulations, and institutions. Second, the chapter examines the CD initiatives taken by the private sector,

particularly Shell. Third, the chapter assesses the joint efforts at CD made by the state and the market – i.e. the partnership attempts made by the Nigerian federal government and Shell. The chapter agrees with Ake cited in the Niger Delta Voices (2009, p. 1) that "development efforts did not so much fail-they were never made". Chapter four presents empirical data on CBOs as bottom-up alternatives for top-down initiatives. The chapter begins with constructing a typology of CBOs in Ogoniland, dividing CBOs into TCBOs, HCBOs and MCBOs. It separates TCBOs into first and second tiers and further subdivides first-tier TCBOs into four categories, and second-tier TCBOs into three categories. Similarly, MCBOs were subdivided into four categories, and HCBOs were divided into seven categories. Next, the chapter explores the perceptions of Ogonis about their CBOs and their contribution to CD. The chapter concludes that like top-down agents of CD (state and market) discussed in chapter three, most CBOs in the eight Ogoni communities are not genuinely interested in promoting CD.

Chapter five is divided into two parts. The first part presents empirical data on the nature of Ogoni communities as perceived by KI respondents. This part concludes that contrary to the claims put forward by communitarians (community chiefs and elites and many communitarian thinkers) neither Ogoni oil endowed nor non oil- endowed communities exist as harmonious wholes, see (Sesanti, 2015 and Nyaluke, 2014). Part two of this chapter presents the results of the survey questionnaire on respondents' sense of community administered in oil- endowed and non oil- endowed communities. At a glance, the positive results of this questionnaire seemed contradictory to the negative results of the findings in both part one of this chapter and in chapter four. Chapter six presents a critical analysis of the three data chapters (three, four and five), and assesses the significance of their findings. In particular, the chapter suggests possible reasons for the apparent contrast between the positive and negative perceptions of community in chapters four and five respectively. The chapter also discusses whether Ogoni CBOs constitute a third category of governance or whether they are state and/or market surrogates. In addition, the chapter discusses the future prospects of CD in Ogoni communities, in particular looking at whether Ogoni CBOs would be able to promote CD if they manage to become independent of the state and market. Chapter seven is the concluding chapter of this thesis, and it has four parts. First, it provides a summary of the main findings of the research. Second, it explores the wider implications of these findings. Third, it makes some policy and practical recommendations about ways in which CD can be promoted in Ogoni communities. Finally, it offers reflections on my experience of undertaking this study, and writing this thesis.

Chapter 2: Literature Review, Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Case Study Context

"The research process is not a clear-cut sequence of procedures following a neat pattern but a messy interaction between the conceptual and empirical world, deduction and induction occurring at the same time" (Bechhofer, 1974, p. 73)

2.1 Introduction

Section 2.2 of this chapter reviews the literature on CBOs, CD and community. Section 2.3 describes the philosophical and theoretical framework that underpins this thesis. Section 2.4 explains the case study research strategy. Sections 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 discuss the methods of data collection, analysis and triangulation, respectively. Section 2.8 outlines the current condition of the Niger Delta region (NDR) from which the case studies used for this study were selected. Section 2.9 concludes the chapter.

2.2 Literature review on CBOs, CD, and communities

This literature review has three main parts: section 2.2.1 is about CBOs; section 2.2.2 is about CD; and section 2.2.3 is about community. However, these three parts are not hermetically sealed: much of their content is about the relationships between them. Moreover, some other concepts are also discussed alongside these notions – most notably, the concept of NGOs, which is often confused with CBOs.

2.2.1 *Community-Based Organizations (CBOs)*

There is a huge literature on CBOs, so this section must necessarily be selective. I concentrate on the distinction between 'traditional' CBOs and 'modern' CBOs, which runs through much of the literature. But first, I note that during the last 30 years, CBOs have been much praised for their institutional role in smoothing the path of CD. For example, Dill (2010, p. 1) stated that the "institutional turn in contemporary development theory emphasized the importance of facilitating the emergence of institutions that will improve citizens' abilities to make choices" in their communities. According to Sen (1999), the ability of community members to make choices is essential for sustainable development. Therefore, following the poor results of decades of top-down approaches and agents (market, state) of CD, writers say it is refreshing to turn to a new approach which promises to deliver CD, and this is the promise of CBOs. This shift is based on the assumption that CBOs, unlike top-down agents of CD (market and state), are bottom-up and therefore provide wider platforms for grassroots participation in CD (Abegunde, 2009). CBOs are said by commentators to deliver genuine CD because they are community-based (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). This assertion was made by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (2009, p.16) when it noted that CBOs "organize

community action. They represent the building blocks of rural communities' social capital and they help develop the community members' potential for social and economic development". In other words, CBOs are claimed to be structured to deliver community-driven development (CDD). Narayan *et al* (2000) commends CBOs as the "21st century" agents of bottom-up CD because they entail community members initiating and driving their own development. Yachkaschi (2008) claimed that the advantage of CBOs in delivering CDD lay in their grassroots origin which enabled them to sustain the spirit of communality among their members. Besides their communal nature, their small size and informal structure are held to be important features that have facilitated interaction and mutual support among their members (Opare, 2007).

This brings us to the distinction made by many writers between traditional and modern CBOs. Zablon (2012, p.2) argues that because Africans are communal by nature, CBOs are not new in their communities. Quoting Mbiti's assertion that "I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am", Zablon concluded that through traditional CBOs (TCBOs) Africans depend on each other to achieve their CD. Like Zablon, Kendie and Guri (nd) claim that traditional CBOs maintain strong ties between members which motivate them to help one another. In other words, TCBOs are pictured as unique repositories of social capital. According to (Dawari and Shola 2010:144), they are seen as:

> "Solidarity-oriented agencies, which encourage self-help that is expected to put common interest and ideals above individual interest. As self-help groups they are based on reciprocity and explicitly work for the benefit of their members".

The repository of bonding social capital within TCBOs explains, say their advocates, why members are still able to help their members despite their poor financial base (Kendie and Guri nd; Opare 2007). According to Green (2010), membership of TCBOs is natural to the people, since everyone becomes a member at birth, just as a new baby at birth naturally takes up the clan membership of his/her father. Many writers assert that TCBOs run through many generations, making them the oldest and most important type of CBOs. For example, Yatta (2007) reports that TCBOs in Sierra Leone can be traced back to pre-colonial times, and Emeh *et al.* (2012) noted that TCBOs have been in the business of community governance and bottom-up community development in Nigeria since pre-colonial times.

Much of the literature on TCBOs is highly favourable to them. Testimonies to the enduring virtues of TCBOs are anchored in four characteristics: (1) (Kendie and Guri nd, p. 1) claimed that TCBOs bring material benefits: "the majority of people (rural areas) are organized"

around various TCBOs for the sustenance of their wellbeing (see also Olowu and Erero 1995). (2) TCBOs preach the principles of equality and participation (Dawari and Shola, 2010). (3) TCBOs have the advantage of being in situ, symbolizing community identity because they remain when other types of CBOs or organizations fade away (Green, 2010). (4) TCBOs exemplify quality leadership because they are based on the sacredness of tradition and culture, and are custodians of indigenous knowledge for endogenous development (Dinbaba, 2014; Ekeh 2000; Kendie and Guri (nd). Zablon (2012, p.11), cited Mulwa and Mala, who described the TCBO as a manifestation of the common good: "an organizational entity made up of people whose membership is defined by a specific common bond and who voluntarily come together to work for a common good". Indeed, expressing the views of the Community Development Resource Association (CDRA), Magadla (2008, p.1) sees TCBOs as the epitome of nobility and democracy: "they are formed by people as a way of responding to the needs and challenges facing their communities. CBO carries the nobility of the collective, the concept of humane society, the profound attempt to create a real community from fragmented parts; that it manifests as a flagship of democracy".

By contrast to this adulation of TCBOs, the literature contains less favourable verdicts on modern CBOs (MCBOs), which have their roots mostly outside communities and are more akin to NGOs in focusing on specific objectives rather than the general well-being of communities. For example, the study of CBOs in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe by Kakietek *et al* (2013) concluded that CBOs, are not always indigenous to their host community and communal, but sectional and external or 'modern'. Like Kakietek *et al* (2013), Dill, from his study of urban CBOs in Dar es Salaam, found that CBOs could be partial, because their mode of operation and functions "are not consonant with the norms that have long governed popular participation in either the development process or associational life" (Dill, 2010, p. 23). Dill was critical of these modern CBOs (MCBOs), which he saw as a misfit for their host communities in that they were exclusionary and achieved very little or nothing by way of community development (CD). Moreover, these urban non-traditional MCBOs were subject to the will of the state, working in accordance with the dictates of the state (Dill, 2010).

Abegunde (2009, p.241) described the cooperative CBOs that he studied in Oshogbo, south south Nigeria, as MCBOs and therefore selective of membership because as "membership increases in these CBOs, the amount of money for capital base increases", an indication that that membership may not be open to the poor and cashless community members. Adebayo (2012, p.46) suggested that CBOs are not always indigenous and collectivist in structure.

Findings from Adebayo's study of CBOs in riverine communities across the Ilaje local government area of Ondo state in Nigeria revealed that most community members patronised market-structured MCBOs mainly for self-centred economic reasons: "the highest percentage of the benefactors (53.2%) belonged to Cooperative Societies in order to obtain different forms of financial assistance which could help boost personal small-scale business and to meet family need, many residents of Ilaje rely on Cooperatives Societies".

Many other writers allude to the distinction between TCBOs and MCBOs based on the fact that MCBOs are external and sectional while TCBOs are indigenous and communal (Ajayi and Otuya, 2005). Molyeux et al (2007) cited Lyon who held that CBOs are organizations whose members are linked together in either strong relationships such as ethnic groups (TCBOs) or weak relationships (MCBOs) (see also Adebayo, 2012 and Onyeozu, 2010). In the CBOs discovered in Kilifi communities, Molyneux et al (2007) noted that 'local- level 'CBOs [TCBOs] even though not entirely communal, were more collectivist in structure than 'strategic and intermediate-level' CBOs [MCBOs]. Consequently they (MCBOs) are unable to impact on the local communities that they were established to serve: indeed the strategic-level CBOs were donor-controlled organizations (Molyneux et al, 2007), more focused on donor programmes and approaches of CD than on community-felt needs.

Interestingly for my research purposes, a few writers have argued against the prevailing view that TCBOs are communal and MCBOs are sectional, and have claimed that both TCBOs and MCBOs are sectional. For instance, Abegunde (2009) cited Oludimu, whose study of CBOs in Rivers state, Nigeria revealed that TCBOs may not be communal, because most community members do not invest their time and efforts in them. Similarly a study of health CBOs in Kilifi district in Kenya showed that TCBOs are not always communal but like MCBOs could be exclusive in that their members do not trust one another and they were mostly self-serving, as TCBO leaders benefitted more than their followers: "leaders were coming for credit from this money without the other members being informed; especially the chairman was the one who usually borrowed this money for his own use" (Molyeux et al, 2007, p.11). Kendie and Guri (nd, p.345) found that the leaders of 'asafo', a TCBO in Ghana, were not transparent because they "started conniving with the illegal forest operators for their personal benefit".

At this point, it is useful to point out that in the literature, MCBOs are sometimes difficult to differentiate from NGOs. The concept of NGOs is highly contested. (Gray et al, 2005). This is because they:

"come in all shapes and sizes, and the agendas and actions of some are diametrically opposed to those adopted by others. Some proselytise as a condition of receiving project benefits; some focus on a theme or geographical area; some are specialist operational agencies, while others provide only funds and other support; some concentrate on high-profile international advocacy, others work quietly and unobtrusively at the grassroots" (Eade, 2000, p.12).

During the 1980s, NGOs were fashionably termed elements of 'civil society' (James, 2000), and they often positioned themselves as channels through which civil society is strengthened because "they claim the divine right to represent or speak on behalf of civil society at large" (Eade, 2000, p.12). Political scientists describe them as 'pressure or lobby groups' while economists refer to them as the 'third sector', different from the state and the market (James, 2000, p.1; see also Aksel and Baran, 2006). NGOs can be classified into either local or international organizations, though in most developing countries like India and Sub-Saharan Africa, local NGOs work across local communities (Kamar, 2012; Platteau and Abraham, 2002). NGOs can also be classified according to whether their functions are environmental, health or advocacy-related, and also as organizations formed to pursue the public interest (Shah, 2005) or as private businesses (Kamar, 2012). According to some writers, the definition of NGOs is so loose that it can embrace CBOs. Indeed, for Molyeux *et al*, 2007; Magadla, 2008 and Uphoff, (1986), the term NGO is synonymous with the term CBO, since both work with, or for, local people in local communities. Some CBOs rely on NGOs (Cornish *et al*, 2012): Magadla (2008), notes that some business-oriented NGOs with their paid staff act as contractors who seek funding for projects in local communities and sub-contract these projects to CBOs.

NGOs are generally seen in a positive light as organizations that pursue programmes which relieve local people of the sufferings inflicted upon them by the state (Shah, 2005). For example, Makoba (2002, p.1) argues that because of the prevalence of fragile states and declining markets in developing countries, NGOs are not top-down, but bottom-up agents of CD because they encourage participatory CD, and they "are emerging as a critical third or middle sector fostering the development of marginalized segments of the population". James (2000) quoted two former Secretary Generals of the United Nations who both eulogized the contributions of NGOs: Boutros Ghali, Kofi Annan's predecessor, was quoted to have said that NGOs "are indispensable part of the legitimacy" of the United Nations, and Annan reported that NGOs are "the conscience of humanity" (James, 2000, p.2).

However, researchers are beginning to question how NGOs, as mostly private, undemocratic organizations, reconcile the demands of their organizations and the needs of the people they

purport to serve (Kamar, 2012). Shah (2005) notes that NGOs are finding it increasingly difficult to balance both needs; first some NGOs not only lack sufficient funds, but also sufficient power, to bring about change in local communities. Second, most NGOs are becoming financially dependent on the state and market which not only influence, but also weaken, their approach to CD. As gessellschaft organizations, NGOs may for their own self-interest work to advance state and market interests at the expense of the marginalized groups which they claim to serve. Eade (2000) argues that even though NGOs can provide social amenities and offer assistance to the poor in local communities, they are careful to work alongside the state and the market. James (2000) notes that the state and their officials are highly dependent on NGOs, which they perceive as innovative. According to Kumar (2012, p.2), even though there are good NGOs, some gesellschaft organizations were established for self-interested reasons. For example, Kumar claims that many NGOs are self-serving organizations in communities like Bihar, Jharkhand and the state of Uttar Pradesh in India:

> "many people, friends, and students showed interest and contacted me to take my advice about opening a Non-Government Organisation (NGO). Most of these people were doing well in their life but their hearts were crying to help people and bring change in the society. They were moved by the poverty, illiteracy, etc, (as expressed by them) and determined to open an NGO to serve the people. In reality, these people's hearts were crying to bring changes in their own lives. They wanted to properly utilize their connections"

Kamar (2012) argues that NGO business is highly lucrative not only because their owners make a good living out of them, but also because they are often passed on as family business, transferred through generations. In other words, the NGO businesses help their founders achieve "sustainable self-development" because the motivation for establishing NGOs is mostly for their founders to get rich through the business of helping the poor (Lofredo, 1995, p.345). Platteau and Abraham (2002, p. 129) hold that even when business-profit-oriented NGOs manage to provide aid for local communities, because of the unequal structure of these communities, local elites who serve as 'development brokers' hijack programmes and aid/resources sent into their communities. Other writers claim that most NGOs' programmes "are predetermined and are detached from the cultures of the communities in which they are implemented (Mpofu, 2012, p.1; see also Benneth and Dearden, 2014).

Crowther (2001) says that the lines between CBOs and NGOs have always been blurred, because both types of organizations are (ostensibly) non-profit making civil organizations. Also, NGOs work 'with' and through CBOs in local communities (IFAD, 2009; Molyeux *et al*, 2007). Defilippis (2001) and Blaikie (2006) link the blurring of the lines between them to the policy shift by development institutions towards CBOs, noting that more formal

organizations like NGOs are increasingly adopting the acronym 'CBO' in order to access funds. An authoritative attempt has, however, been made to maintain a distinction between MCBOs and NGOs. Magadla (2008) cites the Masikhulisane CBO-donor dialogue report and the Community Development Resource Association (CDRA) report which made the following points outlined in Table 1 differentiating between CBOs and NGOs:

Table 1: Differences between NGOs and CBOs

1. The Masikhulisane report, notes that CBOs are led and driven by community members, while NGOs are externally driven.
2. CDRA, stated that as community led and governed organizations, CBOs respond to their community needs and unlike NGOs, they are more accountable to their communities
3. Therefore as pointed out in the Masikhulisane report, CBOs are mostly volunteer-driven, NGOs pay their staff
4. In addition, according to the Masikhulisane report, CBOs are mainly informal and communal in structure, NGOs are more formal sometimes they have board members and as a result more visible with access to information and resources
5. CRDA in their report notes that CBOs are more resilient organizations and unlike NGOs withstand hard times

Magadla (2008, p.2), summed up the distinction between NGOs and CBOs by noting that since CBOs are established, managed and mostly funded by community members, unlike NGOs, their contribution to CD is people-driven through 'sweat equity' (see also Opare, 2007). It seems that, although there are some common features shared by MCBOs and NGOs, the prime distinction between them is that MCBOs, unlike NGOs, aspire to be more people-driven than project-driven see (Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 2016).

2.2.2 Community Development (CD)

The meaning of CD has always been contested, and over the years, institutions and organizations have planned and implemented CD programmes based on their own interpretations (Bhattacharyya, 2004). CD is "as varied in definition as those who profess to practice it" (Denise and Harris, 1989, p.7). "What is not an approach to community development, then? Since every socially approved occupation exists because it is thought to contribute to community development" (Bhattacharyya, 2004, p.9). This ambiguity of CD has been attributed by some writers to the 'value-laden' nature of development, in that people hold different values about what constitutes development (Denise and Harris, 1989). Some

commentators follow donor organisations in interpreting CD to mean mostly physical and tangible outputs, which also represent the most visible evidence of their work (Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Bhattacharyya, 2004). Other writers follow the meanings of CD given by communities themselves. For example Narayan *et al* (2000), discovered from their study that CD could mean different things to community members, and they noted that the very poor mostly prioritize inclusiveness, i.e. CD as solidarity (Page, 1999, Cavaye, 2001, and Campbell and Jovchelovitch, 2007) and CD as economic development, whereas more privileged community members like the elites/leaders, prioritize CD as infrastructural capital (Platteau and Abraham, 2002). One pitfall of the latter approach to CD is the "lack of ownership of the projects by the beneficiary groups" (Platteau and Abraham, 2002, p.27). Kanyinke (2010, p.7) claimed that his study of CD projects across African communities and in particular in East Africa, showed that the prioritization of CD as infrastructural capital increased tension in local communities, dividing local people into 'anti-modernization' and 'pro-modernization' groups, which led to costly but needless projects like:

> "hydro power plants without enough water to run the turbines, plant species that ended up destroying biodiversity and livestock, bridges with no roads or roads without bridges, health centres without medicines, nurses or doctors, hundreds of half-complete classrooms full of pupils but no teachers or books but worse of all, forced enrolment in schools without adequate measures to sustain the education until a meaningful level where one can earn an income"

Osuoka (2007) argued that there are 'needless projects' which local people did not want in Ogoni communities and several other ND communities in Nigeria. Bhattacharyya (2004, p.14) traced the supply of these needless projects to the lack of consideration of CD as solidarity/ collectivism and the consequent opening to authoritarianism, which is "the erosion of solidarity and agency" (see also Popple and Quinney, 2002).

Other writers have asserted that interpretations of CD couched in purely economic terms also failed. For instance, a study of CD as economic capital through community-based resource management projects (CBNRM) in Malawi and Botswana, showed that the prioritization of CD as economic capital over solidarity was unsuccessful, because they failed to provide jobs, reduce poverty and improve the economic status of community members (Blaikie 2006). Similarly, Biswapriya (nd) claimed that for over two decades, the interpretation of CD as economic capital and job creation has led to the development of several poverty alleviation institutions/programmes across several Asian, African and Latin American communities that have not improved the financial status of local people. Like Bhattacharyya, Shaw (2011) also attributed these failures to the inadequate consideration of CD as solidarity.

According to other writers, the influence of the state and market on the meaning and practice of CD has had a damaging effect on funding (state and market) programmes. Dill (2010) reported from his study of CBOs in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania that the meaning of CD has been politicized and now encompasses anything that arises from the disposition of the state. Bhattacharyya (2004) laments the confusion over the meaning of CD which now seems to cover everything. He tries to clarify its meaning by distinguishing between the methods, purpose and techniques of CD. The methods relate to the actions taken to achieve its purpose, while the techniques are the tools through which the purpose was achieved. Accordingly, definitions of CD as infrastructure, locality development and social planning are not about its meaning, but about its techniques. Similarly, CD defined as human empowerment or capacity development is only about the techniques and not the purpose of CD: indeed, "empowerment capacity building, and similar 'buzz words' are not ends in themselves but means for the higher end of agency" (Bhattacharyya, 2004, p. 13). These are helpful clarifications of the concept of CD, though they leave open the question of what is the purpose of CD. Perhaps this purpose is the common good, as Jane Addams appears to say: the "good we secure for ourselves is precarious and uncertain until it is secured for all of us and incorporated into our common life" (in James and Scott, 2000, p.107).

Cavaye (2001, p.110) also contributes to the clarification of the concept of CD by arguing that it entails more than just the passive receipt of infrastructure, but also the active engagement by local people in their own development:

> "social and economic changes are transforming rural and regional communities. How communities deal with these changes depends not only on the "delivery" of services, the maintenance of infrastructure and economic development, it also relies on local people using assets in new ways, working cooperatively, improving networks, mobilizing existing skills, and putting innovative ideas into action. The outcomes are not only jobs, income and infrastructure but also strong functioning communities, better able to manage change. To what extent then, are communities fostering innovation, maintaining enthusiasm, supporting "drivers" and helping turn passion into action?"

This point is taken up by Denise and Harris (1989, p. 7) who claim that CD is "an umbrella concept embracing the principles that human collectivities can, through mutual consent and appropriate action, improve their living conditions and ways of life". IFAD (2009) described this sort of 'collectivities CD' as 'community-driven development' (CDD). This is because community members through their CBOs work with facilitators not as mere beneficiaries of CD, but as active partners since they (community members) are practically involved at every stage of their development process (IFAD, 2009). In other words, CD is genuinely

participatory and does not mean helpless dependence on facilitators/charity: instead it means that community-felt needs are adequately recognised and the principles of self-help are maintained (Bhattacharyya, 2004). On this interpretation, CD is an integral element of the 'democratic project':

> "a positive response to the historic process of erosion of solidarity and agency. Its premise is that people have an inalienable right to agency and that solidarity is a necessity for satisfying life. Community development is a part of the democracy project" (Bhattacharyya, 2004, p.14).

Page (1999, p.1) also claims that CD is a democratic participatory process: "fosters power in people for use in their own lives, their communities".

However, there are critics of the interpretation of CD as a democracy/participatory process. Heeks (1999, p.1) claims that participatory definitions of CD have "reached the status of a new orthodoxy" - a point where its consideration overrides almost every other condition for development. Cooke and Kothari (2001), Mansuri and Rao (2004) and Fung (2006), questioned how the level of participation can be measured in CD. Heeks (1999, p.2) cited Musch (1998) who described participation as a 'container concept', i.e., very broad and accommodating. According to Fung (2006, p. 1), "the multifaceted challenges of contemporary governance demand a complex account of the ways in which those who are subject to laws and policies should participate in making them". In other words, we cannot take for granted that participation in decision making is always beneficial. Some commentators describe the record of participation in development and organizational studies as ambiguous, while Cooke and Kothari (2001, p.2) characterize participation as "the new tyranny". Its value depends on who participates; how participants take decisions and communicate with each other; and what policy and public actions result from participants' discussions.

Some writers point out that participatory democracy is not a guarantee of socio-economic equality or social justice (Platteau and Abraham, 2002, Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016). Mansuri and Rao (2004) claimed that development institutions like the World Bank continue to fund so-called CDD projects, which are theoretically constructed as participatory, yet rarely reflect the views of the marginalized groups and therefore do not represent their interests (Shaw, 2011). Projects borne out of this method of CD have continued to enjoy accolades from their facilitators, community chiefs and elites who are mostly their beneficiaries (Blaikie, 2006 and Platteau and Abraham, 2002) despite their deficit in social justice.

Some writers have attempted to address this problem of inequality by defining CD as social justice, which entails working to achieve peace and equality in local communities (Gormally, 2013). Loue (2006) notes that within this CD framework, issues around structural imperfections in local communities are dealt with through community organizing and advocacy. But other writers have argued that there is a limit to which CD as social justice can go without undermining capitalism, since the "continued existence of deprived areas was essential for the continuation of capitalism" (Popple and Quinney, 2002, p.6). According to Shaw (2011, p. 139), this is a major cause of tension in the practice of CD: CD "may have become stuck in the middle of a number of competing claims and interests, uncertain as to its purpose, yet operating in a policy environment in which it is here, there and everywhere".

2.2.3 *Community*

Attempts to conceptualise the meaning of 'community' are well documented in the literature (Stancey, 1969; Fitzsimmon and Lavey, 1977, Smith, 2001), yet arrival at an agreed definition has remained elusive. A community may be loosely interpreted as a group of people within a locality (Stancey, 1969), but this definition is inadequate because it describes any type of group (in places of work, church, neighbourhood, school) as a community, without any substantive understanding of the nature of relationship between the group members (Bhattacharyya, 2004). To reduce this ambiguity, Tonnies makes a distinction between 'relational' and 'associational' communities (Wagner, 2005). Relational communities are described by Tonnies as gemeinschaft, because they are characterized by close, face-face relationships between their members; traditional norms are the basis of social control and regulation; and members are loyal to their community as they possess an 'natural will' which informs their subconscious mind to voluntarily serve the group interest (Tonnies, 2002). Both Tonnies and Durkheim recognised that relational communities are not static but subject to change (Thyssen, 2012), and according to Tonnies, gemeinschaft will change into gesellschaft (see Wagner, 2005; Tonnies, 2002; Thyssen, 2012 and Sandstedt and Westin, 2015). Gesellschaft communities are characterised by Tonnies typically in cosmopolitan settings with bureaucracies and industries, guided and managed by individual-self-interest and neo-liberal economic policies (Tonnies, 2002). Here, community members do not possess 'essential will', but 'rational will', and their subconscious minds are mostly tuned to work towards their own self-interest and not the communal interest, and as a result, communal bonds are weakened (Tonnies, 2002).

2.2.3.1 *The gemeinschaft in TCBOs and their CD outcomes*

Recently, scholars have viewed the performance of organizations like CBOs in their approach to CD through the lens of constructions of community (Sue, 2002; Popple and Quinney, 2002; Bhattacharyya, 2004; Blaikie, 2006; IFAD, 2009; Shaw, 2011). IFAD (2009, p.10) stated that this link between CD and constructions of community is important because it reveals the "social reality of operational significance". Development institutions/donors are better prepared to deliver genuine CD because of their foreknowledge of the 'social reality' of the communities that they work in. And the 'social reality' of these communities is often viewed through the lens of the gemeinschaft conception of communities. For example, Eziju (nd) has argued that communal spirit and the virtue of being one's brother's keeper are highly prized assets of African communities which experiences of modern day life cannot replace. This is why African communities are still guided by traditional norms which have remained in force despite modern pressures, since:

> "in traditional African society the sacred and the secular are inseparable. There is no compartmentalization of life. All the various aspects of humans' life are interwoven. What religion forbids or condemns the society also forbids and condemns, and similarly society approves those things which religion approves or and sanctions". (Nwafor 2013, p 127).

Accordingly, TCBOs are often perceived through this interpretation of traditional communities as promoting harmonious and settled polities. Woolcook and Narayan (1999, p. 6) note that the perception of TCBOs as perfect instruments of community development is modelled on the "communitarian perception…that communities are homogenous entities that automatically include and benefit all members".

However, for other writers, this comfortable assumption is an illusion. Oyowe (2015) argues that the description of African communities and their TCBOs as communal is wishful thinking - an assumption that "what is authentically Africa must in some way be communitarian" (Oyowe, 2015, p.514). Platteau and Gaspart (2003) claim that traditional communities are structurally unequal, restrictive, and consequently that CD programs suffer from elite-capture. Similarly, Okeke- Ogbuafor *et al* (2016) concluded from their study of Ogoni communities that community chiefs/ elites subject their followers to a condition of unfreedom, i.e. an inability to make choices (see also Okome, 2002; Calderisi, 2007 and Pham, 2008).

Of course, African communitarians have refuted these claims. For example, Obioha (2014) asserts that the communal nature of African communities and their institutions do:

"not render the individual irresponsible. Radical communitarianism may dominate the individual, but it does not kill responsibility. In fact the community in communal personhood provides the individual the opportunity, the environment and the resources necessary for pursuing his or her life plans, set goals and objectives" (Obioha, 2014, p.256).

Such communitarians argue that the causes of the present underdeveloped condition of their communities are not from within, but imported from without (see Shaw, 2012).

2.2.3.2 *The gesellschaft in MCBOs and their CD outcomes*

By contrast to the communitarian perception of community, TCBOs and CD, Popple and Quinney (2002) report that CD also takes place in non-communal i.e. contractual or associational communities, described as gesellschaft by Tonnies. Since structural inequality, marginalization, powerlessness and class struggle are inherent in associational communities, CD workers in these communities mostly target the marginalized (Popple and Quinney, 2002). NGOs also work in local communities to ensure that the marginalized are not only empowered materially, but are made to realize their potential and take charge of their lives and communities (Biswapriya, nd and Kajimbwa, 2006).

2.2.4 *Conclusion*

This literature review has raised five important issues that will be discussed in this thesis. First, following the construction of community as either communal or associational, TCBOs and MCBOs, respectively, reflect this categorisation. Second, there may be little difference between the TCBOs' 'communal' contribution to CD and that of MCBOs' associational organizations. Third, there is hardly any difference between MCBOs' supposed bottom-up approaches to CD and NGOs' approaches. Fourth, the nature of TCBOs and MCBOs and their CD contributions can be traced to the nature of the communities they serve. Fifth, the three concepts of CBOs, CD and community are inextricably interlinked, and consequently an interpretation of each informs our understanding and construction of the others.

2. 3 Philosophical and theoretical framework

Moss (2005), in his classic work, *Cultivating Development,* demonstrated that the concept of development was socially produced by actors/agencies in the development industry. My study, which seeks to test the long-standing claim that CBOs are bottom-up community development solutions, has adopted a social constructionist position to understand the various perceptions of CBOs and their approach to, and output of, CD that are held by Ogonis.

2.3.1 *Social Constructionism*

There is a contrast between the perception of knowledge of reality held by advocates of realism and advocates of social constructionism (Scotland, 2012; Crotty, 1998). Realists hold

the view that reality can be measured and determined objectively, because reality is detached from human beings and therefore its meaning exists outside social actors. By contrast, social constructionists argue that our understanding of reality is subjective (a social phenomenon) and its meaning is constantly being constructed by social actors: "our realities are mediated by our senses and without consciousness the world is meaningless" (Scotland, 2012, p.11). This is because objects "may be pregnant with potential meaning, but actual meaning emerges only when consciousness engages with them" (Crotty, 1998, p.43). As a result, knowledge about reality depends on human practices or interaction, and also on how these practices are perceived within their social context (Crotty, 1998). Social constructionists argue that subjectivity is an inevitable part of all human knowledge: "true objectivity is absent in the human sciences because all methods require one set of subjective humans to rate another set of subjective humans. So, the tool for knowing is inevitably subjective people themselves" (Owen, 1995, p.2). Although the theory of social constructionism is controversial (Cornish *et al*, 2010) because of its many interpretations (Ogwu, 2012), it is popularly used in the search for knowledge about reality (Crotty, 1998).

However, there is a distinction between extreme and moderate versions of social constructionism. The extreme version asserts that there is no objective reality 'out there' but only subjective reality 'in here'- i.e. within people's minds. On this view, nothing exists outside some human conception of it. This extreme version also holds to absolute relativism: i.e. that everyone's conception of reality is as 'good' as that of anyone else. By contrast, the moderate version of social constructionism is that while there may well be an objective reality out there, we cannot make sense of it except through our subjective mode of interpreting it. Moreover, the moderate version rejects absolute relativism, arguing that some peoples' perceptions of reality are more valid than others (see Hannigan, 1995; Young and Collins, 2004 and Andrew, 2012).

In the current study, I have adopted the moderate, rather than the extreme, version of social constructionism, since I do not deny that things exist independently of human perception of them, but I do believe that those things only become meaningful to us through the light we throw on them, and that this light will reflect our subjective judgements of them. Nor do I believe in absolute relativism, since I hold that some people's judgements are less valuable than those of others – though my criterion of assessment does not coincide with the criterion adopted by social elites.

2. 4 Case Study Research Strategy

Case study research defines an "aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself" (George and Bennett 2004, p.18). It is rich because within the historical episode, it collects in-depth data about complex social phenomenon and processes (Fisher and Ziviani, 2004), which are understood in their cultural context (Huang and Deng, 2008). Very different from acquiring general knowledge, "case study works on the basis of intimate knowledge. This sort of context-dependent knowledge and experience are at the very heart of expert activity" (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 222). In other words, case study research examines variables within a context in order to produce new empirical insights that contribute to the theoretical understanding of the research subject (Yin, 1994). My research sought an in-depth understanding of the subject of study in order to answer the research question of whether or not CBOs are bottom-up community development (CD) solutions in Ogoni communities. The in-depth knowledge sought was first about the various constructions of CBO and CD; and second about the complex network of relationships within CBOs. Case study research generally uses a multi-perspectival approach because, according to Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991) cited in Tellis (1997, p.1), the researcher benefits from heterogeneous voices and viewpoints. Such case study research presents "not just the voice and perspective of the actors, but also of the relevant group of actors and the interaction between them" (Tellis, 1997, p.1). The richness of data collected from case study research explains why it is so popular for investigating social science issues (Yin, 2013). This thesis, which evaluates CBOs as bottom-up agents of community development, has particularly benefitted from the case study approach.

Like Stake (1995), Yin (2004) affirmed that there are single case studies and multiple case studies. A single case study explains research into a particular case of interest, considered because of its unique qualities (Ogwu, 2012), while multiple cases explain research into a group of cases (Stake, 1995; Chong and Graham, 2013). Multiple cases may be "similar or dissimilar, with redundancy and variety each important. They are chosen because it is believed that understanding them will lead to better understanding, and perhaps better theorizing" (Stake, 2005, p. 446). In other words, multiple cases studies present opportunities for comprehensive and comparative studies (Chong and Graham, 2013). They also provide "numerous sources of evidence through replication" (Zainal, 2007, p.2). The multiple case study research strategy is employed in the current project, which used dissimilar cases (oil-endowed and non-oil endowed) and multiple sources of evidence (diverse range of participants and different methods of data collection), in order, first, to understand how Ogonis in oil-endowed and non oil endowed communities perceive the concepts of CBO and

CD; second, to identify the typologies of CBOs in both types of community; third, to know whether CBOs constitute a third category of governance outside the state and market; fourth, to understand the extent that Ogoni CBOs deliver CD; and fifth, to suggest ways that Ogoni CBOs can be made to promote sustainable CD.

The case study approach has been criticised for not being sufficiently rigorous to yield generalizable conclusions, and can only be justified as a 'starter' i.e. at the exploratory stage of an investigation (Yin, 2014). But this criticism has been rejected by defenders of the case study method such as Flyvbjerg, 2006; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2014; Crowe et al (2011) and Wedawatta et al, nd. For example, Flyvbjerg (2006, p.230), argues that generalizable conclusions are reached from case study research, especially when strategic cases are investigated, since "atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied". Second, in case study research, generalizable conclusions are reached from: "both an understanding-oriented and an action-oriented perspective, it is often more important to clarify the deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences than to describe the symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur" (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.78).

Indeed, former critics of the case study research strategy are increasingly embracing it. For example, Flyvbjerg (2006), notes that Hans Eysenck, once a critic, subsequently stated that: 'sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual cases-not in the hope of providing anything, but rather in the hope of learning something!' Kyburz-Graber (2004, p. 63), reports that case studies can be scientific, rigorous and rich, as long as "sound case-study procedures" are followed. Sound procedures starts from sound research design, which includes a strong justification for selection of cases, methods of data collection and analysis (Yin, 2014).

2.4.1 *Choice of Cases Selected*
Multiple case study research focuses on limited, manageable but crucial cases with less emphasis on obtaining representative statistical data and more focus on obtaining rich and in-depth knowledge, that could "uncover or refine a theory" (George and Bennett, 2004, p.31; see also Ogwu (2012). Following this guidance, out of the 160 communities that make up Ogoniland (UNEP, 2011), this thesis selected eight which it considered as crucial cases. These communities are spread across all Ogoni local government areas (LGA), and their names are the Ebubu, Ogali, K-Dere, Korokoro, Nonwa, Lewe, Sii 2, and Kaani-babbe communities.

Even though Shell stopped production in Ogoniland in 1993, the oil endowed communities of Ebubu, Ogali, K-Dere, Korokoro, and Nonwa still suffer from the environmental pollution inflicted as a result of past production and Shell's abandoned facilities (UNEP, 2011). Moreover, they still serve as transit routes for oil-pipe lines, hence continue to suffer pipeline leakages/oil leakages (Pegg and Zabbey, 2013). With regard to the three non oil endowed communities chosen for study - Lewe, Sii and Kanni-Babbe - since oil pollution knows no boundaries, they have suffered from secondary effects of direct pollution experienced elsewhere, a fact not fully recognized by either the Nigerian government or Shell, which have failed to compensate them sufficiently. Zandvliet and Pedro (2002) confirmed that non oil-endowed communities do not get as much financial compensation for CD as oil endowed communities (see also Arisuokwu, 2012; Mohammed, 2013). This thesis intends to find out whether this sort of compensation influences residents' perception of CBO and CD as well as the typology and structure of their CBOs.

Ebubu community, which is located in Eleme LGA, is known for one of the "most infamous oil spill locations in Ogoniland (UNEP, 2011). The history of this spill can be traced back 40 years, to the time of the Biafran war, and it continues to contaminate not only the creeks but also downstream (UNEP, 2011).

Ogali is in Eleme LGA and according to Abii and Nwosu (2009), has experienced a series of oil spills from leaking pipelines. These leakages, according to Ojimba and Iyagba (2012:10), have "detrimental and negative effects on the area of farmland cultivated, horticultural crops output produced and hence farm income".

K-Dere is in Gokana LGA and houses the famous 'Bomu manifold' (Weli and Kobah, 2014), and there are recorded explosions of pipes in the (K-Dere) manifold areas (UNEP, 2011). Presently oil continues to seep through these pipes (UNEP, 2011).

Korokoro is in Tai LGA, and hosts a flow station and two well-heads (Korokoro 4 and 8). Between 1986 and 1990, five spills were recorded from the flow station, which still impact negatively on community residents (UNEP, 2011). Polluted soils and rivers undermine farming and fishing activities (Pyagbara, 2007).

Nonwa, like Korokoro community, is in Tai LGA. In 1993, major oil pipelines were constructed through this community including through their farmlands (Ojakorotu, 2008). By October (2013), due to pipeline failures, about 2,200 barrels of crude were spilled in this community, for which Shell has since compensated residents (Shell, 2013).

Lewe, Sii 2, and Kaani-babbe are non oil endowed communities in Gokana and Khana LGAs. These three communities, even though they may not be comparable with the five oil endowed communities in terms of pollution, have also suffered to a significant extent. For example, Bodo city community, in its legal suit against Shell Petroleum Development Company for oil pollution of their creeks, noted that the spills have also extended to the Lewe creeks, yet while Shell has compensated Bodo communities, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) reported in 2015 that the Lewe community is yet to receive any form of compensation.

Figure 1: Shows the case studies: modified map by author

2.5 Method employed for data collection

This thesis relied largely on qualitative methods of data collection to gather information from the 175 CBOs it sampled out of the 492 that were identified. Unlike quantitative research, which focuses on numbers and percentages of respondents' perceptions, qualitative research explores for meanings through explanations and descriptions (Al-Busaidi, 2008), and therefore, hopefully, reaches a deeper understanding of the subject (Kvale, 1996; Gill *et al*, 2008; Fox, 2009). The use of qualitative methods of data collection was particularly useful for this thesis in unravelling the myths and realities about whether Ogoni CBOs provide effective bottom-up community development solutions. However, this study also used some quantitative methods, as we shall see. According to a USAID technical note (2013), researchers typically combine qualitative and quantitative methods when an evaluation requires both kinds of data to answer its research questions, and when findings from one method are used to design other parts of the same study. This thesis used quantitative data to complement its qualitative findings in administering SQBs as a follow-up to preceding qualitative data on the nature of communities.

The diverse participants involved in this research and the different sources of data collection used in this thesis produced complementary data, which provided the basis for triangulation. Triangulation as a research strategy increases the validity of research results (Yeasmin, 2012), because it addresses "completeness, convergence, and dissonance of key themes" (Farmer *et al*, 2006, p.1). In addition, the iterative process involved in this research, from secondary documentary analysis, to primary data collection and analysis, provided new insights, because these exercises were not mere "repetitive mechanical tasks but deeply reflexive processes" (Srivastqva and Hopwood, 2009, p.77).

2.5.1 *Secondary documentary analysis*

Secondary documentary analysis involves studying books, published journal papers, government reports, newspaper articles, and internet materials. According to Ogwu (2012, p.123), documentary analysis helps to "maximize the benefits" of other sources of data used in research, providing a comprehensive context for the research subject and guiding the researcher in data collection and analysis. The theoretical and conceptual frameworks for this research were sourced from documented texts.

2.5.2 *In-depth interviews*

The use of in-depth key informant interviews was imperative for this thesis in its investigation into the controversy about whether CBOs are genuinely agents of bottom-up CD, because this controversy stems from the wide variety of constructions of the concepts of CBO and CD. Qualitative research interviews attempt to analyse such constructions by a "discovery-oriented method" which obtains comprehensive information about the subject of research from participants (Workbook, nd, p.3). This discovery process helps to "unfold the meaning of peoples' experiences" (Kvale, 1996, p.1).

In-depth interviews may be conducted face-to-face, and it has been claimed that this is the most reliable method of conducting interviews because the interviewer is able to observe interviewees' body language (Dialsingh, 2008). However, scholars like Vogl (2013) have argued that technological advancement has created other mediums through which semi-structured interviews may be conducted, including skype and telephone. Like Vogl, Sullivan (2012) dismissed the argument that face-to-face interviews are more reliable than other methods of conducting interviews, insisting that the genuineness/ openness of the participant was more important than the medium through which interviews were conducted. This thesis used both telephoning and face-to-face interviewing methods.

Telephone interviewing (TI) was the first method of empirical data collection employed in this research, used for the pilot study. These interviews were conducted between December 2013 and February 2014, after a list of 405 registered CBOs that originated from outside Ogoni communities but work inside them was collected from Eleme, Gokana, Khana, Tai local government and the Ministry of Youth Development, Port Harcourt, Rivers state. Of these 405 registered CBOs, 101 were contacted and interviewed: the telephone contacts of the remaining 304 CBOs were not obtainable. The 101 telephone interviews were mainly semi-structured and so participants responded naturally to questions. This pilot study of TIs provided information on the typology of CBOs in Ogoniland, and showed that the concepts of CBO and CD are both 'porous'. Findings from these TIs served as a framework for the other methods of data collection used in this research.

Face-to-face key informant (KI) interviews, unlike TIs, focused mostly on CBOs with origins from within and across Ogoni communities. The main aim of this second phase of in-depth interview was to investigate the way residents of Ogoniland perceive the concepts of CBOs and CD, as well as their views on the role of their CBOs as a bottom-up solution of CD.

Participants in this phase were recruited through snowball sampling, targeted especially for their first-hand experience of CBOs. Sixty one KIs, mainly made up of past and current members of CBOs and also beneficiaries of 'external' CBOs, were involved in this phase. Others who made the KI list were two social performance officers from Shell and six community leaders/chiefs. In all 69 KI interviews were conducted.

Both TI and KI interviews were semi-structured – the structure being informed by the researcher's previous work on the conceptual and theoretical frameworks used in this research. This type of interviewing allowed the interviewer to probe for more information, and the interviewee to deviate during the interviewing process in other to tell narratives about the subject of study. The focus group discussion (FGD) method of data collection is a form of group interview that explores the experiences and perceptions of community members (Kitzinger, 1995), searching for meanings behind varying perceptions of CBOs and CD (Gill *et al*, 2008). This part of the research followed the guidelines for FGD provided by Krueger (1988), Kitzinger (1995) and Morgan (1998). First, the number of participants in each of the three FGDs conducted in Ogali, Sii and Kanni-Babbe communities did not exceed eight - the numbers were six, six and eight respectively. Second, discussants were selected because of their in-depth knowledge of CBOs. Third, a varied group of discussants was chosen, because while homogeneity in selecting focus group discussant may provide more information, this research opted for heterogeneity in order to increase the diversity of views and gain more insight into the subject of study. To achieve this, each session had at least one octogenarian, one youth and one woman, to represent their respective CBOs, and the other discussants were either passive or non-members of CBOs. Fourth, each session was recorded and moderated by the researcher and an assistant. Discussants had enough time to debate and air their individual views. In order to avoid discussants stirring up quarrels and disrupting the discussion sessions, they were encouraged to speak mostly about their own CBOs, and the researcher/moderator was careful to always remind discussants of the need to accommodate areas of disagreements. This to a very large extent worked, and in the three sessions the discussants were patient and tolerant towards each other's views. Fifth, the venues of the three FGDs were church premises, where participants felt respectful and comfortable. These focus group discussions provided additional qualitative data, and to an extent clarified certain themes obtained from the TIs and KIs.

Figure 2: Methods of data collection and functions of data sets

Methods of data collection	Function
↓	
Secondary documentary analysis	To support and maximize benefit of data collection methods
↓	
Telephone interview	Pilot study provided insights about registered external organizations from their founders' perspective
↓	
Open-ended questionnaires	Provided insights about external and internal CBOs from mostly past and current community leaders
↓	
Key informant interviews	Provided insights about external and internal CBOs from users' perspectives
↓	
Focus group discussions	Debates clarified conflicting views from preceding data mostly from the perspective of CBO and non-CBO members
↓	
Closed questionnaires	Survey provided insights from CBO members into the nature of Ogoni communities

2.5.3 *Survey questionnaire (SQ)*

The survey questionnaire method of data collection enables the gathering of large amounts of data mostly without rigour, and is an "easy way to a quick publication" (Chapple 2003, p.1). But it has been criticised when researchers do not follow the principles of designing high quality questionnaires and administering them carefully (Chapple, 2003). As a result, survey questionnaires (SQs) may suffer from sampling, non-coverage, non-response and measurement errors (Dillman, 1991). When, however, carried out properly, SQs are an important tool for discovering people's thoughts and perceptions (Bulmer, 2004). This is because as well as providing quantitative data, well-designed SQs can also provide rich qualitative data (Bird, 2009; Riiskjaer *et al*, 2012). This research used both open-ended questionnaires (for qualitative data) (SQAs) and closed questionnaires (for quantitative data) (SQBs).

Open-ended questionnaires are rarely used for surveys, because of the enormous amount of time involved in coding themes that emanate from participants' comments (Vehovar, 2003). However, notwithstanding the difficulties involved in using open-ended questionnaires, they can provide rich and critical information (Riiskjaer *et al*, 2012). This is partly because they avoid the bias that results from suggesting options, and partly because they present patterns of responses and themes that are naturally expressed by participants (Vehovar, 2003). Since I was less worried about the greater amount of time involved in using open-ended questionnaires and more concerned to gain the benefit of the richness of this method of data collection, I made full use of open-ended questions in my SQAs.

Open-ended questionnaires used for this study (SQAs) were first sampled; six were sent out by e-mail, however when pilot participants sent back their completed questionnaires, their comments did not answer the questions effectively. At this point, I realized that most questions contained in the questionnaire were too complex, hence the need to make them simpler and more straightforward. In 2014, 200 survey questionnaires (SQAs) were administered to current and past leaders of CBOs that operate within and across the eight communities which were studied. Participants were recruited through snowball sampling (non-probability). Questionnaires were administered directly by the researcher and research assistants. In this exercise, 74 CBOs were sampled and 189 questionnaires were returned.

Closed questionnaires (SQBs) were administered between March and April 2015. However, even though this is a quick method of data collection (Chapple, 2003), unlike open-ended

questionnaires, closed questionnaires contain a range of possible options/answers which are provided by the researcher (Vohovar, 2003), and these options/answers lower "the richness of potential responses" (Boynton and Greenhalgh, 2004, p. 4). Nonetheless, closed questionnaires have the advantage of tracing patterns from large samples (Kelly *et al*, 2003). Kelly *et al* (2003, p. 261) cited Denscombe who stated that closed questionnaires provide 'snapshots' of events, and can be used separately or with qualitative data (Harris, 2010; Bird, 2009). This study used closed questionnaires as follow-ups of preceding qualitative data, in other to gain more insights about the nature of Ogoni communities by measuring four important elements from the theory of sense of community (membership, influence, meeting needs, and shared emotional connection). Data generated in this phase also served as a source of triangulation. This questionnaire was administered to 200 respondents in two oil endowed communities (Ebubu and Korokoro) and two non oil- endowed communities (Lewe and Kanni-Babbe). These four communities were selected from the original eight communities (Ebubu, Ogali, K-Dere, Korokoro, Nonwa, Lewe, Sii 2 and Kaani-Babbe), partly to reduce expenditure, and partly because they were safer to work in, since the SQBs were administered during the 2015 presidential and governorship electioneering period.

SQBs were administered through convenience sampling for two reasons. First, CBO leaders could not provide a complete list/register of their members to allow for probability sampling. Banerjee and Chaudhury (2010) noted that such poor record-keeping has been identified as a challenge in conducting research in developing countries (see also Salawu, 2009). Second, the SQBs were administered during the 2015 presidential and governorship electioneering period in Nigeria, when community members avoided gathering/ meeting. So, even though the researchers managed to target members during meeting times, for security reasons, members were always in a hurry to leave meeting venues. This is because the political situation in Rivers state during the 2015 elections was one of fear and panic (Joab-Peterside, nd): as Lunn *et al* (2015) points out, elections in Nigeria are generally characterised by tension, violence and even killings. In all, fifty questionnaires were administered in each of the four communities on scheduled days at various CBO meeting venues and sometimes at the homes of CBO members. Like most survey sampling techniques, even though this method was quick and convenient, it was not free of sampling errors. For instance, I am unsure about the exact membership strength of the six types of CBOs I sampled in each of the four communities as some members were reported absent.

Two measures were taken to reduce sampling errors and increase representativeness. First, attempts were made to include all traditional CBOs (youth, women, and CCE and committee members of CDC) which are said to be representatives of the entire community. Second, even though some CBO members gave their consent to participate in the research, following results from preceding qualitative data collected from these communities, the researcher at each meeting venue made a great effort to convince more members, especially those identified by the research assistant (an Ogoni indigene) as passive members of their TCBOs, to participate in the research. Questionnaires were administered directly by the researcher and an assistant.

Table 2: Distribution of closed questionnaires (SQBs)

Name of community	Youth CBOs	Women CBOs	Council of chiefs and elders	Social clubs	Cooperative meeting	Community development committee	Community chiefs/representative	Total
Ebubu	43	35	27	19	24	4	1	160
No of participants	14	11	9	6	8	1	1	50
Korokoro	51	47	15	28	25	7	1	174
No of participants	15	9	7	11	5	2	1	50
Lewe	60	32	21	25	19	9	1	167
No of participants	19	11	5	4	7	3	1	50
Kanni-Babbe	47	32	13	51	9	5	1	118
No of participants	11	11	4	13	6	4	1	50

2.6 Procedure for data analysis

Data analysis (qualitative and quantitative) can be done either manually or electronically. According to Basit (2003), the choice between these two options depends on the size of the project, resources (time and funds), expertise, and preference of the researcher. Considering the availability of resources (time and resources) the small size of this project and in particular the researchers' preference and expertise in manual procedures for analysing data, the qualitative data generated from this research were mostly analysed manually. The first stage of qualitative analysis, according to Bailey (2008), involves transcribing recorded interviews/discussion, in other to allow for closer study of field discussions. Ashmore and Reed (2000, p.1) make a distinction between taped and transcribed interviews, stating that the former is 'realist' while the latter is 'constructivist'. In other words, according to Ashmore and Reeds, transcribed interviews are never exact facsimiles of original taped interviews, but at best, are constructions of the original. For one thing, according to Bailey (2008, p. 1) at the stage of transcribing, the researcher makes the "judgements about what level of details to choose". However, in this study, the researcher chose to give the fullest possible accounts of the discussions/interviews in the field when transcribing the TIs, KIs and FGDs verbatim. This was to ensure that little or no information was lost, because, inductive research "uses the actual data itself to derive structure of analysis" (Burnard *et al*, 2008, p.1).

Comments in the open-ended survey questionnaires (SQAs) were studied carefully and copied into a table according to themes, and into a second table based on the context in which these themes were used. Similarly, two types of tables were created from each of the transcribed text of TIs, KIs and FG discussions: the first to show the themes generated from each of these methods of data collection, and the second to show the context in which these themes were used. Data sets were analysed separately, and identified themes were then threaded together. Burnard *et al* (2008), describes the method of qualitative analysis used in this study as 'thematic content analysis', entailing the reading, re-reading, scrutinizing, identifying themes, and threading up of themes. For more clarity, the frequency of themes generated from the qualitative data was worked out in percentages using Microsoft Excel. Similarly, Microsoft Excel was used to analyse SQBs quantitatively. However, having attended several workshops on the use of NVivo for qualitative research, like Zamawe (2015, p.1), I concluded that such software could not effectively analyse my qualitative data, and I analysed my data manually.

2.7 Triangulation

According to Alexander Jakob, cited in Yeasmin (2012, p.1), triangulation means that by combining:

> "multiple observers, theories, methods, and empirical materials, researchers can hope to overcome the weakness or intrinsic biases and the problems that come from single-method, single-observer, single-theory studies. Often the purpose of triangulation in specific contexts is to obtain confirmation of findings through convergence of different perspectives. The point at which the perspectives converge is seen to represent reality."

The use of multiple methods of data collection in this study helped me to gain more insights and produce more reliable findings about the 'reality' of the Ogoni social world (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Even though the reality of the social world is never completely objective, a closer approximation to it is likely to be achieved by obtaining more perspectives than by relying on fewer perspectives.

2.8 Case study context: the Niger Delta (ND)

2.8.1 *Demography*

The Niger Delta (ND) region of Nigeria covers an area of about 70,000 square kilometres, one third of which is wetland. It is one of the richest and largest deltas in Africa and, indeed, the world (Tyoyila and Terhenmen, 2012; Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010), because of its unique ecological features contained in seven distinct ecological zones: coastal sand plain, deltaic plain, lower Niger flood zone, Niger flood plain, mangrove forest, western coastal plain, and beach and barrier islands (UNDP, 2006; Akpomuvie, 2011). It is widely recognised for its unique high taxonomic endemism, owing to the varieties of global and local species of plants and animals that it harbours, which makes it a vast storehouse for resources like food, oil and gas (Scheren, *et al*, 2002). The ND is located in Nigeria's south-south geopolitical zone, and includes Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo and Rivers states with a total population of about 30 million people (Akpomuvie, 2011), spread across the region's 185 local government areas. According to NDDC (2006), about 62% of this population are younger than 30 years, while 36% are between 30 and 60 years, and the remaining 2% are 70 years and above. UNDP puts the urban population density at 265 people per square kilometre, but the 13,329 rural settlements in this region are the main settlement types (Idumange, 2011).

Figure 3: Map of Nigeria showing Rivers state in south south geopolitical Zone (Ja'Afaru, 2014)

Figure 4: Map showing Ogoniland in the Niger Delta (UNEP, 2011)

This is why the ND is mostly described as rural (Akpomuvie, 2011), with varied ethnic groups, including the Ijaw, Ikwerre, Itsekiri, Urhobo, Ogoni, Andoni, Ibibio, and Ukwani, who speak four languages and over 250 dialects (Ihayere *et al*, 2014). Akpomuvie (2011, p. 211) describes these people as a "mosaic of heterogeneous…fractious people held together by a robust sense of being Delta people". Ogonis seem united in the collective battle for the restoration of their environment; 300,000 of them in 1993 took part in a march of solidarity in the quest for a greener Ogoni, indicating unity in the midst of diversity. For Ibeanu (nd p.2), this (MOSOP) struggle stands out "because of the level of mobilisation and effectiveness", indeed it showcased the development challenges of Ogoniland to the world and contributed to Shell's withdrawal from Ogoni. However Shell's withdrawal from Ogoniland and the 'global showcasing' of the Ogoni problems did not lead to development for the Ogonis because it was not followed up by either environmental clean-up or meaningful poverty reduction programmes. Besides the Nigerian government is yet to implement the issues raised in the Ogoni Bill of Rights: "many of the issues raised by the Ogoni (such as the need for locally sustainable development, distribution of oil wealth, community projects) have yet to be addressed" (Boele et al, 2001, p. 75).

Ogoniland is a kingdom located in Rivers state, one of Nigeria's core ND states (see Figures 1 and 2). It is made up of four local government areas - Khana, Gokana, Eleme and Tai - which together cover an area of about 1,000km, with a total population of 832,000 in 2006 (UNEP, 2011). In 2010, according to the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), cited by Ojide (2015), the Ogoni population increased to around 914,899. Ogonis have one of the highest rural global densities in Africa and they live in close-knit rural communities across their four local government areas (UNEP, 2011, p.32).

2.8.2 *Pre-oil economy*

As indigenous people, Ogonis have existed and lived in the ND for several centuries (Alagoa, 2003) and they have relied heavily on resources from their land and water bodies. They are fishermen and farmers (UNEP 2011), and their legendary farming and fishing prowess stemmed from their fertile alluvial soils, rivers and creeks which earned them the title of a 'food basket' as their products were sold in other parts of the Niger Delta (Pyagbara, 2007, p.2; see also Akpomuvie, 2011; Babalola 2014 and Nbete 2012). Zandvliet and Pedro (2002) observed that land and water bodies meant more than sources of edible resources to Ogonis because they have a strong cultural and spiritual attachment to their land. For example, when a child is born, the accompanying placenta (afterbirth) is buried in the ground where she/he belongs, and traditionally it is an expression of the child's being bound to the land in her/his place of origin (Zandvliet and Pedro 2002). Pyagbara (2007, p.4) cited ERSC which confirmed that:

> "Ogoni people have a tradition and custom that is deeply rooted in nature and this helped them to protect and preserve their environment for generations. The land on which they live and the rivers which surround them are viewed by them not just as natural resources for exploitation but with deep spiritual significance".

According to Pyagbara (2007), forests and the animals in them are also seen as sacred gifts, and so the felling of trees and killing of animals are done with care because they are connected to community wellbeing. Likewise, there is a complex link between Ogonis and the ferns, reeds, floating grasses, and shrubs found in their three main vegetation zones of beach ridge, salt water, and freshwater (UNEP, 2011).

2.8.3 Post-oil economy

After oil was first discovered in 1956 in Olobiri, the present-day Bayelsa state of the Niger Delta, major reserves were located and commercial production began in 1958 in Ogoniland, followed by an expansion of oil exploration sites and facilities. At the last count, UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (2011) recorded in Ogoniland 12 oilfields, 116 drilled wells, 89 completed wells and 5 flow stations each with a capacity of 185,000 barrels/per day. Pyagbara (2007, p.7) reported that these facilities are owned by Shell, which he described as the 'sole players' in the Ogoni oil business because of their monopoly of licences of operation that covers the entire Ogoniland. Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) is the largest oil company in Nigeria, and its activities in the Niger Delta, according to Arisukwu and Nnaomah (2012), span an area of over 31,000 square kilometres. It produces about 2.0 million barrels of oil per day which is a very significant quantity when compared to Nigeria's total production per day, which Kadafa (2012), put at about 2.7 million barrels. From the beginning of oil capitalism in the 1950s to 1993, the year Shell moved out of Ogoniland, Detheridge, cited in Boele *et al.* (2001), reported that the 634 million barrels of oil produced in this kingdom had added about US$5.2 billion in revenue to the Nigerian national budget.

With the discovery of oil, Nigeria moved from an agro-based economy to an oil-dependent economy. Oil also changed Nigeria's mode of governance from a system in which regions controlled the resources they produced and only paid taxes to the federal government to enable it to maintain important national services like national defence (Ogwu, 2012), to a system in which resource allocation became based on population size and land mass (Ogwu 2012). As a result, the northern part of the country received considerably more money than before from the national treasury, at the expense of other regions especially the Deltans who are now classed as a minority ethnic group despite their vast contributions to the coffers of the Nigerian state (Chibueze, 2011). This unequal pattern of resource allocation in Nigeria is far from the expectations of an ideal federal system, where no section of the country is supposed to suffer from unequal resource allocation since all federal regions are deemed to contribute equitably in the creation of national income (Ko, 2014). This marginalization of the oil endowed ND communities has led to the development of other regions but the under-development of the ND region, which has been dubbed an 'internal colony' of the Nigerian nation (Nbete 2012, p.50). Moreover, not only does the ND region suffer disproportionately

from Nigeria's discriminatory resource-sharing formula, but it also suffers from the indiscriminate way in which oil multinationals extract oil.

Shell was expelled from Ogoniland by Ogonis over two decade ago because of its connivance with the Nigerian government in polluting their lands and waters and also their (Shell and Nigerian government) use of the Nigerian armed forces to shield themselves from protesting communities. However, the after-effects of Shell's activities are still felt across several Ogoni communities because the most notorious spills that occurred over four decades ago, like the Ejama-Ebubu community's pollution, are yet to be properly cleaned up (UNEP, 2011). This is in addition to spills from facilities that Shell abandoned when they vacated Ogoniland in 1993 (UNEP, 2011), which have seeped their way into previously unpolluted areas (Pyagbara, 2007). Moreover, Ogoni communities, according to Ojide (2015, p. 19), continue to "serve as transit route for pipelines transporting both SPDC and third party oil from other areas". While it is not exactly clear what is the total volume of spillages that have occurred in Ogoniland, Amnesty International (cited in Adekola and Igwe, 2014), put the volume of spills that occurred in the ND between 2005 and 2010 at 298,000 barrels, and the number of spills at 1,110. This explains why pollution is a "common phenomenon" in Ogoniland (Akpomuvie 2011, p. 201), and why Ogonis have lived in polluted communities for over five decades – i.e. since the discovery of oil in their areas. As Pyagbara (2007, p.5) put it, the "history of oil exploitation in Ogoni is like the history of oil pollution".

Many researchers have reported the negative impacts of pollution (gas flares and oil spills) on Ogonis and their communities, including Tyoyila and Terhenmen (2012), Arisukwu and Nnaomah (2012), Nbete (2012), Akpomuvie (2011), and Boele *et al* (2001). According to Akpomuvie (2011), oil pollution is the most persistent and major cause of environmental degradation in Ogoniland. Ogwu (2012) linked the frequency and quantity of oil spillage in Ogoniland to Shell's outdated pipelines and constant sabotage of pipelines by community youths. UNEP (2011) reported the foot-dragging manner in which the Nigerian government and Shell have attended to issues of pollution and their poor and incomplete clean-up exercises as factors that have contributed to the unhealthy current state of the Ogoni environment. UNEP cited the notorious Ejamu and Ebubu community spills which occurred over 40 years ago and the K-Dere, Bue Mene and Bodo community spills as examples of polluted communities that have not been successfully cleaned up. Before the Ejamu and Ebubu community spills, the sites were arable lands and fertile swamps, but "crude oil spilled

flowed downwards in an easterly direction into a lagoon …from the lagoon the oil washed further into creeks leading to the contamination of downward areas. Part of the area caught fire" (UNEP, 2011, p.110). As a result, Ogoni streams, rivers and arable lands are contaminated from oil wash-offs from these polluted sites, and thickly forested areas are increasingly becoming bare, causing significant loss in biodiversity. Kadafa (2012) reports the disappearance of aquatic species like periwinkles, fish, crabs, molluscs and wild birds. Yet throughout recent history no significant remediation activities have been made to restore polluted areas (UNEP, 2011).

Moreover, UNEP (2011) reports that human health in Ogoniland is greatly at risk from hydrocarbons released either through spills or flares, as they can get into the human system through activities like breathing, eating, drinking and bathing, and depending on the quantity taken in, hydrocarbons are potential killers. Pyagbara (2007) cited Jonathan, who reported that research carried out at the University of Lagos found that water samples from Ogoniland collected from bore holes in the sea, beaches and rivers contain very high concentrations of Benzo pyrene, as high as 0.54 to 4ug per litre, which is far above the World Health Organization (WHO)'s recommendation for drinking water (UNEP, 2011). Pyagbara (2007, p.12) claimed that the University of Lagos report on the effects of hydrocarbon pollution is:

> "consistent with the experience that we have had amongst our people in the past thirty years who had lived to see an increase in the occurrence of cancer and other respiratory problems traceable to oil pollution in the area. The diseases include respiratory problems, skin ailments such as rash and dermatitis, eye problems, gastro-intestinal disorders, water borne diseases and nutritional problems associated with poor diet".

In addition to these oil-related pollutants, the 2009 World Development Report stated that the ND region is faced with other challenges (see also Mmom and Aifesehi, 2013), such as loss of tree cover for fuel, and pollution of rivers and creeks with sewage (Cookey and Kokpan 2008). Inokoba and Imbua (2010) argue that the resulting devastation of the Ogoni environment has positioned Ogoniland as home to some of the poorest African people (see also Arisukwu and Nnaomah, 2012; Babalola 2014; and Nweke, 2012).

2.8.4 *Current economic condition of Ogonis*

Over 90% of Deltans still depend on their natural environment for survival. Okeleke (2013) described them as ardent farmers and fishermen, who rely on their land and water to earn a living (Zandvliet and Pedro, 2002; Pygbara, 2007). Babalola (2014, p.119) "paints a picture of a people enmeshed in poverty, and a region suffering from chronic underdevelopment in the midst of plenty". A striking feature of this region is high youth unemployment (Babalola, 2014), and according to UNDP, as cited in Iniaghe et al (2013), about 54% of Deltans live on less than 1$ dollar per day, and the ND is the worst region in Nigeria judged on social indicators like health, education and quality of environment. For example, according to NDHS cited in the 2009 World Development Report, the ND has one of the highest levels of infant mortality.

Nations or communities blessed with oil often suffer poor economic growth (Obi, 2014, Ross, 2012) because, according to Feyide cited in Pyagbara (2007), oil has a peculiar way of changing the destinies of communities and nations. This is the fate of the Ogonis, because with the exploitation of oil, Ogoniland became an "ecological wasteland" (Kadafa, 2012, p. 41), as once fertile lands and rivers became toxic and no longer supported farming and fishing. In fact, swamps which once provided food crops and sea foods now contain sheens of oil, hence families can no longer feed from them (UNEP, 2011). The notorious 2008 oil spills in Bodo community which took away jobs and sources of livelihood from about 15,600 farmers (Vidal, 2015), demonstrate that environmental pollution is a major cause of untold hardship and poverty in Ogoniland (Inokoba and Imbua, 2010).

Government policies carried out by legislative acts like the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Land Use Act of 1978, which removed land rights from communities and bestowed them on the central government, exacerbated the spread of poverty in Ogoni. With these Acts, the central government became the new landlord who permitted Shell to pollute 'their lands' and collected rents and royalties from Shell (Ebeku, 2001). In fact, these Acts made Ogonis landless, thereby reinforcing the current poor economic condition of Ogonis, by depriving them of both economic and political power (Igbara and Keenam, 2013). Ironically, another government and Shell policy that has contributed to poverty and underdevelopment in Ogoniland, according to Aaron (2005), is the policy of compensation, because since the Nigerian government and Shell only compensate Ogonis when there are occurrences of oil

spills, community youths sabotage pipelines in order to get compensation, thereby worsening the pollution of their already polluted environment.

This economic deprivation has also caused social conflict (Ross, 2003, p.16). Ikejiaku (2009) explained that in their fight against corrupt political leaders and Shell who pollute their lands, Ogoni youths end up destroying community infrastructure. Kialee (2011) claimed that the oil conflicts that have occurred in Ogoni communities have caused the destruction of lives and properties. Ikejiaku (2009, p. 19) reports that the "cost of conflicts are horrific", as they quickly destroy the little economic and social infrastructure that does exist in these deprived local communities. The supply of cash from the government and Shell to traditional chiefs by Shell (Zandvliet and Pedro, 2002) has weakened the sacredness and respect accorded to chieftaincy stools (Nweke, 2012), contributing to further conflict, poverty, and underdevelopment across Ogoni communities (Zandvliet and Pedro 2002; Nweke, 2012; Arisukwu and Nnaomah 2012; Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, (2016). Contestation for leadership stools has led to the rise of cult activities in Ogoniland, and according to Kialee (2011), this has deepened the dynamics of tension across Ogoni communities. Traditional chiefs and politicians who seek to advance their careers, patronise these cult groups to fight those opposing them. For example, the Zaakpon community suffered a crisis over challenges to its chieftaincy stool, and during this period the entire community was deserted. Community members sought refuge in other communities because their community was hijacked by cult groups, and for five years Zaakpons not only suffered the destruction of community infrastructure, they also lost crops and animals. Such crises exacerbate poverty and hinder community development (Baddeley, 2011).

There is also a link between the widespread economic poverty experienced across Ogoni communities and the educational deprivation suffered by Ogonis. Poverty is an impediment to achieving a quality education. As Pyagbara (2007) says, acquiring an education is a hard task for Ogonis, since most of them live from hand to mouth, and sending their children to school is very difficult. Over 70% of Nigerians live on less than $1 per day (Anger, 2010), and most Ogonis are cashless Ikejiaku (2009). Maduagwu (2012, p.5), reports that life is not getting any better for Ogonis as poverty levels have increased in recent years and "health facilities are almost non-existent, school buildings are collapsing with classrooms and laboratories empty". A Human Rights report (2007, p.1) indicated that some Ogoni communities lack basic infrastructures: "public schools have been left to fall apart and health

facilities lack even the most basic amenities". Poverty in Ogoniland has been described as 'poverty qua poverty', which means a condition where the vast majority find it practically difficult to feed, clothe, have roofs over their heads and acquire education beyond primary school level (Ikejiaku 2009, p.15; Ekpenyong *et al* 2010). Youth unemployment and hopelessness are common features of Ogoni life as young Ogoni youths are unemployable by IOCs (Babalola, 2014). Nwilo (2013, p. 1) described the life of an Ogoni child in these words:

> "if you ever grew up in the Ogoni territory and your parents were not local government chairmen or maybe some big wig politicians or oil block owners, it means you must have come across some level of poverty. It means you must have stayed in a house made of wood called batcher in one of the many watersides/waterfronts in Port Harcourt. It means you must have been so broke, you have no dime…and the little you have you will send it through a friend from your village to send it to your parents or sister who is taking care of a herd of kids who are also counting on you"

2.8.5 Ogoni elites and community social structures

This is not to say that all Ogonis are poor. Even though Mohammed (2013), Nwilo (2013) and Babalola (2014) have reported that the majority of Ogonis are poor, some possess political and economic power that places them ahead of the masses. Watt (2006) described these powerful people as the region's one percent or elites. The elitism of the one percent is a common feature of oil endowed countries where institutions are systematically structured to benefit their controllers (Ovadia, 2013, Ehwarieme and Cocodia, 2011). According to Pyagbara (2007), while poor Ogonis agonise over the injustices inflicted on them by external agents (the Nigerian state and Shell), Ogoni elites and local traditional chiefs together with Shell and the state gain financially from the pollution of Ogoniland. This is because Ogoni elites have built networks with the state, national institutions and Shell, and through these networks, they siphon off monies meant for their communities. According to Mohammed (2013), national and regional elites who have been in control of the development projects set up by the federal government, have corruptly mismanaged those schemes. For example, funds that have reached the communities for development projects are hijacked by community chiefs (Mohammed, 2013). This means that corruption is institutionalized at the state, regional and community levels. Local chiefs have been able to embezzle and mismanage community funds because it is a tradition that community allocations must pass through them, and they take advantage of this to keep to themselves large portions of such monies (Mohammed, 2013). This sort of corruption explains why there is so much economic

and social inequality within Ogoni communities. Pyagbara (2011) has linked the endemic social and economic inequality within Ogoni communities to the social capital shared between community elites and Shell: Ogoni chiefs/elites have adopted more individual-centred lifestyles, different from the Ogoni traditional communal way of life, and they have become interested more in "self than us" (Pyagbara, 2007, p.11).

Pyagbara (2007) claimed that Shell eroded the Ogoni tradition of communal living and caused the rise of new unequal communities from more equal older ones. Agbonifo and Aghedo (2015) reported that these new emerging communities in Ogoniland are characterised by lack of trust, betrayal, corruption and violence (see also Arisukwu and Nnaomah, 2012; Asunni, 2009; Zandvliet and Pedro, 2002). These negative changes occasioned by poor governance, spurred a feeling of betrayal and disinheritance among Ogonis by their supposed leaders, whom they named vultures (Agbonifo and Aghedo, 2015, p.154). The weaknesses of these leaders affected the traditional system of conflict resolution, which now fails to effectively resolve the various dimensions of conflicts that have erupted (Nweke, 2012). Youths no longer subject themselves to the leadership of their chiefs and elders; they take the law into their own hands (Arisukwu and Nnaomah, 2012).

Solutions to these problems seem far off, as the culture of corruption in Ogoniland is constantly energized at all levels of government (Mohammed, 2013). Past corrupt leaders from the ND are most times left unpunished and unquestioned, and even when they are arrested they are rarely convicted (Mohammed, 2013). For example, according to Mohammed (2013), in the controversial cases of money laundering, corruption and wealth mismanagement against the former governor of Bayelsa state, the accused was pardoned on account that "he had been remorseful" (Babalola, 2014, p. 125). Likewise, the corruption charges against Dr Peter Odili, ex-governor of Rivers state, were dropped because under the prevailing political culture of the Nigerian state he is 'a free man' despite allegations of misappropriation of over 100 billion naira (Babalola, 2014). This lack of accountability, according to Babalola (2014, p.1), explains why "corruption is a significant feature of the region's political economy" at the federal, state and community levels because revenues allocated to oil producing states since 1999 are not accounted for (Mohammed, 2013).

2.8.6 Psychological helplessness

According to many critics, Ogoni elites manage their communities in mostly self-serving ways that benefit themselves not their subjects. The creaming off of community funds and resources has made the socially unconnected even poorer (Babalola, 2014; Mohammed 2013). Poor community members are invariably hit harder than the richer and better placed groups when there are threats like "health, economic down turns and even man-made violence" (Rayhan and Philip, 2004, p. ii). In addition to physical challenges, poor people suffer from emotional challenges like humiliation and psychological helplessness (Chambers, 1989). Narayan *et al* (2000, p.1) explained that poor people experience emotional pain due to "lack of power and the moral pain from being forced to make choices such as whether to pay to save the life of an ill family member or use the money to feed their children". Even organizations created to help the poor sometimes end up aggravating their problems due to separation of the poor from the rich (Narayan *et al*, 2000). Scholars have reported the general feeling of hopelessness among Ogonis. Currently, Ogoni communities are home to one of the world's poorest populations, described in the UNDP Niger Delta Human Development report (2006, p.2) as "a place of frustrated expectations and deep-rooted mistrust.

Ikerionwu (2013) held that this has happened because most Ogonis have not only lost control over their environment, but also over their lives (Akinbobola and Njori, 2014).

2.8.7 Cultism and militancy in Ogoniland

Some Ogoni youths have graduated from being members of their community youth organizations to becoming dangerous militants (Oluwaniyi, 2010). This set of community members is mostly made up of young, single and unemployed males who feel economically powerless following the destruction of their environment and also the marginalization they face by national and local community elites (Asuni, 2009). This marginalization and disempowerment provokes "deep rooted frustration" which explains the spread of violence across communities (Paki and Ebienfa, 2011, p.141). While some members of this group can be criminally or politically motivated for selfish reasons, according to Asuni (2009, p.3), others are "ideologically driven". Kialee (2011) described militancy as financially rewarding because politicians and local chiefs who recruit militants to fight their opponents pay for such services. Financial gains from the business of militancy and the social status that comes with it explains why more young Ogonis are recruited into militant and cult groups (Asuni, 2009). Moreover, according to Asuni (2009), the actions of these militants have international,

national and local costs. For instance, the kidnapping of oil workers by militant groups in 2006 helped to raise the price of oil globally (Asuni, 2009), while the Nigerian state suffered economic losses following incessant attacks on pipelines such as the 2008 attack on Nigeria's largest oil platform (Paki and Ebienfa, 2011).

Scholars have described the Deltans as poor people in the midst of so much wealth. The cause of this apparent paradox is traced, first, to the "criminal neglect" of the ND communities by the Nigerian government (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010, p.1) through its discriminatory politics of resource allocation. Second, the paradox has been attributed to the pollution of their land and water bodies, which are their primary sources of livelihood, by the Nigerian government and oil multinationals that explore and exploit crude oil from the region (Arisuokwu and Nnaomah, 2012; Olawuyi 2012; Akpomuvie, 2011). Third, the culture of corruption has evidently contributed to the paradox, by channelling resources for the development of ND communities into private bank accounts (Mohammed, 2013).

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has prepared the groundwork for the data chapters that follow, by explaining the literature on community, and on community-based organizations (CBOs); by formulating the theoretical framework of social constructionism; by discussing the methods used for obtaining and analysing data; and by outlining the dire circumstances in which Ogoni communities live. The next three chapters build on these conceptual and contextual foundations to investigate top-down and bottom-up attempts to alleviate those circumstances, and the perceptions of residents about their communities.

Chapter 3: Analysis of top-down approaches to community development in Ogoniland

"The most critical issue with…development is getting the right resources to where they are needed most and ensuring those resources are being integrated in a sustainable manner. The greatest failure of…development to this day is the wasting of resources due to lack of comprehensive knowledge of the realities on the ground" (Unite for Sight, nd, P.1).

3.1 Introduction

During the last fifty years, Ogoniland has received considerable attention from the Nigerian government. For example, in an attempt to protect the environment of local communities, the government has formulated laws, policies and regulations and created agencies charged with responsibility for CD. Yet Ogoni communities have remained development-poor. Nor have interventions by Shell, or by their combined partnership with government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), made significant positive difference. The failure of all these efforts of the Nigerian state, Shell and NGOs to relieve the under-development of Ogoni communities prompts this chapter, which provides a review of the top-down approach to CD in Ogoniland. First, the chapter reviews the repeated attempts made by the Nigerian state, Shell, NGOs and their partnerships to develop Ogoni communities. Second, it argues that these top-down initiatives failed to develop Ogoniland because they replicated patterns of bureaucracy and corruption endemic in the oil-dependent nature of the Nigerian state. Third, it concludes with a critical analysis of the deficiencies of the top-down framework, examining why both ill-motivated and well-intended top-down approaches of CD are expert-poor and generally unsustainable and have failed in the CD of Ogoni communities. These three themes are covered in the following sections: sections 3.2 and 3.3 explain government initiatives for environmental protection; section 3.4 is a historical review of the activities of government agencies; section 3.5 discusses Shell's model of social responsibility for Ogoniland; section 3.6 considers the partnerships established for CD in Ogoniland; and section 3.7 summarizes the issues that have emerged from the chapter and reaches a conclusion.

3.2 Government laws and regulations for environmental protection

There is a link between the environmental degradation of Ogoniland and the high levels of poverty and community underdevelopment (underutilization of environmental, social, economic, human and psychological capital) that have besieged its communities and inhabitants (Babalola, 2014; Arisuokwu and Nnaomah, 2012; Maduagwu, 2012). For

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example, as Ebegbulem et al (2013, p. 281) notes, oil exploration and exploitation is a cause of Ogonis'economic and social underdevelopment because Ogonis':

> "tremendous potential for economic growth and sustainable development remains unfulfilled and its future is threatened by deteriorating economic conditions that are not being addressed by government policies and actions"

Perversely, over the years the Nigerian government have formulated environmental protection laws and created institutions with the responsibility for protecting the ND environment, even while they connive with multinational oil companies to degrade this same environment (Aghalino nd).

As part of the framework for the protection and sustenance of the ND environment, the Nigerian government, according to Ebeku (2004), has over time formulated many detailed laws and policies. Between 1969 to 1992, the Nigerian state promulgated: (1) the Petroleum Act of 1969, which empowers the commissioner in charge of petroleum to develop guidelines on how to prevent water and atmospheric pollution in the course of oil production; (2) the Associated Gas Re-injection Act of 1980 which requires Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) to submit preliminary reports of their gas reinjection strategies; (3) the Harmful Waste Decree No 42 of 1988, which prohibits the buying, selling, transportation and storage of toxic substances; (4) Decree No 58 of 1988, which established the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) with the responsibility for preserving bio-diversity; and (5) Decree No. 59 of 1992, which updated the FEPA Decree No.58 of 1988 (Ogbonnaya (2011). In addition, the government issued in 1992 the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for Petroleum Industries in Nigeria (EGASPIN), which is one of Nigeria's most important measures for the protection of Ogoniland and other ND communities. EGASPIN mandates the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), which is an arm of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, to manage every environmental problem arising from oil exploration (UNEP 2011). In 2000, the Nigerian state also formulated the Nigerian Management Act on Environment, which contain strategies for the phase-out of gas flaring. Further measures that prohibit gas flaring include the Natural Gas Conservation and Development Policy and the Nigerian Policy Thrust on Atmospheric Protection (Okafor 2011).

In addition, two regulations were put in place to protect the marine environment: the Oil in Navigable Waters Acts of 1968, which is an elaborate guideline for dealing with water pollution, covering aspects of the International Convention for the Prevention of Sea Pollution by Oil; and the Oil Pipeline Act, which provides licences for the development and

maintenance of pipelines, makes provision for the laying of pipelines, and provides permits for the survey of pipelines (Akpomuvie 2011). Nigeria, in her 'resolute' concern to protect her environment, is signatory to the following international conventions; International Convention of the Law of the Sea; International Convention for the Prevention of the Sea by Oil Pollution; Civil Liability Convention of 1969; and Civil Liability Convention of 1969.

This array of legislation, regulations and frameworks leaves an impression that Ogoniland and ND communities are well-protected against agents of environmental degradation and pollution (Ukoli 2005). However, what protects an environment is not the number of laws and regulations but their effectiveness, and the fact is that the laws, regulations, and policies formulated to protect Ogoniland and ND communities suffer from "both substantive and implementation problems" (Ebeku 2004, p. 369). This is because they were formulated by so-called 'experts' who are unaware of, or not up-to-date with, polluted sites in local communities, still less the enormous impacts of pollution on local communities (Aghalino 2004). Moreover, local communities are mostly unaware of laws and regulations that seek to protect their environment (UNEP, 2011). Furthermore, these laws, regulations and policies are framed on weak structures, as the Nigerian government lacks the political will to enforce these laws and to punish defaulters (Duru 2011; Ebeku, 2004). Therefore, the end to the pollution of local communities may not be near despite all these laws and policies, and MNOCs will continue to pollute communities and drag their feet on cleaning up already polluted sites. The next section discusses how institutions established with the responsibility of protecting the environment of Ogoni communities have fared in this task.

3.3 Government institutions established for environmental protection

Along with environmental laws, regulations and policies, there are also many institutions and agencies charged with the responsibility of protecting the environment of local communities. These institutions/agencies were designed to monitor the enforcement of government policies as well as prosecute defaulters when and where necessary (Okafor 2011; Aghalino, nd). For example, Decree No 58 of 1988 established the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), which later became the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV). In addition, as Okafor (2011) pointed out, the following institutions worked towards the environmental protection of local communities: Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR); Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR); Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC); Natural Resources Conservation Council

(NARESCON); National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA); National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) (Rim-Rukeh, 2015); Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA); National Orientation Agency (NOA); and Town Planning Institutions (Ogwu, 2014), in addition to the state government ministries of environment (UNEP, 2011).

One problem with such a proliferation of agencies charged with protecting the environment of local communities is that, as Okafor (2011) noted, there is an overlapping of mandates, and it is sometimes unclear where the responsibility of an institution starts and ends (see also UNEP, 2011; Duru, 2011). While all these environmental protection agencies are important, I will focus particularly on the activities of three of them: first, the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV), because "it brings together all activities within the government machinery that are related to environmental and sustainable development" (Duru, 2011,p.3); second, the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP), an institution primarily set up to tackle hydrocarbon pollution in Ogoniland (Mmom and Pedro, 2013); and third, the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), which has important responsibilities for managing environmental problems resulting from oil exploration (UNEP, 2011).

3.3.1 *Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV)*

This organization was formerly known as the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) (Babalola *et al*. 2010), but with the change to civilian government in 1999, FEPA was absorbed into the newly created FMENV (Duru, 2011). FMENV took over the mandates formerly borne by FEPA which aim at securing a high quality environment that ensures the well-being of all, through the sustainable exploitation of natural resources, in order to preserve biodiversity thereby maintaining healthy ecosystems (FMENV, nd). To achieve these goals, FMENV monitors the implementation of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) for oil and gas exploration and exploitation; publishes newsletters and discoveries about the environment and the economy; controls the oil and gas section of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) which has the responsibility for issuing and implementing oil and gas guidelines; sets out strategies for gas capture and utilisation in a bid to phase out gas flaring; and prosecutes defaulters (Okafor, 2011). FMENV also has the responsibility for ensuring the implementation of international treaties like the Kyoto Protocol for controlling climate change (FMENV, nd).

However, according to Omofonmwan and Osa-Edoh (2008), this institution, which enjoys generous government funding and legal backing, is yet to achieve its objectives because of its clear disconnect from the local communities it seeks to protect. Despite its promises, FMENV made no provision for protected or reserved areas in Ogoniland, according to Ebeku (2004), because it has no respect for community culture. Hence, for example, its silence over the destruction of forests which communities hold as sacred sites (Verschuuren *et al.*, 2010). In other words, its mandates "did not evolve from the people's tradition or way of life" because its values are not indigenous (Omofonmwan and Osa-Edoh, 2008). This is why local communities view this agency with suspicion (Verschuuren *et al*, 2010). While FMENV coordinates environmental protective action for the entire nation, the next section discusses HYPREP, an agency that manages hydrocarbon pollution only in Ogoniland.

3.3.2 *Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP)*

Commentators like Mmom and Igbuku (2015) and Saheed (2012) have described as a heart-breaking discovery by UNEP the very high concentrations of toxics across Ogoni communities due to oil pollution caused by SPDC. Duru (2011, p.1) asked the central question: If there are environmental laws and accredited environmental agencies to protect the environment, why is Ogoniland so massively polluted? The apparent inability of FMENV to protect and restore the environment of Ogoniland caused the Nigerian state to establish HYPREP to coordinate the sustainable environmental restoration of Ogoniland. At the same time, the Nigerian government worked towards the establishment of the Ogoniland Environmental Restoration Authority (ERA) as recommended by UNEP to oversee the clean-up of Ogoniland which according to UNEP (2011) would take 20 to 35 years.

HYPREP was established in 2012 with a mandate to inspect all communities and sites in Ogoniland which are polluted with hydrocarbon, and make recommendations to the federal government to clean up hydrocarbon-polluted communities. This task, according to Amnesty International (2014), means implementing UNEP's emergency measures of (1) creating awareness by marking sources of hydrocarbon-polluted drinking water; (2) making available alternative sources of potable drinking water for communities; (3) monitoring the health status of local people exposed to Benzene through drinking water from sources found to contain carcinogen at levels up to 900 times above World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines; (4) surveying other sources of drinking water in local communities; (5) informing local people about the dangers of consuming rainwater; and (6) campaigning against artisanal mining. According to Amnesty International (2014), however, the implementation of these

measures has been very patchy, as water supplies to local communities have remained fitful and most times there are no supplies, and even where HYPREP placed signs on sources of hydrocarbon-contaminated water, local people for lack of alternative sources still drink from contaminated sources. While the Nigerian government has claimed that other emergency measures have been implemented, Amnesty International (2014) reported that no progress has been made. This is partly because of corruption (Ogonis have accused the Acting National Coordinator of corruption), and partly because of bureaucracy (barely two years into its existence, HYPREP owed its staff salaries in arrears and due to the complex bureaucratic nature of this agency, unpaid staff remained with no information about when and how their salaries would be paid (*Thisday,* 2014). This is why Mmom and Igbuku (2015, p.9) claimed that this Port Harcourt-based agency "has not been able to take off properly", hence its poor performance. Similarly, in an interview extracted from *Thisday* newspaper of Saturday 9th August (2014, p.2), the Minister of Petroleum, whose ministry established HYPREP, was quoted as saying: "Whilst HYPREP has implemented some of the transitional phase objectives as recommended in the report, Government recognises and is very mindful that the programme has not achieved its full objectives as envisioned by this administration".

Pyagbara stated in *Thisday* newspaper of Saturday 9th August (2014, p.3), that the only visible achievement made by HYPREP remains "the placing of billboards at strategic places in Port Harcourt and Ogoni land and the placing of notices around oil spill sites. Is this what is expected of the agency?" Mr Danladi Kifasi, the former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Petroleum in a meeting at Bori, acknowledged in *Thisday* newspaper of Saturday 9th August (2014, p.5) the shortcomings of this agency, describing HYPREP as a 'mistake', for three reasons; Ogonis had no input in its creation and planning; a corrupt coordinator was hand-picked to manage this agency; and it is only a smokescreen by a government that is not genuinely interested in Ogonis and their communities (see also Amnesty International, 2014). A fourth reason is that HYPREP was ill-equipped to function effectively (UNPO, 2013; Mmom and Igbuku, 2015). Currently, Ogonis are calling for the scrapping of HYPREP (UNPO 2013) because, like FMENV, they view HYPREP with extreme suspicion (Mmom and Igbuku, 2015).

3.3.3 *National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA)*
The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) was created in 2006 through Act CAP N157, with the overarching aim of organizing and executing a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan through: (1) timely and proficient responses to cases of oil pollution;

(2) identification and clean-up of high risk and priority areas; (3) protection of threatened environments as well as the arrangement of resources necessary to save lives; (4) assurance of available oil pollution-combating equipment with a functional communication network to ensure timely response to spills; (5) provision of training and drills to ensure preparedness of operational staff; (6) advisory and technical support and equipment for major cases of oil pollution across the West African sub-region; (7) support for research into indigenous approaches and equipment for oil spill detection; (8) information-sharing with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and other local, regional and international organizations to improve oil spill detection skills and technology; (9) information-sharing with neighbouring countries about the rapid movement of equipment and personnel; (10) development of quick procedures for the importation of necessary equipment; and (11) periodic review and assessment of entire NOSDRA mandates and plans (Rim-Rukeh, 2015). With these mandates, NOSDRA has positioned itself as the principal agency in charge of all oil spills and related matters in Nigeria, and to achieve these mandates, NOSDRA works with the Oil Spill Recovery, Clean-up, Remediation and Damage Assessment team (Rim-Rukeh, 2015). For the purpose of remediation and damage assessment, NOSDRA conducts Joint Investigation Visits (JIVs) and produces Joint Investigation Reports (JIRs). According to Amnesty International (2012, p. 1):

> "The joint investigation team includes representatives of regulatory agencies, the oil company, the affected community and the security forces. The team investigates the cause of the oil spill and is supposed to jointly agree and sign a report, which confirms the cause and includes other key information such as the volume of oil spilt. The information recorded on the oil spill investigation form is known as a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) report"

JIT reports are of considerable importance as they serve as the foundation for negotiating compensation with communities based on the extent of damage (Amnesty International, 2012). But the credibility of JIVs and JIT reports has always remained controversial (Amnesty International, 2009; Rim-Rukeh, 2015). Even though JIVs claim to embrace a participatory type of disaster management, community representatives involved in JIVs mostly lack relevant skills and so only end up 'participating in participation' (Rim-Rukeh 2015). For example, because of their lack of technical skills, community representatives and even NOSDRA staff, all depend on the technical expertise and data from Shell personnel for oil spill assessments. With this upper hand, Shell is accused of manipulating local communities because they fail to report accurately the exact cause and amount of many spills. For example, according to Amnesty International (2012), the 2012 Bodo (Ogoniland)

community spill was a case where Shell together with other members of the JIV team alleged that local people sabotaged pipelines that polluted Bodo Creeks, and that it was not caused by pipeline corrosion. But this spill was later discovered to be the result of pipeline corrosion by US pipeline experts (Amnesty International, 2012).

Moreover, an Amnesty International report (2013, p.41) stated that Shell work hand-in-hand with NOSDRA staff to sustain polluted sites and underdevelopment in Ogoniland by denying community members copies of the JIV reports, thus enabling Shell to change reports in their favour. Amnesty reported a conversation with NOSDRA staff:

> "Amnesty International asked NOSDRA about this issue. According to the Zonal Director, Communities always get a copy of the JIV report in the field. When questioned about how this was possible, he said carbon paper was used. However, community members involved in JIVs said they had never seen carbon paper used… Researchers also found clear evidence that carbon copies are not made and that JIV documents are taken away and a photocopy of the JIV is later given to the community representatives (if they receive a copy, which some do not)".

While it is said that communities are involved in JIV, Shell prefers a few representatives, especially community chiefs and youth leaders, who thereby become mediators for their communities. In other words, not only do these selected representatives only 'participate in participation' because of their lack of technical skills that would have made them informed in the JIV exercise, the majority of Ogonis remain excluded from an exercise that could have afforded them the opportunity of giving out information about the impact of spills on their lives. This explains why Amnesty International stated that JIV is an incomplete process because "the damage done to individuals can be lost in the course of these negotiations and more powerful members of the community may benefit while others… lose out" (Amnesty International, 2012, p.42). The suspicion is that JIV exercises cause more problems within communities than they provide solutions.

Moreover, as UNEP points out, the fact that the supervision of remediation of old contaminated sites is not within the mandate of NOSDRA (an organization in charge of oil spill assessment), explains why there are countless cases of un-remediated polluted sites across Ogoniland. Some of these un-remediated sites suffered oil spills over 40 years ago. In its defence, NOSDRA insists that even though it has faced understaffing since its inception, it still manages to investigate spills and require defaulting companies to pay for polluting the environment, while also exploring other ways to improve its service (NOSDRA 2011). But

Murade Sheriff at the Centre for Peace and Environmental Justice in an interview with the *Nations Newspaper* on 22nd May 2015, described NOSDRA as a statue with no action.

3.4 Government interventions for community development

In addition to intervening to protect and restore the environment of local communities, the Nigeria government has over the years invested heavily in interventions to ensure that local communities enjoy economic, social and infrastructural development. This section provides a historical review of these interventions. There have been five main governmental initiatives for community development (CD):

(1) The Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB),1960-66

(2) Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA),1976-to date

(3) Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), 1992-1999

(4) Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 2000-to date

(5) Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), 2008-to date

3.4.1 *The Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB), 1960-66*

The long history of underdevelopment of the Niger Delta gave birth to the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB). This agency was created to develop local communities when it became obvious that the Willinks Commission of 1957 would not support the creation of a Niger Delta state that would develop its own communities (Enemugwem 2009). NDDB was created by the Nigerian federal government through the Niger Delta Act (1960), which was strongly supported by the then Nigerian Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who desired the development of this area. NDDB was given an initial ten-year lifespan to tackle the development challenges of local communities (Okorobia 2010). But for Ering (2013), ten years was too short a time to develop this area, considering the enormity of the challenges facing the communities. NDDB had one of its zonal offices in Bori, Ogoniland and its headquarters (HQ) in Port Harcourt, even though Port Harcourt was not one of its catchment areas. The choice of Port Harcourt city for its headquarters was, according to NDDB as cited in Okorobia (2010), "for administrative convenience, in view of the availability of electricity, water, industrial workshops, commercial house, airport, postal and telephone connections" which could not be readily accessed if it moved its headquarters to local communities. This Port Harcourt HQ was equipped with extensive facilities, including laboratories and even a marine base with jetties, slipways and stores (Okorobia, 2010). From this distance, Board members carried out feasibility studies of local communities for planning

purposes (Okorobia, 2010). Results from these feasibility studies revealed that the majority of local people were employed mainly in primary activities such as farming, fishing and lumbering, and the Board members advised that the development of these sectors could help local communities live above the poverty level. For instance, Okorobia (2010) cited NDDB (nd, p. 7), which reported that the agricultural sector could benefit from the introduction of new and improved varieties of crops, and that preliminary experiments were carried out which resulted in the proliferation of cash crop farms.

Turning to afforestation, stock-maps that showed the quality of mangroves were prepared and Raffia palms were identified as very valuable forest products. These efforts at developing the forestry sector resulted in the establishment of non-indigenous tree nurseries in Bori town. The abandonment of indigenous crops in favour of the importation of cash and food crop seedlings as well as the proliferation of experimental farms had everything to do with the technical advisory team of the NDDB, who were mainly Dutch and British nationals (Enemugwem, 2009). Statistical surveys of the estuarine, brackish water and fresh water were also carried out, and information was obtained on fish population, methods of fishing, and gear types, as well as landings and prices. According to NDDB, as cited in Okorobia (2010), NDDB Board members in charge of fisheries suggested the introduction of new methods of fishing especially the exploitation of untapped potential fishing grounds.

Evaluating the impact of NDDB, however, Falola and Genova (2009) claimed it had no positive impact as it had hardly begun to embark on the building of infrastructure, which was part of its development programme targeted at attracting foreigners and more investment into local communities, before it collapsed in 1966, following the change from democratic to military rule. The deficiencies of this agency were compounded by the outbreak of the Biafran-led civil war (Ekpe 2015) and poor funding Ering (2013). The fact that during six years of existence, NDDB made no significant impact indicates that it failed in its assignment (Aghalino, 2004; Idumange, 2011). Ten years after this collapse, the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA), was created in 1976.

3.4.2 *Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA), 1976-to date*
NDBDA was created ten years after the collapse of NDDB following its poor performance and the sustained pressure on the federal government from indigent communities (Aghalino 2012). But unlike NDDB, NDBDA was established through a military decree; No 37 by the then military government of Olusegun Obasanjo. Its mandate was strengthened by Decree

No.25 of 1979, while Decree 25 of 1987 led to boundary adjustments as more communities were added to its initial catchment areas to make a total of ten Basin Development Authorities (Okorobia, 2010). Each of these Basin Development Authorities only worked within their specified catchment areas. Eight years after the creation of this agency, the Nigerian government through its Decree No.25 called for the privatization and partial sale of NDBDAs, while also creating more NDBDAs (Okorobia, 2010).

NDBDA, like NDDB, has its headquarters in Port Harcourt city, and administratively it was also highly bureaucratic, with a General Manager supported by Assistant General Managers. These appointments during the military era came from the office of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, whereas during the democratic era nominations came from the office of the president. The NDBDA was charged with the responsibility of making available irrigation and drainage systems to check flooding and erosion, through widening waterways and making dredges, and providing potable water (Ering, 2013). In 1987, following Decree No.35, more responsibilities were added to NDBDA, and all Basin Authorities were authorised with the following mandates: (1) to embark on detailed development of surface and underground water resources basically for irrigation and erosion control purposes; (2) to construct and maintain dams, wells, and boreholes; (3) to supervise and ensure the transference of lands to be cultivated using irrigation schemes to farmers; (4) to supply water from reservoirs to farmers at a fee determined by government agents; (5) to build and maintain roads and bridges that linked NDBDA project sites; and (6) to develop and record the latest information about water shortages and supply in their master plan using environmental and socio-economic data from their catchment area. Some further functions not listed above could be carried out upon directions from the federal government, though none of these agencies could borrow or lend money without approval from the government (NDBDA, nd).

NDBDA carried out the construction of several boreholes, and among other projects, accomplished the surveying of 1,000 hectares of land. But it has been criticized for under-achievement and in some cases complete lack of achievement. Akpomuvie (2011, p.212) linked this poor performance to the management's "organizational problems that bedevilled it from inception"; to the fact that the federal government appointed Directors who were not indigenes or members of the communities in areas they sought to develop; and to corruption within it (politicians expected returns from the Directors they appointed, and the appointees themselves worked towards lining their own pockets). Okorobia (2010) attributed the failure

of this agency to develop its catchment areas to two factors: side-lining of local communities in the creation, design and management of NDBDA; and the indifferent manner in which the federal government handled this agency (making puzzling its extension of this scheme to more developed parts of the country).

3.4.3 *Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), 1992-1999*

When it became obvious that NDBDA could not contribute much to developing local communities, the federal government had to develop alternative ways of tackling the chronic problem of underdevelopment. In 1982, the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari approved a 1.5% derivation fund from the payment of rents and royalties for the development of local communities (Edigin and Okonmah, 2010). By 1991, however, it was clear to the federal government that this money channelled into local communities through the state could not mitigate the problems of community underdevelopment. The need for an agency to manage these funds led to the creation of the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992, and the derivation fund was increased from 1.5 to 3%. OMPADEC was given the major responsibility of ensuring that this money, which Omotola and John (2010) estimate at 13.6 billion naira in 1998, was used prudently for development purposes. OMPADEC was empowered to distribute monthly allocations to local communities, and it was required to investigate and find solutions to the environmental challenges resulting from oil exploitation, serving as an intermediary between oil companies and local communities (Oguine 2000). Unlike NDDB and NDBDA, however, OMPADEC had community representatives on their board (Aghalino 2002), though like the board members of NDDB and NDBDA, these two community representatives (Professor Eric Opia and Albert K. Horsefall) were both appointees of the government.

OMPADEC inherited several abandoned projects by the defunct presidential committee that managed 1.5% of revenue meant to develop local communities. It introduced 200 new projects in these areas, including funding for power supplies, road construction, health provision, and mass transport programmes (Omotola and John, 2010). In addition, it gave soft loans to small-scale farmers. Within a year, OMPADEC had spent about two billion naira in its bid to develop local communities.

There are divided views about the achievements of OMPADEC, because barely a year into its existence, its first Sole Administrator released a statement notifying the public that powerful government officials were squirrelling away two billion naira meant for the development of

local communities from its account (Aghalino, 2002). To counter these allegations, the federal government alleged that OMPADEC failed to follow due process as stipulated by the state, in approving substandard projects and inflating contract charges. For instance, it was a tradition in OMPADEC to pay contractors half the cost of the entire project before the start, and as a result, most of their projects were not completed. A notorious case of corruption was reported by Aghalino in relation to a contract for the construction of a gas turbine in Eleme, Ogoniland, which was awarded at a cost of US$20.7 million in 1993, but by 1995 the project was not completed, and only after the collapse of OMPADEC, did the state government complete it in 2001 (BBC, 2005). Yet, even then, a report on the situation in Ogoniland compiled by Mader (2002, p. 51) quoted Chiefs Obekle Tenwaji and Ngei Nwakaji of Eleme saying that "the gas turbine said to have been built here to electrify the whole Ogoniland - nothing there. Anytime they want to show that they have light they will use a generator. You just see light; you will think there is light". Similarly, respondents KIs-26, 2, 4, 14, 17, and 20, all reported that this gas turbine is not operating and they still live in darkness.

Between 1992, the year it was created, and 1999, the year it ended, OMPADEC "used huge amount of money to create hundreds of uncompleted projects most of which have no direct relevance on the lives of the oil communities" (Aghalino, nd, p. 52). Opia and Horsefall were both linked to the embezzlement of missing funds: according to Aghalino (2002), Opia was unable to account for a missing sum of 6.7 billion naira. This widespread and deep corruption caused the unceremonious dismissal in quick succession of the two pioneering administrators of this agency (Omotola and John, 2010). In their defence, it could be argued that the Nigerian government was itself implicated in this scandal, because Horsefall and Opia awarded contracts at various times to individuals who were recommended by the same government that accused and dismissed them on charges of corruption (Ering, 2013).

The verdict on OMPADEC, therefore, is that "no significant impact was made" (Ugoh and Ukpere, 2010, p.1172), see also Aghalino, 2002; Omotola and John, 2010; Oguine 2000). Or rather, while OMPADEC did not succeed in developing local communities, it did succeed in enriching some community chiefs and elites when it changed to a contract-awarding agency, and it left communities with pockets of abandoned projects. The failure of OMPADEC to develop local communities after seven years of its existence led to the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000. The next section discusses NDDC.

3.4.4 *Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), 2000-to date*

As Omotola and John (2010) report, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was created by the democratic government of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2000. Unlike OMPADEC, which was created by military decree, NDDC was claimed to reflect 'democratic codes' (Omotola and John, 2010) because it was established by a Bill approved by the National Assembly. Nevertheless, Niger Deltans argued that they were not consulted as this Bill was drafted by hired consultants (Omotola and John, 2010). This was the reason why the nine governors of the Niger Delta states rejected the Bill outright (Idumange 2011), claiming that the NDDC agency, its mandates, and its projects are not owned by the Niger Deltans. However, Okumagba and Okereka (2012) argued that the Niger Deltans were consulted before and during the drafting of this bill because: the NDDC unlike previous agencies was planned to be more comprehensive and as a regional master plan, it needed inputs from Niger Deltans; this Bill was designed in a way that Niger Deltans could claim ownership of the new agency and also take responsibility for its failures or successes; and unlike previous agencies, NDDC wanted to make not only an impact but also a lasting one, and this required stakeholder involvement. According to Okumagba and Okereka (2012), this stakeholder participation was built into the NDDC Master Plan. Unlike NDDB, NDDC was developed by experts from GTZ in Germany who carefully crafted it following global principles of sustainable development, within which values of good management, governance and teamwork were taken into account. However, Aghalino (nd, p.46) reported that poor management remains a major challenge for NDDC because" successive Managing Directors and Boards of the Commission have flouted and brazenly violated the Act establishing the commission".

Critics have asserted that senior staff at NDDC have acted in line with the directives and character of the government that appointed them to whom they are answerable (Ugoh, 2008). According to Idumange (2011), like the Nigerian state, these NDDC and managers have maintained a culture of corruption through manipulating contracts. Aghalino (nd) refers to the massive corruption that has weighed down this agency, which, according to Idumange (2011, p.6), began with internal misunderstandings that were allowed to "snowball into a crisis level" that politicians have learnt to exploit. The close relationship between NDDC Board members and federal government/ politicians explains why the NDDC Board is not independent, and according to Idumange (2011, p. 5), this makes it "impossible for the Board to function properly". For example, Idumange quoted the State Commissioner who linked the

malfunctioning of NDDC to the office of the federal government, saying that "the office kills every viable programme and policy initiatives by the Board and stifles their implementation. It ridicules the decisions of the Board by permitting NDDC Contract Award letters to be flaunted outside the commission and sold cheaply to contractors" (see also Oguine (2000). It is for these reasons that Aghalino (nd) finds little difference between the ways OMPADEC awarded contracts and the manner in which NDDC awards contracts. Like OMPADEC, NDDC managers award contracts without following stipulated due process, thereby creating room for embezzlement of contract funds. This explains why most of NDDC's infrastructural development projects are abandoned midway (Dikewoha 2013). For example, between 2000 and 2010, NDDC awarded 3,112 infrastructural development projects like road construction, construction and reconstruction of modern jetties, rural electrification, construction of classrooms, and rice processing plants, but out of this figure, only 1,412 projects reached completion stage (Aghalino, nd). The greatest failure of NDDC lies in the mid-way abandonment of projects especially road construction schemes. According to Dikewoha (2013, p.1), a community group reported on the negative impacts of mid-way abandonment of road constructions projects that "it has made it impossible for economic and social activities between communities affected". Moreover, according to Osuoka (2007), often community members have no real need for some completed projects which are initiated haphazardly. For example, Osuoka reported that NDDC built a landing jetty in a community that had no source of potable water. Part of the problem is the over-extensiveness of NDDC's mandate, which covers development in sectors like hydrology; environment; agriculture; aquaculture; biodiversity; transport; health; housing; education; rural and urban planning; tourism; small- and large- scale industry; youth and women employment; solid mineral extraction; water and electricity supply; waste management; vocational training; social welfare; conflict prevention; and arts and sports (Idumange, 2011; Oguine, 2000).

Ten years after the establishment of NDDC, its management admits that it has only completed its Quick Impact Projects (QIP) in seven spheres: establishment of good governance for sustainable development; HIV/AIDS and malaria control; agriculture; micro and small business; power and energy; sports development; and education. Accordingly, with medium- and long-term plans that last till 2020, it is unlikely that NDDC will achieve the mandates in its regional Master Plan (Akinwale and Osabuohien 2009). This means that the overall aim of this agency, which is to "reduce poverty, induce industrialization, and ensure

economic transformation aimed at raising the people's living standard" (Akinwale and Osabuohien, 2009, p.150), may not be achieved by 2020.

Does this mean that NDDC has caused more problems in communities than it has solved? It seems that NDDC has added to the ND's problems, not least because aggrieved militants who felt their communities were disenfranchised from NDDC projects, doubled their attack on the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies, thereby causing more mayhem in their already poor, underdeveloped and fragile communities (Aghalino, nd). Rexler (2010, p.1) suggested that closer examinations might reveal that NDDC "may be more harmful than beneficial". For Idemudia (2010, p.145), NDDC "is partly responsible for community under-development due to duplication of development projects and inefficient use of scarce resources"

On the other hand, some community chiefs and elites who have benefitted from NDDC contracts, praise the agency for its 'development strides' (Babalola 2014). For example, Omotola and John (2010, p.131) cited Djebah, who quoted the National Secretary of Traditional Rulers of Oil Mineral Producing Communities of Nigeria, as saying:

> "Many people just talk, open their mouth without knowing how much the Commission has and what its mandate is really in the Niger Delta…if you look at the overall set up of the Commission and the NDDC mandate, you will see that the Commission has done well given the funds at its disposal…we in the oil producing communities are impressed. But we are saying that given more funds, the Commission can do more".

However, this positive assessment does not reflect the reality on the ground, according to Omotola and John (2010), and it is for this reason that the Nigerian government embarked on the setting up of committees to investigate the activities of NDDC, and the creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) in 2007 to oversee NDDC (Aghalino, nd).

3.4.5 *Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), 2007-to date*
The culture of creating and scrapping of agencies gives an impression of 'new administration, new agency'. This is the case with the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), which was created in 2007 by the Yar'adua administration. But with almost the same mandate as NDDC, it is difficult to determine how both agencies could carry out their respective functions without clashes or duplication of duties. Like NDDC, MNDA claims it is determined to tackle head-on the many challenges of ND communities (Tyoyila and Terhenmen 2012), including the fulfilment of corporate social responsibility (CSR) obligations; the

enforcement of all petroleum laws so that local people can enjoy the benefits but avoid the harms from oil exploitation; the allocation of 10 percent equity contributions from federal government and multinational oil companies to communities; the development of databases of community members adversely affected by oil exploitation activities; the protection and conservation of biodiversity; and the assurance that oil companies follow best practices. These mandates are medium-term objectives, and in addition, MNDA has the following mandates which are short-term: granting amnesty to ND militants in order to restore peace in communities; coordinating the development efforts of all stakeholders in the Niger Delta, especially those of the NDDC; reducing poverty; cutting unemployment; fixing social and physical infrastructures; controlling environmental degradation and pollution; investigating inter- and intra- ethnic/ communal conflicts; and probing the disruption of oil extraction activities (MNDA 2013).

Like previous agencies, the management of MNDA was handpicked; the only difference being that MNDA is made up of ministers not directors. This, according to Agbu (2011), is its supposed advantage over previous agencies because its two Ministers are also members of the Federal Executive Council and so can meet with the president to deliberate on the developmental needs of the ND. In theory, this arrangement should speed up the implementation of the NDDC's regional Master Plan and ensure the realization of vision 2020.

The much celebrated 'achievement' of the MNDA has been, in the words of Aghalino (nd, p. 50), the "taming of the Niger Delta monster", which, according to Dahou-Nwajiaku (2010, p.1) consists of:

> "armed groups, many affiliated to the Niger Delta-wide political organization MEND, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, proliferated throughout the oil producing states… MEND declared war on the oil industry pending the resolution of long term political grievances relating to poverty and underdevelopment, the poor regulation of an environmentally polluting oil industry, and the alienation of local people from rights to land and resources in the Niger Delta. Attacks on oil industry infrastructure, the kidnapping of expatriate oil company personnel and the illicit tapping and sale of crude oil became stocks in trade of armed militia, many with political as well as pecuniary objectives"

MNDA sought to deal with MEND by establishing a handpicked committee, tagged the "Technical Committee of the Niger Delta", according to Aghalino (nd, p. 51), made "up of 45 wise men and women with sound knowledge" of the ND terrain, whose main task was to carry out a documentary analysis of reports on the ND and then advise the federal

government on how the many problems in this region can be solved. The most important recommendation in the reports from this committee was that for peace to reign in the ND, an amnesty should be granted to militants to bring about their disarmament and rehabilitation. However, this recommendation, like previous recommendations, was received with mixed reactions from the ND people. Critics complained that Niger Deltans were not consulted before the selection of committee members. Aghalino (nd, p. 52), explained that a leader of MEND not only queried the criteria that were used to select the 45 wise men and women who brought forward the recommendation, but argued that the entire process "is orchestrated and lacks integrity". Other militant groups, like the Niger Delta Youth Movement, accused the Nigerian government of investing again in a vain venture, because ND youths were not part of the technical committee. Authors like Aghalino (nd), Dahou-Nwajiaku (2010) and Nwankpa (2014) claimed it was only a short-term unsustainable political solution yet the ND problem needed a long-term political solution. Nwankpa (2014, p. 5) said that:

> "The Niger Delta amnesty, as such, may not be different from past amnesties such as the one General Gowon offered Issac Boro (a Niger Delta revolutionist that raised a mutiny against the Federal Government of Nigeria for 12 days in 1967) and the Biafran war lords during and after the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War (1967-1970) or the many presidential pardons granted to political prisoners since independence."

This is because its ability to bring peace and economic development in the Niger Delta depends on the motivation of the government. Amnesties are a "political tool used by government for both good and bad purposes", and in the ND it was widely felt that they would not solve the socio-economic problems of local communities (Nwankpa, 2014, p. 1).

Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, on 25th June 2009, an official announcement for the adoption of the amnesty programme was made and between 6th August and 4th October 2009, ND militants who surrendered their arms received presidential pardons and were included in the amnesty programme to be given packages which provided monthly allowances and training (Dahou-Nwajiaku, 2010) including formal education and vocational skill training for a period of five years (Nwankpa 2014). Approximately 10,000 ex-militants benefitted from this package (Ekaette 2009). The amnesty attracted international commendations because it was perceived to have brought back peace in the ND, which in turn improved oil production (Nwankpa, 2014). However, this acclaimed peace may only be temporary because militants enrolled in it have at various times threatened to return to the streets because the Nigerian government has failed to keep its part of the contract. In 2013, *Premium Times* of May 30th reported that ex- militants took to the streets saying "we agreed

to surrender arms and ammunitions because we only want to be good and law abiding citizens. We are disappointed that after the amnesty programme, where most of us were taken out of the country and others within the country, the federal government has refused to pay our allowance". In July, 2015, Oyadongha reported in *Vanguard* yet another threat by ex-militants to return to the streets if their allowances are not paid. Three months on (10th October, 2015), Ibekwe, reported in *Premium Times* that these threats have continued. Moreover, beyond the amnesty package is the fact that about 700,000 Ogonis are faced with more fundamental issues of environmental, socio-economic and political concerns that threaten their existence but are not covered in the amnesty programme. The amnesty programme thus seems to be another ill-fated top-down package from the government facilitated by MNDA.

In addition to the amnesty programme, MNDA, claimed that in partnership with the private sector, it put together a job creation fair, which trained and created jobs for 11,000 ND people. Also, according to Ekaette (2009), there are on-going discussions about how micro-finance banks can make credit available to ND youths who wish to set up small-scale businesses. MNDA also has plans to construct the Niger Delta Coastal Road, which on completion will be one of the longest roads in Nigeria (Ekaette, 2009).

Judging the success of MNDA is a hard task because it is difficult to draw a line between its work and that of NDDC. Aghalino (nd: 51) claimed that "There was hardly any guarantee that the newly created ministry would now perform the magic which the NDDC could not… having been hamstrung by the twin factors of poor management and funding".

3.5 Shell: a model of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and community development in Ogoniland

Parallel with these governmental attempts to improve ND communities, Shell Nigeria Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) have over the years come up with various strategies of social responsibility to develop Ogoniland and other ND communities. This section discusses these attempts made by SPDC, which is the only MNOC with a legal licence to mine for oil in Ogoniland (Pyagbara 2010). Of all business sectors, Frynas (2005) identified the oil sector as the one that lays the greatest claims to business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR) through environmental protection, community relations and protection of human rights. But the capacity of Shell to carry out these roles effectively depends on its motivation for CSR. According to Garriga and Mele (2004), motivation for CSR could be either ethical and integrative, in the interest of host communities; or

instrumental and political, targeting only company profit. CSR is subject to manipulation since any package from companies to host communities could be branded as CSR.

According to Boele *et al.* (2001), SPDC dates its CSR in Ogoniland to the 1950s, and now claims it spends over $20 million yearly for the development of local communities. Following discussions with local leaderships, Shell has sent substantial funds into local communities for CD through community elites (Zandvliet and Pedro 2002; Arisuokwu and Nnaomah, 2012; Babalola,2014). This was confirmed by KIs-4, 23, 25, 26, 28, 34,35, 36, 49, 63, 68, and 69; SQAs-1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 65, and 101; and FG-1, 2, and 3. For example, KI-49 reported that "*our leaders get paid monthly by Shell*". KI-4, a community leader, explained that "*we get something* [money] *from Shell…our secretary* [of the council of chiefs and elders] *completed his house from the money they* [Shell] *paid last year* [2013]".

Within the space of seven years, SPDC changed its CSR package for Ogoniland three times: from Community Assistance (CA) to Community Development (CD) and then to an 'acclaimed' participatory Community Development Programme (CDP). Pyagbara (2010) noted that Shell claimed the last package was designed to develop community capacity by building partnerships with local communities. In other words, Shell moved from a philanthropic gesture to a Sustainable Community Development (SCD) approach, which is a more long-term strategy of community development. To implement SCD, Shell entered into an agreement with numerous communities to work with it to develop long-term projects under a Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU). This new approach was confirmed by (KI-23) a Shell Social Performance Officer:

> "*Shell has done excellently well for indigenous communities. We started with Community Assistance, where we look out for projects and goods we think these communities need and then supply them. But to encourage participation we moved that to Community Development and today we have gone steps ahead to Sustainable Community Development. This new innovation encourages close to 90% participation. We are no longer reactive as before, that means when someone cries we do not turn back to go and attend to the person because in our planning we now incorporate social and environmental elements. We do this in partnership with the community and other stakeholders at the point of planning and at the end we fuse all data together*"

However, notwithstanding these innovative efforts, critics have condemned the SPDC method of community development as largely instrumental, political, unethical and non-integrative (Rexler, 2010; Frynas, 2005). Pyagbara (2010) accused SPDC of capitalising on the looseness of the definition of CSR to manipulate Ogoni communities. Despite the so-

called change from community assistance (CA) to SCD, whatever SPDC provided in communities was a product of high-level bureaucratic decision making, according to Frynas (2005), who doubted whether such development echoed the needs of local communities. Pyagbara (2010) stated that this change in name and the signing of the GMoU was merely a paper strategy that Ogonis have got used to, following lessons learned from years of deceit by Shell:

> "Some years into the programme [Sustainable Community Development], there is little to celebrate. The programme demonstrates the usual lack of community consultation, top-down approach, failed projects, sporadic crises and questionable close ties to locations of company operations. Most projects appear to be less a response to priorities of communities than guided by company's logic of providing access to locations and comfort for its staff" (Pyagbara, 2010, p.25)

An example of a Shell-driven initiative that was tagged a SCD project driven by Ogonis, according to MOSOP (nd) as cited by Pyagbara (2010), is the case of the K-Dere community road project. This project was highly contested by local people who thought it was a self-serving project constructed to link up Shell facilities in the community. Key informants from K-Dere community, KIs-4, 26, 32, and 63 claimed that the roads Shell constructed in their K-Dere community were very narrow and connected to their own facilities. KI-4 described Shell's SCD approach to provision of energy supplies to his community as hollow:

> "*we are living in darkness here; imagine the giant generators that they* [Shell] *have here, just only one of them can serve the whole of this community. We went to them* [Shell] *to please extend their cable a little so that our community will get power supply, instead of that Shell bought small generators that can only last for three months for only few of us. Pipelines run from here to Bonny and even when they say they are not drilling, there are some places you get to in this community and you hear sounds, but we don't know the meaning of the sound. Look at the road from here to Port Harcourt, a place where they* [Shell] *get all their money from, look at the community where they get the oil from, all these things are worrisome… our community had been in darkness and it is Shell that have caused us serious setbacks, imagine they brought solar light into our community just to light up only their Manifold area and then our whole community will be in darkness. Our youths rejected that arrangement and went on to destroy these solar connection that was what led to the problem…in 2008, when I was coming back from Kaduna state after my service year, imagine after serving my fatherland, I was welcomed with a gun shot that left me handicapped. I did not know that Shell was having problems with my community and because of that our youths were exchanging fire with soldiers and vandalising Shell manifold and burning down houses*"

According to Pyagbara (2010), far from meeting the development challenges of local communities, Shell's SCD programme has exacerbated them by using the state military to cause havoc in protesting local communities. The partnership between Shell and the Nigerian

army dates back over two decades, according to Vidal (2011, p. 1) who discovered it through "confidential memos, faxes, witness statements". These sources reported that several thousands of Ogonis were killed in the 1990s by the Nigerian military and many fled from their communities. KIs-1, 22, 30, and 32 all witnessed the brutality against their community members by the state military in partnership with Shell. KI-26 explained that Shell invited the Nigerian military to gun down protesting youths from his community, after which the residents stopped Shell officials from gaining entrance into their community because *"we don't want their divide and rule selfish projects* [SCD] *again"*. KI-22 said that Shell used the Nigeria military to intimidate youths from his community who demanded the clean-up of oil polluted creeks. Amunwa and Minwo (2011, p. 6) concluded that *"Shell's close relationship with the Nigerian military exposes the company to charges of complicity in the systematic killing and torture of local residents"*

According to Amunwa (2011), Shell has a system of CD and community engagement that instead of building peace for development, creates and rewards violence. According to KIs-1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 30, 65, and 67, Shell profits when there is unrest in communities. KIs-1, 2, and 30 explained that Shell rewards 'Rascals' (violent youths) who are able to destabilize their communities. According to KI-20, it *"has a policy that is not in line with community policy in the sense that they use our own people to cause confusion in the community"*. KI-30 held that *"they* [Shell] *deal with us differently; normally they manipulate us and set us against each other. They only generate crisis in my community."* KI-32 claimed that Shell provoked youths to commit acts of violence, thereby reinforcing underdevelopment in his community by destroying its infrastructure. KI-1 claimed that Shell comes into his Ogali community to find:

> *"any radical soul, a boy that…can cause confusion. Shell will then pick the person and empower him and then introduce him to government security after that the boy comes into the community, recruits his own boys that will work with him and then they will begin to cause confusion in the community. Shell will then declare that they cannot work in Ogali because it is not peaceful"*.

Pyagbara (2010, p. 25) asserted that in the name of SCD, Shell has planted seeds of division within communities across Ogoniland. He reported the following case in Tai, Ogoniland:

> "The case of Chief Kamanu of Gio community in Tai local government area, Rivers State, illustrates this point. Chief Kamanu said that on 18 February 2005 he had gone to Shell's offices in Port Harcourt with a colleague to report an oil spill in his community. According to Chief Kamanu, hardly had he finished meeting with Shell

official Engineer Paschal in the office when Paschal telephoned the Shell surveillance contractor in the area, Chief Monday Ngbor. The latter was known locally for committing human rights abuses on behalf of the ruling People's Democratic Party. Chief Kamanu stated that when they drove to inspect the site of the spill along with Engineer Paschal, they were met at the site by Chief Ngbor and his band of thugs fully armed."

Pyagbara reported that Kamanu was beaten to unconsciousness by these thugs.

According to Pyagbara (2010), the collective impact of SPDC's dysfunctional SCD explains why there has been a severe erosion of trust in Ogoniland, and why Ogoniland under Shell has become a kingdom divided along opposing paths despite ethnic affinity (Pyagbara 2007). SPDC's latest SCD project - 'Community and Shell Together' (CAST) - established to explore the use of local community contractors as guards for SPDC oil gas facilities, was viewed with suspicion by Ogonis because it was "ad hoc, hollow and lacking in seriousness" (Pyagbara, 2010, p. 26). Shell's SCD appears to have the backing of the government since Nigeria stands to gain when Shell cuts corners and embarks on self-serving and substandard projects branded as products of 'SCD', because under the joint venture agreement between the Nigerian government and MNOCs, both parties share the operational cost of such projects (Idemudia, 2010). According to Idemudia (2010, p. 87), therefore, the Nigeria government could not but "effectively mandate CRS and engage with its endorsing roles".

On the other hand, Burger (2011) has argued that Shell has lived up to its CSR expectations because it has invested in building infrastructures, awarded overseas scholarships, and funded training in scaffolding, project management, welding and other vocations, despite the constant vandalizing of its facilities. Burger (2011) quoted the Managing Director of Shell who claimed that "in a region and country where publicly provided infrastructures and services are badly lacking, SPDC has often stepped in and acted in lieu of government" (Burger 2011, p.7). On this view, Shell is the backbone of CD in Ogoniland and indeed the ND. Burger asserts that Shell has become a scapegoat despite its positive contributions to develop its host communities in a country with very complex challenges of which Shell is also a victim (Burger, 2011). But if it is a victim, it is a victim in a crisis that it ignited and has continued to sustain, according to critics, because Shell has changed the destiny of Ogonis, in six ways: destroying their physical environment, thereby creating poverty; delaying and most times refusing to carry out clean-up, hence sustaining poverty; releasing toxics into the environment, creating health problems; destroying sacred forests and animals, thus disconnecting Ogonis from their gods and beliefs; monetizing traditional political

systems, thus disconnecting leaders from their followers; and sowing seeds of divisions and conflicts in communities (Pygbara, 2007; Arisukwu and Nnaomah, 2012; Akpomuvie 2011; Nbete 2012; Boele et al, 2001). Even when Shell is compelled to take responsibility for the oil pollution that it has caused, it bargains to pay for only short-term impacts of pollution, neglecting the long-term and multiple impacts (Amnesty International, 2014; Rexler 2010).

3.6   Partnership and community development in Ogoniland.

Having described top-down interventions separately initiated by government and by Shell, we now turn to partnership initiatives. In the documented accounts of partnership for CD in Ogoniland, according to Idemudia (2010), they have generally taken three forms: (1) government-business; (2) business-international NGOs; and (3) business-local NGOs. Pyagbara (2010) added a fourth: (4) government or business or NGO with international agencies. In this section, we look at all four types, beginning with a case of (1) in section 3.6.1 (NDDC); a case of (2) in section 3.6.2 (Shell- Living Earth Partnership); a case of (3) in section 3.6.3 (local NGOs); and a case of (4) in section 3.6.4 (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

3.6.1 *Government-business partnership and community development of Ogoniland*

This sub-section looks at the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), which is the latest example of a government-business partnership established to develop local oil-producing communities (Rexler, 2010; Aghalino, nd; Idumange, 2011). The NDDC was created by the democratic government of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2000, and it is funded by the state and international oil companies. According to Amadi and Adullahi (2012), the Nigerian government committed to contribute 15 per cent from the oil revenue allocated to the Niger Delta states; the oil companies were committed to contribute 3% of their annual budgets (Rexler, 2010; Omotola and John, 2010; Idemudia, 2007), and Niger Delta states were expected to contribute 50% of the ecological funds allotted to them. The remaining 32%, according to Dokpesi and Ibiezugbe (2012), is sourced from the proceeds of other NDDC assets. However, Idemudia (2007) cited Alexander's Gas Connections, who noted that instead of the approved 15 percent, the Nigerian government contributes only between 10 and 12 percent; the oil companies deduct the cost of their investment for CD in local communities from their approved 3 percent and then remit the balance; and the ND state governments contribute less than their approved 50 percent and sometimes nothing at all (see also Oladele and Austen (2015). Idemudia (2010) cited the *Guardian,* which reported that between 2001 and 2006, the Nigerian government was expected to contribute a total of 318

billion naira to NDDC, but it contributed only 93 billion, while the oil companies paid 142 billion naira instead of 182 billion.

Edikan Eshett, who is the executive director of projects at NDDC, in an interview with *Newswatch* newspaper of June, 18th 2013, linked the underfunding of this agency to its abandonment of several contracts in the Niger Delta: "we found several abandoned contracts on the ground. The biggest issue we discovered was insufficient allocation in the budget to cater for their timely allocation. I will say NDDC is underfunded". Oladele and Austen (2015, p. 26) said that "NDDC is known to have suffered greatly from insufficient funding". According to Idemudia (2010, p. 83), this government-business partnership is yet to deliver dividends of development in local communities, and both partners have shifted the responsibility of developing local communities to each other, thereby making the partnership "a domain of stakeholder contestation". KIs-1 and 3 held that it will be futile to hold either of the two NDDC partners (oil companies and the government) responsible for projects in their communities, because they contest project ownership: *"sometimes the government may claim that they brought something to the community…Shell will say they are the owners of the project"* (KI-3)

While NDDC's achievements have been discussed in section 3.4.4, Rexler (2010) reported that Shell claims that its greatest contribution to the NDDC project is its investment in capacity building, as Timi Alaibe, the past Acting Managing Director of the board, said in this speech:

> "the oil companies, being major players in the region, also made significant contributions to the successful completion of the Master Plan. Indeed, of particular importance are the contributions of Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), who not only partnered with us, but also went so far as to assign its staff to work on the project. It also deployed scenario planning experts from its London office who, with some Nigeria personnel, brought to bear on the process their globally renowned wealth of knowledge and expertise. We are grateful to them, and continue to savour the joy and effectiveness of their collaboration" (NDDC, 2001, p.12).

But this celebrated collaboration has remained silent on the fundamental issue of environmental pollution which, according to Rexler (2010), has remained the crux of widespread poverty and underdevelopment across Ogoniland. As discussed in section 4.4.4, NDDC, like previous agencies is yet to develop local communities. For Rexler (2010, p. 30), the failure of the Shell-NDDC partnership shows the drawbacks in such partnership arrangements because they weaken the already weak Nigerian state by increasing the

"dependency of the state on private-sector support, ties the hands of the state…such control over development policy that should rest in the realm of the state, weakens the power of the state to regulate oil MNOCs". In other words, far from reinforcing the effectiveness of the state in promoting CD, such partnerships undermined its effectiveness. Significantly, NDDC is unknown to most respondents resident in local Ogoni communities. For example, nearly 40% of KIs,; FGS-1, 2, and 3; and SQAs-23, 31, 35, 36, 46, 57, 86, and 103, were all unaware of this government-business partnership. KI-56 reported that "*I do not know Shell…I do not know our government*". KI-6, a community leader, explained "*we have not seen any agency like that in this community*". KIs-1 and 14 stated that NDDC, like past interventionary agencies, was not meant to serve local communities. KI-14 described NDDC as "*only theory, it does not exist in practice*". The former Nigerian Senate president (David Mark) described it (NDDC) as a failure (Saheed, 2012).

3.6.2 *Business-international NGO partnership and community development of Ogoni-land*

There are representatives of international NGOs in Nigeria, like Friends of the Earth Nigeria (FOE) and Amnesty International, which have their headquarters abroad. These organizations have generally criticised Shell's business style in the Niger Delta. For example, Amnesty International has always fought against what it deems the human rights abuses of Ogonis by Shell, and it helped enormously in obtaining the financial compensation paid by Shell to the Bodo community in Ogoniland over oil spills (Vidal, 2015). However, according to Heap (2000), Living Earth Foundation UK, with its partner, Living Earth Nigeria, was an international NGO that signed a partnership agreement with Shell Development Company of Nigeria. This subsection discusses whether this partnership was successful at developing Ogoniland. According to Heap (2000), the determination by Shell Nigeria to change its CSR to a more participatory programme saw the emergence of Living Earth as its partner. This union brought together the following four organizations; Living Earth Nigeria; Living Earth UK; Shell Nigeria, and Shell UK.

As a partner, Living Earth was unsure about which communities Shell wanted it to work in and about its role and that of Shell in their partnership arrangement. According to Heap (2000), in the midst of this uncertainty, Shell accepted the funding of $2.25m presented by Living Earth. Because Living Earth had no work experience in Nigeria, it embarked on recruiting local and international staff from the UK to support its capacity for the task ahead (Heap, 2000). Heap (2000) said it was determined to develop a model for participatory development in Nigeria and indeed the Niger Delta. To achieve this, Living Earth, in a

proposal to Shell, suggested the need to work on reconciling Shell with its host communities, through 'competence development and learning within Shell' by cutting off some bureaucratic processes to enable the direct reporting of projects to the company's board of directors (Heap, 2000). However, this idea was rejected by Shell because they regarded their partnership as simply giving Living Earth the role of "a sub-contractor who would carry out a development-project for them" (Stappenbeck, 2010, p. 28).

At this point, Living Earth realized that it would be difficult to work with Shell Nigeria, since, according to Stappenbeck (2010), it became obvious that an unrepentant Shell wanted to use it as a façade while it continued its business as usual. Stappenbeck (2010, p. 28) cited Shah who said that "we had written in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that Shell would play an active part in using…our reports…as learning documents with which to change the way the programme worked. Now the reality has been very, very different". After both partners signed the MOU, their relationship ceased to be cordial, and Living Earth got little feedback on its reports from its partner (Heap, 2000). Although MOSOP accepted the legitimacy of Living Earth's working relationship with Shell, they warned that this relationship should not be associated with representing the Ogoni people (Heap, 2000). In effect, this meant that Ogonis disassociated themselves from Living Earth and its partnership with Shell, whom they perceived as their enemy (Heap, 2000, p.12). Living Earth could not have implemented a participatory model of development in Ogoniland where it was not welcomed.

Living Earth did not achieve much in the Niger Delta because Shell held opposing views about the concept of partnership: Shell Nigeria maintains that partnership is about funding agreements, whereas Living Earth maintains that partnership is about "continual internal learning and self-reflection" which both partners needed to achieve genuine community engagement and development. Heap (2000, p. 22) speculated whether "the differing motivations of the organizations involved reflected the "geographical split between UK and Nigeria (North and South)".

The failed relationship between Shell and an international NGO, Living Earth, explains why KI-23, a social performance officer with Shell, claimed that his company switched its approach to the problem of community underdevelopment in Ogoniland from partnering with international NGOs to partnering with local NGOs. This local partnership is discussed in the next section.

3.6.3 *Business-local NGO partnership and community development of Ogoniland*

According to KIs-3, 5, and 23, Shell use local 'NGOs' to facilitate their CSR in local communities. This was partly because international NGOs had proved to be problematic partners, but also because direct dealing with communities was also problematic. KI-23 (a Shell employee) said that communities have learnt to exploit Shell: *"once they know it's Shell, wants turn into needs for them, they can say they need 20 wells instead of 6"*. By contrast, partnerships between stakeholders, his company, local NGOs and communities discuss and put collectively *"social and environmental views of stakeholders together"*. This form of partnership, unlike Shell's partnership with Living Earth, was rated more productive and useful by KI-23 because:

> *"These NGOs have a good track record of working in Ogoni. They are not western, they are Nigerians, when you ask them what Ogoni communities are like they will tell you straight on. They even show us their minutes of meetings with Ogonis, I mean you will see the records of engagement sessions they had with the people. As stakeholders before we put our equations together…we use these NGOs to dig out information".*

However, while Shell claims it partners with local NGOs, 97 out of 101 registered organizations that work in various Ogoni communities introduced themselves as 'CBOs', and the ones that work with Shell are not independent partners, but virtual offshoots of Shell. TI-6 said that *"we get assistance from Shell…we are represented in most communities but coordinate from our head office in Port Harcourt…we are a community based organization"*. TI-12 said that *"our source is from personal funds, donations and assistance from Shell and Elf …we work as CBOs…our members cut across communities in Rivers state"*. Some of them are large organizations: for instance, TI-6 said his organization controls about 5,000 members across Rivers state, including Ogoniland. The CD role of these organizations is best seen, therefore, not as local NGOs in partnership with Shell, but as CBOs controlled by Shell, and I discuss them as such at length in Chapter 5.

3.6.4 *Business and/or government-international agencies partnership and community development of Ogoniland*

In 2006, Shell, with the approval of the Nigerian government, funded the UNEP to carry out an environmental assessment of Ogoniland based on the polluter pays principle (Amnesty International, 2014). This initiative followed a Shell- funded survey of Ogoni and other ND areas by UNDP in 2004. This section evaluates how both of these Shell-funded partnership initiatives have contributed to CD in Ogoniland. The UNDP, after its survey of Ogoni and other ND communities in 2004, published the UNDP Niger Delta Human Development

Report in 2006, which among other things, put the life expectancy in Ogoniland and other oil-rich communities with oil facilities at 43, lower than the national average of 48.6 years. This high mortality rate, according to the UNDP report, is because oil endowed communities not only suffer more poverty, they also have poor quality houses and unsafe water supplies. Like previous research conducted in this area, UNDP linked the high rate of poverty to environmental degradation and poor governance, among other factors (Boele *et al,* 2001; Akpomuvie, 2011; Ugoh, 2008). It described local communities as places of "frustrated expectations" because these communities suffer from "administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict" (UNDP, 2006, p. 9; see Nnimmo, 2014).

As a development strategy, UNDP recommended: bringing about peace; strengthening local governments to make them efficient; diversifying the economy to open up employment opportunities; practising the politics of inclusion because exclusion/marginalization impedes development; encouraging sustainable environmental practices to cater for the needs of the present and future generations; and building partnerships at all levels of governance to advance human development. However, the fact that Ogonland remains one of the poorest, underdeveloped and violent kingdoms in the ND suggests that the above recommendations for community and human development by UNDP have remained mere suggestions. In other words, the UNDP produced a report of aspiration not action, on the much-needed CD that Ogonis yearn for (Pygbara, 2010).

On the Shell-UNEP partnership, UNEP was recruited and funded by Shell; an arrangement that was approved by the Nigerian government. The aim of this partnership was to determine the nature and extent of oil pollution in Ogoniland (Mmom and Igbuku, 2015). Findings from this 14-month study revealed that "oil contamination in Ogoniland is widespread and severely impacting many components of the environment. Even though the oil industry is no longer active in Ogoniland, oil spills continue to occur with alarming regularity. The Ogoni people live with this pollution every day" (UNEP, 2011, p. 9). According to UNEP, ameliorating the sufferings of Ogonis will mean the environmental restoration of their land, which could take over 25-30 years to complete. In order to achieve this clean-up, UNEP recommended that the Nigerian government and Shell create an Ogoni Environmental Restoration Authority (OERA) to operate under the Federal Ministry of Environment. UNEP was optimistic that if established and well planned with good governance and a reliable team of communication experts constantly dialoguing with local communities, OERA could restore the Ogoni

environment, which would be the first step towards reducing poverty and developing Ogoni communities.

However, in August 2013, Nnimmo Bassey, an environmental activist with Friends of the Earth International, noted that "two whole years after UNEP issued a damning assessment of the Ogoni environment, the Ogoni people are forced to continue wallowing in the toxic broth that their lands and waters have been made to become" (*Sahara Reporters*, 2013, p.1). In 2014, Amnesty International stated that the Ogoni environment has remained the same because the Nigerian government had yet to establish OERA to oversee the restoration of their environment. In August 2014, Dr Isaac Osuoka of the Social Development Integrated Centre (SDIC) advised the Nigerian government and Shell to learn from the United States and BP, the company responsible for the 2010 spills in the Gulf of Mexico, because "when the BP oil spill occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, there was an immediate response by the President Obama-led US government and BP, the company responsible for the spill. Shell could also go on with the clean-up of Ogoniland should the Federal government continue to foot-drag on the matter" (Punch, 2014, p.1). But according to Shoraka *et al* (2014), Shell has remained resistant, even when its actions are shown to be responsible for the high mortality rate in Ogoniland. Shoraka *et al* (2014, p. 4) claim that even in areas that Shell claimed it has remediated, "communities report oil crusts on their land, rotten crops and poisoned fish…people are dying, sick, can't feed themselves and have no clean water". Although the Nigerian government (as reported in *Thisday* newspaper of 9ᵗʰ August 2014) stated that it is working towards the establishment of OERA, the delay in doing so led Mmom and Igbuku (2015) to suggest that the Nigerian government and Shell used UNEP only as a publicity stunt to exhibit their supposed determination to restore and develop Ogoniland (see also Saheed, 2012).

Like Living Earth, UNEP has been criticized for partnering with Shell. Indeed, according to Lang (2010), UNEP no longer has any respect in Nigeria, having sold its reputation for the US$10 million it received from Shell, the company that polluted Ogoniland. The supplier-contractor partnership between Shell and UNEP most likely explains why the UNEP report did not make any provision for sanctions against the Nigerian state or Shell, if either of them or both fail to implement its recommendations (Saheed, 2012). While UNEP's environmental assessment of Ogoniland was presented to Nigerians and indeed Ogonis as a step towards the amelioration of poverty and the development of Ogoniland, the delay in its implementation, according to the *Premium Times* newspaper of Saturday 9ᵗʰ August 2013, seems to have

exacerbated community underdevelopment, in that Ogoni youths violently halted the activities of oil companies and started a fresh round of war with Shell. Such conflict, has contributed significantly to the continuance of underdevelopment in Ogoniland (UNDP, 2006 and Grove, 2009). So the claim that partnerships have the potential to advance community development in areas where other approaches have failed has not been borne out by the partnership initiatives targeted at CD in Ogoniland.

3.7   Emerging issues and Conclusion

There are three main issues that have arisen from this analysis of top-down initiatives for community development in Ogoniland. First, the top-down approach to community development has a poor track record, in that throughout recent history, its initiatives and agencies have uniformly failed. Second, there is a strong negative relationship between the oil dependent nature of the Nigerian state (derives over 80 percent of its revenue from oil) and the method of top-down CD practised by the Nigerian state in partnership with Shell, because both institutions profit through engaging in instrumental rather than genuine CD. Third, partnerships between NGOs (such as Living Earth) and Shell have been marred by ideological differences over the right methods of community engagement and development. For Living Earth, community engagement and development is an end not a means, whereas it is a means of wealth creation for Shell and the Nigerian government. Popple and Quinney (2002) argued that often the initiators rather than the 'supposed paper beneficiaries' gain most from the partnership initiatives. These gains are in the form of maintaining control over the communities, as indicated in Table 3 compiled by Ihugba and Osuji (2011), which shows how Shell's CSR programme was carefully developed to engage with local communities for corporate reasons:

Table 3. Stakeholders' engagement framework (Ihugba and Osuji, 2011).

S/n	Level of engagement	Corporate reasons for that level	Purpose and features
1	Manipulation	Control	Managerialist
2	Therapy	Control	Managerialist
3	Informing	Control	Managerialist
4	Consultation	Relay information	Managerialist
		Manage stakeholders	Flow of information, withholding power of veto
5	Placation	Manage stakeholders	Managerialist, Adhoc Reactionary, flow of information, withholding power of veto

All these levels of engagement, according to Ihugba and Osuji (2011, p. 30), lack the important elements of genuine stakeholder engagement because there is absence of trust, understanding, respect and collaboration between stakeholders. For example, at the first level, 'manipulation', community leaders are only tutored, advised and bribed by Shell officials. According, to Ihugba and Osuji (2011), the second level - 'therapy' - is another vague level of engagement, whereby Shell advises the community to seek help from their government by educating the community about their (Shell) contributions. By this Shell does not only vindicate itself, but directly or indirectly it exposes the weaknesses or failures of the Nigerian government to meet their community development responsibilities. In level three, 'informing', members are only informed about intending company projects virtually at the start of such projects, which means that even though communities are asked to contribute, they may not have sufficient time to do so. In level four, 'consultation', when Shell claims it consults with communities, the views of the less powerful (local communities) are hardly listened to. At the fifth level of engagement, 'placation', local communities are presented as the most important stakeholders whose lived experiences and knowledge are fundamental for CSR, but are subject to Shell's interpretation and endorsement.

These findings infer that the top-down approach is not sustainable because sustainable policies work with established "facts on the ground" (Fowler *et al*. 2010). Nigeria has a tradition of neglecting facts that come from local communities, and thus the bottom–up input into the formulation of policies is grossly neglected (Enobun, nd). This lack of bottom-up input explains why there is hardly any community in Ogoniland without a scar from Shell's activities (Amunwa 2011) and why Ogonis still eat oil polluted food, drink oil polluted water, bathe in oil polluted rivers and breathe in polluted air (UNEP, 2011). My conclusion to this chapter is, therefore, that the top-down mode of community development is not a promising approach for addressing the negative impacts of oil pollution on the wellbeing of local communities. It is clear that power relations as well as vested interests play a significant role in determining who benefits from such an approach, and in Ogoniland, the predominant interest of the most powerful stakeholders in the business of CD has resulted in community underdevelopment. In other words, according to Niger Delta Voices (2009, p.1), which cited Ake, "development efforts did not so much fail-they were never really made".

Chapter 4: Bottom-up initiatives: community-based organizations as alternative agents

 "The good we secure for ourselves is precarious and uncertain until it is secured for all of us and incorporated into our common life" (Jane Addams in Linn and Scott, 2000 p.104).

4.1 Introduction

There is increasing unease about top-down approaches to CD because of their inherent flaws, which include being too bureaucratic, manipulating the concept of participation, and failing to develop community capacity, which should be at the centre of any CD programme (Sue, 2002). This unease has led to an institutional turn in current approaches to CD towards the bottom-up approach to community development through community agencies like community based-organizations (CBOs) (Dill, 2010). The bottom-up approach to CD through CBOs has been dubbed the "21st century" CD strategy because it entails community members initiating and driving their own development (Narayan *et al,* 2000). Within the bottom-up framework lies an assumption that community members become the experts because it is believed that they design programmes to "work with the grain" of their traditions (Dill, 2010, p. 1). They take advantage of their deep-rootedness in the community to evaluate community needs and try to meet them (Yachkaschi, 2008; Opare, 2007; Onyeozu, 2010).

In this chapter, I investigate the role of CBOs in Ogoniland based on the perceptions of its residents. First, I provide a typology of CBOs (Section 5.2); second, I report the views of Ogonis on the concept of CD (Section 5.3); third, I evaluate Ogonis' perceptions of the role of their CBOs in achieving CD (Section 54); and fourth, I provide a critical analysis of the inherent flaws of Ogoni CBOs as agents of bottom-up CD (Section 5.5).

4.2 Typology of CBOs in Ogoniland

The understanding of the 101 telephone interviewees (TIs), 67 key informants (KIs), and 163 survey questionnaires (SQAs) out of the total of 101 TIs; 69 KIs and 189 SQAs was that CBOs are organizations that work in the community, but do not necessarily originate from the community. Based on this understanding, I identified three types of CBOs: (1) Traditional; (2) Modern; and (3) Hybrid.

4.2.1 *Traditional community-based organizations (TCBOs)*

Fifty four TCBOs were studied; they are divided into two tiers first tier (FTCBOs); and second tier (STCBOs). The first tier (FTCBO), as shown in Figure 5, includes the Council of Chiefs and Elders (CCE), the Community Development Committee (CDC), youth

organizations (YO), and men and women organizations (MWO). Eight CCEs, eight CDCs, eight men's and fourteen women's CBOs were sampled. The CCEs, according to KIs like 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, and 25, are elderly men, generally perceived as living custodians of community culture. For example, KI-18 stated that "*our council of chiefs and elders* [CCE] *"are custodians of our tradition"*, this is because they *"are the oldest"* (KI-13).

Figure 5: Typology of CBOs in Ogoniland

Source: Author's fieldwork (2014)

CCEs generally play advisory roles: community chiefs are overall leaders in their communities, but they get words of wisdom from members of this organization. According to KI-18, "*they advise us and the first thing we do is to listen to our elders, we obey them because they were here before us and so they know better than us"*. This leadership of FTCBOs makes up what Ogonis describe as their community council, which is headed by community chiefs, and it comprises leaders of MWO and other senior elders, but not leaders of YOs. KI-18 confirmed that as a community youth leader he is exclusively interested in youth affairs: "*I only want to talk about our youth organization, because am in charge of youths"*.

According to KIs- 1, 3, 6, 17, 25, 27, 31, 18, 28, and 65, and SQAs-8, 29, 30, 37, 65, and 66, membership of FTCBOs is passed on through generations. KI-28 said this is because *"everything about this type of organization is cultural"*; for KI-18 it is because membership is inherited - *"if our fathers did not manage our organizations very well, there wouldn't be any for us to inherit"*; KI-27 reported that membership of FTCBOs is *"right from birth"*; KI-25 described FTCBO and its membership as *"an old tradition"*; KI-20 pointed out that *"I grew up to see these organizations, it is a natural thing here";* KI-3 explained that *"our generation met these organizations, we only baptised some like the CDC, which has been in existence for a long time"*; KI-65 held that FTCBOs are *"old organizations, I cannot fully explain it";* and SQA-35 said *"it is generational, as a youth I will grow to become a member of the elders' organization and then my son will become a youth member"*. This is because FTCBOs are kinship organizations (SQA-65; KIs, 27, 8), culturally structured to accommodate every adult in the community (SQAs- 1, 33, 62, 66, 107 and 114; KIs- 1, 3, 8 and 13; TIs- 1, 2, 3, 4, 19, and 23). KI-27 reported that formal registration into FTCBOs starts at age 18. KI-1 stated that formal registration and membership into FTCBOs is compulsory, because *"as a community member, you must, I use the word you must, identify with an organization, as a woman, you belong to the women group, a man, the men organization"*. KI-3 claimed that FTCBOs *"cover every son and daughter of our community"*. According to KI-8, FTCBOs represent every adult in the community: *"it is just like dynasty and family heads because the people that constitute the council of chiefs and elders are virtually from every family in the community. Every family is represented and so they speak on behalf of their people"*.

It is because of this universality of community representation that KIs-1, 4, 5, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, and 24; TIs-1, 2, 3, 4,19, 23, and 34; and SQAs-8, 29, 30, 65, 67, and 71, note that the leaders of FTCBOs serve as agents of community governance and community development (CD), and that membership of FTCBOs is a source of community identity. KI-1 confirmed that as the CDC chairman of his community, he works towards the development of his community: *"I reach out to some of my friends as a way of assisting my community. Last year I embarked on good road opening through meeting a few friends, I do things from my purse"*. Similarly KI-3 explained he personally funded community projects: *"I use my money to put things in place, you see this culvert; I constructed it with my money"*. In addition to individual funding of community projects, about 10% of TIs, 60% of SQAs and 40% of KIs stated that FTCBOs embark on CD from community contributions like levies and dues. SQA-

132 reported that his community gets funds for CD "*through collective contribution from villagers*". Another source of funding for FTCBO projects according to 30% of SQAs, about 50% of KIs, 20% of TIs, and FG-1, comes from outside in the form of external assistance. For example, KI-27 reported that FTCBOs get funds annually for CD from SPDC, and KI-26 said that "*Shell gives money…to our chief and youth leader*". KI-8 stated that Shell sends huge amounts of money for CD through community leadership: "*there is no year they don't get money*". Communities in the Eleme local government area investigated in this study also get funding for CD from the various companies that they host, according to KIs-8, 18, 28, 65, and 69, and FG-1, and 3. Respondents like KIs-1, 2, 21, 22, 28, 30, and 31, and SQAs-7, 26, 30, 32, and 59, say government also sends funds into local communities for CD: KI-22 explained that council members from FTCBOs are usually awarded contracts to provide infrastructure in their respective communities: "*contract for this road…was given to one of the leading members*" of an FTCBO.

The second tier CBOs (STCBOs) which were studied numbered 16, including dance groups, cultural religious groups like 'Amonikpo' secret cult group, age grades and football clubs. Membership of STCBOs is based on individuals' choice, unlike membership of FTCBOs which comes automatically to people according to their demographic categories, such as age and gender. .

4.2.2 Modern community-based organizations (MCBOs)

The total number of MCBOs was 101, divided into three types: 96 environment/charity MCBOs; three town MCBOs; and two resident MCBOs. Even though these MCBOs work across several communities and have their offices outside their catchment communities, they are CBOs because they operate in local communities and work with local people. According to 54 MCBOs leaders, their organizations are CBOs because they work 'with' local people, while 43 leaders said they work 'for' local people. The remaining three explained that their organizations have features of both NGOs and CBOs: TI-76 said that "*corporately when we deal with big clients we are NGOs, with local people we work as CBOs*". TI-6 explained that while his organization works in local communities, "*our coordination office is in Port Harcourt*". Likewise TI-7 said "*we work in villages but our main office is in Port Harcourt*". Unlike town unions and resident organizations, environmental/charity CBOs claim to use skilled paid staff. TI-6 reported that in his CBO: "*our managers and directors are professionals in different fields…the top directors are professionals in various disciplines,*

followed by directorates, facilitators and then liaison officers". Likewise TI-11 stated that in his CBO, "*managers and directors are all degree holders"*. These skilled directors are paid from funds sourced from Shell: TI-6 said "*we get assistance from Shell*"; TI-7 stated that his organization is funded through personal funding, donations and from Shell; TI-12 said that his organization is funded by an oil company; TIs-8 explained that his charity organization is funded from personal and outside assistance; and TI-18 revealed that his organization is funded through "*personal funds, donations and support from state and oil companies"*. This predominantly external source of funding entails that the beneficiaries of MCBOs have little financial stake in its management. According to 55% of KIs, 65% of SQAs, 45% of TIs and two FGDs, the relationship between the leadership of MCBOs and their beneficiaries can be described as that of the "*provider and receiver. This is because the management/proprietors and funders of these organizations decide what to provide for local communities"* (KI-22). TI-2 stated that "*decisions are taken by the top executive members and then passed on to other executives*"; TI-7 claimed that "*our executive directors take decisions about the need of the communities*"; KI-31 explained that MCBOs decide by themselves what they think community members need; and KI-5 held that this is because they (MCBOs) are more skilled and financially experienced.

Some environmental/ charity organizations, like the river conservation initiatives, which according to TI-32, are funded by Shell, claim to have over 5,000 members from several communities in Rivers state. KI-31 reported that over 2,000 youths from his community registered with a charity MCBO. TIs-86, 97, and 100 put their membership strength at about 1,000, 15,000 and 500, respectively. However, it is not clear who the leadership of environmental/charity CBOs refer to as 'members' actually are, and the role these members play in their organizations, because, according to KIs-4, 14, 17, 33, 34, 35, 46, and 47, environmental remediation in their respective communities is carried out by Shell, who employs local youths. KI-17 explained that NGOs/CBOs are not carrying out the clean-up of his environment because "*Shell gives us the opportunity to provide youths that will do clean-up in my community"*. Other respondents and security guards living near the polluted K-Dere water fronts reported that they have yet to see any river conservation organizations, but that remediation works are being carried out by oil companies, through local youths. The absence of environmental CBOs was reported in all communities studied in this research.

According to three KIs and eight SQAs there is a proliferation of town and resident MCBOs across Ogoniland. KI-1 explains that this is because there is an inflow of non-Ogoni indigenes into Ogoniland: *"we have many Igbos, Yorubas and Akwa Ibom people that have their own organizations* [Town MCBOs]*"*. TI-15 said that membership of his town union is restricted to natives of his home town who are resident in Ogoniland. This, according to three KIs, four SQAs and five TIs is because they are primarily organized to serve their members since they are self-funded. Like town unions, resident organizations according to TIs-10, 75, 76, and 78, and KIs-28, and 30 are also self-funded organizations of non-Ogoni indigenes resident in neighbourhoods across Ogoni communities. KI-28 explained that foreigners set up resident organizations as self-help organizations to take care of their needs:

> *"as foreigners in this neighbourhood, we established 'Good neighbourhood'* [resident organization] *to unite us, to keep us going. We started with seven members now we are up to 30 and it all started when one of our neighbours lost his mother we came together and contributed two thousand naira… now we support members during burials and weddings".*

Likewise, TI-10 noted that members of his resident association got together to help each other.

4.2.3 *Hybrid community-based organizations (HCBOs)*

Hybrid community-based organizations (HCBOs) are crossbred CBOs that display in varying proportions features of both TCBOs and MCBOs. They are subdivided into intra - and inter - hybrid community-based organizations. Intra-HCBOs, according to KIs-7, 12, 17, 18, 20, 22, 34, and 66; SQAs-9, 19, 28, 40, 50, and 83; and TIs-11, 20, 23, 26, and 46, include cooperative groups and social clubs-organizations that have their founders within a community - i.e. their community of origin. Generally membership of intra-HCBOs, unlike that of FTCBOs, is voluntary, and according to KIs-19, 20, and 25, is based on either qualification or invitation. Hence, they have lower membership strengths when compared with FTCBOs. SQAs -20, 34 and 40 put the membership strengths of their various intra-HCBOs as 20, 15 and 30 respectively. Intra-HCBOs, according to KIs-4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 21, and SQAs-3, 6, 10, 22, 23, 26, 33, 113, and 114, are self-funded and primarily self-serving organizations. For example, members of intra-community cooperative organizations benefit from the relatively small-scale personal services they provide. Respondent KI-34, a member of a cooperative group, explained that her daily savings with her organization helps her every weekend because *"I use the money to repair and buy oil for my garri engine".*

Another respondent (KI-66) said "*I save 500 hundred naira every month with my club* [Intra-HCBO]*; I will take my money in lump at the end of the year*". Likewise SQA-28 said "*we contribute money to buy tricycles*"; SQA-28 said "*we contribute money…our contribution will be over in two years, it helps members financially*"; and SQA-50 said "*through cooperative we help each other*". Equally, intra-community social clubs like intra-community cooperative groups, concentrate primarily on their members: KI-8 said "*what I know about them is…they will assist in making your ceremonies enjoyable, that is what they do, am not sure whether they have put up any structure or not, but it is most likely no*". These social organizations according to 30% of KIs, 55% of SQAs and one FGD are informal organizations which, KI-3 said, are products of daily events, which gradually change with time into a steady gathering and consequently named club:

> "*they are formed as a result of certain incidences that occur at a particular point in time…maybe if I want to bury my mum or marry, my friends can just come together to help me plan for those ceremonies. After that they can decide to give a name to the gathering so that tomorrow when one of us has an occasion, we all will help, this is how it starts*".

KI-23 describes intra-community social clubs as "*group of community youths, like cliques of friends who have same purpose and ideology*", KI-14 thought most social clubs in Ogoni-land only organize to entertain themselves because "*they come together and start their meetings with beer and also end with beer*". By contrast, about 15% of KIs, 25% of SQAs and one FGD claim that intra- community social clubs, beyond serving their members, extend their assistance to their host community. KI-8 stated that:

> "*we have social clubs that are in the community, these organizations assist based on their own capacity because they are rendering selfless service, maybe through their monthly contributions and savings. There is an apex organization that we have here; it is called the Lewe club they have tried in this community*".

However, while an intra-community social club can sometimes be beneficial to its host community, KIs-13, 16, 22, 29, 65, and 67 explained that this sort of community assistance is usually short-lived. This is because since these organizations were formed by individuals they generally die with them: "*These organizations* [intra-community social clubs] *have lost their pioneers and the organization is now weak*" (KI-16). In addition, KIs-22, and 29, and FG-1, and 2 noted that intra-community social clubs in their communities are easily taken over by politicians and hence lose their community focus very easily. KI-29 reported that "*most organizations here are being hijacked by politicians, since I came here I have noticed this*

and it is so in our neighbouring communities". KI-22 explained that some intra-community social clubs join together to form political alliances:

"Sometimes clubs merge together here so that they can represent themselves in government, most of them are party agents, they just group themselves together in the name of organization". For KI-29, another reason why intra-community social clubs do not last is because of the corruption of their leaders: *"when anything like money comes in, these leaders will use it and disappoint their people".*

Turning to inter-HCBOs, unlike intra- HCBOs, they have their management and membership across several communities, sometimes not only limited to Ogoniland. According to KIs-19, 20, and 23, and TIs-3, 7, and 32, inter-community social clubs have more members than intra-community social clubs. KI-19, reported that membership of his inter-community social club cut across all communities in Ogoniland; SQA-7 noted that membership of his inter-community social club spanned all communities in Rivers state; while SQAs-13 and 32 said theirs had members throughout Nigeria: *"membership is open to all Nigerians"*.

But despite their wide membership range beyond their community of origin, their founders and advocates insist that they are still community-based, evidenced by their very high membership strength across local communities. According to five KIs, eleven TIs, and six SQAs, inter-community social clubs are the most politicised CBOs in this category, partly because of their very wide coverage and presence in several communities, and also because their foundation is fundamentally political. However this politicization seems to undermine their community credentials. KI-12 revealed that she works for the All Progressive Congress (APC) party through her inter-community social club. KI-29 stated that: *"there is this CBO that I belong to, we call it…, it is purely a political association but we portray it as a CBO and it is funded by a politician, so we live in disguise as an organization, our main interest is not the people but our sponsors".* KI-23, a social performance officer with Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) who has worked closely with these communities for over a decade, described inter-community social clubs as *"a copy and paste situation"* across Ogoniland, noting that *"politicians do not go door to door campaigning; they use CBOs…I guess their slogan should be if you have the number I have got the cash".* KI-23 reported that politicians *"use CBOs and give them millions"*, and KI-22 pointed out that his organization is funded by politicians. In other words, inter-community social clubs were used by politicians as conduits for buying up large numbers of votes. Explaining how leaders of inter-community

social clubs are able to mobilise grass roots support for their political masters, KI-29 said that poor community members *"have no choice, because of poverty, they support organizations based on financial grounds, they are easily wooed, they are easily influenced"*. SQA-147 revealed that *"we make promises to the grassroots; it is very easy to convince them"*. This happens, according to KI-23, because *"members of these communities are not educated and also because of blind loyalty"* to leaders who respondents KIs-19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, and 29, and TIs-2, 3, and 27 described as mostly literate/elite community members.

According to respondents KIs-12, 29, 23, and 20; TIs-18, 44, and 48; and SQAs-4, 6, 7, 15, 29, 57, 58, 59, 76, 101, 103, and 148, inter-community social clubs are able to woo their ever- increasing passive members because they get funds from government. SQA-7 claimed that because *"we produce local government chairman…we are sponsored by the local government chairman"*; SQA-76 reported that his own inter-community social club is funded by government: *"they fund our projects"*; while SQA-101 pointed out that his inter-community social club *"has maintained a good relationship with the local government…we do meet with them and they have sponsored some of our programmes"*. Christian religious organizations, parent teachers associations, market women and associations of professionals, according to KIs-27 and 31, TIs-2, 8, 14, and 19, and SQAs-15, 22, 42, 46, 68, and 114, are like inter-community social clubs in that their membership and management cut across several communities. For example, TI-22 explained that as a Christian organization *"we ensure that every community in Tai has a least a church"*. KI-31 said that the Christian Youth Council spans all communities in Khana LGA: *"it is made up of youths from different churches…but we gather as a forum and each of these churches have representatives"*. Christian religious organizations (CROs) according to respondents KIs-7, 8, 19, 22, 27, 25, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 67, and SQAs 3, 4, 6, 8, 14, 17, 19, 37, and 77, have provided support for the development of many Ogoni communities. KI-27 claimed that CROs are one of the most important agents of community development in Ogoniland. This, according to about 25% of KIs, 30% of TIs 40% of SQAs and two FGDs is because their membership is open to willing community members. TI-22 explained that his CRO targets poor people in the community who need assistance. KIs- 8 and 25 noted that CROs work with anyone - they are not selective. KIs-36, 37, 38, 40, 41, and 45, thought CROs were the best organizations to seek help from, because even though they are self-funded, their membership is open to interested members of their host communities. But according to KIs-22 and 46 and SQAs-3, 4, 6, 8, 96, and 97, CROs are unable to achieve much in their host communities for lack of sufficient funds. TI-22 explained that CROs are not primarily established for the purpose of CD: *"we*

don't get money from the government and you know that we have our own challenges as well. The little money we get from tithes and offering we use it for the planting of more churches". Nevertheless, SQA-26 reported that most CROs manage to help local communities from church offerings and tithes.

Parent Teachers Associations (PTAs), according to TIs-2, 8, and 18, KIs -14, and 31, and SQAs-54, 57, 59, 75, 97, and 81, work towards the development of the schools that they are involved with. Likewise the associations of professionals are mainly interested in their members, who span several communities. TI-14 reported that his association is primarily interested in the *"repackaging of their profession…for better recognition"*. TI-19 stated that her organization is committed to its members across the nine Niger states because *"we train and empower our women to be financially independent"*. CROs, PTAs, and associations of professionals, according to KIs-7, 8, 22, 25, 43, and 62, and SQAs-25, 54, 57, 59, 75, 97, and 118, source funds through members' contributions, dues, and donations from well-wishers. SQA-85 reported that *"we fund this organization from our purse"*, while SQA-94 explained that his organization gets funds *"through contributions and donations from people and outside bodies"*.

Having described the typology of CBOs in Ogoniland, the next section discusses the views of Ogonis on the concept of CD.

4.3 Perceptions of Ogonis/ CBO members about the meaning of community development (CD)

When respondents were asked for their perceptions of community development (CD), three discourses of CD emerged: (1) community development as infrastructural capital; (2) CD as human, economic, and social capital; and (3) CD as psychological capital.

4.3.1 *CD as infrastructural capital*

The perception that CD is infrastructural capital development through the supply of public goods was expressed by about 40% of TIs (who are mostly founders/ executive members of MCBOs); 75% of SQAs and 10% of KIs. This perception prioritizes communal over individual interests and explains CD as the supply of facilities for community/ public use. For example, KI-17 reported that CD *"is the development of community not individuals in the community, we got a transformer, it was for the development of the community…now we have a transformer anytime there is power supply we (community) enjoy it, that is development"*.

Similarly,- KI-18 explained that CD is the supply of infrastructure for the community as a whole and not (directly) for individual development, and this explains why as much as his organization sympathises with the poor, unfortunately within this framework there is no provision for direct poverty alleviation. KI-14 believes CD is primarily about the provision of good roads, schools and potable water, though regrets that for financial constraints *"empowering our members is supposed to be part of our work but we lack the finance"*. Likewise, KI-15 explained that CD is firstly about the provision of public amenities in the community, and only secondly about consideration for individuals. KI-10 stated that CD is about *"everything, roads, schools…our organizations cannot help individuals, even the assistance given to widows are personal"*.

4.3.2 *CD as human, economic, and social capital*

The perception that CD is about increasing human, economic, and social capital was prioritized by about 20% of TIs; 30% of SQAs; 70% of KIs and three FGDs. There is an assumption here that human, economic, and social development is prior to the supply of goods, services and infrastructure. KI-29 explained that CD is about *"first, human capacity development, economic development and then infrastructural development"*. According to KI-20, infrastructural development is a means to human development: *"infrastructural development brings about human development; it gives members of a community some sense of respect. If you see our women that work as cleaners and attendants in the new hospital, you will see self-fulfilment and confidence around them when you compare with their former selves"*. For some respondents, infrastructure comes first in time but second in priority, whereas for other respondents, such as KI-1, human, economic and social development come first in both time and priority: i.e., human development leads to infrastructural development: *"if the human aspect is taken care of, individuals can then build the community…there will be peace and cooperation* [social capital]*"*. Similarly, KI-19 held that human, economic, and social developments are vital elements for sustainable community development, and to achieve this form of CD, *"human mentality is the first area of development. The first thing is how these people can see life differently"*. Likewise, FG-1 claimed that "*empowering people that make up the community, intellectually, academically, is the most important because it is the key to development"*. About 10% of SQAs noted that their CBOs invest in human development because they are basically intent on the provision and renovation of primary and secondary schools materials. Likewise about 15% of TIs stated that their organizations were established purely for skill and vocational training.

4.3.3 CD as psychological capital

The perception that CD is about increasing psychological capital (i.e. emotional strength) was held by about 60% of KIs, 50% of SQAs and one FGD. Psychological capital can be increased either directly or indirectly. On direct increase, six community leaders held that CD is about providing immediate psychological support. Indirect increases in psychological capital can be achieved by empowering people. Thirteen KIs and 12 SQAs all held that psychological capital is enhanced through inclusive participatory processes in community decision-making that gives voice to community members. For example, KI-65 described CD as entailing inclusive participation because it is "*something one person cannot do, we need to put our heads together so that our community can be developed*". KI-67 held that an unequal level of participation in community decision making is not CD, and argued that Ogoni communities have remained development-poor because members are excluded in community work. KI-29 pointed out that genuine CD process ensures that the views of the least community member count because *"participation is not only by who is giving but also who is receiving"*.

The next section looks at whether the CBOs identified in section 4.2 fulfil these perceptions of CD.

4.4 Evaluation of the role of Ogoni CBOs in achieving community development (CD)

This section assesses whether traditional, modern and hybrid CBOs fulfil the criteria for CD as defined above. It begins with an evaluation of traditional community-based organizations (TCBOs).

4.4.1 Traditional community-based organizations (TCBOs) and community development (CD) in Ogoniland

As discussed above, whereas modern and hybrid CBOs do not cover all Ogoni indigenes, TCBOs, especially the first tier CBOs (FTCBOs), are designed to cover every Ogoni indigene see (Table 4). Beginning with FTCBOs, 25 community leaders and other elites noted that their various FTCBOs invest in the community by providing infrastructure. For example, KI-17 explained that his organization through communal efforts provided a transformer in their community, while KI-6 said that his community youth organization built a town hall. SQA-3 noted that his FTCBO built a signpost in their community; SQA-33 said his FTCBO provided a bus-stop in their community; and SQA-114 reported that FTCBOs in his community worked together to add three blocks of classroom to their community secondary school. However, while community leaders and elites give the impression that

despite scarce resources they still manage to invest in infrastructure, most community members thought their community leadership have not achieved much in terms of infrastructural development especially when compared with their estimated amount of cash inflow into the communities.

Turning to human, economic and social capital, although there are divided views on whether FTCBO provide , about 60% of SQAs mostly community leaders and 10% of KIs have argued that while human capital is important, FTCBOs are unable to do much because addressing the issue of human capital largely depends on the availability of infrastructures. KI-20 linked the relationship between infrastructure and human capital in these words "*infrastructural development brings about human development*". This means that Ogoni FTCBOs do not invest in human capital development because of the absence of basic infrastructure in their communities. On the other hand, respondents like KIs-19 and 31 and SQAs-76 and 79, said FTCBOs invest in human capital development because *"we organize enlightenment campaigns in the community…about the importance of education"* (SQA-76). KI-18 explained that as a community leader he advises his members to shun violence. Likewise, KI-1 said the leadership of his youth FTCBO organize sensitization programmes for youths in his community.

On whether FTCBOs are able to provide economic capital for their members, community leaders and elites like KI-1, 3, 8, 18, and 27 have stated that it is not the responsibility of the community or leadership of their FTCBOs to empower their members economically. However, these respondents indicated that if they had sufficient finance they might consider the economic empowerment of their members.

Answers to questions about whether FTCBOs provide social capital were also conflicting see (Table 4). About 60% of SQAs and 5% of KIs said their various FTCBOs nourish social capital, in providing a wide platform for community participation. For example, KI-27 praised FTCBOs because "*in the area of participation they carry community members along they provide a platform for people to participate in community development*". Likewise, SQA-107 reported that through membership of FTCBOs, his "*entire community participate in community development*". KI-14 said that "*we take decisions collectively*" in his FTCBOs. Even when FTCBO leaders meet without their members, according to KI-8, there are still opportunities for consultation with members because "*after we have reached agreement, we ask the town crier to announce to everyone and then we give room for consultation*". KI-25

stated that his FTCBO: *"carry everyone along…. when our major road was constructed, our leader called everybody to the town square through the town crier and he advised us to accept the compensation from the state government, he made us to understand that sometimes change comes with pains and everyone accepted it without trouble"*. According to KI-25, such road projects would lead to serious conflicts if there were not an abundance of social capital in his community, because selfish people do not give out their lands. SQAs-23, 24, 26, 28, 65, 101, 107, and 117, and KIs- 8, 14 and 25 said FTCBOs are able to nurture social capital because they are not discriminatory but give voice to everyone in the community. KI-14 stated that *"every member has equal rights, the poor participate actively but they don't contribute financially…* [during meetings] the *poor and the rich can speak their minds"*. Members of FTCBOs, according to these respondents, are united as one, and this social unity ensures that members are treated equally and fairly and are not robbed of their rights.

On the other hand, many other respondents gave a much more negative picture. For example, about 60% of KIs, 10% of SQAs and 3 FGDs (mostly passive and non-members of FTCBOs), all claimed that their respective FTCBOs are discriminatory and do not provide good platforms for community participation and so are not nurturers of human, economic and social capital. This, according to KIs-34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, and 49, and FGs-1, 2, and 3, happens because FTCBOs have various classes of membership. Within FTCBOs, there is a whole spectrum of economic status: rich, educated, socially connected poor, uneducated and socially unconnected members. KI-35 pointed out that the poor, uneducated and poorly connected members are always discriminated against in her FTCBO: *"I belong to this organization because am a member of this community…but am not in their agenda because I do not have any certificate and good job, I only go so that I will not pay fines"*. Similarly, KI-39 reported that *"our leader will not look your way if you are not influential, in our organization they only concentrate on the rich and people that are educated, they help themselves not people like me"*. KI-55 explained that if you are a poor member, the leadership of her organization will not have any need for you: *"even when you raise up your hand in the meeting nobody will call you, they will pretend as if they did not see it and even when you get the opportunity to talk, it is treated like a poor man's talk…senseless talk"*. SQAs-2, 7, 13, 30, 43, 65, 95, 101, and 155 claimed that the poor are not always consulted in their respective FTCBOs. According to SQA-2, this happens because *"nobody sees you (poor) as a human being"*. KI-55 said *"nobody regards me; they don't regard me as part of them"*. KI-41 explained that she does not fit into FTCBO: *"I just don't*

fit in…I am poor and do not have any certificate". SQA-27 claimed that FTCBOs are not representative of community members because *"I no longer belong to any of our organization* [FTCBO] *many people don't belong…because of the happenings in the community"*. SQA-8 said he does not believe in FTCBOs: *"I don't see the need"*. SQA-2 revealed that *"I don't belong to any of those organizations* [FTCBOs]". KI-41 explained that

> *"am no longer a member of any FTCBO because I don't have money and good cloths, I will not be happy when other women tie good wrappers and I tie rags in their midst, it will further compound my problems that was why I decided to stay on my own. There is so much competition for material things in FTCBOs".*

Sixteen KIs-and and seven SQAs all claimed that their various FTCBOs only arranged meeting venues for their supposed members, and have not provided good platforms for wider genuine community participation. According to KI-47, *"in my organization* [FTCBOs]), *it is rich man talk to rich man and poor man talk to poor man"*. SQA-50 explained that in his organization *"people with big cars do not talk with people like me that do not have bicycles"*. KI-46 reported that *"we* [the poor] *are disconnected from our organization and our community"*. Similarly FG-1 noted that there is always a lack of voice from the bottom: *"you are never considered for anything in our organization* [FTCBOs], *if you don't have good networks or cash"*.

This gap between community leaders/rich/educated/socially connected and the poor, according to ten KIs; four SQAs; three FGDs and Pyagbara (2007, p.9), explains why the poor within FTCBOs are mostly unaware of the happenings within their FTCBOs and their communities in general. For example, KI-53 reported that *"we* [the poor] *don't even know what is happening here…they ask us to contribute money and we don't even know how they use the money"*. KI-59 explained that *"when anything comes into this community we hardly hear about it",* while KI-45 said that *"when you are poor you will never know when Shell send good things into our community"*. KI-35 reported that in her FTCBOs *"they will not announce that money was brought in or that there are scholarships for children, they will not say things that will benefit me, they only discuss such things within their own group not the general FTCBO"*. KI-37 reported that *"most of us* [the poor] *don't even know how things are done in our organizations not to talk of this community"*. Generally, according to KI-26, *"the poor are unaware of things happening around this community, their level of awareness is low"*. Thirteen KIs and SQAs-4, 25, 30, 62, 79, 86, 88, 89, 111, 129, 130, and 132, all linked the current underdeveloped condition of Ogoniland to the social and economic inequality

among members of FTCBOs. This inequality, according to the above respondents, widens as more preferential treatment is enjoyed by the advantaged members of FTCBO at the expense of the disadvantaged groups.

According to KIs-34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, and 53, FG-1, and SQAs-15 and 55, the incompatibility between the different classes of people within their respective FTCBOs explains why they have adopted private over communal lifestyles. KI-57 reported that "*am not involved in decision making…I prefer to invest my time in things that will benefit me and that is why I always stay in my house*". Similarly, KI-35 sees no benefit in communal lifestyle: "*people like me invest our time in our farms or rest at home*", while for KI-43, "*I keep to myself*". KI-45 added that life is better alone: "*the only thing is when…women* [FTCBOs] *have meetings, I join them after that I stay on my own*". SQA-30 explained that his FTCBO is an incarnation of division and is not interested in developing and nurturing economic capital: "*am not happy about the way they run my organization that is why I mind my business*". KI-36 said "*I attend meetings to avoid paying fines*". KI-44 affirmed that "*whatever is happening in his organization* [FTCBO] *is none of my business…I have no stake in that gathering*". KIs-2, 4, 8, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 25, and 67 and SQAs-36 and 87, linked the increasing state of unrest across Ogoni communities to the lack of interest and withdrawal of the poor from FTCBOs.

Many respondents attribute the failures of FTCBOs to corruption in the elites. For example, FG-2 explained that they (the poor) are frustrated because "*we have leaders that invest in themselves, we have council of elders, who at very old age are very corrupt, they invest in themselves and their families only*". Similarly KI-23, an oil company employee, explained that "*community leaders want a fair share of whatever comes to the community for themselves…it is not poverty but greed*". KI-28 reported that "*the problem is from the leaders of their local organizations* [FTCBOs] *and chiefs because they are not concerned about development*". SQA-7 claimed that his community chief depends on the community rather than vice-versa, and will not devise ways to help the community. SQA-3 held that his chief feasts on his community, and according to SQA-13, "*our leaders are after themselves…they are greedy*". Similarly, SQAs-3, 7, 25, 26 and 30 claimed that the leaders of FTCBO/community elites reinforce underdevelopment in their respective communities. SQA-7 said that "*our chiefs always demand for money from contractors…see all the uncompleted projects around*". FG-2 held that FTCBO leaders/ community chiefs/elites

undermine CD in their community because "*they embezzle money meant for CD…our leaders collect money from the government and Shell and nothing gets to us…community leaders could bring in ten electricity poles and claim they brought in 100 pieces and you cannot confront them*". KI-21 stated that the leaders of FTCBOs/elites/chiefs locate facilities to suit their own convenience: "*my chief got money to do 3 boreholes…he only did one in his compound*". Most projects, according to about 60% of KIs (mostly community members) and 25% of SQAs, are not born out of genuine inclusive community engagement. SQA-95 alleged that "*our leaders do not take us* [the poor] *into consideration in all they do*"; while SQA-44 said "*our leaders do not listen to us* [the poor]". KI-25 stated that most FTCBO/community projects are "*of no benefit…what they do is like bus-stops, sign posts, they don't maintain these projects because if the zincs go off, nobody replaces them.*" Far from expanding economic capital, some FTCBOs diminish it. For instance, KI-67 explained that the weakening of YOs is one reason Ogoni communities have remained underdeveloped: "*our youths are joining cults… they are now appointed as youth leaders based on their physical strength and their skills on how to use guns. With this they only destroy and not build our communities*". KI-65 claimed that Ogoni FTCBOs "*are supposed to be instruments of community development, but the truth is that we do not have good leaders*". KI-67 concluded that "*our organizations* [FTCBOs] *are not primarily organized for the purpose of community development…they do not meet up what they call CBOs*".

Another part of the problem is the constant turnover of leaders, as K-25 pointed out: "*We have problems maintaining projects here because of changes in leadership* [FTCBO]…*New leaders abandon old projects for their own, it also happens at the state level, there is no continuity*". A further part of the problem is lack of funds. Sixteen KIs and 22 SQAs linked the inability of their FTCBOs to provide major infrastructures to shortage of money. SQAs-66 explained that "*we always want to do more but lack finance*". KI-2 said "*our organizations* [FTCBOs] *are as poor as the members*". Another part of the problem is disagreement over projects. KI-4 explained that misunderstanding between his community leaders/elites and members caused the destruction of the "*few projects that some of our organizations* [FTCBOs] *were able to do, it was a serious crisis…see what everywhere looks like*". KI-21 noted that disagreement between a faction of youths and leadership of his community resulted in "*over 50% of our houses were burnt; this crisis lasted for close to 8 years*". Another part of the problem was friction within the elite leadership. KI-3 argued that although the poor will always blame the rich for their predicaments, "*there are some good*

[FTCBO] *leaders*", but KI-16, a community leader, claimed that while there could be good FTCBO leaders/elites like himself, their good intentions will always be frustrated by their community chief. KI-16 narrated his experience with his community chief:

"our number one problem here is our chief. We do not have a functioning health centre in my community because of our chief and youth [FTCBO] *leader, it is so because of the mere fact that the contractor handling the project has not gotten money to pay our youth president and our chief the money he owed them for the supply of sand and cement. Can you believe that a community chief can descend so low to lobby for sand and cement contracts and then ask the youth leader to lock up the health centre and stop any further work till he is paid. You cannot imagine the little amount that they* [chief and youth leader] *are owed and the number of deaths that this has caused. I had no choice than to write a petition against our chief, the commissioner of police invited him and after interrogation, the police asked us to settle it ourselves since it is more like a family or kinship matter. Today we do not have a health centre in my community, my people travel very far to get treatments".*

On psychological capital, respondents like KIs 2, 20, 29, and31 and SQA-62 reported that their FTCBOs provide psychological and emotional support by stabilizing their members, *"when you lose someone they* [FTCBOs] *will help you all through the mourning period. They will stay with you, contribute money and do all manner of good things to see that you are happy and it helps"* (KI-20). KI-2 added that even in the face of absolute poverty, *"all we do is to come together since we don't have anything, we buy soft drinks and talk together, that makes us happy that we belong somewhere".*

However, by contrast, about 32% of KIs ; FG-1, 2, and 3; and SQAs-2, 4, 7, 9, 25, 82, 130, and 131, explained that their FTCBOs have not delivered CD in areas of psychological capital because their poor platform for community participation stigmatises a large percentage of people as objects, a stigma that many poor FTCBO members appear to internalise. For example, respondent KI-51 explained that *"my level is too low…am only called to weed our community roads"*. KI-43 reported that *"I cannot talk where human beings are…nobody regards me, they don't involve me in anything"*. KI-59 said *"my organizations* [FTCBOs] *don't need me because am not complete…they don't have need for poor people like me"*. KI-35 narrated how poor uneducated FTCBO members are de-humanised by being used as objects:

"there was a time they asked us [widows] *to submit our passports and then prepare to travel to Bori. We were happy I used all the money in my house to transport myself to Bori… in Bori we waited at the local secretariat from morning till evening, nobody attended to us, most of us were tired and hungry and had no transport money back home. We later heard that they take our passports all over the world seeking funds*

and when they succeed they will not give us anything…that is what they always do to us”.

SQA-86 reported a similar experience of abandonment: "*there is corruption in our women organization* [FTCBOs]*, our leaders always use us to make money for themselves…they took us to Port Harcourt, took our pictures and abandoned us there, they have abandoned us*".

Not only have FTCBOs not fulfilled any of the above perceptions of CD, according to KIs-2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 16, 23, 25, 31, 63, 65, and 67, and SQAs-3, 4, 11, 25, 59, 79, 82, and 132, in some communities they have harboured vicious agents of community underdevelopment. KI-63 claimed that community elites, especially politicians, "*give hard drugs to youths*". KI-65 explained that drugs devalue the youths: when you

> "*give them one naira and drinks, they become your boys and start fighting on your behalf. But when these politicians succeed, they dump these boys and they become serious problems in the community. These boys when they are dumped feel cheated and even when these politicians are in Abuja, these boys look for ways to get back at him, and sometimes they attack any of the politician's relatives in the community. This type of things have caused serious problems here because they will not only end up killing people, they burn down houses and our few schools".*

Turning to second tier traditional community-based organizations (STCBOs), only a few STCBOs are designed to provide infrastructure. One of these is *Amonikpo*: the much-celebrated achievement of this organization is the building of schools. For example, KI-18 said the *Amonikpo* organization in his community built their first ever community primary school: "*the first school we had in this community was built by this organization, they moved from house to house soliciting for funds".*

On whether STCBOs contribute to human, social and economic capital, SQAs-67 and 86 reported that traditional cultural organizations and events are gradually dying out across Ogoni communities because of the expansion of churches and Christianity. Respondents SQAs- 43,67, 101, and 155, and KIs-22 and 67 all held that STCBOs do not contribute to the economic empowerment of community members because whatever money they get from cultural dances and festivals do not go into the community purse, but instead are used by their members.

However, STCBOs are credited with a significant impact on psychological capital, both good and bad. Good impacts include the contributions made by football clubs. According to KIs-8

and 20, and SQAs -38, 69, 96, and 97, football clubs are the most valuable agent of community development because they unite rather than divide community members. SQA-69 said that *"our football tournaments bring people together, everybody is involved"*. Likewise, SQA-64 explained that *"football unite enemies because members of this community are very cooperative whenever we have our match… so many people come to watch us"*. KIs-8 and 20 observed that football engages youths and occupies their minds positively; KI-8 reported that *"our youths are carried away with our football events"*; and KI-20 hoped that peace may return in Ogoni communities when their football clubs are strengthened. Peace, according to KIs-4, 5, 17, 18, 19, 28, 32, and 67, is the foundation for CD. According to KI-32, *"we lost everything in our community when we were fighting…now that we have small peace, we have started rebuilding"*. Although football clubs have not provided infrastructural or human, or economic development in their respective communities, they create peaceful platforms on which such developments might thrive. This is because they help in the development and nurturing of psychological (and possibly social) capital. However, these achievements and prospects may be short-lived: SQA-97 said that *"my organization* [football club] *may die any moment…our major challenge is financial constraint because we cannot do what we planned"*. SQA-96 reported that *"we have always been constrained by finance"* and SQA-69 explained that his football club may no longer have access to a playing field: *"we do not have football field because the ministry of education now wants to fence their schools, when this is done how our boys can gain access?"*

Good impacts are also claimed for dance groups. STCBO leaders like SQAs-21, 78, 111 and 117 insist their dance organizations contribute to psychological capital because they preserve Ogonis' endangered culture. For example, SQA-21 claimed *"our aim is to educate our children on our culture and develop cultural dance"*. Similarly, SQA-111 said that his organization ensures that young people learn Ogoni traditional dance steps, while SQA-78 explained that her organization organizes *"traditional dance competition…for social reasons because we bring people together"*.

However, some STCBOs are perceived to have bad impacts on psychological capital. For instance, cultural religious organizations, according to SQAs 30, 46, 65, and 189, and KIs-13, 14, 19, 22, and 65, are not agents of CD. KI-65 explained that the *Amonikpo* cultural religious group/secret society is an agent of underdevelopment and a human rights violator that sows division among his community members: *"that organization is a big problem…if you are not*

their member; you are not allowed to go out when they have their festival in April. You will remain indoors until after their festival, is this an agent of development?" KI-22 claimed that:

> *"it is tyrannical because it kicks against development, they almost imprison everybody during their festival because if you are not a member you don't go outside, you stay indoors. The only free place is the federal express roads but other areas are deserted, now no matter the amount this people realize from their festival, they do not give account to anybody, they use the money among themselves and not for the betterment of the community, they eat, drink and enjoy the money alone".*

SQA-65 held that *"not all traditional functions will be favourable to everybody".* This, according to KIs-4, 8, 13, 14, 15, 22, 25, and 67, is because the practices of most cultural religious and dance organizations are inconsistent with modern culture. KI-14 explains that the majority of Ogonis do not identify with *Amonikpo* or other secret religious organizations because "*we try to advance only good culture and values, we do away with bad ones".* This is why members of secret cult/religious organizations like *Amonikpo*, according to KIs-8, 14, 13, and 25, hide their identity. Dance groups have also been criticised: SQA-65 claimed that dance groups do not contribute to CD. However, judging whether cultural religious organizations like *Amonikpo* and dance groups fulfil the criteria for CD is difficult because of the contested evaluation of the activities of these organizations. While most respondents thought they are tyrannical and do not contribute to CD, members of cultural organizations like *Amonikpo* claim that community members use their schools and even invite them to secure their communities as community police.

This patchy record of first-tier and second-tier traditional CBOs to fulfil the criteria for CD in Ogoni-land according to KIs-2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 28, and 31, explains why Ogonis look to alternative CBOs, such as MCBOs. KI-19 said *"we call for help from outside organizations…we have so many problems and no solutions".*

4.4.2 *Modern community-based organizations (MCBOs) and community development (CD) in Ogoniland*

This section looks at whether modern community-based organizations (MCBOs) fulfil the perceived criteria for CD see (Table 5). On infrastructural capital, about 20% of KIs reported that some MCBOs contributed to the provision of infrastructure in their communities. For instance, KI-10 said "*we benefitted six blocks of classrooms";* KI-15 said they dug a borehole in his community, which provided his community with potable drinking water; and KI-11

said charity MCBOs laid the foundation for a health centre in his community. For TI-10, members of his resident association contribute money for the development of their neighbourhood: *"we develop our area of residence, there is need to control flooding"*. TI-25, also a town MCBO leader, explained that his organization was primarily set up to help their members resident in Ogoniland, and "*we are involved in the development of Ogoni because we pay tax, development levies*". KI-1, an Ogoni community leader, said that although town MCBOs organize primarily to meet the needs of their members because "*they have to first settle their own problems...they are also part of development here because some of them have started acquiring lands here, they have started building, it is part of development. There are areas that have been cleared and now developed, with this I can say that non-indigenes* [town MCBOs] *are helping in community development"*. Similarly, for KIs-3, "*non-indigenes* [town MCBOs] *come together, so that when they have challenges their organizations will understand their predicaments. They sometimes contribute to the development of our community because we approach them for money in the way of fines for community development"*. Judging how well environmental CBOs are able to fulfil the criteria of CD, is, however, difficult because all respondents resident in the communities studied are unaware of any environment CBO, despite the fact that most environment CBOs assert that they have many members - TI-6 claims his environmental CBO has more than 5000 members.

With regard to charity MCBOs, according to five KIs and four SQAs, when charity MCBOs are involved in the provision of infrastructure, firstly, they seldom engage genuinely with communities, and even when they do engage with communities, according to 33% of KIs and TIs-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, they only engage with community leaders. The charity groups admit this: for example, TI-5 explained that "*we cannot possibly engage with everybody but at least we try to do that through different leaders of their community organizations* [FTCBOs]*"*. Likewise, TI-8 said "*the leadership of my organization meet on issues of community development and then discuss with community leaders"*, while TI-6 said "*my organization works with community leaders"*. This means that infrastructure development obtained from charity MCBOs may not represent the genuine needs of local communities because MCBOs work in harness with traditional community structures which are themselves not truly representative of the community see (Table 5)

Secondly, respondents KIs- 3, 6, 10, 13, 15, 24, and 30 claimed that most charity MCBOs work as 'ghost' organizations. For example, KI-10, reported that members of his community

"supplied labour for the work and they [charity MCBOs] *handled it on their own…I do not know the organization, some people said it is from Shell… the contractor in charge is not friendly at all"*. KI-15, another member of the community elite, reported that *"I know an organization drilled this borehole, but I do not know their name"*. KI-6 explained that a strange organization rumoured to be from Shell, constructed blocks of classrooms in his community, but *"they did not tell us exactly where they come from…they said we should donate land for school project"*. KIs-3 and 30 linked ghost MCBOs to Shell officials: according to KI-3, Shell officials cultivate this type of CBO: *"people sit down in their comfortable offices in Shell and once they want to empower their relations they set up emergency organizations, just to get contracts"*. KI-30 described ghost MCBOs as *"hired contractors"* because *"they are only after themselves, most Shell officials own those organizations, they award contracts to them and make serious money"*.

On human, economic, and social capital, positive evaluations included statements by six KIs and seven SQAs all of whom are community leaders. For example, KI-5, a community youth leader, reported that charity health organizations periodically visit his community to treat the sick at subsidized rates:

> *"some people came here and treated our people for different sicknesses at subsidized rate, they did quite a number of eye tests…Seeing our poverty level here, they decided to do for three thousand naira operations that cost like ten thousand naira at the general hospital"*.

KI-20, a former local government chairman, said that charity health MCBOs treat the sick in his community at subsidized rates. KI-2 reported that charity MCBOs also provide skill acquisition programmes at subsidized rates: *"they* [charity MCBOs] *put in resources to help our people, they have skill acquisition programmes, most of our women here have learnt how to do a lot of things like bakery…with paltry sum of money"*. Turning to residential (or neighbourhood) and town MCBOs, on the former, KI-28, FG-1 and TIs-10, 89, and 91, said resident MCBOs are primarily organizations set up to serve the interests of their members. KI-28 explained that foreigners set up resident organizations as self-help organizations that will take care of their own needs:

> *"as foreigners in this neighbourhood, we established a 'Good neighbourhood' resident organization to unite us, to keep us going. We started with seven members now we are up to 30 and it all started when one of our neighbours lost his mother and we came together and contributed two thousand naira… now we support our members during burials and weddings"*.

On town MCBOs, positive evaluations came from TI-4, a town MCBO leader, who claimed that his organization is primarily concerned with *"finding out the needs of our people...we are*

involved in the development of our native community in Ebonyi state". TI-15, another town MCBO leader, explained that "*we foster unity among our members; we are concerned about each other's wellbeing*".

However, there were also negative evaluations of charity groups in relation to their contribution to human, economic and social capital. First, KI-65 claimed that charity organisations were used by elites to serve their own purposes:

> "*there was a charity organization that came into our community and requested for seven poor children to train in school. They specifically requested for seven poor children, they consulted a member of our council of chiefs and elders* [CEC], *who lectures in the polytechnic. That scholarship ended in the hands of the first son of the lecturer and his sister's children*".

KI-8 asserted that charity MCBOs always fall into the hands of the rich in the community, who hijack whatever package they have for the poor. A second criticism was that charity groups were highly selective in the places where they chose to operate. According to respondents like KIs-4, 7, 14, 16, and 19, charity MCBOs do not work across all Ogoni communities, as they themselves are yet to be visited by any. For example, KI-4 stated that "*we are very desperate, we are not fostering in anything...we need organizations to support us...if these organizations come up with ideas, there will be much progress, we can then start from there*". Fifteen KIs, and FGs-2 and 3, criticized charity organizations for failing to operate in their communities. KI-68 said he has never seen any charity MCBO in his community: "*do we look like people that have received help? We only own ourselves and these mud houses that is all*". FG-2 said "*people don't visit us...see what all of us look like*".

A third criticism was that despite providing services at subsidised rates, most charity groups were essentially market-driven organizations see (Table 5). KIs-10, 22, 31, 28, 65, and 67 critiqued charity groups as uncaring about the absolute poor, who are in the majority. KI-31 described charity MCBOs as market-driven because: "*first you must register with them ...this money is part of their benefit, we also benefit from them and so it is trade by barter, no real help*". KI-10 reported that a charity MCBO sold "*loan forms to us*". KI-67 explained that even though charity MCBOs are quite productive...those from the poor class don't benefit because these organizations talk about registration. When I was in …, there was an organization [charity MCBO], they said they wanted to train people as caterers and also as drivers, initially they said it was free but later they brought forms and asked people to buy. After that they demanded money for materials, based on this so many people withdrew.

A fourth charge levelled against charity groups was fraud. According to KIs-10, 18, and 31, the leadership of most charity MCBOs was corrupt. KI-18 explained that a charity MCBO duped members of his community, and they have not been able to locate it to demand redress: *"they came here and I told them what they can do for us and that was to help in any way to bring up the educational level of our children. This organization now asked our people to pay four hundred naira each for passports nothing came out of this, they are not organized… most of these organizations are fraudsters"*. KI-31 narrated a similar experience with a charity MCBO:

> *"as a community leader, an outside organization* [charity MCBO], *convinced me that they will train my people in computer and driving and so I introduced them to my people. More than 2000 youths registered. They brought in two computers and then promised to come the next day but since then, we have not seen them. I tried to locate their office in Port Harcourt, when I got there I discovered that I was duped because people around also confirmed that so many people have been coming to look for the fraudsters that claim to be an organization".*

Likewise, KI-10 reported that *"the organization that sold loan forms to us did not give us the loan after selling their forms and our community bought many"*. Moreover, according to KI-28, FG-1, and TIs-10, 89, and 91, resident MCBOs are primarily self-serving organizations, while KIs-1, 3, 10, 20, and 28, and TIs-2, 4, 10, 15, 19, 23, and 39, all noted that both resident and town MCBOs are primarily concerned about the interest of their own members, and only contribute occasionally to their host Ogoni communities.

On MCBOs' contribution to psychological capital, sixteen KIs were highly critical. For example, KI-22 reported that only fortunate people benefit from MCBOs: *"if you don't have your brother or sister in the community council or state house, you may not be called for anything…but if you have the right connections you will be invited"*. KI-65 described this discriminatory legacy as *"my people syndrome"*, a disorder that he claims has kept most people in poverty which now affects their perception of themselves, because *"poverty is a sickness that will not allow you do anything or see anything good in yourself"*. KIs-5, 8, 14, 17, 18, and 24 explain that it is because MCBOs are not familiar with Ogoni culture that they are unable to offer psychological support. According to KI-14, the onus of the development of psychological capital lies mostly on FTCBOs as custodians of culture and not on outside organizers like MCBOs. For KI-14, this is because *"they don't have any local knowledge of our community",* and according to KI-5, outside MCBOs can only be *"relevant in terms of providing services for us"*. Finally, the self-serving nature of resident and town MCBOs,

suggests that they are primarily organized to protect the interests of their own members rather than in the development of the psychological capital of everyone in their host communities see (Table 5).

4.4.3 *Hybrid community-based organizations and community development in Ogoniland*

As discussed in section 4.2.3 above, HCBOs can be either inter-HCBOs or intra- HCBOs (see Table 6). Beginning with inter-HCBOs, respondents KIs-2, 8, and 22 and SQAs-3, 15, and 26 praised CROs for their contributions to infrastructural development in Ogoniland. For example, KI-22 reported that CROs are useful because "*they dug a borehole in my community...we now have potable water*". KI-67 explained CROs have always provided amenities in poor communities because: "*as it stands we cannot point to any project from any organization in this community...with the exception of... that one from that religious organization. They constructed a borehole for us and provided two generators for it*". SQA-87 reported that "*our only source of potable drinking water was provided by a church*", and SQA-36 said "*we* [religious organization] *dug a borehole at Ebubu*".

On the impact of inter-HCBOs on human, economic, and social capital, some respondents again had positive things to say about the role of Christian religious organisations (CROs), which KIs-8, 14, 19, 25, 27, 28, 31, 38, 43, 65, and 67, and SQAs-67, 78, 83, 85, and 87, described as the most useful in the inter-HCBO category. KIs-22, 25, 31, and 38 linked CROs' usefulness to their empathetic approach to CD. KI-22, a clergyman, explained that even though his CRO is self-funded and therefore strictly speaking responsible only to its own members, they cannot ignore the very depressing condition of members of their host communities:

> "*we have our own challenges as well...but in most communities that we planted our churches, we have people that go virtually naked. They are very poor and so we supply them with foodstuffs like rice, beans, garri and even common salt, all these cost so much money. We sometimes help to put up sheds for them*".

KIs-8 and 25 noted that Catholic Missions come into their communities periodically to rescue orphans, while KI-8 explained that "*there is this Catholic organization...they normally come here to pick orphans and take them to the motherless babies' home*". KI-25 said CROs "*usually assist orphans, especially in the area of education; they also take some of our children to where they will acquire and learn new skills. Sometimes they come down*

themselves to do trainings for our people and they give out loans to our widows to set up small businesses".

However, KI-31 argued that while CROs assist by dispensing charity without demanding registration fees, they do not meet the needs of local communities because they define their programmes without community input. Moreover, while CROs can aid and nurture the development of social capital among their members, according to KIs-8, 11, 13, 14, 22, 25, and 28, they discriminate against community members who belong to the *Amonikpo* organization and other traditional organizations. The fact that CROs only supply items to community members suggest that they may not be in the business of human capacity development because, according to KI-31, like charity *"they only give us what they have for us"*: they do not engage with the community to find out what poor people themselves want.

Moreover, most respondents were negative in their assessments of the impact of other types of inter-HCBOs on human, economic, and social capital. According to KIs-19, 22, 23, 27, 28, and 31, and FGs-1, and 2, most inter-HCBOs are organized primarily to serve their founders. KIs-8, 18, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 65, and 67, and FG-2, all explained that individuals set up organizations for self-serving reasons. For example, KI-27 reported that *"people just set up organizations to get funding…they even register these organizations"*. According to KIs-22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, and 31, and FGs-1, and 2, inter-HCBOs flourish in Ogoniland because of the high rate of illiteracy and poverty among Ogonis, which founders/sponsors of this type of organization exploit to their own advantage. For example, FG-1 asserted that *"people take advantage of our condition to seek for funds on our behalf…they form organizations as an opening for exploitation"*. KI-23 said that Ogoni is a fertile ground for self-serving inter-HCBOs: *"60% of the reason lies due to the fact that members of these communities are not educated, 30% is blind loyalty to leaders of these organizations and 10% is due to poverty…because they get food stuffs and stipends"*. KIs-29 claimed that his inter-HCBO enticed their supposed followers with food:

> *"they have no choice because of poverty…when people launch organizations, they cook and kill goats and these poor and hungry people eat and then register their names. This type of organization is across board…it has no constitution".*

A further criticism is that many inter-HCBOs are partisan political organizations posing as neutral public institutions. Like environment/ charity MCBOs, most inter-HCBOs have very high membership numbers. For example, SQA-44 put the 'membership strength' of his inter-

HCBO at over 3,000, while SQA-46 thought his organization has over 25,000 members. Inter-HCBOs have large numbers of members because their members, like those of MCBOs, are spread across several communities, not limited to Ogoni. KI-29, boasting about the ability of his inter-HCBO to attract numerous 'members/followers' for their sponsors, admitted that it *"is purely a political association but we portray it as a CBO and it is funded by politicians, so we disguise as an organization"*. The successes of most inter-HCBOs in attracting large numbers of members, according to KI-19, can be attributed to the perceived quality of their leadership: *"graduates manage this organization…especially those that participated actively in student unionism…the essence of this criteria is to harness leadership potentials, because having been a student leader, it is believed that you are a great leader"*. While young graduates exploit the poor, hungry and unlearned members of Ogoniland through their inter-HCBOs for their sponsors, according to KI-23, they earn a good living from politicians:

> *"now politicians do not go door campaigning, they use CBOs…CBO is now a business venture for idle people, they mobilise people and name it an organization with the expectation that politicians will catch up with them, if their number [members] is encouraging. I guess their slogan should be if you have the number, I have the cash, these idle hands mobilise people from the grassroots for this purpose".*

KI-22 noted that most inter-HCBO leaders are *"party agents, they just group themselves together in the name of organization, only to deliver their members to their party and then get contracts in exchange"*. KI-29 was frank: *"we do not have anything to offer…we make empty promises and will not fulfil anyone…our superior aim is about the man funding us which is political"*. SQA-147 admitted that his inter-HCBO makes empty promises to the grassroots see (Table 6)

On the influence of inter-HCBOs on psychological capital, KIs-27, 38**,** 42, 43 and 54 said CROs provide psychological support because attending CRO meetings uplifts their souls: KI-43 explains that *"I like attending fellowships in the church…I always feel happy there"*. KI-53 said church gatherings *"enrich my soul"*. Likewise, KI-42 said that *"our church gathering enriches my soul"*; KI-54 thought her time was better spent in the church. KI-27 concluded that CROs *"are better alternative organizations"* for most members of his community because they *"support our people in many ways."*

However, KI-9 claimed that inter-HCBOs do not improve psychological capital; instead they reduce it because they undermine the fragile self-esteem of the poor. Poverty and illiteracy has eaten deep *"into our people… [and] they feel shy and inferior"*. KI-16 said poor Ogonis are susceptible to manipulation, while KI-27 held that *"in my area poverty has affected the*

reasoning of our people, they are easily manipulated". SQA-147 noted that *"it is very easy to convince them".* According to KI-8,

> *"our people especially our women are easily deceived…the problem we have with our women here is that they only know how to farm…they are not educated. They only do peasant farming…farming manually is very hard and do not give them money…that is why they follow organizations blindly".*

KIs-24, 25 and 28 confirmed that poverty has made it very easy for inter-HCBOs to manipulate members of their host communities. KI-16 said that poverty and lack of enlightenment among members of his community means *"you can deceive them easily...and they will follow you".* According to KIs-22, 23, 28, 29, and 30 and SQA-75, leaders of inter-HCBOs take advantage of the fragility of their 'members' and do not work towards improving their psychological capital.

Turning to intra-HCBOs (i.e. cooperative and social groups), cooperative organizations may serve as agents of infrastructural development. Even though cooperative organizations are primarily self-serving organizations, according to KIs-5, 12, 33, and 66, this type of organization still boasts of providing some infrastructure developments in their respective communities. For instance, KI-12 said her cooperative built a security post in their community primary school: *"from our contributions we always remove two thousand naira from everybody's money. For example, I was supposed to take forty thousand naira from our group, but I was given thirty eight thousand naira. Since we are eight members, we saved sixteen thousand naira for this project".* KI-5 said *"some of these women try to save in the form of cooperative and still set aside money for assisting the community…our local market was built by them".* Intra-HCBO social groups also boast some contributions to infrastructural capital. According to KIs-3, 8, 18, 19, 22, 24, and 25 and SQAs 43, 48, 49, 67, and 134, even though self-funded, occasionally they build little projects like culverts and sign-posts in their various communities. KI-8 said an intra-social organization in his community renovated their community town hall, while KI-21 reported that his social organization replaced the old leaking roofing zincs in their community market.

Cooperative intra-HCBOs are held to contribute to human, economic and social capital in that they empower their members financially. KI-36, a member of an intra-community cooperative organization explained that her daily savings with her club helps her business because *"when I collect my contribution* [money], *I always buy goods at wholesale price for my business…before I registered with our cooperative, I buy small goods at retail price.*

There is more gain if you buy at wholesale price". Another respondent (KI-66) said "*I save 500 hundred naira every month with my club; I will take my money in lump at the end of the year*". Social intra-HCBOs also contribute to human, economic and social capital. SQA-25 confirmed that her social organization support their members when they have burial and wedding ceremonies, while SQA-28 explained that *"we help our members with money for burial and marriage ceremonies"*, and SQA-128 reported that his social organization helps members plan their wedding ceremonies.

However, while intra- cooperative organizations (Table 6), are able to help some of their members economically, the majority of Ogonis according to 64 key informants, 157 survey questionnaires (SQA) 3 focus group discussions and 96 telephone informants are too cashless to belong to this type of organization. Besides they are too pre-occupied with their hand-to mouth existence. For example, KI-49 reported that he is not a member of any cooperative organization because of his level of cashlessness. He explained that because of poverty, most first sons like him in their community have to sacrifice their future for their families, and for his part, he had to withdraw from school to take up '*Pyagbora*' which entails mixing concrete in building sites. From this work, he earns about 1,200 naira (less than £5) per shift and with this he feeds his mother and siblings, yet due to competition for such jobs, sometimes he spends two weeks searching for sites that will need his services. KIs-40, 41, 42, 54, and 56 and SQAs-11, 13, 17, 18, 30, 34, 42, 43, 44, and 50 reported that they beg for cash and money to feed their children. For example, KI-56 said "*my land is no longer fertile due to overcropping...whatever I get I feed my children with it*". KI-3, a ward councillor, traced the cause of general cashlessness and low membership of cooperative organizations among Ogonis to this cycle: *"my parents were farmers and did not send me to school because all we do is plant cassava, yam and cocoyam and then harvest them to eat not to sell. It then means that I have automatically entered into poverty and my children will be poor too"*. Similarly, KI-67 said that poverty in Ogoni is *"generational because you see parents transfer poverty to their children and their children will transfer to their own children"*.

The same criticisms are made of intra-HCBO social groups. According to KI-1, even though most intra-social organizations claim they provide economic and social support to their members, they may not be investing in human capital development, because most intra-social organizations are more like social clubs: they *"always do not have important programmes for our community...to me they are a group of friends that discuss burial, wedding or bachelors eve"*. KIs-3, 8, 19, and 25 said that intra-social organizations in their respective communities

discriminate against the poor and uneducated. KI-3 reported that *"these organizations at times put their members under stress…because they want their members to belong to a certain class…they tell their members what to wear for specific events"*. SQAs-6, 7, 21, 26, 78, 104, 110, 111 and 138 confirmed that membership of their various intra-social organizations is based on stipulated criteria and is not open to all. SQA-7 said only graduates with qualifications are registered into his organization, while SQA-6 acknowledged that *"we carefully select our members from families"*. KI-25, 33, 41, 42, and 54 all wished to belong to intra-social organizations in their respective communities but are held back because of their very low status. KI-25 said he is still waiting for Lewe club (intra-community social organization) to invite him: *"they have not invited me yet, but I hope they will in the future"*. KI-33 was not hopeful that he will be invited because *"I do not have good clothes to wear, they will not accept me"*.

Intra-HCBO cooperative organizations also deliver psychological support, but only to their few members in the community and not the poor majority. For example, KI-66 explained that members of her club always organize parties to socialize with each other: *"we organize ceremonies…our members come around"*, and KI-34 said *"what I like most about our cooperative is our end of year gathering"*. According to KIs-12, 13, 14, and 17, most intra-community social organizations are mostly 'fun organizations'. KI-18 said the little he knows about intra-social organizations is *"when you have an occasion, they will assist in making it enjoyable that is what they do"*. KI-19 said that when intra-social organizations do not have weddings or burial ceremonies to attend, *"we come together sometimes to eat and drink whatever we have as a family"*

One reason why intra-HCBO social clubs may fail to promote CD, according to respondents KIs-16, 19, 22, 23, 28, and 30 and FGs-2 and 3, is because these organizations are always short-lived as they die with their members. As respondent (KI-16) explained: *"there are social clubs in my community… due to the death of their founders those organizations seem to have lost their bearings"*. Another reason is that most intra-HCBO social clubs aspire to upgrade their status to inter-HCBO social clubs, and join up with inter-HCBO social clubs to recruit their members for politicians in exchange for cash. For example, respondent SQA-109 explained that his intra-HCBO social club started small, but now *"we have about 15 branches across the local government area…we want this association to touch lives in various communities"*.

Table 4: TCBO Framework for community development

Typology of CBO	Source of funding	Concept of civic virtue	Target population	CD as infrastructure	CD as human, economic, and social capital	CD as psychological capital
Traditional CBOs						
FTCBOs	Government, individual donations, Shell and community contributions	Communality	Community members	Priority but performance below members expectation	Weak	Weak, some times cause of psychological concerns
STCBOs	Members contributions, individual donations	Communality	Interested members	Not a priority	Not a priority	Not strong

Table 5: MCBOs framework for community development

Typology of CBO	Source of funding/relief	Concept of civic virtue	Target population	CD as infrastructural Capital	CD as human, economic, and social capital	CD as psychological capital
Modern CBOs Environment/ charity	Shell State, individual donations Members contribution	Market driven/ philanthropy	Recommended community members	Not priority but invest scantily	Weak	Weak work mostly along traditional structures
Resident Neighbourhood organizations	Members contribution	Self-serving	Neighbours	Not priority	Not priority	Not priority
Town organizations	Members contribution	Self-serving	Individuals from other towns resident in Ogoni-land	Not priority	Not priority	Not priority

Table 6: HCBO framework of community development

Typology of CBO	Source of funding/relief	Concept of civic virtue	Target population	CD as infrastructural development	CD as human, economic, and social capital development	CD as psychological capital
Hybrid CBOs Inter-HCBOs	Politicians, donations	Self-serving	Grass-root population across communities,	Not priority	Weak (self – serving)	Not priority
CRO	Tithes, offerings	Empathy	Members/community members	Not priority	Weak, priority	Weak
Intra-HCBOs	Members' contributions	Self-serving	Not priority	Not priority	Empower members financially	Not priority

4.5 Emerging issues and conclusions

There are five main issues that have arisen from the analysis in this chapter of the bottom-up approach to CD manifested by CBOs in Ogoniland. First, with the exception of CROs, PTAs and football clubs, most 'members' of CBOs in Ogoniland are passive and are used by their leaders as a means to achieve their own elitist ends. Second, there is a strong relationship between the current poor condition of Ogoniland and the type of CBOs that exist in them, most of which have proven to be opportunists because the poor condition of Ogonis and their communities provide a good market for them to flourish in. This was strongly echoed by KIs-23, 29, and 34; FGs-1, and 2, and SQAs- 86, and 107. For KI-23, "*CBO is now business*", and for KI-29, it *"is the business of the day…especially when they have political attachments".* Third, there is hardly any difference between the bottom-up approaches of MCBOs and HCBOs on the one hand, and the much-eulogised communitarian TCBOs on the other hand, in the way they all practise instrumental CD with limited community assistance see (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016). Fourth, although a few of these organizations try to provide services in Ogoniland, none has fulfilled the criteria of CD (egalitarianism, environmental, infrastructural, human, economic and psychological capital) as espoused by Ogonis (sections 4.3.1; 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). Fifth, since CBOs in Ogoniland benefit from the poverty and underdevelopment that ravage these local communities, the view that they are solely devoted to the task of developing local communities is a myth, disguising their real motivation. This was confirmed by KIs-22, 23, 28, 29 and FG-2: according to FG-2, *"our leaders take advantage of our condition to do fund raising… but the truth is that they do it to help themselves and family not us* [poor]"

So, like top-down initiatives (discussed in chapter three), bottom-up initiatives of CD have not developed Ogoni communities, but instead in some cases have compounded their under-development. It could be argued that the failure of CBOs and the bottom-up approach to CD in Ogoniland is due to the nature of Ogoni communities, in the sense that communities get the CBOs they deserve. Ogoni communities may be so imperfect that they attract mainly imperfect CBOs. We will return to this question in chapter six. In the meantime, we must turn to the perception of Ogonis about the concept of community, because, as Popple and Quinney (2002, p. 1) note, "a critical examination of the theory and practice of community development depends upon an understanding of the concept of community". Consequently, the next chapter (5) discusses the perception of Ogonis about the concept of community.

Chapter 5: The perceptions of Ogonis about community

"Regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (Anderson, 1983).

5.1. Introduction

This chapter is about Ogonis' perceptions of community. Given the failure of most top-down and bottom-up initiatives to improve the lot of Ogoni communities, I report how respondents described their communities in order to understand whether or not there is something intractable about Ogoni communities that makes them impossible to improve. The chapter is divided into four sections: section 5.2 provides a background or context for the three ways that the concept of community in Africa has been understood in the literature; section 5.3 presents evidence of Ogonis' perceptions of their communities held by 69 face-to-face key informant interviewees (KIs), 189 survey questionnaire respondents (SQAs) and 3 focus group discussions (FGDs); section 5.4 presents evidence of perceptions of their communities held by 200 Ogoni respondents of survey questionnaire B (SQBs); and the concluding section 5.5 summarizes the findings from the two preceding data sections.

5.2 The concept of community in Africa

There are three conceptualizations of community in Africa: extreme communitarianism; moderate communitarianism; and individualistic associationism. Extreme communitarianism is enunciated by radical African communitarian philosophers such as Menkiti who have argued that the community makes the individual, and therefore is prioritized over the individual. Menkiti asserted that an individual can only exist in the company of members (others) of his community. According to Menkiti, "as far as Africans are concerned, the reality of the communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual histories", because individuals in the community owe their existence to a common gene:

> "just as the navel points men to umbilical linkage with generations preceding them so also does language and its associated social rules point them to a mental commonwealth with others whose life histories encompass the past, present and future" (cited in Bongmba, 2005, p.2).

Similarly, Wiredu (2003, p.351) has argued that African communities are communal societies (gemeinschaft) not associational societies (gesellschaft): "not a mere association of individual persons whose interests and ends are contingently congruent, but a group of persons linked by interpersonal bonds". In the event of a moral clash between the individual and the

community, the community wins (Famakinwa, 2010), because Africans are characteristically communal beings who place more emphasis on community progress than on individual progress (Uwaezuoke, 2014). The community nourishes commonality, reciprocity, warmth, unity cooperation, and mutual respect (Uwaezuloke, 2014). Uwaezuloke (2014) argues that viciousness in African communities is caused by lack of communalism not its excess. As a result of modernism, many African communities have lost their communality and become associations which are characterised by injustices:

> "Suppressions and oppressions that characterize our world today are responsible for…crimes against humanity. Humanity is being dehumanized on a daily basis; a testimony to the collapse of the wholesome human relationships…humanity has lost touch with simple morality which is a hallmark of wholesome human relationships" (Uwaezuloke, 2014, p. 265).

Like Uwaezuloke, Muniz and Guinn (2001, p.413) blames modernism for this loss of traditional African communalism, arguing that

> "something more natural and real… was replaced by a more depersonalized, mass produced, and less grounded type of human experience (modern society). The received view was that anomie; dislocation and disconnectedness were the result of modernity's fatal assault on the premodern community"

Similarly, Pyagbara (2007, p. 11) argues that

> "one area oil has dealt a dead knell to our custom and traditions is the…individualism which it has fostered amongst members of our communities, which is contrary to our communal lifestyles. This had led to the disintegration of customs, traditions and social values" (Pyagbara, 2007, p.11).

However, other extreme communitarians have argued that African communities have withstood the onslaught of modernity. For example, according to Eziju (nd), not even industrialization has destroyed the strong African communal spirit, especially in rural communities. This is because African communities are built on a solid moral foundation that is characterised by "the absence of classes, that is, social stratification; the absence of exploitative or antagonistic social relations…equality at the level of distribution of social produce; and the fact that strong family and kinship ties form (ed) the basis of social life in African communal societies" (Tatah, 2014, p. 447).

Moderate communitarianism is enunciated by African philosophers such as Gyekye who have argued that extreme communalized values and beliefs may be tyrannical, and that

prioritizing community duties over individual rights may become immoral (Famakinwa, 2010). Gyekye claims that African communities are not radically communitarian – on the contrary, they exemplify moderate communitarianism, because they are structured to balance community and individual values. Moderate "communitarianism acknowledges the intrinsic worth of the individual and moral (natural rights) of the individual" (Gyekye 1997, p. 69). Matolino describes it as "limited communitarianism" cited in (Oyowe, 2015, p.513).

Individualistic associationism is enunciated by African philosophers such as Oyowe (2015, p.514), who rejects the idea that African communities are communitarian, claiming that moderate communitarianism is "an appendage merely to the grand communitarian project". Like Oyowe, Chigudu (2015), Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al* (2016), Calderisi (2007) and Platteau and Abraham (2010) have argued that African communities were not transformed from communitarianism into individualistic associationism by modernism, but that these communities even in their natural (pre-modern) state resemble Tonnies' concept of gesellschaft.

In this chapter, I report the perceptions held by Ogonis about the nature of their communities in the light of the three interpretations of community identified above - extreme communitarianism, moderate communitarianism, and individualistic associationism. Section 5.1.2 presents Ogoni perceptions that communities are extremely communitarian in nature. Section 5.1.3 presents Ogoni perceptions that Ogoni communities are moderately communitarian in nature. Section 5.1.4 presents Ogoni perceptions that Ogoni communities are individualistically associational in nature. Section 5.2 presents data on Ogoni respondents' perceptions of a sense of community. Section 5.3 concludes the chapter by summarizing its findings.

5.3 Key informant interviewees', survey A respondents' (SQAs) and focus group discussants' perceptions of community

5.3.1 *KI respondents', SQA respondents', and FG discussants' perceptions of communities as radically communitarian*
The perception that Ogoni communities are radically communal in the sense that community interests are prioritized over individual interests, was held by 15 KIs and nine SQAs most of whom are community chief/elites. SQAs-62, 65, and 101 explained that community is prioritized over the individual because "*tradition demands we cooperate*" (SQA-62). This is

because we are related: *"we are a kindred"* (KI-8), and it is natural that we live in unity because we understand each other (SQAs-65 and 71). Ogoni communities are communal in nature because *"we always work to make sure that our community acquires what they are supposed to get for the progress of the community"* (KI-10). Even though individuals in the community are important and deserve consideration, according to KIs-4, 5, 10, 17, and 18, this consideration can only be secondary because the community's interest is paramount: *"we target maintenance of our community so that it will not collapse"*. KI-18 declared that Ogonis have more commitment to their communities than to individuals: *"yes there is nothing"* in individual considerations that override community decisions. KI-17 held that his community is more important, because individual concerns *"is not our work, it is not our function"* and *"there is nothing anyone can do about it"* (KI-27): *"the community owns all of us"* (KI-14). In other words, no individual is greater than the community (KIs-1, 8, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 25). KI-8 affirmed that his community is well-established and *"individuals cannot be bigger than the community"*. KI-25 said:

> *"we believe that no matter how rich or big you are, you cannot be bigger than the community because you were born into it and it existed before you…no matter who you are, you cannot be bigger than this community. This community is complete."*

According to KIs-8 and 25, the community has natural ways of maintaining good moral standard by punishing injustice. KI-25 claims:

> *"in my community if something happens to a bad man, people will say it was his past that killed him and this goes a long way to stain the image of his family and this is especially when the death is not natural. Research has also shown that violent people don't live beyond 40 years in this community"*

Most respondents - 39 KIs, 3 FGs and 67 SQAs - attributed the current practice and culture of inherited leadership to the importance attached to community tradition. KI-64 explained that even though individuals might have reservations about this culture, it is retained because of the importance attached to the community over individual choice and preference. This is why *"most of these positions are hereditary and until these leaders die they cannot be replaced"* (KI-64; see also Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016). Respondents such as KIs-6, 11, 15, and 18 insist that the community is an embodiment of morality, because it works with moral traditions laid down by past generations. KI-17 defended the culture of inherited leadership which he linked to ancestors: *"here, it is hereditary, if your old grandfather was a chief, the throne will never leave your family"*. KI-6, an octogenarian, claimed that since ascending the throne he has followed the ancient precedents of his predecessor, his late father. Working

along the grain of the values of past generations is important because ancestors managed the community and they preserved it well: *"if we remove it* [values] *then the village is dead already, we cannot abandon this culture"* (KI-18). These communal values are centred on stability: *"we inherited this peaceful nature from our ancestors"* (KI-9), and identity: *"as Africans the community is very important, it is the first form of identity"* (KI-27). KI-1 says all community members have to identify with the community. Under this interpretation, Ogonis and their traditional leaders are not considered as independent, autonomous, self-determined rational beings, but as inheritors of a revered culture which gives meaning to their lives and must be preserved at all costs. They do not have the right to make choices outside the inherited dictates of their community.

However, other voices were very critical of such radical communitarianism. For example, SQAs-65, 71, and 87 described the culture of inherited leadership as a tragedy that they have to live with: *"the sad truth is that even when my chief dies, his blood (son) will take over"* (SQA-87). KI-16 narrated his experience with the Nigerian police over a case of corruption against his community chief:

> *"I wrote a petition against our chief, the commissioner of police invited him and after interrogation, the police asked us to settle it because of tradition. In our kind of society if anybody hears that I arrested the chief, they will blame me not minding our chief's offence, I will be seen as the greatest offender. After considering all these I thought it was wiser not to pursue the case any further".*

Respondent KI -63 claimed that because of community tradition, the culture of inherited leadership undemocratically produces unproductive community chiefs as community leaders who easily fall prey to Shell and politicians, because they: "did not go to school, they were traditionalists that whenever anybody spoke English to them, they will consider that person reliable, they don't know that they were being deceived" (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016 p.59). Respondent KI-2, a community chief, explained that community chiefs get involved in politics out of external pressure to deliver their communities to politicians. Respondent KI-12, leader of community women nominated by her community chief, openly admitted that the linkage between the leadership in her community and the ruling party in her state is purely for personal gain:

> *"am now the new women leader of All Progressive Congress (APC) party in my community, I decamped from Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), am a politician...they have asked me to ensure that all...women vote for APC at all levels. When I was in PDP I gave each of them wrappers and cash. We, will work together to deliver to APC, our gain will be 50-50".*

KI-28 reported that community chiefs take advantage of their poor subjects: "*one politician can buy off the whole community through their leaders*". This, according to KI-19, explains why "*Ogoni has been vulnerable to violence…they got themselves divided along different political lines*". KI-67 stated that leadership of communities (oil-endowed and non oil-endowed) headed by traditional chiefs utilize "*any slightest opportunity that they have to take money*" from politicians, ignoring the destructive consequences of party politics on their communities. Respondents KI-16 and KI-65 thought the chiefs in both oil-endowed and non oil-endowed communities are passive and wait for development, because their poor educational attainments make it hard for them to actively attract development. KI-28 questioned how Ogoni communities can develop when their culture of inherited leadership produces leaders who "*do not bother to attract development…companies here are looking for indigenes to employ but their community leaders go there take the spaces, sign and sell them out to non-indigenes, how do you expect this place to grow?*". According to KI-21, this culture of inheritance could destabilise communities: for example, educated members of his non oil-endowed community find it extremely difficult to subject themselves to the leadership of a non-educated chief and claimed that this was the major cause of the seven years' crisis that befell his community because the:

> "lower chief used to say that the higher chief is not presentable because of their level of education… they don't always agree to whatever our highness says…they see their senior as inferior and not intelligent and because of this on several occasions the high chief has danced to their tune but the councillorship elections led to their major disagreement and this caused us over seven years of instability*" (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016 p.59)

KI-16 said most community problems are caused by chiefs "they just got up and ascended their thrones because their fathers were chiefs*" (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016, p.59). But KIs-64, 65, and 67 feared that not much can be done to change the current negative situations of things in Ogoniland, because, according to KI-67: "*in Ogoni, there is this traditional belief that someone will die*" if inherited chiefs are replaced. KI-64 claimed that "*fear will not even allow people to question them*". In other words, community members "*don't confront their traditional leaders*" (KI-21).

5.3.2 *KI and SQA respondents' perceptions of communities as moderately communal*
Twenty one KIs and 16 SQAs claimed that their communities take cognizance of individual rights, with the understanding that individuals are independent, autonomous, self-determining

rational beings. For example, KI-18, unlike proponents of the radical communitarian school, explained that one way his community balanced community interests with individual rights was through 'consensus', by which every member of the community contributes to the management of the community: *"when we* [community chiefs and elites] *reach an agreement, we ask the town crier to announce that every member of the community should meet at the town square"* (KI-18). *"It is there that we tell our people what we have agreed to do and then give room for consultation"* (KI-8). Chiefs do not have the sole power and authority to decide for the community (KIs-1, 8, 14, and 17): they are *"like servants"* that work for the community (KI-1). This was why KI-25 pointed out that consensus is the backbone of his community because decisions are taken unanimously. KI-1 said that in his community, no adult is left out in the processes of decision making because *"we* [community chiefs/elites] *hear from our people and then unanimously take decisions, we agree on a common decision"*. According to KI-14, *"we use a collective responsibility style of leadership"*, in which every member of the community is treated equally as having a voice in the community (KIs- 1, 20). SQA-16 explains that *"we are united… we are our brother's keeper"*. Members *"always cooperate and do whatever we have agreed to do in oneness"* (SQA-17). According to SQA-114, community members *"have learnt to respect each other, we do things with understanding"* (see also SQA-112). Mutual respect is embodied in their communities (KIs-5, 14, and 20): *"traditionally we respect each other otherwise the community will summon you, we have all this in our constitution"* (KI-20).

Achieving consensus would not have been possible without good community leadership. According to KIs-2, 8, 10, 17, 24, 31, 63, and 68 and FG-2, they have learnt to either supervise their inherited chiefs or appoint new chiefs. KIs-2, 8, 10, 25 and 64 said they supervise their community chiefs to ensure quality governance. KI-24, explained that:

> *"we have learnt from our past, our elites have learnt that the management of the community should not be left in the hands of these chiefs. My community had suffered in the past due to bad management, now our elites visit the community weekly, some of them have relocated to the village to work with our chief".*

KI-2, a community chief, confirmed that he works with his community elites:

> *"this is how we work here; we first discuss issues as the …governing council, if we are not reaching any agreement, we inform our leaders, who are elites of our community. We brainstorm together and whatever we agree upon, will be informed to the entire community in our town square meeting. After this meeting, if our people*

have additional ideas or if they oppose, we look at it again before taking the final decision"

KI-24 said that in his community, they use the appointment method to ensure that capable people ascend their throne:

> *"even when you are from a royal family, the community will still decide whether you are capable or not and if you are not, they will pick a capable person from outside. What is important is whether the person is capable or not…someone that can represent the community".*

Similarly, KI-63 explained that in his community, they no longer inherit chiefs, because they want to live in a community where individuals participate in the selection of their chiefs and not in a community where chiefs are imposed on community members in the name of rigid tradition:

> *"in the past we suffered because of this tradition of inheritance, we are now doing reformation. An uneducated person will not taste our throne again…we make sure that elections are well conducted for any position".*

KI-68, who is both a member of the council of chiefs and an elder in his community, claimed that the practice of inherited leadership was confined to their past; he explained that they now rotate chieftaincy position across families. This is to ensure community members do not feel left out: with this method of rotating leadership, families in the community will "*equally enjoy leadership positions*" (KI-68).

Through good governance, Ogoni communities have made optional some cultural practices (KIs-7, 8, 14, 22, and 25 and SQAs-65 and 91). This is because good leadership recognises that not "*all traditional functions will be favourable to everybody*" (SQA-65). Many community members have even dropped the practice of traditional religion: "*here our festivals are dying*" (SQA-30). For example, only a few people now belong to the *Amonikpo* cultural group, because many former members have opted for Christianity: "*Christianity has taken over the entire place*" (KI-8), though remaining members of the *Amonikpo* group still carry out their cultural practices across Ogoni villages (KIs-8, 22 and 29), and according to KI-8, "*it* [Amonikpo], *exists in all Ogoni communities…just the way Christians celebrate Christmas and Esther; Amonikpo celebrate theirs every April. We call this festival Nabira, the state government always set out funds for it*".

Like their freedom of choice of religion, respondents KIs-8, 9, 14, 17, and 25 explained that individuals in their community have the liberty to decide where to seek for justice. KI-14, a

dethroned community chief said he sought for justice to recover his throne in the court. KI-64 said he has taken his conflict with his community chief to the court: "*I have series of court cases with him*". KI-18, a member of the council of chiefs and elders, said he has an on-going case with his community chief: "*we have taken it up; the case is now a police case*". Respondents KIs-19, 63, and 66 said individuals are also at liberty to go through the traditional communal method of dispute resolution.

Thirteen KIs and SQAs16, 17, 18, 30, 42, 56 and 57, which include community chiefs/ elites said that the balancing of individual and community values have made their communities liveable because of the peace that they enjoy. KI-4, the chairman council of chief and elders in his community, confirmed that his community is peaceful because "*we maintain our culture, not in a manner that will ruin our community, it is standardized and controlled*". KI-14 said they only "*advance good cultural values…we do away with those that are tyrannical*". KI-13 declared that "*we reject barbaric culture*" and KI-11, a community chief, explained that his government ensures that they do not promote oppressive culture. KI-2, another community chief, described his community as warm because: "*we are very poor…but happy, all we do is to come together, since we don't have anything. We buy soft drinks and talk together*". Members of "*our community are united and show kindness to each other*" (SQA-112).

5.3.3 *KI, FGD and SQA respondents' perceptions of communities as individualistic associations*

Critics of the extreme (and even moderate) communalist interpretations of African communities claim that behind the façade or social construction of communitarianism lies a web of individualist self-interest and inequality. Most respondents perceived a deep gulf between community elites and ordinary members which reflected the inegalitarian structure of their communities. According to KI-54, his community was deeply divided: "*here it is big man talk to big man and poor man talk to poor man*". SQA-63 explained that in his community, "*a man that has a big car can never be friends with someone that cannot afford a bicycle wheel*" (SQA-63). In other words, interaction is mainly horizontal not vertical, and Ogoni communities are extremely hierarchical. The perception that in Ogoni communities a member's position on the socio-economic ladder determines their level of participation in the community, was held by 37 SQAs, 41 KIs and 3 FGs. Respondents explained that there are seven classes in Ogoni communities: external funders; community chiefs and their elites; kitchen cabinet and council members; usurper chiefs and their entourages; community elites;

resilient community members; and vulnerable community members (see Table 7). In what follows, I describe Ogoni perceptions of each of these seven classes.

Table 7: Social structure of Ogoni communities

Community /membership status	Level of participation	Method of participation
A: External funders (movers and shakers)	Influential participants	Influence through funds, manipulation, force, incitement, divide and rule
B: Community chiefs and their elites (influential decision makers)	Major full participants	Force, manipulation and disconnection
C: Kitchen cabinet and council members (apathetic decision makers)	Reactive and intermediate participants	Consultation
D: Usurper chiefs and their entourages (fractured decision makers)	Intermediate, revolutionary seeking participants	Participate in fragments, not fully
E: Community elites (floating decision makers)	Voluntarily intermittent participants	Abandonment of duty to community
F: Resilient community members	Aggressive participants but systematically disconnected from full participation	Friction and opposition
G: Vulnerable community members	Periodic participants, but systematically disconnected from full participation	Objectified beings, non-engagers , apathetic

A. External Funders

Data from my fieldwork show that politicians and multinational oil companies make up this first and most powerful and influential category of stakeholder in Ogoni communities (Table 7, External Funders). According to SQAs-3 and 4, national politicians have a way of influencing decisions in communities through their local counterparts, noting that for political reasons, community members no longer meet together to take decisions. SQAs-28, 2 and 3 explained that political differences have a negative influence on the decision-making structure of their communities. For example, SQA-3 reported that "*our youth president belongs to APC…and so due to party differences, PDP youths don't get involved in community clean-up*". This was confirmed by KIs-3, 21, and 30: KI-21 reported that in his community they "*are divided along political lines*". For KI-3, "*this type of divisions and*

tussle has affected the psyche of so many persons and so when gatherings are called people that don't belong in that camp will not attend and that is how we live here". He noted that his community lacks inclusive forums for community gatherings. For FG-1, as a youth you are discriminated against and not involved in decision making if you do not belong to, or "*if you do not have people in the winning party. Six years ago when the Action Congress Party* [ACP] *failed to get the electoral ticket, we the supporters were not considered for job positions because the People's Democratic Party* [PDP] *won*". While this sort of division negatively affects those without links to external politicians, SQA-8 noted that traditional chiefs benefit from it, because they always have their links to politicians. SQA-57 claimed that external political intervention in local decision-making structures is for selfish reasons: "*politicians contribute to our trouble they value themselves and families more than the people they represent…their money causes problems here, they only give money to some set of people and will not give others*". In other words, external politicians are able to manipulate Ogoni local decision structures through their power and funds. According to SQA-59, this explains why youths in his community are divided: those in the ruling party (PDP) lead their youth organizations, while APC youths do not participate any longer in their youth forums or decision-making processes. SQA-23 claimed that because of the power and cash at their disposal, external politicians are able to decide who should participate in community decision-making and with what effect. KI-8 explained that politicians are often able to use their funds to generate sectional loyalty in some communities:

> "*there is a type of packaging from Abuja by politicians that cause these divisions especially in communities that generate revenues…due to the presence of too much money in some communities. Politicians package their people to man the affairs of that community; from the paramount ruler to the women leader all will be loyal to this politician because he has the entire community and its leadership in his palm. If you have worked in Eleme, you will hear people say 'am loyal, I believe' it simply means they go all the way to support this politician and also keep assuring him that their loyalty is not in doubt*".

International Oil Companies (IOCs) also exert great influence on the decision-making structure of local communities. According to KI-26, Shells' policy of divide and rule has over the years impacted negatively on his community's decision-making structure, which according to him is exclusionary: "*our problem is still through Shells' divide and rule method and their selfish projects. Most of their projects don't favour the whole community and when our youths rise to say no to such things, Shell calls some youth leaders and elders including our chief. Shell mobilises them against the community*". Respondent KI-23, a social

performance officer with Shell, defended his company's tactics, explaining that Shell "*cannot engage with everybody in this community... we can only work with their leaders*". But since IOCs like Shell engage with only community leaders and elites, respondents KI-63, 26, 14 and 3 argued that these companies influence community participation negatively. According to KI-26, their policies only favour community leaders: "*most of Shells' decisions do not favour the whole community*". Respondents KI-64 and 68 claimed that Shell, like politicians, decides who gets involved in decision making in their communities because they screen out people who will not serve their interest or are not beneficial to them, and according to SQA-78, this causes internal problems. SQA-57 explained that most times this problem occurs when Shell sends youths to make trouble in their communities. According to KI-10, Shell works hand-in-hand with national politicians, who gave them licences to drill oil and pollute their environment: "*whatever Shell plans to do will pass through politicians*".

External funders are even able to defy tradition and community consensus to decide who becomes a community chief. For instance, KI-14 reported that he was dethroned as a local chief because:

> "*Shell ordered that I should be dethroned, on the 9th of October, 2000. We had a meeting with Shell and in that meeting their plan was to kill our oil wells. In fact they have given out the contract. But I insisted that they have destroyed our environment already, I said killing the oil wells alone was not enough, I asked for compensation because since they started taking our oil we have never benefitted anything from them. After that meeting Shell colluded with some of our people and on their own they chose another chief...before I knew what was happening there was another on my throne, sponsored by Shell*".

KI-1 explained that sometimes IOCs combine manipulation and force, see (Table 7). For example, he noted that Shell will typically recruit a

> "*radical soul...a boy that can cause confusion, they will empower him and then introduce him to government security and after that the boy comes into the community, recruits his own boys that will work with him and then they will begin to cause confusion in the community. Shell will then declare that they cannot engage with us because our community is not peaceful*".

KI-20 asserted that "*when they* [Shell] *come to the communities they remove the home fronts and when they want to deal with us they contact each of our organizations differently and try to manipulate and put divisions within us*". According to SQA-93, most Ogonis are thereby unable to participate in community decision making and thus suffer "*intimidation from their leaders and rich people*". SQA-26 claimed that most Ogonis are voiceless; SQA-29 asserted

that "*we are socially excluded because we are not financially buoyant*". The fact that most of the residents are excluded from full participation in decision making, according to KI-60 also explains why "*we* [poor people] *don't know what is happening in this community*". KI-47 said that "*whenever anything is sent down from the state or oil companies…our community leaders share it among themselves and forget about people like me*". The most damning reaction to Shell came from KI-30, who described it as "*one company without dignity and respect for human life in the whole world*".

According to many interview respondents, therefore, these two external actors (politicians and IOCs) influence community leadership/elites with funds and power through force, manipulation, incitement and divide-and-rule tactics for their own interest and not the interest of the entire community. The next section discusses how community chiefs and elites react to the interventions of external funders and how their reactions have influenced other stakeholders.

B. Community chiefs and their elites

According to 30 KIs, 41 SQAs and 3 FGs, community chiefs and their elites are like gatekeepers, and because of this key position, they are constantly tempted by Shell to serve their own interests and not that of the community. KI-30 reported that this motivation is generated through cash:

> "*these traditional rulers are the people Shell uses to penetrate our communities by giving them reasonable amounts of money, and one thing is that whenever Shell calls them for things like that they don't reject it. That is what they are there for, nothing more, they are always in favour of the oil companies*".

For SQAs-12 and 9, the possession of cash and their social networks have made their community chiefs and elites oppressors. Respondents like KIs-23, 21, 16, 28, 43, 26, 63 and 22 claim that the problem arises because these chiefs and elites are in charge of everything in their communities. KI-63, a member of the community elite, admitted that the elite manipulated elections in the community: "*we formed a central body that see to these elections…we also have a nominating committee, these things are new management systems that we designed as elites of this community, it is also managed by us*". Another community elite member explained that they (the elites), "*are the pillar of this community because we have been exposed to western education and also lived outside our community and have seen how things work elsewhere*" (KI-19). Evidently, this set of actors has the power to determine

who comes on board to join their leadership and decision-making teams, often in accordance with the dictates of external politicians and IOCs, who motivate them as community caretakers to work in their favour, claimed KIs-37, 38, 39, 45, 51 and 63.

According to respondents, the overwhelming power enjoyed by this set of leaders extends to determining who is elected, which voices matter, and how to face down opponents. KI-23 and 28 complained that community leaders deceive their purported followers, telling the people one thing and doing another, and their gullible subjects believe them, because of blind trust and loyalty. When manipulation fails, according to KI-63, they apply force see (Table 7). KI-63 reported that his community chief forcefully dispossessed community members of their lands:

> *"they* [Shell] *paid the chief and he drove those people out and some members of his community reluctantly collected peanuts from their chief when they were dispossessed of their land: the people that collected peanuts are the very poor people among us, they have lost out completely because they are voiceless, even some widows have died prematurely due to this".*

KI-21 traced the exclusionary leadership style of most Ogoni chiefs to their relationship with politicians and IOCs and their insatiable love for money. According to KI-23, "*community leadership exclude their members from full participation*". The consequent gap between leaders and their subjects explains why some respondents reported that they are unaware of things that happen in their communities. For instance, KI-63 reported that their community chief did not inform them that Shell gives out scholarships, and according to KI-26, nothing trickles down to members of his community. Community chiefs possess cultural capital of inherited leadership that makes it culturally taboo to dethrone them, as well as good social networks that not only secure their thrones but also supply them with cash. KI-61 said that money has broken the umbilical cord that once held them together: "*brother no longer knows his blood, if he has the opportunity he treats you like his slave*". FG-2, reported that "*we have chiefs that invest in themselves*", FG-1 explained that:

> *"they* [chiefs], *embezzle money meant for the community…we are suffering because our community leaders could bring in electricity pole into the community for fifteen thousand naira and then claim it was done for fifty thousand naira, or they may just bring in only ten poles and claim they brought in a hundred, just think about this kind of cheating yet we cannot confront them".*

Likewise, KI-21, noted that a:

> *"chief maybe asked to do six bore holes, but instead of doing the bore hole, the chief may just do one in front of his house, so that his household will have access to water and then the remaining money goes into his pocket. Nobody can question him because he has the final say and nobody from the state comes to confirm whether the boreholes were done or not".*

KI-16 reported that his community lacked a health centre because of the corruption of his chief and youth leader:

> *"the mere fact that the contractor handling the project has not gotten money to pay our youth president and our chief the money he owed them… my chief to descend so low and then ask the youth leader to lock up the health centre and stop any further work until they are paid what they are owed. You cannot imagine the little amount that they are owed and the number of deaths that it has caused my people".*

KI-23, a company staff member, noted that his company only worked with information from community chiefs/elites. KI-28 claimed that

> *"the youth president…went to some of these companies and demanded that their indigenes working there should be contracted to him. That means their salary of about sixty thousand will first pass through him; he may then decide to pay them forty thousand naira and then pocket the rest, so this arrangement will make them contract staff. This made some of their people to abandon their jobs. The paramount ruler and the youth president use big cars in this bad road, a community where there is no water and light. Their paramount ruler went and through corruption collected the money meant for the electrification of the community, he claimed that non-indigenes occupy the communities and so will have to do the light themselves, only God knows how he collected that money".*

KI-22 pointed out that with all these cases of corruption and mis-governance, there is no monitoring by federal, state or local government: *"government and their officials do not check whether community leaders use our monies very well or not"*. This suggests collusion between corrupt elites – i.e. what KI-63 described as a strong relationship or 'bonding' between IOCs, politicians and community chiefs/elites: *"all our sufferings today are caused by our leaders; you know that cheating from the top is not possible without an insider"*. According to KI-16, this type of malign social capital enables insiders (community chiefs/elites) to stay connected to their sources of funds as disconnection may mean poverty and systematic exclusion from community politics.

On the other hand, KI-8, a community elite member as well as a ward councillor, dismissed these charges of corruption as mere sour grapes:

> *"when people are not benefitting anything from their community, they point at their leaders…the truth of the matter is that all fingers are not equal even in developed*

countries or environment. There are those with very low conditions and those with high conditions, you see those people that don't have access to power or leadership positions always feel inferior and see any decision taken in the community as marginalization…it is normal".

C. Kitchen cabinet and council members

Respondents, KIs- 16, 21, 26, 28, 30, 31, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 all noted that community chiefs and elites, not ordinary community members, decide who shall be the members of their kitchen cabinets. The term 'kitchen cabinet' refers to the inner circle of close associates among council members whom the chief relies on for advice and support. KI-21 said that this selection "*depends on whom the chief wants to work with, in each unit of our community".* Failure of community chiefs/elites to carefully handpick their council members, according to SQA-150, could mean a great threat to their positions, since *"if members are elected they will overthrow the chief".* Clientelism, therefore, helps maintain the positions of incumbent community chiefs/elites. KIs-28, 65, and 31 linked this clientelism in selecting community council members to national politicians, who sometimes influenced local appointments. KI-65 reported that "*you know it is always by appointment, like some of these big politicians, always want their boys to be youth leaders so that when they have problems, they can be sure to get support from these boys".* KI-28 explained that local politicians also practise clientelism:

> *"it is the local government council that put them in place, so they have to work for the interest of the man or men that put them there. If corruption put you in a place, the same corruption works for you, you cannot fight it".*

KI-31, who is a community youth leader, explained that

> "*a serving senator from our state came to my small house to beg me to allow their PDP candidate take my position, he said he was going to make me smile, he wanted to pay me to relinquish my position for his candidate, even when I refused he kept disturbing me…they want to take over our community like they have been doing in other places".*

KI-28 attributed the extensive level of corruption and community underdevelopment across Ogoniland to this form of clientelist governance: "*if corruption put you in a place, the same corruption works for you, you cannot fight it… the problem in this state is from the top down, what happens at the top is what you are seeing in their communities".* KI-8, a serving councillor, admitted that he decides who becomes a youth leader in his community - he is able to pick out the best based on his own assessment of "*their educational records,*

character and integrity", while KI-2 said *"I, chief, appointed the CDC chairman and our youth leader"*.

KIs-26 and 65 complained that these handpicked candidates worked against the wishes of the majority population, and according to KI-65, his people are not happy with this type of clientelism because it is a self-serving arrangement that has excluded them from planning and decision making about issues that concern them. Because of these shortcomings of appointments, KI-26 explained that his community had for the sake of transparency adopted a more democratic process of selecting their council members. He explained that *"we [elites] constituted an 8 to 10 men committee to go about the nomination"*. But KI-28 sees no difference between this nomination method and the previous appointment method, because:

> *"their big men in Abuja, plus the ones in the community join their hands to choose community council members. In fact they bring out people like themselves…all these people do not love their community, from their behaviour you will notice that they do not care about their poor people. Imagine how women, old people and children suffer here, it is bad leadership or by force leadership… yes nobody voted them in to serve"*

One of the most important figures in the kitchen cabinet is the chairman of the Community Development Committee (CDC). Invariably, CDC chairmen are tarred with the corrupt system of clientelist or elitist nomination, and often live outside their communities. KI-65 alleged that the CDC serves his own interest not the interest of the community:

> *"if somebody is coming from outside after seeing our chief, the next person is the CDC chairman. In our case… when they were doing this road our people kept asking why the contractor was not doing a good job, meanwhile the community has CDC chairman. Our CDC chairman only came all the way from Port Harcourt when these contractors moved their facilities into the community; he just came around to collect his share of the money and then returned back to Port Harcourt"*.

KI-22 confirmed this form of corruption, describing how a contract for a road was awarded thrice as his CDC chairman demanded money from contractors, and in the end, *"they only graded the road and poured sand and gravel, now the rains have destroyed it again"*. Likewise, KI-67 explained that his CDC chairman, who lives outside his community, frustrates development by insisting that:

> *"Contractors will pay 'stepping on ground money', the CDC is not meeting up to their function, they are just there with the fact that if there is any project from the government, they want to serve as liaison officers between government and the community for their own selfish interest, they don't have* [in mind] *the interest of the community. One of their most important functions is to organize community work for*

sanitation; making paths between buildings but they are not meeting up these responsibilities. But if they hear of any government project, you will see them coming out to say you want to do a project and you have not settled CDC they will ask for money, drinks and goats and after that they retire back to their homes and such things are not their roles".

On the other hand, KI-1, a community CDC chairman, defended his conduct, explaining that it is the responsibility of CDC chairmen to take:

"full ownership…create good atmosphere for the contractors to work and also know the job specification because it is meant for them…I need job specification because if I don't know, the contractor can instead of doing a one kilometre road will do less and then bribe people to keep [quiet] *and he goes* [off] *with the money"*.

Some defenders of the kitchen cabinet system claimed that at least it meant that power was distributed more widely than just between the chief and his cronies. For example, respondent KI-19 said that "*we* [kitchen cabinet members and council members] *decide the fate of our community with our chief*", pointing out that being a member of this cabinet guarantees some community participation in community decision making. But KIs-21, 13 and 65 explained that members of the kitchen cabinets are not fully active, but only reactive participants. According to KI-13, they only act on instructions and are not involved in real decision making: "*since our community chief appointed his council members, he tells them the terms of service*". KI-65 said that in his community, the chiefs and elites appoint "*our representatives…the chief can appoint, sometimes the elites just come in and say give this position to this person or the other person and that is final*". This signals that there is no room for wider negotiation or re-negotiation as community chiefs/elites powered by IOCs and politicians conceive and take decisions on behalf of their entire communities, using these reactive participants or members of their kitchen cabinets as passive decision makers and community consultants that only participate to rubber stamp decisions taken by elites. KI-1 admitted that he does whatever his paramount ruler asks him to: "*sometimes the paramount ruler asks me to call the town crier and tell him what to announce to the entire community. On my own, am just a servant. By nature of my office am responsible to the paramount ruler and the chiefs, that is my first and foremost duty*"

This deferential behaviour occurs because loyalty to the incumbent leader is what really matters (KI-8). KI-17 described this show of loyalty and gratitude to their chiefs/elites: "*in our community, dare not point your fingers to our leader, when you do we can go to the extent of banishing you from our community*". KI-23 says it is 'blind loyalty'. These leaders manipulate their kitchen cabinet members to such an extent that, according to KI-21,

community chiefs/elites can *"decide to lie to these people and they work with the information they get from their chief"*. Disloyalty, said respondents KIs-20, 25 and 28, may cause community chiefs/elites to use force against any member of their kitchen cabinet. KI-20 reported that "*community chiefs can decide to terminate appointments of council members*". Some of these disengaged council members make up the class of usurper chiefs and their entourages, which is discussed in the next section.

D. Usurper chiefs and their entourages

Usurper chiefs and their entourages are oppositional figures in communities who dispute the credentials of the traditional chiefs see (Table 7). These stakeholders could either be self-serving or revolutionary-motivated leaders, who are, or feel, excluded from participating fully in community decision-making by more powerful incumbent community leaders/elites backed by external funders. KI-16, a community CDC chairman, referred to this distinction between self-serving and revolutionary usurpers, and KIs-22, 2, 64, 8 and 25 said that self-serving usurpers are not always a strong opposition to incumbent chiefs as they try to maintain their relationship with stakeholders at the top of the ladder. In fact, self-serving usurper leaders seem to engage with members of their community basically to maintain or rebuild their bonds with ruling elites so as to create connections for themselves and not for the majority of people. So this form of usurper can be designated as only moderate opposition. KI-21 described a typical self-serving strategy:

> "*each of our lower chiefs came up with their councillorship candidate and as usual the two lower chiefs worked together to push out the candidate that was from his highness, but this time the advisors of his royal highness advised him to insist on his candidate because if he allows the lower chief this time, they will bring in a councillor that will not be loyal to him*"

KI-23 claimed that some oppositional politicians depend on self-serving usurpers and their entourages: "*politicians do not go door-to-door campaigning; they use...idle people, they mobilize people and name it an organization*". By contrast, KI-16 explained that revolutionary usurpers like himself form a more permanent and serious opposition to the ruling elites:

> "*I am not active as a CDC chairman because of all these...I cannot continue to live in our type of community...where an illiterate will control me. When we say let us act this way, he will never understand why and so he is always taking the opposite direction. We have some boys here in our community, these boys volunteered to stay in Ateke's camp and learn how to operate all types of gun; they decided to be war*

like. I suggested that we keep these boys and use them as community soldiers, after all our mobile police in Nigeria started with the assemblage of very stubborn police men and today they are the best police we have in the country. I suggested that we keep these boys for the rainy day because sending them away and calling them cultists will cause problems in our community because they will see the community as their enemy, but bringing them together will benefit our community more as well as the boys. But our chief was treating it as a criminal case…he refused to bring out the good in those boys…those boys prefer me to their chief because I don't chase them away".

However, even revolutionary usurpers tend to represent only a small part of the community by working with only a fraction of their community members who are also disengaged from full community participation. KI-66, a revolutionary usurper who works with the elite faction of his community to fight their corrupt community chief, confirmed that a faction of his community who felt disengaged in the management of their community overthrew four chiefs within a space of four months. KI-3 explained that this type of chieftaincy tussle explains why their communities are divided, "*it is between your chief and my chief and for that reason, you have your own people and I have mine*".

What fuels the growth of revolutionary usurpers is the exclusivity of chieftain rule. KI-17, a member of the council of chiefs and elders, lamented that their chief works only with his kitchen cabinet members:

"*imagine no common meeting…we* [usurpers] *are asking for our own slot but he* [the incumbent chief] *refused…our youth president and representatives of our women organization are already at the police station. Our chief and his CDC chairman will not allow us to participate; they sit down and take decisions without consulting. They impose these decisions on us, and when we say no it becomes a problem*".

K-17 said that it is this revolutionary usurper opposition that stirs up violence in Ogoniland, and the remedy was for incumbent leaders to always carry other leaders along with them. Significantly, however, K-17 was not insisting that incumbent chiefs must satisfy the interest of the majority of the populace; if the chief included him and the other usurpers in the list he sent to Shell, there would be no need to fight him. In other words, even revolutionary usurpers may only be in opposition for selfish reasons.

KI-21 explained that there could be displacement of a traditional chief's power by a revolutionary (usually rich) usurper:

"*privileged people in the community are now looking for recognition, they want name…they display it by gathering the youths together and giving out orders even when it is against that of the paramount ruler. Traditional leadership in our*

community is based on inheritance and even poor people get to such thrones, now the rich man in the community, who used his connections to do the community roads, empower our people and gave out scholarship to people becomes more relevant in the community than the chief and whatever that person says in the community is final, not even what the chief says or does can change that".

In this case, the traditional chief is pushed downwards and the rich connected man moves up. KI-68, who is both a member of the council of chiefs and an elder in his community, explained that selfish motives reinforce this sort of movement, involving conducting elections that are not open to the public but only to selected community members. These revolutionary usurpers claim that their aim was to produce a more capable hand, but the re-distribution of wealth is also a major consideration; *"if we do not use our common sense, only one family will keep everything that enters our community. We don't want community wealth to end up only in the bank accounts of the royal family we* [council members] *also want to enjoy it"* (K1-69). Indeed, KI-67 linked these movements entirely to a scramble for material wealth: *"this whole thing starts because these leaders are self-centred and they are not always satisfied and of course poverty too, because the level of poverty matters so much."*

E. Community elites (floating decision makers)

Stakeholders in this fifth category are disillusioned members of the elites in the community who voluntarily drop out of their privileged position (especially from D; Table 7 (usurper chiefs and their entourages) due to dissatisfaction with the traditional community leadership. For example, KI-16, a community CDC chairman, seems to have shifted from category D to become a floating decision maker through a voluntary decision he made to abandon participating in his community decision making. KI-63 claimed that *"most rich and educated elites don't have regards for their chiefs and so don't participate in community activities"*. KI-21 noted that the rich and learned members of his community have given up trying to reform constituted authority, while KI-16 explained that,

> *"for now we are not able to sustain development because our elites are not involved in the running of our community, they are not happy with the leadership of our community, our community leaders are not getting it right. Our community is so small but we have accountants, bank managers, university managers, university teachers, lawyers, doctors, but they seem to have abandoned our community. Since we don't work as a group in my community, everybody should face their own families; I only go home now to see my mum and cousins, so I only work with my direct relatives".*

SQA-8 said he lost interest in his community politics and in participating in community decision making because it was all sham: *"am not involved in decision making... I don't see*

the need, I don't want to be involved…many people don't also participate because of the happenings in the community". KI-30, a member of the community elite, explained that even as a registered member of his community youth organization, he has abandoned meeting with his colleagues because of manipulation by their leaders: *"our leaders only represent themselves"* and exclude their supposed followers. Many Ogonis have, therefore, moved towards living individualistic rather than communal lifestyles: KI-16 held that people now relate with only members of their direct families. KI-61 questioned the point of trying to ensure that things work in a community where most stakeholders' suggestions do not count because their leaders liaise with external funders to defraud and discriminate against members of their communities:

> *"what is the essence I stopped participating…our people are callous…there is no gain because our leaders just take our pictures and then begin to go round the world collecting money on our behalf, only to return back and send their children abroad and set up big businesses".*

In other words, community leaders only seek to connect with members of their community for purely selfish reasons. KI-61 held that they live in communities where true bonding no longer exists: *"brother no longer knows his blood"*.

This disillusion extended to membership of organisations. KI-3 asserted that there was no point in struggling to participate in community activities: *"am not interested…I don't even belong to any of their organizations"*. KI-67 explained that there was nothing much to contribute, because the leadership of his community organisations concentrated on trivial things: *"they meet together and discuss…when their children or members want to marry…their organizations are not meeting up...they are not focused"*.

However, some respondents looked forward to resuming a participative role when the current incumbent chief dies. For example, KI-16 said:

> *"if am still alive after his death* [the chief], *my community may likely stay without a chief because nobody from that family will control me again, never again… I know that he is my master now because he is the ruling chief. I have told him that none of his children will inherit our throne…and I have decided to stay off completely and we may all remain this way till he dies and after that if am still alive we will start a new life in our community".*

KI-3 reported that he may consider working with his community leadership when he finds out that they are ready to work for the interest of the entire community. FG-2 decided to refrain from participating in his community until *"when am made the youth president"*.

F. Resilient community members

The lowest class is occupied by ordinary members of communities who fall into two categories: Category F (see Table 7), who are resilient people who keep their heads above water by adaptive activities that are often nefarious; and Category G (Table 7), who are vulnerable people too damaged by poverty to make any effort to better themselves. On Category F, many respondents like, KIs-8, 19, 21, 15, 63, 16, 18, 67, 25 and 28 noted that this sort of negative resilience is common among youths. For example, KI-8 stated that:

> *"the youths are the leaders of tomorrow, they are the apparatus of evil …they are the main people that can be used to achieve leadership positions and if you are truly a leader you cannot do without them because somebody can come and use them against you, if you don't have them by your side, that is why we value them very well".*

KI-19 reported that "*since youths can be instruments of peace, violence and destruction, Ogoni politicians use their resources to buy them over and empower them with weapons during elections. The weapons given to these youths are never retrieved from them after elections".* According to KI-61, holding on to these weapons after elections explains why this set of stakeholders create violence in their communities because they "*use the weapons carelessly to fight opposition…depending on the position of who hires them. Is this development?"*

Similarly, KI-28 noted that "*youth organizations here fight their opponents who are not in support of what they are doing.*" According to KI-63, community leaders expose their youths to drugs in order to manipulate them to take part in their selfish projects of defeating their opponents, rather than in wider projects that will benefit their entire community: "*community leaders contribute because they use the youths to achieve their aims. It has become a tradition to give hard drugs to these boys to work for them…these boys cause so many problems in the community".* According to KI-63, community leaders deliberately keep these youths out of jobs: "*community chiefs/elites do not employ them into meaningful jobs".* KIs-21, 19, 65 and 16 find a link between poor community leadership, youth unemployment and a rise in the number of virtual mercenaries. KI-21 explains:

> *"when you are idle and jobless your brain cannot work correctly because you don't have any farm to go to, no civil service job to go to, you see that your brain will not be able to judge things correctly that is our problem. The effect is as soon as anybody comes from anywhere and offers these jobless people two bottles of drink, which they have not taken for long, whatever they are asked to do, they do, they don't pause to think whether what they were asked to do contributes positively or negatively".*

KI-16 maintains that the number of negatively-oriented resilient stakeholders in his community keeps increasing, because leaders train their youths to approach issues aggressively, creating friction and opposition that causes divisions instead of togetherness (see also KI-28). This makes it increasingly difficult to have a common community platform that will encourage full participation (KI-3). According to KI-28, self-serving leaders produce aggressive cultists who patrol the streets boasting about their influence in the community: "*they roam the streets boasting that they are cult members and carrying arms about*". Part of the reason for this behaviour by youths is the perception of betrayal by their leaders, as FG-2 explained: "*we don't have what it takes to meet them* [community chiefs/elites], *we sometimes get violent…with the hope that things will get better. Our leaders misrepresent us, they don't always tell the truth, they lie, they tell people we are happy and enjoying*". KI-24 asserts that "*if you do not belong to the same clique with their community chiefs/elites they will never call you for anything*".

It is true that SQAs-19, 38, 44, 93, 131, and 106 and KIs-63, 50, 67, 26, 20, 24, 28, 58 and 34 all asserted that there were positively motivated resilient stakeholders. KI-58 claimed that he himself was one, in that despite opposition,

> "*I always try to speak my mind all the time whether people listen or not…I always challenge our leaders: no amount of harassment or intimidation can shut my mouth. Everything in life attracts opposition, there is always opposition in life but it takes a confident person to stand on his grounds.*"

Similarly, KI-50 explained that despite the disrespectful treatment he gets from the leadership of his community, he tries to put forward his suggestions: "*I still manage to air my views*". KI-48 reported that even though community leaders discriminated against him, "*I pick quarrels with them in meetings all the time. I know I don't have money but that has not affected my brains and for that I will always challenge them*". KI-49 said "*I still speak out in our gatherings despite the fact that active members are the rich, we the poor are like spectators…but am a strong man*". KI-52 stated that "*my efforts have not yielded anything but am hopeful that it will someday*"

However, KIs-26, 63, 67 and 28 reported that these voices do not reduce their systematic disconnection from the community. KI-26 describes members' contributions as "*an unreasonable argument*", and KI-34 refers to "*poor man's talk*", which should not be taken seriously. In other words, these alienated community members only produce echoes and not voices in their respective communities. This experience, according to respondents like KIs-

67, 21, 63, 22 and 19, can be very wearying, and KI-19 noted that it could also be frustrating especially for youths: *"frustration is the ultimate cause of violence…for this reason you see these youths trying every means possible to succeed"*. Positively motivated resilient community members either fall prey to community chiefs/elites, thereby moving up the ladder, or downwards, as discussed in the next section.

G. Vulnerable community members

Category G (Table 7) is composed of vulnerable community members who have been too damaged by poverty to make any effort to better themselves. Vulnerable community members are acutely disadvantaged economically and socially, and discriminated against because of lack of power. This is particularly true of women: KI-67 reported that *"women are not normally involved in decision making, I mean women don't have a voice… these women cannot come and defend their own interest"*. Respondents like KIs-34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 60 and 45 linked their present conditions of despair to their lack of economic capital which depleted their ability to bond, bridge or link up with any internal or external source of help. KI-60 graphically expressed this sense of helplessness:

> *"I hardly get four thousand naira in a month…everything is wrong here, our lands are no longer fertile due to overuse, all of us here are already in hell fire, I don't think there is another hell fire elsewhere. Am alive is worth being happy about, but the question is alive doing what? Yes, what have I done that people will remember me for when am gone…am like a man crying bitterly very close to my grave, am crying because no sane human being will not think of what becomes of his children after he is gone. I say this because my children are all school dropouts, they have nothing doing, am worried about their future especially when am gone. There is no sign of hope anywhere, my community discriminates against me, when anything comes into this community, I hardly hear about it and sometimes when we hear we don't get anything out of it because our leaders take those things for themselves and their family"*

KI-7 explained that women in his community are the most vulnerable because most of them are widows, as their husbands died from hard labour and suffering, compounded by poor medical care. KI-34 said *"am very unhappy because my husband is dead and I have no hope anywhere, when I talk nobody takes it seriously so I have only two friends; other people laugh at me because I don't have money"*. KI-35 stated that

> *"I cannot afford the basic things of life because I lack money… I don't have savings; there is nobody around me to share my pains, no true friend and no husband to share my feelings with. That my son may eventually end up like me gives me so much concern, he is out of secondary school, I cannot afford to push him any further due to lack of finance; the thought of what becomes of him is my greatest worry now,*

especially when I calculate that my peasant farming will not do the magic and also that I have no source of help. Many of us here are poor nobody is helping us; our community leaders are the only ones enjoying the good things from our community"

Likewise, for KI-36,

"my greatest pains is the fact that am penniless…my children and I depend only on our farm to feed and you know it takes time for crops to mature for that reason my children and I are always without cash. We only get money when we go out to weed people's farm. If I had money there will be flesh covering my bones, I will have friends because then I will look as fine as other women and my children will be in school. That is the power of money but when you don't have it what can you do? I lack accommodation because where I stay with my children the landlord only allowed us for some time, it will expire this July and I don't have any hope of where to move into"

A similar story was told by KI-41: "*my problems are more than me, my heart is in pieces, I cried to this place: my elder sister moved all my luggage outside, am not happy, I don't have a home*". According to KI-38, working hard for longer hours in the farm will not solve poor people's multiple problems of lack of cash, power and access to justice, poor health and despair. She said that manual labour has affected her health: "*am sick, my body continuously aches due to over labour, everyday hard labour, I don't rest at all*", Similarly, for KI-40: "*I feel pains all round my body especially my waist, I don't walk straight…I fear it will get to the point that I may not be able to bend down again and that will be disastrous for my children because that may be their end*".

KI-37 said that death stared her in the face:

"I work so hard in my farm, everybody in this community knows. But a small boy can just take anything from my farm, they allow their goats graze from my farm because they know I don't have anybody to speak for me. I feel pains all over my body due to overwork and in the hospital they have said I have so much sugar in my blood, they said I should not eat cassava again and all the food they asked me to start eating are very costly we don't grow them in our farms. You see that death is staring at me because I don't have money".

Most of these ills stemmed from poverty. Alienation, distress and hopelessness are direct or indirect effects of poverty. KI-38 explained that

"*having a problem and not having money to solve it can be very painful; it destabilizes me… to see my children hungry all the time. When we don't get anything from the farm we sleep with empty stomach, the one that pains me the more is that sometimes after working day and night my children still sleep without food*".

KI-39 traced her feeling of low self-esteem to her very low financial status. She said that she never expected anyone to respect her because respect *"comes with education and wealth, you get respected for your importance in the community not by sweating it out every day on the farm"*. Similarly KI-41 said *"am a failure, I am tired of life, there is no hope for me and my children. I think about my life always and that of my children and I have concluded that we cannot achieve much, life is too hard here…our farm work cannot help us"*. SQA-26 complained that *"nobody sees you as a human being"*.

SQA-7 said that these people feel inferior: *"yes they are voiceless and feel socially excluded because they feel inferior"*. SQA-13 said *"I wish I was not born here"*. KI-9 noted *"they feel inferior and behave like fools"*. This, according to SQA-32 is because most stakeholders in this set (Category G) have passively accepted their inferior status in the community: they have acknowledged that *"they are not reasonable"*. For KI-39, *"they don't involve me in anything because am an unimportant person…I have accepted my position in this community"*. Effectively, these people constitute an underclass: KI-51 said *"my level is too low"*. While these people are geographically in the same location as everyone else in their communities, they are systematically excluded from all meaningful community membership. For instance KI-34 explained that *"I cannot talk when people are talking"*. According to KI-4, *"there is a wide gap between the poor and the rich"*. For KI-30, these poor people are completely powerless: *"nothing ever gets to them because nobody listens to them…who will hear them?"* KI-60 explained that vulnerable community members do not know how their communities are managed: *"when anything comes into this community, we hardly hear about it"*. For KI-59, it seems his community *"does not have any need for them"*. According to FG-2, *"it is money that speaks, once you don't have it, you just have to learn how to shut your mouth…there is always lack of voice from the bottom"*, while according to FG-1 *"we cannot fight authority"*. Likewise KIs-28 and 45 and SQAs-55 and 89 all noted that this set of people do not have the power to challenge their leaders: SQA-89 revealed that *"am very careful and equally afraid because if I get into trouble nobody will help me"*.

Respondents like KIs-27, 8, 26, and 22 noted that there are vulnerable people all over the world, not only in Ogoniland: KI-27 said that *"there are always poor and marginalized people in every setting"*. According to KIs-29, 22, 21 and 28, these people are more or less tools in the hands of their leaders who always take advantage of their vulnerability. KI-29 explained that politicians use this set of people to garner votes by enticing them with food. KI-12, who is a politician, admitted that *"we give them wrappers…and money"*. KI-22

maintains that they are more like objects than subjects, because "*party agents group these people together…deliver them to their parties and get contracts in exchange*".

KI-8 explained that the role of vulnerable people is to keep their communities clean: "*our women are so poor and have nothing to contribute to the community…their only contribution maybe when we organize monthly community sanitation…they sweep and weed*". Similarly, KI-53 said that her community only calls on her when there is need to weed their community, otherwise, "*our rich people don't discuss anything with people that don't have money*". For KI-44, I "*am controlled to do things against my wish*". KI-35, a vulnerable community member, explained she was exploited to serve political ends:

> "*there was a time they asked us* [widows] *to submit our passports* [photo]*and then prepare to travel to Bori. We were happy I used all my money in the house to transport myself to Bori. In Bori we waited at the local secretariat from morning till evening, nobody attended to us; most of us got tired and hungry and had no transport money home. Later we heard they only collected our pictures to seek for funds*".

FG-2 reported that some people have resorted to smoking and alcohol to anaesthetise themselves from their fate:

> "*our level here is abject poverty, we are unable to afford the basic needs of life, we don't wear good clothes, we don't eat good food, we don't live in good houses, most of us are unemployed. We were born into poverty, we inherited poverty from our parents…many people are lying critically ill and this is due to lack of money for drugs. Most of our people do not have money to buy a morsel of bread. Some of us as we speak do not know where our next meal will come from. We see able-bodied men like us smoking and drinking palm wine this early morning instead of working. This is what sustains us, palm wine contains some basic content of alcohol and it is true that some of us are too old for this but there is nothing else that will help us forget our problems, we are compelled by circumstances…our condition is bad our leaders embezzle money meant for the community…nothing gets to us at the bottom*".

According to respondents like KIs-28, 22, and 29, it is difficult for these community members to develop true bonds with each other to mount a collective fight against the forces responsible for their poverty-stricken situation. KI-28 said that "*people here do not have the idea of forming their own organizations and even if that is done, one politician can buy off the whole group*". SQA-32 claimed that most stakeholders in this category have passively accepted that "*they are not reasonable…and lack the power to revolt*". KIs-43, 45, 54 and 56 pointed out that they have learnt to keep themselves to themselves. KI-43 said "I *stay on my own*" and KI- 45 said "*I only go to farm, from there to my small house*". KI-27 held that "*any member of this group if dissatisfied can decide not to be a member of that community and in*

that case loses his identity". But KI-1 explained that being stripped of community identity may subject these stakeholders to even more hardships and further discrimination.

5.4 Questionnaire B respondents' (SQBs) perceptions of their communities

Having explored the data from KI interviews, survey questionnaire A, and focus groups, on perceptions held by Ogoni people about their experiences of being members of their communities, we now turn to examine the data from survey questionnaire B of 200 respondents on their perceptions of being members of their communities. Talo (2014) explained that a sense of community (SoC) is a lens that can be used to understand member's feelings about their community. According to Mcmillian and Chavis (1986), SoC can be measured by four criteria: (1) membership: the perception of shared boundaries, history, symbols, sense of emotional safety and individual investment in community; (2) influence: the individual's perception of the interaction between the community and herself; (3) fulfilment of needs: perception of the benefits members derive from their community; and (4) emotion: perception of shared emotional connections. Mcmillian and Chavis (1986) produced a 24-question questionnaire designed to test respondents' sense of community, and I used this questionnaire (See Table 8) to determine the perceptions of 200 residents in four Ogoni communities. In this section, I present the results of those 200 questionnaires administered to members of two oil- endowed and two non oil endowed Ogoni communities. Subsections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 present the results from the Korokoro oil-endowed community (5.4.1); the Ebubu oil- endowed community (5.4.2); the Lewe non oil-endowed community (5.4.3); and (5.4.4) the Kanni-Babbe non oil-endowed community respectively. Fifty copies of Mcmillian and Chavis (1986)'s questionnaire on a sense of community were administered to each community. Below is a sample copy of this questionnaire (Table 8).

Table 8: Sample of Mcmillian and Chavis (1986) survey questionnaire on sense of community (1=low; 4=high)

No.	Question	1	2	3	4
A	As a member, my needs are met				
B	We value the same things				
C	This community has been successful in getting the needs of its members met				
D	Being a member of this community makes me feel good				
E	When I have a problem, I can talk about it with members of this community				
F	People in this community have similar needs, priorities, and goals				
G	I can trust people in this community				
H	I can recognise most of the members of this community				
I	Most community members know me				
J	This community has symbols and expressions of membership, such as clothes, signs, art, architecture, logos, landmarks and flags that people can recognise				
K	I put a lot of time and effort into being part of this community				
L	Being a member of this community is part of my identity				
M	Fitting into this community is important to me				
N	This community can influence other communities				
O	I care about what other community members think of me				
P	I have influence over what this community is like				
Q	If there is a problem in this community, members can get it solved				
R	This community has good leaders				
S	It is very important to me to be part of this community				
T	I am with other community members a lot and enjoy being with them				
U	I expect to be a part of this community for a long time				
V	Members have shared important events together, such as holidays, celebrations or disasters.				
W	I feel hopeful that my community has a bright future				
X	Members of this community care about each other				

5.4.1 *Results from the Korokoro oil-endowed community surveys (n=50).*

Figure 6, question (H) shows that members described their community as small, in which they recognise others (score of 3.84 out of a maximum score of 4.00), know each other (3.90), and have shared important events together (3.62). Moreover, community members claim they feel good about their membership (3.79); feel it is very important for them to be part of their community (3.90); which is their source of identity (3.94); expect to be part of their community for a long time (3.82); 'mostly' enjoy each other's company (3.42); can influence their community (3.15); and work together to solve problems in their community (3.19).

However, the Korokoro community does not fulfil the needs of its members (score of 1.98 out of a maximum score of 4.00). Members do not really trust each other (1.88); they do not have any recognizable communal symbols (1.55); and they are not mostly or completely committed to their community (2.38).

The responses are on a scale of 1 to 4. 1: not-at-all; 2: somewhat; 3: mostly; 4: completely.

Figure 6: Questionnaire responses from Korokoro community (n=50 surveys).

5.4.2 *Results from the Ebubu oil-endowed community (n=50 surveys)*

Figure 7 presents the results of the 24 questions administered to 50 members of the oil endowed Ebubu community. From Figure 7, it is clear that members of the Ebubu community were generally positive about their community: most of their responses fell within the range of 3 (mostly) out of the total of 4 (completely). Members of this community were highly positive (3.96) that the membership of their community made them feel very good. The results of questions H and L (3.80 and 3.84) show Ebubu as a community where members are 'mostly' able to recognize each other; with whom they share the same identity; 'mostly' value the same things (3.08); the community has been 'mostly' successful in satisfying all its members (3.18); and members 'mostly' help each other because they have similar needs and priorities (3.04).

The responses are on a scale of 1 to 4. 1: not-at-all; 2: somewhat; 3: mostly; 4: completely

Figure 7: Questionnaire responses from Ebubu community (n=50 surveys)

However, the low scores of (1.06 and 1.12) on lack of communal symbols (J) and the perception that members do not put a lot of time and effort into building or nourishing social capital (K) raises the question of: what holds this community together? It is also unclear why the level of trust among members (2.38), though 'somewhat' reasonable, does not match the level (3.80) that members can recognise each other, or the level (3.12) that members seek help and counsel from each other, or the level (3.76) that shows that members care about each other, or the level (3.86) that shows that members mostly come together to solve their common problem.

5.4.3 *Results from the Lewe non oil- endowed community (n=50 surveys)*
Figure 8 presents the results of 50 questionnaires administered in the Lewe non oil-endowed community. Members of the Lewe community were generally positive (2.92, 2.88, 2.92, 4, 2.80 2.81) that their community fulfils their needs – indeed, they were completely (4.00) happy about their community; their community is their source of identity (3.81); they expect to be part of it for a long time (3.80); fitting into their community is an important concern for them (3.23); they share important events together (3.26); they can recognise members of their community (3.6); they know each other (3.4); and they care for each other (3.72). However, members of the Lewe community are not completely happy with the leadership of their

community (2.67); they cannot completely trust each other (2.47); they do not have a very strong influence over their community (2.85); they do not completely enjoy each other's company (2.8); they do not have strong communal symbols (1.38); they do not invest time and effort into being part of their community (1.06); and they do not unduly care about what other members think of them (2.58).

The responses are on a scale of 1 to 4. 1: not-at-all; 2: somewhat; 3: mostly; 4: for completely.

Figure 8: Questionnaire responses from Lewe community (n=50)

5.4.4 *Results from the Kanni-Babbe non oil- endowed community (n=50 survey)*

Figure 9 presents the results from the questionnaires administered in the non-oil endowed Kanni-Babbe community. It shows that it is a small community where members recognise (3.00) and know each other (3.92). The respondents claim that being members of their community makes them feel good (3.92); it is very important for them to be part of it (3.88); they feel positive about their community because it is their home and source of identity (3.08); and where they expect to live for a long time (3.46). Members of this geographical community 'mostly' have similar needs (3.04) that they 'mostly' come together to solve (3.46).

The responses are on a scale of 1 to 4. 1: not-at-all; 2: somewhat; 3: mostly; 4: completely

Figure 9: Questionnaire responses from Kanni-Babbe community (n=50 surveys)

However, community members do not feel that their community fulfils their needs 'completely' (2.63); they do not 'completely' value the same thing (2.15); they do not 'mostly' or 'completely' trust each other (2.00); they do not 'mostly' or 'completely' like to discuss their problems with each other (2.46); they do not 'completely' enjoy each other's company (2.63); and they do not 'completely' care for each other (2.98). Moreover, members of this community do not invest sufficient time and effort into building and nourishing social capital (1.27); they do not have communal symbols of expression (1.88); and they do not 'completely' share similar values (2.15).

5.5 Conclusion

From this analyses, data from the first data set (KI, SQA and FGD) linked the failure of top-up and bottom-up approach of CD to the hierarchical nature of Ogoni communities. In other words, these respondents saw a largely negative relationship between the practice of community development and the nature of communities (Popple and Quinney, 2002). But the perceptions of respondents from the second data set (SQB) seemed to suggest otherwise; that Ogoni communities have a promising potential to support CD. The apparent disparity between these two data sets will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 6: Discussion

"A critical examination of the theory and practice of community development depends upon an understanding of the concept of community" (Popple and Quinney, 2002).

6.1 Introduction.

In this chapter, I discuss five central issues that have arisen out of the three previous data chapters. Section 6.2 looks at several reasons for the apparent contrast between Ogonis' generally negative evaluation of both top-down and bottom-up attempts at CD, yet generally positive evaluation of their communities, see (sections 5.3.2 and 5.5). Section 6.3 addresses two of the fundamental concerns raised in chapters three and four: whether the tripartite distinction between the state, market and community has broken down in Ogoniland, in that CBOs (the community element) have been hijacked by the state and market, and if so, whether this is responsible for the failure of CBOs to promote CD – the answer to both questions, based on the empirical evidence collected for this thesis, being 'yes'. Discussion in section 6.4 considers whether the solution to the Ogoni problem of community underdevelopment lies with CBOs becoming independent of the state and market, but concludes that even if CBOs managed to become independent of state and market, they may still be manipulated (directly or indirectly) by traditional chief rule, and therefore disabled from promoting genuine CD. Section 6.5 discusses whether decentralisation of authority from state to local communities – e.g. by establishing autonomous village or community councils elected democratically - could deliver sustainable CD. If so, Section 6.6 discusses whether the establishment of such community councils with real power and authority would require a fundamental change in the current political culture of the Nigerian state.

6. 2 Discrepancy between positive and negative perceptions of community

Many writers claim that there is a strong correlation between the development of a community and the sense of community amongst its members, in that a positive sense of community encourages the behaviour that aids the development of community (Garcia *et al*, 1999), and, conversely, that the development of a community promotes a sense of community amongst its residents. This is because the sense of community "acts as an integrative feeling facilitating series of processes closely related to the development of the community. Therefore sense of community and the concept of community is extremely close" (Garcia *et al*, 1999, p. 740). However, other writers claim that lack of community development (CD)

may reinforce a positive sense of community among the poverty-stricken residents. This counter-intuitive claim holds that although threats to the fabric of the community can lead to community breakup, according to Manzo and Perkins (2006, p. 338), such disturbances may strengthen community bonds because "tapping into such feelings and reactions to disruption can, if properly recognised and understood, help mobilize citizens' participation to rebuild a community".

Despite the claims by many KIs, FGDs, TIs and SQAs about the undeveloped nature of their communities which they testified through their heart-wrenching confessions of despair and hopelessness, SQB respondents still endorsed the value of their communities. For example, in both the oil-endowed communities of Korokoro and Ebubu and the non oil endowed communities of Lewe and Kanni-Babbe, members feel a sense of warmth about their communities because it is 'mostly' important to them (ratings of 3.90; 3.98; 3.98; and 3.62, respectively); a source of identity (3.94; 3.84; 3.81; and 3.08, respectively); and a home (3.82; 3.62; 3.80; and 3.48, respectively) into which they must fit (3.47; 3.3; 3.23; and 2.67, respectively). This apparently paradoxical contrast between negative and positive attitudes to community may be due to the different methods of obtaining data: the questions put to KIs, FGDs and SQAs were semi-structured, and greater time was allocated to allow for follow-up questions, whereas the survey questions to SQBs were structured, and allowed no time for follow-up questions. It might be expected, therefore, that KIs, FGDs and SQAs would more likely reveal greater depth of feeling than SQBs. However, even if this is true, it is pure conjecture to assume that greater depth of feeling entails greater antipathy rather than greater attraction to community.

A second possible methodological explanation for the apparent paradox is that the content of the questions differed between KI, SQA, and FGD questions (which elicited negative responses) on the one hand, and SQB questions (which elicited positive responses) on the other hand. This is because KI, SQA, and FGD questions revolved around CBOs, whereas SQB questions focused on a sense of community, and it might be expected that people feel a greater affection for their community than for their CBOs. But such an expectation begs the question by assuming that people are more attached to their community than to their CBOs. A third possible methodological explanation for the difference between the findings of the two data sets could be differences in the respective communities canvassed. The KI, SQA, and FGD respondents were drawn from eight communities - Korokoro, Ebubu, Nonwa Ogali, Kaani-Babe, Sii 2, Lewe and K-Dere - whereas the SQB respondents were drawn from only

four of those eight communities - Korokoro, Ebubu, Kanni- Babbe, and Lewe. In fact, however, I found no evidence to show that there was any significant difference between the two sets of communities that might make one set on average happier with their communities than the other set, except for minor demographic differences. One such minor demographic difference is that fewer members of Kanni-Babbe thought fitting into their community was important to them (2.67), which may be attributed to the fact that 45% of these respondents were young women who knew they would be married out of their communities and eventually become members of their husband's community. SQA-30 clarified that "*members of our women organization are women married into this community*", and SQA-29 said "*we are the mothers*", see (section 5.4.4).

In my view, therefore, none of these three methodological explanations is very convincing, and we must seek a more substantive explanation to make sense of the contrast between the positive affirmations of community expressed by SQB respondents compared with the negative assessments of community expressed by KIs, SQA and FGD respondents. One such substantive explanation is that oil may make the difference: i.e. respondents in oil-endowed communities are more likely to be negative about their community than are respondents in non oil-endowed communities. However, while it might be expected that the level of trust (see figures, 6, 7, 8 and 9) in non oil-endowed communities will be higher than in oil endowed communities, the respondents did not confirm this expectation. For example, even though results show that there is a low level of trust (1.88) among members of the Korokoro oil-endowed community (section 5.4.1), the figure for the Ebubu oil-endowed community (2.38) was higher than the figure for the non oil-endowed communities of Lewe and Kanni Babbe (2.47 and 2.00 respectively).

Indeed, a striking finding of the research presented in this thesis is that there is very little difference between the level of satisfaction expressed by residents of oil-endowed (sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2) communities and that expressed by members of non oil-endowed communities (sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4). This finding is contrary to most results from the literature (Pyagbara, 2007; Asuni, 2009; Ikejiaku, 2009; Arisuokwu and Nnaomah, 2012 and Nweke, 2012), about the impact of oil on Ogoni communities, which report that the presence of oil undermines the sense of community in oil-endowed areas.

A second possible substantive explanation for the apparent contrast between the negative perceptions of community expressed by KIs, FGDs and SQAs, and the positive perceptions

of community held by SQBs, is that if we look more closely at this sets of findings, we can see that they may not be in conflict at all. In other words, it may be possible to reconcile the apparently contrasting sets of findings if we interpret them more carefully. For example, like the positive responses from the SQB respondents, some KI and SQA respondents, especially community chiefs and elites, expressed strongly positive assessments of their communities. KI-7, a community chief, described his community as safe, ideal, organized and complete because:

> "*the youth council of this community is to guide the community so that no outsider can come into the community to terrorize us, the women organization bring up women to understand their husbands and to behave as mothers. Our culture is good and we maintain it…it has helped us to keep this community together in unity*".

Similarly, SQA-30 described his community as communal and peaceful because "*tradition demands we cooperate"* see (section 5.3.1). Such positive responses from KI and about communities were held mainly by community leaders and elites, who disproportionately benefitted from them. FGD 2 explained that his community leaders always present their community in a positive light as a way of extolling their style of leadership so that more funds can be sent into the community through them. This is in line with the assertions of Anderson, who posited that communities and nations are usually constructed as ideal and communal by their leaders for both political and economic motives (Anderson, 1983).

Conversely, a closer analysis of SQBs suggests that even though members of the four communities are generally positive about their community, some of their comments are negative (see chapter 5). For example, 194 out of the 200 SQB respondents, held that their communities lack communal symbols that unite them (1.55, 1.06, 1.38, and 1.88). These negative sentiments are identical to perceptions expressed by KIs-8, 22, 25 and SQAs- 30, 46, 65 and 189, who argued that the lack of cultural unifying symbols have left their communities deeply divided. For SQA- 97, "*our cultural life is dying",* because Ogoni communities are expanding (KI-3). According to KI-1, this is because their communities are "*beginning to wear the status of a big city*". KI-3 claims that another reason why Ogonis lack any common unifying symbol is because "*the influx of strangers into Eleme is affecting our own way of life, our culture and tradition. It has gotten to the extent that if care is not taken, our local dialect can go extinct*". For instance, such expansion has undermined traditional festivals that once brought community members together because they are now seen by many as

tyrannical. This explains why western religions are becoming more popular in Ogoniland (KI-18) and the few who still practice their traditional religion, do it almost secretly (KIs-8, 22, 25), because "*our people now see people that practice it as occultic people and so avoid them*".

What this second substantive explanation means is that the gap between the negative perceptions of their community expressed by KIs, SGAs and FGDs, and the positive perceptions expressed by SQBs, may not be as wide as it first seemed. We can draw a wider inference from this explanation – namely that most Ogonis are torn between traditionalism and westernization, and this divided loyalty could be responsible for the weakening of common unifying symbols see (section 5.4). This division could also explain why most SQBs respondents claim that they do not invest time and effort into being part of their community (1.06, 1.08, 1.27 and 2.38): they do not really have so much in common and therefore do not have to live communally (Pyagbara, 2007). This is similar to the view of KIs such as KI-16, who said that "*we do not work as a group in my community, everybody concentrates on their immediate family…I only travel home to see my cousins, my mum, they are my direct relatives*". Likewise, KI-48 said "*am not concerned about anybody but my wife and kids, am also less concerned about the community*", and KI-55 explained that he maintains a private lifestyle.

Another ingredient in the second substantive explanation (that the gap between positive and negative evaluations of community may not be very great) is that SQBs' commitment to their communities may be due less to enthusiastic positive endorsement of their worth, than to fatalism of their permanency. It could be argued that the broadly positive views expressed by SQBs about the nature of their communities reflect a resigned acceptance of the realities of their lives. They have constructed a vision of their communities that corresponds to their situations.

> "there remains a clear sense that truth is the characteristic feature of beliefs that tend to help us to be ready for what happens in our experience. That is, belief has a function in the life of human beings-namely to prepare us for successful action in the face of recurrent circumstances-and beliefs that best fulfil that function are the ones most deserve to be called true" (Kumerling, 2011, p. 3).

Frediani *et al* (2014, p. 6) cited Sen who provides a similar psychological explanation for such adaptation, which suggests that SQB respondents may have adjusted to the adverse conditions of their communities because "deprived groups may be habituated to inequality, may be unaware of possibilities of social change, may be hopeless about upliftment of

objective circumstances of misery, may be resigned to fate, and may be willing to accept the legitimacy of the established order".

In other words, even though SQBs are not particularly satisfied with their communities, they judged them positively because they are their only source of identity and home, see (sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 5.4.4). Also, SQBs may be hopeful that things might get better for them in their communities (3.55, 3.69, 4 and 4), hence they accept current community imperfections as a temporary condition which may yet improve. More darkly, it could be that the acceptance of community imperfections by SQBs reflects "coping and survival strategies", a phrase used by Alexander and Klein (2009, p. 47) to describe the so-called 'Stockholm syndrome' explaining how hostages deal with life-threatening conditions. Dunning (2015) explained that healthy individuals are most likely to embrace such coping strategies first, if they completely depend on their captives for survival, and, second, to reduce stress. It may be that Ogonis feel that they completely depend not only on their communities but also on their traditional leadership for their survival.

There may also be an element of cognitive dissonance in the SQBs' perceptions. Cognitive dissonance is the simultaneous holding of two or more conflicting views. Drawing on Festinger and Carlsmith's experiment about 'forced compliance behaviour' of cognitive dissonance as explained in Mcleod (2008), it is possible that SQBs (5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 5.4.4) consciously or subconsciously downplayed the negative impacts of their communities on them as part of their coping and survival strategies. This coping strategy could explain why SQBs claim to value their communities, but do not feel it is worth investing their time and effort in them. The coping and survival strategy resembles the fable of the 'fox and the grapes' as explained by Barnes (2009), which graphically describes how preferences could easily be deformed and how non-preferences become adaptive preferences. According to Barnes (2009), the hungry fox deformed its preferences by claiming, even when it was dying of hunger, that grapes were sour, not because they were really sour but because it could not reach the grapes on the high vine of a tree. The question arises whether respondents of SQBs deformed their conscious preference for an equal community to an adaptive preference for their unequal communities, which serves as their home and source of identity. Adaptive preferences could explain why, despite Ogoni communities being perceived by KIs residents as a place of shattered dreams and hopes (KI-60 intoned that "*we are all hopeless, we don't look forward to any good thing*"), SQBs from the four communities perceived that their communities are healthy and impact positively on their wellbeing because they have good

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leaders (2.73, 2.67, 2.67, and 3.55), hence their needs are met (2.38, 2.92, 2.92 and 3.18). Have these SQBs adapted their preferences to match their disadvantaged situations?

Respondents like KI-27 suggested that most Ogonis have adapted to the vicious nature of their communities, because poverty and hopelessness have impacted on their sense of judgement: "*the poor do not always have the capacity to react...poverty has affected the reasoning of our people, they are easily manipulated*". This explains why most vulnerable community members who have been systematically disadvantaged in their communities do not revolt against them (communities), but instead identify with them, see (5.3.3 and Table 7). This is a characteristic response of Africans, because "*the community is very important, it is a form of identity and for this reason everybody tries to belong*" (KI-27). It may be a case of community members being "self-submerged" in a collective sense of identity (Kochalumchuvalti 2010, p.1), and the community is seen as a "horizontal comradeship" (Anderson, 1983, p.7) and not as an individualistic association.

An alternative explanation of this psychological paradox comes from Lewis cited in Howarth (2002, p. 14), who argues that respondent's preferences, whether adaptive or conscious, provide a variety of different lenses through which the concept of community is perceived. In other words, the concept of community is a social construct. Following Lewis' theory, we could argue that the positivity of SQB responses to community reflects their different perceptions of the concept of community from that of other respondents. This would be an illustration of the fact that the meaning of community is a:

> "battle ground between and among folk cultures, class subcultures, ethnic cultures, and national cultures; different communications media, the home, and the school; churches and advertising agencies; and different versions of history and political ideologies. The sign is no longer inscribed within a fixed cultural order. The meaning of things seems less predictable and less certain".

So it is normal and not uncommon for KIs, FGDs, SQAs and SQBs to hold different views of the same community: the varying perceptions are constructions by different minds (Agrawal and Gibson, 2001; Zygmunt, 2001).

6.3 Are Ogoni CBOs the third category of governance (community), or are they state and market surrogates?

The second issue in this discussion chapter is whether CBOs in Ogoniland have abandoned their role as community champions and become instead surrogates of state and market forces,

see (chapter 4). Most recent studies have endorsed the virtues of CBOs as the 21st century agents of bottom-up approaches to CD and few studies have critiqued this positive lens through which CBOs are generally viewed see (chapters one and two). Most of the development literature explains CBOs as extremely useful to poor rural community dwellers; "poor people depend primarily on their kin, their own informal networks… and community based organizations for support in surviving" (Narayan, 2000, p. 197). However, my findings suggest that CBOs in the Niger Delta have allowed themselves to be sucked into the web of top-down approaches to CD, used by both the state and the private sector to serve their own respective agendas. In short, according to my respondents, CBOs have become affiliates of the state and the market rather than the stewards of their communities (chapter 4). On this interpretation, CBOs have lost their roots in communities and become vehicles for top-down initiatives which have invariably failed, and this is the reason why CBOs themselves are perceived by most Ogonis to have failed to serve their communities. In order to substantiate this interpretation, I focus on the three types of CBOs I discovered in Ogoniland: TCBOs; MCBOs; and HCBOs.

6.3.1 *Traditional community based organization (TCBOs)*

Although TCBOs obtain some funds from their communities, they get most of their funds from the Nigerian government (state) and Shell (market), see (4.2.1). This has meant that, like the state and the market, TCBOs have practised instrumental CD, with little or no community engagement. This is to say, the oil-dependent nature of the Nigerian state, and Shell's economic interests, which direct their respective approaches to CD, also informs their engagement with TCBOs. The state and Shell made use of the 'global institutional turn towards CBOs to manipulate local communities through their TCBOs in the name of CD. This research discovered that among other factors, the culture of inherited leadership in the Ogoni communities surveyed, which installs undemocratic and sometimes poor quality leaders, made it possible for the state and Shell to hijack and manipulate TCBOs to serve their own agendas. In other words, the Nigerian government and Shell capitalised on the limited quality of education of local chiefs (4.2.1 and 5.3.1). Most of the chiefs are not products of democracy but rather of cultural impositions, and this made them uncommitted and unaccountable to their subjects (Donovan, nd). Respondents like KI-64 described chieftaincy stools as sacred, and therefore local chiefs are not readily replaced: "*until they die, they cannot be replaced by someone else*". As a result, the leadership of TCBOs under community chiefs was not accountable to community members, and the chiefs focused more

on their own wealth accumulation rather than on CD. This scenario played out not only in oil-endowed communities but also in non oil-endowed communities such as Lewe, Kanni-Babbe and Sii 2 because in all communities, chiefs were sacred symbols of authority, and controlled whatever funds that were sent into their communities (4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 5.3.1). This scramble for material wealth by community elites contributes to the current problems that Ogonis are enmeshed in, because while TCBOs are looked up to as alternatives of top-down agents of CD, this research found out that the leadership of TCBOs in both non oil endowed and endowed communities are incarnations of elitism because of the support they give to Shell and the Nigerian state in return for personal gain at the expense of the wellbeing of their community members.

At the root of this deficiency of TCBOs lies the over-reliance of Nigeria on oil, which contributes to the problems of Ogoni communities in two major ways. First, oil configured the prevailing political culture of the Nigerian state, in which oil-producing communities in Ogoniland are now effectively 'internal colonies' of the Nigerian state. Chibueze (2011, p. 124) cited Akinyemi who stated:

> "We have had basically two systems of revenue allocation in Nigeria. The first system which we practiced during the First Republic allowed the North to keep the proceeds from its groundnuts and cotton, the West to keep the proceeds from its cocoa, and the East to keep the proceeds from coal and oil produce. Then we changed the system so that the federal government got its hands on the proceeds from onshore and offshore crude petroleum proceeds and yet we don't expect the minorities in the oil producing areas to perceive that is an injustice done to them".

This 'internal colonization' of Ogoni communities marginalised Ogonis as a minority group in the Nigerian state, and the oil that proceeds from their communities is not only used for the development of other parts of the country, but is used in an unequal manner, by developing non oil-endowed regions of the Nigerian state and under-developing oil-endowed regions. The oil dependent nature of the Nigerian state has caused it and its partner (Shell), to prioritize the maximization of economic profit over the development of local communities. Indeed, the oil dependent nature of the Nigerian state and its economic interest explains the self-interested and market-driven style of CD, which it (Nigeria) and Shell have pursued over four decades (Idemudia, 2010). Evidently this style of CD, has not fulfilled the criteria of CD as set by Ogonis, (sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3).

Second, although the state and Shell have moved their development strategies from top-down to bottom-up in other to achieve sustainable CD, the result has been to replace one form of top-down strategy by another (chapters 3 and 4). KI-23, who works for Shell, boasted that sustainable CD, which is his company's latest CSR innovation, has achieved close to 90% in terms of community participation, because community chiefs together with the leaders of their various FTCBOs constitute true community representatives: *"we cannot possibly engage with everybody but at least we try to do that through different sections of their CBOs"* (see 3.5). Similarly, the Nigerian government claimed that since 1992, through OMPADEC and NDDC, it has always involved local people through their representatives in its development agenda, see (3.4.3). But the truth is that the Nigerian state and Shell engaged only with traditional inherited leaders and with FTCBOs that are largely controlled by those leaders see (chapters three and four).

There is a distinction between FTCBOs and STCBOs, but my findings suggest that both kinds of TCBOs have become surrogates of the Nigerian state and the Shell oil company (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016). Most of the above discussion applies more to FTCBOs than STCBOs, but some STCBOs are even more compromised by the state and the market. This is because although they are mostly self-funded and only occasionally funded by the state, STCBOs are accused of fuelling inegalitarianism and underdevelopment because they promote the 'natural' leadership of traditional chiefs. This research found out there is a link between community underdevelopment and the claims of sacredness attached to the natural leadership of inheritance which STCBOs support: "*we try to maintain our chieftaincy stools*" (SQ-27), "*we help in the coronation of chiefs*" (SQ-117), see (4.4.1). Moreover, STCBOs in the name of tradition advance the cause of FTCBOs, so while members of Ogoni communities seek freedom to participate in their communities - i.e., to play active roles in their communities and to have a sense of belonging – TCBOs (FTCBOs and STCBOs) - restrict such freedom, and restriction of freedom is both the key cause of underdevelopment (Sen, 1999) and, as discovered in this thesis, the major cause of hopelessness among Ogonis. The continued reliance on the cliché that TCBOs (bottom-up agents) will always succeed where top-down agents have failed, is, therefore, an over- simplification of complex realities where, first, the bottom exists within the top and therefore carries with it shadows from the top; and second, the inherent flaws at the bottom are overlooked.

6.3.2 *MCBOs and HCBOs*

Turning to MCBOs and HCBOs, this research discovered that the partnership of environmental MCBOs with Shell, and the partnership of intercommunity HCBOs with the state and national politicians, indicate that these two organizations, like FTCBOs, are part of Shell and the state, respectively. But while FTCBOs are highly subordinate to traditional inherited leadership within their communities, environmental MCBOs and intercommunity HCBOs are less so because of their mostly exogenous origin (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016). With regard to MCBOs, despite claims by leaders/founders of the Shell-funded environmental MCBOs that their organizations are largely made up of non-voluntary skilled and paid staff - as affirmed by TI-6: *"our managers and directors are professionals in different fields...the top directors are professionals in various disciplines, followed by directorates, facilitators and then liaison officers"* - their contribution to CD is hard to judge, since conflicting opinions are offered by respondents. For example, some local respondents and security guards living near the polluted K-Dere waterfronts said environmental remediation works in their communities are being carried out by oil companies who employ local youths, but other respondents denied seeing any environmental MCBOs in their communities (4.4.2). Likewise, of charity MCBOs, some respondents saw them as helpful in alleviating poverty and suffering of local people. For example, KI-5 said that charity health MCBOs that visit his community provide health services to local people at cheap rates. But most Ogonis belong to the vulnerable group in G, and cannot afford the services of market-driven agents of CD (table 7). KI-67 confirmed that most members of his community, who initially registered with an MCBO, withdrew when the terms of agreement stated clearly that services were not free, and he said that market-driven MCBOs are not sympathetic to the poor: *"the poor do not benefit at all"*. Charity MCBOs claim to contribute to CD by interacting with local communities and integrating their members into social networks (4.4.2). But these MCBOs are 'private profit' organizations which have been criticised for fraudulence see (Lofredo, 1995 and Kamar, 2012) and they do not help poor communities but rather further impoverish them, see (section 4.4.2). Respondents claimed that charity MCBOs take advantage of their helplessness: for example, according to KI-18, *"these organizations were formed to dupe us we don't have ideas about what they are doing...am not sure they were formed to help us, even the ones that asked us to open bank accounts did not even help us"*. Like KI-18, Cornish et al (2010, p. 246) asserted that poverty provides "supportive structural conditions" for self-serving organizations to flourish.

It is true that there are some self-funded charity MCBOs that contribute to CD by philanthropy. For example, some self-funded MCBOs (mostly CROs) adopt orphans, donate items to the poor, and sometimes provide infrastructure to their host communities at no cost see (section 4.2.3). However, while empathy motivates leaders of CROs to assist local communities, their services are not sustainable CD because they do not encourage participation of members in their CD activities. Therefore it is mere "relief from poverty based on patronage" (Sue 2002, p.287 and table 7). MCBOs' philanthropic style of CD, like their market-driven methods, are not collectivist approaches and are therefore inconsistent with the underlying principle of community and CBOs. Moreover, like Campbell and Jovchelovitch (2007), this research found that although communities are increasingly dependent on charity MCBOs, these organizations are not always available.

As for HCBOs, state and national politicians use them as self-serving platforms to spread into communities purely to garner votes: politicians gain votes in return for which the leadership of intercommunity HCBOs gain financial rewards see (section 4.2.3). KI-23 described inter-community HCBOs as private profit organizations (4.4.3). They are voluntary, self- funded and self-interested organizations, and only their members benefit from the relatively small-scale personal services they provide. The fact that TCBOs have aligned with the state and market, and most HCBOs and MCBOs are either private non-profit, or private profit-oriented, indicates that of the three categories of CBOs and their sub types discovered in Ogoni communities, none is genuinely community driven and guarantees the sustainable development of Ogoni communities (as perceived by 277 (TIs, SQA, KI and FGD) respondents). Nevertheless, philanthropic MCBOs and private non-profit HCBOs, even though non-collectivist in approach, currently remain the last resort for community members, especially those in the most vulnerable group (4.4.2). KI-4 claimed that his community yearns for philanthropic MCBOs because: "*we are very desperate, we are not fostering in anything, if these organizations* [non-profit private] *can come up with ideas, I think it will help us, there will be much progress, at least we can start up from there*". The desperate desire for philanthropic MCBOs among local communities is not only a demonstration that their FTCBOs are not sufficient but also a sign that Ogonis are impoverished. The next section looks at whether the best prospect of development in Ogoni communities lies with CBOs becoming independent of the state and market.

6.4 A return to independent CBOs?

The issue discussed in this section is whether, if Ogoni CBOs managed to separate themselves from the state and Shell, they could bring about CD in Ogoni communities. George and Omotola (2010) appear to say yes to this proposition, when they claim that before the creation of states and the discovery of oil, CD was purely driven from the bottom-up, and CBOs were "once pillars of community development" (Dawari and Shola 2010, p. 148). Chigudu (2015) seems to concur when he argues that traditional leadership has been contaminated by colonial and post-colonial regimes: "in the colonial era, some chiefs were reported to have worked closely and supported the colonial masters. In the post-colonial era, there have been reports of electoral manipulation through the institution of traditional leadership" (Chigudu, 2015, p.120). But my research indicates that even if CBOs managed to free themselves from manipulation by state and market, they might still be subject, directly (TCBOs) or indirectly (MCBOs and HCBOs), to manipulation by inherited chiefs and their entourages, and therefore unable to deliver genuine CD (i.e. development that benefitted the community not merely an elite).

6.4.1 *Return to independent TCBOs*

As agents of CD, Ogoni TCBOs since pre-oil times have practised non-participatory and elite-dominated CD, because even though: "the villages co-operated together to discuss and handle common challenges" (Igbara and Keenam, 2013, p. 61), according to KI-67, not all community members were allowed to participate fully in CD. Moreover, as sources of community identity, TCBOs under the leadership of village chiefs maintained a class system (Igbara and Keenam, 2013). Therefore a return to the era of pre-state and market TCBOs would mean a return to an unaccountable elite system strengthened by spirituality and imposed or accepted by community members, and according to respondents like KI-64, very little can be done to change this traditional culture. Moreover, under the dominance of independent TCBOs in Ogoniland, the quality of the Ogoni environment and residents' lives would most likely remain the same if not worse. Even if TCBOs managed to escape being co-opted by state and market forces to perform their respective political and economic agendas, they would still be inadequate instruments for CD because of their inherently undemocratic, indigenous elitism (4.4.1). Indeed, it is this inherent traditional elitism that makes TCBOs vulnerable to being co-opted by state and market forces. The only way to break out of this vicious circle of elitist domination by state and market forces is for a completely new foundation of CBOs to ensure they owe their existence exclusively and comprehensively to the communities they serve.

So the belief that state- and market-independent TCBOs will deliver CD when state- and market-dependent TCBOs failed to do so, underestimates the inherently faulty foundation of the culture of inherited leadership as determined by the results presented herein, see (Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 2016). From this research, it is clear that while Ogoni respondents hold that political bribery (state) and oil capitalism (market) have been largely responsible for the weakening of their community well-being, they also see shortcomings in the traditional inherited leadership system in Ogoniland, because this has been a major contributory cause, see also (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016). These shortcomings include failures of traditional leaders to embrace an accountable leadership style; to provide a peaceful environment for their subjects; and to actively seek development rather than passively wait for it. Respondents particularly regret that the traditional structure has not provided any opportunity for the led to choose their leaders or express their concerns (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016).

Most of the above analysis applies to FTCBOs. With regard to STCBOs, there is evidence that some of them might escape the elitist tincture of traditional leadership which has plagued FTCBOs. For example, findings from this thesis, like those of Totten (2016) and Alegi and Bolsmann (2010), suggests that community football organizations are likely to aid CD in Ogoniland. However, while this thesis agrees that football organizations can be potential sources of community social capital as expressed by SQ-69, who said that *"our football tournaments bring people together…everybody is involved"*, they are generally short-lived in Ogoniland because of lack of finance, see (4.4.1). Moreover, the likelihood that football organizations in Ogoniland can extend their functions beyond the domain of sport to contribute to the continuous strengthening and maintenance of community social capital seems very slim. Unlike the Sankt Pauli community football organization that extended its contributions to CD in its host communities in Hamburg to become a source of community empowerment (Totten, 2016), it is very doubtful that Ogoni football organizations could advance to empower their communities (Totten, 2016). This is because football organizations in Ogoni communities are sub-groups of youth FTCBOs, and share their faults of poor leadership, economic corruption and lack of accountability, all of which compound rather than ameliorate community problems (4.4.1). Moreover, even the democratization of local community governance would not make football organizations viable agents of CD because most Ogoni community football organizations are starved of funds (4.4.1), hence are either dying prematurely, or succumbing to the option of commercializing and corporatizing their assets and becoming, like Shell, another source of self-enrichment rather than CD:

"as the sense of community previously experienced by fans is increasingly being replaced by a passive consumer experience. And community outreach works by clubs is often stealthily focused on product placement, good public relations and market development rather than community empowerment" (Totten, nd, p. 1).

The next section looks at how far MCBOs can go where the state, market and TCBOs have failed.

6.4.2 *Independent MCBOs*

This sub-section examines whether a shift from the dominance of state- and market-dependent TCBOs to the dominance of state- and market-independent MCBOs, could deliver effective CD in Ogoni communities. At present, MCBOs are not independent of state and market. Findings from this research suggest that MCBOs, which are external organizations, are only permitted to work in local communities by community chiefs and leaders of FTCBOs who are also gatekeepers for their communities. In other words, MCBOs *"are under our community and our local organizations* [FCBOs]" KI-31. For instance, charity non-profit making MCBOs, despite their claims of good intentions, work along the path carved by FTCBOs (4.4.2). According to KI-67, even though these organizations come into communities unbiased, they are soon manipulated to work in biased ways – i.e. in ways that benefit community chiefs and leaders of FTCBOs (KI-65), and by extension, benefit the state and market forces which pull the strings of FTCBOs.

While it is possible to conceive of MCBOs as independent of both state and market and also independent of traditional leadership, MCBOs will always be subject to the internal policies of their own organizations, which may not be directed towards sustainable CD of local communities. For example, 'private profit making charity MCBOs' will always have a tendency to concentrate on community members who can afford their services, and not the vulnerable groups in Category G (Table 7) that make up the majority of the population in Ogoni communities. In between TCBOs and MCBOs are HCBOs, and the next section looks at whether independent HCBOs might provide solutions to the Ogoni problem where independent TCBOs and MCBOs are unlikely to do so.

6.4.3 *I Independent HCBOs*

Of the seven types of HCBOs that I discovered in Ogoniland, inter-community HCBOs are mostly affiliated to the leadership of communities and their TCBOs and, of course, to the state which established the HCBOs in the first place and therefore are not independent of the state (4.4.3 and table 6). SQ-148, the coordinator of the Khana chapter of a HCBO (Rivers

state dynamic forum), explained the link between his state-funded HCBO and community leadership: *"we are about 20,000 from our local government…the youth leader of my community shared money to his boys that is why the number moved up"*. A leader of a HCBO confirmed that the linkage between the leadership of his HCBO and the ruling party in his state is for personal gain rather than public good:

> *"our state party chairman has provided money… by next month* [June] *we* [HCBO leaders] *will distribute rice, tomatoes and groundnut to our people in the villages, am sure they will support APC in the next election… it is politics"* (KI-22).

But the other types of HCBOs (see 4.4.3), are mostly self- funded and therefore independent of the state, market and traditional leadership. For example, intra-community cooperative organizations and social clubs, unlike MCBOs that work as strangers in local communities, are not strangers in the communities they work in, hence have very little to do with the leadership of their host community (4.4.3). However, like MCBOs, they are mostly self-serving organizations, stating clearly that only their members benefit from their packages. In other words, intra-community cooperatives and social clubs do not make a genuine platform for sustainable CD because they are not primarily framed to support wider community participation (4.4.3).

By contrast, CROs stand out as being the least partial and divisive of HCBOs: they do not favour what KI-65 described as "my own people" (4.4.3). CROs, unlike 'private profit-making charity organizations', are non-profit-making organizations which are not selective in their supply of aid to community members since their contributions are based on empathy because: *"we don't get money from the government and you know that we have our own challenges as well"* (KI-22). However, Ogoni CROs are not primarily established for CD, for three reasons. First, their contribution to CD, even though important, is individualistic and not collectivist and therefore not a platform that builds the capacity of community members because members do not have the opportunity to: "rethink problems and expand contacts and networks; building social capital, thereby building and developing people to enable them take control of their lives" (Cavaye, nd, p. 1). Second, even though leaders of CROs in Ogoniland are resident in their neighbourhood, they do not have the power to command an equitable distribution of resources in their host communities, neither are they able to reconcile the vulnerable members in groups F and G (Table 7) with the more affluent members in groups B and C. Third, CROs are not primarily preventative in their approach of CD because they help community members when they are already in need: *"in most communities that we planted our churches we have people that go virtually naked, they are very poor and so we*

supply them with food stuffs" (KI-22). Tan (2009:5) cited Jacobson who stated that practising CD as individual assistance "is not a method of primary prevention". Therefore while CROs are independent of the state, market and traditional leadership, like intra-community cooperative and social clubs they do not promote sustainable CD.

6.5. How to build upon a genuine sense of community

If top-down initiatives by both state and market have failed to deliver CD to Ogoni communities, and bottom-up initiatives by CBOs have also failed because they have been tarnished by association not only with the state and market, but also with traditional community leadership, or because they were not primarily established to promote sustainable CD, what alternative approach could promote sustainable CD in Ogoni communities? In an attempt to answer this question, I return to the nature of Ogoni communities because a critical examination of these communities will not only help to explain how and why previous approaches to CD have all failed in Ogoniland, but also help to suggest solutions for more sustainable CD.

The first thing to be said about Ogoni communities is that their troubles did not begin with the advent of colonialism and the discovery of oil. Many deficiencies were evident in traditional Ogoni communities long before the 20th century, including a highly inegalitarian political, economic, and social structure, extremes of riches and poverty, and considerable inter-community conflict (Igbara and Keenam, 2013). Respondents claimed that their communities were never purely communal (gemeinschaft), and they traced the current vicious nature of their communities to a culture which pre-dates oil. First, they regarded the traditional ascription of roles as a deep source of distress and conflict within their face-to-face small groups, see (5.3.3 and table 7). For example, they alleged that the second class role culturally ascribed to women, explains why their economic and social status have remained low. KI-8 confirmed that historically women were seen as second class citizens:

> "*our fathers refused to train their girls in school for the mere reason that it will amount to wasting money since they will get married out of the home, they enjoyed using these girls in the farm. That is why our women only know how to do peasant farming, they are poor and have nothing to contribute to the community. Their only contribution maybe when we organize monthly community sanitation and ask them not to go to the farm or market, you see them coming out with tools to support in cleaning our community. They sweep and also weed as part of their contribution*".

Therefore, according to respondents, it is a communitarian gemeinschaft 'myth' to claim that pre-oil Ogoni communities were harmonious because their: "leaders were subject to the will of the people" (Igbara and Keenam, 2013, p. 62). Respondents criticised the ascription of leadership roles based on inheritance (32 KIs, FG-3 and 27 SQAs) because for these respondents this undemocratic system of natural appointment created classes in their communities. So there was no golden age of community in Ogoniland, and the alternative to the present dire condition of many Ogoni communities is not a return to a pristine past when they claimed everyone lived happily in peace and prosperity.

The second thing to say about Ogoni communities is that my findings reveal a strong sense of community in the minds of most Ogonis (5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 5.4.4). Even in the midst of physical squalor and economic hardship, Ogonis felt a powerful bond with their communities. For better or worse, this was their home, to which they were umbilically and permanently attached. In my view, this sense of attachment and belonging is the basis of a potentially successful movement for genuine CD in Ogoni communities. By building on this emotional investment in their communities, a new system of local control over local issues could be established in the shape of democratically-elected community or village councils with real power, authority, and resources to govern in the interest of the whole community, not just in the interest of an elite.

There is some support from respondents for such a community council, founded on 'artificial' rather than 'natural' trust, see (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016, p 61). Respondents thought that since the dependence on 'natural trust' in traditional leaders has failed to provide good governance, there was a need to try 'artificial trust' by applying modern western principles of good governance such as accountability, transparency, and fairness. One way to implement these principles is through the decentralization and democratization of their currently centralised community governance structure. Respondents like KI-16 endorsed the notion of the decentralization of community power: "*these people have so much power, we need to work against that*" see (Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al*, 2016). According to associationists like KI-65, this will mean embracing democracy where members are free to vote for leaders of their choice. Through these processes (decentralization and democracy), the community governance structure will be sanitized since it will "*remove all our leaders because they are not helping us, there are good people that can represent us very well*" (KI-53).

This proposal is not as utopian as it may seem, since there have already been some tentative steps in this direction in some Ogoni communities. For example, the 'rotating', parallel', and 'complementary' systems' of governance' presented in Chapter 4 were modest attempts by community elites to dilute the traditional inherited system of leadership. The 'rotating' system is the first attempt made in some oil-endowed communities to replace incumbent chiefs. The 'parallel' system involves the existence of a long-lasting opposition to the incumbent local chief. The 'complementary' system is a more collective and cordial relationship between community elites and local chiefs. However, none of these innovations includes either the decentralisation of power or the democratic election of community leaders (see Okeke-Ogbuafor *et al,* 2016).

From this research, it is clear that until and unless the leadership structure of local communities is decentralised and democratised, the bottom-up approach to CD in Ogoni will continue to result in inegalitarian and unhealthy communities with most of the population remaining vulnerable and invisible in group G (see Table 7). According to KI-65, under the present system,

> *"they will not give the position to the right person, but when you allow the people to choose, they will elect the right person for themselves. With this arrangement of appointing leaders, wrong people will always be in leadership positions. We are in a community where there are so many people and one person cannot decide for the whole community because the person you choose may be good to you, then what about the majority?"*

In other words, proponents of 'CBOs as 21st agents of CD' should first pursue egalitarianism through democratization and the decentralization of power. Working towards egalitarianism is imperative if CBOs are to contribute towards sustainable CD, see (chapters 3 and 4).

The third point to highlight about Ogoni communities is that democratization might help to decouple personal identity from collectivist identity. Like the decentralization of power, most Ogonis also seek the decentralization of collectivist identity, and this thesis discovered that the untying of 'personhood' from collectivist forms of identity would be another positive step towards sustainable CD (Chapters 4 and 5). This is because collectivist identities are sometimes harmful (such as the aggressiveness engendered by youth clubs) and can often conflict with each other (4.4.1). For example, viciousness often erupts as a result of clashes between different collective identities. Also, some collectivist identities are demeaning to some members. KI-47 noted that the leadership of his community only identifies with "*you*

when you have money or when you are from a rich family", and members who lack such resources are *"too poor to be relevant to our people"* (KI-45). Occasionally, despite the personal penalties that often come from untying personhood from collectivist identity, a few respondents like SQ-101 have risked it: *"yes, I accept that am an outcast, I belong to myself".* A more mature democratic culture should empower more people to believe in themselves (personhood), rather than invest their identity in (imperfect) collective entities. Most Ogonis, especially members of groups D, E, F and G (Table 7), see the need for their communities to move away from the deficient culture that attaches identity to collectivist entities towards the healthier culture that concentrates on developing individual human capacity. One hundred and fifty six respondents (SQAs, KIs and FGD), affirmed that their preferred communities are those that expand members' freedom to participate genuinely in the community. For these respondents, a progressive community is one in which attempts are made to develop the human capacity of the vulnerable groups F (Table 7) and especially G (Table 7) because such communities recognise that *"if the human aspect is taken care of, individuals can then build the community"* (K-1). In other words, progressive communities perceive CD not as an end but as a process that empowers local people to move out of vulnerability, rather than adapt to it.

The next section looks at the prospects of decentralised Ogoni communities achieving sustainable CD under the current political culture of the Nigerian state.

6.6 Will the current political culture of the Nigerian state allow decentralised communities to achieve sustainable CD?

The question here is whether a decentralised system of community or village councils would be possible under the existing Nigerian political culture of authoritarian intervention in local affairs. As we have seen, currently, CBOs are failing to deliver CD to Ogoni communities because of their manipulation by state and market forces, in partnership with traditional chiefs/elites, see (Pyagbara, 2007; Arisuokwu and Nnaomah, 2012; Mohammed, 2013 and; Babalola, 2014). What is to prevent similar manipulation of new community or village councils were they to be established?

Some respondents thought decentralization of their local governance system might be possible within the existing Nigerian political culture. For example, KI-16 believed that decentralisation would unlock closed doors because more resourceful community members would emerge who would use their goodwill to attract development to their communities.

Even under current conditions, resourceful people like himself can achieve some CD: *"there must be someone to link us, that is the way I see it…when I had the opportunity to present our issues to Shell, I made good use of that opportunity by pushing that electricity be brought to my community and that is the power supply we are enjoying"*. Another line of argument expressed by respondents in support of a decentralised local community governance structure is that this system may help narrow the wide gap that currently exist in their communities between members of groups B (Table 7) and C (Table 7) on the one hand, and other groups especially those in group G, (Table 7) thereby setting their communities on a more egalitarian path to embrace and sustain CD (chapters 3, 4 and 5). This is possible because, according to SQ-89, community members will vote for members who truly care about them rather than "*our leaders* [who] *don't care about us and will never do anything for us*". On this view, decentralised communities could achieve some level of CD even under the prevailing political culture of the Nigerian state.

However, sections (3.7 and 4.5), show that these communities would stand a better chance of doing so under a more friendly political culture because they (Shell and the Nigerian government) are most likely to drop or soften their retrogressive policies- 'blame game has over the years become one of the cornerstones of Nigerian government policy in the Niger Delta' (Idemudia, 2010, pp.84). Indeed under a 'non rentierism' condition there is the possibility that the Nigerian state and by extension Shell might focus on 'integrative or ethical CSR' (Garriga and Mele, 2004, p 53).

6.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the five main findings of this thesis which are as follows. First, that while different data collection methods could be the reason for my apparently contradictory data sets, individuals' varying perceptions of the concept of community is a more plausible explanation. Second, local people adapt by coping and survival strategies to deal with the challenges they face in their communities, because of their strong sense of place. Third, CBOs do not always serve as third sector agents of governance because they are mostly dependent on the state and market and the internal structures and policies of their affiliated organizations and sponsors. Fourth, even though the prevailing political culture of the state and the market constitute an impediment to CBOs achieving sustainable CD, bottom-up approaches of CD could yield some level of CD if its advocates were to pursue the

decentralization of power. Five, the prospect of achieving sustainable CD in Ogoniland lies in tapping into the enduring sense of 'place' that most respondents hold.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

"Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible" (Frank Zappa, 1971)

7.1 Introduction

This concluding chapter has four objectives. First, I will summarise the findings of the three data chapters and the discussion chapter. Second I will make several recommendations about ways of improving the effectiveness of performance of CBOs in delivering CD in Ogoniland. Fourth, I will offer my reflections on my PhD journey.

7.2 Summary of findings

The first data chapter (chapter three), presented an analysis of top-down approaches to community development made by the state and market, and concluded that genuine CD efforts were not made. The second data chapter (chapter four), presented empirical data on the typology of CBOs and on CBOs as bottom-up modes of promoting CD. The chapter concluded that the state, market, and local traditions influence the performance of CBOs in both non oil-endowed and non oil-endowed communities, inhibiting them from promoting CD. The third data chapter (chapter five), comprised two parts. Part one presented data on KI perceptions of the nature of Ogoni communities; part two presented the results of a survey questionnaire on respondents' sense of community. Findings from the questionnaire survey on respondents' sense of community (SQBs) seemed to contradict the findings of the data on KI perceptions of the nature of Ogoni communities and also the findings of chapter four on CBOs: most survey respondents described the nature of their communities in very positive terms, whereas other respondents' perceptions of Ogoni communities and CBOs were often very negative.

The discussion chapter (chapter six), provided a thematic analysis of the findings of the three data chapters. First, the apparent contrast between Ogonis's generally negative evaluation of both top-down and bottom-up attempts at CD, and generally positive evaluation of their communities, was discussed. Second, there was a discussion of whether the tripartite distinction between the state, market and community has broken down in Ogoniland. Third, an account was given of how Ogoni CBOs can be made to promote genuine CD in the face of inhibiting local traditions if they manage to become independent of the state and market. Fourth, in seeking solutions on how Ogoni CBOs can be made to promote genuine CD, the option of decentralizing authority was explored and considerations about whether this would

require fundamental changes to the current political culture of the Nigerian state were discussed.

7.3 Recommendations

I make three key recommendations:

7.3.1 *Decentralization*

This thesis recommends that instead of holding on to the popular mantra that CBOs are the best vehicle for bottom-up CD, policy makers should encourage efforts by citizens themselves to promote CD. This means decentralization of power especially in rural African communities like Ogoniland where the culture of centralised power has proven to be both a cause and a consequence of inequality, see (section 5.3.3 and 6.5). While it may be a difficult task to uproot an oppressive culture like the culture of inherited leadership, which, according to Dumka (2008) is as old as Ogoni itself, maintaining this culture is akin to maintaining a class system which frustrates sustainable CD. Therefore, efforts should be made to decentralize power as "decentralization can deepen democracy: by allowing citizens to become political actors in their own right" (Faguet *et al*, 2015, p.1).

7.3.2 *Create a partnership body of CBOs*

It would be helpful if efforts are made to establish a partnership body of the more genuine CBOs, so they are able to work together in collaborative ways. Working in partnership entails sharing information, learning best practice of CD from each other, while also avoiding the duplication of duties. A partner organization may help check on the activities of CBOs, and, if need be, report suspicious actions. Under such a partnership body, the CBOs would be less subject to the dubious influence of the state and the private sector, and more subject to the norms governing civil society, see (Jaysawal, 2013). For example, unlike under the current arrangements of CBOs registering with governmental institutions like the Ministry of Youths and Sports, CBOs would be registered with an independent partnership body that would ensure they were not only closely monitored by, but also better engaged with, communities.

Whether such a partnership body has much chance of being established is, however, a moot point. As Dill (2010, p. 43) says,

> "engineering fundamental social change is particularly difficult when the proposed reforms threaten vested interests. Those with power may be disinclined to alter either formal institutions or their normatively embedded practices if such a change will come at their expense, even if 'development' more broadly conceived is expected to flourish".

But reformers should listen to R. Buckminster Fuller's advice cited in Molinari (2009) that "you never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete".

7.3.3 *Build on a sense of place rather than a sense of community*

Policy makers should develop CD policies that build on the powerful sense of place, rather than a false sense of community, that is socially constructed and held by most Ogonis (Chambers, 2006). I recognize the criticisms made of place-based conceptions of society. For example, Bhattacharyya (2004, p.11) claims that place does not guarantee social cohesion: "a neighbourhood, a small town, or village is automatically assumed to be a community, regardless of the absence of any cohesion in it". This is because 'place' fails to incorporate the notion of 'shared interest' between the people occupying it. However, for Ogonis, a deficient degree of communalism is less dangerous than an excessive degree of communalism, and policy makers should abandon the idea that traditional communities should be preserved even if they oppress their disadvantaged and vulnerable members and cater mostly for the highly-placed who belong to visible groups. Such an idea merely reinforces economic and social inequality in Ogoniland, and frustrates genuine CD.

7.4 Further research
This study suggests the need for more empirical research into five controversies.

7.4.1 *How far do CBOs reflect the nature of the communities they serve?*
This controversy raises the question of whether or not communities get the CBOs they deserve. Instead of blaming CBOs for their failure to deliver CD, perhaps we should blame communities for failing to provide a favourable context in which good CBOs can work effectively. Where good CBOs can make no headway, bad CBOs take their place. On this argument, the nature of host communities drives the style of bottom-up CD practised by CBOs, for good or ill. Further research on the relationship between communities and their CBOs would help to establish which of them comes first in the CD stakes.

7.4.2 *Is there a difference between the effectiveness of CBOs in oil endowed and non-oil endowed communities?*
On the face of it, it seems likely that with all the corruption associated with oil production, CBOs in oil-endowed communities would be more self-seeking than CBOs in non oil endowed communities. But the results of this study indicate that there was no significant difference in perceptions of CBOs held by respondents in oil-endowed compared to non oil-

endowed communities. Further research comparing the performance of CBOs in oil-endowed and non oil-endowed communities would help to resolve this controversy.

7.4.3 *What is the distinction between CBOs and NGOs?*

The thesis produced an extensive typology of CBOs at work in Ogoni communities. But this raises the question of whether some of them, particularly MCBOs, might be more accurately defined as NGOs, and whether therefore the central distinction is not between TCBOs and MCBOs (as the thesis has assumed) but between CBOs and NGOs. There is a need, therefore, for more research to determine the range of CBOs and their differentiation from NGOs.

7.4.4 *How important is registration of MCBOs?*

Community development literature will benefit from researching more about MCBOs. In particular, it will be interesting if comparative studies are undertaken of MCBOs registered with the state and those that operate without registration. Such research would reveal which set performs better, and therefore, how MCBOs can be enhanced to promote genuine CD

7.4.5 *What is the reality of traditional communities?*

This thesis found that cultural vestiges of the past haunt the present-day development of Ogoni communities, yet African communitarians are quick to defend such cultures, pointing to the ' West' as the sole cause of their underdevelopment. This controversy poses great challenges for policy makers, development institutions and community workers, hence the need for more research to clarify the issue. In particular, there is a need for more historical research into the true nature of traditional African communities, because much of the existing literature seems coloured by idealistic assumptions. It is important that when Africans describe their communities before colonization, they are dispassionate, and critically appraise bland and unsubstantiated statements such as the following:

> "other residents of the village were elites, aliens and limited number of slaves…although differences existed between the upper and lower segments, it was not such that any could use its position to oppress and exploit the other" (Igbara and Keenam, 2013, p. 61)

The call for this sort of research and analysis has become very important considering the scale of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment that is ravaging countries and communities in Africa. This magnitude of misfortune raises pertinent questions of whether the 'West' are the only culprits, or whether there are also inherent causes in Africa's pre-colonial history that have not been properly understood.

7.5 Reflections on my PhD journey

This thesis is a product of various stages of thinking. Initially, at the start of my doctoral programme in late 2012, I set out to investigate why the various top-down efforts by the state and market in the Niger Delta ended up under-developing the local communities they were established to develop. After six months of desk research into this topic, I realised that I needed to spell out what I mean by development, what the state and market mean by development, and especially what local communities see as development, because they were the primary receivers of these efforts. At this point (mid-2013), I sought to investigate these development problems from the bottom-up; and in order to understand bottom-up development, I reviewed the literature on community development (CD). By the end of 2013, I resolved to shift my focus to CBOs, as I was convinced on paper that CBOs were the CD solution not only across Ogoni communities but in other African communities. At this point, however, my positive conviction about the effectiveness of CBOs had more to do with my own ontological position than empirical evidence: I had a positive ideological conviction about CBOs because as an African I was born and socialised into believing that TCBOs were sacred and untainted.

However, in late 2013, when I applied for ethical approval to undertake my fieldwork in Ogoniland, even though this application was granted, my risk assessment was not, hence my application was delayed for five months due to the volatile situation in the Niger Delta. While waiting for this approval, I conducted telephone interviews with respondents in Ogoniland about their CBOs, and I was surprised that the responses from my telephone informants about CBOs were not as rosy as the stories about TCBOs which I held from my personal experience as an African and which I had read and internalised from the literature. To resolve this contrast, I carried out intensive research review on the flaws of CBOs, and came to realise that CBOs were far from perfect. It is important to state that before this U-turn, as a novice researcher, I had so much confidence in the positive interpretations of CBOs expressed by the 'big names and institutions', that I rarely thought through their methodologies, and perhaps the uniqueness of their case studies, which accounted for my 'over confidence' in CBOs as third sector agents of governance and CD. Perhaps the most useful lesson I learnt through this process is that there are many different lenses through which research objects can be viewed. With a more informed knowledge about the different construction of CBOs, I revised my interview questions and adopted a more open-ended structure for my questionnaires.

After the analysis of my first data sets (TIs, KIs, SQA and FGD) which indicated that the solution to the Ogoni problem was not via CBOs, I decided to administer survey questionnaires to respondents on their sense of community, to understand how well local people are bonded to their communities and what they prioritized. Although my investigations into respondents' sense of community would have benefitted from more qualitative research, the respondent's perceptions provided me with a new perspective on the issue – that despite the patchy contribution of their CBOs to CD, most respondents expressed very positive perceptions about at least some aspects of their communities.

So, although my findings add to the relatively small body of negative interpretations of CBOs, my journey through this research process has opened up another area of research in this subject. This is the insight that even in a condition of extreme adversity, people may express a strong sense of commitment to their community. The question is whether that strong sense of community is a reflection of the merits of the community itself, or whether it is an attachment to place in an act of adaptation/coping/survival by residents. My reading is the latter interpretation - that most respondents hold a high sense of community because of their social construction of their community in terms of place, rather than their estimation of the quality of communality in it. It is my belief that this discovery can not only inform further research, but also provide policy makers, community workers and development institutions with an alternative strategy to work with - i.e. starting from the profound sense of place held by most Ogonis, rather than an assumed sense of 'communality'.

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Appendix

Table A: Results from Korokoro community

No.	Question	1	2	3	4
A	As a member, my needs are met	1.98			
B	We value the same things		2.67		
C	This community has been successful in getting the needs of its members met		2.38		
D	Being a member of this community makes me feel good			3.79	
E	When I have a problem, I can talk about it with members of this community		2.78		
F	People in this community have similar needs, priorities, and goals		2.57		
G	I can trust people in this community	1.88			
H	I can recognise most of the members of this community			3.84	
I	Most community members know me			3.90	
J	This community has symbols and expressions of membership, such as clothes, signs, art, architecture, logos, landmarks and flags that people can recognise	1.55			
K	I put a lot of time and effort into being part of this community		2.38		
L	Being a member of this community is part of my identity			3.94	
M	Fitting into this community is important to me			3.47	
N	This community can influence other communities			3.60	
O	I care about what other community members think of me		2.92		
P	I have influence over what this community is like			3.15	
Q	If there is a problem in this community, members can get it solved			3.19	
R	This community has good leaders		2.73		
S	It is very important to me to be part of this community			3.90	
T	I am with other community members a lot and enjoy being with them			3.42	
U	I expect to be a part of this community for a long time			3.82	
V	Members have shared important events together, such as holidays, celebrations or disasters.			3.62	
W	I feel hopeful that my community has a bright future			3.69	
X	Members of this community care about each other		2.92		

Table B: Results from Ebubu community

No.	Question	1	2	3	4
A	As a member, my needs are met		2.72		
B	We value the same things			3.04	
C	This community has been successful in getting the needs of its members met			3.18	
D	Being a member of this community makes me feel good			3.96	
E	When I have a problem, I can talk about it with members of this community			3.12	
F	People in this community have similar needs, priorities, and goals			3.41	
G	I can trust people in this community		2.38		
H	I can recognise most of the members of this community			3.80	
I	Most community members know me			3.8	
J	This community has symbols and expressions of membership, such as clothes, signs, art, architecture, logos, landmarks and flags that people can recognise	1.06			
K	I put a lot of time and effort into being part of this community	1.08			
L	Being a member of this community is part of my identity			3.84	
M	Fitting into this community is important to me			3.3	
N	This community can influence other communities			3.29	
O	I care about what other community members think of me		2.73		
P	I have influence over what this community is like		2.64		
Q	If there is a problem in this community, members can get it solved			3.86	
R	This community has good leaders			3.55	
S	It is very important to me to be part of this community			3.98	
T	I am with other community members a lot and enjoy being with them			3.06	
U	I expect to be a part of this community for a long time			3.62	
V	Members have shared important events together, such as holidays, celebrations or disasters.			3.84	
W	I feel hopeful that my community has a bright future				4
X	Members of this community care about each other			3.76	

Table C: Results from Lewe community

No.	Question	1	2	3	4
A	As a member, my needs are met		2.92		
B	We value the same things		2.88		
C	This community has been successful in getting the needs of its members met		2.92		
D	Being a member of this community makes me feel good				4
E	When I have a problem, I can talk about it with members of this community		2.81		
F	People in this community have similar needs, priorities, and goals		2.82		
G	I can trust people in this community		2.47		
H	I can recognise most of the members of this community			3.6	
I	Most community members know me			3.60	
J	This community has symbols and expressions of membership, such as clothes, signs, art, architecture, logos, landmarks and flags that people can recognise	1.38			
K	I put a lot of time and effort into being part of this community	1.06			
L	Being a member of this community is part of my identity			3.81	
M	Fitting into this community is important to me			3.23	
N	This community can influence other communities			3.31	
O	I care about what other community members think of me		2.58		
P	I have influence over what this community is like		2.86		
Q	If there is a problem in this community, members can get it solved			3.4	
R	This community has good leaders		2.67		
S	It is very important to me to be part of this community			3.98	
T	I am with other community members a lot and enjoy being with them		2.8		
U	I expect to be a part of this community for a long time			3.80	
V	Members have shared important events together, such as holidays, celebrations or disasters.			3.26	
W	I feel hopeful that my community has a bright future				4
X	Members of this community care about each other			3.72	

Table D: Results from Kanni-Babbe community

No.	Question	1	2	3	4
A	As a member, my needs are met		2.63		
B	We value the same things		2.15		
C	This community has been successful in getting the needs of its members met		2.71		
D	Being a member of this community makes me feel good			3.92	
E	When I have a problem, I can talk about it with members of this community		2.46		
F	People in this community have similar needs, priorities, and goals			3.04	
G	I can trust people in this community		2.00		
H	I can recognise most of the members of this community			3.00	
I	Most community members know me			3.92	
J	This community has symbols and expressions of membership, such as clothes, signs, art, architecture, logos, landmarks and flags that people can recognise	1.88			
K	I put a lot of time and effort into being part of this community	1.27			
L	Being a member of this community is part of my identity			3.08	
M	Fitting into this community is important to me		2.67		
N	This community can influence other communities		2.48		
O	I care about what other community members think of me		2.80		
P	I have influence over what this community is like		2.79		
Q	If there is a problem in this community, members can get it solved			3.46	
R	This community has good leaders			3.55	
S	It is very important to me to be part of this community			3.88	
T	I am with other community members a lot and enjoy being with them		2.63		
U	I expect to be a part of this community for a long time			3.48	
V	Members have shared important events together, such as holidays, celebrations or disasters.			3.26	
W	I feel hopeful that my community has a bright future			3.94	
X	Members of this community care about each other		2.98		