



THE HIDDEN GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSNATIONAL SURVEILLANCE:

SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL NETWORKS AROUND SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SITES.



David Wood

PhD thesis submitted for examination, December 21st 2000.
Accepted March 12th 2001.



Department of Agricultural Economics and Food Marketing
University of Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 7RU.

NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

200 13990 X

Thesis L6845

CONTENTS

INDEX	Contents	i
	Index of Figures, Image Credits, Maps and Tables	ii
	Acknowledgements	iv
	Abstract	v
Chapter 1:	Introduction	1
PART ONE	QUESTIONS AND METHODS	6
Chapter 2:	Research Questions	7
Chapter 3:	Methodology	54
PART TWO	INVESTIGATING SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SITES	81
Chapter 4:	The Public History of North Yorkshire SIGINT Sites	83
Chapter 5:	The Function of SIGINT Sites	120
PART THREE	INTERPRETING SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SITES	192
Chapter 6:	Politics, Parapolitics and the State	193
Chapter 7:	Peace Campaigners	246
Chapter 8:	Mind Control, UFOs and the End of the World: Conspiracy Theories and Intelligence Sites.	294
PART FOUR	THEORIZING SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SITES	312
Chapter 9:	Discussion	313
BIBLIOGRAPHY		364
APPENDICES	Appendix 1. Acronyms, Abbreviations, Codewords and Technical Terms used in the text.	384
	Appendix 2. Intelligence Sites in the UK.	393

Index to Figures, Image Credits, Maps and Tables.

Figures

Figure 1	A panoramic view of Menwith Hill	5
Figure 2	An uncovered satellite dish at Menwith Hill in the 1970s	91
Figure 3	New razor-wire-topped security fences at Menwith Hill	101
Figure 4	A road sign showing Menwith Hill's new designation	104
Figure 5	RAF Fylingdales (briefly) with both radomes and pyramid in 1992.	118
Figure 6	The Logo of USSPACECOM	125
Figure 7	USSPACECOM Mission Statement from Vision 2020	126
Figure 8	Satellite targeting Iraq in USSPACECOM Vision 2020	127
Figure 9	'Space - the Warfighters edge.' From USSPACECOM Vision 2020	128
Figure 10	'Control of Space'. From USSPACECOM Vision 2020	134
Figure 11	Global Partnerships'. From USSPACECOM Vision 2020	137
Figure 12	The badge of the NSA	142
Figure 13	The logo of the ISSO	143
Figure 14	An organisation table for NSA sites.	148
Figure 15	The cover of the NSA's corporate strategy document, NCS21.	151
Figure 16	A Coat-of-Arms for RAF Menwith Hill	155
Figure 17	The badge of INSCOM	156
Figure 18	The badge of the AIA	157
Figure 19	A GCHQ logo	166
Figure 20	The badge of the Canadian CSE	168
Figure 21	The badge of the Australian DSD	168
Figure 22	VHF Radio Aerials at Menwith Hill	172
Figure 23	The STEEPLEBUSH Operations Centre	175
Figure 24	SBIRS groundstation under construction at Menwith Hill, 14th May 2000	185
Figure 25	SBIRS groundstation under construction at Menwith Hill, 22nd June 2000	185
Figure 26	The badge of RAF Fylingdales	189
Figure 27	One of the 'Golf Balls' at RAF Fylingdales, during work to replace them in 1992	189
Figure 28	The SSPAR pyramid at RAF Fylingdales.	190
Figure 29	Yorkshire CND Logo	249
Figure 30	OPAG leaflet, showing satirical map of Menwith Hill	255
Figure 31	An OPAG view of the actor-networks around Menwith Hill.	260
Figure 32	A CAAB Logo	261
Figure 33	CAAB founders Anni Rainbow (left), and Lindis Percy (right), demand UK independence from America	261
Figure 34	A WoMenwith Hill Wimmins Peace Camp Logo	268
Figure 35	Witches, from a WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's Peace Camp Leaflet	270
Figure 36	Unstoppable Womyn!	271
Figure 37	A Menwith Hill bye-laws notice, altered by CAAB activists.	283
Figure 38	Clear evidence of sheep at Menwith Hill	286
Figure 39	Project Freedom Network Logo.	296

Image Credits.

AIA: 18. CAAB: 1, 2, 4, 24, 25, 32, 33, 38. CSE: 20. Christine Dean: 31. DSD: 21. FAS: 14. GCHQ: 19. INSCOM: 17. NSA: 12, 13, 15. OPAG Archives: 30. Project Freedom Network: 39. RAF Fylingdales: 5, 26. RAF Menwith Hill: 16. Craig Stennett: 3, 22, 23. Yorkshire CND: 27, 28, 29 USSPACECOM: 6, 7, 8, 9 10, 11. WoMenwith Hill Wimmins Peace Camp: 34, 35, 36.

Every effort has been made to clear reproduction rights with copyright holders where copyright is specified or implied. All images are reproduced in good faith.

Maps		
Map 1	A Map of RAF Menwith Hill	108
Map 2	A Map of the Scarborough Area, showing the location of CSO Irton Moor	112
Map 3	A map of RAF Fylingdales	119
Map 4	A map of RAF Menwith Hill, and the Hunter's Stones telecommunications tower	171

Tables		
Table 1	Changes in the UK Military 1980-1997	21
Table 2	Planning Applications to Harrogate Borough Council for Menwith Hill by year and type.	92
Table 3	Planning Applications to Harrogate Borough Council for Menwith Hill by applicant name	94
Table 4	Parliamentary scrutiny of Menwith Hill (House of Commons) 1988-2000	217
Table 5	Media Scrutiny of Menwith Hill:, 1990-2000	232

Acknowledgements

There are lots of people I would like to thank for a huge variety of reasons.

Firstly, I would like to thank my Supervisor, Dr. Rachel Woodward. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my PhD, and without her common-sense, knowledge, perceptiveness and cracking-of-the-whip I would never have finished. Thank-you to my examiners, Dr Neil Ward (internal) and Dr Clive Norris (external), for managing to read the whole thing so thoroughly, and for a surprisingly enjoyable Viva. I would also like to thank all the rest of the academic and support staff of the Centre for Rural Economy and the Department of Agricultural Economics and Food Marketing at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, particularly those who have put up with my drifting a long way away from my original title. Much respect to my officemates, and hopefully still friends, Gustav, Imre and Andrew (at least you get a reference!) for putting up with me for almost three years. Thanks to Jocelyn, Gaby, Jo, Roxana and everyone else from the late but unlamented RRG for all that serious discussion (!) and all those lunches. Also, thanks to the Geography Department for giving me some work that kept my head above water.

I would like to say a big 'thank-you' to all the people who agreed to be interviewed by me for this thesis in some form or another, and who had to put up with my interviewing technique (or lack of it): Norman Baker, Tony Bunyan, Duncan Campbell, Ann Cryer, Simon Davies, Tony Dodd, Les Ellington, Cat Euler, Mike Gauffman, Lindis Percy, Anni Rainbow, Steve Wright, and those others who wanted to remain anonymous. Apologies to Glynn Ford, Tracey Hart, Helen John and Lord Kennet, whom I never managed to meet properly. Also thanks to those people and groups who provided me with so much whether they know it or not: the John Young's *Cryptome*; the Federation of American Scientists; Yorkshire CND; the staff at Harrogate Public Library, the Public Record Office, and the Inter-Library Loans desk at the Robinson Library. Particular thanks in this area go to: CAAB; the wonderful Christine Dean and her peace archive in Otley; and all the participants in the ESRC *Surveillance and Society* Seminar Series for teaching me a huge amount.

On a different note, I would like to thank: the coffee producers of Costa Rica for keeping me thinking, and the Fairtrade Foundation for making me feel okay about drinking so much coffee; Garibaldi biscuits (you have to ask why?); the five-a-side team and my bicycle for keeping me fit; and the music of the Dandy Warhols, the Egg, Djivan Gasparyan, Gil Scott Heron and Nina Simone for keeping me sane.

Finally, I have to say 'thank-you' to: all my friends and family, wherever they are, particularly my Mum and Dad; and, most importantly of all, to Bridget and Tom, for everything. And I can't leave out our cats, Jenny and Myffy...

Is that everyone?

Peace and Solidarity,

David.

15th March 2001.

Abstract.

This thesis investigates the hidden geography of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) sites, state military bases concerned with the interception, interpretation and communication of information transmitted through technological systems. Focusing on three such sites in North Yorkshire, Fylingdales, Irton Moor, and primarily, Menwith Hill, it examines their histories and functions, and the discourses of different actors and interest groups about these processes and places. The histories, functions and discursive constructions of SIGINT sites are examined using a theoretical framework of surveillance theory, an emerging transdisciplinary field which understands that surveillance, the monitoring and control of actors, is as important to the analysis of contemporary societies as production.

The thesis analyses the sites as part of a hidden geography of transnational surveillance and ultimately weaponry. This geography encompasses not only the places themselves, but also socio-technological networks that stretch across land, air, sea, outer space, and the virtual realm. The thesis is an attempt to trace some of this hidden geography, to assign it history and social meaning, and to subject it to critical interpretation.

The thesis adopts a semiotic discourse analysis methodology informed by Actor-Network Theory to analyse the data gathered. The concept of discourse, the whole array of ways in which actors describe themselves, others and the world around them, is central to the way in which the thesis examines the evidence relating to SIGINT sites. This evidence includes officially generated and unofficial written documents, academic and non-academic analysis, visual representations, and interviews with key actors.

Because these networks of sites are hidden, it does not mean that they cannot be made visible and their presence in the landscape and in society contested. The semiotic structure of the sites has come under attack from actors who derive meanings from their viewing of these places that are at odds with official state discourse, wherein the necessity of surveillance and secret intelligence are bound up with the foundations of the state and with inter-state relationships. This thesis will examine the whole spectrum of rejection: civil rights and privacy campaigners, peace activists, politicians and parapoliticians, Ufologists and conspiracists. These counter-discourses challenge official discourses in different ways, with differing intensities, and with varied outcomes, from failure to appropriation by the state to success in adjusting or supplanting official discourses and practices.

The thesis raises questions about the development of the contemporary capitalist state and its relationship to its people and to other states and peoples. Drawing on recent adaptations of complexity theory to the social sciences, and the work of Foucault, Lyon and Chomsky, the trajectory of societies is considered to be strongly influenced by a dynamic tension between the tendency towards panopticism, a total surveillance society, and opposing tendencies towards individual and collective liberation.

Chapter One. Introduction.

This thesis is about American military surveillance and the militarization of Space¹. It investigates the hidden geography of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) sites, state military bases concerned with the interception, interpretation and communication of information transmitted through technological systems, and examines the networks of people, technologies, information, space and power that radiate out from them, stretching across land and into air, sea, Space and the virtual realm.

It does this by focusing on three such sites in North Yorkshire: Fylingdales; Irton Moor; and primarily, Menwith Hill. It examines their histories and functions, and the way in which SIGINT sites, strategy and technology are represented through the discourses of different actors and interests. The histories, functions and discursive constructions of SIGINT sites are examined using a theoretical framework of surveillance theory, an emerging transdisciplinary field which understands that surveillance, the monitoring and control of actors, is as important to the analysis of contemporary societies as production.

The Structure and Rationale of the Thesis

The thesis has four parts: 1. Questions and Methods; 2. Investigating Signals Intelligence Sites; 3. Interpreting Signals Intelligence Sites; and, 4. Theorizing Signals Intelligence Sites.

Part One: Questions and Methods

The first part contains two chapters. Chapter 2, 'Research Questions' sets out the specific questions which the thesis seeks to address, which fall into three broad categories: the facts about SIGINT sites, the interpretation of those sites by different actors, and the theoretical implications.

¹ To avoid confusion, throughout this thesis I will use 'Space' (with a capital 'S') to refer to the part of the universe beyond the atmosphere of the planet Earth, and 'space' (with a small 's') to refer to the geographical concept.

Chapter 3, 'Methodology', details the methodologies adopted to answer the questions asked in Chapter 2. This thesis adopts a semiotic discourse analysis methodology informed by Actor-Network Theory to analyse the data gathered. The concept of discourse is central to the way in which this thesis will examine the evidence relating to intelligence sites: a discourse is here defined as the whole array of ways in which actors describe themselves or the world around them using words, pictures, ideas and so forth, in other words the complete semiotic structure set up by any actor. It is the interface between beliefs, ideologies and understandings, and the materiality of the world. Discourses can be analysed by identifying certain key attributes within the words and signs used by the actors, and the result is a set of ideal types of discourses, which can be used to categorise actors in relation to whatever phenomenon is under investigation. These ideal types should be general enough to accommodate all actors while at the same time being specific enough to be able to make distinctions. However actors do overlap and discourses are also used tactically and are connected to forms and use of power. Some discourses are considered more appropriate to a particular arena, which usually results in more radical discourses being played down.

Part Two: Investigating Intelligence Sites

Part Two answers the first set of questions, concerning the facts, the current state of knowledge, or more accurately the official and public narratives about SIGINT sites. This part is divided into two chapters. Chapter 4, 'The Public History of North Yorkshire SIGINT Sites', outlines the state of available public knowledge of the visible development of the sites. Chapter 5, 'The Function of SIGINT Sites', concentrates on the activities carried on invisibly, both at a technological and a strategic level. For many, particularly state actors, there is no question of the necessity of such places. The necessity of secret intelligence is part of a hegemonic discourse that encompasses many different features of what are considered to be conventional features of the nation-state: armies, parliaments, free markets etc. The fact that secret intelligence may in fact contradict other accepted features of liberal democratic discourse (privacy, for example) is not of concern in this interpretation because those contradictions are simply not explored. Activities that contradict other features of standard hegemonic discourse may be actively disbelieved, even as the accumulation of evidence makes this harder and harder to sustain.

Part Three: Interpreting Intelligence Sites

Because these networks of sites are hidden, it does not mean that they cannot be made visible and their presence in the landscape and in society contested. The semiotic structure of the sites has come under attack from actors who derive meanings from their viewing of these places that are at odds with official state discourse, wherein the necessity of surveillance and secret intelligence are bound up with the foundations of the state and with inter-state relationships.

Part Three sets out the different interpretations or counter-narratives of SIGINT sites. It investigates the development of these varied groups and examines examples of their discourse, and their intersections with official and public narratives and practices. Chapter 6 looks at the process of the 'discovery' of the NSA and Menwith Hill in varied political and parapolitical arenas: legislatures, investigatory journalism, civil liberties and privacy pressure groups and so on. Chapter 7 examines the discourse and practice of peace groups at Menwith Hill, and finally Chapter 8 outlines the responses of more marginal groups like Ufologists, the American religious right and believers in conspiracy theories.

The contestation of official discourse is largely based on varying degrees of rejection of the purposes for which these places are designed. The rationale for secret intelligence gathering is subject to a spectrum of responses, which does not coincide with the labels 'peace activist', 'privacy campaigner' etc. At the edge of the spectrum of rejection, closest to the hegemonic view are those who challenge not the whole idea of secret intelligence, but only those parts of the system that are perceived to be 'foreign', in this case, Menwith Hill as an American base, which may be damaging our national interests (through economic espionage), or infringing civil liberties (through tapping of telephones etc.). These discourses do not challenge the underlying perceived necessity of secret intelligence gathering, they merely set limits on what is or is not considered acceptable in terms largely premised on nationalism. Within this set of discourses there are varying ideas about what exactly should be done to solve the identified problem. Parliamentary opposition is largely conceived of in these terms.

Further along the spectrum are those discourses which may still regard Menwith Hill as far more important than any British intelligence base, but they do so because they see it as an

integral part of a surveillance system that is intensively destructive and coercive in global political terms. Britain, in these discourse is no longer a free national agent whose interests can be clearly separated from those of the USA, but rather the divide is between those who exercise power and those who are objects of that power. This set of discourses is separated into: those which regard the war-making power as a servant of more fundamental economic drivers; those who see the power as flowing largely from patriarchy; and those who see military-political power as deriving its momentum from forces prior to economics. All of these discourses have radical versions, which see military intelligence *in toto* as morally unacceptable and something not to be reformed but to be eliminated.

Part Four: Theorizing Intelligence Sites

From this I will draw out some implications of these ideas for social inquiry, arguing in particular that they imply integrative, relational and process-oriented social theory. I will examine, in an illustrative rather than a comprehensive way, some of the recent attempts at producing integrative social theory (and practice) within the social sciences, in particular: Actor-Network Theory (ANT); the revival of dialectics; the attempts to include notions of complexity in society. I will also explore the work of some of those who have attempted to integrate these new currents, in particular John Urry. I will then re-examine work on surveillance, particularly in transnational context, before drawing conclusions about the nature of surveillance and resistance to it drawing on the examples outlined in the previous chapters. The thesis raises questions about the development of the contemporary capitalist state and its relationship to its people and to other states and peoples. The trajectory of societies is considered to be strongly influenced by a dynamic tension between the tendency towards panopticism, a total surveillance state, and opposing tendencies towards individual and collective liberation.

Approaching Menwith Hill: a personal view

My own first impressions of Menwith Hill were somewhat apocalyptic. Coming over the brow of a hill, the sky heavy and grey, the base with its numerous radomes seemed to grow from the moors like a great cluster of enormous mutant mushrooms transported from the fantastic imaginings of some 1950's post-nuclear apocalypse disaster movie. Others see it

very differently. My companion on that first journey was more favourably impressed by the architectural forms of the radomes standing out against the landscape.



Figure 1. A panoramic view of Menwith Hill.

Menwith Hill and Fylingdales are both very visible sights, subject to a multiplicity of interpretations. They can be many things: beautiful; monumental; bizarre; ugly; symbolic of either the protection of the free world against threats, or the evil of an imperialist authoritarian new world order; a source of employment and prosperity, or an economic threat; a blow to civil liberties; an another area of beautiful English landscape lost to militarism or modernism; a sinister site of unexplained events and phenomena; or more prosaically, an ongoing planning problem. One thing is certain: how these sites appear is connected to what is done there, or at least to limited and imperfect knowledge of what happens behind the recently upgraded and reinforced razor-wire-topped steel fences. As a peace activist my interpretation tends to the sinister, as an academic, it places these sites as points in a network, a set of technologies that interact in different ways with the environment and human beings as individuals or groups. My initial concentration on the immediately visible mushroom-shapes of the radomes is also another (mis)conception. Menwith Hill's arrays of sophisticated interception technologies consist of far more than the satellite dishes underneath the radomes, as shall be explained in Chapter 5. This thesis can be read as much as a journey of discovery and reinterpretation of those initial impressions as an academic exploration of surveillance, or a resource for activists.

PART ONE.
QUESTIONS AND METHODS.

Chapter Two. Research Questions

Introduction

This Chapter sets out the questions, which the thesis will investigate. These fall into three groups: factual; interpretative; and theoretical. The first group asks the simplest questions: what are the purposes and functions of intelligence sites; where are they and how are they distributed in space; how are they linked? However these are often the most difficult questions to answer because of the clear desire of state institutions for this information to be controlled to a greater or lesser extent. This involves looking at the work of those looking at contemporary and historical intelligence, and at military land use research.

The second group relates to the socio-political interpretation of the functions and facts in the first: how do different actors view intelligence sites; whence do these ideas emerge; how are they communicated; and what interests do they serve? My analysis of these interpretations will rely heavily on the idea of 'discourse', the way in which views and information are represented by the actors concerned. In this category, I will focus mainly on the geography of landscape, and on other historical, political anthropological and sociological literature, which relates to how places are made and viewed.

Finally, the third group of questions concern a deeper understanding of intelligence sites: how do these places and their functions fit into contemporary thinking about society; what concepts are needed to analyse them; how do they relate to debates about power, technology, the state, surveillance, privacy, secrecy, capitalism, globalization and so on? Here I will return to work on intelligence, but there will also be a brief look at other work relating to power, technology and the state. This literature will be expanded upon in Part IV. For further consideration of the methodological approach to the research, see Chapter 3.

Factual questions

Intelligence and Signals Intelligence

The first point to be made is that most academic work that relates to intelligence sites approaches them only indirectly. Intelligence in itself is a subject covered as history, particularly the exploits of the Enigma code-breakers or the activities of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in the Second World War, but also in more general terms in the development of intelligence as a branch of the state, largely from the turn of the century. It is also (at least theoretically) part of the remit of International Relations; again though, the role of intelligence is often downplayed or even omitted.

Writing on intelligence can be categorised in different ways. Peter Gill¹, adapting Ransom², adopts a classification based on the identity of the author or sources. In his view there are five types of writing: insider accounts; usually reliable sources; critical accounts, including both right-wing reformists and more left-wing journalists and activists; academic writing, divided into historical and legal; and official reports.

One could also provide a complimentary cross-categorisation to this that splits the writing by subject: conceptual, which start with a concept such as 'secrecy' or 'security' and attempt to unpack either its theoretical and/or practical dimensions; event-centred, which are based on particular historical events or processes such as the breaking of the Enigma code; institutional, which detail the history and/or current status of particular intelligence agencies or branches of government; technological, particularly common among studies of Signals Intelligence, these are pieces which are based around the evolving technology of surveillance and intelligence; 'hidden history' / parapolitical, a category which includes any writing claiming to have uncovered the 'true story' or 'key secret' documents which often reveal an alternative view to conventional historical accounts; and comprehensive accounts, which attempt to theoretically and / or empirically describe all or a substantial part of the intelligence community.

¹ Gill, Peter (1994) *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence Agencies and the Liberal Democratic State*, London: Frank Cass.

² Ransom, H. H. (1980) Being intelligent about secret intelligence agencies, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No. 1, 141-2.

For this first section the writing surveyed will come mainly from the first and last of my alternative categories: conceptual histories and comprehensive general studies of the development and state of intelligence, particularly those of factually authoritative note, and those with a notable epistemological contribution. The work surveyed tends towards the academic, but includes examples from all of Gill's categories, except those of 'insider accounts' which in general do not consider epistemological questions. The writings of those from a critical journalistic / parapolitical background will be considered here too, where they contain suggestions useful to the definition of research questions, and in more detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Likewise institutional histories will be used mainly in Chapter 4, and technological work in Chapter 5, although, again, key sources will be mentioned here. This is not to suggest that such work is less significant; on the contrary, in terms of political impact and influence, the relative importance of the work is reversed, as we shall see later.

Gill noted in 1994 that British writing on intelligence is thinner on the ground than the US literature³. This remains the case. For British researchers, the concept of 'secrecy' is frequently a starting point, perhaps largely because this is the main problem that British researchers have to deal with in their own work on intelligence. State affairs in the UK are permeated by what has been described as "a culture of secrecy"⁴, a culture that is revealed largely through the law. When it comes to intelligence this legal secrecy increases by orders of magnitude. There are several reasons for this.

The first is the Official Secrets Act (OSA). The first OSA became law in 1889, however it proved ineffectual and was replaced in 1911 by the Act that still forms the basis of the law today despite later reforms and a complete replacement in 1989. Tony Bunyan notes that, despite the importance of the 1911 legislation, the bill "passed through parliament in mere thirty minutes, occupying less than eight columns in *Hansard*"⁵. The reasons for this are detailed in the histories of the OSA, including Hooper⁶, Birkinshaw⁷ and Thomas⁸. They show that the atmosphere of fear and paranoia generated by (an almost entirely false) spy

³ Gill 1994 op cit.

⁴ Ponting, Clive (1990) *Secrecy in Britain*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 10.

⁵ Bunyan, Tony (1977) *The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain (Revised Edition)*, London: Quartet Books, 7.

⁶ Hooper, David (1987) *Official Secrets: the Use and Abuse of the Act*, London: Secker and Warburg.

⁷ Birkinshaw, Patrick (1990) *Reforming the Secret State*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

scare in the 1900's was a climate in which no voices could easily be raised against such legislation. Bunyan convincingly shows that the generation of similar fears about internal security, rather than anything to do with the experience of the First World War, was behind the introduction of the 1920 reforms⁹, which tightened internal civil security measures like the issue of giving false addresses in business. The 1911 Act was again amended in 1939 to introduce rules on revealing sources of confidential information, following some minor media revelations.

The Act had two major sections: Section One, which dealt with espionage in its simplest sense (the act of collecting and communicating secret state information to foreign governments); and Section Two, which dealt more generally with unauthorised receipt and communication of information likely to be damaging to 'national security'. It is this section that had most repercussions for researchers. Some of the specific cases will be dealt with in Chapter 6, what is important here is that there is a 'chilling effect' from such legislation - it limits the scope of research and what can be published, and it also sets up a psychological barrier of fear of the consequences of research. Finally the OSA was completely replaced in 1989 by a new OSA. This did not improve the situation for researchers however: the rules were merely made more amenable to the state's interpretation, as Bernard Porter comments: "insiders could not speak out and outsiders could not look in"¹⁰. The situation is made worse, as Hooper notes¹¹, by the hazy definition of secrecy and the state's broad interpretation: in the 1976 'ABC trial' (see Chapter 6), the state attempted to silence journalists even though their research was the result merely of unusually diligent work in public sources rather than any underhand attempt to gain secret information.

The second limiting factor in British intelligence research is the laws on the release of official documents to the public, i.e.: how documents cease to be secret. Until 1958, there were different rules in each government department as to when it released documents to the public, the Treasury being the most unwilling to release anything less than a century old according to

⁸ Thomas, R. M. (1990) *The Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989 of the United Kingdom*, London.

⁹ Bunyan 1977 *op cit*.

¹⁰ Porter, Bernard (1992) *Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain, 1790-1988*, London: Routledge, 217.

¹¹ Hooper 1987 *op cit*.

Hooper¹². However in 1958 in the Public Records Act, a overall time limit of fifty years was introduced, then this was reduced to thirty in 1967. But, with regards to contemporary intelligence, this limit is almost irrelevant, as there is a "wide-ranging extension for particularly sensitive papers, the disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest, whether on security or other grounds"¹³. The New Labour government's proposed Freedom of Information Act will do nothing to change this particular feature: the list of exceptions to any public 'right to know' takes up most of the published Bill¹⁴.

Those who have chosen to tackle the concept of secrecy include former MoD civil servant, Clive Ponting¹⁵, who was one of the victims of the 1911 Act over his whistle-blowing regarding the sinking of the Argentinean battleship, *Belgrano*, during the Falklands / Malvinas conflict, and more recently Ann Rogers¹⁶, and David Vincent¹⁷. Vincent takes a historical perspective, which demonstrates that the history of secrecy is not as linear as one might believe. The Mid-Victorian period for example saw a rollback of the state's attempt to survey and control its subjects after the 1844 scandal when an Italian exile, Joseph Mazzini, who was resident in London, discovered that the British government were secretly opening his mail. Vincent also notes that prior to the Thatcher years, the OSA was very infrequently used. These fluctuations lead him to question whether the term 'a culture of secrecy' is a valid one: "whereas history is the study of change, culture in this discourse, can be the denial of its existence or possibility"¹⁸. Thus one needs to break down the components of culture and the way in which they change over time. Vincent follows Georg Simmel in arguing that secrecy is connected to the notion of trust¹⁹, and that its rise in official life is intimately connected to the rise both of the mercantile class and of the increased volume of information and range of ways of communicating information that emerged during the industrial revolution. Secrecy in the British state is particularly connected to the idea of responsibility and the notion of public

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ *ibid.* 6.

¹⁴ Freedom of Information Bill, available on-line at: < <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199899/ldbills/010/99010--a.htm>>

¹⁵ Ponting 1990 *op cit.*

¹⁶ Rogers, Ann (1997) *Secrecy and Power in the British State: a History of the Official Secrets Act*, London: Pluto Press.

¹⁷ Vincent, David (1998) *The Culture of Secrecy in Britain, 1832-1998*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, 13.

¹⁹ Simmel, Georg (1950) *The Secret and the Secret Society*, in (trans. and ed. Wolff, Kurt H.) *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, New York: Free Press, 307-376.

interest, which is "about the capacity of those in power to judge what was good for the nation at large"²⁰. Secrecy therefore is "a set of essentially paternalistic moral imperatives"²¹.

This is a view with which Rogers would have a great deal of sympathy. Adopting a Foucauldian approach, she argues that British secrecy laws and practices are evidence of

a class-divided, politically divided state where voices at the centre dictate the forms of acceptable discourse. Policy-makers are able to use the state apparatus to control the parameter of official discourse through defining and invoking national security.²²

In 1976, Tony Bunyan carried out perhaps the first systematic analysis of this 'official discourse' and the workings of the British internal security structure²³, linking together a consideration of the political uses of the law, surveillance techniques and contingency 'counter-revolutionary' planning, with a description of the history and operations of the uniformed police, Special Branch, The Security Service (MI5), and also private security services employed by the state. It was Bunyan's explicit intention to consider these agencies as part of "an interdependent matrix", within a social and political context. Bunyan rejects conventional liberal-democratic theories of the state which see the state as a neutral and legitimate arbiter, instead arguing that the interests and institutions of the British state are historically linked to the rise of capitalism and particular class interests. He shows how Special Branch grew out of the problems posed to the British state by Irish nationalists in the late Nineteenth Century, and how MI5 was founded in 1909 following the 'spy scares' of the early Twentieth.

Bunyan's focus was very much on internal security. This focus has been maintained in many subsequent studies of intelligence. Duncan Campbell expanded upon Bunyan's brief chapter on the emergency state to provide a detailed analysis of the plans the British state had drawn

²⁰ Vincent 1998 *op cit.*, 16.

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Rogers 1997 *op cit.*, 3.

²³ Bunyan 1977 *op cit.*

up to be put in place in the event of war²⁴, including infrastructure - telephone systems, underground reinforced concrete 'Regional Seats of Government' (RSG) and so on - and political structures which approximated to martial law.

Campbell's is a revelatory account, much in the tradition of his work on Signals Intelligence, some of which will be considered later, and in more detail in Chapter 5. Such revelatory accounts can sometimes strain credibility. One such is Gary Murray's account of alleged intimidatory and even murderous activity on the part of private security forces linked to UK Special Forces and employed by Special Branch in the field of counter-subversion against Unions and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)²⁵. He implicates these groups in the murder of anti-Sizewell campaigner, Hilda Murrell in March 1984, and the death of anti-nuclear lawyer, William Macrae and attacks on Greenham Common protesters, the year after. The credibility problem comes not so much from the allegations themselves as the manner in which the story is presented - in populist style with the author making claims about his own involvement in armed forces intelligence and with the same private groups that he exposes. This problem of credibility is one to which we will return in the next Chapter, on methodology, and which will recur throughout.

More academic is Bernard Porter, who provides possibly the most succinct justification for studying the intelligence and security services in his history of political espionage in the UK. "you cannot understand anything properly without knowing something about what is going on beneath it"²⁶. He regards domestic espionage as "the hidden underside of political history"²⁷ - it would follow that international espionage is the hidden underside of international relations, of which without some knowledge, relations between and across states cannot really be understood. Porter argues that work on Signals Intelligence, with the exception of the almost mythical Bletchley Park, the location of the Enigma code-breaking operation in WW2, is thin, yet SIGINT is vital as from the 1950's onwards, "the future of intelligence clearly lay with 'Sigint' and the new technology"²⁸. It is in this period that we see the creation of sites like Menwith Hill. He also points out that the British public have never

²⁴ Campbell, Duncan (1982) *War Plan UK: The Truth about Civil Defence in Britain*, London: Burnett Books.

²⁵ Murray, Gary (1993) *Enemies of the State*, London: Simon and Schuster.

²⁶ Porter 1992 *op cit*, ix.

²⁷ *ibid.*, vii.

been overly concerned about the activities of intelligence organisations; even when more publicity does emerge, for example when Margaret Thatcher ended Trades Union membership at GCHQ in the 1980's (see Chapter 5), there was "considerable publicity, but... none of the strong *feeling* which is always necessary to fuel a really effective protest"²⁹. He argues that British people had two responses to revelations about the activities of spies and secret police: either cynical resignation; or, a reluctance to believe any of it, motivated either by a trust in state institutions or by a belief in the utter ridiculousness of the secret services.

Richard Thurlow, again concentrating on internal security, argues that while there is no adequate accountability for the various intelligence agencies in the UK, "Britain has avoided the worst excesses of administrative government, and illegal activities as a routine measure by unaccountable secret policemen"³⁰. He denies the charges made by Murray, the anarcho-socialist analysis of Bunyan, and even the more moderate criticisms made by Porter in claiming that

only during the period of the world wars, the special case of Ireland between 1916 and 1922, and some aspects of Northern Ireland's history since 1968, can it be said that a serious threat to the civil liberties of individuals existed.³¹

Like most researchers however, he is critical of the secretive nature of the British state.

Peter Gill is perhaps the only researcher since Bunyan to have attempted a systematic analysis of state security services³². However he goes further than Bunyan in reviewing the various analyses and establishing a theory of how the liberal democratic state relates to internal security and intelligence gathering mechanisms. Using a conceptual triad of *information, power and law*, Gill presents of model of the state as a series of concentric circles of security, with *the secret state* of intelligence organisations at the centre, moving progressively through: the *executive*, government and bureaucracy; *other state agencies*,

²⁸ *ibid.*, 189.

²⁹ *ibid.*, 223.

³⁰ Thurlow, Richard C. (1994) *The Secret State : British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Blackwell, 399.

³¹ *ibid.*, 5.

³² Gill 1994 *op cit.*

judiciary, parliament and so on; and finally to the *citizen* or *subject*. The concentric circles mark what might crudely be called power, but which are characterised by degrees of *autonomy* and *secrecy*, increasing towards the centre; and *penetration*, increasing outwards. This is essentially a panoptic model, where the intelligence agencies are seeing (and acting) without being seen (or acted upon). We shall return to the ideas of panopticism and power later in this chapter³³, and also in Chapter 9.

Mark Mazower has edited an international collection of historical case studies of internal security³⁴. His conclusions are interesting and relevant as they argue that the divide between internal and external security was never clear in the British case: the Special Branch also had an Imperial function connected with Indian security, and in any case the Irish question can hardly be described as 'internal'. Mazower extends Porter's observation on Britain, that resistance to internal security and intelligence historically has been extremely limited across Europe, "there was little public resistance to the vast expansion of political policing which took place after the Second World War"³⁵, and that in the absence of any such public opprobrium, the security services are unlikely to decrease in size or scope.

While the vast majority of analytic work has concentrated on internal security services there are some that deal with the state in relation to both internal and external security services. One of the weightiest is by Laurence Lustgarden and Ian Leigh³⁶. Their legalistic analysis is based on a democratic concept of national security, which does not assume as do many official discourses that individual freedoms and rights are automatically subject to the national security considerations, indeed that such rights are part of what constitutes a secure society. They also argue that the state, which following legal terminology rather than political science they do not distinguish from the 'nation', is as much a source of threat as a guardian of its citizens; the state is a 'janus head'. In this they are greatly influenced by IR theorist Barry Buzan³⁷.

³³ See p. 42 below.

³⁴ Mazower, Mark (ed.) (1997) *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives*, Providence, RI: Berghahn Books.

³⁵ *ibid.*, 248.

³⁶ Lustgarten, Laurence and Leigh, Ian (1994) *In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

³⁷ Buzan, Barry (1991) *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Second Edition), Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Jeffrey Richelson has been one of the most productive and prolific scholars of intelligence. Concentrating largely (but not exclusively) on United States Intelligence, he provides the most thorough and accessible treatment of the multiple facets of intelligence, particularly in his continually updated, *The American Intelligence Community*³⁸. In this he covers all the main US agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the NSA, and all the branches of military intelligence, as well as the more obscure agencies like the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), their structures, locations and operations, as well as the ways in which these agencies are controlled and coordinated. He has also written a more popular (but no less rigorous) history of espionage in the Twentieth Century³⁹, and work on more specific areas of military intelligence technology particularly satellites⁴⁰ (see Chapter 5).

British historian, Christopher Andrew is another whose work covers a wide range. He is notable for two studies in particular: his history of the development of the British intelligence services⁴¹, which while not as comprehensive as Richelson's American equivalent, is still valuable as background reading; and for his description of the relationship of American Presidents to the US intelligence community⁴².

There have been several other studies of the historical development of British intelligence, including Anthony Cavendish who writes very much as an 'insider'⁴³, and Richard Deacon's conventional historical narrative which concludes that the intelligence services need more money, a better understanding with government, and more efficient practice in order to be successful - however, he never problematizes his conventional notion of success⁴⁴. He argues that both great powers and small nations need efficient intelligence services, yet his example

³⁸ Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1999) *The U.S. Intelligence Community (4th Edition)*, Boulder CO: Westview Press.

³⁹ Richelson, Jeffrey (1995) *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁰ Richelson, Jeffrey (1999) *America's Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security*, Kansas: University Press Of Kansas.

⁴¹ Andrew, Christopher M. (1985) *Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community*, London: Heinemann.

⁴² Andrew, Christopher (1995) *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*, New York: HarperCollins.

⁴³ Cavendish, Anthony (1990) *Inside Intelligence*, London: Collins.

⁴⁴ Deacon, Richard (1991) *British Secret Service*, London: Grafton.

of a successful small national service is the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, which has been implicated in kidnapping, torture and other undemocratic practices⁴⁵.

A more critical account is provided by journalist Mark Urban. He considers the activities and posture of British intelligence community, and its relationship with government, year by year through the 1980s. He covers the social context and growing anxiety about both the effectiveness of the agencies and the more fundamental questions of the relevance and use of their activities. For example, the intelligence agencies failed to predict both the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina in 1982 and, more significantly the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980's to early '90's. Like Andrew on the American Presidents, he provides particular insight into the differing attitudes of British Prime Ministers to the intelligence services, arguing that Margaret Thatcher was the only PM who ever took an active interest in intelligence.

Earlier in his career, Richelson collaborated with Australian researcher Desmond Ball to produce a key work on the links between intelligence agencies in the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand⁴⁶. This is important not only because it revealed for the first time in a comprehensive way the workings of the 1947 UKUSA Treaty on SIGINT sharing as a crucial part of the military and intelligence relationships between industrialized nations (see Chapter 5), but also because it was in itself an important moment in the growth of research into SIGINT and the purpose of US bases, and inspired further movement towards revealing what had previously been very secretive state activities. Most conventional researchers either do not mention UKUSA (and until very recently did not even mention GCHQ in many cases), or if they do mention it, relegate it to a footnote or small paragraph, as Christopher Andrew does⁴⁷; when it is quite clearly a fundamental part of both the rationale and operation of British and American SIGINT.

Apart from Richelson, more recent work on UKUSA has been carried out by campaigning journalists. In New Zealand, Nicky Hagar produced a comprehensive account of his country's

⁴⁵ For a general history of Mossad see: Thomas, Gordon (1999) *Gideon's Spies: the Secret History of Mossad*, London: Macmillan; or, Shimron, Gad (1995) *Histoire Secrète du Mossad*, Paris: Editions Dagorno.

⁴⁶ Richelson, Jeffrey T. and Ball, Desmond (1985) *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries*, London: Allen & Unwin.

(admittedly small) intelligence services and their links to the USA, Australia and Britain⁴⁸. He details the facilities, the structure of the organisations, personnel, history and even some of the systems, including the first treatment in a published book of the ECHELON system of spoken and written communication interception and analysis, operated by UKUSA nations (see Chapter 5). He also critically analysed the actual output of the New Zealand intelligence services as part of the UKUSA alliance and concluded that very little of what they did was of any use to New Zealand or indeed to the wider Pacific region, as the priorities were determined almost entirely by the United States.

Finally, there has been specific work on particular intelligence agencies. In the USA, the FBI and the CIA have been the subject of hundreds of studies, which are outside the scope of this thesis⁴⁹; in the UK, MI5 and MI6 have both been the subject of investigation. MI5 has a bland official history from its founding in 1908 until the end of the Second World War, published by the Public Records Office⁵⁰, and a regularly updated and extremely sparse official description, first issued in 1993 by the UK government⁵¹. Several critical accounts of recent MI5 activity do exist: Robin Ramsay and Stephen Dorril, the founders of the parapolitical journal, *Lobster*, investigated the persistent claims of an MI5 plot against the government of Harold Wilson⁵², as did Ian Leigh⁵³; Seamus Milne's account of the alleged operations against the National Union of Mineworkers leader, Arthur Scargill during the early 1980's⁵⁴, and finally, from even further out on the political fringe, former *Green Anarchist* writer, Larry O'Hara has investigated the reorientation of MI5 towards investigation of environmental and animal rights groups with the decline of foreign threat after the end of the Cold War⁵⁵.

⁴⁷ Andrew 1985 *op cit*.

⁴⁸ Hager, N (1996) *Secret Power, New Zealand's Role In the International Spy Network.(Second Edition)*, Nelson NZ: Craig Potton Publishing.

⁴⁹ Some of the more notable recent studies include: Blum, William (1986) *The CIA: a Forgotten History*, London: Zed Books; Jeffrys-Jones, Rhodri (1989) *The CIA and American Democracy*, New Haven CN: Yale University Press; Johnson, Loch K. (1989) *America's Secret Power: the CIA in a Democratic Society*, New York : Oxford University Press; Jeffry-Jones, Rhodri and Andrew, Christopher (eds.) *Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA*, London: Frank Cass; and Zegert, Amy (1999) *Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC*, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

⁵⁰ Curry, John C. (1999) *The Security Service 1908-1945: the Official History*, Kew: Public Records Office.

⁵¹ HMG (1998) *MI5: The Security Service*, London: The Stationary Office.

⁵² Dorril, Stephen and Ramsay, Robin (1991) *Smear! Wilson and the Secret State*, London: Fourth Estate.

⁵³ Leigh, Ian (1988) *The Wilson Plot: The Intelligence Services and the Discrediting of a Prime Minister 1945-1976*, London: Heinemann.

⁵⁴ Milne, Seamus (1994) *The Enemy Within: MI5, Maxwell and he Scargill Affair*, London: Verso.

⁵⁵ O'Hara, Larry (1994) *Turning up the Heat: MI5 after the Cold War*, London: Phoenix Press.

The semi-official historian of the British intelligence agencies is ex-Conservative Party MP, Rupert Allason, who writes under the pseudonym of Nigel West. He has published historical accounts of MI5 on either side of the Second World War⁵⁶, and also of MI6 in the pre WW2 period⁵⁷. West has also written an account that criticises the performance of MI6 before and during the Falklands War⁵⁸. Again though, this account is not critical on a deeper level, and does not analyse the role of MI6 within the wider political system. However there is a more recent account of the history of MI6 by Stephen Dorril, that is and does⁵⁹.

This brief survey of work on intelligence agencies functions mainly to highlight how little work there has been on Signals Intelligence and SIGINT agencies. SIGINT agencies, which are the key organisations in this study, have been severely under-analysed. There are only two studies of GCHQ, and perhaps more surprisingly only one serious study of the NSA (excluding those studies already mentioned which cover transnational intelligence links).

One of the studies of GCHQ is by the ubiquitous Nigel West⁶⁰. West traces the rise of the SIGINT service in Britain from its pre-First World War origins in the Admiralty, through the inter-war Government Code and Cipher school to the creation of GCHQ during the Second World War and its operations thereafter. He also attempts to give an idea of the geography of GCHQ interception stations. In contrast, Hugh Lanning and *Guardian* journalist Richard Norton-Taylor start from a different angle: the banning of Trades Unions from GCHQ by the Conservative Government in 1984⁶¹. This leads into a much more critical account of not only the post-ban GCHQ, but also aspects of its previous history.

The only account of the National Security Agency is a remarkable book by New York lawyer, James Bamford⁶². First published in 1982, it was described by Nigel West as an

⁵⁶ West, Nigel (1981) *MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909-1945*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson; and (1982) *A Matter of Trust: MI5 1945-1972*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson.

⁵⁷ West, Nigel (1983) *British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1945*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson.

⁵⁸ West, Nigel (1997) *The Secret War for the Falklands: the SAS, MI6 and the War Whitehall Nearly Lost*, London: Little Brown.

⁵⁹ Dorril, Stephen (1998) *MI6*, London: Fourth Estate.

⁶⁰ West, Nigel (1986) *GCHQ: the Secret Wireless War 1900-86*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson.

⁶¹ Lanning, Hugh and Norton-Taylor, Richard (1991) *Breach of Trust: GCHQ 1984-1991*, Cheltenham: Clarion.

⁶² Bamford, James (1982) *The Puzzle Palace: America's National Security Agency and Its Special Relationship with Britain's GCHQ*, London: Sidgwick & Jackson.

example of when "the dogged researcher can beat the system"⁶³. Bamford managed to find publicly available information, like the registered records of the NSA's Credit Union and the staff newsletters, to construct a detailed picture of the Agency's structure, staffing and geography, so much so that the NSA was forced into offering a limited degree of co-operation, possibly as a form of disaster management.

The Geography of Military Land Use.

Intelligence sites are either directly or indirectly connected to the military. In the case of Menwith Hill and Fylingdales this is formal as well as factual. They are Royal Air Force (RAF) sites, and therefore officially part of the 'defence estate', the land owned and/or used by the military. In addition the actual operations are mainly conducted by military personnel: RAF at Fylingdales, and personnel from various branches of the US military under secondment to the National Security Agency (see Chapter 5). In the case of Irton Moor, this site is run by GCHQ and therefore subject to the Foreign Office, but land management functions are carried out by Defence Estates Land Agents⁶⁴.

Thus it is important to look at work on military land use. Work on defence lands tends to be of five basic types: historical; strategic; economic; environmental; and social/cultural. The latter category spans the gap between the three groups of research questions. Although this literature has a longer history, it has exploded since the end of the 'Cold War' and the spread of ideas such as the 'peace dividend', the supposed economic, social and cultural benefits that would result from a changed, safer international regime.

In the UK, the government's reviews of defence policy which appear to have become increasingly regular in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the Soviet Union: *Options For Change*⁶⁵, *Defending Our Future*⁶⁶, and *Front Line First*⁶⁷, began in an optimistic public climate that presented the idea that there would be substantial benefits from the end of the Cold War in terms of conversion of the defence industry, release of lands and buildings from defence use, and in public spending.

⁶³ West 1986 *op cit.*, 262.

⁶⁴ Letter from Howard Taylor, Defence Estates (Central), 8th December 1999.

⁶⁵ Ministry of Defence (MoD) (1991) *Britain's Army for the 1990s: Options for Change (Cm 1595)* London: HMSO.

⁶⁶ MoD (1993) *Defence White Paper: Defending Our Future (Cm 2270)*, London: HMSO.

The New Labour government's approach demonstrated in the *Strategic Defence Review*⁶⁸ is more cautious and has abandoned the early optimism. John Lovering argued that the idea of the peace dividend was flawed both in economic and political terms⁶⁹, although, Jorn Brommelhorster has identified an ongoing if uneven potential benefit of cuts in military spending⁷⁰. He also argues that "military reasons for procurement decisions are now taking second place to economic reasons"⁷¹.

Table 1: Changes in the UK Military 1980-1997⁷²

	1980	1990	1997
RAF Squadrons	15	11	6
RAF Aircraft	1,320	898	572
RAF Airfields	n/a	54	30
Defence Personnel	469,000	351,000	271,000
Main Battle Tanks	640	699	388
Ships & Submarines	242	235	153
Battalions & Regiments	127	127	94
Net Defence Spending	£27,083m	£28,645m	£21,183m
(1998 prices)			
Built Estate (acres)	242,904	209,545	198,920

This may be true, and the military has been cut back dramatically (see Table 1), but industrialised states continue to fight against cuts and come up with new scenarios, helped by the Gulf War and the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and even using the threat to the environment now termed 'environmental security'⁷³, for which it is argued strong armed forces are needed. According to Lovering, there has thus been a reconstruction of the means

⁶⁷ MoD (1994) *Defence Costs Study: Front Line First*, London: HMSO.

⁶⁸ MoD (1998) *The Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for a Modern World (Cm 3999)*, London: The Stationary Office.

⁶⁹ Lovering, John (1994) The Production and the Consumption of the 'Means of Violence': Implications of the Reconfiguration of the State, Economic Internationalisation, and the End of the Cold War. *Geoforum* Vol. 25, No. 4, 471-486.

⁷⁰ Brommelhorster, Jorn (2000) Military expenditures and the search for peace dividends: an introduction, in Brommelhorster, Jorn (ed.) *Demystifying the Peace Dividend*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

⁷¹ *ibid.*, 22.

⁷² National Audit Office (1998) *Ministry of Defence: Identifying and Selling Surplus Property*, HC776, Session 1997-8, 19.

⁷³ Gill, M. R. (1995) Environmental Security: basis for a new dimension in national security? in Coulson, M. G. and Baldwin, H. (eds.) *Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Environment and Defence*, Swansea UK, 13-15th September 1995 (CCMS Report No. 211). NATO / Department of Geography, University of Wales, Swansea.

of violence⁷⁴: the UK arms industry has reinvented itself as a great British exporter with which the government is more than happy to work⁷⁵.

The history of military land use in Britain has seen only limited treatment. Baldwin provided a brief outline of military land use and public response⁷⁶. John Childs has taken a more extensive historical approach, narrating the development of military lands worldwide, and overviewing the current situation⁷⁷. From 1667 the defence estate was the responsibility of the Ordnance Office until 1855 when the Inspector-General of Fortifications in The War office took over the role. In 1908 it was transferred to the Director-General of Lands, before coming to a longer term home in the Lands Branch of the War Office. This lasted until 1995, when the Defence Estates Organisation (DEO) was created. Following the 1997 SDR, the DEO became Defence Estates, a 'Next Steps' agency.

The Defence Estate reached its greatest extent during the Second World War when the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1939 gave the state the ability to forcibly requisition land for defence purposes. By 1945, 20.5% of the land area of the UK was controlled by the War Office. Most but not all of this was returned to the original owners within two years of the war's end; Patrick Wright has written an account of one area which was never returned, the village of Tyneham in Dorset, which became part of the Lulworth gunnery school range⁷⁸.

In fact the number of requisitions began to increase again as NATO (particularly American) strategic plans for Cold War defence required bomber bases and communications, intelligence and ballistic missile early warning sites in the UK⁷⁹, as well as in other European countries, particularly Norway, Italy and West Germany, which took the bulk of NATO ground forces. Duncan Campbell famously described Britain as America's 'unsinkable aircraft carrier'⁸⁰. Both Menwith Hill and Fylingdales date from this 'first Cold War' period, which is conventionally argued to follow from the 1950 Anglo-American Agreement and the 1951

⁷⁴ Lovering 1994 *op cit*.

⁷⁵ Lovering, John (1998) Labour and the defence industry: allies in 'globalization', *Capital and Class* No. 65, 9-20.

⁷⁶ Baldwin, H. (1995) Responses to military land use in the United Kingdom, in Coulson and Baldwin (eds.) *op cit*.

⁷⁷ Childs, John (1998) *The Military Use of Land: a History of the Defence Estate*, Bern CH: Peter Lang.

⁷⁸ Wright, Patrick (1996) *The Village that Died for England: the Strange Story of Tyneham*, London: Vintage.

⁷⁹ Duke, Simon (1987) *US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom: a Matter for Joint Decision?* London, Macmillan.

Status of Forces Agreement⁸¹. However Campbell showed that much of the American airforce returned in July 1948, the time of Stalin's blockade of Berlin and the U.S. airlift of supplies into the city, and that a series of informal agreements and de facto decisions, including the UKUSA treaty on SIGINT (see Chapter 5) thence governed the growth and maintenance of American bases in Britain⁸². The nature of the land-holding agreement is an important part of the contested nature of Menwith Hill (see Chapters 4, and 7).

Academic analysis has generally followed the official underestimation of the numbers of US bases and facilities in Britain: Childs gives a figure of 75 American facilities in 1985⁸³ based on contemporary government figures, however Campbell's intensive research revealed a total of 135 facilities the year previously⁸⁴. Some of the differences have to do with what counts as a 'facility'. Campbell included housing and fuel supply depots along with bases and airfields, however, even taking this into account, the UK government figures still understated the total.

The rather haphazard, secretive and undemocratic way in which military lands had historically been managed was finally addressed in a special Defence Lands Committee, set up in 1971 under Lord Nugent, which reported in 1973⁸⁵. The Committee recommended substantial land releases, although it did not consider either American occupied land, or indeed surveillance and intelligence sites. However the recommendations were not implemented by the MoD, which has resisted all attempts since to have another similar investigation. The running of the defence estate was investigated by the National Audit Office in 1987⁸⁶, the Public Accounts Committee in 1987⁸⁷ and 1989⁸⁸, and also reported on army training lands in 1993⁸⁹, and finally the House of Commons Defence Committee

⁸⁰ Campbell, Duncan (1984) *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain*, London: Michael Joseph.

⁸¹ Childs 1998 *op cit.* follows Duke 1987 *op cit.* in accepting this.

⁸² Campbell 1984 *op cit.*

⁸³ Childs 1998 *op cit.*, 209.

⁸⁴ Campbell 1984 *op cit.*, 286-294.

⁸⁵ House of Commons Defence Lands Committee (1973) *Report of the Defence Lands Committee 1971-1973*. London: HMSO.

⁸⁶ National Audit Office (NAO) (1992) *Ministry of Defence: Management and Control of Army Training Land- A Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General*. HC218. London: HMSO.

⁸⁷ House of Commons (1986-7) Public Accounts Committee (HCPAC) (1987) *9th Report on the Control and Management of the Defence Estate*, HC191, London: HMSO.

⁸⁸ House of Commons (1988-9) Public Accounts Committee (HCPAC) (1989) *16th Report on the Control and Management of the Defence Estate*, HC88, London: HMSO.

⁸⁹ House of Commons (1992-3) Public Accounts Committee (HCPAC) (1993) *Ministry of Defence: Management and Control of Army Training Land*. HC411. London: HMSO.

(HCDC) in 1994⁹⁰. In 2000 following its reorganisation, the DE released a strategy document⁹¹.

The military remains the second largest landholder in the UK, owning 227,000 hectares and leasing 270,000 hectares, about 2% of the land surface, although much lower figures of 15,000 hectares for the latter category are given in a recent review by Joe Doak⁹². The value of the Defence Estate is given as £14 Billion for accounting purposes⁹³ and consists of both urban buildings, barracks and bases as well as rural and coastal training areas and ranges; training areas constituting around 66% of the total area, according to evidence given to the HCDC⁹⁴. Those intelligence and communications sites that are part of the Defence Estate are most likely classified under 'Telecommunications sites' in the Report and comprise 2.5% of the total area, or 6,222 hectares. Of this the vast majority, 4,258 hectares, is operated by the RAF, with the Royal Navy holding 1,269, the Army, 258, and the Procurement Executive / DRA, 437 hectares, at this time. Further details of the land use in this category are unfortunately classified. However, for a reconstruction from various sources of a list of possible intelligence sites in the UK, see Appendix 2.

Whilst facilities that are no longer required are being sold off and the numbers of actual personnel in the armed forces are being reduced, the army in particular continues to claim that it does not have enough land to fulfil its training needs, indeed recently presenting a training shortfall of some 39,000 hectares at the minimum⁹⁵, a figure which is likely only to be increased by the SDR⁹⁶. Land take for intelligence tends to be far smaller in area, substantial open space needed only for aerials and, to a lesser extent, satellite dishes.

The second type of research into this land tends towards descriptive political forecasting of the future of the defence estate, similar to the military estimations to which I referred above,

⁹⁰ House of Commons 1994-1995 Defence Committee (HCDC) 1st Report (1995) *The Defence Estate*. 2 volumes, HC67, London: HMSO.

⁹¹ Defence Estates (2000) *In Trust and On Trust: A Strategy for the Defence Estates*, London: The Stationary Office.

⁹² Doak, Joe (1999) Planning for the reuse of the redundant Defence Estate: disposal processes, policy frameworks and development impacts, *Planning Practice and Research* Vol. 14, No. 2, 211-224.

⁹³ Defence Estates 2000 *op cit*.

⁹⁴ HCDC 1995 *op cit*.

⁹⁵ HQ Land Command (1997) *Striking a Balance '97: A Report on the Management of Army Training Areas*. Wilton: G3 Training 2.

concentrating on deriving simple policy conclusions with little deeper analysis. The authors provide overviews of the situation and future of military land use, based on the likely strategic direction of foreign and defence policy. This can perhaps be seen as part of a wider genre of 'constructive' or non-critical work on the state, which is also a common feature of work in intelligence and in international relations. Woodward⁹⁷ has also noted this tendency and comments on "the high levels of integration between academic geographers and the military"⁹⁸ shown at a US AAG conference session on military geography in 1998, and the conscious effort by the editor of one geography journal, *GeoJournal*, in the mid '90's to bring academic geography to the service of the military⁹⁹. This theme will be revisited later. A good example in this genre is Farrington¹⁰⁰. He outlines the situation with regard to the UK defence estate and identifies four factors influencing military land-use: the end of the Cold War, leading to pressure to reduce defence spending; the draw down of troops from Germany; the closure of US bases; the introduction of new weapons systems and the return of others from Germany. He also notes: increasing environmental concern and general pressure on public expenditure; changes in use of training land due to increasing range of activities carried out by the armed forces and that particular pressure is likely to be put on larger UK training areas, particularly Otterburn in Northumbria and Salisbury Plain, in Wiltshire; finally that the Treasury's concern to get the 'best price' for less important military land is likely to influence the pattern of land disposal. Savege¹⁰¹ presents a similar but more extensive and technically detailed study, which also concludes that increased intensity of use of military land is likely to be the main factor influencing the future of the defence estate.

The contribution of defence lands, in particular bases, to the local and/or national economy has been studied. Some of this work is part of the extensive literature on the defence industry, which will not be considered here, but is reviewed elsewhere by Rachel Woodward¹⁰². Most

⁹⁶ HQ Land Command (1999) *Striking a Balance '99: A Report on the Management of the Major Army Training Areas*, Wilton: G3 Training 2.

⁹⁷ Woodward, Rachel (1998) *Geographies of Military Activity: A Review*, unpublished paper.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 18.

⁹⁹ Anderson, E. (1993) Editorial: The scope of military geography, *GeoJournal* 31, 115-117; Anderson, E. (1994) Editorial: the changing role of the military, *GeoJournal* 34, 131-132; Anderson, E. (1995) Editorial the military environment, *GeoJournal* 37, 199-200.

¹⁰⁰ Farrington, J. (1995) Military Land in Britain after the Cold War- Peace Dividend or Peace Penalty? *Geography*, 80, 273-277.

¹⁰¹ Savege, J. (with Brotherton, I. and Owens, P. L.) (1995) *The Future for the Defence Estate: Changing Demands for Army Training*. Brasseys/Centre for Defence Studies, London.

¹⁰² Woodward 1998 *op cit*.

of the literature focuses on empirical studies of the effects of closure of either a particular military base or set of bases, or projections of possible economic effects should such an eventuality occur. This is now a global phenomenon according to the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), which exists to act as a monitoring organisation of the process of conversion of military to civilian use¹⁰³. The issue of whether land was or is used for intelligence purposes is irrelevant in this sub-field of study - the concentration is very much on land-use in the future. However the literature is important because, as with any military installation, intelligence sites provide employment and do interact with the local economy in other ways. This literature provides material for many of the discourses that will be considered in later chapters. The government has recently issued a study of the way in which disposal and reuse has taken place¹⁰⁴, and Joe Doak has written a review of the literature in this area from a land-use planning perspective¹⁰⁵. The economic consequences of American withdrawal from Europe, which are particularly relevant, have been studied by Hartley and Hooper, who conclude that the short-term local economic consequences are likely to be severe, but that there will be more widely dispersed long-term benefits¹⁰⁶. America's military restructuring more generally has been extensively studied, though this literature will not be considered here as none of the sites considered are actually owned by the United States¹⁰⁷.

Often such work is oriented towards these purely practical concerns, whether in terms of housing, environment or local economic impact, for policy-makers in central and local government. Examples include the study by the UK's Rural Development Commission into the effects of the peace dividend on rural areas¹⁰⁸, studies by local authorities with high dependency on the military, like Wiltshire¹⁰⁹, and the work of Network DEMILITARIZED, which is a trans-European network of local authorities facing the problems of base closure

¹⁰³ BICC (1996) *Conversion Survey 1996: Global Disarmament, Demobilization and Demilitarization*, Oxford: OUP.

¹⁰⁴ Department of Environment, Transport, and the Regions (DETR) (1999) *Development of the Redundant Defence Estate*, London: The Stationary Office.

¹⁰⁵ Doak 1999 *op cit*.

¹⁰⁶ Hartley, K. and Hooper, N. (1991) Economic Adjustment, in Kirby, S. and Hooper, N. *The Cost of Peace: Assessing Europe's Security Options*, Reading: Harwood Academic Publishers, 199-223.

¹⁰⁷ See for example: Markusen, A. and Yudken, J. (1992) *Dismantling the Cold War Economy*, New York: Basic Books; Wharf, B. (1997) The geopolitics/geoeconomics of military base closures in the USA, *Political Geography* 16, 541-564;

¹⁰⁸ EAG / ECOTEC (1996) *The Impact of the Peace Dividend on Rural England*. Rural Research Report No. 26. Rural Development Commission, Salisbury.

¹⁰⁹ EDAW / Wiltshire County Council (WCC) (1996) *Defence and the Wiltshire Economy- A Study of Defence Employment and Dependency in Wiltshire*, Salisbury:WCC.

and military withdrawal¹¹⁰. There has been analysis of the European Union's Community Initiative which provided aid for initiatives to convert land and businesses from military to civilian use, KONVER, which ran in two versions from 1993 to 1997¹¹¹, and also of the more general issues around conversion under the COST A10 initiative¹¹².

There is work, which critically analyses the cultural and social aspects of defence lands. There is some overlap with other categories here. Both David Doxford and Rachel Woodward's work has involved both analysis of the use of training lands as well as wider issues surrounding the military and the countryside. Woodward's work in particular has been to unpack military training discourse as part of the social construction of specific ideas of masculinity¹¹³. Doxford has attacked the political arguments of the military with regard to the necessity of ownership of large areas of land. He compared military land in the UK with that in France and Switzerland and argued that the spatial distribution and quantity of land owned and used by the British military are largely the result of historical circumstance than any rational national security, let alone democratic, conception of necessity¹¹⁴. This may also be less true with regard to sites used for Signals Intelligence purposes: some are located where they are for historical/technological reasons, but often the placement of SIGINT sites is very much related to their function as radio interception points. As we shall see in Chapter 5, in the case of Menwith Hill and Irton Moor, these functions remain very important despite the growth of satellite systems, although in the former case they may no longer be the primary task. In the case of Fylingdales, the placement was very much the result of political

¹¹⁰ Network DEMILITARISED (1994a) *Demilitarisation and Conversion*, Kaiserslauten DL: Network DEMILITARISED; Network DEMILITARISED/EDAW CR Planning (1994b) *The Conversion of Military Sites- a handbook outlining a commercial audit procedure to assist the reuse of former Defence Establishments*, Trowbridge: ND Working Group Two; Network DEMILITARISED (1994c): *Conversion Instruments - a handbook outlining environmental, planning and social strategies and measures to facilitate the conversion process*, Glyfada EL: ND Working Group Three; Network DEMILITARISED (1995) *The Conversion of Defence-Dependant Regions- A practical workbook for facing the challenges*, Preston: Lancashire Enterprises PLC; Network DEMILITARISED/TSD/EDAW (1996): *Military Base Conversion- The Lessons from Experience*, Trowbridge: ND Working Group Two.

¹¹¹ For example, Hooper, N. & Cox, N. (1996): "The European Union KONVER Programme" *Defence and Peace Economics* 7 (75-94); and, Brommelhorster, J. (1997) *KONVER II: Fostering of Conversion by the European Union*, Bonn: BICC.

¹¹² Jelušić, Ljubica and Selby, John (eds.) *Defence Restructuring and Conversion: Sociocultural Aspects*, Brussels: European Commission Directorate-General Research / Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities.

¹¹³ Woodward, Rachel (1998) 'It's a Man's Life!': soldiers, masculinity and the countryside, *Gender, Place and Culture*, 5 (3), 277-300.

¹¹⁴ Doxford, D. (1996) *The allocation and management of land used for military training in the UK*. Unpublished report for PhD transfer.

compromise between the US and UK governments in the 1950's; The US government had originally wanted a site in northern Scotland, but this would have provided early warning coverage for only a fraction of the UK (see Chapter 5).

There is a body of work covering American bases abroad. Much tends to be from a critical socio-political perspective. Desmond Ball studied American military bases in Australia¹¹⁵. This has a significant intelligence slant, because the most important facilities in that country, Nurungur and Pine Gap, near Alice Springs, were both National Security Agency sites, the latter being the Southern equivalent of Menwith Hill, the former is now closed. Duncan Campbell's work on American military sites in the UK has already been mentioned¹¹⁶, as has that of Nicky Hagar, who exposed the NSA-run intelligence base at Waihopai¹¹⁷, and Ball's collaboration with Jeffry Richelson, which includes details of UKUSA facilities world-wide¹¹⁸.

More generally, Simon Duke provided an overview of US facilities in Europe just prior to the end of the Cold War¹¹⁹, and Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard have edited a collection of work examining the world-wide network of American bases¹²⁰. In his introduction, Gerson traces the growth in American bases from the neo-colonialist interventions in Hawaii, Cuba and the Philippines in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century, through the era of *Pax Americana* in the post-WW2 period. He shows that resistance to US control of bases was more widespread than is popularly believed with particular struggle in Iceland, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Gerson claims six purposes are served by US bases in the post-WW2 period: to project conventional military power, particularly in the third world; to prepare for and launch nuclear war; to act as 'tripwires' to guarantee US response to attack; to serve as symbols of US power; to ensure US economic access to foreign markets; and finally, to influence and control the governments wherein and around the bases are situated. These points are based on the international policy analysis of Noam Chomsky, who has argued that

¹¹⁵ Ball, Desmond (1980) *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia*, Hale and Iremonger.

¹¹⁶ Campbell 1984 *op cit*.

¹¹⁷ Hagar 1996 *op cit*.

¹¹⁸ Richelson and Ball (1985) *op cit*.

¹¹⁹ Duke, Simon (1989) *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*. Oxford: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) / Oxford University Press.

¹²⁰ Gerson, Joseph and Birchard, Bruce (eds.) (1991) *The Sun Never Sets: Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases*, Boston MA: South End Press / American Friends Service Committee.

the Cold War, for the U.S. was simply an extended episode in a longer term project for American economic and political dominance¹²¹. Diana Johnstone and Ben Cramer provide an overview of American bases in Europe, including the UK, and emphasise the importance of the Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) sites¹²².

Also in this collection, Laura Simich provides an account of the negative ways in which an American base at Comiso in Sicily impacted upon the local community. Leading to an increase in political corruption, crime, accidental deaths, brutal treatment of protesters, and fear (as a result of the bombing of Libya), she concludes that: "the military base brought Comiso political, economic and social problems far outweighing any benefits to the community"¹²³. Some of these negative effects, particularly in relation to drugs and violence, were also noticed by Network Demilitarised, in their investigation into the American base at Glyfada in Greece¹²⁴. The impact on women, especially with regard to local women forced into prostitution to serve the needs of foreign servicemen has been studied by Sandra Sturdevant¹²⁵, an issue which is also noted by Cynthia Enloe in her superb study of the relationship between the politics of militarism and feminism¹²⁶.

Feminist analysis has been critically important in the study of opposition to American bases, particularly the case of Greenham Common, another cruise missile base, this time in Berkshire in the UK, which has been analysed by Sasha Roseneil¹²⁷. She argues that the ultimate goal of a true peace movement is not simply to remove military bases but to 'disarm patriarchy' itself. This discourse is vital to understanding the opposition to Menwith Hill, as we shall see in Chapter 7.

¹²¹ Chomsky, Noam (1991) *Deterring Democracy*, London: Verso. See Chapter 5 and p. below.

¹²² Johnstone, Diana and Cramer, Ben (1991), *The Burdens and the Glory: U.S. Bases in Europe* in Gerson and Birchard (eds.) *op cit.*, 199-223.

¹²³ Simich, Laura (1991) *The corruption of a community's economic and political life: the cruise missile base in Comiso*, in Gerson and Birchard (eds.) *op cit.*, 77-94.

¹²⁴ Network DEMILITARISED 1994c *op cit.*

¹²⁵ Sturdevant, Sandra Pollock (1993) *Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and U.S. Military in Asia*, New York: New Press.

¹²⁶ Enloe, Cynthia (1993) *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

¹²⁷ Roseneil, Sasha (1995) *Disarming Patriarchy: Feminism and Politics at Greenham*, Buckingham: Open University Press.

The final area does involve analysis of current and past land-use, but the focus tends to be very much on overt military purposes, largely military training, and in particular where it involves large and noisy equipment. Woodward has considered the case of the conflict between the British army and the National Park authorities at the huge Otterburn training area in Northumberland¹²⁸. The army has progressively lost its cold-war training areas in Germany and feels it necessary to test its large armoured weapons, such as the Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the AS90 self-propelled heavy artillery gun, here in Britain. This has led to a divisive public inquiry, which has already ended once without conclusion and been forced to reopen. And while there is work like Woodward's that does question some of the assumptions of state military policy, intelligence is generally unnoticed. Intelligence is not noisy, or disturbing in the way that tank-training is. It thus does not usually arouse community antipathy. In addition, most of the work in this area tends to concentrate on environmental factors, either critically analysing or supporting the claims of the military to be protectors of wildlife and habitats. Defence Estates put much public relations effort into promoting an image of environmental awareness, with *Sanctuary* magazine, and a stream of reports and papers¹²⁹. One could argue that the current military effort to improve its environmental image is merely an effort to divert attention away from the inherently destructive nature of warfare (and preparing for it) on the environment, a destructiveness analysed elsewhere by Joni Seager¹³⁰, and particularly Thomas¹³¹. Andrew Ross¹³² has argued that it constitutes part of a process of appropriating, and in this case militarizing, environmentalism. In addition heritage and conservation issues fit well into the public policy discourse on 'national security', as Rachel Woodward¹³³ has noted, and thus do not require major changes in thinking on the part of military personnel. Academic work which accepts what Woodward outlines as a set of paternalist, managerial environmentalist and 'Crater-as-

¹²⁸ Woodward, R. (1999) Gunning for Rural England: The Politics of the Promotion of Military Land Use in the Northumberland National Park, *Journal of Rural Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 17-33.

¹²⁹ Ministry of Defence (1999) *Respecting the Environment: Conservation on the Defence Estate and the role of the MOD Conservation Office*, Aldershot: MOD Conservation Office. See also the leaflets: *Defending Biodiversity and Archaeology on the Defence Estates* (both 2000), produced by the same office.

¹³⁰ Seager, Joni (1991) *Earth Follies: Feminism, Politics and the Environment*, London: Earthscan.

¹³¹ Thomas, W (1995) *Scorched Earth: The Military's assault on the Environment*, Philadelphia PA: New Society Publishers.

¹³² Ross, Andrew (1996) The future is a risky business, *The Ecologist*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 42-4.

¹³³ Woodward, R. (1998) *Defended Territory: The Otterburn Training Area and the 1997 Public Inquiry*. Centre for Rural Economy Research Report, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.

habitat' discourses¹³⁴, can thus help perpetuate a 'discursive void', where the deeper issues concerned with why and where the state projects its power, deploys its forces and fights wars are overtaken by arguments about whether training grounds make good breeding grounds for rare flora and fauna. An example of this is the paper by Savege studying the case of the Stone Curlew at Porton Down, a chemical weapons research establishment in Dorset¹³⁵. The results of this process of uncritical scholarship and the state's desire to deflect the debate onto more 'friendly' subjects is most clearly visible in the collection of papers given at NATO's International Symposium on the Environment and Defence¹³⁶, which presents a mixture of official military opinion and independent academic work echoing military environmentalist discourses. In some cases the lines between the military and academic work are very thin, and lead to similar conclusions, with papers of both backgrounds calling for collaboration between the military and environmentalists¹³⁷.

In any case, the military's pride in its conservation record may be misplaced: Duncan Coe's investigation into the conservation of archaeological heritage on the Salisbury Plain Training Area (SPTA) concludes that although the army deserves some credit,

It is true to say that the conservation benefits of military stewardship have been largely incidental. The preservation of large tracts of unspoilt and unploughed downland on SPTA has been an unplanned side effect of the need for artillery impact areas and large areas for tactical manoeuvre¹³⁸,

and that changes to the use of the defence estate may well lead to the erosion of this margin of comfort.

¹³⁴ Woodward, R. (2000) *Discourses of Military Environmentalism*, Centre for Rural Economy Working Paper 48, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.

¹³⁵ Savege, J. (1997) Soldiers, Stones Curlews and SSSIs: Maintaining the Balance, *ECOS* 18(1) pp 68-74.

¹³⁶ Coulson and Baldwin (eds.) *op cit*.

¹³⁷ Compare for example: Stuart, J. (1995) The Ministry of Defence and the Environment, in Coulson and Baldwin (eds.) *op cit*. Savege, J., with Brotherton, I. and Owens, P. (1995): UK Army training facilities into the twenty-first century: a growing environmental concern, in Coulson and Baldwin (eds.) *op cit*.

¹³⁸ Coe, Duncan (1997) Salisbury Plain Training Area: archaeological conservation in a changing military and political environment, *Landscape Research* Vol. 21, No. 2, 157-174, 171.

Seeing Places

The discussion of military environmentalism is essentially a discussion of landscape and identity. Another key example of work at the intersection of the military lands and consideration of landscape in a wider sense is a recent paper by Jackie Tivers¹³⁹. In examining Aldershot, a complex of Barracks, HQs, military housing and training lands in the south-east of England that has grown into a 'military town', she argued that:

military defence landscapes are iconic in nature; that there exist specific icons which symbolize for us (or symbolized for our forebears) military defence and which have a meaning which goes much further than their overt presence.¹⁴⁰

Drawing on Cosgrove and Daniels¹⁴¹, she outlines the way in which such landscapes can be read as texts containing 'markers' which give particular meaning and identity to the landscape. Cosgrove and Daniels define iconography as "the theoretical and historical study of symbolic imagery"¹⁴², and trace its development from the Renaissance through the early Twentieth Century Warburg school of art history. They note that it resonates strongly with Clifford Geertz's ethnographic approach in anthropology, with its call to read culture as a text, and its use of thick description¹⁴³. Iconography is important as a means of inquiry because signs and symbols cannot be taken for granted: they shift and change. Indeed Cosgrove and Daniels argue that, in a post-modern perspective:

landscape seems less like a palimpsest whose real or authentic meanings can somehow be recovered with the correct techniques, theories or ideologies, than a flickering text displayed on the word-processor screen whose meaning

¹³⁹ Tivers, Jacqueline (1999) 'The Home of the British Army'; the iconic construction of military defence landscapes, in *Landscape Research* 24(3), pp. 303-319.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 303.

¹⁴¹ Cosgrove, Denis and Daniels, Stephen (1988) Introduction: iconography and landscape in Cosgrove and Daniels (eds.) *The Iconography of Landscape*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴² *ibid.*, 1.

¹⁴³ Geertz, Clifford (1973) *The Interpretation of Cultures*, London: Hutchinson.

can be created, altered, elaborated and finally obliterated by the merest touch of a button.¹⁴⁴

The meaning of landscape is thus able to be contested. As Cosgrove had earlier argued, "the power of individual visual appropriation of the external world, once the preserve of the privileged few... is now open in large measure to anyone"¹⁴⁵. Tivers argues that these interpretations can be analysed within a three-dimensional matrix of existential meaning made up of security/stress, stimulus/ennui and status/stigma, based on Ley's work on urban landscapes¹⁴⁶.

This iconography of military landscape resonates strongly with the way in which nationhood is constructed. Several authors, apart from Woodward and Tivers, have contributed to this strand of research. This can take the form of examining obviously symbolic landscapes like military memorials and cemeteries, as Heffernan¹⁴⁷ and later Morris¹⁴⁸, have done. There have been exciting analyses like that of Pyrs Gruffudd, who examines the tradition of the 'RAF pastoral', the linking of the symbolism of wide open skies and supposedly distinctive light of southern England with Royal Air Force fighters like the Spitfire, particularly during and following the 'Battle of Britain' during the Second World War¹⁴⁹. He examines the way this was achieved through art and advertising, and interestingly concludes that this RAF pastoral is now well over, and with the advent of American bomber and later cruise missile bases, "the sky has been dispossessed of its Englishness, by American missiles and Soviet fallout... now the sky is anything but reassuring, and a whole new realm of symbolism is attached to it"¹⁵⁰.

Tivers' analysis and Gruffudd's conclusions are both particularly interesting for a study of sites such as Menwith Hill and Fylingdales, which have widely varying and contradictory

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 8.

¹⁴⁵ Cosgrove, Denis (1985) *Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape*, Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble, 263.

¹⁴⁶ Ley, D. (1983) *A Social Geography of the City*, New York: Harper and Row.

¹⁴⁷ Heffernan, M. (1995) For ever England: the Western Front and the politics of remembrance in Britain, *Ecumene* Vol. 2, 293-323.

¹⁴⁸ Morris, M. (1997) Gardens 'for ever England': landscape, identity and the First World War cemeteries on the Western Front, *Ecumene* Vol. 4, 410-434.

¹⁴⁹ Gruffudd, Pyrs (1990) *Reach for the Sky: the Air and English Cultural Nationalism*, Department of Geography Working Paper No. 7, University of Nottingham.

¹⁵⁰ *ibid.*, 14.

iconic significance, particularly when this symbolic presence is considered to be one of the functions of American military bases. The question of what is represented by such places, and how this changes over time is crucial. British and American interpretations of landscape symbolism are also very different and brought to serve different purposes within a framework of the construction of national identity as Daniels has shown¹⁵¹. The notion of 'Englishness' and how it is related to the symbolism of landscape has been further analysed by David Matless¹⁵². In addition, Klaus Dodds has shown how English landscape constructions were transposed to their 'mirror image' of the Falklands, during the conflict of 1982¹⁵³.

However, perhaps the use of 'landscape' is a limited term: Cosgrove places the idea of landscape in Britain very much as a product of the Nineteenth Century, a nostalgic, bourgeois idea of an ideal Britain; for him "landscape is a restricted way of seeing that diminishes alternative modes of experiencing our relations with nature"¹⁵⁴. Whilst this maybe true of the particular historic signifier 'landscape', the idea of landscape in general has been appropriated and reinterpreted. Cosgrove notes that the discipline of geography itself had its roots in landscape, but also contains the seeds of very different ways of seeing. Yi-Fu Tuan's classic study of fear is predicated on this very idea, that landscapes are both internal and external:

"Landscape" as the term has been used since the seventeenth century is a construct of mind as well as a physical and measurable entity. "Landscapes of Fear" refers both to psychological states and to tangible environments¹⁵⁵.

It is therefore appropriate at this point to broaden the discussion and to discuss the ways in which social relations construct space, place and identity.

Space can be seen in several ways. There is a mundane view that it is simply the context in which things exist; it is an abstract that cannot be altered by action. This is what Foucault

¹⁵¹ Daniels, S. (1993) *Fields of Vision: Landscape Imagery and National Identity in England and the United States*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

¹⁵² Matless, David (1998) *Landscape and Englishness*, London: Reaktion Books.

¹⁵³ Dodds, Klaus (1998) *Enframing the Falklands: identity, landscape, and the 1982 South Atlantic War*, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol. 16, 733-756.

¹⁵⁴ Cosgrove 1985 *op cit.*, 269.

¹⁵⁵ Tuan, Yi-Fu (1979) *Landscapes of Fear*, New York: Pantheon, 6.

famously referred to as "the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile"¹⁵⁶. This abstract idea of space will not be considered here, since by its very definition, it has no relation to society. Instead I will draw on the approach predominant among modern cultural geographers and philosophers, that space is something that is constructed - in other words created, delimited, controlled and defined by the action of humans and human societies. Several streams of thought feed into this analysis.

The first is that of Marxist philosophers and geographers, who became concerned with the idea that space was produced within capitalism. Henri Lefebvre pointed out the confused stance of modern philosophical use of the idea of 'space':

We are forever hearing about the space of this and/or the space of that: about literary space, ideological spaces, the space of the dream, psychoanalytic topographies, and so on, and so forth. Conspicuous by its absence from supposedly fundamental epistemological studies is not only the idea of 'man' but also that of space - the fact that 'space' is mentioned on every page notwithstanding¹⁵⁷.

Mental or social space (to which Tuan refers above) was now admitted back into the arena of discussion but it was a cameo appearance - it seemed to represent everything and nothing. Lefebvre argues that "*(social) space is a (social) product*", but that this fact is hidden both by the illusion that space is transparent, or alternatively that 'things' have more reality than does the subject. He develops a conceptual 'triad' of: spatial practice, including production and reproduction of space; representations of space, which would include iconography and the ideal space of military planners; and representational spaces, which "tend towards more or less coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs", and which here include iconic landscapes. I would only question here, Lefebvre's use of the term 'non-verbal' - surely discourse is a form of representational space, and both spoken and written word are key to spatial practice?

¹⁵⁶ Foucault, Michel (1980) *Questions of Geography*, in Gordon, Colin (ed.) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77*, 63-77, New York: Pantheon.

¹⁵⁷ Lefebvre, Henri (trans. Nicholson-Smith, Donald) (1991 [1974]) *The Production of Space*, Oxford, Blackwell, 3.

Lefebvre has been an inspiration to neo-Marxist scholars since. In particular he influenced Neil Smith in his elaboration on the Leninist conception of uneven development: the way in which capital tends to both equalize and differentiate, a process which involves both the production of nature and the production of space: "capitalism does seek to emancipate itself from natural space but only by producing certain absolute spaces of its own as part of the larger production of relative space"¹⁵⁸. This analysis has been taken further by David Harvey who argues for a particularly geographical interpretation of uneven development¹⁵⁹, as well as more avowedly post-modern theorists like Edward Soja¹⁶⁰.

Spatial construction acts not only 'outside' but also is involved in a dialectical relationship with the 'human' itself; spatial construction can also be seen as the act of constructing identity, of what it means to be human. Indeed the interaction of humanity with space is what creates separateness, discreteness within human perception of the world - the idea of the 'body', 'self', 'society', a mountain, a fundamental particle - these are all more or less arbitrary descriptions of the way some part of the universe is defined. This indeed allows us to understand that 'information' exists. Spatial construction is clearly connected with power. While non-human processes are, so far as we know, unconscious, human attempts to control space are directed and conscious and can be carried out with specific aims in mind. The creation of specific places, then are according to Massey: "*attempts to stabilize the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time*"¹⁶¹.

Sack calls this behaviour *territoriality*, which he further defines it as "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area"¹⁶². This involves three basic processes: *classification*, or defining an area by a system of categorisation imposed by the powerful, the actor expressing the territorial behaviour; *communication*, the act of telling

¹⁵⁸ Smith, Neil (1984) *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

¹⁵⁹ Most recently in: Harvey, David (2000) *Spaces of Hope*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.

¹⁶⁰ Soja, Edward (1989) *Postmodern Geographies : the Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*, London: Verso.

¹⁶¹ Massey, Doreen (1994) *Space, Place and Gender*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 5.

¹⁶² Sack, Robert D. (1986) *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19.

others that a space is a territory; and *enforcement*, or at least "an attempt at influencing interactions"¹⁶³ involving the territory.

The concept of territoriality as power over space, does not mean that all places are territories. Territories are particular places that must be established and constantly maintained. They do not necessarily have to be defended in the sense that the actor establishing the territory has to be inside the territory, "territory can be used to contain or restrain as well as to exclude"¹⁶⁴, and proxies such as physical barriers or even legal and cultural ones, like signs forbidding entry or restricting behaviour, are territorial devices. Territory can thus be hegemonic; it can work at the level of socio-cultural expectations and consent.

For example, the act of defining an area as 'forbidden' creates a place that is spatially separate. It also defines, through this territoriality, what are expected human behaviours in relation to the place. This of course can be reinforced by technology (fences, security cameras, guns etc.), by the exercise of power (force used by guards etc.) and by law (arrest, courts, prisons etc.). It effectively creates a regulated, controlled and largely invisible space. Sack calls this particular component of territoriality, "the idea of socially *emptiable place*"¹⁶⁵.

The creation of invisible spaces (and emptiable places), particularly in relation to technology, is related to the Science and Technology Studies (STS) concept of 'black-boxing'¹⁶⁶. This is derived from the visible aspect of most complex modern consumer technologies - within their sleek black exteriors we know something is going on which creates the results we see, but most of us do not know exactly how or what is happening inside. In STS black-boxing is "the way science and technology is made invisible by its own success"¹⁶⁷, but I would suggest that part of this success is the same process by which any space is constructed and defined, by whatever method, as separate. This is perhaps a more geographical way of seeing the concept of secrecy, which was introduced earlier. The interplay of space, information and power leads

¹⁶³ *ibid.*, 22.

¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*, 20.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*, 33.

¹⁶⁶ Callon, Michel and Latour, Bruno (1981) Unscrewing the big Leviathan: how actors macrostructure reality and how sociologists help them to do so, in Knorr-Cetina, K. and Cicourel, A. V. (eds.) *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology*, London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.

¹⁶⁷ Latour, Bruno (1999) *Pandora's Hope: Essays in the Reality of Science Studies*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 304.

to black-boxing as a normalised and expected way of organising society. Here the idea of hegemony comes into play. Gramsci defined this concept as the opposite of coercive leadership; instead it is the idea that a successful dominant social class maintains leadership through consensual methods¹⁶⁸. Thus for the majority of society it is not so much the fear of violence or punishment that prevents investigation of forbidden territories, but the common acceptance of their invisibility. In other words, people consent to these territorializations, whether they are based on coercive power or on technological expertise, and in doing so construct the space as empty, invisible, black-boxed.

What results when many such places are connected as part of a network is an effectively 'hidden geography', which while it may possess a superficial coherence and visibility is in fact effectively unknowable due to the character and intensity of its territorialization. Territories that have been emptied of social meaning may well be subject to conflicting reinterpretations or attempts to fill the emptiness. Clearly the actors who create and maintain the territory have an advantage here, in the case of intelligence sites, an enormous advantage, but their territorializations can be challenged - this process is to a large degree what this thesis is about.

So much for space. But why not give equal prominence to time? As Doreen Massey remarks: "Space must be conceptualized integrally with time; indeed... the aim should be to think always in terms of space-time"¹⁶⁹. The act of spatial construction is also an act of temporal construction firstly because it creates hybrids that are characterised by their persistence through time¹⁷⁰, those 'permenances' in Whitehead's terminology, to which David Harvey refers¹⁷¹. Secondly, the idea of time, or times, is also a construct, a human imposition of pattern on the complex, a way of creating or interpreting information. It is important because territoriality changes over time: spaces become subject to territorialization, and are separated,

¹⁶⁸ Simon, Roger (1991) *Gramsci's Political Thought: and Introduction (Revised Edition)*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.

¹⁶⁹ Massey 1994 *op cit.*, 2.

¹⁷⁰ Latour, Bruno (trans. Porter, C.) (1993) *We Have Never Been Modern*. Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf. Originally published as Latour, Bruno (1989) *Nous n'avons jamais été modernes*. Paris, Editions La Découverte.

¹⁷¹ Alfred North Whitehead (1929) in *Process and Reality: an essay in Cosmology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, developed philosophical categories which are also used by David Harvey (1996) in *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference* to argue that there could be a relational dialectics that could form an analytical base for thinking about and acting for a just society. See Chapter 9 below.

as when an intelligence site is created; existing territories cease to be maintained and are redefined or reterritorialized by other actors, as when military land is sold to public authorities or private interests; or territories change the nature and intensity of their territorialization, for example when access for walkers is restricted on military firing ranges.

Intelligence Sites, the State and Society

At this stage it is worth taking stock of the questions that are developing, and the concepts that have emerged. Firstly, there are questions about the role of intelligence sites, both as part of state agencies - what do they do? who controls them? - and as military land (in its broadest sense) - where are they? what do they look like? how much space do they take up? From this discussion, ideas about *the state*, and the state's use of *law*, and about particular states and the relationships between them have emerged. Secondly, there are questions about the ways these places are seen and their interpretation as *iconic landscapes*; their construction as spaces, their *territorialization*; and how these aspects are contested. In this regard we have examined the concept of *space*.

We have seen how Peter Gill suggests that there are three major concepts relating to such agencies: information, power, and law. I would agree that all of these are essential. However if one is to analyse both SIGINT agencies in general, and SIGINT sites in particular, one further concept, in addition to space, becomes of crucial importance: *technology*. Technology is important because it is only through consideration of technology that the full interplay of information, power and ideology becomes apparent. Likewise, the operation of technology, of power and of law cannot be considered without awareness of spatial factors; indeed power in relation to space, and the way in which space is transformed into the specificities of place, location, landscape, body and so on is the key to how intelligence sites operate.

We have already seen how there might be different sets of discourses about intelligence sites, and how these relate to 'official' discourse, and I shall return to this in the next Chapter. State control is about more than discourse however, it is also about more tangible things: how space is constructed and territory delineated (see above). It is also about how law and technology are used not just to control discourse but to watch and even physically constrain the movement of actors in and around those territories. Surveillance has become a significant issue in recent years, largely via debate about crime-prevention and the introduction of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras in public spaces and the growth of workplace monitoring¹⁷².

¹⁷² Norris, Clive and Armstrong, Gary (1999) *The Maximum Surveillance Society: the Rise of CCTV*, Oxford: Berg.

This is not an entirely new debate however: Weber argued that surveillance is an essential part of the functioning of a modern, rational bureaucratic system, and this approach was developed further by Anthony Giddens in the second volume of *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*¹⁷³, and has been further extended by Christopher Dandeker¹⁷⁴. He defines surveillance as "the gathering of information about and the supervision of subject populations in organisations"¹⁷⁵ He argues that surveillance is essentially the same whether it is used at an international level or at street level. He adopts a neo-Machievellian view to argue that the goal of this strategy is "domination through knowledge... [and] rational discipline"¹⁷⁶, where in fact the subject population (and the bureaucrats themselves) accept this domination for reasons of "monetary reward, convenience and habit" amongst others¹⁷⁷. Dandeker sets up a framework for analysing the totality of any surveillance system, based on four factors: "The size and scope of the files in relation to the subjected population... the centralisation of those files... the speed of information flow... [and] the number of points of contact between the system and its subject population"¹⁷⁸.

Much of the information needed to determine the scale of surveillance here is highly technical (and often secret); some of the key areas to be examined in this thesis are both the arguments about the technical capability of the surveillance systems operating through places like Menwith Hill, but also questions of who constitutes the users of 'the system', and who (or indeed what) are 'the subjected populations'. Many of the discourses about Menwith Hill depend upon particular definitions or assertions about these categories.

The critical distinction between information-gathering by the state and an everyday act of discovery or communication, an individual reading a book for example, lies in the way in which power is exercised and made visible. This is not to deny that power is involved in almost any act within society; however the scale and intensity of power involved when dealing with state, and particularly military, surveillance is of a different order. This ranges from the use of the information, to the ways and means used for its collection, from the

¹⁷³ Giddens, Anthony (1985) *The Nation State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

¹⁷⁴ Dandeker, Christopher (1990) *Surveillance, Power and Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

¹⁷⁵ *ibid.*, vii.

¹⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 9.

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 11.

access granted to the information to the operations needed to protect the information-gathering from exposure.

Fundamentally views of power depend on whether power is considered as a 'thing' or as a 'process' (to use Whitehead's categories¹⁷⁹). If power is considered as a 'thing', it can be made, possessed, transferred, used and so on. If it is a process, it cannot be captured in the same way: it can flow, move, even grow and change in form. The work of Michel Foucault is vital here. Although Foucault's consideration of power varied over time and was occasionally even contradictory, his view was that power is an amorphous flow, but yet it is of limited quantity - it cannot be created or increase but can move from one place in society to another. It is sometimes seen in negative terms: power is a coercive disciplinary force used to maintain the existing social order via state institutions, including, of course, the intelligence services. However it is also seen as positive: power actively seeks knowledge.

Foucault's particularly important contribution in this area was the idea of the panoptic state¹⁸⁰. In his study of the development of prisons, he argued that these institutions were part of a trend towards a society where total observation and total control could be concentrated in the hands of a few. Panoptic, literally means 'all-seeing', and the term derives from the 'Panopticon', a supposedly humane and reforming prison design by Nineteenth century Scottish utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham. The Panopticon was an institution wherein a hidden central observer could see every part of that space. In his study of the development of prisons Foucault argued that these institutions were part of a trend towards a disciplinary state where observation and control could be concentrated in the hands of a few. This situation was disciplinary not simply through the threat of force or the actual constant monitoring of behaviour. In the Panopticon, the observer was invisible, therefore the subject could never know whether actual surveillance was taking place. Thus an assumption of continuous surveillance had to be maintained, and the subject would change their behaviour from deviancy to acceptable social norms, and act as if surveillance were constant.

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.*, 40-41.

¹⁷⁹ Whitehead 1929 *op cit.*

¹⁸⁰ Foucault, Michel (1975) *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, New York: Vintage.

Thomas Mathiesen has recently argued that in society at large (as opposed to closed institutions), it is the advent of information technology that has facilitated the possibility of full state panopticism¹⁸¹. This theme is present in many studies of surveillance¹⁸², and also in popular works in this area (see Chapter 6), and in more alarmist form in the conspiracist writings of American Christian right anti-federalism (see Chapter 8).

If technology facilitates true panoptic power, then it must be to technology that we now turn. It could be argued that technology is merely a way in which concepts are operationalized, i.e.: it is simply a collective name for methods, and indeed particular forms of methods based on the use of artificial tools and processes. But this could equally be said of law. Indeed what these two concepts share is their qualities of both operationalization and normalization in relation to information and power. Technology in particular acts as a way of extending, intensifying and accelerating the exercise of power in relation first of all to the non-human, as Ruth Schwartz Cowan puts it, technologies: "are those things that people have created so that they can exploit or manipulate the natural environment in which they live"¹⁸³. Even within this context technology is problematic enough, however technological systems, "arrays of technologies"¹⁸⁴, also "have people embedded in them". Marshall McLuhan argued that technology is essentially a way of extending the reach of the human abilities and senses¹⁸⁵.

However Arne Naess has a more comprehensive view that the whole system of invention, creation, production and use has to be considered as contained within the concept of a 'technology'¹⁸⁶. This is consistent with the Actor-Network view that technological systems are really 'hybrids'¹⁸⁷, that is something not entirely man, machine or nature, and indeed society is defined by the ubiquity of these hybrids, also called 'quasi-objects', or more recently

¹⁸¹ Mathiesen, Thomas (1999) *On Globalisation of Control: Towards an Integrated Surveillance System in Europe*, London: Statewatch.

¹⁸² For example: Koskela, Hille (2000) 'The gaze without eyes': video-surveillance and the changing nature of urban space, *Progress in Human Geography* Vol. 24, No. 2, 243-265.

¹⁸³ Cowan, Ruth Schwartz (1997) *A Social History of American Technology*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2.

¹⁸⁴ *ibid.* 3.

¹⁸⁵ McLuhan, Marshall (1964) *Understanding Media: the Extensions of Man*, London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.

¹⁸⁶ Naess, A. (ed. and trans. Rothenberg, D.) (1989) *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Orig. published as Naess, A. (1976) *Ecologi, Samfunn og Livstil*. Oslo, Oslo University Press.

¹⁸⁷ Latour (1993) *op cit.*; see also: Haraway, Donna (1997) *Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan@Meets_OncoMouse™*, London: Routledge.

'collectives' by Latour, who defines them as "associations of humans and non-humans"¹⁸⁸. In military terms this is expressed through the development from individual weapons, although these are also involved in hybrid relationships with people (how could a gun fire without some degree of interaction with a human being?), to 'weapons systems', the networks of people and technology, which includes all aspects of warfighting from political decisions through intelligence and targeting to the actual individual missile or bomb¹⁸⁹. As John Street says: "technology... is not just the hardware, nor is it the set of arrangements which enable that technology to operate; it is a set of decisions about how that technology ought to work"¹⁹⁰

Roszack argues that the rise of the information society is "intimately linked to the steady militarization of our economic life since the beginning of World War Two", and indeed that much American high technology research remains linked to the Pentagon, and indeed the NSA¹⁹¹. He also makes a crucial link between gender, popular culture (computer games etc.) and the processes of technological development, that connects strongly to Roseneil's concerns with militarism and patriarchy¹⁹², and to Der Derrian's post-modern analysis of warfare-as-entertainment¹⁹³. This has implications for the way in which intelligence and warfare are researched. As Van Creveld remarks

technology does not just represent an assemblage of hardware but a philosophical system. As such, technology affects not only the way war is conducted and victory is sought but the very framework that we use for thinking about it¹⁹⁴.

We shall explore this further in Chapter 9. In fact the connection between military development and technology go back much further than Roszack's point of the Second World War, for example in the field of communications, Street remarks: "the development of wireless telegraphy [in the early part of the Twentieth Century] was crucially linked to the

¹⁸⁸ Latour, Bruno (1999) *Pandora's Hope: Essays in the Reality of Science Studies*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 304.

¹⁸⁹ Kaldor, Mary (1982) *The Baroque Arsenal*, London: Andre Deutsch.

¹⁹⁰ Street, John (1991) *Politics and Technology*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 8.

¹⁹¹ Roszack, Theodore (1988) *The Cult of Information: the Folklore of Computers and the True Art of Thinking*, London: Paladin.

¹⁹² Roseneil 1993 *op cit*.

¹⁹³ Der Derian, James (1992) *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War*, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

navy"¹⁹⁵. One could trace particular technological developments and their relationship to the military back through millenia.

Mary Kaldor argued that not only is technological development strongly linked with militarism but further that militarism has resulted in a peculiarly redundant form of technological development trajectory that makes the technology not only unusable for peaceful purposes but frequently decadent beyond its military purpose¹⁹⁶. This 'baroque' form of technology is the result of the unhealthy close relationship between the military and private corporations:

'Baroque' armaments are the offspring of a marriage between private enterprise and the state; between the capitalist dynamic of the arms manufacturers and the conservatism that tends to characterise the armed forces and defence departments in peace time¹⁹⁷.

The 'baroque' nature of this technology is revealed in two ways: increasing complexity and increasing versatility, but in fact leads to unreliability, redundancy, and a tendency amongst the developers and users to exaggerate the capabilities of weapons systems. Indeed this redundancy is built in, as in many consumer products, as 'planned obsolescence'. Kaldor comments that this technology is so baroque that it requires the adjustment of wider society in order to allow it to be developed and operated. What results is the dependence of society on military technological development, and not only has this model changed particularly the American socio-economic order, but also the countries to whom America has exported weapons. Military technology thus represents a form of *ideology*, spread through a combination of economic and military power. I shall return to this below.

We have seen in the first section of this chapter how writing on intelligence can be seen to have been downplayed or neglected by mainstream academics. This is a serious deficiency, because intelligence underpins many of the strategic choices made by governments, and in

¹⁹⁴ Van Creveld, Martin (1991) *Technology and War (Revised edition)*; New York: Free Press.

¹⁹⁵ Street 1991 *op cit.*, 50.

¹⁹⁶ Kaldor 1982 *op cit.*

¹⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 4.

itself is a major factor in the economy, and in particular in the last 40 years, in the fields of high-technology and the technological development and the exploration and exploitation of space. There are several reasons for this deficiency, some particular to intelligence, and some related more to the historical context of the development of disciplinary boundaries.

The legal problems connected to state have already been examined, but they are not always insurmountable. However in order to get access to more restricted information, the researcher has to conform to behaviours and political views expected by the intelligence services themselves. Intelligence researchers can in this way become propagandists for the groups they study, either knowingly or through naiveté: the desire for information can outweigh ethical considerations, yet without information the researcher feels powerless and vulnerable to criticism. This can make for a sterile field of knowledge. Investigative journalist Nicky Hagar writes:

I have become all too aware of how little reliable information on these subjects ever reaches the public. Many of the 'leaks that hit the news are planned by the spy agencies, fragments of correct information that do leak out of the highly secretive agencies usually remain scattered or are denied, and incorrect information is frequently repeated year after year in news stories for lack of anything substantial¹⁹⁸.

These facts probably deter many more critical academic researchers, and leave the field largely free for journalists and campaigners. These investigators often themselves become targets of intelligence agencies, another factor which no doubt plays a significant role in deterring academic investigation. For example the independent journalist Duncan Campbell has twice been prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act (the ABC and Zircon affairs - see Chapter 6). Independent researchers also suffer the indignities of being labelled as cranks, conspiracy theorists and obsessives. Academics who wish to make a conventional career for themselves may steer clear of intelligence for fear of being similarly labelled.

¹⁹⁸ Hagar, Nicky (2000) *Echelon: a story about how information spreads (or doesn't)*, *Telepolis*, available on-line: <<http://www.heise.de/english/inhalt/te/8472/html>>

However, in recent years, the realms of intelligence have gradually opened up with the work of several independent organisations dedicated to investigate the state, and particularly those aspects of state activity relating to intelligence and surveillance. These will be detailed in Chapter 6. The activities of these organisations, journalists like Duncan Campbell and Loring Wirbel, activists like Lindis Percy and Helen John has in turn lead to increased scrutiny from the House of Commons, the US Congress and the European Parliament, as well as increased amounts of leaked documentation, which means that there is ample factual and official material for study in addition to the speculation and supposition, however accurate it may be, which is sometimes all that could be offered in the past. The Internet has also made it cheaper and easier for British researchers to access material from the United States (and elsewhere) that is unavailable or even restricted in the UK.

The second reason is one that relates to wider questions of the development of academic disciplines, as noted by Agnew and Corbridge¹⁹⁹ in particular the idea of 'international relations' versus 'domestic' or 'home' affairs, a division replicating the socio-economic separation between 'household' (and family) and the wider economy (or society). The category of the 'state' is often accepted as an actor in the same way as a person within social theory, derived from Hobbes' Seventeenth Century theory of the state. States are isomorphic, and in addition divisions within states are ignored. This means that intelligence agencies (and indeed their component parts) are not considered as actors in their own right. Foreign policy and its military components are considered to be functions of the state as a seamless actor.

Finally then, we are back where we started this chapter, asking what the state does, what particular states do, and what part intelligence agencies play in this. Whether or not one accepts that intelligence agencies share or reflect the goals of the state as a whole, it is important to introduce briefly some major ideas about international relations.

One of the main arguments in IR in the last twenty years has been the question of America's hegemony, a vital question here, because not only does it influence the discourses of the actors around intelligence sites but also the possible trajectories for the sites themselves.

¹⁹⁹ Agnew, John and Corbridge, Stuart (1995) *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, London: Routledge.

Hegemony is generally used in IR, not in the Gramscian sense, but as a more general notion to describe political dominance, although International Political Economists do use it in the Gramscian fashion. There are two questions: the first is an empirical one: is America in decline, or does its hegemony persist? The second is an ethical question: is / was American hegemony beneficial? Of course, many subsidiary questions flow from these two which are outside the scope of this thesis.

On the one hand Gilpin argued that America's decline was assured by the military burdens of the Cold War and the gradual spread of technological developments to other states²⁰⁰. This idea is emphasised by Jochen Hippler who argues that that Gulf War showed that US political and economic power was no longer enough and that military intervention was necessary to assert US control²⁰¹. On the other hand, one finds the likes of Francis Fukuyama arguing that history rather than American hegemony is at an end because of increasing and inevitable convergence of economic and political values towards the American model of liberal democracy²⁰². Thus according to Henry Nau, "America's decline is a myth"²⁰³, and further this hegemony is not achieved by force or coercion, in which arena Nau agrees America's power has declined, but by example:

America leads by knowing what it stands for politically and by getting its own house in order economically. The choice-oriented ideas of assertive, but tolerant, national purpose and market-oriented but equitable, domestic policies are more relevant today than ever before, precisely because America has less relative power to lead by other means²⁰⁴.

Nau's writing is also influenced by the view of American foreign policy guru, Samuel Huntington, whose theory of the 'clash of civilisations' as the key determinant of U.S. foreign policy posture has been influential in U.S. state thinking²⁰⁵. Using a geopolitical model, he claims that America's democratic, free trade civilisation will increasingly come under threat

²⁰⁰ Gilpin, Robert (1987) *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

²⁰¹ Hippler, Jochen (1994) *Pax Americana? Hegemony or Decline*, London: Pluto Press / Transnational Institute.

²⁰² Fukuyama, Francis (1989) The end of history? *The National Interest*, No. 16, 3-19.

²⁰³ Nau, Henry (1990) *The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s*, New York: Oxford University Press, 370.

²⁰⁴ *ibid.*, 371.

from authoritarian, hierarchical and religious states, particularly those within the orbit of Islamic civilisation. It is these religious states that Nau expects to be won over by the American model, yet Huntington is much more sanguine about the chances of a non-military contest, even if he believes that the American model is 'right'.

However the American right's belief in the self-evident correctness of American hegemony is not shared by all. William Robinson has argued that far from the US promoting democracy world-wide, what it has done, formally through coercion and military interventions, and increasingly through more subtle means, is to promote polyarchy, defined as: "a system in which a small group actually rules and mass participation indecision-making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites"²⁰⁶. Noam Chomsky has sought to systematically demolish the claim that the United States has promoted peace, democracy and economic freedom²⁰⁷. He provides concrete factual examples of the successive US governments' subversion of democratic governments in other states that refused to follow the US lead in particular Chile in the 1970s and Nicaragua in the 1980s, and the pursuit of its 'rights' to resources, particularly in Less Developed Nations. This has continued regardless of whether there was a 'Cold War' with the Soviet Union or not. He argues that this has always involved a mixture of coercive and consensual methods, as well as an internal ideological consensus (which approximates to the view expressed by Nau above) that allows the U.S. to project power overseas.

While Chomsky has mentioned the role of Britain as the keenest supporter of U.S. positions internationally, this role has been more fully explored by Mark Curtis²⁰⁸. He argues that when post-war attempts by Britain to shore up its 'Great Power' status with repression in Malaya and Kenya failed, the U.K. settled on supporting America as the standard-bearer of truth and democracy. He also shows that during the 'Cold War', the UN was obstructed not by the Soviets, but by Britain (diplomatic control of the Security council) and the US (economic and political control); these two, with France, were responsible for 85% of the veto's cast. As

²⁰⁵ Huntington, Samuel P. (1993) *The clash of civilisations*, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 22, No. 3.

²⁰⁶ Robinson, William I. (1996) *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony*, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.

²⁰⁷ Chomsky has published numerous books, interviews and collections of essays and speeches in this area. For a good summary see: Chomsky, Noam (1994) *World Orders, Old and New*, London: Pluto Press; also Chomsky 1991 *op cit*.

Chomsky does with the United States, he exposes the consistent support for the aggressors offered by Britain in the post-war period. Curtis shows that far from supporting human rights and democracy Britain has played an active part in destroying democratic experiments and human rights throughout the world. This was carried out through subversion, direct military intervention, support for US subversion or intervention even when no other state would, and the establishment of a world-wide economic and political order designed to exploit poorer nations for the benefit of global elites. Curtis concludes by saying:

Britain bears considerable responsibility for many of the horrors which have afflicted people in the Third World throughout the post-war era. These policies have been based not on whims - or on the delusions of malevolent individuals. Rather they are the consequences of the rich states' pursuit of their straightforward 'national interests'.²⁰⁹

The absence of real democracy in Britain, after the model of Gill (above) makes this possible. One of Robinson's key arguments about the promotion of polyarchy is that it is the establishment of such systems in the dominant states that enables them to force such systems on others²¹⁰.

These arguments are consistently ignored or underplayed by more conventional critics of the state of international relations. Like Fukuyama and Huntington, they appear to take it for granted that the end of the Cold War mean a new phase in global politics, and despite being generally left-wing in orientation, their critiques and solutions can often end of sounding remarkably similar to those of the right. Two examples are recent essays by Mary Kaldor and Martin Shaw.

Kaldor attempts to define the characteristics of the 'New Wars', which although not purely a phenomenon of the post-Cold War period have, she claims, gained speed from the post-Cold

²⁰⁸ Curtis, M. (1995) *The Ambiguities of Power: British Foreign Policy Since 1945*. London, Zed Books.

²⁰⁹ *ibid.*, 235.

²¹⁰ Robinson 1996 *op cit.*

War situation with the breakdown of some centralised states and easily available weaponry²¹¹. These new wars are based on the disintegration of the state; and on identity politics- that is the politics of constructing identity as a way of claiming power; on the mode of warfare, increasingly networked structures (webs) rather than hierarchical systems, and methods built into aims e.g.: atrocities, rape etc. and high tech, but small-scale weaponry (light weapons), resulting in far more civilian casualties; and finally the war economy, New wars destroy the economy of the area, despite only a minority of the population actually taking part. However there is a problem with parts of the thesis in that identities have always been constructed. Western European state formation may have been to do with power and the 'legitimate' monopoly on violence, but this is not the case elsewhere, as Benedict Anderson's classic work on the construction of post-colonial identities clearly showed²¹².

Kaldor argues that many solutions to this problem are wrong because they are still based on Clausewitzian ideas of what is legitimate war - the conflicts are 'primitive', therefore they must be contained. The problem is these wars are transnational, therefore need to reconstitute legitimacy on a transnational scale. Kaldor's argument is that a transnational civil society is essential, wherein violation of rights anywhere is felt everywhere. Military forces will still be necessary for new peace-keeping, defined as "policing but on a much larger scale"²¹³. According to the Chomskian interpretation this is simply what the U.S. has always argued that it does.

Martin Shaw's analysis is even more similar to those on the American right. He argues that:

Western state leaders have not chosen global leadership: it has been thrust upon them by their relative success, by the succession of crises which have presented themselves, and by the pressures of media and civil society²¹⁴.

²¹¹ Kaldor, M. (1997) Introduction. In Kaldor, M. and Vashee, B. (eds.) *Restructuring the Global Military Sector. Volume 1: New Wars*. London, Pinter. 3-33.

²¹² Anderson, Benedict (1983) *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso.

²¹³ Kaldor 1997 *op cit*.

²¹⁴ Shaw, M. (1998) War and Globality: The Role and Character of War in the Global Transition, in Ho-Won Jeong (ed.) *Peace and Conflict: A New Agenda*. Dartmouth Publishing. Also given as a paper at the 'Globalisation, Society and Violence' conference in Brighton (page numbers (1-17) from this version), 11.

This sounds suspiciously like a restatement of the Nineteenth century 'white man's burden' theory, and this suspicion is confirmed by the following section in which he, like Kaldor, contrasts "the rational use of war as a means of inter-state conflict" with the modern "degenerate forms"- again reflecting imperialist discourse of 'primitive' peoples unable to control themselves without enlightened guidance.

Like Kaldor, he concludes that the function of the emergent global state then is "global policing... the enforcement of globally legitimate norms in general and international law"²¹⁵. However Shaw does not question the actual legitimacy of these norms, and in the final section makes his position clear by arguing that "extending pacification from the broad West to the remainder of the non-western world- no less a project than the abolition of war- is essential to global stability"²¹⁶

'Pacification' is in itself a problematic term as Lovering has noted²¹⁷, but the fundamental critique of Shaw's conception of globalisation: there is no mention of capital, or Trans-National Corporations (TNCs). It is these bodies that are involved in a relationship with nation-states that is at once a partnership and a struggle to remake the world in their image. The links between TNCs and the wealthy political elites of nation states are strong enough to survive the end of the nation states themselves- and if globalisation is anything it is the extension of the western class structure to the global level²¹⁸.

In their quest to re-establish the political-military over the economic Shaw and Kaldor ignore the complex reality of the inseparability of such domains, and this leads Shaw in particular to advocate naive, simplistic and paternalistic solutions and brings him dangerously close to the 'clash of civilisation' theories of Samuel Huntingdon.

Where all the writers considered also fail is that none of them consider the role of Signals Intelligence even though like Chomsky they may include the subversive role of the CIA, and some of them omit intelligence entirely. Theorising the connections between surveillance,

²¹⁵ *ibid.*, 14.

²¹⁶ *ibid.*, 15.

²¹⁷ Lovering (1994) *op cit*.

²¹⁸ Van der Pijl, Kees (1998) *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, London: Routledge.

militarism, globalization, inter-state and intra-state relations especially with regard to the role, use and purposes of SIGINT technologies, agencies and sites is the final key task of this thesis.

Chapter Three. Methodology.

Introduction

The research questions, then, are threefold: those to do with facts about signals intelligence sites, so far as these can be ascertained; those concerning the interpretation and social construction of those sites; and finally, the way in which these sites and the networks of which they are part fit into, and change, the way we think about society.

This thesis will be a set of arguments based both on quantitative data and to a much greater extent on empirically-derived qualitative information, defined following Bruce Berg as: "the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptors of things"¹. The information sought was both ontological (things that *are*), and epistemological (how we know that things are)². The analytic methodology adopted here was a heuristic one, an approach which sought meaning through the interpretation of many different but related sources, which could be referenced against each other, and was part of a learning process. In this case the analysis was carried out via an adapted form of social, and in particular, 'critical' social discourse analysis, which combines this approach with other recent developments in the social sciences which focus on process rather than fixed categories, in particular Actor-Network Theory, relational dialectics and complexity theory. This will not result in any 'grand theory', however I would like to think that the approach is applicable to more than the particular cases examined in this thesis.

¹ Berg, Bruce (1995) *Qualitative Research Methods in the Social Sciences (2nd edition)*, Needham Heights MA: Alyn and Bacon.

² For a further discussion of these concepts in relation to social research, see: Hughes, John (1990) *The Philosophy of Social Research*, Harlow: Longman.

Data Collection Methodology.

Problems with Data Collection.

It is not easy to obtain either quantitative or qualitative data about intelligence sites from official sources. For example, the Foreign Office will not say how many Composite Signals Organisation Stations it operates, nor where they are, nor how many employees they have or what size they are, let alone facts about tasks and targets. Letters (and indeed questions in the Houses of Parliament) to this effect are answered with a stock response along the lines of: 'It is not this government's policy to reveal information about the operations of GCHQ...'. Officials and military intelligence employees cannot be interviewed. Even historical records are severely restricted (see Chapter 2). And, as we have seen, the government did not provide publicly available detail of its military 'Communications Sites' in the House of Commons Defence Committee report on the defence estate. In any case there is frequently subterfuge about the real purpose of a site, as Campbell demonstrated so well in 1984, and which the story of Menwith Hill and other sites in North Yorkshire will confirm. 'Communications' is a bland government generalisation that does indeed cover some sites that are used to relay information, however it also hides satellite ground-stations for weapons control, missile defence systems, Signals Intelligence sites and any number of other intelligence-related operations. However sometimes the dissemblance is more active as for example with the case of the American presence at Chicksands (see Chapter 7).

However even with military lands more generally, reliable data is a problem. The Defence Analytical Services Agency (DASA), provides yearly statistical data on defence including the area and composition of the defence estate. However, my own experience with trying to establish how this data is obtained indicate that Defence Estates (formerly DEO) do not necessarily provide DASA with accurate figures from which they compile their more limited statistics. I requested figures for the area of the defence estate, and changes in the area year-on-year, at county level. After initially being told that such data did not exist, I was later provided with a table of figures. However even cursory scrutiny revealed many errors, in particular lines of data for one county simply repeated for the county listed below. I questioned Defence Estates on this and was told that the errors resulted from a combination of changes to computer systems, and unfamiliarity with data input procedures on both new

and old systems. Despite a promise of correct figures, after two years, I have still not received any. One could argue that as Defence Estates does not operate at county scale but using its own 'regions', and thus this lack of reliable data at a different scale is not a real problem, however it does beg a more general question of how much the British government really does know about its own land holdings, and how much agencies and departments are prepared to bluff and prevaricate rather than admit poor internal auditing.

Data about location, size, numbers of employees, purposes and missions can sometimes be obtained from secondary sources, for example websites, books, journals and newspaper articles, however these often do not reveal how they obtained the information; this applies equally to qualitative information. Local Authorities are sometimes willing to offer limited data on employment (though one is unable to differentiate support personnel from GCHQ analysts in this data due to the state's control of this information). One can also obtain data about British intelligence sites from United States intelligence sources which publish such data more openly (even on websites), for example, where a base in Britain is noted in a list of NSA facilities as a 'foreign-operated accommodation site', one can immediately tell that this is a British intelligence site that sometimes hosts American personnel, even if this site may not be acknowledged officially by the UK government or may be defined as a 'storage and supply' facility. Of course such lists in themselves will only result in partial information, because sites that have no direct operational connection with U.S. intelligence will not be listed. One can also never be sure that the apparent openness of the Americans is hiding yet more secret facilities.

Whether this suspicion is valid or not depends to a large degree on the researcher's politics. With secondary sources, particularly the use of popular books and articles, one has to consider the positionality and agenda of the writer: Nigel West and Duncan Campbell, for example, come from different ends of the conventional political spectrum, and while, for arguments sake let us say that West has better 'official' access but may be unwilling or unable to reveal more than a limited view, Campbell might rely on 'unofficial' sources but be prepared to relay exactly what they have to say, or to interpret the sources in ways which West would not. However there is a more general problem both in reading particular authors

and in immersing oneself in the world of intelligence itself that brings with it more than the usual academic concerns about objectivity and positionality; as Bernard Porter writes:

Secret Service history may be a health hazard. After long periods immersed in it everything looks different. Apparently solid objects start quivering and crumbling; fixed points move; spaces appear where there used to be shapes; and shapes start materializing out of nothing at all. There is no firm ground anywhere; no certainties, no reference points, people turn out to be not what they seemed ; institutions do not function as they were supposed to; accepted truths may be deliberate disinformation; spies and moles are everywhere; and the cleverest and most dangerous of them are those who appear most unlikely or innocent.³

Although with any investigation there has to be a balance between naiveté/openness and scepticism/separateness, in the case of intelligence services one is not just dealing with the way people 'lie' or play roles and adopt 'forms' of social behaviours (see below) as part of everyday interaction. As Gill points out, "the agencies concerned have a professional interest in the manipulation of information and its use as a tool in the trade"⁴. Thus there are several levels of dissemblance to be considered and additional, perhaps even unknowable, reasons as to why such dissemblance might be practised. This will become most visible in discussion of revealed information by sources claiming to be ex-employees of the intelligence services, or to be in contact with such people.

Obtaining Data

Given the obvious limitations to data collection, how can one go about answering the questions outlined in Chapter 2? The first point to be made is that it would be unwise for such a broad study, albeit based on particular places, to limit itself in terms of data collection methodology. I have thus used several methods without particular concern as to their disciplinary origin.

³ Porter, Bernard (1992) *Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain, 1790-1988*, London: Routledge, 228.

⁴ Gill, Peter (1994) *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence Agencies and the Liberal Democratic State*, London: Frank Cass, 35.

The first are what are generally called 'nonreactive'⁵ or 'unobtrusive'⁶ methods, unobtrusive in the sense that the data is "gathered by means that do not involve direct elicitation of information from research subjects"⁷. According to Raymond Lee unobtrusive methods fall into three main categories: found data; captured data; and retrieved data⁸. The first two need not concern us here, but the last area is where most of the unobtrusive research for this thesis was concentrated.

Firstly, I would include, though most authorities do not, the often under-rated and usually disliked task of searching through academic and popular written work on the particular and general subjects relating to the study. Some of the results of this particular aspect are summarised in Chapter 2. This work has the dual role of helping to define the 'problem' and the 'questions', but also to begin to answer those questions. Traditionally, such work is published in books, journals, and popular media (newspapers and magazines), however there are increasingly individuals or groups who prefer to bypass traditional publishing methods by using the Internet. Web-sites and list-servers on intelligence abound, and their quality varies. However, they have many advantages, especially in this sensitive area: they are cheap, usually non-commercial (there are fewer considerations of 'audience', or who will buy the work); and most importantly, they can avoid problems of either self- or state censorship, particularly if the sites are 'mirrored', that is situated on computers in several different state jurisdictions. It is easy to think that such sources present greater problems than traditional methods, but the authority attributed to the printed word is generally illusory. Academic journals are refereed in most cases and this can sometimes offer some guarantee of 'quality', but usually this refereeing can only hope to cover the internal logic of the argument and the theoretical content, particularly if the subject written about is new, and of course referees have their own agendas and politics. In any case, the trend in academic publishing is towards quantity and frequency, which tends to devalue refereeing procedures further. This is not to attack the whole concept of academic journals *per se*, merely to point out that one needs to be equally sceptical and careful of information, regardless of its source or method of publication. Searching on the Internet does require some particular knowledge and/or experience in using

⁵ Webbe, E. J. et al. (1981) *Nonreactive Measures in the Social Sciences*, Dallas TX: Houghton Mifflin.

⁶ Lee, Raymond E. (2000) *Unobtrusive Methods in Social Research*, Buckingham: Open University Press.

⁷ *ibid.*, 1.

⁸ *ibid.*

search engines, following hyper-text links and so on, and in particular in knowing when to stop looking: many sites are simply derived from material on others. As with interviewing (see below), recommendation by activists and other researchers can help in more directed searching. Searching was carried out using a variety of engines, including Yahoo!⁹ for general searching and AltaVista¹⁰ for more specific sources, as well as by following links on various intelligence and cryptography resource sites, in particular the cryptology database *Cryptome*¹¹ and the Federation of American Scientists' Intelligence Research Project¹².

Secondly, there are archival sources: collections of original documents, data sets and so on. Searching and analysing this kind of material involves greater awareness of historiographic techniques and understanding. The primary resource in this area in the UK, as far as official documents are concerned, is the Public Record Office (PRO). We saw some of the problems with how material enters or is prevented from entering the PRO in Chapter 2. However with diligent and lateral searching, it is possible to find occasional documents that either reveal more than the state believed, or which have slipped through the net of censorship entirely. Sometimes mistakes can force documents to be placed in the PRO, for example accidental revelation by a minister or civil servant. Unlike the UK government, the Library of Congress in the USA contains far more extensive resources, however for budgetary reasons, the use of this facility was beyond the horizon of this researcher. However, greater use of the Internet has meant that some official archives are starting to appear in electronic format, the most notable being the National Security Archive at George Washington University, which contains many officially released documents relating to the NSA¹³. The European Union's institutions, in particular the Parliament also make extensive use of electronic publication facilities. Part of this category of official archival sources, are what Gary Marx calls: 'institutionalized discovery methods'¹⁴, which include the records of parliamentary and judicial investigations and enquiries and so forth, which result in official recognition of a problem and the 'reading into the record' of information which might otherwise have remained speculative or theoretical. Clearly the United States is a better source of such

⁹ <http://www.yahoo.com>

¹⁰ <http://www.altavista.com>

¹¹ <http://www.cryptome.org>

¹² <http://www.fas.org/irp>

¹³ <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>

information, the classic example in this field being the Church Committee investigation into National Security agencies in 1975¹⁵; however increasingly, there are examples from the UK and Europe, most recently the material published by the Scientific and Technological Options Assessment (STOA) Committee of the European Parliament which gives a detailed picture of the technical, legal, economic and cultural aspects of surveillance technologies in Europe¹⁶. Court cases are also important in this area, and the many involving both authors and activists with regard to SIGINT are another key source of information here.

Other archives accessed include: local government land-use and economic planning records, which can vary in their usefulness depending on the filing systems employed and the time staff are able to offer to help; local library service archives of local and regional newspapers; and finally, private archives and collections of documents. The latter were particularly useful in the case of peace campaigners, where it happened that one member of Otley Peace Action Group (OPAG), who happened to be a museum curator, had decided to collect and file all sorts of information relating to the campaign against Menwith Hill. To support this important unofficial archive I offered a reciprocal arrangement to supply copies of any relevant information in return for use of this valuable resource.

The documents examined included not just texts, but also photographs, maps and videotaped material from both commercial media and private sources. Finally, there were various official and private documents and records that came into my possession that were either of dubious providence and authenticity or were not yet scheduled for official release.

The case of private archives shows that there is no clear line between 'unobtrusive methods' and more ethnomethodological approaches. Indeed local government officials, staff at the PRO and so on, could all be considered actors, however minor, in the study, and major actors in the case of OPAG's archivist. Getting access to the latter's collection was part of the process of entry into the world of that particular group, therefore cannot really be separated

¹⁴ Marx, Gary (1984) Notes on the discovery, collection and assessment of hidden and dirty data, in Schneider, J. W. and Kitsuse, J. (eds.) *Studies in the Sociology of Social Problems*, Norwood NJ: Ablex.

¹⁵ United States Senate (1976) *Hearings before the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, Volume 5: The National Security Agency And Fourth Amendment Rights*, October 29 And November 6, 1975, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 149-150. Available on-line at: <<http://cryptome.org/nsa-4th.htm>>

from the process of interviewing (see Chapter 7). Many of the authors read were also important actors in the story of Menwith Hill, and thus reading their work was also part of a process of understanding their perspective.

Interviewing then is the third major area of data collection. The first thing to say is to repeat that the range of people interviewed was limited by the fact that UK government and American NSA officials refused to be interviewed. I was limited therefore to those with non-state or anti-state surveillance perspectives. However, even here, there was a massive diversity of actors and a range of responses to my enquiries. MPs concerned with intelligence and with Menwith Hill in particular proved harder to talk to than expected largely because of the change in government which has resulted in changed perspectives on what is acceptable discourse, particularly amongst Labour MPs (see Chapter 6). Peace campaigners were generally open responsive, possible because of my own previous involvement in peace and environmental campaigning, and partly because openness is a general feature of anti-militarism (see Chapter 7). Privacy and anti-state activists and radical authors varied in their responses from suspicion, to openness, but there was a general unwillingness to examine the reasons and motivations for involvement (see Chapter 6).

In obtaining interviews, I generally followed a 'snowballing' methodology, a technique common in ethnomethodological approaches, where initial contacts suggest further potential interviewees and so on, until the suggestions begin to overlap and become circular. This approach also helps obtain entry into particular groups through peer introduction and recommendation. However, I did not concentrate on any particular group of people in great detail - this was not a microsociological study, but an attempt to get impressions of meaning across a broad range of sources.

In terms of the way in which I conducted interviews, I followed Steiner Kvale in treating them very much as conversations¹⁷. They were conducted at locations that were the choice of the interviewee, often informally over lunch or a drink, but sometimes, particularly with MPs more formally in their place of work. Occasionally, where face-to-face interviews were not

¹⁶ <http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg4/stoa/>

¹⁷ Kvale, Steinar (1996) *InterViews: an Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.

possible, telephone or even e-mail interviews were used. This made the interviewing of non-UK residents possible, and also those who were unwilling to meet face-to-face.

The interviews were not structured in the sense that there was no strict list or pattern of questions that was consistent. There were particular topics that I made sure that the conversation covered. The way in which I did this was dependent on the impression I received during the interview of what was the most effective way to do so in each particular case. Some interviewees preferred to be given particular questions to which to respond, other were able to talk more freely and address issues *inter alia*. I was thus able to get good general information about each interviewee as well as have the topics I needed to address. Although Kvale argues that a certain deliberate naiveté is necessary on the part of the interviewer, I found that the level of knowledge both assumed and required by interviewees varied. Most interviews were conducted after I was familiar in general and often quite specific terms with the issues, and I was thus able to assume the role requested in most cases. In no case however was I 'not genuine' in the sense that I did not pretend that I had knowledge that I did not have, or conceal information that I did.

Except in the case of telephone interviews and some particular situations where audio equipment was unavailable, all interviews were recorded on tape with the permission of the interviewees. Great care was taken to mark what was 'on' and 'off-the-record' and to seek clarification from the interviewee as to how they and their statements were to be ascribed in any written work resulting from the research. Interviews were only selectively transcribed, for reasons given below.

In summary, a mixture of obtrusive and unobtrusive methods were used to gather data, using a range of methodologies from historiographic to ethnomethodological. The overall research might be labelled a 'case-study', in particular, what Robert Yin refers to as an 'embedded' case-study, that is a case-study as part of broad field of enquiry¹⁸. In fact there are three 'cases' embedded in the thesis: the case of RAF Menwith Hill, which might be termed the primary case, and two secondary cases, CSO Irton Moor and RAF Fylingdales, which are used both

¹⁸ Yin, Robert K. (1994) *Case-Study Research: Design and Methods*, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.

supportively, in the sense of providing further information relevant to the primary case, and comparatively, in bringing out both inter-state and inter-local differences and similarities.

Data Analysis Methodology

Any research methodology is artificial. It will inevitably produce a 'story'; an interpretation of the information uncovered that has much in common with fiction, in that in making sense of complex phenomena, simplifications and judgements are constantly made that render it individual and impossible to reproduce. The key test with transdisciplinary work that combines many types of information to create such a story, is whether the story makes sense internally and to the reader(s), whether it is meaningful, and perhaps even useful. As with data collection, several analytical methods will be used from different sources, with a view to synthesis and a fresh use of each, and with a general unwillingness to accept any ideological baggage that comes with them. As Adrian Atkinson writes: "many a conventional tool of social analysis can be plundered to good effect", but we should be careful for "all technologies come burdened with their original purpose and, indeed, the ghost of the context which created them"¹⁹. Much of the data was in the form of texts or oral conversations; the approach to analysis will therefore start with how one can make sense of such 'discursive' material, in the first place with a consideration of discourse analysis.

Discourse and Ideology

Discourse analysis emerged from studies of language, however within linguistics, discourse is defined in quite a narrow way: "any connected piece of speech or writing"²⁰, the connections being defined by cohesion, or explicit linguistic links, and coherence, "the degree to which a discourse makes sense in terms of our knowledge of the world"²¹. In this context discourse analysis is often similarly limited to close grammatical analysis of speech, a form of semantics, where "meaning is intrinsic to the linguistic form containing it, and is always present in that form"²². Pragmatics is a more recent development which "studies how utterances communicate meaning in context"²³, the size of the context varying according to the approach used. In this sense discourse analysis in the social sciences could be seen as a form of pragmatics; indeed some of the many varieties of discourse analysis even within (and

¹⁹ Atkinson, Adrian (1993) *Principles of Political Ecology*, London: Bellhaven, 213.

²⁰ Trask, R. L. (1999) *Key Concepts in Language and Linguistics*, London: Routledge, 78.

²¹ *ibid.*, 79.

²² *ibid.*, 269

²³ *ibid.*, 243.

around the edges of) linguistics, to which Deborah Schiffrin provides a good guide²⁴, are oriented in this direction.

Within social research, discourse also has a range of meanings, which relate in varying degrees to linguistic discourse analysis²⁵. Stuart Hall defines discourse as:

a group of statements which provide a language for talking about - i.e.: a way of representing - a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed²⁶.

However discourses do not just spring into life or appear out of nowhere. Discourses are social products, they arise out of the relations between people and groups of people interacting in social situations, communicating. As Ray Harris says:

there is no message that is independent of the activities involved in its formulation, and no such process which is independent of the particular communication situation in which it occurs²⁷.

Interaction involves power. This aspect was emphasised in Foucault's interpretation of the idea of discourse. He argued that discourse *seeks* power, in other words that discourse is the way in which the social world is constructed and controlled by the powerful, through individual discourses working together as 'discursive formations'²⁸. Furthermore the action of discursive formations actually "obscure repression in modern bourgeois society"²⁹. Thus discourse acts simultaneously to dominate and to hide the ways in which domination operates.

²⁴ Schiffrin, Deborah (1994) *Approaches to Discourse*, Malden MA: Blackwell,

²⁵ For a broad and well-introduced selection, see: Jaworski, Adam and Coupland, Nicholas (1999) *The Discourse Reader*, London: Routledge.

²⁶ Hall, Stuart (1992) The west and the rest: discourse and power, in Hall and Gieben, Bram (eds.) *Formations of Modernity*, Oxford: Polity / Open University Press, 291.

²⁷ Harris, Ray (1996) *Sign, Language and Communication*, London: Routledge.

²⁸ Foucault, Michel (1975) *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, New York: Vintage.

Combining these interpretations, it can be seen that the relationship between discourse and society is a dialectic one, as Norman Fairclough puts it:

discourse is shaped by structures, but also contributes to shaping and reshaping them, to reproducing and transforming them. These structures are most immediately of a discursal/ideological nature - orders of discourse, codes and their elements such as vocabularies or turn-taking conventions - but they also include in a mediated form political and economic structures, relationships in the market, gender relations, relations within the state and within the institutions of civil society³⁰.

This is not to say that there are no other factors that influence social relations (or discourse); we will return to this at the end of the Chapter.

Teun Van Dijk has recently provided an incisive account of the relationship between discourse and society³¹, which is worth recounting in some detail as it will form the basis of the analysis used in this thesis. He argues that discourse is "a *practical, social and cultural phenomenon*"³², and that discourse analysis should be concerned with all forms of communication, referred to in shorthand as 'text and talk'. Further social discourse analysis should investigate the functions of discourse within complex processes of social reproduction. Van Dijk proposes four key concepts which help to illuminate discourse: action; context; power; and, ideology. Each concept includes many aspects which are important in themselves.

For the concept of action, the first of these is intentionality - discourse must be recognised as a purposeful action. However, this purpose may not always be obvious to others and the end result may be different to the intended aim; therefore, perspective is also important. The results of discourse may be considered in three stages: the components (elements that make

²⁹ Kurzweil, Edith (1996) *The Age of Structuralism: From Levi-Strauss to Foucault (Revised Edition)*, New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers, 9.

³⁰ Fairclough, Norman (1995) *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, Harlow: Longman.

³¹ Van Dijk, Teun A. (1997) Discourse as interaction in society, in Van Dijk (ed.) *Discourse as Social Interaction. Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction (Vol. 2)*, London: Sage, 1-37.

³² *ibid.*, 1.

up the discourse); the consequences (the immediate results); and the implications (the longer term or higher level results). Finally, within the domain of action, there is the crucial element of interaction, that is when several actions combine.

The consideration of context is what Van Dijk believes constitutes the difference between abstract or pure linguistic discourse analysis and social discourse analysis: "social discourse analysis define text and talk as *situated*: Discourse is described as taking place or being accomplished 'in' a social situation"³³. However, as mentioned earlier, while discourse may take place within the social, the social can also be considered a product of discourse: "contexts may themselves be shaped and changed as a function of discourse structures"³⁴. The elements of context include some relatively simple aspects: the modality (i.e.: exactly how the discourse is being accomplished, via speech or writing etc.); the genre (news report, academic text, conversation etc.); the setting (institutional, informal etc.); props (items, technology etc.); actions (here conceived of as other forms of communication which might either facilitate or hinder the discourse); the knowledge needed to understand the explanations offered; and the rules and norms governing the way the discourse takes place.

However other aspects are more complex. The context also includes the nature of the participants, some characteristics of whom, for example gender, race, education, social class, are likely to be more consistently relevant than other particular abilities or attributes which may be more situation-specific. There is also the 'higher level' situation, and the relationship of 'local' to 'global' context. In order to make sense of discourse, there needs to be an understanding of the relationship of the discourse to society at large, or particular parts of it, and a determination of how and where to draw the boundaries of that context. This is a complex, and often, for the researcher, research-specific question. As Van Dijk comments: "there is no *a priori* limit to the scope and level of what counts as the relevant context", and indeed that "context analysis may be as complex as discourse analysis itself"³⁵. For the purposes of this research, the context analysis will in fact be more prominent in many cases, for reasons that shall be explained below. Finally there is the perennial question of the construction of contexts by the discourse and participants themselves, both in terms of the

³³ *ibid.*, 11.

³⁴ *ibid.*, 12.

³⁵ *ibid.*, 14.

way actors actually negotiate and change immediate contexts, and in terms of the subjective 'mental constructs' of contexts held by actors, which may or may not be identifiable as part of the discourse.

As we have seen, discourse involves power. There have been many attempts to categorise and break power into component parts, some of which were considered in Chapter 2. Power is conventionally thought to rest ultimately on force or coercion, as in Wright Mills' classic definition of the powerful as: "those who are able to realise their will even if others resist it"³⁶. This coercive power was contrasted by Steven Lukes, with the idea of power as "a collective capacity or achievement"³⁷. This latter definition is sometimes associated with the idea of individual and group 'empowerment', which is crucial to some of the discourses of protest against military sites³⁸. Lukes argues that the two basic definitions reflect basic beliefs about human nature; in the former case that humans are fundamentally violent and prone to struggle and competition for survival; the second that humans are intrinsically co-operative and social.

Van Dijk's analysis includes and extends these notions. His first category is forms of control linked to the threat of, or ability to use, force. This subdivides into actual coercive force, which uses power almost as a resource; and mental power, commands dependent on "special access to special speech acts"³⁹. Secondly, there is persuasive power, which while it may not depend on the possibility of coercion, can rest on "control over a material or symbolic power resource"⁴⁰. Hegemonic power is the next category. This is very much the generation of consensus that Gramsci described (see Chapter 2) and which is elaborated within the context of discourse analysis by Fairclough⁴¹, but the scale of that consensus is not restricted to a class in relation to society, rather it concerns any social group in relation to another:

³⁶ Mills, C. Wright (1956) *The Power Elite*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9.

³⁷ Lukes, Steven (1982) Power and autonomy, in Botomore, T. and Nisbet, R. (eds.) *A History of Sociological Analysis*, New York: Basic Books, 636.

³⁸ See: Macy, Joanna R. (1983) *Despair and Personal Power in the Nuclear Age*, Philadelphia PA: New Society.

³⁹ Van Dijk 1997 *op cit.*, 17.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 19.

⁴¹ Fairclough 1995 *op cit.*

the discourse of a powerful group may be such that others will form the intentions and accomplish the acts as if they were totally without constraint and consistent with their own wishes and interests.⁴²

This kind of power can be very subtle and even be used to generate group responses that are the opposite of what was thought by the receiving group as the intended response. This is exactly the model that Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky developed in their analysis of the American (and to a lesser extent British) media and its relationship to state activity⁴³. Their 'propaganda model' of the media is also relevant to Van Dijk's next category of power as/in discourse, that of access. By this, it is meant not only access to material resources but also to symbolic resources, the "means of discursive production"; discourse itself and more particularly "preferential access to public discourse", and the ability to control the context and structure of discourse, for example the political agenda, relevant expertise, and even the geographical layout of a space where discourse takes place, are power resources⁴⁴. Van Dijk argues that these symbolic power resources may be increasingly important when compared to more coercive forms like economic and military/political power. He claims that power is not monolithic but shared and distributed - even academics have large resources of discursive power in relation to many other groups in society - and in fact when groups gain even partial access to public discourse, their symbolic power can at least influence the activities of more conventionally powerful groups, and develop 'counter-power', the example given being that of Amnesty International's ability to influence world opinion and the behaviour of even dictatorial regimes. Van Dijk is very careful to argue that this ability to generate counter-power through counter-discourse does not mean that power as conventionally described is meaningless, merely that it is contingent, and that, in any case, power is not always negative: it is in its use and in its consequences that one can determine its moral value. However, I believe that in most cases the various forms of power: economic, symbolic, military, are interdependent: for example, significant economic power can enable control of symbolic resources through the media, can buy weapons and troops, and so forth.

⁴² *ibid.*, 19.

⁴³ Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon. See also: Chomsky, Noam (1989) *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, London: Pluto Press.

The final concept needed to develop a rounded social discourse analysis is ideology. Ideology has been used in different ways. In Marxist analysis ideology usually refers to mistaken or misguided systems of belief, according to Louis Althusser: "ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence"⁴⁵. Ideology in this context is often used instead of discourse- one Marxist commentator in a recent collection of essays attacked a contribution for using the term 'discourse' on these grounds⁴⁶ - although as Van Dijk notes, it can be used as the term for the "the means by which ideologies are persuasively communicated in society, and thereby help reproduce power and domination of special groups or classes"⁴⁷. Fairclough (strangely for a linguist) insists that the idea of 'Critical' Discourse Analysis actually depends on accepting this particular definition of the word: "what makes a theory critical is that it takes a pejorative view of ideology as a means through which social relations of power are reproduced"⁴⁸. Van Dijk regards this view as overly limited. I would suggest that 'ideology' and 'discourse' are rather different things, though certainly interrelated. 'Ideology' I use to refer to cultural systems of belief, whereas as 'discourse' I associate much more with the ways in which these beliefs are operationalized in the everyday worlds of communication. What makes an analysis critical is not whether it uses any particular word in a way which coincides with its use by a particular authority, but in a more general sense to speak the truth regardless of authority (whether political or academic), to tease out and reveal hidden relations of power, and to further the progressive goals of liberation (in the sense of self-unfolding or flourishing) and justice. Within Critical Discourse Analysis, this goal is suggested by Gunther Kress:

If linguistic, cultural and economic resources are at present unequally distributed along lines of class, gender, age, profession, ethnicity, race, religion, and so on, with the consequent formations of subjectivities... then it

⁴⁴ Van Dijk 1997 *op cit.*, 20.

⁴⁵ Althusser, Louis (1971) *Ideology and ideological state apparatuses: notes towards an investigation*, in Beinsler, B. (trans.) *Lenin, Philosophy and Other Essays*, London: New Left Books, 16.

⁴⁶ Walker, R. A. (1997) *Commentary on Part IV: Field of dreams or the best game in town*, in Goodman, D. and Watts, M. (eds.) *Globalising Food: Agrarian Questions and Global Restructuring*, 273-284, London: Routledge.

⁴⁷ Van Dijk 1997 *op cit.*, 25.

⁴⁸ Fairclough 1995 *op cit.*, 17.

behoves critical language projects... to begin to turn their attention to this enterprise.⁴⁹

This has also been well developed within geography by David Harvey, who makes a compelling argument for social and ecological justice as the goals of social research⁵⁰. Any one interpretation of critical theory might be Marxist, or it might be anarchist, feminist, anti-racist, ecological and so on, as long as it sought to act for the goals set out above; although it would be a poor critical theorist who was unfamiliar with Marx and subsequent traditions of scholarship. As long as its terminology is comprehensible and explained, there should be no quarrel with its use of particular words. Roger Fowler, one of the originators of Critical Linguistics, agrees that 'critical' scholarship is not confined to Marxism, instead that it:

insists that all representation is mediated, moulded by the value-systems that are ingrained in the medium... used for representation; it challenges common sense by pointing out that something could have been represented some other way, with a very different significance⁵¹.

However, Fowler also mistakenly assumes that all critical discourse analysts would share this view: "critical linguists have always been careful to avoid the definition of ideology as 'false consciousness'... making it clear that they mean something more neutral"⁵². Ideology then is considered as:

a society's implicit theory of what types of objects exist in the world (categorisation); of the way that that world works (causation); and of the values to be assigned to objects and processes (general propositions or

⁴⁹ Kress, Gunthar (1996) Representational resources and the production of subjectivity: questions for the theoretical development of Critical Discourse Analysis in a multi-cultural society, in Caldas-Coulthard, Carmen Rosa and Coulthard, Malcolm *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, 15-31, London: Routledge, 16.

⁵⁰ Harvey, David (1996) *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, Oxford; Blackwell.

⁵¹ Fowler, Roger (1996) On critical linguistics, in Caldas-Coulthard, Carmen Rosa and Coulthard, Malcolm *op cit.*, 3- 14, 4.

⁵² *ibid.*, 10-11.

paradigms). These implicit beliefs constitute 'common sense' which provides a normative base for discourse.⁵³

The more general use of ideology is generally supported by Van Dijk, but he also unpacks ideology and its dialectical relationship to discourse in greater detail, and is more critical about the functions of ideology in and around discourse. He argues that "ideologies... serve to manage the problem of the *co-ordination* of the acts or practice of individual members of a group"⁵⁴; thus ideologies are social and shared. But ideologies also define social groups in relation to 'others', therefore:

ideologies are developed to co-ordinate the socially shared representations that define and protect the 'answers' that each group provides to manage... fundamental social problems and issues in relation to, or in conflict with, those of other groups⁵⁵.

The goal then is to understand: how ideologies serve these functions, whether they are socially effective (regardless of their factual validity); the ways in which ideologies control knowledge and "the evaluative belief systems (attitudes) groups share about certain social issues"⁵⁶; the structure of the ideology; and finally, how individuals can be members of overlapping social groups which may not possess consistent ideologies, thus: "the actual practices of social actors may show contradictions and variation, depending on the measure of identification with a specific group and ideology"⁵⁷; and the relationship of ideology both to discourse and to societal structure.

How to carry out discourse analysis

Just as there are different views on discourse and its relationship to society, there are differing ways of carrying out discourse analysis even within critical social discourse analysis. Norman Fairclough has argued for detailed analysis of texts as the key point, within social research in general and not just linguistics. This is because:

⁵³ *ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁴ Van Dijk 1997 *op cit.*, 26.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, 27.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, 29.

close attention to texts sometimes helps to give grounding to the conclusions arrived at without it, sometimes suggests how they might be elaborated or modified, and occasionally suggests that they are misguided⁵⁸.

In this context, he considers it essential to study form as well as meaning. I would agree with Fairclough that "texts constitute one important form of social action"⁵⁹, however this does not mean that considering the minutiae of grammar and syntax within a text will necessarily add to the understanding of the meaning of the text, or to the understanding of the discourse structure of which the text is or could be part. This is not to say that this is never important, for example if one was analysing everyday practices in social interaction (conversations etc.), then such micro-linguistic analysis would be vital. A researcher must determine the level of detail that is relevant to the scale of the subject at hand. The problem for the subject of social relations around intelligence sites is that such a topic, even viewed at its narrowest, takes in scales of interaction and discourse that vary from the inter-individual to the inter-state. I have chosen not to take a narrow view, but rather to explore as large a part of the networks around these sites as time would allow, without abandoning the analysis of 'text and talk' to a series of meaningless generalisations. This does mean that, *pace* Fairclough, I have chosen to concentrate on meaning and context rather than form and detailed linguistic analysis (which in any case I do not feel qualified to undertake). On occasions there will be elements of the latter, for example, examining rhetoric, style and lexicalization (the attaching of descriptors to particular words or phrases), but they will be for very specific purposes of elucidation when it is absolutely necessary to the argument.

Semiotic Approaches

In Chapter 2, the notion of the iconic landscape was introduced, along with the notion that landscapes could be read like texts. The idea of iconography, the study of symbols in context, would fit with social discourse analysis and form part of the context, and indeed any written or spoken communication concerning landscapes and how they are viewed would actually be discourse, but it is also different. Many of the pieces of evidence I will examine will not just be 'text and talk', but other things: drawings of proposed satellites, maps, photographs of

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 30.

⁵⁸ Fairclough 1995 *op cit.*, 187-188.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, 208.

landscapes. While these can act both as context to and objects of discourse, they can be discussed or referred to or argued about, they are also products of social processes and relations in their own right. How can one begin to talk about these things in a critical way?

One answer is through Semiotics. Semiotics can be defined as the "the study of meaning from sign systems"⁶⁰, in which things are treated as texts composed of interacting signs embedded within the text. There is of course a particular emphasis on the social nature of signs. Andrew Donaldson refers to the methodology of such an ethnomethodological approach as the semiotic analysis of language worldview⁶¹. According to Nigel Rapport, in this approach culture is "a fund of behavioural forms"⁶², such as language, scientific concepts, gender and so on, and the task is to describe and examine the way individuals and groups use social 'forms', adding meaning to those forms (or changing them) through interpretation and interaction. Rapport is here adopting Simmel's distinction between content and form in society⁶³, and combining it with Anthony Cohen's conception of the symbolic nature of community: "people construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity"⁶⁴.

Worldview here is not exactly the same as ideology, even in its non-pejorative sense. According to Clifford Geertz, worldview is one of two components of what makes a 'culture', the other being 'ethos', which is defined as "the moral (and aesthetic) aspect of a given culture, the evaluative elements", whereas the worldview is "the cognitive, existential aspects"⁶⁵. Ideology therefore has more in common with the term 'ethos', though it also contains elements of worldview.

Van Dijk's holistic view of social discourse analysis, despite its emphasis on 'text and talk' has some elements of a convergence with semiotics more widely. One scholar who does make the link explicit is Gunthar Kress. He argues that one of the most important tasks for

⁶⁰ Trask 1999 *op cit.*, 270

⁶¹ Donaldson, Andrew (1999) *Linguistic Minorities in Rural Development: A Case-Study of the Cornish Language and Cornwall*, Centre for Rural Economy Working Paper No. 42, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.

⁶² Rapport, Nigel (1993) *Diverse World-Views in an English Village*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 165.

⁶³ Simmel, Georg (1950) Fundamental problems of sociology (individual and society), in (trans. and ed. Wolff, Kurt H.) *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, New York: Free Press, 3-78.

⁶⁴ Cohen, Anthony P. (1989) *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, London: Routledge, 118.

discourse studies is to "conduct an ethnography of representational resources", which would include "a semiotic analysis of these resources" and not just language⁶⁶, the ultimate purpose being an "inventory of the larger linguistic, semiotic, cultural, social economy".⁶⁷ In treating things as well as actual 'text and talk' as text, this approach could extend and complement discourse analysis; this wide definition of semiotics has been expanded upon by Kress and Van Leeuwen, who argue that images (video, photos, design, architecture etc.) can be analysed semiotically, through a threefold consideration of: patterns of presentation, the way in which different elements (shape, colour etc.) of the thing work together articulate meaning; patterns of interaction, where social relations are encoded within the thing; and compositional resources, including the way the thing is framed and positioned, for example when photographs are 'cropped'⁶⁸. While this is a worthy project which I support, and to which I hope this thesis will contribute, it still leaves us a long way from a satisfactory analytic framework.

A potentially useful approach is that of Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Arising out of the discipline known as Science and Technology Studies (STS) or the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), ANT is an evolving theoretical grounding for the social sciences which seeks a middle ground between the extremes of structuralism and agency-centred approaches such as ethnomethodology and microsociology. Indeed some have claimed that it seeks to break down all the dualisms which are felt to afflict the study of society, for example: global/local; social/natural etc.⁶⁹.

Of course there have been other attempts to find this middle course before, most notably Anthony Giddens' Theory of Structuration⁷⁰, and ongoing attempts by Marxist geographers such as David Harvey to develop a relational view of the society/nature divide⁷¹; I shall return to these attempts in Chapter 9. Murdoch's recent review and outlining of 'a geography of

⁶⁵ Geertz, Clifford (1973) *Ethos, world view and the analysis of sacred symbols*, in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, London: Hutchinson, 126.

⁶⁶ Kress 1996 *op cit.*, 18.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, 19.

⁶⁸ Kress, Gunthar and Van Leeuwen, J (1996) *Reading Image: The Grammar of Visual Design*, London: Routledge.

⁶⁹ Murdoch, J. (1997a) 'Towards a Geography of Heterogeneous Associations' *Progress in Human Geography* Vol. 21, No. 3, 321-337.

⁷⁰ Giddens, A. (1984) *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

⁷¹ Harvey 1996 *op cit.*

heterogeneous associations' finds both these approaches to be flawed⁷². Successive critiques have already devastated Giddens' claims and shown that Structuration theory eventually collapses back into an agency-centred voluntaristic view. Murdoch's own view of Harvey is that, although he recognises many of the same factors as actor-network theory, Harvey's scheme ultimately falls because it comes down so firmly on the social side of the divide he is trying to bridge; according to Murdoch, Harvey fails to attribute any more power to things other than that which is socially determined.

Drawing principally on the work of Latour, Callon and Law, but also tracing a distinctive path of his own is Jonathan Murdoch. In two articles, 'Towards a geography of heterogeneous associations'⁷³; and 'Inhuman/nonhuman/human'⁷⁴, outlines his view of the way in which long-lasting social structures appear out of social interactions, and the method by which power can act at a distance. The key point is the interaction between actor-networks which include non-human actors (objects, materials, other creatures etc.). Crucially within actor-network theory, these nonhuman actors are not merely passive but carry, change, and produce power and value in a symmetrical relationship with individuals and groups of human beings. Thus human societies do not exist solely by the interactions of individuals, but only because of the crucial role of non-human actors in making these interactions last beyond their specific occurrence in time and space.

Actor-network theory is potentially extremely complex, and thus raises questions about the methods used to trace actor-networks and the way in which these findings are represented and communicated. Marxists have also critiqued ANT for by-passing issues of class power and dominance, which makes it very hard to determine any ethical or moral result or course of action. Finally, ANT, at least in Murdoch's conception of it, seems to ignore cognitive issues around the transfer and perpetuation of social power. This last objection has been at least partially answered by Michael⁷⁵, to whom I shall return in Chapter 9.

⁷² Murdoch 1997a *op cit*.

⁷³ Murdoch 1997a *op cit*.

⁷⁴ Murdoch, Jonathan (1997b) Inhuman/nonhuman/human: actor-network theory and the prospects for a nondualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society, in *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* Vol. 15, 731-756.

⁷⁵ Michael, Mike (1996) *Constructing Identities: the Social, the Nonhuman and Change*, London: Sage.

For actor-network theory to be workable two fundamental conditions need to be fulfilled. Firstly, it needs to be theoretically robust and able to meet the criticisms made of it in terms of both social structure and cognition, for if actor-network theory is to break down dualisms it must synthesise rather than side-step. Secondly, it needs to produce answers to the question 'why?' rather than simply 'how?' as it is only through this kind of understanding that research can have any meaningful and positive relationship with social change.

Bruno Latour, who has always been at least an inspiration if not an active participant in the development of ANT, has criticised ANT on many of these grounds. His own recent analysis is a kind of 'beyond actor-network' approach, however it maintains and refines many of the principles that underlay the ANT project⁷⁶. It is still fundamentally based on ideas of symmetry between human and non-human, as well as the idea of 'translation', which originates in the work of Michel Serres. Latour uses the example of the gun-control debate in the USA to break into this field, arguing that rather than the gun or the person being the actor (or actant) responsible for the act of killing, rather it is a hybrid of the two, the gun-person or person-gun. It is not that the gun is invested with meaning or power by human social relations, or that the technology determines human behaviour, but that the combination of technology and humanity creates qualitatively different and new actants: "this translation is wholly symmetrical. You are different with a gun in your hand; the gun is different with you holding it"⁷⁷. Further, Latour continues that all activities that humans (or indeed other tool-using species) *do* with technology or that technologies *do*, are in fact done by associations of people and non-human things: "B-52's do not fly, the U.S. Air Force flies. Action is simply not a property of humans but of *an association of actants*"⁷⁸. Latour concludes that humans exist not in societies but in collectives, consisting of human, non-human and inhuman.

Latour also tries to explicitly include back in the concept of power, but only as another version of the idea of 'reason'; in the sense that both reason and force share the same qualities. Unfortunately, while it allows Latour to enrol ancient Greek philosophers and all manner of other actants into his network to pull off such an audacious statement, this is not in itself

⁷⁶ Latour, Bruno (1999) *Pandora's Hope: Essays in the Reality of Science Studies*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 179.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*, 182.

helpful. It would have been much more useful as Latour himself requested in an earlier article, to bring back power into the mesh itself, to see how hybrids are created, and see how networks are extended and recreated through the enrolment of human, non-human and inhuman things within them, not just in general when talking about 'society' or 'collectives', but with a differentiation between collectives. One could even satisfy Marxist analytical criteria here by admitting classes as collectives, competing on an uneven basis to extend their own networks, using amongst other things, discourse and symbolic resources (which are in themselves the products of previous translations between the human and the non-human). In this sense, power is not a different 'thing', but is at once the quality that allows network formation to take place and the product of network processes.

Terminology - a summary

We now have several words from different disciplines to describe the context in which intelligence sites operate: world, state, culture, society, community and so on. It is important that these terms are clearly defined in the way in which they will be used in this thesis. 'Person' or 'individual' will refer to a particular human being; human to the species as a whole. 'Community' refers to any group connected by common bonds or interests and which acknowledges the existence of these bonds. 'Society' refers to human beings, groups and communities and the political-economic systems or structures whose reproduction operates in a dialectical way with the actions of the members of the society, whether or not they acknowledge this. In this context an 'actor' is any person, group or community capable of relating socially, the term 'actant' refers to any human, nonhuman or inhuman involved in the creation of networks. 'Culture' will refer to the cognitive and behavioural patterns of members of a society. A 'state' is

a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders); its rule being sanctioned by the law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence⁷⁹.

In contrast, a 'nation' is a community constructed at a scale either actually or potentially equivalent to a state, thus a state may coincide with a nation or it may not and vice-versa. Therefore I will refer to 'inter-state' rather than 'international' relations (unless I am referring to the discipline) to describe formal cultural, economic and political relations between states, whereas I will use 'transnational', to describe any such activities that do not coincide with state boundaries. Finally, 'world' refers to the entirety of human social relations on (and around) the planet Earth. The latter is of a pair with 'Space', the entirety of the universe beyond the atmosphere; as opposed to 'space' more generally which is discussed in Chapter 2.

⁷⁹ Giddens, Anthony (1981) *A Critique of Historical Materialism (Volume 1)*, London: Macmillan, 190.

It may also be useful to ask what exactly I am doing in terms of the research activity being carried out. If one starts from an ethico-political basis, attitudes to any form of enquiry into social relations are already implicit if not explicit, being that social enquiry is conceived of *a priori* as embedded within a particular worldview and is therefore part of a process of social change. Adrian Atkinson invokes the critique of the Frankfurt School (and Gramsci) to argue that civil society (including class structures) suppress co-operation and play through inducement (commodities) and coercion (physical and ideological), and:

Social Science - whether positivist or Marxist - as ideological adjunct to this social and political system, acts as legitimisation of instrumentalism: its 'discovery' of the 'function' behind non-instrumental cultural manifestations represents a simple hegemonic denial of the validity of other cultures or non-instrumental cultural attributes. In other words all forms of rationality comprise our cultural prejudices - a kind of fanatical Judaeo-Christian millenarian self-righteousness - insisting on instrumentalism as the only validator of culture.⁸⁰

Thus both method and alternative social possibility ('egalitarian mutualism' is Atkinson's favoured descriptor) are interlinked and are defined as fundamentally anarchistic. Not everyone, especially those who consider that they are conducting 'social science', in the sense of overtly claiming neutrality or objectivity, will share this aim, which is why I use the more open phrases 'social inquiry' or 'social research'.

⁸⁰ Atkinson, Adrian (1991) *Principles of Political Ecology*, London: Belhaven Press, 61.

PART TWO.

INVESTIGATING SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SITES.

Introduction.

Part Two deals with what I will call the *official* and *public* representations of signals intelligence sites. Chapter 4 will introduce the public history of the sites, in particular Menwith Hill, with an emphasis on the less contentious and more certain aspects of the actual physical developments of these places. Chapter 5, on the other hand, will deal with the function of the sites, which will bring us into areas of interpretation, social construction and territorialization. The semiotic systems and discursive structures analysed in these chapter will be those either conceived and promoted by the state, the *official discourse*, or those factual interpretations which are in the public domain through published research, the media, common knowledge and so on, *public discourse*, which may include discourses actively opposing the official discourse, *counter-discourses*.

There is of course no clear dividing line between these two categories of representation, nor indeed between any of the categories used in this thesis. Whilst much public discussion will be based on official discourse, it can become informed by counter-discourses, which can also feed back into official discourse, even if this only means official denial of a particular element of the representations made through counter-discursive structures. There is also an extent to which powerful actors can absorb counter-discourses, and the actors responsible for these may end up becoming *de facto* spokespeople for the powerful.

These situations are extremely fluid and dependent on often delicate micropolitical situations inside state institutions, which are in turn entwined with wider strategic and inter-state macropolitical and economic considerations. The extent to which counter-discourses become public or even official by gaining power, or to which they are co-opted and thus become less powerful is a complex area and difficult to gauge, especially in the short-term.

Whilst Chapter 4 will consider the information within counter-discursive structures that have become *public discourse*, the processes of political and parapolitical research and campaigning, including the formation and promotion of counter-discourses, will be more fully considered in Part Three. At this stage I beg some tolerance of what may appear to be uncritical acceptance of 'facts' within social semiotic representations; this Part will deliberately err towards the naive rather than the sceptical, and allow official stories to be told, although particular discursive formations will be subject to critical analysis when the problems within the discourse relate to the questions at hand.

The emphasis is placed firmly on the primary case of Menwith Hill, rather than Irton Moor or Fylingdales. In the first case, this is because Irton Moor remains invisible to a greater extent than either of the other two sites: there is no campaigning activity connected to the site, and very little can be discovered about its functions. It is thus instructive as a case that demonstrates how relatively well understood Menwith Hill is, despite - or because of - its iconic status as the largest and most secretive American spy base in Europe. Fylingdales, unlike Irton Moor, is physically very visible and well known. It has also been less subject to information control and more can be determined about its creation. It is therefore useful as a comparative case to what is known of the early history of Menwith Hill. There is also campaigning activity centred around the United States' proposed National Missile Defense (NMD) programme of which Fylingdales (and Menwith Hill) would be a part. However this has so far been small-scale and involves many of the same groups as in the case of Menwith; because of space and time and because this campaign is only just beginning, I have chosen not to delve deeply into this aspect of the site.

Introduction

For both RAF Menwith Hill and CSO Irton Moor, there is little official publicly accessible information. Only one document in the Public Record Office relates directly to RAF Menwith Hill - this is the site map and bylaws released after a series of court cases in the 1990s (see Chapter 7), though there are several that concern the site indirectly. Most of the information about Menwith in this chapter comes from papers in the archives of Otley Peace Action Group, which includes newspaper reports, letters from Ministers, and various other documents; local newspapers; the Local Authority, and from the work of Duncan Campbell and James Bamford. For CSO Scarborough, there are no references in the Public Record Office to the site after 1945, and little research has been done into the facility and its work. In the case of Fylingdales, there is a fair amount on the creation of this site. The origins of Ballistic Missile Defence is obviously felt to be less sensitive than SIGINT and a number of documents have been declassified and put in the files of the Public Record Office in the 1990's. Some of these documents may be analysed here for the first time. However the documents cease after the mid-1960's, but there is some material available from political scientists, historians, NGOs, and from American ex-service personnel on the later history of the BMEWS programme that can help fill some of the gaps. In any case, I will concentrate on the debate surrounding the creation of Fylingdales as it provides an interesting comparative to Menwith Hill.

RAF Menwith Hill

The public history of Menwith Hill begins on 29th of October 1952, at a meeting of the Defence Committee in the Prime Minister's Map Room at the Ministry of Defence. According to the minutes, the first item agreed was:

the erection of a United States Army Intercept Station in the United Kingdom, subject to the conclusion of satisfactory financial arrangements and to the choice of a satisfactory site which would be, if possible, on land already requisitioned by one of the services and not of agricultural value.¹

Such land was not in the end to be found, and a suitable site was eventually specifically requisitioned over two years later. In 1955, rumours began to circulate in the Harrogate area that the U.S. Air Force was about to establish a station and 'township' on 562 acres of land owned by three local farmers bordering the main road between Harrogate and Skipton. This land in the parish of Menwith and Darley, was also at the southern edge of the scenic Nidderdale area of North Yorkshire. The War Office was said to be negotiating the compulsory purchase of the area. The editor of the local paper was a little baffled; the site was too small for a runway, but too big for a simple radar station - perhaps it was to be a NATO communications site².

In fact it was to be a listening post for US military intelligence, and was built in fits and spurts between 1956 and 1960. It was eventually officially occupied not by the U.S. Air Force but by the United States Army Security Agency (USASA). Duncan Campbell and Linda Melvern state that planning had started in 1954, and the local MP was slightly more aware of the real nature of the base than the local paper³. According to a historical brief prepared by the USASA for the Times newspaper, the station was originally designated Field Station (8613) and had a skeleton crew during the building. This crew consisted of "four officers and three enlisted personnel" who "were able to reside on the local economy" as there

¹ Defence Committee (1952) Minutes of a Meeting of the Defence Committee on 19th October, unpublished papers, Public Record Office, DEFE 13/38.

² *Harrogate Herald* War Office Negotiates for 500 Acres Near Harrogate Wednesday 2nd March, 1955, 1.

was no on-site accommodation at this time⁴. The stilted and clumsy military phrasing is typical of military bureaucratic discourse in attempting to present an official and correct form of language but using entirely the wrong words. It probably means that the men lived in local villages, rather than what it actually says, which is that they were financially supported by local people, or the Local Authority. The seven men were officially attached to the US 3rd Air Force, based at South Ruislip in Middlesex. According to the USASA Historical Office this was purely for "logistics support"⁵.

The USASA brief also gives a reason for the delays in building work. It claims that after construction starting in April 1956, "delays soon occurred... due to extreme adverse weather conditions, unforeseen soil problems requiring footing and foundations, and slowness in completion of the design"⁶. These might all have been factors, but there were other important reasons for the construction problems.

The first was the issue of land tenure. Several unpublished documents released as a result of court cases from 1991 onwards (see Chapter 7), tell at least part of the story. The early documents date from September 1957, and consist of a series of memoranda and letters between the 3rd USAF, its RAF liaison officer, the War Office (Lands Branch) and the Air Ministry. None of these documents give a name or designation for the site, merely referring to it as "the U.S. Army installation at Harrogate"⁷, or in one case the "U.S. Army wireless station"⁸. The USAF requested a tenure length of 21 years or more in order to persuade unnamed 'higher authorities' to release the money to continue building work⁹. Previously it appeared that only a generalised and unspecified tenure situation existed "in accordance with

³ Campbell, Duncan and Melvern, Linda (1980) America's Big Ear on Europe, *New Statesman*, July 18, 1980, 10-14.

⁴ USASA Historical Office (9152) *13th USASA Field Station*, brief prepared by the United States Army Security Agency Historical Office for the London Times I/NS/MH-RES, archives of Otley Peace Action Group (OPAG).

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Morgan, C. T. W. (1957) Letter from Wing Commander Morgan for Director of Administrative Plans, Air Ministry to the Under-Secretary of State, War Office (Lands Branch), A.251308/56/O.P.2, 6th November 1957, OPAG archives.

⁸ Bailey, S. H. (1957a) Memo from S. H. Bailey War Office, to HQ, 3rd U.S.A.F, 119/General/1065(L.B.(E)), 17th October 1957 OPAG archives.

⁹ Morgan 1957 *op cit.*

the terms of the War Office / U.S.A.F Agreement dated 11th December 1951¹⁰. The requested security of tenure arrangement was granted on 21st November 1957:

Security of tenure is... assured for the U.S. Army at Harrogate for a period of 21 years commencing from 1st June 1955, the date of occupation, renewable for an additional 21 years upon formal request of the U.S. Army, subject however to such occupation being terminated in accordance with the United States / War Office agreement of 11th December 1951.¹¹

However no evidence exists of the 1951 agreement, whether War Office / USAF or United States / War Office, and when the security of tenure terms were being renegotiated in 1976, neither the MoD nor the USAF could find any trace of it in their files (see below). A letter in the Public Record Office indicates that there were negotiations for an agreement in late 1951 with regards to "the transfer of responsibility for the administration of certain Royal Air Force stations from the respective Royal Air Force commands to the United States Air Force"¹². However Menwith Hill was not an existing RAF station prior to the Americans arriving, and the Station was an American army intelligence base, with the few initial personnel only attached to the U.S. Air Force for logistical purposes. The second further reason for the delay in construction was due to changes in the relationship between Britain and the USA around the time of the Suez crisis.

On 1st of January 1959, the station was renamed. It was designated the USASA 13th Field Station, and named Menwith Hill Station. According to USASA, the station became operational in June of that year, with another 32 personnel of unspecified rank¹³. On its official opening on 15th September 1960 with a staff of 450¹⁴, Menwith Hill Station was, as the local paper noted for the first and probably last time, opened to the general public¹⁵. The opening was of course limited to a purely social visit. While the people of the area were

¹⁰ Bailey 1957a *op cit*.

¹¹ Bailey, S. H. (1957b) Letter from War Office, to Director of Administrative Plans, Air Ministry, 119/General/1065(L.B.(E)), 21st November 1957, OPAG archives.

¹² Melville, R. H. (1951) Letter from Air Ministry to The Commanding General, 3rd USAF, G.311026(a)/BR/11/51/60, Unpublished Papers: Public Record Office AIR 2/10997.

¹³ USASA Historical Office *op cit*.

¹⁴ USASA Historical Office *op cit*.

allowed to 'see how the US Army lives' and marvel at their 'little America' with its US-style shops, bowling alley and so on, there was no suggestion that the nature of their work was open to inspection. Throughout the rest of the year there was a steady stream of stories in the local press stressing the friendly, domestic side of the base: the new teacher at the U.S. school¹⁶, the first wedding in the new chapel¹⁷ and so on. When more military issues were mentioned it was never specific and instead very much in the spirit of the time. In this context, an exchange of crosses between the USASA chapel and a local church was greeted as demonstrating: "our intention of standing together for what is right and against what is wrong" according to US military Chaplain, Father O'Donaghue¹⁸. This reflects standard Cold War discourse: God was quite clearly on 'our side', the American side, against the 'slave state' of the USSR (see Chapter 5). The purpose of this stream of stories is quite clear. The reports use symbols that reflect conservative societal norms: schools, the Church, weddings and the family and so on, to attempt to rapidly place Menwith Hill within the sphere of everyday life. Thus, far from being truly 'strange' or 'alien' or 'unusual', the Americans, while having odd and amusing recreational habits (bowling and hamburgers, for example), were culturally just like the English - Christians and democrats who cared about their children and who valued the nuclear family. This propaganda directed at normalising the Americans in the eyes of local people serve to avert a focus on the activities of the base: if 'they are just like us', and shared 'our' interests and 'our' cultural norms, then what 'they' were doing must be for 'our' benefit. That these mundane stories quickly tailed off as the base became an accepted fact of life to the majority of local people demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach, as does the ease with which protesters could later be constructed as outsiders (see Chapter 7). There still needed to be continual low level reinforcement of the message however: the involvement of wives of U.S. personnel in the local Women's Institute for example, and the annual 4th of July celebrations, as well as the various charitable causes funded by the organisations at the base.

Internal reorganisation took place again in 1962, when the station was split administratively into three parts: US Army Garrison, Menwith Hill Station, and the 13th USASA Operations

¹⁵ *Harrogate Herald* Public Can See What Life is Like in U.S. Army Camp, Wednesday 14th September 1960, and *Harrogate Herald* People See How U.S. Army Lives, Wednesday 21st September 1960.

¹⁶ *Harrogate Herald* American School in Yorkshire Dale, Wednesday 12th October 1960.

¹⁷ *Harrogate Herald* First Wedding in U.S. Army Base, Wednesday 16th November 1960.

Company. At its greatest extent under USASA, Menwith Hill had a staff of 506: 15 officers, 7 warrant officers and 484 enlisted personnel¹⁹. Yet the status of the base was to change within five years. Towards the middle of 1966, the local newspapers reported new rumours: the base was to be vacated by the soldiers, and in their place would come unnamed 'civilians'. Whilst the specific report was denied by the US, the ground was already prepared in the form of policy that had announced replacement of military personnel by civilians on grounds of administrative convenience²⁰. The USASA Field Station was officially closed on 1st August 1966, and the National Security Agency duly arrived largely unnoticed²¹: James Bamford reports the arrival of 70 smartly-dressed but secretive American civilian 'technicians' who all but commandeered the Grand Hotel in Harrogate during the summer²². The USASA historical brief, despite a seeming wealth of superficial information, makes no mention of any aspect of the tasks or operations carried out by the 13th USASA, of the connection of the base to British intelligence or the British phone system (see Chapter 5). Nor does it refer to the NSA or the fate of the station after the 1st August 1966. Officially the 13th USASA Field Station ceased to exist on that day, it's 'discontinuance' in the words of the USASA Historical Office, and thereafter the page is literally blank in public USASA history. This is despite the fact that the 13th USASA Operations Company remained at Menwith Hill, albeit subordinated to the NSA (see Chapter 5). So while, the Field station was 'discontinued', the 13th USASA personnel continued to operate in that blank space, after the full stop.

The base slipped into a new obscurity not only in the official discourse of the USASA but in more general terms, an obscurity commensurate with the highly secretive nature of NSA operations. Indeed the name of the National Security Agency was not even raised in this period. The US Government did not yet even acknowledge its existence to the outside world, and a 1969 newspaper report on a small demonstration (see Chapter 7) still described the base as "the US Army Station"²³. This seems to have been an isolated incident. The Herald and Advertiser both devoted barely a single column inch to the base during the 1970's. This was despite the fact that the NSA was being forced from the shadows by Congressional inquiries

¹⁸ *Harrogate Herald* Crosses are Link with Americans, Wednesday 16th December 1960.

¹⁹ USASA Historical Office *op cit*.

²⁰ *Harrogate Herald* No Plan to Move U.S. Army Men from Menwith Hill, Wednesday 12th January 1966

²¹ Campbell and Melvern *op cit*. See Chapter 5.

²² Bamford, James (1983) *The Puzzle Palace*, (with a new afterword), Harmondsworth: Penguin.

²³ *Harrogate Herald* Protesters at Menwith Hill, Wednesday 23rd July 1969.

in the United States at this time (see Chapter 6), and there were immense technological changes taking place as the role of Menwith Hill was changing and expanding (see Chapter 5).

One thing that did take place out of the public gaze was the renegotiation of the 21-year security of tenure arrangement. One of the letters released during the 1990s court cases dated 25th June 1976 from the Ministry of Defence to the Headquarters of the U.S. Air Force in Europe (USAFE) seems to indicate that the matter of the renewal was not breached until after it had already expired. The U.S. Air Force was still the body concerned with the security of tenure arrangement, even though, as we have seen, it was originally the US Army, and by this stage, the National Security Agency, who controlled the Station. The letter states; "at the outset I wish to make it clear that I have no reason to suppose that the requested extension could not be granted"²⁴. However it continues that the MoD is unsure as to the exact title of the agreement under which the security of tenure arrangements exist (see above). Further, "with the passage of time and not least the various reorganisations within the Ministry of Defence "lands" set up I have not been able to trace a copy of this Agreement". This is regarded as a problem because "I think I should know exactly what the MOD is agreeing to". Finally, the letter remarks that "I cannot find any copy of a lease between the US Army and the War Office and conclude that the occupation rests on correspondence". This, as we have seen, appears to be correct. The letter is remarkably informal for a document that is discussing quite fundamental problems with the basis of land tenure for the largest American SIGINT base in Europe, with frequent use of the first person pronoun, and references to the "'lands'" set up' of the MoD. The tone is almost jocular in the remark concerning the lack of knowledge of the MoD to what it is agreeing. This apparently light tone is very different from the response from the HQ of the U.S. Airforces in Europe (USAFE), the successor to the 3rd U.S. Air Force. This is a short, succinct letter saying that they too cannot locate a copy of the 1951 agreement. No attempt is made to reassure the MoD of the contents of the agreement, merely a curt, almost note-like, final sentence: 'Your early confirmation for the renewal of occupation at subject station would be appreciated'²⁵.

²⁴ Lee, B. E. (1976) Letter from Miss B. E. Lee, Ministry of Defence, to Chief, Real Estate Branch, HQ USAFE, D/DG23/1388/2D/DS23, 25th June 1976, OPAG archives.

²⁵ Duno, Anthony (1976) Letter from Anthony Duno, Construction Support Division, USAFE to Miss B. E. Lee, Ministry of Defence, 19th July 1976, OPAG archives.

The relationship revealed by the letters clearly reflects patriarchal dynamics, and perhaps significant age differences, given that the MoD author is a unmarried 'Miss' Lee. A 'serious' senior (and perhaps older) man is seen to exercise authority over a more 'frivolous' subordinate woman, despite the fact that the man is in the weaker position in terms of the rights of the station he represents in British law - no formal agreement exists. The reaction from USAFE is aggressively defensive and glosses over any potential problems. The exchange should also be viewed in the context of the wider relationship of the USA and the UK. The American representative curtails troublesome legal issues with what is effectively a demand for renewal of the security of tenure arrangement, which the US military knows that its subordinate, the UK, cannot realistically refuse. The British response confirms this. A different writer - gender and rank unknown - writes a simple letter referring to the correspondence. Without further discussion of the potential problems, he or she delivers what the USAFE have requested: "confirmation is hereby given that the Ministry of Defence accept your request for the renewal, giving security of tenure until 30 May 1997"²⁶. Despite the submissive response, there are signs of self-assertion: the literally correct reference to the American order as a 'request', as it technically was, and a reference in the first paragraph of the letter to the "failure on your part" to find a copy of the agreement. There is also reference made to telephone conversations between the parties, the records of which are unfortunately no longer available. The different author and tone of the final letter are also perhaps indicative of other pressure that might have been brought to bear on the MoD, from the intelligence community in the UK, to finalise the security of tenure renewal quickly and with the minimum of trouble. However, this is speculative.

What this exchange certainly reveals is not only the dynamics of the relationship between the USA and the UK with regards to US occupation of land in the UK in the 1970s, but also four key facts. One, there was, in 1976 at least, no extant general agreement upon which the security of tenure arrangement for Menwith Hill is based, and thus the MoD did not know to what it was agreeing when it renewed the arrangement. Two, the occupation agreement is based specifically on correspondence rather than any more formal arrangement. Three, the American military regarded the renewal of the arrangements as necessary for their continued

²⁶ McCall, R. B. (1976) Letter from R. B. McCall to Construction Support Division, USAFE, D/DS23/1588/2B/DS23e, 4th August 1976, OPAG archives.

occupation of the site. Four, the arrangement was renewed not between the MoD and the American organisation actually occupying and running the site, but between the MoD and the U.S. Air Force.




Figure 2. An uncovered satellite dish at Menwith Hill in the 1970s

Not all activity at and around Menwith could be hidden from the public gaze. The most obvious outward sign of change was the construction of dish antennae to receive satellite transmissions in the late 1960's and the first two geodesic 'radomes' during 1974. These domes

result in much public confusion - many people I have talked to, even those who live in North Yorkshire, confuse Menwith Hill with Fylingdales, which also had three radomes until 1996 (see page 113 below). In addition there were many more unusual explanations for what was hidden beneath them (see Chapter 8).

By the end of the 1970's there were a total of eight radomes on the site, as well as numerous radio antennae. The first two official planning applications were submitted in 1975 to the Borough Council for a Primary Electricity Sub-station. The obscurity of Menwith Hill Station was soon to be disrupted, following investigations by journalists Duncan Campbell and Linda Melvern. Their work, which is used more extensively in Chapter 5 and which is examined in Chapter 6, sparked a tide of publicity and protest. This tide has ebbed and flowed ever since and inspired a whole raft of publications in the early to mid 1980s, and lead to the first large demonstrations at the base, in 1981²⁷ (see Chapter 5). This was followed by

²⁷ *Harrogate Advertiser* March on Menwith, Saturday 8th May 1981, 1; Peaceful Nuclear Attack on Menwith Hill Base, 5.

the further exposé by American journalist James Bamford in 1982. The publication of Bamford's book about the NSA, *The Puzzle Palace*, also inspired the local paper to publish its first ever feature piece on Menwith Hill Station²⁸. Conveniently, in an interview Bamford was quoted as denying that the NSA would be interested in tapping UK domestic communications, rather it would be concentrating on international calls passing through the UK, and especially on communication of Soviet and Eastern European origin, a point which he underlines in his book²⁹. It could be argued that the local media might have deliberately understated the surveillance role of the base, however other stories of the time belie that impression. The Harrogate Advertiser had reported Home Secretary William Whitelaw's denial of charges of telephone tapping by Menwith Hill, or any other foreign base³⁰.

Table 2: Planning Applications to Harrogate Borough Council for Menwith Hill by year and type.

Year	Total No. Application	Type of Application									
		Ant Rad	Supp Infra	Trans Log	Sec	Gen Build	Hous	Wel Edu	Recr	Land Env	other unkn
1975	2		2								
1983	1	1									
1985	3			1				1	1		
1986	2	1						1			
1987	14	1	2	1	2	3		2	3		
1988	11	1			2	6		1		1	
1989	4					2		1	1		
1990	8	2				4		2			
1991	5	1	1	1	1	1					
1992	12		3	1		4	1	2	1		
1993	3		2			1					
1994	8	1	1	1	2	1			1	1	
1995	5				1	2	1		1		
1996	19	5	3		3	3	1	2	1		1
1997	24	3	2		3	11		3	2		
1998	10	1		2	2	2		1	2		
1999	6 (to Oct)		1		1	2			1		1
TOTAL	137	19	17	7	17	40	3	16	14	2	2

Key: Ant Rad - Antenna, Radar, Satellite Dish etc.; Supp Inf - Supporting Infrastructure (Electricity, Sewerage etc.); Trans Log - Transport and Logistics (Car parks, vehicle ports, roads etc.); Sec - Security; Gen Build - General Building Work (Unspecified buildings, extensions etc.); Hous - Housing and Accommodation; Wel Edu - Welfare and Education (Schools, nurseries, medical facilities etc.); Recr - Recreation (Shops, gymnasias, clubs etc.); Land Env - Landscaping and Environmental; Other Unkn - miscellaneous and minor applications.

²⁸ Taylor, Donald and Hardcastle, Harry (1983) Eavesdropping on the World, *Harrogate Advertiser* Friday 20th May 1983, 9.

²⁹ Bamford, James (1982) *The Puzzle Palace: America's National Security Agency and Its Special Relationship with Britain's GCHQ*, London: Sidgwick & Jackson.

³⁰ Taylor, Richard (1981) Whitelaw Denial on Menwith, *Harrogate Advertiser*, Friday 22nd May 1981, 1.

From the planning records of the local authority, Harrogate Borough Council, it can be seen that a great deal of development took place at Menwith Hill from this point on. A total of 137 planning applications were submitted by the Crown, or more accurately various government departments on behalf of the American Government, between 1975 and 1999 inclusive. Some of the applications were to do with the threat offered by the protesters (new fences etc.), but chief among them were applications for several new radomes, new buildings, and extensions and alterations to both civilian and military structures. The latest two radome-covered dishes, for the SBIRS programme (see Chapter 5), have recently been completed.

Table 2 (overleaf above) lists planning numbers of planning applications per year (1975-1999), and by type of application. What this table shows in general is that applications covered the whole range of visible development, from radomes to landscaping. Despite the general nature of many of the applications, several specific trends can also be deduced. The first is the rolling program of security upgrades that took place from 1993, a date which coincides with the showing of Duncan Campbell's *The Hill* on Channel Four, and with the setting up of the Women's Peace Camp (see Chapters 6 and 7). The second is the improvement in living conditions for the on-site personnel. On-site accommodation had originally been what the USASA Historical Office describes as "surplus commodity housing", in other words old prefabricated buildings³¹, although the senior personnel eventually lived off-site in rather more salubrious houses in the nearby village of Darley. Now, there are far superior houses, an expanded school and nursery, larger shops, and better medical and leisure facilities including an outdoor running track. These developments could be seen at least in part to be designed to reduce the frequency and length of time base personnel and their dependants spend outside the base, and to lower the risk of unplanned contact with the public and particularly those opposed to Menwith, now that far more of the general public have become aware of the base. This would be a continuance of a series of changes in rules on contact with foreigners (see Chapter 5) and an order issued by the American military commander in 1994 that all personnel must from thenceforward wear military uniform when travelling into work. However the RAF Base Commander insists that this is not the case: he points out that "over 1000 US families" still live outside the base, and that many American service personnel from Menwith Hill are involved in local charitable and

³¹ USASA Historical Office *op cit.*

leisure activities³². According to the Commander these activities have included donations totalling £18,000 to local good causes by the Menwith Hill Women's Club, as well as the rather more questionable benefits of MoD policing and civic receptions³³.

As Table 3 (below) shows, the official applicant has changed several times over the 25 years since planning applications were first submitted. The first isolated applications were submitted without a revealed applicant and these are isolated examples because most building, which was undoubtedly going on, went on without any formal application.

Table 3: Planning Applications to Harrogate Borough Council for Menwith Hill by applicant name.

Name of Applicant	Date Range (number)	Total Number	Notes / Details
Unnamed applicant	1975 (2)	2	
Department of the Environment (DoE)	1983 (1) 1988 (1) 1991 (1)	3	
Menwith Hill Station	1985 (1) 1989-90 (5) 1992 (1)	7	One application 13/02/90 in the name of 'Dept RAF Menwith Hill Station'.
Property Services Agency (PSA)	1985-1991 (35)	35	One application 25/10/88 in the name of 'PSA North East Region'
DoE / PSA (joint applicants)	1988-9 (3)	3	
Ministry of Defence (MoD) / Secretary of State for Defence	1991 (1) 1992- (85)	86	10 applications (1995-6) in the name of 'The Secretary of State for Defence'.
RAF Menwith Hill	1997 (1)	1	
TOTAL		137	

However by the mid 1980's, after a period of increased exposure of United States bases in the UK (see Chapters 6 and 7), a procedure for submitting applications to Harrogate Borough Council gradually become more formal. Most of the applications were submitted after the DoE Circular 18/84 on development on military sites was issued with the Property Services Agency, the state organisation responsible for government buildings, the named applicant in most applications until 1991. There were also occasional applications submitted in the name of 'Menwith Hill Station' itself, or in the name the Department of the Environment (DoE), but there does not appear to be any logical rationale for the selection of applicant name. The DoE, for example is named as applicant for a landscaping application, but also for a new

³² Letter from Squadron Leader H.J.C. Vincent, 22nd August 2000.

radome. From 1992, the Ministry of Defence (or for some applications, the Secretary of State for Defence) has been consistently named as the formal applicant, with one exception, when the newly renamed 'RAF Menwith Hill' was the applicant. The renaming below will be explored further below.

The government insists that Menwith Hill is subject to the same planning regulations as any other applicant: on the 11th November 1999, Lord Kennet asked the government in the House of Lords:

Whether the United States National Security Agency construction activities at Menwith Hill, and elsewhere in the United Kingdom and in United Kingdom Dependent Territories (a) are always in full accordance with Local Plans; (b) have been subjected to fully informed local consultation; (c) are subject to Health and Safety Executive and other specialised inspections; and (d) enjoy Crown Exemption or Crown Immunity from planning and other United Kingdom and international law.³⁴

The response from the Minister, Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, was that:

Planning consultations are always lodged by the Defence Estates Agency in accordance with DOE Circular 18/84 for construction activities at RAF Menwith Hill or elsewhere, on behalf of United States Visiting Forces, where planning clearance is required. Health and Safety construction and planning laws apply to RAF Menwith Hill in the same terms as other defence establishments.³⁵

Whilst the first sentence of this answer is true, the latter sentence is at the least misleading. A lawyer for Harrogate Borough Council in a Planning Committee meeting of the Local Authority in 1997, when asked by one of the councillors asked what would happen if the council voted 'no' to an application concerning Menwith Hill, stated that the application

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Hansard*, House of Lords Session 1999-2000, 11th November 1999, HL4682.

³⁵ *ibid.*

would be sent back to the MoD, who would appeal to the Secretary of State for Defence, who would then, of course, approve it³⁶. To put it more strongly, as a Harrogate Borough Councillor, Les Ellington, said in an interview: "It's very simple: what they want to do, they do" and objections would stand "a snowball's chance in Hell"³⁷.

Under DoE 18/84, all 'objections', or indeed either of the other two responses allowed: acceptance, and acceptance with additional requirements, are classified as 'observations'. As the Chief Planning Officer for Harrogate Borough Council said in an interview: "We don't make decisions on the applications. - it's not really up to us to object... It's not like a planning application, it's a different procedure. We work within this framework purely and simply because we have to." However the CPO admitted that to all intents and purposes the procedure look like conventional planning applications, because "in all other respects, they are treated the same way": notices are put up at the site, the 'applications' go through committees, public objections are allowed, and so on. It might be considered to be misleading to the public to have such a procedure that appears to allow public scrutiny and objection, but which in fact gives no power other than observation to the Local Authority. However, the CPO was unwilling to speculate on how the public might perceive the system: "I couldn't possibly comment on how people see it - people are confused between other different sorts of applications anyway." In other words there was nothing more particularly transparent about many everyday planning procedures.

Baroness Symons' answer, as is typical of government discourse on intelligence (see Chapter 5), is actually very carefully worded. When she states that the planning laws apply "in the same terms as other defence establishments", she does not in fact claim that *all* defence sites are subject to the same rules, nor does she give an example of one of the unspecified 'other defence establishments' to which Menwith Hill is similar. Instead she states that there are others like Menwith Hill, which are subject to UK planning laws in the same fashion (i.e.: not at all). Most of Lord Kennet's questions are not addressed; we can therefore assume from the answer that there is no attempt to meet Local Plan requirements, no informed local consultation, and no specific health and safety inspection. There has in fact been one

³⁶ CAAB Newsletter, No. 3, September 1997.

³⁷ Telephone Interview with Councillor Les Ellington, 04/11/99.

published official health-related investigation into Menwith Hill, and at least one environmental survey - these will be detailed below.

Planning data does not necessarily reflect the amount or type of work being conducted; they only reflect that part of it that is visible to the public and local authorities, in other words, superficial development. Upgrades in computer or satellite technology and so on will not be made public, however some changes in the capacity of the base can be guessed at through applications for increased electrical supply, new radomes and so on, and these will be explored in Chapter 5.

As the 1980's moved on, the trends established by previous local newspaper coverage continued, however there was increasingly a mixture of both positive and negative stories, both about the now established protest camp (see Chapter 7) and the base itself. There were still puff-pieces about the friendliness of the US forces, for example 'Have a nice day American-style'³⁸, which carried a 2 page spread of photos and text about the US Independence Day celebrations in 1987. However stories about the base were not always so complimentary: in 1984 there were two stories which attempted to paint a darker picture: 'Drugs raid on Menwith'³⁹ and 'Drugs Raid on US base'⁴⁰. In the latter incident 'hard drugs' were allegedly found on a party-goer at the base. While these two stories make no claims about the actual involvement of US personnel, these brief glimpses are reminiscent of the studies carried out into the effects of U.S. bases on local communities (see Chapter 1), and in particular of the Network DEMILITARISED case-study into the effects of the presence of US service personnel in Glyfada, Greece, drugs being a chief concern⁴¹.

There was also a more serious incident in which a 'security chief', Mario Carlegna, killed a local girl, Sara Willis by driving on the wrong side of the road while under the influence of alcohol. The tragedy of a child's death under the wheels of a U.S. car, has been an all too frequent occurrence near U.S. bases in Britain as Duncan Campbell's investigations revealed

³⁸ *Harrogate Advertiser* Have a Nice Day American Style, Saturday 10th July, 1987, 5.

³⁹ *Harrogate Advertiser* Drugs Raid on Menwith, Saturday 17th February 1984.

⁴⁰ *Harrogate Advertiser* Drugs Raid on U.S. Base, Saturday 13th April 1984.

⁴¹ Network DEMILITARISED (1994): *Conversion Instruments - a handbook outlining environmental, planning and social strategies and measures to facilitate the conversion process*, Glyfada- Greece: ND Working Group Three.

in the 1980s⁴². The incident is also notable for the way in which the local newspaper reported the affair. Two key facts, the fatal accident, and the fact that alcohol was involved, were reported in separate stories in the same issue of the local paper⁴³, as if the separation of the facts would lessen the impact or that people would not connect the two stories. In the former story, the names of the security chief and his victim are both given and the death is referred to as an 'error'; it is explained that he had not been in the country very long. In the second story, no names are given, but the fact that the 'security chief' had been over the legal limit for alcohol in the bloodstream was introduced. Of course, this action would be considered illegal and socially unacceptable the United States as much as in the UK, therefore the incident ceases to be an 'error' caused by cultural confusion, and Carlegna's actions assume a far higher level of culpability. The use of a discourse of cultural differences, both in Carlegna's legal defence and in the implied acceptance of this defence as factual by the newspaper in the in the first story, should be set alongside the attempts to present the Americans as culturally similar or at least unthreatening in the newspaper reports from 1960 examined above. The different discourses both have the same underlying purpose, despite their superficial opposition, and that is to minimise any 'threat' or fear generated by the presence of large numbers of 'outsiders'. The contrast with the discourses generated about peace protesters (see Chapter 7) is instructive here.

The local newspaper is the only way that many people would discover an incident like this. For those reading the paper casually, the first story, of the 'error' by Carlegna, which was a longer story printed in a more prominent place in the newspaper, on page four, was likely to be the only one of the two that would be noticed. The latter story, a short and not so prominent court report on page twelve, is likely to go unconnected to the former, both because of its positioning and context as a legal story might cause readers either to overlook or ignore it, and because the of the key differences in detail if it were noticed. However at the same time the newspaper could not be accused of 'lying' or not printing the whole truth, if they were ever to be challenged. Thus, this appears to be a deliberate attempt at manipulating the way in which publicly-available information was interpreted by the readers of the paper, perhaps on the request of the NSA, or British intelligence. Unfortunately I have been unable

⁴² Campbell 1984 *op cit*.

⁴³ *Harrogate Advertiser Security Chief's Error Lead to Death, Saturday 22nd July 1989, p.4; Chief was Over the Limit, p.12.*

to trace anyone who was working on the paper at the time who remembers the incident. However the current editor claims that she has never been subject to any pressure to report incidents at Menwith in any particular fashion⁴⁴.

This negative social coverage is relatively unimportant as far as the local council is concerned. For one thing, personnel from Intelligence bases do not interact with the local community to the same extent as conventional military bases, indeed they are specifically prevented by order from doing so according to NSA security policy⁴⁵. Therefore the potential for a similar scenario to Glyfada or Comiso in Harrogate is limited.

In addition, Menwith Hill apparently brings all the employment benefits that one might expect to the local economy. Councillor Les Ellington informed me that Menwith Hill is the second largest employer in the district after the Health Authority; the figure of 392 British civilian (non-GCHQ) employees was given in the House of Commons⁴⁶, most of whom probably live in Harrogate district. However it is impossible to confirm this with the Borough Council, as neither their District Datafile nor their Major Employers List list RAF Menwith Hill, or any related organisation⁴⁷. I was told by the Economic Development Unit that Menwith Hill was "on the restricted list" on the instruction of the British government⁴⁸.

According to local Councillor Les Ellington, employment is "top of the tree" as far as reasons why Harrogate Borough Council supports Menwith Hill. Harrogate, like many Northern communities, "has gone through a lot of employers", and the Council has no desire to cope with the aftermath of another one leaving. Of course this local economic importance has to be balanced against the possible economic losses to the UK economy as a whole caused by economic espionage carried out at Menwith Hill (see Chapter 5). This does concern Councillors, however as in so many cases, they are able to hide behind a veil of disingenuous but politically expedient ignorance. "We don't really know" what happens at Menwith Hill, comments Councillor Ellington, a surprisingly naive comment given the knowing cynicism

⁴⁴ Telephone conversation with the Editor of the *Harrogate Advertiser*, August 2000.

⁴⁵ *NSA Handbook*. Available on-line at: <<http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~nhughes/htmldocs/nsa.html>>

⁴⁶ House of Commons *Hansard* Written Answers for 12 May 2000 (pt 10) Menwith Hill.

⁴⁷ Harrogate Borough Council (2000) *District Datafile*, Harrogate: Economic Development Unit, HBC.

⁴⁸ Telephone conversation with the Economic Development Unit, Harrogate Borough Council, August 2000.

about Menwith Hill that had characterised both the tone and context of the interview up until this point.

Few councillors have anything against Menwith Hill. On the contrary, according to Councillor Ellington the majority view among Harrogate Borough Councillors is that "as far as what they do up there... I don't have a problem with it, as long as they do it in my interest". This is an interesting statement. Despite Councillor Ellington being the ward councillor, Menwith is quite clearly considered outside his domain - it is what the unnamed 'they' are doing in the anonymous 'up there'. He is not concerned with whatever 'it' is that 'they' do, with the proviso that 'they' do it in his interest. He is making an automatic connection here that demonstrates the effectiveness of years of state hegemony over public discourse about Anglo-American relations. The use of the phrase 'in my interest' clearly implies that the speaker's interests are identical with those of the UK state at a strategic level, for what 'they' do at Menwith Hill clearly has no relation to Councillor Ellington personally. It also implies that the 'they' to whom he is referring are an anonymous amalgam of American and British, who are not differentiated. The personal, national and UKUSA 'interest' is effectively the same.

Nor is the Councillor concerned by the appearance of the base. Some frustration is occasionally expressed by Councillors, but Councillor Ellington also claims that, "over recent years, we are getting more co-operation from [the base] in terms of landscape." This has included negotiating to get trees planted to hide the new razor-wire topped security fences, and even forcing the base to abandon plans for guard towers. The pride expressed in these concessions does indicate that there is some degree of mixed feeling about the development of Menwith Hill, and in addition the new security fencing is somewhat embarrassing to a Council which prides itself on good community relations with Menwith Hill, and indeed vice-versa.

The mixed feelings were occasionally more prominent in the interview with Councillor Ellington. For example, he regretted the necessity for the new security fencing, but would rather blame the women peace campaigners than the base. There is certainly an element in

this discourse of what Thayer calls 'landscape guilt'⁴⁹, that is the hiding of human structures considered at once necessary but also aesthetically unappealing behind screens of trees and so on. Menwith Hill, or at least the security fence, in this context *is* out-of-place in the Nidderdale landscape. The Councillor would rather not see it despite the benefits the base brings their district in terms of employment and the perceived personal / national security benefits of the activity at Menwith.



Figure 3. New razor-wire-topped security fences at Menwith Hill

Whether this is more than simple landscape guilt is open to question. Perhaps the screening and delight in little victories over the base does indicate a greater resistance to the official pronouncements of the importance of Menwith Hill than is openly admitted, a sympathy with counter-discourses. The Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases suggest that such feelings are far more widespread in private amongst Councillors and Council officials. There have been other particular occasions when Councillors have tried to express stronger feelings against the base, and occasionally even in Planning Committee debates; the *CAAB Newsletter* for November 1996 describes the Planning Committee meeting to discuss a notification of the intent to construct a new radome:

The members then discussed the application for nearly an hour, instead of it going through on the usual nod. One member urged all the Committee to

⁴⁹ Thayer, Richard (1994), *Gray World, Green Heart: Technology, Nature and Sustainability in the Landscape*, New York: John Wiley.

abstain and agreed that the democratic process was a "farce". Two members eventually abstained as well as the chairman which is unheard of.⁵⁰

This contradictory collision of discourses is especially evident when the more dubious aspects of the espionage activities are mentioned. As we have seen, the espionage activity and the base are no longer referred to by name, but as "it" and "up there" respectively, as if the 'bad' activities are not really present in the same place as the 'good' employment. The 'bad' Menwith is presented almost as a kind of invisible, place-less shadow of its beneficial and visible twin. In local public discourse then, there can be two Menwiths, with differing characteristics and spatial qualities. However it seems that the separation between the two Menwiths is difficult to maintain; the counter-discourses have begun to infect the purity of hegemonic discourse, which results in confusion and contradiction.

Harrogate Borough Council have also been prepared to investigate any allegations about Menwith Hill that were within their legal competence: the best example is a cancer scare in the mid-1990s. In 1996 a health-related survey was carried out, not by central government but by North Yorkshire Health Authority at the request of Harrogate Borough Council⁵¹. The report states that local residents and Thornthwaite and Padside Parish Councils had asked the Local Authority to investigate what appeared to be an unusually high number of cases of cancer, particularly breast cancer. These concerns were "in conjunction with the activities at the United States and the Royal Naval activities at Menwith Hill"⁵². This sentence is syntactically clumsy. However it also indicates a casual approach to the completion of this report, but it also shows a confusion either on the part of the residents, or of the author, Dr Wilkinson, between Menwith Hill Station and HMS Forest Moor, the nearby Royal Navy communications site. The report studied the numbers of newly registered cancers in the Nidd Valley Ward, population 3130, of Harrogate Borough from 1980-1993, although as the report admits complete data was only available from 1987. In addition, although all the complaints had come from a particular parish within the ward, Thornthwaite and Padside, it was felt that because of the low population of the parish, around 130, it would be "very difficult, on the

York: John Wiley.

⁵⁰ CAAB Newsletter, No. 1, November 1996.

⁵¹ Wilkinson, John (1996) *Report of an Investigation into an Alleged Increase in Cancer near Menwith Hill, Harrogate, North Yorkshire*, North Yorkshire Health Authority.

basis of very small numbers, to draw any satisfactory conclusion"⁵³. Interestingly, the parish whence the complaints came is not the parish in which Menwith Hill is located, but adjacent to it: the base is in the much larger parish of Menwith and Darley. The report also studied registered cancer rates in the two adjoining wards of Lower Nidderdale, and Wharfedale Moors, and compared the results in all three wards to expected rates. Dr Wilkinson concluded that: "it has not been possible to demonstrate an excess of cancers in the three electoral wards surrounding Menwith Hill up to 1993"⁵⁴, and that "no excess of cancer has been shown to exist in the Nidd Valley Area which includes the parish of Thornthwaite and Padside adjacent to where Menwith Hill base is situated"⁵⁵. He therefore recommended that the Health Authority take no further action, except to monitor new cancer registrations. It should be noted that because the survey only covered the years up to and including 1993, new cancers after 1993 but before the survey, which may have been the immediate reason for the local concern, were not amongst the survey data.

A few years earlier, around 1992, there had also been an environmental assessment of Menwith Hill, which is far less complementary than Dr Wilkinson's report. This internal report for the American Department of Defense by the ECoS consultancy found: "the general status of environmental programs and conditions at Menwith Hill Station (MHS) to range from fair to poor compared to US standards"; worse that there was "a state of flux and disarray"; and that as a result "considerable efforts are required in many areas to bring the Station into compliance with US, DoD, and UK regulation"⁵⁶. Particular problems were identified with: the storm-water systems, which contained large amounts of oil from an unknown source with "the potential exists in this area for greater problems to be found"; and the hazardous material handling and disposal, which were "in poor condition:, and "many chemicals are not stored properly, dispensed or labelled". There were also no records for previous years of disposal, which had been run by the British Department of the Environment and Property Services Agency. The service was now being taken over jointly by the U.S. Department of Defence and the MoD Defense Works Service The report claims that the lack

⁵² *ibid.*, 2.

⁵³ *ibid.*, 9.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, 12

⁵⁶ Unknown (nd.) *Outbrief. Environmental Compliance Survey: Menwith Hill Station*, OPAG archives.

of records and problems with the change in management account for some of the confusion. The final problem identified was with the "classified material incinerator, which reportedly produces smoke and particulates". A reduction in use of the incinerator because of this problem may have accounted for the greater volume of classified material disposed of in waste bins at the base, bins which were easily accessible to activists (see Chapter 7).



Figure 4. A road sign showing Menwith Hill's new designation.

In the late 1990's, after court challenges by the Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases (CAAB) (see Chapter 7), the land tenure situation again became an issue, as the 1997 date for renewal approached. It may be that the official redesignation of 'Menwith Hill Station' as 'RAF Menwith Hill' on 1st December 1995, was an attempt to pre-empt any problems that might arise from a potential renegotiation of the security of tenure arrangements, which were by now in the public domain as a result of the court cases from 1991 onwards, as well as to deal with the bylaws issue, which was the initial reason for that court case (see Chapter 7).

A letter from the Parliamentary Under-secretary for State for Defence, Earl Howe, to the MP Keith Hampson in response to a Parliamentary question early in 1996, explained the official position:

The reason Menwith Hill Station was retitled RAF Menwith Hill was to bring it into line with other RAF sites made available by the Ministry of Defence to the United States Government. The introduction of the revised byelaws, which were introduced on 19 February 1996, provided the opportunity to clarify the

proper title of the Station, which is an RAF site that was made available to US forces in 1955 on the same basis as other US bases in the UK.⁵⁷

The letter confirms that the renaming was to bring Menwith Hill 'into line with other RAF sites' that had been made available to the US government after 1948, and because of the necessity to introduce new bye-laws as a result of legal challenges. Earl Howe makes no mention of the fact that the UK Government had been legally obliged to change the bye-laws, merely that this 'provided the opportunity to clarify the proper title of the Station'. The latter phrase is particularly interesting. In one sense it is totally dishonest: there is no evidence that Menwith Hill had ever been an RAF site; as we saw earlier, the site was requisitioned by the War Office entirely for the purpose of becoming a U.S. Army intelligence facility. The only reason that any Air Force became involved was because of the official attachment for logistical purposes of the seven original USASA personnel to the 3rd USAF. This then meant that formal arrangements were dealt with by the Air Ministry. Far from being a 'clarification' of the situation, except in the sense of making it easier for the British government to bend the law, this renaming is an attempt to control the public discourse about Menwith Hill. It effectively confuses the situation and changes history: Earl Howe is implying that Menwith Hill has always been an RAF base really, they just got the name wrong. The name change meant that for the first time, Menwith Hill was provided with a token presence of RAF personnel, the Base Commander, and a few aides. Of course they were not the only British personnel at the base; the level of staffing from GCHQ will be explored further in the next Chapter.

When the security of tenure renewal date did occur in 1997, events were apparently different from those in 1976. The British government now insisted that there was no 'lease' as such. In a letter from the Secretariat of the Air Staff to Lindis Percy of CAAB, the British state appeared to have adopted a very different attitude to the security of tenure arrangement:

As you say, in 1955 and again in 1976, assurances were given to the US Government that the site would be made available to them by Her Majesty's

⁵⁷ Earl Howe (1996) Letter from Earl Howe, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence, to Keith Hampson MP, 27th March 1996, D/USofS/FH0683/96/M, OPAG archives.

Government for a period of 21 years. The purpose of these assurances was to facilitate the commitment of US funding to the station and they did not constitute, as you have suggested, and form of renewable lease.

The letter continues:

There is consequently no requirement for the US authorities to seek renewal of the security of tenure arrangements to allow their continued use of RAF Menwith Hill, and I can confirm that no application has been made by the US authorities to renew them. RAF Menwith Hill will continue to be made available to the US authorities on the same basis as other RAF sites in the United Kingdom, the arrangements of which are confidential between the UK and US governments for the purpose of our common defence.

This letter is very revealing and shows the full impact of the new official discourse of Menwith Hill revealed by the Earl Howe in 1996, and the rewriting of history that acceptance of this discourse requires. The Air Secretariat is correct to state that the U.S. had originally requested the security of tenure for reasons of obtaining the necessary financial backing for the building of the base in 1957. This situation appeared to have changed dramatically, as the CAAB newsletter commented, "presumably the dollars are more readily available these days because the base is undergoing a massive expansion at the moment without the existence of the former agreement"⁵⁸.


However financial concerns do not appear to be the basis on which the security of tenure arrangements were to be renewed, or indeed the reason they were in fact renewed in 1976: the USAFE at that time clearly believed that the arrangement was for "renewal of occupation"⁵⁹. There is a serious public problem for the UK government here: if there is no security of tenure agreement then the occupation must rest on other agreements. This is what the Air Secretariat claim in the second paragraph, and this is the reason why the title of the base was

⁵⁸ CAAB Newsletter, No. 6, June/July 1998.

⁵⁹ Duno letter 1976 *op cit*.

'clarified' in 1995. On this occasion, however, they state that these arrangements are 'confidential' because they relate to 'our common defence'.

Confidential or non-existent? It is crucial to remember here that in 1976, no evidence of any such formal arrangements could be found - they had apparently been lost. Had they been found between 1976 and 1997? Was the formal agreement merely a myth, or a mistaken reference to an agreement which related only to bomber bases and airfields, and not to intelligence sites like Menwith Hill? Or, are the arrangements for Menwith Hill actually dependent on entirely different and genuinely secret agreements, like the alleged UKUSA agreement, of which perhaps the bureaucrats of the Air Ministry (and perhaps the USAFE) were not even aware? In the absence of any definitive proof, the validity of the land tenure arrangements must, at the very least, be called into question, and indeed they had been challenged in court by CAAB from 1991. Intelligence links between Britain and the USA, and particularly the UKUSA agreement, will be explored in the next Chapter. The various court cases involving CAAB and other peace protesters will be detailed in Chapter 7.



Map 1. A Map of RAF Menwith Hill.

Reproduced from Ordnance Survey maps by permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationary Office. © Crown Copyright NC/00/1335.

The base itself is bounded approximately to the south by the A59 Harrogate to Skipton Road, to the west by the orange B5941, to the east by Slack Lane and to the north by the minor road past Turpin Lair. The sewage works on the other side of this latter road are also part of the site. Note that the map, despite having detail of individual radome placements, does not include any designation for the 'Camp', nor does it indicate MoD by-laws boundaries.

CSO Irton Moor

CSO Irton Moor appears to have begun life during the First World War⁶⁰, as a Naval Wireless Telegraphy (W/T) Receiving Station⁶¹. At that time the station was simply referred to as 'Scarborough', and appears to have occupied the same site as the current GCHQ station, just to the west of that town, on Irton Moor. Scarborough became the only Naval W/T site when a Cambridge facility was closed at the end of WW1 and its functions transferred, although some other sites were later set up.

Irton Moor remained under Admiralty control despite the creation of the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) in 1920. By the end of the Second World War, Scarborough was still by far the largest Station in terms of personnel. Between 1945 and 1964, the Station was officially used by the Admiralty Civilian Shore Wireless Service⁶², with Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) the successor to GC&CS from 1939 onwards, took over the running of Scarborough in 1964⁶³. Reports of new building in the early 1980's including hardened bunkers, a new operations room and generally substantially modernised facilities suggest a new importance for the site (see Chapter 5).

Reading the literature about GCHQ, the name of the station appears to have changed several times over the course of the years from Scarborough (WW2 and before), to Irton (post-war) to Irton Moor (current). It is difficult to ascertain if these are actual changes of name, or whether the current name of the station, Irton Moor, has simply become more widely acknowledged. One unaccredited source from the early 1990s - an appendix to what appears to be local council document - even lists the site as 'Ayton Moor'⁶⁴. This would appear to be a mistake. There is indeed an Ayton Moor in North Yorkshire but the Scarborough station does not ever appear to have been called by this name elsewhere or at any other time. This document also gives a rounded figure of 100, obtained from further unnamed 'local sources',

⁶⁰ Extracts from SIGINT papers, Clarke, W. F., Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office, Kew. Most of the information in this paragraph comes from this source, unless otherwise noted.

⁶¹ Clarke, W. F. (1945) GC&CS - Its foundation and development with specific reference to its naval side, in *History of GCCS and Naval Section 1919-1945 Historical Notes and Memos*. Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office, Kew.

⁶² Letter, from D. Rice, Whitehall Liaison Officer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10th August 2000.

⁶³ Letter from, , from D. Rice, Whitehall Liaison Officer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 26th July 1999.

for the number of people employed at the base. Given the inaccuracy of the name, this would have to be regarded with some suspicion. Hugh Lanning and Richard Norton-Taylor, the former a GCHQ Union representative, refer to it as Irton Moor⁶⁵, as does intelligence researcher Duncan Campbell⁶⁶. However one source who claims to be an ex-employee of the UK intelligence services stated that officially the station had always been called Scarborough - all other names merely referred to its geographical location⁶⁷. The Local Authority also seem to refer to it as CSO Scarborough.

Little is known about the site at present. Listed on UK maps as a anonymous 'wireless station', it is said by the Foreign Office to be "an outstation of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)", the UK government's Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) organisation, and more specifically to be a "Composite Signals Organisation site"⁶⁸. The CSO is the branch of GCHQ that deals specifically with the interception of signals. An article in the radical New York newspaper, *The Village Voice*, about the National Security Agency (the United States' equivalent of GCHQ), listed Irton Moor as a "foreign-operated 'accommodation site' that provides occasional SIGINT product to the USSS [United States Security Services]"⁶⁹. This implies that there are no US liaison personnel present on a full-time basis at the site, and also that there is no direct investment by the NSA in it. However the Campaign for the Accountability of American bases claimed in 1997 that "An article in the *New York Times* recently, revealed that a huge amount of money, was being invested in this secretive British base by the NSA"⁷⁰. CAAB published a correction in the next issue, saying that the article was in fact published in the *Washington Post*⁷¹, but on-line archive searches of both newspapers⁷² have failed to locate this article, and I have been unable to find it anywhere else as yet.

⁶⁴ Undated document of unknown origin, part entitled 'Appendix A: Defence Establishments in North Yorkshire', (reference YC138E293IDU/5), OPAG archives.

⁶⁵ Lanning, Hugh and Norton-Taylor, Richard (1991) *A Conflict of Loyalties: GCHQ 1984-1991*, New Clarion Press, Cheltenham.

⁶⁶ Personal Communication from Duncan Campbell.

⁶⁷ Interview, Source A.

⁶⁸ Personal Communication, 21st May 1999, from D. Rice, Whitehall Liaison Officer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.

⁶⁹ Vest, Jason and Madsen, Wayne (1999) A Most Unusual Collection Agency: How the U.S. undid UNSCOM through its empire of electronic ears, *Village Voice* February 24 - March 2. Available on-line at: http://www.villagevoice.com/features/9908/vest_madsen.shtml

⁷⁰ CAAB Newsletter No. 3, September 1997.

⁷¹ CAAB Newsletter No. 4, December 1997.

⁷² The addresses of the papers are: <<http://www.washingtonpost.com>> and <<http://nytimes.com>>

The Local Council (Scarborough Borough Council) appear to have far fewer dealings with CSO Irton Moor than Harrogate does with Menwith Hill. Ray Williamson, the Economic Development Officer, says that: "As Planning Authority, the Council is consulted on physical developments through DoE 10/84, but otherwise the Authority has little contact with CSO Scarborough"⁷³.

The only time that CSO Irton Moor has been mentioned in any publication is in a history of the ban on Unions at GCHQ, instituted by Margaret Thatcher in 1984 (see Chapter 5). Hugh Lanning, the full-time officer responsible for all Civil Service Union (CSU) members in GCHQ, and Margaret Platt of the Institute of Professional Civil Servants (ICPS) visited Irton Moor on Wednesday 8th February of that year as part of a tour of all CSO outstations to keep support for the Unions firm⁷⁴. However the government did not retract its decision and many Trade Union members took voluntary redundancy terms rather than stay on under the harsh new regime. Amongst them was Terry Benstead, described by Lanning and Norton-Taylor as "a CSU stalwart" at Irton Moor. He wrote of his feeling that he was 'privileged' to have worked with people who "have stood up to the wickedness of politicians who have sought by stealth and deception... to deprive those employed at GCHQ of basic rights of association". This episode is unusual, not only in briefly illuminating the existence of Irton Moor, but also in demonstrating the human side of SIGINT work. Most government statements then and now reflect only the official role of GCHQ in general as if the organisation were a machine without human components.

⁷³ Personal Communication from Ray Williamson, Chief Planning Officer, Scarborough Borough Council, 9th December 1999.

⁷⁴ Lanning and Norton-Taylor 1991 *op cit*.

RAF Fylingdales

Fylingdales is useful as a comparative to Menwith Hill not only because it has intelligence functions, and because it is clearly linked to Menwith Hill in the discourses of those who oppose them (see Part Three), but also because there is far more publicly available documentation on the early history of the site. This provides an opportunity to analyse the construction of an official discourse around the site, which with Menwith one can only glimpse, and with Irton Moor, is totally invisible.

The RAF claim that the history of Fylingdales began on October 4th 1957, when “the nation awoke that morning to hear on their early morning news bulletin the ‘beep’ ‘beep’ ‘beep’ of Sputnik 1”⁷⁵. However this is simply part of the maintenance of the Cold War fiction of Soviet provocation forcing a NATO response⁷⁶. A recently declassified memo in the Public Record Office reveals that planning for BMEW Stations had already started by at least 1956 in the UK, “By December, 1956, the Air Staff had produced a draft DPRC Paper on the need for an anti-ballistic missile system including a long-distance missile detection radar”, and notes that “the Americans were already working on such a system”⁷⁷. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that most of the major powers had been contemplating ballistic missile defence ever since 1944 when the first German V2 rockets landed on London. What changed after 1957 was simply that the UK government realised that it could not afford a full BMEWS on its own, and in the light of the work already carried out by the USA, and tentative plans by Canada, it was decided that co-operation would be more effective. This was emphasised when the USA approached the UK in December 1957 with a view to surveying potential sites in Scotland, and such searches started early in 1958⁷⁸. However, UK Air Staff realised that such a site would not provide cover for the whole of the UK, so “with an eye to their own advantage”, as the memo dryly puts it, they persuaded the US government to extend as far south as East Anglia, which would have been ideal for defence of the UK as a whole and London in particular. In the end, 1500 acres of a former bombing range, “surplus to W.D.

⁷⁵ RAF Fylingdales (nd.) *Visitor Information Booklet*.

⁷⁶ See Chomsky, Noam (1992) *Deterring Democracy (Second Edition)*, New York: Hill and Wang, for a good deconstruction of this official policy line.

⁷⁷ HMG Air Staff (nd., c.1967) *History of the Negotiation of the Financial Clauses of the BMEWS Agreement (cm1034)*, Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

[War Department] requirements”, plus 700 acres of Forestry Commission land at Fylingdales Moor were chosen. The grounds for this decision were that the site was:

“inland and shielded against jamming; in a sparsely populated area; not close to airfields and airways; on the reasonably solid ground necessary to provide the highly stable foundations necessary for the radar aerials; of sufficient acreage (with the addition of the adjoining Forestry Commission land) to provide for technical and domestic requirements and the necessary safety arcs.”⁷⁹

The reason the USA was so keen to keep the site as northerly as possible was because they had already planned for two other BMEW sites, which together with Fylingdales would provide an unbroken net of cover across the Northern hemisphere, warning NATO of Soviet missile launches on the USA and now all the UK. The Air Ministry document makes it clear that the station was essential if the US network was to function properly. One was at Thule in Greenland, the other at Clear, in Alaska. According to the US government, this BMEW network would “be able to prevent the Russians from destroying US deterrent forces on the ground by surprise attack. The system would give at least half an hour’s notice to all bases in the continent of the United States”⁸⁰.

However Air Staff were more careful about what they said about warning times for the UK. A table shows that the maximum likely warning time for Britain would be seventeen minutes but the Air Staff admitted that “if pressed we must concede that we do not see much likelihood of its [Soviet missile] being deployed on this trajectory”, and in fact the realistic time scales ranged from three to eleven minutes. While they admitted that UK bombers could not be scrambled in less than 15 minutes, the Air Staff still attempted to show that BMEWS was “very far from being useless”⁸¹. There was good reason for their being uncomfortable on this subject. Arguments had been raging in the defence scientific community in the USA over the effectiveness of the proposed the BMEW Stations: whether they would be able to

⁷⁸ HMG Air Staff (nd. c.1959) *Ballistic Missile Early Warning System: Brief for the Secretary of State*, Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

⁷⁹ *ibid.*

⁸⁰ *ibid.*

distinguish between missiles and other phenomena, for example, space debris; the accuracy of their strike point predictions; and the warning time that would be given. On the first point, the Air Staff had “no doubt” that BMEWS would “work and be able to distinguish between them”⁸².

The situation was far less certain for the latter problems. In June 1960, government advisor, Professor Sir Solly Zuckerman wrote to the Minister of Defence concerning the work of US scientist Dr A.G. Hill⁸³. According to Zuckerman, Hill had claimed that “the accuracy of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System has become so degraded that it would not be competent to predict the striking point of a missile to an accuracy greater than a sixth of the area of the United States”, in other words that it could not really tell whether a missile was aimed at the UK or not, and that it could not actually tell whether individual signals detected on the radar were in fact missiles at all. In addition Dr Hill concluded that the warning time given would be less than five minutes as opposed to the generous half an hour stated by the US government in negotiations with the UK, and even less than the 11 minutes maximum estimated by the Air Staff.

Understandably worried, Air Staff tried to smooth Cabinet concerns by admitting Dr Hill was right about the strike point prediction, but only in the case of “inter-continental ballistic missile fired at extreme range against the United States”⁸⁴. Instead they argued, a strike at the UK could be predicted to an accuracy of less than 200 miles, and that, contrary to their earlier internal estimates, the warning period would be more like twenty to twenty-five minutes. In one area at least Hill was later proved correct; the ‘four (or sometimes three) minute warning’ was eventually admitted publicly by the British government and immortalised in popular consciousness.

What these secret discussions showed was that in reality BMEWS, as originally conceived and built, was never able to provide sufficient warning for the vast majority of people in the

⁸¹ *ibid.*

⁸² A.R.W (Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Air Ministry) (1960) Memo to the Prime Minister, Ref.: 9.989, 25th February, Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

⁸³ Zuckerman, S. (1960) Letter to Minister of Defence, 16th June, ref. S2/443/60, Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

⁸⁴ HMG Air Staff (nd., c.1960) *Top Secret Note on BMEWS*, Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

UK to enable them to take any steps that could have ensured survival in the case of a nuclear strike (even if means for their survival had been provided), and may not even have been of much military use to the UK, or even to mainland USA. It is clear that the claims made for the technological systems were at least highly disputable. And these were not the only problems with BMEWS: now infamous incidents of nuclear alerts being triggered by communications blackouts, a simulation tape, a flock of geese and even the rising moon are publicly documented⁸⁵.

There were also major public disagreements with the choice of site. When the proposals were made public early in 1960, many amenity groups were unhappy at the siting of such a visible and possibly dangerous facility in the North York Moors National Park. The National Parks Commission was concerned but circumspect. A meeting was held on the 30th March 1960 with the NPC, the North York Moors Planning Committee, North Riding County Council, the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, Forestry Commission and the Air Ministry, at which there appears, from the Air Staff's version of the minutes, to have been an agreement that the project had to go ahead, but that its impact on the landscape would be minimised⁸⁶. Behind the scenes the Air Staff were far from complimentary about some of the participants, in particular the County Council was singled out as not to be relied on because of an "inconsistent record" on planning issues. It is unclear whether this refers to planning issues in general or whether the Air Staff are effectively accusing the Council of not consistently supporting military planning goals. Despite this the Ministry promised to keep the various planning bodies informed of any changes or amendments to the plans. This air of co-operation was part of a carefully designed strategy to avoid the necessity of a public inquiry that had been first proposed in the Air Staff's briefing for the Minister in 1959. This stated that there were two reasons to avoid a public inquiry:

- (i) Security. While we could not attempt to hide that this is a B.M.E.W.S., neither we nor the Americans would wish to be involved in public discussion that would involve evidence of the circumstances in which Fylingdales is considered to be suitable for the particular purpose; and

⁸⁵ Yorkshire CND (nd.) 'False Alarms', available on-line at: <<http://www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/fdales/>>

⁸⁶ Air Staff (1960) Minutes of a Meeting 30th March 1960. Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

(ii) The inescapable delay in the holding of a public local inquiry and the announcement of a decision on its findings, the two processes taking at least three months, during which pretty well all progress would have to be halted and the desired completion date inevitably lost.

Instead it was decided to focus on “some form of consultation” with amenity groups including the National Parks Commission, relating to “minor adjustments” only which it was thought “might do much to reduce local objections”⁸⁷. The main point that they thought would sway objectors was a promise to remove all facilities when they were no longer needed.

However, agreement was obviously not as widespread as the Air Ministry had hoped. In the month following the consultation meeting, Henry Brooke MP, the then Minister for Housing and Local Government, received letters from: the CPRE (Ryedale and Cleveland Branches); the Pudsey and District Rambling Club; the Cyclists Touring Club; and several individuals. A letter had already been received from the Youth Hostels Association (West Riding Regional Group) in March. The CPRE focused largely on the landscape issue, its local representative, Margery MacDonald speaking of their “consternation” and “very great regret at the choice of a National Park for such a purpose”⁸⁸. However the CTC, Ramblers and the individual correspondents were more concerned with the issue of ownership and access; the land to be occupied by the BMEWS had been requisitioned for use during war time and it was fully expected that it would be returned in peacetime. This concern is still common in many areas where military ownership began during WW2, the most publicised case being that of Tyneham village in Dorset⁸⁹, and many of the issues raised are also remarkably similar to those arising during the recent Public Inquiry into the expansion of training facilities at the Otterburn Ranges in Northumbria National Park⁹⁰. This does not appear to be an issue that the Air Staff had considered previously, however all the correspondents were sent the same response, repeating the statement made in Parliament in February 1960:

⁸⁷ HMG Air Staff c.1959 *op cit*.

⁸⁸ MacDonald, Margery (1960) Letter from CPRE (Ryedale Branch) to Henry Booke MP, Minister for Housing and Local Government, 23rd April 1960. Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

⁸⁹ Wright, Patrick (1996) *The Village that Died for England*, London: Vintage.

⁹⁰ Woodward, Rachel (1998) *Defended Territory: The Otterburn Training Area and the 1997 Public Inquiry*. Centre for Rural Economy Research Report, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.

The Government greatly regrets that the Station has to be in part of the National Park. But, the topography, geography, and the operational criteria governing the choice of site are extremely stringent and after detailed examination, the Government are satisfied that there is no other suitable site in the whole country⁹¹.

There were also concerns about the environmental health implications of the immensely powerful radar system. The government claimed that there were no reasons for such concerns, however took the unusual step of creating a large area in and around the direct line of the radar from which the public were excluded. The exclusion area remains now that the old radomes have been replaced by a single gigantic pyramid (see Chapter 5).




Figure 5 RAF Fylingdales (briefly) with both radomes and pyramid in 1992.

⁹¹ *Hansard* Vol. 617, No. 58, Wednesday 17th February 1960.



Map 3. A map of RAF Fylingdales.

Reproduced from Ordnance Survey maps by permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationary Office. © Crown Copyright NC/00/1335.

Unlike Menwith Hill (see Map 1 on page 108), the actual location of the buildings that constitute Fylingdales are not shown; however the area is marked as 'MOD property' and the boundary of the restricted area clearly indicated. In the latter case this is because of the potential risk to health from the high intensity radar signals.

Chapter Five. The Function of SIGINT Sites.

Introduction

This chapter deals not with the public history of the visible places known as Menwith Hill, Fylingdales and Irton Moor, but rather the trajectory of development in the activities that are carried out there. Again this section will focus on official and public discursive structures. However there is significant overlap with the parapolitical and peace counter-discourses because some of these become part of what might be termed 'elite debate' about the sites and the activities they represent, particularly among academics, parliamentarians and so on. While these debates may be theoretically accessible to anyone (or at least to anyone with the necessary resources and time), they tend to be conducted amongst a very small group of people, who are a varying mixture of the professionally involved, the highly-educated and the highly-motivated. This will be further examined in Chapters 6 and 7.

The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first, A, deals with strategy: the roles that intelligence and intelligence sites play within a broader context of the aims and objectives of states within intra- and inter-state relations. This means introducing some of the characteristic statements that are made about intelligence, and about strategy and 'foreign policy' more generally, particularly since the end of the Cold War. This period has seen a number of challenges to the supposedly settled order of large bloc politics and attendant massive military spending, from concepts such as the 'peace dividend', a scaling down of the military and diversion of resources to focus on other social concerns, the challenge of global environmental problems and humanitarian catastrophes. However these challenges were also counter-challenged by a resurgent military argument which attempted (and continues to attempt) to redefine 'threats' to national security themselves using discourses of internationalism and humanitarianism thereby by-passing any hopes of a peace dividend. This section will look further to the wider strategic goals of the United States and the UK, particularly in the context of the 'final frontier' of the control of Space. This latter aim, prominent in recent military pronouncements, is particularly linked to intelligence, and provides both the major motivation and subtext for arguments about new threats. This section

will also examine and explain some of the language and history of intelligence in general as an integral and influential part of inter-state politics, and this theme will continue into the next section. It means revisiting and expanding some of the debates referred to in Chapter 1 about U.S. hegemony, the UKUSA system and so on. The sources used will be threefold: firstly, official state documents, particularly the publications of the NSA and of the most rapidly expanding American military command, U.S. Space Command, which is key to understanding aspects of Menwith Hill and Fylingdales, as well as UK government statements about GCHQ and its role and about relationships with the USA; secondly, the writings of analysts close to U.S. government; finally, the critiques of those who oppose the stance and strategies of the U.S., in particular, Noam Chomsky.

The second section, 'B', concerns technology: the techniques and objects which provide the military with the ability to carry out the strategic aims and objectives, and which are often the direct sources of concern to campaigners and interest groups. This section, through analysis of available official documentation and the reconstructions of independent investigators and monitoring groups of concerned specialists like the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in Washington DC and 'Enigma' in Bradford, attempts to trace the trajectories of technological development at Menwith Hill, Fylingdales, and Irton Moor. Signals intelligence collection and distribution, such as that practised by Menwith Hill and Irton Moor has evolved rapidly this century from simple radio interception and distribution via horseback courier in the First World War to satellite collection of stray microwave messages and distribution via fibre-optic cable. Similarly, but over a shorter period of time, radar technology at Fylingdales has changed from simple unidirectional analogue radar to digitally-controlled phased-array systems. The increasing militarization of space and the colonisation of earth orbits by intelligence-gathering and military communication devices is in fact by no means a new phenomenon, and these historical developments will be put into context as part of the hidden geographies introduced in Chapter 1. In this section these geographies - technological networks including bases, telephone systems, satellites and ultimately weaponry - will be traced to assess the place of the North Yorkshire sites. Current discussions of the technological capabilities of these sites, and the networks of which they are parts, will be analysed, in particular with regard to the ECHELON system, and the new Space-Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) and National Missile Defense (NMD) program which links Fylingdales and Menwith Hill.

A. THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

American Strategic Thinking in the New Millennium.

In Chapter Two, some broad ideas about American foreign policy were introduced, in particular the debate about U.S. hegemony. The basic argument of the American right, and indeed the policy elite, liberal, left or right, in the west more generally, is that some form of 'Pax Americana', a situation wherein American hegemony secures peace, whether actual, declining, or potential, was desirable as it brought democracy and economic freedom. Most follow a standard historical model of the Cold War as an ideological and military confrontation between the USA and the USSR. When this confrontation ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was followed by a period of change with a dual response. On the one hand, it was seen as an opportunity for peace and cuts in military expenditure (a 'peace dividend'). On the other, it was a dangerous new period where uncertain and multiple threats would arise necessitating a reorganisation of strategic direction, but certainly not a reduction in military expenditure and effort. If anything the myriad regional threats would result in greater necessity and opportunity for U.S.-led Western military intervention.

Both these responses, whether based on an idealistic desire for peace or a hawkish belief in new threats, are flawed. More radical analysts have shown that underlying economic objectives, which preceded and succeeded the Cold War have more explanatory power than the confrontation thesis. Far from promoting peace, free markets and democracy, the USA has consistently manipulated, subverted and overthrown democratic governments, promoted supranational organisations to economically adjust other state economies in favour of Trans-National Corporations. It has in general sought a position of political and economic dominance regardless of the views of other states and peoples.

These views are not based on idealised conceptions of America or the public statements of politicians, but on internal strategy documents and on the actions of the U.S. in international economic, political and military terms. A key case in point is National Security Council 68, a memorandum which was written in April 1950, and which laid down quite clearly the parameters of elite discourse. The Soviet Union was the 'slave state', a global threat, and this

necessitated harsh imperialist actions from the American state to prevent the spread of communism.

Gabriel Kolko¹, Noam Chomsky² and others have catalogued the historical actions that flowed from this imperialism for many years. These includes: the CIA-backed coup in Iraq in 1953 that reinstated the Shah; the series of interventions in South-East Asia, from Vietnam to Indonesia; the support for the racist white South African state; and the subversion of democratic regimes in Central America. The aim was to dominate economically, politically and militarily within a 'Grand Area', which consisted of the entire world outside the Soviet Union and its satellites, and Europe. The confrontation with the Soviet Union was merely a stalemate whose persistence was necessary to justify high military spending and a ideologically homogenous internal political structure, that would provide the tools necessary to continue the development of the Grand Area. In most cases where the US acted to contain a 'Soviet threat', for example in Cuba and Nicaragua, where there was support from the Soviets, it was requested only because of the insecurity those state's felt because of the very real threat from the USA. In the case of Nicaragua this resulted in a ruinous US-initiated and funded war that lead to the eventual downfall of a mildly socialist Sandanista government that had overthrown a dictatorial Somoza regime, and which was subsequently fairly elected on two occasions.

None of these analysts argue that the Soviet Union was not a threat at all, or that it did not attempt to influence other states, or that its rulers did not commit terrible atrocities within the Soviet Union and its immediate area of influence. However they do argue that any external threat was for the most relatively easily contained by a massively powerful American military-industrial complex which always outstripped the Soviet Union both militarily and economically. The effort of even maintaining this competition always threatened to overwhelm the Soviet Union, so that eventually more progressive Soviet leaders decided to leave the arena. This did not end the Cold War: according to Chomsky, it continues, only with one hegemon, the USA. The same economic, cultural and political imperialism persists, and, in fact, because of the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, the USA is now able to act far

¹ Kolko, Gabriel (1988) *Confronting the Third World*, New York: Pantheon.

² Chomsky's output on American foreign policy is enormous, and starts with *American Power and the new Mandarins*, New York: Pantheon, in 1969. Perhaps his most comprehensive explications are to be found in: Chomsky, Noam (1992) *Deterring Democracy (Second Edition)*, New York: Hill and Wang.

more freely, and to intervene more openly, in pursuit of its goals of domination, and to extend the 'Grand Area' globally. The major problem it has now is to convince its erstwhile allies and supporters that there are threats great enough to justify the aggressive behaviour of the U.S. state and wide-ranging enough to threaten those allies and supporters as well.

Chomsky is particularly acute at deconstructing the discourses that underpinned and 'explained' American interventions: for example the racism that constructed the Vietnamese as passive as easily-led³. This discourse of the native as naive dupe, was often supplemented or replaced by the discourse of popular nationalism (or indeed any popular endogenous movement) as either 'fanatical' and dangerous or, of course, inspired by the USSR, or both. Instead, the U.S. backed 'moderates', who were basically those, regardless of popular support or democratic intentions, who could be relied on not to 'make the world safe for democracy', but to provide favourable conditions for U.S. and other developed nation's trading and financial interests. These moderates included Pinochet in Chile, Suharto in Indonesia, Marcos in the Philippines and, for the first 20 years of his regime, Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The use of the term 'moderate' is another term that precedes the 'Cold War', indeed Chomsky shows how both Mussolini and Hitler were constructed as 'moderate' defenders of democracy against the threat of Bolshevism right up until the Second World War began. In most of the so-called 'Third World', whose designation was in itself a Cold War construction, these conditions meant acting mainly as sources of raw materials. Although of course elites would act as consumers of 'First World' products, to which others could aspire, and the masses would also eventually come to be regarded as cheap labour in times of high labour costs in the developed nations. It was when states threatened to step outside this role, and pursue their own self-development that they became designated as 'naive', 'fanatical', 'communist-infiltrated', or any number of other discursive strategies, which were then used to justify American, or sometimes British, political, economic and military intervention in their internal affairs.

Conventional academic disciplines have finally begun to catch up with the Chomskian critique, in either beginning to take documents like NSC 68 seriously⁴, to apply Chomskian

³ Chomsky 1992 *op cit*.

⁴ See, for example: May, Ernest R. (ed.) (1993) *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68*, Boston MA: Bedford Books.

analysis to British political history⁵, or in developing a broad discourse analysis approach to inter-state relations⁶. In International Relations, this has been described as a 'cultural turn'⁷, and has produced some interesting work which will be discussed below. In Geography, cultural geographers have begun to combine the International Political Economy (IPE) of Cox *et al.*, and cultural geography into an approach sometimes termed 'critical geopolitics'⁸. This critique of political-military subversion and intervention also fits in well with the radical critique of development ideology and practice⁹, which is the other side of the American imperialist approach.

USSPACECOM Vision 2020

How does this analysis fit with the Post-Cold War plans of the US military? A good example, with particular relevance to intelligence sites is the strategic plan of US Space Command (USSPACECOM), *Vision for 2020* (Vision 2020). *Vision 2020* is one of many similar documents produced by all American military Commands and various subsidiary organisations, as well as cross-organisation thematic documents, in support of the US Department of Defence's *Joint Vision 2010*. This was developed from the early 1990s to lay out the future strategic orientation of the United States'



Figure 6: The Logo of USSPACECOM

⁵ Curtis, Mark (1995) *The Ambiguities of Power: British Foreign Policy Since 1945*. London: Zed Books; Curtis, Mark (1998) *The Great Deception: Anglo-American Relations and the World Order*, London: Pluto Press. The latter book is particularly good at revealing the way in which the British and Americans (and the French) manipulated the United Nations.

⁶ Chomsky has been attacked by linguistic discourse analysts for *not* using his skills as a Professor of Linguistics to analyse the documents he uses in his writings on the U.S. state. However, this attack is unfair. Chomsky's development of the 'propaganda model' of the media with Edward Herman, and his treatment of US foreign policy documents are both key examples of successful applied critical discourse analysis, where the broad context is as important as the documents themselves, and where the meaning and expression within the documents is used to build up a wider argument. It would be very difficult to make the points he is making from a detailed language-focused analysis of a small number of documents.

⁷ For example: Appy, Christine G. (ed.) (2000) *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism 1945-1966*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press; and, Katzenstein, Peter (ed.) (1996) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

⁸ For example: Agnew, John and Corbridge, Stuart (1995) *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, London: Routledge; Slater, David, and Taylor, Peter (eds.) (1999) *The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power*, Oxford: Blackwell. It is noticeable how few of the authors included actually reference Chomsky, even though it would be almost inconceivable that they would not have read some of his work.

⁹ For example: Escobar, Arturo (1995) *Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

¹⁰ United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) (nd.) *Vision for 2020*, on-line at: <http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace/visbook.pdf>

armed forces in the post-Cold War period. Many of the documents are dominated by a concern with the integration of war and technological development particularly in the field of surveillance and information systems. Thus, for example, the existing overarching concept referring to the organisational and support activities of the American military, previously known as Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I), has now become Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). The designation has been changed to reflect the key role of information technologies, particularly emphasising the parallel and mutual development of information technology and aerospace technology.

It should also be seen in the context of the new national *Space Policy* announced by President Clinton in September 1996 and published in completed form in 1999¹¹, and other policy pronouncements in this field, for example efforts to establish the American military's Global Positioning System (GPS) as the world standard technology in this field¹².



Figure 7. USSPACECOM Mission Statement from *Vision 2020*

The first overall impression of *Vision 2020* is its poor visual appearance: the general layout and appearance are remarkably unimpressive for a body that deals with the highest

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense (1999) Directive No. 3100.10, Subject: Space Policy, July 9th 1999. Available on-line at: <<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/dodspcpolicy99.pdf>>

¹² 'Internationalization of space: Increasing cooperation with our allies'. Speech given by Robert V. Davis, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Space) at the Second Annual Space Strategy and Architecture Symposium, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington DC, February 11-12, 1997. Available on-line at: <<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/speech1.htm>>

technology. It has the look, and sometimes the language, of an amateur business presentation. There is also an apparent naive simplicity in the diagrams, and in the appearance, which appears to be heavily influenced by comic books and popular film. For example, the mission of USSPACECOM is set out in 'Star Wars'-style bold yellow letters advancing outward from the page from the Earth against a backdrop of stars (Figure 7, above overleaf).

On the inside back cover is a very interesting picture of a gold satellite either sending a stylised targeting or communications signal beam, or shooting a laser weapon at the earth from orbit¹³. I did not look at this particularly carefully at first; on a more careful second look, the satellite is over the Arabian Gulf states and it is clear that the 'beam' is impacting on Baghdad. An example of military humour, or a more sinister prediction of future American military capability?




Figure 8. Satellite targeting Iraq in USSPACECOM Vision 2020.

The text provides more evidence, as we shall see below. On the back cover itself, under the title "Space: the warfighter's edge", the earth is seen as an old-fashioned globe on stand, with

¹³ *ibid.*, 15.

different types satellites at each of four 'corners' in almost heraldic fashion¹⁴. Yet on the globe itself is not the surface of the earth, but a photo-montage of rockets, aircraft and soldiers - representing, of course, the world of war and the world of the U.S. military, but also the world *as* war. This is an implied belief that the world is essentially about combat, and further that the world is the legitimate domain of American forces. Looking at the globe on its stand again, it also has the appearance of a crystal ball - this is what the future holds, a world dominated by U.S. military might held together by satellite surveillance and weapons.



Figure 9. 'Space - the Warfighters edge.' From USSPACECOM Vision 2020

This interpretation of a particular image might be unjustified on its own, yet the text bears out this reading. Core to USSPACECOM's mission and to *Joint Vision 2010* more broadly, is the concept of 'Full Spectrum Dominance' (FSD), an ominous phrase full of imperialist menace. In the mission statement, with its 'Star Wars'-style lettering, this concept appears in the following context:

¹⁴ *ibid.*, 16.

US Space Command - - dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect US interests and investment. Integrating space forces into warfighting capacities across the full spectrum of conflict¹⁵.

It seems quite clear at first that 'dominance' refers to the military sphere, and that the 'full spectrum' is likewise restricted to conflict. However, these capabilities are to be expressed in support of nebulous 'US interests and investment'. Considering that these two aspects have been used to justify almost all American political and military interventions in the last 50 years, this is far from reassuring. One also has to unpack this statement much further: what do the US military define as 'military operations' and 'conflict'? Does it simply refer to 'war' as it is commonly understood? U.S. military doctrine has no definition of conflict, so its meaning must be defined by the explication that follows in this context, and in this case, the answer is quite clearly in the negative.

The internal contents of Vision 2020 appear to confirm the reading of the back cover picture, as viewing the world as filled with conflict, as war being the norm of human behaviour which necessitates U.S. intervention to prevent chaos. Legitimate 'military operations' are early on defined as including peace-keeping and conflict prevention, as well as 'war-fighting'. Therefore the 'full spectrum' of in which the US military are to dominate is expanded somewhat, beyond 'war' to activities which one would not necessarily assume were military, but which are often assigned to the military by default. This is consistent with standard military doctrine which divides military operations into: 'war-fighting' and 'military operations other than war' (MOOTW)¹⁶. Over the course of Vision 2020, the range of FSD expands still further.

One of the key characteristics of Cold War ideology which is still clearly visible in this document is the justification of U.S. military build-up on the grounds that it will prevent or deter others from doing the same, and will enable the USA to protect itself against the inevitable consequences of those states' actions. In a section entitled 'Future Trends', USSPACECOM argues that "so important are space systems to military operations that it

¹⁵ United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) nd. *op cit.*, 3.

¹⁶ US Department of Defence (nd.) *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, Joint Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff. Available on-line at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>>

would be childish to imagine that they will never become targets"¹⁷. Thus, because of this potential threat (however remote) from unnamed and perhaps even unknown adversaries, the U.S. must "control the space medium to ensure US dominance on future battlefields"¹⁸, through "robust capabilities to ensure US superiority", including "an ability to deny others the use of space"¹⁹. In other words, if we don't get our weapons up there first, someone else will; if we don't devise the capability to destroy others' satellites, for surely 'robust capabilities' is an understated way of saying violent and destructive means, they could destroy ours. This is the Cold War ideology of escalation still alive and well, and this time in the coldest environment of all.

However it is not just military battlefields, but also economic ones that the US seeks to dominate:

Due to the importance of commerce and its effects on national security, the US may evolve into the guardians of space commerce -- similar to the historical example of navies protecting sea commerce²⁰.

Thus USSPACECOM envisages an American military capability to effectively control trade through and in Space, not just 'U.S. trade' it appears, but rather 'commerce' in general. Thus the future of commerce is unproblematically associated with US national security interests and U.S. military development. This appears to tie in well with the discourse of 'free trade' supposedly going hand-in-hand with 'democracy' as key American values that should also be universal.

The militarization of the sea was one of the major contributing factors to outbreak of war in 1914. One would hope that USSPACECOM do not view this historical example as an exact parallel, but the discourse of preventative militarization and escalation is combined with a discourse of an inevitable historical trajectory which defines not only the past but also the future. Hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, necessitates the reconstruction of the past so as to make a smooth and even path to the present, and to thus make the state's view of the future appear as a natural progression. Indeed the ability to control history is essential to

¹⁷ United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) *nd. op cit.*, 6.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, 6.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, 10.

maintaining control over contemporary public discourse, a factor that was examined, with regard to the British state and disclosure of historical information, in Chapter 3. This manipulation of contested events has been particularly common since the enlightenment period, and intensified still further with the twisting the Darwinian ideas of evolution into teleological philosophies that emphasised the 'manifest destiny' of particular 'nations', and so on. These often racist ideologies dominated the first half of the Twentieth Century²¹, and it would appear that in more or less subtle forms, they persist.

This 'historicism' can also be seen in corporate and state discourses about economic globalization, and in neo-liberal capitalist rhetoric more generally; indeed, the Vision includes complete acceptance of this wider discourse: "globalization will also continue, with a widening between the 'haves' and 'have-nots'"²². There is no suggestion that U.S. economic, political and military dominance might actually be responsible for the 'widening'. The Vision, at this point, accepts this as an inevitable consequence of unstoppable globalization, which the US will simply be in the best position to exploit, to be the 'haves', whilst seeing-off the threat offered by the 'have-nots'. It is clear that the threat will come from this group, as USSPACECOM does not see U.S. hegemony being challenged by "a global peer competitor", only "regionally"²³.

In this historicist discourse, the history of war is seen as one in which new environments, or 'mediums' as the U.S. military terms them, are at first co-opted in support of existing dominant contexts of warfare, and then transformed into military arenas in their own right, thus:

As air power developed, its primary purpose was to support and enhance land and sea operations. However, over time, air power evolved into a separate and equal medium of warfare... During the early portion of the 21st Century, space power will also evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare²⁴.

²⁰ *ibid.*, 10.

²¹ For a compelling non-Euro-American-centric overview of the Twentieth Century as a period dominated as much by state barbarity justified as 'progress' as by real improvements in the lives of ordinary people, see: Ponting, Clive (1999) *The Pimlico History of the Twentieth Century*, London: Pimlico Press. (Previously published 1998, as *Progress and Barbarism: the World in the Twentieth Century*, London: Chatto and Windus)

²² United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) *nd. op cit.*, 6.

²³ *ibid.*, 6.

Military power is seen in quasi-Darwinian terms, almost as a living entity, spawning new beings which adapt and colonize new environments: space power is seen as 'evolving', developing a 'separate but equal' existence in the 'medium' of space.

The use of the word 'medium' with regard to space is also highly interesting in itself. While in one sense it is simply another word for 'context' or 'arena' here, it is also a word which in general use designates a substance, within which actions can occur. Thus air, water and earth are 'things' as well as being equivalent to 'contexts' in which activities take place, and this is probably why the military originally used the term 'medium' in this way. Space on the other hand is, on the whole, empty of matter; there is no 'medium'. It is almost as if the U.S. military have resurrected the ancient idea of 'aether' - that 'Space' is actually filled with some invisible substance that allows things to move in it. In order to make their metaphor consistent, they have resorted to a pre-scientific 'elemental' view of the universe. Thus, with its 'Star Wars' graphic style, historical determinism and elemental imagery, USSPACECOM's Vision contains a curious mixture of pre-modern, modern, and post-modern semiotic strands.

What are the factors that contribute to Full-Spectrum Dominance, and what are its components? A diagram early in the Vision gives both. In this diagram FSD is seen as a large arrowhead: it is thus conceived of as a dynamic process rather than a state. As we have already seen there are three main areas in which FSD is supposed to operate. They emerge from the front of the arrowhead, and despite their differing degrees of overt violence are all depicted as legitimate domains of the military. The first, 'Peacetime Engagement', is written against a picture of camouflaged and beweaponed soldiers emerging from a transport plane. The second, 'Deterrence and Conflict Prevention', is illustrated with a picture of fighter-planes refuelling in mid-air. Finally, 'Fight and Win', is shown against a back-drop of tanks firing and large orange explosions. Feeding into the arrowhead of FSD are two pairs of concepts divided by a composite picture of planes, ground-launched rockets and an aircraft carrier perhaps representing the conventional 'mediums' of warfare. The top pair are: 'Dominant Manoeuvre', and 'Precision Engagement'; the bottom 'Focused Logistics' and 'Full-Dimensional Protection'. These concepts are purely military concepts rather than relating to wider political ideas, though the use of particular words like 'precision' will be examined further below. They are seen as emerging from a ring, with 'Information Superiority' as its

²⁴ *ibid.*, 4.

more visible outer face, and 'Technological Innovation' on its inner. Information Superiority is later defined as being the ability "to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information, while denying an adversary's ability to fully leverage the same". This ability is thought to rely on space power. The word 'leverage' occurs several times in the Vision. In U.S. military doctrine, it relates specifically to information and is defined as: "the effective use of information, information systems, and technology to increase the means and synergy in accomplishing information operations strategy"²⁵. It also seems to have the implication of gaining an advantage without the knowledge or full consent of those from whom it is being won. This shall be explored further below. The presence of 'technological innovation' highlights the issue of 'hybridity' raised in Chapter 2: military force is only partially dependent on human beings, a more complete view is that the military is a network of constantly changing human-machine hybrids or cyborg weapons systems. In the case of Space the human presence is increasingly minor in relations to the machine component. When USSPACECOM claims that "USSPACECOM is the only military organization with operational forces in space"²⁶, the operational forces to which it refers are at most times entirely mechanical, with the human components on the surface of the earth linked to them only by radio and microwave signals.

Later in the Vision, another diagram with a similar arrowhead format provides four more key components feeding into FSD, this time expressed as two 'themes': "*Dominating* the Space Dimension' and '*Integrating* Space Forces'. Here the components, called 'operational concepts', which implies that they are ideas which while not yet doctrine may become so, are more externally focused and of a more political nature: 'Control of Space'; 'Global Engagement'; 'Full Force Integration'; and 'Global Partnerships'. In two of these phrases the adjective 'global' appears, making it clear, if it was not already, that the USSPACECOM's (and the USA's) conception of 'national security' is far from simply the defence of its borders and in fact encompasses the whole world. The 'Grand Area' of the Cold War has simply expanded: global interests are U.S. interests, the USA has become a deterritorialized entity that is in the process of reterritorializing itself as the 'global'. This appears to contradict the earlier discourse of 'globalization as inevitable natural progression'. Globalization appears here as the overt goal of Americanization. Yet, the two things are not contradictory if one accepts the underlying assumption that the USA is the natural agent of progress - that what is

²⁵ US Department of Defence nd. *op cit*.

²⁶ United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) nd. *op cit*, 7.

good for the USA, as the source of 'commerce' and 'democracy', is good for all people. And this underpinning is clear throughout Vision 2020.



Figure 10. 'Control of Space'. From USSPACECOM Vision 2020

Each of the 'operational concepts' is explored further in turn, with the aid of a standardized diagram centred on a computer monitor-type screen showing a picture, surrounded by concentric circles and four 'star-burst'-style speech bubbles at each corner of the screen containing the components. Control of Space involves "real time space surveillance systems", 'timely and responsive spacelift', 'advanced protection', and 'robust negation systems'. The first is a panoptic vision: "real time; precise; complete ID"²⁷; satellites will be

able to see everything, all the time, as it happens, and with complete certainty as to identity.

The latter's star-burst bubble contains what can only be described as an outburst of negation verbs, reminiscent of the hysterical 'Exterminate' cries of the cyborg Daleks in the television series, 'Doctor Who': "Lethal and Non-Lethal; Temporary and Permanent: Destroy, Disrupt, Delay, Degrade, Deny". The alliteration may be coincidental, but it seems unlikely that the author of this diagram could have failed to notice its sinister poetic effect. Again it is difficult to note whether it is meant to be at all humorous. Certainly all the words, though none are doctrinal, have very particular and distinct military meanings: from the lethal finality of 'destroy' through the varied damage connoted by 'disrupt, delay, degrade', to the non-destructive but still aggressive and decisive blocking/prevention indicated by 'deny'. Lethality is also implied by the 'protection' sub-component, which has both 'active and passive' elements protecting both 'military and commercial' systems.

Control within 'the space medium' is one thing; the next operational concept, 'Global Engagement', is a further escalation in scale. This is described as "the application of precision

²⁷ *ibid.*, 10.

force to, and through, space"²⁸. The first point to note here is the use of the phrases 'precision force' or 'precision strike'. This discourse has been characteristic of the way in which recent wars conducted by the USA and its allies have been presented to the public, particularly in the Gulf, and in the Balkans. It is notable though that in military doctrine 'precision' does not have the same meaning as has been presented to the public in the media. 'Precision bombing' for example simply refers to bombing directed at a specific target, regardless of how it is directed or to what level of actual accuracy on impact²⁹. Vital here is the concept of panopticism, which was mentioned earlier. Without a total view, there can be no certain 'precision strike'. Thus surveillance is again emphasised, but with an extra element: in addition to 'global surveillance', there is now also 'information dominance'. This latter addition is particularly interesting, as the dominance over information at a world-wide level implies a great deal more than simply *knowing* or *seeing* everything. We have seen earlier how dominance was equated not only to the ability to use a 'medium' without hindrance, but also the ability to deny others the use of that medium. Here we have the second element, which, to refer back to Chapter 2, is also a key role of Intelligence Services. Not only gathering, interpreting and distributing information, but also preventing others from doing the same, and especially from having access to the product that one's own intelligence community has generated.

There is also here the surreptitious introduction of what is effectively a 'fifth medium' of warfare that concerns Menwith Hill and other SIGINT sites as much as, if not more than, Space - the virtual electronic medium. This is the domain of information itself, where what is known as Information Warfare (IW) takes place. USSPACECOM is primarily interested in promoting its own claims to importance and funding priority, and is not so concerned with advancing the claims of other parts of the military/intelligence community whose primary function is in this area. These agencies include the NSA itself and the U.S. Marine Corps, which is a major player in the Electronic Warfare element of military operations (see below p.156). Thus space is emphasised as the 'fourth medium' of warfare, whereas in contrast IW, the domain of rival organisations is merely implied.

There are three other sub-components of 'Global Engagement'. 'Emerging Missions' is defined in rather less assertive and more hopeful discourse than in other areas in the Vision as

²⁸ *ibid.*, 11.

²⁹ US Department of Defence *nd. op cit.*

the 'migration' of certain tasks currently based in conventional 'mediums' to Space. In other words they would like to see certain functions transferred to them, but they are not demanding these, merely letting a slower and more 'natural' process take its course. The use of the word 'migration' again links to the discourse of 'natural progression' adopted earlier in the text when outlining the history of war. It is particularly instructive to see the contrast between the mild language used when making reference to other U.S. military organisations and the far more aggressive rhetoric when dealing with foreign states and organisations. Perhaps the real threat to USSPACECOM is not seen as coming from outsiders, or as being those threats to national security listed in the annual CIA assessments, but from other elements in the U.S. military gaining more funding, or intruding onto its territory. USSPACECOM appears to be territorializing Space as much in relation to other US military organizations as to foreign forces.

'National Missile Defence' (NMD) is the system that is intended to replace the ageing BMEWS and would be partially based at Fylingdales. NMD is justified here for the same reason as FSD in general was justified at the beginning of the Vision: "the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) requires a National Missile Defence". In other words the United States is being forced into this position by the aggressive military build-up of others. There is no hint that NMD itself may be a part of that proliferation, or might play a role in increasing that proliferation still further, and there is no sense of responsibility for the historical development and proliferation of WMD. Despite all the talk of control and dominance, this discourse is suddenly abandoned when it comes to questions of responsibility for anything that might be considered a threat. It is noted that NMD does include a weapons element, though it does not specify whether this is ground or space-launched - this is important because of arguments about the interpretation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) which only sanctions peaceful uses of space. It appears that even under liberal readings of this treaty, which interpret peaceful as non-aggressive as opposed to the stricter 'non-military', weapons in space targeted at the earth would be prohibited. This is significant too because the final sub-component makes no pretence of avoiding the aggressive military use of Space. 'Precision Strikes' includes not only a supporting role to conventional forms of strike (ground and air-launched missiles, artillery, bombs etc.), but also "space-based earth-strike weapons". This supports the reading of the back-cover illustration (see above) as a picture of either contemporary or, more likely, future military capability. It is difficult to see how such weapons could be conceived of as having a purely defensive role, so

even if one accepts the liberal reading of the OST this statement means that USSPACECOM is committed to breaking or undermining it.

The next operational concept, 'Full Force Integration' is less interesting for what it has to say about US strategy, except for an example of commercial management discourse infiltrating the military. It is stated that "space power will contribute to getting the right military capability and information to the right people, at the right place, at the right times"³⁰. This could almost be taken directly from a management text about 'just-in-time' production.



The final operational concept is 'Global Partnerships'. Again the discourse of 'partnership' is another element of commercial management discourse: in the public sector, it is effectively code for the partial privatisation of state services, or the exploitation of non-commercial resources for commercial benefit. it is in this sense of exploiting another organisation that 'partnership' is used here:

Figure 11. 'Global Partnerships'. From USSPACECOM Vision 2020

Global partnerships augment military space capabilities through the leveraging of civil, commercial and international space systems. The growth of non-US military space systems provides the opportunity for the US to gain increased battlespace awareness and information connectivity in a cost-effective manner.

Here again we see the use of the idea of 'leverage', here not used in strict military doctrine terms to do with information operations, but to describe what is effectively the capture or use of resources for purposes other than which they were intended. USSPACECOM is arguing for the virtual hijacking of non-military systems for U.S. military ends. In another apparent

³⁰ United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) nd. *op cit.*, 12.

contradiction to earlier assertions that the growth of foreign military space systems was a threat which necessitated pre-emptive U.S. action, here foreign systems are seen as a resource which the U.S. can use to reduce its own military costs. The diagram is particularly revealing in this case: the components are arrayed around a picture of the International Space Station, supposedly an example of peaceful, civil, inter-state co-operation. The sub-components are: the 'Military Core'; 'International'; 'Commercial' and 'Civil'. The first simply refers to all the military systems already mentioned, but the phrase itself is interesting. Although it is overtly a reference to the central concern of USSPACECOM as a military organisation, particularly in conjunction with the picture of the civil space station it suggests that within all apparently civilian activities in space there is a military use or function, and that this function is in fact the heart or central purpose. The last phrase refers to the US civil organisations with an interest in space, including the North American Space Agency (NASA) and the meteorological organisation, NOAA. The 'Commercial' sector refers to consortia with private firms, particularly Satellite Communications (SATCOM); it is the final component, the 'international', that is most interesting. Here, the USA not only envisages the 'leveraging' of the United Nations and the European and Pacific 'Communities' (apparently seen as homogenous blocs for USSPACECOM strategic purposes), but also the creation of a "NATO-like" space organisation. This implies the same degree of dominance over the agenda and stance, and influence in members' foreign and defence policy as the USA has in the current NATO organisation. In other words, USSPACECOM envisages setting up another international organisation to legitimise its militarization of space, violation of the OST, and any subsequent military actions that flow from this, just as NATO generally (sometimes retrospectively) legitimates current U.S. terrestrial military actions. Full-Spectrum Dominance is thus extended once again to include political institutions world-wide. Apart from political legitimation, the role of 'partners' will be limited to funding U.S. military requirements, as USSPACECOM envisages: "off-loading funding to civilian and commercial providers"³¹; the word 'off-loading' in particular implies dumping or complete removal of a heavy burden rather than any concept of true partnership. A final list of 'Global Partnership Concepts' reiterates the points, calling for "satellite-sharing"; "space system architecture to facilitate the rapid flow of information"; and "international standardization". Effectively these are all measures to reduce U.S. costs while ensuring the dominance that USSPACECOM has already said that it intends to exercise over Space and over information.

³¹ *ibid.*, 13.

By the end of Vision 2020, the discourse of Full-Spectrum Dominance has expanded to encompass not only the goal of USSPACECOM with regard to military aspects of space, but for the goals of the U.S. state in general. The areas of military operations on land, sea, air and space, commerce, international political institutions, and information are all openly described as areas in which U.S. control should legitimately operate, even if there are existing treaties that forbid aspects of such control. This legitimate right is felt to be based not only on force but also on a moral conception of the role of the United States. In an introduction to USSPACECOM by the previous Commander-in-Chief, General Howell M. Estes - now unfortunately deleted from their website - the General claims that only the USA has the moral right, as well as the operational ability, to control Space. Perhaps this extraordinarily strong claim that goes beyond any statement in Vision 2020 was the reason why it was deleted from the website. However it does seem to reflect the core beliefs of U.S. foreign policy-makers, that U.S. hegemony through global panopticism and military reach is not only politically, militarily and economically feasible, and desirable in terms of U.S. national security goals, but is also a moral mission, a crusade. In this sense, American military / foreign policy discourse at the beginning of the 21st Century differs little from the imperialist discourse of 'manifest destiny' and the 'white man's burden' at the beginning of the last.

It is very easy to get carried away by the bravado and single-minded intensity of *Vision 2020*. However visions are likely to be severely compromised both by technical and political realities. There are four main reasons why we should be cautious of over-playing the threat posed in military visions. Firstly, visions like this serve the purpose of making a case to the funding bodies, in this case the American military hierarchy and the United States Congress, for why a particular military organisation should be continue to be funded or have its funding increased. Putting forward a narrative that places the organisation at the centre of future developments is one way of attempting to win over such funders. Such debates over funding also serve as arenas where counter-discourses can be expressed, as we shall see in the next Chapter.

Secondly, it was also noted earlier that the document serves as an attempt to territorialize Space as much in relation to other elements of the American military establishment as other states and peoples. US Space Command is a relatively young organisation that needs to justify itself to those whose military priorities lie in other 'mediums', and to mark out clearly the boundaries of its own.

Thirdly, the incompleteness of American hegemony may hinder further progress towards this goal. There have been statements by North Korea about the unlikelihood of their nuclear capability being used against the West, warnings by China and Russia, and 'allies' of the USA, about the dangers to the inter-state status quo, in particular to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and to a lesser extent the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, from the development of NMD. These concerns have certainly contributed to the postponement, of NMD, which was announced by the Clinton administration on September 1st 2000³². China in particular has argued for a comprehensive new agreement to halt the militarization of space³³. However, as this thesis was going to press, the new Republican President George W. Bush Jr. was already announcing his intention to speed up the implementation of NMD regardless of objections.

Finally, existing technological capabilities are frequently not capable of carrying out even the basic tasks which military-political propaganda has convinced wider society (and indeed other states) that they can. These technical failures can be obvious at the time: the technical failures that have dogged NMD are a case in point: at least two serious failures of the proposed NMD technology have occurred during the last year³⁴. Alternatively, they can be revealed much later. An example in this latter category is the story of Fylingdales and the establishment of the BMEWS system (see below), which also highlights the political nature of decisions about technology.

In addition one must consider the 'framing' of this document. It is not a secret report leaked to the public but accessible to anyone with the necessary hardware and software. It therefore has an envisaged audience beyond the military/intelligence policy community. Lindis Percy of CAAB argues, correctly I believe, that:

this is the sort of tutoring for Americans to click on, and it says 'this is what it's about - it's about our future...' It actually explains from their point of view what it's about... with all these acronyms and things... but it's actually *very, very serious*. It's about domination of space, American domination of space³⁵.

³² Clinton, Bill (2000) 'Remarks by the President on National Missile Defense', Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington DC, 1st September 2000.

³³ Nebehay, Stephanie (2000) China Says Top Priority is Halting Arms Race in Space, Geneva: Reuters, 27th January 2000.

³⁴ U.S. Department Of Defence, News Release, Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, DC, July 8th 2000.

³⁵ Interview with Lindis Percy, March 2000.

Therefore, documents like this also serve the purpose of supporting an intra-state ideological status quo, of reinforcing or reconstructing popular perceptions among the American public of American international superiority, and of the key role of military technological innovation and development in maintaining this position. The simplicity of much of the underlying reasoning and the populist graphical style, combined with recognisable and aggressive military terminology can also therefore be seen with this target audience in mind. The fact that these many purposes are clearly considered more important than any negative reaction that such documents may arise from foreign readers is clear; we are not important.

American Signals Intelligence and Strategy: the National Security Agency

The Origins of the NSA

The NSA was established by National Security Council Directive 9³⁶, and a Memorandum from President Truman on October 24th, 1952, as a unified agency to deal with Communications intelligence (COMINT) for the following reasons:

The communications intelligence (COMINT) activities of the United States are a national responsibility. They must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources in all participating departments and agencies and to satisfy the legitimate intelligence requirements of all such departments and agencies³⁷.



Figure 12. The badge of the NSA

Up until this point US intelligence gathering activities had been characterised by inter-service and inter-agency rivalries. This was the latest in a long line of attempts to rationalise and centralise control of the multiplicity of bodies, the previous one being to set up an Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), which the NSA directly replaced³⁸. As such it had only limited success, as such rivalries and unclear definition of responsibilities continue, and indeed agencies continued to proliferate. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) set up in 1961 to

oversee the development and operation of all space-based reconnaissance systems, and most recently in 1996 the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), which is tasked with dealing with all areas relating to mapping and imagery intelligence for the US government, was set up³⁹. Various proposals have been made to reform this web of overlapping agencies, but have been defeated by the vested interests of the agencies themselves⁴⁰.

³⁶ Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1999a) *The U.S. Intelligence Community (4th Edition)*, Boulder CO: Westview Press.

³⁷ TOP SECRET A 20707 5/4/54/OSO COPY Oct 24 1952. MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense SUBJECT: Communications Intelligence Activities. Available on-line at: <<http://www.nsa.gov:8080/docs/efoia/released/truman.html>>

³⁸ Richelson 1999 *op cit*.

³⁹ *ibid*.

⁴⁰ For details see Richelson 1999, *op cit*. Ch. 20; also FAS IRP website:

NSA functions

Although the original instructions to the NSA specified COMINT only, it was soon replaced with the concept of Signals Intelligence, or SIGINT. This included both: COMINT activities, defined as: "those activities which produce COMINT by interception and processing of foreign communications by radio, wire, or other electronic means... and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however identified"; and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) activities, "the collection (observation and recording) and the processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources"⁴¹.



INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY ORGANIZATION

Figure 13. The logo of the ISSO

The NSA is also responsible for all internal U.S. state Information Security (INFOSEC), previously known as Communications Security (COMSEC), the defensive aspect of what has become known as 'Information Warfare' (IW). It does this through its information Systems Security Organisation (ISSO). The ISSO makes certain that all state organisations have communication security systems adequate to their required level of security, monitoring such systems, distributing cryptographic resources and components, and the protection of state data and

computers from intrusion, be it from individual hackers or concerted IW attack. This does mean that the NSA has ultimate control over all state codes and systems, and potentially can access any other state systems and monitor communications within the U.S. state, and those of any non-governmental organisation that performs any information-based task for the state. It is not tasked to do this, and indeed is legally prevented from doing so, though evidence suggests that it has abused its position in the past, and may continue to do so (see below).

However the ISSO does not limit itself to state INFOSEC. Through its Business Advisory Office (BAO), it also offers its services to commercial organisations in several ways. First, assessment of commercially available information security systems, Second, the NSA also endorses particular systems which are designed to stop remote monitoring of computer

⁴¹ NSCDID Number 6, *Signals Intelligence*, January 17th, 1972 (updated frequently).

hardware electromagnetic emissions, so called 'TEMPEST' systems. Thirdly it encourages independent research and development, "to encourage independent research and development efforts in areas of mutual interest to both industry and the ISSO", in other words, to 'leverage' commercial research efforts for the benefit of the state. Fourth, by direct sales, which includes various programmes to allow companies which have developed INFOSEC systems for the government to supply them to other customers, for example, one of these the Authorized Vendor Programme (AVP):

"allows an INFOSEC vendor, under contract to NSA for the production of a certain Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) equipment, to obtain approval to produce more equipment than the quantity specified in the contract for the purpose of selling directly to qualified customers"⁴².

These 'qualified customers' can include more than just other state organisations, they can also include selected commercial organisations: in other words the NSA is using Federal Government-funded and Congressionally-approved programmes designed specifically for its own INFOSEC requirements to boost the sales of companies which supply that equipment. The final area of the ISSO's Business Affairs Office is that of 'INFOSEC Outreach', which is designed "to combine the substantial Information Systems Security talents of government and industry partners". The section continues: "working together, the partnership of government and industry can meet the increasing demands for state-of-the-art secure telecommunications and information systems". This appears to be very similar to the discourse of 'partnership', with its component 'leveraging' that USSPACECOM advocates in *Vision 2020*. Besides the cost savings that this offers the NSA, it also allows to make sure that commercial INFOSEC products manufactured in this way and sold either in the USA or abroad are more easily 'crackable' by the NSA.

The operational military cryptologic functions of the NSA are designated under a different agency name: the Central Security Service (CSS), which functions as an umbrella body for all the different military cryptographic organisations, for example the Naval Security Group Command (NSG). Richelson states that this designation refers purely to function, and the

⁴² ISSO Business Affairs Office website: <<http://www.nsa.gov/isso/bao/dsp.htm>>

CSS has no separate staff or budget⁴³, although there are many military personnel attached to the NSA through the CSS.

There are some indications that the NSA also operates small SIGINT units through an organisation called the Special Collection Service (SCS), run jointly with the CIA. According to Jason Vest and Wayne Madsen, the SCS could have a range of functions from simple surveillance of targets in foreign countries from American embassy premises to "riskier 'black-bag' jobs, or break-ins, for purposes of bugging"⁴⁴. As Vest and Madsen also note, Mike Frost's account of his career in the Communications Security Establishment, the Canadian SIGINT organisation and UKUSA partner contains the only published evidence from any SIGINT operative of the SCS.

Employment and Funding

The NSA is now the largest of the American intelligence services by manpower, having between 21,000 and 52,000 employees⁴⁵. It is the second largest to the NRO by budget, satellite development and operation being disproportionately expensive. The NSA's budget is around \$3.5 Billion US per annum according to Richelson, a figure which is consistent with the estimates of the federation of American Scientists, though they note that some estimates put the figure nearer \$10Bn US. According to FAS, the higher estimates include the attached military personnel who operate under the CSS function, as well as support staff (cleaners, drivers etc.). Far more information is available on the NSA than on GCHQ because domestically at least, the American state is more open, however inconsistently so. Budgets submitted to Congress can be analysed so as to reveal the NSA component. For example, although the budget for intelligence and communications is aggregated, with the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Defence Information Systems Agency (DISA), a figure is given elsewhere for the DISA component, which allows an intelligent guess at the NSA portion. FAS describes this as "one of the amusing examples of the foolish inconsistency with which the "secret" budget is publicly discussed"⁴⁶.

⁴³ Richelson 1999 *op cit*.

⁴⁴ Vest, Jason and Madsen, Wayne (1999) A Most Unusual Collection Agency, *Village Voice*, February 24 - March 2, 1999 <http://www.villagevoice.com/features/9908/vest_madsen.shtml>

⁴⁵ FAS IRP website: <<http://sun00781.dn.net/irp/nsa/nsabudget.html>>

⁴⁶ *ibid*.

There is also a public archive of documents relating to the NSA held at George Washington University⁴⁷, and there is also a great deal more oversight (although much of it behind closed doors) from the elected members of Congress and the Senate. However despite the increasing concern over ECHELON in the popular and specialist media, it is still the least known US intelligence agency, and has several popular nick-names based on its initials which reflect its occult profile, for example: 'No Such Agency'; and 'Never Say Anything'.

NSA sites

The NSA maintains facilities world-wide⁴⁸, whose functions vary. Some may serve very particular purposes (a satellite groundstation, for example); others may have several (Menwith Hill being a key example). The NSA is head-quartered in the state of Maryland, with three sites: Fort George G. Meade, the original HQ, also known as the National SIGINT Operations Centre (NSOC), mid-way between Washington DC and Baltimore, where the vast majority of NSA staff are employed and which is described by FAS as,

Virtually a city in itself, Fort Meade has 65 miles of paved roads, and 28 miles of secondary roads and 1,670 buildings. There is also a bank, modern exchange mall, credit union, post office, hospital, chapels and many other facilities⁴⁹;

Friendship Annex (FANX), next to Baltimore-Washington International Airport; and a building in the National Business Park, opposite Fort Meade. In addition, there is the SCS. According to Vest and Madsen, the SCS is housed in a new, extremely high-security "300-acre, three-building complex disguised as a corporate campus" somewhere in a dense forest near Beltsville, also in Maryland⁵⁰.

The next tier of facilities are the Regional SIGINT Operations Centres (RSOC). These are under the operational control of CSS military cryptologic organisations, and provide SIGINT analysis and support for military operations. There are five RSOcs: Central Command, at Fort Gordon, Texas; Pacific Command, at Kunia in Hawaii; European Command, at Bad Aibling in Germany; Atlantic Command at Menwith Hill; and Southern Command, at Lackland Air

⁴⁷ <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>

⁴⁸ This list is largely based on the FAS IRP website: <<http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/nsafacil.html>>

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

Force Base, in Texas. Bad Aibling and Menwith Hill are also Communications Satellite (COMSAT) interception stations, in other words they intercept commercial and foreign military communications, as are: Bude, in Cornwall; Waihopai, in New Zealand; Geraldton, In Australia; Rossman Research Centre, in North Carolina; Sugar Grove, in West Virginia; and Yakima in WA. Satellite groundstations or 'downlinks' for US military satellites are at: Pine Gap (or Merino) near Alice Springs, In Australia; and, Buckley Air National Guard Base (ANGB) near Denver, Colorado; as well as at Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling. Finally, via the CSS, the NSA has responsibility for the NSG facilities at Adak in Alaska, Guam and Diego Garcia - the latter run jointly with GCHQ - in the Pacific, Winter Harbour in Maine, and Quantico in Virginia. The latter site is part of a complex of US state support facilities in that town, which also include CIA and FBI training facilities and laboratories.

Until recently the NSG facilities also included Edzell in Scotland and Brawdry in Wales, as well as a number of other sites in the U.S., but these have been closed under the Federal Base Closure Act of 1996. The NSA itself has implemented a draw-down programme which has lead to closures in Europe and Asia, as well as transfers of some facilities to other agencies.

⁵⁰ Vest and Madsen 1999 *op cit.*




Figure 14. An organisation table for NSA sites

Internal Security

As one might expect, NSA personnel are subject to very strict security regulations. An internal handbook on security for new employees was published anonymously on the Internet several years ago, and this gives an introduction to how NSA personnel are supposed to behave. This includes, restrictions on interaction with foreign nationals:

close and continuing associations with any non-U.S. citizens which are characterized by ties of kinship, obligation, or affection are prohibited. A waiver to this policy may be granted only under the most exceptional circumstances⁵¹.

Information control is tight, and personnel are expected to inform report any attempt to inquire about NSA activity:

NSA personnel must refrain from either confirming or denying any information concerning the Agency or its activities which may appear in the public media. If you are asked about the activities of NSA, the best response is "no comment." You should the notify Q43 [the NSA/CSS Information Policy Division] of the attempted inquiry.⁵²

Security guidelines do not require personnel to deny working for the NSA, however the rule for particular facilities, especially overseas can be stricter, as is the case with Menwith Hill, as we shall see below.

Margaret Newsham, a former NSA employee, gave some insight into the methods used for keeping code-words secret in an interview with the Danish newspaper, *Ekstra Bladet*, in March 2000.

Every day at a specific time, all the NSA's surveillance stations around the world were required to change their codes simultaneously. We did so by taking an encryption card containing the new codes and inserting it in a small

⁵¹ *NSA Handbook*, Available on-line at:
<<http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~nhughes/html/docs/nsa.html>>

⁵² *ibid.*

box at the same time as all the other stations. After making the change, we had the 'old' card which had to be destroyed. For this step, the NSA had introduced a very unique security procedure that departed from the other authorized routines. Normally, everything was supposed to be destroyed in a so-called 'burn bag'. Our new instructions stated that three employees should all participate in the destruction process. We were supposed to fill a blender with water, put the card in the blender and turn it on.⁵³

Three employees had to be present to witness the destruction and sign statements to that effect.

The National Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century

Like USSPACECOM, the NSA also has a vision: the National Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century (NCS21)⁵⁴. It also features a global image on its title page (Figure 15, below overleaf), but one which indicates not only the obvious difference in focus of the NSA compared to USSPACECOM, but which is also indicative of an institutional cultural and perhaps also a generational difference. Where the USSPACECOM Vision 2020 appears to use the symbols of the 'Star Wars' generation, the tail-end of the first American space age, the imagery which Ronald Reagan's administration adopted to describe its plans for ballistic missile defence, and to use them in an amateurish fashion, the cover of NCS21 is slick, corporate, and uses imagery not of outer space but of inner space, of the virtual world of computer networks. The image is a simple one: the distant sun rising over a planet, which is presumably our own but whose surface is inscribed neither with recognisable landscape nor with representational photomontage, but with the neon vector-graphics of the "consensual hallucination", "the lines of light ranged in the non space of the mind" of cyberspace described in William Gibson's first novel, *Neuromancer*.

⁵³ Margaret Newsham quoted in Elkjær, Bo and Seeberg, Kenan (2000) *Key To The Whole World*, *Ekstra Bladet*, Denmark, 4th March.

⁵⁴ National Security Agency (NSA) (nd.) *National Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century* <<http://www.nsa.gov/programs/ncs21/index.html>>




Figure 15. The cover of the NSA's corporate strategy document, *NCS21*.

The difference in imagery between Vision 2020 and that of NCS21 fits the break that occurred in popular culture with the advent of 'cyberpunk' and the effort to overthrow the grip of the utopian space opera dreams of mainstream American space discourse in fiction and

policy. The imagery itself is dated: Gibson's conception of cyberspace was very much conditioned by emerging video-game technology which has moved far beyond that primitive stage now. However the symbolic significance of the 'cyberspace', the 'net' or the 'web' remains contemporary, and in fact has become a huge resource for political, social and cultural discourses. The institutional culture of the NSA, being an organisation composed predominantly of mathematicians and computer programmers, is likely to be infused with this cyber-culture which it has played a major part in creating, sustaining and expanding. Although in terms of time, Star Wars and Neuromancer are only a few years apart, they represent the old and declining and new and expanding semiotic structures and cultural resources respectively. This helps to explain an apparent contradiction with historical facts: the NSA was founded well before USSPACECOM, and indeed cryptographic services have been state agencies since WW1. USSPACECOM is a newer organisation. However, while information technology, and particularly the combination of IT and communications technologies into 'telematics', have totally altered the terrain, physical and symbolic, of SIGINT and cryptology in ways that were not generally conceivable even in the 1950s, the basic vision of humanity moving to colonize space has if anything contracted in its scope and ambition in the last 20 years. Thus, for a dynamic new military space organisation, the richest semiotic resources offered it are neither dynamic nor new, but either those of general contemporary military discourse or specific but older resources from the optimism of the previous generation of space exploration. On the other hand, for an older civilian information-based organisation, the semiotic resources are diverse, dynamic, contemporary, and well understood in conventional public political discourse.

In terms of content the NCS is a bland corporate-influenced mission statement. It refers to its relationship to the wider State in the following way:

The NSA/CSS exists to protect the nation and serve others. We must work collaboratively and corporately to anticipate and meet our customers' needs. Our customers must know that they can count on us to provide them with what they need, when they need it, and in a form they can use⁵⁵.

⁵⁵ <http://www.nsa.gov/programs/ncs21/customers.html>

This discourse of customer satisfaction is backed by a pledge to work harder than any other government agency and concludes with the curiously meaningless piece of corporate team-building jargon "together we form the bond as America's team". This team-building discourse is expanded on the 'Vision' page, which quotes the *Joint Vision 2010* definition of information superiority referenced above in *Vision 2020*. *NCS21* argues that the NSA's twin INFOSEC and SIGINT functions "serve as the offensive and defensive squads of a team dedicated to a single goal - information superiority for America and its Allies". Here the idea of the 'team' is more clearly related to American Football; sport along with business being drawn on not only as a semiotic resource but also invoked as part of the American national identity which the NSA seeks both to promote and to protect. It almost goes without saying to point out that this can be seen as trivialising the actual operations of the NSA and of removing it from connections with bloodshed and death - SIGINT (and war) as game. However, the historical and current significance of sport and its connection with the construction of national identity should not be underplayed. Firstly, the continued use of sporting discourse in state publicity and media coverage of recent conflicts simultaneously, both distances from and heightens the interest in the conflict itself: it becomes a spectacles, an entertainment. Secondly, the Duke of Wellington's famous comment in the Nineteenth Century that 'the battle of Warterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton' reflects the key role that sport has played at least in the ideological, if not the physical, preparation of populations for war: the making of men and the inculcation of masculine military values into wider society. In the USA, this is reflected in the ideal, the cliché, of the 'All-American', a football star, a soldier willing to die for his country.

While constructing its new business-like, can-do, America's team image, the NSA is clearly also conscious of its past reputation. When information has come to the attention of the public, it has usually been in connection with spy scandals and illegal or at least dubious activities (see Chapter 6). While making no reference to this history, the new clean, all-American NSA claims to be different: "we are accountable for our actions, and recognize our obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the United States. We are committed to the highest standards of ethical behaviour"⁵⁶. Of course, the two great ironies here are that, firstly, the NSA has almost no 'obligations under the Constitution or laws of the United States'; and

⁵⁶ <http://www.nsa.gov/programs/ncs21/values.html>

secondly, that such protections, even if were meaningful, would extend only to Americans, not even people of 'friendly' nations would be covered.

The rest of the Vision is an expansion of the initial points, filled with vacuous statements, and coming on like a cheap television advert: exclamations in capitals like " *-GUARANTEED!*" are added to the end of its paragraphs. The only thing missing is a promise to refund the customer's money within 30 days if the NSA does not provide complete satisfaction. Just like the consumer capitalist system the NSA defends, its vision does not deliver on the glossy cover, the surface; the image is more substantial than the contents. Yet this is probably what both the rank-and-file of Congress and the population of the USA expect to see from a modern arm of the States - meaningless promises in large type, wrapped up in a shiny package. *NCS21* is the perfect reflection of the corporate-dominated state in the 21st Century. But one has to remember that this illusion has a another function. It serves to divert and frustrate those who wish to know more about the Agency. Its glossy cliché-d blandness and fulfilment of superficial expectations is in fact a perfect illustration of the continuing power of the NSA. As *NCS21* says, "knowledge is power in the Information Age"⁵⁷; the NSA has the knowledge and the power, it is certainly not giving it away.

As this thesis was being completed, internal reorganisation was reported to be taking place to implement the strategy. This reorganisation appears to concentrate on increasing the commercial aspect of NSA operations and improving finances. The discourse used to justify these changes is one of 'commercial viability', 'clients', and so on borrowed from private enterprise, but increasing operational effectiveness by making these more clearly separate from day-to-day SIGINT and INFOSEC activities⁵⁸.

⁵⁷ <http://www.nsa.gov/programs/ncs21/goal1.html>

⁵⁸ Lardner, Richard (2000) NSA Overhauls Corporate Structure In Effort To Improve Operations, *Inside the Air Force*, June 23, 2000. Available on-line at: <<http://cryptome.org/nsa-redo.htm>>

The Strategic role of Menwith Hill



Figure 16. A Coat-of-Arms for RAF Menwith Hill

Menwith Hill's strategic role is varied. The original station, the 13th United States Army Security Agency (13th USASA), apparently had a more limited focus on Soviet tactical movements and exercises. Bamford paraphrases the former chief of G Group, NSA, Frank Raven as saying that "the main reason for the NSA taking charge was the failure of the Army to allocate sufficient intercept spaces and resources for much-needed strategic intelligence"⁵⁹. This was part of a long-running dispute between military and civilian intelligence in the USA over the rationale of surveillance and reconnaissance. Thus, according to Jeffrey Richelson:

"NSA's take-over marked a reorientation of Menwith Hill's focus, with increased attention to be given to the collection of strategic intelligence against diplomatic and economic targets. Areas targeted by Menwith Hill included Europe (western and eastern) and the Soviet Union east of the Urals. Additionally, Menwith Hill would serve as a key facility in intercepting Soviet Communications"⁶⁰.

But while the NSA took over, the 13th USASA did not leave, they merely took a more subordinate role in SIGINT operations at Menwith Hill, and are still there today.

Staff at Menwith Hill are encouraged to keep their base and their function as anonymous as possible, in a fashion which exceeds the standard NSA guidelines (see above). A memo on Security and Law Enforcement revealed in the early 1990s put forward a "station anonymity policy", which stated that "maintaining Menwith Hill's low profile is the responsibility of all assignees, UK or US, and their dependants"⁶¹. To this end, any sign of particular units "the official seals, certificates, or photographs of particular US government agencies, their... logos, emblems, etc., will not be displayed outside of designated areas". There is no sign of

⁵⁹ Bamford 1982, *op cit.* p. 269.

⁶⁰ Richelson 1995, *op cit.* p. 304

⁶¹ *Security and Law Enforcement*, unpublished memo to all Menwith Hill Station personnel.

any of the serving units at Menwith on any of the gates, including the main gate, as there would be at bases in USA itself. The memo sets out a publicly-stated function of the base, which should be that it "provides communications support to Nato and conducts communications research". This memo is an unusual glimpse into official attempts to restrict both symbols and text, the cultural resources that could provide bases for counter-discourses, in an attempt to control the discursive structures set up around Menwith, to maintain the black-box.

According to FAS, Menwith Hill currently acts as a "regional SIGINT operations centre" and is "the principal NATO theater ground segment node for high altitude signals intelligence satellites"⁶². To the NSA it is known as Field Station F-83. It is already officially admitted from previous answers to questions in the House of Commons that the US military component contains representatives of all four main US armed forces: the Army; Navy; Marine Corps; and Airforce.



Figure 17. The badge of INSCOM

Specific units include, firstly, the US Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) 713th Military Intelligence Group (MIG), which was formerly known as 13th USASA Operations Company, the unit that controlled Menwith Hill until 1966. USASA was one of several Army intelligence agencies, probably the largest one, which combined to form INSCOM on 1st January 1977 after a two-year review of U.S. army intelligence requirements⁶³. The 713th's role is as:

a major subordinate command of INSCOM that support operations of the National Security Agency (NSA) Regional SIGINT Operations Center and to execute operations to support land component commanders' information warfare and information operations⁶⁴.

⁶² FAS IRP website: <http://www.fas.org/irp/facility/menwith.htm>

⁶³ FAS IRP website: <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/inscom/history.htm>

⁶⁴ FAS IRP website: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/inscom/713_mi_gp/index.html

Secondly there is a Naval Security Group (NSG) detachment⁶⁵. Also present is Company G Marine Support Battalion, whose mission is “to support cryptologic mission operations while maintaining readiness for possible augmentation of Fleet Marine Force cryptologic and ground electronic warfare units”⁶⁶. Finally there is the USAF Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) 26th Intelligence Group 451st Intelligence Squadron, which “provides 24-hour-a-day signals processing and communications security support to a variety of Department of Defense (DoD) customers”, and “provides specialists trained and skilled in intelligence and communication systems security to support MHS operational missions”⁶⁷.



Figure 18. The badge of the AIA

The army provides the current Base Commander (from July 18th 2000), Colonel Christine Marsh⁶⁸, and had provided her predecessors, Colonel Dwight Harthcock, Colonel Joseph Brand⁶⁹ and, Colonel G. Dickson Gribble⁷⁰. It was revealed in the House of Commons that “executive management of RAF Menwith Hill was assumed by the US Army on 8 August 1995”⁷¹. This is confirmed by an internal notice of the “MHS Transition Ceremony marking the day when the Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) assumes host responsibility from the US Department of Defence at MHS”⁷². Operational control of Menwith Hill however remains in the hands of the NSA/CSS.

The US civilian component of Menwith Hill comprises mostly National Security Agency personnel, but will undoubtedly also include staff from the US National Reconnaissance Organisation (NRO), the body which oversees satellite development and deployment, and perhaps the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). There are also substantial numbers of workers from the various firms that supply the satellite and other surveillance and reconnaissance systems feeding in to the base. In particular these include: E-Systems,

⁶⁵ FAS IRP website: <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/navsecgru/menwith/index.html>

⁶⁶ FAS IRP website: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/usmc/marsptbn/co_g/index.html

⁶⁷ FAS IRP website: <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/aia/67iw/26ig/451is/index.html>

⁶⁸ Telephone conversation with Liz Brown, RAF Menwith Hill, July 2000.

⁶⁹ *Hansard*, House of Commons Session 1998-9 9th November 1998, Col. 75.

⁷⁰ Menwith Hill Station (1995) Notice of MHS Transition Ceremony, 8th August 1995, OPAG archives.

⁷¹ *Hansard*, House of Commons Session 1996-7, 24th February 1997, Col. 119

Lockheed-Martin, Loral Space Systems (now a subsidiary of Lockheed), TRW, Raytheon and AST. They are there to deal with the technical operation of the various surveillance and communications interceptions equipment, which are so complicated and specialized that it makes more sense to have employees from the companies who made them to maintain them, than the staff of the NSA to be trained do so.

In terms of personnel numbers, Menwith Hill officially has 1801 staff (plus GCHQ employees), whose breakdown was given by the Minister, John Spellar, in a written answer to persistent questioner Norman Baker, Liberal Democrat MP for Lewes in Sussex on 12th May 2000:

As at 26 April 2000, at RAF Menwith Hill there were 415 US military, 989 US civilian, five UK military and 392 UK civilian personnel (excluding GCHQ staff). I am withholding the numbers of GCHQ staff under exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.⁷³

The civilian staff are mostly support workers (cleaners, drivers and so on), recruited locally, and on which the local Council puts so much stress. The RAF component is quite clearly a token presence; this tiny contingent provides the nominal British officer in charge, currently Squadron Leader Vincent⁷⁴, previously Ted Sumner⁷⁵. The figures show changes from the last time that Norman Baker asked this question on 9th November 1998. Then the figures, given by then Armed Forces Minister, Doug Henderson, totalled 1786 (plus GCHQ employees) and were broken down 435 US military personnel, 935 US civilian personnel and 416 RAF and Ministry of Defence civilian personnel respectively.⁷⁶ This increase most likely has something to do with the SBIRS programme (see below).

Menwith Hill played a major part, in targeting and strategic information gathering for Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, for which 'it' received a medal, and the award of NSA 'Director's Unit Award for Support to Desert Storm / Desert Shield'⁷⁷.

⁷² Menwith Hill Station (1995) *op cit*.

⁷³ *Hansard* House of Commons Session 1999-2000, Written Answers for 12th May 2000.

⁷⁴ Telephone conversation with Liz Brown, RAF Menwith Hill, July 2000.

⁷⁵ *Hansard* House of Commons Session 1998-9, 9th November 1998, Col. 75.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*.

Menwith Hill also operates as a major node in the ECHELON system. This global surveillance network involves many NSA and other nations' SIGINT facilities world-wide, including Menwith Hill, Morwenstow in Cornwall, Bad Aibling in Germany, Geraldton and Pine Gap in Australia, and Waihopai in New Zealand, as well as two unnamed stations in the Peoples Republic of China. It is effectively an extension and integration of the tapping work that Menwith Hill has always carried out. Indeed the public acknowledgement of the P415 programme in Congressional budgets for 1989 followed extensive revelations by a former employee of Lockheed, one of the major manufacturers of reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, Margaret Newsham. She claimed in newspaper articles, and in front of the US Congress Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, that domestic and commercial communications interception, based on Watch Lists was undertaken at Menwith Hill, contrary to the assertions of Bamford. Further, this was not limited to obvious subversives: even well-known 'hawk' and right-wing US Senator, Strom Thurmond, was targeted. However, once again, it turned out that the extent, purpose and capability of ECHELON, and other U.S. surveillance systems had been severely underestimated, as we shall see below.

Questions have been raised about whether the particular firms operating at Menwith Hill gain commercial advantage from access to the highly classified information with which they deal. The Channel 4 programme, *The Hill*, revealed that the European Tornado fighter and the Airbus projects were targets for interception, as well as British and French arms sales particularly in relation to the Middle East. However, the particular involvement of aerospace firms operating from Menwith Hill was denied by Admiral Bobby Inman, former Director of the NSA, who claimed that 'these people rarely have access to the actual data', though less reassuringly he concluded that "that is all the assurance you are going to get"⁷⁸. They all work alongside the GCHQ operatives, however such operatives are bound by the arrangements made between the USA and the UK (see below). In more general terms it seems inconceivable and absurd that the Americans would not be operating commercial espionage programmes from their facilities. Indeed the definition of national security used by the USA contains a key reference to the economic interests of America, and most nations have similar definitions.

⁷⁷ Campbell 1993 *The Hill*, an IPTV Production for Channel Four Television.

⁷⁸ Campbell 1993 *op cit*.

SIGINT organisations can always rely on more primitive methods to overcome technological obstacles, namely subversion and intimidation. The NSA has established a working relationship with most of the major U.S. software and hardware companies, and through these relationships has ensured that encryption systems within export versions of software in particular are less sophisticated than US internal market versions, and are more easily crackable. A well-known example of that of the Swedish government, which discovered that its use of Lotus Notes had left confidential communications vulnerable to the NSA because the non-US version used 24 rather than 64 bit encryption, on NSA instructions⁷⁹.

However this is merely the tip of the iceberg. According to research conducted by ex-NSA employee, Wayne Madsen, most countries in the world have used encryption devices for their diplomatic communications that were manufactured by a company almost entirely operated by the NSA⁸⁰. He argues that the Swiss cryptographic systems manufacturer, Crypto AG manufactured commercial cryptographic devices that were optimised for NSA decryption, and that countries were routinely blackmailed into buying these devices in return for aid, arms or other sweeteners.

Finally there are less criminal though no less worrying ways in which the NSA can infiltrate its agenda into International telecommunications systems. Firstly, it does deals with International Licensed Cable (ILC) companies to allow interception (see below and Chapter 6), as does GCHQ. Secondly it has representatives on transnational standards-setting committees, in particular the Frame Relay Forum, an unaccountable body which is responsible for the development of common standards for data transfer, and which also contains all the major telecommunications and computer companies from industrialised nations⁸¹.

⁷⁹ Laurin, Fredrik and Froste, Calle 'Secret Swedish E-Mail Can Be Read by the U.S.A', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 18th November 1997.

⁸⁰ Madsen, Wayne (1998) 'CRYPTO AG - the NSA's Trojan Whore?', *Covert Action Quarterly* 63, Winter 1998. Available on-line: <<http://mediafilter.org/caq/cryptogate/>>

⁸¹ Seeberg, Kenan And Elkjær, Bo (1999) *Tele Danmark In A Club With Echelon Spies*, *Ekstra Bladet*, Denmark, Sept. 26, 1999. The IFRF can be found at <<http://www.frforum.com/>>.

British Signals Intelligence and Strategy: GCHQ

The Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS), the predecessor of GCHQ, was an amalgam of Admiralty Room 40 (the naval SIGINT unit) and Military Intelligence division 1i(b), which came together in 1920. This was then transformed into Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in 1939, at the beginning of the Second World War. The existence of GCHQ was an official secret until May 1983 after the Government was forced to make a statement over the bizarre case of Russian agent and paedophile, Geoffrey Arthur Prime⁸². During the Cold War period, when mention was made of GCHQ listening posts they were referred to as Composite Signals Organisation Stations (CSOS). In fact the CSO was (and is) merely the interception and collection branch of GCHQ.

GCHQ is now publicly acknowledged and has a legal basis in the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which also provided a legal basis for the existence of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, sometimes known as the Intelligence Service, or MI6). The Security Service (MI5) had already been put on a statutory footing in 1989 with the Act. In the Intelligence Services Act, GCHQ is subject to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and its functions are defined as follows:

(a) to monitor or interfere with electromagnetic, acoustic and other emissions and any equipment producing such emissions and to obtain and provide information derived from or related to such emissions or equipment and from encrypted material; and

(b) to provide advice and assistance about -

(i) languages including terminology used for technical matters, and

(ii) cryptography and other matters relating to the production of information and other material,

to the armed forces of the Crown, to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or to a Northern Ireland Department or to any other organisation which is determined for the purposes of this section in such manner as may be specified by the Prime Minister.⁸³

⁸² Prime's identity as a mole within GCHQ was only discovered as a coincidental result of police investigations into paedophile assaults. See: Chapter 6, and: Bamford 1983 *op cit.*, and Lanning, Hugh and Norton-Taylor, Richard (1991) *A Conflict of Loyalties: GCHQ 1984-1991*, New Clarion Press, Cheltenham.

⁸³ Intelligence Services Act 1994, Chapter 13, Section 3.

It is particularly interesting that the functions assigned to GCHQ specifically allow it 'to interfere with' as well as simply monitor emissions and equipment producing them. It is also responsible not only for cryptologic functions but also wider intelligence 'related to' emissions and equipment producing them, as well being tasked with simple advice on languages.

These functions are to be exercised for three purposes: either "in the interests of national security"; or, "in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom", or finally, "in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime". Unlike the NSA then, GCHQ is clearly not restricted to foreign operations, or to operations concerning foreign nationals in the UK. Although the 'economic well-being' purpose does specify its limitation to "the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Isles" (though not only to non-British persons), the other two purposes are not so strictly delimited. The 'national security' purpose is with "particular reference to the defence and foreign policies" of the UK state, but it does not state that it is limited to these areas. In the field of serious crime, no geopolitical line is drawn at all. Thus, there is every reason to suppose that GCHQ has internal political functions, and in fact carries out some of the tasks that would be specifically prohibited the NSA in America, and would be the role of the FBI.

Like the NSA, GCHQ is under the control of a Director, who is responsible for the efficiency of the service, the ethical conduct of its operations at least in terms of making "arrangements for securing that no information is obtained [or disclosed] by GCHQ except so far as is necessary for the proper discharge of its functions", and its non-political party stance. The Director is also required to make an annual report to both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State.

One particularly controversial area of GCHQ operations, as with the NSA in America, is the area of communications interception ('telephone tapping'). It is commonly believed that a warrant is required by the Intelligence Services for every specific instance of telephone tapping. This belief is not supported by the Intelligence Services Act. Although, under the nebulous and harmless-sounding section 'Authorisation of Certain Actions', procedures are set out for how the Secretary of State may, on an application made by the Security Service,

the Intelligence Service or GCHQ, issue a warrant..."⁸⁴, in the first paragraph of this section it is stated:

No entry on or interference with property or with wireless communications shall be unlawful if it is authorised by a warrant issued by the Secretary of State under this section.

This is cunningly-worded paragraph, which is notable as much for what it does not say, as what it does. It does not say that any of the actions mentioned is unlawful *unless* authorised by a warrant, nor does it say that any action authorised by a warrant is lawful. All that it does say is that none of the actions mentioned (including telephone tapping, breaking and entering, burglary etc.) is against the law if backed by a warrant. Therefore, although the procedures for issuing warrants are quite clearly set out including the issues the Secretary of State should consider before issuing one, the times when the Security Service should apply on behalf of GCHQ or the SIS and so on, it is clear that a warrant is not actually required under the Intelligence Services Act. Within the meaning of the Act 'entry on or interference with property or with wireless telegraphy' can be carried out lawfully without a warrant.

The Intelligence Services Act also makes provision for a limited complaints Tribunal⁸⁵ a Commissioner⁸⁶ to oversee the operation of the illusory warrants system, and a Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee. However the Committee's role is limited only to the examination of the "expenditure, administration and policy" of the three Intelligence Services, not its activities or operations, and its reports to the Houses of Parliament on these already limited areas of intelligence are subject to censorship by the Prime Minister⁸⁷.

GCHQ itself is spread across two sites at Cheltenham in Gloucester, although plans have been announced to the public for a hugely expensive new high-tech single site to replace both. According to the plans announced at this stage, the "bagel-shaped complex, the size of Wembley Stadium" will cost over £800 Million, far more than the combined cost of the new

⁸⁴ Intelligence Services Act 1994, Chapter 13, Section 5.

⁸⁵ Intelligence Services Act 1994, Chapter 13, Section 8.

⁸⁶ Intelligence Services Act 1994, Chapter 13, Section 9.

⁸⁷ Intelligence Services Act 1994, Chapter 13, Section 10.

Headquarters built for MI5 and MI6 in London⁸⁸. Abroad, GCHQ maintains sites in Cyprus, the Falkland Islands, on Ascension Island and Hong Kong, both in conjunction with the NSA, the latter site surprisingly enough appearing not to have ceased operations since the colony was returned to China in 1997. Many embassies also have 'closed' (unacknowledged) GCHQ posts or units attached.

It is hard to know exactly how many other units and facilities GCHQ operates in the UK. There are many CSOS of whose historical existence we can be certain: Hawklaw, near Cupar in Fife, Brora in Sutherland, Cheadle in Staffordshire, Flowerdown near Winchester, and Gilnahirk in Northern Ireland, all of which are almost certainly no longer in operation. There are few, apart from Irton Moor, whose current active status is known. Palmer Street in Westminster is an office which intercepts telegrams and so on, ostensibly not part of GCHQ and staffed by British Telecom engineers. There are also sites in London at Earls Court and Broad Sanctuary, which is underneath the Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre, opposite the Houses of Parliament, and which monitors Whitehall communications⁸⁹. Elsewhere in the country, one of the most important sites is Morwenstow near Bude in Cornwall. This is apparently different to other CSOS and was almost entirely paid for by the NSA, its role as an ECHELON station being largely to intercept commercial Intelsat communications⁹⁰. Hanslope Park, in Buckinghamshire appears to have a substantial GCHQ presence and as it is the reception centre for all British embassy communications. Culmhead in Somerset has historically been a CSOS and is apparently also used for training. Wincombe near Shaftesbury is said by Norton-Taylor to have closed along with Flowerdown in 1977⁹¹, however another source informed me that this was not the case and that the site remains active with a substantial number of HF radio antennae⁹². This source also said that there were possibly still CSOS at Shawncliff, Chillwell, and Redbrae. Eastcote in North London, part of a complex of RAF and USAF bases also has a possibility of GCHQ presence as did Poundon in Buckinghamshire, which was closed in 1998 and put up for sale.

⁸⁸ Norton-Taylor, Richard (2000) GCHQ to get new headquarters for £800m *Guardian*, Tuesday March 7. Available on-line at: <http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,143959,00.html>

⁸⁹ From an anonymous interviewee, ostensibly an alleged ex-intelligence services employee - refereed to hereafter as 'Source A'.

⁹⁰ Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community (4th Edition)*, Boulder CO: Westview Press (1999). The role of Bude was also confirmed to me by 'Source A'

⁹¹ Lanning and Norton-Taylor, (1991) *op cit*.

⁹² Source A.

Other so-called 'lodger units' are possibly present at many RAF signals sites⁹³, in particular: RAF Digby in Cambridgeshire, the RAF's main SIGINT base; RAF Wyton, an outstation of RAF Brampton, also in Cambridgeshire; RAF Boddington, which is very near to GCHQ Cheltenham; RAF Oakhanger, the major groundstation for NATO military satellite communications in the UK. Finally there is RAF Rudloe Manor. This is part of the massive Corsham complex of quarries converted for use as weapons stores, factories and the emergency National Seat of Government in the Second World War⁹⁴, some parts of which are still in use by various UK intelligence agencies⁹⁵. GCHQ also operates under a British Telecom cover at Rugby, the massive central BT HF radio site, scheduled for closure at the time of writing, and Leafield. According to Norton-Taylor, GCHQ also has lodger units at some US intelligence bases in particular Chicksands and Menwith Hill⁹⁶, however it is hard to know exactly how many work in these places because of successive governments have refused to divulge this information.

Unlike the American intelligence agencies, GCHQ does not publish corporate plans or publicise its work. It only really came to the public's attention during the early 1980s as a result both of the Geoffrey Arthur Prime case, and the reaction from the Conservative government. In the post Falklands' War fallout and renewed Cold War paranoia and confrontation, afraid that strikes could damage the UK's intelligence-gathering operations, Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government banned unions at GCHQ on January 25th 1984. This resulted in protest within and outside GCHQ, and the departure, voluntarily and involuntarily, of a large number of staff. However the era of the TU ban at GCHQ has now come to an end, and the Unions have been allowed back in. A Press Release from Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, of May 15th 1999 stated:

"I can announce that the conditions of service of staff at GCHQ have today been changed: they once again have the freedom they previously enjoyed to join any trade union they choose. Talks with the unions will begin as soon as possible to settle future arrangements for staff representation and to secure a

⁹³ The RAF is responsible for most military communications in the UK. Their bases often have Royal Corps of Signals (army) units resident in addition to any GCHQ presence.

⁹⁴ Campbell (1982) *War Plan UK: The Truth About Civil Defence in Britain*; London: Burnett Books; McCamley, Nicholas J. (1998) *Secret Underground Cities*, Burnley: Pen and Sword Books.

⁹⁵ Source A.

⁹⁶ Norton-Taylor (1991) *op cit*.

collective agreement on no disruption to the work of GCHQ which will ensure that GCHQ's operations are protected from any threat of industrial action."⁹⁷



Figure 19 A GCHQ logo

GCHQ does have a website. However this is no more than a recruiting device, emphasising the famous historical role of SIGINT services, and appealing to the excitement and importance of the job, "You want the chance to engage in work with vital impact on the political, military and economic well-being of our nation. To be challenged, stimulated - and play a role in history"⁹⁸. Interestingly GCHQ, unlike the NSA, argues that knowledge is far more than power, "In business, knowledge is power. For GCHQ it's vastly more important. Knowledge ensures our nation's security, economic well-being and protection against serious crime"⁹⁹. GCHQ still appears

serious, traditional and 'old-school', and is has not become infused with business or sports discourse. It contains a perfunctory history, and a brief description of "the immense size and sheer power of GCHQ's supercomputing architecture" (to which we shall return briefly below). The site is really designed to tantalize the prospective employee with the exciting prospects of being part of something both so historically and contemporaneously important, and so well-equipped. The symbolic figure evoked here could not be further from the 'All-American' of the NSA, yet in some ways it more accurately reflects what the cover of *NCS21* was offering. This is the discourse of the geek - the computer programmer, the mathematician - as-hero; Gibson's cyberspace jockey striding through virtual landscapes armed only with his supercomputer. Again the appeal is made with virtually no reference to war, to violence or killing. The virtual space is a pure space, uninfected with the real.

⁹⁷ Cook, Robin (1999) Press Release, May 15th 1999, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.

⁹⁸ <http://www.gchq.gov.uk/textonly/careers/index.html>

⁹⁹ <http://www.gchq.gov.uk/textonly/index.html>

Britain and the USA: UKUSA

Understanding the relationship between the UK and the USA, in particular with regard to intelligence is the key to understanding why intelligence sites are where they are and why they do what they do.

Intelligence relationships between the two nations are governed by a series of informal agreements that until very recently were not acknowledged to exist. Even now their precise details remain a matter of speculation. The Second World War saw an openly acknowledged agreement covering the sharing of Signals Intelligence known as the Britain-USA (BRUSA) agreement, which was signed on May 17th 1943. This was apparently the successor to at least two more secret prior wartime arrangements¹⁰⁰ and important agreements signed in relation to naval intelligence. These agreements were mutual, but the post-war situation was very different. Britain's position as a dominant power had long been in decline; the war meant that Britain was economically weak and unable to exercise the long-distance power that it once had. America, on the other hand, had seen both its geographical reach and economic power extended as a result of the war. Thus they were not only able to rebuild the post-war economic system in their own image through the Marshall Plan for Europe, the MacArthur plan for Japan, the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions and so forth, they were also able to effectively dictate military terms to their allies as well as their enemies, with the notable exception of the Soviet Union.

The UKUSA agreement, signed in 1947 or 1948, but still publicly undocumented, was the result for SIGINT. According to Richelson and Ball¹⁰¹ this agreement made it clear that while Britain, and later also Canada, Australia and New Zealand, should provide SIGINT product to the United States, the US was under no reciprocal obligation. Canada had signed a separate agreement known as CANUSA, with the United States, which was incorporated into the UKUSA system. It has been revealed that Australia and New Zealand were far from fully informed participants. Britain initially signed on behalf of its Commonwealth subordinate,

¹⁰⁰ Smith, Bradley F. (1993) *The Ultra-Magic Deals*, Navato CA: Presidio. See also: Richelson, Jeffrey T. and Ball, Desmond (1985) *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Co-operation Between the UKUSA Countries*, London: Allen & Unwin.

¹⁰¹ Richelson and Ball (1985) *op cit*.

Australia, which at the time also spoke for New Zealand in this area, and later a British operative signed separately on behalf of New Zealand¹⁰².



Two UKUSA
'Second Parties':

Left, Figure 20
The badge of the
Canadian CSE

Right, Figure 21.
The badge of the
Australian DSD



The United States is designated as the 'First Party', while all the others are 'Second Parties'. The five first and second party SIGINT agencies now involved are the NSA, GCHQ, Canada's Communication Security Establishment (CSE), Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) and New Zealand's Government Security Communications Bureau (GCSB). Under UKUSA, the world was divided up between the five parties, and each has responsibility for SIGINT operations within their particular areas. The USA took by far the largest total area; Britain was responsible for the Soviet Union and its allies, west of the Ural Mountains, and for Africa, largely a result of its colonial penetration of that continent. CSO Irton Moor's concentration on the Baltic States is almost entirely the result of this division.

The UKUSA agreement covers more than sharing of product however. It also relates to: standardisation of code words, the development of technologically compatible or convergent systems, the exchange of personnel, and to the placement of intelligence bases. Bamford details the personnel exchanges: at present both the NSA and GCHQ have a Senior Liaison Officer, and staff, in place in the Headquarters of the other agency (designated SUSLO and SUKLO respectively)¹⁰³. There are also GCHQ operatives in US bases in the UK and perhaps some further afield, and NSA operatives in GCHQ sites.

Similar, if less formal agreements operate with regard to CIA/MI6 co-operation, on North American Missile Defence, Ocean Surveillance and a number of other technical and research

¹⁰² Hagar, Nicky (1996) *Secret Power, New Zealand's Role In the International Spy Network. (Second edition)*, Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potton.

initiatives. In addition, there is a major agreement on information sharing and operational compatibility between the armies of the same countries (with New Zealand as merely an associate of Australia), the ABCA agreement, which set up a number of Quadrupartite Working Groups (QWGs) which cover everything from electronic to biochemical warfare. Similar agreements exist for Naval Co-operation. These agreements continue to operate regardless of the membership of the USA, Canada and the UK of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), formed in 1949.

Many of the commentators who deal with UKUSA have commented on the white, English-speaking nature of the countries involved. There can be no doubt that this was conceived of as an agreement between countries sharing a perceived racial bond, and that further, one of its prime purposes was to subvert the intentions of idealists in both the British Commonwealth and later the United Nations. It also appears very significantly anti-European, and the current arguments between the Parliament of the European Union and the United States government over ECHELON appear to show that this view is widely held in many countries in continental Europe.

However the UKUSA agreement has expanded to include other nations, but only as 'third parties' to the agreement rather than core signatories. These third rate partners are, at present: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey¹⁰⁴. They provide some accommodation to NSA units, and are not given a status comparable to the Second Parties either in terms of partnership in operation of sites and only receive SIGINT product at the discretion of the United States. The Danish and Japanese NSA sites have both recently been revealed through the efforts of investigative journalists: the Danish site is at Sandagergård Station located at Aflandshage on the island of Amager, but it is also linked through the base at Karup, in the Jutland peninsula which hosts NATO's Baltic Approach (BALTAP) HQ and the US 530th Military Intelligence Group¹⁰⁵. The Japanese site is the US Air Force base at Misiwa. Japan still hosts many U.S. bases that it has occupied since the end of the Second World War as part of the surrender terms; some of which cause immense friction, particularly the bases on the island of Okinawa.

¹⁰³ Bamford (1982) *op cit*.

¹⁰⁴ Richelson (1999) *op cit*.

¹⁰⁵ Elkjær, Bo And Seeberg, Kenan (1999) The Danish Link To The Global Surveillance Network, *Ekstra Bladet*, date of press unavailable.

B. TECHNOLOGICAL TRAJECTORIES

The Technological Development of Menwith Hill

According to James Bamford, Menwith Hill was chosen due to its isolated moorland location, which was "virtually free from urban electromagnetic interference"¹⁰⁶. Campbell and Melvern revealed the co-evolution of the base and the nearby Hunter's Stones Post Office (now British Telecom) microwave relay Tower, and indeed the whole of the British Government's 'Backbone' microwave communications network, first proposed in a 1955 White Paper¹⁰⁷. This was designed "to provide a strategic reserve communications system" and was originally intended to "enable a bomb-blasted Britain to carry on functioning throughout a prolonged nuclear war as an airbase and support base"¹⁰⁸. However it had a peacetime function which was to funnel international communications that pass through the UK, into Menwith Hill. Thus from Hunter's Stones, which was one of the hubs of the system and which connected the original 'Backbone' (London-Birmingham-Manchester-Leeds) and their massive underground telephone exchanges, to the 'Northern Backbone' section (to Dundee) completed in 1962, a special spur was constructed to Menwith Hill (see Map 4 overleaf). To cope with the huge amounts of information flowing into the base from this source, it was equipped with an IBM 7094 computer¹⁰⁹, sometime in the early 1960s¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁶ Bamford, James (1983) *The Puzzle Palace* (reprinted with a new afterword), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 269.

¹⁰⁷ Campbell, Duncan and Melvern, Linda (1980) America's Big Ear on Europe, *New Statesman*, July 18, 1980, 10-14.

¹⁰⁸ Campbell, Duncan (1984) *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain*, London: Michael Joseph p. 307.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Intelligence Research Project (IRP) website:
<<http://www.fas.org/irp/facility/menwith.htm>>



Map 4. A map of RAF Menwith Hill, and the nearby Hunter's Stones telecommunications tower.

Reproduced from Ordnance Survey maps by permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationary Office.

© Crown Copyright NC/00/1335.

Hunter's Stones telecommunications tower is at the bottom centre of the map. Menwith Hill is at the top left. The high-volume fibre-optic underground cable that connects the two sites runs from the tower itself (the aerial symbol) alongside the B6451 road and enters the base next to the gate mid-way along the western boundary of the site.

Notice that no designation is given to the 'Camp', nor are the bye-laws boundaries marked at this scale (1:50,000).

On the 1st of August 1966 both the 13th USASA Field Station and a United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) radio and telecommunications monitoring station at Kirknewton in Scotland were officially closed and all tasks transferred to the National Security Agency (NSA) to be based at Menwith Hill¹¹¹. Kirknewton had opened in May 1952, the same year as the bigger and still operational Chicksands site (see Appendix 2), and was “one of the earliest US sites in Europe”¹¹². Originally set up by the USAFSS 37th Radio Squadron Mobile to intercept radio voice and Morse communications, its role had changed by the time of its closure to non-radio links and the ‘hot-line’ between Moscow and Washington.




Figure 22. VHF Radio Aerials at Menwith Hill

After the hand-over to the NSA, technological change at Menwith Hill was rapid. Increasing satellite communication and surveillance meant that interception of radar, radio and cable transmitted information was inadequate. The US had launched its first surveillance satellite in 1959, two years after the first Soviet ‘Sputnik’ orbit, and by 1966, hundreds of public and secret launches had taken place¹¹³. The Army’s failure to upgrade to cope with these changes was another key concern of the NSA according to Bamford (1983). Dish antennae to receive satellite transmissions were constructed at Menwith Hill in the late 1960’s and the first two

‘radomes’ were constructed during 1974. The radomes themselves are merely protective geodesic covers for satellite dishes and other sensitive equipment, usually made of Kevlar

¹¹¹ Campbell and Melvern 1980 *op cit*.

¹¹² Richelson, Jeffrey (1995) *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Oxford University Press.

¹¹³ Burrows, W. (1987) *Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security*, New York NY: Random House.

polycarbonate material; their protective function covers both the elements and the prying eyes of the public.

Three new systems in particular were closely associated with Menwith Hill at this time. The first was the ultra-secret DEFSMAC (Defence Special Missile and Astronautics Centre), which operates a network of satellites designed to provide early-warning against missile or other aerial or orbital assault. James Bamford claims that “at least part of its [Menwith Hill’s] function is to serve as a ground station for one of the DSP [Defense Support Programme] early-warning satellites, possibly parked over the South Atlantic”¹¹⁴. According to the Federation of American Scientists, DSP consists of a “satellite-borne system that uses infrared detectors to sense heat from missile plumes against the earth background, to detect and report in real-time missile launches, space launches and nuclear detonations”¹¹⁵.

According to the most recent work by Jeffrey Richelson¹¹⁶, the DSP was the successor programme to the early and expensive MIDAS satellites which operated from 1960 until 1963. From 1964 after budgetary cuts, a new system was considered and experimental launches took place in 1966. The first working launch of the finally approved system, DSP F1, took place on November 6th, 1970. Four were launched between then and 1973, and as each had a life-span of some eighteen months, there were 3 in orbit at any one time. The programme continued to be maintained and upgraded until DSP F18 was launched February 23rd 1997, the last of its kind. The DSP is currently being replaced by the Space-Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS), about which more later. Richelson contradicts Bamford's assumption about the orbits of the DSP satellites. They occupied a variety of orbits, both elliptical and geostationary, and covered both Atlantic and Pacific as well as the Eastern Hemisphere. Interestingly, Richelson makes no mention of Menwith Hill in particular as a ground station for this programme, referring only to "various tracking stations" in the Northern Hemisphere¹¹⁷. It is clear that the major DSP facilities were the Continental United States (CONUS) Ground Station at Buckley Air National Guard Base in Colorado, and Joint Defence Facility-Nurrungar (JDF-N) in Australia.

¹¹⁴ Bamford 1983 *op cit.*, 270

¹¹⁵ FAS SPP website: <<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/warning/dsp.htm>>

¹¹⁶ Richelson, Jeffrey (1999b) *America's Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security*, Kansas: University Press Of Kansas.

¹¹⁷ *ibid.*, 67.

The second new system, much more definitely associated with Menwith Hill was another satellite platform, code-named 'RHYOLITE'¹¹⁸, the first of which was launched between 1970 and 1973¹¹⁹. RHYOLITE was later re-code-named 'AQUACADE' after a famous spying incident¹²⁰. Its purpose is debated: Burrows alternately describes them as TELINT satellites, and as "multipurpose geosynchronous SIGINT satellites"¹²¹, while Bamford quotes an unnamed source who describes them as "capable of sucking microwave signals from out of space like a vacuum-cleaner picking up specks of dust from a carpet"¹²², thus being able to eavesdrop on virtually any microwave radio or long-distance telephone calls, as well as having vast TELINT capabilities, used primarily in arms verification. Perhaps the most authoritative comment comes from Richelson and Ball who argue that RHYOLITE was indeed multipurpose and "capable of being targeted against telemetry, radar's and communications", and that different satellites in the series mixed these capabilities in different ratios, although "the highest priority of the RHYOLITE program has always been telemetry interception"¹²³. The third and final 1970's system is the KH-9¹²⁴ real-time PHOTINT (Photographic Intelligence) surveillance satellite platform, code-named HEXAGON, but more commonly known as 'Big Bird'. The first of these short-lifespan satellites was launched on June 15th 1971, and regular launches continued throughout the 1970's and into the 1980's¹²⁵.

By the end of the 1970's there were also total of eight radomes on the site, as well as numerous antennae. The two planning applications submitted in 1975 to the Borough Council (see Chapter 4) were both for a Primary Electricity Sub-station which suggests that more energy-demanding equipment was being installed, and it seems that an improved cable link to Hunter's Stones was installed shortly afterwards in 1977. Campbell and Melvern estimated that, after this upgrade, the base could deal with 32,000 simultaneous telephone, telex and

¹¹⁸ These are BYEMAN codewords - see Appendix I for an explanation.

¹¹⁹ Three different dates: 19th June 1970, December 20th 1972, and March 6th 1973, are given by Richelson and Ball (1985) *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries*, London: Allen & Unwin; Bamford (1982) *op cit.*; and Burrows, W. (1987) *Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security*, New York NY: Random House, respectively.

¹²⁰ This was the selling of plans and transmissions from RHYOLITE to the Soviets by employees of the manufacturers and operators, TRW, which gained huge publicity in 1977, and was turned into a best-selling book (and later film), *The Falcon and the Snowman*, by Robert Lindsey.

¹²¹ Burrows 1987, *op cit.* 24 and 190.

¹²² Bamford 1983 *op cit.*

¹²³ Richelson and Ball 1985 *op cit.* 177 and 178.

¹²⁴ KH- numbers designate PHOTINT satellite platforms (see Appendix I).

¹²⁵ Burrows 1987 *op cit.*

other cable transmissions¹²⁶. This suggests that the old functions of the base had not decreased with the increased emphasis on satellite SIGINT; instead the base had just expanded its capacity and range of activity.

The increased numbers of planning applications submitted in the 1980s (see Chapter 4) do not shed much light on the initial stages of what was perhaps the most important development in the in that period, the ‘STEEPLEBUSH’¹²⁷ programme, which according the Federation of American Scientists involved a \$25M construction programme completed in 1984¹²⁸. Perhaps the 1983 application for ‘a radome’ (see Table 2, page 21) was part of this.




Figure 23. The STEEPLEBUSH Operations Centre.

The centre itself is the low building in front of and below the radomes. This is only the upper part of the centre, which is mostly underground.

Duncan Campbell said in another article in *New Statesman* that the STEEPLEBUSH complex is the main satellite ground station for the ‘MAGNUM’ satellite platform¹²⁹. According to Richelson and Ball the first launch of MAGNUM took place on January 24th 1985 via the Space Shuttle *Discovery*¹³⁰. Richelson later corrected this, claiming that due to leaks to US newspapers, the codename had already been changed to ‘ORION’ by the first

¹²⁶ Campbell and Melvern 1980 *op cit*.

¹²⁷ This is an example of a codename for a particular operation.

¹²⁸ FAS IRP website: <<http://www.fas.org/irp/facility/menwith.htm>>

¹²⁹ Campbell, Duncan (1988) They’ve Got It Taped, *New Statesman*, 12 August, 1988, pp. 10-12.

¹³⁰ Richelson and Ball 1985 *op cit*.

launch¹³¹. He adds that the renamed ORION platform was the successor to the RHYOLITE / AQUACADE programme (see above), though its capabilities remain unknown. What is certain is that the STEEPLEBUSH complex continued to expand through two phases in the 1980s and 1990's, at a total cost of \$160M¹³².

According to Campbell¹³³, from unnamed US sources, Menwith Hill had over 1,200 staff in 1988 of which more than 2/3 of whom were US personnel. He also obtained a list of the programmes operating from Menwith Hill. At that time, in addition to STEEPLEBUSH, these included: SILKWORTH, concerned with long-range radio monitoring, although it has since been connected to the ECHELON system (see below); MOONPENNY, a system for monitoring commercial satellite (COMSAT) communications; SIRE; and RUNWAY, which Campbell believed controlled the VORTEX satellite platform, of which the first launch took place on June 10th 1978¹³⁴, and further followed in the 1980s. Campbell incorrectly asserts that VORTEX was a successor to a programme called CHALET, but again, this was simply a re-designation following US press leaks¹³⁵, a fact of which Richelson and Ball also seemed unaware. They do however provide more detailed information as to its role: "although this satellite was apparently conceived as a geosynchronous COMINT collector, it was evidently modified to give it a capability to monitor Soviet missile telemetry."¹³⁶ Richelson again provides corrected information in his 1995 book, and goes further claiming that VORTEX platforms played a key role in spreading the news of the Chernobyl disaster, and were still in operation into the 1990s¹³⁷

Several planning applications were made during the 1980s for new masts and radomes, and there were at least two applications in 1987 for one or more new electrical substations, which suggests that, as in the mid-1970's a substantial increase in capacity was being planned (see Table 2, page 92).

This could have reflected the advent of another marked upgrading of Menwith Hill's earth-based COMINT capabilities. Campbell claimed that it was about this time that planning

¹³¹ Richelson 1995 *op cit*.

¹³² FAS IRP website: <<http://www.fas.org/irp/facility/menwith.htm>>

¹³³ Campbell 1988 *op cit*. All other information in this paragraph comes from this article unless otherwise stated.

¹³⁴ Burrows 1987 *op cit*.

¹³⁵ *ibid*.

¹³⁶ Richelson and Ball 1985 *op cit*, 180.

started for the P415 civilian communications monitoring and analysis network, otherwise known as ECHELON¹³⁸. It is commonly believed that the system was set up in 1971, though it in itself was as probably an adaptation or further automation of existing interception systems. ECHELON was in fact the code-name of a process rather than a particular technology. According to the Federation of American Scientists:

ECHELON consists of a global network of computers that automatically search through millions of intercepted for pre-programmed keywords or fax, telex and e-mail addresses. Every word of every message in the frequencies and channels selected at a station is automatically searched. The processors in the network are known as the ECHELON Dictionaries. ECHELON connects all these computers and allows the individual stations to function as distributed elements an integrated system. An ECHELON station's Dictionary contains not only its parent agency's chosen keywords, but also lists for each of the other four agencies in the UKUSA system [NSA, GCHQ, DSD, GCSB and CSE]¹³⁹.

Furthermore, it is not actually code-named ECHELON any more. Just as with the satellite systems, all BYEMAN codewords are changed upon public revelation. ECHELON has probably gone through several such changes; In *The Hill* it was revealed that a system called MAJESTRAN appears to bear some relation to ECHELON; either a redesignation or a codename for a part of the system. Now that this is known, it will have changed again¹⁴⁰.

The use of the term ECHELON has effectively been carved into stone by campaigners now that politicians, the media, and to a lesser but growing extent, the general public have become aware of the word and the networks it has come to represent. ECHELON and Menwith Hill have been brought more and more into the public eye, through Privacy International, Statewatch and other campaign groups as well as journalists, but in particular most recently by the European Parliament¹⁴¹. The Scientific and Technological Options Assessment

¹³⁷ Richelson 1995 *op cit*.

¹³⁸ Campbell 1988 *op cit*.

¹³⁹ FAS IRP website: <<http://www.fas.org/irp/program/process/echelon.htm>>

¹⁴⁰ Campbell, Duncan (1993) *The Hill*, an IPTV Production for Channel Four Television.

¹⁴¹ The way in which campaigners managed to release information gathered over many years via these official channels is detailed further in Chapter 6.

(STOA) sub-committee of the Civil Liberties Committee published a report, 'An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control', which included a paragraph on ECHELON:

All e-mail, telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted by the [NSA], transferring all target information from the European mainland via the strategic hub of London, then by satellite to Fort Meade in Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the...[United Kingdom]¹⁴²

It is generally believed that the SILKWORTH system is the basis of ECHELON¹⁴³.

The latest information to emerge about ECHELON has again been via STOA and the European Parliament: to follow the original report, The Parliament commissioned a series of four further reports (see Chapter 6). The report on technology, 'Interception Capabilities 2000' was written by Duncan Campbell, and concentrates on the COMINT aspect of SIGINT¹⁴⁴. This report and Richelson's latest work are perhaps the definitive statements on the current technological capabilities of US intelligence and the NSA and are worth examining at length.

Campbell's more recent work has shown the extent to which, despite being accused of exaggerating at the time, he had actually *underestimated* the ECHELON system. According to the new report, ECHELON has been in operation for more than 20 years. The P415 programme referred to in 1988 was simply an operation to massively upgrade and automate aspects of ECHELON. ECHELON now encompasses interception, processing and interpretation of almost all aspects of COMINT from International Licensed Cable (ILC) communications (telex etc.) to microwave and satellite-based telecommunications, the Internet and radio. Different technologies are of course employed in each case for interception interpretation and processing.

¹⁴² Wright, Steve (1998) *An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control: Interim STOA Report (PE 166.499)*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.

¹⁴³ Campbell 1993 *op cit*.

¹⁴⁴ Campbell, Duncan (1999) *Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Volume 215: the state of the art in Communications Intelligence (COMINT) of automated processing for intelligence purposes of intercepted broadband multi-language leased or common carrier systems, and its applicability to COMINT targeting and selection, including speech recognition (aka Interception Capabilities 2000)*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.

ILC communications are perhaps one of the easiest forms of communications to intercept as all lines pass through nodal points, which for historical and practical reasons are largely located in the major cities of ex-Imperial or long-term economically dominant countries. London is therefore a major centre for the interception of ILC communications, and this is carried out in Westminster. Information is processed through a massive computer known as Dictionary, which operates through key-word recognition.

We have already seen how Menwith Hill was built into the British telecommunications system in the 1950s, however generalised telephone interception, as opposed to phone-taps on specific lines, poses bigger problems in terms of the retrieval of relevant information from the morass of everyday phone-calls, e-mails and faxes. Recent revelations about ECHELON have prompted many over-paranoid fears that the NSA is listening to our every word, however given the presently huge and expanding volume of telephone use, particularly from cellular telephony, this seems unlikely at present, and increasingly unlikely in the future.

Campbell does not appear sure whether the NSA has not yet managed to develop a workable system of word or phrase recognition for voice communications equivalent to the Dictionary. However he is certain that it is more likely that they have a working system of voice recognition, in other words the ability to establish the identity of a person based on various tonal and lexical patterns in their speech. One of the strong arguments in favour of the NSA's possession of an automated word recognition system is the large number of increasingly sophisticated speech-to-type input programmes available for personal computers. Campbell argues that these are likely to be the commercial spin-offs of "more than 40 years" of research by the "NSA, ARPA, GCHQ and the British government Joint Speech Research Unit". Campbell claims that one currently available method, Hidden Markov Modelling performed remarkably well:

"On a limited test the probabilities of correctly detecting the occurrences of 22 keywords ranged from 45-68% on settings which allowed for 10 false positive results per keyword per hour. Thus if 1000 genuine keywords appeared during an hour's conversation, there would be at least 300 missed key words, plus 220 false alarms"¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

This is still not good enough for reliable use in a less limited environment, and there is a big difference again between keyword recognition and the ability to determine whether a conversation contains meaningful information about a subject in which the intelligence services are interested. While Campbell details several attempts by the Canadian CSE to commission software to perform this task, sometimes called 'pattern recognition', he suggests that such attempts have failed.

However Campbell's report came out too early to include recent reports indicating that the NSA is coming closer to a automated way of processing all kinds of communications information (spoken or written). In 1997 the NSA applied for a patent on a form of pattern recognition software¹⁴⁶. As the NSA's own papers published on their website explain, this system is based on the concept of 'semantic forests' which allow not simple word recognition but a far more powerful method that can recognise meaning in large amounts of text or speech¹⁴⁷. One on-line commentator on cryptography commented: "It's pretty clear to me that this technology can be used to support an ECHELON-like system. I'm surprised the NSA hasn't classified this work"¹⁴⁸. This article also highlights the improvements in accuracy claimed by the papers since the patent was applied for: from 19% (1997) to 27% accuracy (1998) in text-based, and from 20-23% in speech-to-text. While this is a relatively low-level of accuracy and does indicate that Campbell is right, there is one particular question to consider: it is strange that this material is widely available, one has to ask then, is it deliberately understating the success of the NSA pattern-recognition systems?

Encryption makes the SIGINT services' attempts to retrieve meaningful information even harder. Campbell makes the telling point that 'Moore's law' of computer development demonstrates that the cost of computing power halves every 18 months. Thus increasingly

¹⁴⁶ United States Patent 5,937,422 'Automatically generating a topic description for text and searching and sorting text by topic using the same'.

Inventors: Nelson; Douglas J. (Columbia, MD); Schone; Patrick John (Elkridge, MD); Bates; Richard Michael (Greenbelt, MD).

Assignee: The United States of America as represented by the National Security (Washington, DC).

Appl. No.: 834263,

Filed: April 15, 1997

on-line: <http://www.patents.ibm.com/details?pn=US05937422>

¹⁴⁷ Two papers are available entitled: *Text Retrieval via Semantic Forests* at: <<http://trec.nist.gov/pubs/trec6/papers/nsa-rev.ps>> and <<http://trec.nist.gov/pubs/trec7/papers/nsa-rev.pdf>>

¹⁴⁸ ECHELON Technology: The NSA has been patenting, and publishing, technology that is relevant to ECHELON, *Cryptogram*, December 1999,

powerful computers are available to the general public at lower and lower prices. These computers are now able to operate sophisticated and, for all currently practicable purposes, uncrackable encryption programmes, for example 'Pretty Good Privacy' (PGP). The U.S. government's attempt to limit the availability and effectiveness of such systems first by banning their export as 'military technology', and then by trying to pass laws to allow the NSA 'backdoors' into such programmes via the infamous 'Clipper' computer chip¹⁴⁹, are perhaps testimony to the seriousness of the problem with which SIGINT agencies are now confronted. As Campbell argues: "In the absence of new discoveries in physics or mathematics Moore's law favours codemakers, not codebreakers."¹⁵⁰

Further it appears that even using proposed technologies like quantum computers, computers which use light instead of electrical signals, the law of diminishing returns means that even today's encryption systems will remain practically uncrackable due to the amount of work needed to solve them. This has not stopped the NSA from exploring the possibilities raised by quantum computers, indeed a recent patent registered with the US Patent Office appears to be for the basis of such a computer¹⁵¹. Whether or not it makes decryption easier, such systems will raise the amount of unencrypted or less well encrypted information the NSA can store and process, therefore bringing the possibility of universal monitoring closer at least in theory. Another explanation is that the NSA is simply getting round the problem of interception by owning the technology, and therefore perhaps hoping to control its release and use, perhaps requiring manufacturers to be licensed and to provide the NSA with trapdoors and so on, a more subtle approach than the Crypto AG scenario. If this fails, then at least the NSA would gain large amounts of money in royalties.

Menwith Hill has probably been a key ground station for three highly advanced satellite platforms in the 1990s, both of which were involved in the Gulf War. The first is the KH-11B

<<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-9912.html#ECHELONTechnology>>

¹⁴⁹ For an analysis of the Clipper controversy see: Diffie, Whitfield and Landau, Susan (1998) *Privacy on the Line: the Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

¹⁵⁰ Campbell 1999 *op cit.* Technical Annex, para. 45.

¹⁵¹ Elkjær, Bo and Seeberg, Kenan (2000) 'Speeding spies: NSA holds patent on revolutionary new computer storage device' *Ekstra Dagsbladet* (Denmark).

The patent details are as follows:

Inventor: Satorius; Duane Anthony, Silver Spring, MD.

Applicant(s): The United States of America as represented by the Director of the National Security Agency, Washington, DC

Issued/Filed Dates: Feb.15, 2000 / May 21, 1999

Application Number: US1999000316031

(or KH-11/Improved) real-time photographic imaging system, code-named 'Improved CRYSTAL', perhaps the most expensive and heaviest satellite system ever launched¹⁵². This, as its name suggests, is a development of the original KH-11, code-named 'KENNAN' and first launched in January 1977, the first genuinely real-time PHOTINT system, which used a CCD (charge-coupled device) radiation collection array to produce a whole range of sophisticated photographic images¹⁵³. It is improved in two ways according to Richelson¹⁵⁴, by incorporating an infrared capability, and also by improved mapping capabilities. The codename discrepancy is simply because KH-11's designation changed to CRYSTAL in 1987. The KH-11B was first launched on 28 November 1992, and at least two more have followed since then. It transmits its images to ground stations via MILSTAR relay satellites.

The second is an unusual satellite platform designated 'LACROSSE'. Previously known as 'INDIGO', a prototype was launched in January 1982, but the first real working version went up on 2 December 1988. Again, at least two more have been launched since then. This platform uses imaging radar, and can thus be used even when there is significant cloud cover, a problem for other imaging satellites. According to Tony Freeman of NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory "an imaging radar works very like a flash camera in that it provides its own light to illuminate an area on the ground and take a snapshot picture, but at radio wavelengths"¹⁵⁵.

Finally, there is the advanced version of the VORTEX platform (see above), known as 'MERCURY'. Larger and more versatile than its predecessor; as well as COMINT:

"MERCURY has been redirected to additionally perform Electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection of non-communications electronic transmissions, to include telemetry from missile tests (TELINT), or radar transmitters (RADINT)"¹⁵⁶

The Federation of American Scientists website also contains pictures of designs for Advanced ORION, code-named 'TRUMPET', and Advanced JUMPSEAT satellite

¹⁵² FAS SPP website: <<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/imint/kh-12.htm>>

FAS choose to refer to the KH-11B as the KH-12 for reasons of clarity, though this only serves to add to the confusion!

¹⁵³ Burrows 1987 *op cit.*

¹⁵⁴ Richelson 1995 *op cit.* All the information in the rest of this and the following paragraph is drawn from this source unless otherwise stated.

¹⁵⁵ Freeman on FAS SPP website: <<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/imint/lacrosse.htm>>

platforms¹⁵⁷, which are not yet in operation but which will no doubt feed Menwith Hill in the future¹⁵⁸. Indeed at Menwith Hill one of the biggest building programmes of the 1990s so far has been the STEEPLEBUSH II control centre; as we have already seen the original STEEPLEBUSH was the programme to support the original ORION satellite platform.

As noted in Chapter 4, the base now has 28 radomes, and more aerials and masts than ever. It is planned to be a major site for the Space-Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS). This is an offshoot of the series of programmes and initiatives that were collectively known to the public as 'Star Wars' during the 1980's, and the successor both to the Defence Support Program and the NRO's JUMPSEAT satellites. The existence of SBIRS was first acknowledged by UK Government ministers on 2nd March 1998, and on 9th March in a written response to a question by Norman Baker, Armed Forces Minister Doug Henderson replied:

Construction of the two radomes at RAF Menwith Hill is due to begin in November 1999 and is scheduled for completion in February 2000. The radomes will support the new US Space Based Infra-Red System, providing early warning of ballistic missile launches¹⁵⁹.

The location of the an SBIRS ground station at Menwith strongly suggests that Bamford was right that the earlier DSP was also partially based here, but does not by any means prove it. In 1999 it was announced that the Australian DSP ground station, JDF-Nurrungar, would close, and the SBIRS Southern Hemisphere ground station will be at the Australian equivalent of Menwith Hill, Pine Gap, near Alice Springs. There is no reason why a similar process could not have occurred with the Northern Hemisphere.

¹⁵⁶ FAS SPP website: <<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/sigint/vortex2.htm>>

¹⁵⁷ FAS SPP website: <<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/sigint/trumpet.htm>>

¹⁵⁸ The original JUMPSEAT programme was a National Reconnaissance Office satellite platform at least partially connected to the DSP, in fact it was also designated DSP-A (Augmentation). Started in 1970 these satellites flew a highly elliptical orbit known as 'Molniya orbit' after the Russian satellite programme that had pioneered it, and carried a wide variety of electronic monitoring equipment including the HERITAGE sensor. This programme will also be replaced by SBIRS. See Richelson 1999b *op cit.* and Burrows 1987 *op cit.* for more details.

¹⁵⁹ *Hansard* House of Commons Session 1999-2000, 3rd September 1999, Column 76.

SBIRS consists of three basic components¹⁶⁰: firstly four high-orbit geostationary satellites (SBIRS-High) equipped with two different primary sensors, a 'scanning' sensor to detect launches and a 'staring' sensor to provide more detail of a launch; two new NRO satellites in elliptical orbits, the above-mentioned Advanced-JUMPSEAT; and finally an as-yet uncertain (but probably quite large) number and of low-orbit satellites (SBIRS-Low) probably equipped with optical and X-ray sensors and possibly electromagnetic pulse detectors. The first contracts for the SBIRS-High system have gone to SIGINT pioneers Lockheed and Aerostar, who are of course already present at Menwith Hill, with Grumman Aerospace. The manufacturers of the SBIRS-Low satellites are still to be decided - three consortia are bidding: TRW/Raytheon (who lost out for SBIRS-High); Lockheed-Martin/Boeing/Aerojet; and Spectrum-Astro, a comparative dwarf when compared with the giant Lockheed et al. CONUS Buckley is being massively upgraded to serve as the primary ground station; Pine Gap's role has already been described. Jeffrey Richelson on whom I have relied for much of the information about SBIRS, however fails to mention Menwith Hill in this context, when it is practically certain (and has been since 1998) that it would serve as a major ground station for the programme.

The SBIRS centre at Menwith Hill was completed as this thesis was being written. CAAB campaigners photographed the construction (see Figures 24 and 25, overleaf).

¹⁶⁰ Richelson 1999b *op cit.* provided the factual information for this section, unless otherwise stated



Figure 24. SBIRS groundstation under construction at Menwith Hill, 14th May 2000.
The first picture shows the concrete bases of the satellite receiving dishes complete, and the dishes themselves ready to be hoisted into place.



Figure 25. SBIRS groundstation under construction at Menwith Hill, 22nd June 2000.
The second picture shows the satellite receivers in place and being aligned.

CSO Irton Moor

As a Naval Wireless Telegraphy (W/T) Receiving Station, Scarborough's job was what was then known as 'Procedure Y' work, covert interception of foreign radio signals, in this case intercepted by ships of the Royal Navy on active duty¹⁶¹. There was another Naval W/T station at Cleethorpes though this was apparently not used for 'Y' work, and one at Cambridge, as well as the central Naval Intelligence Division 25 (NID 25), located in Room 40, of the Admiralty Building, Whitehall¹⁶². The Cambridge site was closed at the end of WW1 and its functions transferred to Scarborough, which was for a time, the only Naval W/T site. Some time after WW1 two small stations at Stockton and Felixstowe were also set up, though Stockton closed and Felixstowe was moved to Pembroke in the 1920s. Finally by 1932 Pembroke's functions were transferred to Flowerdown near Winchester, though the Pembroke site was again in use during WW2, while Scarborough continued to flourish.

Following the creation of the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) from the amalgamation of Room 40 and Military Intelligence 1i (b) in 1920, this organisation set up its own W/T Receiving Stations, but also continued to make use of Naval W/T stations which remained under Admiralty control despite the merger. Thus when new teleprinter services were installed in September 1935¹⁶³, they were linked via the Central Telegraph Office to GC&CS Headquarters, then at Queen Anne's Gate, and only later to the Admiralty in Whitehall¹⁶⁴. Up until this point most interceptions were still conveyed from the W/T Stations to London by General Post Office courier, which meant intercepts were twenty-four hours old by the time they reached GC&CS for interpretation¹⁶⁵. The teleprinters were originally intended for emergency use only, this being the time of Italy's invasion of Abyssinia and soon afterwards the Spanish Civil War, and even in 1937 it was envisaged that this new technology would "not be required in peace time"¹⁶⁶. They were thus limited to year on year

¹⁶¹ Clarke, W. F. (1945) *GC&CS - Its foundation and development with specific reference to its naval side*, in *History of GCCS and Naval Section 1919-1945 Historical Notes and Memos*. Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office, Kew.

¹⁶² West, Nigel (1986) *GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London

¹⁶³ Memo from J. S. Barnes, Secretary, Admiralty to Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, 15th April 1936, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.

¹⁶⁴ Minutes of a meeting held at the GC&CS, 29th December 1937, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.

¹⁶⁵ Minute from Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), 30th August 1935, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.

¹⁶⁶ *ibid.*

approval by the Treasury, although eventually, by 1939, they were put onto a more permanent basis.

In 1945, following expansion during the WW2 years, there were eight Admiralty W/T Stations¹⁶⁷: Chicksands, in Bedfordshire, Cupar, near Fife; Flowerdown; Pembroke; Portrush; Scarborough; Shetland; and Sutton Valence; employing a total of 217 operators. Scarborough was still by far the largest Station in terms of personnel with 118, followed by Flowerdown with 66. However the Navy's SIGINT operation, although larger than that of the Foreign Office, was still dwarfed by both the Army and the Royal Air Force operations; indeed two of the Navy's sites, Sutton Valence and Chicksands Priory were simply small units within larger RAF Stations. Nigel West also mentions Leafield in Oxfordshire as an Admiralty site¹⁶⁸, though I can find no record of this in contemporary historical sources. He also lists Flowerdown as an Army Y service site. It is certain that Flowerdown did eventually become an army site - it is now occupied by the Army Training Regiment (Winchester) - however I have been unable to verify its status at this time. Naval operations certainly continued there until January 1960 when its functions were transferred to a brand new purpose-built site, HMS Forest Moor, near Harrogate in Yorkshire¹⁶⁹, which was also to serve as a back-up Naval Terminal Control Station should Whitehall ('The Citadel') be destroyed¹⁷⁰. It seems that after this time Flowerdown continued as an outstation of the Composite Signals Organisation (CSO), a subsection of GCHQ, which was also used by the UK government as an official cover organisation name during the time when the existence of GCHQ was officially denied. Flowerdown ceased to operate as a CSOS in 1977¹⁷¹.

Irton Moor was important as a High Frequency radio (HF) Direction Finding (DF) site during WW2, and according to Duncan Campbell, when GCHQ took over the running of

¹⁶⁷ Tozer, Col. Nigel (c.1950) *History of Military SIGINT with Special Reference to Interception and to War Office and Overseas Sites*, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office, Kew. All WW2 information in this paragraph from this source unless otherwise noted.

¹⁶⁸ West 1986 *op cit*.

¹⁶⁹ Notice of the Commissioning of HMS Forest Moor, January 1960, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.

¹⁷⁰ Minute from C. P. Mills, Director of Signal Division, Admiralty, 29th August 1955, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.

¹⁷¹ Lanning, Hugh and Norton-Taylor, Richard (1991) *A Conflict of Loyalties: GCHQ 1984-1991*, New Clarion Press, Cheltenham.

¹⁷² *ibid*.

Scarborough in 1964¹⁷³, it continued in this role for GCHQ's Composite Signals Organisation (CSO), in particular intercepting the communications of Soviet Spetznaz maritime special forces in the Baltic during the Cold War¹⁷⁴. Campbell argues that as HF radio declined as a serious mode of secret military communication in the 1980's, what was now called Irton Moor appeared to have shifted its role. Reports of new building in the early 1980's including hardened bunkers, a new operations room and generally substantially modernised facilities suggest a new importance for the site. One area in which it is believed to have been involved around this time was an operation codenamed JUMBO, dealing with burst transmissions from Soviet submarines.

However this view of the technological development of Irton Moor is contradicted by Mike Gauffman of 'Enigma', the Bradford-based organisations that specialises in keeping an ear on state radio transmissions. He argues that far from declining in importance, Very and Ultra High Frequency (VHF and UHF) radio remain among the most reliable means of military communication, in particular due to the vulnerability of microwave and satellite communications to attack¹⁷⁵. He argues that the interception of these signals from the former Soviet Union remains the priority of Irton Moor, and that the specialities referred to by Campbell are in any case simply some of the many tasks that Scarborough performed during the Cold War; they just happen to be those that have come to public attention.

So, what exactly does Irton Moor do? It is unfortunately impossible to say. There is good reason to believe that it continues to concentrate largely on naval and maritime intelligence. Both Gauffman and Campbell believe that, given the upgrading process it went through in the late 1980's, it will certainly survive any proposed cuts in the SIGINT service¹⁷⁶.

¹⁷³ Personal communication, 26th July 1999, from D. Rice, Whitehall Liaison Officer, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.

¹⁷⁴ Personal Communication from Duncan Campbell September 1999.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Steve Gauffman, November 1999.

¹⁷⁶ See Notes 172 and 173 *supra*.

RAF Fylingdales



Figure 26. The badge of RAF Fylingdales

The golf balls were replaced in 1992 with an enormous three-sided pyramid-shaped Solid State Phased-Array Radar (SSPAR) system, a digital radar system, the largest of its type in the world¹⁷⁷.

Fylingdales, while an RAF base in name and in general operation is dedicated primarily to

American surveillance systems in the service of American strategic goals. It is part of the United States Space Command's plans for 'full-spectrum dominance' of space as an arena for surveillance, reconnaissance, military support, and war-fighting itself¹⁷⁸ (see above). The Americans are represented at Fylingdales by detachment of the 21st Space Wing of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, whose role is "to coordinate cooperative missile warning and space surveillance with RAF counterparts"¹⁷⁹.



Figure 27. One of the 'Golf Balls' at RAF Fylingdales, during work to replace them in 1992

¹⁷⁷ RAF Fylingdales (nd.) Visitor Information Booklet.

¹⁷⁸ United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) (nd.) op cit.

¹⁷⁹ 21st Space Wing website: <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usspc-fs/21sw.htm>>



Figure 28. The SSPAR pyramid at RAF Fylingdales.

Fylingdales is currently proposed to be a ground station for the United States National Missile Defence (NMD) the new version of what became known in the 1980's as the 'Star Wars' programme¹⁸⁰, a system for destruction of ballistic missiles (and perhaps enemy satellites) from ground and air launched missiles, and perhaps also orbiting laser platforms, though this proposed role does not feature in the RAF's official guide to Fylingdales¹⁸¹. Indeed despite the Americans having announced their intention to use Fylingdales for this purpose, the British government still claims that it has received no official approach from the American state.

¹⁸⁰ Yorkshire CND (nd.) A History of SDIO and BMDO, on-line at:
<<http://www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/fdales/default.htm>>

¹⁸¹ RAF Fylingdales *op cit*.

Conclusion

This lengthy chapter has elucidated some of the wider networks around SIGINT sites, particularly with regard to American strategic concerns, and technological systems and capabilities. The chapter has attempted to demonstrate both historical development in these areas and the relationship between technology, knowledge, space and power. The limited view that we have of this tangled web is what I have termed *public discourse* on SIGINT sites. This public discourse is a result of complex and ever-changing interactions between the black-boxing and highly territorialized *official discourses* outlined in Chapter 4 and *counter-discourses*.

Future Strategic and Technological Developments

Whilst this thesis has not considered the issue in great detail, it seems that with the election of George W. Bush Jr. as President, the linked issues of National Missile Defense, Signals Intelligence and the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States are likely to become a more significant part of public discourse. The two states will of course attempt to control this discourse by setting the boundaries of the debate. In technological terms, NMD can be presented as a matter of a simple upgrade to the software at Fylingdales. In strategic terms it can be portrayed as an essential part of the 'special relationship' between the two which continues regardless of changes in government, and which is vital for national and international security. They will do their utmost to decontextualise and depoliticize NMD, and the UK state will continue to play down any mention of Menwith Hill and its connections to Fylingdales.

However they might not be successful: in Part Three I will explore counter-discourses, their promoters, and the ways in which they have emerged, and continue to develop, challenging and even supplanting official narratives.

PART THREE.

INTERPRETING SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SITES.

Introduction

The three chapters in this Part concern the nature of the interplay between public and official discourses and counter-discourses. They deal with the process by which knowledge about the intelligence services, and about particular intelligence sites has come into the public domain, and either became part of public discourse or failed to do so. Thus where the previous chapters were about the 'what' of surveillance and intelligence sites, these chapters are more concerned with the 'how' and the 'why'.

Chapter 6 intends to consider the history, politics and discursive strategies of politics around surveillance and intelligence sites, the role of the state, pressure groups, national media and the key function of individual actors as political activists both within the boundaries of the state system (in parliaments for example) and as *parapolitical* investigators, and will begin to consider the changing topology of networks in which the various actors are involved. Although they may fall into several of the categories considered here, the particular activities of peace campaigners in this area are left to Chapter 7. The third, Chapter 8, will deal with less conventional responses: those of Ufologists, conspiracy theorists and the religious right.

Irton Moor and Fylingdales are almost entirely absent from this Part. In the former case this is because there has been virtually no attention paid to the site by any of the groups considered here. In the latter case, there has been both support and protest for its entire existence though both have been sporadic. In 2000, as concern over NMD has risen, Fylingdales has once again come under the spotlight. I will concentrate in this part on Menwith Hill, largely because of the attention and variety of interpretation it has attracted, and because of the sheer volume of material in this area.

Introduction

This thesis cannot hope to map the entire history of discursive construction around intelligence sites from either a conventional political or parapolitical angle. However it will take key examples of where counter discourses have intersected with the mainstream, at how previously secret information was revealed: at the process of knowledge becoming public. As I argued in Chapter 3, it is possible for a counter-discourse to amend, reform or even supplant a hegemonic discourse. This can happen in many ways but basically involves the enrolling of other actors into the network around the discourse, or actor producing the discourse, either in the short-term or more decisively and permanently. For example, an activist may win more powerful allies, members of elected bodies, funding organisations, media actors and so on, who are either persuaded of the veracity of their theory or who are at least willing to consider them. These allies may be able to provide a forum, whether secret or public, for their consideration, such as a parliamentary inquiry, serious newspaper articles, or even in a popular film. They may persuade individual actors to join them, for example by forming a pressure group or research organisation, which can then increase the chance of attracting further active support. Finally, the discourse may gain wider, less active but perhaps more pervasive support amongst a wider range of people, and thus become 'common knowledge'.

The material available here comes from original documents where available, published accounts of such processes, and also from interviews and conversations with key actors involved in the politics and parapolitics of intelligence sites. The material is described in chronological fashion, because a narrative structure helps to make some sense of the way in which particular pieces of research or activity influenced others, or changed the direction or intensity of activity around Menwith Hill, the NSA and GCHQ. The material can however be divided into several categories. The first is Journalism and Reportage: mainstream media coverage of SIGINT services in both sides of the Atlantic. Particularly important publications

and authors will be examined, and there is also a separate section that analyses at the place of Menwith Hill and Fylingdales in the British media over the course of the last 10 years.

The second is whistle-blowers, in this case individuals who claim to have been part of the SIGINT services, and for various reasons, have chosen to reveal information about the organisations by whom they were previously employed. Former insiders have been vital to the development of public knowledge about military surveillance and intelligence sites, however there are particular problems with their testimony. One of the key problems is the question of identity, belief and trust identified in Chapter 3. Often it is impossible to verify the claims made by whistle-blowers, and this is made even more difficult by the frequency of either anonymity or pseudonymity. A common aphorism amongst intelligence researchers is "those who talk don't know, and those who know don't talk". This implies that it is taken for granted that actors with real intelligence service connections would never reveal information. Those who make claims to have access are thus either liars, suffering from some form of delusional mental illness such as Munchausen's Syndrome, or in fact are what they claim to be but are deliberately spreading disinformation. There can be no doubt that disinformation is a strategy of intelligence services, yet disinformation, like conspiracy theory, is a dead-end in any intelligence research because no argument can be made against it, and unless external verifying evidence can be found, neither can it be proved. There can also be no doubt that society is filled with liars, fantasists and the mentally ill. Verification is very difficult: one cannot telephone GCHQ and expect them to reveal whether 'X' is or was an employee. However there is also no doubt that the aphorism quoted above is wrong. There are enough instances of states attempting to prevent publication of particular books or articles, of the prosecution of individuals for breaking the Official Secrets Act to reveal information either to other states or to the general public, and of spying and sabotage of all kinds, to show that on occasion, those who know do talk. In any case, we already know that the state operates secretly in many areas - what grounds do we have for trust in official or accepted public discourse? There is no reason for treating counter-hegemonic accounts with *more* scepticism than official and conventional accounts.

Whistle-blowers often end up as either journalists or activists for organisations dedicated to uncovering further information about state surveillance activities. These latter actors are the

third category. Most are more or less parapolitical in their nature. In Chapter 2 it was stressed that a lot of the useful information that has emerged into the public domain concerning intelligence sites has come not from academic researchers but from these campaigners on the fringes of conventional politics and journalism. I use the word parapolitical here not as a diminutive or patronising descriptor but as an accurate designation as I have found to describe serious political activity which is outside the mainstream of either public consideration or what the state considers to be the boundaries of acceptable political discourse. One examples of such activity would be journalism that continues to investigate particular events or processes even after official inquiries have either resolved the matter to the satisfaction of the state, or whose findings have remained undisclosed. Another would be the investigation into the activities of secret or secretive organisations, beyond the public boundaries set by the state or by that organisation itself either by law, by convention, or by force. Most parapolitical research is published either in small-press or self-published magazines and books, or increasingly, due to low costs, ease of distribution and ability to avoid state recriminations, on the Internet.

There are many problems with parapolitical research both in terms of the difficulties inherent in the process, and also in the difficulty found in persuading the target audience of the validity, let alone veracity, of such work. In the first category, parapolitical researchers may in fact become a target of the organisations that they are investigating, either in terms of physical or legal threat. Alternatively, they may be subject to discursive strategies, such as disparagement or ridicule. In the second case, as Porter was seen to argue in Chapter 2, the work produced must overcome the extremes of disbelief and fatalism which appear deeply embedded in the consideration of such matters by the vast majority of people. Serious parapolitical research may also find itself in competition with other unconventional discourses about the same or similar events, processes and organisations. Some of these discourses may win greater support despite being less well-supported and less rational, for example state-extraterrestrial conspiracy beliefs, or tap into existing religious or sub-cultural ideologies. These discourses are discussed in Chapter 8. It is important to note here that a key disparaging discursive strategy employed against parapolitical researchers is to categorise them and their theories as being similar to the more outlandish ones, to lump them together

with 'conspiracy theory' and postmodern paranoia. Again, the differences will be further explored in Chapter 8.

Most organisations from this background endeavour to overcome the problems inherent in their status and power by accumulating knowledge and making themselves into 'experts'. When openings in conventional political discourse open up they are thus able to step into the gap and emerge as key actors in the reconstruction of public discourse. They can also, as has already been noted, be important actors in opening up that discursive space in the first place.

The fourth category is the discourse generated through more conventional political activity. This is part of what Gary Marx calls: 'institutionalized discovery methods'¹, which include the records of parliamentary and judicial investigations and enquiries and so forth, which result in official recognition of a problem and the 'reading into the record' of information which might otherwise have remained speculative or theoretical. It includes activity by politicians, parliamentary Inquiries and so on. There is a particular section examining the way in which Menwith Hill, ECHELON and the NSA have emerged as key matters of accelerating concern to both American political representatives and to European legislatures in recent years.

Finally, the fifth category is judicial process: the use of the law both by the state against those advocating counter-discourses, and also by activists against the state. Both types can lead to spaces opening up for the reconstruction of public discourse, though this is usually the opposite of what the state had intended.

¹ Marx, Gary (1984) Notes on the discovery, collection and assessment of hidden and dirty data, in Schneider, J. W. and Kitsuse, J. (eds.) *Studies in the Sociology of Social Problems*, Norwood NJ: Ablex.

Early Accounts of the NSA

Information about the NSA began to emerge almost immediately after its creation. Particularly embarrassing was a spy scandal in 1960, when two of its employees William Martin and Bernon Mitchell, defected to the Soviet Union and appeared on TV from Moscow to denounce their former employer. However it was not until the 1970's that the agency became more widely known among researchers, journalists and activists. First of all there were several newspaper and magazine articles. A series of articles in the *New York Times* in 1971 threatened to reveal, amongst other revelations in 'the Washington Papers' about the Vietnam conflict, the ability of the NSA to listen in on the scrambled telephone conversations of Soviet officials including transcripts of complete messages with time-codes. A passing mention of the same story in the *Washington Post* diary section also caused alarm. The NSA took various forms of legal and intimidatory action and managed to prevent publication of the offending aspects².

Ramparts

This early mainstream American reportage was followed by an article in the radical magazine, *Ramparts*, in August 1972, which purported to be the revelations of one 'Winslow Peck'. Peck was supposedly an ex-USAF Security Service Staff Sergeant who had served worked for the NSA in South-east Asia, Turkey and West Germany³. Despite the identification of Peck with a current Washington lobbyist with the equally colourful real name of Perry Fellwock⁴, there has been doubt cast on the authenticity of his testimony. One message by an anonymous writer calling himself 'Gomez', forwarded to *Cryptome*, argues that so many basic errors of fact are made in the interview that:

Either he was engaged in spreading disinformation in the very act of being "interviewed", or what's more likely, he was some low-level dittybop (radio technician) who heard a bunch of shit second-hand and passed himself off to

² For details see: Bamford, James (1983) *The Puzzle Palace*, (with a new afterword), Harmondsworth: Penguin.

³ U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir, *Ramparts*, Vol. 11, No. 2, August 1972, 35-50. Available on-line at: <http://jya.com/nsa-elint.htm>

⁴ Bamford 1983 *op cit*. See also Note 5 below.

the gullible and hungry journalists at Ramparts as a real "in-the-know" kind of guy⁵.

However, this dissenter, who also claims to have worked for the USAF Security Service and attacks James Bamford's work, also makes some very basic errors of fact, such as not appearing to know classification hierarchies for intelligence. The mistakes in the *Ramparts* piece were also played down as "some minor technical errors", the following year by another anonymous ex-NSA whistle-blower in an interview with the Australian magazine, the *Nation Review*. He argued that: "the Ramparts article was clearly written by a traffic analyst and, although a lot of manpower goes into that, he exaggerates the role of this work. A number of NSA units have special tasks set for them"⁶. In other words the claims were authentic but slightly embellished to exaggerate the importance of the source, but not to the extent claimed by 'Gomez'.

Such arguments demonstrate the problem of trust very clearly: three sources, all anonymous, all claiming to have worked for the same organisation, yet present different information, elements of each of which appear contain inaccuracies so far as it is possible for an outsider to identify such things. In any case it appears from later research, particularly in James Bamford's *The Puzzle Palace*, that many of the substantial as opposed to the detailed points in the Peck interview were indeed correct. The US government in any case took no action against Peck/Fellwock. Bamford claims this was for much the same reason as the British government's passivity over Chapman Pincher's work in the 1960's (see below): to make any statement would simply be to acknowledge the seriousness or validity of the claims. As we have seen, confirmation or denial are both equally damaging as far as the NSA is concerned.

In any case the *Nation Review* article revealed far more of the international networks of intelligence gathering presided over by the NSA. In particular it indicated the extent to which other domestic intelligence services were subject to the policy and operational direction of the NSA. It also hinted at the large number of bases throughout the world at which the NSA operated, some named for the first time, and the extent to which the NSA even provided

⁵ Forwarded message to *Cryptome* from 'Gomez', available on-line at: <<http://jya.com/nsa-debunk.htm>>

⁶ Uncle Sam and his 40,000 Snoopers, *Nation Review*, 1973. Available on-line at: <<http://jya.com/nsa-40k.htm>>

equipment and resources to its subordinates. There is also a ring of bitterness and resentment about the interviewee that strongly suggests that the source was authentic. He reveals that most NSA employees joined because of the challenges offered and the benefits in terms of foreign travel and so on. However many of the 1960s intake were soon disappointed in their employment as a result of the actions and activities of the American state in the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly in Vietnam. This led to the result among some of the younger staff that "a lot of people got disillusioned"⁷. He continued, "they get trained intensively for two years, they are sent out thinking they will do important work and within a month they find out that it's mostly bullshit"⁸. He claimed that many ended up working for higher-paying 'friendly' national intelligence services such as those of Israel, or went into the civilian electronics industry either in the USA or abroad, as in his case, Australia, where he claimed to know of several ex-NSA employees in a similar situation.

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ *ibid.*

The Season of Inquiry and the NSA

By 1975 the concern caused by the various reports, of which those about the NSA were only small part, was such that it led to a slew of official investigations, a period termed the 'Season of Inquiry' by American intelligence researcher Loch Johnson⁹. The Pike Committee in the House of Representatives led to CIA Director, William Colby, accidentally making reference to the NSA's international telephone tapping operations, the first such public revelation. The most important was perhaps the Church Committee in the Senate, Two others also concerned the NSA directly: the Abzug Committee in the House of Representatives and an Inquiry by the Attorney General. The mass of evidence uncovered by these Inquiries, much of it still unavailable to the public, meant that by the late Seventies some regulation of the NSA was inevitable. However that regulation, when it finally came in the form of the Federal Intelligence Services Act (FISA), was a masterpiece of doublespeak and deception.

The Church Committee

Starting a little later in the same year as the Pike Committee was a more comprehensive investigation. The *Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities* was convened by the United States Senate, and was known after its Chairman, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, as the Church Committee. The Committee was set up as result of Senate Resolution 21, to investigate abuses by the various American intelligence services, particularly the establishment of 'Watch Lists' of individuals who were thought to be a threat to national security, including anti-Vietnam War and civil rights activists. The NSA did not have a domestic security mandate in this area, but had nevertheless established such lists at the request of the FBI and other internal agencies, as the five month investigation for the Church Committee discovered. The NSA's domestic Watch List project, started in 1969, was known as 'Sensitive SIGINT Operation Project MINARET', and it was:

established for the purpose of providing more restrictive control and security of sensitive information derived from communications as processed [blank----

⁹ For more details of these see: Johnson, Loch K. (1988) *A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence (2nd Edition)*, Chicago: Dorsay; and also Bamford (1983) *op cit*.

-----] which contain (a) information on foreign governments, organizations or individuals who are attempting to influence, coordinate or control U.S. organizations or individuals who may foment civil disturbances or otherwise undermine the national security of the U.S. (b) information on U.S. organizations or individuals who are engaged in activities which may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security of the U.S.¹⁰.

Further, it was emphasised that: "An equally important aspect of MINARET will be to restrict the knowledge that such information is being collected and processed by the National Security Agency". While some took this as *prima facie* evidence of wrong-doing, public denial of the involvement of the NSA in any operation was the norm at this time.

The people on the Watch Lists covered a wide range of dissenters including Dr Benjamin Spock, parenting expert and prominent spokesperson against US involvement in Vietnam, actress Jane Fonda, known to right-wing politicians and media as 'Hanoi Jane', and many others. It was a combination of factors that had inspired the original motion to the Senate: articles like the *Ramparts* piece; complaints by people who had experienced intelligence service harassment; and finally the existence of NSA Watch lists coming to the attention of the Attorney General, who was worried about the potential conflict with the US Constitution of mass telephone tapping. However the NSA did not believe that anything specifically prevented it from responding to requests from the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies to use its telecommunications interceptions capabilities in this way. In a letter to the Attorney General, the then Director of the NSA, General Lew Allen, comments:

The NSA has no facilities or charter that would allow it to ascertain whether specific Watch List entries are appropriate, and has always depended upon the agencies compiling the lists to warrant that they are entitled, in the context of their authorities, to the information they request, and that the names they have

¹⁰ NSA (1969) Establishment of Sensitive SIGINT Operation Project MINARET (C) Memo from the Assistant Director, NSA, 1st July 1969, included as Exhibit 3, in: United States Senate (1976) *Hearings before the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, Volume 5: The National Security Agency And Fourth Amendment Rights*, October 29 And November 6, 1975, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 149-150. Available on-line at: <<http://cryptome.org/nsa-4th.htm>>

entered on their Watch Lists are lawful objects of their inquiries, and are necessary and appropriate to their missions¹¹.

Further he argued that there was no specific effort to target such people that would have required individual warrants for telephone tapping, and that the investigation was simply "by-products of the foreign communications we intercept in the course of our legitimate and well recognised foreign intelligence activities". Many more liberal senators lead by Frank Church believed there was cause for concern, however conservatives were appalled that the Senate was investigating the NSA at all. Republican Senator John Tower made his feelings plain as the Hearings in the NSA began:

Public inquiry into the NSA, I believe, serves no legitimate legislative purpose, while exposing this vital element of our intelligence capability to unnecessary risk... It is my view that there comes a point when the people's right to know must of necessity be subordinated to the people's right to be secure.¹²

Tower's particular concern was that the 'machinery' of NSA operations should not be subject to scrutiny, rather that the enquiry, given that it was taking place at all, should concentrate on uncovering the reasons why the particular people were targeted on Watch Lists.

However the reasons why certain individuals ended up on Watch Lists were not as well justified as Tower might have hoped. Loch Johnson, in his study of the CIA, mentions that FBI watch lists in the early 1970s were compiled on a sweeping basis, for example all black student union members regardless of their involvement in actual activity or protest, and more generally, any student activist¹³. This is sometimes attributed to a particular climate of lawlessness typified by Tom Charles Huston, a White House Official in the Nixon administration, who wrote of a report for the President advocating the removal of legal restraints on the intelligence services. However, with or without his knowledge, most of the

¹¹ Allen, Lew (1973) Letter from the Director, NSA to the Attorney General, Elliot L. Richardson, 4th October 1973, included as Exhibit 8 in: United States Senate (1976) *op cit.*, 162-163.

¹² United States Senate 1976 *op cit.*

activities he advocated were already going on. Legality or ethical concerns were simply not discussed in the American intelligence community. Johnson quotes senior FBI official William C. Sullivan as saying:

never once did I hear anybody, including myself, raise the question: "Is this course of action we have agreed upon lawful? Is it legal? Is it ethical or moral?" We never gave any thought to that realm of reasoning, because we were naturally pragmatists. The one thing we were concerned about was this: "will this course of action work, will it get us what we want, will reach the objective that we desire to reach?"¹⁴

The Huston Plan, and the other actions revealed by the Church Committee were not so much isolated incidents of 'abuse', rather they were a rare glimpse into the workings of the core of the secret state, that part identified by Gill in Chapter 2 which remains constant regardless of changes in government. As Loch argues, the Church Committee and related investigations revealed that "the nation's chief executive may as well have been a mannikin in a storefront display... the President was irrelevant"¹⁵.

MINARET was not the only NSA operation revealed by the Church Committee. It was effectively only an offshoot of a much longer lasting and more extensive operation, code-named SHAMROCK¹⁶. This was the name given to the interception of all International Licensed Cable (ILC) traffic between American and foreign nationals and foreign communications passing through the United States, carried out with the co-operation of the three major ILC companies ICA, ITT and Western Union. This had predated the NSA and originated in wartime co-operation between the US Government and the companies. According to the testimony of former NSA Deputy Director Lou Tordella, the companies were originally informed by the Army Security Agency in 1947 that the President and Attorney General had no objections to the peacetime continuance of such activities and that

¹³ Johnson, Loch K. (1989) *America's Secret Power: the CIA in a Democratic Society*, New York: Oxford University Press.

¹⁴ Sullivan quoted in *ibid.*, 151.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, 149.

¹⁶ Unless otherwise stated, the information the following paragraph comes from: United States Senate (1976) *op cit*. Available on-line at: <<http://cryptome.org/nsa-4th-p2.htm#Shamrock>>

perhaps legislation to further smooth the matter would be forthcoming. The companies sought reassurance again in 1949, but after this point there was no indication that any party involved was consulted again until SHAMROCK was officially closed by the Secretary of Defense on May 15th 1975, shortly before the Church Committee convened.

The question raised by the Church Committee was whether SHAMROCK and MINARET contravened two laws. The first was the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The second was Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, which regulated the interception of communications. In both cases the question was left unresolved: the Fourth Amendment perhaps did not apply to telecommunications tapping and other 'non-intrusive' searches; the Act of 1934 perhaps prohibited only the public or in-court revelation of information obtained by telephone-tapping. In any case the founding document of the NSA (NSCID 9, later 6) freed all NSA activities from the kind of restrictions placed on other government departments. But these possible infringements of the law were not the point for the NSA. It was far worse for them, as Senator Tower correctly believed, to have their existence and operations brought further into the public eye even in a limited fashion. They had fought hard to reduce the damage by closing SHAMROCK in advance of the Inquiries, and they managed to have the report on SHAMROCK itself classified as SECRET/COMINT CHANNELS ONLY. However there can be no doubt that the official closure of SHAMROCK was merely a screen. The 'closure' of SHAMROCK can be viewed in very much the same light as the changing of names for satellite platforms after their publication (see Chapter 5); there can be little doubt that SHAMROCK, and similar operations, continued under a different code-name.

The Abzug Committee

The NSA suffered two further indignities before the Season of inquiry came to an end. The first was the House of Representatives Government Information Subcommittee Inquiry chaired by Congresswoman Bella Abzug that took place from 1976 until 1977. According to Bamford, this Inquiry was again inspired by a newspaper report, this time in the *New York Daily News*, which again focused on ILC tapping. The Abzug committee took a different tack to The Church Committee. Partly because all the major witnesses from the intelligence services were ordered by the new President, Gerald Ford, not to co-operate with the Inquiry, the Abzug Committee concentrated on the ILC companies, and it managed to obtain admissions from them that they had provided the NSA with transcripts. However, back room deals and manoeuvres meant that the report of the Inquiry was never published.

The Attorney General's Inquiry and FISA

The final Inquiry was that of the Attorney General himself. Despite a damning list of areas where the NSA had operated electronic surveillance activity that might be thought to be 'questionable', no action was recommended against the NSA; and, despite the quite severe examination under which it had been placed, very little concrete action to control the NSA took place. Instead the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was introduced, after several failed attempts, in 1978 under the more liberal administration of Jimmy Carter. James Bamford's *The Puzzle Palace* contains an excellent deconstruction of the provisions and discourse of the FISA. Superficially it did limit the NSA to interception of only communications that involved at least one foreign terminal. However the 'foreign' terminal could still be on American territory, and American citizens outside the USA no longer counted as domestic. In addition, what the FISA actually prevented was 'acquisition' of information from American communications; since this was nowhere defined, it was interpreted by the NSA in a very narrow sense to exclude all analysis, interpretation and distribution. Thus as long as another UKUSA partner was responsible for the actual act of interception, the 'acquisition', there was nothing to prevent them supplying the NSA with this information, wherever it was from, and whoever it concerned. In any case, the body that decided whether such regulations were being adhered to could in no way be regarded as impartial or open. The FISA established the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), whose hand-picked judges met in secret in the Justice Department to decide on applications

for surveillance involving American citizens. According to Richelson, Bamford and all other reliable commentators, no application has ever been refused by the FISC.

Digging Deeper

The Season of Inquiry might have been over, but the tussles between the NSA and the American legislature only inspired further investigation of SIGINT organisations on both sides of the Atlantic. In particular the work of James Bamford and Duncan Campbell, both of whose publications have been drawn on in Chapters Four and Five, and some of the sources from whom they gained insights, will be examined here. In addition, I shall outline some of the ways in which research began to interlink with the activities of protesters, and the formation of organisations dedicated to exposing and opposing state surveillance systems. The 1980s also saw the crucial investigative work of Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball, which led to the exposure of the UKUSA agreement that was discussed in Chapter 5.

Into The Puzzle Palace

In the late 1970's in the United States, New York lawyer, James Bamford, began researching the only serious book-length exploration of the National Security Agency, *The Puzzle Palace*. This was initially published in 1982, with a revised edition released the following year following the Geoffrey Arthur Prime spy scandal in the UK¹⁷. It is a work of investigatory journalism widely admired (and envied) by other writers in the field, and remains, until Bamford's much promised new book on the subject is finally published, the definitive work on the NSA. *The Puzzle Palace* is the starting point for much of the investigation in this thesis, and some of the ways in which Bamford acquired the information he uncovered have been outlined in Chapter 2. However Bamford's work was not without its critics. He specifically disagreed with Campbell and Melvern's allegations that Menwith Hill tapped British domestic communications, and he has also attracted criticism from many over his stance that the NSA does not target commercial information, which creates a credibility problem for other researchers and campaigners, as Simon Davies of Privacy International says: "Bamford's strange on this, because he's - he doesn't believe that the NSA targets commercial information. It's a problem - there are those who say that Bamford's caved in, but I don't know"¹⁸.

¹⁷ Bamford 1983 *op cit*.

¹⁸ Interview with Simon Davies, November 1999.

Bamford's work is not without its interesting discursive strategies. It is written in the narrative style of American 'new journalism'. Its themed chapters bearing gnomic titles: 'Penetration', 'Fissures', 'Abyss' and so on give very little away about their contents. Chapters are bookended with descriptive examples of the theme of the chapter and shocking events or cliff-hangers. It is a superb example of accessible populist writing without sacrificing the level of detail and analysis needed to provide an authoritative account. The revised edition also contains an extra chapter which contains both a useful outline of the British SIGINT agency, GCHQ, and which goes into some detail about the 1982 case of Geoffrey Arthur Prime. Prime was a GCHQ Russian section employee who was found to be spying for the Soviet Union, after a completely coincidental police investigation into paedophile assaults, perpetrated by Prime, in the Cheltenham area. Bamford does appear to go into rather unnecessary detail of the different assaults carried out by Prime. Apart from aping the unsavoury voyeuristic nature of popular 'true crime', and attempting to 'cash in' on the scandal created by the Prime case, there is another possible explanation for why this level of detail is felt necessary by Bamford. The framing of the story in this manner, coming as it does as a coda to the whole book, would appear to be an attempt to associate the activities of the NSA and GCHQ with the sexual activities of Prime. This adds a further veneer of sleaze to the portrayal of the SIGINT agencies as underhand and illicit in terms of their disregard for human rights and democratic accountability. It certainly means that the last impression the reader is left with on completing the book is one of distaste, the impression being that the world of espionage could be full of such people, and that it is to them that we involuntarily entrust our security. This reading would perhaps be over-elaborate were it not that others have described the activities of the NSA in similar terms, notably British MP, Bob Cryer (see below, pages 218-19).

Duncan Campbell, GCHQ, the NSA and UKUSA

If Bamford was, and perhaps is, 'the expert' on the NSA in general, there is one other individual who has made one particular aspect of the UKUSA SIGINT networks, ECHELON, his own. Scottish investigative journalist and television producer, Duncan Campbell has also, more than anyone else, successfully assumed the role of outsider expert on espionage technologies. Campbell's first major involvement in this area was in the research for an account of GCHQ's role and functions which led writing an article about

GCHQ, *The Eavesdroppers*, with the American journalist, Mark Hosenball, for London's Time Out magazine in 1976¹⁹. This was the first ever comprehensive account of what GCHQ was, and what it did, and some information about links to the NSA, and included material from an interview with an ex-NSA staffer, 'Winslow Peck', who was responsible for the first major exposé of the National Security Agency (see above). This was the beginning of a process which led to the infamous ABC trial, and eventually to the 'discovery' of Menwith Hill.

The UK state has taken a serious view of attempts to place counter-discourses about intelligence in the public domain, particularly information about GCHQ. As a result of the furore following *The Eavesdroppers*, Duncan Campbell was prosecuted in 1977, along with fellow journalist Crispin Aubrey and former British army intelligence operative, John Berry. In the so-called 'ABC Trial'²⁰, that followed, the three men were found guilty under the arcane and obscure Section 2 of the 1911 Official Secrets Act (OSA), but only Berry was given a custodial sentence. However, the state was unable to prove that the three had actively committed acts of espionage, a more serious set of offences, under Section 1 of the OSA, as the information they had uncovered was already in the public domain, albeit in specialist publications. Mark Hosenball and another American who had contributed to the story, ex-CIA officer and defector to Cuba, Philip Agee, were deported on the grounds that they were threats to national security²¹.

This bungled attempt to silence journalists researching into Signals Intelligence was in marked contrast to the treatment afforded another journalist, Chapman Pincher, a decade earlier. His revelations in the *Daily Express* concerned the routine tapping of cables by GCHQ. However, at this point in time, according to Lanning and Norton-Taylor, the government was afraid of increasing the exposure of GCHQ and therefore held back from any

¹⁹ Campbell, Duncan and Hosenball, Mark (1976) *The Eavesdroppers*, Time Out, June 1976.

²⁰ For more detail of the ABC Trial, see: Lanning, Hugh and Norton-Taylor, Richard (1991) *A Conflict of Loyalties: GCHQ 1984-1991*, New Clarion Press, Cheltenham; and Urban, Mark (1997) *UK Eyes Alpha*, London: Faber.

²¹ For interest's sake the fate of those involved in this case was detailed by Duncan Campbell in a message posted on the Cryptome website, available on-line at: <<http://jya.com/nsa-elint.htm>>: "Philip Agree is married to a ballerina and lives in Germany. Mark Hosenball is a reporter in Washington. Perry Fellwock is a lobbyist in Washington. Crispin Aubrey is an organic farmer in Somerset. John Berry is a social worker in Somerset."

legal action²². Pincher is also well known as a journalist friendly to the state, whose concerns generally stem not from the fact that intelligence services operate against domestic targets, or indeed operate at all, but that they do it incompetently, dishonourably and try to avoid the scrutiny required by law. Pincher's interpretation, like the congressional inquiries in the United States, is therefore not such a threat to the basis of intelligence operations as Campbell's, though it may be more influential within the upper echelons of government and the intelligence administration.

The ABC Trial only seemed to encourage investigation into state security structures. Aubrey published several books on surveillance and the intelligence services²³, and the trio's lawyer, Geoffrey Robertson QC reflected extensively on it in his autobiography²⁴. What is less widely known is that there was a 'fourth man' involved in the research who was not present when the other three were arrested due the time of the meeting being rearranged without his knowledge. This man was Tony Bunyan, author of the seminal book on British state security, *The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain*, and now running the EU monitoring organisation, Statewatch. Both the ABC trial and the work of Bunyan and others inspired a number of parapolitical organisations, particularly police monitoring projects, to be set up in Britain. The latter included the Manchester Police Monitoring Project, which involved Steve Wright, who later set up the Omega Foundation and was also authored the STOA Preliminary Report for the European Parliament which exploded the ECHELON issue wide open (see below).

Campbell also continued his investigations into Anglo-American SIGINT links. With *Times* journalist Linda Melvern, Campbell wrote the first public account of the base and its links to the Hunters Stone telecommunications tower, 'America's Big Ear on Europe', published in 1980 in the left-wing *New Statesman* magazine. This article detailed the nature and history of Menwith Hill Station and Hunters Stones, as well as the state of contemporary knowledge of the NSA. The article sparked a tide of publicity and protest which has ebbed and flowed ever since and was the precursor to a whole raft of publications in the early to mid 1980s which revealed more about the NSA and Menwith Hill's place in its surveillance networks. These, it

²² Lanning and Norton-Taylor 1991 *op cit*.

²³ For example: Aubrey. Crispin. (1981) *Who's watching you?* Harmondsworth. Penguin.

²⁴ Robertson, Geoffrey (1998) *The Justice Game*, London: Chatto and Windus.

turned out, even Campbell and Melvern had underestimated. Their focus was very much on civil liberties: they therefore emphasised tapping of telephone communications, including UK domestic phone lines, which Bamford and others later disputed, and put less emphasis on the satellite surveillance, early warning and weapons targeting roles of Menwith Hill. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Campbell was also responsible for several more wide-ranging books about privacy, the secret state and American bases in Britain in the 1980s. The latter book, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier*, reproduced the information from the 1980 article with added background²⁵.

Campbell found himself under attack again in 1987. This time he had revealed in an article in *New Statesman* that GCHQ was planning Britain's first ever spy satellite system, code-named ZIRCON, at the cost of around £500 Million, and he intended to develop this investigation further in a TV programme²⁶. The state stepped in to prevent the film from being shown to the public by issuing an injunction, however they failed to prevent MPs from being allowed to view it. Norton-Taylor argues that the government's attempts to silence Campbell *et al.* and the later attempt to prevent the publication in the UK of *Spycatcher*, the memoirs of former MI5 head, Peter Wright, is evidence of "what can only be described as a surrealistic approach"²⁷. In most cases, the information is either already in the public domain, has been published overseas, or is indeed in print in the UK. The attempts to try journalists and others only draws attention to the issues, which end up having far wider publicity than they would otherwise have had. Others have made similar observations: Patrick Birkinshaw describes the *Spycatcher* case as "an extremely silly affair"²⁸, and Bernard Porter is highly critical of both the nature and use of the Official Secrets Act²⁹. There has likewise been extensive criticism of the ban on trade union membership at GCHQ in 1982. Margaret Thatcher's attempt to interfere in the internal running of GCHQ resulted in high exposure for an organisation which until this point had barely been acknowledged to exist, and immense upheaval, staff changes and protests, which could only have harmed operations.

²⁵ Campbell, Duncan (1984) *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain*, London: Michael Joseph.

²⁶ Urban 1997 *op cit.* has a good account.

²⁷ *ibid.* p. 53.

²⁸ Birkinshaw, Patrick (1990) *Reforming the Secret State*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, p.5.

After this second major interruption in his work, Campbell's next significant contribution to understanding Menwith Hill was the beginning of the process of the direct discovery of ECHELON: another article for *New Statesman*, 'They've Got it Taped'³⁰. In this article the system of computer-aided traffic analysis was referred to as P415, in fact the code by which it was known to contractor Lockheed, where his main anonymous informant worked (see below).

Duncan Campbell's work also provides an illustration of the complex relationship between protesters and investigative journalists. Campbell's early work inspired the protests at Menwith in the 1980s, and provided the protesters and parliamentary allies like Bob Cryer (see below) with much needed information. However by the end of the 1980s, after the first ECHELON piece, his work on SIGINT appeared to be in a lull. According to CAAB activist, Lindis Percy, it was the local protesters uncovering of hundreds of secret documents from the base in the early 1990s "which was the start of Duncan Campbell being *again* involved"³¹.

The documents discovered in the waste bins of the base (see Chapter 7) were passed on to Campbell, who managed an almost forensic reconstruction of the disparate fragments of data. Lindis Percy describes the activity:

he analysed it, and he was amazed that we'd got this information. It was really the first chink of what was exactly was going on at Menwith Hill, and all these codes and... he built up this picture of what was happening. We also had dockets from stuff that they'd bought, so we knew the amount of money. He analysed what the budget was in dollars.

The immediate result of this research was *The Hill*, a film broadcast on Channel Four as part of the *Dispatches* series on 1993. The film featured the first really systematic picture of what happened inside Menwith Hill, its links to other bases in the UK and abroad, and named ECHELON and the systems of which it was part. It also included undercover footage of local

²⁹ Porter, Bernard (1992) *Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain 1790-1988*, London: Routledge.

³⁰ Campbell, Duncan (1988) *They've Got It Taped*, *New Statesman*, 12 August, 1988, pp. 10-12.

³¹ Interview with Lindis Percy, 2000.

activists entering the base and searching for more documents, which caused problems between the programme makers and other local protesters, and between the protesters themselves. However, it was not until Nicky Hagar's book on the New Zealand components of the UKUSA systems that the full extent of ECHELON came to be realised (see below, page 215).

The summation of Campbell's work so far is however the massive report for the European Parliament, *Interception Capabilities 2000*. The new information in this report has been considered in Chapter 5, and the investigations in the EU will be considered further below.

Campbell was one of the most guarded people who I talked to during the research for this thesis. He was unwilling to be interviewed about his work, and his terms for providing me with any information were very much on a mutual basis: if I found out something new and passed it to him, he would reveal more to me, and provide me with contacts. Other interviewees claimed that this tendency was attributable to professional concerns: for a freelance journalist, just as for the NSA, information is the raw material from which a livelihood must be created. In addition there were personal-historical factors: someone who has been prosecuted several times and threatened by security service personnel would be less likely to trust a stranger wanting to know about them. This unwillingness to be interviewed was not limited to Campbell: it was in fact characteristic of several of the more parapolitical researchers contacted for this thesis, not to mention state employees.

Margaret Newsham

Campbell's informant was later revealed to be Margaret 'Peg' Newsham, who has become perhaps the most celebrated NSA whistle-blower³². Newsham was a computer software systems co-ordinator for a several companies contracted to provide services to the NSA from 1974, including Digital Equipment, Ford Aerospace, Digital Science and Hughes Aircraft. She served at Menwith Hill from 1977 onwards, where she was responsible for the VAX computers on which ECHELON was developed, and later worked at Lockheed Air and Space Systems in California. According to a long interview carried out by Bo Elkjaer and Kenan

³² Campbell, Duncan (2000) Making history: the original source for the 1988 first Echelon report steps forward, *Cryptome*, Friday 25th February, <<http://cryptome.org/echelon-mndc.htm>>

Seeberg (see below), she is now, allegedly like many who have worked at the same Lockheed facility, dying from a form of cancer, but still living in fear of physical violence from the intelligence community³³. According to Newsham it was the casual abuse of the position that SIGINT operatives enjoyed in violating basic human rights, spying on organisations like Amnesty International, and the endemic corruption at firms like Lockheed who supplied equipment and services to the American government, that so appalled her³⁴. This was particularly acute as she felt that had an intimate, almost parental role in the creation of ECHELON, "I actually felt like Echelon was my baby", she commented to *Ekstra Bladet*.. She came to prominence by giving evidence on the abuses she claims to have witnessed to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on April 19th 1988, chaired by Congressman Louis Stokes of Ohio. What she said is still secret, however its effect can be gauged from the a description of the occasion based on what Newsham told *Cryptome* on 24th February 2000:

Ms. Newsham says she spoke only a few words naming the work she did and what it involved. The Committee counsel lept up pale-faced with shock and asked to leave the room. Others present said nothing, only stared at Ms. Newsham in astonishment. The counsel returned after a few minutes, the shocking information apparently confirmed, and with the greatest deference gently asked Ms. Newsham to continue, to take all the time she needed. Which she did, to increasing astonishment and entranced silence from others in the room³⁵.

These recollections were prompted by an interview with Newsham, the first major television report of her story, for an episode of American television network CBS' *Sixty Minutes* documentary strand, shown on February 27th 2000. Duncan Campbell reports that "ABC News interviewed her for television in 1992, but editors at that network chose not to broadcast the report"³⁶, for reasons that were not explained. As part of this film, Newsham also returned to Menwith Hill, whose new vastly expanded facilities startled the former

³³ Elkjær, Bo and Seeberg, Kenan (1999) Echelon Was My Baby, *Ekstra Bladet*, November 17th. Available translated on-line at: <<http://cryptome.org/echelon-baby.htm>>

³⁴ Elkjær and Seeberg 1999 *op cit*.

³⁵ <http://216.167.120.50/newsham-hpsci.htm>

operative: "Oh my God !!!! was I surprised, when I was at Menwith Hill we only had 3 domes. We rounded the bend and I really gasped, now between the big and smaller ones I counted 25 domes"³⁷.

Newsham is unusual in many ways, not least in being one of the only whistle-blowers to have published verifiable evidence of her previous status. In a follow-up to their interview, Elkjaer and Seeberg wrote another piece which included: a 'work review statement' for the 23rd of June 1983, detailing tasks carried out and future work programmes; her security authorization; and a 1980 training certificate signed by Admiral Bobby Inman, Director of the NSA at the time³⁸.

Nicky Hagar

New Zealand peace activist and investigate journalist Nicky Hagar has been vital in the process of the worldwide 'discovery' of ECHELON. In 1996 Hagar published *Secret Power*, which was -and remains – the only account of the real nature of relationships between First and Second Parties in the UKUSA alliance³⁹. Hagar showed how intelligence priorities that were actually relevant to New Zealand and to the Pacific nations more generally were systematically excluded in favour of American priorities, which during the Cold War consisted of monitoring conversations between Russian trawlermen. The book also revealed the nature and extent of ECHELON, and how it operated through 'Dictionaries' specific to each UKUSA party. The book was published by a very small press, and Hagar's work only came to more prominence when he produced an article for *Covert Action Quarterly*⁴⁰. However, even this was, as Hagar later commented, "well-received by specialists and 'alternative' people" but went unnoticed by the rest of the world⁴¹. It was not until Steve Wright picked up on Hagar's article for his report to the European Parliament that his work became truly appreciated, at least for a while, "one day in January my phone started ringing

³⁶ Campbell 2000 *op cit*.

³⁷ E-mail from Margaret Newsham (2000) Return to NSA's Menwith Hill with 60 Minutes, *Cryptome*, 11th February 2000, available on-line at: <<http://cryptome.org/menwith-mn60.htm>>

³⁸ Elkjær, Bo and Seeberg, Kenan (2000) Key To The Whole World, *Ekstra Bladet*, Denmark, 4th March.

³⁹ Hagar, Nicky (1996) *Secret Power, New Zealand's Role In the International Spy Network. (Second edition)*, Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potton.

⁴⁰ Hagar, Nicky (1997) Exposing the Global Surveillance System, *Covert Action Quarterly* 59, Winter 97. Available on-line: <<http://www.caq.com/caq59globalsnoop.html>>

⁴¹ Hagar, Nicky (2000) Echelon: a story about how information spreads (or doesn't), *Telepolis*, available on-line: <<http://www.heise.de/english/inhalt/te/8472/html>>

with European journalists pursuing the Echelon story and it did not stop ringing for three weeks⁴².

⁴² Hagar2000 *op cit*.

British Parliamentary scrutiny of Menwith Hill

The United Kingdom parliament has never conducted the same kind of detailed investigation into GCHQ, or into any of its intelligence services, as has been carried out into the NSA the USA. This is for much the same reasons as apply to other forms of investigation into intelligence in the UK: the limitations set by UK law (see Chapter 2). Despite these limitations, there have however been attempts by particular maverick MPs, and Lords, to raise various issues around domestic and American intelligence operations in Britain, often inspired by the work of investigative researchers or directly supporting activists. This section will concentrate on the ways in which Menwith Hill and Fylingdales have been considered in the House of Parliament.

Table 4: Parliamentary scrutiny of Menwith Hill (House of Commons) 1988-2000⁴³

Year	Oral Answers	Written Answers	Mentioned in debate	Substantive debate	TOTAL (analysed) ⁴⁴	TOTAL (absolute)
1988-89	1	2	0	0	3	4
1989-90	0	3	0	0	3	5
1990-91	0	5	2	0	7	11
1991-92	0	17	0	0	17	26
1992-93	0	19	2	0	21	34
1993-94	4	16	3	1	24	40
1994-95	2	29	0	0	31	44
1995-96	0	29	0	0	29	46
1996-97	0	12	0	0	12	25
1997-98	2	25	2	0	29	47
1998-99	0	10	1	0	11	18
1999-2000	0	9	11	0	20	28
TOTAL	9	176	21	1	207	328

Details of the occasions on which Menwith Hill has been mentioned in the Commons are set out in Table 4. Scrutiny has increased since 1989 and remained around the level of 30 incidents a year since 1994-5 (1996-7 was an election year which explains the lower figure). However few mentions have been made on the Floor of the House. Most are in the form of written answers. Out of the 176 incidents, only 9 are oral answers from Ministers in the

⁴³ *Hansard* on CD-ROM (1989-1999), and House of Commons Publications On-line (1999-2000) <<http://www.parliament.uk/commons/>>

⁴⁴ The difference between the Analysed Total, and the Absolute Total is simply that the latter is the raw figure for the number of times Menwith Hill is mentioned in *Hansard*. The former counts all mentions within the same question and answer or within the same debate, as one reference. The absolute total is misleading as it gives the impression that discussion of Menwith Hill is more common than it in fact is.

Commons, just 9 are references in debate and 1 alone is a substantive debate on Menwith Hill itself.

The vast majority of the references to Menwith Hill prior to the new Labour government were by three particular MPs, all CND members all considered to be on the left of the party: Bob Cryer, Max Madden and Harry Cohen. There were also interventions by Alice Mahon and Ann Clywd. Bob Cryer had been involved with the issue since Duncan Campbell and Linda Melvern had first uncovered some of what went on at Menwith in 1980, and he spoke at the first major demonstration there in 1981. His widow, Labour MP Ann Cryer described the process which lead to them 'discovering' Menwith Hill:

During the last year or two that he was MP for Keighley... so that was during the early eighties, which coincided with the period just after Margaret Thatcher was elected and there was quite a renaissance of the peace movement generally - CND specifically... when that journalist - Duncan Campbell - did that first article in New Statesman... that was when he started to be involved... we didn't know anything about Menwith Hill *until* then...⁴⁵

Ann Cryer describes the emotional vertigo that resulted from the realisation that the USA had spy bases in Britain: "everyone was absolutely 'shock, horror' because this thing had been functioning all those years and no-one knew about it, and that was the horrific part"⁴⁶. But the feeling among Labour Party MPs at the time was not so much awe or fear more a kind of disgust, as Ann Cryer commented: "it's a very seedy set-up you know... this is how we felt about it... that it was going on"⁴⁷. This very similar to how her husband had described the activities at Menwith during the only debate about the NSA that the Commons has ever had:

Menwith Hill is a spy station: a sophisticated version of the man in the dirty raincoat looking through a bedroom window or the pervert spying through a

⁴⁵ Interview with Ann Cryer, November 1999.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

lavatory keyhole. Those who defend the station's invasion of our land, which has never been approved by Parliament, are no better.⁴⁸

Far from being a glamorous profession essential to the security and well-being of the nation - the 'James Bond' image of espionage - what is carried on a Menwith is 'seedy', and 'perverted'. Its rationale, it is implied, is far more to do with individual gratification and control, with the unjustified invasion of privacy. The same discursive strategy can be seen in Bamford's attempt to associate the idea of SIGINT with the paedophile assaults of Geoffrey Arthur Prime in the revised edition of *The Puzzle Palace* (see above page 210), and there are also clear links to feminist discourses of the assault on the body by patriarchal military and intelligence organisations (see Chapter 7).

This debate itself was essentially a long speech by Bob Cryer in which he read a great deal of information from the *Puzzle Palace* and Campbell's work, particularly *The Hill*, into the parliamentary record followed by a reply by the then Armed Forces Minister, Jeremy Hanley. The aim of this process on the part of Bob Cryer can be seen as an attempt to formalise or validate Menwith Hill's status as an object of public discourse. Parliamentary discussion is 'on-the-record' and kept permanently publicly available in *Hansard*. Therefore, the activities discovered over the years by researchers like Campbell, and recited by Bob Cryer, assume a greater degree of validity. Bob Cryer's discourse shows a clear degree of passion visible even in the printed record. The issues he raises are not simply what the NSA does in terms of monitoring private, commercial and official communications, but more importantly how and why they are able to do it without any accountability to Parliament:

Elected Members of Parliament are denied information on the appropriation of more than 200 acres of land by the United States Government, who now run a spy station in the heart of our country which is linked up to a global network. That is inexcusable. If there is parliamentary accountability, the moon is made of green cheese⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ *Hansard* (1994) Vol. 240, Column 609.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

This is emphasised throughout in very strong language, for example:

Our Government continue to betray our people by allowing spy stations such as Menwith Hill to be dominated and operated by the United States, without any control that is visible to the people at large⁵⁰.

The accusation of betrayal is a very emotive one, perhaps calculated to annoy the Conservative Party MPs and the Minister by challenging their patriotism. Bob Cryer also gave his strong support to the opponents of Menwith Hill: "while Parliament remains inert, it is people outside this place who have pushed Parliament along the road to democracy". These two aspects in particular appeared to annoy the Minister. When Bob Cryer attempted to speak further on the issue, the response was intemperate:

Mr. Cryer : Will the Minister give way?

Mr. Hanley : No, I will not give way because I have more to say. I remind the hon. Member for Bradford, South that we have introduced further legislation to ensure that the work of our intelligence services is more transparent than it has ever been before. However, the irresponsible actions of activists who try to disrupt legitimate activities taking place at Menwith Hill cannot be interpreted by any stretch of the imagination as being in our national interest. I am afraid that I can only despise the actions of hon. Members who seem only too happy to jump on that particular bandwagon and to indulge in damaging innuendo and downright untruths about what goes on there⁵¹.

Confronted by the accusation of betrayal, the Minister responds by stressing not only the legitimacy of activities carried out at Menwith, and the 'transparency' of intelligence services in the UK, but also to counter-accuse Bob Cryer of damaging national security by encouraging the activists. The final sentence is particularly desperate. Bob Cryer had by this stage been involved with the issue for 15 years, and the peace movement for longer, he was

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁵¹ *ibid.*

hardly jumping on a bandwagon. In addition, the 'damaging innuendo and downright untruths' indulged in by the MP were well known to be 'state of the art' in terms of public knowledge of what was and is occurring at Menwith Hill. The Minister must have known this, whether or not he agreed with such activities. Admitting that there was espionage being carried out against Britain and other European nations would not have been consistent with the idea of 'national security'. Though the annoyance of the Minister can be seen in the record, just how angry he was is not visible in *Hansard*. According to Ann Cryer, Hanley lost control:

Jeremy Hanley got *very, very* cross - I mean he became quite emotional about it, he started shouting... he was actually shouting, and he was making out that it was a figment of Bob's imagination, and that he was actually encouraging the breaking the *law* by the women there. He was *very* nasty about it⁵².

The substantial part of Hanley's response attempted to emphasise the massive importance of Menwith Hill to relations with the USA, and with NATO, the base's essential place in the UK's strategic interests, and the cordial relations the base enjoyed with the local area and the employment it brought. No one else took part in the debate, and Cryer was not allowed the right of reply to Hanley's response. It remains the only substantial piece of parliamentary discussion on Menwith Hill. However it was almost more of an embarrassment for the Government. Prior to the debate, the Conservative government had assumed that the request for a discussion of 'Menwith Hill Station' was concerning a railway station, Bob Cryer also being well-known for his enthusiasm for the railways. As Ann Cryer recalls:

the Minister of State for Transport was laid on to do it, and within hours of him being called on, and this is probably why Jeremy Hanley was cross, he realised the mistake - it wasn't a railway - because Bob was very keen on the railways, they just *assumed* that it was a station that was about to close⁵³.

⁵² Interview with Ann Cryer, November 1999.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

This indicates the levels of ignorance over Menwith Hill and other American military intelligence establishments in the UK even in the governing party, or at least amongst some ministers.

Like many Labour members, Ann Cryer's main overt concern seems to be the possibility of economic espionage, "that's my worry - I think it's more - since the ending of the Cold War, I think it's more turned to that."⁵⁴ However when examined more closely, this appear to be simply one aspect of a set of greater underlying fears:

I think just the fact that - what shall I say - a power such as the UK - a country such as the UK, can have - it's almost like a *Trojan Horse*, we have it in our midst with no control. I mean that's my difficulty with it, that *our* government, a *Labour* government, neither defence nor foreign affairs actually know what's going on there. And they're quite open about that. They *do not* know what's going on there. I mean I've no fear about it being *bombed*, it's more that - I think that it's morally wrong that another state that we have no control over to direct their plans and to conduct espionage - it could be industrial, it could be about methods of war, or just spying on what the defence capacity is of other countries - it's just *going on*, and it does worry me that at any time, if we ever had a difference of opinion of who should be targeted at some time, what's going to be the position? I mean what's the government going to do about the fact that that base can be used to - spy on, even implement some sort of strike. I mean, would our government - what could they do about it? I don't think there's anything they could *do* actually.⁵⁵

The quick correction of the use of the word 'power' to 'country' sets the tone for this discourse, the shift reflecting the process that the UK as a state has gone through in Ann Cryer's lifetime. There are all sorts of anxieties, fears and uncertainties to be found in the statements that follow. The first is the idea of the Trojan Horse: the mysterious gift that turns out to be the prelude to invasion and take-over. The dissident Labour MPs are transformed

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

into the figure of Cassandra, the prophetess who saw the downfall of Troy but was destined to be disbelieved; there is the implicit fear of public disbelief. There is also clearly anxiety expressed about the Labour government, '*our* government', Ann Cryer emphasises not just the long-standing Labour activists and CND and women (and all the other long disenfranchised sections of society with which she can identify) but also the people of Britain as a whole. There is a sense of distress at the perceived failure of Labour to be as radical as many would have liked. In particular there is a sense in which Tony Blair and senior Labour figures are felt to be too close to America, a factor distressing to socialists who had always seen capitalist America as the enemy, the champion of neo-liberalism, as Ann Cryer later admits: "it's very disappointing. I hate to admit it - I think Blair has this love affair going with Clinton specifically and the States generally - I think he has this - in my view - too close relationship"⁵⁶.

These are all linked to the main theme of this discourse that is essentially about losing control. The specific phrase 'no control' occurs twice, and related phrases are everywhere. Some are connected to knowledge, the Labour Ministers "*do not* know what is going on there". However, knowledge is a subsidiary factor, and may be emphasised simply as an effort to excuse Labour ministers from responsibility. The most important aspect of the loss of control is expressed here is impotency: the inability to take action, or that those actions would be ineffective.

Simon Davies of Privacy International makes no such excuses for New Labour ministers. He presents two basic ideas for why Labour Ministers have been little different from the Conservative administrations, personified for him by two Labour Cabinet members. The first is that many of them are already sympathetic to the strong relationship with the United States, such as John Reid, "even in opposition when John Reid knew he was going to be armed forces minister, Reid had already defended the special relationship. Even in opposition." The second is that those that are not are soon convinced of it by being 'initiated' into the centre of the secret state, such as former CND member, Robin Cook:

⁵⁶ *ibid.*

Robin Cook, who of course spoke out against issues like this, has now shut up. I think what happens is that - you know, these ministers get a security briefing - and - whatever occurs in that briefing silences them for all time - and they're brought into the club, they're brought into the core, they're given the tour - you know, the big tour of the establishment⁵⁷.

The question remains as to why Labour MPs, who are not close to Ministerial posts no longer pursue the issue in the way that they used to. Some of the answers are clear, not to say tragic. Max Madden was not reselected in 1996, apparently due to internal constituency Labour party wrangles. Bob Cryer himself was killed in a car-crash a few weeks after the debate. While Ann Cryer attributes her husband's death to his tendency to drive too fast, "he was always rushing about", others point to the very short time that had elapsed between the debate on Menwith Hill and Bob Cryer's accident as suggestive of a 'wet affair', a political assassination. Simon Davies argues that dismissals of such ideas on the part of his widow and others close to Bob Cryer are simply due to denial and concerns over the safety of relatives: "she's got a family to protect. It's interesting when you talk to people who were in these - affairs. Often they'll - they'll denounce the conspiracy theory"⁵⁸. He compares Cryer's death with that of Karen Silkwood, the American nuclear power worker who was killed in a car crash while on her way to see journalist David Burnham:

You speak to Burnham about it these days and he absolutely denounces any conspiracy theory. Now, Burnham's the most - credible person I know. I cannot understand why he has just, you know, denounced the people who would say something was amiss there. But he's absolutely and completely - he refuses to accept that there was any foul play - and that's Burnham! I'm very surprised! So, yeah, the people in the centre tend to avoid conspiracy theory, whether it's self-preservation - maybe it's self-preservation - I'm not sure - maybe it's just too heavy for them to deal with and they don't want to have to be dragged into this themselves. Because after all, if someone can get hit who you were close to, then - you could be next.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Interview with Simon Davies, November 1999.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

Simon Davies also claims that several other prominent or potential critics of the intelligence services have been killed for their pains, including Tory MP, Stephen Mulligan, who was notoriously found dead in his London flat, supposedly as a result of auto-erotic asphyxiation.

Of the remaining parliamentary activists, Ann Clywd has achieved junior minister status, Harry Cohen and Alice Mahon are both heavily involved in the United Nations Assembly, although Alice Mahon continues to be a vocal critic of the government on its relations with Turkey. Ann Cryer comments: "once you're in government, it's you're own government that your criticising... it doesn't stop some of us: I'm down on the list of - naughty people - ha, ha!".⁶⁰

However it does seem that on Menwith at least, the 'naughty people' are no longer Labour Party members. The official opposition are not going to be the source of any such probing. The only response I could get from the Conservatives was that they regarded the work of Menwith Hill and intelligence relationships with the USA as essential to NATO and the security of Britain, and that "rapid development of technology also presents the threat of asymmetric warfare, and it could be strongly argued that there is a case for the expansion of our intelligence resources"⁶¹. This technological determinist discourse is very similar to that found in USSPACECOM *Vision 2020* (see Chapter 5).

The most prominent questioner on this issue and many others connected with civil liberties and the environment is now Liberal Democrat MP for Lewes, Norman Baker. Although still very much willing to be fed questions from CAAB and other activists, Baker's prime concern with civil liberties has changed the focus of questioning slightly. In addition with Baker frequently the only MP willing to challenge the government on the issue, despite his considerable efforts the breadth of questioning has narrowed. However, his personal impact on the government can be seen in the exasperation expressed in 1998 by John Reid, then Secretary of State for Defence, after Baker had pressed him on his response to the STOA preliminary report and its allegations concerning Menwith Hill (see below, page 239),

⁶⁰ Interview with Ann Cryer, November 1999.

⁶¹ Letter from John Maples, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, 1999.

RAF Menwith Hill is a communications facility, and there is total integration of United States and United Kingdom staff there. There is not only parliamentary accountability but accountability through the Intelligence and Security Committee, and not least from the hon. Gentleman. Of the thousands of questions that he has tabled since entering Parliament - at up to £600 a time - more than 20 on this matter have had my personal attention.⁶²

The House of Lords

While the majority of questions have been asked in the Commons, the House of Lords has not been without its persistent critics of government SIGINT policy. One peer in particular, Lord Kennet, had been most vocal, and had asked several questions on behalf of the various peace campaigners. However he has fallen victim to the 'reform' of the House of Lords: he failed to win election by his fellow peers to serve as one of the remaining hereditaries.

⁶² *Hansard*, House of Commons Session 1997-1998, Oral Answers 6th Apr 1998, Column 9-10.

The Formation of Anti-Surveillance Groups

The rise in parliamentary activity concerning surveillance was outstripped by the growth in extra-parliamentary political activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many of the counter-discourses on SIGINT are now coming from parapolitical organisations: investigative journalists, activists and whistle-blowers have been increasingly creating structures through which they can find support, continue their work, and more effectively challenge and influence official discourse. This period saw the setting up of a number of such parapolitical groups concerned with the activities of state surveillance networks.

Tony Bunyan's Statewatch concentrates on the European Union, yet uncovers a great deal about US-EU links in the fields of surveillance and policing. It has thus revealed almost everything that is publicly known about the links between the FBI and Europol. In particular it has revealed the unaccountable process towards converging standards of telecommunications interception resulting from the secretive International Law Enforcement Seminars (ILETS). These are so designed that they "may be partially or fully integrated" into ECHELON according to Thomas Mathiesen⁶³.

Privacy International (PI) was formed in 1990. PI is a transnational body with associated organisation in many countries and is particularly active in Britain, the United States and in Asia. It campaigns against monitoring and surveillance of individuals by the state, and by private corporations, and has been particularly important in bringing ECHELON to the attention of legislatures on both sides of the Atlantic. It describes the background to its formation on its website:

For more than two decades, governments and companies have used powerful computer technology to collect, process and disseminate a vast spectrum of personal information. Since the late 1980s, when computer and

⁶³ Mathiesen, Thomas (1999) *On Globalisation of Control: Towards an Integrated Surveillance System in Europe*, London: Statewatch, 29.

telecommunications systems began to converge, this process has accelerated.

The result is that personal privacy is endangered as never before⁶⁴.

This is a discourse that might be termed 'technological convergence'. It argues that there is a unseen and unchallenged process of increasing technical and technological development in surveillance, and more importantly accelerating integration of those technologies and more intensive links between the institutions involved in the operation of these technologies. Privacy International have chosen the notion of individual privacy as a counter-discursive focus. When I interviewed founder Simon Davies in 1999, he admitted that this was very much a conscious decision: to build on the expansion of concern for human rights within a liberal democratic context, yet take it in a different direction by challenging some of the foundational assumptions of the states who claim to be operating such systems⁶⁵. They are attempting to be at once subversive and influential. Thus PI conduct extensive research and produce a heavyweight annual report for policy-makers and pressure groups, *Privacy and Human Rights*, yet they also host the highly satirical *Big Brother Awards*, whose gold boot-stamping-on-head trophies are given to the unwilling recipients who have most violated privacy in the past year.

Simon Davies own views appear to be more sanguine about the nature of the liberal democratic state and whether PI can really make a direct impact, particularly on transnational arrangements like UKUSA. As he stated bluntly when interviewed:

I'm not optimistic about there being a possibility of change. I think a lot of what will occur will happen on constitutional challenges, the problem is that governments can just override all of that with omnibus legislation or special legislation which provides a wholesale exemption... if that doesn't already exist.⁶⁶

He cited two pieces of recent British legislation in support of this argument: the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act, and the Freedom of Information Act; both of which he

⁶⁴ Privacy International website: <<http://www.privacyinternational.org/>>

⁶⁵ Interview with Simon Davies, November 1999.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

claimed demonstrated the reality of the low priority which the state gave to individual human rights.

PI collaborates closely with two American research and campaigning organisations which have been crucial in the fight to uncover information about ECHELON in the United States, and increase the democratic scrutiny of the intelligence services: the Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The former was founded in 1994, and describes itself, in Ralph Nader-style terms, as "a public interest research center" whose goal is to "focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values"⁶⁷. EPIC has employed many of the most important researchers in this field including Duncan Campbell and Wayne Madsen. ACLU is a much older civil rights organisation that has been behind Congressman Bob Barr's drive to have ECHELON examined by the United States Congress.

A key organisation from the anti-militarism rather than a pro-privacy tradition is the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). FAS began life as the Federation of Atomic Scientists, a group set up by scientists who had been involved in and who came to oppose the further development and deployment of nuclear weapons. It has now expanded its activities and operates several research projects the results that are published on-line and continuously upgraded. Two of these particularly relate to SIGINT. The first is the Intelligence Research Project (IRP) which acts as a clearinghouse for any information related to United States intelligence activities, for example offering details both official and more speculative of satellite surveillance systems and U.S. intelligence sites and units world-wide, including mission-statements, policy documents and photographs. The second is the Space Policy Project (SPP), which carries out the same task with regard to the militarization of space.

There are several organisations that are even more parapolitical and on the fringe of conventional investigation which have been vital in the process of the revelation of information about SIGINT organisations. There are probably many small organisations like Enigma, the Bradford-based organisation that documents and publishes radio frequencies and direction-finding data from military intelligence sources; however they remain obscure. There

⁶⁷ EPIC website: <<http://www.epic.org/>>

is *Cryptome*, John Young's New York-based on-line cryptology information server, which has accurate information about the latest developments in SIGINT, cyber-liberties issues and so on, before anyone else.

However, perhaps the most influential organisation has been one of the smallest: the Omega Foundation is a three-person investigative organisation concerned with the spread of military technologies into civil society, whose founder, Steve Wright, wrote the first official EU report on ECHELON. This included the infamous paragraph that broke open the floodgates for media coverage of this issue. The Scientific and Technological Options Assessment (STOA) sub-committee of the Civil Liberties Committee published Wright's report, *An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control*, which included the paragraph:

Within Europe, all e-mail, telephone and fax communications are routinely intercepted by the United States National Security Agency, transferring all target information from the European mainland via the strategic hub of London, then by satellite to Fort Meade in Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith Hill in the North Yorkshire Moors of the UK.⁶⁸

Wright's work was a synthesis of published work rather than original research, and had drawn on books and articles by Nicky Hagar, Tony Bunyan and Duncan Campbell in particular. However the reaction was enormous. Simon Davies describes the process that took place:

what happened was that STOA commissioned Steve's report as a report on technologies of political control. Now, as part of that he just - he included three pages of what he thought was going to be innocuous sourced information - on the NSA, and Menwith Hill. But what happened was that - some of the stuff we already knew - but he inadvertently wrote one paragraph which encapsulated everything, and it was: 'within Europe, all e-mails, telephones... blah, blah, blah.' ... my theory is that were it not for Steve

⁶⁸ Wright, Steve (1998) *An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control: Interim STOA Report (PE 166.499)*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.

inadvertently writing that paragraph, this still wouldn't be an issue. It would not be public⁶⁹.

Steve Wright argues that the process had as much to do with the research carried out by Tony Bunyan of Statewatch as his own work⁷⁰. He talks of the paper in much the same terms as I have described the speech made by Bob Cryer in the House of Commons - it was simply a matter of putting information down that would become part of a formal record in a legislature. He claims that he had no idea that there would be so much media excitement generated by this particular paragraph. However, Simon Davies is right to argue that this paragraph became the key text which made the allegations that had been made about Menwith Hill in particular and ECHELON, the NSA and UKUSA more generally, concrete and certain. I will continue to trace the networks that this paragraph generated, after some consideration of the state of media coverage of Menwith Hill and the NSA at the time.

⁶⁹ Interview with Simon Davies, November 1999.

⁷⁰ Conversation with Steve Wright, August 2000.

Recent Media Accounts

The research of Campbell, Bamford and others, the British parliamentary discussions, the protests at Menwith Hill (see Chapter 7), and the formation of groups like Privacy International has led to far greater media coverage. This section first examines recent British media coverage before looking at some particular instances of in-depth coverage from elsewhere in America and Europe.

Recent British National Media Coverage and Menwith Hill

Menwith Hill was not really mentioned outside of local and regional papers and the radical left's publications until the late 1980s. Since that time, media coverage of Menwith Hill has increased. Table 5 (below) outlines the number and type of stories relating to Menwith Hill from 1990 in two major, politically opposed UK papers.

Table 5: Media Scrutiny of Menwith Hill, 1990-2000⁷¹

Year / Paper	Guardian (and *Observer)							Times / Sunday Times						
	Tot	M	S	B	U	Func	Prot	Tot	M	S	B	U	Func	Prot
1990	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1991	2	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
1993	8	2	5	1	0	4	4	2	2	0	0	0	2	0
*1994	9	1	1	7	0	5	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
*1995	4	1	2	1	0	3	1	2	0	1	0	1	0	1
*1996	4	1	3	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
*1997	8	2	2	3	1	3	3	4	0	1	3	0	3	1
*1998	4	0	0	3	1	0	2	4	0	0	1	3	1	0
*1999	9	2	2	4	1	3	5	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
2000 (to Mar)	5	0	1	4	0	4	1	5	0	0	5	0	5	0
TOTAL	53	10	17	23	3	22	26	20	4	2	10	4	11	5

Key: Tot = Total number of references; M = Main story; S = Small story / letter / diary; B = Brief reference within a bigger related story; U = mention in an unrelated story (e.g.: travel section); Func = Espionage / Intelligence / NMD context; Prot = protest context⁷².

A brief glance will confirm that the more left-leaning Guardian regards Menwith Hill as more newsworthy than the right-leaning, establishment 'newspaper of record' The Times. This in itself is not surprising. The Guardian has consistently covered the protesters, and for several years had a diarist sympathetic to the women protesters, Maev Kennedy. It is also the paper

⁷¹ *The Guardian* (and **The Observer*) on CD-ROM, *The Times* (and *The Sunday Times*) on CD-ROM.

to whom protesters are most likely to write and get published. It has printed features by Duncan Campbell, an interview with Lindis Percy, and its own Intelligence Correspondent, Richard Norton-Taylor, author of several books on GCHQ, the intelligence services and civil liberties, has frequently mentioned Menwith Hill in the context of wider articles on espionage and national security. However it can be seen that both papers had an increase in coverage around the time of Duncan Campbell's 1993 Channel 4, Dispatches programme, 'The Hill', and the outcry that accompanied it, with Norton-Taylor in particular reprinting all of the major allegations and quotations contained in the documentary⁷³.

Indeed the Times did not publish a major story about Menwith Hill between this year and 1999, when the twin discussions about economic espionage and the proposed U.S. National Missile Defence system brought Menwith unavoidably back into the public eye (see Chapter 5). Generally, the Times' coverage has been limited to brief references. However, the Menwith Hill baseball team, The Menwith Hill Patriots, with of course no mention of the function of the "American military base in Yorkshire" which the team represents, seems worthy of individual coverage⁷⁴, as did an 'amusing' story about a local farmer who had impounded the car of an American from the base for not paying rent and other expenses he was owed⁷⁵. The Sunday Times did however publish one long story about female protesters which included the women-only peace camp at Menwith⁷⁶.

However, neither paper has ever really provided systematic analysis of Menwith Hill or considered it to be of much more than sporadic news interest. This is true of the British press more generally, with the exception of *New Statesman* in the 1980's (though no longer) and the *Index on Censorship*, which has published Duncan Campbell and a special issue on privacy. However both these publications both of which are small fry in the bid pond of journalism.

Strangely, despite its more high profile coverage, the *Guardian* has not proved to be the most influential of the British papers in this area. The publication of the *Daily Telegraph's* article

⁷² Within the two context categories, it is sometimes difficult to make absolute distinctions

⁷³ Norton-Taylor, Richard (1993) US spy base can snoop on British firms, *The Guardian*, 6th October, 5.

⁷⁴ Szczepanik, Nick, (1996) Old foes prepare to strike out for final accolade, *The Times*, 5th September, 36.

⁷⁵ *The Times*, (1998) Farmer drives hard bargain over rent, 28th August, 6.

on ECHELON in late 1997, which quoted the paragraph from Steve Wright's STOA preliminary report, was a key point in the history of counter-discourses entering the mainstream⁷⁷. The Telegraph, despite its right-wing reputation also has in common with many conservative organisations, a concern for individual liberty and privacy especially within the home, as well as for business. This aspect of their ideology coincided with the more left libertarian stance of Privacy International, and the paper had employed PI's Simon Davies as their correspondent on electronic privacy issues. As he says:

I was correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, and I saw this paragraph [in the STOA report] and looked at it, and said: 'that is the most succinct piece of information', and built a story around it. And then, the amazing domino effect of European papers took hold. Because they all looked at the Telegraph, and they thought, 'if the Telegraph can write it - it's a conservative paper - then Le Monde or Der Spiegel can write it'.⁷⁸

This one newspaper article, and that paragraph, had an effect that was almost like a flood overcoming a build-up of debris, or as Simon Davies describes it: "a domino effect". I shall return to this issue below

No Such Agency

Some newspapers have attempted to carry out serious and sustained research into SIGINT. Perhaps the single most in-depth account was a series of articles called 'No Such Agency' published by the *Baltimore Sun*, the 'local paper' of the NSA⁷⁹. Over a decade after *The Puzzle Palace*, the pieces summarised most of the Bamford and Campbell material. They also provided histories of US cryptography, covered the NSA and the rights of American citizens, included numerous interviews with current and former intelligence services employees, listed the various spy scandals, and provided some good vignettes of examples of NSA activity at different scales from transnational satellite espionage based in Fort Meade to agents in the field tracking drug traffickers in Afghanistan. They also covered some newer allegations,

⁷⁶ Craig, Olga (1996) Wild, wild wimmin, *The Sunday Times - Sunday Magazine*, 4 August.

⁷⁷ Davies, Simon (1997) Spies like US, *Electronic Telegraph*, 936, 16th December.

⁷⁸ Interview with Simon Davies, November 1999.

some of which had been circulating in parapolitical circles for some time, concerning the subversion of the leading international cryptographic equipment supplier Crypto AG by the NSA. Bamford had mentioned the possibility of such a link, but it was not until 1992, when Hans Buehler, a salesman for Cypto, was arrested for spying in Iran and then sacked by the company on his return home. Unsatisfied with the explanations he investigated and uncovered some of the story of how the founder of Crypto AG, Boris Hagelin, had let in the NSA by the back door as early as 1957, providing lower levels of security to customers in whom the NSA were interested. The series also makes similar allegations about commercial software providers, notably Microsoft, many of which have later turned out to be correct (see Chapter 5).

Wayne Madsen

These allegations have been further expanded by the most vociferous whistle-blower critic of the NSA, ex-employee Wayne Madsen. According to an interview with Bo Elkjaer, Madsen's path into the NSA, which he joined in 1975, was via the US Marine Corps and after leaving the NSA, like Margaret Newsham, he worked for companies contracted to the Agency, including RCA and the Computer Services Corporation⁸⁰. Madsen, now employed by the Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) has been behind many of the revelations about the way in which the NSA has placed backdoors in software and subverted cryptographic equipment manufacturers (see above and Chapter 5). He was responsible for much of the inside information in the 1999 article in the *Village Voice*, which detailed the role of the NSA in subverting UNSCOM, the United Nations chemical weapons inspection organisation in Iraq through its Special Collections Service. This article also provided as definitive a list as one is likely to find of the facilities operated and used by the NSA worldwide⁸¹. Simon Davies claims that Madsen's revelations have been extremely damaging to the NSA but that Madsen was now "too high profile" to be silenced. He argues that Madsen was now too driven and passionate to be pressurised or bow to any discursive strategies that might be

⁷⁹ Shane, Scott and Bowman, Tom (1995) No Such Agency, Special Reprint of a Six-Part Series in *The Baltimore Sun*, December 3-15th, 1995.

⁸⁰ Elkjær, Bo and Seeberg, Kenan (1999) Ex-Agent To Danish Ministers: You Are Being Monitored, *Ekstra Bladet*, Nov. 26. 1999.

⁸¹ Vest, Jason and Madsen, Wayne (1999) A Most Unusual Collection Agency, *Village Voice*, February 24 - March 2, 1999 <http://www.villagevoice.com/features/9908/vest_madsen.shtml>

employed against him: "Wayne doesn't care anymore. He just hates them."⁸² Whether it is hate or not, like Newsham, Madsen appears to be in constant fear for his life, as he explained to *Ekstra Bladet* when asked about the loaded gun he carried in his car:

I don't carry a gun because I think it's cool to have a pistol. But based on the sources I still have in the NSA, I know there are people in the intelligence services who do not care for people who talk about the secret services. Since they are armed, I had better be prepared, too⁸³.

Madsen seems more overtly 'left-wing' than many of the ex-intelligence service whistle-blowers. He argues his case against the NSA in moral terms employing a social justice, anti-corporate discourse, reminiscent of that of the anti-globalization movement activists fighting the attempts of the World Trade Organisation and other supra-national organisations to expand their control:

The problem is that the NSA has lost sight of its purpose. It's not right that taxpayers' money is used to help major shareholders in large corporations to earn huge profits. Or for that matter the fact that the NSA puts ordinary people, legal organizations and politicians under constant suspicion⁸⁴.

Ekstra Bladet

Whilst many mainstream newspapers needed a lead, some European newspapers, particularly those in the Scandinavian countries and Holland, were more committed. The key example is *Ekstra Bladet* in Denmark. In 1999 and 2000, Bo Elkjaer and Kenan Seeberg have written over 50 articles on the NSA, ECHELON and the place of Denmark in the UKUSA network for this newspaper. This sustained and systematic analysis of the NSA has included interviews with many of the major researchers and whistle-blower including Campbell, Margaret Newsham and Wayne Madsen (see below). There have also been investigative reports into Danish military bases, and coverage of, and inspiration to, Danish parliamentary activity on the subject and pressuring of Ministers into making statements about Danish

⁸² Interview with Simon Davies, November 1999.

⁸³ Elkjær and Seeberg 1999 *op cit*.

⁸⁴ *ibid*.

Intelligence links. Despite its 'third party' status in the UKUSA alliance, Denmark is a key player. Not only are there NSA bases there, but through its colonial control of Greenland, like the UK, Denmark has provided America with the land for one to the three BMEW Stations, Thule.

Contemporary Parliamentary Inquiries

The escalating series of revelations about UKUSA, the NSA, and in particular ECHELON have led to new legislative inquiries, but unlike in the 1970s, these Inquiries have taken place in several different legislatures in Europe and America.

The European Union

One of the reasons for this is that the revelations have coincided with the struggle to promote a 'European' identity by the European institutions. For the European Parliament in particular, in its attempt to construct an idea of European citizenship, ECHELON represents something against which the Parliament can be seen to be making a stand on behalf of its citizens. The paradox that at the same time the European Commission is establishing several EU-wide surveillance systems, including databases of immigrants, and a telecommunications interception system, has not gone unnoticed either by radical parties in the Parliament like the Greens, nor by parapolitical groups like Statewatch.

As we have seen it was the Scientific and Technological Options Assessment sub-committee of the European Parliament that commissioned Steve Wright's report on the technologies of political control, and the latest information to emerge about ECHELON has again been via STOA and the European Parliament. The EP had been surprised by the response to the original report, and passed a Motion which after a lengthy list of confirmations of friendship of the EU and the USA, specified some mildly-worded criticisms of American economic espionage and infringement of the civil liberties of EU citizens. The Parliament:

12. Asks for such surveillance technologies to be subject to proper open debate both at national and EU level as well as procedures which ensure democratic accountability;
13. Calls for the adoption of a code of conduct in order to ensure redress in case of malpractice or abuse;
14. Considers that the increasing importance of the Internet and worldwide telecommunications in general and in particular the Echelon System, and the

risks of their being abused, require protective measures concerning economic information and effective encryption...⁸⁵

The Parliament also commissioned a series of reports on surveillance and intelligence gathering in Europe under the heading: *Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information*, made up 4 reports covering the economic, legal, encryption and interception aspects, and an Introductory volume. The Introductory volume concludes that:

Electronic surveillance prompts a large number of questions and gives grounds for objections, since respect for fundamental rights has become the buzzword of modern society. The European Parliament will, therefore, have its work cut out if it takes up the cudgels to defend respect for confidentiality⁸⁶.

Despite the detail and seriousness of the issue the tone of this conclusion appears to be overly jocular. This unevenness of tone is characteristic of the quality of the final report. The four volumes are of variable quality, and it is probably only Duncan Campbell's *Interception Capabilities 2000*, which produced new evidence and which will actually move the debate forward⁸⁷. Simon Davies comments acidly on the quality of one of the other studies on the perception of economic issues⁸⁸:

There was a study, a Greek study, which we know nothing about, and which doesn't say anything... I mean we didn't even know the group that did it, and

⁸⁵ European Parliament (1998) Resolution on transatlantic relations/ECHELON system, 16th September 1998.

⁸⁶ Becker, Peggy (1999) *Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Volume 1/5: Presentation / Analysis*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.

⁸⁷ Campbell, Duncan (1999) *Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Volume 2/5: the state of the art in Communications Intelligence (COMINT) of automated processing for intelligence purposes of intercepted broadband multi-language leased or common carrier systems, and its applicability to COMINT targeting and selection, including speech recognition (aka Interception Capabilities 2000)*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.

⁸⁸ Bogonikolos, Nikos (1999) *Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Volume 5/5: "The perception of economic risks arising from the potential vulnerability of electronic commercial media to interception: Survey of opinions of experts*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.

they didn't even consult any of *us* - so we thought 'what the *hell* have they produced'. I mean what new could you have produced if you don't interview the people who are actually alert.⁸⁹

There is a certain element of sour grapes here and a sense that the EU have infringed the monopoly of the small group of experts in this area. As Davies admits: "in fact we were a bit pissed off that we didn't get it, because - you know - we felt that - we had assembled a team that were just - you know - the state of the art, but - such is life."⁹⁰ There is sense in which an issue moves beyond the control of those who originally fought to define it once it becomes public knowledge and that this is felt by those actors to diminish the quality of the research.

There was a vicious battle in the European Parliament over the question of what to do about the Report. The Greens/European Free Alliance Group consisting of the Greens and the various regionalist parties in the Parliament demanded a full parliamentary inquiry and set about gaining the 160 signatures necessary to force a full Parliamentary vote on setting one up⁹¹. They achieved this by the end of March 2000⁹², but there followed an extraordinary process. On 13th April the Presidents of the different political Groups in the Parliament met and decided by a majority vote that there would be no full Inquiry, rather a 'Temporary Commission' which would not have the power to make recommendations. The leaders of the Socialist, Liberal and People's (Christian Democrat / Conservative) Groups all voted against the Inquiry, despite the original investigations in the Parliament having been sparked by UK Labour MEPs - and therefore members of the Socialist Group - Glynn Ford and David Bowe. The legality of such a move was questioned, given that 180 MEPs had signed the call for a Committee of Inquiry⁹³. Finally in June, the Presidents conceded that a full parliamentary vote could take place, but ordered a month's delay⁹⁴, presumably to give time for Party leaders to attempt to win over those who might be tempted to support the motion. The

⁸⁹ Interview with Simon Davies, November 1999.

⁹⁰ *ibid.*

⁹¹ The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament Press release: Appalling facts exposed in Echelon Hearing in the European Parliament, Brussels, 23 February 2000

⁹² The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament Press release 27th March 2000.

⁹³ The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament Press release: Greens/EFA criticise decision of Conference of Presidents on Echelon, Brussels, 14 April 2000.

⁹⁴ The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament Press release: Parliament's Presidency meets demand of Green/EFA Group, Strasbourg, 14th June 2000.

Parliament eventually voted against a full Inquiry by 340 to 210 votes, and instead a Temporary Commission was instituted; the Greens summed up the situation:

They have chosen a toothless instrument, because as Parliament's legal services have clearly stated - a temporary committee cannot conduct inquiries. It will not have the power to call on people to testify and has no right to access confidential documents - which is clearly a prerequisite when investigating a spying system. It is in danger of being no more than a mere talkingshop.⁹⁵

The Commission, chaired by Portuguese Christian Democratic MEP, Carlos Coelho, met for the first time in September 2000⁹⁶. Of those MEPs who have been most active on ECHELON, UK Labour MEP Glynn Ford and German Green Ilka Schröder are only substitute members⁹⁷. As the Committee started work, on-line magazine *Telepolis* interviewed the two European Commissioners on whose areas of responsibility ECHELON impacts. They were asked whether they thought ECHELON existed. António Vitorino, European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, replied: "I believe in God and Echelon, but have never met either."; Erkki Liikanen, the Commissioner for the information Society "said that the technology, which would enable such activities to be carried out, existed"⁹⁸.

What would Europeans want instead? Ann Cryer argues that she sees no problem with any kind of co-operation on defence matters as long as it does not turn into aggression:

If there was some sort of spy organisation that was European-wide, which would perhaps facilitate gathering of information on massive drug deals, *and* movement of armaments, and it simply had a defensive role, I wouldn't have a problem with it. But if it started to be another extension, another sort of thing

⁹⁵ The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament Press release: Greens/EFA regrets that inquiry committee on Echelon spying system was turned down, Strasbourg, 5th July 2000.

⁹⁶ van Buren, Jelle (2000) Echelon Committee presents work programme, *Telepolis*, 18th September. Available on-line at: <<http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/8752/1.html>>

⁹⁷ European Parliament website: <<http://www.europarl.eu.int/tempcom/echelon/en/members.htm>>

⁹⁸ van Buren 2000 *op cit*.

like NATO which is purely used for keeping the rest of the world in place...
then I wouldn't like it very much⁹⁹.

This, as we have seen, is different from the discourse of the privacy activists who prefer to emphasise the increasing inherent intrusiveness of technologies and their integration, rather than whether such a system is controlled by the European union or the United States of America.

Individual European Countries

Several European countries are now considering, are carrying out, or have completed enquiries into ECHELON at various levels, including Italy and Denmark. The most recent report to be completed was that of the French Assemblée Nationale¹⁰⁰. The concerns of the Report focus on the use of UKUSA networks for economic espionage. France may in fact be the only European state to have genuine concerns over UKUSA: it is a relative dissident in the inter-state system, remaining outside the United States' networks, and trying to maintain its own SIGINT systems. These are not technologically sophisticated and are relatively sparse in coverage compared with the UKUSA networks. Reports claim that the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) operates listening posts in French Guyana, in New Caledonia, and in the United Arab Emirates, with a major analysis centre in the Dordogne¹⁰¹. Supporters of the United States have coined the term 'Frenchelon' to try to imply similar capacities to the American networks. But this is ludicrous, its technology is based on the old Hélios 1-A satellite system and has "a poor technical capacity for interception and re-transmission"; newer more expensive programmes are said to have been abandoned. There are some indications that the agency has also been developing joint operations with the German foreign intelligence organisation, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), however Germany is also part of the UKUSA system, as we have seen.

⁹⁹ Interview with Ann Cryer, November 1999.

¹⁰⁰ l'Assemblée Nationale, La Commission De La Défense Nationale Et Des Forces Armées(1) (2000), *Rapport Sur Les Systèmes De Surveillance Et D'interception Électroniques Pouvant Mettre En Cause La Sécurité Nationale*, Presented by M. Arthur Paecht, 11th October 2000.

¹⁰¹ Cukier, Kenneth Neil (2000) "Frenchelon": France's Alleged Global Surveillance Network And its Implications on International Intelligence Cooperation, *Communications Week International Issue* / page number not available.

However France's stance does not necessarily enable it to be seen as the champion of European interests. In fact, France is equally resistant to European Parliament attempts to regulate electronic surveillance on behalf of its citizens. As the STOA Report on electronic surveillance remarked, "France, invoking the need to maintain the interests of national defence, has maintained restrictive legislation"¹⁰².

USA

The latest round of Congressional enquiry has largely been the work of one man. Congressman Bob Barr falls neatly into the category of insider-reformers. He is an ex-CIA official who has focused on the violation of the rights to privacy of American citizens by the intelligence services and particularly the NSA through ECHELON. According to his biography Barr "has fought aggressively for individual freedom, personal privacy, regulatory reform, tax relief, strengthening Social Security, a strong national defense, and a balanced federal budget."¹⁰³ His memberships include the Christian Coalition, the National Rifle Association, and the Pro-Life Caucus. He is therefore quite different from the Senators who constituted the reforming majority of the Church Committee in the 1970s, although Frank Church was, despite his otherwise 'left' orientation, an enthusiastic defender of gun-ownership rights.

However Barr's investigations are not thought of particularly highly by those campaigning for tighter controls on the operations of intelligence agencies on an international level. The mainstream American dissenting discourse on the NSA, as represented by Congressional and Senatorial inquiries, cannot really be described as a true counter-discourse. It has four main features. Firstly it is domestic in IR terms. It is limited to consideration of the activities of the NSA within the USA. Secondly it is individualistic in other words it focuses on the individual American citizen. Thirdly it is legalistic: it is concerned with the citizen in relation to his or her rights under the Constitution and in law. Finally, in relation to the former two features, it is privacy-oriented. This discourse privileges the particular right of the citizen not to be intruded upon by others, including the state. As a result of this, the discourse tends to

¹⁰² Becker 1999 *op cit*.

¹⁰³ <<http://www.house.gov/barr/bio.htm>>

concentrate on, 'abuses' of the four categories, particular cases when the boundaries have been overstepped.

Sometimes this does turn into a more general consideration of the whole basis of the NSA, but only rarely. Abdeen Jabaro was the only victim of the NSA ever to get the agency to admit that it had spied on him, although they still won the court case he had brought against them in 1980. Jabaro is very aware of the shortcomings of a critique of the NSA based on rights under the US constitution and law: "if you're British, if you're French, if you're Dutch, you're any people, anywhere you have no rights to complain about this. You have zero rights"¹⁰⁴. One of my interviewees put it more strongly, in particular making a clear distinction between the importance of keeping any part of the issue alive in the mainstream media, and the long-term 'use' of such narrowly-focused campaigning:

Who the fuck wants to listen to Bob Barr going on about what's happening to the rights of the Americans? I mean I don't know how that's going to help... I mean it might help raise the issue. But he's a low-level Republican... what he's doing is very, very valuable for the media, but I don't know whether it's useful...

¹⁰⁴ Jabaro, Abdeen, quoted in Campbell (1993) *The Hill*, an IPTV production for Channel Four Television.

The Current Situation

There is no doubt that the state of public knowledge about transnational surveillance systems has changed. When I interviewed him late in 1999, Simon Davies described the new climate:

two months the Los Angeles Times took a piece from me - *unedited* - they didn't even touch it. They just took it as accepted that these things were facts. Two weeks later the International Herald Tribune picked up my piece and ran it unedited in the IHT. And I'm sitting there going 'this is really significant', the international media community have just now accepted that this is not conjecture anymore.¹⁰⁵

This is a key point. What is being said has not changed dramatically from what Campbell and Melvern were saying in 1980. Steve Wright's STOA report did not dramatically increase the state of knowledge over *The Hill*. This is not to say that there have been no new discoveries or understandings, but Wright had not written anything new, it was simply a distillation of available public information of which many journalists and policy makers must already have been aware. Davies, a friend of Wright's, was merely repeating what he had said. Davies is also a friend of Campbell. Indeed he recounted an occasion which this friendship had been used by a drunken NSA operative at a conference to make veiled implications as to what they knew of Davies' and Campbell's personal life. There is a small group of dedicated people saying the same things they have been saying for years. Steve Wright often says that if someone bombed the Big Brother Awards or one of the other increasingly frequent conferences on surveillance, they could wipe out just about everyone outside of the intelligence agencies who had significant knowledge about SIGINT¹⁰⁶. This small group of parapolitical researchers seem to have acquired a new power and respect through a small piece of text. However that text is now surrounded by links and networks over which they have no control. This is an issue to which I shall return in Chapter 9.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Simon Davies, November 1999.

¹⁰⁶ Conversation with Steve Wright, August 2000.

Chapter Seven. Peace Campaigners

Introduction

The second half of the Twentieth Century saw the growth of protest against military sites and military priorities by peace campaigners. There were two main waves of peace activity coinciding with the two most confrontational periods of the 'Cold War'. The initial rise of the post-WW2 peace movement in the 1950's, represented by the foundation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the Non-Violent Direct Action (NVDA) of the Committee of 100 and other Direct Action Committees, was a mixture of elements. These included: the remnants of the wartime conscientious objection networks; religious organisations particularly the non-conformist Christian sects like the Methodists and in particular the Quakers; the work of philosophers like Bertrand Russell; as well as general and increasing fear of nuclear war among the population at large. The focus of protests tended to be nuclear weapons bases and parliament.

With regard to intelligence sites, protest has grown from the 1970's, but is still relatively small as a focus for protest activity. The rise of protest at Menwith Hill largely coincides with the second phase of peace activity in Britain in the late 1970s and early 1980s¹. Ann Cryer, MP and a CND member from 1957, defined this period as a "renaissance of the peace movement" which was "really as a result of Thatcher's very - sabre-rattling - persona"². This 'sabre-rattling' included strong endorsement for Ronald Reagan's renewed demonization of Russia, purchase of new nuclear weapons from the USA (Polaris and later Trident) and the siting of the new automatically guided Pershing 'Cruise' missiles at USAF bases in Britain. At a national level CND membership rose from a few thousand to over fifty thousand. For a prominent CND member it was a busy time:

¹ For details of this period see: Maguire, Diarmuid (1992) *When the streets began to empty: the demobilisation of the British Peace Movement after 1983*, *West European Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 75-94.

² Interview with Ann Cryer MP, November 1999.

we went to an awful lot of Labour meetings based on peace, or CND meetings, or single-issue peace meetings - I remember from about late 79 to... 1983, it was almost a full time job, going around the country speaking on the peace issue³.

However the CND movement in this period was not the same sober, male-dominated academic and Christian movement that it had been in the 1950s and early 1960s. A more diverse and unpredictable peace movement had emerged influenced by a number of different strands. These particularly included: the rise of feminism and environmentalism; the spread of new strategic and tactical thinking influenced both by Gandhian and American Civil Rights Movement NVDA, by situationalism with its focus on subverting hegemonic symbolic structures, and by less restricted 'by any means necessary' anarcho-socialist and Maoist forms of action. CND itself had splits as well as growth. In addition to its traditional links with the Labour Party through Labour CND, there were now also troublesome factions like Green CND and Trade Union CND. In addition, groups like Greenpeace had made explicit the connection between ecological destruction and militarism, and there was an increasing range of specific peace groups based either on profession (scientists, doctors etc.), or on gender. The focus of the peace movement expanded from particular sites to a whole range of military establishments, research centres, and even nuclear weapons transport networks: organisations like Cruisewatch targeted the lorry convoys and secret trains which carried Cruise missiles around the country. It was also a time when a great deal more was beginning to be revealed about Britain's place in an American-dominated alliance, and the realisation that Britain was effectively on the front-line in any nuclear war between the USA and the USSR.

Thus there were, and are, several different groups of protesters with different methods, aims, ways of seeing the sites and the land and overall purposes. These differences will also be considered here, both in terms of Menwith Hill itself which has been the starting point of this new wave of protest and remains its most potent symbol, and wider streams of protest against militarism in western society. Here the research will draw on interviews with activists as well as the documents they produce. My intention is not to cause or contribute to division amongst

³ *ibid.*

activists, and therefore out of respect for my respondents, personal arguments and problems between individuals have been omitted from this account, despite the fact that they may play a significant part in the way networks change. However too many accounts of peace movements present them as if they were internally consistent, homogeneous organisations. Such obfuscation does understanding no favours. Finally, the chapter will analyse the relationship of the Peace activists with the state through the use of surveillance, force and law by the state against the activists and vice-versa.

A Brief History of Protest at Menwith Hill

Whilst local peace campaigners claim that protest against the base started almost as soon as rumours of its arrival commenced, the first report I have been able to trace was sometime later, in 1960. As part of its coverage of the 'Open Day' at Menwith (see Chapter 4), the local paper reported "a passive demonstration against nuclear warfare" by the Northern Direct Action Committee, which consisted of "six pickets from Leeds and Pontefract"⁴. At the other end of the decade, there is a small report concerning a protest at the base in 1969 by "30 Young Liberals from Harrogate, Knaresborough and Leeds"⁵. However, the interest of the media in events at Menwith Hill has fluctuated greatly over the years, and local media certainly cannot be relied on as the only source of evidence of protest activity.



Figure 29. Yorkshire CND Logo

In the late 1970's local peace campaigners based in the nearby village of Otley began to campaign more systematically against Menwith Hill. The Otley Peace Action Group (OPAG), an independent organisation loosely associated with Yorkshire and Humberside Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) fought to get the attention of MPs, local councillors and the public brought to bear on Menwith Hill.

The first major demonstration against the base took place on May 1st 1981. Local media estimated a total of 3,600 protesters braved appalling weather conditions to hear CND campaigners speak against the Menwith Hill, and a spokesperson was quoted as saying that there would be an annual protest until the base was closed⁶. The demonstration seems very much to have been reported as an anti-nuclear event emphasising the nature of the base as a potential target in a nuclear attack, rather than a protest against the particular activities of

⁴ *Harrogate Herald* Harrogate People See How U.S. Army Lives, Wednesday 21st September 1960.

⁵ *Harrogate Herald* Protesters at Menwith Hill, Wednesday 23rd July 1969.

⁶ *Harrogate Advertiser* March on Menwith Peaceful Nuclear Attack on Menwith Hill Base, Friday 8th May 1981, 5.

Menwith Hill. This was after all the beginning of the period of the 'Second Cold War', and also the second major era of strength of the peace movement in the UK.

On 29th April 1983, a regular weekend peace camp was set up at the base by OPAG following the high-profile example of Greenham Common in Berkshire⁷. According to a paper written by prominent OPAG activist, Christine Dean, this resulted in an invitation inside the base by two of the American personnel from the base, and a somewhat surreal meeting:

We watched a long, tedious slide show focusing on such important areas of the base as "two person facilities with matching curtains and counterpanes, the nearly new clothing facility and Uncle Sam's beefburger bar." We were told that the two armed guards on the base were solely to protect the liquor store and the postal facility. After the slides, we were invited to "mingle" and ask questions.⁸

It is almost as if at this stage the NSA expected either the tedium or the sheer ordinariness and reasonableness of the base as portrayed in the official presentation would overwhelm the protesters who would then just pack up and go away. This can be compared with the use of a discourse of cultural similarity found in the media in the 1960s (see Chapter 4). In any event, the meeting was not repeated or followed up, despite requests from OPAG⁹. In fact it is hard to imagine that such a meeting would take place today.

Throughout the rest of the year the Advertiser continued to report on the protests, at some points seeming quite sympathetic to the non-violent stance of the protesters who adopted tactics like handing out flowers¹⁰, and even baking cakes for the MoD police who were now guarding the base¹¹. The activists seemed to have a relatively sympathetic hearing when new

⁷ *Harrogate Advertiser* Menwith Peace Group's 'Action' Threat, Friday May 20th 1983.

⁸ Dean, Christine (1986) *Arguments Against the Continued Use for Yorkshire Moorland as a Spy Base*, Unpublished Paper, 1.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Harrogate Advertiser* Protests and Flowers at Menwith, Friday 27th May 1983, 1.

¹¹ *Harrogate Advertiser* As protesters hand in their special cake of peace... Someone kicks up a real Stink, Friday 27th May 1983, 5.

security measures were implemented in 1987¹², despite this coming in the aftermath of various attempts to denigrate the protesters by the media and by right-wing groups (see below). Of the protests themselves that continued, only those in 1985 and 1986 were reported in any detail. In the former incident five campaigners broke into the base and climbed a water tower¹³, and in the latter a large protest of 150 people against the bombing of Libya, on April 20th 1986, resulted in eight arrests¹⁴.

In 1988, many of the camp members moved location from outside the main gate, to a more publicly visible site on the other side of the base, on the main Harrogate to Skipton road. A more significant event that went unrecorded in the media perhaps because it can only be judged in retrospect, was the arrival in the area of Lindis Percy in 1990. Percy, a midwife and long-time Quaker peace activist who had been involved in protests at Greenham Common, was to shake up action around Menwith Hill. Indeed it can be argued that the effect of her arrival and tactical astuteness was one of the main factors in the stream of events that eventually led to the increasing public visibility and criticism from the European Union now suffered by the base.

Percy was (and is) simply unrelenting in her activities. She appears driven to discover as much as possible about the base and to challenge the foundations of its very existence, legally, spatially and ethically. Along with other local activists including Anni Rainbow, Anne Lee and other OPAG members still active, after taking part in an International Women's' Day for Disarmament protest, she embarked upon a continuous campaign of trespass, constant argument with any representatives of the base she could collar, repeated feeding of questions to MPs, and rooting through the waste bins of the base. This latter tactic, surprisingly enough, resulted in huge caches of documents, some whole and some shredded. The shredded ones proved only a limited obstacle; these determined activists carefully reformed as many of them as possible. For several years in the early 1990s, with the base unaware that its organisational structures, codewords and systems were being slowly revealed, the activists fed MPs and journalists, particularly Duncan Campbell, with the information (see Chapter 6).

¹² *Harrogate Advertiser* It's trench war on protesters, 13th March 1987, 2.

¹³ *Harrogate Advertiser* Peace protesters broke into U.S. base, 30th August 1985, 3.

¹⁴ *Harrogate Advertiser* Peace protesters are freed after demonstration, 20th June 1986, 6.

At this stage OPAG and Percy and Rainbow's 'Shut Menwith Hill' Campaign were working together with another group of activists with a slightly different agenda - the women who would form the nucleus of a Women-only peace camp. The actual formation of the WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's Peace Camp did not take place until 1994. On 5th July 1993, Marjorie Thompson, Chair of CND, called for permanent peace camps at both Menwith Hill and Fylingdales¹⁵, and on 8th July, Helen John announced her intention to turn Menwith into the "Greenham of the 1990s"¹⁶. John, who had herself been one of the original Greenham Common protesters, had been invited up to Yorkshire by Women Against Pit Closures leader, Anne Scargill, with the intention of setting up camps outside deep mines threatened with closure¹⁷. However, Menwith soon drew her attention. She brought another new style to the campaign: describing herself as "a bit of a hooligan", she took her action in a different more personal direction than others, graffitying the house of the then Base Commander, N. Addison Ball, and verbally abusing him and other senior base staff¹⁸.

For a period, the various groups co-operated, however splits began during the making of the Channel 4 TV documentary, *The Hill*, produced by Duncan Campbell's Edinburgh-based IPTV and shown in 1993. There were two areas of disagreement: firstly over the use of undercover filming, and secondly over whether the source of the new information (the base's copious rubbish bins) should be revealed. Some local activists withdrew co-operation from the film, whilst others took part. Whilst the film was the first major television documentary to expose Menwith Hill (see below), it did reveal the source of the information that gave it substance, and security procedures were tightened, with the resulting loss of valuable information about the base.

The OPAG 'Close Menwith Campaign', headed by Anni Rainbow, Christine Dean and Lindis Percy with the support of the regional CND group, continued to grow and expand its focus to include other intelligence bases in the network of US sites in Britain. For example, its December 1994 newsletter was dominated by a three-page report on RAF Feltwell, another

¹⁵ *Yorkshire Post* (1993) CND planning to start protest camps outside defence bases, 5th July.

¹⁶ *Northern Star* (1993a) Menwith Hill to become 'Greenham of the 1990s', says peace campaigner, 8th July.

¹⁷ *Northern Star* (1993b) Women step up action against spy base, 19th August.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

NSA facility, in Norfolk¹⁹. Eventually, as a result of this increase in breadth, it was renamed the Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases (CAAB), in 1996, and continues to campaign under this name, using a mixture of tactics from trespass to legal challenges.

The WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's Peace Camp was set up in 1994 at the south-east corner of the base, and lasted until the year 2000 occupied by a mixture of temporary protesters and more permanent activists like Anne Lee, who lived there for most of its existence. The Women organised blockades, broke into the base to paint slogans on the radomes, and, on one occasion attempted to bring down a 'Pusher' antenna. Many were arrested, and some served prison sentences (see below). The campers were evicted from their corner in 1995, and forced to move to a lay-by several hundred metres from the base. Eventually, because of pending court hearings brought by the Local Authority, the peace camp was reduced to a single caravan. Finally after these court hearings in 1999, the local council managed to persuade a Judge that the camp was an obstruction of the highway and the days of permanent peace camps at Menwith Hill were apparently over. However, in the year 2000, Helen John called for a continuous rolling programme of trespass at all American military bases in Britain, and the WoMenwith Hill camp was resurrected as a regular event on the third weekend of every month.

¹⁹ Rainbow, Anni (1994) R.A.F. Feltwell - Unaccountable and out of control, *Close Menwith Hill News*, December 1994.

Discourses of Surveillance, War and Peace at Menwith Hill

OPAG

OPAG was a long-lasting group that changed in composition as people moved in and out or became more or less active. It also overlapped with Yorkshire and Humberside CND and the original peace camp, and later at least partly produced CAAB. It is thus difficult to attribute a single narrative to OPAG. However, several recurring themes do emerge from the various pieces of literature, reports and interviews. The first is a key element of openness and inclusivity. OPAG, despite an apparent preponderance of women, was always mixed in terms of gender. In keeping with its CND-influenced origins, and its period of activity, it kept a focus on the nuclear threat: literature throughout the 1980s emphasises the possibility of Menwith Hill being a target in a nuclear war, and therefore endangering the lives of thousands of innocent people who had no interest in superpower politics. Further, in the face of some apparent cynicism, efforts were made to locate the place of Menwith "firmly in the nuclear weapons cycle"²⁰, not just as a target but also as a key site in the American nuclear weapons system.

Many highly effective leaflets were produced as an irregular newsletter, *Messages From Menwith*, one of which features an accurate, but also satirical map (see Figure 30 overleaf). Along with the STEEPLEBUSH operations centre, dishes, radomes, cameras, and "antennas", it features the "footpath (obstructed)", "Suspect Cows", and "M.O.D. sheep" within the 562 acres inside the "Prohibited Place", and "Foreign Nationals (i.e.: English)", "British Telecom SHAREHOLDER" (BT having been recently privatised), "M.O.D. Police Collecting Car Numbers" and the "M.O.D. Circular Tours Minibus" (the regular patrol) on the road outside. The cable link to Hunter's Stone BT tower is also featured, drawn as a large domestic plug connecting to the base.

²⁰ Dean, Christine (1986) *op cit.*, Introduction.

Perhaps the most interesting document to come out of OPAG from the researcher's point of view is a paper written by Christine Dean, a long-standing activist and also meticulous archivist of the peace movement in the area. *Arguments Against the Continued Use for Yorkshire Moorland as a Spy Base* is over twenty type-written, hand-corrected pages of close argument against Menwith Hill infused with a very personal and passionate spirit, but also a rigorous analysis and a sophisticated theoretical and practical understanding of the networks of which both OPAG and Menwith Hill are part. When I talked with Dean in 1999, she still maintained that this paper "sums up everything I feel" about Menwith and that she could not really add to it²¹. The title itself contains some interesting positioning: rather than calling the place by the name adopted by the American forces, Dean chooses to refer to the specifically rural and regional character of the place. By setting 'Yorkshire moorland', against 'a spy base' she is producing an implicit argument about the unnaturalness of the base. All the peace groups create some form of discourse about nature, and often of the rural, to enhance their claims. In Dean's case, the social relations expressed in the different organisational forms of the spy base and the peace camp reinforce this natural - unnatural divide, as we shall see below.

The paper started off by summarising available information on the place of Menwith in the nuclear chain (as target and C3I centre), but unlike a lot of other peace discourse of the period, went much further. Dean deconstructed the official discourse of the need for nuclear weapons through consideration of the risks of having particular sites vulnerable to nuclear attack, the environmental and human impacts of the nuclear testing process. Like Mary Kaldor, she also critiqued the hierarchical undemocratic and unaccountable decision-making process that are an inevitable part of defence based on nuclear weapons. She concluded that:

We have to accept ALL of that if we accept nuclear weapons on our soil. We have to support ALL of that if we believe that the NATO communications base at Menwith Hill is there to protect us. And we have to accept a hell of a lot more.

²¹ Conversation with Christine Dean, September 1999.

That 'hell of a lot more' included: the pollution and militarization of space; the huge costs and risks to society posed by the networks of satellite and computer systems and their vulnerabilities; the subversion of democracy and the manipulation of law that surveillance and secrecy entail; and the direct damage to the environment caused by sites like Menwith Hill. In her conclusion Dean remarked that:

Some people say that the technology at Menwith would be useful for verification of nuclear tests. If we could believe that the satellites would always be sending back accurate information, that the computers did not break down and that the NSA would tell us the truth, then perhaps I could agree. However, I would prefer that the climate of fear and secrecy was broken down by a different use of money and resources at present poured into military and commercial spying.

This is the opposite of the discourse of historical inevitability found in *Vision 2020* and in contemporary neo-liberal pronouncements more generally. It is a discourse that emphasises that the outcomes of history are based on the choices made by states, and if states are not prepared to make those choices, by people. It is thus infused by the discourse of empowerment. Whilst a traditional Marxist might argue in terms of alienation from society, the new peace movements talked in terms of overcoming the despair brought on (or at least intensified) by the nuclear age. Joanna Macy, an ecofeminist pioneer of mutual counselling for empowerment, writing in the same period as Dean, described the way in which this despair is produced:

The conspiracy of silence concerning our deepest feelings about the future of our species, the degree of numbing isolation, burnout and cognitive confusion that result from it all converge to produce a sense of futility. Each act of denial, conscious or unconscious, is an abdication of our powers to respond."²²

Macy argued that it was only through group discussion and joint experience that the pain that people (and particularly women) felt could be experienced instead of being suppressed. This

²² Macy, Joanna R. (1983) *Despair and Personal Power in the Nuclear Age*, Philadelphia PA: New Society, 16.

could lead to unblocking repressed feelings and a realisation of the connectedness of every person in the web of life. The kind of power this brings out, argued Macy, is not the dysfunctional patriarchal 'power over', but the dynamic, evolving, and synergistic power that is released rather than seized or won, power that "happens through us"²³. I will return to the concept of empowerment in the context of both CAAB and the Women's Peace Camp, below.

One of the most interesting points in Dean's paper is a diagrammatic depiction of the 'communications centres' at Menwith; an attempt to summarise the semiotic networks around the base, through a symmetrical comparison of the STEEPLEBUSH analysis centre (see Chapter 5) and the Peace Camp (see Figure 31, page 260). What is particularly interesting is that the author fully realises that the NSA base and the Peace Camp have as a goal something called 'peace'. This is shown in a rising sun or planet at the bottom of the diagram, visually reminiscent of, but substantially opposed to, the 'world as war' depiction in *Vision 2020*. However the methods used to attain this goal and the systems of thought and social organisation contained within them are markedly different; opposing poles. The anarcho-pacifist values of the Peace Campers allow "caring", "conservation", "consultation", "humour", openness and ultimately "freedom". On the other hand the capitalist-militarist ideology of the NSA permits only "pollution", "waste", "confrontation, fear & spying", secrecy and the "ghetto". Thus where the 'peace' wanted by the protesters is the peace that comes of understanding and the breaking down of barriers, peace as presence and as positive activity; the peace striven for by the NSA is the peace that comes of control, discipline, and surveillance; it is peace as absence, as the negation of activity. However in spatial terms these categories can be reversed. The 'ghetto' of the STEEPLEBUSH compound is expressed through the wire mesh fences, the surveillance cameras, the guard posts and security checks, and the reinforced concrete, partially underground buildings, in other words in the presence of things mediating human contact. In contrast, the peace camp's 'freedom' is represented by the absence of such mediation: open to all, with no barriers, no attempt to territorialize the space they inhabit. Melucci's evocative description of New Social Movements as 'Nomads of the Present' comes to mind here²⁴, also Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of the nomad

²³ *ibid.*, 33.

²⁴ Melucci, Alberto (1988) *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*, London: Radius.

challenge to the settled forms of modern society²⁵. As Cresswell has observed, peace camps with their often ramshackle temporary structures, without the clear straight lines, divisions and barriers that characterise the idealised 'classical body' of the modern civilised order, are consciously or unconsciously offering not only a political but a spatial challenge²⁶. They are taking the forms of the nomad in a society in which nomadism is symbolic of the deterritorialized and the unbounded, the wild and the dangerous.

Within this the place of technology is highly significant. Under "intelligence" the STEEPLEBUSH site is characterised as a network of relationships: "human-machine-machine-machine-human". This is technology as mediator but also as creator of distance and alienation. Whilst humans have enrolled machines in their quest for 'peace', the machines have become the centre and determinant of those relationships. Secrecy is then considered to be either an outcome or an inevitable part of this network. In contrast the Peace Camp consists solely of "human-human-human" relationships, face-to-face personal interaction that is "open". The almost Latourian vision of man-machine hybrids is explored further elsewhere in the document. Dean refers to Menwith as a "military mechanical brain"²⁷, and only "one of many technological brains across the world"²⁸. Again here, with the vision of a cyborg we are given the impression of the creation of something that is no longer entirely human in either its form or its ability to be controlled. As with Ann Cryer (see Chapter 6), there is the idea of loss of control, but in this case it is more specifically associated with technology rather than political power. There is also the sense of the body violated, and perhaps even with the impression that the cold rational aspects of the human, the 'technological brain', have through this alliance with the artificial mechanical, been made separate from the warm emotional natural body. Nowhere though are these characteristics associated with gender, as they are in the discourse of the WoMenwith Hill Women's' Peace Camp (see below).

²⁵ Deleuze, Giles and Guattari, Felix (1988): *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

²⁶ Cresswell, Tim (1994): Putting women in their place: the carnival at Greenham Common, *Antipode* Vol. 26, No. 1, 35-58. Also: Cresswell, Tim (1996) *In Place / Out of Place: Geography, Ideology and Transgression*, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press.

²⁷ Dean 1986 *op cit.*, 20.

²⁸ *ibid.*, 3.

MENWITH HILL COMMUNICATIONS CENTRES




Figure 31. An OPAG view of the actor-networks around Menwith Hill.



Figure 32. A CAAB Logo

The Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases appears very much the product of two women's dedication: Anni Rainbow and Lindis Percy. However there are also a number of people and organisations crucial to the information, research and campaigning work. These include: Yorkshire CND who host and maintain the CAAB website; Mike Gauffman of Enigma; and various firms of solicitors, most recently Stephens Innocent of London, who help CAAB pursue their numerous court battles.

Rainbow arrived in Otley in 1986 and became involved in OPAG. Percy did not appear until 1990, when she took part in a protest at Menwith on Women's Disarmament Day, May 24th. She continues to live in Hull with her husband, and to work as an NHS midwife. Percy considers this element of a 'normal life' essential to her sanity and ability to continue as an effective long-term activist:



Figure 33. CAAB founders Anni Rainbow (left), and Lindis Percy (right), demand UK independence from America.

I have seen people over the years, rush into this, get arrested, get into court, and they get burn-out, and actually I, over the years, I gradually came into it.

I've always kept my job in the Health Service, and I've come out of prison in July and I'm working in the Health Service.²⁹

This is also another example of a discourse of cultural similarity, or normalcy, which can be compared to the discursive strategy of the American military in the 1960s (see Chapter 4). I shall return to this discourse further below.

Percy acknowledged the difference in opinion between OPAG / CAAB and the WoMenwith Hill campers, and clearly believes that John et al. have an agenda of which Menwith Hill is only a small part, and which she does not entirely share. CAAB's campaign is very much focused on exposing American military installations in the UK, their unjust basis, and their eventual removal. However she also feels that the differences between the groups have been exploited by the state: "it absolutely handed it to the MoD on a plate - divide and rule, it's called".

Both CAAB and the WoMenwith Hill campers lay claim to one or more traditions of protest, however in CAAB's case these traditions are not used in any overt symbolic way in leaflets or other documents to legitimise their activity, rather they are apparent in conversation with CAAB activists. In CAAB's case, there are three such strands: the Quaker tradition; the history of local protest; and the Greenham legacy.

Both Rainbow and Percy are Quakers, and although the Campaign itself is in no way limited to, or only supported by, Quakers, the determined serious style of Quaker protest infuses CAAB actions and documents. For Rainbow, CAAB protest at Menwith is part of the Quaker tradition of bearing witness, which she describes as "taking a light to a place of darkness"³⁰. The almost involuntary aspect of this is emphasised: "we feel led to do it", comments Rainbow, "it is a Concern with a capital 'C' - something that does concern you, but you feel compelled to do something about it".

²⁹ Interview with Lindis Percy, April 2000.

³⁰ Conversation with Anni Rainbow, October 2000.

The second tradition is that of local protest against Menwith Hill. Despite her own individual reputation and despite much of the media focus falling on her activities, Lindis Percy is insistent that the contribution of campaigners from the local area over the years should be remembered actively, and that all contributions to the campaign (in which category she included this thesis) should be aware of this tradition:

there's always been a campaign there. CAAB is, has, evolved out of that campaign. - I feel strongly, David, that we each of us, build on the work that's been done before. I mean you're doing your dissertation on protest going back to the Fifties - you know, and all Christine's amazing work - Anni and I have continued to do all this work³¹.

Percy is also adamant that different forms of peace activity should be regarded as equally valid, in this sense CAAB continue the open and inclusive discourse observed in OPAG documents: "nobody works in isolation, we all feed off each other". There is a great sense of humility and self-depreciation from CAAB activists. In particular, Percy emphasises the role of Christine Dean as archivist and historian of the anti-Menwith Hill campaign:

I get annoyed with people who think of the only thing that peace people, or the peace movement, if you haven't been to prison or you haven't been arrested, you haven't sort of been there, which is absolute nonsense, it really is. And all the wonderful work that people do - I mean *Chris* - with her meticulous cataloguing and archiving, which is part of history actually - that's why I was so keen to document everything, so we pass it on. We've had a lot of stuff passed on to us, and it's really important to keep these archives³².

Thus the 'tradition' of local peace protest is not simply a resource to be drawn on, but a culture which must be continually reconstructed. Further the job of reconstructing this tradition, of validating and substantiating this counter-discourse, is considered to be as much a part of the 'protest' as acts of NVDA.

³¹Interview with Lindis Percy, April 2000.

³²*ibid.*

Finally there is the legacy of Greenham Common. According to her own account Lindis Percy was involved with Cruisewatch, and the protest against the deployment of American nuclear missiles at Greenham from 1979, when she lived in Southampton. Anni Rainbow was also involved with Greenham, and according to both women, there is no single legacy of the protests there. Rainbow remarks that "there were huge numbers of Quakers at Greenham". Percy stated in an interview in 1997 that "so many women were touched by Greenham. It was such an empowering thing - that we can do it. As people we can. As individuals we can."³³ What is interesting here though is that Percy argues that although it is important to be part of a tradition, a trajectory of peace activism, particular times pass quickly; as she comments "you can't reproduce these wonderful campaigns". This is somewhat different to the use of the discourse of the Greenham legacy by the WoMenwith Hill Women's Peace Camp, to which I shall return below.

CAAB newsletters and campaigns appear in this context to be speaking to those who already feel empowered enough to take action, to spread knowledge. They are not concerned with the mechanics of empowerment. They do however seek to create solidarity through struggle against the American military machine, emphasising its dishonesty and deceit, for example: "Feltwell is part of a devious web of lies, misinformation and secrecy, spun and kept in place by the National Security Agency of America, and a compliant British government."³⁴

The newsletters feature lengthy reports on bases and incidents with verbatim transcripts of occasions of particular controversy. There are details of question asked in the House of Commons, of Section 18/84 planning notifications from the base, and of court cases. Despite their humility about their place in a legacy of protest CAAB make many claims about the achievements of their campaign. We have already seen how Percy claims to have renewed Duncan Campbell's interest and reactivated the transnational networks of interest in ECHELON. She similarly claims to have been at least partially responsible for Simon Davies' involvement. CAAB are in no doubt that their activities have resulted in information being available to the public, and admissions by the government, which would never have occurred without these sometimes tedious and difficult methods. Percy in fact argues that

³³ Jones, Dean (1997) *Real Lives: the right to fight*, *Big Issue*, issue number unavailable.

³⁴ Rainbow 1994 *op cit*.

much of what is now known about Menwith Hill comes from these forms of activity particularly Parliament: "Those were the results of the questions we asked all over the years... all the ones asked by Max Madden and Norman Baker"³⁵; and also the Local Authority's Planning Department. The process of sorting through planning documents to obtain some idea of what is going on, or at least corroboration for other information is a long and slow process, whose difficulty is emphasised by Percy:

that's a whole area in itself. Trying to persuade the local councillors over the years... going to Harrogate Planning Office and looking through the files, and looking through the working files, because that's where the interesting things are, not just the sort of application -spending hours in the planning office and working with the councillors³⁶.

However valuable this work is, the ability to get inside the fences and the material gleaned from the waste-bins of Menwith Hill, now cut off due to increased security following the showing of *The Hill*, was far more useful according to Percy:

it was *such a valuable source... it really was*. It was brilliant... OK, we were doing the parliamentary thing, we were doing the courts, we were doing the monitoring, we were talking to local councillors etc., but actually one of the things that was *so effective*, was going in, and wandering around, and seeing what was going on. *Quietly*.³⁷

The trespass and document recovery are presented as a kind of dialectic, a process which by moving between one and the other resulted in something more, and new sets of revelations and questions. Percy recalls how a mention of Molesworth in a document found at Menwith led to a visit, which resulted in a change in perception about post-Cold War intelligence operations, and which again emphasise the links between parapolitical journalism and peace campaigners:

³⁵ Interview with Lindis Percy, April 2000.

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ *ibid.*

one of the things through the documents was the revealing of the fact that bases like Molesworth, that we thought - everybody thought - had disappeared after the signing of the INF Treaty and cruise missiles - and I went there, just to have a look actually - because I had been there once in 86, and I just thought 'I'll just go see what the peace garden looks like' - and I had been told that it had all gone away. Not at all. It was absolutely - lights on, something very important happening. So I went in - it was at night - had a wander round, fed this stuff back to Duncan [Campbell] - that actually it's the Joint Analysis Centre - and Duncan was amazed³⁸.

The tactics are described in a manner which is almost espionage in itself - the quietness of the actions are emphasised, the entry at night. However, these hints at 'spying against the spies' are subverted by the ordinariness of the actions: there is no 'sneaking' or 'breaking in', no preparation emphasised, rather 'I went in', 'had a wander around' - the actions are both casual and open. There is a huge gulf in approach between the actions of CAAB and those of the NSA. Percy takes full moral responsibility for her actions, and is prepared to justify them in public. The NSA's use of moral authority, usually in the form of 'national security' (see Chapters 4 and 5), is almost always to justify not giving reasons or taking responsibility, or even admitting that certain actions have been carried out at all. The casual almost off-hand manner in which Percy describes what to most people would be unthinkable risky actions is again emphasised when talking about another base:

I used to go to Chicksands a lot. I was convinced that the Americans were still there. I mean although its the British National Intelligence Centre now, and the army are at the gate. I was convinced the Americans were there. So I climbed over the fence and went in. I mean that's how I get in - I climb over the fence. And, I knew - because I know the American cars, I know what the buildings look like, and I absolutely spotted where they were, rang the bell, and this American said [puts on American accent] 'Can I help you?'. I said, "well, I hope you can". Anyway he suddenly realised, because he said 'who am I speaking to?', and - he shut the door immediately, and the - the British

³⁸ *ibid.*

military came. But, at least that we know that they're there, there's a building there. On the site.³⁹

Important here, as in CAAB newsletters, is the way in which knowledge gained through direct experience, through challenging the territorialization of military intelligence bases, is combined with other forms of knowledge, in this case documentary evidence. As we have seen in the previous chapter, such knowledge is parapolitical in the sense that conventional political discourse discounts and ignores it - hence the ability of government ministers to describe Bob Cryer's summary of the state of knowledge of Menwith Hill as 'rumour and innuendo'. It can also be argued that this experiential knowledge is a challenge to dominant patriarchal ways of knowing - proof is not offered through this method, it is based on the trust that the listener has in the storyteller.

We have already seen the lengths to which CAAB goes to be considered trustworthy. But this does present a paradox. Trust needs to be established and constructed through methods that are recognisable by a wider section of the community. Hence the combination of narrative and document. Despite their often radical methods, CAAB members frequently have recourse to conventional discourses, appealing to what they hope is are values widely shared in society, for example democracy. When talking about the planning process, Lindis Percy remarked: "you can talk your heads off but it makes no difference because - they'll do what they want, and it's an undermining of any sort of sense of democracy that we might have". This discursive strategy is particularly valuable in dealing with local Councillors, several of whom Percy believes she is gradually changing and persuading. Another part of this type of strategy is the use of the courts, and the appeal to fairness, correct and impartial judicial process, international humanitarian law and so on, however incomplete or flawed that CAAB members actually believe them to be. I shall return to these processes in the penultimate section of this chapter (page 281 below).

³⁹ *ibid.*



Figure 34. A Womenwith Hill Wimmins Peace Camp Logo.

The WoMenwith women do not deny their agenda is different from CAAB's. For them, the fight against Menwith Hill is part of a fight not against the NSA or even against military surveillance, but part of an ongoing battle against patriarchy, or more accurately "the gendered effects of militarism", as WoMenwith activist and academic Cat Euler described it in an interview⁴⁰. Many

of the women have experienced a very personal journey that has lead to this point. Information, useful as it is, has only a limited value; Euler argued that

the problem with information-based campaigns is that there is a tremendous amount of information floating about... but it's not happening in the visible sphere. I would say that it is happening largely in the private sphere, you rarely see individuals coming out into the public⁴¹.

But like Percy, Euler is keen to stress that a whole variety of approaches are both welcome and necessary: "the more the merrier - Lindis and Anni are doing tremendously wonderful work - with a slightly different approach"⁴². She does not in fact consider CAAB to be an example of the 'information-based' approach, rather as NVDA activists. Those she does include in this category are the predominantly male parapolitical campaigners like Duncan Campbell and Simon Davies.

The WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's Peace Camp "follows the Greenham tradition" according to a publicity leaflet⁴³. This is expanded upon in a paragraph headed "Making Connections: The Web", which states:

⁴⁰ Interview with Cat Euler, November 2000.

⁴¹ *ibid.*

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ *WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's Peace Camp* (nd.) Leaflet.

We reject all forms of violence against women & children; we see & weave a web of connections between war, nuclear testing, rape, the release of man-made ionising radiation, degradation of the environment, injustices to indigenous peoples, poverty and satellite spying. All are forms of violence against humanity: all effect women and children to a greater degree⁴⁴.

Several aspects of this discourse stand out. Firstly, it contains a vision of the world as intersubjective, constructed, a web of which the activists are both conscious and are in fact weaving by their actions. Like CAAB, the WoMenwith Hill campers also make an explicit attempt to claim validity through the adoption of a discourse of tradition, a line of descent. In this case though the 'tradition' is not primarily that of local protest, though this is acknowledged, but rather that of the women's movement: "we are the continuation of an effective, important and exciting, tradition of women actively engaged in the struggle for peace and justice"⁴⁵. Cat Euler is fully aware of the practical functions of the claim to this tradition, it is "part of putting an image out into the public - so that people know where to locate you"⁴⁶. However there are two reasons why these functions are limited. The first is to do with collective and individual memory within social groups that are changing in composition. Social movements rely on either periodic or continuous recruitment of new members. The problem is that these new members may not possess the same worldview, the same system of signs and symbols that existing members have. In the case of WoMenwith Hill, as Cat Euler says:

When I say I was at Greenham... I find a lot of young women saying 'where?'... the eighteen to twenty-five generation, where people often get involved in activism - a huge percentage of them haven't even heard of it.⁴⁷

The symbolic significance of Greenham has receded deeper into the collective memory of the peace movement and the women's movement, even as prominent individual activists attempt to draw on it. Rather than being recent politics it becomes part of a longer history of women's

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ Interview with Cat Euler, November 2000.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

protest, which Cat Euler traced back to the suppression of the role of women in the anti-slavery protests of the early Nineteenth Century. This is also related to the second reason for the usefulness of such symbols being limited, the intensely personal nature of the activist experience, which is particularly emphasised in the discourse of women-only peace groups, which I shall consider further below.

The way the tradition is constructed then relies more on the continuous reassertion of the place of WoMenwith Hill within a network of active links to other women's peace camps and peace groups more generally, the weaving of the web. To take two examples of each: early newspaper reports from the Camp show women with posters supporting the Wahopai peace camp in New Zealand, and in a more recent newsletter there is detail of Conference on the militarization of space and of the Global Network Against Weapons in Space⁴⁸.



Figure 35. Witches, from a WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's Peace Camp Leaflet

Secondly, this is an ecofeminist discourse, which places women, children, the environment and also indigenous people on a par as victims of patriarchal oppression whose forms include surveillance. There is an implied naturalness to these groups which is under attack from the 'man-made' world. This naturalness is also reflected in the design of the leaflets and newsletters which in place of the usual photographs of radomes found in CAAB material and in journalistic pieces, has rough, faux-naive drawings of spiders webs, moons, stars, spirals,

witches and cats implying a further pagan feminist leaning reminiscent of Starhawk or Mary Daly. In this vein, another leaflet surrounds a spiral with the words "Women Are Powerful" and "We Are Magic"⁴⁹. Some of the WoMenwith Hill newsletters also include drawings of a two-headed axe, usually juxtaposed to stories about action, particularly damage to the base; in one drawing at the base of an article headed 'Unstoppable Womyn!', the axe is seen to be smashing a radome⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ *WoMenwith News*, November 1998.

⁴⁹ *Shut Down Menwith Hill U.S.-N.S.A. Spy Base* (nd) Leaflet.

⁵⁰ *WoMenwith News*, August 1996.

Cat Euler argues that rather than being a particularly deliberate graphical style, the use of such drawings is the result of two factors: firstly, the inclusiveness of WoMenwith Hill: "perhaps that [drawings] is the only thing that some women can contribute - they wanna give you a cup of tea , they want to do whatever";




Figure 36. Unstoppable Womyn!

secondly of a particular culture within the women's peace movement: "they're an ongoing tradition among women who want to create a non-hierarchical, empowering and life-affirming culture"⁵¹. They are part of a semiotic system that is explicitly different and set up in opposition to conventional presentations.

The ecofeminist tradition referred to above is further emphasised in both leaflets: in the first by the inclusion of quotations from camp women. The title "Every women has a different reason for being here" stresses the diversity both of actors and interpretation⁵². However there are some key themes. The first is domination: one woman stresses the "militaristic, imperialistic, racist policies of western governments"; another states that "I oppose Menwith because its such a crucial part of America's plans to dominate the world"⁵³. The explicit link has already been made earlier in the leaflet to the 'Full-Spectrum Dominance' ideology of USSPCECOM's *Vision 2020* (see Chapter 5), as it is in CAAB material. However the camp is seen as a deliberate contrast to this vision of dominance. It is a prefigurative strategy, a small piece of a future Utopia in the present: "I like living with other women at the camp because it gives me glimpses of what might be possible in a non-hierarchical future"⁵⁴.

The second, connected theme is empowerment. One woman comments: "I'm here because the women are inspiring and its an empowering and beautiful place to be"⁵⁵. Sasha Roseneil's study showed that women's strength and self-confidence gained both through individual

⁵¹ Interview with Cat Euler, November 2000.

⁵² *WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's Peace Camp* (nd.) Leaflet.

⁵³ *ibid.*

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

transformation and acting together at Greenham was crucial to the experience of the protest there⁵⁶. As we have seen, empowerment is a key feature of discourse in the second wave of the peace movement and indeed many New Social Movements. Empowerment is thought of as a way of mental self-defence and resistance against the patriarchal hegemony of despair, as another woman proclaims, in language very reminiscent of Roseneil's title: "I have experienced action as the antidote to despair. Ordinary women can in fact dismantle patriarchy"⁵⁷.

In the second leaflet, the empowerment theme is explicitly connected to the rationale for a women-only camp:

We are not choosing this method to exclude anyone, but in order to create a space where women can be empowered by the experience of acting together against the patriarchal war machine. All women are welcome.⁵⁸

Thus women's empowerment is considered to be greatly enhanced by the construction of a particular kind of space, a positive territorialization it is emphasised, one which welcomes women rather than excludes men.

Where CAAB emphasise personal discovery and experience as part of a process of establishing knowledge about military intelligence sites as much as documentation, WoMenwith campers put personal and collective experience in the centre of their project, as an aim in itself:

It's very important to create a new culture - you can speak seriously and be 'valid' - but you always guarantee that people will give you credibility... if you spend your whole time seeking this - the men who control these systems...

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

⁵⁶ Roseneil, Sasha (1995) *Disarming Patriarchy: Feminism and Politics at Greenham*, Buckingham: Open University Press.

⁵⁷ *WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's Peace Camp* (nd.) Leaflet.

⁵⁸ *Shut Down Menwith Hill U.S.-N.S.A. Spy Base* (nd) Leaflet.

they don't care about your credibility. I don't want to spend my life being credible to genocidal mass-murderers, you know?⁵⁹

Here again the question of trust returns. Whereas CAAB appear to adopt conventional discourses to gain credibility, Euler is claiming that WoMenwith Hill makes no such concessions. Euler admits that discourses need to be framed and presented to people in terms they understand: "you need to tell people in the street"⁶⁰. She is referring to this in terms of the amount of scientific and technical knowledge that people need to have in order to make decisions - a simple emotional appeal is more effective than reports and papers. However, she also recognises that some organisations might wish to distance themselves from such an approach and those who carry it out, commenting ironically: "of course the CBI can't be seen to be associated with a lot of scruffy lesbians sitting by a fire."⁶¹

Despite this disdain for conventional channels, like CAAB, the WoMenwith women do act in conventional ways and claim credit for the way in which information has come in to the public domain. Anne Lee and others have used the courts to challenge planning decisions, and reported in a recent newsletter that they were going to take up the issues around Menwith Hill's violations of Town and Country Planning legislation with the Local Government Ombudsman⁶². Cat Euler also commented that Anne Lee had "known Duncan Campbell for years"⁶³, and that the new information he had got out of Menwith had had as much to do with her as with anyone else.

Euler also claimed that the process of discovery in the European Parliament was the direct result of a WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's trip to the Labour Party Conference and a meeting with Labour MEP, Christine Oddy. However she argues that this original women's inquiry rapidly became appropriated by male MEPs like David Bowe. They changed the focus from one of military domination to one of business competition: "it came from a feminist cause - that's how it got started - now it's a boy's game - 'they're spying on our businesses'"⁶⁴. The

⁵⁹ Interview with Cat Euler, November 2000.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁶¹ *ibid.*

⁶² *WoMenwith News*, February 2000.

⁶³ Interview with Cat Euler, November 2000.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*

historical accuracy of these claims could be questioned, and indeed Steve Wright and Simon Davies present a very different narrative of the European discovery of Menwith (see Chapter 6). However what is more important is Euler's underlying critique of the way in which concern has shifted to those which are more easily digestible by mainstream politics. In this case it is the economic threat, but in the case of American internal politics the issue of abuse of power and the rights of the citizen. This shifting of the agenda, an appropriation of counter-narratives, was recognised by all the actors to whom I talked.

The main concern then of WoMenwith Hill is not simply to construct a counter-discourse of Menwith Hill or of military intelligence, but to place themselves physically and culturally next to and in opposition to the base. The base represents a cultural form to which the women are totally opposed, and to which no concession must be made. Its territoriality must not be challenged simply by ignoring or breaking its boundaries and subverting its rules, but by creating something in contrast beyond the boundary of the base, a different space. This vital function of camps was recognised by Christine Dean as we saw earlier, but whereas the 1980s camp was attempting to subvert the whole process of territoriality, the WoMenwith Hill camp is a territory, however positive this territorialization is presented as being.

Portraying the Protesters

Whilst the protesters portrayed Menwith in similar if subtly different ways, they themselves were also the object of discursive strategies and more concrete attacks. Official intimidation and legal action will be considered in the next section. This section will take a brief look at the response of other local groups to the protesters.

The presence of the original peace camp on the doorstep of Menwith Hill was not welcomed by all. In the 1980s the local papers carried several reports of verbal attacks and intimidation. As the Peace Camp was being established pig slurry was sprayed around the peace camp⁶⁵; the culprits were never found, though clearly local farmers would be the primary suspects. A few weeks later, several campers from Bradford were woken in the night, according to Lisa Zychowicz: "some people in cars came to the camp at 2 o'clock on Sunday morning. They woke us up by sounding their horns and shouting obscenities. We had children with us, and they were very upset by it all"⁶⁶. There were suspicions that such attacks were organised, rather than being the work of drunken opportunists. However, the most obvious targets of such accusations, the right-wing anti-CND and pro-American Freedom Association denied that they were involved. The intimidation is not at the same level as that experienced by some at Greenham; Gary Murray claimed that masked thugs had carried out assaults on some of the smaller camps there⁶⁷, and such attacks have also taken place against anti-roads protesters.

The Freedom Association did however lead some of the overt opposition to the Camp. For example, it organised a counter demonstration and the handing in of a Pledge of Support from unnamed 'local residents', for one of the American Independence Day protests that CND and the peace campers had planned⁶⁸. A spokesperson, Irving Warnett, was later quoted as saying that the camp was not wanted by Harrogate residents and was subversive⁶⁹, and fellow organisers included Graham Riddick, later a Conservative MP, who referred to the 'successful' event, clearly not repeated, in a House of Commons question in March 1993⁷⁰.

⁶⁵ *Shut Down Menwith Hill U.S.-N.S.A. Spy Base* (nd) Leaflet.

⁶⁶ *Harrogate Advertiser* Upset for peace camp, Friday 10th June 1983.

⁶⁷ Murray, Gary (1993) *Enemies of the State*, London: Simon and Schuster.

⁶⁸ *Harrogate Advertiser* Upset for peace camp, Friday 10th June 1983.

⁶⁹ *Harrogate Advertiser* 'We don't want peace camps' Friday 1st July 1983.

⁷⁰ House of Commons Hansard Volume 239, Oral Answers, 08/03/94, Column 137.

Interestingly by specifically referring to the 'true-blue' residents of Harrogate and not to villages like Otley and Pately Bridge, Warnett might well have been more likely to have been correct in his claims that the Camp did not enjoy support. The Association commented that "Independence Day can equally be celebrated by the British, reflecting Britain's continued independence from Soviet domination due entirely to our nuclear deterrent"⁷¹. This statement is quite revealing. First, there is a huge irony in a Conservative asking Britain to celebrate American Independence Day, when that day represents the loss of British colonies in the New World, with Conservatives traditionally the most enthusiastic supporters of colonialism. Second, there is the rather contradictory claim that Britain's independence from 'Soviet Domination' is 'due entirely to our nuclear deterrent'. If this was the case, why Menwith Hill was necessary, or at least why was it being staffed and run by Americans?

Despite the end of the Cold War, and the demise of the Freedom Association, this discourse can still be found amongst supporters of the base. One man's website, amongst descriptions of cars and bands he likes, contains a page on why he supports Menwith Hill:

We love Menwith Hill!

Just because the Russians are fighting amongst themselves at the moment doesn't mean they haven't still got several thousand nuclear warheads. It isn't people's current intentions that matter, its what they can do if they change their minds. One day we might need places like Menwith Hill.

BAN PEACE CAMPS TODAY!!!⁷²

The justification for supporting Menwith, in essence a hedge against changes in the former Soviet Union, with the deliberately provocative 'We love Menwith Hill' headline, is then rounded off with a demand for the banning of peace camps. The man also has another dig at protesters in the directions to his visitor's book, "you can leave your comments in my guest book - or not - Menwith Hill protesters can eat lentils"⁷³. The latter comment is an accusation

⁷¹ *Harrogate Advertiser* 'We don't want peace camps' Friday 1st July 1983.

⁷² Malc's Pro Menwith Hill Page, <http://www.mgmsystems.u-net.com/menwith.html>

⁷³ *ibid.*

of vegetarianism, and therefore of being 'hippies', with the attendant implied subversiveness, dirtiness and lack of jobs.

The idea that the campers did not enjoy popular support, and indeed might be considered to be undermining the basis of society was a common one at the time. At Greenham Common, a group called Ratepayers Against Greenham Encampments (RAGE) had been set up by middle-class residents in areas near the peace camps. Cresswell has analysed some of the contradictory statements of members of this group, who would frequently comment on the visual intrusion and 'out-of-place' nature of the camps yet ignore the massive airfield with its concrete bunkers and hangars that dominated the ancient common from which they were also excluded⁷⁴.

The Freedom Association produced a similar discourse concerning the campers at Menwith 'it is time once and for all to let these groups know that we do not want them in North Yorkshire and that we reject their aims' said Warnett⁷⁵. Here clearly is the idea that the protesters are outsiders not from North Yorkshire; an idea of a homogenous, and rural, community which rejects such foreign ideas as unilateral disarmament is implicit here. However this can be compared with the use of other place names as signifiers already noted: Britain and Harrogate. North Yorkshire is extrapolated from implicitly Conservative Harrogate, which as we have seen excludes villages like Otley which were clearly not so homogenous in their views. The use of North Yorkshire is perhaps also an attempt to ground the place in a rural rather than an urban setting, and therefore to associate the views of the Freedom Association with the discourse of the rural idyll, of a natural and pure rural space, where uncomplicated and pre-modern ideas remain unsullied. David Sibley has shown that this "stereotyped pure space cannot accommodate difference", and the notion has been central in constructing many different groups, in the early 1990s in particular New Age Travellers, as outsiders⁷⁶. This use of place name signifiers to denote outsiders in terms of both region and the urban-rural divide can be seen as far back as the earliest report of protest where the pickets were noted to have come from "Leeds and Pontefract": firstly, 'the city' and secondly, a different part of Yorkshire. When locality cannot be denied as in the 1969 report of protest, the age and

⁷⁴ Cresswell 1994, 1996 *op cit*.

⁷⁵ *Harrogate Advertiser* 'We don't want peace camps' Friday 1st July 1983

⁷⁶ Sibley, David (1995) *Geographies of Exclusion*, London: Routledge, 108.

political affiliations of the protesters are more clearly sign-posted - then the protesters were from Harrogate, but they were 'Young Liberals'. Clearly this is also how they would have described themselves, but to conservative Harrogate residents in the late 1960s, such a description probably conjured up images of long-haired disrespectful young hooligans, in a similar way that reference to New Age Travellers would by the 1990s.

On the other hand, 'Britain' is not evoked here, because clearly the protesters were British, even though some were from as far away as West Yorkshire! However when it comes to Britishness, they are considered to have abandoned their right to be considered as legitimate members of the community: they are 'subversives' who refuse to do such natural British things as celebrating American Independence Day and believing in a nuclear deterrent.

Such attempts are not always successful, and the holes in Warnett's discursive strategy were exploited in a letter from Judy Kitchen, the Co-ordinator of Nidderdale Peace Group, based in Pateley Bridge, who wrote:

I am a local resident and no-one has approached me or anyone living in the vicinity to inquire about our feelings, or to ask us to sign a Pledge of Support. I would like to ask which local residents have been approached and why Pateley Bridge would appear to have been left out of this survey.⁷⁷

The Freedom Association's claim to local authenticity is subverted by a drole 'more local-than-thou' discourse, Nidderdale being where Menwith Hill is actually located. In addition, Kitchen denies both the charges of subversion, and the Britishness of the nuclear deterrent. She points out that location does not constitute evidence of political control, "Cruise missiles will primarily be sites to protect America, and it will be the American finger on the button, even though they will be sited on British soil"⁷⁸.

The Freedom Association's confused discourses of place and citizenship were not the only way in which the protesters were constructed as outsiders. There were media attempts to

⁷⁷ Kitchen, Judy (1983) 'Survival, not Subversion', Letter to *Harrogate Advertiser* 22nd July, 2.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*

portray the protesters as dirty and disease-ridden with stories like 'Rat-catchers at Peace Camp'⁷⁹. This story quoted the Chief Environmental Health, Officer of Harrogate Borough Council, Martin Dedsworth, claiming that unnamed 'rodent operatives' had inspected the camp and found "traces of rats on the site"⁸⁰. The Menwith Hill campers responded with prompt letters pointing out the facts⁸¹: one rat dropping had been found, and one rat seen nearby. They commented, "with it being a country area and with a sewage works down the road, wild animals are natural inhabitants of the surrounding areas." David Sibley has outlined some of the discursive uses of the rat (along with other 'dirty' animals like cockroaches and pigs) in racist texts⁸². The rat holds a particular set of symbolic meanings for people because:

there is an association with spaces like sewers, which also channel residues from which they occasionally emerge to transgress the boundaries of society. The potency of the rat as an abject symbol is heightened through its role as a carrier of disease, its occasional tendency to violate boundaries by entering people's homes, and its prolific breeding.⁸³

There is also a long historical tradition of such creatures, both rats and moles, being associated with subversion and treachery, as Allison Young has pointed out in the context of the Greenham Common peace camps⁸⁴. Cresswell argued that such associations were used at Greenham in all of these ways but also to emphasise the socially out-of-place quality of the women in a rural landscape. Rats in a living space, the camp kitchen, suggest that the women have abandoned their natural domesticity, and have failed in their traditional role of cooking and cleaning; indeed that such a thing is impossible outside the confined and thoroughly territorialized space of 'the home'. There are similar implications in Menwith report. Dedsworth was quoted as saying, "these are people with a cause, who think they can set up a camp in the middle of a field without knowing anything about camping."⁸⁵ They are urban

⁷⁹ *Harrogate Advertiser* Rat-catchers at peace camp, Friday 28th December 1984, 1.

⁸⁰ *ibid.*

⁸¹ *Harrogate Advertiser* 'We have never been troubled by rats', letter from The Menwith Hill Peace Campers, 4th January 1985, 2.

⁸² Sibley 1995 *op cit.*

⁸³ *ibid.*, 28.

⁸⁴ Young, Alison (1990) *Femininity in Dissent*, quoted in Cresswell 1994, 1996 *op cit.*

⁸⁵ *Harrogate Advertiser* Rat-catchers at peace camp, Friday 28th December 1984, 1.

outsiders out-of-place in the countryside. But, just as with Greenham, the massive expanse of the base is ignored and not considered in the same terms; its place is not questioned.

Campaigners, the State and the Law.

Both CAAB and the WoMenwith Hill group have been involved in numerous court cases brought by the state against them, and brought by them against the state. This final section intends to examine some of the complex progress and results of these cases. The court cases are interesting for many reasons. The first is that they reveal something of how the state regards the threat posed by counter-discourses, and action against military sites, and the attitude of protesters to the legal system which is at the least ambiguous. The legal system is a mirror of democracy and the idealised institutions of a fair society that both CAAB and the WoMenwith women put up to the police and security services, challenging and provoking them to reveal their distance from those ideals. Two sets of case involving a variety of protesters and courts will be examined here: firstly the long-running series of cases relating to the MoD bylaws, and the behaviour of the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) and US officials, at Menwith Hill, which had implications for all American military bases in the UK; and secondly, the recent failed attempt by CAAB to halt the building of new space surveillance systems at Menwith Hill.

Some of the cases have involved direct action taken by women activists against the base. Numerous women have been given custodial sentences. For example in 1995, Helen Johns was sentenced to six months in Long Newton Women's Prison in County Durham. Her offence was to have broken a window of the Headquarters Building at Menwith Hill. She has frequently been given custodial sentences for offences connected with protests at Sellafield, at the Houses of Parliament and at other military bases. Another WoMenwith Hill visitor, Leeds Peace Campaigner, Tracy Hart, was sentenced to 42 days in Holloway Prison in 1997 for criminal damage, whilst attempting to unscrew the bolts of a Pusher antenna.

However the confrontation between state and campaigners has certainly not simply be fought through the courts. There have been many allegations of intimidation and violence, and other incidents of infiltration. These will also be examined.

Bye-Laws

The longest running set of court cases have perhaps been the most mundane in that they involved the breaking of military bye-laws, yet it is these cases that have revealed most about the nature of the agreements between the UK and the USA. In his judgement in a case against Percy in 1998, High Court Judge, Justice Carnwath summed up the legal situation with regard to military land:

Under section 14 of the Military Lands Act 1892, the Secretary of State has power to make bye-laws for regulating the use of land belonging to him, which is for the time being appropriated for a military purpose. By section 17(2) a person who commits an offence against any bye-law under the Act is liable on conviction before a court of summary jurisdiction to a fine. By section 17(1) the Secretary of State is required to cause the boundaries of the area to which the bye-laws apply to be marked, and the bye-laws to be published in such a manner as appears to him necessary to make them known to all persons in the locality⁸⁶.

These series of cases can be argued to have originated with the attempts of veteran peace activist John Bugg (who died in 1993⁸⁷) to prove that the military bye-laws were invalid. Bugg had campaigned for years for the right of protesters to walk on MoD land. In 1992 he was given a guarded salute by Lord Justice Woolf in the High Court:

if Mr Bugg has achieved nothing else in consequence of this litigation, he has at least convinced us that over the last 30 years there has been a regrettable decline in the standards adopted by the Ministry of Defence in complying with their obligations in respect of by-laws [sic]⁸⁸.

⁸⁶ In *The High Court Of Justice Chancery Division Ch 1993 P No. 5402 Royal Courts Of Justice Before: The Hon Mr. Justice Carnwath Between: (1) Secretary Of State For Defence (2) Ministry Of Defence Plaintiffs - And- Lindis Elizabeth Percy Defendant* Judgement, 24th April 1998.

⁸⁷ His obituary appeared in *The Guardian* : McBride, Juliet (1993) No fence too high. Obituary: John Bugg, 5th February, 10.

⁸⁸ In *the Court of the Queens Bench QB 473, Woolf L. J, Pill J, 31 July 1992, John Bugg, Rachel Diana Greaves v. The Director Of Public Prosecutions and, The Director Of Public Prosecutions v. Lindis Elizabeth Percy, John Bugg, Judgement.*

This 'decline in standards' has been made particularly visible at Menwith Hill. Menwith Hill's bye-laws were not finalised until 1986, so it appears they were devised in response to protest rather than as a preventative. The immediate series of cases over the bye-laws was triggered in 1991 by Tom King, the Secretary of State for Defence, who sued Lindis Percy for trespass and claimed £11,600 damages for wasting police time. This produced a temporary injunction - Percy's first - which lasted for five years before being made permanent in 1996.




Figure 37. An Menwith Hill bye-laws notice, altered by CAAB activists.

However the validity of the bye-laws was challenged on numerous occasions. In the 1992 case brought by Bugg and Percy, Justice Woolf ruled that the bye-laws were invalid because the area to which the bye-laws related was not clear⁸⁹. Justice Woolf also opened the way to a number of cases being brought by Percy and others against the Ministry of Defence, as he ruled that the defects in the bye-laws were substantial rather than technical. This also prompted the revision of the bye-laws by the Ministry of Defence and probably the renaming of the base as 'RAF Menwith Hill' (see Chapter 4). Percy started proceedings against almost 70 police officers by whom she had been arrested in the preceding

two years, and went about removing or altering the old 'illegal' notices (see Figure 37 above).

⁸⁹ Woolf 1992 *op cit*.

In 1993 Judge Crabtree finally ruled on the case brought by the Secretary of State for Defence. He said that if Lindis was right in her defence it would have meant that all the agreements and arrangements between the US and British governments would have to be re-negotiated⁹⁰. However he argued that he did not have the necessary resources in the County Court, nor the experience to be able to judge a case that involved such complex international issues, and perhaps even royal prerogative:

One look at this room itself really should demonstrate to anybody that in practical terms this is not a case which ought to be held in the County Court. We are stacked with documents in all directions. Fortunately, because of modern photocopying, I am still visible behind the bundles of photocopies that have been put in front of me. If the authorities themselves were to be provided, there is no question but that this room would be hopelessly inadequate in size⁹¹.

This mass of evidence accumulated by Percy, who has often represented herself, and has certainly carried out most of the research, is clear evidence of the dedication and commitment of the peace activists at Menwith Hill, a dedication which Judge Crabtree himself felt bound to praise.

Ironically Judge Crabtree did end up making a judgement on a similar case brought by the WoMenwith Hill women in 1998. That the original case was as serious as Judge Crabtree estimated was proved when the case eventually came to the High Court in 1996: the then Secretary of State for Defense, Malcolm Rifkind, issued a Public Interest Immunity Certificate, and the case had to be conceded by CAAB. Rifkind argued, in very similar fashion to Senator Tower on the Church Committee in 1975 (see Chapter 6), that:

⁹⁰ No. 9100 758, York County Court, Tuesday. 6th July 1993, Before: His Honour Judge Crabtree, Secretary Of State For Defence V. Lindis Percy.

⁹¹ Crabtree 1993 *op cit*.

The very nature of the work of the security and intelligence services of the Crown requires secrecy if it is to be effective. It has for that reason been the well-established policy of successive Governments of the United Kingdom not to disclose information about the operations or members of those services and neither to confirm or to deny matters relating to their work. So too the public interest requires that such information be protected from disclosure in legal proceedings, subject to any countervailing public interest in favour of disclosure in the interests of justice⁹².

Unlike Senator Tower, Rifkind had the power to overrule those interests of justice. He did so on several grounds: the revealing of the identities of intelligence services personnel, the locations of particular operation within Menwith Hill, sources of information and details of operational activities. The court proceedings would, he surmised: "tend to reveal information that would damage security and intelligence operations and to reveal aspects of the modus operandi of the services which would necessarily render them less effective in the future". This would in turn:

have repercussions for the coordinated defence effort and would be harmful to the mutual trust that underpins the vital and close signals intelligence cooperation with the United States, of which the operations at Menwith Hill are a key element.

This is the clearest example one could find of the standard British state discourse of national security set out by Lustgarten and Leigh, wherein the security of the state itself is different from, and superior to, the interests of the people, instead of the latter being a key component of the former as would be the case in a truly democratic society⁹³. The case of the importance of Menwith Hill and the relationship between the USA and the UK made by the Secretary of State cannot be challenged because the information which one would use to make such a

⁹² Ch 1993 P No 5402 In The High Court Of Justice Chancery Division Between: Secretary Of State For Defence, Plaintiff - and - Lindis Elizabeth Percy, Defendant. Certificate Of The Right Honourable Malcolm Rifkind QC MP, Dated 7th March 1995.

⁹³ Lustgarten, Laurence and Leigh, Ian (1994) *In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

challenge is the same information is covered by the certificate, and therefore restricted. By controlling information Rifkind is able to foreclose rational debate.

In the Court of Appeal in 1996, Justice Hall over-ruled Justice Woolf, and argued that the area delineated by the bye-laws *was* clear, and further that the officers who had arrested Percy could not have anticipated that a Court would rule them invalid at the time they arrested Percy⁹⁴.




Figure 38. Clear evidence of sheep at Menwith Hill.

The by-laws saga did not just involve CAAB activists. The WoMenwith Hill campers also played an important role. In 1997, Judge Crabtree again at York Crown Court upheld the case of two of the WoMenwith Hill women, Helen John and Anne Lee, and judged the military bylaws invalid because they took in land which was not being using for military purposes, instead of which it was used for grazing sheep. The Judge ruled that:

the only part of this land that is appropriated for military purposes is the area in the top northeastern part of the applicable area and that well in excess of half of the land in that area is not being used for military purposes at all... the boundary could, of course, be generously drawn so as to include some land

⁹⁴Percy -v- Hall [1997] QB 924)

not in military use, so long as it can be properly said that it is intended to be a convenient perimeter around the military use area; that, unhappily, cannot be said here. A large area of farmland, that so far as can be seen has no military use, has been added on⁹⁵.

This case was also particularly interesting as it resulted in British Telecom officially revealing the connections between Menwith Hill and Hunters Stones for the first time, for which they were condemned by the Judge Crabtree; he ruled that, even if the US and UK were, "involved in dishonest activities", "they should be allowed to remain secret." The Ministry of Defence subsequently appealed against the Crabtree decision and this appeal was upheld on 22nd January 1999 in the High Court, London, by Judges Buxton and Collins. They sent the original Appeal against Menwith Hill bye-laws convictions by Anne Lee and Helen John back to the Crown Court to be dismissed and to have both women's convictions re-instated.

In the meantime, Percy had written to the MDP as a result of the 1997 case and asked them to remove all the new bye-laws notices, but they declined arguing that they should remain as the case was subject to appeal. Percy and other activists then began to remove the signs themselves, which led to prosecution for breach of her injunction and criminal damage. In April 1998, Lindis Percy was found to have breached her injunction 9 times⁹⁶. At the High Court in London, Justice Carnwath ruled that the removal of the illegal bylaws signs was in breach of the injunction, but despite this he supported Percy's contention that the MDP should have removed the notices. He said: "I cannot conclude that her stance was wholly untenable", and that "there was no legal justification for the retention of the bye-law notices; it is an abuse of that power, and therefore unlawful, to put up or maintain notices of bye-laws which are known to be invalid"⁹⁷. Justice Carnwath re-imposed a six month suspended prison sentence over one year as from that date. Despite this, Bylaws notices were still put up around the base. Most recently, Percy was jailed for nine months for breaching her injunction by Judge Ian Kennedy in the High Court in London, and served most of her sentence in HMP

⁹⁵ Judgement No: A960110/A960111 In The Crown Court At York, 5th September 1997 Before: His Honour Judge Crabtree (Sitting With Magistrates) Regina -V- Anne Lee And Helen John

⁹⁶ Carnwath 1998 *op cit*.

⁹⁷ *ibid*.

Highpoint in Newmarket. According to Percy she was treated as a criminal prisoner even though her offence was civil and denied many of her basic rights whilst in prison⁹⁸.

Violence

Lindis Percy was actually prosecuted for assaulting an MoD policeman in 1997, which according to the CAAB Newsletter was: "deeply offensive and distressing to her, given her adherence to a non-violent stance and philosophy"⁹⁹. This was not the first time. Percy had been accused of assaulting police officers at Mildenhall the previous year after she had been assaulted by two American security personnel. CAAB argued that

It feels all too familiar. The MDP are yet again bringing spurious charges in an attempt to discredit, criminalise and undermine her integrity: a re-run of the case at Mildenhall last year when she was accused of three false charges of assault on civil and MDP officers. By the time the case came to trial the charges had been amended five times¹⁰⁰.

In both cases, Percy was acquitted of the assault charges, and in the Mildenhall case the Magistrate argued that "the level, duress and duration of the violence to Ms Percy [by the Americans] was shocking"¹⁰¹.

These had by no means been the first instances of assaults on Percy and others, nor of false accusations. The seriousness with which the British state viewed the matter can be seen in the transcript of a 1994 meeting in London which was leaked to CAAB. As Lindis Percy recalls, "somebody sent the minutes, confidential minutes, to me, which said that - you know it was about all this violence going on - and the MoD being very worried - it got to almost Ministerial level". . Present were representatives of the American Embassy Staff, of the 3rd USAF and the Ministry of Defence. The minutes show that the British government had "serious concerns" about the effect of both the levels of violence and the accuracy of American accusations against Percy, pointing to an incident when an American serviceman

⁹⁸ Interview with Lindis Percy April 2000.

⁹⁹ CAAB Newsletter Issue No. 3, September 1997

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Quoted in *ibid.*

had claimed that Percy had thrown a vial of blood at him, "a serious accusation in the Aids era"¹⁰². Percy comments that the incident had resulted from her having been cut during a violent arrest by the servicemen who later made the accusation: "the American security police were *very* rough and *very* violent"¹⁰³. There is also a clear link to the discourse of uncleanness used against the peace camp, as well as to the Cold War discourse of subversion and infiltration. There is a connection made between the incursions of Percy and the AIDS virus, and more particularly the idea that Percy might in fact be trying to 'infect' an American serviceman with a disease that is not only a real and physical one but also mental and ideological. As it is gnominically stated by Treasury Solicitor Peter Messer (acting for the MoD): "she presents herself as an innocent, harmless little old lady", implying that she is in fact guilty and dangerous¹⁰⁴.

The MDP seemed particularly concerned at American security personnel using handcuffs and blindfolds on Percy when dealing with simple trespass. This put officers in a difficult position, the Deputy Chief Constable of the MDP argued because, "any attempt to blindfold or handcuff Ms. Percy could result in three months in prison for a UK officer if he failed to prevent such action"¹⁰⁵. However it seems that the bad publicity and the cost of Percy bringing complaints against the MDP were of equal concern: "any complaint to the Chief Inspector by Percy must be investigated, at a cost of 1000 Pounds (about \$1500) each time" and "we do not want to give Percy publicity for her cause"¹⁰⁶. Replying for the 3rd USAF Colonel Copeland argued that "the U.S. does not agree that handcuffing constitutes assault. Rather it is the standard procedure designed to increase the safety of both the intruder and the security personnel". He claimed that the U.S. forces were unable to discontinue these practices because intrusions meant "there is the potential for a catastrophe", though examples of such a disaster are not given. It was agreed that "minimum force" should be used, and the British suggested that some of the security measures might be improved to prevent intrusion. In particular at Lakenheath, it was dryly noted that "the U.S. could help the UK provide security by installing a barrier at the base", pointing to the surprisingly low levels of security

¹⁰² American Embassy, London (1994) Minutes of Meeting between 3rd USAF, American Embassy and Ministry of Defence, Subject: Incursions at U.S. Bases in the UK, Ref: LONDON 10162 (DTG 271737Z JUN 94)

¹⁰³ Interview with Lindis Percy, April 2000.

¹⁰⁴ American Embassy, London 1994 *op cit*.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid*.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid*.

at some of the American bases in the UK. The exchange shows remarkable discursive similarities with the letters over the land tenure situation in the 1970s (see Chapter 4). While there is agreement about key issues by the end of the minutes, the Americans have effectively dismissed British concerns. In addition there is the same element of almost ironic humour on the part of the British in pointing out lax American security arrangements. What is also quite clearly demonstrated is the impact of a tiny group of campaigners on inter-state relations.

This leaked document also led to more problems over information for Percy. In the wake of the argument over *The Hill*, she was keen that this new source who had leaked the document - possibly someone at the American Embassy - should not be compromised or forced to stop leaking by public revelations about it. However once again, the opposite occurred. Percy was at the High Court in London at the time, and her solicitor talked to Richard Norton-Taylor of *The Guardian* about the leaked minutes. Unfortunately by the time she realised, it was too late to remove the story from the next day's paper¹⁰⁷.

Infiltration

One of the most curious incidents at Menwith Hill involved an infiltrator in the WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's Peace Camp. Justine Taylor, who had been known to the Campers as Justine Woods, claimed to have been a former Special Constable working undercover at the Camp to gather information, and had stolen the camp's 'femaling list' and given copies to civil and military police. However it is not clear how much her 'work' was simply the result of personal frustrations and mental problems. Most local campaigners I interviewed agreed that she was looking for a refuge from domestic problems, and she had admitted as much to local papers¹⁰⁸. The camp newsletter commented "some of us want to prosecute Justine for theft while others feel reluctant to put her through the system and just want to ignore her and move on"¹⁰⁹. Annie Rainbow commented that the police treated her abysmally, and that most people felt sorry for her. In the local paper, Taylor made clear that her demands for a unmarked car and a mobile phone had not been met. The most she claimed to have received from the police

¹⁰⁷ The story was published as: Norton-Taylor, Richard (1994) US warned over treatment of peace protesters, *The Guardian*, 5th October 1994.

¹⁰⁸ *Harrogate Advertiser*, Peace Campaigner was MoD Spy, 1996.

¹⁰⁹ *WoMenwith News*, August 1996.

had been an occasional shower and a meal; but she still appeared to be committed to "the removal of the 'eyesore' A59 peace camp"¹¹⁰.

¹¹⁰ *Harrogate Advertiser*, Peace Campaigner was MoD Spy, 1996.

Looking Forwards

By the end of 2000, the concerns of the WoMenwith Hill campers and CAAB appeared to be converging. Prompted by the plans for Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) and the National Missile Defense (NMD) programme (see Chapter 5) both groups have put the militarization of space at the heart of their agenda. The WoMenwith women have been linking transnationally with groups opposed to the militarization of space and the campaign against the Cassini project, a space probe powered by nuclear material. CAAB have continued to use the Courts. In their most recent court challenge, CAAB have attempted to halt the SBIRS building programme, issuing a claim in the High Court on 15th October 1999, against American Base Commander Colonel Harthcock, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Defence Land Agent, and Squadron Leader Vincent, the RAF Liaison Officer, alleging that SBIRS violated the ABM Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty, as well as other national and local laws¹¹¹. Fylingdales, location of the NMD in the UK, was later added to the claim. Colonel Harthcock claimed state immunity and managed to have himself removed from the writ. However, when President Clinton announced the postponement of the NMD system, CAAB was forced to withdraw the claim, and Percy is now being sued for costs by the other defendants. She remains confident and unrepentant:

I had challenged military land bye-laws, didn't know anything about the law - I've learnt quite a lot now and I *do* defend myself in the High Court. *Unsuccessfully* sometimes! But, *quite* successfully other times! You can make little, small steps in this fiendish thing... I've got 5 permanent injunctions now.... I mean I've got so many costs awarded its just like monopoly money, I mean it doesn't matter.¹¹²

Percy's continuing campaign, and the resurrection of the WoMenwith Hill camp both demonstrate that the state's use of legal remedies against ordinary citizens challenging state activities can be limited if those people simply ignore the sanctions placed on them. It seems that empowerment can truly counter conventional power, that indeed power may be an

¹¹¹ CAAB Newsletter, 15, November 2000.

¹¹² Interview with Lindis Percy, April 2000.

outcome of the creation of effective networks rather than a possession of large actors. However, the activities of the peace activists, and those of the other campaigners detailed in Chapter 6, whilst they have caused reassessment of the security procedures and technologies at a micro level, have not brought the closure of Menwith Hill nor any change in the transnational surveillance activities carried out by the NSA and GCHQ. What will be the long-term outcome of the Inquiries of the EU is impossible to say, though one could plausibly argue that they too will be frustrated. All the activists I questioned had the same sense that they would not see the end of Menwith Hill in their lifetimes, but they were all far from pessimistic, arguing that one day it would be gone, however far in the future that was.

Introduction

The story of the peace and privacy campaigners is very much woven into that of the base itself, and the objections and dissent have been responsible for much of the information that is now available being revealed. However these groups of objectors have not been the only group to come up with their own counter-discursive constructions of Menwith Hill and its role.

This section examines the views of those sub-cultural groups who explain the activities of the intelligence services at Menwith Hill and other sites as being part of something that has no rational or conventional economic or political cause. These fall into three main categories: Firstly there are groups who still regard these activities as being entirely inspired and carried out by human beings albeit with sinister purposes, for example those who believe that 'remote mind control', rather than simply surveillance and weapons control, is being conducted via the various SIGINT networks, in particular Echelon and the microwave telecommunications system.

The second main group are those who largely share the more conventional view of Intelligence organisations as disciplinary and controlling, but who regard these intentions not as human in origin, but as inspired by the anti-Christ, Satan, or at least as being part of a conspiracy against a right and divinely-inspired order. These large numbers of people who hold to literalist interpretations of Christian scriptures, and in particular the Book of Revelations, see some of the developments in surveillance technology as just one of many signs prefiguring the coming of 'the end times' or the apocalypse.

The final group are those who attribute much of the secrecy around military intelligence neither to a human nor a superhuman cause but to extraterrestrial intervention. Whilst Christian fundamentalism is common in the USA, where it exists in a heady and variable

combination of anti-federalism, racism and the politics of gun-ownership, ideas about alien invasion are perhaps even more widespread. UFO sightings have been common in North Yorkshire, some specifically relating both to Menwith Hill and Fylingdales, the latter arousing particular speculation from 'Ufologists' due to its highly-advanced radar-tracking capabilities, and therefore debates about its ability to detect UFOs, and what is then done with the putative information.

This thesis intends to take such groups seriously not in the sense that it will regard their interpretations as equally valid as more conventional investigation, although it is generally impossible to prove or disprove these interpretations, but in several other ways. The first is a practical one - that sub-cultural investigators are as likely as conventional ones to discover interesting information, for example classified space projects and new aircraft design especially those that would otherwise be ignored by the sceptical and the 'realistic'. Secondly, and particularly relevant to the social scientist, is that such responses are directly related to the secrecy of bases like Menwith Hill, in that gaps in knowledge are filled in with whatever knowledge and beliefs are available to the individual. They are thus interesting from the point of view of examining the actor-networks around surveillance technology and the construction of the validity or otherwise of such systems. Finally, and in contrast to the first point, they may also play an intentionally-devised or unwitting role in obscuring the real purpose of Menwith Hill and associated surveillance networks, in actually maintaining the secrecy of intelligence sites and in foreclosing any hope of rational debate for many people on the issues arising from these places and systems. It will be argued that the intelligence services have an interest in encouraging such interpretations as a form of disinformation, and while they may not actively do so, there are more than enough actors willing to do it unknowingly on their behalf.

This is a difficult area to examine not least because the material published by these groups is often hard to understand without some inside knowledge of the particular cultural lineage and mythologies of each group. In addition, media coverage tends to be either sensationalist or dismissive. Nevertheless, examples of all kinds of material will be examined and some interviews with Ufologists in particular will be used.

Mind Control



Figure 39. Project Freedom Network Logo.

Menwith Hill and gave out leaflets to protesters, which argued that Menwith Hill was a key part of a network of 'remote mind control weapons' which are "covertly used to attack innocent individuals and society en masse toward behavioural control experimentation and assassination"¹. The group claims that this is achieved through Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) radio signals sent via the mobile phone network. Its website contains more details of methods of "psychotronic attack", and includes the testimony of 'survivors'². There, are also listed the most common 'symptoms' of this form of attack, in an introductory article by George Farquhar:

Mild to severe headaches; nervousness and irritability; lethargy and fatigue; stress; nausea; insomnia; eye damage; paralysis; aggression and rage; paranoia and panic attacks; hysteria; schizophrenia; hallucinations; memory loss; disordered thought; uncharacteristic emotions; obsessive behaviour; confusion; hopelessness; brain and nervous system damage; heart attacks; fast-acting cancers and severe depression leading to suicide...to name but a few³.

This thesis will not attempt to explain these 'symptoms'. However it should be noted in passing that these all of these have been attributed to different aspects of modern society by a wide variety of pressure groups and medical researchers, for example links have been

¹ Project Freedom Network leaflet (nd.)

² <http://www.isleofavalon.co.uk/local/h-pages/pro-freedom/>

³ Farquhar, George (nd.) Covert Terrorism in the UK, <http://www.isleofavalon.co.uk/local/h-pages/pro-freedom/ct_uk.html>

claimed between depressive mental illness, cancers and pesticides. In addition some neo-Marxist social theorists and psychologists have argued that schizophrenia is itself characteristic of capitalism⁴, a symptom of alienation: an indirect rather than direct attack on the mind. It should also be noted that there is ongoing concern about the effects of electromagnetic radiation from various sources including power lines and microwave communications on human health, but again most do not claim that this is in any way a deliberate and controlled phenomenon.

As was mentioned earlier, proof is very much lacking to support the contention that the state is trying to control our minds directly in this way. This is even admitted in their own way by advocates of this idea:

The main power that these weapons have is that, while the victims are being attacked they are totally unaware of the fact that they are under serious threat from an outside source, and therefore have no means whatsoever of self defence⁵.

This also implies therefore that almost any mental health problem or difficulty in a person's life can be attributed to psychotronic attack from the state. This is perhaps the clearest indication that such theories, if nothing else, are symptomatic of disempowerment, an idea we shall return to later in this chapter. However, it is almost certainly the case that intelligence services, in particular the CIA, have had an interest in methods of influencing the human mind. The American intelligence services have investigated telepathy and remote viewing (the purported ability of some people to 'see' distant locations), which have clear intelligence benefits should they prove to be possible⁶.

⁴ Deleuze, Giles and Guattari, Felix (1983): *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; and Deleuze, Giles and Guattari, Felix (1988): *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

⁵ Farquahar, *op cit*.

⁶ Haines, Gerald K. (1999) CIA's role in the Study of UFOs 1947-90: A Die-Hard Issue, in *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 5 No. 2, 27-48, Note 90, p. 47. It should however be noted that this article originated from within the CIA.

Christian Eschatology

The network of surveillance technologies and organisations of which Menwith Hill, Fylingdales and Irton Moor are part also figure strongly in contemporary fundamentalist Christian eschatology. It is important to make a distinction here between Fundamentalist and Pentecostal/Charismatic Christianity, both of which are considered by many political scientists to be part of the same 'New Christian Right' phenomenon in contemporary American politics⁷. Put simply, Pentecostals tend not to share literalist interpretations of the Bible, and therefore do not share the millennial beliefs of the Fundamentalists. It is therefore only the Fundamentalist Christian views of surveillance and intelligence sites that shall be examined here, and not the New Christian Right as a whole.

There is also a distinction to be made between old-fashioned Fundamentalists and 'conspiracy Fundamentalism'. During the Cold War, Fundamentalist political discourse always associated the Communists with 'evil', and therefore many were strongly behind the 'preventative' imperialistic foreign policy of the United States, high spending on weapons, and a strong surveillant state. However the end of the Cold War has seen the decline of Christian organisations devoted to promoting strong military response to communism externally, and increasing emphasis on generalised 'socialistic' subversion within the United States itself, sometimes associated specifically with the United Nations. In this contemporary fundamentalist politics, the strong state is often seen as an ally rather than a foe of such subversion. This anti-Communist strand of Fundamentalism is not entirely new. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was strongly associated with the John Birch Society (or 'Birchers') which promoted a conspiracy theory that argued that communism was merely the latest form of an ancient conspiracy of 'Illuminati' (often associated with Jewish financiers) to destroy individual liberty by *increasing* state power⁸. In other words while one wing of the Fundamentalist movement was strongly behind the American state's official Cold War strategic line, the others regarded the Cold War as merely a cover for other machinations. Superficially this bears some comparison with the Chomskian interpretation, a right wing mirror image even. However one must remember that Chomsky's argument is a structural-

⁷ Wilcox, Clyde (1992) *God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth Century America*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

⁸ *ibid.*

economic one, and does not rely in any way on individuals or groups within government subverting the intentions of the state, in fact Chomsky has on many occasions specifically warned against such interpretations (see Chapter 5).

Wilcox also outlines the 'capture' of conventional electoral New Christian Right (NCR) politics by Pentecostals in recent years. This offers another important insight. He argues that Birchers and their ideological allies were characterised by "social dislocation, status anxiety and inconsistency, and distrust of others"⁹. The removal of Fundamentalist control of the Christian political agenda, and the thrusting of Fundamentalism further away from mainstream American politics would most likely lead to an intensification in at least the first and last of these characteristics, exacerbating and intensifying the conspiracist tendencies of this group.

In 'conspiracy Fundamentalist' discourse, surveillance technologies are strongly equated with the Book of Revelation, Chapter 13. This Book of Revelation is written as a series of visions seen by St. John the Divine of Patmos; this particular chapter concerns the 'beasts' that will be allowed to rule over the earth before the return of Jesus Christ. One particular subsidiary beast, as well as ensuring that all humanity worships the main beast, the devil, is allowed to introduce a form of surveillance and control:

[16] Also it causes all, both small and great, both rich and poor, both free and slave, to be marked on the right hand or the forehead,

[17] so that no one can buy or sell unless he has the mark, that is, the name of the beast or the number of its name.¹⁰

Other biblical elements are brought in too. One American on-line fundamentalist magazine, Winds, argues that the Echelon system of which Menwith Hill is a key part, is part of the Satanic plot that is the New World Order:

⁹ Wilcox *op cit*.

¹⁰ *The Bible: Revised Standard Version*, Revelation 13, 16-17, available on-line at: <http://www.hti.umich.edu/r/rsv/index.html>

As the nations of the earth struggle to make themselves omniscient (all knowing) by means of their super-computer networks, they seek also to become omnipotent, the sole proprietors over the minds and consciences of men...

...A very similar plan was once before formulated in antiquity when mankind decided to build himself a structure--a New World Order--that would "reach unto heaven" and to make a name for himself lest he "be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth." This first attempt to "reach unto heaven"--to usurp universal power--was looked upon by their Creator Who remarked, "...now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do." His response was to confuse their language, creating the diverse tongues of the earth. Now, the universal language of the international computer network seeks to reverse that decree made by Omnipotence. Again Babylon raises it head against Heaven and just as when King David met with judgment when he sought to number Israel as his own kingdom, so is this earth being met with judgment as its governments seek to create their sovereign One World Kingdom and become unified against Heaven in enslaving the souls of men..¹¹

Ironically for an on-line magazine, Winds appears to see the Internet, and particularly the use of networked computers to surveil others as a new Tower of Babel, a device which is designed to make humanity the equal of God. The panoptic ambitions of the American state are thus a challenge to the omniscience of the divine, and an ambition that will be punished just as Babel was.

The NSA, as the organisation responsible for state computer security and international satellite surveillance, would clearly play a key role in this Satanic conspiracy as well-known US fundamentalist writer Terry Cook has claimed in *Big Brother Nsa*¹². Cook's book is a summary of available information on the NSA with no original research, but with a

¹¹ *The Winds* magazine (1998): A Million Eyes. U.S. surveillance of citizens reaches new levels: Are the citizens criminals or are world governments? <http://thewinds.org/arc_features/government/surveillance12-98.html>

¹² Cook, Terry L. (1999) *Big Brother Nsa and It's Little Brother: National Security Agency's Global Surveillance Network*, USA :Hearthstone.

fundamentalist interpretation. One can get a flavour of the appeal that this approach has amongst the American New Christian Right in reading some of the on-line reviews of Cook's books. For example, one reader comments that *Big Brother Nsa* is:

The best Christian book I've read on this subject! I just can't understand how anyone who has sincerely read this book can find fault with it! It is truly great! In fact, it is the only Christian book available that deals so expertly with the coming Antichrist's international, computerized, Mark-of-the-Beast tracking and identification system.¹³

The reason for this admiration is made even more explicit: "Big Brother NSA is the only book that approaches this subject from a Christian, Biblical, prophetic perspective"¹⁴; indeed the reviewer makes it clear elsewhere that he has read Bamford's *Puzzle Palace*, which is a far more comprehensive and rational treatment, yet despite the former and perhaps because of the latter, this it is considered inferior.

It is clear reading reviews of Cook's first book, *The Mark of the New World Order*, which is an examination of surveillance technologies based on *The Book of Revelation*, that some of those who read such books are credulous and lacking in education beyond some knowledge of The Bible. The spelling, punctuation and grammar are reproduced here as in the original:

its one of the best books in this day and age. it tells it like it is. im well pleaseed with this book. it opens up things that i was never aware of with our goverment. and yes its true about this new world order how there all set up now and they been ready. terry talks about controllling and tracking man kind rich or poor old young. this book you have to read. you will know more now than you did all your life after reading this book. the new world order.¹⁵

¹³ Review of *Big Brother Nsa* on Amazon.com, by 'A reader from Alaska'. <<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1575580365/qid=977283251/sr=1-2/107-4134993-7301344>>

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ Review of *The Mark of the New World Order* on Amazon.com, by 'zeal316@aol.com tina. from the state of pa' <<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0883684667/qid=951402166/sr=1-2/102-1944485-5696814>>

Some of the discourse here could be straight from the Book of Revelation. According to this passage, people are put their trust in Cook's thesis simply because he is a self-described Christian; normal scepticism and critical faculties are suspended. The process of gaining trust that CAAB and other campaigners have to go through does not apply to the relationship between Fundamentalist authors and their intended audience. The books are treated as commentary on the Scriptures and therefore almost infallible.

This is not to say that some of what Cook says is not in line with other critics of the NSA, indeed Simon Davies' populist work¹⁶ describes many of the same technologies sometimes in an equally frightening discursive construction. However to believe Cook's version one has first to believe that: the American constitution and 'way of life' is the result of some form of divine inspiration, that Satan literally exists, and that there is a conspiracy inspired by Satan to undermine America, involving 'socialists', 'liberals', 'environmentalists', the United Nations and so on in fulfilment of the biblical prophecy.

Big Brother Nsa certainly adds nothing to the information made publicly available by the many dedicated researchers into SIGINT over the years, indeed it appears parasitic on genuine research, merely twisting it to fit an irrational agenda. They can also severely mislead people about the actual activities and purposes of government security services, and in encouraging a belief that these organisation will be swept away by the imminent second coming of Christ, and they can in no way be regarded as encouraging either an independent and questioning analysis or a rational response. In this regard it shares much with the other 'theories' described here.

¹⁶ Davies, Simon (1996) *Big Brother: Britain's Web Of Surveillance and the New Technological Order*, London: Pan.

UFOs and Ufology

Like many secretive military sites it has been associated with reports of Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs) or 'mystery aircraft'¹⁷. Local researcher and well-known UFO author, Tony Dodd specifically associates these with 'aliens'. He claims that Menwith Hill, Fylingdales and other local military facilities are targeted for observation by various kinds of extraterrestrial intelligences, and that sightings of alien spacecraft are common on the Yorkshire Moors, including many first-hand sightings by Mr Dodd himself¹⁸.

As far back as the early 1970's, strange theories about Menwith Hill were in circulation. Campbell and Melvern¹⁹ report one particularly bizarre example- that the then new radomes were in fact breeding centres for killer flies! It is a testimony to the power of rumour in the underworld of conspiracy theorists that similar ideas emerged as a major part of the plot in the 1998 movie 'The X-Files: Fight the Future' a spin-off from the popular TV series.

Tony Dodd claims that "there has been a consistency of incidents over and around Menwith Hill... for an awful long time", and mysterious craft have been seen descending into the base or even on the ground. He recounted one particular instance when a truck driver saw several craft descending into Menwith Hill as he was passing by in the early hours of the morning. Some of these sightings are repeated in an article in on-line UFO journal, *Gemini*. Mark Gibbons claims that "in several statements, people claim to have seen strange lights in the sky above and within close proximity to, RAF Menwith Hill". He gives one quite detailed example of three witnesses to a "a strange object in north eastern sky which seemed sphere shaped and very dark in colour" which appeared to descend directly into Menwith Hill Station²⁰. However it is not just the UFO-watchers who have reported such occurrences: a member of the Otley Peace Action Group who I interviewed also witnessed strange lights which she felt unable to explain descending into Menwith Hill. However, rather than trying to

¹⁷ FAS on-line: <<http://www.fas.org/mystery.htm>>

¹⁸ Telephone interview with Tony Dodd, March 2000. All subsequent quotations from Mr Dodd are also from this interview.

¹⁹ Campbell, Duncan and Melvern, Linda (1980) America's Big Ear on Europe, *New Statesman*, July 18, 1980, 10-14.

²⁰ Gibbons, Mark (1997) What is RAF Menwith Hill Station? *Gemini*, available on-line at: <http://www.gemini.org.uk/Twins/ufo/january97/bfile1_97.htm>

create an explanation either through rationalisation or through belief, the activists were content to leave the sighting as unexplained.

Many UFO watchers reject conventional explanations of such events largely because of a court case in 1980²¹. On March 24th 1980, 'Citizens Against UFO Secrecy' (CAUS) attempted to force the National Security Agency to release information it believed the NSA held on UFOs. In the District Court, Washington DC, the NSA admitted that it had such information but argued that it should not be forced to disclose it for security reasons, and the Court agreed. Some UFO-watchers regard this in itself as *prima facie* evidence that the NSA knows 'the truth' about UFOs. However, recently the NSA has released the papers referred to in this case in 1997, and contrary to the claims of CAUS, they do not indicate that the NSA has any secret knowledge of UFOs. The documents are transcripts of Russian Air Force communications which mention sightings of unexplained objects, and which without exception are then revealed to be man-made or natural phenomena, the most common being high-altitude weather balloons²².

How can we interpret such information? Firstly, the refusal of the NSA to release information is hardly unusual. Although the documents in their released form have words and phrases censored, these clearly relate to places, times and names, as well as information which would reveal the methods of collection; information which, had it been released in 1980, would have jeopardised NSA intelligence-gathering operations in the Soviet Union, and might still have security implications today. However, the word or phrase underneath the censor's black pen can never be determined with total certainty. Just as the physical space of the military intelligence site is made invisible through security measures, the textual space of released documents is emptied of certain elements of meaning through censorship. This emptiness can still be filled with anything that an actor's knowledge or imagination can devise, albeit with more restrictions than if the documents are in existence but unavailable. In addition, release of documents can simply cause believers to claim that these documents are disinformation, and represent only partial truth masquerading as the whole, or are in fact fraudulent.

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Devereux, Peter and Brookesmith, Peter (1999) *UFOs and Ufology: the First Fifty Years*, London: Blandford.

However, Tony Dodd goes even further. He claims that it is an incontrovertible fact that the US government is in contact with extraterrestrial intelligences: "I know for a fact that there is interaction between the American government and an alien culture". Whilst he has no hard evidence for this claim, "nobody has come up with a smoking gun", as he puts it, he claims that his conclusions have been reached "as a result of receiving information from various sources... including high-level ex-intelligence and diplomatic sources". Mr Dodd argues that the reason that this contact is kept secret is primarily for two reasons: firstly, to avoid a mass panic; and secondly, to conceal the existence of military aircraft 'back-engineered' from recovered alien technology.

This discourse is very much associated with one particular and predominant strand of popular American UFO culture, known as the 'nuts-and-bolts' Extra-Terrestrial Hypothesis (ETH), which starts off with the assumption of the extraterrestrial alien origin of most UFO sightings. The ETH has established its own self-reinforcing history, into which contradictory information and reports are rapidly assimilated and adapted²³. Despite his claims to privileged information available to no other researcher, nothing Mr Dodd claims as fact is outside standard ETH narratives. In fact his discourse has a great deal in common with the largely discredited views of William Cooper, an American conspiracist, claimant to secret military knowledge, and author of *Behold a Pale Horse*, notorious even within the Ufological community²⁴. This is part of a lineage of ETH conspiracy theory stretching back to Donald Keyhoe's classic 1950 'non-fiction' work *The Flying Saucers Are Real*²⁵, which contained all the elements of modern saucer belief²⁶.

It is certainly the case that the National Security Agency maintained some interest in this phenomenon, although not on the same level as the US Airforce or CIA. Charles Ziegler in a recent article confirms what Brookesmith and Devereux argue, that this interest is largely

²³ See Devereux and Brookesmith 1999 *op cit.* for a far minded but rigorous analysis in the tradition of Charles Fort, who advocated abandoning any preconceptions either sceptical or tending to belief when analysing strange phenomena. See also Schnabel, Jim (1994) *Dark White: Aliens, Abductions and the UFO Obsession* Harmondsworth: Penguin, for a psycho-biographic treatment of many of the protagonists. For a sympathetic account from the discipline of Cultural Studies, see: Dean, Jodi (1999) *Aliens in America: From Outerspace to Cyberspace*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.

²⁴ Kossy, Donna (1994) *Kooks: A Guide to the Outer Limits of Human Belief*, Portland OG: Feral House.

²⁵ Devereux and Brookesmith 1999 *op cit.*

²⁶ Schnabel 1994 *op cit.*

tangential to any fundamental purpose of any of these institutions²⁷. He also argues that this interest has unintentionally created further investigation and will have to deal with the consequences of the increasing politicisation of the UFO issue. I would argue that in fact it suits the intelligence services to have people believing that UFOs are their main concern. Apart from the obvious explanation of a bureaucratic concern with following the letter of the law, something not always associated with intelligence operations and especially not with the NSA, it is perhaps strange that the NSA would admit to possessing undisclosed information about UFOs in 1980 unless it believed that such a statement would help to divert attention from its actual operations. It also seems highly plausible that the NSA would encourage gullible people to believe that Menwith Hill is “a test site for extraterrestrial technology”²⁸, a belief that would only serve to marginalize and discredit those who held it, and perhaps by association, more conventional investigators, a point to which I shall return later.

²⁷ Ziegler, Charles A. (1999) UFOs and the Intelligence Community, in *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 5 No. 2, 1-25.

²⁸ Gibbons 1997 *op cit*.

Understanding Conspiracy Theories

The fact that Tony Dodd's claims coincide with many discredited ideas does not in itself explain the many UFO sightings at Menwith Hill and elsewhere, and this thesis will not attempt to do so. Conventional psychology argues that such ideas are delusional and contain many elements of paranoia and related mental illnesses that include "internally consistent delusions of grandeur and persecution"²⁹. However psychological researchers have also noted that it is impossible to prove that such people are actually wrong; with regard to paranormal phenomena, it has been noted that whilst continued rational examination can show that there is no proof, "outright disproof is certainly unattainable"³⁰. Indeed, the very nature of these putative high-level conspiracies would mean that if they did exist they would be hidden from the view of ordinary researchers. This begs the question as to why such 'truths' are revealed to ordinary people, not to say people who have blatantly failed to excel in conventional society. But Dodd argues that it is the conventional campaigners and researchers who are "well-meaning" but misguided, and that many of the attempts to understand the hidden world of military intelligence are themselves victims of disinformation spread by the intelligence services. A similar argument is used by both Christian fundamentalists and by the believers in mind control. In the later case, the very denial of the existence of mind control is regarded as evidence that the person denying it is either a victim or part of the conspiracy. These again are classic elements of paranoia³¹. However it also relates to a wider debate on the problems of trust and information in research into intelligence and surveillance, which has been mentioned previously, and to which I shall return in the concluding chapter.

The Oxford Companion to the Mind, whilst noting as we have seen that many of the characteristics of these beliefs have much in common with paranoia, also categorises such people along a spectrum of 'Independent Thinkers'³². These are defined as people who stand outside conventional beliefs or accepted wisdom, or who consider themselves in some ways in advance of current scientific and philosophical inquiry. This spectrum would include those parapolitical researchers who actually were or are in advance of current knowledge and

²⁹ Rycroft, Charles (1987) Paranoia, in Gregory, Richard L. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³⁰ Scott, Christopher (1987) Paranormal Phenomena: The Problem of Proof, in Gregory, *op cit*.

³¹ Rycroft 1987 *op cit*.

incorrectly considered delusional or wrong-headed, as well as those who actually were or are delusional: in this analysis, many independent researchers are indeed linked to conspiracists. However this approach can be misleading. Whilst the independent parapolitical researchers and organisations examined in Chapter 6 may be considered to be obsessed and misguided by some conventional academics and particularly by state authorities, there has never been any suggestion that most are propounding theories that involve inherently implausible and untestable assertions. Indeed the whole basis of the work of most independent anti-state researchers is the painstaking compilation and analysis of detailed factual evidence over the course of many years.

This fundamental division between conspiracy theorists and serious researchers who acknowledge the existence of conspiratorial politics has been well described by Jeffrey Bale³³. He argues that there are three major characteristics within a Conspiracy Theory: simplification/reductionism, identification/explanation, and personification. Thus a simple cause is sought for confusing or inexplicable events or feelings, this source is identified and explained, and finally identified with a particular person or group.

In short, a belief in conspiracy theories helps people to make sense out of a confusing, inhospitable reality, rationalize their present difficulties, and partially assuage their feelings of powerlessness.

The one adjustment I would make to this analysis is that, although conspiracists do often attribute evils to an identifiable small group of people, there is usually the sense the conspiracy is so vast and so powerful that there is not very much that any individual or group can do about it. This Bale does later acknowledge. The idea of conspiracy is thus absolving of any responsibility. It legitimises rather than assuages the sense of disempowerment and allows the believer to feel satisfied with 'knowledge' that others do not have. Conspiracists share much with the religious in this sense, although there is not necessarily any belief in the ultimate triumph of good within conspiracy theories. The New Christian Right view of the NSA-satanic computer conspiracy does contain an implication that there is nothing that one

³² Moore, Patrick (1987) Thinkers, Independent in Gregory, *op cit*.

³³ Bale, Jeffrey M. (nd.) 'Conspiracy Theories' and Clandestine Politics, in *Lobster* 29, <<http://www.lobster-magazine.co.uk/articles/129consp.htm>>

can or should do about global panopticism; it is enough to believe and therefore be amongst the saved when the inevitable apocalypse which it signifies arises. This connection with religion is also clear within the view that conspiracists tend to have of the conspirators as something more than human or at least in connection with superhuman powers. In this regard, Bale stresses that conspiracists tend to regard their opponents as the source of ultimate evil.

Erik Davis argues that obsessions with aliens are absurd, but that this absurdity is an essential part of the reason why they remain a popular property, both free from and against the state and against scientific narratives:

By remaining beyond reach, by remaining absurd, the UFO attracts our hiddenmost obsessions with scientific authority, state power, and spiritual futurism — and it demarcates these obsessions far more viscerally than more normal forms of popular culture³⁴.

He continues:

Even if the UFO is bunk, it has become modernity's great mythic mirror. The first "flying saucers" were sighted in 1947 by Kenneth Arnold, in the year that gave us the CIA and information theory, in the decade that gave us TV, the Bomb, digital computers, and LSD. The UFO is part of a package deal—a rumor of god stitched into the dark web of our military-industrial-media complex³⁵.

Davis argues that ETH belief serves a cultural purpose, and indeed is an inevitable response to a hierarchical military-scientific society, in which the role of the ordinary individual is increasingly limited to that of consumer not just of products but of images from further up that hierarchy. This argument could be extended to conspiracy more generally. Making sense of such a world is no longer simply the prerogative of a single church, nor of trusted politicians or leaders, but of a fractured and multiple individual response to these images and

³⁴ Davis, Erik (1993) *My Favorite Martians: A UFO Epistemology*, originally published in the *Voice Literary Supplement*, February 1993. Available on-line at: <<http://www.levity.com/figment/martians.html>>

³⁵ *ibid.*

signs in the context of consumer capitalism. Language worldview is increasingly self-referential and divorced from the any counter-arguments or critiques. Conspiracy theories thus evolve and adapt to new beliefs and ideas, and even to contradictory evidence. This is very similar to the concept of the 'paranoid interpretative ideal regime of significance' put forward by Deleuze and Guattari. They argue that this concept:

is defined by an insidious onset and a hidden centre bearing witness to endogenous forces organised around an idea; by the development of a network stretching across an amorphous continuum, a gliding atmosphere into which the slightest incident may be carried; by an organisation of radiating circles expanding by circular irradiation in all directions, and in which an individual jumps from one point to another³⁶.

Put more simply, Donna Kossy, an independent researcher into popular conspiracy culture, has summarised this all-encompassing nature, arguing that:

Conspiracy theories are like black holes -- they suck in everything that comes their way, regardless of content or origin; conspiracies are portals to other universes which paradoxically reside within our own. Everything you've ever known or experienced, no matter how 'meaningless', once it contacts the conspiratorial universe, is enveloped by and cloaked in sinister significance. Once inside, the vortex gains in size and strength, sucking in everything you touch.³⁷

What can be said however is that even with the information that is publicly available on Menwith Hill and on the intelligence services generally, knowledge of the workings of the base and its associated networks is not extensive. Thus many of the buildings, work and events within SIGINT networks may appear inexplicable even to quite knowledgeable observers without requiring an extraterrestrial, superhuman or paranormal explanation. Intentional disinformation is thus not routinely necessary, although it is likely that such

³⁶ Deleuze and Guattari 1988 *op cit.*, 120.

practices take place for specific purposes and at particular times. On the other hand unintentional disinformation of the kind perpetuated by many Ufologists, Fundamentalists and Conspiracists probably serves to divert many people from the concrete activities of the intelligence services and the state in general and to discredit many who do follow accepted standards of evidence gathering or proof whether within academia or as independent parapolitical researchers. Thus, despite Ziegler's assertion to the contrary, conspiracy theories are certainly not likely to be discouraged by any state institutions despite the strong belief in their own persecution by the state held by the proponents of such ideas.

IMAGING SERVICES NORTH

Boston Spa, Wetherby
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ
www.bl.uk

**PAGE MISSING IN
ORIGINAL**

Chapter Nine. Discussion.

Introduction.

In Chapter 2, it was stated that the third task of this thesis would be to theorise the connections between surveillance, militarism, globalization, inter-state and intra-state relations with particular regard to the role, use and purposes of SIGINT technologies, agencies and sites.

I have described the technological, military-political, socio-economic and semiotic networks around Menwith Hill, a SIGINT site in North Yorkshire operated by the United States National Security Agency, with some comparative examples from nearby RAF Fylingdales and CSO Irton Moor. These sites have had various impacts on the landscape in terms of appearance, and in the case of Menwith Hill, in terms of environmental impact from pollution. They have also interacted with the local economy and society both by taking land from local farmers and by providing jobs. They have been a locus of cultural interaction and the generation of discourses of cultural similarity and difference. The sites are also massively important in their primary functions of providing information to support the strategic and military objectives of the United States and, to a lesser extent, the British government. They have been major foci for technological development in relation to surveillance, notably: the so-called ECHELON network for communications monitoring and analysis; the co-ordination of warfare via satellite targeting; and BMD, with the new SBIRS and proposed NMD initiatives. In the case of Menwith Hill and also Fylingdales, this has led to an increase in the visibility of the sites through protest both by peace campaigners and by those fighting the rise of the surveillance society. Whilst Fylingdales' symbolism has perhaps declined with the end of the Cold War, Menwith Hill has become an intensely symbolic landscape. It is a place crowded with meaning and representative, both literally and metaphysically, of all manner of perceived evils. In this guise, it has also come to the attention of the American right-wing as well as to Ufologists and conspiracy theorists.

While I have used certain terms like 'discourse' to help describe the way in which aspects of these networks operate, I have deliberately favoured accessibility over academic precision. I could define what I have done so far as a modified actor-network account, yet I have not used much in the way of recognisable 'ANT language'. This has been deliberate: the pioneers of ANT all emphasise that the language most appropriate to the situation and analyst should be used. In this chapter, in contrast, I will cover many ideas, terms and descriptive languages, before deciding which ones could help me understand the way in which the stories interrelate and can be integrated into a wider understanding of 'society' and social change.

Integrative Social Theories

To begin to address this complex question, it is necessary to examine further some of the attempts to produce a more integrative social theory that were mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3. Social theorists of all political orientations have long attempted to devise 'theories of everything' or at least everything social. From Marx and Comte, many thinkers have struggled to produce a theory that will work in explaining both the development of societies and the behaviour and influence of individuals within those societies. However since the social sciences have tended to succumb to the temptations of disciplinarity, disciplinary boundaries have lead to very different, and often incompatible theories of everything: from rigid environmental determinism in geography to the structuralism of Levi-Straussian anthropology¹.

However, with the advent of philosophers proclaiming the end of the modern and in particular an end to belief in metanarratives², there has been a general movement away from grand theory. This is partially due to the association of this postmodernism, based on a philosopho-linguistic deconstructionism, with a broad current of post-structuralist thought stressing the radically subjective and heterogeneous nature of social experience. This was further strengthened by the failure of 'actually existing socialism' in most of the eastern bloc countries, which has lead to a directionlessness on the part of many who had placed their hopes in world socialism to solve both practical and academic problems.

But not surprisingly, this twin current has been received unsympathetically both by those who still believe in revolutionary social change and by those on the conservative end of the conventional political spectrum. From both these extremes the emerging celebration of aesthetics, of being, of surfaces and consumption, is seen as a celebration of nihilism. This is typified in Baudrillard's later writing. His early writings on the development of consumption and consumerism of real objects and of signs and images were significant contributions to the analysis of contemporary capitalism. However, Conley argues that in the 1980's and 90's Baudrillard became progressively more seduced by the very simulacra that he originally

¹ For two excellent surveys of such attempts see Atkinson, Adrian (1991) *Principles of Political Ecology*, London: Belhaven Press; Conley, V. A (1997) *Ecopolitics: the Environment in Post-Structuralist Thought*. London: Routledge.

² Lyotard, J. (1979) *La Condition Postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir*. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.

critiqued, to the point where he appears to believe that nature itself and the ideas of ecological destruction are merely 'horror movies', images to be treated in same way as Hollywood films³. However where the conservatives see this nihilism as threatening to the social order, the revolutionaries regard it as being merely a product of and a surrendering to the onward march of capitalist development⁴. According to Conley, Baudrillard has drifted into a techno-liberal utopian mode of thought where all that matters is the individual's consumption and construction of the hyper-real. He identifies this trend as 'viral' and unstoppable, therefore to be embraced and celebrated, and he misses power, inequality and human tragedy as much as ecological tragedy.

This is not only opposed by writers with an overt political agenda, but also by other postmodernist thinkers with a more opaque politics, in particular Paul Virilio. Conley defines Virilio's vision as neither dystopian or utopian but instead: "a teletopia, a world that is neither here nor there but insipidly pervasive, a world that has a dull attractiveness because of the ease it seems to offer and that it is ultimately soporific"⁵. This insipidity appears to have affected academic study as much as the wider social realm.

In contrast, I will examine attempts to both explain and change the world. Firstly, I will look at three of the more revolutionary activist-thinkers here, two of whom are attempting a revival of dialectical thinking, of a realist, materialist social analysis: one from within a European Marxist tradition, David Harvey; and the other from the anarchist stream, the American 'social ecologist' Murray Bookchin. The third is Norwegian philosopher, Arne Naess, whose 'ecosophy-T' shares some features with both the dialecticians, yet maintains distinctive advantages over both.

The emancipatory thinkers are not entirely to be found within the camp of traditional revolutionary socialism or anarchism however. Thinkers who some might classify as being postmodernists themselves have been trying to develop what is, if not meta- or grand theory, is at least integrative and processual, attempting to explain the whole as well as the parts, but by focusing on the links and the interactions, rather than the reductionist methodology of

³ Conley 1997 *op cit*.

⁴ Harvey, D. (1990) *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the origins of social change*. Oxford: Blackwell.

⁵ Conley 1997 *op cit*, 81.

starting from either the whole or the parts themselves. This approach broadly termed *Actor-Network Theory* (ANT) will be considered here through the work of Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, Jonathan Murdoch and Mike Michael. One of the main conclusions will be that we need to both loosen and focus actor-network theory by attempting to integrate better ideas of power, class and hierarchy. In this context I will also consider the recent work of sociologist John Urry, which while not claiming to be actor-network theory *per se*, has been strongly influenced by ANT, and is in some ways an attempt to understand how ANT-like approaches might help in recasting social research.

Finally, there have been those social researchers who have used chaos/complexity theory. There have been attempts to place this recent scientific current within the critique of postmodernism and to argue that it, along with other great twentieth century scientific concepts such as General Relativity Theory, supports the renewed concentration on the subject, and also leads to an end to any rational predictive or causal science. This is very much based on lay misinterpretation, wilful or ignorant, of scientific research and writing, in this particular case, often based on a misreading of the word 'chaos' as it used scientifically. Some social scientists, like David Byrne, who have a greater comprehension of chaos/complexity theory, have seen its usefulness not in destroying social theory but in enriching the understanding of how subjective behaviour can influence social systems, whilst not constituting the totality of those systems⁶. Others, in particular Mary Lee, have seen parallels with Latour's work⁷. Finally there is an emerging group of evolutionary political economists, who, while not using 'complexity' in the sense of a direct import from physics, are trying to develop an understanding of 'social complexity' which has much in common with it, and which seeks to explain society in similar ways but using slightly different language⁸. I will then attempt to draw some common threads from these theoretical approaches before returning to the subject of surveillance, and to the case-study.

⁶ Byrne, D. (1998) *Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: an Introduction*. London, Routledge.

⁷ Lee, M. E. (1997) *From Enlightenment to Chaos: Toward Nonmodern Social Theory*. In Eve, R. A., Horsfall, S and Lee, M. E. (eds.) *Chaos, Complexity and Sociology: Myths, Models and Theories*, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 15-29.

⁸ Amin, A. and Hausner, J. (eds.) (1997) *Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and Social Complexity*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

The Revival of Dialectics: Bookchin and Harvey

In his essay "Thinking Ecologically: A dialectical approach"⁹ Murray Bookchin puts forward an argument for an *ecological dialectic*, because the problem of dualism, identified by many as the main barrier to integrative social theory, is actually giving way to that of reductionism. Some of those who know Bookchin's writing might think it strange to use his work in a discussion that will attempt to find commonality between integrative theories, for he is one of the most vicious critics of the attempts of others in this area, including Marxists, Naess, and particularly systems theory from which complexity theory arises. He criticises the latter as reducing everything to chance and stochastic processes, and leaving no room for potentiality. These are all examples of the "reductionist fallacy" which is:

the application of the most general formulas to the most detailed particulars, in the belief that what is universal and all encompassing must necessarily explain what is highly particular and uniquely individual.¹⁰

Systems theory is decried as a imperialistic and totalizing whereas, in contrast, dialectical traditions seek to build up rather than reduce, "Dialectic, in effect, is a logic of *evolution from abstraction toward differentiation*; systems theory is a logic of devolution *from differentiation toward abstraction*"¹¹. He attacks the careless use of words like complexity and process, which often tell us nothing about the nature of the complexity or the process. Systems theory is in the end a flawed project, "abandoning the study of things - living or not - for a study of the relationships between them is as one-sided and reductionist as abandoning the study of relationships for the things they interrelate"¹². This also constitutes a potential critique of network theories, and one to which I shall return later.

How does Bookchin's ecological dialectic operate? Following Aristotle and Hegel, it moves from the abstract to the concrete, from the one to the many. However it differs from both earlier thinkers in three ways: firstly, they saw being as a scale, a hierarchy, whereas for Bookchin it is a flowing, dynamic and diversifying continuum; secondly, drawing on Marx

⁹ Bookchin, M. (1995) 'Thinking Ecologically: A dialectical approach' in *The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism*. Montreal, Black Rose Books, 76-146.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, 110.

¹¹ *ibid.*, 112.

he deals with historical materiality more than idealised concepts; and finally, Bookchin claims to recognise contingency, spontaneity and creativity rather than relying on any teleological interpretation. Bookchin also attempts to rescue Hegelian dialectic from the overly negative interpretation of the Frankfurt School with its emphasis on conflict, and replace it with one of transcendence, the 'negation of the negation'. It is thus "a philosophy of process in which there is growing elaboration and self-consciousness, insofar as the world is rational"¹³. But it is more than just process: "Dialectic is *development*, not merely change; it is *derivation*, not merely motion; it is *mediation*, not only process; and it is *cumulative*, not only continuous"¹⁴. Dialectic is not considered to be a method, and in fact can be seen as the opposite of method and technique:

dialectical philosophy, properly conceived and freed of mechanistic assumptions is an ongoing protest against the myth of methodology: notably that the 'techniques' for thinking out a process can be separated from the process itself¹⁵.

Social evolution therefore works by encompassing, internalising and surpassing all previous phases:

Each phase or 'moment', pressed by its own internal logic into an antithetical and ultimately more transcendent form, emerges as a more complex unity-in-diversity that encompasses its earlier moments even as it goes beyond them¹⁶.

As such human evolution can provide ethical meaning to biological evolution- the success of second nature, the human, would be in its ability to actualise the potential for conscious evolution intrinsic within first nature, the 'natural' as is commonly understood. This new synthesis would diminish neither first nor second nature, merely add freedom, reason and

¹² *ibid.*, 114.

¹³ *ibid.*, 124.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, 125.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, 129.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, 131.

ethics. All other aspects of human societies emerge from "the ways in which human communities *institutionalise* themselves"¹⁷.

In *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, David Harvey, despite using Bookchin as illustrative of eco-anarchist ideas about community and so on, never actually examines his dialectics¹⁸. In *JNGD* Harvey attempts to outline what he calls a *relational dialectics* to describe and analyse the space-place-environment triad. Harvey's dialectic draws on Liebnitz, Alfred North Whitehead and Naess, while acknowledging their alleged conservatism, and combines aspects of their thinking with that of Marx, Lefebvre, Ollman and Haraway. He chooses to engage with, on the one hand Naess' deep ecology, which, he unexpectedly approves of and with good reason, and on the other with other forms of environmentalist thinking, although not always successfully.

Harvey argues that in some ways it is self-defeating to try to set out 'principles' of dialectics as it is a process, and can therefore only truly be understood in practice. This, he claims was Marx's achievement and improvement over Hegel - both Bookchin and Adrian Atkinson would disagree. Nevertheless he does set out a total of eleven principles¹⁹, which can be summarised as follows:

1. "Dialectical thinking emphasises the understanding of processes, flows, fluxes, and relations over the analysis of elements, things, structures, and organised systems"
2. "Elements or 'things'... are constituted out of flows, processes, and relations operating within bounded fields which constitute structured systems or wholes."
3. "The 'things' and systems... are seen in dialectical thought as internally contradictory by virtue of the multiple processes that constitute them."
4. 'Things' are always internally heterogeneous.
5. "Space and time are neither absolute nor external to processes but are contingent and contained within them."
6. "Parts and wholes are mutually constitutive of each other."
7. Cause and Effect, and subject and object, are interchangeable.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, 138.

¹⁸ Harvey, David (1996) *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*. Oxford: Blackwell.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, 45-57.

8. "Transformative behaviour - 'creativity' - arises out of the contradictions which attach themselves both to the internalised heterogeneity of 'things' and out of the more obvious heterogeneity present within systems."
9. Change and instability are normal and characteristic.
10. "Dialectical enquiry is itself a *process* that produces *permenences* such as concepts, abstractions, theories, and institutionalised structures of knowledge which stand to be supported or undermined by the continuing process of enquiry"
11. "The exploration of possible worlds is integral to dialectical thinking".

Several points can be made here. Firstly that he understands where Bookchin fails to, that the privileging of 'flows' is not reductionist, in that all 'things' are ultimately flows and cannot be considered as either homogenous or static, even though they may cohere in certain times and places. Secondly, based on these principles, there is nothing in Harvey's interpretation of dialectical thinking that is incompatible with complexity theory nor with ANT, indeed Harvey characterises the way in which internal relations are shaped as a process of 'translation', just as Serres, Latour, Callon and others describe the heart of their analysis²⁰. However some ANT advocates have argued that Harvey fails to recognise generalised symmetry between human and non-human: Murdoch's view of Harvey is that, although he recognises many of the same factors as Actor-Network Theory, Harvey's scheme ultimately falls because it comes down so firmly on the social side of the divide he is trying to bridge; Harvey fails to attribute any more power to things other than that which is socially determined²¹.

Arne Naess and Ecosophy-T

In *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*, Naess outlines his 'ecosophy', derived not only from ecological science but also from Spinoza and Gandhi, a personal ecological way of thinking and living, but which is none the less based on a minimum ethical platform²². Naess' *Ecosophy-T* is a personal philosophy, indeed that is the case with ecosophies, as defined by

²⁰ *ibid.*, 80.

²¹ Murdoch, J. (1997a) 'Towards a Geography of Heterogeneous Associations' *Progress in Human Geography* Vol. 21, No. 3, 321-337.

²² Naess, A. (ed. and trans. Rothenberg, D.) (1989) *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Orig. published as Naess, A. (1976) *Ecologi, Samfunn og Livstil*. Oslo, Oslo University Press.

Naess as opposed to (ecological) philosophy. In other words there are many ecosophies, and from my own reading of Naess, both Marxists and Anarchists can certainly have an ecosophy. For Naess the ultimate goal (and process) is that of Self-realisation. By this he means not ego-realisation but the development of a wider consciousness and identification with nature and with other humans. Naess' ecosophy is relational - human beings, trees, things cannot be seen independently of their milieu. The environment is as much a part of what it means to be human as anything within human society or internal to us. We are nodes in networks, and we are also process ourselves. He draws in this from Alfred North Whitehead, Daniel Bohm, Heraclitus, and especially Spinoza. The relations he imagines are hologramatic, in other words parts do reflect wholes, but they are not wholes. His philosophy is not extreme philosophical holism; things, beings etc. do exist but only exist in terms of relationships with other things, beings etc.

Deep ecology, in Naess' formulation, is simply a reference to the need to think deeply about these broad ecological issues, it does not mean new-age or mystical thought, it means going beyond the superficial, which entails, as he makes clear in the final chapters, an ongoing concern with social justice, with the rights of all beings to Self-realisation, to flourishing, and a commitment to end class-divisions. It does mean change in consciousness (what is the point of an environmental society enforced against the will of individuals?), but this is parallel with the need for political action, solidarity and community. Naess' own Ecosophy-T is non-violent in the Gandhian sense, although even he admits that this is an ideal and can never hope to perfectly realised. Instead the change in consciousness Naess envisages involves understanding the deep joy and freedom to be found in realising the interdependent relationships between ourselves and others and nature. This idea is also to be found in Hegel and in Buddhism, although Naess does not envisage any mystical transcendence. David Harvey is right to engage with Naess as a thinker with serious relevance for the understanding of social justice²³, and the humanist eco-Marxist, Peter Dicken has characterised Naess' deep

²³ Indeed there often seems more about social justice, social theory and society in Naess than in many Marxists who write about ecology, including Harvey, indeed I would say that Harvey's relational dialectics owes even more to Naess than he claims.

ecology as “a serious corrective to the Marxian paradigm”²⁴, which can be seen as “more profound than anything Marx or Engels considered”²⁵.

Naess' argument has implications for the understanding of technology. Naess claims that appropriate scale in technology is always to be preferred to large-scale 'techno-fix' solutions to problems that are social as well as technological. Technology must be under human control. Bookchin also makes this argument, but Naess' reasons for this are rather more sophisticated than his. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, he recognises that not only are technologies themselves embedded within social and ecological relations, as Bookchin argues, but so too are their development processes and the decisions that lead to particular technical developments. This seems to fit with other relational theories such as Actor Network Theory and with Mary Kaldor's analysis of baroque technology, and implies that processes of technological development also affect human society and nature, which makes more sense than to say that technologies have no 'value' in and of themselves.

Actor-Network Theory

Bruno Latour has done much to lay out the philosophical bases of what is commonly called 'Actor-Network Theory', although he never uses this description. In *We Have Never Been Modern* Latour argues that we have never really been modern and further we never will or should be modern²⁶. He claims that 'modern' is defined not so much as a historical period, but rather as one side of a quarrel and an impossible attempt to reconcile simultaneous domination of and separation from nature: “‘Modern’ is thus doubly asymmetrical: it designates a break in the regular passage of time, and it designates a combat in which there are victors and vanquished”²⁷. The contradictions within the notion of the 'modern' are to be found within the practice of being modern:

the word 'modern' designates two sets of entirely different practices which must remain distinct if they are to remain effective, but have recently begun to

²⁴ Dicken, P. (1992) *Society and Nature: Towards a Green Social Theory*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 188.

²⁵ *ibid.*, 190.

²⁶ Latour, Bruno (trans. Porter, C.) (1993) *We Have Never Been Modern*. Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf. Originally published as Latour, B. (1989) *Nous n'avons jamais été modernes*. Paris, Editions La Découverte.

be confused. The first set of practices, by 'translation', creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature and culture. The second, by 'purification', creates two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand; and that of non-humans on the other. Without the first set, the practices of purification would be fruitless or pointless. Without the second, the work of translation would be slowed down, limited or even ruled out. The first corresponds to what I have called networks; the second to what I shall call the modern critical stance... so long as we consider these two practices of translation and purification separately, we are truly modern - that is we willingly subscribe to the critical project, even though that project is developed only through the proliferation of hybrids down below.²⁸

Latour's solution, in common with other ANT advocates is to start any examination of society not from the actors, the system, or nature, but from the hybrids, the 'quasi-objects' that are created by the continual interaction of human and non-human actors. From here the networks can be traced.

Latour and Callon's earlier pieces that helped establish ANT contain some suggestions for doing this. Latour argues in 'The Powers of Association' that when one simply *has* power, nothing happens; yet one *exerts* power it is others doing the work²⁹. The way in which this occurs in a network is through the diffusion of a *token* such as an object, an order or a disciplined body. The term, token, is derived more directly from anthropology than some of Latour's later terminology. The passage of the token through the networks is either facilitated or slowed by the chain of actors along which the token is passed, or translated. The actors do not simply transmit the token, they can also transform and change it. Therefore in this model power is seen as a consequence and not a cause of collective action, and not just collective action by people, but by combinations of people and things. It is the way in which things act upon tokens that leads to the term 'actant' rather than actor.

²⁷ *ibid.*, 10.

²⁸ *ibid.*, 10-11.

²⁹ Latour, Bruno (1986) *The Powers of Association*, in Law, John (ed.) *Power, Action and Belief: a New Sociology of Belief?* Sociological Review Monograph No. 32. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.

In the same collection, Michel Callon puts forward some principles for network analysis³⁰. He starts by asserting that the liberty accorded by sociologists to the actors they study when discussing nature is not accorded when they discuss society; “for them nature is uncertain but society is not”³¹. However he claims that in truth sociological explanation is contested, and “since society is no more obvious or less controversial than nature, sociological explanation can find no solid foundations”³². There is therefore a problem of trying to maintain symmetry between these two worlds. Callon puts forward three principles: the first, “extends the agnosticism of the observer to include the social sciences as well”³³, thereby asking the researcher not to pass judgement on statements made by actors about society; the second is generalised symmetry, in other words any vocabulary can be chosen to describe the phenomena being studied but the language and terminology must be consistent when describing both the social and the natural; finally, the principle of 'free association', which implies that “the observer must abandon all a priori distinction between social and natural events”³⁴.

Despite this emphasis on natural descriptive language ANT has evolved a unique vocabulary. Mike Michael gives a succinct guide to the three basic processes of network formation and extension³⁵. The first is *interessement*, which might also be referred to as problematization. This is the process by which one actant causes the identity or status of another actant to be called into question, with the aim of destabilising that actants place in existing networks. *Enrolment* refers to the successful inclusion in the network of an actant. Finally, *translation* is the process by which an actant is given a role within a network. This has several forms: the first is the creation of an *obligatory point of passage*, a stage through which actants have to pass to become part of a network; the second is *displacement*, the structuring of movements in the network; *black-boxing*, as we have already seen, refers to the concealment of parts of a network; and finally *inscription* refers to the process which is perhaps the key theoretical contribution of ANT, the process by which the creation of an *immutable mobile* allows an action to last beyond its specific occurrence in space and time. The immutable mobile can be

³⁰ Callon, Michel (1986) 'Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay' in Law, J. (ed.) *op cit.* 196-233

³¹ *ibid.*, 197

³² *ibid.*, 199.

³³ *ibid.*, 200.

³⁴ *ibid.*

an object, a text, an organisation or one of many other forms, but importantly its immutability is only relative, defined by its place in the network. Such things are in fact often the centres round which new rounds of problematization can take place. We saw the creation of such an immutable mobile in the form of the ECHELON paragraph Steve Wright's STOA report (see Chapter 6). Latour's tokens are also still present, either called *intermediaries* or *emissaries*, which in turn emphasise the in-between nature and mobility of these things. They are effectively actants without agency in themselves. What constitutes an actant is largely determined by the particular circumstances under investigation. This is a potential problem: if things are to be studied symmetrically with people, who are we to define which out of these categories has agency?

Latour is clear that there is, or should be, a political project involved in ANT. In a recent article he has stated that many attempts at empirical use of ANT have missed the point a little and confused actor-network theory with simpler notions like 'policy networks'³⁶. Actor-network theory is potentially extremely complex, and thus raises questions about the methods used to trace actor-networks and the way in which these findings are represented and communicated, which have been acknowledged by the originators. Latour has stated that:

it is an extremely bad tool for differentiating associations. It gives a black and white picture not a coloured and contrasted one. It is thus necessary, after having traced the actor networks to specify the types of trajectories that are obtained through highly different mediations.³⁷

Latour seems to be acknowledging a common critique of ANT: that it bypasses issues of class power and dominance, which makes it very hard to determine any ethical or moral result or course of action. However, Latour makes it very clear that ANT rejects epistemological and moral explanations *per se*. Indeed both Latour, and Murdoch clearly reject the idea of any underlying foundational ideas which presuppose the description of the network. Murdoch argues, following Latour, that analysis can only happen after every

³⁵ Michael, Mike (1996) *Constructing Identities*, London: Sage, Ch. 4.

³⁶ Latour, B. (1997) On actor-network theory: a few clarifications. (Reprinted from *Soziale Welt* 1997). Available on-line at: <<http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/stt/stt/ant/latour.htm>>

³⁷ *ibid.*, 9.

possible component has been described, after description has 'saturated'. This would however appear impossible, if one accepts the accounts of complexity theory, to which we will next turn, and also could act as another justification for inaction. In another article, Murdoch offers a solution: the idea that 'first order approximations' could substitute for detailed prosaic description, in essence that ANT should use 'black-boxing' techniques³⁸. This appears paradoxical: ANT has claimed to be concerned with opening the black-boxes created by scientists, yet it now appears to want to create ones of its own. I shall return to this below.

A Sociology of Mobilities? (1)

This emphasis on process has lead inevitably to other attempts to reposition social research as the study of flows. The most complete of these is perhaps John Urry's *Sociology Beyond Societies*, which as its first task attempts "to develop through appropriate metaphors a sociology which focuses upon movement, mobility, and contingent ordering, rather than upon stasis, structure and social order"³⁹.

Urry's achievement is all the more remarkable because of the inadequate or at least incomplete attempts that he had previously produced with Scott Lash. In Lash and Urry's network theory in *Economies of Signs and Space*, they borrow from economic geography:

Networks are made up of a few basic elements: of 'bridges' or 'links' which connect the points in the network. These bridges stand out in lesser or greater relief from a 'backcloth' or 'support structure'. The entities that move along these links are called 'traffic'. This traffic can be transmitted or not. Communications, including documents, are transmitted traffic. Other traffic is mobile, not through transmission, but via transportation, whether of capital, labour or information. The points connected by links in a network are called 'simplices'... Simplices can be individuals, they can be organisations, they can be terminals, transmitters or receivers.⁴⁰

³⁸ Murdoch, Jonathan (1997b) inhuman/nonhuman/human: actor-network theory and the prospects for a nondualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society, in *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* Vol. 15, 731-756.

³⁹ Urry, John (2000) *Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century*, London: Routledge.

Unfortunately this seems a very mechanistic, old-fashioned physical systems view, that still does not appear to acknowledge that 'simplices' could themselves be conceived of as networks. In addition there is still a huge problem with the idea that there is such a thing as 'backcloth'. What is this bizarre material, where does it exist, and what influence does it have on the network? If it does interact with the network, then surely it is part of it; if it does not then it has no useful theoretical purpose. This can be contrasted with ANT in which everything is network; there is no 'backcloth', only different degrees and qualities of connection and process.

There are many other problems with their analysis. One small criticism could be of their distinction between 'tame' and 'wild' spaces in the new world disorder. This seems so redolent of the neo-colonialist discourses of spatially / environmentally-determined civilisation and barbarity that were introduced at the end of Chapter 2 in the context of 'new wars'. In addition the whole idea of disorganised capitalism is contradictory and much of the insight to be gained from an application of chaos/complexity theory to social theory (see below, page 327). Disorganisation is apparent or superficial; it is simply more complex organisation, in that sense it is reorganisation on and to different spatial and temporal scales. Considering that Lash and Urry spend a good proportion of the book reviewing concepts of time and space, this is disappointing.

However, Urry draws substantially on actor-network theory in the later work, effectively a manifesto for a new sociology. This treats all theories as metaphors, however not in the relativist sense that one theory is as good as another. On the contrary, "there are good and bad metaphors"⁴¹, and empirical findings can play a large part in determining which are which, "it is possible to evaluate different metaphors for their scientific productivity. They can be set against each other and many kinds of empirical evidence can be deployed to evaluate their plausibility"⁴²; as can other forms of context. The book itself is a call for the use of metaphors of mobility to analyse society, a natural outcome of the increasing turn towards processes rather than states. However, he does not shy away from proposing his own sets of metaphors, largely accepting the post-ANT concept of networks, but differentiating network connection

⁴⁰ Lash, Scott and Urry, John (1994) *Economies of Signs and Space*. London: Sage.

⁴¹ Urry 2000 *op cit.*, 22.

⁴² *ibid.*, 27.

into *scapes* and *flows*. Scapes are described as "the networks of machines, technologies, texts and actors that constitute various interconnected nodes along which the flows can be relayed", and which "reconfigure the dimensions of space and time"⁴³. Flows move along these scapes, and "consist of peoples, images, information, money and waste"; they are independent of direct social control, and lead to the creation of "new inequalities of access/non-access"⁴⁴. However, although there are implications of such processes, Urry does not appear to make it clear whether scapes have more than a facilitatory relationship with flows. One advantage of ANT is that it puts forward a mechanism, and explanatory metaphor, for how flows might be able to transform scapes, not simply vice-versa. At least in this case, Urry's schema is compatible with ANT and indeed with Harvey's relational dialectics, and will thus be more useful and adaptable. Urry has also taken on board complexity theory, and I shall return to this aspect of his thinking after some consideration of this topic.

Complexity (1): from science to social theory

Social science has often looked to natural science for guidance. Indeed some ecologists have seen the ecological project itself as a kind of bridge between natural and social sciences⁴⁵. Sociologist Peter Dicken turns to 'new' biology to find support for a dialectical view⁴⁶. He finds it in Lewontin, Goodwin and Webster (also much quoted by Adrian Atkinson) which concentrate more on the reciprocal relationship between organism and environment, organisms cannot be reduced to genetically-determined behaviours. He sees this work as paralleling Marx and Engels' early dialectical analysis. Bookchin also looks to ecology, though not in quite such a specific way.

In the past this has often led to misleading, incomplete or ethically dubious social theory - the attempts of the Chicago School for example - and many oppressive regimes have used justifications for social engineering based on racist interpretations of 'nature'. This has led to a reaction against 'science', for example in the work of the Frankfurt School typified by Horkheimer and Adorno⁴⁷, and the relativistic view of extreme social constructionism. Bob

⁴³ *ibid.*, 35.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 36.

⁴⁵ Odum, W. E (1997) *Ecology: A Bridge Between Science and Society*. Sunderland USA: Sinauer Associates.

⁴⁶ Dicken, P. (1992) *op cit*.

⁴⁷ Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T. (trans. Cumming, J.) (1979) *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London, Verso. Originally published (1969) as *Dialektik der Aufklärung*. Frankfurt: Fischer.

Price has characterised the views of postmodernists who argue that science has only a relative claim to the discovery of 'truth' or 'natural laws' as simply mythology⁴⁸. In a comparison of the work of systems theorists to Foucault he argues that while postmodernists try to demolish totalizing ideologies, the whole project in itself is a totalizing one, and ends up attributing less power to the subject, who can in any case no longer be held to 'exist' in any meaningful way, than do recent attempts within science and social science to acknowledge and analyse complexity. Going even further, Sokal and Bricmont have recently noted how much of the analysis of such postmodernists is based on faulty understanding of scientific ideas, and while they may go to far in their attempt to demolish postmodernism and end up committing the same crime of misunderstanding of which they have accused the social theorists, their basic point is a valid one⁴⁹.

So what of those who continue to align their social science with natural science? The most recent wave of such theorists are those who deal with complexity theory. Complexity theory is a development of systems theory which emerged from several different fields including meteorology and information theory in the 1960's. It is sometimes called 'chaos theory' though this label only refers to the *apparent* behaviour of the systems involved rather than their *actual* nature, and this has led to much popular misunderstanding of what is involved and consequently the qualified use of the term - for example David Byrne always uses 'chaos/complexity'⁵⁰.

According to Byrne, complexity theory has three major components: firstly, that it rejects reductionism - things cannot be reduced to parts, as the parts are only the *emergent properties* of systems; secondly, changes in the real world are non-linear, i.e.: the size and nature of effects often has very little in common with the size and nature of their causes, and in fact this frequently has the result that initial causes cannot necessarily be determined if one knows the effects - this is generally known as *extreme sensitivity to initial conditions*; finally, complexity views all processes as *evolutionary*. They are thus historical and non-reversible.

⁴⁸ Price, B. (1997) *the Myth of Postmodern Science*. In Eve, R. A., Horsfall, S and Lee, M. E. (eds.) *op cit*. pp. 3-14.

⁴⁹ Sokal, A. D., and Bricmont, J. (1998) *Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern Philosophers' Abuse of Science*, London: Profile Books.

There are three major concepts vital to the understanding of complexity: *bifurcation*; *strange attractors*; and the *far from equilibrium system*. Bifurcation simply refers to a point where a system is able to move in one of two directions. These critical points occur all the time, however major ones can lead to the complete transformation of the system itself. Thomas Martin has noted the obvious parallel between this idea and Kuhn's theory of 'paradigm shift' in science⁵¹ and, like Byrne, claims that engaged social research must concentrate on understanding these points. Attractors are simply the points to which a system tends. They can be divided into: fixed point attractors, which are those in unchanging steady states; limit cycle attractors, in periodic states, for example the point at which a pendulum stops (Byrne's basic illustration) and strange attractors⁵². Strange attractors are those attractors that bring about complex change within a dynamic system. A tendency towards a strange attractor produces outcomes which are almost impossible to determine given knowledge of the initial starting conditions. Finally there is the far from equilibrium system or *dissipative structure*. This concept simply refers to the dynamic and evolutionary character of systems. In these, order is never assumed (but can certainly occur), in fact the question to ask is rather how change occurs out of apparent order. We have already seen how Bookchin describes these ideas, however Byrne regards complexity theory as "identical" to the Marxist theory of social transformation⁵³. Whether or not this is true, treating human society as a dissipative structure certainly allows change to be an innate part of the system, it is "systemic without being conservative"⁵⁴, and not only that it means that agency is vital as being the 'emergent' behaviour of the system. Of course, although Byrne makes a clear distinction between society and environment, complexity theory also makes it clear that systems are nested, i.e.: human social systems exist within a wider evolving natural system, and that human agency (and human society as a whole) is also part of the emergent behaviour of that system. Despite Bookchin's rejection, this is in fact remarkably similar to his particular adaptation of the Hegelian-Marxist idea of humanity as representing some form of potential within nature. Determinism is only present in the idea of limits, both social and environmental, and outcomes are not predictable but are contained within the emergent properties of the systems.

⁵⁰ Byrne 1998 *op cit*.

⁵¹ Martin, T. S. (1998) *Greening the Past: Towards a Social-Ecological Analysis of History*. Bethesda MD, International Scholars Publications.

⁵² Coveney, P. and Highfield, R. (1995) *Frontiers of Complexity: the Search for Order in a Chaotic World*. London, Faber and Faber.

⁵³ Byrne 1998 *op cit*, 31.

Michael Serres, the philosopher who has been a major influence on ANT also drew on complexity theory, and according to Conley was particularly influenced by Gregory Bateson, a systems theorist who despite being vilified by Anglo-American social scientists was more highly regarded in continental Europe⁵⁵. He argues that the universe is founded on chaos (noise), within which temporary 'islands' of order (orderly disorder or meaning) emerge and dissolve. He attempts to end the mind-body dualism, not by holism but by positing the mind as the mobile part of the body. The universe is a complex, homoergetic system characterised by flow and balance. The body is seen as possessing a 'proto-language' by which cellular and molecular level interaction occur, interlocking to form human language and the human body. Being cannot define itself against another being or an object, but there is no cosmic harmony either. We need a new 'contract' with nature, not simply a social contract. This does not lead to nihilism or confusion according to Conley's analysis:

Complexity shows us a new 'reality', always in process. The perpetually open condition of world-systems has repercussions on notions of self and collectivity. Communities are henceforward at once local and global, in constant variation, always part of ever-transforming, complex systems. Being is interacting...⁵⁶

Although Urry does not mention Serres, this is also highly compatible with Urry's society of mobilities.

Complexity (2): Social Complexity

In a recent edited collection Amin and Hausner present various attempts to outline and explore the idea of 'social complexity'⁵⁷. This appears to be another way of moulding postmodern and post-structuralist critiques of universal theories into a framework acceptable to all, arguing that social complexity is made up of "a multiple set of non-universal

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, 51.

⁵⁵ Conley 1997 *op cit.*

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, 67.

⁵⁷ Amin, A. and Hausner, J. (eds.) (1997) *Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and Social Complexity*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

determinants”, variety and variability, the crucial element of human mental processes and lack of knowledge, which lead to different types of rationality⁵⁸.

They posit three different types of networks - reactive, cognitive and creative - through which actors can express their agency, and which operate to varying degrees of success. The authors thus make it clear that power is important, and that the nature of ties or links is as or more important than the fact of the links themselves in any network. Like Harvey, they have a political agenda, though it is expressed more in terms of what they regard as the most successful way of governing social complexity, which is “a strategic-interactive approach” which “can be summarised as one combining central strategic guidance with decentralised associative governance”⁵⁹. It is clear however that this agenda is not a transformatory one in the way that the revolutionaries would want: “The challenge”, they comment, “is less that of building capacity to compete, but capacity to evolve in order to compete”, in other words they are quite clearly placing their notion of evolution within capitalist society, arguing that society somehow is intrinsically capitalist and competitive rather than realising that capitalism is merely a complex system, which can be altered or overthrown by phenomena emerging from within it.

Robert Delormé, in the same collection, makes it clear that this approach is inspired by complexity theory, but that, like Urry's metaphorical view, he takes “a position whereby complexity is not modelled but, instead is viewed as a descriptor of the real world”⁶⁰. Thus reductionist strategies will never lead to a useful description of a complex phenomenon. He argues that there are two useful definitions of complexity in the context of political economic analysis, one being “consideration of the interaction between a generating principle and what is generated”⁶¹ and the other being the recognition “that the study of a complex situation can hardly be carried out independently of considerations of the generating principle.”⁶². Thus he concludes that complexity is not simply “a research strategy, it is a *mode of knowledge*”⁶³.

⁵⁸ Amin, A. and Hausner, J. (1997) Interactive Governance and Social Complexity. In Amin, A. and Hausner, J. (eds.) (1997) *op cit.* 1-31, 4.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, 4.

⁶⁰ Delormé, R. (1997) The Foundational Bearing of Complexity. In Amin, A. and Hausner, J. *op cit.* 32-56, 32.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, 52.

⁶² *ibid.*, 52-3.

A Sociology of Mobilities? (2)

In the final chapter of *Sociology Beyond Societies*, John Urry attempts to portray globalization as a situation of "constant disorder and disequilibrium... where millions of decisions based on local knowledge have resulted in unpredictable and non-linear consequences at the emergent global level"⁶⁴. Urry argues that the unprecedentedly rapid development of telematic technologies and the Internet from American military origins can be seen as an example of such a process. Millions of iterative actions combine to produce a result - the sprawling, ungovernable Internet - that could not have been predicted given the knowledge of the initial invention. In the same way he comes up with the best and most common-sense explanation of why Marx's predictions of the inevitable demise of capitalism have not been fulfilled, a question that has exercised sociologists and political economists ever since. Urry argues that his vision was perfectly reasonable given the knowledge available at the time, however "relatively small perturbations in the system could produce a very different branching from what Marx had envisaged"⁶⁵. Further, as Urry and Byrne both observe, Marx's analysis included a very detailed understanding of how capitalism is reproduced at local sites, and is therefore subject to local conditions, and therefore to complex consequences.

Preliminary thoughts towards a synthesis

As I stated in Chapter 2, a useful theory needs to have a meaningful relationship with social change: if it is to be descriptive, it needs to describe in a way that suggests points of entry around which new interestments can occur or map the location of strange attractors in the system. Thus I cannot accept the view that complete description should always proceed analysis. Complexity means, as Delormé notes, that in some ways the realisation and recognition of complexity itself precludes any entirely realistic description of the system. How is one to end up with a description that is totally 'saturated' as the ANT advocates originally demanded? Murdoch (1997b) has partially answered this by arguing that areas can be black-boxed, in other words spatial and temporal limits can be set so long as these are made explicit. But as reality is always evolving and changing the descriptive process could, even in a bounded area be never-ending as the researcher becomes lost in the fractal by-ways.

⁶³ *ibid.*, 53

⁶⁴ Urry 2000 *op cit.*, 208.

On the other hand, a misleading static picture could result from setting strict temporal boundaries.

How can we determine what are reasonable limits? Dialectical approaches recognise evolution, indeed Bookchin's dialectical naturalism expressly emphasises the evolutionary potential of humanity, however in order to use the dialectic one has to be part of it, as Thomas Martin, commenting on Lukacs, points out⁶⁶. Martin argues that elements of Bookchin's dialectic combined with an understanding of systems theory and complexity, "one that is organic and free of Cartesian and Newtonian superstitions"⁶⁷ should meet the criteria. He advocates physicist Geoffrey Chew's 'bootstrap hypothesis', which states that the universe is itself generated by the interlocking and interlacing dynamics of all of its parts, or more accurately all of the events that occur, including our thoughts and actions, as the basis of such a theory.

This is potentially compatible with ANT and with Harvey's relational dialectics. Latour has argued that systems are the emergent properties of agency rather than the other way round as conceived of in complexity theory, which is one of the reasons why he prefers the term 'network'⁶⁸. However if one takes a dialectical view of complexity, it becomes clear that both are true. The 'far from equilibrium system' of complexity theory is not the same stable, orderly system that previous generations of systems theorists had modelled, it is a network, but a network whose configurations and properties are constantly evolving, and producing hybrids which are the strange attractors around which emergent system behaviour will develop and grow. To say that the system is emergent rather than the behaviour of the system merely starts to reconstruct the old agency-structure arguments again in different language.

Complexity theory provides a way in which both agency and structure matter - both are real, but both are also subject to change. Indeed human beings are themselves complex systems nested within other complex systems. Mary Lee has tried to combine the insights of Latour

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Martin (1996) *op cit.*

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, 281.

⁶⁸ Latour, Bruno (1991) Technology is society made durable, in Law, John (ed.) *A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination*, London: Routledge 103-131.

with complexity to produce a genuinely ‘nonmodern’ social theory⁶⁹. In fact it could be argued that she is simply taking Latour back to Serres and one of the main roots of ANT. She puts forward a simple conceptual model of levels of analysis (a Chinese box model) in any situation. This can be imagined as a series of concentric circles through which a time line passes. As the line passes towards the centre of the circle, ‘feed-forward’ effects are produced. These “produce the macroscopic configuration of components”⁷⁰. As time moves away from the centre ‘feedback’ effects occur, which are “the continual accretion of effects from previous interactions”⁷¹. Of course, the macroscopic conditions set the context for local behaviour, but the feedback effects coalesce into new macroscopic conditions. Her conclusion, like that of Latour and Callon, suggests that “local events must be explained using the languages best suited to describing them”⁷². She thus suggests that quantitative and qualitative methods will be able to describe the world, or different parts of it more or less effectively. Byrne, although the bulk of his book is concerned with quantitative methodologies, appears to agree.

Martin’s concludes that we proceed as before but with a heightened awareness of ourselves and our project. This could be regarded as a non-conclusion. However, if postmodernism has reminded us of anything it is that there are different ways of knowing, and a variety of approaches to breaking apart accepted categories. What it has not done is to equip us with new methodologies or new tools for putting the pieces back together, indeed some postmodernist interpretations can be seen to be arguing that this is impossible and undesirable. However, in order to affect and encourage social change, we need to have an understanding of how such change occurs, of the processes that contribute to and detract from it, and not least, visions of the kind of society we would prefer to see. Some of this is the job of history, but a new history concerned with bifurcations, processes and ideas as much as ‘events’, as Martin has proposed. Some of this will be in the realms of sociology, geography and anthropology. Latour’s proposal that our sociology and geography have really always been lacking because we have been afraid to turn the anthropological spotlight upon

⁶⁹ Lee 1997 *op cit*.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, 23.

⁷¹ *ibid.*, 23.

⁷² *ibid.*, 28.

ourselves, to see our similarities within and without, goes a long way to answering those who would rather emphasise difference and diversity as virtues in themselves⁷³.

⁷³ Latour 1993 *op cit*.

Social Theory, Surveillance and Intelligence Sites.

Surveillance

As we saw in Chapter 2, surveillance has become an increasingly important concept in the analysis of contemporary society at many different scales. In urban spaces, the introduction of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras; in workplaces, the growth of performance monitoring and employee drug-testing; the creation and integration of computerised databases of personal information by state and private organisations; the technologies of satellite mapping and intelligence gathering: these are all aspects of an increasingly sophisticated and comprehensive attention to the lives of individuals and groups inside the borders of particular states, but also transnationally and globally. While, as we have seen in Chapter 2, Weber, Giddens and Dandeker all attempted to place surveillance at the heart of modernity, Roy Boyne has recently taken the next logical step and argued that surveillance is a central *mode* of industrialised societies, as important as production⁷⁴. Yet despite the importance of surveillance, and a growing body of empirical and theoretical work, Kirstie Ball has recently pointed out social theory still lacks a common language to describe surveillance practices, tends to focus either on organisational issues or technology, and neglects consideration of the experiences of the actors under surveillance, the surveilled⁷⁵.

Most analyses of surveillance either implicitly or explicitly accept James Rule's classic definition of surveillance, "the systematic attention to a person's life aimed at exerting influence over it"⁷⁶. However this is inadequate because, as we have seen in this thesis, the surveilled are not just individual people, but a range of human individuals, groups and even societies, as well as non-human beings, situations and things. Surveillance exists at different scales, or in information theory terms, varies in its granulation. Dandeker's definition (see Chapter 2, page 40) is superior in many ways.

There are, I think, three main reasons for this widespread acceptance of Rule's definition. Firstly, it fits well with the modern post-enlightenment idea of the individual subject which

⁷⁴ Boyne, Roy (2000) *Post-Panopticism*

⁷⁵ Ball, Kirstie (2000) *Situating Surveillance: Representation, Meaning, Movement and Manipulation*, Paper presented at the Surveillance and Society Conference, University of Hull, 20th September (no page numbers).

⁷⁶ Rule, James B. (1973) *Private Lives, Public Surveillance: Social Control in the Information Age*, London: Allen-Lane.

has been fetishised in neo-liberal economic ideology and which also forms the basis for the civil liberties or privacy rationale for opposing surveillance. Secondly, it reflects the bias towards studying surveillance within societies, in other words the way the state acts towards its citizens or the corporation acts towards its workers. This has two effects: the neglect of transnational surveillance and globalization; and in a bias towards the civil at the expense of the military. The third reason is related to the approach to the non-human in the social sciences, to which I shall return later.

The Military in Surveillance Theory

The military are not absent from surveillance theory. Dandeker, following Weber and Giddens, argues that in the early modern period, military organisations and modes of control were crucial in the development of the modern state. It was the control of military resources and the resting of the legitimate right to use force with institutions of the state which underlay the establishment of modern nation-states⁷⁷. Lyon claims that "several facets of surveillance can... be found embedded in the history of modern military and war-related activities", including "the growth of security and intelligence services as departments of state"⁷⁸. However, the key word here is 'history'. Implicit in these accounts is an assumption that we are living in, or will soon be living in, what Shaw explicitly called a "post-military society"⁷⁹. This is an assumption shared by many social analysts. It is certainly true that, in superficial terms, the military is a smaller section of the state industrialised societies than it used to be: there are fewer full-time troops, smaller areas of training land, fewer buildings, and less expenditure (see Table 1, page 21, for the UK). However, this is in some ways only relative; the Twentieth Century saw the most extensive mobilisations of people and resources for war that has ever been seen - levels of military expenditure and land-use are still higher than they were in previous centuries. More significantly there are deeper reasons for contesting the post-military society thesis. It is another manifestation of the tendency to replace analysis by simply adding 'post-' onto any concept associated with modernity, which is as redundant as the concept of modernity itself, as Latour has pointed out. In addition, as Giddens pointed

⁷⁷ Dandeker, Christopher (1990) *Surveillance, Power, and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

⁷⁸ Lyon, David (1994) *The Electronic Eye: the Rise of the Surveillance Society*, Cambridge: Polity Press / Blackwell, 29.

⁷⁹ Shaw, Martin (1991) *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

out, the relative decline of military culture in some areas should not hide the spread of this culture to others:

we live today in 'military societies' - the combined spread of industrialism and the nation-state system has served to ensure that virtually every state across the globe now possesses armed strength far in excess of that of any traditional empire⁸⁰.

However, this is more than just a widening. Some argue, as does Steve Write of the Omega Foundation, that the gradual increase of privatisation of policing and security and the spread of technologies developed by and previously used exclusively by the military into civil spaces rather than indicating the transformation of military technologies and processes into civil use and control, is actually evidence of the infiltration of military behaviours and ideology into civil society⁸¹. The casual ease with which wars are reported as entertainment, the consensus between major political parties about the support for military operations, and of course the case examined here - the continued growth of military surveillance systems - these too support the case for the military enjoying a huge degree of support, but support that is largely unspoken, unnoticed and uncontested. This, as we noted in Chapter 2, is particularly true when it comes to war. James Der Derian claims that there has been only 29 years free of war in the last three millennia and that "war continues to be the rules that proves the exceptionalism of sovereignty"⁸². Thus the state does not prevent violence and reduce it to an unusual occurrence, rather it facilitates new forms of violence and allows new configurations of war-making organisation to come about. As Zygmunt Bauman has astutely remarked, the Twentieth Century has been about "fast and efficient killing, scientifically designed and administered genocide"⁸³. Again, the intimate relationship between technology and killing, the relationship that makes so many who believe in a pure enlightenment vision of human progress uncomfortable, is highlighted. As Ponting argues in *Progress and Barbarism*, the

⁸⁰ Giddens, A (1985) *The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

⁸¹ Wright, Steve (1998) *An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control: Interim STOA Report (PE 166.499)*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.

⁸² Der Derian, James (1998) *Virtual Theory: State, Speed and Violence*. Paper given at the RIPE Conference on Globalization, State and Violence, University of Sussex, 15th-17th April, 1998, 6.

⁸³ Bauman, Zygmunt (1995) *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Modernity*, Oxford: Blackwell, 193, quoted in Der Derian 1998 *op cit*.

Twentieth Century was in fact characterised by a seemingly inescapable dialectical relationship: the undeniable striving towards better conditions for humans (and latterly for all living beings), and at the same time the most uncivil, violent and regressive episodes that show no sign of declining as the Twenty-First Century begins⁸⁴. This is in fact the same contradiction pointed out by Latour that lies at the heart of the illusion of modernism, but in concrete form. The translations and purifications carried out by 'advanced' states mean real injustice, and this injustice is essential to the modern project of which global capitalism is the economic manifestation.

The Transnational and Surveillance Theory

Just as there is a neglect of the military, there is a neglect of the transnational, and the inter-state, in surveillance studies. This is particularly peculiar given the almost universal mantra of globalization that swept academic disciplines in the 1990s. Importantly, I am not arguing that surveillance studies does not recognise that surveillance is a global phenomenon: most recent major collections contain material both from many different places and which recognises the global spread of surveillance, but usually only as a localized, and often urban or workplace, practice. This certainly has both causes and consequences for changing forms of capitalism, both in terms of consumption and the use of urban space (in malls, town centres etc.), and production (the control and discipline of workers, and the lived experience of work).

What is missing from all these micro-sociological accounts is any sense that are other scales of surveillance. This is perhaps what this thesis has tried to demonstrate more than anything else. Whilst we have seen instances of micro-level surveillance - the infiltration of peace groups, the use of security cameras and monitoring of movements of protesters in and around Menwith Hill - this thesis has mostly been about the operation of socio- technological networks on a transnational, and increasingly global scale. Even David Lyon, perhaps the most coherent analyst of surveillance, does not really get to grips with these problems of scale. The section on intelligence services in *The Electronic Eye* concentrates mostly on conventional questions of national security, and when tackling globalization he only

⁸⁴ Ponting, Clive (1999) *The Pimlico History of the Twentieth Century*, London: Pimlico Press. (Previously published 1998, as *Progress and Barbarism: the World in the Twentieth Century*, London: Chatto and Windus.

comments that some rethinking of the notion of citizenship is necessitated by "the increasingly global character of surveillance"⁸⁵. In fact, military surveillance is one of the few phenomena that can be said to be truly global: the Earth is increasingly surrounded by many different kinds of satellites, which are either entirely military, partially military, easily interceptable by the military, or there under military sufferance. In addition transnational communications systems are thoroughly interpenetrated and infiltrated by military surveillance systems: even their invention, design and protocols have military elements, as we saw in Chapter 5. A further example, as Rheingold has so clearly shown, is the Internet. This transnational system of network connections and protocols was in no small part based on the American military's Arpanet distributed communications system, designed to survive destruction of particular parts of the system⁸⁶; and as we have seen, the NSA plays a role, its degree unknown but probably highly significant, in the ongoing creation of telematics protocols.

These examples also makes it particularly clear that to talk of 'the military' in this context, is to ignore the obvious. It is not a generalised military that is at the heart of this, but one military and one nation in particular: the United States of America. David Slater and Peter Taylor's recent collection convincingly makes the case for the Twentieth Century being socially, politically, militarily, economically and culturally, 'the American Century'⁸⁷. In the final chapter the editors themselves argue that at least in military and economic terms, this dominance is unlikely to be challenged conventionally in the Twenty-First Century, "defence spending continues to dwarf that of other major powers", with a particular advantage in attack-oriented weaponry, and further:

the military capacity of the United States, post-Cold War, not only gives it a pre-eminence unequalled in previous periods, but with the dawning of another military revolution based on the application of information technology to

⁸⁵ Lyon 1994 *op cit.*, 117.

⁸⁶ Rheingold, H. (1994) *The Virtual Community*, London: Secker and Warburg.

⁸⁷ Slater, David and Taylor, Peter J. (eds.) (1999) *The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power*, Oxford: Blackwell.

weapons, the United States could go way ahead of its enemies and allies alike⁸⁸.

Thus massive investment combined with being ahead of the game in both Space and information technologies gives America a huge advantage. This is combined with a necessary economic superiority, and the seductiveness of the cultural and political images it projects. In this sense, as I argued in Chapter 2, and as Slater and Taylor also argue: globalization is Americanization. However they also argue that while the Twentieth Century phase of dominance was based on the territorial container of the USA, this territorial component will become less and less necessary, as US companies and cities become transnational companies and global cities. This will not necessarily mean an end to American hegemony, but it might lead to a qualitatively different form.

In such a context what could become of the great networks of military surveillance? According to Chomsky, America's transnational dominance in the Twentieth successful application of a dual strategy of ideological maintenance at home backed by political projection including the frequent threat and use of force abroad⁸⁹. All America's major 'economic competitors' (to treat economics in crude and inaccurate state terms momentarily, for reasons that will become clear), are thoroughly connected to the UKUSA SIGINT network as well as the multiplicity of other political-military alliances created by the USA after the Second World War (see Chapter 5). As we have seen, even China supports at least two American listening posts. National economic competition between industrialised states is a myth, a cover-story. The European Parliament is therefore probably side-tracked by its concern with American economic espionage in Europe.

The American-directed networks perform a role similar to that which Slater and Taylor attribute to US territorial reconstructions in the Twentieth Century. This is not new, and in this sense Slater and Taylor are perhaps deliberately simplifying by suggesting a progress from strong state to global economy. As Chomsky shows, the United States has regarded the rest of the world as a legitimate location for its national security interests throughout the

⁸⁸ Slater, David and Taylor, Peter J. (1999) *Multiple Themes, One America; One Theme, Multiple Americas*, in Slater and Taylor 1999 *op cit.*, 345.

⁸⁹ Chomsky, Noam (1992) *Deterring Democracy (Second Edition)*, New York: Hill and Wang.

Twentieth Century, largely in terms of securing resources and providing markets⁹⁰. With the post-Second World War reconstruction of Germany and Japan and the alliances with other 'Anglo-Saxon' states in particular, the United States expanded its idea of who was allowed to exploit these markets and resources, thus its conceptualisation of where ideological consensus was needed expanded too. The military networks are just some of the devices that America uses to keep these states within its expanded conception of legitimate transnational actors, and can therefore exploit their political and economic resources too, as we saw USSPACECOM argue in Chapter 5, to expand its own networks to better manage the world economy. In this context, the United States military becomes more openly the enforcer of American (global) economic norms. A clear recent illustration of this has been the former Yugoslavia, where the Rambouillet accord designed to bring 'peace' to the province of Kosovo and which resulted in a satellite-directed high-level bombing campaign by the USAF, specified the adoption of a free market economic system. In addition the new democratic government of Yugoslavia has adopted entirely an International Monetary Fund blueprint for the economy including massive public service cuts and widespread privatisation. This conflict also illustrated the advantages of the United States' technological superiority. The high-level bombing campaign meant minimum American casualties with maximum destructive effect, and despite some small problems (civilian casualties, the loss of an expensive 'stealth' aircraft etc.), indicates the tactical direction that the United States military is likely to follow in the future. In the post-Cold War period, the United States no longer even has to cloak its military interventions in humanitarianism.

Actor-networks, Panopticism and Surveillance

If the aims and intentions of those creating and controlling transnational military networks are increasingly clear - perhaps so clear that many academics cannot bring themselves to consider them - the way in which these networks are maintained and expanded is very complex. This leads us to the third reason for the popularity of Rule's definition, which is at the heart of the analysis I will put forward here. This reason, like the others also relates to the legacy of the enlightenment, the modern. However here it is related not to the idea of the atomised individual, but to the simultaneous neglect and fetishism of the non-human in the social sciences. As we have seen, social theory has in general assumed a dualism between

⁹⁰ Rai, Milan (1995) *Chomsky's Politics*, London: Verso.

nature and society and between objects and actors that is increasingly tenuous, and has now begun to be addressed. This is particularly important if one is to take seriously Lyon's assertion that it is technologies, particularly information technology, that have made the surveillance society possible, and if one goes further, Mathiesen's view that technology is facilitating the development of Foucault's Panopticon on a global scale⁹¹.

In the context of panopticism, it is worth considering not only Foucault's idea of networks, but also to trace the connections between Foucault and the ANT advocates, particularly Latour. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault gives a succinct description of the way in which he views surveillance as operating: "although surveillance rests on the individual, its functioning is that of a network of relations... this network holds the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another"⁹². Like Harvey then, Foucault is using a concept of *internal* relations: power derives from other effects of power in the network. There are as we have seen two basic effects of surveillance: the gathering of information, and the behaviour-modifying aspects related to the knowledge or at least suspicion of being surveilled. Of the former effect, Lash and Urry argued that this has a direct relationship with power: "Stratification into powerful and relatively powerless is partly decided by who is doing the transmitting and who is doing the receiving of information"⁹³. They qualify this by stating that much of this information does not express itself as power in the immediate sense, but that it is 'pervasive'. This is a very Foucauldian idea of power. This conception of power is evident in Latour's work, and Mike Michael has made the philosophical connections very clear: both depend on the obtaining of consent. There are therefore connections between Gramsci and the ANT view, though there is a key difference in scale:

the difference with Gramsci's view and that of ANT is that the former tends to focus upon the role of those large-scale ideological, political and economic media by which alliances are struck between classes or social blocs. In

⁹¹ Mathiesen, Thomas (1999) *On Globalisation of Control: Towards an Integrated Surveillance System in Europe*, London: Statewatch.

⁹² Foucault, Michel (1975) *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, New York: Vintage, 177.

⁹³ Lash and Urry 1994 *op cit.*, 28.

contrast, ANT stresses the microsociological site at which such struggles and alliances take place⁹⁴.

Latour has said that Foucault's conception of the spread of power is a useful model. ANT has generally focused on interactions in particular *centres of calculation* where scientists or experts enrol various humans and non-humans in their networks. Murdoch has remarked that in Latour's work "the laboratory now seems to replace the Panopticon as the most tangible exemplar of modern forms of domination and control".⁹⁵ However this misses the point a little: the laboratories facilitate the Panopticon, they make it possible; scientists are involved in military networks and are key parts in the functioning of surveillance and weapons systems.

Many writers have expanded upon and/or critiqued Foucault's concept of the Panopticon. In *The Mode of Information*, Mark Poster makes a serious and at least partially successful attempt to show that the medium by which information is conveyed does more than just intensify existing social 'facts', however these are defined⁹⁶. Following Marx's concept of the mode of production, he argues for a *Mode of Information* both as a way of periodizing history, and to characterise the present dominance of information as a privileged term. He defines three historical modes: oral, written and electronic, all of which have different ideas of society, language, ideas and action. Currently society operates in the electronic mode of information which, Postman argues is not adequately explained with the foundational assumptions of either Marxism or liberalism. Instead, concentrating on electronic databases, he turns to Foucault. However Poster notes that Foucault, despite understanding the potential of the panoptical model actually failed to notice that technological and infrastructural developments had by the late Twentieth Century taken on a qualitatively different form from the Nineteenth Century prison architecture he transformed into an icon:

Today's "circuits of communication" and the databases they generate constitute a Superpanopticon, a system of surveillance without walls,

⁹⁴ Michael 1996 *op cit.*, 60.

⁹⁵ Murdoch 1997b *op cit.*, 137

⁹⁶ Poster, Mark (1990) *The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social Context*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

windows, towers or guards. The quantitative advances in the technologies of surveillance result in a qualitative change in the microphysics of power⁹⁷.

Poster argues that this Superpanopticon has three main features: advanced technology: a disciplined self-surveillant population, and a new language situation. Each of these aspects is equally important. The new language situation relates to the way in which digital encoding works by reducing information to the minimum necessary for accurate reconstruction, in contrast to analogue forms which aim at perfect reproduction of the original. The result is that the subjects that are created through databases are not the same as the original subject nor even an imitation, but a multiplicity of selves, which, as Poster points out, may be acted upon without the original subject necessarily knowing.

This separation of information from context is referred to in much more forthright social justice terms by another major figure in surveillance studies, Oscar Gandy, as 'victimisation'⁹⁸. He has also put forward a panoptic model of capitalism in the information age, through the notion of the panoptic sort, the process by which people are categorised and valued on the basis of information contained in databases. As we saw in Chapter 7, the concern with integration characterises the discourses of privacy advocates, and it is also the key concern of those academics looking to the future of surveillance technologies. Gandy argues that:

it is only the locational constraints, the notion of separation by space, occasioned by the initial conceptualisation of the panoptic system as a building and by the surveillance as visual that limits Foucault's construct. But in an age of electronic networks, virtual memory, and remote access to distributed intelligence and data, disciplinary surveillance is no longer limited to single buildings, and observations no longer limited to line of sight⁹⁹.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 93.

⁹⁸ Gandy, Oscar H. Jr (1993) *The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information*, Boulder CO: Westview Press.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 23.

However both Poster and Gandy appear to undersell Foucault's message. In a study of the development of integrated surveillance systems primarily within the European Union but also in transatlantic linkages, radical Norwegian jurist, Thomas Mathiesen has pointed out that Foucault always envisaged more than a Benthamite Panopticon¹⁰⁰. Poster's conception of the Superpanopticon can be seen as redundant because Foucault's argument was that such institutions were only the model of precursor for "a whole new type of society" which he termed the "panoptical machine"¹⁰¹. As for other analysts, what is particularly worrying according to Mathiesen is not so much the individual technologies or systems of surveillance - he points out that there are many historical examples of very effective surveillance systems that do not rely on particular technologies - but the integration of such systems through intermediary linking and networking systems and institutions. The lesson of the progress of the European Union's surveillance systems is that the global Panopticon is being constructed piece by piece, and then the linkages are forged as if it were a natural next step. We have seen exactly this discourse of natural progress to linking such systems in the USSPACECOM *Vision 2020*, through the concept of leveraged partnerships.

Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong in their study of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in Britain make a similar point. It is the linking of cameras to databases, and the integration of different databases, which are of most concern¹⁰². However the integration of surveillance systems does not just mean things being joined together, it also means other elements being removed. In ANT terms, the networks of surveillance have always been hybrids. However it appears that humans are removing themselves further and further from the centres of calculation; in other words, there are increasingly integrated automated systems of surveillance *and response*, in which the human component is not involved in the actual functioning of either process, but is limited to a prior (construction) or post (evaluation) role. These systems are algorithmic, that is the mediation is carried out through pieces of computer code; ECHELON is such a system. In the most extreme case, for example with the development of algorithmic systems of facial recognition of subjects linked to automatic lethal response¹⁰³, the element of human discretion is removed almost entirely from the

¹⁰⁰ Mathiesen 1999 *op cit*.

¹⁰¹ Foucault quoted in Mathiesen 1999 *op cit*, 31.

¹⁰² Norris, Clive and Armstrong, Gary (1999) *The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV*, Oxford: Berg.

¹⁰³ For more details, see Wright 1998 *op cit*.

situation. Gandy's 'victimisation' may actually result in death. We shall return to this point with regard to transnational systems of surveillance later.

Importantly Mathiesen argues that surveillance must not be thought of as simply passive or one-way. Whilst a successful Panoptic strategy would result in self-disciplining behaviour, such an 'ideal' situation would seem unlikely. Mathiesen has also argued strongly that Panoptic strategies tend to be involved in a complex relationship with *synopticism*, that is mass observation of a few. Examples of this might include the television screening of wars or weapons testing. Such synoptic surveillance has critical potential, but it is reliant on information being presented to the mass of observers via an intermediary technology, which is not only vulnerable to the inherent limitations of the technological form involved, but also to the political and commercial agenda of the actor controlling that technology, in terms of framing, editing, advertising and manipulating and so on. Thus synopticism, instead of playing a role in limiting or providing material for a critique of panopticism, merely reinforces the movement towards self-disciplining and compliant subjects. Like Herman and Chomsky's concept of the 'spectator democracy' in which we are reduced to an observational role in politics¹⁰⁴, Mathiesen is convinced that the mass media are essentially institutions for the diversion of the great mass of people from critical thought or engagement in society. Simon Davies agrees: "the new technologies", he writes in *Big Brother*, "feed on a diet of mass pacification"¹⁰⁵. Even the violence in which the masters of the new global Panopticon indulge can be turned, through synoptic systems, into entertainment rather than a reason for action, or resistance. This has reached its most extreme form in the 'missile-cam' used first in the Gulf War and in Kosovo, which transmitted video images as the missile approached its target. Cumings described this synoptic device as "a bomb that was simultaneously image, warfare, news, spectacle, and advertisement for the Pentagon"¹⁰⁶. Of course, the particular video segments used for public consumption were a few selected from thousands to give the impression of precision, of the technological superiority of the panoptic machine.

¹⁰⁴ Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon.

¹⁰⁵ Davies, Simon (1996) *Big Brother: Britain's Web of Surveillance and the New Technological Order*, London: Pan, 260.

¹⁰⁶ Cumings, B. (1994) The politics of television in the Gulf War, in O'Laughlin, J., Mayer, T. and Greenberg, E. (eds.) *War and its Consequences: Lessons from the Persian Gulf Conflict*, New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 137-154, 149. Quoted in Kirsch, Scott (1997) *Watching the Bombs Go Off: Photography, Nuclear Landscapes and Spectator Democracy*, *Antipode* Vol. 29, No. 3, 227-255, 228.

There has been one overt attempt to apply ANT to surveillance studies and tackle the question of Panopticism. This is Kirstie Ball's paper *Situating Surveillance*¹⁰⁷. Ball does not use a straight ANT analysis, but combines it with Donna Haraway's work, in particular her adaptation of the Marxist notion of commodity fetishism and her conceptualisation of the material-semiotic nature of any scientifically produced object or body. She thus sees surveillance technologies as "a product of technoscientific progress, as dense material semiotic nodes in local webs which are surveilled domains". She argues that the fetishism of surveillance technologies is widespread not only amongst advocates but also amongst academic analysts. The questions asked are all too frequently those of what technologies do to us, how surveillance conditions our behaviour; Ball would prefer an interactional approach, that recognises that "any form of surveillance implies that humans and non humans are arranged in a relation". She claims that accounts of the electronic Panopticon in particular have reified the technological architectures of surveillance, thereby separating the social and the technical.

Ball examines several accounts of surveillance theory to draw out four common elements, each of which is privileged to different degrees by each theory. These are: firstly, "the technological artefact" through which the subject is *re-presented* as data; secondly, the social which enables *meaning* to be derived from the data; thirdly, movement, the way in which interpretations are circulated between actors, produced by and producing social relations; and finally, the *manipulation* of "the circuits of information, knowledge, profit and threat" through power relations. She suggests that actor-network methods could be key to the problem of integration, by "mapping the type of connectivity between disparate surveillance webs", and that ANT's analytical vocabulary incorporates the categories and concepts that cover all elements of surveillance. Ball's analysis suffers however in that it neglects transnational scales of surveillance; partly, this is because the accounts she is considering are accounts of localised, micro-scale surveillance. In addition, Ball too uncritically accepts the location of the surveillance within "the western capitalist mode of production and consumption", which she appears to take for granted as a self-evident explanator of the development of control technologies. It is this context, she argues, which makes a nonsense of attempts to analyse any surveillance tool, technology or technique in isolation. This makes

¹⁰⁷ Ball 2000 *op cit*.

me uncomfortable. As we have seen throughout this thesis, the relationships between and within states, corporations, people and technological systems are highly complex. Reducing everything to an explanatory context of capitalism (or indeed to any one of those other components) would appear to be reductionist in the extreme, and missing a key point of recent analyses. Surveillance is, as Lyon puts it "an institution in its own right, not reducible to capitalism, the nation-state, or even bureaucracy"¹⁰⁸.

Is Surveillance all Bad?

David Lyon is at pains to point out from the very beginning of his study, that despite the clear negative aspects:

surveillance systems are meant to ensure that we are paid correctly or receive appropriate welfare benefits, that terrorism and drug trafficking are contained, that we are made aware of the latest consumer products available, that we can vote in elections, that we can pay for goods and services with plastic cards rather than with the more cumbersome cash, and so on. Most people in modern societies regard these accomplishments as contributing positively to the quality of life.¹⁰⁹

However even most of these accomplishments of surveillance are at the very least ambiguous in their nature. The fact that 'most people in modern societies' regard them as good things should lead to the question 'why?' Many of the accomplishments of modern societies have to do with regulating the social hierarchy and maintaining the status quo, as Lyon also notes. The seductions offered by easy consumption to the richer members of societies worldwide are of a piece with the pacification of the spectator democracy, and the discipline meted out to those who cannot or will not conform. In addition there is increasing evidence that current modes of production and consumption rest not only on the poverty of billions of people, but on the destruction of the very ecological systems that allow humanity and other species to exist. To argue that making consumer capitalism function more efficiently is a benefit of surveillance is to ignore the role that surveillance plays in reproducing that system.

¹⁰⁸ Lyon 1994 *op cit.*, 219.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid.*, 4.

This is not to ignore the huge benefits brought to many within industrialised societies by social security, health services and mass education, all of which need forms of surveillance. However it seems increasingly apparent that high spending on such public service provision is incompatible with the competitiveness demanded by the neo-liberal economic system. The institutionalization of neo-liberal ideology through organisations like the WTO, and in particular the attempts to introduce a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which would make competition in service provision obligatory would decrease the good provided by state surveillance. It would also move the surveillance capabilities increasingly into the hands of private corporations with historic and current commitments to the US military.

Trajectories

The Political Economy of Transnational Surveillance

Looked at from the transnational scale, American state surveillance is involved in a dynamic web of relationships with both the operation of neo-liberal capitalism and the Western democratic social model, and with the panoptic impulses of the dominant transnational class. What is crucial and sometimes forgotten is that the original Panopticon was designed to control the deviant, that is people and organisations that are somehow obstructive to a particular social order constructed and maintained by the ruling class. Bentham's Panopticon can be seen in the context of Victorian fears about the masses of uneducated and underemployed who might rise up and sweep away bourgeois society. This deviancy was to be controlled for the good of the deviants; as Lyons points out, Bentham was inspired by the concept of God as a benevolent all-seeing observer in Psalm 139¹¹⁰. Foucault was writing as a deviant himself, a gay sado-masochist at least partly inspired by the oppressive nature of conventional cultural models of sexuality.

The emerging global Panopticon, of which military satellites and Space weapons are only a small part, is concerned with controlling behaviour at all levels from the individual in real and virtual space, to groups and to states in global politics and economics. Politically deviant countries can now be identified as 'rogue states'; neo-liberal economic institutions like the IMF have for some time been identifying economically deviant states, monitoring their compliance with international norms and if necessary enforcing structural adjustment of their economies, which is presented, as Chomsky and others have shown, as being entirely for their own good. The 'Grand Area' of the Cold War has simply expanded: the USA has become a deterritorialized entity that is in the process of reterritorializing itself as the 'global'.

This is not simply theory: it is most important to emphasise that surveillance is active and translates images and impressions into actions that have concrete effects on the lives of groups and individuals. Much American rhetoric of the sort USSPACECOM presents in *Vision 2020* and the NSA lays out in *NCS21* may be bravado. It may be limited by internal and external politics and by technology. However it forms part of an ideological system that

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*

has created real socio-technological networks that are easily capable of crushing those who oppose it, that has the ability to kill and maim from a distance, as the Gulf War and particularly Kosovo demonstrated.

However, the violent methods available are not limited to those usually categorised in this way. In the context of American hegemony, Jamil Salmi has argued that we need to reconceptualize our notion of violence¹¹¹. He criticises the approach to violence taken in western societies, arguing that it is superficial, lacks a sense of proportions, trivialises both the causes and the effects, is ideologically partial, and is also excessively individualistic. Instead he puts forward a typology of different types of violence¹¹². The first is *Direct Violence*, deliberate injury to the integrity of human life: homicide (genocide, massacre and murder); brutal acts (rape, torture and maltreatment); and restrictions or physical constraints (force removal of population, kidnapping, hostage-taking, imprisonment and forced labour). The second category is *Indirect Violence*, defined as indirect violations of the right to survival: violence by omission (lack of protection against social violence - hunger poverty and disease - accidents and natural catastrophes; mediated violence (dangerous modifications of the natural and social environment). The third category is *Repressive Violence*, the deprivation of fundamental human rights, including: social rights (right to organise, social equality, economic and social participation, property rights); civil rights (protection from the state); and political rights. Finally there is *Alienating Violence*, the deprivation of what Salmi calls 'higher rights': alienating living conditions; social ostracism; and ethnocide, the destruction cultures. Most of these forms of violence are enabled by surveillance practices; surveillance is essential particularly for those forms of violence that are performed by groups or institutions. Salmi argues that "violence is a structural element of the capitalist production and reproduction process"¹¹³. I would add that the mode of surveillance is involved in a dialectical relationship with both the mode of production and with violence.

Some have argued that there is a particularly American cultural relationship with violence that is also twisted into this strand. Denis Duclos has claimed that there is an underlying assumption in American society and politics that violence is the natural state of humanity and

¹¹¹ Salmi, Jamil (1993) *Violence and Democratic Society: New Approaches to Human Rights*, London: Zed Books.

¹¹² *ibid.*, 22-23.

¹¹³ *ibid.* 120.

that only strict discipline can control this terrifying undercurrent that threatens to burst out and overwhelm civilisation¹¹⁴. Therefore the global Panopticon can also be seen as a natural extension of American cultural, as well as political and economic, norms.

An immense financial commitment is needed to sustain the global Panopticon. For this the American state needs the onward march of globalizing capitalism, the economic might and the technological innovation that is so much a part of the way in which capitalism continually reproduces itself. However globalizing capitalism needs the global Panopticon in equal measure to monitor and enforce the 'natural' American values of liberal democracy and free-trade, whose social orderings produce the most willing producers and consumers. In the systems of surveillance which I have examined from the starting point of Menwith Hill we see expressed the harsher, more pessimistic face of the American liberal vision of 'the end of history' through free choice. The reality is that such a free-trade Utopia is inextricably linked with military power and can only be imposed through global surveillance and punishment.

However, there are many reasons why this dystopian trajectory might not come about. The first of which is to do with the fact that global trajectories are built out of a multiplicity of spatially-specific iterative events, which are in turn structured by the global context. The second is to do with resistance and the nature of social change.

Surveillance, Place and Territoriality

Surveillance is controlled from particular places, and surveillance activities take place at particular sites: the places examined in this thesis are three such sites. We have seen that at these particular places, the Panopticon can be seen to be peculiarly blind at certain times and in certain places. Small groups of activists can wander at will around the highest security establishments. One particular map produced for one of the many court cases by the MDP shows 111 individual spatio-temporal locations where Lindis Percy was intercepted by either the MDP or American security personnel up to that point. The majority of these arrests took place inside the Inner 'operations compound', or 'Secure Zone'. While this can be seen as an attempt to territorialize this place, to establish boundaries and behaviours through law as well

¹¹⁴ Duclos, Denis (1998) *The Werewolf Complex: America's Fascination with Violence*, Oxford: Berg.

as in practice, it is equally revealing of the failure of both the American and British states in territorializing Menwith Hill and emptying the site of meaning.

The actual lived practice of those operating surveillance systems has also been crucial. In theory all the papers containing confidential information at Menwith Hill are supposed to be either burnt, or in the case of codewords, liquidized in front of three witnesses (see Chapter 5). However in practice, this has quite clearly not happened at all times. Activists were able to retrieve substantial amounts of secret information from the waste bins - the flow of waste from the base proved to be anything but. Part of this might well have to do with the relationship between rather more basic technologies than computers and satellites, and those working at the base. The environmental survey conducted for the Department of Defense indicated that the waste incinerator was over-stretched and consequently causing pollution. Binning rather than burning would have kept down the flow of waste to the incinerators. The amount of waste paper also indicates that the high-tech world of the NSA has failed to live up to the techno-utopian vision of the future computerised workplace where paper would be a thing of the past¹¹⁵. These flows of waste were appropriated by the activists. They effectively changed the status of this particular actant from rubbish into valuable information and enrolled into their network, and for a short time at least, made it part of the resistance.

The other way in which the lived practice of state employees has subverted the progress towards global panopticism is through the realisation of their own dislike of these systems of surveillance and their place in them, a political awakening. Despite, or because of, their training and constant injunctions to keep to strict security procedures, NSA employees appear to be no more robots than anyone else. If school grades and degrees constitute any measure of intelligence and understanding, they also have substantial advantages over the rest of the population. It is therefore not surprising that some will choose to rebel and to reveal what they know, sometimes to newspapers, sometimes to legislatures, and in a very few cases, like that of Margaret Newsham and Wayne Madsen, make substantial contributions to the public understanding of transnational surveillance networks. The courage to reject not only the monetary and social rewards but also the ideological certainties offered by being an employee

¹¹⁵ Roszack, Theodore (1988) *The Cult of Information: the Folklore of Computers and the True Art of Thinking*, London: Paladin.

of the intelligence services must be substantial but so, as we have seen, are the risks and the fear engendered by such a transformation. What happens when state employees speak is not so much that they leave the surveillance networks - if that were possible - rather that they push back the black-boxes that enclose these networks, making indentations, or causing the smooth and even surface to become at least partially transparent.

The impact of these processes and practices has meant that the two states have actually lost control of at least some aspects of the territoriality of Menwith Hill. Whilst higher, tougher fences, security cameras, improved security procedures and so on, have all been instituted, meaning has leaked out of Menwith like water through a sieve. In addition, while the British government, the 'Gore-tex' state with its strict control of information¹¹⁶, does not supply any information except the same bland and patently untrue statements about NATO communications, they will not be able to supplant the counter-discourses now proliferating and forming the bases of increasing networks of challenge and resistance. The water has not leaked away: it has flowed through various scapes: legal, legislative, social mobilisation and so on, to fertilize new landscapes of resistance.

Challenging and resisting the Global Panopticon

Resistance does not automatically lead to success. There are many different forms of challenge and resistance offered to surveillance networks, some of whose solutions may be contradictory; some of which may not in fact offer solutions.

I asked earlier whether surveillance is a 'bad' thing. A more significant question for some might be: does surveillance have to be bad? As we have seen in Chapter 6, Nicky Hagar attacked the UKUSA alliance on the grounds that it provided little of any real use to the security of peoples of New Zealand and the Pacific¹¹⁷. This kind of attack is often made: that surveillance systems even when highly sophisticated, either do not work properly in technological terms, or fail to work politically because of the wider networks in which technological systems are enmeshed.

¹¹⁶ Gill, Peter (1994) *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence Agencies and the Liberal Democratic State*, London: Frank Cass, 80.

¹¹⁷ Hagar, Nicky (1996) *Secret Power, New Zealand's Role In the International Spy Network*. 2nd. ed. Craig Potton, Nelson, New Zealand.

The liberal democratic answer is greater accountability and democracy. David Lyon, in common with Norris and Armstrong¹¹⁸, and Wright¹¹⁹, argues that truly accountable surveillance in the context of a genuinely democratic society would remove some of the problems. In such a society, surveillance could operate in three ways which are very different to the ways in which it operates today. First, it could maximise participation rather than exclusion, for example, instant voting and other forms of on-line participatory governance. Secondly, data images could include "caring and protecting motifs" to enhance rather than attack personhood, and be easily erasable. Finally clear limits, and "dynamic criteria for gauging their appropriateness", rather than an open-ended quest for dominion, could be placed on surveillance methodologies¹²⁰.

Lyon is understandably critical of the fatalism of Foucault, who, while he is essential to the analysis of surveillance, offers no solutions. He also decries the almost ubiquitous use of George Orwell's 'Big Brother' as metaphor for the surveillance society across the political spectrum from Privacy International to the American religious right. Yet Lyon's solution of databases which define our personhood in 'caring and protecting' terms, conjures up visions of different but equally barren futures. These are the futures of Virilio's teletopia, or the cloying, insipid and pervasive society of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, where the World Controllers watch over every person to make sure that they are fulfilling their - genetically determined - potentials to the full, and are not demonstrating alienation, anomie or unhappiness. *Brave New World* is, I would argue, a far more likely literary metaphor for the society to come out of 'third way'-style marriages between state and neo-liberal capitalism than *1984*. The combination of enforced transnational 'peace', of full surveillance and control of the body inside and out, would be a more appropriate dystopian vision given the current trajectories of both biogenetic, computer and communications technology.

Peter Gill, in common with Lustgarten and Leigh, makes a case for the reform of the intelligence services on more democratic lines. The latter argue that the concept of national

¹¹⁸ Norris and Armstrong 1999 *op cit*.

¹¹⁹ Wright, Steve 1998 *op cit*.

¹²⁰ Lyon 1994 *op cit*, 214-217.

security needs to be reformulated to put the interests of people at the centre of the concept¹²¹. Gill, focusing on internal national-level security services, argues that a major public Inquiry would be the only option. However, given the enormous list of caveats and contradictions around the concept of an open Inquiry on intelligence and security in the UK, especially in the light of the highly powerful centralised secret state model that Gill had earlier put forward, and which I largely accept, the Inquiry option seems ludicrous. Gill appears to realise this and finally concludes that such an Inquiry would only be fruitful in a situation of "generalized democratization", and "within the context of broader arguments for positive rights to security from arbitrary arrest, personal privacy, freedom of information and expression, freedom to organise and to demonstrate and freedom of movement"¹²². In other words, an Inquiry would only work in a very different kind of society, which would be almost impossible to imagine without a very different kind of state, the existence of which would remove the need for an Inquiry!

Gill mentions the challenge offered by personal privacy. This, as we have seen is the overt rationale for the challenge offered by Privacy International. I would argue that at least part of the deeper rationale for the use of the discourse of privacy is its practical tactical utility. It is a discourse shared by both the left and right of the conventional political spectrum, and is therefore considered more capable of enrolling actors into the networks established around it, who might then be won over to more radical notions.

There are an increasing number of commentators who reject privacy as a discourse around which to base a challenge to surveillance. These challenges come from several different parts of the political spectrum. Calvin Gotlieb argues that privacy is both too weak and too strong a concept: its inflexibility makes it susceptible to being undermined by the very people who it is claimed will benefit by it¹²³. Increasingly, he claims people are willing to trade their privacy for other benefits offered by social-technological systems involving surveillance. Gotlieb calls instead for the adoption of a realistic commercial-legal concept of *confidentiality*, based on contract. This certainly is more consistent with the Lockean social

¹²¹ Lustgarten, Laurence and Leigh, Ian (1994) *In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

¹²² Gill 1994 *op cit.*, 345-346.

order, however it will not appeal to those concerned with social justice. Contracts are based in existing relations of power, and could threaten to exclude further those who already occupy the marginal places within the socio-economic system, while strengthening the position of those more able to make real choices.

Lyon accepts that this worst-case scenario is one of the major disadvantages of privacy as an organising discourse but accepts that it has utility:

at worst, the dominant framework of the privacy debate - self-possessing, autonomous individualism - leaves us with a world of privilege where self-protection is only available to those who can negotiate it. At best, understood in relation to a notion of personhood centred on self-communication, and thus resonating more with ideas like human dignity and human freedom, privacy,- if that term must be used at all - has a place¹²⁴.

He shows that there is no easily fixed notion of privacy, indeed that historically privacy has had many negative connotations including a lack of social relations, and of course resonates with ideas of the domestic, the patriarchal hierarchic household whose internal relations are effectively black-boxed by the concept.

I would argue that one of the main reasons privacy has increasingly become a central notion in discourses about surveillance is to do with the specific circumstances of the mode of electronic information, and in particular the cultural location of the discourse of privacy. Privacy as an anti-surveillance discourse is increasingly associated with the politics of cyber-rights and cyber-liberties, in other words the politics of technologically-mediated communications. These politics are deeply rooted in a particular American, male, libertarian and in many ways esoteric culture. Erik Davis observes, "the American self is a gnostic self, because it believes, on a deep and abiding level, that authenticity arises from independence, an independence that is at once natural, sovereign and solitary"¹²⁵. This is in some ways

¹²³ Godlieb, Calvin (1996) *Privacy: A Concept whose time has come and gone*, in Lyons, David and Zureik, Elia (eds.) *Computers, Surveillance and Privacy*, Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press.

¹²⁴ Lyon 1994 *op cit.*,

¹²⁵ Davis, Erik (1999) *TechGnosis: Myth, Magic and Mysticism in the Age of Information*, London: Serpent's Tail, 102.

curious: the Internet is a network of communications between a multiplicity of individuals. In an actor-network approach, one can see that the connections work to transform individuals and indeed the notion of individuality, yet the central discourse of cyber-liberties is fiercely resistant to any attempt to compromise individuality.

The discourse of privacy is also inadequate to the task of tackling the many different scales of surveillance: how is one to define the privacy of a group or a nation, let alone of another species? Finally there are political problems because of the increasing shifts in power between nation-state, capital and individual, to look to the nation-state to guarantee 'rights' like privacy is perhaps doomed to be inadequate. This problem is accentuated given that one is asking the state to guarantee the citizens protection against itself. Is this realistic? We have seen some case where state structures like the courts and legislative Inquiries have attempted to guarantee rights against other parts of the state. However if the enforcement of those rights becomes threatening enough, the machinery of the core, the secret state, through injunctions, certificates of immunity or Presidential decrees, can always foreclose such attempts. One of the key question for the future is what happens when private corporations increasingly carry out the service delivery functions of the state, particularly in the final area that has long been felt to define the modern state: the legitimate control of the means of violence through policing, prisons, and the military?

I would argue that there is no simple answer. Erik Davis argues that we need to rekindle a spiritual-ecological understanding of technology: "to fire up the alembics of the imagination, to tune in to the pagan pulse of planetary life, to wire up the diamond matrix"; within this complex interaction of humanity, ecology and technology:

a 'network path' arises from the midst of yearning and confusion, a multifaceted but integral mode of spirit that might humanely and sensibly navigate the technological house of mirrors without losing the resonance of ancient ways or the ability to slice through the greed, hate and delusion that human life courts¹²⁶.

¹²⁶ *ibid.*, 334.

Davis' synthetic evolution is consistent with an approach that combines liberatory impulses, social justice and ecology.

We have seen that those most able to confront the global Panopticon are those who both have a vision of a better society, and who have been empowered as individuals and collectively through processes of mutual education and struggle. These attempts often involve the creation of alternative spaces, whether they are parapolitical organisations or peace camps. I am not suggesting that such spaces are in themselves exemplary of the spatial orderings of a better society; their forms are contingent on the locality and the nature of the surveillance systems to which they are opposed.

Thomas Mathiesen also posits the creation of alternative public spaces and "a restoration of the self esteem and feeling of worth on the part of the grass roots movements" - empowerment by any other name - as two of the key elements of resistance, along with the restoration of the feeling of responsibility on the part of intellectuals¹²⁷. This form of empowerment which would mean an understanding of the self as a relational, rather than the purely individualistic self of liberal democratic theory. In this conception "self-realisation would be achieved through reciprocity and interdependence rather than through autonomy"¹²⁸. We could start by asking what we actually need to provide everyone with the capacity for self-realisation in the context of an ecologically-bounded society. Only then could we ask whether we need surveillance and in what forms, analyse the current systems, their capacities, operations and potentials and determine whether they could or could not be adapted to meet such needs.

As in any situation there are societal choices to be made, and academics have to define their own active roles as engaged researchers and participate fully in the making of those choices. There is a dynamic tension between the tendency towards panopticism, a global surveillance society, and opposing tendencies towards individual and collective liberation. If there is a lesson in the story of Menwith Hill it is that many small iterative actions, and the creation of often tiny immutable mobiles, can affect change, create new networks and redefine old ones,

¹²⁷ Mathiesen 1999 *op cit.*, 32-33.

¹²⁸ Mathews, Freya (1995) Community and the Ecological Self. *Environmental Politics* Vol. 4, No. 4, 66-100, 76.

in more or less unpredictable ways. Thus neither of these extremes, these strange attractors, will determine exactly the way the path that society will take. However the conscious linking of anti-surveillance and anti-militarist networks with the increasing dynamism and confidence of the transnational, yet broad and decentralised, anti-globalization movement could ensure that the trajectory taken is one which provides the opportunity of maximum self-realisation for all.

Bibliography.

This bibliography is very large and thus divided into several thematic sections. The divisions do not represent any kind of hierarchy of knowledge or worth. Within the thematic sections, documents are listed alphabetically by named author following the Harvard system; where no named author is given, documents are listed by publication name in the case of newspapers and magazines, or by organisation name in the case of other publications; where identification of an author is impossible, documents are listed under 'unknown'. For Internet publications, a web address is given; every effort has been made to confirm that these addresses are valid at the time of submission, however their continued availability cannot be guaranteed.

1. Academic Articles and Papers (p.364) - articles in refereed journals, plus conference papers, working papers, and unpublished academic articles;
2. Books (p.366) -including chapters within edited books;
3. Newspaper and Magazine Articles (p.375) - all articles in non-refereed periodicals;
4. Non-Governmental Organisation Publications (p.377) - reports and articles from NGOs;
5. Official Publications (p. 378) - all published state documents, including records of court cases: i. European Union; ii. United Kingdom; iii. United States of America.
6. Unpublished Archived Documents (p.381)
7. Archives, Electronic Databases and Internet Sources (p.382)- all archives, websites, on-line journals, databases, and CD-ROM databases consulted, with brief annotations.

I. Academic Articles and Papers

Anderson, E. (1993) Editorial: The scope of military geography, *GeoJournal* 31, 115-117.

Anderson, E. (1994) Editorial: the changing role of the military, *GeoJournal* 34, 131-132.

Anderson, E. (1995) Editorial: the military environment, *GeoJournal* 37, 199-200.

Ball, Kirstie (2000) Situating Surveillance: Representation, Meaning, Movement and Manipulation, Paper presented at the Surveillance and Society Conference, University of Hull, 20th September (no page numbers).

Coe, Duncan (1997) Salisbury Plain Training Area: archaeological conservation in a changing military and political environment, *Landscape Research* Vol. 21, No. 2, 157-174.

Coulson, M. G. and Baldwin, H. (eds.) *Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Environment and Defence, Swansea UK, 13-15th September 1995 (CCMS Report No. 211)*. NATO / Department of Geography, University of Wales, Swansea.

Cresswell, Tim (1994): Putting women in their place: the carnival at Greenham Common, *Antipode* Vol. 26, No. 1, 35-58.

Der Derian, James (1998) Virtual Theory: State, Speed and Violence. Paper given at the RIPE Conference on Globalization, State and Violence, University of Sussex, 15th-17th April, 1998.

Doak, Joe (1999) Planning for the reuse of the redundant Defence Estate: disposal processes, policy frameworks and development impacts, *Planning Practice and Research* Vol. 14, No. 2, 211-224.

- Dodds, Klaus (1998) Enframing the Falklands: identity, landscape, and the 1982 South Atlantic War, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol. 16, 733-756.
- Donaldson, Andrew (1999) *Linguistic Minorities in Rural Development: A Case-Study of the Cornish Language and Cornwall*, Centre for Rural Economy Working Paper No. 42, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.
- Doxford, D. (1996) *The allocation and management of land used for military training in the UK*. Unpublished report for PhD transfer.
- Farrington, J. (1995) Military Land in Britain after the Cold War- Peace Dividend or Peace Penalty? *Geography*, 80, 273-277.
- Flaherty, D. H. (1988) The emergence of surveillance societies in the Western world, *Government Information Quarterly* Vol. 5 No. 4, 377-87.
- Gates, David (1989) American strategic bases in Britain: the agreements governing their use, *Comparative Strategy* Vol. 8 No. 1, 99-123.
- Gruffudd, Pyrs (1990) *Reach for the Sky: the Air and English Cultural Nationalism*, Department of Geography Working Paper No. 7, University of Nottingham.
- Haines, Gerald K. (1999) CIA's role in the Study of UFOs 1947-90: A Die-Hard Issue, in *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 5 No. 2, 7-48.
- Heffernan, M. (1995) For ever England: the Western Front and the politics of remembrance in Britain, *Ecumene* Vol. 2, 293-323.
- Hooper, N. & Cox, N. (1996): "The European Union KONVER Programme" *Defence and Peace Economics* Vol. 7, 75-94.
- Kirsch, Scott (1997) Watching the Bombs Go Off: Photography, Nuclear Landscapes and Spectator Democracy, *Antipode* Vol. 29, No. 3, 227-255.
- Koskela, Hille (2000) 'The gaze without eyes': video-surveillance and the changing nature of urban space, *Progress in Human Geography* Vol. 24, No. 2, 243-265.
- Latour, Bruno (1997) On actor-network theory: a few clarifications. (Reprinted from *Soziale Welt*) <http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/stt/stt/ant/latour.htm>
- Lovering, John (1994) The Production and the Consumption of the 'Means of Violence': Implications of the Reconfiguration of the State, Economic Internationalisation, and the End of the Cold War. *Geoforum* Vol. 25, No. 4, 471-486.
- Lovering, John (1998) Labour and the Defence industry: allies in 'globalization', *Capital and Class* No. 65, 9-20.
- Maguire, Diarmuid (1992) When the streets began to empty: the demobilisation of the British Peace Movement after 1983, *West European Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 75-94.
- Mathews, Freya (1995) Community and the Ecological Self. *Environmental Politics* Vol. 4, No. 4, 66-100.
- Morris, M. (1997) Gardens 'for ever England': landscape, identity and the First World War cemeteries on the Western Front, *Ecumene* Vol. 4, 410-434.
- Murdoch, Jonathan (1997a) 'Towards a Geography of Heterogeneous Associations' *Progress in Human Geography* Vol. 21, No. 3, 321-337.
- Murdoch, Jonathan (1997b) inhuman/nonhuman/human: actor-network theory and the prospects for a nondualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society, in *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* Vol. 15, 731-756.

- Ransom, H. H. (1980) Being intelligent about secret intelligence agencies, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No. 1, 141-2.
- Savege, J. (with Brotherton, I. and Owens, P. L.) (1995) *The Future for the Defence Estate: Changing Demands for Army Training*. Brasseys/Centre for Defence Studies, London.
- Savege, J. (1997) Soldiers, Stones Curlews and SSSIs: Maintaining the Balance, *ECOS* Vol. 18, No. 1, 68-74.
- Shaw, M. (1998) War and Globality: The Role and Character of War in the Global Transition, in Ho-Won Jeong (ed.) *Peace and Conflict: A New Agenda*. Dartmouth Publishing. Also given as a paper at the 'Globalisation, Society and Violence' conference in Brighton (page numbers (1-17) from this version).
- Tivers, Jacqueline (1999) 'The Home of the British Army'; the iconic construction of military defence landscapes, in *Landscape Research*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 303-319.
- Wharf, B. (1997) The geopolitics/geoeconomics of military base closures in the USA, *Political Geography* 16, 541-564
- Woodward, R. (1999) Gunning for Rural England: The Politics of the Promotion of Military Land Use in the Northumberland National Park, *Journal of Rural Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 17-33.
- Woodward, Rachel (1998) 'It's a Man's Life!': soldiers, masculinity and the countryside, *Gender, Place and Culture*, 5 (3), 277-300.
- Woodward, Rachel (1998) *Geographies of Military Activity: A Review*, unpublished paper.
- Woodward, R. (1998) *Defended Territory: The Otterburn Training Area and the 1997 Public Inquiry*. Centre for Rural Economy Research Report, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.
- Woodward, R. (2000) *Discourses of Military Environmentalism*, Centre for Rural Economy Working Paper 48, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.
- Ziegler, Charles A. (1999) UFOs and the Intelligence Community, in *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 5 No. 2, 1-25.

2. Books

- Aldrich, Richard J. and Hopkins, Michael F. (1994) *Intelligence, Defence, and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World*, London: Frank Cass.
- Althusser, Louis (1971) Ideology and ideological state apparatuses: notes towards an investigation, in Beinsler, B. (trans.) *Lenin, Philosophy and Other Essays*, London: New Left Books.
- Agnew, John and Corbridge, Stuart (1995) *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, London: Routledge.
- Amin, A. and Hausner, J. (eds.) (1997) *Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and Social Complexity*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Amin, A. and Hausner, J. (1997) Interactive Governance and Social Complexity. In Amin and Hausner (eds.), 1-31.
- Anderson, Benedict (1983) *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso.
- Andrew, Christopher M. (1985) *Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community*, London: Heinemann.
- Andrew, Christopher (1995) *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*, New York: HarperCollins.

- Appy, Christine G. (ed.) (2000) *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism 1945-1966*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Atkinson, Adrian (1991) *Principles of Political Ecology*, London: Belhaven Press.
- Aubrey, Crispin. (1981) *Who's watching you?* Harmondsworth. Penguin.
- Ball, Desmond (1980) *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia*, Hale and Iremonger.
- Bamford, James (1983) *The Puzzle Palace*, (with a new afterword), Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Bauman, Zygmunt (1995) *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Modernity*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Berg, Bruce (1995) *Qualitative Research Methods in the Social Sciences (2nd edition)*, Needham Heights MA: Alyn and Bacon.
- Berger, Peter L. and Luckman, Thomas (1969) *The Social Construction of Reality*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Birkinshaw, Patrick (1990) *Reforming the Secret State*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Blum, William (1986) *The CIA: a Forgotten History*, London: Zed Books.
- Bookchin, Murray (1995) *The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism*, Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Bunyan, Tony (1977) *The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain (Revised Edition)*, London: Quartet Books.
- Burrows, W. (1987) *Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security*, New York NY: Random House.
- Brauch, Hans Gunter (ed.) (1989) *Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament: ABC Weapons , Military Use of Nuclear Energy and of Outer Space and Implications for International Law*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Brommelhorster, Jorn (ed.) (2000) *Demystifying the Peace Dividend*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Buzan, Barry (1991) *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Second Edition)*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Byrne, David (1998) *Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: an Introduction.*, London: Routledge.
- Caldas-Coulthard, Carmen Rosa and Coulthard, Malcolm (1996) *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Routledge.
- Callon, M. (1986) 'Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay' in Law (ed.) 196-233.
- Callon, Michel and Latour, Bruno (1981) Unscrewing the big Leviathan: how actors macrostructure reality and how sociologists help them to do so, in Knorr-Cetina, K. and Cicourel, A. V. (eds.) *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology*, London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.
- Campbell, Duncan (Ed.) (1981) *Big Brother Is Listening - Phone tappers and the security state*. 1st ed. Vol. 2. New Statesman, London.
- Campbell, Duncan (1982) *War Plan UK: The Truth about Civil Defence in Britain*, London: Burnett Books.
- Campbell, Duncan (1984) *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain*, London: Michael Joseph.
- Cavendish, Anthony (1990) *Inside Intelligence*, London: Collins.

- Childs, John (1998) *The Military Use of Land: a History of the Defence Estate*, Bern CH: Peter Lang.
- Chomsky, Noam (1969) *American Power and the new Mandarins*, New York: Pantheon.
- Chomsky, Noam (1989) *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, London: Pluto Press.
- Chomsky, Noam (1992) *Deterring Democracy (Second Edition)*, New York: Hill and Wang.
- Cohen, Anthony P. (1989) *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, London: Routledge.
- Conley, V. A (1997) *Ecopolitics: the Environment in Post-Structuralist Thought*. London, Routledge.
- Cook, Terry L. (1999) *Big Brother Nsa and It's Little Brother: National Security Agency's Global Surveillance Network, USA*: Hearststone.
- Cosgrove, Denis (1985) *Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape*, Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble.
- Cosgrove, Denis and Daniels, Stephen (1988) Introduction: iconography and landscape in Cosgrove and Daniels (eds.) *The Iconography of Landscape*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Coveney, P. and Highfield, R. (1995) *Frontiers of Complexity: the Search for Order in a Chaotic World*. London, Faber and Faber.
- Cowan, Ruth Schwartz (1997) *A Social History of American Technology*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cresswell, Tim (1996) *In Place / Out of Place: Geography, Ideology and Transgression*, Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Cumings, B. (1994) The politics of television in the Gulf War, in O'Laughlin, J., Mayer, T. and Greenberg, E. (eds.) *War and its Consequences: Lessons from the Persian Gulf Conflict*, New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 137-154.
- Curtis, Mark (1995) *The Ambiguities of Power: British Foreign Policy Since 1945*. London: Zed Books.
- Curtis, Mark (1998) *The Great Deception: Anglo-American Relations and the World Order*, London: Pluto Press.
- Daly, Herman and Cobb, John B. (1989) *For the Common Good*, London: Greenprint.
- Dandeker, Christopher (1990) *Surveillance, Power, and Modernity : Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Daniels, S. (1993) *Fields of Vision: Landscape Imagery and National Identity in England and the United States*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Davies, S (1996) *Big Brother: Britain's Web Of Surveillance And The New Technological Order*. Pan Books: London.
- Davis, Erik (1999) *TechGnosis: Myth, Magic and Mysticism in the Age of Information*, London: Serpent's Tail.
- Deacon, Richard (1991) *British Secret Service*, London: Grafton.
- Dean, Jodi (1999) *Aliens in America: From Outerspace to Cyberspace*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
- Deleuze, Giles and Guattari, Felix (1983): *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, Giles and Guattari, Felix (1988): *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Delorme, R. (1997) The Foundational Bearing of Complexity. In Amin and Hausner (eds.), 32-56.
- Der Derian, James (1992) *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War*, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

- Devereux, Peter and Brookesmith, Peter (1999) *UFOs and Ufology: the First Fifty Years*, London: Blandford.
- Dicken, P. (1992) *Society and Nature: Towards a Green Social Theory*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Diffie, Whitfield and Landau, Susan (1998) *Privacy on the Line: the Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- Dorril, Stephen and Ramsay, Robin (1991) *Smear! Wilson and the Secret State*, London: Fourth Estate.
- Dorril, Stephen (1998) *M16*, London: Fourth Estate.
- Duclos, Denis (1998) *The Werewolf Complex: America's Fascination with Violence*, Oxford: Berg.
- Duke, Simon (1987) *US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom: a Matter for Joint Decision?* London: Macmillan.
- Duke, Simon (1989) *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, Oxford: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) / Oxford University Press.
- Enloe, Cynthia (1993) *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Escobar, Arturo (1995) *Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Eve, R. A., Horsfall, S. and Lee, M. E. (1997) *Chaos, Complexity and Sociology: Myths, Models and Theories*. Thousand Oaks CA, Sage.
- Fairclough, Norman (1995) *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, Harlow: Longman.
- Fowler, Roger (1996) On critical linguistics, in Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard (eds.), 3- 14.
- Foucault, Michel (1975) *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, New York: Vintage.
- Foucault, Michel (1980) Questions of Geography, in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77*, 63-77.
- Gandy, O. H. Jr (1993) *The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information*, Boulder CO: Westview Press.
- Geertz, Clifford (1973) *The Interpretation of Cultures*, London: Hutchinson.
- Gerson, Joseph and Birchard, Bruce (eds.) (1991) *The Sun Never Sets: Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases*, Boston MA: South End Press / American Friends Service Committee.
- Giddens, Anthony (1981) *A Critique of Historical Materialism (Volume 1)*, London: Macmillan.
- Giddens, A. (1984) *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A (1985) *The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gill, Peter (1994) *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence Agencies and the Liberal Democratic State*, London: Frank Cass.
- Gilpin, Robert (1987) *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gotlieb, Calvin (1996) Privacy: A Concept whose time has come and gone, in Lyons, David and Zureik, Elia (eds.) *Computers, Surveillance and Privacy*, Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press.
- Gregory, Richard L. (ed.) (1987) *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Hagar, Nicky (1996) *Secret Power, New Zealand's Role In the International Spy Network. (Second edition)*, Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potton.
- Hall, Stuart (1992) The west and the rest: discourse and power, in Hall and Gieben, Bram (eds.) *Formations of Modernity*, Oxford: Polity / Open University Press.
- Haraway, Donna (1997) *Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan@_Meets_OncoMouse™*, New York: Routledge.
- Harris, Ray (1996) *Sign, Language and Communication*, London: Routledge.
- Hartley, K. and Hooper, N. (1991) Economic Adjustment, in Kirby, S. and Hooper, N. *The Cost of Peace: Assessing Europe's Security Options*, Reading: Harwood Academic Publishers, 199-223.
- Harvey, David (1996) *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, David (2000) *Spaces of Hope*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.
- Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon.
- Hippler, Jochen (1994) *Pax Americana? Hegemony or Decline*, London: Pluto Press / Transnational Institute.
- Hooper, D (1987) *Official Secrets - The Use & Abuse of the Act (1st ed.)*, London: Secker & Warburg.
- Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T. (trans. Cumming, J.) (1979) *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London, Verso. Originally published (1969) as *Dialektik der Aufklärung*. Frankfurt: Fischer.
- Hughes, John (1990) *The Philosophy of Social Research*, Harlow: Longman.
- Jaworski, Adam and Coupland, Nicholas (1999) *The Discourse Reader*, London: Routledge.
- Jeffrys-Jones, Rhodri (1989) *The CIA and American Democracy*, New Haven CN: Yale University Press.
- Jeffry-Jones, Rhodri and Andrew, Christopher (eds.) *Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA*, London: Frank Cass.
- Johnson, Loch K. (1988) *A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence (2nd Edition)*, Chicago: Dorsay.
- Johnson, Loch K. (1989) *America's Secret Power: the CIA in a Democratic Society*, New York : Oxford University Press.
- Johnstone, Diana and Cramer, Ben (1991) The Burdens and the Glory: U.S. Bases in Europe in Gerson and Birchard (eds.), 199-223.
- Kaldor, Mary (1982) *The Baroque Arsenal*, London: Andre Deutsch.
- Kaldor, M. (1997) Introduction. In Kaldor, M. and Vashee, B. (eds.) *Restructuring the Global Military Sector. Volume 1: New Wars*. London, Pinter. 3-33.
- Katzenstein, Peter (ed.) (1996) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kolko, Gabriel (1988) *Confronting the Third World*, New York: Pantheon.
- Kossy, Donna (1994) *Kooks: A Guide to the Outer Limits of Human Belief*, Portland OG: Feral House.
- Kress, Gunthar (1996) Representational resources and the production of subjectivity: questions for the theoretical development of Critical Discourse Analysis in a multi-cultural society, in Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard (eds.), 15-31.

- Kress, Gunthar and Van Leeuwen, J (1996) *Reading Image: The Grammar of Visual Design*, London: Routledge.
- Kurzweil, Edith (1996) *The Age of Structuralism: From Levi-Strauss to Foucault (Revised Edition)*, New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Kvale, Steinar (1996) *InterViews: an Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.
- Lanning, Hugh and Norton-Taylor, Richard (1991) *A Conflict of Loyalties: GCHQ 1984-1991*, New Clarion Press, Cheltenham.
- Lash, Scott and Urry, John (1994) *Economies of Signs and Space*. London: Sage.
- Latour, Bruno (1986) 'The powers of association' in Law (ed.) 196-233.
- Latour, Bruno (1991) Technology is society made durable, in Law, John (ed.) *A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination*, London: Routledge, 103-131.
- Latour, Bruno (trans. Porter, C.) (1993) *We Have Never Been Modern*. Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf. Originally published as Latour, B. (1989) *Nous n'avons jamais ete modernes*. Paris, Editions La Decouverte.
- Latour, Bruno (1999) *Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Law, J. (ed.) (1986) *Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?* Sociological Review Monograph No. 32, London: Routledge & Keegan Paul.
- Lee, Raymond E. (2000) *Unobtrusive Methods in Social Research*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Lee, Mary E. (1997) From Enlightenment to Chaos: Toward Nonmodern Social Theory. In Eve, Horsfall and Lee (eds.), 15-29.
- Lefebvre, Henri (trans. Nicholson-Smith, Donald) (1991 [1974]) *The Production of Space*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Leigh, Ian (1988) *The Wilson Plot: The Intelligence Services and the Discrediting of a Prime Minister 1945-1976*, London: Heinemann.
- Ley, D. (1983) *A Social Geography of the City*, New York: Harper and Row.
- Lukes, Steven (1982) Power and autonomy, in Botomore, T. and Nisbet, R. (eds.) *A History of Sociological Analysis*, New York: Basic Books.
- Lustgarten, Laurence and Leigh, Ian (1994) *In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lyon, David (1994) *The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society*. Polity Press, Oxford.
- Lyotard, J. (1979) *La Condition Postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir*. Paris, Les Editions de Minuit.
- McLuhan, Marshall (1964) *Understanding Media: the Extensions of Man*, London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.
- McNeil, William H. (1982) *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Macy, Joanna R. (1983) *Despair and Personal Power in the Nuclear Age*, Philadelphia PA: New Society.
- Markusen, A. and Yudken, J. (1992) *Dismantling the Cold War Economy*, New York: Basic Books.
- Martin, Thomas S. (1998) *Greening the Past: Towards a Social-Ecological Analysis of History*. Bethesda MD, International Scholars Publications.

- Marx, Gary (1984) Notes on the discovery, collection and assessment of hidden and dirty data, in Schneider, J. W. and Kitsuse, J. (eds.) *Studies in the Sociology of Social Problems*, Norwood NJ: Ablex.
- Massey, Doreen (1994) *Space, Place and Gender*, Cambridge, Polity Press
- Matless, David (1998) *Landscape and Englishness*, London: Reaktion Books.
- May, Earnest R. (ed.) (1993) *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68*, Boston MA: Bedford Books.
- Mazower, Mark (ed.) (1997) *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives*, Providence, RI: Berghahn Books.
- Melucci, Alberto (1988) *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*, London: Radius.
- Michael, Mike (1996) *Constructing Identities*, London: Sage.
- Mills, C. Wright (1956) *The Power Elite*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Milne, Seamus (1994) *The Enemy Within: MI5, Maxwell and the Scargill Affair*, London: Verso.
- Murray, Gary (1993) *Enemies of the State*, London: Simon and Schuster.
- Naess, A. (ed. and trans. Rothenberg, D.) (1989) *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Orig. publ. as Naess, A. (1976) *Ecologi, Samfunn og Livstil*. Oslo, Oslo University Press.
- Nau, Henry (1990) *The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, Clive and Armstrong, Gary (1999) *The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV*, Oxford: Berg.
- O'Hara, Larry (1994) *Turning up the Heat: MI5 after the Cold War*, London: Phoenix Press.
- Odum, W. E (1997) *Ecology: A Bridge Between Science and Society*. Sunderland USA: Sinauer Associates
- Ponting, Clive (1990) *Secrecy in Britain*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Ponting, Clive (1998) *The Pimlico History of the Twentieth Century*, London: Pimlico Press. (Previously published 1997, as *Progress and Barbarism: the World in the Twentieth Century*, London: Chatto and Windus)
- Porter, Bernard (1992) *Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain, 1790-1988*, London: Routledge.
- Poster, Mark (1990) *The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social Context*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Price, B. (1997) the Myth of Postmodern Science. In Eve, Horsfall and Lee (eds.), 3-14.
- Rapport, Nigel (1993) *Diverse World-Views in an English Village*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Rheingold, H. (1994) *The Virtual Community*, London: Secker and Warburg.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. and Ball, Desmond (1985) *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries*, London: Allen & Unwin.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1999a) *The U.S. Intelligence Community (4th Edition)*, Boulder CO: Westview Press.
- Richelson, Jeffrey (1995) *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Oxford University Press.

- Richelson, Jeffrey (1999b) *America's Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security*, Kansas: University Press Of Kansas.
- Robertson, Geoffrey (1998) *The Justice Game*, London: Chatto and Windus.
- Robinson, William I. (1996) *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rogers, Ann (1997) *Secrecy and power in the British State : a history of the Official Secrets Act*, London: Pluto Press.
- Roseneil, Sasha (1995) *Disarming Patriarchy: Feminism and Politics at Greenham*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Roszack, Theodore (1988) *The Cult of Information: the Folklore of Computers and the True Art of Thinking*, London: Paladin.
- Rule, James B. (1973) *Private Lives, Public Surveillance: Social Control in the Information Age*, London: Allen-Lane.
- Sack, Robert D. (1986) *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Salmi, Jamil (1993) *Violence and Democratic Society: New Approaches to Human Rights*, London, Zed Books.
- Schiffirin, Deborah (1994) *Approaches to Discourse*, Malden MA: Blackwell.
- Schnabel, Jim (1994) *Dark White: Aliens, Abductions and the UFO Obsession* Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Seager, Joni (1991) *Earth Follies: Feminism, Politics and the Environment*, London: Earthscan.
- Shaw, Martin (1991) *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Shimron, Gad (1995) *Histoire Secrete du Mossad*, Paris: Editions Dagorno.
- Sibley, David (1995) *Geographies of Exclusion*, London: Routledge.
- Simich, Laura (1991) The corruption of a community's economic and political life: the cruise missile base in Comiso, in Gerson and Birchard (eds.) 77-94.
- Simmel, Georg (trans. and ed. Wolff, Kurt H.) (1950) *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, New York: Free Press.
- Simon, Roger (1991) *Gramsci's Political Thought: and Introduction (Revised Edition)*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Slater, David, and Taylor, Peter (eds.) (1999) *The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Slater, David and Taylor, Peter J. (1999) Multiple Themes, One America; One Theme, Multiple Americas, in Slater and Taylor (eds.) 341-348.
- Smith, Bradley F. (1993) *The Ultra-Magic Deals*, Navato CA: Presidio.
- Smith, Neil (1984) *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Soja, Edward (1989) *Postmodern Geographies : the Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*, London: Verso.
- Sokal, A. D., and Bricmont, J. (1998) *Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern Philosophers' Abuse of Science*, London: Profile Books.
- Street, John (1991) *Politics and Technology*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

- Sturdevant, Sandra Pollock (1993) *Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and U.S. Military in Asia*, New York: New Press.
- Thomas, Gordon (1999) *Gideon's Spies: the Secret History of Mossad*, London: Macmillan.
- Thomas, R. M. (1990) *The Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989 of the United Kingdom*, London:
- Thomas, W (1995) *Scorched Earth: The Military's assault on the Environment*, Philadelphia PA: New Society Publishers.
- Thurlow, Richard C. (1994) *The Secret State : British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Trask, R. L. (1999) *Key Concepts in Language and Linguistics*, London: Routledge.
- Tuan, Yi-Fu (1979) *Landscapes of Fear*, New York: Pantheon.
- Urban, Mark (1996) *UK Eyes Alpha*, London: Faber.
- Urry, John (2000) *Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century*, London: Routledge.
- Van Creveld, Martin L. (1991) *Technology and War: from 2000 BC until the Present*, New York: Free Press.
- Van Dijk, Teun A. (1997) Discourse as interaction in society, in Van Dijk (ed.) *Discourse as Social Interaction. Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction (Volume 2)*, London: Sage, 1-37.
- Van der Pijl, Kees (1998) *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, London: Routledge.
- Vincent, David (1998) *The Culture of Secrecy in Britain, 1832-1998*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Walker, R. A. (1997) Commentary on Part IV: Field of dreams or the best game in town, in Goodman, D. and Watts, M. (eds.) *Globalising Food: Agrarian Questions and Global Restructuring*, London: Routledge, 273-284.
- Webbe, E. J. et al. (1981) *Nonreactive Measures in the Social Sciences*, Dallas TX: Houghton Mifflin..
- West, Nigel (1981) *MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909-1945*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson.
- West, Nigel (1982) *A Matter of Trust: MI5 1945-1972*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson.
- West, Nigel (1983) *British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1945*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson.
- West, Nigel (1986) *GCHQ : the Secret Wireless War 1900-86*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson.
- West, Nigel (1997) *The Secret War for the Falklands: the SAS, MI6 and the War Whitehall Nearly Lost*, London: Little Brown.
- Wilcox, Clyde (1992) *God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth Century America*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Woodward, Bob (1987) *Veil: the Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987*. New York NY: Simon and Schuster.
- Wright, Patrick (1996) *The Village that Died for England: the Strange Story of Tyneham*, London: Vintage.
- Yin, Robert K. (1994) *Case-Study Research: Design and Methods*, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.
- Zegert, Amy (1999) *Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC*, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

3. Newspaper and Magazine Articles

- Bale, Jeffrey M. (nd) 'Conspiracy Theories' and Clandestine Politics, in *Lobster* No. 29.
- Campbell, Duncan and Hosenball, Mark (1976) *The Eavesdroppers*, *Time Out*, June 1976.
- Campbell, Duncan and Melvern, Linda (1980) America's Big Ear on Europe, *New Statesman*, July 18, 1980, 10-14.
- Campbell, Duncan (1988) They've Got It Taped, *New Statesman*, 12 August, 1988, pp. 10-12.
- Campbell, Duncan (1993) *The Hill*, an IPTV Production for Channel Four Television.
- Campbell, Duncan (1998) Listening in silence. *Index on Censorship* 27:46-53.
- Cukier, Kenneth Neil (2000) "Frenchelon": France's Alleged Global Surveillance Network And its Implications on International Intelligence Cooperation, *Communications Week International*. (Issue number unavailable).
- Davis, Erik (1993) My Favorite Martians: A UFO Epistemology, originally published in the *Voice Literary Supplement*, February 1993. Available on-line at: <<http://www.levity.com/figment/martians.html>>
- Elkjær, Bo and Seeberg, Kenan (1999a) Echelon Was My Baby, *Ekstra Bladet*, November 17th.
- Elkjær, Bo and Seeberg, Kenan (1999b) Ex-Agent To Danish Ministers: You Are Being Monitored, *Ekstra Bladet*, Nov. 26. 1999.
- Elkjær, Bo And Seeberg, Kenan (1999c) The Danish Link To The Global Surveillance Network, *Ekstra Bladet*, date of press unavailable.
- Elkjær, Bo and Seeberg, Kenan (2000a) Key To The Whole World, *Ekstra Bladet*, Denmark, 4th March.
- Elkjær, Bo and Seeberg, Kenan (2000b) 'Speeding spies: NSA holds patent on revolutionary new computer storage device' *Ekstra Dagsbladet* (Denmark).
- Fukuyama, Francis (1989) The end of history? *The National Interest*, USA, No. 16, 3-19.
- Gibbons, Mark (1997) What is RAF Menwith Hill Station? *Gemini*, available on-line at: <http://www.gemini.org.uk/Twins/ufo/january97/bfilel_97.htm>
- Hagar, Nicky (1997) Exposing the Global Surveillance System, *Covert Action Quarterly* 59, Winter 97. Available on-line: <<http://www.caq.com/caq59globalsnoop.html>>
- Hagar, Nicky (2000) Echelon: a story about how information spreads (or doesn't), *Telepolis*, available on-line: <<http://www.heise.de/english/inhalt/te/8472/html>>
- Harrogate Advertiser* March on Menwith Saturday 8th May 1981,1; Peaceful Nuclear Attack on Menwith Hill Base.
- Harrogate Advertiser* As protesters hand in their special cake of peace... Someone kicks up a real Stink, Friday 27th May 1983.
- Harrogate Advertiser* 'Upset for peace camp, Friday 10th June 1983.
- Harrogate Advertiser* 'We don't want peace camps' Friday 1st July 1983.
- Harrogate Advertiser* Protests and Flowers at Menwith, Friday 27th May 1983.
- Harrogate Advertiser* Drugs Raid on Menwith, Saturday 17th February 1984.

Harrogate Advertiser Drugs Raid on U.S. Base, Saturday 13th April 1984.

Harrogate Advertiser Rat-catchers at peace camp, Friday 28th December 1984.

Harrogate Advertiser 'We have never been troubled by rats', letter from The Menwith Hill Peace Campers, 4th January 1985.

Harrogate Advertiser Have a Nice Day American Style, Saturday 10th July, 1987.

Harrogate Advertiser Security Chief's Error Lead to Death, Saturday 22nd July 1989.

Harrogate Advertiser Chief was Over the Limit, Saturday 22nd July 1989.

Harrogate Advertiser, Peace Campaigner was MoD Spy, 1996.

Harrogate Herald War Office Negotiates for 500 Acres Near Harrogate Wednesday 2nd March, 1955.

Harrogate Herald Public Can See What Life is Like in U.S. Army Camp, Wednesday 14th September 1960,

Harrogate Herald People See How U.S. Army Lives, Wednesday 21st September 1960.

Harrogate Herald American School in Yorkshire Dale, Wednesday 12th October 1960.

Harrogate Herald First Wedding in U.S. Army Base, Wednesday 16th November 1960.

Harrogate Herald Crosses are Link with Americans, Wednesday 16th December 1960

Harrogate Herald No Plan to Move U.S. Army Men from Menwith Hill, Wednesday 12th January 1966.

Harrogate Herald Protesters at Menwith Hill, Wednesday 23rd July 1969.

Huntingdon, Samuel P. (1993) The clash of civilisations, *Foreign Affairs*, USA, Vol. 22, No. 3.

Jones, Dean (1997) Real Lives: the right to fight, *Big Issue*, issue number unavailable.

Kitchen, Judy (1983) 'Survival, not Subversion', Letter to *Harrogate Advertiser* 22nd July.

Lardner, Richard (2000) NSA Overhauls Corporate Structure In Effort To Improve Operations, *Inside the Air Force*, June 23, 2000. Available on-line at: <<http://cryptome.org/nsa-redo.htm>>

Laurin, Fredrik and Froste, Calle 'Secret Swedish E-Mail Can Be Read by the U.S.A', *Svenska Dagbladet*, Sweden, 18th November 1997.

McBride, Juliet (1993) No fence too high. Obituary: John Bugg, *The Guardian* , 5th February, 10.

Madsen, Wayne (1998) 'CRYPTO AG - the NSA's Trojan Whore?', *Covert Action Quarterly* 63, Winter 98.

Nation Review (1973) Uncle Sam and his 40,000 Snoopers. (Issue number unavailable). Reprinted on *Cryptome*.

Nebehay, Stephanie (2000) China Says Top Priority is Halting Arms Race in Space, Geneva: Reuters, 27th January 2000.

Norton-Taylor, Richard (1994) US warned over treatment of peace protesters, *The Guardian* , 5th October 1994.

Norton-Taylor, Richard (2000) GCHQ to get new headquarters for £800m *The Guardian*, Tuesday March 7.

Ramparts , U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir, Vol. 11, No. 2, August 1972, 35-50. Available on-line at: <<http://jya.com/nsa-elint.htm>>

- Ross, Andrew (1996) The future is a risky business, *The Ecologist*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 42-4.
- Seeberg, Kenan And Elkjær, Bo (1999) Tele Danmark In A Club With Echelon Spies, *Ekstra Bladet*, Denmark, Sept. 26, 1999.
- Shane, Scott and Bowman, Tom (1995) No Such Agency, Special Reprint of a Six-Part Series in *The Baltimore Sun*, December 3-15th, 1995.
- Szczepanik, Nick, (1998) Old foes prepare to strike out for final accolade, *The Times*, September 5th.
- Taylor, Donald and Hardcastle, Harry (1983) Eavesdropping on the World, *Harrogate Advertiser*, 20th May 1983, 9.
- Taylor, Richard (1981) Whitelaw Denial on Menwith, *Harrogate Advertiser*, Friday 22nd May 1981, 1
- van Buuren, Jelle (2000) Echelon Committee presents work programme, *Telepolis*, 18th September. <<http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/8752/1.html>>
- Vest, Jason and Madsen, Wayne (1999) A Most Unusual Collection Agency: How the U.S. undid UNSCOM through its empire of electronic ears, *Village Voice*, USA, February 24 - March 2.
- The Winds* magazine (1998): A Million Eyes. U.S. surveillance of citizens reaches new levels: Are the citizens criminals or are world governments? <http://thewinds.org/arc_features/government/surveillance12-98.html>

4. Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Publications

- Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) (1996) *Conversion Survey 1996: Global Disarmament, Demobilization and Demilitarization*, Oxford: OUP.
- Brommelhorster, J. (1997) *KONVER II: Fostering of Conversion by the European Union*, Bonn: BICC.
- CAAB Newsletter 1996-
- Farquhar, George (nd.) Covert Terrorism in the UK, <http://www.isleofavalon.co.uk/local/h-pages/pro-freedom/ct_uk.html>
- The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament Press release: Appalling facts exposed in Echelon Hearing in the European Parliament, Brussels, 23 February 2000.
- The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament Press release 27th March 2000.
- The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament Press release: Greens/EFA criticise decision of Conference of Presidents on Echelon, Brussels, 14 April 2000.
- The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament Press release: Parliament's Presidency meets demand of Green/EFA Group, Strasbourg, 14th June 2000.
- The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament Press release: Greens/EFA regrets that inquiry committee on Echelon spying system was turned down, Strasbourg, 5th July 2000.
- Mathiesen, Thomas (1999) *On Globalisation of Control: Towards an Integrated Surveillance System in Europe*, London: Statewatch.
- Network DEMILITARISED (1994a) *Demilitarisation and Conversion*, Kaiserslauten DL: Network DEMILITARISED.

- Network DEMILITARISED/EDAW CR Planning (1994b) *The Conversion of Military Sites- a handbook outlining a commercial audit procedure to assist the reuse of former Defence Establishments*, Trowbridge: ND Working Group Two.
- Network DEMILITARISED (1994c): *Conversion Instruments - a handbook outlining environmental, planning and social strategies and measures to facilitate the conversion process*, Glyfada EL: ND Working Group Three.
- Network DEMILITARISED (1995) *The Conversion of Defence-Dependant Regions- A practical workbook for facing the challenges*, Preston: Lancashire Enterprises PLC.
- Network DEMILITARISED/TSD/EDAW (1996): *Military Base Conversion- The Lessons from Experience*, Trowbridge: ND Working Group Two.
- Norton-Taylor, Richard (1990) *In Defence of the Realm?: the Case for Accountable Security Services*, London: Civil Liberties Trust.
- Project Freedom Network leaflet (nd.)
- Rainbow, Anni (1994) R.A.F. Feltwell - Unaccountable and out of control, *Close Menwith Hill News*, December 1994.
- Shut Down Menwith Hill U.S.-N.S.A. Spy Base (nd) Leaflet.
- WoMenwith Hill Wimmin's Peace Camp (nd.) Leaflet.
- WoMenwith News, 1994-
- Yorkshire CND (nd.) *A History of SDIO and BMDO*, on-line at: <<http://gn.apc.org/cndyorks/fdales/>>

5. Official Publications

i. European Union

- l'Assemblée Nationale, La Commission De La Défense Nationale Et Des Forces Armées(1) (2000), *Rapport Sur Les Systèmes De Surveillance Et D'interception Électroniques Pouvant Mettre En Cause La Sécurité Nationale*, Presented by M. Arthur Paecht, 11th October 2000.
- Becker, Peggy (1999) *Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Volume 1/5: Presentation / Analysis*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.
- Bogonikolos, Nikos (1999) *Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Volume 5/5: The perception of economic risks arising from the potential vulnerability of electronic commercial media to interception: Survey of opinions of experts*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.
- Campbell, Duncan (1999) *Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Volume 2/5: the state of the art in Communications Intelligence (COMINT) of automated processing for intelligence purposes of intercepted broadband multi-language leased or common carrier systems, and its applicability to COMINT targeting and selection, including speech recognition (aka Interception Capabilities 2000)*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.
- Elliot, Chris (1999) *Development Of Surveillance Technology And Risk Of Abuse Of Economic Information (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Volume 4/5: The legality of the interception of electronic communications: A concise survey of the principal legal issues and instruments under international, European and*

national law, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.

European Parliament (1998) Resolution on transatlantic relations/ECHELON system, 16th September 1998.

Jelusic, Ljubica and Selby, John (eds.) *Defence Restructuring and Conversion: Sociocultural Aspects*, Brussels: European Commission Directorate-General Research / Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities.

Leprevost, Franck (1999) *Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (An appraisal of technologies of political control) Volume 3/5: Encryption and cryptosystems in electronic surveillance: a survey of the technology assessment issues*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.

Wright, Steve (1998) *An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control: Interim STOA Report (PE 166.499)*, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Directorate A, The STOA Programme.

5. Official Publications

ii. United Kingdom

Cook, Robin (1999) Press Release, May 15th 1999, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.

Curry, John C. (1999) *The Security Service 1908-1945: the Official History*, Kew: Public Records Office.

Defence Estates (2000) *In Trust and On Trust: A Strategy for the Defence Estates*, London: The Stationary Office.

Department of Environment, Transport, and the Regions (DETR) (1999) *Development of the Redundant Defence Estate*, London: The Stationary Office.

EAG / ECOTEC (1996) *The Impact of the Peace Dividend on Rural England*. Rural Research Report No. 26. Rural Development Commission, Salisbury.

EDAW / Wiltshire County Council (WCC) (1996) *Defence and the Wiltshire Economy- A Study of Defence Employment and Dependency in Wiltshire*, Trowbridge: WCC.

HMG (1994) *Intelligence Services Act 1994*

HMG (1998) *MIS: The Security Service*, London: The Stationary Office

HQ Land Command (1997) *Striking a Balance '97: A Report on the Management of Army Training Areas*. Wilton: G3 Training 2.

HQ Land Command (1999) *Striking a Balance '99: A Report on the Management of the Major Army Training Areas*, Wilton: G3 Training 2.

House of Commons Defence Lands Committee (1973) *Report of the Defence Lands Committee 1971-1973*. London: HMSO.

House of Commons (1986-7) Public Accounts Committee (HCPAC) (1987) *9th Report on the Control and Management of the Defence Estate*, HC191, London: HMSO.

House of Commons (1988-9) Public Accounts Committee (HCPAC) (1989) *16th Report on the Control and Management of the Defence Estate*, HC88, London: HMSO.

House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (HCPAC) (1993) *Ministry of Defence: Management and Control of Army Training Land*. HC411, Session 1992-3, London: HMSO.

House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) 1st Report (1995) *The Defence Estate*. 2 volumes, HC67, Session 1994-5, London: HMSO.

Ministry of Defence (MoD) (1991) *Britain's Army for the 1990s: Options for Change (Cm 1595)* London: HMSO.

MoD (1993) *Defence White Paper: Defending Our Future (Cm 2270)*, London: HMSO.

MoD (1994) *Defence Costs Study: Front Line First*, London: HMSO.

MoD (1998) *The Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for a Modern World (Cm 3999)*, London: The Stationary Office.

MoD (1999) *Respecting the Environment: Conservation on the Defence Estate and the role of the MOD Conservation Office*, Aldershot: MOD Conservation Office.

National Audit Office (NAO) (1992) *Ministry of Defence: Management and Control of Army Training Land- A Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General*. HC218. HMSO, London.

NAO (1998) *Ministry of Defence: Identifying and Selling Surplus Property*, HC776, Session 1997-8.

RAF Fylingdales (nd.) *Visitor Information Booklet*.

Wilkinson, John (1996) *Report of an Investigation into an Alleged Increase in Cancer near Menwith Hill, Harrogate, North Yorkshire*, North Yorkshire Health Authority.

Court Cases

In The Court of the Queens Bench QB 473, Woolf L. J, Pill J. 31 July 1992, John Bugg, Rachel Diana Greaves v. The Director Of Public Prosecutions and, The Director Of Public Prosecutions v. Lindis Elizabeth Percy, John Bugg, Judgement.

In The County Court at York, No. 9100 758, Tuesday. 6th July 1993, Before: His Honour Judge Crabtree, Secretary Of State For Defence V. Lindis Percy.

In The High Court Of Justice Chancery Division Ch 1993 P No 5402 Between: Secretary Of State For Defence, Plaintiff - and - Lindis Elizabeth Percy, Defendant. Certificate Of The Right Honourable Malcolm Rifkind QC MP, Dated 7th March 1995.

In The Court of the Queen's Bench, QB924 1997, Percy V. Hall.

In The Crown Court At York, 5th September 1997, A960110/A960111, Before: His Honour Judge Crabtree (Sitting With Magistrates) Regina -V- Anne Lee And Helen John

In The High Court Of Justice Chancery Division Ch 1993 P No. 5402 Royal Courts Of Justice Before: The Hon Mr. Justice Carnwath Between: (1) Secretary Of State For Defence (2) Ministry Of Defence Plaintiffs -And- Lindis Elizabeth Percy Defendant Judgement, 24th April 1998.

5. Official Publications

iii. United States of America

Clinton, Bill (2000) 'Remarks by the President on National Missile Defense', Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington DC, 1st September 2000.

National Security Agency (NSA) (nd.) *National Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century (NCS21)* <<http://www.nsa.gov/programs/ncs21/index.html>>

National Security Council (1972) NSCID Number 6, *Signals Intelligence*, January 17th, 1972 (updated frequently).

US Department of Defence (nd.) *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, Joint Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff. Available on-line at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>>

U.S. Department Of Defence, News Release, Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, DC, July 8th 2000.

United States Senate (1976) *Hearings before the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, Volume 5: The National Security Agency And Fourth Amendment Rights, October 29 And November 6, 1975*, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) (nd.) *Vision 2020*, on-line at: <http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace/visbook.pdf>

6. Unpublished Archived Documents

American Embassy, London (1994) Minutes of Meeting between 3rd USAF, American Embassy and Ministry of Defence, Subject: Incursions at U.S. Bases in the UK, Ref: LONDON 10162 (DTG 271737Z JUN 94), OPAG Archives.

A.R.W (Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Air Ministry) (1960) Memo to the Prime Minister, Ref: 9.989, 25th February, Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

Bailey, S. H. (1957a) Memo from War Office, to HQ, 3rd U.S.A.F, 119/General/1065(L.B.(E)), 17th October 1957, OPAG archives.

Bailey, S. H. (1957b) Letter from War Office, to Director of Administrative Plans, Air Ministry, 119/General/1065(L.B.(E)), 21st November 1957, OPAG archives.

Barnes, J. S. (1936), Memo from Secretary, Admiralty to Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, 15th April 1936, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.

Clarke, W. F. (nd) Extracts from SIGINT papers, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.

Clarke, W. F. (1945) GC&CS - Its foundation and development with specific reference to its naval side, in *History of GCCS and Naval Section 1919-1945 Historical Notes and Memos*. Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.

Defence Committee(1952) Minutes of a Meeting of the Defence Committee on 19th October, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office DEFE 13/38.

Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) (1935) Minute, 30th August 1935, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.

Duno, Anthony (1976) Letter from Anthony Duno, Construction Support Division, USAFE to Miss B. E. Lee, Ministry of Defence, 19th July 1976, OPAG archives.

GC&CS (1937) Minutes of a meeting held at the GC&CS, 29th December 1937, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.

HMG Air Staff (nd. c.1959) *Ballistic Missile Early Warning System: Brief for the Secretary of State*, Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

HMG Air Staff (nd, c.1960) *Top Secret Note on BMEWS*, Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

HMG Air Staff (1960) Minutes of a Meeting 30th March 1960. Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

- HMG Air Staff (nd, c.1967) *History of the Negotiation of the Financial Clauses of the BMEWS Agreement (cm1034)*, Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.
- Lee, B. E. (1976) Letter from Miss B. E. Lee, Ministry of Defence, to Chief, Real Estate Branch, HQ USAFE, D/DG23/1388/2D/DS23, 25th June 1976, OPAG archives.
- McCall, R. B. (1976) Letter from R. B. McCall to Construction Support Division, USAFE, D/DS23/1588/2B/DS23e, 4th August 1976, OPAG archives.
- MacDonald, Margery (1960) Letter from CPRE (Ryedale Branch) to Henry Boone MP, Minister for Housing and Local Government, 23rd April 1960. Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.
- Menwith Hill Station (1995) Notice of MHS Transition Ceremony, 8th August 1995, OPAG archives.
- Mills C. P., (1955) Minute, Director of Signal Division, Admiralty, 29th August 1955, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.
- Morgan, C. T. W., (1957) *U.S. Army Security of Tenure at Harrogate*, letter from Wing Commander Morgan for Director of Administrative Plans, Air Ministry to the Under-Secretary of State, War Office (Lands Branch), A.251308/56/O.P.2, 6th November 1957, OPAG archives.
- NSA Handbook, Available on-line at:
<<http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~nhughes/htmldocs/nsa.html>>
- NSA (nd.)*Security and Law Enforcement*, unpublished memo to all Menwith Hill Station personnel.
- Royal Navy (1960) Notice of the Commissioning of HMS Forest Moor, January 1960, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.
- Tozer, Col. Nigel (c.1950)*History of Military SIGINT with Special Reference to Interception and to War Office and Overseas Sites*, Unpublished Papers, Public Record Office.
- Truman, Harry (1952) TOP SECRET A 20707 5/4/54/OSO COPY Oct 24 1952. MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense SUBJECT: Communications Intelligence Activities, FAS website.
- USASA Historical Office (nd) *13th USASA Field Station*, unpublished brief prepared by the United States Army Security Agency Historical Office for the London Times 1/NS/MH-RES, archives of Otley Peace Action Group (OPAG).
- Unknown, (nd) part entitled 'Appendix A: Defence Establishments in North Yorkshire', YC138E293IDU/5, OPAG archives.
- Zuckerman, S. (1960) Letter to Minister of Defence, 16th June, ref. S2/443/60, Unpublished Document, Public Record Office.

7. Archives, Computer Databases and Internet Sources

- Amazon.com, US bookshop with space for on-line reviews by thepublic. <<http://www.amazon.com>>
- Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases (CAAB), UK peace activists' website and database: <<http://www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/caab/>>
- Covert Action Quarterly*, U.S. parapolitical journal, on-line: <<http://mediafilter.org/caq/>>
- Cryptogram*, on-line cryptography news: <<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram/>>

Cryptome, the best, most comprehensive and most fearless cryptography, espionage and electronic privacy news, and database on-line: <[http:// cryptome.org](http://cryptome.org)>

Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) website: <<http://www.epic.org/>>

European Parliament ECHELON Inquiry Committee:
<<http://www.europarl.eu.int/tempcom/echelon/en/members.htm>>

Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Intelligence Research Project Database: <<http://www.fas.org/irp>>

Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Space Policy Project Database: <<http://www.fas.org/spp>>

Guardian (and *Observer*) UK newspaper, on CD-ROM.

Guardian, on-line: <<http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/>>

Hansard , records of UK Parliamentary debates, on CD-ROM.

House of Commons Publications On-line: <<http://www.parliament-the-stationary-office.gov.uk/commons/>>

House of Lords Publications On-line: <<http://www.parliament-the-stationary-office.gov.uk/lords/>>

Lobster, UK parapolitical journal , on-line digest: <<http://theknowledge.co.uk/lobster/>>

National Security Agency, Documents Released under the Freedom of Information Act:
<<http://www.nsa.gov:8080/docs/efoia/released/>>

National Security Archive (George Washington University) website: <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>>

New York Times, U.S. newspaper, on-line: <<http://nytimes.com>>

Otley Peace Action Group (OPAG) archives, c/o Christine Dean Otley Museum, Otley, West Yorkshire.

Privacy International website: <<http://www.privacyinternational.org/>>

Public Record Office, Kew, London.

Telepolis, German radical on-line magazine: <<http://heise.de/tp/>>

Times (and *Sunday Times*), UK newspaper, on CD-ROM.

United States House of Representatives: <<http://www.house.gov>>

United States Patent Office On-line: <<http://www.patents.ibm.com>>

United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) website: <<http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace/>>

Village Voice, U.S. 'alternative' newspaper, on-line: <<http://www.villagevoice.com>>

Washington Post , U.S. newspaper, on-line: <<http://www.washingtonpost.com>>

Yorkshire Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (Yorkshire CND) website: <<http://www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/>>

Appendix I. Acronyms, Abbreviations, Codewords and Technical Terms used in the text.

ABC - American Broadcasting Company. US TV station.

ABC Trial - 1977 OSA trial of Crispin Aubrey, John Berry and Duncan Campbell, UK.

ABCAA - America-Britain-Canada-Australia Agreement. Armed forces pact.

ABM - Anti-Ballistic Missile.

ABMT - Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1972.

ACLU - American Civil Liberties Union, USA.

Advanced JUMPSEAT - US NRO satellite platform associated with SBIRS, see JUMPSEAT.

Advanced ORION - see TRUMPET.

AFSA - Armed Forces Security Agency, USA. Predecessor to the NSA.

Agent - Supplier of intelligence under the control of a government agency. *Urban*.

ANGB - Air National Guard Base, USA.

AQUACADE - see RHYOLITE.

Backbone - UK emergency microwave communications network.

BALTAP - Baltic Approach. NATO HQ in Denmark.

BAO - Business Affairs Office. NSA's business liaison wing.

Black bag - Intelligence activities involving breaking and entering.

BMEWS - Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (or sometimes 'Station').

BND - Bundesnachrichtendienst. Federal Intelligence Service, Germany.

BRUSA - British - US COMINT Agreement, 1943.

BYEMAN - Codeword system used by UKUSA countries; always written in capitals.

C3I - Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, USA.

C4I - Command, Control, Computers and Intelligence, USA..

C4ISR - Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, USA.

CAAB - Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases. UK NVDA group.

CARNOVORE - FBI computerised communications interception analysis system.

CAUS - Citizens Against UFO Secrecy. US pressure group.

CI - Counter-Intelligence.

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency. US foreign Intelligence organisation.

CHALET - US COMINT satellite platform, later modified to include TELINT capabilities. Renamed VORTEX. See also RUNWAY, Vortex 2.

Cipher - A system for concealing plain text by transposing the letters or numbers or substituting other letters or numbers according to a key. Also called a "cryptosystem." NSA

Clipper - Proposed US encryption computer chip standard allowing state 'backdoor' to all encrypted private communications.

CND - Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Transnational peace group.

Code - A system for replacing words, phrases, letters or numbers by other words or groups of letters or numbers for concealment or brevity. NSA

COMINT - Communications Intelligence. Information obtained for intelligence purposes from the intercept of foreign communications (by other than the intended recipient). NSA

COMPUSEC - Computer Security. The protection of computers from exploitation by foreign intelligence services and "hackers." NSA

COMSAT - (Commercial) Communications Satellite. Non-military satellite platforms.

COMSEC - Communications Security. The protection of communications from exploitation by foreign intelligence services. This includes ensuring the security of U.S. cryptosystems, the preventing electronic emissions from various communications equipment, and the physically protecting communications security equipment. NSA

CONUS - Continental United States. US designation for military bases.

Cracking - Slang term for successfully breaking codes or ciphers; also for penetrating secure computer systems. See also Hacking, Phreaking, COMPUSEC.

Crypto AG - Swiss cryptographic technology company.

Cryptology - The science and art of making and breaking codes and ciphers. NSA

Cryptography - The science and art of making codes and ciphers. NSA

Cryptanalysis - The conversion of encrypted messages into plain text without having the initial knowledge of the key used in encryption. NSA

CRYSTAL - see KENAN, also Improved CRYSTAL.

CSE - Communications Security Establishment. Canadian SIGINT organisation.

CSO - Composite Signals Organisation. The interception branch of GCHQ.

CSOS - Composite Signals Organisation Station. GCHQ interception site.

CSS - Central Security Service. The military elements of the NSA.

CTBT - Comprehensive (Nuclear Weapons) Test Ban Treaty.

DASA - Defence Analytical Services Agency. MoD statistics organisation, UK.

DCI - Director of Central Intelligence. Head of the CIA.

DE - Defence Estates. UK military land management organisation, formally Defence Estates Organisation (DEO).

Decode - To convert from an encoded message to equivalent plain text. NSA

DEFSMAC - Defence Special Missile and Astronautics Centre, USA.

DEO - See DE.

DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency, USA.

Dictionary - Computer word and phrase recognition technology. Part of ECHELON system.

DIRNSA - The Director, NSA/Chief, CSS. NSA

DIS - Defence Intelligence Staff, UK MoD Intelligence wing.

DISA - Defense Information Systems Agency. US DoD IT organisation.

DGSE - Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, French foreign intelligence organisation.

DoD - The Department of Defense, USA.

DoE - Department of the Environment, UK. Now part of DETR.

DETR - Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions, UK.

DSD - Defence Signals Directorate. Australian SIGINT organisation.

DSP - Defense Support Program. US satellite system for detecting the launch of ballistic missiles.

ECHELON - popularly used to refer to UKUSA global communications surveillance network. Actually referred to the analytic process rather than a particular system. Possibly based on SILKWORTH.

ELF - Extremely Low Frequency

ELINT - Electronic Intelligence – Information obtained for intelligence purposes from the intercept of foreign electromagnetic noncommunications transmissions (by other than the intended recipient). The most common sources of this type of information are foreign radar signals. NSA

Encode - To replace plain text words with code groups. NSA

Encrypt - To conceal plain text by use of a code or cipher. NSA

EPIC - Electronic Privacy Information Centre, US public interest research group.

ETH - Extra-Terrestrial Hypothesis. The belief that UFOs contain, or are, lifeforms from elsewhere in Space.

Europol - Trans-European policing initiative.

EW - Electronic Warfare.

FANX - Friendship Annex. Part of NSA HQ.

FAPSI - Russian SIGINT and INFOSEC Agency.

FAS - Federation of American Scientists, independent US research organisation.

FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation. US federal police and internal security and intelligence organisation.

FISA - US Federal Intelligence Services Act, 1978.

FISC - Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court. Secretive US court tasked with ruling on legality of surveillance operations involving US citizens.

FISINT - Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence.

FOIA - The Freedom of Information Act, USA and UK.

Frenchelon - American coinage to describe the DGSE SIGINT system.

FRF - Frame Relay Forum. International data-transfer protocol development body.

FSD - Full-Spectrum Dominance, US military strategy term.

GCCS - Government Code and Cipher School. Predecessor of GCHQ in UK.

GCHQ - Government Communications Headquarters, UK SIGINT organisation.

GCSB - Government Security Communications Bureau, New Zealand SIGINT organisation.

Geostationary / Geosynchronous - satellite orbit where satellite 'hovers' above a certain point on the earth's surface by matching the earth's rotation.

GPS - Global Positioning System.

Hacking - Slang term for computer programming. Popularly confused with Cracking and Phreaking.

HCDC - House of Commons Defence Committee, UK.

Hélios - French SIGINT satellite platform.

HERITAGE - Sensor system on JUMPSEAT satellites.

HEXAGON - KH-9 PHOTINT satellite platform. AKA Big Bird.

HF - High Frequency.

HFDF - High Frequency Direction Finding ('Huff-duff').

HCISC - House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee, UK.

HPSCI - The US House of Representatives' Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.

ICC - One of the three major ILC providers.

ILC - International Licensed Cable.

ILETS - International Law Enforcement Seminar. FBI-Europol COMINT interception meetings.

IMINT - Imagery Intelligence.

Improved CRYSTAL - US KH-11B (or KH-11/Improved) real-time PHOTINT satellite platform. See also CRYSTAL, KENNAN.

INDIGO - US SIGINT satellite platform using imaging radar to see below clouds. Later changed to LACROSSE.

INF - Intermediate Nuclear Forces.

INFOSEC - Information Systems Security – The protection of information systems against unauthorized access to or modification of information, whether in storage, processing or transit, and against the denial of service to authorized users or the provision of service to unauthorized users, including those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats. NSA

INSCOM - US Army Intelligence and Security Command.

INTELSAT - International Telecommunications Satellite. Non-military US satellite system.

Intercept - The acquisition of electromagnetic signals such as radio or radar by using electronic equipment for the purpose of gathering intelligence information on foreign entities. The material collected is itself sometimes referred to as "intercept." NSA

IOB - The President's Intelligence Oversight Board, which is charged with oversight of all U.S. foreign intelligence activities. NSA

IRP - Intelligence Research Project. FAS research programme.

IPTV - Duncan Campbell's television production company.

ISSO - Information Systems Security Organisation. The NSA's INFOSEC branch.

ITT - One of the three major ILC providers.

IW - Information Warfare. Hacking (or more accurately 'cracking') computer systems.

JAC - Joint Analysis Centre

JDF-N - Joint Defence Facility-Nurrungar. Now closed US base in Australia.

JIC - Joint Intelligence Committee, Body which oversees all UK intelligence operations.

JCS - The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JUMBO - US/UK program, partly based at CSO Irton Moor intercepting burst transmissions from Soviet submarines (1980s).

JUMPSEAT - US NRO satellite platform associated with DSP. See also HERITAGE, Advanced JUMPSEAT.

KENNAN - US KH-11 real-time PHOTINT satellite platform. Later changed to CRYSTAL.

KH - Keyhole. Initial designation for all US PHOTINT satellite platforms.

LACROSSE - See INDIGO.

MAGNUM - multipurpose SIGINT satellite platform. successor to RHYOLITE/AQUACADE system. Later ORION. See also STEEPLEBUSH.

MAJESTRAN – Communications interception system at MHS, 1990s. Probably a redesignation of all or part of ECHELON.

MDP - Ministry of Defence Police, UK.

MEP - Member of the European Parliament.

MERCURY - US COMINT / ELINT satellite platform. Successor to CHALET/VORTEX. Sometimes called Vortex 2.

MHS - Menwith Hill Station.

MI5 - The Security Service. UK internal intelligence organisation.

MI6 - Secret Intelligence Service. UK foreign intelligence organisation.

MIG - Military Intelligence Group. Sub-division of INSCOM.

Milstar - Small US military communications relay satellites.

MINARET - Early 1970s NSA project to provide US domestic agencies with data on US citizens.

MoD - Ministry of Defence, UK.

Molniya - Highly elliptical orbit used by some ICBM launch-detection satellite platforms. Named after Russian satellites.

MOONPENNY - SATCOM monitoring programme at MHS (1980s).

MOOTW - Military Operations Other Than War, US term.

Mossad - Israeli foreign intelligence organisation.

MP - Member of Parliament, UK.

NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration, USA.

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

NCR - New Christian Right. Collective term for US conservative religious political organisations.

NID - Naval Intelligence Division. Early British SIGINT agency.

NCS21 - National Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century. NSA public 'mission statement'.

NIMA - National Imagery and Mapping Agency, USA.

NMD - National Missile Defense. Proposed successor to the SDI program, USA.

NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US meteorological agency.

NRO - National Reconnaissance Office. US Satellite development and deployment agency.

NSA/CSS - The National Security Agency/Central Security Service.

NSC - National Security Council, US intelligence oversight body.

NSCID - National Security Council Intelligence Directive. Lay down responsibilities of US intelligence organisations.

NSG - Naval Security Group (Command). US naval intelligence organisation.

NSOC - National SIGINT Operations Center. Title of NSA HQ.

NVDA - Non-Violent Direct Action.

ONI - Office of Naval Intelligence, pre-WW2 UK SIGINT body.

ONYX - see LACROSSE, INDIGO.

OPAG - Otley Peace Action Group.

OPSEC - Operations Security – The process of denying potential adversaries any information about capabilities and/or intentions by identifying, controlling and protecting generally unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities. NSA

ORION - see MAGNUM.

Orion 2 - see TRUMPET.

OSA - UK Official Secrets Act, 1911.

OST - Outer Space Treaty, 1967.

P415 - Lockheed designation for ECHELON or upgrades to ECHELON (late 1980s).

PAVE PAWS - Perimeter Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning System.

PGP - Pretty Good Privacy. The most widely used personal encryption software.

PHOTINT - Photographic Intelligence.

Phreaking - Slang term for telecommunications system Cracking. See also INFOSEC, Van Eck Phreaking.

PI - Privacy International. Transnational pressure group.

PLP - Parliamentary Labour Party, UK.

PRO - Public Record Office. UK repository for released information.

Procedure Y - pre-WW2 British term for foreign W/T interception.

PSA - Property Services Agency. UK government property organisation.

QWG - Quadrapartite Working Group. Organisations on various aspects of military co-operation set up under ABCA agreement.

RADINT - Radar Intelligence.

Radome - Radar Dome. A shell enclosing Communications or SIGINT equipment, of any size. In this context usually a geodesic structure covering satellite dishes.

RAF - Royal Air Force, UK.

RAGE - Ratepayers Against Greenham Encampments. 1980s anti-peace group.

RCA - Radio Corporation of America. Major US SIGINT contractor.

RHYOLITE - US multipurpose SIGINT satellite system. Later renamed AQUACADE.

RIP / RIPA - UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 1999.

RSOC - Regional SIGINT Operations Center. Regional NSA HQ's.

RUNWAY - MHS groundstation for CHALET/VORTEX.

SATCOM - (Commercial) Satellite Communications.

SBIRS - Space-Based Infra-Red System. Successor to DSP.

SBSS - Space-Based Surveillance System. Generic term.

SCS - Special Collection Service, joint CIA/NSA 'black bag' operations wing.

SDI - Strategic Defense Initiative, AKA Star Wars.

Security Service, The - see MI5.

SHAMROCK - NSA ILC interception program (1960s -).

SIGINT - Signals Intelligence – Information which contains (either individually or in combination) communications intelligence (COMINT), electronics intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), however transmitted. NSA

SILKWORTH - Long-range Radio Monitoring program at MHS (1970s -). Possibly basis for ECHELON.

SIS - see MI6.

Special Branch - The wing of the UK Metropolitan Police responsible for terrorism and political crime.

SPP - Space Policy Project. FAS research programme.

Sputnik - Early Soviet satellite program.

SSCI - The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

SSPAR - Solid State Phased Array Radar. See also PAVE PAWS.

STEEPLEBUSH - MHS groundstation for US MAGNUM/ORION satellite platform (1970s -).

STEEPLEBUSH II - MHS groundstation for US TRUMPET/Advanced ORION satellite platform (1990s).

STOA - Scientific and Technical Options Assessment (Sub-Committee). Part of the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament.

SUKLO - Senior United Kingdom Liaison Officer. GCHQ's senior representative at the NSA.

SUSLO - Senior United States Liaison Officer. The NSA's senior representative at GCHQ.

TEMPEST - US program to prevent Van Eck phreaking.

TK - Talent Keyhole. System of BYEMAN codewords for PHOTINT satellites.

TRUMPET - multipurpose SIGINT satellite platform. Successor to MAGNUM/ORION Aka Advanced ORION. See also STEEPLEBUSH 2.

UHF - Ultra High Frequency

UKUSA - United Kingdom - United States Agreement. Secret SIGINT treaty signed 1947 or 48.

ULTRA - WW2 UK programme to crack German Enigma codes.

UNSCOM - United Nation chemical weapons inspection team in Iraq.

USASA - United States Army Security Agency

USAF - United States Air Force.

USAFE - United States Air Force in Europe.

USAFSS - United States Air Force Security Service.

USMC - United States Marine Corps.

USSPACECOM - United States Space Command.

USSS - United States Security Services. Collective term for US intelligence agencies.

Van Eck phreaking - Illicit close-range interception of electromagnetic signals from computers. See TEMPEST, phreaking.

VAX - supercomputer system.

VHF - Very High Frequency.

VORTEX - see CHALET.

Vortex 2 - See MERCURY.

Watch list - List of names of those to be monitored.

WD - War Department. UK predecessor of the MoD.

Wet affair - political assassination.

WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction.

W/T - Wireless Telegraphy. Pre-WW2 term.

ZIRCON - proposed British SIGINT satellite platform (1980s).

Appendix 2. Intelligence Sites in the UK.

What follows is an explanatory table detailing number of employees, units present and purpose of each base, so far as the information has been made available either publicly or unofficially. The table is clearly incomplete in many respects. This is partly due to the nature of the information, much of which is classified, and the scarcity of research.

The table includes all military sites which have significant intelligence-gathering or analysis capability with official US presence; these are the sites which have figures for numbers of US and UK personnel¹. It also includes sites recently vacated by US forces or about which there are questions as to their presence. It also incorporates a list of known GCHQ and NSA sites and functions provided by Richelson and Ball², and West³, which may have permanent or temporary US liaison; the current status of many of these sites remains unknown except where they have been earmarked for disposal⁴. In addition, lists of RAF sites with significant intelligence presence from the official RAF website⁵, and semi-official sources have been included⁶. Equivalent lists for the army and navy are less easily available. Finally, it includes unverified opinions of campaign groups concerning the function of certain bases from FAS, CAAB, and independent researchers, in particular Steve Gauffman of Enigma and Duncan Campbell.

¹ *Hansard* 2000

² Richelson, Jeffrey T. and Ball, Desmond (1985) *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries*, London: Allen & Unwin.

³ West, Nigel (1986) *GCHQ: the Secret Wireless War 1900-86*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson.

⁴ House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) 1st Report (1995) *The Defence Estate*. 2 volumes, HC67, Session 1994-5, London: HMSO.

⁵ www.mod.gov.uk/raf/

⁶ www.royalwings.org.uk

Name (some of these may be incorrect)	Location	No. Employees US (MoD)	Controlling Authority / units present Official (unofficial)	Purpose 'Official UK Gov.', Official US, (unofficial)	Operational? Yes/No/?
RAF Alconbury	Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire TL 210765	+1,012 (308)	(6952 ESS) (10 RTS) (Detachment of 2 MIL Bn (AE))	'Storage/Support' (TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft) (ELINT / PHOTINT) (Imagery Interpretation)	Yes. Partial withdrawal 1995. Unclear how many / which units still present
RAF Benbecula	Western Isles, Scotland NF 785560		No.71 Signals Unit	'Radar site'	Yes
RAF Boddington	Gloucestershire		No.9 Signals Unit (S.U.). (4 Communications Unit)	'Telegraph Automatic Routing Equipment (T.A.R.E.) H.Q.' (Military unit attached GCHQ)	Yes
RAF Boulmer	Northumberland NU 255130		No.75 Signals Unit No.500 Signals Unit	'RAF School of Fighter Control' 'Radar Site' 'Air-sea rescue'	Yes
RAF Brampton	Cambridgeshire			'Joint Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (J.R.I.C.)' 'Central Reconnaissance Establishment'	Yes
RAF Buchan	Scotland		170 Signals Unit 487 Signals Unit	Radar Site Control Reporting Centre	Yes
Cheltenham	Gloucestershire		GCHQ (NSA liaison)	HQ UK SIGINT operations Joint Technical Language Service (JTLS)	Yes
RAF Chicksands	nr. Bedford, Bedfordshire		Tri-Service (RAF/Navy/Army): Joint School of Photographic Interpretation (a Tri-service unit) 7010 (Photographic Interpretation) Squadron R.Aux.A.F	'British National Intelligence Centre'	Yes. US forces officially left Sept. 1995. NSA transferred to RAF Digby.
RAF Cosford	Shropshire		No.1 School of Technical Training Joint School of Photography		Yes

RAF Croughton	nr. Bicester, Northants	443 (203)	USAF 603rd Communications Squadron 422nd Communications and Information Flight (6913 ESS)	'Communications/Support' Includes: Scope Command Automated High Frequency Radio System (SCAHFS) (Satellite tracking station)	Yes
Defford			Detachment of No.1001 Signals Unit.	MOD P.E. 'Very important' (DC)	Yes
RAF Daws Hill/ West Ruislip/ Eastcote/ USN London		770 (76)	?	'Storage/Support'	Yes
RAF Digby	Lincolnshire	38 (970)	339 Signals Unit No.591 Signals Unit (GCHQ) (NSA) (INSCOM 6950th Electronic Security Group)	'Signals Units, Aerial Erectors School' (Main UK RAF SIGINT site) (SIGINT intercept station)	Yes
Earls Court	Empress Building, Earls Court, London		(GCHQ CSO)	CSOS	Yes
RAF Fairford	nr. Cirencester, Gloucester SU 155985	214 (249)		'currently used by the United States Air Forces'	Mothballed. (but used in Kosovo. Plans to re-open.)
RAF Feltwell	nr. Thetford, Norfolk TL715895	132 (3)	US 5th Space Surveillance Squadron under USSPACECOM 21st Space Wing	'Near Space Tracking Facility'	Yes
Fylingdales	nr. Whitby, North Yorkshire	1 (257)	RAF (USSPACECOM)	'primarily a Ballistic Missile Early Warning Station [BMEWS], with a secondary duty of detecting, reporting and tracking satellite launches and orbits' (Proposed NMD site)	Yes
Hanslope Park	Buckinghamshire		(HMG Communications Centre) (Diplomatic Telecommunications Maintenance Service (DTMS))	(Communications centre for SIGINT traffic collected at GCHQ posts in British Embassies) (debugging / sweeping unit)	Yes
RAF High Wycombe	Buckinghamshire		incl. No.7006 (Intelligence) Squadron R.Aux.A.F.	H.Q. Strike Command etc.	Yes

RAF Hythe	Hampshire	5 (13)		'Storage/Support'	Yes
Irton Moor	nr. Scarborough, North Yorkshire		(GCHQ CSO) (NSA)	(SIGINT intercept station - CSOS)	Yes
USAF Lakenheath	nr. Brandon, Bury St, Edmonds, Suffolk TL 740820	5,294 (655)	USAF 48th Fighter Wing	(c. 61 nuclear gravity bombs) (Naval Aviation Weapons Facility Det. (nuclear depth bomb storage)	Yes
RAF Locking	Avon	0 (0)	No.1 Radio School	Main School of Radio and Radar	Due to close March 1999
RAF Menwith Hill	nr. Harrogate, North Yorkshire	1,407 (373)	NSA INSCOM	'Communication' European Relay Ground Station for Space Based Infra Red System - SBIRS. (ECHELON collection site)	Yes
USAF Mildenhall	nr. Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk TL 690770	3,858 (583)	US Third Air Force (incl. 6988 Electronic Security Squadron)	'USAF Main Aircraft Operation Base' (UK base for SR-71 'Blackbird' and RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft)	Yes
RAF Molesworth	nr. Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire TL 080775	+1,012 (308)	United States European Command	'Storage/Support' American Joint Analysis Center for Regional Joint Intelligence Training Facility (RJITF). Naval Aviation Weapons Facility (nuclear depth bomb storage)	Yes
Morwenstow	nr. Bude, Cornwall		(GCHQ CSOS) (ISS (of NSA) Bude)	(Satellite Ground Station - CSOS) Part of NSA networks	Yes
RAF Neatishead	Norfolk		No.86 Signals Unit No.432 Signals Unit	'Control Reporting Centre'	Yes
RAF Northwood	London	16 (1,712)	Maritime Reconnaissance Force	'Joint Maritime Headquarters'	Yes
RAF Oakhanger	Hampshire	1 (255)	No.1001 Signals Squadron No.1 Radio School Detachment	'focal point of military satellite communications in the UK' incl. 'NATO Satellite Ground Terminal'	Yes
Palmer Street	Westminster, London		(GCHQ)	ILC cable and telex intercept office	Yes
RAF Portreath (Satellite of St. Mawgan)	Cornwall SW 670460		No.405 Signals Unit	'Navigation Air Defence Radar Station'	Yes

Poundon	Buckinghamshire		(GCHQ)	(Foreign Office Training Establishment) (SIGINT Intercept Station) (CDAA, Loop Antenna Array)	Part of site put up for sale 1999.
RAF Rudloe Manor	Spring Quarries, Wiltshire		No.1 Signals Unit	MOD Defence Communications Network HQ	Yes
RAF Saxa Vord	Orkneys		No.91 Signals Unit	'Radar Site'	Yes
RAF Spadeadam		4 (174)		'NATO Electronic Countermeasures Range'	Yes
RAF St Mawgan	Cornwall SW 870645	295 (803)	No.81 Signals Unit Detachment (West)	'H.Q. No.22 Squadron' etc.	Yes
Staxton Wold			No.129 Signals Unit No.146 Signals Unit	'Radar Site'	Yes
Upwood	Cambridgeshire TL 270840	+1,012 (308)		'Storage/Support'	Yes
RAF Uxbridge	Greater London	1 (182)		'headquarters of the Military Air Traffic Operations (MATO)'	Yes
RAF Waddington	Lincolnshire SK 985645		Electronic Warfare and Avionic Detachment (E.W. and A.D.),	Electronic Warfare Operational Support Establishment (E.W.O.S.E.),	Yes
RAF Wyton (part of RAF Brampton)	Cambridgeshire TL 285745		Detachment of the RAF Signals Engineering Establishment (RAF S.E.E.). (GCHQ)	Joint H.Q. Logistic Command (Base for SIGINT aircraft) (SIGINT Intercept Station)	Yes
TOTALS		13,491 (6,816)			