Abstract:

This thesis offers a new evaluation of Philip V of Macedon (221-179 BC) through a reassessment of his portrait in our primary literary source, Polybius of Megalopolis.

Chapter 1 introduces the topic and explores how Polybius’ presentation of his content, including Philip, is greatly dependent on his intention to produce a pragmatic, didactic, universal history, facilitated by the unifying concepts of *sympleke* and *tyche*. Chapter 2 investigates Polybius’ Achaian background, patriotism and admiration of the Achaian leader Aratos, and how this political bias shapes Philip’s depiction. Chapter 3 questions the validity of the historian’s claim that the king suddenly turned from a brilliant king to a treacherous tyrant in 215 BC, and reveals how Polybius overemphasises this change to explain the king’s downfall, encourage correct political and moral behaviour, and defend Aratos and the League’s association with the king. Chapter 4 assesses Polybius’ conviction that Philip’s treatment of his Greek allies turned deceitful after his change for the worse in 215, and reveals how his statements are exaggerated and once again in pursuit of vilifying the king, justifying the League’s defection to Rome in 198 BC and ultimately explaining Macedonia’s demise. Lastly, Chapter 5 discusses Polybius’ tragic account of Philip’s last years and its modern reception, arguing that while the account may not be historically accurate, it still represents a completely satisfactory, consistent and justifiable end to Polybius’ account of the Macedonian king.

This thesis concludes that Polybius’ picture of the king is intensely loaded and complex, dependent on a number of wider literary factors and personal biases. Yet, it also proves that it is possible to unravel Philip from some of the historian’s weavings and uncover a more balanced portrayal of the monarch than the generally negative one presented in the *Histories.*
Acknowledgements:

This project would not have been possible without the constant support, advice and enthusiasm of my supervisor Federico Santangelo, nor the equally valuable contributions of John Moles and April Pudsey. A special thanks must also go to Boris Dreyer for his care and guidance during my stay in Erlangen, and to John Thornton for his interest and kindness in reading much of this work. Felix Maier must be remembered as well for his stimulating and heartening conversation, and the postgraduate students of FAU for their ready friendship.

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Figure 1: Map of Greece, the Aegean and Asia
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The Life and Times of Philip V of Macedon

Philip V (238-179 BC), son of Demetrios II and successor to his uncle Antigonos Doson, ruled Macedonia from 221 to 179 BC.¹ He was the penultimate king of the Antigonid Empire and the first Hellenistic monarch to come into direct conflict with Rome in her gradual penetration into the eastern Mediterranean. That clash had world-changing implications. Philip is primarily remembered for his ill-fated confrontation with the Italian power and for causing (if indirectly) his kingdom’s defeat and destruction by Roman hands in his son, Perseus’s reign. He was the defeated power in the fight for supremacy in the Mediterranean and this fact has often left him an understudied and underrated individual, especially by those more interested in Rome’s success and development into a world power.² Yet, despite the consequences of his reign, Philip can be credited as one of the most successful of his predecessors after Alexander the Great.³ He ruled for 42 years, the longest ruling period of a Macedonian since Philip II,⁴ and, before Roman intervention, was also effective in re-establishing control over Greece and expanding Macedonia beyond her tradition borders into Illyria, Thrace and the Aegean. While the greater length and success of his reign may, of course, be partly due to stabilising conditions in the Hellenistic world, as well as the dwindling number of suitable usurpers (Antiochos the Great (III) similarly ruled for a commendable 33 years (222–187 BC)),⁵ both are remarkable feats considering the violent and volatile conditions of Hellenistic kingship. It would therefore be hard to believe that Philip could have been so long-lasting without possessing qualities that rendered him effective.

At this time, Macedonia, ruled by the Antigonid dynasty, was one of the three main Hellenistic kingdoms in the Eastern Mediterranean that had formed in the years after

¹ Walbank’s monograph on Philip V (1940; revised 1960), although now outdated, still remains the only truly comprehensive and most influential historical study of the king and his involvement in Mediterranean affairs. For Philip V see also the EAH entry by Čašule (2012), and BNP coll. 33-35.
⁵ Antiochos III is also the subject of one of the most substantial studies in Hellenistic history: Ma 1999. For this king see also Dreyer (2007).
Alexander’s death in 323 BC.\(^6\) The first fifty years (323-276 BC) witnessed a complex struggle for power between Alexander’s generals and their heirs in the so-called War of the Successors. With no clearly designated heir and the removal of Alexander’s own dominating personality, his vast empire was left in a chaotic state and split into numerous areas governed by different commanders. It would be many years before this situation became stable and the three main kingdoms (Antigonid, Seleucid and Ptolemaic) be firmly established. Modern scholarship on this period is faced with several factors of complexity: not only the number of players on the scene and their constantly shifting movements and allegiances, but also the fact that our primary sources for it are so few and fragmentary, preventing the establishment of a continuous coherent narrative.

The kingdom of Macedonia finally found firmer ground in the first half of the third century under Antigonid rule in the reign of Antigonos II Gonatas (319–239 BC; reigned 277-239 BC).\(^7\) From this king onwards our knowledge of the period improves as the sources become more comprehensive. After years of chaos, Gonatas finally secured Macedonia and Greece. He had acquired fame for his victory over the Gauls at the battle of Lysimacheia (277 BC), defeated Pyrrhus at Argos (272 BC), installed pro-Macedonian tyrants in several Peloponnesian cities, and successfully crushed resistance from Athens and Sparta in the Chremonidean War (263 BC). In 243 BC, the Akrokorinthos, a strategically important fort at Korinth that controlled the Isthmus and access to the Peloponnese, was captured by Aratos of Sikyon, a leader of the Achaian League (for more on this figure see Chapter 2). While this encouraged a number of cities in the Peloponnese to separate from Macedonian control and join the League, Macedonia still retained influence throughout much of Greece. In 239 BC, after 38 years of power and at the admirable age of 80, Antigonos Gonatas died leaving the kingdom to his son, Demetrios II Aetolicus.

Demetrios II (275-229 BC; reigned 239-229 BC), while only ruling for ten years, was also successful in expanding Macedonian control throughout Boiotia, Euboia, Magnesia and

\(^6\) For the successors of Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic world see Will (1984); Shipley (2000); Bosworth (2005); Bugh (2006); Erskine (2003); Roisman (2012); and Anson (2014). For ancient Macedonia in general see Hammond (1988); Fox (2011); Roisman & Worthington (2011).

Thessaly, despite the combined efforts of a Achaian-Aitolian alliance against him. He was killed in 229 BC fighting the Dardanians to the north of the kingdom and left his nine-year old son, Philip V, and the rule of Macedonia under the guardianship of his cousin Antigonos III Doson. In the eight years that Doson (263-221 BC; reigned 229-221 BC) held the throne, he defeated the Dardanians, put down a rebellion in Thessaly, ended the conflict between Epiros and the Achaian League, and formed an agreement with the latter in 224 BC which, in return for his military support against the Spartan king, Kleomenes, allowed him to reinstate a Macedonian presence in the Peloponnese by the repossession of the Akrokorinthos. Following his aid of the Achaians, Doson was able to establish the Symmachy – a confederation of Greek states under the hegemony of Macedonia, an arrangement similar to the Corinthian League of Philip II – which once again tied affairs in the Peloponnese to the greater power (see Chapter 4 for details of this confederation). Doson’s diplomatic and military skill proved vital in stabilising Macedonia’s strength, and it was into this period of growing security that Philip V came to power.

He was only seventeen when he succeeded his uncle (Polyb. 4.2.5, 4.5.3-4, Justin 28.4.16, 29.1.1), younger even than Alexander had been when he succeeded his father. Yet, despite his youth, Philip soon proved himself to be a competent and successful military commander, as well as a reliable partner (or, to use the political language of the time, a generous benefactor) to his Greek allies. His early policies revolved around securing his position and influence within mainland Greece, and he was primarily occupied with a war in aid of his Greek allies against the Aitolians (4.26-37, 4.57-5.105; Justin 29.1). At the end of this war in 217 BC, having secured Greece to the south (5.104-105; Justin 29.2-3), Philip was able to pursue his own ambitions of conquest. It was when his gaze turned west that he became embroiled in conflict with Rome; conflict which would eventually lead to the First and Second Macedonian Wars (211-205 and 200-196 BC respectively). After his defeat at the

9 Justin’s claim that he was only fourteen upon his accession is incorrect, as Philip was born in 238 BC and came to the throne in 221 BC (Polyb. 4.2.5). See Fine (1934) 100 and Walbank Commentary I 290, 450.
10 For Philip’s early years see Errington (1967), Gruen (1972), Golan (1995) and McGing (2013).
battle of Kynoskephalai in 197. Philip’s relationship with Rome became more cooperative for a time as he aimed for the recovery of Macedonian strength and resources, even aiding the victors in their war against the Syrian king Antiochos III (Polyb. 21.3; Livy 36.4-38.40; Appian Mac. 9.5-6). In his later years, however, this friendship broke down as Philip aimed yet again for expansion, this time in Thrace and Dardania, and Rome tried to curtail him. Relations finally worsened in 186 to such an extent that the king is said to have thought war inevitable and actively begun preparations for the conflict (Polyb. 22.13-14; Livy 39.3; Appian Mac. 10). The king died, however, before war erupted and his son Perseus continued his father’s policies to recover the strength of Macedonia and prepare for war against Rome (Polyb. 22.18.10, 25.3.1, 25.6; Livy 40.57, 42.11, 42.48; cf. Appian Mac. 11.1, 8, Justin 32.3-4). While the Macedonian-Roman relationship was stable at the beginning of Perseus’ reign, however, after several years it also turned hostile as the new king acquired widespread support throughout Greece and began to expand into territory belonging to Roman allies. The Third Macedonian War between Perseus and Rome, and the king’s defeat at Pydna in 168 (Polyb. 29.17-18; Livy 44.42; Plut. Aem.Paul. 19; Justin 33), would mark the end of the Macedonian monarchy and the beginning of Roman control over the kingdom.

1.1.a The Literary Sources: A Preliminary Overview

The vast majority of our knowledge of Philip and this period comes from literary sources, the earliest and most important of these being Polybius of Megalopolis’ Histories, the primary subject of enquiry in this thesis. It is through Polybios’ narrative that we are presented with our fullest picture of the king, and our own interpretations of him have been, and still are, greatly influenced by this reliance. While later authors reveal a few alternative perspectives and attitudes towards the king, those that survive also remain greatly indebted to Polybios’

(2013). For Philip’s interests in Italy, Illyria and the Aegean see Fine (1936), Bickerman (1944), Oost (1959), Thompson (1971) and Berthold (1975).

12 For the Roman war against Antiochos III and Philip’s cooperation see Walbank (1940) 186-221; Errington (1989b); Eckstein (2008) 306-341.

13 For the fall of Macedon see Meloni (1953), Gruen (1974), Dell (1983), and Derow (1989).

largely negative account of him.\textsuperscript{15} Any consideration of the Macedonian king must therefore engage with this limitation.

Polybios’ main objective in writing his \textit{Histories} was to record how and by what means, in the space of 53 years, Rome came to dominance in the Mediterranean (Polyb. 1.1.1; 3.1.4). It was a vast enterprise which took up forty books, covering the whole Mediterranean and, with the inclusion of his introduction to the period, extending over 100 years. It is a work of great detail and careful deliberation; its potentially unwieldy topic is handled with intelligence, producing a narrative with discernible unity and coherency. His original thirty book plan intended to narrate events from 221, continuing on from his predecessor Arato’s narrative (4.2.1) and beginning with the succession of several new leaders to the world powers, up to the defeat of Macedonia in 168 BC (3.1.9, 3.3.8-9). This event, in his mind, marked the end of Rome’s rise to power: she had destroyed the Carthaginian and Macedonian empires, the Seleucids were subdued, and Egypt was still relatively weak (3.2-3). However, soon after beginning, Polybius decided to extend his narrative down to the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146 BC, adding another ten books to his already vast work (3.4). This continuation allowed him to cover not only events at which he himself was present (3.4.13; 4.2.2), but also to include a discussion about the consequences of this new hegemonic power and the correct ways to govern and rule an empire.\textsuperscript{16} It was composed almost contemporaneously with the Macedonian king (238-179 BC) from about 150 BC onwards, and Polybios himself was an eye-witness to the defeat of Philip’s son Perseus in the Third Macedonian War in 168 BC (3.4.13). His personal participation in events no doubt played a crucial role in shaping his treatment of the period and its extension, as well as influenced his understanding and interpretation of affairs and characters.

Born, according to the most reliable estimate,\textsuperscript{17} in about 208 or 200 BC, Polybios was a citizen of the prominent Arcadian city Megalopolis, located in the north-central Peloponnesian

\textsuperscript{15} It seems that there was a more positive tradition in existence during Polybios’ time, as he mentions historians (unnamed and unnumbered) who considered Philip’s actions at Messene, which our historian sees as deplorable, as either praiseworthy or unimportant in the broader schemes of the king (Polyb. 8.8).

\textsuperscript{16} For a discussion of the nature of the continuation of Polybios’ original plan and its relation to wider ancient historiography see Mehl (2013). See Walbank \textit{Commentary I} 43 for Polybios’ continuation of Aratos’ \textit{Memoirs}.

\textsuperscript{17} The evidence for Polybios’ birth is unfortunately indecisive. See ‘Polybius’ by Thorntons (2012) in the \textit{EAH}. Some scholars believe he was born as early as 208-207 BC: Pédech (1961) 145-56 puts his birth as early as 208 BC, Musti (1965) 381-2 in 205, Dubuisson (1980) 72-82 in 208; Ferrary (1988) 283, n.69 in 207. There is also a later school of thought, led by Frank Walbank, which places it closer to 200 and currently seems to be holding.
and a member of the Achaian League from the third century BC onwards. This confederation of Peloponnesian states Polybius describes in glowing terms in the introduction to his narrative (see Chapter 2) and claims was primarily concerned with maintaining independence from the overlordship of Macedonia and later Rome (Polyb. 2.37.9-11). The historian came from a wealthy, politically active family and he himself records how his father, Lycortas, served as strategos, the highest office of the Achaian League, and was involved in the League’s dealings with Rome from 187 BC (2.40; 22.3, 12-16; 23.12, 16-17; 24.6, 10; 28.3-6; 29.23-25; 37.5). From his youth, Polybius was also involved in Achaian politics. He was chosen to carry the urn of Philopoemen (Plut. Philopoemen 21.5), a great Achaian statesman, who had not only improved the military strength of the League by his reforms, but also destroyed the walls of Sparta and strongly resisted Roman interference. It was not just a symbolic task. In 170/69 BC, he was elected to the office of hipparchos of the League at the age of thirty and was on track to a distinguished political career (28.6.9).

It was during this term of office, however, that Perseus was defeated by the Romans and the Macedonian kingdom broken up and placed under Roman control. This defeat affected the historian personally, alongside a thousand other pro-Macedonian or neutral families, as he was deported to Rome as a hostage to insure the compliance of Greece (30.13.6-11, 32.1-12; 31.2, 11-15; 32.3.14-17; 33.1.3-8, 3, 14; Livy 45.31.9; Paus. 7.10.11-12). Polybius’ political career was cut short. Yet he did not allow this turn of fate to force him into a life of inactivity. He was fortunate enough to remain within the city and soon made life-long connections with a number of prominent Romans, most notably the victor at Pydna, Publius Scipio Aemilianus, son of Lucius Aemilianus Paullus, and his circle (31.23-24, 29.8). It was during this period

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18 Most general work on Polybius contain a discussion of his life. See for example Cuntz (1902) 75-78; Mioni (1949) 1-16; Walbank Commentary I 1-2, (1966), (1972) 6-13; Eckstein (1992) 387-406.
19 For primary sources on Philopoemen see Polyb. 2.40, 67-69; 10.21-23; 11.9-18; 16.36-37; 19.1; 20.6, 12; 21.9, 41; 22.1-16; 23.9-16; 24.13-15; 37.5; 39.14; Plut. Philopoemen; Pausanias viii. 49SL. See also Errington (1969) for a monograph on Philopoemen.
20 For an overview of his exile see Erskine (2012).
21 The existence of the Scipionic Circle, an intellectual philhellenic group which contributed substantially towards the spread Greek culture in Rome, has long been a controversial issue. For those who have accepted its existence as real, see Martin Brown (1934), Gruen (1968) 17, Christ (1984) 92-102, Ferrary (1988) 589-602, Huss (1998) 128, and Dreyer (2006) 81-3. The tide is running, however, with those who see the Circle as a literary device providing a historical framework for the dialogue between Greece and Rome: see Strasburger (1966), Astín (1967) 294-306, Zetzel (1972) 176-7, and Forsythe (1991) 363. Finally see Sommer (2013) for a fresh revisit of this ‘circle’ and Polybius’ connection with it.
of exile that Polybios began his vast entreprise. Having gained the trust of the current

generation of Roman political leaders, Polybios held a prestigious position which not only

afforded him access to Greek and Roman sources for his *Histories*, but also enabled him to
collect information from eye-witness accounts and public records, as well as to explore the

geographical features of prominent sites and locations by extensive travel.\(^{22}\) He was a mentor
and companion of Scipio in his travels to North Africa, Spain and Gaul (3.59.7), crossing the
Alps (3.48.12), and even standing by the Roman’s side at the destruction of Carthage in 146
(38.21-22).\(^{23}\) It seems he also sailed alone beyond the Pillars of Gibraltar into the Atlantic,
perhaps visiting Britain (34.15.7; Pliny *Nat. Hist.* 5.9, for Britain see 34.10.7), and to
Alexandria and Sardis, although the dates of these two latter trips are uncertain (Alexandria
34.14.6; Sardes 21.38.7). Following the destruction of Corinth, Polybios was allowed to

personally facilitate the political settlement of Greece, and received multiple civic honours for

his service from his native city and the Achaian League (Polyb. 39.5.4; Paus. 8.37.1-2). Work
on his *Histories* continued throughout this period, and adjustments continued to be made until
the end of his life. He allegedly died in about 118 BC after falling from a horse at the age of
82 (Ps.-Lucian, *Macrobius*, 23; cf. Polyb. 3.39.8 which contains a reference to the Via
Domitia laid down in 118 BC).\(^{24}\)

While Polybios remains our most important source for the period, one of the primary

issues with his account is that the majority of it is fragmentary. Of the original forty books,
only Books 1-5 survive complete, Books 17 and 40 are entirely lost, and the remaining 33
fragmentary to varying degrees.\(^{25}\) This, of course, poses big problems when we wish to speak
about the content of the latter books and the historian’s development of narrative, characters
and themes. In our case, we are fortunate to have a complete account of Philip V’s early years
up to 216 BC in Books 4 and 5; yet, while we have a reasonable amount of narrative material
until his death in Book 25, the account of many important events of his life (for instance his

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\(^{22}\) See Walbank (1972) 74-77 for Polybios’ role in this community. For the freedom accorded to Polybios to

research and travel see Mioni (1949) 13, Walbank *Commentary I* 4-9 and (1972) 76, Pédech (1964) 524-5, Greek

(1990) 277, Champion (2004) 17 and McGing (2010) 140, who claim that he was allowed to move around Italy

and to the west with Scipio before his detention had ended. For views asserting he was more restricted in his


\(^{23}\) See Walbank *Commentary II* 382

\(^{24}\) Dubuisson (1980) objects to the use of both Ps.-Lucian and Polyb. 3.39.8, referring to the Via Domitia, as
arguments and stands by 118 BC for Polybios’ death. For Ps.-Lucian, *Macrobius* see also Hirschfeld (1889) and
Rühl (1907).

\(^{25}\) For the manuscript tradition of Polybios see Moore (1965) and Sacks (1971) 11-20.
pact with Antiochos III in 203 and the details of his last years) is entirely lost and must be inferred from other passages within the Histories or supplemented by the work of others. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in the next chapter, Book 2 and the description of the Achaian League contained within it, prove useful in understanding Polybios’ attitude towards and depiction of Macedonia and Philip.

Many areas of Polybios’ missing Histories can, however, be profitably supplemented by other works, most notably Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita. Titus Livius from Patavium, more commonly known as Livy, was a Roman historian who lived during the reign of Augustus from 64 or 59 BC to AD 17. His Ab Urbe Condita recorded the history of Rome from its earliest beginnings to the historian’s own time. Of course, a vast number of sources were needed for the creation of this extensive history, much of which has unfortunately been lost, but it is known that Polybios’ work was often used, at times almost verbatim, for Livy’s account of our period in Books 26-41. Fortunately, these books are part of the surviving section of Livy’s vast 142 book history, of which only a quarter remains to us, and these are vital for filling in many important gaps in Polybius’ work from 211 BC onwards. Although Greek and Macedonian events can at times be greatly compressed and temporally displaced if Rome had only limited involvement in affairs (for example the years 205-201; see chapter 4 for further discussion), important episodes, such as the last years of Philip’s life, can be reconstructed to such an extent that not only a clear chronology, but also a detailed account can be established (see Chapter 5 for this reconstruction).

Alkaios of Messene, Diodoros of Agyrion (or Siculus), Plutarch, Appian of Alexandria, and Justin also supply literary material relating to Philip V and Macedonia, although, their works were mostly composed much later than the events recorded and Polybios’ influence is often quite plain (with the exception of Alkaios of Messene, who lived during Philip’s reign). For this project, Plutarch is particularly useful and will be consulted extensively in Chapter 2

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26 For a general commentary on Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita see Briscoe Commentary XXXI-XXXIII and (2008). For Livy and his work see also Chaplin (2000); Mellor (2002); Woodman (2003); Chaplin & Kraus (2009); and Mineo (2014).

27 For Livy’s use of Polybios’ narrative for Greek events for books 31-45 and his careful adaptation and rearrangement of it for his own literary purposes see especially Tränkle (1977) and (2009) 476-95, and Briscoe (2013) 117-24. This view is in opposition to the older tradition that Livy was ‘careless and casual in his scrutiny of his sources’, advocated for example by Walsh (1958) 355-375. See also Briscoe’s commentaries (1973) and (2008), and Nissen (1863), Pianezzola (1969), Lanciotti (1983), Briscoe (2013) and Halfmann (2013).
in the exploration of Polybios’ portrayal of the Achaian League and its leaders. Of course, as he was writing more for the sake of biography than history, we must as always be cautious when using him to check Polybius’ account and be aware of his methodology in the construction of his Lives. It is well known that he often manipulated chronology, expanded his narratives with imagined circumstantial detail, and brought to the fore events that highlighted certain characteristics and interpretations while ignoring others. Like Polybius, he had a set purpose; however, Plutarch’s was not to narrate political and military events exactly as they happened, but to illustrate character. His Aratus and Aemilius Paullus are particularly useful in filling in details and checking Polybios’ work of Philip, Perseus and Macedonia, but are also good examples of the different interpretations that one character could receive, in this instance Philip V, in two different Lives.

Importantly, Plutarch’s Aratus is our only other surviving literary source besides Polybios that describes the career of the prominent Achaian politician, Aratos of Sikyon. Aratos was the Achaian leader who oversaw the readmittance of Macedonian influence into the Peloponnese in 224 BC and who later became an important figure in Philip V’s court. Plutarch’s account provides a good counter-balance to the biased perspective of Polybios’ selective account and reveals a great deal about the Megalopolitan historian’s workings (see Chapter 2). Yet, while Plutarch’s description of Aratos is more balanced here, his portrayal of Philip is highly negative and rests on the more negative parts of Polybios’ account (Plut. Arat. 46-54). In contrast, however, a more positive depiction of Philip and his predecessors is sketched in Plutarch’s Aemilius Paulus, where the king is described in much more neutral terms (Aem. 7-8, 12). The difference in perspective comes from the different aims of each Life. In the Aratos, Plutarch, wishing to present Aratos in a positive light, shows that the Achaian was forced to accept Macedonian overlordship and that he was killed by the evil machinations of the king. In this context it made sense to present Philip in a negative way. In

29 Many scholars still term him a historian, however, as his work is generally closer to historiography than encomia or biographical novels. See Wardman (1974) 1-18; Pelling (2002) 147-52.
31 For a discussion of Plutarch’s construction of character see Wardman (1974) 105-144.
33 For a commentary on Plutarch’s Life of Aemilius Paullus see Leidmeier (1935).
the *Aemilius Paulus*, Plutarch records how Aemilius fought and defeated Perseus in the Third Macedonian War in 168. Perseus, as the enemy, is described very negatively and his reign is directly compared with the more successful reigns of his predecessors to discredit him. It is therefore more appropriate in this context to show Philip V in a positive light to heighten the incompetence of his son. It is clear that in this latter Life Plutarch also used Polybios, as he is cited in a number of places (*Aem. 15.3, 16.2, 19.2*). However, in this instance, it appears that he has decided to ignore the more critical of Polybios’ comments concerning Philip to suit his own purpose.

Our other literary sources for Philip – Alkaios of Messene, Diodoros, Appian, and Justin - will only receive cursory attention in this project as their accounts add little to the more comprehensive ones of Polybios and Livy. With the notable exception of Alkaios’ epigram, they also tend to derive to some extent from Polybios’ narrative. The first, Alkaios of Messene, was a Greek poet from the late third-early second century BC, writing contemporaneously with our period.34 Twenty-two of his epigrams written between 219-196 survive to us, five of which are directly related to Philip V (G-A. 7.247, 9.518, 9.519, 11.12 and 16.5; cf. 16.6 a poem also concerning Philip and his victory over the Thracian Odrysian tribe). While four of these are undoubtedly hostile to the monarch in terms of content and tone, one of them, 9.518,35 received much attention from Edson, Momigliano and Walbank in the 1930s and 40s for its ambiguous tone – at times interpreted as representing genuine praise and patriotism towards the monarch, at others irony and hostility.36 From this discussion, a consensus was reached arguing for a sarcastic reading of this political epigram. It should be noted, however, that the genre, purpose and hostile nature of these poems make any use of them historically problematic, and their claims must be analysed within the context of Hellenistic poetry and the common *topoi* of the genre. Yet, they can (particularly 9.518), for example, help to confirm the fact that other ancient writers besides Polybios also considered the king to be aggressively in pursuit of world dominion, expansion and conquest in the

34 For Alkaios of Messene and his epigrams on Philip see De Sanctis (1923) 1, 9; Walbank (1942) and (1943); Momigliano (1942) 53-64 = (1984) 431-46; Edson (1948); Gutzwiller (2007) 117.

35 Μακύνου τείχη, Ζεύ, Ὄλυμπια· πάντα Φιλίππωι / αμβατά· χαλκείας κλειε πύλας μακάρων. / Χθὼν μὲν δὴ καὶ πόντος ὑπὸ σκήπτρων Φιλίππων / Δέδμηται· λοιπὰ δ’ά πρός Ὀλυμπίων ὄδός. Make higher, Zeus, the walls of Olympus: Philip can | Scale everything! Close the bronze gates of the Blessed Ones.] Land and sea lie subdued beneath Philip’s sceptre. | All that remains is the road to Olympus. (*Anth. Pal. 9.518*)

36 Edson (1934), Momigliano (1942), Walbank (1942) and (1943), and Edson (1948).
Mediterranean, confirm his association with Zeus, and even supply historical details about campaigns (e.g. the anonymous epigram 16.6 and Philip’s attack on the Thracians).

The second author, Diodoros of Agyrion (c. first century BC), was a Greek historian who wrote an immense universal history in forty books, the Bibliotheca historica, covering the history of Europe, Syria, Egypt, India and Arabia from their mythic origins to about 60 BC.\(^{37}\) While only books 1-5 and 11-20 of the Bibliotheca survive complete, fragments of the missing tomes have been preserved in Photius and the excerpts of Constantine Porphyrogenitus. Unfortunately, the portion of Diodoros’ work pertaining to our period, books 25 to 31, are part of this fragmentary section and only a few passages survive concerning Philip (25.18; 28.1-12, 15; 29.16, 25-30; 30.5; 31.8). These are, however, clearly derivative of Polybios (see 29.30 for instance).\(^{38}\)

Appian of Alexandria (c.95-c.165 AD), the third major source on Philip and his time, wrote a Roman History in 24 books, of which ten survive intact and six in fragments.\(^{39}\) Instead of adopting a traditional annalistic framework, Appian organised his work geographically with each volume narrating events from a specific region. The first twelve books recorded Rome’s external wars, beginning from the time of first conflict, and was followed by five on Rome’s civil wars. For us, the fragmentary remains of his Macedonian Wars, beginning from 215 BC and ending with the defeat of Perseus in the Third Macedonian War, are the most relevant. While Appian’s sources have been much discussed with little agreement, it appears that his selection was limited and his adaptation of them considerable. Correspondingly, it is clear from his narrative of the Punic and Macedonian wars that for the period 200-146 BC Appian relied heavily on Polybios, a source which he even explicitly mentions at Pun. 132.628-31.\(^{40}\)

The last literary source, Justin, a Roman historian of the second or third century AD,\(^{41}\) wrote an epitome of the voluminous lost of work of Pompeius Trogus (Historiae Philippicae

\(^{37}\) For Diodoros see Burton (1973), Stylianou (1998), Green (2006) and (2010), and Sacks (2014a).


\(^{40}\) FRH 46

\(^{41}\) Justin’s date is uncertain, but Syme (1988) argues for a date around 390 AD.
et totius mundi origines et terrae situs), a first century BC Roman historian from Gallia Narbonensis who recorded the rise and history of the Macedonian monarchy. While Justin’s work remains a valuable text, particularly in offering a continuous if brief description of the complicated period after Alexander’s death, its contribution in regard to the life of Philip V is limited (28.3-4, 29.1-31.1, 32.2-4). It is extremely condensed, lacks detail and omits, for example, the distinction between the First and Second Macedonian Wars, Philip’s campaign in the Aegean, and his cooperation with Rome in their war against Antiochos III.

1.1.b The Contribution of Epigraphy

In addition to the literary sources, over the last fifty years there has also been an increasing amount of epigraphic evidence relating to this period which supplements, checks and challenges the established narratives. The most important of these for our project is the second volume of Hatzopoulos’ Macedonian Institutions under the Kings (1996) which contains a comprehensive collection of the known inscriptions for the Macedonian kings, and Argyro Tataki’s Macedonians Abroad (1998), which offers a valuable contribution to the limited prosopographical work on Macedonia. Bertrand and O’Neil, using epigraphic evidence concerning diplomatic affairs, have also explored the relationship between the Hellenistic kings and the Greek cities, and offered a greater understanding of the processes involved in these interactions and their negotiatory nature (see 2.3.a for further details). For more specific collections concerning Philip V, Le Bohec has helpfully compiled a survey of those inscriptions connected with the king, and Hatzopoulos has very recently discusses the most important of these in the second half of his ‘Vies parallèles: Philippe V d’après Polybe et d’après ses propres écrits’.

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42 For Justin and Pompeius Trogus see the commentaries by Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel (1997) and (2012), and Yardley (2003).
43 For general collections of the epigraphic material available see Oikonomos (1915), Habicht (1973), Rizakes & Touratsoglou (1985), Gounaropoulou & Hatzopoulos (1998), and Austin (2006).
44 See also the review of Tataki’s contribution by Carney (2000) and Shipley (2003). There is as yet no general prosopographical work on Macedonia, but for the reign of Alexander see Heckel (1992), for the period from 146 B.C. to Constantine see Kanatsoulis (1955). For the friends of the Antigonids see also SEG 53-583.
46 Hatzopoulos (2014).
The most significant of these for our subject are the eleven letters and six *diagrammata* that survive relating to Philip V, each allowing us a glimpse into the way in which the king wanted to present himself - as a benefactor and full of piety - to his Greek allies and subjects, as well as into some of the policies deployed in his later years (the remaining material concerning the king is dedicatory or too fragmentary to be of use and of uncertain date). The letters include Philip’s mediation between the city of Mylasa and his agent Olympichos, the confirmation to the citizens of Ainos in Amphipolis of his support for the Ainian exiles, his involvement in citizenship reforms in Larissa, his economic and political concessions to the Abaians, Nisyrians and Amphipolitans, his religious observances in the letters to the Panamariens and Chalkidians, his confirmation of *asylia* at Dion, and his fulfillment of the demands of his Macedonian citizen-soldiers in Evies and Rhodes. The *diagrammata* show his concern for military regulations, for religious property at Thessaloniki, that the Hunters of Heracles Kynagidas wear the traditional attire, and that athletes be registered for competitions by the relevant gymnasia. Studies examining these documents have proven fruitful in outlining the intricacies of the relationships between the king and the associated cities or people, as well as the relationship between king and agent. Not only do they reveal specific concerns of the king at the time, but also the manner in which he wished to portray himself and how he was forced to accommodate local Greek customs and interests. The most famous of these documents, and most revealing for their excellent state of preservation, are Philip’s two letters to Larissa, sent in 217 and 215 BC respectively, and their reception by the community. These show in detail the nature of interaction between the king and city: the methods of engagement and persuasion used by the monarch, and the degree of cooperation,

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47 See Le Bohec (1996) and Hatzopoulos (2014) 107-120 for excellent discussions of these sources.
48 *Labraunda* 4, 5, and 7.
50 *Syll."* 543 (= *IG IX*, 2, 517).
51 *Syll."* 552, *Syll."* 572 and *SEG* 46 (1996) 716 respectively.
52 *IStratonikeia* 3 and *IMagnesia* 47.
58 Hatzopoulos (1996) II 40-41, no. 16.
as well as resistance, to the king’s orders expressed by the city authorities. These letters will be dealt with in more depth at the end of Chapter 2.

This epigraphic material will, however, only be used incidentally in this thesis as a supplement to arguments relating to the literary evidence. This is primarily due to constraints of space which have compelled the body of analysis to focus on detailed discussions of Polybios’ narrative. For a preliminary investigation of the picture of Philip in both the literary and epigraphic records, however, Hatzopoulos’ lastest 2014 article offers an exciting new enquiry. Its conclusions show a striking disparity of presentation in the two types of source and encourage new approaches comparing and incorporating both in order to secure a fuller understanding of the king, as well as Polybios’ work. This thesis aims to offer a contribution to the literary aspect involved in such a reassessment, entailing a detailed analysis of Polybios’ working aims and methodology, and discussion of how these have shaped his portrait of the king. In doing so, it will break the ground for a larger monographic study of the king incorporating literary, epigraphic and archaeological evidence.

1.2 Modern Scholarship on Philip V and Polybios

1.2.a Historical Developments

Frank Walbank’s monograph Philip V of Macedon (1940 and revised in 1967) has been the most comprehensive and influential study of the Macedonian king in the last forty years. Yet, as there has been an astounding amount of new work on Polybios, the Hellenistic world and Hellenistic kingship in these intervening years, much of this treatise has now been rendered obsolete. Even Walbank’s later works on Polybios and his historical context, collected in the volumes Polybius (1975), Selected Papers (1985), and Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World (2002), revise many of the ideas contained in his earlier monograph. This reflects a striking change in attitude towards Polybios and his depiction of the ancient world, and thus requires us also to change our understanding of the Macedonian king.

Caution and even distrust of Polybios’ reliability amongst scholars as a historical source has been increasing, particularly in the recognition, as presented in Arthur Eckstein’s Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius (1995), that Polybios’ agenda to write about the rise of Rome was also influenced by a strong desire to create a highly didactic and moral piece for
his readers (see 1.3.b below). This moralistic stance was once very popular in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, but fell from favour in the early twentieth, first under the instigation of André Aymard in 1940 and then with support by Frank Walbank in the 1960s. Their work perpetuated the idea that Polybios was not so much concerned with a moral agenda, but rather with sympathetically expounding rational and Machiavellian principles of political conduct.60 The older moralising views have, however, made a recent reappearance and consequently encouraged renewed exploration of this theme. The importance ascribed to moral behaviour and to the transmission of traditional Greek values within the ancient historian’s work is now brought out with ever more emphasis.

The historian’s concern with causality in aid of his didactic purpose has also continued to attract attention and seen striking new ground with the recent work of Felix Maier. Maier convincingly argued that, instead of revealing contradiction, two differing strands of thought concerning the past (deterministic or katalogical, and non-deterministic or paralogical) work in tandem in the Histories to promote his educational aim (see 1.3.b below).61 The presence of these two concepts of the past and the historian’s attempt to intertwine them will, of course, have affected the structure, presentation and seeming consistency of his material. Maier’s study will undoubtedly encourage a new wave of interest and investigation, and is certainly part of the background to this project.

Additionally it is now ever more apparent that our historian was not free from bias towards certain peoples or individuals, conditioned by his elite upbringing in Megalopolis, a federal state of the Achaean League, and from personal experience in both political and military fields. Craig Champion, and Karen Haegemans and Elizabeth Kosmetatou, have shown how patriotism coloured Polybios’ depiction of his homeland, as well as his assessment and depiction of the various states and individuals connected with it.62 The voice of the author is also an especially prominent and persistent feature, explicitly expressing the views and opinions of the writer so that his audience may not unknowingly mistake the lessons to be drawn from his material and thereby impress upon them his own view of

61 For Polybius’ view of history see, for example, Pédech (1964), and Maier (2012a) and (2012b). Also see the section 1.3.b below.
events. A valuable new study on the political dimensions of the Histories by John Thornton has illustrated how the historian’s work was constructed as a dialogue between Greece and Rome, addressing the crucial problem of their relations in the changing political context. Thornton convincingly argues that our historian uses his work to encourage both parties to conduct themselves in a way beneficial to all in an attempt to gain the most favourable position possible for the Achaian League and Greece under the new hegemonic power.

Finally, new work has been published on Polybios’ selection, criticism and adaptation of his sources: for example Haegemans and Kosmetatou, and Andrew Meadows on Polybios’ use of Aratos’ Memoirs, Dominique Lenfant and Hans-Ulrich Wiemer on his Rhodian sources, and Boris Dreyer on the use of Macedonian court sources for the account of Philip’s last years. These have shown how the historian’s use of his source material depended upon their availability to him, his assessment of their truthfulness, his own political preferences as well as how well they fit in with and supported his overall interpretations and historiographical schemes. This is especially true of Philip V, who not only suffered an ambiguous reputation in Greece, but also (alongside the Seleucid king Antiochos III) had to be defeated by Rome in order for the latter to emerge as the prominent power in the eastern Mediterranean.

This renewed examination of Polybios has not, as yet, resulted in a substantial re-evaluation of Philip. Since Walbank’s work, Philip and his reign have generally only been included as a sub-section in broader works primarily aimed at the study of Roman imperialism, for example in Erich Gruen’s The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (1986), Arthur Eckstein’s Rome Enters the Greek East (2008) and Donald Baronowski’s Polybios and Roman Imperialism (2011). Before this, only a few articles relating to Philip emerged, dealing with issues such as chronology, and foreign and domestic policy. In 1995

64 Thornton (2013).
65 Respectively, Haegemans & Kosmetatou (2005), Meadows (2013), Lenfant (2005), Wiemer (2013) and Dreyer (2013a). For earlier work on Aratos see also Walbank Commentary I 43, Errington (1976) 20 fn. 9, and Pédech (1964) 261. For Polybios’ Achaian sources see Walbank (1972) 83 fn. 105, for Rhodian sources see Wiemer (2001). For court sources and the account of Philip’s last years, see Walbank (1938) 65, and Pédech (1964) 123-39. This is in contrast to Benecke (1930) 254 who suggests that Polybios used tragedies written about the royal Macedonian house and historic novels as evidence for these last years.
66 For chronology see Berthold (1975). For foreign policy see e.g. Gruen (1973) discussing the alleged alliance between Philip and Rome; Fine (1936) and Oost (1959) for his policies in Illyria; Errington (1971), Thompson (1971), Berthold (1975), Walbank (1993/2002), Meadows (1996) and Eckstein (2005) for his policies in the Aegean and Caria. For his domestic policies see Gruen (1974), Piejko (1983) and Oetjen (2010).
Golan provided a discussion of the sudden change for the worse that Philip’s character allegedly took in 215. However, it is only very recently that scholarship has been directed more specifically to Polybius’ description and construction of the king, and even then only in a limited sense. Craig Champion (1997) explored to great effect Polybius’ construction of motivation and ambition in the Macedonian king in regard to expansion and war against Rome. In a chapter of his *Polybius’ Histories* (2010), and later in an article entitled ‘Youthfulness in Polybius: The Case of Philip V of Macedon’, McGing also identified the theme of youthfulness as a prominent thematic device for the creation of expectation and suspense in the early years of Philip’s reign. Yet, McGing’s investigations did not carry past book five of the *Histories* (Philip dies in Book 25), and there is still much more to be said about the king’s presentation. Finally, Boris Dreyer’s ‘Frank Walbank’s Philippos Tragoidoumenos: Polybius’ Account of Philip’s Last Years’ (2013) and his ‘Polybios und die hellenistischen Monarchien’ (2013) have re-explored Polybius’ account of Philip’s last years, arguing not only for an anti-Philip/Perseus court source for the period, but also for Polybios’ ascription of the trait of indecision to Philip (and his son Perseus) when faced with crucial moments (see 5.2.d for further discussion).

**1.2.b The Literary Turn**

The works of Golan, Champion, McGing, and Dreyer are part of a growing awareness and appreciation of the literary workings of Polybios’ *Histories* that has only fully emerged and taken shape within the last few years. On this thread, an important set of insights into Polybios’ literary strategy has recently come from the work of Nikos Miltsios. He illustrates the importance of narrative shape within the *Histories* and explores how its construction is determined by certain choices made by the historian to express his understanding of the course of events recorded, and to communicate it coherently to his readers.67 These choices include not only Polybios’ emphasis on particular themes and his recurrent, and sometimes cyclical, use of them to instil and enforce certain perspectives, but also instances of analepses (flashbacks) to inform and/or persuade the audience of a certain perspective, prolepses (foreshadowing) to create suspense and inspire a desire to learn how something happened, as

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67 Miltsios (2013).
well as varied focalizations and a strong authorial voice. Through each of these techniques we may better comprehend what was crucial in the historian’s analysis and the perspectives he wanted to convey to the reader.\(^{68}\)

Miltiös’ work is foregrounded by several literary and historiographical studies. His methodological approach draws on concepts of narratological models developed by Gerard Genette and Mieke Bal, which, although originally devised for fictional literature, have also proved invaluable in bringing out the complexity of the narratives of ancient historians.\(^{69}\) This is not altogether surprising as the formulaic difference between ancient historiography and fiction is difficult to determine. They both use, for example, internal focalisation which allows the audience to see into the minds of the characters and expose their feelings and motives; a feature which would not be deemed fitting in modern historiography, but was perfectly acceptable in ancient historical accounts.\(^{70}\) This narratological approach has already been profitably applied to the works of other ancient historians, but, as mentioned above, has only recently taken root in the study of Polybios.\(^{71}\)

One of the first Polybian scholars influenced by Genette’s work was James Davidson, whose article ‘The Gaze of Polybios’ Histories’, paved the way for this literary turn. Although reluctant to use the term ‘focalization’ because of its connection with fictional texts, Davidson applied the same method, under the term ‘gaze’, to explore Polybios’ presentation of warfare.\(^{72}\) His conclusions drew out the importance of perception within the Histories, both of the readers in terms of establishing their expectations and in terms of the historical agents whose actions are dictated by their understanding of events. Davidson’s article and his conclusions about perception within the Histories have influenced further studies moving beyond the parameters of warfare. In 2009, Miltiös also carried Davidson’s work further.\(^{73}\) He stressed how Polybios was greatly concerned that the structure of his Histories created interest in the reader, and that one of the methods he employed to achieve this was the implementation of a varying array of literary perspectives, some more knowledgeable, others

\(^{68}\) Miltiös (2013) 1-3.
\(^{69}\) Genette (1972/1980); Bal (1997). Much of this debate has also been influenced by Tony Woodman’s work on classical rhetoric (2003), even though it only engages with Polybios tangentially.
\(^{70}\) See also Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of the blurred line, in the ancient Greek mind, between history and tragedy.
\(^{71}\) For this narratological approach to Herodotos and Thukydides see for instance Baragwanath (2008) and Rood (1998) respectively.
\(^{73}\) Miltiös (2009) 481-506.
not. This is accomplished in a close reading of Polybios’ account of the capture of Achaeus by Antiochos III (8.15-21), and Miltsios not only shows how suspense, surprise and uncertainty are brought out in the reader, but also how the theme of illusory expectation – that people who are overly optimistic in forecasting success ultimately have their hopes crushed – develops and runs throughout the narrative; a theme which harkens back to Polybios’ didactic purpose.

In 2010, Brian McGing also briefly touched on the literary workings of Polybios and recognised the underappreciated strength of the author in this aspect – his production of a narrative of carefully contrived design. This new attention to literary aspects has left important implications for our study of Philip V. In chapter 3, McGing included an exploration of how our historian constructed his account of the three Hellenistic kings, Philip V, Ptolemy IV and Antiochos III in books 4 and 5 of the Histories.74 As mentioned above, in this piece McGing examines the theme of youthfulness, identified as one of the main thematic strands in Polybios’ portrayal of the king’s early reign. Influenced heavily by Davidson, McGing explores the varying focalizations (through the eyes of his advisers, the Achaeans, Aitolians and Spartans) that are at work within the narrative that lead to the perception that the king is helpless and incompetent because of his youth. This perception of weakness causes the historical agents to act, or react, in certain ways and the audience to hold expectations of failure. However, Philip continuously proves such perceptions of him wrong, causing the unexpected failure of related historical agents and pushing the readers into a state of suspense.75 By 217 BC, four years after his succession, Philip has demolished the misconception that he was an ineffective youth and emerges as a politically and militarily capable king.

The historian’s use of teleology and contingency within his work has also received substantial recent discussion. It has been widely accepted that the Histories is affected by a teleological framework, and this is an underlying element in any discussion involving Polybious’ ‘universal history’ and the attribution of Rome’s rise to supremacy to the work of tyche.76 The specific structuring of events to fulfil this aim has already been discussed by Walbank, who refers to the conference of Naupaktos in 217 BC when Philip ends the Social

74 The section on Philip was later developed into a chapter which featured in the 2013 edited volume, Polybios and his World: Essays in memory of F.W. Walbank.
War and is thereby able to turn his attention towards the conquest of Illyria and Italy, and also by Eckstein in a discussion of Polybios’ account of the pact between the kings in 203 (see 5.2.c). Yet, this literary feature has only recently received dedicated treatment in Jonas Grethlein’s work. Here, he claims that the historian’s use of hindsight is heavy, resulting in a strong teleological design, and explores the narratological intricacies and difficulties that arise from the use of such a methodology. Of particular note is the development of strong discrepancies between the historian’s account and the past as it would have been experienced by the characters; the work’s experiential quality is compromised by Polybios’ urge to explain the causes of each event in accordance with his didactic aims which can lead to serious misconceptions in the reader. However, while this teleological understanding of Polybios’ work still remains strong in modern scholarship, Felix Maier has introduced an alternative perspective: rejecting arguments proclaiming the teleological outlook of the Histories, he has argued that Polybios did not in fact see the past as teleological, but rather as contingent and that his Histories were instead constructed around this concept. While the historian uses patterns of cause and effect, which may appear to support a teleological view, to explain to his readers how events came about, Polybios counters this feature by strongly emphasising the unpredictability and contingency of the past by frequent use of counterfactual thinking (see 1.3.b below).

This escalating interest in Polybius’ literary works is opening up the field for new investigation and interpretation. This project, which examines the depiction of Philip V within Polybius’ Histories, has been strongly shaped by these scholarly approaches and aims to present a new contribution to the scholarship of Polybios and Philip V against the background of these recent developments.

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78 See Grethlein (2013) 224-267. For Polybios’ conception and methodology in creating his universal history, see for example Alonso-Núñez (1990); Hartog (2010); Kloft (2013) 13-24; and Tully (2014).
79 Grethlein (2013) 233-42.
80 Maier (2012a), (2012b) and particularly (2013) for counterfactual thinking.
1.3 The Shaping of Polybios’ Narrative

It is appropriate at this point to discuss the historiographical methodology and aims that shape the whole of Polybios’ *Histories*. The presentation of content is affected by these features and any examination of Polybios’ work must keep them in mind. An assessment of Polybios’ depiction of Philip V is no exception. In fact, I shall argue that the value of Polybios’ evidence for Philip may yet be appreciated through an engagement with Polybios’ literary strategy.

1.3.a Pragmatic History

One of Polybios’ central concerns was defining the type of history he was writing and the kind of reader he aimed to attract. He explicitly describes his work, in Book 6, as ‘pragmatic history’ (πραγματικὴ ἱστορία; Polyb. 6.5.2), which he expands in Book 9 to mean history concerned with ‘the deeds of peoples, cities and rulers’ (περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν ἔθνων καὶ πόλεων καὶ δυναστῶν; Pol. 9.1.4). It is a category which, Polybios claims, would primarily interest those involved in public life (ὁ πολιτικὸς), and is explicitly contrasted with two other types: the ‘genealogical kind’ (ὁ γενεαλογικὸς τρόπος), which Polybios explains attracts those who are fond of stories, or the casual reader (ὁ φιλήκοος), and the kind which deals with the ‘accounts of colonies, city foundations and kinship ties’ (περὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ κτίσεως καὶ συγγενείας), which would attract those curious and eager for all types of knowledge (ὁ πολυπράγμων).

The phrase πραγματικὴ ἱστορία, which is likely to be a formulation of the historian’s own creation as it is not attested earlier, has been the cause of much debate, circling primarily around what its contents were and whether it was confined to a particular historical period. Some scholars, such as Petzold and Meissner, have argued for a wider definition of the term, moving beyond the deeds of peoples, cities and rulers to include other methodological

82 The translation of φιλήκοος as ‘casual reader’ is posited by Walbank in the recently revised Loeb edition of Polybios’ *Histories*. See Walbank Commentary II 116-117 for a discussion of these terms and categories of history.
considerations. Petzold believed that it should also embrace a practical and didactic element, while Meissner goes even further suggesting that all aspects of Polybios’ works should be included within the definition. However, as Walbank rightly points out, to say that ‘pragmatic history’ should include all aspects within the Histories is fallacious. That it has, in Polybios’ work, didactic connotations is also not the same thing as saying that it specifically means ‘history with a direct practical and didactic use.’ In his own discussion of the term in books 6 and 9, Polybios makes no reference to a practical didactic element or an all-encompassing nature (6. 2.2-10; 9.1-2). It would therefore be better to understand the term in isolation from these wider concerns.

It has also been suggested that the notion of ‘pragmatic history’ describes a specific historical period rather than a type of historiography. For example, it was posited by Meister that, although Polybios primarily tackles contemporary and near-contemporary events, his history in fact covers everything from the sixth century onwards. This argument is unpersuasive, however, as the Polybian passage used to support this statement, 9.1.1-5 (describing the different types of history and audiences), does not describe pragmatic history with reference to a particular time-period, but rather a certain subject (‘the deeds of peoples, cities and rulers’). In fact nowhere in Polybios’ text do we find any mention of a strict restriction to a particular time period, and the historian is certainly content to include events beyond the chosen period of 220 BC to 146 BC. The first two books of his Histories, for example, as an introduction to the main narrative, record events going back to 390 BC, and at numerous other locations within the main narrative itself there are references to individuals and events which appear even before the beginning of Polybios’ account. It has been convincingly argued by Beister and Walbank, therefore, that ‘pragmatic history’ implies no chronological restraints. Yet, while pragmatic history was not defined by its chronological range, the Histories were written in an attempt to explain a specific near-contemporaneous

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83 Petzold (1969) 3-24 argues for a didactic element from such contexts as Polyb. 1.2.8, 35.9, 36.17.1 and 39.1.4.
84 Meissner (1986).
86 Meister (1990) 160
87 The first two books detail the Gallic invasion in Italy (various from 390 – 222 BC; 2.18-35, the First Punic War (264 to 241 BC; Polyb. 1.10-63), the Mercenary War in Carthage (240-38 BC;1.65-88), the First Illyrian conflict (229-228 BC; 2.8-12), the emergence of the Achaian League and the Kleomenean War (371-222 BC; 2.38-70.
88 Polybios explains that he will on occasion give his readers some of the earlier history of certain states to aid understanding of current events (1.12.8). He mentions, for instance, Philip II and Alexander the Great in the fourth century: Polyb. 3.6; 3.59; 4.23; 5.10; 5.55.9; 8.9-10; 22.18.10.
phenomenon – Rome’s emergence as the supreme power in the Mediterranean - and to offer solutions to the current problems faced by Polybios’ political audience in the wake of this development. It naturally became contemporary history because of this aim, but its time frame was still only a by-product. Thus it seems appropriate to define πραγματικὴ ἱστορία as Polybios described it: a history concerned with ‘the deeds of peoples, cities and rulers’ (Polyb. 9.1.4), those being political and military aspects, which would be more of interest to the man involved in public life (ὁ πολιτικὸς).90

Polybios decided to write pragmatic history for two reasons (Polyb. 9.2). The first is that genealogies, myths, the foundation of colonies and cities, and the ties of kinship had already been recorded by numerous authors in a variety of ways. Thus anyone attempting to come back to these matters in Polybios’ own time would either have to present the work of previous writers as their own, a thing which Polybios saw as disgraceful (Polyb. 9.2.2: ὃ πάντων ἐστίν αἰσχροτον), or assert that everything had already been recorded adequately. Such a pursuit would therefore be mere repetition and allow no original contribution. His decision to record only recent and contemporary political and military developments allowed our historian to write about events mostly untouched, and thereby place his own distinctive mark on the historical tradition. The second reason for his choice of ‘pragmatic history’ was that it was more practically useful to his audience than the other branches of history and would enable them to deal with any contingency that may arise. Thus Polybios wished to write about the deeds of peoples, cities and rulers so that he could provide a didactic model for his readers (Polyb. 9.2.5-6). This subject matter directly supports his view that history should be educational.

1.3.b Didactic Purpose

This view that the study of the past is of great educational value is voiced by Polybios in the very first line of his Histories (…διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐτοιμοτέραν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διόρθωσιν τῆς τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἐπιστήμης. Polyb. 1.1.1). A few lines later

he narrows this statement even further, claiming that “it is said that the soundest education and training for political life is the study of history, and the clearest and indeed the only method of learning how to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune is to recall the reversals of others” (Polyb. 1.1.2). Polybios thereby acknowledges that history’s beneficial nature has been effectively noted by others. Yet, he is by far the most explicit in proclaiming this point, even making it his opening statement, and consciously tailors his narrative throughout with explanatory and discursive digressions to be of benefit to the reader. In these passages he explains how certain situations came about, drawing out their causes and effects, and even explaining at numerous locations the methodology with which he has achieved this. He also emphasises events which he feels should be remembered and courses of action that should be emulated, should his readers face similar circumstances. He aims to furnish practical help and counsel for the politically involved citizen and at the same time to teach the reader how to bear the changes of fortune.

In order to achieve this goal, Polybios needed to create as clear an understanding of the past as possible, and admitted therefore to being less concerned with the stylistic quality of his writing than other historians, some of whom were more interested in attracting and entertaining readers than conveying the truth (Polyb. 2.56.7-10, 3.48.8-9, 12.15). This kind of dramatic and sensational history, Polybios argued, obscured the facts about what really happened and prevented the reader from benefiting from what he read. As history is meant to be an account of the past, and not a fictional or panegyric piece where a sensational style would be permissible, it was important for the historian to restrain such emotional language and to present an account unadorned by literary embellishment.

91 Polyb. 1.1.2: …φασκοντες αληθινωτατην μεν ειναι παιδειαν και γυμνασιαν προς τας πολιτικας πραξεις την εκ της ιστοριας ματησιν, εναργητατην δε και μονην διδασκαλον του δυνασθαι τας της τυχης μεταβολας γενναιως υποσερειν την των αλλοτριων περιπετειων υπομνησιν… Α similar statement is also made at 1.35.
92 For Polybios’ concern with cause and effect see especially: 2.56.13; 3.6; 22.18. For his explanations of his methodology see: 1.3-5; 1.12.5-1.14; 2.1; 3.1-5.
93 Polyb. 2.4.3-5, 2.9.6, 2.35.4-8.
94 The Histories are also explicitly described by Polybios as ‘αποδεικτη ιστορια’ (Polyb. 2.37.3). This term simply meant, as Sacks has explained with the support of Walbank, a fuller narrative in contrast to a summary, and does not denote any special treatment of historical events or a ‘history which investigates causes’.
95 Polyb. 29.12.9-10; 16.17.10. His lack of concern for stylistic quality and its repercussions have been acknowledged Meister (1975) 177-78; Walbank (1990) 256 n.19; Miltsios (2009) 481-82; McGing (2010) 4-6.
96 Walbank Commentary I 11.
This general programmatic statement should not lead us to underestimate the literary and rhetorical complexity of the historian, however, and nor should it persuade us to typecast Polybios as a historian who is immune from bias, partial analysis, and sensationalism. He is, in fact, fully aware of, and connected with, a wider complex intellectual tradition which to varying degrees permitted and accepted the integration of all these features. As we will see in chapter 2, Polybios permits the presence of patriotism within works of history provided it is applied with sufficient care and consideration in preserving the truth. Furthermore, in chapter 5, we will discuss the presence of sensational and tragic language in the depiction of Philip in his last years, deliberately used by Polybios unapologetically to bring out the importance of the moment for Macedonian and Mediterranean history.

Walbank aptly noted that Polybios’ proclaimed preference for simplicity, and his earnest statements about the truthfulness of his own account, create an impression of great candour, which in fact leads the reader into thinking that Polybios’ account is straightforward and unproblematic. Intellectual sophistication and personal bias are both weighty factors. Yet, this is, Walbank writes, “the apparent candour one sometimes finds in a man who has persuaded himself of the truth about matters in which he has a strong personal commitment, and is not prepared even to envisage the possibility that there may be another point of view”. This conviction, when combined with Polybios’ penchant for frequent authorial intervention, produces a one-sided perspective. As the ancient historian places digressions, which explain, analyse, commend and approve narrated events all throughout his narrative, he allows ‘almost nothing to pass without drawing his own moral from it’. He seems alert to the possibility that his readers might take the wrong moral or lesson from what he has written, and is at pains to steer their understanding and education. This one-sided manipulative perspective is a feature which has a considerable effect on all areas of Polybios’ work, and will be explored in greater detail with particular reference to Philip in the following chapters.

In discussing his didactic purpose, as has already been touched upon, some scholars have also pointed out that there seems to exist a major contradiction within Polybios’ work – his conception of the past. At times, Polybios talks about recurrent patterns and cycles,
especially in regards to the cycle of seven good and corrupt constitutional forms set out in book six (the *anakyklosis* model), and the progression of Roman power and imperialism which leans very much on a ‘deterministic’ view of the past and the future. At other times, however, he relates the unpredictability or ‘contingency’ of events, for example in his description of Regulus’ sudden change of fortune against Carthage (Polyb. 1.35; see 1.2.b above for discussion of the teleology and contingency of Polybios’ work).

Maier’s recent work on this important issue is most enlightening. Not only does he resolve these two seemingly incompatible ideas which thread Polybios’ work, but also helps realise a greater understanding of this complex historian. Maier believes Polybios has been unfairly targeted as inconsistent in his idea of the past, especially as most scholars supporting this view have focused more on Polybios’ infamous digressions, especially the *anakyklosis*, than his whole narrative. Maier argues, however, that both of these ideas about the past can coexist with coherency in Polybios’ work. They represent two different strains of thought meant to be viewed separately, but both contribute to his overall didactic purpose. In his digressions, Polybios is not so much deterministic, but rather observing rational and logical patterns within history to provide advice about certain characters, actions and situations to his readers. Maier prefers to term this conception as *katalogy*, terminology adapted from Polybios’ own frequent use of the phrase κατὰ λόγον when discussing events which happened according to expectation. Yet Polybios’ actual view of the past is very different, namely that events are unpredictable and history subject to chance; Maier uses the term *paralogy* to convey this opposite concept. As he rightly points out, this idea is not developed by Polybios in his digressions and can only be uncovered by a full examination of the narrative. Maier convincingly argues, therefore, that Polybios does not believe history to be truly cyclical or predictable, but very much unpredictable.

The didactic objective plays an explanatory role in this problem. Despite Polybios’ actual idea of the past, he still wishes to highlight examples of rational and logical courses of action that may prove useful to his readers. This would explain why these moments of

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102 Maier (2012a), (2012b).
103 Maier (2012b) 17-67.
104 Maier (2012b) 73-207.
106 Maier (2012a) 145-46.
katalogy or rationally explainable history, are brought out in special treatment from the rest of the mainly paralogical or unpredictable narrative. Polybios strongly believes that individuals can shape their own past through knowledge of similar past events and subsequent logical preparation, and that it is everyone’s responsibility to do so.\textsuperscript{107} By taking into account all conceivable possibilities, while still appreciating that there are many more unforeseeable events and agents, we are more likely to be adaptable in our actions and consequently more likely to achieve our objectives.\textsuperscript{108} Polybios consequently uses these logical patterns in his history as an educational tool, but is still very much aware of the need to adjust to contingency.

\textit{1.3.c General History and the συμπλοκή}

While he did not wish to entertain his audience by resorting to an overly-dramatic and sensational style, Polybios realised the need to keep his readers interested and thereby inspire them to continue reading through to the end (Polyb. 4.28.6).\textsuperscript{109} This concern is clearly evident in the way he constructs his \textit{Histories}, the artistic intricacy of which has only recently been appreciated by modern scholarship (see 1.2.b).\textsuperscript{110}

Polybios’ structural approach is determined in part by his subject matter, which he claims to be one of the most remarkable and complex periods in history (an assertion that is commonplace in ancient historiography),\textsuperscript{111} and in part by his desire to provide a piece of educational value for his readers. The latter motive has already been discussed above. The former, his subject matter, categorised by the historian as ‘pragmatic history’, is more specifically Rome’s rise to power and her subjugation of the whole known world, the οἰκουμένη, in the space of 53 years (Polyb. 1.1.5). This involved, as Polybios saw it, a complex process of unification, which he termed συμπλοκή ‘interweaving’, into a unified

\textsuperscript{107} See also Walbank (2002) 62.
\textsuperscript{108} Maier (2012a) 146-150.
\textsuperscript{110} For recent acknowledgements of Polybios’ artistry see Miltsiōs (2009) 481 and (2013) 1-2; McGing (2010) 3-10 and (2013). Walbank (1972) 67-72 and (1994), and Craige Champion’s work on Polybios’ representation of collective identities (2004) and historiographic patterns (2013) also reflect this awareness of Polybios’ concern for structure and patterning.
\textsuperscript{111} Marincola (1997) 3-12.
whole (σωματοειδῆ), as the affairs of Italy and Libya became connected with those of Greece and Asia producing one specific outcome - the supremacy of Rome (1.3.3-4). This ‘interweaving’ of events throughout the inhabited world, he claims, had never happened before (Polyb. 1.3.3.), the affairs of the world being previously scattered and unconnected, and this is what makes this period in history, and his recording of it, so important.

This process of συμπλοκῆ Polybios saw starting in 217 BC, specifically at the conference of Naupaktos which ended the Social War (220-217) between Philip and his allies and the Aitolians (Polyb. 5.105.4). After this point he says that the affairs of the world became linked. Yet, as Walbank has shown, crediting this event with real historical importance is problematic, as it is hard to find any credible association between this conference and the people of Asia. Polybios asserts that the islanders and Greeks in Asia, aggrieved by Philip and Attalos at this time, instead of turning to Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV, now looked towards the west and sent embassies to Carthage and Rome for help (Polyb. 5.105.6-7). However, there is no evidence for any appeal by these peoples to Rome for many years after 217, and none to Carthage. Siegfried and Pédech have suggested that what mattered to Polybios was the direction of men’s thoughts and attention, which he claimed all started to look west to Italy, rather than the military and diplomatic contacts. Yet, as Walbank countered, this still does not acquit Polybios of falsely stating that embassies began to go back and forth between Asia Minor, Rome and Carthage when it seems that they in fact did not. This highlights with greater clarity the workings of Polybios and his attempt to make his Histories a coherent unity by the imposition of an artificial pattern.

What is especially important for us is the role given to Philip in this process. After being made aware of Rome’s defeat at Lake Trasimene by Demetrius of Pharos in 217 and consequently entertaining plans of invading Italy following the end of the war in Greece, Philip instigates the conference at Naupaktos to obtain peace. In Polybios’ narrative,

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113 For the restoration of this fragmentary passage see Moore (1966) 245-7.
115 It is only during the First Macedonian War (211-206) that neutral embassies were sent from Egypt, Rhodes, Chios, Mytilene and Byzantium to try and persuade Rome, Aitolia and Macedonia to peace, and these did not venture to Rome nor visit Roman forces.
116 Siegfried (1928) 46; Pédech (1964) 507.
therefore, it is the Macedonian king who sets off the συμπλοκή. As a result, from the very beginning of the Histories the figure of Philip is assigned huge importance in the course of history – he is the initiator of the unique intertwining process on which Polybios focuses - and this importance continues throughout the narrative as it is only by Macedonia’s downfall, allegedly designed by tyche, that Rome is able to come to prominence (for further discussion of tyche see 1.3.d below).

To help his readers understand the events of this convoluted period, Polybios decided to structure his work as a ‘history of general affairs’ (ἡ τῶν καθόλου πραγμάτων σύνταξις; 1.4.2; elsewhere described as τὰ καθόλου γράφειν; Polyb. 5.33.2). This, Polybios believed, would bring the greatest benefit to his readers, as specialist histories or monographs (ἡ κατὰ μέρος ἱστορία), not only distort events by making them appear more important than they really were, but also obscure the connections between them (1.4.6-11; 7.7.6). It is only by reading ἡ τῶν καθόλου πραγμάτων σύνταξις, Polybios claims, that it is possible to gain a proper understanding of cause and effect, to estimate the real importance of events, and consequently to understand the workings of the world from a broader perspective (Pol. 1.4.2, 2.37.4).118

The meaning of Polybios’ phrase ἡ τῶν καθόλου πραγμάτων σύνταξις, ‘the systematic treatise of general affairs’, and just what he envisaged the associated τὰ καθόλου γράφειν to be, have been the cause of much debate and controversy, and the scholarship relating to the genre in ancient historiography is vast. It has been commonplace for modern scholars to translate this term as ‘universal history’ and label Polybios as a universal historian.119 Yet this historiographical concept is often fraught with modern connotations which pose a number of problems in any attempt to explain the ancient historian’s own comprehension of the genre. Most modern conceptions of universal history, as offered by Burde and Alonso-Núñez,120 insist on the inclusion of extensive geographical and chronological features. However, Felix Jacoby, attempting to adapt this definition to ancient perspectives, included not so much global, but ‘national’ coverage, a definition which has been by far the most influential in

118 Walbank Commentary I 9-11.
classical scholarship. Jacoby’s assessment of Polybios’ predecessor, Ephoros, as a ‘universal historian’, for example, rested on the ancient historian’s treatment of all of Greece, including the mainland and the colonies in his primary narrative, rather than concentrating on only one part of it. This differed, for instance, from the works of Herodotos and Thukydides in the fact that while they discussed a wide range of events across the Greek world, their main narratives were still focused on singular events (i.e. the Persian and Peloponnesian wars).

In regard to Polybios, however, Jacoby’s definition is ill-fitting as his work is broader in scope than the ‘national’ history of Ephoros and purportedly covers the oikoumene, a term fluidly encompassing the known world, the inhabited world and the habitable world. The definition posed by Burde and Alonso-Núñez is, however, also problematic. Although Polybios’ Histories may cover the whole known world at the time, they do not stretch over a large chronological period, but only 118 years (264-146 BC), and more crucially, like Herodotos and Thukydides, follow one main theme – Rome’s rise to power in the Mediterranean. The concentration on this phenomenon limits the main players to those who were active in the Mediterranean when Rome rose to power. Nor does Polybios deal with each of these individual powers or states to the same degree, and it may be noted that the Achaian League, while certainly one of the stronger Greek powers at the time, is also given far more air-time and importance than it likely had in reality (see Chapter 2 for further discussion of this prominence).

In discussing this problem, Walbank pointed out that Polybios’ description of his Histories as ἡ τῶν καθόλου πράγματων σύνταξις (which Walbank took to mean ‘universal history’), implies ‘a certain sleight of hand’, as the historian moulds his historical composition towards a conception of unity (Rome’s rise to power). Yet, this very observation rather draws attention to the difficulty inherent in equating our own modern conception of ‘universal history’ with Polybios’ understanding of τὰ καθόλου γράφειν, a problem which has received increasing awareness in modern scholarship. Most attempts to solve this difficulty have

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122 Jacoby (1926) 25.
centred on Polybios’ conception of universal history. For example, Sacks and Seafuro have both attempted to answer the problem by using Polybios’ claim that he was writing the same type of history as Ephoros, who he accredits with being the first to write τὰ καθόλου (Polyb. 5.33.2).\textsuperscript{125} Ephoros wrote very widely geographically and chronologically, covering the world as it was known to the Greeks in approximately 750 years;\textsuperscript{126} this fits well into our modern understanding of universal history, but, as already discussed, not so well with Polybios’ more chronologically restricted model. It is therefore difficult to perceive the connection that Polybios emphasises exists between himself and Ephoros if we are to suppose that τὰ καθόλου meant ‘universal history’. This difficulty in squaring Polybios as a ‘universal historian’ is also evident in Brian Sheridan’s discomfort when he describes him as such, but finds it difficult to outline just what Polybios’ conception of ‘universal history’ was.\textsuperscript{127}

Yet, Polybios’ statement connecting his methodology with Ephoros’ is only problematic if we take τὰ καθόλου to mean ‘universal history’. John Tully has recently offered a new, persuasive perspective on this issue.\textsuperscript{128} It is his suggestion that we move away from trying to understand Polybios (and Ephoros) as a writer of ‘universal history’, as he would not in fact have had such a concept and would therefore have been uninterested in the genre. What can be understood from the historian’s comments regarding Ephoros, and from his own writing, is that Polybios’ concern was not with chronological or geographical coverage, but rather with balance and perspective. Tully asserts that Polybios thought that κατὰ μέρος ἱστορία ‘special histories’ and τὰ καθόλου ‘the general’ were not mutually exclusive and that the combination of both was necessary for the ideal historical work. Only by including both the specific and the general could a proper understanding of particular events and the way that they interacted with different events in different regions be obtained; both perspectives were needed to educate the reader. Therefore Polybios was claiming that Ephoros was the first to attempt ‘to write a history with a correct synthetic awareness of events mentioned,’\textsuperscript{129} dismissing all other histories as inferior, and that he himself was also using the same method to write his own

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\textsuperscript{125} For Polybios’ use and critique of Ephoros see Meister (1975) 67-80. For Ephoros in general see Parmeggiani (2011).
\textsuperscript{126} Ephoros’ text is almost entirely lost with only a few scraps remaining. See Jacoby ‘Ephoros von Kyme (70)’ and BNJ col.1035-36. See also Barber (1935) 8-9 for this estimate.
\textsuperscript{128} Tully (2014) 171-190.
\textsuperscript{129} Tully (2014) 178.
**Histories.** This can, of course, be verified by the nature of his chronological and geographical structuring which draws together both the specific and the general.

This pragmatic, didactic, interwoven, specific and general history needed careful structuring, particularly as its vast scope and ambitious historiographical aims could easily make it unwieldy. In order to facilitate understanding, clarity and unity, therefore, Polybios used a number of structuring devices. These included his chronological framework based around the four-year Olympiads, and his geographic cycling which moves the narrative first from Rome to Sicily, Spain, Africa, Greece, Macedonia, Asia and Egypt.\(^{130}\) The combination of these two frameworks allowed the historian to focus on each region in a ‘monographic’ manner for a certain period (usually, but not always, the four-year Olympiad period; see 5.2.c for such an instance), while also placing each regional account next to the others to allow and encourage the awareness of connections between the different sets of events. This not only enabled the historian to fulfil his intention to write τὰ καθόλου promoting both specific and wider awareness of historical events, but also introduced diversity and interest to the narrative by the frequent change of focus. While Polybios’ methodology prompted criticism from other historians who claimed this arrangement made his narrative seem incomplete and disconnected (see Appian, *Hist.* prae. 12), it has been countered that, despite this difficulty, this was in fact the most appropriate method of displaying the interconnection of political events throughout the Mediterranean; a point which may simply have been ignored by others.\(^{131}\)

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**1.3.d Tyche: the ‘Director’ of the συμπλοκή and the Fate of Macedonia**

Another important element which Polybius uses as a structural and explanatory device throughout his *Histories* is *tyche*, fortune.\(^{132}\) This entity holds a great deal of importance for Polybios in his construction and account of the process of συμπλοκή. It is *tyche*, according to the historian, who steers all the affairs of the world into one direction and one end (Polyb. 130)

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\(^{130}\) For an excellent discussion of Polybios’ chronological and geographic structuring to reflect the true nature of the συμπλοκή see Walbank (1974) 203-212 = (1985) 317-24.


1.4.1: καθάπερ ἡ τύχη σχεδὸν ἀπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης πράγματα πρὸς ἐν ἐκλίνε μέρος καὶ πάντα νεύειν ἣνάγκασε πρὸς ἑνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπόν), this end being the superiority of Rome in the Mediterranean, the destruction of the Antigonid kingdom, the subjugation of the Seleucid, and the re-establishment of the Ptolemaic. While the exact meaning and nature of tyche in Polybios’ Histories continues to be a contested issue amongst modern scholars, there is little doubt from the above statement that it was used to give another dimension to Polybios’ overarching plan and explanation of events. It was superimposed to lend unity to a work which could otherwise prove incoherent and at places unexplainable. Yet, this device also seems to introduce a degree of determinism to his work which could contradict another aspect of Polybios’ thought. As discussed above, our historian was a great advocate of human and rational explanation, believing that men, particularly those holding great power, could take control of their own destinies if they were educated properly and took the time to be fully prepared for any contingency. The historian’s use of tyche in the explanation of Rome’s rise, therefore seems inconsistent with his view regarding the importance of human agency, and could compromise his moral and didactic purpose. This apparent problem in Polybios’ causality can be rectified, however, if we consider that in Polybios’ work neither tyche nor the ‘Great Man’ view of history functions as an overall explanatory scheme, but rather that they work in combination: tyche’s influence functions more in a general way, only ensuring the final result, while the details of how this end has been reached is determined by human decisions and actions, the more prominent causal factor in Polybios’ work. Tyche therefore provides an additional layer of explanation for events which are not so easily explained by logical means. The presence of two different strands of causality is also in line with, and supported by, Maier’s perception of Polybios’ entwining of both katalogical and paralogical ideas of the past (see 1.3.b).

However, the concept that tyche swayed the fate of political powers in the Mediterranean was not an innovation in philosophical-historical thought brought about by Polybios, but the extension of an older idea. In book 29 of his Histories, having narrated the defeat of Perseus at Pydna in 168, which ended the Macedonian monarchy, Polybios claims that he is reminded

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133 For discussions of the various interpretations of the role and use of Tyche in Polybios’ text, see for example Fowler (1903); Walbank Commentary I 16-26, (1972) 58-65 and (2007); Pédech (1964) 331-354 and (1966); Roveri (1982); Eckstein (1995) 238-71; Brouwer (2011); Dreyer (2011) 83-86; Hau (2011); and Deininger (2013).

134 On the ‘Great Man’ view of history see Brown Ferrario (2014) and the review by Grethlein (2015).

of the words of Demetrios of Phalerum who, in his discussion of Alexander’s conquest of Persia, commented on the cruelty and mutability of fortune and on how in a mere fifty years the Persians, who were once masters of the world, were defeated and the Macedonians, once scarcely known, rulers in their place (Polyb. 29.21).\(^{136}\) Demetrios continues with the remark that Fortune was showing by her elevation of the Macedonians to the same prosperity which the Persians had once enjoyed that she was merely lending them these advantages until she saw fit.\(^{137}\) Polybios believed that he himself had seen the fulfilment of Demetrios’ prophetic statement in the defeat of Perseus at Pydna in 168 BC and the consequent destruction of the Antigonid kingdom (Polyb. 29.21.8).\(^ {138}\) No doubt the similarity between the lengths of time with which it took Macedonia to come to power, fifty years, and that with which it took Rome, 53 years, also helped to compound the notion in Polybios’ mind. Furthermore, Demetrios’ prophetic words made reference to the notion of a succession of world empires, a concept which was already in existence in Greek thought, and undoubtedly had some influence on Polybios’ own thinking.\(^ {139}\)

The coincidence in name between the two very different kings, Philip II and Philip V, and their respective positions at the beginning and end of the Macedonian empire no doubt also fostered this connection. It is known that Philip V himself encouraged an association with his predecessor and even claimed him as his kinsman (5.10.10), a fact which Polybios accepted and used to suit his own interpretation of their roles in the fate of Macedonia. Only Polybios’ understanding of their connection is far more negative than Philip V would likely have wanted. The historian points rather to the difference each of their reigns had on the state of the kingdom: Philip II and his son Alexander built Macedonia into a world power, while Philip V and his son Perseus engineered its reversal of fortune and destruction (Polyb. 22.18.10). This parallel is another pattern which Polybios took with enthusiasm in the construction of his work, as it not only provided connections with previous events in the Greek mind and gave his work unity and elegance, but also increased the negative depiction of Philip V’s reign.\(^ {140} \)

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\(^{136}\) For Demetrios of Phalerum (c.350 - c.280 BC), an Athenian orator, Macedonian supporter and Peripatetic philosopher, see Diogenes Laertes, \emph{Life of Demetrios}. The treatise \emph{On Style} was long attributed to him, although it is now believed to be the work of another Peripatetic. See also Fortenbaugh & Schütrumpf (1999, 2000), O’Sullivan (2005) and (2009).


\(^{138}\) Walbank (1994) 251.

\(^{139}\) Wiesehöfer (2013).

Yet, our historian did not take up Demetrios’ notion of *tyche* without adjustment. Within Polybios’ own conception of the entity there is also an added retributive element; *tyche* was no longer merely responsible for reversals of fortune, but also for exacting vengeance against criminal action. This feature comes out with particular clarity in Polybios’ account of Philip V of Macedon. The whole story of the king’s life takes on a strong moral character as Philip is ultimately punished by *tyche* for his monstrous crimes against men and gods. These wrongdoings started from as early as the first Olympiad of Philip’s reign (220-216 BC), when the king allegedly turned his thoughts to an invasion of Italy in 217 BC and consequently ended the Social War against the Aitolians at the conference of Naupaktos. An earlier event in 218 BC, the plundering and destruction of the sanctuary of Thermos in Aitolia (Polyb. 5.9-12), could also be included within this list of monstrous crimes. However, as we will see in Chapter 3, Polybios softens the importance of this event in the king’s character development, accrediting it rather to the influence of one of Philip’s advisers, the Illyrian Demetrios of Pharos, than to the mind of the king at this early stage.

It is a few years afterwards in 215 BC that the king is said to have experienced a sudden turn for the worse, changing from the benevolent king which Polybios claims he was in his early years to a treacherous tyrant after his attack on the allied city of Messene (7.10-14; see Chapter 3 for further discussion of Thermos and Messene). His behaviour is said to have worsened towards his subjects, allies and other Greeks after this incident, finally culminating in an ‘evil’ pact contracted between the Macedonian and the Seleukid king, Antiochos III in 203 BC (see Chapter 4 for Philip’s treatment of his Greek allies). Polybios is highly critical of the agreement which sanctioned the capture and distribution of the Aegean and Syrian territories of the infant Egyptian monarch, Ptolemy V, between them (Polyb. 15.20). According to the historian, *tyche*’s wrath finally came against the Macedonian king in his last years, when it is said that she sent furies to torment and inspire him to conduct a war of revenge against Rome (see Chapter 5 for discussion of this period). His crimes against his own people allegedly worsened from 186 BC when, because of this inspiration, Philip implemented policies of transmigration in preparation for the coming war, moving Thracian tribes into Macedonian territory and Macedonians into Thrace. Furthermore, he not only

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142 Walbank (1994) 34-35 = (2002) 253 tentatively suggested that Polybios’ anger at the kings for their pact against Ptolemy V derived from a family connection the Ptolemaic kings. This would not have prevented him from laying criticism on Ptolemy V, for example, but might explain why his feelings regarding the agreement were so extreme.
removed a number of untrustworthy Macedonian officers, but also assassinated his own son, Demetrios, for his allegedly suspicious relationship with Rome (Polyb. 23.10; Livy 40.24). Because of these deeds and the furies sent against him Philip is said to have died in great torment and grief (Polyb. 23.10.12-15). *Tyche*’s incitement of Philip to war against Rome set up the Third Macedonian War, fought by the king’s elder son and successor Perseus, and brought about the final destruction of the Antigonid kingdom with the latter’s defeat by Roman forces in 168 BC. *Tyche* therefore punished Philip for his bad behaviour by turning his focus to Rome once again, which to his death brought him anguish and, because his son allegedly continued his hostile policy against Rome, ultimately caused the kingdom’s destruction. By Polybios’ development of a retributive *tyche*, the historian was able to include and emphasise human reasons and responsibility from the Macedonian side for the fall of the Antigonid kingdom – the king’s bad behaviour resulted in the turning of Greek favour away from himself to Rome, escalating his demise.143

In Polybios’ construction of his narrative, therefore, the figure of Philip is affected not only by the historian’s dual concept of causality, but also by this multi-fold notion of *tyche*. In the historian’s understanding and conception of the period, this was the time when *tyche* decided to remove her favour from the Hellenistic kingdoms, particularly from the original centre of the empire created by Philip II and Alexander the Great, Macedonia. This idea was adopted and extended from Demetrios of Phalerum who saw that the kingdom would in turn, like Persia, also be devastated by an inevitable reversal of fortune. Thus, although it was already known that Rome destroyed Macedonia historically, an overarching explanation for the latter’s fall is provided by the inclusion of Demetrios’ *tyche*. Philip and Perseus’ defeat in the war against Rome, and the downfall of the Antigonid kingdom, is foreshadowed not only by prior knowledge, but also by the idea that *tyche* would destroy them. In the narrative this end becomes unavoidable, therefore, creating not only a certain teleological perspective of the whole affair, but also added suspense for the reader. Of course, in Polybios’ conception of causality, which saw supernatural and human agency working in conjunction, an additional human element was essential; his didactic purpose would not be adequately fulfilled otherwise. Philip, deeply involved in the affairs of the political world, in Polybios’ mind also had to hold some responsibility for the downfall of his own kingdom.

143 For *tyche* as literary device see Walbank (1972) 68-71.
The defeat of Macedonia was, of course, the result of a larger combination of factors, including the military superiority of the Romans (Polyb. 18.29-32), their growing presence and threat in the East, as well as their willingness to listen to Greek complaints and take action in their favour. Yet, Polybios also needed to show that Macedonia’s downfall was not purely due to chance or misfortune, but for the requirements of his political and educational purpose also the fault of Macedonia’s leaders. This allowed him to bring out the point to his Greek audience that Roman power was not something to fight against, its success had come about because of certain structural factors, which his work intends to explain (especially in the discussion of the Roman constitution in Book 6), not because of the favour of the divine sanction of tyche. For both his Greek and Roman audience, Polybios could show that Rome was justifiably the superior power not only because of supernatural, but also because of human explainable causes. Other lessons are also sketched out in Polybios’ construction: it is once again emphasised that all things, even great empires and kings, are subject to tyche and reversals of fortune, that none are immune to the ravages of fate. Secondly, it also asserts that crimes against men and gods have negative repercussions for the individuals and states who exhibit such immoral behaviour. A lesson no doubt also aimed at the Romans too, particularly after the events of 168. Polybios’ treatise, like many of those dealing with hegemonic relationships, aimed not only to show how the current situation came about, but also actively encouraged those in power to think about the manner in which they ruled over their conquered peoples, attempting to persuade the victor to act with morality and nobility.

These two attributes of tyche in Polybios’ Histories are, therefore, of particular significance to the overall construction of the Macedonian king. It must consequently be acknowledged, whenever making any pronouncement about Polybios’ description of Philip, that his character is formed within a wider, artificial interpretation of the period and of the causal links between events. This does not mean, of course, that we cannot trust the detailed factual information on Philip’s life as it is recorded in the Histories, as Polybios would not have been able to alter the known facts without raising suspicion and criticism. Moreover, this

145 See Thornton (2013) 217-223 for how Polybios’ political goals affect the presentation of the Achaian League and Macedonia. This theme is further expanded in Chapter 2.
146 See Thornton (2013) for Polybios construction of a dialogue between Greece and Rome. See also Strootman (2010) for a discussion of the relationship between literature and kings in the Hellenistic period and Ma (2003) for the importance of role-assignment by cities in the construction of their relationship with kings.
would also have compromised his own explicitly prized methods of investigation and desire to convey the truth. It does mean, however, that we must be wary of Polybios’ presentation of material and how this shapes the figure of the king. A sound historical analysis of Polybios’ oeuvre is not possible if one works purely from the principle of ‘in dubio pro reo’, giving him the benefit of the doubt, as no historian, while in the process of recording events and giving them unity and meaning, is free from presenting the past in some kind of interpretative, artificial framework based upon their own background, aims and resources. Therefore, in order to understand the shadows that this framework creates a thorough analysis of this historical text’s distortions is necessary, even when parallel evidence is lacking (see particularly the following chapter).

In regard to Polybios, it is particularly important that the differences apparent in his narrative and digressions are explored. Philip V would have been assessed predominantly in light of his role as the destroyer of the Macedonian kingdom and the loser in the battle for supremacy against Rome. Moreover, from the very beginning of the Histories, the figure of Philip is assigned huge importance in the course of wider historical developments: he is the initiator of the unique intertwining period of συμπλοκῆ, allegedly begun at the conference of Naupaktos in 217 BC, which Polybios is writing about. This importance continues to the end of the historian’s initial 30 book plan, which would have concluded with the defeat of Perseus in the Third Macedonian War, a war of revenge against Rome apparently designed and prepared for by Philip. While Polybios decided to continue his Histories down to the destruction of Carthage in 146 (Polyb. 3.4), recording events occurring within his own lifetime and discussing the manner in which Rome ruled over her subjects, it seems that Macedonia and Philip held an important position within Polybios’ initial conception of the Histories, one which may have been dampened for later scholarship by the extension. This, and the frequent references to Philip, may also be explained by the fact that Philip and his son would have been the kings with whom Polybios’ Greek readers would have been most familiar and who were most involved in, and important for, the affairs of the Achaian League, Polybios’ home institution. The special attention given to the League is a subject of particular importance in the depiction of the Macedonian king and will be discussed in much greater detail in the following chapter.
The brief of this thesis is to investigate how and why Polybios constructed the picture of Philip V of Macedon that he did and where possible to unravel the historical king from the historian’s weavings and explore the purpose with which he is used. This project is not to be a defence of the Macedonian king – in fact, it will be far from it. Philip was undoubtedly a ruthless individual capable of treachery and not opposed to cruelty and questionable action when necessary. However, it does wish to uncover a more balanced figure of the monarch than the intensely contrived and negative one presented in the *Histories*. The first step in this process will be to identify how Polybios’ biases and aims have preconditioned the king to play a role and come to a specific end within his narrative; this is in part dependent on the historian’s background as a citizen of, and once-active participant in, the Achaian League.
Chapter 2: Polybios, Aratos and the Macedonian Connection

While much of the narrative of Philip’s life looks teleologically towards Roman supremacy and the destruction of Macedonia, there is still more going on in Polybios’ portrayal of the king than mere tailoring to fit a predetermined outcome. The construction of the king is also complicated by the historian’s wider didactic aims and political subjectivity, both of which feature heavily throughout his work. These distort the picture of Philip, creating a more consistently treacherous, ruthless, and tragic figure than might otherwise have existed in reality. If we are to develop a more balanced interpretation of the king, however, it is necessary to strip away these trappings. This chapter is, therefore, the start of an extended re-examination of Polybios’ depiction of Philip V of Macedon, which aims to investigate how the king has been depicted, the reasons for this portrait, and what it means for our understanding of the monarch in general.

We will commence at the beginning of Polybios’ narrative and explore some of his pre-existing biases and objectives that are apparent at this early stage and shape the portrait of Philip before he even comes onto the scene. These are primarily: his patriotism as an ex-statesman of the Achaian League, his admiration for the Achaian leader Aratos, and his intention to defend the Achaian League and Aratos against certain criticisms. These mainly revolved around the League’s decision to ally itself with Macedonia in 227 BC, its later decision to defect from Macedonia to Rome in 198 BC, and finally Aratos’ intimate association with Philip in his early years.¹ This approach will allow us to establish a baseline from which to judge future appearances of the king in the Histories. It will also become

¹ Eckstein (1995) 198-202. That there was criticism aimed at this connection with Macedonia is implied from: Polybios’ defence of Aratos’ change of policy-direction towards Macedonia in 227 BC (Polyb. 2.47-55); the positivity with which Doson and Philip in his early years are described (for Doson see 2.47.5, 2.64.6-7, 2.70 and 5.9.8-10; for Philip 4.27.9-10, 4.77, 7.11); and the historian’s insistence on the beneficial role that Aratos played for Greece and the League while at the Macedonian court (Polyb. 5.12, 7.13-14, 8.12, 9.23.9; cf. Plut. 48.3). The unpopularity of the decision to defect from Philip and Macedonia in 198 is also shown at the council meeting discussing the matter (Livy 32.20-22). Direct criticism of the League’s betrayal of the ties of obligation connecting them to Macedonia is also vocalised by Philip at the conference after Kynoskephalai (Polyb. 18.6).
apparent that the portrayal of the Achaian League, Aratos and Philip are intimately connected and cannot be fully understood without the other. All were, of course, associated historically. However, this connection is intensified by Polybios and the fluctuations in their relationship are made more prominent to serve his historiographical objectives. The portrait of a king and his behaviour and moral character thus become deeply dependent on his association with Aratos and the League. This heavy reliance will be further explored and deconstructed in Chapter 3.

2.1 Polybios’ Truth and Patriotism

Polybios was determined to create something that was, in his view and aspirations, more honest and beneficial to the reader than the historical works written by many of his predecessors and contemporaries. He viewed much of their work as insufficiently truthful (of Philinus and Fabius: 1.14.1-2; of Timaios: 12.12.7-15.12), arousing the wrong kind of pity and sympathy (of Phylarchos: 2.56.7), thrilling their readers with exaggerated pictures like tragic poets (again of Phylarchos: 2.56.10-11), deliberately using the fabulous or mythical to fill out areas of uncertainty or ignorance (of those writing about Hannibal: 3.48.8-9), and negligent in supplying both praise and criticism appropriately (of Timaios: 12.15). Polybios did not want to be associated with this type of untruthful historical writing and took great pains to expound the benefits of his more sober and factual ‘general’ history above the more dramatic and ‘specialised’ ones. As he emphatically stresses on numerous occasions, history is meant to be instructive, both from a practical and moral standpoint, and this can only be achieved when historians record the truth (9.1-2) and provide causal explanations for events, without which it would be impossible for the reader to learn how to react appropriately to the problems of their own time (2.56.13).

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2 For Polybios use and critique of Philinus and Fabius see Meister (1975) 127-149; Ambaglio (2005); for Phylarchos see Meister (1975) 93-126; McCaslin (1985), Haegemans & Kosmetatou (2005), Schepens (2005) and Marincola (2013); and for Timaios see Meister (1975) 3-54; Vattuone (2005) and Baron (2013). For Polybios’ comments on ‘tragic’ writing see 5.3.a.
3 See for instance 1.4.2-11, 14.3; 2.37.4, 61.6; 5.33.2; 7.7.6; 12.12.3, 12b, 15.9-12.
4 See Polyb. 9.1-2 for his view that it was the historians’ duty to present an accurate picture of events. See also Polyb. 1.1.1-2, 2.8, 3.7-4.11; 2.6.7-7.12, 35.5-10, 56.11-12 on history’s didactic purpose.
Yet, as discussed in Chapter 1, the educational paradigm that the *Histories* puts forward is not one which encourages free consideration of events. It instead carefully sets down Polybios’ own views of the past and pre-empts alternative interpretation by the use of frequent authorial intervention. The truth that we find within the *Histories* is of Polybios’ own making. Awareness of this fact is vital whenever we read his narrative or use him in a piecemeal fashion, as these biases and aims, embedded within the narrative, will affect the interpretations of characters and events that readers will absorb. This is an especially pressing problem for modern scholars as few other sources exist for much of this period and many of our views are primarily informed by Polybios’ account. Yet, our historian’s manipulations are not hard to spot, and if we are to move beyond the contrived nature of his narrative we must first identify these and become aware of their effects. Most significantly, as we will see, many parts of Polybios’ narrative are affected by the historian’s inability, despite all his claims, to detach himself completely from his political allegiances and biases.6

As Walbank pointed out, despite his strict censure of his fellow historians for writing inaccurately Polybios still permitted two exceptions to his rule of avoiding excessively sensational and vivid writing: piety (ἡ εὔσεβεία) and patriotism (δοτικὰς διδόναι ταῖς αὐτῶν πατρίσι ‘casting weight to their own country’ at 16.14.6; ἡ πατρίδα φιλοστοργία ‘affection of the homeland’ at 16.17.8).7 The first is of limited importance to our understanding of him as a historian, as Polybios rarely mentions miracles and portents and when he does is quick to dismiss belief in them as childish simplicity (παιδικῆς εὐθείας: 16.12.5) or the sign of a senseless mind (ἀπηλγηκυίας ἐστὶ ψυχῆς: 16.12.7). He claims that the only good in recording them is the sense of piety they impart to the masses (τὴν τοῦ πλήθους εὐσέβειαν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον: 16.12.8), yet even in this case, their account must be written without extravagance.8 Polybios himself feels no need to elaborate on religious events, and the weight of piety in his discussion is consequently minimal.

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6 Walbank (2005) 12-18. These political biases are frequently connected to his aristocratic ethos, which has been discussed by Eckstein (1995); see particularly Ch 2, 3 and 4 concerning Polybios’ views on personal bravery, honour, war, wealth, deceit and good faith. For examples in Polybios’ *Histories* which may exemplify bias deriving from his own political allegiances see 2.56-63, 5.12, 7.13, 24.8.6-10.15.
7 Walbank *Commentary I* 11-12.
The second allegation – that of patriotism – as Walbank notes, is more dangerous.\footnote{Walbank Commentary I 11-12.} In his discussion of the Rhodian historians, Zeno and Antisthenes,\footnote{See Meister (1975) 173-78; Wiemer (2001) and (2013), and Lenfant (2005) for these two Rhodian historians and their use by Polybios. Cf. fn. 432.} Polybios generally praises them for their participation in politics, for composing their works for fame and not for profit, and for doing their duty as statesmen (Polyb. 16.14). However, he also cautions the reader about their ignorance (ἄγνοια) and patriotism (τὴν πατρίδα φιλοστοργίαν; 16.17.8). Interestingly, whilst doing so Polybios makes an important qualification that is worth quoting in full:

ἐγὼ δὲ διότι μὲν δεὶ φοτάς διδόναι ταῖς αὐτῶν πατρίσι τοὺς συγγραφέας, συγχαρήσαμι ἀν, ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ κατ᾽ ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα τοῖς γράφοντι, ἀ διαφυγείν ἄνθρωπον δυσχέρες: ἐὰν δὲ κατὰ προειρήσειν ψευδογραφώμεν ἡ πατρίδος ἑνεκεν ἡ φίλων [ἱὰς] χάριτος, τὸ διότι οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦτο εἰς τὸν βίον ποριζομένων: ὦστερ γὰρ ἐκείνοι τῷ λυτελεῖ μετροῦντες ἀδοκίμους ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐτῶν συντάξεις, οὕτως οἱ πολιτικοὶ τῷ μισείν ἢ τῷ φιλεῖν ἐλκόμενοι πολλάκις εἰς ταύτῳ τέλος ἐμπίπτουσιν τοῖς προειρημένοις. διὸ δὲ καὶ τούτῳ τῷ μέρος ἐπιμελῶς τοὺς μὲν ἀναγινώσκοντας παρατηρεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γράφοντας αὐτοὺς παραφυλάττεσθαι. (16.14.6-10)

For my part I would concede that historical writers should give the casting vote to their own fatherlands, but [I would say that] they should not make statements about them contrary to the facts. For writers make enough mistakes through ignorance, which it is difficult for human beings to escape; but if we write falsely by choice either for the sake of our fatherlands or friends or favour, how will we differ from those who make their living from this? For just as the latter, measuring by what is profitable, make their works unbelievable, so too do the politicians, being weighed down by their dislikes and affections, often fall into the same end as the ones that have been stated. Therefore readers too must watch carefully for this share, and writers themselves must be on their guard.

This concession is carefully hedged so as not to arouse suspicion about the validity of his own version of events, but it is clear that Polybios is generally happy to allow, and as we will see, has indeed allowed, his patriotism to filter through the fabric of his narrative.\footnote{Walbank (1972) 26.}
affects many areas of his *Histories* – most importantly for this study, his depiction of the Achaian League, Aratos of Sikyon, and Philip – and we must be very conscious of this effect when assessing events, explanations and characterisation. The rest of this chapter sets out therefore to bring to light Polybios’ Achaian bias and will form a basis for the following sections of our discussion.

### 2.1.a The Depiction of the Achaian League and Aratos

As will have been apparent to all his readers, Polybios’ political allegiances were squarely set with the Achaian League and the Achaian leader, Aratos of Sikyon. His introductory chapters on the League’s history are full of praise for its, and Aratos’, unwavering ever-righteous policies and motives promoting equality and freedom (Polyb. 2.37-71, particularly 2.37.7-11; 2.38.6-9, 39.4-40.4 and 42.3-7). Yet, these statements are unconvincingly insistent and one-sided. Polybios claims that he has deliberately kept this section short because the period has already been well recorded by his predecessor Aratos, unlike the presentation of the First Punic War by Philinus and Fabius (Polyb. 2.40.4, and 1.14-15). In regard to the latter, it was because he viewed their accounts as insufficiently truthful, he claims, that he felt the need to provide a longer, more developed summary for this Roman/Carthaginian conflict. Yet this explanation is inadequate in explaining the general one-sidedness of his summary history of the Achaian League and characterisation of Aratos, especially when we consider that this was a historian who usually prided himself on recording both sides of each character, institution, decision and deed (Polyb. 1.14.5-9; 2.61; 12.9-12).

In summarising events and characters writers must, of course, keep what they think is most important, whittling the description down to its essence. As demonstrated by Craig Champion in his discussion of Polybios’ creation of collective identities, our historian deliberately presented equality, freedom, lawfulness, honesty and democracy as characteristic principles of

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13 See also Polyb. 2.37.3 and Walbank (1933) 9 for Polybios’ aim to keep it an introductory sketch (τὴν προκατασκευὴν καὶ τὴν ἔφοδον).
the Achaian League throughout his account of Achaian action. In Polybios’ opinion, therefore, these are the most important features of the Achaian League; these represent its essence (cf. 2.38.6, 10-11, 42.3). The brevity of the narrative at this juncture conveniently avoids a detailed discussion of these characteristics and ensures the prominence of this pro-Achaian version in the reader’s mind. This lays out the groundwork for Polybios’ defence of Achaian behaviour later in the book (see pp. 56-9 below), as well as his justification of their association with and defection from Macedonia in the future. The League and its leaders’ actions in this early stage are thereby shown to be justified because they are always shown to have been conducted following principles which promote equality, freedom and lawfulness. A more detailed discussion of the League and Aratos would not only have taken up too much space, but also required further defence of these qualities: they would undoubtedly have appeared more questionable in the audience’s mind and could therefore have produced uncertainty and indignation in view of the development of Polybios’ later narrative.

2.1.b Aratos’ Memoirs vs. Phylarchos’ Histories

This patriotic and political bias – the historian’s commitment to his homeland as well as to a certain political elite and social milieu – is also evident when Polybios states, throughout the early books of his Histories, that he is adhering to Aratos’ account for the period covering 250-220 BC:

τῶν μέντοι γ’ Ἀράτῳ διωκημένων καὶ νῦν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπικεφαλαούμενοι μνησθοῦμεν τοῦ τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καὶ σαφεὶς ἐκεῖνοι περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συντεταχέναι πράξεων ὑπομνηματισμοῦ, (Polyb. 2.40.4)

Aratos’ government, however, will be dealt with here and in future quite summarily, as he published very truthful and clearly compiled memoirs of his own career;

14 Champion (2004) 122-3. See for instance the procedures which the Megalopolitan embassy had to go through before approaching Doson for assistance (2.48.6-7), and the Achaian refusal to admit Messenia into the Symmachy without first consulting Philip V and the other allies (4.9.3-4; 4.16.1).
χρήσιμον ἄν εἰς, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν. Ἄρατος προσημένοις κατακολουθεῖν περὶ τῶν Κλεομενικῶν… (Polyb. 2.56.2)

It would be advantageous, rather absolutely necessary for me, since I have chosen to follow Aratos in my account of the Kleomenean war…

The Memoirs are only known through references in Polybios and Plutarch, yet seem to have been written in minute detail, containing more than thirty books, and cover the liberation of Sikyon in 251 to the battle of Sellasia in 221 BC. Polybios makes no reference to any other sources for this period, but we are aware of one other historian who wrote about the Kleomenean war – Phylarchos – whose name primarily survives because of Polybios’ severe criticism of his account. Phylarchos, either Athenian, Naucratite, or Sikyonian in origins, wrote a history of 28 books recording events from Pyrrhus’ Peloponnesian expedition in 272 to Kleomenes’ death in 220/219 (of which we only have fragments). He is said to have had a clear bias towards Kleomenes and a prejudice against Achaia and Macedonia, and his attack on Aratos and presentation of the Kleomenean war from an anti-Achaian perspective are noted as the main reasons for Polybios’ hostility towards him. Yet, while Polybios does not claim to have used Phylarchos for this reason, this does not, of course, mean that he was not in some way indebted to his Histories, as will be discussed below.

Polybios’ claim that he has chosen to follow Aratos’ account indicates his support of his predecessor’s version and his belief in its general historical trustworthiness. It is likely that this would have caused surprise at the time, as Phylarchos’ work seems to have been held in some esteem (2.56.1). According to our historian, however, Aratos should be the one to follow because, unlike Phylarchos, he left behind a truthful and clear account of his own

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15 For references in Polybios see 2.40.4, 2.56.1-2; in Plutarch see Arat. 3, 33, 38; Cleom. 16-19; Philop. 8.5-7. For secondary literature on Plutarch see p.9 fn. 28.
16 On the length and scope of Aratos’ Memoirs see FGrHist 231, Porter (1937) and Stadter (2015) 163-4. See also Marasco (2011) 105 fn. 100, who rightly points out that Porter’s statement ((1937) xv), which asserts that Photius claimed that the Memoirs were used by Sopater in his Eclogues, is incorrect. Photius actually says that Sopater had used Plutarch’s Life of Aratos in book 11 of the Eclogues. Therefore, we cannot know whether the Memoirs were still in existence in the fourth century, as Porter claims.
17 Porter (1937) xxxiii-xxvi, however, suggests 252 BC as a possible dating. See Griffin (1982) 79-81 for the liberation of Sikyon.
18 The most important work on Phylarchos still remains Africa (1961), however, see also Gabba (1957) 3-55, 193-239; Luce (2002) 120; Schepens (2005); and Eckstein (2013). For the Kleomenean War, see Walbank (1933) 70-113; Pédech (1964) 154-161; Larsen (1966); Gruen (1972); Grainger (1999) 244-48, 253-54.
19 See FGrHist 81; BNP coll. 954-55; Plut. Arat. 38.8; Walbank (1933) 4-6; Eckstein (2013).
leadership (Διὰ τὸ καὶ Λίγαν ἀληθινοῦς καὶ σαφεῖς; 2.40.4; cf. 2. 56.1-2); the fact that he left certain things unsaid is, Polybios insists, not an indication of the untruthfulness of the *Memoirs*, but rather of the sensitivity of certain issues (2.47.10-11). These are notably the reversal of his strict anti-Macedonian policy and his subsequent relationship with the Macedonian king, Antigonos Doson. Yet, in this concession Polybios is compromising his declaration about the honesty and clarity of the *Memoirs* only a few lines before and his defence is further weakened not only by discrepancies between his own and Aratos’ accounts, but also by his own ideas about the importance of accurate historical writing. He has already attacked Philinus and Fabius for their biased views and inaccurate recording of important matters of detail in Book 1, and criticises numerous others throughout his work (see above) when he thinks they have not dealt with the past truthfully or given the wrong conclusions. Now, however, we see Polybios avoiding such criticism when it comes to Aratos. He is therefore not following his own principles in creating his account of the past, and its implications are detrimental to the positive image of Aratos that he puts forward. His acknowledgement of the Achaian leader’s omission of events is uncomfortable, skimming over the ultimate implication of his argument: that we cannot derive unfailingly truthful information from Aratos.

It might be assumed, given Polybios’ admission about his reliance on Aratos’ text, that he would recount the events between 250 and 220 exactly as Aratos told them. However, we should not trust this assumption uncritically. His interpretation of the events would have been influenced by his own purpose and aims, both of which were very different to those of Aratos in his *Memoirs*. The latter’s autobiography fulfilled an agenda that was not about telling the straight truth, but primarily about self-definition and ‘white-washing’ his career. Gabriele Marasco pointed out how Aratos’ *Memoirs* fit the general tendency of autobiography at the time in order to underline the political role of the protagonist and defend his conduct. The work is similarly not opposed to other usual practices of the genre, including exaggerations of success, accusations against adversaries, blatant falsehoods and significant silences. We know, for example, from Plutarch that Aratos lied about his ‘minimal’ involvement in the

22 For discrepancies and lies in Aratos’ *Memoirs* see Marasco (2011) 110-12.  
24 See Tarn (1913) Appendix 3 and Walbank (1933) 7.  
attempted occupation of the Peiraios, an endeavour he had pursued to try and force Athens away from her alliance with Macedonia (Plut. Arat. 33). His account of the liberation of Sikyon, his crossing to Egypt, and the liberation of the Akrokorinthos, as detailed by Plutarch and all undoubtedly taken from Aratos’ Memoirs, were also described in a dramatic and romantic tone emphasising his success (Plut. Arat. 6.1-9.2, 12, 20-23). The purpose of Aratos’ Memoirs was not only the justification of his radical change of policy after years of actively trying to remove all traces of Macedonian influence from the Peloponnese. It was also meant to portray their author as a defender of Greek liberty, a champion against tyrants and a ‘solicitous father of his country…ready for everything for the good of his fellow citizens’. We must, of course, keep in mind that the method, content, orientation and testimonies within the Memoirs, intended as an apologetic defence of political action, will all have affected the overall description of historical events within it.

Polybios, however, approached Aratos’ work with his own agenda. This was sympathetic to, but did not quite overlap with, the Sikyonian’s goals. Polybios wanted to justify the League’s previous actions and make Aratos part of an insightful and beneficial change of policy that furthered the League’s agenda of freedom against tyranny. Therefore, although Polybios explicitly claims to be using Aratos’ text for this section of his narrative, we should not be complacent in assuming that he followed Aratos’ without qualification and comment.

Erich Gruen has discussed this point extensively, and argued, on the whole convincingly that Polybios was not in fact following the Sikyonian’s narrative as closely as some scholars believe. His argument is supported by the discussion of two episodes: the first is Polybios’ account of Aratos’ ‘secret diplomatic manoeuvres’ with Antigonos Doson in 227 BC, initiated in response to the growing threat of the Spartan king Kleomenes (Polyb. 2.47.3-51); the second is Polybios’ omission of Aratos’ negotiations with Sparta between 226 and 224 BC, evidence for which only survives in Plutarch (Arat. 39-42; Cleom. 15.1-2, 17.1-5, 19.1-4). However, while Gruen’s discussion of the second incident is uncontroversial, his treatment and conclusions about the historicity of the first are less convincing and have been rejected with attractive arguments by Paschalis Paschidis. Despite this difficulty, however,

26 See also Stadter (2015) 164-69 for Plutarch’s treatment of these events.
29 Gruen (1972).
30 Paschidis (2008) 241-44.
both episodes still show how Polybios deviated from the Memoirs when it suited him, how Polybios used and adapted his sources, as well as how he shaped the interpretation of events to show Aratos in a favourable light. With this in mind, a discussion of both events and Polybios’ construction of them is appropriate.

2.1.c.i The ‘secret negotiations’

In regard to the first instance, the ‘secret negotiations’ between Aratos and Antigonos Doson, it is worth outlining the relevant narrative and its main points. According to Polybios (2.47.3-51) when Aratos saw the energy and daring of the Spartan king Kleomenes and the possibility that the Aitolian League might join Sparta in her war against the Achaian League, he decided to take action in an attempt to spoil Kleomenes’ plans in the Peloponnese. He determined to sound out Antigonos Doson on the idea of an alliance between the Achaian League and Macedonia, but did not want to do so openly as this might allow the enemy to outbid him and would arouse contempt from his countrymen for his own reversal of principles. Aratos therefore decided to carry out his plan through covert means (ἀδήλως αὐτὰ διενοεῖτο χειρίζειν). He picked two Megalopolitans, Nikophanes and Kerkidas, to conduct the meeting not only because they were friends of his family, but also because they came from a city that had been on good terms with the royal house of Macedon since the time of Philip II (for further discussion of this connection see 4.3.a). Through them, the Megalopolitans were inspired to send an embassy to the Achaians begging them to appeal to Antigonos for aid. The Achaians agreed to the Megalopolitan embassy and they met with Antigonos. Nikophanes and Kerkidas explained the general situation to the Macedonian king and advised him to look to the future (σκοπεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ἥξιον), warning against a Spartan-Aitolian alliance. They assured him that once the service they demanded was rendered from him, Aratos would find satisfactory terms for both parties. Aratos would also dictate the date when his aid would be required.

The king agreed to come to their assistance, sending a letter to the Megalopolitans in confirmation of his willingness and goodwill. Aratos also received private information from

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31 Kerkidas was a distinguished poet, Cynic philosopher and legislator from Megalopolis. Seven of his poems survive to us on the Oxyrhynchus papyrus (no. 1082). See also López Cruces (1995).
Nikophanes of the king’s favourable inclination towards the League and himself, and considered it a great advantage (πάνυ δὲ πρὸς λόγον ἠγεῖτο γίνεσθαι) that the Megalopolitans had consented to approach Doson through the Achaians, wanting the appeal to come legally from both himself and the League as a whole. If the appeal had come only from himself, Aratos feared that he would be blamed for any unwelcome movements made by the king, for which Doson could invoke a legal justification, referring to Aratos’ seizure of the Akrokorinthos from Macedonian control in 235 while at peace. Aratos then appeared before the General Council of the League, showing them the king’s letter and begging the Achaians to ask for his intervention at once. Seeing that they were inclined to do just that, he praised the king for his ready help and then begged the Achaians to attempt to save their own cities and country first as this was by far the more honourable and advantageous course (οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτου κάλλιον οὐδὲ συμφορώτερον); only under duress should they resort to an appeal for aid. This was agreed upon but disasters soon followed the Achaian war effort and Doson was asked to step in and confirm an alliance with the League. At first negotiations concerning the question of the possession of the Akrokorinthos proved problematic in ratifying terms. However, when the Korinthians, members of the League, decided to defect to Kleomenes Aratos agreed to hand over the citadel to Doson in an attempt to prevent the city’s betrayal.

In his discussion of this episode, Gruen asserted that these ‘secret diplomatic manoeuvres’ were incongruous and suspicious. Firstly, they are not consistent with Aratos’ policy of removing Macedonian influence from the Peloponnese, to which he had dedicated himself so intensely throughout his career thus far. Secondly, the sources for this embassy in 227 are problematic and draw suspicion on where our historian got his information. Polybios implies that Aratos did not mention the secret negotiations in his Memoirs when he admits, right before his own account of them, that the Achaian leader did not disclose every detail of his political career because of the sensitivity of certain activities. Significantly, Plutarch pointedly contrasts Polybios’ account of the secret talks with the information found in Aratos’ Memoirs: he states that Aratos said everything he could to explain the necessity that was upon him (while not referring to the secret negotiations), while Polybios explicitly states that for a

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33 Gruen (1972) 617.
34 Pédech (1964) 157; Gruen (1972) 617-8.
long time, and even before the necessity arose, Aratos suspected the daring of Kleomenes and negotiated secretly with Doson, as well as encouraged the Megalopolitans to beg the Achaians to call in the Macedonian king (Plut. Arat. 38.7). Aratos, therefore, apparently did not admit to a part in secret negotiations before the necessitated alliance with the king in 224 BC and does not seem to have mentioned them in his Memoirs. The ‘unofficial’ nature of these consultations would also have meant that they would not have been documented in public records. What is more, there is similarly no surviving Megalopolitan tradition to supply this evidence and no Megalopolitan informants are mentioned in Polybios’ work. Our historian even states that oral accounts for this period were not taken, because he considered the oral tradition for any time before 220 as generally unreliable (Polyb. 4.2.1-3). However, Plutarch mentions their presence within Phylarchos’ text, making this their earliest known attestation. In view of this, therefore, Gruen suggested that Polybios picked up these secret dealings from the work of Phylarchos who he claims invented them to illustrate Aratos’ treachery in inviting the Macedonians into an alliance against Kleomenes, instead of reconciling with another Greek and fellow Peloponnesian.

Paschidis, however, finds Gruen’s conclusions extreme and ultimately unrealistic. He states that, although Aratos is said to have withheld information about the embassy of 227, that does not mean that the statesman suppressed all information about it and suggests that the Memoirs could have been one of Polybios’ sources if he read them carefully. Moreover, he finds it implausible that Polybios would have used Phylarchos as an exclusive source for such an important episode when he vilifies him so severely only a few paragraphs later and accuses him of being entirely untrustworthy (2.56-63). Therefore, if Polybios used Phylarchos it must have been in conjunction with other sources, i.e. Aratos and/or a local oral tradition from Megalopolis. In regard to Polybios’ claim that he did not generally use oral sources for this period (4.2.1-3), Paschidis counters that this statement does not mean that he never used them at all. Since the relevant oral tradition would have come from Polybios’ home town, Megalopolis, he would have been well placed to judge the credibility of such an oral tradition

35 Gruen (1972) 618.
36 Gruen (1972) 618-19. See also Walbank Commentary I 11-12; (1972) 79, and cf. Larsen (1968) 316-17.
37 Gruen’s argument has received support from Ehrhardt (1975) 250-55; Urban (1979) 117-55.
38 Paschidis (2008) 241-44. On other views for the historicity of the secret negotiations see Walbank (1933) 70-88; Porter (1937) xix; Walbank (1940) 14; Walbank Commentary I 246; Le Bohec (1993) and Champion (2004) 122.
and would have probably used it. Finally he claims that these manoeuvres between 227 and 224 were not inconsistent with Aratos’ previous policy either.\footnote{Paschidis (2008) 243.} Instead, the Sikyonian consciously and consistently promoted a settlement with the Macedonians to counteract Kleomenes’ increasing power and influence. Moreover, the early meetings with Doson were more exploratory in nature, looking out for contingency plans against future dangers. His veto in the spring assembly of 226 may seem hypocritical in view of these earlier enquiries; however, it was voiced because, despite the goodwill shown by Doson, Aratos did not want to bring in Macedonian aid and incur Achaian loss of power unless it was absolutely necessary. In the end, of course, in view of Kleomenes’ continued successes, the social unrest in the cities of the League and the prospect of the Spartan king assuming the leadership of the whole Peloponnese, this contingency plan was necessary and put into action. Following these lines, Paschidis argues that these secret negotiations were in fact historical and that Polybios did not only use Phylarchos, but rather a range of additional sources for his account.

On the basis of these arguments, it is clear that this episode is fraught with difficulties and that the historicity of the matter is unlikely to ever be resolved satisfactorily. The arguments rest on two different conceptions of Polybios’ working methodology and principles: one which envisages Polybios as not averse to using information which he knows to be false in the pursuit of his own image of Aratos; the other taking the opposite view and trusting in Polybios’ expressed principle to record events as factually as he conceivably can. Overall, Paschidis’ argument is the more persuasive, although there may be one point of contention. His claim that Aratos could have been used as a source is problematic given the fact that both Polybios and Plutarch state the vagueness of his account. Aratos’ assertion that he did what was necessary under difficult circumstances does not negate the existence of these secret dealings, of course, but does make it more unlikely that they were explicitly mentioned in the \textit{Memoirs}. However, Paschidis’ suggestion that Polybios would not pick up the secret negotiations from Phylarchos if there was no other evidence for them is convincing. Our historian’s hostility towards the work of his predecessor is renowned and it would be too disparaging an assessment of Polybios if one were to posit that he exclusively used information drawn from an account that he vehemently proclaimed as untrustworthy. Moreover, although Polybios claims not to have used oral traditions for this period, this is, as
Ehrhardt and Paschidis have claimed, only a general statement and it would not be surprising if he had made an exception in this case.

As it stands, it appears that Phylarchos’ account of these secret manoeuvres was their first occurrence in the literature. However, we might ask where Phylarchos got his information. Would he really have made up the secret negotiations just to discredit Aratos? This seems unlikely and as we will see in the following sections, despite Polybios’ hostility towards him, his information is factually accurate even if it is presented in a sensational manner. Furthermore, had these dealings been a figment of Phylarchos’ imagination, Polybios would surely have picked up on that and used this evidence of falsehood to discredit Phylarchos even further in his polemic at 2.56-63 (see 2.1.c below). It therefore appears likely that both Phylarchos and Polybios had access to at least one other source besides Aratos, and it would not be implausible to suppose an oral tradition.

Irrespective of the episode’s historicity, therefore, this section of his work still shows that Polybios did not follow Aratos’ Memoirs as closely as some have suggested, but also used other sources to supplement the Sikyonian’s account. It is an important instance of how Polybios constructed his image of the Achaian leader and how his political bias affected the interpretation of events. Phylarchos would undoubtedly have used these negotiations to show Aratos in a negative way, emphasising how the Sikyonian preferred bringing in a Macedonian overlord to reconciling with a fellow Peloponnesian (this criticism is voiced in Plutarchian and likely comes from Phylarchos: Plut. Arat. 38.4). This would therefore present Aratos as more interested in protecting his own power and status than sticking to his removal of Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese. Polybios, however, spins a different interpretation of these secret negotiations. The decision to summon Macedonian help is viewed as an attempt to hinder the encroachment of a Spartan ‘tyrant’ (2.47.3) and his treacherous Aitolian allies: both forces were a threat to Hellenic liberty. Acceding to Doson, who is represented as a morally sound ruler, would be a lesser evil than allowing the ‘tyrant’ Kleomenes to take control of the League and the Peloponnese. Aratos is therefore shown to be in control: a committed, insightful and prudent leader of the Achaian League.

41 Significantly, Kleomenes is only termed a ‘tyrant’ and the Spartan constitution a ‘tyranny’ when Polybios refers to him in relation to the Achaian League and Kleomenean War (2.47.7). Otherwise he is termed a king and the Spartan constitution a ‘monarchy’ (2.45.2, 23.11.5). The use of the more negative term would have been used to support Polybios’ positive picture of the League and defence of their decision not to join with Kleomenes.
2.1.d.ii The Meetings between Aratos and Kleomenes

The second instance where Polybios may be believed to have manipulated the recording of events to suit his own purpose is his omission of the negotiations between Aratos and Kleomenes between 226 and 224 BC. Plutarch narrates a whole series of meetings between the two leaders for which Polybios has mentioned nothing.\(^{42}\) Plutarch records that perhaps in the autumn of 226 an Achaian embassy met with Kleomenes and seemed close to concluding an agreement until an illness contracted by the Spartan king postponed further conferences (Plut. *Cleom.* 15.1-2; *Arat.* 39.1). Talks were meant to follow in Argos, possibly in the spring of 225, but these also fell through and Kleomenes resumed hostilities in the summer (Plut. *Cleom.* 17.1-5, 19.1-3; *Arat.* 39.2-40.5). In the latter part of 225, Kleomenes resumed talks with Aratos offering a substantial payment in return for official acknowledgement of his hegemony and joint Achaian-Spartan control of the Akrokorinthos. The terms, however, were too severe for the League and no settlement was reached (Plut. *Cleom.* 19.2; 19.4; *Arat.* 41.3-4). Kleomenes continued to ravage Sikyonian territory and besieged the city for three months before the Achaian accepted Doson’s demands and called for Macedonian assistance (Plut. *Cleom.* 19.4; *Arat.* 41.4-42.3).\(^ {43}\)

This series of failed negotiations was discussed in both Aratos’ and Phylarchos’ work, as indicated by Plutarch (in Aratos’ *Memoirs* at *Cleom.* 17.2, cf. *Aratus* 39.1-3; implied also in Phylarchos at *Cleom.* 15-16.5, 19.4). In Aratos’ text, Plutarch explicitly states, it was claimed that Kleomenes was partially responsible for the failure to find reconciliation; yet, in Phylarchos, it was purely down to Aratos’ obstinate nature. For Aratos, the inclusion of these negotiations in his autobiography would have suited him well as he could deflect responsibility for the failure onto someone else and consequently argue that he only acceded to the alliance with Macedon because of the necessity that this failure caused. Their inclusion, of course, would also have suited Phylarchos’ intentions. However, for Polybios neither version was acceptable. The reasons behind his rejection of Phylarchos’ account are obvious, as he turned Aratos into the villain; those behind his rejection of Aratos’ account, however, are not immediately clear. Aratos’ version explained his shift in policy towards Macedonia as

\(^{42}\) For Plutarch’s differing treatments of the negotiations between the Achaian and Kleomenes in his *Aratos* and *Cleomenes* see Porter (1937) xix.

\(^{43}\) For chronology see Walbank *Commentary* I 250-253.
the result of begrudging and involuntary acceptance of necessity caused by others’ failures to find agreement. As Gruen argues, this did not fit into Polybios’ image of the Achaian leader as the careful and perceptive engineer of an alliance which would save Greece from the Spartan tyrant. Consequently, very little is mentioned of the meetings between Aratos and Kleomenes in the *Histories* as their narration would have drawn attention to the fact that an agreement with Sparta could have been reached had Aratos been more accommodating, and that it had therefore not been as essential to bring Macedonia into an alliance. Polybios prefers to emphasise, however, that Aratos was already ahead of the game by coordinating secret negotiations with Doson and gaining his favour. Aratos is consequently not portrayed as stubborn and uncooperative, but as a leader who is in control and honourable in his actions. The compression of these years is representative of Polybios’ intention to narrate a very brief summary of Achaian history portraying a positive image of the League and Aratos, and to impose a glossy finish on Achaian attitudes and actions.

On a similar theme, the next section will explore how Polybios attempts, not entirely successfully, to construct and reinforce the image of the League as a body preoccupied with law, order and democracy by a full rebuttal of Phylarchos’ criticisms. In doing so, it will become apparent that Polybius’ depiction of Philip, because of his intimate connection with the League and Aratos in his early years, must also be affected by similar manipulations.

### 2.1.e Polybios and the Defence of Achaian Actions: Mantinea and Aristomachos

At the end of book 2, Polybios enforces his image of a lawful, just and democratic Achaian League and a noble, insightful Aratos by a defence of their treatment of the city of Mantinea and ex-tyrant Aristomachos of Argos in 223 (Polyb. 2.56-61). Both acts had received criticism for being excessively cruel, specifically by Phylarchos (as indicated by Polyb. 2.56-63 and Plut. *Arat.* 38.8) and perhaps also by the more general public (Plut. *Arat.* 38.4, 44.4, 45.3-6), and this needed correcting if Polybios’ image was to stand firm.

In terms of the details of the defended instances, while we do not have either Aratos’ or Phylarchos’ accounts of the war we can still be reasonably certain about what happened from

44 Gruen (1972) 622-3.
both Polybios and Plutarch. In regard to the first instance, Polybios claims that the Mantineans were treated with leniency when the city first fell into Achaian hands in 227, yet they soon betrayed this trust by making overtures to Kleomenes and massacring the Achaian garrison. When the city was once again taken by the League in 223 BC, as Plutarch narrates and Polybios eventually admits after long discussion, some of the Mantinean leaders were executed and others sold into slavery with their women and children (Polyb. 2.57-58; Plut. Arat. 45.4). In the end, Polybios is unable to discredit Phylarchos’ truthfulness when it comes to the factual developments at Mantinea. Not only does Polybios finally end up admitting the accuracy of his source, but Plutarch also gives evidence in support.45 In this instance, Plutarch probably used Aratos’ Memoirs and Phylarchos’ narrative, as well as Polybios’ Histories, and it is likely that he would have pointed out any striking differences in the record if there had been any.46

Once Polybios has grudgingly consented to the accuracy of Phylarchos’ reconstruction, he then attacks Phylarchos’ depiction of the episode. He apparently described the Achaians as acting with unnecessary cruelty in an overly-sensational manner and consequently steered his readers towards an overly sympathetic response (Polyb. 2.58.11-15) – an accusation not altogether uncommon for Phylarchos, but one that is unsatisfactory in light of Polybios’ failed attack against his accuracy of information (cf. Plut. Arat. 38.8).47 Polybios then counters the view that the treatment was excessive by explaining that the severity was understandable given the Achaian League’s earlier betrayal by Mantinea (Polyb. 2.58.4-12). He also adds that if the Achaians were as cruel as Phylarchos indicated and did not have a reasonable cause for their behaviour they would have treated Tegea in a similarly severe manner.48 This statement is, however, a contradiction, as Champion puts it, of the “image of the Achaian koinon as a smoothly functioning, disinterested polity based on law and order” as “Polybios’ comparison of the fates of Tegea and Mantinea suggests an arbitrary and inconsistent federal policy toward disaffected members.”49 Polybios’ defence of Achaian actions therefore forces him to impose inconsistency on the very image he wants to portray of the Achaians.

45 Haegemeans & Kosmetatou (2005) 130.
47 Walbank (1933) 5.
48 Polybios makes reference to the laws of war at 2.58.7: τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δίκαια παραβάντες τὸ μέγιστον αἰσθήμα κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐπετέλεσαν. See chapter 3 for further discussion.
The second accusation against Aratos and the League was that they unlawfully tortured Aristomachos of Argos and threw his body into the sea. This man was originally a tyrant of Argos, but he had freely renounced his power in 230 BC and attached his city to the Achaian League (Polyb. 2.59-60; Plut. Arat. 44.4). The main criticism against Aratos was that he had unlawfully allowed this man to be put to death, despite being a man who had possessed no wickedness (οὐ πονηρόν) and had freely cooperated with the Achaian leader and enjoined his city to the League (ἀλλὰ καὶ κεχορημένον ἐκεῖνῳ καὶ πεπεισμένον αφεῖναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ προσαγαγεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τὴν πόλιν, ὡμοι περιυδῶν παρανόμως ἀπολλύμενον). He even held the generalship of the League for a term (Polyb. 2.60.5). However, Polybios provides four reasons against Phylarchos’ negative account: the first, is that his narrative was once again overly-sensational; the second, is that such a death befitted a tyrant (even an ex-tyrant, it seems); the third, is that Aristomachos had tortured and put to death eighty leading Argive citizens when they had tried to betray the city to the Achaians (clearly before he had attached it to the Achaian League himself; Polyb. 2.59); and the fourth is that, while he had initially allied himself and his city with the League he withdrew from the agreement and betrayed the Achaians when it looked like the war would favour Kleomenes (Polyb. 2.60).

While Phylarchos could rightly be criticised for his sensationalistic detailing of events and the common negative attitude towards tyrants in Greece may have leant weight to Polybios’ defence, these two counter-arguments are still unsatisfactory in explaining the severity of Aristomachos’ death. The last two statements – which claim that the Achaians were justified in dealing out punishment and execution because of Aristomachos’ execution of the Argive citizens and later ‘betrayal’ of the Achaian League – are obscuring the political reality and ignoring the severity of the Achaian situation. Plutarch shows that there was a string of Achaian losses at the time: the capture of Mantinea (39.1), the defeat of the League at Hekatombaion (39.1), their near loss of Sikyon (39.3), and their actual loss of Pellene (39.3), Pheneos and Penteleion (39.3). Both actions, therefore – the purging of the Argive leaders and the betrayal of the League – would have seemed to Aristomachos, rightly or wrongly, logical decisions for both himself and his city at the time. The claim of Aristomachos had to be vilified, however, to protect the Achaian reputation, and Polybios aimed to achieve this by his

50 Cf. Polybios’ varying descriptions of Kleomenes as ‘tyrant’ or ‘king’ depending on context; see fn.41.
51 It might be noted that Aratos was also accused of executing citizens from Sikyon, his own city, who were in correspondence with Cleomenes, Plut. Arat. 49.2. Polybios makes no mention of this, of course.
52 Cf. Larsen (1968) 321.
tirade against his status as an ‘ex-tyrant’ and for having committed crimes against his own people. Yet, this defence of the Achaians’ execution of Aristomachos looks very much like special pleading. As Champion states, there originally seemed to be no problem within the League regarding Aristomachos’ earlier career as a so-called ‘tyrant’ when he rescinded his position and brought Argos into their confederation in 230, nor any indication that he had resumed a tyrannical position once he had joined forces with Kleomenes.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, the League had even guaranteed his safety upon his laying down his rule and joining them. The representation of the League as primarily preoccupied with proper legal procedures, equality and freedom of speech, is once again therefore compromised by Polybios’ defence and elaboration of this incident.

What is most revealing of bias, however, is the fact that Polybios does not treat these deeds in a similar way to others he criticises in his \textit{Histories}. Interestingly, his defence of Achaian conduct at Mantinea and the execution of Aristomachos mentions nothing of the reputation that they could have won for leniency and humanity if their actions had been less severe. It is an argument that is used with force against others, particularly against Philip V following his attack of Thermos (5.9-12): the king is criticised for retaliating against the Aitolian attacks on the sanctuaries of Dion and Dodona with a similar act of sacrilege at Thermos. According to Polybios, Philip should have acted far more leniently not only to gain a reputation for humanity, but also to teach the Aitolians by example the error of their ways and the correct behaviour in warfare (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). The lack of any retrospective moralising in Polybios’ account of the treatment of Mantinea and Aristomachos becomes strongly suspect in light of this later episode, and may consequently be read as a sharp indication of the historian’s subjectivity.

Thus, Phylarchos’ version of these two events, which showed the Achaians as being particularly cruel and unlawful, did not sit well with Polybios’ own political leanings, and he therefore felt the need to discredit Phylarchos’ history as overly sensational and undermine it as a whole (Polyb. 2.62-63; Plut. \textit{Arat.} 38.12). However, as this disagreement is primarily based on political differences not fact, Polybios’ censure soon fails to stand firm when his

\textsuperscript{53} Champion (2004) 126.
rhetorical workings and manipulations are put to the test. In attempting to protect the reputation of Aratos and the Achaian League in these instances he in fact compromises it.

2.2 The Best of the Achaians

As has already been discussed, Polybios’ esteem for Aratos and his work was remarkably high, not only did he take the end of Aratos’ Memoirs as the starting point for his own history, but he also credited him with extraordinary foresight and nobility in conducting the political negotiations with Doson in 227. This image of the Achaian leader, while at times tempered by discussion of his failings (Polyb. 4.8) and undoubtedly in many ways accurate, is still decidedly positive. It is a perspective which appears consistently throughout the account of Aratos’ life: from his rise as the initiator, ἀρχηγός, and conceiver, καθηγέων, of the unification of the Peloponnese, his seizure of Korinth from the Macedonians, his persuasion of other cities to join the federation, his governance of the League, and his adherence to one clear anti-Macedonian policy, to his ever morally good and righteous counselling of Philip V (Polyb. 2.40.4, 43.4-6, 43.8-9; see Chapter 3).54 We see very little within Polybios’ narrative that would point to Aratos being anything other than benevolent and considerate (note, however, the brief mention of Aratos’ threatening behaviour at 2.44.3). He is not a leader who condones the excessive treatment of his enemies, but the propagation of leniency, equality and freedom.

Significantly, Aratos also stands almost completely alone on the political scene. Polybios very rarely mentions the presence of other leaders involved in the establishment of the Achaian League, and this also continues later in his description of its decision-making processes.55 By his isolation, Aratos is depicted as the sole player of any significance. As we will see in the following chapter, his preeminence is also reinforced in Philip V’s court: the Achaian leader is placed in explicit opposition with Philip’s Macedonian advisers (Apelles, Leontius, and Megaleas), as well as with the Illyrian friend of the king, Demetrios of Pharos. In each case, Aratos is placed in the position of the good and noble party. Before we follow

55 Except Margus of Caryneia who was strategos before Aratos’ career, Polyb. 2.43.1-3. See Larsen (1968) 216-17.
this chronological thread, however, we should first consider Plutarch’s depiction of Aratos from which a fuller understanding of the politician’s character, agenda and historical importance might be obtained. Through this discussion it will be possible to expose some of the consequences of Polybios’ bias, and his elision and omission of certain events and attitudes towards Aratos. This will enable us to better appreciate how this bias effects not only his telling of the emergence and prominence of the Achaian League and Aratos’ role within it, but also how our historian constructs other episodes in his Histories, particularly Aratos’ presence at Philip’s court.

Despite the difficulties that using Plutarch’s Lives as historical sources always entail,⁵⁶ his Aratus nonetheless allows us a fuller understanding of Aratos’ career in contrast to Polybios’ brief summation. Through it not only do we see positive depictions of the man similar to Polybios’ descriptions, but we also become witness to moments when Aratos was not perceived so well and when he was criticised for his actions. It has already been discussed, of course, how Aratos was reproached for his treatment of Aristomachos at Aratos 44.14; however, it soon becomes apparent that he was also censured for many more. For example, it seems Aratos was often condemned for his lack of skill in open combat, a failing which was also briefly admitted by Polybios (Polyb. 4.8; Plut. Arat. 2-4). Plutarch describes how he was ‘accused of abandoning the struggle and throwing away the victory’ after a battle against Aristippos at the river Chares (28), and how he was constitutionally never well suited for battle (36.3). Stories circulated about how he suffered from stomach cramps before a fight, from dizziness whenever the trumpeter stood by to give the signal, and how after drawing up his forces he would ask his officers whether there was any further need of his presence and then go off to await the outcome from a distance (29.5). He was reproached for not coming to the Achaian commander Lydiades’ aid in the battle against Kleomenes near Megalopolis (37). This was viewed as a betrayal of Lydiades and the League, and resulted in the latter’s refusal to supply Aratos with money and mercenaries (37.3). Equally, Aratos was criticised for violating the period of asylum during the games at Argos (28.3-4), for preventing Aristomachos from joining battle with Kleomenes at Pallantium in 228 (35.4-5), and for refusing to take office in 224 BC, perceived by some as an abandonment of the state (38.2-4). Finally, upset was caused by his harsh treatment of the Sikyonian and Korinthian leaders who had sided with Kleomenes (40.1-3), his transfer of Korinth and Orchomenos to the

⁵⁶ See the discussion on Plutarch in 1.1.a.
Macedonians, his provision of food and pay to the Macedonian army, and the games that he put on in Doson’s honour (45.1-3). These instances demonstrate, in contrast to Polybios’ portrait, just how difficult Aratos could make things for the League, not only by his military incompetence, but also by his uncooperative and competitive behaviour.

It is clear from the evidence in Plutarch that Aratos’ career, despite Polybios’ veil presupposing a smooth and controlled political life, had many ups and downs for which we might at best get the vaguest of references in the Histories. Yet, despite his flaws and adverse reputation, Plutarch expresses a very favourable assessment of Aratos, considering him to be ‘by nature a public figure, high-minded, more exact in his public than in his private relations, a bitter hater of tyrants, and ever making a regard for the public weal determine his enmity or his friendship’ (Plut. Arat. 10.1).57 He dedicates his Life of Aratos to his friend Polycrates (otherwise unknown) and his sons, to whom Aratos is suggested as an appropriate figure of emulation (Arat. 1).58

What is particularly important to our understanding of the Achaian leader in Plutarch’s Aratos is that we also get to see the appearance of other contemporary leaders of the Achaian League working with or in contention with Aratos in greater detail. In the Histories, we are only provided with brief mentions of other figures who helped build the strength and prestige of the League: the Achaian leader Margos of Caryneia, who led the League before Aratos, is merely given two lines (Polyb. 2.41.14, 2.43.2-3); Timoxenos, strategos in 224 BC, is only named for his surprise capture of Argos after its revolt from Kleomenes and again only described as Aratos’ chosen candidate against Macedonian-backed Eperatos in 218 BC (2.53.2, 4.82.8); Lydiades, an ex-tyrant of Megalopolis who held the position of strategos for three terms, is mentioned in two short sentences (2.44.5 and 2.51.3); Aristomachos of Argos, besides appearing in Polybios’ tirade against Phylarchos (2.59-60), is only mentioned in the narrative when he joins Argos to the League at 2.44.6 and his position of strategos is only admitted in pursuit of the argument that the League treated him well at 2.60.5; and, finally, Eperatos, the Macedonian-backed strategos in 218 BC, is mentioned merely by name in

57 Plut. Arat. 10.1: τῷ τρόπῳ πολιτικός, μεγαλόφρων, ἀκριβέστερος εἰς τὰ κοινὰ μᾶλλον τῶν ἰδίων, πικρῶς μισοτύραννος, ἐχθρας ὅσον καὶ φίλας ἀεί τῷ κοινῷ συμφέροντι χρώμενος...
58 See Stadter (2015) for Plutarch’s dedication and his construction of Aratos as a noble figure appropriate for emulation.
4.82.8, 5.1, and 5.5, and simply described as incompetent in 5.30 and 5.91. The fact that other Achaian leaders are given the briefest of mentions in the *Histories* highlights Polybios’ preferential treatment of Aratos.

Plutarch’s work does not, of course, give an account of all of the leaders working in the Achaian League at the time, but it does present a more nuanced picture of Achaian politics and the logistics of warfare. A prominent example is the role of Lydiades, the ex-tyrant of Megalopolis, who appears in a much fuller role in Plutarch than is evident in Polybios. In the *Histories*, mention of this tyrant is very briefly summarised in two short passages:

Λυδιάδας μὲν οὖν ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης ἔτι ζῶντος Δημητρίου, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν, πάνυ πραγματικῶς καὶ φρονίμως προϊδόμενος τὸ μέλλον ἀπετέθειτο τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ μετεσχῆκε τῆς ἑθνικῆς συμπολιτείας. (2.44.5)

Lydiades of Megalopolis in the lifetime of [King] Demetrios, by his own choice, forseeing what would happen with great pragmatism and good sense, laid down his tyranny and took a share in the national league.

οἱ δὲ Ἀχαιοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠλαττώθησαν περὶ τὸ Λύκαιον, συμπλακέντες κατὰ πορείαν τῷ Κλεομένει, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐκ παρατάξεως ἠττήθησαν ἐν τοῖς Λαδοκείοις καλούμενοι τῆς Μεγαλοπολίτιδος, ὅτε καὶ Λυδιάδας ἔπεσε, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὅλοσχερῶς ἐπταισαν ἐν τῇ Δυμαίᾳ περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἐκατόμβαιον, πανδημεὶ διακινδυνεύοντες… (2.51.3)

The first time the Achaians were worsted near Lycaeum, engaging with Kleomenes while on the march, and the second they were defeated in pitched battle at a place in the territory of Megalopolis called Ladoceia, when Lydiades fell; and the third time, their whole force fell completely in a place called Hecatombaion in the territory of Dyme…

At his entrance Lydiades is described as pragmatic and sensible; at his death he is depicted far more neutrally. The positivity of the first statement can only have arisen from Polybios’ perception that to throw down a tyranny was honourable and to join with the justice-loving

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59 See Larsen (1968) 216-17 for Margos; 318-31 for Timoxenos; 315-16 for Lydiades; 311-15, 321 for Aristomachos; and 227, 233, 345-7, 350 for Eperatos.
and democratic Achaian League even more so. The second statement denies any involvement by Aratos in these failures and omits the censure he received for his refusal to help Lydiades (see p. 61).

In Plutarch’s narrative, by contrast, Lydiades takes up three chapters (30, 35, 37). While the account is generally negative towards him and suggests that Plutarch was using Aratos’ Memoirs as a source, it is still valuable in reconstructing the movements of the ex-tyrant within the League. Lydiades first appears in the Aratos at chapter 30 as a tyrant who resigned from his position of power, joined his city Megalopolis to the Achaian League, and was then chosen as strategos by the Achaians in 234 BC. According to Plutarch’s account, he is at once ambitious to surpass the reputation of Aratos, doing many things considered ‘unnecessary’ (ἄλλας τε πολλάς πράξεως οὐκ ἀναγκαίας εἶναι δοκούσας) and even initiating a campaign against Sparta in order to do so. Aratos unsuccessfully tried to oppose Lydiades, allegedly out of jealousy, in his second campaign for the office of strategos (232 BC) and Lydiades was held in favour until he was strategos for the third time (230 BC). After he had frequently and openly denounced Aratos, however, he fell from favour as it was apparent that he possessed an insincere character (πεπλασμένῳ ἠθείῳ) and was contending against someone of genuine and unadulterated virtue (πρὸς ἀληθινῆς καὶ ἀκέραιον ἄρετήν).

His previous status as a tyrant never left him free from suspicion in a context that prided itself on its democratic credentials. In chapter 35, Aristomachos, the tyrant of Argos, has also been persuaded, supposedly by Aratos, to attach his city to the League. Lydiades, still strategos, denounces Aratos to Aristomachos as a man who is always the enemy of tyrants and suggests that Aristomachos instead put all matters into his own hands. The Argive ex-tyrant is, however, initially sent away from the Achaian council because of Aratos’ opposition to the agreement, and it is only when Aratos has been won over again that Argos is admitted into the League and Aristomachos appointed strategos. The final passage, the end of chapter 37, shows Lydiades’ distress at Aratos’ military inaction when Kleomenes was set out in military formation in front of his own city Megalopolis. He decides to advance alone, aiming reproaches at the Sikyonian and bravely calling his men, and is killed in action.

Lydiades’ career in the Achaian League seems to be far more substantial than Polybios describes, as well as the rivalry between the two statesmen and their unwillingness to

60 Porter (1937) xix; Pédech (1964) 156; Gruen (1972) 614.
cooperate. The adhesion of Megalopolis to the Achaian League increased its power but also triggered increasing internal disputes.\textsuperscript{61} It was not only the personal rivalry between Aratos and Lydiades that caused conflict, but also the differences in policy. Lydiades had hoped to use Achaian resources and power to strike at Megalopolis’ traditional enemy, Sparta, and this was no doubt a large part of Lydiades’ original reason for joining. Lydiades was, however, obstructed by Aratos from following this policy. The Sikyonian was more concerned about focusing the League’s energies on the removal of Macedonian influence from the Peloponnese and Greece, and increasing its political strength and independence, than about attacking the Spartans directly; his policy in the 230s, for instance, concentrated primarily on freeing Argos and Athens from Macedonian control (Plut. Arat. 33-34).\textsuperscript{62} Aratos probably knew that his own deficiency as a general and the overall military weakness of the League itself, made success against Kleomenes uncertain and risky, and his removal of Macedonian control, thereby aimed at creating a stronger powerbase from which the League could draw.

Difficulties in following either policy arose, however, by the fact that both leaders enjoyed a strong following within the League and the position of strategos alternated between them for six years. Aratos’ lack of action at Megalopolis in the face of Spartan threat and his refusal to aid Lydiades and Achaian forces when the latter decided to attack, was viewed as a betrayal of the League, one of its members (Megalopolis) and Lydiades, and caused much condemnation against him (Plut. Arat. 36.3-37.3).

However, even with Plutarch’s additional information we cannot be entirely sure about Lydiades’ movements within the League. The negative nature of the passages and their briefness hides much of the detail. Plutarch omits, for example, the particulars of Lydiades’ involvement in Aristomachos’ entrance into the League, as well as Aratos’ initial objection to it (35.2-3). The episode comes across as vague and puzzling. Furthermore, Aratos’ jealousy of Lydiades is explicitly stated in 30.3 and confirmed by his objection to Aristmachos’ admittance to the League under Lydiades’ guidance at 35.3. Such emotion surely indicates that Lydiades played a far bigger role in Achaian politics than Polybios allows and suggests that Aratos feared Lydiades might soon eclipse him.\textsuperscript{63} The ill-repute that resulted from

\textsuperscript{61} Pédech (1964) 156-7.
\textsuperscript{62} Gruen (1972) 613.
\textsuperscript{63} Pédech (1964) 157.
Aratos’ questionable interactions with Lydiades would not, however, have been suitable for Polybios’ picture of Aratos as a just and fair statesman.

Plutarch’s more detailed recording of Aratos’ career, therefore, shows up the one-sided and single-minded approach Polybios took in writing his sketch of the Achaian League from 251 BC. Praises were heaped on Aratos and the League as an institution alone, giving no ground to other leaders about whom even Aratos must have written in his Memoirs. Such information would have been necessary in vindicating his conduct and policy among contemporaries, but it was unnecessary in Polybios’ brief summary of Greek events down to 220 BC. The lack of Achaian leaders in Polybios’ work, alongside his explicit statements asserting that he is following Aratos’ account, gives the impression that the whole of the League was run and strengthened by this man alone. The underpinning logical assumption is that as the League consistently stood for freedom, democracy, and fair judgement, and so too did Aratos. Yet Plutarch, separated personally from the politics and events at the time, and intending to provide a fuller account of the Sikyonian’s life for emulation by future generations, has analysed Aratos’ character and contemporary events in a more balanced manner than Polybios. His expansion has allowed us to see how much of Aratos’ life Polybios has avoided discussing.

2.3 The relationship between Aratos, Achaia and Antigonos Doson

Alongside a more balanced depiction of Aratos’ character in Plutarch’s work, we also get to see a different and extended version of the Achaian leader's dealings with the Macedonians, particularly with the kings Antigonos Gonatas, Demetrios II, Antigonos Doson, and Philip V. His relationship with the latter two kings is recorded as close – not only was he the primary correspondent in the alliance between the League and Macedonia after 227 BC, but also counted amongst their personal circle of friends (φίλοι). Polybios presents these

64 For Antigonos Gonatas, see Plut. Arat. 15, 17-23; Demetrios II, 34; Antigonos Doson, 38.6-7, 41.4, 42-46; and Philip V, 46, 47.4.52. See also Larsen (1968) 215-40, 303-358.
66 For Aratos and Doson see Polyb. 2.47-52 and Plut. Arat. 43. 2-5; for Aratos and Philip see Polyb. 4.76, 4.82-86, 5.5-16, 7.11-14, 8.8-12, 9.23.9 and Plut. Arat. 48-49. Royal ‘friends’ and the nature of royal friendship has received vast attention, see for example Herman (1997) 199-217; Walbank (1984a) 68-71; Austin (1986) 462-63; Hammond (1989) 53-8; Bringman (1993); Gehrke (1995) 52-55; Konstan (1997); Savalli-Lestrade (1998) and (2012); Ma (2011). Elias (1983) remains fundamental for court dynamics in general.
relationships as being congenial and mutually beneficial in character, not only individually for Aratos and the kings, but also for the Achaian League. Plutarch, however, offers a different perspective on the political situation and his narrative may help to reveal the reality of the relationship between the Macedonians, Aratos and the Achaian League, before and during Philip’s reign.

In explaining this aspect of Plutarch’s account we must bear in mind, of course, that the rendition of these events will be greatly affected by whether or not the source viewed Macedonian involvement in Greek and Peloponnesian affairs as beneficial or not. Plutarch is emphatically anti-Macedonian in this text and correspondingly censures Aratos for allowing the League to call in the Macedonians instead of trying to reconcile the situation with a fellow Greek (Plut. Arat. 38.4; Cleom. 16). In contrast, Polybios’ attitude towards the Macedonian kings is more complex. His depiction of them as positive or negative is not only dependent on his assessment of them as rulers, but also on how they relate to Aratos and the development of power relations with the Achaian League.

This section, therefore, hopes to draw light on the Achaian-Macedonian relationship before Philip V’s succession and provide a basis from which to understand Polybios’ initial positive portrait of this king. Significantly, it is only after 215 BC, when Aratos starts to fall out of favour with Philip, that the depiction of the king becomes increasingly negative. Thus, we will first discuss Polybios’ and Plutarch’s accounts of the interactions between the Macedonian kings and the League until the end of Doson’s reign, before exploring the type of relationship that is shown being developed here.

Polybios passes over the Macedonian kings Antigonos II Gonatas and Demetrios II quickly in his summary of Achaian history. He only mentions Gonatas when Aratos’ takes the Akrokorinthos from him in 243 BC and describes him briefly as ‘a great source of fear’ (μεγάλου...φόβου) and meddlesome (πολυπραγμοσύνην), unscrupulous and daring (ἀδικίας καὶ τόλμης) in his decision to join the Aitolians and aid them in dissolving the Achaian League. His death in 239 BC, however, resulted in an alliance between the Achaian

67 For his anti-Macedonian perspective in this text see his description of the relationship between the Achaian League and Doson at Arat. 45, and later his portrayal of Philip, Arat. 49-52. See Wardman (1974) 30, 193-94 for Plutarch’s explanation of Aratos’ decision to invite Macedonia into the Peloponnese instead of reconciling with Sparta as a result of the weakness in human nature (Cleom. 16).
League and Aitolia (Polyb. 2.43.4-44.1). The latter, Demetrios II, has even less said about him: he only reigned for ten years and his death, in 229 BC, caused difficulties for the Peloponnesian tyrants who were supported by him. These were later hounded by Aratos and many acceded to membership of the League (Polyb. 2.44.1-3). It is not until the reign of Antigonos III Doson (229 BC) that the relationship between the Achaian League and Macedonia is reconciled and Polybios’ narrative of the Macedonian kings begins to become more substantial. This is, of course, the period when the Achaian League finally solicits Macedonian aid against Kleomenes of Sparta.

The interactions between Doson and Aratos will be dealt with in more detail, including Polybios’ description of the king and the impression he gives of the public opinion regarding the two leaders. An exploration of this relationship will be important in understanding the one that later developed between Aratos and Doson’s successor, Philip V. The details of Macedonia’s military aid of the Achaian League, for example at the battle of Sellasia in 222 BC, will only be dealt with when it supports the investigation of the Achaian-Macedonian relationship.

Polybios narrates that the Aitolians initially allied with Doson at the start of his reign as they saw him as the undisputed master of Macedonia and an enemy of the Achaians (after their capture of the Akrokorinthos in 243; Polyb. 2.45.1-3). Yet, Polybios states that in 227 BC Aratos initiated secret negotiations with Doson (2.47-50), claiming that the Sikyonian perceived him as ‘a man of energy and sound sense…a man of honour’, despite being wary of the fickle nature of royal friendship. After hearing the envoy’s arguments for concluding an alliance, Polybios narrates that Doson felt convinced that Aratos took a true and practical view of the situation at hand and assured his goodwill towards the people of Megalopolis and his readiness to be of aid. Aratos allegedly received private confirmation of the king’s favourable view of the League and the Achaian leader. The Megalopolitans wanted to put the direction of affairs in Antigonos’ hands immediately; however, Aratos dissuaded the League from this course of action from the start and instead encouraged them to wait until absolutely

68 Polyb. 2.47.5: κατανοῶν δὲ τὸν Ἀντίγονον καὶ πράξιν ἔχοντα καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ πίστεως ἀντιποιοῦμενον, τοὺς δὲ βασιλείας σαφῶς εἰδὼς φύσει μὲν οὐδένα νομίζοντας ὀὔτε συνεργὴν οὔτε πολέμιον, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος ψήφοις αἰεὶ μετροῦντας τὰς ἐχθρὰς καὶ τὰς φιλίας... For references to the ‘friends of the king and nature of royal friendship see p. 65, fn. 66.
necessary. It was more honourable and advantageous, he said, to try and save their own cities themselves (Polyb. 2.50-51.1).

After a number of misfortunes and defeats, however, this course could no longer be delayed and the Achaians finally called upon Doson to conclude an alliance. The first meeting was initially adjourned with no agreement, however, as the Achaians refused to hand over the Akrokorinthos. It was only after the Korinthians had decided to join Kleomenes that Aratos agreed to its handover. By this, Polybios states, Aratos not only atoned for his previous offence against the royal house (the capture of the Akrokorinthos in 243), but also gave sufficient guarantee of future loyalty (Polyb. 2.51.4-52.4). After the ratification of the alliance, Doson moved into the Peloponnese and began his campaign against Kleomenes as commander-in-chief of the allied forces. He ejected the garrisons from the Spartan’s forts, besieged Tegea, Orchromenos, Mantinea, Heraia and Telphusa, and eventually defeated Kleomenes at the battle of Sellasia in 222 BC (Polyb. 2.52.5-9, 54.1-14, 56.6, 60.2, 64.1-7, 65-69). Polybios claims that Doson treated Sparta with great generosity and humanity before dying the same year in Illyria having aroused high hopes in the Greeks not only because of his support in the field, but even more so because of his character and good principles (Polyb. 2.70.7; cf. Plut. Arat. 38.7, 43.2).

Thus is Polybios’ positive characterisation of Antigonos Doson. In his introductory chapters, he only records the king’s relationship with the Peloponnese in detail, mentioning little else about the king’s reign other than his campaign in Illyria. This highlights how limited Polybios’ introduction into events in the East is. His efforts are mainly confined to the Peloponnese and Achaian League, not even encompassing the whole of mainland Greece. Nor in the main narrative is the rest of Greece given much attention except when in contact with Peloponnesian, Aitolian, Roman or Macedonian affairs. This prominence is likely to be partly due, of course, to the greater access Polybios would have had to Achaian sources than those of other Greek states, as well as his greater familiarity with Achaian history. Yet, the lack of attention given to other Greek states is still conspicuous and no doubt partly dependent on preferential treatment. Polybios’ positive depiction of Doson is also dependent upon the need to maintain his positive picture of the League and the view that Aratos acted for the good of its members. The intimate nature of the relationship that Polybios describes existed between Aratos/the League and Doson/Macedonia is also, as we will see in the next chapter, carried over into Philip’s reign. Not only do Philip’s other allies make little appearance in the narrative (see 4.1.b), but Aratos, as one of the king’s advisers, is always depicted as a
beneficial influence on the king and the protector of the Greeks from Macedonian mistreatment. Such a narrow perspective, concentrated on the Achaian League restricts the emergence of a more balanced portrait of the Macedonian king within the narrative.

As we saw above (2.1.c), it is difficult to determine with any certainty whether the ‘secret diplomatic manoeuvres’ between Aratos and Antigonos Doson actually took place. However, irrespective of their historicity it is clear that Polybios stresses the importance of this episode to highlight Aratos’ active involvement in, and consistent support of, the decision to ally with Macedonia. If these secret dealings are really a fabrication as Gruen argued, this is especially the case and Polybios’ depiction of Aratos as an insightful, active and prepared leader is revealed to be contrived. If they are historical, however, Aratos’ prominent role still poses some difficulties.

Pédech has persuasively argued that the Megalopolitans played a much more active role in the appeal to Macedonia than Polybios concedes. As the old enemy of Sparta, with its ancient friendship with Macedonian kings and the repeated aggressions of Kleomenes against the city, it is likely that Megalopolis would have needed little encouragement from Aratos to seek out Macedonian aid.69 Plutarch even records how the Megalopolitans tried to pressure Aratos into meeting Kleomenes in battle when the Spartan king was arrayed against their city (Arat. 36.2) and how they were chiefly responsible for Doson being called in by the Achaians (Cleom. 23.2). Moreover, Pédech suggests that Polybios himself let it be understood that they threatened to approach Antigonos independently if the Achaians did not provide them with prompt aid (Polyb. 2.48.3).

Furthermore, despite the secret negotiations and the guarantees of goodwill provided by Doson, Aratos appears reluctant to call in Macedonian aid. When the Megalopolitans inform the League of the king’s willingness to help and the League in turn show favour in implementing this proposal, he exhorts the League rather to postpone the invitation until absolutely necessary (Polyb. 2.50.3-5). Moreover, when the time came to approach Macedonia in order to confirm an alliance in 224 BC, Plutarch describes how it was ἀνάγκη ‘necessity’ that forced Aratos to go to τὸ δέλνών ‘the terrible ordeal’ (Plut. Arat. 43.1-2). We must doubt, therefore, the willingness and initiative with which Aratos is depicted in

69 Pédech (1964) 156-7.
approaching Macedonia in Polybios’ narrative. It seems more probable if the secret negotiations were historical, that the Sikyonian, pressured by the Megalopolitans and knowing that they would approach Doson even without the consent of the League, decided to take advantage of their exploratory embassy in 227 by requesting that they also make an approach on his behalf. This would allow him to stay involved in, and keep an eye on, all initiatives, show support for the Megalopolitans who would thereby be more attached to him, and create ties for contingency plans. Yet, Aratos was not committed to this course, despite the threat to Megalopolis as is clear by his speech advocating that the League delay its invitation to Macedonia (2.50.10-11). While he wanted to support the Megalopolitans and court their favour, he was not eager to bring in another foreign power that would compromise the League’s independence and strength just as much as a victory by Kleomenes would. In light of this, in contrast to Polybios, it seems Aratos did change his policy direction through necessity – when it became apparent that the Achaian League could not win the war without aid.

When the decision to join forces with Macedonia finally came about, it was vital for Aratos to agree to it and follow this change of policy in order to keep his prominent position within the League. He therefore took the lead in approaching Doson in 224. Whether his earlier secret dealings with Doson actually took place, however, becomes irrelevant as the first meeting with the king was still fraught with uncertainty. Plutarch states that, before this encounter, Aratos had neither confidence in Doson nor trust in the Macedonians, especially as he knew that his own rise to power came about as a consequence of his earlier harm to Macedonian interests (Arat. 43.1-2). This assertion could contradict Polybios’ statement that he had already received notification of the king’s goodwill and favour towards him. This would support Gruen’s claim that the secret negotiations were inventions. Yet, this assumption need not necessarily be the case. If Aratos had previously explored Doson’s attitude towards a future alliance and received a favourable answer, this does not mean that he would have been received well in person at their first meeting. His earlier capture of Korinth would certainly not have endeared him to Macedonian sympathies, and in 227 it was the Megalopolitans, who held ties of friendship with the king, that had approached him. Moreover, the Achaian League was entering into an agreement that would position it as the

junior partner in the relationship and the beneficiary of crucial Macedonian aid should Doson agree to give it. Although Doson would have been eager to re-establish a stable presence in the Peloponnese, the greater power was in the hands of the king and it would be difficult to tell how, as a leader of the weaker party, Aratos would be treated and what conditions might be demanded for military support.

Despite his reservations, however, Aratos is said to have been met with extravagant honour (τῇ τιμῇ περιττῶς), a reception that apparently caused the Sikyonian some surprise (Arat. 43.2; cf. the same fair treatment at 46.1). Yet, Doson’s behaviour is not all that unexpected: the mutual advantages inherent in such an alliance and the delicate nature of this new relationship after years of hostility would have made it imperative that Aratos and the League be treated with consideration and fairness (for discussion of their reciprocal interactions see 2.3.b below). Although surprised by the positive reception, Aratos did not waste the opportunity to gain the favour of the king and soon became an influential presence at both Antigonos’ and Philip’s courts (Plut. 43.2-5, 45-6, 47.4-38). The new role enabled him to deal directly with the Macedonian kings and remain relevant to the League in his capacity as primary intermediary.

While Aratos certainly held an active role in establishing the relationship with Macedonia, therefore, Polybios’ wanted to show that the Achaian leader was more in control, more aware of the need for contingency, and more pragmatic than he might have appeared in his Memoirs. Our historian achieved this by emphasising Aratos’ role in the secret negotiations and omitting his reluctance and concerns about meeting Doson in 224 BC. His positive depiction of the king thereby makes the alliance less of a betrayal of Achaian policy and moderates the loss of power that Aratos and the League incurred by the decision to call in Macedonia.72 This ostensible loss of control is more explicitly brought out in Plutarch’s narrative. Here the biographer states that after Sellasia the League gave the king Korinth, and allowed him to plunder and garrison Orchomenos. It was also decreed not to write or send an embassy to any other king against Doson’s wishes, for supplies and pay to be provided for the king’s troops, and for sacrifices, processions and games to be celebrated in his honour when he was Aratos’ guest (Plut. Arat. 45.1-2). All of this attracted criticism, as Plutarch relates (see above p.61). However, the biographer also defends Aratos against the full impact of such censure by

saying that “since he had entrusted the reins to the king and was dragged along in the wake of the king’s power, he was no longer master of anything except his tongue, which it was dangerous for him to use with freedom” (Plut. *Arat.* 45.2). He then explains how Aratos was aggrieved by many of the king’s actions, particularly his treatment of the statues at Argos – he had re-erected those depicting the tyrants previously supported by the Macedonians and, with the exception of the statue of Aratos, had thrown down those of the old captors of Korinth (Plut. *Arat.* 45.3).

The image of this relationship, as it is preserved in Plutarch, draws attention to some of the negative repercussions that cities and their leaders may have experienced after forming such alliances with Hellenistic kings. Most noteworthy here is the loss of independence and the return of Macedonian influence and control which becomes evident in the circumspection of Aratos’ behaviour and the re-erection of the statues of old pro-Macedonian tyrants and the destruction of those depicting the captors (or liberators from Macedonian control) of Korinth. Yet, while there were certainly disadvantages to establishing such alliances, cities also received many benefits and services in return for this concession of power, most importantly military protection and aid. This assistance, which saw the defeat of Sparta at Sellasia in 222 and the defeat of the Aitolians in the Social War in 217 BC (see Chapters 3 and 4), helped the Achaian League become the predominant power in the Peloponnese.

This would now be a good place to briefly explore this relationship, what the expectations of the participants involved were, how they communicated, and how their political behaviour developed and adapted from their interaction. Understanding how these relationships worked for both kings and cities will allow us to check and assess Polybios’ record of them in regard to Antigonos Doson and Philip V.

2.3.a Benefactors and Beneficiaries

The relationship that was developing at this time between the League and Doson was one which was commonplace between Hellenistic kings and city states in the Hellenistic world. It

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73 Plut. *Arat.* 45.2: ἀγνοοῦντες ὃτι τὰς ἡνίας ἐκεῖνω παραδεδωκός καὶ τῇ ὑμη τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐφελκόμενοι ἐξουσίας οὔδενος ἴνη μόνης φωνῆς ἐτι κύριος, ἐπισφαλῆ τὴν παρφησίαν ἔχουσις.
is what some scholars have come to term a ‘benefactor/beneficiary’ relationship. This was an association based on mutual interest and reciprocal interaction voiced through a ritualised language of euergetism and honours. The benefactor would protect and support the interests of the beneficiary, who, in return for this support, was expected to display gratitude by acts bestowing honour and glory on the benefactor. For Hellenistic kings, such a relationship was advantageous not only for their reputation, which was boosted by their ally’s honours, but also for the exertion of power and influence over the allied city and its people which it allowed. In order to access a more balanced and detailed understanding of this association we will first discuss some of the expectations and procedures involved in it by example of documentary evidence, before returning to evaluate descriptions of it in the literature.

While a benefactor/beneficiary relationship was based on mutual interest, the advantages felt by both parties were, of course, unequal; a symptom of the disparity of power between the two states and the respective roles they occupied. Yet, while this inequality was clearly evident, it appears that the beneficiaries were still willing to acknowledge the superiority of a benefactor provided the latter was able and willing to protect and support local interests.

John Ma has illustrated how the kings, although certainly the more powerful partner, still had to take on locally meaningful roles in order to obtain and maintain legitimacy in their benefactor status. This is a phenomenon which Ma terms ‘role-assignment’. It is important to note that this dialogue affected and changed not only how the beneficiary state behaved, but also how the kings acted and their kingdom developed. The roles taken on by the Hellenistic kings to validate their positions differed, of course, depending on the location and ethnicity of the associated people. In their connection with the Egyptians and Babylonians, for example, the kings had to recast themselves in the local idioms of kingship, particularly religious aspects: the Ptolemies interacted with the shrines and priestly elite of Egypt, appearing as pharaohs to receive legitimacy, while the Seleukids worked with the temples and

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74 See Gauthier (1985), Bringmann (1993), and Ma (2003) 179-83 for this relationship. See also Erskine (1994) for a discussion of the title of euergetes and the differences between its application to Hellenistic kings and Rome.
city of Babylonia, appearing as ‘the king of the world, king of Babylon, king of lands’. With the Greeks, however, it was a different and more difficult matter. It was necessary for the kings involved in Greece to accommodate a degree of local autonomy and self-government. Correspondingly, as discussed above, the Achaian-Macedonian relationship was established to support the League in its conflicts with Sparta and to preserve its commitment to freedom and democracy. At the same time, of course, it also allowed Macedonia a presence within the Peloponnese and consequently increased her power in the Greek world. This accommodation is similarly evident in a surviving letter from Philip V to the Nisyriens in about 201 BC where he confirms their autonomy and permits them to continue governing themselves under their own laws.

Part of the inequality of status between king and city, however, can be seen, as O’Neil has pointed out, in the fact that the Achaians were to some extent subject to royal Macedonian autocracy. This does not mean, of course, that the Achaians were ruled by a set of written, codified laws as Macedonian authority was never so systematic. However, O’Neil’s article demonstrates that Macedonian authority had been influencing the laws and conduct of the allied cities since Alexander the Great and that this pattern did not change noticeably over time. The king’s authority was sometimes seen as powerful as city law and at times even more so, making it hard to image that it was possible for a city to ignore such royal advice.

One particularly instructive example of this is Philip V’s correspondence with Larissa in Thessaly regarding the town’s citizenship between 217 and 215 BC. Two letters recording the details of this exchange survive nearly complete and allow us to witness the power balance between king and city. Philip had been approached at the conference at Naupaktos in 217 by Larissian delegates who conveyed to him their concern about the devastation caused to their territory and the decline in their citizen numbers during the conflict with Aitolia (220-

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81 Syll. 3 572; see Hatzopoulos (2014) 113 for a discussion of how these letters portrays Philip V. Autonomy is a familiar trope in Hellenistic political discourse; for discussions see Hansen (1995); Raaflaub (2004); and Carlsson (2010) 61-100.
84 Syll. 3 543 = IG IX, 2, 517. For these dates see Habicht (1970) 273-79 and (2006) 59-73. For the letters to Larissa in general see Mommsen (1906) 49; Hannick (1968) 97-104, although his suggested dates have been subsumed by Habicht (1970); Bertrand (1985) 469-481; Oetjen (2010) 237-254; Scherberich (2012); Hatzopoulos (2014) 110-13; and forthcoming Mari & Thornton (2016).
The Macedonian king responds to these concerns by sending a letter instructing the Larisceans to increase their citizen body with resident aliens in September 217. This measure, Philip claims, would be beneficial not only for himself, but also for the city and its territory. Hatzopoulos has aptly pointed out that this statement, while addressing the city’s authorities, prioritises Philip’s interests by its placement in the first position, yet mitigating its severity by reflecting back on the city itself (πολλὰ τῶν χρησίμων ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τήν χώραν μᾶλλον ἔξεργασθήσεσθαι. ll. 8-9). This concern to combine firmness of discourse with courtesy, Hatzopoulos asserts, is even sharper in the second letter.

It appears that the city initially obeyed the king’s directives; a second letter, however, was sent out by Philip two years later in 215 BC, revealing that the Lariseans had later destroyed the stele bearing the list of new citizens. Once again Philip is firm in his directives; the courteous tone is, however, more pronounced. In his response the king uses a number of softening and persuasive techniques to encourage the city to follow his instructions. For example he does not blame the city for this deed, but rather the city’s statesmen (οἱ συνβουλεύσαντες ύμιν, l. 28) and then admits that he himself has reservations about the accuracy of his own information (εἰπερο ὡς ἐγεγόνει τούτο, II.27-28). Philip also inverts the priorities of interest from his statement in the previous document, putting the city’s advantage first and his own second (καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς κρίσεως, II.28-29). Furthermore, he deploys his powers of persuasion by claiming that he holds the Larisceans witness to his well-founded point of view (νομίζω μὲν οὐδ᾽ ύμῶν οὐθένα ἀν ἄν τείπειν, II.30-31) and invokes the example set by Romans on the subject of naturalisation (II. 31-33). Finally he invites, not orders, the citizens of Larissa to re-establish

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85 Habicht (2006) 59-73 persuasively moves the date of the first letter from 220/19 BC to 217 BC, making the remark about the ‘previous war’ and its detrimental effect on the Thessalian country understandable.
86 Syll.³ 543 = IG IX,2, 517, ll. 3-9.
87 Hatzopoulos (2014) 111.
88 Syll.³ 543 = IG IX,2, 517, ll. 26-39. For the destruction of the stele is ll. 26-27: συνθάνομαι τοὺς πολιτογραφηθέντας κατὰ τὴν παρ’ ἐμοῦ ἐπιστολῆν καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ ὑμέτερον καὶ ἀναγραφέντας εἰς τὰς στήλες ἐκκεκαλάθανε.
89 Philip’s information here is not entirely correct. Although freed slaves obtained citizenship, they could not hold magistracies. See Austin (2006) 158-59 no. 75 and Bagnall & Derow (2008) 66-68 no. 32. For Roman naturalisation see for example Sherwin-White (1973).
the formerly naturalised resident aliens (παρακαλῶ ὑμᾶς, l. 34). His ‘invitation’ was once again implemented.

While Philip’s tone is courteous in his letters to the city of Larissa, the fact that a second letter was sent out after the reversal of his original order reveals the expectation that the city would concede to the king’s authority. The degree of persuasion reveals more about the method of interaction between a king and a beneficiary than the status each held in the relationship itself: it was an association expressed in the language of mutual benefit, which put a veil over the imbalance of power. The firmness underlines a warning, however, and there would undoubtedly have been serious consequences for the city if it had not followed Philip’s orders.

This interaction between city and king, therefore, suggests that royal ordinances, letters and advice held superior status. Yet, as O’Neil and Ma argue, this influence did not always directly change the city’s laws; royal authority was the catalyst for change but not usually responsible for how things changed, and it was generally coordinated, to an extent, with the authority of the city. The kings were generally anxious to show respect towards a city’s laws, provided the citizens also respected their authority and enacted their suggestions in turn. However, in exceptional cases where a king passed legislation on his own initiative, as in Philip’s statements discussed above, the king was concerned to show that he was acting under “the general conception of justice”, in this instance for the greater good of the Thessalian economy.

Macedonia’s relationship with Larissa was not the same, however, as that with the Achaian League or the other allies in the Symmachy (see 4.1.a). The former, like the rest of Thessaly, had been under direct Macedonian control since Philip II’s appointment to archon tagos of the Thessalian League after the battle of the Crocus Fields (353/52 BC; cf. Diod. 16.14, 35-38). The Macedonian kings continued to hold this position until Philip V’s defeat at Kynoskephalai in 198 BC, and that the region was increasingly regarded as an integral

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90 Hatzopoulos (2014) 112-3.
93 See also Scholten (2003) 140; Graninger (2011) 313-23. For the archon tagos see Hdt. 5.63, Dion. Hal. 5.74, and Pollux 1.128; and Westlake (1935) and Sordi (1958).
component of Macedonia itself. Polybios even describes the Thessalians as holding the same subject status as the Macedonians (4.76) suggesting that they were thus obliged to adhere to Macedonian directives. 95

The Achaian League, on the other hand, was a federation of Peloponnesian cities which had only intermittently been garrisoned by the Macedonian kings in the past and since their reformation in 281/0 BC had steadily weakened the Macedonian hold on the Peloponnese (Polyb. 2.41.6-13). 96 No Macedonian king had previously held a position of government nor dictated political reforms. In 224 BC, therefore, although allied to Macedonia once again the League still guarded its freedom and independence fiercely, requiring the Macedonian kings to be more cautious in their treatment of it. This is particularly evident from the unrest caused by Philip’s adviser, Apelles, when he attempted to force the Achaian League into the same subject status as that of the Thessalians in 218 BC (Polyb. 4.76). 97 Apparently Apelles had not only allowed Macedonian soldiers to eject Achaians from their quarters and to take any booty they might have, but had also encouraged physical violence against them in order to try and make the Achaians more submissive to Macedonian command. Aratos’ complaint to Philip upon hearing these stories reveals the seriousness with which this treatment was taken, and the king ordered such behaviour not to continue.

2.3.b Macedonia and Achaia: A Partnership of Negotiation

Neither the superior position of Macedonia in her association with Achaia, or the loss of power experienced by the League, however, is explicitly acknowledged by Polybios. Yet, this is revealed implicitly throughout the course of his Histories as well as more strongly in Plutarch’s account. The alliance allowed Macedonia to re-establish much more of a presence within the Peloponnese as Antigonos Doson gained possession of Peloponnesian cities such as Korinth (Polyb. 2.54.1), Orchomenos (2.54.10; Plut. Cleom. 23.1 and Arat. 45.1), and Heraia (2.54.12; Livy 28.8.6). 98 The Macedonian occupation of these cities was deeply

96 See Larsen (1968) 215-40, 305-26 for a discussion of the Achaian League and their relationship with Macedonia during this period.
97 For this adviser, see pp. 85-6 below.
unpopular, of course; however as they were strategically important military locations and as the Macedonians were the stronger military force in the alliance, this was a necessary measure to ensure a strong presence in the Peloponnese and to offer the necessary protection to the League. The other honours bestowed on Doson in return for his support entailed deferring to the Macedonian king before any other Hellenistic rulers and holding celebrations in his honour (Plut. *Arat.* 45.2). These honours caused criticism because they openly acknowledged and rewarded Macedonian influence and interference in the affairs of the League; something which would have been particularly uncomfortable for an institution which had been intent on getting rid of such interference only a short time before. Yet, while the Achaians disliked the presence of Macedonia in the Peloponnese and the honours that were bestowed on the king, as is evident from the criticism against Aratos (Plut. *Arat.* 45.2-6), if the League was to continue benefiting from this relationship and be successful in their war against Sparta reciprocity was essential and these actions therefore important.

It is important to note, however, that while Macedonia was certainly the stronger power, it was still critical that the king keep the goodwill of the League. As the prominent political body in the Peloponnese, the connection with this institution became key to Macedonian influence in Greece. Its disapproval and betrayal could prove a threat to Macedonia’s stability in the south and compromise her ability to turn her attention to policies of expansion elsewhere. This is later recognised by both Aratos and Philip at Messene in 215 BC, and again in the political implications for Macedonia of the League’s defection from Philip to Rome in 198 BC (Polyb. 7.11-12; Livy 32.19-23; see Chapters 3 and 4 for further discussion). The agreement between Macedonia and Achaia was mutually beneficial, therefore, if necessarily unequal; however, any sense of a loss of independence that the Achaians may have felt could be endured for the interests of the League as a whole. Additionally, the knowledge that the alliance was also of great importance to the strength of Doson and Macedonia may have dissuaded the king from openly abusing his power.

The dynamics of this relationship are also evident in the way that joint actions were instigated, for which the capture of Mantinea is an excellent example. The treatment of Mantinea, as discussed above, was not deemed in accordance with ‘Greek spirit’ as it included the execution of the city’s leading citizens and the enslavement of its populace (Plut. *Arat.* 45.4). Walbank claimed in 1933 that it was Doson who was responsible for this harsh
treatment, taking as evidence Polybios’ own defence of the king in his *Histories.* However, on closer inspection of Polybios’ text, it is hard to place who the historian is actually defending. Neither Doson, Aratos, nor the Achaians are specifically identified as the ones criticised by Phylarchos for this deed, and we only find the use of the Macedonian king’s name when Polybios states that the Achaians had seized the city four years before the arrival of Doson in the Peloponnesse (ἔτει τετάρτῳ πρῶτερον τῆς Αντιγόνου παρουσίας; Polyb. 2.57-58). It is therefore possible that both the Achaians and the Macedonians were blamed for this incident. However, Polybios’ text is vague about the details and there is no way to be certain. This vagueness was no doubt produced by his constant desire not only to defend the League’s actions at Mantinea, but also their association with Macedonia. This argument is additionally supported by Plutarch’s account (Plut. *Arat.* 45.4-6) which suggests that although the city had been mastered with Doson’s aid (45.4), the cruelty was primarily perpetrated by the Achaians, thus implying that the king had very little to do with the harsh deeds. Yet, despite Plutarch’s assertion that it was the Achaians who were primarily responsible for the deed, it would not do to exonerate the Macedonians completely: they had after all aided in the capture of the city and received two thirds of the proceeds from the selling of its citizens. Significantly, although Mantinea was given to the Achaians as a gift by Doson, the Achaians reciprocated this act of goodwill by changing the city’s name to Antigoneia, and therein belies the mutual benefactor/beneficiary relationship between the king and the League (Plut. *Arat.* 45.4-6).

Polybios’ construction therefore hides the fact that Aratos was not completely in control of the situation once Doson had arrived on the scene. Through Plutarch’s account, it is evident that the Achaian leader was more subject to the demands of the Macedonian king than Polybios is prepared to admit. The blurring of this fact is similarly reflected in the relationship between Aratos and Philip (see Chapter 3). While the relationship between Aratos and Doson may initially have been tense, Plutarch claims that it grew into a congenial one as Aratos was drawn further into the king’s circle of friends (Plut. *Arat.* 43.3-5). Although the extent of this congeniality is hard to assess, it can be safely conjectured that the relationship was seen as profitable. Notably, not only did Doson send the young Philip to make the acquaintance of the

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100 Walbank *Commentary II* 263. It is possible that Walbank changed his mind about who was responsible for the cruelty at Mantinea after his 1933 book *Aratos of Sikyon* where he states that the blame lay on Antigonos. There is nothing to suggest that he still thought this in his *Commentaries* in 1957.
Achaian, but expressly instructed him to attach himself to Aratos (Plut. *Arat.* 46). The perceived usefulness of this connection is quite plain, particularly as Aratos becomes one of Philip’s advisers upon his accession in 221 BC. He was a very important figure in the Peloponnese and his goodwill and cooperation were vital for a Macedonian presence in Greece (Plut. *Arat.* 43.3). Conversely Aratos’ friendship with the Macedonian royal house secured his own political position, improved Achaian standing in the Peloponnese and helped him to influence and direct the king’s actions.

2.4 Conclusion

It is time to draw the numerous threads of this discussion together. This chapter has discussed how Polybios’ depiction of the Greek political environment before Philip’s arrival, which ultimately affects how the king is portrayed in his early years, was directly affected by the historian’s own personal biases towards the Achaian League and Aratos. This patriotism is clear in his introduction to the League in Book 2, which is unusually one-sided and brief for a historian who normally prided himself on writing a balanced and discursive narrative. The preferential status of both Aratos and the League is also revealed by Polybios’ admission that he was adhering to and following on from Aratos’ work, and by his passionate defence of them against Phylarchos’ criticism of cruelty in their actions at Mantineia and treatment of Aristomachos (2.56-63). Polybios’ picture of the League as a just, law-abiding, and democratic body is deliberately constructed throughout his narrative and he will not suffer the more negative interpretations of others to taint this positivity. His portrait of Aratos as a forward-thinking, adaptable and noble leader, always in control and primarily concerned with the interests of the Greeks, also sees a similar treatment in Polybios’ tailoring of material.

Polybios’ account of the relationship between the Achaian League and the Macedonian king is also strikingly congenial and free from conflict, almost presented as an equal partnership. The Achaian reversal in policy regarding Macedonia ultimately had to be justified as a beneficial choice as this appeal to a foreign Macedonian king, instead of reconciling with their Greek Spartan neighbours, likely received criticism from Greeks more hostile to a Macedonian presence. Aratos, too, by his shift from an anti-Macedonian stance to one intimately connected with the Macedonian king was also liable to severe criticism. It was therefore essential for Polybios to show that the Achaian leader was in fact working for the
good of the League. The interactions between Doson and Aratos are consequently portrayed in an entirely positive light.

The preceding pages have been devoted to Polybios’ picture of the Achaian League, Aratos and their connection with Macedonia in such depth because this preliminary picture is vital for understanding our historian’s depiction of Philip V. It explains why the king was portrayed so positively in his early years (221-215 BC; see chapters 3 and 4 for further discussion) and how Polybios justified the League’s attachment to him at that time - the relationship is claimed to be intrinsically desirable and beneficial to the Achaian League and other Greek allies at this time. Yet this grounding also validates the League’s reasons for defecting from him later in 198 BC: as we will see in the following chapters, from 215 BC Philip’s behaviour towards the Greeks allegedly changed to the worse, becoming more ruthless and treacherous. This in turn led to Roman intervention following appeals from numerous Greek states and Philip’s increasing inability to protect his allies. This change in character and subsequent loss of power, Polybios claims, justifies their reasons for leaving this previously sought-after and beneficial relationship.

In the following chapter, we will turn to two episodes which further reveal the workings of Polybios in constructing his image of Philip – the king’s attack of Thermos in 218 BC and his attempt to take Messene in 215 BC.
Chapter 3: Philip, Thermos and Messene

The previous two chapters explored the historiographical and political aims that affected Polybios’ depiction of Philip before the king had even appeared in the narrative. We may now turn more directly to Philip and how Polybios constructed the events of his life around these predetermining factors. In this chapter, two events in the king’s early career will be examined: the attack of Aitolian Thermos in 218 BC and the Macedonian attempt to seize Messenia in 215/14 BC (Polyb. 5.11.6 and 7.13.7). These two incidents were assigned particular importance in the historiographical evolution of the king’s life and character as both are accompanied by extensive digressions and moralising and intentionally connected and paralleled with each other thematically (see 5.12.5-8 and 7.13.2-6). For Polybios, not only do they represent instances of Philip’s growing brutality and excessiveness, but also instances that allegedly reveal Aratos as a noble figure, advocating action with a concern for the greater good of the Greeks. This parallel between Thermos and Messene is a feature that has, surprisingly, not yet been commented on by modern scholars and an investigation of this literary tailoring will therefore offer a new perspective on Polybios’ construction of events and Philip at this juncture.

The last chapter established that Polybios’ desire to absolve the Achaians and Aratos from any criticism levelled at them for their decision to ally themselves with Macedonia in 224 forced the historian to create an overly positive picture of Antigonos Doson. This positivity was also carried forward to the beginning of Philip’s reign as the young prince was introduced to Aratos and the Achaian League under Doson’s instigation (Plut. Arat. 46). Upon his accession in 221 BC, Philip inherited and continued to foster this beneficial relationship by reconfirming Macedonia’s membership of the Symmachy and supporting the interests of its Greek members (Polyb. 4.9.3-4; see 4.1.a for further discussion). In 220 BC, this meant the military support of the Achaians, Akarnanians and Messenians in the so-called ‘Social/Symmachic War’ (ὁ συμμαχικὸς πόλεμος; 4.13.6-7) from 220 to 217 BC against the Aitolians and Spartans (the full duration of the war is recorded in detail in Polyb. 4.3 -

1 For Philip’s relationship with Aratos see Errington (1967); Gruen (1972); and Golan (1995).
The involvement of both kings was especially important and profitable for Achaian affairs as Macedonia’s military strength proved crucial to the League’s success in both the Kleomenean and Social wars. This is no doubt the reason for Polybios’ positive assessment.

In the following discussion of Thermos it becomes apparent that Philip was still viewed in this favourable light. The Social War was in its third year (218 BC) and Philip, who had provided military assistance from its beginning in 220 BC, was proving a valuable ally to the League, reversing the advantages of the Aitolians and forcing the conflict out of the Peloponnese. The war would continue for another year before being concluded to the advantage of Philip and the Achaian League at the conference of Naupaktos in 217 BC. Throughout this period the Macedonian king continues to be framed within a context which sees him as the great benefactor of his allies. Yet, it is in these closing years at Thermos that this glossy veneer first starts to crack, and we see Philip’s image decline from the extreme positivity inherited from that of Doson’s reign. This is the beginning of Polybios’ process of character decline which he uses to justify the defection of the Achaian League and explain the disasters that ultimately brought the downfall of the kingdom. Yet, at Thermos we are given only the barest hint of this change and it is not until the king’s actions at Messene in 215 – two years after the conclusion of the Social War – that this veneer completely breaks down.

3.1 Thermos, 218 BC

The year 218 BC was a busy and on the whole successful one for Philip. First, it saw the implementation of his naval policy (Polyb. 5.2-5): the king had decided to continue the war with Aitolia by sea, convinced that this was the best way to attack the enemy, and the only way to surround and separate them geographically from their allies (the Spartans and Eleians). However, there had been no Macedonian fleet during Philip’s reign before this point, so he decided to bring the Macedonian and Achaian fleets together at Lechaion and train his phalanx soldiers to row (5.2). This new fleet was used to bring his troops to the island of

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2 For the Social War see Walbank (1933) 114-157, (1940/1960) 24-67; Pédech (1964) 161-66; Gruen (1972); Grainger (1999) 244-268 (terming the Social War, from the view point of the Aitolians, the Second Macedonian War); and Scherberich (2009) 103-56.
3 For the Kleomenean War see p. 46, fn. 18.
Kephallenia, to besiege the Aitolian stronghold of Palos on Zakynthos, and finally to sail to Leukas and Limnaia on the way to Thermos (5.3-6). He also invaded and attacked Elis, Aitolia, Sparta and Phokis (5.3.1-2, 5.6-8, 5.13-14, 5.18-24, 5.26), and finished the year with the climactic end to the ‘Apelles Conspiracy’ (219-218 BC). This plot against the king had been instigated by a group of Macedonian advisers (Apelles, Leontios, Megaleas, Ptolemaios and Crinon) who had become disgruntled with the young king’s close relationship with Aratos and his lenient treatment of the Achaian League, which in their view compromised Macedonian control of the Peloponnese. Thus followed successive attempts to disparage the Achaian leader, numerous endeavours to sabotage the king’s efforts in the war against Aitolia (4.76, 82, 84-87; 5.2-7, 14-16), and finally the stirring up of Macedonian troops in mutiny (5.25). This intrigue eventually came to light in 218 BC and the conspirators were either executed or committed suicide (5.26-29), freeing the young Philip from the oppressive manipulation of advisers installed by his predecessor. Our understanding of the events narrated by Polybius in this year is fortunately as complete as it can conceivably be since they take prime place in Book 5 of his Histories, the last book to survive complete. The historian’s account of Philip’s reign after 217 BC becomes regrettably more fragmentary and attempts to reconstruct the king’s later years are varying problematic.

While Philip’s campaign in Aitolia and his attack on Thermos took place during the summer of 218 BC a brief summary of the events at the beginning of the year will prove useful for a deeper understanding of the king’s situation, intentions and reasoning. At the opening of Book 5 Polybius narrates that Philip is in need of supplies if he is to continue offering help to the Achaians in the Peloponnese. The king attends the Achaian Assembly in Aegium to obtain these, but is initially prevented by Aratos and his followers because the Macedonians (advised by Apelles) had backed Aratos’ rival Eperatos in the latest elections for the Achaian strategos. Upon the transference of the Assembly to Sikyon (Aratos’ home city) and reassurances to Aratos of his change of opinion towards Apelles and his policy, Philip finally gains the supplies he needs:

5 For good discussions of this conspiracy see Walbank (1940/1960) 44-61; Walbank Commentary I 538-562; Errington (1967); Herman (1997) 218-24; and Ma (2011).
The Achaians voted to give fifty talents to the king for his first campaign, paying his army on the spot three months of wages and supplying ten thousand medimni of corn; and in the future, as long as he remained in the Peloponnese fighting as their ally, he would receive seventeen talents a month from the Achaians.\(^7\)

The importance of the passage revolves chiefly around its indication of Philip’s financial and logistical exploitation of his allies while he presides in the Peloponnese and before he attacks Aitolia in 218 BC. It reveals Philip's expectation that the Achaians, as his allies, should provide money and food in exchange for his military support in the war against Aitolia.\(^8\) Also noteworthy is the clause signifying that the king must be in the Peloponnese to receive these supplies. This restriction, as will be discussed below, is significant in explaining the reasoning for Philip’s actions at Thermos.

After the assembly Philip attempts to capture Palos on Zakynthos but is unsuccessful, apparently due to the sabotaging efforts of Leontios, Captain of the Peltasts (4.87) and a primary mover in the Apelles Conspiracy (5.4; he was executed later that year for his disloyalty – 5.27.8).\(^9\) Following this failure, the king finally receives the requested money from the Achaians and is then approached by two embassies from Akarnania and Messene: the former asking Philip to attack Aitolia while Dorimachos is on an expedition in Thessaly with half of the Aitolian levies for that year; the latter asking for help against Lycurgos of Sparta (5.5). Leontios urges the king to go to the aid of the Messenians, while Aratos advises invading Aitolia (5.5.8-10). Philip eventually comes around to Aratos’ view and Eperatos is

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\(^7\) Walbank *Commentary I* 538-9 discusses the ambiguity surrounding the terms laid out here. The text could a) indicate support for the future - the Achaians would give Philip 50 talents as soon as he struck camp in the next campaign in 218 BC, supplying three months’ pay for his army, and in addition giving him 10,000 medimni of corn. Or b) recompense Philip for his last campaign in the Peloponnese, as well as provide support in the future - the Achaians resolved 1) to pay him 50 talents immediately for his last campaign, 2) to support his troops for the next three months, and 3) to give him, in addition, ten thousand medimni of corn.

\(^8\) Philip’s failure could in fact have been more a result of inexperience, see Grainger (1999) 284). See Billows (1995) 75-80 for the mutual dependence of Hellenistic kings and cities.

sent to help the Messenians while Philip hurries through Aitolia hoping to launch a surprise attack on Thermos, Aitolia’s capital (σπεύδων ἄφνω καὶ παραδόξως; 5.5.11-6.6). Polybios writes that Leontios knew that the Aitolians would be incapable of facing the situation, not only because of the speed of the Macedonian advance, but also because it was thought no one would ever attempt to invade the district due to its natural strength (διὰ τὰς ὀχυρότητας τῶν τόπων; 5.7.1-2). In view of this, Leontios recommends that the troops be allowed to rest near the Achelous River for the night, hoping to allow the Aitolians time to react. Aratos, however, aware of Leontios’ intentions, implores Philip not to let the opportunity slip by in delaying his advance. The king once again listens to Aratos’ advice and quickly crosses the Achelous River to march on Thermos (5.7.4-8.2).

Having reached the city in the evening, men are sent out to loot the surrounding villages and plains. These are not only full of corn and other provisions, but also valuables used for the Thermika, a local festival of the Aitolians, and the election of magistrates in September (5.8.3-5).10 The substantial wealth of the city and the laxness of military protection reflect the fact that Thermos was considered the safest place in the area and the natural stronghold of Aitolia, an impression of impregnability supported by virtue of it never having been invaded before. The impact of Philip’s attack would, therefore, have had devastating religious, political, financial and psychological consequences not only for the local region but also for Aitolia as a whole. The next day the richest and most precious of the booty and armour from the dedications in the porticoes are selected by the army, who exchange some of the equipment for their own, and the remainder is collected and burnt in a bonfire (5.8.6-9). The equipment and wealth of the Macedonian army is therefore improved and the enemy prevented from using even the items of lesser quality.

We now come to events which Polybios criticises as going beyond the normal conventions of war (5.9.1). The Macedonians, after plundering Thermos and its surrounding area, and keeping in mind the Aitolian outrages at Dion and Dodona, burn the colonnades, demolish the votive offerings and raise the buildings to the ground. They destroy two thousand statues and spare only those representing the gods or bearing inscriptions

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dedications to them (5.9.2-3). On the walls they inscribe a verse by Samos\textsuperscript{11}, son of Chrysogonos,\textsuperscript{12} allegedly well-known at the time, ‘Do you see where the divine bolt has flown?’ (ὁρᾷς τὸ διὸν οὐ βέλος διέπτατο; Polyb. 5.9.4-6), a line of verse revealing a conscious comparison of Philip’s military action with that of a bolt of Zeus’ lightning. The king’s power is presented as divine, irresistible and boundless, and Philip himself as a pious ruler who punishes wrongdoers on behalf of deities. Having done this, Polybios claims that the king and his associates felt justified that they had acted rightly in retaliation for the Aitolians’ similar act of sacrilege at Dion (5.9.4-6).\textsuperscript{13}

Polybios, however, disagrees with this judgement and uses past examples of clemency and piety shown by Antigonos Doson, Philip II and Alexander to show how Philip V should have acted (5.9.7-10.11). The historian asserts that by allowing his passion to rival the impiety of the Aitolians Philip acted no better than the enemy and would consequently earn a similar reputation for impiety, brutally and lawlessness – which according to the historian he later did. Polybios then adds another moralising note and describes one of the requirements of the laws of war: respect of religious property. He states that it is acceptable to take resources from the enemy that will weaken them and strengthen yourself as this is what the laws of war require us to do, but to cause damage to temples, statues and other works which give no benefit to the war-effort must be considered the work of a raging passion and mind (πῶς οὐκ ἀν εἴποι τις εἶναι τρόπου καὶ θυμοῦ λυπῶντος ἔργον; Polyb. 5.11.1-7). Polybios then continues his didactic instruction by arguing that the purpose of war is not to destroy the enemy, but to reform and correct his behaviour. It is the way of a tyrant to gain and hold onto power through fear, but the glory of a king to obtain it through humanity and benevolence (5.11.1-7). As a final note, Polybios states that the Aitolians would have regarded Philip with favour if he had not touched the colonnades and statues, and even felt ashamed at their own behaviour (at Dodona and Dion) had he shown piety and moderation. Conquering the enemy


\textsuperscript{12} Chrysogonos was one of Philip’s Friends (see p.66, fn. 66) set in place by Antigonos Doson and commander of Thessaly. He protected the region from an Aitolian attack in 218 BC (Polyb. 17.6) and was consequently honoured, named a friend, entitled euergetes and given citizen rights by the Thessalian city of Larissa in c. 217 BC (SEG 27.202); see Walbank (1940/1960) 79, (1979) 231-32, 771; Le Bohec (1985) 106; Tataki (1994) no. 316, (1998) 105 no. 22. (cf. his son Samos, no.20).

\textsuperscript{13} For Philip’s attack see Grainger (1999) 16, 208, 277, 284-6.
by noble conduct and just deeds is of a greater advantage than defeating them in the field; in the latter case, victory belongs to the soldiers, in the former to the leaders (5.11.7-12.4).

Thus is Polybios’ narrative of the events at Thermos in 218 BC. He views the incident, despite the Macedonian justifications (Polyb. 4.62.2 and 4.67.3), as wrong on a number of levels: the Macedonian actions go “against the laws of war” (κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους; 5.9.1), they are representative of “the way of a tyrant” (τυράννου ἔργον; 5.11.6), more akin to “the actions of a soldier than a leader” (τὸ δὲ τῆς πράξεως τῶν ὑποτατμομένων, τῶν ἡγουμένων; 5.12.4), and the consequences of “youthful passion” (ἡ ἡλικία; 5.12.5).14 Polybios’ indignation is emphatically apparent. His statements of instruction encourage the observance of higher principles and moral superiority, particularly in leaders of men whom he believes should not fall prey to the irrationality and impulsiveness of their subordinates. Polybios claims that righteous kings would not transgress the laws of war as these are the shared customs of all men and must be observed in order to preserve morality, order, legitimacy and goodwill. Only tyrants would ignore these respected practices for the sake of personal gain.

To better understand the historian’s use of this moralising digression in shaping the picture of the Macedonian king, the following sections will first discuss each moral judgement expressed by Polybios and then explore the practical considerations and reasons for Philip’s actions at Thermos.

3.1.a Laws of War

Polybios’ first criticism of Philip’s attack of Thermos is that the king and his officers transgressed the ‘laws of war’ (τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους; 5.9.1). Such a dense concept has obvious political and moral implications and requires some close discussion.

Polybios’ reference to τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους, ‘the laws of war’, refers to a set of principles and customs surrounding the processes of warfare which belong to a wider body of

14 See Eckstein (1995) especially p. 145 for Philip’s lack of self-restraint at Thermos and Ch. 6 for Polybios’ ideas about generalship and the character of the soldiery.
universal norms, variously and vaguely described as ‘the laws of the Greeks’, ‘the laws of all men’, and ‘the common laws’. These ‘laws’ arose from the acknowledgement of shared customs and constituted what the Greeks generally considered to be just and reasonable conduct within the course of warfare. For the Greeks, as Pindar is claimed to have said, “custom is the king of all things” (Hdt. 3.38). They focused on applying rationality to a fundamentally irrational endeavour - they attempted to manage conflict.

The fact that these laws were never officially set down in writing, however, has caused problems for modern scholars in establishing their contents, the extent of their remit, and their chronological development. This is also undoubtedly the cause of the range of interchangeable terms used to describe them. Yet, references to these customs, or parts of them, occasionally appear in the literature and allow us to form a basic understanding of their nature. The earliest reliable references appear from the fifth century BC in the works of Herodotos, Thukydides and Euripides and continue to be brought up later in the works of Aristotle, Xenophon, Polybios, Diodoros, Plutarch and Pausanias. From these works, we can at least be reasonably certain that these customs pertained to the protection of sacred sites, objects, officials, festivals and observances, as well as the immunity of heralds (who were thought to be under the protection of Zeus), ambassadors and merchants, the respectful treatment and return or burial of the enemy dead, and the victors’ prerogative to treat the

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15 τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμιμα (Thuc. 4.97; Diod. Sic. 19.63), τὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα (Thuc. 1.3, 118; Plut. Pericil. 17), τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμιμα, κοινοὶ νόμοι, κοινά δίκαια τῆς Ἑλλάδος, τὰ κοινά ἀνθρώπων ἔθη (και νόμιμα) (Polyb. 1.70.6, 4.67.4), οἱ κοινοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμιμοι (Polyb. 2.58), τὰ κατὰ κοινόν ὀφειλέματα δίκαια παρ’ ἀνθρώπων (Polyb. 4.6.11), τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια (και τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ὄστις) (Polyb. 2.8.12, 12.13.8), νόμιμα πάσης (συγχέοτας) Ἑλλάδος (Eurip. Suppl. 13). See also Phillipson (1911/2011) 1.57-58; Krentz (2002); and Lanni (2008) 471-72.

16 For a discussion about what the laws of war were and how they were perceived and enforced see Phillipson (1911); Ober (1994) 12; Bederman (2001) 242-66; Krentz (2002) 25-34; Alonso (2007); and Lanni (2008). For general treatises on Classical and Hellenistic warfare in the Greek world see Garlan (1976); Pritchett (1975-1991); Chaniotis (2005); Eckstein (2006) with reservations by Erskine (2008); and Raaflaub (2007).


18 There are a few examples of written rules in the archaic period recorded in the sources: Strabo records a treaty between Chalcis and Eretria in c.700 BC banning the use of projectile missiles (10.1.12), and Aeschines (On the Embassy 115) suggests that after the First Sacred War (c. 600 BC) the victorious state swore never to cut off the food or water supply to their fellow Greeks. Herodotos also mentions a couple of bilateral agreements specifying the number of combatants allowed on each side (1.82 and 9.26). The historicity of all of these is dubious however; see Ober (1994) 11, Krentz (2002), Lanni (2008) 471 fn. 3.

19 For examples of victors being careful not to damage religious sites and the inviolability of temples see Thuc. 4.97.2, Xen. Agesilauis 10.1, Polyb. 5.10 and Paus. 10.28.3. To illustrate how well this law was imbedded in Greek thought see Thuc. 4.97-98. For the immunity of officials see for example Homer Iliad 1.442-45, Hdt. 7.136.2, Polyb. 16.33, and Plut. Alex. 11. For the prohibition against waging war during a religious festival see Thuc. 5.49.1 and 7.73.2, Xen. Hell. 4.7.2-7, and Hdt. 6.106 and 7.206. Also see Phillipson (1911) 2.246-49; Goodman & Holladay (1986) 158-60; Bederman (2001) 246; and Lanni (2008) 477-78.
defeated as they wished. While we may glean scattered bits of information from the sources, however, there is still no comprehensive list in any surviving text describing all the common laws in force at any given time. This persistent vagueness may reasonably suggest that the concept of the ‘laws of war’ and the conventions they pertained to were readily acknowledged and understood by the ancients Greeks, but also, like the terminology, also quite fluid notions from their beginning.

These customs were still meaningful in the Hellenistic period as their continued existence is attested by Polybios’ references to them in the second century BC. However, similarly to the citations in previous literature his remarks are too vague to allow us to construct a more complete list of these customs, even one pertaining to Polybios’ own understanding of them which may also be elusive. In his fifth book, while moralising about the appropriateness of Philip’s actions at Thermos, he writes about religious restraint in warfare:

τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρασκεύασθαι τῶν πολεμίων καὶ καταφθειρίσθαι φρούρια, λιμένας, πόλεις, ἀνδρας, ναῦς, καρποὺς, τάλα τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια, δὲ αὖ τοὺς μὲν ὑπεναντίους ἀσθενεστέρους ἀν τις ποιήσαι, τὰ δὲ σφέτερα πράγματα καὶ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς δυναμικώτερας, ταύτα μὲν ἀναγκάζουσιν οἱ τοῦ πολέμου νόμοι καὶ τὰ τοῦτον δίκαια δρᾶν: τὸ δὲ μήτε τοὺς ἱδίους πράγμασιν ἐπικουριὰν μέλλοντα μηδ᾽ ἡντινοὺν παρασκευάζειν μήτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐλάττωσιν πρὸς γε τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον ἐκ περιττοῦ καὶ ναοῦς, ἀμα δὲ τούτους ἀνδριάντας καὶ πάσαν δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην κατασκευήν λυμαίνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἶποι τις εἶναι τρόπου καὶ θυμοῦ λυτώντος ἔφογον; (5.11.3-4)

For to deprive the enemy and destroy forts, harbours, cities, men, ships, crops, and all the other things of a similar kind, by which someone could weaken the enemy and strengthen his own affairs and plans, these things the laws and rights of war compel us to do; but

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20 For Zeus’ protection of heralds and ambassadors see Homer Iliad 1.334, Hdt. 7.133-136, and Paus.1.36.3. For the treatment of the dead see Eur. Heracl. 1010 and Supp. 19, 311 and 526, Hdt. 9.78-79 and 4,202-205, and Thuc. 4.98; for the religious character of this law see Eur. Supp. 19, 311, 526. For the victor’s right to deal with the defeated as they wish see Xen. Cyrop. 7.5.73, Arist. Pol. 1255a6-8, Polyb. 5.11. See also Thuc. 1.85.2, 3.9.1 for the correct treatment of those seeking restitution, and those who change allegiances. See also Ober (1994) 13; Krentz (2002); van Wees (2004) 115-50; Lanni (2008) 470, 476-82.

21 See Walbank Commentary I 264. Walbank (1972) 90 also argues that Polybios’ concept of the ‘laws of war’ are a good deal harsher than the code envisaged by Plato in his Republic, and reflect, if anything, the more brutal conditions and experiences of Polybios’ own time; see for example Plato Republic 471a.
when one is neither going to provide help to one’s own affairs nor effect some weakening of the enemy with regard to the war at hand, to damage temples superfluously at the same time as their statues and all sorts of equipment, how could one not say that this was the work of a mad character and passion?

This passage explicitly voices, therefore, the universal norm that religious property should be inviolable in war. That this didactic thread runs throughout Polybios’ work is evident from the fact that Philip is not alone in receiving criticism for the destruction of religious property.\(^{22}\) The historian also criticises other violators of sanctuaries: for example, the Aitolians for their attacks on Dion and Dodona in 219 BC (4.62 and 67); Antiochos IV Epiphanes for his attempt on the temple of Artemis at Elymais in 164 BC (Polyb. 31.11); and Prusias of Bithynia’s attack on the Nikephorion in Pergamon in 155 BC (32.15.3-9; cf. Appian \textit{Mith.} 3). This disapproval of sacrilege in warfare is also voiced in Lyciscus of Akarnania’s speech at Sparta in Polybios’ \textit{Book} 9,\(^{23}\) which laments the capture of Delphi by the Phokians and the plundering of the temples of Poseidon at Taenaron, Artemis at Lusoi, Hera at Argos, and Poseidon at Mantinea. Lyciscus is made to assert that none of Alexander’s successors ever committed similar acts of sacrilege (ὦν οὐδὲν πέπρακται τοῖς διαδεξαμένοις, 9.34).

There is the implication from this latter statement that the morals of the present generation in regard to the laws of war and sacrilege had declined from a few years before. Indeed, the number of offences cited by Polybios seems to suggest that the attack of religious sites was not altogether unusual. Yet it is impossible to tell whether Lyciscus actually vocalised such concerns and equally difficult to determine the degree to which Polybios shaped the content of the speech. By its very presence within the \textit{Histories}, however, in conjunction with the first passage regarding Philip’s behaviour at Thermos – where the historian himself is speaking – it seems very likely that Polybios held such a view himself, or that he wanted his readers to

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\(^{22}\) Philip’s destruction of religious property and Polybios’ criticism of it also appears later in the king’s career. First in 201 BC in Pergamon, when, angered by the effectiveness of King Attalos’ defences, the Macedonian throws down the temples and the altars of the surrounding country and spoils the sanctuary of Nicephorion (Polyb. 16.1; Livy 31.17). The second is at Livy at 31.30 which records that the Athenians accused Philip of offenses against them beyond the normal conventions of war and desecrating all human and divine laws by his impious destruction of the tombs, funerary monuments, shrines, temples and sanctuaries in Attic (Walbank \textit{Commentary I} 549).

\(^{23}\) See Walbank \textit{Commentary I} 2. Polybios’ sources for and construction of this speech, and the Aitolian one preceding it, have been much debated: for the argument that these speeches are presented mostly unaltered from the original source see Walbank (1965) 16-17 and (1970) 296-97 = (2002) 95-96; for the argument that Polybios tailored them see Pédech (1964) Ch. 5 especially 265.
believe that this was the case. Taken at face value, this would suggest that attacks against religious sites were becoming more common in the Hellenistic period. It was on the basis of this very statement that Rostovtzeff made such a claim in his classic account in 1941. Yet this was not necessarily the case. These actions do not reflect declining morals in regard to the laws of war as Polybios so strongly claims. While the Greeks clearly acknowledged that certain localities and structures were sacred and inviolable, that they had asylia, and that to destroy or harm them was to invite retribution (divine or human), this did not always prevent destruction of religious property during times of war. Even in the Classical period, these laws were sometimes ignored or manipulated for self-interest. The Athenians, for example, in 428-427 BC, hoping to catch the Mytilenians off guard attacked the city when it was celebrating a festival (Thuc. 3.3), and the Thebans did the same to Plataea in 431 BC (Thuc. 3.56). The Athenians also occupied the Boiotian sanctuary of Delium in 424 and altered the course of its sacred river to protect themselves against attack (Thuc. 4.97). Later, the Phokians raided the treasury at Delphi to hire mercenaries to aid them in the Third Sacred War (Diod. 16.23-37, Paus. 10.2-3).

Philip’s occasional indifference towards the inviolability of religious structures, witnessed at Thermos, although certainly unreasonable behaviour, was not therefore as unique and unusual as Polybios seems to suggest. His exaggeration can only be explained by the wish to support and emphasise his claim that Philip’s conduct at Thermos was morally wrong and far worse than his predecessors’, informed by the wider aim to educate his readers in the correct way to behave in war. He is using Philip as an illustration of what happens if you do not conduct yourself in a way that is respectful and honourable, what Polybios called ‘τὸ καλόν’. The observance of the laws of war was considered one of these important moral qualities to have in order to rule in accordance with ‘τὸ καλὸν’ and be considered a noble and righteous leader. Flouting them would cause reputational damage, affecting political relationships with other states and their consequent willingness to cooperate with the

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24 See Rostovtzeff (1941) 200-1, 1364 n. 23 and Goodman & Holladay (1986) 154 for this view.
29 See Eckstein (1995) for this term and the persistent presence of this moralising theme within Polybios’ Histories.
violator. Polybios warns that Philip’s disregard of these laws would greatly damage the good reputation he had so far cultivated in the Greek world despite Philip and his ensemble’s claim to justified retaliation (Polyb. 5.9.4-6). This is a theme which runs throughout the historian’s telling of Philip’s career and shapes the interpretation of the king in the Histories.

This episode at Thermos is also particularly interesting because it shows two completely opposing ideas about the validity of retaliation after breaches of the laws of war. For Philip and his commanders, their attack of religious property at Thermos was justified because the Aitolians had previously committed similar offenses at Dion and Dodona – the Macedonians were avenging their impious action on behalf of the gods. This, of course, may not have been their primary motive for attacking the city (a matter which will be discussed later), but it was an explanation which Polybios claims satisfied them and no doubt others too as he felt the need to expand on this matter and correct opinion. Polybios’ view is the opposite: avenging one transgression of the laws of war with another is unacceptable. It causes reputational damage and does not accord with the higher principles, ‘τὸ καλὸν’, which he thinks all rulers and leaders should be following.

The difficulty for us, and undoubtedly for Polybios’ argument, is that both views are supported in the literary evidence and there is confusion about the proper behaviour. This is illustrated clearly by a couple of episodes recorded by Herodotos. He writes that after the killing of the Persian ambassadors sent by Darius in 491 BC (7.133) – a transgression of the laws of war – the Spartans thought it appropriate to dispatch two volunteers to offer their lives to Xerxes in atonement. However, Xerxes refused to accept this attempt of reconciliation claiming that he did not wish to act, like the Spartans had done, against the laws of all men (τὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα) by murdering the ambassadors of a foreign power (Hdt. 7.136). While the Spartans considered an act of vengeance to be suitable in the current situation – they believed they were unable to obtain favourable omens from their sacrifices because of this transgression – Xerxes did not, as he did not want to be subject to such a reputation even through an act of reprisal, nor leave himself open to similar divine anger. Later in the Persian war, after the battle of the Plataea, the adviser Lampon suggests to the victorious Spartan Pausanias that he impale the body of Mardonios in retaliation for his and

31 Polyb. 5.9.6: ἐμοὶ δὲ τάναντία δοκεῖ τούτων, and 5.11.2: αὐτὸς δὲ παραπλήσια ποιῶν οὐκ ἔτο τῆς ὁμοίας ἐκείνος τευξεσθαι δόξης παρὰ τοῖς ἁκοῦσασι.
King Xerxes’ earlier decapitation and impalement of the Spartan king, Leonidas. Such brutal treatment of the dead was against the laws of war. This act of revenge, Lampon claimed, would win praise from all the Spartans and the rest of Hellas. Pausanias, on the other hand, responds to this suggestion with horrified rejection as something un-Greek and insulting to the dead (Her. 9.78-9). However, a clearer acceptance of retaliation as a suitable course of action after a transgression of the laws of war appears in other contexts. Thukydides describes how the Boiotians thought it a reasonable reprisal against the Athenians’ occupation and desecration of the sanctuary of Delion in Boiotia in 424 BC (they had disrupted the river running through the sanctuary) to refuse to hand over the Athenian dead for proper burial until the Athenians had evacuated the temple (Thuc. 4.97-8). Later too, Plutarch states that the Achaian execution of Mantinean leaders and the enslavement of their population after their capture by Antigonus in the Kleomenean War came under the law of reprisal (Plut. Arat. 45.4-5: ταῦτα μὲν ἔσχε τὸν τῆς ἀμύνης νόμον).

It should also be noted that Philip II and Alexander also justified certain actions in very similar terms to Philip V’s claims of retaliation against the Aitolians. Philip II defended his intervention in Central Greece by claiming that he was forced to punish the Phokians for their plundering of the temple treasures at Delphi in the Third Sacred War (356 –346 BC; Justin 8.2.3; cf. Paus. 10.2-3, Diod. 16.35). Incidentally, the Phokians also claimed their actions were justified as they were fighting for the honour of Apollo at Delphi. Alexander the Great similarly claimed that his march into Asia was to avenge the Persian acts of sacrilege against Greek temples and he was compelled by his position as hegemon of the Sacred League to intervene (Polyb. 3.6). The latter pronouncements, of course, reflect a concern that their interference and aggression in Greece and Persia be considered legitimate and are unlikely to have come from a genuine concern for the laws of war. That said, the very use of these justifications seems to imply that this kind of rhetoric was accepted by some, and therefore also the act of retaliation.

It seems that the act of reprisal was a controversial one and the decision to retaliate in kind ultimately came down to the principles of the victims of the original offence; those who refrained from striking back were not adhering, as Lanni suggests, to ‘an accepted international norm against reprisals’, but nor were they necessarily only reflecting ‘a

32 See also Austin (1993) 200-1.
particularly pious attitude toward sacred customs’. For some, retaliation in kind was reasonable punishment. For others, going against these norms even to avenge a similar act was considered excessive and unnecessary, potentially causing future retribution from a deity and severe damage to one’s reputation. Polybios’ view, in this instance, undoubtedly aligns with the latter perspective.

This means, however, that the perceived wrongness of retribution at Thermos is very much dependent on the perspective and aims of our historian. Polybios’ strong indignation towards Philip’s disregard of the laws is partly in aid of enforcing certain high principles upon his readers and partly in aid of revealing and developing the king’s (and perhaps his officers’) moral inferiority at an early stage in his career. The placement of an episode showing disrespect of the laws of war at this juncture sets the scene for Philip’s dramatic change in character three years later – when, after trying to capture the city of one of his Greek allies - Messene – he is claimed to have changed suddenly from being ‘the darling of Greece’ to a treacherous and ruthless tyrant – a transformation which has long-lasting consequences for the king and his allies (Polyb. 7.12-14).

Even without this wider methodological perspective it is still necessary to question Polybios’ use of criticism here to enhance the king’s villainy while he underplays the practical advantages of the king’s venture at the same time. There is evidence to suggest, even within Polybios’ own narrative framework, that Philip’s actions at Thermos did not cause him the widespread reputational damage that Polybios credits him with. Furthermore, there is also evidence within the Histories themselves to suggest that Polybios’ assertion that such behaviour could only come about from a raging passion and mind is also not completely accurate. Ideas about what is profitable to the war-effort may be very different when considering practical considerations versus moral ones, and Polybios seems to be focusing almost entirely on the latter. Polybios’ outrage is therefore rather brief and constructed to serve a certain interpretative framework. The following sections will look into this evidence.

3.1.b Kingly behaviour?

After his disagreement of Philip’s claims of justified retaliation, Polybios then takes his criticism to another level. He claims that it is the way of a tyrant to inflict harm and to rule over unwilling subjects through fear, being hated and hating those beneath him; but that of a king to do good to all, earning admiration through beneficence and humanity, and to lead and rule over willing subjects (5.11.6). He therein states that Philip had not acted in the proper kingly manner; he had not followed his predecessors in pursuing respect through leniency, moderation and piety, but treated the Aitolians with ruthlessness (5.11.7-8). By imposing his will through fear and committing similar acts of impiety, Philip had acted like a tyrant. In illustrating his point, Polybios chooses to compare Philip with three of his Macedonian predecessors, Antigons III Doson, Philip II and Alexander the Great (the order in which they are discussed is significant).

In the early section of his overview, Polybios cites Doson’s clemency towards Sparta after the battle of Sellasia, the leniency of Philip II after his suppression of the Athenians and even Alexander’s careful treatment of Theban religious structures as deliberate contrasts to the excessive nature of Philip’s actions at Thermos. These, he claims, are the sort of responses that should have been given instead (Polyb. 5.9.8-5.10.8). The last example, that of Alexander, is rather forced in its praise of Thebes and in a sense undermines the argument here: Polybios has to downplay Alexander’s indignant response, the selling of the inhabitants into slavery and the razing of the city to the ground so he can illustrate how Alexander took the utmost care not to offend the gods even unintentionally by damaging their temples and offerings (Polyb. 5.10.6-7). However, Alexander’s attack on Thebes was definitely not considered lenient treatment and it is even referred to in Book 4 as an extremely harsh attack. It was described as arising from anger and conducted with an emotional element which perhaps increased the amount of damage caused (Polyb. 4.23.8-9). What Polybios does not mention is how the women, children and elderly were forcibly removed from sanctuaries after the fighting, nor the sheer quantity of prisoners taken and property plundered (Diod. 17.11.1-35).

35 Polyb. 5.11.6: τυράννου μὲν γάρ ἐργον ἐστὶ τὸ κακῶς ποιοῦντα τῷ φόβῳ δεσπόζειν ἄκουσίων, μισούμενον καὶ μισοῦντας ὑποτατμούμενος: βασιλέως δὲ τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιοῦντα, διὰ τὴν εὐσεβείαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν ἀγαπώμενον, ἐκόντων ἤγείσθαι καὶ προστατεῖν.
It is likely to have been considered more excessive than the usual conventions of war. His statement that, although Alexander had crossed into Asia to avenge the Persians’ previous acts of sacrilege in Greece, he had only taken vengeance on the people is also unlikely. The burning of Persepolis, for example, caused the destruction of many of the temples, shrines and dedications within the city (Arr. An. 3.18; Diod. 17.72; Curt. 5.7.2-7; Plut. Alex. 38).38

In reality, Alexander makes a poor example of moderation and the true comparison is consequently rather weak not only because Polybios plays down Alexander’s rage against Thebes, but also because the circumstances that dictated what was profitable action were very different. As a new king on the eve of a major campaign it was imperative for Alexander to curb any attempts at resistance in Greece not only to prove his strength, but also to protect his interests while he ventured into Asia Minor. Thebes’ revolt after the rumours of Alexander’s death required a harsher message to curb disquiet in the rest of Greece (Arrian, Anab. 1.7-9; Aischines 3.159; Diod. 17.13-14; cf. Diod. 19.54; Syll.³ 337).39 Whether the excesses committed at Thebes after the battle were intentional or not, the suppression of the city was deemed important to his overall strategy.

The circumstances determining Doson’s and Philip II’s actions were also unlike those dictating Philip V’s. Doson wanted to secure the goodwill of the whole Peloponnese; a more lenient approach in dealing with Sparta, which he did not want or need to annihilate, was therefore preferable and demonstrated how adherence to Macedonia would not result in violence.40 Philip II similarly wanted to secure control over the whole of Greece before he concentrated on Asia; the suppression of Athenian resistance therefore was vital, especially as the city was still a formidable political force in Greece at the time.41 A lenient approach towards the city would have saved Philip’s newly-won acquisitions and reputation as well as time and resources. It should be noted, however, that Polybios is only able to make these comments about behaviour and reputation from hindsight. For Philip and his advisers, not only did they not have such a luxury, but the political situation was also very different. They were not dealing with Sparta in the Peloponnese, but the Aitolian League in the north of Greece, the public enemy of the king and his allies at a time of open war. The comparisons

with magnanimous behaviour and decision-making cited from his predecessors was not
advice that could be used soundly in the circumstances.

Polybios’ attacks against Philip’s actions reveal a general tension between his perception
of how a moral king should act and what was often necessary for the continued existence and
advancement of the king and kingdom. As discussed in Chapter 2, Richard Billows, James
O’Neil and John Ma have pointed out that a range of different strategies had to be
implemented to negotiate success, determined by the individual locations of the realms, the
composition of peoples (i.e. Greek or non-Greek), their surrounding neighbours and the
political atmosphere at the time. Any relationship with Greek cities needed to be based on a
continuous demonstration of benefaction, goodwill, and the ability to protect and promote the
interests of the allied state.43 As the Achaian League was such a vital ally for Philip,
particularly in supporting his position within Greece at the beginning of his reign, and as he
had been directly called in to aid them in their current war against Aitolia (the Social War,
220-217 BC), it was in the king’s best interest to deal with Aitolia as they expected and
wanted. It was after all the prominent Achaian leader, Aratos, in opposition to Philip’s
adviser, Leontios, who initially suggested that Philip make a surprise attack against Aitolia
instead of heading south to help Messene (Polyb. 5.5). It was also Aratos, again in opposition
to Leontios, who advocated an immediate attack against Thermos once they had arrived in
Aitolia instead of allowing the army to rest which might have given the Aitolians time to
react. This advice reflects the Achaian desire for fast, successful military action against their
enemy (even if short-sighted) and, if followed through by Philip, would likely strengthen
relations between the League and Macedonia (Polyb. 5.7.4). As the head spokesman for the
Achaian League, Philip must have recognised that his friendship was crucial for widening
support in the Peloponnese as well as for securing Macedonia’s position in Greek affairs. That
Aratos proved such a valuable resource and ally is clearly evident from Philip’s later
desperate attempts to win the Achaian statesman back after he had withdrawn from court in
214 BC. This, it seems, was the result of the king’s growing tyrannical disposition, his

42 For the tension between the old Greek world and its traditional concept of good kingship see Bringman (1993)
attempt to garrison Messene, and his increasing lack of consideration for the aspirations of the Achaian League.\textsuperscript{44}

3.1.c Aratos’ Involvement and Achaian Loyalty

Interestingly, although Polybios has clearly stated that Aratos was the adviser heavily involved in the Thermos affair, he primarily blames another for the excesses committed there - Demetrios of Pharos. Demetrios was an Illyrian chieftain who had been forced into exile by Roman interference in the region and came to reside in Philip’s court in 219 BC, undoubtedly hoping to regain his chiefdom with the Macedonian king’s support (Polyb. 3.19.8 and 4.66.4-5).\textsuperscript{45} He later comes to hold a position of some influence in Philip’s court and is accredited with playing an important part in directing the king’s attention away from the Peloponnese to Illyria and Italy a few years later in 217 (7.12-14; see 3.2 below). The appearance of the Illyrian adviser at Thermos is, however, suspiciously sudden, as there is no prior mention of him in the account leading up to the attack.\textsuperscript{46} During this episode, only Aratos and Leontios have been individually named and pointed out from the otherwise silent circle of advisers who would no doubt have accompanied the king.

Interestingly, the naming of advisers and the timing of their appearance in the narrative is often significant within Polybios’ narrative. McGing has illustrated this point in an enlightening discussion of how Polybios gradually reveals advisers involved in the Apelles conspiracy at the beginning of Philip’s reign throughout Books 4 and 5 so that the scene would not be cluttered and deflect attention from the king and the development of his character.\textsuperscript{47} Aratos and Leontios were also named for a specific purpose at Thermos: Aratos to encourage the king to take a course of action that would directly aid the war-effort against the Aitolians; Leontios to try to persuade Philip to remain in the Peloponnese, or to sabotage his efforts abroad. In doing so, Aratos comes across as a good adviser, Leontios as a bad one who is trying to prevent the king from achieving success. Similarly, Demetrios is named at this

\textsuperscript{44} Walbank (1940) 74; (1933) 156.
\textsuperscript{45} See Eckstein (2008) 64 and Pédech (1964) 102.
\textsuperscript{46} See Polyb. 5.12.5-8 for Polybios’ suggestion that Demetrios of Pharos’ advice caused the extremes at Thermos, and 5.4-9 for Polybios’ account of the events and advice given to Philip leading up to the attack on Thermos.
point for a specific reason – to deflect blame from the Achaian leader, a role which is carried further to a greater degree in the account of Messene (this will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this chapter).

In addition to Demetrios’ sudden introduction at this point Polybios also never explicitly states within his account that Aratos advised the king against the use of such wanton destruction or tried to prevent it. It would be wrong therefore to exonerate Aratos completely, as Walbank suggests, from condoning the unrestrained behaviour. Remembering the Aitolians’ previous outrages against the Achaian League (Polyb. 4.7, and especially 4.27), Aratos would have had a keener hatred of them than Demetrios and had more to gain from such an attack.\(^{48}\) Furthermore, Polybios only puts the blame onto Demetrios by assumption, as he gives, and possibly has, no proof that Demetrios actually advised the king in this way at Thermos. In positioning the Illyrian here, he is pre-empting the advice that Demetrios will later give to Philip at Messene in 215/214 BC. This Messenian episode is perhaps proof for Polybios of Demetrios’ negative influence and culpability at Thermos, but it still remains a weak assumption based on wishful thinking and a determination to glorify Aratos (Polyb. 5.12.5-8).\(^{49}\)

Of course, the lack of warning against such sacrilege by Aratos in Polybios’ account does not mean that he openly suggested the destruction of religious property either. It was once argued by Cary that the Achaian was just as unconcerned for the laws of war as Philip, citing the public outrage caused by Aratos’ merciless treatment of Mantinea and the cruel execution of ex-tyrant Aristomachus as evidence for this.\(^{50}\) However, neither of these actions actually seems to contravene the laws of war as we know them. The enslavement of inhabitants of captured cities was considered acceptable behaviour for conquerors who were generally allowed to do what they wished with their prisoners (Plut. Arat. 45.5). Moreover, although Mantinea had once been a member of the Achaian League, the city had defected first to the Aitolians and then to Kleomenes of Sparta in 226 BC, and was at that time an enemy (2.57-58, cf. 2.46.2, 2.54.11-12; Plut. Arat. 36.2, 39.). The same can be said of the ex-tyrant, Aristomachos: he had joined the Achaian League with his city, Argos, in 229 BC but had also betrayed this allegiance and sided with Kleomenes in 225 BC (2.60, cf. 2.52.2, 53, 59; Plut.

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\(^{48}\) Walbank (1940) 55.

\(^{49}\) McGing (2010) 111.

\(^{50}\) Cary (1932) 242-3; Plut. Arat. XLV.4 and XLIV.4.
*Arat. 35, 39.1, 44.* Thus Aratos and the Achaian League were deciding the fate of those whom they considered not only to be enemies, but also traitors.

Walbank also agreed with Cary’s assessment of Aratos’ character in *Philip V;* he even stated that the Sikyonian never held conventional honour and glory in much regard. He was a statesman and opportunist, adapting his policies when he thought it necessary; the reversal in policy towards Macedonia in 229/8 BC is the most obvious example of this.\(^{51}\) Walbank even vaguely hinted, following Cary’s point above, that it may have been through Aratos’ guidance that Philip learnt his indifference towards the inviolability of religious property.\(^{52}\) As Philip’s adviser before his succession to the throne, as well as during the early part of his reign, it is possible that Aratos’ political adaptability, preference for raiding, and ruthlessness had some influence on the young king.\(^{53}\) These were certainly two key features which appear in Philip’s character. However, it is impossible to know whether Philip’s disregard for religious inviolability developed partially or wholly from Aratos’ teachings and the suggestion is unverifiable. Although it seems unlikely that Aratos would have tried to hinder the pillaging and burning of Thermos, there is no evidence in Polybios or Plutarch to suggest that Aratos committed any acts of violence against religious property.

Regardless of whether Aratos supported the sacrilege at Thermos or not, he certainly advocated and was involved in the attack of Thermos in general. It was therefore in accordance with what Aratos, and undoubtedly also the rest of the Achaian League, would have wanted. Yet, Polybios claims that the transgression of the laws of war during this event would have damaged Philip’s reputation – implying that it did so with the League. Perhaps this did occur on a deeper moralistic level and it certainly seems to have developed later in the course of Philip’s longer career of questionable behaviour. However, at this particular moment Polybios records no ill-will following the damage caused to religious property. In fact the loyalty of the Achaian League, and its opinion of Philip, does not seem to have been weakened at all. For them, as much as the Macedonians, the sacking of such a valuable and important place for their enemy would have been a success and a boost to their own reputation and standing in the war. Following his digression, Polybios records that having

\(^{51}\) Walbank (1933) 103, (1940) 55.  
\(^{52}\) Walbank (1940) 55.  
\(^{53}\) For Aratos’ preference for raiding see Polyb. 4.8.3-4 and Plut. *Arat.* 10.2-4. His influence on Philip in this direction is also implied by Grainger (1999) 285.
taken as much booty from Thermos as possible, Philip swiftly retreated along the same road, routed the only-recently assembled enemy outside Thermos (Polyb. 5.13), razed Metapa to the ground, and marched past Acrae, Conope and Stratus with little resistance to Limnaia where his army and fleet were waiting (5.14.1-7). After defeating the Aitolians at Limnaia and insuring that the garrison in the city would take no further action, Philip and his officers celebrated:

Ho de Filippou katastrepato theou en ora tois theois ethene euycharistioia tis geganomevnes autow peri tin epi boilen euyroias, ama de kai touz ighemovn ekalei, bourolmenos estiasai pantas. edokei gar eis topous auton dedwokeni parabolous kai toiooutous, eis oous oideis etolimise proteron stratospedio parabaleinei. o de ou monon enebale meta tis dunami, alla kai pan o proethe to sunteluevmeno asfallos epoumatio tis epanodon. de a peri charisin on outos mven eginei peri tis tov ighemovn uppoderhyn; (5.14.8-10)

Having pitched his camp in good time, Philip sacrificed a thank-offering to the gods for the success that had come to him in the enterprise, and at the same time summoned his commanders, wishing to feast everyone. For it seemed he had delivered himself into places of great danger, the sort of places into which no one had ever dared to invade with an army before. And he not only invaded it with his force, but also, having completed everything that he had set out to do, retreated in safety. Being joyous because of this, he busied himself with the entertainment of his commanders.

As the passage shows, Philip’s success was generally acknowledged (edokei gar…auton) among his commanders and retinue within which Aratos would have been present. The prestige of entering the dangerous territory of their enemy and being the first to invade its hub with an army and come out unscathed would have reflected very well not only on Philip, but also on the Sikyonian adviser whose advice Philip had been persuaded to follow. The rest of the Achaian League would also have been buoyed up by the success of their allied king and benefactor against their abiding enemy, and especially while using similar raiding tactics normally used by the Aitolians themselves. His capture of a large amount of valuable booty would correspondingly have worsened the state of Aitolian funds for the war-effort.

Yet, it has been argued that this venture was not actually that beneficial to Philip. John Grainger has pointed out that Philip’s attack on Thermos was implemented after a spur of the
moment decision, inspired by opportunity and Aratos’ preference for raiding warfare rather than a long-term strategy. He claims that it did not in fact advance the king’s cause at all. He argues that Philip not only disgusted some of his friends with his claims of retaliation for the sacrilege at Dion and Dodona and damaged his reputation, but that it would also have been better for him to meet the Aitolians in pitched battle and thus settle the outcome of the war there and then. In attacking Thermos instead of meeting the Aitolians in battle in Thessaly, it is claimed that Philip was effectively giving the Aitolians the upper hand in dictating the terms of war and it was rather the latter who profited from his distraction in Aitolia.

While this attack was certainly opportunistic, it was not as disastrous in terms of Philip’s benefit as Grainger suggests. The king, and his advisers and allies, must have realised that a raid would not immediately end the war, but nor would this have necessarily been the desired or expected outcome of such an attack either. Prolonging the war offered the Macedonian king the chance to prove his speed and military daring after his failure at Palos shortly beforehand, to secure the goodwill of not only Aratos and the Achaian League, but also the Akarnanians who suggested the raid in the first place, and finally to deprive the Aitolians of valuable resources in their war effort. The king could have attempted to meet the Aitolians in battle in Thessaly, but in doing so he would also not have received the same support from the Achaian League and would not have responded to any of his allies requests as required by his status as hegemon of the Symmachy (Polyb. 5.5: the Akarnanians to attack Aitolia; Gorgos to defend Messene against Lykurgos). Moreover, upon hearing of Philip’s attack, the Aitolian commander, Dorimachos, who had attempted to draw the king away from the Peloponnese by overrunning Thessaly, was forced to hasten back to Aitolia to defend his country. The following year also saw the surrender of the Aitolians and the conclusion of the war in favour of Philip and his allies in the Symmachy.

This campaign thereby marks a triumphant moment for Philip in the Social War. Philip’s reputation would have been boosted by this achievement within Greece, Macedonia and his own court, regardless of whether people viewed the damage to religious property as too excessive or as righteous retribution for the Aitolians’ sacrilege. Grainger’s supposition that Philip disgusted friends is not only unsupported by Polybios’ text, which claims that the

54 Grainger (1999) 283-86.
55 For the Akarnanian League and the constant Aitolian raids on the region see Oost (1954) 1-15 and Larsen (1968) 264-73.
king’s friends (τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν φίλους) thought the sack of Thermos justifiable behaviour and that it was only in the historian’s opinion that they were incorrect (5.9.6-7: τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν φίλους), but also by the relative positivity of the reception of this action beyond the circle of his advisers. The League’s loyalty does not seem to have been weakened by this episode; in fact, rather the opposite. The Achaians stayed attached to Philip for many years after the incident, years in which Polybios claims Philip fell into increasingly tyrannical and ruthless behaviour. It was not until 198 BC, when under pressure from the growing threat of Rome and the declining strength of Philip, that the League was forced to relinquish its alliance with Macedonia.

An indirect confirmation that Polybios may have exaggerated the significance of this event and the reaction it would have caused is also supported by the fact that Philip’s sacrilege at Thermos is not mentioned by Plutarch in his Aratos. He only records Aratos’ and the king’s later involvement in the pivotal episode at Messene. This omission is not all that surprising as the episode does not reveal a great deal about the Achaian’s character and Plutarch is, after all, writing a biography of Aratos, not Philip. The event does not seem to have been regarded as important by Plutarch as it was for Polybios (Plut. Arat. 49.2-3); he was not aiming to show how Philip’s character changed to the worse. Yet this does not necessarily mean that there was no general feeling of ill-will towards the king for his treatment of the sacred site at Thermos, but nor does it indicate that there was either.

Philip’s actions at Thermos were, therefore, far from detrimental to his relationship with the Achaians. While his attack of religious structures may have weakened his image as a follower of moral and pious behaviour, at the same time it also boasted his reputation as a successful benefactor and military leader; two qualities which, given the anarchic political climate, would have been far more beneficial and attractive to him and his allies.

3.1.d Benefits to finances and morale

There were also other benefits gained in the destruction of Thermos which are not mentioned by Polybios: namely the capture of booty which would have provided financial relief and increased morale for Philip and his allies on the one hand and despair and monetary loss for the enemy on the other.
As understood from Polybios’ statement at 5.1.11-12, discussed above, Philip sought money and supplies from the Achaians to keep and pay for his army whilst away from Macedonia. This was granted in 219/218 BC provided he remained in the Peloponnese fighting as their ally. Philip's foray into Aitolia, while offering potential benefits to his reputation, would also therefore have lost him the pay and resources offered to him by the Achaian League. It became essential then that the enterprise prove financially, as well as militarily, beneficial and the acquisition of booty was, no doubt, a vital part of the operation. By targeting Thermos with its large quantities of supplies and luxury goods, the venture was made a far more viable and profitable one.

The effect on the Aitolian and Achaian morale by such a raid should also not be ignored. Philip's success in ravaging the heart of Aitolia with little resistance, his capture of large amounts of booty and the damage committed to religious property would have severely harmed the Aitolian position in the Social War, reduced the threat they posed to Philip in Thessaly, as well as perhaps aroused feelings of abandonment by the god. What is more, it would also break the perception of the stronghold's invincibility as an area of great natural strength (διὰ τὰς ὀχυρότητας τῶν τόπων; Polyb. 5.7.2), causing great surprise and fear in the enemy, while at the same time encouraging and reminding their allies of the power of Macedonia. Such was the effect on Aitolian morale that in the next year we find them willing to accept reconciliation and peace (θεωροῦντες αὐτῶν τὴν ὀρμήν τὴν πρὸς τὰς διαλύσεις; Polyb. 5.103).

It seems, therefore, that there is more going on in the destruction of Thermos than irrational vengeance; psychologically and financially it proved a profitable venture. The plundering of the sanctuary’s grain supply and valuable goods not only supported the king’s army and increased the morale of the Macedonians and Achaian League, but also demoralised and stripped the Aitolians of valuable resources, eventually forcing them to agree to a peace that profited Philip and his allies (Polyb. 5.8.4-9; Polyb. 5.103, 105). However, as Polybios is trying to persuade his readers that Philip’s actions were greatly influenced by his impulsive

57 Philip’s attack of ‘impregnable’ places is a strategy implemented quite frequently during this period: see also for example Ambrakos (4.61), Psophis (Polyb. 4.70), Lissos (8.13), and Pergamon (16.1).
character and that he was turning into a ruthless, treacherous monarch it is more effective to leave much of the benefits out. Polybios’ moral outrage, both in regard to the traditional laws of war and in preserving reverence towards the gods, is used to manipulate perception. It is unlikely that Polybios was blind to the financial gains acquired by Philip at Thermos or to the morale-crushing effects this may have had on the Aitolians. He may indeed have dampened the good reputation won by Philip so far among other Greek states, but in regard to his allies it was likely to have represented a fulfilment of the Macedonian commitment to aid them in the war. In this respect, the grievance was perhaps felt far more acutely by Polybios than it was by the Aitolians.

3.1.e An oversight and a concession

Two other passages in the Histories show additional weaknesses in Polybios’ argument that Philip acted irrationally. Firstly, at 5.9.3, the start of the passage in which Polybios begins to formulate his argument, we find a statement which contradicts the severity of his accusation of impiety towards the gods:

ἀνέτρεψαν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀνδριάντας, ὁντας οὐκ ἐλάττους δισχιλίων: πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ διέφθειραν, πλὴν ὅσοι θεῶν ἑπιγραφὰς ἤ τύπους εἴχον: τῶν δὲ τοιούτων ἀπέσχοντο. (5.9.3)

They threw down the statues, which numbered no less than two thousand; and many they destroyed, sparing only those that were inscribed with the names or figures of gods.

Although Philip is destroying the porticoes and offerings, Polybios briefly comments that he preserves the actual images and names of the gods, a remark which cannot denote complete lack of reverence or restraint. There is still some sense of control in the destruction of Thermos. Further evidence that not everything had been destroyed is also found in Book 11 when Philip returns to Thermos to destroy what he had left remaining in 218 BC:

59 Walbank (1940) 55.
60 For the importance of perception in Polybios and its construction see Davidson (1991) 10-24.
61 Walbank Commentary I 546-7.
ὅτι Φίλιππος...παραγενόμενος εἰς τὸν Θέρμον, ἐνθ’ ἦν ἱερὸν Ἀπόλλωνος, ὁσα πρότερον ἀπέλυσε τῶν ἀναθημάτων, τότε πάλιν ἔπαντα διελοβήσατο (11.7.2)

[That] on his way to the lake Trichonis Philip arrived at Thermos, where there was a temple of Apollo; and there he in turn defaced all the dedications which he had spared on his former occupation of the town.

The reason for this new visit in 207/206 BC (the date is uncertain), however, is also not entirely irrational but arises from a clear understanding of the political situation and of the effect such action would have on the enemy. At the time, the Aitolians, alongside their Roman allies, were once again at war with Philip in the First Macedonian War (211-205 BC; Polyb. 9.18-11.7; Livy 26.24-29.12). The Romans had limited involvement in the conflict other than a desire to keep Philip occupied and away from Italy and Hannibal (Philip and Hannibal had formed an alliance in 215 BC; Polyb. 7.9, Livy 23.33, 38.7, cf. 34.9),62 and the Aitolians soon found themselves in difficulties. Unable to stand against the might of Philip’s army without support, they considered suing for peace (11.5-6). Philip’s attack on Thermos in 207/6 was another use of the same tactic he had used to force the enemy to surrender and negotiate terms in 218 (11.7.2-3). As before, this move proved very effective and the Aitolians made peace with Philip in 206 (Livy 29.12). It is difficult to see Philip’s attack on religious property at Thermos, therefore, solely in terms of unreasonableness as the historian wishes us to believe.

There are, however, other instances where Philip destroys religious property ostensibly out of anger and frustration. For example, in 201 BC, the Macedonian king throws down the temples and altars of the area around Pergamon, completely spoiling the sanctuary of Nikephorion and cutting down its sacred grove of trees (Polyb. 16.1; Livy 31.17). To some extent this aggression came about from Philip’s frustration, caused by the effectiveness of King Attalos’ defences at Pergamon and his successful efforts to collect all the supplies and booty from the surrounding land. Philip and his army were therefore prevented from glory and from acquiring desperately needed supplies. By attacking and seizing religious property, the king may have tried to alleviate his situation somewhat, but his rampage may also have been an attempt to draw Attalos out of the protection of his city and force him to accept a battle. Livy at 31.24, 26 and 30, passages that almost certainly derive from Polybios, also records

62 For this treaty see Bickerman (1944) and (1952); Walbank Commentary II 55-56; Gruen (1984) 375-77; and Eckstein (2008) 83-6.
that the king furiously destroyed a number of Attic funerary and religious buildings in 200.63
The intensity of his actions here may also have been used to goad the Athenians into open
battle, but also seem to have arisen from anger and frustration as he had successively failed to
take Athens, Eleusis and the Peiraiaos (Livy 31.24). These instances may show a decline in
Philip’s self-control, however, they cannot reliably be used to inform our understanding of
Thermos, as this earlier event comes about from a very different political context.

The second passage weakening the historian’s argument reveals a concession. At the end
of his digression at 5.12.5, Polybios pauses in his critical judgement of Philip to reflect that
perhaps Philip was not entirely to blame for the events that transpired:

Perhaps, then, one should not attribute all the blame for what happened at this time to
Philip himself, because of his youth, but more to the friends who associated and acted
with him, among whom were Aratos and Demetrios of Pharos. Upon whom it is not hard
to assert, even when not present at the time, which of the two was likely to give such
advice. For apart from the principles of their whole lives, in which nothing could be found
impetuous nor ill-judged in Aratos, in the case of Demetrios the opposite, we have an
agreed demonstration of the principles of each in which they counselled Philip under
similar circumstances. When the proper time comes, I will make suitable mention of it.

Polybios concedes that the young king could not necessarily be held responsible for the
severity of actions taken as he would likely have listened to the advice of others at such a

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63 See Briscoe Commentary XXXI-XXXIII 118-21, 124-25, and 133-35.
young age, and here particularly, as Polybios wants to enforce, to Demetrios of Pharos. As discussed above (see 3.1.c), this assertion seems unlikely historically and it would be more plausible if these actions were encouraged by Aratos - if they were even inspired by one adviser alone.

This remark at 5.12.5 comes at the end of Polybios’ invective and almost seems to be an afterthought. It cannot add to the image of moral decline in Philip’s character as Polybios admits that the decision was likely to be influenced by others. It leads onto and pre-empts Polybios’ discussion of Aratos and Demetrios of Pharos as two opposing influences on the king, each occupying the same moral position each time: Aratos good, Demetrios bad (Polyb. 7.13.4 -14.5). This polarisation of the two, including their unquestioned superiority within Philip’s court and the lack of any mention of other advisers at these crucial moments, must surely underline a design put in play by Polybios: another literary strategy which Polybios uses to bring out a specific perspective regarding Aratos. This motif of the good versus bad adviser is used to bolster the reputation of the Achaian leader which was likely to have been tarnished by his association with the kings of Macedonia, as well as his questionable ethics in his treatment of the Mantineans and Aristomachus of Argos (see 2.1.c for fuller discussion). It was repeatedly enforced to depict him as a moral man.

The incident at Thermos then is the first instance in which Polybios illustrates the allegedly growing tyrannical nature of the king and mentions the contrasting influences of Aratos and Demetrios. The next event to be discussed, the incitement of Messene, parallels this in a number of ways: it draws further attention to Philip’s aggressive temperament and gradual deterioration of his character; it points out the violent treatment of cities which some might view as a breach of the laws of war and alliances; and it brings into closer focus the good versus bad adviser motif.

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64 For discussions concerning the ‘friends’ of the Hellenistic kings see p.65, fn. 66.
3.2 Messene 215 BC

Polybios explicitly claims that the events at Messene in 215 BC mark the start of Philip’s degradation in character:

ἔγω δὲ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐπιστήμως τὴν διήγησιν βραχέα βούλομαι διαλεξῆναι περὶ Φιλίππου, διὰ τὸ ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τῆς εἰς τοῦτοπαλαιν μεταβολὴς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ χείρον ὁμῆς καὶ μεταθέσεως. (7.11.1)

Halting my narrative for the present, I for my part wish to briefly talk about Philip, because of the fact that this was the beginning of his change to the opposite, and his impulse and change to the worse.

The event in question is the Messenian revolution in the autumn of 215. The passage at 7.10 describing this event is unfortunately fragmentary, but we can reconstruct the general sequence of developments from Plutarch’s account: there was factional strife within the city in 215 BC and Aratos was late in coming to its aid. Philip, hearing of the trouble and rushing over, goaded the popular faction against the officials in power (at this time pro-Achaian) and a massacre of the city’s officials and nearly two hundred citizens ensued. Aratos arrived a day too late to stop the carnage and indignantly reprimanded Philip’s behaviour (Plut. Arat. 49.2-3; cf. Livy 32.21.23).

At 7.11 Polybios interrupts his narrative, as seen above, to explain how this marks the start of Philip’s downfall in character. The next chapter, 7.12, narrates what happens after the massacre and Aratos’ arrival. It details the advice given by Aratos and Demetrios to Philip in response to his question regarding whether or not he should take possession of Messene. Demetrios suggests Philip should take the city and so by holding Messene’s stronghold, Ithome, along with the Akrokorthinos, be able to control the whole of the Peloponnese. In contrast, Aratos suggests that unless Philip can take Messene and still retain the goodwill of the Messenians, he should relinquish the town and save his relationship with his allies. Philip is persuaded by Aratos who has noticed the king’s interest in Rome and change of sentiment towards Greece. Polybios now refers back to his statement first posed in his digression on Thermos: that Aratos’ good conduct in his life left him free from suspicion of acting wickedly and offering immoral advice, while Demetrios’ character suggested the opposite. Thus Polybios concludes the difference of one day changed the fate of the town and of Philip. He
committed this outrage, the first of his great crimes, because Demetrios arrived before Aratos. Henceforth, Philip changed from a king into a tyrant and the characters and conduct of Aratos and Demetrios can be firmly decided. The proof of Philip’s changing interests and the growing influence of Demetrios is shown by the fact that despite the success of Aratos’ advice on this occasion, Philip comes back and captures the city just one year later in 214 BC (Polyb. 8.8).

Polybios’ efforts to emphasize this moment, he states explicitly, are for the education of those readers who wish to correct their standard of conduct by the study of history (7.11.2). The admission of this purpose implies his use of Philip as a case study in the achievement of this aim and we see Polybios’ extended use of him, in descriptions and comments on the king’s reign and character, continuously throughout the course of his Histories (4.77.4); he is a figure whom Polybios views as of primary importance not only in the course of history, but also in the lessons that can be extracted from a study of his life and personality. Philip is a warning to Polybios’ audience against corruption of character. The developments of Philip’s reign and life must therefore be carefully constructed; certain events must be singled out, arguably above their real significance as conspicuous instances of immoral behaviour.

Polybios felt the need to mark a specific time and place to highlight the beginning of Philip’s change for the worse. As a theme which he uses to characterise Philip, as well as to point out moral lessons, he had to give it a clear start in order for his readers to understand and realise that this was one of his moments of instruction. Messene is placed into this prominent position by Polybios’ statement above, yet we may question why he chose this episode for the beginning of this theme. An investigation into the reasons for this emphasis will reveal something about Polybios’ construction of Philip’s character, as well as how it fits into the wider context of his Histories. Let us start at the beginning of Polybios’ digression.

The early years of Philip’s reign before the revolution at Messene, between 220 and 215 BC, Polybios cites as being successful and so full of benevolent policy that Philip is named by him as ‘the beloved of the whole of Greece’ (κοινός τις οίνον ἐφώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων; 7.11.8). Polybios’ summation of this period is brief:

65 Polybios’ use of this term in reference to Philip’s relationship with Greece has received little attention. See Walbank Commentary II, 58. It is likely that it refers to the educational side of the erastes/eromenos relationship,
That after he succeeded to the kingship, Thessaly, Macedonia and in short his own dominions were more submissive and inclined to him in their loyalties than to any king before him, although he had succeeded to the rule of Macedonia at such an early age, it is easy to learn from the following facts. For although he was very frequently called away from Macedonia owing to the war against the Aitolians and Lacedaemonians, not only did none of the aforementioned peoples cause disturbance, but none of the barbarous tribes who lived round about ventured to touch Macedonia. And indeed one would be impossible to speak in adequate terms of the goodwill and enthusiasm towards him of Alexander, Chrysogonus and his other friends. Nor can one overstate the benefits he conferred in a short space of time on each of the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, along with them the Epirots and Akarnanians... In fact, as a whole, if one may say somewhat hyperbolically, one might say most aptly of Philip that he was, as it were, the darling of the Greeks owing to his beneficent policy.

This description seems overly positive considering some of the events narrated by Polybios in his earlier books. Here too he mentions nothing about the sack of Thermos, an episode which, as we have seen, he heavily condemns only two books earlier. Perhaps this passage represents

rather than the sexual one. Percy (1996) 15 and Zanghellini (2015) 28 discuss how in its ideal state this relationship was meant to prepare the younger eromenos for citizenship and provide the erastes with grounds to cultivate his own personal virtues of moderation and self-restraint. In Polybios’ metaphor, therefore, the young Philip, as the eromenos of the Greeks, was educated in proper political conduct by Aratos/his allies, which, in the role of a respectable erastes, is thereby able to show its own benevolence, moderation and integrity.
the general opinion felt throughout Greece at the time, Philip had after all vested much of his
time in building and stabilising his reputation, influence and alliances among the Greeks in
his early years. It is also possible that there was a general acknowledgement of his
disaffection in the advancing years as his attention moved elsewhere. Polybios even points
out that Aratos, while advising the king at Messene, had noticed Philip’s enthusiasm for
hostilities with Rome and his change in sentiment towards Greece and Greek interests
(7.13.6). It is unlikely that Polybios drew on an attitude that did not already exist for his
depiction of Philip, but as a historian he felt it his duty to point out specific moments to
illustrate how the king acted nobly as well as ignobly (2.61.2-3). We must wonder therefore
at the high importance that Polybios assigns to Philip’s action at Messene in 215 and its
prominent position as the first event to mark the change in his character.

Pédech claimed that “Polybe a donné une importance excessive aux affaires de Messène”.
The episode had previously been considered by other historians as either a praise-worthy
achievement resulting in the settlement of the city’s civic troubles, or was omitted and
considered of minimal importance as a part of the grander schemes in Philip’s western
ambitions (8.8.3-4). Both of these considerations of the incident at Messene by other
historians may also be valid depending on what view the historian has taken. Unfortunately,
neither the names of the historians nor the nature of their work survives as a comparison.
David Golan noted that Polybios’ description of Philip’s change for the worse actually belied
the king’s change of policy towards the League and the Peloponnese in his turn towards
events in west (the Romans in Illyria, his treaty with Hannibal in 215 BC). However, his
argument for Polybios’ use of two layers of writing – an upper register where he describes
how events evolved through Philip’s change of character at Messene, and a second lower
layer, for the more perceptive reader, where the political differences at this moment are
implied – is forced and unconvincing. As Polybios wanted to make his Histories and the
content within it as accessible and clear for his readers as possible, creating a deliberate
framework which tests the astuteness of his audience was therefore not in his best interest.

66 Walbank (1940) 74.
68 Pédech (1964) 105.
69 See also Golan (1995), esp. 45-54. For characterisation in ancient literature and the concern with character
The historian had other reasons for highlighting this moment as a change in character rather than just a change in policy. These were described by Doron Mendels: first, that Polybios disliked revolutions and violence, and Philip had brought on a massacre by his instigation of both factions in Messene; second, that Polybios felt uncomfortable about reporting Macedonian interference in a matter which the Achaian League had to settle; third, that “it is not accidental that Philip’s *metabole* and his becoming a hated *tyrannos* are according to Polybios a *metabole* in Macedonian politics in the Peloponese”; and fourth, that the historian was also angered by the Achaian League and Aratos’ inability to prevent the Messenian revolution and that his attack on Philip therefore “served the purpose of blurring the helplessness of Aratos and the Achaians.”

70 The last is the most significant - how Philip’s early years were interpreted was very important for the image of Aratos and the Achaian League, and Polybios wanted to make sure his readers picked up the correct interpretation in his eyes. Simplifying a complicated historical sequence into a standard pattern of explanation – the change of the king’s moral character – would aid the acceptance of this interpretation. Polybios was therefore deliberately blurring the political differences between the Achaian League and Philip, as the open acknowledgement of this rift would complicate the narrative and might encourage speculation about the rationality of the Macedonian’s actions, compromising Polybios’ defence of Aratos and his portrait of the king.

Pédech also invoked a further argument to explain Polybios’ choice to overstate the importance of Messene: this exaggeration came about not only because of his attachment to the Achaian cause, but also because he viewed the attack on the city as a major sign that a change was happening in Philip at this time. 71 The designation of Messene as the starting point of Philip’s moral decline, however, seems too precise and its emphasis is undermined by his earlier condemnation of the king’s moral behaviour at Thermos. Polybios appears to have overlooked this critique in Book 5 in his summary of Philip’s good achievements and reputation in the passage leading up to his account of Messene in Book 7 (see above; 7.11.4-8). At Thermos, Polybios claimed that Philip’s character and conduct were excessive, tyrannical and irrational. Polybios could have used Thermos, therefore, as the first tirade against Philip’s excessive behaviour to illustrate the moment when Philip's character first started to change. However, this was not how Polybios wrote his *Histories*, Messene was

71 Pédech (1964) 105.
positioned as the most significant event in the king’s change and we must therefore consider what Polybios was doing with this episode, as well as with his earlier critique of the events at Thermos.

The passage at 7.11.4-8 is deliberately brief and overly positive for a reason: it is intended to highlight the atrociousness of Philip's intervention at Messene in the following passage and make it a moment of prime importance for the king’s character. Reflecting on an argument made about the sacrilege at Thermos two books earlier would not have made this incident as momentous as Polybios says it was. The episode at Thermos also had a different purpose: it was not meant to be a particularly significant moment in Philip’s character development, as Polybios implies from his statement that partial blame should rest on Philip’s advisers. Rather it gives Polybios a moment to caution his readers about the correct way for leaders to act in war and what should not be done, i.e. sacrilege against temples, shrines and other property of the gods. It is also an introduction to the subject of the effects of advisers on the conduct of kings, an area which, as mentioned above, plays a prominent role in Polybios’ depiction of Hellenistic monarchs (Polyb. 7.14.6). The passage at 5.12.5-8, in Polybios’ critique of Thermos, is the first part of his praise of Aratos and his disparagement of Demetrios; the second part is finished at Messene at 7.13-14. Thermos is a prelude to the greater atrocities of Philip to come, but Polybios did not want Thermos depicted as so important, particularly as he aimed to present the incident at Messene as the turning point in Philip’s character and conduct. This would also go some way to explain why his statement about not blaming Philip too much appears at the end of his tirade at Thermos, as if an after-thought.

3.2.a Practical and Strategic Considerations

Polybios does not portray a clear cause for Philip’s sudden transformation at Messene in 215 BC, but implies by his harsh condemnation that Demetrios was part of the cause in his advice to take Messene. In this case, it is not unlikely that Demetrios would have suggested such a course of action as his priorities would have pushed Philip away from Greece and towards the West and Illyria (see 3.1.c above). His presence at court would have encouraged the king to think in other directions, particularly after the peace of Naupaktos. Such a move away from the interests of Greece and the Achaian League would allow him to pursue ambitions of
expansion. At this point, Philip had established himself as a young, but strong and successful king, and one who had recently quashed the stifling manipulations of his advisers with fatal force; he was now ready, having rid himself of the Social War, for new enterprises. Demetrios was in a very advantageous position and quickly drew the king's attention.

Walbank also identified the advice of Demetrios as being one of the factors that moved Philip to take Messene; the other was fear of the Aitolians. For the years after the peace of Naupaktos in 217 BC, Agelaos, the elected general and Aitolian negotiator of the peace (Polyb. 5.107.6), was able to keep a check on the discontent and economic distress which had been growing in Aitolia since 217 BC. This upset had been caused by the forced cessation of raids on the rest of Greece, on which their economy relied so heavily, under one of the terms of the treaty. Tensions were mounting. Philip feared the prospect of a new conflict in the Peloponnese and the military and political distractions that would soon follow. There is evidence that Philip already had garrisons at Korinth, Heraia and Orchomenos inherited from Antigonos Doson, and since 219/18 BC had also brought the region of Triphylia under Macedonian control (Polyb. 4.77.5-8; see below); by adding Messene to the group instead of allowing the Aitolians possession of it he could effectively control all communication between Elis and Laconia and insure the continued safety and stability of Macedonian affairs in Greece.

The region of Messene had always been a problematic area. Its position on the west coast of the Peloponnese in between Elis in the north, Arcadia in the east and Laconia in the south, including its troubled history with Sparta (Polyb. 4.32-3), made it an area of much contention. Its city of Messene, situated on the western slopes of Mount Ithome, held a position of great natural strength and would be of great advantage for anyone wanting to

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72 See Billows (1995) esp. xiii, 24-28 for Macedonian imperial ambitions of expansion, δορίκτητος χώρα (spear-won land) and the necessity of military conquest for legitimacy; see also 33-43 for the emulation of ancestors and the tendency to justify actions by reference to the policies of predecessors.
73 Gruen rightly suggests that Polybios has Philip act against Rome on the counsel of Demetrios from hindsight, as the king could hardly contemplate an invasion of Italy without even a single harbour in his possession and his own kingdom under assault (Skerdilaidas was currently raiding Dassaretis and Macedonia; Polyb.5.101.1). Gruen also points to a neglected passage by Livy (23.33.1-4), who he believes was unlikely to minimise the king’s grand designs, and claims that Philip did not consider Rome’s fortunes to be sinking until after the battle of Trasimene.
74 See p. 78 for references.
75 See also Walbank (1940) 41-2 for Philip’s plans to secure lines of communication down the west coast of Greece into Achaia.
secure their position in the western Peloponnese. In 221 BC, the Aitolians had moved against the city for this very purpose despite being allied with it (Polyb. 4.6.11), to counter the Achaian League’s influence within the city and to use it as a base to unite Elis and Sparta against the League (Polyb. 4.3.9-6). Previously alienated by the Achaian League’s acquisition of Pylus and Cyparissa (Polyb. 4.5.8), Aitolian pressures drove Messene into an alliance with the confederation in 220 BC (Polyb. 4.9.5, 4.15.2). The importance of the city and its location in the war between Aitolia and Achaia is illustrated by the Aitolians’ resolution to remain at peace with everyone else in the Peloponnese, including Sparta and Messene, if the Achaians abandoned their alliance with the latter (Polyb. 4.15.8-11). There seems to have been a fear that Messene, a location which might have allowed the Aitolians to bring the war to Achaia, would be brought into the Symmachy and lose Aitolia this promising possibility. Messene joined the League but remained passive; the region was located between two enemies (Sparta and Aitolia at Phigalia; Polyb. 4.31.1) and the Messenians were reluctant to take part in the war-effort under such precarious conditions, preferring to stick to their traditional neutrality (Polyb. 4.32). In 215 BC, Messene, weak and faction-ridden, would have posed another temptation to the Aitolians who had been forced out of the Peloponnese by the peace of Naupaktos; their capture of it could easily enable another alliance between Aitolia and Sparta, and effectively reverse the outcome of the whole Social War. Its strategic value in the Peloponnese is evident.

The king’s interest in and conduct at Messene were very much intended to benefit the Macedonian position and therefore reveal the reality of Philip’s attitude towards Greece after the Treaty of Naupaktos. He was now looking beyond the Peloponnese and the Achaian League which had become reasonably stable, and was more concerned with the defence and progression of his own position within the Mediterranean. As stated above, Skerdilaidas was marauding in Darassetis and Macedonia in 217 BC, but Hannibal had also defeated the Romans at the battle of Lake Trasimene and Philip seems to have been looking for ways to

77 Roebuck (1941) 3.
78 The Aitolians are said to always court the friendship of the Elians allowing them to stay in touch with the rest of the Peloponnese for foraying and raiding purposes; Polyb. 4.9.10. The Spartans, despite being part of the Symmachy since Doson’s intervention after Sellasia, made a private alliance with the Aitolians in 220 BC against the Achaian League; Polyb. 4.16.5. They would not reply to the call from the Symmachy to go to war against Aitolia and subsequently joined in alliance with the latter; Polyb. 4.34-6.
79 Walbank (1940) 27.
80 See also Bederman (2001) 214-22 for the controversial concept of neutrality in ancient Greece.
81 Holleaux (1921) 197-8, Walbank (1940) 72-3. Contra Porter (1937) xcv.
82 Walbank (1933) 156.
push further west (Polyb. 5.101). There was the need therefore to gain further holdings of strategic and political value within the Peloponnese, and even mainland Greece and the whole Balkan area to allow for enterprises elsewhere.  

From Polybios’ account we might be led to the wrong conclusion that this was the first time Philip had considered garrisoning the cities of the Peloponnese. Yet the attack on Messene in 215 BC, a treaty-ally in the Symmachy, was not the first instance of such a policy. Attempts to secure locations of strategic value were also sought earlier: Philip’s settlement of the captured towns of Triphylia in 219/18 BC, for example, involved garrisoning the towns and placing the region under the command of the Macedonian epimeletes, Ladicus of Akarnania (Polyb. 4.77-80). The capture of the region not only put a wedge between Aitolia and its Spartan allies, but also may have induced the Messenians into joining the war and covered Phigalia, which had been allied with Aitolia since 244 BC and used as a base throughout the Social War (220 BC; Polyb. 4.3.5-6, 4.6.9. 4.31.1). The placement of Triphylia under Macedonian control was a policy therefore more in aid of Macedonian interests than of Achaian or Greek ones. Philip could just as easily have handed the district over to Arcadia, or even granted it an autonomous regime with Symmachic membership.  

Philip’s capture of Triphylia, Walbank has argued, was a reversion to the garrison system of Doson. The king’s actions seemed to continue to build on the number of garrisoned cities in the Peloponnese and consequently Macedonian control. Other cities were also captured and fortified by Philip at this time outside of the peninsula, including Bylazora in Paeonia and Thebes-in-Phthiotis, representing his need to secure Macedonia’s borders and lines of communication. Bylazora, which commanded the pass into Dardania, was taken and garrisoned to prevent further attacks by the Dardanians in the north (their last attempt was in 219 BC when Philip was away from Macedonia in the Peloponnese). The plan to take Thebes-in-Phthiotis had a similar aim to the Triphylian campaign in 219 BC – to separate the province of Phthiotis Achaia from the Aitolians who held it. However, although the town surrendered after fifteen days, Philip was unable to pursue the complete capture of the province due to the appearance of Skerdilaidas in Macedonia (217 BC). Yet the town gave a

84 Syll. 472; cf. Walbank (1936) 68 n. 30.
85 Walbank (1940) 47.
86 Cf. p. 116 fn. 75.
boost to his finances from the selling of the population into slavery and was established as a Macedonian colony, named Philippopolis (Polyb. 5.100).

It seems possible to say, therefore, in consideration of Philip's possession of Korinth, Heraia and Orchomenos, of his acquisition of Triphylia in 219/18, of his attempt on Messene in 215 and the final acquisition of it in 214 that the Macedonian policy towards Greece during the king’s early years had consistently aimed to establish a secure hold within the Peloponnese. One beyond the alliance of the Achaian League which required constant careful handling and attention.

### 3.2.b Keeping the faith of the Achaian League

The apparent danger of this “new precedent” of garrisoning Peloponnesian cities in Philip’s policy, as Walbank claims, was probably obscured from his allies by the king’s brilliant campaigns in Ambracia and Psophis (219 BC), from which he had won such a sterling reputation.\(^87\) It was vital that the Macedonians not alienate the cities of the League by brandishing too much authority over them, a mistake clearly evident from the Achaians’ severe reaction to Apelles' harsh treatment of them in 219/18 BC (Polyb. 4.76; see 2.3.b).\(^88\)

However, at the same time, it was in Macedonia's best interest to increase its influence in the Peloponnese so that it could turn to other affairs and not be concerned with its own position in Greece. The delicacy of this relationship of negotiation (see 2.3.a) meant that Philip's attempts to establish a firm hold in the Peloponnese were at times interrupted by the requirement to aid and accede to certain conditions to the Achaian League. The Social War had forcibly slowed down Macedonian efforts to gain control of the peninsula, but had at the same time encouraged feelings of goodwill towards the king among the Greeks; it was a necessary hindrance to establish Philip’s standing within Greece.\(^89\) More specifically, throughout 219 and 218 it was generally Philip’s policy to hand over his conquests to Achaia, a policy which would not have strengthened his grasp of the Peloponnese but only helped ensure the loyalty

\(^{87}\) See Polyb. 4.69.9, 77.1 and 82.1 for the effect on Greece.

\(^{88}\) See pp. 77-8 above for more detail.

\(^{89}\) See Golan (1995) 17 for the pressure imposed by the Achaian League on Philip to go to war against Aitolia.
and goodwill of the League.\textsuperscript{90} The attacks on Thermos (218 BC) and Laconia (four days after Thermos; Polyb. 5.17-19) were similarly efforts pursued in part for Achaian interests. Although both rendered large quantities of booty and prestige to the young king, neither action increased direct Macedonian control and both were led and executed under the influence of Aratos whose interests very much lay with the Achaian League and its own security.

The episode at Ithome in 215 BC is another instance, made very obvious by Polybios, where the need to keep the faith of the Greeks inhibited Philip and his commanders from furthering their own policies and interests. Instead of taking the city as he intended, Philip was forced to moderate his ambitions to insure Aratos' and the League's continued goodwill. Aratos’ warning against taking Messene and its citadel is quite clear:

ό δὲ διαπορήσας "ei ἐν χωρίς" ἐφὴ "τοῦ παρασπονδήσαι Μεσσηνίους δύνη κρατεῖν τοῦ τόπου τούτου, συμβουλεύω κρατείν: εἰ δὲ τούτον καταλαβὼν φρουρᾶ, πάσας ἀπολλύναι μέλλεις τάς ἀκροπόλεις καὶ τήν φρουρᾶν, ἢ παρέλαβες παρ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου φρουρουμένους τοὺς συμμάχους", λέγων τὴν πίστιν, ὁAllocation is 91 of 100

Unsure, he said, “If you are able to take this place without breaking the treaty with the Messenians, I advise you to take it; but if in taking and garrisoning it, you are going to lose all the citadels and the garrison, by which you inherited from Antigonos the allies being guarded,” meaning good faith, “consider if it is even now not better by withdrawing your men to leave his good faith in place, and by it to garrison the Messenians, and similarly the other allies.”

Aratos states that if Philip were to put a Macedonian garrison into Messene he would lose the trust of the Messenians and his other allies, meaning the Achaian League, and his influence and reputation in the Peloponnese would be greatly damaged. For Aratos and the Achaian League it was imperative to restrain the growth of Macedonian power in the Peloponnese as

\textsuperscript{90} For example Philip hands Ambrakos over to the Epirotes (Polyb. 4.63), gives even Psophis, a city of great natural strength and strategical value, to the Achaians (4.72.5-6), restores Lasion and Stratos to the Achaians and Telphusans respectively (4.73.2), and Dyme to the Dymeis (4.8). See also Walbank (1940) 44.
much as possible to preserve their own independence. Yet, this was of course in direct conflict with Macedonian aims, and the tension between the differing interests of these two allies is acutely felt. For Philip, there was always the need and desire, even after the Social War, to secure the peninsula in a number of locations, preferably by garrison, not only to protect Macedonia’s own borders but also for the resources the region might provide militarily, financially and provisionally. Messene, strategically placed and having just come out of a revolution in Philip’s favour, was the next target. Philip’s readiness to take the city in 215 BC is indicated by the company of armed men that ascended to the citadel with him (μετὰ τῆς θεραπείας at 4.12.1). Yet despite the king’s eagerness, Aratos perhaps unexpectedly hindered the progress of such plans. The severity of the Sikyonian’s reaction emphasises the strong conflicts of interest which were inherent in the Symmachy from the very beginning: Macedonia wanted to take control of the Peloponnese and the Achaian League wanted to prevent it. Yet their reliance on each other, the Achaian League needing military support and Philip influence in Greece, made it necessary not to push too far for their own interests. The balance was precarious.

This stage in Philip's reign, six or seven years after his accession (215/4 BC), reveals the transition of influence of the two advisers, Aratos and Demetrios of Pharos. At least, that is the impression we get from Polybios' Histories. It marks the period when Philip's attention is being diverted from Greece and Aratos falls from his position of influence over the king. It is an important moment for the League, but, as detailed above, it is not the first instance where we see Philip imposing more explicit control over the region. He has already taken Korinth, Heraia, Orchomenos and the cities in Triphylia, so his taking of Messene does not seem that surprising and cannot therefore be that much of a shift in policy. Nor as we see, is it a moment when Philip's character changes dramatically, when tyrannical behaviour springs out of nothing; Polybios has already shown him unopposed to ruthless behaviour for his own ends at Thermos. Why would he therefore be opposed to claiming a city of the League, especially a weak and potentially dangerous one, and breaking one of the clauses of the alliance, when it

91 Walbank Commentary II 60. It is suggested that the military nature of this company is inferred by Polybios’ use of τοῦς ἀνδρὰς ἑξαγαγόντα (7.12.7) and ἄγωμεν (7.12.10) in reference to it later in the passage.
92 See Walbank (1940) 73-4 and Golan (1995) 47-8 for the unexpected vehemence of Achaian opposition to Messene’s capture.
93 See Pédech (1964) 104 for this conflict of interest, although his assertion that Aratos feared Philip was an agrarian reformer is not convincing. See Mendels (1998) 179-99 for a persuasive case against the theory that Philip had democratic tendencies.
would bolster the interests of Macedonia? Especially when he had already laid claim, perhaps less obviously, to the cities of Triphylia? There seems to be some continuity in his actions.

The inherited garrison policy was in effect both before (Triphylia 219/18 BC) and after (Messene 215 BC) the peace of Naupaktos (217 BC) and therefore seems to have been part of Macedonia’s overall policy in the Peloponnese.

As mentioned above, Polybios points out that others writing about Philip’s life either left out the episode at Messene or recounted it as a success:

προήχθην δὲ καὶ νῦν καὶ διὰ τῆς προτέρας βύβλου σαφέστερον ἔξηγήσασθαι περὶ τούτων οὐ μόνον διὰ τὰς πρότερους ἡμίν εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὰ τῶν συγγραφέων τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους παραλειπότεν τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους, [4] τοὺς δὲ καθόλου διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς μονάρχους εὖνοιαν ἢ τάναντια φόβον οὐχ οίον ἐν ἀμαρτία γεγονέναι τὴν εἰς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους ἀσέβειαν Φιλίτπου καὶ παρανομίαν, ἀλλὰ τούναντιον ἐν ἐπαινῷ καὶ κατορθώματι τὰ πεπραγμένα διασαφεῖν ἡμῖν.
(Polyb. 8.8.3-4)

And I was led both now and in the course of my previous book, to expand more clearly these events, not only because of the reasons previously stated by me, but also because of the fact that of the historians, some wholly neglected the events concerning the Messenians, and others, due to their goodwill or on the contrary fear towards the monarchs, generally made Philip’s impiety and lawlessness against the Messenians no great crime, but on the contrary clearly recorded what happened in terms of praise and success...

Polybios tells us that others did not view what happened at Messene as critical a moment as he himself makes out. Yet Polybios does not give us the names of these historians and rather begins a general polemic about writers who fail to describe all sides of a character and who write works more closely related to panegyrics than histories (Polyb. 8.8.5-9). His central aim here is to attack Theopompos for his contradictory account of Philip II (Polyb. 8.9-11).\(^{94}\) Despite Polybios’ omission of these historians’ names, however, we still get the impression that whether the garrisoning of Messene was viewed as important depended on one’s political

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point of view. Polybios’ perspective, of course, was in line with the interests of the Achaian League and Aratos; yet the views which identified the incident as inconsequential are unlikely to have been Achaian or particularly interested in the position and influence of Aratos and Demetrios within the king’s favour. For those more interested in the successes of Philip and Macedonia in general, the garrisoning of Messene would have been another step insuring Macedonian control of the Peloponnese and therefore an achievement. For those who viewed the seizure of it as unimportant, they perhaps reveal that it was not a particularly significant moment for the king in terms of his long-term aims (whatever these were) and even hints that it was not seen as such a dreadful event in the eyes of other Greeks either. It implies, therefore, that the taking of Messene was just another step in Macedonian policy for securing the Peloponnese, not a particularly significant moment despite the importance of the city’s location. The repercussions for the king’s reputation were not severe either. Unfortunately, we cannot know the number of writers who mentioned or ignored this event in their accounts of Philip’s life, and this makes it very difficult to make any conclusive statements about the attitudes proliferating in the wider Hellenistic or Mediterranean context in relation to this event. It seems unlikely, however, that it was considered a defining moment for communities outside of the Peloponnese.

For Polybios, however, so invested in Achaian affairs, the incident at Messene was the moment when Philip most obviously started to break away from the interests of Aratos and from the League, and when Demetrios and his interest in the West made Philip all the more ready to grasp the Peloponnese securely and focus his resources elsewhere. It was the moment when the fall of one adviser and the rise of the other in Polybios’ mind was most apparent, and consequently when the change of attitude and treatment of the Achaian League was most explicit. Nevertheless it was not the overall Macedonian policy in the Peloponnese that had changed, but how far the Macedonians were able to pursue it. The tables had turned in Philip’s and Macedonia’s favour after the peace settlement in 217 BC, a treaty which Philip had very much dictated, and he was now free to think about other areas of operation.

3.2.c Aratos of Sikyon and Demetrios of Pharos: The Hero and the Villain

The influence and hierarchical movement of advisers or ‘friends’ within the courts of the Hellenistic kings was a topic of particular interest to Polybios and he spent quite some time
expounding the differences that each adviser could have on the conduct of kings. In Book 7, after his rendition of the incident at Messene, he notes the importance of choosing advisers carefully:

τηλικαύτην τοῖς νέοις βασιλεύσι όσπην ἔχει καὶ πρὸς ἀτυχίαν καὶ πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢ τῶν παρεπομένων φίλων ἐκλογή καὶ κρίσις, ὑπὲρ ἡς οἱ πλείους οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως ὀφθαλμοῦντες οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην ποιοῦνται πρόνοιαν…(7.14.6)

Great weight for young kings, both leading either to the misfortune or to the success of their rule has the choice and judgement of friends who accompany one, over which most of them, with a sort of indifference, take not the least forethought…

The passage is unfortunately fragmentary and we cannot know what Polybios’ advice or views were in relation to this topic. However, this features at the end of the second part of a discussion concerning the advisers, Aratos and Demetrios, a case study which he undoubtedly uses as a starting point for his exposition on the above subject. His purpose here may be in part educational (as many of Polybios’ transgressions were), here relaying the proper way to choose advisers and the hazards of choosing a bad one. Yet this issue also allowed him another chance to defend Aratos. This very much corresponds to Polybios’ defence of the Sikyonian against Phylarchus’ claims of excessive cruelty in his treatment of Mantinea and Aristomachos as discussed in the previous chapter. The polarisation of the two advisers possibly reflects the fact that Polybios was also countering accusations against Aratos made in view of the close relations between him and the king in the early phase of his reign. These criticisms may have been aimed at Aratos’ involvement in Thermos and his inability later to prevent Philip’s taking of Messene.

It would be misguided to think that there were no other advisers or friends of the king around to influence him during this period, despite the lack of any mention of them in Polybios’ work. The concentrated opposition of Aratos and Demetrios is likely to be artificially constructed, even if they were the main courtiers influential at this time, and we must consider Polybios’ purpose for constructing their presentation as he does. By identifying

95 See for example Polyb. 4.24, 5.26.13. For royal friendship see p.65, fn. 66.
96 Walbank Commentary II 61.
97 See above p.100, and fn. 49, for McGing (2010) and (2013) and the gradual revelation of advisers at court.
his reasons we will better understand what the historian is really trying to say and its ramifications for the characterisation of Philip. Let us now turn to the passages where Polybios makes his comments about the two advisers.

In his critique of Thermos at 5.12.6-8, Polybios openly identifies Aratos and Demetrios as the two most likely advisers to give Philip guidance. The historian then opens up the discussion and claims that it is not hard to determine, even when not present oneself, which of the two was more likely to advise the excessive destruction of religious property. For, Polybios asserts, the principles of Aratos’ whole life and his judgement lacked in nothing and because of this he would not commit such an act of wickedness, while those of Demetrios were the opposite (γὰρ τῆς κατὰ τὸν ὅλον βίον προαιρέσεως, ἐν ἦ περὶ μὲν Ἀρατὸν οὐδὲν ἄν εὑρέθη ἡ προτετέξεσθαι διὰ τὸν Αριττόν, περὶ δὲ Δημήτριον τὰν ἄαντια). Furthermore, the historian claims, there is an undisputed example illustrating each of their principles to this effect when they counselled Philip under similar circumstances (5.12.7). These similar circumstances, he states, will be discussed and their characters fully revealed later at the appropriate time. Polybios then continues with his narrative of 218 BC.

This appropriate time comes about three years later when both Aratos and Demetrios give counsel to Philip at Messene (7.13.3-8). After his narrative of the Messenian massacre and the suggestions given by both at Ithome, Polybios continues on with his previous train of thought concerning their characters. Describing the atrocities at Thermos again to bring us back to his earlier argument in Book 5, Polybios adds to his claim asserting that two points at Messene show his judgement of Aratos and Demetrios to be correct. The first is that from a difference of one day, with Demetrios being present and Aratos being delayed, Philip started to commit the greatest of crimes (ἤρξατο Φίλιππος ἰπτεσθαι τῶν μεγίστων ἀσεβημάτων; 7.13.6), he interfered in the volatile political situation of the city and encouraged a massacre. When he was subject to the guidance of Demetrios the king is encouraged to treat his allies, the Messenians, badly and support civil disorder, thus revealing questionable principles in the Illyrian. The historian then gives as final proof of each adviser’s character the advice given by each at Ithome – Demetrios to take the city, Aratos to leave it ungarrisoned and free; the Illyrian is therefore advising the king to treacherous and tyrannical action against an ally, while the Achaian recommends treating the Messenians fairly and thereby keep the goodwill of the city and the Achaian League. We can therefore assert, Polybios argues, that the life and principles of Aratos were good and those of Demetrios wicked, and their advice to Philip
correspondingly so. Polybios then concludes that the revelation of such sentiments in each adviser at Messene leaves no doubt as to who advised the Aitolian affair (περὶ τῶν κατ᾽ Αἴτωλοὺς) at Thermos.

Yet, as mentioned above, Demetrios’ appearance and involvement at Thermos is unexpected and suspect: Polybios makes no mention of the Illyrian in the decision-making process or events leading up to the attack on Thermos (5.5-9); Aratos’ opposition at this point was Leontios, not Demetrios; Demetrios only makes an appearance in the digression after the narrative at 5.12; and Aratos was much more involved in Thermos and far more interested in the outcome of the attack. Polybios’ inference that Demetrios had to be the one to influence the king’s sacrilege because of the wickedness of his advice later on in Messene, is therefore weak and unfounded. We cannot altogether dismiss the claim, of course, but it certainly fits into Polybios’ polarisation of the two advisers very neatly. The nature of this dichotomy is also revealed in the following passage where Polybios lays out examples when Aratos and Demetrios influenced the king:

ων ὁμολογουμένων εὔμαρξε ήδη συλλογίσασθαι τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς ἐκατέρου προαιρέσεως. καθάπερ γὰρ νῦν Φίλιππος πεισθεὶς Αράτῳ διεφύλαξε τὴν πρὸς Μεσσηνίους πίστιν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἀκραίαν, καὶ μεγάλω, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον, ἐλκεῖ τῷ προγεγονότι περὶ τὰς σφαγὰς μικρὸν ἱάμα προσεῖθηκεν, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς κατ᾽ Αἴτωλοὺς Δημητρίῳ κατακολουθήσας ἦσέβει μὲν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς, τὰ καθιερωμένα τῶν ἀναθημάτων διαφθείρων, ἡμᾶς ταῦτα δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὑπερβαίνων τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους, ἠστοχεὶ δὲ τῆς σφετέρας προαιρέσεως, ἀπαραίτητον καὶ πικρὸν ἀπουσίαν ἐχθρὸν τοῖς διαφερομένοις. ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ Κρήτην: καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἑκείνων Αράτῳ μὲν καθηγεμόνι χρησάμενος περὶ τῶν ὅλων, οὐκ οἶνον ἀδικίσας, ἀλλ’ οὔδε λυπήσας οὐδένα τῶν κατὰ τὴν νήσον, ἀπαντας μὲν εἰχὲ τοὺς Κρηταίους ὑποχειρίσως, ἀπαντας δὲ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας ἐις τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοιαν ἐπήγειτο διὰ τὴν σεμινότητα τῆς προαιρέσεως. οὕτω πάλιν ἐπακολουθήσας Δημητρίῳ καὶ παραίτος γενόμενος Μεσσηνίους τῶν ἀρτί ὑπῆκοντων ἀτυχημάτων, ἀμα τὴν παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις εὐνοιαν καὶ τὴν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἐλλήνην ἀπέβαλε πίστιν. (7.13-14)

If we agree on these things, it is already easy to reckon up the difference of each man’s principles. For just as now Philip, being persuaded by Aratos, kept faith in regards to the Messenians in the matter concerning the citadel, and thus, as the saying goes, put a little
balm on the great wound inflicted before in the matter of the killings; so in the treatment of the Aitolians, while following the advice of Demetrios he acted impiously in regard to the gods, destroying the things set up and dedicated to them, and he went wrong in his treatment of men, transgressing the laws of war, and he fell short of his own principles, showing himself as an inexorable and bitter enemy to his adversaries. And it is the same story in regards to the treatment of Krete: for when he used Aratos as a guide concerning the most important matters, not only did he do no wrong, but also by causing no one on the island grief, he had all the Kretans under his control and brought the goodwill of all the Greeks because of his dignity of principle. So following Demetrios again, he became the cause of the recently mentioned misfortunes of the Messenians, and at the same time he threw away the goodwill of his allies and the trust of the other Greeks.

What is particularly telling in this passage with regard to Polybios’ construction of his narrative is the balance and symmetry with which the comparison is composed. As Polybios wanted to include two instances to show how Aratos advised Philip well throughout his association with the king, for rhetorical neatness and to make his comparison balanced, he also needed to find two incidents which he could ascribe to Demetrios’ encouragement. Other than the massacre at Messene which explicitly mentions Demetrios as an adviser, he needed to assign another incident to the evil machinations of the Illyrian. This Polybios was able to wrangle from his account of Thermos. The demarcation of two events for each is of course artificial, as both men undoubtedly would have had more contact with the king and counselled him on numerous other occasions. Aratos, for instance, is also recorded to have advised the king in his dealings with Sparta (4.24.1-3) and with making the decision to attack Aitolia in 218 (5.5); Demetrios announced the defeat of Rome by Hannibal in 217 BC (5.102).98 It is significant that these additional references were not included within the comparison. This could be merely an attempt to simplify the construction, comparing two sets of episodes is less unwieldy than several and much easier for the reader to grasp. But this also leaves unquestioned Aratos’ advice to attack Aitolia in 218 and Demetrios’ encouragement to end the war with Aitolia and look west to Rome in 217, both of which could be viewed in opposition to Polybios’ point here. That this comparison is artificially constructed and one-

98 Pédech (1964) 104.
sided is further revealed by the fact that Aratos always brings about a good outcome and Demetrios a bad, a questionable statement.

Yet, we are unable to say whether Polybios actually recorded Demetrios’ encouragement to Philip to incite both political factions, resulting in the massacre of citizens, within his narrative. Polybios’ account of this event is mostly lost and the fragments remaining to us contain no mention of him (Polyb. 7.10). We can supply further facts about the revolution and Philip’s part in it from Plutarch’s Aratos, however, even in this account we find no reference to the Illyrian adviser (Plut. Arat. 49-50; see above for this narrative). Plutarch’s account of the guidance given at Ithome by Aratos and Demetrios is sufficiently close to Polybios’ account that we may perhaps infer that Plutarch used Polybios’ Histories in this section. The fact that Demetrios of Pharos is not mentioned before the scene at Ithome by Plutarch may also suggest that there was no mention of the adviser within Polybios’ own narrative before Ithome. Could Polybios therefore be imposing more responsibility for both of these actions – the sacrilege at Thermos and the massacre at Messene – on Demetrios than there actually was? If this is so, we might also say the same for Aratos and his involvement in Crete and Messene. The imposition of responsibilities onto Demetrios raises some serious questions about the historian and his methodology here. However, it must be remembered that this passage is also part of Polybios’ treatment of courtiers and advisers. Case studies for comparison and explanation in understanding the importance of choosing advisers well and of how their character could affect that of kings’ were needed. Polybios has furnished this requirement even if exaggerating and manipulating certain aspects. It just so happened that this was also a convenient opportunity for the historian to further his praise and defence of Aratos, reserving the good and just position for his predecessor.

It is also significant that we do not hear about any replies to Philip’s question at Ithome from other courtiers or advisers, and most strikingly no word from a Macedonian, a curious absence considering the site’s importance for Macedonian control of the area. Surely Chrysogonos and Alexander, noted as dedicated followers of Philip and Macedonians in favour of securing the Peloponnese, would also have had something to say about the choice to garrison Messene at this point. In terms of Greek representation, Aratos was the main Achaian statesmen within Philip’s court, but Polybios also implies that there were others with him, although whether only attendants or comrades is hard to say – Philip, in 215 BC at Messene, took the sacrifice conducted there into his hands and showing it, asked Aratos and those with him its meaning (ἡρετο προτείνων τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον) (7.12.1). We also know that
Aratos the Younger, the son of the elder, was present within the king’s court at this time (ὑπὸ τοῦ νεωτέρου, 7.12.9) and it is hard to imagine that others from Achaia and the rest of Greece would also not be in attendance. The reality of the situation that Polybios portrays seems unlikely unless the king tended to listen to the advice of certain individuals exclusively at certain times, even to the neglect of his Macedonian advisers; a practice which would not have set him in good stead with the rest of his followers. Thus, we must refer to the observation noted above to understand the historian’s choice of method and purpose here: Polybios needed a simple comparative example, uncluttered from the more likely reality of counsel, to make his treatise on courtiers and advisers more clear. This would also, as a consequence, make his defence and depiction of Aratos more remarkable.

Additionally, Demetrios was not the only adviser to be placed opposite Aratos: Apelles came into conflict with Aratos a number of times throughout 219/18, and Leontios were also placed in opposition with the Sikyonian (see pp. 86-7, 99-101). In these instances, we also see Aratos in the positive role, working against the more cruel and violent advice of Philip’s Macedonian officers. Despite this pattern, however, we should not be led to the mistaken conclusion that Polybios placed all Macedonian and non-Greek advisers in the negative position, as Chrysogonos and Alexander are also mentioned (if briefly) in a positive light in Polybios’ summation of Philip’s achievements before the incident at Ithome (7.11.6). It seems a very striking coincidence that those who hold the negative position in Polybios’ comparisons are those who come up against Aratos: Apelles and his group, Leontios and Demetrios of Pharos. Alexander and Chrysogonos do not appear in conflict with the Sikyonian. Aratos, of course, is always placed as the good adviser and this must surely indicate the historian’s wish to prove that Aratos was good for Philip as a king and that any actions deemed cruel or excessive had nothing to do with the Sikyonian. By Polybios’ insistence on Aratos’ goodness, we can more strongly assert that accusations must have been levelled at Aratos in regards to his relationship with the king.

99 See Herman (1997) and Ma (2011) for the attraction of Hellenistic courts to all types of individuals.
100 See Austin (1986) 462-63 for the dangers of dissatisfaction among courtiers and the harm that they could cause the king. These dangers are particularly noticeable in the Apelles Conspiracy, for instance (see p. 85). Note also, in comparison with the polarisation of Aratos and Demetrios, that Polybios records in detail the councils of Antiochos III and the machinations of his two main advisers, Hermeias and Epigenes (Polyb. 5.41-42, 49-51). Similarly one is posed against the other – the evil Hermeias against the good Epigenes.
We may also ask why Polybios put Demetrios of Pharos specifically into this role in opposition to Aratos when it seems the historian had to manipulate the Illyrian into his arguments with no surrounding context and when there were other advisers he could have used. The answer seems to lie in convenience. Apelles and his group, including Megaleas, Ptolemy, and Leontios were all executed in 218 BC (Polyb. 5.25.1, 26.8, 29.6); these men therefore could not be involved. But what about Alexander and Chrysogonos? These two were not part of the conflicts between Aratos and the Apelles group in 219-18 BC and do not appear to have caused the Achaian leader any difficulties. In fact, it was Alexander who was sent to Thebes to bring in Megaleas for execution after the Apelles conspiracy in 218 BC (5.28); Chrysogonos appears in Thessaly in 218 BC to counter Aitolian movements in the area (5.17.6) and is mentioned again in Macedonia and Thessaly in 217 BC having collected levies for Philip after the capture of Bylazora (5.97).

In addition to the geographical position of these two officers at the time which made their involvement at Messene impossible, we may also understand that they held military positions instead of administrative or political ones. Alexander was captain of Philip’s bodyguard (4.87.5-8) and Chrysogonos the king’s commander in Thessaly (see p. 88, fn. 12). Gabriel Herman argues that the king’s inner circle of ‘Friends’ or philoi was generally separated into “those whose position derived from power built up within the court from those who drew their support from the armies” and that the two skills were not generally mixed in one individual, a situation which would be too dangerous for the king’s own position. We may suppose that Alexander and Chrysogonos, as military men, had less say about the administrative and political decisions of the Macedonian monarchy. As far as we can tell therefore, considering the fragmentary nature of Book 7, at this time Alexander, if he was anywhere near the Peloponnese, was unlikely to have posed a threat to Aratos as captain of the king’s bodyguard. Similarly, Chrysogonos seems to have been occupied in Macedonia and Thessaly, away from the Peloponnese and again holding a military position. Both therefore could not be placed in opposition to Aratos at Ithome without disrupting historical continuity.

102 Polyb. 4.87.8, 5.2.8, 14.11, 15.7, 16.2-8, 25.1, 26.8, 14, 27.1-7, 28.4-8; Walbank (1940/1960) 3 n. 1, 20, 32, 52-61; Tataki (1998) 362.
104 Herman (1997) 214-16. Persons who united both administrative/political influence with the king and military favour and success were seen as a threat not only to monarchs, but also to other courtiers; see especially Kleomenes in Egypt (5.36) and Epigenes in the Seleucid court (5.41.3-5).
Demetrios, by contrast, was still alive, did not have a military posting within Philip’s court and had already been introduced into the narrative not only in 219 BC when he had joined Philip’s court, but also in 217 BC when the king received word that the Romans had been defeated at Lake Trasimene. The king’s consultation regarding the news about Rome and the fact that Polybius also notes how Aratos saw Philip looking towards the west whilst at Messene, both imply that Demetrios’ influence was increasing at this point and that he was physically in close proximity to the king.105 This gain in popularity, as well as the Illyrian’s words at Ithome, make Demetrios a convenient person to place responsibility for the massacre onto, regardless of whether or not he was actually involved in persuading the king to goad on both factions at Messene.

Once again, therefore, perspective is very important in the designation of positive and negative. Aratos is the representative of the Greek and Achaian cause within Philip’s court; from a Peloponnesian and Achaian perspective he was of utmost importance for relations with Macedonia. His successes in diverting plans which aimed to increase Macedonian control of the Peloponese would have been viewed with approval by Polybius and the League. Thus it is hard to deny that the Greek perspective, as well as Polybius’ wish to defend the Achaian leader, guaranteed Aratos his good position within Polybius’ construction of the two advisers. Demetrios, who currently seemed to hold the favour of the king, and who was a non-Greek hoping to turn the king’s interests west, would have been considered a convenient opponent to Aratos’ position as good adviser and champion of the Achaian cause. By blaming Demetrios for the devastation at Messene, Polybius was able to deflect attention from Aratos’ failure to prevent the massacre and, more generally, to halt the increasing Macedonian control of the Peloponese. The incident at Ithome was therefore turned into a convenient opportunity to further the defence and glorification of Aratos, suppressing the helplessness of the politician and the Achaian League at this time.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed two specific episodes within the career of Philip which Polybius imbued with importance within his Histories – his attack of Thermos in 218 BC and his

105 It is possible that it was from Aratos that Polybius got his information concerning Demetrios’ involvement at Thermos in 217 BC, as well as his words at Messene 215 BC; either that or he had some other Macedonian source who could have supplied him with details of the incident at Ithome.
attempt on Messene in 215 BC. They are connected by the fact that they reveal to Polybios significant moments in the development of Philip’s character and his decline from a brilliant young king to a treacherous and ruthless tyrant. This association also allows Polybios a convenient opportunity to expound didactically on the correct political behaviour for public figures following τὸ καλὸν and adhering to the laws of war, and to discuss the difficulties of choosing advisers. This latter point is brought out with clarity by the construction of a polarised case-study of Aratos of Sikyon and Demetrios of Pharos, split between Thermos and Messene. Conveniently, this case-study also affords Polybios an excellent opportunity to once again defend his Achaian predecessor – this time against criticism attacking the close connection Aratos held with Philip in his early reign and particularly the Achaian’s ineffectiveness in deterring the actions against Messene. Polybios thereby overemphasises the significance of a particular moment in Greek history – when there was a change of Macedonian attitude and policy towards the Achaian League and Peloponnese. Emphasising Philip’s change of character rather than policy at the same time absolves him from the need to reconsider Aratos’ position within the wider Greek political context linked with Rome. Polybios needed the political separation of the Achaian League from Macedonia to be justified, especially as it broke from ties of friendship which had brought much beneficial aid and support in the past. He needed to justify the move, as it stemmed purely from self-interest without any provocation from Macedonia.106

Chapter 3 has seen Polybios’ wider aims for his narrative and Philip in action and in closer detail. Here we saw the start of Philip’s crucial decline in character which gradually escalates and brings about his punishment by tyche at the end of his life. We also saw Aratos pushed to the forefront of the scene, highlighting his influence and rationalising presence on the king in his decision-making processes, thereby absolving the Achaian from condemnation. Much of the focus of the discussion in this chapter has been on Philip’s advisers and their influence on his strategies. This angle has enabled the exploration of fundamental tensions in Polybios’ work. It has provided a springboard for the analysis of how Philip used his power and the might of his army towards his enemies and contemporaries – a front of might significant to the ambitions of any monarch. In the following chapter we shall turn to a different but equally important and related aspect: Philip’s dealings with his allies.

106 Herman (1997).
Chapter 4: Philip V and his Greek Allies

It is the task of this chapter to investigate the relationship between Philip and his Greek allies from the beginning of his reign to 196 BC. This latter date is chosen to close the time-frame, because it marks the king’s relinquishment of his holdings and attachments in mainland Greece in accordance with the peace terms negotiated after his defeat at the Battle of Kynoskephalai. Following this defeat, Philip’s involvement in Greece is confined to the northern and central regions as he aids Rome in her war against Antiochos III. He is never able to re-create the Symmachy once established in the Peloponnesian and northern Greece. The notion that Philip mistreated his allies came as a consequence of Polybios’ account of the king’s attempt on Messene. However, it would be rather rash to assume that the king started to treat all of his Greek allies in such a way from this point onwards, especially given the contrived nature of Polybios’ account of the event. Philip’s placement of a garrison in Messene was not an exceptional policy at the time, as Korinth, Heraia, Orchomenos and Triphylia on the peninsula, as well as Demetrias, Bylazora and Thebes in Phthiotis on the mainland and Chalkis on Euboia, had also been secured by Macedonian forces for the same purpose.

However, the garrisoning of allied cities was not entirely usual practice and therefore makes Messene a special case. In the above list Triphylia, Thebes-in-Phthiotis and Bylazora were all held by the enemy (Aitolia and Dardania) before Philip’s capture, and the

\[1\] Korinth: Aratos of Sikyon had separated Korinth from the Macedonians and joined it to the Achaian League in 243 BC (Polyb. 2.43), however, it was returned in 224 BC as part of the terms laid down by Doson in his agreement to help the League with their war against Sparta (Polyb. 2.51-2, 54). Philip retained this city until his defeat in 196 BC.

Heraia: Doson had captured the city in 223 BC when helping the Achaian against Kleomenes (Polyb. 2.54.12); Philip is known to have used Heraia to distribute booty in 219 BC (Polyb. 4.77, 80).

Orchomenos: Doson had taken Orchomenos in 223 BC in the Kleomenean War (Polyb. 2.54.11), and instead of giving it back to the Achaian occupied it wishing to safeguard his interests in the middle of the Peloponnesian (Polyb. 4.6.5-7).

Triphylia: Philip captured this region in 219 BC (Polyb. 4.77-81); see previous chapter for more detail.

Demetrias: First mentioned by Polybios when Philip puts the members of the ‘Apelles Conspiracy’ on trial in 218 BC (Polyb. 5.29.5); again, like Chalkis, there must have been a connection earlier than this date. Philip also loses this city after Kynoskephalai (Polyb. 18.45.4-5).

Bylazora: the city is occupied by Philip in 216 BC securing the pass between Dardania and Macedonia (5.97.102); there is no further mention of this city in Polybios.

Thebes in Phthiotis: Philip takes the city from the Aitolians in 216 BC to secure the areas of Magnesia and Thessaly (Polyb. 5.99); also lost after Kynoskephalai (Polyb. 18.38).

Chalkis: first mentioned when Philip’s adviser Apelles withdraws to Chalkis to take care of supplies in 219 BC (Polyb. 5.6.8-9, 5.26.2-3). Yet there must have been a prior connection between the city and the Macedonians for Apelles to be able to do this. Again, lost after Kynoskephalai (Polyb. 18.45.4-5).
rest were Macedonian possessions before his reign. Polybios’ emphasis on Messene as marking the moment when Philip completely changed must not therefore be allowed to trick us into thinking that this was the way in which the king always acted towards his allies after 215 BC.

According to Polybios, the king’s interactions with his Greek allies were initially benevolent and in a manner befitting a good king: he was considered the ‘darling of Greece’ (κοινός τις οίον ἐφώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων) up until 216 BC having conferred great benefits on the Peloponnesians, Boiotians, Epirots and Akarnanians, and was the presiding officer (προστάτης) of Kretan League (Polyb. 7.11). Yet, it was at Messene in 215 BC, according to our historian, that Philip’s treatment of his allies and friends first started to change. This ‘change for the worse’ (7.11.1: τῆς εἰς τοῦμπαλιν μεταβολῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ χείρον ὀρμῆς καὶ μεταθέσεως) turned the young king’s attention away from the Peloponnese and was allegedly the catalyst for his growing ill-treatment of his Greek allies (7.12-14). After his capture of Messene a year later (214 BC), however, Philip is claimed to have completely changed his conduct, treating his allies like enemies (8.8) and guilty of the greatest brutality towards the closest of friends (Polybios accuses the king of poisoning his old adviser, Aratos of Sikyon: 8.12).

Philip’s treacherous and tyrannical behaviour is then said to have continued as he apparently alienates the Achaian leaders at the Nemean Games at Argos in 209 BC by his unrestrained and tyrannical behaviour (10.26), turns the Rhodians against him in 204 by the destruction of their navy (13.4), captures the Aitolian cities, Lysimacheia, Chalkedon and Kios while at peace in 202 BC (15.22-3), and destroys allied towns in Thessaly in 198 BC in the wake of Roman invasion (18.3.8-9). This long run of ruthlessness was only stopped by his defeat by Roman forces in 197 BC. After this defeat, Polybios asserts there was another change of character in the king as he reverted to more kingly conduct (ποιῶν πτῶγμα

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2 Philip showed respect, at least formally, to the city after the Games when he took off his diadem and purple robe. By this act, he was attempting to appear demotikos, as if he were on an equal level with others, lenient and popular. According to Polybios, this only exacerbated the king’s high status; however, this is, of course, his own judgement and the view from the city may have been very different. Cf. pp. 159-60.
Thus is a summary of Philip’s interactions with his Greek allies as Polybios recorded it. Until 211 BC we only have his version of the events to rely on and the resulting impression of Philip’s early reign is very positive. After 215 BC the king allegedly changed quite suddenly, spreading fear and hatred throughout the Greek world where once he had shown benevolence and goodwill:

After the attack on the Messenians had been accomplished, he took a disposition contrary to him[self] in all things, and this happened logically: for having turned to a principle opposed to his previous one, and having always applied himself to this in the sequel, he was going to turn both the opinion of others regarding himself to the opposite as well as meet with outcomes of affairs opposite to before. This indeed happened and will be clear to those who apply themselves with care throughout the events which will be related in sequence.

Such a sudden change, however, prompts some doubts and a case may be made for a shift in the interests of Philip rather than a shift in policy regarding his relations with his allies. There is once again the ring of Achaian bias as the king’s change in character (τὴν ἑναντίαν ἐλάμβανε διάθεσιν αὐτῷ) is very much based on events that were important to the history of the Achaian League.4

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3 See Welwei (1963) 38–53 for the separation of Philip’s life into the four distinct phases of behaviour in the Histories, each phase determined by changes of circumstance.

4 See Chapters 2 and 3, as well as Haegemans & Kosmetatou (2005) 123-39.
A complicating factor is the increasingly fragmentary nature of the text. Our understanding of Philip’s actions in later years must be supplemented by Livy (see p.8 fn. 27 for Livy’s use of Polybios). However, the impression that Polybios leaves with us, even from what little we have of his work, seems to imply that he wanted to show Philip’s treatment of allies between 215 and 197 BC as unfaithful and treacherous. His criticism of Philip within his surviving digressions certainly seems to imply this. In fact, Polybios’ general assessment of Philip’s behaviour comes from these very digressions, not from the narrative which reveals a different, more moderate picture of the king’s actions.

It has already been shown in the previous chapters that Polybios’ digressions convey an interpretation of the king which is not entirely corroborated by his own narrative. There were very practical reasons for Philip’s attack on Thermos based on financial benefit and support of the Achaian League in their war against Aitolia. While Polybios may have recognised these advantages, he refrains from referring to them and instead emphasises the damage done to the king’s reputation by such immoral behaviour. Messene too, despite Polybios’ insistence, does not seem as important a moment in Macedonian policy or in the development of the king’s character as the historian would wish to show. Rather it represents a change in Philip’s primary focus of strategic and political interest – now that the Social War was over, the king wished to move on to new territory and his interactions with the Achaian League and Peloponnesians would be comprehensively revisited.

Modern scholarship on the relationship between Philip and his Greek allies is rather meagre and tends to follow Polybios’ interpretation, painting Philip as a king who after 215 habitually committed treachery towards friends and allies. Eckstein has discussed this depiction of the king in some detail and has listed all of the known treacherous deeds that Philip committed against the Greeks to illustrate how his betrayal of Antiochos III after their pact in 203 BC was not uncharacteristic of him. However, Eckstein includes within this list treacherous actions committed against states that were not officially allied to the king and that only held a peace treaty with him. The inclusion of Philip’s behaviour at Messene (215/4 BC) and Argos (in 210 and 198 BC, discussed below) within a list noting the king’s acts of treachery against allies and friends is understandable, as both were members of the Symmachy of which Philip was hegemon (see 4.1.a below). However, the inclusion of the

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secret pact to help the Kretans against Rhodes in 205/4, the employment of Herakleides to sabotage the Rhodian fleet, and the capture of the cities of Lysimacheia, Chalkedon, Kios (all allied to Aitolia) and Thasos (independent), in this list do not correspond to the theme of treachery to allies and friends. None of these states were actually allied to Macedonia, but were either connected via peace treaties or independent in status, and these incidents therefore require separate treatment. They will be discussed in further detail below and will illustrate that Philip treated those with whom he held an alliance very differently to those with whom he did not.

There has been some confusion, therefore, between the depiction of Philip becoming more ruthless in his dealings with the Greek world and the treatment with which he accorded to his allies – a confusion which may have come about from Polybios’ own terminology and the incomplete nature of the surviving text. An example of Polybios’ fluid use of terminology was noted by Frank Walbank in Polybios’ reference to Philip as κοινός τις οίδον ἐρώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ‘the darling of the Greeks’. He suggests that τῶν Ἑλλήνων would in this case have meant the members of the Symmachy (Philip’s allies), rather than the Greeks in general. While Walbank makes no further qualifying remark to support this statement, it is certainly reasonable within the context: Polybios had just finished relating all of the benefits that Philip had conferred on his Greek allies at 7.11 and he does not mention any good acts towards neutrals or enemies. Although the passage is slightly fragmented and obscures the list of Greek beneficiaries, leaving us uncertain as to whether benefits were bestowed beyond allies (7.11.7: τὴν δὲ Πελοποννησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν, ἀμα δὲ τούτοις Ἡπειρωτῶν, Ἀκαρνάνων, ...δῶς ἕκαστος ἄγαθῶν ἐν βραχεί χρόνῳ παραίτος ἐγένετο), there is still little problem in negating the assumption that τῶν Ἑλλήνων would have meant the Greeks in general. Philip’s protracted war against the Greek Aitolians and their Spartan allies would certainly not have encouraged the view amongst them that Philip was ‘the darling of Greece’; he was instead an energetic and harsh enemy as his speed and conduct at Thermos and Sparta


\[\text{Walbank Commentary II 58; cf. Holleaux (1921) 164 n.7.}\]
showed in 218 BC. Τῶν Ἑλλήνων, therefore, very likely only refers to those allied to Philip in the Symmachy.

This lack of distinction between ‘all of the Greeks’ and ‘the members of the Symmachy’ at 7.11.8 is also likely to be carried forward into the following statement at 7.11.10-11 (cited above). Here Polybios claims that after Philip had completely changed at Messene and reversed his conduct the opinion of others towards him also completely changed. The others to whom Polybios refers can only be those identified as allies as they are the only ones who would have held such an exemplary opinion of the king so as to call him κοινός τις ἑρωμένος τῶν Ἑλλήνων. That these undefined Greeks experiencing Philip’s change for worse are allies is also supported a few chapters later when Polybios explicitly claims that Aratos could see Philip entirely changing his conduct towards his allies (τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους αἰφεσιν; 7.13.1).

Therefore it would appear that the historian on occasion makes little distinction between the Greeks in general and Philip’s Greek allies, something which seems to have led to confusion in modern assessments of the king’s conduct within the Greek world. Philip was almost constantly at war with Aitolia and frequently so with Rhodes, resulting in a starkly different relationship to that with the Achaian League or the Kretans cities. There is the need then to distinguish between three different types of status – official allies, states who hold peace treaties with the king, and those not connected at all – if we are to investigate the treatment that Philip gave to his Greek allies and the severity of the picture that Polybios conveys.

Another aspect of Polybios’ narrative which may have compounded this confusion, as well as encouraged the view that the king was treacherous to all Greeks, is the presence of exhortations to Hellenic unity at the Peace of Naupaktos ending the Social War in 217 BC. This peace conference was given special significance by virtue of it being the designated beginning of Polybios’ concept of symploke in turning all eyes to the conflict between Rome and Carthage and the possibility of a future invasion of Greece by a western power (see 1.3.c-

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8 Polyb. 7.11.10-11: ἀπὸ τοίνυν τῶν κατὰ Μεσσηνίους ἐπιτελεσθέντων ἀπαντά τὴν ἑναντίαν ἐλάμβανε διάθεσιν αὐτῷ...καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων διαλήψεις περί αὐτοῦ τρέψειν εἰς τάναντία...
9 For Panhellenism see Perlman (1976) and Flower (2000a).
The episode comes to a climax when Agelaos encourages the Greeks to stop quarrelling amongst themselves and instead to unify for their own safety. He finishes by addressing Philip, urging him not to exhaust the Greeks and make them easy prey to the coming invaders, but to consider them as if they were part of his own body and to protect every province in Greece as if they were part of his own dominion (5.104). This bid for Panhellenic unity is remarkably similar to that voiced by Gorgias and Lysias in the fifth and fourth centuries in the face of Persian invasion (Isoc. 4.50), as well as Isokrates’ open invitation to Philip II to command the Greeks in their pursuit of revenge (Isoc. 5). \(^{10}\) It would be reasonable therefore to suppose that Polybius was making a direct comparison between the two Philips in this episode. The historian had already done so in his earlier discussion of proper moral behaviour at Thermos in Book 5 and another explicit example survives later at 22.18.10 when he points out the similarities in the respective roles of Philip II/Alexander and Philip V/Perseus in preparing and executing plans for war. \(^{11}\)

In Polybios’ account of the peace of Naupaktos, Philip is therefore called upon to protect and adhere to a Panhellenic spirit in his future endeavours. However, the advocacy of Hellenic unity under the leadership of the Macedonian is more a reflection of Greek aspirations and idealism than realistic in practice. Moreover, the authenticity of this speech is suspect and the extent to which Polybius has adapted it remains uncertain. \(^{12}\) Even if this sentiment was voiced by Agelaos at Naupaktos, it may also have been picked up by Philip V in order to foster and enhance his support in Greece; it was a convenient slogan based on traditions stretching back through the last two centuries and would have encouraged the depiction of him as a benevolent king. In reality, however, it was not something which Philip

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\(^{10}\) See Flower (2000a). For Isokrates’ invitation to Philip II and panhellenism see Perlman (1969) and Flower (2000b).

\(^{11}\) Polyb. 22.18.10: καθάπερ γὰρ εἴτομεν Φίλιππον τὸν Αμύντου διανοηθῆναι καὶ προθέσθαι συντελεῖν τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πόλεμον, Ἀλέξανδρον δὲ τοῖς ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου κεκριμένοις ἐπιγενέσθαι χειριστὴν τῶν πράξεων, οὕτω καὶ νῦν Φίλιππον μὲν τὸν Δημητρίου φαμέν διανοηθῆναι πρότερον πολεμεῖν Ῥωμαίοις τὸν τελευταίον πόλεμον καὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐτοίμας πάσας πρὸς ταύτην ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιβολὴν, ἐκείνου δ᾽ ἐκχωρήσαντος Περσέα γενέσθαι χειριστὴν τῶν πράξεων.

\(^{12}\) Deininger (1973) believes that the Panhellenic sentiments run counter to Polybius’ attitude towards the Aitolians and that this is therefore historical. This is in line with the modern communis opinio also advocated by Gruen (1984) 324 fn. 34. On the other hand, Mørkholm (1967) and (1974) views this notion to be anachronistic and the speech a Polybian fabrication. Champion (1997) convincingly revisits this problem and suggests that Polybius selected and embellished a tradition from Agelaos’ speech that advanced his theory of the symploke. For discussions concerning Polybius’ historiographical practices concerning speeches see Walbank (1963) 211-13, (1967) 397; Sacks (1981) 82-85 refutes Walbank.
would have felt particularly compelled to adhere to should it hinder Macedonian interests. In investigating Philip’s relationship with his Greek allies therefore it is important to be aware of this Panhellenic purpose emphasised by Polybios at the start of his discussion of the *sympleke*. Its inclusion adds further credence to the negative picture of Philip by muddling allies and enemies together in the descriptions of the king’s behaviour, oversimplifying the political situation.

Scholarship has also tended to focus predominantly on the relationship between Philip and the Achaian League, especially during the period of the League’s wavering loyalty from 200 to 198 BC.\(^\text{13}\)^ This is no doubt a fault compounded by the high importance given to the Achaian League. No one has yet questioned Polybios’ depiction of Philip’s relationship with his Greek allies either. Therefore, taking up the thread of the argument from the previous chapter, the image of Philip in the rest of Polybios’ *Histories* also needs to be considered. This chapter will therefore investigate, in as far as the fragmentary nature of the evidence will allow, how accurate Polybios’ interpretation of Philip’s treatment of his allies really is. An analysis of the narrative sections within his *Histories* will illustrate that once again Polybios’ interpretation, and even parts of his factual information, are exaggerated and possibly erroneous. Livy’s account will also prove essential in checking Polybios’ interpretation in places, as well as helping to fill in some of the gaps in Philip’s later years. First, an analysis of Philip’s treatment of his allies until 215 will be conducted to make a comparison with the king’s treatment of his allies after this date – the point when Polybios claims that Philip changed. In the course of this investigation, it will hopefully be proved that a more balanced picture of the Macedonian king can be sketched from the more negative and loaded commentary of the ancient historian.

4.1 Philip’s Treatment of his Allies Before Messene (220-215 BC)

As mentioned above, we can unfortunately only rely on Polybios’ account for this period as Livy does not record Greek affairs until 211 BC when the Romans first appear on the scene. Yet, we are conversely fortunate that the relevant section of Polybios’ text, Books 4 and 5,

survive in their entirety and make the task of charting all the instances of Philip’s interactions with his allies at this time much easier. This permits us to explore with a greater degree of clarity the picture of this early relationship, Philip’s role as hegemon and benefactor, and his behaviour in dealing with disputes amongst his allies.

4.1.a Philip as Hegemon of the Symmachy

The majority of Philip’s Greek alliances were established at the beginning of his reign, when, as successor to the founder and original hegemon of the Symmachy, Antigonos Doson, the position was transferred to him in 220 BC (Polyb. 4.9.4 and 13.7, and implied at 4.2.11, and 26.8). It appears to have been a smooth changeover of leadership and the young king took up the same policy established in the previous reign: namely using the Symmachy to build and consolidate Macedonian influence within mainland Greece and the Peloponnese. This had been a long-term policy of the Macedonian kingdom first implemented by Philip II in 338/37 through the League of Corinth, not only to increase strength and military resources, but also to ensure the safety of Macedonia from its antagonistic southern neighbours. However, the kingdom’s power within Greece had been unstable since the death of Alexander, fluctuating during the course of the Successor Wars, and was only re-established with any solidarity by Doson in 224 BC (4.9.4). In their capacity as hegemon of the Symmachy, the Macedonian kings were allowed to summon meetings of the council (synedrion), make decisions on questions of war and peace, vote for supplies, confirm the initiation of new members into the alliance, and were ex officio commander-in-chief.

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14 For a comprehensive discussion of the Symmachy, its foundation, members and institutions see Scherberich (2009).
15 See Walbank (1940) 19-20 for the view that Doson expected Philip to succeed him as hegemon of the Symmachy and his desire that it might prove to be a permanent instrument of Greek unity as well as a means to Macedonian hegemony in Greece.
16 For the League of Corinth see Demosthenes 17.10, 15; Justin 9.5.1-6; and IG 2² 236 (the League’s oath). See also Perlman (1985), Ashley (1998) 425-26, and Dixon (2014) 19-25.
17 This was based on the confederations of PhilipII/Alexander and Antigonos I/Demetrios Poliorcetes, but had as its units leagues (Achaian, Akarnanian, Boiotian, etc.) instead of cities; Walbank (1984b) 446-81 and (1988) 351 and Scherberich (2009) 75. For Doson’s establishment of the Symmachy in 224 BC see Scherberich (2009) 15-79.
18 Polyb. 2.54.4 asserts that Doson claimed this position when he drew up the Symmachy in 224 BC. See also Walbank Commentary III 406-14; Urban (1979); and Walbank (1940) 15-6.
During Philip’s reign the members of the Symmachy included the Macedonians, Achaian League, Epirotes, Phokians, Boiotian League, Akarnanians, Euboians and Thessalians (4.9.5, 7.11.7, 11.4-6). Macedonian influence therefore spanned a large part of the Peloponnese and mainland Greece providing a platform from which the young king could find political, financial and military support, as well as cultivate an active presence and reputation within Greece. The Symmachy’s importance is evident in the dedication and consistency of the king’s attention: we see not only Philip himself, but also the Macedonian commander, Taurion, working within the Peloponnese for the Achaian League’s interests before and during the start of Philip’s reign (see Polyb. 4.6.4, 10.6 for Taurion; see below for Philip). Moreover, Philip is dissuaded from garrisoning Messene in the first instance at 215, because Aratos warned him that he would lose the goodwill and loyalty of his allies should he do so (7.12-13). The confederation ultimately proved essential in establishing Philip’s influence in Greece and built up the diplomatic and military foundations for his later successes.

The king’s first chance to engage with his allies occurred in 220, before the Social War had been declared, when he was called upon by the Achaians to aid them after the city Kynaitha had been ransacked by the Aitolians (4.19.1). At first, Philip was only able to send a relief force led by Demetrios of Pharos (while an Illyrian king and not yet a courtier at the Macedonian court) in support of their request (4.19); these missed the enemy who had already traversed the Isthmus back to Aitolia two days before and quickly returned to Korinth after raiding the Aitolian coast. The king, who had ventured out soon afterwards from Macedonia, was also too late to confront the enemy as the Aitolian generals, Scopas and Dorimachus, had already returned home by the time he reached Korinth (4.22.1-2). Yet, despite his lateness Philip clearly shows that he is willing to send support and even to come personally to his allies’ aid when called, a characteristic which appears time and again in his treatment of them during this period. In Korinth, Philip calls the members of the Symmachy to a meeting at which it is finally decided to go to war against the Aitolians (4.25-26). The king then

19 Euboia, Opuntian Lokris, two Kretan towns, Eleutherna and Hierapytna, and Demetrios of Pharos have also been variously accredited with membership of the Symmachy. For the inclusion of Euboia see for example Ferguson (1913) 243; Tarn (1928) 759; Treves (1940) 160; and Will (1979) 389. For Opuntian Lokris see Flacelière (1937) 280-81; Lefèvre (1998) 81 fn. 397. For Demetrios of Pharos, Le Bohec (1987) and Coppola (1993) 54-58. See also Scherberich (2009) 17-18 (for summary of these arguments and Euboia), 34-39 (for rejection of Lokris’ membership), 200-209 (for the uncertainty of Eleutherna and Hierapytna) and 211-216 (for rejection of Demetrios’ membership). Macedonian membership of the Symmachy was strongly disputed by Treves (1935) 52-54 who claimed that the Macedonians, while acting as hegemon, always remained outside of the alliance. This question was left open by Walbank (1940) 16 and von Schmitt (1969) 216, but has now been more soundly rejected by Scherberich (2009) 183, 185-86.
diligently collects Macedonian troops in 220/19 for the coming conflict (4.29), sends out more troops (from the members of the Symmachy) in response to the requests of the Polyrhenians, Lappaians and their allies in Crete, bringing them into the Symmachy at the same time (4.55.1-5), and in 219 BC follows the wishes of his Epirote allies by attacking the fortress of Ambrakos in Ambrakia (4.61-62.1, 63). Even as Macedonia and Thessaly are ravaged by the Aitolians, Philip brings to successful completion the siege of Ambrakos and hands the city over to the Epirotes (4.63.1-4).

Polybios tries to downplay the success and goodwill of this last act by claiming that the war could have been won there and then if Philip had not been side-tracked by the Epirotes' request (4.61.3-4). There is good reason to question Polybios’ judgement here, and, as Walbank rightly pointed out, the recovery of Ambrakia from the Aitolians, although not explicitly stated in the declaration recorded by Polybios, was very likely one of the aims of the war declared by the Symmachy.20 Not only is its requisition part of the original plan set down in the League’s aims of war, but there also seems to be sound reasoning behind the move. The recovery of the territory was of high importance to the Epirotes as well as to Philip: Aitolian control of the region entailed Aitolian control of the Ambrakian gulf, the most direct route into Akarnania as well as into Aitolia itself (4.63.3-6). Strongly fortified and well positioned to effectively control the town and surrounding country, the capture of the fortress of Ambrakos would allow the recovery of the whole region (4.61.7). It is equally likely that Philip knew of the fort’s strategic value not only for an enemy invasion, but also for communicating with and protecting his Akarnanian allies. This is evident by the fact that even when he learnt of a simultaneous Aitolian attack in Thessaly and Pieria,21 the king still persisted in his assault. Polybios’ criticism therefore does not appreciate the king’s reasoning. Recovering the fort would not only create a good impression in both the Akarnanians and Epirotes as allies, but would also build up Philip’s reputation as a military leader and strengthen Macedonian influence within other allied cities.

20 Walbank (1940) 32. The terms stated by Polybios are vague but widely inclusive: παρακατεβάλοντο ψήφισμα, προσδιασαφοῦντες ὃτι συνενιασώσουσι τοῖς συμμάχοις, εἰ τινὰ κατέχουσιν αὐτῶν Αἰτωλοῖς χώσαν ἐτὸς πόλιν ἄφ’ ὧν Δημήτριος ὁ Φιλίππου κατὰ φύσιν πατήρ χειλε οὕτως (4.25.6).
21 This involved the Aitolian attack on Dion (Polyb. 4.61.1-2).
Philip continues to act quickly and diligently upon his allies' calls in the years 219 and 218 BC.22 Despite being unable to help the Achaians during his capture of Ambrakia and the fortification of the city of Oiniadai, the latter completed in response to a Dardanian attack on Macedonia, Philip promises to provide them with as much help as he can muster once the Dardanii are dealt with (4.66.1-2). He keeps and fulfils this promise even going beyond the hopes of the Peloponnesians and appearing unexpectedly with an army at Korinth around the winter solstice (4.67.6). Both his swift arrival in the peninsula and his defeat of Aitolian forces at Stymphalos shortly afterwards (4.68-69.8) are heard about simultaneously causing astonishment among the Peloponnesians (4.69.9). The unusual character of a winter campaign must surely have illustrated Philip’s determination in warfare as well as his dedication in protecting his Peloponnesian allies. It is therefore unsurprising that Philip, arriving in Argos for the winter after only three years on the throne, had already won admiration for his general behaviour (κατὰ τὴν λοιπὴν ἀναστροφὴν) and achievements, the latter considered beyond his years (κατὰ τὰς πράξεις…ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν; 4.82.1).

There is one more direct call for aid from Philip's allies in Polybios’ text before the attempt on Messene. In 218 BC, embassies from the Akarnanians and Messenians call on Philip while he is besieging Palos on the island of Kephallenia, then under Aitolian control (5.5). The Akarnanians ask the king to invade Aitolia as the Aitolian general, Dorimachos, was currently rampaging in Macedonia with half of the Aitolian forces; an invasion would therefore be reasonably easy and force the Aitolians out of Macedonia (5.5.1-2). The latter ask for help against Lycurgos of Sparta who had marched out against Messenia, and argue that Philip would be able to make a quick sea-crossing to the region because the Etesian winds had set in and were favourable for a journey to Messenia at this time of year. The king’s attack would therefore be unexpected and almost certainly successful (5.5.3-4). After a discussion with his advisers, however, it is determined that while the winds allowed easy travel to Messenia, they would make it impossible to sail back to Kephallenia or Aitolia afterwards. With these considerations in mind, Philip decides to split his resources and send Eperatos, the Achaian general, to help the Messenians while he himself and his army would invade Aitolia.

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22 For Philip’s reputation for speed and the links Polybios makes between the theme and youthfulness, see McGing (2010) 100-116 and (2013) 189-191, 195-6S.
Both requests for aid were consequently met and, once again, Philip is seen to respond very quickly and efficiently.

The examples above are all those in which Philip has been called directly, but there are also instances where Philip acts for the interests of his allies (and himself) on his own initiative: in his approach and establishment of friendship with Skerdilaidas to increase the pool of resources and manpower for the war (4.29.2-3); in his fortification of Oiniadae in Ambrakia in 219 to gain access to Akarnania and to launch an invasion on Aitolia (4.65); his capture of Psophis, previously in Eian hands (an ally of the Aitolians), to create a bulwark in the defence of Arcadia and a base for the attack of Elis (4.70-71); his decision to prosecute the war by sea in order to attack the island of Kephallenia, then used as an Aitolian naval base for raids on the Peloponnese (5.2); and finally Philip's defence of Tegea against Spartan aggression (5.18-23). On the basis of Polybios' account, Philip appears to be energetic and fully committed in his defence of his allies in Greece. Even while Macedonia is being raided by the Aitolians (in 219 and 218; 4.61.1-2 and 5.5.1-2 respectively) and the Dardanians (in 219; 4.66.1-2), he still manages to act effectively in Greece.

Nor did Philip's support of his allies only extend to military action. During this early period Philip is also described as being benevolent in his handling of diplomatic affairs. His intervention in the factional disputes at Sparta in the summer of 220 show him to be lenient even towards those with questionable loyalty (4.22-24). Upon the succession of such a young king (Philip was only seventeen), three of the five Spartan ephors were more inclined to side with the Aitolians than Macedonia, thinking it weak. However, the Aitolians quickly retreated after hearing about Philip's swift, unexpected appearance in the Peloponnese in 220 (after Kynaitha). A massacre then ensued in Sparta in which many pro-Macedonians were killed.

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23 The crowning achievement of this campaign being Philip's sack of Thermos mentioned in the previous chapter; see 5.6-14 for the invasion of Aitolia.
24 Philip and the Symmachy were called for (παρακαλεῖν αὐτοῦς βοηθεῖν) by the Achaians in 221 BC, Polyb. 4.15.1-2; and Philip was called again (παρακαλῶν βοηθεῖν) by the Achaian League to help Kynaitha in 220 BC, 4.19.1. Requests for aid also came from Krete in 220 (πέμπουσι προσήκεις πρὸς τῷ βασιλέᾳ καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαῖοις περὶ βοηθείας καὶ συμμαχίας; 4.55.1-5), from Epiros in 219 (πεισθεῖν τῷ Ἡπειρώτατος...ἐδέστο τοῦ Φιλίππου ποιήσασθαι πολιορκίαν; 4.61-62.1, 63); from the Achaian League again in 219 (πέμπουσι προσήκεις, ἄξιοντες βοηθεῖν; 4.64, 66.2); and from Akarnania and Messene in 218 (ὁι μὲν παρὰ τῶν Ἀκαρνανῶν παρακαλοῦντες αὐτὸν ἐμβαλεῖν...οἱ δὲ παρὰ τῶν Μεσσηνίων δεόμενοι σφόν βοηθεῖν; 5.5.1-4).
25 See McGing (2013) and (2010) for a discussion about the expectation, particularly by Sparta and Aitolia, that the youthfulness of the king would make him ineffective and incompetent as a leader.
killed including one of the three ephors in favour of Philip, Adeimantos, who was also privy to the designs of the pro-Aitolian party (4.22). Messengers were subsequently sent to Philip requesting that he delay his approach to the city to give it time to recover and stating that it was the city's continued intention to maintain its friendship and obligations towards Macedonia. The king responded by requesting that representatives be sent to him at Tegea to discuss the situation, to which ten were sent. These blamed Adeimantos for the disturbance and promised to follow the terms of the alliance faithfully and to appear second to none in their devotion towards him (4.23.1-6).

There was, however, a divide in the king's council regarding the course of action to be taken against Sparta. Some (whom Polybios does not name) were persuaded that Adeimantos and the others had died because of their Macedonian sympathies, and advocated destroying the city as Alexander had done to Thebes in 335. However, the older advisers (once again unnamed), viewing this as too heavy a punishment, suggested only punishing the guilty party, removing them from office and placing the government in the hands of the king’s friends (4.23.7-9). In the end, Philip followed the latter, more lenient advice, claiming that since the Spartans had not injured the whole Symmachy it was not necessary for him to punish them. Moreover, his father had treated the Spartans with similar kindness even after he had defeated them as an enemy, and it was therefore more appropriate as his successor to treat them in a like manner, especially as they were allies in the Symmachy.

Philip's actions, although very likely dictated by the influence of his advisers, as Polybios states, were measured and respectful, and would have offered a good example of the magnanimity that his allies might expect in the future.

Immediately after the Spartan decision, the aims of the Social War were set down at a meeting of the Symmachy at Korinth in 220 BC. These included: the recovery for the allies of

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26 Walbank Commentary I 470. The king’s council consisted of ‘friends’ and went back to the Argead dynasty, and although it strictly only possessed advisory powers was very influential. They acted at times as a court in cases of high treason (5.16.5-8; cf. Arrian, Anab. 1.25.5; Diod. 19.46.4) and were judges in the distribution of booty (see inscription in Roussel (1934) 39-47). For the depiction of Philip and his court in this episode see also McGing (2010) 100-101, 104.

27 In 335, the Theban democrats assaulted Cadmea upon rumours of Alexander’s death, and seemed likely to encourage revolts throughout the rest of Greece. Alexander marched from Pelium on the Illyrian border to Thebes and seized the city. Thebes was destroyed, except for Pindar’s house, and a large portion of the population were enslaved, a decision allegedly approved by the League of Korinth. (Arrian, Anab. 1.7-9).

28 At the battle of Sellasia in 222 BC: Polyb. 2.65-70 and cf. Polyb. 4.69.5

29 Sparta soon after betrayed and left the Symmachy by siding with the Aitolians to make war on the Achaians, Polyb. 4.34-36.
any city or land occupied by the Aitolians since the death of Demetrios II (Philip’s father); the restoration of the former governments and freedom of all cities who were compelled to join the Aitolian League unwillingly (τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν καὶ αὐτῶν ἡμαγκασμένους ἀκουσίως μετέχειν τῆς Ἀιτωλῶν συμπολιτείας; 4.25.7), and finally the recovery of the Amphiktyonic Council from Aitolian control (4.25.8). Other than the recovery of the Amphiktyony, which would fall into Macedonian hands, the aims of the war did not outwardly appear to benefit Macedonia. As hegemon of the Symmachy and a benefactor to his allies, Philip was very effective in publicly appearing to show great concern for them, perhaps even more so than for his own kingdom. Yet, it should of course be remembered that although the Social War was undertaken by Philip as a great show of support towards his allies, his participation was primarily motivated by self-interest. It would establish his own reputation as a benevolent and successful new king, as well as bolster the reputation of Macedonia’s strength in general. Treating his allies with respect and defending their interests was therefore paramount.

The king’s constant interaction with leaders and ambassadors from allied states also seems to encourage this view of Philip. However, although the king was hegemon of the Symmachy and commander-in-chief of its forces, all decisions had to be ratified by each state-member. Regular meetings with his allies were therefore essential for the endorsement of envisaged actions and logistical decisions; moving without the approval of the members of the Symmachy could prove dangerous to its stability and potentially cause defection. Philip ensured that he met the Achaian League at their annual assemblies at Aegium (4.26.8; 5.1.6-7) and called extra meetings to discuss matters in the war (4.22.1, 25.1-8; 5.17.8-9, 28.3, 29.4). It was also the king’s prerogative to decide when to sue for peace and to head the resulting negotiations, which he does with the Aitolians in 217 (5.102.8-103.8). However, the other members of the Symmachy were still heavily involved in the process. At the end of 218, a Rhodian and Khian embassy mediates a thirty-day truce in Aitolia for the discussion of

30 These included Ambrakia and Amphilochia in Epiros and Phthiotic Achaia in Thessaly, and very likely also included the areas west of the Achelous in Acarnania (Stratos, Oiniadai, Metropolis and Phoetiae), western Phokis, and eastern Lokris (the district of Scarphaea and Thronium); see Walbank Commentary I 472-3 for further discussion.
31 The Aitolians had controlled Delphi and the Amphictyonic Council throughout the third century. The inclusion of this clause seems to suggest that the allies hoped to turn the conflict into a Sacred War for the liberation of Delphi. See Walbank Commentary I 473.
32 On the administrative features of the Symmachy see Scherberich (2009) 177-194.
33 Polybios relates how the cities of Dyme and Pherai refused to pay their contribution to the Symmachy because no military aid had come to assist them from the Achaian League when needed against the Aitolians in 218 BC (5.30).
peace terms and begs Philip to meet with the Aitolians at Rhium. The king writes to his allies requesting commissioners be sent to Patrai to meet him and confer on conditions of peace (5.28.3). After the Aitolians’ failure to meet Philip at Rhium, he gladly carries on the war, confident of future success, and begs the allies not to think of peace (29.4). It is not until the middle of 217 after hearing about the Roman defeat by Hannibal at Lake Trasimene that Philip is once again desirous to end the conflict (5.102.3) and, as the Achaians were also glad for its closure, a peace treaty was finally negotiated at Naupaktos for the status quo (5.103, 105.1-2).34 Philip’s actions here are in line with the terms of the Symmachy and his own role within it.

4.1.b Philip and the Achaian League

In Polybios’ Histories we get to observe the development of the relation between Macedonia and the Achaian League much more closely than is the case with any of her other allies. This is not altogether unexpected when we consider Polybios’ background, political leanings and ready access to Achaian/Aratean source material, nor surprising bearing in mind that Macedonia was closely connected with the Achaian League from 224 BC onwards and that Aratos had an influential role at the courts of both Antigonos Doson and Philip. However, this often means, of course, that any description of the king’s treatment of his allies is primarily founded on his relationship with the League, and readers must therefore be alert to this one-sided generalisation. Furthermore, within the context of Polybios’ Histories, Philip’s character and behaviour are developed according to this one relationship, making the proceedings particularly important for the king’s construction and the overall interpretative framework of the whole work.

In the early stages of his reign, Philip’s treatment of the Achaians is portrayed as especially benevolent and respectful:

34 See Walbank (1940) 65-66.
ἀπελογίσατο δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰφέσιν καὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν, ἣν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσιν ἔφη καὶ νῦν παραχωρεῖν καὶ διδόναι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τὴν πόλιν: προκεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτῷ τὰ δυνατὰ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἐλλείπειν προθυμίας. (4.72.5)

He proclaimed the inclination and goodwill which he held towards their nation, and at the end announced that he would now withdraw from the city (Psophis) and give it to the Achaians, for he had resolved to favour them by all means in his power and omit nothing in his ready kindness towards them.

Polybios’ young Philip appears to hold the Achaians in especial importance and to be committed to doing everything possible to promote and uphold their interests. Yet, the need to keep this relationship friendly also meant that the king was at times prevented from pursuing Macedonian interests, notably the establishment of a secure base in Greece and the pursuit of expansionist policies. Such deference reveals just how important the Achaian League was as an ally. From this passage onwards in book 4 (4.72), at the end of 219, Philip’s relations with the Achaians are mainly focused around Aratos and the machinations of Apelles and the Macedonian officers against him. The events are complicated and one-sided not only because of Polybios’ Achaian/Aratean bias, but also because the historian uses Aratos’ own *Memoirs* for this section of his work (see 2.1.b). However, an outline of these events summarising Polybios’ depiction of Philip’s benevolence towards the Achaians, and especially Aratos, will be useful to define the Achaian/Macedonian relationship and what it meant to both parties. Although we should be cautious in taking Polybios’ account at face-value and crediting Philip with too much goodwill towards the Achaians, they were of course a major player in the Symmachy and the Peloponnese at that time. Keeping their goodwill towards him, and especially that of Aratos, was therefore of vital importance.

It was in 219 BC that Philip first gave an example of this respectful and benevolent treatment when he put a stop to Apelles’ attempts to oppress Achaians citizens. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2 (pp.77–8), Apelles had not only allowed the Macedonians to eject Achaian soldiers from their billets and to take their share of booty, but also had inflicted punishment on the latter through his subordinates for trivial matters, arresting anyone who protested or tried to intervene. His intention, as Polybios reports, was to reduce the Achaians to the same condition of the Thessalians who were forced to obey the king and his officers’ orders as if they were Macedonian subjects (4.76.1-6). Hearing of the disturbances from Aratos, Philip reassures him that nothing of the sort would happen again and orders Apelles
not to give any more orders to the Achaians without first consulting their general (4.76.9). Polybios then emphasises Philip’s kingly and benevolent behaviour in this episode (4.77.1), stating that by this the king was beginning to win a good reputation, both politically and militarily, among all of the Peloponnesians.35

Apelles, however, is persistent in his endeavour to bring the Achaians under the yoke and later in 219 persuades the king to promote one of Aratos’ political rivals to the generalship of the Achaians as this would place fewer constraints on the king and Macedonian policy. He succeeds in getting Eperatos of Pharai into office, defeating the candidate backed by Aratos, Timoxenos (4.82-2-8).36 Yet, this in fact caused the relationship between the king and Aratos to become so strained that Philip was unable to win Achaian support in his request for a provision of grain and money from the League in 218 BC. The king had to reconcile this rift between himself and the Achaian statesman by transferring the Assembly to Sikyon and laying the blame for what happened onto Apelles before consent could be gained (5.1.6-12).

Throughout these incidents, Philip is described as acting as the just king who treats Aratos and the Achaians fairly. It is likely, of course, that Polybios is emphasising Philip’s good intentions towards the Achaians above the rest of his allies as the focus is very much centred on the Macedonians and Achaians from the middle of Book 4. Yet this does not conceal the king’s ongoing endeavour to support and aid all of his allies. From the outset Philip had been very concerned about establishing communication and access routes to all of them: capturing Ambrakos for the Epirotes helped to create a more convenient route to the king’s Akarnanian allies,37 and his decision to prosecute the war by sea at the beginning of 218, assaulting Palos on the island of Kephallenia (5.2-5), was an attempt to deny the Aitolians access to a naval base positioned perfectly for attacks on both the Peloponnese and Akarnania. Furthermore, at the end of 218 Philip was anxious to capture Thebes-in-Phthiotis, then under Aitolian control, to protect his allies in Thessaly and Magnesia in 218 (5.99). The prevalence of Achaian matters within Polybios’ Histories at this time and Philip’s frequent presence within the

35 Φίλιππος μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις συνδιατριβοῦντας καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς πράξει καὶ τόλμαν ὦ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς στρατευομένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς λοιποῖς πάσι Πελοποννησίοις εὐδοκῶν (4.77.1).
36 Aratos could not run for office this year as the League’s policy dictated that candidates could not hold the position of strategos successively; see Larsen (1968) 220.
37 See Walbank (1940) 40-42, 62-3 for Philip’s persistence in establishing lines of communication between Macedonia and his allies.
Peloponnese is not evidence that the king was more dedicated towards his Achaian allies than others, however. The Social War was initially advocated by the Achaian League against the Aitolians; yet Philip and the other members of the Symmachy (Akarnania, Epiros, Boiotia, Euboia etc.) all agreed that the war would be shared by all (4.26). As hegemon and commander-in-chief, Philip would be found where he was most needed. The Aitolians’ persistent assault on Peloponnesian territory made it inevitable that his presence would be most felt by the Achaians.

4.1.c Philip’s Kingly Behaviour

Polybios asserts in a number of digressions that Philip displayed kingly behaviour during this period and subsequently nurtured a good reputation amongst the Greeks. The king’s standing increased after his fair treatment of the Achaians in 219 and 218 (4.77.1), he won admiration for his diplomatic conduct and military achievements in 219 (4.82.1) and, despite Polybios’ statement to the contrary, he seems to have won further approval for his successful plundering of Thermos in 218 BC (5.8-14; see 3.1.c-d). This theme continues throughout the narrative of the Social War and comes to a climax in 215 at 7.10, before the historian relates the horror of the massacre at Messene and the king’s attempt on the city (7.12-14). At this crucial juncture Polybios first summarises the brilliance of the king’s beginning (7.11): he states that none of the allied states that Philip had inherited from Doson revolted from him because of his kingly, benevolent behaviour; that he was held in great affection by many of his friends; and that he had conferred great benefits on the Peloponnesians, Boiotians, Epirotes and Akarnanians. Throughout the account of these early years Philip is presented as a militarily successful and benign monarch, an image which has been intensifying as the narrative progresses. Always ready to come to his allies’ aid, persistently energetic in the war effort, and showing continuous goodwill and respect, it is no wonder that Philip is described by Polybios here as the darling of Greece (κοινός τις οίνων ἐρωμένος; 7.11).

38 Philip does not appear in what survives of Book 6 of Polybios’ Histories, which is primarily an account of the Roman constitution. Polybios concludes the Social War and the peace of Naupaktos near the end of book 5 (5.105). Between this point and the end (5.111), which finishes at the close of 116, Philip makes a sortie against Skerdilaidas and rashly aborts a naval expedition into Illyrian waters for fear of a Roman attack. We hear nothing of his interactions or relationship with his Greek allies during this period.
There can be little doubt that Philip did everything that he could to secure the goodwill and support of his Greek allies at the beginning of his reign; to do anything otherwise would have put him in a very weak position. Nor should we doubt the accuracy of Polybios’ factual information here as he took particular care to consult a number of sources and to expand upon the duty of the historian to recount events truthfully (see 2.1). However, although the events described may be considered historical, we must still be wary when assessing the validity of this image, the literary manipulations used and the interpretation it evokes. As McGing recently demonstrated, Polybios manipulated his narrative to emphasise Philip’s early potential, partly by delaying the entrance of his advisers to make it appear as if the young king were in complete control from the very start, but also partly by showing that Philip countered the expectations of other Greek states (notably Sparta and Aitolia) which thought him to be too young to rule effectively. 39 Taking a similar angle, in the previous chapter of this thesis it is shown that the events at Thermos and Messene have been carefully designed to form a two part assessment of Philip, Aratos and Demetrios, ultimately making the events at Messene the crucial turning point in Philip’s character and the transition of influence from the Sikyonian to the Illyrian. This whole period up until 215 BC will therefore be affected by this model of Philip’s sudden decline as Polybios attempts to portray the king in his early years in an exceptional light to make his change all the more startling.

4.2 Philip’s Treatment of his Allies After Messene (215-196 BC)

It is after the attempt on Messene and the ensuing massacre in 215 that Polybios claims Philip completely changed his disposition and turned to the worse (διὰ τὸ ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι τῆς εἰς τοῦπαλιν μεταβολῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ χείρον ὀρμῆς καὶ μεταθέσεως; 7.11.1).40 Yet, our historian does not explicitly state at this juncture what bad qualities Philip fell into and we must infer these from the following passage at 7.11.4-9 where Philip’s earlier positive behaviour is documented in a summary of the king’s achievements. The relevant

39 See McGing (2013).
40 For an earlier discussion of this change see also Golan (1995). However, Golan’s assertion that Polybios was writing for two different narrative levels, one upper explicit voice relating the story and providing an interpretation safe within a Roman environment, and another deeper implicit one relating his own views, is unconvincing as this compromises his aim to make all his explanations clear and understandable to all readers.
sections of the passage in the previous chapter will be quoted for the sake of clarity (for a full quotation see p. 133):

ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ μετὰ τὸ παραλαβεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τὰ τε κατὰ Θετταλίαν καὶ Μακεδονίαν καὶ συλληβδὴν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ιδίαν ἀρχήν οὖτως ὑπετέτακτο καὶ συνέκλινε ταῖς εὐνοίαις ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν πρότερον βασιλέων... συνεχέστατα γὰρ αὐτοῦ περιστασθέντος ἐκ Μακεδονίας διὰ τὸν πρὸς Ἀιτωλοὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους πόλεμον, οὐχ οἶον ἐστασίασε τὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἐθνῶν... τὴν δὲ Πελοποννησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν, ἀμα δὲ τούτοις Ἡπειρωτῶν, Ἀκαρνάνων, ... ὃσων ἐκάστοις ἀγαθῶν ἐν βραχεὶ χρόνῳ παραίτες ἐγένετο. καθόλου γε μὴν...οἰκείωτατ ἂν οἴμαι περὶ Φιλίππου τούτῳ ὑπῆρθήναι, διότι κοινός τις οἴον ἐρώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως εὐφράσθεικον. ἐκφανέστατον δὲ καὶ μέγιστον δείγμα περὶ τοῦ τί δύναται προοίμες καλοκἀγαθίαν καὶ πίστις, τὸ πάντας Κρηταίες συμφρονήσαντας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς μετασχόντας συμμαχίας ἐνα προστάσθην ἐλέσθαι τῆς νήσου Φιλίππων, καὶ ταύτα συντελεσθῆναι χωρίς ὅπλων καὶ κινδύνων... (7.11.4-9)

That after he succeeded to the kingship, Thessaly, Macedonia and in short his own dominions were more submissive and inclined to him in their loyalties than to any king before him...For although he was very frequently called away from Macedonia owing to the war against the Aitolians and Lacedaemonians, not only did none of the aforementioned peoples cause disturbance... Nor can one overstate the benefits he conferred in a short space of time on each of the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, along with them the Epirots and Akarnanians... In fact, as a whole, if one may speak somewhat hyperbolically, one might say most aptly of Philip that he was, as it were, the darling of the Greeks owing to his beneficent policy. A most conspicuous and striking proof of the power of his magnanimous and faithful policy is that all of the Kretans, uniting and entering into one confederation, chose Philip as president of the island, and this was done without call to arms or violence...

Philip is described as being able to inspire obedience and loyalty: he conferred benefits (ἀγαθά) on many of the Greeks (the exact number of allied peoples recorded by Polybros is unfortunately not complete), and had such a magnanimous and faithful policy (προσφέρεις καλοκἀγαθίας καὶ πίστις) that he was the most beloved of the Greeks and freely given the presidency of the Kretan League. This summary is supported by the deeds and actions.
assigned to Philip by the ancient historian outlined above. Thus, Polybios is claiming just before this passage at 7.11.1 that Philip reversed these qualities, implying that the king came to inspire disobedience and disloyalty, that he conferred no benefits on any of the Greeks, and that he therefore came to hold a self-seeking, petty and unfaithful policy which would remove him from the love of the Greek people. This assertion is reinforced in a few other surviving passages of Polybios’ *Histories*, most notably in his critique of the pact between Philip and Antiochos III in 203 BC to divide up the territory of the infant Egyptian king (15.20), and in his account of the Macedonian king’s capture of Kios and Thasos, and Herakleides’ commission to ruin the Rhodian fleet (15.22-24).

In light of Polybios’ earlier shaping of his text and the image of Philip, however, this claim needs to be qualified. In doing so, some important questions must be asked: did the rest of Philip’s allies feel the change in relationship which Polybios claims the Achaian League did in 215 BC? Does Philip actually treat his allies differently, and, if so, did he do so in a more treacherous way? What is more, if Philip suddenly turned to self-seeking, petty and unfaithful behaviour, why did many of his allies remain loyal to him for so long, some keeping faith even up until the king’s defeat by the Romans in 197, long after his supposed turn for the worse? Only with a broader understanding of these concerns can we make any headway in identifying Polybios’ workings and uncover an alternative portrait of Philip. Yet, to advocate a complete reversal of attitude towards the king’s behaviour and claim that he was always magnanimous and faithful would of course be overzealous and just as misleading as the ancient historian’s own good-to-bad interpretation. The relationship between the king and his allies was never equal and Philip, even in his role as benefactor and hegemon, was not above exerting pressure to shape his allies’ choices (see 2.3.a and 4.1.a). With this in mind, this chapter will attempt to offer a more balanced picture of the Macedonian king in this context as an alternative to the more exaggerated digressions of the *Histories*.

In our re-assessment of Philip’s treatment of his Greek allies, we are also aided at this stage by Livy’s account which begins in 211 BC and without which we would only have a very narrow and incomplete picture of the king’s movements. The Roman historian’s use of Polybios for the majority of Greek affairs from this period onwards enables us not only to

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41 There is nothing relating to Philip in the surviving Polybian record for the years 213-210, 207-205, 203, 195-192, and 190-186.
reconstruct with a reasonable degree of likelihood some of Polybios’ narrative, which becomes increasingly fragmentary from Book 5 onwards, but also to test the Greek historian’s assessment of the king in his digressions (see p. 8, fn. 27 for a discussion of Livy’s use and adaptation of Polybios).

The previous section illustrated the benevolent and attentive behaviour of the king in dealing with his allies before 215 BC. It will now be appropriate to investigate whether this conduct really disappeared as Polybios says after this point.

### 4.2.a 215-205 – To the end of the First Macedonian War

After Messene Philip is known to be active in Illyria, Dardania, Dassaretia and Thrace for the years 213-212, only coming back to Greece in 211 BC at the beginning of the first Macedonian War. There is no literary evidence recording any requests for help from Greece, nor any mention of interactions between Philip and his Greek allies in these intervening years. The Peace of Naupaktos and the end of the Social War seem to have brought about a temporary cessation of the conflict. Livy then describes how the report of the Aitolians’ alliance with the Romans in 212 BC (26.24) prompted Philip to pursue a change of strategy. This Roman-Aitolian alliance meant that the king could no longer concentrate on his expansion westwards as the coming war would centre its attention in Greece and on Philip’s allies. He was once again burdened with the essential task of defending his Greek allies and the price of neglect could be the loss of all his possessions and influence in Greece.43

Foreseeing the resurgence of war in Greece the king therefore makes out from Pella on a sudden incursion into Illyria (Oricum and Apollonia), Pelagonia, and Dardania (Sintia) to curb dissent in these regions and protect Macedonia’s northern border, before stationing his son Perseus with 4,000 men at Tempe to prevent Aitolian incursions into Thesaaly. He then invades Thrace and Maedika to subdue the tribes on the north-eastern border of his kingdom (26.25.1-8). It is at this early stage in the war when the king is still making his preparations

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42 The events of 213 and 212 are unfortunately confused and indistinguishable chronologically from the meagre evidence. However, we know that in these years Philip overthrew Atintania (Livy 27.30.13; 29.12.13), Dassaretia (Polyb. 8.38), the Parthini (Livy 29.12.3; 12.13) the Ardiaei (Livy 27.30.13), Dimale (Livy 29.12.3; 12.13), and Lissos (Polyb. 8.13-14).

43 Walbank (1940/1960) 84-5.
that Philip is first called upon for help. Seeing that the Macedonian king was engaged in a war in Thrace, the Aitolians decided to move against the Akarnanians, who then appealed to Philip for aid against the enemy who were of much greater strength. The king is compelled by the Akarnanian’s appeal to give up the war in Thrace, despite his successes at Iamphorynna and the surrounding area, and immediately moves to prevent them from being overpowered. He only has to reach Dion, however, before the Aitolians, still unsupported by Roman forces, become aware of his approach and retreat (26.25.9-17). Despite his change in focus and direction after Messene, therefore, Philip is still no less willing, and still very aware of the necessity, of coming to his allies’ aid.

There is very little evidence for the year 210, but it seems that Philip concentrated on establishing his communication routes south towards Euboia through the Pagasean Gulf with the capture of Echinos (Polyb. 9.41), presumably also having taken Pteleon and Larissa Cremaste. It is not until early in 209 that he is once again recorded supporting his allies. Livy briefly states how Philip responds quickly to the Achaians call for help against the simultaneous attacks of the Spartan ruler Machanidas (now allied with Aitolia) by land, and the Aitolian general Scopas by sea in the spring of 209. While the king sets out quickly he never in fact makes it to the Peloponnese, but is confronted on the way by another Aitolian force at Lamia and achieves a decisive victory, encouraging discussions of peace by the Aitolians a few months later (Livy 27.29.9-30.2). Philip must have considered the threat to Chalkis from the approach of King Attalos of Pergamon (an ally of Rome and Aitolia) at this time more serious than that facing Achaia, as he immediately sails onto Euboia after this victory and installs a garrison to protect it (27.30.7). It appears that the dangers in Achaia had already been mitigated as there is no mention of further difficulties.

After Euboia, Philip soon appears in the Peloponnese for a council of the Symmachy at Aegium in the summer of 209. Here, there is an attempt to negotiate peace terms with the Aitolians after their defeat at Lamia, but the conference proves unsuccessful as the enemy is encouraged to continue the conflict upon the arrival of Attalos at Aegina and the Romans at Naupaktos. Philip therefore dismisses the meeting but decides to leave 4,000 men in the

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44 Walbank (1940/1960) 88.
45 Machanidas was regent of Sparta from c. 211 and perhaps tutor of Pelops, son of Lycurgus. He continued the anti-Macedonian policy adopted in the Social War and causing problems for the Achaians at this time. Sparta allied with Aitolia in the spring of 210 (Polyb. 9.28-37; cf. Livy 34.32.1). See Ehrenberg (1928); Walbank (1940/1960) 87-88; and Cartledge (1989) 65-67.
Peloponnese in case of further Aitolian incursions, receiving in exchange five Achaian warships to add to the Carthaginian fleet recently sent to him (27.30.9-17). At the Nemean Games in Argos in July, after the failed conference, the king hears that Publius Sulpicius Galba has attacked Sikyon and Korinth and quickly sends out his cavalry in response, driving the Romans back to their ships at Naupaktos with considerable losses (27.31.1-3). Following the games the king sets out to recapture Dyme, which had been handed over to the Aitolians by the Eleans, and joins forces with the Achaian commander Kykliades. The venture proves unsuccessful because of Roman intervention, but a large amount of booty is obtained (27.31-32.9). At this point, the king learns that Lychnidos and parts of Dassaretia have been captured and that the Dardanians are also restless, and is consequently forced to march back to Macedonia. Before leaving, however, he places a further 2,500 men in the Peloponnese under the commander of Menippos and Polyphantas for the protection of his allies (27.32.9-11: *cum Menippo et Polyphanta ducibus ad praesidium sociorum*).

Thus, throughout 209 Philip was still very much energetic in his attempts to help his Greek associates. He was quick to respond to calls, pre-empted enemy attacks, attempted to recover captured cities, and sent out Macedonian commanders and troops when he himself could not be personally present. Moreover, his relations with the Argives also remained congenial at this time as they appointed him president of the Heraia and Nemean Games for 209 (Livy 27.30.9).\(^6\) The fragmentary account of this event is particularly important in the narrative as it presents the first of Polybios’ surviving digressions on Philip’s behaviour after Messene. The historian reports that at the games Philip wished to produce the impression that he was equal to others, lenient and popular, and thereby set aside his diadem and purple robes. Yet, this allegedly aroused Achaian hostility because the more democratic the king’s clothes, the more monarchical his behaviour became. Philip is said to have acted with autocratic arrogance towards the Achaian leaders and seduced a number of women causing public scandal and offence (Polyb.10.26.1-6).\(^6\) The passage is regrettably fragmentary; however, Livy’s account (which derives from Polybios’ and follows it closely) finishes the picture by the addition of the story that the wife of Aratos the Younger, the son of Aratos of Sikyon, was also carried off to Macedonia with the prospect of a royal marriage (Livy 27.30.8). The Greek

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\(^{6}\) The events related in this paragraph are unfortunately only supplied by Livy and they appear in a confused state within his text, primarily because he has merged many of the events in 209 with his account of the years 208/7. See Walbank (1940) 304-305 for a discussion concerning the chronological problems of these years in Livy and pp. 337-47 for his Table of Dates.

\(^{47}\) Cf. p. 134 fn. 2.
Yet, as Walbank suggested, we must be careful in using this incident for an assessment of the king’s relationship with his allies in Greece as it likely represents a hostile tradition, probably derived from an Achaian anti-Macedonian source. Philip’s rapid march against Galba at Sikyon and Korinth and his successful pursuit of the Romans back to their ships, would more likely have encouraged feelings of confidence amongst his allies than distrust. Therefore, the report of Philip’s behaviour at Argos is, regardless of its accuracy, unlikely to have caused anything more than a slight decline in popularity as the king was still active and effective in lending military support to his associates. Furthermore, it is strange that Polybios, who would normally respect such energy, efficiency and daring in leaders, concentrated on this more negative image of the king at Argos and undermined his achievements. However, this hostile depiction of the king, regardless of its factual reliability, represents another instance of Philip slighting the Achaian League and Polybios could not ignore the opportunity to use it to support his tyrannical interpretation of the king after Messene. This is therefore another moment used by Polybios to try and highlight the king’s change for the worse. In doing so, he ignores the king’s efforts to protect all of his Greek allies in the First Macedonian War, despite having already recorded such endeavours in his narrative.

Nor does Philip’s attention waver from Greece and his allies after 209. At a meeting at Demetrias in 208 the Achaians, Boiotians, Euboians, Akarnanians, and Epirotes all implore the king for help, ever more concerned about the growing aggression of the Aitolians, Illyrians and Spartans in the wake of Roman support. Emboldened by the Roman and Pergamene fleets at Aegina, the Aitolians had taken Thermopylai with the intention of preventing the king from helping his southern allies. Moreover, Attalos and the Romans had ravaged the country around Peparethos, Macedonia itself was also under threat from the invasions of the Illyrians and the Maedii, and Machanidas was once again threatening the

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48 Walbank (1940) 91. See also Walbank Commentary II 230.
49 See Eckstein (1995) 28-40 for Polybios’ overall attitude towards praising personal acts of valour by generals even when highly dangerous. This is in contrast with the traditional view held by scholars that Polybios thought a general should be very concerned with his own safety. This latter perspective was taken from two passages within his Histories at 10.32-33 and 11.2.
Argive frontier (Polyb.10.41.1-5, Livy 28.5.1-10). The Macedonian king’s recognition of the situation and his corresponding actions in this difficult period even inspire the respect of Polybios (10.41.6-7) who praises the king for his great courage, vigour and intelligence in dealing with the danger on all sides.\(^{50}\) Dismissing all the embassies, Philip promises each that he will do everything in his power to help them and turns his whole attention to a defensive strategy. Philip sends forces to protect Peparethos, dispatches his commander Polyphantas south to Phokis and Boiotia, Menippos east to Chalkis and Euboia, and marches with an army himself to Scotussa to try to catch the Aitolians in conference at Heraclea. Missing them, he then leaves his forces in Scotussa and returns to Demetrias to prevent an Aitolian invasion of Macedonia (10.41.8-10.42.3; Livy 28.5.10-12). The use of fire-signals is also introduced to increase the speed of communications concerning his enemies’ whereabouts and actions (Polyb. 10.42.7-8; Livy 28.5.16-17). Even under great stress with the prospect of an invasion of Macedonia, therefore, Philip still shows a rationality, decisiveness, and consideration of his allies.

Before the end of the First Macedonian War in 206/5,\(^{51}\) we hear of one more venture in support of the Achaians. Philip’s assistance against the advance of the Spartan king Machanidas, who had marched into Elis during the Olympic Games in 208. It is likely that the Achaians had attempted to take control of the Olympic Games in light of their successes in 209 and Machanidas had then gone to the aid of Elis in 208 after his assault of the Argive frontier (Livy 28.7.15).\(^{52}\) Philip, receiving the call for aid at Elatis where he had met with Ptolemaic and Rhodian envoys calling for peace with the Aitolians, immediately marches towards the trouble in Elis. However, the Macedonian king did not need to go far, only to Heraia, before there was news that Machanidas had retreated and fled back to Sparta (28.7.14-17). The good relations between Philip and his allies at this point are reinforced by the joyful reception of his speech at the Achaian Council at Aegium after Machanidas’ retreat in 208 (Livy 28.8.6: laeti regem socii audierunt). He pronounced that although he had not been able to catch the enemy in this instance (King Attalos, Publius Sulpicius Galba [for these two see below] and Machanidas, had all evaded him), this only proved that they thought themselves

\(^{50}\) See also Livy 28.5.9-10. Livy’s assessment of the king here is much briefer and less exemplary than Polybios’ evaluation.

\(^{51}\) The Aitolians, unable to find further support in Rome, agree to peace with Philip in 206; the Romans although unhappy with the situation are unable to arouse the Aitolians back into action and reluctantly arrange their own peace with Philip in 205 (Livy 29.12).

\(^{52}\) See Walbank (1940) 96 and esp. 304.
no match for the king and he assured them that he would soon defeat the enemy and achieve victory (28.8.1-5). Philip subsequently received six ships from the Achaians as requested and 27 more from the Carthaginians at Korinth before landing at Erythrae and attacking Aitolia (28.8.7-10). Relations with his allies in the Peloponnese were obviously still congenial enough for Philip to justify the supply of forces.

4.2.a.i The Expectations of the King and his Allies

An example of Philip’s treatment of his Greek allies and his own expectations is evident in his dealings with the cities of Oreos, Chalkis (both on Euboia) and Opos (in Opuntian Lokris) in 208. These Macedonian-allied cities were captured by King Attalos and Galba just before Philip’s pursuit of Machanidas in 208, but recovered shortly afterwards. The first to be taken was Oreos, betrayed by its resident commander, Plator (28.6.1-7). After this easy victory, Galba sailed on to Chalkis, one of the “fetters of Greece” and at this time occupied by the Macedonians (Menippos had been sent to protect the city only a short while earlier; Polyb. 10.42.2; Livy 28.5.11-12) but met with a very different reaction. Not only was the harbour treacherous and the place heavily fortified with a strong garrison, but the commanders and citizens also showed great loyalty and resilience, and the attempt was promptly raised (28.6.9-12). The king, having heard news of the surrender of Oreos and the attempt on Chalkis via his recently established fire signals, marched to Euboia to come to Chalkis’ aid.

At about this time, the city of Opos on Lokris was also captured and sacked by King Attalos. However, Philip swiftly approached Chalkis and drove off Attalos and his men who escaped by sea in disarray. The Macedonian king then arrived in Opos, angry to have missed his opportunity to capture Attalos, and upbraided the city for surrendering so willingly and not dragging out the siege until his arrival (28.7.4-9). The journey to Chalkis was then

53 Livy is wrong in assigning Philip’s gift of Heraia, Triphylia and Alipheira to the Achaia to this year; they are not restored until 198 BC as an incentive for continued loyalty. See Livy 32.5.4 and Briscoe Commentary XXXI-XXXIII 174-5.
54 Polybios tells us that this was Philip’s own expression for the three cities of Chalkis, Demetrias and Korinth, although it is unknown when he originally used it (18.11.5: πέδαις Ἑλληνικάς; cf. Livy 32.37.4: compedes Graeciae). Macedonian control of the three cities imposed severely on Greek liberty. The occupation of Korinth allowed tight control of the Peloponnese by Macedonian forces, that of Chalkis and the rest of Euboia gave the means to dominate Lokris, Boiotia and Phokis, and that of Demetrias, Thessaly, Magnesia and the entrance into Macedonia (18.11.5-7). See also Livy 32.37.1-4 for the same episode derived from Polybios.
delayed again by the more urgent need to help the Achaians against Machanidas (see above), and his subsequent raid on Aitolia (28.7.10-8.10). After his success against the Aitolians, Philip sailed from Crenchreae along the dangerous coast of Attica where a number of enemy fleets were quartered at Chalkis. Once there, Philip praised the city’s loyalty and courage in the face of the enemy and encouraged them to remain his allies with the same resoluteness in the future. He concluded with the less than veiled threat that if they did not they would be treated like Oreos and Opos (28.8.11-12). Finally, sailing onto Oreos, Philip entrusted the government and defence of the city to the leading citizens who had fled its capture rather than surrender to the Romans (28.8.13).

The above episode illustrates the expectation by Philip that his allies should remain loyal and resilient for as long as possible in the face of enemy invasion. His rebuke of the Opuntians for their quick surrender implies that his aid would always be forthcoming. An expectation which Philip had almost always fulfilled thus far in Greece as evident from this analysis. The consequence of a lack of resilience would be a heavy-handed and autocratic replacement of leading officials, demonstrated by Philip’s settlement of Oreos. Opos also may have suffered similar treatment as implied from Livy’s vague reference to affairs being settled (28.7.9: *compositis circa Opuntem rebus*). Although the stronger loyalty and resilience of Chalkis may be partly explained by the royal garrison stationed within the city, Philip’s praise and encouragement of the Chalkidians, regardless of this fact, would also have posed an excellent warning to this end. Therefore, as well as Philip’s consistent energy in keeping his allies safe, the inherent inequality in their relationship is also clearly demonstrated in this episode.\(^{55}\) In order to keep their liberty and secure Philip’s superior military strength for their own protection, his allies must remain faithful to him even in moments of serious crisis and danger. Defection or betrayal of the king would produce a far worse outcome for the allies than it would for Philip if he were to betray them.

This pressure is evident in the city of Oreos at a later date: in the summer of 200 BC the city was once again besieged by Roman and Pergamene forces. However, this time instead of surrendering as they had done in 208 the Oreans, partly influenced by the presence of a

Macedonian garrison within the city, but also mindful of the king’s earlier rebuke, withstood the siege beyond the expectations of the enemy. It was only after exhausting the Macedonian garrison within and by penetrating one of the two citadels that King Attalos and the Romans forced the Oreans to surrender (Livy 31.46.11-16). Philip occupied by Aitolian, Athamanian and Dardanian forces on the mainland during this summer was unable for a second time to come to the city’s aid. The king could not meet the expectation which he himself had created in 208 – he was not able to protect Oreos even when the city waited for his aid as instructed. As will be soon become clear, the year 200 BC, which saw the start of the Second Macedonian War, marked the beginning of difficulties for the king. Facing enemies on many sides, Philip would become increasingly incapable of offering protection to those allied to him. This failure to meet this essential requirement on his part would inevitably see the detachment of his Greek allies, either directly by force or indirectly through fear of Roman brutality.

Yet, in 208, this tension in the relationship did not manifest itself in discontent and defection. For now, expectations were still being met and after his successes in the First Macedonian War Philip was still very much the dominant force in Greece. A fragment of Polybios provides proof of this: in the year 207 we hear from a Rhodian speaker at Aitolia, seemingly unattached to either side and pleading for peace, that Philip still had as his allies most of the Peloponnesians, the Boiotians, Euboians, Phokians, Lokrians, Thessalians and Epirotes (11.5.4). It seems therefore that all the original members of the Symmachy were still attached to Macedonia and this is surely a sign that the expectations of all parties had not been excessively strained and were (at least to some extent) still being met.

From the narratives of both Polybios and Livy therefore it is shown that Philip is still very willing and energetic in protecting his allies up to the end of the First Macedonian War; he is fulfilling the expectations of his allies to protect them as hegemon of the Symmachy. The very facts recorded in the narrative thus far undermine Polybios’ statement at 7.11. As far as we can tell in regard to the protection of his allies, which of course also meant the protection of his own power and resources, there had been very little change. The main difference from the earlier period is that the efforts needed to protect and appease the Achaian League were less frequent: this is not surprising when the focus of the war was no longer centred in the Peloponnese as was the case with the Social War, but in the whole of mainland Greece.
4.2.b 205-200 – To the start of the Second Macedonian War

The end of the First Macedonian War in 205 allowed Philip to turn his attention away from mainland Greece and until 200 his movements revolved around expansion in the Aegean and Asia Minor. In 204 BC Philip employed an Aitolian, Dikaiarchos, to sail with twenty ships and engage in piracy against the rich cities of the Aegean to collect funds for a new Macedonian fleet, as well as to aid his Kretans allies in their war against Rhodes (begun in 205).56 So successful were Dikaiarchos’ ventures that the king was able to start building his new fleet in the early months of 203. In the same year, Philip negotiated a ‘secret’ pact with Antiochus upon the accession of an infant Ptolemy V, which also gave the two kings the opportunity to dismantle and acquire Ptolemaic possessions in the Aegean without aggravating the other (Polyb. 15.20; Livy 31.14-15).57 Soon afterwards Philip seizes the island of Samos and a number of Egyptian vessels in 201.58 The Macedonian king’s acquisition of Lysimacheia, Kalchedon, Perinthos, Kios and Sestos throughout 202 and 201 clearly reveals a desire to extend Macedonian-controlled territory along the Thracian coast.59 Having ended the First Macedonian War on beneficial terms to himself and having successfully protected his alliances with Greek states in the Symmachy, Philip was once again able to turn to his ambitions of conquest. This time, wary of the Roman presence in Illyria, he looked to the east - to the Thracian coast, the Aegean and Asia Minor.

The evidence for Philip’s actions during this period, however, is particularly fragmentary and difficult. Livy reports little of note until the incompletion of a summary of the years 203-201 in his narrative for 200 (31.14-15); as the king was no longer as pertinent in Roman foreign policy in the years after the First Macedonian War (205 BC) Livy’s lack of attention is not all that surprising. What we have from Polybios is also generally lacking in context and at times difficult to piece together chronologically.60 The surviving comments concerning

56 For this date and which cities were involved in the war, see Perlman (1999) 134-5
57 Cf. Erskine (2013) for Ptolemaic sea power in Polybios and its decline in these years.
58 See Eckstein (2008) 121-80 and 181-229 for an excellent discussion of the pact between the kings and reactions to it in Mediterranean politics.
59 Polyb. 16.23.8-9 (Lysimacheia and Chalkedon), 18.2.4, 44.4 (Perinthus), 15.21-3 (Kios) and. See Walbank (2002) 119-20.
60 Note particularly the problems in establishing the chronology of the Philip’s attacks on Chios, Lade and Pergamon in 201 BC, as the events must be pieced together from a number of manuscripts (cf. fn. 106). See for example, Berthold (1975) 150-63; Thompson (1971) 615-20; and Walbank (1940) 118-123, 307-8, all who argued for a Lade – Pergamon – Chios sequence. However, a consensus was reached advocating the order Lade – Chios – Pergamon instead for the following reasons: Attalos first engaged Philip at Chios, prompted by the Rhodian admiral (16.9.4), and the Pergamene king had not participated in the battle at Lade, and thus
Philip and his behaviour are on the whole negative and the king is portrayed as particularly ruthless and uncaring towards the Greeks while pursuing ambitions of expansion. The first surviving Polybian fragment after the First Macedonian War, at 13.3, even begins with the historian explicitly claiming that Philip had become treacherous and now acted in a way in which no one would say was befitting a king (ἐγένετο περὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κακοπραγμοσύνην, ἣν δὴ βασιλικὴν μὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδεὶς ἀν εἶναι φήσειεν…; 13.3.1).

As we have already seen above, however, the king’s supportive treatment of his allies had not changed that much from the end of the Social War (217) to the end of the First Macedonian War (205), despite Polybios’ arguments for the king’s decline after 215. This very much puts Polybios’ criticisms and his overall depiction of the king into question. Even his opening statement at 13.3 (above) is tempered in the second clause of the sentence by a digression discussing the prevalence of treacherous behaviour among current leaders and a change in attitude from ancient times about what constituted noble behaviour in warfare:

…ἀναγκαίαν δὲ βούλονται λέγειν ἕνιοι πρὸς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον διὰ τῆς νῦν ἐπιπολάζοντας κακοπραγμοσύνην. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολὺ τι τοῦ τοιοῦτον μέρους ἐκτὸς ἦσαν: τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἀπηλλοτριώντο τοῦ κακομιχαλείν περί τοὺς φίλους χάριν τοῦ τῷ τοιούτῳ συναίξειν τὰς σφετέρις …

… some would say that it is necessary for the political character because of the current prevalence of treachery. For the ancients were greatly lacking in any share of such behaviour: for they were so far from treacherous scheming with regard to their friends for
the sake of increasing their own powerbases by such means, that they did not even choose to vanquish the enemy by trickery, assuming not one of their successes was either glorious or insecure, unless one could weaken their adversaries in their spirits by fighting openly…But nowadays they say that it is the mark of a low grade general to conduct any operation of war openly…Therefore let these things be said in regard to the current prevailing rivalry beyond what is necessary among the leaders in the matter of double-dealing in public affairs and the management of war.

This passage brings forth the fact that some (ἐνιοι) contemporaries viewed duplicity in warfare and public affairs as very much a necessity (ἀναγκαίαν; τὸ δέον) for success, contrasting Polybios’ more traditional and conservative preference exhorting open and honest conduct.

The historian’s discussion about treachery is one which extends throughout his Histories and is a major theme in a range of different contexts.61 Eckstein has argued thoroughly for Polybios’ general unwillingness to accept double-dealing even on utilitarian grounds as a normal and reasonable part of political life; traditional aristocratic Greek society, in which the historian originally resided, dictated that honest interactions with others were part of “the general ideology of honor” and saw deceit as low and ignoble (ἀγεννῆς, 4.30.7).62 The line between skilful political manipulation and blatant deceitfulness was sometimes narrow and ill-defined, yet knowing the limits was also crucial (cf. 22.19). In some of the cases of treachery documented by Polybios, negative consequences also follow the perpetrators and Polybios uses these as warnings against such deceitful behaviour. The purpose of 13.3 was to draw such a moral lesson by pointing out the deceitful behaviour of current leaders, which Polybios viewed as improper, for the benefit of his readers and to enforce the nobility of past attitudes and practices in comparison with present ones. Philip is once again a prominent case study for the digression and the moral lesson that it conveys. It is therefore likely that Polybios’ depiction of the king is influenced by the need to adhere to this lesson. The record of Philip’s behaviour in the Histories must therefore be spun to emphasise his treachery, even if, as it seems, others did not necessarily see the king’s actions as particularly exceptional or abhorrent. This means that Polybios’ condemnation of Philip, therefore, only reflects a certain

61 For example Polybios 1.9; 2.47-52; 3.4; 4.30; 13.3; 14.5; 15.24; 18.8-12, 18.33; 21.32c.1; 30.4 and 30.27.
moralistic point of view, against which other opposing interests and views could have existed, and which may have presented alternative histories with narratives more favourable to the Macedonian king.

After this digression asserting the nobler behaviour of past leaders, Polybios then returns to the narrative and the king, supporting his claims that Philip’s behaviour turned treacherous by bringing in his intrigues against Rhodes in 204. However, as will be seen, this affair only supports Polybios’ claims of treachery when taken from a moral and Rhodian perspective. We in fact get a glimpse of Philip helping another ally, although this is once again ignored in favour of Polybios’ construction of Philip as a deceitful tyrant.

4.2.b.i Philip, Rhodes and Krete

It is at the beginning of Book 13 that Polybios records Philip’s actions against Rhodes in 204 BC. He states that the king ordered Herakleides, a Tarentine in his service, to sabotage and destroy the Rhodian fleet while he himself sent envoys to Krete to try and encourage them to war with Rhodes (13.4). The Rhodians, who had become suspicious of Philip because of his (earlier) treachery in the Kretan War (διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ Κρητικὰ κακοπραγμοσύνην; see below), suspected Herakleides of being his agent. Herakleides, coming before them, eventually persuaded the Rhodians that he had fled from Philip and that the king was very anxious that his designs should not be discovered (13.5). The Polybian passage trails off into an incomplete digression on truth and the inevitability of its prevailing against falsehood, and is unfortunately cut off before coming to the end of the Rhodian affair. The event can be completed, however, by the account of Polyaenus, which asserts that after Herakleides had gained credence at Rhodes by pretending to betray Philip’s intrigue with the Kretans, he had

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63 For the date see Walbank Commentary II 20-21.
64 Herakleides, an architect originally from Tarentum, was entrusted with repairing the walls of the city (at the time in the hands of Hannibal) and accused of betraying the city to the Romans. He fled to the Roman camp, but was soon suspected of secret negotiations with the Carthaginians, after which he fled Italy to Philip’s court. He quickly gained favour with the king, particularly through his successful burning of the Rhodian fleet, but grew so unpopular with the Macedonians for his influence at court that Philip was forced to arrest him in 199 (Polyb.13.4-5; Polyae. 5.17.2; Livy 31.16, 33, 32.5). This is also possibly the Herakleides mentioned in the letter of 209 (IG IX, 1 78 = Syll. 552) granting ateleia to Abae in Phokis (ὑμῖν δουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι γέγραφα τοι Ἰφωκλείδη ἰμή ἐνοχεῖν ὑμᾶς). If so, he was already Philip’s commander in Phokis and joined him after arousing the suspicions of Hannibal and the Romans (13.4.6-8). This identification is, however, hypothetical, and is rejected by Schoch (1924) 729.
then waited for an opportunity and eventually set fire to the fleet, escaping in a boat (Polyaen.5.17.2). Herakleides thus succeeds at his task and Philip’s plans are fulfilled.

The details of Philip’s earlier treachery in Crete, for which we only have a brief mention surviving from Polybios at 13.5 (see above), are probably those preserved by Diodoros at 28.1: Philip, the king of the Macedonians, induced Dikaiarchos of Aitolia, a bold man, to engage in piracy and gave him twenty ships. He ordered him to levy tribute on the islands and to support the Kretans in their war against the Rhodians. Obedient to these commands, Dikaiarchos harried commercial shipping and by marauding raids exacted money from the islands.\(^{65}\) If the relevant details are recorded accurately,\(^{66}\) what Polybios seems to be claiming is that part of Philip’s treachery was his support of the Kretans in their war (206-203 BC) against the Rhodians and his employment of Dikaiarchos in piracy,\(^{67}\) a commission which would likely have interfered with Rhodian maritime and commercial interests.\(^{68}\) Yet, Polybios’ claim that this conduct was treacherous (τὴν... κακοποιημοσύνην) seems odd, considering that Philip was hegemon of the Kretan League and by holding such a position would be expected to help his allies in their war. His support of the Achaian League as hegemon of the Symmachy in their war against Aitolia in 220-217 was after all deemed respectable and kingly behaviour (Polyb. 4.77.1, 82.1, 7.11; cf. 4.1.c). It is unlikely therefore that the Kretans would have considered the king’s behaviour towards them as either treacherous or neglectful.

The Kretans had been attached to Philip from 220/19 BC, when the cities of Polyrrrhaenia, Keretae, Lappa, and the Orii, and the Arcadian Kretans were received into the Symmachy and sent aid against Knossos, an ally of Aitolia (Polybios 4.53-55). Within a short space of time, as a result of the help received from Philip and the Symmachy in 220/219, the Kretan cities of

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\(^{65}\) Diod. 28.1: Ὅσιος Φίλιππος ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων Ἀθηναίας Δικαίωρος τὸν Αἰτολόν, ἀνδρα τολμηρόν, πείσας πειρατεύειν ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ ναύτην εἰκάσιον. Προσέταξε δὲ τὰς μὲν νῆσους φορολογεῖν, τοῖς δὲ Κρητικὲς παραβοηθεῖν ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ῥόδιους πολέμῳ. Οὕτως δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τοὺς μὲν ἐμπόρους ἐλήμενε, ταῖς δὲ νῆσος λειτουργοῦν ἀργύριον εἰσεπράπτετο.

\(^{66}\) Polybios seems to have been one of Diodoros’ chief sources for Books 22-32. See Sacks (2014a) 33-54 and Eckstein (1995) 225-29, 232, 268 fn.117.

\(^{67}\) We hear that Dikaiarchos was appointed leader of the Macedonian fleet and in charge of the whole task of attacking the Cyclades and Hellespontine cities later in Polybios’ Histories at 18.54.8-12: τοῦ στόλου παντὸς ἰγκεμώνα καὶ τῆς ὅλης παραβοηθεῖσι προστάτησιν.

\(^{68}\) See Perlman (1999) 134 for the overlap of Kretan and Rhodian maritime interests in the north and south corridor from Knossos to Mesara on the southern coast and eastern part of Crete. See also Gabrielsen (2001) for the fine line between trade and piracy in the Aegean.
Eleutherna, Kydonia and Aptera had joined the coalition against Knossus, the king’s influence was increased on the island, and the Symmachy received 500 men from Polyrhrinia as gratitude to counter the 1000 men sent to Aitolia by the Knossians (4.55.5, cf. 4.61.2). The war in Crete thereafter went in favour of Philip’s allies (cf. 7.11.9) and no evidence supports the hypothesis that there was any ill-feeling towards the king. Later in the First Kretan War (206-203 BC), Philip once again supports his allies against their enemy and we must be very cautious in accepting the negative depiction of the king at 13.4-5.

So too must we be wary about accepting the ancient view voiced by Polybius and Diodoros that the Kretans were notorious pirates. In 1999, Paula Perlman expressed surprise that scholarly opinion had unanimously accepted “the view that the depredations of Kretan pirates threatened trade in the eastern Aegean and so provoked Rhodes to declare war against the island…”, especially in light of historiographical considerations. She noted that Diodoros used Polybius as his source for his account here and that the latter had probably utilised Rhodian sources, most importantly Zeno’s history. Although the Achaian historian had criticised his Rhodian sources in his narrative (both Zeno and Antisthenes) it is “unlikely that Polybius, whose hatred of Cretans is evident throughout his history, would have scrutinized his Rhodian sources for an anti-Cretan bias.” Moreover, the Kretans had been marginalised and ethnically stereotyped from Homeric times as devious and underhand. This would undoubtedly have affected Polybius’ perspective and supported his stipulation that Philip’s behaviour was unacceptable in this period.

In the course of her study of Kretan maritime interests, Perlman establishes that legitimate trade, particularly with Egypt, was very important to the Kretan cities as it not only helped to supply private, but also public income in the form of harbour dues and transport taxes. She concludes that it was very much in Crete’s interest to contrast piracy. However, this could only mean the prevention of piratical raids on their own Kretan harbours as pirates also contributed to the revenue gained from harbour dues and customs by selling goods at the

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69 See Berthold (1984) Ch. 5 and Wiemer (2002) Ch.6 for this war.
71 Perlman (1999) 133.
72 This corresponds with Wiemer (2001) and (2013), who argues that Polybius made significant use of Zeno’s work.
74 Perlman (1999). See also Viviers (1999) 221-233 for the importance of customs in the Hellenistic period.
Kretan markets. De Souza points out that, “[e]ven where there was no legal or moral justification for piracy, or in cases where the booty was clearly illicit, the possibility of profiting through trade in ‘stolen goods’ was enough to persuade some communities to cooperate closely with those recognised to be pirates”. The presence of both spoils (either from simple piratical raids or more complex schemes of warfare) and the exchange of legitimate goods within the Kretan economic system shows the one-sidedness of the evidence. The stereotyping of Kretans as pirates and the assumption that Kretan cities were entirely dependent on plunder is therefore far from accurate. It is very likely, however, as Perlman and Chaniotis have both suggested, that what caused the conflict between Krete and Rhodes, and would also have encouraged the designation of the former as pirates, is that Kretan maritime interests overlapped with Rhodian ones in Egypt and the West.

Although Angelos Chaniotis has demonstrated that the main forms of economic activity on the island during this period were farming and animal husbandry, Krete was also heavily involved in trade. It possessed a strategically advantageous position on the trade routes of the eastern Mediterranean and had thriving slave and luxury goods markets. These would have competed with similar centres of commerce also found on Rhodes and Delos as ships sailing west from the Aegean to Egypt and Italy inevitably put in at Kretan harbours. On this basis, it has been reasonably argued by Perlman that the cause of the First Cretan War was therefore a failed Rhodian attempt to discourage the Kretans from imposing harbour dues and transport taxes on her own ships and allies, which eventually prompted the declaration of war against Krete in 205/4.

To their enemies Kretan maritime aggression would always be piratical. Yet this is, of course, only one point of view. De Souza illustrated the complex nature of piracy in the

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75 De Souza (2002) 58.
76 See Viviers (1999) 222 for the appearance of successive clauses concerning both spoils and the exchange of goods within treaties between Kretans cities when establishing custom-free trade. He mentions the treaty between Knossos and Tylissos, probably under the patronage of Argos, the inscriptions for which are recorded in I.Cret. I,viii 4 (discovered in Argos) and I.Cret. I,xxx 1 (discovered in Tylissos). See also Chaniotis (1996).
77 Perlman (1999). This is also supported by Chaniotis (1999) 185.
79 See also De Souza (1999) 59-60 who, discussing the economic activities of the island, particularly the unexpectedly prosperous small city of Phalasarna on the western side of Krete, argues legitimately for the unlikelihood that its wealth came solely or primarily from piratical activities; there is also plenty of evidence for agriculture, trade on stone, commercial links with nearby Polyrrhenia and later Egypt, and a constant service of local mercenaries overseas.
eastern Mediterranean and the importance of perspective in designating acts of plunder as either simple piratical activity or as part of a more complex scheme of warfare. At one point, De Souza talks specifically about the activities of Dikaiarchos commissioned by Philip. He states that “[t]o victims of his raids and his attacks on merchant shipping the answer would probably be yes, he was a pirate, as were the Cretans whom he was supposedly assisting. Yet if it is assumed that he was paid for his efforts, then he could be called a mercenary, and from his employer’s point of view he was collecting revenues, and helping Philip V’s Cretan allies in their war with the Rhodians.” He goes on to conclude that due to the scale of Dikaiarchos’ operations and their political purpose it seems more appropriate to call them acts of warfare than piracy; however, the distinction is still a very fine one and brings out just how closely related piracy and warfare were in this period and beyond.

If one takes the viewpoint of the Rhodian sources, the Kretans were devious pirates regardless of the validity of this image. Furthermore, Polybios’ positivity towards Rhodes would have been influenced at least partially by these same sources. The profuse praise of Rhodian bravery in their decision to confront Antiochos in 197 recorded by Livy (33.20), and derived from Polybios, was very probably acquired from Rhodian or pro-Rhodian material. The Rhodians have survived in the historiographical record as defenders against piracy and protectors of the “freedom of the Greeks” and merchant shipping (Polyb. 18.41.a.1; Diod. 20.81.3). At times they had acted as neutral ambassadors promoting peace (in the Social War, 5.24.11 and 5.100.9-11; in the First Macedonian War, Livy 27.30.1-5, 28.7.14, Polyb. 11.4.1) and had previously engaged in war against Byzantium when the city imposed heavy taxes on Pontic shipping (Polyb. 4.45-52). Yet, we cannot view these actions as being completely selfless, as their own maritime interests and those of their allies and dependents would also have been affected and threatened in each of the above instances.

82 De Souza (2002) 82.
83 Polybios claims that he used a number of sources for Philip’s actions in the eastern Aegean later in book 16 (16.4.2). Two historians are explicitly named and criticised for distorting patriotic bias and exaggerations - Antisthenes and Zeno – however it is uncertain whether Polybios used their works for this praise. See Wiemer (2001) and (2013), and Lenfant (2005) for these two Rhodian historians and their use by Polybios.
Thus, what makes Polybios’ depiction here so negative and consequently almost completely hides Philip’s support of his allies is that the events described are only viewed from a Rhodian perspective. The text is also fragmented and lacking a large portion of its context so we cannot be entirely sure if our historian did in fact mention the attitude and response of the Kretans to Philip in this event or not. However, considering the strong criticism at 13.4-5, which describes Philip’s actions as an example of treachery, it seems likely that the Kretan view, if it had been included in his *Histories* at all, would not have been satisfactory to the historian. It would not suit the construction of his work as a didactic model.

As far as Polybios and his sources were concerned the Kretans were dishonest pirates and their depredations in the Aegean would have looked very much like the land raids committed by the Aitolians in mainland Greece. Of course, from Philip’s point of view his actions were not only implemented in support of his allies, but also in support of his own personal ambitions. Diodoros’ passage shows Dikaiarchos carrying out Philip’s request to plunder in the Aegean and although it is not mentioned what this plunder would have been used for it is very likely that it financed the building of the king’s new fleet. 86 Not only were the Rhodians attacking a Macedonian ally in their war against Crete and piracy, but they were also interfering in Philip’s plans for expansion. To prevent further difficulties caused by Rhodian initiatives, Philip consequently sends Herakleides against the Rhodians directly, resulting in the burning of the city’s fleet.

In assessing the historian’s picture of the Macedonian king, it is therefore important to note that Polybios’ Rhodian perspective nearly conceals the fact that Philip was helping an ally in his attack on Rhodes. The historian’s insistence that the Kretans were pirates could only have made the interpretation of Philip’s actions in 204-203 worse, as it would appear that he was endorsing piracy through Dikaiarchos and the Kretans in opposition to the legitimate trade of the Rhodians, a people who defended maritime commercial interests throughout the Aegean. Yet again, Polybios’ statement that Philip had turned completely against his friends and allies should be seen as specious, hidden under the Rhodian bias of the historian’s sources, his literary construction, as well as probably his Achaian bias, which predetermined the king’s decline in character.

86 Philip had built up the Macedonian fleet in 217 while targeting the Illyrian coastline. In 214, after conveying troops to Oricum in 120 lembi, Laevinus trapped the king at the river Aous and he was forced to burn his fleet and retreat over land. Walbank (2002) 119-20.
4.2.b.ii Kios and Prusias of Bithynia

A similar minimising of the king’s assistance of an ally also occurs at 15.22, when Polybios censures Philip’s capture of Kios in 202 BC. At 15.21.1 we learn that the city of Kios, allied to the Aitolians (cf.15.23.7-9), is in the middle of civil disruption: a certain man called Molpgoras of Kios had incited the masses against the wealthier citizens resulting in the murder of some and banishment of others, and the confiscation and distribution of their property amongst the people. After this disruption, Polybios records that Molpgorras soon attained monarchical power (μοναρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν). There is then a digression explaining how the disasters and misfortunes of the Kian people owed more to their stupidity and misgovernment than to chance or to the unjust conduct of their neighbours (15.21.2-8). The passage is unfortunately incomplete and exactly how Philip captured the city is unknown. However, in the next passage at 15.22.1 we hear that Philip has become master of Kios and was highly elated thinking he had performed a good and noble deed (καλὴν τινὰ καὶ σεμνὴν πτραξίν): not only had he readily come to the aid of his kinsman, King Prusias of Bithynia who was assaulting the city, and captured and gifted it to him (cf. 15.23.5-10), but Philip had also conquered those who came against him and justifiably (ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου) enriched himself with prisoners and money.

As we saw at Thermos in Chapter 3, the historian disagrees with Philip’s point of view and instead illustrates the faults of this way of thinking. The king is criticised for not seeing the opposite perspective and draws it out in four points. Firstly, he was assisting a kinsman who was doing wrong to others by his treachery; secondly, by assaulting a Greek city without just cause Philip was confirming reports about his cruelty towards friends and earning a reputation for impiety; thirdly, he had offended the envoys who had come to plead for the safety of the endangered Kians and forced them to witness the city’s capture; and fourthly, the king had infuriated the Rhodians to such an extent that they would no longer hear anything good about him (15.22.2-5). The last point is expanded in the following passage. While Philip

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87 See also Polybios 18.3.12, 4.7, and Livy 32.33.16, 34.6 where the capture of the city is listed at the Peace of Nicaea as one of Philip’s transgressions against the Aitolians. Cf. Strabo 12.4.3.
was at Kios, Polybios reports his ambassador was at Rhodes proclaiming Philip’s magnanimity and declaring that although the king was master of Kios he planned on conceding its safety to the wishes of the people and to refute the slander of his enemies, establishing the honesty of his intentions in their eyes. Yet, at that moment another man entered the Prytaneum and brought the news of the Kians’ enslavement and Philip’s cruel treatment of them (15.23.1-4). Polybios then exclaims that by this act Philip had betrayed himself just as badly as he had the Kians; so blinded and misguided was his understanding of right and wrong that he had given himself credit for and boasted of these actions as good deeds, instead of more appropriately being ashamed of them. Moreover, Prusias, although he was pleased that his purpose in taking Kios had been accomplished, received the city after the enslavement of its population and was allegedly dissatisfied in having possession of a deserted site (15.23.5-10).

This is the end of the surviving section recording Philip’s actions at Kios and Polybios’ bitter critique of him. The criticism seems very similar to the moral concerns voiced by Polybios at Thermos and Messene, which draw attention to the repercussions of the king’s impiety, contravention of the laws of war, and instigation of the massacre at Messene on his reputation not only amongst his allies but also amongst his enemies, the Aitolians. Once again, Polybios wanted Philip to adhere to behaviour befitting a generous and selfless king and not take advantage of the shifting power relations at Kios. As already discussed, however, Polybios’ arguments censuring Philip’s behaviour at these two incidents do not hold up in their concentration on moral rather than practical concerns, as well as their focus on Achaian rather than Macedonian advantage. Undoubtedly, Philip was ruthless and not adverse to morally questionable acts when profitable; however, Polybios’ claim that Philip had become treacherous and ruthless towards his friends and allies after 215 BC is yet again shown to be exaggerated. This episode at Kios gives a further example of Philip helping out an ally, his kinsman Prusias, in the capture of a city which was also attached to Aitolia, the Macedonian king’s old enemy. This act therefore is similar and consistent in its purpose with the king’s earlier raid on Thermos. The enslavement of the Kians would, of course, have brought substantial monetary profit to Philip in his own ventures in the Aegean and therefore have been conducted partly for his own benefit. However, the fact that the king later handed the city over to his kinsman Prusias still shows that he was attentive to the needs of his allies in 202 BC.
At the end of Polybios’ account of the capture of Kios above he claims that not only did the Rhodians consider Philip their enemy, but the Aitolians did the same. For although the king had only recently made terms with them at the end of the First Macedonian War (205 BC) and no excuse for a breach of this peace had arisen, Philip had appropriated the cities of Lysimacheia, Kalchedon and now Kios (above), all allied to Aitolia, seemingly without any just cause (15.23.7-9). In recording these details, Polybios seems to imply that Philip’s seizure of Aitolian-allied cities was particularly treacherous because of their earlier peace settlement and that his seizure of the cities was unacceptable.89

Yet, what should be noted is that the Aitolians only held a peace treaty with Philip (ἄρτι γὰρ διαλελυμένος, Polybios 15.23.8; see also Livy 29.12.1, condicionibus ad petendam et paciscendam subegit pacem) and not an alliance. The latter, formed for mutual benefit between two or more states, imposed relatively permanent offensive and/or defensive obligations on the involved parties and often compelled them to keep the same friends and enemies.90 This is certainly the case with the Symmachy. Peace treaties, however, even from the Classical period, were frequently only viewed as temporary agreements for the cessation of war and were often broken when deemed advantageous by either side.91 P. J. Rhodes points out that “to some extent a treaty meant what its participants wanted it to mean; it was broken if they chose to think so and it was not broken if they chose to think not;”92 a perception which perhaps partially explains Philip’s actions against Aitolia and Rhodes at this juncture. Philip’s capture of Lysimacheia, Kalchedon and Kios were bids to put the Thracian and Propontis coastal area under Macedonian control, a plan which would allow access to Asia Minor and the important trade routes there. The practical advantages of taking these three cities would have outweighed the repercussions of violating the peace treaty with Aitolia.

89 παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀιτωλοῖς μέσῳ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ἐνειργάσατο πρὸς αὐτόν: ἄρτι γὰρ διαλελυμένος καὶ τὰς χείρας ἐκτείνων πρὸς τὸ ἑθνός, οὐδεμίας προφάσεως ἐγγενομένης, φίλων ὑπάρχονταν καὶ συμμαχών Ἀιτωλῶν, Λυσιμαχέων, Καλχηδόνιων, Κιανῶν, βραχεῖ χρόνων πρότερον, πρὸς τὸν μὲν προσηγάγετο τὴν Λυσιμαχέων πόλιν, ἀποστάσας αὐτὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν συμμαχίας, δευτέρον δὲ τὴν Καλχηδόνιαν, τρίτην δὲ τὴν Κιανῶν ἐξηγηθαποθέσατο, στρατηγοῦ παρ᾽ Αἰτωλῶν ἐν αὐτῇ διατρίβοντος καὶ προσετῶτος τῶν κοινῶν.
90 Adcock & Mosley (1975) 189-95.
91 Rhodes (2008) 6-27. See also Chaniotis (2005) 71-2 for the Hellenistic Greek perception that “peace” was a temporary break between wars, and Adcock and Mosley (1975) 132, 136-7, 194, 204, and Low (2012) 118-134 for a similar understanding during the Classical period.
Furthermore, the Aitolians had sued for peace in 206 after a decline in Roman support in the First Macedonian War, Philip’s second assault on Thermos and the death of Machanidas, and had ignored Roman attempts to restart the war in the following year (Livy 29.12.1): they were evidently too exhausted to continue. This still seems to be the case in 202 as they were unable to retaliate effectively against the seizure of the three cities, and merely sent an embassy to Rome in complaint. Therefore, Philip did not betray an ally by the acquisition of Lysimacheia, Kalchedon and Kios, but a long-term intermittent enemy temporarily at peace by agreement and too weak to defend its possessions.

Philip’s capture of Thasos in the same year does, however, show the king acting treacherously as Polybios asserts. Yet the city’s independent status must be kept in mind when assessing the severity of the king’s deception here. Unfortunately, our knowledge of what happened at Thasos remains incomplete as Polybios’ account is once again fragmentary and no account of the event is recorded within Livy’s work. Enough remains, however, to understand that the city was willing to extend philia ‘friendship’ towards the king (φιλίαν οὖσαν) and had willingly surrendered to Philip following promises that they could remain without a garrison, be exempt from tribute and billeting, and be governed by their own laws (εἰ διατηρήσοι αὐτοῖς ἀφορουχώτους, ἀφορολογήτους, ἀνεπισταθμεύτους, νόμοις χρήσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις…). Freely admitted into the city on these terms, Philip then seizes Thasos and enslaves the inhabitants (προσέπερε περὶ μέσον ἡμέρας πρὸς τὴν τῶν Θασίων πόλιν, καὶ ταύτην φιλίαν οὖσαν ἔξηνδραποδίσατο; 15.24.1-3).

While there is little doubt that Philip deceived the people of Thasos, we cannot describe this behaviour with being typical treatment of an ally as Thasos was an independent state and seemingly unattached to the king. Its position off the coast opposite Macedonia and Thrace would have offered a valuable link for Philip’s ambitions of expansion eastwards and the selling of its inhabitants, like those of Kios, would have eased the financial burden of his fleet. Part of Philip’s plan for expansion after the pact with Antiochos in 203 BC, Thasos was also not the only island of the Cyclades to be seized, as Livy states that Andros, Kythnos and Paros were taken as well (31.15.8, 31.4). Therefore, we cannot categorise this incident of

93 Thasos’ capture in 201 is not recorded by Livy. However, he notes that Philip still possessed the city in 196 BC as it was one of the cities which he was forced to relinquish after Kynoskephalai (33.30.3).
94 Walbank (1940) 115, 117 asserts that the Cyclades were at this time independent although officially under the protection of Rhodes.
treachery as part of Philip’s general treatment of his allies, but only as an instance that shows the ruthlessness of the king in pursuit of his own interests.

4.2.b.iv Philip and Akarnania

Before the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War there is one last episode where we clearly see Philip helping his allies as quickly as he can. In the early winter of 201/200, the king sends help to the Akarnanians in response to their plea for aid after the execution of two of their people following an unintentional (imprudentes) violation of the Eleusinian Mysteries in the autumn of 201 (Livy 31.14.7-11). Although Philip received their pleas for help while still held up by Pergamene and Rhodian naval forces in Bargylia shortly after the event, he still responds quickly by sending them Macedonian aid and permits them to attack Athens (id tam foede atque hostiliter factum gens Acarnanum ad Philippum detulit impetravitque ab eo ut datis Macedonum auxiliis bellum se inferre Atheniensibus pateretur; Livy 31.14.9). The conflict between Philip and the Athenians, which was started by his help to Akarnania, would result in the latter’s increased enthusiasm for open war against the king under the instigation of Attalos of Pergamon, Rhodes and Rome a few months later (Livy 31.15.4-5). Once again Polybios’ assertion that Philip was particularly treacherous and ruthless towards his allies after 215 does not carry conviction.

In investigating the period between the First and Second Macedonian Wars, our awareness of the interactions between the king and those allied to him is unfortunately hindered by the fragmentary nature of Polybios and the highly compressed one of Livy. However, the theme of Philip’s treachery, so emphasised by Polybios, has been preserved and is particularly clear. Yet, we must still be cautious of exaggeration, one-sidedness, unrealistic expectations and Polybios’ intention to put Philip in the position of an example for his readers. The escalation in unkingly behaviour is emphasised by the historian in preparation for Philip’s downfall and

95 Briscoe Commentary XXXI-XXXIII 42-5 argues for this date against Walbank (1940) 312 and McDonald & Walbank (1937) 187, who assumed that the Akarnanian raid on Athens occurred in the spring of 200 after Philip’s return from Bargylia.

96 Briscoe Commentary XXXI-XXXIII 94-7 argues that verbal correspondences (at 14.6, 7, 10-12) indicate Polybios was Livy’s basic source for 31.14, although his text is distorted by the deletion of all references to Roman ambassadors. The summary is argued to be Livy’s own take on events. See also Habicht (1997) 196-98.

97 For Livy’s account of the Second Macedonian War see especially Warrior (1996), with the review by Briscoe (1997).
defeat in 196 BC (see the next section), an event which he claims Fortune manufactured to punish the king for his past bad behaviour. It is also of course used to support the historian’s defence of the Achaian League’s decision to abandon their alliance with the king at a crucial moment in 198. By depicting Philip as an evil tyrant, ruthless to all the Greeks and a traitor of Greek unity against the western invaders, the Achaian League’s defection would not be deemed so critically.

4.2.c 200-196 – To the end of the Second Macedonian War

This last section concerning Philip’s behaviour towards his allies must be informed primarily from Livy’s account as Polybios’ text continues to get ever more fragmentary. Thankfully, the Roman historian resumes a fuller narrative of Philip’s actions as Rome is once more engaged in war with the king and we may assume that a significant portion of his work is based on the Greek historian.98 The record of Philip’s interactions with and support of his Greek allies in these years is rather meagre due to the concentration on the war; calls for aid and interventions in city politics are therefore no longer evident in the literature, although it would be remiss to say they did not happen at all. Certain allies of the Symmachy, for example the Akarnanians, Boiotians, Epirotes, Phokians and Lokrians, appear very little in the narrative, despite some keeping faith with the king until the very end. Nor do we know how much of a role they played within the Second Macedonian War or how much help they gave to Macedonia against Rome. Others, notably the Achaian League, are, as might be expected, far more prominent and conspicuous, and the interactions and growing tension between them and Philip are recorded in much greater detail.

Philip’s support of the Akarnanians in the spring of 200 (see above) was the last example recorded in the literature of the king sending help to his allies when called. After this date, the king’s attentions are more focused either on expanding Macedonian influence along the Thracian coastline, or on the war against Rome and her allies. The few surviving recorded interactions between Philip and his associates also reveal a growing strain as complaints continue against the king’s aggressive policies and his position is weakened by a sequence of

98 See p.8 fn. 27 for Livy’s use and adaptation of Polybios’ narrative.
unsuccessful conflicts against Roman forces in 199 and 198 BC.\textsuperscript{99} This section intends to demonstrate that despite these difficulties Philip still attempted to remain supportive and responsive to the needs of his allies during this period, but was at times prevented from doing so by the war and even forced to commit actions that were considered more ruthless towards them in the face of Roman invasion than might generally be deemed acceptable.

4.2.c.i Losing territory and faith

In regard to loss of territory, the first incident of note occurs in the late autumn of 200 when the Romans capture Chalkis, one of the “fetters” of Greece held by Philip (see pp. 160-2 above for its loyalty in 208 BC). This came about when exiles from the city, driven out by the violence of Philip’s garrison, brought the news that the city could be taken without opposition. The Macedonians were in fact spread throughout the country with no fear of a nearby enemy and the citizens, trusting in the garrison, were careless in the protection of their city. Gaius Claudius Centho, who had been sent to Athens by the consul Publius Sulpicius Galba, sailed to Chalkis (Livy 31.22.5-8) and took the city easily, killing the commander, releasing the prisoners and destroying statues of the king. Owing to the small size of the Roman force, however, they were compelled to leave Chalkis and to return to the Peiraios to uphold the defence of Athens. If they had been able to hold the city both Chalkis and the straits of Euripos, the seaward gateway to Greece, would have been lost to Philip and brought the Romans a particularly propitious start to the war (31.23). Philip meanwhile was at Demetrias when he heard about the capture of Chalkis and although he made an attempt to recover the city, arrived too late to confront the enemy and found the city lying half in ruins, still smoking, with only a few survivors to bury the dead. Crossing over the straits once again, he hurried through Boiotia to Athens, hoping to take the city by surprise as the Romans had taken Chalkis (31.24.1-3). The Athenians, however, were aware of Philip’s approach and had prepared for his attack (31.24.5-18).\textsuperscript{100} The next day, having achieved little at Athens, the king moved to Eleusis in an attempt to capture the sanctuary and surrounding countryside, but was again thwarted by the vigilance of the guard and news of reinforcements approaching

\textsuperscript{99} In 199, against Roman cavalry in Dassaretia (31.33), the Battle of Ottolobos (31.35-38), and the Battle of Banitza in defence of the pass of Eordea into Macedonia (31.39-40.6); in 198 BC, at the Battle at the Aous river (32.9-12).

\textsuperscript{100} For Athens in the Hellenistic period see Habicht (1982) and (1997), and especially (1997) 194-204 for the war against Philip.
from the Peiraios. Deciding to give up this endeavour, Philip marched to Argos for the Achaian council now in session (31.25.1-2).

This episode demonstrates that Philip was still doing all he could to come to the aid of his Chalkidian allies despite his failure to get to the city in time. Nevertheless, it should be noted that his quick pursuit of revenge was probably executed more for the damage done to his own position and the great importance of Chalkis as one of the “fetters” of Greece, than for a genuine concern of the Chalkidians. Philip was apprehensive about his allies’ wellbeing only so far as they kept profiting and supporting himself. Furthermore, the rash attempt on Athens suggests feelings of outraged frustration at the allied city’s second attack, similarly performed in 208 BC while the king was away from the vicinity and unable to protect his interests or confront the enemy. This second failure to protect the city, as well as his earlier unsuccessful assaults on Athens and Eleusis, would have done nothing for his reputation amongst his allies, despite his intentions, and the repercussions of this are soon felt.

After the attempt on Eleusis, Philip surprised the Achaians by appearing at Argos for the Achaian council in 200 (Livy 31.25.2-11). The session was primarily concerned with the increased threat that Nabis of Sparta posed after the Achaians had lost military strength and efficiency with the transference of command from Philopoimen to Kykliadas (31.25.2-3). While they debated the number of men to enlist from each city for the war, Philip, attempting a deal, offered help against this danger in return for their own support. He wanted them to send him a force strong enough to hold Oreo, Chalkis and Korinth in the war against Rome (31.25.4-7). The Achaians, however, were not deceived, understanding that Philip’s generous offer and promise of aid against the Spartans would mean the removal of Achaian forces from the Peloponnese and the engagement of the Achaian League in a war against Rome. In response to the king’s offer, Kykliadas, despite being counted among the king’s friends, asserted that it was not allowable under Achaian laws to vote on a subject other than that which the meeting was originally called. Following his answer, a decree was passed regarding

101 The Achaian League had two types of meetings: the regular quarterly meetings, probably consisting of the Council alone, called σύνοδοι, and irregular meetings, which dealt with matters of war, alliances, or communications from the Roman senate, called συγκλήτου. Until 188 σύνοδοι were regularly held at Aegium, but the συγκλήτου could be held in various cities (see for example 32.19.5 at Sikyon). The meeting in question, held at Argos in 200, is a συγκλήτου discussing the threat of Nabis. See Briscoe Commentary XXXI-XXXIII, 121-2. For the Achaian assemblies see Larsen (1925) 75-105, 165-88; Aymard (1938a); Walbank Commentary I 219-20; Lehmann (1983).
the raising of an army against Nabis and the meeting was adjourned (31.25.8-10). Philip was disappointed in this hope and enlisted a few volunteers before returning to Korinth and moving back to Attica to continue his attack (31.25.11).

This attempt to encourage the Achaians to join the war against Rome, recorded by Livy, is probably referred to in a small, one-sentence Polybian fragment surviving from Book 16. Polybios claims that Philip, seeing that the Achaians were disposed to caution regarding the war against the Romans, earnestly tried in all manner of ways to lead them into a feeling of hatred towards them (Polyb. 16.38). It seems therefore that Livy has condensed Polybios’ account of this incident as we hear nothing of Philip’s attempts to rouse the Achaians’ feelings to hatred towards Rome in his account, only his attempt to negotiate a deal giving them aid against the Spartan threat in return for reinforcements. From the little that we have, Polybios’ version shows Philip as far more desperate to ensure the support of the Achaian League against Rome; the League had, after all, been more difficult to deal with and to rely on in the past. While the Achaians had just recently sent an embassy to Rhodes imploring them to come to terms with Philip and put an end to the war, even this move to support their Macedonian ally would have been initiated with personal interests at the fore. The Achaian-Macedonian relationship was becoming critically strained.

The reasons for the Achaians’ reluctance to go to war with Philip against Rome at this time were numerous and deeply ingrained in Greek character. They have been explored by De Sanctis who argues that although Philip was initiating a war in support of his Akarnanian allies, and while the terms of the Symmachy required all of its members to come to the support of the others, this alliance had been drafted so long ago and during a war of such a

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102 Walbank Commentary II 25, 545 discusses how this fragment could belong to the winter of 199/8 (Livy 32.5) or the autumn of 198 (Livy 32.19), but fits more neatly into 200 in Book 16. Although the fragment, surviving in the Suidas, would fit the context of Livy 31.28.6 (when Philip returns to Macedonia from Abydos and destroys Skiathos and Peparethos), this would place the fragment in Polybios Book 17. This is problematic as De Boor has shown that the compiler of the Suidas took his Polybian excerpts from the Constantinian collection, and by the tenth century when it was compiled Book 17 seems to have already been lost as there are no other surviving quotations from it. See also Briscoe Commentary XXXI-XXXIII 121 who also agrees with Walbank and places the fragment in book 16.

103 Polyb. 16.38: Ὅ δὲ Φίλιππος ὁ Ἀχαίων ἐναλαξάς διακειμένως πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ρωμαίων πόλεμον, ἐσπούδαζε κατὰ τὰν τρόπον ἐμβρύασαι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀπέχθειαν.

104 They had refused to support the king financially in his attack on Aitolia in 220 when the Macedonians had supported Eperatos, Aratos’ rival, for the position of strategos of the League. Aratos had also warned the king at Messene in 215 that he would lose the good-will of his Achaian allies should he occupy the city with a Macedonian garrison; a move which Philip completed the next year.
different size and scope to the one on the horizon that it was deemed necessary to consider the present circumstances more carefully. More recently, Scherberich’s assessment that the Symmachy was, in practice, no longer in effect during the First and Second Macedonian Wars also supports this view that members of the Symmachy might have viewed the terms of the alliance as less relevant in 200, not since 217, during the peace negotiations leading to the treaty of Naupaktos, had the Symmachy been brought together as a body.

However, De Sanctis’ second point, notably the claim that the Achaian League felt a repugnance towards going to war against Athens because this city was considered ‘la capitale morale de mondo greco’, and because the League had taken the chief role in liberating it from Macedonian influence in 229, is less convincing. It is hard to tell whether Athens was still, or ever truly was considered, the moral capital of the Greek world, especially as it had kept a conspicuous neutrality, avoiding international entanglements despite numerous war waging around them (the war of Kleomenes (228-222), the Social War (220-217) and the First Macedonian War (212-205)). Moreover, after their liberation in 229, the Athenians had refused to join the League and to help in the war against Kleomenes, which ultimately forced the Achaian approach of Macedonia later in 224. Finally, they had also angered the Achaians by their overtures to Ptolemy III, who had recently transferred his subsidies from Aratos to Kleomenes, and by their foundation of a cult of the Egyptian king in 224/23 BC (Polyb. 5.106.6-8; Plut. Arat. 41.3). It is therefore unlikely that the Achaians would have felt much repugnance towards attacking Athens.

Rome’s intervention in the East, combined with the forces of Attalos and Rhodes, and her recent victories against Hannibal and Carthage had revealed its immense power and maritime supremacy. Combined with the not insubstantial naval forces of Attalos and Rhodes, which could already counterbalance Philip’s fleet, and the added safety of shelter in the allied ports of the Peiraios and Aegina, there would be little problem fighting against Macedonia by sea. The great risks to Philip’s allies, therefore, of being caught up in the king’s ruin and suffering under such a powerful enemy were ones which could not be counterbalanced by the

105 De Sanctis (1923) 40-41.
108 See for example the battles of Lade and Chios. For Macedonian sea-power under the Antigonids see Walbank (2002) 107-126.
prospect of victory; the result of which could either keep the *status quo* within Greece or, worse, increase Macedonian power.

Furthermore, although Philip was still prepared to help his Achaian allies in a time of trouble, there had also been a crucial shift in dependency as the king was now more in need of his ally’s aid than they were of his. The Achaians had not asked him for help against Nabis, a sign that Achaia was more confident and powerful than it once was and now endeavouring to seek out more independence. The Achaian general, Philopoimen, had brought about substantial changes in Achaian military training, resulting in a stronger force far more capable of dealing with difficulties in the Peloponnese. As De Sanctis rightly points out, this growing confidence in their own military strength would only have increased the bitterness they felt in being attached to Philip and therefore in being hindered from following their own independent policies. Despite the moral obligations to support Philip in their alliance with him, the Achaians were wise to the disadvantages of helping their benefactor – they would once again have a greater obligation to him for his help against Sparta, would have to spread their own forces even further making the Achaian military presence in the Peloponnese weaker and their dependence on the king stronger, and they would be involved in a war against a powerful foreign enemy who was allied to a number of other powerful Greek states. The king’s recent unsuccessful attempts against Rome and her allies must also have discouraged the Achaians from offering their support. Not only would they have refused to be involved in a war that Philip might lose and consequently put them in a bad position, but by staying detached at the present moment they could see which way the war went and make decisions accordingly.

The Achaians’ refusal to send aid to the Macedonian king in 200 is the first indication that relations between Philip and his once close allies were starting to waiver. Despite Polybios’ claims that there was ill-feeling towards Philip because of his treatment of the Greeks, the change in relations is more the result of a shift in dependence than the king’s behaviour. Although Philip had always given aid when needed, as the earlier narrative of Polybios suggests, the Achaians were now abandoning their ally in a time of need; the interests of both

109 De Sanctis (1923) 42.
110 There is also a tradition in Plutarch (*Philop.* 12.2), Pausanias (8.50.4) and Justin (29.4) claiming that Philip attempted to have Philopoemen killed, perhaps referring to this time. If this tradition is correct it would, of course, have caused further hostility in the Achaian League towards the Macedonian king. It is, of course, possible that Polybios also included this information in one of the fragmentary parts of his *Histories*, particularly as he was known to be close to this Achaian leader (see overview of Polybios’ life at 1.1.a).
parties were very different now and did not easily unite into a mutual dependency as they did when Philip first came to power. The decision not to help Philip and, as we see later, to abandon him in 198 would not have been considered the proper behaviour for a relationship based on mutual respect and obligation, and it is very likely the Achaians would have been criticised for their lack of fidelity. This episode draws attention therefore to the great importance of power balance in determining the destiny of alliance.

Nor was the Achaian refusal to help out in the war the only sign of Philip’s weakness at this point. The Romans had also won the support of many of the minor kings on the northern borders of Macedonia: Galba had sent Lucius Apustius on a successful raid of the Macedonian frontier and easily captured the towns of Corrhagum, Gerronios, Orgessum Codrio, Cnidos, and burnt Antipatrea. As a result, several minor kings now joined the Romans – Pleuratos, son of Skerdilaidas, Amynander of Athamania, and Bato from the Dardani (Livy 31.27). The wavering of ally loyalty likely continued into 199 BC as Rome and her allies encircled and threatened the Macedonian king on all sides. In the summer of 199, Philip was defeated by the Romans at the battle of Ottolobus and, although the king had defeated the enemy at Pluinna, the pass of Eordaea into Macedonia had been captured with a battle near Banitza. The regions of Orestis and Dassarettia were subsequently taken before the Roman consul ended the campaign and returned to Apollonia (31.35-40.6). The Dardanians and the Illyrians had also caused trouble in Macedonia itself, although they had been successfully driven back by Philip’s commander Athenagoras (31.38.7). At the same time, Aitolians and Athamanians had finally decided to participate in the war on the side of Rome (31.40.7-10), making an assault on Thessaly and destroying Cercinium in Pelasgiotics, Chyretiae in Perrhaebia further north, while Malloia had surrendered. The attack of southern Macedonia was only prevented by Amynander’s desire to capture Gomphi to the southwest and close to the Athamanian border (Livy 31.41.1-6). Yet 199 was not a completely unsuccessful year as Philip’s defensive strategy came off well: the Romans, despite their victories in the north, had not penetrated the heart of Macedonia; Philip’s commander Athenagoras had pushed back the Dardanian and Illyrian invasions; and Philip himself had frightened off the Aitolian-Athamanian attack in Thessaly. In the last, Philip showed typical speed in falling upon the Aitolians near Pharkadon in the Eurupos valley and routed them with severe losses.

111 The Dardanian and Illyrian attack does not seem to have been considered a serious threat as the king did not take immediate action against them; see Briscoe Commentary XXXI-XXXIII 143 and Walbank (1940) 143.
Aynander, encamped a mile away, was forced to retreat and helped escort the surviving Aitolians back to Aitolia (Livy 31.41.7-42.9). Philip had once again protected an ally from capture and destruction.

Simultaneous with Philip’s dealings with the Aitolians and Aynander in Thessaly, a second assault of Oreos took place by land and sea, and the city was finally captured by Roman and Pergamene forces. The struggle was more difficult, however, than the last attempt on the city as the Macedonian defenders had not only increased in number, but also fought with greater spirit, keeping in mind the king’s reprimand for the capture in 207. Eventually, however, the city’s garrison was worn down and a large part of the walls collapsed, after which Oreos surrendered and was given to Attalos (31.41.9-16). The city controlled the Pagasean gulf and the southern route through Euboia, and its loss was a severe blow to Philip’s position. The capture also posed another failure in 199 and, although the king was successful in driving off the Dardanians, Illyrians, Aitolians and Athamanians, his losses would still have caused further disquiet amongst his allies. Perhaps if Achaia had given her support to the king, Oreos would not have been captured and Philip, in spite of weathering the attacks in 199 with reasonable success, would have ended the year in a better position.

4.2.c.ii Philip’s Changing Behaviour and Desperation

In the winter of 199/98, Philip is depicted as a man worried about the future. He is surrounded by the enemy, distrustful of his allies, particularly Achaia and Epiros, fearing they will revolt in the hope of an alliance with Rome (illi ad spem amicitiae Romanorum deficerent), and even suspicious of his subjects who might also be inspired to rebellion (Macedonas ipsos cupido novandi res caperet: Livy 32.5.1-3). Philip decides to send ambassadors to Achaia to demand the annual oath of loyalty towards him, and agrees to restore Orchomenos, Heraia and Tripylia to them and Alipheira to the Megalopolitans; a decision, which, Livy records, strengthens the alliance between the king and the Achaians for a time (32.4-6). Yet this resurgence of loyalty does not last for long, not even the year, as the Achaians become

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112 Briscoe Commentary XXXI-XXXIII 174. See also Oost (1954) 43-48.
113 This oath is not mentioned anywhere else by Livy and is probably the same mentioned by Polybios at 4.9.4 - ἔνορκος... ἃ... συμμαχία. Annually renewed, this confirmed the Philip’s right to summon the Achaian assembly and the members of the symmachy to meetings.
aggravated by the increasing strength of the Romans and her allies, illustrated ominously by Rome’s victory against the Macedonian king at the battle of the Aous Pass in the summer of 198, a clash in which the king initially possessed the advantage.

By this time, Philip’s treatment of his allies had also started to become more ruthless as he found himself and his power increasingly under threat. However, rather than supporting Polybios’ claim on the king’s tyrannical character, it in fact undermines the treacherous and self-seeking image which Philip is meant to be displaying in these later years. In his vigorous preparations for war in 200, the king had destroyed Skiatos and Peparethos, islands off the southern tip of Magnesia, to prevent them from falling into Roman hands (Livy 31.28.6, 45.12-13). It was readily acknowledged that the Macedonian fleet was no match for the combined forces of Rome, Attalos and Rhodes as, although Herakleides was put in charge of the navy at Demetrias in 199, this fleet was positioned here more in aid of taking advantage of any opportunities offered by the enemy’s negligence rather than for an open confrontation of the enemy (Livy 31.33.2, 46.8). Similarly in 198, after Philip’s defeat by the Romans at the Aous Pass, he retreated through Thessaly and burned the allied towns. Livy records at 32.13.6-9:

\[\text{homines qui sequi possent sedibus excibat; oppida incendebat. rerum suarum quas possent ferendarum secum dominis ius fiebat, cetera militis praeda erat. nec, quod ab hoste crudelius pati possent, reliqui quicquam fuit, quam quae ab sociis patiebantur. haec etiam facienti Philippo acerba erant, sed e terra mox futura hostium corpora saltem eripere sociorum volebat. ita evastata oppida sunt Phacium, Iresiae, Euhydrium, Eretria, Palaepharsalus.}\]

He [Philip] summoned from their homes the men who could follow; the towns he burned. The owners were allowed to carry with them what they could of their possessions; the rest was booty for the soldier. Nor was there any remaining hardship which they could suffer more cruelly from an enemy than the things which they suffered at the hands of their allies. These actions were bitter to Philip even as he did them, but he wished to rescue at

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114 Peparethus had been attacked by Attalos in 208 (Polyb. 10.42; Livy 28.5) and seems to have been restored after the First Macedonian War (Syll. ² 587). See also Briscoe Commentary XXXI-XXXIII 129.
least the persons of his allies from a land soon to belong to the enemy. So the towns of
Phacium, Iresiae, Euhydrium, Eretria, and Palaepharsalus were laid waste.

Philip is said to find his own actions here harsh and bitter, but regardless felt compelled to
commit them; he was trying to save the lives of his allies even if he could not save their
homes. This reflects the horror and fear felt by the Greeks and Macedonians at the ruthless
and unmerciful behaviour of the Romans, who were renowned for burning cities, and
massacring and enslaving populations.¹¹⁵ Nor was Philip wrong in his fears as very quickly
after the king’s defeat Thessaly was raided by the Aitolians and Athamanians, and shortly
afterwards the Romans captured and burned Phaloria, with many smaller cities surrendering
in its wake (Livy 32.13.9-15.3). In removing the Thessalians from harms way therefore,
Philip was attempting to preserve a Greek people, even if one closely attached to Macedonia,
from the depredations of the western invaders. Despite the brutality inherent in destroying
allied towns, therefore, Livy’s claim that Philip found the actions distasteful and was only
doing what he had to through necessity, implies the reverse of what Polybios says about the
king’s behaviour during this period.

Interestingly, this discrepancy is also found in Polybios’ account. Philip’s aversion to his
own actions in Thessaly is reinforced in the surviving passages of the conference at Nicaea
(Polybios 18.1-6). In response to the Aitolian ambassador Alexander’s accusations claiming
that he had treated his Thessalian allies like an enemy, Philip defends his position by saying
that everything that he had done had been done through necessity:

σαφῶς γὰρ πάντας γινώσκειν ὅτι τοὺς ἰδίους συμμάχους ἐκῶν μὲν οὐδὲς διαφθείρει,
katὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν καυρῶν περιστάσεις πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι τοὺς ἡγουμένους
παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν προαιρέσεις. (18.4.2)

¹¹⁵ Eckstein (2008) 281. See for instance Anticyra in 211, Polyb. 9.39; Phaloria in 198, Livy 32.15.2-3; Eretria,
Livy 32.16.15-17; Carystus, Livy 32.17.1; and Elateia, Livy 32.24.6-7. For the brutality of Roman weaponry, see
Livy 31.33, 45.5. Interestingly, Livy does not include Philip’s defence of himself for the burning of Thessaly in
the narrative, although Alexander’s vitriol against it is evident (Livy 32.33.14), and it is clear from the similarity
of the texts that the historian was using Polybios’ material. Instead, Livy moves quickly onto describing
Phaeneas’ rude interruption of the king and Philip’s tendency to jest even while conducting serious business
(32.34.1-3). The Roman historian presumably omits Philip’s defence in an attempt to subvert the king’s
reasoning and the necessity of such drastic measure in light of Roman brutality.
For everyone knows clearly that no one destroys their own allies willingly, but according to the circumstances of the particular occasions, leaders are forced to do many things contrary to their own principles.

It is also important to note, of course, that Philip’s concern for the lives of the Thessalian people was more in response to worries about population numbers and their ability to work the land and supply the king with troops. Such anxieties were also evident earlier, for example, in the king’s letters to the city of Larissa in Thessaly in 217 and 215 BC. In these, Philip insists that the Larisseans extend citizenship to the Greek metics in the area to remedy the harmful effects of depopulation caused by the Social War (220-217 BC; see pp. 75-6). It is very likely that the effects of this earlier depletion of population were still felt in 198, particularly as the First and Second Macedonian Wars (211-205 BC; 200-196 BC) would have reduced their numbers further. In taking the Thessalians with him therefore, Philip was no doubt trying to save as many of them as possible and preserve the area not only from complete devastation from lack of use, but also from falling into enemy hands: should events turn out well for Philip, the people could be returned to support the Thessalian economy once again; if not, they could be relocated and still made use of by the Macedonian king. Furthermore, the evacuation and burning of towns in Thessaly also prevented the enemy from gaining much needed supplies in the region; a tactic which soon proved successful as Livy records that the Romans were forced to delay pursuit of the king in order to bring provisions from their ships stationed in Ambracia to Gomphi where they were encamped (Livy 32.15.5-6). Therefore, while Philip’s actions were certainly ruthless in their treatment of an ally, they were also practical and informed by an awareness of the seriousness of the situation and in an attempt to alleviate potential damage to both himself and his allies.

Following his defeat at the battle at the Aous Pass in 198 (Livy 32.6-12), Philip’s situation gets worse. He is unable to send help to Eretria when needed (32.16.10-17, and the Romans soon capture Carystos in Euboia and the regions Phokis and Opuntian Lokris on the mainland (32.17-18, 24). With the allied Roman, Pergamene and Rhodian fleet lying at Kenchreae, Korinth too was under threat (32.19.3). It is also in this year (198) that the Achaian League defect to the Romans and her allies, despite Philip’s attempts to exhort them either to stand with him or to remain neutral (32.19-23; see below for a more detailed discussion of this

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116 The Romans had recently spared the fields in Epiros because of their defection to Rome (Livy 32.15.5-6).
While the main body of the Achaian League decides to defect, however, the individual cities of Korinth, Megalopolis, Dyme and Argos refuse to accept this decision and walk out of the conference before the vote is fully announced (32.22.8-12). We hear nothing more in the literary sources regarding the fate of Megalopolis and Dyme and it may be presumed that they eventually decided to stay attached to the League. In the case of the others, however, Korinth remained under a strong Macedonian garrison until Philip’s defeat at Kynoskephalai (33.14-15); Argos was treacherously taken by Nabis before the battle.

This latter event is notable for the Macedonian king’s attempt to protect the city. Livy records that Philip, away from the region, is concerned for the two cities still loyal to Macedonia left in the Peloponnese, Korinth and Argos, but more so for the latter. He thinks it best therefore to give the city for its own protection to Nabis, the Spartan ruler, with the proviso that it be restored to him if he should be successful in the coming battle; if not, it would remain with Nabis. The king then writes to Philocles to arrange a meeting with Nabis to settle the matter, also adding a pledge of future friendship and the marriage of his daughters to Nabis’ sons. Nabis at first refuses to accept the city on any other terms than an invitation proffered by the Argives themselves. However, after supposedly hearing curses against himself in the Argive assembly, he tells Philocles to deliver Argos to him. Nabis is introduced at night and quickly takes and plunders the city, proposing measures for the cancellation of debts and the redistribution of land to inflame the people against their pro-Macedonian leaders (32.38). Having taken Argos, Nabis then meets with the Roman commander Flamininus and with Attalos of Pergamon, telling them that the city is now in his power and that it would be possible for them to come to an agreement with him. In the course of the meeting, the Spartan agrees to supply auxiliaries to the Romans in the coming battle and to commit to an armistice with the Achaians until the war against Philip is concluded (32.39).

While this transaction is ultimately a failure, it can only be seen as an attempt by Philip to protect an ally. The protection of Argos proved difficult as it was situated in the middle of the Peloponnese, now largely hostile to Macedonia. Yet, the city’s display of loyalty could not be ignored by Philip and his attempt to save it cannot therefore show a complete lack of concern for, nor treachery towards, his allies. Philip must have known that temporarily placing the city in the care of Nabis was a risky move. However, given the circumstances he had few other options open to him. The king would already have been aggrieved and disadvantaged by the loss of his allies within Greece. The loss of the Achaian League, particularly, which would have meant the collapse of Macedonian control of the Peloponnese, the last strongholds being
Korinth, which still possessed a Macedonian garrison, and Argos. Undoubtedly, he was feeling an increasingly desperate need to protect those remaining to him in whatever way he could, even it if meant taking risky action.

This was the last of Philip’s actions with regard to his allies before the battle of Kynoskephalai – this soon lost him all of his remaining possessions within mainland Greece, the Aegean and Thrace. During the course of the Second Macedonian War, it seems that the king still attempted to remain supportive and responsive to the needs of his allies. Yet, as the war progressed Philip became increasingly desperate, severely constrained by the successive defeats inflicted upon him by the Roman forces and forced to commit ruthless and risky actions in the protection of his allies which would do little to help his reputation.

4.3 The Loyalty and Defection of Philip’s Greek Allies

There are numerous reasons for the defection of Macedonia’s allies to Rome and, as hopefully supported by the arguments of the previous sections, these cannot have been wholly dependent on Philip’s behaviour. The majority of Philip’s allies were with him for the larger part of his reign, only switching their allegiance to Rome when compelled to in 198, and some even refusing to break from Macedonia until Philip’s defeat at the battle of Kynoskephalai in 197 BC. Fear and necessity played a significant role in his allies’ decision to side with Rome and some were forced into it to a greater degree than others. The first of Philip’s allies to be lost were Lokris, Phokis and a large number of cities in Euboia, captured by Roman forces in 199 and 198 (see above); little more is said about these places by Polybios than that they were captured. The brutality of Roman military action, first witnessed in 210-207 in the First Macedonian War, was only reaffirmed by the devastation and seizure of these places. Yet, the moment of significance noted in Polybios’ *Histories* and which was, despite his Achaian bias, probably accurate to an extent, was the defection of the Achaian League. Although the Achaian League was not the first of Philip’s allies to make the decision to side with Rome (Epiros left just beforehand), as a prominent confederation in Greece at the time the League’s departure from the Macedonian alliance was more likely to have affected the attitude of the other allies too.
Epiros was the first to defect to Rome and this proved to be an important political moment for the Romans in their bid to separate Greece from the Macedonian king.\textsuperscript{117} Livy records, in a very short passage, that while Thessaly was being attacked by three armies at once (Macedonian, Roman, and Aitolian and Athamanian) after the battle at the Aous river in 198 Flamininus marched into Epiros. Although the consul knew that the Epirotes were allied to Philip, after seeing their zealousness in carrying out his orders to please him, he chose to judge them by their present behaviour rather than their past and, by his readiness to show mercy and protection from harm, quickly won them over to the Roman cause (32.14.4-6; cf. Plut. \textit{Flam.} 5.1).\textsuperscript{118} In his analysis of Flamininus’ conduct and strategy in Greece, Eckstein gives two reasons for the Roman general’s decision to turn south after Aous and protect Epiros from Roman raids: firstly, it was a political decision which aimed at winning over Greece and changing the Roman reputation for brutality amongst the Greeks (cf. Livy 31.33, 45.5; Paus. 7.8.2; App. \textit{Mac.} 7); and secondly, turning south into Epiros would allow the Romans to approach Macedonia from the southeast. The expected fall of the Macedonian fortress of Gomphi, on the border of Thessaly and Athamania, would connect up with the Epirote border and allow new supply routes to open up for an operation against the eastern power.\textsuperscript{119}

\textbf{4.3.a The Achaian League}

The Achaian League’s decision to ally with Rome is unfortunately missing from the surviving Polybian material, as it was recorded in Book 17 of the \textit{Histories}, all of which is now lost. However, we are once again fortunate to have Livy’s account (32.19-23), the length and detail of which suggests a reasonably close adherence to Polybios’ undoubtedly very comprehensive description of the affair. In assessing this episode it should be remembered that Livy was particularly fond of describing the emotions and thoughts of the people he was writing about, and although this episode was no doubt of high importance within Polybios’ narrative, it is

\textsuperscript{117} See Oost (1954) 48.
possible that some of the emotional content originated from the Roman historian.\textsuperscript{120}
Regardless of Livy’s possible adaptations, however, the Achaian League’s change of alliance was an enormously important moment not only for the League, but also for Philip and the rest of Greece as well. It is representative of the pressures felt by all the Greek states in the wake of Roman interference in the East and illustrates the great uncertainty felt at the changes occurring in the power structures of the Mediterranean.

The Achaian question about whether to support Macedonia, to remain neutral or to defect to Rome had been undecided for two years: Philip’s request in 200 for Achaian forces in his war against Rome in exchange for help against Nabis had been the start of the League’s detachment and move away from the Macedonian king. The final decision to leave, however, was not brought to the vote until in the autumn of 198 at a meeting held at Sikyon. The decision was a difficult one and Livy describes the Achaian state of mind as complicated and uncertain (\textit{erat autem non admodum simplex habitus inter Achaeos animorum}, 32.19.6, and \textit{incertos}, 32.19.10), concerned by the threat of Nabis, the horror of Roman arms, the ties of obligation binding them to the Macedonians, their suspicion of Philip in regard to his cruelty and treachery, and their worry that he would become harsher after the war (32.19.6-8).\textsuperscript{121} The confusion and commotion of the Achaian assembly is emphasised by its inability at first to make a decision, no one initially even speaking for or against either side. It is only after Aristainos, the pro-Roman Achaian general of 199/98, had addressed the assembly for the second time, appealing to their sense of self-preservation and arguing for the futility of supporting Philip any longer and reminding them of the king’s crimes against the Greeks, that there is any motion for a decision (32.21). Livy records that the need to reach a verdict and the intense opposition of conflicting views expressed within the League created tremendous confusion and commotion.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{121}] Briscoe \textit{Commentary XXXI-XXXIII} 202 suggests that these benefactions refer to the help Doson gave to the AchaianS against Kleomenes in the 220s, to Philip’s help in the Social War (\textit{beneficis…veteribus}) and his concessions of Orchomenos, Heraia, Triphylia, and Alipheira in 199/8 (\textit{recentibus}). Against this interpretation, Aymard (1938b) 87 n. 18 (cf. Holleaux (1921) 272 n.3) argues that \textit{recentibus} refers to Philip’s help of Achaia in the First Macedonian War. However, as Briscoe points out, it could be said that the First Macedonian War was not initiated by a decision of the Achaian League, that Philip only helped the League to prevent Sparta from fighting outside of the Peloponisse, and that this designation of the First Macedonian War as \textit{recentibus} would not give a sufficient contrast with \textit{veteribus}. \textit{Crudelitate perfidiaque} are stated to be Philip’s attacks of towns and pillaging of sacred places (\textit{crudelitas}), and his murdering of political opponents and the secret machinations against Rhodes (\textit{perfidia}).
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pressure and even outbursts of violence among the League member states and people themselves.

When it finally becomes clear that more are in favour of breaking the alliance with Macedonia than staying in it, the delegates of Dyme, Megalopolis and some of the Argives leave the council before the motion is passed. Their departure goes uncriticised by the remaining members as their cities held close ties with Macedonia and Philip. The Megalopolitans, it is explained, when defeated by the Spartans, had been restored to their homes by Doson in 226 BC. Similarly, the Dymei, recently captured and plundered by the Romans, had been ransomed, restored to their homes and given their liberty by Philip (Livy 32.22.10). The Argives too, besides believing the kings of Macedon to be descended from them, were also bound to Philip by personal friendship (32.22-23.3; see below for further discussion).

Thus the majority of the Achaian League, Philip’s ally since the beginning of his reign, in light of the growing threat of Rome and the apparent weakness of the Macedonian king severed their alliance with Macedonia. The reasons for the Achaian League’s reluctance to go to war with Philip against Rome were varied, yet a primary concern must have been the fear of Roman might and brutality. On land and sea, the Romans had proven a ruthless enemy, witnessed at first in Galba’s command during the First Macedonian War (210-207; Paus. 7.8.2), and later throughout the Second Macedonian War in the commands of Galba, Flamininus and his brother Lucius. It quickly became clear that they were not adverse to pillaging, massacring and enslaving populations, and burning Greek cities for strategic purposes. The Achaian League’s reasons for questioning their alliance with Philip had also been strengthened by the Macedonian king’s inability to fend off the combined forces of Rome, Pergamon and Rhodes, and his consequent loss of Phokis, Lokris and areas of Euboia and Thessaly in 199/8. Moreover, the League was already discontent with Philip’s high-handed behaviour towards them and his recent atrocities in Thessaly. It is therefore likely that Flamininus’ lenient treatment of the Epirotes after the battle at the Aous River (he prevented

123 See Jones (1999) 36-41 for the Macedonian ties with Argos.
125 See p. 188 fn. 117. See also Eckstein (1976) for the continuity of the brutality in the policies of Galba and Flamininus, and particularly p. 135 for the Romans’ typical aim of gaining the quick submission of strategic areas. For the Greek fear of Roman domination see also Ferrary (1988) 45-6.

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the army from plundering and destroying their country and towns in exchange for their allegiance) would also have affected the Achaian decision.

Yet, as seen above, some in the Achaian League – the Megalopolitans, Dymei and a few of the Argives (though not yet the whole city) – still remained loyal to the Macedonian alliance, a fact that cannot be ignored when considering the relationship between Philip and his allies. Some of this loyalty would have come about from the people of these cities – the masses in Dyme for example would have remembered how Philip restored them after Galba had sold them into slavery (Livy 32.22.10; cf. see also the Argive support of Philip described below p. 198). On the other hand, some of this loyalty would also have come about from the bonds of xenia ‘ritualised friendship’ which connected the Macedonian house with the Greek aristocracy, as well as official networks of proxenia, which connected certain individuals from these cities to the Macedonians as a whole.

The former established ‘friendships’ between aristocratic individuals outside each of their own communities and were often stronger than the ties attaching the aristocracy to their own cities and institutions. They could consequently be very influential in shaping the course of events. Correspondingly, proxenia was similar to and derived from xenia, however, instead of tying two individuals together in friendship, it tied an individual to a city in friendship. Both types of relationship were based on terms of moral obligation through the mutual exchanging of gifts and services (euergetism): the xenoi supported each other not only in their everyday and personal lives, but also in perpetuating their political careers. Proxenoi officially supported the public and private interests of their associated city (understood as the beneficiary) while still residing in their own city of origin, and in exchange received status and honours. Maintaining such mutual obligations in both cases was of high importance and a breach of them was considered a crime not only against men but against the gods too. As Herman has pointed out, “being left in the lurch was interpreted as an affront to honour”.  

126 See Herman (1987) for an excellent discussion of xenia and the importance of these relationships for the Greek elite and in establishing the general course of events.

127 Herman (1987) particularly pp. 118-127 for the nature of obligation inherent in these relationships and pp. 129-149 for the type of services offered.

128 See Mack (2015) in general, but esp. 36-80.

We only have Livy’s account to rely on for knowledge of these ties between Philip and Megalopolis, Dyme and Argos, and although the author can only refer to them using Latin terminology – *privatis etiam hospitis familiarique amicitia plerique illigati Philippo erant*, ‘many were still attached to Philip by personal ties and private friendship’ (32.22.11) - these private ties could not be anything other than the former relationship - *xenia*.\(^ {130} \) It is unfortunate that Polybios’ account of this event has not survived, for the reader may have been given more information about these connections within the original text. Considering that Polybios discussed the *xenia* between Philip and the Boiotian house of Brachylles in Book 18, however, it would not be implausible to suppose that he would also have made some reference to ties between the Argive elite and the Macedonian king. But even without Polybios’ input, it may be said, at the very least, that Livy’s text reveals that there was a strong sense of obligation and duty felt by the Megalopolitans, Dymeri and Argives towards Macedonia. Their great aversion to abandoning their alliance with the king, in spite of his recent losses, could very well be partly ascribed to *xenia*, which greatly affected a city’s political leanings, as well as the benefactor/beneficiary relationship between kings and cities (see 2.3.a).

It is also possible that the king’s recent actions in Thessaly, the Aegean and along the Thracian coast, his capture of Kios and Abydos, his sacrilegious and wrathful behaviour in Attica, his breach with and capture of Messene, and all of the other accusations of treacherous and ruthless actions against his allies cited by Polybios, were not considered by all to be severe enough to leave the Macedonian alliance when given the opportunity. On the other hand, the above all demonstrated the king’s power in the Mediterranean and fear of Philip may similarly have affected the allies’ decision to stay, just as likely as it convinced others to leave. Loyalty can be acquired by fear as well as genuine affection and at times the line is so blurred that they could be one and the same. This is certainly the case of the loyalty of Korinth to the Macedonian cause. Livy records the unsuccessful Roman efforts to besiege and take Korinth after the defection of the Achaian League: it is stated that due to the large size of the Macedonian garrison in the city, the recent arrival of reinforcements commanded by Philip’s general Philocrates, and the general lack of dissension among the Korinthian citizens,

the siege was abandoned (32.23). Yet, we should be cautious in crediting the citizens of Korinth with loyalty through genuine goodwill towards the Macedonians. The size of the royal garrison would very likely have been substantial in view of the importance of the city as one of the ‘fetters of Greece’, and this arrival of large Macedonian reinforcements would have put even more pressure on the citizens not to surrender. The Macedonian presence, therefore, not only kept enemies out, but also kept the people inside ‘loyal’. There were undoubtedly xenoi and proxenoi of Philip and Macedonia within the city’s walls. However, it is impossible to judge how they would have affected the solidarity of the city as a whole.

The arrival of Philocles in the Peloponnese also encouraged the part of Argos which had defected with the League to return to their allegiance with the Macedonians. However, the Argives, believing the Macedonian royal house to be descended from their same stock and some having personal ties with the king, only needed the encouragement of reinforcements to stay attached to Macedonia. Philip’s popularity in the city is recorded by Livy (32.25): it had been customary on assembly-days to begin proceedings with the presiding officer pronouncing the names of Zeus, Apollo and Heracles as an auspicious act. It had also been decreed (sometime unknown in the past) that Philip’s name be joined to the list. After the alliance with the Romans, however, the herald had not included Philip’s name after the gods in the customary manner and shouts rose from the crowd. Soon there was uproar as Philip’s supporters supplied his name and ordered the legal honour to be paid him; the reading of his name was met with thunderous applause. Encouraged by this show of loyalty from the masses, Philocles was summoned and able to enter the city at night. Most of the Achaian force were allowed to leave unharmed, while a few who remained determined to fight were defeated. It seems therefore that Argos and its people, connected historically to Macedonia and very probably home to individuals holding connections of xenia with Philip, were far more inclined to keep to its attachments than others may have been. We unfortunately do not hear anything more about the fate of Megalopolis or Dyme from Polybios or Livy, and it is possible that they did not break away from the Achaian League despite their disapproval of the decision to leave the alliance.

131 There is no question that this attack on Korinth was in aid of drawing the Achaians to the Roman side and to consolidate the alliance. See De Sanctis (1923) 68-9; Grainger (1999) 385 and Pfeilschifter (2005) 190 and fn. 15.
4.3.b The Boiotian League

Besides Korinth, Argos, Megalopolis and Dyme, the Boiotian confederations also remained loyal to Macedonia at this point (198 BC). Brachylles, a prominent leader of the confederation and a personal friend of the king (see below for details of this friendship and the effect it had on Boiotian attitudes towards Macedonia and Rome), accompanied Philip after the Achaian League’s defection to the first meeting with Flamininus at Lokris in 198 BC (Polyb. 18.1.2). In fact, it was only in the spring of 197 before the battle of Kynoskephalai that the Roman commander set the task of bringing the Boiotians over to the Roman side. Once again the affair only survives in Livy and we cannot be certain of the closeness of this version to Polybios’, although it is likely a derivative of the Greek historian’s Histories. The account of the Boiotian decision to break away from Macedonia is not as long or as emotionally charged as that of the Achaian one. It takes up only two passages in Livy’s narrative (33.1-2) while the Achaian affair is double that length (32.19-23.3), and the Boiotians are said to have concealed their sorrow, the display of which would have been both fruitless and not without risk (texterunt dolorem quem et nequiquam et non sine periculo ostendissent; 33.1.8). A sentiment very likely true in view of the recent defection of the Achaian League, Philip’s inability to assist them and the fact that the location of the meeting, Thebes, was currently occupied by two thousand Roman soldiers (33.1). Among the speakers, Attalos reminded the assembly of his and his forefathers’ services to the Greek and Boiotian people, and Aristainos, the Achaian general of the previous year, gave the same advice to the Boiotians as he did the Achaians – it was futile and dangerous to support Philip any longer. Flamininus also spoke in terms of Roman loyalty rather than their strength and material resources in an attempt to weaken the Roman reputation for brutality. The motion proposing an alliance with Rome was carried unanimously by the Boiotian cities, no one daring to speak against it (33.2). Fear is the main emotion running throughout the narrative, so much so that the Boiotians do not even have a voice and we are consequently unable to determine their attitude towards Philip and the Romans.

Yet, the actions of the Boiotians only a little later after the battle reveal something about their true regard for Macedonia and Rome. Polybios records (18.43.1-4; cf. Livy 33.27.5-9) that the Boiotians approached Flamininus in the winter of 196 BC as they were anxious to recover the men that had served under Philip in the previous campaign. The Roman commander, hoping to conciliate the Boiotians and win sympathy among the Greek states, consented to look to their safe return. Among those who were brought back was Brachylles son of Neon, a close friend of the house of Macedon, and who was immediately made boiotarch. Yet his return by Roman intervention did not change his attachment to Philip or Macedonia as he continued to promote the interests of and honour other pro-Macedonian Boiotians. Furthermore, the thanks for the recovery of the Boiotian men were directed to Philip despite it being the Roman commander who had organised their return. The Boiotians, therefore, despite the recent vote by the assembly to conclude an alliance with Rome, were clearly still loyal to the Macedonian royal house regardless of its recent defeat.

One of the reasons for Boiotia’s loyalty fortunately survives in the literary evidence. While it is very likely that Philip and the house of Macedon had a great many connections with the Greek aristocracy through *xenia*, the presence of such relationships is only occasionally recorded by Polybios, and very rarely with the recognition of their status specifically as *xenia* (for this lack of detail see below). Nor, of course, are they recorded by Livy who is less likely to have been interested in including these aristocratic Greek coalitions in his work. However, the attachment of the Boiotian house of Brachylles and the reason for the length of its connection with the royal Macedonian house, is an exception and thankfully comes down to us in a more complete form in the surviving fragments of Polybios. At 20.5 the historian states that in 239 BC, during the Aitolian war against Demetrios II, the Boiotians, who had previously joined the Aitolians, deserted and surrendered to Macedonia on the arrival of Demetrios with his army in Boiotia. Some, however, were discontented with this allegiance to Macedonia and rose consequently in violent opposition against the partisans of Macedonia, Ascondas and Neon (the grandfather and father of Brachylles). These two soon got the upper hand in Boiotian policy, however, an encounter with the Macedonian king soon changed the situation: Doson, who had become the guardian of Philip after Demetrios’ death, had been sailing to Larymna in Lokris on business when his ship grounded on the shallows at the extremity of Boiotia. It had just been reported that Doson was about to raid the country, and Neon, currently hipparch and on the move with the whole of the Boiotian cavalry, came upon the Macedonian king in this difficult position and in great distress. Yet, although Neon
could have attacked the Macedonians, he instead spared the king and his men. This was done with the approval of all the Boiotians, except the Thebans. Doson was very thankful that Neon had not attacked him while in this dangerous predicament and continued on to Asia.

As a result of this exchange, Polybios states that Brachylles, the son of Neon, became epistates of Sparta after the battle of Sellasia in 222 BC and that this post was bestowed upon him by Doson out of gratitude for the previous kindness rendered by his father, Neon. The historian continues by saying that the consequences of this event contributed no small amount to the fortunes of Brachylles and his house, as not only Doson, but also Philip furnished him with money and strengthened his position within Boiotia. Those opposed to the friendship with Macedonia in Thebes were crushed and Boiotia now aligned itself to Macedonia. Polybios asserts that this was the start of the attachment between Macedonia and the house of Neon. (τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν οὐκίαν τὴν Νέωνος τοιαύτην ἐλαβε τὴν ἄρχην καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μακεδόνας συστάσεως καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπιδόσεως; 20.5.14).

Although this relationship is never explicitly defined as xenia by Polybios, Herman is quite certain that it is. The way that the relationship between Doson and Neon is formed fits with the general pattern for initiating relationships of xenia: when two strangers are brought together with the prospect of a violent encounter, one averts the crisis, mostly against expectation, by some generous gesture. This gesture, along with other rituals, then serves as a kind of trigger which turns hostility into friendship and the start of mutual obligations and support. The commonplace nature of the relationship (it seems that authors had a stereotypical pattern in mind), as well as the aims, biases, literary tastes and moods of the writer, are reasons that have been cited why some writers, and here specifically Polybios, felt no need to mention what type of relationship was being formed. It was this connection, however, which made Brachylles continue to support the Macedonian party within Boiotia after his return. He had an obligation to do so as a xenos of the Macedonian royal house. Furthermore, this tie was also very likely the reason for Philip’s return of the Boiotians and Brachylles without contention or ransom, and the reason that the Boiotian people in return

133 This pattern can be seen in Herdotos, for example, in his tale of Syloson, Darius and the cloak (3.139ff.); and in Xenophon more explicitly in his description of the ritual which turned Agesilaos and Pharnabazos’ son into xenoi (Hellenica 4.1.39). The specific terms of ritualised friendship were only rarely written down but are evident in the inscription, for example, in the symbolon from Sicily, recording a bond of xenia between a Phoenician and a Greek and his descendants (IG XIV. 279).
sent thanks to Philip instead of the Romans. This show of gratitude towards the Macedonian king would have been necessary for the reciprocation of the act of goodwill that Philip performed by helping Brachylles, his xenos. The fact that Brachylles was appointed to the office of boiotarch immediately after his return must also indicate continued Macedonian leanings among the Boiotian people, as well as the elite families, strong enough, despite the king’s defeat, to take precedence within their internal and external politics. This episode clearly shows therefore how important these ties of personal friendship could be in deciding the course of events; a fact similarly exposed by the connection and friendship developed between Aratos and the Macedonian royal house from 224 BC (see 2.3).

Brachylles’ appointment as boiotarch and his subsequent support and promotion of other pro-Macedonians was very displeasing to the Roman advocates, particularly Zeuxippus and Pisistratus, as they foresaw that if the Romans left Greece and Philip remained, public life in Boiotia would no longer be safe for them or their relatives. Approaching Flamininus, therefore, they suggest that Brachylles, as pro-Macedonian, should be assassinated. Polybios records that the Roman commander said that he would take no part in the deed, but would not obstruct them from their purpose (Livy, 33.27.5-29.12, follows Polybios but omits Flamininus’ involvement in the affair). Flamininus advised that they contact the Aitolian, Alexamenus, who then arranged for three Aitolians and three Italians to assassinate the Boiotian leader (Polyb. 18.43). Livy (33.29) records that this deed caused a frenzy of hatred amongst the Boiotian people against Rome, ending in the murder of a number of Roman soldiers currently residing in the region. After the Boiotian leaders refused to pay for the deaths of the soldiers, claiming that they had been committed without the sanction of the authorities, Flamininus attacked Koronea. Dismayed by the assault ambassadors were sent by the Boiotians, but when these were not admitted it was only by the pleas of the Achaians and Athenians that the Romans allowed them an audience. Peace and the discontinuance of the siege were granted after the criminals responsible for the killings were handed over and an indemnity of thirty talents was paid.

The Boiotians, therefore, like the Argives, were far more inclined towards Philip and Macedonia than the majority of the Achaian League, even staying loyal to him after his defeat at Kynoskephalai. This inclination was seemingly based on state as well as personal ties to the royal house, but their position in mainland Greece may also have made them more disposed to stay with Macedonia than the Achaians, who were positioned far closer to Roman forces (particularly after the defection of Epiros). It was only after the assassination of Philip’ xenos
Brachylles and the violence of a siege that the Boiotians were brought round to a peace with Rome.

4.3.c The Akarnanian League

The Akarnanians were also more resilient to Roman pressure. Livy records that before the battle, Lucius Quinctius, the brother of Flamininus, had summoned the Akaranian leaders to a meeting in Korkyra, the last people in Greece to remain attached to the Macedonian alliance. Quinctius made some headway in provoking a movement but was ultimately unsuccessful because the Akarnanians’ long-standing fidelity, fear and hatred of the Aitolians kept them loyal to the Macedonian king (33.16.1-2). A council was then called at Leukas to discuss the situation, but not all of the cities went to the meeting and those who did could not come to an agreement. In this confusion, Archelaus and Bianor, two prominent Akaranian magistrates, were eventually able to pass an unofficial decree favouring a Roman alliance (33.16.3). The cities not represented at this meeting, however, resented this decree bitterly and so confused was the League that two of Philip’s Akaranian representatives, Androcles and Echedemos, were able not only to rescind the decree, but also to convict Archelaus and Bianor on charges of treason and remove the proposer of the motion from office (33.16.4-5). While Archelaus and Bianor were eventually pardoned, it was still voted to abide by the treaty with Philip and reject the friendship of the Romans (33.16.6-11). Learning about the Akaranian decision, the Romans besieged Leukas but only took the city after the defeat at Kynoskephalai when all the cities of Akarnania surrendered (33.17).

How can the Akaranian loyalty towards Macedonia, and the reluctance of the Achaian League and the Boiotians to join Rome, be seen in light of Polybios’ statement that Philip’s treatment of his allies became increasingly treacherous and ruthless? It is clear that the Greek world was split between the new Roman power and the old Macedonian one, and the reasons for this separation were affected by the military might of the two powers and the Greek expectation of each side’s success. While the Epirotes were forced to defect because of

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135 For the Akaranian League see Larsen (1968) 264-73. See also Oost (1954) for Roman policy in Akarnania from the First Macedonian War onwards.
136 Oost (1954) 49-51.
137 Oost (1954) 50.
Roman invasion and the unlikelihood of Philip’s assistance, some of the king’s other allies may have waivered over this decision because they thought the Macedonian king still powerful enough to succeed against the Romans and protect them. Or, conversely, they thought he was still strong enough to pose a threat should he come out victorious. Philip had after all proved very resourceful in protecting his allies in the past, had been successful in many of his wars against his enemies, and had dealt with any betrayals of the Macedonian alliance with severity (see for example Oreos in 208 BC). On the other hand, those still free to make a decision may not have viewed the prospect of a new foreign power holding sway over Greece with much enthusiasm. It might be far better to remain under Macedonian influence, a regional superpower well known to them and no longer considered ‘other’ in the second century BC, than to place oneself under the rule of an unknown one who had shown equivalent, if not more, brutality and ruthlessness in their activity in Greece, and whose political and cultural conventions were alien to their own.\footnote{For an example of this cultural clash see Moreno (2014) on the failure of the Aitolian deditio in fidem in 191 BC. This is in contrast with Gruen’s less convincing argument (in 1984) which stipulates that the Greeks were already familiar with Roman conventions. Moreno’s perspective is, however, also supported by Momigliano (1990) 22-49 when the latter argues that Polybios found a culture and people in Rome which he could recognise, and that he created an atmosphere within his Histories in which “Roman conquests became both easy to understand and difficult to question.” This implies that Polybios was not fully aware of Roman culture and political conventions before he was held hostage in Rome and that by default neither were the majority of the Greeks at this time. Part of the historian’s purpose was to write about Rome in such a way that Greeks could understand it, and thereby also suggests that the Greeks were not knowledgeable of Roman ways.}

But we must not underestimate the strength of the ties of benefactor/beneficiary, kinship, and xenia linking Philip to the Greek people and aristocracy in contributing to the tensions felt at this time. In regard to the latter especially, so sacred were the bonds of xenia that, as Herman puts it, “Not even welfare of their [the aristocracies’] own communities would prevent them from pursuing their particularistic interests.” The institutions of the polis and the factions within it were not the only power bases shaping inter-state politics: these coalitions of the aristocracy, extending beyond the boundary of the city, were often the deciding factors in issues of policy. It is very likely therefore that ties of xenia encouraged the separation of Argos, Megalopolis and Dyme from the Achaian League after its break from the alliance, just as much as the loyalty of the masses. This was also, of course, what encouraged the loyalty of Korinth when under siege and turned Boiotia from its decision to ally with Rome.

Affection, ties of obligation and fear – these were what held Philip’s allies to him. This mixture of attitudes created a steady loyalty in many of the Greek cities. Yet it was fear,
primarily of Roman might and brutality, but also of Philip’s own increase in power and conversely that he might not be powerful enough to protect his allies, which broke that hold. Fear of Philip was certainly a part of what had driven the Achaians into an alliance with Rome, however, it was also the perception that supporting Philip would be futile. The king had not been able to fulfil his promise to protect his allies from the brutality of Roman attack and there was little hope that he would be able to in the future with the forces of Pergamon, Aitolia, Athamania and Rhodes also building up against him.

4.4 Conclusion

Polybios’ claim that after Messene Philip reversed the benevolent treatment he had afforded his Greek allies and thereupon turned to ruthlessness and treachery is decisively undermined by his own narrative. Even in its fragmentary state, not only is the king recorded as being active in his support and protection of his allies throughout the duration of his alliances with them, but it also seems that many of them felt little compunction, either through affection or fear, to abandon Macedonia when the opportunity arose. This, of course, does not mean that Philip was not ruthless or treacherous in general, or that he was not prepared to exert considerable pressure on his allies when it was beneficial to himself. However, it does mean that Philip’s dealings with his allies were not as fraught as Polybios makes out. He was also very much aware of the importance of keeping the goodwill of the Greeks, or at least of keeping them unopposed to his influence, particularly as he was engaged in his pursuit of conquest.

This chapter has focused on the perception that Philip mistreated his Greek allies and aimed at demonstrating that this view cannot be supported. Having established that Polybios’ depiction of the Macedonian king in this respect is invalid, and having previously explored one of Polybios’ literary constructions in shaping the narrative in the king’s early reign (the importance of the king’s complete change for the worse at Messene in 215 BC), the next chapter will bring together the points addressed in the previous discussions: Polybios’ overall construction of Philip and his reasons for shaping it the way he did.
Chapter 5: Philip’s Last Years

It was at this time [183 BC] that the beginning of terrible misfortunes fell upon King Philip and the whole of Macedonia…

This statement marks the beginning of Polybios’ dramatic introduction to Philip’s last years (183-179 BC) – when, the historian claims, tyche sought to punish the king for the wicked deeds he had committed throughout his life, when she inspired him to pursue a vengeful war against Rome, and when the violent quarrel between his sons and the younger’s subsequent execution, erupted and brought disaster to the Macedonian house. It is an introduction of particular importance as it is the last Polybian passage of substantial size regarding Philip to have come down to us (23.10); the historian’s account of what follows has regrettably been lost. Yet, despite its relative isolation, this introduction to the monarch’s last years is still able to offer valuable insights into how Polybios constructed the king’s end and to provide an understanding of the overall interpretation of Philip within the Histories.

This final chapter will be split into two sections: the first discussing the historian’s account and its reception within modern scholarship; the second exploring this final episode as it stands within Polybios’ overall portrait of the king and the Histories as a whole. In coming to the end of this project, we will circle around from the narrow analysis of the last two chapters back to some of the wider concerns outlined in Chapter 1, and continue chronologically the direction of our investigation, bringing us to the end of Philip’s career and the climactic finale of the historian’s account. The historical events and their factual development will not be extensively investigated as these have already been well discussed by others (see 5.1.b below), but a literary perspective will instead be used to help in the understanding of this episode’s placement and function at the end of the account of the king’s life.

As a contribution to the growing interest in Polybios’ literary style and methodology (see 1.2.b), the present dissertation has already attempted to explore the construction of
the Macedonian king within Polybios’ *Histories* by taking a more comprehensive look (as far as the fragmentary nature of the evidence will allow) at Philip’s reign. Thus far the incidents at Thermos and Messene have been explored in Chapter 3, discussing Polybios’ purpose in placing explicit emphasis on the latter, rather than the former, as a defining marker in the king’s career. In chapter 4, the fundamental validity of the historian’s claim that Philip mistreated his Greek allies after his attempt on Messene in 215 BC was questioned. Although the relationship between the king and his Greek allies was necessarily unequal, the record shows that Philip rarely treated them with anything other than attentiveness and concern for their preservation. Polybios’ assertion has therefore been found to be exaggerated, tendentious, and for the most part uncorroborated by his own evidence. Similarly, McGing’s analysis of the king’s earlier years has shown that Polybios manipulated perception from the very beginning of Philip’s entrance on the scene, giving the young king more control and brilliance than he may actually have had.¹ On this account, it is necessary to question the whole image of Philip in the *Histories*. The reliability of Polybios’ account of the king’s last years has already been questioned and vigorously discussed by scholars, resulting in a number of competing interpretations being presented against the historian’s narrative.² Yet, despite the acknowledgement of the difficulties only a limited attempt has been made to explore the reasons for Polybios’ manipulation of the text and for the interpretation offered of these final years. This chapter will therefore attempt to readjust our understanding of this episode and offer a new perspective on Polybios’ account of Philip as a whole.

### 5.1 Polybios’ Account and Its Modern Reception

The start of *tyche*’s punishment in 183 BC, as introduced by the opening passage, began after a build-up of several years in which relations between Rome and Macedonia had been steadily worsening. It emerged after a relatively long period of peace and occasional cooperation following the Macedonian defeat in 197 BC. Polybios and Livy record how Philip became increasingly embittered towards Rome after she withdrew support for the

¹ See pp. 17-19, 100 and 154.
agreement established between the king and the Roman consul Manius Acilius in 191 BC. This had allowed Philip to keep Athamania, Dolopia, Aperantia and some of Perrhaebia in exchange for his help in the war against Antiochos III and the Aitolians (Livy 36.33-34). Complaints soon arrived in Rome from the captured cities regarding Macedonian behaviour and the Senate became increasingly concerned about Philip’s sudden expansion into Greece and Thrace (39.24-25). Commissioners were sent out to assess the situation in 185 BC and finally judged in 184 that Macedonia should return to its traditional boundaries (stipulating that Philip should evacuate Thessaly and Perrhaebia) and that the king should not expand any further eastward than the road lying to the west of Aenos and Maronea in Thrace (39.26). Philip attempted to circumvent this restriction by redirecting the road eastward to encompass both cities. However, King Eumenes of Pergamon, convinced of his own rights to the territory, drew the Senate’s attention to Philip’s evasive action (Polyb. 22.6; Livy 39.27) and the Romans finally ordered Philip’s full evacuation from the region (Polyb. 22.11.2-4; Livy 39.28-29, 33-34). Before the directives were carried out, however, a massacre of the population ensued at Maronea, allegedly the work of the bitter king. Philip was severely rebuked by the Roman commander Appius Claudius for this incident and an investigation was duly demanded (Polyb. 22.13; Livy 39.34). It is this event at Maronea in 184 BC that is claimed to be the turning point in relations between Macedonia and Rome: Polybios records that Philip recognised this change and discussed the extent of Roman disaffection and the inevitability of war with his advisers (Polyb. 22.13-14).

Polybios’ account of Philip’s last years from this point onwards has survived in a regrettably fragmentary and highly condensed state. Yet we are once again saved from the frustrations of ignorance by Livy who not only provides a fuller narrative of the events summarised in Polybios’ introduction, but also appears to have kept close to the latter’s version. This is quite plain when we compare the two texts (Polyb. 23.10; Livy

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3 After Polybios’ introduction at 23.10, only a small section of the historian’s account of Philip’s speech to his sons is preserved (23.11) and we hear nothing else about Macedonian affairs until Book 25 when Perseus succeeds his father to the throne and renews his friendship with Rome in 179 BC.
4 Livy’s account of this period starts at 40.4. He records in detail the quarrel between Philip’s sons (40.5-16), the king’s reaction and consideration of their disagreement (40.16), the investigation into Demetrios’ attachment to Rome (40.20, 23), the expedition into Maedika and up Mt. Haemus (40.21), the assassination of Demetrios (40.24), Philip’s supposed favouring of Antigonos Echecrates (40.54-56) and finally his death (40.56-7).
The Roman historian’s main contribution to the tradition seems to be an increased focus on human reactions and thereby a more pronounced emotional component.⁵ Livy’s role in the reconstruction of this episode is, however, even more significant than we would first suppose. It was noted by Heinrich Nissen in 1863, and argued fully by Frank Walbank in 1938, that Polybios’ account of Philip’s last years survives to us in an abridged form, evident from the presence of an additional episode in Livy’s narrative.⁶ This is the dramatic tale of Theoxena and the destruction of her household: Livy narrates how her father, husband and brother-in-law, had all been put to death by Philip several years before. Theoxena’s sister had remarried but died after bearing several children and Theoxena, marrying her sister’s widower, Poris, brought up the children with her own. Some time later, after hearing about the king’s proclamation ordering the arrest of the offspring of the executed men, Theoxena and Poris attempted to sail with their children in a small boat from Aenea in Chalcidice to Euboea. Due to stormy conditions, they were not able to travel far and were soon sighted by the king’s troops. Fearing the consequences should they be captured, the whole family committed suicide. The news of this event allegedly caused outrage amongst the Macedonians (40.4-5).

For Nissen and Walbank, this story was undoubtedly relevant to Polybios’ narrative as an example of the disaffection caused by Philip’s imprisonment of the children of leading Macedonians (see the next section for its suggested position within Polybios’ account).⁷ This view is still upheld in more recent studies - Settimio Lanciotti and John Briscoe, for example, have also acknowledged the likelihood that the episode derived from Polybios and that it was probably omitted by the excerptor.⁸ Livy’s account is therefore vital for reconstructing the sequence of Polybios’ introduction, as well as for filling in gaps in information.

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5.1.a Frank Walbank and Polybios’ Tragic Narrative

For the reconstruction of Polybios’ account and a discussion of the historian’s handling of the episode, we are still very much indebted to Walbank’s 1938 article “ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΣ ΤΡΑΓΩΙΔΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ: A Polybian Experiment”. Its arguments are crucial to the modern reception of the passage and are now the foundation of any discussion of this topic. Since the main argument of this chapter is based in opposition to certain points made in that article, its arguments will be outlined in some detail.

To start with, Walbank’s own summary reconstruction of Polybios’ account of Philip’s last years will be recorded in order to layout the sequence of events. Walbank used both Polybios’ and Livy’s accounts in his reconstruction as drawn up below and, according to his own interpretative framework, the sentences which only have the authority of Livy are presented in italics; the rest are either attested in Polybios alone or in both:9

‘This year witnessed the outbreak of disaster for Philip and for Macedon, an event worthy of attention and careful record. Fortune, wishing to punish Philip for all of his wicked acts, sent against him a host of furies, torments and avenging spirits of his victims; these tortured him up to the day of his death, never leaving him, so that all realised that, as the proverb goes, “Justice has an eye” and men must not scorn her. First these furies inspired Philip to carry out exchanges of population between Thrace and the coast towns, in preparation for his war with Rome; and as a result men’s hatred grew greater than their fear and they cursed Philip openly. Eventually, his mind rendered fiercer by these curses, Philip came to feel himself in danger unless he imprisoned the children of those he had killed. So he wrote to the officers in the various cities and had this done; he had in mind chiefly the children of Admetus, Pyrrhichus and Samus and the rest he had executed at the same time, but he included all who had been put to death by royal command, quoting the line

The general effect of this was to awaken pity for the children of men of high station; but a particular incident brought the corresponding loathing for Philip to a climax. This was the death of Theoxena and her sister’s children. (Here occurred the account of this, as given in Livy.) ‘This incident added new flame to the hatred of his people, and they now openly cursed Philip and his sons; and these curses, heard by all the gods, caused Philip to turn his anger against his own blood. For, while his mind was almost maddened on this account, the quarrel of his sons burst into flame simultaneously. Fortune as if of set purpose bringing their misfortunes on the stage at one and the same time. The quarrel was referred to Philip and he had to decide which of his two sons he should murder and which he should fear as his own possible murderer for the rest of his life. Who can help thinking that the wrath of heaven was descending on him for his past sins? The details that follow will make this clearer.’ (Then come the details of the quarrel between Demetrios and Perseus: Livy 40.5-24; Polyb. 23.10.17, 11.)

Such are the essentials, as Walbank made them out, of Polybios’ introduction to the misfortunes that befell Philip in his final years. There has been little refutation of this reconstruction and attempts to do so have not met with a favourable reception. The most important of these discussions arose between Settimio Lanciotto and John Briscoe. The former attempted, in 1983, to show that Walbank was wrong to regard this Polybian passage (23.10) as compressed by the excerptor and wrong to think that Livy could be used to reconstruct the original text. In regard to its compression, Walbank had argued that subsection 23.10.12 (τρίτον δ’ ἦ τύχη δράμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἐπεισήγαγεν τὸ κατὰ τοὺς υἱοὺς; from the excerpts de uirtutibus et uitiis) represented the words of the excerptor rather than the historian and that it was at this point that Theoxena’s story was originally placed, followed by the curses of the Macedonians against Philip and his

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10 A line attributed by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 6.2.19) to the epic poet Stasinus (EGF, Cypria, fg. 22). This sentiment seems to have been a common saying and is found for example in Herodotus (1.155), Euripides (Andromache 519-21), and is quoted twice by Aristotle (Rhet. i.15. 1376 a 7; ii.21 1395 a 19). See Walbank (1938) 58 = (1985) 214; Walbank Commentary III, 232.

subsequent execution of Demetrios. This subsection, as a perceived addition by the excerptor, was consequently not included within Walbank’s reconstruction as recorded above. Furthermore, he considered 23.10.16 (…τῆς τύχης ὡσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἀναβιβαζόμενης ἐπὶ σκηνήν ἐν ἑνικαρῳ τὰς τούτων συμφορὰς; from the excerpts de sententis) to be the original version of 23.10.12. 12

However, Lanciotti argued that the first subsection, 23.10.12, was not compressed. He notes how this phrase is followed by ζήτει ἐν τῷ περὶ παραδόξων in MS Tours 880 (P), the only witness of the now lost excerpts de uirtutibus et uitiis. Lanciotti does not see the curses against the king (40.5-16.3) as unusual enough to fulfil the περὶ παραδόξων ending of the statement and suggests that the tragedy of Theoxena’s story would have suited this position better. It therefore follows that 23.10.12 was not compressed by the excerptor as the story of Theoxena would have followed on perfectly well from the previous statement. The later 23.10.16 would therefore not be another version of 23.10.12, but the introduction to the quarrel between the two brothers, following the story of Theoxena. The causal link between this incident (Livy 40.5.1) and the murder of Demetrios would, therefore, be entirely constructed by Livy. Yet, Briscoe has convincingly argued against Lanciotti’s suggestion, claiming that the episode does not make the anger of the gods against Philip’s earlier misdeeds clear. 13 He instead suggests that the dramatic events at the purification ceremony of the Macedonian army would have done equally well following περὶ παραδόξων. Moreover, Briscoe notes that both Walbank and Lanciotti observe that τῆς τύχης ὡσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἀναβιβαζόμενης ἐπὶ σκηνήν at 23.10.16 also occurs at two other locations within Polybios’ work (at 29.19.2 and with slight variation at 11.5.8). While Polybios was certainly capable of repeating himself, it is less likely that he would have done so in such a short space of time, and more likely that 23.10.16 represented Polybios himself, while 23.10.12 (τῷ ἡ τύχη ὀφάμα….) the excerptor. Briscoe persuasively argues therefore that Walbank is correct in his reconstruction.

The main premise of Walbank’s article in which this reconstruction was presented was to discuss Polybios’ credibility.\textsuperscript{14} This had come under attack for his creation of an end to Philip’s life which was distinctly ‘tragic’ in character. Benecke had suggested earlier that Polybios had uncritically used tragedies and historical novels as sources for these last years. However, this was an argument which Walbank thought particularly important to address as it would have considerable implications for the assessment of Polybios’ reliability if substantiated.\textsuperscript{15} It would make his harsh polemic against Phylarchus’ τραγικός ‘tragic’ style particularly problematic.\textsuperscript{16} Yet in the course of his analysis Walbank pointed out that Polybios was not to be accused of hypocrisy in the use of his sources, or even for framing this episode in a tragic form. Τραγικός, Walbank persuasively asserts, was a stylistic label which Polybios used to vilify those historians who were prone to sensational exaggeration, inaccuracy and a lack of attention to cause and effect within their narratives.\textsuperscript{17} This was not to say that Polybios had any objection to tragedy itself as a literary genre or its use within historiography (this important topic will be discussed in greater detail in 5.3.a below).\textsuperscript{18} In investigating Polybios’ credibility, therefore, Walbank also considers whether the narrative of Philip’s last years contained any of these three characteristics. He concludes that Polybios’ account, although certainly possessing ‘tragic paraphernalia’\textsuperscript{19} and references to the stage, is not particularly sensational as our historian made no attempt to draw the readers into the events emotionally and the tragic paraphernalia were merely there to help present the moral lesson (the first claim about emotional distance is, in fact, not entirely accurate, while the second point about tragedy helping the moral lesson is a point of some validity; both will be discussed with more detail in the second half of this chapter).\textsuperscript{20} Finally, nor did Polybios fail in illustrating a sequence of cause and effect within the narrative as this feature is clearly laid out by the connecting factor of τυχή (see the summary above).\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{14} See Lehmann (1967) and Walbank’s supportive review (1968) for a defence of Polybios’ credibility.
\textsuperscript{16} See Polybios’ polemic against Phylarchus at 2.56-63 and Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the historian’s criticism.
\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Grethlein (2013) 249-52 and Marincola (2013) 77-88
\textsuperscript{18} Walbank (1938) 56-58 = (1985) 211-213.
\textsuperscript{19} Walbank lists these as “furies, torments and avenging spirits of his victims, Justice and her eye, curses answered by the gods”, all features which are taken directly from Polybios’ account.
\textsuperscript{20} Walbank (1938) 64 = (1985) 219.
\textsuperscript{21} Walbank (1938) 62 = (1985) 217.
Yet Walbank believes that Polybios did, in fact, make a mistake and one which puts his reliability as a source for Philip’s last years into question. He states that it was Polybios’ assumption that Philip had deliberately planned an aggressive war against Rome, an undertaking inspired by tyche as part of the king’s punishment. But Polybios also recorded a conversation between the king and his two friends Apelles and Philocles, earlier in book 22, which offers a different perspective. After his meeting with Appius Claudius in 184 BC, in which the Roman censured his massacre of the Maroneans, Philip informed Apelles and Philocles that relations between Macedonia and Rome now looked very bad and that war with Rome was inevitable (ἔγνω σαφῶς ἐπὶ πολὺ προβεβηκών αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους διαφοράν, καὶ ταύτην οὐκέτι λανθάνουσαν, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ τοῖς πλείστοις οὕσαν). He was therefore convinced that Rome would eventually force a war upon him and in the meantime he had to avoid any conflict, consolidate his possessions and manoeuvre for position in the interests of the recovery of Macedonia (22.14.7).

To Walbank, Polybios appears to neglect the implications of this reported speech which certainly seems to show the Macedonian king in a different light. The historian speaks as if the Third Macedonian War was engineered by Philip and passed onto his son after his death. In doing so, Walbank claims, Polybios ignores the fact that the war did not break out until seven years after Philip’s death in 172 BC, and only after the Senate had become concerned about Perseus’ growing popularity among the Greeks and despatched numerous embassies to address issues between the king and the Roman friend Eumenes of Pergamon. Furthermore, it was the Romans, not Perseus, who finally decided to declare war. It is therefore argued that Philip was not obsessed in seeking vengeance for his mistreatment by Rome and Polybios is guilty of an offence which he criticised other historians for - inaccuracy.

22 These issues included: Perseus’ expulsion of Abroupolis, invasion of Dolopia, march into Delphi (22.18); his treaty with the Boiotians (27.5-6; Livy 42.12.5-6, 40.6), assassination of the Illyrian prince Arthetauros, a Roman ally (42.13.6, 40.6; Appian Mac. 11.1, 3), military aid of the Byzantiums against Thracian tribes (42.13.8, 40.6), and interference in Thessaly, Perrhaebia and Aitolia (41.25.1-6,42.5.7-12, 13.9, 40.7; Diod. 29.33.1).
24 Walbank is not the only scholar to refute Polybios’ account, in fact, the ancient tradition recording Philip’s last years has generally been treated with great scepticism by modern scholars. Gruen (1974) laid out and discussed the very clear divide between Polybios’ account of events and the different version(s)
Walbank concedes, however, that there is a fine line between deliberate aggression and precautionary offence and it would have been easy for Polybios to misconstrue the king’s intentions as aggressive. Polybios is thus attributed with having misunderstood Philip’s position and policy after 184 BC. This misunderstanding, it is claimed, was enhanced by the structure that the narrative took by its tragic inflections and emphasis on the moral lesson. Thereby, Walbank concludes that Polybios did not live up to his own standards in writing this episode:

“Polybios’ mistake…was to interpret Philip’s years as a career of infatuation induced by Tychē and showing itself in an unreasoned programme of planned aggression against Rome… He is not convicted of studied incompetence in his choice of sources…On the other hand, he does appear to have misunderstood Philip’s position and policy, when he had in fact the material available to understand it. Furthermore, his excessive emphasis on the moral issues and his unique and unfortunate use of a tragic scheme and tragic terminology – not in the Phylarchean sense, admittedly, yet none the less tragic in a manner opposed to the requirements of scientific history – these factors make Polybios’ account of these last years of Philip one of the least satisfying of his whole work”.

Such is Walbank’s assessment of Polybios’ account of Philip’s last years. Its negativity is characteristic of the views held by scholarship throughout the twentieth century, particularly in the assumption that Polybios was primarily interested in the requirements of writing truthful and instructive ‘scientific history’, staunchly against the sensationalism and inaccuracies of contemporary ‘tragic’ historians, and more interested in condoning practical behaviour that led to success, than in conducting oneself according to moral

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developed and offered by modern historians. The majority, including Walbank and Gruen, see Philip’s actions against Rome as measures of self-defence rather than aggression, and that Rome was more responsible for the dissension that erupted within the royal house and for the ensuing conflict between the two powers than Polybios records. Hindsight and schematism are evident in Polybios’ view of Macedonian-Roman relations and the tragic form which Polybios’ account of Philip’s last years takes makes his narrative less trustworthy historically. This is also supported by, for example, Colín (1905) 204-12; Edson (1935) 191-202; Meloni (1953) 29-34, 41-60; Welwei (1963) 50-54; and De Sanctis (1969) 242-50. There are only a few exceptions to this perspective, including Pédech (1964) 125-34 who stands by much of Polybios’ account, including the forgery of Flamininus’ letter and Philip’s final efforts to remove Perseus from the succession, as well as Stier (1957) who adopts Polybios’ portrait of Philip as bent on revenge against Rome.

principles. Not all of these views hold so much sway any longer, however, and some readjustment needs to be made. The rest of this chapter will therefore discuss two issues brought up by Walbank’s article that require re-examination – the claim that Polybios misunderstood Philip’s position and actions, and his dissatisfying use of a ‘tragic mode’ and moral emphasis to frame his narrative.

5.1.b Disputes over Historicity

In regard to Walbank’s claim that Polybios ‘misunderstood’ Philip’s position and policy from 184 BC onwards, the passage which brought about such doubts concerning the historian’s credibility is 22.14.7:

ο ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς γενόμενος καθ’ ἑαυτὸν καὶ συμμεταδοὺς τῶν φίλων Ἀπελλῆ καὶ Φιλοκλεί περὶ τῶν ἐνεστὼν, ἔγνω σαφῶς ἐπὶ πολὺ προβεβηκὼν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους διαφοράν, καὶ ταύτην οὐκέτι λανθάνουσαν, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ τοῖς πλείστοις οὕσαν.

And the king was left by himself and, exchanging views with his friends, Apelles and Philocles, about the present circumstances, clearly saw that the variance with the Romans had come to a great height, and that this no longer escaped notice, but was completely obvious to most.

Polybios’ assessment of Philip’s attitude and policy at this juncture, which was questioned by Walbank, follows immediately after:

καθόλου μὲν οὖν πρόθυμος ἦν εἰς τὸ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀμύνασθαι καὶ μετελθεῖν αὐτοῦς: πρὸς ἕνια δὲ τῶν ἐπινοούμενων ἀπόχειρος ὃν ἐπεβάλετο πῶς

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Generally speaking, then, he was ready to ward them off and to attack them in all manner of ways, but being unready as regard to some of his plans, he considered how there might yet be some delay and how he might gain time for preparations for the war.

In considering the passage, Walbank argued, as mentioned above, that the historian suggested the Third Macedonian War was engineered by Philip and passed onto his son after his death and therefore deliberately overlooked the fact that the war took place seven years after Perseus’ succession. Ultimately, moreover, the war was declared by the Romans not Perseus, and Walbank therefore suggests that Polybios’ assessment of Philip’s position and policy in this period is flawed.27

Since Walbank’s argument, there has been both agreement and disagreement with his conclusions. For example, Pédech, in support of Walbank’s thesis, saw Philip as far more uncertain about a Macedonian attack of Italy prior to his ascension of Mt. Haemos five years later in 181 BC. Beforehand, he claims that it is difficult to discern whether Philip’s policies after 187/6 were defensive or aggressive towards Rome as they were not explicitly directed at the Italian power but rather efforts to strengthen the kingdom internally and externally. It is only when the king makes the journey up the mountain that he seems to have settled this decision, having taken action to toughen the Macedonian army by this march and scouted out the area of future operation.28 More radically, Erich Gruen argued that Philip did not, in fact, feel constrained or threatened by the interview with Appius. He claims that there was no break down in the relationship between Macedonia and Rome until after Philip’s reign, and that when the king spoke to Apelles and Philocles Philip saw the situation worsening in terms of what Rome was saying against him, rather than what she was doing. “Senatorial declarations, designed to appease envoys from the socii and amici, promoted the idea that relations between Rome and Macedon were irreparable and encouraged Philip’s enemies to persist in their

28 Pédech (1964) 128-129.
That is, that Philip was more worried about the build-up of Greek complaints against him, encouraged by Rome’s willingness to listen, and the eventual compulsion Rome would feel in coming to their aid. His son Demetrios was therefore sent to Rome as “an act of good faith” and “would provide Rome with a convenient vehicle whereby to quiet malcontents in central Greece and Asia Minor and to permit Philip to operate within the limits, but with less annoyance.” The Senate, Gruen later asserted, had also accepted the succession of Perseus and agreed to the renewal of friendship between Rome and Macedonia in 179 BC without issue or hesitation.30 Had Rome been concerned about an imminent war of aggression with the new king, prepared for by his father, they would not have reacted so calmly or agreeably. More recently, however, rejecting Walbank’s and Pédech’s claim, Boris Dreyer has argued that a long-term policy of revenge conceived by Philip against the Romans was plausible.31 This is based on his argument that Philip had planned a double-strike strategy against Rome in these later years, entailing the incitement of his Bastarnaen allies to invade Italy in the north, as well as an attack of his own forces in mainland Greece and thereby robbing Rome of Greek support. While the historicity of Philip’s intentions to incite the Bastarnaen against Italy directly has been doubted, Dreyer claims that this was part of Philip’s whole plan of attack.32

The problem with trying to ascertain Philip’s plans and intentions is Polybios’ ascription of motive. It has been effectively discussed by Miltsios how the ancient historian frequently tries to reconstruct characters’ mind-sets, a task which aims to provide access to an agent’s expectations and fears, and consequently an understanding of their decisions. It is a crucial tool in producing coherent cause and effect.33 Yet determining the validity of such ascriptions is always problematic. It is often believed that they arise from personal conjecture and would be invented or deduced ex eventu from the knowledge of what actually happened, or from public perspectives of the character of the historical agents. Even if the use of eyewitnesses could be ascertained, their impartiality

32 For arguments against this strategy see Walbank (1940/1960) 254. See Dreyer (2007) 227 fn. 140 for his refutation.
33 Miltsios (2013) 86, 92.
and sincerity may be questioned. Furthermore, ascribing motives to an individual from what is known of their character presupposes consistency between the character and its various manifestations. Human personality is, however, generally far too complicated for this to work in practice. Building on the work of Craig Champion, Miltsios has also pointed out that the presentation of motivation within the Histories is usually tied into the text’s literary themes and wider patterns of human behaviour. While Polybios himself acknowledges the complexity of human behaviour, he also tries to make it easily understood. This often required simplification. Coherence within the narrative is therefore promoted, as well as an understanding of the underlying human factors. It is even suggested that “the more smoothly the conception of a plan blends in with its execution, the more likely it is that the narrator invented it afterwards.” Thus Polybios may have to some extent moulded historical agents’ characters to fall into a pattern of behaviour that would fall neatly into his overall plan. This certainly seems to be the case with Philip as he is used as a tool to promote a certain political and moral perspective (see Chs 4 and 5).

As Pédech pointed out, historically the answer to Philip’s motives may not be so clear cut. Certainly while considering Rome’s seemingly fickle and inconsistent attention to eastern affairs thus far, the continued complaints of the Greeks against him, and the waver of diktats and attitudes of the Senate, the Macedonian king could not predict whether a war would come or not, and an immediate defensive strategy seemed best in light of his relative weakness. The fact that Philip was concerned about relations with Rome and that he started to reposition himself and strengthen his kingdom does not exclude him from keeping an eye open to the opportunity of starting a new war against Rome in the future. His short-term policy was to put off what he saw as an inevitable war while at a disadvantage and thereby give him time to strengthen his kingdom. However, while concentrating on the short-term issues he could also very well have kept in mind the possibility of future aggressions against Rome should affairs run that way. Polybios could have been partially right. The reality of Philip’s motives in this period – which Polybios asserts to be primarily aimed at pursuing vengeance against Rome – therefore remains ambiguous and inconclusive. Philip himself may even have been unsure in

34 Miltsios (2013) 93.
regards to his own attitude towards the Romans at this juncture and could only wait on events to discern the most advantageous course to take.

4.1.c Philip’s Ambitions

A brief review of Philip’s ambitions throughout the course of his career towards Rome, as well as towards the Mediterranean more generally, may prove useful for this discussion. Once again, there has been controversy over whether Philip really intended to invade Italy from an early stage, as well as whether he really had aspirations to universal dominion. In assessing his general intentions towards Italy some scholars have argued that Philip was not interested in invading Italy at all throughout the course of his reign, despite Polybios’ claims otherwise. Erich Gruen, for example, has argued that the news of Rome’s defeat in Italy had nothing to do with Philip’s decision to end the Social War in 217 BC, but rather the raids of Skerdilaidas in Macedonia. He points out that the king could hardly have thought about crossing the water without a single harbour in his hands and his own kingdom under assault.\(^{37}\) Champion thought that the extent of Philip’s western aspirations in Polybios’ account was also unconvincing.\(^{38}\) Philip was unlikely to have seriously considered sustained operations in Italy, as these plans would have turned too far from the traditional Macedonian foreign policy in Greece and the Aegean, and would likely have caused conflict with Carthage for Italian supremacy. Furthermore, Macedonia was already preoccupied with stabilising its Illyrian frontier, a situation which would have made it hard to conduct enterprises across the sea. Instead, Philip was only interested in reasserting Macedonian control over Illyria after Roman encroachment.\(^{39}\)

Eckstein has more recently countered this claim, however, and in view of Philip’s opportunistic nature more convincingly argued that the king was interested in invading Italy and moving beyond Macedonia’s traditional boundaries in the west. He observes that before 217, Illyria and maritime Illyris had never been under Macedonian control. Consequently, Philip’s decision to expand in that direction also meant the extension of

\(^{39}\) See Dzino (2010) for Roman expansion into Illyria.
Macedonian ambition. Furthermore, he argues that “if Philip could seize bases in Illyria, it was not hard to conceive of further adventures: an invasion of Italy may sound reckless to moderns, but Philip’s reputation was already that of a successful military gambler. The Romans…took the threat seriously enough to engage in major military preparations to combat Philip’s arrival.”

As with Philip’s intentions towards Rome, there has also been a great deal of discussion regarding the king’s ambitions for ἡ ἀνδρική ἀρχή ‘universal dominion’ (Polyb. 5.102.1), a theme which Polybios continuously emphasised in his portrait of the king (see the next section for more detail). In the past, it was almost commonplace for scholars to reject the idea that Philip had such grandiose aspirations. P. Klose, for instance, considered Polybios’ comments regarding Philip’s aims and behaviour to be unacceptable pieces of prejudice and propaganda against the Macedonian king; a view which resulted from the belief that a balance of power existed between, and was consciously subscribed to by, the main Hellenistic royal houses. In this case, the ambitions ascribed to Philip by Polybios would have violated this arrangement. The role of Demetrios of Pharos in inspiring Philip has also been accused of sounding very much like court gossip, perhaps propagated by Aratos, one of Demetrios’ political opponents.

There has, however, been strong movement away from this rejection of Philip’s aspirations for universal dominion. As Walbank pointed out, Polybios was not the only one of Philip’s contemporaries to believe in the latter’s unbridled and unlimited ambitions, as Alkaios of Messene clearly showed such a belief in his much discussed epigram (G-A. 9.518; see 1.1.a). Furthermore, Klose’s hypothesis regarding a balance of power has now been long rejected and most scholars consider no such restrictions to have applied, or that policies based on this notion were generally only used by states of middling size. Gehrke, for instance, has convincingly argued that adherence to such a scheme would actually have suggested a lack of power: it was essential practice for Hellenistic rulers to be in a state of constant readiness to take advantage of opportunities.

41 Klose (1972) 87-88. See also Ilari (1980) 283-5.
for expansion, or otherwise risk conquest and defeat themselves. Earlier, Michel Austin also supported this claim by illustrating how the military character and origins of Hellenistic monarchy constantly forced rulers into expansionist policies and aggressive warfare, particularly in kings that were young and needed to prove themselves.\(^{44}\) Finally, Eckstein has stressed that there would not have been any consensual “balance of power”, because the political environment of the ancient world was anarchic in nature. Expanding on Gehrke’s original thesis, therefore, Eckstein shows how there was the need for continuous policies of aggression to remain secure and survive in this unprincipled and highly competitive environment.\(^{45}\) Philip would not therefore have been inhibited by a need to keep a ‘balance’ between himself, Antiochos III and Ptolemy IV and V in the third and second centuries BC, but in fact would have fought against such a concept in his attempts to acquire ever more territory, power and security in the Mediterranean.\(^{46}\)

The recent shift in opinion towards accepting Polybios’ assertion that the king was highly ambitious for expansion is also supported by the king’s movements. Philip made efforts and was at times successful in annexing parts of Illyria: he routed Skerdilaidas from Dassaretia in 217 bringing Macedonian control right up to Roman protected Illyrian territory on the coast; he attempted to expand along the Illyrian coastline in 216 (Polyb. 5.108-110); and he captured Lissos in Illyria in 213/12 BC (Polyb. 8.13-14). Yet, we cannot confidently say how far his intentions extended westward and these certainly would have adapted to fit the circumstances. However, he was certainly an opportunist and even after his limited successes in securing Illyria, as well as in the First Macedonian War, Philip moved onto areas that appeared to offer greater potential for conquest, conducting an expedition in the Aegean in the East (205-200). However, he was hindered by the counteractions of King Attalos of Pergamon, Rhodes and the Romans, which eventually led to the Second Macedonian War, and there followed a period of limited expansion after the defeat at Kynoskephalai (197). Yet, the king did not remain idle for long, acquiring territory once again in mainland Greece by aiding the Romans in the war against Antiochos III and the Aitolians (191), and finally turning to Thrace and the north.

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\(^{44}\) Austin (1986) 450-66, esp. 459.

\(^{45}\) See particularly Eckstein (2006) ch. 4 for the anarchic nature of the Hellenistic period.

\(^{46}\) See also Dreyer (2013a) 206 for the assertion that Philip was in pursuit of ‘universal dominion’ and at a early stage in his career; see Eckstein (2008) 78-9 and (2006) Chs. 3 and 4 for the connection between the perception of weakness in states and the resulting adjusting ambitions of conquest in the stronger.
in his final years (189-179). His persistence in the pursuit of expansion is very well attested. This fact, as we will see below, was also emphasised in Polybion’s characterisation of the king.

Yet, while Philip’s motives towards Rome at the end of his life are uncertain, it seems that the king was interested from a very early stage in the essential component of any successful ancient reign or state - conquest and territorial expansion - and perhaps even in the grander ambition of ‘universal dominion’. This latter ambition, to rule over the whole known world, while improbable in reality was still likely to have inspired Philip, as well as the other Hellenistic kings, to aggressive action. Still bright in their memories would have been the spectacular achievements of their predecessors, Philip II and especially Alexander the Great, the latter of whom was considered a conqueror of the known world. While many of Philip V’s predecessors were unable to give much thought to such a grandiose feat due to the instability of their reigns, Philip himself was in a much better position to attempt it. After his suppression of the Apelles conspiracy in 218/17, Philip was secure in his position as king and had proven himself a brilliant military commander on more than one occasion in the Social War; Greece was therefore sufficiently subdued and under his control, and he now had the means and opportunity to pursue ambitious enterprises.

Polybion it seems, was therefore right, to some degree about Philip’s aggressive expansionist ambitions and this would certainly support the claim that Philip would have been interested in invading Italy should the right opportunity arise. He certainly seems to have been attempting to arrange matters in 217/16 BC to effect movement towards Italy, but it may be taking it too far to say that Philip was completely set on this course of action. It depended on a lot of other things going right beforehand. Philip was a consistent opportunist, producing contingency plans on numerous occasions. This is clearly illustrated, for instance, by his decision to attack Thermos while the Aitolian army was abroad; by his decision to turn his attention west after Hannibal’s victory at Trasimene; by his treaty with Hannibal in 215; by his change of direction again in 215 following his failure in Illyria against the Romans, this time looking East towards Thrace; by his pact

with Antiochos III in 203 BC; and by his cooperation with the Romans after his defeat in 196 BC. Philip was constantly assessing the situation and taking action based upon these assessments. Equally, therefore, we should consider that Philip was improving the strength of Macedonia from 186 BC onwards to prepare for a number of contingencies.

5.2 Polybios’ Overall Construction of Philip

5.2.a Thematic Repetition

Philip’s pursuit of expansion is evident even without Polybios’ assertion that the king held such an aim; the historical facts (mentioned above) clearly illustrate the king’s actions and movements to be this way inclined. Yet, Polybios also explicitly draws out this characteristic of Philip throughout his narrative and it emerges as a major theme in the course of the king’s life (Polyb. 5.101-102; 15.20; 15.24). The historian’s repetition of certain themes, familiarising the audience with the ideas they convey, has been observed by Nikos Miltsios. In his exploration of the theme of the dangers inherent in the recruitment of mercenaries, Miltsios notes that this theme marks both the beginning and the end of the narrative in Book 1. By its cyclic nature, the theme brings a sense of unity and cohesion to a book which would otherwise be so diverse that it would be hard to understand and process. The recurrent nature of this theme, which conjures up a sense of circular repetition, helps Polybios bring out the significance of both the result of the First Punic War and the final outcome of the conflict between Rome and Carthage as it highlights a profound weakness in the Carthaginian military system.48 Miltsios finally concludes that the frequent reestablishment of themes, undoubtedly deliberate, makes the account more coherent and convincing, raising certain expectations in the reader, “which when finally realized, lend the narrative, even in its present fragmentary form, a sense of fulfilment and completeness.”49 Polybios, concerned about the structure of his narrative and the ease with which his audience will comprehend its purpose and historical reasoning, deliberately creates these running thematic features within his work in order

49 Miltsios (2013) 32.
not only to convey certain political and didactic messages, but also to bring about some semblance of order.

Similar running themes are also brought out in the depiction of Philip – his youthfulness, his speed, his military prowess, treachery, impiety and lawlessness, and his ambitions of universal conquest. The reassertion of all of these qualities within his narrative, either in subsections (as in regards to the king’s youthfulness) or throughout the king’s life (his pursuit of expansion), regardless of their historical accuracy, all reinforce the depiction of the king which Polybios wants to convey to his readers. The first two characteristics listed – youthfulness and speed – have already been explored by McGing; his military prowess, treachery, impiety and lawlessness have also been touched on by Eckstein and have received some discussion in the previous chapters of this thesis. It is the king’s ambitious dreams of conquest which primarily concern this current thread and will be explored below; a theme which reappears, implicitly within the account of the king’s actions and explicitly in Polybios’ comments about them, in numerous instances within the Histories.

First, an investigation of Polybios’ explicit references to Philip’s persistent policy of expansion will be conducted. While the implicit appearances of the theme allow this character trait to develop with subtlety throughout the narrative, the explicit mentions of it more strongly emphasis this feature and its importance in the course of events. In Book 5, Polybios states how Philip was very much roused by the words of Demetrios of Pharos in 217 BC when he suggested that the king conclude the war with Aitolia and turn his attention towards the west, to matters in Illyria and later to an expedition in Italy itself, as Rome had just recently been defeated at Lake Trasimene by Hannibal (5.101.6-10).

Polybios describes Philip’s reaction:

τοιούτοις δὲ χρησάμενος λόγοις ταχέως παρώρμησε τὸν Φίλιππον, ὡς ἄν, οἴμαι, καὶ νέον βασιλέα καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ἐπιτυχή καὶ καθόλου τολμηρὸν εἶναι δοκοῦντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐξ οίκιας ὀρμωμένον τοιούτης, ἢ μάλιστα πῶς ἂει τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐλπίδος ἐφίεται. (5.102.1)

By using such arguments he [Demetrios of Pharos] quickly incited Philip, as I think would be expected of a young king both successful in his achievements and on the
whole seeming to be daring, and moreover coming from such a house, which more
than any other always aims at the prospect of universal dominion.

In the examination of this statement a number of historical inaccuracies can be identified.
Firstly, the assertion that the house of Macedon was always in pursuit of universal
dominion is not historically accurate. While each Macedonian ruler appears to have
attempted to implement an aggressive expansionist policy in as much as his
circumstances would allow, it is difficult to accredit Antigonos II Gonatas, Demetrios II
and Antigonos Doson, whose reigns were much more defensive, with the explicit pursuit
of the grander aim. Moreover, Philip’s origins are couched in the vague phrase εἰς
οἰκίας…τοιαύτης, making no distinction between the Argead or Antigonid houses. This
vagueness extends throughout the Histories, however, as Philip II and Alexander, as well
as Antigonos Doson, appear as Philip’s predecessors in Polybios’ criticism of the
sacrilege at Thermos (5.9-12), as well as in the historian’s parallel of Philip V and
Perseus with Philip II and Alexander much later in book 22 (22.18.10). It would seem that
for our historian, and perhaps for the wider audience, there was little distinction between
the two royal houses. It is in the use of such vague terminology, however, that Polybios
is able to link Philip V with the renowned figures of Philip II and Alexander, as well as
other successful kings from the Antigonid line. Not only is Philip successful and daring,
but he is also trying to emulate his more famous predecessors in his bid to increase the
kingdom territorially. The point is brought out that Philip was, from a very young age, set
on conquest. By this close association, the historian is able to credit Philip V with similar
tendencies towards expansion.

Polybios therefore exaggerates the Macedonian king’s ambition for universal
dominion, and it may be pointed out at this point that Polybios’ account of Philip’s last
years would not be the only episode to contain inaccuracies in describing the king’s
character or motivations. This is shown in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. Walbank’s
argument that Polybios is at fault for inaccuracy may, therefore, when taken in a wider
context, be further substantiated. Yet, regardless of the fact that Polybios may be accused

of historical inaccuracy, his characterisation of Philip is consistent throughout his work. His depiction of the king would have been convincing and likely believed and accepted.

It is in the early stages of the king’s career that the historian makes out the king’s plans of expansion to be more specific and targeted. Philip, we are told, was set on invading Italy in 217 BC. The seeds of this idea he attributes to the advice of Demetrios of Pharos (5.101.6-10), encouraged further by Agelaos’ speech at Naupaktos when he suggests that the king end the war with the Aitolians, turn his attention to the west and keep his eyes on the war in Italy so that he might someday compete for the sovereignty of the world (5.104.7). However, although there may have initially been plans for such an endeavour, events soon made it impossible for them to come to fruition. Even Polybios himself makes no further references to Philip’s Italian ambitions after 215 BC. The king’s initial attempts to travel north up the Adriatic sea and along the coast of Illyria (the obvious place from which to cross over to Italy) were only moderately successful and efforts to seize the Roman protected Illyrian territories bordering Macedonia and Epirus proved disastrous (Polyb. 5.108-110). Certainly, if Philip had originally had thoughts of an invasion of Italy then they were soon quashed by the strength of the Roman fleet and became limited to Illyria. Nor does the treaty contracted between Philip and Hannibal in 215 BC mean that the king had any plans to attempt the acquisition of Italian soil; the terms of the treaty indicated the territorial limitations allowed to each party – Hannibal was to take Italy, while Philip was to obtain Illyria (Polyb. 7.9). Moreover, in the following years (213-212) Philip concentrated on securing or expanding into Illyria, Dardania, Dassaretia and Thrace in the immediate west, north and east, and only returned to Greece to fight the First Macedonian War against Aitolia and Rome in 211. After the war, the Macedonian king looked to expand into the Aegean (205-200); the pact with Antiochos III in 203 BC to seize Egyptian territory after the death of Ptolemy IV presenting an excellent opportunity to seize Aegean islands unopposed. Philip, of course, did not waste this opportunity (Polyb. 15.20, 15.24; see Chapter 4).

The Second Macedonian War saw Philip back in mainland Greece in 199 BC and his defeat at Kynoskephalai in 197 BC. Thoughts of expansion in any area were temporarily

53 For the treaty between Hannibal and Philip see Bickerman (1944) and (1952); and Eckstein (2008) 84-6.
postponed in the wake of Roman peace conditions dictating that the Macedonian king relinquish his claims to territory in mainland Greece, the Aegean, and Thrace. In 191-90 BC, he was permitted to keep Dolopia, Aperantia and much of Perhaebia after aiding the Romans in their war against Antiochos III and Aitolia, and the king once again felt as if he could attempt to gain further acquisitions. However, the subsequent seizure and garrison of the Thracian cities Maronea and Aenos in 187 BC proved to be a mistake, as it aggravated the Thracians and King Eumenes of Pergamon to such a degree that flurries of complaints were sent to Rome (22.1-11; Livy 39.27). In an attempt to please their allies, particularly King Eumenes, and keep a limit on the Macedonian king’s strength, the Romans forced Philip to give up the two cities (184 BC), embittering their relationship.

It was not until the last stages of the king’s life (183-179 BC) that Polybios says that Philip returned to a course of aggression against Rome; an act of vengeance for their mistreatment of him.54 Although it may be an interpretation that is perhaps too assertively made, it is, however, an essential part of the overall assessment, characterisation and structure of the king’s life within the context of the Histories and must be understood in this light. There may even be a parallel between the beginning and end of Philip’s reign, both of which feature Rome as a target of aggression under Polybios’ construction. The restatement of Philip’s interest in Italy, alongside his continuous attempts to expand in general, reinforce this characteristic in the king in the mind of the reader and make it more believable that he could later become obsessed with revenge against the western power. Polybios is building up the credibility of his whole picture of the king by repeatedly exposing his readers to a specific theme.

5.2.b Hindsight and Teleology

Polybios’ interpretation of Philip is of course heavily based on hindsight, an element which greatly affected the whole of Polybios’ work and way of thinking, and one which he makes no apologies for. As already discussed in Chapter 1, Polybios’ work possesses a
certain teleological quality which stretches throughout the extent of his work and was important in the creation of historical explanation. While Grethlein explored Polybios’ use of retrospect and teleology in regards to his overarching subject – the emergence of Rome as the supreme power in the Mediterranean – it is a design which, in respect of the interconnectedness of the events he is telling and the universal method he therefore uses, must also have reached to all parts of the narrative (see pp. 19-20 and 1.3.d). This would include Macedonia, as the events leading up to its destruction by Rome were particularly important in explaining the western power’s prominence. The life and career of Philip, as the first Macedonian king to have direct contact with Rome, as well as that of his son Perseus, were particularly important in explaining how the fall of the Macedonian kingdom came about. The account of each of their reigns would therefore have been structured accordingly, with Rome’s final victory expected and in sight from the beginning (see a discussion of Eckstein’s work in 5.2.c below). There is justification therefore in considering the account of Philip’s life (as well as Perseus’) to some extent in light of a teleological scheme.

The notion that history could only be written when events had come to an end, that hindsight was essential for writing a meaningful account, had been expressed earlier by Herodotos (1.32.9; 7.51.3). Polybios, however, as Grethlein explains, was even more favourable towards hindsight as he used it unabashedly. This is made particularly clear, conversely, in a discussion laying out the importance of beginnings, which also explains the necessity for historians to know the end of events in order to write meaningful history:

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἠμισοῦ τοῦ παντός εἶναι φάσκοντες μεγίστην παρήγοντο ποιεῖσθαι στοιχὴν ἐν ἐκάστοις ὑπὲρ τοῦ καλῶς ἀξιωθαί: δοκοῦντες δὴ λέγειν ὑπερβολικῶς ἐλλπιστερὸν μοι φαίνονται τῆς ἀληθείας εἰρηκέναι. θαρρῶν γὰρ ἀν τις εἴπειν οὐκ ἠμισοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῦ παντός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ τέλος διατείνειν. πώς γὰρ ἀξιωθαί τινος καλῶς οἶον τε μὴ προσερμαλαβόντα τῷ νῷ τὴν συντέλειαν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς μηδὲ γινώσκοντα τοῦ καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπιβάλλεται τούτῳ ποιεῖν; πώς δὲ πάλιν οἶον τε συγκεφαλαιώσασθαι

55 See also Pelling (2013) 10-12 and Hau (2013) 73-4 in support of this view.
56 Grethlein (2013) 185-223.
πράγματα δεόντως μὴ συναναφέροντα τὴν ἀρχὴν πώθεν ἢ πῶς ἢ διὰ τί πρὸς τὰς ἐνεστώσας ἀφίκται πράξεις; διόπερ οὐχ ἔως τοῦ μέσου νομίζοντας διατείνειν τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἀλλὰ ἔως τοῦ τέλους, πλειστὴν περὶ ταύτας ποιητέον σπουδήν καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν ὅλων. ὁ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς πειρασόμεθα ποιεῖν. (5.32)

For the ancients, saying that the beginning is half of the whole, advised that the greatest care be taken in all matters for the purpose of a good beginning. Although they seem to be exaggerating, they appear to me to have spoken less than the truth. For one could confidently say that the beginning is not half of the whole, but rather stretches as far as the end. For how is it possible to begin something well without one getting a complete grip in one’s mind in advance about the completion of the enterprise, or knowing where, to what end and for what sake he is undertaking to do this? And how again is it possible to summarise events properly without referring to the beginning, and whence, how or why he has arrived at the current situation? On which account we should not think that beginnings stretch only until the middle, but until the end, and both those who speak and hear of a general history should pay the greatest attention to them. And this then I shall now try to do.

Polybios proclaims that beginnings can only be viewed from the vantage point of the end and by such he highlights the importance of hindsight for historical explanation: it is essential for a historian to know the end of the course of events he wishes to relate in order to bring coherence and meaning to them (cause and effect), and thereby draw out a lesson for the readers. As Grethlein states “…retrospect lets us see larger lines that are still invisible to historical agents; it is crucial to historical explanation.”57 Such a sense of teleology, however, blurs the clear borderline between historical events and their presentation, leading away from the perspective of agents and resulting in a work that may easily be faulted with misrepresenting the past.58 This is, of course, a complaint which Walbank levelled at Polybios in discussing the historian’s take on Philip’s last years. He accuses the historian of misrepresenting the Macedonian king’s motivation. The reason for this presentation of Philip, however, is that the whole account of the king’s life,

57 Grethlein (2013) 185, 226.
58 Grethlein (2013) 225.
like the whole of Polybios’ narrative, was affected by a thorough knowledge of what happened beforehand.

Polybios’ interpretation of the king could only have been made after considering Philip’s whole life, in conjunction, of course, with other connecting figures and events at the time – particularly Rome’s rise to world power. The historian could only explain why Macedonia fell and why a Hellenistic king was defeated by the Romans by keeping in mind both the beginning and the end of the affair. A historically accurate telling of events with emphasis on cause and effect was particularly important to his conception of good historiography. Thus Polybios’ view that Philip was aggressively inclined towards Rome from 183 BC must have been based off his own observation of the king’s life and was perhaps supported by his sources; an interpretation which developed within the context of his political preferences and in the course of identifying cause and effect, of trying to make sense of the beginning and end of the king’s reign, and ultimately of the fall of Macedonia. His reliance on hindsight to extract historical explanation will have influenced Polybios’ own assessment of the king and may have led him to misrepresent certain features of the king’s character.

Yet it would also be wrong to enforce this sense of teleology too far, as Polybios was well aware of the on-going nature of history.59 The teleology of the piece only appears in the fact that these are past events are very well-known, although perhaps not in detail, by the Greek and Roman worlds alike. The frequent references to Philip’s and Macedonia’s end foreshadow the steady move towards this development, but the way this end comes about is often unexpected. Philip frequently defies the expectation of both historical agents and readers: he surprises the Greek world, and even his advisers, by his military skill against the Aitolians, his success at Thermos, his diplomatic reasonableness in dealing with Sparta, and his control of the delicate situation that arose in his court from the Apelles conspiracy (see p.84). Furthermore, his attempt to take Messene contrasts with his previous actions in the Peloponnese. Equally, considering his earlier successes and rational approach to difficulties, his sudden panic and retreat from his naval expedition in Illyria in 216 after hearing about the approach of a Roman fleet would seem

59 See 1.3.b for a discussion of Polybios’ contingent conception of the past.
surprising (5.109-10). Finally, his defeat in the battle of Kynoskephalai (18.19-27; Livy 33.6-10), and particularly the later destruction of the Antigonid dynasty, would likely have shocked the Greek world as it had seen the king and kingdom rise to great prominence only a short time before. Polybios therefore makes use of a teleological framework in structuring his depiction of Philip – a feature which is to some extent unavoidable if he is to explain to his readers from the outset how and why Rome rose to power, and therefore how and why Macedonia fell. However, instead of allowing this framework to turn the past into something strongly predetermined and inescapable, he softens its inevitability by playing with the perceptions and expectations of both the historical agents and readers. This creates uncertainty about the outcome of events in the narrative, even if they are already known in reality, and thereby enforces his lessons about the contingency of the past and the unexpected reversals that can occur even if one has tried to prepare for all eventualities (cf. 29.22.2).

5.2.c The Pact between the Kings

Evidence of such a teleological design in Polybios’ account of Philip can be seen very clearly in the historian’s structuring of his work around the pact between the Macedonian king and Antiochos III in 203 BC, and a tendency to foreshadow and repeatedly explain the importance of this event which ultimately resulted in Rome’s supremacy in the Mediterranean.

The pact concluded between Philip and Antiochos is an event which, it has long been pointed out, Polybios sees as being particularly important in the destruction of the Antigonids and subjugation of the Seleucid kingdom. It is referred to in the surviving text of the Histories at no less than four different points, each respectively foreshadowing, recording the event, drawing moral conclusions from its consequences, and referring back to it to consolidate historical explanation (3.2-5, 14.1a.2, 15.20, 29.27.11-12). At 3.2-5, 60

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describing the main themes and events that will be covered in a “table of contents”, Polybios discusses the pact and its repercussions and gives it far more prominence and space than even the end of the Hannibalic War in the same year. Furthermore it is described with a degree of emotion that is unusual for Polybios – the kings are said to have acted wickedly (κακοπραγμονεῖν; 3.2.8), a description only applied to them and the Celts – and the episode stands out against the rest of the list, foreshadowing how important the pact will be historically.\(^{62}\) It looks forward to Book 14 where the details of the pact would have been recorded (unfortunately lost). At 14.1a.2, Polybios, about to begin his account of the Hannibalic War and the pact, says that he will be changing his literary-historical presentation of events to slow the narration down and relate only one year instead of two so that the audience may understand the major historical significance of these two events.\(^{63}\) Book 14 was also almost entirely focused on Egypt and the crisis in Ptolemaic power instead of cycling through regions as is typical in his other books.\(^{64}\) The year 203 BC was seen by Polybios as particularly crucial for the emergence of Rome as a world power.

The third reference in Book 15 is Polybios’ commentary on the pact, “a cascade of moralizing invective” which reveals the historian’s structure of historical causation (15.20). Set on, as Eckstein says, a “double track”, Polybios’ causation operated on both the secular and metaphysical levels, including human agency as well as the power of tychē (see 1.3.b). Our historian claims that it is by the work of tychē that Philip and Antiochos were almost immediately defeated by Rome and thus prevented from seizing the territory of others, instead having to pay indemnities to Rome. So too did tychē punish Philip for his earlier misdeeds by the inspired madness at the end of his life, resulting in the anger of his people and the execution of his son, Demetrios. Again, there is clear foreshadowing in Book 15 looking towards the end of the Macedonian royal house and the dominion of Rome as Polybios claims that during the reign of their successors tychē brought complete ruin to the Antigonid dynasty and disaster to the Seleucids (15.20.6-9).

\(^{63}\) See also Miltsios (2013) 14.
The fourth and final reference to the pact and its consequences appears in book 29, when Polybios comments that *tyche* had managed affairs so that the destruction of the Antigonid monarchy not only saved the Ptolemies and Egypt, but also persuaded Antiochos IV to withdraw from Egypt after Roman demands in light of her recent defeat of Perseus (29.27.11-12).65 From as early as book 3, therefore, even before the beginning of the narrative involving Philip (and Antiochos III) Polybios is looking ahead to Book 14 where he feels the pact between the kings was a crucial moment in the course of history, as well as to the end of the Antigonid dynasty and Rome’s supremacy in the Mediterranean in Book 29.

Further foreshadowing and narrative patterning may be seen in Polybios’ construction of the king’s character. The advice given to Philip by Demetrios of Pharos in 217 BC, directing the king’s gaze to events in the west (5.101.6-10), and Agelaos’ further encouragement (5.104.7) both contain obvious elements of foreshadowing. Demetrios’ advice to Philip opened the king’s eyes to aggression against Rome; and Agelaos’ speech looks directly forward to a time when Macedonia and Rome would fight for dominion. In doing so, the audience, who would be aware of the outcome of the conflict between the two powers, would be reminded both of the Second Macedonian War when Macedonia was defeated by Rome and her supremacy in Greece obliterated, and of the Third Macedonian War which, albeit fought by Philip’s son, saw the destruction of the Macedonian kingdom and Rome’s supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean.

Polybios’ use of a teleological scheme was not explicitly recognised in Walbank’s 1938 article and this, as well as the fact that Polybios was otherwise viewed to represent events and motives truthfully with little regard for style, is why such a feeling of dissatisfaction has been held in regard to this episode. If the last episode is viewed in isolation, disconnected from the earlier events of the king’s life, and when these earlier events are considered to be generally accurate while this last chapter of Polybios’ narrative is not, then the historian’s account of Philip’s last years becomes rather problematic. However, not only has this thesis already argued that the whole of Polybios’ account of Philip’s life should be treated with caution, but it is now also recognised that

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Polybios was very interested in how his work was structured and the propagation of specific political and didactic aims (see 1.3a-b). In this light, we cannot separate the introduction to the king’s final years from what has been said about Philip previously. This is especially apparent in light of the above passage where Polybios explicitly says that beginnings and endings have to be closely connected and that the whole course of events needs to be known to the historian in order to create historical explanation. Polybios himself would certainly not have concluded Philip’s life in a way which he felt was unsuitable or inconsistent with his overall scheme. Describing this episode as dissatisfaction is therefore missing the point.

We cannot tell, of course, what Philip’s motives were during this period, and scholarly opinion is divided. Polybios may be right or wrong in his interpretation of Philip. However, what can be said is that the depiction of an aggressive king aiming at conquest, presented specifically in opposition to Rome in his last years, was a very deliberate strategy within Polybios’ work and was developed from a very early stage in the Histories. In realising that the whole account of Philip V has been consciously constructed from the very beginning to fit coherently with such an end, then to claim that Polybios’ has misunderstood Philip’s situation and policies in 184 BC amounts to not looking at his work in the correct way. This, of course, does mean that we cannot altogether trust the historian’s interpretation of the king. Philip was interested in conquest, illustrated by his numerous attempts on Illyrian, Greek, Thracian and Aegean cities, an ambition undoubtedly fed by the need to continuously demonstrate and prove his strength by military display and victory. Yet Polybios’ account is, at certain points, exaggerated. This should not stop us, however, from acknowledging the excellence of the historian’s efforts to produce a coherent and intelligent historical explanation for the rise of Rome and the fall of the eastern Mediterranean. While Polybios’ depiction of Philip’s motives, as Walbank so perceptively understood in 1938, may be at moments historically flawed, dictated undoubtedly by his recourse to retrospection and an emphasis on the political and didactic purpose of the king within the Histories, we cannot say that Polybios’ account of Philip was inconsistent or contradictory. To say that “Polybios’ account of these last years of Philip are one of the least satisfying of his whole work”\(^ {66}\) because the historian

misunderstood Philip’s position and policy, is in fact misconstruing what Polybios was trying to achieve.

5.2.d The Consistency and Decisiveness of Philip

In a recent discussion, Boris Dreyer has argued that Polybios depicted Philip and his son Perseus as indecisive and inconsistent. In the case of Philip this is a claim based on two fragmentary sections in Polybios’ work. The first criticises his failure to take the opportunity to continue sailing on to Alexandria and attempt its capture after the Battle of Lade, and thereby hindering his own pursuit of universal rule (201 BC; 16.10). The other draws attention to the hesitation shown by the king when dealing with the quarrel between his two sons and facing the prospect of executing one of them (23.10.12-13; cf. Livy 40.23.5-6). A caveat is in order, however. Only two passages within Polybius’ Histories are used to substantiate the assertion that Philip was indecisive at crucial moments and we also have no other surviving passages from the Histories to indicate that this was a pervasive approach in Polybios’ interpretation of the king. Moreover, shortcomings can be found in both of these examples.

Philip may certainly have been aiming to make an attempt on Alexandria in 201 BC, as Polybios states, since Egypt was considered weak during this period and an attempt on the city would have been in accordance with the king’s grand ambitions. However, it seems that Philip was prevented from following this plan by the Rhodians who had been angered by the king’s expansionist policy in the Aegean from 205 BC and his sabotage of their fleet in 204. After his treacherous capture of a number of islands (particularly Kios and Thasos) in 202 and 201, they finally confronted the king at Lade suffering a close

67 Dreyer (2013a). In Perseus’ case, Dreyer’s argument is based on the king’s refusal to keep to obligations towards hired barbarian tribes, his spendthrift nature, his loss of nerve in battle, and the fact that he did not burn his documents after his defeat by the Romans at Pydna. The evidence for this characteristic in Perseus is, however, also problematic as it does not necessarily reveal moments of indecision, but ruthlessness, stinginess, cowardice and despair. Moreover many of the examples are based off judgements made by Polybius in pursuit of a didactic and cohesive work and will be tainted by his own interpretation of events. 68 Egypt’s weakness is a perception based on Ptolemy IV’s lack of interest in foreign policy, the fickleness of their hired foreign mercenaries, the unsettled Alexandrian populace, the eruption of a massive indigenous rebellion in 207, and finally the sudden death of Ptolemy IV and the accession of the 5-year old Ptolemy V in 204. See Höbl (2001) 125-134, Eckstein (2008) 132-33, Dreyer (2013b) and Erskine (2014).
It is here that Polybios includes his digression, criticising Philip for not continuing with his plan and hindering his own ambitions through confusion and weakness of mind. However, while the historian may have thought that the period after the battle was the opportune moment to resume this endeavour, Philip himself may have felt very differently. Such a venture immediately after a battle which, although won by the Macedonian king, was not a great victory would have been dangerous. The Rhodians had retreated after only negligible losses and by heading south Philip would have left the Aegean with an enemy far from decisively defeated and whose numbers would soon be enlarged by Pergamene forces (Pol. 16.1-9). Instead of heading south to Egypt, therefore, Philip decided to move against Pergamum, intending to drive King Attalos out of the war before his military preparations could be completed. The king’s decision not to sail south to Alexandria at this time does not, therefore, represent a moment of indecision, but rather a moment of logical reasoning, acknowledgement of setbacks and adaptability.

In the second example: Philip is certainly described by Polybios as distracted ‘day and night’ (ἐστροβείτο νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν περὶ τούτων διανοούμενος) by having to choose firstly whether or not to execute his sons or be killed by them, and secondly which of the two he should have killed (23.10.12-14). Yet, making any conclusions about Polybios’ depiction of Philip here is problematic as the passage cuts off before the description of the quarrel and how Philip dealt with it. We must rely instead on Livy’s account to complete some of the picture, but even in this version the final stages of the feud seem to have been compressed for dramatic effect - the date of Demetrios’ murder is uncertain, for example – and we cannot know what was omitted from Polybios’ account. What Livy does reveal, however, is that after Philip’s sons had each given their speeches in the spring of 182 BC (Livy 40.5-16), Philip announced that he would not make a decision based on what they had said in a single hour’s debate; a verdict would only be made after an inquiry into the life and character of each prince (Livy 40.16.2-3). Given the seriousness of the situation and the consequences that any resolution would

69 De Sanctis (1923) 1.10; Walbank (1940) 120-21, 307; and Pédech (1964) 111, 241.
70 Interestingly these are all qualities which Polybios is trying to instil in his readers. The fact that he subverts them in his treatment of the king is representative of his selective, subjective approach.
71 Walbank (1940/1960) 335.
have for the future of the royal house and kingdom, both in regard to internal stability and externally in Macedonia’s relations with Rome, an attempt to clarify the situation and enable a more informed decision was very sensible.

In the autumn of the same year the king, therefore, sent two ambassadors to Rome to investigate Demetrios’ relationship with Flamininus, who had been in correspondence with his son since his return to Macedonia in 191 (40.20.3). While awaiting news, Philip makes a reconnaissance mission up Mt. Haemus with Perseus, leaving Demetrios at home. This exclusion from his war councils and confidence may well reflect the king’s growing suspicions regarding his younger sons’ loyalty. The king then hears, while on this venture, that Demetrios planned to make an escape to Rome; however, he still decides to wait upon the report from Italy before taking any action (40.23). While this could be considered hesitation, had Philip acted against his younger son at this point his behaviour would have been based purely on suspicion, not proof. After several anxious months, the ambassadors finally return in the autumn of 181, producing a letter from Flamininus which supports Perseus’ charges of treason (40.23). On receipt of this evidence, the king sends Demetrios to Astraeum in Paeonia, and has him assassinated along the way at Heraclea at the end of 181 or in the first half of 180. At the same time, Perseus is sent to Amphipolis to manage Philip’s Thracian ventures, a move which seems decisive in its support of his elder son.

In the surviving passage of Polybius’ Histories we are presented only with one description of Philip’s confusion and despair, his exaggerated fears. It is a scene of high emotion, tragically displayed to emphasise the importance of the coming events and to evoke sympathy for the disasters effecting such a great figure. Yet, Livy shows that Philip’s actions, although motivated by uncertainty, are considered and cautious. The king refuses to rely exclusively on the impassioned accusations of Perseus and actively seeks out more information – considering the consequences of such a claim, it is sound judgement to want further proof before making a verdict. Finally, it appears that it is primarily during the wait for evidence that Philip is most anxious and hesitant; when proof is finally produced implicating Demetrios in high treason Philip takes decisive action to execute his son shortly afterwards. Significantly, this insistence on waiting for proof is a rational strategy which Philip also used in his handling of another earlier, equally crucial dispute - the Apelles Conspiracy in 219-17 BC (5.14-16, 5.25-28). The
reasons for his hesitation are therefore unique to this situation, not altogether surprising or unexpected, and do not in fact stop Philip from finding evidence or making a decision.

Nor are indecision or inconsistency characteristics in the king which Polybios claims anywhere in the surviving narrative to be a recurring factor or key in the fate of the Macedonian kingdom. The historian’s criticism of Philip’s failure to continue pursuing his original goal after Lade is turned into a moment of reflection discussing the natural predilection of all men to fall into confusion and despair in the face of insurmountable difficulties while pursuing large ambitions (16.10.2-4). Unfortunately, we do not know what else Polybios had to say about this topic, or how it affected Philip’s portrait as the passage cuts off at this point. We cannot say therefore that Polybios considered indecision and inconsistency as general characteristics of the king that extended beyond the moment. Similarly, nowhere in the surviving material does Polybios specifically state that it was Philip’s hesitation when mediating between his sons that was disastrous for the Macedonian house. Even in Livy no such comment is made. What is stated by both is that the quarrel between the two brothers was one of the causes of the Third Macedonian War (Livy 40.16.3), but this can only mean that the result of the quarrel – the increased distrust of Rome and the execution of the one person who had appeased Rome in the past – was part of its cause, not that Philip’s indecision brought it about.

5.3 The Tragic Mode of Philip’s Last Years

Walbank’s further assessment that the last years of Philip’s life are ‘the least satisfying of his whole work’ because of its recourse to a ‘tragic’ and moralistic mode is also a point which needs consideration. Once again we must remember that the whole picture of Philip is being constructed to fit certain themes and aims, and to come coherently to a designated end; in the same way that the whole of Philip’s life has been deliberately constructed around a teleological design, so too has the ‘tragic’ flavour of the last years been created as a deliberate feature. As we have seen throughout the course of this chapter and thesis, and as has also been discussed very recently by McGing and Miltsios, Polybios was particularly concerned about the structure of his work and took great efforts to make sure everything was as clear as possible for his readers, while at the same time also wishing to make his narrative as attractive as he could to retain their interest (see
1.2.b). His use of tragic references and to the stage in the course of his account of Philip’s last years is therefore very likely in aid of all of these aims: to make what happens clearly understood, to make the account at the same time interesting, and to reinforce his political and didactic agendas.

This section will first discuss what may initially seem to be a hypocritical contradiction in Polybios’ use of a tragic mode and his earlier attacks on ‘tragic’ historians, particularly Phylarchos in Book 2.\textsuperscript{72} This was briefly mentioned earlier, as discussed by Walbank himself in his 1938 article, but has also been extended and explored in a later article by the same author discussing the similarities and differences between history and tragedy, and more recently by Richard Rutherford and John Marincola.\textsuperscript{73} Their conclusions are particularly important for understanding Polybios’ conception of history and tragedy, and highlight the special meaning the historian ascribes to ‘tragic’ in his attack on other works and also, more importantly for this chapter, goes some way to explaining why Polybios wrote his whole account of Philip in the manner that he did. Having addressed this issue, this section will then be able to turn more specifically to how the use of a ‘tragic mode’ not only helps the historian develop his agenda but also the audience understand the events of the king’s life.

It is now more commonly accepted that the modern concept of ‘tragic history’ as a separate category in need of explanation has been too rigidly defined and is “very largely a figment and a distortion”.\textsuperscript{74} For the ancients the line between tragedy and history was in fact rather more difficult to determine; there was a great degree of overlap, even confusion, between the two genres as they were “akin” particularly for their employment of the same subject-matter, epic.\textsuperscript{75} This is shown by the need, for example shown by Aristotle in his \textit{Poetics} and Lucian in his \textit{How to Write History} (8-9), to discuss the differences between history and poetry. Furthermore, both forms of writing were also


\textsuperscript{73} Walbank (1985b) 224-41 = (1960) 216-34; Rutherford (2007); Marincola (2013).

\textsuperscript{74} Walbank (1985a); Marincola (2003) 286. See also Marincola (1999) for arguments against over-schematic views of genre in historiography.

\textsuperscript{75} Walbank (1985b) 229-36 for their kinship. See also Marincola (2013) 90 for the lessons epic provided tragedians and historians alike in the construction of their narrative.
attributed with a moral, didactic purpose.\textsuperscript{76} Tragedy was generally believed to hold educational value, even ascribed as its main function not only by later Byzantine grammarians and scholiasts, such as Dionysius Thrax (second/first century BC),\textsuperscript{77} but also earlier by Aristophanes in the whole course of his play \textit{The Frogs}, and the late-fifth or early-fourth-century dramatist, Timocles.\textsuperscript{78} The latter explicitly stated, according to Athenaios, that “the poor man, for instance, learns that Telephus was more beggarly than himself, and from that time on he bears his poverty more easily…One has lost his son in death: Niobe is a comfort. Another is lame: he sees Philoctetes…Thus he is reminded that all his calamities…have happened to others, and so he bears his own trials more readily” (Athen. 6.223b-d).

Interestingly this function is remarkably similar to one applied to history. The recognition of this feature appears from the foundation of the genre when Herodotos claims in the fifth century BC that explanation of the past is to be one of the aims of his work (1.1.0). This function is developed a little later by Thukydides, who explicitly hopes that his work will be useful to those readers wishing to know the past as an aid to dealing with the future (1.22.4). Polybios, of course, in his \textit{prokataskeue} at 1.1.2, continues with this theme, claiming that by learning about the misfortunes suffered by others we may learn how to endure the vicissitudes of fate with greater resolve. Similarly, Diodorus also noted tragedy’s inducement to piety and justice, while exclaiming the extra weight history’s recording of truth and philosophy had on shaping men’s characters in honourable ways (Diod.1.2.2). For the latter two authors, history was, as Walbank claims, “a store house of examples calculated to help the reader either morally or practically according to the bent of the particular writer.”\textsuperscript{79} Similar attitudes towards history appear later in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Cicero, Quintilian and Lucian.\textsuperscript{80} Thus, in consideration of the similar foundation and purpose of the two genres, it is not surprising that the treatment applied to one could also be applied to the other.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{77} Scholia ad Dion. Thrac. p. 746.1.
\textsuperscript{78} Timocles, F 6.1-7, 17-19 K-A. See also Croally (2008) 59-60.
\textsuperscript{79} Walbank (1985b) 236.
\textsuperscript{80} Dion. Hal. \textit{Ant. Rom.} 1.6.1-5; Cic. \textit{Leg.} 1.5; Quint. 10.1.31; Luc. \textit{The Writing of History}. 9.
\textsuperscript{81} See Walbank (1985b) 237 and also Marincola (2013) 88-90 for the attempts by ancient historians to argue that history was superior to tragedy because of its use of true events, while tragedy used fiction, and criticism therefore of those historians who invented certain elements within their work.
Dramatic elements are therefore found, and frequently approved of, in a large number of ancient historical texts. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for example, noted the highly emotional quality (enargeia) of Thukydides’ narrative, referencing particularly the harrowing events at Plataea, Mytilene and Melos (Dion. Hal. Thuc. 15). Plutarch similarly praised him for his constant strive for vividness, making the reader a spectator and inspiring emotions of amazement and consternation as if they were eyewitnesses (De glor. Ath. 347a). Xenophon was also recognised and praised for the experiential quality of both the Hellenica and the Anabasis (Dion. Hali. De imit. 426.7; Lucian, Eikones 10; Plut. Artax. 8.1), and Plutarch himself, although not strictly historiography, is known to frequently create passages of high emotion (see for example, in his account of the battle of Gaugamela at Alex. 31.6-33.11; and of course Aratos’ capture of Akrokorinthos Arat.18-23).  

While modern audiences may not find the descriptions contained within these narratives so affecting, it seems that the ancient Greeks reacted far more directly and emotionally to both the written and spoken word. For them, tragedy and history were connected in their construction which aimed at evoking and playing upon the emotions of the reader or listener. The link and confusion between tragedy and history by ancient authors was therefore forged “by virtue of descent and of analogous literary techniques, it was encouraged by a common moral aim and by the sharpness of Greek emotional sensibility, and it was taught in the rhetorical schools to generations of Greek students”.  

It is therefore not surprising that Polybios would have used elements within his Histories which might be categorised as tragic. As stated in Chapter 1, we should not underestimate the literary and rhetorical complexity of the historian, nor typecast him as one immune from bias, partial analysis and sensationalism. He was very much embedded in the wider Hellenistic intellectual tradition which permitted and accepted the integration of these features. Any similarities in the subject-matter therefore, in the moral nature or in the vivid features of his work with tragedy were not unusual. The line between the two

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84 Walbank (1985b) 241.
genres was inherently blurred and few Greek writers attempted to divide the two.\textsuperscript{85} Moreover, the complaints that Polybios made against Phylarchos and other ‘tragic historians’ are, rather than attacks on their use of emotional and vivid elements in general, instead in response to the extent that they were firstly prone to sensational exaggeration and inaccuracy which would distort the truth, and secondly to a lack of attention to cause and effect which would deviate from the didactic and truthful purpose of history.\textsuperscript{86} It was all about a matter of degree.\textsuperscript{87} In the case of Polybios’ polemic against Phylarchos, it is very likely that the historian’s statements censuring ‘tragic’ elements in historical works are exaggerated by the vehemence of his disagreement with Phylarchos’ political perspective and not really a reflection of his own, or the general, attitude towards the writing of history. Furthermore, as Marincola has pointed out, the invocation of strong emotions was not the sole domain of tragedy, but also rhetoric and oratory which aimed to persuade the audience to a certain point of view. Historiography, which also held such a goal, was therefore similarly associated with rhetoric and frequently included its techniques of persuasion.\textsuperscript{88} For our historian, the production of certain emotions in the audience, instead of being something to avoid, had a valid role to play in historiography, provided that they were produced in appropriate contexts and mindful of the truth. They could reinforce and support the moral and historical analysis being expounded.\textsuperscript{89} The peculiar tragic and emotional quality to the last years of Philip’s life would not therefore have compromised its worth in the eyes of the historian or of his original ancient audience. In fact, it may very well have had the opposite effect as it came to present a moment of importance.

The conceptualisation and structuring of historical narrative would also have been conditioned by this close association of history to tragedy in the ancient Greek mind. Grethlein claims that “the notion of drama helps Polybios to conceptualize the unity of the history he was writing about.”\textsuperscript{90} This statement was made in recognition, not only by

\textsuperscript{85} Walbank (1985b) 241.
\textsuperscript{87} Cf. Lucian, \emph{How to Write History} 44-46 for the appropriate use of poetic language in history.
\textsuperscript{88} Marincola (2003) 290-92, 300-01. See also Arist. \emph{Rhet.} II 1, 1378a19-22.
\textsuperscript{90} Grethlein (2013) 229.
Grethlein but also by a number of other commentators, of a similarity between Polybios’ reflection on unity and Aristotle’s analysis of tragedy. Polybios writes at 3.1.4-5 that:

ὄντος γὰρ ἐνὸς ἔργου καὶ θεάματος ἐνὸς τοῦ σύμπαντος, ὑπὲρ οὗ γράφειν ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, τοῦ πῶς καὶ πόστε καὶ διὰ τί πάντα τὰ γνωριζόμενα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπὸ τὴν Ρωμαίων δυναστείαν ἐγένετο, τούτου δ᾽ ἔχοντος καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν γνωριζομένην καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἄρχομένων καὶ τὴν συντέλειαν ὀμολογουμένην, χρήσιμον ἢγούμεθ᾽ εἶναι καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτῶ μερῶν, ὅσα μεταξὺ κεῖται τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους, κεφαλαιώδες ἐπιμνησθῆναι καὶ προεκθέσθαι.

Since what I have set my hand to write is one action and one spectacle of the whole, the how, when and why all the known parts of the oikoumene came under Roman dominion, and since this has a recognised beginning, fixed duration and undisputed outcome, I consider it useful to recall and lay out in advance summarily an account of the most important parts in it, which all lie between the beginning and the end.

This passage reflects the same concern for plot voiced by Aristotle in his Poetics, where the philosopher elaborates on the importance of unity and cites the beginning, middle and end as the three basic components of tragedy (Arist. Poet. 1450b26-30). Both authors also put special emphasis on the end, the conclusion to the narrative, and so enforce its need for climatic significance. This is a feature which of course is also apparent in the tragic end to Philip’s life. It is uncertain, however, if Polybios ever read Aristotle’s Poetics - there have been inconclusive arguments on both sides91 – yet, as the previous paragraphs illustrated, history and tragedy were to an extent intertwined and Aristotle would not necessarily have been considered the ultimate source of their definition. The necessary components in the execution of their plot could very well have been more generally known.92

91 For the assertion that Polybios was directly influenced by Aristotle’s Poetics see, for example, von Scala (1890) 126-53; Williams (2007); and Hartog (2010). Ziegler (1952) 1470 argues against this influence.
92 Halliwell (2002) 210-11 notes that Aristotle’s Poetics was not a prominent text in the Hellenistic period, and Hoffmann (2002) 210-11 sees an indirect connection between the two.
Regardless of our historian’s awareness of Aristotle’s work, Grethlein’s statement about the notion of drama helping Polybios to conceptualise his *Histories* is supported by more explicit evidence. Polybios is, for example, particularly fond of using *tyche* as “a stage director” which in turn “implies viewing history as a drama”.\(^93\) Polybios’ use of *tyche* in directing the crucial moments in the development of the rise of Rome, and the destruction of Philip and Antiochos, has already been mentioned above in his creation of causation, yet the connection made between *tyche* and the stage is also more explicitly voiced. At 23.10.16, for example, the historian asserts that *tyche* acted as if of set purpose in bringing the misfortunes of the Macedonian people and of the royal house *onto the stage* at one and the same time” (…τῆς τύχης ὡσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἀναβιβαζόσθης ἐπὶ σκηνήν ἐν ἑνὶ καίρῳ τὰς τούτων συμφορὰς). Much earlier in book 11, the image is drawn out further in a speech by an unknown Thrasycrates, who addresses an Aitolian congress in 207 BC compelling them to end their war against Philip which was entered into with Roman support, and warning against the repercussions in the case of Macedonia’s destruction and a Roman victory for the Greeks:

But now, because of the fate of the people of Oreus and the miserable Aeginetans, you have become transparent to everyone, and *tyche*, as if of set purpose, has brought your [Aitolian] ignorance onto the stage. The beginning of the war and the things which are already happening are like this: but what end must we expect, if everything goes entirely as you had in mind? Is it not the beginning of great disasters for all the Greeks?

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\(^93\) Grethlein (2013) 228-29.
Later too, in book 29, a similar phrase is used in another unrelated situation, when the Rhodians approach the Romans after the defeat of Perseus encouraging peace between the two powers:

ὅτι κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν, ἐν ὧν Περσεὺς ἠττηθεὶς ἀνεδίδοσκεν, ἔδωξε τῇ συγκλήτῳ τὸ ύς
παρὰ τῶν Ῥωδίων πρεσβευτὰς παραγεγονότας ὑπὲρ τοῦ διαλυεῖν τὸν πρὸς Περσὸν ἕα πόλεμον προσκαλέσασθαι, τῆς τύχης ὡσπερ ἑπίτηδες ἀναβιβαζόμενης ἑπὶ σκηνήν τὴν τῶν Ῥωδίων ἁγγεῖαν, ἐν χρή Ῥωδίων λέγειν, ἄλλα μὴ τῶν ἑπιπολασάντων ἀνθρώπων τότε κατὰ τὴν Ῥώδουν. (29.19.1-2)

At the time when Perseus was beaten and ran away, it was decided by the senate to summon the envoys from Rhodes who had come for the purpose of bringing the war with Perseus to an end, but Fortune, as if of set purpose, brought the ignorance of the Rhodians onto the stage – if indeed we should say of the Rhodians, and not rather of the men who had then come to the surface at Rhodes.

These examples show explicitly that there is a notion of drama within Polybios’ Histories – intimately connected with reversals of fortune, a feature often associated with tragedy – and that this extends beyond the last years of Philip and even the Macedonian context. This, of course, enhances the argument for the confusion of genres in antiquity. By using theatrical elements within a historical work the audience would be reminded of tragedies on the stage and their typical plotlines of reversal, and thereby enable them to anticipate and understand how the historical stories of the agents would pan out. Familiarity often provides comfort and grounds for interpretation, and this is what Polybios was undoubtedly trying to achieve. Furthermore, the inclusion of vivid and tragic elements in his narrative would more easily have held the interest of his audience and would have allowed him to direct attention and sympathy towards specific moments.

In showing that tragic elements were not only used in describing the Macedonian situation, however, these passages also call into question the argument recently advocated by Dreyer, who claims that the tragic mode of this episode was derived from a
Macedonian court source.\textsuperscript{94} Each variously discusses the changing circumstances of the Aitolians, Philip and the Rhodians, at different points within the narrative and it is unlikely that one Macedonian source could have provided a tragic telling of all of these events. Moreover, all three examples use the same basic phrasal formula (τῆς τύχης ὡστερ ἐπίτηδες ἀναβιβαζούσης ἐπί σκηνήν (11.5.8 and 23.10.16) or τῆς τύχης ὡστερ ἐπίτηδες ἐπὶ τὴν ἔξωστραν ἀναβιβαζούσης (29.19.1-2)), which would suppose that they were all part of Polybios’ original text (see 5.1.a). It therefore stands that this tragic element, although it is possible it may have been picked up from a source, was very likely a literary device extended over the narrative by the historian’s own devising, and widely used to draw attention to moments of reversal and to create understanding and interest in the reader.

\textbf{5.3.a Tragedy, Education and Political Morality}

This familiarity with the tragic/historical form would have arisen from youth in Greek education, within which the knowledge of myth, epic and tragedy were essential elements.\textsuperscript{95} This fact is explicitly acknowledged in a surviving Polybian passage in which Philip V talks to his sons about the importance of reading such works:

\begin{quote}
οτι δει μη μόνον ἀναγινώσκειν τὰς τραγῳδίας καὶ τοὺς μῦθους καὶ τὰς ἱστορίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ γινωσκειν καὶ συνεφιστάνειν ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος. ἐν οἷς ἀπασίν ἔστιν ὅραν, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν ἀδελφῶν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁργήν καὶ φιλονικίαν ἐμπεσόντες ἐπὶ πολλά προὔβησαν, ἀπαντῶν τοὺς τοιούτους οὐ μόνον σφάς ἀπολωλεκότας, ἀλλὰ καὶ βίον καὶ τέκνα καὶ πόλεις ἀρδήν κατεστραφότας, ὅσοι δὲ μετρίως ἐξηλοῦσαν τὸ στέργειν αὐτοὺς καὶ φέρειν τὰς ἀλλήλων ἀγνοίας,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{94} See Dreyer (2013a).

\textsuperscript{95} For primary evidence which states the importance of myth, epic and poetry in general in education see Aristoph. Frogs; Xen. Sym. 3.5; and Isocrates, Pan. 159. The prevalence of poetry in education is also illustrated by the criticisms of the genre in Plato (Rep. 606-8, Prot. 316d2-9, and Laws 653-55) and implicitly, as Croally points out, in Aristotle’s Poetics. For the use of tragedy as a method of teaching see Heath (1987) 37-88 and Crollly (2008). For literature in education in general see also Morgan (1998) and Wissman (2010). Cf. Cribiore (2001) who discusses education in Graeco-Roman Egypt.
τούτους ἀπαντᾷς σωτήρας γεγονότας ὃν ἄρτιώς εἶπον καὶ μετὰ τῆς καλλίστης φήμης καὶ δόξης βεβιωκότας. (23.11.1-3)

It is necessary not only to read tragedies, myths and histories, but also to know and give careful attention to this sort of role. In all of which it is possible to see that those brothers who fell into anger and contentiousness against each other and advanced their quarrel to great lengths, destroyed themselves in every such case, but also utterly ruined their life, children and cities; while those who competed moderately to love themselves and to bear each other’s errors, these were the saviours of the things that I have just mentioned, and lived with the finest reputation and honour.

Philip’s speech goes on to talk about the kings of Sparta and the superiority of their constitution when they listened to the ephors, and finally onto the contemporary example of the two Pergamene brothers Eumenes and Attalos, who increased the size and strength of their kingdom by working together in concord and respect (Polyb. 23.11.4-8).

However, this speech is likely to have been constructed with a good degree of artistic licence. Polybios’ source would probably have been an eye-witness account acquired from a Macedonian informant, perhaps from the court of Philip and Perseus, while in Rome with no reference to a written document.96 Livy makes no record of any such speech given by Philip, only relating how the king refused to make a decision based on what each had said in the short time of the debate, insisting on waiting upon further enquiries into the life and character of each son (Livy 40.16). However, Polybios’ construction of the speech with its emphasis on the importance of tragedies, myths and histories is not necessarily only an expression of his own views, and something similar may well have been understood and even mentioned by Philip himself.

In his 1938 article, Walbank considered Polybios’ emphasis on morals to be troubling and inconsistent for a historian who was perceived by him to pursue truth and practicality. At this stage, Walbank’s later assessment of the ancient historian as a hard-nosed rationalist and Machiavellian, which became so pronounced in the 1960s following André

96 For discussions of the Macedonian sources Polybios may have used see von Scala (1890) 269, Walbank (1938), Pédech (1964) 131-34, and Dreyer (2013a).
Aymard’s argument for Polybios’ realist stance in 1940, had not yet been fully formed. Yet, the roots of Walbank’s conception of Polybios as a man primarily interested in the rational and practical are plain to see in the discomfort and dissatisfaction expressed in his 1938 article in regard to Polybios’ moralistic treatment of Philip’s last years. Such an opinion, which held ground for nearly half a decade, has greatly affected the reception of this episode ever since.

However, this is not the only interpretation of the historian to have influenced scholarship, as there have been numerous supporters of Polybios’ moralistic aim from as early as the sixteenth century. Jean Bodin considered Polybios as much a philosopher as a historian, and Christopher Watson praised the historian for his ‘holesome counsels’. Isaac Casaubon and John Dryden commented on Polybios’ virtuous behaviour and his commendation of everything plain, sincere and good. Later in the eighteenth century, John Adams thought Polybios to have been a man who considered life deeply and whose character was deserving of reverence. In the nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche saw the historian as a primary exponent of teaching by moralising exemplars, and in the twentieth, Rudulf von Scala and Carl Wunderer asserted that Polybios considered traditional morality to be a crucial component of political behaviour. The perception of the historian as a rationalist and Machiavellian, advocated by Walbank in the twentieth century, was once again refuted by Eckstein in 1995 when he convincingly revived the latter opinion that Polybios was interested in living by and teaching traditional morality, considering it essential for proper political behaviour. Polybios’ upbringing among the ruling classes of the Peloponnese instilled in him traditional elite values which he subsequently expounds within his own work.

101 See Chinard (1940) 43-44.
102 Nietzsche (1874) 15.
103 Von Scala (1890) 5; Wunderer (1898) 15-18 and (1905) 30.
104 Cf. Jaeger (1939) and Mitchell (2013) for traditional elite values.
The exploration of the blurred line between history and tragedy by Walbank in 1960, and the subsequent recognition of each genre’s recourse to a didactic function, makes Eckstein’s arguments for Polybios’ moralistic aim all the more compelling. Walbank himself even admitted in 2002 that this aspect of Polybios’ thought had been underestimated by some scholars, including himself. In 1938 Walbank had been discomforted by Polybios’ explicit expression of moral purpose because his own conception of the historian at the time, and the artificial segregation of ancient historical and tragic writing by scholars at the time, could not match up or find consistency with these statements. Any perceived deviations from a rational approach therefore were then liable to accusations of inadequacy and feelings of dissatisfaction. New attitudes towards both the historian and the genres of historiography and tragedy, however, smooth out this discomfort and Polybios’ reasoning and purpose, not only in regards to his account of the last years of Philip but also in his construction of his entire work, becomes more transparent. Polybios did not view history and tragedy as inherently separate genres and was not opposed to the use of tragic features within historiography per se. It was only when the inclusion of such features was excessive and caused a distortion of the truth or failed to recognise and point out the ever important didactic feature of cause and effect, that our historian took issue. History, like tragedy, was meant to be educational, and truth and causation were especially important in fulfilling this function.

5.3.b Philip as a Tragic Figure: Historical Implications

In response to the recent change of direction in scholarly thought towards Polybios and the relationship between history and tragedy, it is now necessary to view the ancient historian’s account of Philip’s last years from a different perspective. Walbank’s 1938 article can no longer hold its ground. While Walbank’s complaints about historicity still ring true and have been successfully expanded on in the following years, his concerns about the conspicuous tragic nuances and moral emphasis within the account and their subsequent devaluation of the text, should be taken as products of modern perception. Polybios was unlikely to have written an account of the last years of Philip, a character to

whom he attributed great significance, not only in the course of history but also in his role as a didactic model, in a way which he would have considered undeserving or ill-fitting with the rest of his narrative of the king’s life. The end of Polybios’ account of Philip is the climax of a long career as well as (within the Histories) a long lesson, and we might expect this finale to be somewhat more emphatic and dramatic than usual.

It was once noted by Walbank that the whole of Philip’s life, without interference, already held all the necessary components of a tragic tale; a convenient feature which did not go unnoticed by our ancient historian, who built on these ‘basic facts’ a superstructure of tragedy.\textsuperscript{106} He uses the definition of a tragic hero and plot put forward by Aristotle to support this statement: “a man who is not eminently good and just, nor one who has fallen into misfortune by vice or depravity, but by some error. He must be highly renowned and successful – a personage like Oedipus, Thyestes or other illustrious men of such families” (Arist. Poet. 13.3, 1453a8-10).\textsuperscript{107} The plot must also have a single result and change from good to bad fortune, and not because of villainy but because of some great flaw in the hero (13.3, 1453a 10-16). Philip certainly fits this model. He is a renowned and prosperous figure from a family of kings and according to Polybios naturally prone to good qualities (10.26). He then changes from a brilliant young king (κοινός τις οίον ἐρώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων; 7.11.8) into a treacherous tyrant (5.10, 7.11-13), not, Polybios claims, through any innate viciousness but through a weakness of character that Demetrios of Pharos takes advantage of in 217 BC (5.102.1). Philip’s defects then increase with age (10.26), exacerbated by his frequent successes and ambitions. Furthermore, the events of the king’s life could also, as Walbank suggested, constitute the best kind of tragic plot. Aristotle states this to be when events come on by surprise and the effect is heightened at the same time when they follow as cause and effect (Arist. Poet. 9.11-12, 1452a 1-11). There is considerable surprise, for example, in the king’s

\textsuperscript{106} Walbank (1938) 55-64 = (1985) 210-19.
\textsuperscript{107} Arist. Poet. 13.3, 1453a8-16: ἐστι δὲ τοιούτος ὁ μήτε ἀρετὴ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνη μήτε διά κακιαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν μεταβάλλων εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἄλλα δὲ ἀμαρτίαν τινά, τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχία, οίον Οἰδίπους καὶ Θυέστης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γενέων ἔπαινες ἀνδρὲς, ἀνάγκη ἀρα τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μήθον ἀπλοῦν εἰναι μᾶλλον ἤπιστολος, ἢ ἀνάγκη διὰ τοῦτον ἢ καὶ εἰς τοὺς μεταβαλλέντας ὡστε τινὲς ἡ δια μοχθηρίαν ἄλλα δὲ ἀμαρτίαν μεγάλην ἥριον εἰσηται ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ θείονος.
defeat at Kynoskephalai in 197 BC. Philip was renowned for his military skill and competence and had been successful in securing the Peloponnese, Macedonia, Thrace and now new territory in the Aegean. But, unexpectedly, he is weakened in the Second Macedonian War and ultimately unable to withstand Roman might. Later still, his reputation amongst his subjects is compromised when he attempts to strengthen his position by the transference of peoples between Macedonia and the Thracian coast, and his assassination of a number of Macedonians with questionable loyalty. Finally, the despatch of his son Demetrios to Rome to alleviate the situation between the Italian power and Macedonia actually ends with the king having to execute his son in 181 for Roman sympathies and treason. The unexpectedness of this outcome is expressly brought out by Polybios at 23.3 where it is even suggested that Demetrios’ embassy contributed to Philip’s misfortunes.

The whole of Philip’s life as it is recorded in the Histories therefore seems to fit roughly into a tragic plotline, full of unexpected outcomes and reversals of fortune. However, it would be going too far to say that Polybios wrote about the whole of Philip’s life in a tragic manner; this would severely compromise his arguments against the use of sensational imagery, as he himself would then have produced a narrative moulded around a framework which explicitly uses such imagery. Moreover, his manipulation of more complicated historical events into a simplified tragic plot would produce inaccuracies, which he was particularly against. While the line between history and tragedy may have been blurred in ancient historiography, Polybios very much came down on the side of history and any tragic elements within his Histories would only work to enforce his historical agenda. This is evident in the fact that it is only the series of events starting with the quarrel between Philip’s sons at 23.10 and ending with the king’s death that Polybios moulds into such a tragic unit. This being when Philip suffered personally from the wrath of his people, when he lost control of the situation with Rome, and when the royal house of Macedon was ripped apart by internal strife.

108 Walbank (1938) 55-56 = (1985) 211. Here Walbank once again refers to Aristotle’s Poetics, citing his dictum that the plot of a tragedy need not necessarily deal with the whole life of a hero, but only a single set of events forming a tragedy (Poet. 8.1-2, 1451a 15).
Such a framework would have been particularly useful for the historian at this stage in his depiction of the king’s life, as his readers’ general familiarity with tragic plots would have alerted them beforehand to the likely outcome of events and the fate of Philip. The use of anticipatory expectation, therefore, combined with the unexpectedness of the disasters which struck the royal house and the tragic language used in the narrative, would not only peak interest in the highlighted passage, but also draw attention to the lessons that Polybios’ wanted his readers to pick up.\(^\text{109}\) The educational quality of tragedy would help to enforce the historian’s didactic purpose and make the final result of Philip’s life and the political message he wanted to impart even more emphatic, vivid and memorable. A tragic mode is used, therefore, in the construction of Philip’s final years by our historian to increase the interest, effectiveness and intensity of his lessons concerning cause and effect, as well as political behaviour.

We should not, however, constrain our understanding of Polybios’ literary working to the inclusion of tragic elements alone, as other literary genres also overlapped with and influenced Polybios’ historiographical method. As Marincola has pointed out, the invocation of emotions was as much an important element of tragedy as it was rhetoric and oratory.\(^\text{110}\) However, while the emotions of tragedy, he claims, tended towards fear and pity, those of rhetoric leant towards a larger range, in particular anger and pity. Both rhetoric and historiography aimed to persuade the audience to a certain point of view, so it is not surprising that they also shared similar features. While our historian refers to tragic paraphernalia in the last years of Philip, the emotions he invokes, anger and pity, are those more associated with rhetoric and more inclined to persuasion. In his polemic against Phylarchos, Polybios unambiguously states that the purpose of history is to teach and persuade (2.56.11), and at the end of Philip’s life he is able to do so brilliantly with a mixture of tragedy and rhetoric.

Polybios’ use of a tragic mode, however, has some serious historical implications for the picture of Philip. While the historian’s account of the king’s policies in these later years is unlikely to be fictional, the interpretation of them, on the other hand, whether

\(^{109}\) See Miltsios (2009) for Polybios’ use of the expectation of anticipation in the story of Achaio’s capture by Antiochus.

they were beneficial or not and the emphasis on certain features, will have been effected by this tragic imagery. In this case, we should be especially cautious of the extreme reaction that Philip’s policy of transmigration and his assassination of certain Macedonian families provoked. Undoubtedly these events caused distress for the people affected, but the emphasis on the suffering of Philip’s people, their cries to the gods and curses against the king, only enhances the villainy of Philip and tarnishes his image further in the eyes of the reader. By this emphasis, the king is again proven to be treacherous and ruthless in his actions, but this time against his own people; a feat which might be considered even worse than the cruelty he displayed towards the Greeks.

Furthermore, Polybios seems to ignore the benefits gained by these policies for Philip and the kingdom. This may, of course, be the fault of the fragmentary nature of the tradition rather than the historian himself; yet, the inclusion of a discussion considering the practical reasons for such action would ruin the dramatic effect that Polybios was creating at this juncture. Such an omission is itself not so unusual for the historian’s treatment of Philip - his earlier accounts of Thermos and Messene reveal a similar exclusion of practical considerations in favour of moral ones.

The policies were part of the king’s preparations, begun in 186 BC, to ensure the security and recovery of the Macedonian kingdom. These aimed at the reorganisation and consolidation of territories, the replenishing of its depleted population after thirty years of warfare, the weeding out of dissidence, and the improving of its financial status.111 The last was achieved by an increase in the revenue from agricultural produce and harbour dues (Livy 39.24.2), the sinking of new mines and the reopening of old ones, and finally the minting of large issues of coinage.112 His transference of populations from the Macedonian coastal cities to Paeonia, and the introduction of Thracians into these Macedonian towns was part of this process of recovery. By moving his Macedonian subjects, he not only consolidated his defence against the Dardanians in the north, but

112 Coinage was minted by the royal mint, the Macedonians as a body and also even separate cities such as Amphipolis, Aphytis in Chalcidice, Apollonia in Mygdonis, Pella and Thessalonike. This last concession represents a political readjustment between centralised authority of king and the local units which had been absorbed into Macedonia. For the evidence see Gaebler (1897) 169-92, (1926) 111-16 and 183-98; Mamroth (1928) 1, (1930) 207-303, (1935) 219-51; Perdrizet (1903) 320-25. For discussion see also Hammond (1972) 460-468, and Mørkholm (1991) 163-171. Cf. Roisman & Worthington (2011) 494-95.
also removed a dangerous section of political opposition which resisted Philip’s policy in Thrace and his resistance to Rome (Polyb. 23.10.4).\textsuperscript{113} The king’s reputation and credibility amongst the Macedonians had probably plummeted after his losses against Rome as he could no longer stood strong as a militarily successful ruler. His plans of recovery may also have been severely questioned. The increase in harbour dues no doubt caused discontent in these coastal towns and their forced migration to Paeonia would have brought about even more ill-will. Philip’s assassination of a group of Macedonian nobles – notably Admetos, Pyrrhichos and the king’s own foster-brother, Samos son of Chrysogonos\textsuperscript{114} – and the imprisonment of their children later in 183, reflects this growing hostility towards the above-mentioned measures and possibly the Antigonid policy towards Rome. His actions, while certainly heavy-handed and ruthless, would have removed direct threats to Philip himself within his own.\textsuperscript{115} By moving Thracians (originally as mercenaries) into these coastal cities, Philip was replacing his unfaithful subjects with more dependable ones as well as replenishing the population, and therefore the military strength, of Macedonia itself (Polyb. 23.10.4; Livy 39.24.4).\textsuperscript{116}

Given the fragmentary nature of the sources it is hard to tell how successful these unpopular policies ultimately were. However, it is apparent from the record as it survives in Polybios and Livy that such was the security of the Macedonian kingdom at Philip’s death that Perseus was able to succeed with no apparent difficulty from within his kingdom, to expand northwards into Thrace without having to worry internally or externally about his own country, and to assemble a sizeable army from the increased population and ties of alliance in Thrace. He was strong enough to pose a threat to Roman power eight years later in 171 BC. Of course, Perseus’ own actions at the start of his reign would also have contributed to his smooth succession. In 179 BC, he called back to Macedonia all fugitive debtors and exiles, either by sentence of the court or for offenses to Philip, promising safety to the returned and the recovery of their property. Similarly,

\textsuperscript{113} Walbank (1940/1960) 244 and fn. 4. Cassandreia for example was constantly hostile to Antigonid rule (Tarn (1913) 186 fn. 82), and Theoxena’s family mentioned in Livy 40.40.4 came from Thessalonica.
\textsuperscript{114} This was the Samus whose famous line was inscribed on the walls at Thermos in 218 BC (Polyb. 5.9.4). His death is mentioned by Plut. Moral. 53 E.
\textsuperscript{115} Walbank (1940) 245 suggests that these executions along with the hostility towards Philip infer the presence of a conspiracy, an interference which seems likely, however, his additional point that this probably had the aim to remove Philip and replace him with Demetrios is much to speculative.
\textsuperscript{116} Griffith (1935) 73, 77-8; Walbank (1940/1960) 242-45.
those in debt or imprisoned in Macedonia were also released and pardoned (Polyb. 25.3). These actions would have endeared Perseus to his subjects as a new king breaking away from the discontent of the last years of his father’s reign. Yet, he still proceeded along the same lines in terms of policy as his father, restoring the strength of his country with an eye on military conquest and an eye on Rome. Without Philip’s preparations Perseus could not have sufficiently increased the population of Macedonia enough within that eight year period to be militarily significant in the Mediterranean once again, nor acquired enough wealth or financial stability to pay for the army and its mercenaries. The policies put into place by Philip from 187 BC onwards, therefore, started this process and contributed to this increase in strength and security in Macedonia. Polybios, however, as at other moments in the king’s life, submerges the benefits and reasonableness of Philip’s policies and actions to bring out moral concerns. This will partly be due to his narrative design and agenda which constantly foreshadowed the downfall of the king and aimed to provide an explanation for the destruction of such a great figure, as well as no doubt partially based on the evidence provided by the sources he used (to a large extent probably eye-witness accounts from the Macedonian court).

In addition to inspiring contempt for the king in the eyes of the readers, however, there may also be a case to suggest that the emotional and vivid depiction of Philip’s last years was also created to stir sympathy for the king. He was after all a powerful and successful Hellenistic ruler, who had countered expectation and overcome adversity in his early years, built up the strength, reputation and influence of the Macedonian kingdom in the Greek world, and met with reasonably swift success in his pursuit of conquest and expansion. As was deemed appropriate for a Macedonian king, he had large ambitions, was a brilliant military commander, and seemed to be following in the famous footsteps of Philip II and Alexander the Great (cf. 22.18.10). All of this changed, however, perhaps rather unexpectedly, at the height of his success. He was heavily defeated by a relatively new player in the Greek east, Rome, considered more alien and perhaps more brutal at this time than the Macedonians. The contact and conflict with this new player left Philip forced to curtail his ambitions and give up many of his recent conquests. Furthermore, in his attempts to recoup his losses and strengthen himself and the kingdom militarily and financially, his policies also turned his own people against him, inspiring sedition and conspiracy. To top off this misfortune, Philip’s house is damaged at the same time by the violent rivalry between his own sons and he is eventually forced to execute the younger,
Demetrios, and consequently remove the one person who had placated Roman anger in the past. Despite his best efforts, therefore, with the addition of this new power on the scene complicating matters further, Philip gradually loses more and more control of the situation. Surely, the downfall of such a successful and promising king, for reasons beyond his control and beyond his best efforts, would also elicit pity and sympathy from some of the readers.

The effect of this tragic mode used at the end of Philip’s life has serious historical implications. Perhaps these are more severe for modern scholars than ancient readers who would also have had access to Polybios’ full narrative; however, we may still get a glimpse of how Polybios has styled the king’s ending and therefore understand to a greater extent how this fits into his overarching image of the king. As it stands, the tragic depiction increases the intensity of the episode, drawing Philip’s life, a longstanding case study in political and moral behaviour, to a climactic end. As a particularly dangerous enemy to Rome and much of the Greek world, the end of such a prominent figure is necessary and appropriate. This view of Philip encourages us to view him more as a failure; we are discouraged from considering him in more reasonable terms. Moreover, by emphasising the ruthlessness of Philip’s actions, the suffering of those associated with him, and his growing madness and lack of control, Polybios arouses vivid anger and pity in the audience. This continues the furtherance of his aims to discredit Philip, and thereby defend the actions of those who defected from him and enforce the consequences of immoral behaviour.

5.4 Conclusion

The last surviving passage of Polybios’ account of Philip last years (23.10) is far more important, satisfactory and consistent than Walbank allowed in 1938. He thought Polybios’ inclusion of tragic features and moral focus to be contradictory to the historian’s earlier statements and usual style. Yet, these features are shown to be the opposite. The use of a tragic style was not itself abhorrent in Polybios’ conception of good historiography, but rather the extent to which it distorted the truth. Moreover, Polybios would not have concluded the life of this central figure in a way which he saw unsuitable for his own designs, even if he was informed by particularly negative sources;
his construction of the king in fact appears to have been reasonably consistent and coherent. Considering his statements concerning the need to know the end of affairs in order to understand their beginnings, it can only have been Polybios’ intention all along to approach the end Philip’s life in this vivid and dramatic way. His interpretation of the entirety of the king’s life will have been informed by how he understood and felt he could explain the information he got from his sources about Philip’s demise.

His use of a tragic mode to structure the end of his narrative of the king’s life is a literary device which enables him to inspire more effectively the desired impression of the king in the minds of his readers – to solidify in the final moments with heightened drama the hostility and ill-will felt by the audience towards Philip for the treatment of his people, encourage sympathy for those who suffered and were associated with him, and even pity for the king himself for his fate. This allowed Polybios the chance to enforce his didactic aim to a greater degree: to impart what he considered proper political and moral behaviour; the consequences of treachery and ruthlessness; the sharp reversals of fortune that often come to those who find success quickly, even among the powerful; and the need for constant careful planning and contingency to weather the volatile nature of fortune.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Polybios’ portrait of Philip V is complex and at first sight contradictory. It is complicated by his manifold historiographical and political aims, many of which are unrelated to Philip himself or Polybios’ own personal view of him, and the ways that these have led the historian to construct his work. As modern readers we are also at a greater disadvantage, faced with further problems created by the fragmentary nature of the surviving material. After Book 5, we more often than not have to deal with narrative and digressional passages in isolation from each other and frequently only in partial completeness. This inevitably skews our perspective of the historian’s assessment of certain episodes, as well as our appreciation of his overall depiction of the king. However, despite these difficulties there is enough surviving material from the Histories to develop a sustained analysis of Polybios’ construction of the king and form an understanding of what our historian was trying to achieve and how. This brief was at the core of the present dissertation.

This project has revealed that there are two different images of the king within Polybios’ text: one created by his digressions, another by his narrative of events. The first have, of course, received far more attention from scholars in the past, and it is on these isolated episodes of commentary that much of our understanding of Philip has been based. Although a few passages survive in which Polybios genuinely praises the king, satisfying his intention to assign praise and blame equally to all where required (7.11; 16.28; 25.3), the Macedonian has emerged as a generally negative figure. The overarching explanation of his life as it survives to us is far from positive: Philip is depicted as undergoing a sudden disastrous transformation in character, degenerating from beloved benefactor in his youth into increasingly hated and unashamedly treacherous tyrant in his later years. The credibility of the king is further undermined by Polybios’ frequent focus on moral considerations over practical ones, and the use of a tragic mode in the account of the king’s last years which is intended to elicit feelings of pity and anger in the reader.

Yet, the narrative often highlights problems with this depiction of Philip. It frequently offers a more neutral and moderate perspective of the king’s career than that outlined in the digressions, and consequently warns against the fact that these interpretations are imposed on
the material by author. For instance, despite his statements of truthfulness and objectivity, we know that much of Polybios’ readings, illustrated in his comments, are based on a Greek and specifically Achaian perspective. Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted the consequences of this fact, revealing the large extent to which Philip’s portrayal depended on the condition of his relationship with Aratos and the Achaian League, and how many of Polybios’ assessments of Macedonian policy invariably came to be judged in terms of Achaian advantage. Equally, Chapter 4 has revealed that Philip was not as cruel, treacherous or irrational towards his allies as Polybios makes out in his comments, but rather mindful of his obligations towards them and consistent in his efforts to protect them. By the examination of the discrepancies between the narrative and the digressions, therefore, we are now in a position to identify to a greater degree Polybios’ workings, the function he set for Philip and how this was structured, as well as an alternative, more objective, understanding of the Macedonian king.

Despite their differences, however, it is essential to understand that these two depictions of Philip do not work alone and should not be considered inconsistent with each other. The digressions and narrative, in fact, weave together to create content and form, and thereby fulfil Polybios’ wider historiographical and political aims. In the narrative, Polybios records the historical events of each region, interweaving the different areas of activity to show how the symploke developed and illustrating for his readers how Rome came to power in the wider context of the oikoumene. Philip is, of course, a large part of this process and Polybios’ didactic purpose is partially achieved by the narration of his story. It is primarily through the digressions, however, that Polybios’ depiction of Philip is created and unity, reason and understanding are imposed on the recorded events. Without putting in place this underlying structure he would not have been able to create the all-important sequences of cause and effect, or explain how these came about. Both briefs were essential to Polybios’ conception of benefical historiography.

Complicating the image further is Polybios’ use of both teleology and contingency in his portrait of Philip. This relates to the important topos of Polybios’ conception of time, which has witnessed a scurry of new scholarly interest in the last few years (see 1.2.b). While opinions regarding the teleological or contingent nature of our historian’s perspective have been various and often at variance with each other, Polybios’ depiction of Philip shows

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clearly that both are purposefully used to satisfy the multiple aims of his work. This contention builds on Felix Maier’s argument that while Polybios himself did not see history as teleological but rather as contingent, he still used both perspectives, illustrating from seemingly logical patterns of cause and effect (katalogy) what kinds of behaviour worked best and when, as well as teaching how to anticipate and react to the unexpected from examples of reversal (paralogy; see 1.3.b). In the case of Philip, the frequent foreshadowing of the king’s and Macedonia’s fate creates a sense of teleology, and thus encourages the readers to think about how the beginning and middle of political affairs connect with their end. This not only creates suspense and interest, but also allows a fuller comprehension of the series of events and actions which brought about Philip’s torment and ultimately Macedonia’s destruction. Polybios could therefore use the Macedonian king as a warning against certain types of behaviour: ruthlessness, treachery, irrationality, impiety and excess. The presence of contingency and counterfactual comments at various points in the king’s life, however, also adds a feeling of uncertainty about the past, encouraging the readers to think about how things could have gone differently. While Philip was ultimately the loser of the struggle between Macedonia and Rome, Polybios was well aware of how close the king came at times to preventing Rome from emerging as the superior power-force, and wished to highlight how, if Philip had acted in a different way, or if circumstances had been other than they were, events may have turned out in his favour. It is, therefore, an exercise in historical interpretation of great significance.

It may be questioned how much of the interpretation of Philip presented in the Histories came from Polybios’ own understanding and shaping of the material, and how much he picked up from his sources. Given the fragmentary nature of Polybios’ work, the scarcity of his source citations, the fact that almost all of those that were cited are now lost (for example, Aratos’ Memoirs, Phylarchos’ history of the Kleomenean War), as well as the general paucity of contemporary material, makes this a difficult question to answer. On this basis, it might be argued that we should be careful in attributing too much to Polybios’ own manipulations and instead give him the benefit of the doubt (‘in dubio pro reo’), and trust that his recording and

2 Counterfactuals are evident in Polybios account of the king, for example, at Thermos when Polybios describes how the king’s reputation could have been improved had he not destroyed religious property (5.9-12), and later after the battle of Lade (201 BC; 16.10) when he states that Philip could have expanded and pursued his dreams of universal rule had he continued sailing on to Alexandria as was his original intention. For discussions about counterfactual history in Polybios’ work see Hau (2013) and Maier (2013). For hindsight and counterfactual history in ancient historiography see Powell (2013).
presentation of material is faithful to the accounts presented in his sources unless there is strong evidence to the contrary. This might include therefore the construction of Philip’s change for the worse in 215 BC, the acutely negative depiction of his later years, particularly his ventures in the Aegean and the recovery policies implemented from 186 BC, as well as the tragic mode used in the account of the king’s last years.

However, working from the principle of ‘in dubio pro reo’ would suppose that we are judges and not historians in our investigations. Historians are never straightforward in the way that they present reality. That would amount to an impossible task: some kind of interpretative, artificial framework is always necessary if we are to record historical events in written form, to give them unity and to give purpose to our account. Historiographical agenda, imposition of meaning and order, and perspective all bend neutral events towards a certain direction. In this respect, a sound historical reconstruction is not possible without a thorough analysis of a text’s inherent distortions. Many of these have been revealed in the course of this project, of course, but even Polybios himself is quite open about his own historiographical purpose and universal framework, and admits at times to making room for partiality (see 2.1). His work conforms to a certain unity, seeing all events narrated leading to the end result of his work, Rome’s supremacy, and forcing didactic purpose upon its course.

The Histories are also flooded with polemic against other writers of historical works, analysing and critiquing their codes of construction in terms of truthfulness, style, research methodologies, and educational intention. Undoubtedly, he would have dealt with the sources he thought appropriate to use with a similar analytical eye. Although truth was crucial to him, he was an incredibly astute, critical, opinionated, and sharply-focused historian, and could still be selective in the sources that he used, at times choosing them according to his own political allegiances and truth, and how well they fit into his overall framework and aims. Moreover, his bid to educate and explain cause and effect on a universal scale, an endeavour seemingly not attempted before for his period of choice, also meant that he had to form his own unique understanding of why things turned out the way they did, and on this basis his own unique understanding of the Macedonian king.

For the comparison between historians and judges see Ginzburg (1991), (1999) and (2002).
This is not to say, of course, that the views on Philip contained in the *Histories* were purely Polybios’ own creation. Much of the negativity directed at the Macedonian king would also have been informed by Greek and Roman public opinion and the sources that our historian decided to use. Whether historical accounts, official documentation or eye-witnesses, these would have primarily come from Achaia, Rome, Rhodes and post-Antigonid Macedonia, all of which would have been hostile to the king at the time of Polybios’ consultation. The recorded brilliance of the king in his early years when aiding Achaia, and his sudden change for the worse in 215 BC will likely have been elements noted by Aratos in his discussions with Polybios (see 2.1.b). However, while it is impossible to determine if these features were stressed by Aratos, one gets the feeling that the importance of this event and the king’s change was narrated with particular emphasis by Polybios. This is implied from his polemic against a number of unnamed historians who praised or undervalued Philip’s actions at Messene (Polyb. 8.8), but also more strongly by the fact that this is a pivotal point in the *Histories*, signifying the first steps in the *sympleke* (see 1.3.d).

Polybios used his other sources for Philip’s later life in a similar way. The one-sidedness of the account of Philip’s ventures in the Aegean was undoubtedly influenced by the negative Rhodian and Roman sources our historian had access to, as well as the general Greek outrage and concern that would have arisen from the king’s ruthlessness in his conquest of the islands and subsequent increase in power. Yet, Polybios draws attention to the injustices felt by Rhodes (13.3-5) without considering a Macedonian or Kretan perspective, and even ignores the fact that these actions would have been conducted in pursuit of his ambitions of universal dominion. This contrasts strikingly with the historian’s later criticism of Philip’s failure to follow his plans to take Alexandria after the Battle of Lade, an endeavour which Polybios deemed a large part of this ambition (16.10). Moreover, the account of Philip’s pact with Antiochos III against Egypt is recorded with more disapproval and concern than it appears was felt at the time (15.20), in order to create another significant moment in the narrative – the catalyst for Roman invention in the East (see 5.2.c).

It has correspondingly been argued by Walbank, Pédech and Dreyer that Polybios most likely used a critical source from the Macedonian court for Philip’s later years. This eye-

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4 Meadows (2013).
witness, if indeed there was only one, would certainly have wished to dissociate themselves from the defeated kings, and thus probably fitted in well with the negativity of the historian’s earlier sources. The vividness of the Macedonian people’s suffering and the tragic story of Theoxena undoubtedly found roots in that material. Polybios’ tragic mode, however, was not necessarily a derivative of this Macedonian source as the phrase which described tychē as a director on the stage at 23.10.16 (τῆς τύχης ἄσπερ ἐπίτιθες ἀναβαζουσῆς ἐπὶ σκηνήν ἐν ἑνί καθὼ τὰς τούτων συμφοράς), also appears, as discussed in Chapter 5, in another earlier unrelated context: in Thrasycrates’ speech to the Aitolians in 207 BC at 11.5.8 (τῆς τύχης ἄσπερ ἐπίτιθες ἐπὶ τῇ ξύστοραν ἀναβαζουσῆς τῇ ὑμετέραν ἀγνοαίν). This parallel thereby suggests that we should be more cautious in accrediting this phrase and concept to a Macedonian court source. It could have been taken up from other material, or even be a literary device implemented by Polybios himself, imposed on various historical figures and situations which illustrated examples of reversal and similarities with tragic plot.\(^6\) Indeed, this concept of tychē as a director of history, bringing about reversals of fortune, as well as raising and destroying empires in cycles of roughly fifty years, was of course influenced by one of Polybios’ other sources: Demetrios of Phaleron (Polyb. 29.21; see 1.3.d). Yet, our historian did not take up Demetrios’ notion of tychē without adjustment. Not only did he write about the fulfilment of Demetrios’ prophecy concerning the demise of Macedonia, which the latter could not have experienced or known about, but also extended tychē’s field of influence, making her responsible for exacting vengeance on immoral and criminal activity.

It thereby becomes clear that all of Polybios’ sources, even the ones we do not know about, would have impacted on each other in the historian’s collation and understanding of the material. The ones he used at the beginning impacted on the ones used at the end, and vice versa; we should envisage a fluid movement of information, ideas and attitudes as he actively adapted them to form a coherent unity of explanation. This is consistent with Polybios’ belief that one can only write about the beginning of an affair once one knows its ending, and thereby suggests that his overall interpretation of Philip would have been affected by his weaving together of all of his source material with his own historiographical and political aims. This was in fact essential as within the framework of a universal, pragmatic, didactic history, a much grander, more complex and integrated design of the king was needed than that

\(^6\) Cf. Walbank’s argument at (1938) 67 = (1985) 222.
provided by the individual sources. Polybios, of course, would not have falsified evidence, but he clearly shifted emphasis, omitted certain arguments, subverted others, and drew on the practises of rhetoric and tragedy to create the effects that he wanted. He also included numerous counterfactual comments and this produced original reflections in support of his didactic purpose. The Philip described in the *Histories* is therefore, to a large extent, Polybios’ own original interpretation.

Through this re-evaluation it may be seen that Philip, and even Polybios’ slightly altered depiction of the king, was actually more consistent and rational than some have allowed. The king was perpetually ambitious for conquest (5.101), pushing the boundaries of his kingdom south into Greece, westwards into Illyria, eastwards into the Aegean and Caria, and northwards into Thrace and Dardania. While Polybios’ notion that the king was continually interested in invading Italy might be somewhat forced, his understanding of Philip’s constant pursuit of expansion is correct (5.101). Despite losing his temper on occasion, Philip more often showed strategic and diplomatic intelligence and reasoning in his pursuit of this aim, not shying away from employing ruthlessness and treachery when it suited his needs (7.11.10-12, 11.7.2-3, 13.3-5, 15.20, 15.22-24, 16.1, 22.1.5, 22.13), and for much of his reign was successful in the wars and campaigns he was involved in. Polybius openly talks about his military prowess and energy (4.77, 7.11, 10.41.6-8). Moreover, Philip was always dependable in his obligations towards his allies, coming to their aid and protecting them from the enemy without hesitation for as long as he was able. Finally and most importantly, in all spheres of action Philip was consistently opportunistic and adaptable. Constantly aware of his surroundings, resources and capabilities, he knew when he could or could not follow through with a plan, when he needed to change tactics, and when he needed to act quickly or wait on events. Polybios himself praises Philip at numerous points for his acceptance of reversals and difficult situations, and his ability to adapt to them with reason and grace (10.41.7-8, 16.28, 18.33, cf. 21.3). It might appear strange and suspicious that Polybios did not make more of this quality, particularly as it is exactly this that he was trying to convey to his audience was necessary for political life. Yet, this suspicion is greatly exacerbated by the fragmentary nature of his surviving work. Polybios may very well have highlighted this important quality

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7 Philip’s military prowess is especially evident in the fact that he is at war every year of his reign, and for the most part successfully so. We are, of course, primarily informed of his skill and speed in Polybios’ account of the Social War, which survives in full, however, these features are still evident in the fragments from Book 7 onwards.
in the king in the missing parts of his Histories, something that would certainly be consistent with his practice to illustrate the sudden reversals that can ravage even the most successful of lives. Acknowledging the good qualities of Philip alongside the bad ones would also, of course, add further weight to Polybios’ cultivation of pity for this great king at the end of his life.

In drawing a close to this work, it seems appropriate to suggest one or two areas which would profitably advance our understanding of the Macedonian king further. The natural extension of this textual investigation is, of course, the incorporation and evaluation of the epigraphic and archaeological evidence pertaining to the king and the surrounding context, alongside the literature. This would push the evidence for Philip beyond the boundaries of Polybios’ interpretation and present a more multifaceted and balanced portrait of the monarch, as well as potentially reveal more about the historian’s methodology. In terms of the literary aspect of Polybios’ work, a new comparison of the Macedonian king’s image in the Histories with other leading figures, particularly monarchs, along the same lines of investigation as the present piece might also be another beneficial direction.

While there was once the perception that any new study of the Macedonian king would be largely unrewarding, it is hoped that this project has proved the opposite and that a full reassessment of the king is possible and, in light of recent scholarly developments, needed. It has been the specific task of this project, therefore, to re-evaluate the picture of Philip contained within Polybios’ Histories, our primary source for this Hellenistic king. Its results suggest that we need to be far more cautious in the way we handle Polybios’ work and, specifically, in this case, that we should not take his portrait of the Macedonian king at face-value, but understand it within the wider context of the historian’s intellectual project. This investigation thereby offers a new analysis of Polybios’ working method, and a new alternative, more objective, understanding of Philip V.

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8 Cf. Sacks (2014b) xxxi.
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